

# CHINESE POLICY TOWARDS NATIONAL MINORITIES IN XINJIANG

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University  
in the partial fulfilment of the requirements  
for the Award of the Degree of  
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY*

MANISH JHA

CENTRE FOR SOUTH, CENTRAL, SOUTH EAST ASIAN  
AND SOUTH WEST PACIFIC STUDIES  
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY  
NEW DELHI - 110 067  
INDIA  
1997




जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय  
**JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY**  
NEW DELHI - 110 067


**CENTRE FOR SOUTH, CENTRAL, SOUTH-EAST  
ASIAN AND SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC STUDIES  
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

**CERTIFICATE**

Certified that the Dissertation entitled "**CHINESE POLICY TOWARDS NATIONAL MINORITIES IN XINJIANG**", submitted by **MANISH JHA** is in partial fulfillment for the award of the Degree of *MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY*, has not been previously submitted for any other Degree of this or any other University. To the best of our knowledge this is a bonafide work.

We recommend that this Dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

  
**(PROF. I. N. MUKHERJEE)**  
**(CHAIRPERSON)**  
Centre for South, Central, South East and  
South West Pacific Studies  
School of International Studies  
Jawaharlal Nehru University  
New Delhi-110067

  
**(Dr. K. WARIKOO)**  
**(SUPERVISOR)**  
21/6/97

*TO*

*MY PARENTS*

## CONTENTS

	PAGES
Acknowledgement	i
Preface	ii-iii
CHAPTER I	INTRODUCTION
	1-16
CHAPTER II	CHINESE POLICY TOWARDS THEIR
	NATIONAL MINORITIES
	17-32
CHAPTER III	XINJIANG UNDER RED CHINA
	33-59
CHAPTER IV	DENG'S POLICIES IN XINJIANG
	60-84
CHAPTER V	CONCLUSION
	85-89
	BIBLIOGRAPHY
	90-104

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

At different stages of this work, I was affectionately encouraged by my supervisor **Dr. K.Warikoo**. He subjected this work under intense intellectual scrutiny. Of course, for his affection and kind co-operation, I am still to find words to express my gratitude.

Staff members of JNU, DU, IDSA and Sapru House Libraries are sincerely thanked for their co-operation.

Colleagues, Nirbhay, Satyen, Sanjeev, Shivraj, Jitendra, Rajesh, Arvind and Birendra are appreciated for their co-operation and friendly suggestions and support.

Last but not the least, I am thankful to Mr.Mahender, Mr.Sushil Kumar Sharma & Mr. Shailesh Kr. Mishra of 'Sanjay Photostat' for word processing (typing) this dissertation sincerely.

New Delhi,

June 23, 1997.

  
(MANISH JHA)

## PREFACE

China has been a country of plural nationalities. The national majority is the majority of Hans who originated from diverse ethnic strains in the past. The other nationalities of China are numerically weak and culturally more proximal towards Central Asian Islamic culture. They are non-accommodative towards the Chinese Han culture. As these communities lived at the periphery of China, China did not afford to ignore them. To extend its authority the Hans always strived to exercise control over these areas. As such Chinese history has been a record of numerous conflicts between the Hans and the non-Han groupings which are now identified in China as "national minorities" of China.

With the breakdown of Soviet Union and Deng's liberal and accommodative attitude towards the national minorities, Xinjiang - the westernmost autonomous province of China is witnessing a spree of protest and demonstrations. The rise of Islam orthodoxy and extremism is a potent source of concern for China. The recent bombs blasts just after the death of Deng Xiaoping have further raised a question mark over China's unity and stability.

Taking the cue from it, this work has focussed on the problems of Xinjiang within the broad ambit of China's policy towards national minorities. In the first chapter Xinjiang has been discussed in its historicity. Xinjiang's status vis-a-vis China has been analysed in a historical perspective. Second Chapter analyses the question of nationality under the Marxist - Leninist

framework. The Chinese policy towards their national minorities has also been discussed. Besides, a comparison has also been made as to how far the Chinese policy towards national minorities has deflected from the traditional Marxist - Leninist framework. In the third Chapter Xinjiang under Mao has been thoroughly discussed and the impact of Mao's policy towards Xinjiang assessed. The fourth chapter deals with Deng's modernisation and liberalisation with a focus on Xinjinag. The concluding chapter seeks to view Xinjiang in its foreseeable future. An attempt has been made to find as to how far China has been able to assuage the ethno-religious and nationalist feelings of the Muslim minorities of Xinjiang.

## CHAPTER - I

### INTRODUCTION

For more than 2000 years, China has existed as a multinational country of which Han constitute the majority. The predecessors of Hans originated from diverse ethnic strains and through a long history of contacts, conflicts and amalgamation with other ethnic identities.<sup>1</sup> However, such amalgamations integrated into a wholesome identity of Hans in due course of time. Hans considered themselves as "culturally superior" race implying that they went to have relations with other ethnic groupings with a sense of dominance and hegemony.

Apart from Han nationality China has 55 other distinct nationalities. China's ever changing political map has made these non-Han communities partly or entirely, fall within the peripheral parts of China. They mostly live in the border areas, carving out an existence in the periphery or China's socio-political hierarchy. These people are now called China's national minorities.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> HuangI-shu., " National Minorities of China" China Report, Vol.32, No.1. January-March 1996, P. 15.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 15.



According to 1990 census, the Han population constituted 91.8 percent and other fifty five nationalities accounted for 8.2 percent. Among the ethnic minorities there were 18 ethnic minorities whose population was above one million, that is, Zhuang, Man, Hui (Muslims), Miao, Uighur, Yi, Tujia, Mongols, Tibetans, Boyyei, Dong, Yao, Koreans, Bai, Hani, Li, Kazakhs and Dai. There were fifteen national minorities whose population was under one million, that is, She, Lisu, Lahu, Dongxiang, Sui, Vo, Naxi, Qiang, Tu, Xibe, Mulam, Kirgiz, Daur and Jingpo. There were fifteen groups whose population was less than 100,000. That is, Salan, Blang, Maonan, Tajik, Prime, Achang, Nu, Ewaki, Gin, Jino, Benglong, Uzbek, Russians, Yugurand, Bonon. The Population of the remaining seven minorities that is Monba, Drogen, Derung, Tatar, Hezhen, Lhoba and Gaoshan was less than 10,000.<sup>3</sup>

Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region of China is one of the provinces of China which extends China's reach to Central Asia with its borders touching Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia and Afghanistan. Holding the distinction of being the largest province of China, Xinjiang is the only autonomous region where Muslims are in majority.<sup>4</sup> Over the centuries the peoples of Xinjiang defined their identities in

---

<sup>3</sup> Jiang Ping.,(ed.) "The Theory and Practice of Chinese Nationalities". (Beijing, 1994), p37.

<sup>4</sup> Warikoo, K., "Ethnic religious Resurgence in Xinjiang", Eurasian Studies (Ankara), Vol. 4, Winter, 1995-96, p.33.

contradistinction to other groups, both neighbours and outsiders. The concept of the most numerous local nationality, the Uighur, gradually developed to distinguish major groups of indigenous Turkik speakers from outsiders, most notably the Han chinese and the various forms of political organisation which they attempted to impose upon the region.<sup>5</sup>

According to July 1990 census, the demographic composition of major ethnic groups in Xinjiang has been as follows:

<u>Ethnic Groups</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>% age</u>
1. Uighurs	7,194,675	47.47
2. Hans	5,695,626	37.58
3. Kazakhs	1,106,989	7.30
4. Huis	6,81,527	4.49
5. Mongols	1,37,740	0.91
6. Kirghizs	1,38,781	0.92
7. Tajiks	33,512	-0.22

Total Population in Xinjiang - 15,155,778.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> Ferdinand, Peter., (ed.) "The New Central Asia, and its Neighbours". (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994.) pp. 95-96.

<sup>6</sup> Warikoo, K., "Ethnic Religious Resurgence in Xinjiang". Eurasian Studies, Vol. 2, No.4, winter 1995-96. pp. 32-34.

Xinjiang's connection with China dates back to more than 2000 years. However, the area was formally incorporated into Chinese empire in 1884. Historically, Xinjiang was a constant source of anxiety to Chinese emperors, because of the danger that a hostile army might suddenly materialize from here and overwhelm them.

Emperor Wu Ti, officially the son of heaven of the Ch'in dynasty of China was the first Chinese to penetrate the remote Western Region. This region was first opened up to Chinese influence during the first Han dynasty (206 BC-9AD). Ever since, China continued to have its vague possession in this region, which was, however, snapped intermittently.

China's penetration in the north-west led to the beginning of caravan route in this region which became known as "Silk Road". The eminent German geographer Ferdinand Von Richtofen the first to give the term of "Silk Road"<sup>7</sup> This led Chinese to view the Xinjiang region as a continental bridge, connecting China upto imperial Rome and simultaneously serving as security buffer to China. The present east-west highway across Xinjiang follows the same ancient Silk Road from Hami in the east to Turfan at the edge of Gobi desert in the west. This region was key to the frontier policy of China during the

---

<sup>7</sup> Sinor, D., (ed.) "The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia", (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990), p.37.

Han period so as to contain nomadic pressure upon the Chinese mainland.<sup>8</sup> Emperor Ming Ti of the second Han dynasty took certain measures to guard the Silk Road which passed through Central Asia.

China in this region had to fight with the nomadic tribes over Tarim Basin mainly to protect itself from incursions in those lands. They had wars with Tibetans over Khotan. During 940-1125AD Karakhnan dynasty emerged strong in this region which later embraced Islam. In this period Uighur dialect firstly came into being. The period of Karakhan dynasty is noteworthy for the creation of Turkik literature in this region.

During 1205-27 AD, the armies of Chengiz Khan assumed control over powered into China and Persia. They also took over the possession of Tarim Basin in 1218AD without much resistance. Chengiz Khan divided his empire among his sons and grandsons. Later several centres of power developed in the Tarim Basin under rulers who claimed descent from Chenagiz Khan and called themselves Mongols.

The Mongols controlled this region for quite a few years after which a Khoja family rose during 1506-1600 under Sultan Rashid, a sufi saint. During this period Islam was broadly propagated. They based their power on the foundation of a theocratic state.

---

<sup>8</sup> Rahul, Ram., "Central Asia: A Historical Survey" (Vikas Publishing House, N. Delhi-1996). p. 60.

The Khoja factions ruled for a hundred years, the prominent being Aktaglik and Karataglik factions.<sup>9</sup> They had intense struggles between themselves over Tarim Basin.

Rivalries of the Khoja factions gave an opportunity for the Manchus to establish their control in the Tarim Basin. They granted favours to the local nobles loyal to them and executed the Khoja leaders. The Manchus had to face intense conflicts in the Ili valley region. However, the Manchu government annexed all the lands from the Dunhuang oasis in the east to the Pamir mountains in the west and from the Altai mountains in the north to the Kunlun mountains in the south, the Ili and the Tarim basins, north and south of the Tianshan range. This led to the formation of the territory of Xinjiang for the first time under the Manchu rulers.

The Manchu rulers formed the office of Military Governors for the administration of Xinjiang. This office was known as Chiang Chun. It closed its north-west border to the Kazakhs, Kirghyzy and Russians. The Manchu Court created a bureau to manage relations with the Mongols in 1637. The Manchus went on for their annexation exercises. After the annexation of Kashgaria and Zungaria, a considerable mass fled to Farghana and Western Central Asia. When the Manchus suppressed the Khojas and took Khotan in 1760, Sarimask, a son of Burhanuddin escaped to Kokand. From there, he issued fatwah against the Manchus. Jehangir (1789-1828), the son of Sarimask attempted to restore Khoja rule

---

<sup>9</sup> Rahul, Ram., Central Asia : A Historical survey (Vikas Publishing House, 1996),pp.60-65.

over Kashgaria. He assumed the role of Imam to deliver the Khojas them from the infidel Manchus. The Manchus of Kashgar sent a force against Jehangir in 1825 and got defeated. The people hailed Jehangir's victory as the victory of Islam. Jehangir established himself as the new Khan of Kashgar. However, this could not continue for long and in 1828 the soldiers of Jehangir were defeated by the Manchus expeditionary force. Thus the Manchus re-established their authority in Kashgaria in 1828.<sup>10</sup>

Similar kind of revolt against the Manchus was seen in the Khanate of Kokand. After the Manchus took Kashgar, they imposed a trade blockade against the Khanate of Kokand. These eventualities led their ruler Muhammad Yusuf to go for a fight against the Manchus in this region. However, in 1831, they went for a treaty with the Manchus.<sup>11</sup> This could not sustain long and in 1847 seven Khoja leaders revolted against the Manchus. This revolt is popularly known as the "revolt of Seven Khojas". However, the revolt failed and the Manchus took Kashgar is without any resistance.

Between 1855-56 Vali Khan Tura, one of the seven Khojas invaded Kashgar several times. But was he overpowered, by the Manchu force after it reached the outskirts of Kashgar forcing Vali Khan to fly. Apart from this, several Muslim revolts were also

---

<sup>10</sup> Hook, Brian., The Cambridge Encyclopadia of China" (Cambridge, 1982) pp. 47-56.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid, pp. 60-62.

seen in Kansu Sehensi and the southern part of Xinjinag in 1855. These revolts led to the rise of religion and ethnicity in this region.

The Manchu rulers had to face several revolts in this region which overtly or covertly had ethnic and religious configurations. The Manchus were able to pacify them to a larger extent. However, they faced another form of challenge with the beginning of Opium war (1840-42) and Russia's advancement in the Central Asian region. The proximity of Manchus and Russians in Central Asia necessitated the settlement of a number of problems.<sup>12</sup> The Chinese military occupation of Xinjiang coincided with the start of the Russian southward advance from Siberia into Central Asia. There was at this time no formal frontier separating Xinjiang from Russian occupied territory, the first attempt to establish one being made in the Treaty of Peking (1860). This only traced the frontier as far south as the Khanate, of Kokand at that time still independent<sup>13</sup>. It necessitated the proper definition of their borders in this region. The governments of China and Russia signed a treaty at Peking in 1860 to demarcate this border. The protocol to this treaty which was signed at Chuguchak on 25 September 1864, assigned the entire region between Lake Balkash and Tianshan mountains to Russia. This treaty of 1860

---

<sup>12</sup> Rahul, Ram., Central Asia : A Historical Survey (Vikas Publishing House, 1996) P. 71.

<sup>13</sup> Wheeler, Geoffrey., "Sinkiang and the Soviet Union", The China Quarterly, No. 16, October-December 1963. pp. 56-58.

provided for the opening of Russian consular and trade centres at Chuguchak and Kashgar. However, entire 1500-mile frontier shown on Russian maps for the past sixty years as separating Xinjiang from Russian territory did not result from any agreement or series of agreements between the Russian and Chinese governments; only parts of it were established by the treaties of Peking and St. Petersburg. The south-east frontier of Tajkistan was demarcated by Britain and Russia in 1895 without Chinese acquiescence. The two treaties were concluded during the rise of Russian power in Central Asia and the decline of the Manchu Dynasty, when the Central Asian policy and the territorial intentions of neither country were clear cut.<sup>14</sup>

The region of Kahsgar however, could not remain passive for long and it was in 1865 A.D. that Yakub Beg, wrested control of Kashgaria from the Chinese. He ruled most of the Tarim basin till 1877. He assumed the title of Atali Ghazi, i.e. Guardian Warrior.<sup>15</sup> He strengthened his position against Manchu rulers by developing contacts with the Russian and the British authorities. He sent his nephew to Maharaja Ranbir Singh (1857-85) of Jammu and Kashmir with the request the British government in India could be persuaded to enter into a political alliance with Kashgar. He also sent him to Constantipole to improve relations with Turkey.

