

**GOVERNABILITY AND WELL-BEING :  
A STATE LEVEL ANALYSIS OF POLITICS AND SPACE  
IN INDIA**

**Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University  
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of**

**MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

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“GOVERNABILITY AND WELL-BEING: A STATE LEVEL ANALYSIS OF  
POLITICS AND SPACE IN INDIA” for the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY is  
my bonafide work and may be placed before the examiner for evaluation.

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*DEDICATED TO*

*THOSE WHO BELIEVE THAT THE SPACE IS CONTAINED*

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# Chapter I

## Introduction

“Viewed over a long historical period, the area that is now identified as India was never easy to govern”.

(Atul Kohli, 1990)<sup>1</sup>

This statement carries some important notions. The most visible interpretation is that India has long history of being governed by outsiders who, with the passage of time, settled in India. From the early historic period to late eighteenth century, there have been continuous incursions in this geographical area. Every stream of incursion had its own *genre de vie* of culture, language and most importantly, ‘*way of governing*’ i.e. their administration and their own functioning structure. Besides country’s own geographical and cultural diversities across the four corners posed limitations in physical and cultural expansion of the incoming streams. These limitations produced some well-identified areas of settlement and isolation. This pattern further enhanced the complexity of governance. Moreover the colonial era of Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries further deepened this complexity by producing certain foci of development and bearing their hinterlands on the mercy of market forces. In order to gain hold on the masses rulers also played dirty game of caste and religious cleavages. They extremely succeeded in north India. Now, three clear areas emerged from the ‘governing’ point of view. **First category** regions were those who were most accessible for incursion as well as settlement i.e north Indian plains. They always remained under constant socio-cultural and political change i.e. in terms of cultural and ethnic assimilation, severe economic oppression and lack of substantial incompatibility. Impact of these incompatibilities was so strong that the ‘ruling mentalities’ could never come out of this shock. It not only destroyed the good old ‘institutional traditions’ but also changed the concept of governing mentalities from ‘a

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<sup>1</sup> Kohli, Atul (1990) : *Democracy and Discontent, India’s growing crisis of Governability*, Cambridge University Press, P. 13.



government who governs for the good of the people' to a 'government who governs for the sake of governance'. The **second category** regions were those who remained outside the domain of dominant ruling stream. So this 'positive isolation' from the arbitrary practices of the rule and successfully conserved their rich cultural institutions and once they got democratic freedom (after independence) and opportunity to increase their own capabilities they succeeded. The **Third Category** regions were areas of isolation i.e. inaccessible tracts where people were pushed when gradual streams of incursion came to India. Till independence, their history is much obscure. Though, they remained at the periphery of development but it was certainly not due to 'incapabilities of governance' but due to the 'absence of any established norm'. Therefore they also succeeded in conserving their cultural legacy and once propelled (like the case of Himachal Pradesh) they should tremendous results.

The significance of Atul Kohli's statement should be first seen in this larger historical perspective which is the basic cause for the 'comparative easiness' of the governance across different regions in India. But certainly Kohli is not a historian; he is a political scientist and contextualises the 'historicity of the comparative easiness' of governance in a politically significant and extremely relevant context of 'governability' across Indian States. The context assumes significance in the wake of degrading capacities of certain Indian states to transform their economic success into comparable levels of well-being. Main reason for the degradation in capacity is erosion in a government's over democracy i.e. its social base, party organization' which gets resulted into increased political violence, failure of a government on policy implementation front, channelisaion of state resources to the advantage of certain social groups and dominance of political elites (which further weakens the democratic functioning resources channelisation). A historical absence of public action (due to weak cultural institutions) only aggravates the problem.

The issue touched upon by Kohli is one way of analyzing the variations in the institutional performance and policy formulation of states with the help of differentiating the political systems of different states and the nature of party organization within those states. The issue raised by him has also been supported by John Harriss (1999), Paul Brass (2001), Francine Frankel (1989,1990), Zoya Hasan

(1998) etc. and without exception every scholars indicate the emergence of the erosion in capacity from early 1980s when the rise of the regional powers and balance of caste /class power posed a threat to the ruling party at one centre many states including Karnataka, Bihar, Gujarat and Uttar Pradesh. So, in order to retain the power political parties adopted 'illegitimate' means. Therefore, a crisis in governability is basically a crisis in 'illegitimacy of tools, for controlling mentalities of rule' or simply the governmentality as propounded by Michael Foucault. Channelisation of state controlled resources to specific social groups, electoral incentives for violence, criminalization of politics are some of the manifestations of the illegitimacy in governmentalities which, affects governability. Over a period of time and eroded capacity shows its reflections on the well-being of people which constitute not only the conventional human development factors like income and life expectancy but also deprivational factors like poverty.

Another way of explaining differential institutional performance is given by advocates of social capital Peter Mayer (2001), Fukuyama (1999), Boix and Posner (2002) who consider co-operativeness and association among people at the local level as the single most important factor in explaining institutional performance. It is indeed excellent in explaining the superstructure i.e. existing infrastructural framework which, rather, is the function of its economic progress. But, it really fail, to show whether the economic progress percolates down to the needy or not and more importantly why it does not! The advocates of the social capital are really unable to explain why, despite having good stock of it, Uttar Pradesh performs poorly at well-being front; or why despite being rich in social capital, Gujarat's performance on human development and deprivation is at the bottom among the fifteen major states? Social capital explanation fails because the 'root' of the problem is not only social but also, and more vigorously, political. It fails because the dimension of the problem is not confined to the local level but at much larger scale where regional boundaries coincide with state boundaries. It also fails because it considers the impact of performance in terms only of overall welfare of society. A society, where rich gets richer and poor's position does not improve, cannot be at the higher levels of well-being. So the discussion brings in the role of 'geography of well-being, so the

discussion brings in the role of 'geography of well-being' where individual welfare and its spatiality is recognized and emphasized.

### **1.1 Objectives:**

With this background of the problem, present work proposes following objectives-

- 1) To discuss the significance of epistemology of governability and its interdisciplinary associations in regional context.
- 2) To evaluate regional disparities in the levels of institutional performance and corresponding well-being,
- 3) To identify theoretical inputs, also measurable, to help examine the spatial variations in governability.
- 4) To analyze how the variations in the levels of governability explains 'important aberrations' between institutional performance and well-being.

### **1.2 Database and Methodology**

It is obvious from the list of objectives and problems stated in the previous pages that this research is trying to interrogated a complex theme. There are bound to be differences of opinion and approach to study such a complex theme. Moreover, there are equally high chances of methodological irregularities and enhanced subjectivity. These, in turn, are likely to reduce the objectives of the study to a considerable extent. Therefore it is an imperative to incorporate some objective data and factual information to minimize subjectivity.

#### **1.2.1 Database and Selection of Indicators**

A) Institutional Performance:-

1. Percentage of villages electrified – 1998

Source: State of Indian Economy, profiles of Districts, Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), Economic Intelligence Service, October 2000

2. Hospital beds per million population – 1999

Source: Health Information of India – Central Bureau of Health Intelligence, Government of India- 2000

3. Households using Public Distribution System – 1999

Source: India Human Development Report – Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research-2002

4. Enrolment of girl children in age-group 6-11 years

Source: Seventh All India Education Survey, 2002

5. Teachers per school (Primary to senior secondary)

Source: Seventh All India Education Survey, 2002

6. Per capita State domestic at constant price

Source: Handbook on statistics on Indian Economy, RBI – 2003

#### B) Well-being:-

1. Percentage of people above poverty line – 1999

Source: National Human Development Report , Planning Commission- 2001

2. Percentage of Female literacy

Source: General Population Tables, Census of India - 2001

3. Expectation of life at birth – 2001

Source: Statistical Abstract, Central Statistical Organization - 2003

#### C) Governability:-

1. Percentage of vote share of two largest parties in assembly elections (1997-2001)

Source: Election Commission, Report on Indian Elections, comported from – [www.eci.gov.in](http://www.eci.gov.in)

2. Average voter turnout at assembly elections (1989-2001)

Source: Election Commission, Report on Indian Elections - 2004

3. Percentage of MPs in Lok Sabha with no criminal record (2004)

Source: Election Commission, Report on Indian Elections - 2004

4. Riots per million population per month

Source: Wilkinson and Varshney Datasat (1990-95)

5. Percentage gap between male-female literacy (2001)

Source: Primary census Abstract, Total Population, Table A -5, Census of India, – 2001.

### 1.2.2 Methodology

The nature of complex relationship between governability and well-being demands both; through discussion on governability, its associations with relevant regional configurations and a statistical verification of the variations and their utility. Here, two types of relationships are sought-First, between Institutional performance and well-being and second, between governability and well-being.

In order to assess the influence extended by them, linear regression is the most appropriate method. A stepwise regression analysis has also been worked out in order to examine the impact of individual variables in group and to get a more realistic picture for the better explanation of dependent variables.

#### a) **Simple Linear Regression:-**

The study of causal relationship between a dependent variable and one or more independent variables in the mathematical form is predictive and helps in assessing the relative influence of each of independent variables on the dependent variable. The form of any linear relationship between a dependent variable  $y$  and an independent variable  $x$  is given as –

$$Y = \alpha + \beta x + \mu$$

Where the constant  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  are the intercept and slope of the straight line and  $\mu$  is the error term. The basic objective of a regression analysis is to estimate the values of  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ .

#### b) **Scatter Diagram:-**

The simplest form, in which the relationship between a dependent variable and an independent variable can be approximated, is that of a straight line. In case, there exists a relationship between a dependent variable  $y$  and an independent variable  $x$ , the

points of the scatter diagram will move around a curve which is called as the 'regression curve'. In case of line, it is called as 'Regression line'. The slope of the regression line  $\beta$  is known as population regression co-efficient. If the dependent variable is indifferent to the independent variable, it means  $\beta = 0$ . Another important summary statistic in a regression analysis is the co-efficient of determination  $R^2$  which tells the proportion of variations in  $y$  as explained by  $x$ .

**c) Stepwise Regression:-**

In this study, the stepwise regression procedure has been followed to select the explanatory variables responsible in determining governability. This procedure has many advantages. Firstly, it tells the contribution of an added or deducted variable in explaining the deducted variable (by seeing the changes in  $R^2$ ). Secondly, it helps to see whether the variable is worth including in the model or not. Finally, it selects the minimum member of variable that could explain the maximum variability in the dependent variable.

The multiple regression equation for the  $i^{\text{th}}$  step (where  $i = 1 \text{ ---- } p$ ) has been assumed to be of the following form –

$$Y_i = b_0 + b_1 x_1 + b_2 x_2 + \text{-----} + b_j x_j + \text{-----} b_i x_i + U_i$$

Where,

$y_i = i^{\text{th}}$  dependent variable, ( $i = 1 \text{ ---- } p$ )

$x_j = j^{\text{th}}$  independent variable, ( $j = 1 \text{ ---- } n$ )

$b_j = j^{\text{th}}$  regression co-efficient, ( $j = 1 \text{ ---- } n$ )

$u_i = \text{random error}$

d) In order to analyze regional disparities in the levels of institutional performance, well-being and governability. States have been divided into high, moderate and low categories of development according to their position in respective indicators.

Regional disparities in the levels of three indices have also been mapped with the help of 'Natural Breaks' method (calculated by 'Zenk's Optimization' which groups the data and minimizes the sum of variance within

each of the class) in Arc view GIS and categorized into five classes- very high, high, medium, low and very low.

### **1.2.3 Methodological Limitations**

It is evident from the list of indicators as well as various methods of research discussed here that there are obvious problems with the application of statistical techniques and selection of indicators. Data belonging to institutional performance, well-being and governability do not often belong to the same year. Unlike census figures other data like those of poverty, PDS allocations, Hospital beds or village electrification data vary from 1998 to 2002. In case of governability, many variables belong to state level assembly elections which, unlike Lok Sabha elections, are held in different years. The data collected varies from 1997 to 2001. In case of ethnic riots, data obtained is from private sources so there cannot be updated on the basis of available documents. However, It is difficult to exclude these because they show a vital trend in Indian politics which strongly manifests degrading capacity of some state governments. Moreover, there are confined to certain states only, keeping all these practical difficulties, the result does not, sometimes, yield desired results. Though for the sake of statistical analysis, there have been omitted yet discussed separately with the help of manual work.

Apart from this, a statistical analysis also may not be feasible to directly evaluate the influence of governability on well-being because a government functions through institutions and not by itself. Since the functions of state-controlled institution in India like low income situations is largely a function of its economic performance (which may not percolate down to the neediest), a good institutional performance may or may not be actually good.

Moreover, it may hold true for an aggregate well being where a rich might have got richer and poor have got poorer or, at best, as they previously were. Under these circumstances, a statistical result is most likely to produce only a partial picture of what is actually happening at the ground and how it has changed the regional configuration of development. In order to cater to this problem, help has been taken from a large chunk of literature including government documents which analyze the

corresponding conditions for both; governability and well-being including how the former (over a period of time) has affected the latter, simultaneously, matching data from both the sides have been presented to substantiate the analyses.

Apart from these demand side (related with results) problems, there are supply side (related with data input) problems too. Data pertaining to party organization (such as frequency of party elections) and electoral malpractices (such as electoral violence) could not have been obtained. Problem can be appreciated regarding their nature and availability. Probably, they are more feasible at micro level and not at this stage. But, the present level is also desirable in order to have a first hand knowledge of what is happening where, who remain deprived and why do they remain so.

### **1.3 Review of Literature**

Considering the type of work and methodological limitations a vast and varied literature survey is needed in order to fulfill the objectives. Therefore, reviews of literature done here is theme based and are divided into 8 themes including geography and regional development, governance, governmentality, governability, social capital, politics, government documents and development.

#### **1. On Geography**

**D. M. Smith (1977)** presents a new dimension on geography and human welfare. His central theme who gets what where through the moulding of societal and spatial structures, revolutionized the then research themes in geography. His work is extremely useful in identifying scope of geography in changing academic scene. **Doreen Massey's (1989)** arguments about space justify the present work. His contention that "it is not just that the spatial is socially constructed, the social is spatially constructed too" not only supports the dynamic aspect of geography but also validates the Lefebvrian view that space is not a scientific object removed from ideology and politics, it has always been political and strategic. **Anindita Datta and Sachinand Sinha's (1997)** paper on gender disparities on social well-being aims to suggest new areas of analyzing the question of social well-being with reference to the problem of gender inequalities. Apart from discussing the existing indicators in the



current research they have tried to evolve a new model for gender disparities by emphasizing the role of social structure and the state. **Ipsita Chatterji's (2002)** work on space as container or contained gives a chance to have an overview of changing dimensions in geography from a pure ideographic stage to nomothetic and current post-modern, post-structural adoptions of political, sociological themes. Space is neither only a container nor only contained; its both, by maintaining its basic epistemological position and by adopting to newer ontological and methodological themes, at the same time. **Graham Smith (2002)** in Human geography; society, space and social science has attempted to contextualize various political theories under one umbrella – 'Human geography'. The trend had started since 1970s with a renewed concern about the underlying modern political life and of the way in which space is important to "how politics in constituted and practiced". He realizes that though the mapping the political conditions has been the central theme of political geography but how political space should be organized, bounded and, within much of geography, theorized; has largely been out of the geographical domain. **Colin Flint (2003)** talks about five key themes in the current geographical research – modernity, geopolitics, the state, representation and the public stance of geographers in the background of terrorism, modernity, governance and governmentality. It argues that the time is ripe to illustrate the explanatory power of geography by educating beyond the confines of formal educational and academic arenas to provide a host of real political opportunities and alternatives. **Sarah A. Radcliff's (2004)** paper is about development, civil society and inequality. The paper focuses on social capital. It reiterates that Putnam largely ignored the role of the state in her discussion on regional growth and civil society. It should be done away with because the crucial factor is political will, beyond trust and cooperation. **Gillian Hart (2004)**, in his discussion on geography and development, tries to explore how critical ethnographies can be made to address the challenges (socio-spatial changes) in politically enabling ways. **Keshab Das's (2004)** discussion on regional disparities and various theoretical approaches, establishes Radical/Human Geography's importance at the forefront of developmental discussions. For him, state-sponsored regional development policies cannot be assumed to be neutral. They are 'explicitly' biased against "spatially defined groups."

He attacks policymakers who belong to neo-classical school and who assume space as just an areal unit, pre given and 'homogenous' (which actually is not). Under these circumstances, national or regional planning, having shifted its emphasis from areal to sectoral planning, seems to have uncritically relied upon the standard strategy of modern sector development. This has been so, primarily due to the equation of the notion of development with that of economic development. The dynamics of the relationship between space and societal change in effecting uneven development has been grossly neglected in studies of this nature.

## **2. On Governmentality**

**Michael Foucault's (1978)** views on the governmentality have an important bearing on the built up of the proposed work. He says that power doesn't emanate from the centre rather it comes through "various instruments" of governance which construct the psychological set up of the individual. A crisis in governmentality emerges when these instruments get illegitimized. **Peter O'Malley, Weir and Shearing (1997)** explore some of the difficulties in future development of governmentality research and theory. It mainly focuses on politics as 'mentalities of rule' and explores the reasons behind virtual exclusion of understanding politics as social relations. **Stephen Baranyi's (1999)** evaluation of governmentality provides us the historical development of governmentality where it referred to a historically specific economy of power. For Foucault, this concept replaces his earlier concept of power-knowledge. **Wendy Brown (2002)** has critically analyses the concept of governmentality as expounded by Foucault. He conceived the idea of governmentality in a new context – 'tolerance' which, according to him, is in part a response to the historically diminished capacity of the state. It also masks the role of the state in reproducing the cultural dominance of certain cultural groups and norms. This, he argues, is the response to the sensitivities of the people whom it governs. **B.S.Butola's (2004)** article is yet another revelation of misuse of governmental rationalities. His contention that health is the most contested sight in the modern age also validates the statistical results where 'health' gives highest explanation among institutional factors.

Its true that availability of modern medical facilities has become the basis for differentiating the developed from the backward.

### **3. On Governability**

**Atul Kohli (1987)** in 'The state and poverty in India' refers the country as a laboratory for comparative political analysis. His conclusion of the study says that differences between the political regimes of different states do make a significant difference, specifically to the adoption of pro-poor policies in the Indian context. **Atul Kohli (1990)** also provides the basic framework for the issue 'governability'. According to him – India has long been considered something of a political exception but now fast catching up with the rest of the developing world. By focusing on the changing conditions of the state and society, as well as on leadership choices, his work attempts to provide answer to the puzzle of why the “world’s largest democracy” has become difficult to govern. Article by **Pradeep Chibber (1995)** examines political parties, Electoral competition, Government expenditures and economic reforms in India. This article again reports the results of an attempt to understand policy making in India in terms of political parties and their electoral concerns. He strongly objects the political analysis of economic policy-making in India which has tended to downplay the role of political parties while stressing the influence of classes and the state. **David Butler, Pronoy Roy and Ashok Lahiri (1995)** have presented an extensive summery of Indian elections held between 1952-1991. Their index of opposition unity is helpful in examining swing factor, Cohesion and impact of coalition on the elections. **John Harriss (1999)**, while comparing political regimes across Indian states, has actually reviewed the existing literature on comparative political analysis, including those of Atul Kohli, Zoya Hasan and Paul Brass, James Manor, Jayant Lele, Francine Frankel and M.S.A. Rao. On the basis of his observations, he made a strong case for differentiating the political systems of different state in India, on the basis of the balance of the caste/ class power and the nature of party organization within those states. Such differences can be shown to influence the policy formulation and performances of these states, especially with regard to decentralization of power to lower caste/ class groups and alleviation of

poverty. **James Manor's (2000)** article on small-time political fixers discusses the under utilized but potentially extremely useful job of political fixer who are a special case in Indian situation. Following Hargopal and G.Ram Reddy, Manor has tried to establish their crucial roles as enablers of the democratic process. These people are political operatives "who donot hold any formal political or administrative positions, "but who practice the art of approaching officials for favours". They can be useful in states like Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh and Karnataka. The backward states, where state level organizations are already weak, they can be of immense importance. **Pradeep Chibber and Samuel Eldersveld (2000)** have discussed the role of political elites in mass acceptance and involvement in economic reform. Elites are also important in determining the beneficiaries of government benefits and in implementing state policy at the local level. In addition, the electoral process provides local politicians a key role in the political system insofar as they are critical to the mobilization efforts of political parties. The situation is critical especially in a democratic setup like India where single person mobilisation means shrinking mass-base and deinstitutionalization of the politics. **Atul Kohli in 'The Success of India's Democracy' (2001)** proclaims India a successful democracy by defying many prevailing theories of democracy that stipulate pre-conditions developed economy, politically vibrant middle class, homogeneous society and civic culture. For him, democracy can work, as it has worked in India, if there are constitutional and political mechanisms for sharing of political power, status and dignity even if symbolically. However, this central proposition of the book raises many questions. The most important one is: does democracy mean only constitutional and political arrangement for sharing of power, status and dignity? His answer is in affirmative and his justification is by trivialising democracy as procedural democracy. **Kohli (2004)** in his latest venture 'State Directed Development Political Power and Industrialisation in the Global Periphery' takes case studies from Korea, Brazil, Nigeria and India. About India, he has talked about slow but steady and guided development after independence. From the colonial era to the present fragmented state of Indian society, all have been discussed in detail one by one. The work gives useful insight into the sequences of events which helped produce current politico-economic

situation. **Ashutosh Varshney's (2001)** essay compares political developments in Northern and Southern India. His principal claim is that our judgments about contemporary North Indian Politics will be wrong if we do not place south India at the centre of our analytic attention. Reason – from a North-South Divide to an emerging southernisation of North India from the point of view of peaceful lower caste movement.

**Manish Thakur's (2003)** notes on communal riots in India are concerned with the 'causes' and have been related to economic or class antagonisms and have least to do with religion. According to him, the illegitimacy of religious identity has been the central plank of the post colonial Indian state. There has been an increasing articulation of identity ideologies in both state and non-state political domain. Of late, scholars have started talking about the institutionalization of communalism as evidenced in the growing power of political parties championing communal ideologies. **Pradeep Chibber and Irfan Nooruddin (2004)** have successfully shown the relationship between the member of parties and government performance in the Indian states. Using macro economic data from 1967 to 1997 as well as post-election voter surveys, they demonstrated that states with two party competition provide more public goods than states with multiparty competition which reflects differing mobilization strategies. In two party systems, political parties require support from many social groups and therefore provide public good to win elections. On the other hand, in a multi-party system, needing only a plurality of the vote to win, parties use club, rather than public goods to mobilize smaller segments of the population. **Sarvalingam and Sivakumar (2004)** deal with poverty, health, education and human deprivation in India. Their way of examining the development justifies the basis of the present study. Their contention is that the contrast between human development and human poverty reflects two different ways of evaluating development. One way, they proceed, focuses on 'conglomerative perspective', advances made by all groups in each community. This contrasts with the '**deprivational perspective**' in which development is judged by the way the poor and the deprived fare in each community. Lack of progress in reducing the disadvantages of the deprived cannot be 'washed away' by large advances – no matter how large – made by the better-off people. They

perceive poverty not only in terms of lack of adequate income, but also as a state of deprivation in socio-economical and political aspects. **Devesh Kapur** attracts our attention by putting forward some of the ongoing trends in Indian politics where politics 'endures' without 'qualitative endurance', without following consociational theory in an extremely heterogeneous society. Yet its voter's turnout has increased and this increase has come from lower sections. Even in that condition, a lower turnout in a particular state indicates a real crisis.

