

PARTY POLITICS IN DELHI

1980-1990

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Certificate

Certified that the dissertation entitled **Party Politics in Delhi, 1980-90** submitted by **Anupama Datta** is in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy**, is her bonafide work and has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other University.

We recommend that this dissertation may be place before the examiners for evaluation.

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INTRODUCTION

In December 1991, Delhi was granted a Legislative Assembly with a Council of Ministers responsible to the Assembly. Elections to the legislative assembly were held in Delhi in November 1993. This constituted a significant change in the political structure of Delhi. The earlier arrangement provided an ineffective Metropolitan Council - which was only a recommendory legislative body. Though Delhi remains a Union Territory, the Assembly has been given wider legislative powers than the previous Council. It is expected that this would help solve many of the local problems at that level.

This is the culmination of a long standing demand articulated by major political forces in Delhi. They demanded a political structure with adequate powers to deal effectively with problems of the city. However, Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP hereafter) leaders pursued this demand more aggressively than others, for the simple reason that they were sure of to win in local election and form government in Delhi.

This study attempts to understand the political development of Delhi in the period from 1980 to 1990. The significance of Delhi lies in the fact that it is the national capital, both the ruling party at the Centre, and the opposition party are equally anxious to dominate the politics of the capital. The politics of Delhi is dominated by national politics rather than local politics. This is because of the physical proximity of Central government, as well as its political

predominance over the local government, institutions and local issues, which leaves weak local legislative/executive bodies to play subordinate role. Unlike other states where state government can solve the immediate problems of the people, in case of Delhi the Central Ministries deal with many aspects of the administration directly. Also the Union parliament and President of India enjoy extensive legislative and executive powers over Delhi. As a result, the opposition parties focus attention on acts of omission and commission of the Central government, while the local unit of the ruling party tries to highlight its achievements.

Hindi speaking states exercise a strong influence on the politics of Delhi, especially the Hindi speaking states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. This is because the majority of the immigrants in Delhi have come from these states and still have very strong emotional, cultural ties with their home states. Similarly, religious minorities are concerned about issues that affect their community interests anywhere in the country.

This dissertation seeks to analyse party politics and political competition in Delhi in the decade from 1980 to 1990. The study focusses attention on the mobilization strategies of BJP and Congress(I) to marshall support of various sections groups and classes in Delhi. A noteworthy feature of the BJP strategy was the attempt to reorient and reconstruct the party on secular lines in contrast to the more Hindu orientation of the Jana Sangh. However, in the process the party lost some of its

traditional support and was not able to make much headway among the middle class salaried people that the BJP was seeking to win over. It focusses attention on the changing pattern of mobilization strategy of BJP for expanding its social base much beyond the traditional support base of Bhartiya Jan Sangh (BJS) - the Hindu refugees from West Punjab, urban middle and lower middle class. Consequently it adopted a different mobilization strategy. In the earlier decades DPBJS had laid more stress on Indianization - abrogation of article 370, ban on cow slaughter, adoption of Hindi as an official language, anti-Pakistan propaganda, Chinese aggression and sales tax issue.

In contrast to this, DPBJP in the early 1980's laid more stress on broader socio-economic issues like price rise, statehood in Delhi, early elections to the local bodies etc. Leaders of DPBJP were certain of the loyalty of its traditional supporters and expected to win approval of other sections of society due to their extensive mobilizing effort. Contrary to expectations in 1983 Metropolitan Council elections it won only seventeen out of total of fifty six seats and in 1984 parliamentary elections it was completely routed in Delhi. This drastic reduction in social base necessitated another change in the strategy. This time DPBJP adopted Hindu nationalism to regain the lost support. It was supposed to bring double benefit to the party in so far as it could gain the support of conservative Hindus, women, poor and illiterate people and also the new rich by making strong appeals base on religion and the middle class could be enamored by appeals based on nationalism.

Therefore, in the post 1987 period it organized agitations against "soft" policies of Central Government towards terrorists in Punjab. It also espoused the cause of Hindu migrants who came to Delhi from Punjab. These efforts were aimed at regaining the support of people conscious about rights of Hindu community. The other trend discernible in this period was formulating public opinion against Congress government in the Centre. It was held responsible for inflation, soft policies towards terrorists, appeasing minorities delaying elections to the Metropolitan Council etc.

The BJP's, its major competitor is the DPC(I) which has neither organized public opinion on any major issue nor done anything substantial to solve many of the problems of the city. During this period, Congress sought to retain its traditional support base-religious minorities economically weaker sections, scheduled castes-on the basis of the personal charisma of the national leaders of Congress party like Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, patronage power of the ruling party. Middle class people were minded of the inability of the opposition party to form a stable government which could keep the country unified. To make a short point the mobilization strategy of the Congress party remained virtually unchanged throughout the decade. It tried to build support by creating a favourable image of Indira Gandhi and later Rajiv Gandhi in the minds of the people. Moreover, it constantly reminded the people of the experience during the Janata regime and projected itself as the only party which could provide security to the people, and maintain the unity and

integrity of the country. It highlighted the achievements of the Congress government in the sphere of economic and foreign policies. Its appeals to the religious minorities was based on its secular orientation. The party also tried to appropriate the Gandhian and Nehruvian heritage by claiming that its present leaders were upholding the secular values and concern for upliftment of weaker and backward sections of society.

An important change was noticeable functioning of the DPC(I) after heavy losses suffered by the Congress in the 1989 parliamentary elections in Delhi. It organized protest marches against the policies of National Front Government and Rajiv Gandhi led a Sadbahvana Yatra in various parts of the city to regain its secular image. The DPC(I) made concerted efforts to retrieve its lost constituency.

The litmus test for the success of mobilization strategy is the performance of political parties in the elections. It clearly indicates the extent to which various sections of society support the programmes and policies of any particular party. However, the link between the two is not so direct in case of Delhi. The voting behaviour of the people in Delhi shows the outcome of elections is determined by issues such as opposition disunity in 1980, assassination of Mrs. Gandhi and post assassination riots, corruption in high places, Bofors gun deal, Ram Mandir issue rather than local issues that affect everyday. Elections clearly reflected national trends and these were more pronounced in Delhi because it is the Capital and the

seat of power and constant activity involving national leaders - ministers Chief Minister and other politically significant leaders. Infact, this helped the Congress party to check the erosion in its support base temporarily. By 1989, the national political atmosphere was saturated with appeals based on religion and anti-Congress.- Ram Janama bhoomi Mandir and Rajiv Gandhi's involvement in Bofors scandal were the two main issues raised by non-Congress(I) parties. Sustained effort by Delhi unit of BJP on both these issues helped the party to regain the loyalty of its traditional supporters and many of those who were disillusioned with Congress party and its leader.

The data for the study is derived from primary and secondary sources. The information is mainly from newspaper reports and interviews of party leaders published in newspapers, and party publications. Data on elections is based on the reports of Election Commission and various books published on the subjects and journals.

The dissertation is divided into four chapters. The first chapter is historical, social and economic profile of Delhi. It describes the important medieval and modern events or personalities whose influence is felt in present day Delhi in many ways. Delhi today is divisible into three parts - 'Old', 'New' and 'Expanding' - each having its distinct cultural and occupational pattern, set of issues that are most significant for people living in one area are irrelevant to people living in the other. The distinction hampers development of a regional

sentiment. Moreover, Delhi is inhabited by people who have migrated into the city from other states of the country in post-independence period. These people have not lived in the city long enough to develop a strong sense of belonging. They are still influenced by events and developments in their 'home state'. Most of the people have come here in search of jobs and three important sectors where these people are absorbed are - Central Government, trade, self employment and industry. And a very small proportion of the population is engaged in the agricultural sector.

Community wise Delhi house the religious minorities - Sikh and Muslims who are concentrated in certain areas in Delhi. Their own security in Delhi and also of their community in other parts of the country affect these people. Political parties make special attempt to woo these people for they expect an en-bloc vote from them. But complication arise from the fact that it also received 'Hindu' migrants from Punjab and Kashmir in the last decade besides the 'refugees' who came to Delhi in the wake of partition. This chapter reveals the context within which the political parties operate and in what way one affect the other.

The second chapter deals with the political structure in Delhi. Since independence, there has been an attempt to create a set up for Delhi which could combine and reconcile the democratic aspiration of Delhi citizens with the recognised requirement for special responsibility of Central Government for the affairs of the Capital city. The chapter analyses the

difficulties of finding a system which could give the city a more responsible government. It also records the varying views of both the political parties on the issue over time and reasons for such change. Significantly the peoples response to this issue is tepid and indifferent.

After examining the social economic and political features of the city, the next chapter deals with the efforts to both Delhi Pradesh Bhartiya Janta party (DPBJP) and Delhi Pradesh Congress(I) (DPC(I) mobilizing public support in the last decade. It was a competition between a well established political party - Congress(I) and another party which had look in the city but was trying to project a new image of itself in order to expand its support base. It necessitated change in the nature of issues raised and also arena of activity of the party. It could no longer capitalise on its 'Hindi - Hindu' image. This chapter also deals with demographic changes in the city and its affect on the efficacy of age-old issues to mobilise support. The DPBJP made an earnest effort at mobilizing support in Delhi but could not turn it into electoral success. The chapter deals with the causes of the failure and also change in the strategy in the period from 1987 onwards. Apart from this the chapter includes the strategy of DPC(I) at countering the efforts of DPBJP in gaining public support and retaining its traditional support base.

The fourth chapter examines the electoral performance of both the parties in the Parliamentary and Metropolitan council

election held in the last decade. The Metropolitan Council election were held in Delhi only once in the last decade, so it would not be exact indicator of the public choice. So the Parliamentary elections are better guide to the trends in the voting in Delhi. So an analysis of Parliamentary elections in 1980, 1984 and 1989 is done in here. Beside it contains a description of the pre-election activities of both the parties to reveal similarities and difference between their election strategy and campaign style.

In the concluding chapter, major findings have been summarised and a overview of the dissertation is included.

CHAPTER - I

DELHI - HISTORICAL, SOCIAL - ECONOMIC PROFILE

Delhi as it is today is a fascinating mix of ancient, old and new. Delhi began as Indraprastha and then was governed by the Tomara Rajputs and the Chauhans who in turn were succeeded by Khiljis, Tughlaqs, Sayyed, Lodhis, the Mughals and the British. All these kings selected Delhi as their Capital, but each ruler selected a different site and gave the city a different name. However, all these were in close proximity of the present day Delhi and over the years the name 'Dili' survived. The city's link with the ancient past is only through the monuments and archeological sights, but the presence of recent past is still felt in what is today known as 'old Delhi' which was built by Mughal Emperor Shahjahan between 1638 and 1658. The city was planned to accommodate about two lakh residents. It was approachable by seven gateways, from the north, south and west. The Capital was located in the centre of the citadel with two stately portals still known as Lahori Gate and Delhi Gate. He built three big streets in the city. This was done so that there was sufficient space for his great state processions. The three great streets were Chandani Chowk road from fort to the Fatehpuri Masjid, a road from Delhi Gate of the Fort to Jama Masjid; and a road from Delhi Gate of the Fort to the city Gate. The master builder had named the city after

himself - Shahjahanabad. Apart from these landmarks the house styles and the street patterns have tended to be preserved. the main bazar - Lal Kuan, Chitli Quabar, Chandni Chowk, Faiz Bazar, etc - retain their alignments, if not there original character. Feeding into these main bazars are secondary bazars which are devoted to one trade or commercial katras - cul de sac alley ways in which 15 - 20 tiny shops about - for wholesale cloth merchants. And the residential areas which are "contained" by the bazar street - the maze of gates, mohallas, katra etc. - at least seem to date from the city's founding.²

Looking back into the history of the city we find that with the decline of Mughal empire Delhi lost its importance. It again came to the limelight when British Government decided to shift its capital from Calcutta to Delhi in 1911 A.D. The reason why Delhi remained capital of the medieval rulers was its strategic importance, invasions from north-west could be successfully tackled from here. But British wanted to shift the capital from Calcutta to Delhi because of growing conflict of jurisdiction and authority between Governor of Bengal and Governor General of India. And Delhi was selected because of its long association with the previous rulers.³ The 'New Delhi' that the British built in 1931 was a dream project for the town planners. Herbert Baker and Edwarad Lutyens. The style of architecture was European and an excellent use of space was made. It consisted of mainly Government office complex, residence of Viceroy (now Rashtrapati Bhawan) and other such buildings.

India won independence in 1947 and Delhi continued to be seat of Government of India. And as the activities of Central Government increased so did the office buildings and residential areas for government employees. So today the area consists of large number of residential colonies of government officials from Class I to Class IV.

We can see that two very important parts of the capital city are so different in many respect each bearing imprints of its origin. What is today called 'Old Delhi' is more of a commercial centre with its unique culture a blend of Hindu and Muslim culture. Whereas imperial or New Delhi is the seat of our National government and a conglomeration of salaried, middle class government employees. Its culture is more westernized than traditional. An interview with members of Council reflected that had not succeeded in delivering the fruits of labour to its masses. It had not been able to improve the administrative efficiency, public distribution system and redressing the grievances of the people. In the case of it, they were one, that lack of sufficient power was responsible for it.

The third and important part of Delhi is that which was established after independence, in the last four decades or that which we could call "expanding" Delhi. The problem which Delhi faced immediately after independence was that of influx of 'refugees' from Pakistan. These seven lakh 'refugees' were gradually shifted to fourteen permanent colonies in the city. These Punjabi 'refugees' formed a significant part of the so-

called 'expanding Delhi' After independence, population of the city increased rapidly. "In the first two decades after independence it witnessed a rise of 235% in population. The rise in the next two decades was 239%⁴". The influx continued in the following decades. Delhi is not only the nerve centre of national politics it is also an important trade and commercial centre. So it has attracted people from the neighbouring states - promise of better work opportunities. It has been estimated that the influx from Uttar Pradesh is the highest (42%), followed by Bihar (10%), Haryana (8%), Punjab (7%), Rajasthan (5%), Kerala (4%) and Maharashtra (3%) Tamil Nadu (3%)⁵. This has resulted in not only growth of slum and resettlement colonies in the city and consequent civic amenities problems, but also changed the socio-cultural complexion of the city. To accommodate the rapidly growing population Delhi has expanded into the neighbouring rural areas, like Mandawali, Narela, Bawana in the south-west and in the eastern side the agricultural land of bordering Uttar Pradesh. Therefore its territory is more rural, but its population is predominantly urban. According to 1981 census people engaged in primary sector constituted only 3.7% of the total work force and the constitution of agriculture etc to the net state domestic product varies between 2% to 2.7%⁸. The reason for this may be the job opportunities available for villagers in the formal and informal sectors in Delhi villagers of Delhi and engaged in petty traders, street hawkers food vendors.⁹ Contribution of secondary sector in the net state domestic product varied between 14 to 15% in the period from '80 to 1989 but increased significantly after 1990 to 27%. This was

duet to increase in number of units engaged in production, output and number of people employed for example number of production units increased from 62,000 in '84-'85 to 81,000 in the year 1990. Corresponding increase in investment was also made Rs. 12,00 crores in 1984-85 to 1880 crores in the year 1990. Number of people employed increased in the same time span from five lakhs fifty eight thousand to seven lakh twenty nine thousand.¹⁰

Another notable feature of Delhi is high literacy rate. It has registered a constant increase from 1961 onward, but its rank has declined from first in '61 to sixth in '91. According to 1981 census the rate of literacy was 71.94% and increased to 75.29% in '91.⁷ According to 1981 census only 40% of the total area of Delhi was urban whereas 92.74%⁶ of population was characterized urban.

A look at the occupational distribution reveals that people in Delhi are predominantly engaged in tertiary sector followed by manufacturing and a very small percentage of people are engaged in primary sector. This assessment is based on number of people employed in the particular sector and its contribution to the net domestic product.

Industrialisation in Delhi in post independence phase is due to the effort of Punjabi refugees who migrated to Delhi after partition. These factories were set up from the financial aid given by the government and were mainly in small scale category. "These manufacturing units are mainly set up in NOIDA,

Narayana, Mayapuri, Moti Nagar and Shahdara i.e. in West and East Delhi" ¹¹ This is also one of the reasons for migration of semi-skilled, people into Delhi, to get employment in these low skill and capital intensity industries.

The predominance of tertiary sector in Delhi's economy becomes evident if we look at the following data. According to Economic Census 1990 number of people engaged in manufacturing sector is only 6.36 lakhs whereas trade - wholesale and retail together involve 4.9 lakh workers, finance and insurance nearly 2 lakhs, restaurants and hotel employ 80,224 workers and state and warehousing 32,825 workers. ¹² A total of 14 lakh 38 thousand people are employed in this sector. In the pre-1980 period it contributed 63% of the net domestic product and in the 80's its share ranged between 83% - 86%. Whole sale trading is concentrated in Chandni Chowk, Ajmeri Gate, Hauz Qazi, Khari Baoli, Chawri Bazar, Nai Sarak - all these markets deal in either commodity and are located in Old Delhi.