---

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, p.57.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, P.73.



However, Yakub Beg was quite apprehensive of enhancing relations with Russian sent his nephew Shadi Beg to negotiate with General K.P. Kaufman, the senior Russian Commander in Turkistan, which did not bear fruits. Both Kashgaria and Russia agreed in 1872 to allow Russian merchants to establish trade in the towns of Kashgaria.<sup>16</sup> However, the agreement did not work to the satisfaction of the Russian merchants incurred huge losses in their trade with Kashgar. Finally, Russia despatched troops against Muhammad Yakub and the Russian troops occupied the Ili country of north Xinjiang in 1871. Russia had intervened in Xinjiang under the pretext of securing Sino-Russian border.

Thus, that Yakub Beg owed his ascendancy to a combination of both ethnic and religious factors. The British supported him as a possible barrier against Russian expansion. Russia too extended support keeping in mind their imperial designs. But Yakub Beg sought to manipulate both Russia and China to bolster his position against Manchu China. However, the British assistance to him proved inadequate and Russia shifted its support in favour of to China, which reconquered Kashgaria in 1877-78 A.D.

The governments of China and Russia signed a treaty at Livadia in Crimea on 2 October 1877 to restore Ili country to China on payment of an indemnity of five million Rubles to Russia. The Russian government retained some of the reigns of Tekkes Valley

---

<sup>16</sup> Xinjiang Government., Xinjiang : A General Survey (Beijing, 1989), p.42.

in order to keep control over passes into South Xinjiang. There emerged loud protests in China against this treaty. After the successful renegotiation of the treaty which was signed on February 24, 1881, Russia returned most of the Ili country including the Tekkes Valley to China. China agreed to pay nine million metallic roubles.

The Manchu government created Xinjiang as a province on 18 November 1884 and made Urumuchi as its Capital. The Manchu government gave the Uighur leaders of Hammi and Turpan, the hereditary title of 'Beg', as they had helped them in the re-establishment of Chinese authority in Xinjiang.<sup>17</sup> The Chinese Government did not decide on the formal inclusion of Xinjiang in the Chinese Empire until 1884, and even after that continued to regard it as an "outer region" inhabited by barbarians over which it was only necessary to retain remote and indirect control. This attitude continued until the 1940s. During this entire period Xinjiang remained to a large extent independent of central government control. Its was deemed necessary only to retain remote and indirect control, its internal and external policies being in the hands of provincial governors. Two of these, Yang Tsen-hsin (1912-28) and Sheng Shih-ts'ai (1933-44) were men of outstanding

---

<sup>17</sup> Forbes, Andrew D.W., "Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia" (Cambridge University Press, 1986) pp. 70-80 .

personality, the first being a feudal bureaucrat of the old school, and the second a "war lord" whose methods alternated between the liberal and the repressive.<sup>18</sup>

Thus, it can be seen that Xinjiang's connection with China dated back to more than 2000 year but the area remained under its intermittent control due to anti-Chinese rebellions. Even during the Manchu period Chinese authority was challenged time and again by Khoja Muslim leaders like Jahangir, Yakub Beg etc. It was only in 1884 that Xinjiang became a formal part of Chinese empire. After the Chinese revolution of 10 October 1911 and the consequent termination of Ching rule, Xinjiang entered into an era of warlordism which lasted till mid 1940s.<sup>19</sup>

The Bolshevik Revolution of Russia also posed problems for Governor (Yang Tseng-hsin) of Xinjiang. The Turks fled from west Central Asia to Xinjing. White Russians sought asylum there. The rehabilitation of the white Russian refugees posed difficulty for the Governor Yang. After the Revolution, the attitude of Governor Yang Tseng-hsin towards the Soviet regime was cautious but not unfriendly. He closed the frontier in 1920 but in the same year concluded a trade agreement, although diplomatic relations between Moscow and Peking were not restored until 1924. In that year, five

---

<sup>18</sup> Wheeler, Geofferey., "Sinkiang and the Soviet Union", The China Quarterly, No. 16, October-December 1963. p.57.

<sup>19</sup> Forbes, Andrew., D.W., "Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia (Cambridge University Press,1986) pp.79-80

Soviet consulates were re-established in Xinjiang and five Chinese consulates in the Soviet Republics of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. A later agreement, signed in 1931 by the then Governor, Chin Shu-jen without reference to the Nanking government, allowed for the establishment of eight Soviet trade agencies in Xianjiang. Under governorship of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, Soviet influence in Sinkiang reached its height.<sup>20</sup> Chin Shu-jen succeeded governor Yang in Xinjiang. He pursued Yang's policy which largely led to another of Muslim rebellion in Xinjiang which in its finality led to his overthrow.

Thus the Chinese Han rulership in the form of Governor Yang and Chin Shu-jen acted as a catalyst for a series of Muslim uprisings in Xinjiang. By 1932, the Chinese authority was adversely affected by Muslim rebellions of Ughurs. Khoja Niyaz of Hami-Turpan and Mehmet Emin Bugra of Khotan founded the " Republic of East Turkestan".

The Soviet government viewed this Republic of East Turkestan as an anti-Soviet creation.<sup>21</sup> During this period of instability in Xinjiang, Chinese and other non-Muslims were massacred by Uighur separatists. At this juncture Chinese government sought support of the Soviet military, after which rebellions were crushed.

---

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p.80.

<sup>21</sup> I-shu,Huang., "National Minorities of China" China Report, vol 32, No. 1, Jan-March 1996. pp. 16-17.

In 1937, General Mahamud and General Ma Hu-shan combined together to make a fresh bid for ousting the Chinese from Xinjiang region. But they failed to realise it and suffered a heavy defeat at the hands of Chinese troops supported by Soviet military and air force. Efforts to set up the Independent Republic of East Turkestan in 1933 and 1944 ended in failure and Xinjiang was completely brought under control by the Chinese communist forces in 1949.<sup>22</sup>

The establishment of central Chinese control over Xinjiang at first by the Nationalists and after 1949 by the Communist Government, marked the end of Russian or Soviet interference in Xinjiang, which in 1934 and 1937 had included the introduction of Russian forces to help in quelling Muslim revolts. While the Soviet government by no means lost interest in Xinjiang, it was now unable to conduct its political and commercial operations through the medium of the provincial government. Reports of Soviet material support for the revolt which broke out in Kuldja (Ining) in 1944 and ended in the creation of the short-lived "East Turkestan Republic" were denied by the Soviet government, but the Russians were clearly interested in the possibility of creating a new area of Soviet influence in which most of Xinjiang's oil and other mineral resources were located.<sup>23</sup> In

---

<sup>22</sup> Rahul, Ram., "Central Asia : A Historical Survey" (Vikas Publishing House, N. Delhi, 1996), p. 65.

<sup>23</sup> Wheeler, Geoffrey., "Sinkiang and the Soviet Union", the China Quarterly, No. 16, October-December 1963. p. 58.

the end, however, the possibility of international complications with China and more particularly with the United States impelled the Soviet Government to mediate between the rebels and the Chinese Nationalist government. After the Communist revolution of 1949 and the arrival of the Communist People's Liberation Army, the insurgent forces in the rebel area in the north were disarmed and any hopes which the Russians might have retained of exploiting them in the future, received a severe set-back.

The Government of the People's Republic of China first consolidated its frontiers in the Xinjiang region. It liquidated the landlords and abolished the existing method of land ownership. It declared up Xinjiang as the Xinjinag Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) on 1 October, 1955. The insertion of 'Uighur' along with Xinjiang in the nomenclature of was the acknowledgement their historical reality and also satisfied the Uighur demands of past. The language authorities of PRC cyrillized the Arabic Script. China which became strong after 1949 undertook strong measures to control Xinjiang and tried to assimilate it into the Chinese mainstream, in which they did succeed to a great extent.

Thus, it can be maintained that the ethnic Uighurs rubbed shoulders with Chinese for centuries and were often been conquered by them. But they continue to view Han Chinese as aliens, as they are divided by language, culture and most importantly by

religion. The cultural and political divides as well as the violent anti-Chinese protests are particularly apparent in Xinjiang even today.<sup>24</sup>

Keeping in view these dimensions, Communist China adopted its policy towards its national minorities with great safeguards. China remained apprehensive about these ethnic groups which were placed to the borders of China. Their anti-Han attitude was also a cause of concern for them. On the other, they also wanted to put them to the mainstream China. Such conditionalities drifted Chinese policy from "right to self determination" on the one to the policy of "national regional autonomy" on the other.

---

<sup>24</sup> Hutchings Garhem., "Separatism frays China at the Edges" The Sunday Telegraph, 17 March 1996. p 31.

## CHAPTER-II

### CHINESE POLICY TOWARDS THEIR NATIONAL MINORITIES

The People's Republic of China is a state of multiple nationalities living within a common geographical space. It is said that China is a unified state with many nationalities. The Han Chinese had a long history of conflicts with these minority groups which many a times times challenged the concept of Han superiority.

However, with the inception of communist rule in China, there emerged some perceptible change in the Chinese policy towards their national minorities. Communist China looked to Marxist ideology and the Soviet experience in dealing with minority nationalities for formulating its own policy on the management of its minority problems.<sup>1</sup>

In this chapter an attempt is made to understand the Chinese policy toward their national minorities within the Marxist-Leninist framework. It also explores the gradual shift in their policy towards national minorities from the standard Marxist-Leninist framework. With the advent of the communist to power in 1949, national regional autonomy was granted to national minorities in China as a political substitute for self determination. The Chinese policy of granting regional autonomy as a basic means of solving the nationalities problem in China, is critically analysed.

---

<sup>1</sup> "Questions and Answers on Minorities", Beijing Review (Beijing, 1979) No.1, March 1979. p.08.



The former Soviet Union was the first Communist state to experience the problem of nationalities. However, different schools within the Marxist framework, dealt the issue differently.<sup>2</sup> In general, the Marxist relegated the concept of nationalism and called it just a reflex of relations of productions in a given society. They considered the question of nationality an imperial phenomenon which is perpetuated by the imperial powers for their expansionist designs. Before Lenin, several expositions were given in this regard. Rosa Luxembourgh identified the concept of self determination as an abstract idea. She stressed more on the cultural aspect of nationalism. She considered the idea of "right of self determination" as bourgeois concept and formulated its alternative in the provision of "cultural autonomy".<sup>3</sup>

Social Democrat's tradition also negated the concept of self determination and they stressed more for the unity of nations. They identified the national question in psycho-cultural terms.

Lenin, was first to experience the question of nationality. He formulated the idea in this regard in purely dialectical terms. He gave precedence to the concept of class, class consciousness and class struggle over national demands. He maintained, "national demands

---

<sup>2</sup> Horace B. Davis., "Towards a Marxist Theory of Nationalism" (New York, 1978), pp.55-61.

<sup>3</sup> Robinson J.Ledric., "Black Marxism- The Making of the Black Tradition" London, 1983 pp. 82-91.

are subordinate to the interests of the class struggle, the recognition of the right of nations to self determination entails for the working class the establishment of the strongest international unity and solidarity between the working classes of different nations".<sup>4</sup> Lenin, maintained that the agenda should stress more on the emancipation of all oppressed nationalities by giving them freedom to secede. It implied only a consistent impression of struggle against all national oppression. He further maintained that provision of the right to self determination to the oppressed nationalities will help in eliminating the web of mutual distrust and hostility among the oppressed nationhood. This would create a more congenial atmosphere for an international struggle against the bourgeoisie. He maintained that by giving them "right to secede" will make the desire for separation and fragmentation less ardent.<sup>5</sup>

Lenin's formulation for "right to self determination" was apprehended by some scholars as a tactical design to subvert the national feelings among the minority communities, yet this very formulation was recognised and given status of theory under the Marxist-Leninist framework and similar arguments were articulated in the writings of

---

<sup>4</sup> Lenin, VI., "The Significance of the Right to self Determination and its Relation to Federation", Selected Works, pp. 162-67.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p.158.

Lenin's successor, Stalin and in some improvised form later in the Mao Tse-Tung's writings.

Stalin defined nation on the ground of having four essential elements; a common language, a common geographic living area, a common economic life and a common psyche based on the common Culture.<sup>6</sup> The PRC government adopted Stalin's fourfold definition keeping in view China's ethnic groups and their ground realities. Stalin also supported for the right of self determination by stating: "A nation has the right freely to determine its own destiny. It has the right to arrange its life as it sees fit, without, of course trampling on the right of other nations...."<sup>7</sup> Stalin however, formulated certain question as to how exactly should a nation arrange its own life. What forms should its future constitution take, if the interest of the majority of the nation is kept in mind. Stalin found the answer to these questions in "regional autonomy".

Stalin maintained that the advantage of regional autonomy would apply over a definite territory having a definite proportion of population. This is not the concept to augment divisive tendencies across the barrier rather for breaking those barrier and uniting the population in such a manner as to open the way for division of a different kind, a

---

<sup>6</sup> Jiang Ping., (Ed.) "The Theory and Practice of Chinese Nationalities (Beijing, 1994), p.37.

<sup>7</sup> "National Colonial Question", Selection from V.I.Lenin and Joseph Stalin, (Calcutta, 1975) p.70-77.

division in terms of classes. In order to allay the fears of the minority nationalities about the status of their culture, language, religion, customs etc. Stalin maintained that "equal rights in all forms should be guaranteed as an essential element in the solution of the national question." <sup>8</sup>

Thus, we find that under the Marxist-Leninist framework the genuine grievances of the minorities and the question of nationality was raised in former USSR for the first time. Several views appeared in this regard. To Austro-Hungarians and Social Democrats the question of nationality was discussed in cultural context. Lenin put forward the first logical exposition in this regard and championed the concept of "right of self determination". Stalin however modulated it later to be fit within the overall concept of "regional autonomy".

China which underwent Revolution in 1949 was very much influenced by the Russian interpretation and their policy formulation with regard to their minority communities. This was well manifested in Mao's writings. Initially, the assertions of the politics of difference within the majority Han society argued against traditional assumptions about the "homogeneous" Chinese and monoculturalism of China. Later on local differences were recognized as "ethnic" whereas they were previously dismissed as

TH-6529

---

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p.103.

merely regional. This semantic shift from "regional" to "ethnic" reflected the new salience of the politics of difference in the People's Republic of China.

The question of relations between national minorities and majorities became an impeccable part of China's agenda for their policy making. Chinese policy has been motivated by a desire to integrate the life style and institutions of these minority groups in the mainland. They sought to seek answers in this regard within the framework given by Marx and Lenin. However, they were greatly concerned about as to how much freedom the minority groups should have, and as to what extent they should be allowed to occupy its social and administrative hierarchies and how to put these minority nationalities in the Chinese mainstream which they were totally devoid of in the past due to one reason or the other.

China's association with these communities has been dating to 2000 years back in the history. However, their relations with these minority groups have never been entirely smooth and successful. These various nationalities frequently went for war and aggression against each other. The Han Chinese always had a concept of superiority over these communities. As a result, the national minorities tend to regard the big Han nationality with suspicion and distrust.<sup>9</sup>

---

<sup>9</sup> Wilson, Dick., "A Quarter of Mankind: An Anatomy of China Today (Harmondsworth, 1966). pp.100-107.

Though, the Hans considered themselves to be culturally superior, the non-Hans minorities did not respond. Due to this China's "Civilizational mission" in its frontier areas where these communities lived was opposed tooth and nail. Such superiority continued to remain till the arrival of Sun-Yat-Sen.

