

**NON-MILITARY THREATS TO SECURITY:
A CASE STUDY OF PAKISTAN (1988-1999)**

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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled, "**NON-MILITARY THREATS TO SECURITY: A CASE STUDY OF PAKISTAN (1988-1999)**" submitted by **W. RADHAPIYARI DEVI**, in partial fulfilment of the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy**, of this university is her original work. This dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this or any other university.

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Dedicated
To
My Late Father
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PREFACE

In the contemporary era the problem concerning threats emanating from non-military sources has drawn the attention of the world community. The non-military threat is so contagious that the threat emanating from a state may directly or indirectly affect regional or global community. Against the background of the changing dimensions of security threat pose by many countries, the present study attempts at analyzing the non-military threats faced by Pakistan during the year 1988 to 1999.

Though the significance of non-military threats to security has assumed recognition over the world, not much literature has been published in South Asian context, particularly Pakistan. Rather, the academic response is so far limited to a few pages articles. This has convinced me to undertake this present study. When the problem of non-military threats are increasing, one finds that Pakistan is the state which is more vulnerable to these threats than any other country in South Asia. An attempt has been made in the present study to analyse the non-military threats to Pakistan's security during the Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif administration (1988 – 1999).

The proposed study has the following objectives:

1. To define non-military threats to security and discuss various aspects of the threats in a theoretical perspective.
2. To identify the different dimensions of non-military security issues in Pakistan with their originating sources in historical perspectives.
3. To study how the internal disorders and unresolved social and political issues had undermined Pakistan's security.

4. To examine the fallout of ethno-nationalism, religious fundamentalism and the drug trafficking on the national security of Pakistan.
5. To analyse the security framework of Pakistan and the future prospects of Pakistan's security.

The first chapter will be theoretical in nature, beginning with the definition of non-military threats to security. The various aspects of these threats will also be analyzed in this chapter.

The second chapter looks at the challenge posed by the ethno-nationalist movement to Pakistan's security. The chapter focuses particularly on the rise and growth of MQM movement and its implication on national security.

In the third chapter, an attempt will be made to analyze the scope and impact of trafficking in illicit drugs. This chapter also analyses the growing nexus between the drug trade and weapons in the form of "narco-terrorism".

The fourth chapter will examine the evolving dynamic of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan. The chapter also examines the nature of threats posed by the religious groups to the country.

The conclusion will be derived from the above chapters. This chapter will evaluate the options and policy measures for resolving Pakistan's insecurity.

CHAPTER – 1

NON-MILITARY THREAT TO SECURITY- A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

INTRODUCTION:

The concept of non-military security threat emerged from the effort to widen and deepen the security agenda. Traditionally, security was about the military and the state. But the concept of non-military threat to security seeks to enhance security by identifying non-military sectors such as environment, human rights and human development, the economy and even health. Very often these threats jeopardized the economic development, social fabric and political stability of the nation.

In the post-cold war period therefore, non-military security moved to the centre stage, with groups and institutions set up to study it and conferences and seminars devoted to discussing it. In January 1992, the United Nation Security Council issued a declaration recognizing that economic, social, humanitarian and ecological sources of instability have become threats to peace and security. Scholars like Barry Buzan, Diertich Fischer, and Thomas Homer Dixon etc. have also identified various dimensions of non-military threats to security. Non-military threats comprehensively covers all the menaces that threatens human survival and daily life - for example, environmental degradation, violation of human rights, transnational organized crime (terrorism, religious fundamentalism), illicit drugs, refugees poverty, and infectious diseases such as AIDS etc.

This chapter attempts at building a theoretical framework that aptly defines non-military threat to security. The recognition of non-military issues as a threat to global stability, therefore, needs discussion on why these issues have considered a threat to global security and how it is originating.

BROADER CONCEPT OF THREAT

Threats in a general sense are defined as an expression of an intention to hurt, punish, and cause pain etc especially if one's instructions or demands are not obeyed. However, there is a widespread debate over what constitutes a threat to national security. Invasions and blockades clearly fall within the category, even though there are other broad areas that also threaten the state.

The first Commonwealth report attempts to define a threat to national security "as any type of specific action or situation which could damage national integrity".¹

Barry Buzan defines threats to states in three senses -

1. to the idea of the state (nationalism),
2. to the physical base of the state (population and resources), and
3. to the institutional expression of the state (political system).²

¹ The 1985 Commonwealth Report, p.23

² Barry Buzan, *People, State and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*, (London: Harvester Press Ltd,1983)p.40

He has also suggested that – the security of human collectivities is affected by factors in five major sectors: military, political, societal and environmental.³

In the second Commonwealth report, a revised definition was taken from Richard Ullman's *Works*. Developing Buzan's theme, he defined threats to national security as follows: -

A threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that:

1. threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of the state.
2. threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private non-governmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state.”⁴

On this perspectives, Caroline Thomas has stated that threats to security are not seen merely as threats to the physical existence of a state but also as to its cultural, societal, political and economic attributes. The security of the state is threatened on all levels: domestically, by different groups competing for power in a political system where consensus is often totally

³ Buzan describes **military security** as “the two level inter-play of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of the state and state’s perceptions of each other intentions”. **Political security** is described as that which “concerns the organizational stability of states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy.” **Economic Security** “concerns access to the resources, finance, and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power”. **Societal Security** “concerns the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom.” **Environmental security** “concerns the maintenance of the local and planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend.”

See. Barry Buzan, *People States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security studies in the Post-Cold War End*, 2nd Ed. (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991). Pp. 19-20.

⁴ Terry Terriff, Stuart Croft, Lucy James, Patrick M. Morgan, *Security Studies Today* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999) p.21

absent, and by the inability to provide secure systems of food and health care, employment and education for their people; and internationally by predatory powers (usually, but not always great powers) and by international institutions and multinational corporations eager to make policy decisions for small states.⁵

Considering the different components, which make up the state, threats can arise in many different areas. They can vary as to source, military or non-military but in order to count as security issues they have to meet strictly defined criteria that distinguish them.

MILITARY THREAT:

The military threat to security involves threats emanating from a clearly defined sovereign source, mainly from another country. These challenges have a particular geographic locus. The referent object is usually the state, though it may also be other kind of political entity.⁶

These threats broadly include such consideration as geo-strategic factor, military doctrine, the forces deployment posture, the weapon system capacity and also the interplay of defense and foreign policy objective of the other countries.⁷ It may come in many types. It can either be the direct military invasion and the occupation aimed at obliterating the state or a

⁵ Caroline Thomas, *In Search of Security- The Third World in International Relations* (Colorado: Lynne Publishers Inc, 1987) p.4

⁶ Buzan, n.2,p.75.

⁷ J.N. Dixit, "Emerging Perspectives", *Seminar*, September2002, p.25.

threat of force aimed at changing policies of the state.⁸ These threats can also be indirect, in the sense of not being applied to the state itself, but rather being directed at external interests. Threats to allies, shipping lanes, or strategically – placed territories would all come under this category. The threats usually have political objectives (seizure of territory, change of government institutions, manipulation of policy or behavior). In this regard, the threats may be in the form of punishment, the objective here usually being to force a change in government policy, rather than to seize territory or to overturn institutions.⁹ Nuclear deterrence is built on this principle.

As Paul B. Stares has asserted that ‘beyond independent initiatives, the military threat can entail entering into coalition and alliances with other states to offset a preponderant power bent on changing the status quo “balancing behavior” or if deemed preferable, allying with it “bandwagon behavior”’.¹⁰

NON-MILITARY THREATS:

Non-military threats are more of an unconventional nature and goes beyond military aspect and include political, economic, social, environment factors and inputs. Though these threats to security are diverse, Terry Terriff, Stuart Croft, Lucy James, Patrick M. Morgan have identified some common features such as:

⁸ Buzan (1983) n.2, p.75.

⁹ Ibid p.76.

¹⁰ Paul B. Stares, *The New Security Agenda- A Global Survey*, (Tokyo: Sapam Center for International Exchange, 1998) pp.12-13

1. For the most part they are not state-centered. Instead, they emanate from factors or actors, which are sub-state or trans-state in character.
2. They represent dangers, which are diffuse, multi dimensional and multidirectional.
3. Threats of this kind endangered individuals as well as states.¹¹

Thus, non-military threat can be defined as threat to national and international security and stability by non-state actors and non-governmental processes and organizations.¹² The nature, intensity and dynamism of these threats are not necessarily uniform. While many of them come to involve violence not all do. Those that manifest themselves in an aggressive manner are typically associated with the activities of non-state actors such as international crime syndicates, drug trafficking organisations and terrorist groups.¹³ Non-violent forces are more generally related to the threat posed by non-governmental processes and influences such as uncontrolled or illegal immigration, famine and transnational spread of diseases such as AIDS and cholera.¹⁴

All non-military issues, whether violent or not, represent a direct threat to the underlying stability and cohesion of modern sovereign state system. However, unlike the challenge posed by traditional security concerns such as overt external aggression, the non-military threat is of a

¹¹ Terriff, Croft, James, Morgan, n.4, P.67.

¹² Peter Chalk, *Non-Military Security and Global Order- The Impact of Extremism Violence and Chaos on National and International Security*, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000) p.2.

¹³ Ibid., p.2.

¹⁴ Ibid.,p.3.

somewhat more transparent and insidious nature. Peter Chalk has argued that this is because it typically stems from a context that exists outside formal state structures and only occasionally from an origin that can be directly linked to, or identified with, another policy, power faction or global ethno-religious bloc.¹⁵

According to Dietrich Fischer the common non-military threats of today include ethnic crisis, national and transnational terrorism, religious fundamentalism, atmospheric pollution, population, poverty, trans-border migration and redefinition of state sovereignty in accordance with the burgeoning trend of supra-nationalism.¹⁶

These threats can be identified according to sources from which it emanates. For instance, an internal threat may be conflict between different ethnic groups. The external sources may be pollution across a border, cross border movement of population etc. A typical example of a threat that stem from activities around the world is the green house effect.

In recent years, the security of the state, security studies etc have increasingly focused on non-military aspect of security. Theoretical traditions like peace studies, gender and post-positivist have been brought into security debate such as environment, economics, transnational criminal

¹⁵ Ibid.,p.3.

¹⁶ Dietrich Fischer, *Non-Military Aspects of Security- A System Approach* (England: Donmouth Publishing Company Ltd.1993) p.14.

organisations and population movements.¹⁷ Dietrich Fischer in his studies on non-military security had identified the following aspects on the subject:

Object of the threat:

The first aspect of non-military threats to security is the object of the threat. In this, distinction will be made whether the threat represents a threat to life itself or to the satisfaction of basic needs and the fulfillment of human aspirations. A five-fold classification is proposed in this respect.

They are threats to:

1. survival,
2. health,
3. economic well being,
4. a livable environment, and
5. political rights.¹⁸

Threats to Survival:

Threats to life stems not only from aggression from outside a country's borders, but also from domestic violence. Domestic violence can be in the form of common crimes and inter groups violence. Individual crimes may be a greater source of insecurity in many societies than the threat of war, but they rarely lead to inter-state war.¹⁹

A more serious threat to international peace than individual crimes is inter-ethnic strife or conflict between different groups in a society. If

¹⁷ Teriff, Croft, James, Morgan, n.4, p.17.

¹⁸ Fischer, n.16, p.16.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp.18-19.

people belonging to two different socio-economic groups also speak a different language, have a different religion and belong to a different ethnic group, the division between them can become very deep. Tensions stemming from various issues tend to accumulate and mutually reinforce one another. In the most acute cases, such polarization may lead to civil war or even genocide.²⁰

Conflict between different ethnic groups or adherents of different ideologies or religions can easily draw in outside powers. These powers may be national allies of one of the groups involved because of similar ethnic background, cultural or linguistic bond, or similar religious or political beliefs. If two foreign powers intervene to support different contending groups, the war can escalate.²¹

Sometimes, a group that feels oppressed by another group may not seek to seize power, but simply to gain local autonomy. If promises of granting autonomy are repeatedly betrayed, a group may seek to secede as soon as the opportunity arises.²²

The major resurgence of religious fundamentalism or terrorism is helping to create highly destabilizing sub-national communal conflicts. Many of these groups have involved armed factions that are prepared to utilize terrorist strategists as either on primary or secondary mode of

²⁰ Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.8 No.3, 1969, p.167

²¹ Ibid p.170.

²² Ibid p.180.

struggle.²³ It is particularly abhorred because it does not distinguish between combatants and civilians, and often strikes defenseless people who are totally uninvolved in the underlying conflict.²⁴

Threats to Health:

Threats to human health are mainly the result of negligence or national causes. But in some instances people deliberately endanger the health of others for personal gain. The sale of addictive drugs, toxic chemicals like pesticide and the export of toxic wastes to areas with less stringent regulation are known to be hazardous to human health.²⁵ Intravenous heroin and cocaine use is helping to foster the spread of one of the most lethal disease – AIDS.²⁶

Threats to Economic Well-being:

The causes of poverty are numerous. It generally found more in unjust social structures. However, there are also instances where people's economic well-being has been intentionally undermined out of greed. Some transnational corporations withhold patents from developing countries by patenting production processes without actually using them, simply to

²³ . Chalk, n.12, p.5

²⁴ Fischer, n.16,p.19

²⁵ Ibid p.20

²⁶ Chalk, n.12,p.47.

prevent local competitors from producing goods that compete with imports. Such practices hamper economic development severely.²⁷

Economic boycotts, embargoes and blockades have been used in lieu of military force to compel a country to change objectionable policies, such as minority rule.²⁸ It might turn out to be a boon in stimulating more rational energy policies and technologies over the longer run.²⁹

Export practices, import restrictions, price manipulations, default on debt currency controls, and a host of other actions may have serious effects on the economies of other states. These range from loss of income to the destruction of whole industries, but they all fall within the merciless norms of competitive economic activity.³⁰ In this sense, the economic expansion of a rival power might be seen as a broad-spectrum threat to the whole national security position.³¹

Threats to livable Environment:

Ecological problems can be a source of international tensions. Barry Buzan mentions that “ecological threats to one state might well stem from identifiable sources within another. Trans-frontier pollution is an

²⁷ Johan Galtung, On the effects of International Economic Sanctions: The case of Rhodesia, *World Politics*, Vol.19 No.3, 1967, p.110

²⁸ Fischer, n.16,p.21.

²⁹ Buzan (1983), n.2.,p.79.

³⁰ Ibid p.80.

³¹ Ibid.

obvious example and attempts at weather modification is another which may become of greater importance in the not too distant future.”³²

The continuing building of industrial gases in the earth’s outer atmosphere is thought to be impeding the national radiation of heat from the planet and thereby producing a gradual increase in global temperature – a process known as “greenhouse warming.”³³ If such warming continues, global sea levels will rise, deserts will grow and severe drought could afflict many important agricultural zones. Other forms of environmental degradation – the thinning of the earth’s outer ozone layer, the depletion of arable soil through over cultivation, the persistence of acid rain caused by industrial emissions could endanger human health and survival.

Pollution of the oceans through oil slicks, radioactive wastes and other discharges is a serious problem. Jacques Cousteau has warned that if the oceans ever die, as a number of fresh water lakes already have, life on the planet itself would be endangered.³⁴

Threats to Political Rights:

Denials of political rights and freedoms internally can lead to international tensions. Sovereignty can be threatened by things that question recognition, legitimacy, or governing authority.³⁵ A government that has

³² Ibid p.83.

³³ Michael T. Klare, “Redefining Security: The New Global Schisms”, *Current History*, November, 1996, Vol.95, No.604, p.357.

³⁴ Fischer, n.16.,p.26

³⁵ Barry Buzan , “Rethinking Security after the Cold War” , *Cooperation and Conflict* , 1997, Vol.32, No.1 , p.16

seized power through a military coup or electoral fraud and sets up a dictatorship suffers from a lack of popular support. Its citizens may not defend it if under attack, or may invite foreign intervention to help overthrow it.

The denial of political rights to certain ethnic groups is a form of discrimination and violates their elementary human rights. One of the most important aspects of human security is that people should be able to live in a society that honours their basic human rights.³⁶ Human rights violations are most frequent during periods of political unrest. Unrest commonly results in military intervention.³⁷

The rights of people of a country to decide their own internal affairs may be violated by another state through subversion and false propaganda via radio, television, printed material or agents. Johan Galtung has coined the term "Subversion" for activities by foreign governments to influence the country's governing elite, from above, to serve foreign interests instead of the interests of their own people.³⁸ It may include giving financial assistance, training or arms to a group that serves the interests of a foreign government.

According to Barry Buzan many layers of sub-state actors exist within the state. They are ranging from the government and its bureaucratic organs, through the economic, political and media organizations, to the

³⁶ Redefining Security: The Human Dimension, *Current History*, May 1995, Vol.94, No.592 p.233

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p.234.

³⁸ Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.8 No.2 p.160

individual citizens, both as individuals and as the amorphous entity known as public opinion. Many of these actors have some interests in national security and involve themselves in varying degrees in the security policy-making process. The problem is that most of them also have other interests as well, and these via their security interest in a variety of ways.³⁹ Even with competition among various newspapers or television channels, the pressure to sell papers or attract viewers introduces a bias toward sensationalism and may sometimes exacerbate conflicts.⁴⁰

Buzan observes:

“Newspapers need to sell Stories of scandal, malice, threat, crisis management, conflict and death will sell more newspaper than complicated analysis. Thus newspapers..... distort the public view of what is important to national security, focusing attention on short-term issues and military means, while largely ignoring longer-range and more abstract issues. Where newspapers are controlled by the state, the bias will be towards the official interpretations of events.”⁴¹

SOURCES:

The second aspect of non-military threat to security is the geographic source. The sources may be:

1. internal
2. external, emanating from another country
3. global, stemming from activities at the global level.⁴²

³⁹ Buzan (1983), n.2.,p.233

⁴⁰ Fischer, n.16., p.27.

⁴¹ Buzan (1983), n.2.,p.233

⁴² Fischer, n.16.,p.14

Internal:

Domestic violence within a nation may be cited as one of the most potential threat of internal order to national security. It may be violent crime, inter ethnic strife, civil war even genocide.

Among these a most serious threat to national security is enter-ethnic strife or conflict between different groups in a society.⁴³

Ethnic and religious conflicts have their roots in clashes or invasions that occurred years ago.⁴⁴ But these schisms have become more pronounced or have exhibited characteristics that are unique to the current era. Greatly contributing to the intensity of ethnic and religious strife is the erosion of central state authority (especially in developing countries). In such circumstances people lose all confidence in the state's ability to meet their basic needs and turn instead to more traditional, kinship-based forms of association for help in getting by – a process that often results in competition and conflict among groups over what remains of the nations scarce resources.⁴⁵

On the other hand, there has been the perceived failure of regimes that have defined themselves on the basis of unifying ideology. The resulting discontinuity and apparent chaos have stimulated demands for alternative models of development. At the same time, people have sought new frameworks of personal meaning to replace the obsolete universalist

⁴³ Ibid .,p.19

⁴⁴ Klare, n.33., p.356

⁴⁵ Ibid.

doctrines. The combined effect has been a resurgence of nativist ideology, with groups increasingly turning to primordial identities based on religion and ethnicity for an amalgamation of the two as a way of ameliorating both their frustration and discontent.⁴⁶

In such circumstances, nationalism has typically drawn upon ethnicity as a relational concept, creating boundaries between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' which have been further entrenched and radicalised by the calls of politicians, nationalists and demagogues to cleanse and purify their particular "ethnies" from all contaminating and alien influences.⁴⁷

Also contributing to the intensity of inter-group conflict is the spread of mass communications and other instruments of popular mobilization. These advances have contributed to what Professor James Rosenau of George Washington University calls a "skill revolution" in which individual citizens "have become increasingly competent in assessing where they fit in international affairs and how their behaviour can be aggregated into significant collective outcomes".⁴⁸ This competence can lead to calls for greater personal freedom and democracy. But it can also lead to increased popular mobilization along ethnic, religious, caste, and linguistic lines, often producing friction and disorder within heterogeneous societies.⁴⁹

From the above analysis the sources of ethnic conflict can be looked into four specific factors in which Udo Steinbach identified as –

⁴⁶ Chalk, n.12.,p.5

⁴⁷ Ibid.,p.6

⁴⁸ James N Rosenau, "Security in a Turbulent World", *Current History*, May 1995, p.194

⁴⁹ Klare , n.33., p.356.

1. national fragmentation,
2. inequitable development,
3. cultural clashes , and
4. liberation movements (the culmination of the circumstances created by the first three).⁵⁰

According to M. Abdul Hafiz and Abdur Rob Khan such ethnic violence poses security problems for a nation in three ways:

1. by posing threat to internal cohesion and territorial integrity,
2. by creating trans border manifestations thereby straining inter-state relations and often creating radical conflagrations on both sides of border, and
3. by occasionally inducing exogenous involvement.⁵¹

External:

Movement of populations fleeing wars, famines or ecological disasters and non-state entities like terrorist groups are the most common external sources of threat.

In the most general sense, the causes behind human migration are deeply embedded in the economic, political and social conditions. Population pressure, lack of employment opportunities, inadequate public services such as health care and schools and increasingly, incidents of

⁵⁰ Udo Steinbach quoted in M. Abdul Hafiz, Abdur Rob Khan, *Security of Small States* (Dhaka: University Press Ltd. 1987) p.40

⁵¹ Ibid.

environmental degradation are the most common causes for human population movement. A frequent accompaniment to these factors is social unrest resulting from ethnic tensions in diverse areas of the world. Internecine stress acts as a type of persistent “white noise” which over time, erodes the spirit and contributes another ingredient to the list of factors giving rise to population movement.⁵²

Apart from it, there is forced migration caused by political oppression and persecution, which makes people refugees. When governments carry out or condone acts, which threaten the physical, emotional, and economic well being of specific segments of society, escape may appear the only option to persons in these situations.⁵³ Streams of refugees flows can place a heavy burden on a country’s resources. For the host country, the refugee issues are at once an “economic burden, a political liability and a foreign policy complication”.⁵⁴

The migration of people also contributes to the growth of population to the host countries. The fall out of the phenomenal growth of population in the poor countries is a great threat to security. As Paul Kennedy observes, it “exacerbates ethnic tensions, contributes to social instabilities and fuels external expansionism”.⁵⁵

⁵² Gerald E. Dirks, “International Migration in the Nineties: Causes and Consequences”, *International Journal*, Vol. XLVIII (Spring 1993) p.199

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p.200

⁵⁴ Lok Raj Baral, “Non- Military Threats and Governance” as cited in Muchkund Dubey, Nancy Jetly, *South Asia and its Eastern Neighbours- Building a Relationship in th21st Century* (New Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd, 1999) p.261

⁵⁵ Paul Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century*, (London: Harper Collins, 1993) p.128

Terrorism is an act or a series of acts intended to harm, or threaten to harm the innocent, so as to make the target audience respond according to the wishes of the terrorists".⁵⁶ It is carried out by individuals or small groups, but normally not for personal gain but for political cause.

