

# **POLITICS OF COALITION IN TURKEY (1961—65)**

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
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Certificate

Certified that the dissertation entitled, *POLITICS OF COALITION IN TURKEY (1961-65)* Submitted by Mr. Subrat Kumar Dash in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy, has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University and is his own Work.

We recommend that this dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

  
PROF. MOHAMMAD SADIQ  
CHAIRPERSON

  
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**TO  
MY PARENTS**

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## PREFACE

BY coalition is meant a temporary or permanent union of two or more political parties for the sake of formation of government. The situation for coalition arises when none of the political parties receive majority. Coalitions are therefore by nature very weak and unstable. It is a common knowledge the development of party system in any country stems first from a dominant political party for some period before it is being dislodged by other political parties. When different political parties emerge, each drawing support from definite region and different section of the people, a kind of situation prevails in which no single political party would be in a position to form the government. The result is that some kind of coalition. Infact, the coalition politics in Turkey between 1961-65 reflects this phenomenon. Establishment of one party system by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in the first decade of the century marked the beginning of a democratic process in Turkey. His Republican People's Party

remained a dominant party for quite a while. However, after the death of Ataturk, it was displaced by the other parties. Thus the root cause for the emergence of coalition in 1961-65 was due to erosion in the support base of dominant parties in Turkey-RPP and Justice Party. As a result the entire period was characterized by crisis and instability. It is therefore both interesting and significant that, we study deep into this new development in the Turkey's politics to understand the working of the political system during this period (1961-65).

The study is mainly analytical in nature. Secondary material, such as books and journals have been the main sources of reference for the purpose.

The dissertation begins with a general introduction. In this part a brief exposition to the country's geography, history has been attempted, which has been influenced the Turkey's politics in several ways.

The first chapter covers the background of



the Turkey's first coalition. An attempt has been made to trace out various socio-economic and political context in which the first coalition of 1961 took place.


The second chapter deals with the working of the first coalition, its performance amidst various socio-economic, political challenges. It has also tried to analyse the factors responsible for its abrupt end.

The third chapter takes care of the second coalition and its viability.

The fourth chapter analyses the 1965 election and the subsequent end of the politics of coalition in Turkey.

**ABBREVIATIONS**

NUC	National Unity Committee
RPP	Republican People's Party
JP	Justice Party
DP	Democratic Party
RPNP	Republican Peasant's National Party
TWP	Turkey's Worker's Party
TLP	Turkey's Labour Party
NTP	New Turkey Party
GNA	Grand National Assembly



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## INTRODUCTION

Turkey's geo-strategic position, size, resource base, and population place it among the more important states of the world. Sharing a boundary with the Soviet Union on the north-east, Turkey also borders Iran, Iraq, Syria, Greece and Bulgaria. It thus sits astride the land routes to the Middle-East from Europe and European Russia. The outlet of the Black Sea into the mediterranean and increasingly busy-lane for Soviet Commerce with the Middle-East and Africa, flows through its terrain. This physical location at the junction of continents has profoundly influenced Turkey's political, social and economic courses. After the losses of territory in the Balkan in the last days of the Ottoman Empire, the country was left with a European lodgment in trace constituting only slightly more than 3 percent of its national once.

The Republic of Turkey was founded by Mustafa Kemal (later named Ataturk) in 1923 after the collapse of the 600 -years old Ottoman Empire. The Empire, which at its peak controlled vast

stretches of Northern Africa, south eastern Europe, and western Asia, had failed to keep pace the social and technological development of Europe. The rise of nationalism impelled several peoples of the empire to seek independence, leading to the empire's fragmentation. This process culminated in the disastrous Ottoman participation in World War I as a German ally. Defeted, shorn of much of its former territory and partially occupied by forces of the Victorious European states, the Ottoman structure was repudiated by Turkish nationalists who rallied under the leadership of Ataturk. After a bitter war against invading Greek forces the nationalists expelled them from Anatolia. The Sultanate and Caliphate, the temporal and religious institutions of the old empire, were abolished and Turkey became a republic.

The new republic concentrated on modernizing and westernizing the empire's Turkish core-Anatolia and a small part of thrace. The social, political, linguistic and economic reform introduced by Ataturk formed the ideological base of modern Turkey. Referred to as Kemalism, it comprises secularism, nationalism,

etatism, and tilt towards the west for inspiration and support. The meaning continued validity and applicability of Kemalism are the subject of frequent discussions and debate in Turkey's political life.

Turkey did participate in World War towards the end. The difficulties faced by Greece in quelling a communist rebellion and demands by the Soviet Union, shortly after the end of World War II for Turkey's cession of some of its eastern territory and for military bases in Turkish straits-led to the declaration of the Truman doctrine in 1947. Large scale US military and economic aid began at this time. Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

The one-party-rule Republican People's Party (RPP) established by Ataturk in 1923 lasted until the 1950 elections, when the Democratic Party came to power. It ruled from 1950 until May 1960 when growing economic problems and internal political tensions culminated in a military coup. A new constitution was written, and civilian government was reinstated with the convening of the Grand National Assembly (GNA) in October 1961. In addition,

the new constitution established a National Unity Committee (NUC) composed of the chief of the Turkish General Staff and representatives of the army, airforce, and navy. In the October 1961 elections no party won a majority, however, the RPP was the dominant party in Coalition government.

Thus, modern Turkey reveals one outstanding characteristic-'instability.' This instability is due to the growing conflict between tradition and modernity which took roots first in the beginning of 1920s when Kemal Ataturk challenged the traditional elements of Ottoman empire. Ataturk was very progressive and desired to build modern Turkey on the basis of western pattern. Undoubtedly, he is the founder of modern Turkish state based on nationalism and secularism. The separation of politics from religion was the chief contribution of Ataturk to the people of Turkey. The ideas of Ataturk were resorted by the kings and their supporters who felt that they were a threat to their position. These persons were against any change or reform in the social and political spheres. Consequently, in the battle between traditionalists and modernists led by Ataturk,



the latter won thereby paving the way for reforms in Turkish society. The changes brought about culminated in the establishment of democracy.

The dream of Ataturk to build a stronger Turkey both economically and politically could not last long. After his death in 1938, the one-party rule setup by him lost the support of the people. His successors did not carry forward the pace of reforms. As a result, the Republican People's Party (RPP) was replaced by the democratic party which followed anti-Kemalist policies. So emphasis on anti-Kemalist principles meant return to old traditional culture. Once again the tussle between traditional and modern elements surfaced. This created a crisis at the end of 1950s which culminated in the military take over. Unlike its predecessor government, military rulers recognized the importance of Kemalist principles. However, military rule was soon replaced by a democratic government. In the 1961 election, none of the parties received majority, as a result, a coalition government was formed. It is with this coalition government that this dissertation is concerned.

## CHAPTER-I

### BACKGROUND TO THE 1961 ELECTIONS

In a sense the *Coup d' etat* of 27th May had been in the making since mid 1950's. The neo-colonial policies and programmes of the ruling Democratic Party had almost brought the country into the brink of deep socio-economic crisis. There were wide-spread social discontentment and mass protests. State repression continued unabated to crush all such unrest. The whole nation was showed by a specter of hopelessness. This sorry state of affairs, which was construed as the logical consequences of anti-Kemalist policies pursued by the Democratic Party, had already given rise to unrest within the Armed Forces. With the social unrest economic crisis worsening by the day, the patience of the Army was fast giving way. By 1960, the situation had really reached a boiling point and it was anybody's guess in Turkey that the Army would take over anytime. The *coup* finally occurred on 27th May 1960 as expected.

*political*

There was however, an interesting <sup>political</sup> development which came in the wake of this deepening socio-economic crisis in the 1960's : it had brought together an assorted melange of ideologically divergent political factions close together. There were pro-Republican People's Party officers who were discontented with the existing regimes 'anti-Kemalist' policies and as such, had the desire to reinstate the 'Kemalist' -State and the ultra-nationalist junior officers who opposed the existing neo-colonial structure the Kemalists. They had narrowed their differences and had come together in an effort to meet the challenges of national crisis.

