

**INTERACTION OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN IN THE  
UNITED NATIONS : A STUDY OF THE SUEZ AND  
THE HUNGARY CRISES, 1956**

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Dedicated

To the loving memory of my Nani who  
died on 26 January 1969

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Prabhat Ranjan Deo

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

This study seeks to analyse the interaction of India and Pakistan at the United Nations on the question of Hungary and the Suez crisis. Attempt here is to examine the extent to which India and Pakistan make use of the fora and political instrumentality of the United Nations, as part of their foreign policy strategy and the extent to which their bilateral relations influence their perceptions and attitude of international conflict situations.

In the context of what has been noted above it is pertinent here to recall that over the years the United Nations has become an important instrument in the foreign policy strategies of the Governments. The main focus of activities are of course the two political organs, the Security Council and the General Assembly,<sup>1</sup> although other UN bodies and subsidiaries do have their own importance. Under the UN Charter, the Security Council was given the primary responsibility of 'peace and security problems' of the world, whereas the General Assembly was given an overall jurisdiction in other fields (Articles 10-17), though the problems of peace and security were not the concern of the

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<sup>1</sup>See, Herbert Nicholas, The United Nations as a Political Institution (London, 1960).

Security Council alone. Article 12 of the Charter provided that the General Assembly could not recommend on issues which were already on the agenda of the Security Council, but in practice this restriction has been continuously blurred by the Assembly.<sup>2</sup>

Therefore, the General Assembly has become one of the most important organs of the United Nations. Dag Hammarskjöld regarded it "the nearest approximation we have at present to a world parliament". He said: "Basically it is an organ for multilateral negotiations, with a few of the elements of Parliamentary life reflected in it; for example in the equal right to vote, and the equal weight of votes, irrespective of size and position of the country."<sup>3</sup> But, a more realistic view would be that the "Politics of the General Assembly reflect an interplay between forces of pluralism, legal equality, and diversity on the one hand, and those of political and military inequality and bipolarity on the other."<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>See, Kurt Jacobson, The General Assembly of the United Nations: A Quantitative Analysis of Conflict, Inequality and Relevance (New York, 1978). Also, Ruth B. Russel, The General Assembly: Patterns, Problems, Prospects (New York, 1970).

<sup>3</sup>Dag Hammarskjöld, Address to the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, delivered on 3 February 1956, cited from The United Nations: An Appraisal (New Delhi, 1956), p. 7.

<sup>4</sup>Robert Owen Keohane, "Political Influence in the General Assembly", in Robert N. Gregg and Michael Barkun, eds., The United Nations System and its Functions: Selected Readings (Princeton, 1971), p. 17.



The informal and intensive interaction that takes place at the United Nations, has made it "the greatest single diplomatic crossroads in the world".<sup>5</sup> The diversity of the issues the United Nations deals with, the procedural meetings, and the continuing presence of delegates and diplomats of member states gave rise to some form of regular caucusing, based on regional functional and ideological lines. The caucusing groups and individual states do not just debate and discuss for public consumption but indulge into hard bargaining, arms-twisting and persuasion in an all-out effort to win support for one's policies and interests. The lounges, bars, conference rooms, corridors etc. at the UN building complex provide the venue and the opportunity needed for this kind of diplomacy, generally referred in UN jargon as "Corridor Diplomacy". Thus, the Member states make use of every possible avenue and opportunity to get the approval by as large and impressive a body of other states as may be possible for multilateral endorsement of their positions, what Inis L. Claude refers to as "Collective Legitimization".<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., cited in Chadwich F. Alger, United States Representation in the United Nations (New York, 1961), p. 5.

<sup>6</sup>Inis L. Claude, Jr., The Changing United Nations (New York, 1968), pp. 73-103.

The role of collective legitimization is not, in principle, reserved exclusively to the United Nations, however, the prominence of the United Nations in the pattern of international organization and its status as an institution approximating universality give it obvious advantages of playing the role of a purveyor of international approval or disapproval of claims, policies and actions of Member states. The United Nations is regarded as an agency capable of bestowing politically weighty approval or disapproval upon their claims, policies and positions. Governments exert themselves strenuously to promote the passage of resolutions favourable to their cause and the defeat of unfavourable resolutions. In reverse, they attempt to block resolutions giving approval and to advance those asserting disapproval, of their opponents' position.<sup>7</sup>

The United Nations records provide the students of international politics, at least in part, an open window to analyse various factors and forces at work there, at a given point of time. Supplemented by the diaries and memoirs of the diplomats at the United Nations, these documents make the study of interactions of the Member states easier.

India and Pakistan are two neighbours in the Indian sub-continent and interaction between them, bilateral or

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid., pp. 90-91.

multilateral, has always aroused considerable amount of interest among the researchers interested in the study of the behaviour of states and the forces at work behind a particular behaviour. Once constituting a single mainland, the two states separated in 1947 and there began an era of mutual hostility, suspicion and competition in every field of international relations which has affected and influenced their foreign policy, strategies and actions at various levels. Their hostile and restrained relationship has prompted them to utilize the United Nations for getting collective legitimization for their positions, policies and actions.

India and Pakistan have always constituted the most important states for each other and consideration of each other's position has always been the dominant factor behind the formulation of their foreign policy strategies.<sup>8</sup> The positions which they took on various issues at the United Nations were, more often than not, prompted by the compulsions of their bilateral relationship. The Suez and the Hungary crises were two such issues, for example, where India and Pakistan endeavoured to safeguard and gain collective legitimization for their respective policies, view-points and interests.

What were the real issues involved in the two crises? What policy postures the two adopted on these two

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<sup>8</sup> See M. S. Rajan, India in World Affairs, 1954-56 (New Delhi, 1964), pp. 503-13.

crisis situations and with what objectives? To what extent their interaction at the United Nations influenced their image in the larger arena of international relations? These and related questions are the focus of the present study.

The first chapter deals with the bilateral relationship of India and Pakistan in its historical perspective. There were fundamental differences between the state ideologies of the two countries and differences between the objectives of their foreign policies gave rise to different national-interest compulsions for them. How far the considerations of bilateral relationship loomed on their positions and view-points on the two crises?

The second and third chapters deal with the Suez crisis and the Hungary crisis respectively and interaction of India and Pakistan at the United Nations over them. How the multilateral UN forum and the questions of international concern were utilized by India and Pakistan to put forth their claims and positions? How far they had been successful in their endeavours? Could they safeguard and promote their national interests and at the same time achieve collective approval of their view points and positions at the world body? An analysis and evaluation of these aspects constitute the subject matter of these chapters.

The last chapter attempts some concluding observations.

## CHAPTER II

### BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN

The circumstances leading to partition of the sub-continent into India and Pakistan was bound to generate conflicts and tensions between the two states. In the wake of hurriedly carried out partition, several issues between the two newly emerged states had remained unresolved. Agreement on some of them was reached but the atmosphere of mutual distrust and apprehension created new problems. While to some extent the failure to resolve the new disputes and problems might have contributed to the continuance of tension between the two, the raison d'etre of the continuing conflict were deeper in origin.<sup>1</sup>

For the purpose of the present study, it is pertinent here to recall the divergent orientations of national policies and postures verging to hostility so that the interactions of the two governments on the question of Hungary and the Suez crisis could be placed in perspective.

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<sup>1</sup>For an analysis of the nature of Indo-Pak relations, see Sisir Gupta, "Indo-Pakistan Relations", International Studies (New Delhi), vol. 5, nos. 1-2, July-October 1965.

### Convergence and Divergence

As independent states, India and Pakistan began to function with a large measure of common outlook and attitudes to their internal and external problems.

Power was transferred in August 1947 to the political elites of truncated India and newly constituted Pakistan, as represented by the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League respectively. Many of their commitments in politics were similar. The British system of parliamentary government was accepted by both as the desirable constitutional form; the judiciary and executive in both the countries were organized on identical lines. In their early thinking on problems of nation building, the leaders of India and Pakistan emphasized many common economic and social problems. Finally, on some important problems of international politics, the positions taken by the Congress and the League were largely similar. The impact of the West over the two countries had left a number of common legacies for them.

There was also a large measure of similarities in the nature of the basic problems faced by the two countries. Food was an important question for both; industrial expansion was the two countries' most obvious answer to economic stagnation; national integration was the major political problem, the status of minorities demanded attention in

both the countries, constitutions were to be framed, the new states were to be ensured a status in the family of nations. In brief, the most fundamental and pressing tasks in the two countries were similar if not identical although their capacity to meet them were not equal.

### Factors Responsible for the Differences

But there were powerful objective and subjective forces at work to lead the two countries in different policy directions. The most important single problem faced by Pakistan in the initial years was to give a meaningful form and substance to the concept of Pakistani nationalism. This necessitated the pursuit of a set of state policies divergent from India's; the rationale for the creation and continuance of Pakistan could lie only in its taking up postures and attitudes distinct from India's. Secondly, there were objective factors in the domestic situations of the two countries, which could not but create differences in policies and attitudes to the major problems facing the two countries. For one thing, the nature and the extent of the influence of the Muslim League over the areas of the subcontinent, which constituted Pakistan, were qualitatively different from the Congress' hold over the areas constituting India.<sup>2</sup> There

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<sup>2</sup>In most of Pakistan the Muslim League rolled over local opposition only in the eleventh hour heat of communal war. When external pressures subsided Western elite from Delhi and United Province found themselves in alien territory and the old animosities came alive." See W.A. Wilcox, Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation (Columbia University, 1963), p. 91.

were also important differences in the structure and composition of the power elites of the two countries; and finally, the sheer magnitude of the problems faced by Pakistan in the political and economic spheres was greater than those faced by India.

With the passage of time not only have India and Pakistan evolved two different economic and political systems internally but their external outlooks and attitudes have often been divergent. In fact, in the making of the foreign policies of the two countries, needs of advancing one's national interest vis-a-vis the other began to play an increasingly important role. It is necessary to elaborate this growing divergence between India and Pakistan in order to view and examine the Indo-Pakistan interaction at the UN which reflects the real nature of their bilateral relationship in that multilateral world body.

#### Political Systems

As for their political system, both India and Pakistan started with the British form of Parliamentary government and institutions of liberal democracy were promised. But the results of the working of these forms were not identical in the two countries. India evolved what is called by political scientists as a "dominant party system", the Congress continued to be the single



important party in India, capable of exerting its influence and authority over the entire country. But opposition parties grew in number and strength, and began to play an important role in the political life of the nation. The party system in India provided, on the one hand, the necessary stability and national cohesion for keeping the democratic system intact; on the other hand, it facilitated the articulation of pressing demands within the Indian society without challenging the legitimacy of the country's political system.<sup>3</sup>

In Pakistan also, the Muslim League attempted to emerge as the dominant party. In fact, in the early years, opposition to the party was virtually debarred from taking organizational forms. But by 1954 the authority of the Muslim League over East Pakistan had crumbled and in West Pakistan itself the influence of the party rapidly declined. What is of greater importance is that the decline of Muslim League also marked the collapse of centralized party politics itself in Pakistan.<sup>4</sup> East and West Pakistan began to have

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<sup>3</sup>See, Myron Weiner, "Political System of India and Pakistan", in Almond and Coleman, ed., Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 153-246.

<sup>4</sup>Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1957), Chapter II. Also, Sisir Gupta, "Political Issues and Political Forces in Pakistan", Afro-Asian and World Affairs, no. 1, March 1964, pp. 43-54.

their own party systems and it was beyond the capacity of any single party to command allegiance in both the wings of Pakistan. Also, the Muslim League itself failed in the early years, when it had an overwhelming control over the country, to build up the necessary political conventions for the growth of the democratic system in the country. In the process of constitution-making, the fundamental structural problems of Pakistan came to the surface, the two major issues of controversy being the relative positions of East and West Pakistan in the federal government and the place and role of the religious leaders (The Ulama) in the country's government. The resulting instability and the recurrence of crises in Pakistan's politics ultimately led to the abolition of the parliamentary system and the introduction of Martial Law.<sup>5</sup> The Constitution which was then given to Pakistan by Field Marshal Ayub Khan was radically different from the Indian constitution and also from the first Pakistani constitution.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>For an account of political developments in Pakistan, see M. Ahmed, Government of Politics in Pakistan (Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House, 1963); G. W. Chowdhary, Constitutional Developments in Pakistan (Lahore: Longmans, 1959).

<sup>6</sup>K. J. Newman, "The Constitutional Evolution in Pakistan", International Affairs, vol. 38, 1962, pp. 353-64.

Pakistan relations would have been insignificant but for the fact that the evolution of two different economic and social models in the subcontinent further aggravated the already existing political differences.

