

**Alliance formation and cohesion in International Politics: a Case Study
of US-Japan Relations after the Second World War**

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University

in partial fulfilment of the requirements

for the award of the degree of

Master of Philosophy

SURESH BABU J



Diplomacy and Disarmament Division

Centre for International Politics, Organisation and Disarmament

School of International Studies

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

New Delhi – 110067, INDIA

2012



27 July 2012

DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled “Alliance formation and cohesion in International Politics: a Case Study of US-Japan Relations after the Second World War” submitted by me in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this university or any other university.

Suresh Babu J

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

Prof. Swaran Singh

Chairperson,



Chairperson, CIPOD
Centre for International Politics,
Organization and Disarmament
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067

Dr. J. Madhan Mohan

Supervisor


Acknowledgements

I thank my mother Mrs. J. Sasikala, for being my fundamental and crucial support along with my father, Late Mr. M.G. Jeyakkumar and my sister, J.S.Sowmiya for bearing with me. I also like to thank my grandfather, Mr. A. D. Thanigaivel Mudaliar and my grandmother, Nirmala Devi along with all my relatives for helping me beyond their financial assistances.

I thank here my unnamed loved ones (material and other forms) and God(s) whose kind support in most times remained indefinable. It will not be fair to thank you Priya Dharshini. Here is the time to thank all my friends closer and distant (geographically though!) to bear with me at times most needed. In specific, S. Raja, Nandini Mazumder, Parul Thapa, Amit Kumar and my roommate M.Saravanan and most other unmentioned but close friends who were of great help in both kind and rude ways.

I thank my Supervisor Dr. J. Madhan Mohan for helping me in completing this work with loads of patience. I also thank all my teachers and professors, my centre, CIPOD and my school, SIS for introducing me to various knowledge forms. I also like to thank Google, Jstor, and many other electronic routes to information and knowledge, Laptop machines and other technologies that made this endeavour a possibility.

I also like to remember all those anonymous mind bloggers engaged with me in the last two years.



Suresh Babu J

Chapter One

Introduction

Alliance formation between states in international relations dates back to the beginning of the creation of the state system itself and also holds much relevance in the contemporary era of world politics. Alliance formation among states is also a perennial phenomenon in international politics. Given the anarchic nature of international system and the evidence that alliances are not always honoured have attracted both theoretical and empirical justifications towards this assumption. Alliance formation is an agreement between two states enters into voluntary but nonbinding commitment to help each other in an event of an armed conflict or in the wake of facing a common external threat. This contrasts with a coalition in which a set of states that simply fights together in a war without any prior agreement to do so. Alliances too are largely assumed to be nonbinding.

This research begins with few initial questions that are concerned with the motivations behind the state's endeavour to get into an alliance and to cling on to it; and also how to regard the cohesion between states which are already into an alliance. Thus, the objective of this study has been to study the international alliance between states and the motives behind those states that engage themselves in an alliance. Since the alliance formation has largely been discussed and debated along with the causalities of war and peace, a study into the reasons for states forging an alliance will help in understanding a state's behaviour in the international system. This study has employed a single historical case of US-Japan relations after the Second World War. This empirical study is a deviant case among the historical cases in alliance formation. The variation in this particular case was due to the cohesion that developed in the later stages of the relations between those states, which were not on an equal footing at the international stage when the alliance between them was established.

This study has also focused in connecting the state's 'independent behaviour' and its commitments towards an alliance set up. Previous investigations in the academic realms

of international politics, war and peace studies and so on into this subject have largely tried to generalise from the historical examples of Trans-Atlantic politics. This case study is a deviant one from the available literature on alliance politics. Thereby it tried to question the western-centric approach in the literatures of alliance formation.

International Relations literature tends to connect alliance formation with the causalities of war and peace. Many of the alliance literatures have a nascent assumption in them that states are of more or less equal status in the international politics that makes alliance formation a possibility between them. For example, few decades back in international history many of the colonised states were not seen as the alliance partner by their masters in pursuit of the latter's interests. They were assumed to have the obligation to queue with their master's interests. Similarly the case study of post-war alliance between United States and Japan questions the billiard ball model assumptions in international politics.

The early occupation phase of Japan shows that it was not a fully fledged sovereign state. In *Anarchical Society*, Hedley Bull (1977) refers to sovereignty as an independent political community which merely claims a right to sovereignty or is judged by others to have such a right, but cannot assert this right in practice, is not a state properly so-called. In other words, Bull means that sovereignty outside the sovereign, requires the recognition by other entities as 'one of them' and thus, is inherently a social concept. *i.e.* sovereignty implies a relationship between formal equals. Thus Japan having no formal diplomatic ties with other states in the immediate post-war period makes it clear that Japan was not a fully fledged sovereign state during the mentioned period.

Relationship between United States and Japan has primarily emerged as a relationship between the victor state and a surrendered power in the post-war scenario. However, this relationship has emerged into an alliance subjectively given the post-war international systemic influences of the cold war climate. This emerged relationship has eventually transcended into cohesion between the two states given the constructed responsibility of Japan's economy that was intertwined with the international economy. Thus, bilateral relations between the two states in the post-war era can be trifurcated. The first phase being the occupation phase which was followed by the second phase of formative stages

of an alliance between the two states. Third phase refers to an eventual cohesion that was witnessed between the two states.

This study has also focussed on the relationship between the concepts of alliance formation and its impact upon state's autonomy in decision making. This has helped the study to focus upon state behaviour in a self-help and competitive state system of Westphalian legacy. The study of relations between the United States and Japan after the Second World War was no doubt an unusual case to study the phenomenon of alliance formation and cohesion, since this bilateral relationship was forged through force which has showed eventually the signs of mutually accepted cohesion.

Thus, this study has tried to focus on that gap area in the literature and to examine the veracity of already established explanations regarding the causalities that put together states in an alliance formation on otherwise a competitive international political platform. This study has also tried to explain the nitty-gritty upon which the cohesion between states can endure. Much of the alliance literature on international politics has looked into the alliance formation as a causal variable for either war or peace. In the existing literatures, few have had a considerable focus on the causes for why alliances are primarily forged between states. The traditional International Relations literature on alliances however is inadequate in their explanations regarding cohesion and alliance persistence once the threat for which the alliance was formed gets vanished. The existing literature on alliance formations also has their roots largely in realist or neorealist theoretical premises.

The initial hypothesis concerning the study is as follows: forging an alliance between states impinges upon a state's autonomy in decision making. However, states do form such alliances in order to confront a general or immediate common threat. The focus on the state's decision-making process which engages them in an alliance has been looked into throughout the study. It has been proved that states will have constraints in their autonomy of decision making due to their alliance commitments. As the initial premises on hypothesis proves, states tend to compromise on their autonomy of decision-making in order to confront the common enemy or threat against which the alliance has been formed.

Similarly, the hypothesis that cohesion between states is sustained in world politics in accordance with the common security interests and threats of the concerned states is also proved valid. In the case of US-Japan post war alliance, since Japan was reformed and transformed as a state that has similar political systems to that of United States, Japan projected a larger similarity in their assumptions of threat all along in the post-World War II era in tandem with the United States. Hence, the security ties have witnessed a lot of cohesion in their bilateral affairs; inspite of their economic relations underwent certain frictions all along since the 1970's.

Looking into the literature on alliance formation and cohesion, Snyder has reflected that one of the most underdeveloped areas in the theory of international relations is alliance theory (Snyder 1991a: 121; 1991b: 83). Walt touches upon the reasons for states forging alliances. Accordingly, states form alliances to balance against threats rather than bandwagon with them. His argument focuses on the dynamics of great power being a threat for a relatively lesser power in international politics. In continuation of the above mentioned argument, he touches upon the causes for cohesion between states and the bottlenecks in the alliance set up. He argues that ideology is the weaker cause for alliance formation and ideological movements that strive for a strong central authority will lead for conflict rather than cooperation (Walt 1985: 33).

Levy brings in the argument that the political decision makers come to believe that support for one's allies regardless of its consequences, is essential to their national prestige, and that the failure to provide support would ultimately result in their diplomatic isolation in a hostile and threatening world (Levy 1981: 582). David Singer was one among the scholars who argue that alliance formation reduces the likelihood of war. He argues that alliances deter war by enhancing the credibility of military intervention in support of the victim of aggression and by clarifying the precise nature of the military coalition that would confront any aggressor. Alliance commitments thereby reduce the level of uncertainty in international system and thus minimise the likelihood of a war generated by misperception and miscalculations (Singer et al., 1972: 23). This alliance system will therefore maintain equilibrium and thereby keep peace in the international system (Gulick 1955: 61-62; Holsti et al., 1973: 31-32).

Alliance commitment will pressurise a state to come in support of its allies in order to counter their common threat. On the other camp, scholars argue that the alliance system paves the way for war. Among them the common line of argument is that alliances tend to generate counter alliances, which generate further mistrust and tensions, leading to arms races and the further polarisation of the alliance structure and ultimately to war (Kaplan, 1957: 24; Holsti et al., 1973: 33; Wright, 1965: 774). Morgenthau (1967: 335) argues that alliance commitments reduce the number of possible coalitions which could be conceivably formed against any aggressor, and are therefore conducive to war.

Decision making and state autonomy in international relations are much linked and relevant to the study of state sovereignty itself. Sovereignty itself is an essentially a much contested concept in the realm of political science and international relations. Concept of state sovereignty is not reviewed or studied here, but how the alliance commitment impinges upon a state's sovereignty has been discussed. Alliance commitment makes the member states to provide their support to an alliance for its stability and longevity. States provide for the alliance only if they get in return the expected benefits which outweigh their costs for their alliance commitment. States of lesser capability within an alliance have their own constraints to negotiate and pull much benefits from the alliance compared to that of the states of larger capabilities. Alliance commitment despite being non-binding on states, it imposes costs on states for staying within an alliance.

The above mentioned case is clear from the US – Japan alliance history, when United States had the leverage to largely influence Japan's diplomatic relationship with many states and especially that of China. On the other hand, Japan has a long standing dispute with US itself regarding the Futenma base. Similarly, alliance commitment of Japan could not make it easy to deny its Japan Self-Defence Forces (JSDF) to assist US in the Iraq endeavour of 2003 despite the strong opposition of public opinion from its home front. Okimoto argues that by almost any criterion of success – be it cost effectiveness, risk reward ratio, multiplier effects, or sheer longevity, the Japan America security Alliance (JASA) stands out as one of the most successful alliances in twentieth century history (Okimoto 1996).

The data regarding the primary sources that concern the post-war relationship between United States and Japan were available for retrieval from archives of various sorts. Those facts were acquired through the source copies of bilateral and multilateral treaties signed between and by them, government communiqués, news articles published in those times and other relevant materials on international and regional occurrences. Secondary sources comprising the books, articles and other literatures were reviewed hereby to highlight the larger arguments, issues and perspectives that they weave regarding the case of the study. Substantial quantity of literatures concerning the historical accounts on the state and culture of Japan are available.

Buckley (1992) investigates the diplomatic history of US-Japan post-war history from 1945 to 1990 through thick primary source data. His detailed account regarding the beneficiaries in the post-war relationship set up will help for the taken study. Sarantakes (2000) argues that more than the national security strategy and foreign policy, intra-bureaucratic conflict had engaged the phase of the US occupation of Japan. His study focused upon the political issues surrounding the Okinawa Island, an important US base for its war efforts at Vietnam and Korean peninsula from its occupation in 1945 to its surrender in 1972.

This work is divided into five chapters that include this introduction Chapter and a conclusion chapter at the end. Chapter Two is the ‘Conceptual Analysis of Alliance Formation and Cohesion’. This chapter will explain the concepts of alliance formation and cohesion in international politics as the name suggests. Available literature on the subject matter is referred and the authors who spoke on the subject and their views on the concepts will be highlighted in the chapter. Different views on the subject of alliance formation and their inherent contradictions have been addressed and the established premises of realism and other positivist trend have been pondered. This chapter will also highlights the niche area that these realms overlooked or incapable of explaining the alliance formation.

Chapter Three in this work deals with the empirics from the US-Japan alliance after the Second World War. It will be of factual and descriptive nature. The chapter is handled in an idiographic approach. Japan’s post-war history has been the main focus since the

United States had a larger impact on Japan's political life in the post-Cold War period not only in the latter's international affairs but also largely in its domestic arena. Hence this chapter handles the way in which Japan has emerged in the economic arena during the post-war period. Since Japan's economy plays a crucial role in its emergence as well as its ties with United States, it becomes necessary not to distinguish and leave behind the domestic impediments in US-Japan alliance politics.

Chapter Four will assess the conceptual understandings discussed in the first chapter by contrasting them with the history of post-war US-Japan relations. This chapter will provide the overall picture of what does the literature on international alliance formation has so far pondered over and how it is relevant to our taken case study of US-Japan post war alliance. This chapter has also handled much of the empirics from the post war politics in order to highlight the gap areas in the existing alliance literature. This is to provide a picture of how the US-Japan alliance becomes a deviant case from that of the existing explanations in the alliance formation literature. Contradictory views and debates regarding the concepts will be brought in once again into this chapter from Chapter Two to match it with the post-war history of US-Japan alliance.

Chapter Five will conclude the work by bringing the final results of the work. This chapter will also deal with primary assumptions that this work held and any alterations that those assumptions underwent in the course of the work. Hence the hypothesis proposed at the initial stage will be explained along with any changes in them. This chapter will also summarise the entire work by highlighting the crucial explanations regarding the alliance formation and cohesion concepts and with the short summary from the US-Japan post war alliance history.

Existing theories on the concepts of alliance formation has been studied in this endeavour. Qualitative research along with the case study method has guided the study of the US-Japan post war history. This was carried out as a one-time research than a longitudinal one along with the clinical and inferential methods. However, the case study method will tend to be empirical and historical method. In reaching out to the theories and concepts, reliability was much upon the classical definitions and conceptualisations. Secondary sources were also largely used to gather those concepts and their various

definitions, interpretations and explanations. To study the case of US-Japan relationship after the Second World War period, relevant information from both the primary as well as the secondary sources of the preserved historical records and documents were relied upon.

Primary sources of news articles were collected to acquire information regarding the empirics of US-Japan post war relationship. Secondary sources like books, literatures, registered and interpreted histories of that particular time period concerning the two states were studied. Secondary sources were also used for understanding the concepts, conceptual borrowings and various theoretical discussions surrounding those concepts. Web sources of both official websites and other relevant web sources were looked into.

Highlighting the case history of post-war US-Japan relationship will help in projecting the background for the taken study. Japan signed an official document of surrender on 2 September 1945 that unconditionally submitted its sovereignty to the allied powers following the nuclear apocalypse at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. By that time, the state of war ravaged Japan resembled a desolated scratch. 'For the first time in history, Japan was a conquered nation' says Edwin O. Reischauer (1990: 184) 'The Japanese faced the prospect with trepidation, but as the emperor had put it, they had no choice but to bear the unbearable.' From 1945 to 1947, Japan was placed under the command and control of General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP). Starting from 1947, the United States took a reverse course in its affairs with Japan. Until 1952, Japan was placed under the direct administration of United States. Albeit named as an allied occupation, the control of Japan was by and large spearheaded by the United States. Moscow agreement signed on 27 December 1945 and the consequent setting up of the Far Eastern Commission in Washington and the Allied Council for Japan in Tokyo remained much of a platform for ideological encounters between the then super power lead camps. In the occupation phase, the United States formed an occupation bureaucracy that administered the domestic affairs in Japan.

The United States in the given Cold War set up was much vigilant against any communist inquisitions or other possible extremist resurgence within Japan. Therefore, Japan was entirely disarmed and subjected to nationwide purge to oust the pro-war lobbies of the

war days. On 3 May 1947 Japan's newly drafted constitution 'shifted the sovereignty' from emperor to the people *via* its Diet. This has given much power to its lower house, the House of Representatives. Newly drafted constitution's Article 9 sealed the prospects of Japan for the renunciation of war through all means. The super power rivalry had later shifted its focus to Korean peninsula by early 1950s and United States peace treaty with Japan had become imminent. The San Francisco treaty signed on 8 September 1951 which came into effect on 28 April 1952 restored Japan with its sovereignty.

Yoshida Shigeru, a Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) candidate became the first prime minister of post-war Japan. He was a former ambassador of Japan to London and served the post of prime minister for more than seven years. His efforts secured Japan an umbrella defence from US through Japan America security alliance signed in 1951. In turn, the pact provided US to retain its military bases in Japan. This effort prevented the considerable amount of nascent Japan's economy getting diverted towards its rearmament measures. However, the Korean War forced Japan to construct its own Jieitai or Self Defence Agency, a base for Japan's future defence build up.

The impact of Japan's alliance with US was soon witnessed in its foreign policy decisions. For instance, the US has urged Japan to sign a treaty with the Nationalist Republic of China on Taiwan in tandem with the then United States' Far East policy. While Japan's economy started booming and its trade ties turning truly global, Japan formulated an independent foreign policy without irking the United States. Hatoyama Ichiro, who replaced Yoshida Shigeru from within the LDP veered away Japan's policy towards the then Soviet Union unlike his predecessor. Although his move contradicted the US interests, US did not react much. Since the move had successfully negotiated with Soviet veto in the UN and secured Japan a membership in the United Nations by 1956. Hatoyama however could not reach a clear cut peace treaty with the then USSR but managed to secure a 'normalization' agreement in 1956.

Japan's China factor was another constraint towards its pursuit of an independent foreign policy. United States foreign affairs towards mainland China kept a tab upon Japan's long alluring business interests in mainland China. Later in the 1970's 'Nixon Shock' of U.S. rapprochement with China brought a short period unease in their bilateral relations.

However, Japan started to exploit the best out of the situation by following two-China policy similar to that of United States. Infamous Bikini nuclear catastrophe of 1954 that aroused widespread protests within Japan also turned out to be a crucial irritant in the bilateral relations.

As the tension between US and Japan mounted in the 1950's, the revision of security treaty between them became imminent. Thus, the revised Treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation was signed on 19 January 1960 which turned out to be much beneficial for Japan. The ratification process of this treaty by the then prime minister of Japan, Kishi Nobusuke was criticised for its illiberal methods that a nationwide unrests and protests. Consequently, the proposed visit of Dwight D. Eisenhower to Japan on 19 June 1960 stood cancelled. The involvement of the US in the Vietnam War allayed fear among the Japanese regarding the probable involvement of Japan into the war. Hence, there were popular protests all over Japan regarding the United States (mis)use of Japan's ports to foster its war efforts at Indo-China.

The Nixon Doctrine came as a shock to Japan when Nixon called upon the United States allies from then on to take greater responsibility in managing their own defence. However, the United States with its efforts by and large had succeeded in bringing Japan back to the international stage as a 'normal state.' Although the US-Japan bilateral relations had sailed through various highs and lows, the larger picture projects that both states had come in cohesion all along the Cold War period and continue as such in the current era.

Chapter Two

Conceptual Analysis of Alliance Formation and Cohesion

The formation of an alliance literally means a state of being joined or associated (Concise Oxford dictionary: 11th edition). To elaborate, the union between two or more entities could possibly materialise only if the association manages to achieve every individual entity's common or specific interests or goals. Walt (1988: 237) in explaining the basic definition of alliance formation has roped in the explanation by Julian Friedman who regards alliances as the central feature of international political life. He also quotes George Modelski's view that alliance is one of a dozen or so key terms of international relations. Ole Holsti and Hans J. Morgenthau describe alliance as a universal component of relations between political units and argue that alliance is a necessary function of the balance-of-power operating in a multipolar system.

