

**AFRICAN STATES  
AND  
SOME COLD WAR ISSUES IN THE UNITED NATIONS**

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## CERTIFICATE

This dissertation entitled "African States and Some Cold War Issues in the United Nations" submitted by Abraha Ghila Michael for the degree of Master of Philosophy in International Studies has not previously been submitted for any other degree of this or any other university. We recommend that this dissertation should be placed before the examiners for their consideration for the award of the M.Phil degree.

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PREFACE

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## PREFACE

War and Peace originate in the approaches adopted by the States (Nations) towards inter-State and international affairs. Cold War is an intermediary state between War and Peace. The present study is an attempt to analyse approaches of the African States towards various issues which emanated from the Cold War in the United Nations.

The first Chapter traces the emergence of African States and their entry into the UN Organisation. It also describes the diversity inherited by these States as they attained their independence from the colonial powers. The second Chapter narrates the philosophy of Cold War which divided the world into two military blocs headed by USA and USSR. It also traces initiation of the non-aligned movement by leaders of the newly independent countries who sought to avoid direct involvement in bloc politics of the time.

The third Chapter takes the issue of Hungary and Czechoslovakia which provided the Western countries with opportunities to attack the Communist adversaries. The fourth takes up the Cuban and Congolese crisis when the Communist adversaries sought to score with the Western countries on the same grounds. The fifth chapter analyses the African approach toward admission of People's Republic of China or mainland China to the UN. The Soviet Union initiated this move to strengthen its position in the

Security Council which, however, later on bommeranged on the Soviet Union itself. This chapter also traces the reaction of African States towards changing relationship between USSR and China in the context of its admission to the UN.

The last chapter notes the conclusions of this study of the above issues.

I owe great gratitude to Professor Anirudha Gupta who inspired my academic faculties and guided me in completing this dissertation. I, therefore, pay my highest regards to him.

I am thankful to the staff of the School of International Studies and Library of Jawaharlal Nehru University, Indian Council of World Affairs and Indian Council of Cultural Relations for providing me with material on the topic.

The above study is primarily based on secondary source materials including UN Documents.

(ABRAHA GHILA MICHAEL)

Chapter I

UNITED NATIONS AND COLD WAR ISSUES  
IN WORLD POLITICS

## Chapter I

### UNITED NATIONS AND COLD WAR ISSUES IN WORLD POLITICS

The nomenclature, United Nations (UN)<sup>1</sup>, was used for the first time in a Declaration signed on 1 January 1942 by 26 States<sup>2</sup> expressing the determination to fight the Axis Powers and to "defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands."<sup>3</sup> The Declaration was acceded to, towards the close of the War, by 21 more States.<sup>4</sup> While the War was going on, the Allied Powers jointly and individually pursued the goal of setting up an international organization after the defeat of the Axis Powers. The diplomats of the Allied Powers consequently drew up plans

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- 1 This was suggested by the US President, Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
  - 2 The signatory states to the UN Declaration were: USA, UK, USSR, China, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Poland, South Africa, Yugoslavia.
  - 3 See, UN Yearbook, 1946-47 (New York, 1947), p. 1.
  - 4 The names of the acceding States, and dates, were: Mexico (5 June 1942), Philippine (10 June 1942), Ethiopia (28 July 1942), Iraq (16 January 1943), Brazil (8 February 1943), Bolivia (27 April 1943), Iran (10 September 1943), Colombia (22 December 1943), Liberia (26 February 1944), France (26 December 1944), Ecuador (7 February 1945), Peru (11 February 1945), Chile (12 February 1945), Paraguay (12 February 1945), Venezuela (16 February 1945), Uruguay (23 February 1945), Turkey (25 February 1945), Egypt (27 February 1945), Saudi Arabia (1 March 1945), Syria (1 March 1945), Lebanon (1 March 1945).



which came to be known as Dumbarton Oaks proposals.<sup>5</sup> These proposals were agreed to at the Yalta Conference which "resolved upon the earliest possible establishment without Allies of a general international organization to maintain peace and security."<sup>6</sup> The Conference also maintained that "this is essential, both to prevent aggression and to remove the political, economic and social causes of war through the close and continuing collaboration of all peace-loving peoples." Accordingly, a further Conference met at San Francisco on 25 April 1945. In its Preamble

the San Francisco Charter maintained that the UN would strive to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our life time has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom. <sup>7</sup>

The San Francisco Conference appointed a Preparatory Committee to draft a Charter for the proposed international

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- 5 In the first phase diplomats of USSR, UK and USA discussed the proposals from 21 August to 28 September 1944; in the second phase from 29 September to 7 October 1944, China, UK and USA deliberated. The Dumbarton Oaks proposals were signed on 9 October 1944.
- 6 UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill, US President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin of USSR met at Yalta (Crimea) in February 1945.
- 7 At San Francisco, 4 States, namely Ukranian SSR, Balorussian SSR, Argentina, and Denmark, were admitted, increasing the strength to 50. Poland was permitted to become the 51st member without attending the Conference.

organization. The first General Assembly met on 10 January 1946 in London and was attended by 52 States.

The principal organs of the UN were devised under the Charter as follows:

(1) General Assembly

The UN General Assembly (UNGA) was to consist of "all peace-loving States which, in the opinion of the organization, are able and willing to carry out the obligations of the Charter. Each State could send five representatives to the UNGA but was entitled to only one vote.

The UNGA was "essentially a deliberative organ, an overseeing, reviewing, and criticising organ." It was restricted to make "recommendations on a dispute or situation which is being dealt with by the Security Council." Its functions and powers concerned mainly with three aspects: (i) maintenance of international peace and security, (ii) promotion of international economic and social co-operation, and (iii) operation of the international Trusteeship System. Though the UNGA could "discuss any question relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the UN, or by the Security Council, or by a State if that State accepts in advance the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the Charter," but its power was circumscribed by the limitation to the effect that (i) any question on which action was necessary must be referred to the Security Council; (ii) it could not make recommendations on any dispute under discussion

in the Security Council and (iii) amendment to the Charter made even with two-third majority of votes could be effective if only "ratified by two-thirds of the Members including all the Permanent Members of the Security Council." Despite these limitations, the UNGA was destined to become a powerful organ of the UN in the years to come, and provided an opportunity to African nations to play an effective role.<sup>8</sup>

(2) Security Council:

The UN Security Council (hereafter Council) consisted of 11 (now, 15) members including five permanent members, namely China, France, the USSR, the UK and the US.<sup>9</sup> Non-permanent members were to be elected by the UNGA. The Council was responsible primarily "for maintaining international peace and security." The Council "exercises all functions of the UN under the Trusteeship System in trust territories" classed as "strategic areas". And amendment to the UN Charter could be made only with an affirmative vote of its five permanent

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8 The UNGA was (1) empowered to "consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments; (2) responsible "for discharging the functions and powers of the UN with respect to international economic and social cooperation"; (3) exercise "the functions of the UN with regard to all trust territories not designated as strategic" through "Trusteeship Council, which operates under its authority"; (4) "exclusive control over the finances of the UN" and (5) could admit new member with "a two-thirds vote... (including) of at least seven members of the Security Council, including its permanent members".

9 Besides a non-member can participate without vote in a discussion of (1) any question brought before the Council if the Council considers that the interests of that Member are specifically affected; and (2) if "it is a party to a dispute being considered by the Security Council".

members. While procedural matters could be disposed of with "affirmative vote of any seven members" other matters need "the concurring votes of all the five permanent members." The latter provision thus gives "veto" power to permanent members. This "veto" makes permanent members more powerful than others and can impede the operation of the UN in any matter affecting their interests.

(3) The Economic and Social Council:

The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) consists of 54 members elected by the UNGA. It can invite any Member of the UN or any specialized agency to participate in its deliberations without vote. Functioning under the authority of the UNGA, the ECOSOC is responsible for promoting:

- (1) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;
- (2) solutions of international economic, social health, and related problems, and international cultural and educational co-operation; and
- (3) universal respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

(4) Trusteeship Council:

The Trusteeship Council (TC) consisted of (1) Members of the UN administering Trust Territories; (2) permanent members of the Council which do not administer Trust Territories; and (3) as many other members equal to the number of the members from the above two categories. The TC was made responsible for the advancement of non-strategic Trust Territories.

(5) The International Court of Justice:

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) represented the principal judicial organ of the UN. Its bench consisted of 15 judges "two of whom may not be nationals of the same State" to be elected by the UNGA and the Council voting independently.

(6) The Secretariat:

The sixth principal organ of the UN is the Secretariat. The UN Secretariat is headed by a Secretary-General. In addition to overall control, he is exclusively responsible for the matters referred to the Security Council. For General Assembly affairs he is assisted by an Under-Secretary General and by two Under-Secretaries General in matters of Special and Political Affairs. In addition there are many other important organs through which the Secretariat implements the decisions taken by the Council, UNGA and other organs.

The UN and Cold War

The UN was organised primarily for maintenance of peace and security. This responsibility was shouldered both by the UNGA and the Council. As stated earlier, the Council had a position of preeminence in the UN scheme and the permanent members, by virtue of their veto power, became the pre-eminent authority over the UN itself. This apprehension was indeed voiced by the negotiators in the beginning. Reacting to this provision in the Dumbarton Oaks

Proposals US Senator Robert E. Reynolds had commented that it would "turn a war of liberation into an aftermath of subjugation."<sup>10</sup> He had also prophetically warned that too much control in the hands of Great Powers might in consequence, split the world into so many spheres of domination.<sup>11</sup> His apprehensions came true after the emergence of Cold War among the Great Powers and their endeavours to balkanise the world into military camps.

The Cold War has been a subject of "debate and argument"<sup>12</sup> since 1947. On the surface, Cold War is a struggle between two super-powers namely the United States of America (USA) and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) or the groups led by them.<sup>13</sup> Their struggle aims at the control of

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10 New York Times, 10 November 1944.

11 Ibid.

12 This phrase entered the vocabulary of diplomacy after the initiation by Winston Churchill of a crusade against USSR. It, however, does not mean that Cold War had over-powered the diplomats for the first time. Aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War (1871) was much more intense from the point of view of the Cold War. The tension generated by that Cold War intensified into militarisation and burst out into the First World War. Bruce R. Kuniholm observes that "the historical struggle for power or defeat of one power in that struggle as an important factor in the origins and development of what later became known as the Cold War." See, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece (Princeton, 1980), p. xv. Underlined mine.

13 USA and USSR are aligned respectively in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (1949) and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) (1955). The former is known as North Atlantic Group or the Western Group, and the latter is described as Communist bloc or Eastern Group.

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the world.

Curiously enough the above struggle emerged between the Allies (USA, Britain, France and USSR) who had joined hands in the Second World War to liberate the world from "fascism". In the concluding years of the War, Anglo-French-US and Soviet armies advanced successfully, respectively from west and east, against Germany. They met in Berlin and the ground for the ensuing Cold War was

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prepared. According to a study, Cold War was the greatest and most crucial result of the occupation of Berlin. This study categorises nine issues which confronted Western Europe in the post-War era. In their categorisation, Cold

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- 14 There are many who hold the view that the Cold War started by the desire of the super powers to control Europe and the colonies of European Powers. But it is one and the same thing since, in 1947, the world consisted of super-powers, European Powers and other colonies. Independent countries outside the jurisdiction of the above Powers were also indirectly within their spheres of influence. See, UN Yearbook (New York, 1946).
- 15 The two sides could not reach an agreement about the Administration of Eastern Europe and Berlin. It became a bone of contention among them. Divided on the lines of ideology, they started diplomatic campaign against each other. While the Western group tried to weaken the Soviets by supporting anti-Soviet political leadership, Soviet leader Stalin revived the old Marxist struggle against Western group. See also, Richard W. Mansbach, Yale H. Ferguson and Donald E. Lamport, The Web of World Politics: Non State Actors in the Global System (Princeton, 1976).

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War figured at the top.

Dexter Perkins believes that the origins of the hostility between the Allies lay in "ideology". According to him Western public opinion and statesmen were overwhelmingly optimistic about co-existence with Russia. He exonerated Americans arguing that they had never been preoccupied with the power-game in the past. To him it were the designs of the Soviet Union which brought the USA into Alliance System and gave birth to Cold War.<sup>17</sup> He lamented:

It is sad story of diplomacy that while specific interests can be compromised disputes in the field of ideas are extremely difficult of solution. The dreams of man have often influenced policy and the dreams of the United States, on

16 Ibid., p. 215. Figures of their categorisation are as under:

<u>Sl. No.</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Points</u>
1.	Cold War	4.00
2.	Integration	1.57
3.	Atlantic Alliance: Strategies	1.27
4.	Colonial and Neo-Colonial	1.08
5.	Extra European Regional Crises	0.88
6.	Regional Stability	0.64
7.	Atlantic Alliance: Economic	0.59
8.	Detente	0.39
9.	Gaullism	0.27

17 Dexter Perkins tried to support American argument by referring to the US policy towards recruitment of armed forces. He pointed out that though compulsions forced it to raise huge armies (350,000) in the First World War and (11,000,000) in the Second World War, but it disbanded most of the battalions after the compulsion was over. It was pursuing the same policy and had brought down the armed forces' strength from 11,000,000 to 5,000,000 in 1946 itself. See, Dexter Perkins, The Diplomacy of a New Age: Major Issues in US Policy since 1945 (Indiana University Press, 1967).



the one hand, and of the Communists on the other presented, as we can now see, a massive obstacle to understanding. 18

He added that the above reasons were sufficient for the USA being forced to break isolationist policy since she dreaded only communism, and opined that "It is the key to the 1952 election slogan: Rolling back the iron curtain."<sup>19</sup>

The above line was supported by Walter LaFeber. He went back to 1890s when the USA and the USSR conflicted on the question of exploitation of China and Manchuria to substantiate his argument. He stated:

It was a preview of the struggle a half century later. Americans hoped to keep Asia open to all nations on equal terms (the "open door" policy), while Russia unable to compete on such terms with the more industrialized nations, sought to close off and privately develop certain areas. 20

The struggle got sharpened after the revolution of 1917 brought a Communist government in power in Russia. Since Russia had an awful military and industrial potentiality, the new regime threw a challenge by proclaiming itself to be the "vanguard of an ideological revolutionary movement".

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18 Ibid., p. 16. There are many Western scholars who held the same opinion. They traced the origins of the Cold War to the Communist Manifesto (1948): "The communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order.... The communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can only be attained by the overthrow of all existing social conditions...."

19 Ibid., p. 17.

20 Walter LaFeber, The Origin of the Cold War, 1941-47: A Historical Problem with Interpretations and Documents (John Wiley and Sons, 1971), p. 1.

It was for this fear that the USA joined Britain and Japan in 1918 to defeat, contain, and eliminate Communism by military force. But the foreign intervention legitimized Bolsheviks and the US forces had to beat a retreat in 1920 before everything was lost. Though the USA recognised the Bolshevik government in 1933 and the latter joined the Allies in 1941,<sup>21</sup> distrust could not reconcile them. This reunion sharpened differences, as LaFeber observed, since "Indeed within months after Americans and Russians became partners against Hitler, they began having serious differences, over post-war reconstruction policies"<sup>22</sup>.

LaFeber further argued that, weakened by war and convinced both by the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the historical record of the 1917-1939 era that the Western capitalist nations would not preserve Soviet interests, the Russians designed to have a restricted world. They wanted a world "around their borders and as far into Europe and Asia as possible" as a bulwark of their security. In the absence of

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- 21 The USSR had signed a treaty with Germany in September 1938 to be neutral in the latter's war with Western countries. But on 22 June 1941, Germany attacked the USSR. On 23 June, the USA declared that it would help Stalin defend his country against the Nazis, but criticized the USSR restrictions on the freedom even of worship". Ibid., p. 2.
- 22 Ibid. LaFeber argued that the USA wanted a world without power blocs or obstacles to trade, a world in which all nations, under the aegis of the UN would enjoy equal opportunity and equal rights, since Americans would be the first among equal in a free world with overwhelming economic power and military potentiality. It was this secret that the phrase, "The American Century", coined by Henry Luce, the founder and Editor-in-Chief of The Time and Life magazines became popular.

other means, LaFerber maintained, the occupied lands could only help them reconstruction of their war-devastated economy.<sup>23</sup> It led to ironic and tragic results: "Within a decade the American Century developed into a military ring of 'containment' around the Soviet bloc. The Russian quest for security resulted in encirclement without and a totalitarian dictatorship within."<sup>24</sup> Thus Cold War took its birth, he concluded.

Thomas A. Bailey however placed the entire blame on the USSR, maintaining that "Kremlin did not want agreement - except on its own terms".<sup>25</sup> He pointed out that the Soviet policies even after joining the Allies could not absolve the Americans of their suspicions. Contrarily after the War was over, majority were convinced that:

- (1) Russia could not be trusted to co-operate effectively in new world organization.
- (2) The foreign policies of Soviet Union could not meet with "our approval".
- (3) Dominance of Russia over her satellite neighbours was prompted by aggressive rather than defensive designs.
- (4) Soviet Union was not a peace-loving nation.
- (5) Another world holocaust was probably within twenty five or so years.
- (6) Russia was most likely to start it.
- (7) A "get tough" policy was needed to halt them.<sup>26</sup>

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23 Ibid., pp. 2-3.

24 Ibid., p. 3.

25 Thomas A. Bailey, America Faces Russia (Cornell University Press, 1950), p. 348.

26 Ibid., p. 10.

He added that :

The Soviets of course had their own point of view regarding the four-power revival of central Europe. Their constant complaint and one seemingly justified by events - was that the Western bloc was trying to outvote them in conference and thus promote capitalism. They were right, in the sense that any rebuilding of Germany and Austria on pre-Hitlerian lines was antipathetic of communism. 27

George F. Keenan summed up prevailing public opinion that Soviet diplomacy "means inexorably along the prescribed path, like a persistent toy automobile wound up and headed in a given direction, stopping only when it meets with some unanswerable force."<sup>28</sup> According to him, Soviet expansion<sup>29</sup> could only lead to the US policy of containment.

I.F. Stone considered that Churchill was the Chief<sup>30</sup> architect of Cold War. He traced how Churchill became the Toscanini of Western foreign policy after Roosevelt's death.

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27 Ibid., p. 15.

28 George F. Keenan wrote about the above theory under a pseudo name "Mr. A" in Foreign Affairs, July 1947.

29 Ibid.

30 I.F. Stone, The Haunted Fifties (The Merlin Press, 1963), pp. 55-58. He also added that Churchill had intensified this Cold War to the extent that even press did not take any cognizance of dismantling process initiated by him only: "The New York Times did not give the Churchill speech in full text. Commentators shied away from a declaration which carried so many unpalatable implications for American foreign policy. The man who wanted to strangle Bolshevism in its cradle had suddenly announced that he was prepared to live with it in its prime."

The USA footed the bills for the themes set by Churchill. <sup>31</sup>

Carl Alperovitz questioned the theory of inexorable Soviet expansion. <sup>32</sup> He referred to Martin F. Herz who pointed out how the "die was cast" to evolve new spheres of influence giving birth to Cold War. <sup>33</sup> According to him, in 1945, Soviet leadership / did not plan any expansionist policy. American leadership was not also then worried about expansion of Communism into Western Europe. It was the US demand in resuming the control and influence of the Red Army in Eastern Europe, he added, that raised the doubts in Kremlin, <sup>34</sup> since Eastern Europe had far greater importance to Soviet security. <sup>35</sup>

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31 Ibid. Stone referred to the speech of Churchill on 8 March 1946 at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri in which he aimed "his shafts directly at Soviet Union". He declared that an "iron-curtain" had descended over Eastern Europe and danger of the spread of Communism loomed large on Western Europe, and called for an alliance between the USA and Britain for joint action "in defense of Freedom". Stone justified Stalin who dubbed Churchill as a "war-monger" on the above speech.

Later, at Zurich in the same year, Churchill proposed a Franco-German entente and a United States of Europe as a counterpoise against the Soviets. At Llandundo, in October 1948, he struck the opening note of the "liberation" chorus: He called for "a showdown" between the two blocs before US monopoly of atom bomb withered away.

32 Gar Alperovitz, Cold War Essays (New York, 1970), quoted in *ibid.*

33 *Ibid.*

34 Herz took up the case of Poland where Western Allies demanded that pro-Western and openly anti-Russian politicians should be given a weight in the formation of Polish government. Naturally Soviet leadership, he said, balked at this demand and its suspicions about Western designs upon Soviet Union deepened. *Ibid.*

35 *Ibid.*

Without going into the merits and demerits of various arguments, it is safe to conclude that the circumstances emanating from the War could not stop an escalation of the Cold War. This Cold War passed through two distinct phases: (1) Militarisation; and (2) Detente.

### Militarisation:

There are many who held Stalin responsible for militarisation. Like Justice Douglas of the US Supreme Court, they referred to the speech of Stalin of 8 February 1946 "as the declaration of World War III".<sup>36</sup> Another set of people argued on ideological lines. Stressing upon the fact that two great rival ideologies found themselves face to face, Arthur Vandenberg said, on 27 February 1946 at Michigan, that: "There is a line beyond which compromise cannot go, even if we have previously crossed that under the exigencies of war, we cannot cross it again. They sought solution to their conflicting interests through military means."<sup>37</sup>

Whoever may be responsible for the conflict, Berlin and Hungary in Europe and Indo-China and China in Asia had to pay the immediate price of militarisation. After nuclear

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36 Joseph Stalin, 9 February 1946, Survey of World Broadcasts (SWB).

37 At the outset of Cold War, the USA had nuclear supremacy. Condemning Communism as an aggressive policy, Acheson and John Foster Dulles stressed upon the need of strengthening Western network of alliances. Acheson nurtured NATO into being, in 1949; Dulles encouraged the formation of SEATO and other treaty arrangements committing the USA to the defense of its allies in the event of a Soviet attack.

technology became known to the Soviets, military techniques became redundant. Increasing burden of armoury was also creating new danger. <sup>38</sup> Rosneau referred to this situation:

As technology shrinks the world and heightens the interdependence of nations, linkage phenomena are too plentiful and too influential to be ignored. Neo society is immune from the stresses and strains of the cold war, from the demands of neighbours and the cross-pressures of hemi-spheric tendencies, from the shifts of trade and the emergence of super national organisations, from the surge towards development of the new states and the restructuring of their historic relationship. <sup>39</sup>

Therefore, the struggling powers fell back upon the traditional means of limiting race towards war through disarmament and detente.

