COLONIAL DISCOURSES AND PRACTICES: AN EXPLORATION OF NAGA IDENTITY

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Certificate

It is certified that the dissertation entitled **"Colonial Discourses and Practices: An Exploration of Naga Identity"** submitted by **Heroka** is in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** in Jawaharlal Nehru University. This dissertation to the best of our knowledge is his original work and has not been submitted for any other degree in any other University.

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DEDICATE TO MY PARENTS

Khehoto Yepthomi and Khetoni Yepthomi

AND MY GRAND FATHER

Late N. Pukiho Yepthomi

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Acknowledgements

Introduction

With the advent of the British colonial power in the region, massive transformations have taken place in the socio-cultural, religious and political spheres of the people in the North East India. One crucial area of those transformations has been the modern identity consciousness among the people in the region. Indeed, much of the modern identity consciousness in the North East India has its mooring in the encounter with the European colonialism, its discourses and practices, in the region.

Even today, the social and cultural history of North East India is marked by a tense and contested terrain of identity claims and counterclaims with the overtone of some colonially constructed categories. The contemporary growth of various identity discourses in the North East India presents a possibility of multiple pockets of emerging identity with many distinct claims. As result of colonial encounter, the colonial administrators, who turned into anthropologist, had a premise of assuming that the region is a terrain of stateless societies were organised in communities and the communities were socially, politically, culturally, and even racially bounded unity. In the case of the Nagas, an important factor in the formulation, extension and strengthening identity in the colonial encounter were standarisation and texturisation in the colonial discourses and practices. This was mostly done by the colonial administrators, who later turned anthropologists, and partly by the Christian missionaries who function as informal extension of colonial power in the area. The present study looks at the dogged nature of these discourses and practices that have shaped and informed the identity discourses and politics in North East India

Colonialism and Identity: Some Preliminary Remarks on Discursive Practices

Colonialism was not an identical process in different parts of the world but everywhere it had traversed, it had inaugurated new dimension or perspective in the life of the colonized subjects. It is by now well know that the success of colonial force over the colonized was not just as a matter of the superior weapons, political and diplomatic shrewdness, and economic energy - as important these factors were (Nandy: 1983). Colonialism was made possible and then sustained and strengthened by the technology of

colonial modernity—its worldviews and practices. Modern colonizers of late eighteenth and nineteenth century in most part of the Africa, Asia, and American continent expressed and perpetuated the inherent logic of western-derivative modernity on the colonized subject. The logic that informs the colonial modernity is drawn from the enlightenment moral conceptions of liberating the colonial subject from their 'life world' of mysticism, superstitious, free less, less rational, less productive, less civilized, less scientific and illogical habits. Much of this colonial modernity project is primarily to universalize the Cartesian subject-centered reason, and linearity of time or the idea of progress, meaning-legislating rationality. The understanding of these metanarrative about European colonial modernity is in this sense gets embedded within the idea of gradual emancipation of colonized from traditionalism, superstation and mysticism. The logic of colonial modernist then seeks to universalize European moral order to its subjects. The European modernity therefore becomes responsible for generating many transformative outlooks, vehemently advocated by the colonial agents. Thereafter the colonial agent in most of the colonial situation invades the culture in the form of the native 'epistemological space' that provides a room for imputing the values of the European modernity on the colonized. In this sense, western modernity did not confine only in Europe but got disseminated in different parts of the world in the form of colonialism and the produced 'colonial knowledge'.

The occident mode of producing 'colonial knowledge' then went on to remodel and refashion the European "others" by juxtaposing "other" and "self" into perpetual entities. In that, the modernity discourses were replicated in the non-western world through the project of colonial rationalization, scientific or logical reasoning of almost everything in the colony. The European concept and categories in theorierizing the oriental has infect played a major role in producing Europe as the radiating center around which others were arranged. The breadth of these subjects cover by western modernity in the colonies stemmed from the desire of the Europeans to systematically normalize its modern powers at all levels and degree it could, over the people and land under its colonial jurisdiction. Colonial modernity then is now left the legacy in the form of institutional practices of enumerating identities in most of the once colonized nations and continues to operate. Consequently, even after the formal decolonization of the technology of European

modernity, it continues to hunt the post-colonial discourses. Modern category thus brings to us the most distinctive project of modernity that now not only confined within Europe but seems to have transmitted to other parts of the world. Hence the project of modernity that originated in western intellectual tradition wishes to declare as well as desires universal application.

This aspect of western modernity is that, as it underwent long trajectory, it did not stop in Europe but rather its symptom percolate outside Europe in the wake of colonialism through its discursive practices. In south Asia specifically, the British colonial interference with natives thought systems, culture, ethnicity, language, has disempowered the natives by limiting their ability to define their world. The native life world has been gradually replaced by the foreign one. This slowly and steady process of transforming native 'self' has effectively been conducted through a systematic application of a number of the so call 'investigative modalities'. The echoes of these modern technologies of 'colonial knowledge' which produced colonial identity can still be heard in the postcolonial situation.

Edward Said shows that these discursive practices inform the intimate connection between knowledge and identity formation (Said, 2003). "His insistence on the entanglement of intellectual production and formation of identity remains a crucial starting point for much works in post-colonial studies and culturally inflicted research within imperial history" (Ballantyne, 2004: 10). In other words, 'colonial knowledge' has preoccupied the theory and practice about European colonialism in Asia. Knowledge has become a site of battle for power struggle across the modern academic discipline for intellectual transformation from colonial hegemony.

In South Asia, within the field of history, anthropologist-historian such as Arjun Appaduri, Nicholas Dirks, Gyan Prakash and other scholars working under intellectual leadership of Bernard Cohn have drawn attention to the way colonially instituted practices and knowledge systems affects the formation of new subjectivities... and cast a lasting shadow over emerging politic of identity" (Chakrabarty, 1995: 3373). Volumes of literature now unearthed the possible ways in which the present production of identities

has its moorings in colonial discursive practices such as the writings of colonial anthropology and colonial historiography.

For Sugata Bose and other the rejection of colonial historiography is as old as colonial rule itself (Bose, 2003:33). In south Asia, it was manifested amongst the anti-colonial nationalists who challenged the dominant colonial historiography long before the actual defeat of colonial system. Yet, colonial modernity also led nationalist intellectuals to follow the historiographical knowledge conventions established by European colonial scholarship that often neglected its pre-colonial reality of the 'past' as proper history. Hence, in South Asia among the post colonial Indian historians who call themselves as *Subaltern Studies* collective, Gramscian in inspiration and led by Ranajit Guha, developed a critique of nationalism that relied on the conventions established by colonial discourses of historiography and ethnography.

The intimate connection between colonial historiography and identity production had been a core of the writing of history during colonial and postcolonial period. In South Asia and Southeast Asia in general, the postcolonial intellectuals led by Bernard S. Cohn have opened up a debit about 'Historical Modalities' that has been an important instrument in constructing meaningful universe of events and narratives for the colonized in the colonies. In most of the colonized situation the colonials as well as the dominant nationalist discourse construct the identity of the colonized past by selectively organizing events in relation to their ideology. In the process many minorities were either marginalized or stereotyped and thereby prevented from identifying themselves. In this sense, identity produces through historical knowledge enterprises is not an object of discovery but rather an invention by the dominant. According to Cohn "historiography, for the British, has an ontological power in providing the assumption about how the real social and natural world is constituted (and) [h]istory in its broadest sense was a zone of debate over the ends and the means of the colonial rulership" (Cohn, 1997: 5). The colonial representation as well as the dominant nationalist discourses on the minority communitarian strife share common position, since each offers explanations cast interims of criminality, backwardness, primitive passion and ready unreason of the people.

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Just as I have discussed that the intimate connection between historical knowledge and identity production has been a core of history writing so also the writing of anthropology. Infect by the late nineteenth century in most of the colonized nation, anthropology become literally the history of the colonized. Though here I will not dwell much but it is on the latter issue that I now turn for a moment as Cohn remarks both "history and anthropology shares a great deal at the epistemological level: ...historians and anthropologist have a common subject matter, 'otherness'; one field constructs and studies 'otherness' in space, the other in time" (Cohn, 1987: 19).

During the colonial period the anthropologist ethnography were in many instances directly or indirectly involve in the colonial project (Baharuddin, 1999:105). In the colonial period anthropologist is responsible for inventing many of the concepts, categories and classification resulted through subsequent exercise of gathering information about different fuzzy ethnic and sub-ethnic group, customs, sub-cultures, traditions and so on for the archival and 'rescue recording' purpose. The ideas which colonial administrators/anthropologists used are perpetuated in the form of governmental and official policy, which are now replicated by postcolonial state. The relationship between colonial anthropologist with colonialism and its discourses in Southeast Asia and South Asia can be drawn from Victor T. King and William D. Wilder who writes:

> "Much of the anthropological research and writing on other cultures was undertaken not by academic anthropologist but by colonial officials and missionaries, who lived and worked in the dependent territories, who were fluent in the mainstream vernaculars, and who recorded social and cultural life in their spare time. Some had acquaintance with anthropological literatures either through personal interest or more often formal colonial training programmes provided in universities, academic and colleges, while other did not" (King and Wilder, 2003: 26).

The colonial administrators played a crucial, if ambivalent, role as a mediator between the colonial subjects and the colonial government. The colonial officials and the missionaries help to construct 'official ethnography' for colonial government and develop practices that sought to disguise the power coded colonial influence by calming what they recorded was genuine for posterity.

Nevertheless, the colonial official anthropologist epistemological premise remains closely intact with the European social theories and the European system of classification. The projects of classification, groping, naming, and enumerating method deploy in the European colonies, however needs clear distinction from their home in Europe. The European logic of employing classificatory technique into quantification and enumeration in their home seems to have different intention from there nineteenth century South Asian colonies. Arjun Appadurai views that there are three sound legitimate reasons to clam such differences (Appadurai, 1996:117-118). In European (British as well as France) context, the first, he says was overwhelmingly territorial and occupational rather than ethnic or racial. Secondly it was sociological, that is, it was tied to the politics of representation. Finally, it concerns the welfare of the socially marginalized poor, the sexually profligate, lunatic, and the criminal. These utilities of numbering were part of their historical experience of literacy for the colonial elite who came to believe that classification and quantification was socially useful.

The major concern of the European metropolitan interlocutors was concentrated on the social or resource-related policy initiatives. This utility becomes a part of a complex including informational, justificatory and pedagogical techniques. In the process this phenomena gradually gets bureaucratized as a key to the colonial imagination that have created the sense of controllable mechanism such as essentialsing, discipline, surveillance, objectification of fuzzy communities in the colony. The colonial project then shaped the colonizing state which was then led to the dislocation of the colonized subject as well as those European audiences. Anthropological works of the colonial officials and missionaries become an integral part of what came to be known as "Colonial Knowledge", which in turn become the taken for granted epithet of history, territory, identity and society of the postcolonial present. In this sense "anthropology through 'colonial knowledge' was involved in the exercise to construct and constitute group and national identities which become the basis of post-colonial nation-state formation" (Baharuddin, 1999:107). Colonial anthropological discourses in this way have contributed in elaborating and constituting identity consciousness in the form of nationality principle, and its related concept such as 'national identity' and 'national culture' and so on. Hence it is on this background understanding, the present work

intended to trace the legacy of colonial modernity through understanding the colonial construction of identity by taking the case of the community in the Eastern Frontier of South Asia popularly known as North East India with a special focus on the community called the Nagas.

Colonial Knowledge and the Nagas: A Preface

The modern Naga identity consciousness grew out of the intrusion of British colonial power and it still continues to trudge on to the contemporary postcolonial India. Colonial expansion brought the British to come in close relation with the Nagas who were then in the periphery of their colonial sphere in South Asia. The colonial expansion in the Naga Hills facilitated colonial administrator, soldier-ethnographers and Christian missionaries to produce ethnographic literature on the Nagas and these 'colonial knowledge' was used to regulate and colonial control.

With the development of colonial knowledge as a technology of modernization, redefinition of Naga identity, not in perspective of the Nagas, but encoded in accordance with the western modernity concept, categories, and classification. In most general term I realize that most of these 'colonial knowledge' about the Nagas have been constructed and elaborated in the fashion of orientalism. It is the influence of evolutionary anthropological theory of Victorian discourses, the Nagas were so to say *orientalised* by the colonial administrator-scholars and the colonial agents in the colonial era.

There are no doubts that, one may identify certain differences between the postcolonial discourses with the former British Empire with regard to the use of concept and categories in understanding and defining the Naga identity. Many of the colonial ontological and epistemological style of defining the Nagas were faithfully reproduced by the postcolonial mainstream Indian discourses. For instance, Nagas are "hostile", "insurgents" and are sought to be 'civilized', 'tamed' and above all 'nationalized' by officially patronizing them as "scheduled tribes" of India. This is observable especially through the media and writings of Indian army officials, civil service officers. These writings continue to use the colonial discourses in its relationship with the communities of the Nagas.

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The effects of such attitude and stereotyping, and the politics framed accordingly have far reaching consequence on the Naga communities. Many of the contemporary socio-political identity politics in the North East India are born out of the deeply embedded colonial and the postcolonial state attitudes and policies of classification and demarcation of communities. For instance, the incapability of the postcolonial Indian State to innovatively respond to the Naga nationalism is due to the postcolonial state continual reproduction of the colonial style of relationship with the Naga. The intimate connection between colonial knowledge and the Naga identity-formation makes it possible to trace the connection between various existing colonial discourses and the postcolonial socio-political identity claims in the North East, particularly the case of the Naga, which is the concern of the present work.

It is therefore an attempt of this research work to examine, scrutinize and bridge the possible connection between the British colonial administrator's colonial knowledge production and the Nagas' search for and assertion of identity in the postcolonial era. Hence, in doing so I may go contrary to the popular notion that Naga movement is a postcolonial discourse.

Chapterisation

The present work is a critical engagement with the problems of colonial modernity discourses that pervade in the once colonized world. The unveiling of such issue requires first to examine the underlining epistemology and philosophical foundation of western colonial modernity. As indicted earlier, much of the discourses in the colonial world have been formulated out of the concept and categories deeply drawn out of the western modernity. In Chapter 1, the essential focus is to grapple with the principles and categories of western modernity. I shall try to show that the terrain of western modernity discourses, particularly those around the conception of the subject-centered reason, meaning-legislating rationality, idea of progress or universal linear history, the emancipation from superstitious world view and absolute knowledge of the world are not only intellectual enterprises but also based on European Enlightenment moral order. The Chapter also briefly presents counter critic of these totalizing western modernity on the colonized mainly from whom I picked up the South Asian postcolonial critic such as

Ashis Nandy, Partha Chaterjee, Depesh Chakrabarty are among the few whose argument I presented.

In Chapter 2, I shall examine the continuation of the western principle of modernity in the colonial world was essentially by drawing the intimate connection between 'colonial knowledge' produced in the colonial history and colonial anthropology. The Chapter seeks to show how colonial technology of modernity such as the historiography and ethnography have been formulated, extended and strengthened the socio-political identities by categorizing individual, and population through stereotypes and artificial sense of boundary and codifying caste, class, culture, ethnicity, language, race, nation, tribes, Hindu, Christian etc into a perpetual standarised and textualised form. The theoretical framework for this chapter were drawn out from the intellectual energy, beginning with the idea of social identity theorist, followed by intellectual legacy of, amongst others, Michel Foucault, Bernard S. Cohn, Sudipta Kaviraj, Ashis Nandy, Benedict Anderson, Partha Chaterjee, Depesh Chakrabarty, and Gyan Prakash.

In Chapter 3, I shall trace the root of the modern Naga identity consciousness in the colonial discourses on the North East. I examine the issue of the Naga identity movement in its historical context of 1832 when the British colonial forces first encountered the Nagas. In understanding the problem, I shall argue that the colonization of the Naga Hills necessarily involves the gradual introduction of colonial modernizing apparatus suitable to the needs of the colonial power and in this process colonial anthropology became a means to perpetuate the domination over the Nagas. As ethnography was a western discourse, Naga identity were objectified in the western language against which indigenous Naga discourses still continue to struggle within to recover the subverted space. Hence, the underlining argument presenting here is that the British policy of categorisation and the drawing of administrative boundaries, the people of the hills become 'tribes' and subsequently the Nagas have been separated from the people of the surrounding population through the various mechanisms like inner line permit to the creation of the category called tribal, tribal elite and non-tribal. Here, I shall try to establish that the emergence of common ethnic identity of the Nagas was the gift of British colonialism as they grouped the 'tribes' under a generic name 'Naga' for

administrative and ethnographic purpose. So also the Chapter opens a possibility of finding contemporary ideology of Nagaism in various ideological state aperture, the Hohos, Student organization, new media's etc.

Chapter 4 presents the Naga identity within the postcolonial discourses. In this Chapter, the focus is essentially to situate the postcolonial construction of Naga identity movement as a project to recovering back from the real or perceived culturally marginalized identity from the colonial on to the postcolonial discourse. The identity assertion begins with the life of freedom that was contextualized in the idea that "Naga should be left alone and free as they were before". This indeed was where the mode of resistance took shaped that prolonged the colonial experience of the past to those experiences under the postcolonial Indian State. The Chapter traces the ethno-Naga people's demand for homeland which is strongly based on the resources such as racially, linguistically, ethnically, culturally, historically, religious and politically different from dominant national entities and communities in India (and Burma). Though cultural contain of the nation is limited as it continually transforms, it has always remained an aspect of contentious issue between India and the Nagas as it is observable in their political attempts at resolving the conflict. In short the oldest movement in Asia that, have travel through long trajectories in trying to integrate both the traditional narratives with the contrasting modern narrative of liberal legal concept like right to self-determination. Hence in this chapter I shall try to develop an issue by focusing on the socio, cultural, political and historical trajectories in which Naga identity gets defined and redefined in the postcolonial era. Most importantly how Naga identity gets to define and redefine itself as a response to the dominant hegemonic India's national building project.

Chapter I
The Categories of Western Modernity and the Postcolonial Critic

One of the intellectual heritages that occupy a significant position in the academic as well as in public sphere is the theme called modernity[1]. Over the years, its significances have been examined, shaped and reshaped by its exponents. Many believe themselves as modern and their time as the era of modern. It seems to be an issue that hasn't fully exorcised as it continues to open up questions and contestations (Akoijam, 2006). In fact, modernity continues to be, as Charles Taylor puts it, "the number one problem of modern social sciences" (Taylor, 2009: 1). In this Chapter, I shall try to look at some of the issues pertaining to this "number one problem".

Popularly modernity is believed to have originated in Europe and responsible for the emergence of many transformative outlooks that vehemently advocated change in the human history. Its advocates believe that modernity emerged with the rise of humanism which understands world in terms of recognition that human beings are prime source of all knowledge and inherently free will to choose for itself. Modernity therefore first emerged as an epochal concept to emancipate human beings from superstition and mysticism (Delacampagne, 2001: 80). For the Enlightenment, rational and scientific become the primacy for European self–understanding and "the explanation of modernity in terms of reason seems to be the most popular" (Taylor, 1995: 25). On this basis one can arguably locate the emergence of the western modernity as western man's urge for self-understanding and to herald the idea of progress. In that, conceptually modernity though a distinct concept and yet relates to the modern era and to modernism. However, the logic of modernity is also about how to universalize its moral order to humankind.

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[1] The notion of modernity is prone to various problematic articulations because it is one of the most ambiguous words in social science lexicon. Modernity as a concept and phenomena has been critically examined. When modernity is taken as a concept, it leads to multitudes of interpretation on what modernity represents. In recent decades the overarching conventional understanding of modernity as a western attributes has come under criticism from several critics, particularly from the Asian post-colonial discourses. These recent discourses talk of 'alternative' or 'multiple modernity' (See, Patel, 2000; Bandyopadhyay, 2010).

There are diverse opinions that describe the founding moments of western modernity. The first of this was the unfolding of the age of enlightenment in Western Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth century where primacy was given to reason and rationality to acquire valid knowledge, to improve quality of life for individual as well as society (Neal, 2007: 3). Similarly, some identify the emergence of modernity with other developments in the end of eighteenth century such as the revolution in philosophy, science, and arts, American independence, French revolution that advocates equality and human right (Mouzelis, XXXX: 143). Some critics also locate it to a much earlier era of Christianity and the theological innovations. In this sense, trajectory of modernity supposedly began in the fifth century as the signifier of a new Christian era that was seen to be opposed to the previous, pagan one (Habermas, 1989: 158). And some likes the postcolonial critics point to the European expansion in the middle age to nineteenth century colonial conquest and industrialization. Hence, conceptually there are some who view modernity from the renaissance in Italy to birth of modern subject in the philosophy of Rene Descartes (Mishra, 2010: 13) and Copernican revolution etc.

Habermas pointed out that western modernity usually defined in opposition to a differently understood idea of antiquity as "the result of a transition from the old to the new" (Habermas, 1991: 153). Hence, Habermas positioned eighteenth century as the threshold of modernity (Habermas, 1990: 4). In that, the notion of modernity was clearly developed first in the philosophical thoughts of G.W.F. Hegel and their contemporary (Habermas, 1990: 5). For Habermas, thinking the western modernity would meant that the "whole movement of modernity drew its sustenance from its confrontation with liner historical the past" (Habermas, 1991: 153). The arrival of modernity therefore is conceived as a fundamental shift from the pre-modern to modern or in other words from old to new. Hence, the new phase called modernity builds its premises in contrast to the period where it is supposedly based on mysticism, superstitious, free less, less rational, less productive, less civilized, less scientific and illogical. Hence the question of modernity juxtaposes antithetical structures that are considered to be pre- modern order of the world view.

Charles Taylor in his *Two Theories of Modernity* (Taylor, 1995) discusses two ways of understanding modernity. Following his argument, the first can be called cultural and the second is the acultural theory of modernity. For the cultural theory of modernity, a description and explanation of societal transformation must invoked culture. Or in other words, cultural theory does not hold the view that modernity is a unique comprehensive and inescapable western phenomenon and every society can be modern without being western. On the acultural understanding, an account of transformation from pre/non-modern to modern society need not make any reference to cultural categories. Rajive Bhargava sums up acultural modernity as "in short, the acultural theory secretes high minded modernism, an equal high mind, rigid traditionalism and a patchy work solution that combines both...... identifies modernisation with westernisation" (Bhargava, 2000: 13). Hence, acultural modernity brings about certain kind of order that implicates new moral order which is guided by master symbols and systematism of underlying acultural logic. In this sense the universalistic attribute of acultural modernity becomes more prominent outside Europe in nineteenth century with the development of the works of the philosophers, scientists and artists as a result of exploration of new socio-cultural horizons.

The Genealogy of the Western Modern Categories

Though unprecedented the moral imaginary basis of modernity within the west, the major institutions of the modern world were shaped and reshaped by a relatively small group of individual social thinkers in the Western Europe (Neal, 2007: 3). These individuals advocated the prospect of reason and rationality for an improvement for universal human condition. Important component of these movements is the centrality of European rationality that emerged in the post-Cartesian intervention as modern. One can trace the genealogy of these ideas of modernity or project of emancipator thinking inevitably goes back in the works of Rene Descartes. "Ever since the Cartesian intervention took place in the seventeenth centaury, philosophically speaking, this is the internal link between modernity and its self-understanding and this has been the distinguishing mark of its conceptual horizon" (Alam, 2009: 17). Stepping out of the intellectual climate of renaissance, Rene Descartes began to think in the language of rationalizing the nuances in

the religious authority, in the quest for the knowledge of authentic self-understanding. The central idea of modernity in Descartes' is "two world-view, in one or the other vision is, in effect, the center of gravity of the whole system of thought called Cartesian Dualism" (Baker and Morris, 1996: 25). Hence, thinking in the language of duality becomes an important constituting core of western modernity. These conceptual categories are indeed embedded in the axiom "*Cogito Ergo Sum*" or "*I think therefore I am*" for primitive knowledge or self evident principle (Masih, 1994: 202). The consequent dissection into two world view categories, as mind and body and its ironical coexistence arises in the method of perceiving through skepticism (doubt) (Ibid., 7). This statement of Descartes, on the other hand, is also an account of the European moral "subjectivity" which finds its proof of existence in the ability to think and to recognize, reflect upon the process of processing knowledge for self-actualizing. The method of deducing certainty through individual cognition also provides an account of individual subject's knowledge of the world. Hence converting the whole energy into deductive reasoning was primarily to acquire certainty of knowledge (Hampson, 1968: 75).

Though the idea is explicated in Descartes proposition, the notion of Cartesian introspective duality in the subject has its root in the Greek thought and the Judeo-Christian traditional concept of the creation (Baker and Morris, 1996: 39). It was Descartes' interpretative project that added conceptual effects in understanding the world around. Habermas meticulously brought to light this underlying value of the post-Cartesian notion of western modernity in his essay "*Modernity: An Unfinished project*", he writes that the project of modernity is constituted by,

> "The separation of substantive reason expressed in religious and metaphysical world view into three moments the connections between which (through the form of argumentative justification) were now merely formal ones. Since the worldviews in question have distinguish and their traditional problem have been distributed among the specific perspectives of truth, normative rightness, and authenticity of beauty- that is can be treated as questions of knowledge, justice, or taste- which we have in the modern world is a differentiation of value spheres of science and scholarship, morality and art. Scientific discourse, moral and legal inquiry, and art production and criticism are

institutionalized in the corresponding cultural systems as a matters for experts" (Habermas, 1991: 162).

The rational and cognitive explanation in the Cartesian notion of the modernity develops as alternative thinking to counter the false religious belief and its world view (Neal, 2007: 4). Reason then become a powerful tool for the modernist thinkers throughout by reinventing and innovative Descartes insight to question and attack the supposedly intellectual fallacy of both the Church and the State. These situations then provide a condition to develop diverse strategy of knowledge that hitherto centered in scientifically to study nature, morality and psychic of their "other" world. The diverse way of the formal connection of above "three moments" as given above, unfolds to us the appropriation of fragments organizing it to champion the sense of European experience at the central debate of the project of enlightenment's self-understanding. Hence an autonomous "subjectivity" becomes one of the key conceptual category of modernity by the formulating a systematic discourse that inevitably juxtaposes the question of subjectivity at the center of modern discourse. In this way it is arguable that the post-enlightenment tradition continued the subject-centered reason and meaning legislating rationality of dualisms in the western thought. Hence, Thomas McCarthy asserts that "the strong conceptions of reason and of the autonomous subject developed from Descartes to Kant have, despite the constant pounding given them in the last one hundred and fifty years (now more or so) continue to exercise and broad and deep often subterranean-influence" (McCarthy, 1990: viii). This premise got constructed into a system of knowledge about the "European subjectivity" in terms of binary that eventually epitomized the foundation for edifying western intellectual heritage to Kant and other predecessors to late nineteenth century colonial era.