Preferences of individual actors play a crucial role in laying the foundations for the formation of an alliance. The fundamental question as to why any entity or a state in international relations prefers an alliance has been questioned and studied for a long time in the academic field of International Relations. Stephen M. Walt probing this fundamental question brings in the widely used premise towards the subject - the balance of power argument. Accordingly, 'the relatively weaker or threatened states,' argues Walt, 'tend to balance the strong or threatening powers by allying against them or they would most likely "bandwagon" by allying with the threatening or powerful states.' Alliance formation literature that underlines the preferences of a state highlights that an individual engaging themselves in an alliance has their liberty to choose their desired ally. However, the US-Japan post-war relationship taken up for the study projects a different picture. This case study proposes that more than the preferences, the position of a state in the international politics determines the nature of alliance that could emerge between the states.

Realist paradigm, the dominant theoretical perspective in the explanation of alliance formation between states in international relations has focused largely upon the state's security concerns. Siverson and Star (1947: 147) had viewed that the security of a state dominates and even compels the state's choices of alliance. Alliances, to neo-realists will become a possibility only if states coming to form or join an alliance are satisfied with the fact that the alliance pays the state more than its expenditure towards the alliance. Since states contribute much of their material resources into an alliance set up, they are entitled to seek both security as well as non-security benefits from an alliance. It is understood that theories by definition do not predict the outcome of specific events. For example, the neo-realist understanding of alliances overlooked upon the longevity of an alliance in respect to the weakening of threat. Neo realist theories on alliances have also overlooked the density and depth of the alliance structures and processes and the domestic impediments of states that engages themselves in an alliance (Barnett and Levy 1991).

The alliances are generally formed in response to external threat and their cohesion is largely dependent on the intensity and duration of the threat, and ...one of the major causes of their disintegration may be the reduction or disappearance of the external threat against which they were initially formed (Holsti et al. 1973: 88). Waltzian or neo-realism posits that states ally with other states in order to balance the opposition alliances or an entity (Waltz: 1979: Chapter 6). Another vantage point in viewing the alliance formation is that states form alliances in order to balance against the perceived potential harms only when the intention of the opposite camp looks threatening. The change that is fostered by the creation of alliance upon the threat also alters the composition of the alliance structure. Hence, the realist paradigm as a whole has no doubt on threat being a necessary condition for the formation of alliances.

The level of cohesion by a state within an alliance is as important a factor as the alliance itself. Alliances however cost states in terms of their loss of freedom for their independent action. It also costs a state to perform action in terms of common good of the alliance and also to align towards the particular policies, and burden sharing within an alliance through the provision of resources such as its arms and manpower. On the other

hand, without an alliance proving itself valuable to a state's interests, a state may hardly subordinate its individual interests to that of alliance cohesion. In other words, larger the threat against the coalition more the cohesion between states. As the threat fades actually or in the perceptions of alliance members than the cohesion will get weakened within an alliance or the alliance may fall apart. Holsti et al. (1973: 17) have argued thus: 'probably the most widely stated proposition about alliances is that cohesion depends upon external danger and declines as the threat is reduced.'

Levy has analysed with the empirics of around five hundred years that whether the alliance formation between states actually leads to war or contributes in establishing a peaceful world order. He has observed that except for the nineteenth century, alliances have been frequently followed by war. Further, he associates the causes for the states forging an alliance between sixteenth and eighteenth centuries as a response to the prevalent instability in the system, rising tension and the anticipation of a probable war. He analysed those periods in relationship with the nature of military technology and organisation, the polarisation of the alliance system and other balance of power considerations and the motivations underlying the alliance formation. His critique on the literature prior to his research was that they have largely associated the alliance formation between states with peace rather than the alliances of great powers leading to war. He argues on those lines that only a fewer wars have taken place prior to the formation of any alliances than its aftermath in the preceding five centuries of his studies (1981: 581-90).

His study has also identified the sharp and fundamental differences in alliance characteristics during the period preceding and following the Congress of Vienna. Prior to 1815 accordingly, the majority of alliances were offensive in nature. During those periods, the initiation of military action was explicitly called for in the treaty and those actions were not conditional upon an external military attack. From 1815 onwards, international politics has witnessed the offensive alliances turning out to be an extreme rarity. In the contemporary age of modern treaties, the offensive attack against one of the allying members in an alliance calls for the military action from other member states due to their alliance commitment. The great power alliance gravitates many of the small states

towards the alliance in recent centuries given that the number of states were on the rise on the historical trajectory (Levy 1981: 581-90).

In earlier times, alliances in general were of *ad hoc* in nature and were formulated with the designs of war in the minds of statesmen and politicians. Nineteenth century alliances were forged generally for the purposes of deterrence and hence they maintained the status quo whenever they were formed during the time of peace. Initiation of the concept of collective security from the Congress of Europe in order to guarantee the provisions of the Congress of Vienna is an important factor that characterised nineteenth century alliance politics. Considerable change in the technologies employed in the defence industries and warfare during the period is also one of the reasons for it. The development of the railroad, use of conscription and development of the general staff system all contributed to an increasing speed of military operations and greater importance of military preparedness (Langer 1931: 6; Osgood 1967: 81-82).

The American national security policy according to Walt plays a crucial role in determining why certain hypothesis was largely employed to study the purpose, causes of an alliance formation and the alliance choices of states. He quotes two divergent views that existed in the global alliance arrangement during the Cold War. One strand argued that the allies of the United States are more likely to defect compared to that of the Soviet Union, while the other strand argued that it was the other way around. These two divergent views played a crucial role in the handling the specific cases in the alliance politics of both the camps during the Cold War (Walt 1985: 3).

Mccalla (1996: 445-50) in the process of seeking to address the limitation in the prevailing literature has mentioned that they frequently bypassed the issue of alliance persistence after an initial threat has faded. Glenn Snyder has already noted that alliance theory is one of the most underdeveloped areas in the theory of international relations. The existing literatures on alliance formation between states is mostly taking refuge into the positivist theoretical frameworks, especially in the realist and neo-realist paradigm and has dealt largely with the origin, membership, alliances' relationship to wars and the interests of member states in the alliance set up (Snyder 1991b). Scholarly studies into alliances have provided primacy to threats in the environment as the compelling

requirement for the persistence of an alliance. NATO however proved to be contradictory to these claims and have kept adding its responsibilities and membership. NATO however is a deviant case. Lijphart (1971) argues that deviant case could have a greater theoretical value.

Theories on alliance formation have generally focused upon the origins, functions and its impact upon interstate relations. George Liska has failed to explain the future of successful alliances and quoted Hellmann and Wolf who have argued that almost all the alliance formations gets dissolved once the threat has got vanished from the scene (Liska: 1962). So far the literature has pondered over the problem of burden sharing in alliances and the size and volume of an alliance over time. However, there seems to be a gap in addressing the cases of obsolete alliances and to the question of which states assumes what functions. Non military perspectives on alliances dynamics and the domestic/international factor considerations were also focused less on alliance between states in international relations. Although alliances centre on the history of world politics, there exists no general or grand theory due to historically limited number of alliances. Since alliances have their roots in conflicts, security alliances have been quite limited in their range of functions, generally confining their actions to military coordination and defensive preparations (Morgenthau 1959: 191-214; Osgood 1968: 25-26).

The succeeding generation to the realist enquiries into the alliance behaviour of states has focused on the tradeoffs between states that guided the trajectories in which the alliances have moved (Altfeld 1984; Conybeare 1992; Doyle 1994, 1994a, 1994b and Morrow 1987, 1991, 1993, 1994a, 1994b). This generation has looked into the trade and autonomy of the states in their decision-making as playing the crucial role in the alliance set up between states apart from their security concerns. Morrow has tested the various empirical data with his asymmetric model of alliance formation proposition. His proposition states that alliances formed between large and small players in the international politics are supposedly stable and durable compared to that of the alliances formed between the states of similar size and capability (Morrow 1991). This explanation has borrowed much from the inter-state trade perspectives than the security concerns model. Self defence of states have also been pondered over in the literature on alliance

formation. In such studies, tradeoffs between states were the primary focus that dealt with the purchase of arms by states within their alliance system. For instance, the works of Connybeare (1992) and Sorokin (1994b) have examined state's concern with their arms purchase in an alliance. Similarly, Snyder (1984) has earlier meditated upon the state facing the dangers of entrapment and abandonment within the alliance set up. Connybeare has extended those arguments to declare that the states may optimise their alliance 'portfolios' by choosing a range of security partners with different propensities towards risk (quoted in Simon and Gartzke 1996: 619).

Alliance formation was conceived by Simon and Gartzke as a two stage process of every state's decision to get into an alliance and a state's preference of picking a partner or partners for the alliance Simon and Gartzke (1996: 617). Domestic impediments in an inter-state relationship and alliances have actually broadened their study along with the thick references to the Correlates of War (COW) project (Simon and Gartzke 1996: 617-635). Kantian perceptions on democratic peace have been questioned in the alliance literatures and the notions were furthered to other political systems including that of the autocratic regimes. However, Doyle's work in 1986 for example was quoted in the works of above mentioned authors who have observed earlier that democracies are particularly prone to ally together due to either political affinity, domestic public pressure, or a shared sense of threat. Thus politically similar states are biased toward selecting each other as alliance partners. States with similar regimes share in common the domestic political institutions, issues and ideologies that may make them more compatible counterparts.

Contradicting the democratic stability hypothesis on alliance formation, Simon and Gartzke (1996) have also argued that the states that are asymmetric in their regime type might possibly forge an alliance that could favour the trade between them. Therefore, the gains in the trade occur only when two or more parties sell amongst them, exchange or barter goods, or services in which each possess a comparative advantage. The argument that underpins the hypothesis transcends the conventional security centric explanations for alliance formation where the exchanges in the trade arena become possible only with the existence of an alliance set up between the trading states. By the turn of the twentieth century, studies on alliance formation between states in international relations have

stepped up beyond the security focus approach and brought in various other variables that influence the states to get into an alliance. Recent research has concentrated on the non-security reasons behind a state's decision to ally. However, it has also emphasised upon the state's decision-making process in forging an alliance, durability of the forged alliance and on the alliance choices of the states.

Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992: 151-52) have tested the established preferential hypothesis of democratic states to ally with the democratic partner. They experimented with the variables of various alliances with different states along with the regime types existing in those states. The alliances among similar regime types were examined by comparing democratic states with that of the non-democratic states. Their inference establishes that democratic states do not align much with similar states than that of the non democratic regimes. Their findings have challenged the established notion that democratic alliance behaviour is different from that of the behaviour of non-democracies, but it overlooked the assessment that whether states actually consider the regime type before forging an alliance with any other state in the international system. However, their test did not distinguish between the alliance choices of states that were motivated by their domestic political structures and their preferences motivated by their security concerns.

Barnett and Levy have suggested that the choice of a state in terms of their preferential partners will be largely influenced from its domestic political concerns. Accordingly, 'states may shun alliances in general because of domestically generated preferences for isolationist policies, and they may reject certain states as potential alliance partners because of ideological differences, religious considerations or exclusionary trade or financial policies that are driven by domestic interests or ethnic politics' (Barnett and Levy 1991: 370). Siverson and Star (1994: 158) have observed that regime change within a state produces shift in the alliance portfolios. Their work focused much upon a state's preference in choosing an alliance partner and shifting or switching to other configuration of alliances in the wake of a state's internal regime change. Barnett and Levy (1991) used a case study to test a proposition method, through which they proposed that domestic politics will have a considerable impact upon the rulers which in turn asks for resource allocations towards their national defence. They furthered their argument as those

impacts of the domestic politics will influence the decisions of the decision makers in seeking a specific ally. At times, those leaders might gravitate towards the formation of certain alliances in order to counter the internal threats of a state.

The focus of literature on alliance has generally been on the causality of alliance formation, the focus on the factors that keeps the alliances intact and the response of alliances in the wake of changing strategic climate. McCalla (1996: 445-75) has tried to examine the explanatory possibilities of NATO's persistence in the post-cold war phase. It needs to be pointed out that NATO is an organisational alliance that was formed primarily to counter the then communist expansion and establishment. McCalla also argues that neo-realism has an inherent inappropriateness in explaining the continuation of NATO's existence. Accordingly, he draws upon international institutionalism theory to explain the phenomenon. However, the realist strand has successfully managed to explain many of the alliance configurations among states. It was allegedly failed in its capacity to explain the post-Cold War trajectory of NATO. Organisational theories broaden the explanation regarding the survival instinct of the organisation yet NATO's survival was depended much upon the willingness and interests of its member states. Verifying the neo-realist claims on the primacy of state interests, McCalla views NATO being an international security arrangement remained a key constituent of its member states to rely for their security needs. The approach of International institutionalism to explain the alliance has broadened the study to larger context than that of the traditional state centric explanations of the neo-realists (McCalla 1996: 445-75).

Threat, actual and perceived along with the security concerns of a state has been emphasised by the scholars on alliance formation as one of the primary motivators of a state seeking an alliance. A strategic concern of a state also plays a crucial role in a state's decision to ally with another state. The perceived threats or an actual threat in any form to a state forces it to seek an alliance with another state. The security concerns and the fall outs of arms mobilisation will also propel a state to seek an alliance with another state that will make it secure. Neighbouring or bordering states are generally vulnerable to insecurities and these are the states that largely advocate an alliance with other states in order to overcome their insecurities. The size and capability of a state in relation to its

neighbour also plays a role in the choice of a state's decision to choose another as its alliance partner.

Alliances are generated by some underlying processes that were independently leading to war. Almost all the alliances are motivated by the fear that there exists some probability of war, and this was particularly true in earlier times. Osgood's interpretation (1967: 71-75) of eighteenth century alliance formation applies to the two previous centuries as well. The motivations of alliances were fundamentally offensive rather than defensive in nature. Alliances were formed generally in anticipation of war. The eighteenth century models of warfare did not require an extensive preparation for the warfare. Hence to defend the unexpected attacks was not on high priority of the states. Other factors in the alliance that leads a state into the war is that the *ad hoc* and secretive nature of the alliances that construct an unstable condition through the manufacture of distrust, suspicion and subsequent tensions leading to war. The alliance also increases the importance of image and prestige considerations that may be highly destabilising. According to Levy, pre-nineteenth century wars were rarely preceded by alliances. The nature of the alliance-war relationship accordingly has changed noticeably after the congress of Vienna, and then again at the end of the nineteenth century. However some of the earlier wars were preceded by alliances, confirming the opposite of the nineteenth century trend in international politics. Among the fourteen great power alliances of the nineteenth century, none was followed by the great power war but one followed by war involving an ally. Thus, alliances were not a destabilising factor during the nineteenth century international politics. Few of the wars of the nineteenth century were preceded by alliance formation and none of the five great power wars were preceded by great power alliances (Levy 1981: 581-613).

Ideology too had long reached the analytical lens of international politics that focused on alliances between states. There are two opposite strands of understandings regarding the influence of ideology upon the cohesiveness in the alliance. Birds of Feather accordingly may fall apart or stick together. In other words, similar ideologies in many cases act as a catalyst in fostering strong ties between the allying states; it was not always a likely case. The Super power led alliance during the Cold War years was an apt example for how the

ideological affinities influence a state in their pick from alliance choice than that of their regime types. However, the alliances during Cold War could not possibly escape the interests and rationality underpinnings of alliance formation (Walt 1985: 18).

There has always been dissimilarities in allying state's regime types although not of huge margins but to a considerable extent which did not have larger say in their preference of an alliance partner. Simon and Gartzke (1990: 621) argue that a relatively large number of states had sought alliance partners in the post-Second World War. For example, many democracies might have been forced to choose other democratic regimes as partners. A substantial number of democratic-democratic alliances would have resulted not because democracies preferred to co-ally but because relatively few regimes of other types had sought alliance partners. They also reflected upon the United States' aggressive attempts in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War to establish collective security arrangements, which were referred as 'Pact-o-mania.' The dilemma that was underlined by the authors being that the likelihood that a democratic state would ally with another democratic state would increase, but that does not confirm the reason for the affinity for similar regimes among the allying partners or the affinity for alliances among those of certain regime types. Thereby, they contradicted the generalised assumption that democracies are biased towards allying with each other.

Simon and Gartzke (1996: 622) have investigated the possibility for a relationship that could exist between regime types and the choices of their allies. This research question was raised in order to observe the covert or overt relationship between the regime types and the choices of allies. They also questioned the well established assumption that if any relationship has existed between regime types and alliance formation, that relationship must be positive. The earlier research on the same question has presented the argument for why states might wish to ally with similar regimes. Contradicting those established notions, the possibilities of a state to prefer and ally with their opposite regime types have been tested.

The political regimes of certain characteristics will always be militarily powerful than that of the other kinds. Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) have argued that this is the reason for why democratic states have a tendency to be more affluent than the non-

democratic states. Traditional theories on alliance formation emphasises that the rationale of any state's motive to form an alliance with another state is to aggregate its capabilities. Thus a state could only seek to form an alliance only with the larger or militarily more capable states. However, the later literature dealt with the question of alliance formation has reversed the argument: states prefer alliances largely with relatively smaller or militarily lesser capable states than they are. Therefore the capability basis for alliance preferences of a state has been debunked in international relations literature. Democracies may find it difficult to garner support in the beginning, but once its population has been aroused and their support has been garnered, it is likely that they will provide a robust support in the long run. However, the stopping of the war fighting will also be difficult in democracies as we have seen earlier, that it might be difficult for the rulers to garner the support of an entire population towards a new trend of thinking compared to that of the autocratic regimes. In autocratic regimes, however the primary decisions are quickly arrived at; the robust backing of an ally in the long run will be found difficult.

The term 'ideological solidarity' was employed by Hans J. Morgenthau (1969) in order to refer the alliances that result between states sharing political, cultural or other traits. In other words, a tendency for states with similar domestic political structure preferring to ally with one another than to align with states whose internal characteristics are different. According to this hypothesis, the more similar two or more states are, the more likely they are to ally (Walt 1985: 18-19). Terms such as natural allies is often heard in the international realm of alliance politics refers to such similarity between the allying states ideologies. This view was contradicted by Walt (1985:19) through a counterpoised hypothesis that argues that birds of a feather may fly apart.

Walt (1987: 11-181) has employed a focused comparison and a statistical-correlative analysis of 36 alliances to find that ideological solidarity alone will not foster an alliance between different states but will be highly influenced by other variables too. Siverson and Emmons (1991) have also attempted to test the impact of democracy upon alliance choices. With the data collected regarding various democratic states and with the help of the Correlates of War (COW) project, it is established that the democracies were biased towards allying with each other in the post-Second World War period than during the

inter war years. They observed that the democratic states and the democratic alliances as a whole in their study. They concluded that between the years of 1946 to 1965, alliances between democracies were formed and maintained at much higher rates than the predicted trajectories of the preceding years. Few years later in 1995, Thompson has attempted to verify the results established by Siverson and Emmons. He brought in a different data set on regime type and a longer period of 1830 to 1986 into his study. He also relied upon the similar research designs for the study employed earlier by Siverson and Emmons. The primary assumption of his study was that the democracies are less likely to gravitate towards an alliance between them, compared to that of other regime types. In other words, regime type does not influence the choice to seek an alliance. The above-mentioned research by those authors has been conducted with the random selection of data from the pool that have silenced the other variables like threats and the ability to counter threats' influence upon a state's decision to ally with other states. Since democracy significantly influences the decision-making process, intervening variables like the one mentioned here should have been given adequate focus in their study.