#### Detente:

Conclusion of the war in Indo-China (1954) augered well. It opened new era of conciliation between the two adversaries and set the stage to be dominated by "detente" which continued

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38 According to Rosneau, Cold War strengthened the position of the USA and the USSR as super powers. These super powers also found allies to form their respective defensive alliances - NATO (1949) and Warsaw Treaty Organisation (1955). But their policies were quite contrary to the needs of the Western world. While the Western Europe needed rejuvenation of their war-torn economy, paramountcy of the super powers relegated the entire world to a lower status. It was this rivalry between the super-powers and the rest of the world that De Gaulle in Western Europe and Jawaharlal Nehru in the under-developed world revolted against military solutions and thus defied bloc-system. It is also argued by him that crusade started by Churchill hoomranged on Britain itself and the USA worn British shoes leading to crippling of the British economy. See Rosneau, Linkage of Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems ( ), pp. 308-9.

39 Ibid.

in 1970s. In this stage, the chief architect of the Cold War, Churchill himself changed his opinion. He said in the House of Commons:

Now five years later ... we all desire that the Russian people should take their high place in the world affairs, which is their due, without feeling unsettled about their own security. The emphasis is new. The problem is no longer to deal with diabolic, but with understandable mutual fears. The Russians are also people, and fear us as we fear them. Discourse has shifted from the cold war hallucinations still dominant here to the realm of the real world. 40

This stage brought a change in the other camp as well. The Soviets' camp came out of the "iron-curtain" and applied "capitalist techniques" to defeat the supremacy of the Western bloc.<sup>41</sup> Soviet Union proclaimed the policy of "peaceful co-existence" to exploit the "international contradictions of capitalism" practised by Lenin in the early 1920s and by Stalin himself from 1935 to 1939.<sup>42</sup>

Emergence of Cold War and intensification of war affairs brought great strains upon smaller nations. The latter had been trying to curtail the power of the Permanent Members from the very beginning. As a representative of the

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40 Debates (House of Commons), quoted in *ibid.*

41 In the autumn of 1952, Stalin published some articles in pamphlet form under the title: Economic Problems of Socialism. He argued in the pamphlets that the conflict between the Soviet Union and the Western group of alliances but conflicts within the 'capitalist world', conflicts between Germany and the West European Powers, between Britain and the US, and between Japan and her victors.

42 See Hugh Seton-Watson, Neither War Nor Peace: The Struggle for Power in the Post War World (Methuen & Co., 1960), pp. 333-4.



small nations, Australian delegate to the UN, H.V. Evatt had made a concerted effort at San Francisco Conference itself. He stressed upon the enlargement of the role of the UNGA in the maintenance of peace and security.<sup>43</sup> The Mexican delegate argued that the UNGA "should have all powers that ought to belong to it in a democratic system".<sup>44</sup> The Philippine delegate stressed that "if the Security Council, by reason of non-concurrence of one permanent member, fails to arrive at a decision ... the matter in question should be submitted to the General Assembly for final decision". He added that apprehensions of Great Powers could be safeguarded by provisioning that decisions "should be made by an affirmative vote of three-fourths of all the members"<sup>45</sup> of the UNGA. They continued their arguments with no avail. The Great Powers did not react favourably but only with exception of the explanation given by the US delegate in the beginning itself that

it was inconceivable that any action of the  
 [Security] Council would be contrary to the  
 wishes of the majority of the Assembly. <sup>46</sup>

It was this explanation which encouraged Great Powers to woo the smaller powers both in the stages of militarisation and detente and divided the UN into their respective spheres of

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43 UN Conference on International Organization, Documents, vol. 9, p. 266.

44 Ibid., p. 271.

45 Ibid., p. 277.

46 Ibid., vol. 12, p. 316.

influence. With largest number of States Africa obviously found a dominating place. We shall examine it in the next chapter.

Chapter II

EMERGENCE OF AFRICAN BLOC IN THE  
UNITED NATIONS

## Chapter II

### EMERGENCE OF AFRICAN BLOC IN THE UNITED NATIONS

We have seen in the last chapter that the United Nations (UN) was organised primarily for joint endeavours to strive for peace and prosperity and this was threatened by the Cold War. The two major groups led by the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) divided the entire world into their respective spheres of influence. The UN was soon engulfed into this rivalry. Both the USA and the USSR being permanent members and enjoying the veto power did not join hands in the Security Council (hereinafter Council). Their animosity made peace precarious. Deadlock left no alternative with the Members, especially the newly independent ones other than attempting to lessen the rigidity of the rules concerning peace. It was possible only by mobilising support in the General Assembly (UNGA).<sup>1</sup> This role of the UNGA gave an increasing importance to "quite" or "private" diplomacy to harmonize deliberations concerning rival bloc interests.

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1 This situation emerged on the Suez Crisis in 1956. The Council was deadlocked by the rigidity of the Permanent Members to their respective stands. Consequently an emergency session of the UNGA was called. A vast majority in the UNGA authorised the UN Secretary General to negotiate and also organise an UN Emergency Force for restoring peace in the Middle East. It set a precedent whereby Secretary General backed by the majority of the Members in the UNGA could assume a major function of the Council.

Group politics was not an innovation in the UN. This had crept into its functioning from the very beginning. Referring to the election of Members to the Council, the Australian delegation had, in 1946, reported back to their Parliament:

For several days before the elections various lists of candidates had been under informal discussion. Groups of countries having common interests had reached among themselves as to which members of their groups should be supported as candidates for the vacancies and representatives of the five Great Powers were also known to have taken part in discussions to reach some measure of understanding among the candidates they were prepared to support. 2

The division fostered by the Cold War and increasing importance to majority decision by the Members with one-vote/<sup>one</sup>state system led to development of horse-trading in the UN. In 1962, the Economist referred to this while apprehending bursting out of Cold War into "third world war" in the context of the "Cuban Crises":

Old or new, states are not altruistic. For all the verbal pieties uttered in the United Nations, its congregation strongly resembles that of a medieval church, to which the villagers came more to trade than to pray. It is useless either to deny that brisk chaffening goes on at the back while the ritual genuflection at the altar proceed, or to deplore the fact. It was ever thus: even in San Francisco in 1945. The horse trade can neither be converted into, nor disguised as angels. Real and fleshy, their interests are ignored only at peril. 3

2 See United Nations, The First Part of the First Session of the General Assembly, January and February 1946 - Report of the Australian Delegation.

3 "How to use the UN", The Economist, 20 January p. 20.



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This horse-trading gave increasing importance to the increasing number of African States in the UN. Simultaneously, territorial unity of African States was endangered by the Cold War which divided the world into military blocs and threatened the ruling leadership of independent States due to well-entrenched Western interests in many parts of their continent. They tried like Asian countries to join non-aligned movement and avoid involvement in the Cold War politics. In the process, African States got divided into various "caucusing groups"<sup>4</sup> and united into an African bloc to preserve their eminence in the UN. This chapter would analyse the emergence of this African bloc in both the non-aligned movement and the UN.

#### Non-Alignment and the Africans

Non-alignment is sometimes compared with the "neutrality" maintained by Switzerland. Swiss neutrality was conditioned by its weakness and location. Therefore, Swiss neutrality was accepted as a national policy and has remained so irrespective of changes in government. Contrary to it, the non-aligned nations from the beginning took, as much, if not more, interest as the aligned countries took in international affairs. It is a fact that non-alignment was proclaimed first by the most powerful nations of the Third

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4 According to Thomas Hovet Jr. "a caucusing bloc is a group of states that are organised to meet regularly on problems of common concern and are bound to vote according to group decisions". See, Thomas Hovet Jr., Bloc Politics in the United Nations (Cambridge, 1960), p. 7.

World such as India, Egypt and Yugoslavia, and the weakest nations namely Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan joined the power blocs. Therefore, Swiss neutrality was not in the minds of decolonized leadership opting for non-alignment. One of the founders of this movement, Jawaharlal Nehru made it clear at the outset that non-alignment advocated by his Government had "nothing to do with neutrality or passivity or anything else."<sup>5</sup> He elaborated:

We are neither blind to reality nor do we to acquiesce in any challenge to man's freedom from whatever quarter it may come. Where freedom is menaced or justice threatened or where aggression takes place, we cannot be and shall not be neutral. 6

On the other hand he declared that:

If there is a big war, there is no particular reason why we should jump into it. Nevertheless, it is a little difficult now-a-days in world wars to be neutral.... We are going to join the side which is to our interest when the time comes to make the choice. 7

The above approach was advocated by President Nasser of Egypt and Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia. Thus, non-alignment was not an inactive policy. It was conceived to avoid involvement in the blocs engaged in Cold War and to concentrate their energies towards development. Magnitude of the development task required a broader network. Echoing this need Burmese Premier, Thakin Nu said, on 13 June 1948, that "of the three

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5 See, Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, 1949-1953 (Delhi, 1954), p. 125.

6 See *ibid.*

7 Independence and After (Delhi, 1955), p. 200.

great powers, the U.K., the U.S. and the USSR, the AFPFL\* wish that Burma should be in friendly relations with all the three."<sup>8</sup> On another occasion he rejected outright "alignment with a particular power bloc antagonistic to other opposing blocs".<sup>9</sup>

Non-alignment, inter-alia, did not emanate from Marxist ideology. This conception developed only in the stage of militarisation when opposing blocs resorted to military means. In that age, it may be recalled, the USA pursued "policy of containment of the USSR." She intervened militarily in Korea (June 1953), Indo-China (April 1954), and the Formosa Straits (October 1954).<sup>10</sup> She netted 42 states in its alliance network to implement containment policy forcefully.<sup>11</sup> The USSR took up the gauntlet and resulted in the formation of Warsaw Pact.

This heightening militarisation created a stir amongst the "uncommitted" leadership of the Third World. They sought to accelerate harmony among themselves and awaken them to the

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8 Towards Peace and Democracy (Burma, 1948), p. 117.

9 From Peace to Stability (Burma, 1950), p. 86.

10 See John Foster Dulles's Interview on 11 January 1956, Life (New York).

11 Henry A. Kissinger, "The Impact of Strategy on Our Allies and the Uncommitted", Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York, 1958).

\* The Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League of Burma.



growing menace of spreading military alliances.<sup>12</sup> Advocates of non-alignment invited all Asian and African countries, including the committed, the uncommitted, and independent and dependent countries to deliberate upon these developments. They met at Bandung in Indonesia. Their move was opposed vehemently by the Western bloc.<sup>13</sup> Thus the Bandung Conference, from the beginning was dragged into Cold War. This Cold War was not between the Western blocs and Warsaw Pact. It was curiously between Western group and "uncommitted" leadership of the Third World. Times of India (Bombay) reported:

Beneath the pleasant facade of the Afro-Asian amith here, there are already some rumbling notes of mounting discord on the issue of coexistence, which might erupt into a highly unpleasant debate. Even before the Bandung Conference has begun, the voice of Washington has started extending to this Asian-African forum its global game of shadow boxing with world Communism. 14

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- 12 Reacting to the emerging menace of military alliances, Jawaharlal Nehru explained in the Indian Parliament that "One can understand the mention of external aggression in a defence treaty, but there is reference also (in SEATO) to 'a fact or situation created within this area' which might entitle them to intervene. Observe these words. They do not refer to external invasion. It means that any internal development in that area might also entitle these countries to intervene." India's Foreign Policy, p. 89. Also, Statesman (New Delhi), 30 September 1954.
- 13 Immediately after the announcement of the holding of Bandung Conference, the USA opposed the participation of the Allied States in that Conference. Britain and France stressed counter-attacking the Bandung itself. British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden instructed British diplomats that "no efforts should be spared to persuade all anti-Communist governments of Africa and Asia to be represented at Bandung." Statesman, 26 January 1955.
- 14 Times of India (Bombay), 15 April 1955.

Pro-West states in their attempt to condemn Communism, in essence, impeded universal harmony among the Afro-Asian countries.<sup>15</sup> Their attempt was, however, punctured by Chinese Premier Chou En-lai. Responding to their condemning attacks, he said:

On the basis of the five principles - (popularly known as Panchsheel) -, China is prepared to have normal relations with all African and Asian countries. We are Communists. We believe in communism. There is no need to publicize one's ideology here. The Chinese delegation has come to the conference to seek common ground rather than emphasize our differences. 16

#### Anti-Colonialism:

Participating States took diverse stand against colonialism. Ceylonese delegate, John Kotelawala referred to Soviet colonialism about which many Afro-Asians were "less clear".<sup>17</sup> Pakistani delegate supported his contention. He

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- 15 Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines had already joined US sponsored NATO/SEATO military alliances. Other pro-West states were Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Iraq, Lebanon, Iran and Ceylon. Iraqi delegate, Fadhil Jamali violently attacked Communism and Soviet colonialism in his opening address. This line was taken by Iran, Pakistan, the Philippines and Turkey. Cambodia and Thailand referred to Communist Chinese threat to their sovereignty. See, *ibid.*, 12 April 1955 and 8 May 1955.
- 16 Times of India, 20 April 1955. Times (London) reported on 21 April 1955 that "the guns which had been trained ready to oppose the expected communist manoeuvres have somewhat misfired against the bland refusal of Mr Chou En-lai to invoke any Communist line as such."
- 17 Ceylonese delegate considered satellite states - namely Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Esthonia and Poland - as Soviet colonies. He asked: "Are not these colonies as such as any of the colonial territories in Africa or Asia? And if we are invited in our opposition to colonialism, should it not be our duty openly to declare our opposition to Soviet colonialism as such as to Western imperialism." See, Bandung Conference (Djakarta, 21 April 1955), pp. 7-11.

argued that "If we are prepared to accuse and mention friendly countries like France, there is no reason why we should not mention the USSR." Other pro-West states stressed that Bandung Conference should condemn "all types of colonialism, including international doctrines resorting to methods of force, infiltration and subversion."<sup>18</sup> But much of the fire of their move was extinguished again by the moderate approach taken by Chou En-lai, and the Conference evolved a compromised draft condemning colonialism as the basic cause of the sufferings of Afro-Asian peoples.

#### Anti-Militarisation:

Pakistani delegate, Muhammad Ali spearheaded the move towards justifying militarisation. He argued that the Conference must accept the right of all nations to self defence either collectively or individually.<sup>19</sup> This move was strongly criticised by the Indian Premier, Nehru. He upheld his argument that division of world into power-blocs would hasten another world war. He added that if there were non-aligned countries, they would help lessen tension and avoid war. The tension generated by the opposing moves was diffused by Chou En-lai. He suggested replacement of "peaceful coexistence"<sup>20</sup> by the UN term to "live together in peace".

Thus, as Times of India opined, "unanimity was achieved at a heavy price by diluting principles to accommodate Cold

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18 Ibid., 22 April 1955, pp. 4-5.

19 Ibid.

20 The Times (London), 25 April 1955.

War politics."<sup>21</sup> Though Cold War alignments proved stronger, the Bandung Conference succeeded in bringing a racial solidarity within Afro-Asian countries and respect for the UN. Thereby it also set the movement in motion and the awakening that their solidarity could thrive only through non-alignment, by enunciating the following principles:

1. To respect the UN Charter.
2. To respect elementary human rights.
3. To respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.
4. To respect equality of all nations and races.
5. To oppose interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
6. To oppose foreign interventions.
7. To refrain from all acts of aggression or threats of aggression and the use of force.
8. To respect the right of every nation to individual and collective defence in conformity with the United Nations Charter and to refrain from collective defence which would be in the interest of great powers.
9. To refrain from exerting pressure on other countries.
10. To settle disputes by peaceful means.<sup>22</sup>

The above spirit took shape in the meeting of Tito, Nehru and Nasser - then famous as trio-leadership - at Brioni in 1956. The trio-leadership reaffirmed the Bandung principles.

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21 One of such compromise was on alignment whereby the Conference recognized "respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the UN."

22 Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), 5-20 August 1979, p. 16.

They stressed that military-blocs perpetuated fears. They added that peace could be achieved only "by working for collective security on a world scale and by expanding the region of freedom as well as by terminating the domination of one country over another."<sup>23</sup> Their thrust coincided with the adversaries in Cold War who had been stressing upon "peaceful coexistence". Latter's detente move legitimised the non-alignment movement. It further strengthened when all the important Afro-Asian leadership joined hands with the trio-<sup>24</sup> leadership in advancing the non-alignment movement. With this started convening of another Conference of the States believing in this movement.

The preparatory meeting held at Cairo in June 1961 defined that the countries

- (1) following an independent policy based on non-alignment and peaceful coexistence,
- (2) supporting liberation movements,
- (3) not being a member of a multilateral military pact in the context of east-west struggle,
- (4) not being a member of a bilateral military pact with a big power in the east-west struggle, and
- (5) having granted no military bases to foreign powers

were non-aligned and were invited to the ensuing conference to be held at Belgrade (Yugoslavia).<sup>25</sup>

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23 Quoted in *ibid.*

24 These were: President Sokarno of Indonesia, Prime Minister of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, Ceylonese Premier Srimavo Bandaranaike, Burmese Premier U Nu, Cambodian Premier Prince Sihanouk.

25 Times of India (New Delhi), 12 June 1961.

The Belgrade Conference, held on 1 to 15 September 1961, was attended by 25 independent states and many observers. Thus it was the biggest gathering of countries adhering to non-alignment. This Conference made it clear that:

non-alignment means not merely non-involvement in power blocs but also adherence to a number of positive concepts like the stabilisation of world peace; elimination of colonialism, imperialism and neo-colonialism in all their manifestations; the principle of co-existence, cooperation and brotherhood between nations; opposition to military alliances, condemnation of policy of apartheid and racial discrimination; faith in fundamental human rights and respect for the right of minorities; disarmament; removal of economic imbalances inherited from colonialism and imperialism; revision of the UN Charter to expand the membership of the UN Security Council and other committees to provide a place to the emerging nations in Asia and Africa. 26

Thus the ideology of non-alignment approximated with Africans' struggle. Vernon McKay observed that "Radicalism" was inherent in the Africans' struggle since they were the people who had been discriminated almost in an inhuman way.<sup>27</sup> Therefore Africans were, he added, "unanimous in their undying antagonism towards a system of White domination which discriminates against Africans because of their race." Non-alignment not only offered them equality but also it corresponded with African personality.

#### Role of African States:

African States were insignificantly represented in the Bandung Conference. Out of the 29 states, only six represented

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26 Review of International Affairs, no. 5, 1961, pp. 19-23.

27 Vernon McKay, African Diplomacy (Pall Mall, 1966), p. 2.

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the continent.

While Ethiopia, Liberia and Libya were unequivocally pro-West, Ghana was still a British colony. It was only Egypt which held strong views against alignment and Western colonialism. She was equally opposed to Soviet Communism. Episode of Suez Canal crises (1956) pushed Egypt to take most radical stance and spearhead African personality. But the Bandung Conference influenced African leadership in a big way. Accra Conference attended by African States in 1956 pinpointed the need of a common foreign policy for Africa based on the Bandung declaration, the UN Charter, and non-alignment.<sup>29</sup> But soon after the emerging states of Africa differed on taking up a radical stand. In the Belgrade Conference the Casablanca group participated and reaffirmed "to reinforce peace in the world by adopting a policy of non-alignment." The Monrovia group which opposed this stand was divided. From this group only the Congo, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Tunisia participated. Nigeria declined the invitation stating that she did not wish to join any bloc "not even a bloc of neutrals."<sup>30</sup> Non-alignment gained ground only when the two groups reconciled in forming the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

#### Organization of African Unity:

Non-aligned movement was one of the pace setters of African unity. The organisers of the Bandung Conference,

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28 These were: Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Ghana, Sudan and Egypt.

29 See Colin Legum, Bandung, Cairo and Accra (London, 1963). p. 18.

30 Ibid.

in 1956, invited as many as 7 African States. Only 5 States then were independent.<sup>31</sup> Thus it was the first Conference where even representatives of dependent States participated as equal members. This conference put one more feather to the African freedom fighters by declaring that:

- (1) colonialism in its all manifestations was an evil and should speedily be brought to an end;
- (2) subjection of peoples to alien and domination and exploitation by them constituted a denial of fundamental human rights. It was contrary to the UN Charter and an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation.

The Conference, therefore, extended full support to the cause of freedom fighters and demanded concerned foreign powers grant freedom to these peoples. Asian States had by then either achieved independence or their independence had become a certainty. Bandung "solidarity" and "indivisible" support was thus a great boost to African freedom fighters. Added to it, the Conference censured South Africa and her supporters for "apartheid" system.<sup>32</sup> These factors strengthened "African Personality" and were also a pointer to the African leadership of a force of independent and united Africa.

Ghanian Premier Kwame Nkrumah pushed the concept of African unity further after independence of Ghana in 1957. He discussed African unity with other leaders attending the festivities of independence of Ghana. He also sent a three-men

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31 The States invited were: Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libyam Sudan, Central African Federation of Rhodesias and Nyasaland. The last one did not attend. Ghana attained independence only in 1957.

32 Bandung Conference Communique, 24 April 1955.



mission to different capitals of African States.<sup>33</sup> His moves resulted in convening of a Conference of exclusively African States in Accra in 1958. As he declared he aimed at bringing through this Conference:

together independent States on the continent of Africa to discuss the problems of mutual interest and to consider, formulate and co-ordinate schemes and methods aimed at accelerating mutual understanding of such countries, to consider ways and means of safeguarding the independence and sovereignty of participating countries in their efforts to the eventual attainment of self-government, and to discuss and plan cultural exchanges and schemes of mutual assistance. 34

Nkrumah-ite line was, however, opposed by African leaders mainly in the Francophone region.<sup>35</sup> They were not in favour of radical unity. This emerged in a conference called by Felix Houphouet-Boigny, leader of Ivory Coast.<sup>36</sup> The latter conference held at Abidjan from 24 to 26 October 1960 was attended by delegates of States in Francophone

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33 The delegation consisted of Minister of Justice Ako Adjei, Adviser on African Affairs George Padmore, and A.B. Kofi.

34 Draft Memorandum, Conference of African States (Ghana, n.d.).

35 It may be recalled that in the course of scramble for the partition of Africa, the continent was partitioned mainly between two Powers namely Britain and France. Though Belgium, Italy and Portugal also held various territories the continent broadly got divided into Anglophone and Francophone regions.

36 Houphouet-Boigny was assisted by Senegalese Premier, Mamaden Dia in organizing the conference.

region.<sup>37</sup> These leaders were intimate to each other.<sup>38</sup> The Abidjan Conference discussed mainly three questions:

- (1) Morocco-Mauritania dispute<sup>39</sup>
- (2) Congo Crisis
- (3) Algerian War.