#### **4. On Governance**

**Bob Curie (1996)** tries to explain the conceptual and empirical problems regarding Governance, democracy and economic adjustment in India. He holds the view that good governance in the political and administrative sphere is seen as essential to make laissez-faire in the economic policies work and vice versa. **Pat O'Mally's (1997)** article on governmentality and risk society tells the increasing negative trends in the art of governance. His observation is that the governance of all manner of institutional domains is organized around risk management rather than, around moralized enforcement of social order. Governmental problems are imagined in terms of their potential harms and probabilistic outcomes rather than their transgressive nature. **Thomas G. Weiss (2000)** takes the proposition that ideas and concepts both good and bad have an impact on international public policy. It situates the emergence of governance good governance and global governance as well as UN's role in the conceptual process. **Niraja Gopal Jayal and Sudha Pai (2001)** talk about governance, poverty and development. They suggest that governance is a more broad-based process which encompasses state-society interactions and partnerships, and are therefore hierarchical. **Martin Doornboss (2001)** discusses various confusions regarding the definition of governance. He says that – as it is often true of a buzzword, there has hardly been a consensus as to what it means, and even less of an idea as how it could be applied more concretely. His paper explores the conditions under which the criterion of good governance first became adopted as a donor policy metaphor and now appears to be transformed in favour of selectivity. **Dr. M. Yasin, Dasgupta and Sengupta (2003)** have sought to develop a theoretical framework on decentralized

governance, development and empowerment. They perceive a common thread in the functional operational chain of these four concepts.

## 5. On Social Capital

**Ben Fine (1999)** observes the reemergence of social capital in both development studies and social sciences in general. These developments, as he observes, are closely connected to one another analytically and they reflect more generally the growing influence of mainstream economics over other social sciences. Despite its acknowledged conceptual weaknesses, social capital is accepted as a potential source for new research. **Boix and Posner (1999)** have tried to explain the origin of social capital and its effect on government performance. The concept's widespread acceptance as a descriptive and diagnostic tool, however, cannot obscure the fact that its predictions do not always hold good. Reason – social capital theory has not specified the logic of the micro linkages that tie a community's cooperative capacity to the achievement of good governance. To fill this gap, they have described five models of rational voters and competitive elite, rule compliance, civic virtue, bureaucratic efficiency and elite accommodation. **Matthew Morris (1999)** has attempted to co-relate poverty with social capital in India. His paper asks the question – have those states with larger endowments of social capital been more successful at reducing poverty? To answer this question, he included social capital as determinant. He was, largely, able to fit the social capital model but there he shows certain deviations unexplained where Uttar Pradesh has been shown as having good stock of social capital while Karnataka is devoid of it. **Graham Hobbs (2000)**, in his review of literature on social capital counts significant contributions in the field. From the Robert Putnam's landmark attempt on social capital to the outcome affecting mechanism given by Narayan and Pritchett his overview embraces every aspect of social capital. **Peter Mayer (2001)** has tried to apply the central methodology of Robert Putnam's Making democracy work in Indian context. A clear relationship has been demonstrated between state government performance in development and levels of civic engagement. He points out that level of education are more important and the implications of these unexpected results are addressed. There appears to be strong

causal linkages between education good governance and successful human development. **Renata Serra (2001)** also talks about social capital. She attempts to analyse the feasibility and the validity of both measuring social capital at the level of the states and identifying its role in explaining the differential performance of states. It identifies three types of problems finding appropriate measures for social capital; locating alternative indicators valid for inter-state analysis and interpreting the statistical association between social capital and the state performance. **Francis Fukuyama (2001)** tries to contextualise the social capital, civil society and development. In his view-social capital reduces transaction costs in economic sphere and promotes the kinds of associational life in the political sphere. Thus, awareness of social capital is often critical for understanding development. He also talks about the sources of social capital in developing countries. They are either religion or globalization; both bring new forms and modernity. Assessment of the electoral system by **Ritu Rao (2004)** confirms electoral trends like poor degree of fairness of electoral conduct in certain states like Gujarat, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh.

## **6. On Politics**

**Paul Brass (1990)** tries to bring out changes that have occurred in the Indian political structure and contributed to its reshaping. From the functioning of the government local politics to language problems and communal and caste conflicts, he tries to correlate all these aspects to the political structure of India. Interestingly, he argues that mass mobilization a Gandhian technique in pre-independence India has become associated with competitive demagoguery, with the manipulation of symbols for the sole purpose to win an election. **Yogendra Yadav (1996)** in his article 'Reconfiguration of Indian Politics (1993-95)' has analysed the state assembly elections between 1993 to 1995. His analysis is important in view of the beginning of the third phase in the reconfiguration of the party system. It brings out some of the enduring structural changes which have redefined the electoral politics. His analysis of electoral participation, turnout, volatility, party fractionalization is really helpful in identifying new trends in the electoral terrain. **Sudipta Kaviraj (1997)**, tries to incorporate sociological factors in order to explain political inconsistencies. He points



out half-hearted attempts at land reforms which created a new landed agricultural caste. Their increased prosperity translated easily into political power but their entry did not follow the expected line of development. So, the geography of land reforms enables us to understand the post-independence inequality and well-being in India. **Partha Chatterji (1997)** in his edited work provides a general introduction to the study of politics in contemporary India. Three articles are the most relevant in this work. An overview on voters' turnout over the last 50 years provides an important input to the proposed work. Article by Paul Brass has an interesting view on the local level politics. Article by Rajni Kothari is significant regarding new mobilization among dalits. **Yogendra Yadav's (1999)** paper deals with India's electoral system between 1989 to 1999 which is characterized by the popular reading of the electoral politics of decline. His is an attempt to contest this all too familiar view from above without yielding to the temptation of building its mirror image. **Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani's (2001)** work present an insight into the civil societies of the other countries. They ask – Does the idea mean the same thing in all these different contexts? They, then, say that analysis of politics and history of ideas about societies of the south have to be comparative. So the discussion is not meant to take a partisan position in the debate for and against 'civil society' – it seeks, rather, to clarify. **T.N.Dhar's (2002)** article 'Politics, Governance and conflict Management' attempts to identify and flag the causes and symptoms of social tensions that arise from the incompatible aspirations of communities, groups and societies. It focuses on the perils faced by national unity, harmony and integrity due to violent coercive attempts at resolving these issues. The author suggests possible ways and means by which political and administrative responses can be generated and administered to minimize conflicts and to ensure all-round progress in united, equitable and harmonious ways. **Steven I. Wilkinson (2004)** talks about trends in electoral competition and ethnic violence in India since 1950s. His intention is to account for inter-state and town-level variations in ethnic violence in India: why do apparently similar towns and states have such different levels of violence? He deals with the conditions under which politicians who control the police and army have an incentive both to foment and to prevent ethnic violence. **Samuel Paul, M. Vivekananda's (2004)** paper presents the findings

obtained by an analysis of affidavits submitted by elected members. **Paul Brass' article (2004)** is an attempt to explain the 'Institutionalised systems of riot production' that are first created and then activated during periods of political mobilization or at the time of elections. The article focuses on two riots in Meerut that occurred in post-independence India with a gap of 20 years between 1961 and 1982. **Suhas Pulshikar and Sanjay Kumar's (2004)** paper on recent Indian elections is an eye-opener where they have argued that the diversification of voters is not matched by a broadening of the social base of participants in politics. Active participants are still from the more privileged sections of society, with education and class being the determining factors. They have presented an account of voter's participation among different social communities in both Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha from 1989 to 2004. Their findings from National Election surveys are also interesting that even in the national elections; the voter's choice was influenced more by the performance of the state government than that of the national government. About the recent elections many articles have explored the new aspects in Indian Politics. **Ashutosh kumar (2004)** examines the elections held in Punjab where religion, caste, region, language and leadership factors combine differently in different elections to produce contrasting electoral outcomes. **A. K. Verma's (2004)** study shows that in Uttar Pradesh, all parties are finding it difficult to overcome the community barriers to their respective support bases. **Pulshikar and Birmal (2004)** maintain that the assembly polls opened up a multi-level competition across regions and among different social sections. The present in determinancy of the social bases of parties is an indication of this transformation of the party system in the state. **Priyavadan Patel (2004)** finds that in the last two decades or so, democratic politics in Gujarat has been characterized by the skilful and strategic use of caste, communal and religious consciousness and considerations for electoral mobilization by political parties. **Sandeep Shastri and Harish Ramaswamy (2004)** reveal that in Karnataka, earlier dominance of the two party system in the state is moving towards a competitive multipolarity.

## 7. Official Documents


**The approach paper to the Tenth Plan (2001)** is an important document in view of state level governance perspective. The paper recognizes that better governance and implementation of programmes within a pro-poor policy framework is needed for effective results on the ground. Good governance according to it may be defined as the capacity of the government to manage resources efficiently and formulate, implement and enforce such policies and schemes that are in the interest of the poor and facilitate development. Successful implementation of development programmes requires adequate funds, appropriate policy framework, and effective delivery machinery. It also opines some measures like decentralization, civil service renewal, open and responsive government increasing responsibility and fiscal reforms. **India Panchayati Raj Report (2001)** deals with the position of women in the present political scenario. It presents several dimensions of women representation at various levels of Panchayati raj. **India Human Development Report (2002)** among other things, also talks about the public distribution system in India. It asserts that coverage and popularity of the PDS appears to be dependent on the demand and the political administrative and infrastructural facilities available at the level of states. **Kirit Parikh and R.Radhakrishna's (2004)** overview of Indian economy for the past 15 years includes, among other things, some relevant themes like beneficiaries of poverty reduction in the 1990s and reveals that some of better developed states like Maharashtra, Gujarat and West Bengal have a relatively higher shares of rural poverty. Maharashtra performs poorly in urban areas too. In areas of nutritional status, middle income states like Tamilnadu and Kerala have performed better than high income states like Maharashtra. They attribute the better performance to the state interventions. Maharashtra, Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh also suffer from adult malnutrition. In area of social sector expenditure their observation is that some of the poor states like Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and Rajasthan have improved considerably, especially in the late 1990s.

## 8. On Development

**Irma Adelman and Cynthia Morris (1967)** talk about quantitative indicators for society, politics and economic development. Among political indicators for economic development degree of centralization of political power, strength of democratic institutions, degree of competitiveness of political parties and administrative efficiency denote their thorough research and understanding. Their view is that both the contemporary scene and historical experience provide instances of successful economic development under quite diverse political systems and therefore they have attempted to represent several important spheres of the political life of a developing society. **Indira Hirway (1995)** points out stark regional disparities in levels of development and poverty in Gujarat. Hi-tech industrialization in a few endowed areas has been coupled with neglect of the relatively backward areas. **Niraja Gopal Jayal (1997)** in her address to the 'democracy and development' tries to highlight the contours of contemporary debate on this issue. Can the concepts of democracy and development be invested with new meanings to render them more sensitive to the needs of the marginalized and how do we find appropriate institutional expression for these new meanings and sensitivities'. **S.Mahendra Dev (1998)** deals with the impact and options regarding public distribution system on poor. The paper indicates some of the shortcomings of the public distribution system like inefficiency of FCI, high costs of procurement etc. **T. M. Thomas Isaac and Richard W. Franke (2000)** give detailed information on the local level governance on the basis of Kerala model. They have identified 5 stages of development on the local level. They argue that only by providing services consistent with the spatially differentiated tastes and preferences of people can welfare be maximized.

**Montek S. Ahluwalia (2000)** in his paper on economic performance and states argues that it is particularly important to study the differences in performance among states in order to extract lessons about what works and what doesn't. **Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen's (2002)** emphasize on participation of the people as a pre-requisite for development seems to be a need of the hour. Their comparison between the developments of kerala, Himachal Pradesh, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh prove the argument that education and public action are the key for any development process.

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**Craig Jhonson (2003)** lays out the political dynamics that preceded the constitutional amendments in 1993 and then explores the extent to which these reforms have been implemented in Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. **Gopalji and Suman Bhakri (2005)** have presented an elaborate account of Human development, its methodology, Index, financing-theory and practice in India. They have noticed a huge regional disparity within the country in terms of social development and analysed how this gets influenced by effectiveness of resources utilization, bureaucratic behaviour and corruption.

## **9. Miscellaneous**

**M. N. Srinivas (1972)** discusses values in today's India. He refers to the pervasive corruption and violence in political and social life. He also points out Sanskritization, secularization and westernization of Indian Society. Although written some three decades back, his works are still relevant with more vigour and prominence. **Ananta Kumar Giri's (1998)** issues related to the questions of justice paper deals with institutional well-being and transformation. It indents to examine Beteille's argument that the pursuit of distributive justice leads to the erosion of institutional well-being.

## **Outcome of the Survey**

Everything that shines is not always diamond. That's true for well-being too. There are certain distinctions between a general and aggregate and valid form and is should not only seen from developmental but also deprivation point of view (Siva Kumar).

Scholars from various disciplines have tried to define, appreciate, analyze and measure well-being by using their own filter glasses. Sociologists have seen it as a relationship between governmental rationality and population (Foucault, Siryanni, Burchell). Political scientists have understood it as a result of a government's ability to govern (Kohli, Kothari, Chatterji, Kaviraj, Frankel, Brass), some have emphasized more on inabilities to tried to grasp the problem in concentration of power and electoral incentives (Wilkinson, Varshney, Brass, Hasan Manor, Harris), some even

went beyond it and uncovered a new relationship- Social capital and institutional performance (Putnam, Morris, Mayer, Serra, Fukeryama, Hobbs, Boix and Posner, Fine) while welfare economists stuck to their stand on public action, state intervention, decentralization (Sen and Dreze, Jhonson, Issae and Franke, Hirway, Mahendra dev, Ahluwalia) and emphasized on development. A last group of scholars found the answer in government itself (Chibber and Nooruddin, Manor, Yadav).

There is absolutely no dearth of literature which point out that look this is the problem but, at the same time, there is almost drought if one tries to find out the causes. No one dares to say – look this precisely the problem is, Another point is how to fit a model in a box whose very shape is suspected i.e. container or contained (Chatterji, Massey, Smith, Smith) and how to apply it in a more relevant perspective of regional development (Keshab Das).

A review of literature concerning all these issues tempts a keen researcher to apply a question – cannot this filter be kept away and use all that is relevant? After all the goal is same – who get what where and how!

#### **1.4 Area of Study**

It is clear from the outcome of the survey that the context of the work is so complex that it would have been better to undertake a meso-level study to unfold a true pattern of regional variations in governability and well-being. But then data and contexts have their own limitations. Moreover, in order to get a larger picture of what is happening where, it was most feasible to have a state level analysis for fifteen major Indian states. The choice of these fifteen states has been made for the analysis where data are easily available and where time factor puts no constraint. Newly created states could not be included due to this limitation.

Generally, in our country, policies are formulated and executed on the basis of sectoral planning<sup>2</sup> and economic development. However a complete development can only be achieved when development is targeted to area and not the sectors. Similarly a development is not only economic but also social. The notion that economic

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<sup>2</sup> Das Keshab (2004) : Uneven Development and Regionalism: A Critique of Received Theories, *EPW*, Nov. 6, pp. 4917-4925.

development will take care of social development has fallen short of its promise. Its manifestation can easily be seen at state level analysis. This justifies the purpose of studying governability and well-being at the macro level i.e. state level.

Another logic for taking states as the area of study is the long term change in political geography of India since independence which had prepared the ground for effective utilization of relationship between space and politics.<sup>3</sup> The politico-administrative structure had produced internal political homogenization of most of the states. The struggles for formation of a separate state (as in case of Andhra Pradesh, Punjab, Maharashtra etc.), occasional rhetoric of regionalism or backwardness and discrimination (for instance in Tamil Nadu, or say, Bihar), separate political trajectories different from the Congress system (West Bengal, Kerala), were some of the factors responsible for creating opportunities of internal homogenization within the state. Besides, the existence of the state as units of federal governance had created the salience of state as a political unit. People of different states got used to the state as the scale of political choices. This had two implications. While people understood national politics through the prism of the state, there was an unwillingness to recognize any other scale or unit of politics between the state and the central government. This contributes to the homogenization of the state. On the other hand, the emphasis on the state also means that any alternatives smaller than the state disappeared from political consciousness of the people. Regions within states or districts, etc., became only administrative categories and lost much of their political salience.

### **1.5 Organization of Research Work**

Now, considering the importance of epistemological discussion generally sought after relationship between institutional performance and well-being their practical problems, the use of governability in an objectified form; and need to take states as measurement units indicate that they should be treated separately. Therefore organisation of chapters has been according to his broad overview of the work. The present study is divided into five chapters including introduction, Epistemologies,

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<sup>3</sup> Yadav, Yogendra and Pulshikar, Suhas (2003): *Journal of Indian School of Political Economy*, Vol. 15 (122), pp. 7-38.

Institutional performance and well being, Governability and well-being and conclusion.

**Introduction** consists of the statement of problem, objectives, Data base and Methodology, Methodological limitations, Area of study, literature review and organization of research work.

**Chapter Two** is devoted to the discussions on various theoretical inputs like governance, governmentality, govenability, social capital, civil society and well-being; their association with the governability; and its utility in regional context.

**Chapter Three** examines the relationship between institutional performance and irregularities found in case of certain states and former's inability to explain them.

**Chapter Four** owes its utility from the limitation arisen from previous chapter. It not only identifies and discusses the indicators suitable for governability but also analyzes how useful the governability is in explaining why certain states, despite their high level of developmental signs, perform badly at disaggregated welfare level.

**Summery of Conclusions** is the final discussion and intends to suggest some alternative ways of improving governability and, thereby well-being.



## Chapter -2

### The Epistemologies

**2:1** 'How spatiality influences the politics of a region', has always been a fascinating area of investigation for the scholars; especially the geographers. But how politics affects the spatial arrangement is relatively less explored by the geographers and has, sadly, been left for the other disciplines. India's extremely volatile political situation at the state level and its manifestations at other levels provide an opportunity to peep into the conditions of well-being. Moreover it also offer an opportunity to explore into the 'deep structures' of the institutional performance from the perspective of 'those who do not get and why they do not get at all' despite seemingly well operating superstructure. But before entering the domain of investigation, it is imperative to contextualize some associated concepts like governance, governability, governmentality, social capital; civil society and well-being which, though, appear similar yet have entirely different contexts and significance. They, in fact help researches at various stages of investigation. Before discussing them in detail this should be made very clear that all the conceptual tools have been discussed in the order of stage of investigation arrived (and not their temporal sequence of evolution). In this sense, one first examines different aspects of governance- its conceptual and practical merits and limitations, then he/she goes for more vigorous search in governmental rationalities and abilities. Social and cultural capital, civil society is other lines of arguments and is entirely different from 'governmental arguments' in their approach. Discussion on well-being has been put at the end of discussion as it is the ultimate objective of 'impact assessment' of any of the two approaches. An equally significant component of the same is the objectification of the proposed investigations and the political scenario of India is an obvious choice.

## 2:2 India's Political Scenario:

"If American traditions have continued to emphasize the importance of limiting the role of the state while Western Europe has adopted the model of the welfare state and the former socialist countries the model of a socially transforming state. India has adopted the model which exists for its own sake. It exists to provide everything that Indians need and require: sovereignty, unity, welfare, jobs for all, social justice. Of course, no state can serve everybody's interests and the Indian state has not succeeded in doing so."<sup>1</sup>

This statement by Paul Brass (1990) tells the basic problem of Indian State from which every other problem emanates. Indian state tries to accommodate the interests of various social groups and its own power sustainability; both at the same time. It, thus, fails to fulfill both. Another problem that Indian state encounters is that unlike first few years after the independence, Indian state has no longer been an 'agent of social change'<sup>2</sup> and has instead become more and more repressive<sup>3</sup>. Rajni Kothari (1988) argues that – 'there is a need now to assert, through grass-root movements and non-party political formations, the autonomous force of civil society over a repressive and increasingly unrepresentative state'-In the interest of a viable democracy and modernization.

His statement points out the frustration from the working of Indian State over the last 50 years. Many other scholars including Atul Kohli (1990) have also pointed out the 'growing incapacities'<sup>4</sup> of the state and associated problems which will be discussed in the sub-section 'governability'.

## 2.3 Discussion on conceptual Tools : Top down Approach

This problem had started in the late 60s when ruling governments at different states began losing ground and took shelter in illegitimate means<sup>5</sup> which instead of solving their problems increased them manifold. This growing resentment enhanced the complexities of institutional performance and provided fertile ground for the investigation of new variables which exert their influence on well-being of people.

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<sup>1</sup> Brass, Paul : *The Politics of India Since Independence*, Cambridge University Press, 1990, P.19.

<sup>2</sup> Kothari, Rajni: in' *State and Politics in India*' by Partha Chatterji, Oxford University Press (India), 1997, pp. 43-44.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> Kohli Atul : *Democracy and Discontent: India's growing crisis of governability*, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p.5.

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*

This also expands research area to the fields of sociology and psychology in order to access more theoretical inputs for evaluating new variables. It creates new arrangements of space as 'spatiality of politics'- as much as it tries to interrogates and contextualise the conceptual tools within the broad theme of discourses on spatiality. Some of the pertinent conceptual tools from the point of view of the present research that need special mention are as following:

### 2.3.1 Governance :

Governance, as defined by the Carolina G. Hernandez (1999) refers to "the way in which organizations, whether in the form of family, the community, the civil society, corporations, the state, or regional and global organizations are run or managed".<sup>6</sup> Among the components of good governance are human rights observance and democracy, market reforms, bureaucratic reforms, environmental protection and sustainable development and non-production of weapons of mass production.

"The issue of governance, especially good governance arose following the end of the cold war. Fortified by the implosion of the Soviet Union that symbolized both totalitarian political rule and a centrally planned economy, democratic and market oriented societies prided themselves in the correctness of their political an economic systems of governance".<sup>7</sup> Sullivan<sup>8</sup> has incorporated – Participation, Rule of law, Transparency, Responsiveness, Consensus orientation, Equality, Effectiveness, Accountability and Strategic vision under governance.