### Islam and Secularism

The divergent policies of India and Pakistan which have a direct bearing on Indo-Pakistan relations are those pertaining to foreign affairs and state ideology. In India, the declared goal of the state is to safeguard its secular character and to exclude religion from all questions of politics. In the permissible definition of Indian nationalism, Hinduism is not one of the ingredients, and the symbolics and myths which sustain the concept of Indian nationalism are not exclusively Hindu in origin. There is a viable concept of territorial nationalism to sustain the Indian State and the political leadership of the country has not considered it necessary to invoke non-secular concepts to impart viability to the post-1947 Indian State.<sup>8</sup> As against this, Islam is the most important single element in the concept of Pakistan nationhood and it has been regarded as essential

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<sup>8</sup> See, Donalds E. Smith, India as a Secular State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

for the viability of Pakistani nationalism that its Islamic basis should be stressed. Writing in 1957, an astute observer of these aspects of the current history of the subcontinent, Wilfred C. Smith, had said:

The viability of any nation depends on many things, including the moral of its people. In Pakistan's case, its initial Islamic quality called forth that active loyalty without which it would never have survived the nightmare of its first six months. Without some similar allegiance, persistent and constructive, one may guess that it will hardly survive the numerous other challenges with which for some time it will doubtless continue to be faced.... 9

On the unity of the two geographical wings of Pakistan, he stated:

The essential and in fact the only point in the uniting of the two geographical wings of Pakistan lies in their Muslimness. Apart from the debilitating negativism to some joint antipathy to India, if a meaning for their collaboration is to be found at all it must be an Islamic meaning. 10

From the very beginning the leaders of Pakistan had stressed the Islamic basis of the State. Of course, in the very first pronouncement made by the founder of Pakistan,

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<sup>9</sup> Wilfred C. Smith, Islam in Modern History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 219.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 231.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah, on the basic policies of the new state, a secular outlook was promised. Speaking at the inaugural session of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly on 11 August 1947, he had said:

If you changed your past and work together in a spirit that everyone of you, no matter what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the past, no matter what is his colour, caste or creed, is first, second, and last a citizen of this state with equal rights, privileges and obligations, there will be no end to this progress you will make.

.... I cannot emphasize it too much. We should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and the minority communities - because even as regards Muslim you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis, and so on, and among the Hindu you have Brahmins, Vaishnavas, Khatris, also Bengalees, Madrasis, and so on - will vanish... You are free, you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the State. 11

But in all policy declarations thereafter, special stress was laid on the role of Islam and within a few months of his above quoted statement, Jinnah himself, faced with growing separatism in East Pakistan, had said:

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<sup>11</sup> Quaid-i-Azam Muhammed Ali Jinnah - Speeches as Governor General, 1947-1948 (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, 19 ), pp. 8-9.

... have you forgotten the lesson that was taught to us thirteen hundred years ago? If I may point out, you are all outsiders here. Who were the original inhabitants of Bengal - not those who are now living. So what is the use of saying "we are Bengalis, Sindhis, or Pathans or Punjabis". No, we are Muslims. Islam has taught us this, and I think you will agree with me that, whatever else you may be and whatever you are, you are a Muslim. <sup>12</sup>

The first Prime Minister of Pakistan described the new State as one in which the Muslims would be able to fashion their lives according to the precepts of Islam and in the Objectives Resolution adopted by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in 1949, Islam was greatly emphasized. <sup>13</sup> The place of Islam in the Constitution of Pakistan remained a major item of controversy during the years of constitution-making; in 1953, a report of the Basic Principles Committee envisaged a system in which Parliament would not be able to pass a law if a body composed of the Ulema declared it to be repugnant to the Quran and the Sunnah. The Constitution that was ultimately passed in 1956 has served "Islamic" provisions. Only a Muslim could be the head of the State. The State itself was to be known as the "Islamic Republic of Pakistan". In Articles 1(1), 24, 25(1), 25(2), 32(2), 197,

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<sup>12</sup>Speech at Dacca on 21 March 1948, *ibid.*, p. 84.

<sup>13</sup>Liaquat Ali Khan's speech in moving the objectives Resolution in The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, 7 March 1949, Constituent Assembly Debates, vol. 5, no. 1, 1949, pp. 1-7.

and 198 of the Pakistan Constitution of 1956, the various Islamic provisions were enumerated,<sup>14</sup>

The vital difference between the State ideologies of India and Pakistan has a direct bearing on Indo-Pakistan relations. There is the obvious fact that it involves the fate of minorities in the two countries (which has in many ways been a matter of dispute between them). In the case of the religious minorities in Pakistan, the attempt to build up an Islamic State inevitably reduced them to the status of second grade citizens,<sup>15</sup> But what is of equal significance is that, the continued controversy in the sub-continent regarding religion and secularism affects the Muslims in India as well. The very establishment of Pakistan on the basis of the concept of a separate Muslim nationhood and the continuous emphasis on its Islamic character strengthened those elements in India which did not consider a secular concept of Indian nationalism to be viable in partitioned India. What is more, there was a persistent attempt on the part of Pakistan to deride Indian secularism. Wilfred C. Smith comments;

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<sup>14</sup>The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1956).

<sup>15</sup>See speech by S.C. Chattopadhyaya in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 12 March 1949, Constituent Assembly Debates, n. 13, pp. 88-94.

To the simple fact of Pakistan's establishment the Indian Muslims could more easily have adjusted themselves, had it not been for that "Islamic" nations subsequent activities. The policies pursued, based in this sphere on a persistently communist interpretation of Muslim interests, have tended to affect adversely the Muslim on the Indian side of the frontier. 16

On Pakistan's persistent attempts to deride Indian secularism he further opines:

Rather than coming firmly to terms with the realization that the position of India's Muslims, their aspiration towards Indianness and India's aspiration towards secularism, Pakistan has tended to deride that secularism and to presume and encourage disloyalty of Indian Muslims to their State... 17

The continuous emphasis on Islam in Pakistan after its establishment is a measure of its inability to eliminate the rest of India from its consciousness and settle down as a self-contained nation. The truth is that Pakistan is Islamic only in order to prove the fact of a separate Muslim nationhood and the validity of the two-nation theory which has been the justification for India's partition. In the very definition of Pakistan's Islamic character an implied assumption is that India is anti-Islamic and this emphasis has essentially been a method of focussing attention on the non-Indian character of Pakistan. Thus, India, along with

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<sup>16</sup>Smith, n. 9, p. 268.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 271.



Islam have continued to be the predominant issue of Pakistani public life.<sup>18</sup>

The solidarity symbols of the days of the Pakistan movement have continued to be pressed into service in the post-partition years. Instead of seeking a different basis for the national identity of the new state, the negative non- and anti-Indian aspects of Pakistan have been stressed. If the task of the Indian Muslims before freedom was defined to be the attainment of solidarity in their struggle against threatened domination by the Hindus, the problem of the Pakistani Muslims after freedom was to strengthen Pakistan and guard its freedom in the face of continued threats from the "Imperialist Hindu State" (India). Numerous statements have been made over the years by persons in authority in Pakistan to this effect. The politicians, as well as the military regimes' leaders of Pakistan during their rule over that country were almost unanimous in pointing out the need for continued struggle against "Hindu India". In 1951, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, had raised the clenched fist as a symbol of Pakistan's attitude to India.<sup>19</sup> Notwithstanding the need for Indo-Pakistan amity, the overall

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<sup>18</sup>Keith Callard, n. 4, p. 17.

<sup>19</sup>Dawn, 26 July 1951.

impact of political debates, responsible policy statements, parliamentary discussions, and organized public outbursts has been one of deepening the consciousness in Pakistan that India was its primary, in fact the only, enemy.<sup>20</sup>


In India, the relative importance attached to relations with Pakistan in the overall approach towards the country's external relations was much less than the relative importance attached to India in Pakistan.<sup>21</sup> In Indian conception of its role and objectives in world politics, many more elements entered than relations with Pakistan. It should also be noted that there were large areas in India which did not get emotionally worked up on issues of partition and communal killings, especially in the southern part of India.

On the other hand the propaganda and ideology that eventually led to the creation of Pakistan was fanned on the propaganda that Islam was in danger in a Hindu dominant area. Some ideology largely motivated the

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<sup>20</sup>On 21 October 1956, Foreign Minister Feroz Khan Noon said at Lahore that India was "the only enemy" of Pakistan'. Dawn, 22 October 1956.

<sup>21</sup>M. S. Rajan, "India and Pakistan as Factors in Each Other's Foreign Policy and Relations", International Studies, vol. 3, no. 4, April 1962, p. 391.



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domestic as well as foreign policy of Pakistan. It is, therefore, not surprising that most of the Pakistani leaders continued to harp on the same theme expressing apprehension and suspicion against India. It should be remembered that the Indian Muslims' political aspiration was initially framed by the League in the most suggestive form - a demand for parity for the Muslims in the Government of India. It was a search of a minority for a status of parity with a majority which ultimately found expression in the demand for a separate state.<sup>22</sup>

Comparing French traditional quest for security with that of the need for Pakistan, a Pakistani scholar noted that just as France's foreign policy since 1871, ~~the foreign policy of France since 1871~~ had been continuously dominated by one main preoccupation, that of ensuring its security and independence from its neighbour, Germany, "The foreign policy of Pakistan in a similar manner has been dominated by considerations of security and independence from its neighbour, India."<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup>Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations (New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1966), p. 419.

<sup>23</sup>K. Sarwar Hassan, Pakistan and the United Nations (New York: Manhattan Publishing Co., 1960), pp. 49-50; quoted in Sisir Gupta, *ibid.*

The Kashmir Question and Foreign Policies  
of India and Pakistan

Among other disputes and conflict situations between India and Pakistan the question of Kashmir occupied a pre-dominant position. Perhaps no other event has been responsible for aggravating the tension and hostility between India and Pakistan as the question of Kashmir. And it continues to be a main source of irritant between the two. Disputes like the question of future of Junagadh, the issue of the police action against the Razakars in the Indian state of Hyderabad, problems of division and equitable distribution of the assets of the united India between India and Pakistan, and other financial matters had become obsolete in the due course of time. By 15 August 1947 the struggle against integration with India by the rulers of Bhopal, Indore and Travancore had crumbled and they were finally integrated with India through the Instrument of Accession and the Standstill Agreement.<sup>24</sup> Kashmir, along with Junagadh and Hyderabad tried to ignore the writing on the wall; Junagadh was, however, formally taken by the Government of India on 1 November 1947 and after the stop-gap agreement of 29 November 1947 between Hyderabad and

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<sup>24</sup> For a detailed account, see V.P. Menon, The Story of Integration of Indian States (Calcutta: Orient Longmans, 1956).

the Government of India, Hyderabad was formally integrated with India following the police action against the Hyderabad Razakars in September 1948.<sup>25</sup> The Nizam of Hyderabad who had referred the Hyderabad question to the UN Security Council, withdrew it on 23 September 1948.

The question of Kashmir, however, remained to be a constant irritant in Indo-Pakistan bilateral relations. "The dispute is important to India not because of any material considerations but because it involves an issue fundamental to the basis of the Republic: whether or not the political allegiance of a group of people ought to be determined by their religious affiliation."<sup>26</sup> India always maintained that religion cannot - at least solely - form the basis of nationhood, while Pakistan believed that Hindus and Muslims formed two "nations". "Here lies the last field of battle over the ideological cleavage which rent the sub-continent asunder in 1947. Here is the final test of the validity of the two-nation theory, the basis of

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<sup>25</sup>For the detailed terms of the Standstill Agreement of 29 November 1947, see N. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, eds., Speeches and Documents in Indian Constitution (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), vol. 2.

<sup>26</sup>M. S. Rajan, n. 21, p. 359.

Pakistan and its raison d'etre.<sup>27</sup>

Because of the vital nature of this dispute, it is not surprising that India had been sensitive to trends in world affairs likely to affect adversely Indian position on Kashmir. Kashmir became so vital an issue that some Western writers noted that India's role in the Korean crisis was handicapped (both in a physical and political sense) by the Kashmir dispute.<sup>28</sup> Most foreign observers have also noted that relations with India have been the main preoccupation of the foreign policy of Pakistan. As Keith Callard in his study of Pakistan has maintained, "problems of relations with India have dominated <sup>its</sup> foreign affairs, defence and economic policy and have lain behind many of the moves of internal politics".<sup>29</sup>

If Pakistan's foreign policy has been mostly concerned with India, it has been in turn primarily concerned with the Kashmir dispute. It would not be too much of an exaggeration to say that the main object of Pakistan's

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<sup>27</sup>Michael Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography (London, 1959), p. 577. For an elaboration of this point, see Joseph Corbel, Danger in Kashmir (Princeton, 1954), chapter 2; Michael Brecher, The Struggle for Kashmir (Toronto, 1953); J.B. Das Gupta, Indo-Pak Relations, 1947-55 (Amsterdam, 1958).

<sup>28</sup>Werner Levi, Free India in Asia (Minneapolis, 1952), p. 68.

<sup>29</sup>Callard, n. 4, p. 17.

foreign policy, at least for long periods, has been somehow to acquire the territory of Kashmir. Pakistan sought to judge many an issue in world affairs by the test of whether or not and how far they contributed to the support of the Pakistani support on the dispute. Sometimes, Pakistani politicians and the Press applied the test of favourable disposition towards Pakistan's position on the Kashmir dispute for determining whether a country or individuals were friendly or otherwise towards Pakistan. It was held that -

while those who have been on the side of truth and justice in Kashmir have forged a new and deeper comradeship with the people of Pakistan, those that stand on the fence in this vital issue, may no longer be counted as our friends, however prepossessing their exterior or valuable and peaceable their professions. On this criterion of value, we must continue to appraise our international relations. In this momentous fight between right and wrong, those who are not with us are in fact against us. 30

From 1948 onwards Pakistan embarked upon positive and persistent efforts to bring together the Muslim nations of West Asia in a bid to create a powerful political entity in West Asia with Pakistan as its leader. Unfortunately for Pakistan these efforts could not yield fruitful results.

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<sup>30</sup>Dawn (Karachi), 27 February 1957.