The Conference unequivocally supported independence of Mauritania. They upheld that Algerian problem was an internal affair of France. Thus these States strikingly supported their ex-colonial masters and also differed with Nkrumahite line to sacrifice local interests for territorial unity of the whole continent. This Conference rather deepened the wedge by deciding that they would "henceforth ... adopt common attitudes"<sup>40</sup> towards national and international issues.

37 Eleven States represented in the Conference were Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, People's Republic of Congo, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta, and Mauritania. Mauritania was still under French sovereignty, and attained independence only on 28 November 1960. Mali sent an observer. Madagascar, however, refused to attend the Conference pleading that Algerian question - on the agenda of the Conference - was an internal affair of France. Togo abstained.

38 These leaders had been meeting frequently in the conferences called by France before independence of these states. After getting independence, they had forged economic cooperation among themselves. As a result, a Council of Entente was established by Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger and Dahomey on 29 May 1959. The Entente Council formed a customs union with Senegal, Mali and Mauritania on 11 June 1959. Gabon, Central Republic, Chad and Congo had also formed their customs union on 22-23 June 1959.

39 Morocco had claimed Mauritania as part of their Empire. Therefore, Morocco had opposed both independence and admission of Mauritania to the UN.

40 Communique Final, Conference des Etats africains d'expression Francaise a Abidjan.

These States again met in Brazzaville from 15 to 19 December 1960. The wedge was further widened there. They decided upon two lines: (i) adhering to non-intervention in their respective internal affairs, and (ii) striving for economic and cultural cooperation on the basis of equality. They also decided to adopt a common attitude towards international problems.<sup>41</sup> Thus the separation was complete. They got a legitimacy in calling themselves "Brazzaville Group".<sup>42</sup>

The Brazzaville Group again met in Dakar from 30 January to 4 February 1961. They drafted there the famous treaty for the establishment of an African and Malagasy Organization of Economic Cooperation (OAMCE). In their next conference at Yaonde (26-28 March 1961), they deliberated to further cooperation among themselves and approve OAMCE Charter. Its Article II explained that:

The African and Malagasy Union is founded on the solidarity which joins its members. Its purpose is to organise, in all aspects of foreign policy, cooperation between its members, so as to strengthen their solidarity, ensure their collective security, assist in their development, and maintain peace in Africa, Madagascar and the world. 43

This group favoured cooperation with Western Europe in general, and France in particular. They denounced Soviet Union severely on the question of atomic tests and its policy towards African

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41 Centre d'Etude des Relation Internationales  
Chronologie politique africaine, vol. 1, no. 6,  
January 1961 (Paris), p. 2.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

States such as Mauritania. Thus the Brazzaville Group tilted firmly towards West in the Cold War.

Differences between Brazzaville Group and Nkrumahite further deepened in the wake of the Congo crisis. Brazzavilleans supported the secessionist leader Kasavubu against Congolese Premier Patrice Lumumba.<sup>44</sup> Thereupon Moroccan King Hassan called a conference of African Heads of State opposed to the policy adopted by the Brazzavilleans.<sup>45</sup> Heads of Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Morocco met from 4 to 7 January 1961 at Casablanca.<sup>46</sup> Head of the Provisional Government of Algeria also attended this Conference. Though the participants differed on Mauritanian and the Congo issues, they showed unanimity in opposing Brazzavillean tilt towards France. They condemned NATO for its assistance to France "in her war of colonial reconquest of Algeria" and in setting up "Mauritania as her puppet."<sup>47</sup> They took an opposite stand in the Cold War and condemned:

- (1) the imperialist powers who continue to lend moral, political and military support to the racialist Government of South Africa.
- (2) Collusion between France and Israel in regard to nuclear test, a collusion which threatens peace in the world and particularly in Africa.

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44 Kasavubu had declared Katanga independent of Congo (Zaire) and proclaimed himself its President. We have discussed this in detail in fourth chapter.

45 Morocco also fell in Francophone region. But the Moroccan King had fallen out with Brazzaville Group on the question of Mauritania. Thus his approach coincided with the Nkrumahites only from a negative point of view.

46 See African Conference of Casablanca, January 1961 (Kingdom of Morocco, Ministry of Foreign Affairs), pp. 31-37.

47 Ibid.

- (3) Belgium for "creating two pseudo-independent States established by the policy of organised repression against the nationalist elements of this country (Congo). 48

They also formed their customs union to get known as "Casablanca Group". The Casablancaians sought

to preserve and consolidate our identity of views and unity of action in international affairs, to safeguard our hard won independence; the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our States ... and to intensify our efforts for the creation of an effective form of cooperation among the African States in the economic, social and cultural domains. 49

In their following meetings held in 1961, Casablanca Group established a common market with preference to the goods of Member States over Non-Member States. They also set up a Joint African High Command to extend military assistance to Member States.

Casablanca Group was, however, moderate in approach. They allowed freedom of action to their Member States by declaring that "the duties and obligations resulting from their international engagements shall not be incompatible with the duties and obligations" they assumed by the Casablanca Charter. They sought felicitation of this independence by adhering to the policy of non-alignment.<sup>50</sup> They also urged all the African States to adhere to the Casablanca Charter to strengthen a single African voice in international affairs. Thus the Casablanca Group adopted a conciliatory approach to strive for a union at continental level.

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48 Ibid., pp. 38-39.

49 Ibid., p. 91.

50 Ibid.

The need for African unity was soon felt by the rival groups. Their division undermined their importance in dealing with the Congo question in the UN. At this juncture, uncommitted States namely Nigeria, Liberia, and Togo made attempts for harmonizing their differences. Their efforts led to convening of a conference at Monrovia from 8 to 12 May 1961. It was attended by all the African States and only "radicals", who differed on Algeria and the Congo, boycotted it.<sup>51</sup> The Monrovia Conference rejected the Nkrumahite line of African unity through political integration of African States. It stressed that unity could and should be attained<sup>52</sup> only through cooperation among equal sovereign States. In

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- 51 The Conference was attended by Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Tunisia, Upper Volta and Congo. Egypt, Morocco, Ghana, Guinea and Mali boycotted. Sudan did not accept even the invitation.
- 52 The Monrovia Conference adopted following six principles for African unity:
1. Absolute equality of States irrespective of their size, populations or wealth.
  2. Non-interference in the internal affairs of Member States.
  3. Respect for the sovereignty and inalienable right to exist and develop its own personality by each State.
  4. Unqualified condemnation of interference and subversion.
  5. Cooperation through tolerance, solidarity, good neighbourly relations, exchange of views and respect for the leadership in respective States.
  6. Unity of aspiration and action rather than political integration.

addition, the Conference urged France to grant independence to Algeria. It also called upon African States to desist from taking sides in the Congo problem. Instead of dividing among themselves, African States should, it added, "present a unity front in the future to all world problems with which Africans might be faced at the United Nations"<sup>53</sup>.

The above States again met in January 1962 at Lagos. There they agreed to adopt Liberation Concept for African unity. It resulted in the signing of famous Lagos Draft on 23 December 1962. The Draft declared that:

The participating States inspired by the aim of brotherhood, solidarity and unity ... Resolved to avoid rivalry or conflict among all independent African and Malagasy States. <sup>54</sup>

It was a great moderation in their stand and paved the way for territorial unity.

#### Addis Ababa Conference:

The above spirit culminated into the meeting of African States in May 1963 at Addis Ababa. This meeting was attended by 30 out of 32 independent African States.<sup>55</sup> The Conference reached unanimity on the Liberian concept envisaging pan-continental cooperation and also safeguarding

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53 Resolutions of Plenary Sessions, Conference of Heads of African and Malagasy States Held at Monrovia City Hall, 8th-12th May 1961 (Monrovia, 1961).

54 See the Charter of the Inter African and Malagasy Organisation in H.F. Stranch, Panafrika (Zurich, 1964), pp. 352-8.

55 Morocco boycotted the Conference on Mauritanian question, and Togo was not allowed to participate due to change of government.

the still fragile independence of African States without altering radically the existing national entities. Thus was born the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).

Immanuel Wallerstine summed up the diversity as well as the unanimity in the OAU:

For the core (Nkrumahites) unity was the unity of the people, the theme of revolutionary movement - its intentions were to transform Africa and thereby the world. For the periphery, the unity was the ultimate point of an alliance of nation-states whose object was to strengthen the participants in the world power game. 56

It is for this reason that OAU became the most appropriate body for all the African States to join it since it gave shield to them in internal affairs, and independence in international affairs strained by the Cold War. But OAU also led to the emergence of a single African bloc in the UN at least on African question.

#### Africans in the UN

In 1946 when UN came into being, only four African States namely Ethiopia, Liberia, Egypt and South Africa were admitted to it. In the midst of 50 member-states four African States had neither any weight nor any significance in the working of the UN.<sup>57</sup> Rather African States were treated as

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56 Immanuel Wallerstine, Africa: The Politics of Unity (New York, 1965), pp. 20-21. It is for this reason that Zdenek Cervenka rightly observed: "There is indeed no other international organisation which has survived more predictions about its imminent collapse and disintegration.... Almost every OAU summit was viewed by the Western Press as critical; time has proved them all wrong."

57 In fact there were only 3 African Members, since South Africa was representing only an European minority regime maintaining sub-system of European imperialism.



inferior to European States.<sup>58</sup> There was no great concern about African problems as is evident from the fact that these problems - (i) fundamental human rights, (ii) dignity and worth of the human, and (iii) social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom - which rocked the continent of Africa were summed up into sub-human treatment and colonial exploitation and disposed off in just two sentences<sup>59</sup> in the first UN Annual Report of sixty six pages. But as we have seen non-alignment leadership took up African cause seriously and brought their problems to the forefront. The concept of African personality highlighted at the Bandung Conference started taking its roots soon in the UN. The Accra Conference (1958) opened, as the Libyan delegate remarked, "a new era for Africa and the whole world."<sup>60</sup> This new era became brighter and brighter with the increasing number of African States getting independence.

From 1955 to 1960, 6 more African States joined the UN raising their strength to ten. The situation underwent a drastic change in 1960 when Francophone States attained independence. UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold observed:

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58 This inferior treatment was more conspicuous in the League of Nations. In 1938 Britain supported Italian doubts on the capability of Ethiopia to be a Member of that organisation. This situation remained undercurrent in the early years of the UN.

59 Quoted in Thomas Hovet, Jr., Africa in the United Nations (London, 1963), p. 4.

60 Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 33.

The African developments are putting the United Nations to a test both as regards the functions of its parliamentary institutions and as regards the efficiency and strength of its executive capacity. 61

It might not be an exaggeration to conclude that the UN in 1960 belonged to the continent of Africa.<sup>62</sup> African problems not only became the most crucial issues in the UN discussions, but also they dominated its decision making functions. In this year, for example, Council held 71 meetings in all; and 31 of them were devoted to the situation in the Republic of the Congo (now known as Zaire); and 12 to the admission of new African members. Contrary to it, in 1948, Council had held the highest number of its meetings i.e. 168. None of these meetings concerned any African questions.

In 1961, an African Member, Mongi Slim of Tunisia was elected President of the 16th Session of the UNGA. Thereafter, African problem was invariably the major preoccupations of the UN. It was reflected in the UN Report. In 1962, 42 per cent of the 16th Annual Report was devoted to Africa and it retained this percentage until 1978. Thus African Members were on the threshold of getting unexpected pre-eminence in the UN handling

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61 UN GAOR, session 15, Supplement 1A. Also see *ibid.*

62 Public image of Africa in 1960 was echoed by the Canadian Representative to the UN, Teura Gaba in these words: "the African continent is shaped like a question mark, and at the same time, like a pistol pointed as if by chance towards the Union of South Africa". UN Doc. A/PV. 951, 1 December 1960. Referring to the African radicalism, Jean Paul Sartre observed that: "African eagle, long kept on the ground and tamed as a chicken, has at last stretched forth its wings to fly." Quoted in McKay, n. 27, p. 1.

the issues related to peace and order. Since these issues were linked with Cold War politics, African Members were simultaneously forced to take sides. In this division and consequent horse-trading, African Members could hardly remain unaffected. Rather, the bloc politics had started taking shape simultaneously with their march towards independence. Its division also stole away its pre-eminent importance. With this we may now shift to examine African response towards specific Cold War issues brought before the UN.

Chapter III

HUNGARIAN AND CZECHOSLOVAKIAN ISSUES  
IN THE UN AND AFRICAN RESPONSE

## Chapter III

### HUNGARIAN AND CZECHOSLOVAKIAN ISSUES IN THE UN AND AFRICAN RESPONSE

We have observed in the first chapter that the differences between Soviet Union and Western allies namely the United States of America (USA), Britain and France led to emergence of Cold War. Soviet Union built its own network which culminated into the Warsaw Treaty Organisation in 1955. In that phase of militarization of the Cold War, the Western world considered the Warsaw Treaty as a grave threat to the free world.

On 23 October 1956, the Socialist Government of Hungary was "accidentally" overtaken by a "revolution".<sup>1</sup> Demonstrating students demanded that Imre Nagy be reinstated in Hungary. Demonstrators pulled their guns at the Russians and demanded their pull out of Hungary. Reacting to their demonstration,<sup>2</sup> Erno Gero, successor of Martys Rakosy declared:

We condemn those who wish to spread the poison of chauvinism among our youth and have used the democratic freedom assured to the working people

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- 1 Hungary is situated in Eastern Europe. It is surrounded by Austria, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany. During the Second World War it was liberated by the Soviet forces advancing upon Berlin in 1945.
  - 2 Imre Nagy became Chairman of the Council of Ministers in Hungary in June 1953. Communist Party of Hungary dismissed him from the chairmanship on 14 April 1955 for his "right wing" and "opportunist deviation" under the "New Course" launched by him to encourage "anti-Marxist views" in Hungary. In his place, Martyas Rakosi was elected Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Later, Rakosi gave way to Erno Gero, who was the Chairman of the Council of Ministers when trouble started in Poland and ended in the success of Polish people in getting Gumulka reinstated to the Chairmanship of the Council of Ministers in Poland.

by the state, to organise a demonstration of a nationalist character. The leaders of our party will not allow themselves to be shaken in their determination to continue in their decision to develop democratic socialism. 3

### The Hungarian Crisis

Demonstrations, however, turned into violent disturbances. Before they could have their say the Communist Party of Hungary acted swiftly. It removed Gero and elected Nagy to be the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, in the early hours of 24 October 1956. However, "the Soviet Units were kept stationed in Hungary at the request of Nagy, to take part in the re-establishment of order." There are many versions. Molnar said that this request was made by Gero before Nagy took over from him. Nagy himself however had said after taking over the charge that "uprising" was the work of the enemy, of fascists and reactionary groups".<sup>4</sup> Stationing of the Soviet troops was opposed by the "revolutionaries". While the cause of the latter was taken up by the Western States to the UN,<sup>5</sup> the Soviet-

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3 Quoted in Miklos Molnar, Budapest 1956 : A History of the Hungarian Revolution, tr. by Jenneth Ford (London, 1968), p. 117.

4 Ibid.

5 Anglo-French-US representatives to the UN in a joint letter dated 27 October 1956 complained to the Secretary General that "foreign military forces" were "violently repressing the rights of the Hungarian people." They demanded an urgent meeting of the Security Council in pursuance to Article 34 of the UN Charter which empowered it to "investigate any dispute which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute" and to determine whether its continuance was likely to endanger the maintenance of international security.

Hungarian leadership were interlocked into a fight to the finish. The Hungarian "uprising" got a boost when Nagy re-organised his Council of Ministers and included some non-Communist and 15 Communist leaders from the earlier Council.<sup>6</sup>

Intensified armed struggle forced the retreat of Soviet forces. Nagy received a delegation of the leaders of the "uprising" and declared a ceasefire on 29 October 1956. Thus, the "revolution" seemed successful. The Soviet official newspaper, Pravda reported in its edition of 30 October 1956 that "Budapest returns to normal life". On 31 October 1956, the Soviet Government declared its readiness to discuss the question of the presence of Soviet troops on Hungarian territory with the member-States of the Warsaw Pact.

Meanwhile, the Nagy Government was initiating new steps. On 30 October 1956, Nagy instituted "a smaller cabinet to exercise powers". This smaller ("kitchen") cabinet consisted of Janos Kadar and Geza Losonczy (Communists); Zoltan Tildy and Bela Kovacs (Smallholders); Ferenc Erdei of National Peasant Party (later renamed as Petofi Party), and a representative of the Social Democrats. Later the number of non-Communist leaders was increased whereby there were only 4 Communists and 8 non-Communists. The new government recalled its pro-Soviet representative at the UN where the Western bloc had been fiercely fighting a diplomatic war. Within the country it recognised political activities. On 1 November 1956

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6 Molnar, n. 3, pp. 161-2.

the Nagy Government declared Hungary's neutrality and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. The UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold and other Diplomatic Missions in Budapest were informed about the change, and requested the "four Great Powers to protect Hungary's neutrality"<sup>7</sup>. It was a big stick in the hands of the Western bloc to condemn the USSR and Communism in the UN.

Hungarian "revolution" was the first breach in the "iron curtain". The Western Group sought for opportunity to wreck the Warsaw Pact by condemning and isolating the Soviet Union in the comity of nations. It was also encouraged in place of militarisation.

The USA, Britain and France requisitioned a meeting of the Security Council to discuss the question of Soviet troops intervention in Hungary. Opening the discussion in the Council, US representative, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., argued that Council was requisitioned with "deep anxiety and concern throughout the world regarding the bloodshed in Hungary"<sup>8</sup>. He pointed out that the USA had not imposed its way of life on any country and "if we give help to nations struggling for independence, that help will be given as all our help is always given - with no strings attached". He referred to

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7 Ibid.

8 United Nations Review (New York), vol. 3, no. 6, December 1956, p. 53; and UN Monthly Chronicle 1956 (New York), vol. II, no. 45.



the statement of US Foreign Secretary John Foster Dulles where he wished that the peoples of "satellite countries" of Soviet Union "should have sovereignty restored to them and that they should have governments of their own choosing".

The British representative, Pierson Dixon, and the French representative, Bernard Cornut-Gentille, took the same line of argument. They added that the Soviet armed intervention infringed the very freedoms guaranteed to the Hungarian people under the Hungarian Peace Treaty. They feared that the emerging situation was fraught with danger to the entire community of nations. It needed, they stressed, immediate action for withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. Their stand was supported by all the five European States' <sup>9</sup> representatives.

Nassollah Entezam representing Iran, an ally of the Western bloc, sailed along the Western wind. There was no other Asian or African member in the Council.

The Soviet representative, Arkady A. Sobolev, accused US of extending assistance to reactionary forces conspiring overthrow of constitutional government of Hungary. He added that the purpose of the States raising this question in the Council was "to give further encouragement to the armed rebellion" in Hungary. He stressed that it was an internal affair of Hungary and its Government was within its rights to crush such hands. Soviet Union was extending support to

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9 These were Carlos Blanco of Cuba, Victor Andres Belaunde of Peru, Chiping H.C. Kiang of China, E. Ronald Walker of Australia, and Ferand van Langenhove of Belgium.

its ally in the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

Explaining the neutrals' stand, Yugoslavian representative Joza Brilej argued that the tragic situation in Hungary was being used for political purposes. He added that this would lead him to vote against putting the matter on the agenda but since Yugoslav Government was in principle opposed to participation of foreign troops, he would abstain from voting on it.

With negative vote, the Council was not competent to adopt and implement the US-French-British resolution. The meeting was then adjourned without taking any decision, other than authorising its President to call another meeting whenever it was considered necessary by him.

The Council again met on 2 November 1956 on the request of France, Britain and the USA. A cable from Imre Nagy,<sup>10</sup> then Chairman of the Council of Ministers in Hungary was circulated in the meeting. The cable accused the Soviet Union of further invasion and informed that Hungary had repudiated the Warsaw Treaty. The Nagy Government through that cable also sought help from other four Great Powers. France's representative, Louis de Huiringvad, argued for immediate UN assistance to people in struggle for independence. He added that after the repudiation of Warsaw Treaty by Hungarian Government, there was a clear violation of Hungarian sovereignty and of the principle of the right of

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10 On 3 November, Imre Nagy had formed a new government.  
See n. 2.

peoples to self-determination. The demand was again supported by all the other eight members. The USSR opposed the demand and Yugoslavia abstained on the same grounds.

The USSR representative Sobolev argued that the resolution aimed at diverting attention of the agitating world against Anglo-French invasion of Egypt,<sup>11</sup> whereas the Soviet forces were assisting the legal government of Hungary to crush ex-Hungarian soldiers who had served in the Hitlerite armies now vanguard to the movement prevailing in Hungary.

As a fait accompli, the meeting was again adjourned on 3 November to meet in the morning of 5 November 1956. However, it met on 4 November 1956 at 3.13 a.m. on the urgent call of Nagy through Budapest Radio that the Soviet Union army was attacking Budapest "with the apparent purpose of overthrowing the democratic government of the Hungarian People's Republic".<sup>12</sup> US Representative, Lodge sought through a resolution immediate action for the withdrawal of Soviet forces indulged in "typical upside-down talk" in Hungary. He was again opposed by Sobolov pleading that

The Soviet forces are there to serve the cause of security of all the parties of the Warsaw Treaty. They are in fact an answer to the militarization of Western Germany and to the conclusion of military agreements between Western Germany and the United States, the United Kingdom and France.

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11 Egypt nationalized the Universal Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956. It strained the relations and culminated in Israel's invasion of Egypt on 29 October 1956. British and French intervened in the conflict on 30 October 1956. Their action was strongly condemned.

12 The Chronicle of United Nations Activities, vol. II, no. 45.

Western move, however, again failed because of negative vote by the USSR. Deadlocked since the Council was, as the US resolution observed, "unable to exercise its primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security" because of "the lack of unanimity among its permanent members", it decided by a vote of 10-1 (USSR) to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly (UNGA) to "make appropriate recommendations concerning the situation in Hungary".<sup>13</sup>

General Assembly:

Special meeting of UNGA was convened on 4 November 1956. Introducing their resolution,<sup>14</sup> the US representative, Lodge explained that "We cannot stand idly by while Hungarians are dragged bodily back to servitude even as they were re-emerging to independence and freedom". He accused the USSR of contravening the principles of the UN Charter by endangering the basic and fundamental right of self-determination to Hungarians. His argument was supported by the representatives of Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Greece, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, the Philippines, Spain, Turkey, and Britain. The French representative, Louis de Guirngvad was stern in his argument:

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13 United Nations Review, vol. 3, no. 6, December 1956, p. 60.