The contemporary development discourses have also linked governance with decentralization, development and empowerment<sup>9</sup>. Malik, etal have pointed out that 'if the governing process is decentralized it will lead to what is called development- an attribute that touches the quality of life of the common people in a sustained manner and finally, if development is achieved and sustained, empowerment takes place- a state of evolution where individual will be free to exercise their even choices on

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<sup>6</sup> Hernandez, Carolina G. (2000): Governance, Good Governance & Global Governance Conceptual and actual challenges, pp. 794-814.

<sup>7</sup> Currie, Bob (1996): Governance, Democracy and Economic Adjustment in India, *Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol. 17 (4), pp. 787-807.

<sup>8</sup> Sullivan (1998): *Organizing for Democracy*, Ateneo De Manila University Press, p. 13.

<sup>9</sup> Yasin, Dasgupta, Sengupta (1998): Decentralised Governance, Development and Empowerment: In Search of a Theoretical Framework, *Regional Studies*, pp. 68-88.

matters affecting them.’ In this context, governance is defined as ‘the creation of a certain’ structure which cannot be externally imposed, but is the result of the interaction of a multiplicity of governing and each other influencing actors’.<sup>10</sup>

Martin Doornbos (2003) has tried to widen the potential coverage of the term. According to him governance could address issue related to political structuring and its handling while at the same time including issues of administration and management.<sup>11</sup> In his opinion it opens a window for focusing on how ‘politics’ are embedded and conducted within larger structures. In the post 1990s scenario some scholars have also defined governance in two domains i.e. ‘market and the non-governmental sector’.<sup>12</sup> But there is wide consensus among scholars that ‘governance is a broad-based process which encompasses state-society interactions and partnerships and it is therefore heterarchical’<sup>13</sup> in nature

Thus, the concept of governance, encompasses -

- 1) Good administration,
- 2) Participation,
- 3) Accountability
- 4) Empowerment,
- 5) Cooperation with the non-governmental sector or public-private partnership

Of late, political structuring (as pointed out by the Martin Doornbos) has been incorporated in the definition of the governance. Planning Commission has also recognized the importance of ‘political governance’<sup>14</sup> which advocates for a resilient democracy but so far very little has been worked out in order to judge the capabilities of the state from this perspective. Institutional performance with good administration has largely been the yardstick for scholars to make comparative analyses among various forms of governance. But paradoxically state’s incapacity, which has a

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Doornbos, Martin: “Good Governance”: The Metamorphosis of a Policy Metaphor, *Journal of International Affairs*, Fall 2003, vol. 57 (1),

<sup>12</sup> Jayal, Pai: *Democratic Governance in India, Challenges of Poverty, Development and Identity*, Sage, 2001, pp. 13-14.

<sup>13</sup> Jesop, Bob : The Rise of Governance and the Risks of Failure: The Case of Economic Development, *International Social Science Journal*, 155, 1998.

<sup>14</sup> *Planning Commission: National Human Development Report*, 2001, p. 117 and Approach Paper for the 17<sup>th</sup> Plan- Vol I. Governance has been put on the centre-stage of development planning. 21 includes increased transparency, greater accountability, politics of coalition and broad political consensus.

significant part in explaining well-being, has remained untouched as far as its measurement is concerned. Consequently discussions of governance have so far concentrated upon the top down manner which has made it lopsided and partial concept as far as well-being is concerned. Therefore a need arises to discuss the factors of states' differential capacities in explaining well-being across states. A more pertinent order of discussion will be first to examine the relationship between governmentality rationalities and people; and then to study its impact on the capacities to govern.

### 2.3.2 Governmentality

The term, in its original form, can be traced back to the philosophical notion as experienced by Michael Foucault (1978)<sup>15</sup>. The crux of his thinking about the governmentality is that 'state has no essence. Power doesn't emanate from the centre rather it comes through various instruments of governance which construct the psychological set up of the individual'.<sup>16</sup> He says that experience from the understanding of knowledge of past three hundreds years provide an effective means to comprehend the political reality as a perspective in the history of present, of different ways in which an art called 'Government' has been made thinkable and practicable. He adds that 'the nature of the institution of the state is a function of the government-called as the governmental rationality or governmentality'.<sup>17</sup>

The idea of governmentality in Foucault's mind emerged out of gradual evolution of understanding of knowledge. It has three stages-

1. What is knowledge,
2. conditionalities of knowledge,
3. who is the subject of the knowledge

These three are the institution building factors which he analyzed on the basis of past three hundred years of changes in the modern society. It shows that how the

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<sup>15</sup> Foucault, Michael: 'Governmentality', trans Rosi Broadotti and revised by Colin Gordon, in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds) *The Foucault effect, studies in Governmentality*, pp. 87-104, Chicago, 1999.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

experiences have changed and made to understand under the instrumental control of various modes of governance of the state.

The beauty of Foucault's idea is that he was able to identify 'that aspect' of politics which is injurious to the governmentality. He said that 'the formulation of politics has changed. The phobic representation of a potentially totalitarian state loses its credibility. Promises of expanded individuals' autonomy and responsibility become electoral necessity'.<sup>18</sup> It was a major shift away from the traditional lines of thinking hence calls for greater elaboration and in depth interpretation.

### **Interpretation of Governmentality:**

Foucault means three things from governmentality –

1. The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security.
2. The tendency which, over a long period and throughout the west, has steadily led towards the pre-eminence over all other forms of this type of power which may be termed government, resulting, on the one hand in the formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, and on the other, in the development of a whole complex of savors.
3. The process of rather the result of the process through which the state of justice of the Middle Ages transformed into the administrative during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, gradually become 'governmentalized'.

Foucault traces the history of governmentality to the sixteenth century. It was, then evolved to manage and govern family. It was not considered as sovereign. He says – "to govern, the means to govern things. Government is the right disposition of things, arranged so as to lead to a convenient end".

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

Gradually the meaning of common good changed into the sovereignty itself. Foucault further adds that the end of sovereignty is circular i.e. the end of sovereignty is the exercise of sovereignty. The good is obedience to the law, hence the good for sovereignty is that people should obey it. This is an essential circularity which, whatever its theoretical structure, moral justification or practical effects, comes very close to what Machiavelli said when he states that the primary aim of the prince was to retain his principality. One always comes back to this self-deferring circularity of sovereignty or principality.

Even then the objective of the government was the greatest possible economic health of the state. He says that governmentality will have to ensure that the possible quantity of wealth is produced that the people are provided with sufficient means of subsistence, that the population is enabled to multiply, etc. There is a whole series of specific finalities, then, which become the objective of government as such. To Foucault, it is the turning point. According to him- the end of sovereignty to facilitate balanced development is hardly effective and desirable in state.

The demographic expansion of the Eighteenth century, the art of government found fresh outlets through the problem of population. So, in what ways did the problem of population make possible the destruction, render possible the final elimination of the model of the family and the reentering of the notion of economy. Whereas statistics had previously worked within the administrative frame and thus in terms of the functioning of sovereignty, it now shows that the domain of population involves a range of intrinsic effect phenomena that are irreducible to those of the family. What now emerges into prominence is the family considered as an element internal to population, and as a fundamental instrument in its government.

Now family becomes an instrument rather than a model and population hence after it represents more the end of the government than the power of sovereign. Now, it is the subject of need but also the object in the hands of the government, of what it wants but ignorant of what is being done to it.<sup>19</sup> This is how the India's growing crisis

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<sup>19</sup> *ibid.*

of governability has emerged where the legitimate forms of governance has been transformed into illegitimate forms.

### **Applications of Governmentality:**

Foucault's concept and its spatiality have extensively been used in projects of housing policy, racial classification, gender identities, national identity and electoral geography.<sup>20</sup>

Governmentality has also been represented in varied forms like-Governmentality of tolerance<sup>21</sup>, Governmentality of Health, Poverty<sup>22</sup> etc. Wendy Brown argues that – “tolerance as a complex collection of cultural, social and state practices, functions in part as a form of political rationality, a strand of what Foucault termed as ‘Goernmentality’.<sup>23</sup>

“Governmentality, as Foucault renders the term, expresses both the leakiness of the state and the insufficiency of the state as a signifier of how modern societies are governed, but it does not capture the extent to which the state remains a unique and hence vulnerable object of political accountability, therefore deployment of tolerance by the state is in part a response to the historically diminished capacity of the state to ally itself with universalism and especially to embody universal representation’. It means according to Brown the concept of governmentality is insufficient to explain present crisis of the state. He might have grasped the concept differently but it is certain that both recognize the growing incapacities of the state.

Butola (2004) on the other hand, uses the instrument of governmentality in deconstructing the myth of poverty and health.<sup>24</sup> According to him- ‘health is the most contested sight and involves the process of emancipation and subjugation’ Citing a study of the north-eastern region of India he argues that –‘availability of modern medical facilities has also become the basis differentiating the developed from the backward, civilized from the uncivilized’. Similarly about governmentality of poverty,

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<sup>20</sup> Flint, Colin: Political Geography II: modernity, governance and governmentality, *progress in Human Gerography*, 27, 1 (2003), pp. 97-106.

<sup>21</sup> Brown, Wendy: The Governmentality of Tolerance, *why war.com*, Feb. 28, 2002.

<sup>22</sup> Butola, B.S. : *Deconstructing Poverty, Population Poverty and Environment in North East India*, Concept Publication Company, New Delhi, 2000, pp. 195-207.

<sup>23</sup> Brown, Wendy: op. cit. p.3

<sup>24</sup> Butola, B.S.: Health As Governmentality, *Deccan Geographers*, Vol. 42 (2), Dec. 2004, pp. 25-34.



he maintains that 'a poor is one who is economically appropriated and deprived, politically manipulated, ideologically hegemonised to accept the value, culture, signs and symbols of the exploiters and ultimately a vote bank in the quantitative liberal democracy. Therefore, the fight against poverty is meaningful only when it involves total overthrow of the existing social structure, power relations'.

Another important work on the emergence of incapacities of the state is provided by Ericson and Haggerty.<sup>25</sup> While dealing with the issue of governance they reveal that – 'governmental problems are imagined in terms of their potential norms and probabilistic outcomes rather than their transgressive nature. Such governance is thus focused on prevention, risk minimization and risk distribution'<sup>26</sup>.

### **Governmentality: New Trends:**

In the post 1991 scenario, governmentality in advanced liberal democracies is supposed to operate not through imposition but rather through cultivating conditions in which non-sovereign subject like NGOs and multilateral agencies is constituted.<sup>27</sup> It, infact, decentres the state as a monolithic source of power. In addition, scholars like Peter O Mally etc. have also advocated for expanding the meaning and context of the term.<sup>28</sup> It is prepared to be called as 'Neo-Liberal Governmentality'.<sup>29</sup>

Whatever be the form of application governmentality but one thing is clear that the legitimacy of power function of the government is the prime determinant of its capacity to govern. Whenever it gets illegitimized, capacity tends to get exhausted and institutional performance starts showing irregularities in explaining well being of the people. It is, therefore, pertinent to see how governability is defined and how it works in a complex socio-spatial set up like that of India.

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<sup>25</sup> Ericson, Haggerty: *Policing the Risk Society*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.

<sup>26</sup> Ericson, Haggerty: *ibid*.

<sup>27</sup> Hart, Gillian: Geography and Development, *Progress in Human Geography*, 28, 1 (2004), pp. 91-100.

<sup>28</sup> O'Mally, Pat et al: Governmentality, Criticism, Politics, *Economy and Society*, Vol. 26 (4), Nov. 1997, pp. 501-517.

<sup>29</sup> Barry, A., Osborne, T. and Rose, N.: Liberalism, neoliberalism and governmentality: An Introduction 1993 *Economy and Society* 22, 265-66.

### 2.3.3. Governability

Governability is the most important conceptual tool for analyzing well being as far as this work is concerned. As defined by Atul Kohli it has four related variables.<sup>30</sup>

1. The role of political elite,
2. Condition of enduring political coalitions,
3. Policy effectiveness,
4. Capacity to accommodate political conflicts without violence

‘A government whose power rests on fluctuating coalitions and whose leaders repeatedly fail to fulfill their stated goals and to control politically directed violence will be deemed to be a government with a low capacity to govern’.<sup>31</sup>

A summary of what Kohli meant by the term and its variable is as follows –

- a) Indurance of coalition refers mainly to the stability of social support. A fluctuating social base often implies fluctuating party membership and weak organization. It, thus, indicates deinstitutionalization in a democratic setting.
- b) Policy effectiveness can be judged by a government’s performance on issues that the government itself considers in areas of priority. A government that repeatedly fails to accomplish its stated goals is likely to be a government that does not govern well.
- c) The absence of open violence, especially in non-democratic setting does not necessarily indicate a government that governs well, but an increase in politically oriented violence in a more or less open polity nearly always indicates a growing crisis of governability.
- d) Lastly, since institutions tend to constrain personal power, those who attain position of power because of personalistic traits usually show little interest in institutional development, or worse, actively seek to weaken existing institutions.

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<sup>30</sup> Kohli, Atul : *Democracy and Discontent: India’s growing crisis of govenability*, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p.23.

<sup>31</sup> Kohli, Atul: *ibid.*

### **Manifestations of Governability:**

Kohli, in his analysis of selected Indian states, has shown that the examination of how demands are mobilized and how institutions become weakened departs from some of the prevailing ideas. 'To reiterate, India's growing demands are not mainly a function of rapid socio-economic modernization, instead the spread of competitive politics in a setting in which the state has disproportionate control over societal resources provide the broad context for over-politicization. This modified perspective aids our understanding of the high degrees of politicization in low income settings'.<sup>32</sup> Interestingly, with the inclusion of this additional input, some of the conventional group identities based on caste, language etc. are replaced by new identities like occupation or class which become foundation for mobilizing competing groups by political elite in order to get greater share of state controlled economic resources. Now, it can't be ascertained that this new model belongs to any particular nature i.e. – ethnic, economic or political'. 'Since it is bit of each, dynamism of such group mobilization requires more attention and research'.<sup>33</sup>

Another manifestation of governability in socio-spatial context is the inseparability of political order with the state's ability to facilitate socio-economic development. This case applies especially in case of third world countries where 'state is an agent not only of political order but also of development'.<sup>34</sup> Thus a crisis of governability is understood to be manifested not only in growing political violence but also in the state's developmental incapacity.

State's pervasive presence tends to enhance the significance of politics and then of political variables in democratic countries (which makes additional, autonomous contributions to the emergence of these crisis).<sup>35</sup>

Apart from Kohli's conceptualization of governability and its crisis there are other lines of arguments which call for a solution that must lie in 'a traditional, more understandable forms of political construction'<sup>36</sup> by coming out of shadow of its alien provenance. This argument clearly favours a 'bottom to top' approach where

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<sup>32</sup> Kohli, Atul: *ibid*, p.27.

<sup>33</sup> Kohli, Atul: *ibid*, p.28.

<sup>34</sup> Kohli, Atul: *ibid*, p.401.

<sup>35</sup> Kohli, Atul: *ibid*, p.402.

<sup>36</sup> Madan, T.N.: 'Secularism in its place', *Journal of Asian Studies*, Nov. 1989.

participation is the foundation. This view has also been supported by Rajni Kothari (1988) who sees 'crisis as stemming from the excessive narrowness of the line of participation'.<sup>37</sup> Some of the Scholars would expect the solution to come from political processes which are less formalized, the 'non-party political processes'.<sup>38</sup> Observers like Kaviraj (1997) have also expressed the possibility of a perspective where the 'arrival of democratic society is making the functioning more problematic'.<sup>39</sup> This situation indicates the operation of a democratic government in the absence of a democratic society, where 'ordinary people- most of poor and culturally deprived, hesitate to act politically on their own ideas.'<sup>40</sup> Dipankar Gupta calls this as the 'Deinstitutionalization of politics'<sup>41</sup> with organizational vacuum at the core of the political space.

### **Significance of Governability in Spatial perspective:**

From the above discussion, it is clear that-governability, as an argument, is not a separate explanation for the existing pattern of well being in a region or country. It is an additional input along with other socio-economic variable of institutional performance. It signifies that state's capacity to govern well is not only a function of externally provided efforts like infrastructure, education, health, welfare or administration<sup>42</sup> but also its own ability to stand strong, coherent, politically accommodative, and internally democratic. It establishes the universal rule that a body which is physically weak cannot support others also.

**2.4** Addition of governability with other socio-economic variables enhances explanation power of institutional performance for spatial pattern of well being on the one hand and explains institutional performance itself to a considerable extent on the other. The most revealing change is seen in the altered map where some states whose performances come down as a result of extra input. All this will be observed in the

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<sup>37</sup>Kothari, Rajni: *State against democracy*, Ajanta, Delhi, 1988.

<sup>38</sup> Kothari, Rajni : *ibid*.

<sup>39</sup> Kaviraj, Sudipta : *Politics in India* (Ed.), Oxford University Press, 1997, p.14.

<sup>40</sup> Kuviraj, S.: *ibid*, p.28.

<sup>41</sup> Gupta, Dipankar .in *Politics In India*, *ibid* ,p.124

<sup>42</sup> . Mayer, Peter: Human Development and Civic Community in India Making Perform, *EPW*, Feb. 24,2001, pp. 684-692.

next chapters. It is clear from the terrain of arguments carried in the previous pages that there are some other related concepts that make the operationalization of these concepts more effective depending upon the other associated coordinates of social reality. In other words the bottom up approach placing people of the centre of the discussion is bound to contextualize these concepts. Some of the cardinal elements of this approach are as following:

#### **2.4.1 Social Capital:**

Social capital refers to those stocks of social trust, norms and networks that people can draw upon to solve common problems. Networks of civic engagement, such as neighbourhood associations, sports clubs and co-operatives etc. are an essential form of social capital, and the denser these networks, the more likely that members of a community will co-operate for mutual benefit.<sup>43</sup> In its liberal form even e-mail exchanges among members of a cancer support group is a social capital.<sup>44</sup> Social capital creates value for the people who are connected and –at least sometimes – for bystanders as well.

Narayan and Pritchett (1997)<sup>45</sup> describe five mechanisms the way social capital affects institutional performance-

- a) Improve society's ability to monitor the performance of government.
- b) Increase possibilities for co-operative action in solving problems with a local common property element,
- c) Facilitate the diffusion of innovations by increasing inter-linkages among individuals,
- d) Reduce information imperfections and expand the range of enforcement mechanisms,

#### **Role of Social Capital in Geography:**

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<sup>43</sup> Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993) *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, USA.

<sup>44</sup> Carraman Sirianni and Lewis Friedland: *Social capital and civic innovation: Learning and capacity building from the 1960s to 1990s*, 1995.

<sup>45</sup> Navayan and Pritchett: *Voices of the Poor: Poverty and Social Capital in Tanzania*, World Bank, Washington DC, 1997.

Social capital has become a familiar concept among geographers because of its ubiquity in the policy field and its utility in offering a 'meso-level' approach that can be combined flexibly with number of development theories.<sup>46</sup> Main areas where social capital has been applied are-

- a) Gender and race ethnicity in aspects of social division and difference in participation.
- b) Local Development including civil mobilization, nature of power relation, role of state and institutions<sup>47</sup>
- c) Civil society and state<sup>48</sup>

Available literature on social capital shows that the progress of its application in various fields of geography is still in its infancy. Even the fields, where the concept has been applied many areas have remained untouched like issues around disability, generation and sexuality in the field of gender and ethnicity.<sup>49</sup>

Studies in local development have indeed gone further in uncovering the complexities and ambiguous outcomes of civil mobilization and the neo-liberal drive of group formations. Another line of scholars who are working from the premise that 'social capital of the capital of poor'<sup>50</sup> local and community projects have been designed to mobilize this capital for development ends.

Concerning state's role in regional growth and civil society recent works have begun to examine precisely the relationship between civil society and the state though originally Putnam (1993) largely ignored the role of the state in his discussion of regional growth and civil society. Current thinking suggests that states have to do more than merely complementing civil society and it will have to show the will, beyond trust and co-operation.

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<sup>46</sup> Radcliff, S.A.: Geography of Development: Development, Civil Society and Inequality- Social Capital is (almost) dead?, *Progress in Human Geography*, 28,4 (2004), pp. 517-527.

<sup>47</sup> Portes, A and Landolt, P. 2 : Social Capital: promise and pitfalls of its role in development. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 32 (2), 529-48.

<sup>48</sup> Fox, : How does civil society thicken? The political construction of social capital in Mexico, *World Development*, 24 (6), 1996, pp. 1089-103.

<sup>49</sup> Radcliff S.A.: *ibid.* p. 520.

<sup>50</sup> Woolcock, M.: *Social Capital: Implications for development theory, research and policy*, The World Bank research observer's 2000, pp. 225-49.

Researches in local level development have also revealed what Atul Kohli (1990) has earlier pointed about the role of regional elite. They have revealed that regional elites differ in their response to grass-root level organization, resulting in considerable intra-state variability in collective action and openings for development.<sup>51</sup>

Robert Putnam and other protagonists of social capital believe that this is a substantive concept to ensemble the issues related to bottom up approach to governability and well-being. However, there are some who believe that the bottom up approach must shift the context and terrain of discussions from mere discussion on phenomenon to the inter connection and articulation of the phenomena.<sup>52</sup> Thus they ask for a transition from an analysis of social capital to a discussion on ‘cultural capital’.

#### **2.4.2. Cultural Capital**

Cultural capital is a general theory, in the sense that it attempts to construct explanations for things like ‘differential educational achievement’ in a way that it combines a wide range of differing influences. In this respect, almost any cultural feature of people’s lives can, under the right circumstances, be applied to an explanation of achievement/underachievement.

Pierre Bourdieu<sup>53</sup> argues that – questions of “power and ideology “ are central to the differential achievement. According to him Cultural capital includes

- a) Embodied in the individual (as a type of habitus),\*
- b) Objectification in cultural goods,
- c) Institutionalized as academic credentials

This concept in some respect has both strength and a weakness in explaining social processes related with well-being. A strength in term of the way the theory recognizes that a multi-causal approach to understanding the complexity of achievement is

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<sup>51</sup> Fox. : ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Sauer, Carl O (1924): “*The Morphology of Landscape*” in Human Geography an Essential Anthology (ed.), John Agnew et al Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge, p .299.

<sup>53</sup> Bourdieu, Pierre & passeron, J.C. (1977) : *Reproduction in Education and Society and Culture, Trans by Richard Nice*, London, Sage, P. 72.

\* Habitus- deeply acquired sysem of perception, thought and action. This is key to reproduction of Knowledge in a society. It is the, thus, the product of social conditioning.

required, and a weakness in terms of the fact that its frequently difficult to pin down the relative influence of particular cultural factors on well being.