However, just prior to Kant and his contemporary continental tradition, there was a growing competing Anglo-Saxons intellectual tradition of empiricism or logistic thinking through sensory perception. This intellectual movement essentially came in reaction to the rationalist arguments and whose epistemological utility become very explicate in eighteenth and nineteenth century colonial discourses. This empiricist rejects the theory

of absolute innate ideas and argued that knowledge is based on both sense experience and internal mental experiences such as self reflection. Hence the effort of empiricism, beginning John Locke, led to the sobering conclusion that certainty is rarely within our reach and thereby open a window for contending with the probable knowledge that significantly reduce epistemological exceptions. According to Y. Masih, it was John Locke who gives us psychological and empirical science and introduces historical sensibility in the modern western philosophy (Masih, 1994: 265). This method of understanding led Locke to explain everything in terms of experiences and thus justly regarded to have developed the Baconian ideal of empiricism. However, this tradition of thought got into complex fructification in the Hume's thought in a more crystallised fashion.

The most remarkable of the epistemic epoch was "the period from the publication of David Hume's *Treaties on Human Nature* in 1739-40 to the appearance of Voltaire's *Candide* in 1759 saw the intrusion of new scientific ideas which challenge the immutability of the natural order and of growing doubts about the management of human destiny by a benevolent Providence" (Hampson, 1968: 88). In this sense Hume thought that human beings are a bundle of different perceptions and has no essential fixed identities. Hence, from the rationalistic point of view his argument is really skeptical for he maintains that reason is not capable of making our knowledge intelligible (Masih, 1994: 328). Hume laid a foundation of mitigated skepticism that humbly accepts the limitation of human knowledge while perusing the legitimate aims of mathematics and science. In that, Hume is described as awakening Kant from dogmatic slumber (Masih, 1994: 328).

It was partly a reaction of Hume that Kant attempted a theory of knowledge. He wanted to rise above the method of skepticism to look for certainty and yet he was not in favor of pure rationalism of Descartes. It was then in the intellectual commitments of Kant that tries to address both the epistemological categories of rationalism and empiricism into reconciliation in the realms of transcendentalism (Masih, 1994: 336). Thus, the attempt to formulate the dialectical method of synthesizing the epistemological categories marks the epochal phase of modern European intellectual history.

Universal Moral Basis of Western Modernity

Taylor awareness of the varied models of reasoning, poses question whether there are any multiple modernity, and if so whether there should be any comparison between the western with that of the non-western path of modernity. Drawing heavily on the pioneering works of Jurgen Habermas, Michal Warner, Pierre Rosanvallon, and Benedict Anderson's, Taylor seeks to identify two central bases of western modernity, what he calls *"The Moral Order"* and *"The Social Imaginary"* (Taylor, 2009: 1). In this essay *Modern Social Imaginaries*, Taylor argues that central to western modernity is a conception of the moral order of the society. He traces the idea of such moral social order in Hugo Grotius and John Locke thought which, latter came to shape the modernity and social imaginary into larger hierarchy and eventually whole societies. Hence, Taylor shows as to how such modern moral values are in proximity to liberal socio-political moral order. He puts it to work in three central forms of social imaginaries that came to life in the European style of economy, the public sphere and governing institutional apertures. Similarly, Han van ruler (Ruler, 2007), in the light of Jonathan I. Israel's *Enlightenment contestant; philosophy, modernity and the emancipation of man,* pointed out the notions that form the basis of defining the system of western enlightenment values are tolerance, personal freedom, democracy, sexual emancipation, and universal right to knowledge. In accordance to Taylor's thesis, this form of modernity found its comfort zone in European moral consciousness- beginning Locke and Groutius into a version of natural law theory in which innate right and obligation towards one another is affirmed. He writes,

> "Society was seen as being made up of different others that needed and complementary one another. This didn't meant that their relationship were truly mutual because they didn't exist on the same level. Rather they form a hierarchy in which some had greater dignity and value then the others. An example is the often repeated medieval idealization of the society of the three order; orators, bellatores, and laborers- those who pray, those who fight, and those who work. It was clear that each needed the others, but there was

also a descending scale of dignity; some functions were intrinsically higher than others" (Taylor, 2009: 7)

The intellectual climate occurring at Hegelian epoch, the European begins to affirm the "other" existences along the wave of the linear understanding of historical changes. In the first chapter of the "*Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*", Habermas illuminates this very notion of the modern western historical consciousness- the idea of "progress", "linearity of time" - a central to the understanding of project of modernity. Habermas brings clarity to the notion of modernity by citing a key passage from Hegel's preface to "Phenomenology of Spirit" to illuminate modernity as an idea of universal progress and change of paradigm in Hegel:

> "Our time is a birth and transaction to a new period. The spirit has broken with what was hitherto the world of existence and imagination and is about to submerge all this in the past; it is at work give itself a new form as well as boredom that open up in the establishment and the indeterminate apprehension of something unknown are harbingers of a forthcoming change. This gradual crumbling ....is interrupted by the break of the day, that lightening all at once reviles the edifice of the new world" (Habermas,1990: 6)

Hence, a critical view on modernity like Hegel will show that the key aspect of western modernity relied on the idea of those realities that are historically determined. Humankind is capable to metamorphose itself in the wave of rational progressive linear fashion. The notion of linear understanding of the past gets deeply embedded in the modern western sensibility which indeed tends to divide time as discovery of the "new world", the renaissance and reformation, or modern, medieval, and ancient history, as found in the modern academic discourses (Habermas, 1990: 5). Critically illuminate the categories of western modernity is indeed a concept of "paradigm shift", first instituted in the Hegel's dialectical method of historicism. The implicated categories of modernity that emerged in the Enlightenment project nonetheless did not end in the works and the thoughts of Hegel but had explicitly transcended in the works of the social thinkers in the nineteenth century (e.g., Darwin's theory of evolution of human kind or rendering Darwinian idea of evolution and Hegelian idea of dialectical history of human progress

and evolution, Marx talks of four stages in his book *German ideology* or Weber talks of progress from culture to civilization and primacy of human reason).

It was in the nineteenth century the use of the idea of a rational singular historical time to recognize the dispersed geography of modernity into stages of Europe's past was found its first clear expression in the works of Marks where development outside Europe have been translated into something else: expression of time itself. More forcefully than any other nineteenth century writers, Marx constructs the idea of "Europe"- defined by the emergences there of modern bourgeoisie society as a single center of all other histories (Mitchell, 2000: 9). Hence, constructing a grand narrative of liner history that privileged Europe over the other, thereby creates the civilized modern European self by juxtaposing the "uncivilized" non-European other (Sahlins, 2000: 44). Hence in the western conception, there was an urgent need to capitalize "with man's burden" to the timeless non European (Dussel, 2000: 472). The conception of historical time thus renders history of singularity by organizing multiplicity of global events into single narratives. These European narratives whether it be the principal of human reason, technical rationality or power over nature are indeed produced by the structured and principal of progress that eventually produced a tool of power relation. Hence, this intellectual consciousness is one of the centrality of modern in various western discourses.

According to Sudipta Kaviraj, eighteenth and nineteenth century European modernity provides a basis through which most of the influential theory of modernity in the western social thought, like the ones developed by Marx and Weber, manifested the process of crystallizing into core tradition of the philosophical debate of western modernity (Kaviraj, 2010: 15). Similarly, he also states that modernity in the west is a single, homogeneous or universalizing process which traced its premises to a centrality of the single causal principal. He writes.

> "it is acknowledge that modernity has various distinct aspects; the rise of capitalist industrial economy, the growth of modern state institutions and resultant transformation in the nature of social power, the emergence of democracy, the declining of community

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and the rise of strong individualistic social conduct, the declining of religion and secularization of ethic...this are all parts of a historical structure animated by a single principal" (Kaviraj, 2010: 15).

Though this strand of intellectualism in most cases one may tend to counter the basis that it a eighteenth and nineteenth century event among the European thinker. Kaviraj citation about Marx and Weber opens up a space for us to see western modernity truly matured itself into totalizing instrumentality. Hence the nineteenth and early twentieth century social theories were inevitably unable to disassociate their lens completely from their predecessors and hence get pivots in their line of thought.

In a similar fashion of argument, Mark Elvin who in his reading of Kolakowski's essay called *Modernity on Endless Trial* drew a parallel categorical distinction between what can be perceived as western and non-western perception of modernity (Elvin, 1986: 209). Implicitly in his view, unlike any attempt to formulate an exclusive western rational liner historical perception of modernity, he observes the practical advantage in a non-west perception of modernity. He rather puts this in a way that modernity in non-west is understood not based on chronology and requires no updating. In other words, he is suggesting that the non-western perception of modernity is rather a synchronic one. He writes that according to a non-European point of view, what encompasses modern Europe is its ability to create power. He then suggestively approximates a complex of modernity to show the following component of western modernity as (a) perpetual power over human beings, whether states, groups of individuals, according to the levels of the system under consideration, (b) practical power over nature in terms of capacity for economic production (c) intellectual power over nature in the form of capacity for predication. Hence, Mark Elvin suggests European modernity as institutionally maintained and embodied with the capacity to direct its energy both critical as well as constructive. Hence the idea of western modernity could be understood as a long process of value rationalization and the instrumental rationalization that got intensified through bureaucratic organization and rationalization of the economy at the height of colonialism in the nineteenth century. In this sense, modernity, particularly from western tradition, is

the totality of all this, together with all the contradictions of progress as an ideology underpinning of modernity discourse. Much of the forms of practices of reproducing and assimilating into various ways of giving meanings are associated with the western moral idea of freedom, progress of reason and rationality that can liberate humanity from the traditional.

The emergence of the western modernity primarily in the wake of western man urges to self-understanding was to establish and universalize the idea of the unitary essence of human nature. Hence the underlying central theme that runs deeply throughout the trajectory of European modernity has been the subject-centered rationality. With the emergence humanism which understands the world in terms of recognition that human beings are prime source of all knowledge and inherently have free will to choose. Enlightenment during eighteenth century, the two ideas of rational and scientific become the basis for European self–understanding heralded by the age of the idea of progress.

Western modernity therefore emerged as a language of gradual emancipation of human being from superstation and mysticism. Hence the logic of modernity primarily urged to universalize its moral order to humankind. On this basis one can arguably locate the European modernity as responsible for the emergence of many transformative outlooks that vehemently advocated remodeling human history. Henceforth, the Europeans domination in most of the colonized situation resulted in imputing the values of the European modernity through various discursive practices. Modern category thus brings to us the most distinctive project of modernity that now not only confined within Europe but seemed to have transmitted to other parts of the world. Considering Charles Taylor's notion of unprecedented modernity in the west as historically unprecedented set of new practices of institution, ways of living and even social malaise, modernity still "needs to be posed again from new angle" (Taylor, 2009: 1). In illuminating the central characteristic that centers on European modernity, I would like to ground it to understand how the European intellectuals reproduced categories of modernity on the colonized people that are still under the process of unveiling.

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Transmission of Western Modernity in the Colonial World

The project of universalizing the western modernity in most of the non-western societies was ensured through the wheel of colonialism and imperialism. Though colonel regime and its offshoot modernity was not identical process in different parts of the world, everywhere colonialism in some way had restructured the society and even the psychic of the people they manage to colonize. Colonial power tends to strive for nearly total possession of the colonial subject in which it does not just limit to dominating the physical world of body but also the mind for perpetual domination and releases of such forces within the colonized societies to alter their cultural priorities once and for all (Nandy, 1983: xi). It can be mentioned that by the 1930s colonialism had exercised its sway over 84. 6 per cent of the land surface of the globe (Loomba, 1998: 15).

The geographical representation came to constitute as an important position in development of colonial knowledge about people, community, nationality, and race. The development of discursive practices like cartography has also greatly determined the way geography was imagination in the colonial period. In this sense geography and empire are thus intimately and theoretically interwoven (Edney, 2007: 25). The innovative imagination of geography in Europe compartmentalizes people into distinct geographical location is also a creation of colonial political and strategic (King and Wilder, 2003: 12). Along with such arbitrary geographical dissection, categories such as civilization and barbarism, east and west, tradition and modern, primitive and civilized, in effect produced irreconcilable differences between self and other.

The encounters with the non-Europe helped European to procure information about the terrains of habitats and lives of various communities, resulted in the production of enormous systems of knowledge about the other. The genres generate volumes of information that often becomes a text for the ethnologists in the eighteenth and nineteenth century to formulate their conceptual framework in their armchair theorization about around the world. The European then conceptualizes the vast complex indistinguishable identities of the colonized social world into cleanly classified and categorized identities into irreconcilable differences between self and other. The encounter with the non-west,

therefore is universality of modernity that, ensure through presenting a particular view of geography in which the world has a single center, Europe, in reference to which all other regions are to be located; and understanding of history in which there is only one unfolding of time, the history of the west, in reference to which all other history must establish their significance and receive their meaning (Mitchell, 2000: 7). History therefore came to be constructed as singular-history center upon Europe.

In European world view, the development of modernity in most of the non-western world could be seen from the context of the colonial situation beginning eighteenth and nineteenth century onwards. In order to modernize the non-west, the European find a way to inculcate its modern values, consequently European colonizers created a strategy to author the knowledge of the colonized, primarily as a practice that accordingly could turn into an important utility for perpetual subjugation and control the non-European world. Hence the unveiling the European practice of structuring and mapping the identities of colonized people on the other hand, we are also mapping out the meta-narrative structure of European schema of modernity. In the process the modern values then were to get objectified and to play ideologically; the Europeans strategically colonize the other. I am trying to locate as to how European rational project of modernity and other related factors that associated with colonialism have translated in the life and the consciousness of the postcolonial populations. There are also no better sources or range of narratives that reflect the deeply implied European modernity other than analyzing colonial discursive practices.

The meaning of modernity in the non-west not only relies on the distinction between modern and non-modern, rational and irrational but also between west and non-west. The analogy that the making of modernity in the west and non-west inescapably breeds the "other" collapses here. Since the other in the case of modernity in the non-west is the non-west itself differentiated as it were from the west with all its dissimilar value system. The demarcation between west and the non-west, according to Edward Said, is necessitated by political expediency (Said, 2003). It is hard to envisage that the objectification of the orient is pure or innocent because it was produced by those who

were necessarily embedded in the colonial history and relationship. Rather, the production of knowledge about the orient tends to be always political (Ibid., 2003: 9-10). Said recognizes the relationship between knowledge and power in construct and generate the "the orient" (Ibid., 9-10). According to him, it is by examining through discourses that one can possibly understand that through having knowledge about Orient, systematic domination and imposing authority over the orient become possible. It is significant to understand that 'the orient was 'orientalized' not only because it was discovered to be "oriental"…but also because it could be made oriental' (Ibid., 5-6).

By domination the orient, the cultural hegemony of Europe vis-à-vis the non-west was asserted by projecting 'the idea of the European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European people and culture' (Said, 2003: 7). The projection of the superiority of Europeans demands the invention and creation of 'other', the orient which the former has to dominate, restructured and imposes authority over it (Ibid., 7). This is to say that Europe needs the orient, the other, to gain its own identity and strength. Here Said argues that the superiority of Europeans culture was established by constantly setting it off against the non-west or the orient. This inevitably triggered the whole idea that the European culture was progressive, rational while that of the non-west served as a Europe's opposites- static, superstitious, vices. This vision of Edward Said is neatly summed up by Partha Chatterjee who asserts that:

> "Edward w. Said has shown how the post enlightenment age in Europe produce an entire body of knowledge in which the orient appears as a system of representation framed by the whole set of forces that brought the orient into western learning, western consciousness, and latter western empires…on this basis an enormous systematic discipline was created by which European culture was able to manage and even produce the orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically and imaginatively during the post-enlightenment period. Orientalism created oriental; body of a knowledge in which the orient was contained and represented by dominant frameworks and western power over the orient was given the status, of scientific truth. Thus, orientalism was a kind of western projection onto and will to govern over the orient" (Chatterjee, 1999: 36).

The argument here is that, the colonial discourse in an attempt to induce the colonized towards the path of modernity and the liner history had constructed Europe as a center in reference to which all other history had to derive their meanings and their significance. The colonial power operated with empirical scientific tool to objectify the indigenous culture so as to regulate and to discipline them into the structure that is within the European understanding of liner history. The culture of the colonized was shaped as a decay which needed vigor to transplant the idea of progress. The linearity drawn from traditional to modern could be bring about through the European humanizing mission of imparting knowledge and technological development. The western modernity found through a shift from the past, demands that the colonized too strive towards that ideal which meant that they had to get rid of the idiocy, superstation, stagnancy, barbaric associated with their cultural belief and practices.

The project of imparting modernity and band up the colonized to European center occur while still persisting with the idea of difference of the colonized from the colonizers. The colonial power tend to strive for near total possession of the colonized which does not limit itself to dominating the bodies and the physical but also "colonized mind...and releases within the colonized society to alter their cultural priority once and for all" (Nandy,1983: xi). Ashis Nandy opines that this colonization of both bodies and minds means that the west is present everywhere, within the west and outside both in structure and minds (Ibid.). Therefore the wave of western modernity on the colonized societies is pervasive. The passage from pre-modern to modern being illustrate by enlightenment as separation of the rationalized self from the disenchanted world, where the newly liberated individual ruled by the faculty of reason free themselves from all the traditional constrains and impose their will on the disenchanted nature, the indigenous culture and tradition is bound to give way to the tidal wave of modernity. The need was to regulate and discipline the indigenous culture so as to drive them towards the path of western metanarrative of modernity; the idea of progress through reason and science.

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Colonial Modernity: A Postcolonial Critic

The criticism of western modernity in the non-west contests the Eurocentric project to universalize the grand narrative of rights, citizenship, the nation states, nation building, discourses of development and public and private sphere etc. This mode of contestation had existed during the colonial time as well. The colonized do not remain as a mute observer during this whole process of constructing difference and imposition of western modernity by colonizers. Rather there were active responses from colonized for the act of disruption by the colonized. One can consider the anti-colonial nationalist response to prevent the colonizers from interfering into that sphere of culture while showing no uncommunicativeness to emulate the European culture associated with power and evolution. Partha Chatterjee has shown that the intrusion of the colonial state to legislate the reform of traditional society was deterred by the anti-colonial nationalist (Chatterjee, 1994). They did this 'by dividing the world of social institution and practice into two domains- the material and the spiritual whereby the superiority of the west with regard to the former is conceded while the superiority of the east in the realms of the spiritual is affirmed (Ibid.: 6).

The sacredness of the spiritual domain was considered indispensable to construct the cultural identity or national culture markedly distinct from the west. Yet 'it is not as though this is so-called spiritual domain is left unchanged the nationalist thought launched its own project to fashion a 'modern' national cultural difference between the west and the east which in itself forms a part of the colonial discourse, the nationalist are of the view the modern European culture possesses attributes which makes the European culturally equipped for power and progress, while such attributes are lacking in the traditional culture of the east, thus dooming those nationality to poverty and subjection' (Chatterjee, 1994: 50). This regeneration of culture and tradition has to be done by the nation collectively by adopting all modern attributes of European culture (Ibid.: 50). This would not however obligate the difference which marks the national culture as something distinct from western culture. Because it was assumed that modern national culture or true modernity for non-European nation would lie in combining the superior material

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qualities of western cultures with spiritual greatness of the east (Ibid.). Which entails that while the cultural differences with the west should be established there should also be no such binaries in the domain of state. The decisive engagement with modernity in the postcolonial studies earlier takes the form of either contestation or negotiation. The contestation and the critical modification is to orbit around the issues of cultural differences, social authority, and political, social unfairness in order to censure the antagonistic and ambivalence instant within the nationalization of modernity (Bhabha,1994: 31). While some decline western modernity such as Ashis Nandy and the South Asian subaltern Studies historians, the negotiated approach to modernity is articulated by the theories like Arjun Appadurai and the public culture (Krishnaswamy, 2007: 6). Here the chapter primarily concerns with colonial modernity as a contestable category for its disillusionment and disenchantment.

The contestation of western categories arises with the consideration that modernity is the western phenomena which is at same time imperialist, ruthless and alienating. Instead the move is to try and recover multiple forms of pre-modern or pre-colonial aboriginal traditions knowledge and communities (Krishnaswamy, 2007: 6). Here, as a way of opening a perspective through which we recognize the colonial domination I would like to mention few. Nandy himself a critical traditionalist drew inspiration from Gandhi's critic of modernity. Hence like any other Subaltern thinkers, Nandy's critique of modernity is marked by a commitment towards asserting the possibility of recoverable tradition of India which is supposedly paralyzed by the colonialism. While Partha Chattererjee appeals for the recovery of community life, Dipish Chakraberty is urged to question euro-centered modernity for demeaning the Indian tradition. This gives a clue to which the postcolonial constantly finds a place to question the European discourse and its hegemonic domination in its social and political life. However it does not say that the critics of modernity can be completely free from scathing criticisms especially from those who see the invocation of culture as constituting the necessary recourses for national identity and also for legitimizing the non-modern critic. But in the following chapters my attempts will primarily to say that colonial modernity and its discourses are contestable phenomena.

Ashis Nandy's Non-Modern Critic

Ashis Nandy drew inspiration from Gandhi in his critic of colonial modernity. For Gandhi, the subjugation of India is precisely because they were seduced by the glitter of modern civilization which both the British colonizers and the anti-colonial nationalists believe in essential for regeneration and reform of the Indian culture. Gandhi debunks the idea that modernity with its idea of progress alleviates the condition of human being. Rather modernity is the source of many of the inequality, oppression and violence that pervades the human society. Gandhi sees his critic of modern civilization not only relevant to the east but also to the west. In a similar strand of thinking, Ashish Nandy traces many of the social problems faced in the postcolonial societies as an impact of the imposition of modernity on the colonized by the colonizers. He also attempted to subvert the existing modern binaries of western modernity such as tradition and modern, memories and history, irrationality and rationality (Nandy, 1983).

Nandy argues that, colonialism is not simply a matter of political and economic control but it is deeply "expressed in the sphere of psychology and to the extend the variable used to describe the state of mind under colonialism.....and define colonialism as defined as sheared culture which may not always begin with the establishment of alien rule in the society and ends with the departure of the alien ruler from the colony" (Ibid.: 2). Hence, for Nandy colonialism as a state of mind is allowed by the colonized to perpetuate and induced norms and values of the colonizers as a cognitive categories. Nandy then goes on to critic the western concept as unacceptable to the non-western societies especially in India for its incompatibility with the Indian values. He also criticizes the modern concept such as nation-state system, nationalism, modern-science and technology, urban industrialism, and injustice and violence in the name of well being of society. He also critic the critics of modernity who critic the modernity as well as endorse the modern category and values of European enlightenment of adhering to the modern nation-system, science and historicism. Nandy critical traditionalism also involved finding resources for "reinterpretation of tradition to create new tradition" (Ibid.: xviii) . Nandy's aim therefore

is finding alternative universality by finding resources in tradition not for alternative history but alternative to history (Nandy, 1995: 53) or modernity.

Partha Chatterjee and the Problems of Modernity

Partha Chatterjee implicitly argues that modernity is solely not western but elaborately discusses the modernity, of the non-western particularly once colonized as what he called "our modernity" (Chatterjee, 2007: 3). In his sensibility he suggests the possibility of multiple of modernities. He writes, there are certain peculiarities about own modernity. It could be the case that what other thinks of as modern, they have found unacceptable, whereas what they have cherished as valuable elements of our modernity, other do not considered to be modern at all. In order to show this, he elaborately discusses Rajnarayan Basu 1873 comparative analyses of what he calls "Those Days and These Days" concerning health and body. In tune with Rajnarayan Basu, he says if there is any universally accepted definition of modernity then it is by teaching oneself to employ the methods of reason which enables self to identify the form of modernity peculiar to their own. But to the once colonized "the burden of reason, dream of freedom, the desire for power, resistance to power—all of these are elements of modernity. There is no promise land of modernity outside the network of power. Hence one cannot be or for modernity; one can only devise strategy for coping with it" (Ibid.: 19). Hence, he says, "ours is the modernity of the once-colonized. The same historical process that has taught us the value of modernity has also made us the victims of modernity" (Ibid.: 20).

Community though an important conceptual category in both west and non-western context, Chaterjee considers culture or community as an important site to provide an alternative avenue to the western modernity. Nevertheless Chatterjee argues that, like in the western idea of community in non-western part of the world have now faced with same theoretical opposition as a relic of pre-modern tradition and personal political identity as a hallmark of modernity (Chatterjee, 1998: 278). He remarks that communities in most of the non-west was first conceptualized by colonials in terms of western modernist propensity and hence have written in terms of progressive narrative of

evolutionary principal, i.e., "the colonial writings usually describe the society as a collection of backward *gemeinschaften* often lacking the internal dynamic to transform them into modern industrial nation" (Ibid.: 278). The nationalist therefore challenged the western assumption and insisted that there were several elements in their tradition that were distinctly national different from the west. Nevertheless Chaterjee argues that the nationalists were consistent with modernity as they were borrowing the categories of the orientalist or the colonial thought. Hence they systematically disregard its traditional values, eastern spiritualism, community solidarity and respect for tradition.

Dipesh Chakrabarty's Contestation of Eurocentric Modernity

Dipesh Chakrabarty insists that the renaissance sense of the past was something the British brought to the subcontinent (Chakrabarty, 1991). According to him, it is "difficult to see that the sense of history was absolutely essential to the relation and the structure of power that Europeans set up in India" (Ibid.: 2162) and tries to meditate the limits of Western notions of modernity and history. He deplores that Europe has been made universal by collaborative venture and violence of modern imperialism and the third world nationalism. The problem at hand for him is to provincialize Europe which had been made universal. However, Chakrabarty here is not only an unusually sustained by the nuanced argument against European ideas of modernity but also a subtle critique of the legacy of modernity in his intellectual formation. The kind of Bengali who was synonymous with modernity and who believed that modernity might be a universal condition-irrespective of whether you are European, Indian, Arab or African. Chakrabarty's work is in part, I think is a tactful inquiry partly directed by the contingencies of being a South Asian historian who is a founder member of the subaltern studies project in America. His attempted is to write a South Asian or, specifically Indian history, 'from below' by bringing the 'subaltern' (Gramsci's word for the peasant or the economically dispossessed) into the territory largely occupied by nationalist history.

'*Provincialising Europe* is not a book about the region of the world we call "Europe", he insists and that Europe, one could say, has already been provincialised by history itself'

(Chakraberty, 2001: 3). What Chakrabarty wants to do with 'Europe', then, is in some ways can draw a parallel with what Edward Said did with the 'Orient': to fashion a subversive genealogy. But Chakrabarty unlike Said features critique and self-criticism in equal measure. That is 'it does not call for simplistic, out-hand rejection of modernity, universal science, reason, grand narratives, totalising explanation as this belongs to European culture" (Ibid.: 42). For Chakrabarty, to *provincialise* Europe is therefore not a utopian gesture to vanquish or conquer it, but a means of locating and subjecting to interrogation some of the fundamental notions by which we define ourselves. The contestation for him is "first recognition that Europe's acquisition of adjectives 'modern' for itself is an integral part of the story of European imperialism within global history; and second, the understanding that this acquisition of a certain vision of Europe with 'modernity' is not the work of European alone; third world nationalism, as modernising ideology per excellence, have been an equal partner in the process" (Ibid.: 43) Hence a closer scrutiny may turn out that he is hesitant to take a step for any radical critic but is powerful plea for alternative modernity vise-a-via the European modernity.