14 Ibid., p. 61.

We must condemn once and for all all military action undertaken by the Red Army in Hungary. We must demand the immediate withdrawal of the Soviet occupation forces from Hungary.... 15

British representative Dixon accused Soviet Union of duplicity and questioned whether it could any more "talk about colonial oppression or imperialism except in terms of the most blatant hypocrisy ... recognized by everyone (here) now as such".<sup>16</sup> Both French and British representatives also argued that their intervention in Egypt was not for occupation but only to prevent an explosion of a conflict between two combatant nations close to a vital international waterway.

South African representative, Donald B. Sole, went a step further. He argued that it was not appropriate to say "Situation in Hungary". It should rather be "External intervention in the internal affairs of Hungary" to which the UN was competent to take action against Soviet forces.<sup>17</sup> In tune with this argument, French representative introduced amendment to US resolution to add to "situation in Hungary" "caused by foreign intervention". The amended resolution was approved by 50 to 8 votes with 15 abstentions.<sup>18</sup> It may be noted that the original resolution was approved by 53 to 8 with only 7 abstentions. Thus 3 voters and 5 more

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15 Ibid., p. 63.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid., p. 61.

18 Ibid., pp. 65, 104-5.

States abstained on voting the amendment. Among those who voted both the original and amended resolution were three African States namely Ethiopia, Liberia and South Africa. Egypt, victim of Anglo-French-Israeli invasion, and another Arab-African State, Libya, abstained.

On 8 November, the Members explained the reasons for their votes on the above resolution. The Eastern bloc contended that the Hungarian situation was purely an internal affair and the Soviet troops had acted in response to a request by the Hungarian Government for aid in the struggle against counter revolutionary fascist elements, imperialist agents and provocateurs aided from without by the US and its allies. They added that it was a manoeuvre of Anglo-French-US combine to camouflage the situation created in Egypt by Anglo-French aggression.<sup>19</sup>

Neutralists' abstaining the vote was explained by Yugoslavia, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia and India. Yugoslavian representative, Brilej, argued against all forms of foreign interference but, he added, the US resolution taken as a whole did not seem to indicate "a course which might lead to an improvement of the situation".<sup>20</sup> His stand was supported by Burmese representative, U Pe Kin and Indonesian representative Sudjarwo. Indian representative V.K. Krishna Menon argued that "We are not neutral where human freedom is concerned" but the UNGA could not deal with a UN Member

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19 Ibid., p. 67.

20 Ibid., p. 68.

State, which Hungary was, as in the case of a colonial country where the people had no representation. He added that "we cannot in any circumstances ... disregard the sovereign rights of Members."<sup>21</sup> The Ceylonese representative, R.S.S. Gunewardene added that "there is no team that can visit a country (as demanded through the resolution) except with the express permission of the government of that country, unless we want to start another world war."<sup>22</sup>

Maghreb Members from Africa namely Egypt and Libya abstained since the former was a victim of Anglo-French invasion seeking redress through Soviet and neutral support. As discussed in the previous chapter, African States had no weight in the UNGA and their two representatives from Ethiopia and Liberia did not give any explanation for their voting in favour of the resolution.

On 9 November 1956, Cuba, Ireland, Italy, Pakistan and Peru introduced another resolution demanding immediate withdrawal of the USSR forces from Hungary and immediate relief from Hungarian refugees. USA also proposed immediate end to USSR action in Hungary. The arguments of respective sides were offered on the same lines. Accordingly five-power resolution was approved by 48 to 11 votes with 16 abstentions.<sup>23</sup> In this voting Ethiopia did not participate while Liberia again voted in favour and Arab-African

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21 Ibid., p. 66.

22 Ibid.

23 Chronicle of U.N. Activities, vol. 2, no. 46.

States abstained. The vote was opposed by two "neutral" States namely India and Yugoslavia who argued that that resolution disregarded the sovereignty of Member States.

The resolutions passed by the UNGA could not be implemented since Hungarian authorities refused permission to the UN observers and Imre Norvath, Foreign Minister and leader of the Hungarian delegation to the UN walked out of the session as a protest on 9 November 1956. He maintained that the developments in Hungary were exclusively an internal matter and permission to the UN observers would "violate the sovereignty of Hungary".<sup>24</sup> UN Secretary General also later informed the UNGA that it was difficult for him to implement the resolutions adopted by the UNGA without Hungarian cooperation. No state was prepared to risk, as the Ceylonese representative had argued, the world war, the question remained a propaganda war to attack Soviet Union and isolate it from diplomatic warfare. African States had no weight to contribute in this word war being fought in the UN.

#### Czechoslovakian Crisis

The second breach in the "iron curtain" was made by "anti-Soviet" leadership in Czechoslovakia in 1968 - the UN Human Rights Year. The breach was initiated by the

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24 Ibid.



Congress of writers in the spring of 1967.<sup>25</sup> The Congress sought replacement of "severest communist rule" by "democratic socialism".

Czechoslovakia was ruled by Communist Party since the set up of Socialist regime. Anton Novotny steered the destiny of both the nation and party since 1954.<sup>26</sup> Under his leadership, Czechoslovakia opted for joining the Warsaw Pact. It became a very important pillar of the Warsaw Pact in their struggle against NATO. Leader of the Congress, Michel Salomon, recalled that Czechoslovakia had an army of 225,000, well equipped and next to Polish army only. It was divided into 22 divisions, four of which were equipped with about 3,200 tanks. In addition, she had an airborne brigade, 2,000 pieces of artillery plus missiles; an airforce of 50,000 men with 600 modern fighter planes, 300 training planes, 100 combat helicopters, and 50 large troop transporters. She could also line up 700,000 reservists immediately and mobilize ultimately 2.5 million men of fighting age. Strategically her Bohemian plain was the pivot of the defence system of the Warsaw Pact.

Economically, Czechoslovakia played an essential role in the Comecon, the Common Market of the Warsaw Pact countries.

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25 The Congress of writers was held at Lucerna on 2 June 1967. The delegates attacked severely "neo-Stalinist dogmatism". The Congress initiated "new direction" to be given to State policy under the leadership of Ludvik Vaculik. See, Michel Salomon, Prague New Book : The Strangled Revolution (Boston, 1968), p. 54.

26 Antony Novotny was President of the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia and Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

She had also contributed largest share in the Warsaw aid to the Arabs, Cuba and Vietnam in their fight against the Western group.

Thus defection of Czechoslovakia from the Warsaw Pact threatened the downfall of German Democratic Republic as well. <sup>27</sup> Anti-Soviet leadership as well the NATO group were not unaware of the importance of Czechoslovakia to their adversaries in the Cold War. Therefore, they were aware of the uphill task against the Communist regime; and took very cautious step in mobilizing anti-Soviet and anti-Communist forces.

On 27 June 1968, the leader of the "new direction, Ludvik Vaculik wrote about "the Reform Movement" under the title, Two Thousand Words. He pointed out that reform movement did not bring any change since "ideas and themes of which many are elder than the mistakes of our socialism, while others have originated under the visible surface of events and should have been announced a long time ago, but have been suppressed." <sup>28</sup>

Sensing the danger in the emerging strength of "anti-Communist" leadership, "the Communists of the army" demanded, in their meeting held on 4 January 1968, that "Comrade Novotny be supported in his functions as President of the Republic and as first Secretary of the Central Committee". <sup>29</sup> Their

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27 Salomon, n. 25, pp. 55, 77 fn., and 85.

28 See Two Thousand Words, in *ibid.* See also Robert Rhodes James, The Czechoslovak Crisis 1968 (London, 1969), p. 24; Z.A.B. Zeman, Prague Spring (New York, 1969), p. 152.

29 Salomon, n. 25, p. 58.

resolution, however, reached the Central Committee, which met in Prague from 3 to 5 January 1968, after its members by majority had resolved to separate the functions of the President of the Republic and First Secretary of the Central Committee. It had also offered the post of First Secretary to Alexander Dubcek.<sup>30</sup> Anti-Communist leaders, calling themselves revolutionaries, turned down the demand arguing that "this letter is out of place, that in essence it expresses our lack of confidence in the Central Committee".<sup>31</sup> This helped control of the Central Committee by the "revolutionaries".

The above event heralded, as the "revolutionaries" claimed, the era of reforms. They lifted the censorship and "free press" exploded the myth of Communism. They selected a new team of youngmen "from outside the (administrative) machine made up of the first brain trusts which imposed themselves on the Novotnyan machine".<sup>32</sup> On 20 February 1968, Dubcek made a public announcement for building a "humane, just, and brotherly Czechoslovakia and asked his audience to "Help Me." The above speech was repeated at various occasions.

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30 Career of Dubcek began as Secretary of the Communist Party at Banska Bystrica, his home town. In 1963, he became First Secretary of the Slovak Communist Party and a Member of both the Presidium and Parliament. In that position, Dubcek came in "alliance" with "the intellectuals" of the Writers Congress. See Salomon, n. 25, p. 70.

31 "The Truth About a Letter: The Events at the Ministry of Defence of October 1967 to January 1968", C.T.K., Daily Press Survey, 8 April 1968, quoted in *ibid.*, p.58.

32 Zeman, n. 28, p. 113.

On 27 February 1968, a close friend of Novotny, an important functionary of the "socialist" regime and initiator of the 4 January resolution, General Senja himself defected to the CIA. His defection led to resignation of Novotny from presidency on 22 March 1968. He was succeeded by General Svoboda which further strengthened the position of the "new direction". Though their language smacked the repetition of events which took place in Hungary 12 years ago, Dubcek and Oldrick Cernik, head of the government, paid a visit to Moscow to assure Soviet leadership of continued association of Czechoslovakia with defence plans.

In that situation of uncertainty, the Central Committee met on 21 and 22 May 1968. It concluded that the demand of the "new deal" leadership for the resurrection of the Social Democratic Party was "motivated by the desire to disrupt the unity which exists in the heart of the working class"<sup>33</sup>. It demanded "return to the situation existing before February 1948. But the "new direction" leadership continued its policy of eliminating Communist Party from the administrative machinery. The Central Committee again met on 29 May 1968 and removed Novotny and 6 other Communist Party members from the Committee itself. They also declared holding of 9 regional extraordinary conferences for the nomination of delegates to the Extraordinary Congress called in Prague in September 1968.

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33 Powel Tigrid, Why Dubcek Fell (London, 1969), pp. 172-3.

The "democratic" process adopted by the "new deal" leadership for liquidating Communist Party in Czechoslovakia was sought to be strengthened by the Two Thousand Word note.<sup>34</sup> Accusing the previous regime, the note branded that their period was "a dark period whose events have endangered (Czechoslovakian) spiritual health and even its character". It made a scathing attack on the "programme of socialism". It condemned the Communist Party which had prohibited honest men acquiring influence. It expressed satisfaction over its replacement by leadership of "new direction". It also cautioned the people against respite in their crusade and demanded "removal of (all) those who have abused their powers, who have wasted the collective patrimony, and who behaved in a dishonest or brutal manner...." It also cautioned the people against the inevitable "intervention of foreign forces in our internal evolution".<sup>35</sup>

The above note revealed the real nature of the movement and caused greater anxieties among all the Member States of the Warsaw Pact. They held a meeting on 14-15 July 1968.<sup>36</sup> Leadership of the "new direction" did not participate in that meeting. After deliberations, they sent a letter, on 19 July 1966, to the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia expressing "sincere friendship based on the principles of

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34 The note was drafted by the Writers' Congress President, Ludvik Vaculik and it was signed by 100 members. It was released on 27 June 1968.

35 Ibid.

36 The meeting was attended by Bulgaria, Poland, Democratic Republic of Germany, Hungary and USSR.

Marxism and Leninism and proletarian internationalism, with a view to strengthening the position of our common cause - socialism - as well as the security of the socialist community.<sup>37</sup> The letter also expressed serious concern of the Member-States over "the attacks from the forces of reaction, supported by those of imperialism (posing) a danger to the interests of the socialist system as a whole."

The letter further cautioned that "we cannot accept that foreign forces should lead your country from the way of socialism and expose Czechoslovakia to the danger of being divided from the socialist community. This is not solely your problem. This is the problem of all the communists and workers' parties of all the countries which are joined by the bonds of cooperation and friendship. It is the common problem of our countries, which are united by the Treaty of Warsaw to assure their independence, peace and security in Europe and to raise an indestructible barrier against the aggressive and retaliatory manoeuvres of imperialism." The letter asserted that they had "achieved victory over the fascism of Hitler at the price of enormous sacrifices" and "shall never consent to seeing endangered the historical achievements of socialism, independence, and the liberty of our people." It said confidently that "we shall never agree that imperialism, whether peacefully or not, whether from within or from without, should create a rift in the socialist system and change the balance of power in Europe in its favour." It

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37 James, n. 28, p. 152.

also expressed hope that "the Czechoslovakian Communist Party will entirely assume its responsibility and will take the measures necessary to combat reaction. In this struggle, it can count on the solidarity and support of the socialist sister countries." Thus the battle was drawn nearer.

Reacting to the above development, Dubcek objected to the Warsaw "ultimatum". He said that "Public opinion (in Czechoslovakia) was understruck by the pronouncement of the Warsaw conference and by our non-participation in that meeting."<sup>38</sup> Another leader Jiri Pelikin added that "we have no other choice than resistance or capitulation."<sup>39</sup>

As was expected, the West had found a great opportunity in this conflict to condemn their adversary, namely the USSR. They extended their solidarity with Dubcek.<sup>40</sup> He also received support from Yugoslavia and Romania - the two socialist countries fallen out with the USSR. It made the situation very tense. It further heightened when Pravda, on 19 July 1968, disclosed the discovery of an arms depot in strategically important Bohemia region and linked it with NATO designs "to detach Czechoslovakia from the Warsaw Pact".<sup>41</sup>

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38 The Times (London), 19 July 1968.

39 Ibid.

40 Le Monde (Paris), 25 July 1968.

41 Pravda, 19 July 1968. The Bulgarian Party paper also warned that the "threat to socialism in Czechoslovakia is growing every day" and that "internal reaction and imperialist centres" were compelling events in the direction of "revisionism and restoration". The Hungarian paper warned that "our historic experiences show that hostile forces will inevitably become involved in the process of correcting mistakes and will use every opening to their own advantage."

In that situation, Czechoslovakian and Russian leaders deliberated the crisis from 29 July to 1 August 1968. However, the leadership of the "new direction" disagreed with the Russians that their reform movement was aimed against them. The Heads of the six Warsaw Pact, including Czechoslovakia, assembled at the Mirror Hall in Bratislava in the evening of 3 August 1968. They signed a document affirming "equality, sovereignty, national independence and territorial integrity". The "new leadership" rejoiced on this as their victory.<sup>42</sup> Thereafter there was a mysterious calmness in the diplomatic atmosphere.

The calm was broken, on 21 August 1968, only with Tass (Moscow Radio) monitoring that:

Men of the Czechoslovakian state and Communist Party have asked the USSR and other allied states to come to the support of the Czechoslovakian people by bringing them military aid. 43

It also informed the world that five States, aligned in the Warsaw Pact, had, therefore, "intervened" in the Czechoslovakian affairs in the preceding night. The interventionists "justified their invasion by the argument that Czechoslovakia was on the verge of anti-socialist counter-revolution. The counter-revolution, they maintained, would have turned the path of development back to capitalism and delivered

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42 Times of India (Bombay), 4 August 1968;  
Times (London), 4 August 1968.

43 Times of India (Bombay), 22 August 1968.



Czechoslovakia into the Western camp."<sup>44</sup>

Dubcek and other leaders of the "new direction" were arrested. President Svoboda led a delegation to Moscow on 25 August 1968 for talks with Kremlin leadership. After negotiations for two days, the two parties signed another agreement. They decided that "Dubcek was to continue as the First Secretary; the invasion forces were to be gradually withdrawn, but a part of them were to remain on western frontier of Czechoslovakia; censorship was to be introduced; and the (communist) party was to strengthen its leading position in the state."<sup>45</sup> Like Hungarian "revolutionaries" Czechoslovak "revolutionaries" also argued that the clock was thus turned<sup>by</sup> back the "counter-revolutionary" Soviet Troops.

Issue in Security Council:

Western group again utilized the opportunity to launch fresh attack of words -- the pivot of the Cold War. On 21 August 1968, six Powers namely Canada, Denmark, France, Paraguay, Britain and USA requested the President of the Security Council, Joao Augusto de Araujo Castro of Cuba to convene an immediate meeting of the Council to consider "the present serious situation in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic".<sup>46</sup> They called the Soviet military invasion a

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44 E.J. Czerwinski and Jaroslaw Piekalivewicz, The Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia: Its Effects on Eastern Europe (Praeger, New York, 1972), p. 4.

45 Ibid.

46 S/8758, Letter of 21 August 1968, SCOR, mtg. 1441, 21 August 1968.

brazen violation of the UN Charter and demanded immediate withdrawal of the invading armies from Czechoslovakia. The Council considered the "situation" on 21, 22, 23 and 24 August 1968.

The US delegate alleged that Czechoslovakian invitation for the intervention was only a fraud perpetrated by the Soviet Union and added that there was no Western conspiracy against communist rule in Czechoslovakia.<sup>47</sup>

The USSR delegate vigorously opposed their move pleading that the discussion would serve the interests of only certain foreign interests. He added that the matter concerned the socialist community bound by mutual obligations of the Warsaw Pact. He also said that they had irrefutable evidence of external interference and that their intervention was in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter. He informed the meeting that intervening forces would be withdrawing no sooner did the lawful authorities of Czechoslovakia were satisfied that threat to their state's security had been eliminated.

#### African Response:

The Security Council adopted the 6 Power draft resolution<sup>48</sup> for debate on 21 August 1968 by 13 to 2 votes (USSR and Hungary). Algeria, the only African Member of the Council, also voted in favour of the resolution. The Algerian delegate explained that his vote was without prejudice to his Government's views

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47 S/8761, and Add. 1, Draft Resolution, *ibid*.

48 S/8761.

on the substance of the question.<sup>49</sup>

In the ensuing debate on the draft resolution, the Ethiopian delegate maintained that the USSR had failed to document convincingly their claim that Czechoslovakia had requested for the intervention. He also read the statement of condemnation of the intervention by his Government. He joined the Western group in demanding immediate withdrawal of the forces of the USSR and its allies.<sup>50</sup>

On 22 August, the third African Member, Senegal, joined hands with Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Paraguay, Britain and the USA in submitting another draft resolution alleging, among other things, that the action taken by the USSR and other Members of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia was a violation of the UN Charter, and, in particular, of the principle that all Members of the UN "shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of political independence of any State."<sup>51</sup> The draft resolution wanted to re-affirm the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia, condemn the armed

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49 UN Monthly Chronicle, vol. 5, no. 5, August-September 1968, p. 41.

50 Ibid., pp. 48-49.

51 S/8767, draft resolution, SCOR, mtg 1442, 22 August 1968. It may be added here that on 21 August 1968, representatives of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and USSR had issued a statement alleging that the Czechoslovak issue was raised in the Council by the Western bloc for diverting the attention of world from the entire responsibility of imperialist States, particularly the NATO powers, for encouraging the counter revolution and undermining the socialist system in Czechoslovakia. They had added that NATO members had become concerned about Czechoslovakia.

interventionists and demanded immediate withdrawal of their armed forces.

Reacting to the above resolution, Algerian delegate wondered on the haste of the debate on this issue which was, he reminded, in great contrast to the complacency shown over African issues. He added that the principles cited in the debate over this issue were equally applicable to Vietnam and Palestine issues as well. He further added that it showed that the present debate emanated from the Cold War politics, which had damaged Czechoslovakia, and would block a just solution of the problem. He declared that Algeria would, therefore, abstain from voting on the draft resolution.<sup>52</sup>

Thus the approach of African States vindicated the lines of sub-groups in which these States were divided on the continent. The resolution was voted by 10 to 2 votes with 3 abstentions. Among the abstentionist, Algeria was joined by India and Pakistan (which had by then withdrawn from Western alliance network). The resolution, however, remained ineffective due to the negative vote of the USSR.

On 23 August 1968, the debate further crystallized. Reacting to the new draft resolution sponsored by Canada referring to their disquiet over the whereabouts of the leaders of "new direction", Ethiopian delegate agreed with the suggestion for utilizing UN Secretary General's good offices in that matter, but he also hesitated to restrict

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52 UN Monthly Chronicle, vol. 5, no. 8, August-September 1968, pp. 61-62.

his choice of action and initiative by imposing a resolution upon him. Canada did not press for a vote on the resolution. <sup>53</sup>

On the same day, the Yugoslav delegate read a statement of his Government appreciating the arguments of the sponsors and supporters of the resolution on the situation in Czechoslovakia. He, however, added that the developments had once again confirmed that military blocs could not guarantee the security and free development of the members of these military blocs. He argued that these military alliances, in contrast, created conditions for subjugating the interests and independence of policy of the member-states to the interests of other members of the alliance. Thus he <sup>54</sup> advocated the philosophy of non-alignment.

On 25 August 1968, the Council rejected the request of Democratic Republic of Germany for participation in its debates by 9 to 2 votes with 4 abstentions. The voting of the African members remained on the pattern of the previous votings. Ethiopia and Senegal voted alongwith Western group; <sup>55</sup> Algeria abstained alongwith India, Pakistan and Yugoslavia.

The Council adjourned its meeting on 24 August to 26 August 1968. Later on, the scheduled meeting of 26 August was cancelled without assigning any reason or prescribing another date. Thus, Czechoslovak issue proved more weak,

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53 S/8767, SCOR; James, n. 28, p. 101.

54 James, n. 28, pp. 102-3. Also UN Monthly Chronicle, vol. 5, no. 8, August-September 1968, pp. 67-68.

55 S/8765, SCOR, mtg. 1444, 24 August 1968.

in so far as the UN organs were concerned, than the Hungarian issue. However, African States took sides in accordance with their policy approach vindicated in their groupings at their continental level. Their reaction outside the UN was also on these very lines.

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56 Mali was the only African State which sided with the Socialist State openly. She approved the intervention by the Warsaw Pact to thwart the imperialist designs of the West. African Research Bulletin, p. 1159.