Apart from these large scale, traditional areas small scale establishments are scattered all over the city. Besides their concentration in Sadar Bazar, Shahdara, Subzi Mandi, Karol bagh, some market places have grown in importance recently like NDSE & Lajpat Nagar in South Delhi, Laxmi Nagar and Gandhi Nagar in east Delhi and many more in all parts of Delhi. Because of this tremendous expansion of small business in Delhi, the stronghold of petty bourgeois element, over politics is noticeable. These people form an important support base on the

BJP in Delhi. Another significant source of employment in Delhi is government service and understandably so Delhi as is the capital of the country and the seat of national government; consequently substantial number of people are in the Central government employment. From 1970 onwards Central Government offices employed more than two lakh people and was marginally increased to 2.31 lakhs in 1989. But substantial increase was found in number of people employed in the quasi government bodies - 1.83 lakhs people in 1985 to 2.25 lakhs in 1990. During this period number of people employed in local government offices remained the same. ¹³ These people are educated and partially westernized and constitute an important element of the middle class. In their political behaviour they pay more attention to the party rather than the candidate and national issues at the time of election. This is because government takes good care of their other needs like housing, health care, education facilities. Apart from these subsidized benefits it gets regular inflation equalizers to compensate hardships caused by price rise. This segment of society is important politically and their demands are raised by political parties in opposition and sympathetically considered by the ruling party.

Poor form an another segment of Delhi's population. They live in sprawling slums, contrast to the middle class mentioned above. It is estimated that density of population in some slum areas is as high as 60,000 per sq.km. The total number of Jhuggi - Jhompris clusters in Delhi are 929 (total population 1.3 million). There are 44 resettlement colonies, 480

unauthorised colonies, whose total population is still not known.¹⁴ These people are living in squalor and filth. Basic amenities like water, electricity, sewage disposal are not provided, despite the fact that schemes are formulated and funds allocated. Absence of educational and medical facilities also adds to the problems.

These people are mainly unskilled and uneducated and have to find employment mainly in the informal sector. This segment of society is considered for the local leaders because the economically weaker section, can be easily either allured or intimidated for voting in a particular way. Nothing concrete is done to deal with their problems but temporary benefits are provided to them at a near election time.

Another significant feature of Delhi is its religious composition. The population is predominantly Hindus (more than 80% of the population). Muslims and Sikhs are - politically significant religious minorities in Delhi. Both parties try hard to woo these votes. Majority - minority relations in the city was affected by such relations elsewhere in the country - Punjab and Kashmir. In almost all election the religious leaders of various minority organisations issue strong appeals to the people to support either party. Political parties mobilize support of this strata of society on communal issues. Such zeal to project their image as champion of rights of minorities is guided by electoral considerations.

Interestingly, Muslims constituted 44% of Delhi's population in 1941 but most Muslims migrated to Pakistan in 1947 and those who decided to stay back were concentrated in Jama Masjid, Suiwalan, Turkman Gate, Chandni Chowk, Ballimaran, Fatehpuri and Farash Khana.¹⁵ Their population declined to 5.85% in 1961 marginally rose to 6.47% in 1971 and 7.75% in 1981.

Sikhs migrated to Delhi in the wake of partition, they formed a very small percentage and their economic background made them seek security. They favoured the Congress ideology which ensured them secular character of state and economic security. In 1961 they formed 7.67% of Delhi's population, and remained at that in 1971 - 7.16% but declined marginally in 1981 to 6.33%.¹⁶ Sikhs are concentrated mainly in South Delhi.

The Muslims electorate in Delhi were behind congress till 1976 when during emergency regime, they were the worst suffers and in 1977 election voted against congress and in election after that in 1980 and local election in 1983 did not get back entirely it congress fold. They no longer believed the Congress party could protect their interests and in 1989 elections voted for Janata Dal (JD).

Similarly Sikhs who voted for Congress in the earlier elections were alienated after 'Operation Blue Star' and later riots in the 1984. Akali Dal issued appeals in all elections to Sikhs for not voting for Congress in Delhi. Bhartiya Janata Party was able to wean away this segment of society, so much so

that in 1993 Assembly elections main plank of the party was punishment to those (leaders) guilty of inciting rioting in 1984

Another section of society is the schedule caste, who are economically deprived and live in slums and resettlement colonies. They constituted 18.03% of total population in 1981 and in 1991 their percentage increase to 19.05%. Political parties try to woo their strata as well in the belief that they vote en bloc. The People belonging to this category are residing in outer Delhi and Eastern Delhi parliamentary constituencies. In the recent 1993 Assembly elections, both BJP and JD tried to woo these voters by using populist slogans and speeches made by Laloo Prasad Yadav, of JD and BJP used popularity of film star Shatrughan Sinha.

The picture which emerges from the accounting of socio-economic feature of Delhi is that it is a heterogeneity society. It includes people from all communities - Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians - though pre dominantly Hindu but significance of religious minorities in the fact that they are concentrated in certain areas of the city. People from all over the country live here which adds to diversity activities.

Delhi is an urban culture and national capital so primary and secondary occupation are relatively less important. Economy is dominated by service sector. Majority of people are either in trade, commerce, middle class professions or government jobs. So the class character of Delhi is dominated by the

salaried middle class and petty bourgeois. Attracted by the prosperity of Delhi people flock to it in search of jobs. These are poor people mostly from Eastern Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Tamil Nadu. Political parties in Delhi try to woo the religious minorities and poor people because it is easier to exploit their feeling of insecurity and can be won over by reassurance over provision of security. Congress(I) party promised them all these and more. Whereas BJP champion these cause in case of law and order problems and demand judicial problems and compensation.

The relative importance of national issues in local politics is also because the salaried middle class - well provided for otherwise is more concerned about the national policies. Religious minorities are also influenced by the policies of Central Government e.g. Sikhs in Punjab, riots in other parts of the country involving Muslims, Kashmir situation. The backward and poor people living in the city are also directly affected by policies of Central Government related to social justice, operation of law and order agencies. So national policies are always the issues around which public opinion is mobilized. Another peculiar feature is the influences of regional issues and trends on the people living in Delhi. As stated earlier, people are immigrants here and still belong to their home state. So, the importance of regional leaders like N.T. Rama Rao, Lallo Yadav in espousing cause of various political parties in Delhi.

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CHAPTER - II

POLITICS SET UP IN DELHI : A JOURNEY FROM COMPLETE CENTRAL DOMINANCE TO PARTIAL AUTONOMY.

The task of governing a capital is difficult and more so in case of a federal capital. This is because two conflicting requirements - ensuring that Central Government has adequate control over the capital city for not only maintaining exemplary civic services but also discharge its national and international responsibilities; on the other hand demands of the local population for a cohesive and democratic set up for local affairs. Delhi being the capital of India faced similar problem and till today has not been able to find a satisfactory solution. Three experiments have been conducted since independence but in each case the balance tilted in favour of special powers to the Central Government.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

From 1911 to 1947 Delhi was governed as Chief Commissioners Province, which meant comprehensive central control. But after independence local sentiment was in favour of popular government. So Pattabhi Committee was appointed by the Constituent Assembly to examine in detail the question of restructuring the political set up in Delhi and other small states. The Committee favoured a democratic set up for Delhi. On the basis of the report "the Constituent Assembly decided that

President should administer the Part C States and authorised the Parliament to create a legislature and a Council of Ministers or Advisors or both and a High Court in each of the state....."¹

The Union Parliament passed Part C States Act, 1951, which gave Delhi a legislative Assembly and a Council of Minister headed by a Chief Minister, working under the general control of the President. However, the legislative powers of the Assembly were subject to special limitations in recognition of the fact that the for the Central Government had special interest in the national capital.² The Assembly could not legislate in relation to the following matters:

1. Public order;
2. Police including railway police;
3. The Constitution and powers of Municipal Corporation and other local authorities of improvement trusts and of water supply drainage, electricity, transport and other public utility authorities in Delhi or in New Delhi;
4. Land and building vested in or in possession of the Union which are situated in Delhi or in New Delhi including all rights in or over such lands and buildings, the collections of rents therefrom and the transfer and alienation there of;
5. Offices against law with respect to any of the said matters;
6. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts in respect to any of the said matters;
7. Fees in respect of the said matters other than fees taken in any court.³

Local leaders expressed favourable opinion on the working of State Legislative Assembly in the period from 1952 to 1956. Jag Pravesh Chandra opined, although the powers given to the State Government were inadequate to meet the challenge of the multiple problems of Delhi, it did much promote public good in various spheres of welfare activities and developmental schemes. It there had been any lapse, it was mainly due to the overlapping of responsibility between the Federal Government and the State Government, functioning together at the same place. If the erstwhile State Government had been allowed full initiative, and also if adequate powers had been given to it, its record of achievements would have been still better. Similar views were expressed by Maheshwar Dayal (President of United Chamber of Trade Associations) on the work done by Delhi State Government. He stated that , "the State Assembly had not only satisfied the aspirations of the people but the people had greatly gained by the popular body".⁴

However, State Reorganization Commission appointed in 1956 was not convinced of the utility of Delhi State Government. It recommended replacement of the popular form of government with municipal body.

Before we deal with the next experiment of giving Delhi only a Municipal corporation and no deliberative legislative body, we must look at the reaction of the two political parties in Delhi to this abrupt end of statehood. Both parties had diametrically opposed view on the issue; Congress leaders gave

whole hearted support to idea of making Delhi a full fledged state. This was because, they were certain of their support base in Delhi to form government and run the affairs of Delhi whereas Jan Sangh was a new party and unsure of its ability to form government. So it criticized the idea of Statehood. Jan Sangh won only four seats out of total of forty eight polling 21.58% vote. 'The Delhi' Pradesh Congress Committee (DPCC) called the abolition of Assembly, "a retrograde step amounting to the disfranchisement of the people of Delhi"..... Later three MPs of Delhi (all from Congress) sent a memorandum to Joint Select Committee of the States Re-organization Bill in 1955, in which they laid down the guidelines for the future set up of Delhi.⁵

Here they supported the idea of directly elected representative with power to legislate on matter of local importance, sharing of responsibility for daily administration with peoples' representatives; and also asked for increasing representation of Delhi in the Parliament. In other words, they wanted popular, effective government to be installed in Delhi so that local initiative was not stifled but given full scope to operate. The DPCC also had differences of view in this regard with the central leadership, which was in favour of limited role of local representatives.

In complete contrast to this the Jan Sangh criticized Legislative Assembly as "costly administration". It also believed that a full fledged government in Delhi would work at cross purpose with the Centre.⁶ It favoured only a municipal body

for Delhi and special powers to the Centre.

The State Reorganization Commission appointed in 1956 concluded that the democratic experiment in Part C States had proved too costly, and this was not compensated by increased administrative efficiency or rapid economic and social progress. Therefore some of the Part C States were merged with the bigger units known as states and others were redesignated as Union Territories. As far as Delhi was concerned it was given a Municipal Corporation and comprehensive control over the affairs of the city were given to the Central Government. While suggesting these changes, the Commission was guided by the facts that (a) Delhi was/is the national Capital, (b) it was/is a city unit with more than 80% people living in urban areas.

Accordingly, the Parliament passed the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act 1957. D.M.C. covered the whole of Delhi (rural and urban) except NDMC and Delhi Cantonment. Board areas. It consisted of 100 members elected on the basis of adult franchise. It was based on the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, and separated legislative and executive wings. It was headed by a Mayor who was also the Presiding officer. The executive wing was headed by the Commissioner. From 1958 to 1966 this was the only elected body Delhi had. Some other authorities responsible for managing the civic affairs were - Delhi Municipal Corporation, New Delhi Municipal Committee, Delhi Cantonment Development authority, Delhi Transport Corporation.

Pressure was mounted on the Central Government by DPCC especially after 1962 Corporation elections. Emboldened by its victory local Congress leaders led by Ch. Brahm Prakash launched an aggressive campaign to convince the Central leadership of the desirability of a democratic set up for Delhi. Various meetings and conferences were organized for this purpose. When the central leadership did not give a positive response, it was decided to take up the issue at Durgapur session (1965) of Congress.

On the other hand Jan Sangh continued to hold the view that "full fledged state for Delhi would be 'irrational, wasteful and inefficient', it would be detrimental to the country's interest as a whole as it would be to the people of Delhi itself".⁷

Central leadership in partial response to the demand of DPCC passed Delhi Administration Act.1966 which provided a Metropolitan Council to Delhi. It consist of 56 elected members - 50 of the elected members come from Corporation areas, 5 from the NDMC areas and 1 from Delhi Cantonment. 5 members are nominated.

Metropolitan Council was given the function of discussing and recommending legislation for the Union Territory Delhi to the Central Government in respect of matters enumerated in Delhi Administration Act. 1966 which were:

- a) Proposal for undertaking legislation with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State list or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, in so far as any such matter is applicable to the Union Territory;
- b) Proposal for extension to Delhi of any enactment in force in a state relatable to any matter enumerated in the State list or Concurrent List;
- c) Proposals for legislation referred to it by the Administrator with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or Concurrent List;
- d) The estimated receipts and expenditure pertaining to Delhi to be credited to and made available from the consolidated Fund of India; and notwithstanding anything contained in the Delhi Development Act, 1957, The estimated receipts and expenditure of the Delhi Development Authority;
- e) Matters of administration involving general policy and schemes of development in so far as they relate to matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List;
- f) Any other matter referred to it by the Administrator.

The recommendations were considered by the Executive Council and then sent by the Administrator to the Central Government and after their examination approval sent to the Parliament.⁸

The only important power enjoyed by the Metropolitan Council in financial matters was that it could discuss the receipts and expenditure of the administration of DDA and send its recommendations to Central Government which had the right to accept or reject it. As far as the general budget of Union Territory of Delhi was concerned, it was presented in the Parliament along with general budget and after its approval, sent to the Administrator.

It is evident from the above account that Metropolitan Council of Delhi had neither meaningful legislative powers nor financial powers with regard to Delhi. H.K.L. Bhagat said, "It is an consultative body. It can talk and talk. It will have absolutely no power to finally determine anything".⁹ Similarly Vasudevan Nair held that "Metropolitan Council is just an ornament, just a debating society and nothing more than that".¹⁰ Parliament predominated in both areas. The elected representatives of people had only recommendatory powers in so far as legislation was concerned and in financial matters it could merely discuss the proposal passed by the parliament.

The Act also provided for an Executive Council consisting of our members. These were appointed by the President

and remained in office during his pleasure. Their main function was to "assist and advise" the Administrator in the exercise of his function in relation to matters enumerated in the State List or Concurrent List only. Even in case of these "transferred" subjects the advise of Executive Council was not binding on the Administrator. It was provided that in case of differences between Administrator and the members of Executive Council, the former refers it to the President whose decision is final. But pending such decision, in case of urgent matters, Administrator could take immediate action.

Apart from this, there were certain "reserved" subjects, which were under the sole jurisdiction of the Administrator. These reserved subjects were law and order in Delhi including the organization and discipline of police force, and such other matters as specified by the President of India from time to time; and issues concerning the judicial or quasi judicial functions of the Administrator or concerning any matter relating to New Delhi.

The above account of political set up in Delhi So what we had makes amply clear the weak and subordinate nature of local government. The Executive was neither responsible to the legislature, nor had any decisive say in transferred subjects. Central Government could easily interfere in all aspect of government in the Union Territory of Delhi through the nominated Administrator Lt. Governor, who had extensive powers in case of both transferred and reserved subjects. Hence the local

representative, even in the experiment could not come out of the overall dominating authority of Central Government. The experiments conducted so far suffered from the same defect of excessive central control of local affairs. However, members of Metropolitan Council were free to make enquiries through various types of questions and could make appeal through resolutions and motions. As per the Rules of Procedure and conduct of Business, the members could avail the following opportunities for this purpose:

- (1) Starred or Unstarred question.
- (2) Privileged questions.
- (3) Half an hour discussion
- (4) Call attention and adjournment motion.
- (5) Short duration discussion and Resolution.¹¹

Councillors made extensive use of these instruments of keeping a check on the activities of the executives. Members asked questions regarding management of Delhi Administration school - appointment of teachers, their service conditions in specific schools. Number of tubewells in rural areas Regularization of unauthorized colonies, Provision of drinking water, sewage facilities. Call attention motion was initiated by members incase of irregularity in ration cards or distribution of rationed items, mismanagement and illegal mining in Bharti mines, terrorist activities and inability of government to protect lives of people on specific problems like inability of children to secure admissions in colleges and schools. Important bills initiated during the 1983-1989 period were concerning

recognition of trade unions in Delhi, CPC (Amendment) bill which sought reorganizing civil courts. It provided for creation of five judicial districts thereby creating five judges who could hear appeal against the levy or assessment of any tax. To provide speedily justice, extension of West Bengal, defacement of Property Act 1976 to the Union Territory of Delhi to protect public property from being misused, defaced or disfigured; Delhi Rent Control Act 1957 was amended. It made provisions so that appeals from the Rent Controller or Additional Rent Controller could be early disposed; Eve Teasing bill 1984; Delhi Apartment Ownership Bill which provides for compulsory registration of the flats to become its legal owner, Absolute title would remove any hurdle in the inheritance procedure of the property; Delhi Motor Vehicles Taxation Amendment Bill was passed - provided for monitoring and recovery of road tax in lumpsum i.e. for ten year.¹² If we look at the issues which are dealt with by these bills we find that these are only for the convenience of people when dealing with various government authorities. They did not deal with the pressing problems of the city as such e.g. land development. The point to note is that Metropolitan Council does not have the power to deal with it. But these were mainly in the nature of seeking information for executive could not be censured for in action.