Earlier in 1993, Maoz and Russett have pondered over the differences in the behaviour of an asymmetric regime types. They viewed that democracies by its very nature make its political structure different from that of autocracies. Domestic institutions and constituents inhibit rapid, precipitous action by a democratic leader on behalf of an ally. Popularising an issue and winning the public support or at the least, on the terms of a majority becomes a prerequisite in a democracy to undertake a military action unlike in autocratic regimes. Popular opinions in democracy might not always make a smooth sail for a state to carry forward certain tasks in order to fulfil their alliance necessities. Fearon in 1994 and Smith in 1996 have reflected upon this issue as that the public might not be supportive of the military action of a state which would bring a pressure from both sides for a democratic leadership - one from the domestic realm and another from its ally. Keeping democracy constant in the above mentioned argument and substituting it with religion and ethnicity factors, Pakistan's decision makers faced the similar kind of problem prior to the commencement of the military campaign of the US against Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Autocrats on the other hand may have closed door decision makings keeping their public unaware of the proceedings and can generate biased

reporting in a way that their citizens are made to support the autocratic decisions without much choices provided that in turn could fulfil the state's alliance commitments.

The dedication of democratic leaders is hardly compared to that of their autocratic counterparts (Mesquita and Siverson 1995; 1996). States committed to alliances were also concerned about the possibility of their partner abandoning their commitments in time of the crisis. (Snyder 1984; Sorokin 1994a, 1994b). Given the conflicting objectives between the allies, constructing a reliable alliance commitment costs a state much in an unpopular proposition. On the other hand, a state that comes to ally with another state will get paid in terms of international reputation which in turn will provide for it leverage in their bargaining at international institutions. The value of such a reputation to individual leaders will vary depending on leader's expectations of what they will be able to recoup. For leaders of democracies, the shorter term in office equates to expectations of fewer rewards for international stability. (Simon and Gartzke (1996: 622). For democracies, reputation amounts to a problem of public goods (Olsen 1971; Sandler 1992). The reputation of keeping the promise within an alliance will pay a state duly in the course of time. The reliability of a state as an alliance partner will naturally converts itself as a desirable alliance partner in a long run. For instance, the alliance between the United Kingdom and the United States for a century long period and prior to the twentieth century, the alliance between France and United States were lauded in history particularly for these reasons.

Simon and Gartzke also highlighted the problems of consistent reliability in alliance commitments amongst the democratic regimes. For them the problem for democracies is that the reputation of the state is in the temporary trusteeship of a series of chief executives. They see that it may be in a leader's interest to make good on alliance commitments; it may not be. The investment made by the previous leaders in the credibility of a democracy is hampered by the fact that they will not be able to benefit as greatly from their own efforts. Therefore, in addition to the competing concerns of domestic and international constraints, democracies are hampered because national prestige is seen as less intimately intertwined with the promises of specific leaders. Autocrats on the other hand are both direct beneficiaries of a strong reputation (because

leaders stay in office longer) and indirect beneficiaries (because leaders are more closely associated with the state). In their words, “public support translates into public activity on behalf of the military effort. In autocracies almost all the decisions are arrived at closed doors and decided mostly by the leaders themselves, autocracy does not garner much public support or public activity compared to that of the democracies. Democratic leaders also have incentives to continue military efforts for some time once public support has been marshalled. Such leaders stake their domestic reputation on winning the military efforts. If these efforts go poorly (and assuming leaders have private information about the state of the war), democratic leaders will more likely choose to continue fighting rather than suffer at polls” (Simon and Gartzke 1996).

The regime type of a state has its impact upon the characteristics of an alliance that it engages itself in. Democratic states will take longer time period to arrive on any decision, given the complexities in its decision making process compared to that of the autocratic state. However, with an amassed public support, democracies will stay in the war fighting relatively on a longer time scale once the fight has been initiated; again the complexities of the decision-making process is to be blamed. Popular support is naturally a foreign phenomenon in autocratic regimes, whose consultations are not necessary for the rulers of such state. Hence, swift commencement of war is a easier possibility in autocratic regime, but are much vulnerable to internal dissent due to the centralised decision making system. The accumulation of dissent transcends largely in change of the rulers in those regimes not by ballots but largely by bullets. Therefore, the asymmetric alliance between democratic states and the states with non-democratic regime type has the potential to tap the best of both the state-types. The democratic state might be expected to choose a partner that comes swiftly towards its defence rather than another state that holds much more complex decision making system. Similarly, an autocratic state might expect an ally of having a reputation for a long-term commitment. Therefore, the authors justify that the states with asymmetric regime types has the possibility of having stronger alliance affinity compared to that of the similar feather attractions.

Much of the international relations literature has associated alliance formation with war and peace. Therefore, argumentative groups associate alliance formation with war or the

counter arguing that alliance stabilises and smoothens the inter-state relationships thereby contributing towards world peace. Both the camps attract various empirics from different historical periods to prove their assumption that has its lineage on different conceptual understandings. One of the established understandings on alliance formations linked to peace was advanced by various scholars and statesmen alike which is that alliances deter war by enhancing the credibility of military intervention in support of the victims of aggression and by clarifying the precise nature of military coalition that would confront any aggressor. Singer et al. (1972: 23) argues that the more generalised argument is that alliance commitments reduce the level of uncertainty in the international system and thus minimise the likelihood of a war generated by misperception and miscalculations. On contradiction, Osgood's views (1967: 86) clarifies the concrete alliance commitments minimise the chance of a major shift in the alliance configuration through the explanation of its potential destabilising consequences.

Balance of Power theorists assert that alliances are indispensable means of maintaining equilibrium and preserving a balance of power, and hence keeping the peace (Gulick, 1955: 61-62; Holsti et al., 1973: 31-32). Their argument critically distinguishes between the *ad hoc* alliances and permanent alliances. Wright (1965: 773) argues that *ad hoc* alliances formed for the purpose of counter balancing dangerous shift in the relative power capabilities are necessary for checking any aggressive state. The permanent alliances on the other hand are destabilising precisely because they interfere with the flexibility of the international system to generate the *ad hoc* alliances necessary in order to maintain a stable equilibrium. Alliance commitments reduce the number of possible coalitions which could conceivably be formed against any aggressor, and are therefore conducive to war (Morgenthau 1967: 335). States in the 'balancer band' will get reduced in case of permanent alliances that eventually lead to war by reducing the possible balancers in the given situation. The balancer state is an unaligned state constantly shifts its political support to the side of the weaker coalition, with the ultimate threat of military intervention (Claude 1962: 47-48; Gulick 1955: 65-67). Hence, the balance of power theorists argue for flexible alliance configurations. The uncertainty concerning the nature of the defensive coalition that might form serves itself as a deterrent. Therefore, the

permanent alliance contributes much to war by reducing the uncertainty and simplifying the calculations of the aggressor (Morgenthau 1967: 335; Mesquita 1975: 190).

Deutsch and Singer (1964: 317-381) argue that pluralist cross-cutting pressures minimise the likelihood of mutually reinforcing antagonisms which lead to war and that alliance commitments contribute to war by limiting these cross-cutting pressures. Thus, a polarised alliance structure, characterised by the absence of cross-cutting ties, may lead to war because of the rigidities which prevent the formation of certain counterbalancing coalitions (Singer and Small 1967: 251; Wallace 1973). On the other hand, non-polarised alliances system facilitates the formation of countervailing *ad hoc* alliances and is conducive to peace. Liska (1968: 34-36) brings in the argument of states' efforts that only few of the states uses the alliance to constrain a revisionist alliance partner. Other theories that links alliances with peace argues that alliance with a respected power may enhance the prestige (and hence the domestic authority and stability) of a regime whose collapse might be destabilising for the international system (Liska, 1968: 37-40).

Alliances lead to fission-like counter alliances thereby creates much mistrust and tensions that facilitate the free flow of arms trade which in turn strengthens the further polarisation of the alliance structure and ultimately leading to war (Kaplan 1957: 24; Holsti et al., 1973: 33; Wright 1965: 774). The argument that alliance formation is an end in itself delves mostly around the national interests of the states for which the alliance has been constructed in the first place. In practice, supporting an ally has been primarily linked with the national prestige. The failure to support an ally may attract a diplomatic isolation of a state in a hostile and threatening international environment. Public opinion is also closely linked with the alliance commitments of a state. Respecting the alliance commitment abroad and upholding the national honour pays duly the politician domestically, especially in democracy. Scott (1967: 117) and Fay (1928: 34) argue that it had been a common scene in international politics that the secondary states often drag their great power as their protectors in war. Thus alliances contribute to the incidence of war and further they also increase the scope of war.

The various theoretical propositions on alliance formation have been put under rigorous empirical tests. The Correlates of War (COW) project generated by Singer and his

colleagues is rich in data on war and alliance and covers the period from 1816-1965 (Simon and Gartzke 1996). Singer and Small (1966b) argue that the alliance commitment demonstrated by a state is reflected in its national war behaviour. While the alliances facilitated peace in the nineteenth century, it has only contributed towards the war in the twentieth century. Hence, the low association between alliance formation and the amount of war (Singer and Small 1967).

Wallace (1973) finds a nonlinear relationship between alliance polarisation and war, in which very high or very low levels of polarisation predict war. Using some different indicators of polarisation, Bueno de Mesquita (1975, 1978) finds that the tightness of the alliance structure is unrelated to war but that change towards increasing tightness is correlated with higher levels of war. In addition, there are several studies of whether alliance commitments lead to military intervention in an ongoing war, and hence to the expansion of that war. Singer and Small (1966a) find that alliance commitments do in fact increase the likelihood of intervention in support of one's ally. Sabrosky (1980) finds that alliance commitments predict wartime reliability in the nineteenth century but not in the twentieth century and that defensive alliances are more reliable than neutrality pacts. Siverson and Kinf (1980) demonstrate that the empirical linkages between alliance commitments and wartime support of allies are a function of various characteristics of the alliance.

Walt (1985: 21) problematises the established hypothesis of natural cohesiveness among the symmetrical regimes with a couple of issues. He pitches in an alternative hypothesis that certain ideological types promote conflict among similar states rather than cooperation. He also questions of how large a role that ideology plays in alliance formation and examines the factors that either increase or decrease its significance. States prefer interests over ideologies in their choice of alliance partners. On the pragmatic side, security interests of a state turn to occupy the primary preference compared to that of the ideology. Ideological factors in explaining the alliance affinity has often exaggerated which is also touched upon by Walt. He argues, "*...the apparent importance of ideology can be exaggerated by the perceptions of statesmen and the policies that they adopt as a result. If statesmen believe that ideology determines international alignments, they will*

view similar states as potential friends and dissimilar ones as potential enemies. Reacting positively towards the former and harshly towards the latter will encourage good relations with one and drive the others to cling together more tightly in opposition.” Walt broadens his explanation through the argument that certain ideologies asks the members in an alliance to adhere to the centralised hierarchical movement under the single command. These kinds of tendencies in an alliance structure will possibly sprout competition and conflict among the member states than making the alliance formation amicable and cooperative.

Traditional understandings in the causality of alliance points out that states will either balance against a prominent threat or it may bandwagon. Balancing is an act wherein states group against an external threat in order to confront it in the wake of any possible attack or threat of an attack. Bandwagoning on the other hand is a gesture by a relatively lesser capable state to align with the powerful state to share the fruits of victory or at the least to appease it. Threat is the crucial part for which a state seeks alliances. However, the response may be whether to balance against the threat or to bandwagon with the threat itself. Walt (1985) analyses the alliance formation through the balancing and bandwagoning distinctions. These terminologies were borrowed from Waltz (1979) and Wolfers (1962). Alliances accordingly are formed as a response to the threat. However, there exists a sharp distinction in the arguments of what the response would be. By balancing against the threat, states tend to ally with other states or entities against the primary source of the threat. By bandwagoning, states tend to ally with and follow the state that poses a threat itself. Thus as a response to threat, states largely tend to either balance against or bandwagon with the threatening entity. In his words, “*...if balancing is more common than bandwagoning, then states are more secure because aggressors will face combined opposition. Status quo states should therefore avoid provoking countervailing coalitions by eschewing threatening foreign and defense policies. But if bandwagoning is dominant tendency, then security is scarce because aggression is rewarded. A more belligerent foreign policy and a more capable military establishment are the logical policy choices*” (Walt 1985: 5-6).

Conventional explanations by balance of power theorists are that the states tend to join alliances in order to evade the domination of relatively higher capability states. Accordingly the intention of states that seeks to ally with another is to counter the threats posed by other states with better potential. States prefer to balance against the stronger power for two different reasons. Walt (1985: 5-6) explains this as *“states risk their own survival if they fail to curb a potential hegemon before it becomes too strong. To ally with dominant power means placing one’s trust in its continued benevolence. The safer strategy is to join with those who cannot readily dominate their allies, in order to avoid being dominated by those who can. Other reason for states to balance against the threat is that joining the more vulnerable side increases the new member’s influence, because the weaker side has greater need for assistance. Joining the stronger side, by contrast, reduces the new member’s influence (because it adds relatively less to the coalition) and leaves it vulnerable to the whims of its new partners. Alignment with the weaker side is thus the preferred choice”* (Walt 1985: 5-6).

Walt (1985: 7) has also mentioned different empirics in which the statesmen and politicians alike were in support of the bandwagoning tendencies of states’ alliance behaviour. He quotes German Admiral Alfred Von Tirpitz’s famous “risk theory”. Accordingly, “by building a great battle fleet Germany could force England into neutrality or alliance with it by posing a threat to England’s vital maritime supremacy.” Walt has also highlighted US officials repeatedly embracing the bandwagoning hypothesis in justifying the American foreign policy commitments. John F. Kennedy was quoted, who claimed that if the United States were to falter, the whole world...would inevitably begin to move toward the communist bloc. Although the rapprochement with China showed his own willingness to balance; similarly, Henry Kissinger also revealed his belief that most states tend to bandwagon by suggesting that if leaders around the world...assume that the US lacked either the force or the will...they will accommodate themselves to the dominant trend. Ronald Reagan also has endorsed the same beliefs in his claim that ‘if the US cannot defend itself [in Central America]...then one cannot expect them to prevail elsewhere... [Their] credibility will collapse and their alliances will crumble’. Through these empirics, Walt argues that states are attracted to strength. The more powerful a state is and more clearly that is demonstrated, the more likely that

others will ally with a state. On the opposite side of the spectrum, if the capabilities of powerful states start declining than the allying powers might choose the neutrality position at best or gravitate towards the opposite camp at worst.

According to Walt, bandwagoning states might have two distinct objectives. First, bandwagoning may be adopted as a form of appeasement. By aligning with the threatening state or coalition, the bandwagoner may hope to avoid an attack on him by diverting it elsewhere. Second, a state may align with the dominant side in war in order to share the spoils of victory. Walt quotes Dennis Mack Smith (1982: 234-35, 246-50), Adam B. Ulam (1972: 394-98), and Taylor (1980: 88-90, 153) to claim that Mussolini's declaration of war on France and Russia's entry into the war against Japan in 1945 illustrate the bandwagoning, as do Italian and Rumanian alliance choices in the First World War. By joining the alliances of the stronger side, each hoped to make territorial gains at the end of the war. He also quotes Ulam (1972: 276-77), Deutscher (1966: 437-43) and Fest (1974: 583-84, 592-93) to claim that Stalin's decision to ally with Hitler in 1939 illustrates the motives of the states to align with the stronger side. The Nazi-Soviet pact led to the dismemberment of Poland and may have deflected Hitler's ambition westward. Stalin was thus able to gain both time and territory by bandwagoning with Hitler. In general, however, these two motives for bandwagoning are quite different. In the first, bandwagoning was chosen for defensive reasons, as a means of maintaining independence in the face of potential threat. In the second, a bandwagoning state chooses the leading side for offensive reasons, in order to acquire territory. Regardless of the specific motive, however, bandwagoning behaviour stands in sharp contrast to the predictions of balance of power theory. The two hypotheses thus offer mutually exclusive explanations for how states will make their alliance choices.

Walt (1985: 15-17) has identified four factors that constitute the power of a state which in turn is perceived by the states in the opposite camp as threats. They being, aggregate power, proximity, offensive capabilities and offensive intentions. Threats calculated in terms of power politics underpin the conception of both balancing and bandwagoning behaviour of a state in an alliance set up. It may seem that states opt to bandwagon the greater power; it is less likely in the historical trajectories. States in the historical study

have revealed that they preferred an alliance that counters the hegemonic power than to follow their dictates.

Walt (1985: 17) identifies three premises upon which a state may prefer to bandwagon. They being, weak states can never add a considerable capability to the alliance and they are highly vulnerable to pressures. Hence, they opt to bandwagon with the powerful state than to balance against it. He also states that weak states may balance against other weak states, but may be relatively more likely to bandwagon when confronted by a great power. Weak states are more likely to have a lesser option regarding the availability of allying choices. They are also likely to bandwagon with the powerful state while it was their only rational option and in the midst of their least confident levels with the optional alliance. It is natural for the strong states through the above reasoning that they create a strong sphere of influences in their neighbourhood. If the capabilities of the neighbouring states are also more or less equal to that of the strong state, then they are likely to balance against the interests of their regional hegemon but the weak states are more likely to bandwagon.

States seeking alliance generally employs certain effective mechanisms to buy off allies though they do not constitute the primary function towards alliance formation. The strategies or tactics used is termed by Walt (1985: 27) as 'bribery' or penetration. However, interests of states however play a primary role even in the flow of such aids from one side to another.

Monopoly or a near monopoly position of a provider state plays leverage in determining the success of an alliance outcome. The presence of many aid providers naturally opens larger options for the recipient state to seek from different sources and align with an alternative grouping. The recipient state's reliability upon the provider state naturally increases with the flow of aid. However, the entanglement in a relationship pays both the state since the provider can also not negotiate regarding their supply chain in the wake of their common enemy standing at their doorsteps. Cohesiveness between the donor and the recipient also determines the negotiation regarding aid volume and the international standings of both the states also will have its say in the process. For instance, if a receiving state is relatively in a better position they cannot negotiate their prestige by

negotiating hard with the provider state. Walt (1985: 27) makes it clear as to how aids can be self-defeating for the provider state and keeps the receiving state in a leverage position. Accordingly, aids strengthen the recipient's position and thus reduce the need to follow its patron's wishes. He quotes Henry Kissinger describing the bargaining process with Israel during his 'step-by-step' diplomacy: "I ask [Israeli Prime Minister] Rabin to make concessions, and he says he can't because Israel is weak. So I give him more arms, and he says he doesn't need to make concessions because Israel is strong" (Walt 1985: 27).

A state may use covert tactics to win over the support of another state and thereby making to ally with it. Among these the more commonly employed strategies are being, winning a group of public servants who are already in a peripheral position of a state's core mechanisms. The penetration of a state interest through the lobbies of another state to alter the latter's policy position and making them to take sides with the former state. Propaganda through various means is also being employed to win over public as well as an elite support in a state.

Chapter Three

Empirics from US-Japan relations after the Second World War

Japan signed an official document of surrender on 2 September 1945 and handed over its sovereignty to the allied powers following the nuclear apocalypse at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) focused on establishing a liberal democracy in Japan during the early years of its occupation phase and also succeeded in laying a strong democratic foundation upon which Japan have thrived a miraculous rise eventually. Activists of Japan's militaristic phase were either brought under an ambit of legal scrutiny or removed from the position of prominence from political life. Among the reforms that were sprinkled over Japan's politics, extensive land reforms to cull the land tenancy are worth noting. Land tenancy policies in Japan during the pre-surrender era were regarded as the reason for the rise of ultra national tendencies in state politics. Japan's royal family, many among the bureaucrats and industrialists were off the purge of SCAP in order to secure the spirit of conservative pragmatism. Purge had rather swept over many of the former army and naval personnel along with some right wing politicians.

In 1947, Japan got its new Constitution that provided for the primacy of political authority upon the prime minister and the Diet. The Emperor of Japan became a symbolic head of the state and Article 9 of Japan's Constitution proscribed Japan's engagement in any war efforts at its will and the need for armed forces. The reverse course followed Japan's early occupation phase, during which the foundations for Japan's economic prominence were laid.

