ISLAM IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

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This is to certify that the dissertation entitled *"ISLAM IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL POLITICS"* submitted by **VIKAS K. JAMBHULKAR** in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of the Degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY (M.Phil)** is his original work and has not been submitted for the award of any other degree of this or any other University.

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...TO MY DAD...

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CHAPTER –I

MAJORITY – MINORITY CONTEXT AND THE MEANING OF DEMOCRACY, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND INTERCOMMUNITY PEACE

Introduction

Today the world has entered a new millennium and a new era. Stimulated by the end of the Cold-war, the tidal wave of change witnessed in the past decade has been overwhelming. The conflict between the US and the Soviet Union, which coloured virtually, every dimension of the political, economic, and social aspects of world politics for nearly fifty years is over. The Berlin wall has been dismantled, the Soviet Union has disintegrated, communism has collapsed, Germany is united, and the European Union and the NATO has expanded their geographical reach. Moreover, democracy has spread throughout much of the world and international trade has grown to unprecedented levels.

Still, the hope for a peaceful world remains by a large an agenda for the days to come, as violent conflict remains rampant in much of the world. The bi-polar world during the Cold-war era has given way for the uni-polar world after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. But the fast changing global politics has already paved a way for a multi-polar world, where regional powers are asserting themselves and are playing an influential role

in the global politics.

Ever and all, the 21st century waits for a restructuring of the world politics. The instability after the Cold war, which itself is the product of the stability imposed by the bipolar distribution of power during the Cold war, the proliferation of conventional and unconventional weapons, global environmental deterioration, and the resurgence of nationalism, religious fundamentalism, ethnic conflicts all portend restructuring marked by disorder.

In the late 1980s, the communist world collapsed and the 'Cold War International System' became history, "Islam emerged as a dynamic force in the contemporary world and the movement of Islamic revival has increasing visibility and influence. Previously unnoticed currents of religious convictions has come to the surface and appears to be major element in determining the course of events".[1]

According to Samuel Huntington, "In the post-cold war world, the most important distinctions among people are not ideological, political or economic. They are cultural".[2] In relation to Islam he further argues that, "

[1] Voll, John Obert, 'Islam, Continuity and Change in the Modern World'; Westview Pressm Ine, 1982, p. 1.
[2] Huntington, S.P., "The Clush of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order"; Penguin Books, 1997, p. 21.

In the contemporary world Muslims in massive numbers are simultaneously turning towards Islam as a source of identity, meaning, stability, legitimacy, development, power and hope; hope epitomized in the slogan, 'Islam is the solutions".[3]

International relations as a distinct field of intellectual inquiry is largely a 20th century phenomena. Overtime different paradigms or models have been developed to explain new developments in the world politics as each time new problems crop up. And each time the theoretical framework, which is either applied or altered to fit the situation, depicts the politics of that time. More dominantly two of the theoretical perspectives, i.e., liberalism and realism have been dominating throughout this century one time or the other. These perspectives remained constantly in struggle to define the world politics in their way. During the course of events these paradigms reshaped itself to understand the present conditions which eventually led to the development of neo-liberalism and neo-realism, the extension of the previous to understand and search for new theoretical orientations.

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[3] Ibid., Huntington, S.P., p. 42.

Two Recent Contesting Theories

The End of History

Francis Fukuyama in his book entitled, 'The End of History and the Last Man', has theorized that the world is witnessing the end of the ideological conflict. He argues that with the end of the Cold war the long fought was of ideology, which generated into cold war between the US and the Soviet Russia has ended. In his article, The End of History? He argues, "What we may be witnessing is not just the end of Cold war, or the passing of a particular period of Post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of western liberal democracy as the final form of human government".[4] The end of cold war meant the end of significant conflict in global politics and the emergence of one relatively harmonious world. The trumpets of liberal democracy as he says, and the future will be devoted not to great exhilarating struggles over ideas but rather to resolving mundane economic and technical problems.

Clash of Civilizations

The central theme or the hypothesis of Samnel Huntington in his article, 'The clash of civilizations?' revolves round the clash between

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civilizations. He argues that, "the fundamental source of conflict in this New World will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great division among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation-states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts in global politics will occur between nations and group of different civilizations. The clash of civilization will dominate global politics. The clash of civilization will dominate global politics. The (cultural) faultiness between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future".[5] He postulates the world of civilizations where in cultural communities and differences shape the interest, antagonism and association of states. "Global Politics", as he says, 'has become multipolar and multicivilizational" (Huntington).

Critical Appraisal

Francis Fukuyama's paradigm is limited to only one alternative, which mainly portrays the western world and leaves the rest. As Gurmeet Kanwal puts, "... The end of totalitarianism and communism does not necessarily mean the emergence of liberal democracy. Fukuyama's paradigm is limited in its applicability mainly to the western world and tends to ignore the rest. With the emergence of many new forms of authoritarianism, ethnic

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[5] Huntington, Samnel, 'The Class of Civilization?'

nationalism and religious fundamentalism, it is extremely doubtful whether ideological and physical conflicts will end and the world will witness the end of history".[6] The witnessing of the realignment and the shifting of power bases along with the rise in conflicts have shattered, in contrast, the argument of post-cold war peaceful world.

The hypothesis of Huntington though cannot be reflected, but still, at this juncture, it will be immature to talk about civilizational conflicts, when there itself are conflicts going on within civilization. Apart from this, the complexities of international system cannot be explained by civilization paradigm alone. As major General Dipankar Banerjee states, ".. The entire concept of civilizational conflict attractive though it may seem on the surface, does not fully address the many contradictions in the world today".[7] Also, according to what K.J. Holsti maintains, "... anarchy within states rather than between states is the fundamental condition that explain the prevalence of war since 1945".[8]

Francis Fukuyama's, 'End of History', leaves only one alternative in world politics i.e., liberal democracy. But Huntington's paradigm of civilizational clash' itself reflects that idea, which is evident from the

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[6] Kanwal, Gurmeet, 'The New World Order' : An Apparisal – I, '*Strategic Analysis*', June 1999, p. 22.
[7] Banerjee, Dipankar, 'An Emerging World Order', '*USI Journal*', Jan-March, 1994, p. 42.
[8] Holsti, K.J., 'The State, War and State of War'.

upsurge and resurgence of Islam in international politics. Antagonistically, the west once again has targeted out the ideology to counter, as much as it is confirmed by the phrases used, i.e., 'Islam Vs. the West' or 'the West versus the rest', where Islam comes as a prominent force which is in direct opposition to the West. So, what Francis Fukuyama conceals with the 'end of history' and ideological based war is reflected repeatedly.

A closer look into Samuel Huntington's paradigm of 'clash of civilizations', though it may appear quite appealing suffers with certain limitations. "There is inevitable, much that appeal in such arguments, many of those who challenge western domination, or seek to defend it do so by involving 'civilization' as a term of guidance and legitimization... With the Cold war gone it seems, other rivalries, one of which is that between Islam and the West, will replace it. Yet enticing as it may be, such an approach has its limits".[9] The limitations arise from the various social and political conditions within which particular societies are operating at a certain time and place. For example, the trade conflicts between Japan and US or the rivalries for influence between Russia and the Western States have only a remote relation to civilization. Therefore, it will not be feasible, or desirable to analyze and evaluate different societies on the basis of same criteria.

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[9] Halliday, Fred, `Islam and the Myth of Confrontation', I.B. Tauris Publishers, London, 1995, p. 2.

The formulation that Islam has 'bloody borders' (Huntington), with a perception in the west of 'Islamic threat needs an objective analysis on the basis of various political, social, economic and other conditions prevalent in that particular state or society into consideration apart from that with the perspective of 'civilization clash'. As Fred Halliday mentions, "Myth of Islamic threat, like myth of legitimacy or of nationalism, are part of the rhetorical baggage of political struggle employed by both those who wish to remain in power and those who aspire to attain power. As long as such interest exist, myths will continue to be generated to legitimize, to mislead, to silence, to mobilize".[10] Thus what appears in the process particularly against Islam by the west, is the undemocratic, authoritarian threat of Islam to the west. So is also taken up by the Islamist to provide justification for their own cause, claiming the others as 'Satan' (enemy). What therefore is needed is a better understanding of a problem in a particular society, with different factors taken into consideration while coming to the conclusion, at the same time caution should be taken before generalization.

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[10] Ibid., Halliday, p. 6.

Historical Background

Islam as a world religion was founded by Prophet Muhammad in 7th century AD. It emphasized an uncompromising monotheism and strict adherence to certain religious practices. The word 'Islam' that is used repeatedly in the 'Quran' is in the sense of 'surrender to the will of Allah'. The Quranic theology is rigorously monotheistic. God is absolutely unique, omnipotent, omniscient and merciful. The Muslim creed consists of five articles of faith; (i) belief in one god, (ii) in angels; (iii) in the revealed books; (iv) in the prophets; and (v) in the day of judgement. All the Muslims are directed to practice the five pillars of Islam: (i) to recite the profession of faith atleast once in once life time; (ii) to observe the five daily public and collective prayers; (iii) to pay the zakat (purification tax) for the support of the poor; (iv) to fast from day break to sunset during the entirity of the month of Ramadan; and (v) to perform if physically and financially possible the Hag; or pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca.

Despite the notion of a unified and consolidated community, which was called as 'Ummah' (muslim community), violent differences, arose among the muslims, within a few years after the death of Prophet Muhammad. In the aftermath mainly two types of theologies came forward – i.e., the 'Sunni' theology and the 'Shiia' theology. The Sunnis identified as

(orthodox), were also the central community of Islam, condemned schism and branded it as opposed to the orthodox belief or against Islamic belief. It developed at the same time the opposite trend of accommodation, catholicity and synthesis.

Shiia Islam arose from a purely political conflict in the late 7th century. Under the old Iranian influence, the Shiia developed a doctrine of esoteric knowledge. Such a doctrine was adopted also by the Sufis, an ascetic movement that arose, largely within orthodoxy, in reaction to the worldliness of the early muslim dynasties. Under the banner of 'Jihad' the sufis inaugurated a much more massive expansion that was mainly responsible for the establishment of faith in India, Central Asia, Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa.

In muslim tradition the socio-political community that was created in Medina provides a model for what a truly Islamic state and society should be. The emphasis on the sole sovereignty of god provides an important foundation for Islamic political thinking throughout the centuries. In contrast to tribal groups, the new community, or 'Ummah', was open to any one who made the basic affirmation of faith, and loyalty to the 'Ummah' was to supersede any other loyalty, whether to class, family, or commercial partnership.

The 20th Century Development

During and after the first world war there emerged a change in the muslim world. With the demise of the Ottaman empire the last of the older Muslim Political System came to an end. The Ottoman Sultanate was formally abolished as part of reforms in the wake of new Turkish nationalism led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. In Iran Qayar dynasty was overthrown, retaining monarchy, Reza Shah, the new leader, worked to create a new state system. During the period between the two world wars, the Islamic movements that emerged, developed in the context of more secular radicalism or nationalism. Indian muslims began to identify in terms of Indian nationalism, though during this period, we find that they supported the preservation of the Ottoman Caliphate. During the course of time other muslims identifying themselves as separate community demanded for a separate nation, which ultimately led to the partition and the creation of the Muslim state of Pakistan.

Another movement evolved that advocated more direct adoption of Islam in its modern society. The most important movements amongst others were the Muslim Brotherhood, established in Egypt in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna, and the Jamaat-I Islami (Islamic Society) founded in India in 1941 by

Mawlana Abu a-Ala Mawdudi. "These groups, and other like them opposed the more traditional, popular Islamic practices and conservative ulama, as well as criticized the secularism of West. They argued that Islam defined a whole way of life and should be applied in economics and politics as well as in individual religious life.".[11] In the second half of the 20th century when the European imperialism came to an end, muslim societies became politically independent; the final step was the end of the Soviet Union, where from emerged new states in Muslim majority areas in the 1990s.

In already independent states of Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia, Turkey upheld a democratic pattern of Kemalism, Iran under Reza Shah and his son, Muhammad Raza Shah continued westernizing reforms. Later the monarchy was overthrown by the 1979 Islamic revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini, which became the indication of resurgence of political Islam in the late 29th century. Saudi Arabia maintained its strict Islamic approach. The newly independent states of Morocco, Jordan, Oman, and Malaysia continued monarchies, which were legitimized try the conservative interpretation of Islam in these societies.

Thus historically, and taking into consideration the recent developments in the political Islam we can very well make out that the socio-

[11] The Encyclopedia of Politics and Religion Vol. 1, Routledge London, 1998, p. 390.

political movement in the different regions of Islam gave way to a different pattern of governance. The new radicalism in the newly emerged Islamic states included Islam in its platform so as to strengthen itself, after the demise of the European imperialism that left them in a shattered position and in a new framework of a state system in contrast to the Islamic 'Ummah'.

Distribution of Muslim Population in the World

"The number of people who adhere to Islam in any ethnic group is often a guess. The data available on adherents are fragmentary and unreliable because, first, muslim communities do not have organized officially recognized churches with membership list, and second, in Africa conversion is a continuing process with Islam finding adherents in nearly every ethnic groups".[12] Muslims live in nearly every country in the world. They form the majority of the population of nearly 46 states and form an identifiable minority population in nearly 45 states. At least there are 800 million adherents of Islam all over the world.

"The muslim population increased dramatically from 12.4 per cent in 1900 to 18 per cent in 1980. And by 2025 it may probably account for about 30 per cent of the world's population. The territory of independent muslim

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[12] Weekes, Richard V., ed., *Muslim Peoples – A World of Ethnographic Survey*', Greenwood Press, 1978, p, xxxiv.

societies rose from 1.8 million square miles in1920 to over 11 million square mile in 1993".[13]

The Islamic regimes are more profoundly dominant in the North Africa, Middle East and the East Asian continents. In the North African region, Algeria has approximately 99 per cent majority population of muslims, Libya 99 per cent; Egypt 92 per cent; Sudan 90 per cent; Niger 90 per cent, Mali 90 per cent; Gambia 98 per cent; Tunisia 99 per cent. The minority population region include, Cameroon 5 per cent; Central African Republic 5 per cent; Ghana 33 per cent; Israel 8 per cent; Kenya 30 per cent and Liberia 45 per cent.

In the Middle East and Asia the majority population countries are, Iran 99 per cent; Kuwait 90 per cent; Bahrain 90 per cent; Saudi Arabia 95 per cent; Quatar 95 per cent; UAE 90 per cent; Yamen 100 per cent; Oman 99 per cent; Pakistan 97 per cent; Maldives 100 per cent; Bangladesh 85 per cent. The minority population regions are, Bulgaria 19.3 per cent; Yugoslavia 21.5 per cent; India 12 per cent; Sri Lanka 7.6 per cent.