Another Serious defect in the frame work was absence of nodal authority.¹³ The administration of Delhi functioned through the Lieutenant Governor in some matters, and through the various Central Ministries in other e.g. Housing and Land is

under Ministry of Urban Development, general administration and municipal authorities under Ministry of Home Affairs. Apart from creating confusion it left space open for direct central interference. In Delhi itself there was multiplicity of authorities e.g. in the sphere of urban planning and development which is primary responsibility of DDA but MCD is empowered to sanction lay out plans as well as building plans. Another problem which is associated to the multiplicity of authorities is lack of coordination within all these governing authorities. The result of this was not only "duplication of work - wastage of time, energy and public money" haphazard of city and dilution of individual responsibility.¹⁴

Dissatisfaction with this political and administrative set up in Delhi led to demands made by major political parties (Congress - I and BJP) for restructuring. During the last decade Delhi Pradesh BJP led numerous demonstrations, presented memorandums to relevant authorities and organized public meetings to raise the demand for complete statehood for Delhi. But the Delhi Pradesh Congress (I) demanded only a legislative assembly for Delhi. Their respective demands were included in their election manifestos in the various local and parliamentary elections.

A debate was triggered off between the supporters of full fledged statehood and those who favoured Legislative Assembly and special powers to the Central Government. The Ministry of Home Affairs appointed an expert committee in 1987,

to recommend improvement in the present structure of government in Delhi. But before we go into the recommendation of the Sarkaria/Balakishnan Committee, we should examine the arguments put forth in favour of full fledged statehood and against it. The supporters of full statehood argued that Delhi has a vast population and it is growing at tremendous rate, and a state like Himachal Pradesh has much smaller population but is a full fledged state. In the light of this fact, demands of democratic rights to the people of Delhi was justified. DPBJP deputation to Sarkaria Committee stressed this point. Abhijit Dutta Prof. IIPA expressed the view that the creation of federal territories for use as capital was feasible only when there was small population. A huge population in Delhi would need some political machinery and participatory form of governance.¹⁵

Multiplicity of authorities cause much hardship to common people and encouraged ad-hocism in decision-making. Moreover, "In Delhi the Municipal Corporation functioned under the supervision of Commissioner - appointed by and responsible to the Central Government rather than local government. And needless to say the Central Government concerns then provision of civic services.". Prof. Abhijit Dutta said since the Centre was in overall control of the territory different arms of the government functions independently with no point of co-ordination except the cabinet, where Lieutenant Governor could be overruled by ministers. He said incase of milk price fixation the general manager of Delhi Milk Scheme did not have the authority to fix the price which remained responsibility of Ministry of

Agriculture. All this showed the absence of a political buffer at the level of Delhi Administration to effectively separate the problems of the Metropolis from the National ones.¹⁶ Highlighting similar problem M.R. Arya a senior BJP leaders, said that the first Master Plan for Delhi formulated in 1961 expired in 1981. The second plan with the perspective of the situation in 2001 A.D was then revised but never implemented. The drafts are laying in Nirman Bhawan for the past nine years.¹⁷

Advocate of statehood were of the view that there would be no conflict even if two governments worked in Delhi. They believe that the constitution had enough safeguards to deal with such a situation. K.N. Sahni point out that their ought to be no serious administrative problem, if Delhi is made a state because it is the national capital as well. There could be a small national capital region under the direct control of the Union Government while rest could be under the state.¹⁸ M.L. Khurana said, "when we talk of special status for Punjab, when we talk of how much more rights do we give away. The same rule applies to the state of Jammu and Kashmir. But when the same question is taken with respect to Delhi, then what is discussed is not what more to give but what can be taken away. That is why we are against special status.¹⁹ Advocates of the status quo, mostly administrators, Economic planners, feels that co-existence of two capital will create more administrative problems instead of solving existing ones.

In a nutshell those who favoured statehood emphasise the need to appreciate right of people to have effective voice in matters that affect their lives. Secondly, the defects of existing set up calls for change in the direction of cohesive administration. Thirdly, they urge us not to be apprehensive about conflict of authority between different government and have faith in the constitutions capacity to solve problems of such nature.

Critics of statehood were of the view that Delhi being national capital could not be treated like any other state. It's special status and different requirements should be kept in mind.

" Delhi, as the national capital, could be vulnerable to attempts to subvert or overthrow the lawful Government, and also has the potential to become the centre of anti-national activities or those incited by foreign powers or organizations. To contain such activities and ensure safety and security of the country as a whole can best be handled only by the expertise and resources available to Union Government".²⁰ The security of national leaders, foreign dignitaries - diplomats, envoys, visiting leaders - requires effort at much larger scale than any state could manage. Hence the Central Government should be given more powers to deal with affairs of the Capital.

The national capital is regarded as symbol of nation's pride. So law and order, supply of essential commodities, water, electricity etc. should be of high standard. Delhi, they say has nothing of its own - not even people who are mainly migrants

from all over the country. Statehood they feel would result in tension among people from various regions and also friction with neighbouring states.²¹ State government could face financial difficulty in maintaining such exemplary standards. Delhi especially has to depend on neighbouring states for water, electricity and other commodities. So the central Government is better placed to negotiate with them to procure a better deal for Delhi, than any state government. Recent water crisis in Delhi, caused by the refusal of Haryana to release adequate water amply illustrates the point.

The other consideration was that of financial viability of state of Delhi. As a Union territory its expenditure was met by Union Government. If it became a state the norms and restriction regarding financial assistance from the centre applicable to other state would apply resulting in decline of resources. It would be difficult to meet special requirement of capital with usual assistance.

As far as the conflict of authority is concerned, the critics of statehood, they argue that management of capital's affairs would not mean occasional intervention, but frequent need to intervention in local affairs and this would definitely create unnecessary tension between Centre and state government especially if both belonged to different political parties. The Union Territories economy is mainly trade oriented. There is little agriculture, hardly any natural resources and its industry is incapable of providing the city's population with mass

consumption goods, say many economists. According to them, the major cause for civic development in the city has been its status as the national capital.

The centre usually gives grants to meet all the needs of Union territories and Delhi as national capital gets an even better deal. Delhi's annual outlay for the year in Rs. 800 crores, while states like Punjab have received Rs. 900 crores. Despite its population rising from 67 lakhs in '82 to over 90 lakhs now Delhi has Rs. 723 per capita land expenditure while national average is Rs. 260. Subsidized services for e.g. DTC charges 15.2 paise per km. Whereas BEST has 12 paise per km. Delhi is consumer state and basically trade distribution centre 18% exports are done from Delhi. Its sales tax and other levies are hiked trade will suffer.²²

Now let us see the recommendations of the expert committee in the light of arguments presented above. It concluded that "there is a good case on merit for providing Delhi with a Legislative Assembly and a Council of Ministers responsible to such Assembly with adequate powers to deal with matters of concern to the common man. However, this should not hamper in any way the discharge by the union of its special responsibility in relation to the capital of the country. The only way of ensuring this was to retain its Union Territory status and make provision for a Legislative Assembly.

The Legislative Assembly should have full legislative powers in relation to matters in the State List and Concurrent List in so far as such matters are applicable to the Union Territories. However, certain specific exception should be made in this regard in view of the special responsibility of the Union in relation to the Capital. The subjects to be excluded are: public order, police and land development.

Moreover, the Lieutenant Governor should be required to perform his functions on the "aid and advise" of the Council of Ministers. In case of differences of opinion, the question should be referred to the President whose decision will be final.

Having regard to the importance of New Delhi area where most of the important institutions of the Union Government are located, NDMC should continue to receive special treatment and the law of Parliament containing provisions for the organization and functioning of municipal bodies for Delhi should make certain special provisions in this regard and should confer on the Central Government adequate powers of supervision and control over NDMC.

Public utility agencies with those of a water supply, electricity and transport should be managed on professional lines by statutory corporation each regulated by or under a law of parliament. Day to day functioning would be supervised by Delhi Administration.

If we take a closer look at the recommendations we find that its provisions regarding the powers of Central Government over Delhi remained same only difference was that it recommended Legislative Assembly and Council of Minister responsible to it. However, many subjects were kept outside the purview of the local assembly including land development. There were no appreciable changes as far as powers of Lieutenant Governor were concerned. Thirdly no significant changes were suggested to overcome problem of multiplicity of autonomy.

Based on this Report, 74th Amendment Bill 1991 and Government of National Capital Territory Bill 1991 were introduced in the Parliament in December 1991. The former sought the amendment of Article 239(A) for the new administrative set up and the latter renamed the union territory Delhi as National Capital Region. The Amendment Bill was adopted in Lok Sabha by an overwhelming majority of 349 votes and in Rajya Sabha by 142 members.

Analysis of the provisions of the Act reveal that the basic structure has not been altered. The changes proposed are cosmetic in nature. The Legislative Assembly has no power to legislate on public order, police and land i.e. right in and over land, land tenures including relation of landlord and tenant and collection of rents, transfer and alienation of agricultural land, land improvement and agricultural loans and colonization. Further the Act did not make it competent to enact laws in respect of State List Entry 64 (offences against laws with

respect to any of the matters in the State List), Entry 65 (Jurisdiction and powers of all courts except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in the State List) and Entry 66 (Fee in respect of any of the matters in the State List but not including fees taken in any court).²³

More over Parliaments powers to maker laws is supreme. Bills passed by Legislative Assembly is submitted to the Lieutenant Governor who may assert to it/withhold it or reserve it for President's consideration. In case of difference opinion between Lieutenant Governor, and Ministers the President's decision is final and pending decision, in urgent matters Lieutenant Governor could act on his discretion. Moreover, the President will have the power to "suspend the operation of Article 239 AA or of all or any of the provisions of any law made in pursuance of that article, for such period as it thinks fit and make such incidental and consequential provisions as may appear to him to be necessary or expedient for administrating the NCT in accordance with the provisions of Article 239 and 239 AA of the Constitutions".

Though the Act provided a Legislative Assembly, however, legislative powers are limited and the whole set up work supposed to under the overall control of President. The powers of the Lieutenant Governor is left intact. In other words the form of government is still diarchic and discretionary powers of Lieutenant Governor and Central Parliament pre-eminence continued.

However, it would be wrong to assume that nothing has changed. The Legislative Assembly's powers in deliberative and financial matters are enhanced compared to the powers given to the Metropolitan Council. As noted above the legislative powers of the Assembly are not purely recommendatory now. Under the present Act Budget would be prepared by council of Minister and approved by the Assembly Section 28, Clause (1) of the Act. not to submit the "charged expenditure" to the vote of the Legislative Assembly, is in conformity with the basic scheme of the Constitution, according to which no "charged expenditure" either in the union or in a state, is subject to the Vote of legislature. And clause (2) Section (28) States - so much of the said estimates as relate to other expenditure shall be submitted in the form of grants to the assembly, and the Legislative Assembly has the power to assent or refuse to assent, to any demand, or to assent to any demand subject to a reduction of the amount specified there in.... Section 30 makes provision for supplementary grants, provision is also made for contingency fund and Assembly will determine the sum to be paid into it from Consolidate Fund of Delhi.²⁴

Despite these changes there are major gaps in the proposed structure. The Act is silent on the relationship of the executive and the powerful corporations such leading NDMC, DESU and other such bodies. The possibility of conflict in authority and jurisdiction. Neither does it mention how to solve disputes between the Lieutenant Governor and the legislative. So there is need for developing conventions for smooth working of the

Assembly.

BJP which vociferously advocated statehood described the Assembly as "club footed and lame legged".²⁵ M.L. Khurana, President DBJP and M.P. from Delhi said, "considering the problems of the Capital, where 60% population lacked even sewage facility at least 70 lakh people lived in "sub standard" areas, the proposed assembly would never meet the expectations of the people for it had not been vested with adequate powers. There is officers raj afsar shahi in the Capital today. But unfortunately, the position may not be much better even after the Constitution of the Assembly".²⁶

Congress leader Jag Pravesh Chandra welcomed and defended the new proposal on the ground that this was the maximum that could have been achieved was of the view that "it is an improvement over what prevailed in the past".²⁷ Home Minister, S.B. Chavan said that earlier the President exercised full control over all the department. But now there are areas without interference.

The issue of a suitable political and administrative set up for Delhi has been an important issue in the local politics of Delhi. A solution that could satisfy both conditions of popular government and the pre-eminent role of Central Government in the national capital has not yet been found. The Central Government was/is clearly not in favour of giving more than municipal autonomy to Delhi. Ineffective, subordinate local

government institution resulted in directing the attention of people to the acts. of Central Government. All the expert committees set up so far have also favoured special powers for the Central Government. But local units of both parties have changed their stand from time to time. DPCC led aggressive campaign for democratic set up in Delhi in 1960's but later accepted the new of the Central leadership and in the 1980's its position varied from demand for statehood to legislative assembly to sometimes satisfaction over existing set up.

On the other hand Jan Sangh vacillated in its demand for popular government according to its relative strength in elections in the earlier decade. Bhartiya Janata party (BJP) however, supported their demand from the very beginning and intensified its activities to demand statehood for Delhi especially when it emerged victorious in the Hindi speaking states in 1989 elections and supported National Front Government from out side at the Centre. As we see in the next chapter National Leaders of the party supported its local unit campaigns in this regard. The main consideration was to claim credit for getting a demand fulfilled and also making its presence felt in the national capital if favourable elections trend continued in the Hindi speaking states.

One notable feature of this whole issue is the conspicuous absence of popular demand for full fledged statehood in Delhi. People are not convinced that making it a state would make it more efficient. Absence of popular demand could also be

explained by lack of any regional sentiment as in other states. Anyhow, political parties have kept the issue alive. Leaders of BJP stated that they will try to give the people of Delhi best possible with the limited powers given to the Legislative Assembly. Simultaneously they will continue struggle for full fledged statehood.

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CHAPTER - III

MOBILIZATION STRATEGY AND CHANGING SOCIAL BASE

In the context of democracy, political parties act as "An organised media for the conduct of public affairs....". So the major task facing them is mobilizing society. In order to successfully accomplish this task political parties need to familiarize themselves with the needs and aspirations of the people and give expression to the demands of the people and champion their rights. A movement is generally organised by the party to fight on an issue or a number of issues and may consist of a single agitation or a series of agitation. Since motive behind organising public opinion is gaining public support the effort of the parties is to gain support of various sections of society.

This chapter is an attempt to understand the efforts of BJP and Delhi Pradesh Congress(I) to mobilize people of Delhi on various issues in the 1980's. Here we examined the nature of issues raised and compare them to those raised earlier. This would help in understanding the efforts of the parties at consolidating or extending their constituency. The nature of issues raised the nature of states of society whose support is sought.

By examining of the interest or demands articulated by the party we can find out the class or community support basis

of the party. According to party seeking consolidation of its support basis would stress more on the demands of its traditional supporters. Those seeking extension of support basis would raise demands of the other sections as well. Change of this sort could also be explained in terms of change in the nature of society as well. Lastly, it assesses the relative success of Delhi BJP in gaining public support through such movements in the face of competition by a Congress party which used its patronage power and charisma of leaders to gain support.

BJP which was formed in April 1980, represented "both the Jan Sangh group and some other who had also walked out of the Janta party."¹ The party so formed wanted to project a new image of itself - not the Hindi-Hindu image of Jan Sangh. The party accordingly retained Janta in its name, adopted green and saffron flag, different symbol and also emphasised its guiding philosophy - Gandhian Socialism. In other words it wanted to project a secular image of itself in order to broaden its mass base. In addition, demographic structure of Delhi underwent change. Immigrants from all parts of country reduced the importance of Hindu refuges in Delhi politics. Keeping these concerns in mind the party raised issues in Delhi which concerned the economic and political aspects. This was in complete contrast to the issues raised by Delhi Pradesh Jan Sangh in earlier decades.

Since Congress (I) was the party in power till 1989 both at the local and the national level, it did not organise itself on issues as extensively as the BJP. It endorsed all the

policies of the central leadership. However, towards the end of the decade it organised a few yatras to project a secular image of itself. But when it lost in the 1989 elections, it was awakened from its slumber. It then led a few demonstrations against policies of the central government.