Concluding Remarks

In trying to grapple with the principles of western modernity I have tried to show that the terrain of western modernity discourses center around the conception of the subject-centered reason, meaning-legislating rationality, idea of progress or universal linearity of history, the emancipation from superstitious world view, and absolute knowledge of the world were not only a intellectual enterprise but are also based on European moral order. Hence the culture of modernity in the nineteenth century was deeply colored by the eighteenth century tradition of European Enlightenment. However, modernity did not confine only in Europe but got disseminated in different parts of the world through knowledge production. The discourses of modernity were replicated in the non-western world through the language of rationalization, especially scientific or logical reasoning of everything in the colony. The knowledge of the west also frequently remodeling and fashion the "others" by re-producing other and self into perpetual identities. Hence the

project of modernity that originated in western intellectual tradition is a family of theories that both wishes to declare as well as desires universal application. This production of modern logic in the non-western world and distribution of European concepts and categories for oriental has is in effect played a major role in juxtaposing Europe as the radiating center around which others were arranged. The breadth of these subjects cover by western modernity in the colonies stemmed from the desire of the Europeans to systematically normalize its modern values at all levels and degree it could, over the people and land under its colonial jurisdiction. Hence western modernity though underwent long trajectory it did not stop in Europe but rather its symptom percolate outside Europe in the wake of colonialism through its discursive practices. This modernity then is now left the legacy in the form of institutional practices of enumerating identities in most of the once colonized nations which continue to operate. These realities of the discourses and practices of western modernity are not unrelated to the production of identities, including that of the Nagas in the non-western world.

Chapter II

Colonial Modernity and Production of Identity

The study of identity forms a critical cornerstone within modern sociological thought (Cerulo, 1997: 385). What exactly constitutes identity is a complex question as there is no single identity but multiple identities that each one of us inhabits. The discourses around identity have, perhaps, increasingly become complex due to their tendency to affect the existential condition of the scholars from various social angles. In other words, the considerable interest has grown out of the many questions that surround and exert on the different societal problem that weaves around the very claim of identity (Sen, 2006). There is no exclusive overarching identity, rather multiple identities-contingent and continuously constructed so that traditions are also continually invented, sheared and reiterated practices and beliefs which reflect the collective memories in the process of construction (Robb, 1997: 245). The most basic question about identity here calls for a general re-examination of the ways in which "individual" as well as "group", "nation" come to constitute as a category. And I shall look into this aspect in this Chapter.

In trying to answer question of identity, particularly the social sciences have taken much interest and have drawn numerous theories of identity. Hence much of identity theorization is discussed in sociology, social psychology and anthropology, history and historiography. The concept of identity, therefore, has grown exponentially in the social sciences which has produced various discourses around identity. Discussion of identity takes varied forms and perspectives. Historians look at the way in which historiography shape the national identity. Anthropologist has examined the cultural expression of identity, its meaning, and how it is used to maintain group boundaries.

Classical sociological tradition dealt with "collective identity"; a concept grounded is a classical sociological construct. Popularly, Durkheim's concept of "Collective Conscience", Marx's "Class Consciousness", Weber's "Verstehen" and Tonnies' "Gemeinschaft" forms the central debate in classical sociological analysis of identity. It was George Herbert Mead and C.H Cooley's pragmatic school of sociology that

championed a different perspective focusing primarily on the individual identity or formation of "me". This lead to the discourse around an individual sense of self molded by interpersonal interactions (Cerulo, 1997: 386). In other words, sociologists have largely dealt with the implication of tension between the individual and constraining social structure; the underlying arguments address the 'we-feeling' of a group. Hence, members usually collectively "normalize" these qualities, unified into singular social experience to which social actor construct a sense of self. Social psychologists have focused on multifaceted and situational contingent nature of individual identity. They have also identified social identity as a powerful ingredient in the development of in-group bias and out-group conflict (See Huddy, 2001). The central trust of sociological and psychological tradition has been to tackle essentialist understanding of the concept.

The social identity theory shows that, the conceptualization first occurs with the distinction between personal identity and social identity. Personal identity refers to self-categories which define an individual's differences from other (in-group) person where as social identity is a "social categorical self" (Turner, 1999: 26). Social identity is a result of transforming personal identity into social identity. Transformation accrue when personal identity gets depersonalized into newer cognitive redefinition of individual self into social self whereby individuals tend to define their individual self less and the self acquires more of the characteristics of the shared social categories.

These social or intragroup categories produce attitude and group behavior as a result of stereotyping the constructed group identity; successively this leads to stereotyping of other intra-group identity as well. Identity used to represent self and others vary with one's motives, values and expectations, one's backgrounds knowledge and theories, and the social context within which comparison takes place (Turner, 1999: 6). In this sense "categorization of an individual or groups are social categorical, judgments, perceptions of people in terms of their group memberships. They represent categorization at the level of social identity, in which people are defined in terms of characteristic of the group as a whole in the context of intragroup and intergroup relation. They are fluid, variable and context dependent." (Turner, 1999: 26).

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One of the key insights into following self categorization theory on identity formation is to identify and examine the governing instrumentality or underlining principle of the categorization of people into perpetual sense of grouping. The most fundamental principle in accordance with the theory of self categorization is the psychological elements that aid in the formation of identity. These psychological elements are adaptive process that tends to produce certain possible group relation of mutual attraction, cooperation and influence between the intragroup members and consequently produce collective behavior which sometimes can even become violent and unethical. The psychological elements in the intragroup formation are then motivated vis-à-vis intergroup consciousness on the basis of perceived identical characteristics. Such real or perceived similarities form the basis of shared ideology amongst members of a group and lead it to be manipulated into perpetual imagined communities.

The ideology of formation of distinct we-group perception primarily arises due to the comparison of the perceived and constructed intragroup narratives with the narratives of perceived intergroup. Thus idealized intergroup identity is constructed by constructing and stereotyping intragroup identities and vice-versa. Hence, the self-categorization theory considerably shows a theoretical perspective through which "people define themselves in terms of shared social category membership" and "there is a perpetual accentuation of intragroup similarities and intergroup differences on a relevant correlated dimension. People stereotype themselves and others in terms of silent social category leading to enhanced perpetual identity between self and ingroup members and enhanced perpetual contrast between ingroup and outgroup" (Turner, 1999:11).

In the colonized state the process of classification and naming of a group or community did not happen in social vacuum or absolutely in the imagination of the colonizer. But are usually a result of the perceived values and norms of the society in which the group was located. In most of the colonized society the fuzzy social differences become the basis through which colonizers use their privilege to differentiate the population into varied codified identities. The socially categorized individual, population were stereotyped and artificial boundaries were created by naming under the categories of caste, class, culture,

ethnicity, language, race, nation, tribes, Hindu, Christian etc. These categories were identified and ideologically deployed in the form of binaries. Further, such binaries were ascribed with perpetual attributes to intensify the artificial sense of boundary.

In the colonial discourse "anthropological studies rest upon the assumption that non-west were backward, primitive, quaint, sometime even noble, but always different from the products of western civilization" (Loomba, 1998:46). In most of the region presently called South Asia and particularly in India, prior to colonial modernity identities such religious, ethnic, cultural, caste and even nationalist were indeed fuzzy. Hence, much of the modern identity consciousness emerged when European colonizers deployed their institutions and apparatus to legitimize its modernity over the native "sense" of the past. It does not mean that there was no undifferentiated indigene before colonialism. However, colonialism is a special historical period that effectively took over in intensifying and codifying the already existing identities in terms of the colonial prescribed categories. There are many identities in the contemporary world, many of them being powerful remnants of construction either from within or without. Paraphernalia of modern identity therefore includes a sense of continuity and a sense of uniqueness from other people. Hence many of the new group identities such as "ethnicity" and "nationalism" have resulted out of colonial domination and now have become an important inquiry in most of the colonized society[1].

Colonial Representation and the Emergence of Ethnic Identity Consciousness

Though colonel regime and its offshoot modernity was not identical process in different parts of the world but everywhere colonialism in some way had restructured the society and even the psychic of the people they manage to bring under colonialism. Since

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[1] All identities, without exception, have been socially constructed; ethnicity as well as nationality such as the Han, the Burman, the American, the Danish, the Indian etc. Quiet often such identities, particularly minorities, are first imagined by powerful states, as Hans imagine Maio, the British colonizer imagined the Karens and the Shan, the French the Jarai. Whether invented or imposed, such identities select, more or less arbitrarily, one or other trait, however vague-religious, language, skin color, diet, means of subsistence- as the desideratum. Such categories, institutionalized in territories, land tenure, courts, customary law, appointed chiefs, schools, and paper works, may become passionately lived identities. To the degree that the identity is stigmatized by the larger state or society, it is likely to become for many resistant and definite identities (Scott, 2009).

colonial power tend to strive for nearly total possession of the colonial subject in which it does not just limit to dominating the physical world of body but also the mind for perpetual domination and releases of such forces within the colonized societies to alter their cultural priorities once and for all. Colonizers make use of colonial technology of control that pervades beyond the apparent physical world in which the legacy of the west continues to dominate. At the same time the very consciousness within and also outside the west or in other words colonialism is everywhere. "In some ways this is not surprising because we now tend to think of the period of colonialism as something we manage to put behind us where as the progress of modernity is a project in which we are all, albeit with varying degree of enthusiasm still deeply implicated" (Chatterjee,1993:14). Hence, today the sway of colonial modernity on the colonized subject is a matter of both perpetual and pervasive. Hence, in the light of the impact of modernity on the colonized people, Dipesh Chakrabarty writes that, "[t]he Enlightenment humanism preached by the colonizers to the colonized makes it now almost impossible to think of modernity without invoking the categories and concept outside the European discourse" (Chakrabarty, 2001). According to him "concept such as citizenship, the state, civil society, public sphere, human right, equality before the law, the individual, distinction between public and private, the idea of subject, democracy, sovereignty, social justice, scientific rationality and so on all bear the burden of European thought and history"(Ibid.:4). In this sense Chakrabarty also writes that "the most far reaching and fundamental innovation that the British introduced to Indian society, in my view was the modern state.....one symptom of its modernity was that its techniques of government" (Chakrabarty ,1995: 3375)

Although Michel Foucault himself has been repeatedly criticized for not paying attention specifically to modern European colonial expansion or how colonial discourse have affected the culture of non-European per say, we are greatly indebted to him for offering the powerful lens of discursive construction of the world around to understand the implication of colonial discursive practices in shaping the identity of European others. To understand this we briefly sojourn into Michel Foucault's theoretical notion of "Biopower" and "Governmentality". This is to understand how the underlying

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technology of European modernity systematically translated the modernity project of classification and practice for historicizing section of population in order to maneuver power.

In Foucauldian sense such practices arises in the philosophical problems of the medieval age and classical antiquity state that underwent a major shift beginning the sixteenth century onwards till eighteenth century. In Foucault's remarkable essay "Governmentality" he locates the power of antiquity in Machiavellian model of "The Prince" (Foucault, 1999:87) in whose relationship was externality and singular transcendent with territory over which he ruled but he with his authority was over and above the jurisdiction. Hence, for Foucault the Machiavellian problem was to deal with the strategy by which the prince or state could retain its coercive power over its principality. In other words, the state theory in antiquity was about sovereign power and it's absolute or divine power to govern the territory; a space where its subject have no other option but to submit to sovereign laws.

From this naissance of state theory, Foucault tries to map out the modern technology of rational regime of power and governing theory. For Foucault, the question of power under the rational modern regime, no longer resides with the self evident supra-legal singularity name "the Prince", but are in multiplicity of agents governing population from within the state and society. In other words the question here is no more about ancient right to "take life" or "let live" by the sovereign but rather was replaced by the discourses that foster life or disallow it to the point of death with the question "how does one govern the population" (Foucault, 1984:138). In Foucault's words "the old power of death that symbolizes sovereign power was now carefully supplant in the form of administration of bodies and the calculated management of life primarily to discipline and regulates the population" (Ibid:139-140). This modern regime of power or "Biopower" for Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose is the

Mode of subjugation, through which individual are brought to work on themselves, under certain modes of authority, in relation truth discourses, by means of the self, in name of their own life or health, that of their family or some other collectives, or indeed in the name of the life or health of the population as whole (Rabinow and Rose, 2006:197).

This major shift in the European project of rational calculate management of life begins with "a set of analysis and forms of a discursive formation which, began to developed in sixteenth century and grew in importance during the seventh century....essentially to do with the state, in all its different elements, dimension and factor of power, question which were termed precisely '*statistics*', meaning the *science of the state*" (Foucault, 1991:87). In a similar fashion in Europe, the colonial state deployed these techniques of subjugation of bodies to control the colonial population marking the beginning of the modern regime of power called "biopower" in the colonies. In other words it was primarily a project to discipline and regulate the colonized society; an exercise of 'pastoral power' that is mediated by production of knowledge. In this sense western modernity gets translated to narratives of colonized societies in the form of measurement, anthropology and history in the colonized societies. Colonial discourses could be conceptualized in terms of "governmentality", as an academic offshoot of a set of Universalist technologies of domination-a *Statistik* or "state-craft" at least partly based on ethnography that developed in dialectic between colonial and European states (Peter, 1997:165).

This phenomenon in the colonial situation gets transformed into power relation between colonizers and colonized; where it drew its legitimate right and authority over colonial space and time. Hence, the colonial modernity was made possible through European rational project of producing knowledge and regimes of truth and thereby fascinated politics of colonial control over its "timeless" "uncivilized" subjects. The European consciousness of constructing its identity / self as a superior over the native subject is essentially to perpetually retain power even after formal decolonization. The essential point is that the success of and retaining of Colonialism helped the evolution of a variety of rational techniques, patterns of conquest and domination. Colonialism was not just a

result of violent use of superior arms, military organization, political powers or economic wealth- as important as these things were. Hence the screamingly brutal success of colonialism can be summed in the words of Nicholas B. Dirks as:

> Colonial knowledge both enabled conquest and was produced by it; in certain important ways, knowledge was what colonialism was all about. Cultural forms in societies newly classified as "traditional" were reconstructed and transformed by and through this knowledge, which created new categories and oppositions between colonizers and colonized, European and Asian, modern and traditional, West and East. Ruling India through the delineation and reconstitution of systematic grammars for vernacular languages, representing India through the mastery and display of archaeological memories and religious texts, Britain set in motion transformations every bit as powerful as the better-known consequences of military and economic imperialism (Dirks, 1997: ix).

Much of the modern identity consciousness in colonial world is the result of knowledge produced in the colonial era. The colonizers in order to objectify the colonial subject first created a strategy of measurement like classified population, and produced the knowledge about the colonized. Cohn in his book "Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge" (Cohn,1996) analyses how colonial knowledge became a tool in the hands of the colonizers. According to him the colonizers uses various modalities to capture the knowledge about the society, the epistemological space extended to the creation of grammars, and dictionaries of languages, map making, Museum, display of artifacts, creation of organizations such as Archeological Survey, Topographical Survey, Botanical Survey and so on. This was in congruence with the European situation, the colonizers took control of the colonized by defining, classifying space, separating the public and private sphere, recording transactions such as the sale of property. Other methods used by the colonizers were counting and classifying the population, replacing the religious institution for registering Birth, Marriage, and death as well as standardizing the native languages and scripts. The colonial state also licensed some activity as legitimate and

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suppressed others as immoral or unlawful. This was perfectly congruent with the European state building process and also played a role in the foundation of the modern nation state in the colonies Cohen argues. According to him colonials "in coming to India (colonies), they unknowingly and unwittingly invaded and conquered not only a territory but an epistemological space as well" (Cohn, 1996:4). He further argues that like in Europe Universities and public schools instituted in the colonies produced and trained the governing elites among the colonized for building the empire.

This invasion of the rather sacred space is a triumph by the core idea of western modernity that the world is knowable through sense experience and that the law of nature that governs the world would be revealed through science, which indeed is very well drawn out of enlightenment thinking. "The British conquest of India brought them into a new world which they comprehend using their own form of knowing and thinking" (Cohn, 1996:58). Nicholas B. Dirks in his book "Cast of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India" (Dirks,2001), drew his conceptual framework from Foucault's "Govermantality" to show how colonial identity was created and shaped primarily in the European discourses to govern.

In the colonial world, the colonial efforts to know the subject well were in order to rule it and profit by it. The colonial rulers brought together many strands of scientific curiosity, missionary frustration, oriental fascination, and administrative concern in the form of property and taxation to know and understand the ruled (Dirks, 2001:6). Hence following the conjectural imperatives the colonial ruler used statistitical and ethnographical techniques, historical and textural knowledge for orientlist generalization primarily to articulate permanent colonial rule (ibid.).

Dirks also illustrates the way in which his historical premises provide for alternative histories for social reformers and nationalist resistances to overthrow the colonialist. In fact, both reformers and nationalists seem to have absorbed from this encounter many terms and arguments for self-determination and self-government. Hence an important component of colonial domination and its consequent emergence of modern selfhood begun with colonial representation that came to constitute an important position in the

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form of colonial knowledge about people, community, nationality and race. This "knowledge were instituted and legitimized through modern discipline such as ethnography, historiography that came to dominate the colonial archival as sources of colonial domination" (Dirks, 2001:194). The archive, then have become a site of state monumentality, and the very institution canonizes and continues to inherit the imperial knowledge for classification that led to "othering" within the postcolonial society. The colonial urge to understand the colonial society invariably led to the objectification of Indian identities and cultures legitimising Cohn's view that the colonial knowledge was an important factor in strengthening imperial regime (Cohen, 1996).

The legacy of invented tradition which postcolonial state will persistently inherit is the categorizing instrumentality. It was first deployed by administrators in the south Asian colonial space in the colonial anthropological account and written histories as archival sources particularly in India shows. Its importance can be understood from the fact that it is repeatedly used by the postcolonial state. The colonial deployment of "the census represents not only the apotheosis of colonial science but also the final conversion of barbarism into civilized data, it was also a transformation of moral condemnation into moral basis of both science and the state" (Dirks, 2001:196). The most well known case studies in this matter are Bernard Cohn's essay, "The Census, Social Structure and Objectification in South Asia" (Cohen, 1987: 238). The article opens up the possible ways of tracing the objectification of present enumerative identity as the result of colonial discourses. Such striving to "study India was an adjunct to the project of "constructing a history of relationship between India and the west, to classify, locate European civilization as a rating scale of progress and decay of the non west" (Chakraberty, 2001:7).

Thus, knowledge after it is objectified becomes a source to be ideologically played upon, essentially to impute artificial sense of dislocated identity. The colonizers locate themselves and dislocate "others" into respectively superiority and inferiority position. This in turn makes their politics legitimate on the vast, complex, indistinguishable identities of the colonized social world which is now categorized into cleanly classified

and categorized identities. Hence, for the colonial ruler constructing knowledge of individual as well as population into stratified artificial boundary was through naming and grouping the "other" into social identities such as caste, class, culture, ethnicity, language, race, and tribe by ascribing values.

Through the legitimization of the colonial rulers these classification gets intensified into "normalized" differences and a perpetual power relation amongst the classified groups. This arbitrarily inscribed meaning gets rationalized and implemented in the practices of colonial discursive practices like law, language, thought, text, science, economy, cartography and other forms of colonial communications. Hence knowledge itself is a social formation, created by knowledgeable people from distinct and active social segments with their own interest (Bayly, 1999:4). However, this does not mean that there were no categories prior to the colonial rule.

In fact, in the pre-colonial period boundaries of identities were based on the loosely identifiable cultural practices of a group, such as rituals, languages, dialect, music, kinship rules, or culinary habits (Franke, 2009: 48). These identities were meant for groups but the groups did not coercively prevent its group members from sharing and even adopting habis of others and were rather fluid and mobile and the subjects were scarcely conscious about such demarked boundary. Sudipto Kaviraj also writes that a "different form of this fuzziness would be a relative lack of clarity of which one community, or even one's region ended and another begins" (Kaviraj, 1992:25).

In India the discursive practices of categorizing and mapping the identities of these "fuzzy communities" into well defined documented communities were largely viewed as legitimate in the colonial bureaucrat instrumental rationalization. Chakrabarty modified Kaviraj's incisive analysis in one respect that is, "movement from fuzzy to enumerated communities did not represent a complete change of consciousness" (Chakrabarty, 2005: 3376). In the process the bulk of the European colonial scholars struggled to represent their "others" in their text. Nevertheless arbitrarily fixed conceptual categories and meanings that suited the colonial definition in appropriating the "natives" have legitimized modern selfhood in most of the non-western societies. In this way the

knowledge produced by the colonizers was insured through the sweep of colonialism and its discourses.

Colonial Modernity and National Identity Production

In thinking about the question of nationalism or national identity in the post World War II social sciences, it is perhaps no coincidence to take Benedict Anderson's work (Anderson, 1983) into consideration weather we agree him or not. The fact is that his work is probably the most influential study of nationalism. As the title is clear "Imagine community; Reflection on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism", a modern nation is generally understood as "imagined community" that "emerged significantly from reflection on the process of identity formation" in South East Asia (King and Wilder, 2003:195). In this work nation as an "imagined community" and "print capitalism" are Anderson's two concepts which are justly famous for understanding nationalism. Deviating our understanding of community as face to face close knitted group, he view imagined community as those who are stranger to each other in real life. Hence modern nation in this view is primarily that lies in the minds that guides the strangers to live as community- that is primarily a political as well as cultural community.

Tracings the forms that nationalism took in Europe, he identifies language as fundamental to the development of nationalism. Hence in his view nationalism is a Bourgeoisie or I would say an elite's project that often attempted to create a sense of community, which knits together various fragments into a sense of homogeneity bounded within geography. This sense of belongingness in his view was a result of the "print capitalism" producing newspaper, novels, and forms of communications as channels of shared culture, interests and vocabulary within the nation. Anderson also argues that such anticipatory strategy of nationalism was not confined to Europe, but extended to colonies in Africa and Asia.

Andersons work is important as the "nation State everywhere was conceptualized along the line of the models discussed by him, including nation borne of anti-imperialist struggles. He explains the dependency of anti-colonial nationalism on the European

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model by the fact that the America and European experiences were now everywhere modularly imagined partly because vocabulary employed were the leagues of imperialist official nationalism"(Loomba, 2009:158). The argument that the idea of nationalism in the colonized world was influenced by the colonial and western world is further supported by Partho Chatterjee's words, "Historical experience of nationalism in the Western Europe, in the Americas, and Russia had supplied for all subsequent nationalisms a set of modular forms from which nationalist elite in Asia and Africa had chosen the ones they like" (Chatterjee, 1993:4-5).

Hence, the argument converges with the standard colonial understanding of nationalism in the colonial world. Hence nationalism in the colonial world is conceived as a "derivative discourses?" as pointed out by Partha Chatterjee as a subtitle of his book "Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World". According to Ashis Nandy "the idea of modern Nation State entered India society (colonial society) in the second half of the nineteenth century, riding the piggy-back of the western ideology of nationalism (Nandy, 1994: ix). In the case of India compulsion to conceptualizing an Indian nation was largely the outcome of the British colonial presence and its articulation (Oommen, 1999). However this does not meant that the postcolonial thinkers have absolutely subscribed whole heartedly to Anderson's modules. In fact, Chatterjee here is challenging the tendency to look at nationalism as a pure product of European history and suggesting that the relationship between anti-colonial and metropolitan nationalism is structured by fundamental relationship of both borrowing and differences. In this sense Chatterjee in "The Nation and its Fragments" sums up his core objection to Anderson's arguments as

> "If nationalism in the rest of the world has to choose their imagined community from certain modular already made available to them by Europe and the America, what they have to imagine? History, it would seem as decreed that we in the postcolonial world shall only be perpetual consumer of modernity. Europe and the America, the only true subject of history, have thought out on our behalf not only the script of the colonial enlightenment and exploitation, but also that of our anti-

colonial resistance and postcolonial misery. Even our imagination must remain forever colonized." (Chatterjee, 1993:5).

Hence Chatterjee tries to reclaim the imagination of the colonized world by discussing the distinct trajectories of nationalism in these parts of the world and try to locate its autonomy in its resistances and multiple histories. Taking India as an instance he says "nationalism had chosen its site of autonomy from the position of subordination to a colonial state". Hence he does this by drawing a distinction between nationalism as political movement which challenges the colonial state, and nationalism as a cultural construct which enables the colonized to posit their autonomy. Here therefore the former can be understood as "derivative" but the latter drew its energy from indigenous sources.

Bernard S. Cohn writes that in the twentieth century, with the development of nationalism, there was a concerted effort on the part of both political and cultural leaders to use historical figures, movements and symbols derived from historical record as a means of relating the struggle to the colonial rule (Cohn, 1987: 228). For instance the Indian nationalist "Gandhi sow *ahimsha* quiet essentially Indian and shape it into an effective political weapon. B. G Tilak and Aurobindo Ghose, early nationalists, selected from Hindu traditions and ideals which could be worked into a new kind of national religious ideology. They reinterepreted Bhagavad Gita into what has become for many modern Indians an authoritative expression of Hindu thought. They argue it was the Hindu dharma to further nationalism; by implicating they argue on the basis of their interpretation of the Gita that Violence was justified in a religious cause and that nationalism was religiously given righteous cause" (Cohn, 1987:229).

Hence the national identity or 'the imagined community does place there boundary in time and space anywhere they like... in the form of objectivity but such objectivity is impossible to justify in its entirety...and hence wither imaginary or real, this way of concaving community is a very modern unprecedented theoretical device' (Kaviraj,1992:20). In one sense, all history including modern Indian historiography is deeply entangled with mythology. Hence the "objectivity reality of today's history....is

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not an object of discovery but invention and was historically instituted by nationalist imagination of the nineteenth century" (Kaviraj, 1992:1).

Central to the question of national identity is the inevitable confrontation with the legacy of western intellectual practice of truth-value history and the practice of social group or movement in line of European thinking. Much of the conceptualization and consequently a consciousness of national identity in Asia primarily emerged in the anthropological accounts and historiography. Methods of understanding the past was disseminated through colonial influence. In south Asia the British deployed historiography modalities for the ideological construction of Indian civilization, as typified in the major historical writings. It begins with late "eighteenth and early nineteenth century a great number of cal British writers- among them Alexander Dow, Montstuart, Elphinston, Mark Wilks, John Malcolm, Colin Mackenzie- felt compelled to write Indian history. Although they all sow the eighteenth century as a decadent prelude to and justification for British rule, and although they frequently disparaged Indian historical sensibility and tradition, they nevertheless felt the need to understand India historically (Dirks, 1992:61)". The European style of construction of the past in such term is a project that selectively organizes events in relations of continuity with contemporary subject, thereby creating an appropriated representation of a life leading up to the present that is a life history fashioned in the act of self-definition. Hence the discussion here will primarily focus on the national identity as a process that is primarily constituted in the colonial historical schema.

