

# **TANZANIAN MODEL OF SOCIALISM**

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MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

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CERTIFICATE

This dissertation entitled "TANZANIAN MODEL OF SOCIALISM", submitted by Ms BULBUL DHAR is in partial fulfilment of the total requirement for the degree of Master of Philosophy of Jawaharlal Nehru University. This work was carried out at the Centre for Political Studies, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

This dissertation is original and has not been submitted for any other degree or diploma of any other University. We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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The interpretation and errors herein remain solely my responsibility.

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## INTRODUCTION

"..... The deeper I enter into the cultures and political circles, the surer I am that the great danger that threatens Africa is the absence of ideology."

FRANTZ FANON

SOCIALISM in the third world implies a dazzling profusion of terms, models and programs, with few common denominators,<sup>8</sup> even fewer links with the codified theories of Proudhon, Fourier, Karl Marx. It is claimed by some commentators (in both communist states as well as the West) that 'a developing country is socialist only because it declares itself as such.'

With meagre theoretical underpinning; in the third world context, socialism represents a search for a development model and a response to anti imperialism. Yet given that, this socialism is expected to provide an explanation of the past, a guide to the present and a blueprint for the future, it is not surprising that its definitions may be vague and its theories diffused.

The socialism here hopes that the benefits of industrial age can be controlled to their best interests by the representation of the masses. It promises the achievements and benefits of capitalism and industrialisation but without the exploitation that is attributed to the capitalist class. As Adam B. Ulam remarked "capitalism without the capitalist class" is a great source of appeal to the post colonial world leaders. The ideas of Frigyes Nagy(1) outline this variety of socialism:

"Very often can be heard declarations that during the building of socialism we have to throw away every idea of capitalist origin and every idea which does not derive from Africa. This is a grave mistake socialism does not reject capitalism in total. It takes useful ideas from it. The motive of the development of all societies is to preserve the useful ideas of previous system and caste away only the unuseful ones".

In this sense the concept that the indigenous societies are socialist in their traditional form is the reason for the "natural compatibility" between traditional societies and socialist revolving around the absence of classes. By attempting to point to an idyllic traditional African society to the extent that it meant common ownership of the means of production i.e. land(2) and the existence of an organic relationship between an individual and the community, the advocates of African socialism are implying a classless society. In short it was a justificatory theory for the uniqueness of African socialism.

The theoretical content of socialism cannot be divorced from the circumstances of its birth. African socialism in its most popularised form was born out of post colonial crisis of economic development and national identity. In their Introduction to African Socialism, Friedman and Rosberg conclude "one of the most significant features of African socialism is its identification with economic development"(3). Much in the same vein Mohan analyses that "when they talk of socialism the African leaders mean economic development, many of them use development and socialism interchangeably"(4).

In restating the independence of African socialism the Kenyan government's White Paper on African socialism states :

"In the phrase 'African socialism' the word African is not introduced to describe a continent to which foreign ideology is to be transplanted. It is meant to convey African roots of the system that is itself African in characteristics...but capable of incorporating useful and compatible techniques from whatever source"(5).

The history of socialist thought is marked by fairly clear relationships between individual thinkers and ideological movements to which they gave birth. African socialism differs in that no single leader has been distinctively and uniquely associated with the

ideology. Rather the ideology of African socialism has been the product of diverse leaders operating within a variety of exigencies in their own countries, which helps partly to account for the lack of development of a Unified Theory.

Three broad categories(6) of socialism could be identified in Africa viz. :

- a) Scientific Socialist oriented countries like Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Angola, Cape Verdi, Benin etc.
- b) Socialist Rhetoric as in Kenya, Nigeria, Ivory Coast which have explicit capitalist overtones.
- c) Populist Socialism or the African Model of socialism like Tanzania, Somalia, Zambia. Since this category is of major concern to our study its characteristics could be broadly outlined as under :
  - i) Nationalism preceding socialism.
  - ii) It implies a radical mood where the term is vague but a tangible reality.
  - iii) Because of the intense nationalism and historical linkages of capitalism with imperialism - there is an underlying ANTI CAPITALIST thread.
  - iv) POPULISM is manifest in the exaltation of the people as in Fanon
  - v) A patchwork of diverse hues like French left influence of Keita, Toure, Marxist imprint as in Guinea; middle east kind of radical thought of Naseer and Quadafy or the fabianism of Nyerere.

Commenting on the existential reality, Jitendra Mohan(7) writes that "...the actual economic and social policies followed by many African 'socialists' differ but slightly from the policies followed by those who do not feel themselves in need of a socialist label."



Thereby, beneath the **seemingly** conflicting dichotomy between theory and practice lurks a **basic congruence**. It is the existence of a congruence between the political ideologies of the 'socialist leaders' (which in practice are **non socialists**) and their political economies (again nonsocialist in practice) authenticated by the stamp of colonialism and patented by **neo colonialism**.

Claud Ake(8)'s argument that differences that do exist between **progressive** socialist leaders like Julius Nyerere and Sekou Toure and conservative nonsocialist leaders like Senghor Mobuto, Houphuet Boigny and Kenyatta are more 'apparent than real' poses **real problems**. Ake states that

" Because **in all** African countries the leaders have held tenaciously to power, change of government is brought about by force only.... the political systems of Africa have become uniformly monolithic..... **power has** become centralised, and opposition to those in power is illegitimate....all African countries are defacto **One Party** systems in which the masses have been effectively depoliticised."

The thesis that **absence of a** theoretical basis or the **appropriate ideological** framework for practical programmes of action is the underlying cause of the failure of the developing states of Africa to **fundamentally transfer** their societies (this implies a congruence between theory and practice), has in essence been posited by Ake. He argues that the failure of African leaders to initiate any fundamental transformation **in the new** states of Africa is **largely a result of** 'congruence of political ideologies (which are in themselves a legacy of colonial past and political economies'. Paradoxically, congruence also carries with it the seeds of its own negation through what Ake calls 'defensive radicalism'(9). Indeed as E.H. Carr wrote earlier

"the **facts** of history are the facts about individuals but **not about actions** of individuals performed in isolation...There are **facts about the relations** of individuals to one another in society and about the social forces which produce from the actions of individuals results

often at variance with and sometimes opposed to the results which they themselves intended"(10).

Basically agreeing with Ake that the salient features of the post independence ideology of the Nationalist leaders in Africa are similar, we would as a point of departure argue that the post independence ideology of the leadership in Tanzania is significantly different from that of most of the other African leaders. The post Arusha leadership in Tanzania has accepted "socialism" as a "national ethic" and has consciously directed its energies on how Tanzania can most effectively achieve a transition to a socialist society. It has NOT been impelled by mere "defensive radicalism" to the brink of socialism(11). It has therefore to be studied as an atypical case with only broad common characteristics(12).

The underlying theme of the study is that in general there has emerged in post Arusha Tanzania policies and programmes which are based on a clearer definition of and a growing commitment to socialist solutions for Tanzania's development problems. In this regard Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul's evaluation of Tanzania is significant.

"Tanzania is perhaps the country in contemporary Africa where socialist aspirations figure most prominently and interestingly in the development equation, and most powerfully affect the kinds of policies which are being pursued(13)."

Relative to any other African leader Nyerere and therefore Tanzania has evolved a clearer conceptualisation of socialism.

Tanzania is one of the economically poorest countries, yet socially and politically it is the most innovative country in tropical Africa. Its experiment in political and economic development has provoked widely differing reactions.

On the one hand its viewed as a conspicuously successful new state whose leaders have been able to avoid the post independence perils of Neo-colonialism, elitism, governmental instability, and instead to construct an order in which brave political slogans are becoming social and cultural realities. According to this view, Tanzania is One developing country where the present generation has a real chance of achieving Uhuru (freedom), Umoja (unity), Ujamaa (socialism) and maendeleo (development).

From another perspective the picture is less bright; Tanzania is also portrayed as a case study of misplaced philosophical idealism, lost development opportunities and unfulfilled political promises. To the left the country is a professed socialist state whose elites have abandoned true socialism. To the right, these same elites have failed to make the hard investment decisions that are imperative for any successful transition to Modernity.

There is little disagreement about the moral context of Nyerere's thought and his vision of a just and prosperous society. The same cannot be said for the means selected and results obtained in pursuit of this dream.

This study is therefore in large part an analysis and a critical evaluation of the practical programme of action of post Arusha Tanzania relevant to the task of socialist construction and transformation under a socialist oriented national leadership. But Saul's observation that "...the ability both to articulate and implement particular kinds of policies would be vitally dependant upon the nature of the existing institutions and the character of the men who influence and staff them"(14) is significant.

Structurally the study has been divided into five parts, an

introduction, and four chapters. The starting point is the **introduction which gives a broad over view of socialism in the African context with the specificity of the Tanzanian model.** Here it is argued that the theoretical content of **socialism cannot be divorced from the circumstances of its birth.**

"Political economy of colonialism" is discussed in the first chapter as a background to the focus of our study. Since historical factors are significant in determining the development of a particular society, the chapter outlines an over view of the pre colonial antecedents and the political economy of Tanganyika under the Germans as well as under the British.

The second chapter delineates the theoretical underpinnings of the elaborated version of Ujamaa - socialism and self reliance which forms the **basis of the practical programmes of action in Tanzania.**

The third **chapter** entitled 'OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS - Socio-economic and Political realities', examines some key policy areas and programmes to **test the** validity of the Ujamaa ideology and the economic and the political system envisaged. Is the political leadership of Tanzania **committed** to the socialist approach to achieve these objectives? Our aim is to find out whether the policies and programmes in the key areas - a) Ujamaa Vijijini, b) production and parastatals, c) foreign aid and d) the social services - reflect and realise the objectives of their ideological **framework.**

Finally it shall be attempted in the **fourth and concluding chapter to put all these strands together.** The chapter outlines the nature of the contemporary state so evolved. It analyses the potency of 'internal contradictions' - **be it** centralization, de-politicisation, coercion or

the role of bureaucratic bourgeoisie - in impeding the course of transition.

Finally we must mention some of the apparent limitations that this dissertation could not avoid.

First of all we have not gone into a detailed or critical assessment of socialism. The study only makes an initial and brief attempt to delineate the kind of socialistic tenets that many countries in post colonial world, particularly Africa have tried to incorporate in their indigenous efforts of nation building. Otherwise we are merely trying to examine the brand of socialism that Nyerere expanded and attempted to implement without going into any kind of comparative assessment. Therefore we felt that making deep forays into the complex world of socialist theory (s) and its practice in various forms in numerous other countries is beyond the scope of this work.

Secondly, the study is more or less delimited to the Nyerere era, which inspite of spanning most of Tanzania's history since independence, stops short of covering the current situation in the country. Given the fact that the new administration under Mwinzi has brought in significant changes in the management of the economy, what effects such measures are having or will have on Tanzania's socialist programme and institutions, is not being covered by this paper.

Lastly the subject chosen extensively involves the entire range of social changes. However it is difficult for one who is basically specialising in political studies to have deep insight into such aspects that are primarily the concern of social scientists from other streams. This constraint was particularly experienced when we examined the purely economic aspects of the political economy of Tanzania. Therefore it was our conscious attempt to restrict the analysis of such issues to a level of general comprehension.

## CHAPTER - I

### POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COLONIALISM

#### PRECOLONIAL ANTECEDENTS

The precolonial history of Africa has been pieced together from archaeological findings, oral tradition and records of Arab and other alien chroniclers, such as Ibn Battuta who travelled widely in the Muslim world in the 14th century.

The history of Africa like the history of mankind as a whole, is really the story of an awakening. The study of Africa needs to be reassessed, for till recently, it has often been masked, faked, distorted, mutilated by "force of circumstances" i.e. through ignorance and self interest. An image of POVERTY, BARBARISM and CHAOS has been projected and extrapolated indefinitely in time, as a justification of both the present and future. The history of Africa is practically unknown - patched up genealogies, missing dates, structures stitched in vague and impressionistic manners - appearing but dimly through a fog. In the African context, the esoteric(1) content of the message manifests the inestimable value of oral tradition and also its limits. It is almost impossible to transfer all its richness from one language to another; especially if the other is structurally and sociologically remote. This tradition lends the history of the African continent a marked originality. Imperative requirement therefore is that African history should be seen from within **and not** measured by the yardstick of alien values.

Many Africans lived in stateless societies, organized around the family, kinship group and clan though this did not necessarily mean that they were backward. John Iliff(2) points out that Tanganyika for instance was not composed of tribes and indeed in most parts of Eastern

and Central Africa, it could be argued that the unit of organization called 'tribe' was largely a European invention and reality was vastly more complex; moreover Africa was a continent on the move in the sense that migration from one area to another was frequent, as a consequence of war, disease, drought and economic needs. Almost everywhere, the African was engaged in a constant struggle with a harsh environment.

Tracing the precolonial origin of Tanzania, one perceives that because of the constant movement and mixing of people between the tenth and nineteenth centuries, it is in most cases not possible to trace the cultural origins of Tanzania's contemporary ethnic groups. One demographic consistency does emerge from the time the mainland was first settled, in the fact that the highest human population densities were established at the periphery of the country with relatively few people inhabiting the arid steppe between the Eastern and Western branches of the great rift valley. This historical settlement pattern bears important implications for social, economic and political relation in modern Tanzania.

The coastal people were, by the ninth century, trading regularly with Arab and Shirazi communities intermingled with Bantu speaking mainland groups and <sup>a</sup> new culture, the SWAHILI, began to emerge.

The development of the increasingly africanized Arab hegemony was delayed by the Portugese conquest of the Coast. With Vasco-da-Gama visiting East Africa in 1498, the Portugese by 1506 had taken control of city states and their Indian Ocean trade. Portugese suzerainty over the Tanzanian coast was lengthy but tenuous. From 1500 AD onwards, slaves were used, originally for digging gold and later to grow sugar, cotton, tobacco on plantations.

Before 1800 the most advanced inland societies were in mountainous areas where a food surplus could be gained by cultivation of cooking bananas. Varieties of the grain crop millet and sorghum had been domesticated locally and were grown in areas of lower rainfall where

the trees could be cleared by burning(3). Livestock (cattle and goats) provided the people with many different kinds of security. Cattle were sources of calories, vitamins, fats and salts as well as proteins - through milk and blood as well as meat. They produced manure which could be used to improve crops. Last and not the least, there were means of storing wealth for use in the future - a means which in addition produced "interest" in the form of milk and calves(4).

CHIEFTAINSHIP emerged first in the mountain area because there a surplus which was worth defending from attack could be produced from relatively limited areas of land. The longest lives of chiefs recorded by Oral historians go back to about 1700 and come from banana growing areas. The chieftainship was often associated with possession of economically valuable skills, such as iron working (which produced means of defence as well as of agriculture), weather forecasting ('rainmaking' in anthropological terms was also of economic value), or special skills in hunting(5).

In return for organizing the defence of an area, a chief received either a proportion of a crop or free labour on his own farms. Chief therefore has an incentive to innovate. Andrew Coulson(6) points out that complex irrigation systems at Engaruka near Arusha (irrigating 2000 hectares) began atleast 250 years ago. Mount Kilimanjaro and the Usambara and other mountain areas were probably built by commercial labour organized by the chiefs; so were the soil conservation works, which involved the construction of stone walls and terraces in the Usambaras. Oral tradition specifically associates the chiefs with one of the most remarkable achievements of all - the transport of thousands of tons of grass from flood plains to slightly higher ground that succeeded in building up the fertility of small areas of land around villages which today make up the coffee-banana growing areas of West Lake Region.



During the 19th century most cultivators in the interior came under the allegiance of a chief(7). The trend was accelerated by trade with the Coast. The difference between this and 19th century trade with the coast was not in quantities - (the quantities of hoes and food traded before 1800 were no doubt greater than those of ivory and slaves later on) - but in the goods that were traded. Fire arms and ammunition in particular had an important influence and could be purchased at the coast. Their use led to a more ruthless hunting of elephants for ivory. It also affected the skirmishes between tribes and the hunting of slaves. Small isolated clans who cultivated far from anyone else in the bush were forced to ally themselves with some chief or other for protection. The chiefs profited directly from long distance trade.

Thus trade led to centralization and by the time the Germans came almost the whole of the country was divided between a small number of tribal empires with organized armies and administrations, based on possession of firearms.

The centre and the south was divided between the Gogo, The Nyamwezi, the Hehe, the Kimbu, the Sangu and the Ngoni. To the northeast lay the Maasai. The Hehe kingdom built by Munyigumba who ruled between 1855 and 1878 and continued by his son Mkwawa who led the most prolonged resistance against Germans, also used civilians to rule the empire. The Ngoni empire was not strongly established till the 1850s but it quickly brought under its control almost all the inhabitants from the coast at Lindi right across southern Tanzania to Lake Nyasa. Most of the chiefs lived in large fortified villages. They received tribute in the form of food from their widely scattered subjects and were able to tax (the Gogo for instance, charged in hoes as late as 1891) or raid passing caravans, but they also grew a lot of their food in permanent fields near their settlements(8). The presence of cattle and of food reserves maintained by chiefs for their subjects meant that 19th century inhabitants of these areas were better

protected against famine and other calamities and probably also fed better than their successors today, although the margin between life and death was not great and there were destructive famines from time to time, as Bryceson(9) points out.

The increase in the size of political units during the 19th century encouraged specialization in industrial or craft skills. The task of selecting ores and other ingredients, and of building kilns with which to make iron from them was complex and confined to relatively few places where ore was available. The blacksmith's task of beating the iron into implements or repairing existing implements was more widely dispersed. In 1860 Kjekshus(10) points out that there were blacksmiths who would make hoes, spears, arrowheads, axes, daggers and knives, sickles, razors, rings, bells, pipes, pincers and a great variety of ornaments. By 1900, they could with difficulty repair muzzle loading rifles. The overall size of the iron industry was sufficient to supply the needs of the whole country : an observer in 1892 estimated that 150,000 iron hoes were sold each year on Tabora market alone(11).

There was also a textile industry, probably based on varieties of cotton which reached the country between AD 1000 and 1500. The oldest cotton spindles have been found by archaeologists at coastal sites such as Kilwa, from where the technique spread very slowly inland. Kjekshus(12) points out that by 1900 the fixed 'heddle loom' for weaving could be found almost everywhere and yellow and black dyes were being made from forest plants.

Their crafts were tanning of leather, boat building, manufacture of fishing nets, traps and sails, bows and arrows, pottery and baskets. Of particular importance was the manufacture of salt, and archaeological(13) excavation has shown that Lvinza Spring, still Tanzania's principal source of salt, was being worked a thousand years ago, though production probably only reached its peak around the

time of the German conquest

Andrew Coulson(14) points out that the economies of late 19th century Tanzania cannot be described as advanced, even for their day. Little or no use was made of the wheel, stone was not used in building and virtually all firearms and ammunition had to be imported. They did possess craft skills but too much labour time was spent in procuring food, on transport, on warfare for a large surplus to be extracted and ploughed back into improving security and living conditions. But the economies were certainly not static. New crops such as maize, rice, cassava and cotton spread quickly and many improvements were made in techniques of agricultural husbandry. Forms of decentralized administration were experimented with, as were different types of diplomacy with explorers, missionaries and traders who passed through. Chiefs like Kimweri of Shambaa, Merere of Sanju, Rindi of Moshi and Mirambo's successor Mpandashalo - recognized the importance of writing and hired Arab or Swahili clerks to assist them. Therefore to develop further these societies would have needed a long period of non-exploitive contact with the rest of the world.

Ford and Kjekshus(15) demonstrate that the precolonial economies of the societies that nowadays constitute Tanzania were well adapted to the ecological conditions, thus offering the local people optimal returns from their efforts. People had devised methods by which they could not only protect themselves against vermin and attacks from wild animals but also use the laterite soils in a productive manner. As Kjekshus concludes :

"the precolonial economies developed within an ecological control situation - a relationship between man and his environment which had grown out of centuries of civilizing work of clearing the ground, introducing managed vegetations and controlling the fauna".(16)

In great contrast is the impression by some early colonial writers who saw in East Africa nothing but blank, uninteresting, brutal barbarism(17), Goran Hyden(18) feels that the reason why such writers

produced a wholly negative picture (an image of despondency, inability and even laziness) of East Africa is that they experienced the African economies at a time of extreme crisis, brought about by the contacts with forces that ruined the existing ecosystems.

We know through Franz Stuhlman (19) who travelled with Emin Pasha to Uganda in 1890, that the Karagive Kingdom in what is now North Western Tanzania, had a flourishing economy based on large herds of Sanga (long horned) cattle. He tells us about local cattle breeding techniques and the use of smoke from cow dung as a repellent against flies. He estimates the Karagive herds to have exceeded 100,000.

In the 1890s large parts of Tanganyika suffered depopulation and famine. To the local people these things were the dark years when they suffered a drastic decline in living standards and social security. Droughts and locust swarms contributed to making conditions catastrophic in some areas. Alongside the 1890s the period preceding European occupation of East Africa, the societies had achieved differing stages of social organization. Some such as Banyambo in Tanganyika had achieved a high degree of centralised government(20) and some such as Nyamweri were in the process of it. On the whole, coastal areas had had a longer contact with Europeans and Arabs than the interior areas. 'Long distance trade' existed whereby Nyamwezi were involved in caravan trade from interior to the coast.

With the region undergoing ecological stress, colonialism came to an area already suffering from an economic crisis with all its attendant effects.

Clyde Ingle(21) claims that though Tanganyika in the late 19th century with a large Bantu population, had contacts with Greek, Chinese, Arabs, Portugese, no attempt was made to change the traditional behaviour or agriculture patterns, the principal form of which was subsistence agriculture which entailed using a plot of land for a few seasons and then shifting to new and often virgin land, once

the soil's fertility had been depleted. Land was held in common by tribal authorities and individual ownership land was virtually unknown. Agricultural activity was above all a quest for community survival, not for individual enrichment.

#### COLONIAL STATE

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Towards the end of the 19th century↳"scramble for Africa" was at its height. Imperialist powers crowded into the continent. Bit by bit, through conflict and agreement, the continent was sliced into domains of rival Imperialist powers. The often haphazard partition of Africa led to a Balkanization Process where political boundaries cut across existing commercial networks and ethnic groupings. These were subsequently reinforced by tariffs, currencies, legal system and location of railroads. Vertical links with respective colonies were forged with horizontal communication between colonies in Africa being discouraged. The result is that today, Africa has largest number of miniscule states. Of the 50 independent African states, eight have populations of less than one million each, 20 have populations between one and five million and so on. The colonialist scramble for East Africa involved three competing powers: the Sultanate of Zanzibar, Germany and Britain. The first on the scene were Arabs who operated from Zanzibar. Their interests both on the coast and the interior, were largely commercial, revolving around trades, slaves and ivory. During the late 19th century Arab interest in the interior of East Africa began to be threatened by German and British interests that had been steadily penetrating the area.

What prompted this insatiable desire on the part of the various European powers - Portugal, Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain - to establish colonies in Africa? Was it part of a civilizing mission, as the Portugese claimed? Brett(22) observes for instance that

the colonies generally saw themselves "as the advance guard of a civilization with a Universal message equally applicable to the whole of the underdeveloped world". Was it for the purpose of trade conducted for the mutual benefit of colonizer and colonized? Was it for economic gain and exploitation; or were strategic considerations paramount?

Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher(23) argue that in the latter part of the 19th century, British extended the colonial boundaries inland, as means of protecting their interests and gains against French and German competition. Herein they took account of strategic considerations whereby there was concentration on poorer East Africa and not the relatively richer West Africa.

In another view, colonies were established to prolong the life of MORIBUND EUROPEAN CAPITALISM. As a French saying has it "the colonies have been created for the metropole by the metropole"(24). Thus the cotton grown by African (and Asian) peasant farmers was fed into the Lancashire textile mills, via the flourishing port of Liverpool, and the cloth which the mills produced was exported back to Africa by European trading companies. However, while the price which the producer received for his cotton fluctuated widely and often downwards, the price which he had to pay for imported cloth constantly increased. The unequal nature of this exchange<sup>is</sup> furnished by the late Walter Rodney<sup>as</sup> an instance (one of the many) of colonial exploitations. Colonialism, he believed, contributed to the Capitalist development of Europe, while leaving Africa underdeveloped:

"Colonialism was not merely a system of exploitation, but one whose essential purpose was to repatriate the profits to the so-called 'mother country'. From an African viewpoint, that amounted to consistent expatriation of surplus produced by African resources. It meant the development of Europe as a part of the same dialectical process in which Africa was underdeveloped"(25).

## THE GERMAN COLONY

"No period in the economic history of Africa has a stronger claim to being a watershed than the approximately two decades from mid 1890s to 1914 when the infrastructural foundations of most contemporary national economies were laid down by colonial governments and commerce between Africa and the rest of the world grew at a historically unprecedented rate ..... the period saw a fairly dramatic strengthening of Africa's connections with international economy and possibly the final conclusive transformation of its economies into peripheries of the industrialist capitalist centre of world exchange. (26)

By early 1880s a newly unified German state was searching for a socio-economic Lebensraum" and a political place in the sun vis-a-vis other European powers. German colonial interests were first advanced in 1884 (27). By 1885 Bismark's Germany had declared a Protectorate over a limited area of the homeland in support of German East African Company.

Iliffe (28) suggests that the "idea of conquest" can be attributed to an individual Carl Peters. The motivation for German colonisation of East Africa was economic and was rooted in the monopoly capitalist economy of Germany.

Having subdued the people (between 1888 and 1906 there were 11 major revolts by the peasants of Tanganyika against German intrusion) and in time having established a colonial administration the Germans turned their attention to creating a colonial economy to suit their needs. A compromise was struck with the powers of precolonial social structure by making indigenous officials agents of the new German administration as 'liwalis' (coastal governors) or 'Akidas' (hinterland agents). The local headman (jumbes) in the village shared some of the powers of the Akidas. As part of the strategy for eliminating the slave trade, Dar-es-Salaam was made the main trading port in place of the traditional Port Bagamoyo, and a German rupee was introduced instead of the Mombasa and Zanzibar rupees. These moves effectively shifted the trade routes (Zanzibar's pre-eminence as an entrepot Contra was considerably reduced).

A second step was to survey all the available resources in the country, as a basis for planning a colonial economy. As R.F. Eberlie noted :

"As a whole, the colony maybe described as a good agricultural country and it has already been found fit for all sorts of tropical plantations...it may be developed into a wide and very important field for German enterprise".(29)

The D.O.A.G. proved unable to win the country militarily. The wars of conquest were long, difficult and destructive and the German government intervened. In 1891 it took over full administrative responsibility from the company.

As soon as the chief submitted, the Germans imposed taxation in his area, usually a hut tax of three rupees a hut. For many peasant farmers this did not mean much change for they had previously paid tribute to feudal war lords such as Chabruma of Ngoni, or Mkwawa or Mirambo. But for the chiefs and families it meant much more than a loss of income : the fact that instead of receiving tribute, they paid tax to the Germans, demonstrated that they were subject people. The Germans preferred the tax to be paid in money.

The people could raise money in either of the two ways : they could sell something - food or an animal or a crop such as cotton or coffee grown specifically to earn the cash - or they could work as labourers (30). Some labouring work was available locally with missions, settlers or the government.

By 1890s sisal, cotton, rubber, groundnuts and coffee were being cultivated, to reduce Germany's dependance upon North American and Mexican sources. There was an emphasis upon estate agriculture(31) with the opening up of vast stretches of uncultivated land; then they used European management and techniques and often unenthusiastic African labour to produce cash crops for export. A prominent feature of the estate effort was the use of compulsory labour, enforced by the use of rhinoceros hide whip(32).



As far as production of raw materials was concerned, the Germans used three means of organising African labour: a) white settlers, b) plantation companies and c) small scale African farmers. In areas with suitable soil, climate and transport connections to the coast, they encouraged both white settlers and plantations. As early as 1891, they started building a railway inland from Tanga along the Pangani valley in the direction of Mount Kilimanjaro - but progress was very slow. In the mountain areas, most of the land that was not given to settlers was declared forest reserve so that the people had little alternative but to move out of the area or work for settlers.

The hot malaria infested lowlands enjoyed a much lower rainfall and were less attractive than the mountain areas to the settlers inland from the coast at Tanga. The first crops to be tried were cotton and rubber.

For many years Africans had tapped rubber from trees growing wild in the forest : in 1899 exports of wild rubber were worth 1.3 million rupees and in 1905 they were worth 2.5 million rupees. But when the prices collapsed in 1913, as against Malaya and Philippines varieties Tanganyika could not compete.

Hitchcock(33) points an almost perfect crop for the environmental conditions for much of the lowlands as CACTUS SISAL from whose leaves a tough fibre could be extracted for use as rope, string or agricultural twine. Sisal was grown mainly on plantations owned by companies in Europe and run by salaried managers. The agricultural operations were labour intensive and in order to minimise labour costs, plantation companies used migrant labour.

One of the aims of German colonialism had been to provide Germany with a reliable source of raw cotton. Cotton was to eventually become Tanganyika's second most important export but most of the initial attempts to grow it failed.

In 1902 Germans compelled the inhabitants of each village in the Rufiji and some other coastal areas to work for 28 days a year on a small communal crop of cotton. To speed up the supply of cash crops - particularly cotton which was proving an expensive import from US - German imperialists introduced a Corvee system of labour(34) based on communal cultivation under which the Akidas coerced labourers to work on large communal farms. At the end of each season the produce was to be divided between the marketing organisation, the Akida and the workers, each receiving one third of the returns. One manifestation of the resistance to this cruel exploitation was the famous MAJI MAJI(35) REBELLION in 1905 which lasted 2 years. This was suppressed with such brutality that there was a reaction in Germany against the whole colonial administration.

Policy marking the first phase of the German colonialism was the administrative apparatus and the creation of European agricultural settlements. Next phase was forced communal cultivation (as elaborated above) which proved counter productive. The third phase is marked by the belated creation of a colonial office in Berlin and the appointment of the first civilian governor Renchenburg who introduced sweeping reforms in treatment of Africans and a developmental policy geared towards agricultural productionism.

Renchenburg encouraged peasant production based on gradual expansion and reforms of the existing indigenous agriculture.

A market was assured by the successful completion of the Uganda railway, which reached Kisumu in 1901. The result was a rapid development of production in indigenous crops which could be sold for certain monopoly interests backed by the "Nyamwezi and Peanuts Policy"(36).

The national liberals and the section of German finance capital they represented, favoured the policy of integration based on large

plantation agriculture, to combat the under capacity and short time working in the German domestic textile industry.

A new opening for large companies occurred in the plantation of rubber which by 1907 was starting to pay well. Although this boom had collapsed by 1913, the price of sisal was then rising again with coffee close behind, so that plantation and settler agriculture maintained itself right up to the end of the German period.

Peasant agriculture remained the most viable method of low cost production for most raw material products, including those grown on large estates. As governor Renchenburg commenting on this 'reform era' in 1907 said:

"East Africa's economy... must be developed through its indigenous products, through the natural experience of its native inhabitants."(37)

This period saw further encouragement to African peasant agriculture but with a difference - it was found expedient to rely on the Indian trader as the new intermediary for German finance capital.

Renchenburg encouraged Indian retail trading against criticism because the traders were the essential intermediaries between producers and their markets(38). By the end of German rule there were well articulated intermediary relationships between Asian traders and the Deutsche Ostrafrika Gessellschaft. Shivji(39) claims that Asian traders played the role of 'price giver' to the African role of 'price taker' but on the whole it was the German monopolies which governed the conditions of production and of trade and hence prices.

INFRASTRUCTURAL NETWORK and an efficient transport system was sought on the grounds that it would pay for itself out of increased tax revenues arising from production of cash crops eg. extending Dar-es-Salaam railway line from Kilosa to Tabora and on to Kigoma in Lake Tanganyika. The military aspect was that a railway line right across the centre of the country would prove invaluable if there was another Maji Maji.

The last 10 years of German rule 1905 to 1914 also saw the creation of most of the rest of colonial infrastructure that was to be handed over to the nationalists in 1961. There was considerable investment. Maps were drawn which was no mean achievement. The layout of much of the present road network of the main towns dates from German times; the Germans also built feeder roads for use by ox carts into many remote highland areas. Their geological survey was also thorough; only one significant mineral discovery (the Williamson Diamond Mine) was made during British period.

East Africa under German domination expanded its range of exports to include about 17 agricultural and mineral products, while the destinations of these exports shrank considerably, and were eventually limited to Germany alone. By 1911, 59% of the territory's exports went to Germany, compared with 22% in 1897, when 72% went to British hands(40).

EDUCATION : Even before the imposition of German rule there were chiefs who welcomed Islamic teachers or christian missionaries. There were Islamic teachers at Kimweri's court in Usambara in 1848. Jiddawi(41) feels that Islamic teaching should not be underestimated; it involved arithmetic and reading and writing taught from Koran in Arabic script and for instance, enabled the Sultan of Zanzibar to collect his customs, build palaces and ships and mount sea voyages to Europe.