### **New Issues:**

Application of social and cultural capital in geography also poses certain questions:

- 1) Despite considerable decentralization and increased participation, state still exerts considerable influence over development and more importantly over command of resources. It does not solve the problem and instead further complicates it especially in resource-poor regions. Indian situation is a good example.
- 2) It challenges the post-modern contention that 'development is local'.<sup>54</sup> Instead it recognizes the significance of non-local geographies on the basis of a) positionality of diverse social actors like state, NGOs; and b) Multifaceted identities.

In other words- its builds up a hypothesis that development is the function of positionality of social actors including other factors.

- 3) The most interesting question is the argument that – richer gets richer because it is rich. Researchers have pointed out that – 'certain state sectors are good at promoting civil benefits then policy-makers and donors may have to target funds and support at the reformists.'<sup>55</sup>

### **Social Capital in Indian Situation**

Anirudh Krishna (2002)<sup>56</sup> in his study of rural India found that the Indian state is actually very generous with funds for rural development, but lacks the capacity to ensure that these funds are well spent. In order to measure the relative abilities of different villages to access these funds he identified two main measurable variables – one is social capital and the other is extent to which individual village are endowed with 'new leaders'. Unlike old leaders new leaders base their power and influence not

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<sup>54</sup> Radcliff: *ibid*, p.523.

<sup>55</sup> Fox, J. and Gerhman, J. : The World Bank an social capital: lessons from ten rural development projects in the Phillippines and Mexico. *Policy Sciences*, 33 (3-4), 399-419.

<sup>56</sup> Krishna: *Active Social Capital: Tracing the roots of development and Democracy*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2002.



on unmerited family or wealth or caste status, but on their ability to act as intermediaries between villagers and external political and bureaucratic organisations. He further says that social capital alone is useful but not effective. The same is true for new leaders. It is the combination of the two that really turns villages into powerful collective actors for the purpose of accessing state resources.

P.K. Doraiswami<sup>57</sup> has categorized social capital into two types on the basis of its suitability to different socio-spatial situations- a) bonding and b) bridging type social capital. Under former, members are bound together into a cohesive bond in furtherance of their common interests while latter type reaches across to other group. Both promote good governance but former is more suitable to Indian conditions. He further says that the term is equally applicable to all levels, but it is much easier to activate it at the micro level which again suits to the bonding type.

But, even after having many visible benefits, the community development and Panchayati Raj experiments have failed due to political and administrative antipathy<sup>58</sup> on the one hand and pervasive externalities<sup>59</sup> (for example mafia networks) on the other. Robert Putnam's study in Southern Italy also showed the link between low level of social capital and regions pervasive corruption.<sup>60</sup>

### 2.4.3 Civil Society:

Civil society and social capital are often used in more or less similar sense. It is used to describe a realm of autonomous groups and associations, such as businesses, pressure-groups, clubs, and families and so on.<sup>61</sup> In the conventional, liberal view civil society is identified as a freedom and individual responsibility, whereas the state operates through compulsory and coercive authority, civil society allows individuals to shape their own destinies. This explains why a vigorous and healthy civil society is usually regarded as an essential feature of liberal democracy.

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<sup>57</sup> Doraiswami, P.K.: 'On Social Capital', *The Hindu*, Oct -05, 2004.

<sup>58</sup> Doraiswami, P.K.: *ibid*.

<sup>59</sup> Dasgupta, Partha: 'Economic Development and the Idea of Social Capital' in Ismail Serageldin and Partha Das Gupta (Ed.), *Social Capital; A Multifaceted Perspective*, Washington D.C. World Bank, 2000.

<sup>60</sup> Fukuyama, Francis: *Social Capital, Civil Society and Development*, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22 (1), 2001, pp. 7-20.

<sup>61</sup> Heywood, Andrew: 'Key Concepts in Politics', Macmillian Press Limited- London, 2000, p.17.

Practice of civil society in western and many developing countries suggest a lot of variation from region to region.<sup>62</sup> In some regions- it meant modern forms of sociability based on interest. In some other it emphasized a secure, reliable legal order. 'in case of India social consequences of democracy and failure of its party system is often considered as a symbol of immature civil society'.<sup>63</sup>

A discussion on bottom-up approach of social and cultural capital and role of civil society as facilitator of a government's policy implementation programme is needed here. Their effectiveness in Indian situation might be a point of debate but their mention in the current academic discussion on causes of differential performance of states is indeed an indication of their acceptance in geographical circles. Since, their relevance in geography is understood in welfare context, a discussion on geography is understood in welfare context, a discussion on geography of social well-being become unavailable in order to appreciate the spatial variations in the levels of development.

### **3.3 Geography of Social Well-Being:**

Social well-being is the real flesh and blood of the physical health of a region. In one way, it is the 'expansion of choices' of an individual. It is defined as –

“The general welfare of the society is intimately related to the welfare or well-being of the individual in it. The general welfare, however, is not simply the sum of welfare of individuals. It is not necessarily promoted if, for example, the aggregate welfare increases because the rich gets richer faster than the poor gets poorer. The distribution of individual welfare i.e. how many have how much, must be taken into account as well as how much there is overall.”<sup>64</sup>

Now, what constitutes well-being? People living in a specific area can be meaningfully differentiated from those living in other areas with respect to their dimension. “It relates to income in its broadest sense, physical health and state of mind- three basic conditions of individual well-being recognized in various

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<sup>62</sup> Kaviraj, S. and Khilnani, S. : *Civil Society: History and Possibilities*, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 2-3.

<sup>63</sup> Kaviraj and Khilnani: *ibid.*

<sup>64</sup> Smith, D.M.: *Geography of Social Well-Being in USA*, McGraw Hill Book Co., 1973, p.1.

literatures.”<sup>65</sup> The experience of researches over the years has shown that social problems, like economic problems, have an important spatial component, and that their incidence can be subject to extreme areal variations.

Similarly, like spatial dimension of socio-economic condition, political conditions have also been incorporated into spatial studies. “We have become accustomed to mapping and interpreting our political world based on a theory of sovereignty which holds that it is the political community of the state that exercises supreme authority over a particular territorial jurisdiction and that is the most appropriate reflection of how political space should be organized, bounded and, within much of political geography, theorized.”<sup>66</sup>

It can be inferred from the statement that while evaluating the well-being of people not only the social and economic conditions should be taken into account but also the political will and propensity that fundamentally propels its own functioning. Since, it is a function of spatial variations, politically motivated well-being is also an important constituent of overall well-being of a society, Susan Smith has also pointed out-“Without more willingness to enter the politics of prescription, geography is powerless to challenge the subtle ideologies that legitimize enduring social inequalities”.<sup>67</sup>

### **2.5.1 Well-Being in New Perspective:**

In a world where reasons for every seeming phenomenon is sought after, cause-effect relationship between institutional performance and well-being is like another revelation. But everything that is visible may not be a complete picture. ‘When distances seem to have reduced, it might have actually enhanced.’<sup>68</sup> This is true for aforesaid relationship also. Institutional performance, in most cases, does not explain levels of well-being more than two third of its variance. This happens while learning political performance or governability apart. So, in effective sense, institutional performance explains who gets what where. But what about the rest of the

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<sup>65</sup> Bossard in Smith, D.M: Ibid. p.7.

<sup>66</sup> Gregory, Desek, Martin and Smith, Grahman: *Human Geography: Society, Space, Science* (Ed.), Palgrave McMillan, 2002, p.55.

<sup>67</sup> Smith, D.M.: *Geography and Social Justice*, Blackwell, 1994, p. 297.

<sup>68</sup> Chatterji, Ipsita: ‘*Space is container, space is contained*’, M.Phil, Thesis, JNU-2002, P.1.

variance i.e. who do not get, where do they not get and most importantly why do they not get it at all. And it is certain that no study can achieve this without taking into account the aspect of governability. This new perspective should indeed help society in achieving greater realization of well-being.

“The importance of space rests not just in the fact that it has become the focus of intense theoretical reflection in a variety of disciplines. Rather, space provides a way to understand the disciplinary production of knowledge in general and that to consider space as interpretive practice- thinking geographically if you will-helps turn space into a visible object”.<sup>69</sup>

Daniel Brewer’s this statement signifies the role of space in understanding intricate interplay of various social, political and economic factors in producing the pattern of well-being.

**2.6** Governance, governmentality, governability, social capital, civil society is all the varied dimensions of one concrete reality i.e. well being. Traditionally, the impact of social capital and governance are over-emphasized in assessing the performance of the state but they have their own limitations. Social capital is more applicable at the micro level as pointed out by the scholars and even at that level it has failed to generate momentum especially in India-like situations. Some scholars have tried to replicate Putnam’s original study into Indian context but with gross modifications<sup>70</sup> and some others have even questioned its applicability in the Indian context.<sup>71</sup>

Governance, on the other hand, is more a fashion in its use than a substantial instrument in uncovering deep structure for observations in well-being pattern over space. Governmentality and governability are more important concepts and tools in fulfilling the objectives of this work. Though governmentality is more an intangible phenomenon, it indeed helps in implementing governability as an important measurable input in understanding gaps between institutional performance and associated well-being in different states.

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<sup>69</sup> Daniel Brewer in Whithers, Caharles : *Progress in Human Geography*, 29, 1 (2005), pp. 64-72.

<sup>70</sup> Mayer, Peter: op. cit.

<sup>71</sup> Serra, Renata: Social Capital: Meaningful and Measurable at State Level , *Economic and Political Weekly*, Feb. 24,2001, pp. 693-704.

## Chapter -3

# Regional Disparities in Institutional Performance And Well-Being

**3.1** For a person, seeking to know the health of a region, the fundamental question is-what causes the specific pattern of well-being across space? Does the answer lie in the Institutional performance?

Well-being is generally regarded as the sum total of the health, education and material standard of living. In the current fashion of explanation- it is the expansion of capabilities. A person who is adequately qualified, possesses good health and lives with a descent standard of living is said to be at a good level of well-being.

Institutional performance, on the other hand, is the performance of the state government for the various institutions like education, health and welfare. A state is called as developed one if its performance raises the standard of well-being of individuals. Now certain questions arise out of this statement-

1. Whether this relationship produces any pattern across states?
2. Which are the areas where certain states out- perform others?
3. What is the degree of relationship between the two Indices of measurement?
4. To what extent the economy of a state affects the well-being (or, overshadows other measures)?

All these questions will be examined in this part of the work.

### **3.2 Measures, Variables, Indicators:**

#### **3.2.1 Institutional Performance:**

In order to evaluate the performance of states six key measures have been selected.<sup>72</sup>

- a) Physical Infrastructure
- b) Medical Infrastructure

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<sup>72</sup> Mayer, Peter: Making Democracy Perform, *Economic and Political Weekly*, Feb. 24 (2001), pp. 684-692.

- c) Educational Infrastructure
- d) Enrolment enforcement
- e) Welfare/social security provision
- f) Economic status

These six measures are the most critical areas where the governments are likely to be examined. Physical, medical and educational infrastructure define a government's ability to successfully locate its resources at fundamental most important places. Educational enforcement examines whether the government is capable enough to attract desired population to education or not? It examines government's own network of information and public relations, its ability to break social taboos and generate new incentives for general public. Efficiency of government's distributive channels is assessed by the success of its welfare provisions. Finally, economic status of the individual is the story of the government's utilisation of its human and capital resources. A performance is said to be good when people are prosperous enough to fulfill their needs without being deprived and dependent.

Now, selecting indicators from each or these measures is not an easy task. Since, India is a vast country not only in terms of its length and width in general but also at the level of internal variations. Among the Fifteen selected states many are as vast as Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan and there are others such as Kerala much smaller than the rest. Apart from these variations, states also vary in their economic conditions. Therefore, any variable which is the direct result of the economic conditions should, carefully, be avoided.\* It can be taken as a separate indicator as it bears considerable influence on enhancing the level of well-being of certain states. Benefit of taking it as a separate indicator is that it can be excluded from the index whenever it is required to isolate the income effect.

Thus, the indicators selected to represent these measures should be considered as suitable in the context, time and area of application.

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\* However, Statistical analyses show that –there can be no institutional indicator which is not an outcome of the economic outcome. In low income settings like that of the India, it puts a serious methodological constraint.

### **3.2.2 Well-Being**

The matter is debatable whether well-being is the function of institutional performance only! But one thing is certain that institutional performance largely explains the variations in the levels of well-being across states.

The different aspects of social well-being include health, nutrition, employment, education and empowerment. Whereas the earlier writers were concerned with education and employment, presently there is a pre-occupation with female health, nutrition and empowerment.<sup>73</sup> Nevertheless, this study takes into account most widely used connotation and includes criteria of poverty line, life expectancy and female literacy rate to cater all aspects of material well-being. Another argument in favour of considering broad connotation is that other aspects of well-being like maternal mortality, child and maternal nutrition and empowerment are not only the function of government's performance but also the levels of education (especially females),<sup>74</sup> social conditioning and government's intrinsic capacities to govern.

### **3.3 Database :**

#### **3.3.1 Institutional Performance:**

Selected indicator for physical infrastructure is 'percentage of villages electrified'. Among the selected states, a clear distinction is visible between socially and economically developed and underdeveloped states. Range of electrification varies from 69.8 per cent in Orissa to near 100 per cent in as many as three states namely Kerala, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu. Most of the other developed states are in the range of 95 per cent to 100 per cent. A striking feature of the data is that Madhya Pradesh is at par with the other developed states while West Bengal falls in the category of underdeveloped states. This feature explains the rise in the performance of Madhya Pradesh and considerable neglect of physical infrastructure in West Bengal.

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<sup>73</sup> Datta, Anindita and Sinha, Sachidananda: Gender Disparities in Social Well-being, *Indian Journal of Gender Studies*, 4:1 (1997), pp. 51-65.

<sup>74</sup> Sen, A. and Dreze, J.: *India: Development and Participation*, Oxford University Press, 2002, p.17.

Chibber and Nooruddin (2004)<sup>75</sup> have also shown in their analysis a rapid progress made by Madhya Pradesh in this field of what they call as ‘public good’.

**3.3.1.1** Hospital beds per million population indicates state of health infrastructure.

The condition of hospital beds varies from 3463 beds in Kerala to only 427 beds in Madhya Pradesh. West Bengal again shows lack of proper infrastructure for health facilities. Kerala’s achievement in social development is visible in the extremely well infrastructure. Next well off state is Gujarat is about half way of that of Kerala. As opposed to this Bihar and Uttar Pradesh are two states with large population, show poor record in the field of health infrastructure. Categories of the states according to this indicator are as follow-

HIGH LEVEL >1500	Kerala, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Maharashtra
MEDIUM LEVEL 1500-1000	Punjab, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka
LOW LEVEL <1000	West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Haryana, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh

Haryana, an economically well-off state, shows poor infrastructure for health. Here, conditions are poorer than many under-developed states like Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan. This is an indication of negligence on the part of the government towards public health.

**3.3.1.2** In the area of social insurance, percentage of households availing public distribution system represents suitable indication. A look on state of PDS allocation to households in different states shows a wide ranging regional disparity among various states. It ranges from only 5 per cent in Bihar to 82.4 per cent in Tamil Nadu and Kerala. Data indicates that the programme is working fairly efficiently in all four southern states, two western states, and Himachal Pradesh, and at modest levels in Madhya Pradesh. Only about 5 per cent of rural households have reported PDS utilization in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa and Punjab. With the exception of Punjab,

<sup>75</sup> Chibber, P. and Nooruddin, I: Do Party Systems Count? The Number of Parties and Government Performance in the Indian States, *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 37 (2), Mar. 2004, 152-187.



the other three states have a very high level of under nutrition both among children and adult populations. Low PDS utilization in Punjab and Haryana is primarily a consequence of lack of demand since these are agriculturally prosperous states with substantial marketable surplus.<sup>76</sup> The programme is very weak in the states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa and West Bengal.

**3.3.1.3** Under educational infrastructure number of teachers per school has been selected as the representative indicator as it indicates the availability of teacher for students. More the teacher and higher is the likelihood of educational attainment and diversification in learning. A regional survey again indicates higher level of teachers per school ratio for Kerala while the other states are clubbed together and are sharing nearly fifteen percent of what is available in Kerala. The range of teachers varies from 15.74 in Kerala to 3.77 in Bihar. Categorization of the states on the basis of high, medium and low is as following:-

HIGH > 10	Kerala
MEDIUM 5 – 10	Gujarat, Haryana, Maharashtra, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu
LOW < 5	Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa, West Bengal

It is clear from the above that educational infrastructure in most of the states is poor. States like Karnataka and Himachal Pradesh fall under the category 'Low'. It seems that educational attainment in some of the developed but low performing states the ratio of teachers per school are more the result of educational tradition and public awareness than the dependence on states infrastructure. Poor states fail in both the areas.

**3.3.1.4** Enrolment of girl children in age group 6-11 years of the total enrolment in that age group has been selected as the representative indicator for educational enforcement by the state. Considering the fact that girl enrolment in the country is always below that of boy and remain below 50 per cent (as per actual

<sup>76</sup> India Human Development Report, *Planning Commission*, 2001 p. 91-92

female population in every age group), this indicator provides an estimate of girl population which remains outside even enrolment at primary level.

As per expectations, the levels of enrolment in developed and underdeveloped states are clearly distinguishable. Bihar, with 42.4 per cent enrolment and Andhra Pradesh with 49.3 per cent enrolment stand at the two poles of this indicator. Their categorization is as following:-

HIGH > 48	Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal
MEDIUM 48-46	Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh
LOW < 46	Bihar, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Haryana

A striking feature of the data is that two developed states – Gujarat and Haryana fall in the third category along with Bihar and Rajasthan. Bihar and Rajasthan are socially backward states. Haryana is characterized by high level of gender-disparity but condition of Gujarat is really striking.

**3.3.2** It is debatable that income should form a part of state's performance or well-being. To quote Dreze and Sen (2002) – “There is, of course, a general association between expenditure-based poverty indicators and many aspects of well-being, including health and educational levels. For instance, it is mainly on the basis of higher incomes that Punjab and Haryana have achieved much better levels of health and education than most other states in the northern region.”<sup>77</sup> In case of Gujarat, they say, that “sustained commitment to economic growth and active infrastructural development have fostered remarkable economic dynamism”<sup>78</sup> and a high level of development. But, in case of human development, as India development report- 2004 says-” ... However, it is comparatively a laggard in sectors such as population and demography, agriculture, health and nutrition, environment and natural resources.”<sup>79</sup>

<sup>77</sup> Dreze and Sen : *India Development and participation*, oxford university press, 2002, p. 87

<sup>78</sup> Dreze and Sen: *Ibid*, p. 17

<sup>79</sup> Parikh, Kirit and Radhakrishnan, S. : *India Human Development Report 2004*, p. 43

This has happened due to sectoral pattern of growth biased against agriculture and the type of industries chosen.

Therefore, it is clear that income (per capita state domestic product at factor cost at constant price) should form a part of institutional performance; well-being of individual is rather an outcome of income effect and even that in selective cases.

A close look of the states in per capita income enables to know the wide ranging disparities between developed and backward states, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa, Bihar are bunched together around 5-6000 Rs. Per capita. West Bengal is slightly above these states while others are more than 10,000 Rs. Their categories are:-

HIGH > 11,000	Punjab, Haryana, Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra
MEDIUM 11,000-8000	Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, West Bengal, Rajasthan
LOW < 8,000	Uttar Pradesh, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar

**3.3.2.1** As a representative of the economic conditions of individual, percentage of people above poverty line has been selected. It gives an overview of the degree of deprivation in a state. It also shows a government's commitment towards economic development.

A close survey of the states indicates that there are aberrations in the level of poverty from the general perception Tamil Nadu (78 per cent), Maharashtra (74 per cent) and West Bengal (72 per cent) are socially developed states where a considerable degree of poverty exists despite their efforts to achieve greater economic development. Range of poverty status varies from 57.4 per cent in Bihar to 93.8 per cent in Punjab. The most visible impact of economic development is seen in case of Punjab.

Division of the states at the seals of high, medium and low are as following:-

HIGH > 80 per cent	Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Andhra, Gujarat, Kerala, Rajasthan
MEDIUM 80 > 70 per cent	Karnataka, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal
LOW < 70 per cent	Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh

The most striking feature of the regional distribution of people with above poverty line is the efforts made by Rajasthan in reducing poverty from the state.

**3.3.2.2** Female literacy gives an idea of the condition of overall social development on the one hand and levels of gender discrimination on the other. Among different states, Kerala (87 per cent) and Bihar (33.5 per cent) present the range of female literacy. Diversity of our country can be surmised from the levels of literacy in these states. In between the two extremes there is another wide ranging diversity among states crossing all barriers of development and backwardness.

Their categorization gives the better idea:-

HIGH > 75 per cent	Kerala
MEDIUM 75-65 per cent	Himachal, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal
LOW 65-55 per cent	Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Punjab
VERY LOW < 55 per cent	Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar

Among other indicators, this indicator shows the most scattered trend and, in fact, presents the realistic picture of India's diversity and only partial development of human resources in some of the socially developed states. It also proves the notion that the development. There are fewer roles of state's efforts and in case of economic set back or any political relativity; they are less likely to perform well. On the other hand, high level of educational attainment by Kerala, Himachal Pradesh and Tamil Nadu are the result of their efforts (by state and public both).

**3.3.2.3** Under health-related well being, life expectancy at age one has been selected as the representative indicator of well-being. Data pertaining to different states doesn't show much irregularity and the regional variation among states is clear.

HIGH > 70	Kerala, Punjab
MEDIUM 70-65	Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, Gujarat, Himachal, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal
LOW < 65	Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh

### 3.4 Analysis of the Results:

#### 3.4. a Summary of the Results: Institutional Performance and well-being

Dependent Index	Well-being
Independent Index	Institutional Performance
Constant	-4.33
Co-efficient	0.52
R <sup>2</sup>	0.72
Standard Error of the Estimate	0.072
Significance at	0.000

**Source:** From Appendix I and II

\* Excluding per capita SDP

It is clear from the summary of the results that Institutional performance has a strong co-relation with the well-being and explains around 72 per cent variance of well-being.

#### 3.4. b Institutional Performance<sup>a</sup> and Well-being<sup>b</sup> –Linear Regression

Independent Variables	R <sup>2</sup>	Co-efficient	Constant	Standard Error	Significance
Per capita SDP	0.635	2.13	-4.66	0.449	0.000
Hospital beds	0.601	0.08	-4.68	0.470	0.001
Teacher /School	0.570	2.034	-7.64	0.486	0.001
Village electrified	0.552	1.99	-4.09	0.498	0.002
PDS allocation	0.289	1.44	-4.51	0.628	0.039
Enrolment of girls	0.270	1.40	-4.67	0.632	0.044

**Source:** From Appendix I and II

a = Independent

b = Dependent

Summary results obtained here from table 3.3.b excluding per capita SDP of various which was specifically entered as control for poverty. Poverty indicator in the well-being index shows strong dependence with the per capital SDP ( $r^2 = 0.635$ ,  $p < 0.000$ ). It clearly indicates that irrespective of other forms of social well-being, poverty eradication is largely a function of economic growth. But, empirical evidences

have proved that other forms like Health and education are the functions of government's own commitment (which results from its own capacity) and historical traditions of public action. This will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.


