

**US-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONS IN THE 1980s:  
DEBATE OVER DEFENCE BURDEN SHARING**

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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled US-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONS IN THE 1980s: DEBATE OVER DEFENCE BURDEN SHARING by Mr. SHAIENDRA KAMLAKAR DEOLANKAR in partial fulfilment for the award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other University. To the best of our knowledge this is a bonafide work.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

  
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## PREFACE

United States and Japan entered into a Mutual Security Treaty in 1951. This had marked a watershed in their bilateral relationship. The US had made a major foreign policy decision of taking over the burden of maintaining the defence of Japan. This treaty was much different from other multilateral treaties such as NATO, in terms of U.S. financial and material commitment. This U.S. decision was conditioned by the Cold War realities. During this period the, US economic interests were subordinated by strategic interests. But this aspect became a subject of intense debate during the 1980s. It had been happening in both the US and Japan.

In the United States, the debate centred around its excessive financial commitments to Japanese security. But at the same time it was not oblivious to the fact that the Soviets increased their military activity in the Asia Pacific and the Gulf region. So, it felt the need to enhance the U.S. defence presence in this region. For this U.S. required Japan also to share the cost of the defence. Moreover, the US economy was facing recession and the Japan's growing economic and technological strength had begun to challenge US competitiveness world wide.

In Japan, however, this issue took a passionate dimension. Though convinced about US strategic motives, Japan wanted to downsize its dependence on the US for its security needs. This was prompted due to the growing nationalistic sentiments in Japan requiring its defence self reliance.

Based on this premise, the study would attempt to analyze the factors responsible for such a debate particularly in 1980s. For this purpose the study have been divided into five chapters.

The first chapter is introductory in nature which gives an overview of the U.S.-Japan relations since the end of Second World War.

In the second chapter, the debate in the U.S. about defence burden sharing with Japan is covered.

The third chapter, however, evaluating Congressional perspective regarding U.S. defence policy planning towards Japan.

In the fourth chapter, the Japanese responses towards US defence planning in 1980s is dealt in detail.

The final chapter attempts to draw conclusion based on the study.

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION : OVERVIEW OF US-JAPAN SECURITY

#### RELATIONS: 1951 - 1980

Trade is not the only area of disagreement between the United States and Japan. The question of how much Japan should spend on defence has also been a source of tension between the two countries. To many Americans, the relatively small amount spent by Japan on defence was related to its burgeoning economy and large trade imbalances with the United States. The strains that particularly manifested in the bilateral relations were sharply etched in the 1980s. When the Reagan administration entered office in 1981 the detente of the 1970s had already ended. The military build up initiated earlier by President Carter, later commanded by President Reagan required its allies to contribute fairly to the joint defence efforts. The US Congress was reluctant to finance these increases as it meant cuts in the "Great Society" social programme that had been enacted during the Johnson administration. The only source that was left was "rational division of labour" between the US, the NATO countries and Japan. Subsequently, this concept was put forward as major thrust of US defence policy.<sup>1</sup> This was partly due to the fact Japan, from being a protected protege of

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<sup>1</sup> Paul H.B. Godwin, "The US and Asia : The success of continuity?" in William P. Snyder James Brown, eds. Defence Policy in the Reagan Administration, (Washington, D.C: National Defence University Press, 1988), pp. 53-4.

the US, was now a leading creditor nation, challenging America's lead in technology and trade. The 1982-84 period saw the rapid growth of American trade deficit and growth of Japanese investments.<sup>2</sup> As trade deficits grew, the American refrain emphatically argued for "Reciprocity" and "level playing field" as central theme in US-Japanese ties.

### **US-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONS - EARLY YEARS**

Asia has been a region of major strategic importance to the United States throughout the twentieth century. Within Asia, the United States has viewed Northeast Asia as more strategically important than Southeast Asia. China, the erstwhile USSR, Japan and both Korea's are in close proximity in Northeast Asia. Soviet and North Korean military capabilities in and adjacent to Northeast Asia required America to place primary emphasis on American security relations with Japan and Korea. The defence of South Korea and Japan became the centre of US Security concerns in Asia.

The history of the US-Japan Security relations that began with the end of Second World War is a continuous process that contributed in maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The geographical location of Japan in the Pacific Rim and its being at close proximity to former Soviet Union, China, and

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<sup>2</sup> Edward Olsen, US-Japan Strategic Reciprocity: A Neo-internationalist View, (California: Hoover Institution Press, 1985) pp. 1-8.



North Korea, made US to include Japan as a front line state in its "containment policy". It not only handled Japan's external security, but also mediated diplomatically between Japan and its neighbours.<sup>3</sup>

After the Second World War Japan had been under US's dominant influence throughout the seven years of occupation. The fundamental objectives of US policy in Japan were to insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world; to bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of the other states and will support the objectives of the United States.

The United States dominated the occupation of Japan to a far greater extent than was true in either Germany or Korea. A State Department document entitled "United States Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan", dated 6 September 1945 and approved by President Truman, indicated that two of the most important occupation goals were the demilitarization and democratization of Japan. Demilitarization involved disarming and demobilising Japanese military forces. This was a relatively easy task to accomplish because Japanese were in favour of

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<sup>3</sup> US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Japan's contribution to Military Stability in Northeast Asia" prepared for the subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1980, p. 61. as quoted in David Johnson Barry R. Schneider, ed., Current Issues in US Defence Policy (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 71.

demilitarization. A more difficult task was to try to prevent the reversion to militarism in the future.<sup>4</sup>

As a part of the effort to forever demilitarize Japan, the U.S. placed Article 9 in the New Japanese constitution which stated "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order the Japanese people renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat of use of force as a means of settling international disputes, Land, sea and airforces, as well as war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognised". This Article has been used by the Japanese rearmament.<sup>5</sup>

During the occupation period one significant issue that was debated concerned the negotiation of the peace treaty with Japan. The State and Defence departments had different views on when a peace treaty should be negotiated. A paper from the Nation Security Council, NSC-49, dated 15 June 1945, represented the latter's views that a peace treaty should be delayed because of the high strategic value of Japan to the United States. For the Defence Department the military threat to Japan was external in nature, and the US military presence served as a deterrent to aggression. The State Department stressed, however, that occupation over a long period jeopardised future US-Japanese security

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<sup>4</sup> Herbert Feis, Contest over Japan, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967), pp. 7-8.

<sup>5</sup> See, Theodore McNelly, Politics and Government in Japan, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1972), pp.261-70, for the full text of the Japanese Constitution.

relations because the Japanese people were becoming disillusioned with the occupation. American security interests could best be protected by an early peace treaty which included provisions "for essential U.S. military needs in Japan". There was no disagreement over whether US military forces should remain in Japan: the issue was how best to assure the presence of these forces.<sup>6</sup>

It was the United States who laid down the economic and political foundation of Japan after the great devastation caused by Second began its economic rehabilitation. Between September 1945 and December 1951, US economic aid to Japan amounted to \$2.1 billion. From the post war period to the 1970s Japanese accepted vast amount of American culture, democracy and economic tutelage. Americans were pleased to view Japan as an eager docile and non-threatening ally in the Pacific.<sup>7</sup>

In the twentieth century, the United States has twice attempted to radically alter the Northeast Asian Security Structure. The first was failure of President Roosevelt's prediction about the future role of China after Second World War. The second attempt was President Nixon's in 1971. Roosevelt believed that U.S.

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<sup>6</sup> NSC-49, Strategic Evaluation of United States Security needs in Japan", 15 June 1949, in Thomas Etzold and John Levis Gaddis, eds., Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy: 1945-1950, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 225.

<sup>7</sup> Martin Broefenbrenner, "The American Occupation of Japan: Economic Retrospect", in Grant V Goodman, ed., The American Occupation of Japan: A Resrospective View, (Kengas: Centre for East Asian Studies, 1968), pp.10-4.

security would be best served by a strong, unified, independent China. He frequently voiced his intention to see China emerge as one of the "great powers" at the end of the war. Therefore he supported Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationalist Forces against the Japanese. But the emergence of Communist China and its role in the Korean War totally shattered Roosevelt's prediction. The U.S. had to alter its policies towards Japan. Now Japan became its strategic centre to control the security threats of Asia.<sup>8</sup>

The bipolarity of the 1950s found Northeast Asia divided into two mirror-image camps: the powerful Soviet Union, less powerful China, and client state North Korea on the one side, and the United States, Japan, and South Korea on the other. From the U.S. side, the objective was to frustrate the development of China while stimulating the resurgence of Japan. By 1948, US policy was altered in favour of "the restoration of Japan's prewar position as the "workshop of Asia" and the preservation of its economy as far as possible from socialistic encroachments".

#### **SECURITY RELATIONS : I PHASE - 1951-1970**

In the first phase of US-Japan security relations. American interests vis-à-vis the Japanese were defined largely by the Cold War America's policy of containment. The Soviet threat not only provided the basis for defining the

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<sup>8</sup> Jack H. Harris, "Northeast Asia: The Problem of Balancing Power" in William W. Whitson, ed., Foreign Policy and U.S. National Security, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976) pp.139-41.

mutual interests of US and Japan, it also provided for what former ambassador Mike Mansfield proclaimed: Japan was the most important US ally "bar none". By 1948, the transformation of international relations the U.S. change its view of Japan's strategic potential. It had been envisaged that the postwar world would be based on great power cooperation. But this cooperation had collapsed and turned into a Cold War, where the West perceived peace to now be threatened by the growing menace of Communism. Soviet intransigence over Berlin, the Czechoslovakian coup, Communist insurgencies in Greece and Turkey, the Communist takeover in China and the Korean War changed Japan's status from one of potential threat to strategic asset.<sup>9</sup>

The early American goals of the occupation, reform and democratization of the Japanese economic system, was replaced by policies aimed at simply reconstructing and strengthening Japan's economy. A fully recovered Japan was seen as one of the vital blocks in the newly envisaged American East Asian Security System.

Japan was made a major partner in the alliance strategy with the Mutual Security Treaty of 1951. However, the Japanese had certain reservations towards the provisions of 1951 Security Treaty and the Yoshida government pressed the United States to renegotiate this treaty. Eventually, Article 1 of the 1957

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<sup>9</sup> Louis D. Hayes, "United States - Japan Strategic Relations : A Limited Partnership" in Strategic Studies, Spring 86, pp. 28-30.

renegotiated version of the treaty not only allowed the US to station its military forces in Japan, but also provided that these forces could be used to suppress internal disturbances if the Japanese government so requested. The treaty however made no provision for consultations between the two countries concerning the use of US bases on Japanese soil, and there was no expiration date for the treaty.

After protracted negotiations, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan was signed on 19 January 1960. In this, there was no mention of a domestic role for US military forces to play in Japan. The signatories affirmed their adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter; they agreed to "maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional processes, their capacities to resist armed attack; and again agreed to consult, at the request of either party," whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened". For this purpose Japan granted the United States the use "by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan". An armed attack against either party in the territories "under the administration of Japan" would be dangerous to its own peace and security, and each party declared it would act to meet the common danger "in accordance with its constitutional provision and processes."<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> For the detail provisions of the Mutual Security Treaty. See *Treaties and Other International Agreement series, Treaty of Mutual cooperation and security between the United States and Japan, no. 4509, (Washington D.C: USGPO 19 January 1960).*

Basically the treaty was an American guarantee of Japanese Security. Japan was not committed to militarily involved in conjunction with United States operations, as was the case with members of SEATO; and military action under the agreement was not automatic, but subject to the constitutional provisions and processes of each party. Provisions were also made for "joint consultation" regarding the U.S. forces in Japan. Nuclear weapons were not, as a matter of Japanese government policy, permitted on Japanese territory. In the later phase, after the Vietnam War, when the U.S. put pressure on Japan for greater contribution to the security efforts, all these provisions were used by the Japanese to fend off American demands.<sup>11</sup>

Since 1950s, Japan has been essentially isolated from global politics, consciously pursuing a "low-risk and low posture" foreign policy, unburdened by external political commitments, concentrating on economic development, and depending on the United States for its external security. The Mutual Security Treaty contributed importantly to this posture; and Japan became a world economic power while nurturing a strong, free, open and democratic society.

In the 1950s and 1960s two important views were dominant in the US-Japan security relationship. The first was the "inevitable harmony" notion that was the characteristic of the 1950s and the second view comprised the idea

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<sup>11</sup> James Buck "Japan : the problem of shared Responsibility" in William W. Whitson, ed., Foreign Policy and U.S. National Security (New York : Praeger Publishers, 1976) pp. 66.

of creating a "close partnership".<sup>12</sup> The idea of "inevitable harmony" implied that the interests of the United States and Japan are identical and that Japan can be counted upon to act as an agent of the United States in Asia. The United States had been instrumental in fashioning the postwar political and economic structure of Japan and Japan had accepted dependence on the United States for both economic and security assistance. The idea of "inevitable harmony" was a "grand scheme" for the protection of U.S. security interests in Asia. Further, in this concept, Japan became a major staging area and logistic base for American troops in the Korean War.

In the 1960s, the idea of "creating a partnership" through diligent efforts on both sides to overcome the differences inherent in the two cultures, as well as divergent national interests was dominant.<sup>13</sup> The notion of developing "close partnership" was advocated to overcome the domestic opposition, especially in Japan towards Mutual Security Treaty (MST). The revision of the MST in 1960 was the first step taken in the direction of "close partnership".<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Morton H. Halperin, "US-Japanese Security Relations", in Priscilla Clapp and Morton H. Halperin, eds., United States-Japanese Relations : The 1970s, (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 210-1.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 211-2.

<sup>14</sup> For a detailed discussion on the National Security aspects from both nations, see Daniel I Okimoto, "Security Policies in the United States and Japan : Institutions, experts and Mutual understanding", in Franklin B. Weinstein ed., US-Japan Relations and the Security of East Asia : The Next Decade (Boulder, Colorado : Westview Press, 1978), pp. 16-20.



## II PHASE - 1970s

By 1970s, the nature of Japan's future military has emerged as a major issue of U.S. post Vietnam policy in Asia. The level and pace of American-Japanese diplomatic exchanges had increased sharply since the U.S. exodus from Southeast Asia. The key military issues were: (i) the size and purpose of the Japanese Self Defence Forces and American pressure to increase them (2) The future of the Mutual Security Treaty and cooperation (3) American bases and their uses in Japan.<sup>15</sup>

After debacle in the Southeast Asia, the US made a fundamental reassessment in the end and means of its foreign policy. Americans found themselves sucked into an unwinnable war in Asia. The major upshot of the war was the realization that a significant part of the containment strategy did not work. Despite the alliances and massive amounts of American aid, the "line had not held". Alliance partners, especially those in Asia, were less than enthusiastic about becoming directly involved in the war.

Japan played a minimal role in Vietnam War. While it was anything but an enthusiastic supporter of US policy, its alliance with and dependence upon the U.S. precluded criticism by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Much of the money the U.S. spent during the Vietnam war was a source of profit for Japan

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<sup>15</sup> Danis F. Verhoff " Japan under U.S. Pressure" in David Johnson Barry R. Schneider, ed., Current issues in U.S. defence policy (New York : Praeger Publishers, 1976) pp. 62-3. See for an illuminating commentary of US-Japan Relations at this juncture : Edwin J. Feulner, Jr., and Hideaki Kase, eds., US-Japan Mutual Security : The next Twenty Years (Washington DC, Heritage Foundation, 1981), Particularly Chapter 4.

and other countries. In the view of some it resulted in the US losing its competitive advantages to other countries, especially Japan. The Japanese were able to build up a strong international market position. While the U.S. was using its resources in the Vietnam war, the Japanese were growing economically and advanced their own national interests.<sup>16</sup>

By 1969, Japan had developed the world's third strongest economy behind those of the United States and Soviet Union.<sup>17</sup> Its export industries were booming, and Japan was becoming a major economic competitor of the US, particularly in the Southeast Asian markets. Japanese exports to the US increased so that, by 1972, the US trade deficit with Japan grew to \$ 4 billion, approximately two-thirds of the total US balance of trade deficit for that year. Because of domestic economic problems in the early 1970s and also because of Nixon's belief that Japan and European Community were not cooperating in reducing their imports to the US, he announced his New Economic Policy in August 1971 which imposed a ten per cent surcharge on dutiable imports. The Japanese viewed this action as being directed primarily at them and objected strongly.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> See, Louis D. Hayes, n.9, p. 31-33.

<sup>17</sup> Robert J. Samuleson, "US-Japan Find old Relationships have unravelled", Nation (Canada : Ottawa), Vol. 14, no. 16, 30 June, 1979, pp. 1152-1154.

<sup>18</sup> For more details on the New Economic Policy see, Joan E. Spero, The Politics of International Economic Relations, (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1977), pp. 90-92.