'The ultra-nationalist which constituted the nucleus of the conspirators, had worked out the precise details of the intervention.'<sup>1</sup> The actual revolution was carried out by the military without direct participation of the intellectuals in the universities. This is indicated by what happened during the next few days. General Gursel

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1. Firoz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, Washington Press, Colorado, 1978, pp.157-58.

and 38 officers representing all branches of the armed-forces organised themselves into the National Unity Committee, to govern the country, assuming legal power under the provisional law that, it promulgated soon afterwards, though executive power remained in the hands of the civilian council of minister, which was appointed and controlled by the National Unity Committee.

The civilian intellectuals called in to write the new constitution soon attempted to use it to achieve their long-standing hopes for social reforms through an autocracy. The NUC replied, however, that it had no intention of ruling beyond the time needed to try and punish those responsible for betraying Turkish democracy and to draw out a new constitution that would be better able to protect the nation from the prevailing chaos and disorder. That there were several NUC officers who agreed with the intellectuals and opposed the committee's decision to limit its term and relinquish power as soon as possible was indicated soon afterwards when 14 member-officers were ousted and deported from the country.

The NUC, remaining in power for little more than a year, concentrated mainly on its basic objectives of trying the Democratic leaders and drafting a new constitution. It also inaugurated major policy changes in the areas of economy and finance in order to put the subsequent regime on a new course. The 1960 military intervention was welcomed by most of the better-informed elements in the community who realized that the D.P. administration had brought Turkey to an impasse and feared that the intransigence of the Democratic leaders would lead to Civil War.

The forcible overthrow of a legally elected government, however corrupt, incompetent and tyrannical it might have been established a precedent that dogged Turkey in the next few years. The two military coups that were attempted (Feb. 1962, and May 1963) and the several more that were rumored created an atmosphere of uncertainty about the future. This hampered the return of normalcy in political and economic life.

Eager to legitimize its seizure of power, the NUC established the tribunals, at which the politicians

and officers were brought to trial. The main charges were violation of the constitution; the officers considered it important to demonstrate this in order to justify the military seizure of power. It is doubtful, however, that the trials were successful in achieving the basic objective of convincing the vast masses of Turks still loyal to the 'DP' that the deposed leaders were unworthy of their loyalty and deserved to be overthrown.

The NUC also carried out its own brand of social reforms, though it was hardly the kind envisaged by the intellectuals. The salaries of military officers and men were greatly increased. Democratic party supporters and sympathizers were purged out of the army and the government, though the former, at least, were given high pensions. A constituent assembly was convened and instructed to prepare a new constitution with better guarantees against the abuse of power. The new constitution inaugurated the second-Turkish Republic to signify a turning point in Turkish politics. The new Constitution included provisions for a senate and a constitutional court,

which were visualized as brakes on the arbitrary behaviour of future governments.

While these new institutions were being devised to prepare for the return to democratic political life, parallel innovations were also introduced on the economic and social side. The need for rapid economic and social development and the expansion of social justice within a democratic order were emphasised.

The new constitution envisaged an all-round development of Turkey. A new university Act was passed, not only to restore and strengthen university autonomy, but also to introduce internal reforms that the faculties had been unwilling to accept themselves. The younger faculty members were given a greater voice in university affairs, providing them with more opportunities for promotion through merit. Other laws also were enacted during the NUC year to wrap up the destruction of the Democratic Party regime and hasten achievement of social progress. A state planning organisation was established and Turkish cultural societies were formed to take the place of the people's

Houses. Both institutions were later written into the constitution. The military went ahead with energy and enthusiasm but many of the measures were so drastic that the economy almost came to a halt and not only businessmen but also workers and peasants began to show increasing unrest and desire for restoration of civilian regime that would provide for representation and protect their interests. "The stated goals of the armed forces in seizing power were to extricate the parties from their political impasse by holding a free election supervised by an impartial administration, and to restore power to the party which won the election."<sup>2</sup> The Report of the Constitutional Commission portrayed the *coup* as a revolution; thereby rationalizing the army takeover. It also sought to legitimize the NUC by conferring on it the sovereign power of the Turkish State till the Grand National Assembly was constituted under the new Constitution. The NUC would exercise legislative power appointed by the head of state

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2. Firoz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, Publishers, C. Hurst and Company, London, 1977, p.157-58.



and approved by the NUC. The NUC had the right to dismiss ministers, but only the head of state could appoint them. Only the judicial function was left independent of the committee though it retained the right to approve or veto the death sentence. Debates of the committee would be held in secret session and neither the discussion nor the decisions would be made public. In the committee all the members were to be equal, regardless of the rank they held. The committee was divided between those who wanted to restore power to the civilian as soon as possible and those who wanted to carry out reforms which would alter the political structure of the country before party politics were once again permitted. The moderates were, in fact, proposing that power be handed to the RPP since that was the strongest political organisation after the Democratic Party had been dissolved. The radicals on the other hand had no desire simply to surrender power to the republicans. They had hoped that purged and purified D.P. would be able to complete, but as that was no longer possible, they preferred the military to retain power until a new political

climate had been created in the country. Initially the position of the radical group was strong and its members were able to exert considerable influence in the sphere of policy making. In the committee, the majority was with the radicals in so far as most members felt no urgency about handing back power to the civilians. Relations in the committee continued to deteriorate and the final showdown between the factions became a question of time. One group was determined to demilitarize politics while the other was just as determined to prevent this. The radicals repeatedly emphasized that they would never permit the committee to pass the necessary measure. The removal of 'the fourteen' had been greeted with great sign of relief by the Turkish bourgeoisie. But the response in the armed forces, especially among the junior officers, was one of frustration and anger. The fourteen had represented a radicalism created by a lack of faith in the ability of the politicians and the established institutions to solve the country's problems, and this radicalism was to be found, throughout the military. So long as the ''fourteen'' were in the NUC the

elements in the NUC felt that they had an indirect voice in policy making and the future shape of the country. One consequence of their dismissal was the re-establishment of conspiratorial groups within the armed forces. Senior officers with active commands were aware of this danger and tackled it by forming an umbrella organisation designed to embrace and control all dissident elements in the armed forces. This organisation was known as the Armed Forces Union. The objective of the AFU was to act as a watchdog against the junior officers and to keep an eye on the activities of the NUC. The AFU became the real power and guarantor of the restoration of parliamentary rule.

By mid-summer Turkey was once again back on the road to multi-party politics. The restoration of political parties had been authorized on 12th January 1961 and new parties began to emerge the following month. In spite of the activities of the supporters of the former Democratic Party against the interim regime, the military guardians permitted the parties to begin political activities. The stage had been cleared for a general election

although provocations against the regime continued to increase but there was very little doubt that the military was doing its utmost to weaken the Justice Party in order to improve the Republican Peoples Party's chances of winning the election. It is not therefore surprising that only members of the neo-Democrat Parties were harassed and prosecuted by the authorities. The military had decided that the future of Turkish democracy could be made secure only with a Republican victory. Finally, in January 1961, a new constituent assembly was formed. A group of professors from Istanbul University was asked to draft a new constitution. Upon its completion, and following considerable debate in assembly, it was ratified in May 1961 and submitted to a national referendum in early July. To accommodate the various demands of the masses, the new constitution contained a number of progressive measures. Despite this there were sharp differences between the liberals and the social reform-minded groups; the former representing the propertied class, the latter coming more from the intellectual elites who wanted to restore some kind of strong regime to achieve their aims.

In the end, the constitution that emerged represented a compromise between the two groups. The elections which were held shortly after the adoption of the new constitution, in accordance with the NUC promise to transfer power back to civilian hands, took place in an atmosphere of economic stagnation.

The events that pushed General Gursel and his colleagues into political activism in May 1960 are still not entirely clear. The General's own explanation was simply that Prime Minister Menderes's regime had been flouting the constitution, using political power for personal profit, involving the army in politics, oppressing the people and dividing the nation. In the absence of any constitutionally defined power to limit unconstitutional act, the army had been obliged to oust the regime in order to protect the constitution and public.

The legitimacy of a government is not derived solely from the time that it comes to power. It is possible to maintain legitimacy only by the manner in which it respects, while in office, the constitution that brought it to that elevated position by the manner in which it cooperates

with public opinion and the army, with legislature and the judiciary, with institutions of learning and by its ability to survive under the rule of law.

