

BANGLADESH CRISIS: A STUDY IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

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PREFACE

Peace and security have remained and would continue to remain the cherished values of mankind. Policy-makers and academicians have concerned themselves with the tasks of devising ways to manage crises and wars towards the achievement and preservation of peace. This fundamental task assumes unimaginable dimensions when looked at the whole thing in the light of nuclear warfare and the disaster that would follow it. It is exactly in this context of nuclear politics, one has to understand the significance of 'Crisis management' as an academic study and guidance to decision-makers.

An attempt is made in these pages to trace the origin of the need for crisis management to the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962, the parties to which were none other than the two Super Powers, who had brought the world to the brink of disaster.

It is worth recalling that the seminar on "Crisis Management in International Politics" conducted by the School of International Studies in January 1974 acted as a stimulant and hence an attempt in these pages towards an academic study of crisis management. As a case study is taken up the Bangladesh crisis of 1971.

The 'Introductory Chapter' is devoted to an inquiry into the past and the present of Indo-Pakistan relations. The necessity for this arises for the simple reason that it is

highly unrealistic to disassociate Indo-Pakistan relations from the later emergence of Bangladesh crisis.

The second chapter entitled "The Simmering Crisis" is an analysis of the natural as well as man-made differences between the two wings of Pakistan from the day Pakistan became a nation.

The third chapter "Escalation into Warfare and Crisis Management" is a theoretical inquiry into questions like the definition of the term 'crisis', the 'techniques' and 'instruments' of crisis management, etc.

The fourth and the concluding chapter is divided into two parts: a) "Pakistan and Bangladesh crisis" and b) "India and Bangladesh Crisis". It concerns itself with a study of the application of the techniques and instruments of crisis management by the decision-makers of Pakistan and India. The reference to India, it is hoped, would help answer the allegation of several schools of thought that it was India who interfered in the internal affairs of Pakistan and managed the crisis to her own favour.

It was Professor M. L. Sondhi who encouraged me to take up the above research work. He has guided me in abundance throughout the course of this work. I thank him sincerely. My thanks are also due to the members of staff of libraries of Jawaharlal Nehru University and the Indian

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**BANGLADESH CRISIS : A STUDY IN CRISIS
MANAGEMENT**

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Any study of the Bangladesh crisis which eventually led to the break-up of Pakistan has to take into account the entire gamut of Indo-Pakistani relations as well. This is a natural corollary to the fact that Pakistan itself was created by breaking India into two nations. This would necessitate a student of such a study to address himself to an understanding of the foreign policy motivations and perceptions of each of the subcontinental countries towards one another. Such a study is also as an answer to criticisms of certain schools of thought in Pakistan that it was India who interfered in the internal affairs of Pakistan and helped the break-up of Pakistan. The argument has been that India was not reconciled to the partition, and in the 1971 crisis found a good opportunity to dismember Pakistan. In fact a detailed study of India and the Bangladesh crisis is made in one of the subsequent chapters.

In their perceptions of each other, India and Pakistan are influenced by a communal past, the tragedy of partition, two major armed conflicts (in 1948 and 1965), many minor clashes and confrontations, limited diplomatic and personal contacts, mutual recriminations and propaganda exchanges and continuously strained relations.

As has been pointed out by G. W. Choudhury, "an analysis of the course of Indo-Pakistani relations reveals that

recurrent crises between them fall into two main categories. First, there are specific quarrels such as Kashmir, the border incidents, eviction of the Muslims from Assam and Tripura, the problems of religious minorities in the two countries and the conflicting aims and purposes of their foreign policies. Serious disputes also arise from the upheaval of partition such as the division of assets of the formally undivided Indian Government and the sharing of the Indus valley waters. Secondly, there are the different outlooks of the two countries, which shape the mental image that each has formed of the other and serve greatly to complicate their relations.¹ Behind the political and economic quarrels lie the more dangerous tensions based on prejudices, myths and age-old hatred.

"The real problem is", says Choudhury, "mistrust". "The outstanding disputes may be solved but the prospects for an abiding good neighbour relationship are vitiated by the depth of the mistrust and prejudice".² All this is not to say that the relations between the two countries ever since partition have been featured by conflict and recrimony.

1 G. W. Choudhury, "Indo-Pakistan Relations: Areas of Conflict", Round Table (London), 1959-60, p. 163.

2 G. W. Choudhury, Pakistan's Relations with India (New Delhi, 1971), p. 8.

There have been definite periods when the two countries have co-operated, acted in unison and tried to find solutions to problems that separate them. Mention should be made in this connection of (a) Nehru-Liaquat Ali Pact of 1950; and (b) the Indus-water Treaty of 1960.

Nehru-Liaquat Ali Pact

A major crisis arose between India and Pakistan over the resurgence of communal troubles in West Bengal (India) and East Bengal (Pakistan) in early 1950. The hate charged atmosphere was again prevalent. The crisis in the two Bengals during February and March 1950 brought India and Pakistan, in Pandit Nehru's words to the 'edge of a precipice'.

The flare-up of religious riots, had, thus, gravely aggravated the ill-feeling that was already running high over Kashmir and the economic cold-war. The Pakistan Prime Minister made a strong plea to end the tensions and proposed a meeting with the Indian leaders to determine how to end the communal riots and fears of war. Nehru responded in a splendid way; notwithstanding the pressure from the extremist Hindu leaders and Press, he reciprocated Liaquat's overture.

The historic meeting between the two Prime Ministers took place in New Delhi on April 2, 1950. As a result of imaginative statesmanship, on April 8, the Liaquat-Nehru Agreement was signed. This could be called a bill of rights for the minorities of the two countries. It is divided into

three parts: it sought, first, to allay the fears of the minorities on both sides; second, to promote communal peace; and third, to establish a climate so that the other differences could be amicably settled. The Agreement declared: "The Governments of India and Pakistan solemnly agree that each shall ensure, to the minorities throughout its territories, complete equality of citizenship, irrespective of religion; a full sense of security in respect of life, culture, property and personal honour. It also guaranteed basic rights to the minorities such as freedom of movement, of speech, of occupation, of worship. Especially important was the provision that minorities would have 'equal opportunity with members of the majority community to participate in the public life of the country, to hold political or other office and to serve in their country's civil and armed forces."

Both Governments, however, emphasized that the allegiance and loyalty of the minorities were to be to the state of which they were citizens, and that it was to the government of their own state that they should look for the redress of grievances. This was a salutary provision, because minority problems in both countries were complicated by the fact that the Hindus in East Pakistan looked to India for protection and Muslims in India expected support and help from Pakistan.

The Agreement was widely hailed as a hopeful beginning to improve relations between the two countries. The two leaders had taken their countries back from the drift towards what might have become a war. Walter Lippman, writing in the Herald Tribune, described it as the 'Light of Asia'. He further said: "it is the first act of great demonstration of high statesmanship by the new independent powers of Asia."³ G. W. Choudhury remarked: "Indo-Pakistani relations have always been strained since they gained independence in 1947, but there have been some brief intervals or 'sweet periods'; the Liaquat-Nehru Agreement of April 1950 ushered in such an interval."⁴

Indus Water Treaty

Whereas East Bengal (now Bangladesh) has too much water and experiences frequent and devastating floods, large parts of the West depend on the rather uncertain supplies which are made available through some half a dozen of rivers which make up the Indus River System, the vital artery of West Pakistan. Three of these rivers - the Jhelum, the Chenab and the Indus itself - rise either in Tibet or in remote parts of Kashmir, but three others - the Beas, the Ravi and

3 Herald Tribune (New York), 11 April 1950.

4 G. W. Choudhury, n. 1, p. 162.

the Sutlej - flow through north-west India into West Pakistan and can therefore be diverted for India's use.

As a consequence of partition the question of the use of the waters of these rivers, whose annual flow is twice that of the Nile, became crucial for Pakistan but for some years no progress was made in resolving this vital issue. In 1951 David Lilienthal, former chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, suggested a solution involving the working out of a comprehensive engineering plan for the use of the waters of the Indus River System and financial assistance by the World Bank. Representatives of the two countries negotiated intermittently for many months, in Washington and elsewhere, but not until the Spring of 1959 was agreement reached on the main issues in dispute. The drafting of the treaty required further negotiations, over a period of a year and a half. Finally, in September 1960, the Indus Water Treaty was signed at Karachi by Prime Minister Nehru and President Mohammad Ayub Khan and W. A. B. Iliff, Vice-President of the World Bank. Subject to certain exceptions, the treaty allocated the waters of the eastern rivers - the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej - for the use of India and of the three western rivers - the Indus, the Chenab and the Jhelum - for the use of Pakistan. Simultaneously an international financial agreement was signed by representatives of Australia, Canada, West Germany, Newzealand,

Pakistan, the United Kingdom, the United States and the World Bank. This Agreement created the Indus-Basin Development Fund of about \$900 million to finance the construction of irrigation and other works in Pakistan provided for in the Indus Water Treaty.

The Indus-Water Treaty was called a "billion dollar investment on peace" by Eugene Black, who was the moving spirit in its formulation.

In a broadcast to his people on the treaty, President Ayub said: "The solution that we have now got is not the ideal one - the ideal solution when negotiated can seldom be obtained - but this is the best that we could get under the circumstances...."⁵

Pandit Nehru said: "the agreement was memorable, not only for the material benefits which it would bring to the cultivators in India and Pakistan, but also for the psychological and emotional effect."⁶ He praised the spirit of co-operative endeavour which had shown the way for further collaboration between the two countries. Many people in India and elsewhere hoped that the agreement on the canal waters issue, and the improved relations between India and Pakistan which this symbolized, might make it possible for the two

5 Dawn (Karachi), 5 September 1960.

6 The Financial Times (New Delhi), 19 September 1960.

countries to reach some amicable understanding regarding the even more complicated and much more highly publicised question of Kashmir.

Again during Ayub Khan's military rule, while the great debate about Tibet was going on in the Indian Parliament in May 1959, President Ayub Khan offered Nehru a plan for joint defence of the subcontinent. He believed that there was a threat to both India and Pakistan from the north; the two countries should therefore settle their differences and come to a joint defence arrangement. The crux of the matter was that Indian and Pakistani forces which were facing each other should be released for the job of defending their territories, once the outstanding difference between them were resolved. This meant a disengagement of Indian and Pakistani armies from the ceasefire line in Kashmir.

The joint defence arrangement was no doubt turned down by the Indian Government. Nehru is reported to have told an official of the Pakistan High Commission in New Delhi that the question of joint defence did not arise because the broader approaches of India and Pakistan to world affairs were fundamentally different.

Writing about the joint defence arrangement proposed by Ayub Khan, G. W. Choudhury says, "By siding with India on the Chinese question in 1959 and offering a joint defence of

the subcontinent, Ayub gave a new orientation and significance to Pakistan's policy. It was India's cold response to Ayub's offer of friendship... that led Pakistan to closer ties with China. She has been in search of security from her inception and her eventual moves to normalize her relations with her powerful neighbours, China and the Soviet Union, are nothing but expressions of the same search for security."⁷

THE KASHMIR QUESTION

"From the beginning of the dispute", says Michael Brecher, "shortly after the two countries began their independent existence, the disagreements between India and Pakistan have been complete."⁸ They have not been able even to agree on the facts of the dispute, not only to mention the proper interpretation of these facts. The Indian position is based on the "fact" says Norman D. Palmer, "of the accession of the Maharaja of Kashmir to India in 1947, the 'fact' of Pakistani aggression in Kashmir, the 'fact' of the manifest desire of the post-partition Governments of that part of Kashmir on the Indian side of the ceasefire line...

7 G. W. Choudhury, n. 1, p. 219.

8 Michael Brecher, The Struggle for Kashmir (New York, 1953).

They have been maintaining for some years, certainly since 1952, that the "accession of Kashmir to India is complete in law and in 'fact' and that then seem to imply that, in spite of the contrary views of Pakistan, the Security Council and vocal segments of world public opinion, the Kashmir issue is in fact settled...."⁹

India also maintains that the present Government in Kashmir represents the popular will, and that a plebiscite would only tend to raise old issues and divisions and might produce communal tensions between Hindus and Muslims.

Following the border war between India and China in October 1962, India and Pakistan agreed, under pressure from the United States and Britain to hold a series of talks on the Kashmir issue. Five rounds of talks - the most comprehensive exchanges on Kashmir between the two countries - were held between December 1962 and May 1963 but no progress was made in resolving the impasse.

The existence of antagonism between India and Pakistan has been aggravated by the different ways in which their foreign policies have viewed great power interventionism. While India's stress was on "decolonisation", Pakistan viewed its strategic environment in line with western advocacy of "military security".

⁹ Norman D. Palmer, The Indian Political System (New York, 1971), 2nd edn., pp. 278-79.

In the mid-fifties the logic of this divergence led Pakistan into the American global network of military alliances whereas India declared non-alignment from the politics of military blocs. One led to the path of more and more dependence - military, economic and political - upon Washington and the others with all its shortcomings, to the striving for economic independence and political assertion in foreign affairs.

It is imperative in this connection to make reference to the fruitful diplomatic relations that Pakistan has maintained with China, in contradistinction to the state of hostile relations with India. Z. A. Bhutto in his book entitled Political Situation in Pakistan writes, "The People's Republic of China is the only country which will be sympathetic to Pakistan's real requirements. This is so because that country's interest in the subcontinent coincide with those of Pakistan. It is strictly a question of mutuality of interests. If we look around us, the only Great Power whose objective interests coincide with Pakistan and the only country capable of assisting Pakistan is the People's Republic of China.... It is the immediate neighbour of India and Pakistan and has a territorial dispute with India which Pakistan cannot ignore. Pakistan will always need a plus factor for coping with India. Whether the Government likes it or not, it so happens that the plus factor is the People's Republic of China. If that factor

is removed, Pakistan will be at the mercy of all the three Great Powers and India." ¹⁰ This particular quotation from Bhutto points clearly to the warmth of relations between Pakistan and China, and is one of the causes of the strained relations between India and Pakistan.

The question then arises whether confrontation with India remains a permanent goal with Pakistan. Whatever were Mr Bhutto's intentions when he wrote: "The Myth of Independence", it is difficult to see how he could avoid understanding the imperative of coexistence after the 1971 conflict and the emergence of Bangladesh. The "new thinking" of the Pakistani leader is evident in the interview he gave to an Indian journalist. Mr Verghese in his book "An End to Confrontation" (Bhutto's Pakistan) makes reference to Bhutto and the changes in his views and attitudes towards the affairs of the subcontinent.

The author says: "He (Bhutto) believes Pakistan could have walked into Kashmir in 1962 when India was engaged in hostilities with China. The balance was still in favour of Pakistan in 1965 and so continued until 1971.... New President Bhutto confesses, confrontation is no longer possible. Pakistan can no longer hope for a successful military settlement." ¹¹

10 Bhutto, Z. A., Political Situation in Pakistan (New Delhi, 1968), p. 25.

11 Verghese, B. G., An End to Confrontation (Bhutto's Pakistan): Restructuring the Subcontinent (New Delhi, 1972), p. 6.

The author further says that "on balance, it would appear that the abandonment of confrontation is a policy based on careful consideration of the objective reality and that it will not be regarded as a viable or worthwhile option if Pakistan sees the prospect of negotiating a just and enduring peace".¹²

12 Ibid., p. 7.

Chapter II

THE SIMMERING CRISIS

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The violent conflict in Bangladesh between West Pakistani forces and the Bengali freedom fighters has its roots deep in the last twenty years of Pakistani history. The entire conflict was understood in two different ways in the two wings of Pakistan. West Pakistan looked upon the entire thing as an attempt at secession, an act aimed at undermining the authority of the Government of Pakistan, instigated by India. These views are expressed not only after the 1971 crisis, but even earlier. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, writing in The Myth of Independence wrote: "with Pakistan co-operating on terms of inequality and submission, India would, in the first instance, turn her attention to the rich and alluvial portions of East Pakistan, which would be assailed with propaganda and subjected to economic and cultural encroachments. India would attempt, by threats and seduction, by insidious cultural infiltration, by sheer weight of proximity to absorb East Pakistan into West Bengal... Incessant appeals would be made to East Pakistan to end the domination of West Pakistan." ¹ Mehrunnisa Hatim Iqbal writing in an article entitled "India and the 1971 War with Pakistan", published in Pakistan Horizon's India-Pakistan War, 1971, says: "The East Pakistan crisis,

1 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, p. 182.

sedulously fostered by India, provided the awaited opportunity of breaking of a sizeable chunk of Pakistan territory which would weaken Pakistan and be a first step towards a complete dismemberment.² In brief, the 1971 crisis was understood in Pakistan to have been created by India, to give shape to India's desire to emerge as a major power in Asia by dismembering Pakistan.

In East Bengal, the delayed tactics of Yahya Khan in handing over power to the legitimately elected Awami League was understood as an attempt to keep East Bengal permanently as a colony, under the domination of the West Pakistan Generals. This feeling led them finally to fight for independence. /

— Apart from the way the crisis was separately understood by Pakistan-East Bengal, there were other contributing factors ranging from geography to economics and the pattern of power structure. An attempt is made in these pages to understand how natural as well as man-made factors were responsible for the final blow-up in Pakistan, which resulted in the emergence of a separate state of Bangladesh.