In April 1980 some leaders of Jan Sangh and Janta Party formally launched Bhartiya Janta party (BJP). And it performed well in the Assembly election in May 1980. This showed "that it was able to reclaim much of the old Jan Sangh's support base"². Inspired by this early success the Delhi unit of BJP concerned itself wholeheartedly with the issue of holding early elections in Delhi. First of all it launched a phased agitation in support of their demand for early election in Delhi. Its processions were taken out from various parts of the city in which influential leaders like V.K. Malhotra, K.N. Sahni and other participated. The issue was again raised at a 'protest march' organised by the Delhi Pradesh BJP. A resolution was passed by Delhi BJP urging the Government to hold early elections in Delhi. But the Central Government did not pay any attention to it, so the BJP continued its activities during the next two and half years till elections were announced in Jan 1983. Until then it organised. In May 1981 it launched a "week long agitation" to press their demand. It organised public meetings in various parts of the city and local leaders led various demonstrations where workers courted arrest. At one such demonstration in front of Town Hall slogans like "Himmat Ho To Chunav Karao", and "Hold elections and Save Democracy" were raised.³ The BJP did not

confine its activities to public protest decided to file a petition before Supreme court to challenge the extension of Central Rule in Delhi. It also organised a signature campaign to show popularity of the demand. Later V.K. Malhorta submitted a memorandum to the President. It also organised a rally addressed by the BJP General Secretary, L.K. Advani. He said, "the Government must be compelled to restore democracy in the Capital".⁴ Elections were finally announced in January 1983 to the local bodies. The DPBJP pursued this demand with favour and as stated above took out processions in various parts of the city, like Chandni Chowk, Karol Bagh, Adarsh Nagar, etc. to mobilise public opinion on the issue. The party workers actively participated in the movement and courted arrests. But the Central Government waited till the time when it could boast of achievements during Asiad 1982 and also local units gave favourable assessment of mood of the electorate, to hold elections. The BJP suffered an unexpected defeat in this election where it could capture only 19 out of 56 Metropolitan Council seats and 37 out of 100 Municipal Corporation seats. The demand for local elections was renewed again in 1987 when elections were due for Metropolitan Council and Municipal Corporation. But now added to this was another demand for complete restructuring or granting full-fledged statehood to Delhi. Especially in the wake of electoral success in 1989 the demand for full fledged statehood was vehemently pursued by the BJP.

The Delhi Pradesh BJP launched a two week "March for Justice".⁵ It took out 'Yatras' in various parts of the city every day. The national level leaders also took active part in it Atal Bihari Vajpayee addressed the opening day rally in a trans-yamuna colony, and the concluding day rally was addressed by L.K. Advani in Mehrauli. During these yatras "misdeeds, failures & acts of corruption" of the ruling party, were be depicted on boards of vehicles accompanying the yatra.⁶ The issue was repeatedly taken up by the BJP and a massive rally was organised, which was addressed by local and national leaders. They all spoke in favour of statehood and brought to the notice of the people the anomalies of the existing set up which was powerless to do any good to the city. Moreover, they pointed out that "union territories with population ranging between 5 to 15 lakh were granted statehood" but Delhi with a population of 9.7 lakh was denied this democratic right.⁷ They also highlighted the problems which people faced because of this faulty set up. It also sent a deputation to Sarkaria Committee set up to go into re-organisation of Delhi political set up and put forth the same demands and same reasons as stated above. 1989 was the year of Lok Sabha elections. So the effort was intensified. Accordingly it staged dharnas at 108 different places in the Capital to protest against the postponement of elections to Delhi.⁸ A rally was organised and addressed by A.B. Vajpayee and later memorandum was submitted to the President for early election and statehood to Delhi. Demonstrations were organised to press the demand for an early elections and statehood.

Later in the year the BJP won an impressive majority in the Hindi speaking states in 1989 general election and the National Front Government at the Centre needed its support. So vigorous campaign begun to demand statehood. It organised an indefinite dharna at Boat Club and addressing the party cadres M.L. Khurana said, "Statehood was no largesse. It is the need of the citizen and Janta Dal is obligated to fulfill it"⁹. Later when the Sarkaria Balakrishnan Committee submitted its report and National Front Government decided to draft a bill on its basis DPBJP opposed retention of certain rights by the Central Government. However, that Bill could not be passed because Congress(I) did not support it. However, later in December 1991 when Congress (I) was the ruling party at the Centre, it introduced the Bills which gave Delhi a Legislative Assembly but retaining its Union Territory status. So, despite all its attempts, BJP could not succeed in getting a full fledged statehood for Delhi.

Another local issue that was raised by the DPBJP during normal times, election time and in the Metropolitan Council was that of 'deteriorating law and order in Delhi. Its mandal unit organised demonstration in front of respective police stations in case of individual cases of dacoity, kidnapping etc. The Delhi Pradesh BJP also observed 'anti crime rise week" many times during which it organised demonstrations and submitted memorandums to the authority concerned. Besides it also organised "Bandh" to express anger and anguish when many innocent people were killed in a series of bomb blasts in May 1985. It

also led silent marches at times and demanded Union Home Minister's resignation.

Another serious cause for breach of law and order in Delhi was the riots involving Sikhs in 1984 and Hindu-Muslim riots which erupted many times. In case of 1984 riots the DBJP led peace marches and meetings in affected areas. It also sent its workers door to door appealing for peace. Leaders of the DBJP threatened to go on fast outside P.M's residence if official whose criminal negligence & callousness cause 1984 riots Later in case of the riots in the "walled city", a memorandum was submitted to demanding an explanation from Delhi Administration for alleged mishandling of sensitive situation, which included lifting of the curfew during tense times non- deployment of adequate number of security personnel and inability to arrest miscreants.¹⁰ They also demanded compensation for riot victims, besides raising the law and order issue. This issue was highlighted at almost all rallies, demonstrations and other public meetings etc. and the DBJP attract the attention of the people to the inability of the government to ensure the security of their life and property. In most cases the main thrust of their argument was that tragedies that happened were avoidable but government mishandled the whole situation causing loss of life and property. Apart from blaming government, it demanded compensation for the victims in monetary terms and bringing the guilty to book.

Another local issue which touched lives of city folk closely was provision of civic amenities. Certain areas in the city like government employee colonies, posh areas of south Delhi are not faced with problems like shortage of water, sewage disposal, health care facilities. On the other hand are the Jhogi-Jhompri clusters, slums, resettlement and unauthorised colonies, where people from the weaker sections of society live; these areas lack adequate water supply (people have to depend on community sources) electricity, insanitary environment, garbage disposal which causes serious health problems in the areas of the poor people. DPBJP organised demonstration, public meetings and dharnas to protest against this utter neglect of these areas by the concerned authorities. "One such demonstration was organised by the DBJP at Town Hall to protest inadequate supply of drinking water. It was led by the DPBJP President M.L. Khurana & Shanti Desai, leader of opposition in the municipal corporation. The demonstrations included large number of women, who carried empty pitchers and shouted slogans."

The DBJP also led number of demonstration when gastro-entritis and cholera epidemics broke out in the capital, one such demonstration was in a front of Union Minister-Jagdish Tytler's residence and the other in front of H.K.L. Bhagat. Both were also MPs from Delhi. Charti Lal Goyel, the DPBJP Vice-President addressing the volunteers said it was "defective planning and criminal negligence by the Congress run Delhi Administration¹²" He also demanded resignation of the Minister. Later in a memorandum addressed to the President, certain demands were put

forth i.e. resignation of all ministers who were MPs from Delhi, compensation to the victims and also basic civic amenities for residents of Jhuggi-Jhohpri clusters, resettlement colonies and urban villages.

On another occasion when the DBJP had organised a dharna to protest against the shortage of water and electricity, its leaders alleged that Union Home Minister failed to properly present Delhi case before the Eradi Commission for Delhi's share of Ravi-Beas water.

The DPBJP also raised the issue of change in the pattern of allotment of MIG flats on cash down basis rather than installment basis. A petition was filed in Delhi High Court against this 'arbitrary decision'. Later it also organised dharna at Chief Executive Councillor's, office for restoration of earlier scheme. This issue is of great significance to the middle class living in the city; these people cannot afford to make payment at one time but attach great significance to owning a house and enjoy a sense of security that comes with it.

An issue with fervent appeal to all section of society was that of price-rise, the Delhi Pradesh BJP left absolutely no opportunity to arouse the 'anti incumbent' feelings of people on this issue. It organised numerous demonstrations, rallies sometimes against rise in price of specific commodities, at other times against inflationary budget.

Massive rallies and demonstrations were organised as part of "anti price rise week" beginning November 17, 1980 in different parts of the city and addressed by national leaders like A.B. Vajpayee besides local leaders like M.L. Khurana. They criticised the Central Government for its failure to check price rise and demanded reduction in prices. Many times local leaders led dharnas, satyagrahs in front of office/residence of concerned minister in case of rise in price of essential commodities like sugar, wheat, petrol. A cycle rally was organised by the DBJP. It was led by V.K. Malhotra, president of local the unit, M.L. Khurana (then) General Secretary, K.N. Sahni (former CEC) and K.L. Gupta in ex-MP. The worker carried placard and banners with legends "Mehnga petrol, diesal, aur tel, Indira Shasan ho Gaya fail".¹³ Later a memorandum was submitted to the Prime Minister..... This was done at a time when prices of petrol had fallen by 15% on the world market..... It demanded that government place before the people details of price structure of kerosene, diesel and other petroleum products and withdraw the unjustified and outrageous increase in prices of these products. In case of fare hike of DTC the DBJP protested. So it did when price of milk was increased led by the state unit President M.L. Khurana, DBJP volunteers picketed the DMS milk booth and raising slogans like "doodh ki keemat kam karo, Bharastachar kam karo" and "Doodh ke keemat badhane Jane Virodhi aur garib virodhi hai".¹⁴

"Anti-Budget week" was observed in April 1985. During this week demonstration were organised - march led by women

raised catchy slogans like - Mehngi Dal, Tel Tarkari, Dukhi Ho Rahi Ghar Ki Nari", "Congress Raj mein Daam Badaye, Kaise gar ka Kharch chalaye"... Budget was described as "Cruel".¹⁵ In 1986 also it presented a memorandum to the President condemning "anti people economic policies of the government" and "unprecedented hike in prices of essential commodities".¹⁶

Payment of 'Dearness Allowance' (D.A. hereafter) to Government employees was also high on the agenda of the DBJP and major demands in this field that were supported by the party were the release of four installments of D.A. and revision of pay structure. This issue is clearly related to the issue of price rise, for D.A. is supposed to be inflation equaliser. In this case also processions were led by local leaders and submitted memorandum.

All these above stated issues were connected to the policies of government, but the DBJP led a campaign in 1987 which was unusual in the sense that it was directed against a person - Rajiv Gandhi the then Prime Minister of the country. The DBJP organised a "Rajiv Hato, Bhrashtachar Metao" fortnight from April 25th to 10th May. During this period issues like fairfax scandal, black money of certain capitalists and other leaders in foreign banks, resignation of former Defence Minister V.P. Singh, scandals of commission in defence deals were raised.¹⁷ In other words, the major issue was that bribes were paid by the foreign company to get the Bofors contract and the Prime Minister was shielding those people from public inquiry. The DBJP organised

a series of street corner meetings in the beginning where leaders urged the people to remove the "corrupt" congress government.¹⁸ Later rallies were organised which were addressed by local leaders like M.L. Khurana and on the last day of the campaign a rally was organised at Boat Club addressed by A.B. Vajpayee. They reiterated demand for Prime Minister's resignation and imparted probe into the whole issue. Speaking on the occasion Vajpayee said "If Mr. Clean does not look as clean today as he looked earlier it was not due to propaganda launched by opposition but due to Prime Minister's decision to force Mr. V.P. Singh to quit Cabinet & his refusal to have submarine and Bofors deals investigated by the Parliamentary committee"¹⁹ This issue assumed the status of main plank of opposition during the 1989 elections later.

The Delhi Pradesh BJP raised all the issues closely connected to lives of people living in the capital city of India. In the last decade it became clear that the party would not succeed only on the basis of traditional supporters - Punjabi refugees, and petty bourgeois sections of society. In the last decades migrants from all over the country came to the capital and settled permanently here. This changed the socio-economic, cultural and ethnic character of their constituency. So it emphasised on issues which were all encompassing, like, the price rise. The party devoted much of its time and energy on mobilising people on this and related economic issues. Secondly, the fact that during the decade it was the opposition party both at central and Union territory level, so its movements and

agitation were mainly in the nature of capitalising on "anti-incumbent" feeling. It blamed Congress(I) party for anything that caused hardship to people. Whether in case of law and order or the local problems of civic amenities, the main thrust of these movements was that government planning and policies are faulty and efforts at implementation insincere. Government's failures were overplayed near or at the time of elections.

The selection and projection of issues for mass mobilisation was for consolidation of traditional support and expanding support base. In its attempt to successfully compete with Congress - I party, it adopted the tactics of that party and failed to project an alternative image of itself. Neither could it give to the people any alternative solution to their problems. But by 1986, it returned to its RSS roots and took up issues, that helped it project the image of defender of Hindus. During the late 1980's the Delhi Pradesh BJP was highly critical of Central Government's policy of containing terrorism in Punjab. It demanded that Central Government adopt 'tough' measures to tackle terrorism. "In support of its demand for deployment of army in four border districts of Punjab and to stop exodus of Hindus from Punjab. It organised a day long dharna at 56 prominent places in the capital²⁰". Whenever Hindus were killed in Punjab by miscreants, protest marches were carried out by the BJP volunteers to "express anger and anguish". At a public meeting they carried placards bearing slogans like "Massacre are common place in Punjab the Government is wearing bangles" & "who is Punjab Government's Guardian? Rajiv Gandhi is silent²¹". It

organised many more processions, dharnas, rallies to press for their demands during 1987 and 1988. It demanded dismissal of the Barnala Government, creation of a security belt & "effective" steps to curb terrorism.

Similarly in 1990 it organised actively against Kashmir policy of the government. It reiterated its demand for abrogation of Article 370 with great intensity. It also demanded "effective" tackling of terrorism in the valley and rebuff Pakistani interference. Due to tension in Kashmir, migrants had come to Delhi. BJP demanded better facilities for their rehabilitation. So, both these issues where minority majority communities were involved the DBJP demanded fair deal for the Hindus migrants and tough measures for terrorists. These demands were bound to be popular with the displaced people and on the whole strengthened the image of Party, fighting to establish Hindu nationalism.

The Delhi Pradesh BJP led a big demonstration outside Pakistani High Commission on Kashmir issue. In particular they were vocal against attempts by Pakistanis and their sympathisers to infiltrate into the state. Apart from a petition to Pakistan Prime Minister, they also called for the "liberation" of POK.²² Later a rally was organised where slogan like "Jise khon se seencha hai, woh Kashmir hamara hai" were raised. Party leader M.L. Khurana read out its demands - no negotiation with militants, they should be crushed with a heavy hand, Pakistan should be warned that if it did not stop its activities in

kashmir, it would face serious consequences; the so-called Azad Kashmir should be liberated from Pakistani occupation; Article 370 deleted; and housing and employment and interest free loans should be provided for immigrants from Kashmir. It criticised what it called "Ghutna tek niti" of the Central government - a reference to recall of Jagmohan, in a rally at Boat Club.²³

Upto now the DBJP pursued these issues related to Hindu nationalism with fervour but not exclusively; other local issues were given their due importance. But later in the year 1990 it pursued exclusively the issue of Ram Janam Bhoomi projecting "Hindutva" as the most important issue.

It all began with arrival of L.K. Advani's rath in Delhi in October 1990. Scooter, motor cycle, cars, vans, jeeps, matadors and even bullock carts adorned with BJP flags were seen making their way to the Tikri border on Rohtak Road. Interesting slogans were raised by The DBJP volunteers - "Jo Ram Ke Nahin, Woh Kisi Kaam Ka Nahin". Baccha Baccha Ram Ka Janam Bhoomi Ke Kaam Ka".²⁴ Local BJP leaders sent their wholehearted support to this campaign.

The Delhi BJP leaders M.L. Khurana, V.K. Malhotra and Kalka Dass decided to defy the orders sealing borders of Delhi - UP in October 1990 to reach Ayodhya to perform Kar Sewa for Ram Janam bhoomi temple. Speaking to a group of Kar Sewaks, "the die has been cast, the struggle has started and time has come for every Hindu to be ready for extreme sacrifices", was V.K.

Malhotra's advice.²⁵ Later when Advani was arrested and Rath Yatra stopped the DBJP organised a Bandh in Delhi. The tempo continued and the DBJP organised a prayer meeting to invoke blessings of the Lord Hanuman to assist Kar Sewaks. A large canopy put up near Hanuman Mandir in Delhi and in it was placed - large cut out of Advani behind prison-bars and women volunteer singing bhajans. Also two large pictures of proposed temple was placed along with party flags.²⁶ Again on November 5, 1990, Bandh was organised in Delhi to protest death of Kar Sewaks in Ayodhya. The DBJP grew defiant and decided to screen controversial audio-visual cassettes showing the shooting of Kar Sewaks in Ayodhya. A public meeting was organised in the heart of the city and provocative speeches were made by the DBJP readers like M.L. Khurana.... "General Dyer ne logo ko Jallian Wala bagh se lashe uthane de the, Yeh Mulayam Singh Yadav ki sarkar ne logon ke lashe tak uthani nahi di". He complained that the Doordarshan was distorting the truth about the situation and people should know reality. He also argued that it was a temple already, for kirtan had been going on since 1949. Slogans raised were "Jai Shree Ram" and "Bharat Mata Ke Jai Ho".²⁷

The Delhi unit of BJP led an ardent campaign for building a temple in Ayodhya and party flags and symbols were freely used for such meetings. The leaders tried to justify their brand of Hindu nationalism and it was tremendous success in Delhi. Not only did people come out in thousands to listen to the speeches etc. But also partly reaped rich benefits in 1991 mid-term elections.

