

**UNITED STATES DIPLOMACY IN THE GULF CRISIS :
AN ASSESSMENT.**

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
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation "**UNITED STATES DIPLOMACY IN THE GULF CRISIS : AN ASSESSMENT**", by SWAYAM PRABHA DAS is in partial fulfillment for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy. This dissertation has not been previously submitted for any degree of this or any other University. To the best of our knowledge this is her own work.

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SWAYAM PRABHA DAS

PREFACE

"Since war begins in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the foundations of peace must be laid".

Preamble of UNESCO.

The dawn of August 2, 1990 caught the community of nations unaware as the Iraqi troops crossed into the neighbouring country of Kuwait. Saddam Hussein's decision of annexing the small Sheikhdome was not actually a bolt from the blue, but keeping in mind his earlier game of manoeuvring of situations in his own favour, it should have been more predictable. But unfortunately Saddam over played his strategic stakes and had to face the wrath the world community forced on him through Operation Desert Storm, and the consequence of the sanctions are still imminent - even though these sanctions have been loosened since 1996 December.

The Gulf Crisis happens to be a major jolt in the international political scenario in the immediate post Cold War period. With the fragmentation of the Soviet Union, and the internal changes in communist break away factions there was a rapid shift in the balance of power. The bi-polar world gave way to a uni-polar world

solely dominated by the United States.

The United Nations which holds an unique position since its inception has been facing challenges due to over-dominance of United States and its allies in its Security Council meetings. So as to protect its interest in the various parts of the world, United States has manipulated votes in its favour by promising its supporters economic aid, grants, etc., Such a malpractice has been strengthened by U.S. with a further non - payment of its dues to the UN which has put it into a financial crisis. As on today, such manipulative tactics as advocated by United States has jeopardised the credibility of United Nations. The Gulf War of 1991 is clear enough an indication of the misuse of the ' good office' of United Nations by the United States to pursue its foreign policy objective in the Gulf.

The objective of my M.Phil. research work has been to highlight the increasing dominance of United States in the world today. It went a step further in the Gulf war of 1991 where by using the banner of United Nations to pursue its own objectives, diplomatically in the region. Infact, such an instrumentation of the United Nations at the hands of the reigning superpower leaves an insecure world behind at the turn of the century.

The first chapter infact deals with these diplomatic objectives of the U.S. in the Gulf. I have tried to sketch the pattern of US

presence and its formulation of foreign policy for this region, from sheer absence to a sheer dependence on Gulf oil for its economic development. Through the pages of this chapter I have brought two factors to the forefront i.e. 'oil' and 'Israel' as the apex of U.S. foreign policy in the region. I have mentioned the Doctrines advocated by Presidents - Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, as well as George Bush and Bill Clinton, as fruitfully applied to this volatile region of the world.

In Chapter II, I have dealt with the Gulf Crisis and the United States diplomatic response. In this chapter, I have tried to show how big nations played their card of balance in the Iraq - Iran war of 1980s, where by pumping in a major amount of arms into this region. Therefore, the field for a major war was already set before 1990. I have traced these developments as leading to the annexation of Kuwait. Keeping in mind the ensuring crisis found mentioned is the US strategic stake and how it uses the tools of diplomacy to fuse this situation. With the failure of diplomacy, US musters up coalition force under the flag of UN to push back the Iraqi troops. Infact, the last section of the chapter deals with how diplomatic failure led to war.

Chapter III, is basically an appraisal of the UN Security Council Resolutions during the Crisis and the War. I have tried to

analyse these resolutions of the Security Council since the first day of annexation i.e. 2 August 1990 to the easing of sanctions in December 1996. The politics of sanctions during this period(1990-1996), clearly indicates foul play on the part of United States. But nonetheless,it has drastically helped in almost full implementation of the embargoes and economic sanctions.

The concluding chapter deals with the Gulf war as a watershed in the Middle East. I have dealt with the Gulf war as a 'war of miscalculations' on the part of Saddam Hussein, the Arab States and finally the US and its allies. I have tried to re-assess U.S. interests in the Gulf as vital or peripheral which is a much debated topic. And finally U.S. has used UN as an instrument to further its diplomatic objectives and secure its position as a 'protector' of sovereign rights of states in the world to day. My arguments are basically based on the deviations from the UN Charter which has undermined UN credibility.

"By God, we have kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all" so said President George Bush in a euphoric victory statement at the end of Gulf War suggesting how important was the war to U.S. psyche.

The war which the US launched against Iraq on January 17,1991 was infact a war to destroy Iraq's power, remove its leader

Saddam Hussein, and impose on the region a political order which will respect American interests and legitimise its presence in the region.

The diplomatic process was abruptly ended by the US to unleash for its own benefit a war devoid of legitimate sanction or purpose. Further more, President Bush did keep his promise that "our troops.. will not be asked to fight with one hand tied behind their back."

To sum it all, 1991 may now be remembered as the year when the Vietnam syndrome was replaced by the Iraqi syndrome. The world politics may have returned to near normal situation in the world's volatile region, but the effects of the disastrous war will be long felt by the people.

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CHAPTER - 1

UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC OBJECTIVES IN THE GULF

"... in the history of the American Republic, it is unlikely that any issue of foreign relations has confounded and frustrated the nation's policy makers more completely, repeatedly and over a longer period of time than the problems of Middle East in the years since World War II".

- Seth P. Tillman¹

UNITED STATES PRESENCE IN THE GULF:

The profound political and economic changes that have recently been taking place in most parts of the world ironically have resulted in major upheavals.

The end of Cold War produced an even greater temptation to recast the international environment in America's image. President Wilson had been constrained by isolationism at home, and President Truman had come up against Stalinist expansion. In the Post-Cold War world, the United States is the only remaining superpower with the capacity to intervene in every part of the globe. Yet, power has become more diffused and the issues to which military force is relevant, have

¹. Tillman, Seth P. - The United States in the Middle East. Bloomington Ind., 1982, p.275.

diminished.²

Middle East arena was not regulated by treaty arrangements unlike Europe; between the two superpowers and was far more affected by internal upheavals, which became the scene of far more rapid and compelling change and intense Soviet-American competition.³

Historically speaking, United States has been a late comer to the Middle East in general, and the Gulf in particular. According to Cecil V. Crabb, United States had no foreign policy at all for the Middle East before World War II, because it thought it had no vital interest in the far away and backward region.⁴ However, towards the end of World War II, it was clear to the U.S. administration that oil was an important ingredient in any war efforts and that this commodity could be easily exploited in huge quantities from the Gulf region.⁵

². Kissinger, Henry - Diplomacy, New York, Random House, 1994. p. 801.

³. Rizopoulos, Nicholas X.(Ed) - Sea Changes : American Foreign Policy in a World Transformed. Council on Foreign Relation Press, New York. 1990. p.32.

⁴. Crabb, Cecil V. - American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age. New York, Row, Peterson & Co., 1960, p. 258.

⁵. Muttam, John - Arms and Insecurity in the Persian Gulf. New Delhi, Radiant Publishers, 1984, p. 39.

Official American interest in Middle East, therefore, crystallized in earnest towards the end of World War II as U.S. began to assume its role as a super power. As Itamar Rabinovich has observed, the region's growing importance in the eyes of U.S. policy makers has been the result of a number of factors⁶.

i) General Geopolitical Considerations - Middle East is located across three continents and it is the single most important source of oil and oil reserves. Furthermore, it occupies a critical position for international communications by land, sea and air, and it represents a significant proportion of the membership of the United Nations. It houses the whole of the Arab World and is effectively the centre of the larger muslim community.

ii) Arena of Soviet - American Rivalry - U.S. asserted itself as the new protector of Western interests in the Middle East in the immediate aftermath of World War II and during the gradual devolution of British Empire. Consequently, America spent almost one decade trying to prevent Soviet penetration of the region.

iii) Oil - Middle East oil has been vital for U.S., Europe and Far Eastern allies, as well as a source of enormous revenues for American oil companies. The Oil

⁶. Op.cit. 2,p.33.

Crisis of 1970s dramatically demonstrated the disruptive potential available to Middle East oil producers, and for a decade i.e. 1973-1982, the huge profits of the members of OPEC turned them into an all important actor on the world financial map.

(iv) Israel -US support for Israel has been firm since the birth of the nation in 1947. The existence of the Jewish lobby in the American political system, has strengthened the support for the Jewish state. Israel today is not only an established part of the Middle East landscape but has become a regional superpower - its GNP is more than twice that of the largest Arab State - Egypt, and it has a world class military establishment. As midwife at the birth of Israel, the U.S. faced the task of helping arrange a settlement that would see it through infancy, and ensure it a prosperous life. To that end, the US supported the Lausanne talks of 1949 and the Palestine Conciliation Commission. It backed the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 on arms limitation, and promoted the Economic Survey Mission of 1949 and the Eric Johnston Jordan Valley Development Plan of 1953-55.⁷

⁷. Hudson, Michael C. - 'To play the Hegemony : Fifty years of US Policy toward the Middle East, Middle East Journal, Vol. 50, No.3, Summer 1996, p. 334.

v) Threats to International Security - A series of Arab - Israeli wars and the 1980s war between Iran - Iraq presented actual or potential threats to the precariously balanced international security system and repeatedly threatened to draw the U.S. into direct military involvement in the area and into a confrontation with the Soviet Union. By 1990, the international challenge facing, the U.S. foreign policy has changed dramatically. Since 1985, such a change required a fundamental reassessment of U.S. diplomacy. It is a fact that Gulf War led to further broadening of U.S. diplomacy. During the Cold War, U.S. interests and the regions in which the truly vital ones resided were relatively clear, when magnified by the zero-sum rhetoric of the period. The goal of U.S. foreign policy was very much an effort to contain Soviet expansion and its area of influence, which has been termed as 'Containment'. In the periphery was the economic and military aid around Soviet Union. The concept of deterrence followed in principle provided the means to achieve the foreign policy objectives. The task of U.S. diplomacy today is to maintain a warm and co-operative economic and political relations and with promoting stability in the Middle East. The challenge today is completely economical, yet to do so within bounds that facilitate the co-operation necessary for the pursuit of

mutual global interests, including security interests. This challenge is especially acute today given the long term U.S. tendency to isolations and the strong tradition of a defence based on 'minutemen' citizen soldiers rather than a large standing army.

Development of U.S. Diplomacy in the Gulf :

Several overriding factors have dominated the United States' approach to the Gulf since World War II : concern about possible Soviet domination of the region; access to oil; the stability and security of friendly states and moderate regimes; the relationship of the previous factors to other concerns in the broader Middle East region (i.e., the Arab-Israeli conflict) and, more recently, concern over weapons proliferation. The policies and priorities developed in response to these interests and concerns have varied with each administration. There has been a desire to ensure the maintenance of open sea lanes for transporting the oil and the development of political and economic co-operation with the Arab world. The U.S. has also sought to limit regional conflicts (such as the Iran-Iraq war) that might affect other interests. Another closely linked concern has been the preservation reduce pt. size of an independent and secure Israel. Although there has been widespread agreement on these interests, there has

been little agreement on their priority.⁸

Until the British Government announcement in January 1968 that "we have also decided to withdraw our forces from the Persian Gulf by the same date (i.e., by the end of 1971)" the British special relationship with the Gulf states and the British presence in that sector served, to a significant extent, as a proxy for the United States.⁹ The British generally represented United States interests and created and fostered conditions of calm and stability. The British role in the Gulf coincided with a period in which the United States did not take a major position in the political/security affairs of the sector and focussed its activities in unofficial, non-political and non-strategic spheres.

Although the sector was not seen as vital to the United States there was a growing realization that there were important United States interests and a potential Soviet threat which, combined with the British withdrawal, led to the need for a re-evaluation of United States' policy and the assumption of new

⁸. Reich, Bernard - 'United States Interests in the Middle East', in Haim Shaked and Itamar Rabinovitch, (Ed) The Middle East and the United States : Perceptions and Policies, New Brunswick, New Jersey and London, England, Transaction Books, 1980, p. 53-92.

