


# **SECURITY INTEGRATION PROCESS IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE AND THE CSTO**

*Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University*

*In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of*

**MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

**SUKANYA KAKOTY**



**CENTRE FOR RUSSIAN AND CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES**

**SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

**JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY**

**NEW DELHI- 110067**

**2012**



# JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

School of International Studies

New Delhi - 110067

Tel. : 2670 4365


Fax : (+91)-11-2674 1586

Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies

Date: 20/07/2012


## DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled "Security integration process in the post-Soviet space and the CSTO" submitted by me for the reward of the degree of the degree of Master of Philosophy of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.

  
Sukanya Kakoty

## CERTIFICATE


We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

  
Prof. Ajay Patnaik

(Chairperson)



Chairperson  
Centre for Russian & Central Asian Studies  
School of International Studies  
JNU, New Delhi - 110,007

  
Prof. Arun Kr Mohanty

(Supervisor)



PROFESSOR  
Centre for Russian & Central Asian Studies  
School of International Studies  
Jawaharlal Nehru University  
New Delhi - 110067

**Dedicated to my dearest 'Maa-Deuta'**  
**Sri Pradyut Kakoty and Smt Kritanjali Kakoty**

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

*Dissertation writing has been a very interesting learning process. The entire period of research and writing dissertation has been very thought provoking and meaningful to me.*

*First and foremost, I would like to express my thanks and humble gratitude to my respected Supervisor, Prof. Arun Kr Mohanty for helping me with my work from the selection of my topic till the completion of the task and working on all the minute details. I thank him for being so patient throughout the entire period of my research and writing the dissertation. He provided me with the basic knowledge and guidance required to initiate my research. His critical insight and thorough support was the only reason that I could accomplish my task.*

*I wish to thank the University and my Centre for inspiring me in every possible way to do my research. The program was very a formative one and an important experience for me.*

*I am grateful to Dr. Rajan Kumar who taught me the basics of how a research paper should be written and clarified the basics of research.*

*I would like to thank the Jawaharlal Nehru University Library and IDSA for granting me the access to all the useful books, journals and magazines that were a core ingredient of my research work. They were in fact very crucial to conduct my research process.*

*My obvious thanks go to my dear parents and dear brother, Anindit (Babu) who always stood by me and supported me immensely through thick and thin. Their faith in me inspires me to move ahead.*

*I would like to especially thank and bestow love to my dearest friend, Kabandi Saikia (Liza) for always being there, guiding me and helping me out in the technical difficulties. You have been an immense source of support always.*

*I would like to thank my friend, Gokul Bora for inspiring me and supporting me in the entire period of research with your valuable insights.*

*My special regards goes to my dear Aunty (Dr. Kalpana Deka Saikia) and Maini Pehi (Mrs. Aparna Saikia) for always believing in me and inspiring me to go higher in the educational field.*

*I would like to thank my friends Manidipa, Swati, Sumit, Swatilekha, Neha and my dear roomy Sudha for helping me with inputs, suggestions and most of all making my stay in the campus a pleasant one. My special thanks also go to all my cousins specially Sudipta and Lupa ba. You guys mean a lot to me.*

*Finally, I thank God for giving me the strength, courage and good health that was indeed very necessary. My believe in You always gives me strength and keeps me calm.*

**20 July 2012**

**New Delhi**

**Sukanya Kakoty**

# CONTENTS

*Acknowledgements*

*Preface* i

*Abbreviations* ii-iii

## ***Chapter 1:***

**Introduction.....1-17**

1.1 Theoretical Framework.....2

1.2 Historical Background.....5

1.3 Existing Literature.....8

1.4 Rational and Scope.....15

1.5 Hypotheses.....17

1.6 Research Methodology.....17

## ***Chapter 2:***

**Russia's Security Policy in the post-Soviet Space.....18-49**

2.1 Introduction.....18

2.2 Nature of Russian Foreign Policy: In Theories.....19

2.3 Traditional Principles of Russian Security Thinking.....23

2.4 Russian Foreign Policy towards CIS.....25

2.5 Russian foreign and security policy doctrines after Soviet breakup.....28

2.6 Russian Interest in the post-Soviet Space.....	29
2.7 Motive for Security Integration.....	31
2.8 Russian General policies in the CIS Regional Security Complex.....	33
2.9 Military Cooperation in the post-Soviet Space.....	34
2.10 Has the CIS Been A Successful Common Security Space?.....	36
2.11 Analysis of Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the post-Soviet space.....	39

**Chapter 3:**

**CSTO's Role in Maintaining Security in the post-Soviet Space.....50-74**

3.1 Introduction.....	50
3.2 Russia's aims towards the Integration Process in the post-Soviet Space.....	51
3.3 The Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO).....	53
3.4 CSTO Evolution.....	55
3.5 Military technical components of the CSTO.....	61
3.6 CSTO's Role and Action in Various Spheres.....	63
3.7 Weaknesses of the CSTO.....	73

**Chapter 4:**

**Competitive Security Cooperation in the post-Soviet Space: A Comparative study of CSTO with SCO and NATO.....75-97**

4.1 Introduction.....	75
-----------------------	----

4.2 SCO and Security Integration in the post-Soviet Space.....	76
4.3 SCO and CSTO: A Comparative Study.....	81
4.4 NATO in the post-Soviet Space.....	86
4.5 NATO expansion and the response of Russia/CSTO.....	89
4.6 NATO and CSTO in a Competitive Framework.....	92
4.7 NATO and the CSTO: Issue of Cooperation.....	97

**Chapter 5:**

<b>Conclusion.....</b>	<b>98-104</b>
------------------------	---------------

<b>Appendices.....</b>	<b>105-118</b>
------------------------	----------------

**Lists:**

**Appendix 1:** List of some International Treaties signed in the Framework of the TCS/CSTO

**Appendix 2:** List of tasks and functions of CSTO bodies

**Maps:**

Map1: The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).....	77
--	----

Map2: NATO and CSTO in their areas of operation.....	92
--	----

<b>References.....</b>	<b>119-135</b>
------------------------	----------------

## **PREFACE**

Even after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, it is very interesting to note how the Russian Federation has evolved. It has been through various phases of its domestic and foreign policy and emerged as a true successor state of the Soviet Union by its policies towards the newly independent states. It almost acts as a ‘big brother’ in the CIS region by looking after its security specific needs and working towards mending the security problems in a collective framework. The Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) has been an instance of such an attempt. Led by Russia, the CSTO is a collective security organisation comprising of seven members namely Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Russia. CSTO is not only a traditional military alliance with the sole purpose of defending its members but it has in recent times evolved and is working towards building linkages on issues of military, political security and deal with security matters prevalent in the region.

The research schema is as follows. It is divided into five substantive chapters. Chapter one introduces the topic by giving a brief historical background and explaining the theoretical aspect of security in general and collective security in particular. The chapter deals with the existing literature and the research design. Chapter two begins by an understanding of the security environment in the post-Soviet space followed by the patterns that Russia followed in pursuing a foreign and security policy in the post-Soviet space, the motive and attempts for security integration and military cooperation.

Chapter three covers the origin of the CSTO, its evolution, the legal basis of its foundation, the military-technical components of the CSTO and the way it works towards security integration in the region. Altogether it contains almost every step that the CSTO has taken in action and in relation towards individual CSTO members. Chapter four presents a comparison of similar security organisations like SCO and NATO having its presence in the post-Soviet space. It further tries to understand what equation the CSTO shares with these two organisations. Chapter five is the concluding one that sums up the whole research and examines to what extent the hypothesis is proved.



# **ABBREVIATIONS**

BSF-----	Black Sea Fleet
BTC-----	Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline
CDM---	Council of Defence Ministers
CENTO—	Central Eastern Treaty Organisation
CFM---	Council of Foreign Ministers
CIS-----	Commonwealth of Independent States
CORF--	Collective Operational Reaction Forces
CRRF—	Collective Rapid Reaction Force
CSC-----	Collective Security Council
CSSC---	Committee of the Secretaries of the Security Council
CST-----	Collective Security Treaty
CSTO—	Collective Security Treaty Organisation
EEC---	Eurasian Economic Community
EU-----	European Union
GUAM----	Georgia Ukraine Azerbaijan Moldova
IAEA---	International Atomic Energy Agency
IMU-----	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
MAD-----	Mutually Assured Destruction
NATO PfP---	NATO Partnership for Peace
NATO—	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NRC---	NATO- Russia Council
NSC---	National Security Concept
OSCE---	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PF---	CSTO Peacekeeping Forces

RATS---- Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure  
SCO---- Shanghai Cooperation Organisation  
SEATO—South East Asia Treaty Organisation  
SES----- Single Economic Space  
TCS---- Treaty of Collective Security  
UN----- United Nations  
UNO--- United Nations Organisation  
US---- United States  
USSR—Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

### INTRODUCTION

Security studies have been studied from ages, as long as human society itself, but as a subject of academic inquiry came to prominence only after the Second World War. (Booth 1997, McSweeney 1999: Part 1)

The concept of security is very significant and is of great concern while doing in-depth study in international relations and it is one of the essential sub-fields in the study of International Relations. To quote Buzan—

*“In the case of Security, the discussion is about the pursuit of freedom from threat. When this discussion is in the context of the international system, security is about the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity.”*

--- (Buzan, 1983)

Barry Buzan in his book argues persuasively that security apart from being about states, relates to all human collectivities; and it could not be limited to focussing on military force. Instead, Buzan developed a structure whereby he argues that the security of human collectivities (not just states) is affected by five major factors, each having its own ‘focal point’ and ‘way of ordering priorities’. These ordering priorities are **military** focused on military offensive and defensive capabilities of states and its understanding of intentions of other states, **political** that is focused on the organisational stability of states, classification of Government and ideologies bestowing legitimacy; **economic** refers to resources, finance and markets for welfare and state power; **societal** focused on development of national identity and custom and **environmental** concerned with the maintenance of the natural environment. (Paul D. Williams, 2008: 3-4)

*“Most scholars within International Relations (IR) work with a definition of security that involves the alleviation of threats to cherished values.”* (Paul D. Williams, 2008)

## 1.1 THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK

Security is a matter of prime importance in neorealism, as it infers the primary motivation of states. The international system is anarchic because of the absence of a central authority to control states' behaviour. There is uncertainty of intentions and lack of trust among actors. Further, the problem of cheating and the problem of relative gains make cooperation among actors a difficult job. The sovereign states therefore develop offensive military capabilities for their own defence. As Kenneth Waltz observes:

*"In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states seek such other goals as tranquillity, profit, and power."* (Baylis 2007)

But contrary to the views of traditional neo-realist like Waltz and Mearsheimer who remain not very positive regarding the cooperation between states in a post cold war world, there are other group of neo- realist writers who present a more positive assessment. Charles Glasner, a Contingent Realist argues that in order to achieve security goals at best, cooperative policies become more useful than competitive ones. Hence security is also understood as 'contingent' or conditional to circumstances. (Baylis 2007)

Liberal Institutionalism also known as neo-liberalism argues that international institutions are much more helpful in achieving cooperation and stability. As cited by Keohane and Martin, *"Institutions can provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination and in general, facilitate the operation of reciprocity."* (Baylis 2007).

While, Liberal institutionalists argue that institutions can help build a system for cooperation which can work towards overcoming the possibility and crises of security competition among states. Hence cooperation between states helps massively in countering transnational security threats. (Baylis 2007) Neoliberal institutionalism intensifies on the role of international institutions in conflict mitigation. Therefore, institutions are so important because despite of various hindrances, they benefit states in different kinds of enforcement and conflict resolution methods. They are also durable. Existing regimes persist even in hard conditions *'because they are difficult to*

*create or reconstruct*' (Keohane 1984: 12–14, 50). The question is: How suitable is neoliberal institutionalism with regard to security issues? Jervis cites that, “*the realm of security has special characteristics that at the same time make regime creation more difficult and increase its need. Security regimes, with their call for mutual restraint and limitations on unilateral actions, rarely seem attractive to decision-makers’ under the security dilemma*” (Jervis, 1982: 360).

Neoliberal institutionalists believe in the idea of common interests of states. But what will happen if antagonists do not share common interests? According to Jervis (Jervis, 1999: 54), ‘*states will establish an institution if and only if they seek the goals that the institution will help them reach*’. It does not seem, superficially, that institutions could do much to increase security.

Considering the subject of security integration process and moreover in connection to the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and security in post-cold war era which is the focus of this study, collective security theorists Charles and Clifford Kupchan cites that, “*collective security is a way of providing an effective mechanism and regulated institutionalised balancing against an aggressor or when necessary band together to stop an aggression*” (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1995). According to Danchin, “*the concept of collective security is notoriously difficult to define, as the term is associated with a loose set of assumptions and ideas and its continued existence remains a contested concept.*” (P.G. Danchin, 2009: 40)

Roberts and Kingsbury define *collective security* as “*an arrangement where each state in the system accepts that security of one of them is a concern of all, and agrees to join in a collective response to aggression*” (Roberts and Kingsbury, 1993: 30)

Collective security supporters argue that this mechanism has been more effective and successful in the post cold war era and also in the post Soviet space where newly independent states have emerged, and the security concerns are unlimited. (Baylis 2007)

Moreover it has been observed that in a chaotic world, in order to find peace and stability, international as well as regional organisations have become indispensable. Keeping in mind the theory of collective security, this dissertation analyzes the threats posed by non-state actors with respect to Eurasian collective security organization

especially the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and its comparisons with other organisations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the NATO PfP.

As cited by Organski, there are five basic assumptions underlying the theory of collective security. These are as follows---

- *“In an armed conflict, member states will be able to agree on which nation an aggressor is.*
- *All member nation-states are equally committed to contain and constrain the aggression, irrespective of its source or origin.*
- *All member nation-states have identical freedom of action and ability to join in proceedings against the aggressor.*
- *The cumulative power of the cooperating members of the alliance for collective security will be adequate and sufficient to overpower the might of the aggressor.*
- *In the light of the threat posed by the collective might of the nations of a collective security coalition, the aggressor nation will modify its policies, or if unwilling to do so, will be defeated.”* (Organski, 1958: 461)

Collective security arrangements and related phenomena such as arms control agreements are designed to enhance the security of their participants’ *vis-à-vis* each other. According to Claude Jr., collective security rests on the proposition *“that war can be prevented by deterrent effect of overwhelming power of states that are too rational to invite certain defeat.”*

The present work explores the concept and theories of alliances, paying special attention to the persistence of alliance system. In the chapters, an attempt has been made to explain the cause of CSTO’s persistence and its future prospects. The research tries to make a comparative study of the activities of NATO and CSTO in the post-Soviet space. Alliances of states happen to be one of the most significant elements for advancing a state’s interest. In particular, alliances are a primary instrument for improving a state’s security in the face of external and sometimes

internal threats. As Stephan Walt cites, “*An alliance is a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states*” (Stephan Walt, 1987:1), it also helps understanding the workings of the CSTO in relation with NATO. If CSTO is viewed as the extension of the Warsaw Pact following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, then alliance studies focuses our attention as to how for several years, great powers, and many smaller ones as well, have regularly formed, acted through, and sometimes broken alliances, to understand the balance of power system, bandwagoning etc, a major component of states’ external security is by alliance systems.

Patricia Weitsman cites, “*alliances are bilateral or multilateral agreements to provide some element of security to the signatories.*” (Patricia Weitsman, 2004: 27).

## **1.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

After the end of the World War 2, almost for four decades, the United States and the Soviet Union were the two superpowers in a well defined bipolar international world order. These two superpowers belonged to antagonistic political, socio-economic and ideological blocs. Conflicts between Soviet Union and the United States were in the lines of ideological rivalry between capitalism and communism and difference regarding a democratic polity and market economy in case of the US and a totalitarian polity and a command economy in case of the Soviet Union. It displayed the central drama within the international system. This ideological divide was so grave that it drove for a very severe competition between them. Both the superpowers strived to possess armies and arsenals unmatched by the others (Goldgeier and McFaul 2003), seen as the primary application of the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Hence the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union dominated the security environment from 1945 when the Second World War ends until 1989.

The end of cold war greatly changed European security scenario. The security environment and the international scenario before and after the demise of one of the

superpowers also changed in a big way. Not only that in case of the international environment the changes were felt, like the global stage went from being a bipolar world to a unipolar world order but internally also in the Soviet Union, because of its collapse in 1991, it led to the appearance of fifteen independent republics.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia and the former Soviet states found themselves in a drastically changed situation. It was totally different from the totalitarian era. The transition to democracy was a costly affair and with inconsistent economic and political situation. Not only that numerous other problems also cropped up in the region in form of territorial and ethnic tensions and socio-economic crises. Moreover, there were the attempts of the West to disrupt relations between Russia and the former Soviet states.

On studying the security aspect of an area like the post-Soviet space, the security paradigm has to be understood in the context of its historical background and the vivid and sudden striking transformations that it had gone through.

The ripples felt in the international relations after the dissolution of Soviet Union in 1991, very significantly transformed the geopolitics of the Eurasian continent. The major change seen in Russian foreign policy aspect was seen in its Eurasian focus. Other than complicated international situation, the demise of the Soviet Union also brought about new domestic changes. Regarding the aspect of security in the post Soviet space, the commonly defined “new security challenges” include “the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the growth of ethnic nationalism and extremism, international terrorism, and crime and drug trafficking.” (Johnson 1999)

The post Soviet states had to handle immediately two contradictory challenges- that is the process of state building with a new national authority while at the same time wrestling with the ‘sub-national’ ethnic disputes, regional political mobilisation and the demands for secession. Since the collapse of the USSR in the late 1980s there have been six violent ethnic and regional conflicts (Azerbaijan-Nagorno Karabakh-Armenia; Moldova-Transdnistria; Russia-Chechnya; Georgia-Abkhazia; Georgia-South Ossetia; Tajikistan civil war) and seven significant conflicts which did not occur. (Hughes and Sasse 2001)



The instability and conflict within states that threatened to spread over into the inter-state arena posing new adversities for the Russian army and the new post Soviet states. As Flynn and Farrell cited, “*States’ efforts to check this new security environment resulted into exceptional arrangements like traditional alliances, great power concerts and community building and collective security.*” (Flynn and Farrell 1999)

As cited by Charles and Clifford Kupchan, “*Under Collective security, states agree to abide by certain norms and rules to maintain stability and when necessary, band together to stop aggression.*” (Kupchan and Kupchan 1995)

In the post Soviet space, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has been used for integration of former Soviet states just after 1990s. It was established to be an “*instrument of civilised divorce.*” as Yeltsin put in. (Libman 2007)

The CIS in reality was established “*to make the process of USSR’s dissolution most civilised and smooth one, with the fewest losses in the economic and humanitarian spheres...*” (Kobrinskaya 2007)

The Collective Security Treaty organisation (CSTO) was formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union and it embraced some of the former Soviet republics. Originally formed in 1992 under the auspices of the CIS and the Collective Security Treaty (CST), CSTO is Russian-led with the primary goal of preventing civil wars in the post-soviet space, to handle new challenges such as terrorism and the spread of radical Islamic militancy which was the result of growing instability in Afghanistan and northwest Pakistan, to ensure the collective defence of the members, secure its independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of member states and a range of other conflicts. The old traditional function of the CSTO is to counterbalance NATO which is seeking continued expansion eastwards through NATO’s Partnership for Peace program (PfP). (Mowchan 2009)

Regarding how CSTO is building up Russia’s stand, the consolidating factors would hence be threats of terrorism and extremism, NATO interference in the CIS, apprehension towards American presence and a belief that Russia could be the sole counterbalance. In brief, as Weinstein cites, “*if anti-terrorism and suspicion of NATO*

*brought the CSTO powers together the American invasion of Iraq firmly cemented CSTO relations on the basis of fear of American powers.” (Weinstein 2007)*

CSTO serves as a means for Russia to continue its military relationship with many of the former Soviet republics. As it is, since 1991 relations with the post-Soviet states have become of increasing focus for Russian foreign policy terming it as *Near Abroad* and to be under Russia’s *Sphere of Influence*. The year 2009 was significant for CSTO as Russia revived its attention on CSTO and created a new component i.e. the Collective Rapid Reaction Forces which increased the number of troops in the military security bloc from 1500 to 16,000. CSTO has strengthened Russia’s position by providing Russia a less aggressive and more institutionalised platform to respond to security related events within the region. (Eugene 2011)

### **1.3 EXISTING LITERATURE**

Notwithstanding the plethora of scholarly publications on this subject of multilateralism in general or multilateral collective security to be specific, there are no generally accepted criteria for determining its completion. Though literature have been existing on the theme of collective security regime and the methods relating to it, many aspects of CSTO have not been adequately dealt with. Most of the research on the post-Soviet space regarding collective security scheme has been emphasised on the issue of disintegration (of the Soviet Union) and reintegration process (through efforts such as CIS, CSTO, SCO, GUAM etc). But there has been scarcity in literature providing a basic ground for the working of the CSTO which is one of the most prominent collective security organisations in the region.

### **TRADITIONAL SECURITY THREATS AND MILITARY SECURITY**

The end of the cold war led to the subsequent rise of new security concerns in the post Soviet area such as terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, environmental degradation, economic problems, religious fundamentalism, ethnic crises and spill over effects of the failed states, etc. These transnational threats lead to the largest social, political and economic consequences following terrorism. Terrorism is a kind of issue that can threaten both hard and soft security of a region. Hans M. Kristensen argues about the traditional/hard security threats of Russia and the post Soviet space.

Threats have also been there with China having increasingly common ground with border agreement, joint exercises etc (Kristensen 2006).

Niklas Swanstorm also cites that, *“there is an interconnection between traditional security threats and trans-national implications and traditional security threats like military threats to the government, follows the so-called soft security threats. A new network of militants in the southern part of Greater Central Asia, especially in Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are posing soft security threats”*. (Swanstorm, 2010).

CSTO is the result of the process of achieving an effective collective security system and for that it works towards the coordination of military, security and foreign policy of the member countries. As already mentioned this post Soviet region has such transnational problems that for any newly independent state it would be hard or a mammoth task to handle it alone. Hence cooperative strength is something which is indeed utterly necessary in an area like this. Abundant literature on the specific workings of the CSTO in such a troubled environment is difficult to find. Zhenis Kembayev argues the cooperation of CSTO in the sphere of military security and how the state parties to the organisation accomplish the composition of their own national armed forces and later on lead to a program of military security. CSTO also works under the framework of coalition groupings like ‘Rubezh’ for instance and conduct regular large scale military manoeuvres. There is also military cooperation under CSTO in a way that the member states can buy Russian military equipments leading to effective control mechanisms against illegal export of Russian artillery. (Kembayev 2009).

The CSTO in the post-Soviet countries is the single most consolidated military dimension institution demonstrating Russia’s willingness to spread its wings in the post Soviet space in a much more institutionalised manner.

Vladimir Paramonov and Oleg Stolpovski argue that Russia’s willingness to further strengthen the CSTO is to create a kind of military and political bloc that is consistent

with Kremlin's policy for the post Soviet space. It even calls for the eventual withdrawal of US military bases. In practical military aspects, Russia has attempted to maintain elements of military integration like arrangement of military weapons and artillery, a common air defence system and joint training, etc. (Paramonov and Stolpovski 2008)

Literature is abundant on describing the CSTO as a tool for Russian foreign policy designs while less mention has been made on the fact that apart from Russia there are other six members also which also play an active role in the CSTO decision-making and has close connections. The present work tries to look into the relations every particular member of the CSTO has with the organisation and actively plays their role.

## **NON-TRADITIONAL THREATS**

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 and coming up of the independent states of the Central Asian region and the Caucasus, the concept of security widened and led to the subsequent rise of new non-traditional threats; religious fundamentalism being one of the grave ones. It has to be borne in mind here that the post-Soviet space shares its borders with one of the most volatile regions of the world that is Afghanistan. Not to forget the mention of Uzbekistan that confronts the IMU and other extremists and radical elements that spread all over the Central Asian region and the Caucasus. Hence the security parameters should be very high.

Niklas Swanstorm cites that, *“religious fundamentalism basically cropped as a very serious threat to all states of the region, Afghanistan is undoubtedly the natural sufferer because of its long-term instability and the dominant position of organized crime but the problem is more widespread. Much of the problem lies in the growing unemployment; weak government sponsored health care, social welfare at large, as well as a lack of belief in the future.”* (Swanstorm 2010).

Terrorism is another serious threat perception in the post Soviet region and arguably could be related to religious fundamentalism and the Muslim *Mujaheddin* targeting the post-Soviet space. Adam Weinstein argues about terrorism and cites the fact that

the anti-Russian security policy in Central Asia and Eurasia receded after interstate terrorism showed up its ugly head. It was realised that the brutal conflicts like the secessionist movements of Chechnya, Tajik civil war, disastrous human rights record of Uzbekistan, the presence of IMU and the Taliban in Afghanistan etc, all of it also leading to the successive restructuring of the Collective Security Treaty from a convention to a full-fledged defence regime in the name of CSTO. (Weinstein 2007) CSTO's emphasis has always been on counteracting threats and challenges like taking action against international terrorism and extremism, against practices of arms and drug trafficking, illegal cross-border migration and organized crime. Moreover issues like drug trafficking and terrorism are serious transnational threats and hence a collective measure designed to counter the same is of utmost necessity. Zhenis Kembayev argues how CSTO has effectively from the very beginning of its formation has sought to fight the security problems of a complicated area like the post-Soviet space and mentioned about a eminent element of the anti-terrorist activities of the CSTO which lies in its operation of the Collective Rapid Reaction Forces. (Kembayev 2009)

My dissertation tries to fill the gap regarding the actions taken by the CSTO in countering these threats, on what specific steps the CSTO has taken; on how much it has succeeded in its attempts and on where the loopholes lie.

The CSTO was initially a Collective Security Treaty, which was upgraded to Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) only in 2002. Therefore the mention and significance of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on US is of utmost importance. US's subsequent reaction to the 9/11 attacks in the form of the 'War on Terror' had led to its presence in and around Afghanistan and the post Soviet area which has also prompted intensified post Soviet states' cooperation in this area. The 9/11 attacks immediately transformed the global communities priorities having profound influence on the future of Collective Security Treaty. CSTO acts as a counteracting force against the US owing to its Russian allegiance. Anatoliy A. Rozanov and Elena F. Dovgan argue how the CSTO has held the responsibility of dealing with a thematic threat like terrorism. Lena Johnson also explained the contours of a New Russian policy adopted post September 2001 examining Russia's policy response, the changing strategic and security situation in Central Asia and the

evolution of the Russian policy in Central Asia in the light of the 11 September 2001 attacks. Russia continued its build up of the Collective Security Treaty which nonetheless was sidestepped when US administration developed direct relations with the Central Asian Governments. However, in Kyrgyzstan, a Russian-military air base formally under the responsibility of the CST Rapid Reaction Force opened and a series of cooperation agreements on economic and security fields were developed. (Rozanov and Dovgan 2010)

## **THE FOREIGN POLICY PERSPECTIVE**

Considering the sphere of foreign policy also, the CSTO plays a crucial role. Russia holds multilateralism as its centrepiece of foreign policy and hails that it is the only legitimate basis for addressing problems of peace and security. Russia has a big brother or a guardian kind of attitude towards the post Soviet region calling it also as its “backyard” and its “sphere of influence” which might be another reason why multilateral arrangements are often witnessed as a trait of its foreign policy. Here, Robert Legvold cites CSTO as *a multilateral umbrella for bilateral arrangements of individual member states with Russia in the field of security* (Legvold 2009). The CSTO member states cooperate closely on the international arena and coordinate their positions on key issues of the regional and global policy. All the member states are well aware of the security issues and recognise that these kinds of threats have to be dealt in a global level, hence cooperation and connection with the international community is mandatory for effective resolution. Anatoliy A. Rozanov arguing about the foreign policy component of the CSTO feels that evolving cooperation with other international organisations on countering common challenges and threats unites the efforts towards shaping the system of common and comprehensive security for Europe and Asia (Rozanov 2010). Elena F. Dovgan refers about the international legal assessment of the cooperation between CSTO and UN. Article 4 of the CSTO charter defines the right of CSTO to cooperate with other international intergovernmental organisations. It’s one of the areas of CSTO foreign policy (Dovgan 2010). The CSTO not only works within the member states but is also active in maintaining an active relation with the other actors either bilaterally or with other international organisations like the NATO and the SCO primarily for the maintenance of peace and security in Eurasia. Zhenis Kembayev points out that CSTO’s General Secretary

Bordyuzha calls cooperation with NATO to be desirable yet not of utmost importance and that CSTO is a self sufficient organisation. However it has been clear that there are no anti-NATO feelings. While on the other hand, the author cites that the relations of CSTO with SCO seems to be less contentious. There is also a political willingness among these organisations to act as a single bloc regarding issues of military and security importance which happens to be the prime need of the hour (Kembayev 2009). Robert Legvold in his argument states that CSTO holds its central purpose to fill the security space and meet the security needs which NATO or other organisations might otherwise exploit and CSTO being a Russian led organisation, its foreign relations and throughout connections with other international actors are continually witnessed. (Legvold 2009)

### **THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF THE CSTO**

CSTO has a very significant relationship with the United Nations (UN). Russia and its allies repeatedly call for attention of the CSTO capacity in the UN peacekeeping activities like in the case of Afghanistan in its fight against war and terrorism. Likewise similar peacekeeping missions under the UN mandate where CSTO has maintained peacekeeping forces explains this cooperative relation between the two. It is to be mentioned here that since 2004, CSTO has an observer status in the UN.