However, Sun-Yat-Sen too was not inclined to acquiesce to the exclusive identity of the national minorities of China. He considered their problem as problems of distance and discrimination. And thus he initiated exercises which enhanced the pace of eventual assimilation of the non-Han peoples into the Han culture. For this he devised mechanisms like inter-marriage and he opened Xinjiang by rail and roads so that it could develop.<sup>10</sup> Despite having such passionate views towards assimilation of non-Han people into the Han culture it could not continue for long. Later Sun-Yat-Sen dropped this idea.

During the period of Chiang Kai-Shek the official view towards national minorities went more traditional. The theory of greater Han was popularised to a large extent. They maintained that such ethno-religious division of nationalities are superfluous and are just the product of accidental geographical fragmentation. They also pulverised the concept of forced assimilation of the non-Hans. They considered the Chinese society as a melting pot consisting of all segments of the society.

---

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, p.10.

However, in terms of Chinese Communist Party's *locus standi* in this regard, it took the first initiative in July 1922. They accepted the separate identity of Hans, Mongols, Tibetans and Turkic peoples of China.

Later it was reaffirmed in Sixth Congress in September 1928 when it declared for a genuine democratic republic for Xinjiang, Tibet and Mongolia within a Chinese Federated Republic.<sup>11</sup>

This was further made clear and manifest in the constitution promulgated by the Chinese Communist Party in 1931 when it recognised and mentioned: "The right of self determination of the national minorities of China, formation of an independent state for each national minority, while, Xinjiang, Tibet, Yunnan and Kweichow were mentioned at the Chinese Communist meetings as candidates for independent statehood in the future."<sup>12</sup>

However this very approach of federation, or loose confederation lost vitality with the coming of Mao Zedong as leader of Chinese Communist Party. He gave more weightage and concern to the question of oppression of the "oppressed nationalities" rather than their national self determination. He argued that the answer to the question of

---

<sup>11</sup> Brandt, Conrad., Schwartz Benjamin, and Fairbank, John K., "Documentary History of Chinese Communism." (New York, 1973). pp-63-66.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid p.217.

national minorities in China was not independence but liberation from oppression.<sup>13</sup> He baptised this very demand in terms of imperialism. He maintained that imperial powers perpetuate such superfluous differentiations in terms of ethnic background, religion and culture to fulfil their expansionist designs. He maintained that Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia have been doubly oppressed by their traditional ruling class and the Guomindong government. Thus, he emphasised more on the removal of oppression of these minority nationalities. He called such divisions among these nationalities as superfluous and frivolous and considered class as the real concept of social stratification and fragmentation.

Mao maintained that any guarantee to the principle of self determination and national independence would pave the way for the imperialists to attack China. Thus, in 1935 during his long March Mao told the Inner Mongolians to unite together to withstand pressure from outside. Mao argued that the first duty of all nationalities in China should be to unite against foreign imperial aggressors.

In the year 1940, the Chinese Communist Party for the first time laid down certain basic imperatives with regard to their attitude towards national minorities. It was formulated that the objective of unity, mutual help, trust and confidence among the

---

<sup>13</sup> Norbu, Dawa., "Chinese Government Views on National Self Determination 1922-1956: Origins of China's National Minority Policy", International Studies, (New Delhi), 1988.



Chinese nationalities can only be reached by implementing the principle of "national equality".<sup>14</sup> It urged the government to let the national minorities manage their own affairs, to respect their religious beliefs, customs, languages, habits and to assist them in improving their economic conditions of life.

Mao in his writings of 1945 "The National Minority Question" further corroborated his view point by stating:

"The broad masses, including the leading personalities who are connected with the masses of all national minorities must be assisted in the liberation and development of their governments, economics and culture and in the establishment of their own military units to protect the rights of the masses. Their spoken and written languages, customs and religious beliefs must be respected".<sup>15</sup>

It is well manifested that before China getting Red in 1949, they had undergone a major shift in their traditional Marxist - Leninist framework. They had remodulated the Soviet notion of "right to self determination" and "right to secede" keeping in view the Chinese national interests and conditions. They gradually shifted to the concept of

---

<sup>14</sup> Mosley, George., "The party and the National Question" (Cambridge, 1966) pp.65-67.

<sup>15</sup> Tse-Tung, Mao., "On Coalition Government", Selected Works (Beijing, 1965) pp.220-30.

"regional autonomy" which had been vaguely defined by now. It was more of a revision of the Marxist - Leninist teachings.

They developed logical grounds to defend their revised concepts. Mao claimed that the concept of national identity was imperialistic and bourgeois in its latent potency. He described it as a tool to further their expansionist designs. He further argued that such superfluous condition of fragmentation (such as ethnicity, religion, custom, languages) hinder class fragmentation and polarisation in the society which is more real and explicit as they are based on the mode of production and relations of production in a given society.

It was maintained that "in socialist state ethnic antagonism will not be a problem because the adoption of tolerant, non-oppressive attitude towards all ethnic groups would lead the workers of different nationalities to identify their interest in class terms, as a result of a common proletarian culture, ethnic differences like the state itself in its finality, would simply wither away".<sup>16</sup>

The CPC under Mao gave preference to the removal of oppression from the oppressed nationalities. It maintained that with the establishment of socialist government in China, the nationalities of China had entered into an era of national equality where the presence of oppressed nationalities almost vanished. That was no more mechanism for

---

<sup>16</sup> Druyer, T. June., "China's Quest for a Socialist Solution", Problems of Communism", Sept.-Oct. 1975, pp.49-50.

exploitation and oppression. Each nationality was going to achieve liberalisation from oppression within the socialist set up. Thus they found the movement for secession and liberation to be of no use and anti-thetical to Marxist - Leninist praxis.

They also rejected the demand of national self determination and liberation among the national minorities on the ground of being reactionary and pro-imperialist. It was mentioned that the nationalist uprising in Xinjiang in 1944 was of progressive nature and after the liberation of 1949, such uprising and rebellions were seen to be redundant which would only breed reactionary elements. Such movements would hamper the interest of other nationalities which would negate the concept of "national equality" itself. <sup>17</sup>Thus such tendencies are of no use to be promoted and catered in the reign of Red China.

Mao's "Socialist Revolution" though enthusiastically reported in the Chinese Press, in reality didn't do much in the non-Han frontier regions of the country. Chou En-Lai quoted Chairman Mao Tse-Tung to the effect that national minority problem has really become a "class problem". <sup>18</sup>He cited certain developments in this regard to clarify his statement. He said that with the progress of China's "Socialist construction", the gap between the Han Chinese and the national minorities had apparently tended to widen

---

<sup>17</sup> Hinton, Harold C., "National Minorities in China", Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), Sept. 1955. p.320-25.

<sup>18</sup> En-Lai, Chou., "Report on the World of the Government of the First Session of the Third National People's Congress" (Summary), New China News Agency (NCNA), Dec. 30, 1964.

rather than as had been expected, to become narrower. Thus, it was thought that a basic readjustment of the CCP's national minority policy had been required by which the Chinese image of "great family of nationalities" advancing together on the socialist road could become tenable. The magnitude of the CCP's shift in policy was revealed in the changed notions of what constituted a "contradiction" in nationality relations.<sup>19</sup> It was felt that during the ensuing years of collectivisation, Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, these minority nationalities were treated as second class citizens.

Thus, the fresh look which was sought at political level gave prominence to the idea that each of China's national minority nationalities must develop into a "modern nationality" on its road to socialism.<sup>20</sup> It was also recognised that "special characteristics" of the national minorities are organic to them. Therefore, attempts at Sinification would not hasten the journey along the road towards socialism but would on the contrary retard it. They must be allowed, even encouraged, to take their own road to socialism. The focus of change would henceforth have to be on the national minorities themselves. Thus, it envisaged for each of China's national minorities a unique and gradual process of modernisation which would lead ultimately to its fusion with the Han people. Thus, the

---

<sup>19</sup> Moseley, George., "China's Fresh Approach to the National Minority Question", The China Quarterly (London) No. 24, October-December, 1965. p.16.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, p.19

party in late 70's admitted the failure of its attempt to denationalise the national minorities. The party now looked to economic development in the national minority areas as the prime agent for bringing about desired evolution in the relationship between Han and non-Han peoples of China.<sup>21</sup>

With the arrival of Deng on the political map of China, the economic development in the national minority areas were further intensified. He wanted to build all the nationalities of China into "modern nationalities" to do away with contradictions among nationality relations in China.<sup>22</sup> He cherished for a more moderate and pragmatic policy towards national minorities keeping in view the "special characteristics" of them. Through his concept of "Four Modernisation", Deng tried to bridge the income and resource disparity between the various nationalities of China.<sup>23</sup> Deng successfully utilised the economic growth as a baton to assuage the nationalist exclusivist feelings of the minorities of China. He developed the strategy of integrating the economies of the various nationalities of China into one to ensure the survival and strengthening of "One

---

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>22</sup> Xiaoping, Deng., "On the Minority Nationalities", Chinese Law and Government, (New York), Vol. XIV No.4, 1981-82, pp. 75-80.

<sup>23</sup> Hariding, Harry., "China's Second Revolution : Reform After Mao", (The Bookings Institution, Washington D.C.) pp.1-10.

China" rather than adopting the process of Sinfication and economic collectivisation which had deepened and widened the cleavages among the nationalities of China in the past.

Thus, after the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 the leader of Chinese Communist Party especially Mao attached great importance to the nationality question in China. They were also concerned because all the national minority groupings of China resided in the periphery of China. Any encouragement to the traditional Marxist-Leninist concept of "right to self determination" or "right to secede" would have been detrimental to the territorial integrity and stability of China. They were also afraid of "imperialistic encroachments" in the border where most minority nationalities lived, which were inclined to negotiate with such powers.

The ghost of "Eastern Turkestan Empire" in the Xinjiang region might have been rolling in their mind. Xinjiang has been the hot spot in China's past where the PRC has positioned troops since 1950. The PRC could not afford to loose any part of Xinjiang as the external boundary of Xinjiang is too long to be defended and too easy for penetration by foreign saboteurs. Beijing couldn't afford to forget what Yusuf Aq Churaoglu said in 1904 that scientific evidence had proved that the Turkic people from "Egypt to China" constituted a single nation.<sup>24</sup>

---

<sup>24</sup> Hiro, Dilip., "Between Marx and Muhammad: The Changing Face of Central Asia (London: Harper Collins, 1994), p.05.

The Chinese minority policy as it developed after liberation encompassed the equality of nationalities, the right to autonomy within a unified state, a unified front with nationalities who were to be co-operative, respect for nationality forms, the right to education in one's native language and the development of a better standard of living for all.

It is thus found that the Soviet and the Chinese policies towards their minorities are on many points antithetical to each other that it is difficult to ascertain whether the Chinese were reacting positively to Soviet model or vice versa. However, on one point it becomes explicitly clear that China after Communist Revolution of 1949 definitely drifted in its stand towards their national minorities from the traditional Marxist-Leninist framework of "national self determination" to that "national equality" or "regional autonomy".

## CHAPTER III

### XINJIANG UNDER RED CHINA

Xinjiang, that vast, rugged land in Inner Asia, rich in undeveloped and peopled by farmers and nomads of many races and creeds with deep rooted differences in ways of life and long years of conflict over political aspiration underwent unprecedented magnitude of changes aimed at the achievement of sweeping cultural, social and economic changes among the national minorities. Its groundwork was laid in the first years after the Chinese communists took control in 1949. This prodigious effort at transformation is the keynote of Chinese communist rule in Xinjiang. From the very outset of their rule, the Chinese communists had taken pains to assure their domination by emphatic assertions of the paramountcy of the Communist Party of China and the inalienability of the region, by monopoly of the key positions in the machinery of government and by outright display of military power.<sup>1</sup>

Unheralded socio-political incorporation of Xinjiang into the Chinese nation-state has taken place in the last forty years. The extent of the incorporation of the Xinjiang region into China is indicated by Han migration, communication, education and

---

<sup>1</sup> "Current Background", (Hong Kong: US Consulate General No. 609), October, 1959.



occupational shifts in 1940s, which became explicit with the establishment of communist regime in China in the year 1949.<sup>2</sup>

Mao Tse-Tung who came to power in 1934 put forward a line of thought in his Presidential Report to the Second National Congress in January 1934 by asserting that the national minorities were oppressed by the traditional ruling class and by the Guomindang government. He argued that the answer to the national minority problem was not independence from China but liberation from oppression.<sup>3</sup> He contended that what was right in the context of Soviet Union may not be necessarily right for China. For Mao, stability and development of China was more important than the issue of national self determination. Mao himself contended that national self determination was the main thrust of the Chinese communist party's "nationality policy". According to Chinese Communist Party principle of national independence and right to secession is going to be an invitation for the imperialists to detach the actual position of China so one had to be for China or for

---

<sup>2</sup> McMillan, Donald H., Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949-1977, (Boulder, Co. Westview Press), 1979, pp. 22-25.

<sup>3</sup> Norbu, Dawa., "Chinese Communist Views on National Self Determination 1922- 56: Origins of China's National Minority Policy", International Studies, New Delhi, Vol. 25, No.4., 1988.

imperialism.<sup>4</sup> Mao had pointed out that the unification of the country, unity of the people and unity of the nationalities are the fundamental guarantees of success in its revolutionary cause.<sup>5</sup>

The reason behind dropping the idea of self determination may have been due to a growing realization of Soviet designs on Xinjiang . It was felt that outside power, would ally with a minority group in order to diminish the authority of Chinese government over what it considered its territory. Chang Kon-Tow, then a high ranking figure in the Chinese Communist Party had stated that the Long Marchers were not informed by the Soviet Union of its foothold in Xinjiang and it had been suggested that this might have been done deliberately so that Chinese communist party would not decide to settle there. Thus , the “right to self determination” came to be replaced by a vague and a weaker concept of "regional autonomy".<sup>6</sup> In fact this drift represented the universal general principle of regional autonomy to solve the national question in multi-national countries and of

---

<sup>4</sup> Moseley, George V.H., "The Consolidation of the South China Frontier" (Berkeley, 1973), p.100.

<sup>5</sup> Browie Robert R., and Fairbank J.K., Communist China 1955-59: Policy Documents with Analysis (Cambridge, 1962) p.564.

<sup>6</sup> Hinton, Harold C., " The National Minorities in China-Part I" Far Eastern Economic Review (HongKong) Vol.19, No.11, September 15, 1955. p.323.

achieving the goal by establishing a democratic socialist country within the context of the conditions prevailing in China.

### **FIRST FIVE YEARS OF AUTONOMY IN XINJIANG (1955-60)**

After Chinese found out in 1954 that the autonomy at lower administrative levels/communes provided a safe system of controlled and limited self-government for the minority peoples, the Chinese communists finally granted autonomy to the whole of Xinjiang. The Xinjiang, Uighur Autonomous Region, comprising three municipalities, seven administrative districts, five autonomous districts seventy three counties and six autonomous counties formally came into being on October 1, 1955. Although the majority of the people probably attached little political significance to the establishment of the Autonomous Region, the event did mark the opening of the developmental stage to increase the agricultural and industrial productivity of the region and to integrate the economic development of the region with the overall plans of China.