In the East Asian region the majority population regions are, Indonesia 90 per cent; Malaysia 54 per cent; Brunei 70 per cent. The minority

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[13] Ibid., Huntington, pp. 65-66.

population regions are Singapore 15 per cent, Thailand 12 per cent; Mauritius 17 per cent; China 10.5 per cent.

Taken in average the population in the majority regions has 92 per cent population adhering to Islam. Whereas in the minority region 17 per cent of the population in average are muslims. Over all muslims form about 25 per cent of world population.

Classification of Muslim Minority and Majority

At least there are 800 million adherents of Islam all over the world. These can be differentiated by dividing majority and minority states on the basis of the population and the status they share in each state. 'There is a wide consensus among sociologists that the term 'minority group' should not be regarded as a statistical concept', as written by American sociologist Preston Valien in the Dictionary of Social Sciences published under the auspices of UNESCO. In other words, 'a minority group' may very well be the majority in a given country.[14] While differing with the meaning of minority given in the Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary which defines it 'as a part of population differing in some characteristics and often subjected to differential treatment', M.Ali Kettani reasons that, "...those who

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[14] Rodinson, Maxime, ed., Gerard Chaliand, Minority People in the Age of Nation-States, Ajanta Pub. Delhi, 1990, p. 55.

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possess these differential characteristics are not aware of them, such a group

of people can hardly be termed as a minority merely because of the existence

of those differential characteristics".[15] Kettani also attributes this awareness

to the majority, who is aware of the differential characteristics and melts

differential treatments upon those having these characteristics making them

aware of its differential position.

Thus, it can be held that minority cannot just be of only statistical

nature, but also that they should be aware of their minority position, Kettani

defines muslim minority as "a part of a population differing because it's

members are muslims and are often subjected to differential treatment".[16] It

follows that, a muslim community numerically inferior but politically

superior cannot be called a minority, e.g., Moghul India. In the same way,

muslims though numerically superior but relegated to position of

insignificance should be considered a minority, e.g., Albania, Ethiopia, and

Tanzania.

Ali Kettani defines majority muslims as ".... Those muslims who live

in those countries which define themselves as muslims by being members of

the organization of the Islamic conference, whose permanent secretariat is in

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[15] Kettani, Ali M., 'Muslim Minorities in the World Today', Mansell Publication Ltd., London, 1986, p. 1.
[16] Ibid., Kettani, Ali M., p. 2.

Jeddah, Saudi Arabia".[17]

Islam in Domestic and Foreign Policy

The world wide distribution of muslim population can be calculated to about 800 million, divided in both the majority and the minority states play a substantial role in the world politics as well as the population within the individual state has also substantially shaped the domestic politics of the state. It can be seen that the population in the minority states also plays a great role internally and externally. The minority countries of India and China form a substantial population in comparison of the overall muslim population.

Most of the Islamic states are poor economies except the oil rich states, and weak governments. The concept of 'Ummah' which means muslim community binds the muslims in these majority and minority states. The organization of Islamic conference furthers this concept. The policy of performing 'Hajj' by visiting the holy city of Mecca, further is meant to strengthen the bonds of the 'Ummah' and the feeling of muslim brotherhood. After the prolonged subjugation under the colonial regimes, the muslim community is finding itself in a difficult position to leave the old Islamic concept of 'Ummah' and is yet to settle down in terms with the modern state

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[17] Ibid., Kettani, Ali M., p. 238.

concept. But it, as the state is here to stay and considering the realities of the time the Islamic politics is taking shape with this new reality. The muslim politics can be categorised into these main distinctions, apart from the independent policies of the majority muslim state in world politics, on the basis of their adjustment in the new realities of nation states. Firstly, Assimilation policy – wherein the muslims have assimilated themselves into the mainstream polity of the state along with the majority community, deriving and demanding participation for the interest of their community. Secondly, autonomy within the state structure demanding for an autonomous governance of their region within the mainstream working of the majorities on state. Thirdly, Independence of secessionist movements, wherein the muslims have struggled and are struggling of independence of their provinces which has led to many secessionist movements throughout the world, demanding independence from the state.

All these patterns have evolved the Islamic polity and their resurgence in the world politics, with the majority muslim kin states supporting the causes of the minorities by having a pro-policy towards these minorities and criticizing the majoritarian rule in such states. This has become the threshold of conflict between the states and also within the states.

This conflict within and between the states, in K.J. Holsti's term, can

be attributed to the 'weak states', who are not able to command 'vertical' and 'horizontal' legitimacy in these states. To him, state strength "is not measured in military terms, it is rather, the capacity of the state to command loyalty – the right to rule – to extract the resources necessary to rule and provide services, to maintain that essential element of sovereignty, a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within defined territorial limits, and to operate within the context of a consensus – based political community". Apart from this due to lack of clear political ideology, the struggle for leadership within the state structure and in the international state community of the muslims, what remains is to evoke the cultural and religious identity as a medium to bind the people as a nation and also to counter the external threat. Thus, a transformation in turbulence is going on within muslim nations for which 'Islam' is evoked very often in the state policies to mobilize and unite the muslim people.

Diversity and Pluralism, Agenda for Peace, Democracy and Social Justice

The world order in relation to the contemporary world politics appears to have undergone a fundamental transformation. Previously established patterns have changed and new patterns have emerged. "... If market, technology, human rights and democracy are de-scarlising some of the old boundaries; nationalism, statism, racism and ethnicity are re-scralising

others".[18] At this vintage point it has become necessary to think afresh of what the world order should be not only at the international relation level of global order but also at the state level. Domestic and foreign affairs has always formed a seamless web and the need to treat them as such is urgent in this time of enormous transformation'.[19] It is also necessary as to what K.J. Holsti says, "... theories of international relations will have to veer away from Russian's insight and recognize that anarchy within states rather than between states is the fundamental condition that explains prevalence of war since 1945".[20]

A dominant ideology has always been followed by the dominant power, which has created monopolies of knowledge. As Halliday points out "... beneath all universalist discourse lie structure of domination and power that impose the system of one group of states on the other and inflict a superiors rationality on human experience".[21] 'The history of international theory and specially the ways in which international thought has been categorised, has created privileges; that is to say primary and dominant understanding and interpretation (Steve Smith)'.[22] The international relation theory so far be it the realist or the liberals failed to acknowledge the link

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[18] Ommomen, · T.K., "Citizenship, Nationality, and Ethnicity: Reconciling Competing Identities', Cambridge Polity Press, 1997, p. 148.
[19] Rosernau, James, Along Domestic Foreign Frontiers, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 5.
[20] Ibid., Holsti, K.J., p. 82.
[21] Ibid., Halliday, Fred., p. 3.
[22] Smith, Steve, p. 1.

between social practice and the constitution of social knowledge. As Steve Smith further argues that, "What international theory rarely accepts, is that our rationalization of the international is self constitutive of that practices. The selfsame reason which rules our thinking also helps constitute international practice. In short, international theory is implicated in the international practice because of the way that theory in the main divorces ethics from politics, and instead promotes understanding via a reason' separated from ethical or moral concerns".[23] Power and a hegemonic concept of reason have done much to distort our understanding of the contemporary world and of the ethical issues embodied in it".[24]

It is not as such that the theories of democracy, peace and social justice has lost their relevance to this context and liberal political culture not suited to the world politics. What is therefore, required is to look into these theories with a sense of ethic, which demands the inclusion of plurality and diversity as the guiding agents of democracy, peace and social justice. In this context it has become very necessary to deal, with the majority and the minority views within the state structure in individuality, as well as to accommodate the various cultural, religious or ethnic differences in the global context. The 'fault lines between civilizations', what Huntington says, has to be analyzed

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[23] Smith, Steve, p. 3.
[24] Ibid., Halliday, Fred, p. 4.

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
taking into consideration various factors – societal, economic as well as political, in that particular context. 'A diversity of voices is a reality and a desirable one both within societies and between them, and there are many contexts in which such diversity should be welcomed".[25]

Thus, when we analyze the Muslim world – the majority and the minority Muslims, we find that there is lot of disparity amongst the minorities. Wherever Muslims live as minorities they increasingly face the problem of discrimination. This is partly due to the historical and political factors, partly due to the media, which has conformed for many that Muslims are violent, unreliable and prove to anarchy. Akbar Ahmad says, "... the problem is therefore, not only of the minority but of the majority. If the majority is a little bit more tolerant and imaginative it will be able to deal with the minorities more fairly, and Muslims in return would respond more positively. The non-muslim voices of tolerance and compassion are easily drowned".[26] So has been the struggle of the muslim majority states in the international arena to establish themselves against the hegemonic corrupt and immoralistic western powers. The sense of retaining their identity had brought these states against the west and the US. It is not as such that the Muslim states do not want to modernize, but what they do not want is to get

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[25] Ibid., Halliday, Fred, p. 4.
[26] Ahmad, Akbar's, Islam Today: A Short Introduction to the Muslim World', I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999.

westernized.

Modernity, secularism, and rationality mean nothing if they do not help in creating and sustaining individual and collective choices in the society. Democratic process intensifies power struggle in the societal arrangement and hence assertion of various identities assumes vital importance. It also leads to correcting of balance of power in the society. Pluralism legitimates new lifestyles and activities and hence not only becomes possible but also desirable.

To conclude, pluralism and diversity are the main agendas of the democratic structural arrangement of the world. Though it will take time to conceptualize the modalities of rendering the democratization in the new framework. As T.K. Oommen writes, "... A world society conceptualized in terms of equality of opportunity, accessibility to justice and institutionalization of democracy and human rights is certainly desirable, but remains a distant dream, if not a mere utopia. But a world society discerned in terms of world culture, one civilization, one communication system and the like is not only not possible but also not desirable".[27]

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[27] Oommen T.K., Contested Boundaries and Emerging Pluralism, Sociological Bulletin 44(2), Sept. 1995.

CHAPTER – II

THE MUSLIM MAJORITIES AND THEIR POLITICAL AGENDA

The 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran set a wave of Islamization throughout the muslim world. It has been a constant endeavor of the muslims to establish an Islamic state governed by Islamic laws and tenets. In this process, they discarded fully the western pattern of democracy and secularism. It denounced the western way of life on the basis that it is contrary to the life in Islam, and its ways of liberal governance on the basis that Islam provides a perfect model for governance. Mostly colonized by the western exploitative powers, they directed their policies, in such a manner so as to establish a strong state. The Islamic community, after the end of the colonial power found themselves in a new state structure form in contrast to their own concept of 'Ummah' (Islamic community) thus, resorting to Islam as an ideological binding factor in their fragmented society. In this chapter, three Islamic majority countries – Indonesia, Pakistan and Iran are taken to show, how the Islamic communities in the majority states put forth their agendas in the domestic as well as in the international arenas.

Indonesia

Indonesia is the fourth largest nation in the world in terms of its population. It is the home to the largest muslim population in the world; about 88 per cent of the total population of Indonesia is muslim. Apart form muslims there were 11.94 million protestants and 5.78 million Roman Catholics. There were also 1.81 million Buddhist, and 3.59 million Hindus (Statesman Year Book, 2000). Christian missionary influence is strongest in eastern Indonesia. Hinduism is mostly influential in eastern Indonesia, particularly on the Island of Bali and of a few small enclaves in Java. Christianity, Buddhism and Confucianism are strong amongst the Chinese minority. Islam has been the religion of the majority. Islam has been the religion of the majority of Indonesians since the early sixteenth century. Indonesia achieved independence in 1949 after 350 years of Dutch colonization, three and half years of Japanese occupation and a four-year war for independence.[1]

In the 50 years since independence, Indonesia has had only two Presidents Sukarno and Suharto. The third one Wahid during the recent Presidential elections. Like most other authoritarian leaders of post-colonial states, Sukarno invested heavily in the symbols of development such as big

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[1] Madrid, Robin, 'Islamic Students in the Indonesia, Student Movement, 1998-99: Forces for Moderation, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 31, No. 3, July-Sept. 1999, p. 18.

hotels and fancy air ports; his economic policies were a middle mix of symbolism socialism, and capitalism. He succeeded in achieving national integration, in the process of which he discarded the federal form of government that the Dutch had imposed and established Indonesian as national language. As he was integrating the nation, he was simultaneously creating new dimension. Older territorial and ethnic identities were replaced or refined by party identities. Village life under Sukarno became increasingly tense with struggle between members of Communist Party (PKI), sometimes allied with Sukarno, and anti-Communist in other parties. In 1965, Sukarno was effectively deposed by the military.

Suharto an obscure mid-level general, became the new President. He distinguished himself from Sukarno in three principal ways. He implemented neoclassical economic policies that attracted foreign investment. He presented himself as a dignified, modest family man – Bapal (father) in opposition to the womanizing flamboyant image of Sukarno, and he was militarily anti-communist. The Islamic community given its role in his rise to power and his anti-communism expected a new role for Islam in the state. They were deeply disappointed, as Suharto's new order regime was committed to excluding ordinary Indonesians form political life.[2]

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[2] Ibid. p. 18.

Presently, Abdurrahman Wahid who was elected President following the elections of June 1999. Wahid is the first Islamist politician of a moderate variety, to assume the highest office in a South East Asian nation. Wahid believes in Islam that is tolerant and encompassing. As a leader of Nahadatul Ullema, a 30 million strong Islamic Organization, Gus Dur, as Wahid is called by his followers and by most Indonesians, has been critical of certain aspects of militant Islam. He has come out openly against institutionalizing religion and had said that, multireligious countries like India and Indonesia follow a non-sectarian agenda.[3]

East-Timor Crisis

East Timor in the SouthEastern region of Indonesia was under Portuguese rule and is predominantly Christian. East Timor, witn a population of just four lakh, was annexed by Indonesia in 1995, and it was believed that General Suharto had the quiet acquiescence of the United States for it. The Portuguese, however, did not recognize the Indonesian takeover. The United Nations also did not recognizing Indonesia's sovereignty over East Timor and protests against Indonesian rule had continued in East Timor, though in low key. After the fall of General Suharto, the ensuing period of uncertainty and instability led to East Timorese intensifying their struggle,

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[3] Frontline, March 3, 2000, p. 48.

which soon became an armed insurrection. Eventually it led to Indonesia under President Habibie agreeing to hold a referendum between autonomy and independence. The referendum was held under the UN supervision and predictably the vote went in favor of independence.[4]

Another province of Aceh is widely held to be the next most plausible candidate for independence. With the empending emergence of East Timor as an independent state, the Acehnese aspirations were triggered. They held massive rallies demanding the holding of a referendum for independence. The province of Aceh is pre-dominantly muslim with a population of about four million. The Acehnese are devout muslims, but the overwhelming majority of other Indonesia are also muslims. This should mitigate in Aceh the sense of alienation that has contributed to unrest among religious minorities elsewhere in South East Asia.[5]

If the Aceh eventually becomes independent, is going to affect the Asian Countries. The Philippines and Thailand have Islamic agitationist in their border regions. If these provinces try to break away on the plea of lack of human rights, development and equal opportunities, it could lead to a chaotic situation in many countries like Myanmar and Malaysia, apart from

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[4] The Hindustan Times, November 30, 1999.
[5] Emmerson,Donald K., will Indonesia Survive?, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 3, May/June 2000, pp. 100-101.

the Philippines and Thailand.[6] But Wahid had explained his position that the referendum he envisioned, the Acehnese would be allowed to decide only whether to apply Islamic laws inside their province, not whether to withdraw from the republic.[7]

Role of Islam

Though approximately 90 per cent of Indonesia's population of some 150 million are Muslims in one sense or another, the Republic is not an Islamic state. Spokesman for Indonesia has insisted that the Republic is neither a theocratic nor a secular state. Moreover Indonesian government, especially from the advent of the New Order inaugurated by General Suharto, have taken great care not to allow foreign policy to be dictated by Islamic considerations. Islam, however, is not without influence on Indonesia's foreign policy, but that influence has been expressed much more in the form of constraint than in positive motivation.