Instead, the government and political power kept formulating new laws wholly contrary to the constitution and then proceeded to utilize these laws to violate the constitution. It also engaged in activities without benefit of any law.

The lesson to be derived from the failure of civilian leadership in Turkey is that such leadership can survive only as long as it continues to lead the people. The Turkish army could be entrusted with major programmes that shaped national development-basic education, technical training, industrial production-as long as the civilian leadership generated the ideas and shaped the institutions which made these service programmes functional for society as a whole. The government made policies and the army carried them out. But when civilian leadership seemed to falter by leaning upon the army for political support, and when it started

blocking channels of promotion for young men of ability and subjecting them to partisan pressures and alienating the national intellectual elite which was closely identified with the junior officers corps and by giving priority to local interests over the national interest - the situation changed. The last two points were of special importance.

As the civilian administration became a closed sphere, opportunities in the military establishment were becoming increasingly available to men of ability regardless of their origin or age. The army's dynamism was not matched by the civilian sector. This tended to make the army's programmes dysfunctional, its satisfactions turned into frustrations. When the tightly closed regime apparently tried to use the army for its own partisan political purposes thereby violating the basic Ataturk doctrine of an apolitical army- it subverted the principle of civilian supremacy. The only way to save civilian supremacy under these conditions was, some thought, a military coup to install a caretaker regime that would re-establish the conditions for democratic civil government.

The idea of temporarily setting aside popular government in Turkey and constructing in its place a military - intellectual oligarchy was very much in the air. Within the emerging nations there seems to be a tendency for these two groups to move together and in terms of membership, to overlap. In Turkey, the non-military intellectual, however, is confined pretty largely to the big cities and has had little direct knowledge or understanding of grass roots of Turkish society. It is significant that General Gursel saw it fit to declare publicly that the gap between the masses and the intellectuals must be closed. By mid 1961, a serious disenchantment between the two groups was apparent.

The General and his committee of national union had declared the number one issue in the country to be that of education and they spoke of reconstituting the village and of using army officers as teachers and of much increased emphasis on education and rural development. Many of the city folk had become unhappy with the Menderes regime precisely because it had diverted so much



money and attention from urban business to rural development. It had upset the existing social and economic order too much too rapidly. Turkey was infact in the throes of accommodating political liberation and economic acceleration. The army was perhaps the most appropriate vehicle for this purpose.

The Turkish army is an active participant in the modernization of the country. The role of the army in Turkish culture has traditionally seen one of paramount importance. The Turkish armed forces take great pride in the historic role that they have played in modernizing their country. They also feel that they have a special responsibility for defending the secular state and preserving the Kemalist reforms. The relationship between the commanders of the armed forces and the civilian political leadership is a sensitive one.



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## CHAPTER II

### THE BEGINNING OF COALITION POLITICS

Turkish politics since 1961 has very much reflected the new democracy created by the constitution. The different social classes and political groups which were limited under the RPP and which had begun to split apart during the democratic decade to reflect their individual interests. Since the major parties tried to gain the support of different groups by widening their appeal as much as possible they had come to emulate the old RPP much more than they might care to admit. The major parties had become almost evenly balanced securing the majorities needed to govern by coalition with the small parties. The old NUC, largely retired into the background, had chosen to exercise a moderate influence from behind the scenes, acting mainly through the Presidents of the Republic, all of whom have been former military officers, to push the squabbling parties to overcome their differences in order to exact the reforms envisaged

in the constitution. The intellectuals, whose hopes that the 1961 constitution would achieve all their liberal economic and social ambitions had dimmed now tended to move away from the existing constitutional structure and towards the more radical socialist movement that would fulfill their objectives by revolutionary change. The new middle-class interested mainly in preserving and extending its prosperity both in the towns and the country-side has come to associate with groups wishing to limit social reforms and promote the enterprise. The religious nationalists and conservatives have splintered into their own radical groups with limited, but potentially dangerous, influence among the masses. With the Democratic Party seemingly put out of existence, the RPP initially emerged as the most important remaining political force, apparently assured of resuming the power lost in 1950. It never was able to accomplish this promise in the decade of the 1960s. However, because many in the country associated it with the 1960 coup and the trials that followed, while the new mercantile classes and peasants who prospered so much under the democrats feared that an RPP triumph would restore

the old statics that had seemingly suppressed them in the past. Still including both conservative and liberal elements, the RPP program in 1961 expressed general proposals that could satisfy everyone.

Private as well as public enterprise was to be encouraged, a more equitable system of taxation developed, land given to the peasants and social security and social services provided to all workers. Foreign capital was to be attracted, but under strong government supervision and the alliance with the West would be preserved. The RPP thus emerged as a progressive but basically middle-class liberal party, somewhat more socialistic than before but still moderate.

The 'New Turkey Party' was founded in February 1961, at least partly by members of the Freedom Party group that had split from the Democrats in 1957. Accepting private enterprise and rapid industrialization as basic necessities for economic development, it advocated government action to achieve this end, but with more of a balance between the nation's financial capacities and efficiency

of production that had been the case in the past. Religious education would be encouraged to give Turkish youth an idea of their heritage, but secularism was accepted as a basic principle and freedom for all religions encouraged. Foreign capital would be accepted but controlled. Land would be divided among the peasants, so long as the proliferation of small holdings did not hurt productions and State planning would be used not to control all aspects of the economy but merely to coordinate and harmonize its different elements.

The new RPNP, now basically a secular and rationalist group, emphasized the social and religious aims more or less in the pattern of the National socialist movements of pre-war Germany and Italy. It accepted the democratic regime established in 1961 but did not really emphasize it, advocating instead strong state action to achieve its aims. Workers were to be given social security and even allowed to participate in industrial management, to organize and to strike. On the other hand, party and government were to reconcile class differences. Private enterprise was encouraged, but capitalistic exploitation and excessive profits were to be

discouraged. Planning was needed so that society could be organized and controlled for its own good. People should be educated and be given a new meaning to lives . Land should be distributed but large units retained to encourage production, while private property was to be recognized and encouraged. Turkish nationalism and Islam were to be emphasized as basic pillars of the society of the Republic.

In the meantime, the nation Party also emphasized private enterprise and economic planning but unlike the RPNP it strongly defended political democracy and rejected the extremes of political and social organization advocated both by the right and the left. Religion was emphasized and all forms of socialism and communism rejected because of their basically god-less approaches. Turkish nationalism should influence foreign policy. Turkey's actions should reflect less of what its welfare allies want and more of what its own interest were in relation to the Arab countries and Cyprus. It also should avoid any kind of cooperation with the Soviet Union, religion and morality should be emphasized to guide Turkish society.

However, most of the old democratic vote had been captured by the Justice Party. With the NUC still in control during the 1961 elections, the Justice Party had to develop an independent programme and could not openly pose as the direct heir of the Democratic Party. It did so though in fact however, and took over much of the latter's electoral apparatus around the country. Its basic position was only slightly right of centre, with its conservative position stemming not so much from the more authoritarian approaches of the other groups on the right but, rather, from old fashioned liberalism, very much like that of the Democrats, advocacy of the maximum amount of freedom for the individual whether he was a worker, a peasant, a merchant, or a factory owner. Private enterprise was to be encouraged, though state enterprise could be accepted when necessary. The party's concern for rural support was expressed through its declarations against any kind of rural income or animal taxes and its support of reductions of taxes on small merchants and traders. Land reform was emphasized, but land owners would be allowed to retain at least small estates, and

small plots would be discouraged so as not to lessen productivity. Workers would be allowed to strike, and the government would give them social security, socialized health care and the like. Education could be reformed to end elitism among the intellectuals; villages and towns would be given more autonomy to control their destinies according to their own needs. Planning would be a voluntary effort to coordinate the different elements of the economy, with worker representatives helping develop goals. foreign capital would be encouraged and with little control as long as the over-all national objectives were achieved: Unemployment would be remedied by money payments and also by finding work for those able and willing to do so. Universities would be reformed so that they could better meet the students' needs and interests, and academic advice would be heeded by the government as much as possible. The party has been divided into liberal and conservative wings.