Among other indicators, health, education and physical infrastructure exert considerable influence on the well-being. Health infrastructure, represented by *Hospital beds per million population* is the most important indicator ( $r^2 = 0.601$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ) and signifies the importance of health in the achievement of overall well-being. A state which does not ensure enough health facilities should be seen at the lower level of well-being. Some of the seemingly developed states like Gujarat and Karnataka fall victim of this attribute.

Educational and physical infrastructure have almost similar influence on the well-being with their indicators teachers per school ( $r^2 = 0.570$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ) and percentage of villages electrified ( $r^2 = 0.552$ ,  $p < 0.002$ ) working at the same levels of significance. Though their individual performance explains only about 55 per cent of the variance, they are extremely significant as far as overall performance of a state is concerned.

Against the above mentioned measures, welfare and enforcement seem to have little influence on the well-being as the values of their indicators i.e. households using PDS ( $r^2 = 0.289$ ,  $p < 0.039$ ) and enrolment of girl children in age-group 6 to 11 years ( $r^2 = 0.270$ ,  $p < 0.044$ ) have low values for the rho. When regressed with the poverty indicator of well-being PDS allocation to households gives weak response ( $r^2 = 0.163$ ,  $p < 0.17$ ) which justifies its overall low influence. While for some developed states like Punjab and Haryana it is indeed needles due to their agricultural prosperity, in other states its low intake shows the heavy leakages and its increasing ineffectiveness. The Irony of Indian situation is that most backward states are also those ones that have PDS utilization highly unsatisfactory. A crisis in governability where a government cannot implement welfare programmes can easily be observed.

On the basis of individual performances of the states in two indices, a regression line has been obtained. (See diagram 3.4 A)

## INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND WELL-BEING



- 1 ANDHRA PRADESH
- 2 BIHAR
- 3 GUJARAT
- 4 HARYANA
- 5 HIMACHAL PRADESH
- 6 KARNATAKA
- 7 KERALA
- 8 MADHYA PRADESH
- 9 MAHARASHTRA
- 10 ORISSA
- 11 PUNJAB
- 12 RAJASTHAN
- 13 TAMIL NADU
- 14 UTTAR PRADESH
- 15 WEST BENGAL

**3.4.1** It shows three clusters of the states. Cluster one, at the bottom of the line represents Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh. Location of Madhya Pradesh slightly far from the line but towards x axis shows that Madhya Pradesh has not yet transformed its achievements as an institutional facilitator into consolidated form i.e. well-being. Achievements of Bihar are still much below even the average of the four poor performing states. This is a striking case where the rules of regional disparities show much contrast than expected. The location of each state at the regression line also predicts their threshold time to come out of low performance and low well-being levels. Madhya Pradesh will take shortest time while Bihar may have to wait for a little longer if persisting conditions of governability do not radically change.

**3.4.2** Second cluster consists of Rajasthan and West Bengal. Rajasthan's superior performances as facilitator have been much earlier transformed into well being due to its better developed local democracy at grass-root level and its achievements in education (Rajasthan registered highest growth rate in case of female literacy in the last decade) and awareness.

**3.4.3** Achievements of Punjab and Haryana can clearly be attributed to their economic performance in the last three decades. Punjab, a high on well-being but comparatively low on institutional performance tells this story perfectly. Despite low state initiatives 'law of market mechanism' has kept the health of the state well. In contrast to Punjab, Andhra Pradesh's position on well-being is much similar to the second cluster but a greater level of governing capacities has retained it among high performances. As per presents trends of its declining capacities it may, in near future, come to join the low performers.

Ranking of the states according to their performances in the two indices is as following:-



### 3.4. c Ranking of States

Institutional Performance	Well-Being
Kerala	Kerala
Karnataka	Punjab
Tamil Nadu	Himachal Pradesh
Maharashtra	Haryana
Gujarat	Maharashtra
Himachal Pradesh	Tamil Nadu
Andhra Pradesh	Karnataka
Punjab	Gujarat
Haryana	Andhra Pradesh
West Bengal	West Bengal
Madhya Pradesh	Rajasthan
Rajasthan	Uttar Pradesh
Orissa	Madhya Pradesh
Uttar Pradesh	Orissa
Bihar	Bihar

**Source: Appendix I and II**


One thing is clear from the ranking of the states is that – poor states show consistency in their performance in both the indices while some of the states among developed group show aberrations in their ranking. It means at least one thing that – its easier to explain the backwardness than to explain development as far as Indian case is concerned.

Ranking of Punjab and Haryana in the two indices support the agreement given by Sen and Dreze (2002) that the propellant of the development in these states is their economy. This also applies to Gujarat where economic prosperity is the main driver of its well being but has not succeeded as much as the two north-western states could do. In the last two decades its position has even deteriorated due to political conditions, changes in the positions of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka are explained by their poor show in reducing poverty and enhancing female literacy.

This contrasting picture of regional association between institutional performance and well-being has also been mapped which shows considerable aberrations between the two i.e. institutional performance and well-being.(See maps 3.4 I and 3.4 II)

3.4I


**INDIA  
SPATIAL VARIATION IN THE LEVELS  
OF  
WELL - BEING**



Not to Scale

3.4 D

INDIA  
SPATIAL VARIATION IN THE LEVELS OF  
INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE



Not to Scale

## Rationales

India Development Report 2004 has discussed socio-economic status, perceptions and aspirations of the poor in three contrasting states<sup>80</sup> Kerala, Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh. It says that – the percentage of poor in rural areas declined from so percent in 1973-74 to 12.7 per cent in 1999-2000 which even with moderate economic growth has been attributed to its effective implementation of land reforms, comprehensive food and social security coverage and public action – of democratically elected state governments, decentralized systems of governance and a highly conscious civil society.

About Gujarat, it says that Gujarat has been on the forefront of the economic growth in the last two decades but is comparatively laggard in sectors such as demography, agriculture, health, nutrition and education.

These two are the contrasting examples where the source of progress has been different but where parameters of development always favour social rather than economic efforts. But then, it is to keep in mind that ‘state cannot continue to have a high level of social consumption due to slow growth of economy.’<sup>81</sup> Human Development as a political development paradigm embraces both economic and social development, both material goods and human welfare.

In case of Madhya Pradesh, last decade has been very encouraging from the view point of institutional performance. It has made remarkable progress in the income as well as education departments. In 1990, its per capita income (at current price) was only Rs. 4500 Which grew to Rs.21000 in 1999 and which improved its state wise Per Capita SDP ranking from 12 to 5.<sup>82</sup> In the field of education its ‘education guarantee scheme’ has succeeded in enhancing the level of education.<sup>83</sup> But these achievements have not shown immediate results (and it cannot be expected to do so). Probably till the next census, this state must have improved its status in the present situation in any indication.

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<sup>80</sup> India Human Development Report, Ibid, p. 17.

<sup>81</sup> Gopal Ji and Bhakri, Suman: *Human Development in India*, Ane Books, 2005, p. 35

<sup>82</sup> Gopal Ji and Bhakri: Ibid, p. 101

<sup>83</sup> Sen and Drezelbid, p. 104

About the impact of PDS on poverty reduction, S. Mahendra Dev<sup>84</sup> says that – there has been minimal impact of PDS on poverty and nutritional status. With the exception of Kerala and Andhra Pradesh, the impact on poverty and nutritional status was negligible. If considering country as a whole, there would have been a decline of barely 2 percentage points in the poverty ratio due to combined incidence of food and non food consumer subsidies. It, thus, suggests the reasons for persisting poverty in states like Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan where a lack of strong commitment towards implementing PDS and a lack of economic generation has helped in persistence of poverty to a mass scale.

### **3.6 Regional contrasts over Time:**

Northern India, as a whole is, generally, considered to be a ‘problem region’. But this is not so. Human deprivation has different aspects involving failures of different kinds of capacities. For examples, rural poverty (by conventional head-count ratio) is highest in the eastern states of Bihar and Orissa. On the other hand child death rates are particularly pronounced in Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan and gender-discrimination is seen in relatively prosperous states. There is, thus, no single ‘problem region’ in India.<sup>85</sup>

Similarly, In South India, Andhra Pradesh has quite dissimilar picture of its institutional performance and well-being. Had this state been in the North India, it would have been easily included in the so called ‘problem region’. Gujarat presents another example of isolated problem regions in the west, characterized by high economic growth but low on health, gender issues (on Human Deprivation Index it ranks at the bottom of developed states under’ Health Index).<sup>86</sup> Karnataka, another ‘developed’ state has performed poorly over the last two decades.

It seems that every region has its own success and failure stories. The states which are seen as developed may not have been so some two to three decades ago but some pioneer steps have steered them towards achieving greater levels of well-being.

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<sup>84</sup> Mahendra Dev, S. : Public Distribution system, impact on poor and options for reform, *EPW*, Aug. 29, 1998, pp. 2285-2290

<sup>85</sup> Sen and Dreze : *Ibid*, p. 17

<sup>86</sup> Gopal Ji and Bhakri : *Ibid*, p. 116

Kerala's experience is particularly instructive in this respect. There is a definite link between its outstanding social achievements and its rich history of public action. **West Bengal** provides a good example of the possibility and rewards of land reform programmes. **Tamil Nadu** is an outstanding case of rapid demographic transition based on a combination of positive state initiatives and comparatively favourable social background. **Himachal Pradesh**<sup>87</sup> has made exceptional progress in the field of education, even catching up with **Kerala** within forty years for the younger age group (starting from a stage of extreme backwardness). In **Gujarat**, sustained commitment to economic growth and active infrastructural development has fostered remarkable growth. **Punjab and Haryana** have transformed their economy after green revolution and afterward rapid industrial development. **Maharashtra**, with its rich industrial tradition, propelled most of its development. And lately, even in some of India's problem states, however, there have been interesting developments in recent years such as the 'education guarantee scheme' in **Madhya Pradesh** and the 'right to information' movement in Rajasthan. **Rajasthan**, a resource-poor region, performed better in poverty reduction and may have lessons to offer from its experience.<sup>88</sup>

### 3.7 Is Institutional performance sufficient enough to explain the levels of well-being?

Analysis of the states on the basis of institutional performance explains almost three fourth of the variance of the well-being but it also produces certain irregularities which the scholars have consistently pointed out-

- a) How long an economically propelled region can sustain high levels of well being in case of political turmoil?<sup>89</sup>
- b) What is the limit of achieving higher levels of well being without actually doing good on economic front?<sup>90</sup>
- c) Why a backward region remain backward despite considerable infusion of development expenditure?<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> Sen and Dreze: Ibid, p. 16

<sup>88</sup> Parikh and Radhakrishnan. Ibid, p. 3

<sup>89</sup> Kohli, Atul: *Democracy and Discontent*, Cambridge university press, 1990, p. 17

<sup>90</sup> Sen and Dreze: Ibid

d) How far it is possible for a backward region to come out of backwardness trap?<sup>92</sup>

Cases a, b, c and d apply to the Gujarat, Kerala, the so called 'problem regions' of northern India and Himachal Pradesh respectively. Though they are quite different in the type of problems they have, there is but one similarity in all of these- 'the capacity of a state' its 'will power' and 'working efficiency'. Of late, official documents have also recognized this aspect by calling it as 'political Governance' which is assessed by measures of various political perception indicators including corruption, quality of bureaucracy, accountability, law and order etc.<sup>93</sup> However, so far no attempt has been made in the official report in India to complete and analyse such indices.

Sen and Dreze (2002) also talk about some kind of social capital while comparing the levels of development in Kerala and Uttar Pradesh. They say-

*"The contrast between Uttar Pradesh and Kerala also points to the special importance of a particular type of public action" the political organization of deprived sections of the society. It has also been important in enabling disadvantaged group to take an active part in the general process of economic development, public action, and social change."*<sup>94</sup>

But, what exactly has happened in case of Uttar Pradesh. The political organization of deprived groups was channeled through electoral motivation (rather than 'public action' of Kerala) and ultimately resulted into the distortion of social equations and process of development.

The same did not happen in case of West Bengal. After 1977, the main electoral base of the left front consists of landless labourers, sharecroppers, slum dwellers and other disadvantaged groups. This change in the balance of power has made it possible to implement to a member of far reaching social programmes that are often considered 'politically infeasible' in many other states. It succeeded in reducing

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<sup>91</sup> Gopal Ji and Bhakri: Ibid

<sup>92</sup> Sen and Dreze: Ibid

<sup>93</sup> Gopal Ji and Bhakri: Ibid, p. 125

<sup>94</sup> Sen and Dreze: Ibid, p. 95-96

poverty and raising the social standing of formerly 'low ranking' group.<sup>95</sup> But surprisingly, the government has been less active in promoting some other types of social opportunities like industrial development and economic participation. Public policies concerned with health, education, and related matters have been comparatively neglected.

These contrasting examples have certain important implications. The case of West Bengal shows that though state failed in providing overall development of the people it succeeded where it wanted. In case of Uttar Pradesh, the set up of the politics is such that state failed in desired areas of development and it also failed in areas where it wanted some development. For examples – Uttar Pradesh and Bihar are such states where allocation to the social sector has been as higher as developed states but the ground result is insignificant.<sup>96</sup>

This is the state of crisis of govern ability where state's internal capacity is unable to translate its policy decisions to get implemented. This happens due to its fluctuating social base, its weak political will and organization and not importantly a crisis of legitimacy of its even existence.

**3.8** Analysis of the regression between institutional performance and well being indicates a positive co-relation between the two indices and institutional performance explains around three fourth of the variance in well-being.

Economic prosperity of a state has a strong correlation with poverty reduction. But, one should keep in mind that this is rather a mechanical way of translating a high economic growth into economic well-being. There are cases in Indian situation where despite a high growth rate, social development gets retarded due to state's limited capacity and lack of any public action.

A regression analysis of institutional indicators shows that health and physical infrastructure are the two most important governmental institutions in providing well-being to the individuals. An overall social development of a state depends upon its capabilities. Development of West-Bengal and Himachal Pradesh adequately suffice this notion.

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<sup>95</sup> Sen and Dreze : Ibid, p. 96

<sup>96</sup> *India Human Development Report 2002*, table 7.7, p. 290



## Chapter -4

### Governability And Well-being: A Search for Deep Structure

4:1 An attempt was made in the previous chapter to find out possible reasons for spatial variations in the condition of well-being for the fifteen major states of India. But the analysis of this relationship widens the surface of thinking and requires more inter-disciplinary and methodological expansion like-

- 1) Well-being of a region is not only a function of economic and social conditions but also a government's capacity to govern-whether it is able to translate its willingness to develop the state into reality or not. A fine example of this ability is West Bengal after 1977\*. Other such examples are Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Himachal Pradesh and to some extent is recent years- Rajasthan.
- 2) Institutional\*\* performance is only a manifestation of larger operating mechanism i.e. governmentality and governability largely are functions of a government's own democratic well-being. A government with low capacity will either get into a trap of mal functioning and low well-being or decelerate the already well functioning system. Gujarat is the finest example of Indian situation.<sup>1</sup>
- 3) Many scholars have contemplated absence / presence of a vibrant social capital as the ultimate reason for the good or bad performance of a state. Had this been the case with India, Uttar Pradesh must have been a developed state<sup>2</sup> because many analyses say that it is one of the few states where social capital is found to

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\* Left government came to power in West Bengal in 1977.

\*\* Though institution has different connotation than state but state also functions as an institution. A crisis in governability, among other things, is the break downs of the state as an institution. See Pat O'Mally. (1997) the paper is about modeling poverty and social capital, for 15 major Indian States. It has shown geographical distribution of social capital in India. Among 15 states, 7 have been shown as having high levels. Uttar Pradesh is one of the. Among the Southern States Karnataka does not figure among such states. (p.22).

<sup>1</sup> Kohli Atul L op. cit , p.238.

<sup>2</sup> Morris, Matthew : *Social Capital and Poverty in India*, IDS Working Paper, UK Department of International Development , The paper is based on – Datt, G. and Ravallion, M. (1996) 'Why Have Some Indian States Done Better Than others at Reducing Rural Poverty', World Bank Policy Research Paper, no. 1594, April 1996.

be excellent. But, Uttar Pradesh is still an underdeveloped\* state undermining the significance of social capital. What actually ails Uttar Pradesh is not the social bondage or co-operativeness at the local level (as social capital is defined) but its historical absence of public action<sup>3</sup> and a vigorous implementation of policies (which can only be done by a capable government). Arguments for social capital are more motivated by the successful work of Robert Putnam<sup>4</sup> than by unearthing the real factors of widespread inequality.

- 4) Levels of institutional performance\*\* can be attributed to the locationality of social actors.<sup>5</sup> Who acts on behalf of the government and where it acts. An NGO a cooperative society, a regional elite<sup>6</sup> or the government; anyone can be a social actor. Its functioning depends on the responses coming from the people. A tendency of public action channels the resources towards developmental activities otherwise resources get exhausted among social actors themselves before actually coming to the surface.
- 5) One way of expressing their concern for deprived sections is to form political organization through public action<sup>7</sup> as has happened in case of Kerala where the last three decades have seen dramatic rise in the level of well being of the deprived section. So, the basic motivation is not electoral gains but the real uplift of living standards. This also explains Kerala's exceptional ability to achieve superior levels of well-being without actually being economically superior. The reverse has happened in some of the states in the northern region where electoral competition has been the main force behind political organization of deprived

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\* The term 'underdeveloped and developed states' have been used in terms of economic and social conditions, See Smith D. M. (1977) and National Human Development Report (2001).

<sup>3</sup> Sen, A. and Dreze, *India, Development and participation*, Oxford University Press, p.17

<sup>4</sup> Putnam Robert: *Making Democracy work, civic Traditions in modern Italy*, Princeton University Press, 1993, p.17.

\*\* Putnam divided his study area into Northern and Southern regions and successfully employed his model to explain the existing development pattern.

<sup>5</sup> Radcliff: *Geography of development, Progress in Human Geography*, op. cit.

<sup>6</sup> Kohli, Atul: *Democracy and Discontent*, Princeton, op.cit, p. 113.

\*\* Institutions at state level are synonymous with the 'governments'.

<sup>7</sup> Sen & Dreze : op.cit,p.93.

\* They have defined public action in form of early state initiatives and Social movements for the promotion of literacy, the implementation of land reforms, the elimination of traditional discriminations, the provision of wide ranging public services, and related goals).

sections. Therefore the capacity of the institution has got exhausted in capturing political gains rather than the material well being of individuals.

- 6) Another tempting observation that comes out of the analysis of institutional performance of various state institutions is that a government in a low income setting is not only a protector of law and order but also a facilitator of the development<sup>8</sup> and therefore whenever a crisis in an institution emerges it not only affects the order but also the process of the development. Situation in many backward states is the result of this complex mechanism.
- 7) Similar to the previous argument is another observation that – most of the electoral competition<sup>9</sup> occurs for capturing vast resources available with the state. Since a low income setting example like India is characterised by concentration of resources at the centre, an incentive to gain or sustain this by ‘legitimate or illegitimate means’<sup>10</sup> often sidelines the vital concern of development. On the other hand a regime with shared resources (either through civil society or local democracy)<sup>11</sup> and responsibilities overpowers this defect and achieves better levels of performance and well-being. Role of civil societies where pressure groups, NGO, play an important role in sharing resources and redistributing them to the individuals. Though they are also prone to the same kind of trap but the situation is less likely to develop as they are subject to more

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<sup>8</sup> Kohli, Atul: op.cit p, 371.

\* The situation has been elaborated in chapter two.

<sup>9</sup> Wilkinson, Steven: *Votes and violence, Electoral Competition and Communal Riots in India*, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.1.

\* Wilkinson holds the view that ethnic violence has often been portrayed as the outcome of a rational, if deplorable, strategy used by political elites to win and hold power. He has cited various examples across the world that –electoral competition arouses ethnic conflict. He has also shown in his analyses that wherever a government relies on minority votes, it prevents violence and the government which does not rely on minority votes will not prevent riots. Gujarat is an example of the latter case.

<sup>10</sup> As referred by Kohli, Atul: op.cit, p. 13.

<sup>11</sup> Issac, TM and Franke Richard W.: *Local Democracy and Development, People’s Campaign for Decentralised Planning in Kerala*, Left Word, 2000, p.7.

\* They argue that only by providing services consistent with the spatially differentiated tastes and preferences of the people can welfare be maximized. Such local-specific choices can only be made locally. Democratic decentralization improves the efficiency of implementation, particularly if the development process is made participatory and transparent.

Similar thoughts about participation and developments have also been forwarded by Sen & Dreze (see India : Development and Participation). Both (Issac, Thomas and Sen, Dreze) have extensively cited the Kerala model of development.

supervisory actions and more importantly their origin is attributed not to facilitate but to solve the problems of the people.

Local democracy is more pertinent form of shared responsibilities.<sup>12</sup> It provides more space to voice and institutionalize the interests of competing groups in local democratic forums.<sup>13</sup> Another line of arguments say that the states lack the flexibility and reach to provide certain types of goods and services. Decentralisation, it is argued, creates institutions that are more amenable to local needs and preferences.<sup>14</sup> In this way, actually two levels of institutions- one at state level and another at local level operate to facilitate the growing needs<sup>15</sup> of the people. A state which lacks either of the two forms of shared responsibilities<sup>16</sup> is not likely to resist before the challenges of development and growing needs of individuals (in terms of their socio-economic aspirations).

- 8) Finally, the 'failure of the state as an institution' in many states of India<sup>17</sup> is particularly seen in post 1967 scenario where regional political powers took over nationalist regimes in many states. In order to retain power, successive governments started using social factors as means to achieve political gains. It led to the fractionalisation in politics, electoral violence, non-fulfillment of social development goal, and in some cases, even the retreat from the developmental

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<sup>12</sup> Jhonson, Craig: *Decentralisation in India: Poverty, Politics and Panchayati Raj*, Working paper 199, Overseas Development Institute, UK, 2003, p.2.

<sup>13</sup> Crook, R. C. and Svcrisson, A.S. : *Decentralization and Poverty Alleviation in Developing Countries*, IDS Working Paper 130, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 1998.

<sup>14</sup> Ostrom, E. : Crossing the Great Divide : Co-production Synergy and Development, *World Development*, 24 (6): 1996, 1079-1087.

<sup>15</sup> Kohli, Atul : op.cit, p 13.

<sup>16</sup> Sen & Dreze : op.cit , p.14.

What Kohli means from 'growing needs has been referred to as 'changing values' by M.N. Srinivas in 'Social Change in Modern India, Orient Longman 1996, p. 172. According to him- values varied from group of group, the locally dominant caste or other ethnic group provided a model for emulation for the non-dominants. Since the 1950s, the power of the dominants to enforce their will on the others has been eroded due to legislation, education, improved communications and other modernizing factors.