⁹. Reich, Bernard et al.- The Persian Gulf. McLean, Virginia; Research Analysis Corporation, 1971.

commitments and obligations for the area. The British withdrawal seemed to create a vacuum in a sector of importance at a time that Soviet influence appeared to be growing in the broader Middle Eastern region in such places as Egypt, Iraq and South Yemen. Thus, combined with Soviet activities elsewhere and a declining American desire to serve as the world's policeman, led to the promulgation of what later became known as the **Nixon Doctrine** in 1969. "We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us.... we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its own defence".¹⁰

The adoption of the Nixon Doctrine led to a Gulf policy which sought to create and support surrogates to ensure regional stability. The "two-pillar policy" focussing on Iran and Saudi Arabia was partially perceived to be responsive to a potential threat from the Soviet Union and its allies. Although the Nixon Doctrine was not designated specifically for the Middle

¹⁰. "Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsmen, July 25, 1969", Public Papers of the Presidents : Richard M. Nixon 1969, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970, page. 359; and "Annual Foreign Policy Report, 18 February 1970", Public Papers of the Presidents : Richard M. Nixon 1970, p. 118-19.

East, it was applied to the Gulf sector and authorized the Shah of Iran a virtual blank cheque for the acquisition of U.S. military equipment to build Iran's strength and capability to help ensure stability and security in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia moved more circumspectly at the outset and was ill-suited to the role as a pillar of United States policy given its military capability and policy inclination.

The policy of the United States and delineated by the Nixon Doctrine was carried into the Ford administration, and the early days of the President Carter's tenure which focused its initial attention on the Arab-Israeli conflict and its resolution.¹¹

President Carter's secondary focus on the Gulf sector shifted with the Iranian revolution, the ouster of the Shah, the taking of American hostages, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In sum, these changes undermined the concepts underlying the 'twin pillar

¹¹. Reich, Bernard, "United States Middle East Policy in the Carter and Reagan Administrations" Australian Outlook Vol. 38, p.72-80, August 1984; Reich Bernard and J. Bennett, Alexander -"Soviet Policy and American Response in the Middle East", Journal of East and West Studies, Vol. 13 p.79-112, Fall-Winter 1984, Reich, Bernard -"United States Middle East Policy in the Carter and Reagan Administrations"- Middle East Review, Vol. 17 p.12-23, p. 60-61, Winter 1984-85; and Reich Bernard -"The United States and the Middle East", Political Economy of the Middle East, US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 1980, p.373-399.

policy' and the Nixon Doctrine and raised new concerns about Soviet intentions and policies at the same time that Middle Eastern oil was becoming more important both as a natural resource and a source of western financial strength. The United States' reaction to the altered regional situation developed into the Carter Doctrine. It asserted that the Gulf was vital to the United States and its allies and that all action necessary, including military force, would be utilized to protect that interest from a Soviet threat. In his State of the Union Address to the Congress on January 23, 1980, Carter said "the Soviet move in Afghanistan threatened a region of great strategic importance which contained more than two thirds of the world's exportable oil". He stated the United States' response (dubbed the **Carter Doctrine**) in these terms.

"Let our position be absolutely clear : An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force".¹²

¹². State of the Union Message by President Carter, January 23, 1980, Department of State Bulletin, February 1980, page B (special insert).

To **President Carter**, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan represented but one more step in a broader Soviet move toward the Persian Gulf. The Iranian revolution and the hostage crisis supported the USSR's achievement of this goal by reducing American influence in the area and by distracting the administration from the immediate threat posed by the USSR to American interests in the region.

The Carter Doctrine was accompanied by the establishment of the **Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF)** at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida on March 1, 1980. This was a permanent military force designed to deploy rapidly into the region to respond to contingencies threatening U.S. interest, specifically threats to Gulf oil. The RDJTF evolved from a planning concept which was then called the Rapid Development Force (RDF). At its inception, the RDJTF (commonly referred to as the Rapid Deployment Force) was frequently criticized as a "paper tiger" lacking the force structure and firepower to engage effectively projected Soviet forces in the region and facing severe problems in strategic mobility to get them into the battle. The RDJTF later became the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) during the Reagan Administration.

When **Ronald Reagan** became President in 1980, he maintained Carter's emphasis on the (Persian)

Gulf-Arabian Peninsula sector, but his approach to the Middle East and its problems derived from a different set of assumptions. The Reagan administration held a broader and more negative view of the Soviet challenge worldwide (including the concept of an "evil empire"). Reagan believed that the fundamental threat to peace and stability in the region was not from the Arab-Israeli conflict (especially since Egypt and Israel were moving towards implementation of the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty as scheduled) but by the Soviet Union and its policies. Unlike Carter, he assumed the main focus of American interest in the Middle East to be in the Gulf sector. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan represented a direct threat to the security of the Gulf.¹³

The Reagan administration introduced the concept of "strategic consensus", which called for the regional states, from Pakistan to Egypt, to co-operate with Washington and amongst themselves to oppose the common Soviet threat. The challenge for the Reagan administration was to convince the regional states that their primary security threat came from the Soviet Union. Strategic consensus required access and a

¹³. Reich Bernard & Maj. Gotowicki, Stephen H. - The United States and the Persian Gulf in the Bush Administration. Royal United Serives Institute & Brassey's Defense Year Book, London, Brassey's, 1991.p. 126.

regional network to support facilities for U.S. military forces. A principal incentive of strategic consensus was to be the expansion of U.S. arms sales to co-operative countries. For this purpose, the Reagan administration supported the sale of 60 F-15 and 5 AWACs aircraft to Saudi Arabia. Except for Israel, none of the regional states embraced the concept. Regional and domestic concerns were perceived by them as greater than those from the Soviet Union.

The Reagan administration was also concerned about the negative effects of the Iran-Iraq war and it adopted the view that U.S. interests in the region would not be served by a decisive victory by one side or the other. A victory by Iraq, might encourage a Soviet military intervention into Iran. A victory by Iran would risk the spread of Iranian Islamic fundamentalism into the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. As the Iran-Iraq war expanded into the Gulf and attacks against non-belligerent shipping increased in 1987, the U.S. agreed to the reflagging of Kuwaiti oil tankers and providing them with U.S. naval protection in **Operation Earnest Will**. Force levels of the **Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR)** which has been operating in the Gulf since the 1940s, routinely with a flagship and four surface combatants, were substantially increased in size with the deployment of the Joint Task Force Middle East (JTFME) in support

of Earnest Will. At the height of the protection action, as many as 40 U.S. naval vessels were operating in the (Persian) Gulf and the Arabian Sea.¹⁴

The last years of the Reagan administration and the advent of the Bush administration coincided with the accession to and consolidation of power in the Soviet Union of Mikhail Gorbachev. This, in turn, led to a modification of American perceptions of the evil empire and, later of the Cold War. The Bush Administration began its tenure in office as developments in the region and world moved in directions previously unexpected. These major developments included the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, a cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war, the collapse of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe, developing Soviet internal political and economic transformation, an assessment of diminished Soviet military capability to threaten the Gulf region; and increasing U.S. and allied dependence on Gulf oil. Oil remains an element of United States strategic/political concern in the region. Because of declining American reserves and production, as well as a price that has not been sufficiently high to promote alternative energy sources and development of new oil finds in the United

¹⁴. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Richard W. Murphy Interview on NBC-TVs "Meet the Press" August 23, 1987, Department of State Bulletin, October, 1987, p. 44-45.

States, there is a growing need to import oil from abroad. The increasing dependence on imported oil necessarily links the United States to a growing need for Middle Eastern (i.e. essentially Gulf) oil since this is where most of the world's oil reserves are located. Some estimates suggest that in the coming decade the increased dependence of the United States on imported oil will grow to between 50% and 60% of its total oil consumption and the Gulf will become the primary source for that oil. The United States requires "secure stable sources of energy supply". Thus, the United States has "a stake in the stability of the Gulf and the moderation of Gulf oil policies over the long term".¹⁵

Despite perestroika and glasnost, the Bush administration has also been concerned about Soviet diplomatic advances in the region. The Soviet Union maintains embassies in four of the six countries; Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates and there have been growing contacts with Saudi Arabia despite the absence of formal diplomatic links. While increasing its diplomatic relationships with the

¹⁵. Statement of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs John H. Kelly before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, February 28, 1990, "Toward Stability in the Middle East and Southwest Asia", Current Policy No. 1259, Department of State, March 1990, p. 3.

moderate Arab states. Moscow continues to maintain a military presence and influence in Ethiopia, Libya, Iraq, Syria, South and North Yemen. In June 1989, the Soviet Union formalized its developing relationship with Iran during the Moscow visit of Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, then-speaker of Iran's parliament. During Rafsanjani's visit, formal economic and military agreements were signed between the two countries.¹⁶ The military agreement was undertaken by the Soviet Union with "the explicit understanding that this will not injure the security of third countries nor make for a change in the power balance in the region."¹⁷

The Bush administration's enunciated interests in the Gulf sector, in light of these factors, include the security of oil and its free passage out of the Gulf, the security and stability of friendly regional states, and because of uncertainty concerning Soviet intentions, there remains the need (generally unstated) to contain Soviet advances. Stated goals include maintaining stability in the region; preventing either Iran or Iraq from dominating the region; preventing the spread of

^{16.} USSR Ministry of the Foreign Affairs, "The Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Activity of the USSR (April 1985-October 1989)", International Affairs, January 1990, pp. 5-111.

^{17.} *ibid.* pp. 5-11.

radical Islamic fundamentalism; and reducing the threat of terrorism from and in the region.

UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY IN THE GULF :

A strategy is a method of reconciling means and ends. Every diplomatic strategy is therefore by nature a challenge to find the best ways of applying resources towards objectives, which in turn contributes to political ends. And strategy cannot be unilateral or static, it is desired from the interaction of at least two parties in which the goals and actions of each are determined in part by the behaviour of the others.

The new U.S. strategy is no different. The passing of the Cold War has not removed the challenge from strategy; it has merely redefined almost all the basic elements-potential adversaries, political goals (and thus military objectives) - while hinting strongly that new ways of reconciling means and ends are now available and needed.¹⁸

Gulf region is important to American foreign policy till it holds Oil and Israel. In this region, especially, neither the Reagan nor the Bush Administrations have been able to articulate comprehensively what the U.S. wants, from whom, or how it might be able to achieve its

¹⁸. Mazarr, Michael J., Snider, Don M. & Blackwell Jr., James A. - Desert Storm - The Gulf War & what we learned. Westview Press, Boulder. 1993. pp.160-161.

diplomatic objectives in order to solve some of the root causes of that regions perpetual tendency towards conflict.¹⁹

Infact, such uncertainties has contributed to some unpleasant surprises such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the reapproachment between Iran and Iraq, the unwillingness of Jordan's King Hussein to follow American policy despite his close personal relations with President Bush have been of great concern.

Interventionist U.S. diplomatic strategy is aimed at world leadership, which is useful to promote certain U.S goals around the world. The U.S. goals have been to promote regional stability, spread of democracy and free trade, growth of multilateral economic and political institutions, human rights and national self - determination. U.S. presence in Vietnam has been justified by its policy of containment. In the Middle East, specially in the Gulf without U.S's opposition, Iraq's power would have grown unchecked either through control of oil supplies or by the development of nuclear weapons capable of supporting Saddam Hussein's ambition for regional dominance.

The U.S. strategy has always revolved around 4

¹⁹. Albright, Mandeleine K. & Goodman, Allan E. - U.S. Foreign Policy After the Gulf Crisis, Survival. Nov.-Dec. 1990. Vol. XXXII; No.6. p. 538.