Japan's bureaucracy got strengthened during the war years and continued to evolve in the post war era. National security was predominant to Japanese thinking, both during the war years as well as in the post-war period. Renovationist thinking always kindled the thoughts of the bureaucrats who held a deep sense of commitment to the necessity of guided change and long range planning to boost their state to a strong position in the new global order. All along, they have demonstrated a strong dissatisfaction in accepting the status quo.

Dower contrasts Japan's pre-war and post war socio-political set up. "Post-war bloom of Shin Kanryo (new bureaucrats) and Kaushin Kanryo (renovationist bureaucrats) in the state's political scene," argues Dower, (1990: 62) "were continuation of intellectual élan and elite class of Japan as much as the pre-war years. He argues that in the periods prior to 1945 as well as post 1945 in Japan, a considerable chunk of the brightest university products had gravitated towards the profession in bureaucracy." The bureaucrat's role in economic decision making had fared better in the post-surrender period compared to that of the wartimes. The United States' indirect rule through Japan's political machinery and Japan's economic disarray continued to prevail till 1952. This scenario had naturally placed Japan's bureaucrats at the key positions. Ministry of International Trade and Industries (MITI) officials had considerably overshadowed Japan's foreign ministry which was struggling without an independent foreign policy. Japan was also not a bureaucratic state or a strictly capitalistic state but its version of capitalism withheld the conservative views of retaining market while controlling excessive competition and promoting the national interests and goals. In the words of Dower (1990: 66), 'Japan's economy was a trans-war phenomenon which broke its shackles from conservative economic nationalism of the *Meiji* era to that of the 'new Japanese Capitalism' of the post-war period.

Japan's economy and the strategic trajectories play a central role in explaining the post war history of the US-Japan alliance. The Cold War had its 'hard to challenge' impact upon many of the politics around the globe during its reign. In the East Asian theatre, resisting and imbibing communism-driven system change was evident. Politics of the states of many East Asian states like North Korea and Vietnam during that period acknowledges the fact. Japan was largely historicized in the context that it has existed in hermitage, cut off from the stormy Cold War global politics of that time. Unlike this view, Japan had its equal share of consequences. The United States tight fisted control over Japan in the early occupational phase and the eventual cohesion that bloomed between the two states in the post-occupational phase had naturally provided Japan with a communism-resistant political system. Testifying the argument, Antony Best et al. (2004: 326-27) argue that the 'economic miracle' in East Asia would not have happened outside

the Cold War environment, and that this alone suggests that the model of development that worked in the region is too historically specific to be exported to the outside world.

The cohesion of Japan with US was meticulously constructed on rationality that Japan's reliance upon US could fetch considerable might, in matters of security and international trade rather than aspiring for a secluded self centric rise. Thus this fast rising nation state plays a crucial role in the ascending trans-Pacific trade ties compared to that of descending trans-Atlantic ties. This has led to the rise of the 'pacific age'. Japan thus could possibly become an important state in the Pacific Rim Community. In the near future, Japan might assume a global role in bringing peaceful, prosperous and stable politics in the region if not assuming the global economic leadership.

North America, Western Europe, Japan and Australia are already balancing themselves with shared security concerns. Power balancing by a group of states against the common or perceived threat by other group of states is not new to international politics. Turn of the twentieth century however brought a new challenge of balancing among states against non-state actors. This challenge has brought almost all the states of the globe against fewer states or against the sub state actors. For example, NATO and the US has led campaign is pursued against some of the West Asian and Northern African states along with North Korea and the sub-state groups in Pakistan.

In the economic realm, the current order has shifted from self-sustained economy to that of the stronger mutual interdependence between the states. These strong inter-state ties are being the vector of the recession avalanche that could affect almost all the states even if it gets triggered from a single centre. A shattered Japanese economy, in the immediate post-war years have passed through the 'economic miracle' and reached a stable trajectory in the eighties. Reischauer (1990: 335 & 279) summarises the stability of Japan in 1980's, as this time period has witnessed many stirrings in the right direction. As Japan has continued to grow rapidly through the eighties, it had been increasingly come to be regarded as an economic superpower – a veritable economic giant – comparable in its fields of strength to the [Cold War reign] United States and Soviet Union as military giants, or China and India as giants in population. Business entrepreneurs and the Japanese government have funded American universities and other centres of Japanese

excellence generously for the study of Japanese culture throughout the world. Japan's Federation of Economic Enterprises *Keidanren* promised aids to East and South East Asia in 1989. The Japanese have also upheld their faith in the "peace constitution" which was reflected in their new Emperor Akihito's statement of working for "improved welfare of the human race" in his first public statement on 9 January 1989. Investments and trade with China and South Korea have increased considerably and with North Korea and other Asian states to a certain extent. Young Japanese of the generation looked forward to close ties with the Western states especially with the United States.

Japan's "economic miracle" is not a miracle that erupted overnight but was the result of persevering and steady growth that it undertook for decades. In the eighties, Japan witnessed the emergence of more self confidence in itself. According to the US and other allies, Japan should have transcended its power to empower other states from the developing world and to contribute considerably towards the world peace. The thought that Japan might transcend its economic might sooner or later into a military might had started worrying many of the global states, especially its neighbours.

On the strategic sector, by the end of the Cold War, US-Japan alliance had witnessed a new threat emerging in the region in the form of militaristic North Korea. The Korean peninsula holds in its memory, the not-so-distant Japan's occupation. However, Korean nuclear pursuit had its roots much from the security paranoia constructed during the Korean War – a fall out of the Cold War, than that of the pre-1945 colonial occupation phase. North Korea's (DPRK) grabbed global attention (especially of other nuclear weapon states) through its pragmatic pursuit of nuclear power status. This swept under the carpet South Korea's (ROK) attempts towards its nuclear weapons experiments in September 2000. Thus, let alone the Himalayan task of driving towards the eastern nuclear free zone, the nuclear weapons free Korean peninsula itself has emerged as a daunting task before the anti-nuclear campaigners. Therefore, Japan's earlier 'nuclear allergy' has given rise to alternative thoughts in the context of possible nuclear pursuit by the Koreans.

Japan's National Defence Programme Guidelines (NDPG) of 2004 lays out Japanese defense doctrine alongside the necessary force structure. The document refers to North

Korea as a 'major destabilising factor' for regional and international security; whereas China's military modernization is simply referred to as requiring 'careful attention' (Hughes 2004: 292). The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK / North Korea) nuclear fallouts of mid-1990's, the Taepodong-I missile test of 1998 and the missile test in October 2006 have gravitated sharp reactions from Japan's policy makers. Japan's bilateral ties with DPRK also floated through troubled waters during North Korea's incursions into Japan's territorial waters and abduction of the Japanese citizens. Hughes (2004) has also argued that Japan's upgradation of its Self Defence Forces (JSDF) and conventional capabilities to respond to guerrilla incursions; is tipping Japan toward the introduction of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) are all linked to "DPRK threat" which eventually forces its policy makers in reconsidering its nuclear stance.

The Six party talks between DPRK and Japan, PRC, ROK, Russia and US with an objective of stalling North Korea's nuclear pursuit have suggested that DPRK might provide enough nuclear temptations for other states in the region. Olsen (1971: 02-03) has argued that the popular opinion regarding Korea going nuclear was reflected in the events like North Korea's attempts to pursue nuclear weaponry, US response towards DPRK's ambitions and South Korea's earlier attempts in pursuing the nuclear. Olsen has also highlighted the 1994 literary work of Kim Chin-Myung, *Mugunghwa kkot-i piussumnida* (Roses of Sharon has blossom) a tri-volume novel that argued against U.S. attempts to stall the nuclear aspirations of both DPRK and ROK. Olsen has linked the popular success of the novel with the then existing Korean mood. He also mentioned the 2003 work by the same author in the name *Jae sam ui sinario* (The Third Scenario) that argued about U.S. attempts to stall the Korean reunification and eventually using the inter Korean conflict to pursue its own ends.

Bifurcated states of DPRK and ROK, divorced from their inherent potential to be a nation state and their inter-state feuds are still standing as a legacy of the Cold War politics. Korea going nuclear or the possible Korean reunification could possibly ring an alarm in the security corners of the Japanese minds. Japan's 'nuclear allergy' that had its roots in the 1945 nuclear carnage has provided it with enough fighting potential against PRC and Russia possessing nuclear weaponry in the region. However, Korean peninsula too going the nuclear way might not let Japan to stick to its current nuclear posture. The Japanese

psyche had already engaged with the ideas of becoming a 'normal state' and a nuclear state. However, Japan might not forego the US security umbrella for the pursuit of its indigenous nuclear weaponry. The post-Cold War historical trajectories between the two states have shown that the US might spend less out of its pocket towards Japan's interests and Japan had already well established itself in the region where it could stand in the region without US assistance.

The post Cold War public opinion has reified that Japan should stay as a non-nuclear state. The United States' nuclear umbrella over Japan underpins such an urge; however during the Cold War, the reliability of U.S.' nuclear deterrence came under the hammer of nuclear analysts. In the post Cold War period, Japan's 'go-nuclear' lobby argued that the United States might not risk a nuclear exchange for Japan's interests even against their common adversary. They foster their argument further by citing the mounting trade frictions between the two states and the United States domestic calls for force reduction in Asia. Further, the United States and Japan are often seen as drifting their policies towards East-Asian politics. United States is no longer threatened by China and Russia, while Japan is facing the heat on several potential political, economic and security concerns towards Beijing and Moscow and possibly Pyongyang. Hisahiko Okazaki, former ambassador of Japan for Saudi Arabia and Thailand noted that 'if Japan had to everything for its own defence, it would go nuclear. This would come from necessity, not from the revival of militarism' (Quoted in Harrison 1996: 26). China's probable rise in the near future was attributed to Japan's self-centric security concerns behind the extended deterrence of US. On the other hand, he notes that Japan should 'stay restrained of nuclear weapons' group and that the United States nuclear umbrella has a more immutable, transcending value precisely because it provides a rationale for keeping Japan non-nuclear. (Harrison 1996: 25)

Go-nuclear lobby also argues that Japan's friction with China, Russia and North Korea is inevitable. The nuclear restraint lobby clarifies that intensifying the CBMs with Beijing and fostering the sea bed petroleum project at the contested Senkaku (Tiao Yu Tai) would keep the conflicts between the two states at bay. Since the rise in China's military capabilities will not alter the balance of power in East Asia any sooner, economic ties between the two states could be strengthened before that. Similarly, broadening of

economic ties with Pyongyang is also suggested by them. In 1996, China deployed the medium range missiles with nuclear warheads, 10 DF-4s with a range of 4,750 miles and 60 DF-3s with a range of 2800 miles. It also possess growing conventional power-projection capabilities. Hence, it is expected that China might assert itself in the region at the expense of Japan which had its before-effects in its military muscle flexing in the South China Sea and East China Sea. Calculated ambiguity – the policy followed by United States in 1996 when China undertook a military exercise in Taiwan Strait has been cited as a reason for Japan not relying on United States in the wake of China's nuclear threat. Adding to the effect, the United States had brought in a joint mechanism with Japan called Joint Theatre Missile Defence in East Asia where Japan had to pitch in with a larger monetary contribution. This concept emerged in the post Cold War era and the United States shifted its stand from extended nuclear deterrence, followed during the Cold War.

Kumao Kaneko, director of the Nuclear Energy Division in Japan's Foreign Ministry has argued that the continuation of the Security Treaty and the issue of the 'nuclear umbrella' should be viewed separately. The United States would be highly unlikely to use its nuclear arms to defend Japan, unless American forces in Japan were exposed to extreme danger. If by any chance, Japan takes the lead in going nuclear, that might be its own self defeating prophecy which in turn might trigger both North as well as South Korea to follow suit. This will provide enough reason for its relationship turning estranged with both China and Russia in the region. Kaenko fears the possible upsurge of nuclear use in East Asia. He further argues that Japan should look for a space in order to construct a regional atomic energy organisation like ASIATOM similar to that of EURATOM in Europe and alongside it should negotiate with its neighbouring states for a nuclear free North East Asia. ASIATOM might serve the purpose of facilitating transparency, safe operation of nuclear facilities, safe disposal of nuclear waste materials and above all the coordinated management of plutonium and enriched-uranium stocks held by all the member states that includes Japan. Nuclear-free zone could only become a reality, according to Kaenko with an effective inspection and verification machinery within the ASIATOM set up.

Suzuki (1996: 52) has referred to Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata acknowledging with the words that he ‘agrees absolutely’ to a closed committee hearing from a Liberal Democratic Party Diet member that Japan should ‘confirm to other nations that it can produce nuclear weapons but is refraining from doing so out of respect for the NPT.’ Suzuki has also referred to Professor Fuji Kamiya, security specialist from the National Defence Academy of Japan, who noted three factors that could possibly shift Japan towards a nuclear weapons procurer. These factors are as follows:

- a) A failure of the five nuclear powers to move toward the reduction and eventual elimination of their nuclear weapons;
- b) The perception of an emerging military threat to Japan from Russia, China or North Korea; and
- c) A Japanese loss of confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella as an effective deterrent to Russian, Chinese and North Korean military pressures.

The post-war study of Japan’s relationship with the United States is much submerged within the economic sphere forcing the strategic and other studies to the secondary levels. As the Cold War progressed, the US had shifted its focus from reforming Japan to that of its economic reconstruction. Economic success of Japan had passed through a stable trajectory in the 1980’s. Just as the United States has been woken up from its slumber in the beginning of twentieth century after its prolonged isolation, Japan realised that it could neither live in isolation nor by militaristic domination. Japan had then turned itself into a crucial economic state in the world economic affairs. Within the region of East and South East Asia, Japan was not all alone in its economic rise. PRC, ROK, Taiwan and Singapore were the other states in the region that shared similarities with Japan in their economic betterment in the final half of the twentieth century.

Japan’s rise has largely altered the established post war global economic order. While Japan’s economy was in the ascendancy, US in the eighties underwent budgetary debt and trade deficits in the world trade which had also contributed towards alterations in the world economic order. The eighties had witnessed Japan turning out as a world’s largest creditor state pushing United States as a world’s key debtor state. The United States was then undergoing a spendthrift decade on borrowed currency which paved an easy route

into it for the Japanese surplus. Consequently, economic and cultural fears towards Japan were on the rise in the United States. Pittsburgh Steel Workers and Detroit Auto Makers were accusing the Japanese for stealing their jobs which instigated a series of protectionist measures. Japanese automobiles and their real estate trade in United States were seen more alarmingly than that of the European manufactures in the US. 'Japan bashing' by US government ascended to the level of frustration that provoked some angry Congressmen to smash the 'Made in Japan' television sets with sledgehammers on the steps of the Capitol. The omnibus trade bill of August 1988 was also an attempt to restrict much of Japan's trade entry into the US. Europeans have also showed a similar antipathy towards products from the Far East. They were much cautious of any possible diversification of Japanese goods into Europe once the doors of the US were shut for them. The domestic scenario in the United States however had projected a different picture. Individual States within the US had tried to attract larger Japanese investments and people were thronging to buy high end quality products that were made in Japan.

Unlike many of the western states, Japan felt much more vulnerable in the global economic arena. The Japanese psyche was that they had ascended only through their self-help and hard work without much support from its alliance partners, specifically in the economic arena. Instances such as 1973 and 1979 oil shocks, soya bean embargo of 1973 rigidified these understandings. Adding to this fear, 'four little tigers' – Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan - who were all following closely on the trails of Japan; also the heavily populated regions of China, India, South East Asia and Latin America were rapidly industrialising themselves in order to grab their shares in global trade and economic space.

Unlike the United States, Japan's economic rise was not from its isolationist posture, but from that of strong economic interdependence with other potential economic powerhouses of the world. With minimum natural resources within its territories, Japan had to have larger engagement and trade ties outside of its territory. The post-Second World War world order underpinned by nuclear weapons domination also made it less likely for Japan to think of any possible hard power global domination which could call for mutual annihilation of states. Given the fewer fuel bases within Japan for its huge

economy, Japan had to be dependent and well connected with the global society until it found the way of using renewable energy resources within a reasonable cost to help it become a self reliant global power.

Despite the similarities that Japan shares with South Korea and Taiwan and the existential extensive commercial ties between these states Japan pulled itself back from a pro-active leadership role in the region. Not for its militaristic past but Japan had lagged a smoother inter-state ties with its neighbours, both communist and non-communist states alike. 'Developmental states' of East Asia say Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have similarly invested much upon their economic growth model since the 1960's compared to that of their social and welfare dynamics. These states had a paradigm shift from import substitution to the manufacturing sector. However, all these three states have focused upon the manufacture from particular industrial output backed up by training highly skilled bureaucrats that eventually lead to the growth of their economy. Inter-linkage between these cultures dates back to pre-Second World War era where those regions were under the occupation of Japan and thereby exposed to Japan's political system and bureaucracy. In the Post-Japanese surrender period in the world war naturally emulated Japan's model of systemic reforms in the region and a similar faith between these three states that internal poverty would provoke upon them an external aggression. However, South Korea and Taiwan witnessed the strains of authoritative rule by autocrats that was not much deviant from that established democracy in Japan. Since Japan was largely ruled by a single party – Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) for the whole era, the stability of rule provided with long-term programmes that led to a steady economic growth. Naturally the US made these states preferential ones to prevent the spread of communism in the region. Hence, they had an easy access to U.S. markets along with the economic and military aid from the United States. In turn, through their economic prowess they projected that capitalist mode of economy is more viable than that of the communists.

The United States also helped facilitating Japan's cordial ties with the People's Republic of China (ROC) in 1952 and with Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1965 in order to make Japan a key investor of capital in these regions. The bilateral ties of these states were always stronger with the United States than within themselves. The only time that

witnessed stronger ties between Japan and South Korea was in the post-Nixon doctrine period and when US President Carter was reluctant of backtracking U.S. troops from Korean peninsula from 1977-78.

Cameras, binoculars, watches and other electronic goods of high-end technologies were largely the manufactured from Japan in the early post-war phase. Manufacturing depots which were employed on heavy duty during the war times shifted their outputs from heavy military machineries to that of the efficient household products in large scale. For example, machine gun producing factories of the war time years shifted their produce to the sewing machines. Robots were pioneered by Japanese manufacturers. Drugs and crime free society, along with the hard work and ethics of good order contributed substantially in the productive sector.

Dower (1990: 50-75) quotes John Stuart Mill, who had made an observation on Japanese labour market that the capabilities of the populace is what matters the most in a country's progress. This was reflected in Japan's ascendancy during the post-war times. History has registered the inefficiency of the Japanese militarists in handling their state's manpower policy which was reflected in the complete chaos of the Japanese labour market in the final two years of the war. Japan had a highly skilled work force in its agricultural sector by the end of the war compared to early 1930s. Between 1930 and 1945, around four million new workers were incorporated into the industrial labour force. Millions of men who served under the strict military discipline were also inducted to build the post war industrial economy of Japan.

Japan had followed a rigorous model of twelve years of primary and secondary education that was in par with any other quality education systems of the world. Nonetheless, ninety five percent of the population had successfully passed those education levels and forty percent amongst them had successfully managed to pursue higher education. This laid the foundation for Japanese industries to equip themselves with technically modernised and scientifically sophisticated and superior equipments without much hardship for its labour force. Japan thus possessed a well equipped and better educated work force compared to other advanced regions of the globe.