The literature in this topic is abundant. But what it lacks is the proper comparison of the CSTO with other collective security organisations in the post-Soviet space i.e. the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the NATO's presence. The present work presents a comparative study of the CSTO with the SCO and NATO respectively.

Ingmar Oldberg points out Russia as being the undisputed leader in the CIS area and that an organisation like CSTO in the post-Soviet space has served to strengthen Russia's position not only in Eurasia but as a great power in the world. Russia has sought to bring together former Soviet Republics to such institutional arrangements that it is controlled by Russia itself. An evidence of it is how Russia leads the command, contributes to the strength of CSTO troops and supply weapons at

favourable prices and how CSTO backed Russia in its war against Georgia in the year 2008 thus fulfilling Russia's political ambitions. (Oldberg 2010)

## **THE ECONOMIC THEME IN THE REVIEW OF CSTO**

The CSTO does not deal with the issues of economic cooperation of member states. It is entirely a military and security organisation. But there is always a concept of economics or economic interest or at least a mild economic relationship as a prerequisite in any kind of cooperation and also for a fruitful economic cooperation a peaceful and secured intra-regional space is also very important. Niklas Swanstorm pinpoints the lack of economic growth in the region as one of the major threats against stability and stands as a reason behind other threats that are all interlinked. Social and economic deprivation has led to the dissatisfaction within the state resulting in major serious troubles. It also breeds the emergence of militant organisations. (Swanstorm 2010)

The post-communist transitions presented the newly independent countries with all sorts of new problems. The majority of former Soviet republics lacked strong traditions of modern statehood. Hence a sort of re-integration process provided a balance with economic and political benefits- a possibility to rely on several states (as an organisation or in a collective framework) and an improved security system.

Mikhail A. Molchanov cites, *“the post-soviet space initially saw a decline in the share of intra-regional exports and imports after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The post-Soviet space reflected a desire to find an optimal balance between security and development and with that energy trade has frequently linked the two together.”* (Molchanov 2009)

The above literature gives enough solutions yet the history of attempts made over to understand the security paradigm and the security integration process in the post Soviet space is not enough. The major question to be addressed are--- If the CSTO is 'Russia-led' then how does it tantamount to collective defence? Secondly, does the



hegemonic character of the Russia hamper the working of CSTO smoothly in an unbiased manner? And thirdly, is it that the CSTO being an amalgamation of unequal member states pose any difficulty in the maintenance of security and peaceful cooperation? Another gap that has to be filled is regarding the thin membership of CSTO. Why is it that out of fifteen post Soviet Republics only seven are member to it presently and why only those states? Moreover, does this minimal membership come in the way of meeting the security demands in the post Soviet space? Considering all these, the proposed study will examine all the intricacies of collective security in the post soviet space with special emphasis on the activities of the CSTO. This paper will study in detail the nature of cooperation and mutual dependence and military collaboration between Russia and the other members of the CSTO and the problems and prospects associated with this. It will establish the linkage between different variables like foreign policy, military, security, geopolitics, strategic assets, the new 'Great Game' in the context of CSTO with Russia and post Soviet space.

#### **1.4 RATIONALE, SCOPE AND HYPOTHESES**

The study aims to fill the gap in the existing research on the security paradigm in the post-Soviet space. It has to be borne in mind that not much study has been done so far regarding the security paradigm in the post Soviet space in general and collective security mechanism of CSTO in the post Soviet space in particular. The importance of multilateralism as a unique strategy taken up by former Soviet republics and Russia's foreign policy particularly to sustain security measures in this area has not been understood by many western scholars. Many western scholars rebuke CSTO to be just an instrument of formally institutionalising Russia's position and influence in the former Soviet space. At times CSTO has also been referred to as a 'paper tiger'. CSTO as an important collective security organisation has also been devalued and many studies have paralleled Russia with CSTO.

However, it has been seen that Russia's hegemony has indeed been a binding factor in the post-Soviet area; as Gleason puts in, "A situation in which a cooperative regime is established through the imposition of the will of a single, dominant co-operator."

Militarily, Russia's power is overwhelming; hence CSTO being fundamentally a military alliance and Russia-led is of definite significance. CSTO has successfully conducted number of military exercises, cooperated in the issues of security, crime and narcotics, deployed peacekeeping forces under the UN mandate. Considering all these, the proposed study will be a relevant contribution to the security studies because no significant and proper academic work has been done specifically on the security integration process in the post Soviet space particularly on the CSTO. Moreover, this study attempts to be a pointer towards future research in this direction.

### **RESEARCH OBJECTIVES:**

- To examine the security parameters of the post soviet space considering the swift and domino-effect transitions after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and also after the '9/11 attacks' that marked foreign policy shifts on part of the former Soviet republics.
- To analyse Russia-led CSTO's potential as a relevant collective security mechanism aftermath the Cold war era.
- To study multilateralism as a foreign policy dimension of Russia to address security issues.
- To understand the level of competitive security cooperation taking place in the post Soviet space which witnesses the presence of other security organisations apart from CSTO like the SCO and the NATO.

### **RESEARCH QUESTIONS:**

- What are the major reasons for the creation of the CSTO?
- What are the measures taken up by CSTO to preserve collective security in the post-Soviet space?
- How far has the CSTO succeeded in maintaining collective security in the post Soviet area?
- Has the Russian hegemonic status in any way helped in reintegration and collective defence of the post Soviet area?
- Has the CSTO been just a "paper tiger" or more influential in checking security threats in the post Soviet space?

## **1.5 HYPOTHESES:**

- The voluntary withdrawal of Russia from Central Asia and the Caucasus after the disintegration of the Soviet Union led to a security vacuum that created fertile grounds for the rise of terrorism, religious fundamentalism, extremism and drug trafficking.
- CSTO's growing role in the post Soviet space has led to the reduction of tension and conflict resolution, strengthening regional stability and security.
- The Russia-led CSTO has emerged as a counteracting force against the US particularly after latter's growing military presence in and around Afghanistan to keep Russia's natural role as an arbiter and defender intact.

## **1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

The study uses descriptive, analytical, comparative and historical methods. The study refers to both primary and secondary sources of information and data. The primary sources like official websites of the CSTO, the President of Russia, Prime Minister of Russia and news paper reports is used. Secondary sources will be relevant books, research papers, international research journals, and published and submitted M.Phil and PhD dissertations covering different aspects of security in post soviet space. Primary data is utilized based on availability and importance. References are made to other available data also.

### **RUSSIA'S SECURITY POLICY IN THE POST SOVIET SPACE**

This chapter of the dissertation looks onto the patterns of security environment in the post-Soviet space. It further focuses on the themes and patterns that Russia followed while pursuing its security and foreign policy after 1991 in the CIS space. The chapter also explains Russia's attempts in security integration and military cooperation with the post-Soviet states.

#### **2.1 INTRODUCTION**

Winston Churchill once said, *"I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma. But there may be a key, and that key is Russian national interest."* (Lo 2002)

This chapter sets out to explain the nature of Russian foreign and security policy in the CIS region, more specifically in the Central Asian region and the Caucasus. It will basically deal with the nature of Russian foreign policy just after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Since then there has been spectacular shifts in the contours of Russian foreign policy. Since the collapse of USSR, Russia as a state had to find meanings and answers of its new existence and identity and also its relations with the post-Cold war world system. (Mankoff 2009)

Scholars on International Relations have time and again tried to understand the dynamics of Russian foreign policy. CIS has always been a priority area for Russia. The words of Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, in the spring of 2007, demonstrate well this Russian positioning. Referring mainly to energy geopolitics, Lavrov stated (2007), *"Russian foreign policy today is such that for the first time in its history, Russia is beginning to protect its national interest by using its competitive advantages,"*. Russian foreign policy increasingly refocused in Eurasia. (Friere and Kanet 2010: 1)

The USSR was a vast territory. Therefore after its dissolution, its legal successor in the Russian Federation had to look after the new emerging security problems resulting out from the collapse of USSR. Some of the basic security issues were the tackling of the vast nuclear arsenal of USSR spreading out widely throughout Russia and also in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Other problems were handling of border issues since there is long porous borders stretching across the extended territory leading to other grave problems like smuggling of contrabands, drug trafficking, illegal migration etc. Another major issue was the problem of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism. (Friere and Kanet 2010: 2)

It has to be borne in mind here that the post-Soviet space shares its borders with one of the most volatile regions of the world that is Afghanistan. Not to forget the mention of Uzbekistan that houses the IMU and other extremists and radical elements that spread all over the Central Asian region and the Caucasus. Hence the security parameters should be very high. Niklas Swanstorm opines that religious fundamentalism basically cropped as a very serious threat to all states of the region, Afghanistan is undoubtedly the natural sufferer because of its long-term instability and the practices of organised crime. Much of the problem lies in the social factors like increasing unemployment, lack of welfare state programmes and a constant lack of hope for a better future. (Swanstorm 2010: 35-51).

## **2.2 NATURE OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY: IN THEORIES**

Post-Soviet Russian foreign policy has seen a dynamic shift from ideological doctrine to pragmatism. As Ludmilla Selezneva defines, “*Ideology referred to a system of ideas or views describing attitudes to a reality, social issues and to the aspirations of classes, political parties and nations*”. And on the other hand, “*Pragmatism is a way of making short term decisions, grasping opportunities to achieve practical results, without considering the long term consequences and in some cases even the morality of the decisions.*” Ideology was of sole importance to Soviet system and politics. The Marxist-Leninist ideology was seen as an ornament and considered as a central pillar of power. Ideolisation of politics in the Soviet era was intense basically dominated by the theory of ‘Class struggle’ and ‘World revolution’ concept. Ideology was the prime

concern of Soviet politics. Some elements of pragmatism however were visible during the first half of the Khrushchev's era with his policy of peaceful coexistence with the West. Yet ideology sharply appeared during Khrushchev's era with the famous Khrushchev speech to the UN, during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 enabling the Cold War concept to be apparently a feature of world revolution ideology. De-ideolisation as a process started with the coming of Gorbachev with his new kind of reforms. First of all, Gorbachev eliminated the 'World revolution' approach and started the epoch of actual cooperation with the West. It seemed that Gorbachev reforms slowly undermined the ideological core of Soviet Union because they changed the rules on which ideological discourse and thus power rested. The doctrine of foreign policy radically changed. The very first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991-1996) can be described as dominated by liberal ideology as Andrey Kozyrev bred anti-communist aspirations as a foreign minister. There was comprehensive partnership and integration with the Western countries. At that time, Russia's relations with the newly independent states was not set as a Russian foreign policy priority. However there was a kind of consciousness somewhere and the administration of the CIS was soon established and the devolution of a huge empire took place largely peacefully. It was seen that in the early periods of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy, the degree of pragmatism increased than that of the Soviet times. The policy of openness to the West and similarly cooperation with the West were the most significant pragmatic steps. Primakov's period (1996-1999) brought about the 'policy of alternatives'. Severe anti-Western feelings cropped up especially because of reasons like, firstly, severe economic crisis 'shock therapy' and absence of economic help from the West began in 1992 followed by devaluation of the 'rouble'. Secondly, harsh actions by the West in the form of NATO bombing of Yugoslavia and further NATO expansion etc lead to relations between Russia and the West became more complicated than the years just after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The concept of alternative foreign policy hence brought about the theory of 'Eurasia'. This period also announced the renewal of relations with the post-Soviet states as a foreign policy priority.

The coming of Putin in the early 2000s set out the foreign policy of Russia in a new direction. It was more Europe-oriented and pragmatism and developing economic relations with other countries not with US as in case of the previous periods.

Moreover this period saw that the Russian foreign policy is based on geographical considerations. As Russia borders Europe, the Middle East, Mediterranean, Central Asia, China and the Far East, Russia has policies towards all these regions. One thing that could be extracted out of this is that Russia's foreign policy towards for example Asia is not the result of pragmatism. Present relations with the CIS countries also appear more pragmatic, CIS being an absolute priority for Russia now. This third period saw inevitable changes from the extremes of the Soviet 'world communist revolution' theory to being an 'ally of the West' to a 'strong Russian state' concept which was ideologically almost neutral and more pragmatic in approach.

The phase after 11 September 2001, Russia took some major steps with cooperation with the West in fighting the 'war on terror'. It also saw the presence of US military bases in the post-Soviet space. However there was also the demand that the US bases could not stay for long in the 'Russian zone of influence'. Therefore it could be understood that the Russian foreign policy had three basic priorities; First, the interest of the country being of prime importance; second, integration to the community of democratic states; third, active policy and a balance between West and East. As historian Selezneva suggests, "*There was an essential movement from a doctrinaire to a pragmatic approach. The newly found pragmatism was characterised by the replacement of geopolitics by geo-economics, prioritisation of domestic policy, stress on integration, and multi-directionality in foreign policy.*" (Selezneva, 2003: 10-27)

#### **SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT:**

Russian geo-strategy and politics differs from that of the Western perspective and others. It is based on many traditions formed both in the period prior to 1917, the Bolshevik Revolution and during the Soviet times. Russian foreign policy is the outcome of several schools of thought. It is imperative to consider and recognise these schools of thought while assessing the influence of geopolitics on current foreign policy decision-making. **The schools of thought are- westernism, eurasianism, neo-eurasianist model, and the so-called pragmatic geopolitical model.**

- **Westernism-** The Westernisers promulgated this theory of Westernism. It initially developed during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The dictums of this philosophical approach became dominant among Russian

intelligentsia. This school of Westernism showed prominence during the period of Gorbachev's doctrine of 'new political thinking' and the so-called 'Kozyrev doctrine'. It was dominant in the country's foreign policy thinking. The basic principles of Westernism were as follows. Western ways and means were adopted. There prevailed a policy of tolerance towards the West that would mutually benefit both Russia and the West. The Western model of liberal democracy and market economy were accepted or in a way introduced in Russia. The policy of Westernism seemed to guarantee Russia's economic revival by attracting foreign investments also.

- **Eurasianism-** Eurasianism as an ideology became most popular when Russia after the disintegration of the Soviet Union sought to find a unique identity of its own. It was a totally new geopolitical paradigm shift in its foreign policy course. The idea was to be specifically an unmatched a region and of course its geographical stretch and cultural heterogeneity helped Russia to find its own special identity. The concept of Eurasianism contributed Russia to make a political-economic balance between East and the West.(Nikolay Petrov: 61-62)
- **The Neo-Eurasianist Model-** This model made appearance among the Russian emigrants in the 1920s and 1930s. It carries strong anti-American perspectives. This model integrates ideas developed by Russian classical geopolitical authors with elements of traditional Western geopolitics and West-European right wingers. This model delivers a logical basis for the significance of physical spaces, natural resources, military strength and direct control over territory and also to defend national interest when in need by building up of political and military blocs. The trans-Eurasian geopolitical system hence defends the existence of axis like, for example- the Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo-Tehran axis. (L.Ivashov's version).
- **The Pragmatic Geopolitical Model-** This model can be used interchangeably with Putin's vision of administration. This model became quite popular during the first years of the twenty first century. It was a revival and reinterpretation of what was known as "Eurasianism". It gives Russia the unique advantage of economic regeneration, favourable circumstances for engaging itself with the regional institutions and security arrangements and an augmenting its geo-



economic predominance as a regional and world player. The essential elements of this model as cited by Daniel S. Triesman are as follows-

*“Economic efficiency, Efficient use of geopolitical resources inherited by Russia from the Soviet Union. Nuclear weapons as an important element of containment, Status, role and right to vote in the UN Security Council, pragmatism (for instance, re-establishing relations with former allies and friends— India, Cuba, the Arab states, Vietnam, Serbia, Armenia), Extended geopolitics (forward presence, Russian military bases abroad),Maximum utilisation of geopolitical privileges.”*  
(Daniel S. Triesman, 2002: 27)

## **2.3 TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF RUSSIAN SECURITY THINKING**

The traditional principles of Russian security thinking can be judged from its behaviour regarding its external and foreign policies adopted. A certain kind of nature and behaviour has always been the trend. The traditional principles of Russian security thinking are as follows---

- **Fear of external powers**—Russia has been invaded many a times throughout history by neighbouring external powers. Hence Russia always is apprehensive regarding steps taken by any external power having the fear that it might not be against Russia. Instances have been of invasions by Mongols, French and German armies.
- **Desire for security**--- Russia has a voracious thirst for security. Therefore it has many Russian-led military co operations like the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), CIS and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) together with China. Earlier during the Soviet times there was the Warsaw Pact.
- **Feeling of superiority**--- The third traditional principle of Russian security thinking is the feeling of superiority. One reason for this is because of Russia’s unique status. Under Putin and Medvedev this thinking comes to the fore in

frequent statements on Russia's great power status and that Russia no longer lets itself being ignored or humiliated by the West (Bezemer 1988: 26, 33–4; 'Russian nationalist' 2006)

- **Obedience to state** --- The Russians never had any heritage of democratic traditions. It had always had the heritage of state-control. This was also evident in President Putin's policy of returning to a centralised power system. Security thinking has always had a considerable influence on the policy views of the Kremlin of the past and present.

(Marcel de Haas, 2010: 3)

- **Desire for global power status**--- Since the reign of Peter the Great Russia has always had the desire for great power status. Putin seems to be continuing this venture. Post dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia thrives to still influence and spread its wings in the regions surrounding Russia. Since the coming of Putin the re-emergence of Russia as a global power has become a significant political priority for the Russian leadership. From Russian viewpoint, the new international order should be based on multi-polarity not US uni-polarity. Russia's great power claims under Putin are based on military strength, energy resources and concentration of power in the presidential hands. Moreover, Russia opposes any kind of US or EU interference in its zone of interest basically comprising the CIS. Motivated by its rapid economic growth, Russia is further developing relations with Latin America and other territories previously under the influence of USSR. (Jacek Wieclawski, 2008)

Hence, Russian security policy always maintains this line of thinking. All these are quite evident from the way Russia formulates its foreign policies towards external powers and the states of the post-Soviet space. In order to analyse Russian foreign policy in general and the in the post-Soviet space in particular, the aforementioned characteristics of Russian security thinking can be very handy.

## **2.4 RUSSIAN POLICY TOWARDS CIS:**

Regarding Russia's policies in the CIS security regional complex, Putin has been successful in establishing Russia's position and stature in the CIS region and Russia does get its deserved respect. This sub region is very much susceptible and crucial to Russian politics, culture and economics. With the coming of Vladimir Putin as the President of Russia there has been a stronger centre and stronger foreign policy discourse.

### **Thematic aspects of Russian Regionalism:**

#### **A. Demographic crisis:-**

Russia is a vast country. One of the worst problems facing Russia is the demographic crises. The population of Russia has dropped considerably. Even in December of 1999, this problem was considered to be "*the problem of year 2003*" as a proposed blueprint referred by the Unity Party. (Segodnya, Moscow: 7 September 2000) The internal reasons behind this demographic downfall are because during last some fifteen years death rates in Russia have exceeded the birth rate by 800-900 thousand people. During the period of 1992-2004, the natural loss was 10.4 million. This has been a threat because in the near future the requirement for economic manpower will increase. The role of CIS countries and Baltic region is very significant in the case of Russian international migration. The growth of immigrants in Russia from the CIS region and the Baltic States have accounted for more than 900,000 people. Some states of the "Near Abroad" passed citizenship laws excluding dual citizenship. But with the gradual improvement of the economic and social situation in the post Soviet states restrained the inflow of population into Russia contributing to the issue of demographic problem. (Rybakovsky and Ryzantsev, 2005: 3-6)

#### **B. Transborder Security:-**

Russia's security environment has transformed quite seemingly since 1991. Since then security concerns have been top in Russia's priority chart. And, in order to maintain security internally and at home, one of the prior concerns was firstly to strongly secure its long stretching borders and secondly maintain external projection of political-military power and influence. (D.Averre, 2003: 63)

Here, we will learn about the main trends in transborder security arrangements, the regions involved and the impact suffered by Russia and the other regions. There has been a changing nature in the concept of security in Russia and the greater CIS region. The changes have basically followed the changes in the security arrangements following the end of cold war. Russia's position with the post-Cold war security arrangements was no more ideological in nature. These new security threats have been not only limited to hard security or traditional threats but newer kind of non-traditional or soft security threats. All these have major impact in policy making of Russia not only domestically but also in foreign relations matters. These non-traditional challenges are transnational in nature which has widespread and hard outcomes like economic dislocation, organised crime, environment degradation, mass migration, the spread of communicable diseases etc. To talk in terms of centre-periphery relations, if Russia remains to be the centre and the Caucasus and Central Asia, the periphery, a stable periphery is utmost necessary. However, establishing a stable periphery has been not very successful yet and the relative openness has made the centre more vulnerable to terrorism, drug trafficking, weapons, illegal migration both as a target and a transit country particularly because the periphery is plagued with these issues. Hence the gravity of this issue can be understood and also the reason as to why the regions of Central Asia and the Caucasus figure prime in the priority list of Russian interest.

Yet Russia's attempt in setting up of political-military security regime in the CIS has not been very systematic partially and successful. Integration of the CIS states with Russia at the centre had been in the very beginning materialised through the Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security. But this treaty formerly attracted only six out of a total of twelve members of the CIS. However, the very name of the treaty became baseless since the withdrawal of Uzbekistan in 1999. Initial parties to the Tashkent treaty were Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Later members were Azerbaijan (joined on 24 September, 1993), Belarus (joined on 31 December 1993) and Georgia (joined on 9 December 1993). (Rozanov, 2010: 3)

The Collective Security Treaty (later upgraded to Collective Security Treaty Organisation) was set to last for a 5-year period unless extended. On April 2, 1999, only six members of the CST signed a protocol renewing the treaty for another five

year period. The countries that exempted it from signing were Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan. In 2005, Uzbekistan withdrew from GUAM and joined the CSTO in 2006. The other commendable multilateral arrangement including some other countries is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. It comprises of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

It can be seen however that for Russia's security arrangements, its residual military involvement in the CIS is mandatory. But many other security arrangements have been developing simultaneously because although initially Moscow was ready to take responsibility for security along the external CIS borders, but only a few had let Russia deploy troops on their borders. These states were Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and for some short span, Moldova and Georgia. (D.Averre, 2003: 65-66)

Russia's southern borders are real troubled ones. The immediate security challenges differ from that of Russia's European borders. The Southern bordered states are weak, fragmented with ineffective Government actions and security regime in operation. There is considerable chunk of ethnic divisions that account for more than "thirty large ethnic nations as well as a large number of smaller peoples." (D.Averre, 2003 and Pain, 2000: 371)

Not only is that, the Southern borders are also plague by the problem of Islamic fundamentalism resulting in armed conflicts and other economic disruption. These porous and unstable borders are a cause of concern and also kicking off the problem of 'soft security threats' paving the way for illicit activities like illegal migration, drug trafficking and terrorism. Regarding the root of the issue of terrorism, Chechnya and neighbouring Afghanistan are posing quite a threat to Russia and the other CIS states. Considering Chechnya as a major immediate threat compromising Russia's national security, Russia took to waging war against Chechnya to prevent secession of part of Russian territory. It was also an indication by Russia that it is very protective about its own territory and territorial claims or interest and does not stop itself from taking the harshest of measures. But it was well spectacled that this action of Russia drew criticism from the international institutions and world over questioning former's commitment in establishing international norms. It also made bitter the Russia-

Georgia relations with Russian attempts to seal borders with Georgia via a new visa regime. ( D.Averre, 2003: 70)

## **2.5 RUSSIAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY DOCTRINES DURING PAST TWO DECADES FOLLOWING SOVIET BREAKUP**

Right after the breakdown of Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian Federation drafted its own security concept. In May 1992, the Russian Federation described the National Security Concept (NSC) as the highest security document. In fact the only achievement of Yeltsin in the field of Russian security was the National Security Concept of 1997, though it was not well-formulated yet it paved the way for Putin to formulate the NSC of 2000. The NSC aimed at safeguarding Russia's national interests against internal and external threats. The first issue of the document appeared at the end of 1997 as this period was plagued with conflicts between the executive and the legislature and the first Chechen War, followed by civil wars in Tajikistan and Moldova and in the Balkans. The NSC of 1997 provided an optimistic view of Russia in international development and gave importance to non-military, socio-economic interests, the problem of terrorism, slow economic growth etc. To improve these circumstances, Yeltsin directed his policy towards cooperation with the West. However, within a few years the situation changed with the change in the policy of NATO and its expansion. It posed a great threat to Russia and hence Russia was forced to change its security policy and a anti-Western inclination was visible. Not only those, the external developments and internal problems were reflected in the NSC draft of 1999 and 2000 that aimed towards reinforcing central authority and vesting power to the President of Russia in guaranteeing national security. (Mishra, 2007: 215-216)

When Putin assumed power in March 2000, for the first time the focus on CIS was placed and cooperation with China was seen as balancing the power equation and checking the dominance of the US. In fact the relation with China was dramatically improved after the Beijing Declaration of July 2000. The Presidents of both these countries also supported a peaceful political settlement of Kosovo and Metohija.

However, post-September 2001 led to a complete policy shift. International politics was completely changed after the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 in US. During that time, Russia fully supported the US offering cooperation such as passing secret information and air corridors for NATO aircraft and also the establishment of US military bases. Yet, the most notable change regarding the shift in relations between Russia and US led NATO was when in 2001, cooperation was offered by NATO. In May 2002, NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was created at the Reykjavik summit.<sup>1</sup> But since the end of 2004, Russian foreign policy consolidated its influence particularly in the “Near Abroad”. The relationship between Russia and US marked a sea change particularly over US policy towards Iran and its interference in Georgia, Central Asia and Ukraine. (Mishra, 2007: 236-239)

## **2.6 RUSSIAN INTEREST IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE**

It has been an established fact that Moscow has always wanted to maintain a special influence over the post-Soviet space and for this limiting full independence for the Soviet republics was communicated during 1990–91, well before the August coup and subsequent appearance of the CIS. (Willerton and Cockerham, 2003: 187)

The first step that Russia took towards maintaining a strong foothold as a big brother in the post-Soviet space came about with the establishment of a strong and reliable system of military control and mutually benefiting economic cooperation. Initially the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was to be the foremost organisational set up for fulfilling the aforementioned goals. CIS was to be helping in various ways like prevention of conflicts through peaceful resolution within the former Soviet Union space, help defend the CIS external border by installing troops, help to maintain a common forum for discussing and addressing issues of economic concern as all the states were slowly transforming their economic structures to regulated market economies. Hence these agendas drove multilateral bargaining efforts among the member states. However, slowly the fact came to light that the former Soviet Union states excessive dependence and reliance over Russian resources and markets was a

---

<sup>1</sup> “the new alliance”, The Times, 15 May 2002

reason behind their deteriorating economic conditions. As Willerton and Cockerham cites Igor Sinyakevich , “During 1992, Russia had a 1.5 trillion rouble trade balance with other CIS states, with its early unilateral moves (e.g., the introduction of non-cash rouble accounting to settle bilateral trade transactions for rouble-zone countries) revealing a continuing proclivity to manipulate its resource and infrastructural advantages to influence other states’ commercial and security calculations.” (Willerton and Cockerham, 2003: 188)

Therefore, in 1992 a crucial step was taken in order to revive and seek more collective ways for addressing these common policy problems, in the form of the Russian-Ukrainian summit and the Minsk CIS Heads of Government meeting. The former Soviet Union states gradually became more and more involved in regional multilateral forum, collective security and peacekeeping activities. (Ibid: 189)

Meanwhile, most of the post-Soviet states try to balance Russia’s power position by creating smaller regional arrangements which essentially include the regional hegemon i.e. Russia. One example of such a regional arrangement is GUAM. GUAM is an alternative grouping as against Russia-led security grouping. GUAM brings out the US factor since military cooperation developed between Ukraine/Moldova, Ukraine/Georgia/Azerbaijan, between GUUAM (GUAM was GUUAM when Uzbekistan was a member) and the US and through NATO’s PfP. GUUAM members had always opposed to the participation within the CST since they see it as a part of Russia’s attempt and strategic policy to the re-integration of the post-Soviet space. There is a strong link between GUUAM and NATO, it was further solidified in 1999 when GUUAM members attended 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the NATO summit in Washington DC, it was the same year that NATO’s bombardment of Serbia took place. The GUAM states have always given more priority to the trans-Atlantic community than cooperation with Russia. It works in a competitive design along with Russia-led organisations. According to Russian sources, GUUAM members at the Summit discussed military problems and resolution of ethnic conflicts in the former USSR in a similar manner as undertaken by NATO in Kosovo/Serbia. Armenia and Belarus, the two very active members of the CST see GUUAM as a ‘pro-NATO’ grouping (Mollazade, 27 March 1999). Moreover, two members of GUUAM, Georgia and Azerbaijan have both expressed interest in joining NATO. (Kuzio, 2000:104-106)



The emergence of GUUAM and other regional security arrangements actually show how the CIS has been divided into two equal groups of Pragmatic Russophiles (Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), the radical Slavophile (Belarus) and the other GUUAM+Turkmenistan group led basically by pro-Western pragmatic elites whose interests are diverging with those of Russia. However, the continued existence of GUUAM is the evidence as how geopolitical pluralism has emerged in the CIS. (Kuzio, 2000:110). GUAM is basically now a dead and stagnant organisation.