<sup>17</sup> Sarvalingam, A. and Sivakumar, A.: *A Study About Poverty, Health, Education and Human Deprivation in India*, 2004, p.4 and Kapur, Davesh, *The Role of India's Institutions in Explaining Democratic Durability and Economic Performance*, 2002, p.1. Kapur writes that – In India parties as institution have virtually collapsed, plagued by intrigue, infighting and factionalization.

records.<sup>18</sup> This condition is known as the crisis in legitimacy in governmental rationality.

#### **4:2 Governability and Governmentality :**

Governmentality is the theoretical basis of the governability. A crisis in governability is basically a crisis in governmental rationality. A government or institution whose power rests on fluctuating social base and whose organizational set up has collapsed, often takes violence as a means to achieve its goal. It represses one social group in favour of another group, uses its resources to retain power at the cost of social development and exhausts and collapses without realizing its disutility and what misfortunes it has given to the state. On this scale, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh fall under severe 'capacity failure' category while Gujarat is some distance apart where last two decades have produced conditions which if remain unchecked, can pull an extremely prosperous state to a severe level of socio-economic deprivation. Foucault, while dealing with the changes that have occurred due to changes in tools of governmental rationality, says that – 'promises of expanded individuals' autonomy and responsibility become electoral necessity.<sup>19</sup> It means that, now the population (as Foucault often refers it) is not only the subject of need but also an object in the hands of the institution of what it wants but ignorant of what is being done to it. This situation is not of a welfare state where it acts to facilitate and not to control the resources. It does not really play with the equations of the social group, it does not manipulate the circumstances in order to retain the power. For it, elections are just the valid ground where its activities are going to be "judged and not the battleground where it is rather interested in talking what others have not done and why it was unable to do anything that could have raised the levels at par with other developed states.

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<sup>18</sup> Bhakri and: *Human Development in India*, op.cit p.93.

<sup>19</sup> Foucault, Michael : On Governmentality in G. Burchell, C. Bordon and P. Miller (eds), *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p.53.

In geographical circles there is a debate on whether to emphasize governmentality as 'mentality of rule' or not?<sup>20</sup> and whether to include 'programmatic failures' of the government under failures of governmentality or not?<sup>21</sup> But the contexts are different. This could well be applied in cases where government and state are not considered identical.<sup>22</sup> Government, here, is still a facilitator of the programme or rather a programmer and state is an implementer. But the situation of India or India-like countries is different. Here, the government is both a programmer and implementer<sup>23</sup> and there is no distinction between a government and state. Government is the sole institution that formulates, facilitates and implements programmes of development. And in this situation of almost complete 'governmentalization of the state'<sup>24</sup> the programmatic failure should also be seen as a failure of the government, institution and state. Miller and Rose<sup>25</sup> have also pointed out the sources of programmatic failure as agents charged with implementation who transform, sabotage or misinterpret the programme during the implementation phase. Since the institution is also charged with the implementation of programme, the failure of implementation is failure of its own mechanism. A mechanism that is clearly attributable to its own priorities (like electoral incentives).

Thus governability crisis can be considered to be as the crisis in legitimacy of political rationalities, governmental programme, technologies and techniques of government.

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<sup>20</sup> Hart, Gillian : Geography and Development: Critical Ethnographies, *Progress in Human Geography*, 28(1)-2004, pp. 91-100.

<sup>21</sup> O'Mally, Peter et al: Governmentality, Criticism, politics, *Economy and Society*, 26(4), Nov. 1997, pp. 501-517.

\* O' Mally's says that – politics is understood primarily as a 'mentality of rule' and the sociological concern with politics as social relations is sidelined in favour of examination of texts of rule that provide the empirical record of government plans, programmes, self-interrogation and responses to the intractability of what it seeks to govern.

<sup>22</sup> O'Mally, Pater et al: Ibid, p. 501.

<sup>23</sup> Kohli Atul : op.cit, p.52.

<sup>24</sup> Miller, Peter and Rose, Nikolas : Governing Economic Life, *Economy And Society*, 19, 1990, pp. 27.

<sup>25</sup> Miller and Rose: Ibid.

### 4.3 The Study: Governability, Well-being and Regional Development:

There are two perspectives for exploring the complex relationship between governability and regional development. One is from the development point of view and the other from the emerging crisis in governability in some Indian states.

A regional development, in its strict sense, is a planned development where resources are allocated to different spatial units of national political economy according to their potential and possibilities. Here first, potential and possibilities are recognized and accordingly allocation is done in phased manner so as to ensure its proper functioning and implementation. This is the ideal situation where a state is supposed to act as facilitator of many implementing institutions including civil societies, pachayats and to some extent state institution.

But, the situation remains ideal in most of the cases as the planning process gets distorted either at conception or, more commonly, at implementation level. Problems at conception level arrive due to confusion in understanding location of need and allotment priorities and most importantly where lies the problem at the stage of implementation or facilitation?\*

In a state of confusion, when most often facilitator itself is the main culprit, planning is left on the mercy of market mechanism. Resources are just allocated without actually assessing the priorities of development. An individual in relatively prosperous state can feel just better off because interplay of market forces will automatically take care of his/her subsistence but since the planning has no defined channels allocations to some priority sectors like education, health or women's empowerment would get lost to either already well-functioning sectors (like selected industries or businesses) or the 'basic sources of confusions (like electoral incentives) in the state institutions. In this case, civil societies and local democracy have least advantage as state assumes the roles of both; a facilitation and implementer and it ends up with doing a mess. The situation is worse in economically deprived states where

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\* See, Keshab Das: Uneven Development and Regionalism, *EPW*, Nov. 6, 2004, p. 4917. he has discussed in great detail the problem of sectoral planning and biased meaning of development.

neither the market nor the state is able to sustain the poor in particular and social well being in general. So, until the capacity of facilitator (or the government) improves, the overall wellbeing is most unlikely to improve.

Another perspective to look at this relationship is to investigate the governability itself. Why the capacity of certain governments is low in comparison to some other socially well off states? How the capacity of a government gets degenerated? And why a vast literature refers this capacity as declining only in source states? Finally, how this degenerated capacity affects the well being in particular and regional development in general.

As the literature refers, incapacity can be attributed to two types of states – first, that are economically well placed and the second that are economically deprived. There are fundamental differences between these two types of states. This difference should be seen in the light of four roles a government plays in a region-<sup>26</sup>

- 1) Provision of ‘Public good’: Example- universal education and health care,
- 2) Provision of ‘Divisible good’: such as credit, agricultural extension.
- 3) Determination and enforcement of laws: regulating key economic inputs. Such as land, labour and capital.
- 4) Recognition and protection of rights: allowing its citizens to form organization, association and entitlements and receive without any discrimination.

A region with good historical tradition of economic activities will often be interested in provisions two and three while leaving provision of public good and recognition and protections right on the market-mechanism. On the other hand, an economically deprived state leaves all the provisions on the mercy of the market as it has to devote its time and efficiency in solving socio-electoral equations. Former is the case for partial incapacity while later is – ‘Absolute Incapacity’ to govern.

How do incapacities arise? A good number of literature including Myron Weiner (1967), Atul Kohli (1990), Rajni Kothari (1988), Pranab Bardhan (2001), Sudipta Kaviraj (2001), Francine Frankel (1997), Steven Wilkinson (2004) etc is available on how and where a crisis of governability arose in India. Basic reason for

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<sup>26</sup> Johnson, Craig : op.cit, p.6.



its origin is attributed to retain power at any cost and especially in the post-1967 scenario.<sup>27</sup> In a case where historically and universally accepted regime lost its legitimacy, a number of manifestations of its illegitimacy began surfacing out. Most prominent of these was – ‘fractionalization of politics’<sup>28</sup> into various organizations which represented different social groups. The problem aggravated in the wake of changing social values in modern India.<sup>29</sup> Fractionalization gave birth to the other political evils like electoral incentives for violence,<sup>30</sup> criminalization of politics<sup>31</sup>, rise of national and local elites etc. Elite politics further deepened the crisis as it favoured autocratic rule which ultimately weakened organizational structures of the parties. Thus, a government whose social base is already eroded and whose organization is weakened by various reasons is either, motivated to capture the power through illegitimate means or, demotivated to pay attention on further developmental activities. Therefore, a crisis when sets in it, only grows and never slows down until it eats up everything.

Now, the last question- why historically such a power hunger is seen in Indian situation and if the crisis is of such an enormous dimension then how other states get influenced by such crisis and what will be its impact upon the levels of well-being? In other words it crisis can deter development then in what ways states like Kerala, Himachal Pradesh and West Bengal succeeded in moulding these in their favour?

Two different notions should be combined here in order to produce a satisfactory result. First, who gets what, where and how; and the second is, who acts in whose favour and how it acts? Jointly emphasize the role of ‘locality of social actors’. This may be a group, an NGO or state institution itself. There is a strong correlation between *public action* and well being<sup>32</sup> on the one hand *government’s own*

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<sup>27</sup> Kohli (1990), Kothari (1988), Kaviraj (2001): op.cit, p.7..

\* Post -1967 situation is marked by confusion in the power equations in basically previously congress dominated states like Gujarat, Karnataka, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. Two important works on this issue are by Myron Weiner and Atul Kohli. Also see- Kohli: Success of India’s Democracy, Cambridge University Press, 2001.

<sup>28</sup> Yadav, Yogendra: Reconfiguration in Indian Politics, *EPW*, Jan. 13-20, 1996, pp. 95-104. and Butler etal: India Decides Elections 1951-1995, 1995, p.31.

<sup>29</sup> Srinivas, M.N. : op.cit, p.103.

<sup>30</sup> Wilkinson, Steven, op.cit, p. 62.

<sup>31</sup> Op.cit.

<sup>32</sup> Johnson, Craig: op.cit, p.3.

*capacities* and well being on the other. Whenever the two i.e. public action and governability are matched, result is excellent. Two such examples are from the states of Kerala and Himachal Pradesh. In this context, it is to be noticed that government's commitment towards well-being is also a function of its own capacities in general and its social base in particular. When a government finds its social base strong enough to get an electoral advantage, it stagnates. This situation may produce a mix of well being out comes; West Bengal is the best example of it.

On the basis of some survey and secondary data based analyses it can be said that apart from Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Gujarat that are extreme cases of bad governability there are other states where the problem has began showing its prominence like Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh. On the other hand, these are some states like Madhya Pradesh where stability and commitment over one and half decade has shown signs of improvement in well-being. In the other states, the government has either succeeded in accommodating political conflicts by maintaining strong organizational set up or succeeded in equating governability and public action.

On the basis of above discussion, it can be ascertained that –regional disparities in the levels of well-being among the regions is basically a function of governability and not the socio-economic changes.<sup>33</sup>

#### **4:4 Governability, Decentralization and Well-being:**

It is often said that decentralization enhances a government's capacity to govern. But the question remains to be investigated in detail. There may following possibilities one; states lack the flexibility and reach to provide certain types of goods and services, particularly ones with large information requirements. Decentralization, it is argued, creates institutions that are more amenable to local needs and preferences.<sup>34</sup>

Two, State institutions lack the time and place knowledge to implement policies and programmes that reflect people's 'real' needs and preferences. Decentralization is thought to create the conditions for a more pluralist political

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<sup>33</sup> Kohli, Atul : op.cit, p.1999.

<sup>34</sup> Ostrom etal: op.cit, pp. 1073-1087.

arrangement, in which competing groups can voice and institutionalize their interests in local democratic forums.<sup>35</sup>

This process is supposed to enhance the efficiency of local bodies in a number of ways- first, by improving the ways in which local people manage and use natural resources; Two, *Synergistic outcomes*<sup>36</sup> with the collaboration between public agencies and local resources users can be achieved, such as-joint forest management, fisheries co-management and participatory watershed management; There, it can enhance participation in *decision making*, particularly among groups that have been arginalized by local political process.<sup>37</sup>

However, the notion that improving participation through decentralization will necessarily lead to improvements in people's well being is not entirely consistent with documented evidences.<sup>38</sup> In one way, this reflects the difficulties of establishing a clear and vigorous link between changes in governance and improvements in well being.<sup>39</sup> It means changes brought in by decentralization donot substantially enhances the capacity of the government and consequently have low bearing on the government and consequently upon the well being (especially of marginalized section of the society). Even the most successful forms of democratic decentralization have been unable to overcome economic and political disparities, both within and among regions.

Surprisingly, it can even reduce the capacity of a government by posing new problems of co-ordination and planning.<sup>40</sup> Without adequate support and training, the devolution of large sums of money can over-burden local bodies whose members lack the resources and expertise to spend large and complex budgets. It also highlights the challenge of encouraging 'empowerment' without addressing rights and entitlements particularly one governing land and property.

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<sup>35</sup> Crook and Manor (1998) in Jhonson, Craig, op.cit, p.7.

<sup>36</sup> Evans, P. : 'Introduction: Development Strategies Across the Public Private Divide; World Development, 24(6), 1996, 1033-1037.

<sup>37</sup> Blair, H.: Participation and Accountability at Periphery, Democratic Local Governance in Six Countries, *World Development*, 2000, 28(1), 21-39.

<sup>38</sup> Blair, H. : op.cit, pp. 21-39.

<sup>39</sup> Jhonson, Craig: op.cit, p.8.

<sup>40</sup> Ghatak. M. and Ghatak, M. : Recent Reforms in Panchayat Systems in West Bengal, *EPW*, January 5-2002, pp. 45-58.

Apart from these local level difficulties one pervasive problem is of 'accountability'. Even if decentralization does not show a high co-relation with poverty reduction, it has its spillovers over other institutions and without effective governability (accountability included) it can not raise the levels of well-being. Instances of effective governability and implementation of decentralization policies can be seen in West Bengal, Kerala and Karnataka. On the other, a government with least capacity in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh could not even fulfill even the required number of women gram Panchayat representatives at Panchayat level.<sup>41</sup>

#### 4:5 Measuring Governability

From Myron Weiner (1967)<sup>42</sup> to Pradeep Chibber (2004) there have been many attempts to conceptualize and evaluate the state of governability in India. These are some that are influenced by Robert Putnam's seminal work. 'Making democracy work' and 'Bowling Alone'<sup>43</sup> and have tried to replicate his work in Indian situation. Peter Mayer (2001), Ranata Serra (2001), Mathew Marris (2001) to name only a few, It is an imperative to critically look at the nature of work that have actually been done to examine governability in India.

To begin with Atul Kohli's much cited work 'Democracy and Discontent: India's growing crisis of governability'. Kohli has selected five districts from equal number of states. These district are Kheda (Gujarat), Madurai (Tamil Nadu), Guntur (Andhra Pradesh), Belgaum (Karnataka) and Kolkata (West Bengal) and later on three states- Bihar, Gujarat and West Bengal were also included in his scheme. His evaluation of the situation is based on the primary survey and he defines the crisis in governability in terms of fluctuating social base, weak political organization, inability to resolve political conflicts without violence and rising political elite. His work is pioneering in the sense that it makes one to feel to search for deeper reasons for regional disparities in institutional performance and associated well being of

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<sup>41</sup> *India Panchayati Raj Report 2001, Volume 1, Women and Panchayati Raj, p. 67.*

\* No. of women elected at gram panchayat levels were the highest in Karnataka (43%), followed by Kerala (37%) and Tamil Nadu (33.4%). While Uttar Pradesh and Bihar could elect only 25.5% women.

<sup>42</sup> Weiner, Myron: *Party Building in A New Nation: Indian National Congress*, University of Chicago Press, 1967.

<sup>43</sup> Putnam, Robert : *Bowling Alone : America's Declining Social Capital*, *Journal of Democracy*, 6(1), January 1995, pp. 65-78.

individuals. In order to assess the levels in disparities at national level, this definition of governmentality needs to be cautiously examined.

Pradeep Chibber (2001) has tried to assess the government performance from many perspectives. In his paper 'Political Parties Electoral Competition, Government Expenditures and Economic Reforms'<sup>44</sup> has tried to emphasize the role of political parties and their electoral concerns in order to understand the policy making in India. He has argued that in cases where control over the *instruments of the state*<sup>\*</sup>, and not ideological positions over the functioning of the economy, drive the concerns of political parties, reform would be more difficult to sustain. He further adds that if political parties are more concerned with providing access to state resources for their supporters, distributive reform would be difficult to implement. The specific concern of his paper is to co-relate electoral competition to the government expenditure. His paper affirms the view that in a state where the ruling government is weak organizationally and has weak social base tries to accommodate the interests of diverse groups from where it is likely to get the electoral advantage and not the sectors where the allocation is desired most.

Going one step ahead of their previous work Chibber and Nooruddin<sup>45</sup> (2004), by using the macro economic data from 1967 to 1997 as well as post-elections voter surveys, argue that differences in state government expenditures are largely the result of differences in their party systems. They also demonstrated that states with two-party competition provide more public goods than states with multiparty competition which reflects differences in their mobilizing strategies. Their argument is that in a two party systems political parties require support from many social groups, therefore they provide public goods to win elections. Contrary to this in a multiparty systems, needing only a plurality of votes to win parties use club (or group), rather than public goods to mobilize smaller segments of the population. Their effort is

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<sup>44</sup> Chibber, Pradeep : 'Political Parties, Electoral Competitions, Government Expenditures and Economic Reforms' In India, *The Journal of Development Studies*, Vol. 32 (1), October 1995, pp. 74-96.

<sup>\*</sup> Chibber has used the term to denote co-operatives. The term can aptly be applied to any facilitating agency including state itself.

<sup>45</sup> Chibber, Pradeep and Nooruddin, Irfan: Do Party System Count? The number of Parties and Government Performance in the Indian States, *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 37 (2), March 2004, pp. 152-187.

different and interesting as most of the current researches in this area of assessing government's performance either stresses the effects of particular political parties (as earlier done by them) or ethnic division on the performance of the government.\*\* In their analysis they included three sets of indicators related to multiparty system i.e. ideological competition\*\*\* and coalition government. They took voters' turnout<sup>46</sup> as an indicator for examining poor's condition in the society; increase in the turnout indicates a '*larger relevant constituency*' whose interests need to be catered to. In India's case this constituency is likely to be from poorer segment of the society.<sup>47</sup> The subsequent lowering of the medium voter's income should make a government more attentive to development policies that are more likely to raise the income of the poor. Thus, Chibber and Nooruddin's paper (2004) gives an idea of what fractionalization and voters' turnout indicate towards the capacity of a government. Especially an increasing fractionalization is a clear sign of the erosion of governability.

Peter Mayer's perspective of finding out the causes of differences in institutional performance is basically based on Robert Putnam's concept of social capital. Putnam, in his studies, found that contemporary governments which deliver effective services to their citizens are located in regions that have long established civic traditions.<sup>48</sup> Peter Mayer observed a considerable comparability between Italian regional governments created in 1970s and Indian states which were formed after state reorganization in the early 1950s. In addition to this, both have ancient traditions of regional diversity.<sup>49</sup> Now, in order to assess the institutional performance, he devised a 'Civic Community Index' loosely based on the Robert Putnam's Index. He took index of opposition unity, average voter's turnout, strong society index, newspaper

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\*\* Similar to the argument of multiparty system, they also argue that parties that are not cohesive, they should be providing club goods with frequencies similar to multiparty system.

See also Schlesinger, Joseph: *Political Parties and the Winning of office*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1991.

\*\*\* Their coding of nature of ideological competition within a state is based on the particular parties that received votes in the state elections. For each state, they examined the state's electoral results and coded whether the political parties that had significant share of seats in the legislative assembly had a left, centre or rightist orientation.

<sup>46</sup> Meltzer, Allan and Richard, Scott: A Rational Theory of the size of Government, *Journal of Political Economy*, 1981-89, pp. 914-927.

<sup>47</sup> Yadav, Yogendra: Reconfiguration of Indian Politics-1993-95, *EPW*, Jan. 13, p. 95.

<sup>48</sup> Putnam: op.cit.

<sup>49</sup> Mayer, Peter: op.cit.

circulation and credit society membership. Except opposition unity, this actually reflects the state of capacity of the government. Others are just the outcomes and not the real reflections of governability.

Renata Serra (2001) has made another attempt to find a cause for varying institutional performance. Before trying to investigate the reasons, she tried to explore the feasibility of social capital. "Does 'social capital' help explain the differential success of states and communities in improving their material well being, in reducing deprivation and having a better quality of life?"<sup>50</sup> She feels difficulty of measuring trusts and co-operations, and compare these levels across communities. For her, it seems that political failures at the top are as important causes as corruption of the local bureaucracy and inertia on the part of the population. And there might be a common root for the observed government inefficiency, bureaucratic corruption and inertia of the people in some Indian States. Nonetheless, she realizes that the differences in terms of the operation of the political system, the party in power and the type of policies pursued are undoubtedly crucial to explain this divergence. Finally, she agree that though Putnam Finds that his constructed index of social capital can explain both 'growth' and 'democracy' but it explains neither the growth nor the democracy.

John Harriss (1999)<sup>51</sup> makes a strong case for differentiating the political systems of different states in India on the basis of the balance of caste/ class power and the nature of party organization within those states. He supports the view put forwarded by Weiner (1968) and Kohli (1990) that such differences can thus be shown to influence the policy formulation and performances of these states, especially with regard to decentralization of power to cover caste groups and alleviation of poverty.

Mathew Morris' paper<sup>52</sup> also explores the need to expand research on social capital and its effects on poverty. This paper has tried to co-relate the spatial distribution of social capital and its connections with the poverty reduction. His paper shows Uttar Pradesh as having high social capital among states but nowhere in the map having drastic reductions in poverty ration in India. His findings reaffirm the

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<sup>50</sup> Serra, Renata: Social Capital: Meaningful and Measurable at the State Level? *EPW*, February 24, 200, pp. 693-702.

<sup>51</sup> Harriss, John: Comparing Political Regimes Across Indian States, A preliminary Essay, *EPW*, November 27, 1999 pp. 3697-3377.

<sup>52</sup> Morris, Mathew, op.cit, p.6.

views made by Renata Serra (2001) that social capital is difficult to measure in case of India and if done any how, it does not correspond to the existing realities at the state level.