Geographically, Pakistan was an incongruity. The two halves of Pakistan were around 1200 miles apart, separated

2 Mehruunnisa Hatim Iqbal, "India and the 1971 War with Pakistan", in Indo-Pakistan War, 1971 (Karachi, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1973), p. 21.

by Indian territory. It is but appropriate to quote Professor Hans J. Morgenthau, who writing under the heading "The Underlying Weakness of Pakistan" said Pakistan is not a nation, and hardly a state. It has no justification in history, ethnic origin, language, civilization or the consciousness of those who make up its population. They have no interest in common save one: fear of Hindu domination. It is to that fear and nothing else, that Pakistan owes its existence and thus for its survival as an independent State."³ About a decade ago, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad in his Memoirs "India Wins Freedom" had written: "Mr Jinnah and his followers did not seem to realize that geography was against them.... These two regions (West Pakistan and Bangladesh) have no point of physical contact. People in these two areas are completely different from one another in every respect, except only in religion. It is one of the greatest frauds on the people to suggest that religious affinity can unite areas which are geographically different.... No one can hope that East and West Pakistan will compose all their differences and form one nation."⁴

3 Extracts from Hans J. Morgenthau's "Military Illusions", The New Republic (Washington, D.C.) 19 March 1956, pp. 14-16.

4 Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom: An Autobiographical Narrative (Bombay, 1959), p. 227.

Maulana Azad's quotation presents in a nutshell the almost insurmountable 'structural problems' Pakistan had to face since its creation.

Next comes the most important factor of economic discrimination. Blatant discrimination in the distribution of economic resources is bound to create severe strains on the political system of any country. But in a newly independent country struggling to evolve its national identity the strains on the political system are bound to be intolerable. This was exactly so in the case of Pakistan. A report by a panel of experts belonging to the Planning Commission of the Government of Pakistan,⁵ which came out in July 1970, provides authoritative documentation of the widening of economic disparities in the two regions. The most striking part of the report is the widening gap between the income of the average West Pakistani and his Eastern counterpart. In 1959-60, the per capita income in West Pakistan was 32% higher than in the East. Over the next ten years, the annual rate of growth of income of West Pakistan was 6.2 per cent while it was only 4.2 per cent in East Pakistan. As a result by 1969-70,

5 Reports of the Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan quoted in "Why Bangladesh" by a group of scholars from Vienna, Bangla Desh Documents, vol. 1, (New Delhi, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1971), pp. 15-22.

the per capita income of the West was 61 per cent higher than in the East. Thus, in ten years, the gap doubled in percentage terms; it increased even more in absolute terms.

From the available data given below, which is mostly official, we get a clear picture of the disparity between the two wings of Pakistan.

Average Annual Budget

Total Revenue	Rs. 6,000 million	W.P.	E.P.
Expenditure in Defence	Total 60%	50%	10%
Civil expenditure	Total 40%	25%	15%

While East Pakistan provided 60 per cent of the total revenue, it received only about 25 per cent for its expenditure and West Pakistan, providing only 40 per cent in the Central Exchequer received 75 per cent of the remaining.

Foreign Trade and Exchange Earnings

	West Pakistan		East Pakistan	
	Export	Import	Export	Import
1958-68 (during ten year period)	£820 m. 41%	£2,315 m. 70%	£1,153 m. 59%	£1,000 m. 30%

In foreign trade, East Pakistan's exports constituted 59 per cent of the total, but imports only 30 per cent. Of the imports which consist of consumer goods, and food, very little is left out for development projects. During the same period, West Pakistan earned 41 per cent of the total

foreign exchange and was allowed 70 per cent of the foreign exchange earnings. Most portion of this was spent on various development projects in West Pakistan.

The percentage of allocation of funds for development projects is still more staggering. Foreign exchange for various developments in West Pakistan was 80 per cent whereas for East Pakistan, it remained at 20 per cent. 96 per cent of foreign aid (excluding U.S. aid) went to West Pakistan whereas East Pakistan received only 4 per cent. Funds allotted to Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation was 80 per cent whereas only 20 per cent was earmarked to East Pakistan.

The above figures clearly show how the established industries in East Pakistan had been allowed to grow extremely slowly in comparison with the extremely fast growing industries in the West.

Arjun Sen Gupta has aptly called Pakistan's economic policy during the last two decades "planning for disparity."⁶

If one adds to this concentration of wealth in one region of the country, the concentration of political power also in the hands of a select coterie in the West wing,

⁶ Arjun Sen Gupta, "Planning for Disparity", in Pran Chopra, ed., The Challenge of Bangladesh: A Special Debate (Bombay, 1971), pp. 79-101.

there is a definite realization that the situation had certainly become ominous for the eventual showdown.

Mohammed Ayooob and Subrahmanyam have rightly pointed in their book, The Liberation War that "the entire political structure of Pakistan, with or without the veneer of parliamentary democracy was built upon three fundamental assumptions: the supremacy of the executive over representative institutions; the dominance of West Pakistan, especially Punjab over East Bengal and the financial autonomy of the army. All three were, in fact, interlinked and a major threat to any one of these posed corresponding threats to the others also".⁷

Pakistan's political system had over the years taken on the character of a "military-bureaucratic-industrial complex", to use a term which Mohammed Ayooob uses in several of his writings on Pakistan. He writes, "East Pakistan was fast turning into a classic colony both in economic and political terms.... in all the crucial sectors of decision-making - economic, military and administrative - East Pakistan's representation was extremely small if not completely non-existent."⁸

7 Mohammed Ayooob and Subrahmanyam K., The Liberation War (New Delhi, 1972), p.

8 Mohammed Ayooob, Sisir Gupta and others, Bangladesh: A Struggle for Nationhood (Delhi, 1971), pp. 14-15.

As far as representation in the armed forces was concerned, the situation was quite worse, the army which accounted for nearly 90 per cent of the man power in the armed forces, had been recruited primarily from the four districts of northern Punjab, namely, Rawalpindi, Campbellpur, Jhelum and Gujrat and the two districts of the N.W.F.P., Peshawar and Kohat. Sixty per cent of the army consisted of Punjabis, 35 per cent Pathans and the others constituted the rest".⁹

East Pakistanis constituted of no more than 5 per cent of the officers of the Pakistan army, according to the figures available for 1963. According to Khalib B. Sayeed, who has been able to compile information "regarding 48 of the 50 senior army officers who attained the ranks of Major-General and above, between 1947 and the closing years of the 1960s, 17 came from Punjab, 19 from N.W.F.P., 11 from among Indian refugees and only one from Bengal."¹⁰

The Leadership Factor

Apart from the above study which gives an insight into the glaring disparities in the economic, industrial and

9 Khalib B. Sayeed, "The role of the Military in Pakistan", in Jacques Van Doom, ed., Armed Forces and Society (The Hague, 1968), p. 276.

10 Ibid., p. 278.

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military fields, one has to take into consideration the leadership factor which is in no way less significant. Fazal Muqum Khan in his latest book Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership says: "After the death of Quaid-i-Azam, Father of the Nation and Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister and the gradual disappearance from the scene of national figures like Suhrawardy, Maulana Akran Khan, and Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan, those left to guide the destinies of the country failed to achieve unity and integration. The sense of patriotism and the urge for political co-operation, achieved during the fight for Pakistan, at great cost, were soon frittered away. Misunderstandings started early. Many forces sprung up to air them but only a few to diffuse them...."¹¹

Rafinshan Kureshi writes in "The Nation of Pakistan", "the death of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan's two most prominent and influential leaders at the crucial time in its history left a vacuum in top leadership. The new leaders who filled this vacuum were unable to work effectively the intricate mechanics of parliamentary democracy. The result was that they failed to give the country political stability."¹² Thus there did not arise any one leader

11 Fazal Muqum Khan, Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership (Karachi, 1973), pp. 4-5.

12 Rafinshin Kureshi, The Nation of Pakistan (New York, 1969), p. 30.

who could be accepted by both the wings of Pakistan, a leader who could command the loyalty of the people of East Bengal, unlike in India, where Nehru was accepted as the national leader.

Sisir Gupta writing on "Bangladesh" also echoes the same view. He says: "the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan marked the beginning of the emergence of the military bureaucratic elite as the dominant elements in the power structure of Pakistan."¹³ He further argues that "for almost a decade the suppressed fury of the people of East Bengal could find no expression in either political agitation or social upheaval. The democratic forces of East Bengal were kept under constant check and even respected figures as Sheikh Mujibur Rahman were tried and imprisoned on charges of treason. In fact, it is interesting that all the three great names of East Bengali public life were at one time or the other accused of treason by the Central Government - Suhrawardy in 1948, Fazlul Haq in 1954, and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1966...."¹⁴ Thus it is evident from the above that the replacing of democratic form of government in the very early stages by military dictatorship

13 Sisir Gupta, "Bangladesh: The Problem", Seminar (New Delhi), no. 142, June 1971.

14 Ibid.

went a long way in feeding the pockets of discontent in East Bengal. The military leaders were utterly self-centred and interested in perpetuating their power and authority and totally neglected the fundamental task of evoking "political co-operation" from East Bengal. The problems of unity and integrity were totally uncared for.

The above facts clearly demonstrate that the compulsions on the part of East Pakistanis were too strong to be sidetracked by the slogans of Islamic solidarity and brotherhood.

THE CRISIS DEEPENS

The preceding pages have pointed out that the crisis was simmering in East Pakistan ever since Pakistan sought separation from India. An unpredictable and precarious situation was the direct outcome of the discrimination that was done against the East Pakistanis by the West Pakistan dominated Government. Given the context of general disillusionment in East Pakistan two important events brought about an extraordinary transformation of popular attitudes leading eventually to an apocalyptic threat to the integrity of Pakistan. They are: (a) Floods in East Pakistan in July-August 1970, followed by tidal wave and cyclone in November; the attitude of the Government of Pakistan to this calamity, and (b) the General Elections of December 1970, the results of it, the attitude of the Government of Pakistan towards it.

On the night of November 12, 1970, the coastal areas of Barisal, Patnakhali and Khulna experienced a cyclone and tidal bore, the like of which even the perennially cyclone-ravaged East Bengal had never experienced in living memory. Approximately one million people were estimated to have died in the unprecedented natural calamity. But what transformed this devastation into an issue of vital political significance was the failure of the Central Government in Islamabad to respond quickly and effectively to the human suffering in East Bengal.

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who had toured the cyclone affected areas issued a press statement on the 26th of November 1970, condemning the Central Government in no uncertain terms. He charged the Government for its total failure... to discharge its obligations at every stage and called this "utterly appalling". Sheikh Mujib went on to say: "A massive rescue and relief operation, if launched within 24 hours of the occurrence, could have saved thousands of lives. Thousands of survivors could have been saved from death due to starvation, exposure and lack of medical attention. Had the Navy rushed into the area it could have rescued thousands who had been swept into the sea. The failure to launch such a relief operation is unforgiveable...." ¹⁵

The Financial Times (London) wrote on December 1, 1970:
 "In the most dramatic and momentous form, the failure or inability of the Centre to respond quickly, demonstrably and efficiently to the east wing's/^{needs} have confirmed the entire argument of Bengali separation".¹⁶

Mohammed Ayooob and Subrahmanyam wrote: "Islamabad's callousness and criminal apathy towards the victims of the tragedy completely destroyed any faith left in East Bengal in the ruling coterie in West Pakistan. The vote for regional autonomy, that is the vote for the Awami League, truly assumed the proportions of a tidal wave itself."¹⁷

The next significant event that contributed to a deepening of the crisis was the outcome of the results of the General Elections held in Pakistan in December 1970, and the attitude of the Government of Pakistan to it.

General Yahya Khan assumed power on the 25th of March 1969, after the fall of Ayub Khan. On assuming power, General Yahya Khan apparently came to the conclusion that if the tenuous fabric of Pakistani unity was to be maintained, some concessions had to be granted to East Pakistan. In fact, immediately on assuming office, General Yahya Khan made it clear that he had no intentions of going back on

16 Financial Times (London), 1 December 1970.

17 Mohammed Ayooob and Subrahmanyam, K., n. 7, pp. 89-90.

President Ayub's decision regarding the reintroduction of parliamentary democracy based on universal adult franchise.

As far as East Pakistan's demands for autonomy and radical changes in the inter-regional equation was concerned, President Yahya Khan accepted in principle, in his broadcast on 28th November 1969, that East Pakistan had suffered discrimination and that some degree of autonomy, both political and fiscal, was therefore, a legitimate demand of the people of East Bengal. In the same broadcast, President Yahya Khan also conceded to East Pakistan the principle of "one man one vote" meaning thereby that the East Bengali majority would be given proportionate representation in the National Assembly.¹⁸

The Legal Framework Order, issued by President Yahya Khan on 30 March 1970, set the dates of election to the National and Provincial Assemblies as 5th October and 22nd October 1970 respectively. The elections had, however, to be postponed to 7th and 17th of December 1970 respectively because of heavy floods in East Pakistan in July-August 1970. Meanwhile political activity was allowed to be resumed from 1st January 1970.

The Legal Framework Order (LFO) issued by Yahya Khan also spelt out five "fundamental principles" of the future constitution, thus pre-empting some of the powers of the

18 Pakistan Times (Lahore), 29 November 1969.

Constituent Assembly. These principles related to the federal character of the republic, Islamic ideology, autonomy, etc. It is interesting to note that on the question of autonomy, while conceding it in principle, the Legal Framework Order made it clear that "the federal Government shall also have adequate powers, including legislative, administrative and financial powers, to discharge its responsibilities in relation to internal and international affairs, and to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of the country."

Two Articles 25 and 27 - of the LFO raised a storm of controversy and protest, especially in East Pakistan. These related to the authentication of the future constitution and interpretation of the provisions of LFO. According to Article 25 of the LFO, "the Constitution Bill, as passed by the National Assembly, shall be presented to the President for authentication. The National Assembly shall stand dissolved in the event that such authentication is refused". Article 27 of the LFO stated categorically, "any question or doubt as to the interpretation of any provision of this order shall be resolved by a decision of the President, and such decision shall be final and not liable to be questioned in any court. Further, it stated that "the President and not the National Assembly shall have the power

to make any amendment in this order".¹⁹

In retrospect it becomes clear that President Yahya Khan's intentions in concentrating in his hands the twin powers of authentication of the constitution and interpretation of the LFO were to prevent a constitution unacceptable to West Pakistan in general and the army-bureaucratic establishment in particular, from being adopted. The Awami League of East Pakistan, although it had its own reservations for these two provisions, decided to participate in the elections to be held under the LFO.

THE GENERAL ELECTIONS

The elections to the National Assembly took place on December 7, 1970, as promised by President Yahya Khan. The Awami League, headed by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman fought the elections on the famous six-point programme for autonomy. The six-points as submitted in their election manifesto are as follows:

(1) Establishment of a federation "on the basis of the Lahore Resolution and the parliamentary framework of Government with supremacy of Legislature directly elected on the basis of adult franchise.

19 All quotations from the Legal Framework Order are taken from S. G. M. Budruddin, Election Hand Book (Karachi, 1970), pp. 118-30.

(2) Federal Government shall deal with only two subjects, that is, defence and foreign affairs, and all other residuary subjects should rest in the federating states.

(3) There should be either two separate but freely convertible currencies for the two wings or one currency for the whole country provided that effective constitutional provisions were made to stop the flight of capital from East to West Pakistan. There should be separate fiscal and monetary policy for East Pakistan.

(4) Denial to the Central Government of the right of taxation, vesting of tax provisions in the hands of the federating states with the Central Government receiving a fixed share.

(5) Foreign Trade; five steps shall be taken:

(a) there should be two separate accounts for foreign exchange earnings;

(b) earnings of East Pakistan shall be under the control of East Pakistan and the same for West Pakistan;

(c) foreign exchange requirements of the federal government shall be met by the two wings either equally or in a ratio to be fixed;

(d) indigenous products shall move free of duty within the two wings; and

(e) the constitution shall empower the Unit Government to establish trade and commercial relations with, set up trade missions in and enter into agreements with foreign countries.

(6) Set up a militia or para-military force by East Pakistan.

Thus the six-points sought to transfer control over foreign trade, foreign aid allocation, and taxation powers to the provinces so that no province could be dominated through disproportionate control of the Central Government's powers over resource allocation.

As the results of the elections came out, Awami League had swept 167 of the 169 seats - in the National Constituent Assembly - that were allotted to East Pakistan. The Awami League's 167 seats constituted an absolute majority in a chamber of 313. The Awami League polled 72.6% of the votes cast in East Pakistan in the elections to the National Assembly.²⁰ The devastating and unprecedented cyclone and tidal wave of November 1970 and even more, the callous attitude adopted by the Central Government toward East Bengal's sufferings added further support to the Awami League's autonomy. The elections had in a way become a referendum on the League's six-point programme. The elections had converted its six-point programme into its minimum de-²¹mands which, therefore, became non-negotiable, writes Mohammed

20 Voting percentage figures given by the Chief Election Commissioner and quoted in Tribune (Chandigarh), 7 February 1971.

21 Mohammed Ayoob, Sisir Gupta and others, n. 8, pp. 35-36.

Ayoob. This was exactly what the Government of Pakistan had not expected. Their own reading of the situation was that the Awami League would be able to get only 115-120 seats out of 162 allotted for East Bengal; fall short of a majority and that it would be made to compromise on its programme. The calculations of the West Pakistan Government simply misfired.

On the other hand, the Government of Pakistan was pleasantly surprised at the way Pakistan People's Party (PPP) had emerged as a major force after the elections. The PPP, led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, emerged with three-fourths of the seats in Punjab and two-thirds of the seats in Sind, the most populous provinces of West Pakistan. This gave it almost 60 per cent of West Pakistani seats (i.e., 82 out of 138 seats). The emergence of a strong party with the right to speak for almost two-thirds of West Pakistan reduced the Awami League's bargaining power.