(four) approaches viz. interventionism, isolationism, balancer policy and multilateralism. According to Z. Brzezinski,²⁰ U.S. should pursue a goal of 'selective global commitment'. If U.S. forfeits its world role, it would have to pay a stiff economic price. It is but imperative to study the four approaches of U.S. strategy in context of Middle East so as to examine the role played by U.S. in the Gulf war.

- i) Policy of Interventionism - U.S. foreign policy considers extending security guarantees to Israel in order to reassure Tel Aviv about its security and allow it to make security related concessions; in order to sell arms to Arab States to obtain their co-operation; in order to serve as the sole sponsor of all negotiations and discussions in the region; and in order to underwrite a permanent settlement with economic and military aid and additional security commitments.
- ii) Policy of Isolationism - Such a policy has no concrete base when applied to the Middle East region. Infact, United States has absolutely no business meddling in disputes so far from its shores except for oil, which plays a key role in

²⁰. in Michael J. Mazarrs, et al. - Desert Storm : The Gulf War and what we Learned, Westview Press, Boulder, 1993.

U.S. economy.

iii) Balancer policy : Striking a balance between States in the Middle East would ensure a free flow of oil to U.S. The policy, therefore, incorporates a more detached military presence which helps dampen regional instabilities and reduces the incentives for arms race and war in the region. U.S. therefore, acts as a support to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. America thus pursues a circumscribed version of interventionism - without the security guarantees, without the economic and military aid and also without arms sale. The U.S. diplomats in this process help establish negotiations and support the proceedings but refrain from directly imposing settlements, as seen in the Middle East Peace Process.

iv) Policy of Multilaterism - U.S. foreign policy strategy has always incorporated a close networking with United Nations in establishing international talks; in co-operating with global arms embargoes in order to halt and reverse the regional arms race; and also to co-operate with multinational attempts to halt the spread of mass destruction in the Middle East.

Gulf war of 1991 re-emphasized the vital nature of the three basic interests - oil, security and conflict.

settlement. These three basic interests and the problems are inter-related. Western nations having a difference in attitude interpret the events differently in capabilities and in degrees of economic vulnerability making for different policy approaches to some of the problems in the Middle East. The European States and Japan are less sensitive to the concerns of Israel, which has a unique relationship with U.S.²¹

The assumption that the security of the U.S. is closely linked with the preservation of World Order attached substantial domestic support only in the course of hegemonial contest with Soviet Union. Seen across a broader time frame, the development of global commitments and the heavy emphasis on military power are unusual in American history. The growth of the nation's power has given it pretensions it once shunned and provided it with temptations it seldom had to face in the past.²²

The changes intrinsic to the post-Cold War world has created new, intense conflicts that complicate any prospective use of force by the U.S. On the other hand,

²¹. Oil and Turmoil - Western Choices in the Middle East. The Atlantic Council of United States - Policy Paper. 1991. p.12.

²². Tucker, Robert W. & Hendrickson, David C. - The Imperial Temptation : New World Order and American's Purpose. Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York. 1992. p.165.



a number of political and technological developments enhanced opportunities for the U.S. to use its military might effectively. The erosion of blocs and alliances makes it easier (in the political sense) to use force against individual states. There is little fear of direct conflict with another superpower growing out of a local confrontation with a third state, and less danger than a great power rival, will furnish political, economic and military support to a client embroiled with the U.S.²³.

American diplomacy was once based upon principles very different from those prevailing today. Ironically, however, these principles now seem to be left behind-in remote past. Right now, at the very least, they are regarded as having little relevance to a nation that now stands at the centre of international system and sells itself as the world's 'sole' superpower. Such a situation as prevails now is indeed ironic for two reasons - firstly, it was the global challenge provided by the Soviet Union that led the nation to break from many of the principles that had traditionally guided its foreign policy and helped build up, in peace time, the formidable around forces and institutional structures of

²³. Haass, Richard N. - Intervention : The Use of American Military Force in the Post Cold War World. A Carnegie Endowment Book, Washington D.C. 1994. p.5.

the national security state. The second irony is that, the very factors that led to the breakup of the Soviet Union - the failure of the Communist command economy and the unnatural suppression of democratic yearnings throughout the Soviet Empire-have often been attributed to the power of ideas that launched the American experiment.²⁴

As has been noted by Michael Elliott in 'America is back' (Newsweek, Oct. 9, 1995), America makes things happen for two reasons - firstly, because it is the only single country with a truly global military reach; and secondly, even though often befuddled, it has a moral sense. For these reasons, he says, America's global ability to offer threat or protection is unique. At this moment in the international arena, Japan cannot rival it nor China. And it will be sometime before the Europeans have a single army, equipped to the same standards as those now enjoyed by the Americans - by which time the next wave of pony-tailed Californian software writers will have leap frogged yet farther ahead.

²⁴. Op.cit. 20, p.165.

BUSH AND THE 'NEW WORLD ORDER' :

Bush administration entered office in 1989 with an outlook and commitment that emphasized the need for continuity over changes in the nations foreign policy. The sudden end of Cold War overturned the political truths of the post-war world - truths by which the experts had interpreted and understood this world.

The Bush administration came to office prepared to administer over the Cold War. Slowly, the administration began to respond to changes that by late fall of 1989, eventuated in the collapse of Soviet Union's European empire. At the year's end, a new and outwardly promising relationship had developed between the Soviet and American heads of state. The conversion gave rise to problems, though not inconsiderable ones. For the first time in over half a century, the U.S. was no longer confronted with a great power threat to its security.²⁵

With the collapse of Soviet Union, America became the only superpower and the world saw a drastic change in the later part of 1980s in the international scenario. The Bush administration coined the phrase '**New World Order**' for this new era. Later on, this notion formed the backbone of many a American justification(s) for opposing the Iraqi seizure of Kuwait.

²⁵. Op. cit. 20, pp.21-23.

The phrase was first mentioned by **President Bush** in February 1990 and became the notion that has been the intellectual backbone of U.S. Gulf war rhetoric. In fact in April 1991, **President Bush** said that the phrase referred to "new ways of working with other nations to deter aggression and to achieve stability, and above all, to achieve peace".²⁶

According to a May 1991 report in Washington Post, **President Bush** and National Security Advisor - **Brent Scowcroft** came up with the phrase while fishing in August 1990. Quoting **President Bush**, "This order gains its mission and shape from both shared interests and shared ideals".

As we notice, the role of America in the 'New World Order' represents a marriage of two opposing traditions in American foreign policy without the limitations that were characteristic of either. The tradition represented by **President Jefferson** and **President Wilson** entertained grand ambitions in the world but was equally insistent on achieving these ambitions through measures short of war. The tradition represented by **President Hamilton** and **President Lodge** eschewed grand ambitions and insisted that foreign policy be tied to the pursuit of limited national interests, while at the same time it saw the

²⁶. Op. cit. 16, p. 5-11.

need for military preparedness and believed that military force would remain the great arbiter of conflicts among nations.²⁷

Prof. Clovis Maksoud, Director of the Centre for Global South School of International Studies, The American University, Washington D.C., interviewed by Saul Bloom and Philippa Winkler in May 1993 stated that - "United States did not make its policy towards the region very clear during the Reagan and Bush administration except in two ways, on the one hand, the tilt towards Iraq in its war against Iran and on the other hand, treating Iraq as a recipient of assistance from Gulf countries that were principal allies of the U.S."²⁸

Bush's vision of foreign policy embraced universal aspirations and military force. It is an authentic offspring of both the traditions, but one from which each parent would have recoiled. It offends the Hamilton - Lodge tradition by virtue of its reliance on force. A product of the past half century, Bush's vision combines the outlook and institutions necessiated by a global

²⁷. Op. cit. 20, p. 191.

²⁸. Bloom, Saul, Miller, John M., Warner, James & Winkler, Philippa (Ed.) - Hidden Casualties : The Environmental, Health and Political Consequences of the Persian Gulf War. ARC, Earthscan Publications Ltd., London, 1994, p. 26.

challenge to the nation's security and purpose with circumstances altogether different from those which justified the initial purpose.

Congressmen, Scholars and Columnists in the United States came up with their own regarding the effort in shaping or post Cold War Order. The Middle East had all along been a tough area for the Americans to achieve their objectives and the Gulf War apparently offered them an opportunity to fulfill that goal. The National Security Council of United States defined these goals/objectives, many of which are still relevant, way back in 1952.

According to NSC 129/1.²⁹

"The objectives of the United States with respect to the area comprising the Arab States and Israel are -

- (a) to overcome or prevent instability with these countries which threaten Western countries.
- (b) to prevent the extension of the Soviet influence and at the same time to strengthen the Western influence.
- (c) to ensure that the resources of the area are

²⁹. Statement of Policy proposed by National Security Council, "Top Secret NSC 129/1, United States Objectives and Policies with respect to Arab States and Israel" April 24, 1952. Foreign Relations of United States 1952-54, Part I.

available to the United States and its allies for use in strengthening the free world.

- (d) to strengthen the will and ability of these countries to resist possible future aggressions by the Soviet Union.
- (e) to establish within the community of nations a new relationship with the states of the area that recognises their desire to achieve status and respect for their sovereignty".

It is significant to note that the NSC recognised in 1952 mentioned that, (at that time) "the danger in this area to the security of the free world did not arise so much from the threat of direct Soviet military attack as from acute instability, anti western nationalism and Arab-Israeli antagonism. Such was the assessment of the NSC at the height of Cold War tension³⁰. The document stated that the "Policies and the Courses of Action" of the U.S. Government should be

- (a) Seek to obtain the participation of the states in the area in Middle East defense arrangement.
- (b) While maintaining flexibility as to the commitment of U.S. forces for the local

³⁰. Mahapatra, Chintamani - America's Role in the Post Gulf War World. Strategic Analysis, June 91, Vol. 14, No.3, p. 341-42.

defense of the area in the event of a general war, be prepared to reinforce political and psychological measures in the area by assigning U.S. token forces in the Middle East defense arrangement.

- (c) The United States should seek to create an atmosphere which will facilitate obtaining base rights where required within the area, and upon the threat of and during general hostilities, the right to operate forces in the territories of the various nations of the area".³¹

In fact, delivering the key note address at a Washington Institute for Near East Policy Symposium in late April 1991, the Defense Secretary **Dick Cheney** enunciated the strategic goals of U.S. policy in the Gulf. Quoting Cheney -

"The President has made it clear that we are not interested in a permanent, or long term United States ground presence.... But we are interested in an enhanced naval presence. We think we can do that safely.... We think there is a greater receptivity on the part of our friends in that part of the world to an occasional United States presence, a

³¹. *ibid.* p. 342.

tactical fighter squadron, for eg. deployed from time to time on a temporary basis to work out exercises jointly with our friends in the region; pre-positioned equipment, both for air and ground forces; those kinds of arrangements we think make sense, and would remind and reassure everyone of our commitment".

Cheney further explained the administrations rationale for wanting a presence in the Gulf when he said -

"... given the enormous resources that exist in that part of the world, and given in the fact that those resources are only going to rise in the years ahead, and the United States and our major partners cannot afford to have those resources controlled by somebody who is fundamentally hostile to our interests".

Never before had America's desire for a presence in the area been articulated so publicly and forthrightly. In the past U.S. officials shied away from such public pronouncements because it was always assumed that any American military presence would destabilise the indigenious regimes.³²

³². Dawisha, Adeed - 'The United States in the Middle East - : the Gulf War and its Aftermath'. Current History. Jan.92. Vol.91. No. 561, p.3

The Bush administration followed an aggressive policy of arms sale to the region. On May 23, 1991 the House of Representative's Foreign Affairs Committee, echoing United Nation's and international concerns, approved legislation calling for an arms sale moratorium in the Middle East as part of the 1992-93 foreign aid authorisation bill. Two weeks later the White House announced that it intended to sell 20 Apache attack helicopters to UAE and 8 to Bahrain. In late July, administration officials announced arms packages to the Middle East totalling \$ 4 billion.

