

DEMOCRATISATION IN INDONESIA: FROM TRANSITION TO CONSOLIDATION

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MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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DATE: 5th January 2011

DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled "DEMOCRATISATION IN INDONESIA: FROM TRANSITION TO CONSOLIDATION" submitted by me for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this university or any other university.

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Dedicated to My Parents

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Abbreviations

ABRI – Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia

ADB- Asian Development Bank

DPD- Deewan Perwakilan Dinerah (House of Regional Representative Council)

DPR- Deewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representatives)

DPII- Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (The Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation)

IMF- International Monetary Fund

KPU- General Election Commission

MPR- Malis Perwakilan Rakyat (People's Consultative Assembly)

NU- Nahadatul Ulema

PKI- Perserikatan Komunisi di India (Indies Communist Association)

PD- Partai Democrat (Democrat Party)

PNI- Perserikatan National Indonesia (National Party of Indonesia)

PDIP- Indonesia Democrat Party of Struggle

PPP- Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party)

PKB- Partai Kebangkitan Bansa (National Awakening Party)

PKS- Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party)

PK- Partai Keadilan (Justice Party)

PAN- Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party)

SSN- Social Safety Net Programme

TNI- Tentara Nasional Indonesia

Preface

The Dutch began to colonise Indonesia in the early 17th century. Japan occupied the islands from 1942 to 1945. Indonesia declared its independence after Japan's surrender, but it required four years of intermittent negotiations, recurring hostilities, and UN mediation before the Netherlands agreed to transfer sovereignty in 1949. Indonesia's first free parliamentary election after decades of repressive rule took place in 1999. As such, the Indonesian democratization process becomes a subject of immense interest and fascination. There are number of factors that have contributed towards this growing interest in this fragmented archipelago that houses 1700 islands. The process of democratic consolidation at various levels in Indonesia has played a crucial role in making Indonesia an extraordinary case of rapid democratization in Asia. In fact Indonesia is slowly moving towards democracy after the fall of authoritarian Suharto led New Order regime in 1998. During the last few years, Indonesia has steadily progressed towards democratization alongside political decentralization. Incidentally, Indonesia's transformation into the democratic country in the world have been preceded by a successful administration of general elections in 1999 and the first direct presidential election in 2004 and recently held in 2009. The Indonesian elites have crafted and established a political transition mainly characterized by frequent free and fair elections, peaceful rotations of powers, effective electoral officials and separation of powers, freedom of expression, independence of media and associational autonomy. Indonesia is now the world's third largest democracy, the world's largest archipelagic state, and home to the world's largest Muslim population. In 2005, Indonesia reached a historic peace agreement with armed separatist in Aceh, which led to democratic elections in Aceh in December 2006. However, the extent to which Indonesian democracy has been consolidated and institutionalised is another issue which requires close examination and assessment. This work thus, tends to investigate the extent to which Indonesia has managed to advance its democratic consolidation.

Country's basic information

Country name:

Republic of Indonesia

Capital: Jakarta

Geography:

Southeastern Asia, archipelago between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean

Area:

total: 1,904,569 sq km

Country comparison to the world: 16

Land: 1,811,569 sq km

Water: 93,000 sq km

Land boundaries:

total: 2,830 km

border countries: Timor-Leste 228 km, Malaysia 1,782 km, Papua New Guinea 820 km

Coastline:

54,716 km:

Maritime claims:

measured from claimed archipelagic straight baselines

Territorial sea: 12 nm

Exclusive economic zone: 200 nm

Land use:

Arable land: 11.03%

Permanent crops: 7.04%

other: 81.93% (2005)

Population

242,968,342 (July 2010 est.)

Ethnic groups:

Javanese 40.6%, Sundanese 15%, Madurese 3.3%, Minangkabau 2.7%, Betawi 2.4%, Bugis 2.4%, Banten 2%, Banjar 1.7%, other or unspecified 29.9% (2000 census)

Religions:

Muslim 86.1%, Protestant 5.7%, Roman Catholic 3%, Hindu 1.8%, other or unspecified 3.4% (2000 census)

Languages:

Bahasa Indonesia (official, modified form of Malay), English, Dutch, local dialects (the most widely spoken of which is Javanese)

Literacy:

Total population: 90.4%

Male: 94%

Female: 86.8% (2004 est.)

Independence:

17 August 1945 (declared); 27 December 1949 (by the Netherlands); note - in August 2005 the Netherlands announced that it had recognized de facto Indonesian independence on 17 August 1945

Constitution:

August 1945; abrogated by Federal Constitution of 1949 and Provisional Constitution of 1950, restored 5 July 1959; series of amendments concluded in 2002

Legal system:

Based on Roman-Dutch law, substantially modified by indigenous concepts and by new criminal procedures and election codes; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction

Political parties and leaders:

Democrat Party or PD [Anas Uraningrum]; Functional Groups Party or Golkar [Aburizal Bakrie]; Great Indonesia Movement Party or Gerindra [Suhardi]; Indonesia Democratic Party-Struggle or PDI-P [Megawati Sukarnoputri]; National Awakening Party or PKB [Muhaiman Iskandar]; National Mandate Party or PAN [Hatta Rajasa]; People's Conscience Party or Hanura [Wiranto]; Prosperous Justice Party or PKS [Luthfi Hasan Ishaq]; United Development Party or PPP [Suryadharma Ali]

Economy - overview:

GDP - real growth rate:

4.5% (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 36

6% (2008 est.)

6.3% (2007 est.)

GDP - per capita (PPP):

\$4,000 (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 158

\$3,900 (2008 est.)

\$3,700 (2007 est.)

note: data are in 2009 US dollars

GDP - composition by sector:

agriculture: 15.3%

industry: 47.6%

services: 37.1% (2009 est.)

Source: CIA World Fact Book, 2010

URL: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publication/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html>

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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

The Indonesian democratization process has been a subject of immense interest and academic curiosity. A number of factors have contributed towards this growing interest in exploring the status that democracy had acquired in this fragmented equatorial archipelago that house approximately in May 1998, 17,000 islands.

Before the popular protest that forced Suharto to step down from the office where he ruled for more than thirty years, almost two generations of Indonesians had experienced only authoritarian political rule. During this period the power was fully concentrated around in the hands of the two presidents Sukarno and Suharto who had widely used a range of several constitutional as well as non constitutional methods to reinforce their rule. But with the downfall of the authoritarian regime of Suharto, Indonesia embarked on a period of democratic transition which has been followed by the steady growth in the democratic consolidation in Indonesia. This period marked a turning point in the Indonesia politics as it was the period of the introduction of electoral reforms and the holding of free and fair elections.

Indonesia's transition towards democracy from authoritarian rule has been one of the most dramatic political events of the late twentieth century. The transition provided the people of Indonesia an opportunity to enjoy the freedom of speech and expression that have not been seen in the country since the first short lived experiment with the parliamentary democracy that was made in the 1950s. The era of reforms that began in May 1998 has taken several steps in various spheres such as the freedom of the press, an open environment for dialogue and debate, as well as holding of general elections and the transition to a Presidential form of government.

The democratization process in Indonesia at various levels has played a crucial role in making it an exemplary case of rapid democratic transition in the third wave democratization in Asia. In fact Indonesia has been slowly moving towards democracy

after the fall of authoritarian Suharto led regime in 1998. But during the last eleven years, the country has made a steady progress towards democratization along with political decentralization. Incidentally, the successful administration of the general election in 1999 and the first direct Presidential election in 2004 have played a significant role and have increasingly contributed to Indonesia's transformation into the third largest democratic country in the world.

However the democratization process in Indonesia's history following its independence from Dutch in 1945 has encountered several hiccups. Beginning with the failure of President Sukarno and his concept of Guided democracy to establish a robustly democratic form of government after the post independence and latter transformation to the authoritarian, "New Order" political system under Suharto which primarily focused on the building up of strong state. This period under Suharto's New Order regime was characterized by military led authoritarian rule. The period from 1998 to 2004 was marked by an element of chaos in Indonesia's political history which was primarily due to the transition process. This was because the democratic structures and institutions which had been eroded due to nearly thirty five years of authoritarian rule needed to be undone and rebuilt.

Thus in this context it becomes more or less important to explore the circumstances that contributed to the Indonesia's transformation into a democratic country and the establishment of more or less effective democratic set up in the country. This could be possible only if we go into the details of the political situation that existed during the period. So a brief historical background has been given below to understand the state of democracy in Indonesia.

The Japanese occupation in Indonesia continued for a small period of three and a half years. However, with in this short period of its rule over Indonesia, Japan introduced a wide range of changes mostly in the political and economic sphere and was successful in building an image of a liberator. But their image of a liberator didnt lasted for a long period as they began to adopt harsh policies mostly in curbing the rising forces of

nationalism. However the landing of the allied forces in Indonesia forced the Japanese to promise eventual independence to the Indonesians. In March 1945, Japan allowed for the formation of an investigating committee which consisted of the members of the nationalist movement and which worked on a draft constitution which was related to Indonesian independence. Japan finally surrendered on 15 August 1945 to the allied forces on the terms of handing over the authority to the Allied forces. This was not acceptable to the Indonesians as they wanted Japanese style of independence. Thus, Sukarno and Hatta were kidnapped by the angry young leaders who forced them to declare independence of Indonesia on 17 August 1945. The return of the Dutch under the allied troops accelerated the instability in the country. However with the strict action taken by the Security Council and with the efforts of the then Indian Prime minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, an Asian conference was held in January 1949. Thus on account of pressure exerted by US diplomats and financial pressures, the Netherlands finally agreed to transfer independence to Indonesia on December 27 1949. During Indonesia's formative years of independence 1949-1955, there was great instability of government and very little prospect was left for the proper functioning of the party system. There were five cabinets in six years between 1949 and 1955, and since then Indonesia has been struggling with democracy. Although during the last phase of nationalist movement, the 1945 constitution was adopted by the Indonesian nationalist leader which was characterized by the concentration of power in the institution of the Presidency. But this constitution was shortly replaced by the Provisional constitution of 1950 which was based on parliamentary system of government.

Although, this parliamentary system worked for a period of seven years, but there were several factors such as compulsions of politics, religion and regional rebellions and finally, President Sukarno's antagonistic attitude towards the multiparty system, that barred the smooth functioning of the parliamentary system and thus, it could not remain in operation for long duration. With the President Sukarno's decree on 5th July 1959, which called for a return to the 1945 constitution a new political system was born which came to be known as "Guided Democracy", which gave wider executive and legislative powers to the President and lasted from 1959 to 1965 in Indonesia.

Although, the concept of Guided democracy was in a sense derived from the 1945 constitution, but historically it was introduced by President Sukarno. In this system of Guided democracy the so called Zaken or functional cabinet was established by Sukarno. The Zaken or the functional cabinet was mainly a business cabinet that consisted of members of political parties, economists and the military. Though the idea of Guided democracy was probably good but in the process it changed. The change was largely because of the rising public criticism regarding the measures that were undertaken by President Sukarno in managing the country. Under his Guided democracy system, several political parties were declared illegal. The parliament was also suspended by him as he felt that the political parties no longer represented the people rather he appointed a cooperative parliament. Besides this, instead of cleansing the administration and making efforts for economic well being of the people as he had promised while introducing his new system of government that is Guided Democracy, he concentrated mainly in representing Indonesia and himself on to the international scene. Such measures were taken by him in order to divert the attention of the people from their genuine demands and to wield them as the national front with a view to make them to stand behind their president in fighting the nation's foes. Not only had this, the directions that the President Sukarno followed in governing the country been also not clear which ultimately led to political chaos. Further this chaotic political situation ultimately tended to change and caused national instability in both social and economic developments of the country.

The essence of Guided Democracy initiatives aimed to embrace the idea of solving the deadlock in the parliament that had led to political instability in the country, along with the purpose of reviving the national economic activities and to increase people's prosperity. These initiatives carried almost all the aspects of the Indonesian social, political and economic activities, but their implementation proved to be a disaster to the social development process of the country. Thus, in time it became clear that the concept of Guided democracy as seen from its implementation was totally different from that of the concept of true democracy.

Besides this, in the Guided democracy introduced by Sukarno, the power of making all the decisions were solely vested with the President without any regard to due process of parliament according to 1945 constitution. During this period, on account of its performance in the 1955 elections, the Indies Communist Association (Perserikatan Komunisi di India, PKI) emerged as one of the most prominent political party in the country and was also successful in attracting the attention of Sukarno towards itself. Sukarno gave his full support to PKI in order to minimise the growing strength of Masjumi which was considered by Sukarno as antidemocratic. However the PKI which was in the good books of the president Sukarno, misused the president's trust and miscalculated the general feeling of the public including ABRI and the students. The miscalculation resulted in the failed coup in September 30, 1965. Thus considering this, it appeared that PKI was not only involved in engineering the introduction of the political manifesto but also at the same time it was also directly involved and responsible for the ending of the Old Era and the Guided Democracy in Indonesia. The end of the Guided democracy signified the beginning of the New Order with the introduction of the Pancasila democracy.

The period that followed the 30 September 1965 coup placed Indonesian system on the verge of crises which the country was about to face in the absence of sound administration. The economy was tottering, inflation reached unprecedented heights, productivity declined and foreign reserves were almost depleted. Government machinery became largely inoperative due to continued corruption which permitted the top levels to enrich themselves while the lower level barely survived. In addition to this, the ominous populization of the political forces around the two outstanding rivals namely the army and the communist party and the antagonism between them left no option for any other resolution for the victory of the one and the elimination of the other.

The controversial coup attempt of 30th September movement thus saw the emergence of Suharto and the army as the dominant political forces in Indonesia. The elimination of Guided Democracy left a wide spread hope that Suharto's army dominated government would establish a new order that would promote a just and prosperous society which

would promote the interest of the Indonesian people and the underlying principles of which would be based on Pancasila. Not only this, the members of the anti communists civilian groups who had suffered under the Sukarno regime as well as western observers regarded the army and Suharto as the agents of progress and modernization to bring about a complete break with the politics and policies of the past. So when General Suharto came to power he used the term “Orde Baru” or the New Order and called Sukarno’s Guided democracy “Orde Lama” or the old order, which according to him represented the rotten, bankrupt system.

However, the New Order was not as new as had been anticipated. The army’s rise to power was the culmination of a long process during which it had acquired the characteristics that shaped its performance after the 1965. This is evident in the role that the army had earlier played in the nationalist movement against the colonial rule of the Dutch. Besides this the introduction of martial law had also made the army a powerful force in the country and enhancing its role in the politics, administration and economy of Indonesia. After emerging as the new President and army chief, the Dwi Fungsi Doctrine was established by Suharto in an attempt to extend the army’s role in political and economic affairs of the country. Besides this, the political stability was held necessary in order to fulfill the goal of economic development and prosperity that were held out by Suharto regime. The New Order appeared to be merely a garb under which the Suharto’s regime could extend its repression and control over all aspects of human activity. No new philosophy of social reform was adopted by the New Order government, although many policies adopted by the government contrasted with those of the old regime, but they merely served in the furtherance of vested interests.

The nature of the Suharto led system came to be based on consensus through control. Civilian organizations like political parties ensuring popular participation received special attention in order to make them amenable to the policies of the regime. Thus after being assured of controlling the governmental system, Suharto started making efforts to further legitimize his position by holding elections. The regime’s sponsorship of the Golkar Party enabled in managing of the 1971 elections in order to provide the desired

interest of his legitimacy. But in no way were these elections free and fair. These elections merely represented the continuation of a process which had already begun in the 1950's. Power was taken away from more representative civilian elite which articulated local interests to a non local military elite leading to the increase of particularization in political life at the expense of civilian organizations and democratic institutions of the country.

Thus, Suharto's regime claimed to have established a New Order which ensured social justice, modernization and development and implementation of the 1945 constitution in a pure and consistent way, through Pancasila democracy. But the reality was not the same as was ensured by the New Order government under Suharto. The income disparity and mass poverty among the Indonesian population reached its height. There was drastic devaluation of the Indonesian Rupiah along with continued corruption which provided an opportunity for the privileged sections of the elite to continue to enrich themselves at the cost of the impoverished masses.

In March 1983, Suharto was again elected as President for a fourth term. The New Order backed by the armed forces and which replaced Sukarno's Guided democracy has proved to be even more authoritarian than the latter. During the New order authoritarian regime, the trend towards centralization and evolution was widely extended in all fields. However the Indonesian communist party could still make their voices heard and thus compete with the army. But the New order in the reaction drifted towards a full military regime in order to stifle such dissenting voices raised against the government. A so called Functional group called the Golongan Karya or Golkar was created by the army as a political tool to gain legitimacy from the people through the general election.

In March 1998, President Suharto was overwhelmingly reelected by due process of the then existing political structure for a record of seventh term in the office. His term was to last for five years .But, due to the rapid deterioration of the economy in the aftermath of the Asian financial crises, the unleashing of social and political challenges and defections by key political allies, his beleaguered presidency together culminated in forcing the

strongman Suharto to resign from the office in favor of his deputy, vice president BJ Habibie who was also the former minister of Research and Technology. The fall of Suharto has forced Habibie's transitional government to face the daunting tasks of bringing the nation out of the economic crises that by that time had reached its height and building up of a democratic political system demanded by the people. However, from the very first day of his appointment, the new President had to face several obstacles which prevented him from being an effective leader to carry out comprehensive reforms which were continuously demanded by the people of Indonesia.

Moreover, he was also accused of practicing KKN (corruption, collusion and nepotism) during his days both as a minister and chairman of many government oriented enterprises. Thus with such a background it was not easy for him to gain quick public support which was an important need of the time to garner his political legitimacy as a new leader of the country. However, inspite of the non availability of the public confidence in his favour the new President however succeeded in instituting wide ranging political and constitutional changes that were to define Indonesia's post Suharto's political system.

One of the most important changes that were introduced by Habibie was the dramatic repolitization of Indonesia through greater freedom of speech and assembly. This included the legislation to allow for the creation of the new political parties, early general elections and alternations of the composition of the parliament. In addition, Habibie also attempted to satisfy the pro reform groups in the field of human rights. In the realm of economy, the regime attempted to convince the donor countries and institutions such as CGI, World Bank, IMF, ADB and IDB to disburse the package of financial aid in order to support the stabilization of Indonesian economy and the implementation of the social safety net programme (SSN) for the victims of the crises.

Despite these efforts, the process of recovering the country from political and economic crises continued to remain slow. Habibie was still incapable and unsuccessful in

overcoming the most important obstacle, namely, the absence of public confidence to his government which in a way could pave the way for rapid democratization in Indonesia.

The political conjuncture in the post Suharto era thus, left Indonesian politics with three alternatives.. The first was the authoritarian polity under a new type of regime, the second was the radical democratization process and the third was the gradual redemocratization process. The basic requirement for the adoption of the first alternative was that the old regime had to regain its strength through the empowerment of its elements, mainly the military backed political party Golkar which was supported by the old military and civilian bureaucratic networks. On the other hand, the radical democratization as an alternative was also not easy to implement as it could also face tremendous difficulties which in turn may bring about totally different outcomes Thus the third alternative the gradual democratization, that the country was left with was regarded as the most appropriate among the three options. Although the existing situation was not totally conducive for radical transformation, yet there were some visible opportunities for creating a gradual transition towards democratic polity. There were several reasons due to which the existing situation was non conducive for a radical transformation because firstly there were remains of the old political system which was visible in the persistence of the military force and the old ruling party, secondly, the weakness of the reform groups and their leadership as well as the civil society and thirdly, the low degree of political participation from the grassroots population. However, there were some accessible opportunities for the empowerment of democratic elements in society which were visible in the pro reform mood among the people and the existing political atmosphere, although these opportunities were temporary, but were favorable for the introduction and implementation of the reforms as well.

Thus, in this respect the general elections of June 1999 became an important starting point for the pro reform groups to begin the process that could open the road for democratization in Indonesia. The election was the only choice for the promotion of democracy and reforms in the contemporary domestic political system. The election seemed to be the only option for the guarantee of the political rights of the Indonesian

people to take the leadership of the country. This also made an influence on the reformist leaders such as Megawati, Amein Rais and Gus Dur who later on opted for joining the election and rejecting radical approaches for their struggles.

The general elections thus were conducted against a background of increasing euphoria surrounding the downfall of the largely authoritarian New Order regime. The 1999 elections were the most fair, just and transparent the country had ever seen. In this election Golkar came a distant second to Indonesia Democrat Party for Struggle (PDIP) under the leadership of Megawati, the eldest daughter of Indonesia's first president, Sukarno that emerged as the leading political party in the 1999 general elections. However, through a series of negotiations, promises and political machination Abdurrehman Wahid came to gather the support to capture the presidency. Although he presided over further democratization and economic reforms in the country, but there still existed high degree of political instability and social political violence still continued in the country. Besides this, he also had to face the challenges to his authority from the New Order groups and the Golkar as well as the individuals that had been successful in maintaining their presence in the political arena of the country on the basis of their important roles that they have played in the Suharto era and the importance that they have enjoyed in the New Order period under Suharto. Thus on July 23rd Wahid was removed by the parliament and was replaced by his vice president Megawati Sukarnoputri.

But Megawati Sukarnoputri also became unable to create a stable and an effective democratic government. The administration under her had to face several challenges like lack of economic recovery, security problems and international pressure for her efforts in the elimination of terrorism. As a result, the party system continued to remain fragmented and appeared to be unable to produce stable support for the government and to make the government more responsive to the needs of the people.

Thus, in a major break from the past and in order to represent an attempt to become a more democratic society, the Annual session of People's Consultative Assembly (Malis Perwakilan Rakyat, MPR) in November 2001, for the first time, provided for the direct

election of all members of the House of Representatives namely the Regional Representative Council, (Deewan Perwakilan Dinerah,DPD) and the President and the Vice President. The new system encompassed a number of new features. Firstly, unlike the past where the MPR elected the President and vice president, the top two political positions in the country were now to be decided by a direct vote by the people. Secondly, the election of the President and vice president was now to be held after the general elections, thirdly, unless a candidate won a simple majority and garnered the majority of votes, a second round was required to be held between the two leading candidates to decide the winner and fourthly, a political party or the coalition party was given the responsibility to nominate the candidates for the post of president and vice president.

The 2004 direct presidential elections were conducted under this new electoral system. In the 2004 elections for the first time voters were given the opportunity to face with an open list proportional representation system for the legislature, a single non transferable vote system for the new council of Regional Representatives and two round majoritarian systems for the presidency. This clearly widened the scope of people's participation in the politics of the country. The most remarkable feature of the 2004 election had been the performance of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat, PD) which got the majority of votes and thus Yudhoyono was elected the next president of Indonesia.

Although the 2004 elections have not actually resulted in a fundamental political change in Indonesia, the election process has been quite encouraging. Democratization process continued although it appeared to be a lengthy process. The newly instituted direct Presidential elections acted as a major step forward in the democratization process. Thus this election provided Indonesians with real opportunity to bring about fundamental change in the national leadership, however, the choices remained very limited for the people.

The year 2008 acted as political year for Indonesia as the 2009 elections was approaching closer. The 2009 elections were quite significant as they acted as an indicator of the

consolidation of democratic process. Several events that played a significant role in the 2009 elections were mainly the internal party conflicts in particular in The National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB), had significant effect on the elections, popular issues were utilized by the political parties to gain popularity and undermine the base of their competitors. The judicial process initiated by the Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK) to solve several corruption cases which involved several parliament members, was another political arena.

The 2009 presidential elections were held on July 8, 2009. The results of the presidential election have been in favor of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and once again he was elected as President for his second term in the office.

Thus the elections adopted as a means to democratize the country, the conduct of these elections and their results thus becomes important to Indonesia's future as it depends so much on them. All the three elections that have been held in Indonesia since 1999 have contributed to the deepening of the consolidation of democratic process. Thus, despite the presence of several uncertainties revolving around the democratic process, the ultimate success in the peaceful holding of elections widely renewed the hope of the Indonesians who since long have been waiting for the emergence and establishment of more transparent and just political system in the country and increase in the economic recovery as well.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The resignation of President Suharto from office on 21st May 1998 marked the end of four decades of authoritarian rule and the beginning of a transition to a democratic, multiparty political system in Indonesia. This democratic transition involved a series of liberalizing constitutional amendments and legislative reforms, which fundamentally altered the political process and structure of state institutions.

Indonesia's Democratic transitions, the absence of preconditions.

The sudden and unanticipated fall of Suharto in May 1998 was a decisive moment in Indonesia's history. Multiple factors had contributed to this event. The devastating Asian Economic Crises, which hit Indonesia hard, was considered by many observers as the primary factor behind the fall of Suharto's regime. (Schwarz, 1999).

Indonesia's moves towards democratization has indeed dispelled many myths and flawed assumptions that have previously influenced the literature on democratization in Indonesia. Modernization and development is the justification used by most authoritarian regime to prevent rather than to promote democratization is a pre condition or conducive to democracy. In this context, the view of most of the modernization and development theorists is that the increased degrees of economic prosperity, industrialization and education promotes and enhances the levels of political participation and democratic development. These theorists further states that economic development is a precondition for democratic transition and consolidation because it leads to social transformation such as the growth of the middle class and literacy levels necessary for the promotion of political representation participation and government accountability (Lipset 1994). In this context the view of Diamond is that, the more well to do people of a country are, the more likely they will favour, achieve and maintain a democratic system for their country (Diamond 1992).

On the other hand, the extent to which cultural values and shared attitudes influences the political change and behaviour has been the major concern of many scholars. Many scholars emphasize that democratic political culture for negotiating, bargaining, accommodating and willingness for compromise is a precondition for successful democratic transition. Thus the development of a new democratic system requires not only formal democratic institutions but also a coherent political culture the components of which should match with the norms and attitudes of ordinary citizens. Thus according to Almond and Verba, Public democratic culture is a precondition which must precede the democratization process in order for the democratic transition to proceed steadily and for democracy to take hold. (Almond and Verba, 1963, Almond, 1980)

The failure of the New Order government to regain investor's confidence in Indonesia's economic reforms, especially after Suharto's reelection by MPR on 10th March 1998 triggered the reformasi movement, which started with the series of a large , anti-government student led demonstrations which started from Jogjakarta and Jakarta to many other cities, ultimately culminating the fall of Suharto's regime(Mietzner 1999a,b).

Many analyst agree that contrary to most modernization theorist's calculations, according to which the steady economic growth under Suharto's regime should have led to democratic development, the Indonesian democratization process was instigated by the economic crises which triggered the fall of the dictator(Uhlin,2000:2,5;Tornquist,2002,2004).

Indonesian Democratic craftsmanship--- The transitional phase

After the fall of Suharto, although the student succeeded in attracting the support and exerting pressure sufficient to force Suharto's resignation, the leadership of their reformasi movement was transferred into the hands of a network of influential leaders and the democratic consolidation mainly developed through political pacts among a group of Indonesian elite. Therefore the Indonesian democratic transition took an evolutionary path which was quite disappointing for the reformasi total agenda of the students (Budiman,1999).