However due to the changes in the US's Asia Policy in the early 1970s two major changes that occurred placed great stress on Japan's ability not only to continue its economic course but also to retain the strategy of a limited military. First, the U.S. substantially reduced its role in Asia while the Soviets correspondingly increased theirs. Secondly, the trade imbalances between the U.S. and Japan reached crisis proportions. Detente and American diplomatic opening to Peking in 1971 had created new incentives and opportunities for Japan to pursue a foreign policy that was more independent of the US and that took into account the uniquely Japanese political, cultural, social and historical experiences.<sup>19</sup>

In July 1971, President Nixon's visit to China as part of the overall revision of Asian policy, and recognition China as sovereign state was the first "shock" to Japan. On Pact, it was argued that, Nixon gave the Chinese what they had been looking for since 1958 : an opportunity to bargain with the United States. This change was made without consulting or informing Japan. In the post-Vietnam security structure envisioned by Nixon, China was expected to play an important "new" role. This new role was introduced in Nixon's "secret plan"<sup>20</sup> for ending the Vietnam conflict. In August 1971 the U.S. dollar was no longer convertible into gold. The dollar was allowed to float freely, giving

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<sup>19</sup> See, Denis F. Verhoff, n.15, p. 64.

<sup>20</sup> See, Jack, M. Harris, n.8, p. 144.

Japan the second "shock". This realignment of currencies was intended to help the growing US trade deficit. As a further step in this direction, a ten per cent surcharge was placed on all imports. This action was keenly felt by Japan, which was increasingly involved in the U.S. market.

The Nixon Doctrine declared that local conflicts must be dealt with by local countries, and the U.S. would play only a supportive role.<sup>21</sup> Nixon's new Asian security arrangements called for the logistic isolation of the battlefield. For Japan this raised the question of the reliability of the American commitment of their defence. The Japanese insecurity over the US in the event of attack, and Nixon Doctrine, exacerbated these worries. Japanese anxiety was even greater when during the Carter Administration the idea of withdrawal of U.S. forces was put forward. Under these circumstances the Japanese realization that they would have to give more serious consideration to expanding their military establishment and to develop a more ambitious strategic policy. They were not oblivious to the fact that a communique pertaining at the Korea was inserted at the insistence of the United States in 1969. As per these agreement, the US had decided to place its bases at Okinawa under the "prior consultation clause" of the Security Treaty.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Richard Nixon, US Foreign Policy for 1970s; Shaping a Durable Peace (Washington, DC : Government Printing Office, 1973),pp. 109-110.

<sup>22</sup> Selig S. Harrison, "The United States, Japan and the Future of Korea", in Franklin B. Weinstein, ed., US-Japan Relations and the Security of East Asia. The next Decade, n.8, p. 203.

The 'Nixon Shock', to some extent, was successful in convincing Japan to provide more for its own defence. In response to this, Japan projected the Self Defence Forces to increase from 180,000 to 271,000 between 1972 and 1976 more importantly Japan began to recognise the need for assuming a larger role in conjunction with the United State for the security of the region.

### **III PHASE (1979-1983)- CHANGING EMPHASIS ON THE ROLE OF JAPAN**

The decade of 1980s emerged with a reemphasis on the Cold War. Several developments in the late 70s and early 80s posed serious threat to the US interests in Asia and challenged its policy of logical isolationism in Asia adopted by both Nixon and Carter. The "Hostage Crisis" in Iran and the developments in Afghanistan made the US and other Western democracies rethink their defence policies. Western Europe came to stress the need for increased defence capabilities first, and the NATO nations reached an agreement. Over a long term defence programme at their Summit meeting in May 1978 and pleaded to increase their military spending by 3 per cent a year in real terms.<sup>23</sup>

In the late 1970s Carter Administration had to change its policies to cope with emerging challenges. Despite the widespread antimilitarism among American public opinion, Carter administration postponed Congressional debates on SALT - II treaty and called for the increased appropriations for the national

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<sup>23</sup> English language version of Defence of Japan, Defence Agency of Japan, (Tokyo : Jaman Times, 1980), pp. 5-10.

defence.<sup>24</sup>

The Soviet military built up that began in the 1960s continued throughout the 1970s in Asia. The increased militarisation in the Far East and Middle East its use of bases at Cam Ranh Bay, Haiphong, and Da Nang, the deployment of backfire bombers and SS-20 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles in the Far East, created a great security dilemma for both United States and Japan. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan marked the first occasion since World War II that Russia committed its troops to sustained combat. The intervention demonstrated the capacity of Soviet Union to rapidly mobilise its reserve forces by reinforcing and ability to carry out a combined airground operation.<sup>25</sup>

When Reagan administration took office in 1981 the detente of the 1970s had already ended. The military build up initiated earlier by President Carter was expanded by President Reagan. This reflected the "gulf" that had grown between the United States and the Soviet Union. To cope with the "harsh realities" of Soviet expansionism, Reagan promised a rapid build up of US military forces and large increases in defence spending. The great dilemma that Reagan administration faced was to determine defence policies and strategies for a

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<sup>24</sup> Congressional Quarterly, US Defence Policy : Weapons, Strategy and Commitments, (Washington : United States, Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 65.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., pp. 12-5

military force structure over extended by a widening set of military commitments. The policies that emerged focused on creating a sustained American military build up and developing an effective coalition strategy. Reagan administration adopted three set of policies as the part of what was termed as the "New Cold War Strategy": (i) Basic containment through NATO to counter any Soviet threat to Western Europe (2) to protect oil supplies and sea lanes in the Persian Gulf (3) to counter threats to US interests in Asia, Central and Latin America that emphasised on a strong coalition strategy.<sup>26</sup>

Reagan administration's approach to defence and security issues in East Asia however, followed the pattern that emerged after World War II. Although the US had direct and growing interest in the regions as a whole, US defence policy was designed around America's World wide military commitments and the administration's perception of the global balance of power between the West and Soviet Union. Within Asia, American interest and those of its allies were compelled to face a set of challenges. As Reagan administration began reviving its Asian defence policy, one of the central feature of the previous administration's strategy to oppose the USSR underwent a change. The Chinese entered into a pattern of negotiation with Moscow as Beijing preferred to move from a position or alignment with the US to one of "independence". In doing so

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<sup>26</sup> Ronald Reagan, National Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington : Pergamon-Brassess International Defence Publishers, 1988), p. 37-8.

China presented Washington a different Chinese foreign policy than one faced by Carter.<sup>27</sup>

By early 1983 Washington perceptibly made a change in the American political military strategy in Asia. Since 1972 the Carter administration had tended to look to China as providing a major countervail to Soviet military power in Asia<sup>28</sup>. The Reagan administration saw Japan as playing a major role in the future US military planning in the region. A number of factors contributed to this shift. Among them the lowest priority assigned by the Chinese to their defence modernisation programme and the Chinese declaration of its policy of independence and refusal to join any "big power", and the reopening of Sino-Soviet negotiations in October, 1982 were significant. Washington began a reevaluation of the strategic triangle concept that had dominated during the 1970s. The Reagan administration agreed that the should play a limited role in modernising Beijing's defence capabilities, believed that China would not become an active partner in US defence strategies. In contrast, Japan, was viewed as having the potential to play much more active role in the American defence planning. Several factors helped the American reappraisal despite political

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<sup>27</sup> See, Paul H.B. Godwin, n.1, pp. 46-7.

<sup>28</sup> See, For an extensive discussion on Carter's China Policy: William E. Berry, Jr., " Alliance Commitments and strategies: Asia" in Schuyler Foerster, Edward Wright, eds., American Defence Policy, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1990), pp.335-6.



friction on other issues. Prominent among them were, the existing security treaty and an emerging pattern of close military ties between Japanese Self Defence Forces and US forces deployed in North East Asia. Japan's strategic geographical location astride the principle sea passages taken by the Soviet Pacific fleet when it moved from its head quarters in Vladivostok, the Japanese airspace being enroute of the Soviet air Force heading for the Pacific, and Japan as world's Second largest economy, could make major contribution to the Western efforts to maintain superiority over the Soviet defence capabilities. Finally, the election of Prime Minister Nakasone in November 1982 presented the US with a Japanese Prime Minister who was determined to place a greater emphasis on the US-Japan defence relationship.<sup>29</sup>

On the Japanese side, the increased Soviet militarisation in Far East encouraged Japan to conclude a Sino-Japanese treaty in 1978, and decide to resume "working - level" bilateral talks with Soviets in 1981, reflecting the fear of future Chinese propensity to play the "Soviet Card". At the same time, emphasis on security ties with the West began to be downplayed with the disclosure of "Swing Strategy" which allegedly prescribed the transfer of US forces in the pacific and the NATO theatre during an emergency. Dismayed over this "a Comprehensive National Security Study Group" was appointed by Prime Minister Nasayoshi Ohira in July 1980. It reported that Japan would now have to

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<sup>29</sup> See, Paul H.B. Godwin, n.1, pp.51-6.

become a "more active participant" in future Western international security efforts by broadening its self defence perspective.<sup>30</sup> A study made by the Joint Working Group of American and Japanese analysts was even more specific. It recommended that Japan should provide airlift and sea-lift capability as well as financial support for increased Western military forces now deployed in the Middle East.

Japan and United States agreed in September 1982 to station up to fifty US F-16 fighter aircraft at Misawa Air Base, approximately 875 miles from the Soviet Pacific Coast.<sup>31</sup> In a visit to Washington in January 1983 Prime Minister Nakasone referred to the Japanese - US relationship as an "unshakable alliance". Nakasone stressed the Soviet threat and agreed that Japan must forge a closer relationship with both the US and Republic of Korea.<sup>32</sup> The approximately 26,000 US combat forces assigned in Japan would not only serve as a deterrent to an attack on Japan, but these forces and their support bases would be extremely valuable in responding to a contingency on Korean Peninsula.

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<sup>30</sup> Edward A. Olsen, US-Japan Strategic Reciprocity : A Neo-Internationalist View; (California : Hoover Institution Press, 1985), p. 20.

<sup>31</sup> New York Times, 1 Oct. 1982, p. 3.

<sup>32</sup> New York Times, 28 November, 1983, p.1.

## RATIONAL DIVISION OF DEFENCE BURDEN BETWEEN US AND JAPAN

The "Defence burden sharing" issue originated during the Korean War, when American occupation forces were quickly shifted from Japan to Korean Peninsula. For the first time the need for Japanese contribution was reorganised. In the subsequent years as Japanese economy developed, the demand for contribution simultaneously increased. Eisenhower's Secretary of State Dulles strongly believed that Japan must be prepared to do more to provide for its own defence. The Japanese government under Prime Minister Yoshida resisted this pressure because of constitutional restrictions under article 9 and memories of military role in prewar Japan.

However, it was only in 1970s the United States started putting direct pressure on Japan for its defence contribution. During his August 1975 visit to Japan. Secretary of Defence James R. Schlesinger urged Japan to increase its military forces. He alleged that Japan's military capability was inadequate to defend Japan : "At the present time.... it is not sufficiently ample to fulfil the mission."<sup>33</sup> The reason for United State's urging Japan to expand its military forces was more related to U.S. plans for the defence of South Korea than to the defence of Japan itself. The same thing was reemphasised in the Miki-Ford Joint Announcement issued at the end of the Japanese Prime Minister's visit to the



<sup>33</sup> See, the statement of James R. Schlesinger, as reported in Washington Post, August 30, 1975.

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United States in August 1975 which stated: "... maintenance of peace on the Korean Peninsula is essential to the maintenance of the peace and security in East Asia including Japan".<sup>34</sup> To a great extent, the backtracking on the "Republic of Korea", clause was caused by internal shifting alignments in Japan's party politics.

In 1976, the cabinet of Prime Minister Miki established a limit of 1 per cent of Gross National Product (GNP) for defence spending. The Carter administration objected to this decision on the grounds that it was unreasonable to establish such a ceiling when it was uncertain whether the threat would increase.

A brief perusal of the earlier estimated expenditure revealed that since, 1960s Japan spent less than 1 per cent of its GNP, the U.S. contrast spent 7 to 10 per cent of its GNP on the defence. In 1970s, Japan still spent less than 1 per cent (0.9 per cent) of its Japan's GNP, which was 6.4 per cent of its national budget, and \$ 39 per capita. By contrast, the United States spent \$ 85 billion on military forces in 1974. This was 6.0 per cent of its GNP, 29.9 per cent of national budget, and \$ 395 per capita.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> See, for further contents of Joint Announcement, as reported in Japan Times, August 8, 1975.

<sup>35</sup> These figures are extracted from Military Balance 1975-76 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975) pp. 76-77, as quoted in David Johnson, Barry R. Schneider, eds, Current Issues in US Defence Policy, n. , p. 62.

As US-Japanese economic relations strained in 1970s. Americans became more wary of the evolving Japanese regional role in South East Asia. Japan had used its massive bilateral aid programme and the dominant position in the Asian Development Bank and other regional institutions to promote its own exports and increasingly cut Americans out of booming South East Asian Markets. The US suspected that Japan might be building an East Asian Economic Bloc which would not only threaten the US access to Asian markets, but would challenge the US global leadership position as Japan take more independent political position.<sup>36</sup>

The relatively small amount spent by Japan on defence was related to burgeoning economy and large trade imbalances with the United States. In 1977 Japan accumulated \$ 17 billion trade surplus of which more than half was with the United States. Between 1965 and 1975 US trade with the countries of East and Southeast Asia increased from \$ 4.2 billion to 22.7 billion, while Japan's trade increased from \$ 4.3 billion to 31.7 billion.<sup>37</sup> The US frustration with the overall trade imbalance and with bilateral sectoral trade issues with Japan, ranging from textiles to steel, colour television and automobiles greatly strained security

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<sup>36</sup> I.M. Destler, Coping with US-Japan Economic Conflicts, (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1982) pp. 71-90.

<sup>37</sup> Ohmae Ken, "The Fictitious Japan-US Imbalance", in Japan Echo (Tokyo), Vol. 13, no. 2, 1986 pp. 7-12.

relations between the two countries. There was a considerable sentiment in Washington that the time has come to stop pampering Japan, to be tough with it in economic dealings, and, to demand of it a role in the world commensurate with its wealth.

Japan was under pressure for two reasons. (a) to liberalise its trade, investments and economy, (b) to increase its defence efforts in response to massive build up of Soviet military power in Central and East Asia.<sup>38</sup> The Soviet military build up began in 1960s continued throughout the 1970s. This alarming possibility of the USSR reaching out with its nuclear power and destroy all the modernized sectors of would inevitably lead to havoc on Japan. The Western countries failed to respond adequately to the Soviet build up as they were beset with political and economic problems, including the energy crisis. It resulted in the perception of a strong military threat from the Soviet Union in the latter half of 1970s.<sup>39</sup>

The Western countries began to question Japan's attitude on defence issue. Western nations claimed that while they are spending heavily on defence despite their internal economic difficulties, Japan as a strong economic giant was enjoying, free of cost peace and security which was the fruit of their defence

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<sup>38</sup> See, James H. Buck, n.11, pp. 170-2.

<sup>39</sup> See, Defence of Japan, n.23, p.

efforts.

The defence policies that emerged in 1980s thus, focused on creating a sustained American military build up and developing an effective "coalition strategy", for it was perceived that American forces alone could not cope with what the Reagan administration saw as an increasing set of potential military conflict created by growing Soviet military capability and areas to overseas bases. The defence guidance provided by the office of the Secretary of Defence for the year 1984-88 clearly implied that the states of North East Asia had to be prepared to do more in their own defence, including the defence of Persian Gulf OIL.<sup>40</sup> Within this new strategy Japan and South Korea were to assume greater responsibility for their own defence. In particular Japan was to be strongly urged by the Reagan administration to become a more active military ally.

Reagan administration adopted the policy of discussing defence corporation with its allies on the basis of "roles and missions".<sup>41</sup> A rational division of labour between the US, the NATO countries and Japan was put forward on major thrust of defence policy. Reagan casted aside the "paternalistic style of alliance leadership" and took Japan as a full partner and gave new importance to it as an ally. The US expected Japan to undertake its own roles and missions to improve

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<sup>40</sup> See the report of US Defence Department, as reported in New York Times, 2 August, 1982.

<sup>41</sup> See, Paul H.B. Godwin, n.1, pp. 49-50.

its capabilities to defend its own territory, the seas and air-space around Japan and its sealanes to a distance 1,000 nautical miles. Their roles and missions were solely designed for Japan's self defence. Reagan called for a new partnership with Japan in which Japan would be senior partner on economic issues and the US on political and military issues. As secretary of Defence, Casper Weinberger outlined it was a "rational division of labour".<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> See, the statement of Secretary of Defence, Casper Weingberger, as reported in New York Times, 31 December, 1982, p. 12.