The CIS member states although are clubbed together, they are not a homogenous group and so have divergent interests. But they have a continuing fear of the re-emergence of a domineering regional hegemon; this has led to nothing but less successful measures taken in terms of multilateral arrangements and Russia in order to maintain its influence in the Eurasian region has to depend largely on bilateral negotiations. From 1993 onwards, an impressive variety of formal economic and security cooperation arrangements were made between Russia and other post-Soviet states. For instance, from November 1993 to 1997, there was the formation of Turmenorosgaz, a Russia-Turkmenistan gas joint stock company, again in 1999 there was reinstalling of Russian military bases in the Tajikistan. Hence Russia marks an eventful impact on most of the post-Soviet states. It has been noticed that if Russia is not in very healthy terms bilaterally with each state then it affects their position in a multilateral forum also. For instance, the March 1994 'Group of Four' that was an accord among Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, could be successful only when Russia normalised its bilateral relations with each member. (Ibid 190-191)

## **2.7 MOTIVE FOR SECURITY INTEGRATION**

Regional security integration in various parts of the world has succeeded. Regional security arrangements have always been better off in dealing with security challenges. Russia being the legal successor to the USSR, regards the post-Soviet space as its own sphere of interest and as such Russia initiated projects like CSTO, EEC, and SCO

which have different aims and spheres of operation. Motive behind Russia towards integration in the post-Soviet space has been pure security concerns. To take the case of the CSTO specifically, it can be seen that the reasons behind the establishment of the CSTO were varying circumstances like the Afghan crisis, ethnic and political destabilisation of Central Asia, also the civil war in Tajikistan. Today, the CSTO is regarded as the legal framework for guaranteeing military security throughout the CIS. In 1999 and 2000 when there were serious conflicts rising due to the problem of Islamic fundamentalist in Kyrgyzstan that the signatories to the CST agreed on joint military action and this led to the CST becoming the CSTO. Uzbekistan rejoined CSTO in 2006 leaving GUAM. But the CSTO is still at a growing stage. Russia (with the support of rest of the members) is the main contributor of the CSTO and its military force, both financially and in the composition of future forces. (Markedonov, 2010)

The political, economic and military prevalence of Russia is indeed one of the prime factors for integration in the post-Soviet space. Taking a lead in all the multilateral agreements and an extensive network of bilateral agreements with its neighbouring states, Russia considers the whole post-Soviet space as its own sphere of influence basically in matters of economics and security. In the context of defence and security the CSTO seems to be developing with a unified staff. (Malfliet, Verpoest, Vinokurov; 2007: 3-4)

As cited by Malfliet, Verpoest, Vinokurov, *“The priority of the relations with the CIS states is determined by the following factors; firstly, Russia’s main vital interests in the fields of economy, security and defence are concentrated on CIS territory; and effective cooperation with the CIS states counteracts centrifugal tendencies in Russia itself.”* (ibid)

While the motive of CIS countries regarding integration depends on a traditional set of factors: economic, social, security, political, international. The CIS countries remain Russia’s most important trading partners. They import 45 percent of Russian oil and 19 percent of construction equipment. Not only that, almost ten million people from the CIS countries work in Russia and send remittances up to four billion US dollars each year. The development of the CIS has been one of the vital interests of

the Russian Federation. Within the CSTO, Russia has begun to supply armaments to the member states at domestic prices. Such steps not only increase Russia's influence in the post-Soviet space but the post-Soviet states also benefit in security considerations. (Ibid, 3-4)

As the Presidential Decree of 14 September 1995 suggests, "*One of the most important documents laying out the conceptual framework of Russia's official approach to CIS affairs is the Presidential Decree 'On Russia's Strategic Course in its Relations with the CIS States' of 14 September 1995.*"<sup>2</sup> Further, the Decree goes on to specify the principal goal in a series of main tasks:

- *"Providing for political, military, economic, humanitarian and legal stability.*
- *The CIS states as politically and economically stable entities with friendly bond with Russia*
- *Maximising Russia's role as a leading force in the post-Soviet space*
- *Building a strong integrating entity in the CIS."*

(Vinokurov, 2007: 28)

## **2.8 RUSSIAN GENERAL POLICIES IN THE CIS REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX**

Here, are some points that are in favour of Russia's standpoint in taking part as an active core member in the CIS region. These points answer the question as to why do the Russian card works in the CIS region. These are as follows--- (Nygren, 2008a: 217-50)

Firstly, Russia's viewpoints are taken into consideration and taken seriously by all the CIS states.

Secondly, Russia's economic presence in the CIS sub region has been commendable since its economic recovery in 1998. Russia has been especially strong in energy and

---

<sup>2</sup> 'Russia's Strategic Course in its Relations with the States-Participants of the Commonwealth of Independent States', Presidential Decree of 14 September 1995, 940.

hydrocarbon sectors and uses it as a tool for foreign policy. Hence capital investment in the CIS crops up from Russian surplus sources. (Sygodnya, Moscow, 7 September 2000)

Thirdly, Russia on the basis of cultural, political and economic arguments tries to establish an exceeding role in the entire CIS region.

Fourthly, another characteristic feature is that although Russia is associated with multilateral forums, it has been observed that most of the foreign policy related matters are dealt in bilaterally. Although, the efforts of newer organisations like the CSTO and SCO in the CIS region is now exemplary. (Nyrger 2008a, 217-50)

A worth noticing nature of the Former Soviet Union states is that for security concerns and a stable and growing economic activity, they tend to rely on one another and to varying degrees upon Russia. (Willerton and Cockerham, 2003: 185) It helps the CIS to help identify and coordinate common security arrangements among members, and it has been the primary intergovernmental vessel used by the Russian Federation to consolidate its security relationships with the CIS members. Yet for Russia, a decade long CIS multilateral arrangements have not harboured much practical policy solutions. Russia and other CIS states have relied primarily on bilateral arrangements and agreements. (Sakwa and Webber, 1999: 379-415)

Yet the former President Vladimir Putin's creditable efforts to consolidate Russia's position in the post-Soviet space have been significant in understanding Russian tutelage in the region. (Willerton and Cockerham, 2003: 187)

## **2.9 MILITARY COOPERATION IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE**

For the development of military-political cooperation in the post-Soviet space in the 1990s, the CIS charter provided that "concrete problems of political-military cooperation among member states shall be governed by specific agreements."<sup>3</sup>

Many agreements were henceforth adopted by member states. As Kembayev (2009: 72-74) suggests, some of the agreements concluded were—

---

<sup>3</sup> CIS Charter (Jan. 22, 1993), Art.15.

- ✓ *“On June 26, 1992 eight CIS countries (all except for Azerbaijan and Moldova) signed the Agreement on the Coordination of Export Control over Raw Materials, Materials, Equipment, Technologies, and Services used or capable of being used for the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction and missiles as well as their means of delivery.*
- ✓ *On September 9, 1994 all twelve CIS countries signed an Agreement on “Repairing of the Military Equipment and Hardware” which provided that such armament may freely (without customs formalities) go through the borders for the purpose of repairing*
- ✓ *Agreement on “Preferential Deliveries of the Military Equipment to the Border Troops of the CIS States” which provided that the producing states (most importantly Russia) would deliver the military equipment to the other state parties at their domestic prices.*
- ✓ *On November 3, 1995 also all CIS countries adopted two further Agreements on “Standardization of the Armament and Military Equipment” and on “Uniformity of Measurements in the Armed Forces”.*
- ✓ *On February 10, 1995 an Agreement on “Establishment of the United Air-Raid Defence System” was adopted, it was signed without reservations by eight countries: Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.*
- ✓ *On May 26, 1995 a Treaty on “Cooperation in Protection of Borders with the Non-Commonwealth States” which provided for coordination of protective measures and mutual assistance in safeguarding the inviolability of the CIS borders.*
- ✓ *The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – One of the significant steps taken under military political cooperation was on May 31, 2001 when under the framework of the Council of Heads of Governments, six countries i.e. Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan which next year became members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization – CSTO. It endorsed “the Long-Range Plan of Development of the Military Cooperation of the CIS Participant States until the Year of 2005.” This document was in anticipation of maintaining peace and security in the post-Soviet space and fight collectively against the thematic threat of terrorism. The military cooperation aspect referred to the various military manoeuvres*

*taken up and air-raid defence systems installed in the region. Moreover, on August 26, 2005 the aforementioned document was replaced by “the CIS Conception of Military Cooperation until the Year of 2010.” It was adopted in the framework of the Council of Heads of States of initial six countries and later rejoined by Uzbekistan.<sup>4</sup> The main principles of this military cooperation includes a more structured development of single military training and education, joint programmes on technical modernisation and maintenance of armed forces, joint air-raid defence, joint programmes on the production and reparation of military equipment and exchange of information etc. The very name of the document suggests that it caters for widening and deepening military cooperation of CIS member states.” (Kembayev, 2009: 72-74)*

Hence the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) came as a rescue to the poor and inefficient mechanism of the CIS. We will learn more about the security integration process and the CSTO in broad illustration in chapter 3 of this dissertation.

## **2.10 HAS THE CIS BEEN A SUCCESSFUL COMMON SECURITY SPACE?**

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russian Federation became its legal successor state. Initially the Russian Federation was convinced that the collapse of the Soviet Union would not go in vain and a similar kind of organisation in place of it would be instated that is in the form of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Yet, it did not appear to happen as it was planned since there were different opinions regarding this among different members of the CIS. There was formation of respective armed forces and economic and security policies of the member-states. (Haas 2004b)

But what happened beyond that and was the CIS a total failure or does it still have any relevance? What was the need for the establishment of the CIS? What was the legal basis for the establishment and development of the CIS?

---

<sup>4</sup> On April 2, 1999, only six members of the CST signed a protocol renewing the treaty for another five year period --Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan refused to sign and withdrew from the treaty.

As Yeltsin puts in CIS was an “*instrument of civilised divorce.*” (Libman 2007)

The following piece will lend an analytical discussion on the legal aspects of the establishment and development of the CIS.

- First, after the sudden collapse of the USSR, the CIS was set up in order to manage the process of civilised divorce smoothly and likewise reach to the needs of rearranging the Soviet administrative system and to coordinate the transitions and attune to a market-based economy. Significantly, two major groups developed, one headed by Russia supported by Belarus and Kazakhstan and the other comprised of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Turkmenistan and Ukraine.
- Second, the CIS took the form of a loose intergovernmental organisation. It was the result of the indecision on part of both the groups in shaping the legal nature of the CIS. The Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan group wanted the CIS to become a strong confederation like the European Union but the second group wanted the CIS to be a temporary and consultative forum.
- Third, from the point of view of international law, the CIS has all the attributes of an intergovernmental organisation. Hence, the CIS could have been successful providing the political will and efforts of its member countries.
- Fourth, the CIS could not be a very fruitful structure because although in the very beginning most of the Soviet armed forces were placed under the command of the CIS, and also the CIS countries accepted the Rouble currency as the common currency giving CIS the form of a confederation, yet, the CIS states were reluctant to confer it with anymore powers presuming a threat to their (CIS states’) national sovereignty. Not only that, the second group was against signing of any closer political-military agreements and deeply engaging in economic matters. Hence, the loophole lied somewhere here.

(Zhenis Kembayev, 2009: 90)

- Fifth, CIS attempt to create joint armed forces was a total failure. Moreover, trying to build CIS in the lines of a common geostrategic space also met with limited success. The reason lies behind the limited cooperation of all the CIS member states. It is necessary to mention here that only seven of the CIS countries at present nurture a close relationship in terms of military-political

and economic integration. These are Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.(Ibid: 91)

- Sixth, although after the decline of the old Rouble zone, the CIS states tried to build up an Economic Union on a new market economy basis, calling for the establishment of trade unions, a customs union, a monetary union and a common market for goods, services, capital and labour keeping the Treaty of 1993 as their basis, yet, all of these remained highly only on paper and very less was actually practically executed. One of the impediments here was Ukraine which despite several attempts by Russia did not sign the CIS charter and become a full member of the would-be Economic Union. Meanwhile, Russia became engrossed in dealing its own problem of state building and economic transition issues.
- Seventh, another reason why the CIS states were not that successful in harbouring a closer integration is that although these states were aware of the need of interdependence among themselves in matters of economy and security, yet these states were apprehensive about a new kind of Russian centralism and hegemony. Not only that, it was also seen that most of the CIS states lacked the respect for 'rule of law'. This was evident from their ignoring of their respective constitutional provisions. Moreover, with the emergence of internal decision-making norms such as the 'dissent norm' – whereby members are free to ignore any collective CIS decision – it has not proven possible to construct a consensus agenda of issues, let alone adopt binding policy responses. (Welsh and Willerton,1997:54-56)
- Eight, the failure to establish an effective judicial organ is another reason behind the ineffectiveness of the CIS. It would have been an effective body to ensure that community laws and norms are correctly interpreted and applied. CIS should have taken this example from the European Court of Justice.
- Finally, in terms of strengthening the integration process in CIS, efforts in general were unsatisfactory. The bilateral terms of various CIS states with each other were not satisfactory. As the Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov told in 2001: *“The entire history of the creation of various integration structures shows that without a solid bilateral base of relations, it is difficult to come to multilateral forms of cooperation. For any form of multilateral cooperation*



*presupposes delegation of a part, insignificant perhaps, but still a part of sovereignty to multilateral agencies... We will actively develop bilateral ties, and as these grow stronger, the possibilities will broaden for multilateral cooperation within CIS as well". (Latawski, 2001: 83)*

Smaller organisations like GUAM (consisting of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) were created within groups. It displayed the act of 'group-ism' within groups. Thus it has been seen that though the CIS had helped in a smooth handling of the breakup of the Soviet Union. Yet, a decade after its formation, it has accomplished little with a minimal mandate, and extremely limited resources. It lacks achievements in matters of external threat.

## **2.11 ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA'S FOREIGN SECURITY POLICY IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE----**

This part of the chapter will discuss about Russia's engagements with its closest geographical, political, economic and social neighbours. It will showcase a descriptive analysis of the various foreign policy strategies from the time Putin came to power. Here, I will deal with different sub-regional security complexes and their relations with Russia. These different sub-regional security complexes are as follows—

- The European security sub-regional complex consisting of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova.
- The Caucasus security sub-regional complex consisting of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.
- The Central Asian security sub-regional complex consisting of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan.

The Russian vision behind engaging with each and every state of the post-Soviet space is that Russia wants to restore a strong Russian presence in the post-Soviet space and to further restrict the penetration of the so-called external powers especially the US, NATO, EU and the Western Europe on common. In order to learn as to how far Russia has succeeded in its attempt to grab its interest in the post-Soviet space,

could be analysed from the following study of its relations with all the different states of the post-Soviet space.

- **THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SUB-REGIONAL COMPLEX:--** This European sub-regional complex comprises of three states. These are two Slavic states of Ukraine and Belarus and one small non-Slavic state with special status that is Moldova. Let us examine the relation of Russia with each of these states. This sub-complex has been the special interest of NATO and the US. (Bertil Nygren, 2008: 47)

- ✓ **Russia and Ukraine—**

Russia-Ukraine relations have been changing at a sweeping pace since the year 2000, or to say since Putin presidency. Putin tried to resolve economic disputes relating to oil and gas deliveries, pipelines and trade-agreements; and considering the political problems, the issues of border delimitations and demarcations was handled tactfully. In the politico-military arena, the strategic conflict over relations to NATO was defused in the aftermath of the incident of 9/11, and the former conflict over the **Black Sea Fleet (BSF)** and the naval facilities generated some military cooperation. *“Russia and Ukraine’s dispute over the Black Sea Fleet needs to be understood as a struggle for control over a historic symbol of national identity, nuclear weapons dispute, as a struggle for sovereignty in relation to the post-Soviet security.”* The dispute between Ukraine and Russia over the ownership of the BSF started with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The conflict is between Ukraine’s claim to the Fleet and the Fleet command’s position that as part of the Former Soviet Navy, the CIS agreements required the BSF to be classified as strategic and as such a part of the Joint Armed Forces. Though post-Cold war, the importance of BSF as a military theatre declined yet a second important factor revolving around this dispute was the perception of a growing economic and geopolitical significance of the Black Sea region. During the period of dispute over the Fleet, Russian analyst drew attention to concerns over potential expansion of the Turkish naval presence in the

Black Sea and subsequently US naval activity in the region. However, the Russian-Ukrainian relations worsened after the Orange Revolution, the new Ukrainian Government denounced the Russian BSF's presence in Ukraine and then asserted that the basing agreement would probably not be renewed after 2017. The dispute took a dramatic turn again in January 2006 when Ukrainian officials took over the Yalta lighthouse which both Russia and Ukraine claimed belonging to them under the terms of the 1997 treaty (Deyermond, 2008: 102-110). However, CSTO Secretary General Nikolay Bordyuzha claimed that it is necessary to discuss extension of the agreement on the Black Sea Fleet base in the Crimea after 2017. "The Black Sea Fleet base in Sevastopol provides for both Russian and Ukrainian security. The expediency to station the Fleet there is evident. It is necessary to discuss extension of the current agreement", said Bordyuzha. According to him if Ukraine fails to extend the agreement, we will take other decisions that would make it possible to preserve the defensive capabilities of the Russian Navy in the Black Sea region. (Bordyuzha, 2008)

Moving towards the politico-economic arena, the crucial gas and oil transit issues and the joint production of military and civilian technologies were soon to be taken care of. Yet, the biggest threat to Ukraine was that of energy dependency on Russia. But after the presidential elections in Ukraine in 2004 which brought a new Ukrainian president after the 'orange revolution', this happy reunion of the two largest former Soviet republics was but bound to change. The energy brawl in December 2005 to January 2006 was evidently the display of Russian economic imperialism and Ukraine's energy dependence on Russia and the continuing conflict between the two. However in the next few years Russia-Ukraine relations would depend upon the clash of interests concerning the interest of the West as well. (Ibid: 64-65)

- ✓ **Russia and Belarus**— Belarus has been the closest of Russia’s CIS neighbours. (Ibid: 66). Putin demands for economic integration with Belarus which would mean a privatisation of Belarusian economy; the prime interest of Russia being the energy and pipeline sector. However, since the 2004-2005 “colour revolution” attempts of the democratisation drives of the West, Putin and Lukashenka has kept their personal adverse relationship aside and since then the military-defence cooperation have started to flourish. Russia and Belarus now constitute the closest military ties in the post-Soviet space. There are still certain unresolved issues between the two, yet the strategic military integration cannot be overlooked which is a very positive aspect of Russia-Belarus relationship. (Ibid 80-81)
  
- ✓ **Russia and Moldova**— Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia and Moldova had a strained relation. The fact that there have been no presidential visits to Moldova until 2000, throws light on their difficult relations. There was a general unwillingness on the part of the Russians especially on the military side to fix onto the 1999 agreement of the Istanbul OSCE summit on the withdrawal of Russian troops and weapons from Transdneister. The major controversy under Putin has been the actual status of Transdneister within Moldova. Apart from that another point of conflict between Russia and Moldova is regarding the latter’s relation with the CIS; of Moldova not joining the integration tool of CIS that is the SES and also with respect to Moldova’s equations with Romania, EU and NATO. There has also been a talk of NATO membership to Moldova after the 2005 elections. Hence Russia-Moldova relations can be defined as of being complicated and disturbed. (Ibid 99-100)
  
- **THE CAUCASUS SECURITY SUB-COMPLEX---** Caucasus could be defined as a sub-region of various other regional security complexes like the greater or the ‘super’ Middle East regional security complex or other sub-complex like the Caucasus/Caspian Sea/Black Sea sub-complex, but also it can be regarded as a regional sub-complex in its own right. (Buzan and

Waever, 2003) Hence the security of the Caucasus region is strongly interlinked with Russia and the three former Soviet republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Conflicts in the Caucasus are age-old and frozen in nature and since the demise of the Soviet Union; it has been a constant problem for Russia.(Nygren 2008: 101)

During the years of President Yeltsin, this sub-region saw one interstate war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh region located within the borders of Azerbaijan, two secessionist civil wars—in Abkhazia and in South Ossetia and also a few new ethnicity based aspects to boost up problems in the greater Caucasus (misplaced peoples in Dagestan and the two Chechen wars and its spill over effects to other parts of the Caucasus). Hence the Yeltsin era of Russia- Caucasus relations were full of developments outside the control of state authorities.<sup>5</sup> (Coppieters, 1998: 56)

Putin's period had started with all the footprints of Yeltsin's era of negligence especially in case of Chechnya. Putin's attempts in refining the relations between South Caucasian states imply the direct and indirect connection of Russia with Chechnya always. Russia and Chechnya have had always conflicts regarding the approaches of both the countries and the wider international community. While Russia blames Chechnya for breeding international terrorism (since the suggestion of 9/11), the Western criticism of Russia goes against Russian human rights abuses in Chechnya.<sup>6</sup> (Nygren, 2008: 102) However the September 11, 2001 incidents did pace up Russian-Caucasian relations by trying to forget the unresolved disputes and working together for the call of the hour. In fact in the CIS Summit in December 2001, Putin met the three Caucasus Presidents separately to discuss regional conflicts and security issues.<sup>7</sup> (Ibid: 103)

---

<sup>5</sup> In addition, other actors, especially Turkey, saw an opportunity to become a 'bridgehead' of the West into Caucasus and Central Asia

<sup>6</sup> In November 2004, Sergey Ivanov announced that Russian forces in the north Caucasus (i.e. on Russian territory) had killed 'terrorists from 52 countries of the world'. But Russia did not, he said, 'accuse the state whose passport he carries of aggression against Russia'

<sup>7</sup> Shevardnadze suggested that the meeting constituted 'a turning point in Georgian–Russian relations', a great misjudgement

✓ **Russia and Azerbaijan—** Russia and Azerbaijan have had tense relations since 1992 due to Russia’s partial support to Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by helping Armenia with military assistance<sup>8</sup>. It was only after January 2001 that Russia’s relations with Azerbaijan started improving basically after the high profile visit of Putin to Azerbaijan. Most importantly Azeri president Heider Aliev remarked, “We have reached mutual agreement on all the questions we have discussed, and this gives me great satisfaction...” (RFE/RL *Newsline* 10 January 2001). It was the start of what Putin exclaimed “the start of a new phase”. (RFE/RL *Caucasus Report* 11 January 2001) Another most important example of improving relations between Russia and Azerbaijan was the maturity shown in handling the issues relating to Chechnya. The bilateral relations between these countries were not affected.<sup>9</sup> Slowly military cooperation also followed the general improvement of relations. Hence, Russian-Azeri relations impeccably altered when Putin came to power. The bilateral relations improved not only in the politico-military arena but also in the economic arena as well. It has to be borne in mind that in spite of the fact that Russia improved its relations with Azerbaijan yet it always maintained a balance between all the other Caucasian states, hence no complaints from Armenia also. (Nygren, 2008: 113)

✓ **Russia and Georgia—**

From the very onset of Yeltsin’s reign in Russia, Georgia became Russia’s foreign policy and strategic problem in the Caucasus. In fact, Russia-Georgia relationship is one of the very few bilateral relations that have declined since Putin came to power. Moreover the relations were affected by a numerous other reasons like the ongoing oil and gas race to the Caspian Sea, the new Chechnya war, the general political and economic instability of the region etc. Not only have that, the

---

<sup>8</sup> A secret weapon agreement was signed between Russia and Armenia in 1997, the revelation of which caused a further freeze in the Russia–Azerbaijan relationship.

<sup>9</sup> True, in the very early Putin presidency, there were some accusations and counteraccusations as to actual Azeri support of Chechnya. (Hadjy-Zadeh 2000 and Torkunov 2000).

September 11, 2001 atmosphere furthered aggravated Russia's aggressive attitude towards the problem of Pankisi Gorge. (Ibid: 119)

In August 2008, Russia fought and won a five-day war against Georgia. Russia's warfare against Georgia was part and parcel of Moscow's security politics. (Haas, 2010: 135)

In case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Putin's second term was of no easily negotiated solution. The Russian peacekeeping forces installed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia though had a stabilising effect but yet the confusion of relations didn't stop escalating. Russia's relations with Georgia have all the components of old nationalist, ethnic, religious and political conflicts mixed with a dose of hegemonic global and regional great power involvement and international terrorism. (Nygren, 2008: 152-153)

- **THE CENTRAL ASIAN SECURITY SUB-REGIONAL COMPLEX---**

Central Asia as a distinct region is both old and new and has in large parts until quite recently been inhabited mainly with nomadic peoples. (Olcott, 2001: 16ff) Today, Central Asia is a distinct sub-regional complex in the Russia-centred sub-regional complex developed at the very beginning of 1992. Central Asia is geographically placed in the part of Asia and the greater Middle East part. Central Asia comprises of five states, these are Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. It's a region of weak states and weak powers with weak national and ethnic identities.<sup>10</sup> (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 24)

The outer borders of Central Asia have been guarded by Russian border troop since 1991. The borders are generally not demarcated and delimited.<sup>11</sup>

Initially, in the very early years of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was not very interested in this region. Greater attention to the Central Asian region was placed during the Putin presidency. Anti-terrorism was the new

---

<sup>10</sup> Central Asia consists of 'pre-modern states' (Buzan and Waever 2003: 24).

<sup>11</sup> Another problem is that the very civilizations in Russia and Central Asia are different (Malashenko 1998: 158).

dimension to Russian foreign policy towards Central Asia. (Johnson, 2004: 63-67)

Russian interests today in Central Asia are mainly for its security and energy. Central Asia is rich in oil, gas and water resources. Regarding security problems in Central Asia, it displays all the features of a weak state—corruption, drug trafficking, human trafficking, smuggling, terrorism and extremism.

Until September 11, 2001 only Russia and China were the main actors in the Central Asian sub-regional complex but after the 9/11 attacks US made its visible presence in this region. This US engagement further ignited Russia's role and presence in the Central Asian region. There is also harder security issues mostly covered in the veil of anti-terrorism activities. One example of it is the Kant Air base in Kyrgyzstan where a rapid-reaction force has been based since 2001 and here Russia has stationed a smaller contingent of fighter aircraft and helicopters under the CST framework. The Collective Security Treaty (CST) is an important instrument for integration in the region. (Nygren, 2008: 163-164) Russian integration process in the post-Soviet space can be seen in the form of actions taken under the CSTO, SCO framework.

Hence, post September 11, 2001, the Central Asian region has been both an object and subject of the larger international and world politics.