Consequently the writing of history has direct influence upon the conceptualization of national identities in the colonies. History, for the British has an ontological power in providing the assumption about how the real social and natural world was constituted. History particularly in Indian subcontinent was in its broadest sense a zone of debate over the ends and means of their rule in India. Primarily the British conceived of governing India by codifying and reinstituting the ruling practices that had been developed by the previous states and rulers.

Hence writing history, be it a colonial state or the nationalists, is itself a way of producing modern identity in so far as it produces a relation between what has supposedly occurred in the past and the present state of affairs. In this sense, any nationalist construction of a history is the construction of a meaningful universal of events and narratives for defining the goal of its subject. And since the motivation of this process of constructing emanates from a subject inhabiting a specific social world we may say that history is an imprinting of present onto the past identity. "In India a national identity was created out of the myth of place and history, from rationalization and shared experiences-social, economic, military and political. To all of these, the colonial past contributes alongside alternative traditions and initiatives" (Robb, 1997:247)

In the case of India, R. Radhakrishnan writes, "when the East India aggressively expanded its role into one of the empire building, it becomes a task of nation building on behalf of the "native" people. Such pursuit of this mandate, local time and spaces and mode of self governance were dismantled or destroyed, and British invented traditions on behalf of Indians and presented it to them so that, in their very act of self-understanding, they could acquiesce in the moral and epistemic legitimacy of British sovereignty. This act of Jerrymandering of a heterogeneous people into nation-state identification for purposes of control and domination unfortunately caused long term disturbance that last well into postcolonalist/ nationalist phase" (Radhakrishnan, 1996:158-159).

In south Asia an important impact of colonialism is the ways in which a nation continues to define itself as ancient civilization entity; composite culture; political entity; religious entity; Geographical territorial entity with specific cultural ethos; collection of linguistic entities; unity of great and little traditions (Oommen,1999). In order to objectify the national identity in the similar vein with the west, the nationalists started to construct its own history. Hence, '[i]n 1920s and the 1930s when nationalism become mass phenomena a professional Indian historiography emerges to contest British interpretation. It's significant that these historians chose ancient India as a ground for this contest." (Prakash, 1990: 388).

Hence, it does not mean such colonial categories and its intellectual legacy was not questioned at all until recently. In fact Sugata Bose remarks that in south Asia "anti-colonial challenge in the domain of historiography construction of India long preceded the actual defeat of the colonial system. Hence the rejection of the colonial historiography is as old as colonial rule itself, on the other, the decolonization of the history and history writings have lagged nearly half a century behind the formal position of the formal process of political decolonization. Yet the onset of colonial modernity also led self-avowedly nationalist intellectuals from the late nineteenth century to share historgraphical conventions establish by European scholarship that often refuse to acknowledge earlier, pre-colonial identity of the past a proper history" (Bose, 2003:133).

Similarly, in South Asia, Gyan Prakash remarks that, the colonial discourses and categories were profoundly challenged by the nationalist and the Marxist. Nonetheless, both the intellectual perspective could not counter adequately colonialism and its discursive practices strongly. In trying to counter such discourses, the nationalist as well as the Marxist replicated the colonial master's narratives and hence fell back systematically within the colonial discourses to construct its own identity that in turn put Europe at the center of their historical narrative (Prakash, 1992:8).

In trying to frame its own discourse, identifiably the important factor we find in both the perspectives is tuning with European modern categories such as reason and progress. It is this use of western categories that becomes inevitable to our knowledge that both nationalist and the Marxist were not free from drawing their own historical category. This in turn produced colonial style of modern historical imagination that led to "othering" its own self through creation of subjugating subjugate (Pandey,1994: 195). Hence like the British colonials in India the elite Indian historians tend to represent the subaltern as the primitive "other" and violent and at the same time it's exact opposite, rending them completely passive in history. Hence Indian nationalism in turn represents certain kind of violence as the work speaks poorly of the backward people who were unfortunately ill-educated and insufficiently enlightened.

Hence subaltern is a figure produced in the historical discourses of domination but nevertheless provides a mode of reading history differently from those inscribed in the elite accounts. Ranajit Guha and Partha Chatterjee have explored the significances of the emergences of a colonialialist historiography in the development of modern Indian agenda to create nationalist historiography of subcontinent in the nineteenth and early twentieth century's. The later phenomenon which was of crucial importance in the construction of the Indian nationhood grew out of a contest in which the Indian nationalist elite sought to appropriate from their colonial rulers the right to create a represent their version of India's past (Chatterjee, 1998: 914).

"The nationalist historiographers accepted the pattern set for them by British scholarship. They accepted the periodisation of Indian history into Hindu, Muslim, and British period, latter addressed as ancient, medieval, and modern eras: relegated cast to sections on society that is to the history of the society with political left out; and reiterated the long and unchanging existence of a Sanskrit Indic civilization" (Prakash,1990:388). The "people without history" or the subaltern subject in this way have been excluded and prevented from identifying themselves for others, in this way the contemporary subaltern have taken a challenge to contest colonial production of identity. This entails the liberation of encompassing superseding identities. Consequently, history and the rapid increase in alternative, ethnic and sub-national identities are an expression of deterioration of the conditions that empower a dominant modernist identity.

Relationship between Anthropological and History

The relationship between anthropology and history has never been cordial, as the two field are perceived as distinct in the course of training and in the social and political organization of their academic practitioners (Sturtevant, 1966: 1). However, Historical sensibilities have never completely been absent in ethnographical exploration of interplay between culture and power in diverse places through time. Such blending has also produced hybrid narrative- rendering strange as familiar and accessing the familiar as strange. Discursive practices that emerged as important instruments during the colonial period were anthropology and history. Hence the bulk of the social and cultural

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anthropological field work has been done in the colonial settings. In factual sense the subject matter of anthropology has been the study of the colonized (Cohen, 1987:224). Saurabh Dube writes that the rethought of anthropological and historical theory, method, and perspective, archival materials have provided a clue as to how anthropological filters and field work has indeed been harnessed for the historical imagination and this significantly opens up question of the nature of the field (Dube, 2007: 2).

In the past decades, anthropologists have also taken a painstaking effort to draw an attention of the scholars to examine the pervasive significance of colonial anthropology and history's relationship with emerging modern identities. Particularly in the South Asian context the range of such writings that intimate the term, terrains, and trajectories of the enmeshment of anthropology and history that offers students and scholars a wide ranging domain of anthropological and historical endeavour were largely gathered under the rubric of historical anthropology (Dube, 2007:2). There have been significant efforts to unveil the process of colonial historical narrative, culture and society since 1960 and 1970s (Dube, 2007:1).

The most notable works that were substantially brought into explicate form was in 1980s in the works Bernard Cohn. The most remarkable part of Cohn's work was that he calls anthropologists to collaborate with history in his landmark collection of essay "An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays" first publish in India in 1987. This essay represents early attempts by anthropologist to take the significance of colonial historical discourses into serious consideration. In his theoretical formulation to understand how particular forms of colonial knowledge were created, written and spoken about he gave two models of analysis-Historyland and Anthropologyland, which he writes exist in the practice and the minds of colonial anthropologist and historians (Cohen, 1987:18). Cohen writes that the two academic communities of colonial anthropology and history share a great deal of common ground at the epistemological level. The basic epistemological ground in which both the disciplinary intersects into common objective is the projection of "otherness" in there discourses. Hence though apparently different subject matter, the intersections of this disciplinary boundary in the

research enquiries have acquired fresh purpose in theoretical and empirical formulation. The conjunctures, therefore, have been accompanied by key consideration of the history of anthropology and the anthropology of history or in other word, the question of celebration of interdisciplinary departure is the anthropological turn in history and historical turn in anthropology (Dube, 2007: 1).

On the other end Dorothy Crozier have also pointed out that anthropology in order to develop into a strong academic discipline uses the techniques of historians and conversely historian uses the concept and theories of anthropologists for the interpretations of data (Crozier, 1965: 561). Both disciplines are concerned with rationalizing actions, behaviours, both verbal and non-verbal of human beings in society. Also both history and anthropology studies the relationship between individual's actions or items of behavior to deduce the relationship between people. At a more complex level both discipline are concerned with the studies of institutions, with the way in which certain activities are organized to achieve desired goals, and also with the relationship between different institutions using the term in a broader sense standardizes the behavior.

Hence, historians and anthropologist as well as other students of social science are lead to read each other writings in search of specific data of social, culture, political and economics of mutual concern. In this sense, Ariane Deluz-Chiva writes that the meeting point of these two disciplines of social sciences which have much in common but whose relationship has always been varied according to the location in which they are practiced, schools of thought such as evolutionism, diffusionism, functionalism, and structuralism they are generated and the degree of advancement of their auxiliary techniques (Deluz-Chiva, 1965: 571).

In nineteenth century in Europe colonizers such as England, Germany, and France, evolutionary anthropologists acted like historians in using descriptions written by others-travelers, traders, missionaries, soldiers- for their purpose (Sturtevant,1966:12). Hence taking nineteenth century colonial era Anthropological agendas have often yoked to historicizing of the interweaving of meaning and practice in the form of distinct terrain across time. Hence in the colonial context the method of social anthropology have often

applied to establish historiography for people whose traditional outlook did not include the idea of what was called "objective history".

The historical investigation of such people referred here were people with unwritten language which had previously been almost exclusively the province of social and cultural anthropology (Deluz-Chiva 1965: 571). Such practices gave meaning and were indeed the core of modern western knowledge system and hence history of most disciplines can be seen to be embedded within and shaped by European discourses (Loomba, 1998: 59). In this context, we might also locate the development of the discourses during the period between the mid nineteenth and twentieth century, when the world was being colonized, internally or externally, directly or indirectly by a small number of strong powers. Within this epochal phase particularly anthropology strengthens its position as an academic discipline and a profession, and consolidated its position in the postcolonial period and during the Cold War (Bermen and Shimizu, 1999:2). Hence anthropology and history are forms of knowledge that were created essentially to formalize the hegemony of the western colonizer.

Conclusion

The discourse on modernity may turn out to be incomplete if there are inadequate considerations of the possible politic of modernity in the western disciplinary enterprises and its varied forms of discourses. In this chapter I tried to show that the crucial aspect in the colonial era was the process of constructing identity by systematizing knowledge about the land and the people they encountered. These practices and processes were not academic but were primarily to exercise power for subjugating the colonized subject (Loomba, 1998:53). Study into colonial Anthropological history have developed an understanding of the political culture, a culture of power relations, constructed by the interaction of colonizer and colonized in the specific form of the self representation and representation of each other (Guha, 1987: xx).

Here the engagement with such possibility is to understand and examine more closely the meta-narrative of the modernity project implicated in the western discursive practices like

history and anthropology that have in turn generated identity discourses in the contemporary world. In other words I have tried to argue here that there is a need to examine political significances of colonial anthropology and history's effort in shaping and reshaping modernity and vice-versa in the context of non-European world. Here my contention begins with the fact that the relationship between history and anthropology with modernity while producing identities are in many instances an unmistakably passionate and productive alliance (Dube, 2007:1). To which I have drawn parallel arrays of looking at the problem as to how identities gets produced in these discourses. Hence in the colonial context the anthropological turn in history and historical turn in anthropology (Dube, 2007:1) in their relationship with colonial modernity seems to be an issue that has not been fully articulated and continues to be open to questions of contestation and debate about identity.

While deliberating into these seemingly complex discourses such as modernity in relationship with historical and anthropological knowledge, I have also anticipated and unveiled the basis as to why western men have to passionately engage to impart their ways of modern sensibility to what is known as their "other" or "non-modern" world.

Chapter III

Colonial Encounter and the Naga Identity

Most of the communities in the region called North East India, of which the Nagas[1] forms a part, decisively entered into the European crafted written history of the world with the Anglo-Burmese war in the 19th century. The British speculation of possible threat on the Eastern Frontier of Bengal in the light of the cross-border dispute with the Ava kingdom became the pretext to enter into war with the Burmese. Consequently on 5th March 1824 the Governor General officially proclaimed war on Burma. The war was put to an end after two years later on 24th February 1826. On this remarkable day, the kingdom of Burma and the British military signed the *Treaty of Yandabo*, in which Burma renounced all claims over independent states of Assam and Manipur (Oppitz, Kaiser, Stockhausen, Wettatein, 2008: 11). As a result, the Burmese was driven out of these two princely states and Assam was brought under British control. Following this development, the British government gradually nurtured its policies to reinstall the native government in between buffer zone and deepened its involvement in the region. With this, a deepen contact with the Nagas also opened up. In this Chapter, I shall try to look at how colonial discourses and practices, particularly those of the administrators and ethnographers, perceived and constructed the identity of the Nagas from this period onwards.

Towards the beginning of 19th century, R. B. Pamberton, a British official, was asked to write a report on the race and 'tribes' of Bengal's Eastern Frontier. In 1835 the general survey report was published with a title *The Eastern Frontier of Bengal*. On the request of the Lieutenant-governor, Sir William Grey, Mackenzie completed his report in 1871 as *Memorandum on the North East Frontier of Bengal*. It was further revised and updated in 1882 and published as *History of the Relation of the Government with the Hill Tribes of North East Frontier of Bengal*. The situation brought British into close proximate relation with various fragmented communities as allies on the peripheral border of North East Frontier of India (Franke, 2009: 5). In fact, with this the region emerged in the British

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[1] During British rule the present Nagaland state was known as Naga Hill District of Assam. Though the term "Naga" has different interpretation, ethnologically, the Nagas are the Tibeto-Burmis and Sino-Tibetian groups of Mongoloid, and linguistically Tibeto-Burman. For the purpose of my work the term "Naga" is inclusive of all the communities that come under nomenclature Naga.

colonial discourses as a frontier region. But the British politics of making the hills people as diplomatic allies gradually altered when they discovered the mountains surrounding Assam as a strategic location for their economic prospect as well as political unit (Franke, 2009:5). To further complicate the matter, in 1873 the British Governor under the approval of the Governor General in council acquired a legitimate power to promulgate an 'impossible line' to be call *'the Inner Line'* in each or any of the districts affected, "beyond which no British subject of certain classes or foreign residents can pass without a license" (Mackenziw, 1884: 56). As a result, no British subject or foreigner was permitted to cross the 'inner line' without permission and rules were laid down for trade acquisition of land beyond the line.

According to Peter Robb "the motive behind the closer definition of the frontier and the administration was not just the need to define and define British territory: it was also the need to identify the peoples who were to be treated as British subject" (Robb, 1997: 262). However "[m]ore deeply, it was also suppose to demarcate 'the Hills' from the 'plains', the nomadic from the sedentary, the Jungle from the arable- in short, 'the tribal area' from 'the Assam proper'" (Kar, 2009: 52). Bodhisattva Kar also further argues that, "the line instituted to define the world of 'law' and 'no law' was however an impossible line, given the routine insistence of the British Indian State on the informalization of legal agreement in its north-eastern frontier" (Kar, 2009: 53). According to Marcuse Frank, the "hill people were turned from sensible and potential allies into irrational, irresponsible, and barbarous savage from who the plains people had to be protected" (Franke, 2009:1). India's North East is a British imperial construct subsequently accepted by the post-colonial nation-state.

Such disruptive policies of the colonial rule had deeply impacted communities in the North East Frontier. Beginning with the colonial rule, the region has been experiencing a systematic reduction to a perpetual subordinating that now informs our postcolonial situation. The British occupation over the *Frontier space* also brought profound change among the hill communities. Today within these *'Nationalizing space'*, the various communities conglomerated itself into 'normalized' generic name such as Nagas, Mizos, Khasis, Garos, and Arunachalis (Baruah, 2007). During colonial rule with no evidence or

knowledge of these communities they were then made appendages to Assam, now transformed themselves into strong imagined political communities. In illustrating the result of colonial hegemony, the editors of *Naga Identities* pointed out:

> "Today the Nagas are fighting for a joint, supra-tribal identity which in practice prove difficult to grasp. In particular the young urban generation is caught in a feeling of inner conflict. Its traditional culture has by and large been consigned to oblivion, while any number of obstacles stands in the way of a new, all encompassing identity: an undeveloped economy and infrastructure, tribalism, the religious fundamentalism of the parent generation, the smouldering and the concept of culture coloured strongly by the new media" (Oppitz, Kaiser, Stockhausen and Wettstein, 2008:12).

The Advent of the British Colonialism in the Naga Hills

Prior to the British colonialism, according to Aosenba, "no foreign country had conquered the Nagas. It was only by the end of the 19th century, British came and colonized some part of the Naga Hills"[2]. Inato Yekheto Shikhu writes "Naga society was until mid 19th centaury known for its distinct lifestyle and culture that made it unique. There values, attitude, behavior and pattern of living were clearly unadulterated and were in their totality, rooted in its past and heritage" (Shikhu, 2007: 45) Aosenba on the other hand writes that "from the very beginning the Nagas have not shown much interest for unity. Inter tribal feud was very much prevalent among the Nagas" (Aosenba, 2001:12). In the pre-colonial encounter, "the Nagas society has been the sovereign village-states" (Yonuo, 1974: 15), After a several Decades of putting the northeastern frontier to subjugation, in 1920s J. P. Mills, a British colonial officer, tentatively draw the boundaries as "[t]he Naga inhabited areas are bounded by The Hukawang Valley in the North East, the plains of Brahmaputra valley in the North West of Cachar to the south-west and of Chindwin to the East. In the south the Manipur Valley roughly mark the point of contrast between the 'Naga Tribes' and the very much closely inter-related group of Kuki tribe". (Mill, 1973: XVII) This is to say, according to Charles Chasie, "there are different estimates, given from, 20,000 to 30,000 sq.miles. My own guess is that it would be nearly the latter figure, if not more, given the fact that Nagaland state alone occupies

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more than 16000 square kilometers" (Chasie,1999:21). In the post-colonial situation therefore, "[t]he Nagas referred here are an indigenous people, about three million strong who inhabits parts of the northeastern Indian States of Nagaland, Assam, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and North West Burma" (Lotha, 2007: 2). The Nagas presently are located in the hills of the North East of India and North West of Burma (Myanmar). The colonial administrators' ethnographic and colonial policies become important tools that have facilitated in producing boundaries and the identity discourse in the postcolonial North East India.

The initial intention of the British in the Naga Hills was primarily driven, firstly, by its skeptical attitude towards the Chinese possible disruption in the trading fields of Burma and India (Lotha, 2007: 15). Secondly, in order to privilege them strategically, colonial officers surveyed a possible rout link between Manipur and Brahmaputra valley by passing through the Naga Hills. Thirdly, this gesture would thereby protect their tea gardens from incursion by the "wild tribe" and also check the menacing custom of Naga raids on the British subjects of the Cachar and Nowgon frontier (Sema, 1992: 3-4). In this sense, A. Bimol Akoijam rightly puts it that "the colonial British looked at the region primarily as a jungle of 'belligerent tribes' and their policy was guided by 'security and strategic' considerations. Their interest was to safeguard the colonial interest in the eastern region in the face of belligerent tribes" (Akoijam, 2002: 809). Thus, in the colonial writings, construction of the region inhabited by the belligerent tribes was primarily to maneuver systematic colonial policy. The earliest foreigner to come in contact with the Nagas was the British soldiers (Lotha, 2007: 16). It was in 1832, for the first time, the imperial military survey team intruded into the Naga territory led by Captain Jenkins and, Pemberton from Manipur with 700 soldiers and 800 porters, in search for possible direct communication route between Assam and Manipur (Mackenzie, 1884: 102; Lotha, 2007:3)

The first Naga community with whom the British came in contact was the Angami Nagas (Hutton, 1914: 476.) Insipid of constant resistance from the Nagas, the British Surveyor team was accompanied by Raja Gambhir Sing of Manipur to literally fight through their ways through the whole Kutcha (the Zeliangrong) and Angami Naga

country. (Mackenziw, 1884: 101) The British destructive expedition on the Nagas continued until 11th February, 1851, when the British troops withdrew following the adaptation of non-intervention policy (Sema, 1992:7).

The rational calculation brought the British to disengage with Naga Hills from 1951 to 1865. The British soldiers extended all possible means to win the confidence of the Nagas through various technique of friendship to different villages with the view of systematically incorporating whole Naga territory under its political control. During the short span, there was a constant raid by the Nagas for at least nineteenth times in which 232 British subjects had been killed, wounded or carried off in the planes of Assam until 1866 (Sema, 1992: 7). When the negotiation failed the British in turn changed tactics and tried to make them comply with what they called *Punitive expeditions* in the Naga Hills from 1839 onwards (Aosenba, 2001:13). Indeed, the British reversed that policy for the larger reason that lies beyond the Naga Hills they attempted to progressively conquer them but never brought them entirely under their control (Franke, 2009: 5). According to Marcus Franke, "Punitive Expeditions involves forgaining into Nagas territory, destroying their villages and defenses together with their grain stores, leaving them resourceless and defenseless, at the mercy of often hostile neighbors, and trying to overawe them into subjugation" (Franke, 2009:5). This act of destroying villages, destroying grain stores, living resourceless, defenseless at the mercy of often hostile neighbors was a colonial tactic to overawe them into complete mantel and physical subjection. This colonial situation created by the British was not necessarily to show their power of superior arms, organized military, political power to the ill equipped "wild tribes" (See Woodthrope, 1882). But implicitly created in them a social psychosis with the hope that the Nagas eventual submit their very soul to the perpetual British hegemonic control. Hence, in a few years the colonizers carried out its tactic of psychological imprints in the minds of various fuzzy communities in region.

The colonial psychological warfare was not completely complied by the Nagas and the Nagas continued to practice its belief in head taking raid in the British territory in the Assam Plains. The British officials followed the line of their own understanding by sending its military expectations to the Naga Hills. As a colonial response to the Nagas,

several military expeditions till 1866 led to the annexation of some part of the Naga country into the British administration and control. In this process British abandoned the policy of non-interference policy and propose to set up *Naga Hill District* with its headquarter at Samaguting (Chumukedima), whose administrative jurisdiction covers the Angami village-States and the water shade of Doyang' (Yonuo, 1974: 90)

As a result, "the Naga hill district had been constituted in 1867, but its boundaries had not formally settled" (Robb, 1997: 257). Consequently, 14th November 1878 the Angami territory was taken over and an administrative center was set up in Kohima. Subsequently, British brought territory inhibited by communities like the Lothas in 1875, the Semas in 1887 and the Aos in 1889. This was the period of systematic policy of annexation and subduing the villages for settling down all the communities inhabiting the Nagas hills for extending the British supremacy. The defeat of the bordering strong Angami villages like Jotsoma, Kohima, Khonoma sowed its seed of long awaited extension of British Empire. The British government of India then in February 1881 established Kohima as the centre to administer the whole Naga Hills.

Throughout the colonial punitive expeditions, they conducted numerous investigations, among which the predominant *survey modality* was used during this phase. According to Bernard Conh in short, "it would meant a forms of exploration of the natural and social landscape.....that covers any systematic and official investigation of natural and social feature" (Cohen,1997:7). Hence survey modalities would meant deployment of Govermantility model by the British administrators encompass wide range of practices of mapping out topographical and ethnographical landscape. "The result was the vast official documentation project...upon the acquisition of new territory, by going far beyond mapping and bounding to describe and classify the territory's zoology, geology, botany, ethnography, economic product, history and sociology" (Cohen,1997:7).

These survey enterprises provided the 'thick description' about the people and their geographical location. In these courses of expeditions many descriptive reports, travel accounts were published in the journal such as *Journal of Asiatic Society of Bengal* and

many other soldiers ethnography too were published during these days. The Nagas stopped raiding upon the British territory but there was a tendency of internal "tribal" warfare that was prone to occur from time to time. When in 1873, the colonial force was assured of their power over the Nagas Hill District.

The Colonial Ethnographic Enterprises under Colonial Rule

The most remarkable attitude of the colonial administration is very well reflected in the colonial writings and the "colonialist discourse that was in much way affected by its dominant political interest of the time" (Channa, 1992: 14). The interest not only influenced administrators in subtle ways but greatly helped the administrators to articulate colonial position through a perpetuation of the unconscious effort to justify its regime. Colonialism in Dirks understanding "was made possible, and then sustained and strengthen, as much by the cultural technology of rule as it was by the more obvious and brutal mode of conquest that first established power in foreign shores" (Cohen, 1997: IX.).

In the case of the then British '*North East Frontier of India*', the discovery of the existing strategic location of its political and economic concern led to the production of colonial writings about people and the land. The process of ethnographising present North East India to which the Nagas are part of was indeed began during the formative year of the British social anthropology under the British colonialism in the Naga Hills. The initial military report, diaries and ethnographic accounts of adventures into the Naga Hills by soldier-ethnographers were published parallel to the establishment of the British Empire. This knowledge became instrumental under the hands of the colonial British who legitimately used it for domination and control. In this sense, Dirks's observation can be well taken which says, "[c]olonial knowledge both enables conquest and was produced by it; certain important ways, knowledge was what colonialism was all about (Dirks, 1997: IX). One of an important premise in which such as this is possibly true is because, "growth of modern western knowledge systems and histories of most disciplines can be seen to be embedded within and shaped by colonial discourse" (Loomba, 2009: 59). Hence "it seems clear that the existence of particular discipline dedicated exclusively to

the study of non-western culture reflects the Victorian sense of superiority of nineteenth century and was perfectly consistent with, and useful to, the colonial expansion of that period" (Marquet, 1964:51).

The imperial British in trying to hold on the lands adjoining the hills for the strategic location inevitably had conducted numerous studies and explorations about the topography and scrutinized the Hills. First, they surveyed to find out whether there were profitable resources in the hills. Secondly, they secured the plains by bringing the hills under control and opened up and secured communication from Manipur to Assam. (Loomba. 2009: 100). In this way, trying to formulate there enterprise, the colonial administrators participated in the colonial system which gradually organized and maintain dual relationship between them and the Hill people (Lewis, 1973: 581-602). Consequently, the effort to survey, tabulate and enumerate with certain dominant political ideological interest of the time began. A possible premise to endorse the idea of writing about North East in particular was to reduce the colonized into manageable form rather than due to simple ignorance or lack of "real" knowledge. 'Colonial writers in the Naga Hills often resort to western symbols or objects to describe and interpret several Naga custom and rituals' (Kikon, 2009: 85).