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[6] The Hindustan Times, November 30, 1999.
[7] Ibid., Emmerson, Donald K. p. 103.

If one tries to access the Islamic factor in Indonesia's foreign policy, one is obliged to begin by nothing the absence of single cultural traditions within the post-colonial state. The national motto 'Unity in diversity', constitutes a statement of aspiration rather than one of established fact. The most fundamental source of diversity is the communal division between nominal and observant adherents of the Islamic faith, which is not most acute on the private Island of Java, which contains almost two-thirds of the country's population.[8]

Foreign policy in Indonesia is in the formal charge of government department. However, ultimate sanctions for its conduct comes from military establishment, whose formative experience has produced a strong disposition against Islam, regarded as danger to national unity. Heavy military representation in senior diplomatic post and within the higher echelons of the foreign ministry provided visible assurance that the external priorities of the armed forces will not be disregarded. However, the civilian section of the Foreign Ministry had been permitted freedom of initiative in areas where matters of security do not impinge too directly. Relations with Arab-Islamic states fall under this heading but have not proved to be a matter of controversy because the consensus, which pervades the armed forces over the

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[8] Leifer, Michael, (ed.), Adeed Dawrsha, Islam in Foreign Policy, Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 144-145.

issue of Islam, extends to the Foreign Ministry.[9]

The Islamic factor in Indonesia's foreign policy has become more significant over the decade since independence because of the greater convergence of International and domestic muslim dimensions. Islam within Indonesia has become a bitter force with a sense of denial of rightful political entitlement. Although, permitted formal expression within a controlled political system, it has been denied a place in the symbols of state. Indeed it has been obliged to defer to a state symbolism which arouses resentment rather than an intended sense of harmony. Islamic resurgence is nevertheless a fact of life stimulated by the domestic impact of a development policy based on western orthodoxies and also by international associations and solidarity. The Indonesian government has been conscious of the need to take account of muslim feeling in the conduct of foreign policy. The government has always sought to strike a balance in foreign policy where Islamic issues are concerned in an attempt to appease that opinion without appearing to enhance the standing of political Islam or to validate its domestic political claims.[10]

In Indonesia, Islam has entered the foreign policy process more by way

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[9] Ibid., p. 150.
[10] Ibid., p. 157.

of challenge than by way of support. Domestic circumstances have been responsible for this state of affairs correspondingly; successive governments have made a conscious attempt to exercise a co-religionist dimension from foreign policy wherever possible because of its perceived threat to national unity. Because of these same domestic circumstances, it has been found necessary also to engage cautiously in Arab-Islamic issues internationally as a practical means to neutralize political challenges willing to exploit a co-religionist dimension. In addition, such cautious engagement has been used to secure international support over matters deemed vital to Indonesia's interest. However, Islam does not provide a natural meeting ground between Indonesia and other states. Indonesia prefers to keep the Arab-Islamic world at a distance, because Islam remains a divisive force within the republic the more to be feared because of its international resurgence.[11]

Pakistan

The army coup in Pakistan on Oct. 12, 1999 led to the dismissal of the civilian government and suspension of its Parliament and constitution.[12] It was Pakistan's fourth coup after 11 years of democracy, the last coup being led by General Muhammed Zia-ul Haq on July 5, 1977 resulting in a

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[11] Ibid., p. 158.
[12] The Hindustan Times, Oct. 13, 1999.

prolonged spell of martial law. The Oct. 12, 1999 coup has been a bloodless coup characterized by very little political opposition. Democracy in Pakistan is still fragile with military intervention predominant. But also, it is not only military intervention that has destablised the democratic process; the responsibility for the failure of democracy also lies with politicians.[13]

Demography and Society in Pakistan

The total population of Pakistan according to 1998 census is approximately 130.5 million people. The considerable ethnic diversity within Pakistan is overwhelming muslim i.e., about 97 per cent (81 census), it is divided, not only by race but also by linguistic and tribal differences. The Punjabi are the principal ethnic group, comprising about two-third of the total population. Other major groups are the Sindhi which account for 13 per cent, Pashtun (Iranian) which account for 8.5 per cent, Urlu, 7.6 per cent, and Balochi 2.5 per cent. The muslims are also divided into Shia which are 15 to 20 per cent to the predominantly Sunni muslim population. The Hindus, Parses, Buddhists and others fall in the rest of two percent.

The Punjabis, Sindhis, Balochis and Pathans are the major ethnic streams of Pakistan. These ethnic communities dominate particular regions,

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[13] Ahmar, Moonis, Where is Pakistan Heading? Implications of the cout D'Etat, World Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 1, Jan/March, 2000, p. 64.

i.e., Punjabis in Punjab, Sindhis in Sindh, Pathan in North West Frontier Province, and Baloch in Balochistan and before the creation of Bangladesh, Bangalis in East Pakistan. The Punjabis and Pushtun, the numerically larger people command disproportionately large number of position in the army, government and higher echelons of civil services. There are hardly any Baloch or Sindhi high ranking officials in the armed forces and very few in government sectors. The majority in Pakistan are muslims, but Islam does not play the same role ethnic identity does in articulating community demands.[14] This has resulted in the demand for greater provincial autonomy for Balochistan, Sindh and North-West Frontier Province.

There are also secretarial differences within the muslim community, which goes to intolerable extent. The overwhelming majority of people of Pakistan are Sunnis, Shia's constitute a minority sect. As many as 70 Shias had been killed in the fortnight preceding Parvez Musharraf's coup.[15] In another incident 15 Shia worshipers were killed on 12 April in the central Pakistan city of Khanpur. Lt. General Haider stated to the BBC that the killings was a consequence of spread of hatred.[16] Another example of sectarian differences can be found in the case of Ahmads, with whom

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[14] Chadda, Maya, Talibanization of Pakistan's Transitional Democracy, World Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 3, July/Sept. 1999, p. 108.
[15] The Hindustan Times, December 13, 2000.
[16] The Hindu, April 4, 2000.

muslims have minor theological differences. Most religious groups ever since the emergence of the sect have baited them, particularly by the Ahrar. The Ahrar are demanding that the Ahmadis be declared non-muslims and followers of the sect purged from government jobs. In July at a rally in Lahore, the head of the influential Tanzeem-i-Islami organisation stated that the government and muslims have a right to commit a general massacre of the Ahmadis.[17]

This situation emanated from the fact that in Pakistan, the Ulama differed radically one very single issue of the Islamic interpretation of a modern state 'whatever claims regarding the tolerance of Islam be made the 'Ulama' are not prepared to grant equal rights to non-muslims in an Islamic state.[18]

Pakistan's Polity

Pakistan's politics had constantly been in search of an ideology. Caught between modern concepts of state theories and Islamization the polity had been unstable throughout the years since its independence. Every ruler in Pakistan, be it the popularly elected government or the military regime experimented the inclusion of Islamic rule and experienced its outcome.

[17] The Hindustan Times, December 13, 1999.
[18] Bahadur, Kalim, Islam, Sharia, Ulama, World Focus, Vol. 13, No. 7, July 1992, p. 10.

Though the people have nurtured political aspirations of the democratic rather than theocratic type, it is only the religious leaders and fundamentalist parties who have persisted in promoting this line.[19] As Benazir Bhutto the former Prime Minister of Pakistan says, "to substitute for the lack of popular support, a two pronged strategy was prepared. First, to exploit the name of religion to give legitimacy to an otherwise illegitimate regime, and second, to eliminate the democratic choices illegitimatic choices through judicial abuse".[20]

The successive regimes in Pakistan till the mid-seventies were ambivalent towards the Islamic issues in the country. The emergence of General Zia-ul Haq as a military ruler in 1977, ushered a new phase when Islamization of Pakistan became the official policy of the regime. Zia declared the introduction of Islam as an essential pre-requisite for the country. A series of Islamization measures were introduced. The prominent among them were the 'Hudood' ordinance dealing with adultery, rape etc., law regarding Islamic penalties for theft etc., followed by the establishment of the Shariat benches in the provincial High Court and an appellate Shariat bench in the Supreme Court. These benches were to declare any law void,

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[19] Chengappa, Bidanda M., Pakistan: Insight into Islamisation, Strategic Analysis, Vol. XXII, No. 11, February 1999, p. 1695.
[20] The Hindustan Time, December 5, 1999.

which was found repugnant to the Quran and the 'Sunnah'.

The Pakistan's People Party (PPT) under Benazir Bhutto could not completely abandon Zia's legacy with General Ishaqhe Khan, formerly a key advisor to Zia, as the President of Pakistan, and the Senate hostile to any move to reverse Zia's Islamization process. In 1989, a modified version of 1985 Shariat Bill was passed. It lapsed as the assemblies were dissolved in 1990.

Again, the Nawaz Sharif regime first from 1990 to 1993 and second from 1997 to 1999, saw the Islamization process. He raked up the Shariat Bill issue to gain legitimacy since the fairness of the 1990 election was questioned. In his second spell he introduced the 15th amendment bill, by which, the federal government will be empowered to issue directives and make laws for implementation of the Islamic process. This amendment also serves to render the constitution and Parliament irrelevant so as to concentrate all powers in the hands of the Prime Minister. The time in which Sharif put up the Islamization process itself was conducive. As after the nuclear test, resulting in US sanctions, the economy of Pakistan was in shambles. Moreover the frustration of the fallout of the Kargil endeavor made the Sharif government unpopular, the missile attack on Afghanistan by America in which few people from Pakistan were killed raised strong

reaction from the right wing fundamentalist parties and anti-US sentiments, which questioned the credibility of Sharif's government. Also, the Islamization process is linked to the signing of Comprehensive test Ban Treaty since there is no consensus on this issue. Thus, at this juncture Islamization became more relevant for Nawaz Sharif for securing legitimacy.[21] Bindada also states 'the argument that the Prime Minister's option for 'Shariatisation' was in order to concentrate political power in his hands, rather than for any genuine religious reasons'.[22]

There are three major Islamic fundamentalist parties in Pakistan, they are, Jamaat-I-Islam, Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam and Jamiat-e-ulema-e-Pakistan. These fundamentalist parties have never been able to gain popularity and political power. These parties demand for a theocratic state and have promoted the ideology that Islam can provide the best form of governance by ensuring a social system characterized by justice and emancipation from economic exploitation. But they never touched the basic socio-economic issues, to nearer themselves to the masses. The Jamaat's co-operation with the military government, the extremist sectarian politics by militant organization like Sipah-e-Sahaba and Tahrik-e-Jafaria have rendered

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[21] Pattanaik, Smarti S., Islam and the Ideology of Pakistan, Strategic Analysis, Vol. XXII, No. 9, December 98, p. 1285.
[22] Ibid., p. 1287.

sectarian violent and bloody conflicts. 'The Tablighi Jammat movement, based on the Deobandhi or Wahabi movement, a Sunni orthodox belief system, implicitly excluded Shiites and Sufis, as well as other groups like the Ahmadis. The Blasphemy laws, that had been radicalized during the Zia's period, have made the minorities vulnerable to exploitation – minor quarrels involving lands are falsely portrayed as blasphemy and an effort is made to implicate people to settle scores.[23]

Kashmir Issue

It was during Zia's period that Islamization had peaked and given rise to militant fundamentalism directed against India. Zia in July 1988 launched 'operation Topac' which was planned to wreck the Indian security and political fabric by waging low intensity or proxy war, 'Kargil was perhaps the highest point of operation Topac'.[24] The Inter Service Intelligence was chosen by Zia so that it would deny any complicity of Pakistan in such conflicts. Pakistan demanded that Kashmir should be included in Pakistan on the basis of muslim majority state. It led to two wars in 1948 and 1965 in which Pakistan was defeated. Henceforth Pakistan opted a low profile strategy particularly since the period of Zia, by fueling the minds of Kashmiri

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[23]   The Hindustan Times, December 10, 1999.
[24]   The Hindustan Times, November 30, 1999.

youth in the name of Islam against India.

After Zia's death, Mrs. Benazir Bhutto appeared to make very little difference. To her Kashmir dispute was the major dispute between India and Pakistan. During her time she did not give much attention to the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, as its policy was based on independent Kashmir, and instead enthusiastically extended the support to the mujahadeen and other pro-Pakistani groups who wanted Kashmir to be included in Pakistan. During the Nawaz Sharif's regime, the Kargil issue, opened the inclusion of hired Afghan mercenaries in the region.

The military take over by General Parvez Musharaff, disposing Sharif, has also given prominence to the Kashmir issue. General Musharaff 'had ruled out any parleys with India unless the main issue of Kashmir is discussed'.[25]   Thus, Kashmir is the focal point which has been kept burning throughout the history of Pakistan – India relationship.

Foreign Policy

External relations have always been of major importance to Pakistan. Obsessed with the threats to national security and in search of ways to

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[25]   Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, (ed.), Dawisha, Adeed, Islam in Foreign Policy, Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 68.

supplement military capability, the Pakistan elite looked towards the only

major source of assistance available to them – the US. 'Even as Pakistan

entered into alliance relationship with the west, it regularly expressed a

desire to cultivate its Islamic ties, reminding the muslim world that Pakistan

was the only modern state created exclusively in the name of Islam'.[26] The

Foreign Policy of Pakistan reflects how Islam as a state policy has

determined its relations with the countries of the world.