In the post-war period, the number of technical schools in Japan had increased from 11 to over 400 between 1935 and 1945. In-firm technical training was designed to create a highly skilled cadre of blue-collared worker force. Science and engineering in Japan was stimulated by war. The university graduations between 1941 and 1945 tripled compared to a decade earlier. While isolation from interaction with Western scientists was a grievous blow to the first-rate researchers, the expansion of indigenous research facilities in both basic and applied science was encouraging, prestigious institutions like "Riken" laboratory which emerged during this period. Reliable quality with uniform standards was in practice in the production of mass military equipments. The 'QC' (quality control) ideals that have become famous in the contemporary times were largely influenced by the post war American technical consultants like W. Edwards Deming. The formal guideline for quality maintenance used by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry in the mid-1980s has retained the Industrial Standardisation Laws introduced by the military regime of 1940.

Nippon, the chain of islands that had been vulnerable to repeated natural calamities forced many of the Japanese individuals to save a chunk of their monthly income in the banks. The Banks in Japan has diversified these savings into long term growth projects and most of the business in Japan has relied upon this banking capital. Thus Japan had created for itself an efficient economic system in ways much better than that of many western states including that of the United States. Japanese businesses have largely relied upon the banking financial capital rather than the shares and stocks which provided the stability of its firms in the long run. The working days in a week also reduced from initial five and a half days to that of the five which extracted efficient work in a stipulated time period.

The banking sector of Japan had its unbroken lineage from the pre war year. Between 1927 and 1936, Japan's banking sector had witnessed a huge wobbling in the ordinary commercial banks numbers due to the panic in 1927. The numbers had reduced from 1400 in 1927 to that of 418 in 1936. It was further reduced to sixty one in the inter war years due to the heavier rate of mergers and absorptions. Legislations passed in 1942 and 1944 had however strengthened the urban-nationalised banks which were designated as

authorised financial institutions to serve the war mechanism by funding nearly six hundred producers of major strategic war materials. 'Over loan' and 'leveraging' practices in the post war era by Japanese banks were also the legacy of wartimes.

Many big corporations of Japan did not collapse following its surrender in the Second World War. They survived and reinvigorated themselves despite the political turmoil in their state. Many of the firms in Japan were able to shine during the occupation period. Ten of the eleven key automobile manufacturers of Japan that dominated its economy in the post-war period were the legacy of the pre-war era. For example, military usage carriers were manufactured during the war years by Toyota, Isuzu and Nissan which continued to flourish even after the US occupation. During the wartime and the period preceding it, these corporations and their guilds had forced their government to carry out restrictionist practices towards the foreign corporations and requested to increase the low cost loans to the Japanese companies. The legislation passed in 1936 for example played a crucial role in sidelining the US firms like Ford and General Motors in Japan. A couple of control associations were established in 1941 and 1942 to coordinate the production and distribution of war time vehicles. During wartime, executives of both these associations worked closely with the government. The second largest corporation in Japan in the post war years after Toyota, Nomura Corporation was also formed as early as 1925. Founded as a firm that specialises in dealing with bonds, it emerged to the forefront by 1938 by widening its stock dealings and commencing investment operations in 1941.

Hitachi was then the second largest manufacturer of electrical goods. It was part of the Ayukawa conglomerate that held Nissan and Toshiba and commenced its venture in the early twentieth century. A military campaign of 1939 to consolidate and rationalise the production in Japan forced Toshiba towards a merger. This merger was responsible for the firm becoming a comprehensive manufacturer of electrical products. Dentsu, which had become the world's largest advertising agency by 1970, acquired its name by 1955. This agency had recruited many of the ex-military officers and former Manchuko bureaucrats in the post war occupation period. Hence, its corporate headquarters was also referred as the 'Second Manchurian Railway Building'. Japan's emergence as the world's

leading builder of merchant shipping by 1956, for example, is directly related to the almost frantic development of a capacity to turn out warships (and super battleships such as the Yamato and Musashi) in the previous decades (Dower, 1990: 55).

Conglomerates in Japan were called *Zaibatsu*. The Four old *Zaibatsu* – *Mitsui*, *Mitsubishi*, *Sumitomo* and *Yasuda* were challenged by the new *Zaibatsu* (*Shin Zaibatsu*) under the military dictates that had engaged largely with the military contracting. *Asano*, *Furukawa*, *Ayukawa*, *Okura*, *Nomura*, and *Nakajima* were the six conglomerates that had dominated the *Shin Zaibatsu*. These ten conglomerates together had handled around fifteen per cent of the Japan's total paid capital by 1937 which had shot up to thirty five percent by the end of the war. The war had stimulated a considerable concentration of capital at the hands of Japan's government. These groups were dissolved and their shares were diversified in the early occupation phase. This disbandment however did not have much impact on the nation's capitalist morale but the concentration within the conglomeration had received a severe blow. Only few of the key companies of Japan remained intact. *Kigyō Shudan*, a giant guild comprised the then six huge enterprises along with *Kinyū Keiretsu* of three old *zaibatsu* groupings – *Mitsui*, *Mitsubishi* and *Sumitomo* and three groups headed by the giant banks like *Fuji*, *Dai-ichi Kangyō* and *Sanwa*. By 1955, the corporations of the guild alone accounted for around twenty three percentage of the assets which has rose to around thirty percent by 1970.

Small and medium sized enterprises that emerged during the war years in Japan also boosted themselves to the higher degree in the reconstruction phase. Thus on the one hand heavy corporations flourished in Japan in the sixties and on the other hand parallel tracks of small enterprises were also growing. Those dual tracks in the Japan's post war economy attracted an array of criticisms in the 1950's and 1960's for the differentials in wage and income. This wage and income disparity was also seen as a primary concern for the dumping of Japanese products abroad. Japan's unorganised sector showed an intrinsic dynamism post-1950. Many small enterprises flourished as subcontractors and as independent entities in the war economy as well as in the post war economy. Among the forty per cent of sub-contractors who were supplying Toyota during the war years, continued their work till the late 1960s. In the manufacturing sector, those small

enterprises played a crucial role in the output of efficient and highly skilled Japanese products. During the war, small entrepreneurs had developed their close ties with the political machinery which in turn secured them a considerable level of political and bureaucratic patronage. They also backed and supported the militarist regime during the war time. Dower (1990: 58) argues that in the reformist age, those enterprises were backed by the conservative politicians who were then merged with the liberal democrats. Much of the genuinely innovative entrepreneurial energy that lies behind Japan's post war economic takeoff, moreover, has come from such small enterprises.

Traditions such as Japanese 'household' have had its reflection upon the state's industrial relations. Industrial relations in Japan derived its values from the age-old Confucian philosophies that guided the culture in the region. Values derived from it like harmony and hierarchy – like master and apprentice relationship and lifelong loyalties for the feudal merchant houses and family values were mostly untouched even after they encountered waves of western cultural impacts. Japan therefore retains its unique work and employment system for which the explanation providers both in and out of Japan point their fingers to the intrinsic Japanese culture rooted in the Confucian ethics. However, the Second World War has taken toll upon the basic nature of Japanese labour force including its size, composition and the competence. Contemporary Japanese industrial management relations also retain three distinct features, namely life time employment, age determined wages and company or enterprise guilds. Larger industries follow this pattern, but much of the workforce outside these industries does not have those privileges that lead to 'dual track' labour modes in Japan which is distinctive in the contemporary age. Those three distinctive features in large enterprises and the dual track labour force were also the legacy of the war times.

Instability in Japanese labour force witnessed along the war years have stabilised in the post war years. Later, surveys were conducted by the government to study the instability in its labour work force. One of those surveys that analysed the period between the 1937 incident at China and 1941 Pearl Harbour attack have provided the data of high rate employee turnover in the critical industries. Speedy job juggling was common among the Japanese workers during war which had only started to recede during the end of the war.

To deal with instability, the war time government of Japan had come up with the series of measures to reinforce greater control and discipline. Ordinances were passed between 1939 and 1942 to curb the shifting of Japanese labour between various industries. In order to make the employee stick to their jobs, these ordinances were made in a detailed manner and thereby bringing a change to the wage structures. Practices like fixed starting salaries and clearly defined raises at regular intervals were introduced. Due to these efforts the practise of life time employment and age-based salary scheme, which is unique to Japanese employment system, entered into practice. Complementary benefits like allowances for family members and on-the-job training that were characteristics of the post war Japanese intra-industrial relations were initiated during this phase. Thus, the labour force of Japan had witnessed stability during the post war period without losing much of its hold from the Confucian thread that it was holding for ages. Their uniqueness imposed by the Confucian tradition underwent a tumultuous stride during the war times but survived and stabilised once the war had become history.

Prior to the commencement of the war, widespread poverty and unrest were spread extensively in Japan. Only a few landlords seemed to have a considerable concentration of wealth. The promise to overcome the then rural crisis in Japan imposed by an economic depression had brought the militarists to power. Their ascendancy to power has started to hit the nails in the coffins of Japanese landlord class. The land reforms that were carried out between 1946 and 1948 dispossessed the landlords and virtually eliminated land tenancy. This had laid the foundation for the establishment of an expanded domestic market in Japan from which bourgeoisie capitalism had matured during the post war phase. The defeat of Japan in the war had also contributed to the fastening of the process. The land reform played a crucial part in the demilitarisation and democratisation agenda introduced by the victorious powers in Japan, and it was only due to the authority wielded by the victors that the reform was implemented thoroughly.

The Americans have also acknowledged the fact that the circumstances beyond their control also played a crucial role in bringing about the change. A vast majority of Japan's rural population also helped in making the reform become successful. Japan's rural population apart, commitment, perseverance and administrative expertise from certain

sections of Japan's academia and the bureaucracy were instrumental in achieving this feat. Adding to the woes of Japanese landlords, wartime developments in the post Pearl Harbour scenario worked much against their interests and impinged heavily upon their traditional power. The precipitous decline in the authority of landlordism dates back to 1941, when the government introduced a food administration system designed to increase agricultural production and expedite delivery. By paying tenants directly for their produce, the government essentially undercut the landlords economically and destroyed their direct relationship with their tenants. Military and civilian bureaucracy has also helped in bringing crucial changes concerning Japan's rural landscape. Dower (1990: 60 – 65) quotes Chalmers Johnson, who notes that Japan's miracle in the economic system was due to the system powerfully guided by 'economic general staff.' Dower further states that 'it did not follow Smithonian *laissez faire* since 1930's as an economic model nor it constructed a centralised state ownership but *laissez faire* in a box *i.e.* intricately constructed box that looks into how much control is actually exercised upon the market. Japan was variously phrased as a plan-rational as opposed to market rational state, a mixed capitalist state, a capitalist development state, a technocratic state, a neo-mercantilist state, a 'smart' state, a network state and a corporatist (or corporatist without labour) state. It practised an industrial policy, administrative guidance, "window" guidance, patterned pluralism, canalised pluralism, bureaucracy-led mass-inclusionary pluralism, administered competition, compartmentalised competition, guided free enterprise and managed capitalism, quasi-capitalism and state-directed capitalism'

In the early post war years, Japan's economy had naturally witnessed serious deficits which were overcome only in the sixties. By 1965, Japan's economy had balanced itself and by the eighties it showed the signs of surplus. Japan's growth in GNP was relatively better off than that of the United States in the 1970's which in turn had caused a slight friction in its relationship with the US and other advanced industrial states. Criticisms were on the rise regarding the low wages in Japan's domestic sphere and Japan instigated alterations in the system of global trade. Later the anomaly of its exports and low wages arguments were overcome through the surge displayed in its economy. Japan's world trade splurge was in a way at the expense of the West and its share in the international trade had risen dazzlingly from two percent in 1960 to that of nine percent in 1973.

The established trade equation between core and the satellite state looked altered in the case of US-Japan post war trade ties. Large volume of quotas and trade barriers were constructed in the post war Japan in order to boost its exports. Those quotas and barriers played a central role in excluding the imports of many US manufactured goods into Japan. Raw materials like coal, lumber, scrap iron and cotton, certain food materials, complex and scientifically advanced machineries were not sufficient within Japan. However those barriers also curtailed the imports of the said products. On the other hand, Japan had exported technically advanced manufactured goods to the United States and the rest of the West. Thus the role reversal made Japan play the role of the core state, while the US and other Western states imitating that of the satellites. These smooth and favourable conditions for Japan did not last for long. Once the Japanese industries recovered from the blow of post war disarray, cries for liberalization of Japanese market were on the rise. Japan had opened its markets slowly, steadily and reluctantly only after its products evolved to the level of keeping the western imported goods at bay in its local market. Even then, just like many western states, Japan kept its farm sector within its thick protectionist tentacles.

Japan was consistently accused by the western powers for creating an unfair trade playing field. The accusation was that by establishing a close cooperation between its government and MITI, Japan had constructed many hidden barriers against the imports. Japan had eventually turned out to be show by as a state with the lowest tariff restrictions among the OECD community of industrialised states. Generally, the trade practices in the East were usually carried out on the basis of personal relationships nurtured between the traders. This practice was naturally benefitting the Japanese industrialists and few of the outsiders. This practice has also succeeded in keeping most of the western players at bay. While Japanese showcased their efficiency in quickly learning English and the western marketing methods, westerners usually demonstrated difficulties in grasping the local language in Japan, its marketing practices and the strategies to sell their products in the Japanese market. Japan took the time lag advantage in replicating the western products largely on equal or superior quality to that of the more or less similar prices and thereby falsifying the westerner's prediction that Japanese market would have a prolonged demand and dependence on western products. Reishauer (1996: 284) observed, 'Why

should Japanese buy American refrigerators that were too large to fit into their tiny kitchens or American right-hand-drive cars for their left-hand roads?’

While the trade friction between Japan and US had broadened, it had its reflection upon their politico-strategic affairs. Arguments like the reasons for the US spending its tax payer’s money for Japan’s defence started to erupt. Japan’s response was that the US had initiated its engagement in Japan for its own interest satiation. Indeed Japan was contributing around one per cent of its GNP, and was providing its bases for the United States. Japan however relaxed its postures for US demands but its surplus production in the economy has never failed to shoot. Japanese eventually have mastered the art and science of innovation and manufacturing of goods with high end technology.

By 1980’s four of Japan’s automotive industries were among the top end global automotive producers. Japan has also succeeded in their collaboration with their counterparts in US in order to escape the tariff barriers. Advanced Japanese manufacturing industries started to spread its wings all over the globe during this period. Dower (1990: 284-45) argued that ‘Japanese also bought a great deal of real estate in the United States – hotels, office buildings and choice resort areas, especially in Hawaii, to the dismay of the local population. The names of the great Japanese firms such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Toyota, Nissan, Matsushita, Toshiba, Hitachi and Fujitsu became as familiar to Americans as Ford, Exxon and IBM. It was a veritable economic invasion and Americans responded with a mixture of enthusiasm, admiration, puzzlement, indignation and fear.’

Japan’s economic trajectory can be witnessed in the following statistics that shows its relative rise in the post-war period compared to that of the United States.


Table of Comparison between the US and Japan's gross domestic products and GDP per capita* between 1989 and 1998: (Values are in US \$ billion)

Year	USA		Japan	
	GDP in \$ billion	GDP per Capita	GDP in \$ billion	GDP per Capita
1989	5438.7	21,989	2897.3	23,550
1990	5743.8	22,983	2996.2	24,273
1991	5916.7	23,421	3413.9	27,557
1992	6244.4	24,450	3725.5	29,979
1993	6558.1	25,406	4292.8	34,449
1994	6947.0	26,658	4700.3	37,632
1995	7269.6	27,636	5144.1	41,975
1996	7661.6	28,863	4591.2	36,521
1997	8110.9	30,263	4187.6	33,231
1998	8511.0	31,488	3782.7	29,900


Sources: Economic Planning Agency, Japan, 1998, pp. 374-81; *Economist Intelligence Unit*, London, 4Q 1998, 1999; *the World Bank Annual Report* 1999.

*not adjusted to purchasing power parity (ppp).

Chart Representation:



Tabulated per capita in chart representation:



Comparing the total trade and Foreign Direct Investment between US and Japan from the year 1988 to 1997: (Values are in US \$ billion)

Years	USA		Japan	
	Total Trade In US \$ billion	Foreign Direct Investment In US \$ billion	Total Trade In US \$ billion	Foreign Direct Investment In US \$ billion
1988	781.9	58.6	452.3	3.2
1989	856.7	69.0	483.7	2.9
1990	910.6	48.4	523.6	2.8
1991	930.1	22.8	552.4	4.3
1992	1002.1	18.9	573.2	4.1
1993	1068.2	43.5	603.9	3.1
1994	1201.8	49.9	672.3	4.2
1995	1355.6	60.8	779.2	3.3
1996	1447.1	79.9	760.1	3.2
1997	1555.3	70.8	759.5	5.4

Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, vol. II, United Nations, 1997; Economist Intelligence Unit, London, 4Q 1998, 1999; Economic Planning Agency, Japan, 1998, pp. 314, 359; OECD, *International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook* 1997, pp. 177, 330;

Total Trade Chart comparison between Japan and US from 1988 to 1997:





Chart projecting the Foreign Direct Investments in Japan and US between the years 1988 and 1997:




Top Trading Partners of Japan & U.S. (in 1997) (%)

Rank	Japan (1998)	US (1997)
1	US (27.7)	Canada (20.9)
2	China (8.6)	Japan (11.9)
3	Taiwan (5.4)	Mexico (10.1)
4	Germany (4.5)	China (4.8)
5	Korea (ROK) (4.1)	UK (4.4)
6	Hong Kong (3.4)	Germany (4.3)
7	Australia (3.1)	Taiwan (3.3)
8	UK (3.1)	Korea (ROK) (3.1)

Sources: *Directions of Trade Statistics Yearbook*, IMF, 1998; 'Japan 2000: An International Comparison', Keizai Koho Centre (Japan Institute for Social and Economic Affairs), (15 December 1999), p. 60

Retrieved from: Zhao, Quansheng Sino-Japanese relations in the context of Beijing-Tokyo-Washington triangle in Soderberg, Marie ed. *Chinese-Japanese Relations in the Twenty-first Century – Complementarity and Conflict*, pp. 32-51.

Pie Chart projecting the top trading partners of Japan and US in the year 1997:



Chapter Four

Assessment of Alliance Formation and Cohesion between US and Japan after the Second World War

Alliance in international politics, as we have seen in the earlier chapters emerges between states only in the presence of a prominent threat. However, in the case of United States and Japan, the emergence of an alliance was in a different scenario. The purpose of this chapter is to connect the conceptual frameworks of alliance formation in international politics with that of the post war bilateral history of the United States and Japan. Soon after the Second World War, Japan became a war vanquished state occupied by the victorious powers among which the United States played a key role. Therefore, the immediate post war period witnessed the relation between the two states as a tie between the coloniser and the occupied. Due to least resistance in Japan towards the occupying forces and its positive responses towards the US imposed reforms, the bilateral ties have evolved into an alliance. Cohesiveness was witnessed in the later part of their bilateral post war history. Although there emerged rough patches in the sail of their bilateral relations, in a larger picture Japan turned out be an inimitable ally of United States in the Pacific region.

Alliances are generally built upon the external threat argument which can be countered with this case. There was no major threat that existed for the United States in the immediate aftermath of the war but for the possible rearmament of Japan. It was only after the Soviet Union turning nuclear, the Cold War climate started to intensify. In one way it could be argued that with the rise of the Soviet Union has forced the United States and Japan to enter into an alliance. On the other hand, many other variables emerge within the dynamics of US-Japan post war alliance. Japan was surprisingly reluctant to rearm itself and was in tandem with most other US interests which led to close cooperation between the two states. The United States also did not stop its assistance towards Japan for almost the entire Post-War period, even in the wake of many trade frictions between the two states. These complex factors like strategic, geographic,

military, aid, economy and trade have contributed towards the sustainability of the alliance which has brought a considerable cohesiveness between the two states.