The first Protestant missionaries arrived in 1850s; the first Catholics in 1858. The missions established bases at the coast and then inland into the trade routes. Since they arrived about 20 years before colonial military occupation, they were entirely dependent upon the goodwill of the local chiefs. The chiefs such as Nyakyusu valued employment possibilities and trading contacts with the outside world which followed the establishment of a mission. Others welcomed the missionaries for diplomatic or even military reasons(42).

Both Protestant and Catholic missionaries recognised that "Africans could only be converted by Africans"(43) so they started schools to train African Catholics or Evangelists. Before long there was a network of "bush schools" around each mission station from which the best students proceeded to primary schools. Ronald Oliver described the missions as "small independant states"(44), with their rules and regulations, their farms and gardens on which work was compulsory three days a week and even their own police forces for defence and the enforcement of their rules and regulations. They expanded in German times especially in the years after Maji Maji. By 1912 there were 171 mission stations in the mainland Tanzania(45).

Mission education threatened many of the traditional institutions of tribe opposing dance ceremonies surrounding birth, death, traditional system of clothing, polygamy and initiation ceremonies. Initiation was an important part of this education; the syllabus was relevant to the life of the tribe: covering skills required for good agriculture, health, child-rearing, survival in times of famine or disaster as well as tests of bravery and stories about the origins and history of tribes.

Mission education with its combination of reading, writing, arithmetic and Christianity was the ideal means of creating a new class of literate officials cut off from their tribal origins with loyalties to those who had educated them. Hence was created the COMPRADORE class resigned to the colonial interests.

German rule created a demand for literary skills for there was no possibility of Germans running all institutions without some source of semi-skilled labour. Some mission schools provided training in carpentry and building and also metal work, shoe-making and printing. At the coast and main administrative centres the government opened its own schools.

Africans were used to fill the middle level with administrative posts since for instance there were never more than 79 European administrative staff in their districts. Initially the Germans simply took over the Sultan of Zanzibar's officers like Liwalis in maintown, Akidas under them and Jumbes or headmen responsible for tax collection at local level. But gradually the Germans replaced Liwalis by German officials and appointed younger men as Akidas and Jumbes mainly graduates from the secondary school at Tanga. With commercial agriculture established, a subordinate African bureaucracy for the whole territory had been created which continued to remain even after the German settlers ascendancy eclipsed. Since they used the bureaucracy of the Sultan of Zanzibar, the Germans also used his language Swahili. Taylor(46) and Iliffe claimed that they thus continued by accident as much design to give Tanzania a national language.

German agriculture and medical research was based at Amani in the Usambara mountains. A wide range of crops and trees were brought into the country and Coulson(47) points out that there has been no significant introduction of new crops since. On the medical side, the first doctors were surgeons who treated the wounded in the fighting with Abushiri in 1888: in the 1890s a network of hospitals was established along the coast. As early as 1891 locally grown quinine was introduced as a prophylactic to control malaria. Dr. R. Koch identified sleeping sickness and its bovine version, trypanosomiasis with tse tse fly and tick fever and east coast fever (another cattle disease) with the tick. Health regulations(48) were introduced to prevent the spread of intestinal diseases.

The agricultural pattern development in Tanganyika opted for by the Germans was a mixture of settler and plantation agriculture (basically sisal and rubber) on the one hand and cash crop oriented peasant agriculture of considerable vitality (exporting rubber, coffee,

beeswax, cotton, groundnuts and other crops in increasing quantities and selling livestock and food to the cities and plantation.) Yaffey(49) points out that at the end of the German period there was a fairly vigorous development both of infrastructure and agriculture, plantation and peasant "all stimulated by massive capital inflow".

The other side of the picture shows that German colonisation of Tanganyika effectively put an end to the prosperity of the indigenous precolonial economies. A combination of epidemic diseases, natural catastrophes and German colonial policies wrecked the fragile balance between man and nature on which these economies had rested. The conventional explanation is their incorporation into the capitalist mode of production. The evidence supporting this conclusion is generally highlighted.

Goran Hyden(50) points out that the most significant thing that happened at the time of colonisation was the disruption by default, as much as by design of the man controlled ecological systems that supported the precolonial economies. By undermining these, the colonizers forced the producer into a defensive posture vis-a-vis nature. The local knowhow no longer secured their reproduction. The relative and absolute deprivation that the rural peoples of Tanganyika suffered was largely caused by being unable to secure the necessities of life in a regular and familiar fashion.

Colonial conquest destroyed the precolonial modes of production but it did not pave the way for capitalism - with the exception of plantation and settler enclaves. Instead it helped to create a precapitalist peasant mode of production in which the integration of rural producers into a wider national economy was an essential element. Thus, integration was marginal(51) and the needs of capitalist sector did not impinge on peasant producers to the extent that they were absorbed by it. Therefore, colonialism destroyed the precolonial mode

of production but it generated a new precapitalist mode based on independent peasant production.

Importance of German colonialism lies in the fact that the economic structure laid down by 1914 was in all but detail that handed over in 1961. Lines of communication, towns and land areas alienated to settlers did not greatly change during British rule. Few new crops were grown, either by plantation or by peasants. It had been established that there were no mineral resources of huge value in the country. Above all, the mechanisms by which African labourers were 'persuaded' to work had been pioneered, as had the need for African education.

#### BRITISH PERIOD

Yaffey observed that:

"By 1912 the private capital inflows appear to have reached the astonishing level of over 40% of imports .... By modern standards the investors appear to have been venturesome and to have had high expectations"(52)

The success of this venture in colonization drew the attention of the more experienced British imperialist. The cession of Tanganyika to the British came about as a result of the First World War - a war that was waged to decide whether Britain or Germany was to obtain the opportunity and the right to rob, strangle and exploit the whole world.(53).

Britain occupied most of German East Africa during the war, renaming it Tanganyika in 1920. Using international mechanism, it obtained the right to administer and exploit Tanganyika as an "integral part of the mandatory power and its dependencies". Tanganyika was not a colony in the formal sense but an internationally mandated territory (consigned by the League of Nations) to be administered in the interest



of "Peace, order and good government" and of the "material and moral wellbeing and social progress of inhabitants".(54) For all practical purposes Britain had gained another colony and now governed all of modern Tanzania. The long term implications of this was a socio-economic and political system that would tie Tanzania up in a web of imperialist interests.

All political power is directed to specific ends and there is no such thing as power as an end in itself. Power of the coloniser served the interest of the coloniser. In case of Tanganyika the first priority was to change the country into a reservoir of cheap raw materials for British industry - and consequently a market for its finished goods. Having established the mechanism of exercising political power, British proceeded to reorganise economic life (though no radical changes from the German system were made) to suit their interests. Through administration and economic measures the peasants time and land was divided in such a way that he would produce crops for his own consumption and export crops for British industry.

Meanwhile the war between the Germans and British in East Africa forced the peasants on the defence. Many were conscripted into the army and supplies for soldiers commandeered from the peasant household. The war left the colonial economy in disarray.

The transition period was relatively smooth for the British made no radical changes to the administrative and legal structures preferring as far as possible to adapt existing institutions. The office of governor and commander-in-chief was created. The 22 administrative districts of earlier regime were retained as well as services of experienced Akidas on a reduced basis. This limited revival of old forms of indigenous institutions altered to serve the needs of the British imperialist powers (was accomplished under governor Cameron).


The initial British presence in Tanganyika was low key. First it gave priority to the task of winning over to its side the local rulers - traditional or appointed by Germans. The British effort to make the territory immediately productive was thwarted for some 10 years by the after effects of war. Famine conditions prevailed in many parts and both African and peasant agriculture and white settler plantations were "practically derelict". Communications had been demobilised and many roads were nothing but caravan tracts. Rehabilitation had to be undertaken, law and order re-established and friendly and close contact made with peasantry "before any programme of development could be started"(55).

Secondly, Hyden claims that the British tried to retribalise the Africans by allowing them to resettle in their home areas.

Once these twin tasks were accomplished, the British under Governor Cameron (who succeeded Bratt in 1925) put into practice a more systematically conceived local indirect administration - commonly known as INDIRECT RULE. Under this system material progress and political responsibility were to be moderated through tribal chiefs.

Cameron is often credited with fending off the movement for 'closer union' or federation with Kenya and Uganda which would have allowed Tanganyika to be dominated by the settler who already controlled the Kenyan state. Yet he failed to prevent the economic dependence on Kenya as regards both import duties and railway rates. Since the policy in Tanganyika was not to industrialise, there was no justification for protecting goods produced in Kenya.

Lugard argued for accelerated promotion of African administrators and even gave qualified praise to the Pan African Congress of 1919. In contrast Cameron advocated the deliberate policy of DIVIDE AND RULE: he foresaw a time when 'the educated native' would 'seek to gain possession of the machinery of government and run it on western lines' but his answer to this was to aim at indirect administration through



the appropriate native authority - chief or counsel; in this way he could claim he was administering the country through the people.

In 1920s and early 1930s there were British politicians and officials who argued that this could be achieved through cooperatives but it was not till Victoria Federation of Cooperative Union was accepted in 1952 that the penny dropped.

#### THE ECONOMY :

##### Agricultural Production :

By 1914 a balance had been achieved between plantation agriculture, white settlers and small scale African farmer (peasants.)

The variety of crops grown is clear from the export statistics (table I.1)

In terms of value the largest export was sisal which had recovered quickly after the war to become overwhelmingly the most important export. There were about 150 growers including some settlers but the biggest plantations were owned by the European companies and run by salaried managers. Wages remained low (table I.2)

The next crop to expand production after the First World War was coffee. Despite opposition of the white settlers in Kilimanjaro region, peasant production of coffee was established as the only form of production which promised quick returns. Other peasant crops that were encouraged included groundnut, sesame, rice, hides, skins and ghee.

Cotton cultivation carried out almost entirely by small African farmers living in the south of Lake Victoria also increased, rivalling coffee as a source of foreign exchange by 1938.

At the time of Depression the settlers and planters suffered economic ruin. Hyden's(57) analysis manifests crisis in the plantation sector which stood in contrast to what happened in the peasant sector.

The table I.3 shows the production for export of coffee and cotton in Bukoba and Mwanza respectively.

It is clear that peasants are more immune to world market price changes. During the Depression when prices slumped their production did not go down. Both Iliffe and Dato(58) are inclined to see this as a result of their wish to make as much money as before.

#### USE OF FORCE :

In 1937 native authorities ordinance was amended to allow bye laws to be passed for the enforcement of soil conservation measures and other agricultural practices. In Tanganyika recruitment for work in the capitalist sector (plantation sector) had to be done by compulsion. There was no shortage of land that forced peasants to seek wage employment on the plantations. Every family had access to land in their home areas. It was easier for them to cater for their needs than it was as wage earners on plantations.

In line with Policy of Indirect Rule, British tried expanding peasant agriculture which meant (in 1920s and 1930s) primarily introducing new crops and new farming techniques. The Agriculture Extension Service was forced to follow a trial and error approach in the absence of reliable research data, which proved detrimental. These unpopular policies were sought to be implemented through native authorities i.e. chiefs who were expected to serve as buffers between colonial authorities and local population. The element of coercion with which they were sought to be implemented reinforced the antagonism of the peasant. Many chiefs were not very anxious to go along with the British since it was likely to undermine their local legitimacy. Still they often had no choice. Thus tension began to emerge in the rural areas between peasants and authorities. Many peasants engaged in passive resistance. Pratt(59) reports that as a result of colonial policy and agricultural development through coercion, some 75,000

persons were convicted before native courts in 1946 alone. It was not until 1950s that British shifted their attitude towards local peasant adopting a Policy of Persistent Persuasion(60).

CAPITALIST PRODUCTION IN AGRICULTURAL SECTOR was not really expanded during the British era. Land alienation increased somewhat but remained small in terms of area covered. The first comprehensive effort by the British to launch new types of farming in the colony - the Groundnut Scheme was a total failure(61). In Urambo in western Tanganyika, tobacco was successfully introduced as a commercial crop, cattle ranches were set up. Settler agriculture continued and even received a boost after the Second World War. There were confrontations between settlers and peasants e.g. Meruland case which served as a catalyst of anti-colonial sentiments in the area. The challenge of capitalist farming served to make the local peasants improve their own cultivation.

PEASANT REACTIONS changed the political situation in favour of nationalist movement. The British had set in motion a process over which they lost control. Hyden(62) points out that herein "key actor in this process was the peasant."

Peasants reaction to enforced agricultural change manifested itself in Bukabo riots, Sukumaland, Kilimanjaro, Handeri district in Tanga region, Uluguru Mountains in Morogozo district etc. The widespread nature of these resistance movements was clearly an important factor for the development of Nationalist Party organisations. The peasants provided the base for the emergence of TANU.

#### AGRICULTURAL MARKETING AND COOPERATIVES

Colonial government had the means of collecting produce from dispersed small farmers : (a) it could allow private agents to do this

more or less uncontrolled hoping that competition could ensure fair prices. (b) it could persuade the farmers to market their crops themselves through cooperatives marketing organizations or (c) it could create its own bureaucracy (i.e. a marketing board), to purchase and subsequently sell the crops. The Germans used the first method. The British discouraged the Africans from any sort of commercial operation - through policy measures like Native Restriction Ordinance of 1931. Therefore Africans from the start itself, when in trade, sought means of protection such as cooperatives.

The first cooperative organizations, the Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association (KNPA) was formed to market African produced coffee in Kilimanjaro in 1925. By 1927 it was in conflict with settlers and by 1932 cooperative ordinance was passed designed to ensure government control over the movement. After the war the effectiveness of the bureaucratic structure as a means of creaming off surplus from peasant farmers became apparent. The Victoria Federation of Cooperatives Union was the first cooperative to be accepted from 1952 onwards (table I.4).

The role of the cooperative movement was that (a) it enabled the farmers to receive higher price (b) it was a means of channeling power and influence to the larger growers and (c) it was a way of involving ambitious educated Tanzanians in crop production.

By 1920, the competition for mass produced imports had destroyed most of the traditional craft skills in Tanganyika. By the same date most of the minerals known about today had been discovered. Coal fields, iron ore deposits, titanium, manganese, exploitable deposits of phosphates and small deposits of copper, lead, tin, nickel. and sulphur as well as salt from brine springs etc. Overall resource base was sufficient for a balanced industrialization. Yet in the 1920s the decision was taken not to industrialize, and the industrial sector by any standard was minute (table I.5).

The development of colonial production in no way entailed colonial industrialization. At the point of production in the Colony, raw materials were processed only so far as to reduce their bulk for export. The little manufacturing that developed in the country was to service the export/import economy and the consumption needs of resident administrative and business interests like cotton ginneries and coffee processing works which reduced transport costs and protected the quality of the raw material.

Walter Rodney(63) observes that the African peasant went into colonialism with a hoe and came out of it with a hoe. To which Mamdani(64) adds that 'the hoe that the peasant went in with was locally manufactured, the hoe he came out with was imported.'

"The great interest of the Colonies is to secure markets for their primary products" was made clear in the House of Commons. Tanganyika was integrated as a primary producer. Manufacturing industry at the time of independence was restricted to certain types of secondary agricultural processing such as grain and oil milling and to the production of food and beverages. Other permitted activities were carpentry, furniture production and saw milling, motor vehicle repair and general engineering. Therefore, at the end of colonial period manufacturing accounted for barely 4% of Tanganyika's gross domestic product.

Coulson(65) points out that politically independent Tanganyika had to arrange its own industrialization in the highly competitive world markets of the late 1960s and 1970s starting from a virtually non-existent base.

SOCIO-CULTURAL-IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS have to be linked to the Education which served the ends of British colonial policy. It emphasized the individualistic values of the capitalist society - the individual

gaining wealth and power in competition with others. A more devastating aspect of colonial educational system lies in the cultural invasion. It begins with a comparatively few African children who had the benefit of this type of formal education. They were taught alien traditions and attitudes to life; the history, traditions and customs of their own people were then ignored and ridiculed. Again, this is as it should be (for cultural invasion to succeed, it is essential that those invaded become convinced of their intrinsic inferiority. The invasion is accentuated and those invaded are alienated from the spirit of their own culture and from themselves, the more the latter want to be like the invaders; to walk like them, dress like them, talk like them" (66).

Tanzanian political leadership painfully recognised the awesome inadequacies of the colonial educational system bequeathed to them as manifest in Nyerere's (67) evaluation:

"The education provided by the colonial government.... was motivated by a desire to inculcate the values of colonial society and to train individuals for the service of the colonial state.... with emphasis on subservient attitudes, on white collar skills, the individualistic instincts of mankind.... instead of cooperative instincts.... This meant that colonial education induced attitudes of human inequality."

Cultural deprivation which the colonial situation engendered in the colonised people inevitably left behind a social psychology, conscious or otherwise, of social and cultural subordination, submission and imitation.

The British took the decision to continue using SWAHILI as the language of administration.

After the First World War, the re-establishment of education was by no means the government's first priority. As late as 1922 there were only 2 expatriates in the government educational service. In 1938 total government revenue over 40 million shillings but expenditure on



education was still less than 2 million(68)

**SOCIAL INEQUALITY** was nurtured through education and other colonial mechanism in areas of (a) racial dichotomy, (b) creation of elite intelligentsia (class categories) and (c) a gender dichotomy.

**RACE:** By allowing three parallel educational systems to develop, one for each of the three races, dichotomy was deliberately sought by British colonists (table I.6)

**CLASS** dichotomy was sought to be created. (a) Coersively to meet the demands of the rural capitalism and the scanty industrialization/marketing sectors and (b) through the elitist nature of education and segregation in the education imparted.

Marjorie Mbilinyi(69) has highlighted the ambivalence of the British towards education for Africans. Government officials were aware from a very early stage, that a class of educated Africans would become a threat to them; they therefore tried to plan African education so that only the numbers required by the economy would be educated and to concentrate as far as possible on the sons of chiefs headmen or influential town dwellers.

Upto 1940s few Africans received more than 3 years schooling and in the Depression of 1930s it was post primary education that was most drastically cut back: as late as 1940 only 5 schools offered a complete secondary education i.e. 10 years schooling to Africans. The overwhelming majority had no opportunity to go to school at all.

**Class** based nature of colonial education manifested itself in the Tabora School, created as a school for chiefs and sons of chiefs in 1924. Tabora Girls School followed in 1929; for a number of years it was the only school whose graduates could go directly to Masarere

**College in Uganda** and it is no coincidence that a high proportion of Tanzania's present leadership attended Tabora School in 1950s.

There were only a tiny number of **central schools** - never more than 26 - which offered **4 more** years of education on top of 2 or 3 years in mission or government schools. But even **then there** were differences in the syllabi for **children** of different **kinds of parents**. For the **rest there** was no school at all. There were **places for fewer** than 70% of children of school **age** before the Second World War. With Depression, world prices and government revenue falling, **government expenditure had** to cut and **education** appeared expendable.

The nascent **rural capitalism** was an open espousal of differentiation : it was to concentrate resources on relatively rich farmers and / or villages who could be expected to increase **their** marketing **production** by the use of **machinery**, fertilizer and hiring labour. **Ruthenburg** points out(71) that it was the intention to increase inequality. 'The grouping together of the progressive farmers can be called **an attempt** to establish rural elites with **progressive** attitudes.'

Labour **hiring** peasants or small capitalist farmers or kulaks could be found in every part of the country. John Sender(72) points out that **almost** every rural survey carried out immediately **before** or after **independence demonstrated** the existence of these large farmers.

**Alongside** the plantation sector hired labour **often recruited** from far away, eg. workers for coastal rural plants were recruited in western and southern areas of the country. The idea was to **uproot** them and **turn them into** a class of workers. This had to be done by compulsion as there was no shortage of land that forced peasants to seek wage employment.

Dichotomy between the GENDER was very subtly maintained. The **involvement in a** market economy which spread over time through the length and breadth of the continent altered the utilization of **the**

factors of production on the family holding, adding for the most part burdens onto the women and increasing further the power of men within the family as Mbilinyi(73) points out eg. with plantation agriculture - migrant labour was sought. Neither the wages paid to the migrant labour nor returns to small scale farming were sufficient to support a man and a family: both systems depended upon women, growing food to feed themselves and their children.

IDEOLOGICAL IMPACT: Education was the most powerful weapon in the battle for the minds of the colonised. Impact of mission education created a petty bourgeois class of Tanzanians who could earn their living by working for wages.

British frequently feared that their legitimacy could be challenged by this emerging petty bourgeois - as indeed it was. In an attempt to stem the tide, from the beginning they imbued their education with nationalist ideology, first German, then British. When in the 1950s this was undermined by African nationalism, they drew in another ideology - that of "Modernization Theory" or dualism which distinguishes between the modern (or western) as good while tradition as bad.

This ideology enables the educated to think of themselves collectively (as a class), as bearers of all things modern and good even though they had been almost totally divorced from direct involvement in production, they feel that they alone can tell others what to do. The Paradox was that the same ideology contained the seeds of the process that was to undermine formal colonial rule eg. Christian religion and philosophical writings of Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill etc. containing ideas of individualism, liberalism, equality etc.

## CHAPTER II - IDEOLOGY AND POLITICO-ECONOMIC SYSTEM OF UJAMAA

### SECTION I : IDEOLOGY OF UJAMAA

"We have been oppressed a great deal, we have been exploited a great deal and we have been disregarded a great deal. It is our weakness that has led to our being oppressed, exploited and disregarded. Now we want a revolution..."

ARUSHA DECLARATION 1967

#### GENESIS OF THE IDEA OF SOCIALISM IN TANZANIA

Nyerere points out that in the modern world there are 2 basic systems of social and economic organisation - capitalism and socialism. Yet "for the underdeveloped nations there is no real choice. In practice, third world nations cannot become developed capitalist societies without surrendering the reality of their freedom and without accepting a degree of inequality between their citizens which will deny the moral validity of our independent struggle". Nyerere feels that the present poverty & national weakness makes socialism the only rational choice for Tanzania(1).

Nyerere feels that capitalism is incompatible with the aspirations of the third world, it does not mean that the alternative of socialism is an easy one, nor that success under it is automatic. However by adopting socialist policies it is possible to maintain 'our' independence and develop towards human dignity for 'our' people.

The vital point is that the basis of socialist organisation is the meeting of peoples needs, not the making of profit. The decision to devote the national resources to the production of one thing rather than another is made in the light of what is needed and not what is profitable. Furthermore such decisions are made by the people through their responsible institutions - their own government, their own industrial corporation and their own commercial institutes.

Nyerere feels that this does not mean that great inequalities

within the society or the exploitation of groups or even the seizure of power and privilege by a small minority is automatically ruled out in a society which opts for socialism. But that such things mark a failure to implement socialism they are not inherent in it the way they are inherent in capitalism.

While the ethical foundation of Tanzanian socialism was laid down with the publication of the doctrinal document "Ujamaa" in 1962, for the first years of independence, its policy applications were limited. The momentum of the welfare and development programmes of the terminal colonial era were carried forward, and the country counted heavily on western investment and aid to finance its first five year plan. Corporations were expected to assure peasant control over their major cash crops. While the capitalist ethos was decried in Ujamaa statement, little was done in practice to circumscribe it. In fact as Crawford Young points out "principled non racialism of Nyerere appeared to guarantee a more secure role for the main mercantile group, the Asian community"(2)

Though the country had a satisfactory growth record during these years - 4.5 percent real growth per annum on 1.5 percent per capita(3) there were a number of trends that Nyerere viewed as ominous. The flow of public and private western capital fell far short of expectations, while at the same time political irritants multiplied in relations with Britain, U.S. and West Germany.

Civil servants and politicians displayed a distressingly acquisitive instinct in the pursuit of leisure time capitalist ventures in such spheres as urban housing, transport and beverage distribution. The cooperatives, according to Young(4), were a bitter disappointment : the farmers were outraged by their unreliable marketing services and occasional dishonesty, while party leaders were disconcerted by the autonomous mercantile fiefdom that the leaders of larger cooperatives constructed. A presidential enquiry in 1966 encountered a barrage of

farmers' grievances.

In 1967, the socialist ethos was translated into concrete policy through a far reaching statement set forth in the Arusha Declaration. While this was ostensibly a party document, it reflected above all, the moral vision of Nyerere himself. As Shivji(5) asserts with some acerbity, Arusha was not a "Proletarian Ideology" but it nonetheless set forth a radical set of moral axioms: the aim was a "truly socialist society" where all people were workers, where no one lived on the work of others, where "all major means of production and exchange were controlled and owned by the peasants through the machinery of their government and their cooperatives" and where the ruling party was "a party of peasants and workers".(6)

With Arusha, the mobilisations of the people and the policy was towards UJAMAA, which sought to reconcile productionist imperatives(7) with Nyerere's concept of African humanism. African "familyhood" or "Communalism" is seen by Nyerere as not merely establishing norms of social justice but also providing a basis for a socialism appropriate to African conditions.

CONCEPTS RELATED TO UJAMAA(8) like the connection between freedom, development, discipline and democracy are essential because the national policy of creating socialist villages throughout the rural areas depends upon it.

FREEDOM: as defined by Nyerere incorporates: a) national freedom, i.e. the ability of the citizens of Tanzania to determine their own future and to govern themselves without interference from non Tanzanians. b) freedom from hunger, disease, poverty. c) Personal freedom for the individual i.e. his right to live in dignity and equality, his right to freedom of speech, to participate in the making of all decisions which affect his life, freedom from arbitrary arrest etc.

These depend upon (i) the economic and social development to the extent that National freedom can be endangered by any foreign power which is better equipped. Nyerere feels it is not simply a question of military armaments, but a consciousness among the people of the nation, (ii) freedom from hunger, disease and poverty depends upon an increase in wealth and knowledge available in the community (iii) even personal freedom becomes more real if it is buttressed by development. A man can defend his rights effectively only when he understands what they are and knows how to use the constitutional machinery which exists for the defence of those rights - and knowledge of this kind is <sup>a</sup> part of <sub>^</sub> development.

The truth is that development is the development of the people. Road building, increase of crop output and other things of this kind are not development: they are only tools of development. If development is to increase people's freedom, it must be development for the people. It must serve them and their interest.

Nyerere admits that pre-Arusha "what we were doing in fact was thinking in terms of things and not of people....the people were secondary; the first priority was output".

Policy of Ujamaa Vijijini is a new concept, not intended to be merely a revival of the old settlement scheme under another name. Based on post Arusha Understanding, what we need to develop are people not things and that people can only develop themselves.

Ujamaa Villages are intended to be socialist organizations created by the people and governed by those who live and work in them. No one can be forced into an Ujamaa village. It is a voluntary association of people who decide of their own free will to live together and work together for a common good.

Ujamaa means "familyhood". This basic definition is crucial to understanding the quality of inter-personal relationships Nyerere invoked, as both the means and end of socialist transformation. Ujamaa has a broader and more humanistic meaning than does the other possible

Swahili translation for socialism -"UJIMI", or communal work. The use of a Swahili term for socialism emphasises the African character of ideas, values and policies associated with socialism in Nyerere's Tanzania.

Ujamaa posits a peaceful transition to socialism. Contemporary socialism will grow out of African communal past. Nyerere denies the relevance of any concept of class in Africa, claiming that Africans never even had a word for "class" in their indigenous language(9). Contrasting Ujamaa with European socialism, he wrote:

"Ujamaa" then or 'familyhood', describes our socialism. It is opposed to capitalism, which seeks to build a happy society on the basis of exploitation of man by man and it is equally opposed to doctrinaire socialism which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between man and man.

We, in Africa have no more need of being "converted" to socialism than we have of being "taught" democracy. Both are rooted in our own past - in the traditional society which produced us".(10)

Nyerere thus urges Tanzanians to analyse their heritage and their present circumstances in developing a realistic and appropriate socialism. In rejecting any claim to universal validity and applicability of the socialist orthodoxy, Nyerere asserted that :

"If (Marx) he had lived in Sukumaland, Masailand or Ruvuma, he would have written a very different book than Das Kapital, but he could have been just as scientific and just as socialist".(11)

".....It is necessary that those who call themselves scientific socialists should be scientific. In that case they would accept or reject socialist ideas and methods in accordance with the objective circumstances of time and place. They would certainly not be hampered or inhibited by the irrelevances of a socialist theology(12)."

Nyerere does not eulogise the African past, and rejects any ideology that seeks merely an egalitarian poverty. He emphasised that respect for the African past "does not mean that we have in any way accepted our present poverty...what we are attempting a telescoped



evolution of our economy and our society."(13) Increased prosperity is possible only through increased effort. Work (kazi) is the central tenet of Ujamaa ideology. Therefore Nyerere constantly tells Tanzanians that "we the Tanzanians have to work our way out of poverty."(14) In 1962 Nyerere had written that "there is no such thing as socialism without work".(15) This was true in traditional as well as independent Tanzania. The work ethic grows out of African custom:

"Not only was the capitalist, or the landed exploitation unknown to traditional African society but we did not have the other form of modern parasite the loiterer, or idler, who accepts the hospitality of the society as his "right" but gives nothing in return."(16)

Thereby the first characteristic of the socialist state was an ABSENCE OF EXPLOITATION.

" A truly socialist state is one in which all people are workers, in which neither capitalism nor feudalism exists."(17) In the socialist country every able bodied person works and every worker obtains a just return for his or her labour". The incomes derived from different types of work are not grossly divergent(18). The only people who are allowed to live on the work of others, are the very young, the sick, the old, the crippled and those the state has failed to provide with work.

Ahmed Mohiddin(19) points out that though the declaration does not make any reference to Marx, its definition of socialist state does approximate the Marxist rather than the liberal view of state. Alongside the declaration admits the existence of classes in Tanzania, which though considered weak, nonetheless have considerable potential for growth if left unchecked. Indeed one primary objective of the declaration is precisely that of preventing the property owners and commercial classes from taking over political power in the country. Mohiddin in discussing the concept of exploitation, feels that declaration goes beyond the conventional Marxist notion of exploitation(20). In terms of class relations based on ownership of

the basic means of production, distribution and exchange contending that exploitation in the sense of one person or group or persons living on the proceeds of work of others is a phenomenon which does not require capitalist industrialisation(21). It exists where there are people strong and powerful enough to exploit others. In a predominantly peasant and agricultural country like Tanzania where the wealth of the nation is produced in rural areas but modern amenities - hospitals, schools, sewage systems, well paved roads and so on - are concentrated in the urban centres, there is bound to be exploitation of peasants by city dwellers. This is exploitation of RURAL by URBAN areas. Another form of exploitation prevalent in Tanzania is manifest in the rural areas where women do virtually all the work while men spend most of the time drinking and playing games. This is exploitation of woman by man.

The next essential feature of a socialist state is that the basic means of production, distribution and exchange must be owned and controlled by people. Since Tanzania has no class inequalities to overcome, unity for increased production replaces conflict over more equitable distribution.

"Our major pre-occupation must be to increase our wealth and the amount of time and energy we spend on squabbling over what we have now, should be very limited indeed"(22).

On the issue of NATIONALISATION, the declaration declared that ownership of means of production by the people is not itself a sufficient condition for existence of socialism. It depends on who, among the people actually owns and in what proportions. Socialism implies the equality of all and the satisfaction of the basic needs of all. It is thus <sup>in</sup> the interest and the service of the wellbeing of all men that <sup>Nationalization</sup> of the major Means of Production must be considered. Nationalisation is not a theoretical dogma to be observed but an empirical necessity without which socialism cannot be built. It is within such a frame of reference that the declaration does not restrict nationalisation to only major means of production, but included other

economic enterprises that employ a large number of people. Therefore, it is the people and how best to serve them and not simply the ownership of means of production which is the objective of socialism. This leads us to the third essential feature of socialism.

To be socialist, the Declaration asserts a country must also have its government and other public institutions chosen and led by the people themselves. Nyerere feels that two factors essential in development by the people are (a) democracy in decision making and (b) leadership through education.

"True socialism cannot exist without a DEMOCRACY also existing in the society".(23). Although no definition of democracy is offered in the Declaration, it does state that "for a country to be socialist, it is essential that its government is chosen and led by the peasants and workers themselves".(24).

Two essential elements of democracy without which it cannot work are that everyone must be allowed to speak freely and everyone must be listened to. Free debate must continue. It is an essential element of personal freedom. But necessity of continued freedom in discussion must not be allowed to prevent decisions from being made and once a decision is reached, it must be accepted as the decision of all. And everyone including those who are in the opposition have to cooperate in carrying out this decision. Therefore democratic decisions must be followed by :

DISCIPLINE in carrying out the decisions. Greater freedom is achieved by cooperation which is possible if there is disciplined acceptance of joint decisions. Yet provided decisions are made after free and friendly discussion and by the majority will, the essential discipline should be freely accepted and should in fact be largely self discipline. Discipline must be a means of implementing decisions - but discipline is not another word for force.