Pakistan's foreign policy much is centered around India and to curtail

India's dominance in the region. Kashmir has been the issue throughout its

relations with India. According to the news report, the military government

of Pakistan had prepared a new policy on Kashmir under the directive of

Chief Executive, General Parvez Musharaff. According to this policy,

Pakistan would use all resources and means to internationalise the Kashmir

issue.[27] Earlier Parvez Mushraff ruled out any other talk with India unless

Kashmir is discussed. Thus Kashmir is at the forefront of the military regime

of Musharaff. "If Kashmir goes, the ideology of Pakistan goes. The

liquidation of Pakistan as a state may then only be a matter of time".[28] The

remarks shows the extent, how much the Kashmir factor is important for

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[26] In Hindu, December 14, 1999.

[27] The Hindu, December 14, 1999.

[28] Al-Mujahid, Sharif, India Pakistan Relations: An Analysis, Foreign Policy of Pakistan – An Analysis, Department of International Relations, University of Karachi, 1964, p. 43.

Pakistan, importantly to keep its domestic polity and society in shape and united.

Pakistan's relations with America came to low after the nuclear explosion. US laid economic sanctions against Pakistan and is also pressuring and pursuing it to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). 'It was at this juncture that Sharif, on August 28, 1998 chose to announce his plans for Islamization'.[29] In the sense that religious rule would appease the clergy and in turn unable him to sign the CTBT without domestic political opposition. In 1996 Pakistan voted in favor of CTBT in the UN General Assembly. The official position during the military led Musharaff government has not changed as, the Foreign Minster categorically stated that "If India conducts another nuclear explosion before the CTBT comes into force, nothing in or outside, the treaty can foreclose Pakistan's right to do so, whether it has signed the treaty or not"[30] Thus, linking its stand to that of India's, it has maintained the security threat perception from India.

'The Post-Chagai period, plagued with an economic crisis, the Islamic cord could come in handy to strengthen its linkages with the oil rich West Asian States'.[31] The Prime Minister, prior to the announcement, undertook

[29] Ibid., no. 19, Chengappa, Bidanda M., p. 1702.
[30] The Hindustan Times, November 26, 1999.
[31] Ibid, no. 19, Chengappa, Bidanda M., p. 1702.

visits to these states in order to obtain financial support from them; to overcome its economic setbacks accelerated afterwards by US sanctions.

Thus, historically in the Pakistani foreign policy, Islam has been used and propagated by Pakistan's political or military rulers, whenever they had found themselves in deep political waters.

Iran

A new phase seems to have occurred in the Iranian politics, what Mr. Abdullah Nouri the former interior minister and Vice-President of Iran, called the 'Third Revolution', in his defense statement of his trial, before the special court for the clergy in charge that Khordad, the news paper of which he was the Managing Editor, had violated provisions of the Press Code.[32] The pro-reformist movement, sweeped the February 18 and the May 5 Presidential elections in Iran. The reformist headed by Mr. Khatami gained 120 out of 185 seats in the first round and 46 seats out of 66 in the second round of polling and assured a simple majority in the 290 members house.[33] In Nouri's words, the overthrow of the Shah was the first and Imam Khomeini labelled the take-over of the US embassy the second. For the second time, after Hojatolessam Syed Mohammed Khatami's landslide

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[32] The Hindu, December 12, 1999.
[33] The Hundu, May 7, 2000.

victory in May 1997 Presidential elections, the conservatives were given a strong reminder of the popular attitude towards them, when the reformists swept the recent Presidential elections.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Shia muslim spiritual leaders, steered the revolution in Iran ultimately dissolving the Shah's regime, and Iran was declared an Islamic Republic on April 1, 1979. The supreme authority since then vested in the hands of religious leader (Wali Fagih) Ayatollah Khomeini holding this position for the rest of his life till 1989. The constitution of December 1979 established Shi'ite Islam as the official state religion and placed supreme power in the hands of nation's religious leader (Wali-Fagih). The 'Fagih' is supreme commander of the armed forces and the revolutionary guard, can declare war, and can dismiss the President.

Population

The population of Iran according to the 1996 census was 60.1 million. Much of its population resides in the Urban areas. Iran is a multiethnic country predominated by the Persian ethnic population that account for two third of its total population i.e. 65.85 per cent. The principal minority groups are the Turks, which account for 11.80 per cent and the Kurds, which account for 5.86 per cent. They speak their own language and dialects. The Baluch, Arabs, Bakhtiari, Lur, Amaq are other minority ethnic sects which fall up in line. Atleast 93 per cent of Iranians are Shiite muslims, 6 per cent are Sunni muslims (1990), and 1 per cent are Zoroastrians, Jews, Bahais, or Christians. In all the muslim population in Iran account for atleast 99 per cent of its total population. The religious ethnic minorities in Iran face discrimination state sponsored or otherwise since the revolution. The most blatant religious discrimination has been directed against Bahaiis, although other religious minorities have also suffered.

Khomeini's Era and Islamization

Iran has gone through many political upheavals, but it was Khomeini's revolution that has become the basis of what Iran is politically today. As Mahmood Monshipouri states, "Two revolutions dominated Iran's twentieth

century political history: the constitutional revolution (1905-1911) and the Islamic Revolution (1978-79) whereas the first revolution failed to leave a lasting imprint on the region, the second vastly altered the regions political dynamics. Led by Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini, the Islamic Revolution toppled the regime of Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi – ending 2,500 years of monarchy – and caused a wave of Islamic populism that spread through the Middle East and North Africa".[34] As early as the 1940s, Khomeini had led a movement against moral corruption, arguing that social decay spawned by urbanization was a threat to public morals and decency. After the 1950s, Khomeini blamed the Pahlvi Dynasty for society's social and economic ills. The Islamic Revolution aimed to defeat the Pahlavi Dynasty whose interest were too intimately enmeshed with those of the West especially those of the US. Also it was a reaction to the secularization by the Shahs. This became the backdrop of Khomeini's Islamic revolution and the establishment of Islamic Iran.

'Khomeini's assumption of the supreme political leadership of Iran and the conception of the absolute power of the 'fagih', in that role have been based on his insistence on the implementation of Islamic laws and

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[34] Monshipouri, Mohamood, Islamism, Secularism and Human Rights in the Middle East, Lynne Rienner Pub. Inc., 1998, p. 171.

ordinances, and the absolute power of the 'fagih' as the supreme political leaders of the Islamic state of Iran'.[35] He concentrated in 'fagih' a supreme leadership, he is head of the army, the security services, the judiciary, he has the final say on both internal and international affairs, and it is his duty to ensure that all political actions is the excecutious of God's will.

The Islamization during Khomeini's period culminated into curtailment of rights of the people and discrimination of the minorities. Constant human rights violations caused large number of Iranian intelligentsia and managers to leave the country. Paramilitary groups such as the revolutionary guards and Basiji's (those who are mobilized) created a climate of fear as they hunted down books, tapes and videos that promoted western culture in Iran. 'Though in the Iranian constitution, protection of rights is similar to that in most constitutions. Each right is qualified, however, by a statement that the right can be exercised only within Islamic standards – i.e., rights can be restricted in the name of Islam'.[36] The government guaranteed the rights of women according to Islamic standards. Since the conventional Islamic standard towards women relegates them to a lower status to that of men, this policy runs counter to internationally

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[35] Seifzadeh, Hossein, (ed.), Mutalib, Hussin, and Taj-ul-Islam Hashmi, ; 'Islam, Muslims and the Modern State', St. Martin Press Inc., 1994, p. 197.
[36] Ibid., no. 34, Monshipouri, Mahmood, p. 184.

recognized norms. Similarly article 24 does not allow press publications contrary to Islamic principles. Hence, whenever the press did not co-operate with the clerics, it was gashed by the government in the name of Islamization. The Iranian constitution thus reflected clerical power and interest much more than equality during Khomeini's period.

Khomeini's period can be considered as the dark period for women. 'It was the Islamic regime's principal objective to restore women to their traditional role in society – a role based on domestic responsibility motherhood, the raising of children and submission to a husband'.[37] In its pursuit many changes in Iranian personal statue law have been carried out, that denied constitutional rights to women. The lowering of women's marriage age to 13 years, the Shia practice of 'muta' marriage, the hajab (Islamic dress code), exclusion in the fields of education and a unilateral right to divorce to a man along other criminal codes all relegated women to low status and denial of their rights.

Khomeini's period is also responsible for the discriminatory treatment of religious and ethnic minorities in Iran. The Bahais face the most blatant religious discrimination in comparison to other minority religions. The ethnic tribal minority, the Kurds is the most visible tribal victims. They are

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[37] Ibid., no. 34, p. 188.

the major minority population in Iran and are demanding for a separate Kurdish state.

The Baha'sis are scattered in small communities throughout Iran, but most live in Tehran. Although, they are the largest non-muslim minority in Iran. They lack the status of a legitimate religion under strict muslim law. Bahais are the followers of Mirza Husayn Ali Nuri (1817-1892), known as Bhaiullah (glory of god). During the 20th century Bahaism had evolved into a religion. Following the proclamation of the Islamic Republic in 1979, the Iranian government refused to recognize the Bahais as a religious minority. They were declared apostate and were forbidden to hold government positions, all of their religious and testimonials activities were officially banned in 1983 and their schools were closed and their prosperity confiscated. Their marriages are also not recognized and they are banned from working for or receiving aid from social welfare organization.

The Kurds are the largest ethnic minority in Iran. The Kurds were viewed as an integral part of the Islamic community and were to be treated like any other ethnic minority. The Islamic Republic's constitution recognized no Kurdish minority rights, but Kurdish leaders, including Abdullah Rahman Ghassemleu and Sheikh Izzeddin Husseini, rejected Khomeini's views and had demanded autonomy for these minority. By early

1984 when the Kurds failed to come to terms with negotiations with the central government, the Kurdish resistance in Iran had since taken the form of sporadic guerilla actions.

Muhammad Khatami's Period of Reforms

The second time win of the reformist in the Iranian Presidential elections have certainly given a blow to the conservatives 'President Muhammad Khatami has succeeded in making the theocratic state less restrictive. But a growing number of Iranians – the bold, the thoughtful the young – want an administration and a judiciary that are free from clerical despotism'.[38] Khatami's coming to power, though have set an urge for reforms in Iran, but fundamental change is yet on the board. The constraining factor is that, the President is subordinate to Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khameini's, who represents the religious establishment and also because hard-line clerics are still well entrenched in the majlis (Parliament). In a speech delivered by Khatami, he sought to position himself midway between conservatives and reformers. Stating that his reforms were within the framework of the constitution that guarantees the republic as well as Islamic characteristic of the regime.[39]

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[38] The Economist, February 19, 2000.
[39] The Hindu, May 24, 2000.

Khatami has certainly brought greater freedom and tolerance in political and social Iran. The freedom of press has been reasonably upheld. Female students can now compete with male students for university seats in all engineering fields previously reserved solely for male students. He has also contributed to the opening up of the political climate in Iran by supporting the formation of different political parties and supporting the rule of land. In the meeting of Islamic conference Summit held in Tehran December 9-11, 1997, Khatami placed several important issues on the agenda, including the Islamic character of human rights, support for women and the family, cooperation among muslim states and condemnation of terrorism.[40] But the biggest problem of the pro-reform camp is that 21 years of conservative control has caused so much of damage that there are vast areas were reforms are disparately needed. 'Whether it is in the areas of civil liberties, democratic rights, the functioning of the Judiciary, management of the economy or Irans relations with the outside world, the conservatives have introduced so much of abnormalities into the system that any cleansing exercise has to be all pervasive and comprehensive'.[41]

Foreign Policy

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[40] Ibid., no. 34, Monshipouri, Mahmood, p. 182.
[41] Frontline, March 17, 2000.

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It was the Shah's policy domestic and foreign, which led to his downfall and the emergence of the revolution of 1979. During the Shah's regime, Iran's policy was that of a total reliance on the west, especially the US, as a means of maintaining the Shah's regime and the territorial integrity and political independence of Iran. Secondly, it identified the Soviet Union and communism as a main source of threat and finally it held up the policy of friendship with pro-western and anti Soviet States.

The ideological perspective that drove the foreign policy of Iran during the Khomeini's period was the principle of rule of theocracy. As opposed to the Shah's policy, it rejected the dependence on either the West and the East and identified United States as the principal enemy of the Islamic revolution. Khomeini did not see why Iran should have any relationship with the United States. He charged that Iran's relationship with the United States was that of a 'tyrant' (zalem) with an 'oppressed' (mazhum) people'.[42]

Following this line, Iran's policy in this phase became anti-imperialism and it sought for closer ties with the Third World Countries, especially those with muslim countries. Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati has said that in establishing relations with other states, Iran accords the highest priority to

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[42] Ramazani, R.K., (ed.), Dawisha, Adeed, Islam in Foreign Policy, Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 10.

muslim states, followed by other Third World States and then others.[43] The regime determined to break away from its isolation in international politics that followed the taking of American hostages, stepped up its ties with wide varieties of countries, such as Syria, Turkey, Pakistan, North Korea, India and others, using its oil in barter deal.

Khomeini's fundamentalist Islam clashed first with Bazargn's libertarian Islam, then with Bani-Sadr's socialist Islam and finally with Rajavi's Marxist Islam. The domestic political instability reflects the proliferation of ideologies of both secular and religious varieties and silencing them was more by resort to coercion than efforts of accommodation.

The Khatami government had brought reprieve both on the domestic front and the international. The steady decline of extremist political influence in the post Khomeini era has gradually eased. state control of political life. Khatami's government is trying to foster its relations with the European Union and also with America. During his visit to Germany, which is also the largest trading partner to Iran, Khatami spoke about a 'new beginning' in Iran's relations with major EU economic powers. Earlier he

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[43] Ibid., Dawisha, Adeed, p. 21.

had visited France and Italy in the previous year.[44] Khatami's period is a period of transition, with lots of expectations and hope in the domestic politics as well as in international relations.

To conclude, thus, as we have seen in this chapter, muslim majority states have evolved in a particular historical conditions. A common pattern among these states is that they share an authoritative type of government, in which Islam plays a dominant form of ideology. But this ideology had been frequently used by the political elites to harness their interests and stringent structures were evolved to be lessen the scope of dissent. Another notable point in these states is that, though constitutionally they provide for the protection of the minority rights, but at another pertex they are covertly curtailed, at the same time. In Iran, the minority forms a subjugated population, and has no right to dissent. Indonesia's military regimes have tried to keep Islam's influence on its policy but in practice the ethnic minorities are facing alienation in the majoritarian muslim Indonesia. So is the case of Pakistan where various governments have tried to impose Islam from outside. The political elites are fighting within themselves for gaining power and Islam has always been used as a stabilizing and legitimizing factor for the instability and unpopularity of their regimes. Differences between

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[44] The Hindu, July 12, 2000.

sects, ethnicity and religion have been the targets by the majority and the denial of rights to these minorities, ethnic by coercion or covertly by Blaspheme laws.