The Government of Pakistan, no doubt, congratulated the Awami League and the Pakistan People's Party for emerging victorious. President Yahya Khan spoke of the transfer of power to the leader of the majority; in fact, he even referred to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as the future Prime Minister of Pakistan, in a statement made at Dacca on January 14, 1971. ²²

22 The Pakistan Observer, 15 January 1971.

The President said that the National Assembly would meet on March 3, 1971. But then occurred a major development which precipitated the crisis. And that was the declaration by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, leader of the Pakistan People's Party that his party, being the leader of the people of West Pakistan, had equal share in the constitution-making task. He raised objections to the Awami League's legitimate claim for constitution-making.

Addressing a crowded Press Conference in Peshawar on February 15, 1971, Bhutto said: "We cannot go there only to endorse the constitution already prepared by a party and to return humiliated. If we are not heard and even responsible proposals put by us are not considered, I don't see the purpose to go there"²³. Mr Bhutto further said that his party had accepted only the first and the last points of the Awami League's six-points (they relate to the basis of representation or federation and the existence of People's militia in the provinces) and rejected the other points. Bhutto put forward in this connection, the famous 'two-majority' theory. Speaking in a Press Conference, at Karachi, on March 15, 1971, Bhutto said that his party wanted that while transferring power, at the central level it should be transferred to the "two majority parties" of East and West

Pakistan. "Our position is that the majority party in East Pakistan together with the majority party in West Pakistan could democratically represent the country...." ²⁴

Thus Bhutto precipitated the major constitutional crisis of the period.

This naturally shattered the hopes, the Awami League leaders had in Yahya Khan of his promises of transfer of power. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman made several Press statements asking the Government of Pakistan to go by the wishes of the people as expressed in voting Awami League as the majority party for the National Assembly. He even cautioned the people to be aware of the tactics of the Government to thwart the thwart the legitimate claims of Awami League to run the Government. In the meanwhile the President put off the National Assembly session, scheduled to be held on March 3, 1971. The reason given by the President was the so-called constitutional deadlock. The postponing of the National Assembly sessions confirmed the suspicion in the minds of the Awami League leadership, of the delaying tactics and the unwillingness on the part of the Government to transfer power. Postponement of the National Assembly sessions was criticized not only by the Awami League, the Government of Pakistan had to meet the opposition of the various other political parties

also.

Baluchistan Provincial National Awami Party (Wali Group) held a meeting at Quetta on March 4, 1971. The meeting termed the postponement for an indefinite period as "deplorable and undemocratic". "The present postponement", the meeting said, "has created a feeling of unrest amongst the people and complete chaos all over the country".²⁵

Jamaat leaders held a meeting at Lahore on March 13, 1971 and blamed Bhutto for aggravating the situation by threatening to boycott the National Assembly session on March 3.²⁶

In the meanwhile, Sheikh Mujib gave a call for nationwide hartal. He was supported by the other political parties too. Mujib called it a call for the 'emancipation of the Bengalees.' President Yahya Khan put forward the idea of Round Table Conference of the leaders of all the parliamentary groups in the National Assembly on March 10 in Dacca to resolve the so-called constitutional tangle. Mujib Rahman declined to attend the meeting, protesting against the use of armed forces by the Government to crush the hartal and the movement for autonomy. By March 6, 1971, the President appointed General Tikka Khan as Governor of East Pakistan.

25 The Dawn, 5 March 1971.

26 Ibid., 14 March 1971.

Hindsight reveals that the Government of Pakistan was embarking on a military solution to crush the democratic aspirations of the people of East Pakistan. General Tikka Khan was very well-known during those days as the blood-thirsty General of the Military Junta.

Later on March 7, 1971, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman announced that the Awami League would attend the Round Table Conference provided his four points demand was accepted.

They were:

1. Withdrawal of the Martial Law;
2. Sending of troops back to barracks;
3. Inquiry into the killings in hartal;
and
4. Transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people.

Civil disobedience movement started throughout East Pakistan after March 7, 1971. No taxation campaign started in full swing; the television, radio and the newspapers started supporting the movement, all educational institutions were closed.

In the meanwhile there were a few meetings between Sheikh Mujib and Z. A. Bhutto; but the meetings ended in deadlock; because of the rigid stand taken by both sides.

The non-violent, non-cooperation movement mustered popular support by leaps and bounds. Almost without exception, everyone from the highest to the lowest in the land

refused to carry out the biddings of those who had by now been characterised as alien rulers. Violent repressions on the part of the army had its natural impact on the civil disobedience movement, in the sense, the movement changed its character and became armed resistance. The postponement of the National Assembly Session for the second time on 25 March led matters to the breaking point. The Awami League lost what little hope it had in the military junta. With the declaration, Yahya Khan himself destroyed the last hope of a united Pakistan. On the night of March 25, 1971, Sheikh Mujib told a West Pakistani visitor that he had done his best to hold Pakistan together but Yahya was set on a military solution and that this was the end of Pakistan.²⁷

President Yahya Khan made a nation-wide broadcast on March 26, 1971. He termed the situation, 'a grave crisis and imposed strict martial law regulations. He banned all political activities throughout the country; Awami League as a political party was banned; Press censorship was imposed.²⁸ Thus, a reign of terror was unleashed throughout East Pakistan. During the early hours of March 27, 1971, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and other prominent leaders were arrested.

27 Guardian (Manchester), 5 June 1971.

28 The Dawn, 27 March 1971.

On the same day, i.e., 27 March 1971, Pakistan's Eastern Wing, rechristened herself as an independent state of Bangladesh. In fact, the step followed the crackdown of the army by the military Government of Pakistan. Civil war erupted in East Pakistan. A detailed study of the civil war, which later escalated into an Indo-Pak conflict is made in the subsequent chapter. One thing that becomes clear, is that the so-called constitutional deadlock that arose after the general elections of December 1970 was a deliberate contrivance on the part of Pakistan People's Party and the ruling Government of Pakistan. There was a definite convergence between the two in the face of East Bengal's threat to the hegemony both of the army and of Punjab.

It is appropriate in this connection to raise the question of the requirements of Pakistan's national security. What were the alternatives left to Pakistani decision-makers once the crisis was on?

President Yahya Khan had two options. He could keep the long term interests of unity and integrity of the country in view and came to terms with the leaders of East Bengal, accepting their demand for autonomy and ignoring the persistent efforts of Bhutto to undermine any such effort. He could also brush aside the long term considerations and opt for immediate returns by suppression of East Bengal in order to sustain the legitimacy of his regime.

President Yahya Khan had apparently chosen the latter

course. In doing so, he had unleashed uncontrollable historical forces. The people of East Bengal proclaimed their independence.

Chapter III

ESCALATION INTO WARFARE AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

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"One of the most prominent characteristics of an adolescent discipline is that it encompasses a large number of areas which have not been subjected to careful and comprehensive examination. International politics is such a discipline and the study of Crisis Management has long retained this Cinderella status within it."¹ So writes P. Williams. In the 1960s there was a realization among Super Powers for the need for managing crises short of nuclear war.

The relevance of the study of Crisis Management arises in the wake of the nuclear character of the game of international politics. The super powers have at their disposal such a lot of nuclear capabilities with their destructive character that any crisis that arises in their sphere has the chance of escalating into a nuclear warfare. Hence it is a basic assumption that international crises have to be managed short of war. In this connection, it is essential to make reference to the Cuba Missile Crisis, the parties to which were none other than the two super powers. Both Khrushchev and President Kennedy were fully aware that any mismanagement of the crisis and its consequent escalation into a nuclear confrontation would lead to disastrous consequences not only for themselves but for the entire mankind.

Referring to the suggestion by one group of advisers

1 P. Williams, "Crisis Management", International Relations (London), vol. IV, no. 3, May 1973, p. 261.

that the United States should decide on military action against the Soviets who had secretly placed missiles in Cuba, President Kennedy said: "it is not the first step that concerns me, but both sides escalating to the fourth and the fifth step - and we don't go to the sixth because there is no one around us to do so. We must remind ourselves we are embarking on a very hazardous course."²

Referring to those Council meetings which took place during the crisis period, Robert Kennedy writes in Thirteen Days, "those hours in the Cabinet room that Saturday afternoon, in October could never be erased from the minds of any of us. We saw as never before the meaning and responsibility involved in the power of the United States, the power of the President, the responsibility we had to people around the globe who had never heard of us, who had never heard of our country or the men sitting in that room determining their fate making a decision which would influence whether they would live or die"³. This particular quotation from Robert Kennedy points to the responsibility of the super powers to mankind as a whole. It brought about an awareness of the necessity for crisis management.

We may^{now} turn to definition of crisis, and the various approaches to the study of crisis.

2 Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days (London, 1968), pp. 96-97.

3 Ibid., p. 98.

Definition of Crisis

The age-old saying that 'where there are six economists, there are seven opinions', holds good when we discuss the question of definition of crisis. There has not been unanimity among the writers on a precise definitions of crisis. Coral Bell in her book The Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic Management defines/as "a situation which threatens to transform the existing nature of relationship".⁴

The same writer also looks upon crisis as "turning points" or "decision-points". Some others look upon the term as "interpellations between War and Peace".

However, there are two approaches to the study of crisis - the systemic and the decision-making or the perceptual.

The systemic approach to the study of crisis has writers like Oran Young as its advocates. According to this approach, a system is "a set of actors (e.g., nations, international organizations and so on) interacting with one another in established patterns and through designated structures".⁵ In any given international political system,

4 Coral Bell, The Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic Management (London, 1971), p. 9.

5 C. F. Hermann, ed., International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research (New York, 1972), p. 10.

critical variables must be maintained within certain limits or the instability of the system will be greatly increased perhaps to the point where a new system will be formed. A Crisis is defined as "a situation which disrupts the system or some part of the system (e.g., a sub-system such as an alliance or an individual actor)".⁶

One of the more complete systemic definition of crisis is offered by Oran Young in The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crisis, wherein he says, "An international crisis, then, is a set of rapidly unfolding events which raises the impact of destabilizing forces in the general international system or any of its sub-systems substantially above normal (i.e. average) levels and increases the likelihood of violence occurring in the system."⁷

An analysis of the systemic definition of Crisis leads us to the question as to whether all crises result in system-change. The answer is obviously 'no'. A distinction is to be made between 'system change' and 'non-system change' crises.⁸ "The point is", writes Hermann, "in some inherently unstable systems, the appearance of a single crisis might trigger of war and result in system-change. In other systems where effective regulatory mechanisms are devised, crises

6 Ibid.

7 Oran Young, The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crisis (Princeton, N.J., 1967),

8 Hermann, n. 5, p. 12.

might be repeatedly managed without resort to war/^{or}even if a war is fought, it may not result in system-change."

The nature of the international system also has its impact on the occurrence of crisis. According to Waltz, crises are frequent in the bi-polar system whereas it is not so in a multi-polar world. He also contends that "in a multi-polar world a nation's policy makers can create a crisis to further their objectives with the hope that opponents of the change will not coalesce in opposition. In a bi-polar system the permanency of opposing polar powers greatly increases the probability that any move to initiate a crisis will be countered. Thus two relevant hypothesis from the Waltz study are that the type of international system influences (1) the rate with which crisis occurs and (2) the probability of direct confrontation between actors when any system attempts to abruptly change significant systemic variables".

Decision-making approach to the study of crisis:

As the name itself suggests, central to the decision-making approach is the process by which decisions are made on questions of policy. Also important to this organizing framework are the persons who as individuals or in some collective capacity constitute the decision-making unit. The

9 Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bi-polar World", Daedalus, vol. 93, no. 3, 1964, p. 883.

decision-makers behave according to their interpretation of the situation and not according to its objective character as viewed by some theoretical omnipotent observer. It is in this connection that Professor J. L. Richardson says that 'the practitioner and the theorist have different interests. He says: "the practitioner is seeking policies that will 'work' in a specific, unprecedented and often confused situation..."¹⁰ Therefore, in attempting to explain how different kinds of situations influence the type of choice that is made, the analyst must interpret the situation as it is perceived by the decision-makers.

A crisis is an occasion for decision. The generally accepted definition of crisis, so far, from the decision-making or perceptive angle is given by Professor Hermann. According to him, "a situation is said to be a crisis if, and if only it (1) threatens one or more important goals of a state, (2) allows only a short time for decision before the situation is significantly transformed, and (3) occurs as a surprise to the policy-makers"¹¹. Thus the important components of crisis as spelled out by Hermann are: threat, time and surprise. Ole Holsti defines crisis as a situation of

10 J. L. Richardson, "Crisis Management: Theories and Models", a revised version of the paper read at the Seminar on Crisis Management, School of International Studies, New Delhi, p. 1.

11 Hermann, n. 5, p. 187.

unanticipated threat to important values and restricted
12
decision time."

Some of the characteristic effects which crises bring about on decision makers and the decision-making process are as follows:

(1) "Crisis brings about increased strain and stress on the decision-makers.

(2) Contraction in the number of persons exercising authority, i.e., in crisis situations, the number of decision-makers assuming a role in the decision-making unit will be reduced.

(3) In crisis, the number of alternatives to the situation that will be identified by the national-decision-makers will be reduced.

(4) Internal communication: In crises, the role of communication within the foreign policy agencies of a nation will increase.

(5) External communication: The rate of communication by a nation's decision makers to the international actors outside their country will increase.

(6) Frequency of actions: In crisis situations, the frequency with which a nation's decision-makers are likely

to take action in response to the situations increases.

(7) In a crisis as opposed to non-crisis situations decision-makers will tend to perceive their own range of alternatives to be more restricted than those of their adversaries.

(8) In a crisis, as opposed to a non-crisis situation, there is an increase in the prevalence of force and violence." ¹³

After analyzing both the systemic and the perceptive approaches to the study of crisis, it may be appropriate to remark that we cannot adhere strictly or rigidly to either of these approaches and define crisis on terms of it. Actually any definition of crisis has to take into account both the systemic and the perceptive elements, as the effect of a crisis would touch both the system and the decision-makers. In the light of this argument, a crisis may be defined as "an occurrence which not only poses threat and surprise to the decision-makers but in its extreme form brings about a transformation in the nature of relationship between or among the components of a system."

As regards classification of crisis, it may be pointed out that keeping in view the contemporary international system, a distinction should be made between crisis which occur in nuclear environments and those occurring in non-nuclear environments. It is not necessary that nuclear weapons be actually utilized for a nuclear contest to influence

the developments of crisis substantially. Whenever the possibility of nuclear devices being employed is present, their presence even if they are not used will greatly influence the motivations, attitudes and expectations of relevant decision-makers at all levels.

INSTRUMENTS AND TECHNIQUES OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT

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Coral Bell makes a distinction between the instruments and the techniques in the sense that the former indicates 'what is used', the latter 'how it is used'. Based on this distinction, she regards signalling as the basic instrument of crisis Management and the techniques are mostly ways of using or reading the signals. The definition of signal as given by the writer is "By signalling", I mean, "a threat or offer communicated to the other party or parties to the crisis"¹⁵. The author warns about the disastrous consequences of ambiguous signalling. She cites the example of how the Korean crisis precipitated into a war because of misleading or ambiguous signals by Dean Acheson when he was the U.S. Secretary of State.

Added to this, the author makes mention of the more straight forward and natural instruments that must seem

14 Coral Bell, n. 4, p. 73.

15 Ibid.

entitled to claim a role in Crisis Management; law, economic sanctions, intermediaries, arbitration, conciliation procedures and international institutions.

Writing about third party intervention, Oran A. Young defines intervention as "any action taken by an actor that is not a direct party to the Crisis that is designed to reduce or remove one or more of the problems of the bargaining relationship and therefore to facilitate the termination of the crisis itself--but the role is ultimately directed towards aiding the parties to a crisis to realize their own common or overlapping interests when various problems threaten to disrupt or severely downgrade their bargaining relationship-- finally, it should be noted that there is a real difference between 'regulating' and 'terminating' a crisis on the one hand and reaching a substantive settlement of the underlying issues. Especially in international conflicts, it may be possible to reach a real settlement only over an extended period of time. But third party intervention, may nevertheless, be of great importance in terminating a given crisis in the sense of reducing the threat of violence in the system and bringing the destabilizing impact of the crisis under control." ¹⁶

Some of the instruments of crisis Management as prescribed by the perceptual approach to the study of crisis are:
(a) perception, i.e. perception of the capabilities, attitudes

of the adversary; (b) a good system of intelligence and information flow; (c) communication; and (d) a viable system of alternatives.

Also appropriate in this connection is a study of the goals of crisis Management. What should be the goal of crisis management? Should it be war-avoidance or the maintenance of systemic stability? My own answer to this question is that a non-nuclear or conventional war may at times be unavoidable, but the regulatory arrangements or mechanisms in a system should be so established that a crisis would not disrupt the systemic stability. Maintenance of the stability of the system should be the prime goal of Crisis Management.

Lastly we may focus our attention on some of the objections to Crisis Management. There are some analysts who want 'crisis management' to be replaced by 'Coercive Diplomacy'. But this would be a too narrow definition. Coral Bell is right when she rejects this and says "in reality crisis management involves considerations of not only how and when to yield, but also how and when not to".¹⁷

J. L. Richardson also expresses his own doubts about the usage of the term Crisis Management. Writing about the difficulty in adhering scrupulously to the techniques enshrined in crisis management studies in practice he says, "in fact

17 Coral Bell, n. 4, p. 100.

there is no such set of techniques of crisis management, and thinking along these 'technocratic lines', if taken seriously would be extremely dangerous. On the other hand, the term suggests a distinction between the managers and the managed, and is readily perceived as 'a mechanism for preserving the existing global structure of power and status'. For these reasons it would be preferable to replace the term 'crisis management' by a less value-laden term, such as 'Crisis
18
Diplomacy'.