The growing secularism in most of the Muslim countries of West Asia, the articulation of the aspirations of the nascent Arab nationalism in anti-Western terms, the peripheral position of Pakistan in the Muslim world, and the existence of many diversities among the countries of West Asia prevented the emergence of a Muslim bloc or an "Islamistan" as envisaged by Pakistan.<sup>31</sup> It is interesting to note here that one of the reasons for the lack of enthusiasm in many other West Asian countries about the Pakistani lead was that it might affect their relations with India and they had no interest in pulling Pakistan's chestnuts out of fire. It is believed that -

"once partition was accomplished many of the other Muslim States were reluctant to make a choice between friendship for India and Pakistan. If a choice had to be made, India, as more powerful, more stable, and more influential, was likely to have the advantage." <sup>32</sup>

The discovery of difficulties in forging unity among the Muslim countries led Pakistan to a new search for alternative policies. The United States' needs of the global strategy and Pakistan's search for new alternatives became complimentary to each other. Following the Korean War

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<sup>31</sup>For a detailed analysis on this aspect of Pakistan's foreign policy, see Sisir Gupta, "Islam as a Factor in Pakistan's Foreign Relations", India Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 3, July-September 1962.

<sup>32</sup>Callard, n. 4, p. 314.



and the gradual extension of the Cold War in Asia, Pakistan joined the Western alliance system by receiving military aid and assistance from the United States. It gave up its erstwhile policy of non-alignment and eventually joined the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (CENTO).

If Pakistan had no reason to join the SEATO (in September 1954) other than hostility to India and the desire to militarily strengthen itself against India, there was barely any other reason for its joining the Baghdad Pact in July 1955. As far as Pakistan is concerned, the reason had little to do with the avowed object of the pact which was to contain "international communism" in the area. As usual, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Feroze Khan Noon, asserted that "enmity of a powerful neighbouring country had obliged Pakistan to enter into defence alliances to preserve her freedom",<sup>33</sup> and that "Pakistan will not commit suicide by getting out of the Baghdad Pact which is her defence against India".<sup>34</sup> And Prime Minister Suhrawardy, defending Pakistan's membership of the Military Pacts, claimed that Pakistan's membership of the SEATO had borne fruit in that it had reaffirmed Pakistan's stand on Kashmir (and the "Durand Line") "which from our point of

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<sup>33</sup> The Hindu, 22 October 1956.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 8 December 1956.

view, is the most notable achievement of the SEATO in giving a new sense of confidence to the Asian participants".<sup>35</sup>

Thus, among the varied reasons for the Pakistan's alliance with the West, the decisively most important was to strengthen itself militarily against India. Both official spokesman and unofficial sources committed enough indiscretions publicly and privately, in support of this reason. Foreign, especially American, observers and journalists also testified to this.<sup>36</sup>

India, on the other hand, adhered to a policy of non-alignment and in the ensuing cold war, by a concatenation of circumstances, found itself playing a role of the mediator between the warring groups of the cold war. The roles India played in Korea, Indo-China, conflict situation in Formosa state bear the point. True, India acquired a role, in international relation, larger than its size. India brought large number of Afro-Asian states under the collective leadership of Nehru, Nasser, Sukarno and Tito.

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<sup>35</sup> Dawn, 23 February 1957.

<sup>36</sup> See the reports sent by American correspondents from Karachi. The New York Times, 24 November 1953. Also, A.H. Rosenthal, "Kashmir's Far-reaching Impact", Foreign Policy Bulletin, 1 March 1957, p. 93; and Survey of International Affairs, 1954 (London, 1957), p. 205.

As Nehru, much to the annoyance to the United States, took one initiative after another to limit the area of conflict and to bring the two warring sides to the conference table,<sup>37</sup> the Soviet leaders became convinced that although heavily dependent upon the West in the economic field, India was not only sincerely desirous but also capable of pursuing an independent foreign policy, untrammelled by unfavourable Western reactions. This opened the way for a better Soviet understanding of India's role in world affairs which became evident in Soviet utterances regarding South Asia even when Stalin was alive. After his death this trend became more marked, and within a couple of years (1955-55) firm foundations were laid for an abiding friendship between India and the Soviet Union. This was symbolized by such events as the signing of the Indo-Soviet Agreement in February 1955 for the setting up of the Steel Plant at Bhilai, and the exchange of visits later during the same year between Nehru on the one hand and the Soviet leaders, Khrushchev and Bulganin on the other. As the United States openly came forward with massive military assistance for Pakistan, and the latter joined the SEATO

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<sup>37</sup>For details see Shiv Dayal, India's Role in the Korean Question (Delhi, 1959); and Alka Gupta, India and the Peace-Keeping Activities: A Case Study of Korea, 1947-1955 (New Delhi, 1977).

under US leadership, the Soviet Union realized that it was in its interest to support India so as to enable it to withstand the pressure of the Western Powers and continue to follow its independent policy. This paved the way for strong Soviet support on the Indian stand on the question of Kashmir in the subsequent years.<sup>38</sup>

Apart from the immediate consequences, the US military aid and its alliance with Pakistan has had far-reaching long-term consequences to Indo-Pakistani bilateral relations since 1954. It logically led Pakistan increasingly to be drawn into full and active membership of the Western Camp, thereby bringing the Cold War to India's doorsteps.<sup>39</sup> It made a deep dent in the "peace-area" that India was seeking to create around India. It introduced a sudden frigidity in India's attitude to the settlement of disputes with Pakistan, just when the atmosphere for settling the disputes had become favourable following the two Prime Ministers' meetings in July-August 1953.

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<sup>38</sup> For details, see Bimal Prasad, Indo-Soviet Relations, 1947-1972: A Documentary Study (Bombay, 1973), pp. 54-139.

<sup>39</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru Speeches, 1953-57 (New Delhi: Publications Division, 1958), p. 268.

The above analysis of the Indo-Pakistan relations would provide a proper perspective to examine and understand various factors affecting the interactions, reactions and responses of India and Pakistan at the United Nations on the question of Hungary and the Suez crisis. In the light of the above framework it is attempted in the following pages to analyse the stands and positions they took on the two situations, and to find out how the nature of their bilateral relationship shaped their policies and postures over the two crisis situations.

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## CHAPTER III

### THE SUEZ CRISIS

The tension that was simmering on the Middle East for quite some time precipitated in the Suez crisis in October 1956. In the post-Second World War era, the Suez crisis was one of the gravest crisis situations which threatened to develop into a wider conflagration.

In contemporary times, the Middle East has been a hotbed of power-politics because of its strategic location and oil wealth. It has always been witnessing cross-currents of political forces and after the Second World War it became an arena of Cold War between the Western Powers and the Soviet Bloc.<sup>1</sup> Both of them have been trying to outbid each other in the expansion of their respective spheres of influence. In an era of changing power equations, the Middle East witnessed in October 1956 one of the most serious conflict situations of the post-War world.

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<sup>1</sup>See D.F. Fleming, The Cold War and its Origins (London, 1961), vol. 2, pp. 815-21.

### Background of the Crisis

Various factors contributed to the accumulation of dark clouds of conflict and confrontation over the Middle East which culminated into the Suez crisis of 1956. One of the most important factors was the perpetual Arab-Israeli conflict and the second factor was the growing intensity of Cold War, which together had a devastating impact on the general atmosphere of peace in the area.

President Nasser of Egypt, a staunch supporter of the Palestinian homeland, realized that Israel was gradually becoming more hawkish as it had withdrawn from the Egypt-Israel Armistice Agreement. With the Israeli attack of the Gaza City in 1955, Nasser's idea of a political and economic competition with it, was shattered.

The situation was worsened because of the Super Powers' rivalry and the West's support to Israel. Nasser's support to the Algerian liberation struggle could only incite for him the French antagonism. In the face of such hostility, Nasser began to champion the cause of Arab-Nationalism and in no time he was acclaimed to be the strongest voice for Arab unity. This voice naturally hurt the interests of the West which could not afford to allow the Arab states to stand united against their influence

in the area. Thus, the growth of Arab nationalism added fuel to the fire which engulfed the Middle East's already tormented situation.

President Gamal Abdel Nasser's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956 was a sequel of developments taking place since 1955. The decision of the USA<sup>2</sup> and Great Britain to withdraw their offers of financial assistance on 19 and 20 July respectively for the construction of the Aswan Dam in Egypt can be held as the immediate reason for the nationalization of the Suez Canal. The act of nationalization was, however, regarded as a severe blow not only to the prestige and influence but also to the military and economic interests of the Western Powers in West Asia. In fact the Western Powers were already feeling humiliated by the growing stature of Nasser in the Arab world where Arab nationalism was being equated with Nasserism. The Great Britain, to which the Suez Canal was one of the most prestigious symbols of an otherwise waning British Empire, felt deeply indignant. It appeared that she would not bear easily the loss of this

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<sup>2</sup>The American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles who openly condemned a policy of non-alignment in international relations as obsolete, short sighted and immoral, wanted to deal a blow to the doctrine by abrupt withdrawal of financial assistance to Egypt, one of the three leading non-aligned countries in the world. See New York Times, 10 June 1956, p. 24.



"lifeline" of her economic survival and an area of great strategic importance. The British leadership warned that navigation through an international waterway of such importance could not be left at the mercy or caprice of one power or one man.

✓ As India stood for peaceful coexistence of nations, its approach to this development in the Middle East was characterized by a spirit of moderation and tolerance for differing views and interests. India stood firmly committed to the elimination of all forms of colonialism, racialism and other evidious inequalities in the world but it was opposed to taking up a crusading or vindicative attitude. Its leadership held that the Suez Canal, though a waterway of international character, was an integral part of Egyptian territory;<sup>3</sup> the Suez Canal Company was only a concessionaire from the Egyptian Government whose sovereign right to nationalize it was unquestionable; but at the same time they expressed their reservations

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<sup>3</sup>It shows that the Indian diplomacy was primarily directed towards the preservation of freedom of navigation through the canal which was of vital importance to the Indian economic development and secondarily to protection of sovereign right of Egypt (a friendly non-aligned country) over the Canal. Krishna Menon said: "... so far as our problem in this issue is concerned, it lies in finding ways and means by which the Egyptian Government is under a solemn obligation of law, and of the Charter of the UN to carry out this particular obligation...." Information Service of India, The Suez Canal Crisis and India (Delhi, n.d.), p. 17. See also, M.M. Rahman, The Politics of Non-alignment (New Delhi, 1969), p. 136.

with regard to the timing and manner of its nationalization.

After proclaiming the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956, Egypt placed it in the hands of an Egyptian operating authority management of the Canal traffic, which in 1955, amounted to some 14,000 ships with a net tonnage of some 107 million tons.<sup>4</sup> The decree provided for compensation on the basis of the market value of the shares on 25 July upon receipt of all the assets and property of the Canal Company.

Nationalization of the Canal Company was followed by a series of events which included lengthy negotiations over how to settle the Suez question, the further deterioration of the situation, especially along the Egyptian Israel and Jordan-Israel Armistice Demarcation Lines in September and October, and military action in Egypt by Israel and Anglo-French forces. The issue eventually came to the UN for discussion and settlement which included the creation of United Nations Emergency Force and clearance of the blocked Suez Canal under UN auspices. But in the intervening period between the nationalization and the actual use of force by Great Britain and France there had been several developments.

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<sup>4</sup> United Nations Year Book (Hereinafter referred to UNYB), 1956, p. 19.

Right since the beginning of the crisis, India had regarded the American withdrawal of the loan offer to Egypt as a challenge to non-aligned nations and had regretted the Anglo-French reaction to nationalization of the Canal Company. India expressed deep concern over their threats to use force to settle the dispute or to enforce their viewpoint in the controversy. Jawaharlal Nehru condemned their war-like gesture as unrealistic and imprudent steps for the revival of outworn colonialism. He urged all the parties concerned to enter into negotiations and seek peaceful solution of the whole issue. India's stand on the issue particularly in the context of the Cold War atmosphere in international affairs and because of the high stature which Nehru enjoyed in world affairs of nineteen fifties; lack of support to Great Britain by the American President who was busy in election campaign,<sup>5</sup> the strong Soviet support to Egypt and certain other factors compelled the British and French leadership to have second sober thoughts and to moderate their threats of aggression against Egypt.

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<sup>5</sup>See The Hindu (Madras), 17 August 1956.

### The London Suez Conference

The London Suez Conference was organized on the initiative of the West in order to put political pressure on Egypt for the reversal of its decision of nationalizing the Suez Canal. President Nasser saw through the motives of the West and therefore, decided not to participate in the Conference. India, however, strongly criticized the idea of organizing the London Suez Conference, without Egypt participating in it, on the ground that it might establish a dangerous precedent.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, out of its anxiety to avert the conflict over the Suez, it decided to attend the same with well expressed reservations.<sup>7</sup> At the Conference (16-22 August 1956) India's Chief delegate Krishna Menon cautioned the British and French Government to abandon their intentions of imposing any settlement on Egypt by threats to use force or by the actual use of force.<sup>8</sup> He criticized the American plan providing, inter alia, for the

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<sup>6</sup>India had apprehensions that some day Portugal and her allies might hold a Conference in Lisbon to discuss Goa. See, The Times of India (New Delhi), 9 August 1956.