To grasp the post-war political trajectories in Japan, it is necessary to have a synoptic recap into its past. Japan had its constitution drafted earlier in 1889 and its *Taisho* democracy in the beginning of the twentieth century was viewed by historians as following a liberal political trend. The authoritarian core witnessed in its 1889 constitution of the Meiji era was due to its insecurities due to the possible Western colonisation of Japan. A shift was witnessed in the subsequent decades and especially in the 1930s of which Japan turned out to be an imperial expansionist state underpinned by ultra nationalism and militarism. The causality behind such a turn by Japan was due to the nature by which Japan turned open to the Western inquisitions. Nearly seven hundred years of feudal rule within Japan made its people to react normally to the rule by militaristic regime. Experiences of Japanese with the west and their attitudes towards Japanese have also fostered Japan's turn towards the militaristic stance. Japanese society has been imbibed all along in the Confucian ideals of social harmony and conformity in contrast to that of the individualism of the Western world. As *Taisho* democracy witnessed Japan aligning closer to the western ways, its economic downturn in the thirties pulled it away from the western lifestyle. People inhabiting in the western part of Japan were relatively more aware of the problems and strategic concerns in the other Asian states. It was from this region that the Pan-Asian ideology has first emerged.

As Japan's economy witnessed a downfall in the 1920s, it was added with racial overtones in the attitude of West towards Japan. Japan was not treated on par with them by the western powers. Due to these developments, Japan had claimed for 'racial equality' clause during the treaty of Versailles in 1919. However it was turned down by the United States and Britain in order to curtail the oriental migration into US, Canada and Australia. The 'yellow peril' kind of racial abuse was common all over in the western lands during this period. In US, it was illegitimate for Orientals to naturalise. The California segregation in this period advocated for separate schools for the people from Japan and China. Japanese immigration was virtually ended with a gentlemen's agreement of 1908 between Japan and the United States. Adding to that the US Congress

has passed an Exclusion act in 1924 that declared Japanese as aliens and ineligible for US citizenship. By the early days of Second World War, Japanese settlers in the Western coast of US called *Nisei* were driven out of their belongings to the concentration camp. These proceedings reflect the anti-Orientalism and racist underpinnings in the American psyche by the beginning of the Second World War.

The military rule also worked out for Japan due to the natural affinity of peasants towards the military class of Japan. Military personnel have separated themselves from the rest of the population earlier in their lives due to education. Their prolonged education groomed them as conservatives and to have pride in their traditions. Other factors being Japan's military class was a preferred lot compared to that of the industrialists, businessmen and the self-seeking politicians. With Japan emerging internally with heavy industrialisation and population boom, people started to believe that Japan's expansion outside with colonies is the only escape way for Japanese to prosper. Hence, the militaristic expansion of Japan got the national approval and support but however history seemed to have a different picture for them.

Thus Japan's military tentacles become considerably prominent especially in the Manchukuo and Inner Mongolia. In 1932, the US took a 'non-recognition' stance regarding the Japanese conquests while the League of Nations investigation report has out rightly condemned the Japanese army excesses in China's North-east. Japan responded simply by making a withdrawal which resulted in the League's demise in the long run. While Japan's army was eyeing on the continental expansion in the Asian theatre, Japan's navy was cautious in its approach towards US naval bases in the East Asian region and the Dutch East Indies for the raw materials. Japan's domestic politics of the period was sprinkled with violence and assassinations while the Japanese masses were in much anticipation of such effacement of corrupt political heads.

Japan's army officials started to gain weight in every other say in Japan's government. At times, it looked like Japan was run by two governments one civil and another military. As the war ended with the United States, Japan's military has completely gained control over Japan's government. With the army minister General Tojo Hideki assuming the prime

ministerial post of Japan by 18 October 1941, Japan was completely under the control of the army with its emperor being a silent spectator.

Japan slipping into totalitarianism in the thirties could be highly distinguished from that of the totalitarian regimes of the time that emerged in the continental Europe. As the army took over the control of Japan's polity, stern measures were gripping the domestic political arena. The Peace Preservation Law passed in 1925 made it a crime to advocate or even the thinking of overthrowing a national polity. This law also made it a crime regarding the overthrow of private property. These 'ideals' were monitored all over Japan and enforced by a special police force called 'thought control' police and the infamous military police *kempeitai*. Hundreds of leftist thinkers, politicians, university students, teachers and academics were thrown into prison and some of their works banned. Unlike Nazi rule, Japan did not find for itself a doctrine such as *Mein Kampf*. However, attempts were made to formulate such a doctrine which resulted in a book called *Kokutai no hongi* that translates as 'Fundamentals of National Polity'. This book was criticised largely for being absurd, rich in emotional provocations and scoring lesser on the intellectual content. However, it did not fail to advocate against greedy capitalism, corrupt politicians, individualism, internationalism and nevertheless menacing anti-westernism. Japan's totalitarian regime did not gather mass support compared to that of the European totalitarian regimes of the time. Japan's such a regime was very well in tandem with its 1889 democracy and smoothly integrated with its primary forms of parliamentary system.

War bells of the Second World War started to roll in the Far Eastern theatre a bit early compared to that of the Western scene. Japan occupation of Manchuria on the pretext of 'liberating' the Asian neighbours from western oppression looked absurd in the age where the then Asian colonies were on the upsurge of their own nationalism. Hence contrary to Japan's self constructed objective, they were viewed in China as uninvited guests and were retaliated in stronger terms. Although, Japan had initial success in China it was not sailing smooth further and the backfiring erupted in the form of unsettling guerrilla encounters in deep lands of China. Japanese navy wanted to fight their US counterpart for a long time while its army was looking forward at the Soviet mainland.

Hence, Japan entered into an alliance with Nazi Germany through anti-Comintern pact of November 1936 followed by Italy's inclusion, the next year.

France's subjugation in the early years of the Second World War made it easier for Japan to ride and take control of Eastern colonies in the Indochina region once owned by France. These initial victories made Japan to take over by the idea of 'Greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere.' The Greater East Asia ministry was also found to emerge in Japan's government by the year 1942. Japan had emboldened along with Germany and Italy to make it a full tripartite alliance. In the alliance formation between states we have seen that a state in order to secure its allies will provide resources to them. The US might not have been in good terms with the Japanese regime in the first half of the twentieth century. However, it had been a prime supplier of resources for the industries of resource scarce Japan. As the Japan expanded its conquest and tightened its cohesiveness with the axis powers in Europe, the US was made to reconsider its earlier stance of non-recognition towards the military expeditions of Japan and mere verbal protests and started to build its own military armoury. The period just preceding the outbreak of the Second World War in the European theatre, the US has denounced its commercial treaty with Japan. In July 1940, the US has adopted the policy of licensing scrap iron and oil shipments to Japan which became a serious blow to the supply chain of Japan's war machine. In July 1941, Japan invaded South Vietnam that attracted US along with Britain and Dutch to impose a strict oil embargo upon Japan.

With these developments Japan had the only option of taking larger control over East Indies by driving the Dutch out for the sake of oil resources. Japan with the oil supply cut has only the supply for the next two years for its war machinery. Since the emperor of Japan was out rightly against the war policies, Konoe government had least choices open than to force US towards the negotiation table but was disappointed with the high moral grounds that the US policy makers adopted towards the Japanese invitations. The summer and autumn of 1941 witnessed Japan having a fair chance of success in the war to build a richest empire on earth along with the millions of industrious population. Alas! They made serious miscalculations in their strategic, geographic, economic as well human

calculation by overconfidence in the 'Japanese Spirit' and misconception of US war fighting capabilities.

Inspired by its own strategies employed in its successful campaign against Russia in 1904, Japan built a brilliant plan to tackle the US navy. The public opinion was very much divided between the active and passive engagement of the US in war at Asian and European theatres. Japan's first strike came as surprisingly shocking. After a careful meditation, the Japanese navy carried out a meticulous attack upon Pearl Harbour at Hawaii on Sunday, 7 December 1941. This single event has brought a severe blow to the United States naval forces virtually eliminating its navies' war fighting capability. This in turn had promised Japan a smooth sail in the Indo-china region. Almost all the states in Indo-china region was raided and occupied by Japan with the resistance from Filipino American alliance ending by 1942. Thailand being the only independent state, with not much choice allied with Japan as a passive supporter of its efforts. On the other hand, Pearl Harbour incident has tremendously raised the spirits in the US and made it to take a firm stand to fight a war to the finish by crushing both Japan and Germany.

United States was blessed in disguise by Japan destroying its naval capabilities but leaving the aircraft carriers almost untouched. However, it took considerable time for the US to rebuild its war machinery but with the natural alliance help from Australia which opted to bandwagon with the US in order to balance Japan, the US made it possible to reclaim the mid way islands and chasing back the Japanese fleet back to Guadalcanal, north east of Australia within a year. It was still a long way for the US to make inroads into Japan's acquired vast lands in South East Asia. Japan's long and comfortable run in the chase of colonies started to stand still by then. By then Japan's economy was weary of its four years of war at the Chinese theatre and its major South East Asian expedition. US capabilities outnumbered the Japanese population by twice and its landmass ten times higher than that of Japan. The 'Japanese Spirit' indeed played a ferocious role in countering US outbursts on Japan but by 1944, US has outclassed the Japanese forces in air, water and land and reclaimed Japanese occupied territories one after the other. The supply lines of Japan were intercepted and cut by allied powers.

The US carried out a two-way drive towards Japan. The US navy undertook an island to island ride through which it has secured Marshall Islands in the mid-Pacific and advanced till Saipan. Capturing of Iwo Jima, the north of Saipan has helped US bomber aircrafts to raid the Japanese cities with much ease. Firebombs were dropped in almost every city of Japan except for Kyoto while Tokyo suffered the serious brunt in the spring of 1945 with more than 100,000 lives having been decimated. These unending firebombs made the Japanese to flee the cities and furthered the crippling of Japanese industrial produce.

Under General Douglas MacArthur, the US army was reclaiming the islands in the South-West of Japan starting from New Guinea to Philippines. After an arduous encounter, Manila fell to the American forces by October 1944. Both the army and the navy of the US converged at the Okinawa Island from where they raided the mainland Japan. Japan's fierce resistance cost them more lives with around 110,000 Japanese military men and 75,000 Okinawans and about one eighth of the island population laying their lives against the American conquest. The American conquest was viewed by Japanese as similar to that of the Mongolian invasion of Japan in 1281 and the opponents were translated as *kamikaze*. However, the vastly superior fighting force of US made its Japanese conquest look simpler. Japan's civilian population was determined to fight the war till the end in the midst of starving and mounting war disasters. High end civilian leaders however realising the Japanese fate by early 1944 wanted to replace General Tojo from the post of the prime minister, who was a relatively liberal politician. Occupation of Okinawa made it necessary for them to replace Tojo with relatively moderate Admiral Suzuki.

On the other hand, Japan was pressed by United States for an unconditional surrender. In Japan's earlier calculation was that Germany may lead the axis force in Europe while Japan could have a smoother sail in the Asian theatre. Otherwise, Germany could be at the least rear guard with Japan leading from the front. With Germany surrendering by 8 May Japan's future in the war looked bleak. The US along with Britain and China declared at Potsdam proclamation on July 26 year that Japan should surrender unconditionally. Its provisions called for stripping Japan of its empire and to remain occupied till it becomes a peaceful and demilitarised state. However, Japan was allowed to retain its national identity and people would be free to choose their future form of

government. While the Japanese government assumed that it had time till mid autumn to surrender since it was unlikely that US could invade the main islands before the typhoon season. On the other hand, the US was uncertain of whether Japan would surrender or prolong the war and dropped on 6 August 1945 and 9 August 1945 the deadliest nuclear weapons upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Nearly 200,000 people were killed and the incident marked the birth of the nuclear age and drastic change in the global politics there on. Although the dropping of nuclear weapons was looked as a bitter memory world over, there could never be a possible justification for the second bomb. Meanwhile, Manchuria was invaded by the Soviet army on 8 August 1945. Three months after Germany's surrender, Joseph Stalin joined hands with allied powers at the Yalta conference to invade Japan but before any active participation of Soviet Union war came to an end in Japan thereby ending the hopes of any say from Stalin in the post-war settlement of Japan.

It was anticipated that vastly spread Japanese navy might continue an all-out suicidal fighting after the surrender. But with not much option left, the Japanese emperor himself made public the Japan's surrender in the World War on. His request of retaining Japan's emperor post has not been responded positively by the occupying forces. Hence the prince was made as Prime minister to oversee the post war transitions and settlements and the Japanese forces that were spread all over the region also laid down their arms in unison with the emperor's command from Tokyo.

To begin with, Japan was not a state which allied with the United States soon after the Second World War, solely on preference basis or in the wake of an external threat. Japan was an occupied state and the US was the coloniser. Japan surrendered to the US ending the Second World War after signing the official document of surrender on 2 September 1945. For next seven years, Japan was virtually a state ruled by the United States. General Douglas MacArthur, the supreme commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) was engaged during the period in implementing a series of reforms that altered the nature of Japan's polity. This fact testifies that United States as an occupying power had complete control over not only upon Japan's external affairs but also of its internal governmental machinery.

The United States engaged itself in reforming the internal political structure of Japan in order to efface any remnants of feudal and militaristic order that might possibly emerge in the future to threaten the peace in other regions of the world. In spite of being defeated in the war, the position of emperor was retained in Japan. The reason is that Japanese still owe their loyalty to the kingship and from the vantage point of the US, it could possibly prevent the redo of a mistake that the allied powers committed during the treaty of Versailles. Another reason being, if the reforms enforced by the United States are being implemented by the Japanese government itself it may be less likely that they turn up once again to the militaristic modules once the occupation phase was over. This was the serious concern for the United States. The gravest of strategy ever employed in a war by dropping the atomic bombs haunts United States for a longer time that it was prepared to appease the state at the receiving end at any cost. This reason is vital in the understanding of provisions and concessions that United States has offered Japan in the post war period.

The beginning of the occupation phase, i.e. the first two years from 1945-47 was dedicated by United States in Japan much for the implementation of democratic and pluralist reforms. Land tenancy driven landlordism in Japan was identified as the primary cause for Japan leaning easily towards the militaristic polity. Hence, the United States in its first wave of reform has eradicated the land tenancy, along with strengthening the foundations for Japan's labour rights and enfranchising Japanese women. The 'purge' of ultranationalists who engaged themselves in the war on behalf of Japan was meticulously carried out by effacing only the extreme right wing conservatives and retaining other bureaucrats, industrialists and professionals from the imperial family in order to impregnate the first generation of Japanese government in the post war period. These proceedings explains that Japan as a state re-formed in the post war era falls very well within the way the United States wanted the future Japan must be. Thus, the natural alliance cohesion in the aftermath of Japan's emergence shows that the United States has 'formed' a state in its own design to create for itself a stable and reliable ally in the strategic Pacific sector.

The formulation of Japanese constitution which will frame the future polity in Japan was also the product of a joint venture from occupying United States and the surrendered

Japan. Unlike the pre-war times, Japan's political authority was vested in the post of the Prime Minister, making the Emperor a ceremonial head similar to that of the British crown. Article 9 of Japan's constitution was a crucial addition which proscribed Japan from engaging in any sort of military confrontations and was completely disarmed. It was also worth to note that its independent decision to upgrade or increase the volume of its army is also thoroughly restricted through this article. Laying the foundation for Japan's future largely designed by the United States, the period since 1948 is called a 'reverse phase' in post-war Japan's history. In this phase, the United States took serious steps that could appease Japan and stall them from any possibility of turning against them. Accordingly, the focus of Japan has shifted to the economic arena; since Article 9 thoroughly proscribes Japan's liberty on military affairs.

Japan began to emerge as a key ally in the Pacific for the United States. The then global political climate was that states are stepping into the communism-centric Cold War through various alliances. Hence the United States calculated that if Japan was kept impoverished in the economic arena, it would become a soft target to communist winds from its neighbourhood. Hence, Japan was encouraged to focus on the economic arena similar to that of other US allies in the region, South Korea and Taiwan. Yoshida assumed the office of the prime minister of Japan by October 1948. His phase was crucial in setting up the strong alliance of Japan for the decades to follow. He was a former diplomat with anti-communist views who believed that considerable cooperation with United States might help in fostering social and political stability in Japan and also will foster Japan's engagements with the world economy. His steps were regarded with an intention to accelerate the end of the American Occupation. Yoshida Shigeru has formulated a doctrine which reifies the US designs in Article 9 and accepts Japan's non militaristic future with a focus on the economic arena. His doctrine has guided Japan for the entire post war period that followed only to be overlooked recently by the Junichiro Koizumi's regime in its decision on Iraq that too for up maintaining Japan's alliance commitments with the United States.

In 1949, the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) has introduced an austerity drive in Japan's economy that has brought series of reforms such as controlling the

inflation rate and cutting down various expenditures of government. Japan was introduced to various paths that could help it find foreign investments and thereby foreign currencies. Japan was also made a preferential state towards its access to the raw materials for its industrial produce. It is worth to recall that raw materials was the crucial concern for Japan's involvement and setbacks in the Second World War it has always turned out to be a controversial case in the US-Japan relationship during the years prior to the war as well as in the years of later post war.

The US transferred the sovereignty to Japan through a peace treaty signed on September 1951 at an international conference at San Francisco. This marks an era of Japan becoming an important US ally in the Pacific region from that of the near colony of the United States. Through the conference, it was announced that Japan will be restored with its full sovereignty from April 1952. Japan's control over its territorial gains during the Second World War came to a formal end and Japan was asked to pay the reparations to those states in South East Asia. Japan's antagonism with few states had not ended by them which left the Soviet Union and India boycotting the San Francisco conference. The People's Republic of China was uninvited for the conference, since the United States was yet to recognise the state by then and Ryukyu Islands of Japan was retained by the United States.

The Administrative Treaty signed in 1952 between the US and Japan has provided the US military personnel, places in Japanese bases with extraterritorial rise. In the recent years there has been a call for an amendment to this provision, since time and again, the US Marine personnel is caught in one or other criminal incidents and accidents especially in the Okinawa region and go scot free, since they could not be tried under the Japanese constitution. The capabilities of a state play a role in determining the leverage of a state in the alliance set up. This is witnessed in US having high handedness in certain crucial issues. For instance, the US had a clear-cut stance on Japan's diplomatic relations in the beginning years. The US tried and succeeded in coercing the Japanese government by stalling the ratification of Peace Treaty in its Congress to make Japan open its diplomatic relations with the Jiang Jieshi's regime in Taiwan rather than the People's Republic of

China. Although Japan enjoyed a traditional and closer trade ties with the mainland China, it has no choice but to budge.

Thus Japan became an ally of the non-communist world as the Cold War proceeded. Its politics and strategy that was framed in the first seven years of the occupation phase made it a natural ally of United States. Japan also accepted the facts of the day and did not resist much to US imposed reforms and cooperated in a surprising manner to emerge as an economic giant.

Siverson and Star (1947: 147) had viewed that the security of a state dominates and even compels the state's choices of alliance. As the states contribute much of their material sources towards the alliance, it is naturally expected that the states will in turn look for pay back benefits from the alliance set up. Analysing the case of post-war trajectory of US-Japan relations may help us understand this logic. Almost in the same time as the Peace treaty with US, Japan has entered into a security pact with the United States that formally initiated the US-Japan security alliance in the Post war era. This treaty has served as a linchpin document in the post-war bilateral alliance between the two states guiding all along the security and foreign policy of Japan to date. The US-Japan security treaty is an important breakthrough in the study of post war alliance between the two states. In the first few years of the post war period, the US was comfortable in keeping Japan as a demilitarised state. As the Cold War intensified in the region by slipping into Korean War, the requirements of the US have changed. It became necessary for the US to concentrate much of its forces in the Korean Peninsula. The US anticipated that Japan would provide an overwhelming response in order to rearm itself instead of constitutionally imposing limits on arming for the purpose of self-defence.