Administrators study the people with the basic premise of "scientific objectivity" as an important methodological goal. But when the anthropologist and the ethnographer assumed the goal of 'objectivity', his behavior significantly affects the relationship between himself and the informant and consequently he become estranged from those he studies. This arises as surveyors, tabulators, enumerators and anthropologist occupied a position of some economic, political and psychological superiority over "North East Frontier" subject whom they studied. In this process, scientific knowledge is refracted through the prism of prejudice. As Ania Loomba argues, "science and prejudice are not necessarily counter-posed to one another" (Loomba, 2009:56) and thereby aggressively displaced the identity of the colonial other. The act of detachment in the observation inevitably dehumanizes the subject and reduced him mealy to a subordinating position.

Taking the North Eastern India, the writings of the British soldiers-ethnographers, Christian missionaries, monographers and other published and unpublished materials implicitly legitimizes the discourse about Britain's 'civilizing mission' (Cohen, 1997) in the region. The communities in the region were then written as people who needed to be tamed by European colonizers. In actualizing the ideal, the government paved a safe passage for numerous agents-businessman, planters, civil-servants, army personals, professionals, clergyman, and so on all with a common aim to promote colonialism and its discourses. In the writings of the colonial agents, the hill communities came to be represented as exotic people who are best known as "head-hunters of Assam", "savage and warlike tribes" (Mackenzie, 1979: 7). This technique of normalizing the colonial other in the colonial language is a crucial to occident conception of self (Said, 1978); that is, if the colonized people are irrational, Europeans are rational; if the former are barbaric, sensual and lazy, Europe is civilization itself, with its sexual appetites under control and its dominant ethic of hard work; if orient is static, Europe can be seen as developing and marching ahead; the Orient has to be feminine so that European can be masculine.

The creation of the dichotomy between Europe and its "other" from assumed phenomenal appearance are the obvious project to create European culture and to maintain hegemony over other lands. Hence, the scholars like Kathleen Gough calls "anthropology is a 'child' of western imperialism (Gough, 1968: 403) and Levi-Strauss called it as the daughter of the colonial era of violence. In same vain with Said it is possible to strongly deny the epistemology of "objectivity" and like Foucault, the colonial production of knowledge that now filled the Archives is not innocent but profoundly connected with the operation of power. The colonial deploy the method of processing information primarily to provide a justification for their settlements, trading practices, religious missions and military activities in the past. But on the other side of the same coin, the basic premise on which a body of literature emerged and developed was due to the fact that, the colonial officers felt the urgent need to rescue the dying cultural identity for posterity (Lotha, 2007: 42). Such "rescue recording" in some way have preserved the memories of the primordial cultural practices, but on the other hand it also produced a stereotype and discursive

knowledge which have now benevolently contributed to their unfinished colonization of the consciousness. In this sense, importantly it was to leave a trail of its unfinished legacy of colonial power for the history of the present. In this sense, colonial knowledge is not to be taken for granted as innocent but profoundly connected with the operation of power. Hence, Foucault's notion becomes important for our understanding though he did not pay any special attention to the relationship between colonialism and the system of power and knowledge per say. His notion of power/knowledge interplay is a very crucial analytical aperture through which one can come to the knowledge about the structure of colonial knowledge and how that have been profoundly captivating and regulating the post-colonial society. In this case one cannot effort to escape from analyzing colonial discourse to unveil the possible connection between the visible and hidden, dominant and marginalized ideas and institutions.

The Colonial Knowledge and Modernity Project

Hence, it is indispensable in the first place to understand how 'colonial power works amidst colonial language, literature, culture and the institutions which unconsciously regulate our daily lives" (Loomba, 2009:45). Therefore, anthropological knowledge about the nineteenth century Hill people undoubtedly is intimately related to the movement of colonial modernity in the region. These processes of modernizing the "other" are indeed embedded within the larger framework of historicisation of people and it is in this sense identity, modernity, and knowledge production become complementary entities. Ethnographers' reports then are an important mechanism that contributed in intensifying the socio-political and cultural identities within and outside the Naga hills. These present existing differences are strengthen and developed by the proliferated information, construct and injected by the hegemonic institutions. This situation has led to perpetually stereotype the differences among the people that in turn unconsciously continue to perpetuate the communities into various division and conflict. Examining these establishments and expanding role of colonialism and consequent knowledge production is crucial to our understanding of the nature of probable correlation with the consequent

emerging identity politics in the region. The practicing narratives genres of these colonial writers should obviously subjected to critical analysis.

In "many nineteenth and twentieth-century writers one could observe the tendency of equating the advance of European colonization with the triumph of science and reason over the force of superstition and, indeed many colonized people took the same view" (Loomba, 2009: 24).

Here, "British colonial rule in the Naga Hills was always portrayed as a success story; it stops headhunting and perpetual warfare, and brought peace and prosperity. Even the Nagas themselves today look upon the time under the British rule as having been greatly beneficial" (Franke, 2009: 55). Subsequently, the 19th century Nagas' encounter with the colonial modernity is understood today as a major breakthrough from their primordial savage mode of organized society. Taking the lenses of the colonial modernity by terming its past as *"Unique History"*, the Nagas now disowned its own pre-colonial reality. The unconsciousness effort of the Nagas today is simply an expression of *"colonized consciousness"*. In the words of Ashis Nandy it is in this, "enlightenment sensitivities, whether in the west outside, presume a perfect equivalence between history and the construction of the past; they presume that there is no past independent of history (Nandy, 1995). The colonial legacy then are reproducing in the form of universalizing colonial project on the 'backwardness self', and 'primitivism' towards ideal type European way of rationalizing history over past. Colonial categories then tend to replicate on the Naga's past simply as irrational, ignorant, primitive and savage that are incompatible with their so-called present modern sensibility. This is one of the process through which the contemporary communities in the region have "other" itself. This very conception of self in the postcolonial situation is not merely a crisis in the identity formation but a result of a profoundly rooted replication of the unfinished colonial gaze on the self that essentially has its origin in the inscribed categories implied in the colonial history and institution.

Therefore "it is in this sense that anthropology grew out of modern history, become the history of those without history as well as the prehistory of those now mired in history. By the late nineteenth century, anthropology becomes literally the history of the colonized" (Dirks, 2001:194). In this sense, the historical writing of the Nagas in modern European sense begins only with the colonial encounter and colonial ethnographic representation beginning the mid-nineteenth century. The primary tactics of writing Nagas in the British intervention into the Hills on the other hand was constructing modern history for Nagas that got burgeoned in the postcolonial situation.

Here, primarily I am trying to show how such relation between colonial writings and identity is possible in the case of North East in general and the Nagas in particular. The modern identities among the Nagas emerged in the context of the systems of modernity discourses that mainly emerged and developed within the group of officers who serve as an administrator in the Naga Hills (West, 1994:55-88). Hence, possibly like in any other context, the history of anthropological account of the Naga developed in name of rescue-recording saga by the colonial military regime. This colonial discourse is now a reference point for many practitioners of this discipline as well as policy makers to understand Nagas' past. This modern history of the Nagas in this sense is the history of struggle within British policy and administration. And since most of the modern identities are products of history, and is therefore the modern identity of the Nagas is the product of colonial history. It is on this, modern identity of the Naga is an enumerated identity objectified by the agents of colonialism. The pioneering authors of the Naga History are the colonial administrators to whom we still cannot escape owing a favor for telling our own story.

Appropriation and Legitimizations of Identities

In North Eastern India the patterns of classification and naming population into different categories on the basis of certain similarities took shaped in the colonial writings. In the pre-British the name *Naga* was not in general use among the people who are called Nagas themselves today. It only began to be used widely when the colonialist called the hill area

as the Naga Hills. Ethnologically, the people inhabiting the region are Mongolian stock with variation in languages. Although the theories hint at the ambiguousness of the nomenclature, it was probably given by the Ahom who ruled the areas of present-day Assam from the 13th century to the early 19th century to the inhabitants of the eastern hills in the Ahom Buranj: the Ahom Chronicles' (Oppitz, Kaiser, Stockhausen, Wettstein, 2008, 15). Though, it is difficult to establish the term or remember, but Nagas in the pre-colonial were known to the outsider especially Ahoms, as *Aitaniya Naga, Jabokiya Nagas, Hatiguriya Nagas* etc. During the colonial period this terms were put into official records in the form of report by P.T. Carnegy, Assistance Commissioner of Jorehaut to the Deputy Commissioner of Seebsaugor. In 1873 P.T. Carney distinguished numerous groups into three main nomenclatures in accordance with *dooars* or paths they use (Mackenzie, 1979: 400). In other words from the very start Nagas are not absolutely single community but is applied to the similar communities by the people from the plains. And it was appropriated and further classified and enumerated under colonial rule.

A number of communities in the North East India succeeded in bringing the official reinstatement of the original names after the colonial era, they were earlier named and classified as *Lalung* and known as *Tiwa, Mikir* now *Karbi, Lakher* as *Mara*, and *Cossyas* now *Khasi*. Among the Nagas, "the *Khiamungan, Tikir, Chirr, Makori* and some *Pochury* villages were given a nomenclature called *Kalyo Kengyu* by the British. Now Puchury and Khiamungan in Nagaland are recognized as major tribe although majority of Khimungan tribe lives are in Myanmer" (Lotha, 2007: 2). Till 1930 Furer Haimendorf was writing them as *Kalyo Kengyu* Nagas and also *Raziamia Angami* probably a group that is now considered part of the *zeme* (or Jeme) (Oppitz, Kaiser, Stockhausen, Wettstein, 2008: 15). We also learn from Mill that the 'Lhotas known to the British government were earlier call themselves as *Kyong* meaning human in their own language (Franke, 2009: 54.) located to the northeast *Angami*. The "name Angami was a corrupted name call *Gnami*, given by the Manipuris and the communities called themselves as Tengima" (Hutton, 1914: 476). They were also known to the neighboring community of 'Kezhamas, Semas, and Lhotas as *Tsoghami, Tsungumi*, and *Tsangho*' respectively (Hutton, 1914:476). While *Rengma* was essentially divided into three eastern Rengmas

who were named as *Naked Rengmas* now call themselves as *Pochury*, western Rengmas present day Karbi Anglong district of Assam. They call themselves *Njang*. "The Aos call themselves 'Aor' posses the tribal consciousness and fenced themselves off vis-à-vis other group......and the Konyaks call themselves 'Yamenu Ha', composed out of two clans, called 'Than ko' and 'Than Du'" (Franke, 2009: 54).

In Manipur, before T.C. Hodson's *Naga Tribe of Manipur*, the British political Agents used loose terms to Naga community with terms like *Koupoi, songboo, Pooeeron* and *Koireng*. Kabui is common name of the Songboo, which means the Rongmi. Though the pre-British period most of the communities were not conscious of their ethno-tribal identities and there world was confined to their family, clan, 'khel' and village. In the colonial period most of the communities in North East "the term likes Naga, Kuki, Abhor, Lushi, Garo, Chulikata and Kapur shor were given to them by the plains people...even the major tribe in Nagaland like Ao, Angami, Lotha and Konyak got their names from other communities (Nag, 2002:37)"

In the post-colonial situation among the Nagas themselves continue to construct communal nomenclature or generic name for itself. Though the *'Kacha* is an Angami word derived from *Ketsa* or *Ketsu* meaning deep forest dwellers and was originally applied to the *Zemes* (Kamei, 2004: 13) in particular. As early as 1850, British colonial anthropologist J.H. Hutton wrongly applied *Kacha* Naga that covers *Zemei, Liangmi*, and *Marongmei (Rongmei)* and *Kabui*. In 15th February 1947, just few months before the British left India, on the basis of *'ethno-cultural entity'* present pan-*Zeliangrong* solidarity was formed by combining three tribes called *Liangmei, Rongmei, Zemei* (Kamei, 2004: 13). Similarly, during colonial rule, the Eastern Angami, now since 1960s, *Chakesang* formed out of three communities' *chakri, khezha,* and southern *Sangtam*. The imperial British while enumerating identities of the people had also left its legacy that could be used systematically to perpetuate colonial ideological apparatuses to regulate postcolonial situation.

The crucial aspect of colonial enterprises is turning the pre-colonial 'soft boundaries of identities into hard boundaries', that is the "definitive demarcation of the community into Angami, Lotha, Rengma, Ao, Zemi, Sema, - and their boundary as 'foreign' as an 'other' to be colonized (Lotha, 2007: 24)". But on the other hand, "colonial master created territory out of loosely connected villages and regions which led to the formation of many new groups. Important herein was not the drawing of arbiter boundaries, but was creation of territory (Franke, 2009: 49). Ethnographers also on the other hand contributed in creating such barriers between fuzzy bounded cultures. The barriers are primarily building in the knowledge system developed by the colonial monograph. This eventually perpetuate the power to hegemonies the policy of *divide and rule*. Hence, the colonial power structure gets re-couched in grounding the contemporary political framework that has profound effect in the formation of identity politics. The process of such objectification in the colonial narratives are already hinted in the colonial census record, survey report, government gazetteers, officer's monographs, personal diaries, missionary's writings etc.

Briefly, central to the process of such objectification and enumeration of the identity of the Naga begins with publication of articles in *Journal of Asiatic Society of Bengal, General report of the topographical survey* by the soldier-ethnographers for their military reports. These articles were further reproduced in many other academic journals like *Journals of the (royal) Anthropological Institute (JRAI)*. From 1870s till 1910 numerous articles and books were published in journals like *Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute, Folklore, Man, Census of India, Journal of Society of Arts, Anthropos, etc.* In all these writings, strong methodological influence of the nineteenth century ethnologist concerns of origins and migration, of various race and racial groups to objectify its search for scientific evidence could be seen. However, the bits and pieces of the above works were compiled into volumes of monographs begins at the dawn of 1911 onwards with the publications such as T.C.Hodson, *Naga Tribes of Manipur* (1911), J.H.Hutton, *Angami Nagas* (1921), *The Sama Nagas* (1921), J.P.Mill, *The Lotha Nagas* (1922), The *Ao Nagas* (1926), The *Rengma Nagas* and Furer-Haimendorf's *Naked Nagas* (1939), are few among others. In 1960s after the post-colonial era Furer-Haimendorf authored several articles including volume such as *The Konyak Nagas* (1969).

The reading of colonial monographs on the Nagas will show that the prior to 1930s the colonial ethnographic enterprises have common descriptive narrative patterns. These narratives deals with prescribing, grouping, naming, ethicizing and radicalizing (e.g., classifies into Mongoloid racial stock, common origin etc). A keen observation of the monographs will show the nineteenth century intellectual trend such as Taylor's comparative method and diffusionism which hails the view that a particular culture come to transmission and diffusion in the process of migration. The comparative methodology deployed during the nineteenth century was essentially to find a clue to the origin of race and racial differences. The parallel intellectual trends are found in the colonial administrators who drew commonalities of origin, common linguistic group such as Tibeto-Chinese, Tibeto-Burman language group. Most of the ethnographers basing on some of the material culture have also compared the origin and cultural affinity with other ethnic groups of South East Asia. Parallel reports about people, land on the basis of attribution description about its exotic defense system, habitat, warfare, cultivation, dress, morungs, tattoo etc. had also came into being (Lotha, 2007, P. 24). But it has not yet made any definite conclusions about such claims of affinities and origin of different Naga community with those regions. This is because such "valorizing and idealization of the traditional culture were, for the colonial regime, socially useful trends in spite of the apparent oppositions" (Marquet, 1964: 49). Hence most remain as probabilities and not an objective fact. Careful reading of anthropological monographs on Nagas until the works of Christopher Von Furer-Haimendorf, most works prior to 1930s has been based on comparative method and diffusionism. Initially C.V. Furer-Haimendorf was influenced by Robert Von Heine-Geldern of Vienna School. Then his encounter with Malinowski in London School of Economic in 1936 resulted in inclination towards functionalism and Malinowski's fieldwork method. However, C.V. Furer-Haimendorf was no exceptional as he himself took interest in the study of the Nagas began when "J.P. Mills introduced him to the Naga Village during one of his official trips" (Misra, 2003: 41). In this sense, P. K. Misra opines that anthropological writings on the Nagas during this period "had little to do with what Malinowski advocated in 1920s for scientific anthropological work" (Misra, 2003: 41). But the anthropologists were guided by their

feelings of the urgent need to rescue the dying cultural identity of the ethnic group for posterity.

One of the important factors in which, the colonizers gained consistent preferential treatment from both the crown and the hill people where by the fact that the administrators in the hill were the group in power. This existential location of colonial officers in the region placed them in the privileged position of gathering information through direct or indirect means to match their anthropological interest. The colonial administrators given the situation exploited the very situation for their personal and professional gain. "Hudson, for example, become professor of anthropology at Cambridge University, Hutton succeeded Hudson as a professor. J.P.Mills become reader in anthropology at the University of London, Von Furer-Haimendorf, who did his Naga field work in association with Mills, become professor of anthropology at SOAS, London and W.G. Archer becomes Curator at the Victoria and Albert Museum" (West, 1994: 58). Such works indeed remained in the realms of possibility rather than what their claim as scientific exploration. Taking this as a pre-colonial starting point, we now try to understand the consequence of such impact that resulted in the formation of tribal identity and national-formation of the groups that would develop into the Naga.

Tribal Identity: A Colonial Construct

"During the pre-British period 'tribe' was not a primary reference point for identity among the hill people of the north east, in the British and post-British period it become increasingly so" (Nag, 2002: 138). The term came to be appropriated as British administrators in the hill need to classify and name the peoples they governed. It also came out of the need of complications in the census report and other official enumerative document. The premise was the seemingly primordial elements of the socio-cultural landscape which were the bases for colonial officers to fix nomenclatures as a practice of empirical undertaking. In the process, it was this administrator who first systematically assigned names given to them by their neighbors or name apparently arising out of understanding or even misunderstanding of the information. In the postcolonial situation, these administrative procedures had contributed in creating a sense of identity among the

communities inscribed by term. Meanwhile both the postcolonial state as well as the community inscribed by the term has also started responding to the description given by the colonial census reports and other records.

The random and vague nomenclature commonly found in all the colonial works; the application of the term *tribes* to the ethnic groups in the hills of North East India are similarly found among the other parts of India. But unlike in many other parts of India in North East India "the term was inappropriate from the very start. The Nagas and their Neighbors to the north, south, and east organized themselves in autonomous village independent states (Oppitz, Kaiser, Stockhausen, Wettstein, 2008: 16). Similarly, in the context of India in general as well as in the North East anthropologically ascribed category such as 'tribe' as well as 'indigenous' poses several conceptual and empirical difficulties, especially while coming to terms with the contemporary situation of those social groups being referred by these terms (Eddie and Game.1998: 2710). In this way legacy continues to be inherited till today which can be seen in the volumes of works produced by both Naga authors as well as non-Naga Authors[3]. The colonial legacy in the post-colonial situation has its root in the heart of the objectified colonial identities. Therefore, the term 'tribe' itself is a colonial construct born out of the administrator's need for classified information on the people they governed which resulted in the gigantic task of mapping the population into tribes.

On the other hand, making 'tribe' in the work of British soldiers-ethnographers, Christian missionaries, monographers as well as unpublished materials were to legitimize the administrative convenience and the discourse of the 'civilizing mission'.(See Cohn, 1997) The ethnic communities were then implicated in writings as people who needed to be tamed by "European colonizing agents-Businessman, Planters, Civil-servants, army personals, professionals, Clergyman, and so on all with aim in common to promote colonialism" (Misra, 2003: 36). This was the process to discipline the entire generation to

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[3] In many of the writings of both Nagas as well and non-Naga authors continue to inherit colonial concept and theory in making Naga identities. In this sense there is a continuation of the colonial legacy in producing and objectifying the unfinished colonial project of groupism, tribalism that is installed by the European colonials.

legitimately accept Europe superiority by "creating in them of a deep sense of inferiority (Ibid, 33)".

The missionaries began with the understanding that the natives should be nurtured and educated under colonial institution, if ever needs to be civilized. The interest unconsciously influenced Christian missionary to implicate their location that perpetuate them to justifying its colonial cultural politics. An important role the Christian missionaries played was strengthening identity formation process in various ways. "Christian missionaries introduce the Bible and hymnals into various vernacular Naga languages in the late nineteenth and early twenty centuries and thereby educated the few Nagas who thereby were employed in colonial administration who were influenced by missionaries" (Kikon, 2009: 85). In this way missionary like "anthropologist participate in the power and privileges of the dominant groups and justifies the action of the colonial government on the ground that the native people had no knowledge of what was good for themselves; hence the doctrine to mission to civilize the 'savage' had to be assisted in all possible way" (Pathy,1981: 623).

Thus, the British established their suzerainty over the Naga Hills in 19th century Christian, missionaries was used by the colonial government to "function as an informal extension of the colonial state in the area of cultural politics" (Franke ,2009: 49).

The Naga Elites during Colonial Rule

Christianity were used as an important agent of colonial rule and hence concomitant of the British colonial expansion among the Naga communities. There was societal change among the Nagas as result of the spread of Christianity beginning with Rev Miles Bronson as early as 1836. And in the Naga Hills it began with Gadhula an Assamis Christian missionary, and E. W. Clark in between 1871 to 1876 (Sema,1992: 72). The colonial interference in the Naga society is crucial to the creation of new section of educated elites born out of Christian missionaries. Apart from Christian missionary, British government also instituted colonial administrative agency beginning 1882 like

"*Gaonburas* (headmen/chief) and *Dobashis* (interpreter)"[4]. Dobashis were mostly chief or erstwhile chiefs. "These two institutions were very important officials during the British regime and had played an important role in the matter of the Nagas Vis-a-via British India by virtue of there being chiefs" (Nag, 2002: 60). These "elite become conscious of its own nation-building, and could consequently form themselves into a national organization" (Franke, 2009:45). In the Naga Hill it was the elites who spearheaded and laid the foundation of modern identity consciousness through forming organizations such Naga Club, Naga Hill Tribal Council, Naga National Council.

In the contemporary ideological legacy of colonial modernity are acknowledged and endorsed by the people themselves as the result of their inability to radically shift out from colonial paradigm. Because of this situation the Nagas constantly drawn colonial categories and also reaffirmed such implications for the collective mode of organized society. Over a period of time colonial policies subsequently become a heuristic device for the elite and civil society to curve out communal identity consciousness within the Naga communities, essentially by reasserting those categories invented by the colonial discourses and practices. The traditions like common mythical story of origin, songs, dialect, are craft by the elite for assimilation, acculturation, and socialization of communities for larger communal political interest in the region. Then the elite uses similar cultural trait to objectify and gerrymandering socio-political and psychological space for their larger political interest; mediated by numerous deployable ideological apertures. Within Naga society "ethnicity was employed by the colonial administrators and the 'tribal' elite for different purposes, one for administrative connivance and another to build up an expanded identity formation, a process described by B. K. Burman as proto-nationalism" (Kamie, 2002: 58). In the contemporary classified categories of groupings are then nurtured and theorized by different streams of institutions ranging from social and cultural anthropologist, the modern institution like the state, civil society, activist of social movement and section of the elite's.

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[4] Apart from Konyak, Sema who had hereditary chief, in the rest of the Nagas the institution *Gaonburas* in colonial time was an extension of modern discretionary power to act as a chief. And Dobashis were mostly chief or erstwhile chiefs in all Naga community or else a new institution set up by the colonial British.

Emergences of Modern Identity Consciousness

The supra-community identity consciousness in our contemporary situation is a result of a colonial modernity, first felt by the Naga elite during colonial era. When the First World War broke out in Europe, "the British ask every village in the Naga Hills to provide a certain number of men for deployment for work on the battlefield in France and the Middle East. Approximately, 2000 Nagas Joined Naga Labour Corps and were deployed to respective theatre" (Franke, 2009: 59). The Nagas who went to France were confronted with contradiction with their own impression about the great civilized nation. It originated when Nagas perceived what they saw on the European battlefield as contradictory to the statement of condemnation about their barbarous headhunting practice. Whereas the same civilized people engaged in the conduct of a massive carnage stretching over years, in comparison to their harmless cultural practice (Franke, 2009: 59). Here drawing an instance of such systematic subordination cultural practices in colonial "system of knowledge and practices in accordance with what Bourdieu would term as colonial *habitus* (Kikon, 2009: 83) can be shown in J.H.Hutton's monograph *The Sema Nagas:*

> "In the administrated village, however, war is gradually receding into the limbo of the forgotten past, except insofar as the desire to wearer the warrior's pig's tushes and cowries gauntlets keep the young man desirous of going as carriers on expedition on which they hope for a chance of 'touching meat' and thus acquired the right to put on the coveted ornaments. It is partly this desire as well as loyalty, which at the time of writing has just taken 1000 Semas to work in France (Hutton, 1921:173)"

The above lines give a clue to the mind of J.H. Hutton who sent 1000 Semas to fight for British in France during his administration in Naga Hills. But what is important here is that, the way he gives his information reviles colonial's contradictory attitude towards the cultural practices of the Hill People into mere evil practices. It also reviles the perpetual design of the British about how they should be viewed. The question that follows is in the context of the relentless fight the Naga put up against the enemy, which for Hutton was nothing but merely a foolish habit of the Sema.

In France this experience with the Europeans in the battlefield as well as their dislocated image about their culture by colonials back home, made them to "change their perspective about the world and their knowledge of the surrounding political reality once and for all" (Oppitz, Kaiser, Stockhausen, Wettstein, 2008: 24). When they return to the Naga hills, it was on this bed rock Nagas saw limitation to remain disunited in the world of small fragmented communities. The Nagas were "aware of their plains neighbors superiority; there was a danger that there future could be with them; were cognizant of their own disunity, and lack of consciousness on the part of the majority as Nagas. And that despite this negotiation, consciousness was created to form themselves as Naga population (Franke, 2009: 61). The Nagas elite begin to sensitized and politically motivate the idea of unification among them. Consequently "the feeling of oneness, among the various community probably took shape at this point (Chasie, 1999: 32). The circumstances provided the elite to make an impression upon itself the idea of politically uniting the fragmented Naga community into creating join identity. The Nagas entered into the contractual union at the cost of giving up there sovereign village and community life by normalising itself to a foreign term 'Naga' as an antonym to provide a sense of identity. In Naga Hills it was on this account in 1918 the elders of War Veterans, *Gaonburas, Dobashis*, government servants, priest and educated Nagas in Kohima formed the first ever self-determined *Supra Community* platform; the *Naga Club*. According to Sanjal Nag "though there are very little materials on the Naga Club, but the very idea of a Naga Club.....was very modern and obviously the work of ex-soldiers return from the war, government officials, professionals like teachers who comprises the nascent middle class" (Nag, 2002: 60).