Prominent leaders like Amien Rais, Abdur Rahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri played a significant role in facilitating political reform and stabilizing the democratic transition (Budiman 1999, Falaakh,2001)

The extraordinary, unprecedented events of 1998-1999, which saw the first successful, democratic transition of power in Indonesia since its independence , marked the most significant moment in the nation's history since the events of 1965-1966 that brought Suharto to power. The October 1999 meeting of Indonesia's People's Consultive Assembly(MPR) and its selection for nation's fourth President capped the period of dramatic political transition sparked by the fall of President Suharto and his New Order regime in May 1998. In the opening of up of Indonesian democracy ,a political landscape

emerged that pitted parties and political reforms identified with the New Order against the forces of Reformasi. Despite the uncertainties that swirled around the process, the ultimate success of democratic transition has filled Indonesians with renewed hope for economic recovery and for an increasingly transparent and just political order in the country (Thompson: 1999).

Democratic consolidation in Indonesia

Despite many pessimistic expectations the democratization process in Indonesia has been progressing steadily over the past decade. The Indonesian elite has crafted and stabilized a political transition mainly characterized by regular free and fair elections, peaceful rotations of powers, effective elected officials and separation of powers, inclusive suffrage, freedom of expression independence of media and associational autonomy.(Lovay Abdalbaki, 2008)

The steady progress of civil military reforms will eventually lead to the consignment of the military to the barracks for good , a critical Rubicon Indonesia needs to cross in its march to democratic consolidation(Juoro, 2006).

With its consistent autonomous stance and support of the formal political process, the military has contributed positively to the ongoing security reforms required to consolidate democracy in Indonesia(Barron, 2005)

Linz and Stepan extend the notion of institutionalization beyond the political and elite behaviour domain, incorporating public attitude as an indicator of democratic consolidation . According to Linz and Stepan , democracy is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion , even in the midst of major economic problems and deep dissatisfaction with incumbents, hold the belief that the democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life, and when support for antisystem alternatives is quite small or is more or less isolated from prodemocratic forces(Linz and Stepan,1997:16).

The institutionalization of democracy is meant to describe a political environment in which the rules of the democratic game become routinised as a part of everyday life, rather than a careful or conscious process of cost benefit political calculations on the part

of the political actors. Political actors in this situation become habitually committed to the democratic process and customarily subjected to the rule of law(Linz and tepan,1996,6)

Democracy is consolidated when a majority of public opinion holds the benefit that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate(Linz and Stepan 1996,6)

Democracy is consolidated when a reversal to authoritarianism is impossible(Suchit Bumbangkarn).

SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The resignation of President Suharto from the office in May 1998 marked the end of three decades of authoritarian rule and the instigation of a transition to multi party democratic system in Indonesia. This democratic transition involved a series of liberalizing constitutional amendments and legislative reforms, which fundamentally altered the political process and structure of state institutions. In the process Indonesia has successfully conducted peaceful, free and fair elections from 1999 to 2009 and three peaceful rotations of presidential power from B.J. Habibie (1998-1999), to Abdurrahman Wahid(1999-2001), Megawati Sukarnoputri(2001-2004) and Sushilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-present). The most recent president was directly elected by the people for the first time in Indonesia's history after the constitutional amendments abolished the role of the people's consultative assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat) in choosing Indonesia's president.

Although Indonesia's democratization process has been progressing steadily, the quality of Indonesian democracy and the extent of its consolidation still remain under serious consideration and heated discussion. The issue of the status of democracy in Indonesian politics has been a matter of intense scrutiny and debate all over the world. This is equally true of Indonesia, where the goal of democratization is actually guaranteed by the country's constitution. Despite this, there remains a great deal to be done to secure Indonesia's democracy. This work, aspires to be comprehensive, vivid depiction of the current changing status of democracy in Indonesia. The analysis has been conducted in the framework of the political ambience that has characterized the state in recent decades.

This work will also highlight both the areas of strengths and weaknesses and clearly demonstrate that the status of democracy cannot be conceived as monolithic or static as it has many facets and is in a state of constant flux. The real question is about the changing status of democracy in the post independent period. This work analyses the current political development and democratic revivalism in regard to the changing status of democracy in Indonesia.

The time period under the study i.e. between 1945 till date becomes all the more important, since it covers the period from Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia to an independent Indonesia and also from the independence to the struggle for democracy ranging from political changes to the rotations of power in the country. And this will give us clear picture of the changing status of democracy and its development and also electoral reforms revivalism that has influenced the overall Indonesian political system. The detailed description of democratization process in Indonesia will be covered in the subsequent chapters and a major part of that will be dealt in the introductory chapter alone separately. The present study will have three chapters excluding introduction and the concluding chapter. Thus it will have five chapters in all. As the introduction chapter has covered the broad understanding of the topic. It has touched upon the brief historical background of the political system in the country as well as its various dimensions in the post independence era. Most importantly it will delineate the variables used in the study like status of democracy, what constitute democracy, factors influencing the process of democratization and other such variables.

The further proceedings of this work will go through chapter wise description which gives a full account of the democratic process in detail which I am going to present separately. These are as follows: In my first chapter, which is the introductory chapter, I have given broad understanding of the topic along with a brief description of the political system that existed in Indonesia and the present day political developments in the country. Various dimensions have been discussed in this chapter.

In the next chapter, my focus is on the detailed description of the political structure of the country in the post independent era under the presidents like Sukarno and Suharto. It will also provide the description from the period from 1945 to 1949 which are considered as the revolutionary years in the history of Indonesia politics. In this an issue of political change or transformation too has been incorporated to have the broader understanding of apparent changes taking place in the post independent era. And this gives a clear picture of the direction and progress of the Indonesian political system particularly in the light of democratic advancement.

In the next chapter, my focus is on the electoral reforms and the conduct of the free and fair elections in the country and their significance and an effort that the country had made in developing regional autonomy in the supporting the process of democratization in Indonesia. And lastly I have tried to incorporate the phase of democratization that Indonesia had gone through since its independence. This chapter argues that the demands for reforms and democracy were not only demands for a change of regime, but also for a change of political system. This chapter states that such demands require an overhaul of all political, social and economic institutions and relations and the establishment of stable framework with in which the democratic practices can take root. In the last chapter I have concluded my theme of research. This is an overall overview of the analysis and review of my work that have been concluded in support of my hypothesis. And, if it is found contrary to my hypothesis, then, it is opened up for further study and scope for research in the field of democracy particularly in Indonesia. Thus, it completes my study and the purpose of research

Research Question

1. To what extent does Indonesian democracy fulfill the criteria stipulated by the theorists of democratic consolidation?
2. To examine the significance of the direct Presidential elections in the process of consolidation of democracy in Indonesia.
3. To what extant political reforms have succeeded in consolidation of democracy.

4. The role played by the leaders in the transition process in Indonesia.
5. To what extent the process of gradual democratization has been successful in the politics of Indonesia.
6. How far the June 1999 elections had acted as an important starting point to pave the way for democratization in Indonesia.

Research Methodology

A suitable methodology is always required to process the available information to meet the objective of the study. While preparing this work I have adopted a descriptive and analytical method. This work basically analyses the existing condition of democracy in Indonesia. This work also analyses the significance of the Parliamentary and Direct Presidential elections in democratization process. Further this study is based on primary and secondary sources. The study of various documents reports government records, as well as reports from international organizations available on the Internet has also been undertaken and the data has been analyzed. The secondary sources includes various books and articles that existed in the area of studies and related issues Moreover, The Internet as a potent source for online research has been used.

Tentative Chapters

Chapter One

Introduction

This section covers the broad understanding of the topic at hand It begins with the brief historical background of the politics existing in Indonesia since Sukarno era till date.

Chapter Two

Indonesia from 1945 to 1998

The main focus of this chapter is on detailed description of the political structure in the post independent Indonesia under the presidency o Sukarno and Suharto, along

with a brief description of the colonial rule over the country and the country's struggle for independence

Chapter Three

Reforms, Elections and Decentralization in Indonesia

This chapter deals with the electoral reforms introduced in the country and the significance of the elections in opening road for accelerating democratization process as well as promoting the decentralization in the country.

Chapter Four

Phases of Democratization

This chapter tries to incorporate the different phases of democratization that Indonesia had gone through since its independence.

Conclusion

The concluding part summarizes the whole research and will establish the conclusion that how far Indonesia has gone towards a transition to democracy. It will also determine the extent to which the Indonesian democracy has been consolidated.

CHAPTER TWO
INDONESIA FROM 1945 to 1998

Revolutionary Movement in Indonesia:

TH-18692

The Dutch were the chief distributors of Asian produce in the sixteenth century Europe. The Netherlands was more dependent on its colony than any other European colonial power in Asia. The prime objective of the Dutch aimed at maximizing their profits from trade and concentrating more on establishing its monopoly over the several products of trade specially the spices. The Netherlands was successful in gaining a remarkable degree of success in overshadowing its European and Asian rivals. In view of Meilink Roelfz, 'Whatever its defects in the sphere of trade the Dutch East India Company represented a far more efficient and above all much more business like system than the government undertaking of Portuguese' (Meilink 1962, p. 177). Apart from making profits from trade another factor that had made the Netherlands more dependent on its colony as mentioned by Herbert Feith was the physiological one. To quote Feith, "The Indies were Holland's only colony of importance. With the Indies, Holland was the world's third or fourth colonial power; without them it would be a cold little country on the North Sea" (Feith, 1962. p.2). As the contemporary colonial powers of the Dutch like Britain and United States made efforts to provide self-government to some extent to their colonies, the Dutch on their part showed no interest in accepting the necessity of giving any chance of self-government to Indonesia. Thus, it can be said that it was the social economic contradictions created by the tendency of the Dutch, which aimed at making their profits rather giving any attention toward the social and economic development of their colony that gave rise to a nationalist movement in Indonesia.

Education for Indonesians was neglected since long time in Indonesia under the Dutch colonial rule. Although the technical, law and medical colleges were established but the Indonesians could not get much attention in being trained in these Dutch language school. However, in the beginning of the twentieth century a groups of literate Indonesians arose who were successful in obtaining secondary and higher western education. These educated Indonesian emerged as a powerful class that was able to meet the needs of the government and was successful in getting white-collar jobs in foreign firms. The western ideas and education gave rise to new self-spirit and self-awareness and made these Indonesians able to cope with their needs. Besides this, several modern organizations also came into existence from the core of which nationalist movement arose to challenge the



Dutch authority. In the meantime, these organisations also prepared these Indonesian to forge a nationalist movement against the Dutch rule in the country (Feith 1962). Besides this Japan's growing modernization was also taken as an example by the Indonesian along with the growing grievances due to the discrimination in the government employment due to the dominating role of the Chinese middlemen, produced rising dissatisfaction in their inferior status under colonial rule among the small groups of Western educated Indonesians. This rising dissatisfaction led to the growth of several organizations in Indonesia. The first national organization that came into existence was Budi Utomo or the High Endeavour that was founded in 1908 to promote culture and organize schools on national basis. Further due to the rapid growth of Chinese control over textile trade of Java, there came into existence another organization called the Sarekat Dagang Islam also known as Society of Muslim Traders which got established in 1911 as a result of the Chinese hold over textile trade in Java. This organization was reorganized later and came to be known as Sarekat Islam which along with retaining its religious character emerged as the first popular political movement and demanded for self government based on the union with the Netherlands. However, the Dutch showed their unwillingness in giving the Indonesians any participation in the administration of the country which in a way accelerated the pace of rising nationalism in Indonesia (Fryer and Jacson 1977). Thus, important roles were played by Sarakat Islam in organizing and unting trade unions. Between 1917 and 1921, Srakat Islam continued to remain under the influence of the Dutch and Indonesian Marxists (Feith 1962; p.4).

Besides this, the Decentralization law of 1903 also led to the formation of local councils in Java, which was comprised of European, Indonesians and the Chinese. Again in 1918 People's Council was formed which was also known as Volksraad. However, it could only offer advice. As the majority of the members of the Council were the Europeans, this Council failed in representing itself as a representative body. However, the year 1920 saw the birth of the Perserikatan Komunist di India (Indies Communist Association, PKI). The Communist quickly penetrated the new trade unions and formented strikes in the early 1920s and instigated revolts in West Java in 1926 and West Sumatra in 1927 respectively. These revolutionary actions of the communist antagonized the government who implemented repressive measures and as a result, PKI was banned. Because of the

collapse of the communist movement, Sarakat Islam easily got the required nationalist stage which had already called for independence and had started to show their concern for the social and economic condition. In 1925, a new constitution was drafted for the Indies, which gave supreme executive powers to the Governor General that ultimately lessened the power of the Volksraad. Thus Volksraad remained insignificant. Regarding the ineffectiveness of the People's Council or the Volksraad, Herbert Feith remarks: "In 1918 the government agreed to the establishment of the Volksraad or People's Council, an advisory body whose membership would be partly nominated and partly elected, but indirectly on the basis of a small and racially delineated franchise. In 1931, it agreed to admit a majority of Asians, Indonesians and Foreign Orientals to the council but beyond this point, there was no progress. The council's wishes could always be overridden by the Governor General. Most nationalists regarded the body with distrust and the more radical organizations forbade their members to participate in it" (Herbert Feith 1962: pp.5-6).

Thus, the powers of the Volksraad, however, remained insignificant and although it was given an elective majority, Indonesians held only thirty of its sixty one seats. Thus neither the Volksraad nor the policies of Sarakat Islam, could satisfy all the aspiring nationalists especially those with more extreme views. This made Sukarno instrumental in founding of the Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia (National Party of Indonesia) in 1921. However, he was arrested and imprisoned by the Dutch from 1929-1932 on the grounds of advocating a policy of non-cooperation. He was again rearrested in 1933 and was exiled too. Thus, the period of the 1930s was a time marked by polarization of feelings between the Dutch and the Indonesian communities. Further, the economic depression aggravated the economic competition between the Dutch and the Indonesians. The turn of the western educated Indonesian towards radical and populist nationalism also created a sort of fear in the Netherlands country. In this context Fryer and Jackson remarks: "Faced with the severe economic problems caused by the Great Depression, government reactions to nationalist claims hardened in the 1930s; officialdom displayed a strong determination to pressure the colonial situation and only the more moderate were allowed free rein" (Fryer and Jackson 1977, p. 61).

In 1936, the demand of the nationalists for holding up of the conference to discuss the issue of self-government was passed by the Volksraad but however, it failed in bringing

out any solution due to the invasion of Japan in early 1942. According to Herbert Feith, “Even after the Nazi invasion on Holland in 1940, Indonesian nationalism were offered no more than vague promise of reorganization in relations between the Netherlands and the Indies after the war. Thus when Japanese inflicted their quick defeat on the Dutch in early 1942 and moved in to occupy the archipelago the most general reaction of Indonesian nationalism was one of applause” (Feith 1962, p. 6).

The Japanese occupation in Indonesia was for a period of three and a half years and during this period, Japan brought far-reaching changes mostly in the political and economic sphere. One of the most important changes was the shifting of several government officials. Many of these officials were Dutch and thus they were publicly humiliated and were sent back to their camps. Besides this, the Japanese also replaced the Dutch who were in higher positions and the same was done to the Indonesians in the lower positions. Thus, Japanese established their full control over the government of the country. Regarding this Fryer and Jackson argues that the Indonesians regarded the Japanese as the liberators whereas the Dutch and the indigenous nobility that were the power holding community before the establishment of Japanese occupation in Indonesia began to be regarded as the constraints to nationalism. The Japanese occupation also made available several government jobs for the Indonesians but the key posts continued to be under the control of the Japanese (Fryer and Jackson 1977). Besides this, a variety of semi military mass was used for the spread of militant anti western feeling among the entire Indonesian population. This provided an opportunity to the national leaders to foster nationalist aspirations among the grass roots of the Indonesian masses. In addition to this Japan also encouraged the Indonesian language, which also played a significant role in boasting the political strength of nationalism. Thus with the new facilities for propagating their views as according to Fryer and Jackson , helped the nationalist in forging bonds between the intelligentsia and the common people which was impossible in the Dutch colonial period. Although, the main objective of the Japanese occupation in Indonesia was to replace the Dutch language by Japanese and also to compel the teaching of the Japanese language in schools but due to insufficient time, it was not possible for the Japanese to implement such policies which thus resulted in the wider use of Indonesian language or the Bhasha Indonesia and was given the official status too (Fryer

and Jacson 1977). Besides this, an effort was also made by the Japanese to train the Indonesians in arms. Although this step was taken under the fear of Allied troops that were landing in Indonesia in large numbers but it prepared the Indonesians for their future struggle with the Dutch in the fight for gaining independence. As many as 62,000 young Indonesians as mentioned by Herbert Feith were trained in PETA and Heiho. Besides this a large number of Indonesians were also trained in several Para military youth organizations (Feith 1962, p. 7).

However, the image of liberators that the Japanese had established among the Indonesians was very soon shattered. The main intention of Japanese occupation in Indonesia was merely a means to maximize their own war effort. Japanese adopted harsh policies, which completely faded their goodwill that they have gained as liberators. In order to fulfill their purpose of maximizing their active popular support for their war efforts, they began to court the forces of nationalism. Despite this in comparison to the Dutch rule in Indonesia, however, the Japanese sponsored political organizations in large scale in Indonesia than the Dutch (Benda 1958).

In September 1944, because of the continuous success of the allied forces the Japanese were forced to promise eventual Indonesian independence. Because of this, the Japanese opened several higher administrative posts for the Indonesians. Japan also lifted several restrictions that were previously laid by it in the propagation of Indonesian nationalism. In March 1945, Japan allowed for the formation of an investigating committee which consisted of members of the nationalist movement and which worked on a draft constitution related to Indonesian independence (Anderson 1961). However, nothing much could be gained before the Japanese surrender on 15 August 1945 under the terms of handing over the authority to the allied forces. This was not acceptable to the Indonesian nationalists who were demanding for the Japanese style independence. Thus, both Sukarno and Hatta were kidnapped by the youth leaders and were forced to declare the independence of Indonesia on 17 August 1945. Sukarno was nominated as president of the newly independent republic and Hatta as the Vice President. However, with the coming of allied troops in Indonesia, the Dutch got an umbrella for itself to once again reestablish its base in Indonesia. The return of the Dutch made the situation more chaotic and explosive. In the meantime, the political changes began to take place within the

republic itself that resulted in the shifting of power from the hands of the old nationalist into the hands of the young leaders like Sjahrir. Negotiations were made by Sukarno, Hatta and Sjahrir with the British and the Dutch but these negotiations however failed in putting a halt to the entrance of the Dutch soldiers into the archipelago. Very soon, the Netherlands was successful in establishing its control over the most of the major Indonesian cities. The continued negotiations between the nationalist and the Dutch ended with the intervention of the British pressure, which resulted in the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement under the terms of which Netherlands agreed to give its recognition to the Republic as the defacto authority in Java and Sumatra (Djajdiningrat 1957).

However, the agreement failed in bringing out valued solutions. The Dutch continued to land their soldiers in Indonesia. Thus by the end of 1948 most of the former colonial administration was in the hands of the Dutch while the nationalist like Sukarno, Hatta, and other leading nationalist were detained. At the same time, the Dutch still faced highly localized military resistance. In order to tackle with the situation, a cease-fire resolution was adopted by the Security Council on August 1947. Besides this, the Security Council also established a committee of Good Offices that was comprised of United States, Belgium, and Australia. This committee was formed to make conversations with the two parties and to resolve the conflict. As a result of this an agreement was signed which came to be known as Renville Agreement. The Agreement proposed for the holding up of the Plebiscites in various parts of the archipelago in order to decide whether the inhabitants of these areas preferred to join Indonesian republic or to have Dutch sovereignty to continue. At the same time clashes between the Dutch and the Indonesian continued. In 19th December 1948, the Dutch made a second major attack on the Republic which escalated into a police action. However, this time the Security Council action was much stronger than it had been at the time of first police action. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru convened an Asian Conference in January 1949. It was at the conference urge that the Security Council ordered an immediate cease-fire. Besides this, it also ordered the release of political prisoners and the reestablishment of the Government in Jog Jakarta. The United States also laid tremendous pressure on the Netherlands government, which yielded positive results according to which the

Netherlands finally agreed to transfer the sovereignty to Indonesian hands on December 27, 1949. Thus, combined with U.S. diplomatic and financial pressure and the Dutch war weariness, the Netherlands formally transferred power to the independent United States of Indonesia by the end of 1949 (McMahan 1981).

Thus, the Indonesian struggle for their independence from the Dutch rule was revolutionary. The process adopted by the Indonesians in gaining strength to compel Netherlands to withdraw from Indonesia was that of violence. Thus, it was through violence along with the support of foreign nations that Indonesia was successful in establishing itself as an independent nation.

Early Years of Independence: Emergence of Guided Democracy

Indonesia achieved complete independence in 1949 and soon after Indonesia based its political set up on the federal structure of government created by the Dutch in the previous years of their rule over the areas controlled by them. The Dutch created this federal state structure of government in order to tackle with the growing Revolutionary Republic of Indonesia. However, the way, by which these federal states were created by the Dutch left a wide range of suspicion and hostility in the minds of most of the Indonesians towards this idea of Federal structure of government. In this context, Ghoshal argues that, because of Indonesia's experience with federal structure with the Dutch the idea of Federalism was considered to be a colonial vestige and a tool to subjugate the young Republic and therefore had to be discarded. This had also made the problem of autonomy to the regions much more complex since the very idea had reminded many Indonesian leaders of their bitter experiences of the early stage of their independence (Ghoshal, 1973). Thus, when the first cabinet of the newly independent Indonesia was formed in 1949 and Hatta assumed the office as the Prime minister, there was great demand for the abolition of the Federal structure type of government from the large portion of the political public encouraged by Sukarno and other high government leaders. George Kahin expresses his view by stating that, within nine months after the

transfer of power the federation had collapsed and the unitary state of Republic of Indonesia emerged on 17th August 1950 (Kahin, 1952, pp. 446-69).

Soon after gaining independence Indonesia tended to follow the footsteps of the other newly independent Asian and African countries and adopted the democratic form of government. As was the case with the other newly independent Asian countries who adopted the political system of their ruling country, similarly Indonesia also adopted the multi party system of the Dutch and the proportional representation system. In this context Feith mentions his view as, "It appeared in 1949 and 1950 that the "really Asian" nations were those practicing constitutional democracy. India and Burma, countries with the most appealing records of struggle against colonial domination, countries which had helped Indonesia in its fight for independence and which had served, as much as any country had, as models for Indonesian foreign policy. These were also the countries with a commitment to democracy on Western lines" (Feith, 1962 p. 44). Besides this, the parliamentary democracy was adopted mainly to forestall the Dutch campaign and to gain recognition from the world. The parliamentary system was also adopted to make the world know as mentioned by Ghoshal, to convince the world that the Indonesian government was derived from the wishes of the people (Ghoshal, 1973). Another view regarding it has been put forward by Herbert Feith who writes that, "national self respect demanded that a serious effort be made to operate Western type democratic institutions, for this was the one way to show the Dutch that Indonesians could indeed govern themselves democratically" (Feith, 1962:44).

Thus, the third constitution of Indonesia, which was promulgated on 15th August 1950, was based on the system of parliamentary democracy. Under this new constitution, the Republic as mentioned by Baladas Ghoshal as a democratic constitutional state of Unitary structure in which the sovereign power was exercised by the executive and a unicameral house of representatives and in which the responsibility for the entire policy of the government was vested with the ministers (Ghoshal, 1973). However, Indonesia failed in its attempt of creating a viable political system, which can be traced out in the failure of the seven cabinets that have assumed the office during a period of only seven years. However, the parliamentary democracy could gain some success but it was only in the years before the elections of 1955 were held. In view of Krishnamurty, In Indonesia's

history it was only in the years before the general elections of 1955 that the parliamentary democracy which was implemented came out with some success (Krisnamurty, pp552-567).

Herbert Feith in his work on Constitutional democracy in Indonesia mentions that a serious attempt was made for the successful operation of the parliamentary democracy during the period of the four cabinets before the 1955 elections were held. He further mentions that the supremacy of the parliament was accepted in principle and the ministers presented policies to the parliament where serious discussions were made on important issues related to the national interest (Feith, 1962, pp.320-330). Same view have been proposed by Budiardjo. According to him, attention was given to the questions, interpellations and criticism. Serious debates were held in the parliament regarding the programmes of the cabinet along with the acceptance to the symbol of constitutionalism in by the parliament (Budiardjo, 1956).

Although the principles of the parliamentary democracy were accepted but it failed in bringing about any effect on the future practice of the parliamentary democracy in Indonesia. Thus, in short it can be said that the supremacy of the parliament according to the constitution was accepted only in principle and not in practice. There were several occasions where the parliament visibly showed its impotency in solving the several issues with in the parliament. There were several instances where the extra parliamentary forces like the president and the army exercised wider control over the parliament and often challenged the decisions made by the parliament. Despite all these, as Benda argues that democracy did operate in Indonesia for a limited period, even though only in the embryonic form (Benda, 1964: pp.449-56).

Several factors contributed in carrying out the constitutional democracy although with limited success. The outbreak of the Korean War increased the prices of the rubber and tin which were the two major exports of Indonesia and which eventually benefited the economy of the country. Besides this, although the political parties like Masjumi, National Party of Indonesia (Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia PNI), and PSI cooperated with each other in the initial years of the independence but this cooperation gradually vanished especially after the results of the elections. The main reason for this fading of

the cooperation among the parties after the elections was that the results of the elections were quite unexpected. Thus, it can be said that there were several factors that stood responsible for the failure of the constitutional democracy. Some of these factors were like, the existence of lack of unified leadership in the political parties, visible defects in the political parties system, prevailing of internal party conflict in the greed of gaining power, rapid growth in the hostility between secular and religious political parties. Not only this, there also existed the lack of understanding between some of the cabinets and the extra parliamentary forces like the President and the Army which in a way also acted as a major contributing factor in the failure of the constitutional democracy (Ghoshal, 1973).