Chapter IV

CUBAN AND CONGO CRISIS AND THE AFRICAN  
RESPONSE

## Chapter IV

### CUBAN AND CONGO CRISES AND THE AFRICAN RESPONSE

Latin America had been a victim of big power politics in the early nineteenth century. The Monroe doctrine (1822) was the first step towards preventing Big Power interference. At that time the Big Powers were concentrated in Europe and, therefore, the Monroe Doctrine declared America for the Americans. The Monroe Doctrine, however, indirectly perpetuated US hegemony over the continent known as South America or Latin America. European powers were restricted to commercial activities only. Intensification of Cold War in the post-Second World War era brought first time commotion in that continent when the 1950s witnessed rising tide of politico-military interference in the Latin American countries by the powers outside America. This commotion hit directly the interests of United States of America (USA) which led the NATO bloc against the Warsaw Pact countries in the Cold War. Being ideological, the developments obviously were closely linked with the Cold War Politics.

#### Cuba : Communist Resurgence in Latin America

Guatemala was the first Latin American country to break the "convention" indoctrinated by the Monroe Declaration. Guatemala Government led by Jaco Arbenz became increasingly responsive to Communist influence. Since it was considered extension of Soviet influence into its exclusive sphere, the



USA engineered a successful invasion against Arbenz in 1954 and killed the Communist "monster" in the womb. However, before the USA could eliminate Communist "menace" in Guatemala, civil strife overtook the pro-US Government in Cuba. Fulgencio Batista ousted Frio Soccarras in 1952. Batista succumbed to Fidel Castro's "rebel band" in 1956. Castro's victory augered a new era of Cold War tensions in Latin America. Though Castro was not a Communist,<sup>1</sup> future events brought him closer to the Soviet Union. His alienation helped Soviet Union bring a successful breach at the very centre of the US power-base. This breach extended the Cold War politics to Western hemisphere. Western group was first time defensive in the UN. It would, therefore, be interesting to analyse response of African Members who were entering the UN with a "radical" bang.

A turn to hostile relationship with the USA began when Castro nationalised private investment in Cuba. The USA protested to the Cuban Government alleging that nationalisation tantamounted to "the failure of ... Cuba to recognise the legal rights of U.S. citizens who have made investments in Cuba."<sup>2</sup> The Cuban Government rejected the US protest note and argued

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1 According to an CIA estimate, Castro was "not a communist" but "certainly not anti-communist". The Communist Party of Cuba viewed him representative of the "leadership of a nationalistic, bourgeois democratic revolution which precedes a Communist rise to power." This theory became a phobia to the US policy makers and caused alienation of Castro from the USA. A Facts on File Publication, Cuba, the U.S. and Russia, 1960-63 (New York, 1964),

2 Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 12 June 1960.

that it was an interference in their internal affairs. It strained US-Cuba relations to a point of no return.

US-Cuba relations deteriorated further with Castro accusing, in a public statement at Havana (Capital city of Cuba) on 2 January 1962, that the US embassy was the centre of "counter-revolutionary activities", and that 80 per cent of the US mission personnel were "spies of F.B.I. and the Pentagon" (the US military headquarters) who were helping the "terrorists" with bombs. He asserted that he would "eliminate all terrorists and counter-revolutionaries in Cuba".<sup>3</sup> Taking the first step in that direction, Cuban Government, in their note dated 3 January 1962, to the US Government desired that Cuba wanted to reduce its personnel in its Embassy in Washington to eleven. The note also demanded that "under present circumstances", the USA should also reduce its personnel in their Havana Embassy from 48 to eleven.<sup>4</sup> The USA thereupon broke diplomatic relations with Cuba and recalled US Ambassador, Philip W. Bonsal.<sup>5</sup>

In a statement on 3 January, US President Eisenhower said that the note was a "calculated action on the part of the Castro Government ... of a long series of harassments, baseless accusations, and vilification."<sup>6</sup> He added that "There is a

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3 The Patriot, 3 January 1962.

4 Hindustan Times, 24 January 1960.

5 Cuba charged US Government of violating diplomatic custom by making public recall of her ambassador before apprising Cuba Government of their decision.

6 Hindustan Times, 4 January 1962.

limit to what the US in self-respect can endure. That limit has been reached." In its retaliatory note to the Government of Cuba, the US Government said that "this unwarranted action by the Government of Cuba places crippling limitations on the ability of the US Mission to carry on its normal diplomatic and consular functions. It would consequently appear that it is designed to achieve an effective termination of diplomatic and consular relations between the Government of Cuba and the Government of US. Accordingly the Government of the US hereby notifies the Government of Cuba of the termination of such relations."<sup>7</sup> The USA thereupon broke diplomatic relations with Cuba and recalled US Ambassador to Cuba, Philip W. Bonsal.<sup>8</sup>

There was a hope of improvement in the US-Cuban relations,<sup>9</sup> but the blowing up of a French frigate, La Coubre, loaded with munitions from France heightened the tension to a point of no return.<sup>10</sup>

The USA, in their note dated 8 April 1960, warned that Cuba's friends "have been gravely disillusioned by what is

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7 Ibid., 24 January 1960.

8 Ibid.

9 President of Cuba, Dorticos, in his statement dated 27 January 1960 expressed that Cuba "laments the progressive deterioration of relations" between his country and the USA which emanated from "misunderstanding" of their aims and goals by the USA. Ibid., 28 January 1960.

10 French frigate, La Coubre loaded with explosives and ammunitions purchased by Cuba from Belgium, was exploded at Havana's Talia Tiedra dock on 4 March 1960. Castro alleged that explosion had been caused by US directed saboteurs. He added: "We have the right to believe that those who did not wish us to receive arms ... are among those guilty of this sabotage." Quoted in, A Facts on File Publication, n. 1.

coming to be considered a betrayal of these ideals in such matters as freedom of expression, equal protection of the laws and the right to choose a representative government."<sup>11</sup>

In reply to this note, President of Cuba charged that "international strategies are set up against Cuba, attempts are made to isolate us internationally and efforts are concerted against the Cuban revolution."<sup>12</sup> These charges and counter-charges went on increasing and their tone taking to severity.

While the diplomatic channels were sticking their guns at each other, the US Government took economic measures restricting the import of oil<sup>13</sup> and export of sugar.<sup>14</sup> Turning

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11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Oil was most important item for the running of economy as well as administrative machinery. Cuba was entirely dependent on outside resources and refineries owned by USA and other interests operating in Cuba. Cuba signed an agreement with Soviet Union in February 1960 for obtaining petroleum in exchange of 5 million tons of Cuban sugar in the next 5 years. The Texas Company's Refinery later refused to refine Soviet oil. Thereupon Cuba Government nationalised this Company. US Government condemned that Cuban action was a "naked ... contravention of the norms of conduct by responsible governments." Cuban Government then nationalised, on 1 July, other 3 oil companies, Esso, Standard Oil of J.J. subsidiary and the Shell Petroleum Company which had also refused to process Soviet crude oil. Ibid.

14 Sugar was the mainstay of Cuban economy. US Congress voted, on July 1960, to cut the quota for Cuban sugar imported into USA. The Agricultural Department suspended, on 5 July 1960, imports of rest of the Cuban sugar. On 6 July 1960, President Eisenhower cut sugar quota by 700,000 tons. The Eastern bloc had already filled the vacuum by purchasing 763,715 tons in January-April 1960. Cuban President further made public that Soviet Union had agreed to buy 732,752 tons of sugar from Cuba. Hindustan Times, 11 July 1960.

to the Soviet bloc to counteract the US moves, Cuba also nationalised all the oil refineries and sugar factories owned by the US interests.<sup>15</sup> On their failure in puncturing Cuban economy by commercial embargo, US Government resorted, on 19 August 1960, to restricting US loans for purchasing Cuban sugar.<sup>16</sup> The Communist bloc again came to their rescue and made agreements for purchase of Cuban sugar and thereby their support to Cuban resistance against US imperialism.

US-Cuban tension took a new turn when Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev made the most provocative statement in the history of Cold War. On 9 July 1960, he declared that the USSR did not consider the Monroe doctrine valid in Cuba. He denounced the doctrine as a device of domination of Latin America and added that USSR would support the Castro regime with rockets against "the intrigue of American imperialists".<sup>17</sup> His declaration brought the adversaries in Cold War face to face. US President Eisenhower warned USSR that USA would uphold her commitments to prevent foreign nations' "interference" in Latin America. He said in unequivocal terms that USA would not "permit the establishment of a regime dominated by international communism in the Western Hemisphere".<sup>18</sup>

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15 Ibid., 7 July 1960.

16 According to the agreement, 50 per cent of the sugar purchased against US loans was to be shipped through US vessels. The Government of Cuba, the US officials charged, was violating this provision by refusing shipment in US vessels. USA refused Morocco to utilise \$ 10 million loan on this account. Ibid., 12 August 1960.

17 Ibid., 10 July 1960.

18 Ibid., 17 July 1960.

Cuban Issue in the Security Council:

Cuban Foreign Minister, Roa wrote, on 15 July 1960, to the President of the Security Council that "a grave situation endangering international peace and security had arisen as a result of repeated threats, reprisals and aggressive acts by the Government of the United States against Cuba and requested (convening) an immediate meeting of the Security Council.<sup>19</sup>

He added that Cuba had adopted measures only to "safeguard the national resources and improve the conditions of the Cuban people". He charged that USA had inflamed propaganda against Cuban Government's "anti-feudal and democratic character of the Cuban revolution". He alleged that USA had extended protection to Cuban war criminals and "facilities to counter-<sup>20</sup>revolutionary elements."

In its rejoinder-letter to the Security Council USA argued that the Castro regime was deliberately making a "systematic campaign of distortions, half truths and outright falsehoods against the Government and the people of United States, the continuation of which could not fail to increase

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19 In its complaint Cuba submitted that (i) a grave situation endangering international peace and security had emerged by the aggressive acts of USA against Cuban people and their Government; (ii) USA had interfered in the internal affairs of Cuba by offering protection to Cuban war criminals and by providing facilities to counter-revolutionary elements in Cuba; (iii) USA had violated Cuban air space; and (iv) USA had adopted measures which tantamount economic strangulation of their country.

USA accused Cuba of intense and systematic campaign of distortions, half truths, and outright falsehood against the United States.

20 Hindustan Times, 17 July 1960.

tensions in the Caribbean sea."<sup>21</sup> USA also informed that it was an internal affair of the Organization of American States (OAS) whose committee, the Inter-American Peace Committee was already seized with the problem.

Debate in Security Council:

Security Council considered the two letters in its 874th meeting held on 18 July 1960.<sup>22</sup> Initiating the arguments, Cuban delegate maintained that OAS was just a sub-serving instrument of US interests and, therefore, his Government would like consideration of their complaints by the Security Council. He referred to the US document circulated amongst the members of OAS wherein Cuba was relegated as a USSR satellite. He added that USA in conjunction with the OAS aimed at isolating and destroying the Cuban "revolution which had put an end to colonial domination and had changed the country's economy and social structure for the benefit of the (Cuban) people."<sup>23</sup> He charged that the United States was intervening in the internal affairs of Cuba through economic, diplomatic and military measures. He also apprehended uprising of anti-Castro forces being financed by USA.<sup>24</sup>

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21 UN Doc. S/4388, Letter dated 15 July 1960.

22 SCOR, yr. 16, mtg. 874, 18 July 1960.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

US delegate denied the allegations and charges levelled by the Cuban delegate. He added that his Government was exercising "restraint in the face of a deliberate effort on the part of Cuba to exacerbate relations with the United States." He stressed that proper form for resolving such differences in the Caribbean Sea was OAS already seized with the problem. He sought adjournment of the meeting of the Council until the OAS had reached conclusions.<sup>25</sup>

Two Latin American Members, Ecuador and Argentina moved a resolution demanding adjournment of the "consideration of this question pending the receipt of a report from the OAS".<sup>26</sup> It also urged all other States "to refrain from any action which might increase the existing tensions between Cuba and the United States of America."<sup>27</sup> Thus the resolution indirectly indicted USSR.

USSR supported the Cuban argument and sought an amendment in the resolution to nullify reference to OAS and advocated continued consideration of the question by the UN organs.<sup>28</sup> These arguments soon brought Cold War politics in the debate. US and the Soviet delegates traded severe charges against each other. US delegate Henry Cabot Lodge apprehended that USSR "military might" had been instigating Cuba and was the root cause of the tensions in their hemisphere.

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25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid., UN Doc. S/4392.

28 Ibid., yr. 16, mtg. 876, UN Doc. S/4394.



Tunisia was the only African Member of the Security Council at that time. Her delegate agreed with the US and other Latin American delegates that it would be wiser to await the conclusions of the OAS. He, however, hastened to add that utilization of regional agencies such as OAS did not, however, preclude recourse to a competent UN organ, particularly Security Council. He further added that that Council could delay any decision on the substance of the question until the conclusions of the OAS were made known to the Council.<sup>29</sup>

US argument was vehemently supported by the Western countries. Resolution submitted by Ecuador and Argentina was adopted by 9 votes to zero and two abstentions (USSR and Poland). Tunisia supported the above resolution but abstained on voting USSR amendment which was rejected by 8 votes to 2.<sup>30</sup> Thus USA demonstrated her strength and obtained tacit support of all the non-communist countries. Her ascendancy remained intact in the coming meetings.

Secretary General of the OAS submitted the text of Final Act of the Meeting of the Committee of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to the Security Council on 29 August 1960. Besides resolving to settle the dispute by mutual discussions, the Final Act condemned intervention or the threat of intervention from an extra-continental power in the affairs of OAS. It unequivocally condemned Communist bloc's attempt to destroy American hemispheric unity and peace. The

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29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

Act also asserted that all the members of OAS were "under obligation to submit to the discipline of the inter-American system."<sup>31</sup> Cuba, however, challenged the validity of the Final Act and that the information received from the Secretary General of OAS could not be regarded as constituting the report from OAS requested by the Council resolution adopted on 19 July 1960.<sup>32</sup> It led to a prolonged rangling between the two parties without any settlement.

US-Cuban dispute again became hot in December 1960. Cuban Foreign Minister wrote to the President of the Security Council, on 31 December 1960, that Cuba feared "imminent US invasion" on the pretext of "the alleged construction in Cuba of launching sites for Soviet rockets." He requested the Council to take urgent measures to save Cuba from that invasion.<sup>33</sup> On 3 January 1961, he informed the Security Council that in its move to isolate Cuba, USA had severed diplomatic relations with Cuba and that the latest action had increased the apprehensions of armed aggression by USA.<sup>34</sup>

#### Security Council and the Crisis

The Security Council took up the appeal in its 921st meeting held on 4 January 1961. In the meeting, Cuban representative asserted that the emerging situation in American

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31 UN Doc. S/4605.

32 UN Doc. S/4606.

33 UN Doc. S/4605.

34 Cuba had in earlier letter informed the Security Council that they were in possession of a plan for US armed aggression against Cuba. Ibid.

hemisphere had a bearing to the world as a whole and, therefore, its discussion by the OAS must be resisted. He also informed the meeting that after breaking off diplomatic relations with Cuba, USA was laying the groundwork for direct military aggression accusing that Cuba "had become a spearhead of international communism".<sup>35</sup> He charged that USA was adamant to restore "the old regime and re-imposition of colonial domination" over Cuba. USA had also given, he further charged, war materials to the "counter-revolutionary groups operating in the Cuban mountains". He urged the Council to "condemn the United States as an aggressor."<sup>36</sup>

US delegate repeated his old arguments and said that such wild allegations were being made since 1959. He further said that "by underrating subversive and military activity, far beyond the resources of Cuba acting alone, the leaders of Cuba had put their country more and more into the hands of international communism." He also charged that the Soviet Union had instigated the Cuban regime to raise an imaginary bogey of US aggression at a time when world opinion might otherwise be noticing "certain events in Laos or in the Congo."<sup>37</sup> In spite of continued Cuban hostility against them, he added, USA was

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35 SCOR, mtg. 922.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid. Also UN Doc. S/4611. It may be noted that Soviet Union had extended unilaterally military assistance to Lumumba, Premier of Congo in his fight against the secessionists forces tacitly supported by Belgium. The Western countries severely condemned Soviet Union for this assistance and charged her of violation of the Security Council resolutions which had authorised only the UN forces to assist the authorities of the Congo in their fight against secessionists.

making genuine efforts to "restore peace and friendship with Cuba."<sup>38</sup>

US argument was again vehemently supported by the countries aligned with Western bloc and Latin American countries. Ecuador alongwith Chile again submitted a draft resolution seeking that (i) differences between Cuba and USA should be resolved through mutual deliberations and (ii) that other States should refrain from the acts inflaming the situation further.<sup>39</sup>

#### African Response:

By this time, Liberia and Egypt had also become members of the Security Council. All of them aired different approaches. Liberian delegate echoed pro-Western sentiments. He said that Liberia understood Cuban fears but added that his Government was still unconvinced that Cuban complaint was genuine. He welcomed the denial of the charges by the US delegate.<sup>40</sup> Tunisian delegate continued to adopt cautious approach on the lines adopted by him in the last session of the Council. The Egyptian delegate, who was also then President of the Council and a representative of leading non-aligned nation, represented more or less non-aligned policy. He stressed "the importance of the principle of non-intervention" and expressed support for the joint draft resolution. He also pointed out that fears and anxieties of

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38 Ibid.

39 Ibid., mtg. 923.

40 Ibid.

a small State like Cuba in the neighbourhood of a great power like USA were genuine and the Security Council should find solution to end that state of uncertainty and tension.<sup>41</sup> He added, as President of the Council, that though Chile-Ecuador resolution had not asked for a vote, the debate thereon would contribute, he expressed his confidence, to reduce tension between Cuba and USA "whose conduct must be regulated by the (UN) Charter, that nothing would be done to aggravate the existing situation."<sup>42</sup>

The adversaries of the Cold War used the event only to condemn each other and none of them was prepared to go beyond that criticism. They manouvered only to mobilise support of other nations through the good offices of the UN organs. USSR had clearly seen the steam-rolling strength of USA in the Security Council. Therefore, in July 1960, she abstained from voting; and in January 1961, she did not press for a voting and allowed the matter to be adjourned. African countries were divided on the lines of their continental grouping namely Monrovia, Casablanca and non-aligned. This diversity of approach deprived them, on the one hand, the leading role in the UN, and on the other, resulted only in apathy towards the settlement of a dispute highly intermixed with Cold War politics.

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41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

Debate in the General Assembly:

Above apathy was reflected in their approaches even in the General Assembly. Cuban complaint against USA was included in the agenda of the fifteenth session of the General Assembly of the UN. Initiating the consideration of this issue on 15 April 1961, the Cuban representative charged that USA had made various economic, political and military aggressions against Cuba. On 17 April 1961 he informed the Assembly of fresh invasion of Cuba by a mercenary force from Guatemala and Florida. He said that this mercenary force was organised and financed by the USA.<sup>43</sup>

US delegate denied all the charges. He also said that USA undoubtedly sympathised with those who opposed the Castro regime, but was also in opposition to the use of any foreign country and resources for mounting an offensive against another government.

The Assembly adopted, on 21 April 1961, a resolution submitted by 7 Latin American countries that they should adhere to the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 19 July 1960 and that all the States should contribute only in easing the tension. Thus the situation remained unchanged even in the General Assembly where a large number of African States were represented.<sup>44</sup>

Again on 8 August 1961, Cuba requested Security Council to consider the grave threats posed by USA and OAS

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43 GAOR, session 15.

44 Ibid.

to Cuba. Her letter was allotted to the First Committee of the General Assembly for recommendations regarding its consideration by the General Assembly. The First Committee submitted its report to the Assembly only on 20 December 1961. Until then, the President of the Security Council continued to maintain that neither the letter nor the recommendations of the First Committee of the General Assembly could be debated in the Council when the Assembly was seized with other matters. There was no objection to his suggestion for postponement of this question to future meeting. The General Assembly also did not give any priority to this complaint.<sup>45</sup>

In the meantime, OAS concluded that Cuban activities were against regional interests and had, therefore, decided to expel Cuba from its association. Their decision was called the "enforcement action". Thereupon, Cuba submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council asking it for obtaining an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice upon OAS decisions.<sup>46</sup>

She also cited Article 53 of the UN Charter, which provided that "enforcement action" could not be implemented by regional agencies without the authorisation of Security Council. Cuban resolution was, however, rejected by 2 (Romania and USSR) to 7 votes, Egypt and Ghana abstained.<sup>47</sup>

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45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

### Active Role of African States

Ghana took an active part in the above debate. Her delegate, Alex Quaison-Sackey proposed for a separate vote on "enforcement action". Arguing his point, he said that his delegation was "not unaware" of the political nature and background of the Cuban request, but there were, he added, identifiable points of law at issue. He stressed that Security Council, at the least, could enquire whether OAS had the authority of "enforcement action". He was supported by Egyptian delegate, Mohammed H. El-Zayyat, who was glad that the Cuban complaint had been included in the agenda of the Security Council. He also praised Cuban representative who had presented "a remarkable juridical analysis" of the case. He declined to accept that a regional agency had to be a "microcosm" of the UN and that only General Assembly could exclude a member of a regional agency. Thus both the delegates who represented a "radical personality" in the African context were quite moderate towards the Western bloc on the Cuban issue. They continued to maintain their moderate approach even after Ghanian proposal was rejected by 4 votes to 7.<sup>48</sup> They abstained in voting the Cuban resolution which was rejected by 2 votes (Romania and USSR) to 7 votes. Their approach did not change even when the Cuban issue blew up into "missile crisis" which shook the world from its moorings and heightened the fear of open war between the two Great Powers namely USA and USSR.

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48 Ibid.



The Security Council received three separate requests from Cuba,<sup>49</sup> USA,<sup>50</sup> and USSR<sup>51</sup> on the critical situation in the Caribbean region created by the proposed deployment of rockets by USSR. The later move is known as "missile crisis". The climax of the Cuban question in the "missile crisis" brought at stake, as the Acting Secretary General U Thant said, "not just the interests of the parties concerned, or even of all member states, but the very fate of mankind."<sup>52</sup>

The Council met on 23, 24 and 25 October 1962 to consider the above letters. USA and USSR submitted their separate draft resolutions reiterating their respective charges against each other. But the Cold War adversaries struck hard to their stand and caused a deadlock in the Security Council.