To get Ujamaa villages established and help them to succeed, EDUCATION AND LEADERSHIP are required.

But giving leadership does not mean usurping the role of the people. The people must make their own decisions about future and through democratic procedures. Leadership cannot replace democracy; it must be a part of democracy. If the decision relates to national affairs, then the people make it through the National Executive Committee and Parliament, and through the National Conference of CCM. If <sup>it</sup> is a decision about district affairs, the people make it through the district committees and district councils. If it is a question of purely local interest eg, whether to undertake a particular self help scheme - then the people directly concerned must make the decisions following free debate. Just as real freedom for the people requires development, so development of people requires freedom.

"Leadership does not imply control any more than it implies bullying or intimidating people. A good leader will explain, teach and inspire. In an Ujamaa village, he will do more. He will lead by doing. He is in front of the people showing them what can be done guiding them, and encouraging them. But he is with them. You do not lead people by being so far in front, or so theoretical in your teachings that the people cannot see what you are doing or saying. You can lead the people only by being one of them, but just being more active as well as more willing to learn - from them and others".(25)

The need for commitment and honesty among public servants was enshrined in a leadership code which prevented leaders (senior civil servants, managers of nationalised industries and party officials), from having more than one source of income, own<sup>n</sup>g property for rental or having shares or directorships in private companies. The political leaders, including civil servants, as well as the President himself, took salary cuts, and the ministers were no longer provided with cars for private use at public expenses.

The MWONGOZO or Party Guidelines of 1971 is a party document rather than a Presidential Paper - it was brought to a Party Conference during a wave of apprehension that followed Idi Amin's coup in Uganda, the coup and invasion of Sekou Toure's Guinea by the Portugese a few

months before, showed the two dangers facing the Tanzanian revolution : subversion from within or intrusion by white armies from outside.

A more central role than in the past is given to the Party. But in the important sections on "Defence and Security" and "Economics and Progress," the logic of freedom and development was extended. The basis of Tanzania's development is the people themselves. The army must become a "people's army"... to enable the people to safeguard their independence. Political education is required so that every Tanzanian recognises the importance of safeguarding the policies, independence, economy and culture.

"For a people who have been slaves and who have been oppressed, exploited, humiliated by colonialism and capitalism, development means liberation. Any action that gives them more control of their own affairs is an action for development even if it does not offer them more health or more bread"(26). Therefore a socialist ideology and a way of life was sought to be created.

The emphasis is also on the need for Tanzanian self reliance "KUJITEGEMEA". While foreign aid can be helpful it must not be the basis for economic development. As Nyerere told Tanzanians "the only people we can rely on is ourselves".(27) Self reliance is not merely a development strategy; it is to become a way of life. It is essential for the return to African heritage that forms the basis for socialist transformation.

Education and work were to be united in all educational institutions, not only to cover costs of schooling, but also to ensure that youth developed the correct attitude to manual labour as future peasants and workers; and to break down the petty bourgeois arrogance of students in higher educational institutions who would become the future bureaucrats and experts.

In recruitment, recommendations of employer and TANU branch-executive committees would be necessary as well as essential for academic credentials. The new intake resolution implied that students of the university should be workers and peasants.

Education reform policy: With the background of declared national policy of "socialism and self reliance" in 1967, leadership code, Nationalisation, Mwongozo, Decentralisation etc. were issued. The education for self reliance policy was declared in 1967 to see that educational institutions were in line with "socialism and self reliance". The policy had the following objectives: orientation of schooling to rural areas and specificity to agriculture, development of cooperative attitudes, creativity, critical thinking and self confidence; the unity of manual and mental work, loyalty to the Party - the peasants and workers and the fostering of egalitarian values.

Primary school education was to be considered terminal education, "complete in itself" and not a route to higher education. Schools were to become in totality productive units where both students and teachers produced together. Both urban and rural schools were to engage in productive activities, though <sup>the</sup> activities they would pursue would depend upon their specific location. Manual work such as sweeping, cleaning, cutting grass which was done previously by hired labour was now to be done by students themselves, in particular at the university where capitalist tendencies with respect to social relationships between student and servant and bookish education had advanced further.

One of President Nyerere's speeches, Education for liberation, 1974(28) noted that attitudinal change was not enough for the liberation of masses, knowledge and skills are also necessary to take control of society. "The purpose of education is not to turn out technicians who can be used as instruments in the expansion of the economy. It is to turn out men (and women) who have the technical knowledge and ability to expand the economy for the benefit of individuals in society".

The Musoma Resolution of the TANU National Executive Committee in 1974 represents the effort to hasten the implementation of the education for Self Reliance Policy. Partly in response to growing peasant

demands for more educational opportunities for their children especially after the National Villagisation programme, UPE 1977 (Universal Primary Education) was declared. In order to implement UPE, resolutions called for mass mobilisation and self help, use of local resources for teaching and building.

## SECTION II - POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM OF UJAMAA

The political organisation to move Tanzania towards socialism was the DEMOCRACY IN ONE PARTY STATE. In elaborating his ideological commitment to African socialism and one party democracy, Nyerere had ruled out the two party or the mutli party system on grounds that :

a) A new state requires the combined efforts of all in building a unified nation and in maximising economic social development.

b) Traditional African cultural attitudes and communal practices favour decision by consensus(29)

c) Multi party systems themselves are either artificial luxuries which tend to make government into a game, or they are perversions of true democracy in that they represent and solidify class divisions and inequalities rather than eliminating them.

Indeed Nyerere(30) argued that a one party state could be even more democratic than one, with two or more parties "Where there is one party and that party is identified with the nation as a whole the foundation of democracy are firmer than they can even be where you have two or more parties, each representing only a section of the community".

The ideal of African socialism is communal and egalitarianial and its theoretical political corollary is Government by populist participation. Nyerere feels that within the party there would be disagreement on "how to do things which we agree should be done"(32). Given the freedom of expression within the party (TANU) which provided thus a two way process of communication between the Government and the

people, the essence of democracy should be preserved, for basically democracy is Government by discussion(33).

TANU (or CCM) was to remain a mass party and any member could be nominated to stand for election to parliament if he or she could obtain the support of 25 electors. The Party's Annual District Conference would interview all prospective candidates and rank their preference. The TANU National Executive Committee (NEC) would then decide on 2 candidates for each constituency. No candidate was permitted to spend personal funds to advance his or her candidacy. All campaign events were to be organised by the District TANU Committee and were required to include both candidates on each constituency. No candidate was allowed to campaign nationally to use only a locally spoken language in public statements and debates, or to make any appeal based on racial, ethnic, or religious considerations.

One of Africa's most powerful and comprehensively organised political parties, TANU has party structures patterned at all levels. Ten house cells are designated for the rural areas and 50 member cells for places of work, each with an elected leader. Branch organisations include monthly general meetings, representative annual conferences and executive committees led by elected chairman and appointed secretaries. District and regional units consist of conferences (held at 30 month intervals), executive and working committees and chairman and secretaries. At the central level, a national conference serves as the Party's highest decision making authority and in an election year nominates a candidate for the Presidency of Tanzania. Policies are suggested to the Conference by National Executive Committee and smaller central committees which also oversee policy implementation. CCM is headed by a Chairman and Vice Chairman elected by the National Conference. Routine party administration is supervised by a chief executive secretary, assisted by two deputies. The Party includes an



elders section and 5 "mass organisations" representing youth, women, parents, national trade union and cooperative movement.

TANU had a dual role as a partner in government and a channel of citizen participation. Frances Hill is critical in that these two roles need not necessarily be compatible.(34)

Presidential circular No.1(35)1969 envisioned three phases in the implementation strategy. It would start with the education and training of TANU and government leaders "in ideology, purpose and methods of establishing villages." Phase II would constitute taking the ideas to people, to educate and help them see the relevance of this policy to their own desires and their own needs. Finally phase III would be the stage when Regional and Area Commissioners in conjunction with other relevant departments of the government should give practical assistance in the successful operation of the villages. Other services mentioned in the circular were Planning, Research and Training Units.

#### THE UJAMAA VILLAGE

For an individual, life in an Ujamaa village means working for the collective farm as well as for himself. The following description of life in an Ujamaa village is fairly representative. An individual member of the village is entitled to one acre of land, free. On it he can build his house for himself or his family; he can grow any type of crop he wishes or keep the kind of animals he likes. In the course of one week he is expected to work five days for the Ujamaa village and the remaining two days on the development of his one acre plot. Whatever he grows or keeps on this plot is his and he is entitled to dispose of it in whatever manner he wishes. He can for instance sell his surplus produce if he so wishes. One thing he is not allowed to do is to employ people to work on his plot for him. This would be exploitation. The only other people allowed to work on the plot are members of his family. His remuneration is based on the number of days

worked, with each unit of labour day having the same monetary value irrespective of the type of work done e.g. there is no difference in monetary value between the clerk and the carpenter and the manual labourer. All get the same value for their unit of one labour day. Any person who is prepared to accept the Ujamaa village constitution can join the village of his choice.

Ujamaa villages are the third phase of Tanzanian efforts to increase rural production. The first phase focussed on "progressive farmers" organised into marketing cooperatives. The second phase emphasised resettlement schemes with capital intensive techniques and then deemed essential to large scale agricultural production.

In keeping with the philosophy of revolution against exploitation, oppression or humiliation, a policy of self reliance is sought. In this the Arusha Declaration states 4 essential ingredients of development i.e. a) people b) land c) good policies and d) good leadership.

In translating ideology into policy, economic realities like agriculture as the mainstay of Tanzanian economy providing a livelihood to 96% of the economically active population should be perceived. Agriculture required people and land which Tanzania is abundantly endowed with. "Tanzanians can live well without depending on help from outside if they use their land properly"(36). The Arusha Declaration states that land is the basis of human existence, land is the most valuable asset for future development and as such must be regarded as national property. Consequently it should be the responsibility of the government to see that it is used for the benefit of the whole nation and not the benefit of one individual.

By emphasising on self reliance as the major strategy in building socialism, Arusha introduces two significant shifts: in the first phase there is a shift of emphasis from industrialisation as the major strategy by which socialism can be built and the second major shift a

corollary to the first one, is towards agriculture and in particular the development of peasantry. SELF RELIANCE is not merely a development strategy, it is also a way of life. It is essential for the return to African heritage that forms the basis for socialist transformation.

In this neither the rejection of foreign aid, money, investment and industrialisation is basis for socialist development, nor indeed the emphasis on self reliance and agriculture should be constituted to mean that Tanzania would not accept gifts, aid, loan as investment from outside. All these would be needed, perhaps in ever increasing scales in the future - their role would be to augment rather than to determine the direction and style of development in Tanzania. As Nyerere said "we shall not depend upon overseas trade to the extent of bending our political and economic or social policies in the hope of getting it. But we shall try to get it in order to hasten our economic progress, and that it may act as a catalyst to our effort(37).

Nyerere feels that besides reliance on money, Tanzanians are weak and unable to keep themselves because of the effect of colonialism.

At Independence Tanzania's regions showed a differential pattern of economic stratification which was patterned on the sole criteria of providing colonial power what is needed. Certain areas during the colonial era became increasingly underdeveloped. Regional imbalance thereby proved to be a serious political problem for national government. The other area of stratification pattern is urban-rural imbalance which Nyerere has warned against:

"If we are not careful we might get to the position where the real exploitation in Tanzania is that of the town dwellers exploiting the peasants"(38).

Frances Hill perceives another economic reality in the fact of CLASS. This when recognised by Nyerere has been discussed primarily in RACIAL terms. This is not a total misconception as the colonial legacy

meant that race and class coincided. Colonial stratification among individuals was based on the same factors as stratification among areas. Colonial perception was based not on individual ability but primarily on ingrained prejudices about appropriate positions for individuals of white, brown or black races. Such prejudices meant that whites were not allowed to hold positions below a certain level and blacks were not allowed to rise above a certain level. The space in between became reserved for browns who became traders and middle level clerks. Colonialism seemed to have created a class system co-related with race and based on cash earnings. In short it created a SALARIAT. Colonialism created a class system appropriate to an administrative state : a class system based not on direct control on the means of production but on control of means of management.

In its approach to development, Arusha rejects the indispensability of money as the fundamental basis of development. Tanzania is involved in a war against poverty and oppression and the ultimate objective of this struggle is amelioration of the living conditions of all the people of Tanzania. Being a poor country, Tanzania could not successfully conduct her battle against oppression and development by relying on money.

It is due to the general poverty of the country that the government cannot extract more taxation from the people: and yet because they are poor the people demand more money from government for development and other projects. The key factor is of course money and the circle is a vicious one.

With this ambiguous criteria for development the Declaration criticises the obsession with money, both on theoretical economic grounds that money is not the sole basis of development, and on practical grounds that the country does not have the requisite amount of money anyway.

Economic Nationalism was a logical follow up of and natural sequel

to the "political nationalism" that led to independence. The Arusha Declaration in the subsequent Policy statement(39) provided the foundation for the indegenisation process of Tanzanian economy. Here in the economy was sought to be localised, with the abolishing of capitalism and all forms of exploitation whether by foreign investors or by Africans themselves.

Tanzania as a poor ex colonial country had three other basic resources besides mobilising political resource for the fulfillment of its economic nationalism. a) material resources both financial and natural b) human resources for the full participation of the production effort and c) technical resources in the form of technical, scientific knowledge and skills in a variety of fields - economic, administrative and managerial - as well as institutionalised technical capability in research centres and training institutions.

Basic mechanisms which Tanzania devised for controlling its economy since 1967 are manifest as :

- a) Control through Nationalisation
- b) Control through Central Bank
- c) Control through Parastatal System
- d) Control through Cooperative movement/Villigization programme.

Under conditons of pervasive poverty, ignorance and disease SELF RELIANCE means the maximum possible mobilization of existing resources, the minimization of waste in their extraction and allocation and the activation of most of the country's potential wealth. This was made difficult by the nature of the society inherited from colonial times. The extreme dependence of national activities on external centres frustrates any attempt to transform the pattern of life in a way consonant with full and effective mobilisation of internal resources.

Tanzania has opted for a policy of Nationalization of the most significant foreign enterprises. The policy was to place the major

means of production and distribution under the control and ownership of people of Tanzania through the state machinery. In terms of declaration, the major means of production and distribution are the following: land, forests, mineral resources, water, oil and electricity; communications, transport, banks, insurance, import and export trade, whole sale business, steel and machine tools, arms, motor car, cement and fertilizer factories; textile industry and any other big industry on which a large section of the population depend for their living, or which supplies essential components for other industries; and large plantations, especially those that produce essential raw materials(40).

Despite these sweeping nationalization measures, the economy would remain "mixed" and the four industrial sectors (2nd Five Year Plan, launched in July 1969) were specified as follows:

1) WHOLLY GOVERNMENT OWNED INDUSTRIES - These include a limited number of strategic industries in which the government or parastatal organisation will own 100% of the equity. The main ones are banking, insurance, petroleum exploitation and armaments.

2) GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED INDUSTRIES : These include basic industries in which the government (or its appointed agent) usually acquires more than 50% of the voting and participating shares of sufficient concerns to account for the major shares of that industrial branch in order to exercise effective Policy control.

3) PARTNERSHIP JOINT VENTURES : includes industries upon which a large section of the population depend for their living, or which provides essential components for other industries. In these industries, the government and its appointed agents (including cooperatives, workers organizations and local government bodies) would play an active role, although not necessarily holding the controlling interest.

4) OPEN INDUSTRIES : These include all other industries not falling under Sectors 1-3 above. They are open to all sectors including government, local and foreign private investors etc. Within this group, there are a number of industries that involve small and medium scale operations, most of which can be handled by cooperatives and village collectives(41).

Yet nationalization must not be equated with socialism although it is a necessary aspect of it in a country where the economy is externally controlled. As Peter Meyns summed up the case:

"State ownership of the means of production is not in itself a guarantee that planning will be directed towards construction of socialism. In fact we know for instance that in industrialised capitalist countries, an increasingly important sector of the economy is under state control. However planning in those countries functions exclusively because and to the extent that it maintains and consolidates the principles of capitalism"(42).

Secondly, nationalization in itself is not a sufficient guarantee for a self reliant development. Tanzania's experience has show that, at low resource level, the goal of self reliance development requires a more radical restructuring of the economic structure than the simple act of nationalisation.

Third, nationalisation per se does not necessarily lead to an "indigenized" economy. The indigenization of the economy requires among other things a complete reorganisation of the country's financial infrastructure so as to prevent the surplus from flowing out of the country, and an investment policy that is deliberately geared to the removal of the historically transmitted roots of underdevelopment. Nationalization seeks to create a situation in which the benefits of the horizontal and vertical integration of the activities by the headquarters of multinationals can be transferred back to Tanzania and the adverse effects of the peripheral location of the country within the system served by the multilateral corporations can be eliminated.

## CONTROL THROUGH THE CENTRAL BANK

Until 1966 East African Currency Board (EACB) played the role of a central bank for the three African countries (Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania). Its functions however were geared to benefit Britain for it was designed in such a way that surplus funds were kept in British banks and invested in lucrative ventures outside East Africa. Efforts to establish an East African Central Bank between 1963 - 1965 were frustrated by the failure to create an East African Federation. Thus each East African state went ahead to establish its own central bank. By June 1966, the Bank of Tanzania started functioning. This proved to be an important financial infrastructure, when 8 months later the Arusha Declaration led to the nationalisation of foreign banks and industries; for one of the central banks functions was to regulate and oversee the entire banking and credit policy in the country.

Functions of the BANK OF TANZANIA include the following: to issue currency, to manage the country's gold and foreign exchange reserve, and to advise the government on economic and related fiscal matters. By controlling foreign exchange and regulating credit, the bank would strive to foster monetary stability which had depended on the stability of the sterling in the past. Thus the act stipulated: "within the context of the economic policy of the government, the activities of the bank shall be directed to the promotion of credit and exchange conditions conducive to the rapid growth of the national economy of Tanzania, due regard being given to the desirability of fostering monetary stability(43).

Relative to free enterprise economic arrangements, the restrictions of the Central Bank may appear unduly restrictive or even "inward looking." Adedeji(44) points out that in practice, there are built in mechanisms which ensure flexibility and efficiency without sacrificing the primary function of financial control.



- a) First, there is the mechanism of delegation.
- b) Second, the Bank's exchange control and imports departments are assisted by an independent company, namely the General Superintendence Company Limited (established in 1972), in ensuring the goods authorised for importation actually come into the country and that the price, quality and quantity are acceptable.
- c) Third, non luxury personal remittances such as payment in respect of business travel, education, health, immigration and even pilgrimage for religions are usually permitted by the bank.
- d) Finally, the Bank of Tanzania keeps the other financial institutions and all importers and exporters, as well as general public well informed about new regulations by means of regular circulars and bulletins. Thus strictly speaking Adedeji feels the control function of the Central Bank had not led to "over insulation" of the economy, as it may appear on the surface.

With the conspicuous contradiction between ideology of socialism and self reliance and the continued importation of luxury goods (like glamorous personal cars) from abroad by the urban, political, commercial and bureaucratic elites is sought to be curbed with the government ban. The import licensing department of Bank of Tanzania was established in 1971 to control imports and an export department was created in 1975 providing focal point from which the country's export drive was to be coordinated. Alongside there is sustained political campaign to educate the leaders as well as the 'led on' the importance of conserving the nation's foreign reserves and attacking all forms of economic sabotage - like accelerating the localising manpower employed in these institutions.

#### CONTROL THROUGH PARASTATAL SYSTEM

The Arusha Declaration started a new era of corporations, companies, boards and authorities. These constituted the Parastatal

system. By mid 1976, virtually all important economic activities of the nation - mining, industry, commerce, construction, agriculture - were (controlled or regulated) either by parastatal bodies or cooperative societies. There is a special Standing Committee for Parastatal Organisations (SCOPO) which is responsible for defining and enforcing the terms of service in the parastatal organisation.

In Tanzania, parastatals have a long history. The German East African Company, which administered the Colony between 1885-1891 could be described as a parastatal, set up by the German government to avoid the necessity of direct government involvement in administration. Under British rule railways and harbours posts and telecommunications and East African Airways were run by corporations on an East African basis.

The idea of holding company to manage government share holdings was suggested for African countries generally by Lord Hailey in 1952, and for Tanganyika specifically in a report of 1960 World Bank Mission. But it was in 1962 that Tanganyika Development Corporation was created, with an initial capital of 500,000 Pounds Sterling. By 1965 National Development Council (NDC) took over the TDCs assets besides Agricultural Corporation and other government shareholdings.

After Arusha Declaration, three significant functions of parastatals were manifest as :

- a) to limit the transfer of profits out of the country
- b) to invest in productive sectors especially manufacturing, agriculture, tourism etc.
- c) to strengthen the productive infrastructure, especially transport, construction and power generation.

Each of these shall be considered in turn:

In order to limit transfer of profits out of the country it was essential to control a wide range of financial institutions, as well as

import and export trade. As far as control through the monetary system is concerned we have already seen the way the banking system was reorganised after the Arusha Declaration. However since financial control would not be complete unless foreign trade was also controlled, in 1967 eight of the largest foreign import-export houses were nationalised and merged with a cooperative trading company (INTRATA) to form the State Trading Corporation (STC). By February 1970 President Nyerere announced that all importing, wholesaling and exporting would be socialised by the end of the year. STC was not expected to do this entirely alone, since NDC subsidiaries another parastatals would import their own input requirements as well as finished products in the product areas in which they were involved (e.g. Tanzania Fertilizer Company, an NDC subsidiary was to become responsible for all imports of fertiliser into the country, including types of fertiliser which it did not produce itself).

The second broad role of the newly created public institutions was to channel investments into productive activities. To achieve this three types of institutions were created: investment banks, parastatals which were holding companies for productive enterprise and parastatals directly involved in production. There were 3 investment banks : a) Tanzania Rural Development Bank - especially for small scale rural production b) the Tanzanian investment bank for larger investments in any sector, but particularly in manufacturing c) Tanganyika Development Finance company - an investment bank lending in the main to medium scale industrial ventures in the private sector. All three proved suitable vehicles for the receipt and channeling of foreign funds into Tanzania. The rural development bank inherited a close relationship with the World Bank manifest in the fact that it was used in the 1970s to allocate and monitor the credit components of a series of World Bank projects intended to stimulate agriculture. The Tanzania Investment

Bank negotiated lines of credit with Canadian, Swedish and other governments and with the World Bank. The Tanganyika Development Finance Corporation was in itself a joint venture between NDC and government investment agencies from 3 European countries - Britain, France and Germany(45).

The second type of parastatal involved in productive investment was the HOLDING COMPANY. The model for these was NDC, created at the beginning of 1965. NDC has been the centre-piece of industrialisation process. Most of the companies nationalised at the initial stage, in the wake of Arusha Declaration (with the exception of finance trading and sisal concerns) were placed under the management of NDC acting as a holding company. At the peak of its activities it controlled 40 subsidiaries and 25 associate companies. These include National Agriculture and Food Corporation (NAFCO), The Tanzania Tourist Corporation (TTC) and the Tanzania Wood Industries Corporation (TWICO).

NDC's contribution to Tanzania's development shows an impressive rate of growth (in pure economic terms) between 1966 and 1972 (table II.1 and II.2).

The third and last role of parastatals was that of traditionally associating with government corporations, provisions of infrastructure and other services. Railways, harbours, ports, telecommunications and East African Airways continued as parastatals under the East African Community until its breakup in 1977 when control passed to the three National governments.

By 1976 the cooperative unions were replaced by crop authorities - parastatals which combined the functions of marketing boards with involvement in extension, crop processing and transport. The new authorities took over the cotton ginneries, processing factories and transport operations of the cooperative unions. Hotels, farms, petrol stations and other small investments were handed over to the District Development Corporation, set up in most of the 60 or so districts, 1971

onwards, and expected to make money in small scale production or trade. The parastatal form seemed so convenient to administrators frustrated by government regulations ( e.g. about salaries and accounting procedures) that even educational establishments such as University of Dar-es-Salaam, some foreign aided integrated projects (for instance the KIBANA Educational Centre and the Lushoto Integrated Development Project) and Muhimbili Hospital in Dar-es-Salaam were allowed to become parastatals.

The tables II.3 and II.4 shows the rapid increase in the value of parastatal assets (between 1964-71) and their distribution.

Inspite of all this the Tanzanian economy is not a fully planned one, it is still a market economy to a very large extent - for three main reasons : a) Although private sector has shrunk it still accounts for about a third of total investment b) The government has to bargain with its foreign (private or public) partners in the case of joint industries c) Even in the case of wholly state owned industries the government cannot have a completely free hand, depending as it does on foreign expertise, consultancy, capital and technology. These factors make it difficult to have a comprehensively planned economy even after nationalising the major means of production and distribution. Consequently not all the avenues of foreign exploitation have been blocked - atleast not in the initial period.

Unlike other revolutionary regimes, Tanzania paid full (or fair) compensation for the nationalised industries. This fact restored the confidence of foreign investors, manifest in their readiness immediately to undertake joint ventures with the government. Foreign companies have cooperated with parastatals in two ways, viz in undertaking management contracts and in providing consultancy service. Therefore apart from capital investment in joint ventures, consultancy and technology transfer have become new and very lucrative forms of

private foreign investment in Tanzania's parastatals.

Parastatals have been criticised on various grounds (the criticism seems to have been directed specially to the NDC) for following capitalist investment criteria. This part is dealt with in detail in the next chapter.

#### INDIGENIZATION BY COOPERATIVIZATION/AND VILLAGIZATION

"For the foreseeable future the vast majority of our people will continue to spend their lives in the rural areas and continue to work on the land. The land is the only basis for Tanzania's development; we have no others. Therefore if our rural life is not based on the principle of socialism our country will not be socialist regardless of our commercial and political arrangements. This meant that we have to build up the countryside in such a way that our people have a better standard of living; while living together in terms of equality and fraternity. It also meant that in the course of time, the advantages of town life in the way of services and personal pleasures and opportunities must become available to those who work in the rural sectors/areas" (46).

Herein the importance attached to the rural peasantry in the task of socialist transformation becomes evident in the President's Policy Document titled "Socialism and Rural Development" of September 1967 which followed, the publication of Arusha Declaration earlier that year - in short the battle for socialism in Tanzania would be lost or won in the countryside.

Thus Tanzania's post Arusha Rural Development Strategy of COOPERATIVE FARMING has evolved from two earlier approaches or phases : the "IMPROVEMENT Approach" of colonial days and the "transformation Approach" initiated by the government in the early post independence period all in an attempt to increase rural agricultural production and consequently to increase foreign exchange earnings.

The WORLD BANK too identified these two approaches to Agricultural development : the 'improvement' approach and the 'transformation' approach. In the Period between gaining independence in 1961 and the beginning of the Ujamaa Village Programme in 1967, the government of Tanzania adopted a two pronged strategy to agricultural development in

Tanzania's "First Five Year Plan (1964-69) involving the use of both "improvement" and "transformation" approaches.

The objective of this approach, as the term itself denotes, is to achieve a "progressive improvement" in present methods of crop and animal husbandry by working on the peasant farmer on both psychological and technical plans to induce an increase in productivity without any radical change in socio-traditional and legal systems.

The Approach focussed on "progressive farmers". The main weight of government effort to generate rural development under the improvement approach was directed at encouraging the responses of individual producers by a variety of incentives in order to achieve overall targets in the development of various cash crops on an extensive scale. It thus sought to exercise control in a very indirect manner - statutory measures, marketing arrangements, training and demonstration centres, the use of extension and community development personnel etc. In general the results of this approach in Tanzania for the early post Independence Period were dismal failures as testified to by various area studies. In assessing the effect of improvement approach on Sukumaland, Hulls concluded ".....the failure to communicate modern agricultural technology to the vast majority of farmers of Sukumaland appears to have been almost total"(47).

Mushi points out the same conclusion regarding the Nyaza Cooperative Union(48).

TRANSFORMATION APPROACH : Having recognised the fact that an agricultural system premised on small scale individual peasant holding could not provide the necessary conditions for the long term economic and social development of the country in general, and the countryside in particular, the government then decided to broaden its developmental strategy to include the alternative Approach recommended by World Bank Report of 1960 - the Transformation Approach. It emphasised resettlement schemes with the capital intensive techniques then deemed

essential to large scale agricultural production. It aimed at concentrating resources in a few select areas (which happened to be the more fertile of the country) where conditions would be created for the peasants to produce certain crops intensively. Its basic rationale was that it is difficult for peasants just emerging from colonialism to adopt modern techniques of agriculture since they are limited, on one hand by the lack of technology and on the other hand by the traditional socio economic environment. There was the added benefit of enjoying social services such as schools, dispensaries and water supplies made possible by a government now in a better position to provide these amenities to farmers not in scattered homesteads but living in gathered villages. It is true writes Rene Dumont "the scattered population characteristic of Tanzanian countryside is an obstacle to the spread of technical progress, to the commercialization of crop production and to easy access to schools, dispensaries, mosques and churches. The creation of villages throughout Tanzania would also bring down the cost of community services....."(49).

But barely 2 years after the start of the programme it had to be abandoned and those schemes already launched were showing anything but success. Few of the farmers genuinely identified themselves with the schemes, considering themselves rather as temporary and unpaid employees on government estates whose aim was to do the least possible work and to exploit the settlement agency for what they could get out of it(50).

In his diagnosis of the failure of the settlement schemes the second Vice-president Mr. Kawawa said "in the first place they have been heavily over capitalised and need to repay this great debt will be a lifetime burden on the settler farmers...and will swallow up his crop proceeds..."(51).

Despite the participative role in the indigenisation process, the cooperative movement had a number of weaknesses like a) most of the cooperatives formed after independence became ineffective largely



because they had been imposed from above. Some bureaucrats have termed them as "political cooperatives" organised from the top without genuine local demand or even understanding(52), b) local politicians used the cooperative movement as a means of transferring scarce resources from the central government to their constituencies irrespective of whether or not these cooperatives had viable development plans, c) training of personnel did not keep pace with the rate of growth of the cooperative movement, and thus many cooperative societies went bankrupt or failed to pay their debts. Moreover the absence of proper accounting procedures led to corruption and a misuse of funds. A Presidential Committee summed up the weaknesses of the cooperative movement as follows: the proliferation of societies and marketing boards was a new form of "middleman": progressive farmers were benefitting at the expense of smaller farmers; the movement was becoming undemocratic and the peasants were losing faith in their leader (53).

With the Arusha Declaration the role of cooperatives and marketing boards was rethought. They were now considered a transitional phenomenon which would be supplanted by Ujamaa Villages programme. The ultimate aim was that Ujamaa Villages would become multi-purpose cooperatives, making the existing societies and unions redundant.

The Ujamaa Village Policy was initiated partly as a response to Kulak or progressive farmers whose wealth was growing significantly through the use of hired labour on privately farmed plots. The greater wealth meant inequality and the higher labour meant at least the beginning of exploitation. Indeed the significance of the emergent large scale Kulak farmer as potential obstacle to the realisation of government policy of rural socialist transformation finds its clearest expression in the following statement by President Nyerere:

"The present trend is away from extended family production and social unit towards the development of class system in rural areas. It is this kind of development which would be inconsistent with the growth of a socialist Tanzania in which all citizens would be assessed by

human dignity and equality and in which all were able to have a decent and constantly improving life for themselves and their children"(54).

Therefore it is ultimately necessary to create institutions at the local level. It called upon the peasants to organise themselves into viable socio-economic political communities - the Ujamaa Villages intended to transform production that is private and scattered into communal and planned production.

Within the context of rural Tanzania the second Five Year Plan 1969-74 envisaged that groups of families would farm their land collectively deciding upon the distribution of proceeds with the following objectives in mind :

a) The creation of self reliant and self determining communities following tenets of Arusha Declaration.

b) Avoidance of exploitation and excessive differentiation in wealth, income and power.

c) Raising the status of agriculture and reducing the gulf between urban and rural life.

d) Economies of scale in purchasing, marketing, provision of services (schools, hospitals etc.) and some field operations required mechanisation (including intermediate forms of technology)

e) Facilitating national planning both as to formulation of overall goals and decentralised implementation.

f) Better utilisation of rural labour to raise productivity potentially obtainable through groups of peasants working together compared to equal number of individuals working in isolation.

g) Openness to technical innovations, through increase in scale, readier access to farmer education and removal of conservative influence of traditional environment.