The initially intention of Naga Club was "formed with the primary purpose of assisting the colonial administration in understanding the social, cultural and administrative problem of the Nagas, it latter begin to assume the socio-political responsibility" (Sema, 1992: 142). In their course of deliberation about common concern and various other important affairs of Naga society: later brought back alive their war time experiences of foresight to maintaining distinctive identity. This apolitical organization formed under the shadow of the British colonialism turned its will against the British in the near future. The Club became politically active in the year 1928 and 1929 when the deliberation

about the reorganization of the Indian colony led to negotiation as to whether Nagas would be part of the new reform scheme of India. By virtue of being the apex body that represents Naga communities, the Club rejects the proposed scheme by "submitting the memorandum to the statutory commission led by John Simon with Clement Attlee and E. Cadogan in Kohima on January 10th, 1929" (Alemchiba, 1970: 163). The memorandum essentially demanded that Naga Hills be withdrawn from reformed scheme and keep directly under the British government. But it invoked a 'life' of freedom that contextualizes itself in the idea Nagas be left alone to determine for itself as they were in the past. Hence the report of the Simon commission to replace the phrase *'Backward Tract'* of Government of Indian Act 1919 was debated in the House of common in 1935. The British recognizes the claims of the Nagas to be treated separately. As a result through Government of India Act 1935, *Naga Hill District* was renamed *Naga Hill Excluded Area*.

Naga's Engagement with Modernity

The situation in the Naga Hills drastically changed with the outbreak and the conclusion of the Second World War. A shift of paradigm was brought about in the socio-political landscape by the fact that the Naga Hills became the forward base, frontline, battlefield of the war in the east. The Second World War opened a "connection of the Naga Hills with the wider region accompanied by the rapid improvement of the line of communication, the fast-moving penetration of the hills themselves, and the flood of people and armies of all kind" (Franke, 2009: 65). The war also made the Nagas loyal subject of the British against Japanese ambition to invade Assam and beyond and won a great appreciation from the British administration. As a gesture of profound happiness over the Nagas support to the allied forces, the government initiated further to organize the Naga Hills. In April 1945, "Sir C. R. Pawsey, the then Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills District had displayed an influential concern over the Hill District by instituting Naga *Hills District Tribal Council"* (Aosenba, 2001:34). The aim was establishing the colonial institution among the Nagas was once again the process of naming and grouping the various fragments of community into one manageable administration. On the part of the Naga elite, primarily the concern for acceptance of such offer was above all, to use such

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organization to actualize their "idea of getting back the lost freedom and one's homeland" (Kamei, 2002: 58).

2nd February 1946, the Naga Hill District Council was changed into *"Naga National Council* a political platform outside the British Jurisdiction as well as of territories occupied by the British was formed" (Biswas and Suklabaidya, 2008:166). The organizations objective was shifted from social aspiration, but latter tuned to violent political activities by raising its will against the foreign rule and domination. The initial intention of NNC was determined effort towards *self-determination*. This in the words of Piketo Sema, the "NNC was to fight for a separate Naga country and to develop it according to the genius and taste of the Nagas" (Sema, 1992: 152). In other words, it was to retaining Naga as a distinctive people having their own homeland and home rule; the leaders desired that Nagaland should remain connected with India in matters of border issues such as development, defense, finance and foreign relation and whatever might be necessary for the benefit of the Nagas. "The NNC leader was voicing here the Naga people's view regarding their future relationship with India. But it was not clear, as to what shape this relationship would take" (Misra, 1978: 618). Within this liberal paradigm, inflamed by the "political pressure, the NNC become the first pan-Naga political organization that laid the foundation for the demand of separate sovereign political geography comprises of Naga inhibited area of contemporary Nagaland, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Burma" (Shikhu, 2007: 97). Till date NNC have been the reference points for accommodating different views of desperate nationalistic force into forming supra-community identity political organization among the Nagas. Thus, "[t]he Nagas are now an ethnic nationality of Asia" (Kamei, 2002: 69).

Engagement with Modern Ethno-Naga Identity

Though the genesis of Naga nationalism could be trace from First World War, the formation of the NNC marked the first major political shift that initiated the consolidation of dispirit nationalistic forces. Due to the political and economic crises at the global level, as a result of the war, in the late 1940s the British realized that they could no longer remain in India but wish to extend its colonial legacy for the postcolonial state. Meantime, knowing political complexity amidst Hindu and Muslim in the sub-continent,

some administrators in the North East Frontier of India wanted to curve out a nation under British guide as the region had racially, culturally, and ethnically different from the rest of India. In 1941 Sir Robert Reid, the then governor of Assam province (1937-1942), saw the possibility of creating a nation comprising of the area inhibited by the Naga Hills belonging to mongoloid race who were neither Indian or Burma. According to Yonuo, this was because "Sir Robert Reid genuinely had a great sympathy and love for eastern hills tribes of India and the upper Burma" (Yonuo, 1974: 139). Sir Robert Reid's recommendation of creating separate identity based on racial components was largely supported by several other British administrators in these areas, among them were Dr.J.H.Hutton, commissioner of the Naga Hill and J.P.Mill, adviser to the Assam governor on tribal Affairs, and N.E. Parrey superintendent of Lushai Hills (Chasie, 1999:36).

Reid's successor, Sir Reginald Coupland, the British constitutional expert, reviewed Sir Robert Reid's proposal and suggested a *Crown Colony Plan*. According to this Plan Government of India and Burma would have a treaty with British to take share of responsibility for the areas as 'trust territory'. In the form of executing the said plan, "British government sanction out a notion of Crown colony or Trust territory in a broad ways by forming a kind of confederation comprising the Naga Hills, other Assam Hills, NEFA and Upper Burma with a view to eventual independence" (Yunuo, 1974: 141). In the case of Naga Hill, NNC in 1946, only political platform, refused to anticipate the probable outcome and consequence but continued to peruse that they would be independent after British quit India. As a result, the very proposal concerning the status of the Nagas in the Crown Colony model was vigorously rejected in 1946 by Naga National Council.

Given the choice of alternative proposals to be either with the future of India or Burma, NNC voted for total independence and entered into negotiation with British Governor of Assam Sir Akber Hydari 29th June 1947 which came to be known as Hydari Agreement. Under this agreement, the Naga Hills was to remain independent for ten years and after which it was to decide its fate. But this engagement was turned down by the leaders of the Indian state. This served the Naga elites to determine not to be further occupied and

ruled by any other nations. Thus the Nagas under the banner of NNC declared themselves independent on 14th August 1947. After the attempts by the moderate NNC to achieve independence for the Nagas at the negotiation table and the plebiscite in May 1951, the NNC under A.Z. Phizo embarked upon an armed struggle. The Indian army was called in to quell the Naga rebels. Meanwhile some of the nationalists were already growing tired of combat, and in this situation in 1975 some of the individuals representing Nagas were made to signed an agreement called *Shillong Accord*. But right from the outset the infamous Shilling Accord was far from sound, and become the precursor for some dissident to leave NNC in 1980 to form *National Socialist Council of Nagaland* (now call Nagalim) (NSCN). The NSCN continues to undergo a further split in 1988 on a communal line to produce two factions NSCN (IM) and NSCN (Khaplang). Until now the two factions have been involved with fratricidal politics and accusing the opposing factions of betraying the common cause. The Nagas claim of independence is to recover its subjected identity that provides a background to the culture of insurgency as a mode of resistance offer to the postcolonial Indian state that prolong the colonial experience of the past. "The very assertion of the life of freedom contextualized in the idea the Naga be left alone and free as they were before....it is this 'memory of identity' and 'identity of the memory' that shapes the Naga political consciousness" (Biswas and Suklabaidya, 2008:167).

Concluding Remarks

The root of the contemporary enduring Naga's assertion of modern identity reaches back to the colonial era. The effects of colonial attitude and stereotyping in the colonial anthropological literature and policy framed accordingly have far reaching effects on the communities. Many socio-political problems in the postcolonial North East India have their roots in the colonial attitude and the policy of classification, grouping, naming and demarcating communities. In the case of the Nagas, the colonization of the Naga Hills necessarily involves the gradual introduction of colonial modernizing aperture suitable to the needs of the colonial power and in this process ethnography itself became a means to perpetuate the domination over the Nagas. Ethnography was a western discourse and

objectified in the western language against which indigenous Naga discourses still continue to struggle within to recover the subverted space.

The colonial agents also had a tendency of presenting itself to the western audience, that they are the only legitimate authority over the people by the virtue of having acquired profound Knowledge about the communities. The colonial agents are often called upon by the government to provide favorable situation through direct or indirect means to prepare a basic framework that could be used for manipulating and controlling. Meantime the colonial agents no doubt, felt that there understanding of the native people sometime place them in the position to negotiate on their behalf. But no matter how the sense of sympathy for 'tribes'; the administrators, Christian missionaries were the agents of the government and could not disassociate himself from the influence of colonial framework, thereby implicate colonial ideology in the process. As such was because the colonial agents were under the socio-political inclination of the time. In this situation the enterprises of the colonial agents and its discourses have placed most of the contemporary issues of the Northeast India in subordination to the colonial legacy.

The consciousness of Naga nationality is both direct and indirect result of British colonial rule, the first and the second world wars, and subsequently Nagas' search and assertion of join ethnic identity, articulated by the elites. In other words, the question of identity has been a central Naga concern since the colonial era. Hence the line of argument presenting here is that the British categorisation and the drawing of administrative boundaries, the people of the hills become 'tribes', Nagas now separated from the people of the surrounding population. In other words, originally the Nagas did not exist as a distinct isolated people but had entertained cordial relations with its neighbor. But the feeling of separateness from these neighboring community naturally got nurtured under various colonial circumstances. The identity of the Nagas was also further strengthened with the consequent creation of various mechanisms from inner line permit to the creation of tribal elite. As suggested by Kamei, "the emergence of common ethnic identity of the Nagas was the gift of British colonialism as they grouped the 'tribes' under a generic name 'Naga' for administrative and ethnographic purpose" (Kamei, 2002: 69). Today, the fundamental modern project of unity and diversity expressed in the feelings of pride in

being a Naga is one of the ideological factors of Naga Nationalism. The ideology of Nagaism is promulgated by the network of various ideological state apertures, the Hohos, student organization, new media's. In this sense, the larger political realms, there is continuity of "modern Naga identity being created- that is, a more general sense of being 'Naga' as oppose to Angami, Ao, Sema, and so on and hence of Naga political ambitions, interest and rights (Robb, 1997: 256)". Hewasa and Venusa Tinyi also remark that the "Naga consciousness in the present political sense therefore is a recent phenomena in the scale of history and not primarily an internal reality since time immemorial" (Hewasa and Tinyi, 2010: 3).

Chapter IV

Naga Identity and the Postcolonial Discourses

The Nagas encounter with the British colonizing forces in the Naga Hills during the first half of nineteenth century had left a deep imprint of modern socio-political problems on Nagas. I have dealt in the previous chapter with the colonial expansion and establishment of administration on the Naga Hills. The intention of introduction of colonial ideological state mechanisms like classification, grouping, naming and demarcating communities, introduction of Christianity, western education, modern organization, communication systems, laws etc, the direct and indirect impact of the first and the second world wars.

I also discussed how introduction of the modern colonial state apparatus greatly revolutionized the thinking of the Naga elites by leading them to new dimensions of the cognitive understanding of their existence. Thereby, Naga elites in the course of subscribing colonial modernity also become much aware of cultural identity and how such sense of identity got its political tuning. As a consequence of the growth of identity consciousness among the Naga elite, it gradually percolated among the mass, which was conspicuously lacking among the Nagas in the pre-colonial era. In other words there is a continuity of modern Naga identity being politicized, that is, a more general sense a supra-community identity as opposed to the pre-colonial fragmented communities. I then have discussed how these consciousnesses of the modern Naga identity resulted in a subsequent search and assertion of a common Naga ethno-cultural identity, articulated by the elites which have shaped contemporary Naga political ambitions, interests and demands.

In this sense the question of modern Naga identity has been a central concern since the colonial era. It became apparently more assertive only after the end of the British rule. In other words the ideology of Nagaism is first promulgated under the British in the colonial era and now replicated by the Naga intelligentsia as a response to postcolonial Indian

state's nation building project. In order to counter the dominant hegemonic national building project, the Naga intelligentsia from its very inception perceived and constructed their "differences" based on grounds such as racial, linguistic, customary, cultural and ethnicity as integral to their claim of separate identity. For instance when Naga Club submitted its memorandum to the Simon Commission in 1929, it stated that, the Nagas have nothing in common with the people of India as Naga's "language is quite different from those of the plains and we have no social affinities with either Hindu or Muslim. We were being look down upon by, one for our 'beef and the other for our pork and both for our want in education which is not due to any fault of ours (Alemchiba, 1970:164)".

In the postcolonial phase Nagaland was the first state in India that was curved out on the basis of ethnicity and socio-cultural identity of the Nagas. Under the moderate nationalist Nagaland state came into being along with special protective provision in the amended *Article 371(A)* of the Indian constitution with regard to the Naga's land, culture, and customs etc. However, the consciousness of cultural basis for Naga national identity is not solely based on the Naga affairs but was a result of deep provocations of the colonial anthropological discourses. The most explicate of such assertion was during the period preceding of India's independent when J.H.Hutton was presenting the case of the Naga to the Indian Statutory Commission. He asserted that the communities in the North East India were racially, linguistically, culturally, politically and economically distinct from Indians.

Further, in postcolonial India's North East such real or perceived cultural differences served the litany of nationalism, particularly for the Nagas. According to Udayon Misra "the NSCN manifesto generalizes India with Hinduism and call upon the Nagas to fight against the 'effect India and Burmese culture and their faiths', referring to India government as 'Hindu Government' (Mishra, 2000: 51)". But prior to the NSCN (National Socialist Council of Nagaland) this was obvious in several dialogues where the emphasis was on culture symbols along with the demand of the right to self determination.

Dolly Kikon writes "the Naga people's demand for homeland is strongly based on being culturally, historically, and politically different from dominant national entities and communities in India (and Burma). The cultural aspect has always remained a contentious issue between India and the Nagas in their political attempts at resolving the conflict (Kikon, 2008: 99)". However since 1950s "[i]n response to the assertion of Naga nationalist aspirations the postcolonial Indian state unlashed a series of armed campaign in Naga Hills (Kikon, 2008: 99)", like the punitive expeditions introduced by British colonizers in the first half of nineteenth century as a mechanism to colonize Nagas. It was in fact, the impact of such aggressive gesture of the postcolonial state under Nehru's premiership that cemented the Nagas notion of modern identity.

The Naga movement is probably the oldest in Asia, trying to integrate both the traditional narratives with the contrasting modern narrative of liberal legal concept such as right to *self-determination[1]*. The most distinguishing unifier for the fragments of the Nagas in the postcolonial era is "determining to fight off, what the Naga sow and still sees as an invasion of their land" (Franke, 2009:82). But here, the cultural content of the nation is limited as it is continually transforming.

In this chapter, I would first begin by exploring how Naga intelligentsia perceived Nagas as being culturally, historically and politically different from India. After which I will look into how the Naga Nationalist as well as the postcolonial Indian state have shaped the modern Naga identity discourses through the historical trajectories of the movement. Taking the nationalist movement, here I will focus on the historical circumstances in which the Naga identity got defined in the colonial and redefined in the postcolonial era. Hence it will be helpful to recollect briefly the historical trajectories that the Nagas have undergoing in order to understand the narrative of freedom mooring identity struggle in the postcolonial era.

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[1] Nagas struggled for self-determination did not emerge after Indies independent. It originated in the struggle against the colonial rule in the Naga Hills. Though there are no water tight view but the Nagas struggle for self-determination/identity have two strands in the postcolonial phase: the moderates (overground) and the radicals (underground). I will make the point as I discuss its historical trajectory in the postcolonial era, see Donald Clark & Robert Williamson,(ed) "Self-Determination: international Perspective", Macmillen Press ltd, Great Briten.

Oral Historiography and the Construction of Naga Identity

The theorists on nationalism and nationality have opened a broad picture about the trajectory of how nation come into being, that is, how the modern nation was imagined. Homi Bhabha have drawn our attention to the alliteration between nation and narration, Ernst Gellner view that the story about the nation requires a practice of literature, and Benedict Anderson have demonstrated the power of print capital in forming the national identity consciousness. In short if nation is a narrative it is written texts that have travelled and shaped it in the course of history and ideology.

The Nagas did not have script of their own and so conventional written history may not effectively encapsulate the memory of its national identity. In fact writing was not a part of Naga's culture. The practice of representing Naga identity in the modern conventional style of historiography as an objectively given truth may land up in a serious error as it is not a practice of our own. In Dr. Visier Sanyu's words, "written history does not necessarily tell our story as it is, nor as it out to be, because it was influenced by force from outside, mainly by ideology of colonialism" (Sanyu, 2010:50).

The practice of presenting Naga identity in a conventional style of history began to get normalized only "with the advent of the British era when the British administrators, philologist, anthropologist, and American missionaries started there researches across the vision of century upon the historical threads surviving in those of legend, traditions and the background of primitive social, political, economic and religious beliefs, customs and institutions of the Nagas, amongst whom their lives were acclimatized more deeply, and wrote about them" (Yonuo,1974:35). Hence the colonial anthropologist and Naga authors in the postcolonial phase had invoked the use of the traditional religious practices, myths, legends, proverbs, oral customs and traditions to established common identity among Nagas.

In the postcolonial phase the Naga nationalist captured this very fact and continues to produce the identity through hybrid conceptual categories, that is, combination of modern concept and theory with traditional oral history. However, the NNC (Naga National

Council) under Phizo shaped the modern pan-Naga identity which was articulated and encompassed within two problematic western constructed categories; that are from the anthropologically constructed categories *tribe* which has become *National*.

In Hokishe Sema's view Naga nationalism was primarily "devoted to one's nation. A nationalist is a supporter of nationalism, an advocate of national rights, freedom and independence. It is an aspiration of certain distinct race of people, characterize by common docents, language or history, living or occupying definite territory, united in character and manners not by regulation of law but by uniformity of life and food and common influence of climate...the Naga sub-nationalism emerged out of strong desire and common sentiments of belonging to common family of Nagas. It comes out of their feelings of consolidation of all Nagas near and far under one compact administration" (Sema,1986: 155). Hence, for the Nagas it was a positive gesture for unifying its people who share the same race, culture, and affinity for the common agenda to form an independent country. Following this development, the Nagas started recruiting volunteers known as *Safe Guards*, and trained its volunteers to handle arms in revolutionary camps and jungles. Hence non-violent method of identity struggle was abandoned after 1953.

In it's initial phase, the Nagas like many other indigenous people, primarily had been using their oral traditions to interpret its own ethnic identity. Though the Nagas did not have a common language, the common myths and legends of origin of Nagas, and tales of migration played a pivotal role in the construction of the nationalist discourse. In other words in place of written narratives, the Nagas made use of the oral histories, poems and stories as an important sources for the Nagas to constantly innovate, harness and transform its political memories.

The modern Naga identity draws its strength from *'collective representations'*[2] such as mythical story of origin and migration. One of its popular mythical stories assumes that

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[2] In Durkheimian terms the classification of things which are socially given and the general name he give to this group of social phenomena is collective representation. Collective representation also may be defined as any subject matter into which the ideas of society have become condensed so that they come to represent collective values and beliefs. Example of collective representation into which social subject matter is concentrated is religious doctrines, legal rules, myth, legends, proverbs, customs, and traditions (Thompson, 2002).

Naga communities such as Angamis, Chakhesang, Sumi, Rengmas, Zeliang, Lotha and Mao that forms the first waves of migration from the south to the present location. The legends of these community points its early settlement and dispersion to the place in *Mekhroma* (makhrepfu in Mao language) and *Khezhakenoma* village in Nagaland. Here apart from Lotha and Semi (sema) all other communities including two other new communities Poumai and Pochury forms one nomenclature now known as *Tenyimia*. According to Charles Chasie "the Semas was supposed to have been the younger brother of the Angami. This fact of the Angami and the Sema being brothers is admitted by both side.......but all of these the Sema does not belong to the Tenyimia group. Why is this so? Where there a point of divergent or was there any convergence, in the first place?" (Chasie, 1999:22).

The second wave is believed to have comprised of communities such as "Aos, Changs, Kheimunghans, Sangtams, Yimchungers, and Tangkhuls. They are believed to have migrated from Thangdut, near the Chinwind River by different routes at different time. The Konyak Naga came to their present hills from the north east of Burma" (Yonuo, 1974:39). Hence it was this past collective identity, in the mythical stories which consolidates the group-identity among Nagas.

In recent decades for many instances, the Naga nationalist also incorporated and transformed Christian sources for modern historical, social and political discourses. For instance, NSCN (IM) (IM stands for the Issac-Muivah fraction of NSCN) coined the phrase *Nagaland for Christ* or *Christian Socialism* that found its way into the NSCN's lexicon. Kaka D. Iralu puts such view as the "sovereignty and independence of the Nagas on the basis of universal law governing the origin and the existence of all nation on earth is premised on a biblical scripture from the book of Acts, that reads; 'And he (God) made from one (Adam) every nation of men to live on all the face of the earth, having determined allotted periods and the boundaries of their habitation" (Iralu, 2000:1). Similarly, Dolly Kikon in her field study in year 2000 to document the role of women in the Naga national struggle for WISCOMP, observes the use of Christian symbols and

pre-colonial cultural attributes in a song sung by the Women Society of Tsungiki Village. The song reads as follows:

> *This Naga land has been given to us by the creator*
> *We praise your name of lord, bless this land*
> *If the lord leads the path what is there to be scared of*
> *Our ancestor David was also strengthen by the lord*
> *Line up, arise and be alert soldiers of the land*
> *Stride fast to take the head of the enemies*
> *Oh bless our land almighty.*
> *And we shall participate in the victory dance*
> *When the heads of Indians are brought back*
> *And the heads from Assam are brought up to the villages*
> *The victory shouts will echo from the village*
> *Then we shall build the victory house in the village*
> *We shall weave colourful purses for each soldier*
> *Where they can keep their rewards*
> *So we bless you once again at the village gate*
> *Go forth to the battle in the name of the lord*
> (Kikon, 2008:99)

In the nationalist discourse the Christian sources in combination with popular oral traditions along with modern liberal legal expression like *Right for self determination* became the essence to weave multivalent voices into a common past shared by a community. Further it was not only Christian sources but the influence of the Baptist church later in the Naga affairs which became another defining moment for the Naga identity. It was particularly in 1950s and 1960s at the height of armed conflict in Nagaland when villages were burned down and villagers had to flee to the jungles for months that Christianity came as sources of moral strength to many. For instance, "in Khonoma Village the population of Christianity was only 10% in the early 1950s. Mass conversation took place during the period of armed operations. By 1970s the situation had reversed and the Christian population was 90% with the remaining belongs to ancient religion. Today only a few household are following the traditional religion in that village. But in many other villages, it has become 100% Christian" (Sanyu, 2010: 60). Since then Nagas began to accommodate indigenous religious elements with Christianity.

In recent times faith plays an important role in the Naga nationalist movement according to Udayon Mishra, who writes "[u]nlike NNC which drew its strength from both the Christian and non-Christian segments of Naga population and which laid great emphasis

of the traditional chiefs, NSCN declare its struggle primarily as one for a Christian Nagaland and adopted a slogan "Nagaland for Christ" (today Nagalim). Article X (d) of the NSCN manifesto specifically states that it stands for 'faith in God and salvation of mankind in Jesus alone, which is Nagaland for Christ.....in sharp contrast to the NSCN position on religion, the NNC Yehzabo or constitution states that protestant and Naga religion are recognized religion in Nagaland (Mishra,2000: 51)".

Hence Nagas had been constantly trying to create and recreate the unfinished product of Naga identity not only in terms of its memories in oral histories, culture, poems, songs, stories, events, but in the postcolonial period also through faith. Christianity has become an important tool for producing the alternative narratives of its modern identity. Ethnicity and ideology remain major influences on the movements in the North East. Religion and imagined ethnicity is used as an ideological apparatus for some group in the region to influence the political agenda. Hence on one hand there are claims of religious distinctiveness, when conterminous with ethnicity, 'unique history' exacerbates the sense of "otherness" in the Nagas and Mizos vis-a vis each other.

The Formative Period of Naga National Identity

To situate the postcolonial construction of Naga identity, it is worthwhile to remember that prior to the formal end of British rule, the Nagas had stubbornly persuaded the British to allow them to recover their identity. The persuasions lead to the demand that the Nagas should be left alone, that is, free and independent as they were in their past. Meanwhile contemptuously the British rulers felt that the Nagas were too weak to stand alone outside the parameter of Assam administration which resulted in bringing about Naga Hills as the integral part of Indian union after the British left the subcontinent. Today, the fundamental ideological factor for modern project of Naga Nationalism is expressed in the language of racially, culturally, linguistically, historically, distinct and uniqueness from "India" or 'Indians" that fosters pride in being a Naga.

According to Sanjal Nag one of the "significant aspect of the Naga Nationalist construction was its painstaking effort at constructing the Nagas against the so called-

Indians....Naga intelligentsia was conscious that there was very little material to present their community as unified entity but it was easy to show the difference that existed between the plainsman and the Nagas. Therefore these differences were handpicked to depict the separateness of the Naga. Resulting of such comparison and contrast were also used to prove that Naga society was still pure and perfect, free from evils which the Indian society suffered from. As such it was an ideal society which they did not want to lose to India" (Nag, 2002:145). Hence in the postcolonial period an essential component of "the politics of differences that the Naga struggle invoked is an ideological critics of mainstream Indian culture that, acts as the basis of formation of nation from above, ignoring a large number of 'tribes' and other minorities from the axis of cast, religion and tradition" (Biswas and Shuklabaidya, 2008:176).

The Nagas claim of independence since the colonial domination was primarily to recover back from the perceived culturally marginalized identity. The identity assertion begins with the life of freedom that was contextualized in the idea that "Naga should be left alone and free as they were before". This indeed was where the mode of resistance took shape in the prolonged colonial experience and now continues to offer resistance to the postcolonial Indian state. The formation of the NNC on 2nd February 1946 at Wokha was one of the major confrontation with modern identity politics in which the nature of the identity struggle got modified by accommodating dispirit nationalistic forces. At the time of its formation, different opinions were accommodated within the NNC, even those who were "short-sighted in their political vision for the future of the Nagas" (Iralu, 2000:48). At the time of its inception, the Naga National Council had 29 members representing the various "tribes" or communities on the principle of proportional representation (Mishra, 1978: 619).

On 19th June 1946 just before India's independence NNC had its 2nd General Conference at Wokha and drafted a resolution which was submitted to the representative of His Majesty's Government (Cabinet Mission). It reads "(a) Naga National Council stands for the solidarity of Naga tribes including those in the unadministered areas, (b) this council strongly protest against the grouping of Assam with Bengel, (c) the Naga Hill should

continuously included in an autonomously Assam in the free India, with local autonomy and due safeguard for the interest, (d) the Nagas and the Naga tribes should have a separate electorate" (Aosenba, 2001:36-37).