Saifuddin Azizi, Chairman and then Party Secretary of the Autonomous Region remarked that both the Soviet Union and China participated in Xinjiang's economic growth. The Chinese communists, handicapped by distance and the lack of railway lines, furnished manpower and capital. Soviet experts gave technical direction to increase cotton

production. The Soviets donated two hospitals, 1066 large tractors and 4000 tractor ploughs came from Russia. The Soviet engineers helped in the discovery of Karamai oil fields.<sup>7</sup>

Factories, highways, dams and many major engineering works were built by the army's labour corps augmented by workers from China. The credit of 13,980 million yuan was extended to Xinjiang for the 1950-58 period. Nearly half of this amount was for the year 1958 alone to defray the expenditure needed in the establishment of the communes and the "big leap forward" in production. In 1958, when the Second Five Years Plan was undertaken, the Party Committee of Xinjiang announced that it aimed to convert Xinjiang into a base for the production of iron, steel, oil, coal and cotton, an objective to be attained by launching a multi-phase campaign, propaganda, increase of production, technological improvement and cultural revolution.<sup>8</sup> One of the means to the achievement of economic self sufficiency was to speed up the programme of collectivisation. By the spring of 1956, there were 8,500 lower type agricultural producers cooperatives in which ownership of private property was permitted to a certain degree. They comprised 45

---

<sup>7</sup> New China News Agency; "Extensive Soviet Help Xinjiang" October 28, 1957, translated in China Mainland Press (HongKong).

<sup>8</sup> En-Mao, Wang., Xinjiang Jin-Pao., June 6, 1958 in CB 512.

present of the farming population. In the autumn of 1958, 7000 agricultural and a number of animal husbandry co-operatives were merged into 450 large scale communes embracing over 96 percent of the peasants and operating over 17,000 small factories and mines.<sup>9</sup>

In response to the exhortation of party committees to carry out the "Big Leap Forward" in agricultural production, the farmers were claimed to have celebrated the bumper harvest. The extension of irrigation acreage was also reported to be commendable. By 1959, the cropping area reached over 6.6 million acres. Per capita production of grain which averaged 500 pounds in 1949, rose to 800 pounds in 1953-57 and to 1,100 pounds in 1968.<sup>10</sup>

The most conspicuous aspect of economic development in Xinjiang had been industry. The number of factories rose from 64 in 1955 to 400 in 1957 and to over 1500 in 1958. Particular emphasis was placed on the production of petroleum, coal, iron and steel and electric power. The large scale surveys by Chinese and Soviet teams led to the

---

<sup>9</sup> Azizi, Saifuddin., "Xinjiang's great achievements in agriculture in ten years". Translated in Extracts from China Mainland Magazines, HongKong; US Consulate General No.19, October 8, 1959.

<sup>10</sup> ✓ Lo, J.P., "Five Years of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region 1955-60". The China Quarterly, No.8, October December 1961, p. 97.

discovery of many new oil fields, the largest of which was in the area around Karamai and Uehro. With the assistance of Soviet Union in 1951, a steel plant was set up at Urumchi. By 1957, the production came to 17,230 tons of iron and 14,640 tons of steel.<sup>11</sup> New thermal-electric plants were installed in Urumchi. Between 1957 and 1958, the construction of hydro-electric plants at Urumchi and Kashgar and nearly 200 small hydro-electric stations boosted power output to 38 million kilowatt hours.<sup>12</sup> Telephone lines and highways were said to be over 6,000 miles in 1958. A railway around the Tarim Basin to join the Lanchow-Sining-Tsaidam Railway was envisaged for the future.<sup>13</sup>

The picture of the developments in Xinjiang gave one-sided view as seen by Chinese Communists. The emphasis was more on visible pictures and on quantity rather than quality. The long drawn effects on the Uighurs was widely apprehended by them. Further they adopted certain measures in the guise of prosperity and development of Xinjiang which widely started affecting the demographic composition, culture, education, and language of the Uighur Muslims. Such development measures led to large scale migration of Chinese Hans in the Xinjiang region which resented by the local nationalities.

---

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p.98.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p.99.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p.100.

The people were promised equality but they had to submit to the guidance and help of the Chinese. The natives, whom the communists labeled “local nationalists” charged that the Chinese ate up all the rice, held the best jobs and left the heavy work for them to do.<sup>14</sup> The peasants of southern Xinjiang claimed that collectivization had reduced them to starvation.

This led to the beginning of murmurings of discontentment in 1956. They started calling for the expulsion of the Chinese and the Chinese Communist Party from Xinjiang and also wanted the change of the name of Xinjiang to East Turkestan. Sporadic revolts in Xinjiang was reported in the summer of 1959. The Chinese Communists struck back heavily by the wholesale attack of “counter revolutionaries” followed by a series of rectification campaigns in which it was pointed out that Xinjiang was an inalienable part of China.<sup>15</sup>

### **POPULATION CHANGES IN XINJIANG**

With the inception of Xinjiang as an Autonomous Province in 1955, measures for prosperity and development in this region were taken which led to the huge influx of

---

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p.103.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p.104.

Chinese into the region. At the end of 1957, the Xinjiang branch of All-China Federation of Trade Unions had a membership of 252,000 among whom 172,000 were Chinese Hans. Thus started a trend in Xinjiang which greatly altered its demographic composition. The population of region steadily mounted. By the close of 1958, the population of the region mounted to 6 billion from 4.3 billion in 1953. The multitude of Chinese, military and civilian, who poured into the region led to the swelling of the population. <sup>16</sup>


The Communist Party of China, adopted the policy of promoting inter-provincial migration which later affected the demographic composition of Xinjiang. In Xinjiang, the increase in population has been much greater than in China. China can be considered as a closed population unit, because there have been few significant migration to China since 1949. Thus, the increase in the population of Xinjiang has been largely due to inter-provincial migration.<sup>17</sup> This has been evident in the graph mentioned ahead:

---

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, p. 101.

<sup>17</sup> Qing, Li Yuan., "Population Changes in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region : 1949-84, Central Asian Survey, No.1 vol.9 (Pergamon Press, London) January March 1990, p. 36.





Five phases of population development can be determined from the data related to the growth rate in Xinjiang.

	Period	No. Increase (thousands)	Percentage Increase
First Phase	1949-53	450.2	10.39
Second Phase	1953-61	2316.9	48.43
Third Phase	1961-62	-110.9	-1.56
Fourth Phase	1962-76	4868.4	69.65
Fifth Phase	1976-84	1852.8	13.35

Source: Calculated from Statistical Yearbook of Xinjiang (1985).<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Statistical Yearbook of Xinjiang, 1984.

The first phase corresponds to the period when a large PLA (People's Liberation Army) contingent entered the area. The central government began to send political cadres, engineers, doctors and skilled workers Xinjiang. The second phase was characterized by a dramatic increase in migration and within seven years, the total number of immigrants reached 1,523,200. This period with coincided the period of "Great Leap Forward" in which Mao cherished for prosperity in China. The third phase shows the decline which was due to famine in many parts of China. The fourth phase coincided with an explosion in the birth rate. Volunteers were sent to Xinjiang at the beginning of cultural revolution during this phase. The final phase coincided with family planning in the Han population of Xinjiang. The improvements in rural life in other areas of China also limited the number of immigrants in Xinjiang.

No detailed data on the occupation of migrants are available but the main category of migrants can be grouped as cadres and the army. The second category comprises demobilized army personnel, the third the "volunteer youths" from both urban and rural areas, fourth the skilled workers and fifth the scholars, engineers, doctors sent to Xinjiang.<sup>19</sup>

---

<sup>19</sup> Qing Li, Yuan., "Population Changes in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region : 1949-1984", Central Asian Survey, Vol.9, No.1 (Pergamon Press, London), Jan-March 1990, pp. 37-39.

Thus, Han Migration into Xinjiang has swelled its population to an incredible twenty six times that of the 1940 level. This has greatly altered the demographic composition of the region. It also threatened the cultural precepts of the local Uighurs which has led to a further development of ethnic socio-economic niches. The Uighurs are mostly involved (almost 84%) in the production of agriculture and husbandry whereas all the high positions are being occupied by the migrant Han Chinese. The 1956 "Socialization of Industry" provided a boost to technical rustication, because employees in small stores and plants could gain a measure of job security by moving out of Shanghai.<sup>20</sup> Henceforth the policy which had been pursued by Mao to bring prosperity and growth in the Autonomous Region of Xinjiang proved to be catastrophic for the local Uighurs. They suffered a lot with regard to their cultural and economic aspirations. Though Xinjiang prospered, the inhabitants of Xinjiang became poor and more vulnerable.

### **CHINESE EDUCATIONAL POLICY IN XINJIANG**

When the Chinese communists spelled out their policy of regional autonomy for ethnic minorities, it appeared to many observers that a significant break with the past has been made. Throughout China's modern history, central governments sought to

---

<sup>20</sup> White, Lynn T., "The Road to Urumchi : Approved Institutions in Search of Attainable Goals During Pre-1968, Rustication from Shanghai" The China Quarterly, No.79, Sept. 1979.

amalgamate the various ethnic minorities with the dominant Han group. Now, in 1949, it seemed as if, for the first time, a central Chinese government was determined to end this process of Sinification and to give its non-Chinese subjects a degree of autonomy. This self rule included the administrative, economic, educational and cultural spheres of life. However the process of Sinification couldn't be abated and its implementation widely deflected from the official stance of "national equality".

A large number of schools and colleges were opened in Xinjiang. The underlying assumption to start them was the belief that the national minorities were not developed enough to undertake "Socialist Construction". In Xinjiang, the number of schools had increased and by 1960 the number of primary schools reached 957,000 comprising almost all of the children in the region.<sup>21</sup> Xinjiang College, with an enrollment of 4000 in 1960 was elevated to the status of University of 1962.

The Uighurs are reported to be about average in terms of the number of university graduates and literacy in China as compared with other ethnic groups. The Tatars achieved the highest representation of graduates among Muslims (39 percent).<sup>22</sup> These

---

<sup>21</sup> Kuan, Ou Lo., "Sinkiang's higher education is developing rapidly" JMJP, July 10, 1960 in United Joint Publications Research Service.

<sup>22</sup> Gladney, Dru C., "The Ethnogenesis of the Uighur", Central Asian Survey, Vol.9, No.1 Jan-March 1990 (Pergamon Press, London).

figures reflect only what is regarded by the state as education, namely, training in Chinese language and the sciences. However, among the Uighur intellectuals, there continues to be a high standard of traditional expertise in Persian, Arabic, and the Islamic sciences which is not considered part of Chinese culture and education. Although elementary and often secondary education is provided in Uighur, Mandarin has become the language of upward mobility in Xinjiang, as well as, rest in the of china.<sup>23</sup>

The national regional autonomy to the minorities was to be followed up by the 'nationalities work' that included the training of large number of national minority cadres to help national minorities realize national equality and ensure that minority nationalities enjoy their right to autonomy.<sup>24</sup> The Central Institute for Nationalities at Peking, established in 1951, enrolled national minority students from all parts of China. From 1951 up to the cultural revolution over 9,000 students graduated from this Institute. Such Nationalities Colleges are 13 in number scattered throughout China. It is these intellectuals trained in the Chinese schools who are asserting political leadership in Xinjiang ,as opposed to traditional religious elites.

---

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 15.

<sup>24</sup> Xing Wu Liu., and Alantan., "China's Policy Towards Her Minority Nationalities", Social Scientists (New Delhi) vol. 16, No.1, January 1988, p.145.

However, the minorities and their traditional leaders also seem to have several misconceptions and doubts about the concept of regional autonomy. They feel that their history and traditional culture continue to be downplayed in the state schools and must be privately re-emphasized to their children. It is through the elementary schools that Uighur children first participate formally in the Chinese nation-state, dominated by Han history and language and then enter the Chinese world.

One of the most interesting features of the policy of “regional autonomy” lay in the field of language. Article 53 of the common programme of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference held in late 50’s guaranteed the development of minority languages and dialects.

The initiatives undertaken in Peking were:

- (1) to create and reform the written languages for several national minorities.
- (2) scientific research in spoken languages.
- (3) the training of language cadres.<sup>25</sup>

The Language Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences sent out teams to investigate the spoken languages of a number of nationalities. On Nov. 28, 1954,

---

<sup>25</sup> Schawarz, Henry G., “Communist Language Policies for China’s Ethnic Minorities”. The China Quarterly, No.12 Oct-Dec 1962, p.170.

the Institute of Linguistics and Philosophy of the Chinese Academy of Sciences started to participate in the reforming and creation of minority languages. The investigation of spoken languages and dialects was carried out in Xinjiang. On July 2, 1955, a survey team of forty-two linguists left Peking for Xinjiang to investigate the languages of Uighurs.<sup>26</sup>

However the initial communist policies towards the full development and use of non-Chinese languages was, probably, to ensure maximum effectiveness of official propaganda and indoctrination in minority areas.<sup>27</sup> At the end of the first ten years of communist rule, this attitude came to change and ceased to function.

Three main policy principles were enunciated. The old principle of helping each minority in creating and reforming its written language was still considered applicable. The second principle directed the minorities to “grasp the tendency for spoken and written languages to draw closer to the Chinese language.” Any plea for the preservation of purity of the existing minority languages was to be resolutely attacked. The third principle ordered the minority nationalities to learn the Chinese language.

---

<sup>26</sup> Ibid. p.180.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid, p.183

The minority resistance against the Peking Government might have been one of the reasons for this change in the language policy of China in 1957.<sup>28</sup> Later, the communist programme for minority languages fell victim to the “Great Leap Forward” which marked the beginning of all out Sinification and communisation. The Committee for studying the languages of nationalities of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region suddenly decided on new drafts for a language reform movement in the region. It was ordered that the Latin alphabet should replace the Cyrillic alphabet for the Uighurs.<sup>29</sup> The people were told that the study of Chinese was the only way to advancement. Many government offices rejected documents not written in Chinese. A government directive of February 1960 replaced the Cyrillic alphabet with the Chinese orthographical system in Xinjiang.<sup>30</sup> With regard to China’s minorities, this meant the beginning of the end to any meaningful policy of regional autonomy. While the training of language cadres and reform of minority languages were still carried on, it was on a very reduced scale and done mostly in Peking for obvious propaganda purposes.

---

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, p. 180-182.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. 181.

<sup>30</sup> Lo, J.P. “Five Years of the Xinjiang - Uighur Autonomous Region 1950-60. The China Quarterly, No.8. Oct.-Dec. 1961. (Oxford Street, London), p.101.



## XINJIANG ON THE EVE OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION

Since its inception in 1949, CCP had to face several obstacles in Xinjiang. There was long tradition of ethnic and religious animosity among the native groups and the Han people from “China proper”. It is probable that Mao first began to doubt the willingness of China’s minorities to join the People’s Republic willingly during the Long March. In February 1957, Mao in his famous address “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People” included the nationalities question under the category of “non-antagonistic contradictions” and affirmed his adherence to the gradualist approach.

Efforts were made to promote unity among all nationalities in the PRC. From 1952 onwards, an ingenious programme called “Propaganda month for the unity of nationalities” was launched in Jilin.<sup>31</sup> In September every year, special propaganda activities were organized to promote international unity. Following the example of Jilin, Xinjiang also launched a propaganda month.<sup>32</sup> This spread to all autonomous regions, prefectures and counties.

---

<sup>31</sup> I. Shu, Huang., “National Minorities of China”, China Report London, 1996, Vol.32, No.1, Jan-March 1996, p.19.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p.20.

Despite the regimes continued commitment to gradualism, its patience was severely tried. During the Hundred Flowers Campaign, when freedom of criticism was encouraged, minorities expressed desires which Peking could never accede to, some wished independence. They termed the Party's Nationalities Policy "trumped up" or a "deaf ear".<sup>33</sup>

The Hundred Flowers Campaign led to serious setbacks to the Beijing Government. This unhappiness fed into a general mood of impatience with the rate of progress towards communist goals in China as a whole and culminated in the sweeping reforms of the "Great Leap forward" aimed at reducing mutual distrust among the people.

The rhetorical question "Can the minorities catch up with the Han in eight to ten years" was posed to which dutiful members of CCP replied:... "yes within three or five years".<sup>34</sup> China brought together groups with widely differing customs, languages and levels of technology into large communes. As the economy was run to provide basic amenities and to increase production, religion was attacked. In the subsequent venture by

---

<sup>33</sup> Dreyer, June, China's Minority Policies in Cultural Revolution, The China Quarterly, No.35, July-Sep. 1968.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p.99.

putting the class struggle to an extreme form, the local leaders and priests were denounced for crimes against people in Xinjiang.