The strongest left wing group was the Turkish workers party, whose leadership was calling all the other parties reactionary. The workers' party



followed the Marxist line of criticizing American imperialism and claiming that Turkish interests were sacrificed in return for American help. While its went on to advocate an independent foreign policy including both workers and intellectuals in its candidate list, the worker's party emphasized restoration of state control over heavy industry and all the basic units of production, with private enterprise being allowed to continue. The banks, insurance companies, foreign trade, and the use of foreign capital would be nationalized along with the mineral resources. In a strongly property oriented state, however, the worker's party was not able to expound more radical ideas while in opposition; thus it started that property rights would be preserved as long as the owners did not use them for exploitation. The democratic regime would be retained, with minority rights respected.

The national elections held on October 15, 1961 were carried out in complete freedom and without government or army interference despite the continued rule of the NUC. Though the latter

gave the RPP its moral support and the other parties had only just been organised, 'the RPP received 36.7% of the votes and 173 seats; the JP and the NTP received 34.8 and 13.7% of the votes and 158 and 65 seats, respectively; and the RPNP received 14% of the votes and won 54 seats.<sup>1</sup> The elections demonstrated the continuing strength of a populist political movement deeply distrusted by civil servants, officers, intellectuals and other members of the elite. It thus underscored once again the basic dilemma that continued to trouble the Turkish elite: Which was likely to result in the victory of a populist party and their own exclusion from political power. Many members of the elite drew the conclusion that Turkey was not yet ready for democracy. Under the circumstances a coalition government seemed necessary and the NUC thought of annulling the election's because of the belief that no one could govern effectively. It finally agreed to accept the situation and retired from the scene.

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1. Berberoglu Berch, *Turkey in Crisis*, London Zed Press, 1982, p.89.

However, when the RPP and the Justice Party agreed to a coalition with the trusted elder statesman Inonu was given the task of forming his first coalition.''<sup>2</sup>

The weak and often internally divided coalition were unable to provide either the stability or the forceful leadership that rapid economic and social development required. But that did provide some useful experience in the art of political accommodation. Although initially none of the parties wanted to share power with the RPP, the considerable pressure put on the justice party by the generals persuaded the latter to form a coalition government with Inonu. The participation of the Justice Party in this coalition blocked the implementation of the reforms promised by the new constitution, as these were directed against the landed interests and comprador elements which had enriched themselves under the Democratic party regime. Confrontation between the RPP and the neo-democrats intensified, and unrest began to surface among the popular

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2. Firoz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, Publishers, C. Hurst and Company, London, 1977, p.212.

forces and within the Army. In urban industrial areas workers began to agitate for implementation of the right to collective bargaining and the right to strike permitted under the new constitution. Workers protests continued and reached a high point only a month after the new civilian government had been formed when, on December 31, thousands of workers staged a mass rally in Istanbul to press the government to heed their demands. Dissatisfaction with the regime grew among wide sections of the population as its ability to deal with the nations pressing social and economic problems was called into question. The intelligentsia and technocratic elements also become disillusioned when the concessions, gained from the generals following the 1960 coup and which were written into the new constitution, did not yield any concrete results and remained only on paper. The environment was such that the future of parliamentary democracy was in question. There was an influential group in the armed forces and the intelligentsia which was convinced that only a closed regime could protect the Kemalist reforms, carry out new reforms envisaged in the constitution, and withstand the

onslaught of neo-democratic revanche. Their principal fear was that the neo-democrats would, in time, assume power and create a revanchist regime.

The "unending political crisis focused around the question of ~~amnesty~~ amnesty only disguised the serious differences between the RPP and the neo-democrats over socio-economic issues such as planning and reforms, the role of the private sector, rights for the workers and the question of the social state which the 1961 constitution promised to create."<sup>3</sup> And the mutual animosity between the RPP and the JP increased to a great extent. And over the issues of social reforms and the denationalization of the economy which perpetuated the existing weak relation between the RPP and the JP. And Inonu appraised all the leaders of the parties regarding the situation of the country and the required co-operation of all the leaders to maintain the coalition government stronger. There were the problems which needed immediate attention but due to the coalition government and varied ideologies of different parties, it

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3. Ibid., p.215.

was a tough job for Inonu to convince them properly. Since the political parties were ridden with factions and groups among themselves it was gradually very difficult for Inonu to obtain concessions on each every issue and for running the government and revive the economy which had been stagnating for years, cooperation of all the coalition partners was inevitable. "The deterioration of the general economic situation and the failure to obtain concessions from the Justice Party on the main issues confronting the government soon led to Inonu's resignation and the dissolution of the first coalition in May 1962."<sup>4</sup> Therefore the first coalition government came to an abrupt end.

### **Economic Crisis**

When the military commanders took power in 1960, the Turkish economy was in dire straits. Output was stagnant and there were high levels of inflation and unemployment, a sizeable trade

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4. Berberoglu Berch, *Turkey in Crisis*, London Zed Press, 1982, p.90.

deficit, a large and ever increasing external debt and an associated balance of payment crisis. The 1960 intervention, therefore, was in good part a reaction to the worsening economic situation and its socio-political repercussions. However, the generals who were in charge of the Junta had no intention of effecting any long term social transformations. Having kept the social class structure of the country intact, the reforms proposed in the new constitution were doomed to failure from the very start. The maintenance by the generals of the existing social order on behalf of the dominant classes, however meant the continuation and eventual worsening of the general crisis in the economy throughout the 1960s. Despite lip service in the early 1960s to reform that would strengthen the public sector through state planning, state enterprises continued to be handed over to the private sector, and the state planning organization was turned into a supportive institution of local and foreign private capital.

The Five Year Plans, formulated by the state

during the 1960s, were qualitatively different from those adopted during the 1930s. While in the 1930s planning and state investments played an important role in the development of a diversified national economy and worked to safeguard and advance the long term interests of the national industrial bourgeoisie. By the 1950s and early 1960s the state sector had become an integral part of dependent economy based on foreign and local comprador capital. Planning was reintroduced in the 1960s to work within the framework of this dependent capitalist economy rather than against it. Those who had hoped that the 1960 coup would mark a new beginning towards the fulfillment of Kemalist goals become frustrated and later resigned from their technocratic post as the real purpose ~~behind~~ the generals' so called 'reforms' became apparent. Throughout the 1960 and beyond, state policies reflected the interests of foreign capital and of local land lord comprador interests who had consolidate their economic and political power during the previous decade. Thus denationalization of the Turkish economy continued unabated. Major



state enterprises continued to be transferred to foreign and local private hands. And this process accelerated the expansion of foreign and local private capital. While in the 1930s the extraction of Turkey's mineral wealth had been monopolized exclusively by the state, especially after 1960 foreign and local private capital were allowed and encouraged to enter this field.

The process of foreign penetration into Turkish industry in the 1960s was further accelerated through joint ventures with local private and state enterprises. This meant a more thorough integration of large section of the national industrial bourgeoisie into the dependent economy and a gradual transformation of a section of the traditional comprador bourgeoisie into a dependent industrial class with direct ties to metropolitan monopolies. As a result the Turkish economy had effectively been turned into an appendage of the metropolitan controlled world capitalist economy. This led to numerous adverse consequences, the most important of which were the chronic deficits in the balance of trade and balance of payments.

In short by the end of the 1960s, the Turkish economy was in critical state as in the 1950s planning by the state was ineffectual as denationalization continued and came to serve the interests of expanding foreign and local private capital. Deficit in trade, increased military spending and the resultant budget deficits led to a crisis in the balance of payments. This in turn, led to more external borrowing, which exacerbated the problem of foreign debt and debt servicing. The problems coupled with the worsening inflation and unemployment situation led to a general crisis in the economy. Which soon began to affect the condition of the working class and the working people.

## CHAPTER - III

### THE POLITICS OF SECOND AND THIRD COALITION

The situation was a little more promising than it had been six month earlier. The new Turkey party was willing to join a coalition. President Gursel asked Inonu to form a new coalition. After considerable difficulty and with military pressure again being brought to bear on the various parties still active in politics, the second coalition was formed by the end of the month, 1962. It consisted of the RPP, the RPNP, the NTP and independents. This coalition marked a further swing to the right, which meant the adoption of a more active policy of repression against the labour movement and the left, as well as granting of further concessions to the reactionary forces. While these moves undermined the changes of successful implementation of the reforms called for in the 1961 constitution. They also caused dissension within the RPP, leading to the call for Inonu's resignation in both as PM and party chairman.