The period of the constitutional democracy, the parliamentary democracy or the multi party democracy as mentioned by Chalmers was marked by three features of political behavior. The most obvious was the parliament. An interim constitution of 1950 formalized the liberal democratic system, which gave a unicameral parliament the authority to appoint and dismiss the prime minister and the cabinet as well. Thus, with this Indonesia entered into the period of legislative activity. Although Sukarno remained, the president but his position remained ceremonial and symbolic and now the political parties became the central players (Chalmers, 2006). The period was also marked by the visible instability of the cabinets. The instability of the cabinet coalitions and the greed for gaining the power within the parliament also highlighted the weak internal structure of the political parties. These political parties remained busy in protecting their constituencies rather paying any attention towards political ideology (Feith 1962, pp. 108-13). Despite this, the period was also marked by the some indications of a political system that was evolving and which could overcome the weakness of the parliamentary democracy. However, these developments were hindered due to the changing political scenario. The steady gains made by the PKI in the 1955 elections had increased its strength tremendously mainly in the areas that were dominated by its chief rivals who were the Muslim landowners. This led to the emergence of anti Sukarno rebellion. The rebellion and the increasing strength of the PKI provided an opportunity to the military under Genearl Nauston to declare martial law in 1957, which ultimately increased the power of the army. The defeat of the rebellion ended the region-based system of

government. Besides this, it also led to the defeat of the liberal democracy and provided the reason for the burying of the party system (Cribb and Brown 1995).

The third factor that marked the period and played a significant role in the extinction of the parliamentary form of government was the personality and personal political ambition of Sukarno himself. Sukarno had a very clear vision of Indonesian society and it was believed by him that the Western derived forms could not provide an expression to the Indonesia's national character. Besides this, he was also not happy with the existing political system, which had largely curtailed his power and had made him to remain at the post of the President as only a symbol. Thus, this greatly dissented Sukarno who in 1957 imposed his own conception for an alternative government, the ideas of which were particularly drawn from the Javanese nationalist. Besides this, he also advocated the family principle as the basis for true Indonesian democracy. According to him, his concept was based on consensus formation rather than voting. It was in his this speech as mentioned by Reeve that he advocated the formation of Functional groups to represent society (Reeve 1990). Thus, all these factors combined in ending the parliamentary democracy in Indonesia.

Role of Political Parties in the decline of Constitutional Democracy

Indonesian political parties came into existence mainly during its intensive struggle against the Dutch (Kahin, 1952). Although the Indonesian political parties and their leaders did not exercise much freedom during the Japanese occupation, yet the leading political parties were allowed to carry on their activities although to limited manner. These political parties reemerged after the surrender of the Japanese occupation. The newly established government of the Republic of Indonesia initiated for the establishment of political parties, which created an assumption that now Indonesia would have a multy party system modeled on the constitutional pattern (Roeslan, 1952).

When the new government proceeded to establish the representative assembly, it was decided by the political leaders to give representation to the number of political parties in the assembly and the strength of the parties was to be determined by the President Sukarno and Vice President Hatta in consultation with the cabinet. After the transfer of power and with the formation of provisional parliament, more than fifteen parties were

given representation and many more tried for gaining the same. As Feith proposes his view through his argument that although these parties exercised considerable influence over the major sections of the Indonesian society still there existed several other parties who attained political identity through bluffing techniques (Feith, 1962)

Besides this, almost all the parties with an exception of PKI failed in developing itself as a movement of protest against some of the most stubborn features of the traditional Indonesian society and emerge as an affirmed agent of criticism and change. In this context Soedjatmoko remarks, "Instead of developing into organs mediating between the needs, problems and wishes of the electorate and the purposes, limitations and problems at the level of national government, the parties became more instruments in the power play of the leaders" (Soedjatmoko, 1967: 263-86). In addition, many of the political parties failed in presenting clear objectives and policies; neither had they ever spoken about working of the government.

Not only this, there was also the absence of discipline in the parties and they were mainly characterized by intra party divisions. As Baladas Ghoshal maintains that, "Divisions within the parties, numerous political parties fighting with one another for power, personalities having greater influence than the ideology of any political party were some of the important factors that led to the decline of the party system and with it of the parliamentary democracy in Indonesia" (Ghoshal, 1973:276). The multiplicity of the parties and the rising defects in the political party system were mainly the outcome of the role played by the personalities. In this context Robert Bone remarks, "political life was a kind of poker game played by a few thousand people, all of whom have known each other much too long and too well" (Robert Bone, 1954)

Another contributory factor in the decline of the parliamentary system was instability of the cabinets and the coalitional nature of all the cabinets in Indonesia. Before the first elections that were held in 1955, sixteen parties were represented in the parliament out of which only four dominated. After the separation of Nahdatul Ulema from the Masjumi in 1952, the cabinets were dominated by the coalitions between three parties namely the PNI, Masjumi, and NU. The governments, which they formed, were not strong and thus the cabinets based on unstable coalitions rose and fell in quick succession. The instability

of the cabinet coalitions and the struggle to gain the power within the parliament highlighted the weak internal structure of the political parties. Most of the political parties were less concerned with the political ideology than their names and thus they tended to be informal coalitions of individual mainly concerned with the purpose to protect their constituencies (Fieth, 1962: pp.108-113).

Thus due to the absence of unity and consensus among the political parties, the coalitions did not succeed and thus it resulted in the fall of one cabinet after another. This left a wide-ranging impact and led to the decline of the party system along with hampering the functioning of the parliamentary democracy. As none of the political parties could secure an absolute majority in the parliament which ultimately provided an opportunity to the parties to utilize the extra parliamentary forces namely the President and the army who in turn utilized the parties in furthering their own interest.

Role of the Army in the Fall of Constitutional Democracy:

In Indonesia, the army played an important role in the politics of the country, which ultimately weakened the parliamentary process. In this context Edward Shils writing about the role of the military in the political development of the newly emerged states points that the increasing role of the military in the domestic policies of the country was largely the outcome of the reaction to the difficulties that these states have encountered in their efforts to establish themselves as the modern sovereignties. He further mentions regarding the role of the army in the country's politics, that the political institutions which was established by these new states at the time of their independence to some extent failed in tackling with the rapid growing needs of the modern state which thus, paved the way for the military rule in the country which was considered as the most appropriate alternative in the existing political setup and to the existing regimes (Edward, 1962).

Thus on the basis of above description, one cannot deny the fact that one of the major determinant that inspired the army to intervene in the politics of the country was mainly the outcome of the failure of the civilian politicians in initiating the necessary process of modernization for the enhancement of the economic and political development in the country. According to Lucian Pye, as the army was one of the most modernized

authoritative agency of the government along with the possession of some qualities like it was more disciplined, efficient, honest and possession of the capacity of maintaining law and order in the country made it to play an important role in the process of filling the gap which was created by the civilian authorities along with making attempts in strengthening the political system of the country ¹(Lucian 1962).

Thus, it was the weakness of the civilian authority with regard to the ethnic, regional and other various reasons that played a significant role in shaping the army's political role in Indonesia. The army's significant emergence as a powerhouse in the politics of Indonesia can be traced back to the period of revolution. Its existence in the politics of the country was supported by the heroic role that it had played in the revolutionary struggle against the Dutch. Besides this, the role the army played in the suppression of several movements that had occurred all over the country had also strengthened its position in the political sphere of the country. Regarding this, we can quote Ghoshal who remarks "With regard to their crucial role in the revolutionary period made the army to claim itself as an Army of the People and the Guardian of the State and the People of Indonesia" (Ghoshal, 1973 p22).

In view of Harry Benda, the revolutionary struggle against colonialism in Southeast Asia led to the emergence of a distinct group of military leaders who socially, educationally and ideologically as well distinguished themselves from the Western trained academic intellectuals of the colonial era.² (Benda, pp.235-57). The army consisted of the members belonging to various social strata with varying regional, ethnic, social and educational background. Most of the members recruited in the army belonged to the lower aristocracy or better-educated social groups. Many of the army officials came from the graduates of the University, Peta and with rural areas and so, they differed in their thoughts as compared to the other members of the army that ultimately gave rise to the problem of integration and made it more difficult to be resolved. This problem of integration was further accelerated due to the existing links between the officers of the army and the political parties. In addition to this, there were also differences within the army regarding

¹ Lucian Pye, "Armies in the Process of modernization" in J.J.Johnson, ed., *The Role of Military in the Under Developed Countries*, Princeton, 1962.

² Harry .J. Benda, "Non- Western Intellegentia as Political Elites" in John H. Kautsky, ed., *Political Change in Under Development Countries*. New York, pp.235-257.

the collaboration with the Dutch during the revolution. Many of the members who were recruited on top most position in the army have received their training from the Dutch. Thus, it led to the lightening of some sort of resentment among the members who had come from Peta and other groups. According to Ghoshal, the foremost reason for this resentment lay in the fact that these people have played a significant role in the freedom struggle of the country but they did not possess formal military training as compared to the Dutch. Further 17th October Affair played a significant role in accelerating this dissatisfaction. The economic crises in the export sector had compelled the government to reduce its expenditure on defense budget, which left an adverse effect on the interest of the many of these members who had built up their military career during the years of the revolution (Ghosal 1973). Whereas in the view of Herbert Feith, the importance of these officers were curtailed because the Willipo Cabinet that had remained in the office from April 1952- June 1953 had initiated rationalization programmes which was culminated in the 17th October Affair and acted as an important landmark in the Indonesian politics (feith, 1962: pp.246-273).

Thus, the 17th October left a deep repercussion on the politics of Indonesia. This brought into light the loopholes of the strength of the political parties, which was being tested during this period under the umbrella of the Parliamentary democracy. For the first time the army leadership showed its impatience with the civilian politics and therefore it decided to actively participate in the politics of the country. Besides this, it was also realized by the army that the early transfer of power in to the hands of the civilian authority had provided many of the politicians who were actually not the part of the freedom struggle, by becoming the part of the Indonesian politics an opportunity to gain good in life which actually they did not deserve (Ghoshal 1973).

Therefore the 17th October Affair played a significant role in the introduction of the Guided democracy in Indonesia as the seed of the Guided democracy which was introduced by Sukarno by his presidential decree in 1959 were actually sown at the time of 17th October Affair. Not only this, the demands made by the army were also similar to those introduced by Sukarno during his Guided democracy period. The basic demands made by the army were the dissolution of the parliament. It also demanded for Sukarno to assume more power. One of the most important demand of both the army and Sukarno

was the revival of the 1945 constitution which provided more executive powers to Sukarno and also accelerated his Guided democracy (Ghoshal 1973).

The 17th October Affair thus brought a new phase in the Indonesian politics with the intervention of the army in the civilian affair. Based on its role in the revolutionary period, the army started to claim itself as the Guardian of the state. To quote Ghoshal, "It was a strong indication that the army would not be satisfied with its traditional task of defending the country from the external aggression but would take active part in the affairs of the state" (Ghoshal, 1973 :p. 28)

The 1955 Elections

Indonesia had its first General elections in 1955. The 1955 elections occupies a significant place in the history of Indonesia as it was for the first time that the strengths and the mass support of different political parties factions and the individuals were tested. The 1955 elections also raised hopes among the Indonesian masses regarding the elections that these elections will make Indonesia to usher into an era of democracy and thus all the evils and corruptions that had previously plagued the Indonesian society will be completely rooted out. As the common people had no participation in the country's politics and control over the government, the elections tended to create awareness among the people of receiving more and more opportunity to express their view in the formation of the government. Not only this, the elections also created hopes regarding the formation of the new government which was to be formed after the elections that it would be free from evils and corruptions and would also bring stability in the country. Further, the elections also strengthen the desire of the people for the removal of all the constitutional difficulties with the installation of a truly representative parliament (Feith, 1962)

However all these aspirations regarding the elections that it would bring stability and political crystallization remained as mere hopes and thus were not transformed into a reality. Further, the elections also revealed the regional character of the political parties. The Masjumi move was promptly directed towards in securing votes from the Muslims. On the other hand, The PNI campaigned for a Unitary Secular State inspired by the Pantjasila principles. On the part of PKI who thought of its convenience and thus supported the PNI in its demand of a Pantjiasial secular state (Mestenhauser, 1960). Thus

in this regard it has been argued by Ghoshal that the 1955 elections failed in bringing any kind of stability in the country. Besides this, it also failed in satisfying the rising expectations of the people rather it made the party differences more bitter and also intensified the ideological, ethnic and other differences like Pantajasila vs Islamic state, Java vs Sumatra, Communism vs anti communism (Ghoshal, 1973). Thus, the elections revealed the regional character of the parties and 1956 when the regional differences became more complex; the political parties also began to identify themselves with their respective regional interest. Thus, this attitude of the political parties made it difficult and almost impossible for the post election cabinet to carry out its well defined policy. Thus in this respect the elections proved to be a big failure.

The Rebellion of 1958

The 1958 rebellion acted as a turning point in the political history of Indonesia and it also enunciated the development of Guided democracy. The rebellion occurred in the year 1958 in various parts of the country notably in Sumatra. The 1958 rebellion left far-reaching consequences. Although for itself the rebels failed in gaining something, rather the concessions related to autonomy that were previously granted to the regions were scrapped. According to J.D.Legge, the rebellion not only weakened the bargaining positions of the regions against the central government, it also hurt the autonomy of the provinces. As the centre was willing to grant regional autonomy although to limited extent, to the regions, the outbreak of the rebellion compelled to stop the process of giving autonomy to the provinces (Legge, 1961).

By defying the central government and challenging the unity of the country, the regionalist thus provided an opportunity to Sukarno to strengthen his determination to fight them back. By crushing the rebellion all the opposition of Sukarno were eliminated, for example Masjumi was discredited and thus Sukarno came out as a victor and thus confident of his capability to guide the nation. Thus the suppression of the rebellion and the elimination of the opposition made the implementation of the Guided democracy inevitable (Ghoshal 1973). Thus in this respect the rebellion emerged as a significant factor in the evolution of the Guided Democracy as it offered those political advantages

to Sukarno which was needed by him in gaining momentum for the support of his of implementing his concept of Guided democracy. Besides this, the rebellion also provided Sukarno an opportunity to prove that the political idea which could be implemented as an alternative in resolving the existing political, social and other conflicts in the country.

Support of PNI and PKI to Sukarno's Concept of Guided Democracy:

The political parties like the PNI and PKI rendered their full support to Sukarno's concept of Guided Democracy. Both PNI and the PKI publicly stated their approval of President Sukarno's concept. Besides this, the PNI also accepted the participation of the communist in the state leadership. The consent of these two parties to the concept clearly showed their motive of sustaining their survival in the politics of country. It was felt by the PNI that it was the Guided democracy, which was widely directed towards the weakening of the growing strength of the Masjumi, while the PKI considered the concept of Guided democracy as democratic which could guaranteed the unity of the nation.

Several factors inspired the PKI to render its support to President Sukarno's concept of Guided Democracy. Ghoshal proposed the following reasons for the PKI's support to Sukarno. Firstly, the concept invited the communist to participate in the proposed Gotong Royong cabinet. Thus this created hope in the PKI that the new government will fulfill their long standing aim of securing seats in the cabinet. Secondly, although the PKI fared well in the 1955 elections, it failed in emerging as a strongest party, which made it to remain far behind the Masjumi in strength Ghoshal:1973). Thus the only objective of the PKI was during this period was to increase its strength and decreasing the strength of its most important opponent the Masjumi.

Besides this, the Sukarno was also striving to lesson the strength of the Masjumi . As the aim of both Sukarno and that of the PKI was the same of reducing the power of the Masjumi, thus it was felt by PKI that the president Sukarno could be used as an valuable ally in diminishing the strength of the Masjumi. To quote Ghoshal, "Guided Democracy was evolved by the President as a too against the Masjumi and its call for an Islamic State" (Ghoshal:1973 p.100).

In the view of Pluvier, Sukarno supported both the nationalist and the communist to put a check on the increasing influence of the Masjumi, which was regarded by the President as the most antidemocratic. Besides this, the Masjumi's demand of an Islamic state also worried the president and made him determined to create means to stand against Masjumi's antidemocratic demands. Besides this, the Anti Western feeling of the Indonesian masses also made Sukarno to render his cooperation to the PKI. To quote Pluvier, "Any strong anti communist line would have destroyed the image of the young emerging nation which Sukarno was building up and would have placed the Indonesian regime on the same on the same level as the regimes Thailand, South Vietnam and Philippines which were not highly esteemed in Asian Public opinion" (Pluvier:1965;p. 48).

Thus, an analysis can be drawn on the basis of the above description that it was the need of the time that left Sukarno and the political parties with no other option and thus made both Sukarno and the political parties like the PNI and the PKI with their own reasons to support each other during the period.

Sukarno's Concept of Guided Democracy:

The lurch towards authoritarianism in 1958-1959 was led by neither the armed forces nor the PKI but by the president himself. Sukarno's interest lay outside the liberal democratic system, within which he had restricted formal authority. Under the slogan of the Guided democracy in 1959, he reactivated the emergency Constitution of 1945, declared an end to the liberal democracy, and replaced cabinet authority with presidential rule. In 1960, he abolished the parliament altogether (Cribb 1992, p.125). Regarding Sukarno's concept, it can be said that it was the outcome of the failure of the Pantjasila concept, which was previously proposed by Sukarno to the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesia's Independence in his address on 1 June 1945. The idea behind Pantjasila was the same as that of the idea of Gotong Royong or the mutual assistance under Guided democracy. Pantjasila was comprised of five principles namely the nationalism, social justice Internationalism, mufakat and unanimity, and belief in God. Sukarno evolved the ideology of Pantjasila with the purpose of creating an umbrella under which all the

conflicting ideologies of Islam, nationalism and communist would take shelter. Besides this, the concept of the Guided democracy was very much rooted in the Indonesian tradition. It was nothing but the derivation of the traditional Indonesian village democracy based on Mushyawarah and Consensus. The concept of leadership, deliberations and consensus were deeply embodied in the traditional culture as well as the traditional political organizations that operated in the Indonesian villages. Besides this, it has also been argued that Sukarno's advocacy for Guided democracy had some outside influences too. It is argued that, Sukarno adopted some of the political techniques from the Communist China, which he witnessed there at his visit to China in 1956 (Kahin, 1965).

However, the Pantjasila concept failed in working as an element in its main purpose of uniting the people of Indonesia, rather it itself became a source of tension between the political parties. Thus, Pantjasila remained no more the umbrella as considered by Sukarno under which political completion can take place rather it became the part of the political competition and strength. Thus, it was very soon realized by Sukarno that his concept of Pantjasila had failed in bringing positive results. The failure of this concept made Sukarno to think about other concept that could replaced the Pantjasila concept and thus, the concept of Guided democracy emerged as a last means to be applied as a remedy to heal the existing political instability. The underlying idea behind the concept of Guided democracy was the same as that of the Pantjasila. The only difference was the absence of proper institutional form in the Pantjasila, which was introduced by Sukarno in his new concept of Guided democracy (Ghoshal 1973)..

Sukarno's concept of Guided democracy consisted of two items. The first one was the Gotong Royong cabinet and second one was the formation of a National Council. The President Sukarno suggested Gotong Royong cabinet the literal meaning of which was Mutual Assistance because according to him it was an authentic Indonesian term, which gave the purest reflection of the Indonesian soul. The Gotong Royong cabinet consisted of all the political parties and groups that were represented in the parliament and had attained a certain degree of electoral quotient (Vreeland 1975: p. 46). Besides this the

formation of National Council was also suggested by Sukarno which consisted of the representatives belonging to various functional groups like labours, peasants intelligentsia, national entrepreneurs, protestants, Catholics, women, youth, Chiefs of Staff of Army, Navy, Air force, police and several ministers and was headed by Sukarno himself. The National Council, which was created by Sukarno under his concept of Guided democracy, was an advisory council whose main function was to advise the cabinet. Under the provision of Sukarno's Guided democracy, the decisions and policies were not made by the majority vote. The process of making decision was based on traditional means of discussion, or *mushyawarah* also known as deliberation that aimed at to reach to certain consensus (Vreeland 1975).

Sukarno by his presidential decree of 1959 finally dissolved the parliament on the ground that it had failed in reaching to a consensus in writing for a new constitution. Thus, by his decree, Sukarno reinstated the 1945 constitution and the himself selected the members of the Constituion. The new constitution consisted of the members selected from three main groups namely the nationalist, the religious (*agama*), and the communist (*komunisi*). These three groups were collectively termed as "NASAKOM"³ (Jhaveri 1975, p274).

The idea that lay behind Sukarno's concept of Guided democracy, which literally meant democracy with leadership was not, knew for Sukarno. The only single factor that inspired Sukarno to introduce his concept was his desire to protect and maintain the unity of the country and to protect it from being disintegrated. Sukarno advocated his desire of protecting the unity of the country as a running theme through out his political career. Thus, whenever the country's unity came in danger of being disintegrated, Sukarno used to device means to protect the unity of Indonesia (Naerssin 1967). Thus, in this regard the Guided democracy appeared to be one of the means devised by Sukarno to protect the Indonesian unity.

³ "Nasakom"- National, Religion, Communism. This was the pet concept of Sukarno in which he envisaged a unity among main political forces operating was doomed to fail because each party wanted sole power in hand. After the 30th September incident the army and the youths publically challenged the concept and insisted that the communist had no place in the political life of Indonesia. The communist were accused of working against Pancasila, which was the basic political philosophy of the country. Sukarno's insistence on NASAKOM was one of the reason leading to his downfall. Satyavati S Jhaveri, "The Presidency in Indonesia; Dilemas of Democracy," Mumbai; Popular Prakashan, 1975. p. 274.

Besides this the another factor by which the Guided democracy's concept was inspired was its aim to resolve the conflict existing between nationalism, communism, and the religion which often created tension and affected the smooth functioning of the country's political system. With this purpose of maintaining the smooth relation between the three groups, Sukarno laid great emphasis on leadership, as it was believed by him that in the absence of leadership it was impossible to maintain the nation's unity. Besides this, it was felt by him that he was able to fulfill the role of an able ruler in maintaining the unity of the country and thus he became the great champion of unity (Kahin 1965). Thus, Sukarno's desire of protecting Indonesia from disintegration led to the origin of an idea of forming NASAKOM, the details of which have already been mentioned above.

Thus, the return to the 1945 constitution as argued by Satyavati Jhaveri made Sukarno to implement his concept of Guided democracy freely. Soon after the announcement of the presidential decree, a speech was delivered by him, which represented a 'Manifesto Politic' of the Republic of Indonesia which came to be known as "MANIPOL'. The manifesto became the political doctrine and the blue print as mentioned by Jhaveri of Sukarno's Guided democracy from 1959 onwards until the end of Sukarno's old order regime. The manifesto created by Sukarno aimed at listing the basic objectives of the Indonesian Revolution along with presenting a detailed account of programs of the government, the programs of the political parties, National Front, mass organizations and as well as the programs of all the citizens of the Republic of Indonesia (Satyavati,, 1975::p.263).

However, in the years that preceeded the Guided democracy, Sukarno's regime shifted towards authoritarianism, which was visible in the economic collapse of the Indonesia. The period of Guided democracy also represented the period in which the economy became the matter of state control. Inorder to bring the economy totally under the control of the state, major political parties were banned as the leaders of these parties were regarded to be economically liberal and supported the measures that enabled the Indonesian market to function freely. The removal of these leaders as argued by Ian

Chalmers largely affected the development policy and also paved the way for greater state interference in the economy. Besides this, the declaration of martial law that had already provided greater powers to the military also helped the military owned corporations in assuming control over sizable parts of the Indonesian economy Chalmers 2006). Thus, the increasing state interference in the economic sphere led to the transformation of the process of policy formation for development into the state apparatus. Besides this, economic technocrats who were responsible for framing the plans for the economic development of the country were increasingly kept out of the process that ultimately led to the shift in the concerns of the policy makers towards achieving their own distinctive political goals. Thus according to Christopher the Guided democracy era in context of economy was the period which was highly marked by least development policies and creation of greater hardship for the Indonesian masses (Christopher 1986).

Another remarkable scene of the period was the existing relationship between the state and business, which was based on strong personal ties between the state patrons and the business clients. Sukarno and his ministers paid much of their attention in national self-reliance and gave the state agencies to carry out the responsibility of regulating the private enterprises. Besides this, a number of corporatist organizations were also established to coordinate business activities and the state business relations became highly personalized that pave the way for the personal connections from becoming more crucial for the success of the business. With the passage of time, these personal ties gained more importance in place of economic programmes. Not only this the funds that were raised for the economic programs went into the pockets of the bureaucrats and the politicians in fulfilling their own interest. Thus, it can be said that the president was surrounded by the handful of palace millionaires that had already clustered him (Robison 1986, pp.88-93).

Another remarkable feature of the Guided democracy era was associated with the process of policymaking and their implementation. There was shortage of foreign capital, which represented the failure of the government in the implementation of the policies and

schemes that were provided for the 1960 plan. Not only this in 1964, complete reversal of the economic policy was announced by Sukarno which had dire consequences on the country's economy. As the gap between economic policy and practice widened, inflation soared, that reached 600 percent in 1966, production of the simple manufactures got slumped and the supply of even basic goods became extremely uncertain (Mackie 1967). Thus, it can be said that Sukarno was responsible for what happened in Indonesia during his Guided democracy regime. All these factors combined in creating discontentment among the Indonesian masses over the issue of the Sukarno's negligence towards the development of the nation. In short, his policies acted as the preconditions for his downfall. Although Sukarno had proclaimed himself as the Great leader of the Revolution and the protector of the Indonesian unity, his policies in final analysis paved the way for his downfall.

Army and the Communists under Guided Democracy:

PKI or the communist party was one of the most important political forces that emerged and rose to prominence in the post 1958 period. With the suppression of the rebellion all, the opposition parties namely the Masjumi and the PSI were eliminated and thus it provided road to the PKI to emerge as the strongest party in Indonesia. The PKI emerged as the most articulate and active supporter of Sukarno and played a significant role in fashioning and accelerating the implementation of the Guided democracy (Barnett, 1963). In this context Ghoshal argues that "without its help and of the army it would have been difficult for Sukarno to make his concept acceptable to the public as much of the ground work for Sukarno was done by the PKI" (Ghoshal, 1973:179). There fore after the declaration of the concept by Sukarno, the PKI turned to Sukarno and supported him. Besides this, it also countered those who stood in opposition of Sukarno namely the Masjumi and the Vice President Hatta and supported the formation of the national council.

The army on the other hand was however successful in occupying a central role in the Indonesian politics. The root of its political enhancement laid in the role played by it in

the revolutionary movement against the Dutch to win the Indonesia's independence from Dutch colonial rule in the year following the Second World War (Smith 2001; 93, Robinson 2001; 230-231). Besides this, the introduction of the martial law also enhanced the role of the army in the Indonesian politics, administration and the economy of the country as well. The army also pressurized its demand regarding the return of the 1945 constitution, which provided the institutional framework for Guided democracy. Although the army in the period of Guided democracy exercised great increasing executive powers especially in the domestic affairs, it lacked political ideas, which barred it in occupying more executive and administrative positions in the country. Even the senior officials who were anxious about the existing situation failed in presenting themselves as a match to the expansive personality of Sukarno, whose reputation as a person born with extraordinary talent for agitation and his brilliance completely made him to outshine all others (Jordan, 1974). Thus, the alliance that existed between the President Sukarno and the army was signified by both cooperation and conflict as well as unity and animosity.