Meeting twice on the UN Day (24 October), the Council further deliberated over these drafts. Nine members partici-

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- 49 Cuba sought consideration of "the act of war unilaterally committed" by USA in ordering what it called a "naval blockade" and what the US termed as "quarantine" move of Cuba. Cuba charged that this was the culmination of a series of aggressive acts against her by USA. UN Doc. S/5185, letters dated 22 and 23 October 1962 from Cuba.
- 50 USA wanted the Council to bring about the dismantling and withdrawal, under UN observation, of offensive long-range missiles and launching bases which she charged had been secretly established in Cuba by the Soviet Union. UN Doc. S/5181, letter dated 23 October 1962 from USA.
- 51 USSR sought condemnation of USA for "violating the Charter" and "increasing the threat of war" and to insist that it revoked its decision to inspect ships bound for Cuba. UN Doc. S/5185, letter dated 23 October from USSR.
- 52 SCOR, mtg. 1022.

pated and expressed their opinions without any conclusive results.

African delegates representing Ghana and Egypt played an important role in these debates. They introduced jointly a draft resolution. <sup>53</sup> Their resolution proposed that

- (i) Security Council should request the Acting Secretary General to promptly confer with the parties directly concerned on the immediate steps to be taken to remove the existing threat to the world peace, and to normalise the situation in the Caribbean;
- (ii) Security Council should call on the parties concerned forthwith to comply with the draft resolution and provide every assistance to the Acting Secretary General in performing his tasks;
- (iii) Security Council should ask the Acting Secretary General to report to the Council on implementation; and
- (iv) Security Council should call on the parties concerned to refrain meanwhile from any action which may directly or indirectly further aggravate the situation.

Introducing the resolution, Ghanaian delegate proposed that USA and Cuba should give the Council written guarantees that the former had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Cuba; and Cuba, in turn, that she had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of any country in the Western hemisphere. He further said that he understood US anxiety, but questioned whether Soviet arms aid was sufficient justification for naval blockade of Cuba to quarantine that country. He referred to Soviet and Cuban stand that their joint action was of a defensive nature, and

quoted his President Kwame Nkrumah, who had said that:

The President of the United States has informed that there are rocket bases in Cuba. We have no means of knowing whether that is the case or not. We do know, however, that intelligence reports on Cuba have misled the Government of the United States before and have caused serious damages. 54

He added that the resolution was not for accusing anyone but was only "a peace resolution, calling for negotiations with the assistance of the Secretary General, and it should therefore receive the approval of the Council."<sup>55</sup>

President of the Council, however, adjourned the meeting without consideration of the joint draft. The Council again met on 25 October only after the Cold War adversaries namely USA and HSSR had already agreed to a peaceful negotiation and settlement of their disputes. After ceremonial statements by the delegates of USA, Cuba, USSR, Egypt, Ghana and Chile on this "pleasant" climax, motion for adjournment of the debate on Cuban issue was accepted unanimously.

The above dispute and debates thereon illustrate that the African States - pro-West, radical or non-aligned - were not interested much in taking sides too seriously. They were interested more in strengthening the UN organs under whose aegis they saw their salvation as well. The Ghanaian delegate's statement reflected the mind of African States:

These are grave times. I agree with the representative of the United States that our job is to save the peace. Indeed my delegation welcomes the response conveyed by the President of the United States and the Chairman of the

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54 UN Doc. S/5190.

55 Ibid. See also SCOR, mtg. 1024.

Council of Ministers of Soviet Union to the timely appeal and constructive suggestions addressed to them yesterday by the Acting Secretary General. My delegation wishes to record its warmest appreciation to U Thant for his tremendous show and statesmanship and initiative. 56

Thus the African Members representing "radical personality" were also not prepared to sacrifice UN at the alter of Cold War interests. This approach was vindicated more clearly in the case of the Congo crisis.

#### Congo Crisis

In the "scramble" for African territories in 1880s and 1890s, the region around the Congo and Luapula rivers was claimed by the Belgian King Leopold. It was the largest territory on that continent with an area of about 906,000 square miles and a population of about 13,559,000 kept under one administration. It was bounded by Congo (Brazzaville), Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, Zambia and Angola. It was given the name of the Congo Free State. It remained one of the most backward colony, in particularly, politically in comparison to all other surrounding colonial territories. The first political party, the Movement National Congolese (MNC) was founded only in 1958 by Patrice Lumumba. The party soon became a mass base party and put the most radical demands of general election and home rule. There occurred riots on 4 January 1959 when

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Joseph Kasavubu defied the ban and organised a political meeting in Leopoldville. Belgian authorities were convinced that the riots had occurred due to slow progress towards independence of their colony. They also realized that they could not hold on long after the French colonies around their colony had attained independence. They called a round table conference in Brussels, capital of Belgium, on 20 January 1960, and reached an agreement to grant independence to Congo on 30 June 1960.

The agreement, however, proved a Pandora's box. Though Belgium had never planned territorial independence, she had, however, given enough encouragement to the Congolese at local level. The territory was divided into six provinces namely Katanga, Leopoldville, Kivu, Kasai, Oriental and Equator. Tribal based political parties had attained considerable control in their respective strongholds which coincided with the provincial boundaries. Among them Kasavubu's Akaba party was the largest party and derived their strength from their tribe, Bakongo. Pre-independence general elections, held in May 1960, returned MNC as the single largest party at territorial level but short of majority for forming central government. MNC had, therefore, had to align with tribal leaders like Kasavubu, Moise Tshombe and Kalonji whose parties had won in their provinces namely Leopoldville, Elizabethville and Kasai respectively. Thus a coalition government came into existence at the centre.

Kasavubu became President and Lumumba became the Prime Minister and Head of the Government. Three members of Tshombe group got cabinet posts.

Tribal leaders were, however, not reconciled with the coalition and they aspired for independence in their respective strongholds. They soon got an opportunity when, on 5 July 1960, Force Publicque (National Army) mutinied. On 11 July 1960, Belgium intervened in the Congolese warfare pleading safety for its nationals. Belgian paratroopers occupied Leopoldville and started extending their control all over the territory. Their re-occupation of the erstwhile colony coincided with the disintegration of the country.

Tshombe declared the secession of Katanga and declared it as an independent nation. Thus with one stroke, as Kasavubu and Lumumba alleged, Belgians negated the independence of Congo.<sup>58</sup> It may be noted that Katanga was the wealthiest and industrial base of Congo. It provided about 50 per cent of the revenue to the central government. The central government appealed to the United Nations (UN) and its Secretary General for "urgent despatch" of military assistance to avert destruction of Congo by foreign military forces.<sup>59</sup> Congolese leaders also sought help from big powers who, however, refused to intervene because of the possible

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58 See, Cornelia Meigs, The Great Design (Boston, Mass., 1964), p. 185.

59 UN Doc. S/4382; also UN Yearbook, 1962, p. 62.

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danger of a direct involvement in a war.

Cold War Rivalry:

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On their appeal, Security Council met on 13 July 1960. The Council was, however, soon overtaken by the Cold War rivalry. Communist bloc led by the Soviet Union sided with the agitated African Members. They held that the armed intervention by Belgium was "an unwarranted act of aggression". USSR accused that Belgium had taken this act of "armed aggression" under the 'Nato Command'. Her delegate demanded that Security Council must "condemn" this "aggression" and order "immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops".<sup>62</sup>

The Belgian delegate, on the contrary, maintained that they had intervened to protect Belgian lives, property and honour and also to avoid greater bloodshed.<sup>63</sup> He also declined to withdraw Belgian forces until UN forces could ensure order and security to their people.<sup>64</sup> His stand was supported by British, French, Italian, Kuomintang and US delegates.<sup>65</sup> The Western bloc countries termed the Belgian intervention only a "temporary security measure to keep law and order".<sup>66</sup>

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60 SCOR, yr. 15, mtg. 873, 13-14 July 1960.

61 Ibid; also UN Yearbook, 1960.

62 UN Doc. S/4583, 13 July 1960.

63 SCOR, yr. 15, mtg. 873, 13-14 July 1960, pp. 33-37.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid., British, p. 26; French, p. 28; Italian, p. 44; Kuomintang, p. 44; and USA, p. 43.

66 Ibid., p. 23.

Tunisian delegate, Mongi Slim, who was then the sole member from the continent of Africa in the Security Council, introduced a draft resolution on 13 July 1960.<sup>67</sup> It called upon Belgium (i) to withdraw its troops from the Congo, (ii) to authorise the Secretary General to take necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of Congo, (iii) to provide such military and technical assistance as might be necessary until the Congolese national security force was in a position to stand by itself.

Non-aligned countries which abhorred the Cold War rivalry, were represented by Argentina and Ceylon. Their delegates, as also Kuomintang delegate, took a moderate stand. They argued that it was not time to apportion blame and that there was the urgent need to keep Congo question "out of cold war arena". They added that military help be rushed to the Congo.<sup>68</sup>

#### African Pre-eminence:

The Council finally approved Tunisian draft by 8 votes to zero with 3 abstentions.<sup>69</sup> It, however, rejected three Soviet amendments which sought: (i) condemnation of Belgian "armed aggression"; (ii) "immediate" withdrawal of Belgian troops; and (iii) limit selection of UN forces from African Member States only.<sup>70</sup> But Secretary General could not ignore

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67 UN Doc. S/4583, 13 July 1960.

68 Ibid., pp. 29-32.

69 Ibid., p. 42.

70 Ibid., pp. 41-42.



the importance of the significant role of African Member States supported by Afro-Asian group. He announced that selection of the personnel of the UN forces would be, in the first place, only from African States. He added that he would exclude troops from any of the permanent members of the Security Council.<sup>71</sup>

The importance of African States was further emphasised by him on 20 July 1960. He said: "We are at the turn of the road where our attitude will be of decisive significance not only for the future of the (UN) organization, but also for the future of Africa. And Africa may well, in present circumstances, mean the world. I know these are very strong words but I hope the Council and the Members of the Organisation know that I do not use strong words unless they are supported by strong convictions."<sup>72</sup>

Though critical of West, African States were not, however, willing to alienate from that region. While they did not agree for the presence of Belgian troops for a moment, they refused to "condemn" Belgium or to ask for "immediate withdrawal" of Belgian forces. They argued that Belgian intervention could not be justified. It was a matter of serious concern to the African States since the sovereignty and independence was violated by an ex-colonial power only. They demanded that situation aggravated by Belgium needed an immediate rectification.<sup>73</sup>

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71 Ibid., p. 5.

72 SCOR, mtg. 877, 20-21 July 1960, p. 4.

73 Ibid., p. 12; also Hindustan Times, 15 July 1960.

The above unanimity helped improving situation in Congo only temporarily. Belgium struck to its stand that her troops could not withdraw unless UN troops shouldered the responsibility for maintaining public peace.<sup>74</sup> Both Kasavubu and Lumumba insisted immediate evacuation of Belgian troops.<sup>75</sup> It led to another meeting of the Security Council on 20 July 1960.

Controversy between Belgium and the Congolese Government developed a situation of conflict amongst the Cold War adversaries. The communist bloc sought immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Belgian forces.<sup>76</sup> They got support from Lumumba who threatened that if the UN forces did not throw the Belgian forces out within 72 hours, he would call in the Soviet troops "to throw out the aggressors".<sup>77</sup>

Western bloc struck to their stand that Belgian troops could be withdrawn only after the UN forces effectively maintained law and order.<sup>78</sup> US delegate, Henry Cabot Lodge warned that his country would not tolerate any military force other than UN force in the Congo.

In this tense atmosphere, USSR draft resolution, submitted on 20 July 1960, demanding "immediate cessation of armed intervention" and withdrawal of all foreign troops

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74 SCOR, yr. 15, mtg. 877, 20 July 1960, p. 22.

75 Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 11.

76 *Ibid.*, p. 22.

77 Hindustan Times, 20 July 1960.

78 SCOR, yr. 15, mtg. 878, p. 6.

within three days was strongly opposed by British and French delegates.<sup>79</sup> They argued that setting a deadline would impede the smooth withdrawal of Belgian troops. Western Powers were, however, not prepared to take hard lines against African States. They agreed with the moderate approach adopted by African Member in the Security Council, and supported resolution submitted by him.

Tunisian delegate conceded that Belgian Government might have a genuine concern for her nationals but she could not keep her troops against the wishes of sovereign and independent Government of Congo.<sup>80</sup> He alleged that from the prevailing situation it appeared that Belgian Government was less concerned about the protection of her nationals. Her real intention seemed to help succede Katanga secession.<sup>81</sup> He stressed that the only solution was the immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops which only could reduce tension and restore calm in Congo.<sup>82</sup>

Unanimity of the Western bloc to the above moderate approach helped UN troops take position in all the cities of Congo. Belgian troops were withdrawn from Leopoldville by the evening of 23 July 1960.<sup>83</sup> Belgian Government also declared, on 29 July 1960, that her all the 1,500 troops would be with-

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79 UN Doc. S/4402, 20 July 1960.

80 SCOR, yr. 15, mtg. 878, 21 July 1960, p. 5.

81 Ibid., p. 7.

82 Ibid., p. 6.

83 UN Review, vol. 7, no. 3, September 1960, p. 11.

drawn from Congo at the earliest possible opportunity. But the situation soon took to new turn.

The secessionist leader, Tshombe declared, on 3 August, that his Government would resist entry of UN troops in Katanga.<sup>84</sup> This announcement embittered the situation and heightened the smooth and calm solutions expected as a result of unanimity reached in the previous meeting of the Security Council. Ghana and Guinea took strong stands and proclaimed that their Governments would provide direct assistance to Lumumba.<sup>85</sup> It led to the convening of another meeting of the Security Council on 8 August 1960.<sup>86</sup>

In the meeting, Tunisian delegate subscribed to the earlier stand and urged Security Council to strengthen the authority of the troops deployed in Congo by the UN. He submitted another resolution which called upon (i) Belgium "to withdraw immediately its troops from Katanga"; (ii) authorise entry of UN troops in Katanga; and (iii) to reaffirm that UN troops would not be "a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise".<sup>87</sup> Thus

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84 Hindustan Times, 7 August 1960.

85 UN Doc. S/4415 and S/4417/Add. 1/Rev. 1.

86 The Secretary General opined that Katanga situation was an internal affair where UN could not interfere without interfering with the UN principle of neutrality. He, therefore requested Security Council to suggest him further action. See UN Doc. S/4427, Report of the Secretary General.

87 UN Doc. S/4424, 8 August 1960. Ceylon was co-sponsorer of this draft resolution.

Tunisian draft was not as critical of the stand taken by Secretary General as the Warsaw group attempted to be.<sup>88</sup>

But since it had the tacit approval of majority of African Members, no Member was prepared to veto it.<sup>89</sup> Therefore, the resolution was accepted by 9 votes to zero with France and Italy abstaining.<sup>90</sup>

The above resolution, however, failed to ease the tension. Lumumba not only challenged the resolution, he also expressed "no confidence" in the UN Secretary General.<sup>91</sup> He appealed to Ghana, Peking and the Soviet Union for military assistance. These States responded to his appeal immediately and supplied 17 aeroplanes, 100 trucks, several thousand tons of foodstuff, and some 300-400 technicians. This widened the gap between Lumumba and Secretary General; it also hardened the approach of Cold War adversaries towards each other. Internal developments strengthened the pro-West forces led by the Chief of Staff Colonel Joseph Mobutu. The latter ordered all East European embassies to close down and also expelled their technicians.<sup>92</sup>

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- 88 Polish delegate opined that it were Belgian forces which had crushed Congolese army in Katanga and, therefore, there was no question of intervention in the internal affairs. See SCOR, yr. 15, mtg. 886, 9 August 1960, p. 21.
- 89 As seen in the second chapter majority of African Members had joined Monrovia group which was moderate towards the West.
- 90 SCOR, yr. 15, mtg. 886, p. 52.
- 91 UN Doc. S/4417/Add. 7, dated 15 August 1960.
- 92 On 5 September 1960, President Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba from the office of Prime Minister, and Lumumba, in his turn, dismissed the President Kasavubu. It soon made the situation ripe for another civil strife. On 14 September 1960, Chief of the Staff Colonel Mobutu established college des universitaires to rule the country.

Security Council again met to deliberate the above developments. Western bloc was highly critical of Soviet bloc. US representative, James J. Wadsworth charged the Soviet Union for obstructing the UN move in the Congo. He added that Soviet Union had design to convert Congo into her satellite.

African Members of the Council namely Guinea, Liberia and Tunisia were also sharply divided in their reactions. Liberia and Tunisia were against censoring Secretary General. They maintained that UN troops had helped in stabilizing the situation and scotching the possibility of intervention by "Great Powers". They also eulogized that Secretary General had brought about speedy withdrawal of Belgian troops.<sup>93</sup> Guinean representative argued for censoring Secretary General for not being unequivocal in his condemnation of Belgian intervention.<sup>94</sup> But both groups - Brazzaville and Casablanca - favoured help to Lumumba only who could thwart secessionist activities and preserve territorial unity. They were also unanimous in not supporting the move of condemnation of UN and Secretary General. On the other hand they stood for strengthening both to lessen the hold of military blocs over international affairs and intensity of Cold War.

The voting pattern was, therefore, clearly in favour of the Western bloc. Their move was, however, vetoed by the

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93 SCOR, yr. 15, mtg. 888, 8 August 1960, pp. 24-25. Also Hindustan Times, 10 August 1960.

94 Ibid.

Soviet Union. Security Council being deadlocked in the Great Power rivalry, US representative proposed that an emergency special session of the General Assembly should be called to solve the problem. Despite strong opposition by the Polish and Soviet delegates, US resolution was adopted by 8 votes to 2 with one abstention.<sup>95</sup> Accordingly the emergency session of the General Assembly was convened on the night of 17 September 1960.

Emergency Session of General Assembly:

While the Congo was confronted with constitutional and political chaos, Members were sharply divided in their approaches in the General Assembly. Communist bloc criticised the Secretary General for his partiality in implementing the Security Council resolutions. Soviet delegate argued that the Secretary General was "playing the game of the imperialists". He defended Soviet aid to Lumumba, who headed, he reminded, the legal Government of the Congo.<sup>96</sup>

The Secretary General defended himself by arguing that he was guided by the advice of the Advisory Committee. He added that uncertainty existed because of diversity of

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95 Un Doc. S/3425. Polish delegate, Bohdan Lewandowski argued that Security Council had not failed in its primary duty and only resolutions adopted by it earlier needed implementation. Soviet delegate, V.A. Zorin argued that regular session of General Assembly, opening on 20 September 1960, had already included this question in its agenda and, therefore, convening of special emergency session was unnecessarily diverting the attention from the cause of the trouble. SCOR, yr. 15, mtg. 906, pp. 33-35.

96 GAOR (ES-IV), plen. mtg. 858, pp. 11-12.

approaches of the Members in the Security Council. Western bloc extended outright support to the Secretary General. They charged Soviet Union for inflaming the situation by helping one faction in the struggle for power between the Congolese leadership.<sup>97</sup>

The Afro-Asian bloc continued to maintain a moderate approach. They also appreciated the role of Secretary General and apprehended that intervention by any other Powers than the UN would add fuel to the fire. In view of the problems posed by the extension of the Cold War into the Congo dispute, Ghanaian delegate, Quaison Sackey moved a resolution requesting the Secretary General "to assist the central government of the Congo in the restoration and maintenance of law and order ... (and) safeguard its unity, territorial integrity, and political independence".<sup>98</sup> The resolution also urged all the Powers to refrain from intervening individually. Their approach was appreciated by all sections and the resolution was carried by 70 votes to zero with eleven abstentions.<sup>99</sup>

The truce among the Cold War adversaries, however, ended with Kasavubu and Lumumba sending their respective delegates to the UN. The Communist bloc advocated acceptance of the delegation deputed by Lumumba; the Western bloc opposed the demand tooth and nail. Both sides did not reconcile even

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97 Ibid., pp. 15-18.

98 UN Doc. A/1474.

99 Ibid.



to defer a decision argued by Argentina and Kuomintang. On being deadlocked in the Security Council, the question was sent to the General Assembly. The Credential Committee of the General Assembly, however, accepted the credentials of Kasavubu. Despite opposition from the Communist bloc as well as the Afro-Asian countries, the General Assembly endorsed the recommendations of the Credential Committee on 22 November 1960.

Western triumph soared the Communist bloc and embittered also the non-aligned bloc. Their anger was reflected in the Security Council meeting convened to consider the arrest of Lumumba on 7 December 1960. Soviet delegate, Zorin blamed Belgium, its NATO allies and the Secretary General for the deterioration of the Congolese situation.<sup>100</sup> Western bloc, however, opposed the discussion on the arrest arguing that it was an internal affair of the Congo. Their rivalry again failed Security Council to reach any decision. India and Yugoslavia, therefore, requisitioned the meeting of the General Assembly.

The General Assembly considered two draft resolutions: First was submitted by eight Powers. It represented the Afro-Asian approach underlining the UN intervention in securing the release of Lumumba. The second draft co-sponsored by Britain and USA considered it an internal matter and discussion thereof would be in violation of the sovereignty of the Member State. Both the resolutions failed

to obtain endorsement of the General Assembly. Thus the Cold War politics persisted the stalemate in both Security Council and the General Assembly.

At this juncture, murder of Lumumba heightened the controversy amongst the Cold War adversaries. On the requisition of Soviet Union, Security Council met on 12 January 1961. Soviet delegate accused Belgium for committing "fresh acts of aggression" and sought condemnation of Belgium called to be a party to the murder of Lumumba. He also demanded resignation of the Secretary General and discontinuation of the operation of UN forces in Congo. <sup>101</sup>

Liberia, Egypt, Indonesia and Ceylon also submitted a draft resolution. Approach of their resolution also approximated with the Soviet approach. <sup>102</sup>

Western bloc took diametrically opposite stand. French delegate, Pierre Millet and delegates of Chile, Ecuador, Kuomintang and Turkey vehemently defended Belgium. They argued that assistance extended by Belgium at the express request of the Congolese Government could not be termed as an "act of aggression". <sup>104</sup> Their opposition failed to get the assent of the Security Council on any of the resolutions and crippled the UN action in Congo.

Above stalemate led to deterioration of situation in Congo seriously. Security Council met again from 13 to

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101 SCOR, yr. 16, mtg. 924, pp. 1-11.