#### **4:5:1 Governability : A Measurement Model**

It should be clear that there has been no attempt on the part of Scholars to develop any index to measure the ways in which capacities of governments vary from state to state. Indeed, work done by Kohli is pioneering in this area and every other subsequent attempt has supplemented the ‘capacity’ model in one way or the other. Chibber’s attempt is more helpful than any other attempt. Serra’s paper conceptualizes the practical difficulties in applying ‘social capital’ model in its original form. Peter Mayer’s attempt is no doubt the most balanced essay in recognizing the possible factors influencing institutional performance but his is certainly not the replication of Putnam’s model and has been built on his own conceptual modification. Yet the problems pointed out by Atul Kohli and subsequently realized by other scholars still get unresolved – the growing crisis of governability in certain developed states like Maharashtra and Gujarat. It seems that most of the attempts try to fit their model into established index of well being i.e. human development index. Serra has pointed out that the most likely proxy of social capital in India is the literacy. Myron Weiner (1968) has also recognized the importance of this factor in promoting democracy –

“Widespread illiteracy represents the main paradox in the largest democracy of the world”.<sup>53</sup>

If this is the case, then why not this factor should be taken as an indicator for assessing governability? Criminalisation of the politics is the most likely outcome of the political fragmentation of states. Therefore, it should also form part of the larger assessment process.

#### **4.5.2 Governability : Alternatives :**

Electoral incentive for violence has been pointed out by many scholars like Kohli (1990), Varshney (2001), Wilkinson (2004), Brass (1961, 1982, 2001) etc.

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<sup>53</sup> Weiner, Myron : op.cit, p.73.



These scholars opined that “the most effective method for elite dominated ethnic parties to mobilize heterogeneous target voters that are at the risk of voting for the main rival parties will be to use ethnic wedge issues to increase in the short term the salience of ethnic issues that will favour their party”<sup>54</sup>. The theory of electoral incentive has proved to be by far the most authenticated reason for violence.<sup>55</sup> But this indicator has its own limitations. Among the states, only Gujarat presents the major aberration among good performing states. Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh accompany it to some extent which others do not. The main feature of these three states is that these are all less fractionalized and have basically two party system where electoral incentive for violence exists in at least two states – Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh.<sup>56</sup> If this result is to be validated on well-being, then one thing that clearly emerges is the lower level of well being in the state. Andhra Pradesh is already on the boundary line between high and low development<sup>57</sup> while Gujarat has shown visible signs of degradation in the last two decades.<sup>58\* - \*\*</sup>

Among other alternatives – Consociational model\* as originally put forwarded by Lijphart (1996) suggested as an indicator for explaining governability by Boix and

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<sup>54</sup> Wilkinson, Steven: *Votes and Violence, Electoral Competition And Communal Riots in India*, Cambridge University Press, 2004, P.23.

\* he has shown that the choice of which identity politicians choose to invoke in an election is complex and depends on (among other factors) the degree of ethnic heterogeneity in any constituency, political alliance with other ethnic parties, strength of party’s inner discipline; and the number and ethnic heterogeneity of other seats in which the party is competing.

<sup>55</sup> Other explanation include states’ administrative and judicial capacity to prevent the violence and ‘consociational theory’ put forwarded by Arnold Lijphart who agreed in an important 1996 article that India has since independence been de facto consociational state, by which he means a state with a ‘political grand coalition’ that includes representatives of all the main ethnic groups, a minority veto over important legislation and minority proportionality in government and employment, see-Arned Lijphart: “The puzzle of Indian Democracy: A consociational interpretation”, *American Political Science Review*, 90(2), 1996, pp. 258-68.

<sup>56</sup> Wilkinson : Ibid, p.92 (on the basis of dependence on Muslim Voters)

<sup>57</sup> Human Development Index -2001.

<sup>58</sup> ‘Human Development Index’ for India – 1981, 1991, 2001

Bhakri and Gopalji: *Human Development in India, Analysis, Measurement and Financing*, Ane Book, 2005, p.105.

\* Regarding Human development, two economically developed state who lost their rankings are Gujarat and Maharashtra. Among others Andhra Pradesh lost while Tamil Nadu and Rajasthan gained significantly.

\*\* On Human Deprivation Index, based on poverty, illiteracy and IMR, Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh are again on the margins of development.

\* Recently, India Human Development Report also reaffirms this viewpoint.

\* Consociational theory by Lijphart in the Indian context (1996) investigates the level of involvement of minorities in government jobs and decision-making processes.

Posner<sup>59</sup> is a good alternative but since fractionalization also indicates lack of consociationalism, it shall produce multicollinearity between the two indicators. Therefore, only one can be shown as a cause of governability.

Irma Adelman and Cynthia Morris<sup>60</sup> have also opined some measures such as degree of centralization of political power, strength of democratic institutions, degree of freedom of political power, strength of democratic institutions, degree of freedom of political opposition, degree of competitiveness of political parties, predominant basis of the political party system, political strength of traditional elite, degree of administrative efficiency and the extent of political stability. Indeed these are political indicators and represent economic viability rather than government's own capacity to govern. Therefore, these are less suitable in the present context.

#### **4.6 Governability ; Anatomy of the Chosen Indicators :**

After analyzing all possible measurement based works, three indicators have been selected to show the state of governmentality in fifteen major states of India. These are those same states for which institutional performance and well-being Indices had been calculated in the preceding chapter. These are-

- i) Vote share of the two largest political parties in the state,
- ii) Voter's turnout at assembly elections,
- iii) Percentage of MPs with no criminal records

Apart from these indicators which represent existing capacity of the government, another group of indicators was selected in order to assess the outcomes (or manifestation) of capacities. These are-

- 1) Percentage gap between male and female literacy and,
- 2) Number of Riots per 10 million population per month.

For the sake of conceptual clarity the former group of Indices be called as '*Reflective Indicators*' and latter as '*outcome Indicators*' of governability.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Boix, Carles and Posner, Damil: *Social Capital: Explaining its origins and Effects as Government Performance*, Ohio, pp. 686-695.

<sup>60</sup> Adelman, Irma and Morris, Cynthia : *Society, Politics and Economic Development, A Quantitative Approach*, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1967, p.51.

<sup>61</sup> Most of the previous works have mingled these two groups of indicators. In order to analyse the 'capacity' their separation is necessary. See Mayer (2001)

#### 4.6.1 Reflective Indicators

Most of the analysis that were referred during the course of the research with respect to institutional performance, there is consistency in at least one sense almost all the scholars recognized the *importance of 'political fragmentation'* though at varying degrees. Some like Chibber (2004) and Kohli (1990) identified these as the most important. Moreover there are others like Mayer (2001) consider it one of the main measures and Boix and Posner consider it as traditional.<sup>62</sup> However, there is no specific time period (either pre 1990s or post 1990s) since when it has been considered as the most important. It was recognized by Kohli before 1990s and by Chibber in the new decade. In between there has been many studies based on Putnam's radical work on social capital. Perhaps, it was the failure reflected to emulation of Putnam's Italian model to Indian situation which again attracted scholars to search for new variables or reexamine older ones under new perspective and changed attitude. This can also be attributed to the demand of the context.<sup>63</sup>

Therefore, keeping in mind this concern, vote share of the two largest parties in the state<sup>64</sup> has been chosen as the representative indicator for shaving the political fragmentation is different states. Though, Butler et al<sup>65</sup>, have also given index of opposition unity as an indicator for measuring political party's social support base but it also takes into account the coalition and doesnot give the ground reality of the fragmentation. \*\*

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<sup>62</sup> Boix and Posner have said – “why some governments are more stable, efficient, and innovative and well managed than others? The traditional answers to these questions focus on such factors as electoral competition institution design, political polarization and bureaucratic capacity.

<sup>63</sup> Chibber, Pradip, op.cit, p.172.

\* Chibber regressed party fractionalization with the government expenditure and showed that if political parties are more concerned with providing access to state resources for their supporters, distributive reforms would be difficult to implement.

<sup>64</sup> Wilkinson, Steven: op.cit, p. 156

\* The data pertains to the 1997 to 2002 according to the elections held in various states

<sup>65</sup> Formulae for calculating IOU (Index of Opposition Unity) is –

$$IOU = \frac{\text{votes of the largest opposition party}}{\text{Sum of the votes of all the opposition parties}} \times 100$$

\* It takes into account the party alliances, swing factor and margin of victory. See Butler et al in, *India Decides Elections, 1962-1991*, 1995 p.38.

\*\* Another measures of fractionalization is 'Rae's Fractionalisation Index' measured by Subtracting the value obtained by 1.

See Yadav, Yogendra : Reconfiguration in India Politics, 1996, EPW, Jan. 13-20. pp. 95-104

Another indicator is the average of voters' turnout in the state entered into public arena as the main units at which politics 'happens'. The voter's choice is now influenced more by the performance of the state government than that of the national government.<sup>66</sup> In the last two-three elections, there has been an increase in the turnout at the state level which signals to the government that there is a larger relevant constituency whose interests need to be catered to.<sup>67</sup> As the new mobilization of new voters is more likely to come from the poor, a lower turnout definitely indicates that the state government should be more attentive to development policies.<sup>68</sup> Moreover, it indicates a wide regional disparity in the state.<sup>69</sup>

Third indicator is the percentage of MPs with no criminal records in 2004. This is an important indicator in the sense that it shows the emergence of new tools of governmental rationality-empowering money and crime to capture power. It also shows a weak social base and organizational set up that could attract more suitable candidates to enter into the political arena.<sup>70</sup> It also challenges the view that criminality can be banished from politics through legislation and penalties. The more tragic aspect of this phenomenon that criminalization and politics are concentrated in few regions- west and north, in both ; economically developed and backward regions.

Basis for taking these indicators is, basically, derived from Kohli's definition of governability –

- (1) Absence of enduring coalitions / weak social base
- (2) Policy ineffectiveness
- (3) Weak organizational setup

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<sup>66</sup> Pulshikar, Suhas and Kumar, Sajnay: 'Participatory Norm; How Broad-based is it? *EPW*, December 18, 2001, pp. 5412-5417.

<sup>67</sup> Chibber, op. cit, p.173.

<sup>68</sup> Yadav, Yogendra: op.cit p.99.

<sup>69</sup> Hirway, Indira: Selective Development and Widening Disparities in Gujarat, *EPW*, Oct. 14-21, 1995, pp. 2603-2618.

\*Hirway has pointed out the selective development of the Gujarat. She strongly argues that any member of poverty eradication cannot compensate for lack of sustainable and healthy development of the economy.

<sup>70</sup> Paul, Samuel and Vivekanand, M; Holding a Mirror to the New Loksabha, *EPW*, November 6, 2004, pp. 4427-4934.

\* Following the Supreme Court Directive, the 2001 parliamentary elections saw the submission of affidavits by constants for the first time.

Vote share of two largest parties represents the weak social base; Voter's turnout represents the effectiveness of policies; and member of MPs with no criminal record represents the organizational strength of the party.

A government showing poor performance will also be liable to the poor performance in raising the well-being of the people. Any variation might happen depending upon the degree of erosion in its capacity or the time period when the erosion has started. In the latter case, the indicators of institutional performance and well-being are likely to take some time in producing corresponding outcomes.

#### 4.6.2 Outcome Indicators:

After carefully studying the state of governability and well-being across Indian States, The logical outcome one expects is that certain attributes described by Kohli under governability might not cause the problem of governability. They are rather the outcomes of a 'deeper problem' (better to be called as, crisis). These are –

- 1) Male- female literacy gap for year 2001.
- 2) Number of ethnic riots per 10 million per month (1990-1995)<sup>71</sup>

Basis for taking such indicators is taken from Kohli, Wilkinson, Paul Brass,<sup>72</sup> Ashutosh Varshney,<sup>73</sup> Sen and Dreze,<sup>74</sup> and Renata Serra.<sup>75</sup> Since a developed state is

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<sup>71</sup> Wilkinson : op.cit, p.156.

\*The data for riots has been obtained from 'Varshney and Wilkinson' data set. Their sources of calculating riots involves the government's response to the Loksabha queries and Ministry of Home Affairs documents and its not possible to update or obtain this information on the basis of any published government document.

<sup>72</sup> Brass, Paul: Development of an Institutionalized Riot System in Meerut City, 1961 to 1982, *EPW*, October 2004, pp. 4839-4848.

\* His article is an attempt to explain the 'institutionalized system of riot production (IRS)' that are first created and then activated during periods of political mobilization or at the time of elections.

<sup>73</sup> Varshney, Ashutosh: Ethnic conflict and civil society: India and Beyond', *World Politics*, 53 (3), April, pp. 3-25.

<sup>74</sup> Sen & Dreze (1996): *India : Development and Participation*, Oxford University Press, p.93.

\* They have emphasized that one way of enhancing the capacity of the government is to promote literacy (and especially female literacy). Examples of Kerala and Himachal Pradesh confirm this view. Logic is that the more literacy will promote awareness and public action.

<sup>75</sup> Serra, Renata : op.cit. p.702.

\* See suggests that – political participation does affect state performance, but merely because it implies higher literacy levels. Education appears as a powerful element determining whether citizens are able to participate in society at large, interact effectively with government, and promote democracy.

\*\* Literacy is the only social capital which is relevant for Indian case

supposed to lower the difference between male and female literacy, persisting gap reflects the efforts and capacity of the respective governments. A lower gap shall show the degree of ability of a government to put the policy at the right place. It has been proved by the existing literature<sup>76</sup> that in a less fragmented, political space, parties always converge on major social issues including educations. A diversion from this notion clearly indicates a crisis of governability. If this happens in an ‘apparently’ developed state crisis will be more severe. This situation reflects an intense inter-party competition between the major political groups and highly fluctuating social base even in a two party system. The situation leads to the channelisation of public resources to non-desired locations (among mobilized social groups) and a highly biased regional development.<sup>77</sup>

Electoral incentive for ethnic riots<sup>78</sup> is also a major outcome of the decline in governability which affects well-being by adversely affecting institutional performance (via channeled or no development). Though when regressed to the institutional performance, it gives an insignificant explanation but this is largely because (a) It is basically a north-Indian phenomenon and (b) even in north India it is concentrated only in few states. Nevertheless, it has wider implications. Or in other words states with a declining capacity might opt for this instrument when gradually being voted out of power. There are definite signs (passed on the available literature) that a state engaged in such an exercise in order to hold on the power shows either an already lower levels or declining well-being. The inconsistencies found in the human development Index from 1981 to 2001 must be seen in the light of this indicator. Cases of ethnic riots, definitely do not explain the well-being; they only divert state’s efforts and resources to obtain the desired goals. In short, it limits the capacity.

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<sup>76</sup> Chibber, P. : Do Party System Count? op. cit, p. 181.

\* In multiparty system, on the other hand, parties have an incentive to focus on their voting blocs, because any loss of support from this group of ardent supporters could spell defeat. To ensure the support of this core group, parties provide state resources directly to these group.

<sup>77</sup> Hirway, Indira: op. cit, p.2611.

<sup>78</sup> Kohli, Atul: op. cit, p.23.

\*pursuit of political goals by violet means either by state or its citizens. The absence of open violence doesnt indicate a government that governs well, but an increase in politically oriented violence in a more or less open polity nearly always indicates a growing crisis of governability.

#### 4.7 Results :

##### 4.7. a Reflective Indicators of Governability<sup>a</sup> and Institutional Performance<sup>b</sup> : Stepwise Regression Analysis

Independent Variable	R <sup>2</sup>	Co-efficient	Standard Error	P
Voter's turnout	0.208	3.75	1.168	0.008
MPs crime	0.301	-4.71	1.655	0.016
Fractionalisation	0.552	-3.85	1.555	0.030

a – Independent Index

b – Dependent Index

Source : Calculated from Appendix I and III

##### 4:6:1 b Governability<sup>a</sup> And Institutional Performance<sup>b</sup> : Stepwise Regression

Independent Variable	R <sup>2</sup>	Co-efficient	Standard Error	P
Literacy Gap	0.35	0.316	0.144	0.54
Voter's Turnout	0.455	0.408	0.151	0.22
Fractionalisation	0.490	0.277	0.105	0.025
MP Crime	0.697	-0.327	0.125	0.026

a – Independent Index

b – Dependent Index

Source : Calculated from Appendix I and III

##### 4.7. c Performance of States on the Indicators of Governability

States/Variables	Literacy	Vote	Fraction	MP Crime	Riot
Andhra Pradesh	√				
Bihar	√		√	√	
Gujarat		√		√	√
Haryana	√				
Himachal Pradesh					
Karnataka				√	√
Kerala			√		
Madhya Pradesh	√	√			
Maharashtra	√		√	√	√
Orissa					
Punjab		√		√	
Rajasthan	√				
Tamil Nadu					
Uttar Pradesh	√	√	√	√	√
West Bengal					

Source : Calculated from Appendix III

\* Each (√) mark indicates poor performance of states in each category

\* Categories – Good, Medium, Poor

#### 4.7.1 Discussion on the Results:

Before discussing the final results, it is pertinent to see what the indicators say about the states. In order to check the severity of the problem among different states, the performance of states in each indicator was classified into *good, medium and poor* based on the range between highest and lowest values. Poor performing states in each of the indicator were assigned  $\sqrt{\phantom{x}}$  sign. Now, Reflective and outcome indicators were treated separately. Any state which performed poorly in, three indicators including any two of the 'reflective indicator's was treated as *severe* (problem of governability). Similarly, any states which performed poorly in any two of the indicators including at least one reflective indicator was treated as *moderately severe*. Others were treated as *adequately capable states*.

On the basis of above categorization, four states were identified as 'severe' cases of governability while Four states were identified as 'moderately severe states'. Their details are as following –

##### 4.7.1. a Categorization of States According to the State of Governability

Stage	States
Severe	Bihar, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh
Moderate	Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Karnataka
Adequately Capable	Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Orissa, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal

Source : Appendix III

When matched with the regression results, the percentage of states which are categorized as poor performing roughly corresponds to the  $R^2$  of reflective indicators which explains the institutional performance.  $R^2$ , in this case (without including literacy gap) stands only 0.55 or it explains only 55 per cent variance of institutional performance. After including literacy gap it explains 69 per cent variance. It thus, proves the hypothesis that literacy, as social capital, has an important component in capacity building mechanism of the government.<sup>79</sup> It also proves the notion that the

<sup>79</sup> Serra, Renata: op.cit.



only sustainable situation for governability is *when government's own democracy and public action go hand in hand*.<sup>80</sup> Other situations might prove unreliable and unstable when political base gets destabilized and illegitimized.<sup>81</sup> Cases of Gujarat and Maharashtra among the well-developed states certainly points out to this notion.<sup>82</sup> Most other economically developed states are liable to the same condition if their problems are not contained at the right time.

Table 4.7.a fills the gap between reported irregularities of correspondence between institutional performance and well-being i.e. states well on institutional performance. The states show remarkable fluctuations when ranked according to their levels of well-being. Table 4:6:3 a also explains the variations in the ranking of human development index for three successive decades (1981,1991,2001) where Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu improved their rankings at the cost of three developed states namely Gujarat, Karnataka and Maharashtra.<sup>83</sup>

#### 4.7.1. b Comparative Positions of States on Human Development Index between 1981-2001

States	Value gained (1981-2001)	points (1981-2001)	2001 value	Change in ranking 1981-01
Andhra Pradesh		.122 (13)	0.416	-1
Bihar		.130 (10)	0.367	0
Gujarat		.119 (14)	0.479	-2
Haryana		.149 (6)	0.509	+1
Himachal Pradesh		-	-	-
Karnataka		.128 (11)	0.478	-1
Kerala		.138 (8)	0.638	0
Madhya Pradesh		.150(5)	0.394	+2
Maharashtra		.160 (4)	0.523	-1
Orissa		.140 (7)	0.404	0
Punjab		.126 (12)	0.537	0
Rajasthan		.172 (2)	0.424	+3
Tamil Nadu		.192(1)	0.531	+4
Uttar Pradesh		.133 (9)	0.388	0
West Bengal		.167 (3)	0.472	0

Source : National Human Development Report 2001

<sup>80</sup> Sen and Dieze : op.cit., p.121.

<sup>81</sup> Kohli, Kothari, op.cit.

<sup>82</sup> Kohli, Wilkinson, Varshney, Hirway: op.cit.

<sup>83</sup> National Human Development Report-2001, p.25.

The above table reveals that among major states, Gujarat is placed at the bottom position in value points gained between 1981 and 2001 followed by Karnataka Punjab and Andhra Pradesh. This sluggish progress is also reflected in 2001 positions where the only losers are Maharashtra, Gujarat, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh.

Similar situations can be obtained on Human Poverty Index (1991) and *Human Deprivation Index* (2001).

#### 4.7.1.c Comparative Positions of States on HPI, HDI and SDP Per Capita.

States/Rankings	HPI (health)	HDI	SDP per capita (2001)
Kerala	1	1	10
Maharashtra	2	5	2
Tamil Nadu	3	2	4
Punjab	4	3	1
West Bengal	5	7	9
Andhra Pradesh	6	10	8
Haryana	7	6	3
Karnataka	8	8	6
Gujarat	9	9	5
Bihar	10	13	15
Rajasthan	11	11	11
Uttar Pradesh	12	12	13
Orissa	13	15	14
Madhya Pradesh	14	14	12
Himachal Pradesh	-	4	7

- Source :**
- 1) National Human Development Report-2001,
  - 2) As cited in Suman Bhakri and Gopalji, Human Development in India, p.116.
  - 3) A. Sarvalingam and M. Sivakumar : A Study about Poverty, Health, Education and Human Deprivation in India, 2004
  - 4) Handbook on Statistics on Indian Economy, RBI-2002

**4.7.1.d Top Poor Performing States on the Indices of HDI, HPI (Health), HDI (Deprivation) and Governability**

	HDI	HPI (Health)	HDI (Deprivation)	Governability
Among Developed	Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Punjab	Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, Karnataka, Gujarat	Punjab, Gujarat, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh	Gujarat, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab
Among Backward	Uttar Pradesh, Orissa, Bihar	Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh	Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh	Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa, Rajasthan

- Source :**
1. National Human Development Report 2001
  2. A. Sarvalingam and M. Sivakumar : A Study about Poverty, Health Education and Human Deprivation in India 2001.
  3. Appendix III


When compared to the states' ranking for institutional performance and well-being it becomes clear that major aberrations are in case of Gujarat, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Punjab can well be explained with the help of governability index. It is evident that over the last two decades Gujarat and Karnataka have failed to keep pace with the well-being parameters. On the other hand, Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh have progressed due to increasing social base of major parties and resultant commitment of the state governments towards development. These results can also be verified with the help of attached map (4.7.A)

**4.8 Who are the Problem Regions and Why?**

Traditionally, northern Indian states have been called as *problem region* as far as development of these states is concerned. But, in the last two decades, situation has slowly altered in favour of some of these states. So it is but obvious to know the reason. Possibly some of the explanations may lie with what Yogendra Yadav analyses.<sup>84</sup> During his discussion on party fractionalization of state assembly elections between 1985-1995 he showed that is evident in the following table –

<sup>84</sup> Yadav, Yogendra: op.cit, pp. 95-104.