<sup>7</sup>India had already categorically stated that nationalization of the Suez Canal was absolutely within Egypt's rights of sovereignty. The London Conference could reach no final decision in the absence of Egypt, because such a decision required the agreement of Egypt. See, *ibid.*

<sup>8</sup>See, Information Service of India, n. 3, pp. 7-15.

establishment of a Suez Canal Users' Association (SCUA) without the consent of Egypt, as an unrealistic and unacceptable proposal. He warned that such an ill-conceived idea would be disastrous to the world peace. In keeping with its tradition of compromise and tolerance, at the Conference, India offered a compromise solution between the position of the majority and that of exclusive control and management of the operation and development of the canal by Egypt. It proposed a consultative body which would advise Egypt in accordance with the interest of the users of the canal and would maintain contacts with the United Nations.<sup>9</sup> Pakistan supported the American plan which was supported by 17 other powers. On the other hand the Indian proposal was supported by Ceylon, Indonesia and the USSR.<sup>10</sup>

India firmly pointed out that the users of the Canal be assured of peaceful and safe passage through the Canal only if an agreement or settlement was based on the consent of Egypt as well. Pakistan, on the other hand, supported the Dulles Plan during the Second London Suez Conference (19-21 September) which provided for a voluntary Suez Canal Users Association. Egypt, however, made it very

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<sup>9</sup>UNYB, 1956, p. 19.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

clear that any control other than Egyptian, was not acceptable to it, and India was opposed to any plan which was not acceptable to Egypt. One cannot ignore the fact that India's firm stand on the issue and Nehru's stern warnings about the risk involved in an imposed settlement were, to a certain extent, responsible for influencing Anglo-French decision to take the dispute to the UN Security Council.

#### Suez Crisis at the UN

It was on 12 September 1956 that the British and French Governments informed<sup>11</sup> the Security Council that the decision of the Government of Egypt regarding the nationalization of the canal was likely to endanger the free and open passage of shipping through the Canal and it constituted a potential threat to international peace and security.

India was not a member of the Security Council at that time and so was Pakistan. Nevertheless, India's representative, Krishna Menon who had earlier tried his utmost to dissuade the Western nations from the idea of establishing a Suez Canal Users' Association, engaged himself in intensive diplomatic efforts involving discussions, consultations and negotiations with the statesmen of important countries including the Great Britain,

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<sup>11</sup>UN Documents, S/3645.

France and Egypt and even with the Secretary General of the UN.<sup>12</sup> As a result of these hectic mediatory efforts he evolved out an Indian plan for the pacific settlement of the dispute. It is widely believed that the Council's Resolution of 13 October<sup>13</sup> was more or less based on the Indian proposals.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup>See, Michael Brecher, India and World Politics Krishna Menon's View of the World (London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1968), pp. 62-76.

<sup>13</sup>Hammaraskjold's six points were: (1) free and open passage through the Canal without discrimination, overt or covert; (2) respect for the sovereignty of Egypt; (3) the insulation of the Canal from the politics of any country; (4) the manner of fixing tolls and dues to be settled between Egypt and the users; (5) a fair proportion of the dues to be allotted to development; (6) in the case of disputes, unresolved affairs between the Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian Government to be settled by arbitration. UN Doc. S/3675. See also UN Year Book, 1956, p. 23.

<sup>14</sup>The proposals which were discussed by Menon with French, Egyptian and British delegations and the Secretary General were supported by the Soviet Union, Ceylon and Indonesia and these had the informal approval of Egypt. These provided: consistently with the principles and purposes of the UN as well as Egyptian sovereignty, negotiations for a peaceful settlement be started on the basis of the recognition of the Canal as an integral part of Egypt and as a waterway of international importance; free and uninterrupted navigation for all nations in accordance with the Convention of Constantinople of 1888; just and equitable tolls and charges; and non-discrimination; proper maintenance of the Canal; co-operation between the proposed Canal authority and the users; reaffirmation and revision of the 1888 Convention to bring it up to date and its registration with the UN; settlement of disputes if any, in accordance with the Charter of the UN; and due recognition of the interests of the users of the Canal. These principles were reiterated by India in a statement issued in New Delhi on 24 October 1956. See India, Lok Sabha Secretariat, Foreign Policy of India: Text of Documents, 1947-59 (New Delhi), pp. 24-7. See also SCOR, yr 11, mtg 743, p. 18.

On 29 October, however, Israel invaded Egypt and at the request of the United States<sup>15</sup> the Security Council met on 30 October, but Great Britain and France vetoed the draft resolutions proposed by the United States and the Soviet Union separately.<sup>16</sup> By 31 October Great Britain and France began air attacks against military targets in Egypt.

The tripartite invasion of Egypt by Israel, Britain and France proved the ineffectualness of India's efforts at settling the Suez Crisis. All attempts made during the preceding months to settle the issue through negotiations had failed. In the Security Council a deadlock was created because of the French and British vetoes. At this juncture a proposal by Yugoslavia called for an emergency session of the General Assembly under the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution No. 377(V).<sup>17</sup> France and the Great Britain voted against the proposal while Australia and Belgium abstained. However, the seven votes which were required to pass this proposal were obtained. The matter was then referred to the General Assembly. Anthony Eden in his memoirs calls this decision fateful

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<sup>15</sup>S/3706, Letter of 29 October 1956 from representative of the United States.

<sup>16</sup>See S/3710; also UNYB, 1956, p. 26; and S/3717; also UNYB, 1956, p. 27.

<sup>17</sup>UN Doc. S/3721.



in its consequences. In his view, "in a General Assembly of eighty members, any chance of examining these events dispassionately, or using them to bring about a Middle Eastern Settlement, would be infinitely less than in the smaller Security Council".<sup>18</sup> The blame for referring the matter to the General Assembly was laid on India by Eden. He remarked that the resolution was no work of Yugoslavia alone, but it was prompted from the sidelines by the Indian representative.<sup>19</sup>

In spite of British and French protests, the First Emergency Special Session of the United Nations met on 1 November 1956 to discuss the Suez Crisis. It was here that India and Pakistan both got a chance to raise their active voice at different points of time during the discussions. The main issues involved in the crisis were concerned with ceasefire, withdrawal of troops and the maintenance of peace in the area. These issues should be discussed in detail in order to elicit various positions taken by India and Pakistan and the underlying factors behind their respective positions.

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<sup>18</sup>Anthony Eden, Full Circle (London, 1960), p. 331.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

India-Pakistan, the Arab World and the Suez Crisis

As discussed earlier (Chapter II), the creation of Pakistan in 1947 was an unnatural one, though Balkanization of states is a very old phenomenon. It was a state composed of two parts divided by the breadth of a large country, India. Besides this, it was founded on the medieval concept of theocracy. As a result of partition, a quarter of the former United India stood separate, but on equal footing with the rest. To prove that it was equal to India in every respect became a major aim of the newly founded state of Pakistan, thus causing unending hostility between the two. (This aspect has been dealt with at length in the Second chapter.)

This perpetual hostile attitude towards India became an important factor in keeping Pakistan together as one state. In addition to this was the abnormal vast distance between the two wings of the country (West Pakistan and East Pakistan, now Bangladesh) combined with cultural differences. Further, it was burdened with a shattered economy and dual leadership (Punjab and Bengal). The leaders of Pakistan stood at a disadvantage as they were suddenly faced with areas unfamiliar to them. Mohammed Ali Jinnah came from Bombay and Liaquat Ali from Uttar Pradesh. With a Muslim ideology in their mind,

it was natural that Pakistan be named 'Islamic Republic' in its Constitution. One of the objectives laid down by the Constitution was that the State would endeavour to strengthen the bonds of unity among Muslim countries.<sup>20</sup>

After the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in 1949 the Muslim solidarity plan was launched vigorously. The Shah of Iran's visit in 1949 had been a great success. This was followed by an International Islamic Conference which was held at Karachi the same year. It was a semi-official Conference, attended by official observers from Muslim countries. The Conference was supposed to meet once a year in some Muslim country. Next year it met in Teheran. In 1951 the Motamar Alania-Islam (World Islamic Conference) was held.<sup>21</sup>

Pakistan laid special emphasis on its relations with Egypt which according to them, was "one of the most important members of the great family of Muslim nations and therefore especially dear and near to our hearts".<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup>Constitution of the Republic of Pakistan (Karachi, 1962), p. 15.

<sup>21</sup>For further details see Sisir Gupta, "Islam as a Factor in Pakistan Foreign Relations", India Quarterly, (New Delhi), vol. 13, no. 3, July-September 1962, pp. 230-53.

<sup>22</sup>Pakistan News (New Delhi), 18 February 1951.

In August 1951 a treaty of friendship was signed. Pakistan continued its support to Egypt in its struggle against the British. This did not seem to pay dividends that Pakistan hoped for, as the expected support on the Kashmir issue did not come. It is explained that "such attention and sympathy as might have been accorded to Mr Jinnah's demand for a separate Muslim state could not have been divorced from Egyptian fears of the Sudan's separation from Egypt".<sup>23</sup>

In 1952, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Zafrullah Khan, visited various Muslim countries. In spite of this, an impression was formed in Pakistan that the persistent plea for Muslim unity was not getting them anywhere.<sup>24</sup> Pursuing its Islamic ideals they extended their whole hearted support to Palestine, whereas the same was not reciprocated on Kashmir. The years 1952-54 were marked by ups and downs in Pakistan's relations with the Middle East. Trade went up, and Pakistan narrowed its balance of payment from Rs. 10.78 crores in 1951-52 to Rs. 5.52 crores in 1954-55.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>23</sup>H. E. B. Catley, "India and Pakistan Relations with the Middle East", Asian Review (London), vol. 50, no. 183, July 1954, p. 199.

<sup>24</sup>Dawn (Karachi), 11 October 1951.

<sup>25</sup>"Pakistan's Trade with Middle Eastern Countries", AICC Economic Review, vol. 8, no. 3, 1 June 1956, p. 29.

Pakistan soon changed its stand. It gave up its idea of an Islamic Bloc and turned towards the United States. The military aid from the United States was just a beginning, which finally culminated in Pakistan joining the Baghdad Pact (on 6 April 1955). It was a member of the SEATO already.

This inevitably led Pakistan to the slippery slope of the Western camp of the bipolar world, in particular membership of the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact. There was no doubt at all that her object in joining these western alliances was merely to strengthen herself, politically, militarily and diplomatically vis-a-vis India, in order that she could speak to India from a position of strength, and in the hope that she could compel India to concede her claims in respect of Kashmir....<sup>26</sup>

This brought about an ambivalence in Pakistan foreign policy. By joining a Western alliance, Pakistan was joining hands both with the Western imperialists and the Zionists, and thus working against the New Asian States. Countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia were enraged at the rift in the Arab world, which was caused by Iraq joining the Pact. Firoz Khan Noon writing on it says: "Iraq is an Arab Country, and we of the Baghdad Pact were always being accused of having almost stolen an Arab child. The biggest grievance that Egypt had against us was because of Iraq

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<sup>26</sup> M. S. Rajan, India in World Affairs, 1954-56 (New Delhi: ICWA, 1964), p. 504.

which, according to Egypt, should have been only in the Arab League and not in the Baghdad Pact."<sup>27</sup> Pakistan was in a dilemma out of which it had to find a way out. This was due to the question of Kashmir. Kashmir, for both India and Pakistan became the pivot around which their domestic and foreign policies revolved. Pakistan felt that if it did not acquire Kashmir, its security was threatened.<sup>28</sup>

The Kashmir question was of no less importance to India. Kashmir was considered vital for the security of India; helping Kashmir, therefore, was an obligation of national interest to India.<sup>29</sup> Besides this, if Kashmir stayed within the India Union it would mean a denial of the theocratic basis on which Pakistan was formed. Nehru had made it clear: "Kashmir is not just a piece of territory to be bartered. It is a struggle for progress against reaction, of a secular nationalism against communalism."<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>27</sup>Firoz Khan Noon, From Memory (Lahore, 1966), p. 259.

<sup>28</sup>For a detailed view of Pakistan see, SCOR, yr 5, mtg 464, pp. 4-8.

<sup>29</sup>Government of India, White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir (New Delhi, 1948), p. 45.

<sup>30</sup>India, Parliamentary Debates, part 2, vol. 9, no. 17, 28 March 1951, col. 5300.

By 1953 circumstances had changed the prominent issues in the subcontinent. India was already a stable and non-aligned state. Pakistan was moving towards the West by deciding to join the Western aligned pacts. In this new atmosphere, direct negotiations between the two countries which had been taking place reduced misunderstanding between both the countries noticeably. In spite of this, by 1956 talks again had reached a dead end. Kashmir still remained a problem though it was soon to become a part of India by its new Constitution promulgated in 1956. The new pro-Western stand of Pakistan was later to complicate its stand in West Asia. Despite improving bilateral relations these could not be divorced from the total environment in which Indian and Pakistan foreign policies were shaped.

The foregoing discussion reveals that Indian foreign policy had acquired a sound footing by 1956. India had succeeded in activizing and mobilizing the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa to stand on their own in the context of a world politics that was dominated by the Great Powers and their ever increasing ideological, political and economic differences. India's relations with the major actors in the Suez Crisis that unfolded in the later part of 1956 were cordial with the exception

of Israel. With the United States, the relationship was characterized by the complex factors of apprehensions as well as understanding and distrust. Pakistan, however, fell into an altogether different category which though not directly and principally involved in the Suez Crisis as an adversary, influenced to a large extent Indian thinking and action during the crisis.