These were the activities the newly launched BJP's Delhi unit engaged in during the whole of last decade. Apparently different from its predecessor BJS, the party could not and did not completely serve all links with the past. It continued to bank on the support of the urban middle class and petty bourgeois segments of society. It also made attempts to mobilise economically weaker sections of society and the rural Delhi. The Shift was apparent only after 1991 elections and clearly established in 1993 Legislative Assembly Elections. During the first five years of its existence it mobilised people on secular issues, mainly economic issues. But after 1986, it exploited its association with Hindu nationalism. The erstwhile BJS had solid support from the Punjabi refugees in Delhi, the BJP attempted same by speaking loud and clear about migrants from Punjab and Kashmir in Delhi. It also vigorously pursued the Ram Janambhoomi campaign in Delhi in the 1990. Due to its efforts it has not only been able to hold the traditional support base but also expanded it considerably partly by exploiting Hindutva and partly discontent with Congress rule.

In sharp contrast to this Congress party which won two out of three Lok Sabha elections and only local elections in the last decade seems to have lost the traditional support basis. The reason for this is clear if we look at the inactivity that marked DPCC(I) in the last decade. On issues like deteriorating law and order, early elections to local bodies and restructuring of the political set-up in Delhi, which were actively raised by the DBJP, the Delhi Pradesh Congress leaders declared in few press

conferences that they had sent delegations to concerned authorities in Central Government to improve the situation and take suitable action. And communicated to the people the assurances given by the Union Ministers. But, it was intended that Central Ministers took keen interests in Delhi's affairs only when elections were round the corner.

From 1986 onwards, its main effort was directed to organising communal harmony marches in various part of Delhi. The Delhi Pradesh Congress Committee's minority cell and Youth Congress organised one such march to create communal amity and restore confidence among people in view of violence in Punjab. Another multi-religious prayer meeting was organised to mark the second death anniversary of Smt. Indira Gandhi. Marchers pledged to uphold the values of secularism and work for national integration. All these symbolic gestures did not cut much ice with the people, neither the minorities nor the others. But the DPCC(I) continued to organise such activities to project secular image of Congress(I) in Delhi. In the face of major aggressive Ram Janambhoomi campaign of BJP and its Delhi Unit, Congress (I), and DPCC launched a month long Sadbavana Yatra from October 2, - Birth anniversary of Mahatama Gandhi. H.K.L. Bhagat who was the coordinator of the committee to organise the yatra in the Capital said, " the programme is aimed at awakening the people against the perils of communalism and castism. It will strengthen the secular foundation of the country". This march was led by Congress (I) president Shri Rajiv Gandhi. It began in the walled city - covered muslim majority areas - Delhi Gate, Darya Ganj,

Urdu Bazar, Jama Masjid, Chawri Bazar, Huaz Quasi, Lal Kuan, Naya Bazar, Khari Baoli, Fatehpuri Masjid. Later in the month a similar procession was taken out in the north west Delhi. At Mahatma Ganahi's smadhi a pledge was read out. It was "I pledge to strive for a secular India. An India where the various religions and faiths achieve full independence and respect, where every citizen gets independence and equal opportunity. I will strive to promote people's unity and integrity and will work towards, bringing an end to the difference of birth caste and religion".²⁸

This was in consonance with the concept of secularism propagated by Congress Party from the time of Gandhi. But it was not followed/practiced by Congress(I) leaders especially in the last decade. Besides the Muslim women's Bill and Shilaniyas at Ayodhya at national level and the involvement of local leaders in anti-Sikh riots made the Congress(I) a ruling party as seen by the people whose main concern was to remain in power. Ideology was compromised and expediency was the deciding factor. Other factor which caused complacency in the DPCC(I) was the fact that it exploited well the charisma of its national leaders. Both Indira Gandhi and Rajiv's personal charisma was used in local and parliamentary elections to woo the voters. Secondly, the party was in power and could rely on its patronage to get support of various section of society. The weaker sections were offered regularization of unauthorized colonies where they were living in. Installments of Dearness Allowance could be announced to woo the government employees.

Thee Pradesh Congress Committee paid only lip service to the cause of minorities and weaker sections and schedule caste and substantial help did not reach a large number of these people. This led to loss of credibility. The other parties made same promises but people were hopeful that these parties may sincerely do what they say e.g. Kasnshi Ram in 1989 General Elections promised exactly the same things that other did, but people believed him.

However, when National Front Government assumed office in New Delhi the DPCC(I) was reactivated and it organised public demonstration on the favourite issue of Price rise. A large procession of DPCC(I) workers taken out to protest against general budget the slogans raised were "Kala Budget vapas lo (withdraw the black budget). Local leaders like Jag Pravesh Chandra took part besides H.K.L. Bhagat, Sajjan Kumar, Jagdish Tytler. A memorandum was submitted to Lok Sabha Speaker detailing hardships it would cause to common people. A rally was also organised addressed by H.K.L. Bhagat on the same issue and memorandum to President. An effigy of Prime Minister V.P. Singh was burnt to protest against petroleum price hike.²⁹

During this brief period the DBJP was in a dilemma, for at the national level BJP supported National Front Government but was not exactly a constituent of the Central Government. So it criticised the government policies but the tone was cautions. It also did not lose the opportunity to protest against price rise and petrol price hike and also governments handling of the

Kashmir issue.

During the 1980's DBJP organised actively to mobilize public opinion in its support. The theme underlying all these movements anti-Congressism. The whole effort was to prove to the people inability of Congress government on various fronts protecting interests of minorities in Delhi as well as outside, protecting lives of Hindus living in Punjab or Kashmir, control inflation, deal effectively with terrorists. It could not resent to the people any alternative programme of action. Moreover, it still remained party of the urban. In the movements led by it we find complete absence of support for demands of rural strata of society. The Congress party on the other hand remained passive as long as it was the ruling party. After 1989 it organised extensively against the policies of National Front Government. So DPC(I) also tried to exploit anti-incumbent sentiment. But it was unable to gain much due to it in the 1991 elections.

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CHAPTER - IV

ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE: EMERGENCE OF DPBJP AS A SERIOUS CHALLENGE

Preceding chapter described the attempts of BJP to expand its social base in Delhi. It articulated demands of diverse sections of society to win their support. But how far it was successful in converting this support into electoral success is analysed in this chapter. Competing with it was the Delhi Pradesh Congress(I) which until 1967 gained impressive victories in all Lok Sabha elections in Delhi. Post 1967 period witnessed the importance of conjunctures in determining the outcome of parliamentary elections. In 1967 Congress candidates lost to BJS in all except Outer Delhi constituency whereas in 1971 elections all Congress candidates won with comfortable majorities. Another trend emerged in the 1977 elections - Erosion of minority bloc voting. Muslims and Scheduled Castes who were worst victims of Emergency programmes (forcible sterilization and slum clearance) deserted the Congress Party. However, 1980 elections there people again supported the Congress party. Despite poor performance of Janata government its candidates in Delhi were able to secure on an average 37.89% of votes. 1984 elections were held in unusual circumstances and the voting behavior was fully determined by conjuncture.¹ However, a complete reversal of 1984 was found in 1989 election results. The trend which was most pronounced in the 1980's was unpredictability in the voting behaviour of the people.

These elections reflect the mood of the electorate more clearly than metropolitan council election, because a) it is an ineffective body which is unable to solve most of the problems people face; b) in the last decade elections to this body was held only once in 1983. So the focus of this chapter is on their parliamentary elections held in 1980, 1984 and 1989. However, brief account of 1983 metropolitan council elections is also included.

Before we analyse the election outcome, here a detailed account of pre-election activities, election strategy and campaign style of both the DPBJP and the DPCC(I). Similarity of selection procedure, nature of issues and raised campaign technique of both parties is striking.

The process of electioneering is a multiple one. It consists of determining the basic policy, taking political decisions, issue of election manifesto and allotting seats to candidates and making pacts and electoral alliances with other parties. The specific purpose of performing these functions is to do anything and everything which is likely to ensure maximum success at the elections. All this hectic activity starts about six months before the polling takes place and may be referred to as election strategy.²

The Election strategy is followed by Election campaign. "The term campaign technique is used to cover all those organisational and operational tasks necessary to project

ideological objectives and programme of a party or a candidate before the electorate and counter act similar efforts by other parties. Used in this sense, the term campaign technique covers all type tactical devices which various parties and candidates adopt to convince the electorate regarding their own suitability and superiority."³ To put it simply one can say that it is basically an attempt at projecting a favourable image of oneself and showing/proving the opponent as unsuitable. So the candidate tries to magnify the achievement of his party and himself and under plays that of his opponents. Now we will look at the three Lok Sabha election held in the 1980, 1984 and 1989 in Delhi and examine the issues and techniques used by both the parties to woo the voters. Before that it is also useful to look at the intense pre-election activities of the parties and selection of candidates.

1980 MID-TERM ELECTION;

Both DPBJP and DPCC(I) have election committees but their powers are only recommendatory. The final decision is taken by the national leaders. The whole process is centralised. In 1980 the press quoted Congress(I) sources as saying that the modus operandi of Sanjay Gandhi was different, with a view to replacing the so-called dead wood. He left out difficult constituencies for them, keeping the "soft" constituencies for his supporters. Sanjay Gandhi's say was stated to have been decisive in the distribution of Delhi's seats. 5 out of 7 candidates were his supporters - Jagdish Tytler (Delhi Sadar),

Sajjan Kumar (Outer Delhi), Deep Chand Sharma (Karol bagh), H.K.L. Bhagat (Shahdara) and Charanjit Singh(South Delhi).⁴

The selection criteria and procedure is more or less similar in both parties. Though the Congress Party at times selected people from outside the constituency and at other time novice like Subash Chopra was pitted against an experienced DBJP leader M.L. Khurana. The DBJP always fielded candidates rooted in the city for many years. This factor also influenced their chances of winning.

Manifestos of both the DPCC(I) and the DBJP were formulated by special committees formed for the purpose. The promises made were more or less same in all the elections and similar for both parties.

In their effort to woo the voters, the parties and the candidates raise certain issues during their election campaigns. These issues could be divided into three categories: National, Regional and Local. One point to note here is that national issues change, these are specific to each election. But the latter both categories remained more or less the same. So let us examine these in some detail.

In 1980 elections the main thrust of the opposition party was on the emergency excesses. These were supposed to have decisive impact on voters mind because people of Delhi had first

hand experience of the large scale denial of human rights to opponents of the regime, police excess etc. So Janata party leaders warned that if Mrs. Gandhi comes to power India would become a "prison house" again. The fight was projected as between forces of democracy and dictatorship.

Congress(I) on the other hand capitalised on opposition disunity. People of Delhi also had close experience of infighting in the Janata party after 1977 and the fall of government within two and half years. As far as emergency was concerned Congress(I) leaders were apologetic about it and reassured that it would never happen again. The acceptance of mistake and reassurance that it would never happen again was supposed to be best strategy to woo the voters.

Regional issues raised during the campaign were price rise and deteriorating law and order situation in Delhi. Both parties claimed that prices were lower when it ruled and law and order deteriorated during opposition government's rule.

Apart from these, the micro level or constituency specific issues were raised in relevant areas. A constituency like East Delhi where majority population lives in slum, leaders laid emphasis of development of the area. In areas like Delhi Sadar where large number of trader constitute the electorate, removal of sales tax was promised. In rural areas of Delhi water supply was an important issue and people were more interested to hear about that rather than other things. Emphasis in campaign

on issues varied according to the complexion of the constituency. In areas like New Delhi - where other problems were not so acute national issues and price rise were important issues, whereas in area like Karol Bagh. Achievements of the candidates were emphasised the campaign of Congress(I) candidate impressed on the people that he was approachable to common people and tried to get colonies regularised and streets lighted.

CAMPAIGN

Both the DPCC(I) and the Janta party made full use of charisma of their national leaders. DPCC(I) began its campaign with five election meetings addressed by Smt. Gandhi in different parts of the capital.⁵ A.B. Vajpayee did the same for Janata Party. These meetings were well attended but those of local leaders were neither well attended nor did people stay till the end.⁶

At the grass roots level the campaign style was similar. Both parties pasted posters extensively in the capital, wall writings were common all over the city, numerous election offices were opened, life size posters of national leaders were put up. Numerous vehicles - cars, tempos, three wheelers - on all these vehicles were fixed public address system, blaring party messages, slogans etc. Flags and party symbol appeared in large numbers in slums and shops. In some areas candidates of both parties went on door to door canvassing speaking well rehearsed lines.⁷

Campaign techniques were clearly less electronic in 1980 elections. At the macro level both parties spent enough on press advertisement. Janata Party tried to whip up emergency phobia - press censorship, sterilization, etc and a picture of policemen beating a man with lathis. In a positive mood, another advertisement promised freedom, equality, workers rights, and a picture of Babu Jagjivan Ram. Moreover it promised clean drinking water, irrigation facilities, etc to rural people. Congress advertisement emphasised the need for a stable government for development and warned against a hotch potch government.

Apart from advertisement campaign, election broadcast of both parties elaborated on the same topic. Mrs. Gandhi said, "set the country on to the road of order, stability, purposeful government and progress"⁸. Babuji reiterated the dangers inherent in re-electing a dictator like Mrs. Gandhi.

The result of 1980 mid term polls in Delhi when seen in the context of 1977 debacle certainly appears impressive. Congress(I) won 6 out of 7 seats and polled 50.40% votes. Constituency wise also it won 55% votes in East Delhi and 50% in Outer Delhi constituencies and 47% in South Delhi. However, the notable feature is that it secured convincing victory in the Karol Bagh (reserved) constituency and 47% votes in Chandni Chowk (large number of voters are Muslims and during emergency demolition and forced sterilization was conducted here). The weaker sections were also found in substantial number in East Delhi where Congress(I) did well. This is in contrast to the

trend in other Hindi belt states especially Uttar Pradesh and Bihar (where large scheduled caste population lived). In U.P. Congress(I) could secure only 36% votes in reserved constituencies. In Bihar it was still better where it won 48% votes. However, the overall trend remained the same for the Congress(I) polled 51.37% votes in UP and in Bihar 52% and secured 51 and 30 seats respectively.⁹

The reason why Congress(I) was able to recapture confidence of the traditional vote banks is disillusionment caused due to the mutual bickering and the falling apart of Janata Government within two years of its coming to power. People in Delhi had a first hand experience of it. Moreover, Congress(I) leaders stressed during their campaign that emergency nightmare would not be repeated.

The 1984 General Elections

In 1985 in order to project a clean image of the party, sitting MPs with tarnished image were not given ticket. But Congress played safe for it gave tickets to newcomers like K.C. Pant, Lalit Maken, but also gave it to H.K.L. Bhagat and Jagdish Tytler though their images were not so clean. The DPCC(I) faced a difficulty due to the centralised selection procedure. For when popular leader like Sajjan Kumar was denied ticket the party workers were displeased and did not work for the party candidate during the election. BJP candidates were mainly important local leaders like V.K. Malhotra, M.L. Khurana, Sikandar Bakht and.

K.L. Gupta - all these candidates had association with the party and both Mr. Malhotra and Mr. Khurana also were members of RSS. All these leaders had clean image and active participants in the political workers at Delhi and had good winning chances. No newcomers or outsiders were selected. They all could be identified with their constituencies. BJP fought the elections in urban constituencies only. It has left the Outer Delhi (a rural constituency) and East Delhi to the Lok Dal and Janta Party.

These elections were held in unusual circumstances - assassination of Mrs. Gandhi and subsequent anti-Sikh riots in all parts of Delhi especially East Delhi. So the atmosphere was emotionally charged and tense. People were apprehensive about the future of the country, such unprecedented turbulence in the Capital City made all section of society open to appeals of need for strong and stable government and the Congress(I) argued forcefully that it was the only party capable of preserving country's unity and integrity. The main thrust of the campaign was "Desh Ki Ekta Aur Akhandata Ke Liye Congress Ko Vote Digiye".

Congress(I) promised strong Central Government to protect the nation from destabilizing forces. All Congress(I) candidates over emphasised this in their respective constituencies. the other related issues were image of Rajiv Gandhi - a young capable, dynamic leader who could promise to take people into the 21st century. So the issue was that of a party with clean vision and sound leadership who could take the

country on to the road of prosperity, stability.

The opposition party (BJP) criticised the failure of Government to protect lives of people during riots in Delhi. The Congress party was also criticised for encouraging dynastic rule. Sikander Bakht BJP candidate from Chandni Chowk referring to "our kid PM", said that a man with just three years experience was considered fit enough to be sworn in as Prime Minister even before his party would elect him leader, only because he was Mrs. Gandhi's son.¹⁰ In a rally all BJP leaders declared that if their party come to power they would promise security and protection to people belonging to all castes and communities.¹¹ Other national issues were the inability of 'opposition' leaders to stay together and by implication disasters for country in such delicate situation.