On the eve of the war, Bush reminded his critics that the United States had fought the war not to institute democracy in Kuwait, but to liberate the country from the Iraqi occupation.

Bush's fealty to this half century old foreign policy tradition and its international experience have brought clear benefits. His 'diplomatic skill' enabled the U.S. to fight a \$ 50 billion war against Iraq in 1991 and to preserve American access to reasonably priced oil, without in the end, paying a penny of the war's operation of costs.³³

³³. Tonelson, Alan - 'Prudence or Inertia? The Bush Administration's Foreign Policy' Current History. April 1992. Vol. 91, No. 564. p. 145.

BILL CLINTON AND POLICY OF DUAL CONTAINMENT IN THE GULF:

The Clinton administration came to office amidst the usual state of turmoil and tensions in the Middle East. Clinton faced both challenges and opportunities in this volatile region. Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War of 1991 had crippled one of the most powerful Arab States, reducing its ability to threaten either Israel or the vulnerable oil rich Arab kingdoms of the Gulf.

Saudi-Arabia and its small neighbours had always depended on U.S. for a security umbrella against Iraq and Iran, the two major Gulf powers. Egypt on the otherhand relied heavily on U.S. financial aid. Syria was brought into a semi-cooperative position, joining the U.S. led coalition against Iraq in the Gulf War and agreeing to participate in Arab-Israeli peace talks. The only Arab regimes actively opposed to the new American hegemony - Iraq, Sudan and Libya were relatively weak, and so was Iran - Washington's non-Arab adversary.

Clinton's view of Middle East is not unlike President Ronald Reagan's view of Central America : discount the authoritarianism, poverty and social injustice within allied countries and blame their internal unrest on outside forces; insist that military solutions are required to solve what are essentially political and economic problems; see terrorism and extremist movements as the primary problem rather than

the gross injustice that spawn them; apply strict inter-relations of international law and U.N. resolutions to governments the U.S. opposes and ignore them when they target governments the U.S. supports; and position the U.S. as the primary economic, military and diplomatic force in the region even to the exclusion of its European allies.³⁴

But as Clinton had stated, during his administration's first year in office he devoted his energies overwhelmingly to domestic economic and social issues, and his foreign policy team demonstrated that its mission was limited to conducting foreign relations than taking foreign policy initiatives.

Under-Secretary of State for Policy Peter Tarnoff illustrated the administration, passivity in off-the-record remarks in May 1993. Tarnoff spoke of a reduced role for the United States overseas, and seemed to be articulating a "Clinton Doctrine" in which "partnership and consensus would become paramount considerations". These utterances were widely criticised as tantamount to an abdication of American's leadership role in a New World Order. To be sure, the administration hastily disavowed Tarnoff's views when

³⁴. Zunes, Stephen - Hazardous Hegemony : The United States in the Middle East. Current History. Jan. 97. Vol. 96, No. 606. p. 24.

they were made public, even though they did not differ substantially from comments by Secretary of State Warren Christopher to the effect that the United States could not become the world's policeman.³⁵

Martin Indyk, who was appointed by Clinton as a Middle Eastern specialist on the National Security Council, detailed the administration's Middle Eastern policy blueprint on May 18, 1993, in a speech delivered before the Washington Institute. Apart from Israel, Indyk named only two Arab Government as friends - Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

President Clinton during his first term in office asked Secretary Christopher to travel to the Middle East with several important objectives in mind.³⁶ First to demonstrate his belief that the Middle East Peace Process presented an opportunity for real progress in the period ahead and, conversely, to signal our awareness that this is a region which, if left unattended, can do much harm to vital U.S. interests, (and) second to promote other important objectives :

³⁵. Hudson, Michael C. - The Clinton Administration and the Middle East : Squandering the Inheritance. Current History. February 1994. Vol.93, No. 580. p. 50.

³⁶. Djerejian, Edward P. - United States Policy in the Middle East. U.S. Department of State Dispatch. March 15, 1993. Vol. 4 No.11, p. 149.

- * Concern about human rights and broader political participation in the region;
- * Promotion of American business and commercial opportunities abroad and the need to end the secondary and tertiary aspects of the Arab economic boycott;
- * Reassurance to allies that we would expect Iraq's full compliance with all U.N. Security Council Resolutions; (and)
- * Recognition of the importance we attach to Lebanon's continuing to make progress towards full independence and economic recovery.

With regards to Gulf Security, **President Clinton** in his semi-annual report to Congress in February 1993³⁷ reaffirmed the continuity of U.S. policy towards Iraq. He noted that the Iraqi regime's continued refusal to accept the U.N. resolutions had perpetuated the suffering of the Iraqi people. President Clinton stressed that Iraq must fully comply with the UN resolutions, which mandate an end to repression of the Iraqi people as well as measures designed to achieve the security of Iraq's neighbours, before lifting of economic sanctions can be considered.

In early March 1993, in Riyadh, Secretary of State

³⁷. *ibid.* p. 151.

Warren Christopher stressed on the importance the Clinton administration attaches to the full implementation of all UN resolutions on Iraq and of implementing the means chosen by the coalition to do so. He emphasized that

"we bear no ill will to the sufferings of the people of Iraq.... The pain inflicted on the Iraqi people is the responsibility of Saddam Hussein's regime".

In fact, the Clinton administration still continues to fund-relief programmes in northern Iraq, to support UN efforts to establish relief in Central and Southern Iraq and to support the recommendations of UN Special Representative Max Van der Stoel that the United Nations should station human rights monitors throughout Iraq.³⁸

The Clinton administration's approach to the security of Gulf was summed up in Indyk's speech as 'dual containment' of Iraq and Iran, and support for Saudi Arabia and Turkey to help stabilise a region still under immense tension years after the Gulf war.

A country with America's idealistic tradition cannot base its policy on the balance of power as the sole criterion for a new world order. But it must learn that equilibrium is a fundamental precondition for the

³⁸. *ibid.* p.151.

pursuit of its historic goals. And these higher goals cannot be achieved by rhetoric or posturing. The emerging international system is far more complex than any previously encountered by American diplomacy.³⁹

So far, United States policy has largely been successful in extending American strategy and economic interests in the region. Even though there has been growing resentment at the United States role by much of the regions population, yet US's presence in the Gulf enhances a sense of security for the insecured regimes. Unlike its predecessors, viz. the Romans, Mongols, British, etc. who had short lived hegemonic relationship with the Gulf States, US had proved its presence as a dominant superpower in this area till date. U.S. is unlike to face a disastrous situation in Gulf unless there is a dramatic change in the United State's Gulf Policy.

³⁹. Op.cit. 2, p.833.

CHAPTER - II

THE GULF CRISIS AND UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC RESPONSE

"Our objectives are clear. Saddam Hussein's forces will leave Kuwait. The legitimate government of Kuwait will be restored to its rightful place and Kuwait once again will be free. Iraq will eventually comply with all relevant United Nations Resolutions".

- President George Bush.¹

A NEW WORLD (DIS)ORDER:

War is a fixture in human history, and has played an important political role. Most historians and political scientists have seen war the way the Prussian Karl Von Clausewitz did - 'one way of settling political disputes'. Some political and other goals are still being met through war. United States achieved its political goal in the Gulf War by forcing Saddam Hussein's troops out of Kuwait. And even when there is an apparent victor, wars rarely result in lasting settlements of the political disputes which spawned them. Thus, Saddam Hussein remained in power in Iraq after the Gulf war, and none of the long term geo-political problems which gave rise to it in the

¹. Statement by the President, The White House Office of Press Secretary, 16 Jan. 1991.

first place were any closer to being solved.²

The end of Cold War has to an extent removed the threat of a nuclear holocaust, atleast for now. Until 1991, United States and the Soviet Union intervened directly or indirectly in the various conflicts of the world. It must be noted that the two superpowers never came into direct conflict with each other but fought each other in proxy wars or struggles. On few occassions, either of the superpowers did send their troops to war, in other lands, be it Vietnam or Afghanistan.

The Cold War also increased the arms trade which made regions like the Middle East, specially the Gulf region, even more volalite. The case of Iraq, through its war with Iran, proclaimed threat to Israel and its subsequent annexation of Kuwait, clearly, demonstrates the repercussions of pumping in of arms by the superpowers during the Cold War into the region.

With the exception of Brazil, the top ten exporters were "northern" countries, and all but two of the leading importers were less developed countries. Much of the industrialised countries may have become what Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky (1993) in their book

². Hauss, Charles Beyond Confrontation - Transforming the New World Order. Westport, Praeger, 1996, p. 17-18.

call a 'zone of peace' in which countries are not likely to go war with each other. On the other hand, they have done a lot to make the rest of the world an even deadlier 'zone of turmoil' than it had been before.³

Middle East has been a region where arms trade has been a way of East - West contention. Iraq has been the bigger exporter of arms in the region. Almost eighty percent of Iraq's arms have come from U.S. and Soviet Union. In the Gulf War, Saddam was fighting, the U.S. and allied forces with the same weapons as supplied by them. The U.S. troops were hit by the weapons supplied by the Soviets, even though both these countries were together fighting Saddam's Iraq.

The story of arming of Iraq goes back to the Iraq - Iran war of 1980s, when these two nations unmindful of the consequences imported arms worth \$ 27 billion - an amount that accounted for 25 percent of major arms imports of the third world.⁴

The deliveries to Iraq included multiple rocket launchers, armoured cars, tanks, armoured personnel carriers, towed guns, helicopters, surface to air

³. Singer, Max & Wildavsky, Aaron in Charles Hauss-Beyond Confrontation - Transforming the New World Order, Westport, Praeger, 1996, p.23.

⁴. Kala, Arvind - 'Arms Suppliers yesterday, Enemies today.' Indian Express, January 28, 1991.

missiles, anti-aircraft vehicles (missile armed). Point defense radars, anti-ship missiles and air to surface missiles. During the 1980s Iraq got 83 percent of its arms from the Soviet Union, 22 percent from the U.S. In this period, the Soviet Union gave Iraq 80 self propelled howitzers, 80 self propelled guns, 360 mobile rocket launchers, 800 armoured personnel carriers, 1,000 T-52 tanks, 700 T-72 tanks, 40 air to surface missiles and 350 Scud missiles.⁵

Most of the arms exporter, specially Soviet Union, maintain an arms balance by supplying arms to both the contending countries at war. According to SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) - "after being Iraq's supplier in the 1970s, the USSR refused to supply arms to Iraq for 18 months after Iraq's invasion of Iran. the USSR and WTO (Warsaw Treaty Organisation) countries supplied arms to Iran and permitted the transfer of Soviet arms to Iran from Libya, North Korea and Syria. After 1981, and specially after 1983, as Iran gained the upper hand, USSR became Iraq's largest supplier of arms. In 1988 and 1989, as Iraq gained the military initiative, the USSR and East European countries resumed supplies to Iran".

According to SIPRI, the world trade in major

⁵. SIPRI, Year Book, 1990.

conventional weapons fell in 1989, where it was \$ 39 billion in 1987, it came down to \$ 31 billion in 1989. The arms market was controlled by Soviet Union (37 percent) and US (34 percent) followed by France, Britain and China. Infact, in 1989, 17 British, 35 French and 03 Italian compaines displayed their manufactured weapons at an arms exhibition in Baghdad. West Germany is said to have supplied Iraq with technology to manufacture a missile called Condor 2.