P. Williams helps to dispel certain assumptions in the earlier studies which led to erroneous and confusing conclusions that Crisis Management was equivalent to either "appeasement" or brinkmanship. Appeasement differs from crisis management in that it involves 'peace at any price' or surrender to aggression -- appeasement is the result of unilateral pacifism whereas Crisis Management is the result of perceptions on the part of all the major antagonists that they have an overriding common interest in making an agreement short of war while at the same time recognizing that there is room to bargain over the exact terms and nature of that agreement. In other words, Crisis Management requires a careful mixture of restraint and firmness on all sides if it is not to degenerate into pure aggressiveness or
19
appeasement."

18 Richardson, n. 10, p. 3.

19 P. Williams, n. 1, p. 265.

A NOTE ON LOCAL WAR

It is appropriate in this connection to make brief references to local war, the commitment of Super Powers and the freedom of action of local parties. "A local war is one", says Morton H. Halperin "in which the United States and the Soviet Union see themselves on opposing sides but in which the homelands of the two major powers do not come under attack." 20

Not every war in the post-war period has been a 'local war'. The Arab-Israeli war of 1948 was one of the largest post-war incidents of violence in which the Soviet Union and the United States never lined up on opposite sides. In other cases, Soviet-American opposition has played only a small role in the conflict. In the Suez Crisis of 1956, it was only when the Soviet Union made missile threats against Britain and France and the United States made counter-threats against the Soviet Union that the crisis became a potential local war. Similarly the Sino-Indian border dispute for a long time was not a 'local war', but became one in November 1962 when the United States began to supply military aid to the Indians.

As has been pointed out by George Modelski, some involvement of the major powers in local violence is almost inevitable, since at least the weaker party in the local struggle will be seeking outside aid. Once they see themselves in

local violence, the major powers must decide on the degree of participation or at least the degree to which they wish to comment themselves at this point."²¹

The process by which the major powers are drawn into a situation of local violence will depend largely on the way in which the violence breaks out and the nature of the local forces involved. When, as in the Taiwan Straits, one side is a Communist regime and the other an ally of the United States, the involvement of the two major powers is immediate and evident.

Can we consider, based on the above definition, the 1971 war between India and Pakistan as a local war? Were or were not the parties to the war using military weapons supplied to them by the Super Powers? Were the Super Powers finding themselves on opposite sides?

If one goes by the definition (of local war) as given above, one would have to conclude by saying that the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 can be called a local war, potential in nature, because of the obvious reason that the Soviet and American weapons were used by India and Pakistan respectively.

It is also appropriate in this connection to examine the potential of crisis management in situations like Bangladesh crisis. This may involve Indian decision-makers' perception

21 George Modelski, The International Relations of Internal War, Princeton, N.J., Research Monograph No. 11, 24 May 1961.

of American involvement in the crisis, specially Indo-Pakistan war.

The letter which Prime Minister Indira Gandhi wrote to President Nixon in the wake of the war definitely throws light on this aspect. "The tragic war", she wrote, "which is continuing, could have been averted, if during the nine months prior to Pakistan attack on us on December 3, the great leaders of the world had paid some attention to the fact of revolt, tried to see the reality of the situation and searched for a genuine basis for reconciliation. I wrote letters along these lines. I undertook a tour in quest of peace at a time when it was extremely difficult to leave the country in the hope of presenting to some of the leaders of the world the situation as I saw it. It was heart-breaking to find that while there was sympathy for the poor refugees, the disease itself was ignored.

War could have been avoided if the power influence and authority of all the states and above all of the U.S. had got Sheikh Mujibur Rahman released. Instead, we were told that a civilian administration was being installed. Every one knows that this civilian administration was a farce. Today the farce has turned into a tragedy."

The fact of the matter is that the rulers of Pakistan got away with the impression that they could do what they liked because no one, even the United States would choose to take a public position that while Pakistan's integrity was certainly

sacrosanct, human rights, liberty were no less so and that there was a necessary inter-connection between the inviolability of states and the contentment of their people.

It is amply evident from Mrs Gandhi's letter to President Nixon that the potentialities for managing the crisis in the early stages were quite ripe and that it was only due to the callous attitude of Pakistan Government and a unilateral posture of the rest of the world that the crisis resulted on a full-scale war between Pakistan and India.

Chapter IV

**APPLICATION OF THE TECHNIQUES AND PRINCIPLES
OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT TO THE BANGLADESH
CRISIS**

Chapter IV

APPLICATION OF THE TECHNIQUES AND PRINCIPLES OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT TO THE BANGLADESH CRISIS

A) Pakistan and Bangladesh Crisis

Crisis decision-making differs from the ordinary process of decision-making in several respects in the sense that in times of crisis, with its danger to the national goals, the highest level of Government officials make the decisions. C. F. Hermann¹ has summed up the effects of crisis on the decision-makers of any Government in three terms: a) Threat, b) Time and c) Surprise. As any crisis poses threat to the members of the decision-making unit, limits their time and poses a surprise to them by the occurrence of it, crisis decision makers have to conform to certain techniques and principles in matters of decision-making. Some of these principles may be studied as under:

1. Perception: When relations between and among nations deteriorate to the point of crisis, a threat is perceived by the political actors either to the frontiers of the nation or its vital territorial interests or its cherished values. A crisis decision-maker is expected, as a first step to perceive the capability of his adversary, or as Robert Kennedy² says in his famous book Thirteen Days, to put one

1 C. F. Hermann, ed., International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research (New York, 1972), p. 187.

2 Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days (New York, 1969).

self in the other man's shoes.' Perception includes the ability to gauge not only the military strength that the adversary is in possession of but also his attitudes, the course of action he is going to undertake, the level of popular support he is getting in case of a conflict and so on. Based on such perception, the decision-maker has to prepare himself to meet the situation. For instance in the 1950s Indian leaders' perception of China was that China is a great power, friendly to India and that once India and China get rid of foreign domination and internal disunity, they inevitably become strong and that there is nothing to prevent them. But the Indian leadership soon realized in the early sixties-in the wake of the armed conflict between the two countries - that their perception of China was entirely incorrect.

When we apply this first principle to the Bangladesh Crisis of 1971 and study as to how far perception ~~of~~ influenced the decision-makers of Pakistan Government, the fact becomes easily clear that the military Government headed by Yahya Khan and his Subordinate Generals failed to perceive the enormity of the capabilities and the popular support that the Awami League commanded in its fight for justice for East Pakistan. The decision on military solution was more a byproduct of over-confidence ~~of~~ that overtook the decision-makers in Pakistan.

2. Intelligence and Information: Crisis decision-making also requires an excellent system of intelligence and information

flow about the activities, the attitudes and capacities of the adversary. In the particular case selected for study here, it is well known that the Pakistan Intelligence services failed to supply the Government with the actual position in East Pakistan. The intelligence reports before the December General Election that the Awami League would be able to get only 115-120 seats in the National Assembly and that no party would get majority proved utterly wrong and baseless after the results of the General Elections were announced and the Awami League emerged out to be the single majority party in the National Assembly. Again when the Military Government unleashed a reign of terror in East Pakistan and when there were mass-killings and arrest of the leaders, we find a reference to Bhutto blaming the Intelligence for its failure to keep track of the Awami League leaders and for allowing them to escape.

3. Communication: In times of crisis, the communication - both internal and external - would/increased by leaps and bounds. The parties to the crisis are expected to have a sound system of communication which would help them to thrash out the confusions and doubts that exist between the two and

3 Mohammed Ayoob & K. Subrahmanyam, The Liberation War (New Delhi, 1972), p. 140.

4 Ibid.

clear the way for proper understanding and appreciation of the nature of the problem that they are confronted with. Once again reference should be made to the immense use of the hot line between Kremlin and Washington by Khrushchev and President Kennedy in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

4. Framing of Alternatives: Crisis Management, to be effective demands that the decision-makers should conceive alternative solutions before hand to see that the crisis is effectively managed. Effective alternatives were very well framed during the Cuban missile crisis, on the American side - military action or blockade - and ultimately President Kennedy decided upon blockade as in his own view - which was very much correct - the costs of military action would be heavier than the benefits it was going to confer on them. The gain and loss or cost-benefit ratio in foreign relations is to be measured in the last analysis by the nation's own capability and the risks that capability permits of taking. Crisis decision-making is finally the choice of the best alternative, the course of action that would bring in the maximum results with the minimum of costs.

In this connection, it is most appropriate to make a study of the decisions which the Military Government in Pakistan took as measures to solve the crisis.

1. "Putting off the National Assembly session which was supposed to be held on March 3, 1971 to a later date.

Speaking to the nation over the Pakistan Radio, General Yahya Khan said, 'the position briefly is that the major party of West Pakistan, namely, the Pakistan People's Party, as well as certain other parties, have declared their intention not to attend the National Assembly session on the 3 March 1971. In addition, the general situation of tension created by India has further complicated the whole position. I have, therefore, decided to postpone the summon-⁵ing of the National Assembly to a later date.'

2. The decision to take military action against the freedom fighters;

3. The decision to put off the National Assembly meeting for the second time;

4. The decision to ban the Awami League as a political party and arrest Sheikh Mujibur Rahman;

5. The decision to unleash a reign of terror in East Pakistan and mass murder, etc.;

6. Banning of all political activities throughout the nation; and

7. Imposition of press censorship and the declaration of Martial Law regulations in pursuance of these decisions."⁶

5 Morning News (Karachi & Dacca), 2 March 1971.

6 Bangladesh Documents, vol. 1, New Delhi, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.

An analysis of these decisions makes it quite clear that the Military Government of Pakistan did not care to conceive alternative solutions at all. On the other hand, it decided on the military solution as a final measure to manage the crisis.

"It is difficult to assert that the entire junta held a single view on the course of action to be adopted. It is now obvious that General Yakub and Admiral Ahsan refused to go along with the plan to use force and consequently had to be removed,"⁷ write Mohd. Ayooob and Subrahmaniam.

"The accounts given by Colonel Osmany, Major Zia and various other leaders would confirm that these preparations were going on for some time and they came to suspect these plans a few days earlier. All available evidence also points to the fact that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman himself was aware of these plans and of even the timing of the action and warned all the senior leaders of the Awami League to get out of Dacca in time. They succeeded in doing so...."⁸

The military junta, it is observed, by many writers on the subject, had come to decide on taking military action thinking that if they killed a few thousand Bengalis, the movement would be cowed down. The crisis later proved they were simply wrong in their assessments.

7 Mohammed Ayooob & K. Subrahmanyam, n. 3, p. 144.

8 Ibid., pp. 138-39.

Our study of the crisis decisions should also take into consideration the pressures and influences, internal as well as external, which worked on the military junta to arrive at these decisions. Internally the influence of Bhutto, leader of the Pakistan People's Party and the subordinate Generals who worked under General Yahya Khan carried a lot of weight on Yahya Khan. Most diplomats credit Yahya Khan with sincerity in his promise to transfer power and some still feel that had he been his own master, the army repression would not have been ordered. But major decisions in Pakistan were made by a junta of several Generals, most of them hardliners and though Yahya Khan was the Commander-in-Chief, he could not act independently. Mention should be made of General Tikka Khan, the blood-thirsty Governor of East Pakistan. The influence of Bhutto on Yahya Khan was quite considerable. There was obviously a convergence of interests between the army rulers and the forces represented by Bhutto. "While there seemed to be an apparent contradiction between the interests represented by Bhutto and those of the Army, in actual fact, the two interests were converging especially in the fact of East Bengal's threat to the hegemony both of the army and of Punjab".⁹

⁹ Mohammed Ayoob, Sisir Gupta, et al., Bangladesh: A Struggle for Nationhood (Delhi, 1971), p. 37.

External influence was also quite substantial on the military regime to take to military action on the freedom fighters. The international scenario was such that the United States and China had solidly stood by Pakistan. One should recall at this juncture the statement of the U.S. Secretary of State wherein he said that in case of a war between Pakistan and India, India should not expect the United States' support. It was only in these circumstances that India signed the Treaty of Peace, Cooperation and Friendship with the U.S.S.R. conforming the support of the two nations to the struggle the East Pakistanis had waged against the military rule.

The last and the final principle which the crisis decision-makers have to keep in mind is that their decisions should be able to muster domestic support, i.e., the backing of the masses and the political groups. When we apply this principle to the decisions that were taken by the Military junta, it becomes clear that it failed to get the support of the masses and the various political parties. The statement issued during the period by the leaders of Punjab's Pakistan's Front, National Awami Party (Wali Group) points to the fact that they were in complete disagreement with the decisions taken by the Military junta. Jamaat leaders blamed Bhutto for the crisis in press statements issued on ¹⁰ March 13, 1971 at Lahore. Air Marshal (Retd.) Asghar Khan, 10 The Dawn (Karachi), 14 March 1971.

addressing a press conference on March 4, 1971 at Karachi, said "transfer of power to Awami League now is only solution of crisis."¹¹

After making a study of the decisions that were taken by the Military Government in Pakistan in the light of the principles and instruments laid down in crisis management studies, my own conclusion is that the Pakistani decision-makers failed to perceive the dimensions of the challenge to them by East Pakistan led by Awami League. Not only were the decisions not in consonance with the principles laid down by crisis management studies but also it failed - it was a natural corollary to the bad decisions taken - in preventing the crisis from getting out of the hand and escalate into war. Actually things did not end there. The disastrous effects of those decisions became manifest in the break-up of the political system of Pakistan. It resulted in the emergence of Bangladesh as a new political entity. This was the biggest blow to the political system of Pakistan as a whole. Pakistan is still paying for it in the sense that it is struggling hard to re-establish herself as a political entity in South Asia.

B) India and the Bangladesh Crisis

Any crisis would have actors to its occurrence. As such in the case of Bangladesh crisis, to say that the actors

¹¹ Ibid., 5 March 1971.

were only East Pakistan and the Government of Pakistan would not be appropriate. India was definitely a party to the crisis and for purposes of convenience we may say that India got involved in the crisis exactly at the moment refugees started crossing the Indian borders in Punjab. Even otherwise India could not remain quiet and unperturbed when the most brutal genocide on mankind was taking place next to her doors. Prime Minister Mrs Gandhi, speaking in the Lok Sabha on the Bangladesh situation, on May 24, 1971 said: "These twenty-three years and more, we have never tried to interfere with the internal affairs of Pakistan, even though they have not exercised similar restraint. And even now we do not seek to interfere in any way. But what has actually happened? What was claimed to be an internal problem of Pakistan, has also become an internal problem for India. We are, therefore, entitled to ask Pakistan to desist immediately from all actions which it is taking in the name of domestic jurisdiction and which have vitally affected the peace and well-being of millions of our own citizens. Pakistan cannot be allowed to seek a solution of its political and other problems at the expense of India and on Indian soil." ¹² It is relevant to quote in this connection,

12 Bangladesh Documents, vol. I, n. 6, pp. 673-74.

Ajit Bhattacharjea's article "Stakes in Bangladesh" in a book published by the Institute of Indian Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, entitled Bangladesh: Background and Prospects. He says: "...It (India) cannot afford to stand by and watch the sufferings of the people of East Bengal. It has much to gain if a viable friendly Bangladesh emerges; it has even more to lose if West Pakistan effectively reoccupies the area or if the fighting degenerates into a protracted guerilla warfare. Considerations of geography, history, culture and economics give India a vital stake in the outcome of the struggle..."

Thus it is essential for India to do whatever is required to end the war in favour of Bangladesh governed by the political and military leaders now at the helm. The stakes for it are almost as high as during the border conflict in 1962 and the war in 1965. In one vital respect - in the conjunction of secular and national values - they are perhaps higher.

The major gains to India in the emergence of a viable Bangladesh include:

1. A potential enemy on both its borders will be replaced by a far weaker enemy on one side and a friend on the other.
2. The Kashmir question will be rid of what remains of its stings, domestic as well as international.
3. The claim of secular democracy to be the best

governing system for multi-racial developing countries will be strengthened; and the myth of an enduring nationhood based on religion will be exploded.

4. The cynical role of China, which has come out in support of the military regime in Islamabad, in the region will be exposed and countered. The appeal for aid to India addressed by Maulana Bhashani, the veteran leftist East-Bengal leader who was regarded as pro-Chinese, shows the shift in sentiment caused by Peking's reactions.

If Bangladesh goes under the struggle becomes confused, the pendulum will swing in the opposite direction. The Pakistan-China axis against India will be strengthened. Peking's policies will be regarded as irresistible secularism and democracy will be on the retreat and India will have a chaotic, embittered and impoverished popularity of some 75 million on its eastern border."¹³

These reflections of Ajit Bhattacharjea gives a clear insight into the attitudes of the Indian leadership to the Bangladesh crisis.

Wayne Wilcox in his book Emergence of Bangladesh says: "there were two other factors of major importance in the Indian Government's review of the problem. The first was the danger that the Awami League leadership would disintegrate

13 Ajit Bhattacharjea, Bangladesh : Background and Prospects (New Delhi, Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, 1971), pp. 52-53.

and that the League would be transformed into either an all-Bengali regional nationalist movement or a guerilla Communist movement or a guerilla communist movement increasingly dependent upon China or both."¹⁴

The other factor in New Delhi calculation was the regional strategic balance. Ever since 1954, when Pakistan started getting armed assistance from the United States, Pakistan had consistently involved other great powers in the subcontinent, most recently and dangerously China. It was a golden opportunity for India to prove her strength and neutralize the Pakistani threat.