Upsurges can be noticed in these regimes from the people for democratic rights, which have been forcefully quitened. Though Iran is showing some developments from its previous position, Pakistan has partially taken a back seat, while Indonesia is trying to balance between Islamism and democratic rights. But the issues of democratic rights in these regions are uncertain and are fluctuating at a low degree, to grant these rights.

CHAPTER – III

THE MUSLIM MINORITTIES AND THEIR AGENDA

Introduction

Muslims in minority countries are playing a significant role in shaping the political course of the state. The three muslim minority countries – China, India and Israel, i.e., South East Asia, South Asia and the Middle East respectively. While India and Israel have a democratic form of government, China is a communist state. Nevertheless, there are some aspects which are unique in each and form the core, regardless the form of government. Each state has its own unique socio-political background under which Islam is playing its part. The assertions of muslims in China, India and Israel, though Islamic are not same in their tone. Muslims in these countries have reacted to the peculiar situation present in that particular state. They have organised themselves to the extent that their presence be felt and their demands addressed to politics in these muslim minority countries, be it the domestic policies or the foreign policies, are shaped accordingly the part muslims in these countries are playing the role and vise-versa.

The politics in the muslim minority countries have also gained lot of importance and attention in the international arena. The problems of conflict escalation and resolution has taken new dimensions with states acting and aligning one way or the other diplomatically to serve their national interest and security. Thus, for example, the Kashmir problem in India has gained international attention, and India's policy towards it has shaped its international relations. So is the case with Chinese muslims, where the muslim upsurge had not only drawn international attention, but has also changed China's political behaviour towards its muslim population. Israel's case is also one of those in which, the resolution of conflict has taken a centre stage in the government's policy, no doubt keeping the security of the state as an prime objective.

A closer look into the politics in these muslim minority countries – China, India and Israel, will shed some light over the issue and it will be possible to make an assessment of the politics devolving in these countries.

China

Islam arrived in China within a few decades after the death of Prophet Mohammad. There has not been much written material available on the Chinese muslims, their society and belief before the seventeenth century, and

the first writing dating back to this century. Thus leaving the muslims of China in the cold storage of unidentification. The recent assertions of muslims in China, has brought the issues of Chinese muslims to the fore and are shaping events with China as well as outside. As around the globe, in China also, ethnic and national movements has arisen to the fore-front of social and political action. The melting pot has erupted into a 'cauldron' of ethnicities ... Though both modernization and Marxist theories of nationalism have predicted the demise of national identities, the recent assertion of these identities in the political arena has cast doubt on, if not repudiated, these assimilationist assumptions.[1] Two contrasting views have generally prevailed in understanding the muslim minorities in China. As Gladney Dru explains, "... At one extreme are those who portray the Hui as 'Muslims in China' – communities defined solely in terms of their religion".[2] This has led to the assumption that, Islam in China is by defination, potentially rebellions and secessionist, and the Hui, often portrayed as homogenous muslim community in an alien land. Accordingly, this view holds that assimilation or recession is the only option available to muslims in China. The other exptreme view, to what Dru refers is that Hui are virtually indistinguishable from the large population, differing only in certain religious

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[1] Dru C. Gladney, Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People's Republic, Harward University Press, 1996, p. xiii.
[2] Ibid., Dru C. Gladney, p. 21.

beliefs. According to Gladney, the Hui consists of various ethnic groups, with linguistic diversity and multicultural background. This has also been recognized by the State Commission of Nationality Affairs, China, apart from nine other muslim minority nationalities recognized by the state.

Muslims in the People's Republic of China account for nearly 20 million of the poopulation. Comparably they are very less if we look upon the entire population of China. The reasserting of their identity on a national and transnational level calls into question many assumptions about the nature of Chinese society, ethnicity and national identity. Mostly situated in the Xinjiang Uigur autonomous region, North-West of China, the muslims have generally been marginalized on the geographic and social horizons of discourse and power in China. With the independence of the Central Asian nations, there is only one large muslim population remaining under communist rule: the muslim population in China.

Economic liberalism in China in contradiction to the regime government of the communist has opened various issues of conflict. The conflict which is systemic in nature. The hard handed rule of the communist had been challenged on various occasions and on various issues. The pre-democratic movement and the Tinament Square insidence, the movement for the freedom of press, religion and belief among other issues, the international

pressure on the Human Rights issue etc., are all opposed to the doctrinaires and the cadre regime of the Communist government. These voices are not going unheard and the changing domestic policies and international relations of China are finding way to come in terms to the conditions which has been graving the situation. No doubt, the unity of the People's Republic is the foremost, and other issues will not be permitted to its cost.

Religion is discouraged by the communist government of China. It regards religion as superstition. 'The current religious revival in China, then, responds to a burden of personal and collective suffering over fifty years that is inexplicable through communist belief. It also seeks to fill the immense moral and cultural void that has been excavated at the centre of Chinese life by the communist rule'.[3]

Anti-Chinese sentiments in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region intensified in early 90 and in April as many as 60 people were reported killed when government troops opened fire on muslim protestors. A new compaign to repress the Islamic reperatist movement was initiated by the Chinese government with a heavy hand. The decade starting from the 90's has seen many incidence of splitist movement in the Xinjiang Uygur region. It was reported in the Hong Kong news paper Ming Pao, on 7 October 1998, that

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[3] Waldron, Arthur, Religious Revivals in Communist China, Orbis, Vol. 42, No. 2, Spring 98.

international terrorist activities have been gradually connected with China. It

has also maintained in addition that Xinjiang's Islamic forces also have ties

with the Afghan ruling group, the Taliban.[4]   Wang Leguan (Regional

Communist Party Secretary) from the Xinjing Uyghur Autonomous Region

openly attacted the Taliban for helping to train pro-independence elements in

carrying out terrorist activities in Xinjiang.   It was also reported that

Kazakhstan and Turkey are also supporting and training the Xinjiang

independence activists.

In a report by the Tiwanese Central News Agency Web Site, on 16th

December 1998, some 300 representatives of Xinjjiang dissident groups from

more than 10 countries met in Turkey and pledged to oppose mainland

Chinese imperial rule in Xianjing and work for its independence. They also

called the Chinese government to stop prosecuting the Uighurs and release

Uighur political prisoners immediately.[5] A report by Xinjiang People's radio

on 16th March 2000 said that, 11 people charged with act of splitting the

country, robbery, setting to explosions, theft and illegally making explosives

were executed in Xinjiang.[6] Another report by the Chinese regional radio

from Xinjiang, maintained that during the period year 1999 almost 19

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[4]   Summary of World Broadcast – Asian Pacific, Part 3, October 8, 1998. P. G/8.
[5]   Summary of World Broadcast – Asia Pacific, Part 3, December 19, 1998, p. G/10.
[6]   Summary of World Broadcasting – Asia Pacific, part 3, March 21, 2000, p. G/2.

policemen were killed in Xinjiang while fighting against terrorism and splittism.[7] Recently 18 splittist elements were sent to jail by the Xinjiang production and construction Branch of the Xinjiang Autonomous Regional Higher People's Court, holding that the behaviour of the 18 criminals seriously undermined national security and constitute the crime of splitting the nation, and therefore must be severely punished.[8]

The Chinese government claim that these splittist and terrorist groups are handful fo people driven by personal interest and do not claim support from the majority of muslim population. It has employed a wide propaganda in this region to promote nationality, solidarity and to safeguard social stability.[9] It has also warned against propaganda work illegal religious forces. The party Chief of Xinjiang mentioned that, the overwhelming majority of personalities in religious circles are patriotic, and only a small handful fo them are involved in separatist sabotage activities.[10]

Distribution of Population

After the foundation of People's Republic, the muslims were identified as specific nationalities, leading to the creation or recognition of 10 so-called

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[7] Summary of World Broadcast – Asia Pacific, Part 3, March 23, 2000, p. G/11.
[8] Summary of World Broadcast – Asia and Pacific, Part 3, May 2, 2000, p. G/3.
[9] Summary of World Broadcast – Asia and Pacific, Part 3, , Feb. 19, 2000, p. G/13.
[10] Summary of World Broadcast – Asia and Pacific, Part 3, December 14, 1998, p. G/10.

muslim nationalities in China: the Hui, Uigur, Kazak, Dongxiang, Kirghiz, Salar, Tadjik, Uzbek, Baoan and Tatar. Other muslims in Tibet, Mongolia, Yunnan and Sichuan who were smaller in number and did not have a language of their own, however, were merely grouped with the Hui as one nationality. The Hui is the most numerous minority followed by the Uighur which also has a substantial population. In total, the muslims in China, according to the 1990 cnesus accounts for 17.5 million, which represents approximately about 2 per cent of the total population of China.[11]

The Hui are the most widespread and numerous with population of atleast 8.6 million according to the 1990 census (Gladney, Dru). They are mostly situated in the inner China region and are sparce at the broader regions. They are specially located at Ningxia, Gansu, Henan, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Yunnan, Hebei and Shaudong. They speak Sino-Tibetan language. Followed by the Hui minority the second most populous muslim minority are the Uighur which are located in the Xinjiang. They amount for a total population of 7.2 million and they speak Altaic (Turkic) language. The Kazak, Donxiang, Kirghiz, Salar, Tadjik, Uzbek, Baoan and Tatar are the rest which follow in the line. Except the Tadjik who speak Indo-European language, rest speak the Altaic (Turkic) language. These are also mostly

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[11] Dru C. Gladney, Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People's Republic, Harward University Press,, 1996, p. 20.

situated in the Xinjiang province with sparce distribution in other provinces.

The Hui minority as it is more widespread has more autonomous administrative units assigned to them, than any other minority. While the Hui have their own Ningxia Autonomous Region, they constitute only one-third of its population, the Han being the majority there. By contrast, 99.8 per cent of the Uighur population live in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.

China's Policy

The Chinese policy towards its minorities dates back to the Jiangsi Soviet political resolution of the sixth National Congress held in Moscow from July to September 1928 which called for a unified China and at the same time, recognised the principle of national self-determination as one of the major slogans of Chinese revolution. "This may be interpreted in two ways", as Dawa Norbu says, "One, 'self determination' here means self-government or autonomy, which was the Chinese substitute for self-determination. Two, it kept both options open to national minorities. They could either remain within the fold of the new China or secede from it".[12]

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[12] Norbu, Dawa, China's Policy Towards its Minority Nationalities in the Nineties, China Report, Vol. 27, No. 3, July-Sept. 1991, p. 220.

There was a gradual change in the CPC's attitude towards its minorities in the aftermath. When the CPC was sphere heading the communist movement in China in the twenties, the CPC had propounded the goal of self-determination for China's national minorities, to the extent of encouraging them to become independent countries. From 1935 onwards, under the leadership of Mao Zedong, the CPC espoused China's national interest and began to reformulate its policies around the crucial national goal. 'The issue of China's unification and integrity became the focal point of attention'.[13] Eventually, it led in constituting National Regional Autonomy in the minority areas. Thus, the policy of self-determination was substituted by autonomy, giving them equality with other nationalities within a single Chinese nation.

The national minorities had mixed reaction to the integration policy, where the smaller minority groups are not in favour of secession. 'The single larger minorities, like Tibetan, Mongols, and Uyghurs are dissatisfactorily bound to the PRC in the kind of uneasy marriage, and hence occasionally express their desire for freedom, even if this would materially affect their living standard and development. This yearning for freedom is like a scared fire which would never b e extinct'.[14] The reason is that, for long, there has

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[13] I-Shu, Huang, National Minorities of China, China Report, Vol. 32, No. 1, Jan.-March, 1996, p. 19.
[14] Ibid., I-Shu, Huang, p. 19.

been a clash of interest between different nationalities in China. Secondly the international trend after the second, world war, of minorities forming a nation-state, is still being waged in many parts of the world.

The domestic policy of China is trying to passivate the flux of secessationist activities by both means of carrot and stick. China, in its constitution has given religious freedom to the muslims. Responding to the critical report on religion in China, published by the US state department, the Vice-President of Islamic Association of China, Wan Yaobin, endorsed that religious activities of muslims are protected by law.[15] The IX NCP (National People's Congress) has called for legislation law to promote law making in Ethnic Minority Regions. It is expected to improve the quality of legiislation in ethnic minority areas, facilitate implementing the strategy of developing China's West in a big way and promote economic development in ethnic minority regions.[16] China also has set up developmental plans for the western region. In an interview with the news paper 'Xinjiang Ribao' Wang Lequan, Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party's fifth Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Regional Committee, has outlilne plans for the development of western region. He said that development would focus on building infrastructure restructuring the regional economy and improving

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[15] News from China, October 27, 1999, Vol. XI, No. 41, p. 40.
[16] News from China, March 22, 2000, Vol. XII, No. 12, p. 5.

environmental protection.[17] He said that the regional government has earmarked 70 billion yuan for various development projects.

'In China's immediate future, however, religion seems likely to be a secondary factor in process of change ...., religion may well turn out to be a more important factor in the foreign policy than in domestic politics'.[18] In the foreign policy level at present Beijing is attempting to avoid penalties for violating human rights and manage its uneasy relations with foreign religions groups active in China. In this endeavbour, its relations with the Islamic countries of the Middle East are also taking shape. State sponsored Hajj has also increased and several muslim students are presently enrolled in Islamic and Arabic Studies at the Al-Azhar University in Egypt. Delegations of foreign muslims regularly travel to prominent Islamic sites in China, in a kind of state sponsored religious tourism. By establishing trade partnership for arms, commodities and currency exchanges with the muslim countries it is through its diplomacy trying to persue them for taking a strong stand against the terrorist and the splittist elements operating in the various respective states. China has asked Pakistan which is its close ally to crack down on the Tableeghi Jammat, a muslim group suspect of arming fundamentalist in Xinjiang. So, also, it expects kazakhstan to crack down on

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[17] Summary of World Broadcast – Asia and Pacific, Part 3, March 6, 2000, p. G/3.
[18] Waldron, Arthur, Religions Revivals in Communist China, Orbis, Volo. 42, No. 2, Spring 1998. P. 333.

separatist groups headquartered there. The Chinese President Jiang Zemin signed an agreement with counterparts from kazakhstan, Kirgyzstan and Tajikistan in "April 1996 that included calls to oppose seperatism.[19]

India

Muslims in India has a long history starting from the 7th century AD. Before the advent of British colonization, muslims had been ruling many parts of India and had been responsible for political unification of India one time or the other. The advent of nationalism in India came along with the struggle against the British and India was transformed into a single nation-state in the modern sense. But the seeds of communalism were already sowed by the British during the freedom struggle by its policy of divide and rule, favouring one community against other. The independence of India brought into fore, the division of the country into India and Pakistan. Pakistan formed on the basis of religion. The partition of the country and the demand for the separate muslim state put forward and persuied by Muhammad Ali Jinna since 1940 on the basis of two nation theory culminated into the creation of Pakistan. But the purpose of partition (by which the muslim population was to be provided homeland) itself could not be served as a large number of muslim popultion preferred to live in India.