And in a move to further concretize the interpretation of the Ujamaa agricultural programme, the President explained that:

"This means that most of our farming will be done by groups of people who live and work as a community. They would live together in a

village; they would farm together, market together and undertake the provision of local services and small local requirements as a community. Their community would be traditional family group of people living according to Ujamaa principles, large enough to take account of modern methods and 20th century needs of man. The land this community farmed would be called 'our land' by all the members; the crops they would produce on that land would be 'our crops', it would be 'our shop' which provided individual members with day to day necessities from outside; 'our workshop' which would make the bricks from which houses and other buildings were constructed and so on"(55).

Having outlined the broad objectives of Ujamaa strategy, the means by which these objectives are to be achieved as set out in policy document, involves 3 steps/stages.

The first stage is a formative one when villages have not yet attained social and economic viability. The main requirements at this stage are infrastructural for which funds are usually provided, e.g. through the Rural Development Fund (table II.5).

The second stage in development of a Ujamaa village is reached when the community has gained sufficient experience of living and working as a unit, has a workable constitution, and has become economically viable. It is then registered as an agricultural association and is then entitled to credit from the Tanzania Rural Development Bank as well as other infrastructural investments.

And thirdly, the villages become a fully fledged multi purpose cooperative society and has adequate security to attract commercial credit from any source including the National Bank of Commerce, Marketing Boards etc(56).

It is significant that the emphasis in the implementation of Ujamaa Policy was in principle at least on the voluntary establishment of cooperative Ujamaa activities among peasants rather than of forced massive resettlement of the rural populations.

Thus <sup>on</sup> Ujamaa Vijijini, President warns:

"It is essential to realise that within the unity of Tanzania, there is also diversity, that it would be foolish for someone in Dar-es-Salaam to try to draw up a blueprint for the crop production and social organisation which has to be applied to every corner of our large country. Principles of action can be set out but the application of these principles must take into account the different geographical

and geological conditions in different areas, and also the local variations in the basically similar traditional structures. Local initiatives and self reliance are essential(57)."

Moreover, there is the President's basic belief in the superiority of PERSUASION as a method of influencing behaviour. Once the people realised their potential creativity, energy will be channeled into development, it was hoped that leaving the initiative to manage change in the hands of the rural population would force them to rely more on themselves and their hard work instead of relying on government.

There was no doubt about the key role party and government officials were supposed to play as the primary initiators of the implementation of the Policy.

However, while emphasising that the Party and government agencies must give their strongest support and encouragement to the formation and development of Ujamaa villages, the President still maintained that the decision to start Ujamaa village must come from the farmers themselves and the establishment of the village must be through the efforts of the farmer. The plan, for instance, stressed the importance to balance the need for vigorous leadership and official encouragement, against the need to avoid the dangers of bureaucratic control, Coercion, overcapitalisation could negate the very principles of self help and cooperation which the villages are intended to embody(58).

Therefore the socialism in Tanzania was sought to be linked with self reliance. As President Nyerere has put it "the truth is that it is not possible to accept socialism without self reliance or vice versa"(59). This position is in line with his argument that under existing conditions peripheral capitalism cannot result in an indigenised, self reliant economy.

Secondly, in both theory and practice, self reliance is a recognition that 'the development of a country is brought about by people, not by money', and that 'money and the wealth it represents is the result and not the basis of development'(60). In keeping with this mobilisation of internal resources which has taken four main forms a) direct, indirect taxation b) creation of saving and financial

institutions c) governmental roles and parastatals refinancing and d)  
village based self help activities.

64 .... continued on page 68 ...

## OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS : SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REALITIES

## I. UJAMAA VIJIJINI

The Ujamaa Policies were so far-reaching and complex that when it came to putting Nyerere's ideals into operation there inevitably arose conflicts between different Policy goals that could not be reconciled at the stage of implementation.

Ujamaa Villages are the third phase of Tanzanian efforts to increase rural production. The first phase focussed on "progressive farmers" organised into marketing cooperatives; as manifest in the development plan for Tanganyika 1961-64. The main proponent of this approach outside of government is Rene Dumont, who urged this approach in his report prepared for Tanzanian government under the title *Tanzanian Agriculture after the Arusha Declaration*(1).

The second phase emphasised resettlement schemes with capital intensive techniques then deemed essential to large scale agricultural production as manifest in Tanganyika Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development 1964-1969. Each approach in turn was declared a failure shortly after it had been launched.

Hyden<sup>(2)</sup> points out atleast two main sources of inspiration of Ujamaa as it applies to rural development : one was the domestic ~~by~~ the other foreign - the achievements of Mao's China.

A study by Jannik Bosen, Birgit Storgard, Madsen and Tony Moody(3) states that in its conception, the "Ujamaa ideology is clearly revolutionary". How valid is this assertion ?

The first two years after Arusha Declaration saw a limited development of Ujamaa Villages and communal production by people, who for a variety of reasons, responded favourably to the new policies. There were TANU Youth Groups who initiated Ujamaa Villages or responded

by transforming their existing settlement into communal villages. Hyden(4) points out that in some cases genuine transformation towards more socialist relations of production took place as in case of KABUKU. He says that there was also a reasonable amount of communal production started by existing villages to complement the production on their private plots. Regional party and government administration made systematic efforts to promote Ujamaa villages in some areas. In parts bordering Mozambique, people were grouped together in villages for national defence purposes. These villages were created and armed so as to prevent Portuguese infiltration into Tanzania in search of guerilla fighters. Therefore modest communal productions did emerge in the process. The plan to create makazi mapya (new settlement) did not follow the principle enunciated by Nyerere: voluntary participation. Instead it was characterised by bureaucratic highhandedness. With the exception of 400 villages set up in Lindi and Mtwara regions to strengthen the defence of the southern border, there were only another 400 villages registered as Ujamaa Villages in 1969; inspite of explicit rural orientation in its welfare policies by initiating an ambitious rural water supply programme, expanding primary school education and health facilities etc.

Von Freyhold described what she called a bargaining proces between villages and government. She points out that in 1970 the resulting contract was even written down in the Five Year Plan that was prepared for most registered villages by teams of civil servants, which specified on the one hand what government and credit agencies would provide and on the other what the villages would grow(5). The production targets were usually unrealistic, As Freyhold points out "no village ever tried to meet the unrealistic labour targets,"(6) since the incentive for communal work ended altogether when they realised that once a plan for a water supply, school or dispensary had been

approved by the relevant government department, the project was not cancelled even if communal work declined or ceased.

Francis Hill(7) suggests that Ujamaa Villages are a feature of the economically marginal regions eg. Dadoma, where the central Party state can experiment with socialism, without disrupting the production of import crops or the production of the local urban food supply as the table of Spearman correlation coefficients suggests (table III.1)

To the TANU leadership, the growth of the Ujamaa villages appeared so slow that its promise to transform the rural areas was in danger of losing its credibility. It was in the light of this experience that in 1970-71, TANU began to take a more active role in the creation of Ujamaa villages.

The President took a personal lead by initiating 'OPERATION DADOMA' a government planned programme to move all people in that region into villages with the hope of developing these into communal places of life and work. As is evident from the table III.2 between 1970 and 1971, the number of Ujamaa Villages in Dadoma region rose rapidly from 75 to 246. Operation Dadoma signalled the start of similar operations and campaigns elsewhere in the country to spread the Policy of Ujamaa.

The number of villages arose by and by and the table III.2 shows that by 1973 over 2 million Tanzanians were reported to live in such villages. The quantitative implications of the operations and campaigns to start Ujamaa Villages were quite impressive. But it is ~~important~~ to recognise that these figures conceal significant variations. Hyden(8) points out that :

a) Ujamaa Villages were registered even if their communal efforts were not successful; in some cases even villages without any communal cultivation were registered as Ujamaa Villages.

b) Not all villages were new creations. People were simply told to move to the nearest existing villages, or trading centre and



political efforts were made to create an Ujamaa Village out of that enlarged unit.

c) The first ~~two~~ years of Ujamaa campaign did not lead to more than an 'partial villagisation'. Although no precise figures exist, approximately only half of Tanzania's rural population in 1972 lived in villages, i.e. places of residence with some concentration of people. The majority of these people lived in such villages even before the Ujamaa campaigns and were not asked to move. Those who actually moved their residences during the Ujamaa Campaign were a minority (except in Dodoma)

d) The figures in the table III.2 do not reveal the fact that within each village, some people depended much more on communal production than others. Communal production was introduced as a complement to individual production. Petty capitalist farmers' participation and dependence on communal production was smaller than that of other villages. <sup>Poorer farmers stayed out of the communal village</sup> production or made a contribution only when forced to do so.

The Policy of village settlements or concentrations was by no means new as launched by Arusha Declaration. Such a Policy had been followed by colonial regimes and was an integral part of TANU Policy in the first independence years. Yet the Ujamaa approach was unique in that, it was conceived as a part of a radical political transformation. It was meant to neutralise the powers of the petty capitalist farmers, and strangle the hold that they and other bourgeois elements had on the ECONOMY OF AFFECTION(10).

As pointed out earlier, there are discrepancies in the figures about the number of Ujamaa Villages. These figures cover a broad range of extremely different situations not only in terms of distribution between regions (as manifest in the tables III.3 and III.4) but also with regard to the socio-economic and social organisation of the

village and with regard to the manner by which they were initiated, reflecting flexibility in the programme. Equally significant is the fact that initially the majority of the Ujamaa villages were established in areas where there was no shortage of land developed. This was generally in the economically less developed parts of the country where there are few permanent crops and relatively less social and economic differentiation to act as a barrier to cooperative organisation. Boesen opines that "there were completely collectivised new settlements, where the people had (been ?) moved together to become more accessible to government help and services but with hardly any communal production activities; old traditional villages where some inhabitants cultivate a communal field by retaining their private farms as their occupation and many other types of Ujamaa Villages.(11)

Ellman(12) suggests that the criteria on which progress towards socialism must be judged are: "the proportion of land or other assets which are commonly owned and used, the level of cooperation practised between farmers on individual holdings, the amount of hired labour which is used and how it is rewarded, the way in which the proceeds are distributed...the amount of popular participation in the government of the village communities."

Based on available data many of the Ujamaa Villages made very little progress towards socialism(13). This is not to deny the fact that there are very notable exceptions, especially in Tanga and Ruvuma regions though there were no more than twenty to thirty of them across the country. In these cases the land was owned and farmed by the village as a whole, with the exception of small privately owned homestead plots near each family's house. These, Ellman(14) points out are characterised by "high level of ideological commitment, strong internal leadership and closely defined norms and sanctions for maintaining unity. They have a high degree of popular participation in village government with village assembly of all members as the final

authority, and subsidiary committees...." In all these exceptional cases Ellman points out that the establishment of Ujamaa Village was voluntary and spontaneous.

With regard to the level of productivity in the agricultural sectors (since agriculture dominates the Tanzanian economy, contributing 40% of GDP, 80% of exports i.e. in terms of both processed and unprocessed agricultural products and 90% of the employed labour force) the performance was rather sluggish despite the importance attached to the country's development strategy since 1967. Agricultural output increased by only 2.7% between 1967 and 1975, as manifest in the table III.5. This was barely enough to keep up with the population growth.

Similarly, as per the World Bank's report on Tanzania, April 1977 (15), the growth in the six principal unprocessed agricultural exports (i.e. coffee, cotton, sisal, cashewnuts, tea, tobacco) which together accounted for 50-60% of total commodity exports between 1967-1972, was even slower, barely 2% a year.

Okoko(16) gives several reasons to explain the weak performance of the agricultural sector. These include among others the meagre allocations of capital received by this sector as shown in the table III.6; lack of leadership and skill; inadequate extension services; defects in supply and marketing systems, insufficient research on appropriate technical packages especially for food crops, weak infrastructural base; price fluctuations of commodity prices in the international capitalist market, natural disasters (drought of 1972 etc) - but the most significant is that the agricultural sector, more than any other sector, bore the brunt of the major institutional changes which characterised Tanzanian development till mid 1970s.

As the World Bank report says "while in many respects these changes especially the 1971 decentralisation of government, increased the potential for broad based rural development, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that during the period of

transition the upheavals and uncertainties in framework, organisation of management of the supporting services for agriculture and rural development took their toll in terms of foregone potential output"(17).

Assessing the agricultural sector ten years after the Arusha Declaration, President Nyerere observed :

"Since the Arusha Declaration was passed, we have talked a great deal about rural development and expansion of agriculture as the basis of Tanzanian future... and we have spent large sums of money on rural development ... the truth is that the rural agriculture sector results have been very disappointing. There are many contributing factors to this lack of sufficient agricultural growth... But the real failure seems to have been a lack of political leadership and technical understanding at the village and district level. Despite the call 'politics is agriculture' for all political leaders to learn the basis of good husbandry in their areas and join with the peasants in production, we have continued to shout at the peasants, exhort them to produce more...without doing much to help them or work with them in a relationship of mutual respect(18)".

As far back as 1970 the government had identified "the chief bottleneck to the development of Ujamaa "(19) in the rural sector as the shortage of leadership and skill. The solution was seen in terms of increased education, particularly adult education, including a large element of political education relevant to Ujamaa living. Besides problems of leadership various researchers like Freyhold, Velzer, Mbiliniyi, Senders, Hyden, Mapulo etc. have all reported the diabolical role played by the kulaks including resistance to the establishment of the Ujamaa Villages in various parts of the country, especially in the relatively more prosperous agricultural regions of the country (viz Kilimanjaro, Mwanza, Morogozo, Ismani)(20). The regional distribution of Ujamaa Villages in table III.3 demonstrates this point. For instance Mushi(21) found that in Morogozo district 'the majority of the people lived in mountains and were relatively well to do farmers'. He claims that 'they have been little interested in or perhaps indifferent to Ujamaa'. Even more crucial is the fact that they have dominated leadership positions in village development committees (VDC), TANU, Ten house cells etc. given the dearth of leadership in rural Tanzania (table III.7). Clearly then on a local

level, the richest farmers seem to have political power. Okoko(22) points out that some of the kulaks happened to be bureaucrats from Dar-es-Salaam and other urban centres, that bureaucrats own shambas, houses etc. in the villages and around some urban centres inspite of the MWONGOZO (TANU) Party guidelines of 1971.

The DECENTRALISATION was sought by 1972 to break down the hierarchy of command, reduce social distance and introduce equality. With Village as the lowest participatory development forum, a more intensive Villagisation was launched.

Phillip Mawhood(23) points to a continuity in the structure of government and administration since colonial times inspite of a profound ideological change since. In the words of Mawhood,

"Julius Nyerere's sympathy with communal values of Village harmonised rather than contrasted with British administration's own preferences. Certainly there was a transformation at the time of national independence; in the arrival of socialist party to dominate the structure of government; but structures themselves were modified in an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary way, and important parts of them persisted."

At the time of national independence in 1961, the government inherited a dozen thriving Urban Councils together with the constitutional model for the District Councils which would be set up throughout the rural areas during the following six months. Before the 1960s, the District Councils withered and were abolished by 1972. The Urban Councils were also closed down at the end of 1973 but recreated after a span of about four years. For the entire period the basic law used was the Local Government Act (Cap 333) of 1953 or for the Municipalities and Dar-es-Salaam city, the Municipalities Act (Cap 105) of 1946. The 1982 laws Mawhood(24) points out, embody some new thinking about structures and functions but are still founded on the same principles as the earlier system.

The rural cooperatives were first favoured but the Ujamaa Villages were systematically regularised by law of 1975 which provided for a

Village Assembly and an elected Village Council of 25 members. Mawhood points out that the villages did not possess an administration powerful enough to control the major local services, or to take part in any serious central/local bargaining with the government.

Nelson Kasfir(25) points out that Africa's fundamental poverty had a variety of unfortunate consequences for decentralisation. Thereby, besides financial crisis Tanzanian councils reduced services below minimum levels and paid employees out of central government grants intended for specific projects. In spite of an elaborate discussion, in Operation Decentralisation in Tanzania fell far short of the goals though the opportunity to participate was provided by the new system and perhaps 40% of the development budget was disbursed directly to the regions and district participation declined and difficulties of coordination increased. Louis A. Picard(26) points out that the crucial decisions were actually made by planning committees, in which elected officials from the start were in the minority and which tended to rubber stamp the choices of administrators. New elections for representatives at district or regional level were not held. "Decentralisation" concludes Francis Hill(27) has been accompanied by the restriction of participation.

Besides poverty, quadrupling price of oil, drought (which reduced grain production by 30%) price increases of imported industrial goods, war in Uganda, floods (in 1977) and drought in 1980s could be explanations for the relative failure.

Kasfir(28) feels that decentralisation has actually served - providing positions for newly graduated university and secondary school students. With an increase in number of administrators, the public sector recurrent expenditure between 1970-76 on public administration, Malima(29) points out was more than five times that on agriculture and three times that on industry.

Although labelled 'DECENTRALISATION', Mawhood(30) feels that this

was ofcourse the well known formula of "DECONCENTRATION' plus advisory committees" - a management reform with little political content.

Andrew Coulson(31) asserts that the "decentralisation of July 1972 could equally well have been called a 'centralisation'; for it meant the end of local government which was replaced in each region and district by an arm of the central civil service under Nyerere's office. In the same line of thinking Coulson continues that the way in which villages were created hardly encouraged grass root participation, because there were such obvious shows of government force, and so little time for discussion and real planning. (32)

Commenting on the continued dominance of the bureaucrats, Goran Hyden(33) writes :

"A main reason why socialist results of Ujamaa programme have so far been meagre is that any revolutionary strategy is ultimately a class strategy that can be bolstered by, eg. bureaucratic control and technical assistance inputs. For many reasons, some clearly beyond the control of a poor country like Tanzania, its socialist rural development strategy has been on the latter terms."

And in a similar vein, Saul(34)writes :

"The Ujamaa strategy was changed to conform closely with the preconception and interests of bureaucratic bourgeoisie who controls implementation....just as they tend to distrust the intentions and capabilities of the peasants....so do they distrust the major political changes which would have to occur before and during a socialist transformation. This would go further to threaten their very reason for existence."

Okoko(35) feels therefore that the total impact of decentralisation proposal suggests that the balance between central government guidance and local popular participation is heavily loaded in favour of guidance.

#### PEASANTRY, BUREAUCRACY IN RELATION TO UJAMAA

TANU wanted to avoid overcapitalisation and premature mechanisation in the Ujamaa villages. Though existing technologies were to be used, 'economics of scale' it was felt, could be achieved through the organisation of a larger labour force - even one using the

simple techniques of hoe cultivation.

The people's response to Dodoma operations helped to demonstrate the peasant's feelings and understanding of Ujamaa. They went along with the government policy, so as not to be punished but their concern with production did not go beyond what they considered desirable and feasible within the context of their 'economy of affection'. Because Ujamaa was framed in revolutionary terms, inviting the state to play a major role in transforming the rural areas, it carried its own seeds of contradictions. It asked the peasant farmers to accept a social relation that they did not conceive as necessary for their own reproduction. Neither Party officials nor government servants were particularly welcome in the villages. Because of the government's earlier commitment to provide free services, the peasants did nothing except wait for their implementation. So the bureaucrats' hands were completely and effectively tied and it was difficult for him to enter into a 'contract' with the peasant leading to his increasing production.

Hyden(36) points out that it is not surprising that the bureaucrats turned to an authoritarian managerial approach. According to Issa G. Shivji(37), these policies forced upon the peasantry a growing bureaucratic bourgeoisie whose primary loyalty lay with the President and TANU. The bourgeoisie careerists as state managers either in political and administrative capacity, depended upon ability to implement Party Policies and in the years after Arusha Declaration particularly it depended upon their ability to start Ujamaa Villages. There was little room for spontaneous and voluntary initiative as manifest in the dissolution of the Ruvuma Development Association and its subordination to the local TANU leadership(38). Coulson, points out that "only a bureaucracy distanced from peasant life could have forced through measures as draconian as villagisation and with so little productive effect" (39). Many political leaders resented having



successful Ujamaa villages in their area of operation over which they had no control. Hyden(40) points out that as bureaucratic managers they wished to be associated with these villages in such a way that they could reap political benefits. Hyden points out that the successful villages not succumbing to bureaucratic leadership (like Matendo in Kigoma region, Mareu in Arusha region, Kabuku Ndani in Tanga region) were ostracised by the Party leadership.

Hidden in the frontal approaches of campaigns and operations, there lay a definite antagonism between the bureaucratic bourgeoisie on one hand and the petty capitalist farmers and other petty bourgeois elements on the other. Hyden claims that by nursing the economy of affection many of the latter had attained a certain measure of power of their own(41). The peasant mode did not call for state participation.

It was the rural development policies in Tanzania after the Arusha Declaration that gave the officials an opportunity to dispense a wide variety of goods and benefits to peasants appearing to support the party policies. Herein the bureaucratic bourgeoisie could compete more effectively with the local petty bourgeoisie who had previously monopolised patron - client relations in rural areas.

The gestures of patronage however bore little relation to village capacity. In modern economic terms, Hyden(42) feels that aid (to provide semblance of Ujamaa Policy success in villages) was wasteful and an instance of how economics is asked to feed politics in precapitalist societies.

It was a different set of priorities and limited capacity that helped to explain Ujamaa shortfalls in rural areas. With little capitalist orientation the peasants were unconcerned with the surplus as an end. With the introduction of communal farming side by side with their private household plots, managerial complications inevitably arose. Given the dependence of Tanzania's agriculture on rain, the

timing of all farming activities is vital. Everything has to be done within a span of few days. There is a limit to how much a peasant can also plant, and the insistence of communal farming heightened the problem. First priority here was given to private farms over which peasants had direct control.

McHendry(43) analyses that the poor members of Ujamaa Villages had little room to gamble with their food supply. Better off households who could spare labour were main contributors to communal farming. The low return from communal farming is the structural constraint of the peasant mode itself, though many variations are contained in the structures of the peasant mode of production.

Within the peasant mode, social inequalities have been accommodated without tension by following the principle of economy of affection. Ujamaa , Hyden(44) points out as a radical strategy of development at the national level could not be reconciled with its objective of promoting development from within the peasant mode. Because of this conflict - party and government officials were inclined to discard traditional peasant institutions in favour of the official stereotype of Ujamaa. This did not make the task of convincing peasants to adopt Ujamaa easier(45).

Lack of dynamics of the rural structure also complicates the attainment of Ujamaa objectives. In spite of expansion of social amenities like schools, dispensaries, water supply, rural living, after Arusha Declaration, there is very little evidence to show that younger generations were more inclined to stay in the villages.

#### EFFECTS OF UJAMAA VIJIJINI

By initially stressing the primacy of hoe cultivation in the villages , the authorities left the productive forces untouched with the exception of work organisation.

Hendry Mapulo and Gesal Phillipson(46) discussing studies of

Ujamaa production conclude that productivity in the communal land was considerably below that on the private farms. Shivji, Mapulo and Phillipson(47) and other political economy analysts of Tanzania feel that the relations of production were capitalist. Consequently it is logical to blame the bureaucratic bourgeoisie; portrayed as deliberately sabotaging these policies because they threatened its class position. Hyden(48) feels that the studies have overlooked that in Africa all regimes, irrespective of ideological orientation are placed in antagonistic relationship with the peasantry. The structural constraints of the peasant mode also operated, against a socialist transformation.

On the other hand, compulsory villagisation in Tanzania between 1973-76 (the largest resettlement effort in the history of Africa) involved coercion. This villagisation drive comprised two sets of policies a) removal of all middlemen complicating the interaction between government and peasants and b) the reorganisation of party and government structures to reach peasants more effectively. Hyden(49) emphasises that these policy measures have facilitated the articulation of class relations. Conflicts which were previously mitigated by the economy of affection are now displayed more openly.

Alongside the Tanzanian state has now reversed the direction of all its main policies of the 1970s District Councils and Cooperatives have been reestablished and "satellite hamlets" are allowed, thus enabling people to move out of nucleated villages. Deborah Bryceson(50) feels that Tanzania's immediate future depends not so much on whether the state or market takes the leading role but rather on whether the logic of the state and the market will prevail over the logic of peasant household and clientele networks. Here in international terms of trade will play a large part in determining the course that Tanzania follows.

## II. PRODUCTION AND PARASTATALS:

The conventional starting points to evaluate the performance of an economy are the growth of gross domestic products and the behaviour of the balance of payments. The first is a measure of how the economy is capable of producing for consumption for export, while the second begins with balance of trade (the value of exports, less the value of imports) ensures and shows how any deficit in that balance is financed.

There are however difficulties with measures such as these based on adding up money values of goods and services. - One difficulty is that an increase in the production of goods says nothing about the use of those goods - any increase may go to a small group of the rich, while the mass of people get worse off.(51). A second difficulty is that the GDP as conventionally measured, includes services as well as goods. Thus an increase in educational services, health provisions, or even public administration, is counted in the measure as a cost of the wages of salaries paid to worker in those services. The difficulty, Coulson(52) points out is that a better health service or a more efficient police force is 'indirectly production' in the sense, that it may enable others (workers, peasants or companies) to produce more.

It is for this reason that it is desirable to evaluate the performance of an economy not just on the basis of GDP but also to examine GROSS MATERIAL PRODUCT, a measure which includes productive sectors but excludes services. These are subsequently examined in the last part of this chapter.

Another difficulty with aggregate measure is that they are affected by price changes over time. If prices rise, the value of GDP will rise, even if physical quantities of goods produced stay the same.

The statistics provide evidence of a crisis, in production, especially when the 1970s are compared with the 1960s eg. the rate of inflation averaged only 2.1% per annum between 1961 and 1971, but 22.5% per annum between 1971 and 1977. The balance of trade shown in the

table III.8 also shows a sharp deterioration, which started before the oil price rise, and owed much to declining export tonnage and unprecedented imports of food than it did to increase imports of capital goods.

The trade deficits reduced the country's foreign reserves almost to zero, towards the end of 1975. As manifest in the table III.9, the economy was rescued by foreign exchange earned from services (mostly insurance and shipping, the former a consequence of 1967 nationalisations) but above all, by grants, loans and special facilities arranged with assistance of the IMF and the World Bank. Tanzania a country that was nationalising property and officially committed to socialism, became a large scale recipient of western 'aid', is considered in the next section of this chapter. (table III.9).

This crisis is also apparent though less obvious in figures for Gross Material Product (table III.10). To move from Gross Material Product to GDP, the services sector are added as manifest in table III.11. In the last half of 1960s, the fastest growing services were transport, construction, electricity and water supply, all growing at more than 10% per annum in real terms. In 1970s the fastest growing sector was Public Administration, including defence, public order, education, health growing at 11.2% per year.

The industrial production figures show the extent of the creation of new industries in the 1970s but also the limits of the rapid growth (table III.12) and also the absence of any reference to engineering machine production or motor vehicles.

The overall picture (table III.13) is one of government taking increasing control of the economy, ~~the rise of the state~~ putting great emphasis on provision of social services and on the increasing rate of investment through use of foreign capital transfer and high rates of domestic taxation by being frustrated by

failures in agricultural production and by low productivity in manufacturing. The growth potential(53) is restricted basically to the fields of agricultural diversification and tourism.

A proliferation of public institutions, parastatals or government corporations took place in the years after Arusha Declaration. They were set up in almost every sector : industry, agriculture, banking, finance, trade, transport and housing; there were even a few in education, health services and public administration. Yet as manifest in the above analysis, the performance of the parastatals gave cause for concern from 1967 onwards. They seemed to exercise little control over the resources available to them, or over their expatriate managements.

Edmund Clark in 1971 found that the parastatal firms in manufacturing were more capital intensive than private sector firms and yet each employee in a parastatal firm contributed less to the production than his opposite number in the private sector.

Mporogomyi(54) feels that a substantial inflow of foreign exchange is needed "for rehabilitating and revamping the productive sectors of the economy". The crisis by the shortage of foreign exchange is compounded by "the extremely weak capacity of the management system, both in parastatal and government ministries".

Considering the dominance of the National Development Corporation in Tanzanian 'industrialisation' efforts and the fact that the attempt to industrialise will determine in part, the success of the country's overall development strategy - thereby the performance of NDC becomes critical. NDC's strategy of industrialisation will thus be analysed to evaluate its role in building a socialist and self reliant economy. These will include (a) objectives and goals of the enterprises under the management of NDC (b) issues related to NDC Investment Policy - is it contributing to a balanced integrated national economy capable of attaining increased productivity and higher levels of living throughout the country? (c) its management and decentralisation problems.

OBJECTIVES AND GOALS are usually viewed from the rather narrow perspective of profitability and almost always contrasted with the social objectives of socialism for which it is "often assumed to be inconsistent". But as Nyerere(55) pointed out, Profit is necessary whether an enterprise is privately or publicly owned. Public ownership affects what happens to the profits, not the necessity for them.

Okoko(56) points out the absence of any clear cut National Industrial Development Strategy what comes closest to objectives are put in the forms of tasks for the NDC - organise production of high quality goods at reasonable prices and to save imports, or to earn foreign exchange by exports, along with the task of increasing wage employment and diversifying economic activity in the rural area."

A consequence of government's failure to formulate broad national objectives for the NDC and parastatals is that the NDC and its organisations virtually had a monopoly of decision making process. Edmund Clark(57) noted in his study that too often parastatals adopted a very narrow definition of socialism and often acted as if socialism only meant government control. Shivji(58) of course argues that 'the absence of an industrial strategy in the wake of Arusha Declaration was due to the inevitable capitulation of the bureaucratic bourgeois to their international cohorts.

#### INVESTMENT POLICIES

NDC's eight criteria for project selection :

- |           |                             |
|-----------|-----------------------------|
| Primary   | a) Profitability            |
|           | b) National cost/ Benefit   |
|           | c) Foreign exchange effects |
| Secondary | d) Employment               |
|           | e) Location                 |
|           | f) Industrial linkages      |
|           | g) Budgetary impact         |
|           | h) Investable surplus       |

Mramba and Mwansasu's(59) analysis are revealing for their appalling lack of criteria relating to the broad socialist objectives of post Arusha Tanzania.

Loxley(60), Saul(61), Seidman(62) and others note that the area of investment chosen was in response to foreign initiatives, rather than the result of NDC's desire to operate a certain sector, or in accordance with its investment criteria. This is also manifest in the fact that NDC and other parastatals are characteristically capital intensive, import intensive and have tended to be oriented towards import substitution.

According to Clark's findings(63) parastatals consistently pay higher wages which reflects both the policy of government and the more capital intensive nature of the parastatal sectors. (Refer to table III.14.) A classic instance of role played by foreign partners in the choice of projects which are capital intensive is illustrated by NDC's decision to build the friendship Textile Mill and the Mwanza Textile Mills.

Clark(64) estimates that the labour/capital ratio of import firms is more than three times that of local material based firms. Closely related to this fact, the IMPORT-INTENSIVE firms tend to be more capital intensive; have greater capital/value added ratio and tend to be larger. Moreover because they rely on imported raw materials, such industries must be located on the coast or in towns with relatively adequate transport system. The result is that these industries tend to be located in the towns and regions which are already more developed adding again to the URBAN-RURAL DICHOTOMY. (See table III.15.)

Therefore the high external orientation of much of the NDC and other parastatal investment indicates that they have failed to be, or even seem to be self reliant and are developing the economy in a way which makes it quite externally oriented. Its investment pattern has



led to a situation where often industries are developed by foreign firms, drawing heavily upon foreign personnel and dependent upon foreign technology.

MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS : is intrinsically linked with the investment decisions ie. the policies of NDC and parastatals in general. Herein also the unhealthy pattern of linkages is manifest between the public corporations and foreign private firms through partnership agreements and management contracts. The surplus drain to the metropolitan countries is usually procured through mechanisms as; share acquisition, exorbitant salaries and management fees for expatriate staff, royalties, patent rights, annual dividends and over invoicing of capital funds imported by management.

It was perhaps in recognition of the subservient role played by the indigenous managers of public corporations and inherent threat to the continued progress towards socialism posed by the dominant role of management agents (foreign consultants) that really prompted the Presidential directives in Circular 1 of 1970 and the publication of Mwongozo Party guidelines in 1971. Yet as Mapolu(65) asserts that 'despite the directives and formation of workers councils in industrial enterprises, not much progress has been made in developing socialist management technique that are consistent with industrial discipline'. The post Arusha phase is characterised by industrial investments which are efficient vehicles only for transferring surplus outside the national economy.

Hence until that basic problem is resolved, the relationship of the duo may continue to grow in strength with all its attendant implications inspite of the rather severe but welcome circumscription of the avenues for personal aggrandisement imposed on the bureaucratic bourgeoisie by the leadership code.

### III.      **SOCIALISM AND SELF RELIANCE** (The International Dimension)

Socialism and Self reliance was the slogan of the Arusha Declaration. Socialism meant national control of the economy, democracy and absence of classes. For Rweyemamu(66), self reliance is a policy of internally based growth, or a minimisation of trade; it could also mean self reliance in manpower or a refusal to employ foreigners, or a self reliance at decentralised levels, with each parastatal or village making do with local techniques and materials and minimising dependence on central government, and extension of this interpreted self reliance as rural development on the grounds that it was only in the rural areas that the majority of population could be self reliant; finally it could mean non alignment - no reliance on anyone great power and the refusal to accept that the national boundaries lay within any nation's sphere of influence.