Added to this, India enjoyed stability in the domestic field too. The elections of March 1971 restored central authority in Indian society and created conditions for massive effort to bring about social change and economic development in the country. For nearly five years, political uncertainty and a sense of despair had bedevilled Indian public life. The emergence of Mrs Gandhi as the universally accepted leader of this country created new hopes, particularly among the common people of India who only wanted to feel confident that the nation was moving in the right direction. Mrs Gandhi's policies regarding Bangladesh received

14 Wilcox Wayne A., Emergence of Bangladesh: Problems and Opportunities for a Redefined American Policy in South Asia (Washington, 1973), p. 34.

overwhelming support from all corners of the nation.

The decision-making group in the wake of the crisis consisted of a handful of persons consisting of Mrs Gandhi, the Prime Minister, D. P. Dhar, P. N. Haksar, T. N. Kaul rather than the Foreign Minister. Others whom the Prime Minister took into confidence at different points of time and different degrees were the service-chiefs, and the Ministers in charge of Defence and Finance. Bhabani Sen Gupta points out that "within a few days of the military crack-down on the Awami League, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi took three crucial crisis decisions which more or less laid the course of future developments as far as this country was concerned. She ordered (i) the border security force to let the East Pakistani refugees cross over to India; (ii) declared that the refugees would be kept separately the camps for a temporary period until they could return to their land in security and honour, and (iii) permitted the Awami League leadership to operate politically from Indian territory. These three decisions conveyed one political message to Pakistan, namely that the Pakistan Government must settle the East Pakistani crisis with the Awami League if it wanted India to remain neutral to the crisis."

15 Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Crisis Management: An Introductory Framework", read in the Seminar on Crisis Management, conducted by the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, p. 11.

Wilcox writes: "During the summer and early autumn, the Indian Government began planning strategies to minimise the risks involved in her interference, while following a declaratory policy aimed at building pressure on Pakistan to deliver a political settlement. It was a classic diplomacy at its best."¹⁶

When the crisis took a serious turn because of mismanagement by the military government of Pakistan, somewhere between July and September Mrs Gandhi took a series of decisions which are again very well summed up by Professor Bhabani Sen Gupta in his paper. They were: (1) "The Bangladesh Mukti Bahini was allowed to operate from Indian soil receive training in India; (2) the service chiefs were asked to prepare contingency plans for a possible war with Pakistan; (3) in order to counter the newly forged detente between the United States and China, India moved closer to the USSR and signed the treaty of peace and friendship; (4) no formal diplomatic recognition was to be conferred on the Bangladesh government; and (5) messages were sent to President Yahya Khan that a political settlement between him and Sheikh Mujib would be acceptable to India even if this meant that Bangladesh remained part of Pakistan. Interest in this cluster of crisis decision was readiness to compromise as well as to go to the extreme, depending upon the evolving circumstances.

16 Wilcox Wayne, A., n. 14, p. 36.

For the first time in Indian crisis management, one indefinable alternatives none of which sacrificed India's best interests."¹⁷

It is appropriate to recall some of the statements made by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in the Indian Parliament during those days. In one of her speeches, she said: "We are concerned with one thing and one thing only - our national interest and security and naturally that of the heroic people of Bangladesh. That is why it is important to act calmly. The situation is far too grave for anything else."¹⁸ Answering questions on the issue of recognition of Bangladesh she said: "It is, as my colleagues have said, constantly under review. We are not waiting to see what other countries will do in the matter. Whatever decision we take in this or other issues is guided by our own independent assessment of the situation and how our interests in the broadest sense are served."¹⁹

As regards the time, it should be pointed out that the calendar was decisively in favour of India's military planners concerned with rapid advances. The monsoon rains end in late summer and the period of maximum danger from

17 Bhabani Sen Gupta, n. 15, p. 13.

18 Bangladesh Document, vol. 1, n. 6, p. 681.

19 Ibid., pp. 681-82.

floods is August-September. The harvest generally occurs in October and the dry season begins in November. In short, November is the best month for battle both climatically and economically. It was the month that allowed the Indians to exploit their superiority in the air and with force.

In late October, Mrs Gandhi undertook a 'damage limitation tour', to use a term which Wilcox uses in his book, to the capitals of the Aid India Consortium of the World Bank. The purpose of this was to appraise these governments of the burden placed on India by the five million East Pakistani refugees. Mrs Gandhi's position was clear. India had exercised great forbearance and had undergone great sacrifice while an oppressive tyranny had committed atrocities and had suppressed a genuine national movement. India was not in a position to bear these burdens any longer. Unless massive assistance for the refugees and for India was forthcoming and unless it was coupled with a settlement in East Bengal that would lead to the refugees returning home, India would act militarily to create that settlement.

When we study the Indian Crisis decisions during the period from the point of view of the principles and techniques that are envisaged in crisis management studies, it becomes amply clear that Indian crisis decisions conformed to an appreciable extent to Crisis decision making principles. Indian leaders' perception of the capabilities, atti-

tudes and motivations of her adversary was quite clear. The leadership had accurately perceived the escalation of the civil war in Pakistan into an Indo-Pak confrontation, and the decisions the leadership took were so matching that the Prime Minister and her senior cabinet colleagues could even afford to be away from the capital when Indian forces were swung into action to the Pakistani attacks. Their instructions had been precise and clear. The Intelligence agencies worked quite up to the mark. A study of the decisions as analyzed already clearly points to the framing of alternative solutions by the Indian leadership. Iqbal Narian, writing on "Bangladesh issue and the Indian political system" in a book²⁰ edited by S. P. Varma and Virendra Narain Pakistan Political System in Crisis, says, "the objective was liberation of Bangladesh so that the refugees could go back ... limited and balanced objectives could in turn impart a sharp focus to military strategy and help her to take a consistent stand. It is equally well to remember that her handling of the situation had been marked by confidence; it has been patient but firm, bold but not reckless. She could anticipate moves and control initiatives. She could neither be hustled into a premature military action nor she could be made to recognize Bangladesh before the situation was ripe for it. The unilateral declaration

20 Bangladesh Documents, vol. 1, n. 6, p. 681.

of ceasefire, which was in the logic of balanced and limited objectives, is a tribute to her (Prime Minister's) statesmanship.²¹ In sum, she appears to have mastered the style of impassioned crisis management which is epitomized in her classic letter written to President Nixon. Mohammed Ayooob and Subrahmanyam have also expressed similar views.²² They wrote in The Liberation War, that the political-military coordination appears to have worked out very satisfactorily.²³ G. K. Reddy writing in Hindu in the wake of the Bangladesh crisis seems to credit Mrs Gandhi with good leadership. According to him, she could not only keep the domestic public opinion in control but - more interestingly - could get the unstinted support of the people. Mohammed Ayooob, Sisir Gupta and others say in Bangladesh: A Struggle for Nationhood, that "the struggle for Bangladesh is a milestone in the process of secularization and radicalization of politics in the subcontinent."²⁴

The same writers are further of the opinion that.

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- 21 Iqbal Narian, "Bangladesh issue and the Indian political system" in S. P. Varma & Virendra Narian, eds., Pakistan Political System in Crisis: Emergence of Bangladesh, 1972, p. 212.
- 22 Mohammed Ayooob & K. Subrahmanyam, n. 3, p. 273.
- 23 G. K. Reddy, "Crisis Diplomacy and Decision Making", The Hindu (Madras), 8 June 1971.
- 24 Mohammed Ayooob, Sisir Gupta & others, Bangladesh: A Struggle for Nationhood (New Delhi, 1971), The Preface to the book.

"East Pakistan's decision to transfer itself into Bangladesh is one of the most momentous events in the history of the subcontinent, possibly in the history of the entire third world. Not only does it explode the two nation theory, it has brought into question the whole process of nation-building as it has operated with local variations in most parts of Asia and Africa."²⁵

1971 was an appreciable crisis management from the Indian side in one more sense in that it brought about a restructuring of the political map of the subcontinent. India was largely instrumental for the creation of Bangladesh, as a new political entity in South Asia. Not just this; the 1971 crisis also "helped in restoring the health of the Indian political system substantially eroded since the 1967 election."²⁶

In a way the 1971 crisis liberated not only Bangladesh from the clutches of military rule but also helped change the political system of Pakistan as well. It helped Bhutto emerge as the leader of Pakistan and introduce democratic system in Pakistan. Mohammed Ayoob and Subrahmanyam have adequately summed up the revolutionary change that the crisis brought about when they say "the December war of 1971 liberated

25 Ibid.

26 Bhabani Sen Gupta, n. 15, p. 12.

Bangladesh from Pakistani colonialism and Pakistan from obscurantist military and administrative statism. For the first time since 1947, the political process has reasonable opportunities to develop in that country".

27 Mohammed Ayob & K. Subrahmanyam, n. 3, p. 271.

APPENDICES

'Six-Point Formula - Our Right to Live'
by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as the President of the
Awami League on March 23, 1966 (Text)

I have placed before the country a 6-point programme as basic principles of a firm solution of the country's inter-wing political and economics problems. I expected and in fact was ready to welcome criticism. But instead of criticizing the programmes and pointing out its defects, if there be any, a class of people has started hurling abuses at and ascribing disruptionist motive to me. Normally I would ignore these vilifications, firstly because these abusive voices are too familiar, these grimacing faces are too well-known, and these sallying patterns are too old to deserve anything but such ignorance; secondly because I have no manner of doubt that my 6-point programme has truly reflected the mind and correctly represented the demands of fifty five million East Pakistanis of their right to live. Neither have I any doubt that all right-thinking patriotic elements of West Pakistan agree with me on these points. This has been amply demonstrated by the newspaper writings and reports, statements and speeches by all sections of the intelligentsia, students and workers. This country-wide tremendous support to the 6-point programme is spontaneous. It is spontaneous because these demands are no new points invented afresh by me or any individual, but are in reality longstanding demand of the people and pledges of their leaders awaiting fulfilment for decades.

This being the case, I am confident that the mischievous propaganda and motivated campaign carried on by the vested interests through their agents and protectors will fail to mislead our people. They will surely not forget that whenever in the past any demand was made by East Pakistanis, however, small simple and reasonable it might be, these beneficiaries and agents of vested interests kicked up the self-same dust by raising the well-known cries of 'Islam in danger', 'disruption of Pakistan' and 'Sovereign Bengal' etc. It was the same set of people who discovered 'hidden hand of India' in our simplest demand for inclusion of Bengali as a State Language along with Urdu. These are the people who brazenly dubbed our Shere-e-Bangal as a traitor and incarcerated our beloved leader Suhrawardy on a fantastic charge of wrecking Pakistan with the help of foreign money. Nothing is too mean for them to achieve their selfish objective which is perpetuation of their exploitation of the people of East Pakistan. I know, our people is quite aware of these events not to very distant past.

But I also know that the mischief-making potentialities of these enemies of the people are inexhaustible; that their resources are unlimited; that they are a multi-colour variety of human species with sub-human conscience. It is this variety who will be found in large number in the camp of the ruling coterie in the name of 'unity, faith and discipline'; they will be found in larger number in the opposition camp

for the sake of 'Islam and democracy'. But wherever they may be, in whatever colour, under whichever garb, they actually belong to one and the same camp, that is, the camp of the enemies of the people. They are thus solidly united in their attitude of denial towards East Pakistan. So, naturally they will leave no stone unturned to achieve their objective as they have done in the past. Whenever it suited their purpose to think that the people of East Pakistan were secretly inclined towards communism, they turned the stone of American aid and assistance by signing military pacts to fight communism and thereby save East Pakistan from secessionist design engineered by the communists. If, on the other hand, it suited their convenience to imagine that East Pakistan was too much wedded to Western democracy and too much attached to U.S.A., they hastened to turn the stone of aid and assistance of communist China to save East Pakistan from falling a prey to dollar imperialism. So on this occasion also they will come to the field to fight 6-point programme just as they did to fight 21-point programme in the past. They have, in fact, already taken the field with varieties of weapons brandished by different heroes of numerous battle fields. The target is the same; it is the 6-point. Therefore, it is quite in the fitness of things that President Ayub, Choudhury Mohammad Ali and Moulana Maududi, outwardly three avowed mutual enemies, wielding their respective weapons from three antipodal horizons, are aiming poisoned arrows the same

target of the 6-point.

I, therefore, deem it my duty to issue this booklet as an explanatory note to the 6-point programme and fervently appeal to the democratic forces in general, and the Awami Leaguers in particular, to spread out in the country and carry the message of the 6-point to every hearth and home. Now that the 6-point programme has been formally adopted by the Awami League, it has undoubtedly become the national demand of the people, particularly the people of East Pakistan. I hope they will find this booklet useful in their confrontations with the agents of the vested interests who are likely to be lying in ambush everywhere.

POINT 1

In this point I have recommended as follows:

The Constitution should provide for a Federation of Pakistan in its true sense on the basis of the Lahore Resolution, and Parliamentary form of Government with supremacy of Legislature directly elected on the basis of universal adult franchise.

It will be seen that this point consists in the following seven ingredients, viz: (a) Pakistan shall be a Federation, (b) it shall be based on Lahore Resolution, (c) its Government shall be of Parliamentary form, (d) it must be responsible to the Legislature, (e) the Legislature must be supreme,

(f) it must be directly elected and (g) election must be on the basis of universal adult franchise.

Let the opponents of 6-point programme speak out. Which of these seven ingredients are they opposed to? Let the people know who are federalists and who are unitarists. Those who are unitarists are definitely against Lahore Resolution. Conversely, those who are opposed to Lahore Resolution are definitely unitarists. So let it be decided once for all who own and who do not own the Lahore Resolution by which Pakistan was created and is rightly called the Pakistan Resolution. The people who disown Lahore Resolution disown Pakistan itself. It is evidently those people who did not raise their little finger in the struggle for Pakistan but subsequently jumped on it to grab power after it was created with the blood and tears of the people. These opportunists and job-hunters cannot naturally have any regard for or attachment to the sanctity of such a historic Resolution which brought about a revolution in the subcontinent and created Pakistan. Even amongst those who swear by the Pakistan Resolution, there are some pseudo-federalists. They pay lip-service to the Lahore Resolution but disregard it by speaking against the very fundamental principle of Federation and by introducing extra-political controversies. This confusion has been further confounded by the power that be by forcible addition of political aberrations like basically controlled democracy. It was against such future personal

likes and dislikes, whims and caprices, hunger and thirst for power of individuals, that the Lahore Resolution was pledged as a guarantee by the creators of Pakistan under the able guidance of Qaid-i-Azam. It will be sheer political dishonesty to deviate from Lahore resolution after Pakistan was created by people's votes obtained on the basis of that Resolution. If it is now found necessary to so deviate for the sake of stability and integrity of Pakistan itself, the people will certainly agree to such changes or even complete reversal. But in any event it is the people who will decide and not any body else. As far as the people of East Pakistan are concerned they in the 1954 general election overwhelmingly voted for a constitution based on the Lahore Resolution. If, however, any body has any doubt about their present attitude due to lapse of long twelve years, we are prepared to face another referendum on the issue. Until that is done by a specific referendum on universal adult suffrage the Lahore resolution and all its corollaries remain the Magna Carta of the people of Pakistan, and the rulers and the leaders are bound to give them a Constitution based on the Resolution.

POINT 2

This point recommends as follows:

Federal Government shall deal with only two subjects, viz: Defence and Foreign Affairs, and all other residuary subjects shall vest in the Federating States.

Let us dispassionately discuss whether a two-subject Centre will be sufficiently strong to be a respectable Federation. It should be borne in mind that what makes a Federation strong is not heaps of subjects under it. A Federation becomes strong by the loyalty and affection in which it is held by the people in peace and the allegiance they owe and obedience they show it in war. The happy and strong people represented through efficient and strong units that make the Federation, are the real source of its strength irrespective of the number of subjects dealt with by it. Indeed, a State which serves the base rather than the apex is really the strongest. It is now an well established principle of political science that decentralization rather than centralization makes the work of a State efficient both in the administrative and in the developmental spheres. It is also a well recognized principle of Federation that only those subjects should be in the Federal list which can be jointly managed more efficiently and profitably. It is the same principle that is underlying the system of Local Self-Government like District Councils and Municipalities. The very concept of Federation is based on the maxim of unity in diversity and union without over-centralization.

It was on this principle that in 1946 the Cabinet Mission proposed an Indian Federation with only three subjects, viz: Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communication. Both

the Congress and the Muslim League accepted the Cabinet Plan. The fact that ultimately it did not materialize due to a hitch elsewhere is a different matter and quite irrelevant to the issue now before us. Now, the British Government by proposing the Plan and the Congress and the Muslim League by accepting it have all demonstrated their agreement on the feasibility of a Federation with only three subjects. The only difference between the Cabinet Plan and my proposal is that I have given two subjects instead of three given in the Cabinet Plan. Even that difference is only apparent and not real as will be seen in my explanation to the Point 3 given later on. That explanation will show that I too have given three subjects to the Centre and not two. Only I have recommended Currency in place of Communication as had been earlier done in the famous 21-point programme. I have omitted Communication for obvious reasons. The basic principle on which subjects are handed over to a Federation, as has been said earlier, is the oneness and indivisibility of the interest of the federating units in the subjects concerned. In the case of an undivided Indian Federation, Communication was really such a subject. In it, all the federating units would have been commonly interested and could have been more efficiently and profitably run if jointly managed by the Federation. An unbroken railway line and a non-stop through railway train could have run from Khybar to Chittagong. This would have been so because of the geographical contiguity.