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[19] Forney, Matt., Far-Eastern Economic Review, Feb. 27, 1997, p. 20.

The Indian muslims thus became the part of the Indian polity and were accorded minority status, equality and religious freedom and protection of their rights by the constitution of India.

The muslims in India are widely settled throughout the country. After the independence, muslims have participated in the political process of the country and have raised their voices and issues, using the means and institutions, and political process of the country. It is viewed that muslims have common interest from those of others and must operate in politics as a single collective entity, still holds much appeal for large section of muslim opinion. But in reality the muslims in India are far from homogenous. As Gopal Krishna puts "... Because of its large size and dispersion over all states, differences of languages, economic conditions, sect, culture and traditions are as much to be found within it, as in the rest of the Indian society..., these differences are asserting themselves, and the political pluralization of the muslim electorate is continuing despite the impulse to the contrary".20

The currents of Islamic thoughts, have also taken several forms, from the orthodox traditional view to the secularised and nationalist. The most

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[20] Krishna, Gopal, ed. Madan, T.N., Muslim Communties in South Asia, Culture, Society and Power, Manohar Publication, 1995, p. 384.

eminent representative of the traditional orthodox view is Maulana Abul

Hasan Ali Nadwi. His primary concern was solidarity of community at home

and the success of muslim powers abroad, which he associated with Islam.

'In India he maintains, muslims are representatives of the Muhammad

Ibrahimi civilization, and the purpose of their stay here must be its defence,

in which also lies their own safety. Muslims must not allow the lines of

demarcation between themselves and others to be blurred'.[21] In contrast are

the secularist, whose most outspoken representative is hamid Dalwai from

Maharashtra. A modernist, he finds much that is unacceptable in muslim

tradition, social practices and political outlook. He criticized the separatist

tendencies and exports muslims to review critically their past, their laws and

customs, and the ethos of their society. He feels that such a self-scrutiny

would review the need of a movement for reforms in all respect. The

Nationalist Ulama, continue to uphold the position, that nationalities are and

must be based on countries, not as religion, and therfore Islam cannot be the

basis of nationality.

'In India, the Islamic development has inevitably focused on local

issues. Here the muslim concerns have been the same that they were in the

first quarter of century after independence, namely, how do muslims relate to

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[21] Ibid., Madan, T.N., p. 387.

India, and how do they ensure that the muslim identity is preserved and muslim rights are protected'.[22] In a press statement at New Delhi, on 9th July 1999,' major muslim organizations formulated a muslim agenda in connection with the coming General Elections and to place it before the leaders of all major secular parties. The head representatives of muslim organisations of national eminance, namely the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-I-hind, the Jamat-e-Islami Hind, All India Hilli Council, All India Muslim Personal Law Board and All India Muslim Kajlis-e-Mushawarat were present. The agenda was largely based on issues like, continuing under representation in the legislatures and the power structure, in public employment and higher education, discrimination in distribution of development and welfare benefit.[23]

Kashmir

Terrorism, sessasonist movements and demand for autonomy, as well as participation in the mainstream politics of India has been the characteristics of muslim population residing in Kashmir region of India. On June 26, 2000, the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly, adopted by voice vote, for the greater autonomy to the state. Dr. Farooq Abdulla, the Chief Minister of the state said that "granting greater autonomy to the state

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[22] Ibid., Madan, T.N., p. 393.
[23] Muslim India, August 1999, p. 351.

was the matter of restoration of rights".[24] The demand for greater autonomy to the state has generated much disturbances in the political corridors. The cabinet meeting of the BJP led coilation government rejected the demand put forward by Dr. Abdulla.

Since 1989, terrorism has been rampant in the Kashmir valley. Atleast forty-four militant and secessonist groups had been identified in Kashmir which are either pro-Pakistan or/and demanding independence for Kashmir. The two most prominent among these are the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which is demanding for independent Kashmir and the Hizbul-Mujahideen, which demands an Islamic state and association with Pakistan. Kashmiri muslims have been crossing the border to Pakistan occupied Kashmir and receiving miliitary training. 'The valley has also been infiltrated by foreign Islamic 'jihad' fighters (Mujahidden). The best known mujahidden group is Harkat-ul-Ansar, headquartered in Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistan Kashmir. It boosts a membershiip drawn from Pakistani, Afghani, Labanese, Egyptian, Algerian, Saudi, Syrian, and Sudanese origins'.[25] The very recent major incidence that diverted the international attention was the hyjacking of the IC 814 flight of Indian Airlines on

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[24] The Hindu, June 27, 2000.
[25] Tremblay, Reeta Chowdhari, National Identity and the Intervening Role of the State: A Study of Secessionist Movement in Kashmir, Pacific Affair, Vol. 69, No. 4, P1996-97, p. 472.

December 24, 1999 on its way from Kathmandu to New Delhi.[26] The plane was taken to Kandahar in Afghanistan. The Hyjackers on 26 December demanded the release of Maulana Masood Azhar and four other milittants detained in Indian jail, for the hostages taken which comprised of 178 passangers and 11 crew on board. The militants are believed to be affiliated to the dreaded Harkat-ul-Ansar, now relabelled harkat-ul-mujahadeen.

Population Distribution

India is a multireligious, multiethnic, and multilingual country. The people in this country are complexly interwoven and hence no particular community or group can be singled out in a compartment. There are six major religions in India – Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Sikh, Buddhist and Jain. Among these Hindus are the predominant accounting for 82 per cent of the total population. The other important religions with their population are – muslims (12.12 per cent). Christians (2.34 per cent), Sikhs (1.94 per cent), Buddhist (0.76 per cent) and Jain (0.40 per cent) census of India 1991.

The muslim population is widely spread throughout the country. They are the second largest religious community accounting for 101.59 million persons in the country, according to the 1991 census of India. Among the

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[26] The Hindu, December 25, 1999.

states and union territories the highest proportion of muslims has been recorded in Lakshadweep with 94.31 per cent, though the number of muslims is only 48,765. The proportion of muslims is significantly higher in Assam (28.43 per cent) West Bengal (23.61 per cent), Kerala (23.32 per cent), Uttar Pradesh (17.33 per cent), Bihar (14.80 per cent) and Karnataka (11.63 per cent). In the remaining states and Union Territories, the proportion of muslims is less than the national average of 12.12 per cent. The states having less than 2 per cent of muslim popultion are Orissa, Himachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh, Punjab, Sikkim and Mizoram.

Muslim Organizations

Religiously, the Sunni majority in India is divided into two schools, the Deobandi and the Bareilvi, located in the North Western Uttar Pradesh. Two religious movements have been affecting the lives tablighi Jamaat. The Jamaat-e-Islami is centered in Delhi and it looks into all those problems that muslim community faces. The Tablighi Jamaat is mainly concerned with the spiritual welfare of the muslims. The basic religious education is imparted to muslim, children in Islamic primary schools called 'makatib' or 'madaris'. The Jamiyat-ul-Ulema which is centered at Delhi looks into the matter of establishing these primary schools. The All India Muslim Personal Law Board is generally concerned with the implementation and the working of Muslim Personal Law based on sharya.

Apart from these there are many muslim education centres and associations. The Indian Association of Muslim Social Scientists, with its centre in New Delhi, promotes research and development of social sciences, encouraging muslim social scientists to highlight the Islamic perspective relating to various issues in social sciences and human ties, as well as problems faced by the muslim community in .India. The Institute of Objective studies, also based in Delhi was founded in March 1986 with the purpose of promoting imperical and conceptual studies and research on issues

and problems of contemporary relevance to Indian polity, society, economy culture and religion. It also awards fellowship and scholarships for promoting the aims and objectives of the institution. These educational institutions also publish books pamphlets, periodicals, monographs, and project reports for wider dissemination of the institutes programmes and points of view.

India's Policy

India is a democratic country and the Indian constitution has guranteed the fundamental rights of the minorities in India. They have complete freedom to profess and practice its religion. They have all the rights to establish and maintain their educational and cultural institutions. In India Muslim Personal Law according to the Sharia is in force. It deals with the civil matters of the muslims.

Political assimilation and participation has also been the characteristics of the muslim population. By and large muslims have supported the Congress Party, which was a ruling party in its initial phases, committeed to secularism and protection of minority interests. But the incidence of the demolition of Babri Masjid on December 6, 1992 during which the Congress government was in power, has seen the loss of faith in Congress. The BJP,

with its 'Hindutwa' propaganda and the 'car seva', ultimately was responsible for the demolition , is now in power lacks the support of Muslims. The democratic process of India has enabled muslim leaders to mobilize muslim opinion effectively on issues bearing upon muslim personal laws and on religious concerns, focusing on the status of the Babri Masque in Ayodhya, as well as Sahman Rushdie's novel 'The 'Satamic verses'. The demand for autonomy for Kashmir by the Chief Minister was taken up to the Prime Minister. He said, while adressing to the media in New Delhi on 30th June that the resolution passed by the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly on the autonomy issue was within the framework of the constitution and that the issue would be discussed by the Union Cabinet.[27]

On the foreign policy front, India's relation with Pakistan had been the most conflicting. India accuses Pakistan for sponsoring terrorism in Kashmir. Though Pakistan denies its hand in sponsoring terrorism, it certainly claims that, the Kashmir issue is the root cause on India – Pakistan tension. It claims of giving moral support to the Kashmiri freedom fighters. India took steps during the 90's to normalize relations with Pakistan but it usually ended in a deadlock. The Bus Diplomacy was initiated, wherein India and Pakistan signed the 'Lahore Declaration', in October/November

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[27] The Hindu, July 1, 2000.

1998. But due to escalation of conflict in the Kargil sector of India by the militants supported by Pakistani troops, the peace process has taken a backsent.

India has been consistantly taking steps and initiating dialogues in the international arena focusing on terrorism. It has improved its relations with America. During his visit to India, President Bill Clinton on March 27, delivered a tough message to Pakistan to stop violence and respect the line of control.[28] His visit to Pakistan during the same period also highlighted the issue of terrorism. In a press news, that said, 'the core issue of Pakistani support to terrorism will occupy centre stage in talks between the visiting US President and General Parvez Musharraf (the Executive Chief of Pakistan after the Military coup).[29] During the NAM meeting in Cartagena (Colombia) on April 9, the Indian Extternal Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh, raised the issue of terrorism and military regimes, calling it as a very antithesis of what the NAM represents.[30] A resolution was called for combating and denouncing terrorism.

India's relations with China has also improved since the pPokhran II incidence. It has resumed its military ties, by resuming senior lever military

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[28] The Hindu, March 28, 2000.
[29] The Hindu, March 25, 2000.
[30] The Hindu, Arpil 16, 2000.

contacts which were suspended after India's nuclear test.[31] It aalso signed a pact on WTO, on February 22, pledging New Delhi's support to Beijing's entry into the WTO.[32] India has also won a new political partner in West Asia- Turkey. High level consultations with the visiting Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Bulent Ecevit have helped consolidate India's burgeoning ties with a large Islamic nation. Reaffirming their common commitment to secularism, democracy and rule of law, India and Turkey have resolved to intensify their co-operation in war against international terrorism.[33] India's relations with Russia have been further strengthened by the visit of Defence Minister Mr. George Fernandis on June 28. Mr. Vladimir Putin, the newly elected Russian President recognised Russia as India/s best friend and also assured that Russia's defence dealings would not be at Indian security cost.[34]

Israel

On 17th March in Tiberias, serious riots took place, where hundreds of local residents led by city council Mayor tired to prevent muslims from praying in the backyard of an abandoned mosque situated in the town's promenade.[35] Another incidence happened relation to the Pope's visit to

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[31] The Hindu, April 30, 2000.
[32] The Hindu, Feb. 23, 2000.
[33] The Hindu, April 12, 2000.
[34] The Hindu, June 29, 30, 2000.

[35] Summary of World Broadcast – Part IV, March 21, 2000, p. 8.

Jerusalem's Notre Dame Church. The Shaykh Taysil al-Tamimi who represented Islam, sharply attacked Israel, accusingit of stealing the Palestinian People's laws, killing its sons and attempting to Judaize Jerusalem. He said, peace will come when prisoners are set free, lands are restored to their owners and all the Palestinian refugees receive a right of return.[36] A clash between Arab Students and the Police appeared when the students were demonstrating against the confiscation of local Arab lands, on this incident the Public Security Minister Shilomo Ben Ami expressed that there is a deep rift growing between the Arabs and the Israeli establishment.[37]

Israel, a republic in the Middle East was established in 1948 in the formerly mandated territory of Palesiine as a nation state for the Jewish people. 'Since its establishment in 1948 its dual defination as a 'Jewish' and 'democratic' state has placed Isreal in a serious dilemma. Overemphasis on the former undermincdes its commitment to democratic values and vice-versa'.[38] Since its very formation there has been a deep cleavage between the Arabs and Jews in Israel. 'The Jewish state was formed following a prolonged intercommunal conflicts between Jews and Arabs and wars

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[36] Summary of World Braodcast – Part IV, March 2000, p. 12.
[37] Summary of World Broadcast – Part IV, Arpil 13, 2000, p. 8.
[38] Kumaraswamy, P.R., Special Majority for Golan: Democratic Dilemma of the Rabin-Press Government (1992-96), Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. XXII, No. 3, Spring 99, p. 30.

between Israel and Arab states'.[39] Yet despite these deep divisions, Israel enjjoyed certain amount of inter-communal tranquility throughout the first period of its independence. It is in this backdrop that the muslim resurgence in Israel took place. Most prominantly it appeared after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, which also concurred the period of Islamic resurgence throughout the Arab world. The 1967 war led to the rebirth of Islam as a political force among the Israeli muslims, preventing their assimilation with Israel. Today the Islamic movement has become a major political force among the Arabs in Israel. Arabs form the second biggest community in Israel. About 80 per cent of Arabs are muslims who belong to the Sunni tradition and they account for 15 per cent of Israel's population.