✓ **The Caspian Sea Basin—**

Politics rather than economics dominated the interests of great powers in the Caspian Sea region in the Yeltsin era, although geo-economics and geo-politics are interwoven in the Caspian Sea region. (Blank, 2001: 136 and 138) The geopolitics of oil, gas and pipelines is of utmost complexities in the Caspian Sea region. Russia has been taking active part in this game; in fact oil and gas pipelines in the former Soviet space have been seen as a fabric through which the former Soviet Union is still being preserved. (RFE/RL Newswire 16 October 2001)



Russia's interests in the Caspian Sea are still as much related to strategy as to energy.<sup>12</sup> The Caspian Sea, the Caucasus and the Black Sea regions are closely interlocked regarding oil, gas production and transportation. Since Putin came to power, he tried to develop good relations with the neighbouring oil and gas exporters that would fasten them to Russian pipelines. Putin made it very clear and sought to strengthen Russia's position in the Caspian Sea and also defend it. Even after '9/11 terrorist attacks', Russia used this terrorist threat as a point to defend the Caspian Sea region and to not demilitarise. (RFE/RL Newsline, 2002)

However, in this region, the *Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan* oil pipeline (BTC)<sup>13</sup> has been the most controversial which starts from the Azeri oil fields in the Caspian Sea via Tbilisi in Georgia and crossing the Turkish heartland to the south to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, all bypassing Russia. (Torbakov, 2002)

✓ **Russia and Kazakhstan—**

Russia-Kazakhstan relations have been fairly smooth since the demise of the Soviet Union. In October 2002, Russia upgraded its relations with Kazakhstan to the level of being strategic partners and termed Kazakhstan as Russia's 'closest and most consistent ally.' (RFE/RL Newsline, 2008)

Russia and Kazakhstan relations actually started accentuating only in the year 2005 when as many as ten summits took place between Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbaev and former Russian president Putin. In fact, in 2006, Nazarbaev termed the Russia-Kazakhstan relation as the "most effective model for bilateral cooperation in CIS", to which Putin called Kazakhstan "one of the most consistent supporters of the integration process in the post-Soviet space." (RFE/RL Newsline 13 January, 2006) Again in April 2006, Nazarbaev

---

<sup>12</sup> The Caspian Sea *problematique* strongly influences both the narrower Caucasus security sub-complex and parts of the Central Asian sub-complex.

<sup>13</sup> Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey signed a security agreement in early 2002, one of the purposes of which was to protect the BTC (Torbakov 2002a).

complimented Russia as the “locomotive of all integration processes in the post-Soviet area.” (RFE/RL Newline, 5 April 2006)

In the defence and security sector, Russia and Kazakhstan had undisputed issues in their relationship. Russia has been the most reliable partner in this region. (RFE/RL Newline, 31 October, 1997)

In fact in May 2006 Kazakh president Nazarbaev exclaimed that Russia and Kazakhstan were “fated by history itself to be eternal friends.” (RFE/RL Newline, 9 May 2006)

✓ **Russia and Kyrgyzstan—**

Kyrgyzstan has been very much dependent on Russia since the demise of the Soviet Union in economic, security and defence field. Kyrgyzstan has also been in the gambit of direct Islamic fundamentalist aggression. Hence, Russia’s support is indispensable for Kyrgyzstan. Against Russia’s agreement on taking care of Kyrgyzstan’s security, it wants Kyrgyzstan to work towards evicting the US airbase in Manas settled in there for operations in Afghanistan since September 2001. (Nygren, 2008: 187) In fact, Kyrgyzstan’s president Atambayev told visiting US officials that all foreign troops must be withdrawn from the Manas international airport in 2014. It has been understood that this new statement of Atambayev came ahead of his visit to Moscow. Over the past 18 months from 2012, Kyrgyzstan has received more than \$100 million in aid from Russia. Kyrgyzstan is also a member of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation. (The Hindu, 21 February, 2012)

✓ **Russia and Tajikistan—**

Regarding relations between Russia and Tajikistan, although Russia was indifferent to almost all the Central Asian states yet Tajikistan was a sole exception. (Jackson, 2003: 144) Russia and Tajikistan signed a friendship, cooperation and assistance agreement in May 1993. (Jackson, 2003: 164) Russia was a major supporter of Tajik Communist party leader Rakhmonov during the civil war crises. In fact Rakhmonov came to power with the assistance of Russia. Tajikistan is

the only CIS country without an army of its own. Therefore, even during the Tajik civil war, the pilots were Russian and the Russian 201<sup>st</sup> motorised division fought on behalf of the Tajik central Government. (Panfilov 2000)

Tajikistan having to share its long and porous border with the volatile Afghanistan has numerous sorts of soft security threats. Tajikistan has been most influenced by developments in Afghanistan since the Taliban came to power in 1996. For all of these reasons Tajikistan has been dependent on Russia for its security. (*OMRI DD* 31 January 1996)

✓ **Russia and Turkmenistan—**

Turkmenistan adopted the neutral status in the year 1993 and subsequently ended the border cooperation with Russia in the year 1999. (Jonson 2004: 45) Turkmenistan keeps itself isolated from the other CIS states. Although it is a member of the CIS but it is not very active and moreover Turkmenistan is not a member of the Collective Security Treaty (CST). Turkmenistan has hence a different attitude towards Russia and other CIS states. It has been almost independent of Russian influence in its economic and security aspects. So, even if in the future some prospects of Russia-Turkmenistan show up it is apprehended to be moderate. (ibid: 45)

### **CSTO'S ROLE IN MAINTAINING SECURITY IN THE POST SOVIET SPACE**

*“The CSTO is also meant as a symbolic continuator of the Soviet-era Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) and a consolation prize for Russia’s loss of that political–military bloc in Central and Eastern Europe.”*

---Socor (2009)

This chapter will focus on the security integration process of the post-Soviet space in general and that of the role of CSTO in particular. The chapter will be a descriptive analysis of the creation and evolution of the CSTO and the legal basis of its foundation. It will also lay down an analysis of the successes and failures of this Russian-led organisation in countering the soft and hard security threats of the post-Soviet space.

#### **3.1 INTRODUCTION—**

One of the traditional principles of Russian security policy is its insufficient want and desire for security. This thing gets expressed itself in expansion and buffer zones since the days of the Soviet Union. Collective security arrangement at that time existed in the form of the Warsaw Pact. Nowadays this feature of Russia is seen in its collective security integration in the shape of the Russian-led military cooperation in the CSTO as well as with China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). (Haas 2008: 3)

The pursuit of integration process in the post-Soviet space is not just about institutions but also about ideas and vision that the region is some sort of political community. Though the Commonwealth of Independent states (CIS) lacks the internal drive for development, the CSTO does show some coherent qualities with continued development. The only disadvantage with the CSTO is that it has a relatively restricted command with only seven members till very recently. The members are

Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Whatsoever, the CSTO indicates a small step towards the genuine way for the development of a strong and dynamic integration process in the post-Soviet space. (Richard Sakwa, 2010: 195)

In fact on May 2008, Russian president Dmitri Medvedev stated that strengthening Russia's ties with other former Soviet Republics would be the leading concern for his presidency and in fact his first foreign visit was to Kazakhstan. (Moscow Times, 23 May 2008)

### **3.2 RUSSIA'S AIMS TOWARDS INTEGRATION PROCESS IN THE POST SOVIET SPACE**

Russia always had the drive to create something in consonant with the Russia Empire or the Soviet Union. It was a drive to maintaining stability in the region as a vital element to its national interest and the draft 'Basic Provisions of the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation' in December 1992 insisted that the creation of a "*belt of good-neighbourliness*" was Russia's primary goal. (Valdez 1995: 94)

Putin's presidency saw two main concerns:

- Focus on strengthening internal hierarchy within Russia.
- Attempt to make Russia the system forming power or *Ordnungsmatch* in the CIS.

Earlier, relations with CIS member states were complex. Hence Putin came about with the development of sub-regional organisations like the CSTO whereby Russia could take the lead and bind its allies to itself. As Buzan and Waever explain, "*the aim here was to give an institutional form to the creation of a regional security complex.*" (Richard Sakwa, 2010: 196) This would also help Russia pursue its broader goals of notable opposition to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to prevent the latter's extension into the post-Soviet space. (*Moskovskii komsomolets*, 3 March 2009). New forms of potential integration in the post-Soviet Eurasia remain possible though in certain respects, the existing level of association might be difficult

to maintain. (Pivovar, 2008). Trofimchuk (2007) questions the fact that whether Russia while going on for a collective integration would be able to count on the support of its neighbours and which of the countries could be used against Russia and which of them could be the potential strategic partners. (Trofimchuk 1997, Richard Sakwa, 2010: 198)

In the post-Soviet era, regional integration has been limited. It has been sensed that economic integration has not become very effective while security integration has been rather more effective and productive. Security integration has aimed to boost up the power of leaderships in the region and hence have developed in a more profound manner. (Collins 2009)

A very important key feature of Russian foreign policy is the aspect of multilateralism<sup>14</sup>. Both Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin sincerely professed deep connection to the principle of multilateralism in foreign policy of Russia. Moreover, another feature of Putin presidency that is energy politics also shapes Russia's engagement in multilateral institutions. Regional multilateral initiatives like CSTO and SCO can be treated as exhibitions of the concept of multilateralism. (Elana Wilson Rowe and Stina Torjesen, 2009: 1-7)

Russia's engagements with the former Soviet countries reap reciprocal benefits in these relationships between equals. Though Russia does have a dominant role in the region yet beneficial outcomes have yielded both for Russia and the other post-Soviet states. The Russian leadership credits international importance to the idea of Russia being "*one of the largest Eurasian powers..... [which] predetermines Russia's responsibility for maintaining security in the world on both global and regional levels.*" (Y.Primakov, 2004: 76)

---

<sup>14</sup> Refers to the institutions and issue areas that involve multiple countries (three or more) working in concert in a sustained manner

The key characteristics of Russia's multilateral engagement in the post-Soviet space includes-

- ✓ The significance of Russian influence/dominance in the former Soviet space as an instrument for enhancing great power status globally.
- ✓ An increasingly ambitious and pragmatic engagement in the 'near abroad'.
- ✓ Efforts to balance the introduction of market principles with the perceived imperative to establish Russian leadership.
- ✓ A reactive and competitive regional multilateralism against 'Western' multilateral arrangements.
- ✓ Limits to Russian institutional power that result in multilateral efforts supported by bilateralism and informal relationships between heads of state in the region.

(ibid: 14-15)

Basically, three multilateral institutions largely serve towards legitimising Russia's foothold in the post-Soviet region. These institutions are the CIS, the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC) and the CSTO. While the EEC institutionalises the economic alliance of Russia with Central Asian states, the CSTO institutionalises security alliance of Russia in the post-Soviet space. (Robert Legvold, 2009: 55)

The Collective Security Treaty and its successor the CSTO has been a concrete step by Russia towards a mutual security arrangement. It may be defined as a collective action agency intended to deal with thematic threat like terrorism, but being a military organisation, it points outward and addresses to threats originating beyond the borders of its members. It is often treated as a counterpart to NATO. (Robert Legvold, 2009: 28-29)

### **3.3 THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY ORGANISATION (CSTO)**

Security relation is an arena where Russia has been relatively powerful and successful. Russia's military might has been profound worldwide and alliances and multilateral security cooperation constitute Russia's military genius. The

development of Russia-led security organisation, CSTO was set up in the 1990s to address the emerging regional security needs. A key intention of Russia's efforts towards security integration through CSTO was its desire to secure the military dependability of the states of post-Soviet space. The aim was to create a 'security belt' around the Russian Federation and in this way, maintain Moscow's hegemonic presence on the Eurasian continent. Russian analyst A. Hramchihin states that, "*Russia sees in it one of the rudiments of USSR, which are highly valued in Kremlin on considerations of a purely psychological nature.*" (Rozanov, 2010: 1)

As a matter of fact, among the various efforts to create a collective security system in the post-Soviet space, the CSTO has been the most successful attempt. It is because CSTO has a clear military dimension. The participating countries of the CSTO have a very different perspective regarding its goals and objectives. The member-states of the Russia-led CSTO are from the three most important strategic routes—the European (Belarus), the Caucasian (Armenia) and the Central Asian (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan). These allies of Russia often perceive Russia as a country that will provide a 'security umbrella' and assist modernisation of arms and weapons on a preferential basis. Basically, these countries like to think of Russia as their security guardian. (Anatoly Rozanov, 2010: 1)

But it seems that the CSTO would have been a mere 'paper tiger' if not for the CSTO Common Military Force. The military force of CSTO has been increasingly active in the Central Asian region. About 10,000 personnel have been tasked with the responsibility of responding to external threats of the region. (McDermott, 2008) Currently, the CSTO's military component consists of Collective Rapid Deployment Forces, to further include ten battalions (4,000). Russian military experts while commenting on these plans consider that, "*it likely that higher readiness formations contributing to this new structure would remain in the host country on combat readiness status to react to any potential threat from the south.*" (www.gazeta.ru, Moscow, September 12).



### 3.4 CSTO EVOLUTION

It was on May 15, 1992 during the Tashkent meeting of the Council of the Heads of States of six CIS countries namely Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, “*taking into account the formation by the states parties of their own armed forces*”<sup>15</sup>, signed the Treaty on Collective Security also known as the Tashkent treaty.

The prime essence of it constituted the following provisions---

*“In the case one of the state parties is subjected to an aggression by any state or a group of states, this shall be considered as an aggression against all the state parties of the present Treaty. In the case an act of aggression is directed against any of the state parties, all other state parties shall provide it necessary assistance, including military assistance, and shall also support it by all means available in exercise of the right of collective defence under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. The state parties shall immediately report to the Security Council of the United Nations about the measures taken in conformity with the present Article. While implementing these measures the state parties shall abide by the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter”*<sup>16</sup>

- **The Specifics of the Collective Security Treaty**

Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union when new kind of security threats had to be dealt by the newly independent states along with their own troubles of state- building, the demand of the hour was the finding of a model that could successfully guarantee security to these states. Regarding the military cooperation of the CIS, Anatoly Rozanov cites three developments, “*Multilateral military and military-technical cooperation in the framework of the council of Defence ministers of the CIS member states, Multilateral military, political-military and military-technical cooperation in the*

---

<sup>15</sup> CIS Treaty on Collective Security (May 15, 1992), at Preamble.

<sup>16</sup> CIS Treaty on Collective Security (May 15, 1992), at Preamble, Art 4

*framework of the Treaty of Collective Security and Bilateral cooperation in the military field based on bilateral treaties and agreements.”(Anatoly Rozanov, 2010: 3)*

The Treaty of Collective Security (TCS) was signed on 15 May, 1992 in Tashkent. Previously it was referred to as the Tashkent Treaty but the name inapt once Uzbekistan in 1999 quit from the Treaty. The initial parties to the Collective Security Treaty were Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Later members were Azerbaijan (joined on 24 September, 1993), Belarus (joined on 31 December 1993) and Georgia (joined on 9 December 1993). (Rozanov, 2010: 3) The Collective Security Treaty (later renamed the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) was set to remain for a 5-year period unless further extended. On April 2, 1999, only six members of the CST signed a protocol renewing the treaty for another five year period except Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan. However, in 2005, Uzbekistan withdrew from GUAM and rejoined the CSTO in 2006. However, Uzbekistan very recently withdrew its membership from CSTO for a second time on 28<sup>th</sup> June 2012. Conceptually, the TCS is of a strictly defensive nature. It gives priority on political basis for dealing with military conflicts. The states, party to the Treaty call for mutual cooperation with each other in the area of international security. ((Anatoly Rozanov, 2010: 5)

**According to the concept of the TCS, the collective security of the participating states is based on the following main principles--**

- ✓ Indivisibility of Security: an aggression against one participating state is aggression against all.
- ✓ Parallel and similar responsibility of the participating states in providing security.
- ✓ Maintenance of territorial integrity, respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs.
- ✓ Collective nature of the defence, provided on a regional basis.
- ✓ Consensus-based decision making on the key issues of providing collective security.
- ✓ Correspondence of force organisation and readiness to the scale of military threat.(Ibid :7-8)

### **Three main stages of the Collective security system---**

- ✓ Completing the establishment of armed forces of the participating states, developing a programme of military and military cooperation among participating states and starting its implementation, developing and adopting legal acts regulating the functioning of the collective security system.
- ✓ Creating coalition group of forces to repel a possible aggression, introducing related operational planning creating a joint air defence system.
- ✓ Completing the creation of the collective security system.

(Ibid: 8-9)

The political and security scenario since the 1990s had started changing drastically. By the end of 1994, the situation in the Caucasus became extremely disturbed. The problem in Chechnya extended and Islamic fundamentalism in Dagestan, victory of Taliban regime in Afghanistan had direct effects in the neighbouring Central Asia. This entire situation demanded an effective action of a collective security system. By 2000-2001, in order to increase the efficiency of the TCS system, reform attempts came about in the form of summits of the TCS Heads of the States. These summits were as follows---

#### **1. The Minsk session of the Collective Security Council, 24 May 2000:**

The important decisions and documents adopted during this session were—

- ✓ Memorandum on the efficiency of the TCS of 15 May 1992 and its adaptation to the contemporary geopolitical situation.
- ✓ Provision on the procedure for taking and implementing collective decisions for the uses of forces and means of the collective security system.
- ✓ On the main principles of the coalition strategy of the states participating in the Treaty on Collective Security of 15 May 1992.
- ✓ Model of the regional system of collective security.

It accomplished the task to undertake practical steps in the creation of regional structures in the collective security system and mechanisms for use of multinational forces and means in providing the necessary support to TCS participating states in crisis situation.

## **2. The Bishkek session of the Collective Security Council , October 2000:**

It adopted a set of interrelated decisions defining the process of practical creation of components of the collective security system, and the system as a whole. An initiation for the creation of the Central Asian regional forces with the formation of its nucleus limited in scale Collective Rapid Reaction Forces (CRRF) was made. Not only that, it was also decided that a creation of the Central staff body will be made for the interaction among the regional security systems. The parties also signed an 'Agreement on the Status of the Forces of the Collective Security System' and adopted a Plan for the main activities in the creation of the collective security system 2001-2005.

## **3. The Yerevan session of the Collective Security Council, May 2001:**

The most essential step taken in this session was the signing by the Heads of States of the Protocol on the procedures for creating and functioning of the forces of the collective security system of the participating states of the TCS. The Council's decision was to create an intergovernmental body for military command of the collective security system of the TCS parties. In the year 2001, the TCS parties took practical steps towards the establishment of rapid reaction forces of the Central Asian region of the collective security with 1300 personnel. These forces were adapted to conduct mobile operations and swift occupation for eradication of limited groups of terrorists.

(Ibid: 10-13)

### **• CREATION OF THE CSTO**

By the mid of 2001, there occurred a balance of power shift in the Caspian and the Central Asian region. The US apart from focussing on economic consolidation, became more available as a military-political power by building military bases. Russia's military-political presence was till then in this region mainly through the instruments of TCS and the 201<sup>st</sup> infantry division stationed in Tajikistan. However, the TCS states did not have the military-technical and financial capacity. Therefore just after ten years later at the anniversary session of the Collective Security Council

on 14 May 2002 in Moscow, TCS was transformed into an international regional organisation namely the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). CSTO creation led to not only the strengthening of internal integration of the states but it also gave it an international significance. The CSTO Charter and Agreement on the CSTO legal status entered into force on 18 September 2003. By December 2003 the personnel strength of the CRRF in the Central Asian region increased 2.5 times. The multinational HQ of the armed forces of the member states tasked with operational command and control of the Collective Rapid Reaction Forces began working on January 1, 2004. The CSTO member states also introduced the preferential regime of military technical cooperation. Russia at that time contributed 50% of the financing of all activities in the framework of CSTO, while other five members were to contribute 10% each. (Ibid: 13-16)

In the CSC session of Minsk on 23 June 2006, the decision to reinstitute Uzbekistan in CSTO was signed. (M.Tyshchenko, 2009: 16)

*As put by Weinstein, “if anti-terrorism and suspicion of NATO brought the CSTO powers together, the American invasion of Iraq firmly cemented the CSTO relations on the basis of fear of American power. . . [and] democracy enforcement” (Weinstein, 2007: 167-178)*

Hence, as Anatoily A. Rozanov cites, *“The CSTO was established on the basis of an international treaty towards the achievement of specific objectives (strengthening peace, international and regional security and stability, collective protection of the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of member states<sup>17</sup>), acts in accordance with the principles of international law<sup>18</sup>, has an independent system of bodies<sup>19</sup> and autonomous will, independent of the will of the member states,*

---

<sup>17</sup> Article 3 of the CSTO Charter

<sup>18</sup> Preamble and Article 5 of the CSTO Charter

<sup>19</sup> Article 1 of the CSTO Charter

*expressed in the rights to make decisions , including mandatory ones, and to conduct international cooperation activities<sup>20</sup>.” (Rozanov 2010)*

**The documents adopted after the creation of CSTO are-**

- ✓ The decision of the CSTO Collective Security Council “*On the Concept for creating and functioning of the mechanism for the CSTO peacekeeping activity*” of 18 June 2004.
- ✓ Priority directions for the activity of the CSTO in the second half of 2006, approved by a CSC decision of June 2005.
- ✓ Plan for the collective actions of the member states of the CSTO for the application of the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy 2008-2012, approved by a CSC decision of 5 September 2009.

(Anatoly Rozanov, 2010: 25)

• **CSTO BODIES:**

The following structures function presently in the CSTO—

- ✓ Collective Security Council (CSC)
- ✓ Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM)
- ✓ Council of Defence Ministers (CDM)
- ✓ Committee of the Secretaries of the Security Council (CSSC)<sup>21</sup>
- ✓ Permanent Council
- ✓ CSTO Parliamentary Assembly
- ✓ Secretariat
- ✓ Supporting bodies of CSTO

---

<sup>20</sup> Articles 5 and 12 of the CSTO Charter

<sup>21</sup> Article 11 of the CSTO Charter

### **3.5 MILITARY-TECHNICAL COMPONENTS OF THE CSTO:**

The CSTO is in a process to increase its military-technical component. CSTO Secretary-General Nikolai Bordyuzha, revealed plans on the characteristics of the organization stressing on two main objectives: transforming the CSTO into a multi-functional international arrangement which will be better equipped in responding to broader issues that will further contribute in enhancing its military component. The decision was followed by the CSTO summit in Moscow on September 5, 2008 as a result of the 2008 conflict in Georgia. Technically, the CSTO's military component clearly envisages enhancing of the affinity of both management and weaponry with the help of timely joint operations. (Nurshat Ababakirov, 2008)

The significant step in the military field of the CSTO was the signing of the agreement on the status of the force formations of the collective security system on the main principles of military-technical cooperation, the protocol on the procedures for creating and functioning of the forces of the collective security system of the states participating in TCS, the model of a regional collective security system and the provisions on the procedures for taking and implementing decisions for the use of forces of the collective security system.

The creation of the **Collective Rapid Reaction Forces (CRRF)** in August 2001 was a fundamental step taken towards developing the military component of the CSTO. The CRRF works as a nucleus of the CSTO in the post Soviet Central Asia and Belarus and Armenia. Military exercises of the CRRF are taking place since 2004 and also include the practising of anti-terrorist task. An anti-drug operation is conducted annually by the name of "Channel" since 2003. Operations for countering illegal migration have been going on since 2006 under "Nelegal CSTO". (Dovgan, 2010: 61) Russia's plans for the ten-battalion stronger CSTO Rapid Deployment Force to provide security in the Central Asian region against "threats to sovereignty" will aim to provide for the greater degree of military control in this region, enabling the accumulation of forces during emergency situations. Moreover, Russia also plans to establish an anti-aircraft defence system to sustain the vigour of the forces. (Nurshat Ababakirov, 2008)

An agreement on the peacekeeping activity of the CSTO was signed on 6 October 2007 at the Dushanbe Session of the Collective Security Council (CSC). It foresees

the creation of the **CSTO peacekeeping forces (PF)** in a permanent basis. According to this agreement, the CSTO member states will act collectively employing military, police and civilian personnel in order to prevent, deter and terminate military activities between states or within a state in the case of intervention by a third country. The decision for conducting a peacekeeping operation on the territory of a CSTO member state will be taken by the Collective Security Council with account for the national legislation and on the basis of an official request. The composition, organisation and personnel strength of the CSTO peacekeeping forces will be determined by an individual decision of the CSC for each operation. The peacekeeping forces are made up of peacekeeping contingents of the CSTO member states. The contingents are trained on the basis of common programmes equipped with common and weapons and communications. They take part in regular joint exercises. Again, on 4 February, 2009 at a session of CSC in Moscow, the heads of states – the members of CSTO decided to create **CSTO Collective Operational Reaction Forces (CORF)**. The signed framework agreement on the CSTO Collective Operational Reaction Forces determines the status, the functioning and the procedure for employing CORF defined in Article 2 of the Agreement. CORF has the main tasks like support in preventing and repealing armed aggression and localising military conflicts, participation in countering international terrorism and transnational organised crime, illegal trafficking of narcotics, strengthening the protection of state borders and sites of key importance on the territories of member states, emergency management and humanitarian assistance. The quantitative parameters of CORF as determined on 14 June 2009 of the CSC Moscow session are as follows--- it consists of military contingents of approximately 18,000 total personnel strength and special purpose forces including 1500 officers and staff of the respective structures. Russia assigns to CORF the 98<sup>th</sup> Guards Airborne Division and the 31<sup>st</sup> Guards Assault Brigade. Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan contribute one assault brigade each and Kyrgyzstan contributes a reconnaissance company. The special purpose police detachments “Zubr” and “Ryis” from Russia, the special rapid reaction unit from Kyrgyzstan have already been assigned to CORF special purpose forces. (Dovgan, 2010: 61-66)

Russia aims that the CSTO has the potential grow into a united military-economic long-term program covering the period until 2015. As Nurshat Ababakirov cites



Dmitriy Medvedev, “*the CSTO has a “special mission”, and to support it in its early years of operation, it is crucial to develop the organization’s military potential.*” Russia is expected to support it with weapons, whereas other member states may provide with fuel, foodstuffs for the force. (Nurshat Ababakirov, 2008)

### **3.6 CSTO’S ROLE AND ACTION IN VARIOUS SPHERES:**

Secretary General of the CSTO Nikolai Bordyuzha states, “*The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is operating in a complex geopolitical environment. In addition to existing challenges and threats, new negative trends have arisen in recent years.*” (Nikolai Bordyuzha, 2011)

Lately, the foreign policy component has also come to the forefront. The member states have been closely cooperating on the international arena and on key regional and global issues like countering various challenges already mentioned earlier (Anatoly Rozanov, 2010: 53).

The member states achieved practical coordination and definition of common approaches to issues such as strategic and long term stability form non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technologies, reform of OSCE, post-conflict settlement in Afghanistan, enhancing the efficiency of United Nations etc. (Nikolai Bordyuzha, 2005: 72).

Regarding the case of Afghanistan, the Russian led CSTO is assertively expanding its strategic influence in the region of Central Asia as it is the one which is most affected by the activities that take place in Afghanistan. CSTO has successfully established security relationship with Afghanistan for maintaining a regional air defence system. In 2007, a CSTO working group visited Kabul which led to talks that marked the beginning of ‘direct contacts’ between CSTO and the Afghan Government. More focus was put on the revival of Islamic radicalism and drug trafficking. The CSTO strongly feels that these security issues need to be resolved. Not only is the CSTO interested to resolve these issues but the Afghan side also is

interested and hence look forward train military and law enforcement officers in Russia and purchasing Russian artillery. All these assistance needed for improving the border security of Afghanistan in terms of both personnel and technical training. Regarding the implementation of such security terms, the CSTO created a working group on Afghanistan in 2005 under the auspices of the organisation's Foreign Ministers' Council to strengthen Afghan security institutions and improve anti-trafficking measures. Thereafter, on 14 March, a CSTO statement revealed that the group intends to transform the Channel 2006 anti-drug initiative to check the practice of trafficking out of Afghanistan. (Sergei Blagov, 2007)

As per the foreign policy component of the CSTO, it strengthened since the meeting of ministers of foreign affairs of the CSTO member states on 5 November 2002 that dedicated to discuss about the situation around Iraq. Not only that, implementing CSC decisions, the CSTO member states cooperated and established contacts with the UN, OSCE, SCO and others. Regarding the political dimension of the CSTO, one vital accomplishment is that since 2 December 2004, CSTO has an observer status in the United Nations General Assembly. The Agreement on the CSTO peacekeeping activity came into force on 16 January 2009. CSTO has been repeatedly helping the UN peacekeeping forces through operations in the required area of disturbance, for instance- the participation of CSTO in Afghanistan in the fight against drugs and terrorist activities. On 2 March 2010, the UN General Assembly adopted by consensus a resolution on the "Cooperation between the United Nations Organisation and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation" through which it laid the necessary legal foundation for practical cooperation between the United Nations Organisation and the CSTO. (Anatoly Rozanov, 2010: 53-55).