The Han migration to Xinjiang was encouraged. The number of Han cadres of the local Chinese Communist Party Organization grew in proportion to the minorities. Irrespective of Han and non-Han areas, the economy was put on the priority of the agenda. But the difference in the minority areas was that the consequence of Great Leap Forward was perceived as having been imposed by non-indigenous group bent on assimilation. Consequently revolts surfaced in Xinjiang province in 1958. Since 1960 and after the socio-economic upheavals due to Great Leap Forward, the Chinese Communist Party's main thrust was to build the links between the party and the minority people. This was done by liberalizing the centralized control and disbanding communes in many of the areas of Xinjiang.<sup>35</sup>

The party also reversed itself and acknowledged that there is a natural commonalty of interest among the members of a given national minority without reference to class. In due course of this new policy, the party constructed roads, laid railway lines and improved telecommunication facilities and began to interlink all parts of China. The party's stress for

---

<sup>35</sup> Staats, David R., "Minorities of Inner Asia", Problems of Communism Vol 27. May-June 1978. pp. 70-79.

the historical links among the ethnic groups and the Hans was highlighted in the media organs such as radio, television, newspapers etc. But the long drawn chasm between the national minorities and the Hans could not be convulsed.

### **CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND XINJIANG**

The setback of the Great Leap Forward and the communes both in the economic and social spheres brought into sharp focus the differences with the CCP over the correct approach in policy implementation. The Cultural revolution launched in 1966 was a virtual showdown by the radicals led by Mao Tse-Tung. Initially, it was meant for cultural regeneration within the revolutionary framework. Later it engulfed the entire social and political life of the Chinese and resulted in the purge of several top leaders in Beijing Party Committee.

The radicals during this period felt that by emphasizing ethnic nationalism to the exclusion of national patriotism, the party was promoting national cleavages. They advocated a new party constitution based on Mao Tse-Tung's statement that "national struggle is in the final analysis a questions of class struggle".<sup>36</sup> They rejected the claims for the respect of the special characteristics of minority nationalities at the cost of

---

<sup>36</sup> Survey of China Mainland Press (Hong Kong) vol. 40, No.4151 Feb., 1968, p. 3.

prosperity and furtherance of Socialist cause.<sup>37</sup> The Eleventh plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in August 1966 announced the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. They took upon themselves to cleanse the party and the government of “rotten elements” even at the risk of crippling and destroying the party and the government. Mao said, “There is no construction without destruction, no flowing without damming and no moving forward without a holding back.”<sup>38</sup>

The Radical representatives from army cadres and the mass organizations came forward under the leadership of a Cultural Revolution Group in Beijing to seize power from “decadent bureaucrats” and to form so-called Revolutionary Committees at various levels. During this time it was widely apprehended that socialism facing the contradiction within its own institutional setup. The controlled mode of governance and economy gave birth to a hierarchial bureaucratic class containing bourgeois values which were impeding the progress of socialism itself.<sup>39</sup> So, the term distraction meant the destruction of enemies of socialism within the party, government and elsewhere in the country.

---

<sup>37</sup> Dreyer Teufel June., “China’s Forty Millions”, (Cambridge, Mass, 1976), pp. 90-100.

<sup>38</sup> Selden Mark., “The People’s Republic of China : A Documentary History of Revolutionary Change (New York, 1979), pp.445-50.

<sup>39</sup> Dreyer, June., “China’s Minority Nationalities in the Cultural Revolution”. The China Quarterly No.35, July - Sept. 1968., p.101.

The People's Liberation Army Chief of Staff, Lin Biao was named the successor of Mao and Jiang Qing took charge of the cultural reform and later became the leader of the most radical group of Maoists . Red Guards were mobilized and the task that was put forth was to do away and destroy the Four Olds: old ideas, customs, culture and habits.

The effect of this was reflected in minority areas of China. Mass rallies of "People of all nationalities" were held, welcoming the central committee's decision on the Great Proletarian Revolution. However, the Red Guards who were raised and mobilized to destroy the Four Olds: ideas, culture, custom and habits, in the minority regions made drastic and far reaching impact in these provinces. In their all out attack on the vestiges of the old society and the "decadent" customs, the Red Guards made these minority areas, where the greatest attachment to religion and to things traditional remained, a major focus of attack.<sup>40</sup> It played a havoc in China's inter-ethnic relations completely negating all the accomplishments which had been achieved in the years since their inclusion into Chinese mainstream. The Ethnic Work Departments were slandered as "carrying out a revisionist

---

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, p. 101.

and capitulationists”.<sup>41</sup> Later eight out of ten institutes for nationalities in different parts of the country were closed down.

The Minority Languages were vilified as backward and the works on the themes of minorities were labelled as “revisionist” and “reactionary”. The ways and practices of minorities were labelled as bad practices. The minority peoples were prohibited from participating and practicing in their religious faith. The Gang of Four allegedly suppressed the regional style operas as one in Xinjiang. Vernacular operas were banned by the Gang. Jiang Qing (Mao’s wife) regarded the minorities as historical invaders of China. She also opened attacks on minority songs and dances in 1973. The Gang particularly attacked the “Twelve Mukams” - traditional music of the Uighur People in Xinjiang. The traditional dances of Uighurs which are distinct for their shoulder and waist movements were banned. This became more vivid in descriptions of David Bonavia who mentioned :

“The result of investigation in four national minority areas, namely Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Yan bian showed that only four national minority songs could just be managed to be put on the air while broadcasting of the other several hundred songs was forbidden because the ancestors of these old songs were suspected to be ditties and love

---

<sup>41</sup> “Questions and Answers about China’s National Minorities” (Beijing Review) No.1 March 1997, p. 23.

songs”.<sup>42</sup> Apart from this the Muslim clergy in Xinjiang was forced to walk through the streets with pig heads tread around their necks.

The Red Guards from Han areas fought battle with Wang Enmao, the leader of Xinjiang and made him ousted. Wang Enmao had so far been successful in Xinjiang because of his good relations with Soviet Union and manipulative political acumen. But during Cultural Revolution, he buckled before Red Guards. The Beijing Radio broadcasted in its Uighur language about the Red Guard attacks on Uighur cultural centres and the burning of Uighur books and works of art.<sup>43</sup>

Mass resettlement Han of Chinese in Xinjiang was motivated by Beijing’s desire to ensure loyalty of population of areas bordering Soviet Union at a time when China’s relations with USSR were at the lowest point. The Soviet Union made full use of the opportunity. A series of talks about the flourishing development of Uighur culture in the Soviet Union was begun and interview, of refugees form China describing their harrowing experiences, were highlited in the Soviet media.<sup>44</sup>

---

<sup>42</sup> Bonavia, David., “Verdict in Peking : The Trial of the Gang of Four, (London; 1984), p. 138.

<sup>43</sup> Dreyer, June., “China’s Minority Nationalisties in the Cultural Revolution”. The China Quarterly., No.35, July-Sept. 1968 p.107.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid, p. 108.



When in February 1967, the Xinjiang “General Headquarters for the Revolutionary Seizure of Power” announced that it had taken power from Party Committee and People’s Council, the PLA had to be called to restore order. On 25 February, the Party Central Committee announced its decision to end cultural revolution activities in Xinjiang.<sup>45</sup> In the early 1970’s the minority policy became strong after the purge of Lin Biao. Restrictions on religious practices and other conditionalities were eased. It was now argued that minority areas should be nationalist in form and socialist in content. Later, political changes brought about substantial rethinking of the attitudes towards the minority nationalities by giving them greater autonomy and greater emphasis on national cultures and values.

Thus, it can well be stated that PRC which had deflected from the traditional Marxist framework of “Self-determination” to “regional autonomy” and “national equality” could not even maintain it. In the minority provinces the development process was initiated in such a way as led to “Sinification”. Their policies towards national minorities greatly boosted and Han migration in this region. Further their educational and language policies further undermined their exclusive ethnic identities. It had been planned

---

<sup>45</sup> Ibid, p. 108.

to bring put these nationalities into the Chinese mainstream by giving them the status of “national equality”. However, the attitude of Red Guards in these provinces further reminded these minority nationalities about their past of animosity with the Hans. The Han Chinese failed to win the confidence of these minority nationalities. And they still continue to see the mainland Chinese with apprehension. In a way Mao could not succeed in winning the sentiments of the minority nationalities of China. The chasm between the Han majority and the non-Han minorities continued to grow even in the post -Mao era.

## CHAPTER IV

### DENG'S POLICIES IN XINJIANG

With the death of Mao Tse-Tung, the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party came under the leadership of Hu Yao Bang, Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang who pledged to implement the commands of Mao with renewed vigour. However, during the period of Cultural Revolution the attitude of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four was criticised vehemently. The National Policy Research Group of the National People's Congress' Standing Committee in August 1977 held the Gang of Four and Lin Biao responsible for the 'leftist deviations' committed against the minorities. They were criticized for maligning the party's national regional autonomy policy as 'creating splits by artificial means', and for accusing Xinjiang of setting up an independent kingdom. It was further stated:

"By attacking national regional autonomy, the Gang of Four aimed at ... creating splits among the nationalities, weakening the unity of big family of the Chinese nation and opposing the emancipation of all nationalities".<sup>1</sup>

In the year 1978, the Constitution of People's Republic of China urged, " We should enhance the great unity of all the nationalities in our country". It also reaffirmed

---

<sup>1</sup> Xiaoping, Deng., "On the Minority Nationalities", Chinese Law and Government, (New York) Vol. XIV, No. 4, 1981-82, pp. 73-80.

the equality of all nationalities (Art 4) and granted ethnic minorities freedom to use their own spoken and written languages as well as the right to exercise autonomy through local organs of self government in the national autonomous areas (Art. 39).<sup>2</sup>

There was fresh rethinking in matters concerning the policy towards national minorities after experiencing the a terrible phase of cultural revolution in the minority provinces dominated by minority nationalities. An article was published in *People's Daily* titled "On the Protracted Nature of the Problem in the Socialist Period" argued in favour of gradual elimination of inequalities between the nationalities through modernisation enabling them to gradually catch up with the advanced nationalities and concluded that the nationalities would disappear only after the classes and the states disappear.<sup>3</sup>

The ascendancy of Deng Xiaoping to power in 1978 stabilised the process of rethinking with regard to national minorities in China. He cherished for a more moderate and pragmatic policy towards national minorities. He advocated the concept of Modernization by which the disparities among the various nationalities of China could be minimised.

---

<sup>2</sup> The Constitution of the People's Republic of China (Adopted on March 5, 1978 by Fifth NPC of the PRC at its first Session), (Beijing : 1978).

<sup>3</sup> "People's Daily on Nationalities Problem", Summary of World Broadcast, FE/6099/B11/10, 24 April 1979.

During the Deng era, the politics-in-command scenario of Maoist period was replaced by economics-in-command scenario.<sup>4</sup> The government started encouraging the people to become rich individually as well as collectively. Deng Xiaoping utilised economic growth as a baton to beat the political forces of destabilisation in China. the PRC government planned to use Han intellectual, scientific, technological, capital and managerial resources as the 'dragon head' to develop the minority economies. Many of the minority areas which had never seen motorable roads before started travelling by train, even by plane. As some scholars have observed that many of the minorities have 'leap frogged' to the modern world, jumping over several centuries of developmental lag.<sup>5</sup>

Deng's concept swept China under "Second Revolution". The sweeping political and economic reforms were undertaken in the post-Mao era. Almost every institution in the country from stores and farms, factories to universities and military units to party committees underwent tremendous changes in personnel, structure and operation.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> I-shu, Huang., " National Minorities of China", China Report Vol. 32, No.1, January-March 1996 p. 22.

<sup>5</sup> pp. 22 - 3.

<sup>6</sup> Harding, Harry., "China's Second Revolution: Reform after Mao", (The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C.), p.p.1-7.

The concentration of political power in the hands of the party in order to redistribute land, wealth and property was the hallmark of the first revolution which the party spearheaded in 1949. In contrast the underpinning of the current reform is liberalization, granting society more autonomy from the state and freeing economic activity from rigid adherence to a mandatory state plans.

Deng categorised four inviolable "Cardinal Principles"- adherence to the socialist road, the people's democratic dictatorship, communist party leadership and Marxism-Leninism-Mao thought. He believed that China could have both market competition and a monistic political order, socio-economic modernity and a socialist spiritual civilization.<sup>7</sup>

He also initiated the magnificent plan of the "Four Modernisations" which legitimised the shift to economic objectives by claiming continuity with Mao's own concern to "catch up and surpass" advanced world's levels of production and technology at an early date. Deng Xiaoping sought to channel these new ideas into an acceptable package labelled "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics".<sup>8</sup> Through these economic

---

<sup>7</sup> Mac farquhar, Roderick., "The Politics of China 1949-89", (Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.p.340-345.

<sup>8</sup> Gittings, John., "China Changes Face: The Road from Revolution 1949-1989", (Oxford University Press, 1989), p.110.

reform measures, Deng also tried to bridge the income and resource disparity between the various nationalities of China.

Within this broader ambit of Modernisation of China Deng formulated its policy towards national minorities. Deng successfully utilised the economic growth as a means to assuage the nationalist exclusivist feelings of the minorities of China. Deng strived to bring the economies of these regions into the mainstream of China. For this, he gave more thrust to infrastructural development in these regions. Further to erase the memories of Cultural Revolution which blatantly clamoured the Han superiority and considered them as backward nationalities, Deng gave more space for these national minorities to propagate, practise and promote their language, religion and other aspects of culture.<sup>9</sup> Committing himself to the notion of "regional autonomy" and "national equality", Deng tried to bring real autonomy in these provinces with regard to self governance in reality. Within these macro policy dimensions Xinjiang would be seen under the Deng's era.

#### **DENG AND THE ECONOMY OF XINJIANG:**

Since 1978, policies of reform and liberalization came to be introduced in the economic sphere to reverse the slump in the Xinjiang's economy that was the result of the economic mismanagement and inefficiency during the Cultural Revolution period.

---

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, pp, 115-25

Now emphasis was laid on strengthening leadership and heightening scientific management, extending the right of self determination and improving business accounting methods, developing a more diversified economy and allowing bonuses in addition to basic wages.<sup>10</sup>

The Constitution of China which was promulgated in December 1982, by the fifth NPC at its First Session reaffirmed this policy. It stated:

"The Chinese people of all nationalities will continue to work hard and self-reliantly to modernize industry agriculture, national defence and science and technology step by step to turn China into a socialist country with a high level of culture and democracy".<sup>11</sup>

The Xinjiangs economy was sought to be integrated in a unprecedented way with the special integrated in an unprecedented way with the Economic zones and the Intermediate Economic Zones. In the regional communes. policy guidelines were made for increasing material incentives, assigning production quotas to household units and broadening the market economy. In this regard, in 1992 to stimulate the trade in

---

<sup>10</sup> Mc. Millen, Donald H., "Xinjiang and Wang Enmao-New Directions in Power, Policy and Integration", The China Quarterly, No. 99, September, 1984.

<sup>11</sup> The Constitution of the People's Republic of China (1982), p. 7. 5

*not correctly written, part's missing*



Xinjiang, its five cities were granted equivalent rights as were given to the ten open cities of the eastern coast for attracting foreign investment.

During this period the financial subsidy along with technical guidance to Xinjiang increased. It helped the minority areas to raise funds and introduce advance technology and administrative expertise from other areas to exploit local resources.