102 UN Doc. S/4625.

103 SCOR., yr. 16, mtg. 925, pp. 1-14 and mtg. 927, pp. 2-4.

21 February 1961. Soviet delegate was highly critical of the Western bloc as well as the Secretary General. But the African Members had realized that continued stalemate would cause fatal injuries to the Congolese. They did not agree to radical demands put forward by the Soviet Union. Therefore, Soviet proposals were rejected by 8 votes to 1.<sup>105</sup>

Egypt and Liberia submitted another draft resolution in consultation with other African States.<sup>106</sup> Their draft resolution sought strengthening the authority of both Secretary General and the UN for dealing with the situation in Congo. The resolution demanded that (i) the UN forces should take immediate steps to avert intensification of civil war in Congo; (ii) Belgian forces should evacuate the territory; (iii) Congolese army should be neutralized in internal affairs; (iv) immediate and impartial Parliament should be called for establishing a representative Government.<sup>107</sup> This draft resolution was approved by 9 votes to zero. Both USSR and France abstained and thus conceded the African Members' general consensus that the UN would not be allowed to collapse in Congo.

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105 Ibid., mtg. 942, 21 February 1961. Liberia voted alongwith Western group but Egypt abstained.

106 The draft was formulated in a meeting of the African bloc in the UN. The meeting was attended by Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon, Madagascar, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Tunisia and Upper Volta.

107 UN Doc. S/472, 21 February 1961.

Spirit of the above resolution, however, did not hold long. Belgian forces refused to withdraw from Congo. Kasavubu called a Conference of Congolese leaders at Tananarue on 8 March 1961. The conference questioned the validity of Security Council's resolution adopted on 21 February 1961.<sup>108</sup> In the event of fast deteriorating situation, a meeting of the Conciliation Commission on the Afro-Asian Members was called. Differing with the moderate approach of Monrovia group towards West, the Casablanca group dissociated themselves from the Commission.<sup>109</sup> Nkrumah suggested for adopting a hard line and to solve this "African problem by Africans". The sharp differences surfaced in the fifteenth session of the General Assembly when it resumed deliberations over this issue on 7 March 1961.<sup>110</sup>

Casablanca group Members argued that presence of Belgian and other foreign forces was the crux of the Congo problem.<sup>111</sup> Their resolution, therefore, called upon Belgium to respect the resolution adopted by Security Council on 21 February 1961 and completely withdraw and evacuate Congo within twenty-one days, failing which

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108 Hindustan Times, 10 March 1961.

109 UN Doc. 4711 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1, 2 (Report of the Conciliation Commission, dated 20 March 1961).

110 GAOR, plen. mtg. 961, p. 2. Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Sudan and Tongo joined other 10 Asian Members in submitting a draft resolution.

112 UN Doc. A/L. 339, and Add. 1-5, dated 21 March 1961.

necessary action should be taken in accordance with the Charter of the UN. The Monrovia group members<sup>112</sup> wanted to extend the time limit from 21 to 40 days.<sup>113</sup> While their amendment was rejected by 31 votes to 41 votes with 24 abstentions,<sup>114</sup> draft resolution of Casablanca group could not also secure approval of the General Assembly. Provision for fixing the time limit for withdrawal and evacuation of Congo by Belgian and other foreign troops was rejected by 40 to 36 votes with 23 abstentions.<sup>115</sup> Provision for urging "necessary action" also failed to secure two-third majority necessary for adoption.<sup>116</sup> The voting pattern, however, revealed that though African Members were equally divided on the question of withdrawal of forces within 21 days, an overwhelming majority of them favoured "necessary action" in the event of failure of implementation of Security Council resolution. 5 Members of the Monrovia group voted in favour of "necessary action" and two abstained. Thus 18 African Members favoured

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112 Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar and Niger.

113 UN Doc. A/L. 343, and Add. 1. Congo also introduced a separate amendment vide A/L. 346.

114 GAOR, session 15, mtg. 985, pp. 322-3. Congolese amendment was also rejected by 36 votes to 42 votes with 20 abstentions.

115 Ibid., pp. 324-5. Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guinea, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Togo and Tunisia voted in favour; and Congo opposed it. Cameroon, Central African Republic, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Madagascar, Niger and Upper Volta abstained.

116 Ibid., pp.

"necessary action" and only 4 Members voted with the  
Western group opposing this provision.<sup>118</sup> It was this  
feeling that African States were not prepared to fully  
align with any bloc indulged in Cold War. It was also  
for this reason which helped formation of the OAU.

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117 Ibid.

Chapter V

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN THE UN

## Chapter V

### CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN THE UN

Communist victory in China, in 1949, was a major and substantial cause of bickering between USA and USSR in the affairs outside Europe. USA was involved in that region with more intensity. During the Second World War USA tried to help strengthen the Kuomintang. She deputed General Patrick Hurley (September 1944 - November 1945) to get Economic, Administrative and Democratic reforms introduced. USA also favoured a coalition of Kuomintang with other political parties, including Communists. President Truman sent also General George C. Marshall to China in late 1945. Marshall used both diplomatic and coercive methods by stressing that "a united and democratic China was essential to world stability and the proper functioning of the United Nations". But all the US manoeuverings failed and the Kuomintang had to surrender mainland to the Communists who set up the Government of the People's Republic of China there on 1 October 1949. The Kuomintang fled to Formosa and claimed to be the legitimate rulers of China.

At this juncture, the Cold War had already strained relations between the West and USSR to serious proportions. Fall of China to the Communists tilted the balance in favour of the Soviets. In order to localise this unfavourable balance, the USA adopted the policy of "isolating Communist



China" from world interactions. The United Nations (UN) was one of the major forums of this world interaction. Therefore, question of representation of China in the UN became one of the most crucial and protracted issue of the Cold War. It ended only in 1971. With their effective force in the UN in the 1960s, African States obviously played a crucial role in this aspect of Cold War politics.

### Tibetan Question

The Western group opposed from the beginning admission of Communist China to the UN. They got an opportunity in Tibetan question to further back-down this admission. On 7 November 1950, Tibet, an autonomous State, sent an appeal to the UN for providing her protection against 'armed invasion' launched by Communist China against her on 7 October 1950.<sup>1</sup> Tibet, as the appeal maintained, was declared completely independent nation in 1911-12. She had then agreed to accept only "nominal" suzerainty of China.<sup>2</sup> China had, however, declined to assent to this proposal. Therefore, "Tibet's independence", the appeal claimed, had "thereby reassumed de jure status". After the Communists came in power, the appeal added, Tibet broke off her

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1 Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 8 November 1950.

2 China maintained a mission in Lhasa. British India also enjoyed extra-territorial rights in Tibet and maintained a mission in Lhasa. After India won freedom in 1947, the rights and mission in Tibet were inherited by the independent Government of India.

diplomatic relations with "Peking regime". The Tibetan authorities ordered closure of Chinese mission in Lhasa and deputed a mission to negotiate a new treaty with the "Peking regime". While this mission was on their way to Peking, the Radio Peking announced that the Panchen Lama, aged 13<sup>3</sup> had appealed on 24 November 1949 to the Chairman of the Peking Regime, Mao Tse-tung to "liberate" Tibet from other Lamas and foreigners. The Peking regime announced on 1 January 1950, that they had accepted the above appeal and maintained that "liberation" of Tibet would now be the main task of the "People's Liberation Army". General Liu Pechen added, on 5 August 1950, that it was necessary for the defence of China that Tibet was brought back into the fold of "motherland's big family".<sup>4</sup> Chinese forces crossed into the Tibetan border on 7 October 1950 without any effective resistance.<sup>5</sup> The Tibetan authorities were ousted from all the places of important strategic importance in an unexpectedly short time.<sup>6</sup>

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3 There were two - Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama - who yielded dominance by the system of reincarnation.

4 Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), 7 August 1950; Hindustan Times, 6 August 1950. On the first anniversary of "Peking regime", Premier Chou En-lai declared that Tibet "must be liberated". Hindustan Times, 1 October 1950.

5 Hindustan Times, 8 October 1950.

6 Chamdo was captured on 9 October 1950 and by 24 October 1950 Chinese had freed "three million Tibetans from imperialist oppression and (set) to consolidate the national defences of China's western frontier". Ibid., 25 October 1950.

The Tibetan authorities fled out of Tibet and China. In their appeal, they stated that "This unwarranted act of (Chinese) aggression has not only disturbed the peace of Tibet, it is in complete disregard of a solemn assurance given by the Chinese to the (British) Government of India; it has created a grave situation in Tibet and may eventually deprive Tibet of her long cherished independence." The appeal denounced the "invasion" as "grossest violation of the weak by strong". They urged all the nations through the UN "to intercede on our behalf and retrain Chinese aggression". They added that Chinese conquest of Tibet would "only enlarge the area of conflict and increase the threat to the independence and stability of other Asian countries."<sup>7</sup>

El Salvadorian delegate, Hector David Castro raised the points of Tibetans' appeal in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). He also submitted, for adoption, a resolution condemning "this unprovoked aggression against Tibet".<sup>8</sup> The British delegate, Kenneth Young asserted that Assembly should make a thorough inquiry and find out the actual details before taking any action. Supporting his contention,

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7 The plateau of Tibet is also called the roof of the world. It is bounded by Kashmir province of India, Nepal, Bhutan and Burma. On the south and the Chinese provinces namely Sinkiang, Chinghai, Szechuan and Yunan in the north and east. It is considered strategically the most important place. Ibid.

8 He asked for the appointment of a committee to decide measures to be taken for the protection of independence of Tibet. He reminded that Assembly could not ignore this act of aggression merely on the ground of being troublesome item since Tibet was an "autonomous" State.

Indian delegate, Maharaja Jam Saheb of Navanagar informed that Indian Government was certain of amicable settlement of difficulties raised by the Chinese act. He requested, therefore, adjournment of the consideration of the matter. The USSR pointed out there were numerous documents proving that Tibet was a part of China. He warned that the UN interference in Tibetan affairs would be an interference in the internal affairs of China. He also agreed with the suggestion to postpone the consideration of this dispute.

#### Shadow of Cold War

But vested interests were out to utilize this opportunity in projecting "barbarous" activities of the Communist regimes. The Kuomintang delegate alleged that invasion of Tibet was in chain with Soviet design on China itself. He apprehended that invasion was designed "to convert 3,000,000 peaceful Buddhists into tools of Soviet imperialism, and add 1,275,788 square miles of territory with untapped resources to the Muscovite Empire." He added that invasion of "Chinese Communist forces" violated the principles which had always guided Kuomintang policy in the past and was prejudicial both to Kuomintang and the interests of peace in India." He also, however, agreed to the postponement of

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9 Kuomintang regime did not consider the Communist regime in Peking as independent but only a tool of Soviet imperialists. He also, therefore, condemned the invasion of Tibet though he claimed that Tibet was part of China for the past seven centuries.

the consideration of the matter.

John Foster Dulles supported the contention of Tsiang. He referred to Stalin's thesis maintaining "colonial territories to serve as a reserve for the revolutionary proletariat. But he also assented, as was explained by the US delegate to the UN, Ernest A. Gross to postpone the consideration of the dispute in view of India's hope for reaching an amicable settlement of the question.

Seeing the consensus in favour of the postponement, the debate on this question was stopped and African members did not get any opportunity to speak their mind on this Chinese act. The debate, however, vindicated that West was averse to the Chinese and was adamant to project Communist China as a war-mongering and an anti-peace regime. These arguments came to the fore on the question of the Chinese admission to UN. It may be recalled that the USA recognised Formosa based, Kuomintang Government as the "real" representative of Chinese State and people. The USSR recognised Peking-based Communist regime on the mainland China. With these two powers taking opposite sides, question of the Chinese admission to the UN became a serious issue of the Cold War politics. African Members time and again responded to this question mainly on the lines taken by their respective caucusing groups in the UN.

Issue in Security Council

Protracted war of arguments began with the cable of 18 November 1949. The Chinese Foreign Minister informed the UN Secretary General that his Government "repudiates" the legal status accorded to the Kuomintang representative at the UN. He added that he (T.F. Tsiang) could not, therefore, represent China in the UN.<sup>10</sup> USSR and Ukranian SSR endorsed the Chinese stand in Security Council (hereinafter Council)<sup>11</sup> when it met on 29 December 1949.

Reacting sharply to the above contentions, Tsiang argued that if such a demand of minority was accepted, it would lead to anarchy in the UN organisation itself.<sup>12</sup> He asserted that he was the true representative of a constitutional Government duly recognised by the People's Representatives in the National Assembly of China.

President of the Council, however, forbade discussion of this problem since it was "out of agenda item".<sup>13</sup>

On getting their move floundered in the Council, the Peking regime resorted to mobilising world opinion in their favour. Chinese Foreign Minister apprised all the Governments represented in the UN of the Chinese stand.<sup>14</sup> When the

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10 UN Doc. A/1123, Cable dated 18 November 1949.

11 SCOR, mtg. 458, 29 December 1949.

12 Ibid. Kuomintang maintained that Peking regime did not have the approval of the majority of the Chinese people but communists only.

13 Ibid.

14 Cable dated 8 January 1950.

Council met again on 10 January 1950, USSR argued for accepting Chinese contentions regarding their representation at the UN.<sup>15</sup> Her delegate, Y.A. Mallik asked for the expulsion of Tsiang in a draft resolution submitted by him to the Council.<sup>16</sup>

The Council considered the Russian draft resolution in its meetings held on 12 and 13 January 1950.<sup>17</sup> It was supported by Yugoslavia but was opposed by the US, British and French delegates. The latter maintained that they still recognised the existence of the Kuomintang Government and consequently its delegate to the UN. Instead of vetoing the USSR resolution, the USA sought to demonstrate her strength in the Council. Her delegate, therefore, added that the USSR proposal was procedural one and needed two-third vote for approval by the Council. He added that the USA would abide by the decision if it was assented by two-third majority i.e., 7 Members of the Council.<sup>18</sup> Kuomintang delegate, Tsiang did not agree with the US argument. He maintained that it was not merely a procedural matter. Since it tantamounted denial of representation in the UN to his country, he added, it was a matter of the utmost political importance. He said that he would oppose the

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15 SCOR, mtg. 459, 10 January 1950.

16 Ibid, S/1443.

17 Ibid., mtg. 460 and 461.

18 The Council then had only 11 Members, of which only 5 Members had broken off diplomatic relations with Kuomintang Government. 6 Members had not recognised the Peking regime.

resolution and his vote would have full negative effect.<sup>19</sup>  
 Thus the procedural requirement as well as "negative" effect of Kuomintang vote sealed the fate of the USSR sponsored resolution. When put to vote on 13 January 1950, the resolution was opposed by all the 6 members who continued to recognise the Kuomintang Government as the "legitimate" and "rightful" Government of China. Other 5 members, who had recognised the "Peking Regime", were, however divided: Britain and Norway abstained while India and Yugoslavia supported the USSR resolution. On rejection of his resolution, the USSR delegate walked out of the Council asserting that the USSR delegation would not participate in its work until illegal occupant Tsiang was expelled, and right of representation at the UN was restored to China.<sup>20</sup>  
<sup>21</sup>  
 It was a big victory for the West.

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- 19 Kuomintang representing China was a permanent member and, therefore, her assent was essential for adoption of any resolution in the Security Council.
- 20 USSR delegate said that though his country attached great importance to the UN and its organs, he could "not consider it possible to participate in the Council's work when the very basis of the authority and prestige not only of the UN as a whole, was being undermined by the presence of an individual unlawfully." SCOR, mtg. 461, 13 January 1950.
- 21 On 17 January 1950, Yugoslavia sponsored another resolution to stop Tsiang preside the Security Council pleading that "serious objections had been raised against the validity of the credentials of his (Tsiang) representation.

on 17 January 1950, speaking on Yugoslav sponsored draft resolution on this issue, the USA regretted absence of the USSR but maintained that it would in no way diminish the power of the Council. He further pointed out that only one State (USSR), which did not



On 20 January 1950, Peking informed the UN Secretary General and all other Members of the States represented at the UN, that in place of Tsiang, Chang Wen Tien would be their representative to the UN.<sup>22</sup> In the meantime, the Secretary General had got prepared a Memorandum on the legal aspects of the problem of representation. The Memorandum negated the argument of the overwhelming strength of the Western group supporting representation by Tsiang.<sup>23</sup>

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recognise Kuomintang Government, had disrespected the decision taken by the Council. When the Yugoslav resolution was put to vote, all the six members of Western group opposed it. Strangely, India joined Britain and Norway to abstain and thus Yugoslavia was completely isolated.

Ibid., mtg. 462, 17 January 1950.

- 22 Cable dated 20 January 1950. On 3 February 1950 Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs protested against the illegal presence of Tsiang in UN. See UN Doc. S/1472.
- 23 UN Doc. S/1466. The Memorandum maintained that representation of a State was linked with the recognition of its Government by other Governments represented at the UN. It called this linkage as unfortunate and wrong. It asserted that the representation should be regulated by Article 4 of the UN Charter which stipulated that a Member State must be able and willing to carry out her obligation could be carried out by Governments which possessed power. It further pointed out that on being questioned by a revolutionary Government, the issue should be about the capability which of the two Governments - Kuomintang or Peking - was capable of utilisation of resources and directions for the adherence of the UN provisions by Chinese people. The Memoranda maintained that "it would seem to be appropriate for the UN organs ... to accord the new government the right to represent the State in the organisation, even though individual Members of the organisation refused, and might continue to refuse, to accord that Government recognition as lawful government for reasons which were valid under their national policies."

Tsiang lodged a formal protest against the conclusions of the above Memorandum.<sup>24</sup> He asserted that it was an attack on his Government and also "on the cause of freedom throughout the world". He added that enquiry proposed in the Memorandum about the capability of respective Government could be made only after "free and fair elections" had voted a Government in China. He alleged that the Chinese Communists were mere puppets of Russia. His argument was supported by all the Members of the Western group.

The USSR delegate, who had rejoined Security Council on 1 August 1950, assumed presidency of the Council on that day. As President, he held that the Kuomintang representative could not participate in the meetings of the Council. The ruling was challenged by the US delegate. After a heated debate, the USSR delegate's ruling was overruled by 8 to 3 votes.<sup>25</sup> The matter was again raised in its meeting on 3 August 1950 to include the proposal, "Recognition of the representative of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China as the Representative of China."<sup>26</sup> Arguing their respective stands, the members rejected this motion also by 5 to 5 votes. It may be noted that rejection was due to negative effect of the Western votes of the USA,

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24 UN Doc. S/1470, 13 March 1950.

25 India and Yugoslavia voted in favour of USSR ruling.

26 The resolution was submitted by the USSR delegate, then President of the Security Council.

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Kuomingtang and France. There was only one African delegate representing Egypt. Though his Government then had no sympathy with the USSR in the Cold War, he abstained in the voting. It set the pattern of future response of various States towards this question.<sup>28</sup>

Four draft resolutions were submitted to the UNGA on the opening day of its fifth session: (1) Arguing on the lines indicated in the Memorandum of Security Council, Indian draft resolution reiterated that the Tien "should be entitled to represent the Republic of China in the General Assembly."<sup>29</sup> However (2) and (3) USSR draft resolutions stressed upon expulsion of Tsiang and invitation to Tien to represent China;<sup>30</sup> (4) Canada submitted the fourth draft resolution seeking the establishment of a special committee to consider the question of Chinese representation. Canadian draft resolution argued for the continued participation of Kuomingtang representative only.

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27 Kuomingtang, Cuba, Ecuador, France and USA voted against and India, Yugoslavia, Britain, Norway and USSR voted in favour.

28 Peking sent another cable to the Secretary General asking for the expulsion of Tsiang and admission of Tien as the representative of China in UN. The Secretary General replied that he would request the US Government to permit entry of the Peking delegation in New York, Headquarters of the UN. He added that the Chinese delegation could, however, participate in the fifth session of the General Assembly only after its admission to the UN. See A/1364, GAOR, session 5 (1950).

29 A/1365, GAOR, session 5, 19 September 1950. It was seconded by Yugoslavia.

30 A/1369 and A/13, *ibid.*

Kuomintang representative stressed that his Government was the "only legal Government based on a constitution passed by the representatives of the Chinese people", whereas the "Peking regime" was thrust upon the peoples of the mainland by the USSR.<sup>31</sup> He added that the "Peking regime" did not believe in peaceful coexistence of nations.

His arguments were supported by the USA. The US delegate, John Foster Dulles even refused to recognise "Peking regime". He said in unequivocal terms that admission of "Peking regime" would neither be in the interest of the USA nor of the UN.<sup>32</sup> Thus the admission of China to the UN was clearly linked with the Cold War politics. All the allies of the USA in the Cold War supported the above arguments.<sup>33</sup> Britain and Australia, who had already recognised Peking regime, also expressed concern over the continued debate on this question since it had been increasing tension.<sup>34</sup>

Supporters of the admission of the Peking regime argued that political, social, economic systems or ideologies were not barriers to the admission of Members to the UN. Instead,

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31 A/1386, *ibid.*

32 US, Department of State Bulletin, vol. 37, no. 942, 15 July 1957, p. 93.

33 Representative of Peru pointed out that "Peking regime" had already been condemned as an aggressor by UN, and Peking regime was still enjoying the fruits of aggression on Korea disrespecting UN decisions. "What tokens of attitude, of adaptation to the mentality, the goals and the spirit of the UN Charter has", he asked, "Communist China given us to justify a change in our attitude." See GAOR, session 12, mtg. 686, 24 September 1957, pp. 118-19.

34 *Ibid.*

they pointed out, the organisation anticipated universality of admission. They added that authority and effectiveness of the UN itself had suffered when the Peking regime had not been made a party to the decisions concerning her most. They added the UN organs had, therefore, failed to perform successfully the tasks assigned by the UN Charter.<sup>35</sup>

### Response of African States

Then there were only three African States -- Egypt, Ethiopia and Liberia -- represented in the UN. Ethiopia and Liberia were pro-West in the Cold War politics; Egypt, after the Suez crisis, had, however, joined the neutrals in the UN. Accordingly, Ethiopia and Liberia supported the Western bloc in opposing Chinese admission to the UN; whereas Egypt abstained from voting.<sup>36</sup> Thus the role of African States was almost insignificant. But the emerging strength of the African States in the UN was gaining momentum; and each group was trying to woo the sympathy of these emerging nations.

China was fully aligned with the Warsaw Pact. In June 1949, Mao Tse-tung had unequivocally proclaimed that "internationally we belong to the anti-imperialist front, headed by the Soviet Union".<sup>37</sup> But there had later started

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35 Ibid., session 12, plen. mtg. 686, 24 September 1957.

36 Indian draft was rejected by 33 to 16 votes with 10 abstentions. Both the USSR drafts were rejected respectively by 38 to 10 and 37 to 11 votes with 8 abstentions. Canadian draft was approved by 42 to 8 votes with only 6 abstentions.