Biersteker Thomas J.(67) discusses national self reliance as involving a partial disengagement of a country from the existing pattern of dominant economic and political relationships prevailing in the international system. The disengagement process is an integral part of the strategy of self reliance and is intentionally partial and selective. Disengagement is a call for a partial reduction in the magnitude of international economic transactions with industrial countries and for the attainment of self sufficiency only in particular sectors or activities. Self sufficiency in fulfilling the basic needs of the population (such as food, energy or national defence) is ordinarily given priority in the selective disengagement process. Agricultural self sufficiency is the basic need closest to being fulfilled in most countries pursuing a strategy of national self reliance. Johan Galtung(68) stresses that self reliance is a dynamic movement from the periphery, at all levels, which cannot be lead from above. Therefore both disengagement and restructuring are necessary

components of a strategy of national self reliance. Disengagement without a deliberate restructuring cannot be described as self reliance.

Accordingly, President Nyerere(69) claimed that :

"we are trying gradually to transform our economy so that it is no longer export dominated but is directed to the creation and service of a rising local market".

These interpretations were used at various times, but none was pursued consistently. Tanzania became a major recipient of foreign aid and continued to export the traditional agricultural products and to use expatriate man power. It did not direct all its investments to rural areas, or follow an internally oriented development strategy, and by mid 1970s western (especially U.S.) influence was considerable. There were obvious paradoxes.

Though recognising that "neo colonialism is a very real and very severe limitaton on national sovereignty..... matters of vital interest to our development are determined externally, without any consideration being given to our interests"(70) Nyerere warned "loans and grants will endanger our independence" : however he did not clarify that overseas finance would be refused and the policy was clarified to mean that Tanzania would not "bend its political, economic or social policies in the hope of getting overseas aid as a result." It was in this context that Niblock(71) in his study of aid and foreign policy in Tanzania 1961-68 concluded that Tanzania's eventual aid pattern was determined by Tanzania's Foreign Policy rather than the foreign policy determined by the aid pattern.

When Tanzania nationalised its largest export import firms in 1967, it created the STC (State Trading Corporation) to handle most of the country's foreign trade as well as the bulk of its internal wholesale trade. The STC and more recently the Bank of Tanzania have employed import licensing powers to ban the importation of television sets altogether. Tanzania has demonstrated its ability as

Biersteker(72) points out to reduce the importance of some luxury items (automobiles and electronic goods). Yet whether it is due to its inability or an unwillingness to enforce restrictive tariffs and import confinements, other luxury consumer items like textiles continue to be imported at previous levels.

In the 1980s, despite setbacks in its Ujamaa and Villagization Programme, Tanzania remained strongly committed to the attainment of agricultural self sufficiency. Yet here again, the gap between the policy objectives and policy realities is apparent as displayed in the table III.16.

The data in table III.17 suggests that Tanzania has had some success in restructuring its import priorities. Imports of consumer goods have declined, and the importation of intermediate and capital goods has increased in both absolute and relative terms since 1967.

Inspite of the desired intentions to reduce the amount of foreign aid (table III.18) Tanzania's foreign aid in the post Arusha period actually increased, as manifest in the foreign aid debt as of March 15 , 1974 to be repaid by 2023 (table III.19).

Very little recognition is usually given to the dependency problems posed by heavy reliance on foreign aid for development , especially if it involves aid from a donor country whose ideological and economic orientation is at variance with that of the recipient country (Tanzania). The development effort in Tanzania seems to have become intimately tied up with the diplomatic effort to mobilise capital abroad. (table III.20). But the cases of Tanzanian aid terms have in many an instance been relatively favourable to Tanzania. For instance, most donor countries extend low interest rates to Tanzania with generally long repayment periods. Interest rates range from 0-6%. (table III.21)

Yet instances of the outcomes of the Policy measures designed to

translate self reliance into practice in its foreign trade sector seem to have more often than not fallen short of expectations (table III.22)

The fact remains that the bulk of foreign aid for Tanzania still came from capitalist sources though Okoko argues that since there is now no overwhelmingly dependency on any one country for aid, this may in large part be a reflection of the non aligned foreign policy stance of the government, especially when it is realised that the important sources now included the "middle power" countries like Sweden and Canada.

Yet in the late 1980s within Tanzania it has been evident for the last several years that the political leadership has been desirous of coming to terms with the World Bank - given the gradual cooling of relations with the Scandinavian countries. The World Bank lending programme is manifest for instance in table III.23.

In the beginning of 1985, sweeping policy reforms took place with major cuts in the government spending (including food subsidies and social programmes), the abolition of crop marketing authorities and the reintroduction of cooperatives, substantial cuts in public sector employment levels (the number mentioned is 20,000 jobs) and increased attention to promote exports (including higher producer prices for peasants and better terms for private capital(73)).

Yet despite these unmistakable indications that Tanzania was, if not eager, then certainly willing to talk about her development priorities, the World Bank/IMF and the major western aid donors have continued to hold out against negotiations in the evident desire to secure the maximum possible concessions. That the intention is to discredit Tanzania's social-"ist" programmes is indicated by the paltry amounts of aid that is on offer (a total possible package of \$ 800 million versus Tanzania's own minimum estimate of \$1.2 billion for the first year alone) the price of such aid would in effect be the loss of control over financial planning (particularly aid administration) and

the determination of development objectives.

Therefore in essence Aid Pattern of Tanzania has tended to reinforce the dependency features of the Tanzanian economy compromising on its proclaimed ideals.

#### IV. SOCIAL SERVICES AND SOCIAL CLASS (EDUCATION AND POLITICAL PROCESS)

Tanzania is often singled out among many developing countries as a country having a well formulated education policy, a declared commitment to it, and well designed implementation machinery. "As has often been stated, a great asset for the educational planner in Tanzania is its well defined and consistent taxonomy of goals and objectives."(74). It is significant that in Tanzania, the educational role goes beyond just mere formal education. It includes educational efforts designed to mobilise not only students and workers but also peasants into socialist, self reliant, democratic economic units. 85% literacy rate, the highest in black Africa, is no mean achievement.

But the significance and determinancy of education reforms has to be viewed in accordance with the conditions of existence of the Tanzanian SOCIAL FORMATION. Social Formation is defined as the concrete articulation of a dominant mode of production with elements from other modes of production, operating at several levels (economic, political and ideological) where under specific conditions any one level may be predominant at a given moment. It is important to conceive these levels not as self contained structures but rather as inter-related aspects of the social formation. This will become clear in the analysis of formal education, which conceivably represents all three levels at once.

In Tanzania, an attempt has been made to reorient education as an apparatus for sustaining and expediting overall development for increasing political, social awareness, and for providing a cadre of

highly trained indigenous manpower to implement, manage and administer ambitious and sometimes grandiose national development strategies. Hence education in Tanzania is a central force in NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT.

The Arusha Declaration was followed by the pamphlet, 'Education for Self Reliance' (ESR) in March 1967, which continues to be the blueprint for educational policy in Tanzania. ESR operationalized the intentions of the Arusha Declaration and serves as the cornerstone for educational development by altering the philosophical and structural nature of Tanzania's educational system. ESR sought to eradicate the vestiges of colonisation by changing an elitist educational system through curriculum reform, enhancing social equity among regions, urban and rural areas, and increasing access to all Tanzanians. Nyerere's speech "Education for liberation" in 1974, (75) noted that attitudinal change is not enough for liberation of masses; knowledge and skills are also necessary to take control of society." The purpose of education is not to turn out technicians who can be used as instruments in the expansion of the economy. It is to turn out men (and women) who have the technical knowledge and ability to expand the economy for the benefit of man in society". However these efforts to reorient education towards more agricultural and practical training have proven to be difficult in the face of strong pressures from parents, teachers and students for more paper qualifications and the view that education was the way from manual to white collar job.

Ndonde(76) <sup>and Mvji(77)</sup> in this context, argues that the Tanzanian educational scene "despite all organisational changes and reorientation of curriculum in the wake of "Education for Self Reliance", in practice, education in Tanzania is still elitist and bourgeois in its philosophy".

In an opinion survey on the attitude of pupils, teachers, parents, politicians and educational administrators about 'ESR' in 1971, Lema

concluded :

"still<sup>in</sup> the minds of most teachers, pupils and parents, education is interpreted simply as an academic book learning....Success in academic education has been accepted and is projected as the highest goal a young person should strive for"(78)

As long as these kind of attitudes persist in the community at large, it will be difficult to interpret the value of education in a different perspective as called for in ESR. Indeed the influx of children to towns from rural areas in search of the better paying white collar jobs, for instance bear testimony to this prevailing conceptualisation of education (table III.24 and III.25).

The task of transformation and socialisation is not an easy one since there is the cardinal need to make the new socialist values, attitudes and norms not only comprehensible and acceptable but internalised as well (and no substantial political, cultural or ideological transformation of the children is feasible through the system so long as the adults themselves remain unsocialised and untransformed).

There is a considerable body of empirical evidence revealed by Lema(79), Mbilinyi(80) that the school teachers themselves still hold attitudes of worshipping education as a symbol of wealth and status. Teachers in a number of schools in Tanzania are highly esteemed, well remunerated and quite non socialist in orientation. Self reliance projects are held in contempt by staff and consequently by the students. If the cornerstone for implementation of Ujamaa are teachers (as rightly emphasised by the leadership), then these shortcomings will seriously undermine the successful implementation of education for self reliance.

A significant role is also played by the expatriate staff who originate from the capitalist world in the educational system at the secondary and university level. "The vast majority consider themselves either 'apolitical' or are explicitly consciously hostile to



socialist ideas...most of the teaching and reference material, especially that used in social sciences, originates from UK and the USA and therefore soaking with official and widely shared anti-socialist and anti-communist orthodoxy"(81).

Crisis in education was manifest in an instance when in October 1966 in the New University of Dar-es-Salaam, 400 students marched to the State House in their academic gowns with an ultimatum. The immediate cause was the introduction of a new scheme of "NATIONAL SERVICE" (under which those who left secondary schools and universities would undergo five months of military training followed by 18 months in which they would work at their jobs but receive only 40% of their salaries, tax free)(82).

An assessment of ESR was made at the Party's National Executive Committee meeting in Musoma in 1974. Appalled by the anti-egalitarian and anti-socialist attitudes persisting among graduates at the secondary and university levels who were continuing to develop into a new social and political elite and to eradicate the elitist tendencies and buttress the ESR policy the Party issued the Musoma Directive which accentuated the need to bridge the gap between practical knowledge and theory and by ensuring that work was an integral part of education. The Directive opposed aristocratic propensities by imposing three distinct strategies; universalisation of primary education, a new education scheme for the University of Dar-es-Salaam which further ensured that the university access and career pattern of students would be determined at the political level as dictated by economic needs, and combining academic training to include preparing graduates for employment at the end of the secondary education as well as preparing some for advanced education.

The greatest educational achievement was raising the number trained. Crash programmes for the training of teachers by correspondence and in colleges and the use of unemployed school leavers

as volunteer teachers was made. By 1977 80% of the children of school age were in school(83), a remarkable achievement that could not have been possible without the Villagisation. But the expansion was not without difficulties like shortage of material and books.

Progress was made in adult literacy: in 5 years over 5 million people registered in literacy classes, 3.8 million of whom preserved for long enough to sit a national test. Much of the material with which they learned to read was designed to acquaint them with useful information on agriculture or health.

Primary education was to be an end in itself, terminal, and not means to higher education and employment. The emphasis was on relevant rural oriented curriculum (poultry and fishery, handicrafts, tailoring, brick-making).

But as pointed out earlier, to change this expectation of masses requires more than changes of school curriculum. Besides the teachers themselves are alienated from the curricula, they don't join students in productive or manual labour.

Access to primary and post primary schools is uneven. Mbilinyi(84) points out that "less than half the children in our public secondary schools are children of peasants, despite the fact that 90% of the population are peasants. A disproportionate number of children are children of bureaucrats and experts. Besides this public secondary schools have not been expanding but private secondary schools have at a very fast rate (14% increase of private school enrolment in 1974, compared to 3% in public schools). Mbilinyi(85) points out that using private schools to get children into public schools is not surprising - though it is contradictory to socialist policies.

A major lacunae is that the basic education reforms have relied in part if not in entirety on foreign sources of finance situated in advance capitalist countries. Donors or investors (World Bank)

influence the design, implementation and evaluation of basic education reform policies.

Therefore even though the Party has been able to increase accessibility to education, in quantitative terms, the education system is an elitist one. With the success of Party's universal primary education effort and the low absorptive capacity and high degree of selectivity at the secondary and university levels, Tanzania's educational system will continue to contribute to STRATIFICATION and perpetuation of an educated elite class. Samoff(86) states that "in Tanzania" differential access to education has facilitated the perception of a particular pattern of social stratification which in turn has fostered class differentiation."

Economic reality has forced trade offs between the Party's pursuit of self sufficiency in high level indigenous manpower and equality of opportunity.

The legal and political efforts, resiliency and the commitment of Tanzanians, the government and the Party must be commended for their quest to achieve a democratic socialist egalitarian society.

It remains to be seen if Tanzania continues to develop along democratic socialist lines in the wake of:

a) Disequilibrium between supply and demand of secondary graduates if not resolved could lead to a cadre of recalcitrant, educated but un/under-employed and threaten the socio-economic and political stability of Tanzania.

b) An evergrowing entrenched dysfunctional educated elite that scoffs at the rural life and seeks an urban wage employment thus becoming increasingly separated from the masses, and generating resentment, factionalism and dissension.

c) Discontented masses caused by continued economic hardships, shortage of essential goods and food staples, deteriorating trade, widespread poverty stagnation in agricultural production, official

corruption and profiteering.

d) The growth of Zanzibar nationalists and secessionists driven by economic hardships.

#### URBANISATION

The rate of urbanisation in Tanzania is extremely high, even by African standards. During the 1970s the urban population was expanding at 10% per year and it seemed safe to assume that rapid urban population growth has persisted in the 1980s.

In the urbanisation context therefore the question arises as to whether the implementation of Ujamaa and associated policies has actually increased urban growth rates above those <sup>which</sup> might have occurred if another (laissez faire, capitalist oriented) development path had been followed. Anthony O'Connor's (87) analysis on the rate of Tanzania's urbanisation reflects this interpretation when he highlights factors which could be associated with heightening the propensity of rural people to migrate to urban areas.

An alternative analysis (88) of Tanzanian development policies since 1967 being unable to or were not truly designed to alter the structural conditions contributing to Tanzanian underdevelopment and the associated rural-urban inequalities which generate high migration rates to urban areas. Campbell (89) suggests that Tanzania's willingness to collaborate with the World Bank (and vice versa) is indicative of ~~the~~ the government's real lack of commitment to socialism, the lessening of dependence and the transformation of power relationships between the poor, the petty bourgeoisie and the ruling political class. This analysis when applied to the rapid rate of urbanisation, it is not surprising that rural/urban migration has occurred on such a scale, since the structural factors which underlie this movement have not been altered.

The causes of Tanzania's especially rapid urbanisation are

probably to be found mainly in the countryside rather than in the city. O'Connor(90) cites a range of factors including general dissatisfaction with being moved or with increased control over individual's decision making , improved transport and information diffusion and dramatic improvements in access to education for the increased magnitude of rural-urban migration.

Problem of rural development seems to be the crux of this trend of urbanisation. This could be related to : a) villagisation programme - 'Ujamaa Vijijini' facets. Ecological problems associated with increased densities and failure to deliver promised services and b) general collapse of the rural development programme which was externally caused by World Bank whose policies are characterised as disruptive and inappropriately oriented. Campbell's(91) conclusion about the future of Urban Housing Policies are depressing and Tanzania's acceptance of IMF restructuring is likely to hit the urban poor the hardest, and it appears that their immediate future is not a promising one.

#### UNEMPLOYMENT AND VAGARANCY

Tanzania, as a member of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) is required to maintain a Public Employment Unit in accordance with ILO Convention No.88 (ILO 1978):

"...Employment service as an integral part of the national programme for achievement and maintenance of full employment and the development use of productive resources"(92).

But Tanzania's Employment Service Unit lacked official authority. The rural-urban migration has led to serious unemployment in urban areas. The movement of rural people to urban areas has not been matched by a corresponding industrial growth that could absorb an expanding urban population.

But several steps have been taken to contain urban unemployment and reduce the bias towards <sup>urban areas</sup> in favour of rural agricultural areas.

This is extremely significant since 90% of Tanzania's population lives in rural areas. The party through a series of summary measures and policy interventions sought to minimise standard of living inequalities between rural and urban areas, inhibit income and consumption differentials and discourage rural to urban migrations. These interventions included : increasing the minimum wage, institution of a progressive tax system causing urban wage earners to experience a decline in after-tax income; increased prices and market oriented incentives to producers; the Economic Sabotage Act 1984 and the Human Resource Deployment Act 1983.

The HUMAN RESOURCE DEPLOYMENT ACT (HRD Act) specified that every able bodied Tanzanian must be gainfully employed as a paid employee licensed or approved self employment, or as a peasant farmer. This Act enabled the Party to relocate urban unemployed to home areas.

To assess the HRD Act in clear historical perspective, the roots of vagrancy in Tanzania must be traced. Leonard P. Shaidi(93) traces it to the transformation of the pre capitalist social formation into peripheral capitalism during the colonial period. During the early years of colonial rule there were severe problems of recruiting labour for settler plantations, <sup>and</sup> mining/processing industries. The colonial regime had to resort to forced labour in certain instances and to impose taxes to achieve commodity production. As capitalist relations of production developed the problem of vagrancy started affecting the local population, especially in Dar-es-Salaam. The immediate cause was the worldwide economic depression of early 1930s. Changes in the social formation had created a class of wage labourers whose survival depended on nothing else but their labour power. The post colonial Tanzanian state inherited the problem of vagrancy which was to grow in seriousness every succeeding year.

It is significant that President Nyerere likened loiterers to

economic saboteurs and racketeers 'whom the nation had declared war on'. Earlier on he had referred to unemployed in urban areas as "criminals and idle parasites"(94).

Since late 1960s the state has periodically resorted to repatriation of unemployed to rural areas. In most cases this was prompted by increases in the crime rate, especially robberies, burglaries, although the sisal and tea plantations with their perpetual labour shortage benefited from such operations.

The HRD Act could therefore be seen in the light of the diminishing food and cash crop production in the late 1970s and early 1980s in a country which is predominantly agricultural. Like all post colonial African states the under developed nature of the production force means that the state has to be directly and closely involved in the process of production. In Tanzania the promotion of economic development is accompanied by measures intended to mobilise more people in the production of primary commodities. All such measures even if entirely successful, merely entrenched the existing dependency relations without giving the peasants or the "not gainfully employed" any real improvement in their living standards. Shaidi(95) points out that "only an agrarian revolution accompanied by an internally integrated economy, less vulnerable to international capitalism, stands to offer a meaningful alternative to this problem."

HEALTH: In the area of endemic debilitating diseases, Tanzania has not been able to conquer malaria, bilharzia, tuberculosis, polio, measles, whooping cough, hook worm and other gastric infections including typhoid (recently) and cholera. All these are made much worse by malnutrition which, for instance, makes measles a killing disease among children - responsible for one third of all hospital deaths caused by disease in 1975.

Preventive measures were not ~~recognized~~ as cost effective till 1972, by when curative medicines (hospitals etc) consumed 87% of Ministry of

Health's recurrent expenditure. The policy shift from 1972 lead to an increase of the former. Coulson(96) points out that formidable vested interests operated against the change of policy - like doctors, drug salesmen, importers and behind them, multinationals. These are harsh realities which still need to be resolved.

HOUSING : was manifest as a sector in which government intervention was ineffective. Mascarenhas(97) stated "the picture one gets is that the people in the households are crowded and the quality of amenities available to them range from poor to appalling." In the rural areas villagisation destroyed most substantial permanent houses. The promised 'OPERATION NYUMBA' (houses) to change the situation is still very lukewarm.

In the area of TRANSPORT , the infrastructure in roads, railways, bridges, ferries seem to have improved, but there are still considerable problems over maintenance and operation. With rural urban migration, passage costs by road increased but comfort and reliability seems to be going downhill since 1970s.

The picture which emerges is one in which life was seldom easy, for rich or poor. There was inflation, financial insecurity, the risk of ill health etc. The government invested heavily in the social services especially health, education, water supply yet much needs to be done.

#### EQUALITY FOR WOMEN?

Historically women have been appendages of men and decisions on major family and tribal issues have been man's domain. The involvement in a market economy, which spread over time throughout the length and breadth of the continent altered the utilisation of the factors of production on the family holding , adding for the most part, burdens on to the women and increasing further the power of men within the family.



POWER RELATIONS changed not only within families: they changed between family and regions. Besides MBILIN YI(98) states the "double standard of men, who despite their own practice, do not want their wives to work because then they sleep with other men, they do not want their wives to use contraceptives because that would remove the wages of sin". Herein weight of moral pressure, often backed by law, is exerted on women in order to reverse or hinder possible changes in power and authority.

The 1967 Arusha Declaration elaborated the basic principals of Tanzanian socialism acknowledged this inequality between men and women, especially in the rural areas. ".....the truth is that in the villages the women work very hard. At times they work for 12 or 14 hours a day..."(99). Though continually stressing the virtues of traditional Ujamaa principles, Nyerere has also noticed their inadequacy. The first of which is the acceptance of inequality between men and women.

Both TANU (and now CCM) state constitutions guarantee women's rights, and in 1962, the Union of Women in Tanzania (Umoja wa wanawaka wa Tanzania; - WUT) was formed to foster women's participation in national development. This organisation trains women at regional training centres, and has conducted literacy classes in the rural areas, and undertaken income generating activities for women(100).

Tanzania influenced by the consistent support given by the President has a legal structure of equality. It does not discriminate against women in respect of employment and pay and promotion. Maura Rafferty(101) states that its record of women MPs is much better than U.K. and it also has an occasional high office filled by women.

The establishment of Ujamaa Villages held out special promise for rural women. The potential of the villages to help rural women has been only partially realised. Women can be registered as Ujamaa members in their own right, and they are guaranteed access to land ,

capital inputs and information. Provision of water at a central location is an instance of a Ujamaa service that frees women from an arduous household task but there are traditional prejudices against women. Rafferty points out the failure of the villagisation programme to deal with entrenched patriarchal relations and attitudes. She feels problems have to be rightly diagnosed to be solved. Manifest is the failure of development strategies to take account of the fact that :

"women in Tanzania are the main productive force in rural communities. Most of their daily activities are related to agricultural production and domestic household production. They have almost total responsibility for subsistence farming and play not an unimportant role in cash crop production. Women spend upto 6-8 hours a day planting, weeding, manuring and harvesting. During peak periods in the growing season, their hours in the fields may be even longer."

-But the day does not end there. Women also have the main responsibility for transportation of crops and the processing, storage, and preparation of food. They walk a long distance carrying the family's daily needs of firewood and water. They see to their children and the old. Literally, it is the women who ensure the survival of the rural household.(102)

Various initiatives chronicle womens contribution to economic production and reproduction, highlighting the nature of constraints under which women operate. Reduced access to land, great amounts of time spent in domestic activities. collecting water and firewood , food processing, transportation; limited access to credit; no mechanisation of women's farming and the lack of information and opportunities for further training.

Annual Conference of Adult Educationists at Morogozo in 1983 pointed out that :

"Agricultural extension programmes have traditionally concentrated on educating the male farmers in modern agricultural practices. The male farmers are supposed to transmit information to their wives. Emphasis in agricultural extension and research has always concentrated on cash crops which are primarily owned by men. Subsistence crops which are generally produced by women have been neglected in this

respect"(103). Barbara Rogers(104) outlines the ways in which international development agencies all across the board have failed to take account of women as agriculturalists in their investment policies and development strategies.

The changing economic and social conditions in Tanzania have force women to accept a growing share of cash responsibilities in their families. Statistics on wage employment support the argument that a growing number of women are being proletarianised, specially in agriculture where between 1976 and 1980, employment<sup>of males</sup> has dropped by 4,685 and women increased by 2615. Majority of the rural peasant producers are women - and they are not covered by occupational health and safety services(105). They are neglected by the state despite acknowledgement of their importance to economic development.

All this has been exacerbated by the migration pattern as a result of which womens responsibilities have been tripled. In some cases they are now the sole on the major providers of family's, material needs including children's school fees, due to the frequent reduction or disappearance of support from migrant husbands. This migration has at times led to under utilisation of land when women cannot afford the time or energy to devote to men's agricultural labour of clearing the bush and breaking the ground.

Female migration to urban areas has been motovated by a desire to join a migrant husband or a need to escape rural drudgery and undesirable marital situations. The female migrants and household heads are amongst the most economically depressed segments of the urban population. They predominate in low level industrial jobs , in the informal sector, in prostitution and other exploitative situations.

#### SOCIAL CLASS AND POLITICAL PARTY

In the generic sense the term "class" is synonomous with "category" - yet it is more closely associated with STRATIFICATION

denoting those individuals possessing within the framework of the same society or community relatively the same amount of power, income, wealth or prestige or some loosely formulated combination of these elements. Most strictly class has denoted those holding a common position along some continuum of the economy. This could be called a continuum of the wealth or income or occupation and in the strictest Marxist usage has denoted basic forms of relationships to the modes of material production i.e. those who control those instruments of material production and those who do not.

It is impossible to comprehend contemporary Africa without an acute awareness of the variety of analytically separable categories. The stratification within Africa for instance could be perceived in the reality of TRIBALISM (assumed to have a derogatory connotation and to imply an element of primitivism). But 'tribe' today only becomes a relevant differentiating category when there is a situation of competition. As Abdul Naseer once wrote that every individual is involved in several 'CIRCLES OF IDENTITY' - African, Arab, father, politician, socialist and so forth which are not all relevant to every situation(106). It is the specific characteristic of each individual situation that determines which 'circle of identity' predominates. Therefore most behaviour in tropical Africa, specifically Tanzania is not tribally determined at all.

The lack of a differentiated class structure in Tanganyika is traced by Nyerere to it becoming a de facto one party state before independence in 1961; and with legalisation following in 1965. In Tanzania the mandate for one party rule seemed to be clear whereby TANU won all the National Assembly seats except one in Tanganyika.

What Samoff(107) wrote of Tanzania suggests that the state may function to discourage a climate of 'group enterprise' vis-a-vis government:

"In Tanzania the Party frowns on the formation of interest groups

in general and economic interest groups in particular except for trade unions, cooperatives and social and charitable organisations it is assumed that the interests of any particular section of the population can be adequately represented by TANU and its auxiliaries, and that adherence to bureaucratic norms assures individuals fair and just treatment without the need for recourse to interest group protection. It is assumed that interest aggregation, articulation and communication - are performed by TANU and its auxiliaries and that interest groups, which could be used to form competing centres of power are both unnecessary and dangerous".

The integrative function of the Party is contradictory; thus in his TANU Yajenga Nchi (1968), Goran Hyden points to the success of TANU in institutionalising new cultural values in the rural communities of the mainland Tanzania, but in Beyond Ujamaa (1980), he finds that familial and other communal ties provide the basis for "organised activity" among Tanzanian peasants.

Regarding POLICY FUNCTIONS, Samoff(108) records the initiative taken by voluntary associations in Tanzania's Kilimanjaro region. Tordoff(109) points out the importance of informal mechanisms of decision making on issues like education, liquor licensing etc. which have a high degree of local salience, inspite of the introduction of Decentralisation measures in 1972.

The political communication is a corollary of political competition and TANU recognised from the outset the importance of keeping open a two way channel along which government policies could flow to the people and the people's wishes and reactions to those policies could reach the government. Potentially the communications remain an important Party function but Tanzaniangovernment relies on non TANU channels like the bureaucracy. TANU and administration were to carry out Ujamaa. Nyerere felt that there was no need to continue with the present artificial distinction between the Politician and Civil servant since the Ujamma Programme visualised a politico administrative system(110).

Nyerere has denied the existence of classes (incipient, transitory or concrete) in Tanzania. He denied the existence of class

in his pre Arusha formulation of socialism. The justification of this position does not lie in any rigorous theoretical analysis of the productive forces as they exist, but on the pristine characteristic feature of traditional African society, they themselves had thrown up. Yet in fairness to Nyerere it must be pointed out that contrary to early post independence phase Nyerere in the Arusha Declaration recognised the existence of social class in Tanzania. Tanzania, he writes is a "nation of peasants and workers but it is not yet a socialist society. It still contains elements of Feudalism and Capitalism - with their temptations these feudalistic and capitalistic features of our society could spread and entrench themselves".

Besides these Djilil(112) traces a 'new class.' Colonialism he says "created a class system appropriate to an administrative state, a class system based not on direct control of means of production but on control of means of management." In Tanzania the dispersed settlements which are the hallmark of African 'village' have been transformed into nucleated settlements where the increased range of services can be made more easily available. The consequences of these changes and the essential continuity of the family farm is to produce a very differentiated society, a veritable kaleidoscope of different occupations. Herein Djilil like new class can be perceived to which access originally quite open but which has begun now to consolidate itself, even to the extent of espousing private schooling for its children; or of the many faceted intermediate groups of clerks and local party officials whose comparative affluence and discretionary powers made them 'big men' in the vilages, or of the increasing number of small traders and store keepers, bar owners and transporters without whom the nexus between the primary-producing villages and outside world would be broken; or the variations within the peasantry itself, some of whom barely survive on their small holdings, whilst others actually

employ the less fortunate on their land or the men and women who seek money in inhospitable ~~ghettos~~ of the growing towns.

The industrialisation of the 1950s and 1960s produced for the first time a settled working class in Dar-es-Salaam. This was predominantly coastal, Swahili speaking and Muslim whereas the managerial cadres nicknamed NIZERS(113) or 'Africanizers' (those who Africanize jobs previously held by Europeans) were mainly from up country, spoke English as well as they spoke Swahili and were Christian.

The class analysis(114) portray political behaviour as a logical consequence of class formation and influence of the world capitalist system. This analysis proves that those in government positions siphon off surplus from the peasantry through the marketing of agricultural produce. Thus the class accounts of politics propose a national and international dimension, namely an alliance of a domestic ruling class with in some sense International Capitalism either defined as a class agency or in more structural terms. The long standing debate on Tanzania of Shivji and Saul who see Tanzania essentially as a class state usually an alliance with capitalist interests in developed countries persists. Others like Crawford see the state as more autonomous and the leadership more genuinely committed to socialism as an ideal.

Therefore one can recognise that the quintessence of the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie as managers of the state apparatus and economy lies in their functional specificity as well as their technical, managerial knowhow, it is the location of their base in the Civil Service which concretises their existence. Significant is the fact that most of the regional and district directors, including the managers and directors of numerous parastatals, have come through the ranks of civil service. It remains important to note that government of Tanzania has not instituted any radical structural change in the country's civil service. The basic features of the colonial civil

service remain intact inspite of its politicisation and decentralisation measures of 1972. Over and above the essential features of the civil service is the link between the bureaucratic bourgeois and international capitalism, accentuated and accelerated by the dominant economic role of the state apparatus.



## CHAPTER IV - CONCLUSION

### NATURE OF CONTEMPORARY STATE

#### COERCIVE STATE

Attempting to produce a cooperative self sufficient society based on the values of equality and popular participation, Nyerere stressed that changes are meaningless unless the people can be persuaded to adopt them voluntarily. Yet in 1973-76, massive force was used to move millions of people from their ancestral homesteads into villages. He had argued the need for cooperatives and yet in 1969, the most successful of Tanzania's Cooperative Village Association (Ruvuma Development Association)<sup>(1)</sup> was banned. This was banned by Nyerere exercising powers vested in him under the Societies Ordinance (ironically the Act that had been used by the British to proscribe TANU in the 1960s). Declaring RDA illegal, the order was enforced by "guntoting soldiers who appeared at the Society's office. The banning of the RDA signalled<sup>(2)</sup> major turns in the government policy: a) a turn towards centralising control over developmental activities under the Party and the State. This was the start of a trend later increasingly prominent. b) it signalled the beginning of a greater reliance on force, a reliance which later culminated into the "villagization" Programme.

By 1973 it was clear that attempts to transform the rural areas by persuasion would take a very long time. Therefore Nyerere in 1973 openly abandoned the reliance on Persuasion for rural transformation, announcing to the TANU conference that it was time to force people to move to save them from a continuing "life of death". "Operations" involving lorry loads of people being dumped into new sites on which minimal preparation had

while the number of people actually abused may have been small, their misfortune had a powerful demonstration effect(3).