However, Yoshida Shigeru made a clear cut inclination towards Japanese constitution and pressed for the United States armed forces to stay in the Island nation. Yoshida made it clear that rearmament of Japan means diversification of huge currency from its nascent economy towards the process. Hence, his pragmatic decision and negotiation has earned positive response from the United States. The 1980s witnessed a series of debates on Yoshida's such a move. One of the camps argued that it was a successful and pragmatic step taken by Yoshida, while the other camp considered it as the root cause of Japan's

'free ride' under the US security umbrella. Japan providing the US its base has also paved the way for long standing Futenma friction in the bilateral alliance. Thus, the pragmatic calculations and interests of the states decide the alliance's longevity and cohesion of states within an alliance. Yoshida's status quo stance was not welcomed wholeheartedly in Japan but faced with opposition from the right, centre and left of the political spectrum. Yoshida in May 1954 yielded to the pressures from the US President Eisenhower to upgrade its paramilitary forces created in 1950 for Japan's domestic security into an air, sea and land Self-Defense Forces (SDF) with the ceiling of 150,000.

Another important factor in the US-Japan strategic alliance is the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed between the two states in the year 1960. This agreement stipulates the burden sharing among two states in an alliance, where Japan's contribution is largely in terms of monetary and other aspects through Article XXIV, while the military contributions are taken care of by the United States according to the paragraph two of the agreement. Article 6 of the security treaty empowers the US with the right to use Japan's land, air and water forces.

The Host Nation Support Programme (HNS) has brought certain amendments to the agreements in the SOFA. HNS has also contributed immensely towards the cohesiveness of the two states in the US-Japan security alliance. Accordingly, Japan has to increase its expenditure towards US Defence Forces in Japan's operational concerns like paying for the Japanese workers in the US bases in Japan and facility constructions; if not otherwise, US has to be in terms of Yen. This expenditure was termed as *Omayari Yosan* (sympathy budget) which was asked by the US to pay from Japan's defence budget in order to strengthen the US-Japan security alliance.

In November 1978, an agreement was reached between Japan's Defense Cabinet Secretary, Shin Kanemaru and the US Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown through which Japan agreed to pay around seven billion Yen as differential, language and retirement allowance.

Special Measures Agreement for the HNS Programme		
Fiscal Year	SMA	New Support Item Included
(1978)	N/A	Labour cost (Welfare Expenses)
1987-91	1 st SMA	Labour cost (50% of allowances)
1988-91	1 st SMA revised	Labour cost (100% of allowances)
1991-95	2 nd SMA	Labour cost (100% of base pay) plus utilities (electricity, etc.)
1996-2000	3 rd SMA	Relocation cost of training sites
2001-05	4 th SMA	(Minus utilities for houses outside US bases)
2006-07	5 th SMA	Same as 4 th SMA but for two years

Source: Yoda, Tatsuro (2006), "Japan's Host Nation Support Program for the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance: Past and Prospects," in *Asian Survey*, 46(6): 940.

Japan started to increase its contribution to an alliance despite the criticism from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) that the SMA was not in tandem with SOFA. Since every state has to contribute to an extent in an alliance for its effective functioning, states are expected to gain from the alliance set up. The reasons behind Japan's agreement to contribute towards the SMA are growing US trade deficits with Japan, rapid appreciation of Yen and the US criticism of Japan that it free rides on US security provisions and the Gulf war in the early 1990's. Japan's cost sharing has increased in the two decades between 1970 and 1990 due to FIP. Yoda, Tatsuro (2006: 942) has mentioned that the US Defense department's *Statistical Compendium to Report on Allied Contribution to the Common Defense* published in 2004 has highlighted Japan's HNS contribution of US \$ 4.41 billion as the largest among all US allies including that of Germany and South Korea which were the second and third largest contributors. The US Department of Defense has positively commented on Japan HNS in its annual review of allied contributions submitted in its Congress. From the vantage point of allying state's contribution to the alliance, Japan's largest contribution in the alliance is paid back by the alliance to Japan in terms of its state security. Hisahiko Okazaki, a Japanese diplomat mentioned in 2000 that Japan could contribute only in terms of monetary means towards the alliance in order to acquire the US Congressional support towards the alliance. However, it is argued that

Japan's contribution towards the HNS accounts only for around 0.25 percent of its annual budget.

Theories on alliance formation show that the fade of threat will have its share of impact within the alliance dynamics and cohesion between the states. As the Cold War receded and the common threat for the US allies shifted from Soviet Communism to that of the other premises, Masahiro Hosakawa, who served as Japan's Prime Minister between August 1993 and April 1994 called for the reduction of US troops in Japan and Japan's contributions through HNS due to the changes in the international political climate and tight financial situation faced by the Japanese government. His and the Japanese political scientist Shinichi Kitaoko's statements on HNS were quoted by Yoda Tatsuro (2006: 945) as, 'This burden to Japanese taxpayers hangs like a darkening cloud over the future of the alliance. Japan should honor the 1995 agreement but put America on notice that it will not renew the agreement in 2000.' According to Kitaoko, "Tokyo should change the size of the HNS in order to become a "normal" country; by increasing the sharing of roles in other areas for contributions, it would be possible to proceed to the direction of a more mature US-Japan alliance relationship." Another criticism regarding HNS apart from that it is not mandatory under SOFA is that it was considered wasteful expenditure in the times of tight Japanese budget, since the free supply of electricity and utilities might go unsaved by the US families inhabiting the camps (Johnson 2000: 228).

There exist a long time concern among the Japanese security analyst in the wake of any attack upon Japan; it would take much longer for the United States to pitch in for the defence of Japan by risking its cities vulnerable for an attack. In the midst of often raised opposition for US bases at Okinawa, Japan lacks the strength to seriously push for it (Japan Times: 2 November 2003). In the midst of Japan lacking the force to make concession for it from the US government, there was a systematic increase in the US capabilities at Guam, a mid way island between Taiwan and Hawaii in terms of men and arsenals. Apart from these, Japan had to renew its maritime logistical support to the US navy operating in the Indian Ocean region; there is a rise in the anti-base demonstrations that could possibly ask US to relocate their Futenma base at Okinawa. It is unlikely for the United States to spend much of its GDP in the era of its sliding economy to defend

Japan. Since the domestic calls within US are already on the rise for its expenditure cut in the Asian theatre.

Hence, Japan started to dwell on the options of security multilateralism from that of bilateral ties solely with the US. Kaifu, Miyazawa and Hosokawa governments of Japan between August 1989 and April 1994 have tried to promote such multilateral security arrangements with the establishment of ARF by the end of the Cold War. The Nye report of 1996 which was approved by the Clinton administration asks for the maintaining of at the least 100,000 US troops in the Western Pacific. As the People's Liberation Army of China conducted its missile exercise in 2006 at the Taiwan strait in order to influence the Presidential vote in Taiwan, Japan once again turned back to rely upon its bilateral security ties with the US. This has culminated in the discussions to revise the guidelines for the bilateral security ties. As China mounted its security engagements in the period of 1996 to 1997 through Eurasian security engagement with Russia, it becomes necessary for Japan which has the border disputes with both the states to maintain its cohesiveness in the strategic relationship with the US.

Since Japan plays an active role with intelligence exchange, capacity building and hijacking reporting under the "Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia" (ReCaap) it can engage itself in multilateral engagements and with the other states in the region. Japan provides China regularly with green technologies through its Japan-China Energy Conservation Forum since 2006. Japan is already pioneering in the R&D of such technologies like smart-grid power systems, water purification devices and energy-saving electronic appliances.

Futenma, US Marine Corps base is situated in the heart of the Ginowan city of Okinawa Island, South of Japan. Futenma is an air-pilot training station that provides the support for land based marines spread all over the Island. By 2010, around 41,000 of US military personnel were stationed at the base which accounted for less than ten percent of the US armed forces personnel stationed in Japan. For a long period, people of Ginowan who numbered less than a lakh have complained that the training in the region causes irritable noise, pollution and often reported recluse behaviour of the armed personnel. Hence there had always been a cry from the Island inhabitants to vacate the US base altogether from

the Island. On the other hand, almost all the US defense exercises were carried solely from the Island, hence Okinawa serves as a crucial geographic region that not only pays for the Japanese security but for the whole of US – Japan security alliance for a longer period. In 2005, the issue became larger when civil-political mobilisations occurred against Futenma, especially in the island. This pushed the US to agree for the transfer of considerable number of its troops to Guam Island and relocation of some of its forces near the less populated Schwab marine base camp within an island. This move was also responded with opposition by the Island population.

The LDP is the primary ally for the US in Japan, Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is also a moderate left-centre party, which has supported much of the US security decisions. However its coalition with the leftist leaning Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDP) did not provide much choice but to raise the issue of demilitarisation and to call the US forces to vacate the Okinawa Island. Futenma case, on the positive side has succeeded in mobilising the Japanese population to have a concern for their external affairs. Post-Second World War, the war weary Japanese civilian population did not respond much towards the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security that underpins the US-Japan security alliance due to their aversion to war. Bringing Japanese foreign policies to public debate, Futenma had its opposition among the Japanese but however the larger debate was not about driving out US troops entirely from Japan but how to win larger concessions from the US. Hatoyama's resignation was not only linked with the Futenma issue. The public has viewed his leadership in lacking effectiveness in international negotiations along with unrealistic and indecisive policy postures. As the policy debates in the foreign policy arena percolates down to the citizenry, the options were how to gain larger concessions within the security treaty set up without rocking the boat of Japan's US alliance. However, the nature of the treaty appears to provide only minimum towards Japan's security.

Anti-War campaigns in Japan are still witnessed even after six decades of the Hiroshima, Nagasaki incidents. For instance, when Junichiro Koizumi supported the war efforts in Iraq by George W. Bush Jr. in 2003 there was more public unrest in Japan. For instance Japan's three major dailies, *Asahi Shinbun*, *Mainichi Shinbun* and *Yomiuri Shinbun*

along with the public broadcasting network, *Nihon hoso Kyokai* [NHK] and the cabinet office, *Naikaku Sori daijin Kanbo Koho Shitsu* were all unanimous in reporting the public opinion of Japanese citizen's unwillingness to dispatch the Japan's Self-Defense Forces to Iraq. Koizumi's address in the Japanese Diet also testifies it. He announced, "If I follow public opinion, I will make a mistake. Even though the majority of citizens do not understand my decision, I have to carry out the policy which needs to be implemented" Natsuyo I. (2007: 766). Despite the strong opposition from the public Japan contributed to the US war efforts in Iraq by sending its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in January 2004. This shows the states constraints to balance its domestic interests to fulfil its alliance commitments.

The LDP government made it possible through its coalition support from the *Komeito* (Clean Government Party). Despite sending Japanese troops to Iraq under the alliance commitments against the public interests, LDP has managed to win the lower house elections that followed in the aftermath of the incident. Political analysts in Japan gave their opinion that Japanese citizens preferred the foreign policy interests of Japan over the domestic constraints which shows the trajectory of Japanese minds shifting from that of the pacifist's attitude to somewhat realist. The Japanese public also wanted to their state to make certain international contribution which was a sign of shift in the post war politics since 1945. The Iraq issue was not however the first of such kinds. Japanese interests in sending their troops abroad were on the rise since 1992. Although there were not much support when Japan passed a bill to send their SDF on behalf of UN peacekeeping mission in the 1990's, opinion polls from the Cabinet office confirmed that it was on the rise in the subsequent ten years.

The proposed revision to the Article 9 of the Japanese constitution also reflects that public opinion in Japan has shifted from support to the no-war clause of the article to that of the collective self-defence. Although the support towards the revision of Article 9 was not complete, there still remains scepticism among the public, although both LDP and DPJ were advocating for the amendments to the Article 9 in the constitution. LDP has managed the dispatch of SDF troops to Iraq keeping in mind the upcoming elections. The

impact of SDF's dispatch to Iraq on the domestic elections in Japan has been internally assessed and examined in LDP.

After losing the upper house elections in the year 2007, the LDP Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made constitutional revision a campaign issue. Consequently, Japan's Defence Agency was upgraded to Defence ministry. This move was regarded by Abe as 'an end to the post-war regime...and the basis for building a new nation' (*Quoted in Govella, Kristi and Steven Vogel 2007: 102*). His subsequent visit to the NATO headquarters was first ever by the Japanese prime minister and wherein he declared that Japan will be dispatching its Self-Defence forces overseas for peacekeeping operations. Thereafter, Japan engaged in Iraq mission and its Diet passed laws which called for the realignment of the US forces in Japan. Japan improved its bilateral ties with Australia and India during Abe's tenure. Abe signed a joint declaration with the Australian counterpart calling for closer security cooperation and engaged with India to construct an environmental framework to make Kyoto protocol a success.

Abe failed to come together well with George Bush as compared to that of his predecessor, Junichiro Koizumi. He took seven months for his first visit to US, an unusual gesture from the Japanese Prime Minister in the post war era. This gesture was interpreted as Japan taking a larger independent stance since the end of World War II. Despite these low key frictions, Japan's cohesiveness in the alliance with United States has undergone a smooth sail. Unlike the Cold War scepticism in the US alliance system pointed out by Walt in his alliance literature, the US-Japan alliance had a depth in their cohesiveness. However there exists slender uncertainty that United States may prioritise its relationship with China, and forego the Japanese alliance any sooner. This issue was raised by DPJ's young politician Maehara Seiji as, *"I don't think Japan can maintain the U.S.-Japan alliance in the long term by offering only military bases....Having considered the inevitability that China will become the most important strategic partner in East Asia for the United States in the future, what Japan should do is...to enhance the necessity of the U.S.-Japan alliance by adding other values. For example, Japan will be able to intercept missiles launched against the United States from Japan's neighbouring countries...The present interpretation of the right of collective self-defence makes it*

difficult for Japan to do such things. It is thus necessary to revise the constitution so that Japan can exercise the right of collective self defence” Quoted in I. Natsuyo (2007: 778).

Neo-realist theory was often criticised for its lack of explanatory power regarding the future of alliance; if the perceived or actual threat vanishes-which binds the states into alliances. This case study projects that the theory collapses with a different picture. With the demise of the Soviet Union, United States alliance structure in the Asia Pacific region did not fall apart. On the other hand, the alliance retained its cohesiveness, rather the threats that this alliance has faced have changed its forms. From Soviet Union, Japan and the US has started to counter terrorism and various other non-state issues other than PRC and North Korea. Abe held a different posture towards the six party talks in terms of engaging with North Korea as compared to Koizumi. While Koizumi took a proactive role in engaging with North Korea, Abe was criticised by the allied powers for holding on to the rigid policy stance which in turn has isolated Japan.

There was another incident in the midst of the talks that could possibly explain Japan's posture. Abe has successfully dealt with the abductee in order to champion the concerns of dozens of families kidnapped by North Korea. He rose to prominence after this incident. Conciliatory measures of the US were interpreted otherwise in Japan as George Bush Jr. was taking a soft stand with North Korea while Japan was concerned about the fate of the kidnapped persons. The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law that was passed in the post-9/11 period has brought the alliance into much closer cohesion since the demise of the Soviet Union by the end of the Cold War. This law has authorised Japan to assist the allied forces in their anti-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan which includes supplying their vessels with oil. In spite of Bush pressing for Japan's engagement as early as possible, the opposition DPJ has successfully stalled the operations under the pretext that it has yet to acquire the approval of the United Nations Security Council. Abe's measure towards Japan's assertive security posture has often hit the roadblocks of day to day economic and political concerns of the state.

The 2009 elections to the lower house of the Diet witnessed that was ruling Japan a huge change in Japanese domestic politics. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the last fifty four years has lost their power to Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). After the

retirement of Junichiro Koizumi and the consequent fallout of instability in choosing the Prime ministerial candidate caused LDP dearly. DPJ promised certain changes at the helm of Japan's international affairs. The DPJ leadership that came to power promised to work towards the nuclear free globe and to strictly uphold the three non-nuclear principles of no possession, introduction or use of nuclear weapons. It seeks for a more equal relationship with the United States and to maintain closer ties with its Asian neighbours. DPJ also sought for Japan's proactive role regarding the issues like climate change.

DPJ also made an announcement to end the refuelling mission of the Maritime Self Defence Forces (MSDF) in the Indian Ocean. As compensation, it agreed to offer refuelling of ships that patrol against Somali pirates off the African coast and to assist in Afghanistan civil development. It also stated that it will bring in amendments to the legislations that authorises the sending of troops overseas. They promised to retain the cohesiveness of Japan's US alliance, but the emphasis was laid much upon Article 9 of the constitution. Accordingly, Japan will maintain its ties with the US and the latter will have a considerable say in Japan's relationship with other states. The Okinawa issue was given primacy in their propaganda which will be raised with the US in order to relocate the US marines base to the coastal area. It also seeks changes in the Status Of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that exempts the US military from Japanese criminal legal jurisdiction. DPJ also sought to revise its monetary contribution regarding the maintenance of US troops in Japan.

Since the cohesiveness within an alliance depends much upon the nature and intensity of an external threat, the kind of threat that faces the alliance also determines how the cohesion dynamics between states in an alliance works. The response and behaviour of the Pacific alliance is not the same during the Cold War period as compared to that of the post-11 September 2001 phase. Despite the stress upon Article 9 of the Japan's constitution, the new governments' minister for foreign affairs Okada Katsuya took a surprise trip to Afghanistan on 12 October 2009 and discussed with President Hamid Karzai the possibility of offering Japan's help to Afghanistan without prior consultation with the US Defence Secretary Robert Gates. As a result of an agreement reached in 2006

between the US and Japan it was agreed upon to relocate the US bases in Okinawa to its coastal region. After the objections from the residents of the region, Hatoyama's foreign affairs team has stalled the shifting on 9 October 2009. Hatoyama favoured the removal of Futenma base altogether from the Okinawa Island. However, Okada suggested the relocation to the Kadena air base in the island. Okada has also raised the issues of SOFA that prevented military officials of US being tried in the Japanese courts. He also raised the issue of Japan paying 193 billion Yen for the maintenance of US bases in Japan for the year 2009. US pressed in October 2009 through the visit of Gates and US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen to resolve at the least the Futenma issue prior to the visit of its President Barrack Obama scheduled for on 12 November 2009. Hatoyama however did not budge. The Pentagon failed in coercing the Japanese government in fostering the relocation plan which had its fallouts in its other plans of moving 8000 US marines to the Guam base. Obama's visit to Japan realised an agreement of bilateral consultative committee. Hatoyama later in Singapore have reiterated that he did not feel obliged by the agreement.

Thus the Futenma incident turned to be an irritant in the US-DPJ relations. Post-Obama's visit to Japan a bilateral working group on Base relocation was set up which has reached an impasse and suspended the talks. As a result, the US called off the Hatoyama-Obama meeting on the sidelines of Copenhagen climate summit. The US Marine Corps Commandment called the postponement of base shifting plan by Hatoyama government till next year as unfortunate. The Hatoyama government on the other hand faced an internal pressure from its main coalition partner SDP whose chief Mizuho Fukushima stated that unless the base was returned in Okinawa, her party would withdraw its support. SDP's support becomes crucial in the passage of new legislation in Japan's upper house. Another irritant in their bilateral relations emerged when Japan decided to scrap the planned purchase of US missiles for its Missile Defence System (MDS).