But Inonu stayed on despite the criticisms. Shortly afterwards, "the principal technical advisers at the state planning organization resigned collectively because the government had diluted the plan so as to make it ineffective."<sup>1</sup> Notwithstanding the protests of reformist elements within and outside the party the RPP followed a conciliatory line towards its 'right-wing coalition partners and hardened its position against the progressive forces.

With the party's steady move away from its Kemalist principles, a section of the radical nationalist intelligentsia connected with the left wing of the RPP began to move towards an independent base of ideological expression and political action founded on these principles. Not surprisingly, the swing to the right was marked by a more active policy of repression against the left. No Turkish government had ever tolerated the left. However, "the 1961 constitution permitted for the first time the existence of a legally constituted

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1. Firoz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, Washington Press, Colorado, 1978, p.212-213.

socialist party like the workers' party of Turkey. More important than the legal right was the existence of liberal and hopeful atmosphere after 27th May 1960, which allowed ideological debate and the organization of the left.''<sup>2</sup> And 'on the labour front, the new constitution had permitted the formation of a legally constituted socialist party; and in February 1961 a number of trade unionists founded the workers party of Turkey. Within a year, under the leadership of Mehmet Ali Aybar, the party began to attract numerous intellectuals and students, while at the same time maintaining its rank and file working class base.''<sup>3</sup> Despite its reformist politics and petty bourgeois distortions the result of its open door policy towards the liberal intelligentsia and ex-RPP members the WPT was instrumental in advancing the interest of the working class promoting democratic rights and freedoms. As the strength of the party grew,

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 2. Firoz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, Publishers, C. Hurst and Company, London, 1977, p.281.

3. Berberoglu Berch, *Turkey in Crisis*, London Zed Press, 1982, p.91.

so did official repression against it. Nevertheless with the on going struggles of workers in the factories, mines and industry in general on the one hand and the political gains through advances in party organization and agitation on the other, coupled with disillusionment among the intelligentsia and technocratic elite in the midst of the continuing crisis within the RPP and the RPP-led coalition government during 1962-63, Turkey entered a period of wider political crisis the long-term consequences of which become clear only later. Although the labour movement and the forces on the left in general were not yet strong enough to pose any immediate threat to the bourgeois regime, they were nonetheless steadily gaining momentum and the regime had to intention of taking any chances. In this atmosphere the assembly set up all-party commission to combat communism in the Turkish polity. The politicians were going in a diametrically opposite direction to that of enlightened opinion in the country. One of the result was the total disillusionment of youth with the traditional parties. Large numbers resigned from the RPP in January 1963 and began joining organizations like

the WPT. And during this period the long promised legislation recognizing the right of trade unions to bargain collectively and to strike was passed. The passage of this basic labour law in 1963 placed the trade union movement on a firmer base and facilitated its rapid growth in the ensuing years. The activities of the trade unions increased to a large degree.

Turkey's close association with the United States and Western Europe was brought into question following the renewed outbreak of communal disorders and violence in Cyprus at the close of 1963. The United States, not wishing to take sides in a dispute between Turkey and Greece both of which were its allies in NATO, concentrated its efforts on preventing an armed clash and on seeking a peaceful resolution of the dispute. This neutral position was unsatisfactory to many Turks who regarded anything less than full U.S. support of Turkey's position as a betrayal. But the United States and NATO would not help Turkey in its hour of need, despite Turkey's unwavering support of NATO, its sending of troops to other foreign

countries.

There were anti-Inonu demonstration and demands for his resignation and protest of reforming elements inside and outside the party. In this period Turkey was moving towards a acute economic crisis like unemployment problem and balance of payment crisis. And the rising expectations of the public were not properly heeded by the government and this led to disenchantment with the political parties and their programmes. There were futile coup attempts and "the general unrest among wide sections of the population led to the imposition of martial laws in Ankara, Istambul and Izmir."'<sup>4</sup> The industrialization drive of this period, dependent as it was on foreign capital and based on advanced technology imported from abroad was unable to absorb the larger migrant population of dispossessed peasant families. Also, increased mechanization in the agricultural section, while increasing productivity and profits for the large landowners, continued to drive many small and middle peasant into bankruptcy and threw thousands of agricultural

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4. Ibid., p.91.



workers out of work. This worsened rural unemployment situation which had already reached critical proportions during the previous decade. The resulting massive migration to the cities of the rural unemployed and underemployed continued throughout this period and increased the rate of urban employment. In place of hope there emerged a sense of pessimism amongst those who had placed their faith in the ability of a Republican Government to carry out peaceful change. "Inonu's policies did however, succeed in providing governmental stability. There were no longer constant rumours regarding the collapse of the coalition and it lasted, with minor change, until December 1963. The principle reason for the collapse of the second coalition was the poor performance of the RPP's coalition partners in the local and municipal elections of 17 November, 1963."<sup>5</sup> The results of the local and municipal elections changed the temperament of the minor parties and they decided to withdraw from the coalition. And the second

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5. Firoz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, Publishers, C. Hurst and Company, London, 1977, p.219-20.

coalition came to an abrupt end. On the second coalition, the swing to the right did not either produce social stability or reform. And the only legislation regarding the uplift of the labourers was in respect of trade union rights to strike.

### **The Third Coalition (RPP + Independents)**

The alliance between the RPP and the independents, formed the third coalition, which despite its weakness remained intact throughout 1964 as the Cyprus crisis which threatened precipitate open war between Turkey and Greece, came to the aid of the Government helped secure national support of its policies. The RPP was losing ground because the voters held it responsible for the prevailing climate of socio-economic and political uncertainty. "Regif Gumuspala, Chairman of the Justice party was asked to form a new government"<sup>6</sup> but "the situation was contradictory his justice party had become the first party" in the country but

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6. Berberoglu Berch, *Turkey in Crisis*, London Zed Press, 1982, p.92.

it was still the second in the Assembly. A general election would alter that situation but it was still almost two years away. The union parties could not go into a coalition with the Justice Party, precisely because they were so ideologically close to it that they *would* risk of being swallowed up and losing their identity and independence."<sup>7</sup> At last Inonu formed the government in alliance with the independents, neither with the J.P. nor with the small parties. Inonu appealed the parties and coalition partners to maintain restraint and a sense of national solidarity was necessary to handle to Cyprus crisis. The government was preoccupied with Cyprus throughout 1964, which distracted it from such vital tasks reforming the economy.

The Cyprus crisis embittered the already tense relations between the government and the opposition especially the Turkish public; this was the question of Turkey's place in the Western alliance. The dissatisfaction of the Turkish public with the

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7. Firoz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, Publishers, C. Hurst and Company, London, 1977, p.220.

United States over Cyprus legitimized the airing of much accumulated resentment against America that had not previously been expressed openly. Inonu felt betrayed by what he considered America's unfavourable stand towards Turkey the Cyprus crisis. Turkey was totally isolated when the issue was debated at the United Nations and this stimulated a neutralist trend in the Turkish press.

The presence on Turkish soil of larger number of American military personnel, the superior standard of living of the U.S. community in Turkey and the occasional disrespectful behaviour of individual Americans offended many Turks, who thought they saw a repetition of the capitulations and other indignities of the late Ottoman era. The exercise of U.S. military rather than Turkish legal jurisdiction over American Servicemen involved in automobile accidents certified by U.S. military authorities to have taken place in duty was especially offensive. Some bureaucrats, a number of RPP members and the newly emerging socialists became more outspoken in their criticism of U.S. economic policies,

which they characterized as an effort to impose a capitalist system and keep Turkey in a state of economic colonialism. In this connection they were particularly critical of U.S. support for the development of the Turkish private sector, encouragement of foreign investment and emphasis on the need to develop agriculture. To some extent these criticisms were an attempt by frustrated members of the elite humiliated by the continuing evidence of poverty and backwardness to lay the blame for the disappointingly slow progress on the United States. The disappointment and anger against the United States for its failure to side with Turkey over Cyprus not only created a climate favourable for anti-American propaganda but also facilitated a rapprochement between Turkey and the Soviet Union.''<sup>8</sup>

In the meantime, 'Suleyman Demirel, a representative of the Morrison corporation an 'American firm' was elected the new leader of the Justice

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8. Edwin J. Cohn, *Trukish Economic, Social and Political change; The Development of a more Prosperoes and open society*, New York, Parger, 1970, p.34.