Potentially, the most dangerous situation occurs when a government is suspected of using terrorists to further its own foreign policy ends.⁵⁷ If a foreign country offers sanctuary to terrorists, or even supports them with money, arms and training, this will seriously strain relations between the host country and those suffering from terrorist attacks.⁵⁸

Global:

Threat that does not stem from any particular country or group of countries, but around the world are the Green House Effect, ozone Layer Depletion and Global drug trade etc.

The green house effect results from the fact that the planet's atmosphere is largely transparent to incoming radiation from the sun but absorbs much of the lower energy radiation remitted by the earth. This natural phenomenon makes the earth warm enough to support life. But the emission of green house increases, the planet is warmed unnaturally. Carbon dioxide produced from the combustion of fossil fuels and by deforestation is responsible for about half of the green house effect. The destruction of

⁵⁶ Shaukat Qadir, "The Concept of International Terrorism- An Interim Study of South Asia". *The Round Table*, Vol.360,2001 p.334

⁵⁷ David C. Rapoport, " The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism", *Current History*, December 2001, Vol.100, No.650, p.423

⁵⁸ Fischer, n.16.,p.19

wetlands, coral reefs, and temperate forests also figures heavily.⁵⁹ A number of other gases, notably methane (natural gas), nitrous oxide, ozone (in the lower atmosphere, as distinguished from the protective ozone layer in the stratosphere) and the man-made chlorofluoro carbons are responsible for the other half.⁶⁰

Despite important uncertainties about aspects of the green house warming, a virtually unanimous scientific consensus exists on its central features. Layers of these gases, including carbon dioxide and methane, accumulate in the upper atmosphere and contribute to global warming because they reflect back infrared radiation that would otherwise escape into space.⁶¹

Climate warming could alter the fundamental physical conditions of life on the planet. Biological diversity is more threatened.⁶² As habitats are fragmented, altered, or destroyed, they lose their ability to provide ecosystem services – waste purification, soil regeneration, watershed protection, temperature regulation, nutrient and waste recycling, and atmospheric maintenance.⁶³ All these changes threatened global human security.

Green house change is closely linked to stratospheric ozone depletion. The ozone layer is also depleted by a number of industrial waste

⁵⁹ Human Development Report, 1994, n.36.,p.235

⁶⁰ Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security", *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1989, p.169

⁶¹ Human Development Report, n.36.,p.235

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

gases, particularly chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). The increased ultra violet radiation resulting from losses in that protective layer will cause an increase in skin cancers and eye damage. It will have many still uncertain impacts on plant and animal life, and may suppress the immune systems of many species.⁶⁴

The trade in narcotic drugs is one of the most corrosive threats to human society. The UN study on narcotics reports that in the 1980s, conditions such as failing commodity prices, debt problem and poverty contributed to the increased in drug trafficking.⁶⁵


The UN report points out only one of the many factors that perpetuate drug trafficking. The more influential factors that perpetuate drug trafficking include political instability, regional instability, ineffective central control, and global reach of the drug syndicates and involvement of the state in illicit drug trafficking.

Political instability not only perpetuates the growth of drug trafficking but also renders all attempts at anti-drug programmes ineffective. This fact is supported by Jamieson who points out that, "The drug producing countries have all experienced one or more of the following – coup d'etat, revolution, tribal tensions, violent ethnic or religious protest, invasion, intensive guerrilla warfare".⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Mathews, n.60.,p.171

⁶⁵ UN Department of Public Information, January 1990, quoted in Alison Jameison, "Global Drug Trafficking", *Conflict Studies*. No. CCXXXIV, September, 1990, p.3

⁶⁶ Ibid p.5



Regional instability, like political instability contributes greatly to drug cultivation and trafficking. Any political unrest, especially along the borders of two countries, provides a conducive environment for drug trafficking. In a region fraught with discontent voices from various sections, sponsoring of terrorist activity against a neighboring state not only becomes feasible with narcotic linkages but also profitable to the state in the absence of a costly conventional war.⁶⁷ More often the states sponsoring terrorism or insurgency or armed resistance in neighbouring states permit the groups to mobilise finance through drug trafficking.⁶⁸

The ineffectiveness of central control over all parts of the state has been another influential factor in the perpetuation of drug trafficking. The failure of the government to effectively curb both drug trafficking and cultivation increases the average drug cultivation and trafficking.⁶⁹

The next influential factor is the wide reach of the drug syndicates, not only in having international connections, but also in successfully permeating the national political parties, bureaucracy, judiciary and sometimes even the army.⁷⁰

Drug trafficking also increases due to encouragement from the government for various reasons. In most of the states, the drug money forms

⁶⁷ D. Suba Chandran, "Drug Trafficking and the Security of the State: A Case Study of Pakistan" *Strategic Analysis*, September 1998, p.907

⁶⁸ Ibid., p.908

⁶⁹ Ibid., p.909

⁷⁰ Ibid., p.908

a major source of foreign exchange.⁷¹ Thus they pay only lip service towards taking the necessary steps to curb drug cultivation and trafficking.

While considered as illegal, the global drug trade has given rise to some international tensions. The threat posed by global drug trade covers many dimensions. Most visibly, it contributes to growing social instability by fuelling high rates of crime. The ensuing instability encourages yet more crime, thus perpetuating the problem. The end result is an extreme case of societal dislocation where life, in the words of Thomas Hobbes, is 'brutish, nasty and short'.⁷²

Drug use is helping to foster the spread of lethal diseases like AIDs. The costs associated with trying to control the global trade are contributing to a lack of economic performance in source/ transit and consumer states. As the United Nations International Narcotics Control Board noted in its 1984 annual report:

Illegal drug production and trafficking financed by organized crime is so pervasive that the economies of entire countries are disrupted, legal institutions menaced and the very security of some states threatened.⁷³

In fact, Carolina G. Hernandez, Gina R. Pattugalan has asserted that drug lords are actually posing a serious threat to the governments of some Third World Countries. The traffickers either have their own military

⁷¹ Ibid.,p.100

⁷² Chalk ,n.12.,, p.47

⁷³ United Nations International Narcotics Control Board, Annual Report, 1984, cited in Paul B. Rich, *Warlords in International Relations*, (Great Britain: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1999) p.42

capacity or are able to use related insurgent groups to engage government forces in guerrilla warfare to protect their interests. The reliance of a number of insurgent groups on narcotics production and trafficking to finance their campaigns gives rise to the problem of narco-terrorism.⁷⁴ Lupsha defines narco-terrorism as “acts of terror and violence against civilian populations and authority aimed at intimidation, and to thwart law enforcement and to maintain the drug-trafficker’s control over a given area of drug cultivation or production.”⁷⁵

NATURAL AND HUMAN SOURCES:

A third classification distinguishes between natural and human sources of threat.

Natural:

Human life is at risk also from natural disasters. Some has a local scope like earthquakes, landslides, floods and volcanoes etc. Some others are entering a country from across its borders or coastlines like tidal waves, cyclones and some are having a global origin such as climate shifts that cannot be traced to any human activities.⁷⁶

Droughts, pests (e.g. Locusts), plant diseases and other natural calamities may destroy an entire harvest. A poor harvest resulting from

⁷⁴ Carolina G. Hernandez, Gina R. Pattugalan, *Transnational Crime and Regional Security in the Asia Pacific*, (Philippines: Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Inc.1999) p.36

⁷⁵ Ibid p.36

⁷⁶ Fischer, n.16., pp. 27-28

unusually dry weather on a global scale will cause food price increases everywhere and may lead to hunger in poorer regions.⁷⁷

Human Sources:

Many chronic 'natural' disasters have also been provoked by human beings.⁷⁸ Drilling for ground water in areas where water is scarce has contributed to desertification. The clear cutting of entire forests instead of harvesting trees selectively leads to long-lasting deforestation. Deforestation has led to more intense droughts and floods.

CONCLUSION:

Formally, the state is the main concern for developing a security strategies. However, other forces and represented by non-state actors and non-governmental processes should also analyse in order to extrapolate the emerging threats to the security of the nation states. There has been a wider areas like ethnicity and, religion and secessionist movements which have heightened the intensity of violence in society.

Structural violence, that is the unintentional loss of life due to unjust social conditions has caused many more avoidable deaths than wars. A systematic analysis of threat to security suggests that many of them are the result of apparently rational behaviour by numerous actors who pursue their own self interests without coordination or mutual agreement. In this

⁷⁷ Ibid.,p.28

⁷⁸ Human Development Report, 1994, n.36., p.282

regard the following non military factors may contribute to war – conflict over resources, extreme inequality, population pressure, dictatorship, religious fanaticism and nationalism. Many nations in the world today have grappled with this kind of threats. Moreover the weakening capacity of the state to address these threats with an urgency or sense of purpose has heightened the intensity of the more violence emanating from non-military factors.

CHAPTER-2

ETHNO-NATIONALISM

Ethnic turbulence has been one of the most important sources of long-term conflict leading to civil war, insurgencies and even in the most extreme case to the disintegration of states. Like other state, Pakistan also faces the problem of conflictive ethnic militancy. The ethnic tension in Pakistan started immediately after the creation of the country in 1947. Pakistan is a multi-ethnic state, comprising five broader ethnic groups or nationalities such as Bengalis, Punjabis, Sindhis, Pushtuns (Pakhtuns or Pathans) and Balochis plus a multi-ethnic community of Muhajirs. They differ in terms of their cultural traits, the number of their people, and their movements of independence or autonomy.

Uneven development of capitalist modes of production generated the province-center tensions in Pakistan. In Bengal, mass awareness of ethnic identity and pride in indigenous culture spread rapidly. This means that the Bengali nationalism quickly shed its feudal characteristics and came into conflict with the feudal nationalism of West Pakistan. In the process, Pakistan was disintegrated into two separate nations – Bangladesh and Pakistan.

At the time of partition, the Pushtuns demanded a separate independent state for themselves. After the North West Frontier Province

had joined Pakistan, Pushtuns movement for the establishment of 'Pakhtunistan' continued. But in the post zia phase Pushtun movement has considerably waned.

Like the Pushtuns in NWFP, Baluchis were waging war for regional autonomy. Balochistan National Movement (BNM) and Balochistan Students Organisation (BSO) fought a pitched battle against Islamabad and they demanded Azad Balochistan. Between 1973 and 1977 there was insurgency in Balochistan.

The Sindhis also talked about Sindhi nationalism and thus nursed a dream of a full-fledged autonomous Sindh. Their nationalism has ranged from regional autonomy to independence. But Sindhi national movement suffers from fragmentation syndrome.

The people of Multan, the erstwhile Bahawalpur state and the vast areas around it speak Saraiki. In 1975, Saraikis raised a demand of a separate Saraiki province. Saraiki leaders said that populace is located in compact territory. They have their own language, literature, culture, folklore etc. that are distinct from the neighbouring Punjab and Sindh. It was in 1983 that saraikis formed a "Saraiki Suba Mahaz". The aim of the Mahaz was to seek autonomy for Saraikis within the framework of Pakistan.

During the 1980s ethnic disturbances have also become commonplace in Sindh, the southern province of Pakistan. In 1990s ethnic violence in this province had claimed numerous life. Politics in Sindh was characterized by contradictory pressures from the Muhajir and Sindhi

nationalist movements. Especially in Karachi, where a militant Muhajir nationalist party Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM) has struggled for political supremacy for more than a decade, and social and economic life of the country had suffered a severe set back. The upsurge of Muhajir Quami Movement in Sindh had the potential of threatening not only the territorial integrity of Pakistan but also the stability of South Asia.

As will be discussed in brief in this chapter, the ethnic tension in Pakistan has a potential to threaten the security of the state. The dangerous trend of ethno-nationalist movement has been aggravated since 1984 with the launching of Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM), a political party claiming to represent the Muhajirs or Urdu speaking immigrants of Indian origin. This chapter attempts to show why the MQM really poses a serious challenge to the security of Pakistan.

Ethno-nationalism- A Theoretical Perspective

In the contemporary world, ethno nationalism has assumed prominence because some new countries were constituted on the basis of ethnicity. Ethnicity refers to some kind of “collective identity”.¹ According to International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences: “ an ethnic group is a distinct category of the population in a large society whose culture is usually different from its own”.² Ethnicity then is the phenomenon of ethnic group

¹ Rudolf C Heredia, “Ethnicity, Class and Nation – Interrelationships in a Multi-cultural State”, *Economic and Political Weekly*, May 10, 1997 p.1010.

² *Ibid.*, pp1010-1011.

coming to self-awareness that enables it to affirm its identity and pursue its interests. In this regard, Urmilla Phadnis has defined “ethnicity as the summation of its impulses and motivations for power and recognition... the driving force in the emergence of ethnic movements”.³ In other words “ethnicity is to ethnic category what class consciousness is to class”.⁴ Even in the state politics also ethnicity has been the center of political discourse dealing with nations and nationalism.

Ethnic nationalism is not a new phenomenon. It originated as a regional reaction against the excessive centralizing and homogenizing policies of the nation state.⁵ Paul Brass argues that the activities of the modern centralized state play a pivotal role in pushing the elites of the non-dominant groups to ethnic nationalism.⁶ Elites who are in competition for resources ‘draw upon, distort and sometimes fabricate materials from the cultures of the groups’ for collective and individual advantages.⁷ Then, state policies and elite competition emerge as central variables in Brass’s theory of ethnic nationalism. John Stuart Mill in his essay on representative government had come to the conclusion that “it is in general a necessary

³ Urmila Phadnis, *Ethnicity and Nation-Building in South Asia*, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1990) p.16.

⁴ Paul Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991), p. 19.

⁵ Mahfzul Haque, *Ethnic Insurgency and National Integration*, (New Delhi: Lancer’s Books, 1997) p. 23.

⁶ Brass, n.4.,pp 8-9.

⁷ Ibid.,p.8.

condition of free institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincided in the main with nationalities”.⁸

Johann Gottfried Herder, Europe’s nineteenth century theorist of a historical and romantic conception of “ethno-nationalism”, maintained that every activity, situation, historical period, or civilization possessed a unique character of its own; so that the attempt to reduce such phenomena to combinations of uniform elements, and to describe or analyze them in terms of universal rules, tended to obliterate precisely these critical differences which constituted the specific quality of the object under study, whether in nature or in history.⁹

In fact Herder’s ethno –nationalism held that the entire cultural life of a people is shaped from within the particular way of tradition that comes from a common historical experience. Walker Conner among others refers to ethno nationalism in terms of “any group that conceives itself as constituting a separate people is apt to view a right to create its own state as self evident and therefore incontestable.”¹⁰

Once the movement for establishing a new state on the basis of ethno nationalism gains strength, the leaders of the movement demand granting of the right of self-determination for deciding an independent political status. In the process, the politicization of ethno nationalism and the

⁸ John Stuart Mill, Representative Government as quoted in David Welsh, “Domestic Politics and Ethnic Conflict”, *Survival*, Vol.35 No.1 Spring 1993 p.65.

⁹ Haque, n.5., p.23.

¹⁰ Walker Conner, “ The Politics of Ethno-nationalism”, *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.27 No.1 1973, p.5.

imposition of an ethno-nationalistic state representing an intolerant majority on a pluralistic terrain generate violence and warfare.¹¹

MUHAJIR ETHNO NATIONALISM IN PAKISTAN:

Muhajir nationalism can be identified in terms of its structural transformation from a migrant to a 'nativist' movement.¹² Muhajirs are defined as Urdu (and Gujarati) speaking migrants mostly settled in Sindh. They are those migrants who came to Pakistan from Muslim minority provinces of the sub-continent at partition, who do not belong to any of the nationalities of Pakistan – neither to Punjabi, nor Sindhi, nor Baluchi nor Pakhtun communities, and who migrate from those areas of East Punjab whose language and culture was not Punjabi¹³.

Muhajirs led a process of social and political identity formation among themselves. They claimed a separate status for Muhajirs as a nationality and cultivated territorial nationalism based on parts of urban Sindh, especially Karachi. Muhajir nationalism, unlike the previous nationalist movement of under-privileged communities such as Bengalis, Pathans, Sindhis and the Baluch, is a movement of a relatively privileged community on the decline.¹⁴ The clue to this movement lies in the fact that the migrant community had launched a 'sons of soil' movement of its own

¹¹ Haque, n.5.,p.24.

¹² Mohammad Waseem, "Ethnic and Religious Nationalism in Pakistan", *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.23 No.2, Winter 2000, p.48.

¹³ Ibid., p.48.

¹⁴ Ibid., p.49.

seeking to carve out a political space for itself.¹⁵ It had focused on the activist dimensions of an ethnic movement including its organizational profile, strategy of mass mobilization and political agenda.¹⁶

Muhajirs brought with them a political culture and a mode of political articulation that was different from the indigenous culture of Pakistan. For instance, they desired a clear separation between religion and the state. Islam- or perceptions of it- was the pivot around which ideological, psychic and cultural attributes of the group had evolved. Besides, as explained by Feroz Ahmed they not only carried a legacy of Islamic revivalism, but their intellectually oriented view of Islam leaned heavily towards fundamentalism or other conservative interpretations which contrasted sharply with the more tolerant, Sufi-influenced syncretic Islam of the Sindhis.¹⁷

For the sake of nation-building the state needed unity and emphasized homogeneity of the population. Any assertion of ethnic identity was disapproved, and every citizen was expected to identify himself only as a Pakistani. This approach suited the Muhajirs, who were in the forefront of the Propaganda against “provincialism”.¹⁸ Hence, the “two nation theory”,

¹⁵ Mohammad Waseem, “Ethnic Conflict in Pakistan: The Case of MQM”, *The Pakistan Development Review*, Vol. 35 No. 4 Part II, Winter 1996, p.618.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 619.

¹⁷ Feroz Ahmed, “Politics and Ethnicity – The Rise of Muhajir Separatism-II”, *Viewpoint*, August 25, 1988, p.27.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.28

which had been coined to justify the creation of Pakistan, had become the raison d'etre for them in Pakistan¹⁹.

While Sindhi could claim a shared history, indigenous roots and a long held language to build their ethnic nationalism, Urdu speakers would use language and migration as the two contributory factors in inventing their ethnicity.²⁰ By the end of the first decade the Muhajir-centric view of Pakistan as a unitary Muslim/Islamic state, with the hegemony of Urdu and special privileges for the professional middle class, had taken firm foot in their mind. In the process, they saw themselves as “the fifth that is the Muhajir nation of Pakistan”.²¹

THE EMERGENCE OF THE MUHAJIR QUAMI MOVEMENT (MQM):

The emergence of the Muhajir Quami movement (MQM) is rooted in a generation-long, imperceptible and gradual process of alienation of the Urdu speaking Muhajir from the state authority in Pakistan.²² Like in the case of other alienated ethnic communities, students were the pioneers in the movement. The activities of the All-Pakistan Muhajir Student Organization (APMSO), which was established on 11 June 1978, provided the initial

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Iftikhar H. Malik, *State and Civil Society in Pakistan - Politics of Authority, Ideology and Ethnicity*, (Great Britain: Mcmillan Press, 1997) p.186.

²¹ Anwar Iqbal, “Karachi Violence-V, Excerpts from Report in MUSLIM as quoted in *Strategic Digest*, March 1987, p.444.

²² *Public Opinion Trend (Pakistan Series)* 2 March 1988, p.274.

impetus for assumption of a separatist identity by the Muhajirs. The educated unemployed provided the base for this movement.

The genesis of the Muhajir problem can be traced to the day Urdu-speaking immigrant swarmed into Sindh in the wake of partition.²³ As a result of partition of former 'British' India in 1947, nearly seven million Indian Muslims had crossed the border into West Pakistan.²⁴ These immigrants were mainly concentrated in the large urban areas principally in the big cities such as Karachi, Hyderabad and Sukkur. This large and compact settlement in an urban environment allowed for the formations of a cultural isolate. In other way, the group could develop its ethnic identity, which protected from local influences. Resenting the term used by outsiders to describe them, these immigrants insisted on being called Muhajirs.²⁵ They were elite and quite a few of them were better educated than the natives, having held governmental jobs in pre-1947 India. Naturally, they occupied key slots in the state.²⁶

To the great resentment of the local Sindhis, Karachi was separated from Sindh and designated as Federal Capital Area in 1948. In 1955 Sindh was dissolved as a province and amalgamated with the other provinces of West Pakistan to form the so-called One Unit²⁷. Urdu was declared as

²³ Kalim Bahadur, "Ethnic Politics in Pakistan", *Link*, 4 October 1992, p.19.

²⁴ Feroz Ahmed, "Ethnicity and Politics - The Rise of Muhajir Separatism", *Viewpoint*, August 18, 1988. p33.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ *The Observer* (Delhi), 7 July 1995.

²⁷ Ahmed, n.24.,p.28.

Pakistan's national language. It was introduced as a required subject for the Sindhi students, and the teaching of Sindhi to the Muhajir students was discontinued.²⁸ In fact, Muhajirs were better off than those of the local people. They held a privileged status in the society. Many of Pakistan's top bureaucrats were Urdu speaking and exercised a high degree of influence over the country in the early formative years. The upward social mobility of the Muhajirs was in evidence everywhere. Their cultural domination, facilitated by the official promotion of Urdu and the growth of the Urdu press and literature, was even very noticeable. Thus one can argue that from 1947 to 1955 Urdu speakers dominated the political scene of the country.