The Congress(I) also made capital out of Mrs. Gandhi's assassination. The campaign focussed on the fact that she sacrificed life for the country and slogans like "Indirajee Ki Antim Ichcha - Boond Boond Se Desh Ki Raksha". This gave an advantage to the Congress party. But BJP was doubly disadvantaged for it could neither find fault with the policies and programmes of a dead leader, nor could criticise the emerging Congress(I) leader who had an absolutely clean slate to write on. In a city like Delhi with majority people belonging to urban areas the image of Rajiv Gandhi fitted well - people thought he was one of their own.

In this elections all other issues were relegated to the background.

CAMPAIGN

Campaign style also under-went complete change. Electronic media played unprecedented role in it. Congress(I) party appointed a professional advertisement agency for its campaign and spent large sums of money on it. National newspapers carried full page advertisements entailing the virtues and achievements claimed by the Congress(I) and attacked the opposition as men of straws. Cassette recording of Mrs. Gandhi's speeches particularly the last address at Orrisa use extensively played on the loud speakers.

The BJP lacked resources but still could manage a video film "A galaxy of our leaders". But it depended heavily on door-to-door canvassing and slogans. etc.

But the Congress(I) campaign was in the nature of a blitzkrieg - millions of posters were printed and walls, lampposts, bus stops and every possible corner was plastered with posters. Majority of them had big pictures of Rajiv Gandhi and Mrs. Gandhi Personal charisma factor was used to the minimum limit in this election. "Rajiv Wave" was sought to be created in Delhi. Consequently, there was less reliance on street corner, public meetings, other usual methods. Flags, symbols, etc were also liberally used. As usual the last phase of

campaigning included public meetings addressed by national leaders in various parts of the city. Rajiv Gandhi, Chandra Shekar, Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Rajiv Gandhi addressed 3 rallies and A.B. Vajpayee 8 public meetings. Minority leaders always appealed to their community to vote for a particular party or leader. In this election, All India Imam's Organisation, Jamaat-ulema-e-Hind, All India Muslim Council, Indian Muslim Youth Conference extended full support to Congress and were actively involved in the party's election campaign. On the other hand, the Shahi Imam of Jama Masjid and J&K Chief Minister, Farooq Abdullah come out openly against the ruling party. As far as the Sikhs were concerned, the DBJP got some of the Sikh leaders to issue an appeal in Punjabi, asking the voters of the community to support the opposition candidates in the "hour to test for us". Local Congressmen led by the Mayor M.S. Sathi appealed to the Sikhs not to be 'misled' by those who want to exploit them.¹²

1984 election's outcome was determined wholly by immediate factors. Mrs. Gandhi was assassinated in the city and was followed by large scale violence, arson, looting. 11 positive aspect in those insecure time was emergency of Rajiv Gandhi - young, honest progressive - leader of the Congress(I) party. People gave him overwhelming support. Performance of Congress(I) candidates in all the seven constituencies was incredible. In East Delhi, Congress(I) candidate polled 76.95% votes followed by Outer Delhi - 72.75%. Performance in other areas was as good. Congress(I) won all the seven seats polling 68.72% votes. The bewildered opposition party BJP could win only 18.85% votes and no seat.¹³

1989 GENERAL ELECTIONS:

Pre - Election Activity

Pre- Election Activity began at least six months before the expected date of election. It includes large public meetings organised by both parties and addressed by top rank leaders. Tone of speeches become aggressive and the thrust of arguments would be clear cut - the opposition party which in case of 1985 and 1989 election was the DBJP vociferous criticism of the ruling party. People are reminded of all the unfulfilled promises, neglect and mishandling of issues while the ruling party would try to show its achievements - implementation of welfare programme, development activities and benefits to the electorate. The best example was of this kind of behaviour that of launching Jan Jagran Abhiyan by the DPCC(I) in Outer Delhi areas, where in a public meeting Mr. Prem Singh said "Even since, I was appointed the executive councillor (development) by Mrs. Gandhi, I saw to it that construction work for a school building moved apace and work was initiated for construction of a railway bridge here. On account of traffic being held up at railway crossing, there had been instances of patients being rushed to the hospital dying at the railway crossing itself" He further asked "Did the BJP ever think of the problems that you people are facing", "Tens of thousand of landless and harijans have been given free land plots in rural Delhi under 20 point programme", P. Singh said and charged that it was the BJP leader who had opposed the drive to give land to the landless.¹⁴

The DBJP on its part organised numerous public meetings & criticised government. One such meeting was held in Ramlila Ground and later a memorandum was submitted to the President. Addressing the rally A.B. Vajpayee said that Congress had no moral right to remain in power if it could not solve water and electricity problem of the city. He also demanded that the election to local bodies be conducted. The memorandum submitted to the President by the President of the DBJP said that the Congress(I) had failed to fulfil any of its thirty four pre-election promises to the city populace . And instead of seeking a fresh mandate on the expiry of the term of the metropolitan council (1988), and municipal corporation (1987) the two bodies were given extension, it said, voicing resentment over the rise the prices of essential commodities, inadequate civic amenities and "hellish condition" of the Jhuggi-Jhompri residents, the memorandum said fullfledged statehood for Delhi was the answer to the city problem. In its 31 point charter of demands the DBJP also called for "immediate" abolition of sales tax, end to lease system, provisions of loans for unemployed for self employment scheme and an "unemployment allowance" of Rs. 300 p.m. for those registered with employment exchange. "Lal Dora" (residential limits) in the village should be extended, health services improved and more colleges set up, the memorandum said. And once election are announced, activities closely connected to fighting election are taken up.¹⁵

Whereas Congress Party beset with charges of corruption, organizational confusion lacked a general sense of

direction. This was reflected in the selection of candidates. The Congress Party pitted a relatively little known social worker Mohini Giri in the New Delhi constituency against BJP leader L.K. Advani; and a political non-entity Subash Chopra against Madan Lal Khurana of BJP in South Delhi. Bahujan Samaj Party's candidate contested in East Delhi and Karol Bagh constituencies, BJP and Janta Dal reached an electoral agreement whereby BJP fielded candidates in all constituencies except East Delhi and Outer Delhi.

ISSUES :

As pointed out earlier the DBJP led a campaign against Rajiv Gandhi in 1987 demanding his resignation and enquiry into corruption charges against various people. This came in handy to DBJP to delegitimise the government and also deglamorise Rajiv's image. The Bofors issue was raised by all leaders but mainly in New Delhi constituency and in other public meetings of the national level leaders like A.B. Vajpayee. Slogans were raised on this issue repeatedly. This was also connected to the failure of government on other fronts like price rise, delay in local elections, unemployment, failure to restructure the political set-up in Delhi. Catchy slogans raised were :-

"Jo Sarkar Nikami Hai, Woh Sarkar Badalni Hai" and "Chehre pe jo lali hai, Bofors ki dalali hai" and "Congress beiman/PM Badnam/Senapati apman/Bikar naujawan/Paishan kisan/Mere Bharat Mahan." "Bheekh Nahin Adhikar Chahiye/Kam Ki Sarkar Chahiye".¹⁶

In the context DBJP had an advantage for it was known to be a

disciplined party with integrity.

Main national issues raised by DPCC(I) was "safeguard of national unity and integrity" and "power to the people. Party tried to minimise the damage by focussing on Rajiv Gandhi's personal popularity - by highlighting the fact that the Congress party was behind him. Slogans like 'Rajiv Gandhi naye yug ki naye naveli asha hai' and "Toofan mein, Andhi mein, vishwas Rajiv Gandhi main" were used to impress the votes.

The other national issue was that of Ram Janambhoomi - Babri Masjid. Euphoria generated for the taking of bricks from the city to Ayodhya for Shilanyas on November 9, 1989, was used by the DBJP for electoral gains. Slogans like "Hum Mendir Wahien Banayenge" filled the air.

In the face of this stiff competition from Hindu elements Congress(I) leaders like Jagdish Tytler argued the case for secular image of the Congress party and its belief in 'Mazhab Nahin Sikhata Apas Mein Vair Rakhna....". But connivance of the Congress(I) in the shilanyas at Ayodhya disheartened the progressive elements who favoured Rajiv Gandhi in 1984. The misuse of official media was also an issue raised by the opposition parties.

However the regional issues like statehood for Delhi and the price rise was taken up by the DBJP leaders. The DPCC(I) also reiterated its promise of legislative assembly and both

promised better Delhi. M.L. Khurana, the DBJP president and candidate from South Delhi, his vehicle carried three hoardings two sides put up the promises which ruling party made and third side displayed skyrocketing prices. Issues were emphasised according to socio-economic characteristics of constituency e.g. in middle class locality of South and New Delhi - issue of corruption - Bofors, price rise statehood were raised time and again by the DBJP candidates, whereas in constituency like Chandni Chowk which is dominated by traders BJP candidate raised issue of sales tax apart from national issues, whereas Congress(I) candidate talked more often about the provision of civic amenities.

Campaign techniques remained the same, its first phase was launched by national leaders' public meeting. The second phase had intensive grass roots activity and in the last phase again national leaders took over. Both parties made use of film stars this time.

The minority organisation : the Shahi Imam clearly sided with the Janta Dal and issued a fatwa asking Muslims to vote for Janta Dal.

All India Sikh Congress(Babar), The Shiromani Akali Dal(Talwandi) and (Longowal) groups and Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management Committee and Sikh Forum all issued an appeal to their community to vote either JD or BJP in Delhi as the Congress(I) had denied them justice. Speaking on the occasion the DBJP

president M.L. Khurana accused the Congress(I) of engineering the November 1984 riots and shielding the guilty. A rally was organised to mark the beginning of the protest week to observe the fifth anniversary of riots in Delhi.

Till 1984 elections, immediate causes revised the trend of traditional vote bank alienation set during emergency days. Congress(I) was unable to retain the support of these sections of society, for it could neither provide them security nor economic benefits. In post 1986 period the Central Government followed a policy of appeasement of all communal elements in society. To please Muslim fundamentalists, it passed Muslim women bill. It agreed to 'Tala Kholo' demand of Hindus in Ayodhya. 1989 elections were an advance of this trend of highly communalised elections. All types of religious leaders Hindu Priests, Muslim Maulvis issued religious Fatwas to the people asking them to vote one party or the other. All political parties made extensive use of religion in these elections.

Another aspect of this election was deglamorization of Rajiv Gandhi and corresponding projection of V.P. Singh as Mr. clean.

Main beneficiary of this anti Congress(I) sentiment was the BJP party which won 5 out of 7 seats it contested in Delhi and the Outer Delhi seat was won by National Front candidate.

In overall terms Congress(I) loss was heaviest, it won

only two seats and 43.41% votes (it won 68.72% votes in 1984 elections). Its votes were cut down from 72.75% in Outer Delhi to 42.72%, and in East Delhi from 76.95% to 25.42%. In Chandni Chowk also it secured only 35% votes. In this area the total of non-Congress(I) vote was 61% but divided between BJP and National Front Candidates.

Another notable religious minority in Delhi is the Sikh population, mainly concentrated in South and East Delhi and Delhi Sadar. After 1984 anti-Sikh riots one of their main demands had been, punishment to the guilty of inciting violence. The Sikhs were mainly supporters of Congress(I) party but since 1984 there was a sharp decline. But by 1989 they had clearly shifted loyalty to the BJP and the party promised to bring the culprits to book if voted to power. The demands of the Delhi Sikhs like making Punjabee number two language in Delhi were also supported by the party.

The trends clearly was discernable in the voting preference of the people, in the last decade in Delhi and in other Hindi belt states are temporary restoration of support of Congress's traditional vote bank after 1977's loss because of circumstantial and personality factors both in 1980 and 1984 general elections. But the party was unable to retain this support and by 1989 elections large number of its supporters defected and the trend continued in the subsequent 1991 elections when its performance in the whole of the Hindi belt had been dismal. In 1989 polls Janta Dal won 54 seats in UP and 30 in

Bihar (in 1984 election Congress(I) won 51 and 30 seats in UP and Bihar respectively). And in Delhi and Rajasthan the BJP did much better than Congress(I). Moreover, in terms of Muslim and scheduled caste vote a sharp decline was registered in U.P. and Bihar. Muslims were agitated by the Ram-Janambhoomi procession in Ayodhya and the subsequent rioting. The scheduled caste voters supported militant organisations. Indian Peoples Front in Bihar and in U.P. Bahujan Samaj Party (B.S.P) won 9.21% of such vote and also 5/21 assembly members of this party were Muslims. In Delhi also the BSP candidate was able to cut into the votes of Congress(I) candidate in East Delhi constituency.

The other trend has been the determination of outcome of polls by conjunctural factors, personality or immediate issues which brought a certain amount of unpredictability in the voting behaviours of the people of the Hindi belt especially Delhi which is the nerve centre. Impact of events issues like Mrs. Gandhi's assassination, Bofors scandal, Rajiv's personality is minimum here while voting consideration of these immediate factors affects the choice of the people. This creates unpredictability which is clearly shown by the fact that Congress(I) won 6/7 seats in 1977 then all the seats in 1984 but could only manage two seats in 1989 elections and that too with much reduced margins.

Talking of unpredictability, if we look at the 1983 metropolitan elections result these were no less than the national election result. The BJP which considered Delhi its traditional area of strength performed poorly in 1983 elections

and Congress(I) did extremely well. The expectation of a BJP win were stronger in face of Congress reverse in Andhra and Karnataka polls. But the outcome imaged both parties equally.

METROPOLITAN COUNCIL ELECTIONS - 1983

The DPBJP continuously demanded civic polls in Delhi after it was formed in 1980. But the Central Government delayed it till 1983 January, that is till the time DPCC(I) firmly persuaded and assured success. But the DBJP kept itself ready for election from December 1980 onwards. It completed its organisational elections and also launched an enrollment drive and claimed to have enrolled over 35,000 members. It organised protest movements on early elections, deteriorating law and order and criticised government on both issues. The DPBJP organised a rally to demand early elections and draw attention of government to the demands of the people.

The DPCC(I) had all its district committees intact and some mass rallies including the one taken out in Delhi in Pandit Nehru's birth anniversary and another combined rally taken out on 'Youth Day' in cooperation with Youth Congress(I), to give a boost to its image. Government department dealing with various aspects of Delhi were told to finish the development work undertaken in the city quickly. Central ministers were asked to take keener interest in affairs of the Capital e.g. Ministry of Works and Housing and the DDA announced allotment of Turkman Gate flats to previous residents of the area who had been shifted

during emergency. The DDA notified 200 cooperative group housing societies about allotment of land to them. Besides a number of steps were taken to provide for the regularisation of unauthorised colonies and provision of civic amenities.¹⁸ Prices of essential commodities and their supply was kept under check and other facilities like transportation were made more efficient.¹⁹ The Congress(I) party used government machinery and resources to gain popularity. The other major party BJP was without any such aid so it tried to attract the minorities and use its the coherent, disciplined party organisation. A major issue which both parties used was that of holding Asian Games in New Delhi in 1982.

Elections were announced on the 5th of January 1983. After that work of election began in right earnest. The DBJP and DPCC(I) began the selection process and respective election committees were formed. In this case, party Congress(I) high command allowed free hand to local leaders to decide nominations.²⁰ Both parties selected candidates with loyalty to party, service record. However, the over riding criteria was winning chances of the individual.

However, dissatisfied elements were there in both the DBJP and the DPCC(I). DBJP - a cadre based party faced dissent in two places. Tibbia College, Shakurbasti matter had to be referred to L.K. Advani.

The DPC(I) decided to field candidates in all 56

metropolitan and 100 municipal wards, whereas the DBJP contested in 46 seats and 6 seats of Metropolitan Council were left for Lok Dal, these were in rural Delhi - Bawana, Najafgarh, Palam, Tughlaqabad, Narela and Minto Road in urban area.

According to H.K.L. Bhagat the main plan of election would be to 'improve Delhi further'.²¹ It could claim credit for magnificent flyover broad roads, big stadias built in Delhi for Asiad '82. The Congress(I) candidate projected Asiad as an achievement - the benefits it brought to the common people, the speedily implementation of projects for roads, better transportation, flyover etc. As far as local issues were concerned both DPC(I) and DBJP promised the same things. These parties differed only on the issue of policies of the present government and implementation of these policies. The DBJP's main focus was on the omission of the government/ruling party. It criticised the government for the extravagant Asiad project when people were living in sub-human conditions in slums in Delhi. Other major issue was that of price rise and law and order deterioration. Besides there were issues specific to certain class of people e.g. leasehold system and sales tax abolition. In an election broadcast K.N. Sahni DBJP leader promised "efficient and clean administration". It promised uplift of poor people, employment to youth better service condition and pay scales to teachers, government employees abolish sales and lease system, labour given minimum wages, slums resettlement colonies, urban villages would be provided better amenities. In addition he criticised Congress government for inability to fulfil 1980

election promises could not check price rise.²²

Local issues remained the same Civic amenities, abolition of sales tax and leasehold system, implementation of 20-point programme especially in rural segments and economically disadvantaged section of people, traders were promised amendment to essential commodities Act for free movement of food grains. National issues and issues like political structure for Delhi were not raised often. National issues were raised only by leaders like Mrs. Gandhi when she addressed a series of public meetings in Delhi and by A.B. Vajpayee in public meetings organised by the DPBJP.