The First Emergency Special Session  
of the General Assembly

In the 562nd meeting of the First Emergency Special Session (ES-1) of the General Assembly, India voiced its support for the draft resolution introduced by the United States, which called for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of forces behind the Armistice line.<sup>31</sup> Lall, India's representative, explained India's position in a most unambiguous way and his speech carried with it the sentiments of the entire Afro-Asian nations. He said:

... the people and the Government of Egypt are the victims of a triple invasion, and our deepest feelings go out to them in sympathy. They are being subjected to the brutal facts of war. Their sovereignty is being violently curtailed and their territory is being occupied by the armed might of a

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<sup>31</sup>General Assembly Resolution 997 (ES-1) of 1 November 1956 (UN Doc. A/3256). For the text of the resolution see UNYB, p. 35. The resolution was adopted on 2 November by a roll-call vote of 64 to 5, with 6 abstentions. Pakistan had voted for the resolution.



neighbour and of two powerful countries. 32

He strongly urged the Assembly, including the parties mainly concerned, to accept the US draft resolution by unanimous vote as a first step towards settling the issues involved.<sup>33</sup>

No such clear position was taken by Pakistan though it voted for the US draft. Its alliance with the West and the naked aggression by Britain and France against Egypt put Pakistan in a tight position. But it had to support the US draft resolution as it was being supported by nearly all the Afro-Asian countries and moreover because Pakistan desired to win the confidence of the Arabs (among whom Nasser's was a dominant voice) which was impaired by its alliance with the West. This is the reason why it co-sponsored a joint draft resolution<sup>34</sup> to which India was also a party. Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri writes:

In 1956, when the Suez Canal Company was nationalized, Pakistan supported Egypt against the Western Powers, although Pakistan had recently entered into defence pacts with the latter.... The closing of

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<sup>32</sup>GAOR, First Emergency Special Session (hereinafter referred to as ES-1), 562nd mtg., p. 31.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

<sup>34</sup>A/3275, 19 Powers draft resolution of 3 November 1956.

the Suez Canal was to interfere with the flow of goods to Pakistan from abroad and vice-versa, causing a setback to Pakistan's economic development. 35

But so was the case with India whose more than seventy per cent of the total trade passed through the Suez. Indian imports and exports passing through the Suez were estimated to be valued at Rs. 462 crores and Rs. 393 crores respectively.<sup>36</sup> However, it was India which "practically carried the burden of the Egyptian campaign at the UN".<sup>37</sup>

Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri further says that -

... Pakistan opposed any solution being imposed on Egypt. During the London Conference on Suez, Pakistan proposed that the nationalization of the Suez Company by Egypt be recognized and the matters of financial settlement and compensation be dealt with separately by the parties concerned. But, Pakistan's stand on the Suez problem did not impress President Nasser, who was more interested in winning the support of communists and the so-called neutral countries. 38

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<sup>35</sup> Foreign Policy of Pakistan: An Analysis, Department of International Relations (Karachi: University of Karachi, 1964), p. 22.

<sup>36</sup> India, Rajya Sabha Debates, part 2, vol. 14, no. 33, col. 4430.

<sup>37</sup> Michael Brecher, n. 12, pp. 68-69.

<sup>38</sup> See, Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, "New Egypt and the West", Pakistan Horizon, September 1956, p. 141.

Pakistan was not very happy about India playing an influential and dominant role over the question of the Suez. But, it was so because India's intentions were not dubious and it genuinely impressed President Nasser and the other Afro-Asian countries that its sincere efforts were directed towards only one aim - cessation of hostilities in the region and recognition of Egypt's sovereign right with regard to the Suez by the UN and the world.

Pakistan's Mir Khan took the floor of the Assembly only on 4 November at its 565th meeting. In the meanwhile, Resolution 997 (ES-1), 999 (ES-1), and 998 (ES-1) were already adopted by the Assembly and though Pakistan had voted for all the three resolutions, it did not trouble itself by taking a clear position. However, it tried to do so when Mir Khan declared that "Pakistan is against colonialism and imperialism of all kinds and condemns aggression wherever it takes place."<sup>39</sup> But, he lost no time in quoting his Prime Minister, Suhrawardy, who had always tried to identify Pakistan with "Islamic nationalism" and thereby in trying to strengthen its position vis-a-vis India. Suhrawardy expressing the grief and shock of Pakistan over the tripartite invasion of Egypt, stated:

So far Pakistan is concerned, the fact that the Moslem country towards which Pakistan has always entertained fraternal feelings

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<sup>39</sup>GAOR, ES-1, mtg 565, p. 81.

should be the victim of such aggression has further exercised public opinion. What is happening in Egypt today constitutes a threat to the entire Moslem World. 40

Egypt, however, did not believe Pakistan's pious proclamations as it was a member of the Pact whose most powerful country had invaded Egypt.

Following the adoption of the Canadian draft resolution, alongwith the 19-Powers draft resolution, put forward by India and co-sponsored by Pakistan with seventeen other Afro-Asian countries,<sup>41</sup> efforts were started to establish an emergency international United Nations force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of the Resolution 997(ES-1) of 2 November 1956. On 4 November, following the report of the Secretary General on the plan for an emergency international United Nations Force, Canada, Colombia and Norway submitted a draft resolution which was adopted the next day.<sup>42</sup> This authorized General Burns, then Chief of Staff of United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), to recruit officers for the UN Emergency Force (UNEF), as

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<sup>40</sup>Ibid.

<sup>41</sup>Resolution 998 (ES-1), adopted on 4 November 1956 by a roll-call vote of 57+00, with 19 abstentions. UNYB, 1956, p. 36. Resolution 999 (ES-1), adopted on 4 November 1956, by a roll-call vote of 59+5, with 12 abstentions. UNYB, 1956, p. 35.

<sup>42</sup>A/3290, Resolution 1000 (ES-1); see, UNYB, 1956, pp. 36-37.

it came to be known, Krishna Menon thus observed:

The Egyptians were always quite unwilling to admit troops, from any country. The problem, however, was that the Israelis would not agree to any settlement which would not offer them what they thought was protection. The Americans would not agree to give direct protection. Mr. Pearson (Canadian representative) proposed his United Nations Emergency Force - but his original proposal was a police force, which would make people behave. <sup>43</sup>

India put forward a set of conditions <sup>44</sup> and circumstances in which such a force would function. On the other hand Pakistan had supported the Canadian proposal overenthusiastically. <sup>45</sup>

The conditions laid down by India were: first, that the emergency force would be set up in the context of the withdrawal of the Franco-British forces from Egypt and on the basis of the call to Israel to withdraw behind the armistice line; secondly, that force would not in any sense be a successor to the invading Franco-British forces or would in any sense take over its functions; thirdly, that it would be understood that the force might have to function through Egyptian territory and therefore, that the Egyptian Government must consent to its establishment;

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<sup>43</sup>Michael Brecher, n. 12, p. 75.

<sup>44</sup>A/3302/Add.4/Rev. 1.

<sup>45</sup>M.S. Rajan, n. 26, p. 505.

fourthly, that the force would be a temporary one for the emergency.<sup>46</sup>

Thus, India was strongly against any idea of establishing a permanent UN Force and assigning it the role of a 'police force'. Obviously, Indian position was prompted by its relations with Pakistan on the question of Kashmir. By adding the condition of the consent of the country to which such a temporary, peace keeping force would be sent, India safeguarded its position vis-a-vis Kashmir where Pakistan would have pressed for such a UN Force. Pakistan's overenthusiastic support to the idea of the UN Force explains its anxiety for establishing a precedent which it could exploit later in the case of Kashmir issue. "Indeed, the Pakistani Foreign Minister publicly referred to the idea of a UN force replacing the Indian and Pakistani forces in Kashmir."<sup>47</sup> Thus, India and Pakistan both countries' attitude on this issue was affected by the consideration of the Kashmir issue.

When the Secretary-General and Major General E.L.M. Burns began to build the force, they were confronted with many limitations with regard to their choice of the countries from which they could raise troops. The Secretary General, however, decided -

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<sup>46</sup>GAOR, ES-1, mtg 567, p. 117.

<sup>47</sup>Rajan, n. 26, p. 505.

... not to include units from any of the permanent members of the Security Council and not to include units from any country which, because of its geographical position or for other reasons, might be considered as possibly having a special interest in the situation which has called for the operation. <sup>48</sup>

Dag Hammarskjöld who himself "served as a three-dimensional 'go-between', working to ameliorate tensions between Israel and the Arab States and Britain and France, and between the Afro-Asian group and Britain-France-Israel", <sup>49</sup> had at his disposal a "few other countries, such as India...," who were able to serve as effective 'go-between'. <sup>50</sup>

No doubt the United Nations had the prerogative of accepting forces from any country which was willing and able to contribute to the UNEF, but the reality of the situation demanded due respect for the sovereign right of the host state to refuse to admit into and operate on its territory, the nationals of a state hostile or unsympathetic to its case. Egypt was loath to consent for the admission of units of a Member State whose intentions with regard to the future withdrawal of troops on the request of Egypt's Government appeared to it to be doubtful. It was for this

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<sup>48</sup>See UN Doc. A/3943, p. 8, para 160.

<sup>49</sup>Richard I. Miller, Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy (Oceana Publications, Inc., 1962), p. 93.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid.

very reason that the offer of Pakistan which was an ardent partner of the Baghdad Pact (Britain being the senior partner of that) and whose leadership had criticized Egypt's decision of nationalizing the Canal was not activated. Thus, India scored another point against Pakistan. Pakistan, which always claimed that its attitude towards Egypt was guided by its ideology, became very sore about it.

President Nasser, however, took no notice of Pakistan's sympathy for Egypt. When Prime Minister Suhrawardy, following the Suez Crisis, expressed his desire to visit Cairo to meet President Nasser, his request was unceremoniously turned down.... Soon after this incident, President Nasser refused to accept from Pakistan any contribution to the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt. President Nasser was at logger-head with Pakistan over Baghdad Pact, which he regarded, rightly or wrongly, as detrimental to Egypt's national interest. 51

After Suhrawardy was declined an invitation to Cairo, he issued "a cleverly worded statement implying that it was not an insult to him but to Pakistan", and he "cleverly equated Nasser with Mr. Nehru". 52

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<sup>51</sup>Foreign Policy of Pakistan : An Analysis, n. 35, p. 23. Also see, Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, Pakistan and the Regional Pacts (Karachi, 1958).

<sup>52</sup>Samin Khan, Pakistan : Ideology, Constitution, Laws, Foreign Policy (Karachi: Sentinel Publications, 1964), p. 110.



Nasser's apprehensions about Pakistan were, however, not baseless. Pakistan, no doubt, did not want to lose Egypt's friendliness to project its image as a champion of Islam and thus establish a separate identity in the subcontinent to counter the Indian influence and become at par with the Indian position in the world. But, Nasser was not a favourite of Pakistan because of his friendship with Nehru and his non-aligned foreign policy. Nasser's non-aligned Egypt found numerous points of convergence with a non-Islamic state of India than any among the Islamic states including Pakistan. Besides the general similarities between India's and Egypt's line of thinking, another factor was of much importance. Since its independence India has been maintaining good relations with Muslim countries to offset Pakistani Pan-Islamic diplomacy and to prevent particularly the Arab States from aligning with Pakistan on Kashmir and other related issues. But, Nasser was supposed to be an enemy of Pakistan as he was 'found to be an ally of Nehru and Bharat'.<sup>53</sup>

India, whose foreign policy is known as a happy blend of idealism and realism, was badly in need of foreign aid for its developmental programmes and in the need of

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<sup>53</sup>Ibid.

continuous and quick supply of foodgrains from abroad,<sup>54</sup> it was keenly interested in the preservation of peace among great powers and in the cessation of hostilities in the Middle East. It were its enlightened national interests, therefore, and not merely its traditional attachment to idealistic and ethical principles<sup>55</sup> which prompted India to extend full support to the UN efforts in arresting the situation created by the triple aggression against Egypt. One such interest was, as pointed earlier, safeguarding its position on the question of stationing of the UN troops in Kashmir. According to Geoffrey Murray, the Senior Councillor in the Permanent Mission of Canada to the UN, "The sharpest disagreements probably revolved around India and Pakistan, both of whom were conscious of implications in the UNEF proposal for their dispute over Kashmir",<sup>56</sup>

Pakistan, however, was not free from the obsession of its identity problem and scoring points against India

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54 See, The Times of India, 8 November 1956.

<sup>55</sup> India's attachment to ethical and idealistic values in formulating its foreign policy has been an old phenomenon. See, Bimla Prasad, The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy: The Indian National Congress and World Affairs, 1885-1947 (Calcutta, 1969).

<sup>56</sup> Geoffrey Murray, "Glimpses of Suez 1956", International Journal (Toronto), vol. 29, no. 1, winter 1973-74, p. 58.

over the issue of Kashmir. India had emerged during the Suez crisis as the champion of the Afro-Asian group and was receiving overwhelming support for its moves. Subimal Dutt wrote that when Menon arrived at New York to represent India at the UN (7 November 1956) he "kept up a continuous pressure with the support of the Asian-African countries to compel the withdrawal of Anglo-French-Israeli forces from Egyptian soil".<sup>57</sup> Therefore, to tarnish the image of India and to gain legitimacy for its claim over Kashmir, Pakistan raised the Kashmir question several times during the debates over the Suez crisis in the General Assembly. With the stationing of the UNEF troops in Egypt, the question was transferred to the regular session of the General Assembly.