In 1960s the influx of Punjabis and Pathans had upset the demographic balance between the ethnic communities of Pakistan. A Punjabi ascendancy came to the fore in the country, in which Urdu speakers retained their disproportionate influence, but as the junior partners of the Punjabis. From 1955 onwards a Punjabi ascendancy came to the fore in Pakistan, in which Urdu speakers retained their disproportionate influence, but as the junior partners of the Punjabis. The Muhajirs felt threatened and their interests were in jeopardy.²⁹ The most vocal complaint heard from the Muhajirs during that time was the regional allocations of positions in the civil services were discriminatory towards them. Thus an ideology of "meritocracy" developed, according to which the Muhajir were better

²⁸ Feroz Ahmed, "Ethnicity and Politics- The Rise of Muhajir Separatism", *South Asia Bulletin*, Vol.8, 1988, p.36.

²⁹ Aabha Dixit, "Ethnic and Regional Tensions in Pakistan", *Strategic Analysis*, March 1989, p.1473.

qualified and thus, should be entitled to a larger share of government jobs and admissions in the professional colleges.³⁰ And also Muhajir's social vision was effectively 'nativised'. They now looked at themselves as belonging to Sindh and, especially Karachi.³¹

In 1970 the former provinces of West Pakistan were restored. Karachi once again became the capital of Sindh province. The political landscape of Sindh underwent profound transformation in 1971. The separation of East Pakistan in that year affected the country as well as Muhajirs in many fundamental ways. A new configuration of forces emerged in Pakistan in which Punjabis formed the new ethnic majority followed by Sindhis, Pashtuns and Balochs and Urdu-speakers respectively. Freed from the more salient issue of Bengali under representation, the demands of the Sindhis came to the fore.³²

The most devastating impact of the emergence of Bangladesh on the Muhajirs was that it seriously put into question- if not destroyed- the validity of the "two nation theory" which justified the creation of Pakistan and sustained the Muhajir's faith in the state and in their own actions³³. For the first time a significant section of the Muhajir was forced to rethink their enthusiasm for the creation of Pakistan.

³⁰ Ahmed, n.24., p.36.

³¹ Wassem, n.15., p.623.

³² Charles H Kenedy, "The Politics of Ethnicity in Sindh", *Asian Survey*, Vol.31 No.10, October 1991,p.949.

³³ Ahmed, n.28.,p.36.

In 1972, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was at helm of affairs and his party was in power in Sindh. Being a Sindhi himself, his government adopted several policies conducive to serving the interests of his Sindhi constituent. The first was fulfillment of a campaign pledge made by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) to restore Sindhi as the official language of the province. The Muhajir's discontent found violent expression in 1972 when, on 7 July, Mr. Bhutto passed a Sindh language bill in Sindh National Assembly³⁴.

Subsequently the leader of Jiye Sindh Mahaz(Long Live Sindh Movement) G. M. Syed's heated rhetoric calling for a "return of Muhajirs to India" further incited the Muhajirs.³⁵ At that time demands of the creation of a Karachi a province, or incorporating Karachi into Balochistan, was also raised by some Urdu-speaking intellectuals.³⁶ Mr. Bhutto then introduced domestic quotas for Sindhis to restrict Muhajir access to educational institutions and government jobs. It was against this discrimination that Altaf Hussein floated the All-Pakistan Muhajir Students Organization (APMSO)³⁷.

From 1972 to 1977 most of the Muhajir joined the anti-Bhutto Nine Party Alliance, which finally resulted to the execution of Bhutto by Zia-ul-Haq in 1979. As a reaction to Bhutto's execution and their persecution by

³⁴ Owen Bennett Jones, *Pakistan Eye of the Storm*, (India: Viking, Penguin Books, 2002) p.118.

³⁵ Kennedy, n.32.,p.944.

³⁶ Mehtab Ali Shah, "The Rise of the Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM) in Pakistan and its Implications for Regional Security", *The Round Table*, Vol.348, 1998, p.507.

³⁷ *The Observer* (Delhi) 7 July 1995.

the Zia regime the Sindhis in 1983 launched the Movement for the Restoration of democracy (MRD).

The 1983 movement convinced the Muhajirs that ethnic particularization of political assertion was legitimate and had come to stay. On the other hand, perhaps the single most important factor in the emergence of the MQM and Muhajir ethnicity was the rising nationalist sentiments of the Punjabis Baluchis, Pathans and Sindhis.³⁸ Muhajirs started developing a sense of nationalism about Karachi and Sindh as bulwark against these nationalities.

The Sindhis were perceived by the Zia Regime as a serious challenge to it. Zia's reign coincided with the significant development of Muhajir ethno-nationalism. It was seen to be a counterpoise to the Pakistan People's Party in the big cities of Sindh.³⁹ Hence, in 1984 he encouraged the Urdu-speaking militants in forming the Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM), under the leadership of Altaf Hussain, and Karachi became its operational base.⁴⁰ In non-party election, which was held in 1985, the MQM won overwhelming majorities in the big cities of the Sindh provinces. The MQM was split into two factions led by Altaf Hussain and Afaq Ahmad (Haqiqi Group) in 1991. Since then both factions of the MQM are forces to be reckoned with in the urban areas of Sindh.

³⁸ Veena Kukreja, *Contemporary Pakistan – Political Processes, Conflict and Crises*, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003) p.147.

³⁹ Salamat Ali, "Soldiers and Spooks", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 10 November 1988, p.36.

⁴⁰ Ayesha Jalal, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) pp.107-108.

ETNO-NATIONALISM AND THREAT TO SECURITY:

The threat posed by the ethno nationalism are multifarious and they set the main tempo of the insecurity syndrome that permeates every aspects of political and social life of the country. The internal dimensions of insecurity emanating from ethno nationalism may be political, economic and thereat to public life. Again, ethnicity related political threat may be to the state structure and to the regime. The state in the center is threatened by ethnic groups in the periphery.

Ethno-nationalism challenges all three referent objects of the security of state i.e. the idea of the state, its physical base, and institutional expressions. If the idea of the state is insecure in the sense that it is violently challenged or is not widely shared within, one of the main elements of the security of the state is absent.⁴¹ The threat posed by ethno-nationalism to the physical base of the state and its institutional expression is more direct and visible. Ethno-nationalist movement in different forms threatens the main component of the physical base, namely the territory and population. The armed reaction on the part of the state to the ethno nationalists often exacerbates the insecurity of the individual, as well as the ethnic collectivity as a whole.

Ethno political threat to economy arises from the rising cost of prolong counter-insurgency operations and also from the negative impact of

⁴¹ Gamini B. Keerawella, " State, National Security and Collective Identities: Security Implication of Ethnic Secessionist Movements In Post-Cold War South Asia ", in Nancy Jetly (ed), *Regional Security in South Asia- The Ethno-Sectarian Dimension*, (New Delhi: Lancer's Books, 1999) p.217.

insurgency and counter-insurgency on the economy in general.⁴² Furthermore, the trans-border ramification of ethno politics has not only created bilateral security issues, but also could bring external powers into the crisis in different capacities, which in turn seriously limit the maneuverability of the state.

THREAT POSED BY THE MUHAJIR ETHNO-NATIONALISM TO THE PAKISTANI STATE:

In 1988 the MQM shared power with Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People Party. Ms. Bhutto gave recognition to the emerging political importance of the MQM and signed on December 2, 1988 the Karachi Declaration with its leader, Mr. Altaf Hussain.⁴³ But the coalition was broke on the issues of the repatriation to Sindh of an estimated 250,000 Urdu-speaking Biharis, (or, stranded Pakistanis) from 66 refugee camps in Bangladesh where they have lived in wretched conditions since 1971, and the end of the quota system. Disappointed by the PPP's failure to adhere to the accord, the MQM deserted Ms Bhutto on 18 September 1989 and made a secret agreement with the Islami Jamhuri Itahad (IJI).⁴⁴ The MQM then helped president Ishaq and the Urdu-speaking army chief, General Beg to overthrow Benazir Bhutto's first government in 1990. It then forged an alliance with Nawaz sharif's IJI, which also disappointed it on the same

⁴² Syed Anwar Hussain, "Internal Dynamics of South Asian Security: Ethnic Dissonance", in *Ibid.*, p.153.

⁴³ Pannalal Dhar, *Ethnic Unrest in India and her Neighbours*, (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1999) p.463.

⁴⁴ Mahnaz Ispahani, "Pakistan Dimensions of Insecurity", *Adelphi Papers*, No.246, 1990 p.24.

issues. In 1991 the MQM turned against its own patron, the army. It had challenged the military by acts of kidnapping, torture and killing military personnel. Hereafter, the target of the MQM was not any particular party but the state of Pakistan itself. It had become a state within a state.⁴⁵ In 1992, BBC had confirmed that the MQM was allegedly running its independent government within the urban areas of Karachi.⁴⁶ Altaf Hussain had challenged the Two Nation Theory, the rationale for the creation of Pakistan in 1947⁴⁷. In a sense, the Muhajirs provided some credibility to Jinnah's theory that Hindu and Muslim are two separate nations and cannot live together. But soon after they came to realized that they had been fooled into believing his two nation theory. For them Pakistan really was the promised land, and if it did not live upto their expectations then that was because it was not following orthodox Islam, which they associated with speaking Urdu in proper idiom.⁴⁸

In 1988, the Far Eastern Economic Review published an article in which Salamat Ali Sayed on an idea that had been put forward to create more provinces in Pakistan. Plans had discussed to carve a new coastal province out of Sindh and Balochistan in the area between the boundaries

⁴⁵ The crisis in Sindh, *The Indian Express*, (New Delhi) 30 June 1992.

⁴⁶ *Indian Express*, (New Delhi) June 23, 1990.

⁴⁷ Syed Nooruzzaman, "Muhajirs and the Two Nation Theory", *Tribune* (Chandigarh), June 29, 1995.

⁴⁸ Christina Lamb, *Waiting for Allah- Pakistan's Struggle for Democracy*, (New Delhi: Penguin Books India (P) Ltd 1991) p.146.

with Kutch in India and Sistan province in Iran.⁴⁹ It would thus include the coastal area of Sindh, where high quality oil that could meet some of the Industrialized world's requirement had been discovered. In fact many MQM militants urged on by their leader, Altaf Hussain, advocated a separate Muhajir province and even a separate Muhajir state.⁵⁰ In an interview carried by the Pakistani press Mr. Hussain put forward the demand for a separate province when he said, "it has now become the voice of every Muhajir that until and unless we have our own province we will not get our legitimate rights".⁵¹ To many Pakistani politicians or the establishment who had witnessed the Bangladesh situation, the MQM's demand were akin to the six points made by the Awami League in East Pakistan in the 1960s. It had evidence as Altaf Hussain wrote a letter to the president of Pakistan on August 22, 1995, which had far reaching repercussions. In it he wrote:

We fear that this policy (Pakistan's Muhajir policy) will bring great danger to the integrity of the Federation since, emboldened by your overt and tacit support, the People's Party regime of Ms Benazir Bhutto is creating a situation which is similar to the one of 1971 when the then People Party's actions resulted in the creation of Bangladesh.⁵²

The MQM leader refer to 'Muhajir Nation'.

The change in the tone of the MQM coincided with the rising graph of its militancy. Because of its increase militancy and organized encounters

⁴⁹ Mehtab Ali Shah, *The Foreign Policy of Pakistan – Ethnic Impacts on Diplomacy, 1971-1994* (London: I.D Tauris and Co. Ltd, 1997), p.77.

⁵⁰ Ahmed Rashid, "Pakistan: Trouble Ahead, Trouble Behind", *Current History*, April 1996, p.162

⁵¹ *Indian Express*, (New Delhi) July 20, 1995.

⁵² Dhar, n.43., p.472.

with the police and rangers Pakistan had witness numerous daily deaths. Moreover, MQM received steady support from its financiers and patrons and retained its own armed bands engaged in sniping, looting or kidnapping etc. The Hyderabad massacre of 30 September 1988 or Black Friday as it is remembered, was the worst example to date of the ethnic violence in the Sindh, which had claimed more than 1,200 lives (most of those killed were Muhajirs).⁵³ This took the form of a mini insurgency in which armed MQM militants battled the security forces.

Early March 1989 witnessed unexplained shooting incident in Karachi.⁵⁴ On the tenth of the month a pedestrian was killed and scores injured following shooting from speeding cars in the Gulshan-i-Iqbal, Quaidabad and Nazimabad Muhajir localities of the city. The following week similar attacks by masked men led to ten deaths in the Malir and khokrapar colonies. The crisis in urban Sindh climaxed in Hyderabad with The Pucca Qila incident of 27 May 1990. That episode was likened by Muhajir leaders to the notorious 1919 Jalianwala Bagh massacre.⁵⁵ The Pucca Qila area was a Muhajir locality. On the day of the massacre a Sindhi police party entered it to recover suspected illegal arms. They opened fire, allegedly killing over 40 people and wounding many more.⁵⁶

⁵³ Lamb.,n.48., p.139.

⁵⁴ Ian Talbot, *India and Pakistan* (New York: Oxford University Press Inc, 2000) p.260.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p.261.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

After a weeklong violence, which left more than 250 people dead, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto persuaded that there, might be no alternative to the military option. However, as General Beg was out of the country the Sindh government decided to launch a crackdown based on police and centered on Hyderabad, the main bastion of MQM power. Shoot-on- Sight curfew was imposed, and a police house-to-house search begun. The situation had become so bad that people were suggesting dividing the Sindh province (the MQM's demand) as the only answer.⁵⁷

In 1992 the Pakistan Army, considering the MQM as a security risks decided to flush out its "anti-state cadre".⁵⁸ The blow dealt at the MQM by the army had significance on the revelation of a network of torture cells maintained by the MQM. In the light of these disclosures, most of the frequent outbreaks of gruesome violence in the urban areas of Sindh had been attributed to what could best be described as the 'Muhajir Mafia'.⁵⁹ In May 1992 "Operation Cleanup" was launched in Sindh after the province was rocked by violence. When Benazir became Prime Minister again in October 1993 a new stage of conflict had ushered. The MQM had waged an urban guerilla war of increasing ferocity against our government.⁶⁰

The army had withdrawn from Karachi and was replaced by paramilitary troops and police on November 30 1994. Since then the city

⁵⁷ Lamb., n.48., p. 140.

⁵⁸ Ali Shah , n.36., p.512.

⁵⁹ "The Sindh in Crisis", *The Indian Express* (New Delhi) June 30, 1992.

⁶⁰ Saeed Shafqat, " Pakistan under Benazir Bhutto", *Asian Survey*, Vol.36 No.7 July 1996 p.671.

had experienced the worst kind of violence that had claimed the lives of thousands of people. The hostility between the MQM members and the establishment deepened as result of alleged extra-judicial killings of MQM members by the security forces.⁶¹

On May 25, 1995 Benazir Bhutto described the MQM as terrorists and anti-state elements.⁶² Since July 1995 to January 1996, as many as 70 police encounters had taken place in the city. In 1995 on average, 10 to 20 persons died daily as a result of terrorist activity, and in the past two years, over 6,000 have died in terrorist related acts, including about 200 security services personnel.⁶³

In the late 1990s the MQM having a taste of political power had become ruthless in its operation. It had resorted to urban terrorism and political violence to achieve its end.⁶⁴ Indeed by the middle of 1998 violence was once again erupted, despite the presence of the MQM (A) in a coalition government led by Muslim league. The stand off between the government and the MQM with the implication for sustained violence had led to Karachi being called “bleeding wound of Pakistan”.⁶⁵ To many observes, Karachi

⁶¹ Kukreja, n.38., p.149.

⁶² *The Observer* (Delhi) July 7, 1995.

⁶³ Shafqat, n.60., p.671.

⁶⁴ *The Pioneer* (New Delhi), 26 September 1994.

⁶⁵ Kukreja, n.38.,p.149.

had become Pakistan's Beirut of 1970s⁶⁶, largely due to the criminalization of ethnic dissent attributed to Altaf Hussein.

The total breakdown of law and order in Karachi seriously affects the country's economic life, since the city is Pakistan's main financial center, providing 60 per cent of state revenue.⁶⁷ Since 1993 the country had undergone the deepest economic recession in its history, with high unemployment and inflation (officially set at 13 percent but independent economist and banker put it over 25 percent). The economy grew only 4.7 percent between 1994 and 1995, compared to a 30 year average of 6 percent.⁶⁸ The country had run chronic budget deficit throughout 1990s.

The frequent armed clashes and work stoppage in Karachi had caused massive damage to the infrastructure of that city and to the economy of Pakistan. Violence and insecurity related to ethnic conflicts had seriously disrupted economic activities in urban Sindh where there had been evidence of flight of capital to other region and shyness on the part capital to invest, besides billion of rupees lost each year due to recurrent strikes.⁶⁹ A research paper commissioned by the Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI) revealed, "a working day lost by strike in Karachi costs 1.3 billion rupees (\$ 38 million) and in 1995 a total of 34 working days were lost as a

⁶⁶ *India Today*, July 15, 1995, p.41.

⁶⁷ John Bray, "Pakistan at Fifty: A State in Decline", *International Affairs*, Vol.73 No.2 1997, p.327.

⁶⁸ Rashid, n.50., p. 159.

⁶⁹ Feroz Ahmed, "Pakistan: Ethnic Fragmentation or National Integration?", *The Pakistan Development Review* Vol.35 No.4 Part.2 Winter 1996, p.631.

result of strikes called by the MQM”.⁷⁰ Karachi, Pakistan economy’s jugular with unresolvable in it, there was no foreign investment in other parts also. Karachi accounts for two-thirds of Pakistan’s trade and industry, almost one half of its gross domestic product and, in the minds of local and foreign investors, “is synonymous with the progress of the nation”.⁷¹ When peace could not be restored in the city, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s highly touted efforts to attract foreign investment to Pakistan (to the tune of \$12 billion in contracts and memoranda of understanding since October 1993) was totally disrupted. Everybody agreed that the situation creates a great threat to national security.⁷²

THE MQM AND TRANS-BORDER LINKAGES:

The Muhajir ethno-nationalism in Sindh also had international ramifications. Islamabad accused India of meddling in the unrest to get back at Pakistan for its support of Muslim separatist in the northern Indian state of Kashmir.⁷³ The charge was more simplistic than what Indians said about ISI hand in Kashmir. Pakistani government had accused India that “RAW (Intelligence agency of India) hires MQM militants, takes them to places as distant as Madras or Shillong, trains them in urban guerrilla warfare, and

⁷⁰ Bray, n.67., pp.328-329.

⁷¹ Munis Faruqi, “Contextualising Karachi’s Violence”, *South Asia Bulletin*, Vol.15 No.1 1995 p.124.

⁷² N B Naqvi, “Islamabad should not be blind to ground realities in Sindh”, *The Times of India* (New Delhi) May 30,1995.

⁷³ *Indian Express* (New Delhi) June 30, 1992.

sends them back to Karachi with loads of weapons, explosives and funds”.⁷⁴ Moreover, because of their unremitting rivalry over the Kashmir dispute India and Pakistan tend to interfere in each other’s internal affairs.

If one’s neighbourhood was burning one could not afford to remain silent. Thus it was natural for the people in India to feel concerned about the violence in Karachi.

Besides the human angle, there were other reasons why India had kept extra vigilant under the circumstances. The older rank and file of the MQM originally migrated from India. The Muhajirs have their relations in various parts of India. The two sides have never allowed their social contacts to get snapped, though India and Pakistan have had adversary relationships ever since partition. When the situation in Karachi, Hyderabad and elsewhere in Sindh had gone from bad to worse many Muhajirs might think of returning to India that would amount to giving this country an infiltrator problem when it already had one courtesy Bangladesh.⁷⁵

The other reason that India took greater interest in the hour of crisis in Pakistan was that the political leadership in that country may find ways to intensify its low-cost war in Jammu and Kashmir to divert the attention of the world and also of the Pakistani masses from the unfolding apocalypse in Karachi.⁷⁶ Thus speaking in psychological terms, and given the MQM’s

⁷⁴ Bhabani Sen Gupta, “Karachi is forcing to rethink on Kashmir”, *The Pioneer* (New Delhi) August 19, 1995.

⁷⁵ Nooruzzaman, n.47.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

prevailed frustration with Pakistan, India, and its adversary for decades, thus appeared as a “natural ally” of the MQM.

The MQM’s mounting militancy in Pakistan had coincided with increased insurgency in the Indian administered part of Kashmir. It was obvious that the Pakistani leadership wanted to carry Punjab terrorism and Kashmir separatism to such a pitch that India’s integrity begin to crack. Meanwhile, Pakistan had faced a several internal upheaval. Indian military analyst thus feared that in its frustration, Pakistan might at any moment launch a military adventure against India.⁷⁷ In attempts to make Pakistan sorrow to its pressures, India was looking to provide covert support for some dissident groups within Pakistan form the late 1980s onwards.

Quoting the famous K+K+K (Karachi, Kashmir, Khalistan) theory, many analysts portrayed India of trying to ease the burden of Kashmir and troubles in its Punjab by hitting Pakistan at its most vulnerable spot, Karachi.⁷⁸ Moreover, the insurgency in Kashmir and the moral support the Pakistan government had extended to the freedom fighters had become a perennial embarrassment for India at international level.⁷⁹ Elaborating the objective of supporting terrorists in Pakistan Mani Shankar Ayier, who spent many years in Karachi as the Indian consul-general had argued:

The possibilities of secession in Pakistan have decrease significantly. Because of the soviet intervention in Afghanistan,

⁷⁷ *The Patriot*, July 29,1992.

⁷⁸ Moonis Ahmar, “Ethnicity and State Power in Pakistan”, *Asian Survey*, Vol.36 No.10, October 1996,p.1044.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p.1045.