At the grass root level the BJP depended entirely on door-to-door canvassing and these party workers helped to get electors names included in the official list. On the other hand the DPC(I) depended more on micro phone equipped vehicles blaring party messages, slogans etc. These were in addition to the party flags, posters, symbols, hand bills etc. Writing on walls also continued to be one of the favourite methods of canvassing. Film music and songs were used; parodies made and sung - 'lauding the virtues of the candidates and tempoing their opportunity.

Posters were another important means of spreading party messages. These were pasted on all possible places walls, poles, bus stops, buses, even public convenience. Most of them covered simple ' vote for message and party symbol and name and picture of the candidate. "But there were other which hurled changed

e.g. one poster accused the Congress(I) of promoting corruption and the "Prince" . The languages used were - English, Hindi, Punjabi and Urdu, the last two being used clearly to attract Muslim and Punjabi/Sikh voters.²³

In the last phase of campaigning activity become frenetic - road side meetings, padyatras were organised. Hoarding were put up at all strategic places - cross roads and market places - so that message could reach maximum people repeatedly. Black paint was used over the collage of posters to put across message Auto rickshaws were replaced by cycle - rickshaw. In old Delhi area where lanes are narrow and congested. But the characteristic feature of the last phase of campaigning were the usual rallies of national leaders. A.B. Vajpayee addressed series of meetings in Delhi one such was organised at Super Bazar in Central Delhi. Here he raised issue of foreign policy especially he criticised government's policy towards Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. He also criticised government's mishandling of Assam problem. The other issues touched were price rise and need for an Assembly for Delhi.

Mrs. Gandhi held an important public meeting in rural area of Outer Delhi. Where she raised a plethora of issues ranging from women's issue, to procurement prices and criticism of opposition disunity to casteist and communal forces and separatist movement.²⁴

Religious minorities in Delhi are significant politically because they are concentrated in certain region. So, leaders of these communities issue appeals for guiding electoral behaviour of their co-religionists "Akali Dal leaders Jathedar Tohra asked Sikhs in Delhi to boycott elections. He said, "let Delhi Sikhs nor forget" that more than 70,000 Sikhs courted arrest and over 100 killed in Punjab in the interest of the Panth. Let those souls not betrayed, your boycott will strengthen the Panth". But the President of Delhi Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee Harbans Singh Manchanda urged the Sikhs to vote for Congress(I).²⁵

Two other organisation issued appeals for influencing voting choices a) Youth for Democracy - it urged youth to vote for BJP candidate in eight metropolitan council constituencies in New Delhi, b) the executive of All India Non-Policemen Federation called upon its members of Delhi Police and their families not to cast their vote in favour of the Congress(I).

The poll outcome was unexpected for both parties. The Congress(I) did better then expected(it had faced reverses in South) and the BJP did less well than anticipated. The Congress(I) polled 47.5% votes in Delhi and the BJP was class with 37% but the former won 34 seats out of 56 whereas the BJP won 19 seats. The BJP did well in its traditional stronghold - South Delhi where it won 5 out of 8 metropolitan seats and in contrast it got only one seat in East Delhi areas out of total eight. And in Outer Delhi it did not contest the rural seats

where it had adjustments with other party. It did well in the seats where Muslims were large part of the electorate e.g. Motia Mehal, Chandni Chowk, Qusabpura etc.

The hold of Congress(I) however, remained strong over the scheduled castes, for it won eight out of nine reserved seats. Only the Mehrauli (reserved) seat was captured by the BJP candidate Kalka Dass won.

At this stage traditional voters for Congress Muslims turned away from it but did not vote en bloc against it in areas like Nizamudin, Okhla, voted for Congress(I) candidates and so did Muslims living in Outer Delhi areas.

Congress(I) was able to win because Muslims did not dissent en bloc, Sikhs still voted for it and so did the Scheduled Castes. The votable group of government employees did not have strong loyalties for either party.

Though out the decade, ascendance of national politics continued over local politics. It was inevitable, for the people living so close to the nerve centre to be affected by the events of national importance. There were frequent demonstrations by various opposition parties against the policies of Central Government affecting the nation as a whole; and people of the city were unwillingly involved with it. The constant presence of national leaders diminished the importance of local leader. Besides, the local leaders were unable to solve the problems of

the people. The only reason for this was ineffectiveness of local government and complete control by the Central Government. The DPBJP mounted constant pressure on the Central Government to grant full statehood to Delhi. Therefore, an expert Committee was appointed in 1987 to go into the details of the issue. Based on the recommendations of this Committee Delhi was given a legislative Assembly and a Council of Ministers. However, it continued to be a Union territory and Central institutions and the Administrator held predominant position. Elections to the Legislative Assembly were held in November 1993 in which BJP emerged victorious. Since, at present Delhi has a Chief Minister and a Council of Ministers. This change was expected to redirect the focus of public attention to the local issues/events since Metropolitan Council was in consequence, the main target of attack of DPBJP was the Central Government. It aroused anti-Congress sentiment by criticising policies of the National Government. Instead of highlighting its own achievement the DPC)I) focussed attention on Central Government.

CONSTITUENCY PROFILES

In 1952 Delhi was divided into three constituencies - Delhi City, New Delhi and Outer Delhi. Later in 1957, Delhi city was bifurcated into Chandni Chowk and Delhi Sadar, while other two constituencies continued. "As a result of the Two Member Constituencies (Abolition) Act, 1961, the reserved constituency of Karol Bagh was carved out, and thus Delhi had five single member constituencies in 1952. The need for increasing the

member of representatives arose in 1967, when the number of elected representatives was increased from five to seven, and the reorganization of constituencies brought seven constituencies into existence; New Delhi, South Delhi, Delhi Sadar, Chandni Chowk, Karol Bagh(Reserved), East Delhi and Outer Delhi".²⁶

NEW DELHI

The New Delhi constituency is the second smallest constituency. It extends from Red Fort to Darya Ganj in North to Anand Lok in South and from Upper Ridge Road in West to banks of Yamuna in East.²⁷ The total number of voters increased from over three lakhs in 1980 to four lakhs twenty nine thousand in 1989. Sixty percent of the electorate are government servants who are well educated and come from various linguistic and community backgrounds. It also includes some posh colonies like Chanakayapuri, Golf Links, Sunder Nagar, Jor Bagh, Defence Colony. Thirty percent of the electorate are traders living in Lajpat Nagar, South Extension areas. Middle level bureaucrats live in Lodhi Road, Laxmi Bai Nagar, Sarojini Nagar, whereas senior bureaucrats live in Pandara park, Bharti Nagar. Community wise there are "Thirty five thousand Sikhs concentrated in Ashram area, Bhogal and Lajpat Nagar. There are about ten thousand Muslim voters in Nizamuddin, and Sarai Kale Khan and about ten thousand jhuggi dwellers.²⁸ Women voters constituted more than forty percent of the electorate. The Number of scheduled caste voters is insignificant.

Keeping in view the central location of these constituencies, it had always attracted stalwarts of both parties. Congress leaders like Smt. Sucheta Kriplani and Meher Chand Khanna, contested elections from here in 50's and 60's. They were opposed by equally established leaders of Jan Singh like Balraj Madhok and M.L. Sondhi. In the 80's also, Congress fielded C.M. Stephen against A.B., Vajpayee of Janata Party. In 1985 K.C. Pant was given the Congress ticket to fight against K.L. Gupta of B.J.P. Later in 1989 Mohini Giri of Congress(I) fought against B.J.P's L.K. Advani. All these leaders were highly educated, had wide political experience and were leaders of national and international stature. Selection of Candidates was very much in accordance with the socio-economic character of the constituency - It has a high literacy rate of about 80%. Mostly are salaried middle class and are more concerned about national issues, though personality of the candidate also seemed to matter. A.B. Vajpayee of Janta Party won in 1980 despite disenchantment with the Janta Government. BJP leaders emphasised more on the immediate interests of the electorate e.g. higher salaries, better working condition for government employees, better living condition for slum dweller and anti-Congress issues like Bofors, corruption, dictatorial government. But Congress party highlighted national issues only.

New Delhi constituency registered a high rate of voters' turn out in the decade of 80's. Nearly 60% in both 1980 and 1984 elections, when it was only 55%. The voting pattern in this politically conscious constituency indicate that in the pre

1967 phase, it elected Congress candidates with decisive majorities. In 1967 and 1977 in accordance with the national trend, it voted for the non-congress candidates. In 1977 Government employees were agitated over negative incentives for family planning, arbitrary dismissals, compulsory deposits, withdrawal of dearness allowance and overtime and rising prices. Shifting of some 50,000 slum dwellers out of out of these area also deprived Congress of its traditional supporters. Interestingly enough in 1980 when the mood of the country was that of disenchantment with the Janta party, New Delhi returned A.B. Vajpayee of the same party. Though the margin of victory was only 2.6%.²⁹ In 1985 it returned Congress(I) candidate with over 67% votes, with BJP securing 30.37%. In 1984 another factor which played an important role in determining outcome of election was attitude of women voters. They were influenced by assassination of Mrs. Gandhi and had sympathy for Rajiv. Women constituted 41% of the total electorate in New Delhi constituency. However, in 1989 the scale was turned and BJP leader won securing 55.49% votes. But if we look at the votes polled by the Congress(I) candidates in both 1980 and 1989 elections we find that the decline was only of 6% though this time Congress(I) fielded a political light weight and the party workers members did not support her wholeheartedly. Moreover, whole atmosphere was charged with strong anti-Rajiv Gandhi feelings. She was contesting against L.K. Advani of BJP who had all the advantages of - senior party leader, known political figure, party resources and party support.

This constituency always witnessed a straight contest between two parties Congress BJS-BJP. Though there were independent candidates ranging from 15 to 20 in the fray each time, the preference of the voters often fluctuated.

SOUTH DELHI

South Delhi is the third largest and biggest urban constituency in Delhi. It is situated to the East-West of Capital and stretches from Yamuna near Okhla and Maharani Bagh in the East to Tilak Nagar and Tagore garden in the West. It has maximum number of affluent colonies. A large number of to serving and retired government servants, senior executives and new rich families like those in localities like Panchsheel park, Shanti Niketan, Vasant Vihar, Westend, Maharani Bagh and Greater Kailash. Other urban settlements are Munirka, Janakpuri, Green Park and Safdarjang Development Area. Further, twenty eight villages and resettlement colonies like Raghbir Nagar and Jhuggi Johari colonies are also included in constituency.³⁰ In many respects its composition is similar to that of New Delhi constituency. There were about 1 lakh government employees in the area who were well educated and from various communities. It is estimated that in the eighties there were around eighteen thousand Bangali voters living in Chittranjan Park and Kalkajee area. South Indian are living in R.K. Puram, Saket and Janakpuri. In contrast to these, people living in urban villages of Okhla, Shahpur jat and slums of Ambedkar Nagar and Govindpuri, are illiterate and impoverished.³¹ In other words constituency

consists of a complex mix of upper middle and lower class of people living in its different parts. Community wise also it has sizeable population of Punjabis of whom 1.2 lakhs are Sikhs. 30% concentrated in Tilak nagar and 22% in Rajouri Garden. There are twelve thousand Muslims largely concentrated in Okhla and Jamia Milia areas. There are about ninety thousand industrial workers.³² This constituency was created in 1967 and both parties fielded their important leaders from this constituency. The BJS fielded Balraj Madhok in 1967 and in 1977 V.K. Malhortra was contesting against Charanjit Singh of Congress. In 1980 again both leaders contested against each other. However in 1984 Lalit Makan fought against Madan Lal Khurana of BJP. In 1989 Congress gave a ticket to a relatively little known Subash Chopra against Madan Lal Khurana. If we look at the socio-economic background of these leaders we find that they are highly educated and active party leaders in the city. All the BJP candidates were post graduated, engaged in teaching at different level. Both M.L. Khurana and V.K. Malhotra were active party workers and were appointed to various parties posts and member of Metropolitan Council. Charanjit Singh was a rich industrialist and close friend of Sanjay Gandhi. Lalit Maken was also a well educated trade unionist. Though this constituency was/is considered a BJP strong hold it never returned the same party in any two consecutive elections. Voters turn out has also been high in this area with highest in 1984 being 68.35% and lowest in 1989 i.e. 56.86%.³³ In 1967 BJS candidate secured 54.5% votes and again in 1977 won 70% of the votes. Similarly in 1971 and 1984 elections, Congress candidates won more than 60% votes. Besides these elections were

held unusual circumstances, 1971 victory of India over Pakistan and later Mrs. Gandhi Assassination, as stated earlier, voting performance of women played a crucial role in determining the result in 1984 elections, they constituted 45% of the total electorate in South Delhi, influence the outcome of the elections. We see that performance of BJP had been better than that of Congress for e.g. in 1980. Margin of victory was 1.30%. Even in the 1984 elections the BJP secured 37% votes and it won the 1989 elections by securing nearly 68% votes. an important base of support of BJP in this area are the middle class government servants, new rich, and recently the party was successful in mobilizing the Sikh voters in its favour. The Congress drew its support mainly from the rural and urban under privileged sections of the society. Another feature of this constituency is the apathy of the rich voters in the areas - where voters turn out is very low. Congress candidate over emphasized the issue on national important like strong Central Government, unit and integrity of the country etc. in 1984. Earlier in 1980 it emphasized the opposition disunity. BJP candidates also brought out the local issues like abolition of leasehold system, law and order in the city, DA installment etc.

DELHI SADAR

Delhi Sadar in the 1984 elections became the forth largest constituency in Delhi. Area covered by this constituency fall within the old city area and the division of social groups have been on traditional lines.³⁴ The total number of electorate

has gone up from 3.67 lakhs in 1984 to 5 lakhs in 1989. Residential areas of Moti Nagar, Kamla Nagar, Vijay Nagar, Model Town, Deputy Ganj, Sohan Ganj, Shakti Nagar and Marampura formed parts of this constituency. Apart from these residential areas it includes two main commercial centres of Delhi Naya Bazar and Azad market.³⁵ The electorate consists of small traders, middle class businessmen, government servants (mostly from Police and Class III & IV categories), factory workers and residents of Jhuggi Jhompri. The most important segment of electorate are middle class traders who are generally Punjabi speaking. Traders concentration is more than 75% in areas like Sadar Bazar, Deputy Ganj, Kamla Nagar, Shakti Nagar, Jawahar Nagar. Moti Nagar and Kirti Nagar. Community wise there are about thirty thousand Sikhs, fifteen thousand Sikhs are spread over Model Town, Moti Nagar, Roshnara Road. In pre-1984 elections they managed the campaign of Congress(I). Muslims concentrated in Bara Hindu Rao, Kishan Ganj and Inder Lok and twenty five thousand jhuggi jhohpri dwellers, mainly from Eastern U.P. and Bihar.³⁶ Jain Community also forms an important constituent. Women constituted 44% total electorate in 1984. The electorate in that area is educated and has a history of giving its mandate not on popular slogans but on issues and ideologies. Abolition of sales tax and harassment of traders by government servant were/are two important issues reused mainly by BJP candidate. Congress leaders emphasized the national issues like unity and integrity of nation charisma of Rajiv Gandhi and opposition disunity. This area was also considered a Jan Sangh strong hold in pre 1967 phase for the Jan Sangh candidates even when they lost elections polled substantial

number of votes ³⁷ in Timarpur, Vijay Nagar are areas dominated by government servants and University teachers. These educated voters give more weight to the individual than party.

Like the other constituencies in 1967, 1971, and late in 1977 it followed general trend. In the 1980 Congress candidate won by a narrow margin of 3.17% votes. Even in the 1984 elections when tide was in complete favour of Congress. M.L. Khurana secured 35.78% votes. However, BJP wrested the seat in 1989 by securing 53.77% votes. But the point to note is that if we compare percentage of votes polled in favour of Congress, the difference was only that of less than 4%. In this constituency also, voters' turn-out is very high ranging from a low of 60.11% in 1989 to 69.2% in 1980 elections.

CHANDNI CHOWK

It is the smallest parliamentary constituency and the most congested. It forms the historical and commercial centre of the capital. It is spread over the entire walled city except a part of Darya Ganj. It being a commercial centre, Banyias and Marwaris constitute majorportion of Hindu voters. Their number is estimated to be two lakh thirty thousand. Next in importance are the Jains estimated to be around fifty thousand.³⁸ The distinguishing feature of this constituency is the presence of seventy thousand Muslim voters and another seventy thousand belonging to scheduled castes and weaker sections. Voters turnout is highest in this area always about 70%. Both parties

select candidates who are most suitable in terms of caste or community and also are residents of the area. So did the Congress candidate J.P. Aggarwal - Bania caste or earlier B.R. Jain represented Jain community. Sikander Bakht, S.C. Khandelwal of BJP represented Muslim & Bania community. According to 1984 Election Commission Report women constituted 44.3% of the total electorate. They were influenced by the brutal assassination of Mrs. Gandhi in 1984 and local sphere the provision of regular water supply and other such amenities affected their choice. Another important feature is the presence of Jama Masjid in the vicinity. So appeals of the Shahi Imam and other religions leaders or organizations, has a bearing on the political preferences. The voting trend was similar to the other constituencies in all the elections. But notable feature was the presence of the fielding Muslim candidate by the PSP in 1957 elections who polled 24.3% votes³⁹ and later in 1989 Janta Dal fielded a Muslim Candidate. During emergency both the Scheduled Caste and Muslim voters were victims of sterilization and demolition programmes of the government. Consequently in 1977 elections Congress candidate lost to Janata candidate by a wide margin of 45% of votes.