The NNC in order to spearhead modern Naga (pan-Naga) identity in the Naga Hills instituted its Central Council at Kohima and Mokokchung. In Kohima the council was composed of twelve members out of which seven were Angami Naga, whereas, the Mokokchung council had five Aos, four Semas, three Lothas, two Sangtams and one Chung. In this way formally a pan-Naga character is apparent in the composition. Although the Angamis were numerically dominant in the NNC at the time of formation, the Aos with the exception of the Konyaks who at the time could not have a representative, all the other Naga communities were represented. Out of the 29 members, "[t]he founding president of NNC was Mayangnokcha Ao, while secretary was Aliba Imti Ao, a one time activist of the Hill Student Federation which was affiliated to the leftist All India Students Federation. The join Secretary was an Angami, T. Sakhrie " (Mishra, 2000: 29). In this sense, "the new council had studied the representation from all the 29 Naga 'tribes' to make the representatives and national in character. It proclaimed that it stood for the solidarity and the unification of all Naga tribes and their freedom. To demonstrate its numerical strength it included the tribes of the then North-Eastern Frontier Agency within its preview...thus formed the Naga National Council (NNC) as the representative of its people set out to construct a national identity for the Nagas" (Nag, 2002:144).

The objective of NNC from the very start was therefore to create "solidarity of all Naga communities including those of unadministered area (Yonuo, 1974: 161)". NNC invoked a deep sense of necessity among the leaders to work towards making such an identity a reality. The leaders of the Nagas in this initial stage found the colonial theories very handy and so drew much of their inspiration form the idea of the construction of national identity. In other words the elites of all the community under NNC had a responsibility in avoiding the language of placing own community as a complete entity, but rather each was to bring about communities into one unified functioning whole.

In order to initiate its pan-Naga Identity campaign within the Naga Hills, "the finance were raised by contributions which every family made, ranging normally between rupee one to hundred, or even more so, making contribution also directly or indirectly implied, in a way, that every Naga was an allegiant member of NNC (Yonuo, 1974:161)". With this systematic policy of brining about various Naga communities within a broad common platform to voice its right to *self-determination*, the council encouraged reforms in the working of the various unit councils existing in the respective communities.

In order to objectify modern identity project the NNC also "published a monthly newspaper entitled the *Naga Nation*" (Yonuo, 1974:161). However, it was banned after Jawaharlal Nehru's first visit to Nagaland. The paper was published at Koihma as a mouthpiece of the NNC to "create immense political consciousness and identity. Further it plays a vital role by educating the Nagas about not only there socio-economic problems but also their culture and rich tradition" (Aosenba, 2001:36). According to Kaka D. Iralu "the policy of the NNC [was] to establish a sovereign Naga country and to develop it according to the genius of Naga democratic custom and culture" (Iralu, 2000: 48) but some of the cultural categories were reconstructed by the colonial rulers. These later provided a background to generate a degree of cohesiveness and a sense of shared destiny within the generic identity. Therefore, in trying to legitimize the Naga identity consciousness one has to re-appropriate some of the already existing category reconstructed by the colonial government.

Attitude of the Postcolonial Indian State towards the Nagas

The concern of the NNC from socio-cultural identity to full political demand begins with the attitude of the Indian state; "the *Hydari Agreement* remained in abeyance for nearly a year as government of India was not serious with the agreement" (Aosenba, 2001:42). This was essentially with the sudden death of Sir.Akber Hydari on 28th December 1984, after which "the nine point agreement was no longer considered to be existent by the Indian government, in this way the agreement now become obviously a scrap of paper"

(Yonuo, 1974:178). According to Charles Chasie "Akbar Hydari himself, even before he could leave Kohima, showed bad faith, after signing the agreement, and threatened the use of force unless Naga leaders agree to join the Indian union after the ten years period" (Chasie,1999: 42). It was partly "repudiated by Gopinath Bardoloi the successor; his position was that the government of India had not formally accepted the NNC-Hydari accord. He certainly was not taking ten years interim demand, in which Nagaland would be allowed to go its own way" (Hazarika 1994: 98). Instead "he tried to impress upon the members of NNC, the benefit that the Naga Hills would receive being a part of India...and taking that consideration of the fear and the apprehension of the Naga people, Bardoloi recommended in his report that all the communities beyond the province of Assam should be treated as minority" (Nag, 2002: 162).

The conflict came about over *Article 9* of the agreement where it apparently marginalized the moderate elements, as after the end of ten years the NNC was asked whether it wanted to join Indian union or left free to decide their own fate. "However advisory committee made no further recommendation to the constitutional assembly on the issue and NNC refuse to accept the Indian constitution as it already had its own" (Bhaumik, 2009: 94). Later such ambiguity over the agreement led both the representative of the Naga National Council and the Government of India to interpret in its own way that suit its interest. In this manner "the so called Hydari Accord was, however turned down by the Indian leaders; the Indian state, which shortly after was handed its independence, donned the mantel of the British colonials at its north-eastern border and annexed the Nagas territories as a part of its own" (Oppitz, Thomas Kaiser, Alban Von Stockhausen, Marion Wettstein, 2008: 25). However it is said that, the accords and discords arises as partly what Kaka D. Iralu including several Naga Authors, "reviles that there were three categories of people within the NNC at this stage; (a) those that were for total sovereignty from the beginning and never compromised their stand till date, (b) those that wavered from the beginning but were eventually won over to the majority body and become faithful to date, (c) those that wavered from the beginning and eventually went for cooperation with the Indian government" (Iralu,2000: 48).

As it became more apparent that the Article 9 was not to be acceptable by the Indian government but was rather interpreted and insisted upon as the article gives Naga the right to suggest administrative change within Indian union but not that of secession. With this soon the moderates within the NNC lost ground, in the process Aliba Ao got increasingly marginalized within the NNC. Though Phizo was to assume his leading role in the NNC he succeeded in organizing the minority group within the within the body which was opposed to the Hydari Agreement and went with delegation of five members to meet Gandhi in July 19, 1947. In the meeting Gandhi reportedly told the Naga delegation that "the Nagas have every right to become independent".

Meantime Aliba Imti who continues to be the NNC secretary, also meets Nehru but return with no substantial result but to accept the sixth schedule. This was perceived as undermining of NNC and the Nagas desire for self determination. Hence Aliba Imti sends an ultimatum till December 6, 1947 to consider the Hyder Agreement or the Naga people would cease to be part of Indian union. Phizo too meantime returned to Nagaland and declared independence for Nagaland on August 14th, 1947 as a gesture of attuning with the modern world.

The Rise of Extremism and the Pan-Naga National Identity

The return of Phizo as an elected president of NNC on December 11, 1950 was major shift in the way Naga identity is shaped and produced. The NNC under Phizo turned more radical corollary to the idea of sovereign independent state of Nagaland. In 1956 the ardent nationalists in Nagaland set up the Naga Federal Government (NFG). The NFG maintained that, Nagaland was never conquered by any nation prior to the British rule and hence independence of India from British rule does not confer upon her sovereignty over Nagaland. Hence, "[i]n the words of Naga independence leader A.Z. Phizo, "we share our house with the British and when they vacated, the whole house becomes ours once more" (Means and Means, 1966: 290). The postcolonial Indian state, on the other hand is implacable framed to the view that Nagaland will continue to form an integral part of India.

In the contemporary Naga situation the strongest NSCN faction has indicated that they may give up their long standing demand for sovereignty only if *Greater Nagaland* is established. That is, the mixture of the idyllic vision of Greater Nagaland with the developing concept *special federal relationship* as bedrock of what they call *honorable solution* rather than settlement. In sense Subir Bhaumik referring to NSCN (IM) faction supremo Mr. Thuingaleng Muivah, writes that "as a Tangkhul Naga from Manipur, *Grater Nagaland* is more important for his political future then sovereign Nagaland" (Bhaumik, 2009:2,3). Further the consequence according to Bhaumik who argues that, "political parties and insurgence groups in Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh have fiercely opposed a 'Greater Nagaland' as they stand to lose a lot of its territory. That's put Delhi in a bind. It desperately wants to end the long-festering Naga problem because it cannot effort to powerful insurgencies in the east and the west" (Bhaumik, 2009:91-92).

The NNC under Phizo's Presidency silenced the moderate notion of Naga identity based on socio-cultural underpinnings by giving a new meaning to it by invoking concepts such as *sovereignty* and *independence* to the movement. However, contemporary Naga scholars such as Charles Chasie conceptualizes Naga sovereignty as "the word 'sovereignty' is not to be trifled with, because it had meant more than its literal political terminology.... 'Sovereignty' and 'independence' were the words that launched and accelerated the process of a group of desperate tribe to become a people and the nation" (Chasie, 2010: 246). A very proximate view was taken by Dolly Kikon, according to her "for many Naga nationalist who make the case for sovereign Naga state argue that there notion of sovereignty may not be synonymous with classroom definitions; yet they persevere with the right to determine their indigenous notion of justice, rights and land ownership which according to them were established over a period of time through custom and tradition" (Kikon, 2008: 25). In this sense the concept of sovereignty prior to Nehru's visit of 1953 was appeal by the Naga nationalist primarily to consolidate various communities to give them a sense of community or a generic Naga nationhood.

The questions of sovereign pan-Naga identity got perpetuated vigorously under Phizo who formed *People Independent League*, "by laying the foundation of a Naga National movement dominated by radical Nagas corollary to the idea of sovereign and independence state of Nagaland" (Aosenba, 2001, p-44). "One of the first act of NNC after Phizo took over was to reject the sixth schedule of the Indian constitution, which provides wider power to the district councils which would be elected bodies and would replace the traditional councils. This was a cleaver move because it earned him the support of the 'tribal councils' and the chiefs" (Mishra, 2000:30). The support of the village chief and the tribal councils for the NNC was amply demonstrated during the "plebiscite" for Naga independence which Phizo organized from May 16th to August, 1951.

"The result was tabulated and published on 16th March, 1952 under the agesis of A.Z. Phizo, on two basic issue; (a) whether they want to remain in India or to be separate independent state and (b) to repudiate the charge of the Indian Government that the NNC was supported by only a minority of the people (Aosenba, 2001:45). The Plebiscite to which, some clime over 99% supported Naga independent state. This was followed by total boycott of the 1952 General Election, with no nomination paper being filed in the Naga Hills. In both the case NNC could claim that it has received the support of the overwhelming majority of the Naga people.

Though the moderate NNC from its very start had the task of fostering feelings of common past and an ancestry to the various section of communities in order to legitimize the Identity of the Naga Hill. The moderate NNC leaders finds the task difficult to make various fragments community to come to understand that they were a Nagas whose, entire past had lived with the costumes of perpetual warfare and Head taking raid within them. In this sense the move made by the moderate NNC leaders were not much different from the colonial administrators who had earlier understood very internal problem and sympathized with the Nagas by making an effort to unify them. But the creation of modern organization under the moderate represents a landmark for the postcolonial history of the Naga identity mobilization. It was this modern organization that later give a

political meaning to the pan-Naga identity struggle by bring about fragments of communities under a generic socio-cultural and political platform. Therefore in its initial setting on 2nd February 1946 the council was concerned with the welfare and social identity issues about the Nagas, but latter beginning 1948 under Phizo leadership extended its aspiration into a forceful construction of pan-Naga "political activities of what came to be considered as independent from foreign yoke" (Asongba, 2001, 35).

India's Nation Building Project and Marginalisation of Naga Identity

From the very start of its modern identity assertion, beginning around the World War I, the Naga assertion was peaceful in its approach until the aftermath of Nehru's first visit to the Naga Hills in the postcolonial period. Naga systematically then got integrated to the Indian socio-political system as the so called Hydari Accord was turned down by the Indian state. Before this, shortly after India got its independence from the colonial rule the Naga hill was partially incorporated under Indian state. Partly the Naga Hills were left ambiguously under the mercy of the indo-Assam protagonist's administration by the colonial British administration. The postcolonial Indian state in the Nehruvian era was crucially engaging in the policy that centers on *"Unity and Diversity"*, the policy was to peruse unity at all means and eradicate diversity.

Even prior to end of British rule the Indian nationalists realized India was diverse and had a vision to accommodate the heterogeneity by making decentralized autonomous states of independent Indian states. However, it was later compromised by some of the Indian nationalist elites in course of competing power struggle amongst them. The vision of making the fragments of "nation" into one unique nation, a nation that undertook the unity in diversity strategy of violent repression by restoring to terror to achieve its aim. Like many post-colonial states, Indian state deployed the use of massive force with utter brutality as an instrument to eradicate the slightest resistances from national minorities in nation building project. In this paradigm, the political nature of the Indian state in relation to the Nagas in the postcolonial era is no different from the nineteenth century colonial rulers of the South Asian region.

In response to the assertion of Naga's separate identity aspiration, the Indian state launched a series of armed campaign in the Naga Hill beginning 1950s. However the crackdown was preceded by a futile visit to Kohima by Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru with his Burmese counterpart Thakin Nu (Unu) on 30th march 1953. Though "this was a very significant visit for both India and Burma and, especially for the Naga people because any adequate settlement on the Naga problem would have to involve the government of India and Burma" (Chasie, 1999:45).The crowds gathered to listen to Nehru and submit memorandum was angered and walked out as mark as a protest against the attitude of Barkakaty, the then Indo-Assam protagonist and Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills. On the part of the Nagas such was the expression of the protest over the existing conflict or an act directed to secure national right for self-determination from their "oppressor nation". On the other hand for the postcolonial Indian state it was merely a "misguided", "secessionist", "terrorist", "hostile", "ruthless" act. In this way Naga people were "constructed as perennial trouble makers, representation of the Naga people continue[d] to sway between the necked hunters and the gun-wielding guerrillas" (Kikon, 2009:94). Such was the confrontation between the "oppressed" and "subjugated nationalist" and the reciprocal identity of the "oppressor" or the replica of the colonial state.

Nehru blamed the Assam chief minister Bishnu Ram Medhi for miss handling of the Nagas, who in turn sacked the Deputy Commissioner for mishandling the Nagas. To avenge the misconduct, the British protagonist Assam government cracked down on the NNC activities and the *Naga Nation*, the mouthpiece of Naga nationalism was banned. Following the declaration of Tuensang as free Nagaland, NNC formed parallel government call *Federal Government of Nagaland* with its armed wing *Nagaland Home Guard* in exile. The Indian state then articulated the persuasion of the Naga self-determination nothing more than *law and order* problem. The Assam Government deployed troops making matters worst as thousands of young Nagas were encouraged to take arms as the Home Guards. The Indian army was deployed with the systematically by terming the region as *Disturbed Area*. Thus, reproducing the colonially constructed

categories such as "wild, savage, disobedient communities that need to be panelized and disciplined" (Biswas and Suklabaidya, 2008:53).

The major strategic turn in the region and for its people were the deployment of the modern paradigm of governance through *Assam Maintenance of Public Order Act 1953* and *Assam Disturbed Area Act 1955*. The Assam police was replaced by armed forces with the introduction of *Armed Forces (Special Power) Regulation (AFSPA) 1958, Armed Forces (Assam-Manipur) Special Powers Ordinance 1958, The Nagaland Security Regulation 1962,* etc. These Acts legitimize the army and use of discretionary power to violently nationalize the peripheries. Although the government often refutes the contested human right abuses, the consequence of such military operation generated experiences, stories of torture, killings, destruction of property which got deeply internalized as a part of the Naga's struggles. Such indictment led to the political transformation cutting across an entire generation of Nagas.

Even after fifty years of the enforcement of AFSPA, it is seen by scholars as not only counterproductive but considered as one of the most repressive law passed by the Indian Parliament. These powers were injected into the armed forces through juridical and political apparatus. The postcolonial state systematically deployed an ample range of power since 1950s and 1960s with the view of bring about in the North East the nation building project. "Thus, by the virtue of the geographical, historical and political construction among other issues the Nagas and several other nationalities form the region denied access to right and justice" (Kikon, 2009:94).

According to Prof. A.Bimol Akoijam the region now called India's Norh East and the Nagas were considered by the postcolonial state as a "theatre where one still gets to witness all shades of struggles that articulate anti-colonial rhetoric and slogan, and mission-primarily powered by military might-to civilized and develop the 'other', the 'backward people'" (Akoijam, 2006 :116). In other words, in the postcolonial phase the mainstream intelligentsia has inherited the colonial concepts and categories in understanding the periphery, like the North East India or even more so the Naga Hills. It is with this mindset that the postcolonial state disregards the common will of the people

and understands the region "mainly in terms of security and policing, waiting to settle any disagreement by force" (Franke, 2009:105). It is on this argument, Marcus Franke remarks that, "in India, the major tool for national building on the periphery was the Indian army. The post-transfer of power Indian army fundamentally resemble its imperial predecessor" (Franke ,2009:67). In this case the post-colonial Indian state's stand vis-à-vis the postcolonial Naga Nationalist is no different from the nineteenth century British colonizing power regime in the region.

The demand for a Naga sovereign homeland intensified after the government of India launched a series of military operations beginning in the early 1960s against the Pakistani trained Naga guerrillas. As the movement intensified, Delhi backed up its military efforts with various political mechanisms to curb the any slightest resistance of the Nagas. But prior to the eruption of violent armed conflict, in 1955 State of Emergency was imposed on the Mokokchung sub-district of Naga Hill. Meantime out of the pressure the Phizo, Jasokie and three other leaders pleaded for possible peaceful resolution of the problem within NNC itself as T.Sakhrie and Jasokie were disillusion with Phizo leadership. Taking the advantage of the situation within NNC Assam Chief Minister, Bishnu Ram Medhi, deliberately turn down all the peaceful negotiations and resorted to solve the problem of what was termed the *Disturb Area* with force.

By January 1956 the violent armed conflict marked the beginning of widespread armed conflict. Consequently, Sakhrie, Phizo's nephew and a moderate leader was murdered by extremists with the view to strike terror within the "traitors" in January 1956. "Nehru was outraged. In his eyes the Nagas were about to endanger the Nation Building project that had just begun and he ordered the army to quell the uprising by handing over the responsibility of Naga Hill District to the army" (Franke, 2009:95). And on January 31st of the same year, the State of Emergency was imposed on the whole of the Naga Hills.

The Negotiation and Systematic State Maneuvering over the Identity Struggle

Apparently the Indian state did not formulate what is known as "anti-insurgency policy", its methods and patterns developed as a result of numerous confrontations with the extremist groups of Naga nationalists. Some of the attempts of Indian counter-assertion was in the form of "(a) block the exit-entry routes for the Pakistan and Chinese guerrilla columns, (b) deny base areas for those guerrilla squads activity within the Naga Hills, (c) negotiate with tribal elders and chiefs to secure the surrender of the guerrillas belonging to a particular tribe (d) encourage fragmentation by exploitation of tribal division within the NNC (e) strengthening the electoral system and providing huge development fund for Nagaland" (Bhaumik, 2009, p-97). In other words the postcolonial Indian state inherited the character of the colonial state by maneuvering the politic of "Divide and Rule" within the Nagas as well as in India's North East through systematic modern mechanisms.

The initial nationalist effort of brining Naga communities within a common platform of ethnic nationalism was disrupted by the seed of discord sowed by the Indian state within the NNC. The discord deepened within the Nagas with the success of the Government of India's effort to win over the moderate members by conciliation with the view to alienate the extremist. Most of the scholars agree that the movement of ethno Naga identity faced its first threat during the split between the Overground and Underground. However a major menace was the political or fratricidal tribalism inserted into the Naga society by the postcolonial Indian state and faithfully reproduced by the moderate and the extremist of NNC in "othering" itself.

The Naga Underground's violent assertion of separate Naga national identity became reality in the 1960s as a reactionary to the massive policy to nationalize and bring the Nagas within the folds of Indian national identity by deployment of the repressive state apparatus. However, this policy has only aggravated the problems as the Naga guerrillas re-organized again into a strong and more efficient force to counter the postcolonial Indian hegemonic identity project. Thousands of people were recruited both in the civil services as well as in the army and seek arm aid from neighboring countries particularly from East Pakistan and China to counter the repressive Indian security force.

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Meanwhile "the Naga commoners were caught in the fierce factional fights between Naga insurgents and the Indian Army" (Nag, 2002:254). According to Charles Chasie "most of the Naga found themselves at the receiving ends. Demands for food and shelter, kidnapping and forcible recruitment, torturing and killings from the underground. Harassment, tortures and killings, raping, burnings of village granaries, herding of villagers to concentration camps etc from the Indian troops" (Chasie,1999:47). Hence particularly in 1950s the Naga struggle for separate identity "had thus metamorphosis; from then on it took the form of an organized insurgency. From the over ground activity the Naga movement become an underground movement in the face of the onslaught of Indian state and weakening social basis of the movement itself" (Nag,2002:231).

The militarized situation since 1950s to 1960s in the region particularly in the Naga Hills, subsequently, laid some moderate Naga elites to enter into a piecemeal negotiation within the Indian union as a sixteenth state of India. To put an end to continuous violence and human trauma the church leaders meet at Kohima and Impur and appealed to both the Underground and Overground fractions to end the conflict. Seeing the people's desires for peace and normalcy in Nagaland, the moderate elements which had been marginalized due to the rise of the extremist, took the opportunity to capture the situation. Understanding the situation the postcolonial Indian state made a cautious response to maneuver the conflict which had military and socio-political aspects.

As proposed by the moderate the *Naga Hill Tuensang Area* (NHTA) created in 1957 was accepted as conglomeration of contagious Naga areas under one unit. The section of the moderate Naga nationalist formed Naga People's Convention and furthered the negotiations with the Prime Minister for the creation of the Nagaland state to primarily bring peace. Taking the view of the NNC's moderate Naga leaders and its endorsement of its 16 point proposal, Nehru rushed to the creation of the Nagaland state. On December 1, 1963, Nagaland, comprising of the early Naga Hill Tuensang Area, was declared as the 16th state within the Indian union with special provision for Tuensang and by amendment of Indian constitution special provision was made with regard to land, culture, and customs. Nagaland was place under the *External Affairs Ministry of Government of India.*

For the first time, the ethnic principal was introduced in the Indian federal system. Granting of full statehood to Nagaland evoked similar demands for statehood for Manipur, Tripura and Hill area of Assam with multiplicity of language and ethnicity.

However, it did not end its agony in the newly formed Nagaland state, but rather the repression continued throughout the unsuccessful rounds of peace negotiation which ultimately culminated into signing of the Shillong Accord in 1975 between the postcolonial Indian state and the representatives of Naga Underground.

The creation of Nagaland as a state neither brought the desired peace in Nagaland nor end what had then came to be known to the Indian state as insurgency movement but rather a further division and discord within Naga society. The formation of state of Nagaland which supposes to open up the possibility of shareing power in turn contributed to the rise of *tribalism / communalism*. The inter-communal revelry for power, thus, became a significant feature of the Naga identity politics both within the Overground and Underground. Sensing the deterioration of the peace in Nagaland, the churches in Nagaland capture the opportunity in initiated ceasefire between the government of India and the Underground Nagas in 1964.

The peace mission was carried out through B.P. Caliha, the then Chief Minister of Assam. Jaya Prakesh Narayan, the noted Sarviodaya leader, Shankar Rao Deo, Rev.Michael Scott were made to think and explore possible ways to restore peace and normalcy in Nagaland. The ceasefire came into force with effects from 6th September 1964. The two unsuccessful phase of negotiations on the question of sovereignty-the first at the government level and the second at the ministerial level further aggravated and triggered the seed of "tribalism". As a result both the so called "Naga parliament (*Tater Hoho*) and the members of Indian parliament roundly blamed the Naga leader Kughato Sukhai, and held him responsible for the failing the talk with the prime minister of India" (Nag, 2002:272).

The entire Naga Underground movement was full of inter-community revelry and struggle for hegemony within in order to change the leadership and replace it in a

communal line within the NNC. The Parliament or *Tater Hoho* systematically ousted and marginalized some of its leaders like Kughato and Kito and Scato Swu through the inherited modern western liberal democratic mechanism called non-confidents motion. "Indira Gandhi sensed the growing schism within the Naga movement; she went ahead with an affective divide-and-rule initiative that split the NNC down the middle. She then followed it with a massive counter- secessionist operation up until the Bangladesh operation in 1971" (Bhaumik, 2009:98).

Within the so called cease-fire, that lasted a short period of time, the postcolonial Indian state renewed its operation of *Unlawful Prevention Act* on the NNC and the Federal Government of Nagaland. For the first time under this systematic mechanism the Nagas were formally incorporated within Indian society by transferring the Nagaland state from Ministry of External Affairs to Home Ministry. Meanwhile the Nagas were at the pinnacle of inter-communal hostility and some of its cadres within the Underground murdered General Kito which laid to the formation of alternative organization called *Council of Naga People* represented by the nine Naga communities.

The CNP met on 2 November 1968 and a new government call *Revolutionary Government of Nagaland* was formed. It was a short lived, till its surrender in August 16[th,] 1973. "The new government pledge for (a) the integrity of Nagaland (b) peaceful coexistence (c) peaceful solution of Naga political problem (d) preservation of Naga culture and tradition (e) achieving national and individual liberty and freedom from external pressure" (Nag, 2002, p-274). But finally "the Revolutionary Government of Nagaland comes to an end when their cadres, about 1500 surrendered to the postcolonial Indian government on august 16, 1973 at Zhuniboto. Hokisha Sema, then a chief minister of Nagaland state was said to have played the key role to bring the RGN overground" (Vashum, 2000:92).

As a result "the seed of discord begin to grow and in its long run the NNC had to pay a rather heavy price for it. That tribalism had become the great bane within the Naga underground is an accepted fact that is evident from in the various issues by the different factions from time to time" (Mishra, 2000, p-53). Several Naga scholars tend to write that

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the formation of Revolutionary Government of Nagaland in November 1968 under the leadership of Scato Swu, former president of FGN as a beginning of serious "tribalism".

Under the *Unlawful Activities Prevention Act 1972*, Nagaland came under Presidential rule on 22nd March 1975, followed by suspension of "rule of law" by the National Emergency from 26th June 1975 under Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi. The Nagaland Government under a regional party called the United Democratic Front (UDF) and Nagaland Baptist Church Council initiated a peace accord. Consequently, on 11th November, 1975 the Shillong agreement was signed between the insurgent groups and the Indian government, which later came to be known as *Shillong Accord*. The accord was signed by the six member delegation led by Kevi Yallya as the representative of Underground and L P Sing as representative of the government.

The Shilling Accord was signed with the view that "(1) the representatives of underground organizations conveyed their decision of their violation to accept without condition the constitution of India, (2) it was agreed that the arms now underground would be brought out and deposited at appointed places. Details for giving effective to this agreement will be worked out between them and representative of the government, the security forces, and the members of the Liaison committee. (3) It was agreed that the representative of underground organization should have responsible time to formulate their issues for discussion on final settlement" (Aosenba, 2001:76).

However, after the signing of the Shillong Accord "government of India seems list bothered of actually arriving at the settlement" (Chasie, 1999: 70). As a result, the Shillong Accord apparently became an abrogated document. According to Sajal Nag "the talk was subdued affairs, and most of the meetings were held in Camera" (Nag, 2002:275). Subir Bhaumik also asserts that "the Shillong Accord signed by the NNC leaders with the government was an apology of a statement. It mealy reiterated the will of the two sides to achieve final settlement. The NNC got no political dividend from the Accord" (Bhaumik, 2009:98).