Pashtun are more interested in that country. Wali Khan is alone and he is surrounded by Pro-establishment Pushtuns in the NWFP. Balochs have either joined the Pakistani establishment or live in a self-imposed exile, Sindhis are supporting either PPP or other federalist parties. Only a few of them still cherish the fantasy of Sindhudesh. And their influence in Sindh is marginal. In these circumstances the MQM is now the unrivalled power center of Karachi Politics. Though the MQM is divided against itself it is united against all non-Muhajirs. Thus the MQM is a force to be reckoned with.⁸⁰

The clashes between the MQM activists and the security forces had resulted lost of life to many on both sides. The Indian media had given a wide range of coverage to the MQM casualties without making any reference to people killed either by the MQM activists or in cross fire.⁸¹ The Indian intention of demonstrating to the world that Pakistan was guilty of violating human right in Karachi came true. The Karachi crisis had damage Pakistan support for the Kashmiris because both Amnesty International and the Pakistan Human Right Commission had heavily criticized Islamabad for serious human rights violations against the followers and supporters of MQM.⁸² Pakistan found it embarrassing to raise the matter of human rights violations committed by the Indian security forces in Jammu and Kashmir when its own record in Karachi was not clean. The Indian media as well as the diplomats had raised the human rights violation issues in Karachi in different forum. Thus Indians had attempted to neutralize Pakistan pro-Kashmiri stand by creating a linkage between Kashmir and Karachi. The creation of the linkages between Karachi and

⁸⁰ Ali Shah, n.36.,p.512.

⁸¹ *Daily Barsat*, March 27, 1994.

⁸² Ahmar, n.78., p.1045.

Kashmir had partially given advantage to India. It made India to compel Pakistan to review its policy options over Kashmir. Since the days of Kashmir accession to India, Pakistan had been insisting that the state should join it. Besides, the option of an independent Kashmir has been rejected both by India and Pakistan. But in January 1996, in a statement in the United States, Pakistan's former Foreign Minister, Sardar Asif Ahmed Ali implicitly endorsed the idea of an independent Kashmir, if the Kashmiri wished it.⁸³ A third option would provide a face saving formula to India for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute.⁸⁴ Hence by supporting the MQM militants India intended to change Pakistan's policy towards the Kashmir dispute.

Meantime the Indian factor in Sindh violence made the media commentators in Pakistan caution against the possibility of an "East Punjab-like"⁸⁵ situation developing in Sindh. The federal authorization took place on May 28 1992 and necessary orders were issued to the commander of the Fifth Corps at Karachi in that regard. An elaborate operation code named Blue Fox (OBF) had been publicized with specific officers of the army assigned specific operational commands for specific areas of Sindh.⁸⁶ The perceived aim of the Army's operation was to keep a vigil on India's infiltrating saboteurs and agents into Sindh. Besides, the operation Blue Fox

⁸³ *Asian Age*, March 21, 1996.

⁸⁴ Mehtab Ali Shah, "The Kashmir Dispute- A View from the Four Provinces of Pakistan", *Contemporary South Asia*, Vol. 4 No.1, 1985, pp.110-111.

⁸⁵ "The Sindh Question", *The Hindustan Times*, June 5, 1992.

⁸⁶ N B Naqvi, "Pakistan's gamble in Sindh may boomerang", *The Times of India*(New Delhi) June 2, 1992.

disturbingly reminded one of the previous Pakistan Army Chief Aslam Beg's dream exercise of Operation Foxland at the conclusion of which he had declared that the Pakistan army was satisfied it could carry war into the "enemy's territory".⁸⁷

The Sindh situation had become a serious cause of straining relation between the two countries. The state of total helplessness in which Pakistan found itself over the escalating and uncontrollable violence in Karachi had left it no choice but to order the closure of the Indian diplomatic mission in Karachi. The then Pakistan foreign secretary, Mr. Najmuddin Shaikh has charged the Indian Consulate-General in Karachi with having become a center for sabotage, subversion and terrorism and fomenting internal strife in Karachi⁸⁸.

Since Karachi is the only developed port of Pakistan, is a much more sensitive area to it than the whole of Kashmir. Any exposure by India near Karachi, or a misperception by Pakistani authorities on Indian intention, could plunge them into war. In 1998, India and Pakistan had declared nuclear powers by conducting simultaneous nuclear test. Both of them have weak command and control structures, though this is much more true of Pakistan than of India. The principal purpose of both the nation going nuclear was to avert the possibility one's interference in the internal affairs of others, especially by lending active support to dissidents. In 1990 India

⁸⁷ *The Hindustan Times*, June 5, 1992.

⁸⁸ "Time for soul searching", *The Hindu (Madras)* December 28, 1994.

and Pakistan were at the brink of a nuclear war, which was averted mainly by US diplomacy.⁸⁹ In a worst possible case such a situation might be repeated over the Karachi issue.

There had also been newspaper reports to the effect that, besides forged links with Indian intelligence through RAW, since the early 1990s, the MQM (A) had been in touch with the US and Israeli intelligence agencies, the CIA and MOSSAD.⁹⁰ These agencies had offered to lobby different human rights bodies with a view to promoting the MQM's case for dividing Sindh and ultimately carving out an Urdu speaking state out of the boundaries of Pakistan. As a quid pro quo for this US-Israeli collaboration, MQM had agreed to refrain from participating in anti-Israeli rallies organized in Sindh.⁹¹

There had been reports in the press that the USA had encouraged the MQM-sponsored idea of converting Karachi into a free port and creating tax-free zones in the coastal areas of Sindh.⁹² The objective of the USA supports to MQM was that Karachi provides an ideal site for US submarine surveillance and other base facilities with which to maintain its global hegemony in the post-cold war era.⁹³ This reported MQM connection with the USA had given many articulate Sindhis the impression that the MQM(A)

⁸⁹ Ali Shah, n.36., p.515.

⁹⁰ Ali Shah, n.49., p.78.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² *Frontier Post*, June 6, 1994.

⁹³ Ali Shah, n.49., p.78.

had received the blessing of the USA in a bid to divide Sindh.⁹⁴ According to their view, such events would allow the West to impose their hold over the region.

CONCLUSION:

Muhajir politics was born almost forty years after independence. They tended to depend on various government institutions to deliver goods to them, largely at the expense of social integration at the local level. Since Zia period, various activist Muhajir elements allegedly responded to offers of the military to play the ethnic card to counter the ethnic based political parties. From that point onwards, the MQM was able to accumulate weapons and spread terror in urban Sindh with relative impunity. In various statements made by certain political groups the MQM had been identified with ethnic strife in the city of Karachi. Following the increased violent action deployed by the MQM activists Karachi had experienced gruesome tragic events quite frequently. More recently, the MQM had pursued two contradictory strategies in response to the variety and intensity of challenges it faced. It had occasionally used the name Muttahida Quami Movement (United National Movement). Moreover, the MQM's rhetoric and actions have become more militant since the beginning of 1994.

The objectives of the MQM, and the violent tactics in which it attempts to achieve them, had posed serious threats to the stability of

⁹⁴ Ibid.

Pakistan. The unfortunate situation and their spill over beyond the country had posed serious threat to regional security also. Pakistan, a weak and a vulnerable state, lacking internal cohesion is susceptible to disintegration. If the regional and extra regional powers like India and America lend any moral or material support to the MQM it might harbour secessionist tendencies. The disintegration of Pakistan might set a chain reaction and convulse all the Southern Asian states. Considering the strategic location of Pakistan, which is situated at the crossroads of South Asia, South West Asia and Central Asia, the West and Japan have a host of interest. Any serious threats to Pakistan's territorial integrity, pose either by the MQM militant or religious fanatics, might erupt into a wider instability affecting these areas.

CHAPTER-3

DRUG TRAFFICKING

INTRODUCTION:

Pakistan since independence was enmeshed in a drug problem that was complex and multifaceted. The phenomena of narcotic trafficking, which started as an organized cross border crime had emerged as a threat to nation states because of its diabolic linkage with terrorist groups. The emergence of new strata in society- that of the drug lords not only have the capacity to corrupt the law enforcement agencies but also buy political power. This had profoundly affected the basic political structure of the state. In a “soft” state like Pakistan which has already become vulnerable due to ethnic clashes, organized crimes and religious fanaticism, the complete breakdown of law and order machinery had led many taking recourse to sophisticated arms. The easy availability of those arms to the drug traffickers had introduced the culture of the gun or the Kalashnikov in Pakistan. The Kalashnikovisation had led to the organized crime and criminalisation of society.

Ultimately the greed for money and power has made the drug lords the destructor of Pakistani society. Adding to this, the politicians, the Army and other high echelons of the country, for their self-interest were associating themselves with those power-seeking outfits. The influence of

drug traffickers on the politician runs so deep that it could destabilize any government that attempt to disappoint their interest. It was also a matter of serious concern that the illicit drugs have become the major source of funding state sponsored terrorism in the country. Apparently, drug trafficking, with its penetration of state institutions, economy and society, had become the most formidable force threatening the government's authority, political stability and the economic and social equilibrium of the society.

Highlighting the nature and extent of drug trafficking, this chapter discusses the nature of threats pose by it to the security of Pakistan. It can be categorized as threats to society, political, economic and physical security of the state.

Genesis of Drug Trafficking in Pakistan:

The two main areas of opium poppy cultivation in the world are the 'Golden Crescent' of South West Asia and the 'Golden Triangle' of South East Asia. Pakistan falls under one of these two main areas that is – the 'Golden Crescent' consisting of Iran and Afghanistan also. The 'Golden Crescent' region provides for 60 per cent of heroin reaching America and 80 per cent of Europe.¹ In Pakistan, opium is cultivated mainly in the remote mountain areas of the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Afghanistan Pakistan border. In this region opium cultivation and use has

¹ Alison Jamieson, "Global Drug Trafficking", *Conflict Studies*, No. CCXXXIV, September 1990, p3.

been continuing for the last few centuries. Under the British rule opium production was licensed. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the British used to import opium from India to China for reducing the balance of payments deficits caused by large tea purchases. When Pakistan came into existence in 1947 the system of control on production was inherited by it.

By all accounts, the opium usage and production levels remained relatively static, rising from about 100,000 in 1947 to 250,000 by the end of the 1970.² Drug cultivation and drug trafficking assumed alarming proportions in the country after 1979.

As a key participant in the Golden Crescent's heroin trade, Pakistan got an increase attraction in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The industry was used to fill vacuum created by the crackdown in South-East Asia, which reduced supplies from the region. Since the beginning of the 1980s when, at the behest of the United States, Islamabad came to be embroiled in the Afghan imbroglio, drug trafficking became a thriving business in Pakistan.

Afghanistan and Pakistan alone shared nearly 6,000 metric tons of the total illicit production in 1999. The United Nation's Drug Agency sources estimated in 1993 that more than \$30 billion worth of heroine manufactured in Pakistan and neighboring Afghanistan found its way to Europe and America every year.³ According to United States officials, more

² CIA Report on Heroin in Pakistan – Sowing The Wind as reproduced in *Strategic Digest*, October 1993, p1595.

³ Veena Kukreja, *Contemporary Pakistan – Political Processes, Conflicts and Crises* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003), p193.

than 20 per cent of the heroin smuggled into the US originated in Pakistan.⁴ According to the Pakistan Narcotic Control Board (PNCB), thousands of acres of land in the Frontier's tribal belt came under poppy cultivation in the early 1980's. Total area of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and Pakistan stood at 27,360 hectares at the end of 1993.⁵ The conflict following the 1979 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan facilitated increased opium production. The Soviet account quotes the American left-liberal magazine, Rolling Stone, reporting on a powerful narcobusiness network, including vast new fields of opium poppies on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border, created during the jihad.⁶ It was "complete with well planned routes and a whole network of dozens of factories" to process the opium into morphine base and heroin. From slight production before the Russians and the CIA began the war in 1979, the Golden Crescent countries of Pakistan and Afghanistan have grown into the largest center of heroin production, consumed elsewhere as well as locally, in the world. By United Nation and other estimates this amounted by 1997 to around 500 tons of pure white heroin powder.⁷

As a part of Cold War politics, the refugees from Afghanistan to Pakistan were converted into Mujahideen (one who participates in jihad) and were provided money and weapons to fight the Red Army. They were also

⁴ *POT (Pakistan Series)*, June 1993, p2123.

⁵ United States State Department Publication, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report , April 1994, p16.

⁶ John K.Cooley, *Unholy Wars – Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism* (London: Pluto Press, 1999) p131.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p137.

provided the needed ideological framework by declaring that their fight against the Red Army was a jihad (holy war). In the name of mobilizing the money for jihad, the drug barons of the Golden Crescent were activated by the major players supporting the Mujahideen. This increased the poppy cultivation, and poppy-refining factories came up all along the Pak-Afghan border.

Factors Leading to the Drastic Growth of Drug-Trafficking in Pakistan in the 1980s:

The narcotics situation in Pakistan has acquired a drastic transformation from a largely uninvolved state on the margins of the international narcotics trade into one that not only produced and refined opium, but which provided key transportation routes to the international market in 1979 and the beginning of 1980s. Certain regional developments and a few other internal factors led to the drastic growth of drug trafficking in the country.

Three major regional events in 1979 had pushed Pakistan into the International Narcotics Trade. The first event was the Iranian Revolution in February 1979. The Khomeini Regime banned all forms of narcotics production and usage and executed several well-known drug lords after short trials in revolutionary Islamic courts. As the regime took hold, farmers stopped or severely limited poppy cultivation. Iranian narcotics dealers and middlemen either went underground or abroad — some to Pakistan and the

Gulf states.⁸ With its long coastal belt and porous borders with Iran and Afghanistan, Pakistan's geographical position was ideal for drug trafficking to Europe and USA. The Iranian dealers poured their money for producing poppy in the Helmand Valley in Afghanistan and made use of the old smuggling routes between the Makran coast, Karachi and the Gulf countries.⁹

The second event was the passage by the General Zia-ul-Haq Regime in Pakistan of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) order of 1979. This order had banned the legal cultivation and distribution of opium. As a part of General Zia's Islamization policy, it pushed the opium business underground and into the hands of the old smuggling networks in the North-West Frontier Province(NWFP) and Punjab. With an opium surplus warehoused in the Frontier and the vast potential for expanding poppy cultivation in the poor and politically autonomous region of the NWFP, the smuggling clans of the Frontier did not take time to move into refining heroin and put it into their clandestine channels for international export. In fact, General Zia's policies increased the production of opium in the NWFP rather than decreased it. Moreover, cultivation of poppy and cannabis were encouraged during the Zia regime to finance terrorist activities in India.¹⁰

⁸ A few of Iranian narcotic dealer were settled in Quetta in Pakistani Balochistan , but most who came to Pakistan went to Karachi ,See, n.2, p1596.

⁹ These Iranian dealers provided Pakistani smugglers with access to international narcotics networks and reportedly brought in experts to train locals in the relatively simple chemical process of refining opium into morphine base and heroin, Kukreja, n.3., p197.

¹⁰ Ibid.

The third event was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. The entry of Soviet troops in Afghanistan cut off the traditional drug routes to Europe. This led to deflection of much of the trade in Pakistan, particularly through Baluchistan.

The outbreak of the Afghan War and influx of eight lakh Afghan refugees into Baluchistan turned this province into a great drugs and armed bazaar. With Pakistan welcoming the Afghan refugees and Iran depriving the poppy growers of its market, the obvious route to West became through Pakistan.¹¹ Afghanistan has traditionally been the largest cultivator of poppy in the region, producing annually between 1500 to 2000 tones. Most of it was refined into heroin in laboratories set up in the tribal regions of Pakistan, where due to a complex combination of factors like the tribal code of honour, inefficiency of Islamabad's writ over these areas and the generation of high profits that new high value narcotics substances like heroin bring, the refining process continues without any disturbances.¹² During the Afghan war, the Inter-services intelligence propped up most of the tribes living in the Pushto speaking Baluchistan belt bordering Afghanistan against the pro-communist regime tribes in the region and gave them free hand to indulge in various activities ranging from gun-running to drug-trafficking.

¹¹ Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema , The Afghan Refugees and Pakistan's Internal Security Problems in S.D. Munni and Lok Raj Baral (ed) *Refugees and Regional Security in South Asia* , (Delhi : Konark Publishers, Pvt. Ltd , 1996) p. 187.

¹² Aabha Dixit , " Narco-Power : Threatening the Very Roots of Pakistan Society " , *Strategic Analysis* , May 1991 , p.190.

Compiled with these three events, the following two internal factors are the most important in aiding drug cultivation and trafficking in Pakistan:

1. the narco-politics, that is, the linkages between the politicians and the narco- barons and
2. narcotics, military, and ISI axis.

The narco-barons have entered every walk of Pakistan's society. Not only do they have links with the political elite of the country, they have themselves turned into politicians. In a report, the United States Central Intelligence Agency had observed that Pakistan's drug-runners had established firm contacts with 'higher political circles in that country'.¹³ What was more disturbing was that drug lords financed political parties. They bought enough votes for themselves to win seats in the National Assembly and thereby gained access to the highest dignitaries in the land. Names of various prominent leaders like the former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the late president Zia-ul-Haq and even Benzir Bhutto had been linked with one drug syndicate or the other.¹⁴

In the NWFP, drug trafficking was done by clans such as the Jadnus, Yusufzais khattaks and Afridis, who had powerful connections with the ruling elite. The yusufzais had close connections with Nawaz Sharif through Lt. General Fazle Haq who was the governor of the NWFP. In 1990, Fazle Haq sponsored the election campaigns of the Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad

¹³ CIA Report , n.2., p.1595.

¹⁴ Ruchita Beri , " Poppy Politics " , *Strategic Analysis*, November 1993 , p. 1027

(IJI) in the Frontier. While Yusufzais had linked with the IJI, the Afridis had connections with the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). Another drug baron, Malik Mohammad Ayub Khan, also known, as Haji Ayub was also closely associated with the IJI. During the 1990 election campaign, the IJI openly sought his help to finance IJI candidates. The Haji reportedly purchased his own seat (NA-33, Khyber Agency) declaring he would pay upto Rs. 50,000 per vote.¹⁵

Another Afridi Malik who was elected to the national Assembly from the Khyber Agency in the 1988 election is Malik Waris Khan Afridi and his loyalties like with the PPP. During the famous no-confidence vote in the PPP government, tabled in the National Assembly by Nawaz Sharif in 1989, Malik Waris Khan mobilized drug money to enable the PPP to buy votes of the wavering members of the National Assembly.¹⁶

The Balochistan coast had been open to smuggling since day's bygone while the land borders are also porous and extremely difficult to control. In this area, the Notezai and Bugti tribes were involved in drug trafficking. A powerful drug baron, Sakhi Dost Jom Notezai, when arrested in 1991, was able to cut deal with Nawaz Sharif for his release. When Nawaz Sharif needed two-third majority to pass the 12th Amendment which empowered special anti-terrorist courts, "four senators and several MNAs

¹⁵ Ibid., p.1028.

¹⁶ Ibid.

went to the Prime Minister to exchange their votes for the release of Sakhi Dost Jan Notezai.”¹⁷

In Punjab, Haji Iqbal Beg, known as the “King of Indian Route” for his control over the heroin trafficking across the Indian border had close contacts with Malik Meraj Khalid, a founder member of the PPP. He also claimed to have some powerful political friends. Name such as Aifzaz Ahsan (the then interior minister), Jehangir Bader, the petroleum minister, Faisal Saleh Hayat, the commerce minister and Punjab MPA Salman Tasser.

All of these illustrious figures, he claimed to have financially assisted during the 1988 general and provincial elections, either with straight cash, or by providing such assistance as banners and posters. In one instance involving Salman Tasser, he also arranged for opposing candidates to withdraw from the race.¹⁸ Haji Iqbal Beg was also the elected Punjab Legislative Assembly member of the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI). He also helped out Nawaz Sharif in the 1995 elections by providing one of his offices as campaign headquarters. Nawaz Sharif also maintained close contacts with Beg and helped him to acquire denationalized industrial units, including the Muslim Commercial Bank in which Sharif was a partner.¹⁹

A study of the electoral politics in the poppy growing areas of Dir, Buner, Malakand Agency and Gadoom Amazoi, revealed:

¹⁷ *Frontier Post*, August 31, 1993.

¹⁸ Zahid Hussain, “Baig Bussiness”, *Strategic Digest*, June 1996, p.2499

¹⁹ Sudhir Singh and Ana Ballesteros Peiro, “Drug Trafficking And Drug Barons in Pakistan”, *India Quaterly*, Vol.58, No.1, 2002, p.128

1. All Jamaat candidates, despite their inability to justify poppy cultivation on religious grounds, continued to oppose the ban on poppy cultivation as it would deprive poor farmers of their major means of livelihood;
2. Mohammad Shah Haroon, later elected as MPA distributed poppy seeds free of cost during his election campaign; and
3. Haji Yaqub, leader of the Jammat-i-Islami parliamentary party, criticized the anti-narcotics measures taken by the PPP government in 1989-90, raising slogan, "our land, our choice", thus emphasizing the right of the Pakhtoon farmers to grow poppy in their lands.²⁰

Added to narco-politics, another alarming trend in Pakistan is the drug-army nexus. The military is significantly involved in narcotics. During the eight years period of martial law under General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1985), a number of officers did become involved in narcotics. Those were mostly Majors who headed martial law courts and started by taking bribes from those accused in narcotics cases. In the early 1980s, the Army charged thirteen majors and two Brigadiers in narcotics corruption cases. Some of these men - Major Afridi, Major Javed, Major Zahoor escaped from custody and became more deeply involved as traffickers connected to the Frontier mafias.²¹ Many observers believed the cases involving the Majors and the Brigadiers was only the tip of the iceberg and that corruption in military over narcotics and commissions on weapons sales, etc. was more extensive.

²⁰ Rahimullah Yusufzai, "Poppy Polls", *Strategic Digest*, June 1990, pp.251-252

²¹ CIA Report, n.2., p.1625.

The Army, which was the real ruler of Pakistan in 1980s, needed the drug money to pursue its security interests in Afghanistan and Northern India. The drug mafia needed the support of the Army for the safe passage of drugs. The CIA Reports suggested, "The drug trafficking could not have thrived without the connivance of a section of the armed forces. Vehicles of the army controlled national logistic cell and those used to supply arms to Mujahideen have also been used as drug carriers. The Pakistan narcotic Control Board (PNCB) and other agencies did not have the authority to check these vehicles and so they were the safest means for drug transportation"²².