The challenges in the post-Soviet space are varied and require adequate political response from the CSTO. CSTO hence has developed a well-oiled system of political coordination. For this, it has equipped itself with the necessary military power and the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF) and its peacekeeping contingent, the East European and Caucasus regional groups of forces and the Central Asian Collective Rapid Deployment Force, amount the organization's military component. The CRRF is a universal tool capable of resolving conflicts of varying degrees of intensity, conducting special operations to crash terrorist attacks and violent extremist action

and preventing and responding to emergency situations. The CSTO is making joint efforts to counter new kind of situations to collective security. Instances of some joint operations code named are Kanal, Nalagal and Proxy. Since the 2010 unrest in Kyrgyzstan, the CSTO has improved its crises management capabilities a lot including political monitoring infrastructure to prevent conflicts. If a crises break out in the territory of CSTO, the CSTO has developed and tested a sequence of actions to provide timely logistic and humanitarian aid and information support. The CSTO Head of States informal meeting on 12 August 2011 was held in Astana where Agreements were reached to promote CSTO's solidarity, mutual support and capabilities to protect the constitutional systems, sovereignty and territorial integrity of its members and to use the organisation as an intermediary in resolving bilateral disputes. Proposals are being developed for joint efforts against drug trafficking, terrorism, extremism and other organised crimes. It includes a program to militarise the CRRF by providing military-technical assistance to armed forces, border troops and law enforcement agencies of some CSTO members. Measures are also being developed to improve CSTO's collective response to natural and man-made disasters, and there are proposals for adapting the decision-making process to deal with emergency situations. Hence it has been seen that reforms are continuously being made for the improvement of the collective security system under the CSTO. (Nikolai Bordyuzha, 2011)

The CSTO has a minuscule membership of just six members. And each member has unlimited trust in this mechanism, instances of feedback from different member states on the CSTO mechanism speaks so. Bilateral cooperation under the CSTO mechanism has been seen all over. For instance- we can take the examples of cooperation between CSTO and individual members. On December 20, 2011, members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) reached an agreement which deters any member of CSTO to let a foreign country install its military base on the territory of CSTO without unanimous consent of all the members of the CSTO. It also gives Russia the power to veto any foreign country with plans to establish bases in the territory of member countries. Hence, this move empowers Russia's efforts to counter balance the US military presence and influence in its neighbourhood. (Interfax, December 21, Tajikistan Monitor, 2012).

CSTO's momentum has been increasing over the past few years. Apart from collective drills, CSTO started conducting sportive competitions among military and non-military personnel. The motive behind was to raise the prestige of military service, nurture patriotism, and promotion of healthy lifestyle. The Russian military defence majorly funds these activities and therefore dominates it thus recalling the Soviet style of supra-national integration.

### **CO OPERATION BETWEEN CSTO AND INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS:**

We can make case studies of various co operations under the CSTO mechanism, most relations being bilateral.

- **CSTO and Belarus —**

Nikolai Bordyuzha on 21 February 2012 at a press conference stated that, *“Belarus has always been traditionally a very active member of the CSTO.”* Belarus has forwarded a good number of “very creative proposals” aiming at the improvement of CSTO activity. These proposals include implementation of CSTO collective protection and crisis response mechanisms. (Belarus.by, 2012)

It has been observed that President of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko is in favour of stepping up military and political cooperation of Belarus and Russia in the CSTO. As Lukashenko told Nikolai Patrushev, the secretary of the Security Council of Russia, *“Positive and negative aspects of our military and political union CSTO are prominent more than ever. Yet we can state that all CSTO members agree the organisation is developing in the right direction. It has acquired more dynamics recently.”*(Law.by, 2012) Nikolai Patrushev in fact welcomes a closer cooperation of Russia and Belarus within the framework of CSTO for the mutual benefit of the two countries.<sup>22</sup>

Very recently bilateral relations among Belarus and Kazakhstan have shown prospect all around like in trade and economic relations, implementation of the agreements and cooperation between the two states in the CIS, CSTO and SES. (Law.by, 2012)

---

<sup>22</sup> “President of Belarus stands for activation of politico-military cooperation of Belarus and Russia within framework of CSTO”, 01.03.2012, URL: <http://www.tvr.by/eng/president.asp?id=63519>

- **CSTO and Armenia —**

Armenia is a full member of the CSTO. Nikolai Bordyuzha is in full support for Armenia, and regarding CSTO'S position on the Karabakh conflict, he says that the organisation is not interfering but monitoring the situation. As Bordyuzha recalling Russia's efforts into CSTO of the Armenian-Azerbaijani summits says, "There is an OSCE Minsk Group acting as a mediator in negotiations." Regarding CSTO's position in case of the Karabakh conflict, the Secretary General of CSTO claimed that the CSTO is not only a military organisation but also has political and peacekeeping potential, thus justifying CSTO's position in the conflict. Armenia further has the full support of CSTO in the conflict and will get the required assistance as full member of the CSTO. (Lurer.com, 21.2.2012) There would be possible deployment of the CSTO peacekeepers in Karabakh as a support to Armenia to which Armenia will applaud and welcome to the CSTO decision. (Naira Hayrumyan, 2012) However such cooperative attempts of the CSTO and Armenia has been seen by Azerbaijan as an anti-Azarbaijani policy. The statements of the Secretary General have somehow provoked the situation. However a spokesman of the organisation clarified that the CSTO is not a side in the Nogorno-Karabakh conflict. The OSCE MINSK group co- chaired by Russia is just working on settling the conflict. (Vestnik Kavkaza, 22.02.2012)

Another illustration of Armenia and CSTO cooperation is the "Cooperation 2012", which is a CSTO military exercise to be held in Armenia on 3-8 September 2012. The theme of the cooperation is named as "*the application of the CSTO joint forces and measures in Caucasus with the CSTO forces of quick reaction*". Armenian Minister of Defense accomplishes the general leading of the preparation and holding of the military exercises. Representatives of the Ministries of Defense of the CSTO member-countries, interested Ministries and the representatives of every Force of the CSTO member countries may be included in the staff of the leadership of the exercises. The first staff negotiations of the CSTO member-countries' delegates and Armenian interested Ministries will take place on February 28-March 1 during which these the preparation issues of the military exercise will be discussed. (Times.am, 28.2.2012)

- **CSTO and Kazakhstan—**

Kazakhstan is one of the greatest Central Asian countries with a long border with Russia. It has very tight economic and trade relations with Russia and Russian minority resides in Kazakhstan. It is in all probability the closest ally of Russia and a very loyal member of the Russia-led CIS organizations and the CSTO. (Iniutin, 2006: 28f) During Kazakhstan's presidency of the CSTO, the protection of information and further strengthening of Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF) were to be amongst the priorities of CSTO member states. As Nursultan Nazarbaev stated, "*Kazakhstan considers the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as an important institute for mutual cooperation in the sphere of military construction, protection of territorial integrity and sovereignty of the member states, as well as a tool providing national security*". Kazakhstan has been a very loyal member of the CSTO. For instance, it was in August 2006, that CSTO held its largest military exercises in Aktau in Kazakhstan, named *Rubezh 2006*. The 2500 defence personnel as well as many armoured vehicles and war planes were from CSTO member states Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia participated in the exercise. All the CSTO's major command components comprising of its standing joint headquarters, permanent joint staff and secretariat participated in the exercise. (Richard Weitz, 2008)

- **CSTO and Russia—**

The CSTO may be conceived as a Russian instrument of uniting its member states on ideological grounds with Russia being the leader of the organization. Through the CSTO, Russia continues to diffuse its political interest and influence and reaching out for leadership in military cooperation. (Erica Marat, 2008) Moscow regards the CSTO as a key organisation to respond to regional challenges and other hard security threats. (Alexandrova Lyudmila, 2009)

Russia wants a strong CSTO so that it could be used as a mechanism to shape the geo-strategic designs in the post-Soviet space in Russian lines. (John A. Mowchan, 2009: 1-6)

- **CSTO and Kyrgyzstan—**

Kyrgyzstan is located in Central Asia. It is located at a very crucial zone for drug trafficking and potential terrorism. It also has its closeness to Afghanistan and its territory thrives with U.S. activity. For this reason, Russia has its full military presence in Kyrgyzstan. The Kant Air base of Russia have been in fact expanding and upgrading. Highly designed Soviet style Su-25 ground attack aircraft and Su-27 fighter aircraft has been developed. The number of fighter aircrafts has also been increased with the increase in the number of personnel. The Kant airbase is of great significance as it majorly carries out its tasks during the operations of CSTO. (Habibe Ozdal, 2010)

While analyzing CSTO's role in the recent events that took place in Kyrgyzstan where the CSTO did not took effective steps, the significance of the CSTO was questioned. As some analyst pointed out, "*But when CSTO member Kyrgyzstan erupted in violence earlier this year, the CSTO did nothing, exposing the organization to criticism that it is a paper tiger.*" (Bektour Iskender, 2010)

During the crisis of Kyrgyzstan, the provisional government of Kyrgyzstan seeked the help of Russian troops. This Kyrgyz crisis was then referred to CSTO by Russia. But what came into the light of facts was that CSTO proved inefficient in responding to the Kyrgyzstan crises. The valid on reasons such that as supported Article 2 of the CSTO charter, the organisation could help in such a situation only in the event it threatens the security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of one or several members and that the crisis further threatens international peace and security. Moreover, Article 4 of the CSTO charter states that "*in case an act of aggression is committed against any of the Member States, all [other] Member States will provide ... necessary assistance, including military ..., as well as provide support with the means at their disposal in exercise of the right to collective defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter*". Hence, the official reason given regarding CSTO's very less role in this crisis was that the situation called for internal political turmoil and domestic concern rather than an external threat, so the CSTO was not in a situation to respond in a concrete way. (Bektour Iskender, 2010)

- **CSTO and Uzbekistan---**

The relations between the CSTO and Uzbekistan have not been very steady. Uzbekistan had been one of the founding members of the Collective Security Treaty, which was once known as the Tashkent Treaty but the name became void once Uzbekistan withdrew from the treaty in 1998 and went to join GUAM. But it later rejoined CSTO again. However, things were not still very stable with Uzbekistan recently until it finally for a second time withdrew from the CSTO on 28<sup>th</sup> June 2012.

But during the CSTO summits the ambiguity regarding the membership of Uzbekistan was indeed raised. In October, 2011, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko made a highly critical statement towards Uzbekistan for the “triple game” the country plays in its foreign policy. Such a game is incompatible with Uzbekistan’s membership in the CSTO, Lukashenko said. Moreover, the Belarusian President warned that without the CSTO, it will be difficult for Uzbekistan to safeguard its independence; “we shouldn’t joke here; the world today is very unstable.” Lukashenko pointed out two things; firstly, all other members except for Russia and Belarus as sources of divergences and disunity among the member countries. The second statement singled out Uzbekistan as a member causing problems for the CSTO. Thus Lukashenko implied that only Russia and Belarus have the right positions within the CSTO, while Uzbekistan is especially problematic. Lukashenko’s statements revealed the persistence of geopolitics and ambiguity concerning integration processes in the post-Soviet space. These circumstances are especially challenging for Uzbekistan. In this complicated context, Karimov’s participation in the CIS and CSTO summits on one hand, acknowledged the “historical role” the CIS has played throughout the post-Soviet period acknowledging that it was difficult to imagine what would have happened if the CIS had not existed. On the other hand, his attendance at the CSTO summit was more reserved. His seeming optimism about the CIS and moderate “no-veto approach” to the CSTO’s decision regarding the deployment of foreign military bases, once again reflected Tashkent’s “one-step forward, one step back” strategic posture within these two post-Soviet structures. (Farkhod Tolipov, 2012)



At the CIS summit, Uzbekistan's position was expressed in terms of its long-term national interest connected to Uzbekistan's need for modernization and for cooperation to correspond with its national legislation and international obligations. Karimov confirmed that Uzbekistan remains in the organization but failed to demonstrate any clear desire to reduce its cooperation with the US. A strategic partnership agreement between the U.S. and Uzbekistan is in force since 2002. Uzbekistan together with all CSTO members is part of the NDN which, among other things, requires mutual trust and cooperation not only between the CSTO members but also between them and the U.S./NATO. The CIS and CSTO summits in Moscow seem to have been preceded by an ultimate warning from Belarus and Russia towards Uzbekistan to make a choice regarding the direction of its foreign policy. The summits coincided in time with the new strategic turn in Afghanistan and expectations to coordinate policies ahead of the Russian presidential elections. The new stage of post-Soviet regional integration will depend on Russia's attitude towards other former Soviet states. (ibid)

However, recent news suggests that Uzbekistan has finally suspended its membership in the CSTO. The consequences however could be disastrous as its departure from this defence bloc would lead to new security risks in the region and it seems that US might have an extra advantage due to this step of Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan's decision favours the position of US by building a cavity in the otherwise security arrangement made by Russia in its area of influence. But a silver lining could also be seen amidst this decision, as from the very beginning Uzbekistan has not proved to be a very stable and loyal member of the CSTO and been creating problems within the organisation. By its departure at least Russia can now consolidate the CSTO and increase cooperation among the remaining active members. It is believed that nevertheless, CSTO's importance will accelerate once the US-led forces withdraw finally from Afghanistan. (Vladimir Radyuhin, 11 July 2012: The Hindu page 11)

- **CSTO and Tajikistan—**

Tajikistan is a small, mountainous and landlocked Central Asian country. It is also a very active member of the CSTO. Tajikistan is most affected by

developments in Afghanistan as it shares a very long and porous border with it. Tajikistan participates in all Russian-led integration and regional security schemes, including the Russian-led CSTO. Tajikistan contributes an infantry battalion to the group's Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF). In April 2010, Tajikistan hosted the CRRF's military exercises Boundary 2010 that aimed at preventing possible incursions of "terrorists from Afghanistan" ([www.news.tj](http://www.news.tj), April 26, 2010). In September 2011, the CSTO conducted exercises in Tajikistan as part of Tsentr 2011, which also trained the group's militaries in preventing possible popular uprisings (EDM, September 30, 2011).

However, the CSTO Agreement on Foreign Bases limits Tajikistan's options to establish relations with non-CSTO countries and let those countries set up bases and hence reaffirms Russia's hold on the country, confirming how vulnerable the Tajik state has become to Russian political pressure. Tajikistan is excessively dependent on remittances from its migrant workers in Russia, and the Kremlin has repeatedly indicated that the presence of these workers in the country is conditional on Dushanbe's willingness to follow Moscow-dictated foreign policy directives. (Sodiqov, Alexander. EDM January 16, 2012)

Regarding Tajik cooperation with the CSTO, an anti-terror drill for the Collective Security Treaty Organization's (CSTO) Central Asian group, dubbed Rubezh-2010 (Frontier-2001) has opened in northern Tajikistan.<sup>23</sup> Moreover as an active CSTO member, Tajikistan has also provided humanitarian aid under the framework of implementation of collective response actions to Kyrgyzstan when the south of Kyrgyzstan had suffered from outcome of rioting and ethnic crises in June 2010. (Halima Khushqadamov, 2012)

Also, in a news report, Tajikistan foreign minister, Zarifi urged members of the CSTO to intensify the struggle with the threats emerging from cyberspace. (Nieuws, 20.12.2011)

---

<sup>23</sup> Embassy of Tajikistan to Pakistan, "Tajikistan holds CSTO anti-terror drills"  
<http://www.tajikembassy.pk/m-news21.aspx>

### 3.7 WEAKNESSES OF CSTO

The CSTO is still evolving; hence it has not overcome all its difficulties. There are still some shortcomings in the structure and the working of the organisation. Below is the analysis of the CSTO considering its loopholes and areas to improve---

- The CSTO is fairly new, created very recently. Among twelve CIS member states only seven are members of the CSTO. This **limited membership** might be contributing to fewer results in working as a vital element in the post-Soviet space.
- Second, the **case of Uzbekistan** could be taken which sets an example of being a highly unstable member of the CSTO. It quit the organization for the first time in 1999 and then rejoined it in 2006 after the criticism by the West regarding the Andijan crisis and very recently withdrew officially for a second time in 2012. This implies how the members of the organisation lack seriousness about the organisation. They join and leave at their own will.
- Third is the **case of conflict among members of the CSTO**. There have been bilateral and regional tensions among member states on issues related to borders, water issues, and transportation blockades, payments due of rent from military bases etc. Russia being the stronger member, most of the member states sometimes faces uneasy situations with Russia but of course they need inevitable economic and security relations with Russia. If these minor and some major conflicts are taken care of within the members of the CSTO, it is likely to yield fruitful results in the working of the CSTO.
- Fourth, **the functioning of the organisation is flawed**. Appeasement of Russia is sometimes a driving force in cooperation within the “alliance”. Much more resources are utilised in making the organisation capable of countering the NATO forces rather than committing to work for the benefit of the member-states and trying to work for collective security issues of the region.
- Fifth, the CSTO was put to test during the very recent **Kyrgyzstan crisis**. No action on the part of CSTO was taken in order to prevent the crisis or calm down the situation. Referring to the CSTO charter calling for collective

defence against an external attack, the organization did not intervene in Kyrgyzstan, its role was utterly limited and as a result thousands of civilians had to suffer. (Bektour Iskender, 2010)

- Lastly, another shortcoming on the path of the CSTO is the **duplicity of issues**. The presence of other regional organisations such as the SCO and the GUAM etc in the post-Soviet space, there is repetition of tasks relating to issues of security like terrorism, drug-trafficking.

**COMPETITIVE SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE POST-  
SOVIET SPACE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CSTO WITH  
SCO AND NATO**

Russia and China have continued normalisation and improvement of their ties since the 1980s. As both being great powers in a world dominated by the US, Russia and China finds themselves to be in the same side of the coin of critical issues in international politics. (Jeffery Mankoff, 2009: 193)

As far the relations between Russia and US-led NATO, the vital question is as to how the two organisations would put aside their fifty years of confrontational relation and go ahead in a cooperative manner working in a specific region together? Is cooperation between US and Russia really a possibility? It however seems that the new international world order suggests that both these former blocs work together peacefully (Lionel Ponsard, 2007) in a more troubled space as the post-Soviet.

**4.1 INTRODUCTION:**

For assessing the multilateral dimension of Russian foreign policy, multilateral security cooperation is a very interesting and essential element. It has already been understood that Russia's military might is a significant instrument for Russia's claim to great power status. It is the military might that has helped Russia lift itself up even after the collapse of the Soviet empire. Not only that, Russia seeks for alliances and multilateral security co operations and aggregates a foundation for this military expertise. (Stina Torjesen, 2009: 181)

I have already explained about the role and importance of the CSTO, as to how it works under the Russian guidance trying to maintain stability and security in the post-Soviet space. But this region does not exist in a vacuum. CSTO is not the only multilateral security arrangement in this region. My study will further reveal

specifically the other two organisations that have played a meaningful role in the region and their equations with Russian interest in its 'near-abroad' in general and the Russian-led CSTO in particular. These two organisations are the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

The SCO is a regional organisation which was founded in 2001 in Shanghai by the leaders of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Earlier it was known as Shanghai Five. Shanghai Five was renamed Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) after the inclusion of Uzbekistan. On the other hand NATO is an intergovernmental military alliance since the time of cold war. It was founded on the basis of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April, 1949. Presently the NATO has an extended membership of 28 countries.

## **4.2 SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANISATION (SCO) AND SECURITY INTEGRATION IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE**

The SCO was created very recently only in 2001 on the basis of a treaty signed in 1996 by leaders of countries-- Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The prime objective behind the initial agreements was the concern for the Islamic extremism. Afghanistan after falling into the hands of the Taliban, posed security threats to Central Asia and the Caucasus. Hence, then known as the so-called Shanghai Five along with Uzbekistan signed the Declaration of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in June 2001.

Russia's outlook towards China has been characterised as a preference for bilateral interactions and co operations and compromises rather than useless conflicts that would result in fruitless endeavours. (Igor Ivanov, 2001: 122)

Sino-Russian cooperation has been considerably growing and visible in the recent years. There has been growth in trade and investment and economic cooperation. Russia and China had also opposed US action in Iraq and wants US to withdraw

NATO forces from Central Asia eventually. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has been an apparent institutionalising factor of cooperation between Russia and China. Through the SCO both these countries along with the other smaller members have been in an ongoing relationship of regular summits and working level meetings. It is necessary to mention here that in order to expand economic opportunities and promotion of person-to-person and cultural exchanges between these two countries, ‘Year of Russia in China’ in 2005 was held and ‘Year of China in Russia’ in 2006 was held that helped. (Jeffery Mankoff, 2009: 206)



**Map1: Shanghai Cooperation Organization (source: Bailes et al. 2007).**

The SCO is a sprouting regional organisation with the post-Soviet Central Asia being an important hub for both Russia and China's regional strategy and economic policies in the region except Turkmenistan. The SCO is not just an important regional organisation but its significance lies in it being of wider attention to global politics, security and economics. SCO is of global significance also because two of its larger members, China and Russia. These two larger members are huge in territory, economic strengths; military might and as an addition also occupies positions as permanent members of the UN Security Council. More over Russia and China often consider themselves as alternative power centres in relation to the West. Hence a regional organisation like the SCO has quite a weight consisting of two great giants of the international world order. The SCO provides a significant study in Eurasian regionalism and international relations because it depicts the coming together of two non-Western powers for regional cooperation yet setting implications for Western powers. (Stephan Aris, 2011: 1)

As the SCO specifically deals in with China, Russia and the post-Soviet Central Asia, hence it is imperative to understand the backdrop of that region, its geography, history, politics, the cultural affinities, and last but not the least the impact from its neighbouring areas, its geopolitics etc. The SCO is a basic component of China and its emerging regional strategy. The adoption of the 'good neighbour' policy in the 1990s placed strong and favourable relations with bordering countries at the heart of Chinese foreign policy. Against this background, the SCO is very significant as the first fully fledged regional organisation, of which China is a forever and significant member. In this way, it represents a crucial test case of China's regional strategy, especially given that there is already evidence of the Chinese leadership seeking to replicate its approach to the SCO in other regions of the world. (Ibid: 1)

Not only that, the SCO is also a notable development in case of Russian foreign policy dimensions. Russia is another big member of the SCO and the SCO 'area of action' is considered by Russia as its "near-abroad". However in the recent years, Russia has pursued a renewed multilateral strategy aimed at developing closer relations with those former Soviet states which are most likely to cooperate with Russia. (Ibid: 2) Moreover, while estimating the importance of SCO for Russia, the establishment in September 2004 of an inter-agency commission on Russian



participation is significant as it confirms how SCO is also important to Russia. (Mikhail Troitskiy, 2007: 258)

One important observation on part of both Russia and China is that if in any case Russia's is somehow considered to be a secondary member of SCO, then the organisation will account to losing its gravity, legitimacy and aspirations and the other members of SCO are smaller and newly formed governments and less experience in handling issues. Hence both Russia and China have interest in preserving and promoting Russia's position in the organisation. In fact, Russia along with China in the year 2004 was one of the prime initiators of SCO Regional Anti-terrorist Structure (RATS). (Mikhail Troitskiy, 2007: 31)

In 2006 SCO Shanghai Summit stating Russia's official position, the then President Putin mentioning the SCO called it '*a new model of successful international cooperation*', which was indeed also the title of an article by Putin. (Vladimir Putin, 14 June 2006)

What seems is that by strengthening SCO, Russia and China leave will not hesitate to oppose and grant US and other Western designs in the region of Central Asia. (S.F.Starr, 2005: 164-178)

Not only has the SCO benefited Russia, it has also been of great help to China by institutionalising its presence in Central Asia both economically and in security terms. It is through SCO only that China can mark its valid presence in the post-Soviet space. (Wayne, 2003: 25-26) To Russia, the SCO provides an additional means of maintaining Russian influence in the post-Soviet space and for acting as a watchdog to Chinese activities in its area of interest. China prefers using of SCO to combat militant Islamic organisations threatening the Central Asian republics as well as Chinese Xinjiang. (Alexei Bogaturov, 2004: 9)

The SCO is also the result of a thought of deepening bilateral ties between Russia and China in considerable extent for a desire to balance against the dominant power of the West, specifically the US. The most apparent and vital aspect of the SCO is however been in the sphere of security although the organisation tries to play a prominent role

in establishing economic and cultural role among its member-states. At the 2006 summit, Russian president Putin announced that the organisation has become a powerful factor in ensuring stability and security in Eurasia.<sup>24</sup>

### **Aims and strengths of the SCO:**

The first and foremost aim of the SCO is mutual security avoiding conflicts among the members.

The main aim of the SCO as proclaimed in its charter of 2002 is, “*to strengthen mutual trust, friendship, and good-neighbourliness between the member states. They are to adhere to the principles of mutual respect to sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, non-aggression, and non-interference in internal affairs, non-use of force or threat thereof and no seeking of unilateral military advantage.*” (SCO Charter, Article 1)<sup>25</sup>

The second most important aim of the SCO members is to promote regional security and internal stability by fighting terrorism, separatism and extremism. In fact in 2001 itself a special ‘Convention against Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism’ was adopted. Countering these threats became the primary goal of the SCO Charter. (Alexander Shylyndov, 2006: 69) Therefore as already mentioned earlier, the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) was created to avert attempted terrorist attacks and hundreds of them were actually averted as a Russian spokesperson claimed. (Weitz, 2006: 40)

To fight terrorism, the SCO member states have had several military exercises, both multilateral and bilateral. (Ingmar Oldberg, 2006: 14f) First large scale military exercise that took place was *Mirnaia misiia-2005* (Peace Mission)<sup>26</sup>, the second large scale SCO exercise was held in Chelyabinsk, Russia in July 2007 and in the year

---

<sup>24</sup> President of Russia Website “Press statements following the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Council of Heads of States session”, 15 June 2006

<sup>25</sup> Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, <http://www.hrichina.org/content/5207>

<sup>26</sup> The exercises had an anti-terrorist scenario, even though long-range aviation, air defence and submarines were used.

2010, a Peace Mission was held on September 9–25 at Matybulak training area in Kazakhstan. Here more than 5,000 personnel from China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan participated. (Boland, 2010)

After the phenomenal 9/11 incident, SCO became a part of a larger international anti-terrorist mechanism. There had been SCO's anti-terror military exercises since then. The SCO RATS emphasises the maintenance and strengthening of peace, security and stability in the region and works towards countering security threats. It also extends collaboration and discusses on regulatory enactments on cooperation with the Regional Representation of the UN Office for Drugs and Crime in Central Asia, UN Counter-Terrorism Committee, UN Al Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee, Committee - 1267. (Kurmat Samarkhan, 9.02.2011) At a RATS meeting in Tashkent in April 2006, fourteen terrorist organisations were identified directly threatening the security of the region including the Taliban, the Islamic party of Turkestan and Hizb-ut Tahrir. At the same time the RATS regime has been praised for preventing over 250 terrorist attacks in member states since its establishment. (Lanteinge, 2006-2007: 618)

Another interest among SCO members as already analysed beforehand is withstanding the West and Western type of democracy. Especially after the so-called 'Colour Revolutions' in 2003-2004, the SCO member states were more apprehensive about such a situation in the post-Soviet Central Asia.<sup>27</sup> Moreover a very visible aspect of SCO's attitude towards the West is that United States has repeatedly been denied observer status in the organisation. (Maksutov, 2006: 9)

### **4.3 SCO AND CSTO: A COMPARATIVE STUDY**

It seems that much of the concern about the SCO is blown out of proportion because it has been observed that though SCO talks about taking steps towards military cooperation and integration, but it has no armed force of its own and a much less general staff or any of the other attributes of a unified command structure. There are

---

<sup>27</sup> Though the 'Tulip Revolution' did occur in Central Asian state of Kyrgyzstan in 2005 that saw the overthrow of President Askar Akayev after the parliamentary elections of February 27 and March 13, 2005

no common military forces, no joint command and a combined planning staff. (Weitz, 2006: 42; Zyberk, 2007: 4) SCO members are free to make their own decisions on security matters, have the right to join other blocs and alliances without prior consultation with other member states (Jeffery Mankoff, 2011: 352). Not only those, the Central Asian members of the SCO also belong to NATO's PfP program, and most have strong bilateral ties with the United States. It provides Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan large amounts of military assistance. (Evan A. Feigenbaum, 6 September 2007; Caitlin, 2007)

It has been also seen that in the aftermath of the 9/11 crisis, the SCO was in the same side with the US and the West in the fight of 'War on terror'. SCO members Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan accepted US' presence in their territory by signing bilateral agreements with US permitting the stationing of U.S. bases on their territory. (Jao Huashen, 2005:17) Also in the 2008 War in Georgia, SCO summit refused to give Moscow more than equivocal support for its military intervention.