**CHAPTER - II**  
**DOMESTIC INFLUENCES ON COORDINATING THE U.S.**  
**DEFENCE STRATEGY TOWARDS JAPAN**

Security arrangements between two nations are indeed a multi-faceted relationship which are conditioned by several factors. The U.S. Japan security relationship is a good example to demonstrate the constraints and restraints faced by them in this regard. From the day of signing the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, successive U.S. administrations have tried to strike a balance between the security and economic implications of the relationship. But in the 1980s, increasing strains were witnessed in trying to strike this balance. On the one hand in the international context the Soviet Union continued to pose a direct threat to U.S. interests. On the other hand, the U.S. president had to address the issue of economic recession and continued domestic demand to take hardline approach in its policies towards Japan. As a result the U.S. began to demand an increase in the Japanese share in the bearing of defence burden.<sup>1</sup>

**U.S. DEFENCE POLICY PLANNING; COALITION STRATEGY OF 1980s**

Some of the major changes which affected US foreign policy; namely the debacle in the Vietnam War, led to a restriction of US foreign involvement

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<sup>1</sup> Marc Leepson, "Tensions in US-Japan Relations", Editorial Research Report (Washington, DC, 9 April, 1982), Vol. 1, no.13, pp. 263-7.

in Asia.<sup>2</sup> These US changes manifested through the declaration of 'Nixon Doctrine' and Carter's decision to withdraw US troops from Korea. However, it did not mean that the US had lost its interests in the Asian matters. For instance, at the end of 1975, President Gerald Ford announced a new "Pacific Doctrine".<sup>3</sup> It was a new security mechanism for the Asia-Pacific region. The subsequent Carter administration too assured the U.S. commitment to the security of Northeast Asia. The U.S. Secretary of Defence Brown, in his speech before the World Affairs Council in 1978 declared that the U.S. could not "afford to be weak in Asia" while remaining strong in Europe.<sup>4</sup> But the domestic economic constraints forced the US to cut drastically its foreign involvement. The 'Nixon Doctrine' or the Carter's historical decision clearly demonstrated the U.S. strategy to involve its Asian security partners in "defence burden sharing", and in particular Japan was the centre of this strategy.

However, the chronology of events that emerged in the late 1970s and the early 1980s forced the US to rethink over its "logical isolationist" posture in

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<sup>2</sup> Sheldon Simon, The Future of Asian-Pacific Security Collaboration (Massachusetts : Lexington Books, 1988, 1988) pp. 1-10.

<sup>3</sup> For more details about Pacific Doctrine, Takkuya Kubo, "Security in Northeast Asia", in Richard Solomon, ed., Asian Security in the 1980s : Problems and Politics for a time of Transition (Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, Publishers, 1980), p. 105.

<sup>4</sup> New York Times, 26 December, 1978, p. 3.

Asia.<sup>5</sup> President Carter had to revise the security strategy with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. He postponed Congressional debates on SALT-II treaty and called for increased appropriations for the defence.<sup>6</sup> In July 1980, President Carter signed "Presidential Directive 59 (PD. 59)" to cope with the Soviet threat. It was an attempt to convince the Soviets that they would be successfully opposed at any level of aggression.<sup>7</sup>

When Reagan became the President of America, he had to face the "bitter realities" of new Cold War politics, such as, increased Soviet military build up in Asia-Pacific, US hostage crisis in Iran, Vietnam's attack on Cambodia, Sino-Soviet reapproachment,<sup>8</sup> etc. Reagan warned in 1983 that, "If we cannot

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<sup>5</sup> See for more details about US isolationist posture after Vietnam War, Robert E. Osgood, The Weary and the Wary : US and Japanese Security Policies in Transition (Baltimore : The John Hopkins University Press, 1972), pp. 3-16.

<sup>6</sup> Congressional Quarterly, US Defence Policy : Weapons, Strategy and Commitments, (Washington, DC : USGPO, 1980), pp. 41-2.

<sup>7</sup> See for an extensive discussion on "PD. 59, strategy", Ronald Sullivan, "Dealing with the Soviets", in Schuyler Foerster and Edward W. Wright, eds., American Defence Policy, (Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), pp. 179-81.

<sup>8</sup> Paul H.B. Godwin, "The US and Asia : The success of continuity?" in William P. Snyder and James Brown eds., Defence Policy in the Reagan Administration (Washington, D.C. : National Defence University Press, 1988) pp. 45-52.

depend ourselves, we cannot expect to prevail. Our creditability would collapse, our alliance would crumble, and safety of our homeland could be put in jeopardy."<sup>9</sup> Reagan's Secretary of State, George Shultz also emphasised on greater defence efforts by the United States.

George Shultz maintained in one of his speeches, "... If we shrink from leadership we create a vacuum into which our adversaries can move. Our national security suffers, our global interests suffers, and yes, the worldwide struggle for democracy suffers."<sup>10</sup>

In the 1980s the principal national security objectives were as follows:

- (a) To maintain the security of U.S. and its allies, with cooperation of its allies deter any aggression that could threaten their security
- (b) To respond to the challenges of the global economy. To be aware of economic factors that may affect U.S. national security. Protection of supply lines, combat the threat of a global spiral of protectionism, problem of development in the developing countries were the major economic goals of economic security strategy.

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<sup>9</sup> Ronald Reagan, "Central America : Depending our vital interests". Department of State Bulletin, no. 2075 (1983), p.5.

<sup>10</sup> George Shultz, "America and the Struggle for Freedom "in US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, (Washington, DC : 22 February, 1985), p. 3.

- (c) To defend and advance the cause of democracy, freedom and human rights throughout the world.
- (d) To resolve peacefully disputes which affect U.S. interests in troubled regions of the world. conflicts, or attempts to subvert friendly governments, which are instigated on supported by the Soviet and their client states which represent a particularly serious threat to U.S. interests.
- (e) To build effective and friendly relationships with all nations with whom there was a basis of shared concern.<sup>11</sup>

As per these objectives, Reagan's Defence Secretary (as per these objectives, Reagan's Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger outlined the US national interests in the 1980s they were framed as follows: first, the survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, secondly, to protect the U.S. economic interests, and protect oil routes, thirdly, a stable and secure world free from Communist threats, fourthly, to ensure free market economies throughout the world, and finally, pursue a healthy and vigorous alliance relationship.<sup>12</sup>

Therefore the military issues became the major issue perceived by the

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<sup>11</sup> Ronald Reagan, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC : Pergamon Brassey's International Defence Publishers, 1988), pp. 9-12.

<sup>12</sup> Caster W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defence, Annual Report to the 100th Congress, Fiscal Year 1987 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Press, 1986) pp. 5-20

Reagan administration. He put greater emphasis on the defence modernisation and expansion of Pacific command forces, and increasing the military stockpiles necessary to sustain US forces in prolonged combat. The major objective was to increase US military capabilities while at the same time developing a more viable coalition strategy to offset Soviet military strength.

In 1980s the political environment was characterised by what was called as "alliance drift". As European nation became more powerful economically and independent politically, American and European interests were not always parallel. The alliance countries harboured doubts about the creditability of American security guarantees, because Moscow had enhanced its conventional and nuclear military power. The U.S. experience in Vietnam War and later in Lebanon, led many defence partners grew uneasy about the US capacity for good judgement in foreign affairs. In the 1980s four developments in the Soviet military threats were pronounced 1) the growth of Soviet military capabilities 2) the marked improvement in the quality of Soviet military weaponry 3) Moscow's propensity to project military power beyond its boundaries 4) increased ability to translate its military capabilities into political power.<sup>13</sup>

Reagan entered into the Presidential Office with his promise to develop Neutron Warheads for US theatre forces, including ballistic missiles, cruise

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<sup>13</sup> Christopher Coker, US Military Power in the 1980s, (London : The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1983), pp. 63-91.

missiles, artillery and bombs. As advocated by William Van Cleave (Reagan's Chief defence adviser in 1980's election campaign) and Richard Allen (Reagan's campaign adviser on National Security Matters) advocated defence modernisation was basic goal of Reagan's defence policy. For the Fiscal Years 1982-86, Reagan asked the congress to approve defence budget authority totalling \$ 1460 billion which represented an increase of 14.4% over the five year total requested by President Carter.

Three defence priorities were determined by Reagan administration: 1) Basic containment through NATO to confront any Soviet threat to Western Europe 2) The need to protect oil supplies and sea lanes in the Persian Gulf 3) to counter threats to US interests in Central and Latin America.

Thus the Reagan administration emphasised on the "coalition strategy".<sup>14</sup> Soviet threat was the concern not only for the United States but also for the NATO and Japan. Therefore Reagan emphasised on sharing the defence burden between the U.S., NATO and Japan. US domestic pressure was inclined towards the "rational division of labour"<sup>15</sup> between the United States and its allies.

#### **DOMESTIC INFLUENCES ON U.S. DEFENCE STRATEGY TOWARDS JAPAN :**

In the 1980s, increased Soviet military build up and subsequent events

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<sup>14</sup> See, an extensive discussion on Reagan's building of Coalition Strategy in Paul H.B. Godwin, n.8, pp. 56-60.

<sup>15</sup> See, Mark Leepson, n.1, 2. 264.

posed a great threat to the security of Japan. The Japanese economy was independent upon imported oil from the Persian Gulf and the defence of this route became critical after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The United States Seventh fleet which was responsible for the defence of Persian Gulf, had to be swung to the Indian Ocean. Therefore the area of security ;for Japan had then expanded from the narrow waters surrounding the archipelago to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. Thus it was argued that the problem of the protection of Persian Gulf was not pertained to the United States only, but it was common to all the free countries of Northeast and Southeast Asia.<sup>16</sup>

In such situation the central theme of debate between Department of Commerce, the ;Office of United States Trade Representative, National Security Council staff, and the Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries in the State and Defence Department was to produce change in the U.S. economic and defence policies towards Japan. Though there were differences regarding how and to what extent Japan should contribute, there was a fundamental consensus that Japan should increase its defence expenditure.

To encourage burden sharing, particularly with Japan, the US bifurcated its Asian responsibilities into two parts. In 1982, Assistant Secretary of Defence, Francis J. West, Jr., summarized this policy as follows:

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<sup>16</sup> Chae Jin Lee and Hideo Sato, US Policy Towards Japan and Korea : Changing Relationship (New York : Prager, 1982), pp. 110-13.



In the Northwest Pacific the United States would provide the nuclear umbrella, offensive projection forces as necessary, and assist the Republic of Korea in the defence of its territory. In the Southwest and Indian Ocean, the U.S. would provide the nuclear umbrella, projection forces as necessary, and sealane protection.<sup>17</sup>

Thus, by dividing its security role into two distinct regional responsibilities, the United States was encouraging Japan to increase its own capabilities for air and sea control in the North West Pacific. Some American strategists insisted that the Republic of Korea and Japan should jointly cooperate "to bottle" the Soviet fleet in the sea of Japan through coordinated mining of the straits within their territorial waters.<sup>18</sup> The Pentagon experts argued that Japan should bear the part of expanded defence responsibility because there was no other country except Japan in East Asia that had latent strength for shouldering the responsibility.

In the same year, US secretary of State, George Shultz, outlined five areas of cooperation between the United States and Japan. The first four steps dealt with the economic cooperation, they were; reaffirm commitments to free trade, create conditions for more stable international monetary system, assist the

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<sup>17</sup> Sheldon Simon, n.2, p.19.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 20.

development of less developed countries, and to search the opportunities for cooperation. The last area of cooperation on which Shultz greatly emphasised, was the security area that Japan should contribute in the U.S. efforts to defend the Asia Pacific.<sup>19</sup>

In an important policy statement, Reagan's Defence Secretary, Caspar Weinberger asserted that the defence of Japan was as vital as the defence of Europe. He further maintained that the combined defence efforts of Japan, South Korea and China was crucial to the maintenance of an Asian regional component to the global security balance.<sup>20</sup>

While taking before Japan's Press Club on 26 March, 1982, Weinberger remarked that the,

"Japanese forces today have not yet reached the point of being able to carry out their mission fully. Thus, they would have difficulty in defending Japan. The defence of Japanese air space and sea lanes out to 1,000 miles will require substantial improvements in military capabilities. To satisfy those critical defence missions would require increase in defence spending substantially greater than the current annual rate".<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Michael Natch, "Will the Pacific Alliance Endure?" in William A. Buckingham, Jr., ed., Defence Planning for the 1990s and the Changing International Environment (Washington, DC : National Defence University Press, 1984), p. 266.

<sup>20</sup> New York Times, 29 April, 1981, p. 7

<sup>21</sup> The Remark is quoted in, Atsushi Tokinoya, "The Japan-US Alliance: A Japanese Perspective", Adelphi Papers, (London: IISS, Autumn, 198 ), no.212, Vol.1, p.10.

In one analysis of the Department of Defence it was argued that

Despite sometimes impressive annual growth-rates in defense spending (almost 8% average real growth in the 1970s and at least 3% real growth in the 1980s), Japan started from a very low base and has never been willing to address defense expenditures from the point of view of actual requirements ... Japan's Ground Self Defence Force has obsolete equipment. Its Ground, Maritime and Air Forces all have only token levels of ammunition, making them unable to sustain themselves in combat and therefore unable to defend Japanese territory against any serious incursion. The Air and Maritime forces are too small to provide for defense against the large air threat which proximate Soviet Far East Forces pose and to protect the sea-lanes to 1,000 miles respectively.<sup>22</sup>

A number of demands were made by the US defence experts to abandon Japan's National Defence Programme Outline (NDPO) which was the major impediment in Japan's rearmament . They insisted that Japan should double its procurement plans for sea-lane and air defence. At the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Consultative Committee meeting in Hawaii, it was argued by the US policy planners that Japan should develop sufficient capability to cope with the Soviet fleet as well as its Backfires. As they maintained the Seventh fleet deployed one to two carrier task forces in the western Indian Ocean, Japan's utility as a barrier against Soviet naval egress from the sea of Okhotsk was crucial. The US strategists argued that if Japan could block the Soviet navy from the Tsugaru and Tsushima straits, the Soviet Pacific fleet would be denied access from its headquarters at Vladivostok.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> U.S. Department of Defence, 'Allied Contribution to the Common Defence', A Report to the United States Congress, 1st Session, 87th Congress, 1983, p.55.

<sup>23</sup> Sheldon Simon, n.2, p.49.

In order to defuse the "free-rider" argument by the US, Japan initiated the doctrine of "Comprehensive Security".<sup>24</sup> This doctrine emphasised Japan's non-military contribution to the security of the East Asia.

This approach was criticised in the US as a "smokescreen" to camouflage low level of Japan's defence expenditure. However, former CIA Director, William Colby, implicitly recognised the value of this approach for strengthening bilateral relations between the two countries. He argued that...

Let's say the (Japanese) military budget is 1% or below 1% of GNP. I think there will be continuing (U.S.) criticism.... I do not think you are going to eliminate that criticism by jumping from 1 to 2%. I do think you might eliminate that criticism if you increased it to 4 to 5%, putting most of it into economic progress, and thereby show that there is a comprehensive security approach...

.....If Japan were way ahead of us in terms of the amount of effort that she is making (in the area of economic assistance), then I think there would be general understanding that the Japanese have made a major effort in the area appropriate for Japan to contribute. This is the way the alliance should work : that we do not necessarily do the same things, but we each do the thing that is appropriate to a good relationship between us.<sup>25</sup>

Again, Former Secretary of United States Navy, J. William Middendorf II made three arguments with the context of U.S. Japan Security relations in the 1980s, (i) Both the US and Japan must recognise the interdependence of strategic

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<sup>24</sup> Yukio Sato, "The Evolution OR Japanese Security Policy", Adellphi Papers (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1982), No. 178, p.21-4.

<sup>25</sup> Chae Jin Lee and Hideo Sato, n.16, p.140.

interests with regional issues (ii) the security interests of the Japan could not artificially be confined to the Northeast Asia only. Peace and stability in Korea and the overall stability of the military balance in Asia was Japan's most important security consideration (iii) Increasing Soviet power in the Northeast region could be deterred by combined efforts only with greater investment in those military capability which could provide better deterrence, strong and credible Japanese posture was a most critical element in regional stability. He elaborated the nature of combined defence efforts between the US and Japan that included : close aligned, inter operable defence forces, bilateral military Planning, Japanese sharing of costs of maintaining U.S. Forces in Japan and combined military exercises, such as RIMPAC. He emphasised greatly on the cooperative efforts in air defence through Japanese technological cooperation.

Dr. Richard B. Foster, Director, Strategic Studies Centre, USA, urged that there was an absolute requirement that America's allies carry their share of the burden, rather than acting against their own interests by failing to supplies. He added that significant defence of the oil lifelines of its allies required a significant degree of U.S. mobilisation.