Some other instances, which came to light, also demonstrated the penetration of an illegal narcotic traders influence into the armed forces. According to media reports in Pakistan, Squadron Leader Qasim Bhatti of the Pakistani Air Force used to carry drugs as a part of the cargo in the military aircraft to the US and sell them directly to US military personnel.²³ Some official sources did not rule out even the involvement of the ISI, which ran the Afghan war, in drug trafficking. Its former Chief Lieutenant General Hamid Gul, was reported to be implicated in a drug trafficking case.²⁴

²² Zahid Hussain , " Narco – Power : Pakistan's Parallel Government ?," *Strategic Digest*, June 1990,pp 2494-2495.

²³ Sreedhar and T. Srinivas, "The Illegal Drug Trade:Asian Experience," *Strategic Analysis* ,Vol.20, No.5., August 1997.p.744.

²⁴ Dixit, n.12., p.723.

With the active support of the ISI, the drug barons have used Army vehicles as carriers of narcotics. The drug connection of the army and intelligence services came to light when at the instance of Robert Oakley, the US Ambassador to Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto ordered investigation into the BCCI (Bank of Credit and Commerce International) failing attempt. The entire exercise turned eyewash when Mirza Iqbal Beg was released on bail despite ample evidence of his involvement. An American scholar, Selig Harrison rightly remarked that Pakistan has 10 Noriegas (Noriegas was the chief of the Army staff in Panama, who was involved in drug smuggling) very high up in the military and it was very difficult to disclose their names.²⁵

The unholy nexus of narcotics drugs, army and ISI can be traced back to 1979 when the US government launched its combat mission against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The US deliberately ignored the problem of narco-terrorism in this region. On May 13, 1990, the Washington Post Article said that US officials had ignored Afghan complaints of heroin trafficking by Hekmatyar and the ISI, an allegation that at least one senior American official confirmed. Specifically, the Post reported “ Hekmatyar commanders close to ISI, run laboratories in southwest Pakistan” and “ISI cooperates in heroin operations”.²⁶

²⁵ David Philip, “ Ghulam The Grim ”, *Economic And Political Weekly*, December 21, 1996.

²⁶ Ikramul Haq, “Pak-Afghan Drug Trade in Historical Perspective ”, *Asian Survey*, Vol.36, No. 10, October 1996, p.953.

Drug trafficking and the security of the state

The security threat to the state by drug trafficking depends upon the nature and scope of the drug trafficking organizations. There are three types of drug trafficking organizations.

The local organizations that are run by individuals or a group of individuals, who are mere criminals.

The second type of organizations is “community” owned and these are mostly ethnic groups or tribes. This type of organization is political and public, designed to benefit the ethno religious group or tribe and strengthen it vis-à-vis others.²⁷ It is likely to be a far greater threat to the physical state and to the political regime.

Thirdly, there is the organization run by the professional drug mafias. This type of organization have global reach and influence over the entire gamut of institutions of the state ranging from the local police up to the high profile leaders in politics and the Army.

The second and third types of drug trafficking organization have far greater consequences to the state security. Threats from these organizations take various forms and affect the social, physical, economic and political security of the state.

²⁷ Angela S. Burger, *Narcotic Drugs: Security Threat or Interest to South Asian States* in Marvin G. Weinbaum and Chetan Kumar (ed), *South Asia Approaches the Millenium – Reexamining National Security* (Oxford : Westview Press , Inc. , 1995) p.170.

Drug trafficking and social security

Drug trafficking contributes to growing social instability by fuelling widespread drug abuse and high rates of organized crime.

Drug abuse: Drug trafficking had spread like contagious diseases in Pakistani society. The heroin boom was so large and uncontrolled that drug abuse swept Pakistan itself, leaving it with one of the world's largest addict populations. A massive increase of heroin consumption among the Pakistanis was noticed within a short span of time. Before 1979, there were no heroin addicts in Pakistan. In the words of Pakistan's Narcotics Control Board, addiction went "completely out of hand", exploding to more than 1.3 million addicts in less than three years.²⁸ In the late 1990s, the drug addicts in Pakistan number around four million.²⁹

Perhaps the increased consumption could be attributed to the easy availability of heroin in local markets. Moreover, the heroin drug has no barriers, no geographical boundaries. It had jump beyond the kind of ethnic, social and religious compartments. It was clear that heroin had touched all parts of the Pakistani society- students, young professionals, taxi drivers, petty vendors, craftsmen and even public servants. And it had equally rampant in Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, Rawalpindi, Multan and Quetta. In

²⁸ Hussain , n.22.,p.2495.

²⁹ D. Suba Chandran , " Drug Trafficking and the Security of the State : A Case Study of Pakistan " , *Strategic Analysis* , September 1998 , p.914.

fact, in Pakistan this gave birth to the phenomenon of the “heroinization” of society- a malady that threatened to rip the social fabric apart.³⁰

As heroin use became more popular in the country, the worst affected were teenagers or those in their early twenties, whereas opium users traditionally were between 40 to 60 years old. According to the National Survey conducted by the Pakistan Narcotic Control Board (PNCB) on Drug Abuse that was published in 1993, 72 percent of the drug abusers are under the age of 35.³¹ Punjab has the highest number of drug abusers in Pakistan with a population of 1.5 millions followed by Sindh (0.8 million), NWFP (0.4 million) and Baluchistan (0.3 million).³²

Drug addiction leads to further adverse effects. Heroin use affects the physical health of the individual as it helps to foster the spread of one of the most lethal diseases- AIDS. It ruins the economic structure of the families, which has further implications for the economic structure of the society. As studied by the PNCB, in 1993 the average monthly expenditure of one Pakistani drug abuser was estimated to be Rs. 1, 259.³³ The abuse of drugs in a society had created social imbalances and moral decay. The male addicts indulged in the crimes from petty to major ones and the female addicts took to prostitution to pay for their drugs.

³⁰ Haq , n.26.,p.955.

³¹ Chandran , n.29.,p.914.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

Organized crime: Drug trafficking results in the growth of “organized crime” that further affects the social security. Organized crime is different from ordinary traditional crimes such as murder, robbery, kidnapping etc. The term drug related crime is used to cover an extremely broad and complex range of offences. The most direct relationship between drug and crime is the category of drug law violations that includes unauthorized possession and consumption of controlled drugs, illicit cultivation, their production and sale and the laundering of the profits from these activities.³⁴

Another category of connection between crime and drugs is the range of other criminal activities, which may be linked to drug trafficking such as corruption, (white-collar), intimidation, murder, terrorism, and the illegal traffic in arms and explosives.³⁵ Drug money is used to bribe the police and other drug enforcement agencies not to conduct raids or to make aspects. Drug money is paid to the government prosecutors not to prosecute. Drug money is donated to political parties and politicians, so that they are not very sincere in controlling drug trafficking.

In Pakistan, drug money had changed the social scene of the country. Although a small and powerful group of narco barons had reaped the major profits, members of the law-enforcing agencies had also benefited from the drug money. In 1995, President Farooq Leghari alleged, “the police force was involved. If police was not involved, drug trafficking cannot take

³⁴ World Drug Report, United Nation International Drug Control Programme: Oxford University Press, 1997, p.96.

³⁵ Ibid.

place.”³⁶ There was also report of break up of a drug ring involving senior police and PNCB officials in Punjab in 1991 mainly because of a better struggle inside the police over drug payoffs.

According to one narcotics expert PNCB had been “tipped off” about a narcotic shipment. An example of such event could be seen from the Dalbandin raid. During December 1990, the frontier constabulary (FC) of Pakistan seized 1,800 kg of fine heroin, the biggest haul in drug history. The PNCB in Quetta refused to file an FIR at first, later, due to pressure; an FIR was filed after 12 days. The three people who were named in the FIR were never arrested. All the PNCB officials in Quetta refused to investigate the case, and instead sent four month leave applications to the PNCB headquarters in Islamabad. The Inspector General of the FC, who seized the heroin, was transferred.³⁷

It is believed by the security agency on drug trafficking of Pakistan that narco-barons can influence anyone, at any level from judiciary to the civil administration and the police are ready to cooperate with them. Hence, workings against narcotics have become a risky game.

Drug trafficking: Economic threat to the security of the state

Drug trafficking poses a serious economic instability to the state. The economic well-being of a state can be measured in terms of its GDP,

³⁶ *Dawn*, 27 June, 1995.

³⁷ Chandran, n.29., pp.914-915.

national and international debt, its vulnerability to other states in terms of energy, food, basic materials for production, and increasingly, environmental dangers that reduce the productivity of labour and capital.³⁸ The economic effects of the drug trade stem mainly from the processes of legitimizing narcotics earnings in the country of origin.³⁹ In such conditions, it gives rise to inflation. “Drug abuse contributes to the loss of productivity due to addiction, rehabilitation etc. It increases the cost of health care”.⁴⁰ The state has to spend more on social measures for rehabilitating drug abuse. On the other hand, the state has to spend more on counter measures to control and eradicate drug cultivation and drug trafficking. In doing so, the state authority has to divert more funds for the maintenance of law enforcing agencies that involve anti narcotics programmes and operations.

Pakistan faces the same economic dilemma. If the economic well being of a state can be measured in terms of GDP (Gross Domestic Product), national and international debt etc, in Pakistan, drug earnings are larger than the budget of the government. By 1989 drugs were bringing in at least \$4 billion a year – more foreign exchange than all Pakistan’s legal exports combined.⁴¹ According to a UNDCP Report, Pakistan’s heroin industry in terms of turnover was estimated at approximately Rs.74 billion, i.e. 5

³⁸ Burger, in n.27., p.172.

³⁹ Rensselaer W. Lee III , “ Global Reach : The Threat of International Drug Trafficking ” , *Current History* , May 1995 , p.208.

⁴⁰ Ivelaw Griffith, “ From Cold War Geopolitics to Post-Cold War Geonarcotics ” , *International Journal* , Vol. XLIX , No.1 , Winter 1993-94 , p.30.

⁴¹ Christina Lamb, *Waiting For The Allah – Pakistan’s Struggle For Democracy*, (New Delhi: Viking Penguin, 1991), p.195.

percent of its GDP in 1992-1993, which was 20-25 percent of the total estimated shadow economy.⁴²

In fact, the drug money had led to the creation of not just a parallel economy, but also essentially a national economy dangerously dependent on foreign exchange from the drug trade. So strong was the impact of drugs on the NWFP economy that the absence of dollars as a result of the stoppage of US aid to the Mujahideen had forced the drug mafia to set in and fill the vacuum to prevent the collapse of the order that had kept the province alive economically.⁴³ With so much heroin money flowing into the country, Pakistan's commentators were concerned that politics would take on a Colombian cast – that is, that the drug lords would use money to influence the nation's leaders.⁴⁴ Indeed, as Alfred McCoy, an expert in this field had asserted that Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's efforts to move against the traffickers were halted partly because heroin earnings were larger than the government's budget and one fourth of GDP, and partly because of the need to placate critical elements in the military that could threaten Bhutto's continuance in office.⁴⁵ "Narcotics would have to be considered vital for Pakistan. It is, therefore, not limiting the trade but tolerating or protecting it, which promotes economic security."⁴⁶

⁴² *The Times of India*, 19 December, 1994.

⁴³ Dixit, n.12.,p.192.

⁴⁴ Haq, n.26.,p.961.

⁴⁵ Burger, in n.27.,p.173.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

Hence, it is this aspect that poses the greatest security challenge to Pakistan. It made the state dependent dangerously for its economic stability on drug money, which has further ramifications for the social, political and physical security of the state in the long term.

Drug trafficking and the political security of the state

The political regime includes the form of the government and its usual processes, and also those of power. Hence, the political security does not mean the security of the government alone but also includes the security of the political structure and political process. In the case of a democratic state, the political security of the state comprises the security of the democratically elected government for the period that it is elected, the democratic structure and the institutions of the state, and the security of the democratic process.

Drug trafficking poses a serious threat to all these components of political security. Narcotic industries in the state are associated with extreme anti-state violence or with the disintegration of national authority. However, most drug dealers are not pursuing independent political initiatives, preferring to co-exist with and manipulate the state authority.⁴⁷ As long as the political leadership decides not to harm the interests of the drug traffickers, the loyalty continues.

Politically, Pakistan has the worst problems. Drug money from the illicit trade in heroin has played a key role in weakening and undermining

⁴⁷ Lee III, n.39.,p.208.

already weak officials in government and military circles. “Politically, no government is likely to more than mouth the rhetoric and publicize occasional arrests.⁴⁸ In Pakistan, there were incidents in which the government in the NWFP, refused to take any measures on drug trafficking, because that would jeopardize the government. Most poppy-growing areas elected IJI and ANP candidates during the 1988 polls and they had exploited every opportunity to highlight the plight of the farmers.⁴⁹ In the 1988 elections, the Chamla and Khadukhel areas of Swat district elected the ANP’s Abdul Karim Babak as an MPA primarily because he vowed to defy the ban on poppy cultivation.⁵⁰ Babak was a provincial minister then in the PPP-ANP coalition government and a lot of responsibility had devolved on him to eliminate the standing crop. But the situation went differently when he was out from the power and did everything in his power to embarrass the ruling PPP. He had warned the government that the farmers would grow poppy on a longer acreage.

Even at the national level, the drug barons who have become the members of the National Assembly, and the drug money, played a significant role during no-confidence motions, and during the passage of important bills, etc. Indeed, facing a no-confidence motion in the National Assembly in late 1989, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto charged, “drug money was being used to destabilize her government”. When she claimed

⁴⁸ Burger, n.27., p. 176.

⁴⁹ Rahimullah Yusufzai , “ Poppy Polls” , *Strategic Digest* , June 1990 , p.2512

⁵⁰ Ibid.

that heroin dealers had paid Rs. 194 million for votes against her, many observers find the allegation credible.⁵¹

The greatest threat to the political security from drug trafficking comes in the form of a threat to the democratic process. The difficulty of heading a legitimate and coherent government in Pakistan is the testimony to the changes in political position caused by the narcotic trade. In fact, those without narcotics profits had fewer bargaining resources than those who did.⁵²

The end of the Zia regime has not automatically made Pakistan into a full fledged democratic state. In fact, in the three elections held in Pakistan in the 1990s, the people's participation has been declining. In the 1990 elections, it was 45 percent, which declined to 42 percent in the 1993 elections, which further came down to 37 percent in the 1997 elections.⁵³ With people's participation declining, any adverse effects on the process would completely endanger the democracy in Pakistan.

Drug Trafficking and the physical security of the state

“Physical security” includes internal cohesion and protection of the citizenry from harm. Drug trafficking affects the physical security of the state. The narcotics related internal disorder stems mainly when the linkage

⁵¹ Lawrence Lifschultz, “Turning a Blind Eye?”, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 10 August, 1989, p.14.

⁵² Burger, n.27., p.176.

⁵³ Chandran, n.29.,p.917.

between narcotics and weapons get strengthened, that is, when it develop to the so-called narco-terrorist phenomenon. The reliance of a number of insurgent groups on narcotics production and trafficking to finance their campaigns gives rise to the problem of narco-terrorism.⁵⁴

Narco-terrorism is an “acts of terror and violence against civilian populations and authority aimed at intimidation, and to maintain the drug traffickers control over a given area of drug cultivation or production.”⁵⁵

There is also evidence that terrorist groups are cultivating or trafficking illicit drugs to provide the funding to sustain their political campaigns.

Hence, narco-terrorism can identify in two forms: -

1. Drug lords have been prepared to employ terrorist type tactics for specific political purposes, generally in the context of trying to force advantageous (or curtail disadvantageous) changes in the law.⁵⁶ In other cases, the ethnic or tribal group that fight for independent state or against the domination of other groups uses drug money as a source of self-financing of the movement.
2. Drugs as a source to gain more weapons, where the terrorist movement in a state is given drugs by the neighbouring states.

⁵⁴ Carolina G. Hernandez , Gina R. Pattugalam , *Transnational Crime and Regional Security in the Asia Pacific* , (Philippines : Institute for Strategic and Development Studies,Inc. , 1999) , p.36.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Peter Chalk, *Non-Military Security and Global Order – The Impact of Extremism Violence and Chaos on National and International Security*, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000) , p.52.

Here narco-terrorism becomes “state sponsored”, in which the sponsoring states find it easy to create instability in the neighboring states.⁵⁷ By sponsoring narco-terrorism the states aim to achieve many foreign policy and security goals. For instance, it creates instability in the neighbouring state. And, it need not directly support the terrorist movements; hence it need not covertly divert its financial resources.

Inside Pakistan, the narcotics weapon nexus had become a danger to the security of the state. The twin influences of a leaky weapons pipeline and a burgeoning narcotics economy combined with many traditional factors to intensify and in some ways create a cult of violence and lawlessness that Pakistani newspaper in the late 1980s dubbed “Kalashnikovization” (or Kalashnikov culture), after the ubiquitous automatic weapon of the choice in the country.⁵⁸

Kalashnikovization did not necessarily introduce violence to Pakistan, rather it heightened the intensity of the violence. Pakistan’s culture of violence has grown much more dangerous and common place as a by-product of a phenomenon to the country, the drug culture. There is a clear linkage between the opium-heroin production and weapons, which are used both to protect the drugs and are brought with drug profits. As this nexus between the drug dealers and the arms trafficker developed, much of the profit from the drugs trade was being channeled into the arms business that

⁵⁷ Chandran, n.29.,p.918.

⁵⁸ Craig Baxter, Charles H. Kennedy, *Pakistan: 2000*, (U.K: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.170.

in turn provided protection to the drug dealers by raising private armies having the latest weapons to defend the drug traders.⁵⁹ Another nexus exists between the concentration of drug dens and ethnic conflicts. In Pakistan, the worst of ethnic violence always begin in the areas where drugs are openly sold.

In the heart of Pakistani territory, Darra Adam Khel is a center for arms trafficking. Darra is central to the highly efficient arms network. The town plays host to most important drug barons of the area who live in fully armed. The weaponry was designed to meet the requirements of guerrilla warfare. It was inevitable that a fair share of the weapons should find their way into private armies. Indeed, one of the leaders of the Afridi tribe, a major figure in smuggling enterprises, raised a fully armed tribal army of 20,000 soldiers to force the government's hand.⁶⁰ He was able to close the infamous Landi Kotal bazaar for 2 whole weeks.

According to senior police officials, the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) alone has more than half million Kalashnikov rifles.⁶¹ These embolden the drug mafias to maintain entire armies. Moreover, the heavily armed tribal populations of the area were ready to defend their opium cultivations. What was worst was that the tribes were determined to fight the state if the state decides to regulate drug cultivation and trafficking.

⁵⁹ Dixit, n.12., p.190.

⁶⁰ Prasant Dikshit, " Small Arms, Drugs, and International Terrorism ", *International Studies*, Vol.32, No. 2, 1995, p.151.

⁶¹ Ibid.

There was doubt about the capacity of paramilitary forces to take on the mafia armies in an encounter without the support of the army as the tribal arsenals included automatic assault rifles, anti-aircraft guns, and rocket launchers. As told to a foreign correspondent in 1989, those tribal farmers believed that “the government cannot stop us growing poppy, we are one force and united, and if they come with their planes, we will shoot them down”.⁶² Even the Anti-Narcotic Task Force (ANTF) officials agreed that there existed an insurgency situation and the environment was hostile to them, since the drug traffickers were heavily armed.

Once considered as a safest region in Pakistan (even as the rest of Pakistan suffered under political violence), the frontier began to degenerate due to the easy availability of weapons and the rise of drug barons. In late 1994, when Islamabad called off the imposition of Shariat laws, virtual rebellion broke out in Malakand district, where a rich crop of poppy were grown. Security forces battled a reported 8,000 –10,000 tribals armed with “pipeline” weapons. These weapons, no doubt were purchased through drug money. In that incident, the paramilitary forces seized anti-aircraft guns, 3246 anti-tank rocket founds (40 mm), 371 mortars (82 mm), 50 anti-tank wines, 40 anti-personnel mines, two RP-7, and 10 quantities of ammunition etc.⁶³ In the second round the government reportedly was forced to use

⁶² Kathy Evans , “ The Tribal Trials ” , *Strategic Digest*, June 1990 , p.2504.

⁶³ Tara Kartha , Diffussion of Light Weapons - A Case of Pakistan in Ramakant , S.N. Kausik , Shashi Upadhyaya (ed), *Contemporary Pakistan – Trend and Issues* , (Delhi : Kalinga Publications, 2001) , p.63.

aircraft and long range artillery to defeat the rebels.⁶⁴ Trouble simmers, even as the government was accused of having given under duress.

The easy availability of arms had increased criminalization, which had fuelled ethnic violence and sectarian strife in Pakistan. Drug money helped Sindhis, Muhajirs, and Pathans buy weapons to combat the domination of Punjabis in the administration and society, as well as to challenge each other. Moreover arms dealers were remarkably free of ethnic biases, selling to all the ethnic groups alike during the violence.

Since the introduction to heroin culture, Karachi was divided on ethnic lines and the city had been at war with itself. In 1995, ethnic and political violence in Sindh has claimed more than 2,000 lives and Karachi alone was assessed by police officers to have around 1000,000 weapons during the height of the violence.⁶⁵

Sectarian violence in Punjab continued with a deep Shia-Sunni divide. But part of the violence was thought to be a fight to control the lucrative Lahore smuggling route that pushes drugs into India to be shipped to Europe and increasingly Canada as well.⁶⁶ According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report, in Jang city, both the Shia based Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Tara Kartha, "Non-Conventional Threats to Security : Threat from the Proliferation of Light Weapons and Narcotics", *Strategic Analysis*, May 1997, p.289.

⁶⁶ Tara Kartha, *Tools of Terror – Light Weapons and India's Security*, (New Delhi : Knowledge World , 1999), p.124.