Japan denies US, the deployment of Japan's Self Defence Forces abroad extensively. However, they reached a consensus regarding Joint Missile Defence and Cooperation in the joint anti-terrorism endeavours. The foreign minister, Okada ordered an investigation into the leakage of the news from the retired Japanese diplomat admitting knowledge of

secret protocols that exempted the US from observing Japan's three nuclear principles. The No first Use stance advocated by DPJ also contradicts the US policy on nuclear use and makes the provision of US nuclear umbrella problematic. Arase (2010: 51) has mentioned that DPJ's call for a more equal relationship with US was responded with "more equal" means that Japan should defend the U.S., just as the U.S. defends Japan. Arase argues, "However the DPJ's point was that there are some 47,000 US troops in Japan on 134 bases (by some estimates), and 1% of Japan's land area. Although the DPJ remained friendly toward the US, it wanted to fulfil a promise to give the long-suffering Okinawans some relief (Arase, 2010: 51).

The change of government demonstrates not a smooth sail for the US and DPJ. The United States helped LDP in having a continuous rule in the Japanese diet for fifty four years. Although DPJ poses a friendly attitude towards US, it does not owe much to the US as much as LDP does. The leverage of a state's capability within an alliance is clearly evident in the proceedings of US-Japan alliance in the year 2010. The Liberal Democratic Party made an election campaign on the lines that if they come to power in the 2009 elections they will negotiate for an equal footing for Japan in the strategic decision making with US that concerns their national interest. The LDP as we have seen has a lot more to owe to US for being in power for almost fifty four years. In the wake of leadership problems within LDP, the Democratic Party of Japan also vigorously campaigned to fight for the cause and interests of the people of Okinawa in order to determine the exact locations for the US base situated in the Island. The US being a powerful state in the alliance did not budge which made SDP to withdraw its support to the ruling coalition headed by DPJ and as a result, Hatoyama Yukio resigned from the post of DPJ President and eventually relinquished the post of the prime minister by 2 June 2010.

Although the popular opinion in Japan sticks to the anti-war and its indigenous three nuclear principles, there were debates open regarding the possibility of Japan becoming nuclear weapon possessor. US-Japan security alliance is one of the prime factors that clearly indicates that Japan could not afford to forego the security umbrella of the US in search of the nuclear weapons option. On the other hand, Japan is much committed

towards the global-zero nuclear principle. For instance, the US-Japan study Group on Arms Control and Non-Proliferation has recommended ways for the nuclear haves to follow regarding the non-proliferation issue that could eventually lead to global zero. China's case points out that US nuclear umbrella and Russia's deployment makes it necessary for it to deploy its own nuclear missiles. The phrase nuclear umbrella used against both conventional and nuclear attack has been clarified through a fine distinction by James Leonard, the former US representative at Geneva Disarmament conference as, "calling protection against a nuclear attack alone 'umbrella A' and protection extended also against a conventional attack 'umbrella B' (Leonard 1995: 30-44) China calls for the US and Russia to opt nuclear no-first use posture. Although the US has withdrawn its nuclear deployments as the forward defence in East Asia, it is yet to opt for the no-first use posture which turns out to be the concern for Japan. The options of creating an ASIATOM, the regional nuclear safeguards regime for Asia and the possibilities of North East Asia Nuclear Free Zone are the options in which Japan could engage itself actively (Harrison 1996: 30-44).

The post-war era marked many of the non-communist East Asian states faring well in their own economy compared to that of the communist states. In particular Japan rose to the number two position in the world economy by 1970s and among the capitalist states only next to the United States. Japan's rise from the shatters of 1945 was seen as far better than many of the European states during the period and far ahead of the economic growths in other parts of Asia, Latin America and Africa. Politics and economics are mostly intertwined so much that if one realm begins to show promise, growth will be reflected in the other sector. Japan's rise in economy during the first two decades of the Cold War can be attributed to the political climate that it has experienced during the period. While the non-communist states were strategically engaging the communist world to stall the spread of communism, Japan had a privilege to focus largely upon its economy as a benefit from its alliance with the United States. Not only Japan, other states in the East Asian theatre like Taiwan and South Korea which allied with United States also project a similar story. However, it will be too deterministic to argue that these East Asian states have had no impact from that of the Cold War.

Ikeda's efforts to concentrate on Japan's economy bore fruit when Japan started to emerge as a key global player from the 1950's. Japan has substantially increased its steel production in the period which helped it becoming the world's largest ship builder. Japan as an emergent player was privileged with protectionist tariffs on import goods. This advantage was well used by Japan to shine in its automobiles and electronic manufacturing. Thus Japan began to outwit France, Britain and Germany in the realm of trade with an average growth rate of 10.4. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) has reemployed the strategies that Japan employed in the trade sector during the war days to concentrate on the national resources into particular crucial sectors like shipbuilding.

Despite Japan being the primary ally of the United States in the Pacific sector, the competing interests of both states in the economic arena projects a different picture. A series of frictional encounters between US and Japan in the 1970s testifies the fact. Hence the alliance exists between these two states. The cohesion is maintained in the strategic affairs but not much in the economic sector. In the case of the defence sector, Japan is far way unequal compared to that of the United States while in the economic sector; Japan turns out to be a prime competitor with the United States. As we witnessed in the theories on alliance, it is clear that the alliance set up between a powerful state and a weak state tends to last a longer period compared to that of the states that possess more or less equal capabilities. The US-Japan post-war economic and strategic relations are the illustration of the former relationship.

Japan's earlier rise in the economic arena can also be attributed to the stability in the world economy which was witnessed between the years of Korean War and the first oil shock in 1973. The Bretton Woods' model introduced and dominated by the United States has brought in the practices of fixed exchange rates and the reduction of protective tariffs. Being an industrialised state and relying much on the export arena, Japan was naturally blessed with the period's global economic climate. Japan also was the prime contributor to the Asian Development Bank. The US helped in easing the pressure between Japan and South Korea which was otherwise estranged since the war times to find new markets for the Japanese produce and to curtail the overdependence of South

Korea upon the United States. Japan has also fostered its investments in the South East Asian region during Vietnam especially in Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia thereby overcoming the bitter experience that these states had earlier with Japan during the Second World War.

Japan played the diplomatic card cautiously with the United States during the Vietnam War. Although the alliance commitment calls for Japan's participation in the war, Eisaku Sato who replaced Ikeda in 1965 has referred to the Japanese public opinion to engage Japan in any of the war efforts in Vietnam. The paradox in Japan's stance between Sato and Koizumi regimes response to US war efforts also clearly explains that in the current scenario, Japan holds a urge to become a 'normal' state. President Nixon's call for the East Asian states to take care of their own security in 1969 came as a shock to Japan. He in turn has promised to return Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty by 1972. Nixon's reorientation of US policy towards PRC has also come as a shock towards Japan. He also announced the increase in tariffs for the goods imported by US. This move came as an attack on the Bretton Woods' understanding through which Japan has prospered so far since the peace treaty. These Nixon shocks started the frictional phase in the US-Japan economic alliance. However, the cohesiveness in the strategic bilateral relations remained unaffected.

The United States introduction of import surcharge on August 1971 was witnessed by Japan as the second of the "Nixon Shocks" aimed at them. Consequently, the US threatened to invoke the trading with the enemy act against Japan. During 1977-78, the US pressurised Japan in order to boost its domestic growth rate. This episode has questioned the fundamental faith of Japan on its bilateral ties with US and also had a huge impact upon the career of the then Prime Minister, Takeo Fukuda. These economic frictions between the states had its toll on the security concerns in the bilateral relations. However, the two states have managed to stitch over rather than to fall apart. The friction between the two states was witnessed all along in the bilateral ties since Japan re-emerged as an industrial power. Japan's produce in the textiles, industrial sector, ship building industries, automobiles and high end technology on electronics together has altered the American economic life without doubt. These proceedings of Japan in the

economic arena have not failed to attract accusations as 'unfair' practices and 'free rider'. The US has accused Japan for its drastic protectionist policy on the one hand and expecting larger concessions from that of the United States on the other. Hence the decades of negotiations between the two states have centred on the issues such as the policy that Japan should follow restraint on its export, opening larger space for US investments in Japan and the demand for Liberalisation of Japan's import regime.

The US is still a favoured destination for the Japanese produce. On the other hand, Japan is being regarded by United States as core to its international hub-and-spokes security arrangement and a stable partner in the East Asian theatre. As reciprocation, Japanese feel that its alliance cohesiveness with the United States is a reliable way to counter the fast emerging Chinese economy and military might. Scepticisms prevail over US-Japan free trade agreements since Japanese view that there exists minimal tariff for imports within Japan while US still maintains around twenty percent of tariffs for its import of four wheelers from Japan.

Japan's rise in the 1970's raised concern among the US and Chinese elites of any possible Japan's re-emergence. However, Japan's Asian Monetary Fund initiative to help Asian countries in financial crises collapsed in 1997. Japan had also abandoned its efforts to establish diplomatic ties with North Korea in 2002 following Pyongyang's intentions in search for nuclear weapons. Japan also did not compete vigorously against China in its emergence as a proactive participant in the regional forums in which Japan was also engaged. Japan rather looks forward for India to engage in the ASEAN forum since this could help its transitions secure in the Indian Ocean region. Similarly, Japan for its larger trade engagements with Australia, look towards its active participation in the regional forums along with New Zealand. However, it was interpreted as Japan's intention to check China's unilateral dominance in the regional forum without irking the Chinese public and the ruling class.

The US however will continue to remain as a top priority with Japanese engagements even in the wake of any possible diminishing of American troops in the region. In the post war context, Japan did not share such cohesiveness in any other alliance or with any other state as much as it does with that of the United States. The US-Japan alliance is

viewed in majority opinion as not only it favours the security interests of Japan but also the economic concerns of the state. Hence, Junichiro Koizumi took a quite pragmatic step concerning the Iraq issue. LDP's policy research council Chairman, Kyuma Fumio has expressed his views as, 'In light of the U.S.-Japan alliance, I can either oppose or support a potential U.S. military attack on Iraq. All I can do is to "understand" the U.S. decision...The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is likely an American Ministry of Foreign Affairs.' Not only can Japan not solve the problem of North Korea without the United States but also its economy is closely tied to the U.S. economy. Japan cannot do anything without the United States...Japan has no choice but to understand the U.S. decision because Japan is like one of the American states' (Quoted in Natsuyo 2007: 784).

Iraq war has also placed Japan in an entanglement between its alliance commitment and the Yoshida doctrine. Yoshida Doctrine was an important factor that guides Japan's foreign policy for almost the entire period of the post-war. The doctrine stresses upon the alliance commitment with the US to avoid overseas military confrontations, to focus on economic policy and to have a minimal expenditure towards military and defence forces. Going by the doctrine, Japan should not have committed itself in the Iraq crisis of 2003. However, to deny any assistance to US implies undermining the US-Japan alliance which in turn is entirely against of what the Yoshida doctrine has suggested for. Earlier in 1951 when the US-Japan Security Treaty was signed, it also raised serious doubts that it might pull Japan into any possible war. However, the benefit that Japan acquired from the treaty has outweighed the scepticisms. The North Korean crisis also helped the LDP in a way to divert the Japan's public discontent towards its decision on Iraq. The North Korean issue and the increasing drift in the Sino-Japanese relations in a way contributes towards the cohesiveness of US-Japan alliance and the widespread public support in Japan for the bilateral Security treaty and Japan's defence policies. The transformation in Japanese posture from offering US with monetary assistance in the first Gulf War to the dispatch of SDF in 2003 was called as 'reluctant realism'. This transformation has no doubt has bent the long unquestioned Yoshida doctrine. It was also argued that LDP has stressed on the preamble of Japan's Constitution diverting from its prominent Article 9 in order to justify its decision on Iraq.

Fortunately for LDP, the opposition parties did not take up the SDF issue of 2003 effectively in 2003. Another opposition party SDF was already sidelined during the period due to its silent posture regarding the North Korean kidnapping case due to the ideological affinities with North Korea. Although Koizumi could not promise the security of SDF personnel, his repeated speeches reflected that SDF will only engage in the non combat reconstruction operations in Iraq. It was said that it was a ceremonial participation by Japan in George Bush Jr.'s call for the 'coalition of the willing'. The Ground self-defence forces dispatched to Iraq have engaged themselves only in the humanitarian works in Iraq and returned with zero casualties in 2006 and the Air Self-Defense Forces stayed in Iraq. The Koizumi government also employed extensively the right of collective self defence as a reason towards his decisions. As Christopher Hughes (2004: 427-45) suggests, the Japanese government changed the previous constitutional interpretation on this right by switching emphasis from Article 9 to the preamble in order to justify its decision to send the SDF to a *de facto* combat zone. Thus, the SDF's dispatch to Iraq established important precedents for a potential 'radical leap' in Japan's foreign policy in the future.

Independent strategic and military posture of Japan from that of United States is less likely in the current scenario, since Japan's military is not prepared to counter any threat without considerable assistance from the United States. Currently, Japan possesses no nuclear weapons and hence there is no first strike capability. Its counter-air or land based missiles does not exceed more than three hundred kilometres that intensifies its worries regarding any possible strategic threats even from their neighbours. Article 9 of Japan constitution still denies the country its right to collective self-defence. Hence it has to rely much upon its strategic and cohesive alliance partner, the US. Article 9 also proscribes the JSDF from participating in any frontline battles without the United States military command even for its self defence.

The US-Japan alliance despite facing frictions at times especially in the economic sector reflected huge cohesiveness in the contemporary period compared to that of the early times of the post war. Japan was largely witnessed as a peaceful state since the end of the Second World War. Its geographic isolation from the Asian mainland could largely

favour the state in the future to maintain such an image in its global affairs. Japan's export of certain political and non-political values on the lines of its alliance partner might attract some feud from its competitors like China and other Central and South East Asian states that follow different political values. Japan may handle these issues with tact and caution. Japan has the potential in the current settings to defend its interests in the regional and global forums despite China's highhandedness. A more autonomous security posture is more likely given the recent trajectories in the US-Japan alliance. Japan has a prospective future in its coast guard diplomacy. Currently Japan trains around 4,000 coast guard personnel from the East Asian region and India at the Coast Guard Academy in Hiroshima. Japan is likely to engage the JSDF in many of peace keeping missions in the future. This could be gauged from its change in posture since the Iraq War of 2003. These developments are clear pointers to the fact that Japan is fast emerging as a 'normal' state.

Chapter Five

Conclusion

The primary research puzzle that this work engaged with the motivation of a state to get into an alliance has unveiled multiple causalities. Threats – perceived and actual have been highlighted by many scholars as the primary reason for states seeking an alliance. Through our case study, it has been proved that although threats are important for states to seek an alliance, these threats are not constant. It is stated that there exists neither a permanent ally nor a perennial foe in politics. In the post-Second World War period, the possibility of Japan rearming and pursuing militarism was perceived as a primary threat by the United States. As the Cold War progressed, Japan was smoother in its cooperation with the United States especially in the reform endeavours undertaken by the United States. Gradually, the threat perception of the United States regarding the possible rearmament of Japan has started to disappear. Thereon Japan has started to ally with the United States in its endeavour to encounter their common threats from the communist world.

The attitude of the allied powers *vis-a-vis* the vanquished powers has undergone a change from the Versailles treaty which was evident in the Potsdam and Yalta declarations. This has considerably succeeded in winning the Japanese consent for the smoother reform phase in the early post war era. This could be stated as a primary reason for Japan having agreed to many of the US dictates since its surrender and agreed to ally with the United States once the occupation phase was over. However, the fact that Japan's political thinking and its structural polity was meticulously constructed by the United States in the early post war period cannot be ignored. In spite of this fact, Japan has realised and grasped the drastically changed world order after the Second World War to forego its earlier ambitions of world domination through its military doctrine.

Although the Wilsonian shift in world order has privileged the economy over military, Japan realised it soon after its surrender and diverted its potential towards emerging as an important economic power in the global order. Notwithstanding the trade frictions that emerged in the US-Japan alliance from 1970's, the United States has helped in

constructing Japan's post war economy and considerably privileging Japan in many of its early trade endeavours. This also the reason as to what motivates Japan to stay closer with the United States for all the periods since the end of the war. Beyond trade, it was Japan's strategic concerns which synchronised with that of the United States security interests in the Pacific region that helped in attaining considerable cohesiveness in their alliance.

Strategic alliance between them was crucial which sustained their relationship for more than six decades. Despite the trade frictions, their strategic cohesiveness has reflected a smoother sail. Although few of the issues raised concerns in the alliance like Japan's monetary contribution towards its security and Futenma issue, these issues did not distort the larger picture of sustaining the alliance. In the wake of Japan eyeing to become a 'normal state' in the contemporary era, any drastic change in their alliance equation is unlikely. However, these developments in Japan have raised concerns among its neighbouring countries. Nonetheless its relations with the United States remain undisturbed. Thus the cohesiveness that was started to be seen in the relationship from 1980's is likely to continue for a considerable period in the future. On the other hand, Japan's autonomy in its own decision making also emerges as a serious concern. For example, Governor of Tokyo Ishihara Shintaro has observed, 'I wonder how the US will interpret its security treaty with Japan if our nation decides to confront China...?' (Shintaro 2005: 43). The US-Japan alliance is an exceptional case. At the time of forging an alliance, they were unequal in terms of their capabilities and 'international standings'. After a few decades, their relationship became more cohesive. Hence the case although reifies many of the established understandings of state behaviour in an international alliance set up, it throws light on certain new areas in alliance politics like cohesiveness between states and multi-level study of a single relation between two or more states.

The primary hypothesis of this work suggests that the alliance commitment of a state impinges upon its autonomy in decision-making and this has been validated positively through this case study. For example, Japan's national government twice faced the dilemma of having to choose between the stance of the US in the Gulf region and that of its public opinion. In the earlier Gulf expedition of the United States during the oil crisis

of 1970s Japan rallied behind its public opinion to stay away from United States and its war efforts. Similarly it has refrained itself from assisting United States in its Vietnam War except for the previously accepted monetary assistance. However, alliance commitment has pushed the Koizumi regime in 2003 to dispatch its Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) compromising on its public opinion. That the security concerns of the alliance make the state to commit itself toward the common interests of an alliance confirms yet another hypothesis of the study.

That the cohesion between the states is sustained as long as the threat prevails has also been proved during the study. However, this proposition has already been stated in the alliance literature which tends to focus more on the common security threat. This work has broadened the study through various realms of international politics other than the security concerns of the state. For example, beyond the militaristic rise of China, Japan's concern pertains to its economic competitiveness along with many emerging economies that makes it commit more towards its alliance with that of the United States.

Beginning with a chapter on introduction engaged with this work has the concepts of alliance formation and cohesion. The literature on the alliance formation was surveyed and a conceptual analysis undertaken. This chapter has shown that the available literature on the subject was largely established upon the premise of realism and other mainstream perspectives. This chapter has also thrown light on the limitations in positivist approaches overlooking certain explanations pertaining to the alliance politics.

The history of the US-Japan alliance after the Second World War has been narrated in Chapter III. United States impact upon the post war polity in Japan was highlighted. This chapter has not only dealt with Japan's security and foreign relations but also its economy and other domestic arenas. This chapter engages with the way in which Japan has emerged in the economic arena during the post- Second World War period.

Conceptual understandings that we have seen in the Chapter one contrasted with the history of post-Second World War US-Japan relations in Chapter four. This chapter highlights the gap areas in the existing alliance literature. Chapter five concludes the work by summarising the final results of the work. The hypothesis proposed at the

beginning of the study has been proved. Thus the US-Japan security alliance continues to experience considerable cohesion even after the change in Japan's posture in the post-11 September 2001. However in the contemporary scenario, Japan's urge to become a 'normal state' and its willingness to engage in a larger role in its neighbouring affairs is clearly evident. It could be hypothesised that Japan is likely to accelerate the process of rearming and maintaining security on its own without altering fundamentally its position as a key ally of the United States.

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