On 29 November 1956, Mr Firoz Khan Noon raised the Kashmir question in the 601st meeting of the Assembly.<sup>58</sup> Before this, on 23 November 1956, Begum Hiramullah equated the situation in Egypt, Hungary and Algeria with that of Kashmir. Co-sponsoring a draft resolution (A/3335) she said:

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<sup>57</sup>Subimal Dutt, With Nehru in the Foreign Office (Calcutta, 1977), p. 170.

<sup>58</sup>GAOR, session 11, 1956-57, plen mtgs., nos. 574 to 677, vols. 1-4, p. 415.

my delegation has co-sponsored a draft resolution asking for withdrawal of foreign troops from Egypt because we are against all foreign troops and troops of occupation anywhere, under any pretext by anybody. We condemn aggression and suppression of liberty equally in Egypt and in Hungary and in Algeria and Kashmir. 59

Speaking at 611th meeting on 6 December 1956,

Krishna Menon said:

Our neighbours from Pakistan also made reference to India in regard to Kashmir. Now Kashmir is still on the agenda of the Security Council. We put it there. We came here with a complaint of aggression. I have no desire, therefore, to go into great detail about it. I had the pleasure of hearing the distinguished lady, who was a countrywoman of ours until ten years ago, for whom we have very great affection and regard, speak to us (592nd meeting), and I can only echo her sentiments; we want to see the end of aggression in Kashmir. 60

It was India who had taken the Kashmir question to the UN and Krishna Menon observed that a practice was developing in the UN of converting the victim into the aggressor. Anyone, he remarked, "who brings a complaint here and shows any reasonableness very soon finds himself in the position of having done the mischief himself. That has

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<sup>59</sup>Ibid., p. 270.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., p. 570.

been our experience, at least in one instance, and we do not want to see it repeated elsewhere".<sup>61</sup>

India's policy towards the Suez Crisis was therefore, not free from its obsession with Pakistan. Participating in a Lok Sabha debate in March 1957 Krishna Menon remarked that "our position with regard to the Middle East is exactly the same as in Kashmir - that is you cannot establish rights by invasion, that conquest does not confer any legal rights."<sup>62</sup> It is not hard to infer that when Menon said that "my country and my Government refuse to acknowledge the right of the aggressor to lay down conditions for vacating",<sup>63</sup> he had the situation in Kashmir and India's relation with Pakistan over this issue in mind.

On the one hand, Begum Ikramullah tried to project Pakistan's policy towards the Suez Crisis as one of the moral position, notwithstanding its pacts with the West,<sup>64</sup> but on the other hand, Samin Khan holds a different view

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<sup>61</sup>Ibid., p. 1272.

<sup>62</sup>Lok Sabha Debates, part 2, vol. 1, no. 8, 20 May 1957, col. 832.

<sup>63</sup>GAOR, session 11, n. 58, p. 303.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., p. 631. Begum Ikramullah declared: "In taking the attitude we took in the matter of Egypt, we have proved that pacts did not impair our moral sense for all times...."

altogether. He observes that "to our allies our approach to the Suez problem seemed indelicate and foolish. To the neutralists and to those who wanted our support, it seemed very deceitful and fraudulent".<sup>65</sup>

President Ayub Khan talking about Pakistan's role during the crisis, said:

In the Middle East our position had been compromised by some of our leaders who handled the situation at the time of the Suez crisis, in a clumsy fashion. President Nasser and certain other Arab countries under his influence thought that we were involved in some deep conspiracy to divide the Arab world. <sup>66</sup>

On the other hand, Indian diplomacy during the crisis brought to it the faith and confidence of the Arab world, and thus it successfully countered Pakistan's endeavour of winning the goodwill of the Muslim states and rallying them against India over the question of Kashmir. Later, Pakistan tried to bring Egypt and the other Arab states closer to it and Ayub Khan had to accept that Pakistan had acted in a clumsy manner during the Suez crisis but "every sensible man in Pakistan had been deeply disturbed

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<sup>65</sup> Samin Khan, n. 52, p. 108.

<sup>66</sup> Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 116.

by the invasion and their sympathies were all out with Egypt".<sup>67</sup> However, Pakistan could not compete with the sharpness of Indian diplomacy and its efforts to project Pakistan's identity with the Islamic world and bring it at par with India, in the eyes of the world, failed.

Indo-Pak relations had taken a turn for the worse due to the latter's membership of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact. The Suez crisis did not bring the two countries any closer. Relation between India and Pakistan had deteriorated soon after the Suez crisis which was reflected in their attitude and behaviour at the UN during the period. The reason for worsening of relations was the Kashmir issue. The Kashmir Assembly had on 17 November 1956 completed its task of making its constitution which would come into force on 26 January 1957. This gave an excuse for Pakistan to refer the issue to the Security Council again and mention it at the other occasions as well, e.g. during the debates over the Suez Crisis in the General Assembly.

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<sup>67</sup>Ibid., p. 155.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE SITUATION IN HUNGARY

While the Suez Crisis was reaching a very explosive situation, another conflict situation developed in Hungary. What happened in Hungary was in the nature of a revolt of a Communist country against the monolithic communist system controlled by Moscow. To that extent it was the first event of its kind since the Second World War. For this reason alone it was bound to attract worldwide attention.

#### Background

Sparked by a student demonstration on 22 October 1956 against the Communist regime in Hungary, a series of incidents followed. According to Krishna Menon the "Hungarian uprising in the beginning was a national revolt, not in the sense of a territorial revolt but national in character".<sup>1</sup> On 27 October 1956, France, the UK and the USA requested a meeting of the Security Council to consider an item entitled "The Situation in Hungary", pursuant of

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<sup>1</sup> Krishna Menon, quoted in Michael Brecher, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World (London: Oxford University, 1963), p. 85.



Article 34 of the Charter.<sup>2</sup> They alleged that Soviet tanks and Hungarian political force had fired on Hungarian citizens, that Soviet military reinforcements had entered Hungary and that large scale fighting had ensued. They held the view that even if Soviet troops were there under the Warsaw Treaty provisions, those troops, under Article 8 of that Treaty, could not be used to maintain law and order. In a broadcast on 28 October, Imre Nagy, President of the Council of Ministers of Hungary and acting Foreign Minister, had stated that recent upheavals in Hungary represented a bid national democratic movement and also that his Government was opening negotiations about the relationship between Hungary and the Soviet Union, including the question of withdrawal of Soviet troops.<sup>3</sup>

On 1 November, Imre Nagi informed the Secretary General that further Soviet Units were entering Hungary. In the communication he had requested the help of the four great powers in defending Hungary's neutrality which he had declared on 1 November after repudiating the Warsaw Treaty

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<sup>2</sup>UNYB, 1956, p. 67. It is interesting to note here that like the Suez crisis, the question of Hungary was also brought to the notice of the Security Council by the USA, though along with Britain and France.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 68.

with the Soviet Union.<sup>4</sup> In a letter of 2 November circulated to the Council, Imre Nagy gave further details about the arrival of Soviet reinforcements and Soviet military movements in Hungary.<sup>5</sup> The US submitted a draft resolution<sup>6</sup> on 3 November calling upon the USSR to desist forthwith from any intervention, particularly armed intervention in the internal affairs of Hungary. The draft was not adopted because of the Soviet veto. The US then submitted a draft resolution, adopted by 10 votes to 1, by which the Council decided to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly to consider the situation in Hungary.<sup>7</sup>

The Second Emergency Special Session  
of the General Assembly

When the second emergency special session of the Assembly was convened on 4 November 1956 to consider the Hungarian situation, the USSR opposed its inclusion in the agenda on the ground that discussion of it was barred by Article 2(7) of the Charter. It stated that Nagy Government had collapsed and all communications of Nagy were

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<sup>4</sup>UN Doc. A/3251.

<sup>5</sup>UN Doc. S/3726.

<sup>6</sup>UN Doc. S/3730 and Rev. 1.

<sup>7</sup>UNYB, 1956, p. 69.

invalid. However, the item was included in the agenda of the Assembly on 4 November.<sup>8</sup>

The US submitted a draft resolution which was adopted, following a few modification during the debate, on 4 November as Resolution 1004 (ES-II). India had abstained on this resolution but Pakistan had enthusiastically supported and voted for it. Explaining India's abstention Krishna Menon said that the necessity for doing so "arose from the nature of this subject and the nature of the resolution".<sup>9</sup> He further said that "the draft resolution that was before the Assembly on 4 November (A/3286) contained many parts which, if they had been put individually to the vote, we would have supported".<sup>10</sup> However, he appreciated the parts of the resolution, for example, parts stating that "the United Nations is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members" and referring to the human rights and fundamental freedoms.<sup>11</sup>

The main reason for India's abstention was because of para 4 of the preamble of the Resolution<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 70.

<sup>9</sup>GAOR, General Assembly - Second Emergency Special Session (ES II), p. 44.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 45.

<sup>12</sup>For the Text of the Resolution 1004 (ES-II), see UNYB, 1956, pp. 84-85.

which condemned the USSR. Krishna Menon observed that, "The basis of our approach was; first, our background in regard to national sentiments, and maintenance of foreign forces; second, our desire not to use the UN for 'fisticuffs'; and third, that we were against the use of force or unnecessarily forceful language."<sup>13</sup>

Pakistan, having entered the military pacts with the West, was swept by the West's desire to punish Russia to give a rebuff to the expansion of communism. It was an opportunity for Pakistan to link itself even closer to the West to strengthen its position vis-a-vis India. Pakistan, in its counter complaints over the issue of Kashmir, had charged India of letting loose "a pre-planned and extensive campaign of genocide against Muslim in several parts of India".<sup>14</sup> Now, participating in the debates over Hungary question, Mir Khan reminded the Assembly of Pakistan's charges against India and he declared that "we have always stood for freedom of religion and for basic human rights. We have always abhorred any suppression having the nature of genocide".<sup>15</sup> Pakistan's bilateral relationship with

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<sup>13</sup> Brecher, n. 1, p. 86.

<sup>14</sup> K.P. Saksena, The UN and Collective Security: A Historical Analysis (Delhi, 1974), p. 70.

<sup>15</sup> CAOR, ES-II, p. 48.

India loomed large on it at the UN and it was now going to utilize any possible opportunity to win the support for its positions and policies on the issue with a few objectives in mind: bringing Pakistan at par with India, rallying the maximum possible support to win credibility and legitimacy by getting its position endorsed by the Assembly, and countering India's growing influence among the Afro-Asian group.

Krishna Menon seems to agree with this analysis when he says that "at that time Pakistan was not taking any interest in UN affairs; she did not count for much there, unless Zafrullah (Khan) or some one like that came. But she took a hand merely to embarrass us".<sup>16</sup>

On 9 November Pakistan co-sponsored a draft resolution along with four other Powers by which the General Assembly would, inter alia, consider "that free elections should be held in Hungary under United Nations auspices".<sup>17</sup> Mir Khan, speaking on the draft resolution held that it represented "the stand Pakistan has always maintained throughout its record of participation in the deliberations of this Assembly".<sup>18</sup> He was, undoubtedly, having Kashmir

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<sup>16</sup>Quoted in Brecher, n. 1, p. 89.

<sup>17</sup>UNYB, 1956, p. 17, for the text of the draft resolution, see *ibid.*, p. 85.

<sup>18</sup>GAOR, ES-II, p. 48.

in mind while saying that, and he hoped to invoke this provision of the draft as a precedent in the case of Kashmir as well. It would strengthen and could legitimise its demand for holding elections in Kashmir to ascertain the views of the people there over the question of their accession to India. It was, in effect, an attempt to delegitimise India's claim over Kashmir on the legal basis of the Instrument of Accession and to win a political battle against it in the Assembly.

India, on the other hand, tried to safeguard its position by voting against this resolution and stating that "we cannot say that a sovereign Member of this Assembly admitted after due procedures can be called upon to submit its elections and everything else to the United Nations without its agreement".<sup>19</sup> Moreover, Resolution 1004 (ES-II) of 4 November had requested the Secretary General to make certain investigations with regard to the situation in Hungary and report to the Assembly.<sup>20</sup> The Resolution was still pending and the Secretary General had informed the Assembly<sup>21</sup> that he had taken steps in this direction and that he was awaiting a reply. It would not

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<sup>19</sup>GAOR, ES-II, p. 68.

<sup>20</sup>Para 4 of the operative part of the Resolution.

<sup>21</sup>UN Doc. A/5315.

be, therefore, advisable to proceed to take any decisions before the Secretary General gave the informations which were sought by the Resolution 1004 (ES-II). On another draft resolution submitted by the United States,<sup>22</sup> India, jointly with Ceylon and Indonesia, moved amendments<sup>23</sup> intending to delete the references to the USSR and certain other harsh words and phrases. The amendments however were rejected and the draft resolution was passed as Resolution 1006 (ES-II). Pakistan had readily extended its support for the resolution while India abstained clarifying that it could have voted for the resolution had the political aspect of it been removed and put separately or just withdrawn because that was already there in the five power draft resolution.<sup>24</sup> The five powers draft was also adopted by the Assembly as Resolution 1005 (ES-II) but India voted against it.

Krishna Menon claimed later that Kashmir did not loom large in his thinking while voting upon the five power draft resolution.<sup>25</sup> But the very fact that India

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<sup>22</sup>UN Doc. A/3319, of the text of the draft resolution, see, UNYB, 1956, p. 94.