However the accord was put under a severe criticism by the breakaway nationalist organization NSCN. Kamarupee writes that, "The NSCN denounced the Shilong Accord as simply a clever devise by which the Angami leadership sold out to the government of india; and further begin to view Phizo himself as one fundamentally motivated by the worst form of tribalism" (Kamarupee, 1990:983)". In other words in "NSCN version, the split essentially occur, because NNC Phizo fail to condemn the Accord and did not even communicate his views to his comrades in arms" (Chasie, 1999, p-70).

Post-Shillong Accord and the Emerging Discourse on Identity

The Naga signatory of the Shillong Accord did not represent the entire resistant movement (Upadhyaya, 1996:159). Disenchantment with a supposedly an invalid Shillong Accord[3] was then a marker for some members of extremist NNC to find a new avenue of political opportunity to turn the Naga identity struggle into a newer perspective. As a result separate organization of what is known as National Socialist Council of Nagaland (now Nagalim) NSCN was formed on 31st January 1980 "under a strong leadership of Isak Chishi Swu as chairman, S.S.khaplang as vice president and Thuingleng Muivah as general secretary" (Vashum, 2000:94).The group then went on to form an alternative front call *Government of the Peoples Republic of Nagaland* (GPRN). The organization under supposedly to be an alternative negotiator for Nagas sovereignty, however seems to have now couched with ambiguous issues. However, though NSCN was the outcome of the Shillong Accord, the later too was soon to be engulfed by internal dissension on communal line; pitted Muivah and Swu against their one time comrade, the Burmese Hemi Naga leader S.S. Khaplang" (Bhaumik, 2009:99).

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[3] Shillong Accord automatically becomes an invalid document. The reason for this invalid is because of the following reason. The Accord was signed when Nagaland was under heavily militarized situation, it was signed by the group of individual who call themselves the representatives of underground organizations, and no designation was mention except L.P.Sing, governor on the behalf of the Indian government. It was signed when the civil liberty was suspended (almost like a state of anarchy), The word "Naga" was not even mention in the accord (how then can it become a document of indo-Naga political settlement). The Accord was never ratified ether Federal Government of Nagaland nor Government of India. After a decade's several negotiation of what is known as indo-Naga talk was held in different parts of the world. See Zhimomi (2004), "the role of the Semas in Naga National affairs".

Differences between Muivah-Isaac Swu and Khaplang groups of NSCN developed ever since the former accused the latter of trying to arrive at a settlement with Indian union. It did not take too long for the open clash between two group to start, that leds to the further split into NSCN (IM) and led by Muivah-Isaac Swu and NSCN (K) led by Khaplang. However, in the 1988 there was split within the NSCN, again along the communal line. As a result since then Nagas were at hopelessly at odds with each other; there was the NSCN (IM), the NSCN (K), the Federal group, the parental organisation NNC.

It is from the popular conscious that the turning point in the Naga nationalist politics remain the year 1975. The real or perceived defeat of the Shillong Accord inaugurated a new era of nationalist aspiration for the Naga. In other words what seems most unusual to the scholars and commentators of the Nagas was the rise of the NSCN of both factions. That is, essentially it rise to power by through dedication and organizing tactic, led to cease-fire and internationalization Naga issues to the world. However it should be remember that the organizations re-emerged as a nationalistic struggle from within the members of the NNC which opposed any compromised of Nagas sovereignty to the postcolonial Indian state.

The dissension within over the signing of Accord and factionalism within crystallizes it into the formation of NSCN of both groups: NSCN (IM) and NSCN (K). It drew its legitimacy through an alternative narrativisation of a contingent Nagas past by redrawing the battle lines and creates a new ideological edifice. "The redrawn manifesto of the NSCN was based upon the ideological critic of 'Phizoism', describing as reckless nepotism, familism, and capitalist egoism and it condemned total capitulation" (Biswas and Shuklabaidya, 2008: 180).

Accourding to Udayon Misra, "the NSCN issued its manifesto in 1980 in which it declared the Phizoite Naga National Council to be spend a spend force which had turned 'treacherous and reactionary'. It affirmed its commitment to 'sovereignty, independent Nagaland' which would be 'socialist' and Christian in character (Mishra, 2000:51)". As a result, it framed its own derivative discourses of nationalism, socialism and Christianity with various indigenous idioms to differentiate into a clean line of struggle; the Phizoist

and the Socialist. Meanwhile it has been clear that the ethno pan-Naga identity which has its root in the colonial period begin to deteriorate in the postcolonial phase due to the both internal and external dynamic in the Naga society.

The NSCN exposed the divisive politic of Phizo in the name of an apparent appeal for unity by listing some paradoxes of Phizoean brand of politics as a "sellout of Naga's right". According to Subir Bhaumik the "China-trained Naga leader Thungaleng Muivah labeled all Angamis as 'reactionary traitors' and describes all Tangkhuls as 'revolutionary patriots', when he lashed out at the 'betrayal' of Angami-dominated NNC" (Bhaumik, 2009:2). Hence the NSCN has clearly drawn the ideological battle line of false consciousness of their struggle between the Angamis and the rest of the Naga people or communism and Christianity. However in the minds of the Naga population there were paradoxes with their Christian belief and the atheism of communism and consequently NSCN comes under criticism.

The NSCN sorted it out this blameworthiness of sidling with communism by referring to their pledge of struggle for Christian nation which would have socialist economy. This, however, brought the masses to believe that their ideological struggle is much more open which seems to widen the ideological struggle against the narrow subscription to Maoism and socialism. The idea it infused amongst the people was to protect the spirit of sovereign people by referring to "Nagaland for Christ" which inspire in re-making a decolonized Nagaland in which the will of God shall work. Hence its derivative ideological discourse of Christianity, nationalism, socialism, and question of sovereignty for the Nagas could be viewed in the light of the statement, "NSCN stands for Naga sovereignty. The manifesto of NSCN is essentially based on the principal of 'Christian socialism'. This concept is combination of the aga old traditional socio-cultural and economic system of Naga with tinge of Marxism, Leninism, Maoism.....they beloved in a combination of dictatorship and democracy / intra democracy and struggle through arms to their cherished goal" (Vashum, 2000:94).

Within a decade, the NSCN had achieved a position of primacy amongst the other suppressed nationalities in the North East India. It also resulted in the officials in Delhi to

name the NSCN as the *mother of all insurgencies* in the region. The name was given to the NSCN, probably as noted by R.Vashum that, "the NSCN-IM joined hands with other ethnic insurgents in the region such as the Assamis, Meiteis, Garos, Khasis, Hmars, Twipras, etc who were all fighting for self-determination. The NSCN-IM had also linked with the Kashmirs, Khalistanis, Karen, Mon, Arakn, and chin insurgents. It was also reported that NSCN had relation with LTTE (Vashum, 2000:101). The massive mobilization attempted by the NSCN against their common militarised Indian state lead to the bloody conflict in the region.

In this situation the Indian government had no clear partner for negotiation in the region, so the talk with the Nagas came to stand still. In fact the majority of the Naga were already tired of combat and were only interested in at last being able to lead a normal life in dignity. The geopolitical position of the government of India in the North east had improved by the mid 1990s. This according to Marcus Franke was "mainly due to the rapprochement between India and China, closer collaboration with Myanmar and the electorial victory of the pro-Indian government of Sheikh Hasina Wajad in Bangladesh in june 1996" (Franke, 2009:140).

On the other hand several authors including Marcus Franke writes that by May 1993, the NSCN had renewed its activities in Manipur and Myanmar border area at the same time ethnic conflict in the hills lead to the brutal fights between the two ethnic communities of Manipur Nagas and the Kuki's (Franke,2009, p-137). The communal violence between the two ethnic communities began under the pretext that "the Naga saw the Kukis as government informants, settled their first by the Meitis and then British and order them to leave the region" (Ibid:138). According to Subir Bhaumik "[a] new militia, the Naga Lim Guards, formed by the Manipuri Nagas as backup force of NSCN, came into existence and started attacks against the Kukis" (Bhaumik, 2009:142). As a result different authors on this issues writes that it lead to several deaths and displacement, beginning with "the worst carnage occurred at Zopui village of Manipur where more than 80 Kuki men were beheaded in one night and in counter-attack 150 were killed" (Bhaumik, 2009:142; Franke, 2009:138).

"The Manipur government says that only 15,000 Nagas and kukis have been permanently displaced, where the mixed Naga-Kuki districts like Senapati, Tamenglong, and Chandel, where the violence was fierce and sustained (Bhaumik, 2009:143). However the ethnic violence did not stop with the initiative of the government as though "the Indian government and the state government of Manipur increased their presence of security forces but did little else to control the violence" (Bhaumik, 2009:142). It was only with the intervention of the Baptist Church of both Naga and Kuki pleaded for the ceasefire between the two communities.

Meanwhile according to Marcus Franke "NSCN (IM), increased of operations in scope and territorial expansion, against the Indian security force and its rival faction NSCN (K)…encroached into northern Nagaland, into the district of Mokokchung, Zunheboto, and Wokha...Everyday life in the Naga hills had been characterised by violence once more" (Franke, 2009:138).

The Naga civil society and politicians' exerted pressures on two NSCN factions to settle their differences and face the Government of India. Most of the Nagas wanted unity. For instances "the Naga politicians like former chief minister of Nagaland S.C Jamir have been calling for a comprehensive dialogue involving all Naga factions. The emearging civil society- the Naga Mother Association, the Naga peoples Movement for Human Rights, the Naga Hoho, and the Naga Student Federation- also call also call for a comprehensive dialogue that would involve all the Naga factions" (Bhaumik,2009:100). The call for negotiation also arises as everyday life is characterised with the existential concerns.

According to R Vashum, after the split of the between NSCN into the two camps both the group then geared up to consolidate there hold in terms of millinery strength as well as to win the mass public supports, and there seemed to be no sign of any compromise between the groups, each trying to outdo the other, while keeping sovereignty of the Nagas as their main goal (Vashum, 2000:100). "Since then mutual killing was the order of the day" (Franke, 2009:137).

According to Sajal Nag "to insure financial viability the NSCN collected taxes and rations periodically from villagers. The business communities of Dimapur and Kohima and forest contractors of Tizit paid huge sums as Taxes to the NSCN. Activities like bank robberies, attack on government officials, ambush of army personal and elimination of a person's suspected to be informers were steeped up in the post-1984 period" (Nag, 2002:286).On the other side in order to strengthen their hegemony both begins to make an alliance with various other fighting 'suppressed nationalities' in the region. According to Sajal Nag "S.S.Khaplang was instrumental in uniting all insurgent outfits in north-east India and Burma under one banner which came to be known as the Indo-Burmese Revolutionary Front (22nd may 1991) at Mukpa in west Burma. The IBRF was organise as a supervisory body comprising of representatives of various insurgent outfit, and coordinate their struggle" (Nag, 2002:287).

Since then "the NSCN had by the middle of the 1990s established itself as the most powerful organisation of the North East. So it was not accidental that it was this organisation the government of India decided to negotiate with it" (Franke, 2009:140). It has been more then twelve years since the declaration of the truce in 1997, announcement of the ceasefire by Prime Minister I. K. Gujral with NSCN (IM), more than 60 round of negotiation and there is still no singe of any substantial settlement. On the other hand according to Subir Bhaumik that "NSCN have actually displayed some skill at Indian-style manipulative politic that characterise the country's ballot democracy. In two assembly elections (2003 and 2008), that they the supported the opposition Democratic Alliance of Nagaland (DAN)- a collection of Naga regional parties and Bharati Janata party (BJP) and work ensure their victory...the combination use of terror and persuasion by the NSCN first brought down congress government in 2003 (Bhaumik, 2009:101)". The government of India meantime acknowledged the North Eastern societies condition of hopelessly at odds with each other; between the different the sections of ethno-suppressed nationalities as well as its impact on the larger society. In year 2001, "the protest was staged out of fear that, the extension of ceasefire was first step towards the territorial extension of the Nagas" (Franke, 2009:124).

The postcolonial Indian state went against the general will of the protesters over the ceasefire with NSCN beyond Nagaland that led to an unfortunate event of 14 people death in the police firing. On the other hand there had been continues weakening of the movement due to the fratricidal strife, the growing cry over all the armed conflict by the non-state actors to a mere terrorism. This makes it difficult for the Naga leaders to revive its armed struggle against Indian state. For the Indian state it is a priority to ensure the Naga do not renew their armed campaign against Indian state. This is in Subir Bhamuk who writes "durable peace is desirable but not if it means fresh trouble in the neighbourhood. So long the settlement is not reached with the NSCN, India will be happy to keep them confined to their barracks- or fighting each other" (Bhaumik, 2009:102). Inato Yekheto Shikhu writes that, "this factionalism and disunity with different ideologies has weakened the whole process and the spirit of true patriotism is fast disappearing (Shikhu, 2007:102)".

Concluding remarks

The colonial British protagonist Indian state in relation to the Nagas in the present time too is profoundly embedded within this dynamic of nineteenth century colonial discourse in the South Asia region. It had been since late 1940s and early 1950s in the postcolonial Indian state that the region called the North East India had been of marginal interest to Delhi, and her North East Frontier policy had only being determined by strategic defense against the communist China, Nepali communist and international border with Burma and now its policy of looking east from west.

The post-colonial Indo-Assamese protagonist state's stands vis-à-vis the Nagas relation is, no different from the nineteenth century British colonsating power regime in the Naga Hill. The independent Indian state have taken strategic turn of deploying the aggressive policy such as the mindless operation of oppressive state apparatus like Armed Forces and repressive law as a major tool for nation building in these peripheries. One of its initial systematic repressive measure put to the fore was terming the region as Disturbed Area and subsequently replicate the colonial Government of India Act 1935 into fully matured post-colonial Indian state Act, infamously known as Armed Force Special Power

Act 1958, implemented formally in the Naga Hill is said to have originated in Nehru's March 1953 incident in Kohima.

It was in fact, the impact of such aggressive state policy under Nehru's premiership that cemented the Naga's notion of modern nation partly contributed by Christianity on a board as a distinguishing unifier and determining to fight off of what the Naga sow and still sees as an invasion of their land. At the height of Indian state's aggression in 1950s to 1960s in the region and particularly in the Naga Hills, subsequently laid some Naga elites to find a piecemeal choice within the Indian union as a sixteenth state of India. However, it does not end its agony in newly formed Nagaland state, but rather it continues throughout the unsuccessful rounds of peaceful negotiation, that ultimately culminated into signing an invalid Shillong Accord in 1975 between the Government of India and the Naga people.This Accord was then a marker for some members of NNC to form a separate organization of what is now known as NSCN that supposedly is an alternative in negotiation for Nagas sovereignty that too seems to have, now couched in its ambiguity.

There are no doubts that one may identify certain differences between the newly independent Indian states with the former British Empire with regard to the use of technique to exercise its hegemonic power regime. However, it is not also possible to deny the possibilities of coming to discover that the independent Indian State is not yet free from replicating the deep implied chain of unbroken continuity of the colonial practices of power over its marginalized peripheries. This obvious continuity of the imperial project and trajectory in the postcolonial Indian is justifiable, in the fact that, it could be seen in the imperial institutional structure that is deeply operating in the postcolonial Indian power politic at all levels of relation.

Hence the fact of Indian state replicating the legacy of its former colonizer's method of control and disciplinary measure can be very well taken as a premise of examining the very inherent nature of popular discourse in the postcolonial period. The postcolonial Indians mainstream intelligentsia in order to have systematic control over the region call "North East" permanently, has been striving to impute in them a sense of inferiorness in

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comparisons to their mainstream. There language and way of life were stereotyped into considering something that is to be overcome and changed into that of the dominant group or sometimes even inassimilable and relegated to the lower level of society. Therefore in order to tame and discipline these exotic "other" the "backwards" people into lasting subservient to the socio-cultural location of the Indian mainstream through officially patronizing discourses. Hence the Indian government's inability to innovatively response to the Naga Nationalism is due to the media and writings of the Indian army officers and civil service officers which continue to faithfully reproduce the colonial discourses in their relationship with the people of North Eastern states.

Conclusion

This work is a demonstration as to how culture of modern selfhood is constituted. Like most societal phenomena, the culture of identity formation in colonial and postcolonial society takes place within two social realities. The consciousness of modern categories in the colonized society such as nation and nationalism, ethnicity, community, tribes, etc seems to have first imagined by the dominant power structure of the colonial or by the postcolonial state. On one hand there is a constant contestation of such category, paradoxically on the other hand such categories are continually asserted by the people themselves in their daily life.

In the Chapter 1, I have explored how western modernity which centers the European enlightenment project did not end in Europe but was reproduced in the non-European world in the wake of colonialism through its discursive practices. Drawing from Hegel, Habermas have positioned eighteenth century as a threshold of modernity and hinted at modernity as an epochal concept. In this sense, western modernity is conceived as fundamental shift from pre-modern to modern or from old to new. This is essentially to unearth the epistemological and philosophical foundation of European modernity that drew its sustenance from the conception of an idea of progress or universal liner history, emancipation from superstitious world view through its subject-center reason and meaning legislating rationality.

The premises of Descartes, Kant and Hegel advanced into the formation of 'normalized' system of modern European inter-subjectivity in the form of juxtaposing 'self' and 'other' into binary relation. The underpinning premises eventually epitomized the foundation for edifying western modern thinking in the late nineteenth century Anglo-Saxons intellectual tradition of empiricism or logical thinking of David Hume, John Locke, and utilitarianism of J.S.Mill, deeply reflected in the works of the colonial agents (Srivatsan, 2005). Tracing a very brief trajectory, I began with the genealogy of western modernity embedded in a relatively obscured intellectual heritage in Descartes. The method of deducing certainty is central to the subject-centered rationalizing project of Descartes that view the world in the language of dualism or a binary. The European

modernity embedded deeply in this form of converting the whole energy into deductive reasoning to acquire certainty of knowledge ultimately hints at the European project of logocentericisation of the rest to itself. As Dipesh Chakrabarty has provocatively put forward, Europe has been 'provincialized' as a single-history whereby all non-European 'other' drew its radiant center in Europe.

In this sense western modernity is said to have entrenched in the non-western world in eighteenth and nineteenth century through the project of colonization. Western colonial modernity in the colonial world was made possible and sustained through colonial knowledge that essentially remodel and refashion the European others by juxtaposing 'self' and 'other' into stigmatized perpetual binary entities. The constructed binary for Edward Said is necessitated by political expediency. It is in this context the Chapter 1 shows how the critic of western modernity arises with the consideration that modernity is a grand narrative which is imperialist, ruthless and perpetually alienating and subjugating. For Ashis Nandy, the project of colonial modernity strives for a near total possession of the colonized which does not limit itself to dominating the bodies and the physical but also 'colonized mind…and releases within the colonized society to alter their cultural priority once and for all. For Partha Chatterjee, the modernity prevailing in most of the non western context is a modernity of once colonized with a burden of reason, dreams of freedom, the desire for power and resistance to power: all of these are itself elements of modernity. Therefore, we cannot go against modernity but only find strategy to cope up with it.

Problematising the nature of western modernity and its universalizing implication, Chapter 2 primarily focuses on the continued trend of western principle of modernity in the colonial world through colonial discourses. Foucault himself did not pay much attention to colonialism and its expression and the intimate connection of colonial knowledge and identity production. Invoking Foucauldian conceptual and theoretical formulation, one recognizes his notion of modern regimes of power in knowledge and it serves as a useful analytical aperture to understand the colonial technology of constituting selfhood. It is therefore an attempt of this chapter that examining the continuation of the western modern regimes of power in the colonial world by bridging a possible connection

between 'colonial knowledge' and identity production. As such the Chapter essentially dwells on anthropologist and historian like Bernard S. Cohn, Nicholas B. Dirks and also Sudipto Kaviraj to unravel how colonial technology of modernity such as historiography and ethnography formulates, extends, strengthens, textualises, standardizes the socio-political identities of the colonized. The theoretical framework for this chapter was drawn out from the intellectual energy, beginning with the idea of social identity theorist. One of the key perspectives of social identity theory is that it helps to examine and identify the underlying principle as to how perpetual sense of grouping gets ingrained in the identity formation. That is, social identity gets formed through mechanism of 'othering' the other from social self on the basis of mutually perceived sheared similarities. Paraphernalia of modern group identity such as ethnicity and nationalism therefore are constructed with a deep sense of continuity and uniqueness from the other people. Hence, referring to the views of Ashis Nandy and other subalterian thinkers like Partha Chaterjee, Depesh Chakraberty, Gyan Prakash and many more, I have explored the making of modern identity in the colonial world as a result of colonial domination that marked the terrain of tense and struggle for power in the colonized societies.

The preceding Chapters 1 and 2 have critically engaged with the pervasively prevailing problems associated with western colonial modernity in the colonial world. Verities of critical perspective in the colonial world have questioned the place of west as modernity, history, and destiny. However, much of the colonized world still bears the burden of European modernity, its concepts and categories. The essential focus of this work was to grapple with the idea as to how the discourses of western modernity produce identity in the colonized world. In attempting to uncover this possible connection we learn that 'colonial knowledge' is an important instrument through which the discourses of colonial modernity get translated into the colonial world.

It was indeed in this context, Chapter III unfolds how modern identity gets perpetually produced and reproduced in the colonized society like the Nagas as a result of confrontation with the colonial modern regime of power, "a regime in which power is meant not to prohibit but to facilitate, to produce" (Chatterjee, 1997: 15). In this sense, the end of British colonial dominations in the Naga Hills did not mean a cessation from

the colonial influence. Instead, the discourses associated with foreign rule and its functioning continues to shape the lives of the Naga communities. To understand these nuisances of the postcolonial situation of the Naga society, I examined the colonial modernity project, the structure of the modern regime of power that operates through discursive practices of colonial knowledge and its identity production. The discursive practices of producing colonial knowledge were taken for granted as a mere statement of rescue-recording of the Naga's dying culture for posterity. But in many instances it reflects much about colonial attitude towards the destiny of the colonized. Yet there are no better sources or range of narratives that reflect the deeply implied "official mind". Colonial monographs are valuable sources for understanding the British colonial policies and attitude rather than the Nagas. Hence, the root of the problems associated with the contemporary enduring Naga identity struggle has much bearing in the installed structures of the colonial power.

After having critically dealt with the effect of the first half of the nineteenth century colonial discourses, Chapter 4 presents the possible legacy of colonial modernity in the postcolonial society such as that of the Nagas. The focus is essentially to situate the lens of postcolonial perspective in order to see how far Naga identities are being constructed out of colonial modern discourses. The chapter treats that the Naga identity is a product of both colonial as well as postcolonial India's Nation building project. There are no doubts that one may identify certain differences between the newly independent Indian state and the former British Empire with regard to the use of technique to exercise modern regime of power. The chapter argues that the protagonist Indian state in relation to the Nagas in the postcolonial present is profoundly embedded within the very dynamic of nineteenth century colonial discourse in the South Asia region. For instance, the Naga's life world were stereotyped into something that is to be overcome and hence must be civilized into the dominant way of life or sometimes even relegated to the lower level of society.

As a project to recover from these real or perceived marginalizations, the Nagas asserted their life of freedom that was contextualized in the idea that Naga should be left alone and free from any foreign interference. Hence, throughout long trajectories, the NNC

which has been the first pan-Naga mouthpiece remodel Naga identities by integrating both the traditional narratives with the contrasting modern narrative of liberal legal concept like right to self-determination. Slight antitheses to NNC in a recent time, the NSCN have begun to develop a terrain of new concepts and ideology to champion Naga identity movement. In short, it is in these terms modern Naga identity is being shaped through the prolonged colonial experience of the past and is now continually remodel by both postcolonial Indian state and on the other hand by the fragmentation and systematic contradiction within.

In this work, the attempt has been to demonstrate the process through which modern identity consciousness gets produced as a result of confrontation with the project of both colonial and the postcolonial state. The method chosen to demonstrate this argument in the case of the Nagas is by embedding the emerging Nagas identity consciousness within the large framework of both colonial as well as the postcolonial modernity discourses. The use of the term Naga, as personal and political identity as have discussed at length grew out of the intrusion of British colonial technology of modernity. The colonial expansion and establishment of colonial institutions and modern systems of power in the Naga society probably have marked the first instance where modern Naga's culture of self got tuned and continued to develop. Therefore, in the case of the Nagas, the anthropologically constructed categories of the Nagas can be seen in the context of the literature that mainly emerged and developed within the group of officers who served as administrators in the Naga Hills (West, 1994: Lotha: 2007). The anthropological enterprises on the Naga identity were indeed began during the formative year of the British social anthropology under the shade of British colonialism.

In Abraham Lotha's word, the objective of the ethnographic survey was intended to be "partly scientific and partly administrative"- to help the advancement of anthropology and to aid the colonials in their administration of the colonized. Arjun Appadurai's argument pushes it further as a complex information gathering aperture that has two sides that in retrospect need to be distinguished. The one side may be described as justificatory and the other as disciplinary. In the produced colonial knowledge, the Nagas were popularly known as another "primitive", "savage tribes", non-modern European others.

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Through the writings of the British soldiers-ethnographers, Christian missionaries, monographs and other published and unpublished materials, the Nagas were represented as exotic people who were best known to the non-Nagas as "head-hunters of Assam". The rescue recording of the colonial administrators and anthropological enterprises in some way have preserved certain primordial cultural practices, but on the other hand it had also produced discursive knowledge which still benevolently contributed to their unfinished colonial and postcolonial state project. These knowledge systems are long term ideological apparatuses to discipline the entire generation of population, to legitimately accept the derivative self as inferior and was nurtured and educated under colonial institution.

On the other side, such ideological remnant category of colonial modernity are acknowledged and endorsed by the people themselves as a result of their inability to move out from its colonial paradigm. Hence constantly reaffirm it as a major starting point for collective mode of resistance as well as to organize society. The work has tried to problemetise the issue by asking what could be the responses of the scholars when the produced and reproduced representations like "indigenous", "tribal" are utilized by people themselves in their struggle with both colonial and postcolonial state. Similarly, the institutional mechanism of colonialism such as religion, education and other byproducts of colonial bureaucratic mechanism, institutional apertures down to the village: like *Gaonburas* (British invented chief) and *Dobashis* continue to carry the political legacy of modern colonial power. These modes of reasoning are replicated through the discursive discourses of the postcolonial Indian state like law and statutes, for administrative purpose. Therefore, the discourse on the theory and practices of colonial regimes of power on Naga continue to regulate Nagas' social, economic, political, culture identity etc,. These are few observation and many more have not yet adequately touched in this work which needs a further exploration. Hence, analyzing the colonial discourse will make it possible to trace connections between the implicated and the explicated identity, the dominant and the marginalized identity, ideas and institutions. In the process, it will allow us to discern how colonial modern regimes of power works through colonial language, literature, culture and the institutions which regulate the daily lives of the postcolonial society.

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