While the SCO backed Russia's active role in resolving the Georgian conflict but the SCO member states hesitated to recognise South Ossetia and Abkhazia's independence. One of the prime reasons in not recognising their independence by the SCO giant, China, is that it would create a same problem and example for its own separatist regions as China combats separatism in Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. While Russia without any doubt expected much stronger support from the members of the organisation, did not receive enough support. (Niklas Swanstorm, 2008: CACI Analyst)

Hence in comparison with the CSTO or for that matter other regional organisations like the CIS or the Eurasian Economic Association, the influence of SCO is relatively limited.

In political-military terms also, the SCO is somewhat a loose partnership and it also does not obligate members to spend a fixed amount of budget on its operations like the NATO or the CSTO. The SCO does not have a mutual defence clause or any standing army of its own. The potential of SCO to become a mighty tool of foreign policy also varies over time because the degree of attention paid by the SCO to

geopolitics varies over time. For instance, on one hand, the SCO following the 2003–2005 Colour Revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, the SCO member Kyrgyzstan, appeared to provide a device for overturning the status quo throughout the post-Soviet space. And as a result, the SCO increasingly set itself up in opposition to the U.S.-led campaign for democratisation. As Russian foreign minister, Lavrov remarked following the 2007 SCO ministers’ meeting in Kyrgyzstan: *“It is clear to everyone that one-sided approaches to solving regional and international problems, [those] not relying on international law, are out of place, and that ideological approaches to international affairs, including any kind of ‘‘democratization’’ schemes are ineffective because they do not account for the historical, cultural, and civilization peculiarities of the countries involved.”* (Lavrov, 2007)

On the other hand, it remains a fact that the SCO did not oppose the establishment of NATO bases in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 2001 which were set up in order to fight terrorism in Afghanistan and stabilise the situation in the Ferghana Valley. (Oldberg, 2007)

Another problem with the SCO has been that there have been gaps between declarations and actual actions. It is because the SCO lacks a parliamentary body like in case of NATO which has the NATO’s North Atlantic Assembly. (Weitz, 2006: 41) It shows that the democratic basis of the SCO is also weak. (Bailes and Dunay, 2007: 1, 9)

Researchers point out that China respects Russia’s strategic role in the Central Asia and the CSTO. (Portyakov, 2007: 12) Although there are instances of closer cooperation of SCO with CSTO yet some Russian analyst are apprehensive of such cooperation because of growing Chinese influence in the SCO and others in favour of developing the CSTO have complained of parallel military structures, which sometimes may put members before contradictory obligations. (Litovkin, 2006: 6) In the military sphere Russia stakes on CSTO which is a real defence alliance where the members are committed to defend each other against external aggression. Moreover, as the CSTO is built on the former Soviet structure, it seems to have a tighter military cooperation than the SCO. The CSTO performs more frequent military exercises, a

4000 personnel strong rapid deployment and an emergent collective peacekeeping force. (Weitz, 2006: 42; Plater-Zyberk, 2007: 3)

Russia moreover has much stronger bilateral ties with four Central Asian states than China. And after Uzbekistan rejoined the CSTO in 2005, formerly evicting American base, Russia and Uzbekistan intensified military cooperation in the form of a ‘Treaty on Allied Relations’. Russia had similar treaties with Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. Russia has a permanent base in Tajikistan having 7000 service personnel (Suhrov Majiov, 2011: CACI Analyst) since 2004 and also there is hope for the deployment of a new air base there. (Oldberg, 2007)

*As Zarifi told a news conference in Dushanbe in 21 July 2011, "Negotiations on the military base and the use of the Aini airport by Russia have been under way since 2008. These questions are not simple or easy. So far the positions of the sides haven't reached a necessary degree of rapprochement that would make it possible to sign an agreement. But work is going ahead at the level of experts. I think that this vital document is going to be signed during the CIS jubilee summit this September in which Russian President Dmitry Medvedev will also take part." (ITAR TASS News Agency, 21/7/2011)*

Meanwhile, even if China does recognise Russia's military security in the post-Soviet Central Asia yet there are limits in contact between the CSTO and the SCO. This was well evident when in the year 2007 when China refused a Russian proposal of arranging the planned SCO exercise concurrently with the CSTO as CSTO is Russian-led. Hence, it seems that somehow China will always be apprehensive of Russia and certainly does not want to play a second fiddle to Russia at least in the SCO dimension. (Litovkin, 2007) And, Russia's uncertainty about Chinese designs led many Russian officials to view the CSTO, of which China is not a member as a superior alternative. (Erica Marat, 2007)

Mikhail Troitsky talks about a dilemma that Russia suffers through while comparing the SCO and the CSTO on which would have a comparative advantage, *"Russia faces a dilemma: should it work for the*

*SCO to become more militarised, or rather seek to focus it on a 'soft' security and economic agenda? In the former case, the SCO might overshadow the CSTO or at least create confusing choices for Central Asia states. In the latter case, China may gain additional leverage within the SCO and the relative importance of Eurasec might decline.”*  
(Troitsky, 2007)

It has been observed that if there is immediate security threat within post-Soviet Central Asia that requires a military response, the CSTO is most likely to be the one to act quickly by sending troops to hold the border because it has Collective Rapid Deployment Forces and the Russian military would be leading the effort and contributing most number of troops. It also helps in taking quick actions in times of emergency. As cited by Matveeva, Anna and Giustozzi, *“It was applied to peacekeeping in Tajikistan when contingents from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan were used alongside Russian forces under an overall CIS mandate to maintain security in the border areas.”* (Matveeva, Anna and Giustozzi, 2008)

Hence, analysing these facts it can be concluded that the SCO is still a organisation which is growing. Since it is more of a Chinese effort hence the economic aspect of the SCO sounds more than the aspect of security. Drawing all the facts such as SCO having a lack of tool and mechanism for the security purpose in the post Soviet Central Asia, the CSTO seems to be at an advantageous position than it. Moreover, another fact is that the CSTO apart from the four Central Asian states has its membership in the European and the Caucasus region also while the SCO sums up only the Central Asian region with Russia and China. Hence SCO is fairly a new organisation and is yet to grow improving both in structure and in handling tasks.

It seems Russia's concern about Chinese economic presence through SCO into Central Asia is a general fear of gradually becoming a junior and less important partner in the organisation and the region. It definitely does not want to become a second fiddle to China. It is an established fact that Russia is the predominant power in the CSTO and the Eurasian Economic Community. Comparing SCO and CSTO, in the security sphere the CSTO is undoubtedly more equipped and powerful because it has been designed as a traditional defence arrangement, security and collective defence being the priority and the SCO has renounced any form of military integration

with only some amount of small joint military exercises. (M. Troitskiy, Dunay and Guang, 2007: 34)

The SCO still lacks a lot important elements to become a mature military security organisation and it does not have any integrated military-political structure, permanent operational headquarters, a rapid reaction force, as well as continuous political deliberations. Therefore, it could not be truly labelled as the ‘NATO of the East’. (Haas, 2007:7)

#### **4.4 NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION (NATO) IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE**

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has been a collective defence effort of the West and the US. NATO was a military alliance that was designed to protect members from the non-members.

The relationship between NATO and Russia is a complex one, sometimes the highs and sometimes the lows. Both of them have a difficult history and the framing of future depends on that relation. From 1949 until the 1990s NATO and Russia (then the Former Soviet Union) have been having conflicting interests only. The primary obstacles that seemed to be fulfilling in case of building a fruitful relation between NATO and Russia was the identity gap between them and the inability to cooperate in a true sense. The whole ideological mindset of these two organisations was contradictory. Yet the international security environment has been changing and these two entities have been evolving since then. Since the Soviet days NATO, an alliance strongly led by the US has been seen as a rival. The NATO enlargement and democratic transformation is an element of generating problems in relations with Russia. From a realist perspective, the expansion policy of NATO weakens Russia’s position in the European space, a space that Russia considers a part of itself, its own backyard. And the potential for such conflict is not ideational. One of Russia’s main concerns is that the contagion effects of the “Colour Revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine have largely dissipated. (Aurel Braun, 2008:41)



As Russian reformer Anatoly Chubais explained in 1997, “*Frankly, the politicians who support this decision [to enlarge NATO] believe that Russia is a country that should be put aside, a country that should not be included in the civilized world—ever. That is a major mistake.*” (Anders Aslund, 1995)

In the year 1999, Russia severed its official relations with NATO when NATO under the leadership of USA undertook a so-defined ‘humanitarian intervention’ against Yugoslavia on account of Kosovo. This was viewed by Russia as a violation of the UN Charter and the principle of territorial integrity. NATO’s adoption of a Strategic Concept that widened its responsibility to areas beyond the North Atlantic was perceived by Russia as legitimising NATO interventions in the former Soviet space. The relations between NATO and Russia were restored in 2000. Yet Putin’s military and foreign policy doctrines of 2000 still mentioned NATO as a problem for Russia. (Iver B. Neumann, 2006:33)

Though relations between Russia and NATO started to move away from the deadlock when in the ‘War against Terrorism’ after September 2001 and specifically in May 2002, a common council in the name of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was formed. The major goals of this council were to promote cooperation in the fight against terrorism, crisis management, non-proliferation, arms control, regional air defence, rescue operations and emergency situations. During this phase Putin concluded, “*NATO was turning into a more political and less military organisation and that its relations with Russia had reached a new level and quality.*”<sup>28</sup>

Yet what Putin was strongly concerned was to stop NATO’s enlargement eastwards since 2001. Not only that, Russia is against any NATO troops and nuclear weapons stationed in these countries. Although Russia accepted the fact that these countries accepted NATO membership yet further NATO expansion eastwards is not welcomed by Russia. More difficult to tolerate for Russia was the NATO membership of the three Baltic countries (formerly part of the Soviet Union) which also recently became members of NATO. Moreover, Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan have talked openly of NATO membership to which Russia totally oppose. Russia’s relations with NATO

---

<sup>28</sup> Russian President, ‘Vystuplenie prezidenta . . .’ [Speech by the president], 28 May 2002 (<http://www.president.kremlin.ru/events>, retrieved 31 May 2002).

came at a low point during the war with Iraq where Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan participated in NATO exercises and supported US operations in Iraq.<sup>29</sup>

Russia is in competitive terms with NATO. It maintains the military element of the CIS, namely the CSTO in order to sustain the post-Soviet space in a more protected frame and away from the influence of the NATO and the US. Russia puts military pressure on some CIS states that are not in the CSTO. It also maintains a naval base at Sevastopol in Ukraine. In Moldova it maintains forces (although reduced) in the Transnistria region. (Wall Street Journal Europe, 2003) It supports Armenia and retains a strategic radar station in Azerbaijan. On 11 September 2002 Putin issued an ultimatum demanding that Georgia take measures against the Chechen 'terrorists' seeking refuge there and pressed it to agree to cooperation against them. (Nygren, 2008: 119) The CSTO is totally dependent on Russian forces, since the other partners cannot afford to contribute, and the maintenance of these forces has become a heavy responsibility of the Russian armed forces.

During the war in Afghanistan in 2001, NATO bases were set up in the Central Asian states of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan that strengthened their bargaining position alongside Russia, so that they could demand and in fact got the fee for the Russian bases (Wall Street Journal Europe, 2003). Yet there was no loss of Russia's influence in Central Asia. The Islamist guerrilla activities around the Fergana Valley currently seem to have ceased. The Russian leadership now wants that the US presence in Central Asia will be temporary. In order to show that Russia retains interests in the region, it established a new airbase in Kyrgyzstan near the US one in November 2002, and Putin himself inaugurated it. (ibid)

---

<sup>29</sup> Russian President, 'Otvety prezidenta . . .' [Replies by the president], 11 February 2003 (<http://194.226.82.50/text/appears>, retrieved 19 March 2003).

## 4.5 NATO EXPANSION AND THE RESPONSE OF RUSSIA/CSTO

As the Wall Street Journal cites, “*NATO enlargement moves the military responsibility of Germany and the US closer to Russia’s borders.*” NATO’s eastward expansion perceives a threat to Russia. The prospect of having NATO at the doorstep of Russia is unacceptable to Russia. Sections of the Russian military are looking towards the anticipation of upgrading the role of Russian weaponry to counter threat from NATO. NATO yet still determines to remain as the most important security organisation on the continent. (Turner, 1996:1)

Taking the case of Georgia which was previously a member of the CSTO<sup>30</sup>, a colour revolution in the name of Rose Revolution evidently sponsored by US-based NGOs occurred in Georgia in 2003, Georgia slowly going off into the grip of the US as the new Government installed was US friendly. Hence, Georgia has been an instance of NATO expansion as it wants to be a member of NATO. This further fuels the tension in the region leading to a tense diplomatic crisis in Russia-Georgia relations. Between the years 2005 and 2007, Putin often emphasised issues of the need of restoring Russia on the same level as the developed countries, believing in a multipolar world order, the rejection of the idea of “exporting democracy,” the development of the CSTO, and Russia’s privileged position in the CIS and criticism against the US policies in this regard. (Dr. Irina Ionela Pop, 2009: 278-290)

In fact after the Russo-Georgian war of 2008, the strengthening of the CSTO increased further, it being one of the prime reasons. It was one of the causes of the speedy militarisation of the CSTO. The Moscow Declaration of the Collective Security Council of the CSTO (September 5, 2008) was considered “*the first real consolidated position of the alliance, a view on international politics and the place of CSTO in it.*” (David Erkomaishvili, 2008: 33)

These document refers to, “*Georgia’s attempt to resolve the conflict in South Ossetia by force.....the growing military capabilities and escalating tensions in the Caucasus region;*” “*the situation in Europe,*

---

<sup>30</sup> Georgia withdrew from the CST in 1999.

*the proliferation of medium- and short- range ground-based missiles; strengthening the role of the United Nations as well as the situation in several conflict zones; the situation in Afghanistan; the situation around Iran; the prospects of establishing relations between the CSTO and NATO on a number of issues; and support for the initiatives of the Russian Federation relating to a treaty on European security.” (Dmitry Medvedev, 2008)*

The Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept announced on July 17, 2008, stated, *“Russia will promote in every possible way the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as a key instrument to maintain stability and ensure security in the CIS area, focusing on adapting the CSTO as a multifunctional integration body to the changing environment, as well as on ensuring capability of the CSTO Member States to take prompt and effective joint actions, and on transforming the CSTO into a central institution ensuring security in its area of responsibility.”* (The Foreign policy Concept of the Russian federation, 17 July 2008)

However, the main concern of CSTO regarding NATO’s expansion policy is latter’s growth of its military infrastructure and information campaign. As Nikolai Bordyuzha remarked, *“On the Western European direction, against the existing power balance, NATO's military structures keep approaching the CSTO's zone of responsibility. This disrupts the current balance of forces and cannot help but concern us.”* Also in the 8th CSTO Information Conference, Bordyuzha said, *“Real threat of arms race has existed as well as rising level of tension and distrust....The CSTO needs a joint tool to counter joint information superiority” of the Western countries.”* (News.Xinhua.com, 21.12.2010)

Russia has in fact built CSTO as a force to being able to counter NATO forces in Europe and further Russia wants to make CSTO a better equipped military structure and a pro-Russian military bloc to successfully handle security problems in the post-Soviet region. (Ria Novosti, 29.05.2009)

As President Medvedev expressed:


*“The Russian Federation and other member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Central Asian states, are ready for full and comprehensive cooperation with the United States and other coalition nations in combating terrorism in the region. This fight should be comprehensive and modern, and based on military and political components – only in this case will it have a chance of success.”*

(Dmitry Medvedev, 4 Feb 2009)

Considering the presence of Colour Revolutions in the post-Soviet space, it can be seen in two ways: it can be considered as a ‘single phenomenon’, a sequence of non-violent protests that succeeded in overthrowing authoritarian regimes during the first decade of the twenty first century. Or can be understood as a process of regime transformation in the CIS by minimising Russian influence in the region since the newly established regimes are pro-Western in orientation. Colour revolutions mostly took place across the post-Soviet space in 2003-2005 in the name of Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003, Orange revolution in Ukraine in 2004 and Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. Russia was disturbed by their occurrence basically for its causes and implications. It is the role of the West that bothers apart from the role of the social factors like poverty, corruption, income inequality etc. As an article in 2005 in the *Renmin Ribao* cited, *“If we do not speak about the internal political situation, the ability of the Colour Revolutions to succeed cannot be separated from the behind the scenes manipulation by the United States.”* However, much active steps have not been taken by the CSTO yet in terms of responding strictly towards colour revolution crises till now. Therefore, in the unlikely event of a colour revolution in the CIS complex in future, the Heads of the CSTO member states have agreed to establish a joint rapid reaction force that can legally intervene in case of an internal conflict. (Jeanne I. Wilson, 2009: 369-395)

## 4.5 NATO AND CSTO IN A COMPETITIVE FRAMEWORK:

**MAP 2: NATO and CSTO in their areas of operation.**



Map 1.2, Source: Wikipedia, url: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:NATO\\_CSTO.PNG](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:NATO_CSTO.PNG)

According to Allison, the CSTO-NATO competition can be identified in a way whereby CSTO is still evolving from a military-political organisation to one that is more capable of taking huge responsibilities not only within the region but also in the extended part covering Afghanistan as problems in Afghanistan impacts its surrounding post-Soviet Central Asia as well. (Roy Allison, 2008:4-5)

Russia for the first time played a leading role in forming a military alliance in the post-Soviet space by the name of Collective Security Treaty Organisation by the amalgamation of originally seven post-Soviet states basically in a military framework. Yet the feeling of threat still prevailed in the form the US-led NATO's eastward expansion in the CIS borders and the US further planned the deployment of the

national missile shield in the East Europe. As analyst Dadan Upadhyay observed, these kinds of threats altogether prompted the CSTO to uplift itself and thus created a Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF) for deployment in the Central Asian region. Since then the CSTO has been emerging as an effective security bloc, an alternative to counter the threats from the US and NATO in the post-Soviet space. (Dadan Upadhyay, 2011: Global Research, Russia and India Report)

During a press conference, following the Moscow CSTO summit on February 4, 2009, President Medvedev stated that,

*“The Collective Rapid Reaction Force should be an effective, all-purpose instrument that can be counted on to realize security objectives throughout the CSTO. And these would include resisting military aggression, conducting special operations to eliminate terrorists and extremists, the fight against organized crime and drug trafficking, as well as dealing with the consequences of natural and industrial disasters..... The Collective Rapid Reaction Force will have the same sort of training as the troops of the North Atlantic Alliance”.* (Dmitry Medvedev, 2009)

The US and NATO have been constantly present in the part that borders Russia and its ‘sphere of influence’ that is the regions of Afghanistan, Iran and the Middle East on the guise of democracy promotion and upholding the values of freedom. This has made the CSTO all the more important to become a stronger military-political regional security bloc. This in fact is not a new thing, the presence of US and NATO forces though have been more visible especially since the “9/11 catastrophe” following the “War against Terror”, yet the US forces have been there near the borders of the Soviet space since cold war times. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia did play a leading role by always considering the post-Soviet Central Asia as it’s ‘sphere of influence’ and hence does not approve of the region’s much exposure to external powers especially the West. The CRRF signed an agreement on June 14, 2009 that was designed to repel aggression, carry out special operations and fight terrorism. The CRRF under the command of CSTO consists of special military units as a result of contributions from its member states. Russia’s 98th Airborne Division and the Russian airborne troop, 31st Airborne Assault Brigade are the

founding pillars of the CRRF. Additional responsibilities of the CRRF is responding to emergencies, dealing with humanitarian crises, strengthening armed forces in the borders and safeguarding the public and military facilities of the member states, and meeting the challenges recognised by the Collective Security Council. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev cited, *“The Collective Rapid Reaction Force will be well-equipped and will operate just as well as that of NATO and.... It will be a mobile force designed to respond to any critical developments and not only of military nature. It will be promptly used in case of any urgent necessity upon the authorisation of the Collective Security Council of the CSTO,”* he said. (Dadan Upadhyay, 2011: Global Research, Russia and India Report)

In the course of actions, the CSTO have also signed an agreement in 2009 with the UN for developing and maintaining its own peacekeeping force. This step helps the CSTO in coming up as a substitute to NATO. For operations both on the CSTO territory and outside of their borders on the UN mandate strength, the member states are in the course of forming a peacekeeping contingent. Another significant development of the CSTO is that on December 20, 2011 all the CSTO members unanimously agreed on that a foreign base will only be established in the territory of the member states only with the full consent of all the CSTO members. Hence, the new agreement lets Russia get an edge over the US and the West and can successfully avoid the deployment of the US airbases in Central Asian states. On the event of the 20th anniversary of the Collective Security Agreement and the 10th anniversary of the CSTO ,to quote Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, *“In order to deploy military bases of a third country in the territory of the CSTO member-states, it is necessary to obtain the official consent of all its members.”* (Vladimir Radyuhin: The Hindu, December 21, 2011)

Russian president Medvedev said, *“The decision we have made with regard to military bases of a third country is very important for the consolidation of positions within the CSTO”*. Moreover at the Moscow summit, much of the agenda were for the higher rate of orderliness of CSTO functioning. (Dadan Upadhyay, 2011: Global Research, Russia and India Report)

Russian ambassador Igor Lyakin-Frolov further emphasized the main goal of CSTO is to contribute better in strengthening regional security and make the CSTO a more



responsible zone. And leading Russian business daily Kommersant said, *“This is one of the key measures worked out by Moscow for turning the CSTO from a ‘decorative structure’ into a ‘fully fledged military-political bloc,’ whose members take into account not only their own financial benefit, but also the interests of the partners.”* (ibid)

Regarding the US military airbase at Manas in Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyzstan’s President Atambayev has over and over again demanded for its closure in 2014 with the expiry of the prevailing agreement. Moreover, the CSTO members showed their agreement with Russia by disapproving the unilateral deployment of strategic missile defence systems in Eastern Europe. As a statement by CSTO read, *“The unilateral deployment of strategic missile defence systems by one state or a group of states without due account for the lawful interests of other countries and without extending legally-binding guarantees to the latter may damage international security and strategic stability in Europe and the world as a whole,”* (Robert Bridge, RT, 20 Dec 2011)

Russia has opposes NATO’s plan of deploying the missile defence system in East Europe as it sees this step as a pretext for the US to build up a shield surrounding Russia. US however, refuse these accusations and also reject to share the missile shield control. It further refuses to sign a written assurance appealed by Russia that will assure that their system does not intend to target Russia in any way. Though the CSTO’s main objective is collectively assuring and working towards military security yet recently there has been an inclination to transform itself into a multifunctional organisation aimed at countering hard and soft security threats. CSTO has been evolving slowly by engaging in more positive cooperation with the UN, CIS, SCO, EurAsEC. It has designed its own peacekeeping forces and CRRF and hence is emerging as an important player in the new global security set up. As Medvedev said in 2009, because of CSTO’s positive engagement with the UN it is making itself *“worthy competitor to NATO”*. Before one of the CSTO summit in Moscow in December, a new radar station which is capable of monitoring missile launches from the North Atlantic, and the future European missile defence system, was put into operation in Russia’s Baltic region of Kaliningrad. On December 1, it became part of the national missile early warning system which strives to serve Russia’s promptness to counter threats posed by NATO and the West., which Medvedev told the station

command, *“I hope this station will operate well and fulfil the tasks at hand”*. (Dadan Upadhyay, 2011: Global Research, Russia and India Report)

Also considering the case of Iran, Russia’s interest over Iran fundamentally diverges from those of the US. The US and the West blame Iran of making nuclear weapons under the pretext of peaceful nuclear programme and threatening military intervention. Iran however denies the charges and affirms that the nuclear programme is purely for meeting the country’s electricity needs. But for Russia, for over a decade, Iran has been a significant element of Russian foreign policy. The US administration here wants the assistance of Russia in stopping Iran’s nuclear programme. The position of CSTO in the context is in total support for Iran and it strongly opposes the use of force and military strike against Iran. On actions if taken by US against Russian ally Iran, the CSTO head makes its position clear by saying, *“The position of the CSTO member countries concerning the possible attack of the USA on Iran is united and consists of the idea that no strikes should be made. If this happens, this will shake many and from all points of view.”* (Aleksey Kudenko, 2012)

Also in the words of Nikolai Bordyuzha, the Secretary General of CSTO, *“Our position is clear, that is we firmly oppose military actions against Tehran and support the continuation of negotiations between Iran and six international mediators....., We hope the situation in Iran will be settled by political and diplomatic means. It's the peaceful resolution of the conflict that can improve the situation.”* (Mu Xuequan, 2012)

All that CSTO insists is that Iran should cooperate with the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). And pointing towards the international community, the CSTO urges the non-use of force and the settlement of problems with Iran in a peaceful way. Russia’s support for Iran’s nuclear policy is driven by both economic and geopolitical factors. Russia considers Iran as a partner and de facto ally towards adjusting the power balance in the Middle East region and limiting US influence in this region. (Ariel Cohen, 2010: 1)

## 4.7 NATO AND THE CSTO: ISSUE OF COOPERATION.

The issue of cooperation between the CSTO and NATO seems to be rising at times though there is more of a competitive nature of relations among these two organisations. Even back in the cold war days, NATO did not have relations with another such organization like the CSTO and even though CENTO and SEATO (the Southeast Asian and Central Treaty Organizations) existed, NATO didn't really interact with them in organisational basis. There are certain inherent structural limitations on NATO working in full cooperation with the CSTO. The factors responsible for limitations of NATO-CSTO cooperation—

- Firstly, it is more likely that individual member countries of NATO work with the CSTO like in CSTO exercises rather than NATO participating with the CSTO. Many events that take place in Russia as NATO events are events of individual countries' of NATO exercises.
- Secondly, the limitation that could be seen in NATO-CSTO close cooperation is that presently NATO is more focussed on its internal problems. Apart from its role in humanitarian intervention like the one in Kosovo in 1999 and more recently in Libya, and some counter-terrorism missions in Afghanistan, NATO still has internal debates regarding its long term focus and hence rather than focussing on other similar organisations like CSTO.
- Thirdly, the NATO could not establish formal ties with the CSTO because of the consensus principle of NATO where US does not become a part of such a consensus. Some parts of the US security establishments still see CSTO as a potential way for Russia to stretch its dominance over the post-Soviet space. NATO actually pretty much does not want to recognise CSTO. (Dmitry Gorenburg<sup>31</sup>, 2011)

---

<sup>31</sup> *Dmitry Gorenburg is Senior Analyst at CNA, editor of the journal Russian Politics and Law and a Fellow of the Truman National Security Project.*

### CONCLUSION

The study begins with the research on three hypotheses. **First**, The voluntary withdrawal of Russia from Central Asia and the Caucasus after the disintegration of the Soviet Union led to a security vacuum that created fertile grounds for the rise of terrorism, religious fundamentalism, extremism and drug trafficking. **Second**, CSTO's growing role in the post Soviet space has led to the reduction of tension and conflict resolution, strengthening regional stability and security. And **third**, The Russia-led CSTO has emerged as a counteracting force against the US particularly after latter's growing military presence in and around Afghanistan to keep Russia's natural role as an arbiter and defender intact.

This dissertation has been divided into five chapters. The **introductory** chapter throws light upon the intellectual prominence of the issue of security studies in general and collective security in particular. Further it selects the post-Soviet space in order to examine the security integration process and collective security model in the post Soviet space. The theoretical perspective and the scope are provided in the study and also the existing literature has been considered in the introductory chapter. It further gives a broad account of the aims and objectives of the work, the gap it tries to fill up and the research methodology adopted.

The **second** chapter looks onto the patterns of security environment in the post-Soviet space. It sets out to explain the nature of Russian foreign and security policy in the CIS region, more specifically in the Central Asian region and the Caucasus. It basically deals with the nature of Russian foreign policy just after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. Since then there has been spectacular shifts in the contours of Russian foreign policy. Since the collapse of USSR, Russia as a state had to find meanings and answers of its new existence and identity and also its relations with the post-Soviet states and the post-Cold war world system. It gives a theoretical framework of the Russian foreign policy and traditional principles of Russian security thinking. It further focuses on the themes and patterns that Russia followed while

pursuing its security and foreign policy after 1991 in the CIS space. Russia refocused its foreign policy interest towards the post-Soviet states since the coming of Putin. It explains the nature of Russian foreign policy and the way Russian foreign policy drifted from its ideological base to pragmatism. Russia has taken many significant steps regarding the maintaining of security in its sphere of influence. The CSTO has been one of the most successful and useful attempts amongst it. Russia has been a guiding light to the newly independent states with less or no experience in overcoming the sudden problems persisting just after the disintegration of Soviet Union. The chapter also explains Russia's attempts in security integration and military cooperation with the post-Soviet states. It further explained the motive for security integration as to how a process of security integration is so very vital for both Russia and the other post-Soviet states. This process is mutually beneficial. The chapter further analyses Russia's efforts while cooperating with each CSTO member independently.