Figh-i-jafariya (TNFJ) and the militant sunni Anjuman-i-sipahi-i-sabah (ASS) were reported killing each other over control of the heroin trade.⁶⁷

Pakistan sponsored narco-terrorism

There is no doubt that the Pakistan government in collaboration with the ISI uses proceeds of illicit narcotic drugs and small arms trade to fund terrorism in India. A close scrutiny of the evolution of militancy in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab indicate that it had covert linkages with narcotic smuggling. The eyewitness accounts of terrorists and drug traffickers arrested in these areas also confirmed that the Pakistani government has been using them to achieve its foreign policy goals in India especially in Jammu and Kashmir.⁶⁸ It is believe that narcotics make Pakistan's determination to keep India engaged in countering cross-border terrorism continues.

It is an established fact that the Pakistani government in collaboration with the ISI uses drug money and small arms trade to fund terrorism in India. And it was convinced during discussions that took place at the Prime Minister's residence in Islamabad in November 1990, when he claimed that " Pakistan's Army chief, General Aslam Beg and its Central Intelligence chief, Durrani, had sought his approval for a detailed ' blue

⁶⁷ Dikshit, n.60.,p.154.

⁶⁸ Kshitij Prabha , "Narco-Terrorism and India's Security " , *Strategic Analysis* , January 2001, p.1884.

print', to sell heroin to pay for covert military operations ".⁶⁹ The ISI, the Army and the Pakistani government are together in 'operation terrorism'.

It was also substantiate that Pakistan sponsored mercenary forces to the bordering states like Kargil, Kapurthala (Punjab) or kokrajhar (Assam) to destabilized India. All such activities cost money. Narcotic drugs are the main source of funding terrorist activities. There is no authentic estimate available for assessment of expenses incurred by Pakistan for creating the spectre of terrorism in India. However, on the basis of information gathered from terrorists and drug traffickers it could be roughly estimated that Pakistan spends approximately 20 to 30 crores a month on payment to militants alone.⁷⁰

The ISI was deeply involved with the Sikh and Kashmiri militants, who use Pakistan as sanctuary and use black money earned by drug operations to fund their arms purchases. Pakistani involvement was further supported by the fact that Haji Iqbal Beg, a well known Pakistani drug lord cooperated with ISI in its programme to assist anti-India Sikh insurgents in their violent rebellion against New Delhi. The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) also charged that there was a group of traffickers who dealt in arms, mainly AK-47 assault rifles and RPG-7 rocket launchers, and trafficked the package into East Punjab. Once across the border, the stuff was the responsibility of the Sikh separatist, who shared it with the group of pro-

⁶⁹ Jamma Das Akhtar, "Pakistan-Narcotic-Terrorism: The Linkages", *Strategic Analysis*, December 1994, p.1131.

⁷⁰ Prabha, n.68., p.1886.

Gulbadin Kashmiri extremists who were by then carrying out an insurgency and manslaughter.⁷¹ Further, it had been reported that Chaudhury Saukat Ali Bhatti who was elected to the Punjab Assembly on the IJI ticket in 1990, and an important member of the Asian mafia, brockered a Rs 7 million (US \$ 357,000) arms deal between Darra Adam Khel arms merchants and Sikh militants.⁷²

The most perceptible fall-out of state sponsored narco-terrorism and a potential danger to the state itself is that Pakistan had become a center of terrorist. As the centre for training Mujahideen of different nationalities, Pakistan had left with an uncountable number of these men trained for nothing other than war. During 1997, one indicator of the possible manpower within Pakistan was the figure of 80,000⁷³ annually that had been given by Brigadier Yousaff, the man who was the in charge of the whole operation. Many of these trainees were the “undesirables” of other countries.

In terms of her relation with other countries, Pakistan was in dilemmas. Unequivocal support to the US in its anti-terrorism campaign had inevitably raised the danger of the armed Islamic militias operating within the country. On the other hand, the continued support had further increased Pakistan’s vulnerabilities with its neighborhoods, especially in Central Asia (where it nurses strategic ambitions) and with some OIC countries who

⁷¹ Truth Behind Drug Trade and Drug Barons, *POT (Pakistan Series)*, 7 September, 1993.

⁷² Akhtar, n.69., p.1140.

⁷³ Kartha (1997), n.65., p.289.

continue to see Pakistan as the base for most of the fundamentalist terrorism that plagues their countries.⁷⁴

As Benazir Bhutto and a majority of analysts have noted, continued interference in Afghanistan would mean the strategic death of Pakistan.⁷⁵ Stirring the Kashmir wheel had brought little advantage to Pakistan. Armed with foreign weapons and protected by its status of a frontline state with the desire to interfere in the Indian heartland of Punjab and Kashmir valley were, in the end, paid heavy price. Indeed, Pakistan was suffered from a humiliating defeat in the Kargil misadventure in 1999.

CONCLUSION:

Pakistan is the leading manufacturer and exporter of heroin and hashish. The country is playing a devastating role in the international opium and heroin markets. Pakistan produces about 65 metric tons of opium, but many accounts revealed that the actual production is more than this figure. According to government sources, there are twenty largest drug mafias in the country. What is worst is that these mafias have strong political and economic influences, which make them most powerful section in the society.

In addition to this, Pakistan is facing major challenges due to the free flow of drugs from Afghanistan. Indeed, a powerful drug mafia has emerged in the country particularly in the tribal belt of the North West

⁷⁴ Kartha (1999), n.66., p.136.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

Frontier Province and Baluchistan. These drug mafias have also extensive network internationally. Economically, they are tremendously powerful and this has created a parallel economy in the country.

In Pakistan, the linkages between drug and weapons have created the syndrome of narco-terrorism. Export and promotion of illicit narcotics and terrorists suit Pakistan's foreign policy aspirations in South Asia. Both the geography and polity of this region encourages Pakistan to sponsor terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. The political conditions helps Pakistan organize the Mujahideen to achieve its foreign policy goals and security strategies towards India. Hence, the illegal trade in drugs and its ramification in terms of political instability and cross-border terrorism have become major problems in maintaining internal security of Pakistan as well as regional security of South Asia as a whole.

CHAPTER – 4

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

INTRODUCTION:

The founder of Pakistan had carved out a separate nation for all the Muslim of the subcontinent and Islam had become the *raison de'tre* of the creation of the country. But the biggest irony is that Islam, which was supposedly the founding stone of Pakistan, not only failed to hold the country together but also became the potent source of religious fundamentalist groups, which poses a serious threat to peace and stability in large part of the world.

Pakistan has been home to various Islamist fundamentalist organizations. In the last twenty years it has been nurturing militancy in the name of Islam. The Islamic militancy and extremism has emerged as potentially the most threatening form of international terrorism since the late 1980s. This form of terrorism has little to do with Islam as such. Islam has provided a convenient religious cover for achieving political objectives through the means of violence and terror. The violent and terrorist movements, launched in the name of Islam, were intended to terrorise the common people as well as countries. Murders, suicide attacks, extortion and kidnapping have been carried out as a terrorist tactics in various part of the world. These acts of violence have been justified in the name of “freedom struggle”, “fight for Islam”, “in defence of Islam” etc. Forces like Lashkar-i-

Toiba and Jamaat-i-Islami tried to reestablish God's rule, as interpreted by them, in Pakistan and declared that their 'jihad' would continue till all the evil influences were wiped out in that country. The actions by these militant fundamentalist groups have not only served to distort the image of Islam but also threaten the very existence of Pakistan.

Analysing the evolving dynamics of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan, this chapter seeks to examine the nature of threats posed by these religious fundamentalist groups to the security of the country.

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM – A BRIEF EXPLANATION

Fundamentalism relates to religion and its basic principles. It is the term used to define the fundamentals of a religious system and adhere to them.¹ It implies going back to the original principles of the religion as contained in the basic scripture of the religious guidelines. It has also come to imply a dogmatic adherence to tradition, orthodoxy, inflexibility and a rejection of modern society, intellectual innovations and attempts to recreate a 'golden era'.² According to Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, the term fundamentalism is "a movement in 20th century Protestantism emphasizing the literally interpreted Bible as fundamental to Christian life and teaching".³ On the other hand, there are many orientalist and area study

¹ Dilip Hiro, *Islamic Fundamentalism* (London : Paladin Grafton Books, 1988),p.1.

² Kalim Bahadur, The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism in Nancy Jetly (ed) *Regional Security in South Asia* (New Delhi: Lancer's Books, 1999) , p.280.

³ John L.Esposito, *The Islamic Threat- Myth or Reality ?*, (New York: Oxford University Press,Inc., 1992), p.7.

specialists who continue to use the term to characterize the contemporary Muslim world.

Indeed, Islamic fundamentalism has received more attention than fundamentalist movements of Christianity or even Jews as it has spanned many Muslim countries. During the 1980s, Islamic fundamentalism became synonymous to the Western scholars, policy makers and media with political extremism, terrorism, hostage ordeals, suicide bombing, assassinations and killings.⁴ The west often equated Islamic fundamentalism with fanaticism and Anti-Americanism. So, in a way, contemporary Islamic fundamentalism is “a continuation of the post-colonial, anti-western nationalist struggle, couched in the language and garments of radical Islam. It is the reincarnation of the nationalist movement with an Islamic face”.⁵ It is basically an ideology founded in protest against the deteriorating cultural and material conditions of Arab Muslim societies and the perceived hegemony of the west.⁶

According to the defenders of Islamic fundamentalism, the term does not necessarily means enmity towards modern civilization or western culture. The Egyptian Islamic thinker Hasan Hanafi point out that “the term Islamic fundamentalism means, among others, that Islamic legitimacy should be reformulated and realized in establishing the Islamic system

⁴ Ayman Talal Yousef, Dilip H. Mohit, *Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism and the Grand American Strategy*,(Delhi:Kalinga Publications,2002)p.45.

⁵ Mahmud A. Faksh, “the Prospects of Islamic Fundamentalism in the Post-Gulf War Period”, *International Journal*, Vol.XLIX, Spring 1994,p.186.

⁶ *Ibid.*,p.185.

(Nizam-al-Islam)”⁷. The term defends this system regardless of the other existing systems and achievements.

In the context of this theme, the term “Islamic fundamentalism” is not employed to defame anybody, individual, organization, movement or society. It implies that the basis of Islam and Muslim’s belief and thought, lies in its holy scripture, the Quran. In other words, it means going back to the classical ages of original beliefs and faith and take Muslims back to the stage of their purity, the golden era of Islam, which was flourishing in the seventh century Arabia.⁸ Hence, the defenders of Islamic fundamentalism believe that Islam is an ideology and worship, religion and state. In the process, the Islamic fundamentalist advocates strict observance of Islamic Shari’a in private and public lives. They consider Islamic ideology to be the basis of political and social institutions such as socialism, communism, nationalism and liberalism.

Most Islamic fundamentalists agree on the establishment of an Islamic state. In such a state “God’s absolute sovereignty”⁹ will prevail, governing all aspects of the life of the individual as well as of the society. According to Lawrence Davidson, in this regard many of them shared and continue to share, a set of common assumptions such as-

⁷ Yousef and Mohit, n.4.,p.48.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ The acceptance of the sovereignty of God implies that he alone is the law-giver. The divine law has been given through two sources, viz, the Quran and the Sunnah. No person, class or group, not even the entire population of the state as a whole can lay claim to sovereignty. See Bahadur, in n.2., p.286.

1. The Muslim world is in a state of disorder brought on by centuries of political and moral decay.
2. This decay made possible western intrusion, for all intents and purposes, infected the Muslim world with an alien set of immoral, secularist values and behaviours based on the defining concepts of materialism and (in terms of politics) nationalism.
3. In order to combat this perceived decay and infections, the Muslim world must be re-islamised. This entails the reassertion of classical Islamic ways, particularly the reintroduction of Shariah, or Muslim law, while purging most aspects of western cultural and political influence.
4. The only way to re-islamise society is to re politicize Islam itself.¹⁰

The various movements now active in most Muslim countries work on these assumptions. They thus constitute a direct challenge to (or in some cases have managed to take over) the sitting secular governments of their nation-states. Behind all this is Islam revival or resurgence, a renewed interest in Islam.

THE RISE OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IN PAKISTAN:

Islamic fundamentalist movements have emerged in most Muslim countries during the post-second world war period. Sayyid Abul Alla Maududi, one of the most prominent modern Islamic thinkers who have contributed to the twentieth century Islamic theory, founded the Jamaat-i-

¹⁰ Lawrence Davidson , *Islamic Fundamentalism*, (London: Greenwood Press, 1998), pp.12-13.

Islami and has influenced Islamic movements in Pakistan society.¹¹ The Jamaat-i-Islami was a conservative force. The Jamaat considered itself Hizbullah i.e. party of Allah and Maududi theorised in an Islamic regime only one party i.e. the party of Allah could exist.¹² Maududi stood for a theocratic state. In fact, he wanted a pure Islamic state “in conformity with the fundamentals of Islam”.¹³

In the world of Islam, the mass appeal of Islamism is an ideology founded in protest against the deteriorating cultural and material conditions of Muslim societies as well as for expressing socio-political and economic dissent, especially in times of crisis. Likewise, Islam for Maududi was a revolutionary ideology to be followed by all members of the Muslim community in their struggle towards a “world wide revolution that transcended artificial boundaries and national territories”.¹⁴ According to him, this Islamic revolution was the highest form of Jihad and the use of force was acceptable tool for toppling countries, which came in the way of this revolution.¹⁵ It was these ideas of Maududi, which made him a strong opponent, and the critic of the Muslim League led by Mohammad Ali Jinnah who wanted to create a secular and progressive Muslim state- Pakistan. Hence, the Jamaat-i-Islami had kept the issue of islamising Pakistan through

¹¹ Rasul Baksh Rais, “Assesing the Threat of Islamic Revivalism in Pakistan” in Jetly (ed), n.2., p.289.

¹² Asghar Ali Engineer, Pakistan: Religion, Politics and Society in Ramakant, S.N.Kaushik, Shashi Upadhyaya (ed) *Contemporary Pakistan: Trends and Issues, Vol. I.* (New Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 2001), p.229.

¹³ Davidson, n.10., p.93.

¹⁴ Youssef M. Chouriri, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, (London: Pinter, 1997), p.144.

¹⁵ Ibid., p.145.

sustained pressure on the government. While setting up his Jamaat-i-Islami also, Maududi cautioned, “no member of Jamaat should acknowledge any one except God as political sovereign, Nor should he obey any government not based on the sovereignty of God, nor recognize the right of any one except God to legislate”.¹⁶

In fact, for persons like Maududi sovereignty of God means their own sovereignty, as it is they who interpret what God desires and want to impose it on others. Thus in Pakistan sovereignty of God will ultimately mean sovereignty of the Jamaat-i-Islami and its interpretation of Sharia’ah.

Maududi was opposed to the secular nationalism. For him the creation of Pakistan was un-Islamic and it was a set back for Jamaat and himself. In his view, the loyalty of all Muslims should be toward the establishment of a system that entitled the Muslims to choose their leader and for appointment to key posts. In its new struggle, the Jamaat formed the ‘Vanguard’ of a movement to change the system from within.¹⁷ As S.V.R. Nasr asserted, “Maududi had demanded an Islamic state where he had once dreamed of an Islamic empire. His programme was no longer to save Islam in India but to have it conquered by Pakistan”.¹⁸

To achieve this goal he set about influencing key institutions like the army, colleges and universities, from where it could influence the masses as well as the decision makers. The Islamic Jamaat-i-Tulabah (IJT), the

¹⁶ Kapil Kaul, “Growth of Radical Islam in Pakistan”, *India Quarterly*, Vol.58, No.1, 2002,p.92.

¹⁷ Sayyed Vali Reza Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jamaat –I-Islamic of Pakistan* (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1994). P.7.

¹⁸ Ibid.

student's wing of the Jamaat-i-Islamic played a significant role in this strategic move of Maududi. It operated on the campuses of various colleges and universities of Pakistan, and was successful in diversifying the party's social base and 'served as an effective means of infiltrating the Pakistani power structure'.¹⁹ In fact, the Jamaat's campaign soon served as the medium for articulation of diverse political views, and the party became the flag-bearer of civil societies and spearheaded their challenge to the state. The overall impact of these activities of Jamaat was to radicalise the Muslim society of Pakistan to a great extent.

Other than Jamaat-I-Islamic Pakistan inherited certain Islamic fundamentalist groups like Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam and Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan etc. from pre-independence days.

Till the 1960s, these parties had been generally confined to the pulpit of the mosque.²⁰ The 1970 election catapulted them into prominence. For the first time the 1973 constitution stipulated many Islamic provisions stronger than the ones in all previous constitutions. Islam was declared the state religion. According to Article 31, one of the fundamental principles of state policy was to enable the Muslims of Pakistan to order their lives in accordance with the principles of Islam. The teaching of Islamiyat and Holy Quran was made compulsory for the Muslims. The Council for Islamic Ideology (CIL) was formed to give advice to the state and provincial

¹⁹ Ibid., pp.63-64.

²⁰ Mohammad Waseem, "Ethnic and Religious Nationalism in Pakistan", *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, vol.XIII, no.2, Winter 2000, p.47.

governments so that the existing laws could be passed and implemented according to the tenets of Quran and Sunah.²¹ In 1974, a major breakthrough of the Islamist groups like the Jamiat-ul-Ulama Islamic (JUI), Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) and Jamiat –ul-Ulama Pakistan (JUP) came with the question of declaring the Ahmadis as non-Muslims. Gradually the movement picked up momentum and finally Mrs. Bhutto yielded to their demand by proclaiming Ahmadis as non-Muslims through constitutional amendment. During this period, the Jamaat played a crucial role in banding the influential groups against the ‘un-Islamic politics’ of Bhutto and gave impetus to the Nizam-i-Mustapha Movement.²²

General Zia-ul Haq’s military regime came as a booster for Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan. His regime coincided with the advent of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979 onwards) and the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. For the first time in the history of Islam the Shia Ulema’s took reigns of power in Iran. The Islamic Revolution sent two strong messages to Pakistan. First the Pakistani Ulemas also took it as a role model for establishing a similar form of government in Pakistan. Second, since the Islamic Revolutionaries use the symbols of Shia Islam, the Shias in Pakistan also started asserting themselves. “Unlike Iran which is mainly a Persian speaking Shia society, Pakistan is ethnically and confessionally a

²¹ Veena Kukreja, *Islam and Politics in Pakistan – The Rising Tide of Fundamentalism*, in Upadhyaya et al., n.12., p. 262.

²² Kaul, n.16., p.93.

diverse society. It became a question mark that what sort of Islamic form of government could be imposed here”.²³

Under general Zia’s rule, there was a sustained effort to ‘Islamize’ the civil society also. His Islamization programme was happening at a time when various Jihadi groups were also being patronized by the government. Most Afghan Jihadi groups were linked to religious parties in Pakistan. These policies of General Zia led to the strengthening of different militant fundamentalist parties, which were earlier fighting Afghanistan now organised themselves as sectarian fundamentalist groups.²⁴ This was how the militant Sunni groups Sipah-e-Sahaba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Jafaria, Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi etc., and the smaller groups belonging to Sunni and Shia sects came into existence.

Major Islamist Militant Groups in Pakistan:

The massive increase in fundamentalist policies in Pakistan in the last 20 years has led to the growth of number of Islamic militant organisations. All the major religious groups have their private militias. The growth of Islamic militants can be seen as the consequence of the Islamisation policies of the successive governments and the backlash of Pak-Afghan collusion in training the militants. Moreover, the people of Pakistan have also encouraged the establishment of such a large member of Islamic

²³ Syed Mehtab Ali Shah, ‘Sectarianism’, A Threat to the South Asian Security “ in Moonis Ahman (ed.) *Internal and external Dynamics of South Asian Security*. (Kavachi: Fagleasons (Pvt. Ltd., 1998), p.120.

²⁴ Kalim Bahadur, “Is Pakistan a Terrorist State?” *World Focus*, Vol. 23, No.1, Jan. 2002. p.7.

military organisations and groups in the last 10 years. The growth of such organisations continued unchecked even during the democratic governments. A list of some of the largest Islamic militant organisations, provided by the Herald news magazine in September 1998, is as follows –

- Harkat -ul-Mujahideen
- Lashkar-e-Toiba
- Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
- Hizb-e-Wahadat
- Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan
- Lashkhan-e-Jamghvi
- Sipah-e-Mohammad Pakistan.²⁵

Harkat-ul-Mujahideen:

The religious fronts have fighting outfits called “jehadis”.²⁶ The Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (holy warrior’s movement) is one such outfit. It is the successor of the Harkat-ul-Ansar, which was declared a terrorist organization by the United States. It is also a Deobandi-Wahabi group and is believed to be under the influence of Maulana Samiul Haq’s Jamiat-ul-Ulema-Islam as well as the Sipah-e- Sahaba Pakistan’.²⁷

²⁵ Satish Kumar, “Militant Islam: The Nemeesis of Pakistan”, *Strategic Digest*, September, 2000. p.1084.

²⁶ S.K. Datta, Rajeev Shama, *Pakistan from Jinnah to Jihad*, (New Delhi, UBSS Publicsher’s Distributors Pvt. Ltd., 2002), p.225.

²⁷ O.N. Mehrotra, “Madrasa in Pakistan, The chief Promotoer of Islamic Militancy and Terrorism”, *Strategic Analysis*, vol.Xxiii, no.11, February 2000, p.1887.

Farooq Kashmiri, who was earlier looking after the Kashmir operation has been positioned as head of HuM to make it appear as truly Islamic jihad. Making a Kashmiri the leader of HuM would give the impression of an indigenous jihadi group' not led by foreign element. Their activities are not confined to Jammu and Kashmir alone, but have international networks like Bosnia, Chechnya, India, Myanmar, Philippines, Tajikistan, among other spots. It dreams of an Islamic Federation which will impose a Pakistan-Taliban stretching from Lahore to Samarkand.²⁸ It is also widely believed to be working in proximity with Osama Bin Laden.

The Harkat-ul-Mujahideen recruits young men from all the provinces of Pakistan and from both sides of the line of control of Kashmir. A large number of its recruits are students from madrassas. They have been referred to as the Pakistani version of the Afghan Taliban.