Party in November 1964.''<sup>9</sup> And Demirel the newly elected leader of the J.P., openly prepared the ground for the dissolution of the government highlighting the socio-economic problems of the country and the contribution of Inonu-led coalition partners, Demirel appealed to the people to overthrow the coalition government. The Cyprus crisis weakened the image of the government. The Inonu-led coalition bears the responsibility for having weakened useless Us-Turkish relations. Finding that their NATO allies were in no position to side with them against Greece but their heavy reliance on NATO had left them rather isolated diplomatically, the Turks began a vigorous search for new friends. One result was the exchanges of visits between Turkish and Soviet leaders beginning in 1964, which led to limited cultural contacts and credits for industrial development projects as well as some modifications in the Soviet position on Cyprus.'''Economic and cultural ties with Eastern Europe have also become closer as have relations with the Arab countries

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9. Berberoglu Berch, *Turkey in Crisis*, London Zed Press, 1982, p.92.

which the Turks have tended to look upon rather contemptuously.'"<sup>10</sup>

The demise of the third coalition was due to the

defeat of the government over the approval of the budget. "Using the budget debate as a spring board to capture political power, Demirel succeeded in obtaining the necessary majority to block approval of the budget.'"<sup>11</sup> But few people were sorry

to see the demise of the third Coalition "As a government led by the RPP it had no moral raison d'etre after the party's defeat in the local and municipal elections. Such a weak government was incapable of vigorous policy and to some extent. Demirel had been correct in attributing a vacillating foreign policy to its feebleness.'"<sup>12</sup>

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10. Edwin J. Cohn, *Trukish Economic, Social and Political change; The Development of a more Prosperoes and open society*, New York, Parger, 1970, pp.34-35.

11. Berberoglu Berch, *Turkey in Crisis*, London Zed Press, 1982, p.92.

12. Firoz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, Publishers, C. Hurst and Company, London, 1977, p.223.

But for Inonu, with unstable coalition partners it was very difficult to expect anything. Even any other party would have done the something regarding the domestic and Cyprus issues. The JP was not interested in the formation of or taking responsibility in forming in coalition government. But it is not faculty with the JP. In politics every party was having it own calculations to capture power with a clear mandate from the masses. It was the prevailing circumstance in Turkey at that time which tempted the parties to go for such decisions without carrying for the repercussion on the economy. Therefore, it was traumatic experience for all the parties and for the people of Turkey. And for the next general election there was a caretaker government leaded by Suat Hayri Urguglu.



## CHAPTER IV

### 1965 ELECTIONS

The 1965 parliamentary elections were a triumph for the justice party, which campaigned on a platform of more rapid economic development and ported almost '22.9% of the votes and won 240 seats, whereas the RPP polled only 28.7% of the vote and won 134 seats and the smaller rightist parties (the RPNP, the NP, and the NTP) together received 12.2% of the vote and 61 seats.''<sup>1</sup> The Justice Party was thus able to form a government by itself, without relying on any of the minor parties on which the previous coalition had depended. for the RPP which adopted a moderate position related to the workers problems, the election was a disaster. It had the lowest percentage of voters politics. The orderly transfer of office to a popularly elected JP government so soon

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1. Firoz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, Washington Press, Colorado, 1978, pp.191-92.

after its predecessor DP regime and been overthrown was a remarkable accomplishment for political moderation and conciliation. An accommodation between the JP and the top military leaders assured the latter that their own vital interests would be safeguarded.

Meanwhile, Demirel had assumed leadership of the Justice Party and was rebuilding it in a new image, moving it away from the old democratic ties and ideology. He projected the image of a new kind of technocrat able and willing to steer the nation according to the needs of the time rather than in fulfillment of outmoded political philosophies. This image was strengthened by his moves to give control of the party machinery to professional and technical experts in place of the more conservative politicians who came over from the Democrats. He was also able to develop a sufficiently modernist policy to satisfy the demands of the army as well as his own professional supporters for reform while he relied enough on a rural and religious approach so as not to alienate his peasant followers, who still provided most of the votes. During the election.

campaign, the Justice Party presented an image of a vigorous, dynamic group with a positive policy to move the nation ahead. The RPP on the other hand still led by the aging Inonu and many of its most vigorous intellectual supporters, had by then gone to the worker's party. While those who remained, fought with the party leaders over the future direction of both the party and the country. The Justice Party, with an overall parliamentary majority was able to push ahead to fulfil its programmes in a way that Inonu, now in opposition, never had been able to do with coalition regimes. The policy was determined by its desire to promote economic development and social justice, not only in reaction to the constitution and the insistence of the army, but also to the increasingly strident demands of the more radical left wing groups composed mainly of trade unionists and militant students who began to manifest their opposition by street demonstrations and even more violent activities. Economic policy followed the mixed approach given in the constitution. The Demirel government used both private and state

control to stimulate growth and prosperity through plans by the state planning organization.

The leftist organization, which now came to include most university teachers and students and many professionals, became more and more adamant in criticizing the government for not going much faster despite the fact that most people were satisfied by policies that increased their prosperity without the hectic excesses of the Menderes Years. Relations of the government with the army were better than anticipated. Demirel also continued the effort to modernize the army, improving the conditions of its officers and men and avoiding direct interference in its affairs. The opposition also extended cooperation and Inonu in opposition played a constructive role. There had also been periodic meetings and exchanges of views between Inonu and Prime Minister Demirel. And the repression against the communists stiffened and the 'Workers Party rally was attacked by a mob of thousands chanting death to the communists. There were physical attack on the delegates six of whom were physical attack on the delegates six of whom were seriously

wounded''<sup>2</sup> However such types of activities strengthened the workers party ''drawing to its ranks the angry and disillusioned intelligentsia.''<sup>3</sup> The image of the workers party of Turkey improved drastically and the participation of the workers party in the 1965 election changed the very charter of the scene. And the party represented by a group of intellectuals, who were very keen on raising the prevailing fundamental socio-economic condition. Anti-american feeling also spread amongst the masses due to the Cyprus crisis and they wanted to counter from the hold of Americans.

### **Political Parties And Development**

Political parties played an important role in the economic, social, and cultural development of the country as well as in the distribution of power since the parties constitute a significant element in the matrix within which development

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 2. Firoz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, Publishers, C. Hurst and Company, London, 1977, p.225.

3. Ibid., p.226.

takes place. Their strengths and weaknesses have many implications for development. Turkey has made significant progress toward evolving differentiated political parties and towards developing a viable political system. At least the two major parties, the Justice Party and the Republican People's Party, are based more on the content of the party programme and less on personal loyalty to leaders than was the case in the past, although RPP leader Ismet Inonu retains a special role as an historic personality. Moreover, both were national parties in contrast to the smaller parties most of which had a regional or factional character.

Despite occasional bitter recriminations exchanged between these two rival groups, both were essentially moderate reformist parties. They shared a desire for rapid economic growth, increased social justice, the development of the backward regions, a democratic society, secularism and close association with the west. Both accepted the need for planning, expanded educational opportunities, the mixed economy and economic stability in achieving these goals. The policy differences between them are primarily

ones of emphasis, with the RPP's placing greater stress on secularism and on the role of the state in regulating the economy and conducting economic operations itself, while the JP is more tolerant of Islamic forces and placed greater, but by no means exclusive, reliance on the private sector and market.

In the political & cultural field, the RPP's emphasis on secularism had taken the form of accusing its opponents. But to equate the more lenient JP attitude towards Islamic practices with anti-secularism as the RPP seemed to do was to distort the meaning to secularism and convert it into anti-religiousness. One of the greatest weakness of the RPP had been its continued failure to formulate a public position recognizing that secularism does not mean anti-religiousness. Instead it attempt<sup>d</sup>, without much success, to exploit secularism as an issue to detract from the mass appeal enjoyed by the JP. There were some religious conservatives who would like to undo the 'Kemalist' reforms and to replace the secular republic with a political system based on Islam. But such anti-secularism

should be distinguished from the observance of Islamic practices, to which the great bulk of the Turkish public is attached.