Despite the short run problems, Villagization seems generally to have been accepted by rural dwellers. Certainly the increase in votes against Nyerere from 3% in 1970 to 6.7% in 1975, though most marked in regions where villagization had been carried out heavy handedly was not of such magnitude as to suggest seething discontent.

Mbilinyi(4) states that a high degree of COERCION is found within the so called ideological apparatuses of schooling e.g. the caning of students as the prominent mode of control, fining or imprisonment of parents for not enrolling in the UPE Programme or for withdrawing them from school later; the emphasis on student 'discipline' and punishment of student resistance to the hierarchal authoritarian structure of the school by expulsion from National School System.

The Coercive aspect is manifest in the state acting against the workers organisation, restricting or imprisoning their leaders (1962 and 1964), limiting their freedom to negotiate better conditions for their members and nominating Union leaders (1967) and dismissing a large proportion of elected workers leaders (1973 and 1974). Yet it is significant that between 1969 and 1973 and to some extent subsequently, attempts were made to involve workers in industrial decision making, but the documents of the period manifest that it was an attempt on the government's part, to limit some of the freedom enjoyed by the managers and owners and most parastatal managements interpreted it as a change to improve industrial relations by co-opting workers. But as soon as workers showed that they wished to go beyond consultation and 'participation', in the direction of control of enterprises; the state intervened against them and in support of owners and management; as implicit in the MOUNT CARMEL CASE. Because of these measures, Coulson(5) states that the state was not controlled by the workers and peasants.

Two fundamental dilemmas lie at the root of this struggle. Nyerere's personal dilemma shared by other leaders committed to peaceful transformation, is that of persuading a vision of the new world that is best for them; yet since this vision involved uprooting existing values and structures most people will not accept it until they are convinced that it will work. Thus the leader is faced with a choice of forcing a transformation of structure and leaving the populace hostile, or of waiting indefinitely for people to be won. The other dilemma is that the administrative hierarchy are subject to an 'organizational imperative' of justifying their own position to formulate and choose government course of action. Even though Nyerere calls for participation of the people in working out policies that affect his well being may appeal to an altruistic streak in administration but it also runs directly counter to their *raison d'etre*.

#### MERE SOCIALIST RHETORIC

Therefore socialism really is a "mere manipulation". Through Arusha Declaration, Mwonyozo Party guidelines leadership code (a code designed to prevent leaders from involving themselves profitably in private sector), attempts to involve workers in industrial decision making are aspects difficult to reconcile with mere manipulation politics. But then here ideology has gained an upper hand, for even a rhetoric has its own momentum and can have significant effects on concrete measures. As Claud Ake<sup>(6)</sup> analyses the "progressive countries" with their populist rhetoric taking a social stance. This is really a defensive radicalism (having within its ambit as diverse a political system as an obscenely capitalist Nigeria, Senghor's Senegal, Kenya's ~~session~~ Paper no.10, Uganda's common man's charter, Kaunda's humanism) which paradoxically while allowing the bourgeoisie to buy time, develops the consciousness of the people, reveals the consciousness of the social order and intensifies the class struggle.

The regime achieves the requisite visibility by propagating ideas in creating expectations which contradict its raison d'etre. Defensive radicalism has a dynamic of its own. To purchase legitimacy by defensive radicalism is to establish a new criterion of regime performance and legitimacy which becomes a constraint on the regime. Therefore when a regime is obliged to undertake defensive radicalism it will in all probability, become increasingly progressive. Herein Tanzania manifests itself as atleast one African country impelled by radicalism to the brink of socialism.

**DISTRIBUTIVE SOCIALISM :** In assessing the performance of a particular system, per capita Gross National Product seems to hold sway as the prime measure of efficacy. The economic growth or the GNP per capita is considered synonymous with DEVELOPMENT. This as Samoff(7) points out does not

a) reflect the distribution of wealth in society nor does economic growth over time indicate change in the distribution of wealth, and

b) it does not suggest the nature of relationships as it exists and changes between the developing countries (individually and collectively) and the major industrialised nations.

Samir Amin(8) feels that economic growth may well take place without either reducing poverty of majority of population or developing the structures necessary to permit self sustaining economic progress. A mechanical definition of development based on growth rates is obscene in a world in which most people go to sleep hungry and if a development model is to have any real meaning in a world in which most are struggling just to stay alive, it must, as development theorist Dudley Seers(9) points out to provide solution to most critical inter related social problems of late twentieth century i.e. poverty, unemployment and inequality.

Keeping this in mind the emphasis of Socialism in Tanzania was on the distributive aspects. Equality of distribution is manifest in the

nature of the Fiscal Policy. Most significant herein is the Programme(10) using indirect method of progressive taxation to redistribute national wealth. Nnoli points out that "Tanzania's Policy of Income redistribution has been the oldest instrument of socialism and has contributed more to social equality than any other socialist programme."

Green(11) shows that as a result of these measures the country's wealth is so equitably distributed that the gap between the rich and poor has significantly narrowed. Herein the maximum pretax income differential between citizens is 25:1 in cash terms and 30:1 when fringe benefits are included. but the post tax equivalent are 12.5:1 and 16:1 respectively. A similar effect is produced by government's limitation of increases in wages and salaries to 5-7% a year for those at the bottom of the wage structure, 4-5% a year for an average wage earner and 2-3% for those earning Shs 500 or more a month. This is reinforced by promotion procedures which slow down promotions and eliminate incremental allowances.

Statistically the reduction of the income ratios from 29:1 in 1967 to 9:1 in 1977 is a very impressive achievement by any standards but the other side of the achievement is those who have been compelled to "officially" sacrifice their higher salaries and other privileges are precisely the ones who make or implement crucial decisions affecting development of the country.(12)

Apart from this, egalitarian impact of state development policies is the degree of dispersion into the countryside of the most keenly sought state provided amenities like school, medical facilities, roads and piped water. Crawford Young(13) points out a useful means in a state fixed urban minimum wages for unskilled labour, a category often covering the majority of wage earners.

Racial and ethnic pressures have been coped with adequately. Here

per capital annual rate of economic growth from 1960 to 1979 at 2.3% placed her thirteenth among the 37 states listed by the World Bank(14). The literacy rate of 66% in 1976 was one of the highest in Africa, and even food production to 1979 was above average for African states(15). Besides rural development, democracy nationalization have been logical steps towards implementing socialism.

Radical analysts like Francis Hill(16) and Claud Ake(17) acclaim the distributive aspect of the Ujamaa model, though reasserting that 'Production is what is significant'.

Yet one has to realistically perceive that even these limited distributive aspects of 'development' can only be sustained and consolidated if the economy is buoyant. On the political level, the Tanzanian state seems to be accelerating its subordination under world market conditionalities and thereby further curtail its flexibility. In April 1986 the Tanzanian government accepted even this position - with the minister of Finance in Charge of IMF negotiations gained the mandate from government and party, to bring the arrangements to completion.

#### REGIME : FLEXIBLE AND OPEN TO CHANGE

Tanzania has a government with a reputation for flexibility and openness to criticism of their shortcomings. "There is a grassroot feeling" noted one correspondent, "that one can always appeal to authority" against abuses of power and another observed that in Dar-es-Salaam in 1981 magazines and books were being published questioning whether Tanzania was on the right track(18). Furthermore in 1975-80 despite severity of the crisis faced by the regime and the country, the presidential and legislative elections were held on schedule. In each the voters removed a substantial proportion of the sitting legislators(19) .

Admitting and examining the reasons for the mistakes, Nyerere has

for instance, punished police who used torture, and expelled CCM officials for incompetence and corruption. However whether this openness is enough to stop the CCM sliding down an increasingly coercive path of centralising control is examined next.

Yet it is this constant questioning and uncertainty about the best means to achieve the goals that has been the greatest strength and the greatest weakness of the Tanzanian experiment. More single minded ideologues could have produced a "final solution" or achieved a form of socialism in which all shared equally in the misery as the Khmer Rouge demonstrated in Kampuchea. Yet at the same time Nyerere's lack of certainty about how to achieve these goals made it easier for his subordinates, particularly in the government bureaucracy, to pursue different goals without clearly violating his overall vision, or atleast to provide a different balance among the goals than he might have favoured.

#### DECENTRALIZATION OR CENTRALIZATION?

The central government's response to the dominance of the local party branches by a privileged stratum was to reduce the opportunities for local participation. The major step was the "decentralisation of major government departments begun in 1972". Samoff(20) analyses that in this process "elected district councils have had their operating responsibilities substantially reduced". In 1976 came another move in the same direction - the closure of the locally run marketing cooperatives.

In both the district councils and the cooperatives rich farmers had been disproportionately influenced terminating the power of these bodies could thus be seen as a step towards preventing the growth of greater economic disparities. However, it also served to tighten the central government and party control over the rural areas and to reduce the opportunities for any grass root participation (these moves

towards tighter control over the rural areas were linked to the most severe economic crisis Tanzania had faced since independence in the form of world oil price hike, the drought etc.

Before this the banning of the Ruvuma Development Association(21) signalled major turn in the government policy in the move towards centralisation (as well as coercion).

The movement towards centralisation can be illustrated by the research project coordinated by S.S. Mushi(22) which compare small scale development projects in 3 districts before and after the 1972 "decentralisation" reforms which were supposed to pass more power to local organisations, but which in practice increased the power of the officials. Decisions taken at the village or even district levels could be overturned by the officials in the regional offices or in PM's office in Dodoma. Projects had to be documented which meant official involvement. The result was that in 1974 after decentralisation two thirds of the project implemented in the 3 districts studied were proposed by the officials and only one third by elected representatives. In 14% of the projects implemented, the main beneficiaries were the civil servants, 20% benefitted rich individual farmers. Only 55% of the projects were "successful" - 21% were unsuccessful (e.g. poultry projects, buildings erected and then abandoned etc.) and 24% were of mixed success (like water supply that failed during dry season, road that stopped short of its destination because a bridge had not been built).

#### POLITICIZATION OR DEPOLITICIZATION?

Concerned with lack of any popular participation, Nyerere in 1965, set up a commission to consider how a defacto one party state could be made democratic. The Commission proposed a system whereby two or more candidates from within TANU should be allowed to contest each



Parliamentary seat, with entire electorate choosing among them. In this way they could vote out a candidate or member who was particularly unpopular, there was in essence a considerable restriction on the electors freedom of choice through TANUs power to decide who would be allowed to contest.

In this way in the Defacto One Party system - the masses have been effectively depoliticised in the sense that their political participation has been reduced to choices which are totally inconsequential. In this institutionlisation of monolithic political system, the masses cannot very well be given any power. Political participation therefore would necessarily have to be one that would guarantee the survival of the existing leadership; and power structure. And such a guarantee is possible when mass participation is trivilised to the point of being a formal confirmation of the status quo. Fundamental institutional development in all African countries - progressive and reactionary seems to follow the trajectory of leaders holding tenaciously to power, political systems become uniformly monolithic and as a consequence masses being effectively depoliticised.

#### PERSONALISTIC VIEW OF HISTORY?

Personalistic view of history implies a tendency to think that a country's historical development can be accounted for by the fact that it happened to have particular types of leaders who happened to do particular types of things and hold particular types of ideals. Keeping Tanzania in mind, Nyerere's perspective of historical development of society seems distorted. In his Ujamaa Doctrine, Nyerere overstresses the African traditional institutions and underestimates the effects of institutions which have emerged during colonial period and had radically changed the mode of production introducing money economy profit motive, individual acquisitiveness and

economic competition.

The introduction of commerce, industry, plantation economy, and cash crop farming had brought in various classes into existence. Nyerere while recognising, the existence of classes and the consequent clashing of vested interests in Tanzania - wants to revert the course of history to classless traditional commercial society where because of the absence of private property the class contradictions do not exist.

But as a matter of empirical evidence the wheel of history cannot be reversed. Nyerere seems to believe that by just presenting the idea he will bring the change and that the owners of private property will definitely relinquish their privileged position in society.

Tordoff(23) feels that the Ujamaa Village Policy was based on an incorrect assumption that it was possible to adapt traditional work methods to the needs of the modern production system. It may even be argued as Suzanne Mueller has done that Nyerere paid too much attention to checking the process of class formations in Tanzania and that more material advantage might have been gained for the rural people by "letting the kulaks run".(24).

But then how far is this Nyerere's personalistic view? Ideas and ideologies are not autonomous but derivative (of the objective contradictions of the real world). The objective forces as Ake(25) analyses, shape the ideologies of African countries - and the ideologies of these countries are 'congruent with their economies'.

Tanzanian model of Ujamaa offers a somewhat atypical post colonial pattern of development. Keeping in mind Hamza Alavi's(26) characterisation of the post colonial states along with Saul's(27) ideological dimension of "dominant classes political power centre", historically colonial Tanzanian <sup>State apparatus</sup> became "over developed" in response to(28) subordinate pre-capitalist, generally non feudal social formations to the imperative of colonial capitalism. Thereby post

colonial Tanzania seems to have little equivalent to "landed class" and "indigenous bourgeois" (which is confined to retail trade and services comprising mainly Asians). Herein is the strategic position that the state occupies vis-a-vis the economy. In circumstances of weak indigenous classes, theorists like Fanon(29) feel that the national middle class i.e. the New oligarchy emerges and discovers its historical mission: that of an intermediary of "a transmission belt".

The strategic position<sup>o</sup> of the state vis-a-vis the economy available to the oligarchy, defines the latter's position as being that of a class. As POULANTZAS(30) says, the state bourgeoisie in developing countries context "does not constitute a class by virtue of being the bureaucracy but by virtue of being an effective class."

A ruling class must have a defined relation to the means of production, it must have a means of reproducing itself and should possess a consciousness of its interests as a class (though there may be situations in which this interest is suppressed or confused). Does the bureaucratic bourgeoisie in Tanzania fulfill these requirements? Though not a class with historic origin associated with a form of accumulation, it disposes or manages (although it does not own) a large part of the means of production, that part which is controlled by the state. It has a consciousness of itself as "the educated" or "leaders" in Tanzania and reproduces itself through education. Thereby it is close to conditions required to define ruling class(31).

Shivji feels that nationalisation under the label of socialism provided the bureaucracy with a convenient ideology to bring the economy under their control supposedly of course on behalf of the entire population. "socialism permitted them to put the bureaucracy into the position of a managerial board of a kind of state corporation(32). Therefore the class which takes power is the petty bourgeoisie, particularly its upper level (the "intelligentsia identified rather



eclectically as comprising of intellectuals, teachers, higher civil servants, prosperous traders, farmers, professionals, higher military and police officers"(33). An outstanding feature of this section is their urban based occupations with some education and knowledge of the outside world.

Maji Maji school of socialist theorists (like Shivji, Mapolu) feel that post independence class struggles (in which they include Arusha Declaration) were themselves a process leading to emergence of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. But Shivji alongside recognises the difficulty in reconciling "socialism as a mere manipulation with Mwongozo leadership code - a code designed to prevent leaders from involving themselves profitably in the private sector.

Mapulo's study reveals the high level of proletarian action in Tanzania..." It has been a veritable revolution for the Tanzanian workers, within a period of 3 years they have moved from a state of docility, timidity to initiative and class solidarity"(34). This manifests the high level of consciousness. Michaela Von Freyhold(35) too ~~also~~ discusses <sup>the Skill</sup> "ongoing struggle among the 'nizers'. 1967 Arusha Declaration and 1971 Leadership Code were both vital and just steps. It is to these still ongoing struggle among nizers that the socialist impulse in Tanzania is traced.

Suzanne Mueller(37) and A .B. Babu(38) find the ideological basis of Nyerere's development strategy very akin to Narodniks(39), the movement in pre-revolutionary Russia. The Narodniks longed to take society back to innocence of early communal life, unspoiled by penetration of capital. This has been institutionalised in the context of Tanzania by a populist ruling class. Tanzania had state capital and a small and under developed class of kulaks (and practically no industrial capital) at the time of independence. Mueller feels that state capital served the interests of bureaucrats who have consistently acted to forestall development of bourgeoisie and proletariat by basing

accumulation on expansion of middle peasant household production for market. Thus historically progressive capitalist mode of production has been avoided, with an uneconomic system prevailing. Lenin's critique of Narodniks is applicable in Ujamaa conditions whereby labour is fettered to unproductive land and vice versa.

The right wing interpretation like Green (40) realised the self interest opportunist nature of elites in Africa yet feels that for some unexplained reason this does not happen in Tanzania, where "public sector has accepted material rewards substantially lower than those in neighbouring states with no evident loss of morale and loyalty." 'Benign elite' (41) interpretation of Crawford Pratt gives bureaucrats and politicians in Tanzania high marks as developers despite what he calls "occasional dangers of a doctrinaire determination of politics".

The rightists castigate, the continuous and seemingly disjointed social experimentation characterising Ujamaa. The policies like Villagisation, Universal Price and Wage Control, and comprehensive nationalisation of major economic activities are alleged to have destroyed private incentives, discouraged much needed foreign investment and rendering Tanzania incapable of accommodating to rapidly growing population through technically and economically feasible improvements in productivity.

Dostoyusky once said that ideas tend to have their consequences. The consequences of Nyerere's political ideas had generated such a storm of controversy that it is scarcely possible to find a dispassionate commentary on the modern Tanzanian scene.

Yet, not withstanding the critiques certain facts about Ujamaa socialist state cannot be ignored. In that, the Tanzanians are "more equal" than their counterparts elsewhere, governmental stability, its openness to change and experimentation is manifest, degree of political

repression if at all, is felt much less here, and the lack of entrenched interests (the power of the bureaucracy notwithstanding) and the slow recognition of the technical requirement for living standards to be raised are elements in Tanzania's favour.

Finally the future of Tanzania is significantly uncertain at the moment because of the substantial economic reorientation that has been taking place since Ali Hassan Mwinyi took over from Nyerere. The economic problems that Mwinyi inherited were enormous. Tanzania like most African countries is confronted by a hopeless debt trap; its exports market is sluggish and it desperately needs capital and technology. The only source of solutions to such problems is the west - whether it is the western private banks, the multinationals, or the west controlled World Bank and International Monetary Fund. After stridently opposing these instruments of neo-colonialism for years, Tanzania has finally accepted at least partially the necessity to cooperate with them in order to haul itself up from the present quagmire of economic stagnation. As to what extent and in what direction such adjustments and liberalisation of economy are going to effect the existing setup in Tanzania is an open question.

## NOTES AND REFERENCES

### INTRODUCTION

1. FRIGYER NAGY: In Goran Hyden Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania, London, Heinmann (1980).
2. As NYERERE (Freedom and Unity, page 166) says "to us in Africa land was always recognised as belonging to the community, each individual within our society had a right to the use of land because otherwise he could not earn his living and one cannot have the right to life without also having the right to some means of maintaining life. But the Africans right to land was simply the right to use it, he had no other right to it, nor did it occur to him to try and claim one".
3. W.M. FREEDLAND and CARL G.ROSBURG, "Introduction: The Anatomy of African Socialism" in African Socialism, edited by Freedland and Rosburg, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1964, p.1
4. J.MOHAN "Varieties of African Socialism" in Ralph Miliband and J. SAVILLE, ed. The Socialist Register, New York, Merlin Press, 1966, p.221.
5. Cited in OKOKO KIMSE A.B., Socialism and Self-Reliance in Tanzania, London and New York, KPI, 1987, p.16.
6. CRAWFORD YOUNG: Ideologies in Africa
7. J. MOHAN:"Varieties of African Socialism" , op cit, p.31
8. CLAUDE AKE: "Congruence of Political Economies and Ideologies in Africa" in Political Economy of Contemporary Africa, ed. Peter Gutkind and Waller Stein, Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1976.
9. " Defensive Radicalism remains essentially a progressive force in the sense that as the political leadership buys time with 'Defensive Radicalism', it also fosters the development of consciousness among the masses and hence class struggle as the latter becomes aware of the contradictions of the social order to which they belong. Therefore 'Defensive Radicalism' carries with it the germs of its own negation.

10. E.H. CARR: What is History?, London, Penguin Books, 1964, p.52.
11. Most of Nyerere's counterparts in Africa do not contemplate real changes in the socio-economic structure of the countries - as they play the game of "Defensive Radicalism", but the post Arusha policies in Tanzania on foreign aid education, villagization schemes were genuine attempts by the political leadership to improve the lot of the mass of the population.
12. See A.K.RAY "Towards the Concept of the Post Colonial Democracy: A Schematic View" in Hassan, Jha and Khan (ed) State Political Processes and Identity, Sage, New Delhi, 1989.
13. GIOVANNI ARRIGHI and JOHN SAUL " Socialism and Economic Development in Tropical Africa", in Socialism in Tanzania, VOL.1, ED. BY Lionel Cliffe and John Saul, Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1972, p.3.
14. CLIFFE and SAUL ed. Socialism in Tanzania vol.2, Policies, Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1973, p.4 of Introduction.



## CHAPTER I

### POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COLONIALISM

1. Oral content of message is often hermetic. For the African speech is a weighty matter which can make and unmake. If someone says to another "you have eaten the toad but spat out its head" he understands at once that he is being accused of "avoiding a part of his responsibilities". The hermitism of half speech shows at once the inestimable value of oral tradition and its limits.
2. J. ILIFFE, A Modern History of Tanganyika, Cambridge University Press, 1979, p.9 ch.2
3. ibid
4. Cited in ANDREW COULSON, Tanzania A Political Economy, 1982, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p.16
5. ibid
6. ibid
7. E.A. BRETT, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa 1919-1939, Heinemann Educational Books, 1973, Chapter 7 and 9.
8. This was made possible by agricultural innovation, the use of iron hoes in place of wooden ones, the cultivation of new crops such as maize or rice; the use of both cattle manure and green manure and advanced system of inter cropping, crop rotation and irrigation.
9. BRYCESON D.F. Peasant Food Production and Food Supply in Relation to the Historical Development of Commodity Production in Precolonial and Colonial Tanganyika", Service Paper Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning, University of Dar-es-Salaam, KJEKSHUS H. Ecology Control and Economic Development East African History, Heinemann Educational Books, 1977, also holds this opinion.

10. KJEKSHUS, *ibid*, p 81-82
11. KJEKSHUS, *ibid*, p 90
12. KJEKSHUS, *ibid*, p 105-9
13. KJEKSHUS, *ibid*
14. ANDREW COULSON: Tanzania: A Political Economy, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982, p 20.
15. HELGA KJEKSHUS, *ibid* and JOHN FORD: The Role of Trypanosomiasis in African Ecology, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1977.
16. KJEKSHUS, *op cit* p. 181
17. Sir CHARLES ELIOT, "Report by His Majesty's Commissioner on the East African Protectorate", dated 18 April 1903 Africa No.6, ed 1926 (HMSO, 1903).
18. GORAN HYDEN, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania, Underdevelopment and Uncaptured Peasantry, London, Heinemann, 1980, p 39-40.
19. HYDEN, cited in *ibid*
20. UNESCO General History of Africa, Vol 4
21. CLYDE INGLE, From Village to State in Tanzania, Cornell University Press, London, 1972, p 39-40.
22. E.A. BRETT, *op cit*, p.51
23. R.ROBINSON and J. GALLAGHER with A.DENNY, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism, London, Macmillan, 1961, p.393-8
24. Quoted in WALTER RODNEY, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania Publishing House, 1972, p.162.

25.     ibid
26.     J. FORBES MUNRO, Africa and International Economy 1800-1960, London, Dent 1976, p.86.
27.     In 1891 German government reluctantly assumed administrative responsibility for German East Africa following a further Anglo-German agreement that fixed the colony's western boundaries, instituted a British Protectorate over Zanzibar and gave Germany permanent ownership of the coastal strip.
28.     ILIFFE, "Tanganyika under German and British Rule", in J. Saul and L. Cliffe ed., Socialism in Tanzania, vol.1, Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1972, p.8
29.     R.F. EBERLIE, "The German Achievement in East Africa". Tanganyika notes and records, Sept, 1960, cited in Clyde Ingle op cit, p.40.
30.     ILIFFE, Tanganyika Under German Rule, pp. 57-63, 99-103, in Agricultural Change in Modern Tanganyika, East Africa Publishing House, 1971, pp.12-27.
31.     J.F.R. HILL and J.P. MOFFET ed., Tanganyika: A review of the resources of their development, Dar-es-Salaam, 1955, p.358
32.     Cited in Clyde INGLE op cit, p.41
33.     SIR E.HITCHCOCK, "Sisal Industry of East Africa", Tanganyika notes and records, 1959
34.     NABUDERE, op cit p.21
35.     Maji is a Kiswahali word for "water" and revolt took its name from the commonly held belief that a medicine of water and grain could ward off European bullets. German bullets were expected to turn to water as they struck African fleets that had bathed in the magic fluid. Focussing their fury on all outsiders, the rebels attacked Arabs and Swahili Africans as well as European farmers and missionaries.

36. Cited in NABUDERE, op cit p.22
37. Quoted in J.ILIFFE, Tanganyika, op cit, p.24
38. ibid
39. ISSA G. SHIVJI, Class Struggles in Tanzania, Dar-es-Salaam, Heinemann, Tanzania Publishing House, 1975, p.42.
40. M.J.F. YAFFEY, Balance of Payments: Problems of a Developing Country: Tanzania, Munich, Welt Forum, Verlas, 1968, p.45-46.
41. JIDDAWI A.M. "Extracts from Arab account Book 1840-1885' Tanganyika Notes and Records 1951.
42. OLIVER R. The Missionary Factor in East Africa, Longmans 1952, 2nd edition 1965; Roberts A (ed) Tanzania before 1900 East African Publishing House 1968.
43. J.CAMEROON and W.A. DODD, Society, Schools and Progress in Tanzania, Pergamon Press 1970 p.52.
44. ROLAND OLIVER The Missionary Factor in East Africa 2nd edition, Longmans 1965 pp 50-65.
45. cited in ibid
46. TAYLOR J.C. Political Development of Tanganyika, Stanford and Oxford University Presses, 1963 p.21, ILIFF, A Modern History of Tanganyika, Cambridge University Press 1979 p. 208-10.
47. COULSON, Tanganyika - 1982 op cit p 42.

48. The Last Annual report before the war showed 70,000 patients more than 90% of whom were Africans treated in 12 general hospitals, a sanatorium and lunatic asylum, while 750,000 vaccinations were administered, as cited in TITMUS R.M. et.al "The Health Services of Tanganyika," a Report to the Government, Pitman Medical Publishing Co., London 1964.
49. YAFFEY op cit p 46
50. GORAN HYDEN 1980 op cit p.41-42.
51. ibid
52. YAFFEY 1968 opcit p.23
53. LENIN "Report on the International situation to the second Congress of comintern" 20 July 1920, Collected Works Vol 20, Moscow Progress.
54. YAEGER RODGER Tanzania an African Experiment, Colorado, West view Press Inc, 1982, p 8-9
55. Tanganyikan Territory, Report of the Central Development Committee, Dar-es-Salaam, Government Printer 1940, cited in Nabudere op cit p.28.
56. GORAN HYDEN 1980 op cit p 46
57. HYDEN ibid
58. ILIFFE, "Agricultural Change" opcit p 29 and BASHIR A.DATOO, 'Peasant Agricultural Production in East Africa' cited in HYDEN op cit p 47
59. CRANFORD PRAFF, The Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945-1968 Cambridge University Press 1976 p 25
60. RUTHENBERG, "Agricultural Development in Tanzania", cited in Hyden 1980 op cit p 48

61. Poor Planning (particularly of soil condition), Unpredictable weather, untried mechanical equipment, rosette disease etc. led to its failure.
62. HYDEN op cit p 49
63. WALTER RODNEY op cit
64. MAMDANI 'Imperialism in Uganda'
65. COULSON op cit p 80.
66. PAULO FREIRE, The Pedagogy of the Oppressed, New York Heider, 1970 p 151
67. J. NYERERE, Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism, Dar-es-Salaam Oxford University Press, 1968 p 46-48
68. COULSON op cit p 84
69. MARJORIE MBILINYI op cit
70. This was manifested in 2 broad divisions made in the school, forming a general side for sons of Sultans, chiefs wealthy land owners who received general all round training consisting of academic subjects like English, Mathematics, Geography and practical subjects such as Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, elementary Carpentry, Tailoring, native handicrafts i.e. drum making etc. The second side will consist of apprenticeship to various trades, carpenters, tailors etc.
71. RUTHENBERG. Agricultural Development in Tanganyika 1964, Springer Verlag cited in Coulson p 55.
72. SENDER, "Political Economy of rural development in Tanzania", Economic research Bureau, Paper 74.5, Univ. of Dar-es-Salaam cited in Coulson p 58.

73. MBILINIYI, "The new Women and Traditional norms in Tanzania," Journal of Modern African Studies Vol 10, 1972 pp 52-72. Also held by Kitching; Class and Economic Change in Africa, Themaking of an African Petite Bourgeoisie 1905-1970, London, Methuen, 1980

CHAPTER - II

IDEOLOGY & POLITICO ECONOMIC SYSTEMS OF  
UJAMAA

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1. NYERERE, Freedom & Unity, OUP. Dar-es-Salaam, 1976.
2. CRAWFORD YOUNG, Ideology & Development in Africa; Yale University Press; New Haven & London; 1982 p. 104.
3. CRAWFORD PRATT, Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945-1968, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1978; p. 175.
4. YOUNG, op cit p. 104.
5. ISSA G. SHIVJI, Class Struggles in Tanzania, London, Heinemann, 1976, pp. 79-99.
6. NYERERE, Ujamaa : Essays on Socialism London, Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 13-16.
7. "Productionist Imperitives have been elevated to the Paramount position in Tanzanian Ideology & policy; Ujamaa may truly be called PRODUCTIONIST SOCIALISM." FRANCES HILL "Juamaa : African Socialist Productionism in Tanzania", p - 216. in HELEN DESFOSSES & ACQUES LEVESQUE edited Socialism in the third world, Praeger Publishers Inc., New York, USA, 1975.
8. *Concepts elaborated in 'Freedom & Development', in Coulson (eds) op cit.*
9. NYERERE, "Africa & the Democracy", in Nyerere, Freedom & Unity (UHURU NA UMOJA); Dar-es-Salaam : Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 103.
10. NYERERE, "Ujamaa, the basis of African Socialism", ibid, p. 170.
11. NYERERE, "Introduction" in Freedom & Socialism (UHURU NA UJAMAA); Dar-es-Salaam, Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 77.



12. NYERERE : "The Purpose is Man", ibid, pp. 93-94.
13. NYERERE, "Education for self reliance" ibid, p.65.
14. NYERERE, "Ujamaa the Basis of African Socialism" in Freedom & Unity; op cit. p. 165.
15. Ibid.
16. NYERERE, Freedom & Socialism, p. 233.
17. Ibid.
18. AHMED MOHIDDIN, "African Socialism in Two Countries", New Jersey, Groomhelm Ltd, 1981, p. 83.
19. Ibid.
20. YOUNG, alongside points out that the Perspectives and Values of Petty capitalism had been inculcated by colonial agricultural policy; hence the Ujamaa ethos had to be reactivated. Therefore, in 1969 NYERERE followed the Arusha Declaration with a statement called "Socialism & Rural Development" or "Ujamaa Vijijini", socialism in villages. The ideal formulated was the construction of rural communities where nascent capitalism was transcended through cooperative productions.
21. NYERERE, "After Arusha Declaration" in Ujamaa - Essays on Socialism; op cit. p. 162.
22. NYERERE, Freedom & Socialims, p. 233.
23. Ibid.
24. NYERERE, "Economic Nationalism" in Freedom & Socialism, op cit; pp. 162-171.
25. FRANCES HILL, op cit; p. 221.

26. NYERERE, Freedom & Development, op cit.
27. NYERERE, Education & Self Reliance in op cit.
28. In the text.
29. Like NYERERE, C.B. MACFERSON seems to have the opinion that single party could be democratic, if :-
  - a) it has intra party democracy.
  - b) open membership.
  - c) the activity indulged in by its party members is strenuous.
30. NYERERE, "Democracy & Party System", cited in G. ANDREW MAGUIRE, Towards Uhuru in Tanzania, Cambridge University Press, 1969, p. 361.
31. NYERERE, "Challenge of Independence" cited in p. 363.
32. NYERERE, "One party Government", ibid, p. 362.
33. HILL felt that problems were not resolved by the decision that TANU should continue as a mass party. TANU lacked capability for either role. It did not have professional staff necessary for its government role, its own experts who could deal with planners in the administration linked to National decision makers through a party hierarchy capable of making democratic centralism a reality. Citizen participation via party seemed to have little role. HILL in fact feels that leaders need citizens only sporadically, even in innovative systems. For many major changes they require only lack of opposition; Frances Hill, op.cit., pp. 229-30.
34. Cited in MOHIDDIN, op cit, page. 139.
35. NYERERE, Freedom & Socialism, op cit. p. 247.
36. Ibid.