Though there was an increased pressure from the United States for the Japanese rearmament, in the US policy community there were some experts who approved Japan's low military posture. For instance, a study on Japanese security policy conducted by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency underscored

the stabilising role of the Japanese military efforts in post war Northeast Asia. The study findings were noteworthy. It reported as follows:

"Japan's role as an economically powerful, but lightly armed nation is an important influence (in the maintenance of stability in the region). Japan's deliberate policy of foregoing the development of offensive military capabilities has demonstrated to traditional adversaries that Japan's economic and technological strength need not foreshadow military ambitions, nor otherwise threaten the security of other nations. The acceptance of this perspective has encouraged the development of mutually advantageous economic and political relations between Japan and other near-by nations, heightening a common stake in the stability of the status quo. This particularly evident with respect to China's progressive opening to the West, including its recent dramatic steps to normalize relations with both Japan and the United States. Although Soviet-Japanese relations remain less friendly (a result mainly of continuing territorial dispute), although correct, the limited character of Japanese rearmament, coupled with Japan's firm alliance with the United States, has made possible the avoidance of significant political conflict and, to some extent, permitted at least the prospect of mutually beneficial economic ties.

While it is unclear to what extent Japan's salutary influence on regional stability would have been less had it pursued rapid rearmament at some point during the past 25 years, at a minimum, a significant Japanese military build up would have made Japan's reconciliation with former adversaries more difficult, delayed Japan's entry into the international community, potentially threatened Japan's economic growth, and hurt Japan's attempts to sustain a viable, if fragile domestic consensus on defense and foreign policy issues.<sup>26</sup>

The central focus of U.S. domestic debate was confined to five major areas, they were: firstly, permit US bases in Japan to provide critical air and naval support for American military forces in the event they are engaged in a renewal of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula. Secondly, utilise Japanese maritime and ground forces to deny the Soviet navy access to the Pacific Ocean by blocking the Korean, Tsugaru, and Soya Straits. Thirdly, to deploy Japanese forces to protect the sea

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid. pp.138-9

lines of communication near Japan and the Western Pacific, especially if the US Seventh Fleet were engaged in a conflict in the Persian Gulf or the Indian Ocean, and finally use the totality of Japanese military power to dissuade the Soviet Union from opening a Far Eastern Front in the event of a US-Soviet conflict in Europe or southwest Asia.<sup>27</sup>

The U.S. domestic debate on the defence burden sharing issue was particularly the outcome of a sentiment that Japan was getting "free ride" in defence matters. Japan's economy was burgeoning, and as the US was taking care of Japanese security, it was argued that Japan must contribute financially. The Reagan administration had announced the Strategic Defence Initiative(SDI). This, needed not only advanced, technological expertise but financial assistance. Therefore pressure was being put on Japan to contribute to the US "Research and Development" (R and D) efforts pertaining to security matters. Japanese technological development was the product of US nuclear umbrella because that helped Japan to divert its investment from security to research in technology. Pentagon was especially interested in the technology transfer issue.<sup>28</sup>

Another issue that highlighted in the domestic debate were the 'Article 9' of the Japanese 'peace constitution' and the "1 per cent GNP limit" on defence

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<sup>27</sup> See, Michel Natch, n.19, pp. 268-9.

<sup>28</sup> Walter Arnold, "Japan's Technology Transfer to Advanced Industrial Countries", in John R. McIntyre and Daniel S.P.,PP. eds; The Political Economy of International Technology Transfer (California : Hoover Institutioun Press, 1990) p. 168-70.

expenditure announced by Miki government in 1976. There were harsh reactions against the US unilateral commitment to the security of Japan as mentioned in the revised version of security treaty.

Bush became the president of America when the tensions of new cold war between the two superpowers was lessening. As soon as the threat from the major enemy became bleak, there was a change in US defence policy planning's priority. This was demonstrated in the U.S. changed defence policies towards Japan.<sup>29</sup>

A major debate that took place in America greatly influenced the administration. The debate was centred around the fact that when there was no threat to Asia Pacific from Soviet Union, should America keep to forces for the security of Pacific? The U.S. Congress and other defence policy experts were the major actors in the debate. As Defence Secretary Cheney argued, "If containing Soviet expansion was all cared about, we might be tempted to withdraw. But if United States folded its tents, a vacuum would quickly develop. These almost surely would be a series of destabilizing regional arms races."<sup>30</sup> Most of the strategists were in favour of continuing the U.S. Military presence in Far East. Because as he observed that the Soviet Union was not the only threat to the U.S. interests in the Pacific. The growing Chinese regional role, its increased navy power

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<sup>29</sup> Patrick G. Marshall, "Should the U.S. reduce the Pacific Force"? Editorial Research Report (Washington, D.C., 20 April 1990), p. 221.

<sup>30</sup> New York Times, 25 February 1990, p. 3.



alarmed the emerging challenge to the US leadership in this area. There was also a possibility of Japan's aggressive role. As mentioned by the editorial of a magazine, "only America can ensure that Japan is not tempted because of Western neglect to build an economic and perhaps military zone at its own in Asia".<sup>31</sup>

On the other hand, the Japanese- Soviet rapprochement in;1986, to some extent, assured Japan that Soviet could not threat the Japanese Security. This changed U.S.S.R's approach marked a great influence on Japanese domestic debate on its recommendation. Japan was then inclined more on economic matter than the security. It was a great setback to the American pressure for greater defence efforts by Japan. As one expert pointed out, "The current U.S. policies of pressuring Japan to spend more an defence could not last. It would eventually invite an unhealthy nationalistic backlash".

Though the Bush administration recognised the significance of U.S. military bases in Japan, it had to bow before the congressional pressure. In the 1989 Bush administration proposed cutbacks in U.S. forces in Japan. The US Defence Secretary *Richard Cheney* announced, in 1990 that the United States would be withdrawing 12,000 of the more than 90,000 US troops stationed in Japan and South Korea.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> The Economist (London), 24 February, 1990, p.11.

<sup>32</sup> Patrick, Marshall, n.29, p.223.

## IMPACT OF PUBLIC OPINION

It is observed that in 1970s American public opinion gained significant weight in the policy making process.<sup>33</sup> It was the result of Vietnam war. For the first time after the Second World War, public opinion turned against the theory that the executive branch should enjoy a relatively free hand to decide and pursue US foreign policy. Till the 1960s most of the Americans were reluctant ;to know foreign matters.

During the first two decades after the Mutual Security Treaty between the US and Japan, it was seen that majority Americans were not aware about nature of Mutual Security Treaty and even Japan's strategic relevance for the U.S.<sup>34</sup> But in the 1970s, as US-Japan economic relations strained, people began to talk about the Japanese challenge. As observed in various surveys during 1970s, the economic aspect of relations seemed more important for the Americans than the security aspects. A poll taken by the Asahi newspaper in 1971 found that, only 39 per cent of those Americans polled were aware of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. When they were informed about the treaty, 68 per cent agreed that it was the US obligation to help if Japan was attacked by another nation, equally, 74 per cent

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<sup>33</sup> John E. Rielly, American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1987), pp. 5 to 10.

<sup>34</sup> Priscilla Clapp, "US Domestic Politics and Relations with Japan" in Priscilla Clapp and Morton H. Halperin, eds., United States - Japanese Relations: The 1970s (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1974) pp. 37-8.

replied that it was also a responsibility of Japan to help the US in the crisis time.<sup>35</sup>

The Gallup polls conducted in March 1972 demonstrated that 34 per cent of Americans found that Japan was an economic threat and 59 per cent of Americans felt that Japanese economic strength was an asset to the US.<sup>36</sup> In the same year another Gallup cleared that although a majority of Americans felt that China and Japan were the stabilising force in Asia, Japan had the larger majority.

In the 1980s Japan became the frontline state in Reagan's new Cold War strategy. There was a shift of in U.S. emphasis from China to Japan. Japan's new strategic and economic relevance for the U.S. also influenced the Americans that reflected in various opinion polls conducted in the 1980s. In 1983, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, surveyed American opinion as to the country in which the United States had vital interests, Japan headed the list, cited by 82 per cent of the public and 97 per cent of the elite.<sup>37</sup> In the same year one more survey demonstrated that 71 per cent Americans had positive feelings toward Japan. The following table shows majority Americans from 1976 to 1983 continuously giving high

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid, p. 38.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, p. 39.

<sup>37</sup> U.S. - Japan Advisory Commission, "Challenges and Opportunities in United States - Japan Relations". ; A report submitted to the President of United States and Prime Minister of Japan, September 1984, p. 10.

status to Japan.

**TABLE - I**  
**American Positive/Negative Feelings Toward Japan and Other Countries**  
**(Percent positive/negative with those with no opinion excluded)**

| <b>American Positive/Negative Feelings Towards Japan and Other Countries (Percent Positive/Negative with those with no opinion excluded)</b> |       |       |       |       |       |
|--|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
|  | 1976  | 1979  | 1980  | 1982  | 1983  |
| <b>Canada</b>  | 91-2  | 92-3  | 95-2  | 94-2  | 91-3  |
| <b>Japan</b>   | 75-17 | 82-11 | 84-12 | 75-20 | 71-22 |
| <b>China</b>   | 20-73 | 65-25 | 70-26 | 66-29 | 59-34 |
| <b>South Korea</b>   | n.a.  | 58-27 | 59-36 | 55-40 | 46-45 |

Source: US: JAPAN ADVISORY COMMISSION REPORT

On the defence budget sharing issue between the United States and Japan, most of the Americans emphasised on greater defence contribution by Japan, 48 per cent of Americans accepted that the United States was spending more on defence and Japan was getting a "free ride".<sup>38</sup>

The opinion polls conducted in 1983 by Potomac Associates indicated that 56 per cent Americans wanted Japan to increase its defence expenditure.

The following table shows a considerable difference in the views of both the

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p.12.

Americans and Japanese on the issue of benefits of Mutual Security Treaty to each other.

**TABLE - II**

| <b>U.S. and Japanese Views on Whether the Mutual Security Treaty Benefits Japan or the United States More (1983 data)</b> |                                   |
|---|-----------------------------------|
| More beneficial to Japan  | Americans - 36%<br>Japanese - 13% |
| More beneficial to United States  | Americans - 6%<br>Japanese - 31%  |
| Benefits both about equally   | Americans - 39%<br>Japanese - 26% |
| Don't know  | Americans - 19%<br>Japanese - 30% |

Source - US. JAPAN ADVISORY COMMISSION REPORT

From the above various surveys and polls report, some conclusions can be drawn: a) most of the Americans had a fundamental consensus about Japan's strategic and economic relevance for the America b) At the same time they agreed that Japan's economic development was the product American security commitment c) Most of them were in favour of increased Japanese defence efforts to cope with the new challenges that emerged in the 1980s.

In effect then, three major schools of thought have pertained with regard to the "Coalitionist view" to "U.S. Japan Cooperation view" and "the threat of Japan view". The main stream of US strategic thinking toward Japan is divided into two

groups: "the overall cooperation" school and the "limited Cooperation view". Policy makers in the US have been influenced on both these aspects from time to time.

**CHAPTER - III**  
**CONGRESSIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE**  
**DEFENCE BURDEN SHARING**

It has been stated that the US Congress most of the years after the World War II deferred "to the notion that the legislative branch should confine its influence to the domestic sphere and leave foreign policy more or less to the initiative of the executive branch."<sup>1</sup> However, during the 1970s, and especially after 1975, changes took place in the composition and attitude of the Congress that began to manifest in its role in the foreign policy area.

In the post Vietnam era, the widespread distrust and conflict between Congress and President on major foreign policy issue like, US-Japan security relations, human rights, arms control, the sale of AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia, deploying the marines in Lebanon, resisting guerrilla warfare in El Salvador etc., intensified the belief that assertive involvement in policy development and oversight of its implementation by Congress were essential to protect the national interests.<sup>2</sup>

Three important legislative reforms that Congress undertook provided new

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<sup>1</sup> Nelson Polsby W., Congress and the Presidency (New Delhi: Prential Hall, 1989) p.8.

<sup>2</sup> James Lindsay, Congress and Nuclear Weapons (London: The John Hopkins Press, 1991), pp. 1-7.

boost to the Congressional powers in defence matters. (1) Congress gradually limited the discretion available to the executive in the spending of defence expenditure (2) All weapon systems, research and development and military construction, must be approved and authorized by the two Armed Service Committees (3) The 1974's Budget Act enhanced Congressional powers on defence budget.<sup>3</sup>

Although the Congressmen varied in their opinions regarding the US commitments for Northeast Asian Security and the nature of Mutual Security Treaty with Japan, there was a fundamental consensus on Japan's strategic importance for the United States in the protection of US interests in the Far East and to maintain Peace and Security in the region. The Congress recognised the geographical location of the Japan in the Pacific Rim and its being at close proximity to former Soviet Union, China, and North Korea.<sup>4</sup> Congressional recognition of Japan's strategic significance was further demonstrated by the incident, when Carter concluded a Peace Treaty with China and agreed to withdraw US military personnel from Taiwan in 1979, Congress was highly critical about the President Carter's decision. As summarised in a report prepared

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid., pp. 123-9.

<sup>4</sup> US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Japan's Contribution to Military Stability in Northeast Asia", Prepared for the Sub-Committee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, (Washington DC : USGPO, 1980), p. 61.



by Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, many senators and Congressmen, irrespective of party or ideological affiliations, expressed their disappointment about the following:

The hasty way with which the Administration had moved late in 1978, the lack of consultation with Congress despite the provision in the International Security Assistance Act of 1978 which said the President should consult before making policy changes which might affect the Mutual Defence Treaty, and the lack of adequate consultation between the United States and its Asian allies.<sup>5</sup>

From the start Congress was inclined to maintain Japan as a close strategic ally of the United States to protect US economic and security interests in the Asia Pacific. After the Second World War, Congress accepted the US paternal role in the Japanese economic, social and political development. Congress was liberal in granting huge funds under the Mutual Security Assistance Programme to Japan. When the Korean War broke out in June 1950, Congressional attitude towards Japan had undergone significant change from its original emphasis on demilitarisation and economic punishment to a policy of actively stimulating Japanese economic recovery and encouraging Japan to build at least limited armed forces for internal security and defence.

The Korean War became a catalyst since it increased Japan's strategic importance for Congress. The "Nunn

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<sup>5</sup> US Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee Hearings on Taiwan, 98th Congress, (Washington, DC : Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 48.

Report"<sup>6</sup> that was published in 1979 clearly demonstrated how Congress valued Japan as a strategic point to protect US interests in Asia-Pacific. In March 1979, Senator Sam Nunn led the Pacific Study Group from the Committee on Armed Services of the US Senate and published the so called "Nunn-Report" entitled "US-Japan Security Relationship : The Key to Fast Asian Security and Stability" This report maintained that the care should be taken not to let friction in the economic area between the two countries affect their security relationships. Again, in 1981 Senator Vance Hyndman published a report titled "US Japan Security Relations" which viewed Japan as a cornerstone in US Asia Pacific politics, which aimed to establish peace and stability in the region."<sup>7</sup>

**CONGRESSIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON US  
ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO  
JAPAN:**

An abrupt expansion in the economic and military aid defence spending after the Second World War was the major source of debate among the congressmen. A study was conducted by the Congressional Research Service in 1976 clearly indicated how over allocations in any military sector could undercut essential capabilities elsewhere. The study further proposed drastic cuts in the US military

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<sup>6</sup> Alexis Johnson, George Packard, The Common Security Interests of Japan, The United States and NATO (Cambridge : Ballinger Publishing Company, 1981), p. 136.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, p. 45.

aid to foreign countries.<sup>8</sup>

Economic and military assistance emerged as a major instrument of American Foreign Policy after World War II. The United States provided approximately seventy five billion dollars in military equipment and training to some ninety countries.<sup>9</sup> Japan is a close strategically of the US constituted the major share of U.S. aid programme. Japanese rehabilitation began under the huge flow of U.S. economic aid. Between September 1945 and December 1951, US economic aid to Japan amounted to \$ 2.1 billion. The Truman and Eisenhower administration developed an extensive and heterogeneous military and economic assistance programme to Japan in 1950s. The outbreak of the Korean War brought an enormous increase in then size and scope of the military aid programme to Japan.<sup>10</sup>

In the 1950s, especially after the US-Japan Mutual Security Agreement, Congress was inclined to vote larger appropriations for Japan. This Congressional

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<sup>8</sup> Congressional Research Service, United States/Soviet Union Military Balance, A study Prepare For Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Service (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 53.

<sup>9</sup> Chester I. Pach. Jr., "Military Assistant an American Foreign Policy". in Mochael Barnhart ed., Congress and United States Foreing Policy : Controlling the use of Force in the Nuclear Age. (New York : State University of New York Press, 1987), p. 137.