The **second** chapter of the dissertation has tried to answer the **first hypothesis**. It sets out to explain the nature of Russian foreign and security policy in the CIS region, more specifically in the Central Asian region and the Caucasus and as to how Russia emerged out from the ashes of the broken Soviet Union and how during the early years Russia had no clear Central Asia policy. Since the second half of the 1990s, Russia's foreign policy has been evolving much because of the rapid changes in Russia's domestic situation which gave birth to a different kind of phase of Russia's foreign policy. As the 'Primakov Doctrine' suggests Russia makes attempts to get back its lost great power status and as such gives prominence to the post-Soviet space and revives relations with these newly independent countries. (Laruelle, 2006). Till then the security scenario in the post-Soviet space was a disaster being a very volatile zone by creation of a security vacuum that led to the rise of concerns regarding terrorism, religious fundamentalism, extremism and drug trafficking and most of all nuclear arms proliferation.

After its disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991, it left behind an enormous arsenal of nuclear weapons and a vast nuclear weapons complex which was before the disintegration controlled by authoritarian government and hence it was under tight scrutiny and control. However after its demise, the collapse of the Union

led to a condition where nuclear weapons coexisted in such unstable and insecure atmosphere. Nuclear leakage is not a hypothetical danger. It was one of the grave and immediate dangers of that time not only for Russia but the entire post-Soviet complex.

During Yeltsin's reign there was no apparent policy for Central Asia but with the coming of Putin in power, Russia had two major concerns with regard to Central Asia, firstly it had strategic concerns about the growing engagement of foreign actors in Central Asian Countries, and secondly it had security concerns about the threats to the security of the region. Economic concerns were intrinsic to both the issues. The increasing influence of the Taliban in 1996 in Afghanistan, their further influence in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan border in 1998 and the fact that it gave support to Chechen separatists which was regarded as a major internal security threat, posed several problems for Russia. The growing "Islamic threat" posed as the major internal and external security threat. Along with this, the growing influence of the United States added to the problems of Russia. Russia had to manage both its domestic economic priorities and also had to secure its neighbourhood. Russia's new focus on economic and energy cooperation became the central theme of its foreign policy towards Central Asia. Russia's response to US influence was of special interest as it was away from the zero sum perspective. There was a clear reflection of a cooperative perspective in Russia's approach.

The 9/11 terrorist attack was a major occurrence which influenced the Russian foreign policy. Rather than taking rhetoric steps to oppose US presence in the Central Asia, Russia actually cooperated with US and gave consent to a US military presence in 2001(Pawar, 2011). However, Russia always wanted to be the big brother in this region. Furthermore, Russia in order to actively participate in the promotion of regional integration in the post-Soviet states made its attempts through the CIS Collective Security Treaty and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). This concern of Russia was seen in its various steps taken in order to revive relations with these countries that Russia considers to be under its 'sphere of influence'. While taking this measure, Russia through the CSTO sought to manage transborder security problems that were emanating right from the borders. It also sought to prevent proliferation of terrorist groups and terrorist activities that would breed from neighbouring Afghanistan and threaten the whole of Russia, Central Asia and the

adjoining areas. The main motive behind security integration is however mutual. Security integration and collective security benefits all the parties involved. As the post-Soviet states specifically the CSTO members in this context, benefits from being a part of the Russia-led CSTO, similarly Russia also draws benefits by engaging with these states be it in security dimensions or economic benefits.

The **third** chapter focuses on the security integration process of the post-Soviet space in general and that of the role of Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) in particular. It analyses Russian aims towards the integration process in the post-Soviet space. The chapter gives a descriptive analysis of the creation and evolution of the CSTO and the legal basis of its foundation. It also lays down a list of concrete actions taken by the CSTO in resolving the disputes and conflicts and an analysis of the successes and failures of this Russian-led organisation in countering the soft and hard security threats of the post-Soviet space. The CSTO have actually been a fruitful attempt by Putin who sought to bind together the Russian allies of this post-Soviet region and in its goal to oppose the expansion policies of NATO in the region. Regarding the major activity of the CSTO it addresses to the various security threats of its member states and secure the members' military dependability creating a 'security belt' around the Russian Federation. The most important element of the CSTO is that it has a very strategic military dimension. In this chapter, the military-technical components of the CSTO have also been discussed. Further light has been thrown on the cooperation between CSTO and its individual members.

The **third** chapter of the dissertation answers the **second hypothesis** of the dissertation. CSTO's growing role in the post Soviet space has indeed led to the reduction of tension and conflict resolution, strengthening regional stability and security. CSTO is the only collective security organisation in the post-Soviet space that in true perspective is Russia's effort towards security integration in this region and it has a clear military dimension. Not only that, the militarisation of the CSTO and its transformation into a powerful security organization bolsters Russia's ability to lessen U.S. and Western influence in the region and in serious terms fight against the emerging soft and hard security threats of the region. The feathers of CSTO do not only spread through the Central Asian region but the European and the Caucasian as well with members being Belarus and Armenia respectively.

This chapter also lists the shortcoming of the CSTO. However, CSTO being fairly a newer organisation, if the loopholes are well addressed to then it can become one of the mighty security integrations in the post-Soviet space in true sense.

The **fourth** chapter emphasises on the role of the CSTO in relation to the other major regional organisations functioning in the post-Soviet Area. Special focus is given on a comparative study between the CSTO, SCO (that is a Chinese-led Organisation) and NATO (US-led European security alliance) in understanding the competitive security cooperation in the post Soviet space. It is basically a comparative study of the CSTO with SCO and NATO's presence in the post-Soviet space. Regarding SCO, CSTO can be considered a better equipped organisation for security integration since it does not have any integrated military-political structure, permanent operational headquarters or a rapid reaction force. Moreover being a Chinese-led effort, it has an economic side too which is more affluent than its security side. Regarding, NATO's presence in the Russian domain, the CSTO definitely acts as a counter balance. Though there have been talks regarding the cooperation between NATO (US-led) and Russia yet it is a very complex issue still and it is evident that NATO certainly does not want to recognise the CSTO as a successful security alliance in the region. Hence the equation between the NATO and CSTO has been strictly in a competitive security framework. Also with the unanimous agreement of the member states of CSTO regarding the establishment of foreign bases in the territory of member countries has been a landmark step. According to this agreement no foreign country can set up its military base in the territory of any CSTO member without the consent of all the CSTO members. This action gives Russia and hence CSTO leverage upon NATO, the US and other Western countries interested to set up bases here.

Hence the **fourth** chapter of the dissertation addresses the **third hypothesis** relating to CSTO emerging as a counteracting force against the US particularly after latter's growing military presence in and around Afghanistan to keep Russia's natural role as an arbiter and defender intact. The fourth chapter speaks volumes about the presence of NATO forces and the SCO's presence in the post-Soviet region and how in spite of it, CSTO emerges as a strong organisation in this competitive security cooperation.



The **concluding** chapter of the dissertation gives an account of the assessment of the other four chapters of the dissertation. This chapter evaluates the CSTO in detail. It focuses on the challenges and difficulties cropping up in the working of CSTO smoothly. It also evaluates the opportunities and the relevance of the CSTO. Main findings of the entire work constitute this chapter. It restates the research problem and summarises implications of the study.

So, in definite terms the present work answers the following questions---

If the CSTO is 'Russia-led' then how do it tantamount to collective defence?

Secondly, does the hegemonic character of Russia hamper the working of CSTO smoothly in an unbiased manner?

And thirdly, is it that the CSTO being an amalgamation of unequal member states pose any difficulty in the maintenance of security and peaceful cooperation?

The CSTO in spite of being 'Russia-led' does not become a complete tool for Russian hegemony in the region but it does tantamount to collective defence because the CSTO has equal relations with all of its members because most of the relations being bilateral, it is able to address problems of each member state separately, as mentioned in chapter 3 of this dissertation.

Hence it also answers the second and third part of the question that the hegemonic character of Russia does not hamper the smooth working of the CSTO. In fact, the CSTO is not just Russia in all. It has other important members as well. The main character of the CSTO is not delivering to the needs of Russia alone but become a capable organisation that can take substantial steps in managing security and take prompt and effective actions during times of emergency.

It should be borne in mind that the CSTO originally formed only in the 1990's is only a nascent organisation. It is as nascent as the post-Soviet states itself. It is therefore still growing up and is in the process of becoming a more vital and able-bodied security organisation. Militarisation of the CSTO has been one example to understand how it is growing up to be more and more successful in its aims and objectives. But it cannot be undermined that Russia has in fact re-energised the CSTO by providing a

robust military structure, economic assistance and it is for sure that Russia is indeed taking a step forward in preserving and sustaining this organisation. The CSTO has miles to go, it is still very nascent but of course it needs the active support of all its members and the solidarity of the members as well. However, the significance of the CSTO as a security organisation in the post-Soviet state will rise further after the US-led forces depart from Afghanistan creating a security vacuum in this much troubled space.

Therefore, suggesting the fairly new inception of the CSTO, it seems to be a promising development in the arena of security integration process in the post-Soviet space although it still has a long way to go. It seems to have a promising future.

# **APPENDIX 1**

## **List of some International Treaties signed in the framework of TCS or CSTO**

- Treaty on Collective Security (15 May 1992)
- Protocol on the extension of the Treaty on Collective Security of 15 May 1992 (2 April 1999)
- Agreement on the main principles of military-technical cooperation among the parties to the Treaty on Collective Security of 15 May 1992 (20 June 2000)
- Agreement on the status of the forces of the collective security system (11 October 2000)
- Protocol on the procedures for creating and functioning of the forces of collective security system of the states participating on TCS of 15 May 1992 (25 May 2001)
- Protocol on the procedure for exercising control over the purposeful use of military products delivered in the framework of the agreement on the main principles on military-technical cooperation among the parties to the Treaty on Collective Security of 15 May 1992 (7 October 2002)
- Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation/ CSTO Charter (7 October 2002)
- Agreement on the legal status of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (7 October 2002)
- Protocol on amending the Agreement on the main principles of military-technical cooperation among the parties to the Treaty on Collective Security of 15 May 1992 (19 September 2003)
- Protocol on amending the Protocol on the procedures for exercising control over the purposeful use of military products delivered in the framework of the agreement on the main principles of the military-technical cooperation among

the parties to the Treaty on Collective Security of 15 May 1992 (22 November 2004)

- Agreement on the mutual preservation of classified information in the framework of CSTO (18 June 2004)
- Agreement on the operational preparedness of the territory and the joint use of military infrastructure of CSTO member states (18 June 2004)
- Agreement on education and training of military personnel for the member states of the CSTO (23 June 2005)
- Protocol on amending the Agreement on the creation of a unified system for technical protection of the railroads of the CSTO Member States of 28 April 2003 (23 June 2006)
- Agreement on the procedures for operational deployment, the use of and the comprehensive support to the Central Asian Republics' CRRF for Collective Security (23 June 2006)
- Agreement on the peacekeeping activity of the CSTO (6 October 2007)
- Agreement on the creation of a command and control system of the forces of the collective security system of the CSTO (6 October 2007)
- Protocol on the mechanism of providing military-technical assistance to member states of the CSTO in cases of arising threat of aggression or given an act of aggression (6 October 2007)
- Agreement on the preferential terms for delivery of special technology and the means for equipping law enforcement agencies and special services of member states of the CSTO (6 October 2007)
- Agreement on the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Forces (14 June 2009)
- Agreement on Cooperation between the Collective Security Treaty Organisation Member States on Development, Production, Operation, Maintenance, Modernisation, Service-life Extension and Disposal of Military Goods, signed in Moscow on December 10, 2010.

(Source: Rozanov, Anatoliy A. and Dovgan, Elena F.(2010), *Collective Security Treaty Organisation 2002-2009*, Geneva/Minsk: Procon Ltd. Page:91-92)

## **APPENDIX 2**

### **TASKS AND FUNCTIONS OF CSTO BODIES**

#### ***COLLECTIVE SECURITY COUNCIL:***

##### **Main tasks of the Council:**

1. Defining the strategy, main areas and prospects for the military-political integration in the framework of CSTO.
2. Coordinating and enhancing the interaction among member states in the area of foreign policy, developing cooperation with respective international organisations, individual states and group of states, determining the positions of the Organisation on important regional and international issues.
3. Developing and improving the system for collective security and its regional structures.
4. Developing and deepening the cooperation in military-political, military-technical and other areas.
5. Defining the main directions of the common fight against international terrorism, extremism, illegal trafficking of narcotics and psychotropic substances, armaments, transnational organised crime, illegal migration and other security threats.
6. Organising the peacekeeping activity of the member states.

##### **Main functions of the Council:**

1. Examines issues determining the activity of the organisations.
2. Conducts consultations in order to coordinate the positions of the member states in case of a threat to the security, territorial integrity and sovereignty of one or more member states, or a threat to peace in the world and to international security.

3. Decides in issues of providing needed assistance, including military and military-technical assistance to a member state subject to aggression by any state or group of states, as well as by the forces of international terrorism.
4. Defines and introduces measures for maintaining and restoring peace and security.
5. Decides on key issues of military and military-technical policy.
6. Decides on issues of improving the legal basis in the fields of defence, force development and security of member states.
7. Appoints and relieves from his/her position the Secretary General of the Organisation (further- the Secretary General) on the proposal of the Council of Foreign Ministers.
8. Examines the annual reports of the Secretary General on the status of the Organisation and the implementation of the decisions.
9. On proposal by the Secretary General agreed with the Council of Foreign Ministers, approves the structure and the number of personnel of the Secretariat of the of the Organisation (further-the Secretariat), the number of quota positions in the Secretariat and their distribution among the member states in accordance with the determined quota for each state.
10. Decides on the acceptance of the new member states in the Organisation, on suspending the partnership of a member state in the activities of the Organisation's bodies or terminating its membership in the Organisation.
11. Decides on giving a state or an international organisation the status of an observer to the Organisation, as well as suspending or annulling the observer status given to a state or an international organisation.
12. Endorses the provisions of the consultative, executive and the working bodies of the Organisation, the Permanent Council of the Organisation and the other provisions defined in the Organisation's Charter.
13. Endorses the budget of the Organisation for each budget year and approves the report of the Secretariat on budget execution.
14. Endorses the provisions on the procedure of planning and executing the budget of the Organisation.
15. Endorses the symbols of the Organisation.
16. Performs other functions deemed necessary in order to provide collective security in accordance with the Organisation's Charter.

## ***COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS:***

### Main tasks of the Council:

1. Coordinating the activity of the member states in the area of foreign policy, including the cooperation of their diplomatic services on issues of international and regional security and stability.
2. Maintaining contacts among the member states, conducting consultations exchanging views on international issues of interest.
3. Preparing proposals for foreign policy activities aimed at preventing security threats to member states.
4. Examining operational issues of foreign policy cooperation in the framework of the Organisation, emerging in the period between sessions of the Collective Security Council and adopting measures (within its sphere of competencies) aimed at implementation of the decisions of the Council.
5. Developing- jointly with the Council of Defence Ministers of the CSTO and on instructions by the Council—proposals for peacekeeping activities.

### Main functions of the Council:

1. Organises the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the Council on issues of foreign policy and further development and improvement of the system of collective security, develops proposals for international cooperation aimed to conduct coordinated foreign policy, encompassing the policies on countering international terrorism, extremism, illegal trafficking of narcotics and psychotropic substances, armaments, transnational organised crime and other threats to security.
2. Examines, coordinates and recommends issues to be included in the agenda of Council's session.
3. Conducts regular and emergency consultations and exchange of opinions on issues of international and regional security affecting the interests of member states, and forms joint positions on these issues.
4. Coordinates the activities of the member states towards the implementation of foreign policy decisions of the Council.

5. Makes proposals to the Council on establishing contacts with other international intergovernmental organisations and states that are not members of the Organisation.
6. Examines issues of interaction and coordination of the positions of the member states in international organisations and fora dealing with international and regional security.
7. With the consent of the Council of Defence Ministers and the Committee of the Secretaries of Security Councils (CSSC) of the CSTO, makes a proposal to the Council on accepting new members in the Organisation, on the provision on the status of an observer to the Organisation to a state or an international organisation, as well as on suspending or terminating the observer status of a state or an international organisation.
8. With the consent of CDM and CSSC makes a proposal to the Council on the candidacy of a Secretary General of the Organisation (further- the Secretary General).
9. Examines and decides on other issues as tasked by the Council.

### ***COUNCIL OF DEFENCE MINISTERS:***

#### **Main tasks of the Council:**

1. Preparing proposals on issues of military policy, force development and military-technical cooperation among the member states, examining and agreeing on draft documents to be put forward to the session of the Collective Security Council (further- the Council).
2. In the period between sessions of the Council examines issues of military and military-technical cooperation requiring operational decisions and, within the scope of its competencies, adopts respective measures aimed at the implementation of Council decisions.
3. Implementation—according to Council decisions—of activities aimed at furthering and improving the military and military-technical cooperation and the military-political integration of the member states.
4. Jointly with the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (further - CFM) and on instructions by the Council, prepares



proposals for peacekeeping activities.

Main functions of the Council:

1. Prepares, coordinates and presents to the Council, along with the necessary financial and economic justification, proposals on:
  - using forces and means of the system for collective security
  - providing assistance, including military and military-technical assistance, given a rising threat to the security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of one or more member states, needed to prevent or repel a military aggression (armed attack)
  - developing and improving the system of collective security and its regional structures
  - Promoting the cooperation in the military-scientific field and in the joint education and training of military personnel.
2. Endorses or presents to the attention of the Council, within agreed time-lines, plans for joint activities in the operational and combat training of command and control structures and components of the coalition (regional) groups of forces in regions (areas) of collective security.
3. Jointly with CFM and the Committee of the Secretaries of Security Councils of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (further - CSSC) participates in the preparation of proposals on accepting new members in the Organisation, on suspending the participation of a member state in the activities of Organisation's bodies or its exclusion from the Organisation, on the provision of a status of an observer to the Organisation to a state or an international organisation, as well as on suspending or terminating the observer status of a state or an international organisation.
4. Participates in the coordination of the proposal on the candidacy of a

Secretary General of the Organisation (further - the Secretary General).

5. Participates in harmonising and coordinating the positions of the member states in international organisations and forums on military aspects of regional and international security.
6. Examines and decides on other issues as tasked by the Council.

### ***COMMITTEE OF THE SECRETARIES OF SECURITY COUNCILS OF CSTO:***

#### Main tasks of the Council:

1. Participating in the organisation and coordination of the activities of the bodies of the Organisation and the state authorities of the member states in order to implement the decisions of the Collective Security Council (further - the Council) on the joint fight against international terrorism, extremism, illegal trafficking of narcotics and psychotropic substances, armaments, transnational organised crime, illegal migration and other threats to security.
2. Preparing proposals to the Council on adopting necessary practical joint measures for preventing or eliminating threats to the national, regional and international security.
3. Interacting with the state authorities of member states and coordinating their activities in accordance with international treaties in the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States and other international levels on countering the threats to the national, regional and international security.

#### Main functions of the Council:

1. Contributes to the regular exchange of information among member states on threats and crisis situations that have emerged or may arise within the states, in neighbouring and other regions and may negatively influence the security the member states.
2. Coordinates the efforts of the national authorities of member states in a joint approach to countering security challenges and threats.

3. In the period between sessions of the Council, examines operational issues of cooperation in the framework of the Organisation and undertakes measures to implement the decisions of the Council.
4. Provides for interaction with interstate and specialised bodies of the Commonwealth of Independent States supervising the developments in specific security areas.
5. Jointly with the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (further - CFM) and the Council of Defence Ministers of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (further - CDM) participates in the preparation of proposals on accepting new members in the Organisation, on suspending the participation of a member state in the activities of Organisations bodies or its exclusion from the Organisation, on the provision of a status of an observer to the Organisation to a state or an international organisation, as well as on suspending or terminating the observer status of a state or an international organisation.
6. Participates in the coordination of the proposal on the candidacy of a Secretary General of the Organisation (further - the Secretary General).
7. Examines and decides on other issues as tasked by the Council.

***CSTO PERMANENT COUNCIL:***

**Main tasks of the Council:**

1. Harmonising the positions of the member states on issues of Organisation's activities.
2. Assessing and analysing the situation, rapid exchange of information on pressing issues of national, regional, and international security and preparation of respective recommendations.
3. Participating in the organisation for implementing the decisions of the Council, the consultative and the executive bodies of the Organisation.
4. Participating in preparing draft documents for the meetings of bodies of the Organisation.

Main functions of the Council:

1. Prepares proposals aimed at the coordination of foreign policy activities, development of the multilateral military-political integration, development and improvement of the system for collective security and its regional structures.
2. Participates in drafting proposals for coordination of the efforts of the member states towards countering international terrorism, extremism, the illegal trafficking of narcotics and psychotropic substances, armaments, transnational organised crime and other threats to the security of the member states.
3. Participates in the preparation of draft decisions and documents for the sessions of the Council and the meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (further - CFM), the Council of Defence Ministers of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (further - CDM), and the Committee of the Secretaries of Security Councils of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (further – CSSC).
4. Tables proposals to conduct consultations in developments impacting the interests of the Organisation or the security of any of its member states.
5. Examines issues related to the organisational and financial activities of the Organisation and drafts proposals for their improvement.
6. Maintains and develops contacts with the relevant authorities of the member states and informs them on the activity of the Organisation and its bodies.
7. Provides information to the bodies of the Organisation on national defence and security related legislation, as well as on international treaties and international legal acts of a military-political nature signed by member states and states that are not members of the Organisation, or international organisations.
8. Assists the working contacts of the Secretary General of the Organisation (further - the Secretary General) in the member states.

***CSTO SECRETARIAT, SECRETARY GENERAL:***

Main tasks of the Council:

1. Preparing, in coordination with the Permanent Council, draft decisions and other documents on issues related to coordinating the foreign policy interaction, developing the cooperation in the military-political, military, and military-technical spheres, developing and improving the system for collective security and its regional structures, the fight with international terrorism, extremism, the illegal trafficking of narcotics and psychotropic substances, armaments, transnational organised crime and other threats to security, as well as on peacekeeping issues.
2. Planning and executing the budget of the Organisation.

Main functions of the Council:

1. Summarising proposals and materials for the agenda of Council sessions and meetings of the consultative and executive bodies of the Organisation received from member states, preparing draft agendas for Council sessions and meetings of the consultative and executive bodies of the Organisation, preparing draft documents and other documents and sending them to member states.
2. Preparing for the member states information-analytical and other materials necessary for the work of the Council and the consultative and executive bodies of the Organisation.
3. Providing organisational and technical support to the Council sessions and the meetings of the consultative and executive bodies of the Organisation while interacting with relevant governmental agencies of the state hosting the session (meeting).
4. Providing organisational support for the meetings of the Permanent Council.
5. Registering and storing documents (performs the functions of a depositary).
6. Performing financial and administrative activities supporting the performance of the functions of the Secretariat.

The Secretary General:

1. Supervises the Secretariat.
2. Organises consultations among the member states on issues related to the implementation of the Treaty.
3. In accordance with the decisions of the Council coordinates the drafting and harmonising of respective decisions and other documents for Council sessions, meetings of the executive and consultative bodies of the Organisation and various consultations.
4. On the instructions of the Council's Chairperson, and when necessary, organises the signing of Council's decisions by heads of states following the Rules of procedure of the bodies of the Organisation.
5. Presents to the Council an annual report on the work done, including also analysis of the situation and the factors that may impact the security interests of the member states, respective findings and recommendations.
6. On the instructions of the Council, represents the Organisation in the relations with other states that are not its members, with international organisations and the media.
7. On the instructions of the Council, informs the UN Security Council on undertaken or planned activities of the Organisation towards maintaining and restoring peace and security.
8. Prepares information to the members of the Council and to the consultative and executive bodies of the Organisation on the implementation of their decisions.
9. Determines the functions of structural units and the responsibilities of the officials and staff of the Secretariat.
10. Sends proposals on the budget of the Organisation for approval by the respective executive authorities of the member states within the timelines, established by national legislation of the member states in planning their national budgets.
11. Submits for Council's approval the draft budget of the Organisation for the forthcoming year, as agreed with member states.

12. Organises the current financial oversight over the execution of the Organisation's budget.
13. Submits for Council's approval the report on the execution of the Organisation's budget for the past year.
14. Performs the functions of depositary of documents adopted by the Council, the consultative and executive bodies of the Organisation.
15. Signs contracts with persons employed by the Secretariat.
16. Performs the functions of Organisation's budget holder.
17. Examines and decides on other issues as instructed by the Council.

***CSTO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY:***

1. Discusses issues of the cooperation among member states in the international, military-political, legislative and other areas, and, depending on the nature of the issue, submits its respective proposals to the Collective Security Council, other CSTO bodies, or parliaments.
2. Examines issues proposed by the Collective Security Council and makes respective recommendations to the Collective Security Council, as well as to other CSTO bodies.
3. Makes recommendations for convergence of the legislation of CSTO member states in the international, military-political, legislative and other areas.
4. Adopts model legislative acts aimed to regulate the relations in the CSTO areas of activity and, along with respective recommendations, sends them to the parliaments of the CSTO member states.
5. Adopts recommendations on synchronising the procedures of ratification by parliaments of international treaties signed in the framework of CSTO and, upon a decision of the Collective Security Council, of ratification of other international treaties when the participation of CSTO member states will contribute to the achievement of their common objectives as enshrined in the 2002 Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation.
6. Adopts recommendations on bringing the legislation of CSTO member states in line with the provisions of international treaties signed among the member states in

the framework of CSTO.

7. Facilitates the exchange of legislative information among the CSTO member states.
8. Interacts and cooperates with parliamentarian and other organisations in the pursuit of its objectives.
9. Discusses other issues of parliamentarian cooperation.

(Source: Rozanov, Anatoliy A. and Dovgan, Elena F.(2010), *Collective Security Treaty Organisation 2002-2009*, Geneva/Minsk: Procon Ltd. Pg- 81-90)



## **REFERENCES:**

(\* indicates primary sources)

Adomeit, H. (1998), 'Russian national security interests', in R. Allison and C. Bluth (eds) (1998) *Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia*. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Adomeit, H. (2009), "Inside or outside? Russia's policy towards NATO", in Elana Wilson Rowe and Stina Torjesen (eds.) *The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy, USA and Canada*: Routledge.

Akbarzadeh, S. (2004), "Keeping central Asia stable", *Third World Quarterly*, 25 (4): 689-705.

Akiner, Shirin (2005), 'Political process in post-Soviet Central Asia', in M. Amineh and H.Houweling (eds) *Central Eurasia in Global Politics*, Netherlands: Brill Academic Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP.

Allison, R. (2004), "Regionalism, Regional Structures and Security Management in Central Asia", *International Affairs*, 80 (3): 463-483.

Allison, R. (2004), "Strategic Reassertion in Russia's Central Asia Policy", *International Affairs*, 80 (4): 277-293.

Allison, R. (2008), "Russia resurgent? Moscow's campaign to coerce Georgia to peace", *International Affairs*, 84 (6): 1145-1171.

Allison, R. and Bluth, C. (1998), *Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia*. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Aris, S. (2011), *Eurasian Regionalism: The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation*, UK and US: Palgrave Macmillan.

Averre, Derek L. (2003), "Transborder Security and Regionalism", in Graeme P. Herd and A. Aldis (eds) *Russian Regions and Regionalism: Strength through weakness*, USA and Canada: RoutledgeCurzon.

Babus, Sylvia W. (2004), "Democracy building in Central Asia Post September 11", in Burghart, D. and Sabonis-Helf, T. (eds) *The Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's path to the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Washington D.C.: NDU CTNSP.

Baev, Pavel K. (1996), *The Russian Army in a time of troubles*, Oslo: PRIO.

Baev, Pavel K. (2003), "Military aspects of Regionalism", in Graeme P. Herd and A. Aldis (eds) *Russian Regions and Regionalism: Strength through weakness*, USA and Canada: RoutledgeCurzon.

Baylis, John (2007), "International and Global Security in the Post-Cold War era", in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds.) *The Globalisation of World Politics: An introduction to international relations*, USA: Oxford University Press

Bergman, J. (1998), "Was the Soviet Union Totalitarian? The View of Soviet Dissidents and the Reformers of the Gorbachev Era", *Studies in the East European Thought*, 50 (4): 247-281.