One of the most significant reasons that infused cooperation between the army and Sukarno was the need of the help that both needed from each other in order to maintain their power and influence. Conflict arose between them on account of their distinguished views on several issues. One of such issues was related to the status acquired by the communists. As army stood against the communist and thus considered it their main rival. The root cause behind the enmity between the army and the communist laid in the growth of the army's influence in the Indonesian politics contrary to the rapid growth in the influence of the communist. Besides this, the army was also well equipped to match the communist both organizationally and politically and thus it acted as a counter force against the PKI. In this context, Gay Puker argues that that the attitude of the army towards the communist was deeply influenced by its strong feeling of nationalism and thus the army was not in a mood of standing like a mute audience and allow the communist to achieve the control of the country (Pauker 1958).

Whereas, on the other hand Sukarno politically needed the support of the PKI to maintain his dominant position in the power structure of the country. Not only this, his desire to complete the revolution also in some way made him dependent on the PKI. The opposition of Sukarno against the parliamentary democracy and his disliking regarding army's growing gun power also to some extent made him to seek the help of an effective political organization which could counter the emerging power of the army and thus the PKI emerged as the best tool to play this role. On the part of the PKI, it has already faced several restrictions on it imposed by the army and thus it also needed Sukarno's protective influence. As has been argued by Donald Hindly, that the danger that the PKI felt that could come from the army forced it to vest greater reliance on Sukarno and thus to consider him as their protector against the army. The nature of the alliance between the PKI and Sukarno thus compelled PKI to render its cooperation to Sukarno's initiatives towards Guided democracy along with the desire of the PKI to grab greatest authority in the parliament. Sukarno on the other hand hold this view of letting the PKI to grow to such an extent from where it could be used as a counter balancing force against the army (Hindley 1964). On the part of Sukarno, as he did not wanted to antagonize any of the two organizations as this could weakened his power too, he tried to maintain the balance of power between the two. On the one hand he protected the PKI from the open repression of the army, on the other hand he also made several attempts to put a check on the increasing power of the PKI so as to make the party more dependent on him and to gain more support from it in the meantime making it less powerful to challenge his authority.

Beside this, Sukarno's growing attraction towards the communist has also put a question mark on his continuous propaganda regarding his aim of keeping the country united. As it was adopted by Sukarno as his lifetime task to create an accommodation among the nationalist, religion and the communist groups. It was realized by both Sukarno and politically aware Indonesians as well that without such an accommodation there could occur physical clash between these groups. Besides this, it also represented the fear that it would not only threaten Indonesia's internal unity but it would also plague her quest for leadership abroad as well. However because of this question on national unity Sukarno

although insisted of him being impartial and not favoring any single political party, but the visible position of the PKI in the Guided democracy tended to contradict this profession of impartiality (Feith, 1964: pp. 969-977). Several factors were responsible behind Sukarno's close intimacy towards the communist. Firstly, the PKI was successful in increasing its strength tremendously, so it was realized by Sukarno that it would be harmful to neglect such a strong political party. Secondly, Sukarno wanted to utilize the communist in reducing the power of the strongest force apart from him in the Indonesian politics and which was expected to challenge his own authority and this rising force was the army (Daniel, 1963: pp.349-364).

After the successful suppression of the 1958 rebellion, the army had vastly expanded its political position. It fully exploited the special power available to it under the martial law and entrenched itself in the economic administration of the country. While at the same time, the army showed its hostility towards the PKI by harassing it whenever the opportunity arose. The army leadership had come to oppose the PKI not merely on grounds of its alleged international connections but it also became the army's own personal interest in sports of the Guided democracy (Ghoshal 1973).

Thus on the basis of above description an analysis could be drawn that three major political forces emerged in Indonesia namely the President Sukarno, army and the communist with a determination to implement the new type of democracy called the Guided democracy. The most important aspect of their alliance was that it was just a tactical and temporary arrangement that was more or less created to enhance the interest of the three forces. As the army had increased its political prestige by suppressing the rebellion and protecting the country from disintegration which also furthered its political position in the country. Besides this the army had also helped Sukarno in the implementation of the Guided democracy, yet Sukarno was not happy with the increasing power of the army as it was realized by him that a powerful army could pose a threat to his own authority. Thus, PKI was emphasized by him to curtail the power of the army while at the same time he also attempted to limit the strength of the PKI as well. Thus, the period of Guided democracy was marked by a delicate balancing of power between

these three forces. All these three forces from time to time cooperated with each other at certain level. However, the failure of Guided democracy can be traced out in the presence of lack of uniformity between the three forces, which were actually the contenders for power (Ghoshal 1973).

1965 Coup and the fall of Sukarno:

As has been mentioned above that for years there existed political tensions between the armed forces and confident communist party because of its major gains in the 1955 elections. However, by the time, the Indonesian army also had emerged powerfully and had better organized itself than before. Besides this, the army leadership was also determined to prevent its bitter rival the PKI to attain state power. As Sukarno needed both army and PKI to legitimize his position, he adopted the policy of balancing the power between the two. To quote Ian Chalmers, "For some years President Sukarno had managed to maintain an uneasy political balance between the two rivals, drawing on its charisma as leader of the nationalist movement, on the legitimacy driving from his role as the man who proclaimed independence and on his capacity for political intrigue" (Chalmers,2006: p.20).The continuous bitterness that existed between the army and the communist finally broke out on the evening of 30th September 1965 when the leftist officers murdered the leading generals of the military. However, the involvement of PKI in the coup is still under debate. However, its involvement was considered as anti government activity. The event acted as a major political turning point in the Indonesia's political history. The coup resulted in the adoption of anti coup policies by the then major General Suharto which finally eliminated large number of PKI 's members and also pave the way for the armed forces under him to become the prominent political force in the country. Thus, Suharto's anti counter coup policies resulted in the silencing of leftist political traditions. As already mentioned in this chapter regarding the PKI being the largest communist party in the non-communist world, however their suspected involvement in the coup resulted in their full elimination from the political activity, which ultimately put a halt to its exercise on wide ranging power in the political sphere of Indonesia. The involvement of the Communist in the coup thus created anti communist

feeling in the Indonesian society in the years that followed the coup and thus the communist were equated with chaos and violence (Gregor2002).

Thus, the end of Sukarno's regime in 1965 initially allowed the emergence of a new socio political force along with liberal political tradition in Indonesia. During the Guided democracy, era the activities of the various political, religious and cultural organizations were restricted and it became possible only in 1965 that these organizations could make their voice heard. These broad alliance of these organizations in some way initially pave the way for and supported the birth of New Order, and was also successful in gaining the support of the armed forces leadership in 1966. However the most important outcome of the event was that it enabled the military to consolidate its authority. Sukarno was gradually removed from power in 1966-67 and the state institutions came under the control of the army leadership making the political activity more restricted than before. The new balance of power became visible with the holding of the elections in 1971 in which the electoral results were dominated by the military backed political party called Golkar (Chalmers, 2006).

Thus, the fear that grew because of the killings of 1965-66 created kind of political passivity. The social life of Indonesia was completely traumatized by these killings. With the consolidation of the New Order in 1970's and 1980's, the political leaders who were close to the centre constantly propagated their political theme according to which only a strong leadership could maintain harmony and prevent social unrest from creating instability in the country. Though the liberal activities could raise their voice in 1965 but with the consolidation of the military backed new regime by 1970's, the elements with in the New Order showed same intolerance towards the liberal minded critics (Ryter, 2001). Thus, the event of 1965 marked a turning pint in the political history of Indonesia resulting in the fall of Sukarno and his concept of Guided democracy along with complete elimination of the Communist and leading to the rise of another authoritarian regime in Indonesia termed as New Order under Suharto.

Suharto and his New Order Regime: Rise and fall

As already mentioned above that, the politics during the Guided democracy era was mainly vested with the three political forces namely the President Sukarno, armed forces and the PKI. The unsuccessful coup led to the elimination of the two of these forces. The PKI was completely eliminated and Sukarno was removed from the office in 1966- 67. It provided an opportunity to the army to consolidate its position and to establish its control over the state institutions with complete domination over the politics during the early years of the new Order regime. During the 1970's and the 1980's a kind of political system was established by Suharto, which institutionalized his personalized rule in Indonesia.

At the time when the New Order came to power, he was supported by the groups who were afraid of the rising influence of PKI and the mass politics that was represented by the PKI. This New Order coalition together demanded the banning of the PKI, and its associated organizations, and thus sought to get military protection. However gradually the position of these groups got narrowed and thus military established its firm control on the politics of the country (Raillon, 1985). Thus, it can be said that Suharto's regime emerged as an authoritarian states in which military rule was enshrined in law. The military role in the Country's politics was made permanent through a law that was passed in 1982. This law provided several provisions to the Defense and Security of the Republic of Indonesia.. Besides this, the law also sanctioned military intervention to protect the nation from both external and domestic threats (Vatikiotis 1993, p.71). In the 1980s, the New Order was at the peak of the power with the support of the military officers who were largely involved in day to day running of the country. Thus, the military performed dual function. Firstly, it performed its duty of protecting the country from external threat and secondly it completely intervened in the social life of the nation. Thus, its tendency of performing both the role came to be known as DWI Fungsi or the dual function. This dual function of the military also allowed military officials to gain experience in civil administration, which resulted in the retiring of these officers into several senior in the civil administration. Not only this, the economic expansion of the 1970s and 1980s also led to the significant increase in the military budgets. Thus, the

1982 law represented the extent to which the Suharto's authority of the regime reflected the melding of the military and the state structures. Besides this, the greater capacity of the military acted as a key element in the expansion of the regime's authority. Thus with the support of the military the New Order regime of Suharto was successful in establishing its domination in political and social life as well. As a result of this expanding authority in the first two decades of its rule the regime was successful in reaching the heights of its power (Liddle 1988).

Besides enhancing the power of the military and basing its rule so much on military traditions, also other methods were adopted by Suharto in strengthening his political position and to enhance his hold on power in the following years of his regime. These were as stated by Ian Chalmers, use of force, manipulation of party political activities, corporatist control and an ideological campaign to legitimize his position. The first and the most important method was the threatened or actual use of force (Chalmers 2006). This is evident from the fact that whenever any protest occurred against the regime, Suharto tactfully handled it. Besides this, Suharto skillfully manipulated elite rivalries and used harsh methods in repressing those who refused to compromise. Secondly, strict constraints were made on political parties, which soon resulted in the electoral success of the government. After the fall of Sukarno, it was decided by the new MPR to hold elections in 1968 and after some delay, the elections were finally held in 1971. By the time, a political party called Golkar was also established by the government, which could compete for seats in the parliament. However, the members of this party were non-party politicians who were given the facility to campaign based on the government's development program. Several restrictions were made on other political parties but Golkar was kept separate from this and it was successful in gaining overwhelming official support. The strategy adopted by the government according to which the bureaucrats were not allowed to join any other political party but were pressurized to join the Golkar led to the resounding victory of Golkar in the elections in which it was successful in securing 63 percent of the total popular votes (Chalmers, 2006).

Besides this, the Golkar leaders were free to campaign for the government party throughout the archipelago while the other political parties were deprived of the same opportunity. The other political parties were not allowed to campaign below the level of sub district and thus they could only campaign in the villages during the short period that preceded the five yearly elections. This policy adopted by the government in restricting the influence of other political parties came to be known as floating mass policy. This policy as argued by Gaffar was more importantly adopted to prevent the masses from being manipulated by the other parties against the government and being diverted from the government's development programs that was actually the basis of the campaign for the Golkar (Gaffar 1992).

Thirdly, Inorder to legitimize his position Suharto adopted the ideological policy in restricting the demands of the people on the regime. Suharto successfully convinced the Indonesian masses that their needs could be best served by the authoritarian rule. Thus, the developmentalism became the defining feature of the legitimacy process. It was promised by the government that the regime would provide wide-ranging development by which the whole Indonesian society would be benefited (Chalmers 2006: p.254). In the late 1970's efforts were made in order to popularize such ideas. For this purpose, Pancasila that was previously introduced by Sukarno was redefined by the new government leading to the campaigning of Pancasila indoctrination on large scale. Besides this, for the fulfillment of this objective, a special government office was created which was responsible directly to the President and its main work was to teach Pancasila philosophy. Besides this Pancasila, upgrading courses were held every year and it was made compulsory for all the government officials throughout the archipelago to attend these courses. These courses were thus attended by millions of public servants who were given homeworks and were examined rigorously. The successful completion of the courses was made the compulsory criteria for getting the promotion (Morfit , 1986). Thus, it can be said that the New Order that was introduced by Suharto basically aimed at creating a system in which political, economic and cultural life was inspired by Pancasila, and was based on the belief in God, nationalism, democracy, social justice and

humanitarianism. Besides this, it also aimed at creating a stable and institutionalized structure.

As mentioned above Pancasila was originally created by Sukarno, which laid emphasis on both the integrity of the nation and its diversity. Indonesia was considered by him as both an integral unity and a union of different elements. The formulation of Nasakom by Sukarno was an ideology that aimed at bringing together the nationalist, religious groupings and the communists and thus it can be considered as an effort to institutionalize this diversity. However, under Suharto's New Order regime the emphasis was constantly on the former that is the nationalist. Anderson regarding this policy of Suharto has argued as that it was adopted as a way to legitimize his increasing concentration of power (Anderson 1983).

Thus by 1980 as have been argued by Herbert Feith that the strategy that was followed by Suharto in legitimizing his political position appeared to be a successful one. Although there was the continuous existence of the fear of repression, yet the New Order regime made itself capable, which ultimately lessened its dependency on the state apparatus to maintain the control thus providing Suharto other ideological approaches to legitimize his position. (Feith 1980). Besides this rapid economic growth played a significant role in enhancing his power and legitimizing his rule. In the middle of the 1970's there was a rise in the international oil prices which allowed the New Order regime to gain a great deal of political credibility which was required for the regime's development policies. Thus, the economic development of the country as mentioned by Liddle provided road to Suharto in strengthening his control over the state apparatus making him to gain an increase in the height of his power (Liddle, 1988).

In the following years, several measures were employed by Suharto to establish his firm control over the state organizations. For the fulfillment of these objective loyal followers of Suharto were appointed on several positions of authority. Based on his political skills, which made him, capable of ruling over Indonesia for more than three decades made him ensured that the persons who were loyal to him staffed all the important state institutions.

Thus, all these measures were employed Suharto to reinforce his authoritarian rule. The regime applied the policy of cooperating with the groups that were found amenable to state pressures while in the meantime the regime also isolated those who were suspected of constituting a threat to his legitimized rule. The whole structure was held by Suharto and his personalized form of rule created a chain of dependencies. These political structures created by Suharto have been described by Liddle as “a steeply ascending pyramid in which the heights are thoroughly dominated by a single office, the presidency” (Liddle 1996).

In the late 1980's wide range of social changes associated with economic development began to take root in the country, which gradually resulted in limiting the efficiency of the New Order regime to maintain its control over the political life. In this context Robison argues that the emergence of an effective business class in Indonesia played a significant role in shaping the nature of political power in the country as it felt necessary by the state establish negotiations with this growing business class in order to maintain its own political effectiveness (Robison 1986). In the 1990's this business class thus have strengthen its roots and made itself more economically powerful which thus made it capable of pressurizing the regime to fulfill the interest of this class. This widely affected the legitimacy of the regime. Further, there was also a rapid growth in the societal forces, which already have emerged during the period of economic expansion after the 1970's. This group on its part also demanded for social changes and thus acted as an agent of social changes. It was found difficult by the regime to adjust with these rising groups and thus the regime's inability to deal effectively with these rising groups and the pressures that these groups exerted on the regime led to the draining of the regime's legitimacy (Chalmers 2006).

The demand for the social change resulted in the appearance of a large number of study clubs which provided the students an access to the literatures like Marxist and social literature and thus made the young students to learn about strategies that were adopted by the neighboring countries of Indonesia in instituting social changes (Aspinall 1995). Besides this the openness also provided the students the opportunity as

mentioned by Akhmad, to learn about the indigenous traditions of popular activism that began in the early twentieth century and gain momentum during the period of freedom struggle (Akhmad 1989). Thus, the exposure of the Indonesian students played a significant role in challenging the regime's authority. In this context, the year 1989 marked the beginning of the period of political liberalisation in Indonesian political life. Many prominent figures that had occupied place in the state institutions made several demands. As for example, Golkar demanded for the greater civilian involvement in the country's politics. Besides this the senior military officials also made the demand for the inclusion of public in the discussion over the controversial issues. The media was also vested with freedom although to some extent and thus this opportunity was largely utilized by the media in canvassing the role and terms of the presidency and the political parties along with bringing into light the widening gap between the rich and the poor. All these visible changes made Suharto to acknowledge the importance of the existing situation and thus in his state address in August 1989 he agreed to give more relaxation on the constraints that were previously levied on the freedom of speech (Bourchier and Hadiz 2001).

The period of political liberalization thus allowed a wide range of social forces to get involved in the Country's political setup. Besides this, the period was also marked by the emergence of number of new NGOs, which were largely political in nature. In 1991, the Democracy forum was established which aimed as mentioned by Hikam, at bringing together the activists whose main aim was to broaden the area of public involvement in the political sphere of Indonesia (Hikam 1999, pp.225-227). This period also marked the infusing of more populist radical thoughts which later became the base of the student movement and made the students to demand more wide ranging solutions to the existing social problems besides this as argued by Billah and Nausantara, the efficiently existing NGOs also widened the scope of their activities which enabled them to directly challenge and raise questions on the development policies of the government (Billah and Nausantara 1989).

Besides the rising voice of the students and the questions raised by the NGOs regarding the government policies, there existed another area of political dissent and that was the Islamic community in Indonesia. In 1990, the Association of Islamic Community known as ICMI was launched by Suharto with the purpose to court the Muslim Community. In the beginning, Habibie chaired the ICMI but latter on it was dominated by the beurocrats. ICMI was essentially a state project but with the passage of years, it became more and more diverse from its original purpose and became difficult to be controlled. Not only this, now it had also began to make demands for political change. In this context we can quote Hefner who remarks that, “the commitment to political reform among ICMI independents, and in the Muslim leadership generally is not restricted to theological liberals but is shared by a broad segment of the independent Muslim community’ (Hefner 1999, p.53). The politics of the 1990s marked the beginning of fall of Suharto’s New Order regime as this was the period when the regime had to face severe crises to his legitimacy as it mentioned the same state centered policies to the development and security that were previously pursued since its birth. The development policies employed by the regime to benefit the Chinese owned and foreign linked conglomerates also paved the way for the lightening up of the resentment. The same issues that were made as base for the rise of nationalism in the past as Pabbotingi mentions were once again employed in the 1990s as base to question the regime (Pabottingi 1995). Besides this, the powerful elements that were also the part of the regime were still attached to the same tradition of the state policies as was in the 1970s. After the banning of large number of newspaper, Suharto made it visible that he had returned the same security approach to political life of Indonesia as was previously followed by him and had characterized his regime in the 1970s (Goodfellow 1995). Thus, the gap between Suharto’s leadership that had increasingly diversed and mobilized society had become evident in the late 1990s.

In 1997-98 there occurred East Asian Financial Crises which caused dire consequences on Indonesian economy and society and challenged Suharto’s presidency. At the same time, Indonesia also suffered from severe draught. The economic crises led to the downfall of the Indonesian currency and Suharto came under the scrutiny from lending institutions mainly the World Bank, International Monetary fund and the United States.

Besides this, there was also a dramatic rise in the prices of several goods like kerosene, and rice. Not only this, there was also rise in the fees for the public services, which also included education fees. The majors applied by Suharto to deal with this crises completely eroded the people's confidence in the New Order thus resulted in popular protest against the government. In this context, AS Hikam remarks, 'in its development until its demise in May 1998, the political format adopted by the New Order brought devastating effects on democratic aspiration and practices in the country. For the first time in post independent Indonesia, the majority of the people had been both legally and systematically deprived from their basic political rights" (A.S.Hikam 1999: pp.225-227).

Thus with the collapse of the Indonesian economy in July 1997 both national security and stability were upset by mass killings and riots. Due to this, the long period of security and maintenance of political and economic interest that existed between Suharto and the army now began to diverge from that of Suharto, which ultimately led to his downfall. Although in 1998 he was reelected for the office of presidency but due to the outbreak students led demonstrations, against his regime, he had to step down. The student led demonstrations broke out all over Indonesia and demanded for greater democracy. At the same time, the urban poor also began to demand for the removal of subsidies on basic commodities. Thus at this stage Suharto's companion also refused to support him. The senior ministers including the speaker of the parliament Harmoko and the leaders of the Golkar tried to exploit the situation in their favour in order to gain the presidency. Suharto was also convinced by Habibie to step down from the office and finally military head Wiranto also refused to act against the demonstrations thus removing Suharto's last hope of retaining power. Suharto's resignation resulted in the favor of Habibie who became the president of Indonesia although for a short period of one year (Hikam 1999).

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CHAPTER THREE

REFORMS, ELECTIONS AND DECENTRALISATION IN INDONESIA

Over the course of thirty two years, Suharto's Indonesia occupied different positions on a spectrum of non democratic authoritarian regime. Suharto's new Order began as a typical hierarchical military regime (1965-1974), took on the additional characteristics of bureaucratic authoritarianism (1975-1988) and during its last decade became increasingly to resemble a Sultanistic regime (1988-1998). In 1998 as protests intensified over Suharto's handling of the Asian Economic crises and his reelection to the presidency, students and the intellectuals demanded his resignation and an end to the military's self-proclaimed "dual function", the doctrine under which it claimed the right to add a role in socio-political affairs to its traditional defense function. Facing economic collapse, elite defections and wide spread of protest Suharto resigned from the office on May 21, 1998. His resignation thus paved the way for making possible a long awaited transition from non-democratic rule and democratic consolidation (Chandra and Kammen, 2002). Thus, the resignation of Suharto and the event thereafter paved the way for the introduction of several reforms in the political sphere of Indonesia. Several scholars and observers of Indonesian politics have also agreed that Indonesia had successfully entered a democratic period accompanied by changes in the political, social and economic sphere (Budiman, Hately, and Kingsburry 1999, Manning and Van Dierman 2000, Emmerson 1999).

Thus, following the fall of Suharto in 1998, a number of political reforms were implemented which also included the adopting of new laws on political parties and elections, forming of an independent Election Commission and amending of the 1945 constitution to place parliament in a stronger position with regard to the president. In addition to this, the post Suharto politics also offered new ground for debating the merits and demerits of Indonesian presidential system. The presidential system that was outlined

clearly in the 1945 constitution and which was adopted during the independence period of Indonesia has been the subject of debate and criticism because it allowed two authoritarian presidents such as Sukarno and Suharto to dominate Indonesian politics in their respective periods in the office (Sulistiyanto 2004).

Peeping into the political history of Indonesia, it becomes evident that Indonesia had been ruled over by two very powerful presidents namely Sukarno and Suharto. Sukarno the first president of Indonesia dominated Indonesian politics from the independence period of the 1940s to the 1960s, while Suharto ruled Indonesia for more than three decades, from 1966 till 1998. The original version of the 1945 constitution allowed the president to remain in the office for five years. It also gave the president the power to set up a cabinet and to appoint ministers. The president was also the chief commander of the armed forces with the power to declare war, sign international treaties and give amnesty. These powers of the president were guaranteed under the 1945 constitution, which was drafted and adopted during the transitional period from Japanese occupation to Indonesian independence in the mid 1940s.

As mentioned above, from 1966 until 1998, Indonesia was ruled over by Suharto. All the main political actors namely the military, bureaucracy, business groups and the ruling party (Golkar), were fully under the control of Suharto. As such, very little room was left for the opposition groups to challenge the authoritarian grip of Suharto on Indonesian politics (Robinson, 1986; Liddle, 1996; Hill, 1994). The 1945 constitution was retained by Suharto and its interpretation was also monopolized for his own benefit. For instance, as the 1945 constitution does not clearly stated the limit on presidential terms, which ultimately made Suharto to take this to mean that he could be continuously, be reelected after every five years. He insured his reelection by organizing general elections in which the ruling party Golkar was made to always win (Ward, 1974; Suryadinata; 2002). Although the president was appointed by the People's Consultative Assembly which included members of the parliament and the regional and functional representatives, the election process occurred in such a way that made the incumbent President Suharto to win the election for another term. This was made possible by using the policy of

persuasion and repression to get Indonesian people to vote for Golkar. As have been mentioned in the previous chapter that the policy of floating mass was adopted by Suharto to prevent the Indonesian masses from being manipulated by other existing political parties in the competition to his Golkar party. Thus in this political environment, the parliament and the judiciary were reduced to mere rubber stamp institution. Both the president Sukarno and Suharto deliberately weakened the role of the parliament in Indonesia, making it a second class institution. Besides this, the parliament was also not able to act as a counter balance to the executive power of the president. It is often said that, the Suharto's New Order period was one of political stability but the so called political stability of the Suharto's presidency was not as solid as many people or scholar thought (Bresnan 1993; Crouch 1988). In this context, Sulistiyanto writes, "In fact it was very fragile and it was maintained at high cost." He further writes that, "The various forms of repression and persuasion were used to keep Suharto in power for decades. The entire age of Republic of Indonesia has been shaped by two powerful presidents (Sulistiyanto 2004, p. 9).

Another view in this context has been presented by Sherlock according to whom , the 1945 constitution was designed to be a presidential system, which provided for a clearer separation of powers between the legislative and the executive arms of the government, but the appointment of the president by an assembly which was largely dominated by the parliamentary arrangement which actually meant that a president was depended on the parliament for his or her incumbency (Sherlock 2004; p. 5). However, this unstable system worked successfully under the authoritarian Suharto regime because the powers of both the MPR and the DPR were only nominal, with Suharto being repeatedly reelected by acclamation. But problems with the system soon became apparent after the 1999 elections when the various arms of the government actually assumed the powers they had in theory. For example, as mentioned by Sherlock in his report that as the president Wahid completely failed to maintain good relations with the parliament and there was also the rapid deterioration of the relationship between the executive and the legislature during the tenure that paralyzed government and eventually culminated in his removal from office (Sherlock 2004; p.5).