<sup>10</sup> Smartin Bropenbrenner, "The American Occupation of Japan : Economic Retrospect", in Grant V Goudman, ed., The American Occupation of Japan : A Retrospective View (Kensas : Centre for East Asian Studies, 1968), pp. 10-4.

inclination was caused by the growing threat and military efforts of the USSR in the Far East. A vocal group of Republican legislators led by Walter H. Judd of Minnesota in the House and William F. Knowland (California) in the Senate, were concerned about the implementation of containment policy in the Far East.<sup>11</sup> One more reason for the congressional preparedness was the successful and assiduous cultivation of the leaders at the Republican controlled 80th Congress by the Truman administration, especially Arthur M. Vandenberg, Chairman of the Foreign Relation Committee and John Foster Dulles who introduced a series of amendments in the US economic and military aid programme to Japan.<sup>12</sup>

The revision of the Mutual Security Treaty in the 1960 and the subsequent riots in the Japan introduced the fulfilled debate in the Congress. The U.S. security commitment in the Far East, and appropriations to Okinawa base were the major issues in the debate. However this Congressional assertiveness mounted no effective challenge to the U.S. Military Aid Programme to Japan and other major allies.

The Congressional attitude in granting aid to Japan began to change in the late 1960s with the emergence of Japan as an economic power. Japan was capable

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<sup>11</sup> See, Chester I. Pach, Jr., Military Assistance and American Foreign Policy, n.9, p. 139.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 141.

to purchase U.S. arms. In fact, Congress had already instructed the president to reduce and, as quickly as possible, terminate the grants of military equipment to nations capable of maintaining their own defence. The following year, Congress slashed John F. Kennedy's foreign aid request by one third, the largest cut in the programme's history. As the result of this Congressional stand, sales rose from less than twenty per cent of American arms transfers during the Truman and Eisenhower administration to almost sixty per cent during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.<sup>13</sup>

The Vietnam War brought the drastic change in the Congressional attitude on aid problem. As Senator Fullbright, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, insisted that, it was not possible to talk about foreign aid, or indeed any problem of this country's foreign relations without discussing the Vietnam War.

After the Vietnam War of U.S.-Japan economic relations began to strain, Congress tightened its control over security assistance to Japan. The concept of 'rational division of labour.'<sup>14</sup> began to gain currency among congressmen.

The congressional policies of economic protectionism and pacifism greatly affected on U.S. security assistance to Japan. The pacifist attitude of the Congressmen like Fullbright, Mansfield, and Frank Church, democrat of Utah had

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 144.

<sup>14</sup> Louis D. Hayes, "United States - Japan Strategic Relations : A Limited Partnership." *Strataegic Studies*, vol. 29, n.3., 1981, p. 39.

significant influence on the future US-Japan security assistance programme.

## **MILITARY STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS**

The United States deployed units of strategic air force and the Pacific Command in the Asia Pacific region that constitute unified commands consisting of army, navy, airforce and marine corps. At the same time the United States had a policy of protecting the national interests of allied countries by concluding security arrangements with Japan and countries in the region.<sup>15</sup>

The question of the legislative control over executive authority to commit US forces abroad became the major area of confrontation between the executive and legislative branch. In 1969, the senate stipulated that no funds in defence appropriations bill be used to finance the introduction of American ground troops in South East Asia. At the initiative of Senator Javits, Congress succeeded in drawing up a War Powers Bill to prohibit the President from ordering US troops into combat abroad for longer than 60 days without the approval of both the houses.<sup>16</sup> In its background paper on "Budgetary Implications of US withdrawal

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<sup>15</sup> US Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on United States Security Arrangement and Commitments Abroad, Hearing on "United States Security Arrangements and Commitments Abroad: Japan and Okinawa" 92nd Congress, (Washington, DC : USGPO, 1970), P. 1434.

<sup>16</sup> See, for more details about War Power Bill, William Gibbons, "The origins of the War Power Provision of the Constitution", in Michael Barnhart, ed., Congress and United States Foreign Policy: Controlling the use OF Force in the Nuclear Age (New York : State University of New York Press, 1987), pp. 9-38.

from the Korea" in 1973, the Congressional Budget Office highlighted the huge spending on US Far Eastern Bases. For instance, in 1980s more than two lakhs soldiers were stationed for the security of Far East South Korea 42,000, Japan 48,000, Philippines 15,000, Guam 10,000, Taiwan 4,000, and Thailand 20,000.<sup>17</sup>

In case of Japan, the initial Congressional inclination for the deployment of US forces in Japan changed with the subsequent deterioration of US economy and emergence of Japan as a trade challenger. There had been a number of debates in the late 1970s in the Congress regarding the aid appropriation to Japan. The major demands made by Congress in that respect were : to bring the scale of military forces in Japan down the lowest possible level, to encourage Japan to enhance its defence capabilities and capability to defend the 1,000 nautical miles sealanes to request Japan to concentrate its political effort so that Japan could keep close relations with allies in the West to encourage Japan to procure military equipment and materials from the United States to the maximum extent to pressurise Japan to pay additional expenditures for the US forces in Japan.

#### **TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND US AID**

The tremendously competitive high-technology struggle between the US and Japan further deteriorated the Congressional attitude towards Japan. The rise of Japan from an imitator, non-innovator country to a technological power, able to

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<sup>17</sup> See, Dannis F. Verhoff, Japan Under US Pressure, in David Johnson, Barry R. Schneider, eds., Current issues in U.S. Defence Policy (New York : Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 74.

innovate on its own was a reality that greatly disturbed Congress. By 1980s Congressional debate on technological transfers issue intensified. Demands were made to put pressure on Japan for unconditional technology transfer in the area as laser optic and microelectronic devices, ferrite paints, and fine ceramics, all of which the Japanese made for civilian purposes but which the U.S. viewed as vital to U.S. defence capabilities."<sup>18</sup> Under the Congressional pressure in 1982, the United States imposed a ban on the export of technology to the Soviet Union and appealed for allied support. By 1987 the Japanese decision to build their own jet fighter, the FSX greatly shocked and gave rise to fullfledged controversy in the Congress.<sup>19</sup> To them it signalled the coming of the new military-Industrial complex in Japan. However, Prime Minister Nakasone had to bent before the Congressional pressure and tentatively agreed to export advanced military technology to the United States. Japan too was the apprehensive that the congressional pressure for the transfers of high military data from Japan, was motivated by a desire to eliminate the possibility, that Japan might take the lead in arms transfer.

#### **CONGRESS ON JAPAN'S NUCLEAR POLICY DIMENSIONS:**

In Japan the debate over 'Nuclear Japan' intensified in the late 1970s. The

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<sup>18</sup> Walter Arnold, "Japan's Technology Transfer to Advanced Industrial Countries", in John R. McItyre and Daniel S. Pupp, eds., The Political Economy of International Technology Transfer (New York: Quorum Books, 1986) pp.164-80.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 82-4.



pressure from pragmatic nationalists to build nuclear weapons influenced the government to a great extent. Two major demands were made by the nationalists (i) to keep Japanese nuclear option open and not to join the NPT (ii) to refuse the international inspection of Japanese nuclear reactors.<sup>20</sup>

Congress was concerned over the failure of 1974's Diet session to ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Possession of nuclear weapons by the Japan was found as a tremendously destabilizing factor throughout the Asia. In a testimony before the Congress in 1974, Deputy Secretary of State, Robert S. Ingersoll, a former U.S. Ambassador to Japan clearly warned:

"If ever Japan were judged to be returning to an earlier militarism, tensions would rise throughout Asia, countries would arm and China in particular would react strongly. The situation would be thrown into even more serious relief were Japan to acquire a nuclear capability."<sup>21</sup>

Basically the disturbing factor for Congress was that Japanese nuclear debate demonstrated the Japanese willingness to go much further and faster down the road to an independent military efforts with or without U.S. approval.

In 1978 Congress passed Nuclear Non-proliferation Act that strengthened Congressional control over U.S. nuclear exports. Senator John Glenn, (D. Ohio)

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<sup>20</sup> See for a exhaustive discussion on NPT and Japan's Security, Takuya Kubo, "Meaning of US Nuclear Umbrella for Japan", in Franklin B. Weinstein, ed., US - Japan Relations and the Security of East Asia : The Next Decade (Colorado : Westview Press, 1978), pp. 110-3.

<sup>21</sup> Deputy Secretary Robert S. Ingersoll's testimony is cited in Weyes Beech, "Japan - the Ultimate Domino?" Saturday Review, 23 August, 1975, p.17.

who was the principal sponsor of this act called it, "the most comprehensive piece of nuclear legislation since the Atomic Energy Act of 1954." This act mandated a cut off of nuclear exports to any nation found, at any time after the act took effect, to have developed or tested atomic bombs, aided other countries in developing atomic weapons or violated international safeguards.<sup>22</sup> According to those guidelines, the United States signed an agreement with Japan allowing Japan to open its newly built Tokai Mura reprocessing plant north of Tokyo.<sup>23</sup> Thus Congress was clearly uneasy, disturbed and wary of the changing role of Japan vis-a-vis the US security arrangement.

#### **IMPACT OF STRAINED ECONOMIC AND DEFENCE RELATIONS:**

Congressional debates that continued to shape US defence and economic policy planning towards Japan after World War II. The debates mainly concentrated on burden sharing issue between US and Japan and trade imbalances. However, the defence burden sharing issue that intensified in 1980s was the direct outcome of strained economic relations between the two countries. Congressional attitude towards Japan was largely affected by the trade deficit of the 1970s.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Congressional Quarterly, US Defence Policy : Weapons, Strategy and Commitments (Washington, DC : USGPO, 1980),pp. 41-2.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., pp. 42-3.

<sup>24</sup> William J. Brands, Japan and the United States: Challenges and opportunities (New York: New York University Press, 1979) p. 20-2.

In the first two decades after the Mutual Security Treaty, there was no direct and rigorous pressure from the Congress on Japan since the economic relations between the two countries were harmonious. Although some reservations were expressed from few Congressmen regarding the U.S. commitment for Japanese security, they had a mild impact on executive initiative. The Cold War Politics marginalised the scope of Congressional debates on security matters. However in the late 1970s, the rise of Japan from an imitator, non innovator country to a economic power heightened the trade related questions. Since 1965 trade imbalance had been generally in Japan's favour, by 1972 it was \$ 4 billion. 2. Japanese export rose sharply in 1970s while imports stagnated, the bilateral gap rose to \$ 5.4 billion. In the late 1970s the issues most frequently aired on the floor of the House and the Senate were related to trade wars in textile, oil and Soyabean. The world economic crisis that grew out of 1973's war in the Middle East and the resulting disruption of oil flow was particularly severe for Japan, and since virtually all of Japan's oil was imported, its vulnerability was obvious to everyone. Since the large part of Japan's oil imports were handled by American corporations, there existed the possibility of serious strains in US-Japanese relations.<sup>25</sup>

Continuous congressional debates about the Japanese unfairness, closed markets, piracy of US technology in the 1970s finally resulted into the protectionist

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<sup>25</sup> Hisao Kanamori, "Future U.S.-Japanese Economic Relations", in Priscilla Clapp and Morton H. Halperin, ed., United States - Japanese Relations : The 1970s (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974) pp.58-77.

sentiments that demonstrated through Burke - Harte Bill that recommended severe restrictions on Japanese imports to the United States.<sup>26</sup> Senator John Heinz asked for an imposition of a 20 per cent tariff surcharge solely on Japanese goods. Senator Lawton Chiles said that unless Japan allowed a \$ 10 billion more U.S. goods to be sold in that country within two years, the president must retaliate with actions similar to those the US accused Japan of using.

In 1979 Congress published the "Jones Report", an investigative report by a task force for the surveillance of trade with Japan, headed by U.S. Congressman James Jones. The report mainly emphasised on the liberalisation of Japanese market and elimination of Japanese import barriers.<sup>27</sup>

On a following year a Congressional Committee made a comprehensive study which brought forward the reasons for the bilateral and global trade imbalances with Japan. The Committee in its report clearly maintained that, "The world trade was dominated by a few large multinational companies, which compete for the same markets. The Committee found out that in the U.S. some 250 firms accounted for over 75 per cent of US export, whereas in Japan some 200 firms

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<sup>26</sup> Prscilla Clapp, "US Domestic Politics and Relations with Japan", in Priscilla Clapp and Morton H. Halperin, n.25, p. 48-9.

<sup>27</sup> Alexis Johnson, George Packard, The Common Security Interests of Japan, The United States, and Nato (Cambridge : Ballinger Publishing Company, 1981) p. 13-8.

accounted for roughly 64% of exports."<sup>28</sup>

Another study conducted by US Congress, advised facing the Japanese economic challenge boldly. In its report the study mentioned:

We believe that Japan's rate of industrial progress and stated economic goals should be as shocking to Americans as was Sputnik. And like Sputnik, we should be shocked into responding to the challenge. Nothing could serve the world economy better than good, clear competition with Japan in high-technology innovation. It is time that we respond to the Japanese economic challenge. As with Sputnik, we did not block Soviet efforts - we bettered them. The same approach should guide us in dealing with the Japan; we don't need protectionism - we need to make our own economy better.<sup>29</sup>

A Senate Subcommittee on International Trade was appointed to suggest the remedies to reduce U.S.-Japan trade imbalances submitted its report to the 98th Congress. The Committee attributed the trade deficit vis-a-vis Japan to unfair trade practices in foreign countries and diminished US industrial competitiveness. Committee recommended a more active role by the government in opening foreign markets and enhancing the competitiveness of US firms.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Congressional Information Service, Special Study on economic change; "The International Economy: US role in world", Vol. 9; J 842-2, 17 December, 1980, pp. 60-6.

<sup>29</sup> US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Trade, United States Japan : Trade Reports, 100th Congress (Washington DC: USGPO, 1980), p. 39.

<sup>30</sup> Stephan Solarz, "A Search for balance", Foreign policy, vol. 49, No. 82, Winter 1982/83, p. 75.

In the Omnibus Trade Act of 1988, Congress had sought to ensure that the government would take action when US interests were harmed by unfair practices and would provide temporary relief for injured domestic industries. This act coupled with the previous 1984 Trade Act provided for a strong Congressional role in the future. Subsequently, Congressional perspective on the vital aspects of trade between the two began to influence on the defence burden sharing issue as well.

### **CONGRESS AND DEFENCE EXPENDITURE:DICHOTOMY BETWEEN SOCIAL AND DEFENCE SPENDING IN 1980s**

Congress played a major role in balancing American defence and social expenditure. Defence budget sanctioning was and is an important instrument to control the executive action. The Congressional reforms during the late 1970s and 1980s aimed primarily at limiting defence expenditure.<sup>31</sup>

After the Korean War, from fiscal 1951 through fiscal 1970, the defence budget never dropped below 40 per cent of total federal spending. Defence outlays as a percentage of GNP remained high throughout this period. But the 1970s produced a break in the defence spending. During the Vietnam War defence GNP level never exceeded 10 per cent.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Congressional Quarterly, "Budgeting for America" (Washington, D.C. : Congressional Quarterly Press, 1982), p. 48.

<sup>32</sup> Dennis S. Ippolito, "Defence Budgets and spending control : The Reagan Era and Beyond", in William P. Snyder and James Brown, eds., Defence Policy in the Reagan Administration (Washington, D.C. : National Defence University Press, 1988), p. 171-5.

When Reagan took over the office, he was forced to reconcile two competing objectives: One was restraining over all spending growth and the second was to significantly boost defence. By 1980s the defence GNP level had already risen by almost 25 per cent. However, the gap between revenue and spending had widened drastically in the 1980s. By the end of 1985, Federal debt was \$ 1.8 trillion. For the Fiscal Years 1983-86, the average annual deficits were in the \$ 200 billion range.<sup>33</sup>

Domestically Congress passed two important acts to reduce the US defence spending and to boost then so-called "social spending" Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 1981, in which Congress rejected most proposed domestic cuts, and the Gramm-Rudman Hollings Formula, which provided a new mechanism for domestic defence spending cut and required that Federal deficit to be eliminated by 1991.<sup>34</sup>

These congressional constraints forced Reagan to depend upon the financial help from U.S. Security partners and defence burden sharing between US, NATO, and Japan.

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<sup>33</sup> Congressional Budget Office, Budgeting For Defence Inflation (Washington, DC : Government Budget Office, 1986), pp. 18-20.

<sup>34</sup> For a detailed discussion on the Gramm Rudman Hollings Act, See, Dannis S. Ippolito, Defence Budget and Spending Control, n~~32~~ pp. 186-98.

## **RESPONSE ON DEFENCE BURDEN SHARING**

Congressional pressure on Japan for appropriate defence efforts was the outcome of disturbed economic relations. Emergence of Japan as the strong U.S. competitor shattered Congressional anticipation that Japan would protect U.S. economic interests in Asia Pacific.