Not so Pakistan. Pakistan being comprised of two geographical units separated by over a thousand miles of foreign territory, cannot possibly have any unbroken line of communication between the two wings. The two wings being themselves two compact geographical areas, must have their own system of communication separately organized and managed. It can, therefore, never be a Federal subject. By transferring the railways to the Provinces though after prolonged procrastination the present regime has reluctantly admitted the hard fact of geography. The same will have to be done also in the case of Post and Telegraphs and all other branches of communication.

In this connection another point need be clarified. Here I have recommended designation of the federating units as 'states' instead of 'provinces' as is now done. This very mention of the word 'state' is liable to be mischievously misinterpreted by the unitarist and pseudo-federalists. They will tell the unwary public: "Look, Mujib is wanting independent States." This would be viciously wrong. Everywhere in different Federations of the world federating units are called 'states' and not 'provinces'. U.S.A., U.S.S.R., Federal Germany, Federation of Malaysia, and last of all our neighbour India, all have designated their units as 'states' instead of 'provinces'. Our next door neighbours like West Bengal and Assam are 'states' of Indian Union and not 'provinces'. That designation of Indian provinces has not

rendered their Union loose or their Central Government weak. If Assam and West Bengal can have the dignity and honour of being called 'states' without impairing the solidarity of Bharati Union, why can't we have the same dignity and honour without impairing the solidarity of Pakistan Federation? Why are our rulers so allergic to our dignity?

POINT 3

In this point, I have recommended either of the following measures with regard to our Currency, viz.

A. Two separate but freely convertible currencies for two wings may be introduced, or

B. One currency for the whole country may be maintained. In this case, effective constitutional provisions are to be made to stop flight of capital from East to West Pakistan. Separate Banking Reserve is to be made and separate fiscal and monetary policy to be adopted for East Pakistan.

From the above it will be seen that I have not recommended the straightway taking of Currency out of the Federal list. If my recommendation contained in B above is accepted, Currency remains a Central subject. In this case, the only difference is that I have recommended the creation of separate Reserve Banks for two wings in a Federal Reserve System as obtains in U.S.A. According to this arrangement, the State Bank of Pakistan will have two Reserve Banks for two

wings. The currency for East Pakistan shall be issued through the East Pakistan Reserve Bank and shall be marked 'East Pakistan' or simply 'Dacca'. Similarly, West Pakistan currency shall be issued through West Pakistan Reserve Bank and shall be marked 'West Pakistan' or simply 'Lahore'.

This is the only way by which we can save East Pakistan from such economic ruination by effectively stopping flight of capital from this wing to the other. The geographical separateness has made the two wings inso facto two economic units. An economic convulsion, either for the better or for the worse, in one wing has no corresponding convulsion in the other wing. So progress and development in the one does not in the least benefit the other. These economic incidents are quite independent of each other in the two wings. Expenditure in one cannot create employment in the other. This economic independence and separateness of the two wings is correctly reflected in their respective price and wage structures including the price of gold. This is what is known as the absence of mobility of labour and capital. This immobility of capital, however, does not prevent flight of capital. This is how it happens under the present dispensation:

We are supposed to belong to one indivisible economy. We have one currency. There is no distinguishing mark to show the currency circulation wingwise. We are under only one Finance Ministry situated in and operating from West Pakistan

presided over always by a West Pakistani Minister formulating financial, fiscal and monetary policies through one single Central Bank, that is, the State Bank of Pakistan, also located in West Pakistan, issuing money minted, coined and printed in West Pakistan. This money after travelling and meandering in circulation throughout the country journeys back to and rests in accumulation in West Pakistan. Along with the head office of the Government Central Bank the head offices of all the joint-stock Banks, except one or two small ones of very recent origin, are also located in West Pakistan. The seat of the Government being located in West Pakistan, head offices of the three Armed Forces, all Foreign Missions and almost all foreign and national trades and industries organizations are situated in that wing. As a result, all money transactions done in East Pakistan are instantaneously transferred to West Pakistan. All share money of joint-stock companies, all deposits of Banks, their security money, all Government reserves, all earnings, profits of savings of trade and industry operating in East Pakistan move in a matter of seconds to West Pakistan. Any one conversant with banking operation knows well that only barely ten per cent of the entire deposit need be kept ready for payment and the rest can be and generally is invested. Savings when invested become capital. This investment is naturally done in West Pakistan as West Pakistan's capital. This is how capital formation in West Pakistan has been so rapid. This again is how there has been

total absence of capital formation in East Pakistan. As investment means employment, this incident has meant the employment in West Pakistan only. As capital formation is followed by rapid industrialization, this has meant industrialization of West Pakistan alone. This process will continue unless and until the prevailing one-way traffic of finance is effectively checked by stopping this flight of capital. This can be done and capital investment can be generated in East Pakistan only by creating a Reserve Bank for East Pakistan as suggested by me. It is the only way to save East Pakistan from economic extinction. This reform in our currency system while saving East Pakistan from economic collapse will keep currency a Central subject as a symbol of our unity and oneness.

If, however, our West Pakistani brothers think otherwise, then my other alternative may be adopted. Under that arrangement Currency will, no doubt, be a provincial subject, but that will not weaken our Centre. Neither will it affect the oneness of Pakistan. For even then we can have the same currency symbol by mutual discussion and agreement. And for other, a federation can effectively work and be strong and stable without Currency as its subject. The Cabinet Mission recommended an Indian Federal Centre without Currency in the Federal list. Had it been thought unworkable, British Government would not have recommended it, nor would the Congress and the Muslim League have accepted it.

POINT 4

In this point, I have recommended that the power of taxation and revenue collection shall vest in the federating units and that the Federal Centre will have no such power. The Federation will have a share in the state taxes for meeting their required expenditure. The Consolidated Federal Fund shall come out of a levy of certain percentage of all state taxes.

It is this proposal that seems to have most annoyed the unitarists and pseudo-federalists. They are making a lot of noises and kicking up dust of confusion such as disintegration and disruption. These are not old bogeys and shibboleths used by the vested interests against all reforms in all ages. They need not worry any Pakistani. The fact is that a strong Federation can successfully work and is actually working without the power of taxation. It makes the Federation rather stronger. This is so because taxation is a duty and necessity rather than a right and power. Levying taxes and collecting them is a responsibility and a botheration. It is just like manually earning one's own livelihood. In our daily life we find people wanting to better employ themselves in finer and nobler work, lease out their properties to others at fixed rent leaving to them the arduous task of collecting small amounts from individual tenants and earning petty sums from day-to-day transactions. The

monarchs of the past used to, and land-lords of the present do, lease out their realms in ijara for tax collection. The Central authorities in all ages have tried to be spared the botheration of tax collection for their own maintenance. It is only the banva mentality of the present day rulers that impels them to handle all money matters themselves. A little reflection will show that the right and power concerned do not rest in the act of tax collection but in the money so collected. If a Central Government is constitutionally assured of the required amount, why should it bother about the actual collection? In the case of a Federation it is only the fiscal taxation in which it is interested. The rest of the purposes of taxation, viz: protective, social, commercial and moral, are the responsibility of the federating units. This is what is done in U.S.A. and some other Federations. In the U.S.S.R. even the fiscal taxation is not done by the Union. There is no Finance Minister and Finance Ministry in the Union Government of the Soviet Union. The Finance Ministries and Ministers are all with the Federating republics. They meet the requirements and serve the purposes of the Union Government. Have these arrangements weakened the Central authorities of U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.? It was with this knowledge and experience of the working of a Federation that Cabinet Mission offered an Indian Federation without the power of taxation and it was for the same reason that the Congress and the Muslim League accepted

the offer. It will, therefore, be seen that a Federation can be firmly provided with fiscal finances without being burdened with the duty of tax collection. My proposal is precisely to this effect. According to my recommendation, the Constitution will provide that a certain percentage of the Revenue collections on all heads shall automatically be credited to the Federal Fund by the Reserve Banks, on which amount the unit Governments shall have no control. Constitutional provisions may also be made empowering the Federation to raise funds to meet the increased Defence expenditure at the time of war including expansion of Federal jurisdiction in such emergencies. It is, therefore, sheer bunkum to call the autonomists the disruptors of Pakistan. On the contrary, relieving the Federation of the burden of tax collection will have the following salutary effect, viz:

(a) the Federation will have more time to devote in matters of Defence and External Relations and to act as a unifying force;

(b) wastage due to overlapping, duplication and litigation etc. will be saved and money thus saved and officials thus relieved will be available for better and nobler utilization;

(c) the tax and revenue collection will be cheaper and easier;

(d) economy of having a single authority for tax

collection will have been achieved;

(e) it will pave the way for introducing and adopting the most modern taxation method, viz. single taxation.

POINT 5

In this point, I have recommended that:

- (1) there shall be two separate accounts for foreign exchange earnings of the two wings,
- (2) earnings of East Pakistan shall be under the control of East Pakistan Government and that of West Pakistan under the control of West Pakistan Government,
- (3) foreign exchange requirement of the Federal Government shall be met by the two wings either equally or in a ratio to be fixed,
- (4) indigenous products shall move free of duty between two wings,
- (5) the Constitution shall empower the unit Governments to establish trade and commercial relations with, set up trade missions in and enter into agreements with foreign countries.

Now, a panoramic glance at the economic history of Pakistan since its creation will show the following consistent incidents:

- (a) East Pakistan has earned bulk of the annual foreign exchange of Pakistan.
- (b) East Pakistan's earnings have been spent in West

Pakistan in industrializing that wing and earnings from those industries have been reinvested in West Pakistan as the earnings of that wing.

(c) East Pakistan's earnings are not being spent in East Pakistan on the plea of its inability to absorb them due to absence of capital formation.

(d) Import to East Pakistan is less than her export, whereas import to West Pakistan is more than her export.

(e) Two thirds of Pakistan's foreign exchange is earned by jute; but that earning is utilized neither for the benefit of the jute-growers nor for East Pakistan.

(f) Almost all foreign aids and loans are secured against foreign exchange earned by East Pakistan; but they are spent in West Pakistan on the same plea of non-absorbing capacity of East Pakistan. The irony is that interest on these loans and their instalments are being borne by East Pakistan.

Now, the cumulative effect of these economic incidents, all of which are artificial, are the following consequences, viz.

(i) East Pakistan has not been industrialized sufficiently,

(ii) the little industrialization that has been done has been done by West Pakistanis or by people other than East Pakistanis with all the characteristics of foreign investments both in the matter of employment and profit earning,

(iii) there is chronic inflation causing soaring high prices of commodities with all its concomitants like black-marketing and profiteering bringing untold miseries to the life of the people,

(iv) jute-growers are not only not getting fair economic price of their produce but even the cost of production is denied to them resulting in their perpetual indebtedness and progressive impoverishment.

These are man-made iniquities and are, therefore, remediable. The obvious remedies are, firstly, to industrialize East Pakistan to produce wealth among and provide employment for East Pakistanis; secondly, to check inflation by equalizing import and export and thereby supplying commodities to the people at reasonable prices; thirdly, to nationalize jute trade and thereby give fair price to the growers and ensure the state's earnings in foreign exchange. It was with this last object in view that Awami League Government set up Jute Marketing Corporation in 1957. It was subsequently reduced to nothing by the vested interests with the help of the Central Government.

Each and every one of these steps presupposes acceptance of the above proposals recommended by me.

POINT 6

In this point, I have recommended setting up of a militia or a para-military force for East Pakistan. This is neither

unreasonable nor new. We had pledged in the famous 21-point programme in 1954 that we would give arms and uniforms to our Ansars.

Neither is the proposal unprecedented and impracticable. There are instances where such para-military territorial forces are maintained in outlying regions. We ourselves had one such regiment from before Independence. It was the Eastern Rifles. After Pakistan, it became East Pakistan Rifles. The present regime has taken this away from the hand of East Pakistan Government.

East Pakistan is the home of the majority of Pakistanis. To defend it is the political obligation as well as moral duty of the Government of Pakistan. Why then should it be necessary for East Pakistanis to demand it? Why do they not do it on their own initiative? How and with what conscience do they say that defence of East Pakistan lies in West Pakistan? Does it not tantamount to saying that the mouth, the belly and the stomach of East Pakistan lie in West Pakistan? How will the arms, ammunitions and wealth in West Pakistan help Pakistan when transport between the wings can be snapped in a matter of seconds? Has not the recent 17-days war proved our utter helplessness? How can one brag that some event in Warsaw saved East Pakistan? It is the defence policy of our Government that has reduced us to this position. In spite of all this we want a united Defence of the country and to retain it as a Central subject. But at the same time

we want that East Pakistan be made self-sufficient in the matter of Defence; that an Ordnance Factory, a Military Academy and the Navy Headquarter must be set up in East Pakistan. These things were actually demanded in 1954. Nothing, however, has been done in the course of long twelve years. We do not yet know when these will be done.

So in the meantime we want to make our own Defence arrangement in a small way with unsophisticated weapons suited to our own field craft within easy reach of our limited resources. What is the objection? Where does it lie? It is not easy to comprehend. Neither is it easy to understand why a Fund separately raised for East Pakistan war purposes is promptly taken over by the Centre.

Pakistan National Assembly Election
Results

Name of Party	No. of Seats Contes- ted	East Pakis- tan	PROVINCE-WISE RESULT				Tribal Area	Indirectly Elected Women's seats	Total	
			Punjab	Sind	NWFP	Baluchi- stan				
Awami League	162	160	-	-	-	-	-	7	167	
Pakistan People's party	122	-	64	18	1	-	-	5	88	
All Pakistan Muslim League (Qaiyum)	132	-	1	1	7	-	-	-	9	
Muslim League (Council)	119	-	7	-	-	-	-	-	7	
Jamait-Ulema-i- Islam (Hazarvi Group)	93	-	-	-	6	1	-	-	7	
Markazi-Jamait-ul- Ulema-i-Islam (Thanvi Group)	Not known	-	4	3	-	-	-	-	7	
National Awami Party (Wali Khan)	61	-	-	-	3	3	-	1	7	
Jamait-e-Islami	200	-	1	2	1	-	-	-	4	
Muslim League (Convention)	124	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	
Pakistan Democra- tic Party	108	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	
Independents	300	1	3	3	-	†	7	-	14	
			162	82	27	18	4	7	13	313

III

Pakistan People's Party Not to Attend National Assembly Session if Awami League Not Flexible - Wants Adjustments in Six-Points Two-Subject Centre not Acceptable - Z. A. Bhutto's Declaration in Peshawar on February 15, 1971

Mr Z. A. Bhutto, Chairman of Pakistan People's Party, declared that his party will not attend the National Assembly Session starting on March 3 at Dacca unless it was made clear to him and his partymen that there would be some amount of reciprocity from the majority party, either publicly or privately.

Addressing a crowded Press Conference he did not term his decision as boycott of the Assembly but said: "We can't go there only to endorse the constitution already prepared by a party and to return humiliated. If we are not heard and even reasonable proposals put by us are not considered, I don't see the purpose to go there".

Mr Bhutto said that his party had accepted the first and the last points of the Awami League's Six Points (they relate to the basis of representation and the existence of people's militia in the provinces), but he could neither accept a "two-subject Centre" nor the point relating to currency. "I am not without hope about foreign trade and taxation", he added. Mr Bhutto said that his party had also accepted 10 out of the 11 points of the students. It could not accept the point which said that there should be a sub-federation in the West Wing.

He, however, said, "I think we can work out something

which will satisfy both of us. There is hope for understanding. But if we are asked to go to Dacca only to endorse the constitution which has already been prepared by Awami League and which is not to be altered an inch here and an inch there, then you will not find us in Dacca on March 2 when elections for women seats are to be held."

Mr Bhutto said his party was of the opinion that the constitution based on the six points could not provide a "viable future for the country". Nevertheless Pakistan People's Party has tried to come as close to the Awami League points of view as possible, even upto the edge of precipice, whereafter there is destruction.

He said he had taken the decision as a big responsibility in the interest of the nation. The country is passing through a very critical phase and we may go one way or the other.

Mr Bhutto said: "If we have to go just for formality we are not prepared". Asked if other leaders go there to help Awami League, he said: "Let them go," adding "but they will have to come back also".

He, however, said: "I will not come in the way of a constitution made by the National Assembly. Let them frame it with those who go there. The onus and odium will not then fall on Pakistan People's Party," he added.

He accused the Awami League of applying double standards for constitution. He said for normal procedures of

of leading to constitution making the party had followed normal democratic principles but for the constitution itself it did not accept the universal principle of a democratic consensus of all provinces. You can't apply double standard, he declared.

He said dictation or imposition of a constitution on West Pakistan will not be accepted. "We want East and West to live together in equality but that does not mean things should be thrust on us", Asked if an indication of a compromise was given to him by the Awami League in private and if it did not stand good, he said: "You can always come back".

Mr Bhutto said that he had taken the decision after consultation with his party leaders and other political leaders of the West Wing.

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He said that his party had the greatest respect and admiration for the people of East Pakistan, and had in its foundation papers, conceded that the people of East Pakistan had been badly exploited and had a cause to feel aggrieved. It had been even insisted for the removal of the "internal colonial structure", he added.