37. NYERERE, "Arusha Declaration - in Ujamaa Essays on Socialism, p. 28.
38. MILOVAN DJILAS, The New Class, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1957.
39. Education for Self Reliance (1967), Socialism and Rural Development (1967), MWONOGOZO (1971) and Decentralization (1972).
40. The Arusha Declaration.
41. United Republic of Tanzania, Second Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development Vol. 1, cited in ADEDEJI ed Indigenization of African Economics, 'Tanzania' by SS MUSHI, Hutchinson University Library for Africa. 1981 p. 206.
42. PETER MEYNS, 'Some Aspects of Planning and Socialism in Tanzania', in Lionel Cliffe and JOHN SAUL (ed) Socialism in Tanzania Vol. II (Dar-es-Salaam, East African Publishing House, 1973).
43. cited in ADEDEJI p. 208.
44. ADEDEJI *ibid.*
45. Its shareholders were the Commonwealth Development Corporations (British); Deutsche Gesellschaft for Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (West Germany); Nederlandse Overzeese; Financierings - Maatschappij (for the Netherlands) and NDC.
46. JULIUS K. NYERERE, Socialism and Rural Development in Ujamaa, Essays on Socialism, Dar-es-Salaam, Oxford University press, 1968, p. 118.
47. HULLS cited in OKOKO *op cit.* p. 89. Also AO ELLMAN 'The Introduction of Agricultural Innovations through cooperative farming: a brief outline of Tanzania's Policies', East Africa Journal of Rural Development, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1970), p. 1-15.

48. ADEDEJI, Indigenisation of African Economics op cit. p. 219.
49. RENE DUMONT, Socialism and Development, London, ANDRE DEUTSCH, 1973, p. 145.
50. AO ELLMAN, 'Introduction of Agricultural Innovations through cooperative farming : a brief outline of Tanzania's policies,' East African Journal of Rural Development, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1970), p.4.
51. KAWAWA, 'New approaches to rural development', speech at a Seminar on Rural Development at the University of Dar-es-Salaam, 1966, cited in ADEDEJI op cit. p. 92.
52. United Republic of Tanzania, Report of the Presidential Special Committee of Enquiry into the cooperative and marketing boards (Dar-es-Salaam, Government Printer) 1966, p. 5.
53. Ibid.
54. NYERERE, "Socialism and Rural Development", in Ujamaa : Essays on Socialism p. 117.
55. NYERERE, ibid p. 124-125.
56. A ELLMAN, 'Development of Ujamaa Policy in Tanzania' in Rural Cooperation in Tanzania, edited by CLIFFE and LAWRENCE, Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania Publishing House, 1975, p. 325.
57. Ibid p. 121-2.
58. Second Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development 1st July 1969-30th June, 1974, cited in OKOKO p. 102.
59. NYERERE, Arush Declaration, - cited in OKOKO p. 220.
60. ARUSHA Declaration, cited in ADEDEJI p. 220.

CHAPTER III

OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS : SOCIO ECONOMIC AND  
POLITICAL RELATIEIS  
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1. Cited in FRANCIS HILL, Ujamaa: "African Socialist Productionism in Tanzania"; Helen Desfosses and Acques Levesque (ed) Socialism in the Third World, Praeger Publishers Inc, New York, USA 1975 p 250.
2. GORAN HYDEN, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania, London 1980 p. 100.
3. JANNIK BOSEN, BIRGIT STORGARD MADSEN and TONY MODDY, Ujamaa, Socialism from Above, Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1977, p. 164.
4. HYDEN op cit p. 101.
5. VON FREYHOLD, Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania : An Analysis of Social Experiment, Heinemann Educational, Books, 1979.
6. COULSON, Tanzania, A Political Economy, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1982 p. 245.
7. FRANCIS HILL, 1975, op cit p 236
8. Regional party secretaries, the chief representatives of the President in the regions, made a point of taking personal lead in these efforts. Particularly notable was the political work, of the party secretary in the Iringa region, Wilbert Kierruu, who saw his aim as putting an end to the capitalist and petty capitalist farming in the region - and eventually became a personal victim of the political tensions that stirred up and was shot to death after an argument with one of the capitalist farmers in Ismani, an area known for its large maize farms.

9. HYDEN, op cit p. 104.

10. Each mode of production gives rise to its own type of economy. HYDEN points out (in his book Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania, Heinemann London 1980) that peasant mode gives rise to an economy in which the affective ties based on common descent, common resistance etc. prevail. He refers to it as an 'Economy of Affection'. Work on improved productivity is not an end in itself. While in the modern economics both capitalist and socialist - 'live in order to work' in the economy of affection it is 'work in order to live'. The market economy does not unilaterally cause the destruction of the economy of affection. The latter has the ability to survive and also to affect the mode of operation of the market economy. HYDEN feels that political economists need to increase their competence to deal meaningfully with 'historically deviating' cases such as contemporary Africa. The reason why the individual in African society continues to see his primary obligation as being towards the primordial public realm is structural. The fragmentary economic base that characterizes a society where the peasant mode is strongly articulated gives rise to social formations in which primordial orientations are highly rational.

This orientation is well documented in the writings of FRANK HOLMQUIST whose work focuses on how people in rural communities group together and with the help of well placed individuals with ties to the community - political patrons - try to secure benefits and resources for themselves. It is a common task of these local political patrons to divert controversial state action away from their communities. Success in such efforts increases their status and power within the local community and potentially also elsewhere. (FRANK HOLMQUIST, 'Implementing Rural Development' in GORAN HYDEN, ROBERT JACKSON and JOHN OKUMU eds, Development Administration, Kenyan Experience, Nairobi, Oxford University Press, 1970).

CRUISE O'BRIEN has pointed to the crucial role that local patrons play in the decision making system in Senegal (D C CRUISE O'BRIEN, Saints and Politicians : Essays on the organisation of Senegalese Peasant Society, Cambridge University Press, 1975 p. 141). Similarly PEEL has shown how communal action often takes precedence over class action in Western Nigeria (PEEL, 'In equality & action : the forms of Ijesha social conflicts' Conference on 'Inequality in Africa' of the Social Science Research Council at Mt Kisco, New York, Sept. 1976, p. 41).

All these above studies manifest that the peasant mode of production gives rise to an 'invisible' economy of affection that provides opportunity for social action outside the frame work of state control. These ties are personalised and very difficult to change, short of an effective transformation of the structure that support them.

Even when people become rich, the economy of affection makes its demands on them, as Hyden points out 'status implies growing obligations'. They get even more closely involved in the economy than before. The economy of affection serves as the guarantor of social reproduction. It offers collective security, in a manner that modern economics does not.

The entrenched system of economy of affection is manifest in that fact that in the 1965 parliamentary elections of Tanzania principal losers including some ministers were those who had forgotten to adhere to the principles of the 'economy of affection'.

How much the precapitalist, familial forms of organization still remained in Tanzania has been documented by MICHAELA VON FREYHOLD (op cit). She shows in her study of attitudes among workers and members of bureaucratic bourgeoisie that both these categories retain strong links with their homes in rural areas. In the Tanzanian data, social security is seen to rest more within the parameters of economy of affection than within the modern economy by FREYHOLD. HYDEN points out that the frequency with which acquisition of nepotism and favouritism were made against managers is evidence that the economy of affection was at least well marked after Mowongozo, as it was before.

Taking the instance of Tanzanians who have served dutifully in the party or the government that they have done so with often limited rewards. Employment as an official has not been an absolute necessity in most cases. Many could have probably remained in farming but in the context of the economy of affection with the specific purpose of offering something in return once they had reached a position of importance in the society.

If the Tanzanian state displays features of 'softness' it has structural explanations.

11. J. BOESEN, cited in OKOKO, Socialisms and Self Reliance in Tanzania, London, New York, KPI, 1987, pp. 103-106.
12. A. ELLMAN, 'Development of Ujamaa Policy in Tanzania', in Rural Cooperation in Tanzania, edited by CLIFF and LAWRENCE, Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania Publishing House, 1975, p. 328.
13. See for example (1) M. VON FREYHOLD, 'Rural Development through Ujamaa Vijijini : Some considerations based on experiences, in Tanga Pangani and Handeni Districts', University of Dar-es-Salaam, Deptt. of Economics, 1973 (2). A. AWITI, - "The Development of Ujamaa Villages and Peasant Question in Iringa District : A study outline" Economic Research Bureau Paper, University of Dar-es-Salaam 1971. (3) SUMRA ! Problems of Agricultural Production in Juamaa Villages in Handeni districts, ERB Paper, University of Dar-es-Salaam, 1973 etc.
14. ELLMAN, Development of Ujamaa Policy in Tanzania in Rural Cooperation in Tanzania, ed by CLIFFE and LAWRENCE p. 329.
15. WORLD BANK Report on Tanzania, April 1977 pp 5 and 8.
16. OKOKO; Socialism and Self Reliance in Tanzania, London New York, KPI 1987 p 109-110.
17. WORLD BANK Report on Tanzania, April 1977, pp. 5 and 8.
18. JULIUS NYERERE, Arusha Declaration, Ten Years After, cited in African Socialism in Practice, the Tanzanian Experiences cited by Andrew Coulson, Spokesman, Nottingham, 1979 pp 53-55.
19. Economic Survey and Annual Plan 1970-71 cited in OKOKO op cit p. 112.



20. OKOKO op cit.
21. SS MUSHI, 'Ujamaa - modernization by traditionalization' Tamuli, Vol. 1 No. 2 March 1971 p. 23.
22. OKOKO op cit 116.
23. PHILLIP MAWHOOD, "The Search for participation in Tanzania, in Phillip Mawhood ed The Local government in the Third World, experience of Tropical Africa, New York, John Wiley & Sons 1983 p 75-105.
24. Ibid p. 76.
25. NELSON KASFIR, 'Design and Dilemma : an overview' in Philip Mawhood ed. The Local Government in Third World, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1983 p 27-47.
26. LOUIS A PICARO, 'Socialism and Field Administrator : Decentralization in Tanzania' Comparative Politics 12, 4 (July 1980), p 453-4.
27. FRANCIS HILL, 'Administrative Decentralization for Development, Participation and Control in Tanzania', Journal of African Studies 6, 4 (Winter 1979-80)p. 190-1.
28. Op cit p. 39.
29. KIGHOMA A, MALIMA, 'Planning for self reliance - Tanzania's Third Five Year Development Plan', African Development, 4, 1 (January - March 1979) p. 51.
30. MAWHOOD op cit p. 98.
31. ANDREW COULSON, Tanzania, a political Economy, Oxford Clarendon Press 1982, p. 254.
32. Herein, COULSON substantiates his argument through quotations from research reports from MOROGOZO, IRINGA, MARA and MASILAND in p. 250-252. This view is also held by McHENDRY, BOESEN, MADSEN and MOODY'.

Ujamaa : Socialism from above, Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1977, VON FREYHOLD, Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania : Analysis of a Social Experiment, Heinemann Educational Books, 1979.

33. HYDEN cited in OKOKO op cit.p. 117-118.

34. JOHN SAUL 'African Peasants and Revolution', Review of African Economy, No. 1 (1974), p. 61.

35. OKOKO op cit p. 118.

36. HYDEN op cit p. 106.

37. SHIVJI, Class Struggles in Tanzania, Heinemann, 1976.

38. Ruvama Development Association was a model of much of NYERERE's writings in 1960s. COULSON points out that most of what was recommended in 'Education for self reliance' had been pioneered at the primary school at Litowa, and the description of small vilages of politised farmers given in 'Freedom and Development' could apply to most of RDAs 17 Villages. <sup>Yet in</sup> 1969 it was declared a prohibited organization. Its abolition was announced to the nation with the newspaper headline "TANU to run all Ujamaa villages" and was followed by the restatements, including several in 1971 MWONGOZO that 'the party is supreme'. But the RDA story along with Mount Carmel Case shows that the 'the party' in this slogan did not mean a grass root organisation of workers and peasants : it meant the party officials and professional politicians.

39. COULSON, Tanzania A Political Economy, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1982, p. 262.

40. HYDEN op cit p. 106.

41. ibid p. 107

42. ibid p. 112-113.

43. McHENDRY, cited in HYDEN ibid p. 115.

44. HYDEN ibid p. 117.

45. Got instance, In BUKOBA, where local village institutions like clan structure, special purpose organization - 'byamba' (cattle owners, masons, womens associations etc) developed in response to peasant needs have always been strong. This involvement in active local economy has a rationality of its own.

46. HENRY MAPULO and GESAL PHILLIPSON, Agricultural Cooperation and the Development of Productive forces : some lessons from Tanzania', Africa Development (Dakar), Vol. 1 No. 1, 1976 discusses this problem with reference to several villages in Tanzania.

47. MAPULO, SHIVJI, PHILIPPSON op cit.

48. HYDEN op cit.

49. HYDEN op cit p. 152.

50. DEBORAH BRYCESON, "Household hoe and the nation, Development Policies of the Nyerere era", in MICHAEL HODD (ed) Tanzania/Nyerere London and New York, Pinter Publisher 1988, pp 36-48.

/after

51. G.D.P. as an authentic measure in questioned by DUDLEY SEERS in 'What are we trying to measure'? Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1972, and G. PRATT and A. ROE et al, Social Accounting for Development Planning, Cambridge University Press, 1977, Chapter 4-6.

52. COULSON op cit. 1982 p. 186.

53. DUGGAN and CIVILLE, Tanzania and Nyerere, Orbis Books, Maryknoll, New York, 1976 p. 105.

54. MPOROCOMYI, 'Industry and Development in Tanzania; the Origins of Crisis' in MICHAEL HODD ed. Tanzania after Nyerere, London, New York, Printer, Publishers, 1988, pp. 51-68.
55. NYERERE, The Arusha Declaration Ten Years after cited in COULSON ed African Socialism in Practice, Nottingham Spokesman 1979, p. 43-71.
56. OKOKO op cit p. 137.
57. EDMUND CLARK cited in OKOKO op cit. p 138.
58. SHIVJI, op cit.
59. MRAMBA and MWANSASU, 'Management for socialist Development in Tanzania: The care of NDC in Tanzania', African Review, Vol. 1, No. 3, January 1972, p. 37.
60. LOXLEY, 'Financial Planning and Contest in Tanzania' in Towards Socialist Planning, edited by RWEYEMAMU and LOXLEY, Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzanai Publishing House, 1972.
61. SAUL, The State in Post Colonial Societies, Tanzania, Socialist Register, edited by MILIBAND and SAVILE, London.
62. SEIDMAN, Comparative Development Strategies in East Africa Nairobi, East Africa Publishing House, 1972.
63. CLARK cited in OKOKO op cit 144.-145.
64. CLARK cited in OKOKO p. 150-153.
65. MAPOLU, The organisation and participation of workers in Tanzania, African Review, Vol. 2, No.3, 1972 pp 381-415.
66. J. RWEYEMAMU, Underdevelopment and industrialization in Tanzania, Oxford University Press, 1973 pp. 177-92.

67. THOMAS J. BIERSTEKER, Self Reliance in Theory and Practice in Tanzania Trade Relations, RAVEN HILL ed, Africa in Economic Crisis HOUNDMILL, Macmillan Press, 1986.
68. JOHAN GALTUNG, Self Reliance : Concepts, Practices and Rationale, cited in Biersteker, ibid p. 218.
69. NYERERE in the introduction to the II Five Year Plan (1969-74) cited in Biersteker ibid p. 221.
70. NYERERE on 'Process of liberation' cited in Nabuders Imperialism in East Africa, London Zed Press 1989, p. 108.
71. NIBLOCK in Cranford Pratt A Cultural Phase in Tanzania 1945-1968, Nyerere and the emergence of socialist strategy Cambridge University Press 1976, p. 132.
72. BIERSTEKER op cit.
73. HORACE CAMPBELL 'Tanzania and the World Bank Urban Shelter Project : Ideology and International Finance in Review of African Political Economy, ROAPE No. 42 1988 (Spring). pp. 5-6.
74. O OSTERLING, The Literacy Campaign in Tanzania, A short Introduction, The Directorate of Adult Education, Ministry of National Education, Dar-es-Salaam (1972) p. 11.
75. MBILINYI, Contradictions in Tanzanian Education in ANDREW COULSON ed African Socialism in Practice, the Tanzanian Experience, Nottingham Spokesman 1979 p. 219.
76. EMILE C NDONDE, Educational Methods for Self Reliant Development, Maji Maji No. 25(Jan. 1976) p. 22.
77. K.F. HIRJI, School Education and Underdevelopment in Tanzania Maji Maji No. 12, Sept. 1972.
78. cited in OKOKO op cit p. 64.

79. LEMA, OKOKO op cit
80. MBILINGYI, Peasants Education in Tanzania, African Review Vol. 6 No. 1, 1976.
81. G KAMENJUI, 'In defence of a socialist concept of universities' in Socialism in Tanzania, SAUL and CLIFF Vol. 2, Nairobi, East Africa Publishing House, 1972, p. 286.
82. The ultimatum stated "we shall not accept national Service in spirit". - Let our bodies go but our souls will remain outside this scheme and the battle between the political elite and the educated elite will perpetually continue....." NYERERE response was to revise the salaries i.e. slash the high ones, but National Service remained compulsory for anybody entering government service.
83. COULSON, Tanzania a Political Economy op cit p. 217.
84. MBILIN YI Contradictions in Tanzania Education Reforms, COULSON eds op cit p. 223.
85. MBILIN YI ibid p. 223-224.
86. SAMOFI, Education in Tanzania, Class Formation and Reproduction, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 17, No. 7, 1979.
87. ANTHONY O'CONNOR, "The rate of urbanization in Tanzania in the 1970's, MICHAEL HODD ed. Tanzania after Nyerere op cit p. 136-142.
88. JOHN CAMPBELL, 'The World Bank Urban Shelter Projects in Tanzania, a partnership in development of self reliance' in MICHAEL TODD ed. Tanzania after Nyerere ibid p. 143-154.
89. CAMPBELL ibid.
90. O'CONNOR op cit.
91. CAMPBELL op cit.

92. Cited in LESLIE BLOCK 'The Political Process and Education', M HODD eds. op cit. p. 116.
93. LEONARD P SHAIIDI, 'Tanzania - the Human Resource Development Act 1983 - A desperate measure to contain a Desperate situation'. Review of African Political Economy ROAPE No. 31 Dec. 1984.
94. NYERERE, 'Arush Declaration 10 years after' in A. CULSON ed. African Socialism in Practice : The Tanzanian Experience, Nottingham Spokesman, 1979.
95. SHAIIDI op cit.
96. COULSON, Tanzania A Political Economy op cit p. 207-211.
97. A COULSON, Tanzania, A Political Economy op cit p. 214.
98. MBILINI YI cited in CHRISTINA OBBO African Women thier Struggle for economic Independence, London Zed Press, 1980.
99. NYERERE, Ujamaa p. 30.
100. KOKUHIRWA, 'Role and Status of Women in Tanzania', cited in S. ELLEN CHARLTON, Women in Third World Development, Boulder and London, West View Press, 1984 p. 191.
101. MAURA RAFFERTY, 'Women Development and Adult Education in Tanzania', in MICHAEL HODD (ed) Tanzania after Nyerere, op cit. p. 128.
102. HANNAN ANDERSSON 'Impossible Equation' cited in M HODD (ed) op cit p. 129.
103. 'Institute of Adult Education Proposal' cited in ibid.
104. MAURA RAFFERTY - Women Development and Adult Education in Tanzania, ibid.

105. PETER KAMUZORA, "Redifining Occupational Health for Tanzania"; Review of American Political Economy, ROAPE, No.36, Sept. 1986.
106. NASEER ABDUL GAMAL, Egypt's Liberation : The Philosopy of Revolution, Washington Public Affairs Press, 1955.
107. J SAMOFF, Tanzania Local Politics and Structures of Power, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1974 p. 69.
108. SAMOFF 1974 op cit p. 52.
109. TORDOFF, Government and Politics in Africa, London Macmillan Press 1984, p. 111.
110. NYERERE, "Democracy and Party System" in Freedom of Unity OUP, p. 202-203.
111. NYERERE, Ujamaa Essays on Socialism, Dar-es-Salaam, Govt Printer, p. 11.
112. MILOVAN DJILAS, The New Class, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1957.
113. VON FREYHOLD op cit. 1977.
114. ISSA G SHIVJI, Class Struggles in Tanzania, London, Dar-es-Salaam 1975, Tanzania Publishing House 1975, MICHAELA VON FREYHOLD. 'Post Colonial State in its Tanzanian Version', Review of African Political Economy, London 1977 pp. 75-90, JOHN SAUL, The State in Post Colonial Societies, Tanzania, Socialist Register, 1974, IRVING LEONARD MARKOVITZ, Power and Class in Africa, An introduction to change and Conflict in African Politics, Eaglewood Cliffs, N. Jersey 1977.



## CHAPTER IV

### CONCLUSION - NATURE OF THE CONTEMPORARY STATE

1. This has been elaborated upon in the Chapter III, Part I on 'Ujamaa Vijijini'.
2. JOHN CART WRIGHT, Political Leadership in Africa, Croomhelm and St. Martins Press, London & New York 1983 p.173
3. Early in 1974 only some 2.5 million people were living in villages and that figure included some who had always been village dwellers. This also included the people who had been compulsorily uprooted in 1971 in the first of a number of 'military style operations' - from 1973 to 1977 some 11 million people were incorporated into new villages although perhaps less than half of this number were physically uprooted.
4. MARJORIE MBILINYI "Contradictions in Tanzanian Education Reform". Andrew Coulson (ed) op cit 1979.
5. COULSON, Tanzania, A Political Economy op cit
6. CLAUDE AKE, 'The congruence of Political Economics and Ideologies in Africa, in Gutkind and Wallenstien (ed) The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa, London, Sage Publication 1976 p.198-211
7. JOEL SAMOFF, Tanzania Local Political and Structure of Power, London Wisconsin Press 1974 p 227
8. SAMIR AMIN cited in Samoff ibid p 227
9. DUDLEY SEERS in BARNETT & MULLEN, Global Reach, Power of Multi National Corporations, Sigmond & Schuster, New York, 1974
10. NNOLI OKWNDIBA, Self Reliance & Foreign Policy in Tanzania New York, London, Nok Publishers 1978, p 216-217
11. cited in ibid

12. MOHIDDIN Points out ('Socialism & Class Concepts in African Development, Africa Quarterly, New Delhi Vol IX No.2 July September 1969) that <sup>due to the</sup> loss of their financial position and other privileges which could have compensated for their loss of income, the top bureaucrats could succumb to subtle persuasion and compelling pressure of their corrupt counterparts. Though it is true that socialist and egalitarian ethics have to some extent provided a protective shield against these corrupting pressures, and in this the guideline in 1971 went in a big way towards ensuring the letter and the spirit of the Declaration were implemented.
13. CRAWFORD YOUNG, Ideology and Development in Africa, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1982, p 16.
14. World Bank, World Development Report, 1981 Table I.
15. ibid
16. FRANCIS HILL. Ujamaa: African Socialist Productionism in the Third World, Praeger Publishers Inc, New York 1975
17. CLAUDE AKE, Political Economy of Africa 1986. Infact Ake says "the state of development of productive forces in Africa threatens to turn socialism into a caricature.
18. cited in CARTWRIGHT JOHN, Political Leadership in Africa Croomhelm & St Martins Press, London & New York 1983 p 180
19. cited in bid.
20. SAMOFF "The Bureaucracy and the Bourgeoisie, Decentralization and Class structure in Tanzania", Comparative studies in Society and History, 25, 1, 1979, p.36.
21. elaborated in Chapter III part I on Ujamaa Vijijini
22. SS MUSHI, Popular Participation and Regional Development Planning - cited in Andrew COULSON, Tanzania, a Political Economy op cit p 319

23. WILLIAM TORDOFF, Government and Politics in Africa, London, Macmillan 1984 p 271.
24. SUZANNE MUELLER, "Retarded Capitalism in Tanzania" - Socialist Register, 1980.
25. CLAUDE AKE, "Congruence of Political Economies and Ideologies in Africa; in Gutkind and Wallenstien (ed) Political Economy of Contemporary Africa, London, Sage Publications 1976 p 198-211.
26. HAMZA ALAVI: Characterization of nature of post colonial states viz.
- a) inheritance of an over developed apparatus of state and its institutional practices through which the operations of social classes are regulated and controlled.
  - b) apart from colonial-legacy, the contemporary production whereby the state appropriates a large part of the economic surplus and deploys it in bureaucratically directed economic activities in the name of promoting economic development.
27. SAUL, "The State in post colonial Societies", Tanzania, Socialist Register, 1974
28. Tanzanian State is over developed not in response to a need to subordinate the native social classes.
29. FRANTZ FANON, Wretched of the Earth, London, Penguin, 1963 p. 122
30. N. POLANTZAS, cited in Saul op cit p 354.
31. ANDREW COULSON, Tansania, a Political Economy, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1982 p 322.
32. ISSA G SHIVJI, op cit.
33. ibid

34. HENDEY MAPOLU, cited in Saul op cit p 363,
35. VON FREYHOLD MICHAELA 'Post Colonial state , its Tanzanian version', Review of African Political Economy
36. NIZERS is a precise and dialectical term. It refers  
 (1) firstly to the progressive aspect of Africanization, to the promise that those who take over power would return this power to the people on whose behalf they took it away from colonialists.  
 (2) secondly it refers to the fact that nizers have not created the existing socio-economic structure but have taken it over either adapting it or changing the built-in dependency on Imperialism.  
 (3) it refers thirdly to the negative possibility that the original promises are not held that the structure is not changed, that those who have taken power will usurp it for themselves.
37. SUZANNE MUELLER, "Retarded Capitalism in Tanzania", Socialist Register, 1980
38. A.B. BABU, African Socialism or Socialist Africa London Zed Press, 1981 p xi-xv.
39. NARODINICS, a romantic and utopian socialists influences by French utopian socialists of early 19th century who imagined the path of socialism was through a semi feudal peasant community. They idealised the village community, the obschina or Mir (which also meant in Russian "the world" which shows the limits of peasant world outlooks, whereby the village community for them constituted the world. 'It was their world!' as Babu points out) and longed to take society back to the innocence of early communal life, unspoiled by penetration of capitalism.
40. GREEN, cited in Saul, op cit 355-359
41. CRANFORD PRATT, State of Nations, in Cliff and Saul (ed) op cit.

# APPENDIX

## TABLE I.1

*Tanganyika: Agricultural Exports 1913 and 1938*

Produce	1913			1938		
	Quantity ('000 tons)	Value (£'000)	Percentage of total value	Quantity ('000 tons)	Value (£'000)	Percentage of total value
Sisal	20.9	536	30	101.4	1 425	38
Rubber	1.3	309	18	—	—	—
Hides and Skins	3.4	275	15	3.0 <sup>a</sup>	160	4
Copra	5.5	117	7	4.0	32	1
Cotton	2.2	98	5.5	9.1	380	10
Groundnuts	9.9	96	5	3.6	31	1
Beeswax	0.6	71	4	0.7	55	2
Coffee	1.1	47	3	13.8	386	10
Sesame	1.5	20	1	5.3	53	1
Rice	0.5	9	0.5	8.2	91	3
Sugar	—	—	—	4.0	40	1
Others <sup>b</sup>	n.a.	200	11	n.a.	1 055	28
<b>Total</b>	<b>46.3<sup>c</sup></b>	<b>1 778</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>152.7<sup>c</sup></b>	<b>3 708</b>	<b>100</b>

<sup>a</sup> Hides only.

<sup>b</sup> Mainly minerals and forest products; gold accounted for 16% of total exports in 1938.

<sup>c</sup> Excluding others.

Source: Annual Reports of the Department of Agriculture (adapted from Leubuscher 1944: 204).

## TABLE I.2

*Wage rates by province 1927 and 1940  
(shillings per month)*

Province	1927	1940
<i>Unskilled labour</i>		
Northern	10-30	7-15
Lake	6-24	6-20
Western	7.5-24	5-12
Central	10-18	5-12
Eastern	15-30	6-21
Southern	10-26	8-15
S. Highlands	5-15	6-12
Tanga	15-30	9-18
<i>Semi-skilled labour</i>		
Northern	18-30	15-30
Lake	10-30	9-50
Western	12-40	9-50
Central	15-45	10-30
Eastern	20-60	10-60
Southern	15-40	9-60
S. Highlands	10-45	10-30
Tanga	24-50	10-35
<i>Skilled labour</i>		
Northern	30-80	30-100
Lake	40-120	30-200
Western	20-150	23-80
Central	30-100	20-99
Eastern	20-180	30-100
Southern	25-90	15-100
S. Highlands	30-105	20-150
Tanga	40-120	20-200

Note: The rates for 1927 include an allowance for payment of rations in kind. In 1940 an amount varying from 3 shillings per month to 15 shillings should be added to make the figures comparable.

Source: Annual Reports of the Labour Department 1927 and 1940.

TABLE I.3

Production of coffee in Bukoba and cotton in Mwanza,  
1924-34

Year	Bukoba coffee (tons)	Mwanza cotton (lb)
1924	3 535	2 128 694
1925	4 150	2 975 300
1926	4 637	4 290 300
1927	3 943	2 848 000
1928	7 826	2 880 000*
1929	6 794	2 961 602
1930	7 368	3 325 600
1931	6 586	2 604 597
1932	7 111	3 100 000
1933	7 922	6 060 000
1934	10 210	10 585 200

\* First year of rail connection to Mwanza, and figures are incomplete.

Source: Tanganyika Agriculture Department Reports, reprinted in Ralph A. Austen, *Northwest Tanzania under German and British Rule: Colonial Policy and Tribal Politics, 1889-1939* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

TABLE I.4

Numbers of registered primary co-operative societies 1959

Province	African marketing co-operatives	Other types of co-operative	Total membership
Lake	324	1	130 382
West Lake	76	1	80 402
Southern Highlands	55	2	31 945
Northern	54	4	47 575
Southern	31	—	15 440
Eastern	27	7	9 522
Tanga	6	2	9 412
Central	—	1	116
Western	—	1	200
Total	573	19	324 994

Source: Annual Report on Co-operative Development, 1959

TABLE I.5

Industrial Establishments and Manufacturers in Tanganyika  
1914-1945

	1914	1921	1931	1939	1945
<i>Agricultural processing for export</i>					
Cotton ginneries	n.a.	12	29	34	35 (3937)
Sisal decortication	n.a.	n.a.	9	120	126 (n.a.)
Tea factories	—	—	1	4	6 (n.a.)
Coffee curing	—	—	—	10	11 (n.a.)
Rubber factories	—	—	—	—	12 (n.a.)
Meat products	—	—	1	—	—
<i>Agricultural processing for internal use</i>					
Flour mills	4	4	32	55	103 (1314)
Rice mills	—	—	17	24	
Oil mills/soap factories	4	6	27	27	72 (590)
Copra drying	—	—	—	3	5 (100)
Sugar jaggery	—	—	5	3	21 (n.a.)
Creameries/ghce factories	—	—	—	77	312 (1721)
Tannery	—	—	—	—	1 (310)
Bacon curing	—	—	1	1	3 (69)
<i>Manufacture for local market</i>					
Salt	2	2	7	6	10 (1084)
Cigarette & tobacco factories	1	1	1	4	4 (325)
Bakeries	—	—	—	38	44 (190)
Ice and soda-water	3	3	46	46	30 (133)
Beer	—	—	—	1	1 (130)
Sawmills	—	—	18	22	29 (1696)
Furniture makers	2	2	22	48	30 (210)
Fibre board factory	—	—	—	—	1 (300)
Lime burning	1	2	13	11	14 (732)
Pottery	—	1	—	—	—
Jewellers	14	14	17	7	10 (20)
Printers	2	2	10	10	11 (75)
<i>Miscellaneous</i>					
Power stations	—	—	—	6	6 (201)
Others	—	—	12	26	8 (218)
Total	33	49	269	583	905

Note: The figures in brackets show numbers of employees. For the factories with figures available, the average number of employees in 1945 was 18.4.

Source: Adapted from *Tanganyika Territory Blue Books*, 1921, 1931, 1939, 1945

TABLE I.6

## Numbers in School 1926-1956

	European			Asian			African			Total
	Years 1-6	Years 7-12	Total	Years 1-6	Years 7-12	Total	Unassisted Years 1-4	Government assisted Years 1-6	Government assisted Years 7-12	
1926	580	—	580	1 360	—	1 360	162 806	5 843	—	168 649
1936	725	—	725	3 742	293	4 035	191 061	30 570	26	221 657
1946	599	—	599	7 277	1 547	8 824	n.a.	115 516	1 446	n.a.
1956	1 929	464	2 393	14 461	5 586	20 047	84 300	345 014	13 857	443 171

Source: Morrison (1976: Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, pp. 45 and 46)

TABLE II.1

Some Relevant NDC Growth Indicators Between 1966 and 1972

	Employment	Wage Bill	Sales	Taxes	Net Investment
	(in million shillings)				
1966	11,360	53.0	311.5	20.2	117.0
1967	17,460	89.3	805.7	145.9	211.0
1968	22,030	104.9	724.3	176.6	311.1
1969	16,170	94.8	710.6	179.9	260.7
1970	18,030	99.7	968.6	194.2	333.5
1971	18,640	109.7	1,062.1	156.4	429.7
1972	22,960	144.4	1,422.8	181.4	450.8

Source: NDC Annual Report (1973), p. 40.