Congress had always believed that Japan spent much less than it should have on defence, as they were convinced that Japan lacked military strength for its own defence, when the Japanese could easily afford to do more to meet Soviet Threat.<sup>35</sup> Mutual Security Treaty with Japan was fundamentally a parallel commitment by two or more governments to the defence of each other. As long as Japan was unwilling to contribute materially to collective security of its neighbours, there was no justification for offering a comprehensive guarantee for Japanese Security. There was a strong sentiment among the Congressmen that Japan was getting something of a free ride militarily and ought to move more rapidly to strengthen its forces and increase its contribution to American base costs. Under the US strategic umbrella, Japan expanded its sphere of economic influence on the Asian rim of the Pacific. The Japanese economic miracle was possible because the Japanese interests coincided with US global interests in containing the whole Euro-Asian socialist block. Congressmen John Conally, Melvin Laird, Walter H. Judd, William F.

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<sup>35</sup> See, Louis D. Hayes, *United States - Japan Strategic Relations*, n.14, pp. 31-3.



Knowland. Arthur M. Vandenberg, Fullbright, Mansfield, Frank Church were the prominent member who demanded a greater Japanese defence effort.<sup>36</sup> During the Korean War, Congress, for the first time demanded that Japan should build at least limited armed forces for internal security and territorial defence. Under the congressional pressure, the United States reduced the number of troops stationed in Japan; they dropped from almost 200,000 in later 1954 to about 90,000 in December 1956. Simultaneously Congress demanded to reduce arms assistance to Japan in 1970s and shift it into arms sale. Senator Stuart Symington, S.W. Fullbright, and Mike Mansfield complained that Japan's inadequate defence budget that was \$ 1.3 billion Vs. \$ 600 million for US military expenditures in Japan during 1971 amounted to a free ride at the expense of US taxpayers. They emphasised the vital, strategic interdependence between Japan and United States and demanded that the US should gradually reduce the number of troops and facilities in Japan, terminated its military assistance programme to Japan by 1975.<sup>37</sup>

Thus a number of demands were made to stop pampering Japan, to be tough with it in economic dealings, and demand of it a role in the world commensurate, Congressional pressure had already manifested in President Nixon foreign policy

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<sup>36</sup> Chester J. Pach, JR., *Military Assistance and American Foreign Policy*, n.9, pp. 137-47.

<sup>37</sup> Chae Jin Lee and Hideo Sato, *US Policy Towards Japan and Korea : A Changing Relationship* (New York : Praeger, 1982)p. 41.

message of May 3, 1973 in which he stated that, Japan should assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defence.<sup>38</sup> President Carter's decision to withdraw American troops from the South Korea was the result of growing congressional pressure. It was a signal for Japan to be self-reliant in security matters.<sup>39</sup> Congress was no longer ready to sacrifice American life for the security of its allies.

A new definition of Security Partnership was put forward by the Congress in which Japanese were urged to assume more of the burden of their own defence to cut US costs and permit removal of US military forces from Korean Peninsula. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations presented a report regarding the withdrawal of US troops from the Republic of Korea. The plan was prepared, by Senator Herbert H. Humphery and John Glenn, for the withdrawal of 32,000 US troops over a four to five years span so that the Northeast Asian Countries could continue to prepare for their own defence.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Katsumi Kobayashi, The Nixon Doctrine and US-Japanese Security Relations, California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy Discussion Paper no. . 65 (Santd Monica, California, 1975), p. 6.

<sup>39</sup> S.W. Sanders, "Japan: The U.S. pushes a reluctant dragon to dream", Business Week (New York), 23 March 1981, p. 64.

<sup>40</sup> US Congress Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Sub Committee, Hearing on US Troops Withdrawal from the Republic of Korea, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, (Washington DC, 9 January 1978), p. 1.

Congressional pressure continued to mount on Japan in the subsequent years. Two issues received great attention during the Congressional debates. First, the decision of the Miki government in 1976 to keep Japanese defence budget under 1 per cent of GNP and second, Increasing Soviet power in the Asia- Pacific. As a response, two demands were made by the Congress: One, that Japan should take initiative in maintaining an adequate military balance in the Western Pacific and two, Japan should be capable of responding to any sort of crisis. As Congressman Stephan Solarz summarised, "the real danger was not an isolated Soviet attempt to invade Japan, but the possibility of an outbreak of hostilities elsewhere that would require the diversion of some US Naval and airforce now in East Asia".

According to many these circumstances led to more Congressional pressure for Japan's arms build up in an "open, high-handed and concrete" manner as the US then wanted modernization of weapons, elaboration of contingency plans, and acceleration of rearmament programmes.<sup>41</sup>

In furtherance of this approach a Congressional Committee was appointed to investigate two issues: controversy related to the statement of Edwin Reischauer, Former US ambassador and secondly the Suzuki - Reagan Summit. The Committee found three ways of looking at Japan's defence expenditure - as percentage of GNP, percentage of government expenditure and on a per capita basis - all indicated

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<sup>41</sup> James Wallace, "The festering irritation with Japan", US News and World Report (Washington, D.C.) August 23, 1982 p. 39.

that Japan remained far behind in its defence contribution compared to the US, NATO and other countries with comparable GNP.

In 1981, 68 congressmen signed a letter urging Japan to abandon its "artificial 1 per cent of GNP ceiling on defence expenditures".<sup>42</sup>

A number of recommendations were made by the Congressman on what the role should Japan play in the US-Japan security arrangements. David Bowen, (Democrat) Representative maintained that only two nations that were capable to expand military capability and strength to the point of making a really substantive contribution towards restoring the balance of powers' that America once had in Asia-Pacific -China and Japan. On his view, Japan should increase its defence outlays. Senator from Utah Orrin Hatch, emphasised on the concept of a "Pacific Assembly" to counter the threat posed to Japan and the West from the rapidly expanding power of Soviet Union. He maintained that it was necessary for Japan, the United States, and the Western European nations to be in closer cooperation and to share in the responsibility of opposing Soviet threat. Congressmen Richard Ichord placed more emphasis on the intelligent assessment of the threat posed by Soviet Union. He felt the need for sacrifice from both the sides, United States and the Japan, and disagreed with the concept that such and such nation should spend 1 or 2 or 3 per cent of its GNP on defence.

Senator Jesse Helms (Rep.N.C.) proposed an amendment to renegotiate the U.S.

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<sup>42</sup> Edward A. Olsen, *US-Japan Strategic Reciprocity : A Neo-Internationalist View* (California : Hoover Institution Press, 1985), p. 29.

Japan security treaty to make it a reciprocal arrangement. That motion was quickly tabled. Stephen Neal (D.,N.C.) subsequently introduced a bill calling on Japan to share in the burden by paying a 2 per cent "security tax" to the United States. This suggestion created a full fledged controversy in the Japan. Neal was denounced as a person who "shows no understanding at all of the realities of the US-Japan security treaty."<sup>43</sup> Congressman clement Zablocki then introduced a bill including a specific request that Tokyo should keep the Reagan-Suzuki commitments by spending more than 1 per cent of Japan's GNP on defence. He also suggested that Japan should allow U.S. nuclear powered ships to stop at ports in Japan. Congressman Zablocki thus managed to revive the post- summit and Reischauer controversy and to inject the views of U.S. Congressmen into the Japanese internal decision making process.<sup>44</sup>

In the late 1980s the lessening of tensions with the Soviet Union led the Congress to suggest that the US should cut its troop strength in the Japan. Due to the increased Congressional pressure President Bush in the 1990 announced the cut backs in US Forces in Japan.<sup>45</sup>

Congressman Paul Findley suggested that the US should seek Japan's support

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<sup>43</sup> Ibid., pp.27-8.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>45</sup> Patrick Marshall, "Should the U.S. reduce the Pacific Foreces?" Editorial Reseach Report (Washington, D.C.) 20 April 1990, p.221.

for its naval presence in the Indian Ocean; such support could include the provision of civil aircraft and sea lift assets. Senator - Carl Levin argued that as a tangible sign of Japan's commitment to closer cooperation in sharing the burden of common defence, Japan should increase its defence expenditure to at least 1% of GNP. Senator- Karl Levin's proposal which was adopted and included demands that asked for the deletion of 1% GNP on the defence expenditure and that Japan should assume a significantly larger share of the total annual overall operating costs of the US forces in Japan and should contribute to meeting the US costs currently incurred in Japan for operations, maintenance, repair, and overhaul of US ships and aircraft operating in Japan's security interests in the Pacific Ocean region.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> James Lindsay, *Congress and Nuclear Weapons*, n.2, p. 63-7.

## CHAPTER - IV

### JAPANESE RESPONSE TO CHALLENGES OF "BURDEN SHARING"

The defence issue between Japan and the United States raises many questions that test the viability of decision-making processes in both the US and Japan. Several Ministries and agencies of the Japanese and US government have jurisdiction over these matter. As some have argued, it is "a challenge to the ability of both sides to gain a better understanding... especially at the time when the United States is increasing its pressure on Japan for a greater defence effort."<sup>1</sup>

Discussion of the issue of defence has provided opportunities for both sides to expound their views about the threat from the Soviet Union and what to do about it to explain the rationale for policy action taken and contemplated to examine essential elements in the security relations between the US and Japan and propose if necessary measures to broaden understanding and achieve agreement on fundamental issue of security. The two countries have had different perceptions of the threat to Japan. This chapter proposes to understand the reason for the divergences and cooperative efforts made by Japan to address Washington's concerns on the "Soviet Menance" through defence "burden sharing."

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<sup>1</sup> Harrison M. Holland, "Managing Diplomacy : The United States and Japan, (California: Hoover Press, 1994), p. 132.

The Japanese response to the U.S. pressure, demonstrated positive outlook. Japanese adherence to its sceptical defence attitude in 1960s and 1970s was challenged by a number of security problems raised in the late 1970s. Three factors mainly contributed to change Japanese attitude. First, the U.S. policies of late 1970s in the Far East that raised questions in the Japanese mind about the reability of the American defence commitment. Second, the growth of Soviet military and political role in Asia and its implication for Japanese national security and third, the tightening energy supply situation and the seeming inability of the United States to deal with it in a timely and effective fashion.<sup>2</sup>

However this change of Japanese mind was not a drastic step but the product of a evolutionary process that began with "defence debate" in the early 1970s. Prime Minister Ohira clearly said in 1980 that Japan would proceed steadily step by step. The main reason for this slow opening was the continuous Japanese domestic refusal for large defence efforts. All the three Prime Ministers in the early 1980s, Ohira Suzuki, and Nakasone had to make serious efforts to get domestic consensus for their defence policies. The emergence of conservative-reformist coalition in the 1970s further limited the possibility of drastic change.

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<sup>2</sup> Paul F. Langer, "Changing Japanese Security Perspectives", in Richard H. Sotomon, ed., *Asian Security in the 1980s : Problems and Policies for a time of Transition* (Cambridge: Oelgeschager, Gunn and Hain Publishers, 1980), p. 87.



The dichotomy between external security challenges and internal domestic impediments pushed Japan into the great security dilemma. In order to get a better understanding of the Japanese response, a brief review of Japanese defence policy and the changed Japanese response towards U.S. security arrangements is essential.

### **JAPANESE DEFENCE POLICY**

The Japanese defence policy is basically related to its own defence only. The catastrophic defeat of the Japan in the Second World War created psychological conditions favourable to an outright rejection of itself as a military force. Defeated Japan under an American occupation found no need for an indigenous military force to ensure its security from external threats. The adoption of the peace constitution, with its outright of "war potential", was one product of such thinking. That's why Japanese defence policy is based on "minimum necessary defence power." It was based on the idea that Japan should not become an unstable element in the East Asian region.

"Basic Policy for National Defence" adopted by National Defence Council in 1957 provided the fundamental base for Japan's defence policy.<sup>3</sup> The objective of the national defence was to prevent direct and indirect aggression, but once invaded, to repel such aggression, thereby preserving the independence

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<sup>3</sup> English version of Defence of Japan, Defence Agency of Japan, (Tokyo: Japan Times, Ltd., 1990), p.94

and peace of Japan. Therefore from the beginning the efforts were made to build up an effective defence capabilities necessary for self defence.

Since Fiscal year 1958, Japan had formulated a series of four defence build up programmes, each covering a period of 3 to 5 years, and had improved nation's defence capability in accordance with those programmes.

With the completion of the fourth defence programme in Fiscal year 1976, the National Defence Programme Outline was adopted by National Defence Council in 1976. That outline stipulated the level of defence capability that should be maintained by Japan in peacetime and provided the guidelines for improving Japan's defence capabilities. The Outline prescribed the preparation of posture of national defence and maintenance of the system of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defence Forces. Thus, Japanese defence policy stood on two pillars (a) Japan's appropriate scale of defence capability and (b) US-Japan security arrangement.<sup>4</sup>

#### **JAPANESE SELF-DEFENCE CAPABILITY**

The scope of Japanese defence policy restricted to self defence only. This self defence capability that Japan was permitted to possess within the constitutional limitations must be the necessary minimum for self-defence. This right is restricted to the three requisite conditions (1) there has been an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan (2) there is no appropriate means

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p.86.

to deal with this aggression other than to resort to the right of self defence. (3) The use of armed strength is confined to the "minimum necessary". There are two more characteristics of this self defence policy. One, the Japanese constitution does not permit it to dispatch armed forces to Foreign land, sea and airspace for the purpose of using force, secondly, the exercise of the right of collective self-defence exceeds the minimum limit and is constitutionally not permissible.

#### **SELF-DEFENCE FORCES:**

During the Korean War the United States suggested Japan to organise a force to maintain and preserve peace within Japan. This force of 75,000 men was euphemistically called the National Peace Reserve. The name was subsequently changed twice: to the National Safety Force in 1952, and to the Self Defence Force in 1954.<sup>5</sup> As the Self-Defence Forces grew, the military assistance programme to Japan expanded.

According to some, the Self-Defence Forces are at least extra constitutional if not totally unconstitutional. Their very existence is a violation of Japan's constitution. The SDF was built up steadily under four successive "Defence strength build-up programmes covering the period from 1957 to 1976.

The self Defence Forces (SDF) have two basic missions: to defend Japan against external attack (boi Shutsudo) and to help maintaining domestic public

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<sup>5</sup> Martin E. Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defence Policy: 1947-1968 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), pp. 74-75.

security (chin Shutsudo). The SDF is divided into three branches - army, navy, and air force.

The SDF is under strict civilian control. It has the foundation of its existence in the will of the Japanese people. Constitutionally, SDF is under the control of Diet the defence operations of the SDF require approval of the Diet. In 1986 the Security Council was created within the cabinet to discuss important defence matters that have close control over SDF.

Self Defence Law prohibited the Self Defence Forces responding to an external attack without Prime Minister's authorization. However, General Kurisu's in July 1973 call for "supralegal" actions by the Self-Defence Forces to respond promptly to an attack by the Self Defence Forces without waiting a permission from the bureaucracy That decision stirred "a hornet's nest of complaints" - about civil-military laxity - and Kurisu was "fired".<sup>6</sup>

Article 9 of the Japanese constitution is the major impediment that restricted the progress of SDF.<sup>7</sup> Although the Japanese Diet has interpreted this article to mean that military forces for defensive purposes are not prohibited, the constitutionality of this interpretation was being challenged by Japanese Socialist

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<sup>6</sup> As reported in New York Times, 26 July, 1978.

<sup>7</sup> For the exhaustive discussion of Article 9, see Seiichiro Orishi, "Japan's Self Defence requirements and capabilities", in U. Alexis Johnson, George Packard, eds., The Common Security interests of the Japan, United States and NATO, (Cambridge: Ballinger Company, 1981), pp. 144-7.

Party before the Supreme Court many times. According to a survey conducted in 1973 demonstrated that only 58 per cent of the Japanese people supported the SDF.

In the 1960s and 1970s Japan itself was not enthusiastic to expand SDF because it perceived no immediate, direct threat to the integrity and security of its islands. The only adversary capable of attacking Japan was the Soviet Union. However, the possibility of such an attack was low for several reasons. As argued by a expert, an attack on Japan would have been severely taxed the minimal Soviet logistical and amphibious capabilities in the Far East. The Sino-Soviet dispute required the Soviets to maintain large military forces on the Chinese border, and the Soviet Warsaw Pact commitments kept substantial military forces tied down in Europe.<sup>8</sup>

#### **JAPAN'S DEFENCE SPENDING**

In the 1954 when SDF was created, defence was given a higher priority than the social security, economic development. By the fiscal year 1960 defence had lost out to all three other major items in the budget, accounting for less than 10 per cent of the government's spending. The figure then continued to decline year after year, until it was down to 5.24 per cent in 1980.<sup>9</sup> The privilege of

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<sup>8</sup> Paul F. Linger, Chinese Japanese Security Perspectives, n.2, pp. 77-82.