During the seventh Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development certain targets were set for developing Xinjiang. They were:

1. To give priority to build Uringi-Karmai region into an important industrial base in Xinjiang.
2. To upgrade airport and air services in Xinjiang.
3. To extend railway network in Xinjiang and to step up electrification of existing railway trunk lines.
4. To establish sugar refineries in Xinjiang.<sup>12</sup>

During this plan, the western region's assigned purpose was to concentrate on expanding agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and transportation. Besides, it was also decided that the western region especially Xinjiang should also develop in energy and mineral resources. However, the major thrust remained for the development of coastal

---

<sup>12</sup> "Three Economic Zones", Summary of World Broadcast, FE/0198/B2/3, 8 July 1988. pp.166-70.

regions of China. The western provinces of China were explicitly relegated to the role of providers of minerals and agro-raw materials.<sup>13</sup>

With the collapse of Soviet Union and the opening of frontiers business people in Xinjiang started looking northwards, where they found a particular demand for consumer goods. Markets in Alm Aty and Tashkent became well stocked with Chinese consumer products. Due to this trade developed from US\$ 88 million in 1988 to US\$ 2 billion in 1992. In that year Chinese government attempted to stimulate it still further by granting five cities in Xinjiang equivalent rights to the ten open cities in Xinjiang coast for attracting foreign investment, whilst in 1993 it opened ten highways to land ports on the frontiers of Central Asian<sup>14</sup>

One Xinjiang official predicated that this border trade would constitute half of the province's total foreign business in the near future. In 1992, Xinjiang firm signed a deal to build the largest hotel in AlmaAty. In the recent years, cross-border tourism and travel also flourished. In 1992, roughly 130,000 business people and tourists visited Xinjiang from across the border and in 1993 that figure was expected to rise by 100,000.<sup>15</sup>

---

<sup>13</sup> Ferdinand, Peter., (ed) "The New Central Asia and its Neighbours", (Pinter Publishers, London) 1995. pp. 101-102.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, p. 102.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, p. 103.

In 1993, China became a net oil importer and rapid growth has had the effect of making the energy balance even tighter. China, being financially squeezed thus allowed foreign oil companies to participate in onshore oil exploration in Xinjiang. To draw oil from this region the Mitsubishi Corporation was commissioned by the Japanese government to begin exploring the possibilities for a gas pipeline linking Xinjiang with the Pacific east coast. <sup>16</sup>

However, the apprehension still has persisted with regard to Xinjiang's modernisation and the intentions of Beijing in this regard. Thus, Xinjiang's ability to win foreign investment is still extremely limited. In 1992, it attracted the second lowest amount of FDI. Xinjiang signed contracts for just US\$ 10.5 million which was only a quarter of what Ningxia attracted. It was only 0.01 percent of all foreign investment contracted to China in that year and only 0.17 percent of the total contracted to provincial level authorities. <sup>17</sup>

The Fifth session of the Eighth Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Regional People's Congress on 25th January 1997 heard the "Government Working Report". The Report dealt mainly with the economic development and cited statistics on the full range of socio-economic issues facing the region (Xinjiang). In this report, the autonomous

---

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, p. 104.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, p. 106.

region's gross domestic product was estimated at 97.9 billion yuan, an increase of about 9 percent over the previous year, primary industry grew by 8 percent, secondary industry by 7.5 percent and the tertiary industry by 12 percent, Revenue was 4.7 billion yuan and investments in fixed assets across the region amounted to 40 billion yuan, the total volume of foreign trade was 1.4 billion dollars. New achievements were made in various social undertakings. The region enjoyed economic development and social stability, and living standards had improved. <sup>18</sup>

1996 was the first year in which Xinjiang implemented the strategy to make it a major agricultural region despite unfavourable factors of exceptionally severe flood disasters and low temperatures. This year, Xinjiang began comprehensive pilot reform for state owned enterprises centred on establishing a modern enterprise system.<sup>19</sup> In 1996, 210,000 people in Xinjiang shirked off poverty, thus achieving local authorities set target to help 164,000 people get rid of poverty in the year. <sup>20</sup> The development of agriculture served as a "point of breakthrough" in poverty relief work.

---

<sup>18</sup> "Urumqi newspaper carries Xinjiang government work Report", Summary of World Broadcast, FE/2871/S1/1, 19, March 1997.

<sup>19</sup> "Xinjiang's economy grows steadily", Summary of World Broadcast, FE/2809/S1/4, 6, January 1997.

<sup>20</sup> "Xinjiang region more than meets 1996 poverty eradication target", Summary of World Broadcast, FE/2835/S1/6, 5, February 1997.

World Bank launched an agricultural project in Tarim Basin in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region in 1992. The project is designed to lift local people out of poverty and lead to a better ecological environment in this area. The first phase which was started in 1992 and completed early this year (1997), focussed on the construction of irrigation and drainage facilities. The second phase will make maximum use of local water resources and put the whole area under a single plan. <sup>21</sup>

Xining is also speeding up its development of energy resources. The oil exploration drives have been intensified. To speed up the development of new energy resources, the region is going to set a solar energy heat collector production base. The region also plans to establish a group of wind-power stations with a total wind-generating capacity reaching 135,000 KW by the end of 2000 A.D.. <sup>22</sup>

On December 5, 1996 Xinjiang economic conference was held in its capital in which the Autonomous Party Committee Secretary, Wang Lequan urged the entire region to unify thinking and understanding, identify objectives and tasks, reinforce confidence and work harder to achieve a new level and greater success in Xinjiang's economic work in 1997. They reiterated their adherence to Deng Xiaoping's theory of building socialism

---

<sup>21</sup> "World Bank funded project to be launched in Xinjiang", Summary of World Broadcast, FEW/0467/WG/3. 1, January' 1997.

<sup>22</sup> "Xinijiang speeds up energy resources development", Summary of World Broadcast, FE/2787/S1/8, 5, December' 1996.

with Chinese characteristics. They focused on the following tasks in the foreseeing future:

1. To regard agriculture as the primary task in the economic development.
2. Intensify reform in industrial sector.
3. Step up construction of infrastructural facilities. <sup>23</sup>

### **DENG AND CHANGES IN XINJIANG'S POLITY:**

There was no major shift in the polity of Xinjiang during the Deng's period. However, some rectification was definitely made. Following the third plenary session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, errors were corrected and all the policies towards minority nationalities that had proved their worth were restored. Once again the right of the minorities in the political, economic and cultural spheres came to be recognised.

In September'1980, the need for a fresh law on Regional Autonomy was recognised by the CCP <sup>24</sup>. The discussion on ethnicization of the organs of the local self governments in the autonomous areas continued till a Draft Law on Regional Autonomy

---

<sup>23</sup> "Regional government head addresses Zijing's economic conference", Summary of World Broadcast, FE/2793/S1/2, 12, December' 1996.

<sup>24</sup> "Ulanhu, New Law on Regional Autonomy Needed for the National Minorities", Chinese Law and Government, Vol XIV, No.4 1981-82 pp. 79-80.

was produced in 1983.<sup>25</sup> It emphasised that officials of the minority nationalities should fill leading posts in state organs in autonomous areas. It went further emphasised that legislation in minority areas should be suited to local conditions.

Following the spirit of the new PRC constitution of 1982, the NPC Nationalities Committee and the State Nationalities Affairs Commission drafted the new Law on Regional Autonomy for National Minorities which emphasised ethnicization of minority cadres, increased recruitment of minority cadres, a fair measure of financial autonomy besides, respect for cultural and national particularities.<sup>26</sup>

In 1980, a nationwide programme for re-education in the policies on nationalities was launched. The new shift in the nationalities work since 1980 had resulted in tremendous increases in the minority cadres. In the 34 departmental and leading bodies, the proportion of minority cadres had increased from 26.3 percent to 40.3 percent between 1978 and 1983 in Xinjiang. These figures however still demonstrate the overwhelming dominance of the Han cadres in matters concerning the administration of Xinjiang.<sup>27</sup>

---

<sup>25</sup> 'Discussion of Law on Regional Autonomy: not all Problems Solved', Summary of World Broad Cast, FE/7655/C/2, 23 May, 1984.

<sup>26</sup> 'Regional Autonomy Law for National Minorities', China Report No. 45, 1984, pp.33-46.

<sup>27</sup> 'More Cadres of Minority Nationalities', Beijing Review, No. 40, October 3, 1983, pp. 5-6.

Deng Xiaoping in his later speeches stressed the need for political reforms. His first stress was on the vitality of the party which implied that cadres must be young. His second objective of political structural reform was to eliminate bureaucratism and increase efficiency. Several raids were conducted to curb the official's corruption in Xinjiang. Efforts were made to improve transparency in the governance of Xinjiang province. The third objective of political reform was to stimulate the initiatives of grass root units and or workers, peasants and intellectuals. To achieve objectives Deng made several trips to Xinjiang in early 80's.

#### **DENG AND CHANGES IN XINJIANG'S SOCIETY**

With the arrival of Deng political map of China, the Communist Party of China began to admit towards ethnic minorities were harsh and non-accommodative.

Summing up the problems of the past, Beijing Review in 1981 said:

"For a long period, it was mistakenly stressed that the problem of nationality is in essence a problem of class... It in appropriately led to a movement against local nationalism. Local nationalism and Han Chauvinism alike are contradictions among the people which should be overcome. However, local nationalism was treated as a contradiction between ourselves and the enemy. Moreover some legitimate national feelings and normal differences in work is regarded as manifestation of local nationalism



and were wrongly criticized and struggled against especially during the cultural revolution" <sup>28</sup>

Since 1977 onwards significant concessions were made to minority sentiments. The Tibetans were allowed to practise Lama Buddhism to which they faithfully adhered. Similarly the Uighurs were permitted to practise Islam without any harassment. A great mosque was constructed in Sining in June, 1979. Some 1400 mosques were renovated so that Muslims could worship. An Islamic Theological Academy was set up in 1982, enrolling a number of Imams for advanced studies. The Kashgar's Idgah Mosque which had been built in 1442 to accommodate nearly 20,000 people for prayers, was closed for several years and suffered considerable damage. It was reopened in 1979. Only two out of 90 Mosques in the city and 600 out of 5000 in the prefecture were able to continue religious functions. About 1,000 people attended each of Idgah five-times a day prayers and as many as 10,000 the Friday Service.<sup>29</sup> The chief Imam Idgah Mosque, 83 years old Kasim Kalaji, was the Vice Chairman of the Xinjiang Islamic Association. A number of Kashgar's religious figures were elected delegates to national or local people's congress or were chosen by the people's political consultative conferences to join these

---

<sup>28</sup> Grunfeld, Tom., "In search of Equality: Relations Between China's Ethnic Minorities and to Majority Han", Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars (Boulder) Vol. 17, No. 1, January 1985.

<sup>29</sup> "China Reconstructs", vol. 34, No. 4, April 1985, p.57.

bodies. Contacts with Muslims elsewhere in the world were restored and broadened. By 1985, throughout the country some 24,000 mosques were functioning.<sup>30</sup>

In China after the Cultural Revolution religious institutions were reopened. The Institute for Islamic higher learning was founded in 1955 to train a large group of Islamic professionals. In 1989, China set up the first Muslim University. Simultaneously began the enrolment of students mainly from ten ethnic minorities belonging to Islam in which the Uighurs were prominent.<sup>31</sup>

On 12 July, 1989, in a celebration of Muslim festival in Xinjing Regional Party Committee the Regional People's Government and the Regional Nationalities Affairs committee held grand evening party. The Muslim festival of Korban was attended by Wan Enmao, Vice Chairman of the Xinjiang Regional advisory commission, Ismail Amat, Vice Chairman of the national CPPCC and ministers of the State Nationalities Affairs Committee.<sup>32</sup>

---

<sup>30</sup> Warikoo,K., "Ethnic Religious Resurgence in Xinjiang" Eurasian Studies, Ankara, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1995/96, p.34.

<sup>31</sup> Summary of World Broadcast FE/0529/BII/7,7 August, 1989.

<sup>32</sup> Summary of World Broadcast, FE/0511/BII/5, 19 July 1989.

The ban imposed during the cultural revolution on the printing and distribution of Koran was lifted. The China Islamic Association printed 160,000 volumes of Koran and published Chinese-Arabic bilingual sections of Koran.<sup>33</sup>

Such propagation of Islam became more intense after the disintegration of former USSR. Liberalised Chinese policy towards religion has opened new vista of cooperation and linkages with Pakistan, Turkey and other Central Asian Islamic States. Pakistani and other Muslim travellers, traders and Islamic activists who have been thronging the cities of Xinjiang, have been contributing widely for the construction of Mosques and distribution of Islamic literature in this region.<sup>34</sup>

To counterbalance the Han form of education in 1987, Uighur Traditional Medicine Hospital and Madrassah complex were opened to propagate their traditional concepts of disease and diagnosis.<sup>35</sup>In broadcasting, the Central People's Broadcasting Station now offers programmes in the five minority languages of the Mongolian, Uighur, Tibetan, Kazakh and Korean in addition to Han speech. Some local stations also broadcast in minority languages commonly used in their localities.

---

<sup>33</sup> Summary of World Broadcast, FE,0512/BII/9, 19 July, 1989.

<sup>34</sup> Warikoo,K., "Ethnic Religions Resurgence in Xinjiang (Eurasian Studies, Ankara), Vol. 2, No.4, 1995-96 p. 39.

<sup>35</sup> Gladney, Dru C., "The Ethnogenesis of the Uighur", Central Asian Survey (Pergamom Press, London) Vol.9, No.1 January-March' 1990.

As regards to the publication, the central organisation translates the Han language books into minority language or vice versa. And with reference to education, Law on Regional Autonomy for minority nationalities provides that schools enrolling chiefly minority nationality students should use minority language text books and also teach in such languages and that primary school senior classes and middle schools in the minority areas include Han language. And the cadres working in minority areas are encouraged to learn minority languages.

In 1978, Hua Guofeng, the then party Chairman and Premier, urged that the national rate of population increase should be lowered to 10 percent within three years. However, during this period of formulation of planning policy and one child per family programme the minorities were given preferential treatment by exempting them from this policy of one child per family. During Deng's period, a high tide was flowing with regard to mechanism for birth control. In 1982, however, for the first time, family planning was confirmed in legal form. Article 25 in the 1982 constitution reads. "The state advocates and promotes fertility planning in order to achieve compatibility between population and various socio-economic development plan".<sup>36</sup>

With the arrival of Deng, academic and literary freedom was were given to the national minorities unlike during the Cultural Revolution period. Three books namely

---

<sup>36</sup> Constitution of Peoples Republic of China (Beijing 1982), p.81.