In the years after the fall of Suharto Indonesia was governed by three different presidents. These were Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati Sukarnoputri. Habibie who was one of the most trusted ministers of Suharto was regarded as the transitional president. Although he was a weak president as compared to Suharto but he used his short term in office to oversee major political reforms which ironically caused the downfall of his own presidency. As a result Habibie was replaced by Wahid who was elected as the new president of Indonesia in October 1999. However, the idiosyncratic personality of Wahid led to the failure of him to provide political stability that Indonesia desperately needed at the time. Thus in June 2001, he was impeached by the People's Consultative Assembly and was replaced by Megawati Sukarnoputri. Thus, Indonesia was governed by subsequent presidents namely Habibie who ruled over Indonesia for a very short period from 1998- 1999, Abdurrehman Wahid (1999-2001), and Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004). These presidents governed Indonesia with greatly reduced presidential powers. The reduction in the powers of these presidents was mainly because of the political reforms including amendment of the 1945 constitution implemented from 1998-2004 which eventually strengthened the role of the parliament. Though the powers of these three presidents were curtailed, however each of these presidents were successful in bringing about major political developments in Indonesia. The three presidents differed from Suharto in terms of their power to govern the country and to deal with the powerful parliament. Indonesians who lived under the strong presidents for decades now began to experience different kinds of presidents and a powerful parliament.

Thus the quick rise and fall of these three presidents brought about pressure to reform the 1945 constitution or to replace it with a new one. Intellectuals, non governmental organizations (NGOs), constitutional lawyers and students who argued that Indonesia needed a new constitution that could reflect a new era of democracy and could also acknowledge the principle of separation of powers, advocated for the replacement of the 1945 constitution. However, the People's Consultative Assembly took the safest route by choosing to amend the 1945 constitution. In 2002, the Consultative Assembly established a committee to work with constitutional experts in order to carryout the amendment

process in which the 1945 constitution underwent four amendment processes as a result of which a number of articles were revised (Sulistiyanto 2004, p11). Thus the visible shortcomings of the 1945 constitution added to the demand of constitutional reform that had already emerged immediately after the end of Suharto's regime. The economic crises that hit Indonesia in 1997 snowballed into a political crisis, which finally resulted in bringing down Suharto from power. Besides this, it also set in motion a new period of transition. As mentioned above, Suharto was replaced by a transitional government led by Vice President B.J. Habibie. With the takeover of the presidency by Habibie, the so-called reform era began to take its roots in the country. The new president instituted wide ranging political and constitutional changes that were to define Indonesia's post Suharto political system. The convening of an extraordinary session of the MPR in November 1998 led to the passage of twelve landmark decrees that marked and legitimized the break from the Suharto's era (Bilveer Singh 2001). The Habibie's interim government could not withstand the public pressure to liberalize the political system. Thus a series of changes to the constitution were introduced over the years after the fall of Suharto which effectively led to the increasing of the role of the DPR in the government and also clarified the division of power between the parliament and the president. The most remarkable achievements gained during the reformation period of Indonesian democratization were primarily realized through a series of constitutional amendments, a number of new statutes and legislative revisions which were now to govern the new political processes and were also responsible for the restructuring of the state institutions. Thirty one of the thirty seven articles were affected by the new constitutional amendments (Abdulbaki; 2008:157). The powers that were previously vested with the MPR were largely eliminated. In addition to this the power to elect the president was given into the hands of the Indonesian masses through direct election of the president. Besides this, one of the most remarkable features of this new electoral system created by the members of the DPR in the political law of 2003 was that the system was design to favour the existing major political parties. The requirement for the parties to have branches in a majority of provinces and districts meant that it was impossible for the provincial and regional based party to participate in the electoral process (Croach2003). Besides this the reforms to the electoral system introduced since 1999 which also

included the introduction of direct presidential elections led to the change in the voting system for the parliament (DPR) and a creation of a new regional assembly (DPD). These were the important refinements to the constitutional and legislative framework of democratic politics in Indonesia. These reforms were engineered in such a way that it perpetuated the centralized control of the political parties by existing elites while apparently offering increased choice for the voters.

These amendments and revisions particularly modified the structure of Indonesia's representatives and legislative institutions at the national, regional and local levels. These reforms also removed restrictions on the political participation. Besides this, the reforms also permitted the formation of new political parties and also enhanced the electoral rules and processes. Other important reforms also included the guarantee of the freedom of expression, associational autonomy and the independence of media. Besides this, some new important measures were also introduced by Habibie with the purpose to liberalize the political system. An attempt was also made by him to present an image of him of a reformist leader. In this regard he also expressed his intention to call for free and fair elections (Abdulbaki 2008).

Thus a reform government was led by Habibie which was however successful in managing in liberalizing the political process at a time when the loyal officers of Suharto were still very strong enough to prevent any meaningful reforms. In the process of reforming the Indonesian politics, many political detainees were released by Habibie. Not only this, he also lifted restrictions that were previously levied on the media. He also successfully managed to introduce laws on elections and political parties that eventually opened up the field for free and fair electoral contests. In addition to this, he also utilized his presidential power and political influence over the Golkar party which was during that period very powerful and also exercised its control over both the People's Representative Council or Indonesia parliament (Deewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) and the MPR, he was successful in managing the campaigns against the corruption, collusion and nepotism. As a result of his efforts, with in few months most of the Suharto's loyalist members of the MPR were replaced with pro reforms members (Abdulbaki 2008).

Furthermore, the number of the appointed military representatives who were later eliminated in the DPR was reduced from 75 to 38. Besides this, the military personal were also prohibited from taking positions in the bureaucracy while serving in the armed forces (Jakarta Post, 10 May: 1999 b).

The laws that were introduced regarding the elections, codified Habibie 's proposal to conduct the 1999 elections and also stated that the political parties that meet the legal requirements should be able to contest the elections freely. This also removed the provisions for ideological uniformity imposed on political parties and social organizations. Thus the political parties were though not allowed to adopt the ideological platform that contradicted pancasila or the five principles, but the parties were also no longer required to adopt pancasila as their sole basis. In addition to this the 1999 election law provided for the establishment of an independent General election Commission (KPU), the membership of which included representatives of political parties participating in the General Elections and five government officials (Jakarta Post; 25 June: 1999 a).

Despite some defects, the political laws passed by the parliament provided a strong basis for a multi party system and also paved the way for free and fair elections. Consequently, these laws were broadly accepted by the major political parties and leaders who agreed to participate in the elections. Thus the reform period in Indonesia marked the turning point in the country's politics and made Indonesia to usher into the phase of consolidating its democracy.

1999, 2004 and 2009 Elections and their Significance in Indonesian Democratization:

As of 1999, Indonesia held its 8th general election since it became independent republic to select most of the members of the national and regional legislative bodies. In context of the importance in regard to the elections held during Suharto's New Order regime, it has been argued by several scholars, according to whom, the elections are simply means for strengthening state domination. Anderson for example writes, "There is no need here to spend any time on the series of elections held regularly since 1971 by Suharto's New

Order military regime. They are carefully managed to produce externally plausible two thirds majorities for Golkar, the government's electoral machine and a passive parliament without any genuine representative character" (Anderson 2003, pp.30-31). In the view of Taylor, "studied systematically in their specific and their universal circumstances, elections in Southeast Asia clarify important aspects of political, economic and social change in the region. Ruling elites have found they must concede the importance of elections. New social groups and classes, new and old interests, can then attempt to use the opportunities for organization and discussion, by law and practice, to pry open further opportunities and rights for themselves" (Taylor, 1994; p.85).

The period of 1970s in Indonesia was marked by the beginning of the swelling of the third wave of democratization. It also witnessed the collapse of many communist governments. These circumstances alerted the authoritarian leaders and made them feel the need of cultivating some multiple bases of legitimacy with the purpose to stabilize and perpetuate their rule. These bases however included to some extent adherence to some of the democratic norms, such as constitutionalism, elections at regular intervals and the honest counting of ballots. In the case of Suharto, his adherence to such norms can be viewed as "a useful facade constituting a second line claim to legitimacy behind economic development and political stability" (Liddle 2003, 34- 60). Thus in this regard Suharto's New Order regime in view of Larry Diamond, Linz and Lipset can be defined as a regime marked by the existence of multiple parties, elections, and other constitutional features of electoral democracy (Diamond, Linz and Lipset, 1995, pp. 6-9).

After thirty two years under Suharto's authoritarian rule, Indonesia underwent several fundamental changes. The 1999 elections thus can be viewed as free and fair and can also be regarded as the first one in Indonesia's history to bring about a change in government. The defeat of New Order backed Golkar, Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri's ascent to the presidency clearly indicated that Indonesia had changed politically into an electoral democracy (Diamond 1997).

Thus, the year 1999 marked the turning point in the political history of Indonesia as it

was the year when the most important story of the transition to democracy after the four decades of authoritarian rule under former president Sukarno and Suharto was near to its completion. A democratic general election for parliament was held in June followed in October by the election of a new president and vice president for the term of five years from 1999- 2004 by the People's Consultative Assembly. The transition was marred only by the presence of unelected members, particularly representatives of the armed forces, in the partially appointed Assembly (R. William Liddle, 2000). On June 7, 1999 for the first time since 1955, Indonesians held a democratic election. Forty eight parties competed with 21 winning at least one of the 462 contested seats in the parliament. Simultaneous elections were held for legislatures in 25 provinces and more than 300 districts and municipalities. Ninety percent of the registered voters turned out for the three level elections⁴. At the national level the five most popular parties were PDI-P, Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar), Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), and Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN). The 1999 results demonstrated broad continuity with the outcome of the 1955 election, when Indonesia was a parliamentary democracy with a cabinet government led by a prime minister and headed by a ceremonial president. The 1999 general elections were conducted against a background of the increasing euphoria surrounding the downfall of the largely authoritarian New Order regime (Evans, 2003 pp. 121-133). This major event led to a proliferation of political parties with 148 being registered by early 1999. By the time the country readied for polls, only 48 were eligible for the electoral contest. The elections were organized to elect party members for the national Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR, House of Representatives) as well as the regional and provincial legislatures. By most yardsticks, the 1999 general elections were the most fair, just and transparent the country had ever seen. When the results were announced only six parties namely the PDIP, Golkar, PPP, PKB, PAN and PBB received a significant proportion of votes. The other 42 parties were relegated to being minor parties. Of the six major parties, four (PPP, PKB, PAN and PBB) were essentially Islamic in character, although sharp differences

⁴ Calculated from the data on actual voters in the Jakarta daily Kompas, July 27, 1999, p.1, and on registered voters compiled by the Komisi Pemilihan Umum (National Election Commission), on the world wide web at <<http://kpu.gpo.id>>.

existed among them. Only the PDIP and Golkar could claim to be secular- nationalist in the orientation. In the election, the PDIP won 154 seats in the DPR, Golkar 120, PPP 58, PKB 51, PAN 36 and PBB 13 (Bilveer Singh 2001:p.103).The PDIP under the leadership of Megawati Sukarnoputri, the eldest daughter of Indonesia's first president Sukarno, emerged as the leading party capturing 34 percent of the valid votes with Golkar trailing second with 22 percent and PPP third with 11.6 percent of votes. In reality this meant that the three leading parties of the Suharto and post Suharto eras were similar even though the the PDIP was now in the position of the national leadership. The PDIP and Megawati's victory in the polls can be attributed to a number of factors. First, there was the symbol of the PDIP, especially Megawati, as the victim of repression of the New Order regime. Secondly there was much support bequeathed to Megawati by the sheer fact that she was the daughter of Sukarno, as there continues to be much sympathy and support for the charismatic first president, especially in Java and Bali. Megawati and her party were viewed as bearers of Sukarno dream, especially in terms of championing the "small people". Thirdly, various groups and individuals who were anti Suharto, anti Habibie, anti Golkar and anti Islam, for one reason or another, supported the PDIP. Finally, there was also the public image created by the domestic and international media of the PDIP as the underdog and more important, of a party that would be suitable to take over mantle of political leadership in the country (Bilveer Singh 2003).

The elections held in 1999 were only the second free elections held in Indonesia's history, and are considered to have been conducted peacefully and relatively fairly. A new electoral system was created, and new political parties flourished (Chalmers 2006: p. 270). The elections also revealed the reemergence of the aliran politics. The analyses of Indonesian politics since the 1950s has revolved around the issue of aliran. Indonesian politics is said to be organized by this concept (Lanti, 2001). In general, there are two definitions of aliran, as mentioned by Clifford Geertz. One is "a political party surrounded by a set of voluntary social organizations formally or informally linked to it". The other is "a comprehensive pattern of social integration"(Geertz, 1959: pp. 37-41). However, the view of Anderson regarding the aliran politics is that, aliran was "a distinctive, integrated cultural outlook, together with its organized and unorganized (but

potentially organizable) adherents” (Anderson, 1972). On the other hand, Herbert Feith demonstrated the first definition of aliran politics as proposed by Greetz. Feith defined aliran in terms of “streams of political thinking”. A dominant party was found in each stream. These parties were supported by various social groups, representing the youth, labour, women, students, intellectuals, artisans, and so on (Feith, 1970). The present analysis tends to agree with both definitions. Aliran, besides this, signifies a distinctive politico-cultural set of beliefs. The beliefs are represented in the public sphere by a number of social organizations, and in the political sphere by a political party. An aliran party is usually distinguishable from the others by the level of mass support that it receives both in and out of elections. The support, in general terms, can be discerned according to geographical localities such as between Java and the outer islands, between coastal and agricultural areas in Java, and between rural and urban areas (Lanti 2001. p. 3).

Aliran is different from ideology, although it is influenced by a number of “Western” ideologies. A number of political parties did try to demonstrate that they were the vanguards of certain ideologies. Marxism-Leninism is represented by the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party), nationalism by the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Party), democratic socialism by the PSI (Partai Socialist Indonesia, Indonesian Socialist Party), and capitalist development by the Golkar (Golongan Karya, Functional Groups). However, these affinities have less to do with mass support than with a platform to wage a political competition with the other parties. To say it from the perspective of the voters, the amount of voters who voted for a certain party due to the party’s ideological choice was significantly less than those who based their votes on the cultural outlook of the party. Furthermore, over a period of time, some Aliran parties shifted their ideological orientation. This had been done without alienating their constituents (Lanti 2001). Aliran is also different from class. Although the PKI was notable for its zest and rhetoric of class struggle, the localized support that they received came mostly from the ability of its leaders to communicate effectively with the Javanese cultural group, rather than through their Marxist-Leninist orientation. Hence, each aliran could enjoy the support from its respective cultural group with no consequence to the class differentiation within such group (Lanti 2001. p. 4). However, it

should also be noted that in the past, both class and ideology were still important in aliran politics, especially in trying to win the support of the majority group, the Javanese. The race for Java was competed primarily by two aliran parties, the PNI and the PKI. Here, the issue of class and ideology emerged. The PNI appealed to the more conservative middle and upper classes, while the PKI gained support from the more radicalized lower class. Such a race also happened in some other areas, albeit not to the extent as in Java. In the contemporary setting, class and ideology grew more salient in Indonesian politics, due to the growth of the middle class and its increasing exposure to the outside world. These conditions were a result of economic development during the New Order era (Lanti 2001, p. 4). Secular nationalism was most closely associated with abangan Javanese, Hindus and Christians. These groups voted overwhelmingly for PDIP and to a lesser extent to Golkar. The PDIP thus received a large vote (Bilveer Singh, 2003).

The 1999 elections can therefore be considered to mark the reassertion of the democratic tradition within Indonesian politics. The struggle between supporters of authoritarian and democratic tendencies had continued throughout the decade but was eventually won by the latter. The outcome was the recognition at the political level of Indonesia's political and cultural diversity. In the ensuing presidential election, Habibie withdrew his candidacy, and, with the support of Golkar and the ABRI faction, Abdurrehman Wahid was elected as the president. Although PDIP won the largest number of votes, Megawati became vice president (Abdulbaki 2008).

The 2004 elections in Indonesia marked a signpost in the growing democratization and maturity of the Indonesian voters. While this boded well for the country, especially following the political economic and social turbulence it experienced since the onset of the Asian financial crises in August 1997. The year 2004 can be regarded as the crucial year for Indonesia's democracy. It was in this year that a series of elections were held that ended in September with the final round of the presidential elections. The first election on April 5 was to elect members of the parliament (DPR), the council of Regional Representatives (DPD) and the provincial as well as country level legislatures (Wanandi 2004: p. 115). Around 600 million ballots were cast that day by about 120

million voters. The election was seen by the public and the international community as democratic, fair and peaceful. This was also the case with the first and the second rounds of the presidential elections on July 5th and September 20th. These elections helped to move Indonesia's democracy several notches higher. The 2004 elections represented the democratic process where the Indonesians exerted their political right to make their choice without being influenced or pressured by their social and political groupings (Wanadi 2004). The final round of direct presidential election was held on September 20th. The final round's competition was between Sushilo Bambang Yudhoyono who was the most popular candidate and Megawati Sukarnoputri. The results of the final round of the presidential election were in the favour of Yudhoyono – Kalla camp. The inauguration of president Yudhoyono and Vice president Jusuf Kalla took place on 20th October 2004 at the legislature complex in Jakarta (Sulistiyanto 2004). Their inauguration marked a major step forward in Indonesian democratic transition. The 2004 elections were thus concluded in a relatively smooth, peaceful and satisfactory fashion. These elections were one of the largest and the most complicated elections ever held in modern history of democracy in the world. Thus regarding the 2004 elections it can be said that Indonesian voters have shown maturity and sensibility in exercising their voting rights for democracy. In this context Harry Tjan Silalahi writes, "The shift of voters paradigm from traditional mindset into a more rational one is of the essence in sustaining stability after the new government is elected" (Silalahi 2004: p. 236). He further writes, "The significance of the 2004 elections in comparison to the 1999 elections lies in the shift of the voting system which in principle, gives voters greater opportunity to become more familiar with individual candidates" (Silalahi, 2004: p. 236). The 2004 legislative and Direct Presidential election marked the end of the transition to democracy and the start of the phases of democratic consolidation (Abdulbaki, 2008, pp. 167), For the first time in history, Indonesia had a president who was directly elected by the people. This was the third democratic election and the first direct presidential election in Indonesia's history. The 2004 elections were a victory for Indonesia's democracy as they were conducted peacefully. Thus, the 2004 elections brought Indonesians to the gate of democracy.

For the first time in history, Indonesia had a president who was directly elected by the people. The 2004 parliamentary elections that took place in April 2004, followed by the two rounds of direct presidential elections held in July and September enhanced the democratic experience in Indonesia (Seebastain 2004). The 2004 elections also represented a further step towards the consolidation of democratic politics in Indonesia as well as the launching of a new system for electing the parliament and the president. Thus the 2004 elections highlighted the emergence of new constitutional arrangements along with a new balance of power between the parliament and the president in Indonesia.

As the result of the implementation of the new electoral system the Indonesian President began to be directly elected in a separate presidential election that is held after the parliamentary elections. Under the Indonesian law presidential candidates run with their choice of vice presidential candidates. The presidential election of July 8, 2009, gave president Yudhoyono 60% of the vote while Megawati Sukarnoputri of PDI-P received 26% of the vote and Jussuf Kalla of Golkar received 12% (Intelligence Unit, 2009). According to the new electoral rules introduced, if one candidate for president of Indonesia receives over 50% of the vote in the first round they became president. If no single candidate receives over 50% of the vote then a subsequent run off election is held between the two leading candidates for president. No second round was necessary in 2009 presidential election given that President Yudhoyono received over 50% of the vote in the first round.

Several factors appear to have contributed to Democrat Party's victory in the April 2009 parliamentary elections. Declining food and fuel prices as well as programs for the poor improved Yudhoyono and his Party's standing (Intelligence Unit; 2009). According to Marcus Mietzner of the Lowy Institute in Sydney Australia: "it was the introduction of massive cash programs for the poor that triggered, Yudhoyono meteoric rise from electoral underdog to almost unassailable from runner... the government spent approximately \$2 billion on compensation payments..." (Meitzner 2009). A related factor in the election appears to have been shifting Indonesian perceptions of the economy from 2005 to 2009. More Indonesians generally felt that national economic condition was

worsening, but by early 2009, this negative perception changed as more Indonesians came to believe that the national economic condition was now better than the previous year.

In February 2009, 37% believed that the economy was better while 31% believed it was worse (Mujani and Liddle, 2009). Another key factor that appears to be the general popularity of President Yudhoyono as well as positive perceptions of his anti corruption drive. Some 80% of Indonesians polled believed that SBY was good, in fighting corruption. Indonesian voters also believed that the Democrat Party was the least corrupt of the political parties by an increasing margin in the lead up to the April 2009 parliamentary election. Indonesians believed that the parliament and the judiciary are the two most corrupt institutions in Indonesia (Media Indonesia, 2009). Indonesians have a consistently negative perception of the branch.⁵

The apparent lack of resonance of Islamist messages with Indonesian voters appears to have been a key factor in the parliamentary election results (Meitzner, 2009). It appeared that the Indonesian voters were less ideological and more pragmatic than some assumed (Karmini 2009). The Islamic vote declined from 38.1% of the vote in the 2004 election to 27.8% of the vote in 2009. Indonesian Islamic parties received 44% of the vote in the 1955 election and 37.59% in 1999 (Jakarta Post, April 17: 2009). Some have cautioned that the fortunes of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the United Development Party (PPP), the National Mandate Party (PAN), the National Awakening Party (PKB), and other Islamic parties that did not make the representative have stable or declining performances more because of internal divisions and political stagnation than as a result of a major shift in voters attitudes (Meitzner 2009). Others also point to the instability of Islamist parties to “translate ideological identity into concrete programs. (Effendy 2009). A politically significant outcome of the parliamentary election has been that the Democrat Party attained sufficient votes and seats to be allowed to nominate its own presidential candidate. Indonesian election laws required the parties to attain 20% of the seats in the 560 Member House of People's Representatives (DPR) or 25% of the

⁵ “Indonesia,” National Democratic Institute, <http://www.ndi.org/content/indonesia>.

national vote to be able to nominate a presidential candidate. The Democrat's strong performance and crossing the 20% nomination with 20.9% of the vote, meant that President Yudhoyono was in a stronger position on the issue of the coalition partners and the selection of his vice presidential running mate (Vaughn: 2009).

Another observation of the Indonesian electorate in 2009 leads to the conclusion that the conventional wisdom on Indonesia appears to have overestimated the importance of religion, and civil- military relations. It now appeared to some analyst that religion and civil military issues were not as silent as they once were in Indonesian politics (Liddle 2009). Although the political stability was enhanced by the decline of the divisive issues in the Indonesian politics, the apparent move towards personality politics is expected to not to be stabilizing in the long run. In the view of many, the Democrat Party lacks structure and is driven by its members support for Yudhoyono as an individual (Vaughn: 2009).

There were three pairs of presidential and vice presidential candidates in 2009 presidential candidates in 2009 presidential election. President Yudhoyono, who has been described as a moderate, cautious and intelligent man of common sense picked Boediono as his vice presidential running mate (Parry 2009). Yudhoyono's former vice president from Golkar, Jussuf Kalla, ran against Yudhoyono with former General Wiranto of Hanura Party. Wiranto was accused of human rights abuses in East Timor by a U.N. Backed Special Tribunal (Philip 2009). Formal President Megawati Sukarnoputri of PDI-P ran for president with Vice president running mate Probowo Subianto. Probowo was the former son in law to the former President Suharto. It is believed by the critics of Probowo that he was responsible for violence towards anti – Suharto intellectuals and students, as well as against the ethnic Chinese community in Jakarta, during Indonesia's transition from Suharto's authoritarian New Order to reformasi and more open government in 1998 (Gartell 2009).

The outcome of the the presidential election of 2009, with its strong mandate to return President Yudhoyono to the office of the presidency, is important for several reasons.

Firstly, it marked the continued development of Indonesia's democracy and civil society and move away from past authoritarian government. Indonesian voters continued to prefer national, secular, and democratic leaders who were likely to continue to pursue reforms policies. The vote was also an endorsement of SBY's second term (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2009). The election also marked the further transformation of Indonesia political parties.

The outcome of the parliamentary and the presidential elections are important for several reasons. Firstly, the strong performance by the Democrat Party and other national secular parties in 2009 parliamentary election indicated that the Islamist political fortunes were declining and not rising as had been feared in the wake of the 2004 elections. Second factor concerns the expansion of democracy and the rule of law in Indonesia and the region. Thirdly there is the hope that the elections would produce a government in Indonesia that would strengthen human rights, religious freedom and bilateral trade ties (Bruce Vaughn, 2009). Thus the main practical achievements of the democratization process were realized through the 1999 and 2004 free and fair legislative elections and peaceful rotations of the presidential power, especially with the introduction of Direct presidential elections and its successful implementation in 2004. In other words Indonesian political landscape is mainly characterized by frequent free and fair elections, effective elected officials, separation of powers, inclusive of suffrage, freedom of expression, the independence of media and associational autonomy (Abdulkaki, 2008, pp. 167). Thus it can be said that all the three elections held from 1999 onwards acted as an affirmation that Indonesia had not only reverted to authoritarian rule but it had also started new venture into developing and refining an Indonesian version of democratic policies (Sherlock, 2004).

Direct Presidential election and its Significance

Following Suharto's departure, the country's political elites to a large extent continued the entrenched practices as far as the election of the president was concerned even though the label of being of more democratic, transparent and accountable was attached to the

whole process. If there was a fundamental change, it was the introduction of the Annual Session of the Majelis Perwakilan Rakyat (MPR) whereby the President was required to present an “accountability address” which the MPR was to either accept or reject. As the MPR was also the only body that could “hire and fire” the president, these new powers gave the MPR a renewed sense of importance with everything being undertaken in the name of reformasi, democratization, greater participation and accountability (Bilveer Singh, 2003, pp. 436).

Thus in a major break from the past and representing an attempt to become a more democratic society, the Annual Session of the MPR in November 2001, for the first time, provided for the direct election of all the members of the House of Representatives, the Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD), and the president and the vice president. This new system encompassed a number of new features. These features as mentioned by Bilveer Singh are, first, unlike the past where the MPR elected the president and the vice president, now the top two positions in the country were to be decided by a direct vote by the people. Second, the election of the president and vice president was to be held after the general elections. According to the third feature, unless a candidate won a simple majority and garnered the majority of votes that is 50 +1 percent, a second round was to be held between the two leading candidates to decide the winner. Fourth, a political party or coalitions of political parties were given the responsibility to nominate the candidates for the post of president and vice president (Bilveer Singh, 2003, pp.438).