Iraq's acquisition and application of modern technology took two tracks. First, was buying sophiscated weapons and skills from the USSR and West. In the 1980s, Iraq imported more than \$ 25 billion worth of major weapons system. Secondly, around 1984, Iraq began building up its domestic arms and military industries with the help of investment advisers in Switzerland, Britain and France.⁶

Even though US and USSR were major suppliers of arms, but the Germans, French, British and Italians did not lag behind. The Germans helped perfect Iraq's missile delivery systems which was aptly demonstrated in the 1991 Gulf War. France was Iraq's Chief nuclear source till the Israelis bombed the French built 'Osirak' reactor in 1981. Even though they stopped

⁶. 'How the West Helped build Iraq's awesome might' Manthan, Feb. 1991, Vol. XII, No.2, p.67.

supplying but by then they had already supplied 27 pounds of weapon grade uranium, still intact in storage. Iraq acquired artillery rockets from USSR, Brazil and Yugoslavia which it modified and upgraded with foreign help. the Italians sold hundreds of decoy tanks to fool the attackers. German expertise helped the Iraqis to extend the range of Scud missiles from 219 miles to 500 miles and more. And thus were born the 600 km range Al-Hussein and 900 km range Al-Abbas missiles along with 2,000 km range Tammuz 1 and the Fahd, solid fuel missile.⁷

From the mid 1980s, till Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the US Commerce Department promoted trade as part of overall policy to embrace Iraq. Massive amounts of sensitive equipment and technology were sold to Iraq without preconditions. Other American equipments with Saddam Hussein today are \$ 200 million worth of Bell helicopters, a machine tool plant capable of making weapons, and a power press suitable for the compaction of nuclear fuels.⁸ Along with American companies, the British companies and the Swedish companies helped Iraq assimilate a massive arms buildup which during the Gulf War fell heavily on the allied forces.

⁷. Compiled from Sunday Observer, January 17, 1991 and Statesman, January 30 and February 21, 1991.

⁸. Op. cit. 6, pp. 67-68.

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, calls immediately went up for a regional arms - control framework to help restrain the growth of military power in the world's most volatile area. In testimony after the war, **Secretary of State Baker** argued that

"the time has come to try to change the destructive pattern of military competition and proliferation in this region and to reduce arms flow into an area that is already over militarized".

Yet the dilemmas involved in arms control quickly became apparent as the US appeared to ignore its arms-control rhetoric in proposing a new \$ 1.6 billion arms deal for Egypt and an \$ 18 billion arms sale to other Arab States that participated in coalition operations. Any attempts to restrain the flow of conventional arms into the Middle East, moreover, will run foul of both Israeli and Arab claims that their support for U.S. policy in the recent war entitles them to new weapons. The growth of nuclear, chemical or biological arsenals in the Middle East would aggravate existing instabilities, nourishing ambitions of regional hegemony.⁹

⁹. Mazarr, Michael J., Snider, Don M., & Blackwell Jr., James A. - 'Desert Storm :The Gulf War and What we learned'. Boulder, Westview Press, 1993, pp.176-177.

THE GULF CRISIS :

The intensity of Iraq's aggressiveness was fully revealed long before the Gulf War in Saddam's series of decisions : to launch a war against Iran; to develop, deploy and use chemical weapons over a sustained period against Iran; even more chilling was that it was willingly to use chemical weapons against its own Kurdish population. This pattern of behaviour not fully taken into account by most analysts in their failure to predict his subsequent rash and foolish invasion of Kuwait - gave clear indications of the regime's intent and willingness to develop and use weapons of mass destruction in general. The use of Scuds against Israel and Saudi Arabia fulfilled those anxieties.¹⁰

Invasion of Kuwait :

On 7 December 1989, Iraq announced that it had launched a rocket 'al -Abid' which was capable of putting a satellite into space.¹¹ Seven days later, Iraq made a further announcement that it had developed two more rockets with a range equivalent to 2,000 kms. (Tammuz I and Fahd). In practice, Iraq did not have

¹⁰. Fuller, Graham E. - Iraq in the next decade : Will Iraq Survive Until 2002 ? RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1993, p.72.

¹¹. Law, John - 'Mushrooming Missiles', Middle East International 15 Dec. 1989, p.13.

sufficient territory to test these missiles, but if the report was genuine, it meant that Iraq had developed its first missile capable of delivering a large nuclear weapon, or large chemical or biological weapons pay-loads, against any target in Israel or Iran.¹²

In a speech in January 1990, Saddam explicitly warned that 'any attempt by the Zionist entity to strike against our scientific or military installations will be confronted by us with a precise reaction, using the means available to us according to the legitimate right to self defense". He also warned that the U.S. would be held responsible if Israel were to initiate such an attack.¹³

In February and March 1990, a series of events strengthened Saddam's conviction that the U.S. was orchestrating a campaign of intimidation and destabilization. Around this time, a U.S. State Department report severely criticised Iraq for its appalling human rights record and the U.S. Congress responded by threatening to impose sanctions on Iraq.

On 23 February 1990, in a meeting of the Arab

¹². Cordesman, Anthony H. - Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East. London, Brassey's 1991, p.50.

¹³. Baghdad Domestic Service, Jan 5 1990, in BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 4, ME/0655-A/4.

Cooperative Council (ACC), Saddam presented his personal analysis of the implications of the ending of the Cold War and the subsequent challenge posed by the U.S. to the Arab world. He demanded in a private gathering, in this ACC meeting, that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait should write off Iraq's debts and advance a further \$ 30 billion.¹⁴

In an act of defiance, on 15 March 1990, Iraq executed the Iranian born British journalist **Farzad Bazoft**, on charges of spying for Israel. On 29 March British custom officials uncovered an attempt to smuggle electronic capacitors, called krytons, which could be used to trigger the implosion mechanism in a nuclear device.

In the Arab Summit at Baghdad in May, Saddam again demanded the \$ 30 billion from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and also made clear that overproduction of oil by some of the Gulf States beyond the quotas set by the OPEC was harming Iraq's economic position. Iraq's grievances grew deeper when the prices of a barrel of oil dropped from \$ 18 to \$ 14 from May to July 1990, which Iraq believed was caused due to excessive oil production (exceeding in quota) by Kuwait and United Arab Emirates (UAE). This

¹⁴. Salinger, Pierre & Laurent, Eric - Secret Dossier : the Hidden Agenda behind the Gulf War. London, Penguin Books, 1991, p.7.

acquisition against Kuwait and UAE were made public in a memorandum handed by the Iraqi Foreign Minister **Tariq Aziz** to the Arab League on 17 July 1990.

Infact the American Ambassador **April Glaspie** had an interview with Saddam Hussein on July 25, 1991. According to Ambassador Glaspie's statement in the Senate's House of Foreign Affairs Committee - "She had warned the Iraqi dictator not to make the mistake of invading Kuwait, pointing out that the United States was a Superpower and intended to act like one". Ambassador Glaspie, after the meeting, clearly had felt that the talks with Saddam had gone off well. Her assumption may not have been wise, but it was not completely unreasonable either. Saddam Hussein had made it pretty clear that Iraq intended to drive a hard bargain with the Kuwaitis at the OPEC meeting. It would expect the oil prices to rise. But the chances of a military invasion of Kuwait, Ambassador Glaspie thought, were negligible now that Saddam Hussein had given his word to President Mubarak that there would be no invasion while Iraq and Kuwait were still talking. Every thing, Ambassador April Glaspie knew about the Arab code of honour and prudence suggested that the President of Iraq would not likely break a personal promise given to the president of Egypt. In other words, the crisis has been

diffused.¹⁵ But as events would prove, Ambassador Glaspie had been mistaken.

Unfortunately the onus of responsibility was laid firmly at Kuwait's door. This was due to a variety of factors. First, Iraq had always questioned the legitimacy of the state of Kuwait and the rule of the al Sabah dynasty. Over a period of years, Iraqi government had frequently staked its claim over Kuwait, arguing that it had been a part of Basra vilayet during the Ottoman Empire. Iraq's annoyance was more due to Kuwait's refusal to cede or lease the islands of Warbah and Bubiyan. Secondly, as already mentioned Saddam wanted the war loans it had taken from Kuwait to be written off, to which Kuwait had refused. Irked by this refusal, the Iraqi leadership initiated a propaganda campaign which sought to emphasize Kuwait's alleged ingratitude and greed. Kuwait was accused of stealing \$ 2.4 billion from the al-Rumaylah oil-field, situated in the disputed border region between Iraq and Kuwait.

This cumulative case against Kuwait was made starkly threatening when Iraqi troops began amassing against Kuwait's borders on 21 July 1990. Kuwait at this stage partially succumbed to the campaign of intimidation and agreed on July 27, 1990 to cease

¹⁵. Cave, Ray and Ryan, Pat (Ed.) - Triumph in the Desert. London, Random House, 1991,p.45.

over-production and to accept OPEC's decision to raise the price of oil to \$ 21 per barrel.

In a meeting in Jeddah on 1 August 1990, the Kuwaiti Crown Prince - **Sheikh Said al-Abdullah al-Sabah**, refused to offer Iraq the full \$ 10 billion that it demanded and suggested he would only contemplate doing so if there was a satisfactory agreement on the demarcation of Kuwait - Iraq border. The desire to punish Kuwait for its defiance made the invasion of Kuwait an attractive option. The next day Iraqi tanks rolled into the small state and easily overcame the minimal opposition they encountered.¹⁶

It was in the wee hour, i.e. 2am, on Thursday, 2 August 1990 when the massive Iraqi troop crossed into Kuwait and annexed the small Sheikhdome, while the world was looking the otherway.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a sheer flagrant and dangerous violation of International Law by Iraq. It posed a threat to peace in the region which by itself has been a very volatile area over the decades. Infact the crisis that so erupted wasn't flared due to East-West confrontation made it even more alarming.

¹⁶. Dannreuther, Roland - Adelphi Papers, No. 264, 1991-92, p.16.

The Strategic Stakes:

Due to the invasion of Kuwait, at stake was the future of post Cold War global stability, the nature of regional conflict including efforts to limit weapons proliferation, the world economy, the regimes of Middle East and the Bush presidency itself. The Gulf Crisis, coupled with the prospects for several new independent Muslim states, including Uzbekistan, Kazakshtan and Kirgiziya - that emerged from the breakup of the Soviet empire and the Moscow government rapprochement with Israel, suggested that a new Middle East was emerging with far reaching implications.

The failure (in case) of United Nations to solve the ensuing crisis would have led to drastic consequences. Firstly, if Saddam achieved a political victory because the co-alition against him collapsed, it would not only have left him in control in Kuwait, but his army and military infrastructure would have assured him of virtual hegemony over his Arab neighbours. This would have further given him a leverage over oil supplies and revenues. Secondly, would it have been a divisive war that would have led to the breakup of UN coalition, high casualties, fighting spreading to Israel, the disruption of oil market, Iraq would

have remained a viable military threat to the region.¹⁷

In either circumstance, the global security environment would be bleak. It would cripple the world economy leading to a state of depression, and would render nascent democracies unstable. It would further polarise the gap between the rich and poor countries and also among the rich countries. Furthermore, Iraq's success would have sent a clear message to the third world countries. The colonial borders which have been sacrosanct since independence, could now be redrawn based on military power. The UN would be seen as a paper tiger and US would be discredited and resented.¹⁸

In his address "Why America is in the Gulf", before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council (Los Angeles, California) on 29 October 1990, US Secretary of State, **James Baker**¹⁹ enunciated the three point stake due to Iraq's aggression.

What is at stake:

- i) Iraq's aggression challenges world peace.
- ii) Iraq's aggression is a regional challenge.

¹⁷. Kemp, Geoffrey - 'The Gulf Crisis : diplomacy or force?' Survival, Nov.-Dec. 1990, Vol. XXXII, No.6, p.508.

¹⁸. ibid. p. 508.

¹⁹. Dispatch, U.S. Department of State, Washington D.C. November 5, 1990.

iii) Iraq's aggression challenges the global economy.

When so much was at stake, it definitely fell on the shoulders of United States, under the banner and flag of United Nations, to lead the way and diffuse this crisis situation for a stable world. Here again the U.S. position was somewhat similar to the situation faced by President **Harry S. Truman** in 1950, when North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel and marched into South Korea. Unlike the 1950's Korean crisis, U.S. had well defined defence perimeter in the Middle East. Where Harry Truman had "initially" failed to recognise South Korea's strategic importance to U.S. policy, President Bush in the 1990 war equation was aware of the catastrophic set back, non intervention in the area, would have on his administration and American policy, and, of course, the world at large.