The PPP Chief emphasized that if the Awami League had received a mandate on Six Points, in the election, they should accept the People's Party's position that its success was based on economic programme and its stand on foreign policy. He stated that his party was convinced that the Six

Point programme should be taken on a political basis and not on a "test tube" basis.

His party had abstained from taking any position on the Six Points, during the year-long election campaign, since it felt that a "dialogue" was necessary on them.

Mr Bhutto also regretted over the failure of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to come to West Pakistan, because of the existence of "vested interests" here, and said that he could personally guarantee "fullest honour and protection" to the Awami League leaders.

Mr Z. A. Bhutto expressed his party's inability to attend the National Assembly session, beginning from March 3 in Dacca, in the absence of an understanding for "compromise or adjustment" on the six points.

Mr Bhutto stated that his party had "gone as far as possible" on the issue of Six Points to ensure a viable constitution for the country. But, in the present circumstances, they would not be going to Dacca to frame a constitution but to "accept" a constitution.

"If I am given to understand that there is a room for compromise and adjustment I am prepared to go there even today", he added.

He added: "If there is a purpose to build up Pakistan, we are prepared to go to the Assembly even today".

Mr Bhutto said that if there was a question of framing of the constitution, the consensus of federating units, was essential "but the position is that the constitution has

already been framed" and the Awami League "wants us to endorse it", he said. The Awami League, the PPP Chief said, had adopted an attitude of "take it or leave it".

He added, we should have a guarantee that we would be heard and if our viewpoint was reasonable, it would be accepted. Participation in the National Assembly without such an understanding would further "vitalize" the situation.

Mr Bhutto emphasized that if the things were to be taken on democratic basis, "you have to make scope for adjustments".

Mr Bhutto also said that the participation in the present situation, might lead to a "deadlock" which was against national interests. "I do not want to deteriorate the position" he said--adding that he was only "objective and reasonable".

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Mr Bhutto said that it was for the nation to judge as to what had been the stand of the People's Party in the past and "the nation always judges correctly". "We took no position on six points all through our election campaign", he said. On the other hand the six points had been criticized by many a leader in West Pakistan. The irony was that these very leaders were now praising the six points because the Awami League had registered a vast majority in the

National Assembly.

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Mr Bhutto said that there were many "misgivings" in West Pakistan about the six points. He reminded the Awami League leaders that when he had visited East Pakistan in October 1966 he had suggested an analytically critical dialogue on six points, as soon as possible. It created a stir in West Pakistan and the politicians demanded as to how he could hold a dialogue on six points.

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Bearing in mind the background of our 23 years history, the six points, as they stood today, could not be worked viably. He had assured the Awami League leader that the People's Party would try its best to come as close to the precipice as possible and not beyond to accommodate the six points.

Discussing the consultations he has had within his own party, Mr Bhutto revealed that there was a "divided view", on the six-points. Some of his partymen took "extreme" position,--that the party should fight it out--, and a very small number took the position that the Awami League programme should be accepted. But the majority of the party leaders supported the view that there should be reasonable adjustments to bring about a compromise.

The PPP chief said he had now completed his discussion

with other leaders of West Pakistan and that at his party-men's meeting in Karachi on February 20 and 21, "we will take formal and final position".

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Mr Bhutto said that now the date of the Assembly session had been announced but he emphasized that before he and his party-men went to Dacca they would like to have an idea of the amount of "reciprocity" but this necessary pre-requisite was not yet known.

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He had hoped that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman would come to West Pakistan and that he could have further talks with him. But now it seemed he (Sheikh Mujibur Rahman) was not prepared to do so, because the Awami League leader felt that the atmosphere was not "congenial" for him, to visit West Pakistan. There was a good deal of talk about the dangers he faced from the vested interests.

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Mr Bhutto said that he did not know whether there was an element of "give and take" and of reciprocity in the Awami League position. If it was not proper for Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to come here, it was even harder for Mr Bhutto to go to Dacca. With the present state of relations with India, and in the light of the gradually threatening posture of the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi against Pakistan and

bearing in mind the PPP's well known and clear stand on the relations with India "have I not the responsibility to be with my people here", he asked.

Mr Bhutto went on to say "I can put myself in jeopardy, but it is a question of 83 party leaders, going to East Pakistan in the present state of affairs". He said that he could not put his partymen in a position of double hostage because of Indian hostility and their non-acceptance of six points.

He added that his party comprised of working people, who have to do a job and naturally they would like to know how long would they be away from their homes.

In the beginning it was announced that there would be only a ceremonial session in Dacca. But the position was not clear today, whether his party members were to stay there for a long period or only for a few days.

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Mr Bhutto said that his party members were expected to go to Dacca in the present circumstances not to frame the constitution but to just "accept" it. "With this background we will not be there on March 3 in the Assembly".

He, however, added that if an assurance was given even privately that there would be give and take and there would be a purpose for us to be there to construct something together, then we would go.

Other leaders of West Pakistan he said, may go if they

so desired, but the PPP members would go only if there was room for adjustment, and not to sign a dictated constitution.

Mr Bhutto said that on the one hand the Awami League claimed the right to frame the constitution on the democratic principle of simple majority, and on the other it wanted six points because of the geographic peculiarities of the country. He said, it could not have it both ways. If they wanted their six points on the basis of geographical peculiarities, why should this factor not come into play in the framing of the constitution and the principle of the consensus of the federating units applied instead of the principle of simple majority.

However, he said that if the Awami League insisted on the framing of the constitution on the basis of six points, then the onus and odium of that constitution would not fall on the Pakistan People's Party.

He said that he did not want to deteriorate the situation but was stating what was objective, scientific and reasonable.

He said that he took full responsibility for the position he had taken and he would be prepared to face the barrel of a gun, for he had done so often in the past. But he said, he must save the people from the firing line.

Asked if he was boycotting the Assembly, Mr Bhutto emphatically disagreed with the suggestion.

Mr Bhutto said that he did not want to aggravate the

situation. He conceded that in the past some West Pakistani leaders had dictated to East Pakistan, but he had nothing to do with it. What had happened in the past should not mean that this dictation should now be repeated on West Pakistan. West Pakistan had thrown up a new leadership which wanted to end the system of exploitation, not only in West Pakistan but also in East Pakistan, he said. A constitution imposed as a vendetta against Pakistan would not be accepted, he added.

To another question, Mr Bhutto said that he would accept in good faith, an assurance from Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on the question of give and take in the framing of the constitution, even if such an assurance was given privately.

Replying to another question Mr Bhutto said that he was "satisfied" with his talks with the leaders of the NWFP. Mr Bhutto met Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, President of the Pakistan Muslim League, Khan Abdul Wali Khan, President of National Awami Party and Maulana Mufti Mahmud, General-Secretary, Jamaita-e-ul-Ulema-e-Islam, during his two-day stay here.

(The Dawn, Karachi--February 16, 1971)

IV

No Room left for Negotiation with Awami League - Pakistan People's Party not going to endorse a 'Dictated' Constitution - Mr Z. A. Bhutto's statement in Karachi on February 17, 1971

Mr Z. A. Bhutto, Chairman of the Pakistan People's Party yesterday reiterated that if a "viable" constitution is to be framed for the country "all of us must have a hand in that".

He told a Press conference at the party's central office in Karachi that "under present circumstances" it was pointless for the People's Party to attend the ensuing National Assembly session beginning at Dacca from March 3.

He said that the PPP's MNA elect could not undertake the journey to Dacca merely to endorse a constitution in the making of which they did not have their say. He said that India's belligerent attitude towards Pakistan had created an abnormal situation in West Pakistan. There had been Indian troops movement on the Lahore border and in the adjoining areas and the Indian political parties were outbidding one another to take a "stronger position" against Pakistan. Such situations in the past Mr Bhutto said had led to war between India and Pakistan. The situation was critical not only within but without also taking into account the situation in South-East Asia, particularly in Laos.

In the light of these circumstances, Mr Bhutto said, the journey of the party's 85 MNAs-elect from West Pakistan

to Dacca was not a simple matter, especially in view of the party's known views. It was the first duty of the party members to be with their people in this situation, he said.

Mr. Bhutto said that the basic position today was that the Awami League says that there could be no compromise on its six-point programme and that it was a "final word and last position". He said, in reality, the Pakistan People's Party had gone to the precipice beyond which there was a fall.

The party, he said, had accepted all the demands of the students. Ten out of 11 demands had been accepted. The eleventh point itself belongs to the six-point programme, he added.

He said the People's Party had said it at the very outset that it would step aside if its views were not accommodated on the issue of Constitution.

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Mr. Bhutto said that his party had tried its best to work out some agreed settlement and understanding with the Awami League. But, now, he added, there is no room for further negotiations with the Awami League.

The PPP leader criticized those who objected to his party's decision not to attend the National Assembly session and maintained that the PPP members should discuss constitutional issue in the Assembly. He said that in normal circum-

stances. Such discussions took place in the Assemblies. The members went collectively together with a blank slate. But here the situation was entirely different. The Awami League leaders had been making speeches showing the rigidly expressing their determination to frame the Constitution only within the framework of the six-point programme of the party. They also made their intention to this effect clear during their talks with him.

Under the circumstances Mr Bhutto said if the PPP members went to attend the Dacca session and did not endorse the Awami League's Constitution they might be asked by the Awami League as to why they had come to East Pakistan. "Did not they know Awami League's views and stand on the Constitution previously".

Under such circumstances, Mr Bhutto said, the Assembly would have been a "slaughter house." He did not elaborate on this point.

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Of the Six Points of the Awami League, Mr Bhutto said, the "most difficult" was the one pertaining to foreign trade and foreign aid.

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To a questioner, Mr Bhutto said that he was not worried if his party's decision not to attend the Assembly session would make the party members, liable to surrender their membership to the House. Let the 85 seats from West Pakistan.

be vacated and let there be bye-elections to these seats. "We will recapture them all" he said.

Asked if there was any similarity in his party's decision not to attend the round-table conference in 1969 during the Ayub regime and the recent one, Mr Bhutto said there was some element of similarity. He however, said that the present situation was much different from the previous occasion. "In the round-table conference, a hand pick of the establishment were there but in the Assembly there were representatives elected by the people."

He denied that his party's decision not to attend the assembly had any blessing from the present regime. He said that there was no question of any agreement "behind the scenes" between him (Mr Bhutto) and anybody else. He however, said that it was the Awami League which had hailed the summoning of the National Assembly session by President Yahya.

(The Dawn, Karachi--February 18, 1971)

President Yahya Khan's statement on March 1,
1971

The following is the text of President Yahya Khan's statement:

"Today, Pakistan faces her gravest political crisis. I therefore consider it necessary to appraise you of the situation and the action that I propose to take to resolve our present difficulties.

But before I do that let me recount to you the steps that I took, from the day that the responsibility for the administration of this country devolved on me, to transfer power to the elected representatives of the people.

In my very first address to the nation I had indicated the need for the smooth transfer of power. Since then we have moved forward step by step towards the achievement of this aim.

In spite of there being Martial Law in the country I did not ban the political parties and in fact permitted full political activity with effect from the first of January 1970.

Later in March 1970 the Legal Framework Order under which elections were to be held, was duly notified. All other work, including delimitation of constituencies and preparation of electoral rolls, was completed with speed.

The election campaign which was long and arduous, ended up in, what we may all claim with pride one of the most peaceful and well-organized general elections on the basis

of adult franchise.

As you know, the elections were finally completed on 17 January 1971.

Just prior to the elections in my address of the 3rd of December, 1970, I had suggested to the leaders of the political parties that it would be useful for them to employ the period between the elections and the first session of the National Assembly in meeting each other and arriving at a consensus on the main provisions of our future constitution.

I had, at the time, indicated that to be successful these meetings would call for spirit of give and take, trust in each other and realization of the extreme importance of this particular juncture in our history. Appreciating the great significance of such exchanges of views between political leaders I tried to facilitate the process by giving them enough time to do so.

I therefore, decided to fix the third of March as the date of the inaugural session of our National Assembly.

In the past few weeks certain meetings between our political leaders have indeed taken place. But I regret to say that instead of arriving at a consensus, some of our leaders have taken hard attitudes. This is most unfortunate. The political confrontation between the leaders of East Pakistan and those of the West is a most regrettable situation.

This has cast a shadow of gloom over the entire nation.

The position briefly is that the major party of West Pakistan, namely, the Pakistan People's Party, as well as certain other political parties, have declared their intention not to attend the National Assembly session on the third of March, 1971. In addition, the general situation of tension created by India has further complicated the whole position. I have, therefore, decided to postpone the summoning of the National Assembly to a later date.

I have repeatedly stated that a constitution is not an ordinary piece of legislation but it is an agreement to live together. For a healthy and viable constitution, therefore, it is necessary that both East and West Pakistan have an adequate sense of participation in the process of constitution making.

Needless to say I took this decision to postpone the date of the National Assembly with a heavy heart. One has, however, to look at the practical aspects of such problems. I realized that with so many representatives of the people of West Pakistan keeping away from the Assembly if we were to go ahead with the inaugural session on the 3rd of March the Assembly itself could have disintegrated and the entire effort made for the smooth transfer of power that has been outlined earlier would have been wasted.

It was, therefore, imperative to give more time to the

political leaders to arrive at a reasonable understanding on the issue of Constitution-making. Having been given this time I have every hope that they will rise to the occasion and resolve this problem. I wish to make a solemn promise to the people of Pakistan that as soon as the environments enumerated earlier become conducive to Constitution-making I will have no hesitation in calling the session of the Assembly, immediately. As for myself, I would like to assure my countrymen that I shall do everything in my power to help the political leaders in achieving our common goal with even handed justice which I have all along been doing.

"In the end, I pray to Almighty Allah to guide us all in acting according to the dictum of the Father of the Nation, namely, faith, unity and discipline. I appeal to the political leaders and all my countrymen to exercise the utmost restraint at this grave hour of our lives."

(Morning News, Karachi and Dacca--
March 2, 1971)

VI

President Yahya Khan's broadcast on March 26, 1971.

Following is the text of the broadcast to the nation by President Yahya Khan:

My dear countrymen.

Assalam-o-Alaikam,

On the 6th of this month I announced the 25th of March as the new date for the inaugural session of the National Assembly hoping that conditions would permit the holding of the session on the appointed date. Events have, however, not justified that hope. The nation continued to face a grave crisis.

In East Pakistan a non-cooperation and disobedience movement was launched by the Awami League and matters took a very serious turn. Events were moving very fast and it became absolutely imperative that the situation was brought under control as soon as possible. With this aim in view, I had a series of discussions with political leaders in West Pakistan and subsequently on the 15th of March I went to Dacca.

As you are aware I had a number of meetings with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in order to solve the political impasse. Having consulted West Pakistani leaders it was necessary for me to do the same over there so that areas of agreement could be identified and an amicable settlement arrived at.

As has been reported in the Press and other news media from time to time, my talks with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman showed some progress. Having reached a certain ^{stage} in my negotiations with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman I considered it necessary to have another round of talks with West Pakistani leaders in Dacca.

Mr Z. A. Bhutto reached there on 21st March and I had a number of meetings with him.

As you are aware, the leader of the Awami League had asked for the withdrawal of Martial Law and transfer of power to the meeting of the National Assembly. In our discussions he proposed that this interim period could be covered by a proclamation by me whereby Martial Law would be withdrawn, Provincial Governments set up and the National Assembly would ab initio, sit in two committees--one composed of members from East Pakistan and the other composed of members from West Pakistan.

ONE CONDITION

Despite some serious flaws in the scheme in its legal as well as other aspects, I was prepared to agree in principle to his plan in the interest of peaceful transfer of power but on one condition. The condition which I clearly explained to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was that I must first have unequivocal agreement of all political leaders to the scheme.

I thereupon discussed the proposal with other political leaders. I found them unanimously of the view that the

proposed proclamation by me would have no legal sanction. It will neither have the cover of Martial Law nor could it claim to be based on the will of the people. Thus a vacuum would be created and chaotic conditions will ensue. They also considered that splitting of the National Assembly into two parts through a proclamation would encourage divisive tendencies that may exist. They therefore expressed the opinion that if it is intended to lift Martial Law and transfer power in the interim period, the National Assembly should meet, pass an appropriate interim Constitution Bill and present it for my assent. I entirely agreed with their view and requested them to tell Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to take a reasonable attitude on this issue.

I told the leaders to explain their views to him that a scheme whereby, on the one hand, you extinguish all source of power namely Martial Law and on the other fail to replace it by the will of the people through a proper session of the National Assembly, will merely result in chaos. They agreed to meet Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, explain the position and try to obtain his agreement to the interim arrangement for transfer of power to emanate from the National Assembly.

The political leaders were also very much perturbed over Sheikh Mujib's idea of dividing the National Assembly into two parts right from the start. Such a move, they felt, would be totally against the interest of Pakistan's integrity.

The Chairman of the Pakistan People's Party, during the meeting between myself, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and him, had also expressed similar views to Mujib.

On the evening of the 23rd of March the political leaders, who had gone to talk to Mujib on this issue, called on me and informed me that he was not agreeable to any changes in his scheme. All he really wanted was for me to make a proclamation, whereby I should withdraw Martial Law and transfer power.

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's action of starting his non-cooperation movement is an act of treason. He and his party have defied the lawful authority for over three weeks. They have insulted Pakistan's flag and defiled the photograph of the Father of the Nation. They have tried to run a parallel Government. They have created turmoil, terror and insecurity.

A number of murders have been committed in the name of movement. Millions of our Bengali brethren and those who have settled in East Pakistan are living in a state of panic, and a very large number had to leave that Wing out of fear for their lives.