In the socio-economic field the RPP claims to be the more socially responsible party and tried to project itself as the only party that could safely be entrusted with the nation's economic and social development. In contrast, the JP initially was lukewarm, if not negative, in its attitude towards, planning, although subsequently it had endorsed it. Although supporting the mixed economy concept, the RPP attaches somewhat more importance than the JP does to state operation of industry, particularly in the natural resource field. Its attitude toward foreign investment is less favourable than that of the JP.

In foreign policy, the RPP at least now that it was out of power, became more critical of Turkey's close relationship with and dependence on the United States. And the 'most difficult question of foreign policy to trouble Turkey after 1950 was that of Cyprus, caused not by any Turkish desire to annex the Island but rather by the



tendency of the island's ruling Greek majority to exclude the Turkish minority to achieve enosis (union with Greece).<sup>4</sup> In Turkey, anti-American feelings amongst the masses increased due to the position taken by the US. In addition, the RPP endorsed the JP policy of normalizing relations with the Soviet Union, a policy that the RPP itself initiated late in 1964 in response to the situation created by the Cyprus crisis.

Since 1965, the RPP had been trying to appear as the best friend of the under-privileged but the slogan making phase, marked by the adoption of the motto "left of centre slogan."<sup>5</sup> Meanwhile, adoption by the RPP of the left-of-centre stance, in an attempt to broaden its appeal and to make it a mass party, alienated a number of long time associates many even deserted the party and formed their own political outfits. This had reduced

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4. Stanford J. Shaw and Ezelkural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1977, p.430.

5. Firoz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, Washington Press, Colorado, 1978, p.225.

the strength of the party to a very significant extent.

The justice party, a populist party with deep roots in the country had much more mass appeal than did the RPP have. RPP leaders liked to think of themselves as the political heirs of 'Ataturk'. In fact the RPP had been stronger in the backward region than in the more developed provinces. The 'RPP lack in mass appeal and the JP lack in intellectual resources.''<sup>6</sup>

The steady decline of the 'RPP had been disappointing and frustrating to the party leadership. Even the RPP did nothing to revitalize the Party for its survival. The Turkish political system required a responsible and constructive opposition able to provide an alternative government. The elimination prior to the 1961 election of the national remainder provision of the proportional representation system had strengthened the tendency of Turkish political life to coalesce around a two party system. This

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6. Edwin J. Cohn, *Trukish Economic, Social and Political change; The Development of a more Prosperoes and open society*, New York, Parger, 1970, p.144.

provision, which rewarded the smaller parties by allocating to each of them a proportion of the seats in the national assembly corresponding to its share in the total popular vote, was introduced in 1965.

The 'Turkish Labour Party' represented an important innovation in Turkish political life. Because of a number of highly articulate spokesmen in parliament and in the press, it had attracted much more attention than any other party. Its 'Marxist' emphasis on the class struggle, demands for widespread nationalization, anti-western foreign policy and attempts to raise the Kurdish problem led many to regard it not as the democratic socialist party that it claimed to be. As a result, it was subjected to considerable harassment, which had made the party more conspicuous. The 'difficulty is that the Marxist analysis however accurately it may have described early nineteenth century England, which had just gone through the Industrial Revolution and on which Marx based his theory, is not applicable to contemporary Turkey.''' An illustration of

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7. Ibid., p.146.

the Turkish Labour Party's Marxist ideology was its contention that foreign investment was coming to Turkey to take advantage of the country's cheap labour and draw materials. This was untrue because most of the foreign companies had established branches in Turkey in order to protect their sales position in the domestic market.

The Turkish Labour Party's diagnosis based on Marxism did not fit the situation in Turkey. Their presentations were largely irrelevant. The Turkish Labour Party had been capitalizing on the resentment of the intelligentsia about the economic and social short-coming of the prevailing system. Among these were the inequalities in land ownership and the high speculative profits and habitual tax evasion of some businessmen. They advocated land for every peasant but this was an impossibility in view of the limited supply of land. It would be more consistent with their Marxist ideology but not with their present desire to attract votes. They also advocated nationalization of banking, foreign trade, industry and mining. But one of the curious aspects of the Turkish

Labour Party was that its ideologists appeared indifferent to or perhaps even unaware of the reformist unrest that were sweeping the Eastern European countries.''<sup>8</sup>

Turkish development strategy assigned a key role to industry and visualized it as the driving force in the development of the economy. But the prevailing conditions inside Turkey were not favourable for the diversification of industrial establishment by the industrialists. The investment decisions by political considerations which seemed in moral to the economists were considered as normal by the politicians found it difficult to resist the temptation to use the operations of the enterprises for partisan purpose. Ministers interfered in the management decision of the enterprises thereby denying the managers the autonomy that they need for efficient functioning of the enterprises. As a result, the turnover of managers was high. Men with more political than professional qualifications were appointed to responsible posts. All of these

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8. Ibid., p.148.

contributed to the inefficiency of the enterprises and the high cost of their products. And "from time to time, particularly in the early 1950's and again after the 1960 coup, government spokesmen proposed to sell off some of these factories to the private sector."'<sup>9</sup>

With the state gradually withdrawing itself from industrial entrepreneurship and leaving the ground for private enterprise, many industries opened up in private sectors. Through the process of liberalization, the government was playing a crucial role of promoting rapid industrialization even the hitherto existing public sectors were privatized, giving a further boost to the ongoing industrialization drive. Thus private enterprise was given the fullest opportunity to grow properly.

Members of the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia criticized businessmen for being selfish and dishonest: 'businessmen don't have the nation's welfare at heart and act in antisocial ways.' To some extent

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9. Edwin J. Cohn, *Trukish Economic, Social and Political change; The Development of a more Prosperoes and open society*, New York, Parger, 1970, p.124.

these charges were justified. The rigid and often unrealistic administrative regulations, that the bureaucracy had imposed almost for the industrialists to engage in evasion and even bribery. The bureaucracy and the intelligentsia had developed an anti-party towards private enterprises due to the growing affluence of the business class. The political stability of 1965 and the expectation that it would continue, had given industrialists greater confidence to take risk. "During the 1960s merchants especially those engaged in foreign trade, had turned industrialist."<sup>10</sup>

In many cases they were producing in Turkey the goods they had previously imported. They saw to it, that, their sons received an education that prepared them better than they themselves had been for business management. The previous Turkish attitude towards their domestic manufactured products were being replaced by a pride in Turkish products. And buyers were increasingly showing willingness to pay for quality products and to penalize the producers of shoddy goods.

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10. Ibid., p.130.

A number of large firms had built primary schools in the areas where their factories were located. And "Turkish development strategy assigns a key role to industry and visualizes it as the driving force in the development of the economy."<sup>11</sup> Moreover, unless Turkey makes its industrial products competitive in world markets, it will be condemned to continue reliance on foreign exchange earning from agricultural exports.

In the 1965 elections, the people of Turkey expressed their opinion for a single party to rule the country. And with the changing circumstances the JP represented a clear image before the masses which met need of the time. The people of Turkey were no more interested in having a coalition government which delivered nothing except another political uncertainty. There was hardly any difference between the RPP and the JP in their election manifestoes of 1965 elections. In the previous coalition governments, the two major

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11. Edwin J. Cohn, *Turkish Economic, Social and Political change; The Development of a more Prosperous and open society*, New York, Parger, 1970, p.128.



parties, the RPP and JP were interested in assuming power single handedly. The image of the RPP in the 1965 election was worse than that of the other parties. The people of Turkey had no interest to repose their faith in the RPP because of the infighting amongst the RPP leaders themselves, which exposed their disunity.

Beside, adoption of a 'left-of-centre' stance in the 1965 election, in effort to ingratiate the workers and peasants, further aggravated its electoral prospects. Far from proving a help, it plunged the party into an internecine internal squabbling along ideological lines on the very issue of taking a 'left-of-centre' stance. Thus the party which went to polls as a house divided in itself, could neither keep its cadre united nor secure the votes of the peasants and workers, which it had expected to win as a result of the stratagem adopted.