<sup>9</sup> See, Johnson Alexis U., Packard George, The Common Security Interests of Japan, the United States and NATO, n.7, p.156. For early proposals to raise expenditures to 2 % of the GNP see James H. Buck, "Japan's Defence options for the 1970s", Asian Survey, Vol. 10, no.3, ( October, 1970), pp. 891-93.

U.S. security arrangement, domestic and political impediments, Japanese keenness to maintain its "pacifist label" combined to contribute to the scepticism in raising defence efforts.

It has been argued that the Japanese notion of defence planning had been determined more by the specific requirement of keeping their defence budget under 1 per cent of GNP than by when actually needs to be done, further they were not determined on the basis of threat perceptions but on the basis of expediency. Even though there was no legal or constitutional basis for it, the self imposed limit of one per cent had become an almost sacrosanct element in Japan's public policy, and thus created a psychological barrier of immense proportions.

**Korean Factor:**

Instability on the Korean Peninsula has always been perceived as a great threat by Japan. The Korean question involved the interests of all the three major powers, the United States, Soviet Union and China. As then Defence Secretary James R. Schlesinger maintained in 1975, U.S. pressure on increased Japanese defence efforts was for the defence of South Korea than to the defence of Japan itself.<sup>10</sup> Japanese Prime Minister in 1975 reaffirmed the same thing. Japanese economic interests and trade with both Korea's, domestic constraints due to Korean residents in Japan, stability on the Korean Peninsula was a great concern

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<sup>10</sup> As reported by The Washington Post, 30 August, 1975.

for Japan. Korea factor was one of the major causes that provided the feedback to the security debate in Japan. As it has been pointed out the reference to Korea in the 1969, Joint Communique between Sato and Nixon was inserted at the insistence of the U.S. as a quid pro quo for the U.S. agreements to place US bases on Okinawa "under prior consultation" Clause of the security treaty.<sup>11</sup>

### **Japanese Nuclear Dilemma**

In spite of clear Japanese policy on nuclear weapons - that refrains from possessing, producing or bringing nuclear weapons into Japan - the bid for a nuclear Japan created a huge controversy in 1970s. Some military analysts in Japan regard a nuclear armed Japan as inevitable. Japan's nuclear policy is based on these so called three non-nuclear principles. This policy was spelt out explicitly by Prime Minister Sato during Diet questioning in late 1967. It was incorporated into the text of his administrative policy speech early 1968 and was thereafter known officially as three non-nuclear principles.<sup>12</sup> Nuclear weapons were found essential to play the game of great power politics commensurate with its economic status. Japanese nuclear dilemma was the response of Japanese

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<sup>11</sup> See for an exhaustive discussion 'Korea Factor', Selig S. Harrison, "The United States Japan and the Future of Korea", in Franklin B. Weinstein, ed., US-Japan Relations and the Security of East Asia, (Colorado : Westview Press : 1978), pp. 189-223.

<sup>12</sup> Takyyo Khubo, "The Meaning of the US Nuclear Umbrella for Japan", in Franklin B. Weinstein, ed., US-Japan Relations and the Security of East Asia, n.11, p. 109.

efforts for self defence followed by American isolationism in early 1970s in Asia and the growing Soviet threat. However most of the Japanese opposed the 'nuclear Japan' with the argument that increased involvement of military even in Japanese self defence could change the role of military in Japanese society. The memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki episode were deeply ingrained in Japanese conscience. The five-week blockade of Japan's first nuclear-powered cargo ship, the Mutsu, by Japanese fishermen in 1974<sup>13</sup> and the furore provoked in 1974 by the testimony of retired Rear admiral Gene La Rocque that U.S.Navy ships did not generally off load their nuclear weapons before entering any foreign ports clearly demonstrated Japanese public attitude towards nuclear question.

The geographical and demographic composition of the Japanese islands makes Japan peculiarly vulnerable to nuclear attack. Japan is the chain of narrow islands with most of the population concentrated in a very small area. This narrow geographical extend of Japanese islands was the evident that an independent Japanese nuclear force would infact give far less security than the more broadly based American nuclear umbrella.

The NPT issue raised a fulfilled controversy in Japan eventhough in February 1975 the Japanese government agreed for the inspection of peaceful nuclear facilities, there was a continued opposition from one section of Liberal

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<sup>13</sup> For the more lengthy discussion of the Mutsu incident, see, Shuji Taoka, Japan's Defence and the American Presence, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1975) p.30.



Democratic Party. Their argument was mainly focused on four things: first it was to Japan's future advantage to maintain a free hand concerning the nuclear option. Secondly the third of the non-nuclear principles, forbidding the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan, needed to be reexamined. Thirdly the US-Japan Security structure needed to be strengthened and finally, although there was no reason for adamant opposition to ratification, there was no need to rush it.<sup>14</sup>

However, in 1976 the Miki government took clear decision that the government would not allow the introduction of nuclear weapons under any circumstances and ratify the treaty in May 1976.

#### **US-Japan Security Arrangements:**

The third major factor which influenced the Japanese response to the U.S. was the Mutual Security Treaty (MST) known as the second pillar of Japanese defence policy, U.S.-Japan security arrangement, provided a security umbrella which played an important role in the defence of Japan.

The Miki Ford Joint Announcement of 1975, Japan and the U.S. declared that "the U.S. nuclear deterrent was an important contributor to the security of Japan." It was further stated that "the U.S would continue to abide by its defence commitment to Japan... in the event of an armed attack against Japan."<sup>15</sup> The former Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka while describing the significance of

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<sup>14</sup> See, Tokyo Kubo, Meaning of U.S. Nuclear Umbrella for Japan, n.12, pp.110-1.

<sup>15</sup> Japan Times, 8 August 1975, p. 6.

U.S.-Japan security arrangement said that, "If there were no Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Japan would naturally expand its defence forces drastically beyond the present strength."<sup>16</sup> The main value of the MST to Japan has been to provide a symbol or shared values and interests on to deter nuclear attack or external aggression against Japan by conventional means. The Japanese economic development is mainly the product of US-Security umbrella because Japan could divert its defence expenditure to economic growth.

A subcommittee on Defence Cooperation established in 1976, agreed upon between the United States and Japan, prepared "Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defence Cooperation" which ensured the target of Japanese defence efforts.

Though the Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security (MST) remains the cornerstone of The U.S. relationship with Japan, their relations often suffered from differences in interpretation of the treaty. From the American perspective, the emphasis was largely centred on the military aspects of the treaty. For the Japanese, emphasis was placed on all aspects of U.S.-Japan relations, military, economic, political and cultural. Even though both U.S. and Japan had recognised the growing military threat of Soviet Union, there were widely differing views over what could be done with that armed might. While the U.S. viewed the Soviet activities in the Far East as part of a global challenge, Japan

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<sup>16</sup> James Buck, "Japan: The Problem of Shared Responsibility", in William Whitson, ed., Foreign Policy and U.S. National Security, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976) p.169.

was more inclined to view the matter from a narrower regional perspective, particularly as concerns the Kurile island and maritime vulnerability.

Three specific clauses of the MST represented sources of tension in American-Japanese relations.

1. Article VI, or the so-called "Far Eastern Clause" which grants the United States use of area in Japan for its land, air, and naval forces to insure the security of Japan.

2. The prior consultation arrangement under which the U.S. troop movements and use of equipment are subject to prior approval by Tokyo.

3. The third source of tension was the presence of American bases in Japan. For many Japanese, these bases represented a continuation of the occupation and an unnecessary guarantee of the questionable American nuclear umbrella. In the 1970s, 70 per cent of U.S. base area and 77 per cent of American military personnel in the home islands were located within 60 miles of Tokyo.<sup>17</sup>

Given the changing climate in Japan in the 1970s, with regard to their hitherto held "rigid antimilitarism", and the U.S. acceptance of a survival of Japan on strategic, political and economic front as a must, U.S. pressure on extra defence efforts by Japan became a forerunner of stresses in the security

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<sup>17</sup> Donis F. Verhoff, "Japan Under U.S. Pressure", in David Johnson, Barry R. Schneider, ed., Current Issues in U.S. Defence Policy, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976) pp. 71-2.

relationship. The United States pressure on Japan to modify its approach was estimated by some to have began as early as October 1953. A meeting between Assistant Secretary of State, Walter Robertson and Ikeda Hayto, a special envoy of Prime Minister Yoshida Shingeru, found the U.S. emphasizing the need for stronger Self Defence Force. Robertson-Ikeda meeting set an early precedent for a general pattern for defence burden sharing.<sup>18</sup> The creation of National Peace Reserve of 75,000 men in Japan during the Korea War was the outcome of the U.S. pressure.

However the Japanese from the beginning were reluctant for the US demand. Majority of Japanese public opinion was not in favour of increased defence role of Japan, citing the danger of the revival of Japanese militarism. The Japanese constitutional provisions too reflected the governmental efforts for a limited defence role.

#### **Debate over the restructuring of MST:**

The debate over the restructuring of MST has been started in Japan in the early 1970s. Three factors mainly contributed to this debate a) The Nixon shock of 1970 that called Japan to increase in military forces and "to pick up its share of the burden" in Asia. b) Post-Vietnam American foreign policy with its emphasis on logical isolationism, the relative decline in America's international influence

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<sup>18</sup> Edward A. Olsen, U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity: A Neo-Internationalist view, (California: Hoover Institution Press, 1985) p.77.

and creditability of American military guarantees and c) the spectacular economic development of Japan provided new impetus to its national self confidence and pride.

A debate to restructure the MST was stated publicly by prominent Japanese leaders. In the summer of 1969, then Director General of the Japan Defence Agency Yasuhiro Nakasone said it was "necessary to make rearrangements regarding the American military bases in the Pacific-belt Zone"<sup>19</sup> He further added that Japan should coordinate efforts with the United States concerning its nuclear deterrent and that all other facilities maintained in Japan should be under Japanese control. In 1970, Nakasone said that the MST should be replaced with a "new friendship treaty" by 1975 because Japan was "too big a power to rely blindly" on that agreement. Others suggested that a "no change" policy could be costly to the United States, particularly when a serious deterioration in economic relations were to be accompanied by a rise in nationalism in Japan. Thus, there were demands that the MST be altered to an emergency deployment formula.

Another specific recommendation was advanced by a Japanese strategist that MST should be "reinsured" by complementary agreements, such as a non-aggression pact with China and possibly one with Soviet Union. Similarly, one expert had suggested that a Soviet nuclear umbrella might more actively deter

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<sup>19</sup> See, James Buck, "Japan: the Problem of Shared Responsibility" n.16, p.168.

a Chinese nuclear threat than a U.S. guarantee, arguing that as the Chinese nuclear capacity grew, the Soviet Union would be the state most interested in deterring it.

The socialist elements in Japanese politics took a different stand by demanding unconditional abrogation of the MST. The Japan Socialist Party, the major opposition Party, argued that MST must be abrogated with the precondition that Japan adopted a stance of unarmed neutrality. As has already been noted, opposition to the existing Japanese dependence on the US from the government circles can be understood with a look at the 1976 White Paper and the notion of a "Standard Defence Force" which entails the maintenance of a limited force in peacetime and the qualitative improvement of hardware and the capabilities for combat and logistic support.

According to some analysts, Tokyo's unwillingness for increased spending on national defence and to use its armed forces was partly a matter of inertia resulting from the old dependency relationship with the United States and partly a matter of economic self interest. Another important element in this reluctance was the legacy of the Imperial Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Navy which weighs heavily on the Japanese consciousness and impairs the ability.<sup>20</sup>

Tokyo tried to persuade Washington that if Japan's defence expenditure

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<sup>20</sup> For the additional information on this topic, see, James H. Buck's, "Japan", in Claude E. Welch, ed., Civilian Control of the Military, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976), pp. 20-2.

were calculated according to the so-called NATO formula, which incorporated pension benefits to retired military personnel, the percentage of GNP Tokyo allocated to defence would rise from less than 1 per cent to 1.4 per cent.

As major changes took place in security environment in the 1970s followed by the U.S. debacle in South East Asia. The debate over constitutional restraint on defence expenditure in Japan began seriously. Demands were put forward by many defence analysts for more defence efforts since U.S. Security guarantee was bleak. Some Japanese defence analysts expressed strong doubts whether any American President would dare risk American lives in a crisis involving Japan.

In December 1975, U.S. President Ford announced a new Asian Policy, which he referred to as the "New Pacific Doctrine".<sup>21</sup> It was a compilation and restatement of past American policies in this region. The "Doctrine" emphasized on the defence efforts by the alliance partners, specially Japan. In the Miki-Ford meeting on August 1975 Ford reemphasised on his Doctrine.

Defence modernisation for self protection was determined as the policy goal in 1970s. The Forum on Defence Issues was created by Defence Agency Director General Michito Sataka to discuss defence issues. To materialise and clarify a defence target, the concept of "Standard Defence Force Programme

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<sup>21</sup> Takuyo Kubo, "Security in North East Asia", in Richard H. Solomon, ed., Asian Security in 1980 : Problems and Policies for a time of transition, (Cambridge : Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, Publishers, 1980), p. 105.

Outline adopted by National Defence Agency in 1976 provided the guidelines for improving Japanese defence capability.<sup>22</sup>

However, the constitutional restraint and economic situation put greater limitations on Japanese efforts of defence modernisation and improvement. Japan's Finance Ministry had set an overall spending limit to which Japanese Defence Agency must adhere. An inflation rate of 24 per cent in 1974 and increased in personnel costs had largely consumed the 12.4 per cent increase in the defence budget from FY 1973 to FY 1974. Japanese Defence Agency's Fourth Five-Year Defence Plan (1972-76) called for requisition of 68 Japanese built FS-T2 attack aircraft, but the number actually in the Air Self Defence Force's (ASDF) inventory at the end of the plan was 18. Another economic restraint on defence spending was Japan's need to remedy social and economic inadequacies much neglected in 1960s.<sup>23</sup> As Japan's expenditure for education, social security, medical care, pollution control increased, military spending was restrained.<sup>24</sup> From the beginning Japan strictly followed the constitutional obligation regarding Defence expenditure. In 1976 the Cabinet of Prime Minister

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<sup>22</sup> Sheldon Siman, *The Future of Asian-Pacific Security Collaboration*, (Massachusetts : Lexington Books, 1988), p. 47.

<sup>23</sup> See Danis F. Verhoff, *Japan under US Pressure*, n.17, p. 68.

<sup>24</sup> See for detail discussion on this aspect Henry Rosovsky, "Japan and the United States: Notes From the Devil's Advocate", in Priscilla clapp and Morton H Halperin, eds., United States Japanese Relations: The 1970s, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), p.79-93.



Miki established a limit of 1 per cent of Gross National Product (GNP) for Defence spending which was seriously objected to by Carter administration.

Within Japan the ongoing debate over an appropriate Japanese defence policy entered a new phase in the 1980s. The Soviet invasion and continued occupation of Afghanistan, the build-up of Soviet military forces in the Far East, and the USSR's apparent nuclear parity with the United States raised questions about the adequacy of the Japanese defence planning. The growth of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, deployment of Backfires and SS-20 in the Far East, and the reinforcement of Soviet forces deployed in the "northern territories" claimed by Japan, all combined to create a distinctly different security environment.<sup>25</sup>

Secondly, an increased Japanese sensitivity to American criticism that Japan was getting a "free ride" in defence, and that Japan could now easily afford to spend more in the defence of its own country also contributed to the debate. This issue, in conjunction with the rise of Soviet military power, even produced doubts in Japan about US capability and willingness to defend Japan in the future.<sup>26</sup>

In January 1980, the U.S. Secretary of Defence Herold Brown visited to

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<sup>25</sup> Paul H.B. Godwin, "The United States and Asia: The success of Continuity", in William P. Snyder and James Brown, eds., Defence Policy in the Reagan Administration, (Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, 1988) pp. 53-60.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, p.62.

Japan and frankly requested that Japan should step up its defence expenditure.<sup>27</sup> Prime Minister Ohira's reaction on Brown's request was positive. In one of his speeches he was able to send signals to Washington that Tokyo could take reasonably firm stand against Soviet invasion against Afghanistan. He simultaneously regretted the Japanese stand on Iran crisis.

By spring 1980, it was noted that Japanese responses indicated a veering towards the U.S. way of thinking for Japanese Defence Agency. JDA Director General Hosoda Kichizo told the Commander of U.S. Forces in Japan that the Japanese defence efforts should be strengthened. The newly appointed Japanese ambassador to the United States Okaward Yashilo maintained the same thing in 1980. Prime Minister Ohira while emphasising the need for strong Japanese defence, told party the Liberal Democratic Party Officials that "the United States was no longer a super-power but had become one of the powers, and the era had passed when one could depend on the United States for everything".<sup>28</sup>

During the Summer of 1980 a private advisory body, Comprehensive National Security Group, established by Ohira, released in English its Report on Comprehensive National Security on 2nd July which explained the political,

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<sup>27</sup> See Fuji Kamiya, "US-Japan Relations in Retrospect and Future challenges", in U. Alexis Johnson, George Packard, eds., The Common Security Problem of Japan, the United States and NATO, n.7, p. 141.