TABLE II.2

NDC Net Investments in Relation to New Jobs Created Between 1966 and 1972

	Net Investment (million Shillings)	Changes in Employment
1966	117.0	-
1967	211.0	6,100
1968	311.1	4,570
1969	260.7	-5,860
1970	333.5	1,860
1971	429.7	610
1972	450.8	4,320

Source: *Ibid.*

TABLE II.3

Growth of parastatal assets 1964-1971  
(millions of shillings)

Sector	Value of assets in 1964	Investments		New companies 1964-71	Value of assets in 1971
		in existing parastatals 1964-71	Nationalizations 1964-71		
Manufacturing	25	211	324	549	1109
Mining	241	70	-	-	311
Construction	25	137	-	-	162
Electricity	231	294	-	-	525
Transport	-	80	-	288	368
Tourism	15	13	1	128	157
Commerce	13	142	347	12	514
Agriculture	56	60	120	14	250
Finance	4	67	96	16	183
Total	610	1074	888	1007	3579
Per cent of total in 1971	17	30	25	28	100

Source: Clark (1978: 109).

TABLE II.4

Regular wage employment 1969 and 1974

	1969	1974
Parastatals	42 522	90 220
Private sector	107 614	101 132
Public services	75 444	171 289

Source: Bureau of Statistics (cited by Collier 1977: Table 3)



TABLE II.5

*Stages in Development of Ujamaa Village by Region*

Region	Number of Villages			
	Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 3	Total
Arusha	38	5	1	44
Coast	31	26	1	58
Dodoma	132	17	1	150
Iringa	349	-	1	350
Kigoma	93	15	-	108
Kilimanjaro	9	2	-	11
Lindi	162	26	-	188
Mara	226	20	4	250
Mbeya	191	-	3	194
Morogoro	21	2	1	22
Mtwara	651	21	-	672
Mwanza	38	3	-	41
Ruvuma	105	15	-	120
Shinyanga	131	1	-	132
Singida	42	15	-	57
Tabora	35	43	4	82
Tanga	113	32	1	146
West Lake	43	-	-	43
Total	2,410	243	17	2,668

Source: *Economic Survey 1970-71*

TABLE II.6

*Ujamaa Village Statistics (Continued)*

Region	In December, 1971 Stages			Registered Co-operative Societies May, 1972*	
	I	II	III	Full	provisional
Arusha	47	11	1	1	-
Coast	(95)	-	(26)	28	1
Dodoma	227	17	2	15	22
Iringa	628	-	23	59	4
Kigoma	(117)	(15)	-	1	-
Kilimanjaro	11	-	-	-	-
Mara	308	54	14	22	-
Mbeya	490	3	-	6	-
Morogoro	112	-	1	1	-
Mtwara	727	21	-	-	-
Lindi	524	66	2	-	-
Mwanza	(124)	3	-	-	-
Ruvuma	(190)	(15)	-	-	-
Shinyanga	150	-	-	1	-
Singida	194	7	-	5	-
Tabora	59	2	20	12	-
Tanga	96	35	1	1	-
West Lake	26	12	8	8	-
All Regions	4,125	261	160	160	27

\*The number of villages registered as Co-operative Societies has been provided by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies.

~~TABLE III.1~~  
Spearman Correlation Coefficients for Ujamaa Villages

	Ujamaa Villages	Percent of Regional Population in Ujamaa Villages
Subsistence agriculture	.238	-.111
Export agriculture	-.319	-.590
Market agriculture	-.302	-.556
Food crops marketed	-.047	-.007
Livestock sales	.391	.161
Primary school enrollment	-.560	-.715
Government per capita expenditures on medical services	-.264	.106

~~TABLE III.2~~

Number of *ujamaa* villages and total members by region\*

Region	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
Arusha	25	59	92	95	110
	5200	14018	19818	20112	25356
Coast	56	121	185	188	236
	48300	93503	111636	115382	167073
Dodoma	75	246	299	336	354
	26400	239366	400330	378915	504952
Iringa	350	651	630	659	619
	11600	216200	207502	243527	244709
Kigoma	34	132	129	132	123
	6700	27200	114391	115672	111477
Kilimanjaro	9	11	24	24	14
	2700	2616	5009	4934	3176
Mara	174	376	376	271	111
	84700	127371	127370	108068	233632
Mbeya	91	493	713	715	534
	32900	64390	98571	103677	86051
Morogoro	19	113	116	118	96
	6000	10513	23951	19732	25509
Lindi	285	592	626	589	339
	70673	203128	175082	169073	218888
Mtwara	465	748	1088	1103	1052
	173027	371560	441241	466098	534126
Mwanza	28	127	211	284	153
	4600	18641	32099	49846	40864
Ruvuma	120	205	205	242	184
	9000	29433	29430	42385	62736
Shinyanga	98	150	123	108	134
	12600	12265	15292	12052	18425
Singida	16	201	263	263	317
	6800	51230	59420	59420	141542
Tabora	52	81	148	174	156
	16700	18408	25115	29295	28736
Tanga	37	132	245	245	255
	7700	35907	77858	77957	67557
W. Lake	22	46	83	85	77
	5600	9491	16747	13280	15968
Rukwa†	-	-	-	-	121
Dar es Salaam†	-	-	-	-	24988
	-	-	-	-	25
	-	-	-	-	4713
TOTAL	1956	4484	5556	5631	5016
	531200	1545240	1980862	2028144	2560472

\* First figure refers to number of villages; second figure, to total members

† Regions created in 1973: Dar es Salaam out of Coast, and Rukwa out of Mbeya and Tabora Regions

Source: Prime Minister's Office, Planning and Research Division

TABLE III.3

## Distribution of Ujamaa Villages, March 1974

Region	No. of Ujamaa Villages	Average population per village	Approximate Population	
			Total population in Ujamaa Villages	Percentage of regional population living in Ujamaa Villages
Arusha	41	200	9,000	1.3
Coast	38	946	55,000	6.0
Dodoma	150	410	17,000	5.9
Iringa	350	240	84,000	10.8
Kigoma	108	300	32,000	6.3
Kilimanjaro	11	190	2,100	0.3
Lindi	188	420	79,000	18.3
Mara	250	380	95,000	15.5
Mbeya	194	260	50,000	4.6
Morogoro	22	240	5,000	0.7
Mtwara	672	420	282,000	44.1
Mwanza	41	190	8,000	0.7
Ruvuma	120	100	12,000	2.7
Shinyanga	132	100	13,000	1.3
Singida	57	230	13,000	2.7
Tabora	82	240	20,000	3.2
Tanga	146	160	23,000	2.7
West Lake	43	250	11,000	1.5
Total	2,668	315	840,000	6.3

\*The figures for Dodoma exclude most of the new villages which are being established as a result of the current mass mobilization campaign (q.v.)

Source: *Economic Survey 1970-71* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer).

TABLE III.4

## Distribution of Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania by Regions, March 1973

Regions	Number of Villages	Village Population	Average per Village	% of Villages to Population
Arusha	95	20,112	212	3.3
Coast	188	115,382	613	22.6
Dodoma	336	378,915	1,128	53.4
Iringa	659	243,527	370	35.4
Kigoma	129	144,391	1,119	30.4
Kilimanjaro	24	4,934	206	0.8
Lindi	589	169,093	287	40.2
Mara	271	108,068	399	19.8
Mbeya	715	103,677	145	10.7
Morogoro	118	19,732	167	2.9
Mtwara	1,103	466,098	423	75.0
Mwanza	284	49,846	176	4.7
Ruvuma	242	42,385	175	10.7
Shinyanga	108	12,052	112	1.3
Singida	263	59,420	226	12.9
Tabora	174	29,295	168	5.2
Tanga	245	77,957	318	10.1
West Lake	85	13,280	156	2.0
Totals	5,628	2,024,418	361	16.9

Source: *Economic Survey 1972-73* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1973).

TABLE III.5

*Growth rates in GDP and Selected Sectors*

	1967-73	1967-70	1970-73
GDP (factor cost)	4.5	4.3	4.7
Agriculture	2.7	2.7	2.6
Manufacturing	7.6	7.8	7.4
Transport and Communications	8.8	10.8	6.8
Construction	5.5	4.1	6.7
Public Administration and Services	7.7	5.3	10.2

Source: *World Bank Report on Tanzania, 1977*, Table 4, p. 6.

TABLE III.6

*Fixed Capital Formation by Industry (per cent shares)*

	1966-69	1970-73	1966-73
Agriculture	9.6	5.8	7.1
Manufacturing and Mining	16.4	15.7	15.9
Electricity and Water Supply	6.0	8.2	7.6
Transport and Communications	35.9	46.9	43.9
All Other	31.5	23.4	26.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: *World Bank Report on Tanzania, 1977*, Table 9, p. 7.

TABLE III.7

*Balance of Trade (Tanzania Mainland) 1965-1977*  
(Millions of shillings)

Year	Exports	Imports	Trade balance
1965	1400	1335	65
1966	1878	1691	187
1967	1760	1625	135
1968	1657	1834	-177
1969	1640	1659	-19
1970	1713	2232	-519
1971	1777	2678	-901
1972	2025	2806	-781
1973	2302	3410	-1108
1974	2719	5137	-2417
1975	2434	5424	-2990
1976*	4108	5355	-1247
1977*	4482	6160	-1712

\* Including Zanzibar

Sources: IBRD (1977: Table 3.1) and Bank of Tanzania, *Economic and Operations Report*, June 1978, Table 20

**TABLE : III . 9**

*Balance of Trade (Tanzania Mainland) 1965-1977*  
(Millions of shillings)

Year	Exports	Imports	Trade balance
1965	1400	1335	65
1966	1878	1691	187
1967	1760	1625	135
1968	1657	1834	-177
1969	1640	1659	19
1970	1713	2232	-519
1971	1777	2678	-901
1972	2025	2806	-781
1973	2302	3410	-1108
1974	2719	5137	-2417
1975	2434	5424	-2990
1976*	4108	5355	-1247
1977*	4482	6160	-1712

\* Including Zanzibar

Sources: IBRD (1977: Table 3.1) and Bank of Tanzania, *Economic and Operations Report*, June 1978, Table 20

**TABLE : III . 10**

*Finance of trade deficits (Tanzanian mainland) 1970-1977*  
(Millions of shillings)

Year	Financed from.				
	Trade deficit	Income from services (net)	Transfers, grants, loans and SDRs (net)	Reductions in reserves	Unexplained residual
1970	519	226	603	114	-425
1971	901	209	1131	34	-473
1972	781	256	338	-390	76
1973	1108	130	944	-215	248
1974	2417	152	1632	606	28
1975	2990	451	2126	68	345
1976*	1247	466	1006	-156	-69
1977*	1712	602	2036	-992	56

\* Includes Zanzibar

Sources: IBRD and Bank of Tanzania.

TABLE : III . 11

Gross domestic produce at factor cost at constant (1966) prices  
1965-1977  
(Millions of shillings)

	1965	1968	1971	1974	1977*	Trend growth rates (percentage per annum)		
						1965-71	1971-7	
Gross material product	3184	3824	4102	4306	5172	4.3	3.9	
Electricity and water supply		53	72	96	127	150	10.4	-7.7
Transport, storage, and communications	400	618	814	958	1085	12.5	-4.9	
Construction	198	309	380	413	374	11.5	-1.0	
Trade and tourism	710	912	972	1068	1143	5.4	-2.7	
Finance and property	570	629	685	789	859	3.1	-3.8	
Public administration and other services	658	764	952	1359	1804	6.3	11.2	
Gross domestic product at factor cost	5773	7128	8001	9020	10 587	5.6	-4.8	

\* Provisional

† Less imputed bank charges.

Source: *Economic Survey 1977/8*, Table 3.

TABLE : III . 13

Allocation of central government expenditure

	1967/8		1976/7*	
	millions of shillings	per cent	millions of shillings	per cent
Agriculture	143.7	10.2	705.7	10.8
Industry	16.8	1.2	444.4	6.8
General administration	269.5	19.1	803.9	12.3
Public order and safety	116.7	8.3	351.7	5.4
Defence	88.2	6.3	910.0	13.9
Education	194.0	13.8	1003.1	15.3
Health and social security	86.3	6.1	525.1	8.0
Housing	41.7	3.0	22.6	0.3
Water and electricity	69.8	5.0	545.4	8.3
Transport and communication	154.0	10.9	446.1	6.8
Other services	32.5	2.3	235.4	3.6
Pensions	48.0	3.4	82.0	1.3
Purchases of financial assets	14.7	1.0	72.5	1.1
Debt service	133.2	9.5	488.3	7.4
Total	1409.1	100	6536.7	100

\* Provisional.

Sources: *Economic Surveys*, Table 18.

TABLE : III . 12

## Production in selected industries, 1966-1978

Commodity	Unit	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Textiles	'000 sq. metres	14 315	14 497	28 871	46 260	58 412	67 008	74 136	80 763	86 399	87 435	82 716	77 232	83 456
Beer	'000 litres	15 816	23 275*	31 185*	33 140*	38 601*	53 915*	64 823*	62 234	63 659	64 264	69 511	75 129	85 764
Cigarettes	millions	2 049	2 044	2 137	2 336	2 599	2 923	3 285	2 890	4 649	3 511	3 625	4 064	4 359
Cement	tonnes	—	146 910	156 338	167 632	176 826	179 313	236 956	314 000	296 000	266 000	244 339	246 500	272 000
Petroleum	tonnes	463 143	642 150	637 393	626 403	684 151	716 524	763 083	731 000	753 000	669 000	746 423	610 586	590 000
Iron sheets	tonnes	11 987	13 265	13 261	13 516	17 484	21 869	20 800	20 800	26 000	25 617	25 943	27 506	30 183
Enamelware	'000 pieces	5 306	3 841	4 881	5 608	5 436	5 561	4 267	4 150	1 378	2 657	2 183	2 838	2 331
Blankets	'000 sq. metres	3 444	3 584	3 577	3 644	4 154	4 077	4 583	5 476	2 686	4 309	3 676	3 514	2 706
Fishnets	tonnes	109	108	127	148	303	286	229	524	463	210	248	528	n.a.
Aluminium	tonnes	2 666	1 524	2 073	2 323	2 701	3 427	3 602	3 332	3 660	3 247	3 446	4 005	4 048
Sisal ropes	tonnes	10 332	15 126	16 718	18 724	20 404	23 138	22 575	25 354	29 496	25 492	42 377	36 535	31 423
Pyrethrum extract	tonnes	203	291	190	177	110	177	204	156	148	189	138	128	62
Wheat flour	tonnes	40 351	41 820	42 916	42 075	43 119	50 002	47 459	51 979	34 194	35 185	32 690	30 975	37 940
Canned meat	tonnes	9 310	9 673	6 824	6 988	7 980	8 362	4 878	1 401	4 740	2 193	1 650	580	764
Batteries	'000 pieces	—	—	5 543	11 278	15 026	24 012	36 552	45 049	48 001	50 301	52 870	64 684	70 914
Shoes	'000 pairs	—	—	1 490	2 200	2 100	1 600	2 157	2 320	2 800	2 700	3 689	6 331	6 383
Rolled steel	tonnes	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4 776	8 591	9 298	10 500	11 912	16 423
Chibuku	'000 litres	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7 092	6 203	9 612	10 365	13 580	15 226
Fertilizer	tonnes	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	32 594	58 778	59 327	42 146	36 886	44 443
Konyagi	cases	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	56 127	42 500	52 200	52 966	60 333	50 233

\* Beer and Chibuku.

Source: Bank of Tanzania, *Economic Bulletin*, March and December 1978, Table 27.

TABLE : III . 14

*Some Basic Ratios for Majority Parastatals*

	Capital/ Value Added Shs.	Capital/ Labour Shs.'000	Wages/ Labour Shs.'000	Wages/ Value Added %	Return to Capital %	Profit Rate %	Value Added/ Labour Shs.'000
Manufacturing	2.5	38	6.5	43	23	13	15.2
Mining	2.9	103	10.4	29	25	20	35.8
Construction	3.0	23	5.7	75	8	1	7.6
Electricity	5.7	134	5.3	23	14	8	23.6
Finance	0.9	41	12.1	25	87	56	47.7
Transport	3.5	119	12.0	35	19	13	34.5
Tourism	9.3	56	5.5	92	1	-6	6.0
Commerce	0.9	30	8.8	27	80	60	33.2
Agriculture	5.5	12	1.6	75	5		2.1
Average	2.4	40	5.9	35	27	17	16.8

Source: Clark, Table IV-XIV, p. 190.



TABLE III.15

*Regional Location of Parastatals*

Region	Dar es Salaam	Kilimanjaro	Arusha	Tanga	Mwanza	Other
Assets (shs million) (1970)	402	27	47	128	85	203
% of Total	45%	3%	5%	14%	10%	25%
Value Added (shs million) (1971)	151	54	13	7	25	166
% of Total	41%	1%	4%	2%	7%	45%
Employment (1971)	125%	238	840	430	1730	9840
% of Total	49%	1%	3%	2%	7%	32%

Source: *Survey of Industrial Production 1970*, p. 72, unpublished data.

*Regional Location of all Industries, 1970*

Region	Coast	Kilimanjaro	Arusha	Tanga	Mwanza	Other
Value Added (shs million)	365	24	26	33	57	56
% of Total	65%	4%	5%	6%	10%	10%
Employment	22016	2537	3020	4127	4964	11735
% of Total	45%	5%	6%	9%	10%	25%
Population as % of Total	7%	6%	5%	6%	9%	27%

Source: *Survey of Industrial Production 1970*, p. 72, unpublished data.

*Urban Location of Parastatal Investment*

	First F.Y.P. shs million	%	Second F.Y.P. shs million	%
Dar es Salaam	350	58	603	35
Tanga	11	2	209	12
Arusha	5	1	80	5
Moshii	12	2	84	5
Mwanza	52	8	80	5
Sub-Total	430	71	1056	62
Other towns	178	29	645	38
Total Towns	608	100	1701	100
Towns as Share of total		57		64

Source: Clark, Table IV-XXI, p. 201.

TABLE III . 17  
Tanzanian performance in efforts to attain food self-sufficiency (All figures in million Tanzanian shillings, at current prices, unless otherwise designated)

Year	(1) Total imports*	(2) Food, beverages & tobacco imports*	(3) (2) as % of (1)	(4) GDP**	(5) (2) as % of (4)
1961	903.2	120.3	13.3	4,102	2.9
1962	902.1	131.0	14.5	4,454	2.9
1963	915.6	87.5	9.6	4,932	1.8
1964	952.9	90.2	9.5	6,030	1.5
1965	1,082.1	112.3	10.4	6,140	1.8
1966	1,360.7	133.7	9.8	7,042	1.9
1967	1,359.5	121.6	8.9	7,343	1.7
1968	1,531.7	108.6	7.1	7,874	1.4
1969	1,418.7	99.6	7.0	8,271	1.2
1970	1,939.2	109.3	5.6	9,173	1.2
1971	2,412.9	127.1	5.3	9,814	1.3
1972	2,595.9	227.2	8.8	11,172	2.0
1973	3,141.2	197.9	6.3	13,103	1.5
1974	5,429.3	990.9	18.3	15,994	6.2
1975	5,324.1	955.9	18.0	19,011	5.0
1976	4,738.8	334.9	7.1	23,139	1.4
1977	6,041.2	520.8	8.6	29,420	1.8
1978	8,775.7	495.8	5.7	33,580	1.5
1979	8,882.7	307.1	3.5	36,839	0.8
1980	9,927.3	1,197.7†	12.1	40,426	3.0

\*UN Department of Social and Economic Affairs, *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics*, various years.

\*\*IMF, *International Financial Statistics Yearbook*, 1979.

†Most of this was accounted for by a major increase of food-grains and cereals.

Data before 1968 are adjusted to include both mainland Tanzania (Tanganyika) and Zanzibar.

TABLE III . 17

Composition of total imports of Tanzania (percentage by type of goods)

Year	Consumer goods*	Intermediate goods**	Capital goods†	Total (million shillings)
1966	47.3	33.5	19.2	1,691
1967	35.6	40.7	23.7	1,625
1968	39.9	37.2	22.9	1,834
1969	37.5	40.6	21.8	1,710
1970	30.0	40.4	29.6	2,274
1971	25.3	44.4	30.7	2,725
1972	28.8	45.9	25.4	2,878
1973	30.4	45.8	23.8	3,479
1974	37.0	42.2	20.8	5,258
1975	24.2	48.4	27.3	5,694
1976	28.0	42.9	29.1	4,739
1977	24.7	42.2	33.1	6,041
1978	23.5	38.8	37.7	8,776
1979	22.3	34.4	43.2	8,883
1980	32.5	35.9	31.8	9,927

\* Includes a portion of passenger cars.

\*\* Includes building and construction, and spare parts (i.e. capital goods parts).

† Includes transport equipment and basic machinery.

SOURCE Tanzania, Bureau of Statistics, *The Economic Survey, 1975-1976* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1975) for 1966 through 1975. UN Department of Social and Economic Affairs, *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics*, for 1976 through 1980.

TABLE : III . 18

Commitments of external public loans and grants by sources, 1967-1975  
('000s of US dollars)

A. Type of Creator	Commitments									
	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	
<b>Suppliers' Credits</b>										
Private Bank Credits	15 451	2 400	1 384			4 200				
Public Issued Bonds										
Other Private Debt	6 228	2 973	16 860	5 194	523					
<b>Loans from International Organizations</b>	5 200	4 300	27 500	19 000	9 300	14 057	24 389	133 300	47 100	
African Development Bank						3 257	1 789			
Arab Fund for Econ. and Social Dev								7 100	7 100	
IBRD	5 200		7 000	30 000				65 000	30 000	
IDA		4 300	20 500	9 000	9 300	10 800	22 600	61 200	10 000	
<b>Loans from Government:</b>	17 794	20 404	48 762	232 530	25 393	47 117	82 757	127 136	91 269	
Bulgaria						3 000	3 000			
Canada	416		925	2 675	2 079	7 419	57 606		4 327	
China, People's Republic of		799	1 999	200 811		1 876		76 458		
Czechoslovakia									5 426	
Denmark	5 677				5 398			15 612	17 442	
Finland						5 285		2 662	7 611	
Germany, Fed. Rep. of		38			3 731		14 534	17 091	8 148	
India						6 595				
Israel		67								
Italy			10 000							
Japan		5 600				10 860				
Kuwait										
Netherlands					1 028	5 296	3 955	14 154	15 517	
Sweden	6 572		17 977	18 944	6 437				7 927	
United Kingdom	196					751			4 829	
United States	1 600	13 900		10 100	6 700	4 900	2 600		20 000	
USSR	3 333		16 665							
Zambia			1 196							
Multiple Lender:						1 135	1 062	1 159		
<b>Loans—Total</b>	44 674	44 971	104 646	279 810	36 026	65 374	107 146	260 436	138 369	
<b>Source of Grant:</b>										
<b>Multilateral Agencies</b>	2 990	2 990	3 050	4 480	3 300	4 490	5 110	6 600	10 130	
UN Development Programme								2 980	3 740	
UN Regular Programme	2 990	2 990	3 050			200	3 030	520	410	
UN Children's Fund				140	180	320	400	470	790	
UN FAO World Food				450	280	410	190	340	1 460	
UN High Commission on Refugees				3 400	2 210	2 780	1 360	2 290	3 480	
Other United Nations				490	630	780	100		250	
European Development Fund							30			
<b>Governments</b>	28 160	17 770	18 010	19 820	23 560	25 206	37 350	55 010	89 870	
Australia	120	90	100	100	80	80	80	150	790	
Austria	20	30	10	20	10	30	20			
Belgium		10	20	10	10	20		10	40	
Canada	1 430	1 790	1 670	1 460	2 340	3 480	3 910	3 490	6 130	
Denmark	730	760	850	1 280	1 480	2 680	4 080	5 520	8 840	
Finland									5 800	
Germany, Federal Republic of	5 150	3 220	3 620	3 540	4 180	3 620	5 620	7 790	10 550	
Italy	30	30	30	30	450		100	370	60	
Japan	20	180	250	330	670	710	730	1 020	1 880	
Netherlands					1 130	900	2 560	3 360	5 120	
New Zealand									30	
Norway	410	410	440	750	1 390	2 910	3 480	6 890	10 700	
Sweden	1 630	1 760	1 560	2 990	2 110	3 180	9 110	17 540	29 500	
Switzerland	20	60	220	180	410	170	210	470	310	
United Kingdom	7 620	2 430	4 240	4 130	4 300	3 420	3 450	3 400	3 060	
United States	11 000	7 000	5 000	5 000	5 000	4 000	4 000	5 000	7 000	
<b>Grants—Total</b>	31 170	20 760	21 060	24 300	26 860	29 690	42 460	61 610	100 000	

Source: IBRD.

TABLE : III . 19

Donor Country	Aid Debt
PRC	1,949,319,625
World Bank	821,266,042
Canada	413,348,338
USA	357,709,044
Sweden	337,425,060
W. Germany	175,605,880
USSR	172,334,800
UK	105,009,685
Denmark	98,560,000
Italy	91,621,276
Holland	54,864,100
India	46,725,000
Bulgaria	21,000,000
Zambia	20,629,328
Romania	7,349,300*
Finland	39,487,140
East Africa Power & Lighting Co	50,657,269
CDC	37,984,800
Soleh Boneh Co	5,621,911
UNDP	1,750,000
	TOTAL = 4,818,268,598

\* Yet to be disbursed.

Source: *Daily News*, March 15, 1974, p. 3.

TABLE : III . 20

*Aid Donors involved in Regional Planning 1975/7* ✓

Donor	Regions
Canada	Coast; Dar es Salaam; Dodoma
Denmark	West Lake
European Economic Community	Iringa*
FAO (UNDP)	Iringa
Finland	Lindi; Mtwara
Germany (Federal Republic)	Tanga
India	Singida
IBRD (World Bank)	Kigoma; Mara; Mwanza*; Shinyanga*; Tabora*
Japan	Kilimanjaro
Netherlands	Morogoro; Shinyanga
Norway	Mbeya
Sweden	Arusha; Mwanza; Tabora
United Kingdom	Lindi*; Mtwara*
USA	Arusha
Yugoslavia	Ruvuma

\* Donor invited to rewrite or finance plans prepared by another agency  
Source: adapted from Mushi (1978: 94) with additional information.

TABLE : III . 21

Donor Country	Interest Rate	Repayment Period	Grace Period
USSR	2½ %	12 yrs.	No Grace
W. Germany	3 %	20 yrs.	5 yrs.
Israel	6 %	8 yrs.	No Grace
Sweden	2 %	Over 15 yrs.	5 yrs.
Japan	5.75 %	Over 18 yrs.	5 yrs.
IDA	0 %	Over 50 yrs	10 yrs.
IBRD	3-6 %	Over 23 yrs.	3 yrs.
China	0 %	20 yrs.	10 yrs.
USA	1-2 %	40 yrs.	10 yrs.

Source: Compiled from Niblock, 'Aid and Foreign Policy.'

TABLE : III . 24

*Male Migrants: Education by Time of Arrival in Town 1970 (Percentages)*

	No Education	Some Education	Standards 1-4	Standards 5-8	Forms 1-6	University
Before Independence	33	67	29	28	9	1
After Independence	14	86	21	44	20	2

Source: Adapted from R.H. Sabot, 'Education, Income Distribution, and Rates of Urban Migration in Tanzania,' *Economic Research Bureau Paper 72.6*, University of Dar es Salaam, 1972.

TABLE : III . 25

*Table 5 Male Migrants: Rates of Urban Migration by Age and Education (Percentages)*

Age	No Education	Some Education	Standards 1-4	Standards 5-8	Forms 1-6	University
14-19	0.15	1.62	.60	2.65	5.0	3.33
25-34	0.28	1.88	.81	3.45	11.11	22.22
35-44	0.47	2.00	1.00	3.61	11.81	20.00
45-59	0.46	2.62	1.63	4.69	15.00	50.00
60 and Over	0.55	4.00	2.09	12.10	30.00	-

**TABLE : III . 22**

*Tanzanian trade policy: translating self-reliance into practice*

<i>Policy objectives</i>	<i>Policy measures</i>	<i>Policy outcomes</i>
<i>Disengagement</i>		
1. Reduce foreign control and ownership of major means of production	Nationalisation of export-import commercial activities	All large, foreign owned commercial enterprises nationalised in 1967. Subsequent nationalisation of importing enterprises in 1980.
2. Reduce reliance on export receipts for national income	State incentives and investments to transform domestic production	Export receipts begin decreasing shortly after independence. Only significant change in rate of decline after Arusha (during 1977) due to commodity price and cyclical production drops.
3. Reduce luxury consumer imports	Tariffs and STC import confinements applied to targeted luxury commodities	Mixed results: passenger car imports reduced, television sets banned, but luxury textile imports unchanged.
4. Attain self-sufficiency in agricultural production (eliminate food imports)	Considerable state investment in agricultural sector; <i>ujamaa</i> and villagisation schemes	Food imports have decreased only slightly since Arusha, and increased dramatically after two drought years.
<i>International restructuring</i>		
1. Diversify export market destinations	Establish STC agencies abroad, participate in international trade fairs, employ parallel trading in bilateral trade agreements.	Export market diversification has increased significantly since the Arusha Declaration.
2. Diversify import sources	STC to take control of imports, purchasing offices established abroad	Import source diversification has taken place, but is independent of post-Arusha policy measures.
3. Expand South-South linkages:		
(a) Expand trade with developing countries	Commercial attachés, special trade missions, foreign purchasing offices	Little success: only increases in trade value due to increased cost of petroleum imports.
(b) Expand trade with East Africa	East African Community established (with common external tariff and differential tariff policies)	East African trade decreased after 1967, EAC dismantled in 1977
(c) Cooperate with other developing countries in North-South negotiations	Policy coordination within UNCTAD and Lomé Conventions	Tanzania has been an active participant, but tangible benefits have not yet been received.
<i>Domestic restructuring</i>		
1. Establish 'appropriate institutions' to implement self-reliance	STC created to manage trade policy	STC dismantled in 1973 and 1974 due to ineffectiveness and mismanagement.
2. Reorient the internal market:		
(a) Diversify export commodities	Establish crop priorities, employ tax incentives, extension advice, political exhortation, and state investment for diversification efforts	Major primary export commodities remain unchanged, though some progress on export of manufactured goods. Most changes in specific primary commodities due to international market fluctuations, not government policy.
(b) Restructure import priorities	Use of tariffs, import licensing, and state investments to expand domestic output	Limited success: consumer imports have declined slightly relative to intermediate and capital goods.

**TABLE : III . 23**

*World Bank lending programme in Tanzania up to June 1978  
(US \$ million)*

	Fiscal year	IDA	IBRD
<i>Agriculture</i>			
Agricultural credit	1966	5.0	
Livestock development (beef)	1969, 1973	19.8	
Tobacco (including processing)	1971, 1977, 1978	31.0	
Smallholder tea	1971	10.8	
Geita cotton	1974	17.5	
Cashewnut processing	1974, 1978	23.0	21.0
Kilombero sugar	1975	9.0	9.0
Integrated regional development projects	1975, 1977, 1978	40.2	
National maize project	1976	18.0	
Dairy development	1976	10.0	
Fisheries	1977	9.0	
Forestry	1977		7.0
<i>Education</i>			
	1964, 1969, 1971, 1973, 1976	34.2	
<i>Infrastructure</i>			
Highways	1967, 1969, 1971, 1975	48.2	8.0
Hydroelectric power	1967, 1970, 1974, 1977		70.2
Morogoro water supply	1977		15.0
Low-cost housing	1975, 1978	20.5	
Trucking	1978	15.0	
<i>Industry</i>			
Tanzania Investment Bank	1974, 1976, 1978	6.0	30.0
Textiles	1975, 1978	25.0	35.0
Morogoro Industrial Complex	1977	11.5	11.5
<i>Programme Assistance (untied)</i>			
	1975, 1977	15.0	30.0
<i>Technical Assistance</i>			
	1976	6.0	
Subtotal		374.7	236.7
One-third share of loans to East African Community for railways, harbours, & telecommunications	1965-73		81.3
Total		374.7	318.0

Source: IBRD

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