<sup>23</sup>UN Doc. A/3325.

<sup>24</sup>GAOR, ES-II, p. 76.

<sup>25</sup>Brecher, n. 1, p. 94.

did not abstain on this resolution, though it did not contain anything different from the resolutions where India had already abstained, except for the mention of holding elections in Hungary under UN auspices, goes against Menon's claim. It is to be noted here that India had abstained on the five paras of the Preamble and first para of the operative part of the draft resolution<sup>26</sup> when separate voting was done on each para of it. Even on para 2 as such, which dealt with the elections in Hungary, India abstained but when a separate vote was taken on the phrase "under UN auspices" as asked by the South African delegation, India voted against it.<sup>27</sup> So it becomes amply clear that India voted against the whole draft resolution because of the part 'under UN auspices' only. It clearly implies that India did not want to give a similar opportunity to Pakistan to invoke this precedent and therefore, it reserved its claim to hold plebiscite or else in Kashmir under its own supervision and not under UN auspices. Thus, it is very difficult to accept Krishna Menon's contention that Kashmir was not a consideration then, because in that situation India could have abstained on it.

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<sup>26</sup> GAOR, ES-II, p. 81.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.



The same day the Assembly adopted another draft resolution submitted by Austria which dealt with the humanitarian assistance to the Hungarian people. This resolution 1007 (ES-II),<sup>28</sup> did not receive any negative votes and India and Pakistan both voted for it. On 10 November the General Assembly adopted another US draft resolution, as Resolution 1008 (ES-II), which was duly amended by Italy.<sup>29</sup> India, while agreeing to vote for the original US draft resolution which sought to place on the provisional agenda of the Assembly's eleventh regular session, the question on the agenda of its second emergency special session, abstained on the amended draft resolution which excluded the Secretary General's memorandum from the proceedings of the Assembly.<sup>30</sup>

Interaction of India and Pakistan  
In the Cold War Situation

Before embarking upon further analysis of interaction of various forces and considerations in the bilateral relationship of India and Pakistan as reflected in the Assembly during the period of the Hungarian crisis, it

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<sup>28</sup>For the text of the Resolution 1007 (ES-II) see, UNYB, 1956, p. 94.

<sup>29</sup>For the text of the draft resolution as amended by Italy, see UNYB, 1956, p. 86, for the Italian amendment see, GAOR, ES-II, p. 87.

<sup>30</sup>GAOR, ES-II, p. 87.

would be worthwhile to pause and ascertain the dynamics of the crisis itself.

The tension and division of the world body over the issue, as a matter of fact, emerged from its cold war syndrome. Taking a more realistic and objective view of the situation, it would be generally agreed that the Soviet troops could not withdraw from Hungary so long the American, the British and the French troops were present in Germany. The Soviet troops were primarily there as a part of the Soviet and Western forces after the world war and were a component of the Cold War complex. It was a proof of the fact that the UN was being used as an instrument for Cold War propaganda, when demands were made by the West that the Soviet forces be withdrawn from Hungary, whereas, at the same time, no demand was made about the other foreign troops of the West to withdraw from Europe.

This is why India, in consonance with its non-aligned posture and mediatory and conciliatory approach, declined to support use of any harsh and provocative language against the USSR. Moreover, it was in the broader national interest of India as well. There is little truth in the allegation that India "valiantly defended" Soviet Union on the Hungary issue. Reacting sharply to this

allegation by Cuba, Krishna Menon said:

I represent here the Government of India - not the Government of Cuba or the Government of Soviet Union - and therefore what I state here are the views of my Government. I have said repeatedly that we deplore the situation in Hungary. We would like to see the position where foreign forces were withdrawn from any country - whether they be called bases, contingents, parts of alliances or.... This does not mean that one may not treat the problem calmly, in the context of a legislative deliberation, as it were. 31

India was not under any cold war compulsion to support one bloc or the other, while Pakistan, on the other hand, was. It was a part of the Western alliances, which it had joined to safeguard its sovereignty and national integrity from 'Indian expansionism'. However, India was developing more friendly relations with the Soviet Union in order to gain its help for the construction of a viable modern economic and industrial infrastructure. With Prime Minister Nehru's visit to the Soviet Union in middle 1955, "it was not surprising that India started promoting greater friendliness and intercourse with the Communist bloc - thanks to the entry of the Western Bloc into the Indian sub-continent through Pakistan".<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>31</sup>GAOR, ES-II, p. 75.

<sup>32</sup>M. S. Rajan, India in World Affairs, 1954-56 (New Delhi: ICWA, 1964), p. 513.

But growing closeness with the Soviet Union could not blind India's rational thinking and it did not deviate from its consistent foreign policy postulates. Of course, Pakistan was an important consideration in the pursuance of Indian diplomacy, bilateral or multilateral, but unlike Pakistan it did not enter into any military pacts with the Communist bloc. On the contrary, India tried to see things in black and white and also in their proper perspective. Prime Minister Nehru, alongwith the Prime Minister for other Colombo countries, had issued a statement in November 1956 saying that

they regret that Soviet forces, which had been withdrawn in accordance with the policy laid down in a statement issued by the Government of the Soviet Union on 30 October, were reintroduced into Budapest a few days later. The Prime Ministers consider it an inalienable right of every country to shape for itself its own destiny free from all external pressures. They are of the opinion that Soviet forces should be withdrawn from Hungary speedily and that the Hungarian people should be left free to decide their own future and the form of government they will have without external intervention from any quarter. 33

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 pp. 166-7. GAOR, session 11, Fin. Mtgs, 1956-57,

Quest for Legitimacy

Indian attitude on the Hungary issue was quite rational as India avoided to be swept away in the passion aroused by one group or the other. The entire information about the situation in Hungary was mainly based on the accounts given by refugees which could not be accepted without a pinch of salt. The real situation of Hungary was really difficult to know for the want of authentic and first hand information. Elaborating this aspect of Indian policy towards the issue Krishna Menon said that -

Today we are dealing with a problem in regard to allegations that have been made in this Assembly on the one hand, and denials on the other hand; and I want to assure you that it is not as though we sit detached, unconcerned, by the reports on one side, and by denials on the other, as though we were giving a Solomon's Judgement, a kind of award in this matter. We think, first, that there is a responsibility for the Assembly to express itself in a restrained fashion, in order to obtain a settlement. Secondly, the main concern that we should have is to try to obtain, in terms of the decision of the general Assembly the introduction into Hungary of observers, and the good offices of the Secretary General. 34

He further declared that

we have kept ourselves under restraint, without pronouncing judgements on events

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<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 167.

which we have not been able to observe ourselves, and in spite of whatever newspaper criticism there may be, whatever epithets may be used, my Government and people will not shift to a position where we are called upon to condemn without evidence. <sup>35</sup>

This is why India had introduced a draft resolution, <sup>36</sup> co-sponsored by Ceylon and Indonesia, "recalling paragraph 5 of the resolution 1004 (ES-II) of 4 November 1956, in which the Government of Hungary is asked to permit observers designated by the Secretary General to enter the territory of Hungary, to travel freely therein, and to report their findings to the Secretary General."<sup>37</sup> While considering this Three Power draft resolution, a separate voting was done on the phrase "without prejudice to its sovereignty", contained in operative paragraph 1. Pakistan voted against it but the phrase was adopted by 43 votes to 6 with 30 abstentions, but on the entire draft resolution Pakistan voted for it and it was adopted as Resolution 112B(XI) by 57 votes to 8, with 14 abstentions.

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<sup>35</sup>Ibid., pp. 167-68.

<sup>36</sup>UN Doc. A/3368 and Rev. 2 and 3.

<sup>37</sup>For the text of the draft Resolution see, UNYB, 1956, p. 87.

Thus, Pakistan once again tried to strengthen its demand that the UN should intervene in a country even if it did not give its consent for doing so. This is why it opposed the phrase, "without prejudice to its sovereignty". Speaking on 4 December in the 606th meeting of the Assembly Pakistan's Begum Ikramullah said that "we believe that the peace of the world and the existence of the small nations depend on accepting the principle of intervention by the UN."<sup>38</sup>

Pakistan had moved a draft resolution<sup>39</sup> on 2 December along with thirteen other powers. Speaking on this 14-Power draft resolution Krishna Menon said:

If it had been possible for the sponsors of the draft resolution to bring before this Assembly a text which would have reiterated the demand that the Secretary General go to Hungary and that observers go to Hungary, expressing its regrets or its concern or anything else, or deploring the action of the parties concerned, which are stated to be Hungary and the Soviet Union, we would have been willing to support it. But because we are willing to support such a draft resolution, because we want to see the end of this state of affairs in Hungary, it is not right to invite us to subscribe a

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<sup>38</sup>GAOR, n. 33, p. 492.

<sup>39</sup>UN Doc. A/3413, for the text of the draft resolution see, UNYB, 1956, pp. 87-88.

large number of statements couched in words which are not the kind of words to which we could subscribe, 40

The draft resolution had referred to "The Hungarian authorities" and not to the Hungarian Government or even to Hungary as such. Stating India's position Krishna Menon said that

so far my government is concerned, it so happens that not only have we an Ambassador in Hungary but, on account of the situation in Hungary, the Prime Minister has also sent, according to the decision of his Government, a special representative of his own into Hungary. Therefore, when we have two representatives functioning there and talking with the Hungarian Government to be helpful in whatever way is possible, it is not right for us to come before this Assembly and pretend that the Government does not exist. 41

He further clarified that

for that reason we could not subscribe to a proposition which refers to 'Hungarian authorities'. It has not to do with whether some of you like the Government or do not like the Government. I have said a dozen times that if only those who were liked by everybody could sit in this room, there would have been no representatives at all to the General Assembly.... That is why we

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<sup>40</sup> GAOR, n. 33, p. 523.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.



cannot support draft resolution of this character.... 42

Therefore, India abstained on this draft resolution which was, however, adopted by 54 votes to 10, with 14 abstentions. One very significant point to be noted here is that this draft resolution could not get as much affirmative or positive vote as Indian draft (Three Power draft resolution) resolution had got.<sup>43</sup> By securing three more positive votes India could claim that its policy was more legitimate and creditable than that of Pakistan whose policy was pronounced in the fourteen power draft resolution. It was a victory for Indian policy and attitude towards the crisis over those of Pakistan which was playing an active role unlike India in the Cold War equation.

But, Pakistan wanted to counter the Indian policy and influence by raising the Kashmir issue once again. In the 611th meeting of the Assembly on 6 December 1956, Begum Karamullah said that

India tries to take a moral stand, and a very high moral stand, on many questions

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<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>Ross N. Berkes and M.S. Bedi, The Diplomacy of India ; Indian Foreign Policy in the United Nations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 104.

in the world. We feel that, with the charge of aggression laid at its own door, it ill becomes India to do so. It must clear its fair name if it wants to play a really effective part and a moral role in the affairs of the world. <sup>44</sup>

On 10 December Pakistan co-sponsored a draft resolution <sup>45</sup> which stated, inter alia, that the Soviet Union should withdraw its forces immediately from Hungary under UN observation. Begum Ikarmullah, in 615th meeting on 11 December said -

The delegation of Pakistan has once again co-sponsored a draft resolution that brings the plight of Hungary under discussion in the General Assembly. We have done so because we feel that wrong does not become right, or injustice justice, because it has been going on for some time. We must not accept as a fait accompli something which outrages our moral sense just because we are tired to seek redress for it. <sup>46</sup>

Voicing Indian position on this 20-Power draft resolution, Krishna Menon said that "we believe that resolutions which involve condemnation, which in their logical consequences, would be followed by a declaration of who is the aggressor and who is not, and would thereby stultify

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<sup>44</sup> GAOR, n. 33, p. 579.

<sup>45</sup> UN Doc. A/3436 and Add. 1, for the text of the resolution see, UNYB, 1956, pp. 88-89.

<sup>46</sup> GAOR, n. 33, p. 605.

the United Nations, are not the elements which would assist in a solution."<sup>47</sup> He further said:

My delegation finds itself faced with a draft resolution moved by the US and its supporters with considerable part of which we are in agreement, but we cannot subscribe either to its phraseology or the implications of some of its paragraphs. Those implications may not strike others in the same way but we have to think of the future, when these same precedents may be applied to other people. For when the United Nations takes a step, it is essential for us not merely to think of what may be suitable at the present time or what our emotions and passions at the time demand, but what precedent and law we create in this respect. <sup>48</sup>

India, jointly with Ceylon and Indonesia, submitted amendments<sup>49</sup> to the 20-Power draft resolution and also moved a separate resolution, co-sponsored by Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia,<sup>50</sup> on 10 December. Only one of the amendments was accepted in a separate voting on all the amendments. The other four amendments which formed the bulk of the draft resolution put forth by four Powers, were rejected by the Assembly. When the 20-Power draft resolution was

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<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 609.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., p. 610.

<sup>49</sup>UNYB, 1956, pp. 78-79.

<sup>50</sup>UN Doc. A/3437.

put to vote, two of the co-sponsors of the Indian draft voted for it, which was finally accepted by the Assembly as Resolution 1131(XI).<sup>51</sup>

In the face of it and also because all but one amendments were rejected, India withdrew its draft resolution. Krishna Menon said that

In view of the fact that all the amendments that have been proposed have been overwhelmingly defeated - and they contained the substance of this draft resolution - it is the desire of my delegation and our co-sponsors that we should not press this draft resolution to vote. 52

This was a diplomatic and political loss to India whereas Pakistan strengthened its position vis-a-vis India by supporting the 20-Power draft resolution and by being instrumental in defeating the amendments moved by India.