However, in the 1980 elections Congressmen B.R. Jain won by a margin of only 8.11% votes. In 1983, Metropolitan Council Elections, the Muslim voters preferred to vote for candidates of their own community irrespective of party affiliations. So in the 1984 elections the BJP fielded Sikander Bakht. He was in an advantageous position in so far as he was

the only Muslim candidate in the fray. He only polled 37% votes only a marginal reduction from the votes polled in his favour in the 1980 elections J.P. Aggarwal won by 60% votes. He was supported by Muslims living in Qusabpura, Matiya Mahal areas.⁴⁰ In this constituency in 1984 - 1989 elections, Congress candidate J.P. Aggarwal highlighted his achievement in the local area - getting the roads carpeted, manholes covered, regular water supply, sewer lines, whereas the BJP candidate, Sikandar Bakht laid emphasise on national issues like dynastic rule, a novice being made party leader of Congress(Rajiv Gandhi), emergency excesses in Turkman Gate.

However, in the 1989 elections, Congress candidate won by a very narrow margin of 2%. The notable feature of this election was that Muslim voters very unhappy with the Congress government for its handling of Ram Janam bhoomi - Babri Masjid issue. We must also take note of the fact that the BJP and the Janta Dal fielded separate candidates and non-congress vote was divided between the two. Sadiq Ali of Janata Dal secured 30% of votes. In this constituency, comparison of both 1980 and 1989 shows that Congress support declined from 47.35% to less than 36%.

KAROL BAGH (RESERVED)

Scheduled Caste voters constituted 1/3rd of the total electorate in the Karol Bagh constituency. Out of the total 3 lakhs 30 thousand voters in the 1984 elections, 1 lakh 25

thousand were harijan voters. They were stratified into Rehgars, Jatavs, Balmiks and Berwas and Dhanike.⁴¹ Rehgars constitute the largest group followed by Jatavs. Balmiks and Berwas constitute 32% of the total scheduled castes voters and only 10% are Dhanike. Besides there are 30 thousand Sikh voters, 25 thousand Punjabi speaking and 20 thousand Brahmins and 12 thousand others.⁴² Its demographic structure has been changed somewhat due to (a) Reserve migration and (b) a large number of middle class voters moving into the DDA colonies of Naraina and Prasad Nagar.⁴³ There are also pockets of semi posh area like East Patel Nagar, Rajender nagar, where affluent class voters live. This area was/is considered a Congress strong hold. However, it also followed the same general trend of voting in favour of Jan Sangh/Janata Party in 1967 and 1977 elections. The candidates selected by various parties belong to the most numerous Rehgar or Jatav communities. The Congress party re-established itself in the constituency in 1980 election when D.D. Shahstri secured 55.35% votes. In 1984 Congress Party candidate polled nearly 70% of the total votes and the rest going to the BJP. IN 1989 like the Chandni Chowk constituency the constituency witnessed a triangular contest Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) fielded G.R. Nirman. Though BJP candidate Kalka Das won by polling 50% votes Congress candidate was not far behind polling 47%. The BSP candidate showed very poor following it won only 1.12% votes. The voters turnout in this constituency was also above 65% in most of the elections. Women constituted 46% of total electorate. Small and middle class businessmen, traders, shopkeepers, private and government employees. the complexion of the constituency has

changed due to both in and out migration. The Haryana voters have moved out. In fact, latest estimate put the number of SC voters to less than 50%

EAST DELHI

The East Delhi constituency having been created in '67, is the youngest of Delhi's seven constituencies.⁴⁴ This sprawling constituency is the second largest in terms of electorate, accounting for nearly 25% of Delhi's total electorate. It covers not only the whole of trans Yamuna area of Delhi but also areas which were earlier under Delhi Sadar and Outer Delhi. Majority of electorate living in the resettlement colonies of Trilokpuri, Kalyanpuri, Nand Nagri and many more. These under privileged people were moved to these areas under slum clearance programme during emergency. Besides there area number of residential colonies like Gandhinagar, Shahdara where lower middle class people live. In the last decade numerous housing societies have come up in the area. People living in there are mainly retired or serving government officials. The upper middle class lives in the posh areas of Anand Vihar, Madhuvan, Preet Vihar etc. Apart from this there are rural areas like Alipur, Narela etc. 10,000 Gujjars, 20,000 Tahkurs religious minorities also constitutes an important section of the electorate. There are about 1 lakh 30 thousand Sikhs, and 1 lakh Muslims in the area.⁴⁵ In 1967 elections was won by BJS. But from 1971 onwards except for 1977 H.K.L. Bhagat won all the elections. A notable feature of this constituency is that the BJP did not field a candidate

from this constituency till 1991 elections. The Congress maintained its dominance till the composition of the area was such that it was dominated by under-privileged poor people in Wazirabad area.. It polled a record nearly 77% votes in 1984 elections. But by 1989 a serious challenge to its dominance was offered by BSP Kanshi Ram who polled 11.23% votes whereas H.K.L.Bhagat of Congress only 25% votes. Major election issues raised were - regularization of unapproved colonies - provision of facilities like bus service, sewer lines, roads, electricity. H.K.L. Bhagat of Congress(I) highlighted the achievement of in these area. Besides it raised the national issues, like unity and integrity. Caste and Community also played a significant role in election especially in resettlement and slum area and also the rural areas of the constituency.

OUTER DELHI

It is the largest constituency both in terms of size and electorate. It starts from Bawana in the north, stretches to Najafgarh in the West and Mehrauli and Badarpur in the South. The number of voters increased from 6 lakhs 7 thousand in 1980 to 8 lakhs 51 thousand in 1984 and in 1989 its total strength was 15 lakhs, 75 thousand⁴⁶. The tremendous increase in population is attributed to an influx of slum population and labour class to the resettlement colonies. The constituency can be divided into three segments - rural, urban and resettlement colonies. 4 lakh people live in its 360 villages, 5 lakhs in resettlement colonies and about 7 lakhs in the urbanized part of the constituency,

which includes middle class housing projects and posh colonies. People living in the resettlement colonies from Bihar, U.P. and Tamil Nadu.⁴⁷ There are 50 thousand Sikhs living in Tilak Vihar, Chand Nagar, Shyam Nagar and Khayala. There are about 67,000 muslims and 2.5 lakhs harijans.⁴⁸ Rural areas are divided on the caste basis with jats-concentrated in Bawana, Najafgarh and Kanjwala and Ahirs in Shakurpur, Palam, Nangloi, Badli has 80,000 voters in resettlement colonies and 12,000 Muslim lines in the area. Besides there are also Gujjars and Yadavs.⁴⁹ Caste plays a very important role in the political choice of the rural people.⁵⁰ Accordingly political parties fielded jat and Gujjar candidates. Like in the East Delhi constituency BJP never contested from Outer Delhi constituency. Congress was opposed by either Janata Party, Lok Dal, Janata Dal. This constituency include die hard Congress supporters in the 1967 elections when Congress lost all other seats in Delhi, it won the Outer Delhi constituency. However in 1977 its candidate was defeated by Ch. Brahm Prakash, a Congress stalwart to join the Janata Party. In 1980 elections, Janata Party candidate secured only half the percentage of votes polled by Congressmen. In 1984 Congress increased its support to about 73% whereas Lok Dal maintained 23.05% votes. However, fortunes reserved when in 1989 Congress candidate Bharat Singh lost to Janata Dal candidate Jarif Singh who polled nearly 50% votes. This was due to dissatisfaction of people living in resettlement colonies over provision of civic amenities - water supply, sewer lines, roads etc. Congress leaders were sure of the support these section of the constituency for it provided the slum popular with flats at

subsidized rate in resettlement area. They were conscious of corruption, Bofors also. Rural segment the other traditional supporters of Congress(I) were confessed on the issue of selection between Dina Lal and Bharat Singh. Dina Lal at that time had tremendous support in the neighbouring Haryana. Another area of discontentment over the provision of are benefit from implementation of 20 point programme. The SC voters were unhappy over Congress of these benefit by Jat.

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CONCLUSION

In post-independence India, Delhi continued to be the capital city, and the first problem it confronted was that of Hindu-refugees from Pakistan. These people settled down in various parts of the city and gradually entered into trade and business. Until the 1970's they dominated the political life of Delhi. They were staunch supporters of the Jana Sangh. Besides, the party drew support from traditions oriented Brahmins and white collar workers. The party gained maximum support of traditions oriented people because of its strong advocacy of Hindi as an official language and Bhartiyan Karan which included de-westernisation and prohibition. It was a protagonist of the rights of displaced refugees -- compensation and their rehabilitations; hostility against Pakistan was the other major plank to gain their support. It supported the demands of better housing, education, transport services to win over middle class professionals. The party also took up the issue of abolition of sales tax to woo the traders.

In contrast to the narrow homogenous base of the Jana Sangh, the Congress Party drew support from diverse elements in society. The Congress party exploited the charisma of leaders like Pandit Nehru, Gandhiji, its role in the freedom struggle. The party also supported the demands of various sections of society like farmers, tenants, and regional demands like statehood for Delhi. On the basis of this support Congress party was able to win almost all Lok Sabha seats from Delhi in the pre-

1967 phase. However, the Jana Sangh provided considerable challenge to the Congress party in the elections to the local bodies. In 1954 and 1958 Municipal elections it was able to capture 17 and 25 seats respectively. After in 1967, the Jana Sangh won convincing majority in both the Metropolitan Council and Municipal Corporation. Later in 1971 the Congress party defeated the Jana Sangh in the elections polling a total of 64.39% votes. However, in 1977 Janta party candidate gave a crushing defeat to Congress candidates in the sixth Lok Sabha elections. the outcome of both these elections was determined by the policies of the Congress Government at the Centre. ↗

In the beginning of the 1980's leaders of both the major parties Congress and BJS faced uphill task. Congress leaders had to regain the support of its traditional voters; and the leaders of newly formed BJP clearly understood the disadvantages of a narrow social base - upper caste Hindus Punjabis refugees, traders and white collar workers - and decided to project an changed image of the party. The demographic structure of Delhi also underwent changes, the older generation of Hindu refugees was no longer the dominant social group in Delhi. In migration from other areas like Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Rajastan was on a larger scale. these people belonged to backward and poor class. They lived in slums and resettlement colonies where they faced enormous problems of housing, basic civic amenities, health care, law and order. In its effort to expand its social base, the Delhi unit of BJP adopted, the strategy of supporting demands which directly concerned there

sections of society. In selected issues like price rise, deteriorating law and order, shortage of essential commodities, early elections to the local bodies. This mobilization strategy was aimed to projecting a secular image of the party and also delegitimising the Congress Government in the eyes of larger crore section of the society. the only weakness of BJP was conspicuous absence of demands of rural segment of society. Throughout the decade, the party led various movements on issues concerning the urban people but not a single demonstration on issues concerning rural areas of Delhi.

In earlier decades, the Delhi unit of Congress actively mobilized people on various issues and at times look independent stand viz--a-viz the Central leadership. In the 1980's the attitude of the party was marked by complacency and extreme subordination of the Pradesh Congress to the Central leadership. the party did not mobilize public opinion on any issue and defended the policies of Central Government. the local leaders were confident about the ability of national leaders like Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi to win mass support. A notable feature of the 1980s was the shift of communal issues from periphery to centre stage of national politics. The Muslim community were alienated from the Congress party due to the policies followed during Emergency. In the early 1980s, they were perturbed by anti-muslim riots in Moradabad and other towns in Uttar Pradesh. During these years, Mrs. Gandhi made an attempt to mobilize the support of Hindus voters. The elections to the Metropolitan Council in 1983 was a clear example of this strategy. The Assam

Accord signed in 1985 and later judgement in Shahbanu's case further alienated the Muslim community. Besides the Sikh community resented operation blue star and post - assassination riots in 1984. However, Congress Government could not afford to offend the minorities especially Muslims any further lest they desert Congress party enmasse. So it passed the Muslim Womens Bill in 1987 to assuage the feelings of Muslim fundamentalists. On the other hand, Congress Government yielded to the demand of Hindus to open the gates of Ram Janama bhoomi temple in Ayodhya.

As stated earlier, Delhi has large concentration of both Muslims and Sikhs apart from majority Hindus. So it proved a fertile ground for communal politics. Delhi unit of BJP led extensive campaign for the rights of Hindu migrants from Punjab and later from Kashmir. It attacked the Congress Government for appeasing the minorities. This policy helped BJP to regain the support of Hindus living in the city and also the migrants. The Congress(I) could not make direct appease to Hindus on communal bases because of compulsions of its social base. It had to present a secular, progressive image in order to gain the support of religions minorities and backward classes. By 1989, the role of primordial totalities, in determining political choice, increased manifold. the defeat of Congress candidates in the Outer Delhi constituency clearly indicated the loss of minority (Sikh and Scheduled caste) and backward caste vote in the area. In East Deli Constituency, the leader of Bahujan Samaj Party, Kanshi Ram was able to win backward caste support. congress leaders H.K.L. Bhagat could retain the constituency but won with

reduced margins.

The Bofors scandals gave a death blow to the image of the party leader Rajiv Gandhi as an honest efficient man. The Congress party depended entirely on the personal charisma of its leaders and the opposition parties always criticized their leaders. But for the first time leaders of the opposition were able to convince the electorate of the personal involvement in the Bofors scandal.

By the end of 1980 exploitation of Caste and communal division of society and anti-Congressian accounted for defeat of Congress in Delhi. the subsequent elections of 1991 proved the importance of there two factors in Delhi politics. So far we have talked about social groups with stable political choices -- there groups vote en bloc on the basis of caste or community. But Delhi, had a larger member of people belonging to the educated middle class who were known to be volatile in their voting behaviour. their political preference was most unpredictable because their choice was based on immediate issues - National policies regarding foreign affairs or economic matters, conjunctures and personality of the candidate. Both parties Congress and BJP made earnest effort to gain the support of this section of society.

The success of BJP in the later part of the decade was due to prevailing national atmosphere - ascendance of communal politics extreme anti-Congressism. However, in 1991, provision

was made for a Legislative Assembly and Council of Ministers, for Delhi. It is expected that it may reduce the significance of national politics over local politics. Elections to the Assembly were held in November 1993. BJP emerged victorious by winning 49 out of total 70 seats with 43% of the vote. The significance of BJP's victory becomes clear if we look at the voting pattern according to the parliamentary constituencies. In Outer Delhi, where until 1989, BJP had electoral adjustments with Lok Dal or other parties, in the 1993 elections it won 37.45% vote and 11 Assembly seats out of the total 20. Similarly in East Delhi it won 42.55% of the vote. and 15 out of 20 seats. In the Karol Bagh parliamentary constituency it took all the 5 Assembly seats with 46.28% of the votes. Moreover, New Delhi, South Delhi and Sadar gave the BJP more than 49% of the vote. The performance of Congress Party in the Assembly polls was dismal. It won only 14 seats with 34% of the vote. In its traditional stronghold in the East Delhi it won 29.59% vote and only 3 out of 20 Assembly seats. Similarly in Outer Delhi, it won 32.0% vote and only 6 seats. If we look at the election date community wise we find that BJP performed well in constituencies with large number of Sikhs. Out of five constituencies classified with high Sikh concentration. BJP won 46.4% vote and 3 seats. Out of the total 30 seats classified as slum dominated BJP won 37.8% vote and 20 seats. In 15 rural area seats it won 36% votes, and 10 seats. Scheduled Caste voters also supported BJP in large numbers. Roughly 13 seats could be categorized as dominated by Scheduled Castes, BJP won 8 seats with 39.2% votes. The major cause of Congress debacle in the 1993 elections was strong presence of a

third party - Janta Dal. It performed well in the areas dominated by Muslim community. It polled 23.8% votes in Muslim dominated constituencies which was very close to the 29% of the Congress. The other areas in which it performed well were those predominated by rural regions, slums and Scheduled Castes. It polled 17% votes in these constituencies! The reasons for defeat of Congress in these elections were exploitation of anti-Congressism - involvement of Prime Minister in securities scam (Payment of Bribe by Harshad Mehta, handling of Hazrat Bal incident in Kashmir, Right and grievances of Sikh community, price rise and better deal for Delhi. Janta Dal exploited the social justice issue to gain the support of backward castes living in slums and resettlement colonies, protection of rights of Muslims Community. The outcome of 1993 elections proved the complete alienation of traditional supporters of Congress and their flight to other parties.

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