Lashkar-e-Toiba:

The Lashkar-e-Toiba (army of the righteous) is the militant outfit of Markaz Dawa Wal Ishad an Ahle Hadith Wahabi organization based in Muridke, about 30 miles north of Lahore. Even though it is the latest to join the ranks of the jihadi organisations, it is the one with the largest manpower and resources. The Lashkar was formed after the Afghan Jihad against Soviet occupation was nearly over. It is headed by Professor Hafiz Saeed. It gained popularity for its role in the Kargil conflict and also by sending its

²⁸ Tariq Amin, 'In the Doghouse', *On the Abyss*, (India: Harper Collins, 2000), p.26.

fidayeen on suicide missions to blow up military cantonments in Kashmir. The Lashkars holds an annual congregation at Muridke every year, which draws thousands of new followers many of whom go to fight in Kashmir.²⁹

There are many Pakistani jihadi organisations operating on the Indian side in Kashmir, but Lashkar is the largest of them. The members of other jihadi organisations are mainly local men, assisted by fighters from the other countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan. But the case with Lashkar is exactly the opposite. It is believed that 80 per cent of the lashkar's soldiers belongs to Pakistan.³⁰

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen:

The Hizb-ul-Mujahideen is a militant outfit of the Jamaat-i-Islami. Its recruits are mainly from amongst the workers of the Jamaat's student wing the Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba. Most of them are Kashmiri, both from POK and Kashmir. There are also a large number of Pakistanis, some Afghans and a few Arabs.

The Hizb-ul-Mujahideen was founded in 1989 in Srinagar under the leadership of Syed Salahuddin. Since its inception, this group has been operating in Kashmir. Hizb-ul-Mujahideen members were initially trained in Afghanistan, but were deprived of their Afghan base after the Taliban took over the areas that were under the control of the pro-Jamaat Hizb-e-

²⁹ Sumita Kumar, "Pakistan's Jehadi Apparatus", Goals and Methods", Strategic Analysis, Vol. XXIV, No.12, March 2001, p.2184.

³⁰ Ibid.

Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in 1996.³¹ The Taliban is totally against the group because of their links with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

Hizb-e-Wahadat:

It is a militant Shia organization. Its power base is in the Hazara's region of Afghanistan. It has strong links with Iran as well as Shia organisations in Pakistan including the Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan and Sipah-e-Muhammed.³²

Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan :

It is a hardline Sunni political and militant organization. It came about in 1984 as an offshoot of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI). It was founded by Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi who was assassinated by his Shia adversaries. It was under his leadership that the militant SPP came to be organised in almost all major cities and towns of Punjab. The SSP is staunchly opposed to Iran and to the Shia community in Pakistan. The party reportedly has links with the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and the Taliban, as well as some Arab donors.

It should also be mentioned here that Sipah-e-Sahaba is not the only institution the JUI and other Deobandi ulama are using to pursue their anti-Shia activities. The Sawad-i-Azam Ahle Sunnat of Karachi, Sunni Tehrik of

³¹ Ibid., p.2185.

³² Mehrotra, n.27., p.1877.

Sindh and Punjab, Sunni council, Sunni Jamiyyat –i-Talaba, Pakistan Sunni Ittehad, Tahaffuzz-i-Khatam-i-Nabuwat, and dozens of other organisations are also engaged in providing support services for violent activities of sipah-e-Sahaba. This network has been successfully used in recent years “to incorporate thousands of sympathetic mosque imams and khatibs into several front-line voluntary associations, ostensibly organised for “religious” purposes but serving, in effect, as political arms of Sipah-e-Sahaba”.³³

Lashkar –e- Jhangvi:

It is a separate militant wing of the sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan. It is one of the most dreaded militant sectarian organisations operating in Pakistan. While the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi militants basically operate within Pakistan, member of this group are believed to have links with Hizbul Mujahideen as well as the Taliban.³⁴

Sipah-e-Mohammad Pakistan:

It is the militant wing of Shia political party Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqh-i-Jaafriya (TNFJ). Though not a youth wing of the TNFJ, the Sipah-e-Muhammad is very much a young men’s organization. Most of its members are from rural or small-town background, educated in madrasas in Punjab or elsewhere in Pakistan and participated in the war in Afghanistan. The

³³ Mumtaiz Ahmed, “Revivalism, Islamization, Sectarianism, and Violence in Pakistan” in Craig Baxter, Charles H. Kennedy (ed.) *Pakistan: 1997* (New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers, 1998). P.110.

³⁴ Kumar, n.29., p.2191.

organisation is based in Thokar Niaz Baig, a traditionally Shi'i stronghold in the suburbs of Lahore.

Since its inception in 1991, the Sipah-e-Muhammad has frequently been linked with much anti-sunni violence in the Punjab, in Karachi, and elsewhere in the country.

The organization is mildly critical of the TNFJ for what it sees as the latter's failure to protect the Shia from Sunni militancy.³⁵ Well armed with sophisticated automatic weapons and a remote-controlled bomb arsenal, the Sipah-i-Muhammad militants are swift to settle accounts with the militants of the Sipah-i-Sahaba.³⁶

Threats Posed by the Islamic Fundamentalism:

The threat of Islamic fundamentalism that is widely publicized in the west comes exclusively from the Islamists trends like the militant, radical, and revolutionary Islamists groups who are prepared to use violence in their efforts to unseat existing governments. "They generally reject the idea of pluralism, political or otherwise, decry democracy as non-Islamic, and repress ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities. Terrorist tactics are normally considered a legitimate tool in the arsenal available to such

³⁵ Muhammad Qasim Zaman, "Setarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shia'i and Sunni Identities", *Modern Asian Studies*, vol.32, No. 3, 1998, p.698.

³⁶ Ahmed, n.33., p.112.

groups”.³⁷ These Islamists parties and ideology that had for most of the country’s history influenced its politics have given placed to a new trend of militancy. This new trend is less concerned with ideology and those issues related to Islamism, and instead places emphasis on sectarian posturing and violence, which has a deep impact on nation security.

In Pakistan, the propping up of Islamists fundamentalist groups had led to the militarization of society and widened the gulf between various groups since they competed with each other for material benefit. As a result, sectarian conflict in Pakistan acquired a far more violent than it had ever before in the country’s history. Sectarianism poses horizontal threats to Pakistan’s national security.³⁸ The hot spots of sectarianism are not confined to a particular geographical region of the country. Shias and Sunnis all over the country feel threatened by the fanatics of the other sect whose number is on rise and are in possession of deadly weapons.

Sectarian violence in Pakistan has exploded over the past two decades. But is seemed to have acquired enormous blow in the 1990s. The principal parties were: the Sunni Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (Pakistan’s Army of the Prophet’s Companion’s or SSP), and its allies, the Sunni Tahrir (Sunni Movement), Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Sha’riat-e-Muhammadi (Movement for Protection of Muhammad’s Religious Law), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Jhangvi Army), Lashkar-e-Toiba (the Army of the Pure), and Tehrik-i-Jafria

³⁷ Carolind G. Hernandez, Gina R. Pattugalam, *Trnastional Crime and Regional Security in the Asia pacific* (Phiippines’, Institute of Stategic and Development Studies, Inc., 1999), pp.209-210.

³⁸ Ali Shah, in Ahmar (ed), n.23., p.121.

Pakistan (Pakistani's Shia Movement or TJP) and its militant offshoot, Sipah-e-Muhammad (Army of Muhammad or SM). They have been engaged in a violent campaign to safeguard the interests of their respective communities.

Several parts of Pakistan emerged, as hotbeds for sectarian tensions and the unique feature of sectarian riots have been their capacity to spread violence to all corners of the country. Four belts where sectarian consciousness had taken deep roots were in Karachi and Hyderabad, Parachinan district in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Gilgit and Baltistan in the Northern Areas and the Multan-Jhang-Mianwali – Faisalabad belt. So endemic was sectarian violence in these areas that the law and order machinery had collapsed totally and the army had been forced to step on a permanent basis.

In the Northern Areas, the first phase of Sectarian violence erupted in 1988 when riots broke out in Gilgit. In later years, the sectarian troubles have taken a more menacing turn. In 1992, sectarian clashes in Gilgit erupted when a Sunni Leader, Gayasuddin, was assassinated on May 30. At least 60 people were reported to have lost their lives in retributive killings.³⁹ Riots further intensified a year later when Latif Hussain, a Shia leader, was shot dead outside his residence. The riots claimed another 20 lives and simmering tensions between the Shia and Sunni communities were visible throughout the region.

³⁹ Aabha Dixt, "Sectarian Crisis in Ppakistan - Punjab Reels Under a New Scourge", *Straegic Analysis*, November 1994, p.945.

The Pushtoon population of Kurram Agency is split between Sunnis and Shias. In September 1996, a gun battle among teenage members of the two rival Muslim sects escalated into a communal war in which more than two hundred people were killed and women and children were kidnapped. A paramilitary official said that the atrocities were out of “the stone Age”, militants even executed out-of-towners who were staying at a hotel.⁴⁰ One incident, a five-day war involving mortars, rocket launchers, and anti-aircraft missiles in Pachinar, a small town in the NWFP in 1996 alone claimed hundred of lives and many more injured.⁴¹ Assassinations, machinegun attacks on mosques and explosions have claimed 581 lives and over 1,600 injured between 1990 and 1997 (100 between January and July 1997 and 70 in the first 10 days of August 1997).⁴²

The worst possible consequences of sectarianism can be seen from the case study of the frequent sectarian violence in Parachinar which suggested that in this situation even the levies and doctors get involved either by firing on the members of the other sect or by not treating the wounded members of the other community.⁴³ In an unending attacks of sectarianism this situation can repeat anywhere in the country. The massacre of twenty-five Shia mourners at Manipura cemetery in Lahore in January

⁴⁰ Robert D. Kaplan, *Soldiers of god – with Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan* (United States: Vintage Books 2001), p.242.

⁴¹ S.V.R. Nasr, Islam, the State and the Rise of Sefctarian Militancy in Pakistan in Christophe Jaffrelot (ed.) *Pakistan – Nationalism without a Nation?* (New Delhi, Manohar publishers and Distributors, 2002), p.85.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ali Shah, n.23., p.121.

1998 reignited sectarian violence that left seventy-eight people dead and some eighty wounded in Punjab, and an estimated one hundred and fifty in all of Pakistan.⁴⁴

Sectarian tensions also represented the dangerous implications of the self-serving policies that the ruling elite has perused over the past four decades. The sectarian fundamentalist groups had always been in the forefront of the movements for the socio-religious change in the society. Fifty years after the establishment of a state ideologically rooted in Islamic ideals, these new movements reflected old regional patterns of resistance to central authority, but more importantly, directly challenged the Pakistani state itself. The increasing power of these militants sectarian groups can be judged from the fact that they do not feel any hesitation in entering into an armed conflict with the government if their interests are threatened. For instance, in November 1994 violence and confrontation in the Malakand Agency, particularly in Swat, signaled the rise of an Islamic movement, the Tehrik-i-nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi (TNSM) led by Sufi Muhammad.⁴⁵ The TNSM directly challenged political and judicial institutions and presented claims for socio-religious reforms. They forced the Pakistan state to rethink legal codes, development priorities, and issues of power sharing. The armed activists of the TNSM, demanding the imposition of Shariat in

⁴⁴ Nasr in Jaffrelot (ed), n.41., p.36.

⁴⁵ Robert Nichols, Challenging the State: 1990s Religious Movements in the Northwest Frontier Province in Craig Baxter, Charles H. Kennedy (ed.), *Pakistan: 1997* (New Delhi: Harper Collins publishers India, Pvt. Ltd., 1998), p.133.

Malakand clashed with the police and law enforcement agencies resulting in a large number of deaths.

In November TNSM activists again sparked up what was called at the time a “near insurgency” and “virtual rebellion”.⁴⁶ TNSM militants announced a meeting in mosques, organised crowds, and claimed that the government had ignored their commitment to Shariah-based “qazi courts” The judges and other local officials were seized. Rumours quickly spread about jihad and about a government plan to disarm TNSM activists.⁴⁷ Also by 1995, in the Khyber Agency the Tanzeem-i-Ittehad-i-Ulama-i-Qabail (TIUQ) began to assert a religious claim to local leadership based on perceived failures of the state to provide a social justice, law and order, and representative political authority. This challenge to the authority of the Khyber Agency political administration led to violence, arrests, and an initial repression of the movement. The movements were variously characterized. The liberal press in Pakistan and abroad ran pictures of public floggings and used terms such as “medieval” and “fundamentalists”.⁴⁸

The Jihadi Culture in Pakistan:

The Pakistani Islamists fundamentalist groups and other external actors (particularly mujahideen) have developed a unique relationship in internal and external operations. For instance, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam

⁴⁶ Ibid., p.127.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p.124.

(JUI) has a fundamental connection with the Taliban, since the rank and file of the student militia was originally formed by Afghans educated at JUI-run madrassas. The Sipah-e-Sahaba is also linked to the Taliban, as well as to the Harkat-ul-Ansar. The Jamaat-i-Islami is said to have produced a guerrilla, offshoot, the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, while most Ahle Hadith political groups in the country are affiliated with the Lashkar-e-Taiba. Similarly, Shia political parties in Pakistan are associated with the Hizb-e-Wahadat. After cutting their teeth in battle in Afghanistan and Kashmir, the young Islamists militants prove to be a key human resource for hard line religious parties in the activities on the streets of Pakistan.⁴⁹ Moreover, there is convergence of policy of Pakistan fundamentalist groups and jihadis for promoting the so-called Islamic cause or jihad. In this context Satish Kumar, an astute scholar aptly remarks:

“Together, the Islamic political parties and the militant outfits have given rise to what may be called a ‘jihadi culture’, with jihadi movements and jihadi strategies which are deployed inside and outside the country by vested interests. The consequence, in terms of instability, disruption, disaffection, conflict, and contradiction within Pakistan and outside, is there for anyone to see”.⁵⁰

Even worst was that some extremist madrassas preached jihad without understanding the concept. They equate jihad – which most Islamic scholars interpret as the striving for justice (and principally an inner striving to purify the self) – with guerrilla warfare.⁵¹ Pakistani officials estimated

⁴⁹ Kumar, n.25., p.1086.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Jessica Stern, “Pakistan’s Jihad Culture”, *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 79, No.6., November/December 2000, p119.

that ten to fifteen per cent of the country's tens of thousands of madrassas support such extremist ideologies.

These madrassas received their funding from larger religio-political parties or outside donors, and instruct their students in accordance with the sectarian beliefs and agenda of those donors. With an estimated sixty per cent of funding emanating from abroad, the schism of sectarianism was magnified further by the ideological and strategic contests of foreign funding agencies and states. Afzal Mahmood, for instance, notes that, "by allowing Iran and Saudi Arabia to fund, influence and use some sectarian organisations of their liking, we have virtually encouraged Tehran and Riyadh to fight a proxy war on the soil of Pakistan".⁵² It would be quite naïved to assume, as was contended by the Sipah-i-Sahaba, that the Iranian authorities want to export their model of Islamic revolution to Pakistan in order to convert it into Shia state. Similarly, the Saudis were also no likely to believe that Pakistan could become a Wahabi state. The battle lines between the two Middle Eastern giants were drawn primarily on political and strategic grounds.⁵³

Patterns of international rivalry were also visible in the some retaliatory killings. Thus Iranian diplomat, Sadiq Ganji, was gunned down in Lahore following the assassination of SSP founder Haq Nawaz Jhangvi in March 1990. Similarly, the 1997 assassination of Jhangvi's successor, Zid-

⁵² Afzal Mahmood, "What price Jihad culture", <http://www.dawn.com/2001/01/15/op.ht>

⁵³ Ahmad, n.33., p.115.

ur-Rehman Farooqi and 26 others in a bomb blast at the Lahore Sessions court, saw the alleged revenge killing of Iranian diplomat Muhammad Ali Rahimi and six others in an attack on the Iranian Cultural Centre at Multan.⁵⁴

Besides radicalization of sectarianism, the primary output of the madrassas has been the export of international extremist terrorism, and this has created enormous internal concentrations of armed, trained and indoctrinated irregular (terrorist) forces who, at some point of time or the other, may have been supported by the government through the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) that oversaw the Afghan campaign, and that guides the export of terror into Jammu and Kashmir and other theaters across the world, but who do not acknowledge the power of the government to define their long-term goals and objectives.⁵⁵

Their loyalty is dictated by the various ‘spiritual leaders’ who run madrassas that have acquired extraordinary notoriety over the years, both as hotbeds of terrorism and as the safe haven of the Afghani Taliban. It is here that a “theology of rage” is taught, and the Talib (student) exhorted to practice a ‘sacred violence’ that is his greatest duty in Islam.⁵⁶ These institutions include most prominently the Dar-ul-Uloom Haqqani at Akora Kattak, the Markaz–ad-Da’awa-wal-Irshad(MDI) at Muridke, the Jamiat–ul-

⁵⁴ See South Asia Terrorism Portal; www.satp.org.

⁵⁵ Ajai Sahni, South Asia – Extremist Islamist Terrorism and Subversion in K.P.S. Gill and Ajai Sahni (ed.) *The Global threat of Terror - Ideological, Material and Political Linkages*, (New Delhi: Bulwark Books for the Institution for conflict Management, 2002), P.209.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

Uloom Islamia Madrassa in Karachi; the Dar-ul-Uloom, Pashtoonabad, the Dar-ul-Iftah-ul-Irshad, Nazimabad, and the Ahle-Sunnat-wal Jamaat madrassa at Rawalpindi. Many of these institutions run a multiplicity of schools across the country. These, however, are only a sampling, the visible tip of the iceberg, and there are hundreds of less known 'Jihad factories, the 'supply line for jihad'⁵⁷ – that indoctrinate their students and give them 'military' training, both for the sectarian war, and for international terrorism.

The apparatus of training for terrorism reflects principal and agent conflict that characterises the growth of the madrassas. A number of training camps, especially those that fuel the terrorist movement in Jammu and Kashmir, have long been run by the army and the ISI. However, most function with various degrees of autonomy under the charges of quasi-independent extremist Islamist institutions and groupings. When occasional difficulties crop up, the Taliban in Afghanistan had willingly provided sanctuary and space to armed groups. This may have been a highly convenient arrangement, and Pakistan had found it opportune to relocate specific training camps in Afghanistan when international community put excessive pressure on it. For instance, in 1992-93, when Pakistan feared that the US would declare it a state sponsor of terrorism for its activities in Jammu an Kashmir, Pakistan moved most of its Kashmiri militants groups to bases in eastern Afghanistan, and by 'privatizing' its support to the Kashmiri

⁵⁷ Stern, n.51., p.121.

Mujahidden, made the Islamic parties responsible for their training and funding.⁵⁸

However, the ‘privatization’ of these camps and of the jihadi armies had disastrous consequences. It had contributed to the growing autonomy of religious groups and they challenged not only their Army and ISI handlers, but also the government itself. Moreover, there has been increasing penetration by extremist Islamist elements into Pakistan’s Army, and elements of ‘Islamisation’ have been introduced into the Army’s training programmes at various levels. In 1992, the then Prime Minister appointed a well known Tablighi (congregationist) lieutenant General Javed Nasir, as the Director General of all powerful ISI.⁵⁹

Indeed, the cumulative impact of ‘Islamization’ has put in doubt the Army’s ability to suppress the extremist Islamist forces in case of an open confrontation with government. It is apparent that at least some sections within the Army would side with the extremists if such event emerged. For instance, Lieutenant General Hamid Gul, who headed the ISI through critical periods of the Agency’s campaign in Afghanistan shared the vision of the Islamist fundamentalists and argued that “Pakistan will go through its own version of an Islamic revolutionThe army is the last hope. And if the army fails – and it probably will – then people will realize they will have to

⁵⁸ Shani and Gill, n.55., p.210.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

do it themselves revolt against the system... Because everything else in this country has failed, Islam will have to lead the way”.⁶⁰

Talibanisation of Pakistan:

The unholy nexus in terms of close ideological and military ties between Pakistani religious extremists and the Taliban posed a grave threat to Pakistan. As Ahmed Rashid pointed out – “some 80,000 Pakistani militants have trained and fought with the Taliban since their emergence in 1994, which provides for Taliban style Islamic revolution in Pakistan. The Taliban have thus established close ties not only with the military but with many sectors of Pakistani society, which posed a threat to Pakistani stability”.⁶¹

The complex interplay of Pakistani organisations and institutions that support the Taliban have promoted a cross-border fertilization of Islamist ideology. With the rise of the Taliban, Pakistani Islamism has received a kick, which was regularly boost with every wave of Pakistani Taliban who return from the battlefields of Afghanistan to spread the message at home.

Thus, despite Central Asian fears of Afghanistan’s Islamism spilling over to challenge their secular governments, the country that has

⁶⁰ Robin Wright, “The Chilling Goal of Islam’s New Warriors”, <http://www.latimes.com/news/nation/2001228/500123583.html>

⁶¹ Ahmed Rashid, ‘Pakistan’s Coup: Planting the Seeds of Democracy’, *Current History*, December 1999, p.413.

been most affected by the Taliban ideology so far is Pakistan, which has thousands of Pakistani Taliban veterans attempting to Islamise its political discourse and social life.⁶² For the first time, thousands of Pakistani youth had gone abroad to participate in a militant religious social movement, not for economic gain or regular religious pilgrimage (large number of Pakistanis travel abroad for this reasons). When these Pakistani Taliban return home they have weapons training and often combat experience, ideological indoctrination and a shared experience with other true believers in a grand jihad, and often they have developed or intensified a commitment to Islamize their own society.⁶³

Like the “Arab Afghans” who returned from the jihad of the 1980s to challenge secular regimes in the Middle East, the Pakistani Taliban also wish to apply the lessons they have learned from the battlefields of Afghanistan to Pakistan. But, unlike the Arab Afghans, the Pakistani Taliban was viewed by the JUI and similar organisations as the foot soldiers in a crusade to change Pakistan forever. This new militancy Islamism in Pakistan has been most pronounced in those Pusthun areas that lie along the Afghan border, especially in the Federally Administered Area (FATA). Under different names, viz – Tehrik-i-Tulaba in Orakzai Agency, Tanzim-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Mohammadi in Bajaur Agency Hizbul Mujahideen in Chitral and Northern Areas, etc, movements led by Ulema have sprung up throughout

⁶² Larry Goodson, Foreign Policy gone Awry – the Kalashnikovization and Talibanization of Pakistan in Graig Baxter and Charles H. Kennedy (ed.) *Pakistan: 2000* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp.170-171.