Thus, in order to actualize the new electoral system, the House of Representatives was expected to pass a number of laws. Among other aspects, these laws and regulations involved the registrations of the political parties, organizations of the general presidential and vice presidential elections, composition of the House of Representatives, provincial and regency legislatures, the constitutional court as well as the mandate of the General Election Commission (KPU). By the time these regulations were in place, the KPU was given a budget of Rp 3.5 trillion as well as permitted to appoint 1.750 members in the 30 provinces and 410 regencies and municipalities to oversee the elections. Of the more than

200 political parties registered, according to various criteria set by the KPU, only 50 parties were likely to be eligible for the polls. The KPU also started to register the 141.97 million voters in April 2003 (Jakarta Post; 11 Feb, 2003). Despite the addition of the five new provinces, Law Number 12/2003 also stated that there would be the same number of seats in the House of Representatives in 2004 as they were in 1999. While the general elections were scheduled followed by a two phased presidential elections, the new laws only allowed political parties or coalitions winning at least 20 percent of the House seats to nominate presidential candidates. According to the new election laws, no later than seven days after the results of the legislative elections have been announced, political parties or coalitions must register the nomination of the presidential candidates and their running mates with the KPU.⁶

The significant changes were introduced with regard to the direct presidential election in Indonesia. In the words of Bilveer Singh, “The changes led to the distinct diminution of the power of the MPR which previously utilized its power and acted as an arbiter of the nation’s president and the vice president (Bilveer Singh: 2004: p.437). Thus by these amendments, the power of the MPR were curbed to some extent as far as the election of the president and vice president was concerned. Besides this, people’s sovereignty which was previously exercised through the MPR was now returned to the people providing them the opportunity to directly exercise their power in the election of the president and the vice president. In addition to this, the new electoral system also led to the rise of a strengthened presidency. Further the amendments also lessened the importance of the political parties in the country. Now the factor that was to be determined and play a significant role in gaining the presidency for the candidate was the strength and popularity of the candidate. Thus, now the popularity of the candidate could gain him the office of the president rather than the name of the party to which the candidate belonged. Thus, powerful and charismatic personality of the candidate and one that was less dependent upon a political party was to be the order of the day in future. Further a president and vice president directly sanctioned by the people were likely to affect the balance of power of the three key elements of the political system, namely the executive,

⁶ “Compromise Seals Election Bill”, *ibid.*, 5 July 2003

legislature, and judiciary. Thus this provided for a strong prosperity for the rise of the “imperial presidency” in the context of the domestic politics, especially when and if the political parties and the ensuing power structures were likely to be fractured and dispersed. In this new electoral system, the two aspects were to determine the final outcome namely the system of presidential election and the criteria utilized by the voters to elect the eventual winner. As the system was based on the direct election and in which political parties were expected to prefer the best candidate, what constituted the best was to play a major role in determining the eventual winner and hence, Indonesia’s president (Bilveer Singh, 2003, pp. 437-439).

Thus the amendment of the 1945 constitution provided a new definition to the presidentialism in Indonesia. In this redefined presidentialism, the president still acted as the executive body that runs the country on daily basis. However, the president could not dissolved the parliament and vice versa. Since both are elected directly by the Indonesian people, both sides shared equal legitimacy. The Indonesian people elected the president and the vice president through a direct presidential election mechanism and both are elected for the term of five years and can be elected for one further term. The president can be replaced by the People’s Consultative Assembly which is made up of the Deewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representative, DPR) and the Deewan Perwakilan Daerah (House of Regional Representative (DPD)). As far as Indonesian presidentialism is concerned the adoption of direct presidential election with two rounds of as the way to elect the president is remarkable. This new system of electing the president and the vice president received wide ranging support especially from the leaders of the main existing political parties of Indonesia. This was mainly because it was felt by these leaders that this direct presidential election system would greatly improve their chances of electoral victory (Notosusanto, 2003).

Decentralisation and Democractization in Indonesia:

Decentralization recognition can be found in the Constitution of Indonesia, article 18 of constitution state that Indonesia is divided by large and small region and recognized for

its autonomy and their legal origin (Ashidiqie 2002). Decentralization recognized that the central government must delegate certain amount of government responsibilities to sub national levels. It is a broadly held view that decentralization system matches Indonesia which is known for its long inter-island distances, rich cultural heterogeneity, and widely divergent socio-economic condition; however decentralization had been abandoned since its recognition (“Indonesia’s Decentralisation toward Democratic Consolidation”, paper prepared for political development; Kobe University).

During New Order, a policy of decentralisation was pursued by Indonesian government within framework of the unitary state. However, centralizing tendencies have strongly, and successfully, obstructed official decentralization policies for the sake of government control and national integration. By the late 1980s the New Order regime had lost sight of its original goals of national development and improved economic welfare for the people, and was concerned primarily with staying in power and with the financial advancement of an extremely small section of the Indonesian community. This, together with the excessive centralization and the lack of freedom for democratic expression, led to increasing dissatisfaction not only in regions outside Java but also in the provinces of Java. Finally, Soeharto resigned in 1998 and, after 32 years in power, the New Order collapsed. Demands for reforms in all fields and for democratization were accompanied by intensified calls for regional autonomy and decentralization. The new national-level parliament (the DPR), formed through democratic general elections in June 1999, passed decentralization legislation that took effect on 1 January 2001(op.cit).

Although, when Suharto came to power, he also declared that his government was committed to decentralization. The New Order gave priority to deconcentration which was mainly in the form of relocation of central government activities to the regions. So for much of the New Order period, decentralization process involved and was characterised by the administrative tier between the local governance where the regional offices of the central ministries were given the responsibility for the implementation of national development programs. Thus the local governments were restricted to responding to centrally determined policies and priorities (Morfit 1986). In the 1990s, an

another attempt was made by the regions to make decision making decentralized. This attempt however was successful to some extent. Through out the 1990s campaigns were made by the political activists in order to get the decision making decentralized. Further the regional planners and politicians also demanded for the actual implementation of the stated policy of devolving the decentralization of decision making to the regions (Hill 1998). In this regard, in 1992 it was decided that the district government and the urban municipalities would play greater role in developmental planning of the particular region. In addition to this, a pilot area programme was established by the government in one district within each of the provinces of Indonesia. The main aim behind the implementation of this programme was to improve the local planning process and to deal with administrative shortcomings. Another aim of this programme was to transfer the responsibility for planning and implementation from the administrative tier of the local government. In other words it represented the possibility of the real decentralization rather than of the deconcentration of the administration. Further under this program the local elected representatives were given the responsibility to control the development activities of that particular region (Chalmers 2006). However, the 1992 regulation remained largely unimplemented and remained as mentioned by Hill, “essentially a statement of broad philosophical principle” (Hill 1998, p. 25). In addition to this, the 1995 pilot program also showed mixed success as it had to face a combined opposition both from the central department along with inconsistency in the implementation of its policies (Devas 1997). Thus, these two programmes did very little to satisfy the demands for the regional autonomy.

Besides this, the physical concentration of the economic activity was also associated with the enormous disparities in the wealth distribution. As mentioned above there was rapid industrialisation during the New Order period that led to the enormous economic growth which also tended to make Jakarta the industrial centre of Indonesia. This transformation accelerated the expansion of the urban centers. Various policy measures were taken to lessen regional differentials in wealth (Chalmers 2006). The stated objective of the regional development planning was to distribute economic activity more evenly in the regions. In this context the most successful mechanism for promoting equitable regional

development during the new order years was the Inpres also known as presidential Instruction scheme, which provided a great deal of central funding for the construction of social infrastructure. The first Inpres scheme that dates from 1969 was followed by other scheme for building roads, irrigation, primary schools and hospitals. As have been mentioned in one of the studies, that at one stage ten percent of the national budget and over thirty percent of regional budgets were accounted for by Inpres funds (Devas 1997, p. 335). Although, the scheme to some extent was successful in benefiting the Indonesian masses and also played a significant role in dispersing the economic activities throughout Indonesia yet the central control of budgetary process gave rise to regional discontent. This led to the rise of pressure for greater local control over budgetary allocations In the meantime the economy also became more larger and more dynamic than in the mid 1970s. Besides this the central government also lacked the capacity to supervise the process of policy implementation in the regions (Chalmers 2006: p. 9).

Thus we find that, in the Suharto era itself, in the late 1990s, there had been a wave of demands throughout the archipelago which called for localized administration and greater recognition of the distinctiveness of the regions. The first post- Suharto government that of Habibie, acceded to demands for decentralization. A special team of advisors consisting of seven members (The Tim Tujuh)⁷ was appointed by him to formulate new policies on the regions. As a result, one of the most important initiatives of the Habibie administration was the 1999 legislation for regional autonomy (otada, otonomi daerah), granting the regions greater control over their political and economic fate. It is instructive to examine the circumstances behind the push for the local autonomy, for this legislation has unleashed forces that have made regionalism a powerful force in national life. One of the important source of the pressure for regional autonomy during Habibie's transitional government was the national pro democracy movement. The critics of the Suharto regime had long felt that political power had become too concentrated. By the 1990s, it had become an article of faith among the democracy activists that greater influence for the

⁷President Habibie appointed seven legal and political experts to design laws that revolutionised centre region relations, the regional autonomy(otada) legislation. All but one of these experts was from outside Java; Habibie himself was born and grew up in South Sulawesi in Ian Chalmers, Indonesia: an introduction to contemporary traditions,(2006) Oxford University Press, pp.88.

regions would restrain an over- concentrated state and thus help i n building a more vibrant civil society. Besides this there was a mounting pressure for the decentralization of economic planning. As mentioned above, the rapid growth in the industrialization during the New Order period led to the enormous expansion of the Indonesian economy which ultimately made Jakarta the industrial heartland of Indonesia. Industrialization and the expansion of Indonesia's modern sector during the New Order period clearly had a major impact on its physical geography. From the 1970s, the Indonesian economy was transformed structurally, with Java becoming the industrial heartland. This transformation accelerated the expansion of the urban centers, particularly that of Greater Jakarta. (Ian Chalmers, 2006, pp. 88). In addition to a national movement pressing for democratization, the country had also experienced separatist movements and communal conflicts on such a scale that observers inside and outside the country feared it would collapse. Despite these challenges, the interim government of Habibie that ruled Indonesia between May 1998 and October 1999, however managed to lay the foundation for a more democratic and decentralized political system, which created prospectives for Indonesia to emerge as a democratic country and to join the ranks of the world's democracies.

The twin processes of democratization and decentralization reflected a backlash against the authoritarian and centralized character of the previous regime that is New Order regime of Suharto. Besides this, their origins and impact were so deeply interwoven with each other which made them in many respects, inseparable. In the words of Garry Bland and Cynthia J. Arnson, "Indonesia's transition to democracy and decentralization occurred under conditions that impelled leaders of the authoritarian regime to enact reforms, but limited their opponents to indirect participation in the process of designing them" (Bland and Arnson 2009). On the one hand, the regime had generally succeeded in disorganizing and intimidating its main opponents during the mid-1990s, so groups and individuals of national stature were unprepared to use the crisis as an opportunity to mobilize public opposition to the regime. On the other hand, President Soeharto resigned his position just two months after orchestrating his "reelection" to a seventh five- year term and only one month after a nascent student movement moved from university

campuses onto public streets Malley 2001). Thus with in short period of time, massive protests were mounted in cities and towns across the country, but however these protests failed in producing a significant opposition leaders with whom the regime could negotiate the terms of a transition. Thus, the weakness of the opposition and Soeharto's sudden decision to resign created the conditions for an incumbent-led transition(Malley2007: pp. 136-137).

Although the protest movement was successful in attracting the support in almost every region of the country, however its demands were simple, straightforward, and essentially national rather than regional. Everywhere, students marched under the banner that demanded Suharto's resignation. Besides this they also demanded the elimination of corruption, collusion, and nepotism. Thus, after the fall of Suharto from power, the new government under Habibie was left to translate these demands into specific reforms. In his attempt to avoid the further occurrence of protests, he quickly committed his government to a three-stage timetable for reform which included liberalization of laws on parties, elections, and legislatures within about six months, legislative elections at national provincial, and district levels within a year, and an indirect presidential election within about 18 months. However, he made no commitment to decentralization, and also faced no significant criticism for failing to do so (Bland and Arnson 2009: p. 137).

In his attempt and in order to draft the legal framework for his reformasi agenda Habibie's government turned to seek the help of a small team of bureaucrat-scholars, who were mainly political scientists. In late 1998 the bills which were drafted by these political scientist were presented to the House of Representatives, whose members had been elected in 1997. Fifteen percent of the members of the House of Representatives were the military and police appointees, and the rest were either members of the regime's party or members of two other parties whose candidates were already been screened by the government prior to the election. But like the executive branch drafters of the legislation, House members appreciated the need to present a "reformist" image to voters by supporting the proposed legislation. Despite the authoritarian conditions under which they had been chosen, they intensely debated several key provisions. These

provisions included particularly whether to permit civil servants to join political parties, and how much to reduce appointed seats for the armed forces in the House (Bland and Arnson 2009: p. 137). However, they rejected the drafters' recommendation to replace the traditional proportional representation system with single-member districts. Even though the legal framework for democracy did not contain any reference to decentralization, rather it contained several provisions of tremendous importance to center-region relations. In the first place, it combined liberal rules on the formation of political parties with restrictions that effectively prevented regional parties from participating in elections, whether at the national or regional level. In order to take part in the elections the interested parties were required to have headquarter in Jakarta, and besides this, it was also required that their headquarters should have branches in half the provinces and half the districts in each of those provinces. Under the second provision, the closed-list proportional representation system strengthened national party leaders' influence over regional branches by allowing them to determine which members were nominated and where they were ranked on the party list. Third, it stated that, the new framework called for legislative elections to be held simultaneously at the national, provincial, and district levels, which made many of the election experts to expect that it will further privilege national over regional concerns. Fourth, it distributed seats in the new legislature in a way that overrepresented sparsely populated regions outside Java, the demographic, political, and cultural center of the country. This provision was common to what was practiced by the previous regime that is the New Order regime under Suharto. Thus, this meant that, even though people of Java constituted nearly 60 percent of the country's population, they would receive only about 50 percent of the seats. And fifth, the new laws did not call for the early election of regional executives, which meant that unlike either Suharto, who was forced from office, or Habibie, who would face election in 1999, many regional heads would continue to remain in office long after democratic elections had occurred (Bland and Synthia 2009: p. 138-139).

Besides this, the laws which aimed at decentralization were drafted and approved under much different circumstances. The same small team of drafters took the initiative and finally turned its attention to introduce decentralization in late 1998 after completing

work on the bills needed to prepare for elections in 1999. Its leader secured presidential approval for two parallel efforts under which his team would draft a new law on regional government and another team, based in the ministry of finance, would draft a law on intergovernmental fiscal relations. Both the teams in their efforts for implementation of decentralisation process proceeded in highly technocratic fashion, although with little public input, scrutiny, or even attention despite the team's high profile (Bland and Cynthia 2009: p.138).

However the members of the team that drafted the law governing political and administrative decentralization mostly dwelled from regions outside Java, and as a result of the nativeness they took for granted that the country was overly centralized. Moreover, they tended to believe that decentralization was needed to forestall a swelling cacophony of demands for autonomy. It was believed by most of the members that decentralization was essential to maintain national unity. In addition, it was long debated by their counterparts in the finance ministry for the need for fiscal decentralisation. Besides this, they also supported several theoretical claims which stated that the local governments were self sufficient to efficiently perform some of the functions. Besides this it was also realised by Habibie that decentralization would not be as dangerous as his predecessor had thought. And thus, therefore he also gave his consent for decentralization which also aimed at to enhance his own reform credentials ahead of the 1999 election (Bland and Cynthia 2009: p. 138-139).

The bills which were drafted by the respective teams appointed by Habibie were radical, and contradicted the previous Indonesian practice or the decentralization policies of other countries. They promised to democratize regional government. Besides this, they also guaranteed the regional governments a large share of national government revenues, and turn over to regional governments millions of national government employees (O' Rourke 2002). As the bills drafted tended to underpin the democratic elections, these laws promised that it would not make any immediate impact on legislators' own career prospects. The 1999 regional government law granted the broadest range of rights to district-level, or second-tier governments rather than provinces. This was similar to the

Suharto era plans for decentralization, but it was also readily acknowledged by the drafters that the provinces were more likely than districts to demand Independence. So under such fear, it was decided by the drafters to grant less autonomy to the provinces in comparison to the districts (Bland and Cynthia 2009: p.139). Thus as a result of the implementation of decentralisation policies, only authority over defense, foreign affairs, justice, religion, and monetary policy remained solely with the central government. Not only this, the law also eliminated the district's status as an administrative unit of the national government. This increasingly effected the positions of the regional chiefs who previously have enjoyed the position as the head of the regional government. Under such circumstances, the regional chief executives (mayors and bupati) were deprived of their position to serve simultaneously as heads of regional government and chief representatives of the national bureaucracy in their regions. Their positions were now only as heads of regional government. Accordingly, the national government surrendered to district legislatures the right to elect these officials. This marked a radical break with previous practice since these officials had always been appointed by the national government. As a result of this change, local governments were no longer accountable national bureaucrats, rather they were at least in law, downward to local legislatures and, indirectly, local electorates (Bland and Cynthia 2009).

Since their passage in April 1999, it has become conventional among analysts of Indonesian decentralization to treat the laws on regional government and intergovernmental fiscal relations as though they alone define Indonesian decentralization policy. Laws No. 22/1999 and 25/1999, proposed to change the organisation of governments in several fundamental ways. Firstly, Law No.22/1999 on Regional Government eliminated the hierarchal relationship between the provincial and the district governments. Thus, the Law NO. 22/1999 replaced the hierarchal governance system linking local governments to the center with one that granted local government considerably greater autonomy. With Mayors and district heads now selected by local assemblies rather than appointed by the provincial governor, local governments have become accountable to the local population in a fundamentally new way (Christopher Silver 2001: pp.345-362). In the view of James Alm and Roy Bahl, the districts

governments became fully autonomous and the head of these district governments became no longer responsible for reporting to the governor of the province. Instead the district head was now responsible to the locally elected assembly (Deewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or DPRD). Secondly with some limited exceptions, Law N0. 22/1999 also marked all deconcentrated central government ministries at the province and the districts, the responsibility of the respective local government with the exception for defense and security, foreign policy, monetary and fiscal policies, judiciary affairs and religious affairs. Thirdly the Law N0. 25/1999 on the fiscal balance between the central government and the regions altered the transfers received by local governments from the central government. Besides this, this law also introduced revenue sharing for provincial and district governments, assigning each level of government its share of revenues from the taxes on land and buildings, the transfers of land and buildings, forestry, mining, fisheries, oil and gas (Alm and Bahl 1999).

The companion act, law no. 25/1999, revamped fiscal relations between the central government and the regions by restructuring the system of intergovernmental transfers. One significant change was that funding of the regional civil servants salaries through the Autonomous region subsidy was discontinued as was the extensive array of Inpres (Instruksi Presiden, Presidential Instruction) development grants. These were replaced by a single block grant, which was known as the General Purpose Fund. While the language of law 25 suggested the likely retention of several embarked transfer grants, particularly for primary schools, public health, roads and water supply (Almond Bahl 1999: pp. 1- 4). In working out the fiscal aspects of decentralisation, a key concern has been whether local governments are capable of assuming the level of responsibility and discretion necessitated by a block grant system. One reason why decentralisation in Indonesia proceeded so slowly during the 1980s and 1990s was the commonly articulated view that local governments lacked both the capacity and the willingness to manage their affairs independently. This view was advanced by the New Order government ministries that did not want to relinquish control of development funds to the regions and was based largely on anecdotal evidence rather than any systematic appraisal of local performance. Throughout the year before laws 22 and 25 were implemented, the unpreparedness of

local governments for fiscal and administrative autocracy was a common refrain of decentralisation critics and skeptics (Christopher Silver 2001: pp. 345-362).

While looking into the recent political developments that have taken place in Indonesia, one can easily say that Indonesia's party system is now highly competitive, and the press is free though no one is quite sure about how a culture of accountability actually emerges. Yet decentralization has not produced the kind of democratic results. The problem is that the institutions of democracy have been appropriated by many elements of the old rapacious, authoritarian regime. These have according to Robinson and Hadiz, successfully reconstituted themselves as democratic actors via political parties and parliaments over which they preside. A good example is the 'ruling' PDI-P (Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle) of President Megawati Soekarnoputri. The party includes a range of former military men, entrepreneurs, and political hustlers, peddlers and enforcers of the old New Order (Robison and Hadiz, 2004).

Moreover, even the free press in places like North Sumatra, has partly been appropriated by political gangsters involved in extortion rackets to further the political aims of local alliances (Vediz 2004: p.699). Because Indonesia's democratization process has been hijacked by predatory interests which 'reformasi' failed to sweep aside, the outcome of decentralization has been affected to a certain extent. In this context the view proposed by Malley is that the unravellings of the long-entrenched Suharto regime in the wake of the Asian economic crisis of 1997-98 set the stage for the emergence of a new political framework within which political parties, parliaments (national and local) and elections have become increasingly important as arenas of genuine political contestation. As central authority has eroded, power has been decentralized from the executive body of government to the legislative branch and from Jakarta to the regions. In the new democratic context, openly expressed desires for more local autonomy in a host of regions, and in some cases even for secession, demanded an urgent response (Malley 2001). There had been regional expressions of discontent even during the Suharto era, including separatist movements in Aceh, Papua and newly-independent East Timor, but these were often simply suppressed by the use of brute military force. As the New

Order's institutional framework disintegrated, however, a reaction based purely on violence was no longer possible. The main response of Suharto's successors to regional demands, by contrast, took the form of new legislation on local autonomy drafted in 1999 and enacted in January 2001 (Hadiz 2004: p. 707). Thus the point to be emphasized is that the decentralization process in Indonesia has largely been hijacked by interests that have little to gain from local governance characterized by greater accountability to local communities and transparency. Although the design for decentralization was faulty in the first place as it was full of legal contradictions and ambiguities. However, this was not the main reason behind the deterioration in the decentralisation process. It was the persistence, and indeed 'victory', of predatory interests in contests over power that had the most important implications for decentralization and local-level democratization in Indonesia. The key was that these elements were not swept away by the fall of Suharto, but managed to reinvent themselves in the new democracy. This is most vividly illustrated by the rise of political gangsters in the leadership of parties, parliaments and executive bodies at the local level (Hadiz 2004).

In Indonesian process of decentralisation, the timing and content of decentralization is much broader than the terms of the two laws that embodied the government's official decentralization policy. In the view of Bland and Cynthia, the decentralisation has two benefits. First, it shows us that, in effect, political decentralization preceded fiscal and administrative decentralization. And second, it highlighted the significance of subnational initiative and agency in bringing decentralization. This signifies that a small group of people could design the policies on their own. Both benefits emphasize the role of democratization as a motivating force for decentralization, not a hindrance to administrative and fiscal efficiency. Decentralization cannot be separated from the impact of democratization on parties, elections, and legislative behavior. Though more by accident than design, the crafters of Indonesia's democratizing and decentralizing policies seem to have struck an important balance between centrifugal and centripetal pressures by combining party and electoral institutions that privileged central authority with others that enhanced the authority of sub national governments. Assessments of decentralization's impact must take into account the principal aims of the architects of

decentralization, including politicians and the bureaucrat scholars who drafted so much legislation. Their overwhelming concern was to maintain national unity (Bland and Cynthia 2009: pp. 142- 144).

In the view of Larry Diamond, democracy should be viewed as a developmental phenomenon (Diamond 1999: 18). According to him if democracy is viewed from a developmental perspective, the fate of democracy is open ended. He further writes, the element of liberal democracy emerges in various sequences and degrees, at varying paces in the different countries. Democratic change can also move in differing directions. Just as electoral democracies can become more democratic more liberal, constitutional, competitive, accountable, inclusive and participatory so they can also become less democratic (Diamond 1999: 19). Therefore democratic consolidation or democratic deepening should be continuously reinforced. One of the challenges of democratic deepening is to provide citizens access to power and to make the institutions of democracy more responsive to their preferences (Diamond 1999: 21). Thus, the role of decentralisation and regional autonomy can act as a crucial factor in the deepening process of democratic consolidation in Indonesia.

As, decentralization refers to devolution the transfer of resources and power to lower level authorities which are largely or wholly independent of higher levels of government, and which are democratic in some way and to some degree (Manor 1999: 6). Consequently, this provides an opportunity to the local governments to create their own policies independently of the central government, and also providing the local residents an opportunity to participate in the decision-making process. Thus, ultimate mission of local government existence is how to improve local community life by giving and providing them effective, efficient, and economic public services and through democratic ways.

In the view of Smith there are basically, two arguments related to decentralization, democratization of government and government manageability. Regarding the democratization of government, the principles of local self-reliance and participation are

generally regarded as political objectives in their own right. In addition, the democratization of government is considered an important contribution to government accountability (Smith 1992:9). Besides this, there are several theorists who agree that the efficiency and equity benefits of decentralization come from the presence of democratic processes that encourage local authorities to serve the needs and desires of their constituents (Smoke 2000:10). Therefore, democratic decentralization is its most effective form. The underlying logic of decentralization is that democratic local institutions can better discern and are more likely to respond to local needs and aspirations because they have better access to information due to their close proximity and are more easily held accountable to local populations (Crook and Manor 1998:1-2). The decentralization law in Indonesia had been effectively implemented since 2001. As a result of this implementation, most of the Indonesia's districts have come under the control of local parliaments, which are functioning with varying degrees of success. In 2004, it was revised in the form of new law on decentralization, Law No. 32 of 2004 concerning Regional Governance in Indonesia. The New Law effectively implemented in the beginning of 2005. Tens of thousands of civil servants who were formerly working in the regions for the deconcentrated branch offices of the central government were now responsible to the local administrations. Law No. 32 of 2004 stipulates that district heads must be popularly elected rather than appointed, as had been the case. This law indicates that the program for the decentralization of political authority and regional administration begun in 1999 has not lost its momentum (Ian Chalmers 2006). Based on new law, process of democratization and decentralization moved another step forward in June and July of the year 2005 when democratic institution in the form of direct elections were conducted for a large number for 226 of district heads, city mayors and provincial governor. Yet although this sounds promising, many Indonesian observers feel pessimistic about some of the trends that are emerging and ask whether these direct elections have really promoted democracy at the local level. However, direct election result gives promising future on democratic consolidation. There are democratic safeguards built into the current decentralization process, notably regular elections and a free press. Over time, these safeguards may reduce the potential for undemocratic practices in the regions. Thus, according to a recent USAID document, for example,

'Indonesia is moving rapidly from years of tight central control to a far more decentralized and autonomous system of local government.' More specifically, USAID suggests that the legal framework for local autonomy in Indonesia as a part of a series of wider reforms of an array of institutions is geared to help 'create the basis for national and local democratic governance.' Ultimately, regional autonomy is not just a matter of regulating the relationships between the various levels of governments; rather it is also about regulating the relationship between the state and the people. Regional autonomy is essentially the responsibility of the local population, because it is ultimately the people's right to administer their own system of government in a manner that will accommodate their own laws, ethics and local traditions (Maskun1999).

Thus it can be said that, the future of the move towards regional autonomy and decentralization in Indonesia, thus involved a struggle between the forces of centralism and regionalism. Clearly, local political elites will play a critical role in determining the outcome of this process, for the extent to which regional elites support the interest of the local community that of the centre will determine the pace of decentralization. But the issue of decentralization in Indonesia is closely linked to the process of democratization. The question of local identity has increasingly involved non-elite forces. The changes set in train by the democratization and regional autonomy movements in the late 1990s have required local elites, increasingly to support the interest of their region. In other words, societal forces have imposed new regional identities on the national identity.