Divided upon ethnic lines between Jews, muslims and Christians, Israel can be more sutaibly called as an ethnic state, leaving aside the democratic institutional setup. Israel was established as the homeland of the jewish people only. According to Nadim Rouhana and As'ad Ghanem,

> "When the term 'jewish' state is used to describe Israel, it is not merely applied discriptively to denote that israel has a jewish majority or that its culture is determined by its majority. It is further used out only to indicate that jews are to be preferred to Arabs in some of the laws and regulations of

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[39] Sandler, Shmuel, Israeli Arabs and the Jewish State: The Activation of a Community in Suspended Animation, Middle East Studies, vol. 31, No. 4, Oct. 95, p. 932,

the state, but also to indicate that Israel is the state of the Jewish people

regardless of citizenship or residency. Thus, inclusion in the state's identity

and defination is determined by belonging to the Jewish people not to its

citizenity".[40]

Thus, grounds had been already prepared for the emergence of ethnic

assertiveness of the Arabs in the later period. Some of the approaches had

been put forward by Samuel Sandler, to him, according to the approach of

Jacob Landare, the situation of the Israeli Arabs eminated from gaps in the

modernisation levels of the two communities, as well as the national conflict

between the state of Israel and the Arab states with whom Israeli Arabs share

a national identity. In another perspective, according to Sammy Shooha,

interpreted the relationship between the ruling Jewish class and the Arab

minority as internal colonialism. He asserted that the Jewish state ruled over

its Arab minority through a combination of devices of social separatism,

economic dependence and political separatism, Shmuel Sandler argues that,

"during the first two decades of co-habitation along ethnic lines, however did

not pose a comunal problem to israeli regimes. The Israeli community was in

'suspended animation', which characterised low level of collective action,

indicated by the lack of a radical All Arab party, the vast majority voting for

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[40] Rouhana, Nadim and Ghanem, As'ad, The Crisis of Minorities in Ethnic Sttes: The Case of Palestinian Citizens in Israel, Middle East Studies, No. 30, 1998, p. 322.

either labour affiliated Arab list or Zionist parties, the concentration of dissent vote in the communist party whicfh never posed a threat to the regime and the low level of Arab public protest".[41]

The 1967 war, along the West Bank and the Gazastrip changed the character of the Israeli Arabs. It brought them closer to the Polestinian and the Arab world. The most important of it is its contact with Rukah, the pro-Moscow party, represented to the Israeli Arabs the rejection of the Zionist character of Israel. During the 1980s a vibrant Islamic movement emerged to mobilise the 7,00,000 muslims who are citizens of the Jewish state. The 1967 war intitated the process of Pakistanization and Islamization. One another important factor explaining the religious revival was the state of Islamic establishment within Israel. In 1948, the ministry of Religious Affairs created a muslim establishment to administer the Shia court system, to provide religious service in the mosques and to maintain other religious sites in the country. 'While in the early years of the state, this was largely overlooked because of the secularisation of the community, the situation became a matter of public concern as the result of the religious revival of 1980s. Today the Islamic movement has begun to challenge the state Islamic

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[41] Sandler, Shmuel, Israeli Arabs and the Jewish State: The Activation of a Community in Suspended Animation, Middle East Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4, October 1995, p. 942.

establishment, actively for control of the religious institutions'.[42]

The external factor of Khomeini's victory in Iran was also responsible to crystallize the Islamic movement after 1979, as a wave of Islamism it sparked in the Moddle East. To some, 'the appearance of the Islamic Organisations in Israel was also a response to Jewish fundamentalism, particularly the rise of powerful interest groups advocating settlement of occupied territories'.[43] Thus, 'during the 1980s, the role of religion, at people to people level was introduced in Arab-Israeli relations. While Jewish fundamentalism was also being encouraged among the Palestinian and the Arab citizens'.[44] The Islamic movement stressed the religious rather than the secular roots of Palestinian nationalism. Another strong impetus came from the Islamic Resistance movement in the occupied territories – Hamas, whose leadership derives from both the Muslim Brother and the Islamic Jihad, resorted to violents opposition to the Israeli occupation during the 'Intifada'.

On 4 September 1999, an agrement was signed between the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, under

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[42] Peled, Alisa Rubin, ,ed., Mutalib, Hussin and Hashmi, Taj ul-Islam, Islam, Muslim and the Modern State, St. Martin Press, 19994, p. 280.
[43] Ibid., p. 280.
[44] Singh, R.K., Peace Process Sans Peace Environment, World Focus, No. 237, Sept. 99, p. 4.

which Palestinians will be given control of more west base land. This initiative had given the boast to the already started peace process between Israel and Palestine. According to it, Israel will relinguish another 11 per cent of the West Bank to Palestinian control within five months, with a goal of sighning permanent accord by September 2000. This has set a new wave of attacks by the muslims following the signing of the land for peace agreement. According to a report which said, the Hamas and Islamic Jihad Organisation were determined to carry out sucide attacks.[45] The considerable and consistent delay in the transfer of territories as well as Israels policy of settlement, simultaneously had not only aroused an unrest in the people but also had put Israel's intentions into suspicion. In a report by an Egyptian News Agency MENA, on 18th May the Arab League warned Israel against igniting the situation inside the Palestinian areas. The Chief of Arab League Ismat Abd-al-Majid called on the international community at large and the Usa in specific to make Israel implement the signed agreements, stop playing for time and suspending resumption of talks on all tracks.[46]

In an interview with Dr. Sa'id Urayqat, head of the negotiations, higher steering and supervision committee, he said that, 'the only real thing

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[45] Deccan Herald, September 5, 1999.
[46] Summary of World Broadcast – Part IV, May 18, 2000, p. 2.

on the ground is the unpresidented and mounting Israeli settlement activity. Baraq is seeking an equilibrium. He wants to carry out a slight and partial withdrawl from the Golan, the West Bank and Jerusalem, and on the same day he announces his intention to construct a new settlement'.[47]

Population

Israel is a small state, both in terms of population and territory. At the time of its creation, the Jewish population was hardly 650,000. Thus, accelerated imigration became not only a part of the national objective but also of the security doctrine. Israel's population doubled in three years. By 1961 it increased to 2.26 million. Before June 1967 war Israel was a small but a honogenous Jewish state with a relatively small non-Jewish population. That character changed after the 1967 war.

By 1992 the population of Israel had increased to about 5 million. That included 4.175 million Jews, approximately, 7,00,000 Muslims, 130,000 Christians and 85,000 Druzes Israel has also to face a hostile population of about 1.45 million in the occupied territories, comprising of 860,000 Arabs in the West Bank, 564,000 in the Gaza Strip and 23,900 in the Golan Heights. Thus 4.2 million Jews in Israel, with a non Jewish population of about 2.3

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[47] Summary of World Broadcast, Part IV, May 18, 2000, p. 4.

million mostly concentrated in the occupied territories.

Islamic Organizations

The Islamic movement in Israel had responded to the policy of Israeli government of control over religious appointments, by establishing its own alternative religious institutions, staffed by its own personnels and independent from state funding. The Islamist established the Islamic college in Umm al-Fahim to train clerics. To protect religious sites local Islamic associations have been formed throughout the country. In addition, the Islamic movement had created a National Ismalic Association to research holy sites, waqf properties and cementries which belong to muslim community prior to 1948. The association is also involved in restoring muslim cementries and mosques in settlements which had muslim populations prior to 1948. The Islamic movement had also fostered its ties with 'Hamas' a radical organization and had constantly opposed the Israeli policies.

Currently the Islamic movement is working hard to forge ties with the wider Islamic world. They initiated a programme to adopt Bosnian Muslims Orphans in the summer of 1992. As reported on 29 March 2000, a delegation comprising Ibrahim Sarsur, leader of the Islamic movement in Israel,

Attorney Ahamad Balhah, Chairman of the Islamic committee in Jaffa and memjbers of the Tel Aviv municipal council and Ibrahim al-Ya'mur Chairman of the Islamic Association for the Protection of Orphans, met to discuss on the technical aspects of transfering financial suppoort to kosov and Chechnya.[48] Through such contacts and international conferences the Islamic movement is trying to increase its legitimacy at home and abroad.

During the early 80's Fardi Ibrahim Abu Mukh founded and led a quasi-military clandastive organisation called Usrat-al-Jihad (Hihad Family). The group initiated its jihad against the Zionist state by acquiring and training with weapons. Abu Mukh and his organisation ex exemplified a more radical stream which used Islam in the service of nationalism and did not refrain from violent means. The Islamic movement also used the state apparatus and polity to articulate their demands. Since their additional victories since the municipal elections of 1992, Islamic mayors now have greater access to government officials to express religious concerns and to highlight the short comings of the Islamic establishment.

Israel's Policy

In contrast to the acceptable short term goal of participation in local government, state authorities strongly object to what they consider to be the

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[48] Summary of World Broadcast, Part IV, March 29, 2000, p. 15.

ultimate goal of Islamic movement the establishment of muslim state in Palestine. They regard the Islamist attempt to gain control of the Israeli Islamic establishment as the first step in this process and therefore have resisted it strongly. Israel though has a democratic setup, but given its socio-political conditions has kept its policy such that its institutions are not undermined. The state enjoys complete control over religious appointments and has repeatedly denied positions as 'imam' and 'qadi' to members of the Islamic movement. A case of Abbas Zakur an Islamist for the position of Immam was rejected, though he enjoyed wide spread public suppoort and the recommendation of the mayor, on security grounds. He was subsequently arrested for inciting disturbances in the Mosque against the new 'Immam'.[49] Israeli law gurantees religious freedom and allows members of any faith to have days of rest on their subbaths and holidays. There are three subbaths in Israel – Friday (Muslims), Saturday (Jews), Sunday (Christian). Members of religious establishment are expected to display moderation and co-operation with the state.

Shortly after the election of the labour government in June 1992, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin abolished the position of advisor to the Prime Minister on Arab Affairs, in accordance with the coalition agreement with the major Israeli Arab parties, thus opening a way for direct unmediated relation

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[49] Hadashot, September 19, 1991.

with the Arab citizens of the state.[50] After the coming to power, Barak led labour coalition, signed the Wye II agreement on September 4, 1999 at Sharm al-sheikh in the presence of Mandeline Albright. It promised a follow up of Oslo process as well as the agreemnt to negotiate framework for a final settlement. But Israel's decision to build 174 new settlers units in Ma'ale Adumim, North East of occupied Jerusalem has once again brought the negotiations to a dead end. President Yasser Arafat rejected this policy of the Israeli government on the basis that the poliicy is represented in the continuation of the settlement activity in the Palestinian territories and the refusal of the Israeli government to abide by the implementation of all signed agreements.[51]

Israel had been trying to encourage the participation of the Islamic movement in the democratic process in the hope that cooperation will lead to moderation. The participation of muslims in the Israeli political scene has become a major recognised force and are in the position to bargain for their rights. The Israeli government has also increased fundings to the Arab sectors. But notably the increased fundings are generally alloted for the physical maintenance of mosques and cementries, rather than for masque education programme, feared for their potential to transmit radical Islamic

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[50] New York Times, Octrober 5, 1992.
[51] Summary of World Broadcast, Part Iv, June 6, 2000, p. 8.

doctrine. Apart from all these the Israeli government is keeping close watch on the Islamic movement and cracks down immediately on any illegal activity against the state. In a report Muhani al-Khatib, an Israeli Arab from Qalansywa was arrested for aiding the Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) squad, that was caught in Toyyibah on its way to carry out attacks in Israel. Four of them were killed in the clash by the security forces and one was caught.[52]

Israel's threat perception or ssecurity environment has undergone changes ove the years. Before 1967 it was primarily influenced by the military balance between Israel and Arab states. But after 1967 international terrorism became and added factor. Israel occupied the entire Palestine, parts of Egypts , Syria and Jordan; this has created new cause of fear eminating from the Arabs in Israel and Israeli occupied territories. Israel had developed a strong conventional military capability with the help of England, France in the earlier stage and USA in the later stage. Israel cannot afford to maintain or hold the occupied Arab territories. One factor of concern is the rise of Ialamic militancy not only in Palestine but also in neighbouring Arab countries. With the European Union and America continueously pressuring Israel, it has initiated a peace process with Palestine, Syria Jordan and

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[52] Summary of World Broadcast, Part IV, March 25, 2000, p. 9.

Labanon. Israel and Palestine had signed the wye II accord where by Israel will withdraw from the occupied territories. In furtherence, as a goodwill gesture, Isreal released 15 Palestine prisoners on the occasion of muslim festival Id al-Adha.[53]

Conclusion

As we have seen in these three muslim minority countries – China, India and Israel, muslim politics have evolved from a different historical backgrounds. In the case of Cfhina, it has evolved tracing its origin to particular ethnicity. In India its roots are in the political legacy, where once a dominant political entity, has turned into a minority. In Israel also, the domestic politics based on the ethnic overtones have created a rift in the society and muslims flnding their identity with the land they are attached.

No state is having a homogenous miuslim population concentrated in a particular region. In China the muslims are divided on ethnic lines and they are widely distributed. In India also muslims do not form a homogenous group, they are divided into regional, ethnic and linguistic lines and are settled through out the country. So is the Israeli muslim population which constitute from various nationalities, the Egyptian, the Arabian, the

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[53] Summary of World Broadcast, Part IV, June 9, 2000, p. 11.

Lebanese, and the Syrian.

The muslims have assimilated themselves into the mainstream politics of the state. In all these three countries, the muslims are taking part actively in the mainstream politics of the state and is using the state politics and institution to fulfill its demands. In China, autonomy had been given to the muslims, and have been provided with autonomous regions. In India autuonomy has been provided only to Kashmir the rest are in the mainstream of the nation. Secessonist activities vary in all these countries. In China it comes from the Uyghur's who relate their identities to the Turkie identity. In India, the Kashmiri muslims are themselves divided upon the course of secession, with some groups inclined towards Pakistan while others want independence. In Israel, the externist movement has taken force to get back the occupied territories from Israel and a homeland for the Arab muslims.

CHAPTER – IV

THE IMPACT OF DEMOCRACY AND MARKET FORCES: THE POST-COLD WAR SCENE

The Post World War II saw the end of colonialism and the emergence of new states. The post-cold-war scenario witnessed the demise of Soviet Union, the forerunner of the communist movement, and the emergence of democracy in the disintegrated states. Even Russia adopted a democratic constitution thus ushering a new wave of democracy and democratic governance. The liberalization process started in the 1990s is trying to erase the broader of strict homogenous state rule, demanding for greater and more decentralized democracy.

Impact of Market Forces

Market forces and international trade has been recognized as one of the parameters of analyzing the state policy internal and international. Economy plays a vital part in determining the policies of a state that are directed towards its development. International relations are fostered keeping in mind the economic and strategic interest it serves. The post-cold war has seen a period of overall liberalization and a process towards globalization of markets. Transnational communication and complex interdependence is growing;

multiple channels between societies, with multiple actors, not just states, multiple issues, taken at various levels, but not in strict hierarchy, are the emerging trends of the day.[1] 'Globalization is transforming trade, finance, employment, migration, technology, communication, the environment, societal systems, ways of livings, cultures and patterns of governance'.[2]

The international relations of the muslim majority countries and the minority countries show that, their relations with the other countries of the world had not been strictly on civilizational basis, as Huntington maintains and predicts clash between civilizations. But on the contrary the trade relations of these states between the so-called different civilizational countries and particularly the western industrialized states, have fostered devoid of civilizational affiliations, mostly marked by their national interest.