⁶³ Ibid., p.173.

Pakistan's Pushtun areas. For instance, the Tahrik-i-Tulaba (student movement) as indicated by its name, followed the example of Taliban. In December 1998, in an act that was reminiscent of the Taliban's rule over Kabul, a Sharia court established by the Tehrik, ordered the execution of a group that was found guilty of criminal activity.⁶⁴ The execution was carried out in public, and the houses of the executed were burned to the ground. In January 1999, the Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Zargari launched a movement, on the Taliban model, in Hangu district for 'the removal of all prime sources of social evils' (i.e. television, dish antenna, music and unveiled women).⁶⁵

Not only the Talibanisation is most potent in the border areas, it has grown rapidly to also have a nationwide impact in Pakistan. The fear of Talibanisation spread in the country in 1997 after the Binuri-Taliban seminaries virtually took over the city of Karachi for a day during protest.⁶⁶ It was realized for the first time that the Taliban power was now centered in Karachi, which was seen as a city with 'secular' character, and not in the NWFP and Balochistan.

Increasing pressure from Islamist groups on the government led them Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to declare that "Taliban justice" was needed in Pakistan on 17 November 1998. Legislation passed the lower house in 1998 that would amend the constitution to make the Shariah the

⁶⁴ Nasr, in n.41., p.92.

⁶⁵ Mariam Abou Zahab, "The Regional Dimension of Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan", in n.41.,p.129.

⁶⁶ Khaled Ahmed, "Fundamental Flaws", in n.28., p.104.

source of all law (the Shariat Bill). The senate, where the opposition holds the majority, refused to pass the bill, but the growing pressure from Islamist parties was taking its toll, as for example in August 1999 when the Senate refused to even discuss a resolution to condemn the tribal practice of 'honor killing',⁶⁷ This was followed in September 1999 by inflammatory calls to arms, such as when "Maulana Ajmal Qadri, the leader of a breakaway faction of Jamiat-Ulema-i-Islam, issued a religious edict... saying lawmakers opposing a constitutional amendment to impose Islamic law here (Pakistan) deserve die".⁶⁸

In this atmosphere of heightened intolerance, the Pakistani leadership has chosen to play Islamic card and was finding it difficult to dismount it. In the wake of their success, the militant Islamic parties have started pressurizing the governments of Pakistan on matters of foreign and security policies. Moreover, the fundamentalists and sectarian organisations run their own foreign and security policy agendas, which may not necessarily correspond to the national security of Pakistan.

As far as the Indian government's unilateral cease-fire initiative to Pakistan was concerned, Jihadi organisations like the Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammad rejected the offer of cease-fire. However, Pakistan agreed to de-escalation and the observance of "maximum restraint" along with Line of control (LOC). While the third extension of the cease-fire

⁶⁷ Ahmed Rashid, "Raise the Crescent", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 3, 1998, p.22.

⁶⁸ Goodson, n.62., p.174.

continued, the incidents of terrorism in India have increased. As was evident by various statements from the Lashkar, a negotiated settlement to the Kashmir problem is not acceptable to its members, who reject the system of constitutional democracy and one in favour of Islamic Revolution.⁶⁹ Although their agenda is limited to 'liberating' Kashmir, which they believe was annexed by India illegally, their next objective is to turn Pakistan into a truly Islamic state.⁷⁰ Islamabad supports these volunteers as an easy way to keep India off. In the process, it has created a disastrous outcome that threatens every facet of Pakistani society.

Also worrying was the threatened violence by Pakistan's extremists if Sharif signs the comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) during his visit to Washington in 1998. The Jamaat-e-Islami, on November 11, 1998 urged other fundamentalist organisations to band together to prevent the premier from signing the nuclear non-proliferation pact. The fundamentalist – revolutionary clerics, led by the ex-ISI chief, General Hamid Gul, intensified their campaign against the signing of the CTBT, saying that the army could be disloyal to the country if it acquiesced in it.⁷¹ The extremists believed Islamabad should ignore its pledge to the United Nations and transfer nuclear technology to brother Muslim states.⁷²

⁶⁹ Venena Kukreja, *Contemporary Pakistan – Political Processes, Conflicts and Crises*. (New Delhi: Sage Publications), 2003., p.185.

⁷⁰ Stern, n.51., p.118.

⁷¹ Ahmed, in n.28., p.91.

⁷² Rashid, n.61.,p.21.

Pakistani extremists have turned their attack against the United States, as the enemy of Islam. They have warned Washington against the capture of Osama Bin Laden, a Saudi terrorist wanted by the US for allegedly bombing its embassies in Africa. This campaign reached an especially dangerous level in August 1999, when Maulana Fazlur Rehman, leader of the JUI, threatened to harm Americans in Pakistan if the US attacked Osama Bin Laden.⁷³

Thus, the policy discourses and agendas of the fundamentalist parties had complicated Pakistan's relations with the rest of the world. These groups in their own way contribute to the diplomatic isolation of Pakistan and increased its security dilemmas.

Conclusion

The growing menace of religious fundamentalism in Pakistan is posing threats to religious tolerance, freedom of expression, and civil society. The regime in power has always confronted with the militant Islamists groups and its survival is at stake. The most frightening aspect of fundamentalism in Pakistan today is that society itself is becoming fundamentalist and parties based on religion have formed their own armies. Instead of promoting enlightened version of Islam it is the fundamentalist extremist kind of version that is being imposed in Pakistan. This kind of peculiar brand of Islam is based on sectarianism, misrule and terrorism. This

⁷³ Goodson, in n.62., p.175.

has led to the spread of sectarian forces in the country. Throughout the 1990s, the intensification of sectarian war in Jang and Punjab had adversely affected life in the country. It has caused damages to the existing state structure and social cohesion, which led the country to the path of destruction.

Indeed, the fundamentalist forces have the potential to shake the foundations of the state and the society. The fundamentalist groups in Pakistan and their association with international terrorist groups have led to the growing strength of militancy in the country. The terrorist tactics employed by these militant groups resulted to the increasing violence and casualties of death. On the other hand, when the society comes under the grips of violence, the government reacts by adopting strict laws and creating more anti-terrorist and military courts. Such measures have no impact on militants who are ready to sacrifice their life in the path of Jihad. In the process, the state has experienced more of violence, crime and terrorist incidents.

CHAPTER – 5

CONCLUSION

A renewed assessment of the world security environment suggests that the major international threats of the twenty first century will not always be definable in geographic terms. As military threats have subsided or disappeared, other threats, especially non-military one, have emerged with greater clarity. It has thus become possible to argue persuasively that non-military threats are an essential component of national or international security.

In recent years, many of the most severe and persistent threats to global peace and stability are arising not from conflicts between major political entities but from increased disagreement within states, societies, and civilizations along ethnic, racial, religious, linguistics, castes, or class lines. Conflicts between communal groups and states have been recognized as the major threat to domestic and the international security in most part of the world. Hence, national security perpetually related to the situation of threats or perceptions of insecurity.

Since the end of cold war there has been substantial change in threat perceptions. The changes affected international society, regional structures, nation-state and the individual who constituted them. Indeed, the contemporary world will demand a redefinition of what constitute a threat to national security.

Non-Military Threat to Security:

The notion non-military threat is extended beyond a narrow military element to include areas such as economic, environment, and other non-traditional areas. This means that the primacy of state as an actor has become diluted and the state per se has become less effective and relevant with emergence of a variety of transnational forces and multi national entities.¹ It seems that the threat perceptions has changed from threats to state to threats to not only to the state but also to the constituting components of the state i.e. land and nature, life and living beings, ecology and environment.

Non-military threat is defined from a multi dimensional perspective. On the national level, these include ethnic conflict, religious fundamentalism, criminalisation of politics, crime and violence etc. On the regional and global levels, this includes deforestation, desertification, air and water pollution, radiation pollution etc. Equally important are the problems such as pollution of marine environment, global warming and the resulting green house effect, sea-level rise and global drug trafficking etc.

Given the dramatic events of the past few years – events that have unleashed a host of ethnic conflicts, religious fanaticism in the form of terrorism, global drug trafficking and growing awareness of potential environmental disasters – insecurity in the comprehensive sense has resulted in various types of violence. It has wide spread implications to the security

¹ Dr Abul Kalam, “Multi-Level Security Debate and the National Security of Bangladesh in a Regional Frame”, *Regional Studies*, p.98.

of the state – direct (physical), structural (social) and, more recently, violence against nature, endangering ecological or environmental security.

Pakistan is one of the vulnerable state in South Asia, which is prone to the non-military threats. It does not possess internal cohesion and the domestic stability which provide security to its people and society.

Nature of Non-Military Threats to Pakistan Security:

The terms vulnerability (defined as susceptibility to risks or harm) and threat (defined as any type of specific action or situation that could damage national security) are closely related to each other. The higher vulnerability of a country, the greater the non-military threat to its national security. For securing its people, society and the country, Pakistan has to overcome non-military threats emanating from within the country. However, it is almost impossible to implement an alternative measure to overcome it. Given this situation the country faces, among other, three major non-military threats to its national security. They include ethno-nationalism, the problems of drug trafficking and Islamic fundamentalism.

Ethno-nationalism:

The threats emanating from ethnic nationalism are multifarious. It has penetrated to every aspects of life – political, economic and social life of the country. In Pakistan, the last ten decades have seen a steady erosion of state power in the urban centers of the country's Sindh province, driven by feelings of separate identity based on Muhajir nationalism. Widespread

killings in Karachi during 1990s and stalement in the talks to normalize political conditions in urban Sindh account for the continuing struggle between those forces who want to maintain the status quo and those who want to alter it to their advantage.

The assertion of Muhajir ethno-nationalism against the political status quo was considered a major threat to the interests of the ruling authority. The political elites under the military high command, look with abhorrence at the way the Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM) was dealing its opponents in Sindh, particularly those opposing the policies of its leader, Altaf Hussain.

The restoration of democracy in Pakistan in 1988 ushered in a new phase in the Karachi violence. The state's resort to force, including extra judicial killings, rather than political accommodation, had heightened the crisis in the country. This took the form of a guerilla insurgency in which armed MQM militant fought with the security forces. The state justified its repression course by claiming that the MQM threaten secession with its plan for the creation of separate province Jinnahpur based on Karachi.

In the early 1989 Karachi was witnessed terrible shooting incidents. The use of rocket launchers against security forces and state installations became common during the peak of the MQM agitation. When the intensity of the violence grew deeper, the government was compelled to call for law enforcement agencies from other provinces to cope with the better trained and well armed MQM activists.

The use of army, paramilitary and police to deal with a guerilla war situation in Karachi and Hyderabad resulted in genocide and mass killings. The sustained violence costs thousand of lives. The hostility between the MQM and the paramilitary troops deepened as a result of alleged extra-judicial killings of the MQM members by the security forces. As a result of civil strife in Karachi, 2,095 people were killed in 1995 and 1,113 in 1994.²

In 1995, Benazir Bhutto government officially announced the MQM as a terrorist organization. Since July 1995 to January 1996, as many as 70 police encounters had taken place in the city in which over 120 terrorists had been killed. Indeed, by late 1990s the MQM became ruthless in its operation and has resorted to urban terrorism and political violence to achieve its end.

Moreover, one of the most severe implications of Muhajir nationalism on Pakistan's security was the MQM's projection of Muhajir nation against the Pakistani state. It is true that MQM has not called for establishment of a separate province but their agenda goes beyond a separate province and was aimed at attaining statehood for Muhajirs. Thus they directly challenged the credibility for the creation of Pakistan.

Another implication of Muhajir ethno-nationalism on Pakistan security is the internationalization of the problem. The trans-border ramifications of the Muhajir ethno-politics has not only created bilateral security issues, but also could bring external powers into the crisis, which in

² Moonis, Ahmar, "Ethnicity and State Power in Pakistan- The Karachi Crisis", *Asian Survey*, Vol.36 No.10, October 1996, p.1035.

turn seriously affected the stability of the state. The linkages between the MQM militants and the Indian intelligence agency, RAW had increased Pakistan's vulnerability vis- a- vis India. Pakistan has frequently accused India of interfering in its domestic violence. Islamabad justified India's interference as a revenge for Pakistan's support of Muslim separatists in Jammu and Kashmir. Infact, because of their discord over the Kashmir dispute India and Pakistan tend to interfere in each other's internal affairs. Thus the linkages between Karachi and Kashmir had become a serious cause of straining diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Drug Trafficking:

Another non-military threat posed by Pakistan was a threat of drug trafficking. Drug trafficking contributes to growing political, social and economic instability. The consumption of drugs among Pakistani citizen had left Pakistan with one of the world's largest addict population. The inexorable trend towards the mass addiction of its society had swept Pakistan gradually. The fear of becoming the country a Columbia type situation has become reality. The growing situation in Lahore represents the scale and intensity of drug problem in Pakistani society. According to a report, about twenty four tonnes of heroin worth Pakistani Rs. 16.8 billion in the international market was supplied to cater to the needs of over 200,000 drug addicts in the city alone.³ The impact of drug abuse on Pakistani

³ Aabha Dixit, "Narco-Power: Threatening the very roots of Pakistan Society", *Strategic Analysis*, May 1991,p.190.

society has been terrific. It was estimated that in 1991, there were three million drug addicts and they consumed per capita four times more as compared to the western addicts.⁴

Further, drug addiction leads to adverse effects. Heroin use affects the physical health of the individuals as it helps in spreading in one of the most lethal disease – AIDS. In addition to this, the abuse of drug in the society had created social imbalances and organize crime. The connection between crime and drugs had led to the increasing criminal activities, intimidation, murder, terrorism and the illegal traffic in arms and explosives.

Drug trafficking also poses a serious threat to the economic stability of the country. The social cause to Pakistani society, when translated into economic indicators present a gloomy picture. Drug abuse contributes to the loss of productivity due to the costs for treatment and rehabilitation of addicts.

It is hampering the process of education and technological development and causing premature deaths. Millions of rupees are being spent to eradicate the production, processing, trafficking and to meet the crime-related costs. The profits earned through drug trade are rarely spent on enterprises that benefit the national economy nor they are available for taxation by the government to support the national welfare activities. Thus, the abuse of drugs in a society creates social imbalance, religious decay,

⁴ Ibid., p.197.

weakens social bonds and ultimately renders the society defenceless against poverty, ignorance and national security.

Drug trafficking threatened the physical security of the state. The phenomenon of narcotic trafficking which is generally considered as an organized cross border crime has now emerged as a threat to nation states because of its alliance with terrorist groups. In the 1990s a new dimension was added to the trade of narcotics and small arms. The diabolic nexus of drugs with the arms has contributed to the growth of a new phenomenon called narco-terrorism.

The drug culture in Pakistan could not have flourished had it not been in league with the arms trade. An illegal trade like drugs requires illegal armed protection. As the nexus between the drug dealer and the arms trafficker developed, much of the profit from the drugs trade was being channeled into arms business that in turn provided protection to the drug dealers by rising private armies having the latest weapons to defend the drug traders. In the process, weapons diffused rapidly into Pakistani society – political parties, feudal lords, drug traffickers, and common criminals are able to pursue their respective objectives with weapons that filtered in from the drug money.

One of the most affected provinces in Pakistan affected by the culture of drug and guns has been Baluchistan. The breakdown of the traditional Sardari system has come about as a result of the fusion of the role of the arms trader with that of drug dealer, making the narco-smuggler a law

into themselves. Large areas straddling the coastline of the province, especially in Mekran district, are beyond the control of the Pakistani government.

The lucrative trade of narcotics and the Taliban's desire for arms brought many criminal elements into the country. It is not only Pakistani metro cities of Karachi and Lahore, but also small cities and provinces are flooded with drugs and arms. And every rival ethnic and religious group has full potential in terms of sophisticated arms to attack the counter groups. This nexus has resulted in the increased sectarian bloodshed all over Pakistan. It has also accelerated the pace of ethnic animosity.

Islamic Fundamentalism:

In Pakistan, the Islamic militancy and extremism has emerged as potentially the most threatening form since the closing years of the 1980s. The radicalization of the Islamic fundamentalist groups had led to the polarization of society into sectarian line.

If ethnicity destroyed Sind's socio-political structure through years of ethnic violence, sectarian tensions in Punjab has threatened Pakistan as a whole. Sectarian conflicts are not limited to Punjab alone. Sectarian tensions have frequently broken out into violence in other provinces and cities, like Karachi and Peshwar, where the Shia population is substantial. Sectarian tensions represent the dangerous implications to the state policies and the ruling elite. Private sectarian armies have battled government

agencies and been successful in retaining control of their areas of dominance.

Sectarian war has become prevalent during the 1990s. In 1992 in Peshwar, in 1995 in Pachinar, in August 1997 – when in the first ten days of the month, days before the celebration marking the 50th anniversary of the country's Independence, 70 died in Punjab in incidents of sectarian violence – and in March 1998 in North West Frontier Province.⁵

The regional dimension of sectarian conflicts in Pakistan has been a major concern for its security. The Iranian revolution inspired Pakistani Shias and contributed to their politicization. But it has a backlash as Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait started patronizing Wahabis and other non-Shias to counter this influence. Thus, Pakistan becomes a primary battlefield as it shares a border with Iran and has a sizeable Shia population (15-20%). The sectarian tensions have become perhaps the most important factor capable of making the most serious breach in Pakistan Iran relations.

Sectarian conflicts acquired a new dimension when the jihad was introduced in Pakistan. Most of the extremist's madrassas started preaching jihad in every walk of life. They equate jihad with guerilla warfare. These schools encouraged their graduates to fulfill their jihad by fighting against Hindus in Kashmir or against Muslims of other sects in Pakistan. These madrassas has also received financial supports from Arab countries. The

⁵ S. V. R. Nasr, "Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan", in Christophe Jaffrelot (ed.), *Pakistan-Nationalism Without a Nation?* (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers and Distributors, 2002), p.101.

financial support has been a significant source of funding for the militant groups in their jihad against state.

As the so called jihad movement continues to acquire its own financial flows, it had become increasingly difficult for Pakistan to shut down these madrassas. These jihadi groups who fought in Afghanistan and Kashmir have started looking for a new 'jihad' to fight even against Pakistan itself. As one of the Islamist militant pointed, "we won't stop even if India gave us Kashmir.....we will also bring jihad here. There is already a movement here to make Pakistan a pure Islamic state".⁶ Aspiration like this has been common agenda among all the fundamentalist groups.

Since 1994 when Taliban movement got its momentum in Afghanistan, the fundamentalism took a new turn in Pakistan. Various Islamists militant groups started providing support to the Taliban, most notably in recruitment and financial aid. The Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islami (JUI) and other radical Islamists organizations such as the Lasker-e-Toiba, Hizbul Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, and Tehrik-e-jihad provide recruits for the Taliban in Afghanistan. The JUI has encouraged students in its madrassahs to join Taliban declaring the afghan struggle a jihad.

In August 1998, after the capture of Mazar-e-Sharif by the Taliban, hundreds of Pakistanis went to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban. When relations between Pakistan and Iran were very strain after the killing of Iranian diplomats in Mazar-e-Sharif and the reported massacre of afghan

⁶ Jessica Stern, "Pakistan's Jihad Culture", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.79 No.6, November/December 2000, p.121.

Shias, Maulana Azam Tariq, head of the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) who was detained in Attock military jail at the time, announced that his party was “ready to send 20,000 militants to fight along side the Taliban if Iran try to impose a war on Afghanistan”.⁷ Dharb-e-Momin, a weekly published from Karachi, Lahore and Rawalpindi also present the Taliban as fighting for the survival of Pakistan.

The nexus of Taliban and the fundamentalist group of Pakistan had infused Talibanisation within Pakistan. The threat of Talibanisation in the country stems from the stiffening in religious ideology. Around 26,000 religious seminaries have undergone a dramatic change. Talibanism has started spreading across the country. In the case of the barelvi organization, Dawat-e-Islami, which falls around 200,000 strong congregations in Multan in Punjab annually, the prohibition of human image was the change in the direction of Taliban opposition to Television and photographs. In their interpretation of law, the judges of the lower and higher judiciary have inclined to a more fundamentalist view of Islam. The lower courts have started imposing death sentences to non-Muslims under the blasphemy law. Christians have been targeted by the Muslim clergy in the rural areas by the jihadi militias.

In 1997, a Christian settlement in Punjab, Shantinagar, was razed to the ground by militias using incendiary bombs normally a part of the arsenal

⁷ Mariam Abou Zahab, “The Regional Dimension of Sectarian Conflicts”, in n.5., p.123.

of the mujahideen in Kashmir.⁸ The Islamists fundamentalists continued association with the Taliban produced severe consequences to the country. As one Pakistani scholar quoted, “ the Taliban’s close link with Pakistani society, their uncompromising stance on their version of Islamic values and the fact that they represent a new form of Islamic radicalism which is admired by a younger generation of Pakistani madrassah students, give them far more clout inside Pakistan than other afghan mujahideen groups. For many Pakistanis, the Taliban an inspiration.”⁹

Infact, in January 1999 an Islamic revolution on the Taliban model had launched in Hangu district by the fundamentalist sectarian organization or the imposition of Taliban laws in Pakistan. Thus the rise and the growth of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan have the potential to root out the foundation of the state.

While the society has confronted with threats from various dimensions, the Pakistani government reacted by adopting strict laws and repressive measures. The nature of threat is such that such measures have no impact on it. The more the state imposes force the more the intensity of the threat increases.

⁸ Khalid Ahmed, “ Fundamental Flaws”, *On the Abyss* (New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers India Pvt. Ltd., 2000), p.100.

⁹ Larry Goodson, “Foreign Policy Gone Awry- The Kalashnikovization and Talibanisation of Pakistan”, in Craig Baxter and Charles H. Kennedy, (ed.), *Pakistan: 2000* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.169.

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