The struggle between centralism and regionalism although have involved more than the interest of political elites, however, for the decentralization movement has been sustained by a new sense of community identity throughout the regions. Previously, regionalism had implied a sort of provincialism. But as regional interest increasingly made their presence felt within state institutions throughout the 1990s, the association with a particular region became a source of legitimacy for prominent social and political actors. In the process, the concept of region gained a new political identity. In short, a definition

of the national identity has been emerging in Indonesia, one in which the regions played a large role (Chalmers 2006:p. 94). Decentralization has changed several fundamental ways in governing Indonesia. It has been colored not only by sweet story of decentralization impact but also by many problems arising within its implementation. As the wheel of decentralization moves forward, it twill strengthen the process of democratic consolidation in Indonesia.

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CHAPTER FOUR
PHASES OF DEMOCRATISATION IN INDONESIA

While looking into the Indonesian democratization process in the previous chapters of this work it can be asserted that, with the fall of strong authoritarian president Suharto in May 1998 who ruled over Indonesia for more than four decades, Indonesia began to progress steadily towards Democracy. However Indonesia has not been the only country that had been ruled over by authoritarian governments for years but there are other countries also who have undergone such kind of dictatorship. As for example in countries like Latin America, Asia and Africa, there existed authoritarian rule in most of the post 1945 era and even despite the third wave of democratization that took place after the cold war, one can still witness the presence of powerful constraints on the advance of democracy (Huntington 1991). In the case of Indonesian democratization it is found that the country in early post colonial era had experienced the liberal parliamentary style of democracy that was discontinued by Sukarno's Guided democracy which lasted from 1959-1966 and was further replaced by a military backed New Order regime under Suharto which in years tended to transform itself into an authoritarian government (Vedic Hadiz, 2004: pp. 55-71)

However in the view of most of the scholars, Indonesia since Suharto's ouster in May 1998, has been now commonly assumed to be either already a democracy or in a transition towards democracy as there have been momentous changes since the end of iron fisted authoritarian rule under Suharto's regime (Liddle 2001:pp. 373-399). In 1999, Indonesia became the world's third largest fledging democracy. It is true that the more than 30 years of authoritarian rule of Suharto's regime came to an end mainly due to its own internal contradictions and because of the changing external conditions. But the importance of democratic movements cannot be ignored as the democracy movement was also vital. Its importance was most visibly in the overthrow of Suharto and the democracy was widely regarded as the only way out of the crises. The resignation of President Suharto marked the end of four decades of authoritarian rule and the instigation of a transition to a democratic multi party political system in Indonesia.

Indonesia Experience with three types of democracy

Indonesia remained under the colonial rule of Dutch for long period of time and it had to struggle hard for its independence. However with the intervention of foreign powers mainly the actions taken by the Security Council and the pressure exerted by US diplomats on the Dutch, Indonesia was finally successful in gaining independence from the Dutch colonial rule and since then it has been struggling with its democratic status. However, between the years from 1950-1957 Indonesia has been successful in presenting itself as representative democracy. Indonesia had no democratic experience prior to its 1945 declaration of independence from the colonial rule. However, since 1950 till 1998, the country has experienced two types of authoritarianism. First was under the personal rule of of president Sukarno's Guided Democracy from 1957 till 1965 and second was under the army and the army backed New Order authoritarian regime of President Suharto from 1965 till 1998. In the 1990s the New order was successful in establishing its firm grip on Indonesian society (Liddle, 1999). Although Indonesia has experienced with two types of democracy all of which failed. First was the failed attempt at parliamentary democracy (1949-1957) which led to the transition from parliamentary democracy to guided democracy (1957-1959). Second, there was another attempt at Guided Democracy under President Sukarno (1959-1965). With the fall of Sukarno's Guided Democracy the country entered in to the longest period authoritarian rule guided by the principles of Pancasila Democracy under President Suharto from March 1966 to May 1998(Dhakidae 2001: pp. 67-74).

Constitutional Democracy

The period of Parliamentary democracy has been called by Herbert Feith as Constitutional democracy. Besides, there is another term that was used by most of the Indonesian political community to define constitutional democracy was 'liberal democracy', the term that was also popularized by Sukarno. However, according to Feith,

Liberal democracy was used by Sukarno with a purpose to mock the Western democratic practices such as voting, which was criticized by him as 'fifty percent plus one democracy'. Besides this, Feith has also proposed some distinctive features of constitutional democracy. First, in the constitutional democracy, a dominant role was played by civilians, second, the parties were of great importance, third, the contender for power showed respect for the rules which were related to the existing constitution, and fourth, the members had and showed some sort of commitment to the symbols connected with constitutional democracy (Feith, 1962). However the constitutional democracy was replaced by Sukarno's Guided democracy. However the reasons that constituted the decline of Constitutional democracy remains an issue of debate among the scholars. Many political scientists have put forward their opinion regarding this. They are of the opinion that liberal democracy did not fail rather it was killed by Sukarno and the military. The dissolution of the constituent assembly and the reinstatement of the 1945 constitution have been taken as watershed events in the end of constitutional democracy and the beginning of the next period in Indonesian political history, that of Guided Democracy. From the idealist's perspective, the failure of constitutional democracy was the result of lack of democratic culture, and an insufficient economic base (Ikrar Bhakti, pp.197).

Guided Democracy

Demokrasi Terpimpin or the Guided Democracy concentrated power within the executive, particularly the President. While liberal democracy laid emphasis on the process, guided democracy emphasized the attainment of one of the major objective such as a just and prosperous society which according to him could be only achieved by a systematic and planned democracy. President Sukarno loved to call it Democracy with leadership. Guided democracy was implemented in Indonesia from July 1959 to October 1965. After six years, however the systematic and planned democracy failed to achieve a healthy economic system. Indonesia's economic situation was dire in 1965. Production had slowed dramatically. Exports and imports came to halt and hyperinflation of more than 600 percent crippled the country. This economic collapse was followed by a struggle for power between the army and the Indonesian Communist Party. The murder of six

army Generals and one lieutenant by a left wing elements in the army capped the political and economic chaos and led to the army coup on 11 March 1966 to bring down President Sukarno and his Guided democracy.⁸

Pancasila Democracy (1966-1998)

Pancasila democracy is a form of democracy guided by five principles of national ideology (Pancasila). When Suharto came to power he used the term Orde Baru or the 'New Order', and called Sukarno's Guided democracy Ore Lama, or the 'Old Order', which according to Suharto represented a rotten, bankrupt system. In the beginning it was hoped that New Order would start a fresh new era which was quite evident from some of the activities of the regime such as the releasing of the political detainees and freeing of the press by lifting restrictions that were previously levied on newspapers by Sukarno. In other words, a process of liberalization was introduced by Suharto (Ikrar Bhakti, pp.198).

As the years passed, however, the New Order moved slowly and surely in the direction of dictatorship. The Indonesian Communist Party and the Indonesian Nationalist Party could still make their voices heard and thus compete with the army. The New Order, in reaction, drifted towards a full military regime to stifle such dissenting voices. The Army created the so called Functional Group (Golongan Karya, or Golkar) as a political tool to gain legitimacy from the people through general elections.⁹ Suharto's ties to the Army started to weaken when he asked B.J.Habibie to establish and chair the Association of Indonesian Moselem Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia, or ICMI) in 1991. During the early period of 1990s, the rise of ICMI to power highlighted the division of the military into so called nationalists officers which were nicknamed as 'red and white officers'. These names were given to the divisions after the colours of the

⁸ On 11 March 1966 President Sukarno was forced by there army Generals to sign a letter transferring power to General Suharto. In Indonesia, Sukarno's letter was known as a Super Semar, an abbreviation of Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret ,(letter of Order of the March). However, from a Javanese Shadow puppet (wayang) story, semar is a rayal servants known for a powerful spirit and strength.

⁹ During the New Order period, Golkar was not seen formally as a political party but as a functional group, a strategy aimed at discrediting other political parties.

national flag as opposed to 'green officers'. The green colour was associated with Islam.¹⁰ After that, the political interests of the red and white Army became clearly different from those of Suharto (Ikrar Bhakti, pp. 199).

During the New Order period, Suharto's regime was outwardly a success. There was a long period of security and the maintenance of political and economic interest between Suharto and the Army. After the Indonesian economy collapsed in July 1997, national security and stability were upset by mass killings and riots in Jakarta in May 1998. At that point, military interest got highly diverged from those of the Suharto and his family which ultimately led to his downfall.

The Four Stages of Democratization Process:

The year 1998 in Indonesia has been marked by the organizing of public demonstrations started by student protesters which also marked the beginning of a historic transformation of Indonesia's political system. Forty years earlier, parliament was dissolved by Sukarno which brought an end to a period of multi party democracy. Then in the mid 1960s, the state control was absorbed by a military back Suharto's New Order regime. The Suharto group consolidated its control in the following years leading to the marginalizing of the independent societal forces that could impose a threat to his hold on power. For over decades a powerful state apparatus which was controlled by the elites tended to extend its authority throughout the archipelago. But in 1998 pro democracy activists directly confronted the state apparatus which forced President Suharto to resign. He was succeeded by Habibie who was the vice president during Suharto's regime. Habibie promised to hold free elections, and the new administration to permit open political competition between dozens of new political parties (Ian Chalmers, 2006).

The demands which were made by the Indonesian masses especially the Indonesian students for the introduction of reforms and establishment of democracy were not only

¹⁰ These divisions within the army were later on united.

demands for a political change of a regime, but it also demanded for a complete change of the existing political system which required an overhaul of all political, social and economic institution and relations, and the establishment of a stable framework within which democratic practices can take root. As Indonesia remained under authoritarian rule for more than four decades, so owing to this fact one cannot expect the immediate changes to take place immediately after the fall of the strong man after whose fall the country's political system due to the existence of chaos and disturbances tended to become vibrant. Thus, the expected changes could only take place in certain stages. Similarly, transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy is understood to take place within various phases. There are various phases that the Indonesian politics have undergone, such as, pre-transition, liberalization, democratic transition, and democratic consolidation (Klinken 1999).

The Pre Transitional and the Transitional Phase:

The first phase that is of pre-transition began during the period of Indonesia's economic crises in 1997. This period was marked with the emergence of large number of anti-Orde Baru or the anti New Order groups who aimed at establishing a reform movement that could act as political rival to the New Order regime. This period was also marked by the growing detention and rapid disappearances against the New Order political activities. Besides this the rapid economic crises also tended to worsened the image of the state and further led to the crumbling of the credibility of the New Order as a strong and powerful regime. These circumstances further paved the way for the growth of mass movements and social unrest in a number of provinces in the country. This unrest gained much of the flame as there occurred shootings of four Trisakti University students on May 12 1998. The shootings initiated strong criticism against Suharto and his New Order regime both domestically and internationally as well. The political turbulence led to the three days of social unrest in the days immediately following the shootings. This was followed by a student demonstration in Jakarta. The parliament was occupied by the students from May 18 1998 until the fall of Suharto on 21 May 1998. However with the fall of Suharto, the presidency was transferred to B.J. Habibie (Forrester and R,J. 1998). When Habibie came

to power , the whole country was on the verge of instability. Protests and demonstrations were the daily affairs. Thus when Habibie occupied the presidential office he had to fulfill the demands of the people. The most important demand of the people especially the student was a new democratic constitution. Another remarkable demand was for the reformation of the judiciary along with freedom from corruption, collusion and Nepotism. Another remarkable demand was regarding the involvement of the armed forces in the politics of the country. The people demanded that the Indonesian armed forces to be kept out of politics. This early stage of political transition from Suharto to Habibie also acted as an opening to the next stage of political liberalistaion from authoritarianism.

As mentioned above the transitional phase was marked with the introduction of liberalizing measures that were introduced by Habibie. However this period of transition was also marked by the withdrawal of old political laws and the implementation of new political laws(Bhakti pp 201). Besides this several democratic procedures such as provision for press freedom, free and fair elections, decentralization of the regional government and the release of political prisoners were also embraced by Habibie as the part of his reformation programme. The stage of political transition in Indonesia was also marked by its first genuinely democratic election since 1955. However the elections campaigns of 1999 were similar to those held in the Suharto period. The main difference was marked by the repolitization of the society. Another remarkable difference was marked by the freedom of media to report on elections. Besides this, the media also exercised great freedom in making reports on the activities of all the parties which also included live debates among the party candidates. The media politicians and the public experienced freedom in making any kind of criticism at the government. However the main themes of the election campaign remained the same as that in the New Order period such as improvement of the wages of the labouring classes, elimination of poverty, struggle for the justice and a more equal distribution of wealth. Although political liberalization was portrayed by Habibie as the first step in the transition towards democracy, however, he failed in maintaining his power. The main reason behind his failure to retain his power was that the Indonesian elites considered him close to the

authoritarian Suharto regime. In view of Harris the political liberalization under Habibie's administration was not seen as a sincere personal political conviction, rather as an expedient measure. It was believed by the people that Habibie would never have allowed freedom of press or the establishment of political parties without political pressure from the opposition particularly the university students (Haris 2002, pp.3-21).

The 1999 election that was held as a result of reform movement was won by the Indonesia Democrat Party of Struggle (PDIP) under Megawati Suaknoputri. The Golkar party was positioned as the runner up. It was in this election that B.J.Habibie lost his chance to be reelected as president by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) because the Assembly rejected his accountability speech. However, although PDIP under Megawati Sukarnoputri emerged as an electoral winner, but Abdurrahman Wahid was elected by the MPR as the fourth president of Indonesia. In this context Larry Diamond labells this era of transition in Indonesia as "falling into a gray area of democracy, that is neither clearly democratic nor clearly undemocratic" (Diamond, 2000: 641). Again in this context Ikrar Bhakti writes, "However, Indonesia's system is , in some ways, disorderly, and may not reflect the will of the people. Megawati, who came ahead in the general election, was choosen only as Vice President, and not President causing much anger among her supporters (Bhakti, 203).

The transition period was also marked by an existence of compromise between authoritarian and democratic powers. Besides this the system based on the 1945 constitution also did not represent a clear relationship between the parliament and the president. As both the parliament and the president possessed equal constitutional powers that often resulted in the conflicts between these two branches of the government. The government that emerged from the 1999 election was comprised of a loose coalition of parties like PDIP because of Megawati Sukarnoputri's role as the Vice President. One of the most important concerns with this coalition government was that it became the matter of concern that whether the government would be fragile because it was formed by an unsteady and adhoc coalition with Abdurrahman himself coming from a minority grouping within this loose coalition. In the view of Bhakti, "The Abdurrahman Wahid

government had to face one of the paradoxes of democratic transition, when New Order groups, both through parties such as the former ruling party, Golkar and through powerful individuals had to be accommodated because of their important and economic roles (Bhakti, 202).

In this context Liddle presents some of the important preconditions required for the consolidated democratic regime. According to him, “when no significant national, social, economic, political or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a non democratic regime or by seceding from the state. A democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion, even in the midst of major economic problems and deep dissatisfaction with incumbents, holds the belief that of democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life and when support for anti system alternatives is quite small or is more or less isolated from pro-democratic forces. Constitutionally a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and a governmental forces become subject to as well as habituated to the resolution of conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and institutions that are sanctioned by the new democratic process” (Liddle 2001:p.28). However, Abdurrahman Wahid administration failed in providing these preconditions as mentioned above by Liddle. Political crises continued to maintain their pressure and were marked by the clashes of interest between the parties and the cabinet. Wahid’s presidency failed in gaining the mass support. Ultimately he was brought down by a coalition of forces. A special Assembly was held in July 2001 in the parliament to impeach Wahid. The impeachment of Wahid opened the gate for Megawati to gain the presidency. As such she became the fifth president of Indonesia. However, the new administration under Megawati also began to face serious challenges to its own legitimacy. These challenges included the lack of domestic economic recovery, security problems and international criticism regarding its efforts in eradication of terrorism. Thus, the political situation continued to be fraught with problems since there were no clear decisions on constitutional amendments. Besides this, although Indonesia has a presidential system, yet there was also the provision for the impeachment of the president. However the amendments and reforms introduced in the transitional phase made the president stronger

in comparison to the parliament which ultimately made the impeachment of the president difficult.

Thus during its transitional phase Indonesia had moved forward and have also created the environment where the democratic procedures could take place. It was during the transitional phase of democratic process in Indonesia that the Indonesian political elites introduced comprehensive constitutional and legislative reforms that democratized the structure of the representative and executive institutions as well as the political process. These reforms included an effective separation of powers, an enhancement of the electoral system and the facilitation of political participation. The main practical achievements of the democratization process during the transitional phase was the holding up of the 1999 and 2004 and recently the 2009 elections which were free and fair and the peaceful rotations of the presidential power especially with the introduction of direct presidential elections and the successful implementation of the same in the 2004 elections which resulted in the strengthening the consolidation process in Indonesia (Abdulbaki 2008).

The Consolidation Phase:

The political process in post-Suharto Indonesia has been predominantly characterized by the establishment of frequent, free and fair elections, effective elected officials, separation of powers, inclusive suffrage, freedom of expression, independence of the media and associational autonomy. Thus the 2004 parliamentary and direct presidential elections have been considered by many of the observers as the start of the process of democratic consolidation in Indonesia where the democratic electoral process and peaceful alternation of power have become established practices. A few months before the 2004 elections, an opinion poll in order to assess the political culture of the Indonesian electorate was conducted by the Asia Foundation which finally concluded with the assertion that, democracy has begun to take root in Indonesia. According to the Asia Foundation's report, electoral credibility was no longer a real concern at that stage, and the priority was shifted towards the promotion of democratic consolidation

(“Democracy in Indonesia: A Survey of the Indonesian Electorate”, The Asia Foundation Report, November 2003: pp. 27-28). In view of other scholars such as Azra who also considers the 2004 elections as the end of the transitional phase of Indonesian democracy (Azra 2006). Hence, it can be assumed that Indonesia has completed its phase of democratic transition and has entered in to the phase of consolidation of its democracy.

Besides this, a number of criterias have been proposed by several scholars with the purpose to evaluate the extent to which Indonesia’s democratic process has been consolidated and institutionalized. In the view of these scholars two primary elements are required for the consolidating the democracy. These are the elimination of all other alternatives contradictory to democracy that may compete with the democratic norms along with the commitment of all the important political images of the country to the democratic rules without being concern of the outcome which may not be in the fovour of their own political position. In the view of Przeworski, democracy can be regarded as consolidated when it becomes the only game in town, where no one can imagine action outside the democratic institutions all the loser wants to do is to try again within the same institutions under which they have just lost, all relevant political forces find it best to continue to submit their interests and values to the uncertain interplay of the institutions(Przeworski 1991: 26). Similar criteria has been proposed by Schneider and Schmitter for the consolidation of democracy, according to whom the developing of ‘mutual trust and reassurance among the relevant actors’, where the process of ‘contingent consent’ becomes institutionalized, that is, an established or accepted part of the political structure (Schneider and Schmitter, 2004: 61).

As the issue of democratic consolidation has been a highly contested concept in Indonesia. Thus Donnell has proposed some constituents that can support and enhanced the process of democratic consolidation in the country. These constituents as proposed by Donnell are: (1) the elimination of all authoritarian legacies and undemocratic alternatives, (2) the unequivocal and consistent commitment of all significant political actors to the democratic rules of the game, (3) the occurrence of at least one democratic rotation of power, (4) the routinisation and institutionalization of democratic practices

and procedures and (5) the development of a strong majority of public support for upholding the democratic system. All these constituents proposed by Donnell are basically concerned with democratic survival and which can play a significant role in the elimination and the prevention of democratic breakdown (Donnell, 1992:17) In short it can be said that the existence of these criterias in Indonesian political spectrum can produce a deeper and high quality democracy in the country.

While looking into the recent political developments in the country it can said that despite visible presence of some of the important challenges with regard to the deepening and institutionalization of the democratic practice, that Indonesia today possesses most of the characteristics of a consolidated democracy. The primitive years of the post Suharto reform era was marked by the heavy involvement and efforts made by the pro reform political actors in eliminating the Suharto era authoritarian legacies. The removal of the New Order restrictions on political participation and freedom and the opening up of the gate for free and fair electoral contestations encouraged the pro democracy members of the 1999 parliament to embark upon a democratization campaign. In this context Abdalbaki writes, "In one battle after another, the reform-minded leaders who were determined to complete and stabilize the democratic transition defeated the anti-democracy actors and forces of the status quo. With the total elimination of non-elected parliamentary members, especially with regard to the military's reserved seats, Indonesia's representative and legislative institutions became fully democratized" (Abdalbaki, 2008: p.161). Besides this, the military without making any significant resistance accepted the new democratic rules which ultimately led to the lessening of its role in the politics of the country. In addition to the military's acceptance to the new rules, several significant political actors belonging to the Islamic groups also showed their commitment to the democratic norms which greatly minimized the threat of breaking down of democratic norms in the country. In short the post Suharto era was marked by the absence of emergence of any antidemocratic figures which may obstruct the democratic development by advocating anti democratic activities and objectives. In fact, post-Suharto Indonesia did not see the emergence of any significant deviant or anti-

democratic actors with access to substantial resources and support that could be invested in advocating anti-democratic activities and objectives.

Furthermore, since the instigation of the democratic transition, Indonesia's advancement towards the consolidation of its democracy has been marked by peaceful rotations of power. The three presidential alternations occurred as the result of democratic votes in parliament for Abdurrahman Wahid (1999) and Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001) or of direct presidential elections for Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004 till date). The transition of presidential authority in each of these rotations was peaceful. Besides this, the constitutional balance of power between the legislative and executive branches of government and the highly successful implementation of democratic government rotations acted as an essential element of democratic consolidation in preventing the emergence of any kind of presidential dictatorship (Abdulbaki, 2008: p.162).

However, one of the most important challenges that Indonesia has to address in order to join the rank of consolidated democracies has been the requirement of an ability to implement full civilian control or supremacy over the military (Aguero, 1997: 177). The extent to which the Indonesian military also known as Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI has been able to maintain its influence, formally or informally, over government policies is the matter of consideration. Historically, the TNI formally known as Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia or ABRI has occupied a central position in political and social life, where under both Sukarno's and Suharto's regimes, it maintained its traditional dual political and military role. The military's doctrine of *DwiFungsi* or the dual function which was laid down by the Chief of Staff Nasution in 1957 when he formulated the theory of a middle road was used to legitimize the dominant role of the military in society (Koekebakker, 1994).

Under Suharto's New Order regime, military officers held key ministerial and bureaucratic positions and were also allocated 20% of the seats in the legislature and were able to maintain control of local government through the use of its command structure which was organized on a territorial basis throughout the entire country

providing a parallel to governmental structures (Koekebakker, 1994). Besides this, along with exercising control on the politics, the military also enjoyed full control over the economy of the country as well. The military has maintained a web of commercial business ventures since 1957, when it took control of Dutch-owned enterprises. These commercial enterprises enabled the TNI to sustain an independent financial system, which remained beyond government scrutiny or civil oversight (Rabasa and Haseman, 2002). Thus the military's control over the budgetary of Indonesia tended to become one of the most important obstacles slowing the pace of the process of consolidation of democracy in the post Suharto Indonesia. "In fact, the military's financial autonomy, which remains outside government control, makes it harder for the 'civil authorities to engage in meaningful oversight of the military. As a result, the government lacks the power to demand accountability from its armed forces and to implement needed reforms'" ("Too High a price: The Human Rights Costs of the Indonesian military's Economic Activities," Human Rights Watch, 18 (5(c)): 2006).

However, despite the above mentioned challenges many positive steps have been taken under the post Suharto democratization process to promote the return of the military to the barracks and to establish civil control and supremacy over it. After the fall of Suharto, the military quickly joined the reform efforts. It also reconsidered its doctrine of dual function. Thus under such circumstances, military relinquished its dual function and withdrew itself from its political role. Besides this, the new constitutional amendments have also eliminated the military's representation in the legislatures. Thus, since the 2004 elections, the military exercises no hold over the appointed seats in the parliament. In addition to this, the police force has also been separated from the military and removed from its control. Military officers are no longer allowed to occupy positions in the bureaucracy where as the civilians have been appointed as ministers of defense. Most importantly, a new law was introduced in 2004 which mandated the end of the military's economic activity. It also transferred the business holdings of the military into the control of the Indonesian government ("U.S. House of Representatives calls for Human Rights Accountability and Military Reform in Indonesia," Paras Indonesia, 26 June: 2007; "Too High a Price: The Human Rights Cost of the Indonesian military's Economic Activities,"

Human Rights Watch, 2006). Besides this the 2004 military reform law also limited the financial sources of the TNI to the state's budget also acted as an important step towards the full assertion of civilian control over the military.

The steady progress of military reforms had also made many observers to believe that these reforms will eventually led to the consignment of the military to the barracks which has been one of the most important need of the time that the Indonesian politics needed in its journey towards democratic consolidation(Juoro, 2006). Thus on account of above discussion it can be assumed that if there occurs the total elimination of the military's reserved representation in the parliament along with the prohibition of military personal from taking positions in the beurocracy and with the removal of the military's control over the police, the journey of democratic consolidation in Indonesia would be easier as these restrictions on the military can overweight the remaining challenges. In this context it has been argued by Barron that, "with its consistent autonomous stance and support of the formal political process, the military has contributed positively to the ongoing security reforms required to consolidate democracy in Indonesia" (Barron etal., 2005: 34).