'The voter showed the ineffectiveness of an electoral law designed to prevent the overwhelming victory of a single party.'<sup>12</sup> The JP got a clear

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12. Firoz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, Publishers, C. Hurst and Company, London, 1977, p.227.

mandate from the masses which ended the political impasses in Turkey. With the emergence of a single party with an absolute majority, there was no need of an alliance to form the government. The 1965 election also gave birth to a strong and responsible opposition to watch the movement of the ruling party.

The RPP played a constructive role as an opposition party and cooperated with the JP in formulation of policies and programmes. The Justice Party with an overall parliamentary majority was able to push ahead to fulfill its programmes which Inonu had never been able to do with coalition regimes. Its policy was determined by its desire to promote economic development and social justice. The increasingly strident demands of the more radical left-wing groups, composed mainly of trade unionists, who began to manifest their opposition by street demonstration and even more violent activities. Economic policy followed the fixed approach dictated in the constitution. The Demirel government used both private and state control to stimulate growth and prosperity through plans

provided by the state planning organization. The leftist organizations composed mainly of trade unionists, became more adamant in criticizing the government for not going much faster. They even took to violent street demonstration and indulged in acts of vandalism to project a grim picture of the policies pursued by the government. The people however were satisfied by policies that increased their prosperity without the hectic excesses of the Merderes Years.<sup>The</sup> Relation of the government with the army was better than anticipated and Demirel continued the effort to modernize the army. Government relation<sup>with the RPP become increasingly bitter over religious matters.</sup> By this time "secularism was such an accepted policy of the Republic that people lost interest in the subject; hence this issue could not be exploited."<sup>13</sup>

13. Stanford J. Shaw and Ezelkural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1977, p.426.

## CONCLUSION

This dissertation has sought to trace out the dynamics of coalition politics in Turkey between the period 1961-65. In doing so, it first discusses the series of the coalition politics, factors and causes for its emergence. Thereafter, it discussed the performance and working of three coalition- 961, 1962 and 1964-and there eventual decline. As said earlier, the period of coalition must be seen from the point of interaction between traditional and modern groups that were active throughout this period. This is not to ignore the role played by external factor on the coalition governments.

The disenchantment of the military towards the ruling Democratic party in the 1950s culminated in military take over in 1960s. Anti-government attitude of the military was due to the violation of Kemalist principle. DeKemalisation had dire impact on Turkish people. Corruption, inefficiency and economic crisis assumed serious proportion. Furthermore, the leadership of Democratic party

was mainly dominated by traditional elite consisting of landlords and opposed to any reforms. In other wards, the rule of democratic party was quite contrary to Kemalist principles which emphasized on modernization, democratisation and industrialisation. As a result, modern elements opposed ruling democratic party *ultimately leading to* a military take over. Military announced its intentions of reverting the country to democracy. Immediately after the <sup>e</sup> seizure of power, new factions came up in the form of moderates and extremes. The former was in favour of handing over power to the Republican People's Party (RPP), while the latter wanted the military to continue its rule. These kinds of factional bickerings within and inside the military rendered it ineffective. Consequently, a new constitution was drafted under the guidance of National Unity Committee (NUC), which ruled the country till political stability prevailed in the country.

Despite all these factional reumbings within the military, the moderate elements triumphed, thereby ushering a new era of democratic politics. The first election held in 1961<sup>with</sup> gave majority to ~~the~~ RPP ~~and~~ Justice Party. On the contrary,

new parties began to emerge. In all, fourteen right-wing and central parties participated in the elections- of these, four were the most important- the Old Republican People's Party (RPP), the Justice Party formed by the disgruntled elements of Democratic party, the New Turkey Party (NTP) and Republican Peasants National Party, a reactionary organization led by Ultra-Nationalist elements. The results of the election were inconclusive. None of the parties got majority thereby facilitating for the formation of coalition government. The coalition was formed under Ismet Inouce with General Gursel, the leader of 1960 coup and the head of the NUC, as president. The ~~essential~~ cooperation between Justice Party and RPP and other minor parties was only short lived. Differences between these two parties surfaced soon. The Justice Party blocked the implementation of reform promised by the new constitution, as these were directed against the landed interests, which had enriched themselves under the Justice Party regime. Lack of agreement on basic issues deepened economic crisis. Inflation was rising high. The general

standard of living further deteriorated; the gap between the rich and poor widened, unemployment and malnutrition became the order of the day. Instead of addressing these problems, every party and politicians diverted their energy in consolidating their position. The Justice Party put all its efforts to protect the interests of its own supporters. It opposed reform proposals of the RPP. Thus the conflict between conservative leadership of Justice Party and progressive leadership of RPP resulted in the resignation of Inonu. As consequence, the first coalition came to an abrupt end in May 1962.

In June 1962, president Gursel asked Inonu to form a new coalition. After considerable difficulty, the second coalition was formed by the end of the month. It consisted of the RPP, the RPNP, the NTP and independents. This coalition marked a further swing to the right which meant granting further concession to the reactionary forces. Two trends can be noted under the second coalition.

Firstly, the moves of this government undermined the chances of a successful implementation of reform, and secondly, dissention within the RPP

began to appear. There were anti-Inonu demonstration in Turkey and demands for his resignation. There were protests from reformist elements inside and outside the RPP. Surprisingly, the RPP followed a conciliatory line towards its right-wing coalition partner and hardened its position against the progressive forces with the party's steady move away from its 'Kemalist' principle, a section of the radical nationalist intellegentisia began to move towards an independent base of ideological experssion and political action.

Thus, the crisis within the RPP strengthened the position of Justice Party. The results of the local and municipal election of 1963, gave further setback to RPP's coalitional partner, while Justice Party improved beyond the expectation. Following the electoral setbacks the two minor parties decided to withdraw from the coalition. This led to the resignation of Inonu as Prime Minister in early December and the second coalition came to an end.

During this period, a new trend started whereby Turkish society, instead of 'progressing' forward



it was 'retrogressing.' Thus, traditional elements comprising of landed sections were getting powerful by blocking proposal for any reforms.

Regip Gumuspala, Chairman of the JP, was asked to form a new government. But when he failed to form a cabinet, the task was given to 'Inonu' once again. The NTP and RPNP declined to enter a new coalition with the RPP, and 'Inonu' went ahead and formed a cabinet with the support of independents.

Despite its weakness, the third coalition remained intact throughout 1964, as the Cyprus Crisis, which threatened to precipitate open war between Turkey and Greece, came to the aid of Government and helped to secure national support for its policies.

Change in Justice Party leadership took place when Süfeyman Demirel, was elected a new leader of the JP in November 1964, using the budget debate as spring board to capture political power, he succeeded in obtaining the necessary majority to block approval of the budget. 'Inonu' then submitted his resignation and the coalition government

collapsed once again.

An independent Senator, Urguplu was asked to form a Caretaker Government until the general elections in October 1965. In October 1965 elections were held. The JP secured a decisive victory thereby ending five year old coalition.

Thus, we see, the period between 1961-1965 was marked by instability and uncertainty. In a span of just five years three government changed and new coalition were formed. Several reasons can be attributed for this phenomena. Firstly, the decline of Kemalist principles enabled the conservatives and reactionaries to come to the fore front. So long as Kemalist Party was in power there was no opposition to reforms and modernisation. Howeverf, the coming of Democratic party in 1950 completely deemphasised 'Kemalist principles. In other words, the rule of Democratic party had completely directed the pace of reform. The result was that various problems such as unemployment, illëteracy, falling of standard of living and balance of payment cropped up. These problems continued to haunt the coalition governments.

As a result, there was lot of instability and crisis.

Secondly, even at the time of crisis, none of the party showed any sign of rapprochement with one another. Political leaders were least concerned about the problems of the people. Ambition and lust for power predominated in their minds.

Thirdly, Turkey was always prone to outside power intervention. United States always wanted a pro US government. It even supplied money and gave donations to political parties. Furthermore, it was against any drastic political reforms. The reason why Justice Party came to power in 1965 was due to indirect support of United States to it. As the regimes became reactionary and anti-people, progressive elements with left inclinations became active. Consequently, the State has become very oppressive thus accentuating the crisis. Thus, state, instead of protecting the people, diassociated itself away from them.

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