<sup>28</sup> See, the statement given in Ashahi Shimbun, April 28, 1980, p.1.

economic and military basis for Japan's stake in international security and argued that Japan could best bear its proper share of mutual burdens by becoming more active on all three fronts.<sup>29</sup>

In June 1980 Suzuki Zenko became the new Prime Minister of Japan. He voluntarily pledged to "do as much as possible with our ally, the United States, in the area of security".<sup>30</sup> However, a collision between a U.S. nuclear submarine and a Japanese freighter causing the death of two of the latter's crew in 1981 gave a big set back to U.S.- Japan mutual defence burden sharing dialogue. It stimulated anti military, anti-U.S, and antinuclear sentiment in Japan.<sup>31</sup> The Prime Minister Suzuki's diplomatic failure in Suzuki-Reagan talks of May 1981 in America, Suzuki's use of the word 'alliance', created full fledged controversy in Japan. Both Suzuki and his foreign minister, Ito were attacked for being "two faced ". and Ito was forced foreign Minister to resign in mid-May as an admission of his responsibility for the debacle.<sup>32</sup>

In 1982 the United States was trying to create a new basis for strategic

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<sup>29</sup> See, Edward A. Olsen, US-Japan Strategic Reciprocity, n.18, p. 20.

<sup>30</sup> Washington Post, 26 July, 1980, p.14.

<sup>31</sup> Washington Post, 21 April, 1981, p.8; Christian Science Monitor, 13 April, 1981, p.8; and 23 April, 1981, p.13.

<sup>32</sup> New York Times, 16 May, 1980, p. 8

cooperation in Asia that required greater Asian self-reliance, inter-dependence, and cooperation with the United States. At the same time the Suzuki government proposed creation of a "Pacific Economic Community" comprised of all the countries on the pacific rim.<sup>33</sup> The U.S. appreciated the idea because it could be the basis of a stronger security system in Asia.

In mid 1982, An Liberal Democratic Party subcommittee, tasked with evaluating Japan's defence needs recommended the 1 per cent barrier to be discarded. The Japan Defence Agency prepared its budget estimates for the 1983-87 that crossed the 1 per cent barrier, despite the other domestic pressures on the budget.

The best progress in burden sharing dialogue was in the area of joint operational exercises between Japan and the US. As a result of Japan's attitudinal shifts and increased US pressures on Japan to share the defence burden. Tokyo became a more active participant in the early 1980s. Starting with its participation in "RIMPAC 80" mid pacific naval war games played with the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand - Japan had moved towards American demands.<sup>34</sup> In 1981 Tokyo initiated bilateral naval exercises with non-US forces in Asian waters. Along with Japan's MSDF, the Ground Self Defence Forces also

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<sup>33</sup> See, Edward A. Olesen, US-Japan Strategic Reciprocity, n.18, p.31.

<sup>34</sup> Washington Post, 27 February, 1980, p. 16.

participated in joint operational exercise in 1983.

### **PARTY RESPONSE ON DEFENCE ISSUE**

The Japanese society's diversity, complexity and heterogenetic political culture, produces different under current in a response on way issue. As regards the defence issue, the heterogeneity of Japanese politics may be viewed as a vital link to the overall response. In particular debates among the political parties, debates among main streamers, nationalists and pacifists, provide clues to the eventual position adopted by the government.

It is stated that Japanese political culture is a collaborative product of the major political parties, especially the ruling Democratic party, the govt. bureaucracy and the business world. The Japanese Foreign policy has been understood to be the outcome of a close collaboration of these three groups.

One study of Japanese responses vis a vis the U.S. defence policy in 1980s, divided the Japanese into four groups (i) minimalists who react mainly to American pressure 2) gradualists who support a more assertive Japanese defence posture 3) neutralists, who want to sever the U.S. defence connection in favour of unarmed neutrality and 4) Gaullists, who want Japan to build a strong navy and adopt an independent military posture. The study pointed out that the majority of Japanese today could be classified as minimalists.<sup>35</sup>

In case of political parties, Japan was termed as a "one-and-a-half" party

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<sup>35</sup> Marc Leepson, "Tensions in US-Japan Relation," Editorial Research Report (Washington, D.C: 9 April, 1982), Vol.1, No.13, p.226.

system, "The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) WAS IN power since its creation in 1955. From the beginning Liberal Democratic Party continuously supported the Mutual Security Treaty. The other minor parties that collectively grouped under "opposition front" are the Japanese Socialist Party, the Communist Party, Democratic Socialist Party and Komito.

From the beginning of Mutual Security Treaty most parties in opposition to Liberal Democratic Party consistently opposed it. The second largest party in the Diet, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) opposed both Mutual Security Treaty and Self Defence Forces and demanded unarmed neutrality. In 1975 JSP created the military problem Research Society, consisting of JSP defence experts, progressive University professors, and military critics. They pushed hard to gain a national consensus for its advocacy of unarmed neutrality and peaceful abrogation of the Mutual Security Treaty.<sup>36</sup>

The Japan Communist Party objective was also non alignment and neutrality the third important party Komeito more or less took the same stand and demanded for staged liquidation of mutual security treaty.<sup>37</sup>

It is pointed out that, the Democratic Socialist Party discussed Japan's

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<sup>36</sup> Susan J. Pharr, "Japan in 1985: The Nakasone Era Peaks" Asian Survey, (Berkeley), Vol.XXVI, No.1, January 1986, p.55-8.

<sup>37</sup> Francis Fukuyama, Kangdan Oh, The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship After the Cold War, (Santamanika: National Defence Research Institute, 1993) pp. 23-4.

defence needs in clearer terms than the Liberal Democratic Party. They supported the defence arrangements which consists of Japan's own defence efforts and the Japan-US security system complementing them. With response to growing threat from Soviet Union, it demanded that Japan should take steady strengthening of its own defence capabilities. However, they rejected any path which would lead to Japan becoming a military giant, but opposed unarmed neutrality.<sup>38</sup>

After the Vietnam War the security policies of the opposition parties have underwent a certain degree of transformation. observed that the opposition parties were moving towards realism in Japanese defence policies. Two major factors have had an important influence on this transformation. The first was external, the shift of China's position vis-a-vis the Japan-US Security Treaty. Previously China had denounced the Security Treaty, In 1972 When Japanese and Chinese relations were normalised. China change its attitude towards US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and accepted its relevance in the context of countering the Soviet Military threat. The second factor was domestic one. Since the middle of 1970s, the political situation had brought the opposition close to the Liberal Democratic Party in terms of number of seats in the Diet in the form of a coalition government. The result was that the opposition was forced to adjust its security policies in the direction of realism suited to the policies of Liberal Democratic

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p.26-7.

Party.<sup>39</sup>

The Komeito Party and the Democratic Socialist Party made an agreement on a coalition concept in December 1979, the former agreed to follow the latter's policy on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and the Self Defence Forces. This "Socialist Komeito axis" of 1979 cleared the fact that how opposition parties became more receptive to the idea of strengthening the US-Japan Security system.<sup>40</sup>

In the 1980s two important elections of Diet, 1981 and 1986 shattered the hopes of opposition parties to access the power. The success of Liberal Democratic Party in the elections for the Diet and the extraordinary friendship of Prime Minister Nakasone with Reagan paved the way for successful talks on defence burden sharing.

### **IMPACT OF PUBLIC OPINION**

The Japanese public opinion remained significant obstruction to any rapid increase in Japanese military capability. They supported the present level of defence efforts and a gradual increase in defence capabilities. Various opinion polls conducted in 1980s clearly demonstrated significant obstructions from Japanese public to any rapid increase in Japanese military capability. They

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<sup>39</sup> For further details of changed attitude of Japanese Political Parties 1970s, See, Masataka Kosaka, "Political Immobility and Uncertain Future", in Priscilla Clapp and Morton H. Halperin, eds., United States - Japanese Relations : The 1970s, n.24, pp. 19-34.

<sup>40</sup> See Edward A. Olsen, U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity, n.18, p.



mainly supported present level of defence efforts and gradual increase in defence capabilities. According to mid-1982 data compiled by Potomac Associates, 45 per cent of Japanese believed that defence expenditures should be kept at present level or reduced, 39 per cent disagreed that Japan needed to increase the size of its defence forces, while only 17 per cent agreed, and 48 per cent of Japanese rejected the view that Japan should pay a larger share of the costs of stationing U.S. forces in Japan, while only 7 per cent agreed.<sup>41</sup> Some Japanese added the view that it is time to demonstrate political independence from the United States and cease accepting status of an American military protectorate. Those holding this view demanded that Japanese government define its own security and defence policies rather than simply acquiesce to American demand. Even in case of Self Defence Forces earlier many people saw its mission as an emergency or disaster relief agent. There was little public opinion for an enlarged military role for the SDF and very little support that Japan to require nuclear weapons. But after the 1979 they found the necessity of strong Self Defence Forces due to increased Soviet military build up. A survey conducted by Prime Minister's office shown that 86 per cent of Japanese were infavour of strong Self Defence Force.<sup>42</sup> Public opinion was quite comfortable with the anti-war sentiment expressed by

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<sup>41</sup> U.S. Japan Advisory Commission, "Challenges and Opportunities in United States - Japan Relations", report submitted to the President of United States and Prime Minister of Japan, September 1984, p.10.

<sup>42</sup> See Paul Langer, n.2, p.76.

Article '9' so there was little public enthusiasm for revising the constitution.

Finally, one thing that observed was eventhough most of the Japanese had some reservations towards the U.S. defence policy planning and especially its pressure for larger defence efforts by Japan, they were cognisant about the increased military threat of the USSR to the Persian Gulf which was Japan's major oil route. Therefore they were in opinion of continuation of "American Security Umbrella" for Japanese security.

## CONCLUSION

The 1980s marked a period of grave predicament for U.S. foreign policy. This was particularly evident in the case of its security relationship with Japan. The U.S. had to reconcile to the emerging strategic and economic realities during this period and as far as its relationship with Japan was concerned both these aspects turned out to be very significant. On the one hand the U.S. was committed to the security of Japan and on the other hand it had to pay the economic consequences of such commitment. Similarly Japan had begun to reconsider the implications of its security relationship with the United States. As a result an intense debate raged within the United States and Japan. The U.S. felt that its commitment to Japanese Security was taking a toll on its economy which was passing through a period of recession. Moreover Japan had begun to surpass to take lead in the economic and technological fronts thereby threatening American global leadership on these aspects. Hence the United States wanted to downsize its economic liability vis-à-vis security and wanted the Japanese to share in the defence burden. The United States however maintained that its security commitment to Japan was important to Japan as much as it was to itself. So U.S. policies passed through a challenge.

In Japan, however, the debate largely centred around national prestige and defence self-reliance. In the first instance the question was how much Japan

should spend on defence. Next the question was should Japan continue to its security relations with United States or not.

In the 1950s Japanese security was totally dependent on the U.S. commitment. The realities of the cold war politics forced US to engage the Japan as a front-line state in its "containment strategy" due to its strategic significance. It was the commitment in which the Japanese could have confidence. In the early years after the end of the occupation the security relationship with the United States and particularly the American military presence in Japan were accepted by the Japanese. The United States too should the view that economically developed Japan would be a milestone in protecting the US interests in the Asia Pacific.

In the 1960s, the US supremacy in nuclear and particularly in the delivery system was greatly challenged by the Soviet Union. However the Americans developed a second-strike capability, invulnerable and technologically superior. Therefore, the US nuclear umbrella over Japan remained credible. In this decade, though, while the US started reducing its military presence in Japan, its commitment to Japanese security was firm partly due to the American urgent need for bases in Japan as staging areas and logistic support centre for their operation in Vietnam.

During these two decades, the United States did not overly agitate about the lack of Japanese cooperation. This was due to a number of reasons particularly related to minimal expectations about Japan's own ability to contribute

to the Strategic plans of the U.S. The United States overlooked economic conflicts in trade with Japan for the sake of its broader strategic interests in the Asia and the Pacific. Therefore, during this period the economic relations between the two countries were harmonious.

However, the situation changed drastically in the 1970s. After the US debacle in the Southeast Asia, the U.S. strategic posture evidently shifted from a universal to a selective commitment. The sentiment of the "no more Asian Ground Wars" was strong among the Americans. Therefore doubts were raised about the value of the U.S. commitment as a deterrent to both nuclear and conventional aggression against Japan. The Nixon Doctrine persuaded many Japanese that the United States would not come to Japan's defence in the event of conventional attack. This changed situation forced the Japanese to ponder over seriously on the two issues, the future of Mutual Security Treaty and the rearmament of Japan.

The debate on the Japanese "free ride" in defence matter further intensified with strained economic relations between the US and Japan. Japanese emergence as the third largest economy in the world with the accumulation of massive trade surplus with the United States, gave enough opportunity to the US to demand for rational division of labour with Japan. However the US still didn't want to be harsh in its attitude because after its debacle in Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia had become the focal point in its containment strategy.

The U.S.-Japan security relationship passed through a very significant phase in the 1980s. It was the beginning of new Cold War Reagan had assumed the U.S. Presidency under extraordinary circumstances. As a result, this had an overbearing effect on the U.S. foreign policy. Japan too recorded significant growth in the economic and technological spheres during this period. Moreover, the election of Nakasone, an experienced defence strategist and former defence minister, as the Prime Minister of Japan gave a pragmatic turn to the Japanese Foreign policy. These developments in the US and Japan began to have an impact on their bilateral relations. This was much ostensible in the case of their security relations.

President Reagan had to address challenges on two fronts, domestic and international. These two challenges turned out to be major factors in determining the nature of US-Japan security relations, particularly the defence burden sharing issue emerged as a significant factor. The U.S. economy was passing through a period of severe recession. So it was forced to cut down its international commitments, especially those relating to security matters. The US Congress, as discussed in the Chapter III, was particularly reluctant to grant finances for increased defence expenditure demands made by the executive branch.

The new Cold War realities, that demonstrated by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, hostage crisis, growth of Soviet military and political role in Asia, forced Reagan to restructure US defence planning to cope with these emerged

threats. Since there was no enthusiastic financial support domestically, the only alternative that remained was larger defence efforts by the US security partners. Therefore Reagan emphasised on the "coalition strategy" and "rational division of Labour" between the US, NATO and Japan. The NATO had already taken the decision to raise their defence expenditure. But the economically sound Japan was still plunged into its so-called "one per cent" of GNP limit on defence expenditure. The Reagan administration called upon Japan to share the defence expenditure.

In this context two apparent logic stand out clearly. In the first instance, the U.S. was facing energy crisis and by strengthening its defence in the oil rich Gulf region, it would be able to safeguard a vital input to its economy namely petroleum. In the second instance, it wanted to diversify its role in East Asia in the aftermath of its debacle in Vietnam.

One significant aspect had been the announcement of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) by Reagan. For this he needed not only advanced technological expertise but financial input as well. Thus, it expected a quid pro quo from Japan on this aspect. The US position was that Japan's economy was burgeoning and as US was taking care of Japanese security need, it must contribute to the R & D efforts pertaining to security matters.

Another dimension to the US rethinking of its security relationship with Japan, pertained to the economic aspect. The US felt that under its security

umbrella Japan was able to invest highly in technology research and development. As a result, this resulted in the economic boom in Japan and its products were competing with the US products worldwide, causing immense loss to the US.

From the Japanese perspective, its rethinking of the security relations with the US was conditioned by two major factors. First, it felt that its economy had the capacity to meet the cost of its defence needs. But the problem pertained to the constitutional provision which did not allow more than 1% GNP expenditure on defence and "Article 9" of its peace constitution prohibited raising of full fledged army. Secondly, Japan was facing constant pressure from the US regarding the amendment of "Article 9". In Japan there were pragmatic nationalists such as the Prime Minister Nakasone himself, who wanted to continue the security relationship with the United States.

The Japanese debate over the defence gave way to emerge a nationalist sentiment which wanted Japan to follow independent efforts in defence matters. However, the Japanese public was broadly sceptical about the utility of military power as a means to assuring national security. Most Japanese believed that military power in itself did not symbolise either national prestige or glory.

Finally though on the economic front (bilateral economic relations with US) Japan was adamant on its stand, on the security issue they had to bow before the US pressure. Its flexibility on the defence matter, especially in the defence burden sharing with US was demonstrated by policy measures taken by Ohira,



Suzuki and Nakasone Government. Even the opposition parties in Japan including the socialist and communist elements abided in this consensus. Though Japan had many reservations towards US defence policy planning in the Far East, the growing Soviet threat especially in Persian Gulf forced them to negotiate with US on defence burden sharing.

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