With regard to the criteria of the institutionalization of democratic practices and procedures, Indonesia's democracy demonstrates elements of both strengths and weaknesses. Several weaknesses were witnessed in this regard during the 2004 legislative elections. Although the 2004 elections themselves were remarkably peaceful, well organized and, as mentioned above, are largely regarded as an important step towards the consolidation of democracy. Barron, for example, although agrees that the 2004 elections were free, fair and transparent and an emphasis has also been made that the 2004 elections highlighted the serious institutional weaknesses and demonstrated a need for capacity-building, increased professionalism and broader social engagement on the part of state actors',(Barron etal.,2005). The weakness of the institutionalization of democratic practices can also be identified through the lack of party platforms in election campaigns. Almost all Indonesian political parties rely mainly on charismatic leadership rather than political programs and policies in order to attract the electoral vote.The

removal of the restriction on the formation of political parties inspired the emergence of many new Islamic-oriented parties. These parties adopted Islam as their ideological basis. They used Islamic symbols to attract the Muslim vote and also relied heavily on Islamic social organizations for electoral support. About 21 out of 42 newly formed Islamic parties were amongst the 48 parties that met the legal requirements for participating in the 1999 legislative elections (Azra, 2006). However, Muslim leaders and Islamic parties have played a constructive role in facilitating and stabilizing Indonesia's peaceful transition to democracy. Indonesian Islamic parties have participated in building political alliances, contested in elections in a peaceful democratic manner and always accepted the outcomes of parliamentary elections and legislative deliberations. With the exception of the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan ,PPP), which was one of the three Suharto-era political parties alongside Golkar and PDI-P, the newly formed popular Islamic parties were founded by former leaders and activists of Islamic social organizations and movements, such as the NU, Muhammadiyah, the Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia [DDII]) and Islamic student groups (Abdulbaki 2008: p. 165). Islamic parties rely heavily on these and other less prominent Islamic movements and organizations for their membership base and electoral support. Four of the eight most popular Indonesian parties in the 2004 elections were in fact Islamic oriented. Three of them were established in the post-Suharto era. They included the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional [PAN]), the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa [PKB]) and the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera [PKS]). Among these parties the PKS was the only Indonesian party which was successful in obtaining significant growth in the 2004 elections. PAN was established in 1998 by Amien Rais, with the assistance of a group of anti- Suharto reform activists, after his few unsuccessful attempts to form a broad alliance with Islamic modernist organizations. Rais was viewed by many Indonesian and foreign observers as a leader 'who could unite some of the more disparate elements of modernist politics' (Fealy and Platzdasch, 2005: 73-99). Rais included non Muslims especially the Christian Chinese in his party and promoted pluralism rather than adopting Islamist agenda. This was mainly done as an attempt to make an appeal to the broader national electorate and to present the image of himself as of a liberal and pluralist leader (Budiman, 1999). PAN

adopted Pancasila as its ideological basis. However, the adaptation of Pancasila as its ideological basis for PAN, does not represent any kind of an insensitivity to Islamic aspirations. Rather, it was asserted by Rais himself that it signifies the belief that the five principles do not contradict Islamic tenets (Schwarz, 1999). Islam continued to remain as the predominant characteristic of PAN, because it has been closely associated and was dominated by the modernist Muslim community. Thus according to Schwarz and Diederich, despite the adoption of Pancasila principles by PAN, it continued to be an Islamic party and which makes it more appropriately situated to be kept in the Islamic camp, and thus it should be included in the category of Islamic parties rather than the nationalist or secular camp (Schwarz, 1999; Diederich, 2002). The PKB, on the other hand, was founded in July 1998 by Abdurrahman Wahid's loyalist members of the Nahdatul Ulama. PKB's adoption of Pancasila as its official ideological basis largely reflected Wahid's pluralist political and religious views. Despite the fact that the PKB aspires to be viewed as a non-sectarian party which welcomes non-Islamic elements within its leadership board and membership base, despite being predominantly dominated by NU members, it primarily represented the traditionalist Islamic community in Indonesia (Mietzner, 1999; Jakarta Post, 6 March: 2000). Thus on the basis of the ideological basis adopted by these Islamist parties which made PAN to be included in the Islamist party camp, similarly PKB should also be included in the same camp rather than in the secular nationalist camp. The PKS was founded in July 1998 and contested the 1999 elections under the name Justice Party (Partai Keadilan, PK). The party was reconstituted as the Prosperous Justice Party in April 2003 because in the 1999 election it failed to meet the 2% electoral threshold required to qualify for participation in the 2004 election. Whereas the PKB and the PAN primarily rely on historical mass-based Islamic organizations, the PKS represented itself as the new social forces that emerged during the 1980s and 1990s in response to Suharto's repressive policies towards Islamic activism. (Mietzner, 1999b). In contradiction to the other political parties who represented themselves as being plagued by the corruption, the PKS made emphasis on merit rather than personal loyalties and adopted a clear political program with a consistent anti-corruption approach. Although, like other parties, it also made attempts to increase its membership but it also continued to consider itself as the cadre party and thus strictly

avoided the inclusion of leaders and activities who according to him in the long run may damage the party's image (Nurwahid and Zulkieflimansyah, 2003). Therefore, looking at the results of both 2004 and 2009 elections we can find that from the eight major political parties that contested both the 1999 and 2004 elections, the PKS was the only party which managed to considerably increase its share of the vote. As such, as in the view of Bruinessen, by initiating a policy-oriented competition, which may lead other parties to follow suite, and providing a successful alternative to patrimonial politics, the PKS may lead to the institutionalization of political parties and 'contribute to a gradual democratization' and consolidation (Bruinessen, 2003). Further the surveys that were held with the purpose to view the public attitude on the other hand demonstrated other important and positive points of democratic consolidation in Indonesia. According to two mass surveys conducted in 2001 and 2002 by the Centre for the Study of Islam and Society at the State Islamic University of Syarif Hidayatullah (PPIM-UIN), a strong majority of Indonesian Muslims supported the idea of upholding the democratic system. The data collected on the basis of these surveys held mentions that about 70% of all respondents supported the idea that democracy in relation to the other forms of government as the best option for the country' (Mujani,2004: 241). This presented a strong indication that the Indonesian public is not likely to lend support to any potential undemocratic alternative, which thus minimizes the threats of democratic breakdown and enhances the prospects of democratic consolidation in the country. Thus, on the basis of above discussion it can be assumed that as the democratic breakdown has become quite unlikely in Indonesia, it can be asserted that Indonesia's democracy will survive and will also continue to progress into a deeper and higher quality (Vruce 2009).

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CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

Indonesian society is old and it is extremely complex. Several different levels of social evolution co-exist in the modern Indonesia which is marked by the interaction of indigenous cultures, along with external influences of Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Dutch colonial rule, and a powerful nationalistic independence movement. Indonesia was a Dutch colony since 1799 until World War II when it was occupied by Japan. However, with the efforts of Sukarno and other nationalist leaders, Indonesia got independence from Dutch in 1949 and since then there started a struggle for establishing democracy. In the process of establishing democracy, Indonesia had different kind of democratic establishment in a three different time and epoch. These were the Parliamentary democracy, Guided democracy and lastly the Pancasila democracy under Suharto's New Order regime. The third Constitution of Indonesia that was promulgated on 15 August 1950 was based on the system of parliamentary democracy. The period of parliamentary democracy has been also called as constitutional democracy or Liberal democracy. Parliamentary democracy created a platform for the common people to participate in the politics. Under this system, the political parties gained importance, and the contenders of power also showed great respect for the rules of the game which were closely related to the existing constitutions. Besides this most of the members of the political elites also showed their commitment to symbols connected with constitutional democracy. Under this new constitution, the republic acted as a constitutional state of unitary structure in which the sovereign power was exercised by the executive and a unicameral house of representatives and the responsibility of the government was vested with the ministers. However, Indonesia failed in creating a viable political system which can be traced out in the failure of seven cabinets that assumed the office during the period of only seven years. Although the parliamentary democracy could gain some success but it was only in the years before the elections of 1955 were held. The supremacy of the parliament was accepted and development policies were presented by the ministers in the parliament where serious discussions were made on important issues. However, the working of the parliament was obstructed at times by the interference of the non-parliamentary forces such as the army and the president in the politics of the country who often contradicted the decisions made by the parliament related to national interest. The period of

parliamentary democracy was also marked by the absence of unity and consensus among the political parties which led to the failure of coalitions and falling up of cabinet after cabinet. This had wide range of impact on the parliamentary system which led to the decline of the party system along with hampering the working of the parliamentary democracy. The failure of the party system to gain absolute majority in the parliament made them to utilize the extra parliamentary forces like the president and the army who in turn utilized the parties in furthering their own interest. Thus, the liberal democracy proved to be a failure due to a series of events that prevented the consolidation of the democratic impulse. There were several leaders who advocated authoritarian political values. The most notable feature of the constitution was the vague relationship between key state institutions which allowed the president to dominate both the chambers namely the People's Representative Council (DPR) and the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR).

The period of Constitutional Democracy also indicated the evolution of the political system that could overcome the weakness of this young democracy. The parties were structured in such a way in which the power for making decisions was vested with the party leaders who were not required to get their decisions to be approved by any organization. The elite nature of the parties limited the extent to which they could become institutions for translating social demands into political programs. However it was also the time of mass politicization which ultimately deepened the people's involvement in political activity of the country. This created brighter hopes among the politicians and general public for liberal democracy. Efforts began to bear fruits in 1955. General elections were held and broad population became engaged in political activity. But the three political events intervened to stagnate this process. First, the 1955 elections revealed a geographical shift in political power away from the Outer islands that altered the balance of power within the parliament. Second, the PKI made steady progress both in electoral terms and in terms of its internal organizational strength, particularly in areas in which their chief rivals were Santri Muslim Landowners. The third factor that paved the way for the end of the liberal democracy and new political system was the personality and personal political ambitions of Sukarno himself. He held the view that Western

derived forms could not give expression to Indonesia's national character. He was also not happy with a political system in which he was a nominal leader but was unable to exert an influence. In early 1957, Sukarno imposed his own conception for an alternative form of government. Thus, it was the constitutional weakness of the political parties that was critical in allowing the rapid collapse of liberal democracy. Eventually, the parliamentary democracy was replaced by Sukarno's Guided democracy in 1957.

So in 1957 Sukarno introduced a new kind of political practice in Indonesia, popularly called Guided democracy. It remained in practice till 1966. It was the first serious effort to bring changes in the Indonesian political system to stabilize its governance by the President Sukarno. It was based on the traditional village system of discussion and consensus, which took place under the guidance of village elders. Under this system, threefold blend of nationalism (nationalism), Agama (religion), and Komunisme (Communism) into a cooperative NASAKOM government was proposed by him who aimed at to appease the three factions of the Indonesian politics namely the Army, Islamic groups and the Communist. Besides this, it also concentrated power within the executive, particularly the president. In contrast to the constitutional democracy it laid emphasis on the attainment of creating a just and prosperous society. In July 1959, the 1945 constitution was reestablished by Sukarno by the Presidential edict. It gave way for the presidential system which corroborated the principles of Guided democracy. In March 1960, the electoral assembly was dissolved and was replaced by the Gotong Royong Parliament.

The 1945 constitution was revived which was implemented by Guided democracy, which ultimately made the President more executively powerful, as a result of which, the President remained no more responsible to the DPR. Thus with the inauguration of the Guided Democracy under Sukarno, the elected parliament was suspended and a new appointed one was installed which was dominated by the functional group representatives and made decisions based on consensus. This largely undermined the role of the political parties within it. In addition to, the period of Guided Democracy was also marked by the rising conflicts between the army and the communist. PKI emerged as the strongest party

in Indonesia after the elimination of Masjumi and it also rendered active support to Sukarno in accelerating the implementation of Guided democracy. The army on the other hand had occupied an important place on the basis of its role played in the nationalist movement against the Dutch to win Indonesia's independence from the Dutch colonial rule. The role of military in Indonesian politics was further enhanced with the declaration of the martial law. The rising influence of both PKI and the army in the country's politics created enmity between the two. Both acted as counter force against each other. On the part of Sukarno, as he did not wanted to antagonize either of the two as he himself needed the support of them to maintain his own power, so he tried to maintain the balance of power between the two organizations. In his attempt, as on the one hand he protected the communist and their mass organizations from open repression of the army, on the other hand he also made several attempts to put a check on the increasing power of the PKI so as to make it more dependent on him and to gain more support from it in the meantime making it less powerful to challenge his own authority. However the events of 1965 brought momentous changes in Indonesia's political structures. The old balance that Sukarno maintained between the army and the PKI became impossible to retain. This led directly to the elimination of the PKI from the political stage resulting in the downfall and political importance of President Sukarno. As a result of such political crises, General Suharto emerged as the new power holder backed by the physical force of the army. This led to the emergence of the army as the dominant force and decline of the power of the various civilian groups. The coup attempt of the September 30th movement which brought with itself the downfall of Sukarno and his Guided Democracy thus appeared to be the watershed in Indonesian politics.

The PKI's involvement in the coup acted as a contributing factor for the ending up of the old era and the Guided democracy implemented by Sukarno. The end of the Guided democracy marked the turning point in the politics of Indonesia with the inauguration of the signified New Order regime with introduction of the Pancasila democracy under Suharto's New Order. The events of 1965 -1966 and the foundation of Suharto's New Order marked the restoration of conservative social forces. Suharto's rise to power also provided road for the adoption of oligarchic ideas and eventual representation of New

Order Indonesia. In its development until its downfall in May 1998, the political format adopted by Suharto under his New Order brought devastating effects on democratic aspiration and practices in the country. It was during the period of New Order and for the first time in post independent Indonesia, that the majority of the people were both legally and systematically deprived from their basic political rights. However, despite this during the New Order period, Suharto's regime was a success. This was mainly because of the existence of security and maintenance of political and economic interests between Suharto and the army. However, this could not be maintained further as after the Indonesian economy collapsed in July 1997, national security and stability were upset by mass killings and riots in Jakarta in May 1998. As a result of this, military interest tended to diverged from that of Suharto which ultimately led to his downfall. By May 1998, there were demonstrations all over Indonesia. Students led demonstrations demanded for greater democracy, while the urban poor fought for the removal of the subsidies on basic commodities and soaring prices. As a result of such instability, the Jakarta elites who have previously gave their full support to Suharto also turned against him and convinced Suharto to step down. Suharto's resignation resulted in favor of his deputy Vice President B.J. Habibie. With Habibie coming to power, Indonesia entered into a new era of reformation and transition. The transition phase was marked with the introduction of liberalizing measures that were introduced by Habibie. However the new President had to face several obstacles which prevented him from being an effective leader to carry out comprehensive reforms demanded by the people. He was forced to make wholesale changes. In his attempts to introduce reforms, a number of democratic procedures, such as provisions for press freedom, free and fair elections, the decentralization of regional government and the release of political prisoners were introduced by Habibie. Despite his efforts, however the process of recovering the political and economic crises remained slow. As Habibie was the Vice President during the New Order regime, he was seen by the people too closed to authoritarian Suharto. Thus his this image made Habibie incapable of gaining public support which was the most important requirement for his interim government which prevented him from introducing reforms. Thus Habibie failed in overcoming the most important obstacles namely the absence of public confidence to his government.

Although Habibie successfully portrayed political liberalization as the first step in the transition towards democracy, he failed to maintain his power because of his failure in overcoming and eliminating the most important obstacle which was in the face of the presence of absence of public confidence to his government. Also the political liberalization under the administration was not seen as a sincere personal conviction, but rather as an expedient measure. It was believed that Habibie would never have allowed freedom of press or the establishment of the political parties without political pressure from the opposition particularly university students. On the positive side during the Habibie period, no serious efforts was made to resume past human rights atrocities which were previously practiced by the New Order regime. Besides this, transitional phase of democratization in the country was also marked with the introduction of a number of comprehensive and legislative reforms that tended to democratize the structure of the representative and executive institution as well as the political process. These reforms included the effective separation of powers along with the enhancement of the electoral system and promoting people's participation in the politics of the country.

However, the transitional phase of Indonesian democratization was marked by remarkable achievements gained during the Indonesian democratization process such as the introduction of a series constitutional amendment, a number of new statues and legislative revisions which were to govern the new political processes and restructuring of the state institutions. These revisions and amendments tended particularly to modify the structure of Indonesia's representative and legislative institutions both at the national and regional local levels. They also removed restrictions on political participation, permitted the formation of new political parties and enhanced the electoral rules and processes. Other important reforms also included the guarantee of the freedom of expression, associational autonomy and the independence of the media. As such after the fall of Suharto, MPR emerged as a prominent player in promoting democratization process in Indonesia. It also facilitated the peaceful rotations of presidential power three times before the introduction of the direct presidential elections. The MPR also forced president Habibie to withdraw from the presidential race when it rejected his

accountability speech. The MPR also managed to impeach president Wahid after he lost the support of his former allies, in favor of his vice president Megawati Sukarnoputri. Consequently the elimination of the possible reemergence of a new presidential dictatorship was one of the most important achievements that allowed the democratic transition to remain consistent and steady in Indonesia. In addition to these, several new important measures were also introduced that liberalized the political system and expressed Habibie's intention to conduct free and fair elections. Remarkably, it can be said that a reformed government was thus led by Habibie which by and large managed to liberalize the political process at a time when the status quo and Suharto loyalist forces were still very strong and determined to prevent any meaningful reforms to be introduced in the country.

The transitional phase also witnessed the withdrawal of old political laws and the implementation of the new political laws. Reform on election laws can be considered as the most important achievements of Habibie's government and certainly was the most important step that facilitated the process of democratization in Indonesia. The 1999 election laws provided for the establishment of an independent General Election Commission (KPU), the membership of which included representatives of political parties participating in the General Elections and five governmental officials. Despite some defects the three political laws passed by the parliament provided a strong basis for a multi party system and by and large free and fair elections. Consequently these political laws were broadly accepted by the major political parties and leaders who agreed to participate in the elections.

Thus with the fall of Suharto in May 1998, Indonesia entered into the era of reforms. The authoritarian regime was terminated and replaced by a democratic process as manifested in 1999 elections. It is significant that Indonesia the World's third largest Muslim country, took major steps towards the consolidation of democratic institutions and promoted the notion of citizenry participation in the country's politics. In these context several changes to the constitution were introduced over the years, which led to the increasing the role of DPR in the government. Besides this, these changes also clarified

the division of powers between the parliament and the president. These changes largely eliminated the power of the MPR and the power to elect the president was given into the hands of the people through direct election. Thus under this system the president was no longer to calculate the political balance in the DPR but was to govern with the legitimacy of a popular mandate. The separation of the parliamentary and presidential elections and greatly reducing the role of the MPR, the constitutional reforms also created a new assembly designed to increase the participation of the regions in the national governance. The electoral system for the level one and level two regional assemblies replicated the system for the nations levels DPR election.

The reforms to the electoral system introduced since 1999, which included the introduction of direct presidential election that was further implemented in the 2004 elections, a change in voting system for the parliament (DPR) and the creation of a new regional assembly (DPD), were the important refinements and legislative framework of democratic politics in Indonesia. Like all the electoral processes, the new system was not entirely neutral in its political effects. The reforms were introduced in such a way that perpetuated the highly central used control of political parties by existing elites while apparently it also offered increased choice for the voters. Besides this, the Constitutional reforms also introduced the broad principle of direct presidential election and the DPR was given the power of putting the principle into effect. The legislative power of the DPR gave it the responsibility to decide exactly what kind of electoral system would be adopted for both parliament and the president. Thus the political parties currently in control of the DPR were granted wide scope to influence their own future political fortunes. Thus in many ways the instability of the Post Suharto period was principally due to the nature of political parties and leaders that came to power following the resignation of the strongman who held power for more than 32 years.

Thus, in an attempt to create a democratic society, the annual session of the MPR provided for the direct presidential election of all the members of the House of Representatives. This new system also encompassed a number of new features. One of the most important feature was that the power of the MPR to elect the President and the

Vice President of the country was minimized to some extent. As previously it was the function of the MPR to elect the President and the Vice President but now as a result of the introduction of these reforms, the right to elect the top two positions in the country was given to the people of Indonesia. Now it was the right of the people to elect their President and Vice President by a direct vote. Also the election of the president and the vice president was to be held after the general elections. Another important feature of this system was that, unless a candidate won a simple majority and garnered the majority of votes that is 50+1 percent, a second round was to be held between the two leading candidates to decide the winner. Besides this, the political party or the coalition of political parties was to nominate the candidates for the post of president and vice president. In order to actualize the new electoral system, a number of laws were passed by the the House of Representatives. These laws and regulations involved the registrations of the political parties, organizations of the general presidential and vice presidential elections, composition of the House of Representatives, provincial and regency legislatures, the constitutional court as well as the mandate of the General Election Commission (KPU).

The changes that were introduced with regard to the direct presidential election were quite significant. These changes minimized the power of the MPR which before the introduction of these changes acted as the arbiter of nation's president, vice president and even the progenitor of the broad guidelines of State policies. In many ways MPR by passing the amendments and revisions, curbed its own power as far as the election of the president and vice president was concerned. Previously people's sovereignty was exercised through the MPR, who were now to directly exercise it in the election of the president and vice president. The President no more remained at the mercy of the MPR, as the new electoral system promoted the rise of a strengthened presidency even though there was a clearer separation of powers between the executive, legislature and judiciary. Hence, the direct mandate from the people resulted in greater legitimacy and strengthening of the political authority of the president and vice president.

Besides this, there was a certain degree of depreciation in the importance of political parties in the country. Even though, they remained important in the nomination of the candidates for the post of president and the vice president, the DPR and DPD. Thus, a president and vice president directly sanctioned by the people were likely to affect the balance of power of the three key elements of the political system. Thus this provided for the strong prosperity for the rise of the imperial presidency in the context of domestic politics. Thus, in this new electoral system, the two aspects determined the final outcome namely the system of presidential election and the criteria utilized by the voters to elect the eventual winner, as the system was based on the direct election and in which political parties were expected to prefer the best candidate and the factor that constituted the best was the power of the people who played a major role in determining the eventual winner and hence Indonesia's winner.

The June 7, 1999, elections were the first democratic elections ever held in Indonesia since 1955. The election of 1999 was accompanied by simultaneous elections held for legislatures in 25 provinces and more than 300 districts and municipalities in which ninety percent of the registered voters turned out for the three level elections. These elections of 1999 were conducted peacefully and were relatively fair. As such these elections can be regarded as the only second free elections held in Indonesia's history. The 1999 elections also marked the reemergence of aliran politics in the country. The general elections which were held in June 1999 and the presidential elections in October 1999 gave rise to a new group of political leaders who were vested with the responsibility to guide Indonesia's transition into a democracy. As such, the 1999 elections can be considered to mark the beginning of democratic tradition within the Indonesian politics. The struggle between supporters of authoritarian and democratic tendencies had continued throughout the decade but was eventually won by the latter. The outcome of the elections of 1999 was the recognition at the political level of Indonesia's political and cultural diversity. In the ensuing presidential election, Habibie withdrew his candidacy, and with the support of Golkar and the ABRI faction, Abdurrehman Wahid was elected president.

The 2004 elections in Indonesia marked beginning of growing democratization and maturity of the Indonesian voters. The 2004 legislative and direct Presidential elections also ended the phase of transition to democracy and marked the beginning of the phase of democratic consolidation in Indonesian politics. The remarkable feature of the 2004 election was that it enabled the Indonesian masses to elect their President by providing them the opportunity to elect their President by a direct vote. This was for the first time in Indonesian history during the 2004 elections that Indonesia had a president who was directly elected by the people. These elections were seen by the people as well as by the international community as democratic fair and peaceful. The 2004 elections represented the democratic process where the Indonesians exerted their political rights to make their choice without being influenced or pressured by their social and political groupings. This was the third democratic election and the first direct presidential election in Indonesia's history. The 2004 elections were a victory for Indonesia's democracy as they were conducted peacefully. Thus the 2004 elections brought Indonesians near to democracy. The elections also represented a further step towards the consolidation of democratic politics in Indonesia as well as the launching of a new system for electing the parliament and the president. Thus the 2004 elections highlighted the emergence of new constitutional arrangements along with a new balance of power between the parliament and the president in Indonesia. The results of the elections were in the favor of Sushilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The inauguration of President Yudhoyono and vice president Jusuf Kalla took place on 20 October 2004 at the legislature complex in Jakarta. Their inauguration marked a major step forward in Indonesian democratic transition.

The 2009 parliamentary elections that followed the elections held in 1999 and 2004 marked a further consolidation of Indonesian democracy as well as it also marked the return of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and his Democrat Party for his second term as the President of Indonesia. The 2009 elections also revealed the Indonesian masses willingness and their strong and increasing preference for secular nationalist parties over Islamic parties. The elections held in 2009 further consolidated Indonesian democracy and marked a continued preference by Indonesian voters for secular- nationalist parties rather than Islamic or Islamist political parties. President Yudhoyono won the presidential

election of July 2009 with a strong mandate. Thus, this enabled him to pursue a reformist agenda in his second term as president. The outcome of the presidential election of 2009, which brought the return of President Yudhoyono with a strong mandate to the office of the presidency marked the continued development of Indonesia's democracy and civil society and also provided road for the Indonesian politics to move away from past authoritarian government. Indonesian voters continued to pursue reformation policies. The 2009 election also marked the further transformation of Indonesian political parties.

Besides this the strong performance by the Democrat Party and other national secular parties in 2009 parliamentary elections indicated that the Islamist political fortunes were declining and not rising as had been feared at the time of 2004 elections. The 2009 elections also marked the expansion of democracy and the rule of law in Indonesia and the region. It also created the hope that the elections would produce a government in Indonesia that would strengthen human rights, provide religious freedom to the people, and increase bilateral trade ties. Thus the main practical achievements of the democratization process were realized through the 1999 and 2004 free and fair elections and peaceful rotations of the presidential power especially with the introduction of Direct Presidential elections and its successful implementation in 2004. The successful holding of 2009 elections and the return of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono back to the office of the Presidency furthered and strengthen the democratic process in Indonesia. In other words Indonesian political set up is mainly characterized by frequent, free and fair elections, effective elected officials, separation of powers, freedom of expression, independence of media and associational autonomy.

Thus, a conclusion can be drawn from this research work on democratization in Indonesia that democracy in Indonesia has been progressing steadily since the fall of authoritarian strong man Suharto and his New Order regime in 1998. The 2004 legislative and presidential elections marked the end of the transition to democracy and the start of the period of consolidation of democratic process. The introduction of comprehensive Constitutional and legislative reforms by the Indonesian elites during the transitional phase, led to the democratization of the structure of the representative and executive

institutions as well as the political process. These reforms included an effective separation of powers, an enhancement of the electoral system and increasing the people political participation. Not only this, they also removed Suharto era restrictions and authoritarian legacies. Further the emergence of the MPR also helped in minimizing the possibility of the reemergence of a new presidential dictatorship. Thus on account of recent political development that have taken place in Indonesia it can be assumed that almost all the authoritarian legacies and undemocratic elements which could emerge as a threat to the democratic norms which have newly taken birth in Indonesian politics have been eliminated. Besides this, almost all the significant political actors have shown their consistent commitment to the democratic norms in the process of democratic set up in Indonesia. Several democratic and peaceful rotation of power has also taken place, along with a strong majority of public support for upholding democratic system has also developed in the country. Thus, consequently, on the basis of this research work it can be confidently said that, Indonesia today enjoys almost all the main criteria of a democratic country and has entered the camp of consolidating democracy. Although one cannot deny the fact that there still exist some very important challenges and weaknesses in the country that are required to be addressed slowly in the coming years. However, with regard to the extent to which democratic practices in Indonesia have become consolidated and institutionalized, a conclusion can be drawn that despite of the presence of challenges, Indonesia has made significant progress towards its consolidation of democracy and thus on account of the recent political developments that have been marked by the holding of democratic elections and the commitment of the Indonesian elites and the prominent political leaders towards democratic rules, Indonesia today can be placed in the list of democratic countries.

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