"The Uighurs", "A Short History of Xiongnu" and "The Literature of the Uighurs", written by Turhgun Almass were published between 1986 and 1989. As expected Almass' books evoked sharp reaction from chinese communist party and government circles. His work was dubbed as a "vain attempt to incite racial conflict and fan flames of Xinjiang's independence. He was accused of manipulating history of Xinjiang to incite its secession from China.<sup>37</sup> Taking advantage of the freedom of religion and culture allowed after 1978, there has been rise in ethno-nationalist tendencies in Xinjiang and protests are fastly becoming the marked feature in Xinjiang. The publication of "Sex Habits" by Shanghai Cultural House caused resentment among the Muslims throughout China and protest marches were organised in Xinjiang.<sup>38</sup> Xinjiang Academy of Sciences which published "Educational Textbook of Atheism" highlighting the negative role of religion in the long history of Xinjiang was widely protested.<sup>39</sup> Similarly, in December 1988, Uighur students staged protest march in Beijing against the exhibition of two historical films which they found disrespectful to their race.<sup>40</sup> "Liberalised Chinese policy towards religion during Deng era, new initiatives for modernisation and economic

---

<sup>37</sup> Warikoo, K., "Ethnic Religious Resurgence in Xinjiang" Eurasian Studies, Ankara, Vol.2, No.4, 1995-96. p.35.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid. p.35.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid, p.35.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, p.35.

development, particularly with Pakistan, Turkey and Central Asian States and developing cross-border trade of Xinjiang with its neighbouring Muslim countries have resulted in greater mobilisation and assertion by the Muslims of Xinjiang on ethno-religious basis".<sup>41</sup>

#### **DENG AND CULTURE OF PROTEST IN XINJIANG:**

With the arrival of Deng, the policy towards national minorities which was followed during the Cultural Revolution period was relinquished. He tried to practise the concept of "national equality" for the national minorities of China. He also strived to give more space for their religious and cultural freedom. Many religious and Cultural institutions were resuscitated during his period. Mosques were built. The cross border trade made these peripheral minority groupings in close proximity to the other Islamic neighbourhood states. However, these could not remain for what they were intended to be. Openness bred movements of protest. Several protests and movements resurrected in these regions based on their ethno-religious identities.

Even after the Chinese liberalised policy towards religion and culture after 1978, riots occurred in Aksu in April 1980 when Han settlers were beaten up. Aksu riots in which several hundred civilians were reportedly killed, terrified the local Chinese forcing

---

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., p. 35.

them to leave Xinjiang. By early 1981, 30,000 Hans were reported to have left Xinjiang for Shanghai.<sup>42</sup>

In June 1981, Uighur demonstrators attacked the Han settlers and even a PLA army base in Kashgar. The situation worsened in August 1981 when the Uighur Provincial Committee members virtually revolted against Chinese forcing Deng Xiaoping to visit Xinjiang to resolve the political crisis. Deng ordered a reorganisation of the provincial committee and Xinjiang's First Party Secretary Wang Feng was replaced by Wang Enmao who had worked in Xinjiang from 1949-69.<sup>43</sup> In 1983 there were reports of violent clashes in educational institutions that seriously disrupted teaching. The Xinjiang Public Security Department issued a circular that banned beside other undesirable activities bringing in schools inflammables, explosives radio-active and poisonous materials and warned that serious offenders shall be punished according to PRC Criminal Law.

A serious separatist movement erupted in July 1988. For, within one week the Xinjiang authorities came down heavily on these very few who were trying to undermine

---

<sup>42</sup> Ibid, p.34.

<sup>43</sup> "Xinjiang Circular on Order and Dangerous Weapons in Schools", Summary of World Broadcast, Fe/7392/BII/6-7, 22 July 1983.

the unity of nationalities and national solidarity.<sup>44</sup> In 1985 and 1986, Uighur students organised public demonstration in Urumchi demanding ban on nuclear testing in Lop Nor and against settlement of Hans in Xinjiang. It was in May 1989 that Muslim Students in Xinjiang University protested against the application of Chinese policy of birth control to non-Han people.<sup>45</sup>

In August 1989, Counter revolutionary activity in Xinjiang set off a massacre of thousands of pro-democracy student protestors. In the very same year the crackdown by the party in the region uncovered the existence of 'questionable' publications full of violence, murder, feudal superstitions and reactionary content.<sup>46</sup> Again in april 1990, it was reported that nearly 22 people were killed and several injured in an armed counter-revolutionary rebellion in its far western region of Xinjiang.<sup>47</sup>

Due to cross border opening, the Uighur and Kazak exiles from Xinjiang settled in other neighbouring countries are running several organisation to achieve the goal of

---

<sup>44</sup> "Meetings Stress Need for National Solidarity" Summary of World Broadcast FE/0214/B2/7 27 July' 1981.

<sup>45</sup> Warikoo, K., "Ethnic Religious Resurgence in Xinjiang" Eurasian Studies, Ankara, Vol.2, No.4 1995/96 P.34,

<sup>46</sup> "Xinjiang Uncovers Questionable Publications" Summary of World Broadcast, FE/0547/B2/5, 29 August' 1989.

<sup>47</sup> "22 Killed in Chinese Riots" The Times of India, (New Delhi), 23 April, 1990.



separation Xinjiang from China. The prominent ones are Eastern Turkestan National Revolutionary Front, Eastern Turkistan Charity Fund, Islamic Party of East Turkistan etc. An International Uighur Union of CIS was set up in early 1992 in Almaty with the objective of protecting Human rights and seeking self determination for Uighurs in Xinjiang. In Kyrgyzstan, new Uighur Party "For a Free Uighurstan" was set up in June 1992 aimed at the creation of independent State of East Turkistan.<sup>48</sup> Following the dismantling of USSR, Xinjiang has begun to started attract western attention.

Recently on 27 February, 1997, three bombs went off in public transport buses in the western, Chinese city of Urumqi claiming many casualties. Later in Moscow, a spokesman of the Uighur nationalist reaffirmed that they are switching to anti-Chinese terror for creation of Islamic State in Xinjiang.<sup>49</sup> In the same month riots erupted in Xinjiang. Over 1000 Uighur young people, who stood for Xinjiang's independence took to streets beating up Han people. Over 400 people were reportedly killed in these riots.<sup>50</sup> In this case Chinese Government took strong action in this regard and passed death sentences to 30 people on 24 April, 1997.

---

<sup>48</sup> Warikoo, K., "Ethnic religious Resurgence in Xinjiang", Eurasian Studies, Ankara, Vol. 2, No. 4. 1995/96 p.36.

<sup>49</sup> "Xinjiang regional official says " scores" injured in bomb blast", - SWB, FE/2854 TG13. 27 February, 1997..

<sup>50</sup> "Xinjian party secretary furiously denies 400 killed in riots", Summary of World Broadcast, FE/2870, 18 March 1997.

Just after the death of Deng Xiaoping, Urumqi was rocked with bombs. These happenings are definitely worrying China. The 7th Xinjiang Uighur autonomous Regional Peoples congress held in March 1990 at Urumuqi identified the ethno- religious separatist movement as the greatest danger facing Xinjiang.

On 15 March 1997 China's regional newspaper "*Xinjinag Ribao*" in an editorial entitled "Safeguard Xinjiang's stability with one heart and one mind stated.." to safeguard Xinjiang's stability, we must hold high the banner for great national solidarity ... safeguarding Xinjiang's stability and accelerating Xinjiang's development should be a relationship of dialectical unity. While unwaveringly focusing on economic construction, we must attend to Xinjiang's economic construction and stability at the same time so that we can ensure development through ensuring stability and promote stability through expediting development ... We should continue to implement the central authorities important instructions on safeguarding Xinjiang's stability, deepen our understanding of important judgement that ethnic separatism and unlawful religious activities are the main danger that jeopardize Xinjiang's stability and wage a firm struggle against ethnic separatism"<sup>51</sup>

Thus, during Deng's era, Xinjiang has been brought closer to the rest of China through its integration into China's main economy and through expansion of rail and

---

<sup>51</sup> "Xinjiang paper warns against handful of bad people", Summary of World Broadcast, FE/286 G/R, 15 March 1997.

communication facilities. The increased incorporation of Xinjiang into the political spheres of China has provided unprecedented openings for the Uighurs in China. International travel has also resumed for the Uighurs. Rail link between China and is promoting cross border trade and traffic.

The cross border openings have made Uighurs accessible to their neighbouring Islamic States. The Uighurs are still oriented culturally and historically towards Central Asia in terms of religion, languages, culture, customs etc. The increased interaction with their Central Asian counterparts are fomenting ethno-nationalist feelings among the Uighurs. The culture of protest and violence are the manifestation of such feelings. Thus, it can be said that the inception of Deng and his liberalized attitude towards national minorities in China "nationalised" as well as "internationalized" the Uighur identity.<sup>52</sup> Ethnic pluralism alongside territorial integrity, the official goal of Chinese present government, it will be fully achieved or not is yet to be seen.

---

<sup>52</sup> Gladney, Dru C., "The Ethnogenesis of the Uighur", Central Asian Survey, Pergamon Press, London, vol 9, No. 1, January-March, 1990.

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, it can well be maintained that there is a continued dichotomy between the People's Republic of China's success in maintaining multinational unity under a unitary political system on the one hand and its difficulties in coping with the political and ethno-religious aspirations, demands and assertions of their national minorities on the other.

In case of Xinjiang, its geographical location of abetting the frontiers of newly independent Central Asian States have made it strategically important. Xinjiang has rich resources of petroleum, coal and jades which makes it economically important for China. And finally for the sake of Chinese national pride and in its dealings with the Muslim world, Xinjiang the minority Muslim dominated province of People's Republic of China assumes additional importance. China administered this province as per their changing policy attitudes towards their national minorities with changing times.

China's relations with its minority peoples have never been smooth and successful. Right from the time of Qin dynasty, successive Chinese governments held fast to their belief that Han culture was pre-eminent. Due to such a presumption, the Chinese rulers had to encounter intense conflicts and rebellions led by Khoja Muslim leaders like Jehangir, Yousuf Katta, Tora, Yakub Beg etc in the Xinjiang region. Even after the

Chinese revolution of 1911 and the consequent extermination of Ching rule, when Xinjiang entered into an era of warlordism which lasting till mid 1940s.

It was only under Red China that the frontiers of Xinjiang was consolidated and stabilised. The right to self determination strictly as defined under the Marxist-Leninist Framework was replaced by the concept of " regional autonomy". The Official Chinese definition of the policy of "national regional autonomy" is that people living in a compact community or where a number of minorities live together can exercise regional autonomy and set up organs of self government as long as it continues as an administrative autonomous region or an autonomous county. In persuit of this policy, the Xinjinag Uyghur Autonomous Region was established in October 1955.

Under this very pretext many changes were seen in the Xinjiang province some of which even breached their official position of " regional autonomy". Steady inflow of Han Chinese was made into this region which greatly altered the demographic composition of Xinjiang thereby diluting the absolute Muslim majority in this region. During the Cultural Revolution large number of Red Guards were sent to Xinjiang and they set about undermining the identity of the ethnic minorities by popularising the concepts of assimilation.

People's Republic of China also tried to realise China's century old dream to become a strong and rich country. In all the PRC's policies, the issue of China's

unification and integrity was the focal point of attention. This yearning for strength is like the sacred fire which would never be allowed to die by China.

There are two elements which are deep rooted in the psyche of the minority nationalities of China. First, there was a history of 2000 years of racial conflict and clash of interest between the Hans and Muslim nationalities in China. It is impossible to create over-night a totally new relationship of inter-nationality, equality, amity and mutual trust.

The second element is the wider international scenario. The western obsession for building nation-states is now uppermost in the minds of minority leaders all over the world. The struggle for ethno nationalism has been a rising trend world over. The current wave of world opinions offer a great deal of sympathy for the national minorities in China. The demise of former Soviet Union and the resurrection of 5 predominantly Central Asian Republics in the neighbouring area of Xinjiang has further given a boost to ethno-nationalist feeling in Xinjinag.

During the period of Deng, an attempt was made for economic integration of the economies of these regions with the main economy of China. Renewed efforts were made to install infrastructural facilities. Serious drives to upgrade the economy of Xinjiang were made. To link the distant Xinjinag with mainland China, communication facilities have been improved in this region. Deng's Modernisation drive did improve the economy and the living standards of the people of xinjiang. Even then, they have been unable to win over their confidence.

Xinjiang and its population are apprehensive about the intentions behind these developments. They feel that it is going to increase Han migration to Xinjiang and in its furtherance definitely going to alter the demographic composition of the province. Culturally, the Uighurs are more proximal to the Islamic Central Asia rather than that of the Han Chinese. The indifferent approach of the Chinese government with regard to their culture has further emboldened their feeling of "Cultural Exclusivism". With the opening of border trade and communication, they are now accessible to the Muslim Central Asian Republics and Pakistan, which gives boost to "Greater Islamic Solidarity". Many Muslim groups in Xinjiang have taken exile in these Republics and from there they are propagating the cause of "Independent Xinjiang".

The liberalised policy of Deng towards national minorities of China has augmented the existing trends of ethno-religious resurgence in Xinjiang. The policy of openness and freedom has given rise to the "politics of protest" in Xinjiang. Several ethno-political outfits have taken its roots in Xinjiang and are demanding its secession from China. Recent spate of bomb blasts and riots against the Han Chinese in the streets of Urumchi have further worsened the situation. The bomb blast just after the death of Deng Xiaoping virtually rocked the government sitting in Beijing.

The trend in Xinjiang has raised a question mark over the existence of People's Republic of China as a "multinational unity". A renewed and fresh approach is needed

by the Chinese government in dealing with the Minority Nationalities of China so as to win over their confidence.

The problem of minorities in China is the question of faith in the governance of CCP. It is expected that in the post-Deng era, China would be able to secure a place of respect for the "exclusive culture" of these nationalities and would strive for bringing them in the mainstream of China. If China is to survive as a "great family of nationalities", it is desirable that the policy which is to be followed by the People's Republic of China with regard to its national minorities should be "Pluralistic in nature and Socialistic in content." China can then only clamour itself as a country of "multinational unity".



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### BOOKS

- Ashworth, Georgina., (ed.) : *World Minorities in the Eighties*  
(Surrey, : Quartermaine House Ltd. and Minority Rights Groups Unwin Bros Ltd., 1986).
- Barfield, Thomas J., : *The Perilous Frontiers : Nomadic Empires and China*  
(Cambridge, Mass : Basic Blackwell Inc., 1989)
- Bowie, Robert R., and Fairbank J.K., : *Communist China 1955-59 Policy Documents with Analysis* (Cambridge, Mass : 1962)
- Bonavia, David., : *Verdict in Peking : The Trail of the Gang of four*  
(London : Burnett Books Ltd., 1984).
- Brugger, Bill., (ed.) : *China : The Impact of the Cultural Revolutions*  
(London : Croom Helm, 1978).
- Conrad, Brandt., Benjamin Schwartz and Fairbank, John K : *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism*  
(London : George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1952)
- Clubb, Edmund., : *Twentieth Century China* (New York : Colombia University Press. 1978).
- Cohen, Arthur A., : *Communism of Mao Tse - Tung*  
(Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1963)

*Constitution of the People's Republic of China*, adopted on March 5, 1978 by Fifth NPC of the PRC at its First Session (Beijing : Foreign Languages Press, 1978).

*Constitution of the People's Republic of China* , Fifth Session of the National People's Congress, November - December, 1982. (Beijing : Foreign Languages Press, 1983)

- Davis, Horace B., : *Towards a Marxist Theory of Nationalism*  
(New York : Monthly Review Press, 1978)
- Das, N., : *China's Hundred Weeds - A Study of the Anti  
Rightist Campaign in China 1957-58* (Calcutta :  
K.P. Bagchi, 1979).
- Deshpande, G.P., and : *United Front Against Imperialism : China's Foreign  
Gupta, H.K., Policy in Africa* (Bombay : Samayya Publications,  
1986).
- Dreyer, June Teufel., : *China's Forty Millions* (Cambridge, Mass : Harvard  
University Press, 1976)
- Daves, Jurgen., : *Government and Politics in People's Republic of  
China : A Time of Transition* (Boulder : Westview  
Press, 1985).
- Dixan, John., : *Chinese Welfare System 1949-79* (New York :  
Praeger 1981).
- Denis, Sinor., : *Inner Asia : A Syllabus* (Bloomington : Indiana  
University Press, 1969).