U.S. Policy in the Gulf Crisis :

In a taped address to the Iraqi people **President George Bush** on 17 September 1990²⁰ said "Saddam Hussein tells you that this crisis is a struggle between Iraq and America. Infact, it is Iraq against the whole world. Further he added -

"Not until the invasion of Kuwait had the U.S. been opposed to Iraq. In the past, the U.S. had

²⁰. Dispatch, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C. September 24, 1990.

helped Iraq import billions of dollars worth of food and other commodities, and the war with Iran would not have ended two years ago without U.S. support and sponsorship in the United Nations.... The world will not allow this aggression to stand. Iraq must get out of Kuwait for the sake of principle, for the sake of peace and for the sake of Iraqi people".

The despatch of US troops to Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was motivated by atleast five considerations²¹.

- i) American policy makers believed it imperative to protect Saudi Arabia from an Iraqi attack. Not to support the Saudi regime would be to undercut the U.S. security network worldwide. To lose Saudi regime would be to place Saudi Arabia's oil wealth at the disposal of an Iraqi regime intent on shattering the fragile Pax-Americana that has existed in the region for the past decades.
- ii) The second consideration of the U.S. policy was to reestablish a friendly regime in Kuwait. To sacrifice Kuwait would be to bolster the Iraqi regime, both morally and financially. With Kuwait

²¹. Palmer, Monte - 'Understanding US Policy in Iraq Crisis'. Mainstream, January 19, 1991, p.5.

in his belt, Saddam Hussain would emerge as the dominant force in Arab politics.

- iii) The third US policy consideration was to "clip the wings" of Saddam Hussein before he posed a direct threat to Israel. Saddam Hussein through his chemical weapons, etc. represents a major Arab threat to Israeli security.
- iv) The fourth consideration of the U.S. policy was to reinforce the principle that the occupation of territory by force would not be tolerated by the world community.
- v) The fifth consideration of the U.S. policy in the Gulf was to secure the steady flow of oil at a reasonable price.

In addition to the above considerations, cynics might suggest three additional points. First, some analysts have suggested that the U.S. exploited the Iraqi invasion as a means of establishing a permanent military presence in the region. Secondly, active military involvement in Kuwait crisis provided justification for the continued buildup of an American military establishment under seige by Congressional budget cutters. Thirdly, involvement in the Kuwaiti crisis provided the US president with the opportunity to sidestep domestic economic and social crisis by demonstrating foreign policy leadership on a global

scale.

There were four policy options available to United States. Each possessed a unique configuration of costs and benefits.²²

The least complex policy option available was to merely maintain a defensive posture in Saudi Arabia. In addition to being the least costly, it would demonstrate United State's commitment to it's allies and deny Iraq's access to Saudi Arabia's massive oil reserves.

The drawbacks to this policy are numerous. By acquiescing in the Iraqi take-over of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein would be enriched and his regional stature enhanced. While denied Saudi Arabia, he might well be tempted to extend his reach to the smaller Sheikhdoms of Gulf. Saddam's military machine would be left intact forcing the US into the long term occupation of Saudi Arabia; which would be costly for America and embarrassing for Saudi-Arabia.

The second policy option available to the United States was to force Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, but not attack Iraq directly. If UN Resolutions and economic blockade did not work this option will, in all probability, require the use of force.

On the negative side, an invasion of Kuwait would

²². *ibid.* p.6

be costly in terms of US lives. Sacrificing American lives for the sake of restoring a desert kingdom would be difficult to the American public. Moreover Saddam's military machine would be left intact, thereby posing a continued threat to the region and forcing an extended American presence in Saudi Arabia. A reasonable probability existed that an invasion of Kuwait would trigger missile strikes on both Israel and Saudi-Arabia, igniting a fourth Arab-Israeli War.

The third policy option was to conduct air strikes against Baghdad with the express goal of killing Saddam Hussein. On the positive side, surgical air strikes being the strength of the US military would result in minimal loss to American lives. And the danger of surgical air strikes against Saddam and his military establishments would probably trigger missile strikes against Israel and Saudi Arabia, thereby launching another war in the region.

The fourth policy option for the US was the overt invasion of Iraq. Advantage of this approach would be that the Iraqi regime would be destroyed and Israel and Saudi Arabia would be secure, Kuwait would be liberated and a new international order denying acquisition of territory by force would be established.

The ambivalence of the US policy in the Gulf is further complicated by two additional factors : the

desire for collective action, and the growing anti-war sentiment within the United States. The US was reluctant to "go it alone" in the Gulf for a variety of reasons including a strong desire to preclude the Gulf crisis from becoming an Arab-American confrontation. Initially, the European and Japanese allies of US were content in offering moral support to the U.S. coalition buildup, but were reluctant to move beyond that point.

Within a week of Iraq annexing Kuwait, on August 8, 1990, President Bush in an address to the nation set forth American objectives.²³

- (i) "the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
- (ii) the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government.
- (iii) the security and stability of Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf.
- (iv) the safety and protection of Americans abroad".

It is notable that the statement did not contain a call for Saddam Hussein's replacement or any other intervention in Iraqi internal affairs. In his memoir, **Colin Powell** says that

²³. Sterner, Michael - 'Closing the Gate : The Persian Gulf War Revisited', Current History. January 1997, p.14.

"In none of the meetings I attended was dismembering Iraq conquering Baghdad, or changing the form of government ever seriously considered. We hoped that Saddam would not survive the coming fury. But his elimination was not a stated objective. What we hoped for, frankly, in the post war Gulf region, was an Iraq still standing, with Saddam overthrown".

Even President Bush had expressed hope that the Iraqi people would overthrow Saddam Hussein, but this never became a United States policy objective.²⁴

DIPLOMACY OR FORCE:

It was the annexation of Kuwait that provided the perfect context for the international community to use force to deal with Iraq's increasing threat to its neighbours to use chemical weapons if its demands were not complied with.

In accordance with US policy objectives Bush ordered an immediate trade embargo with Iraq and with allied cooperation, froze all Iraqi and Kuwaiti financial assets in United States and elsewhere. US diplomacy sought to isolate Iraq as an aggressor state and to mobilise international opinion against it.

On August 6, 1990. The US leaders succeeded in

²⁴. *ibid.* p.14.

getting the UN Security Council, to approve for the first time in 23 years mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, vide resolution 660. This gave international blessings to the US effort to ostracize Iraq for other military, economic and political support. Further to discomfiture Iraq, Gorbachev sided with Bush and with the United Nations in declaring the Iraqi aggression illegal and in calling for a restoration of the status quo ante. This was the first post Cold War crisis in which the superpowers acted in diplomatic concert, and it gave to the United States a virtual carte blanche for a military response of the most unambiguous sort.²⁵

The suspicions of U.S. foreign policy were subsumed by the understanding that only the U.S., as the sole remaining superpower, had the capability to mount an effective response. The Bush administration was aware of this responsibility, and knew that not only the credibility of the US was at stake, but also the trust of the international community.

The fact that the Iraqi challenge threatened vital US national security interest needed little reflection on the part of Bush administration. The security of

²⁵. Cimbala, Stephen J. - Force and Diplomacy in the Future. New York, Praeger, 1992, p. 62.

Saudi Arabia and oil supplies had both been declared 'vital' national interest. If Iraq proved successful it would become the swing producer in OPEC and have a potential stranglehold on the world economy.²⁶

During August, the Bush administration presented a wide range of arguments as to why the Iraqi challenge had to be confronted and reversed.²⁷ The accumulation of reasons, however tended to emphasize the arguments for intervention, particularly the need to protect oil supplies. In United Kingdom and France it was the question of following international law that was given prominence. The British Prime Minister **Mrs. Margaret Thatcher** declared that the international community must defend the principle that aggression can never be rewarded. Otherwise, 'the law of the jungle would replace the law of nations'.

The simplicity of the British and French presentations of the nature of the Iraqi challenge were more effective in consolidating domestic support than the accumulative approach of the U.S. On August 5, 1990, President **Bush** announced his overriding objective that 'this aggression would not stand'. From this point on,

²⁶. Op. cit. 15, p. 25.

²⁷. Bush, George - 'Remarks to Department of Defence Employees', Washington D.C., WCPD, August, 15, 1990, pp. 1255-7.

Bush had placed US prestige and hopes for a more peaceful world firmly on the line. It was a confrontation which the US could not afford to lose.²⁸

Saddam Hussein's annexation of Kuwait evoked international response. The Australian Prime Minister Hawke declared "big countries cannot invade small neighbours and get away with it".

Diplomatic Coalition:

Even though the Cold War had ended and the Soviet empire had collapsed, yet United States could not negate its presence in the United Nations Security Council. US had to concretise a broad international condition to provide a solid political base to counter the Iraqi threat.

The US Secretary of State James Baker visited Moscow the day after the invasion, which elicited unprecedented joint US-Soviet statement condemning Iraq. The degree of Soviet and American coordination undoubtedly strengthened the resolve of the Security Council to support the anti-Iraq coalition. Even though, over the year, US-UN relationship were far from cordial, and Washington re-frequently resorted to suspension of the contributions to various UN agencies, Bush had to take UN into confidence in order to legitimise its

²⁸. Op. cit 15, p.25.

stance on Iraq. The response of the European Community (EC) was crucial for the US because of the former's dependence upon the Gulf oil. After serious deliberations, on August 4, 1990, EC agreed to impose sanctions against Iraq, and to ban the flow of oil from Iraq and occupied Kuwait. The reluctant entry of Japan completed the Western alliance against Iraq.

Acting under articles 39 and 40 of the UN charter, the Security Council formally and swiftly condemned Iraq within hours after the invasion of Kuwait. The UN unequivocally and uncompromisingly adopted 13 resolutions, 12 resolutions were endorsed and only one vetoed, against Iraq. In fact, in August alone UN Security Council adopted five resolutions, viz.²⁹

- (i) **Resolution 660** (of August 2, 1990) condemned the Iraqi invasion and demanded immediate and unconditional withdrawal of troops to the August 1, 1990 position.
- (ii) **Resolution 661** (of August 6, 1990) imposed mandatory global arms and economic boycott against Iraq and Kuwait.
- (iii) **Resolution 662** (of August 9, 1990) unanimously declared Iraq's annexation of Kuwait "null and

²⁹. Kumarasamy, P.R. - 'The US Response to the Gulf Crisis'. Strategic Analysis, October 1990, p.768

void".

- (iv) **Resolution 664** (of August 18, 1990) unanimously demanded Iraq "to permit and facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq of the nationals of third countries".
- (v) **Resolution 665** (of August 25, 1990) called the forces of maritime powers deployed in the Gulf "to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping" in order to enforce Resolution 661.

These resolutions were co-sponsored by US and were vehemently backed by the five permanent members of the Security Council. Among the ten non-permanent members, there were three abstention (Resolution No. 660, 661 & 665) by Yemen and two (Resolution No. 661 and 665) by Cuba. In order to achieve this co-operation US adopted a policy of flexibility.

The Arab world was deeply divided in its response to Iraq, reflecting divisions, apparent prior to the invasion. The Gulf States of Egypt and Syria felt clearly threatened and therefore encouraged a strong response to Iraq under US leadership. The former allies of Iraq - Jordan, PLO and Yemen remained supportive to Iraq and showed a hostile attitude towards US presence in the region. Turkey's President **Turgut Ozal** seized this opportunity to strengthen its strategic role in relation to the U.S. The Iranian leadership though

condemned the invasion, but distanced itself from too close an identification with US diplomacy.³⁰

However, the US did have the support of the principal political and financial powers of the region - Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. Comparatively the Arab dissenting voices were weak - politically, economically and militarily. Therefore, on August 8, 1990 US forces were sent to defend Saudi Arabia under the code name 'Operation Desert Shield'.