Berryman, J. (2010), "Russia and China in Eurasia: The wary partnership", in Maria Raquel Friere and Roger E. Kanet (eds) *Key Players and Regional dynamics in Eurasia: The return of the great Game*, UK and US: Palgrave Macmillan.

Blank, S. (2010), "International rivalries in Eurasia", in Maria Raquel Friere and Roger E. Kanet (eds) *Key Players and Regional dynamics in Eurasia: The return of the great Game*, UK and US: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bohr, A. (2004), "Regionalism in Central Asia: New Geopolitics, Old Regional Order", *International Affairs*, 80 (3): 485-502.

\*Bordyuzha, Nikolay (2007), Speech delivered on 13<sup>th</sup> February 2007 at the meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council

\*Bordyuzha, Nikolay (2011), “Transnational threats and challenges: strengthening the coherence of the OSCE response and interaction with other international actors”, Speech delivered on 30<sup>th</sup> June, 2011 at the 2011 Annual Security Review Conference: Vienna.

Bowker, M. (2007), *Russia, America and the Islamic World*, Great Britain: Antony Rowe Ltd.

Brannon, R. (2004), “Regional Security Cooperation and Foreign Policies in Central Asia: A 21<sup>st</sup> century ‘Great Game’?”, in D. Burghart and T. Sabonis-Helf (eds) *The Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia’s path to the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Washington D.C.: NDU CTNSP.

Bridge, R. (2011), “CSTO talks tough on NATO”, in RT, 20 December 2011 [Online Web], Accessed on 16.6.2012, <http://rt.com/politics/csto-nato-russia-medvedev-kazakhstan-257/>

Buszynski, L. (2005), “Russia’s New Role in Central Asia”, *Asian Survey*, 45 (4): 546- 565.

Calleo, David P. (2003), “Reflections on Eurasian security”, in James Sperling, Sean Kay and S. Victor Papascoma (eds) *Limiting Institutions? The challenge of Eurasian security governance*, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.

Casier, T. (1999), “The shattered horizon: How ideology mattered to Soviet politics”, *Studies in East European Thought*, 51 (1): 35-59.

Chausovsky, Eugene (2011), “The CSTO and Russian Strategy” [Online: Web] Accessed 17 Sept 2011 URL: <http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110706-dispatch-csto-and-russian-strategy>

Checkel, J. (1993), “Ideas, Institutions and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Resolution”, *World politics*, 45 (2): 271-300.

Choo, J. (2003), “The geopolitics of Central Asian energy”, in James Sperling, Sean Kay and S. Victor Papascoma (eds) *Limiting Institutions? The challenge of Eurasian security governance*, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.

Chung, Chein-peng (2004), "The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: China's changing influence in Central Asia", *The China Quarterly*, 180: 989-1009.

Cimbala, Stephen J. (2010), *Nuclear Weapons and Cooperative Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: The new disorder*, USA and Canada: Routledge.

Clunan, Anne L. (2009), *The social construction of Russia's resurgence*, USA: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Colton, Timothy J. (2008), "Post-communist Russia, the international environment and NATO", in Aurel Braun (ed) *NATO-Russia relations in the Twenty-first century*, New York and London: Routledge.

Deyermond, R. (2008), *Security and Sovereignty in the Former Soviet Union*, Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

Duffield, John S., Michota C. and Miller, S. (2008), 'Alliances' in Paul D. Williams (ed) *Security Studies: An Introduction*, Oxon, USA and Canada: Routledge.

Embassy of Tajikistan to Pakistan (2012), "Tajikistan holds CSTO anti-terror drills", [Online Web], Accessed: 14.4.2012, URL: <http://www.tajikembassy.pk/m-news21.aspx>

Everett-Heath, T. (2003), 'Instability and identity in a post-Soviet world', in T. Everett-Heath (ed.) *Central Asia. Aspects of Transition*. London: Routledge

Fawcett, L. (2008), 'Regional Institutions', in Williams, Paul, D. (ed) *Security Studies: An Introduction*, Oxon, USA and Canada: Routledge.

Fawn, R. (2003), "Realignments in Russian Foreign Policy: An Introduction", in Rick Fawn (ed) *Realignments in Russian Foreign Policy*, London and Portland: Frank Cass & Co.Ltd.

Fawn, R. (2003), "Russia's reluctant retreat from the Caucasus: Abkhazia, Georgia and the US after 11 September 2001", in Rick Fawn (ed) *Realignments in Russian Foreign Policy*, London and Portland: Frank Cass & Co.Ltd.

Flynn, Gregory and Farrell, Henry (1999), "Piecing Together the Democratic Peace: The CSCE, Norms", *Construction of Security in Post-Cold War Europe: International Organization*, (53): 505-535

Frederking, B. (2003), "Constructing post-Cold war collective security", *The American Political Science Review*, 97 (3): 363-378.

Friere, Maria R. (2010), "Eurasia at the heart of Russian politics: Dynamics of (In)dependence in a complex setting", in Maria Raquel Friere and Roger E. Kanet (eds) *Key Players and Regional dynamics in Eurasia: The return of the great Game*, UK and US: Palgrave Macmillan.

Friere, Maria R. and Kanet, Roger E. (2010), "Russia in Eurasia: External players and regional dynamics", in Maria Raquel Friere and Roger E. Kanet (eds) *Key Players and Regional dynamics in Eurasia: The return of the great Game*, UK and US: Palgrave Macmillan.

Frost, Alexander (2009), "The Collective Security Treaty Organisation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and Russia's Strategic goals in Central Asia", *The China and the Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, 7 (3): 83-102

Fumagalli, M. (2007), "Alignments and Re-alignments in Central Asia: The Rationale and Implications of Uzbekistan's Rapprochement with Russia", *International Political Science Review*, 28 (3): 253-271.

Fyodorov, Y. (2005), "Do we need reform of Russian foreign policy?", in Andrei Melvill and Tatiana Shakleina (eds.) *Russian Foreign policy in transition: Concepts and Reality*, Budapest: Central European University Press.

Gibler, Douglas M. and Sewell, Jamil A. (2006), "External threat and democracy: The role of NATO revisited", *Journal of Peace Research*, 43 (4): 413-431.

Gleason, G. (2010), "Russia and Central Asia's Multi Vector Foreign Policies", in Stephen K. Wegren and Dale R. Herspring (eds) *After Putin's Russia*, UK: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Godzimirski, Jakub M. (2005), "Russia and NATO: community of values or community of interests", in Jacob Hedenskog, Vilhelm Konnander, Bertil Nygren, Ingmar Oldberg and Christer Pursiainen (eds) *Russia as a great power: Dimensions of security under Putin*, Oxon, USA and Canada: Routledge.

Goldgeier, James M. and McFaul, Michael (2003), *Power and Purpose: US policy toward Russia after the Cold War*, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press

Gorenburg, D. (2011), "Why NATO won't recognise the CSTO", [Online Web], Accessed on: 24.4.2012, URL: [http://valdaiclub.com/near\\_abroad/27800.html](http://valdaiclub.com/near_abroad/27800.html)

\**Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2011), Astana Calling, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Astana.*

\*Govt of the Russian Federation (2011), "Submitting to the President of the Russian Federation of the Agreement on the Creation of the System of Control of the Forces and Assets of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation System", discussion at the Government Presidium meeting on August 4, 2008: Dushanbe.

Haas, Marcel De (2010), *Russia's Foreign Security policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Putin, Medvedev and beyond*, USA and Canada: Routledge

Hayrumyan, N. (2012), "CSTO to Armenia-I am declaring war", [Online Web], Accessed: 29 March, 2012, URL: <http://www.lragir.am/engsrc/comments25210.html>

Herd, Graeme P. (2003), "Russia's demographic crisis and federal instability", in Graeme P. Herd and A. Aldis (eds) *Russian Regions and Regionalism: Strength through weakness*, USA and Canada: RoutledgeCurzon.

Herspring, Dale R. (2010), "Putin, Medvedev and the Russian Military", in Stephen K. Wegren and Dale R. Herspring (eds) *After Putin's Russia*, UK: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Hughes, James and Sasse, Gwendolyn (2001), "Comparing Regional and ethnic conflicts in post Soviet transition States: An institutional Approach" [Online: Web] Accessed 14 Sept 2011.

URL:[https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:Erkdm5DPA1MJ:www.essex.ac.uk/ECP/R/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/grenoble/ws2/hughes\\_sasse.pdf+&hl=en&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEEsGMQ5ycYDBG9EdODFO7fP6PDWZhrBJPctRHknlK1x1pmTTReY\\_U0TdEVzU1fW8gVqEocXr093oRY\\_Mqq4seeuCUVdAQdAH07r0XHMTQuVFk4HJkC76IwZkLkXMl5UdJ06Idx&sig=AHIEtbR4bCbaUMwFNEmq1RjiUQ0UZwpI7g&pli=1](https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:Erkdm5DPA1MJ:www.essex.ac.uk/ECP/R/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/grenoble/ws2/hughes_sasse.pdf+&hl=en&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEEsGMQ5ycYDBG9EdODFO7fP6PDWZhrBJPctRHknlK1x1pmTTReY_U0TdEVzU1fW8gVqEocXr093oRY_Mqq4seeuCUVdAQdAH07r0XHMTQuVFk4HJkC76IwZkLkXMl5UdJ06Idx&sig=AHIEtbR4bCbaUMwFNEmq1RjiUQ0UZwpI7g&pli=1)

\*Informal Meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (2011), transcripts of the Informal meeting of the CSTO member-states leaders, 2011 (Astana), President of Russia Website, 2 November 2011, <http://eng.kremlin.ru/visits/2722>

\*Informal Summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (2010), transcripts of the Informal meeting of the CSTO heads of States, 2010 (Yerevan), President of Russia Website, 2 November 2011, <http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/811>

Isakova, Irina (2005), *Russian Governance in the Twenty-first Century*, New York: Frank Cass  
Itar-Tass News agency, "Tajikistan hopes to sign a military coop agreement with Russia" (21/7/2011), [Online: Web] Accessed 25 March 2012, URL: [http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c154/189540\\_print.html](http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c154/189540_print.html)

Ivanov, S. (2005), "On the New Version of the National Security Conception of the Russian Federation", in Andrei Melvill and Tatiana Shakleina (eds.) *Russian Foreign policy in transition: Concepts and Reality*, Budapest: Central European University Press.

Jackson, N.J. (2003), *Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS. Theories, Debates and Actions*, London: Routledge.

Johnson, Rebecca (1999), "Post Cold War Security: The lost opportunities" [Online: Web] Accessed 9 Sept 2011 URL: <http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art257.pdf>

Jonson, L. (2004), *Vladimir Putin and Central Asia. The Shaping of Russian Foreign Policy*. London, New York: I.B. Taurus.

Jonson, L. (2004), *Vladimir Putin and Central Asia: The shaping of Russian foreign policy*, New York: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd.

Jonson, Lena (2005), "Understanding Russia's foreign policy change: the cases of Central Asia and Iraq", in Jacob Hedenskog, Vilhelm Konnander, Bertil Nygren, Ingmar Oldberg and Christer Pursiainen (eds) *Russia as a great power: Dimensions of security under Putin*, Oxon, USA and Canada: Routledge.

Kanet, Roger E. (2010), "Russia and the Great Caspian Basin: Withstanding the US challenge", in Maria Raquel Friere and Roger E. Kanet (eds) *Key Players and Regional dynamics in Eurasia: The return of the great Game*, UK and US: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kay, S. (2003), "Geopolitical constraints and institutional innovation: The dynamics of multilateralism in Eurasia", in James Sperling, Sean Kay and S. Victor Papascoma (eds) *Limiting Institutions? The challenge of Eurasian security governance*, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.

Kazakhstan Today (2006), "Returning of Uzbekistan to CSTO with strengthen the role of the organization", [Online Web] Accessed: 14 Mar. 2012, URL: <http://engnews.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=280829>

Kembayev, Zhenis (2009), *Legal Aspects of the Regional Integration Processes in the Post-Soviet Area*, Verlag Berlin Heidelberg: Springer

Kobrinskaya, Irina (2007), "The Post-Soviet Space: From the USSR to the Commonwealth of Independent States and Beyond", in Katlijn Malfiet, Lien Verspoest and Evgeny Vinokurov (eds) *The CIS, the EU and Russia: Challenges of Integration*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Khushqadamov, H. (2012), "Tajikistan as the CSTO member to provide humanitarian aid to Kyrgyzstan", [Online Web], Accessed on 06.03.2012, URL: <http://khover.tj/eng/archive/1072-tajikistan-as-the-csto-member-state-to-provide-humanitarian-aid-to-kyrgyzstan.html>



\*Kristensen, Hans M. (2006), “New and Traditional Security Threats to Russia, and the Utility of Nuclear Weapons”, Meeting paper on 12-13<sup>th</sup> October, 2006 on Emerging nuclear weapons policies: An opportunity to increase dialogue, FAS: Washington DC

Kudenko, A. (2012), “US attack on Iran will shake everyone—CSTO chief”, [Online Web], Accessed: 21 March 2012, URL: <http://rt.com/politics/us-attack-iran-csto-835/>

Kumar, Rama S. (2002), “Impact of US-led war on terrorism”, *Economic and Political Weekly*, 37 (33): 3414-3419.

Kurdiukov, G. and Malfliet, K. (2007), “Integration by absorption: New subjects for the Russian Federation”, in Katlijn Malfliet, Lien Verspoest and Evgeny Vinokurov (eds) *The CIS, the EU and Russia: Challenges of Integration*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Kuzio, T. (2000), “Geopolitical Pluralism in the CIS: The emergence of GUUAM”, *European Security*, 9 (2): 81-144.

Lanteigne, M. (2006/2007), “In Medias Res: The development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as a security community”, *Pacific Affairs*, 79 (4): 605-622.

Legvold, R. (2009), “The role of multilateralism in Russian foreign policy”, in Elana Wilson Rowe and Stina Torjesen (eds.) *The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy*, USA and Canada: Routledge.

Legvold, R. (2011), “Russia’s unformed foreign policy”, *Foreign Affairs*, 80 (5): 62-75.

Libman, Alexander (2007), “Regionalization and regionalism in the post-soviet space: current status and Implications for Institutional development”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, 59 (3): 401-430

Lo, Bobo (2002), *Russian Foreign policy in the Post Soviet Era: Reality, Illusion and mythmaking*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lowry, Ritchie P. (1970), “To Arms: Changing military roles and the military industrial complex”, *Social Problems*, 18 (1): 3-16.

Lucas, E. (2008), *The New Cold War: Putin's Russia and the threat to the West*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lurer.com (2012), "Armenia to get necessary assistance as CSTO full member-Nikolai Bordyuzha", [Online Web] Accessed 13 March 2012 URL: <http://lurer.com/?p=13017&l=en>

MacFarlane, Neil S. (2004), "The United States and regionalism in Central Asia", *International Affairs*, 80 (3): 447-461.

Malik, Mohan J. (2002), "Dragon on terrorism: Accessing China's tactical gains and strategic losses after 11 September", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 24 (2): 252-293.

Mankoff, Jeffrey (2009), *Russian Foreign policy: Return of the great power politics*, New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Manoli P. (2003), "The Black Sea Economic cooperation: what contribution to regional security?" in James Sperling, Sean Kay and S. Victor Pappasoma (eds) *Limiting Institutions? The challenge of Eurasian security governance*, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.

McCauley, Martin (2002), *Afghanistan and Central Asia: A Modern History*, Great Britain: Pearson Education Limited.

\*Medvedev, D. (2008), Press Conference following the Collective Security Treaty Organisation Summit, Moscow, (5 September 2008), President of Russia Website, [Online Web], Accessed 13 Mar. 12  
URL:[http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/09/05/2125\\_type82912type82914type82915\\_206180.shtml](http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/09/05/2125_type82912type82914type82915_206180.shtml)

Melville, Andrei (2005), "Foreign Policy therapy 'a la Dr Putin'", in Andrei Melvill and Tatiana Shakleina (eds.) *Russian Foreign policy in transition: Concepts and Reality*, Budapest: Central European University Press.

Merry, Wayne E. (2004), "The Politics of Central Asia: National in form, Soviet in content", in D. Burghart and T. Sabonis-Helf (eds) *The Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's path to the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Washington D.C.: NDU CTNSP.

Mishra, A. (2007), *Security in New Russia*, Delhi: Kalpaz Publications.

Moroney, Jennifer D.P. (2004), "Building security in Central Asia: A Multilateral Perspective", in D. Burghart and T. Sabonis-Helf (eds) *The Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's path to the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Washington D.C.: NDU CTNSP.

Mowchan, John A. (2009), "The militarisation of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation", *Centre for Strategic Leadership*, 6 (9): 1-6

Neumann, Iver B. (2005), "Russia as a great power", in Jacob Hedenskog, Vilhelm Konnander, Bertil Nygren, Ingmar Oldberg and Christer Pursiainen (eds) *Russia as a great power: Dimensions of security under Putin*, Oxon, USA and Canada: Routledge.

Neumann, Peter R. (2008), "NATO, the European Union, Russia and the fight against terrorism", in Aurel Braun (ed) *NATO-Russia relations in the Twenty-first century*, New York and London: Routledge.

Nieuws (2011), "Tajikistan calls for CSTO to strengthen fight against cybercrime", 20.12.2011, [Online Web], Accessed: 16.02.2012 URL: <https://www.cpni.nl/index.php/nieuws/tajikistan-calls-for-csto-to-strengthen-fight-against-cybercrime/>

Nygren, B. (2003), 'Russia's immediate security environment under Putin, before and after 11 September', in Y. Fedorov and Bertil Nygren (eds) *Russian Military Reform and Russia's New Security Environment*. Stockholm: The Swedish National Defence College.

Nygren, B. (2005), "Russia's relations with Georgia under Putin: the impact of 11 September", in Jacob Hedenskog, Vilhelm Konnander, Bertil Nygren, Ingmar Oldberg and Christer Pursiainen (eds) *Russia as a great power: Dimensions of security under Putin*, Oxon, USA and Canada: Routledge.

Nygren, B. (2010), "Russia and the CIS region: The Russian regional security complex", in Maria Raquel Friere and Roger E. Kanet (eds) *Key Players and Regional dynamics in Eurasia: The return of the great Game*, UK and US: Palgrave Macmillan.

Nygren, Bertil (2008), *The rebuilding of Greater Russia: Putin's foreign policy towards the CIS countries*, USA and Canada: Routledge

Oldberg, I. (2005), "Foreign policy priorities under Putin: a tour d'horizon", in Jacob Hedenskog, Vilhelm Konnander, Bertil Nygren, Ingmar Oldberg and Christer Pursiainen (eds) *Russia as a great power: Dimensions of security under Putin*, Oxon, USA and Canada: Routledge.

Oldberg, Ingmar (2009), "Russia's great power strategy under Putin and Medvedev", *Eurasia Daily Monitor(EDM)*, 6 (108): 2-23

Oliker, O (2004), "Friends like these: Defining US interests in Central Asia", in D. Burghart and T. Sabonis-Helf (eds) *The Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's path to the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Washington D.C.: NDU CTNSP.

Papayoanou, P. (1997), 'Great powers and regional orders: possibilities and prospects after the Cold War', in D. Lake and P. Morgan (eds) *Regional Orders. Building Security in a New World*. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Ponsard, L. (2007), *Russia, NATO and Cooprative Security: Bridging the gap*, Oxon, USA and Canada: Routledge.

\*President of Russia Website "Press statements following the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Council of Heads of States session", 15 June 2006

\*Medvedev, D. (2009) Press Conference following CSTO and EurAsEC Summits, Moscow, 4 February 2009, President of Russia Website, [Online Web] Accessed 13 Mar. 12, URL: [http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2009/02/04/1956\\_type82914type82915\\_212504.shtml](http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2009/02/04/1956_type82914type82915_212504.shtml)

Pursiainen, C. (2003), "Regionology and Russian Foreign Policy: Identifying the theoretical alternatives", in Graeme P. Herd and A. Aldis (eds) *Russian Regions and Regionalism: Strength through weakness*, USA and Canada: RoutledgeCurzon.

Radyuhin, V. (2012), "And then there were Five", in *The Hindu*, 11 July 2012.

Radyuhin, V. (2011), "CSTO tightens foreign base norms", in *The Hindu*, 21 December 2011, [Online Web], Accessed on 10.6.2012,

<http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article2735791.ece>

Reuters, (2008), "Factbox: Ukraine-Russia Relations", [Online Web], Accessed on 26.01.2009, URL: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/02/12/us-russia-ukraine-relations-idUSL1282952720080212>

Roeder, P. (1997), "From hierarchy to hegemony: the post-Soviet security complex", in D. Lake and P. Morgan (eds.) *Regional Orders. Building Security in a New World* University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Rosefielde, S. (2004), *Russia in the 21<sup>st</sup> century: The Prodigal Superpower*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

*Roskaya Bersnya* (2012), "CSTO suffers from artificial anti-Azerbaijani policy – expert",

[Online Web], Accessed on 27.3.2012, URL:

<http://vestnikkavkaza.net/news/politics/23397.html>

Rowe, Elana W. and Torjesen S. (2009), "Key features of Russia's multilateralism", in Elana Wilson Rowe and Stina Torjesen (eds.) *The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy*, USA and Canada: Routledge.

Rozanov, Anatoliy A. and Dovgan, Elena F.(2010), *Collective Security Treaty Organisation 2002-2009*, Geneva/Minsk: Procon Ltd.

Rupert, J. (1992), "Dateline Tashkent: Post Soviet Central Asia", *Foreign policy*, 87: 175-178 and 180-195.

\*Russian President, 'Vystuplenie prezidenta . . .' [Speech by the president], 28 May 2002 , [online Web] Accessed on 31 May 2002, URL: <http://www.president.kremlin.ru/events>

\*Russian President, 'Otvety prezidenta . . .' [Replies by the president], 11 February 2003 , [Online Web] Accessed on 19 March 2003, URL: <http://194.226.82.50/text/appears>.

Sakwa, R. (2010), "Senseless dreams and small steps: The CIS and CSTO between integration and cooperation", in Maria Raquel Friere and Roger E. Kanet (eds) *Key Players and Regional dynamics in Eurasia: The return of the great Game*, UK and US: Palgrave Macmillan.

Samarkhan, K. (2011), "SCO RATS to improve anti-terror work through joint efforts of its member states, Dzhumanbekov", [Online Web] Accessed: 14.2.2012, URL: <http://www.inform.kz/eng/article/2349905>

Savranskaya, S. (2011), "Gorbachev and the Third World", in Kalinovsky, M. Artemy M. and S. Radchenko (eds) *The end of the Cold war and the Third world*, Oxon. USA and Canada: Routledge.

Selezneva, L. (2003), "Post-Soviet Russian foreign policy: Between Doctrine and Pragmatism", in Rick Fawn (ed) *Realignments in Russian Foreign Policy*, London and Portland: Frank Cass & Co.Ltd.

Sergounin, A. (2003), "Russia's Regionalisation: the interplay of domestic and international players", in Graeme P. Herd and A. Aldis (eds) *Russian Regions and Regionalism: Strength through weakness*, USA and Canada: RoutledgeCurzon.

Sergounin, A. (2003), "Russia and the world: Changing paradigms of Russian foreign and security policy under Yeltsin and Putin", in Godzimirski (ed) *The Russian Federation – Ten Years of Statehood: What Now?*, Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

Sheilfer, A. and Triesman, D. (2005), "A normal country: Russia after communism", *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 19 (1): 151-174.

Sheives, K. (2006), "China turns west: Beijing's contemporary strategy towards Central Asia", *Pacific Affairs*, 79 (2): 205-224.

Simon, J. (2008), "NATO enlargement and Russia", in Aurel Braun (ed) *NATO-Russia relations in the Twenty-first century*, New York and London: Routledge.

Skak, M. (2005), "The logic of foreign and security policy change in Russia", in Jacob Hedenskog, Vilhelm Konnander, Bertil Nygren, Ingmar Oldberg and Christer Pursiainen (eds) *Russia as a great power: Dimensions of security under Putin*, Oxon, USA and Canada: Routledge.

Smith, G. (1999), "Russia, Geopolitical Shift and the New Eurasianism", *Transactions of the Institute of Britain Geographers, New Series*: 24 (4): 481-494.

Smith, Martin A. (2003), "A bumpy road to an unknown destination? NATO-Russia relations, 1991-2002", in Rick Fawn (ed) *Realignments in Russian Foreign Policy*, London and Portland: Frank Cass & Co.Ltd.

Sperling, J. (2003), "Eurasian security governance: new threats, institutional adaptations", in James Sperling, Sean Kay and S. Victor Pappasoma (eds) *Limiting Institutions? The challenge of Eurasian security governance*, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.

Stepanova, E. (2005), "Russia's approach to the fight against terrorism", in Jacob Hedenskog, Vilhelm Konnander, Bertil Nygren, Ingmar Oldberg and Christer Pursiainen (eds) *Russia as a great power: Dimensions of security under Putin*, Oxon, USA and Canada: Routledge.

Swanstorm, Niklas (2010), "Traditional and non-traditional security threats in Central Asia: Connecting the New and Old", *China and Eurasian Forum Quarterly*, 8(2): 35-51.

Swiderski, Edward M. (1998), "Culture, Contexts and Direction in Russian post-Soviet Philosophy", *Studies in East European Thought*, 50 (4): 283-328.

Times.am (2012), "CSTO 'Cooperation 2012' military exercises will be held in Armenia", [Online Web], Accessed on 30.2.2012. URL: <http://times.am/?l=en&p=5199>

Tolipov, F. (2012), "CSTO Summit raises ambiguity regarding Uzbekistan's membership", *CACI Analyst*, [Online Web] Accessed on 14 March 2012, URL: <http://cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5694>

Torjesen, Stina (2009), "Russia as a military Great power: The uses of CSTO and SCO in Central Asia", in Elana Wilson Rowe and Stina Torjesen (eds.) *The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy*, USA and Canada: Routledge.

Tsygankov Andrei P. (2010), "Russia's Foreign Policy", in Wegren, Stephen K. And Herspring, Dale R. (eds) *After Putin's Russia*, UK: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Valovaya, Tatyana (2005), "The Post Soviet space in the era of pragmatism", *Russia in Global Affairs*, 3 (2): 112-125

Vinokurov, Evgeny (2007), "Russian approaches to integration in the post-Soviet space in the 2000s", in Katlijn Malfiet, Lien Verspoest and Evgeny Vinokurov (eds) *The CIS, the EU and Russia: Challenges of Integration*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Wallander, Celeste A. (1989), "Third World Conflict in Soviet Military Thought: Does the New Thinking grow prematurely grey?", *World Politics*, 42 (1): 31-63.

Weinstein, Adam (2007), "Russian Phoenix: The Collective Security Treaty Organization", *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, VIII (1): 167-178

Weitz, R. (2010), "Why is the CSTO absent in the Kyrgyz crisis?", *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, 12 (11): 6-8

Willerton, John p. and Beznosov, Mikhail A. (2007), "Russia's pursuit of its Eurasian security interests: Weighing the CIS and alternative bilateral-multilateral arrangements", in Katlijn Malfiet, Lien Verspoest and Evgeny Vinokurov (eds) *The CIS, the EU and Russia: Challenges of Integration*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Willerton, John P. and Cockerham G. (2003), "Russia, the CIS and Eurasian interconnections", in James Sperling, Sean Kay and S. Victor Pappascoma (eds) *Limiting*



*Institutions? The challenge of Eurasian security governance*, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.

Wu, Yu-Shan (2011), "Russia and the CIS in 2010", *Asian Survey*, 51 (1): 64-75.

Wilson, Jeanne L. (2009) , "Colour Revolutions: The View From Moscow and Beijing" , *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 25(2, 3): 369-395.

Xuequan, Mu (13.4.2012), "CSTO opposes using force against Iran", English.xinhuanet.com, [Online Web], Accessed on 27.4.2012, URL: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2012-04/13/c\\_122970617.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2012-04/13/c_122970617.htm)

Zagorski, A. (1998), "Regional structures of security policy within the CIS", in R. Allison and C. Bluth (eds.) *Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia*, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Zagorski, A. (2009), "Multilateralism in Russia's foreign policy approaches", in Elana Wilson Rowe and Stina Torjesen (eds.) *The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy*, USA and Canada: Routledge.

Ziegler, Charles E. (2008), "Russia and the CIS in 2007: Putin's final year?", *Asian Survey*, 48 (1): 133-143.

Zwick, P. (1989), "New thinking and the new foreign policy under Gorbachev", *Political Science and Politics*, 22 (2): 215-224.