- Dutt, Gargi : *China After Mao*  
(New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1991)
- Dittmer, Lowell., : *China Under Reform,*  
(Boulder; Westview Press, 1994)
- Ellinwood, Dewitt., and  
Enloe, Cynthia, H., (ed.) : *Ethnicity and the Militancy in Asia* (New Brunswick  
Transition Books, 1987).
- Fitzgerald C.P., : *Mao Tse-Tung and China* (Hammandsworth;  
Penguin Books 1977).
- Forbes, Andrew D.W., : *Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia*  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
- Ferdinand, Peter.,(ed.) : *The New Central Asia and its Neighbours* (London:  
The Printer Publishers, 1996).
- Goodman, David S.G., (ed.) : *China's Regional Development*  
(Lonodon: Routledge, 1989).
- Gittings, John., : *China Changes Face: The Road from Revolution*  
*1949-89* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
- Goodman, David., : *Groups and Politics in the Peoples Republic of China*  
(Cardiff : Cardiff University Press, 1984).
- Galina, Sclovnikava., : *Present Day China: Socio-Economic Problems,*  
*Collected Articles*  
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975).

- Gmur, Clark., : *Economic Rivalries in China*  
(New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1932).
- Ginshurg, Norton., and  
Laior, A.Bernard., (ed.) : *China: the 80's era*  
(London : Westview Press, 1984).
- Han, S., : *China in the year 2001*  
(London: C.A. Watts, 1967).
- Hook, Brian., (ed.) : *The Cambridge Encyclopaedia of China*  
(Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1982).
- Hsu, Immanuel C.Y., : *China Without Mao: The Search for a New Order*  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).
- Harding, Harry., : *China's Second Revolution-Reform after Mao*  
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institutions, 1987).
- Hiro, Dilip., : *Between Marx and Muhammad: The Changing Face  
of Central Asia.*  
(London : Harper Collins, 1994).
- Horowitz, Donald L., : *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*  
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
- Hua, Sheng., : *China: From Revolution to Reform,*  
(New York : MacMillan Press, 1993).

- Jack Chen., : *The Xinjiang Story*  
(New York :MacMillan, 1977).
- Joseph,William A.,(ed.) : *China Briefing 1994*  
(Sanfrancisco, Westview Press 1994).
- Judith, Banister., : *China's Changing Popluation*  
(Palo Alto : Stanford University Press, 1987).
- Juxian, Hua., : *China's minority Nationlities in Almanac of China's  
Economy* (HongKong : Eurasia Press, 1982).
- Melvin, Gurtov., and : *China Under Threat*  
Byong Moo, Hwang., (Baltimore : The John Hopkins University Press,  
1980).
- Moseley, George., : *The Party and the Nation Question in China*  
(Cambridge : MIT Press, 1966).
- Mao, Tse-Tung., : *On the Correct Handling of Contradiction among  
People* , ( Peking : FLP, 1966).
- : *Selected Works (SWMTT) Vol. 5 : II, III, V*  
(Beijing : FLP, 1975).
- Macfarquhar, Roderick., : *The Politics of China 1949-1989*  
(Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1993).
- MacMillan, Donald., : *Chinese communist Power Policy in Xinjiang*  
(Boulder : Westview Press, 1979).
- Ma, Yin., (ed.) : *China's Minority Nationalities*

(Beijing : Foreign Languages Press, 1989).

- Mosely, George V.H., : *The Consolidation of the South China Frontier*  
(Berkeley : 1973).
- Ping, Jiang., : *The Theory and Practice of Chinese Nationalities*  
(Beijing, 1994).
- Quingly, H.S., : *China's Politics in Perspective*  
(Connecticut : Greenwood Press, 1962)
- Rahul, Ram., : *Central Asia: A Historical Survey*  
(New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1996).
- Risking, Carl., : *China's Political Economy: The Quest for  
Development Since 1949*  
(Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1987).
- Robinson, J. Cedric., : *Black Marxism - The Making of the Black Tradition*  
(London, 1983).
- Schram, Stuart., (ed.) : *Mao Tse-Tung Unhearsed*  
(Hammandsworth : Penguin Books, 1975).
- Selden, Mark., : *The Peoples Republic of China: A Documentary  
History of Revolutionary Change*  
(New York : Monthly Review Press, 1979).
- Seth, Vikram., : *From Heaven Lake Travels through Xinjiang and  
Tibet*  
(London : The Hogarth Press, 1983).
- Saheen, Samad., : *Communist Theory of National Self Determination*  
(Hague : W Van Hoene, 1978).

- Star, John Bryan., : *Continuing the Revolution and Political Thought of Mao*  
(Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1979).
- Singh, Ajit Kumar., : *Economic Development and Inequalities in communist China, 1949 - 1975*  
(Bombay : Himalaya Publications, 1985).
- Sinor, D., (ed.) : *The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia*  
(Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1990).
- Skrine F. H., Ross, E.D., : *The Heart of Asia : A History of Russian Turkestan and Central Asian Khanates from the Earliest Times*  
(London : Methuen, 1989).
- Theodore, Shabad., : *China's Changing Map - National and Regional development, 1949- 1971*  
(London : Methuen & C. Ltd., 1972).
- Vaidyanath, R., : *The Formation of the Soviet Central Asian Republics : A Study in Soviet Nationalities Policy 1917 - 1936*  
(New Delhi : People Publishing House, 1967).
- Walker, Connor., : *The National Question in Marxist Leninist Theory and Strategy,*  
(Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1984).
- Wang, James C.F., : *Contemporary Chinese Politics: An Introduction,*  
(New Jersey : Prentice-Hall, 1980).
- Waller, Derek J., : *Government and Politics of the People & Republic of China*  
(London : Viken, 1987).

- Wilson, Dick., : *A Quarter of Man Kind: An Autonomy of China Today.*  
(Hammondsworth : Penguin Books, 1966).
- Wary, Arthur P.,(ed.) : *Studies in Chinese Society*  
(Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1978).
- Warikoo, K.,(ed.) : *Central Asia: Emerging New Order*  
(New Delhi : Har Anand Publications, 1995).
- Warikoo, K., and Norbu, D., (eds.) : *Ethnicity and Politics in Central Asia*  
(New Delhi : South Asian Punlishers, 1992).

#### ARTICLES IN PERIODICALS

- Benson, Linda., : "Comments on Uighur Elites", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. VI, No. 4, 1987.
- Brown, B., : "Ethnic Groups United in Xinjiang", *Beijing Review*, (Beijing), December, 1984.
- Cheng, Joseph Y.B., : "Analysis of the Twelfth National Congress of the CPC," *Pacific Community*,( Tokyo), vol. 1080, 1982.
- Chien-Min, Chao., : "One Country Two Systemsn : A Theoretical Analysis", *Asian Affairs*,(Dhaka) Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer, 1987.
- Christoffersen, Gaye., : "Xinjiang and the Great Islamic Circle: The Impact of Transnational Forces on Chinese Regional Economic Planning", *The China Quarterly*, March, 1993.



- Dreyer, June Teufel., : "Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region at Thirty. A Report Card", *Asian Survey*, (California), Vol. 26, No. 7, July, 1986).
- Dreyer, June., : "China's Minority Nationalities in the Cultural Revolution", *The China Quarterly*, No. 35, July-September, 1968.
- Dreyer, June., : "China's Minority Nationalities : Traditional and Party Elites", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol.3, No.4, 1970.
- "Discussion of Draft Law on Regional Autonomy" *Summary of World Broadcast* FE/7650/C1/3-4. May 23, 1984.
- Farguhar, Roderick Mac., : "The minorities", *New Leader*, (London) Vol. 42, No. 23, June 18, 1959.
- Grunfeld, T., : "In Search of Equality : Relations between China's Ethnic Minorities and to Majority Han", *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, (Boulder), Vol. 17, No. 1, January, 1985.
- Gladney, Dru., : "The Muslim Face of China", *Current History*, September, 1993.
- : "The Ethnogenesis of the Uighur", *Central Asian Survey*, (London) Vol. 9. No. 1, January-March 1990.
- Hinton, Harold C., : "The National Minorities in China Part-I," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, (HongKong) Vol. 19, No.11, September 15, 1955.
- Hundsan, Mark J., : "Religion and Ethnicity in Chinese Islam", *Journal Insitute of Muslim Minority Affairs* (London) Vol.8, No.1, January 1987.

- Harris, Lillian Craig, : "Xinjiang, Central Asia and the Implications for China's Policy in Islamic World" *The China Quarterly*, March 1993.
- Helly, Denise., : "The Identity and Nationality Problem in Chinese Central Asia", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.3 No.3. 1985.
- I-Shu, Huang., : "National Minorities of China", *China Report*, (London), Vol.32, No.1, January-March 1996.
- Jaing, Xic., : "The 1982 Constitution and the Policy Towards Nationalities", *Chinese Law and Government*, (London) Vol.14, No.2, 1983.
- Joseph, Williams A., : "Dilemmas of Political Reform in China", *Current History*, (New York) Vol.84, No.503, September, 1985.
- Lal, Amrit., : "Sinification of Ethnic Minorities of China", *Current Scene* Vol.15, No.2, 1970.
- Lo, J.P., : "Five Years of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, 1955-60", *The China Quarterly*, No.8, October-December, 1961.
- Mosley, George., : "China's Fresh Approach to the National Minority Questions", *China Quarterly* No.24, October-November, 1965.
- Mosley, George., : "The Minority Groups and the Problems of Political Integration", In Yang, Wei., (ed.) *Communist China-A System-Functional Reader* (Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing, 1972).
- McMillan, Donald H., : "Xinjiang and Wang Enmao; New Directions in Power, Policy and Integration", *The China Quarterly*, September, 1984.

- Malhotra, O.N., : "China and Ethnic Nationalism", *Strategic Analysis* (New Delhi), September 1996.
- Norbu, Dawa., : "Chinese Government Views on National Self-Determination 1922-1956, Origins of China's national Minority Policy", *International Studies* (New Delhi), Vol.25, No.4, 1988.
- National Colonial Questions", *Selections from V.I.Lenin and J.V.Stalin*, (Calcutta: Calcutta Book House, 1975).
- Omer, Kanat., : "Comments on the Identity and Nationality Problem in Chinese Central Asia, "Central Asian Survey Vol.5, No.2, 1986.
- Porton, Dudley., and : "Demographic and Social Economic Composition of China's Ethnic Minorities", *Population and Development Review*, Vol.17, No.10, 1982.
- Jing, Shu.,
- "People's Daily on Nationalities Problem", *Summary of World Broadcast*, FE/6099/B11/10, 24 April, 1979.
- Qing, John., and : "Population Growth of Minority Nationalities", *Chinese Sociology and Anthropology*, (New York) Yu, Xiang., Vol.16, No.3-4, 1984.
- Read, Collins, Nicholas., : "Peking and the Minority Problem", *Eastern World* (London) Vol.17, No.3, March 1953.
- "Regional Autonomy Law National Minorities" (Text), *China, Report, Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS)*, No.45, 1984.
- "Regional Government Head Addresses Xinjiang's Economic Conference", *Summary of World Broadcast*, FE/2793/S1/2, 12 December 1996.
- Sidhu, Manjit S., : "The Chinese Diaspora", *Asia Profile*, Vol.13, No.6, December 1985.

- Staats, David R., : "Minorities of Inner Asia", *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 27, May-June 1978.
- Schwarz, Henry G., : "Communist Language Policies for China's Ethnic Minorities; The First-Decade", *The China Quarterly*, No.12, October-December 1962.
- Tam, Mi Liu., and : "Minorities Policy in the Peoples Republic of China: Its Implications in Southeast Asia",  
David Y.H. Wu., *South East Asian Journal of Social Science* (Seoul) Vol.16, No.2, 1988.
- "Three Economic Zones", *Summary of World Broadcast*, FE/0198/B2/3, 8 July, 1988.
- "Ulanhu., : "New Law on Regional Autonomy Needed for the National Minorities", *Chinese Law and Government*, Vol.14, No.4, 1981-82.
- : Report on the General Programme for the Implementation of Regional Autonomy for Nationalities", *Chinese Law and Government*, Vol.14, No.4, 1987-88.
- "Unity of the Nationalities Resumes Publications", *Survey of World Broadcast*, FE/6165/B2/18, July 12, 1979.
- Urumqi Newspaper Carries Xinjiang Government Work Report", *Summary of World Broadcast*, FE/2871/S1/1, 19 March, 1997.
- Vitali, Makyavev., : Some Aspects of China's Socio-Economic Development", *International Affairs*, (Moscow), Vol.11, 1987.
- Warikoo, K., : "Ethnic Religious Resurgence in Xinjiang", *Eurasian Studies*, (Ankara) Vol.2, No.4, 1995-96.
- : "Muslim Migrations from Xinjiang to Kashmir", *Strategic Analysis*, (New Delhi), Vol.14, No.1, April 1991.

- : "Chinese Turkestan During the Nineteenth Century: A Socio-Economic Study", *Central Asian Survey* (London) Vol.4, No.3, 1985.
- : "China and Central Asia: A Review of Ching Policy in Xinjiang 1755-1884", *Strategic Analysis* (New Delhi), Vol.13, No.3. June 1990.
- Wheeler, Geoffrey, : "Xinjiang and the Soviet Union", *The China Quarterly*, No.16, October-December 1963.
- White III, Lynn T., : "The Road to Urumchi: Approved Institutions in Search of Attainable Goals During Pre-1968 Rustication from Shanghai", *The China Quarterly*, No.79, September,1979.
- Xiaopig, Deng., : "On the Minority Nationalities", *Chinese Law and Government*, Vol.14, No.4, 1981-82.
- : "Unify Thoughts and Understanding", *Stratigic Digest*, (New York), Vol.19, No.8, August 1989.
- Xing, Wu Liu., and Alatan., : "China's Policy Towards Her Minority Nationalities", *Social Scientist*, (New Delhi), Vol.16, No.1, 1988.
- "Xinjiang Proud of 30 Years of Growth", *Beijing Review*, Vol. 28, No.41, October 15, 1985.
- "Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region", *China Facts and Figures*, (Beijing: FLP, 1975).
- Xinjiang Government., : "Xinjiang A General Survey", (Beijing : Beijing Press), 1989.
- "Xinjiang Circular on Order and Dangerous Weapons in Schools", *Summary of World Broadcast*, FE/7392/B11/6-7, 22 July, 1983.
- "Xinjiang's Economy Grows Steadily", *Summary of World Broadcast*, FE/2809/S1/4, 6 January 1997.

"Xinjiang Uncovers Questionables Publications", *Summary of World Broadcast*, FE/0547/B2/5, 29 August 1989.

"Xinjiang Regional Official Says Scores Injured in BombBlast", *Summary of World Broadcast*, FE/2854/G/3 27 February, 1997.

"Xinjiang Party Secretary Furiously Denies 400 Killed in Riots", *Summary of World Broadcast*, FE/2870/G/5, 18 March, 1997.

"Xinjiang Paper Warns against Handful of Bad People", *Summary of World Broadcast*, FE/2868/G/2, 15 March, 1997.

Yuan Aing Li., : "Population Change in Xinjiang Autonomous region: 1949-1989", *Central Asian Survey*, (London). Vol. 9, No.1, 1990.

Zhou En Lai., : "Some Questions on Policy towards Her Minority Nationalities", *Social Scientist* (New Delhi), Vol. XVI, No.1, 1988.

**NEWS PAPERS**

<b>International Herald Tribune</b>	(Hong Kong)
<b>The Times</b>	(London)
<b>Washington Post</b>	(Washington D.C.)
<b>People's Daily</b>	(Beijing)
<b>The Times of India</b>	(New Delhi)
<b>The Hindustan Times</b>	(New Delhi)
<b>The Tribune</b>	(Chandigarh)
<b>The Statesman</b>	(New Delhi)
<b>The Deccan Herald</b>	(Hyderabad)
<b>The Indian Express</b>	(New Delhi)
<b>The Patriot</b>	(New Delhi)