Diplomacy of Economic Sanctions:

UN Resolution 661 provided the initial framework for economic embargo, since it obligated all countries to adhere to the sanctions regime. In order to make sanctions successful it was crucial that the pipelines which exported Iraq's oil, principal source of foreign currency, should be out. Thus, economic sanctions became an important instrument for the US.

There were four pipelines which ran through neighbouring countries of Iraq - two in Turkey, one in Saudi Arabia and one in Syria. The Syrian line had been closed earlier during the Iraq - Iran War and Syria had no intention of reopening it.

The 820 mile pipelines across Turkey exports about 1.5 mbd or half of Iraq's total export. Turkey was in a

³⁰. Op.cit 15, p.25-26.

precarious situation. While the closer of its pipelines was vital for the US campaign, this action would imply a loss of about \$ 2 million for Turkey. Moreover, 60 percent of its oil supplies came from Iraq.

Following Barker's visit to Ankara, Turkish President Turgut Ozal on 7 August 1990 agreed to enforce an oil embargo as well as other sanctions against Iraq, besides granting facilities for the US military build-up in the Gulf. In return, US seemed to have assured "cash for arms, World Bank loans, and diplomatic support to Turkey's problem areas like Cyprus, American allegation of genocide and Turkey's application to join the European Community."³¹

Saudi Arabia, once it had agreed to the deployment of US forces on its soil, closed Iraq's last oil pipeline to the outside world.

Jordan had been an all time ally of Iraq. Jordan's close political tie with Iraq was basically because its economy is critically dependent on the Iraqi market. To counter Jordan's possible defection, the US adopted a 'carrot and stick approach'. The stick was Bush's explicit threat to extend embargo to Jordan in case of leakages through Jordan to Iraq. The carrot was the offer of economic aid and compensation to offset

³¹. Op. cit. 28, p. 770.

Jordan's economic losses, if it complied with the sanctions. Presented with such alternatives, Jordan had little option but to adhere to the sanctions regime.³²

As already mentioned Iran agreed to support the sanctions but was wary of US imperialism.

Military Coalition :

From the outset of the crisis, western leaders were concerned that Saudi Arabia would prefer to appease Iraq rather than make the hard decision to accept western protection. Historically, the Saudi leadership had relied on a cautious and key foreign policy, so as to distance itself from the west and protect its Islamic credentials.³³

On August 6, 1990, US Secretary of Defence **Dick Cheney** travelled to Riyadh with the delicate mission of persuading the Saudis to co-operate with the West. The Bush administration felt it could take no chances. King Fahd was shown satellite photographs of Iraqi troops deployed on the former Saudi-Kuwaiti neutral zone, which convinced the Saudi leadership that the Iraqi challenge couldn't be averted by financial pay off but it required a military response. Consequently, Bush was able to send troops to defend Saudi Arabia and

³². Op. cit. 15,p. 29.

³³. Op.cit. 15, p.26.

the swift military deployment as code named **Operation Desert Shield**.

With the support of the diplomatic coalition, US sought to build a military coalition, should force be the instrument to free Kuwait.

In order to gain Muslim and Arab legitimacy, it was pre-requisite to have coalition support from the Arab and Muslim world. The traditional Arab allies of the US - Egypt and Morocco, readily accepted the American request. Unexpectedly., Syria, US's longtime adversary, also agreed to send a significant military contingent to the Saudi soil. In the muslim world, Saudi Arabia did not have to persuade much Pakistan, Bangladesh, Senegal, Niger and Afghan Mujaheddin dispatched troops, though smaller contingents, to help Saudi Arabia.

From the Western Community, the US obtained significant contributions from UK and France. Despite differences in approach of UK and France they provided concrete support for the defence of Saudi - Arabia, and for the security of the Gulf region.

The two economic superpowers - Germany and Japan were bound by domestic considerations where their Constitutions formally prohibited out of area military activity. Similar domestic constrains prohibited other Western countries to contribute forces. But eventually, Italy and Canada did send combat aircraft to the Arabian

peninsula. Now erstwhile, Czechoslovakia sent a chemical defence unit and Hungary and Poland deployed non-combat medical units. Australia, New Zealand, Sierra Leone, Singapore and Sweden also deployed non-combat units.³⁴

FROM DIPLOMACY TO WAR :

The failure of the diplomatic efforts on part of the allied forces left no choice except to initiate a swift military response. And so, with all the necessary aircrafts in place and troops all geared up, Operation Desert Shield gave place to **Operation Desert Storm**, which began at 03.00 Kuwaiti time on January 17, 1991 and continued till February 24, 1991.

The US and its allies launched a massive 'air campaign' against Iraq. The objective of the campaign was to induce an Iraqi compliance with the demands of President Bush and the UN for a prompt withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The setting for the application of air power was ideal. Iraq's airforce was hardly any match for the combined air power of the allies. As former US Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Michael Dugan noted, "If there ever was a scenario where air power could be effective this was it"³⁵.

³⁴. Op.cit. 15, pp.26-28.

³⁵. Dugan Michael, -'The Air War,' U.S. News and World Report, February 11,1991.

The US air campaign against Iraq had four overlapping phases. The first phase involved attacks against Iraqi command and control targets: against nuclear, chemical and biological warfare manufacturing facilities, and other military infrastructure. In the second phase, the suppression of Iraqi air defences was emphasized in order to clear the skyways for the operation of coalition aircraft throughout Iraqi battle space.

In the third phase, an interdiction campaign was designed to isolate Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard and other forces from reinforcement and supply. In the fourth phase, air support would be provided to the ground forces of the coalition as they moved against the Iraqi forces remaining in Kuwait.³⁶

The initial attacks were devastating, clobbering Iraqi air defences, command and control targets with such precision and effectiveness that the Iraqi Air Force was essentially out of the picture of air superiority combat. The UN mandate which authorised the use of force against Iraq was received just hours before the air campaign. The Iraqi intelligence couldn't predict the quick air campaign, which crippled the Iraqi air force significantly.

³⁶. Op.cit. 24, p.92.

The initial success in the strategic air war left the missions of interdiction and close air support for ground phase of the war to be accomplished. The objectives of the interdiction campaign were to further weaken the command and control of the Iraqi armed forces so that they would be forced to fight in disaggregated globules, reducing the combat power of Saddam's Republican Guard.³⁷

The ground war strategy that General Norman Schwarzkopf and his planner devised called for a thrust directly north from Saudi Arabia by United States Marines and Arab forces that would "fix" the Iraqi forces in Kuwait in battles, while two United States army Corps, including British and French divisions, swing far to the west and north through Iraqi territory to cut off the Iraqi lines of retreat and engage Iraqi Republic Guard divisions, which were positioned just north of the Iraq-Kuwait border. The only flaw in this plan was that progress in the eastern sector was so rapid that it exposed the flank of the advancing forces, causing Schwarzkopf to push forward the launching of the two western corps by nearly 24 hours. Then, as the conflict turned into an Iraqi rout, it was feared the "left hook" would not arrive in time to engage the

³⁷. *ibid*, p.92.

Republic Guard divisions before most of them had been withdrawn northward across the Euphrates River.³⁸

Saddam's strategic objectives were apparently threefold. First, he sought to create a war of attrition, including an extended phase of ground fighting, that would make war unpopular with the US Public Congress and the media. Extended ground fighting with high casualties would also alienate allied members from the US coalition. Saddam's second objective was to expand the war geographically (horizon escalation) by bringing in Israel. This would also divide some Arab members of the Co-alition from the U.S. The third Iraqi objective became clear in Febraury, as Saddam entertained visits from Soviet officials offering to mediate the conflict. This was with the objective to hold U.S. to its declaratory objective of expelting Iraqi forces from Kuwait only, and prevent the coalition from destroying all of Iraq's military power and to remove Saddam as a player in the postwar world.³⁹

Even so after four days of fighting between Febraury 24 and 27, 1991, the results were overwhelmingly impressive. Kuwait city had been liberated, most of the Iraqi division in Kuwait had been

³⁸. Op. cit. 22, p.15.

³⁹. Op.cit. 24, p.96.

overrun with minimal resistance; some 82,000 Iraqi soldiers had been captured, in tank battles on February 26 and 27 several of the Iraqi Republican Guards heavy division had been badly mauled; and US forces were astride the main road between Basra and Baghdad. All this had been accomplished with an almost miraculously low allied casualty rate (260 killed, out of which 146 were Americans).⁴⁰

✓ According to General Schwarzkopf's account, he received a call mid-afternoon on February 27 from General Collin Powell, who said it was time to give thought to a ceasefire. In the true sense, the stated objectives of the war were achieved by the morning of February 28, 1991.

On August 24, 1990 when the UN Security Council Resolution No. 665 was passed it authorised 'maritime forces to stop and search vessels to enforce the UN embargo'. Fourteen countries agreed eventually to deploy naval forces to enforce the UN sanctions. This proved to be the final linkage in isolating Iraq and strengthening UN solidarity. As a result, it reaffirmed the UN pledge to restore peace in the area.

⁴⁰. Op.cit. 22, p.15.

Saddam Hussein's Response:

Saddam responded to the Iraqi isolation by the international community by raising stakes in the most uncompromising way. Neither Jordan, nor the PLO nor Libya could support Iraq's out right annexation of Kuwait on August 8, in response to UN resolution to impose sanctions. Such a drastic step by Saddam presupposed that there could be no compromise on the status of Kuwait.

On 12 August 1990, Saddam presented a peace proposal which was to remain the official Iraqi peace plan upto the beginning of the ground offensive in February 1991. The initiative made no mention of withdrawal and only offered to consider the formulation of arrangements for the situation in Kuwait; after the withdrawal of Israel from the Occupied Territories and Syria from Lebanon.⁴¹

This initiative was obviously unacceptable to the anti Iraq coalition and strengthened the conviction that Saddam was not serious about an unconditional withdrawal. But by linking the Kuwait issue to Palestinian question it did strike a chord in the hearts of the Arabs.

⁴¹. Baghdad Domestic Service, 12, August 1990, Summary of World Broadcast, Part 4, Middle East/0842 A/1.

But such peace overtures were belied as Saddam started increasing the number of troops into Kuwait to secure his new acquisition. On 15 August 1990, Saddam agreed to a peace settlement with Iran which allowed him to release 300,000 soldiers tied to the Iranian border. The terms of the agreements involved substantial concessions, effectively annulling any gains Iraq might have made in its 8 years war with Iran.⁴²

Iraq's major concern was that US or perhaps Israel, would initiate an early attack relying on superior air power. As a result, on 16 August 1990, Iraqi authorities started rounding up western nationals in Iraq and Kuwait, and use them as human shields against allied air strikes.

Therefore, the Iraqi strategy revolved around two coherent issues - the Iraqi Palestinian question and the manipulation of Western hostages.

In the latter part of August, Saddam permitted all women and children hostages to leave Iraq. King Hussain and Yasser Arafat argued that Saddam was genuinely interested in a peaceful resolution of the crisis.⁴³

⁴². Baghdad Domestic Service, 12, August 1990, Summary of World Broadcast, Part 4, Middle East/0844 A/1.

⁴³. The Guardian, September 6, 1990.

UNITED NATIONS AND FINAL DIPLOMATIC EFFORT:

In the month of September, UN passed a number of Resolutions condemning the Iraqi acts of abduction of foreigners and forced entry into the embassy of France, Canada and the Dutch. The Resolutions called for the release of foreign nationals, establishment of procedure for providing food in humanitarian conditions and condemn the Iraqi abduction of persons protected by diplomatic immunity.

The 'ultimate' UN Security Council Resolution No.678 was passed on 29 November 1990 which not only authorised member states to implement earlier resolutions but also to restore international peace and security. Through this resolution the deadline for peace or war was firmly fixed to be 15 January 1991. For the first time, the UN had threatened a member state with its ultimate sanction.