37 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, vol. 4, p. 415.

fissures in Sino-Soviet relations. China had begun manoeuvring to assume third pivotal place in the international rivalry. In that chain, China went a big way in penetrating into the continent of Africa. She extended her full support and claimed that with their support, African people would be able to "wipe out all remnants of the colonialist economy and build their own independent economy".<sup>38</sup> When Ghana attained independence, in 1957, China reminded her that it was not an end to the struggle against imperialism. It was the beginning of that struggle, and there should be no relaxation in it. In 1958, Chou En-lai informed Kwame Nkrumah, Prime Minister of Ghana, that they "are very glad to see that new successes have continuously been gained by the people of Ghana during the past year in consolidating (their) national independence and safeguarding state sovereignty."<sup>39</sup> It were these manoeuvrings that Ghana voted for the admission of Peking regime into the UN despite the fact that she had not extended diplomatic recognition to her.

Encouraged by this gain, Peking accelerated her manoeuvrings. Peking had realized that only African votes would negate US attempt of isolating Peking regime in the UN. Therefore, Peking indulged headlong and denounced Kuomintang "friendship delegation" to African States as an

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38 Johnson and Chin, Agreements of the People's Republic of China, 1949-1967 (London, 1968), p. 98.

39 NCNA, 6 March 1958, p. 9.

"imperialist attempt to sabotage friendship between Chinese and African peoples" and to promote a "two-China policy".<sup>40</sup> She asserted that their Government was "the sole legitimate government of 650 million Chinese people". This brought a qualitative as well as quantitative change in the African response in the UN.

Moderate African Response in the UN:

Seventeen African States attained independence in 1960 and joined the UN. Of them, only Mali and Somalia had recognised Peking. It was the result of the Peking initiatives that after three years of its independence, Ghana also recognised Peking in July 1960. But this tally did not reflect the real gains. When the issue of Chinese admission came as a ritual in the autumn session of General Assembly in 1960, African delegates took a cautious attitude and did not use as damaging remarks against the Peking regime as was the case earlier. Their moderation further crystallized when 12 African States abstained and 3 voted against the US resolution obstructing the Chinese admission.<sup>41</sup> Their stand reversed the stereotyped process of voting over the issue of Chinese admission. National chairman of Democratic Party of the USA, Henry Jackson lamented that "the USA failed for the first time to get a majority in the UN. Even more

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40 Peking's Daily, 9 February 1960 quoted in SWB, no. 2195, 12 February 1960.

41 Mali, Senegal and Nigeria voted against the resolution.

ominous for the future is the fact that we did not win a single of any of the new African nations."<sup>42</sup>

It is debatable if it was a success of the Warsaw group in the Cold War politics. But it was a feather to their cap. Western group had already come under severe pressure in the Cuban and the Congolese issues. It is evident from the fact, that African States showed their anger over the mishandling of the Congo question by the West. It was realized by the Peking regime by commenting that "decreasing efficiency of the US voting machinery in the UN did not mean that (their) admission was imminent."<sup>43</sup> Chinese apprehension proved right. The USA changed its tactics and introduced a resolution in UNGA in 1961, that admission of Peking regime into the UN was an important question; hence it could be decided only by two-thirds majority. Passage of this resolution blocked the Chinese admission for another decade only when the Sino-US relations turned to friendship among themselves. The Chinese as well as anti-Western group could only console with increasing support of the African

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42 SWB, Pt. III, series 2, no. 460, 12 October 1960.

43 People's Daily (Peking), 18 October 1960. It is argued that Peking was not interested in joining the UN. The Chinese leadership maintained that "If our country joins the UN, we cannot have a majority in voting, formally the difficult situation may be moderated to some extent, but actually the struggle that arises will be mere violent and we shall loose our present freedom of action." Quoted in the "The Politics of the Chinese Red Army", Bulleting of Activities (Hoover Institute for War, Revolution and Peace Publication), p. 480.



States who finally scaled the balance in favour of Chinese admission to the UN.

### Consolidation of African Support

The year 1961 augured well to the Chinese manouverings in Africa. In that year Senegal, a prominent country of Francophone region and Brazzaville group, recognised Peking regime. Tanganyika also recognised it immediately after attaining independence on 9 December 1961.<sup>44</sup> Peking had not sought linkage of recognition with voting in the UN for her admission. Instead, Peking aimed at persuading as many African States as possible either voting in favour or abstaining the US resolution recognising Kuomintang as the legitimate representative of the Chinese people. The Communist leadership got increasing encouragement and they expressed hope publicly that the voting pattern would be more favourable to Peking in 1961.<sup>45</sup> Peking was justified. In 1961, only 9 African States voted in favour of the US resolution. Ten States opposed and rest of the ten abstained.<sup>46</sup> In addition, majority of the African States not only participated in the debate but also raised their powerful voice for restoring "legitimate right" to Peking. They also forewarned that devious schemes of the enemies of peace and justice were

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44 With recognition by Tanganyika, tally in Africa rose to 8 in a group of 29 independent African States.

45 Peking Review, October 1961.

46 Yearbook of the UN, 1950-64.

doomed to fail.<sup>47</sup>

There was further improvement in positive African votes in 1962 when 14 African States voted for admission of China into the UN.<sup>48</sup> Negative votes also swelled from 9 to 16. But it was not a comforting feature to the USA. Swelling of negative votes was as a result of mass defection of Monrovia bloc who repeated their unified anger of 1960 against West now against Peking.<sup>49</sup> It established the point beyond doubt that African States were not much concerned about Cold War rivalry between the USA and the USSR. These States were guided more by their interests than by ideological differences generated by the Cold War propaganda.<sup>50</sup> China had

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47 UN Yearbook, 1961.

48 UN Yearbook, 1962.

49 Monrovia group supported both Cameroon and Tshombe of Katanga. Peking supported revolutionaries in both the countries. Francophone States lined up behind France in voting against admission of Peking. In July 1963, President of Cameroon, Aridyo himself explained their stand: He alleged that Peking was supporting terrorism in Cameroon. We have proof for Cameroon terrorists are in Communist China. As long as that situation exists, we shall vote against Communist China's admission to the UN". SWB, Pt. IV, no. 1292, 5 July 1963.

50 After a trade and goodwill delegation of Peking visited Central African Republic in October 1964, the latter established diplomatic relations with Peking contrary to the stand taken by other sister countries of the Manrovia bloc. Their step was imitated by Dahomey (Benin) in November 1964, after she got agronomists from Peking to help her in improving her rice cultivation. These two countries voted, in 1965, for admission of Peking regime. But both the countries defected back to Western group after army coup, in 1966, threw out pro-Peking rulers. Thus positive/negative voting pattern was more due to internal politics than the Cold War politics. See, Alex Blake, "Peking's African Adventures", Current Series, vol. 15, 15 September 1967.

gained an upper hand: out of 51 Members recognising China in 1965, 19 were in Africa, 17 in Europe, 14 in Asia and only one in Latin America.

### Aggressive African Approach

Growing support of African States set a new trend in the 1967 debates over the question of admission in the UN. Four African States namely Algeria, Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea and Mali joined hand, with five other States to propose that the question of admission of Peking regime into the UN should be taken up in the 22nd session of the UNGA.<sup>51</sup> Their proposal was significant from another point also. It was on the lines advocated by the Warsaw group of States i.e.

(i) expulsion of Kuomintang delegate; and (ii) restoration of permanent seat in the Council to the Peking delegate. The resolution also accused that the USA was deriving the benefits of stationing their army in Formosa through the unlawful seating of Kuomintang delegate in the UN. The resolution also warned that US hostile and discriminatory policy to "quarantine" Peking regime was dangerous and untenable. They argued that China was a "great nuclear power", and the UN could hardly act effectively in the absence of the Peking support.<sup>52</sup>

Fifteen pro-West States including 3 African States also sponsored their resolution. They repeated the argument

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51 GAOR, session 22/<sup>(1967)</sup> mtg. 1610, 1967.

52 UN Doc. A/L. 531 dated 28 November 1967.

53 These were Gabon, Madagascar and Togo.

that the question of admission of China into the UN was an important question and needed two-third majority.<sup>54</sup> Five States of Western Group sponsored another resolution suggesting appointment of a Special Committee to explore and study the question and to submit its findings to the 23rd session next year for consideration by the UNGA.

In the debate held from 20 to 28 November 1967, the first resolution was rejected by 58 to 45 votes with 17 abstentions. It, however, showed the most significant change in the African response. 16 African Members voted in favour and 4 African Members abstained. Sudanese delegate, who voted in favour, maintained that Peking was not only optimistic about peace but also drew distinctions between just and unjust wars. He also wondered why only Peking was subjected to careful scrutiny of their philosophical and ideological position when the UN was not an assembly of only peaceful and free of blemish nations. Guinea praised Peking for making considerable scientific progress outside the two blocs, setting a new triangular dimension to Cold War politics.

Pro-Western African States numbered 19 in so far as voting on second resolution is concerned. Only one abstainer on the first resolution namely Libya joined the absentors; but three abstainers namely Ghana, Morocco and Tunisia opposed this resolution.<sup>55</sup> Supporting African States

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54 GA Resolution 2271.

55 Kenya had voted in favour of first resolution and abstained on the second resolution.

namely Central African Republic, Madagascar and Niger maintained oft repeated allegation that (i) Peking did not believe in peaceful co-existence; (ii) she had not retraced from her aggressive policy; and (iii) her admission would destroy the UN. Thus African response had become clearly aggressive in favour of Peking. The same trend continued<sup>56</sup> in 1968 and 1969.

Seven African States alongwith 6 other countries again brought the question of admission of China to the UN in 1969.<sup>57</sup> In their explanatory Memorandum to the resolution, they pleaded the principle of legitimacy, need of strengthening the organisation, and removing the discrimination emanating from the presence of US Armed Forces in Formosa. The Memorandum added that Peking's policy was based on the principles of peaceful co-existence, and support to freedom struggles. "Because of the friendly relations that they maintained with China despite their different political, economic and social systems," the sponsoring States asserted, they were able "to contradict the fallacious assertion"<sup>58</sup> perpetuated by the USA.

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56 Three resolutions on 1967 lines were submitted in 23rd and 24th sessions in 1968 and 1969 respectively and met with the same fates.

57 African States were Algeria, Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Tanzania and Zambia.

58 The resolution was debated by the Assembly from 3 to 11 November 1969 and was rejected by 56 to 48 votes with 21 abstentions.

Western group again brought the two resolutions arguing that (i) being question of great political importance, it needed affirmation by two-third majority; and (ii) urging establishment of a Special Committee to investigate the question and report for consideration by Assembly in 1970. Gabon, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Swaziland and Togo supported these resolutions which were carried by 71 to 48 and 4 abstentions.<sup>59</sup> But there was certainly a swing in favour of China. Gabon, Madagascar, Malawi and Niger indicated their receptivity to the admission of Peking regime; but they opposed expulsion of the Kuomintang delegate. But for US resolution abiding the UN to admit China with two-third majority, China had gained a considerable prestige by getting 56 votes in favour of first resolution seeking admission of China against 48 negative votes. African States played a dominant role in this swing. In all 41 States participated in the debate and voted which was a record.

The issue touched new heights in 1970. Eight African States sponsored resolution for admission of China into the UN in the UNGA in 1970. It was debated in between 12 and 20 November 1970 alongwith two other resolutions submitted by the Western group on the same lines. Though the debate remained confined on the oft-repeated arguments, China gained positive votes of Cameroon, Chad and Mauritius. The US resolution was adopted by dwindling strength: 66 votes to 52

with 7 abstentions.<sup>60</sup> Thus it forecast the coming events.

### Sino-US Friendship

In 1970-71, Peking intensified her activities aimed at improving relations with African States. Equatorial Guinea and Rwanda established diplomatic relations with Peking in 1970. Most significant gain to China was its recognition by an important Francophone State namely Senegal and Sierra Leone. Thus with the support of African States, Peking increased its weight before the ritual debate on this issue began in the UNGA in 1971. However, this favourable trend had direct linkage with the improvement in Sino-US relations and rupture in Sino-Soviet relations.

On 15 July 1971, seventeen Members including 10 African Members,<sup>61</sup> again requested the UNGA to restore the rightful place in the UN to the Peking regime and to expel the Kuomintang representative. The Memorandists observed that for years they had protested against the hostile and discriminatory policy adopted by several Governments against the Peking regime. They also repeated all the arguments put forth by them in the yester-years' debates.

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60 Resolution 2642, session 25, mtg. 1913, 20 November 1970.

61 These were Algeria, Congo, Egypt, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia.

In its resolution, the USA, however, submitted that the UNGA should take cognizance of the existence of two Chinas and, therefore, Kuomintang representation be retained while granting membership to the Peking regime. In this way the USA had given up opposition to admission of the Peking regime into the UN. The Peking regime opposed the US proposal from outside condemning it as a blatant exposure of the US Government's "Two China" thesis. This argument was advocated in the UNGA by 22 States including all the 10 African States who had sponsored the resolution for admission of the Peking regime.

The above resolutions were debated by the UNGA from 18 to 26 October 1971. In all 75 Members participated in the debate. The first draft resolution submitted, on 25 September 1971, by 28 States including 11 African States asserted that Peking was the only rightful claimant to the UN seat and, therefore, urged the UNGA to restore her this right and expel Kuomintang. In its opposition, 22 States submitted their draft resolution reasserting that it was an important question and could be decided only by two-third votes in favour. Third draft resolution sought continuation of Kuomintang as a member of the UN. (Three more drafts were submitted by Tunisia on the lines of the third resolution.)

The debate was initiated by the Algerian delegate. He pointed out that by keeping Peking delegate unjustly out, Kuomintang regime had continuously held illegally a mandate



in the UN institutions in the name of the Chinese people. This argument was supported by all the sponsoring African States.

Pro-West States' delegates argued that they would not support expulsion or exclusion of a peace-loving Member like Kuomintang who also effectively controlled a territory with a viable system of Government. They warned that it would be contrary to the very spirit of harmony and friendship between nations. They added that acceptance of the first resolution would both contravene the Charter and set a dangerous precedent. Since the word "expel" was clearly written into that resolution, they further added, application of article 18 of the UN Charter listing expulsion as an important question was applicable to it. They also pointed out that many Member States were maintaining relations with the "two regimes" and, therefore, they should be admitted as separate members to facilitate reconciliation and peaceful dialogue among them. It was necessary for promoting peace and stability in Asia.

Their contention for 2/3rd majority vote was opposed by Mali, Sierra Leone and Uganda. Mali commented that a vote for the two resolutions would create a precedent which far from finding a solution to the problem would divide countries and also could foster parcellization (balkanization) of states of the Third World already interlocked in boundary disputes vis-a-vis secessionist movements.

The USA won a temporary point when the UNGA adopted her motion by 61 to 53 votes with 15 abstentions that priority

be given in the voting to the 22-power resolution calling for two-third majority vote on any proposal depriving Kuomintang representation in the UN. But she suffered soon a greater shock when the Assembly rejected the 22-power resolution by 55 to 59 votes with 15 abstentions. African States played prominent role by voting 18 in favour, 19 against and 5 abstaining.<sup>62</sup> Their vote was more or less on the Monrovia/Brazzaville and Casablanca group lines of approach. (After the fall of Nkrumah, States like Ghana had given up radical approach and contributed to the Brazzaville approach).

Thereupon, Tunisian delegate withdrew his all the three draft resolutions; and voted in favour of 23-power draft resolution admitting Peking in place of Kuomintang. The USA made another attempt to forestall this move by having a separate vote on the provision in 23-power resolution for the expulsion of Kuomintang. This resolution was rejected by the UNGA with 61 to 15 votes and 16 abstentions. Then the Assembly voted the 23-power resolution by 76 to 35 votes with 17 abstentions.<sup>63</sup>

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62 UN Doc. A/L. 632 and Add. 1.2, dated 25 October 1971, mtg. 1976. African States in favour were: Central African Republic, Chad, Dahomey (Benin), Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Niger, Rwanda, South Africa, Swaziland, Upper Volta and Zaire. These States opposed: Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, Egypt, Equatorial, Guinea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia. 5 States namely Botswana, Morocco, Senegal, Togo and Tunisia abstained.

63 GAOR, session 26, Res. 2758 (XXVI), 25 October 1971.

The above vote and debates illustrate that anti-Western argument finally got its way only after the Eastern Group had split; and with the Peking emerging as "the third pivot" of the Cold War rivalry. Thus the non-aligned movement argument against bi-polar system had an indirect triumph. African response was more on the diversity and unity present in the Non-Alignment Movement.

Chapter VI

CONCLUS ION

## Chapter VI

### CONCLUSION

The United Nations was organised in 1945, to harmonise conflicting approaches of Nations of the world to advance towards international peace. This function mainly devolved on the Security Council and General Assembly. Though the Council was supreme body entrusted with the task of maintaining international peace, rigid attitudes of the permanent members (who were also adversaries in the Cold War) - soon passed this ascendancy over to General Assembly. Since General Assembly represented equality among Nations, it increased importance of the individual States and group of States, in particular, outside the military blocs. The rival blocs resorted to horse-trading to maintain numerical ascendancy over their adversaries. In that event a unified bloc of African States, represented by leaders and freedom fighters, gave the Continent extra-importance in the UN organs. Independent African States could not, however, remain unaffected by this horse-trading and hence got divided into various "caucusing groups", thereby decreasing the anticipated strength of Africa.

On continental level, these African States were broadly divided on the lines of partitioning of Africa by imperial powers. Thus, the ex-French colonies gathered together into Brazzaville group which tilted favourably towards the West. It also attracted those Heads of States who abhorred Communism.

The ex-British and Arab States of North Africa represented Africa's "radical" personality. These States formed the "Casablanca" group. The latter group was critical of the West, but not necessarily favourable to the Communist bloc.

The Congo crisis and the strengthening of minority white rule in Southern Africa, however, forced all the African leaders to take a united stand at least in the context of African problems. This led to the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963.

Cold War, in the post-war period, emanated from danger to the West from the Communist regimes and vice-versa. It was being fought through ideological regimentalisation. Adversaries under the leadership of USA and USSR formed NATO (1949) and Warsaw Pact (1955) to back by their respective military stands. Thus intensifying militarisation not only disturbed international peace but also deprived the newly independent states of much needed peace and resources. Since economic development was crucial for the survival of their independence and leadership, they preferred to keep out of bloc politics. Rather they worked for the elimination of the bloc-politics. This gave birth to the non-aligned movement.

The leaders of non-aligned movement argued that peace could not be achieved through division and regimentalisation but by peaceful co-existence of different Nations of the world. At that time, increasing burden of armament and their failure, in particular in Indo-China, to solve disputes

through arms legitimised the non-aligned stand. It was further facilitated by the pursuance of "independent" approach in international affairs. Since it had similarity with the OAU spirit, African States preferred to remain non-aligned. Thus the African States decided to be against military alignment only; they pursued their foreign policies according to their ideologies. With this background we examined their approaches on various issues which had a linkage with Cold War rivalry. These were Hungarian and Czechoslovakian crises; Cuban and Congolese crises; the issue of Chinese admission to the UN.

Hungary and Czechoslovakia fell in the Soviet "sphere" when the Allied armies marched into Berlin. Soviet "Occupation" caused rivalry and consequent division among the Allied. However, the USA, France and Britain argued for the formation of a "liberal" government in the "liberated" but now "occupied" countries. Since this leadership was generally anti-Soviet, USSR apprehended a renewed danger to her security. She preferred instead a "socialist" government in the territories "occupied" by her armies. The latter finally succeeded in her viewpoint; but the former continued to support the "liberal leadership". It was the latter leadership which overwhelmed temporarily the "socialist" ("communist") regime in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Warsaw forces however, extended military support to the "socialist" leadership and ousted the "liberal" leadership in both the countries. Western countries and

"liberal" leadership were fully aware of the fact that Warsaw Pact could risk a war if "balance" was disturbed against them by imposing a break of Hungary and later Czechoslovakia from the Warsaw Pact. Since the "liberal" leadership could not remain in effective control, Western bloc could utilise the events by branding "freedom". Thus the Western bloc restricted their activities only to embarrassing their adversaries ideologically.

The Hungarian event coincided with the Anglo-French invasion of Suez Canal which had enraged the Arab countries which, in addition to Ethiopia, Liberia and South Africa, were members of the UN. Therefore, they were more critical of West and criticised the Warsaw "invasion" indirectly and that also on moral grounds. This tendency continued in the event of "invasion" of Czechoslovakia in 1968. At that time, there were 38 African States in the UN and majority of them took "Brazzavillian" line of approach. They criticised Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. The Casablanca group, on the whole, though did not approve Warsaw action, they hardly supported the West. Rather they condemned more severely the military blocs for generating the tensions and disturbing independence of smaller and weaker Nations of the world. They argued that the weaker Nations could get relief by joining the non-aligned movement.

The West itself came under severe attack in the Congolese and Cuban crises. Though the Brazzavillian group



did not approve Belgian and US "intervention", they did not condemn them. Similarly, the Casablanca group though critical but was not prepared to standby solidly with Warsaw Pact against NATO. Instead they utilised these events to strengthen UN organs and UN Secretary General which could be much better alternative to bloc system and avoid heightening of the Cold War in Africa. Thus the Warsaw Pact could also utilise these events only to embarrass West on "ideological" grounds and they got support from the "radical" African States in their endeavours.

Reaction of African States towards the admission of "Peking regime" and expulsion of "Kuomintang regime" from the UN also adhered to the above stands. While the Brazzavillian group extended support to the West in obstructing the admission of "Peking regime", the Casablancian group was divided. Many of them though supported "Peking's" claim for permanent seat in the Security Council, they were not prepared to get "Kuomintang" expelled. After Peking broke off her relations with Warsaw Pact, there was a change in the approaches of African States. Peking got overwhelming support from the African States. It was their support which finally defeated the US resolution attempting the retention of "Kuomintang" in the UN. Thus again African States favoured breaking off the hold of bi-polar military system which was considered more dangerous to international peace than the multi-polar system.

African States extended "unanimous" support to the UN organs, Secretary General and non-aligned movement. They criticised bi-polar system, and stood for general and complete disarmament.

Thus, we can conclude that African States generally opposed the bi-polar divisions which were responsible for generating Cold War. They extended support to multi-polar system in place of bi-polar system. They were "unanimous" in supporting non-alignment granting equality and independence in pursuing their foreign policy. In this view the last alternative only could avoid emergence of Cold War and eliminate the dangers of a world war.

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