INDIA  
SPATIAL VARIATION IN THE LEVELS  
OF  
GOVERNABILITY



Not to Scale

## 4.8. a

## Severity of Party Fractionalisation in Politically Volatile States

States	Increase in Fractionalisation (points)	Aggregate points
Bihar	06	0.86
Gujarat	08	0.71
Karnataka	14	0.77
Madhya Pradesh	02	0.67
Maharashtra	09	0.05
Rajasthan	-02	0.69
Uttar Pradesh	02	0.80

**Source :** Yogendra Yadav; Reconfiguration in Indian Politics, EPW, January 13-20, 1996 p. 99.

The table proves that 1980s onwards there has been an increasing fractionalization in Gujarat, Maharashtra and Karnataka. Gujarat still enjoys a two party system because its fractionalization base is small and it has adopted a unique method of political mobilizations of caste groups within the major fractions only.<sup>85</sup> But since their mobilization (unlike that of Southern states)<sup>86</sup> has not resulted in their emancipation, it resulted in lower voter's turnout and increased electoral incentive for violence. Situations of Maharashtra, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh are no different as increased fractionalization has enough incentives for 'politically motivated resource dimensions' among support groups and therefore a retarded development. The improvement in the performances in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan can be attributed to the strong organizational structure and stabilized social base from 1980s onwards.<sup>87</sup>

4:9 On the basis of the forgoing discussion it can be concluded that –there is no clear cut demarcations between developed and backward state on the parameters of well-being. To use Varshney's parlance that "*there is southernization of states in Northern India and northernization of states in the Southern India*"<sup>88</sup>. There are,

<sup>85</sup> Wilkinson, Steven: op.cit, p. 17.

<sup>86</sup> Varshney, Ashutosh: Is India Becoming Democratic, ibid, p.4.

<sup>87</sup> Lodha, Sanjay: Rajasthan, EPW, December 18,2004, p. 5456.

And Romshankar: Madhya Pradesh: Social Tectonics in a Two-Party System, EPW, December 18, 2004, p.5518.

<sup>88</sup> Varshney, A.op.cit, p.4.

\*his contention is that north India today, or in near future, may not follow the South India's foot steps entirely, but the rise of lower caste politics in the North bears striking similarities.

indeed, regional disparities but there is no regional contiguity of the disparities as perceived by the academicians in general.

Regression analysis of governability indicators proves the notion that a government's capacity to govern and levels of education of the masses go hand in hand. A strong public action can raise even the lower capacity and an almost dead public action can let the capacity waste away. Kerala and Uttar Pradesh are the two extreme example of this fact.

A sustained decline in the progress made by Gujarat, Karanataka and some other states is well explained by the indicators of governability. A government that cannot govern well is also a government that cannot provide high levels of well being to its people.

A problem of governability is the problem of legitimization of governmental rationality. It questions the sanctity of governing tools. A government that gains power by appeasing certain social groups, repeatedly fails to keep its promises, and uses violence for its gains; is a government that succumbs to its own tactics without securing substantial gains for its subject.

Analysis also predicts that- those states showing poor performance on governability but still retain good levels of well-being (like Maharashtra, Punjab, Haryana) are able to do so either due to persisting grounds for public action for example- Punjab; or low level of the problem of governability (Haryana) or a delicate balance of political alliances (Maharashtra). But, it is quite possible that f the problem remains unchecked, it might pull back the growth of well-being in near future.

## Chapter V

### Summary of Conclusions

**5.1** Issue of governability is so complex, so wide and so inter-disciplinary that a discussion on its viability and application always seems to be partial and inconclusive. It embraces so much within its ambit that any attempt to measure its reflections and effects always demands more to be incorporated. A crisis in its legitimacy (which itself is influenced by encrypted mentalities of rule) is even more challenging. The instruments to legitimized rationalities have transcended our minds which in turn has made the conceptualization of the context more subjective. Moreover if one were to make an honest assessment one would say that its only the tip of the iceberg meaning there by more one tries to understand these problems, the more complex he/she makes his/her job to find out a suitable mechanism to objectify and measure the same.

Therefore attempt made in this study should be seen in this larger context of the problem and limited ways of dealing with it. Here is the summary of what has been done to grasp and objectify the issue. Conclusions have been arranged in a way they have come in the successive chapters.

- 1.1** The highly varied pattern of development across Indian states has deep historical connections. Pattern of development was deeply influenced by the factors like extent to which cultural traditions of societal development were conserved over time, extent to which society was fragmented and degree to which the resource utilization was diffused.
- 1.2** This Spatio-temporal pattern of development got another dimension during British colonial period as the imperial elite began its massive project of enumeration, through Census, maps, and familiarizing the inhabitants with great numbers, and offering them clearer pictures of their own land and people. Then they developed small enclaves of economic advantages. These two processes not only created an entrenched society on the lines of caste, religion

and economy but had far reaching repercussions which considerably reduced the capacity of the governments in independent India.

- 1.3 This pattern of development, thus, is the function of the fact that who governed in whose favour with what degrees of capability to transform the willingness of development into concrete individual welfare.
- 1.4 Analysis of the impact of this 'governability' on the performance of states and individual welfare is complex one and involves a varied set of data base with methodological innovations.
- 1.5 Since it is entirely a new kind of exercise of objectifying, measuring and mapping some of rather qualitative attributes of governability, a wide range of literature relating to conceptual tools like governmentality, social and cultural capital, and civil societies deserve to be analyzed in order to get the conceptual clarity of the subject.
- 1.6 Subjectivity of the governability, institutional performance and well-being is such that their measures do not always confine to a particular year, rather these disperse over a range of period i.e. four to five years. Since the objective of study is to grasp the trend rather than an empirical dimensions that have developed over last three decades, a lag of four-five years does not really put question mark over the validity of the result. Nevertheless it indeed reduces the impact to some extent but it is bound to happen in a study of political space.
- 1.7 Similarly, for want of objectified and relatively a highly subjective attribute often compels one to take surrogate variables. For examples- The choice of ethnic violence in place of electoral violence is indicative of such surrogate variable. Though this restricts our choice of selection of variables yet the results are not far from what was expected because both represent electoral incentive for violence.
- 1.8 Since, the spatial variations in the levels of governability, well-being and institutional performance are very high; a mapping exercise requires that method which can appropriately accommodate both; the findings of study and range of variations at the same time. 'Natural Breaks' method (by Zenk's optimization) combines two conditions successfully.



- 1.9 Choice of the states as the area of study is due to the two factors – Homogenization of the states as the ultimate scale of political choices in the post-independence India where regions within states became only administrative categories and lost much of their political salience; and methodological constraints due to lack of required, secondary data at the sub-state level.
- 2.1 Governance is regarded as a tool in the hands of the government for efficient management and administration. Of late, political structuring has also been included in the definition. However, its position remains at the level of conceptualization only.
- 2.2 Governmentality (as ‘mentalities of governance’) is about conditionalities and subject of knowledge (in terms of political economy). It constitutes ‘promises of expanded individual’s autonomy which has, now, become electoral necessity.
- 2.3 Government now symbolises sovereignty. End of sovereignty is circular, hence good for sovereignty is that people should obey it. Whenever people resist successfully, they succeed in creating space for their own well-being and if they accept it without any resistance then they fall victim of this circularity.
- 2.4 Deployment of tolerance is the way of creating space through various governing tools.
- a) Decentralisation for creating space for local voice,
  - b) Participation is the way to create space for civil society and pressure groups,
  - c) Social groups to create space for group mobilization and their emancipation,
  - d) Welfare to create space for general well-being.
  - e) Power functions to create space for legitimacy.
- 2.5 Issue of governability, a practice of governing mentalities, is mainly linked to the disproportionate control over societal resources in low income situations

like India. This leads to the over-politicization of Indian polity and the spread of competitive politics.

- 2.6 This fundamental problem gives birth to the evil trends like-electoral incentive for violence, recognition of new identities for deprived groups, rise of personalized politics and weakening of the *basic structure* for implementing political actions-the organizational structure.
- 2.7 Since the government, as an institution acts both as protector of law and order and facilitator for the development, a crisis in its legitimacy gives birth to the dual problems of violence and developmental incapacities. Therefore, a study of developmental incapacities is not complete without assessing the realities of violence. A growing incidence of violence, especially in an India-like setting, also signals developmental abnormalities.
- 2.8 State's pervasive presence in every arena of socio-cultural and economic development enhances the significance of politics and other political factors.
- 2.9 Supporters of the social capital argue this as the best explanation for institutional performance following Putnam who ignores the role of state and thinks it only as complementing agency to civil society. Emulation of Italian situation in Indian conditions is very difficult due to entirely different economic and social contexts. The only role that social capital plays to explain performance is through awareness (literacy as its visible representative) and which is extremely relevant inform of public action.
- 2.10 Social capital recognizes the significance of '*positionalities of social actors*'. A region well-endowed with social actors enhances the governing capacities of governments. Social capital alone is useful but not effective. Governability as defined above is both useful and effective social capital enhances its effectiveness for the cause of general welfare.
- 2.11 General welfare, however, is not simply the sum of individual welfare but the redistribution of aggregate welfare. That's what the geography of social well-being points out. And that's why the role of governability is important in examining individual welfare because only a capable institution can ensure the redistribution of general welfare.

- 3.1** Governability in this context is about “*what ensures good governances*” Institutional performance, in this way is the yardstick for measuring respective governments’ efforts to ensure general welfare. A state good on institutional performance often shows similar pictures in well-being too. Its almost true for the poor performing states but developed states frequent deviations, It means performance does not trickles down to the needy automatically. It demands efforts on the part of the implementer-spatial variation of the ‘capacities to govern’ is the key word here.
- 3.2** Causes of deviations for certain states lie in lopsided and laggardly development in certain sectors such as demography, health, nutrition, education despite high economic growth and even that is witnessed in selective areas of industries and regions.
- 3.3** A general argument about this selectivity is ensembled in what is popularly known as ‘lack of commitment’. But what constitutes this ‘lack’? ‘Political obligations’ which originate from inadequate social base and therefore uncalled for channelisation of resources from where necessary ‘survival support’ comes.
- 3.4** Among the measures of institutional performance health has maximum influence on the well-being after having excluded economic performance. A state which performs badly in such a critical area cannot have good levels of individual well-being. This has also been vindicated by empirical evidences and data.
- 3.5** Contrary to general perception, there are regional disparities among poor and good performing states. Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh are clearly ahead of rest of the poor performers in terms of last decade institutional initiatives while Bihar lags for behind Uttar Pradesh and Orissa. ‘BIMARU’ is no longer a valid term for them. Andhra Pradesh, on the other hand, is closer to poor performers than Punjab, Himachal Pradesh; Kerala is better not to be cited here.

- 3.6** The whole analysis of institutional performance, well being and governability is from the ‘deprivation perspective’ as lack of progress in reducing the disadvantages of the deprived cannot be washed away by the advances made by the better-off people.
- 4.1** A problem in governability can well be understood by a change in mentalities of rule. In an ideal situation – a state is programmer and government (a sum of implementing agencies at various levels) in implementer. At the conceptual level there is a clear division of responsibilities but what actually has happened in this case is the increasing governmentalization of the state. Since, the case favours the concentration of power at one centre and parties contest with almost sole motives to grab the power then the polarity between governability and well-being gets enhanced. Concept of shared responsibilities gets vanished. Now, the need of the hour is to reconsider the previous approach.
- 4.2** Even if a government is committed and willing to reform the existing social capabilities it will remain ineffective, organizationally weak and its instruments of rationality too will be poorly equipped with power.
- 4.3** A capacity to govern, by some scholars, has been defined in terms of four roles-provision of public goods, divisible goods, enforcement of laws and protection of rights. A government whose motivation is only to win the power, shall only go for those provisions where it shares monetary benefits like divisible goods and enforcement of laws (related with labour, capital). In this way it leaves other provisions on the mercy of market-mechanism by assuming “demand will create its own supply”.
- 4.4** The overall analysis of the governability and well-being says that – though there is a problem and it varies spatially, it has no boundaries. It transcends and create small pockets rather than creating any contiguity.
- 4.5** There has been a false notion among neo-classical development theorists that the relationship between geographical and social space has one dimension only i.e. economic. Under this notion regional planning has shifted its emphasis

from areal to sectoral planning. It is so because in a common parlance a development is always considered to be an economic development. The aspect of governability and its crisis in Indian situation reveals that the relationship between geographical and social space has another important dimension and that is – ‘Political’.

**4.6** On the basis of analysis of the states a framework of governability can be drawn for the following states.

States	Strength	Indication of the Problem	Ways out
Gujarat	Well Developed Economy	A sluggish Progress in well being, crisis of governability, a persisting weak turnout	Need to diversity its resource base, power share, greater participation, role of consociationalism
Kerala	Public action and exceptional levels of awareness	Poor on economic front	Needs an economic orientation
Maharashtra	Industrial development economically well off	An increasing fractionalization and politically motivated violence, higher literacy gap	Need to cater to the growing needs of deprived classes, consociationalism
Karnataka	Moderate on both economic and social fronts	Increasing, ethnic violence, slow on well being, criminalization of politics	Need to pay attention to organizational strength, promote public action
Bihar and Uttar Pradesh	Very weak on economic and social fronts	Low on social and economic front, already have a crisis in governability	Greater role to political fixers as they are only hope to strengthen organizational loopholes which is the main cause of crisis. Uttar Pradesh has been shown to have good stock of social capital among selected states; a combination of fixers and social capital may rejuvenate its prospects
Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan	Heading towards organizational strengthening, emergence of two party system, implementations of local democracy, education	low on socio-economic front	A political commitment towards emancipation of deprived sections and especially women can produce astonishing results.

Punjab	High on economic and well-being front	A low turnout and entry of representations with criminal record indicates that the institution is not strong enough at the grass root levels	promote greater participation at the local level so that the problem of deprived sections can be resolved.
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4.7 The above conclusions point out to at least one thing; that in any attempt to objectify the well-being on aggregate level is infertile if it does not take into account the well-being at deprivation level. Here, governability acts as a filter and well-being as fluid. Traditionally, governability has been assumed to be neutral and general perception has been that purer the fluid, more will it trickle down. Now this should be considered from another prospective that smarter the filter, easier the trickle down effect will be.

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## Appendix – I

### Indicators of Institutional Performance

STATES	V_ELECT*	H_BED*	HH_PDS*	ENR_GIRL*	TECH_SCH*	SDP_PRCP*
Andhra Pradesh	99.9	1034	66.4	49.3	4.57	10195
Bihar	70.8	507	5	42.4	3.09	3879
Gujarat	99.4	1969	47.6	45.8	5.00	12699
Haryana	96.7	600	9	45.6	7.58	13902
Himachal Pradesh	97.8	1663	75.6	47.7	4.43	11029
Karnataka	98.4	1124	70.1	48.3	5.32	11900
Kerala	100	3463	82.4	48.8	15.70	10627
Madhya Pradesh	94.3	427	34.2	46.3	4.49	7147
Maharashtra	100	1538	50.7	47.5	6.49	14366
Orissa	69.8	473	5.2	47.2	3.38	5663
Punjab	100	1106	5.6	47	6.36	14916
Rajasthan	88.25	716	23.6	45	5.44	8165
Tamil Nadu	100	1101	82.4	48.1	7.27	12944
Uttar Pradesh	77.2	601	5.2	46.1	4.30	5707
West Bengal	77.2	909	11.3	49	4.19	9796

- Source :**
- i) State of Indian Economy, Profile of Districts, CMIE, 2000.
  - ii) Health Information of India – 2000
  - iii) India Human Development Report – 2002
  - iv) Seventh All India Education Survey – 2002.
  - v) Handbook on Statistics on Indian Economy, RBI-2002.

- \* Percentage villages electrified- 1999
- \* Hospital beds per million population -1999
- \* Households using PDS -1999
- \* Enrolment of Girl Children between 6-11 Years- 2002
- \* Teachers per School -2002
- \* Per capita SDP 2002

## Appendix – II

### Composite Index of Institutional Performance

STATES	Tech ci	CI v ele	CI h bed	CI hh pds	Cle nr gir	CI sdp	ci ip
Andhra Pradesh	-0.42	0.74	-0.15	0.09	1.30	0.00	2.31
Bihar	-0.91	-1.78	-0.81	-1.07	-2.51	-1.84	-10.46
Gujarat	-0.28	0.70	1.04	0.30	-0.63	0.73	2.39
Haryana	0.51	0.47	-0.70	-0.94	-0.74	1.08	-0.07
Himachal Pradesh	-0.46	0.56	0.65	1.20	0.42	0.24	2.38
Karnataka	-0.17	0.61	-0.03	1.02	0.75	0.50	4.77
Kerala	3.27	0.75	2.94	1.42	1.03	0.13	10.49
Madhya Pradesh	-0.44	0.26	-0.92	-0.13	-0.35	-0.89	-2.84
Maharastra	0.22	0.75	0.49	0.40	0.31	1.21	3.38
Orissa	-0.81	-1.87	-0.86	-1.07	0.14	-1.32	-5.29
Punjab	0.17	0.75	-0.05	-1.05	0.03	1.37	0.42
Rajasthan	-0.13	-0.27	-0.55	-0.47	-1.07	-0.59	-3.31
Tamil Nadu	0.48	0.75	-0.06	1.42	0.64	0.80	3.98
Uttar Pradesh	-0.51	-1.22	-0.69	-1.07	-0.46	-1.31	-6.90
West Bengal	-0.54	-1.22	-0.30	-0.87	1.14	-0.12	-1.20

- Source :**
- i) State of Indian Economy, Profile of Districts, CMIE, 2000.
  - ii) Health Information of India – 2000
  - iii) India Human Development Report – 2002
  - iv) Seventh All India Education Survey – 2002.
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- \* Percentage villages electrified- 1999
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- \* Enrolment of Girl Children between 6-11 Years- 2002
- \* Teachers per School -2002
- \* Per capita SDP 2002

## APPENDIX – III

### Indicators of well being

STATES	Percentage APL	Percentage Female Literacy	Life Expectancy at Birth
Andhra Pradesh	84.23	51.2	65.2
Bihar	57.4	33.5	63.2
Gujarat	83.9	58.6	65.2
Haryana	91.2	56.3	67.6
Himachal Pradesh	92.3	68	66.6
Karnataka	79.9	57.5	66.6
Kerala	87.2	87.4	73.2
Madhya Pradesh	62.5	50.3	61.2
Maharastra	74.8	67.5	68.1
Orissa	52.8	50.4	62.6
Punjab	93.8	63.5	70.5
Rajasthan	84.7	44.3	64.6
Tamil Nadu	78.8	67.1	66.1
Uttar Pradesh	68.8	42.4	62.2
West Bengal	72.9	60.2	65.8

**Source :**

- i) National Human Development Report – 2001
- ii) General Population Tables – 2001
- iii) Statistical Abstract, CSO-2003.



## APPENDIX – IV

### Composite index of Well Being

STATES	ci perct	ci perct lit	ci exp	ci web
Andhra Pradesh	0.52	-0.46	-0.22	-0.17
Bihar	-1.60	-1.83	-0.86	-4.28
Gujarat	0.49	0.11	-0.22	0.37
Haryana	1.07	-0.07	0.53	1.53
Himachal Pradesh	1.15	0.83	0.22	2.20
Karnataka	0.17	0.02	0.22	0.42
Kerala	0.75	2.32	2.31	5.38
Madhya Pradesh	-1.20	-0.53	-1.49	-3.22
Maharastra	-0.23	0.79	0.69	1.26
Orissa	-1.96	-0.52	-1.05	-3.53
Punjab	1.27	0.48	1.45	3.21
Rajasthan	0.55	-0.99	-0.41	-0.86
Tamil Nadu	0.09	0.76	0.06	0.91
Uttar Pradesh	-0.70	-1.14	-1.17	-3.01
West Bengal	-0.38	0.23	-0.03	-0.18

**Source :** i) National Human Development Report – 2001  
ii) General Population Tables – 2001  
iii) Statistical Abstract, CSO-2003.

## APPENDIX – V

### Indicators of Governability

STATES	FRCTN*	VOTE*	RIOT*	CRIME*	LIT *
Andhra Pradesh	84.4	70.2	0.02	92.6	71
Bihar	42.9	62.1	0.031	66.7	73
Gujarat	79.6	59.4	0.231	73.1	78
Haryana	60.8	68.5	0.016	80	73
Himachal Pradesh	82.5	71.3	0	100	82
Karnataka	61.5	68	0.107	78.6	81
Kerala	52.7	72.4	0.014	57.9	93
Madhya Pradesh	79.8	58.3	0.016	75.9	72
Maharashtra	49.8	64.9	0.04	58.3	71
Orissa	63.1	62.9	0.025	85.7	75
Punjab	64.2	52.5	0	69.2	88
Rajasthan	78.1	60.4	0.018	84	72
Tamil Nadu	62.3	64.8	0.014	78.9	83
Uttar Pradesh	54.3	53.4	0.049	72.2	73
West Bengal	67.2	78.3	0.019	88.1	83

- Source :**
- i) Election Commission, Report on Indian Elections (1989-2001)
  - ii) Wilkinson and Varshney Data sat (1990-1995)
  - iii) Primary Census Abstract, Census of India – 2001

- \* Party Fractionalization-Share of two largest State Parties
- \* Voters' Turn out at assembly elections
- \* Riots per million Population
- \* Percentage of MPs with no Criminal Record
- \* Male – Female Literacy Gap

## APPENDIX – VI

### Index of Governability

STATES	FRCTN	VOTE	CRIME	LIT	RIOT
Andhra Pradesh	1.47	0.79	1.28	-1.00	0.49
Bihar	-1.75	-0.33	-0.90	-0.71	-0.18
Gujarat	1.10	-0.71	-0.36	0.02	-1.26
Haryana	-0.36	0.56	0.21	-0.71	0.97
Himachal Pradesh	1.32	0.95	1.91	0.60	-1.43
Karnataka	-0.30	0.49	0.10	0.45	-1.07
Kerala	-0.99	1.10	-1.65	2.21	1.31
Madhya Pradesh	1.11	-0.86	-0.12	-0.85	0.97
Maharashtra	-1.21	0.05	-1.61	-1.00	-0.46
Orissa	-0.18	-0.22	0.70	-0.41	0.10
Punjab	-0.09	-1.67	-0.69	1.48	-1.43
Rajasthan	0.98	-0.57	0.55	-0.85	0.70
Tamil Nadu	-0.24	0.04	0.126	0.75	1.31
Uttar Pradesh	-0.86	-1.55	-0.441	-0.71	-0.64
West Bengal	0.13	1.93	0.905	0.75	0.59

- Source :**
- i) Election Commission, Report on Indian Elections (1989-2001)
  - ii) Wilkinson and Varshney Datasat (1990-1995)
  - iii) Primary Census Abstract, Census of India – 2001

- \* Party Fractionalization-Share of two largest State Parties
- \* Voters' Turn out at assembly elections
- \* Riots per million Population
- \* Percentage of MPs with no Criminal Record
- \* Male – Female Literacy Gap