The trade relations in the muslim majority countries – Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia, show distinctly their relations with western and Industrialized states. Iran's trade relations are more profound with the west. Germany is Iran's largest trading partner with 2,100 million dollar worth of export in 1996/97. The other prominent in the line is Italy, Belgium and Japan. Indonesia's trade

[1] Keohane, Rebert O. and Joseph S. Nye Jr., Globalization: What's New? What's not? (And so What?), Foreign Policy, No. 118, Spring 2000, p. 115.
[2] Streeten, Paul, Globalisation: Threat or Opportunity? Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 37, No. 4, Winter 1998, p.

relations with Japan is the largest with 9,215.8 million-dollar import and 12,287.8 million-dollar export in 1997. The next important trading partners inline are USA, Germany and Singapore with whom trade substantially surpasses the other countries in comparison. Pakistan's trade relations are also largest with that of America. It accounted for 1,136.7 million-dollar import and 1,774.9 million-dollar export in 1997-98. The other important trading partners that follow in line are Japan, Hong Kong, U K and Malaysia.[3]

The market forces acting and the trade relations sustained between Islamic countries and those countries which are predominantly western, though drastically have not changed the nature of politics in these Islamic countries but have certainly led to societal and class changes. These changes are occurring into the realm of development within the society which are gradually making its impact on the domestic policy and polity of these states. The reforms in Iran and Indonesia and the less severiability of the military regime in Pakistan can be attributed partially, to maintain and promote the economic interests by these states.

Similarly, in the muslim minority states also, the more or less same pattern of economic relationship can be seen. Trade relations are been fostered with the developed and industrialized nations so that their economic interests

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[3] The Europa World Year Book, Vol. 1, 1999.

could be served. These states – India, China, Israel, have also tried to foster trade relations with the dual purpose of procuring oil and also developing bilateral relations bringing back home the message of friendly relations between the Islamic states. Israel has its highest trading engagements with USA, which in 1997 accounted for 5,444.8 million dollars import and 7,212.9 million dollars export. The next in the line follows Belgium Luxembourg, Japan and U.K. China's trade relations are the highest with USA amounting for 16,298.1 million dollars import and 32,694.8 million dollars exports in 1997. The next following in line is Japan from whom its imports are the highest and the equal amount of export. The highest export goes to Hong Kong, which is now the part of China. India's trade ratio is also highest with USA, imports turning out to the value of 135,096 million rupees and exports 246,407 million Rupees in 1997/98. Nest principal trading partners are Japan and Germany. It also has substantial trade relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia.[4]

Apart from trade relations of the states, what needs to be of most concern is the trend of market globalization, for it has started eroding the very supremacy of state, and changing the contents of world politics, though states will retain their dominant position. India, Israel, Indonesia and Pakistan are the

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[4] Ibid., p. 3.

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signatories to the world trade organization. China and Iran are still not the

signatories of WTO; they are mobilizing support for their entry into the same.

Thus, it is certain that no state can remain aloof, when the majority of states

are already in process of expending their markets. The present global

transformation of markets has demanded for a different commutation. As

Keohane and Nye states, "Democratization is probably the wrong world, since

in the market money votes, and people start out with unequal stakes. There is

no equality in capital markets", they suggest that, "pluralization" might be a

better word, suggesting the vast increase in the number and variety of

participants in the global network".[5] The fall out of such globalization is the

inequality in the global distribution of wealth. Where in 1960, the industrial

country's share in the global wealth was 67,3 per cent, the developing

countries share was only 19.8 per cent, and of the former USSR and East

Europe was 12.9 per cent. In 1994, the industrial countries are getting the

share of 78.7 per cent which accounts for an 11 per cent rise in their share in

the global wealth. Whereas in developing countries the share has gone down to

18.0 per cent and that of former USSR and East European, further down at 3.3

per cent.[6] (Source: UNDP DataBase). Thus, who gets what in the global

market system will determine the course of events in the time to come. Every

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[5] Ibid., Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye Jr, p. 116.
[6] Ibid., UNDP Database in Paul Streeten, p. 66.

state is trying to modify and align under such circumstances to cope up with and to have a better share of the market. And on the other hand, grounds are certainly getting prepared for conflicts, in such an unequal proposition, which calls for a human face to the process of market globalization.

Impact of Democracy

The six countries taken as study - Iran, Indonesia, Pakistan (Muslim Majority countries) and Israel, China, India (muslim minority countries belong to different regions Iran and Israel from the Middle East, Indonesia and China from East Asia and India and Pakistan from the South Asia region. Every state has its own peculiar historical conditions in which the states have established. Whatever forms of government that had established in these states, they regardless of this have evolved the institutions, which to a lesser or/and greater degree amount for the democratic process. Nevertheless democratization has its own problems in these states depending upon various political factors, thence its prospects which depends in turn in coping with these problems. Heater Heegan has pointed out that, 'democracy in the third world countries and the Middle East, has to be discussed while recognizing the significance of number of particular constraints in the form of population mobility, the question of refugees, immigration and their implications for citizenship; communal divisions and the possibilities and limitations of the consociational model of political organization, the role of Islam and until recently the cold war'.[7]

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[7] Deegan, Heather, The Moddle East and the Problems of Democracy, Open University Press, Buckingham, 1993, p. 9.

Though belonging from the same regions the political set up in the majority and the minority countries are not similar. Where Iran is an Islamic Republic, with the ceric as the head, Israel has based its government on western secular pattern. So is the case with Pakistan, which has established itself into as Islamic Republic, with democratic institutions, India being a Parliamentary Democracy with secular contents. Indonesia has evolved a secular pattern but Military is given a lawful role in the social life and politics whereas, China proclaiming itself as People's Republic is a cadre regime of the Communist Party.

In the muslim majority states - Pakistan, Indonesia, Iran, democracy had been a dwindling factor. In Pakistan, the elected government had been overtaken by the military coup on October 12. Since its inception the road to democracy has always been rocky in Pakistan as the military role and intervention had always been there either directly or indirectly, accounting for the destabilization of democratic process, as well as the responsibility goes to the politicians, who have politicized the ideology of Islam for their personal interests and for covering their acts of corruption and mismanagement.[8] But the imposition of military rule in Pakistan unlike the earlier Coups, has been lenient in the sense, as it has not imposed martial law, banned political parties,

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[8] Ahmar, Moonis, Where is Pakistan Heading? Implications of the Coupt D'Etat, World Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 1, Jan/March 2000, p. 64.

or unleashed a reign of terror against its political opponents. It was a bloodless coup with no mass opposition. In Iran, the reformist wave has set into motion the hopes for a more free social and political set up. The aspirations of these can be seen in the recent Presidential elections of February 18th and 5th May. The reformist gained a simple majority sweeping the polls. This has given a blow to the conservatives. Though Khatami's government has not yet brought any fundamental changes, yet he had gradually eased state control of political life.[9] This can also be attributed to the end of cold war, that has ushered a new phase, where the countries of the Middle East now can concentrate on new possibilities of the Middle East, than to be the puppets supporting either of the super power against another.[10] Moreover, the domestic upsurge for the reforms has also created conditions for developing a democratic process in Iran. Indonesia has also stepped a step further, when Wahid, a muslim leader, became the country's fourth President and the first freely elected in the 54 years history of the nation in October 2000 Presidential elections in Indonesia, moving towards a probable third largest democracy.[11] The holding of referendum for East Timor in which East Timor voted for separation, and the announcement regarding the referendum for Aceh province are the milestone

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[9] Monshipouri, Mahmood, Islam, Secularism, and Human Rights in the Middle East, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998, p. 182.
[10] Ibid., Heather Deegan, p. 16.
[11] The Hindustan Times, October 22, 1999.

decisions taken by Indonesia.[12]

Given these developments in the muslim majority states it is encouraging. But democracy, liberty and political parties do not carry the same connotation in the Islamic world as they do in the West. As Esposito and Piscatori points out, 'it is difficult to ascertain or to predict whether the evolution of muslim thinking about democracy will lead them to convert their views into action and what particular form democratization might take in diverse muslim cultures. It is clear, however, that in the new muslim world order, muslim political traditions and institutions are evolving, just as social conditions and class structures are changing'.[13]

In the muslim minority countries - India, China, Israel, except China, both India and Israel have a democratic setup from its inception based on western model with a secular polity. China has a Communist regime; it does not promote any religion but has made provisions in its constitution for the protection of religion.

Democracy in India faces the problems generated by the colonial policy, consociationalism and national integration. British colonial rule that ultimately

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[12] Emmerson, Donald K., Will Indonesia Survive? Foreign Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 3, May/June 2000, p. 103.
[13] Ibid., Esposito and Pisctori in Heather Deegan, p. 135.

led to the division of India, Pakistan the result of the division on the basis of Islam. The deep social cleavages, political and religious differences, the polity has always been the problem which many a times had tried to undermine the democratic process of the country. In India three identities have played a seminal role - religious, caste and regional and have shaped its domestic politics and its international relations.[14] The muslim religious identity has taken three pattern recourse that can be identified in India i.e., the assimilist, wherein they have assimilated in the state polity and are demanding the share in power and rights in the state; the autonomy, where in regional identity has demanded greater powers for themselves for their self determination; and independence, wherein certain fractions within the regional identities, upon dissatisfaction against the state have demanded for independence, taking varying course of actions to extreme levels. Thus, the assertion of various identities in India calls for a devolution and greater share in power and adjustment of these identities through negotiations. Israel also faces the burden of the Britains period of colonial rule, that was 'the dual obligation contained in the mandate for Palestine, i.e., 'the commitment to independence and self-government for the Palestinian Arabs together with the promise of establishing a Jewish national homeland'.[15] The population displacement

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[14] Engineer, Asghar Ali, Economic and Political Weekly, No. 33,(13), March 3, 1998, p. 697.
[15] Ibid., Deegan, Heather, p. 121.

followed during 1948/49, 1967 wars and the occupation of territories of West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights by Israel that brought the Arab minorities within Israel. The Arab minorities do share a common identity and are attached to primordial loyalties, thus demanding for the return of occupied land and also aspiring for an Islamic state in Palestine. The political implication of population mobility, displacement, subjugation and statelessness are thus the unresolved questions in front of Israel, that may serve to undermine an ostensibly democratic state. The muslims in China are demanding for more autonomy. China with its close Communist system has created a void of a free assertion. With its opening up with the western world the domestic conditions in China are changing and so is the polity. The demand for share in the politics, the rights of freedom of press and of democracy can now be heard in China. Muslims are also demanding their religious freedom and their rights to preserve than which the Chinese regime is not in a position to avoid; though it can suppress. Though autonomous regions are provided to the ethnic minorities in China, the lack of democratic freedom and state control over religious and public issues, the minorities are recoursing different ways and means to assert themselves.

Thus, the major problem of the muslim minority countries is the accommodation of various demands from various identities. This demands a

reassessment of democratic values and employment of a more pluralist pattern of polity. The demands of muslim minority against the state in the present structure had created grounds of conflicts between the state and the muslim minority groups, this undermining the democratic process of the country.

CONCLUSION

The preceding chapters have tried to deal with the Muslim majority and minority states and their politics in particular, and at the same way have tried to look generally into Islam in the contemporary world politics. It is beyond doubt that the six states - divided into majority and minority, belonging to different regions, in common show a great variety of cultural and ethnic differences not only between the states but also within the states in particular. Politics in these countries revolve round these differences and competition between different groups. Moreover, Islam itself as an ideological factor plays varied roles between and within these states, as the issues pertaining to these states differ from state to state historically. The question of majority and minority relations pertaining to Islam seems to be questioned, as the relations of minority with the majority in the Muslim majority state differ from that of the relation in the Muslim minority state. Also, a case for plurality and diversity made, for the effective devolution of democracy, peace and social justice.

The concept of minority rights have developed in the early 20th century. In Islam the notion of equal minority rights do not exist. The population out of the Islamic fold though considered minorities, are

subjugated and are denied claims of equal rights; and within Islam there is no notion of minority. It is not surprising that in the Muslim majority countries, the minorities have not been granted with equal rights to that of majority.[1] But, the irony is that, the same people who deny minority rights in the majority countries, claim for minority rights in the Muslim minority countries. Thus the majority rule and minority rights in pertinence to Islam show different positions in different conditions. Thus, the ideological considerations throughout the Muslim world is influenced by the peculiar contitions and positions in which they are relegated. This again eminates from the interest the politically active group wants to serve.

Who speaks for whom and with what purpose and interest depends solely on the issues confronting them at a particular point of time and position. In majority states dominant position is maintained by the political active groups, by inciting Islamic principles and laws in a way that strengthens their own position and legitimacy in the state. The issues confronting in these states are that of instability in society, external influence, security perceptions, legitimacy of rule etc., that calls for Islam, a handy instrument to mobilize the people on these issues. Though the constitution may provide for minority protection, but they are subjugated in

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[1] Rodinson, Anxime, (ed.) , Gerard Chaliand, Minority Peoples in the Age of Nation-states, Ajanta Publication, Delhi, 1990, p. 55.

rights either political or social, also dissent voices are curtailed to maintain the position of the political elite, in the grab of Islamic principles of governance. On the other hand in the minority states, the same rights that they deny are claimed against the state, and the legitimacy of the state is challenged on the grounds of denial of equal minority rights. The perception of identity crisis, the share in the process of political power, and demands for more democratic rights, form the main issue, for which Islam is harnessed as a political ideology to mobilize people. Thus political Islam shows a contradiction in its ideological perceptions.

International politics is changing, with various factors of interdependence, be it economic, social, cultural, strategic or else, the need to access the requirements for a peaceful arena is the call of the day. The majority rule in different governmental setups needs to be reassessed. Religious fundamentalist ideologies and secular totalitarian ideologies attempt to merge different spheres of society into a single one dimensional reality. The style of their function vary, but the end result seems to be the same. Here in lies the importance of creating and sustaining the autonomy of different spheres of life. Democratic institutions need to be strengthened not only in the Muslim majority states but also in the minority states, so as to include the plural character of the society and the issues within it. A world

society conceptualized in terms of equality of opportunity accessibility to justice and institutionalization of democracy and human rights is certainly desirable, if not a mere utopia.[2] Islamic communities are steeping towards this reality though uncertainly and slowly. The developments in Iran and the popular upsurge in favour of reforms, the Indonesian government's decision of holding a referendum and accepting East Timores vote for independence is yet another step in the line of democratization and recognition of rights of individuals and minority groups. So is the consideration of accommodation rights by the minority governments to grant more autonomy for these minorities and in turn their participation in the mainstream politics a positive sign of strengthening the functional institutions of the states.

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[2] Halliday, Fred, Islam and the Myth of confrontation, I.B. Tanris Publishers, London, 1995, pp. 151, 156.

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