The debate in the Assembly continued but "after the first year the sessions dragged on; it was a kind of ritual with the West; year after year they brought it up in the same way".<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Burma and Ceylon had voted for the Resolution 1131(XI).

<sup>52</sup> GACR, n. 33, p. 675.

<sup>53</sup> Brecher, n. 1, p. 92.

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSIONS

From the analyses attempted in the preceding chapters it is evidently clear that the political processes and mechanism of the United Nations have variably been used for safeguarding and promoting national interests of Member states. As discussed earlier Member states have made use of all sorts of devices to achieve this objective. Even while expressing views and interacting to international questions where their national interests are not directly involved, they keep in mind their own foreign policy strategies as well as bilateral issues. The states having the kind of antagonism which prevailed between India and Pakistan, try to make use of the political processes employed to seek solution to international problems to their own advantage. The interactions between India and Pakistan at the United Nations, their initiatives, reactions and responses regarding various intricate issues related to the question of Hungary and the Suez Crisis amply substantiate this point.

By the time these two international problems stirred the United Nations in October-November 1956,

India by concatenation of circumstances acquired a position of prestige and leadership among the Afro-Asians. In a situation where the United States was insisting that its fight against the Soviet Union was a fight for freedom and the only right course for the Afro-Asian countries was to align themselves with the United States, India had shown that there was an alternative to that policy and this alternative was more in the interest of peace and security of the newly emerging states. That was something which the US Government, during the Dulles era, found very irritating and creating a 'nuisance value'. It was not surprising, therefore, that the emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement of the newly independent states of the world under the leadership of Nehru, Nasser, Tito and Sukarno was looked upon with contempt by the West, especially by the United States. As noted earlier (Chapter III, n. 2), the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had openly condemned a policy of non-alignment as obsolete, short-sighted and immoral. Nevertheless, the Movement was taking shape and gaining ground.

India was pursuing a policy of seeking friendly relations with all countries and judging all issues on their merits. It may be recalled here that during Nehru's visit to the United States in October 1949, Dean Acheson, who was planning to evolve a collective approach of the non-Communist

world to the issue of recognition of the People's Republic of China, was extremely disappointed because Nehru had already decided to recognize China. Nehru had also questioned the validity of the US policy towards Indonesia and French Indo-China.<sup>1</sup> India's policy of anti-colonialism and its opposition to racialism and, more importantly, its foreign policy aimed at keeping away from the increasing bitter Cold War, resulted in serious disagreement between it and the United States.

"After the traumatic experience of the Korean War, the United States decided on a more aggressive policy for the maintenance of its global hegemony and, failing to get Indian support for it, entered into a military alliance with Pakistan in 1954."<sup>2</sup> Pakistan became a more active partner of the Western alliance system when it joined the Baghdad Pact in 1955. "Consequently, the United States had to share to some extent the regional foreign policy objectives of its ally Pakistan, which had cast itself in the role of an adversary of India."<sup>3</sup> Coupled with this compulsion (or obligation) the United States

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<sup>1</sup> For detailed treatment of this point, see Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York, N.Y., 1969), pp. 334-6.

<sup>2</sup> B.K. Shrivastava, "India and the United States", International Studies, vol. 17, nos 3-4, July-December 1978, p. 760.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

would also never like to let any opportunity go, indeed it seems to have been feverishly seeking then to show India in a bad spot by accusing it of following a 'double standard' and thus tarnishing its image. The Western Press also was engaged variably to support and enhance the US efforts in realizing this objective.

Pakistan found this unfavourable, if not hostile, Western attitude towards India favourable to its own interests and it tried to exploit it on various issues in its hostile relationship with India. The analysis of the Suez Crisis in the preceding pages, as a matter of fact, bears this point. As a member of the Baghdad Pact and a close associate of the Western alliance system, Pakistan was in a tight position when it was called upon to take a position on the Suez Crisis at the United Nations. It could not afford to ignore the people's wrath generated in all Afro-Asian countries especially in the Arab world. At the same time it was eager to prove, so it seems, that in critical times the Western Powers could count its support. Thus Pakistan's approach during the crisis was to criticize the tripartite attack but at the same time to maintain its alliance system with the West. As observed in the earlier chapters, Pakistan's other objective was to guard against India from gaining any political advantage which could win it the goodwill of the Arab world to the disadvantage of



Pakistan. But to the chagrin of Pakistan its alliance was looked upon with contempt and suspicion in the Arab world. This is why Nasser, who had grown into a living symbol of Arab nationalism, not only refused to admit Pakistani troops in the UNEF to be stationed on Egypt's soil, but also turned down its Prime Minister's request to visit Cairo following the precipitation of the Suez Crisis.

Another crucial issue where the divergent approaches of India and Pakistan manifested themselves was the question of creation, composition and mandate of the United Nations emergency force. It is interesting to note here that Pakistan had overenthusiastically supported the proposal of creating a United Nations force to guard the armistice line between Egypt and Israel. India, on the other hand, made it emphatically clear that such a force could be stationed only with the consent of Egypt and according to the detailed terms to be agreed upon between the Egyptian Government and the United Nations. Before extending its support for the proposed United Nations force India safeguarded its position and interests indirectly and subtly by inserting the "prior approval of the party (or parties) concerned" clause. India as well as Pakistan knew it fully well that creation and stationing of such a force in Egypt could not be used as a precedent in the case of Indo-Pak dispute over Kashmir. However,

had India extended its unconditional support for the UNEF, it could have been used by Pakistan to demand for such a force to be stationed in Kashmir and thus it could have scored a political gain against India. India, nevertheless, countered the Pakistani design well.

In the meantime, the power politics continued to cast its shadow over the quickly unfolding developments during the Suez Crisis. The Soviet Union attempted to exert its full pressure in the situation as one of the two Super Powers. Premier Bulganin threatened to intervene militarily on behalf of Egypt. He sent communications to that effect to Britain, France and Israel and requested the United States to join the Soviet Union in taking immediate steps to halt the aggression against Egypt.<sup>4</sup> Through Egypt's arms deal with Czechoslovakia in September 1955, the Communist bloc had gained the first inroad in the Middle East since the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Iran in 1946. The United States and the West, however, could not allow expansion or further inroads of the Communists in the area and this is why the United States not only disapproved of the Soviet proposal, it also took the position that the UN force should not include Permanent Members of the Security Council. Along with New Zealand and Australia,

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<sup>4</sup>K.P. Jaksena, The UN and Collective Security: A Historical Analysis (Delhi, 1974), p. 182.

Pakistan also endeavoured to send its troops to the UNEF and thus while keeping the Russians out, the Western interests could be safeguarded. It was this game which was exposed and Nasser declined and opposed the Pakistani offer to send troops.

Pakistan's policies and postures over the issue, thus, was shaped by twin objectives - first, to win the goodwill of the Arab world by disapproving the tripartite attack and by guarding against India's growing prestige in the Arab world, and secondly, to safeguard its broader military and political interests by staying in the Western alliance system and also to enhance the interests of its allies wherever possible, though in a subtle way. It is noteworthy that Pakistan's threat to quit the Commonwealth and to withdraw from the Baghdad Pact, if Britain and France failed to cease hostilities and to respect Egypt's sovereignty,<sup>5</sup> came after more than one month following the tripartite attack of Egypt. This throws more light on the real motives of Pakistan. It, however, received severe diplomatic and political setbacks as its efforts to win the goodwill of the Arabs could not bear any fruits but India, on the other hand, won the goodwill and confidence not only of Egypt but of the rest of the Arab world as well. Later, trying for a conciliation between Pakistan

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<sup>5</sup>Dawn (Karachi), 1 December 1956.

and Egypt, even President Ayub Khan admitted that "...Pakistani representatives may have acted in a clumsy manner at the time of the Suez crisis but every sensible man in Pakistan had been deeply distressed by the invasion and their sympathies were all with Egypt".<sup>6</sup>

A noted Pakistani scholar<sup>7</sup> also accepts the fact that Pakistan joined various pacts with a hope to put an end to its self-imposed isolation and to acquire a place in international arena at par with India. He regrets that Pakistan unwittingly entrenched itself in certain pacts "which were either not connected with the ideology of Pakistan or the method of accession was so crude and ill-timed that they involved Pakistan in controversies and conflicts in the Middle East.., which proved detrimental to the 'national interest' of Pakistan".<sup>8</sup>

In Hungary, the situation was evidently a case of armed intervention in a civil war, opposed by one revolutionary Government, but called for by the previous Government and then within a matter of days again welcomed

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<sup>6</sup> Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters : A Political Autobiography (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 155.

<sup>7</sup> Samin Khan, Pakistan : Ideology, Constitution, Laws, Foreign Policy (Karachi: Sentinel Publications, 1961), p. 109.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

by a newly installed Government.<sup>9</sup> It was also evident that the Hungarian question became an issue of the ensuing Cold war and both the power-blocs were engaged in an endless propaganda war to score a political victory over each other. Unlike the Suez crisis situation, the Hungarian question witnessed not only a split but also a major confrontation of the world's most powerful nations. Indian attitude towards the situation in Hungary was one of caution and it preferred not to give any value judgement against the Soviet Union till all the facts and reality of the Hungarian situation could be ascertained. Unlike the Suez crisis where all the facts about the situation were readily available and there were no contradictions in the facts provided by various sources, the situation in Hungary was viewed by different sources in different and always contradictory ways.

Pakistan, on the other hand, joined its Western allies in condemning the Soviet Union of aggression. India, however, avoided using any condemnatory language which could only aggravate the situation, instead of bringing that under control. It should be noted here that India avoided the use of any condemnatory language against Britain,

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<sup>9</sup>Saksena, n. 4, p. 143.

France and Israel during the Suez crisis as well. Thus, India's positions unlike Pakistan, did not lack consistency.

As is evident from the analysis of the proposal of the UN supervised general elections in Hungary (Chapter IV), India realized that it would be a dangerous precedent to allow the United Nations to decide upon the form of government a country should have, and to conduct elections in a sovereign independent state. Nevertheless, it was again a propaganda stunt of the West which found an ardent supporter of the proposal in Pakistan which wanted to legitimize its position of demanding similar action in Kashmir to decide its future.<sup>10</sup> India's national interest demanded the blocking of such a position of Pakistan and it did oppose the holding of elections in Hungary under the UN supervision. Pakistan, however, left no stone unturned to utilize the cold war issue of Hungary to muster and rally the support of the Afro-Asians which it had so painfully failed to gain on the issue of the Suez. Moreover, in order to counter India's position, it tried to brand India as a Soviet ally for its conciliatory and mediatory approach.

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<sup>10</sup>See Werner Levi, "Kashmir and India's Foreign Policy", Current History, June 1958, pp. 340-5.

India's doubts regarding the motivations of Pakistani stands and position on the two crisis situations were not unfounded. Pakistan, in fact, tried to exploit the two occasions to bolster up its case on the Kashmir issue.<sup>11</sup> After putting the Kashmir question in the cold storage for more than four years, at least as far as the United Nations was concerned, Pakistan raised it once again in the Security Council in January 1957, that is, immediately after the two crisis situations had hardly subsided. It was an opportune time for Pakistan to cash whatever goodwill and support it had mustered from the West by virtue of its policies and positions on the two issues. Pakistan hoped, and rightly too, that owing to its alliances with the West and the kind of supportive role it had tried to play on the two issues, would now bring a more vocal and unambiguous support from the West on the question of Kashmir.

The type of support that Pakistan wished from the West, came in the form of a draft resolution in the Security Council on 14 February 1957, sponsored jointly by Britain, the USA, Australia and Cuba. Earlier Pakistan

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<sup>11</sup>For example, see the speech of the leader of the delegation, GAOR, session 11, 1956-57, pp. 270-71. Reply of India, p. 570. Also pp. 578-81 for further exchanges.

had requested the Security Council that, inter alia, a UN force should take over the functions of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Four Power draft resolution too, it is noteworthy, expressed a preference for such a UN force.<sup>12</sup> The Four-Power draft resolution was, however, vetoed by the Soviet Union, thanks to the goodwill and support of the Soviet Union that India was able to win by virtue of a non-aligned and objective policy pursued by it rather consistently throughout the debates on the question of Hungary and the Suez Crisis.

On the basis of the preceding concluding observations, it can be said in the last that Indian diplomacy countered all the Pakistani designs and guarded against all its moves to weaken the Indian position while interacting on the two issues. Pakistan's efforts to seek endorsement in a subtle, indirect manner of its claims and positions especially in the case of Kashmir were also drained off. True, it was successful in having another round of debate in the Security Council but it led to a dead end. The interplay of various forces resulted in the growing estrangement that temporarily followed between the United States and India on the Hungarian question, and Britain and

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<sup>12</sup>UNYB, 1957, pp. 68-69. Also see, GAOR, n. 8.



India on the Suez Crisis, was looked upon by the Soviet Union to its own advantage. The cordiality of relationship that became clearly marked on the visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin to India, gained further interest following the two crisis situations. Thus, what has been discussed above leads one to the conclusion that Pakistan did try to obtain certain political advantages, especially on the question of Hungary but it could not succeed in its objective.

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