The Armed Forces, located in East Pakistan, have been subjected to taunts and insults of all kinds, I wish to complement them on the tremendous restraint that they have shown in the face of grave provocation. Their sense of discipline is indeed praiseworthy. I am proud of them.

REASONABLE SOLUTION

I should have taken action against Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his collaborators weeks ago but I had to try my utmost to handle the situation in such a manner as not to jeopardise my plan of peaceful transfer of power. In my keenness to achieve this aim I kept on tolerating one illegal act after another. And at the same time I explored every possible avenue for arriving at some reasonable solution. I have already mentioned the efforts made by me and by various political leaders in getting Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to see reason. We have left no stone unturned. But he has failed to respond in any constructive manner; on the other hand, he and his followers kept on flouting the authority of the Government even during my presence in Dacca. The proclamation that he proposed was nothing but a trap. He knew that it would not have been worth the paper it was written on and in the vacuum created by the lifting of Martial Law he could have done anything with impunity. His obstinacy, obduracy and absolute refusal to talk sense can lead to but one conclusion--the man and his party are enemies of Pakistan and they want East Pakistan to break away completely from the country. He has attacked the solidarity and integrity of this country--this crime will not go unpunished.

We will not allow some power hungry and unpatriotic people to destroy this country and play with the destiny of 120 million people.

In my address to the nation of 6th March I had told you that it is the duty of the Pakistan Armed Forces to ensure the integrity, solidarity and security of Pakistan. I have ordered them to do their duty and fully restore the authority of the Government.

In view of the grave situation that exists in the country today I have decided to ban all political activities throughout the country. As for the Awami League it is completely banned as a political party. I have also decided to impose complete Press censorship. Martial Law regulations will very shortly be issued in pursuance of these decisions.

AIM REMAINS SAME

In the end let me assure you that my main aim remains the same, namely, transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people. As soon as situation permits I will take fresh steps towards the achievement of this objective.

It is my hope that the law and order situation will soon return to normal in East Pakistan and we can again move forward towards our cherished goal.

I appeal to my countrymen to appreciate the gravity of the situation for which the blame rests entirely on the anti-Pakistan and secessionist elements and to act as reasonable citizens of the country because therein lies the security and salvation of Pakistan. God be with you. God bless you.

(The Dawn, Karachi--March 27, 1971)

VII

Proclamation of Independence Order, Dated April 10, 1971: Text of Proclamation - Press report on April 18, 1971.

Mujeeb Nagar (Bangla Desh)

The proclamation of independence order, which was issued on April 10 shall be deemed to have come into effect from March 26, 1971. The text is as follows:-

"The proclamation of independence order, dated 10th day of April 1971".

"Whereas free elections were held in Bangla Desh from 7th December, 1970 to 17th January 1971, to elect representatives for the purpose of framing a Constitution, and "whereas at these elections the people of Bangla Desh elected 167 out of 169 representatives belonging to the Awami League, and whereas Gen. Yahya Khan summoned the elected representatives of the people to meet on the 3rd March, 1971, for the purpose of framing constitution, and "whereas the Assembly so summoned was arbitrarily and illegally postponed for indefinite period, and "whereas instead of fulfilling their promise and while still conferring with the representatives of people of Bangla Desh, Pakistan authorities declared an unjust and treacherous war, and

GENOCIDE

"Whereas in the facts and circumstances of such treacherous conduct Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the undisputed leader of 75 millions of people of Bangla Desh, in due fulfilment of the legitimate right of self-determination

of the people of Bangla Desh, duly made declaration of independence at Dacca on March 26, 1971, and integrity of Bangladesh, and whereas in the conduct of a ruthless and savage war the Pakistani authorities committed and are still committing numerous acts of genocide and unprecedented tortures, amongst others on the civilian and unarmed people of Bangla Desh, and "whereas the Pakistan Government by levying an unjust war and committing genocide and by other repressive measures made it impossible for the elected representatives of the people of Bangla Desh to meet and frame a Constitution, and give to themselves a government and "whereas the people of Bangla Desh by their heroism, bravery and revolutionary fervour have established effective control over the territories of Bangla Desh, "we the elected representatives of the people of Bangla Desh, as honour bound by the mandate given to us by the people of Bangla Desh whose will is supreme duly constituted ourselves into a Constituent Assembly, and having held mutual consultations, and in order to ensure for the people of Bangla Desh equality, human dignity and social justice, "declare and constitute Bangla Desh to be sovereign people's Republic and thereby confirm the declaration of independence already made by Banga Bandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and

PRESIDENT

"Do hereby confirm and resolve that till such time as a constitution is framed, Bangla Bandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman

shall be the President of the Republic and that Syed Nazrul Islam shall be the Vice-President of the Republic and that the President, shall be the Supreme Commander of all the armed forces of the Republic, shall exercise all the executive and legislative powers of the Republic including the power to grant pardon, shall have the power to appoint a Prime Minister and such other Ministers as he considers necessary, shall have the power to levy taxes and expend monies, shall have the power to summon and adjourn the Constituent Assembly, and do all other things that may be necessary to give to the people of Bangla Desh an orderly and just government.

We the elected representatives of the people of Bangla Desh do further resolve that in the event of there being no President or the President being unable to enter upon his office or being unable to exercise his powers and duties due to any reason whatsoever,, the Vice-President shall have and exercise all the powers, duties and responsibilities herein conferred on the President, we further resolve that we undertake to observe and give effect to all duties and obligations devolved upon us as a member of the family of nations and by the Charter of the United Nations, we further resolve, that this proclamation of independence shall be deemed to have come into effect since 26th day of

March, 1971.

"We further resolve that to give effect to this our resolution, we authorise and appoint Prof. M. Yusuf Ali, our duly constituted potentiary to give to the President and Vice-President oaths of office".

(The Sunday Standard--April 18, 1971)

VIII

Prime Minister's Statement in Lok Sabha on
Situation in Bangladesh, on May 24, 1971

The following is the text of the statement of the Prime Minister Shrimati Indira Gandhi, made in Lok Sabha on May 24, 1971, on situation in Bangla Desh:

Mr Speaker, Sir,

In the seven weeks since Parliament recessed, the attention of the entire country has been focussed on the continuing tragedy in Bangla Desh. Honourable Members will recall the atmosphere of hope in which we met in March. We all felt that our country was poised for rapid economic advance and a more determined attack on the age-old poverty of our people. Even as we were settling down to these new tasks, we have been engulfed by a new and gigantic problem, not of our making.

On the 15th and 16th May I visited Assam, Tripura and West Bengal, to share the suffering of the refugees, to convey to them the sympathy and support of this House and of the people of India and to see for myself the arrangements which are being made for their care. I am sorry it was not possible to visit other camps this time. Every available buildings, including schools and training institutions, has been requisitioned. Thousands of tents have been pitched and temporary shelters are being constructed as quickly as possible in the 335 camps which have been

established so far. In spite of our best efforts we have not been able to provide shelter to all those who have come across, and many are still in the open. The district authorities are under severe strain. Before they can cope with those who are already here, 60,000 more are coming across every day.

So massive a migration, in so short a time, is unprecedented in recorded history. About three and a half million people have come into India from Bangla Desh during the last eight weeks. They belong to every religious persuasion - Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist and Christian. They come from every social class and age group. They are not refugees in the sense, we have understood this word since Partition. They are victims of war who have sought refuge from the military terror across our frontier.

Many refugees are wounded and need urgent medical attention. I saw some of them in the hospitals, I visited in Tripura and West Bengal. Medical facilities in all our border States have been stretched to breaking point. Equipment for 1,100 new Hospital beds has been rushed to these States, including a 400 bed mobile hospital, generously donated by the Government of Rajasthan. Special teams of surgeons, physicians, nurses and public health experts have been deputed to the major camps. Special water supply schemes are being executed on the highest priority, and preventive health measures are being undertaken on a large scale.

In our sensitive border States, which are facing the brunt, the attention of the local administration has been diverted from normal and development work to problems of camp administration, civil supplies and security. But our people have put the hardships of the refugees above their own, and have stood firm against the attempts of Pakistani agent-provocateurs to cause communal strife. I am sure this fine spirit will be maintained.

On present estimates, the cost to the Central Exchequer on relief alone may exceed Rs.180 crores for a period of six months. All this, as Honourable Members will appreciate, has imposed an unexpected burden on us.

I was heartened by the fortitude with which these people of Bangla Desh have borne tribulation, and by the hope which they have for their future. It is mischievous to suggest that India has had anything to do with what happened in Bangla Desh. This is an insult to the aspirations and spontaneous sacrifices of the people of Bangla Desh, and a calculated attempt by the rulers of Pakistan to make India a scapegoat for their own misdeeds. It is also a crude attempt to deceive the world community. The world press has been through Pakistan's deception. The majority of these so-called Indian infiltrators are women, children and the aged.

This House has considered many national and international issues of vital importance to our country. But none of them has touched us so deeply as the events in Bangla

Desh. When faced with a situation of such gravity, it is specially important to weigh every word in acquainting this House, and our entire people with the issues involved and the responsibilities which now devolve on us all.

These twenty-three years and more, we have never tried to interfere with the internal affairs of Pakistan, eventhough they have not exercised similar restraint. And even now we do not seek to interfere in any way. But what has actually happened? What was claimed to be an internal problem of Pakistan, has also become an internal problem for India. We are, therefore, entitled to ask Pakistan to desist immediately from all actions which it is taking in the name of domestic jurisdiction, and which vitally affect the peace and well-being of millions of our own citizens. Pakistan cannot be allowed to seek a solution of its political or other problems at the expense of India and on Indian soil.

Has Pakistan the right to compel at bayonet-point not hundreds, not thousands, not hundreds of thousands, but millions of its citizens to flee their homes? For us, it is an intolerable situation. The fact that we are compelled to give refuge and succour to these unfortunate millions cannot be used as an excuse to push more and more people across our border.

We are proud of our tradition of tolerance. We have always felt contrite and ashamed of our moments of intolerance.

Our nation, our people are dedicated to peace and are not given to talking in terms of war or threat of war. But I should like to caution our people that we may be called upon to bear still heavier burdens.

The problems which confront us are not confined to Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and West Bengal. They are national problems, Indeed the basic problem is an international one.

We have sought to awaken the conscience of the world through our representatives abroad and the representatives of foreign Governments in India. We have appealed to the United Nations, and, at long last, the true dimensions of the problem seem to be making themselves felt in some of the sensitive chanceries of the world. However, I must share with the House, our disappointment at the unconscionably long time which the world is taking to react to this stark tragedy.

Not only India but every country has to consider its interests. I think I am expressing the sentiments of this august House and of our people when I raise my voice against the wanton destruction of peace, good neighbourliness and the elementary principles of humanity by the insensate action of military rulers of Pakistan. They are threatening the peace and stability of the vast segment of humanity represented by India.

We welcome Secretary-General, U Thant's, public appeal. We are glad that a number of States have either responded or are in the process of doing so. But time is the essence of

the matter. Also the question of giving relief to these millions of people is only part of the problem. Relief cannot be perpetual, or permanent, and we do not wish it to be so. Conditions must be created to stop any further influx of refugees and to ensure their early return under credible guarantees for their future safety and well-being. I say with all sense of responsibility that unless this happens, there can be no lasting stability or peace on this subcontinent. We have pleaded with other Powers to recognise this. If the world does not take heed, we shall be constrained to take all measures as may be necessary to ensure our own security and the preservation and development of the structure of our social and economic life.

We are convinced that there can be no military solution to the problem of East Bengal. A political solution must be brought about by those who have the power to do so. World opinion is a great force. It can influence even the most powerful. The Great Powers have a special responsibility. If they exercise their power rightly and expeditiously then only can we look forward to durable peace on our sub-continent. But if they fail--and I sincerely hope that they will^{not} when this suppression of human rights, the uprooting of people, and the continued homelessness of vast numbers of human beings will threaten peace.

This situation cannot be tackled in a partisan spirit or in terms of party politics. The issues involved concern

every citizen. I hope this Parliament, our country and our people will be ready to accept the necessary hardships so that we can discharge our responsibilities to our own people as well as to the millions, who have fled from a reign of terror to take temporary refuge here.

All this imposes on us heavy obligations and the need for stern national discipline. We shall have to make many sacrifices. Our factories and farms must produce more. Our railways and our entire transport and communication system must work uninterruptedly. This is no time for any interplay of regional or sectional interests. Everything must be subordinated to sustain our economic, social and political fabric and to reinforce national solidarity. I appeal to every citizen, every man, woman and child to be imbued with the spirit of service and sacrifice of which, I know, this nation is capable.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's Letter
to President Nixon on Bangla Desh, Indo-Pak
War and Indo-United States relations

The following is the text of Mrs Gandhi's letter:

I am writing at a moment of deep anguish at the unhappy turn which the relations between our two countries have taken.

I am setting aside all pride, prejudice and passion and trying, as calmly as I can, to analyse once again the origins of the tragedy which is being enacted.

There are moments in history when brooding tragedy and its dark shadows can be lightened by recalling great moments of the past. One such great moment which has inspired millions of people to die for liberty was the declaration of independence by the U.S. That declaration stated that whenever any form of Government becomes destructive of man's inalienable rights to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, it was the right of the people to alter or abolish it.

All unprejudiced persons objectively surveying the grim events in Bangla Desh since March 25 have recognized the revolt of 75 million people, a people who were forced to the conclusion that neither their life, nor their liberty, nor the possibility of the pursuit of happiness, was available to them. The world press, radio and television have faithfully recorded the story. The most

perceptive of American scholars who are knowledgeable about the affairs of this sub-continent revealed the anatomy of East Bengal's frustrations.

The tragic war, which is continuing, could have been averted if during the nine months prior to Pakistan attack on us on December 3, the great leaders of the world had paid some attention to the fact of revolt, tried to see the reality of the situation and searched for a genuine basis for reconciliation. I wrote letters along these lines. I undertook a tour in quest of peace at a time when it was extremely difficult to leave the country in the hope of presenting to some of the leaders of the world the situation as I saw it. It was heart-breaking to find that while there was sympathy for the poor refugees, the disease itself was ignored.

War could also have been avoided if the power, influence and authority of all the States and above all of the U.S. had got Sheikh Mujibur Rahman released. Instead, we were told that a civilian administration was being installed. Everyone knows that this civilian administration was a farce: Today the farce has turned into a tragedy.

Lip service was paid to the need for a political solution, but not a single worthwhile step was taken to bring this about. Instead, the rulers of West Pakistan went ahead holding farcical elections to seats which had been arbitrarily declared vacant.

There was not even a whisper that anyone from the outside world had tried to have contact with Mujibur Rahman should be released, or that, even if he were to be kept under detention, contact with him might be established, was not considered practical on the ground that the United States could not urge policies which might lead to the overthrow of President Yahya Khan. While the United States recognized that Mujib was a core factor in the situation and that unquestionably in the long run Pakistan must acquiesce in the direction of greater autonomy for East Pakistan, arguments were advanced to demonstrate the fragility of the situation and of Yahya Khan's difficulty.

Mr President, may I ask you in all sincerity: Was the release or even secret negotiations with a single human being namely, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, more disastrous than the waging of a war?

The fact of the matter is that the rulers of West Pakistan got away with the impression that they could do what they liked because no one, not even the United States would choose to take a public position that while Pakistan's integrity was certainly sacrosanct, human rights, liberty were no less so and that there was a necessary inter-connection between the inviolability of States and the contentment of their people.

Mr President, despite the continued defiance by the

rulers of Pakistan of the most elementary facts of life, we would still have tried our hardest to restrain the mounting pressure as we had for nine long months, and war could have been prevented had the rulers of Pakistan not launched a massive attack on us by bombing our airfields in Amritsar, Pathankot, Srinagar, Avantipur, Uttar Lai, Jodhpur, Ambala and Agra in broad day light on December 3, 1971 at a time when I was away in Calcutta, my colleague, Defence Minister, was due to leave further for Bangalore in the south and another senior colleague of mine, the Finance Minister was in Bombay.

The fact that this initiative was taken at this particular time of our absence from the capital showed perfidious intentions. In the face of this, could we simply sit back trusting that the rulers of Pakistan or those who were advising them, had peaceful, constructive and reasonable intent?

We are asked what we want. We seek nothing for ourselves. We do not want any territory of what was East Pakistan and now constitutes Bangla Desh. We do not want any territory of West Pakistan. We do want lasting peace with Pakistan. But will Pakistan give up its ceaseless and yet pointless agitation of the last 24 years over Kashmir? Are they willing to give up their hate campaign and posture of perpetual hostility towards India? How many times in the last 24 years have my father and I offered a

non-aggression pact to Pakistan? It is a matter of recorded history that each time such an offer was made, Pakistan rejected it out of hand.

We are deeply hurt by the innuendos and insinuations that it was we who have precipitated the crisis and have in any way thwarted the emergence of solutions. I do not really know who is responsible for this calumny. During my visit to the United States, U.K., France, Germany, Austria and Belgium, the point I emphasized, publicly as well as privately, was the immediate need for a political settlement. We waited nine months for it. When Dr Kissinger came in August 1971, I had emphasized to him, the importance of seeking an early political settlement. But we have not received, even to this day, the barest framework of a settlement which would take into account the facts as they are and not as we imagine them to be.

Be that as it may, it is my earnest and sincere hope that with all the knowledge and deep understanding of human affairs you, as President of the United States and reflecting the will the aspirations and idealism of the great American people, will at least let me know where precisely we have gone wrong before your representatives or spokesmen deal with us with such harshness of language.

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