In such a precarious state of affairs Iraq had two options - either to withdraw or to accept the consequences of war. The agreement between the US , France and Soviet Union on a 'pause of goodwill' upto 15 January 1991 allowed for a seven week period for final diplomatic efforts to reach a peaceful settlement.

Bush pre-empted other diplomatic moves by announcing, without consultation with his allies, that he was offering the opportunity for Tariq Aziz to visit

Washington during the week of December 10, and that James Baker would be available to go to Baghdad on any date till 15 January 1991. Bush was emphatic that these talks would be made public and there would be no secret deals.⁴⁴

The agenda for the talks with Iraq wouldn't involve negotiations but will be a dialogue informing Iraq of its mandatory obligations to fulfill UN resolutions. James Baker and his principal advisor Dennis Ross had suggested a less hostile stance and felt that Iraq could be offered greater encouragement to withdraw without contradicting the demands of UN. But due to clash in the proposed dates of talk, where Iraq refused to budge from the original date of Baker's visit to Baghdad (January 12, 1991), there emerged a diplomatic dead end.

The new US offer for Baker-Aziz talks on 9 January 1991, in Geneva ended fruitlessly. In the Geneva talks, Aziz gave no hint of any intention of withdrawing from Kuwait. Even the French six point peace proposal of 14 January 1991, failed to elicit a positive Iraqi response. And what followed was the Gulf War of 1991.

⁴⁴. Sessions with Reporters in Santiago, Chile', 6 December 1990, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, p.1,933-5

CHAPTER - III

UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS AND THE GULF WAR

"Desert Storm was the perfect war with the perfect enemy. The enemy leader was universally despised and his troops offered very little resistance. We had the perfect coalition, the perfect infrastructure and the perfect battle field. We should be careful about the lessons we draw from the war".¹

ROLE OF UNITED NATIONS IN THE GULF WAR:

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August, 1990 evoked equivocal responses from both United States and the then Soviet Union, very much unlike the Cold War period. The crisis that had emerged was one in which one member of the United Nations had crossed into the territory and annexed its neighbour. It also involved the question of a big neighbour (Iraq) invading its small neighbour (Kuwait), thereby challenging the sovereignty of the small state. Infact, the annexation of Kuwait invoked responses which drew attention of the member states of UN that force will not be accepted as the basis of conflict resolution. The crisis thus offered the first major opportunity in the post Cold War era for the United Nations to implement the collective

¹. A Senior United States Commander, House Armed Services Committee, United States Congress, 1992.

security measures which had been at the centre of its foundations.

The Security Council, on its part, acted swiftly, decisively and with an unprecedented degree of unanimity. The effective handling of the crisis raises questions of vital impact on the future operations of the U.N.

On the very day of Iraqi annexation of Kuwait (2 August 1990). The Security Council adopted **resolution 660** demanding that Iraq 'withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces from Kuwait and calling upon, the two countries, 'to begin immediately intensive negotiations for the resolution of their differences'. But Iraq didn't heed the UN call for peaceful resolution. On 6th August 1990, the Security Council backed its demand for a withdrawal by imposing mandatory sanctions against Iraq. On 2nd August 1990, **resolution 665** called on member states with maritime forces in the area of the Gulf to enforce the sanctions outlined in **resolutions 661**.

Infact, between 2 August and 29 October 1990, the Security Council passed ten resolutions condemning the invasion and occupation, demanding the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, requiring Iraq to allow the safe and immediate departure from Iraq and Kuwait of nationals from third countries, condemning Iraq's

violations of international norms regarding diplomatic immunity and requiring Iraq to protect diplomatic and consular personnel and property.²

Then on 29 November, the Security Council moved beyond the provisions embodied in Article 41 of the Charter for the enforcement of its decisions, and yet stopped short of authorizing collective security operations as outlined in article 42.³ Instead, Resolution 678 authorised member-states 'to use all necessary means' to expell Iraq from Kuwait unless Iraq implemented resolution 660 and all subsequent resolutions by 15 January 1991.

Iraq didn't comply with the deadline for withdrawal, nor showed any positive effort for solving the crisis. Hence, early on 17 January (local time), the coalition of thirty-two member states, led by the United States, launched the most extensive bombing campaign since World War-II. The war continued till 27 February when a ceasefire was proclaimed. The ground assault 'the 100 hour war' which began on 24 February added to the allied victory.

². Dixon, Elizabeth Riddell - 'The United Nations after the Gulf War'. International Journal, Spring 1994, Vol. XLIX, p.255.

³. Weiss, Thomas & Chopra, Jarat - United Nations Peace Keeping: An ACUNS Teaching Text. Providence RI: Academic Council on the United Nations System, 1992, p.28.

The war formally ended on 3 March 1991, when in a meeting with the American Commander of the Coalition Forces, Gen. Schwarzkopf, Iraqi military leaders accepted the terms outlined in **resolution 686** - which the Security Council had passed the previous day. These terms comprised a 'promise to release promptly all prisoners of war and Kuwaiti civilians, provide locations of all mines, avoid further skirmishes, pay Kuwait for war damages, and comply with all UN resolutions pertaining to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.'⁴

The **Security Council resolution 687** of 3 April enunciated more detailed and comprehensive terms for the ceasefire. Accordingly, the resolution held that Iraq would unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons and unconditionally accept international supervision of the 'destruction, removal, or rendering harmless' of all its chemical and biological weapons and its ballistic missiles with a range of 150 kilometres or more. It further stated that the United Nations would establish and administer a fund, to which Iraq would contribute, to compensate foreign governments, nationals, and corporations for losses, damages, and injuries suffered in the course of Iraq's invasion and

⁴. The Middle East. 7th Ed., Washington, Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1991, p.367.

occupation of Kuwait.⁵

The devastation in the course of the war weakened Iraq so much so that the country faced rebellion by the Kurds in the north and by Shi'ites in the south. Saddam Hussein proceeded to employ combat helicopters to suppress the insurgencies. As a result, the Kurds fled into Turkey and Iran and the Shi'ites into occupied southern Iraq. Turkey and Iran were reluctant to accept them for the fear of insurgencies in their respective territory.

The initial indifference of western governments to this human sufferings changed only in April 1991, as a result of media publicizing the plight of the Kurds hurdled along the Turkish border and the public outcry which it engendered.⁶ On 5 April, Security Council adopted **resolution 688** defining Iraq's repression of its own civilians as a threat to international peace and security in the region'. Furthermore, it ordered Iraq not only to allow international humanitarian organisations access to those needing assistance throughout its territory, but also to provide the facilities necessary for their operations. In spite of Iraqi protests,

⁵. Op. cit. 2, p.256.

⁶. Mayall, James- 'Non - intervention, Self determination and the 'New World Order'. International Affairs, vol.67, July 1991, p.426.

Americans, British, French and Dutch troops proceeded to implement 'Operation Provide Comfort' which afforded military protection for, in Weiss's assessment. 'an international relief effort coordinated by the UN of a magnitude and rapidity not since World War II.'⁷

Further, the allied forces under the auspicious leadership of the United States, and the umbrella of UN's humanitarian efforts, declared two no-flying zones: one in north Iraq and the other in south Iraq to protect the Kurds and Shi'ites respectively.

THE WAR AFTERMATH:

In the post-war scenario the United Nations descended on Iraq to⁸

- (a) establish the main centres of Iraq's arms programmes.
- (b) oversee the destruction of caches of chemical weapons,
- (c) determine the extent of development of Iraq's nuclear and chemical weapons programmes.

At the same time UN did not lift the embargo that it had placed on Iraq. The economic sanctions

⁷. Weiss, Thomas - 'New Challenges for UN Military operations : Implementing an Agenda for Peace'. Washington Quarterly, Winter 1993, vol. 16, p.57.

⁸. AMYS - 'Iraq at the Crossroads again' Link, October 13, 1991. p.26.

continued. The rationale being to ensure Iraqi co-operation with the UN teams in Iraq.

Furthermore, UN Security Council resolution 686 (of 2 March 1991) and resolution 687 (of 3 April 1991) forced Iraq to accept the liability for damages done to Kuwait, and placed restrictions on Iraq's acquisition of weapons. Iraq had been directed to open all its nuclear and chemical installations and facilities to UN inspection, so that they can be identified and destroyed. So much so, Iraq cannot sell its oil freely.

Saddam on his part maintained a tough stance. Ironically, he turned his repression internally towards its own population. The minority groups of the Kurds, Shi'a muslims and others revolted immediately after the conclusion of Operation Desert Storm. On 16 March 1991, Saddam announced that the Southern rebellion had been put down and warned that the Kurdish rebels would receive the same bloody fate⁹. In April 1991, over one million Kurdish refugees streamed across the border into Iran and about 500,000 into Turkey so as to escape their governments genocidal reign of terror.

According to CRS Issue Brief - 'Middle East Peace

⁹. Baghdad Domestic Service, Sept. 20, 1991, Summary of World Broadcast, Part 4, ME/0874 A/1; and Sept. 24, 1991, SWB, Part 4, ME/0877 A/1.

and Security Issues', Updated March 3, 1992, Carol Migdalovitz (Coordinator, Foreign Affairs and National Defence Division) states that the 'Iraqi regime remains largely intact,'...(and) retains a significant military capability. Iraq has failed to honour UN resolutions calling for protection of minority groups. Even after their heavy combat losses during Operation Desert Storm, the Iraqi forces are larger and better equipped than most Middle East armed forces. In addition, Iraq repeatedly had misled and in some cases interfered with UN inspectors involved in identification and destruction of ballistic missiles, chemical agents and nuclear material. These actions imply continued Iraqi resistance to the terms of the cease-fire resolution of 3 April 1991 (UN Security Council Resolution No. 687).

These uncertain conditions underscore the need for new arrangements to maintain stability in the Gulf region. On 6 March 1991, just after the fighting ended, representatives from the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, Egypt and Syria met in Damascus to map out a post war security plan. The resulting agreement, known as the 'Damascus Declaration', envisioned a combined force from the GCC countries. Supplemented by contingents from Egypt and Syria. The plan languished, however, throughout the remainder of the year. On 23 December 1991, a summit conference of GCC states

reaffirmed the combined force concept but postponed implementation pending further study.¹⁰

Edward P. Djerejian, Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs, in a statement before the Sub-Committee on Europe and Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, in Washington on 9 March 1993 said that the Clinton administration had 'reaffirmed the continuity of (our) policy towards Iraq. The President stressed that 'Iraq must fully comply with the UN resolutions, which mandate an end to repression of the Iraqi people as well as measures designed to achieve the security of Iraq's neighbours, before lifting of economic sanction can be considered'. Infact, US still continued to fund relief programmes in northern Iraq, to support UN efforts to establish relief in central and southern Iraq, and to support the recent recommendatiolns of UN Special Representative **Max Van der Stoel** that the UN should station human rights monitors throughout Iraq.¹¹

As for Iraq, there was little evidence that sanctions had seriously weakened Saddam's regime. Baghdad seemed to be slowly deeping its control over the rebellious Shi'ies in the southern part of the country,

¹⁰. Migdalovitz, Carol - 'Middle East Peace and Security Issues'. CRS Issue Brief, Updated March 3, 1992, p.CRS.4.

¹¹. Dispatch, US Department of State, March 15, 1993, vol.4, no.11.

despite the "no fly zone" imposed by the US, UK and France. It was also increasing its economic squeeze on the autonomous Kurdish zone in the north.¹²

But, such a situation didn't last for long and by the beginning of 1996, Saddam could feel the weight of the sanctions. Iraq in the recent years had begun lobbying for the lifting of sanctions. The Iraqi leadership had maintained that Iraq had met the terms under which the sanctions were to be rescinded. Iraq also said that the trade embargo had unfairly caused widespread malnutrition in Iraq and dramatically raised the country's mortality rate.¹³

On 20 May 1996, UN and Iraq signed an accord that would allow Iraq to export oil on a limited basis so as to ease a shortage of food and medical supplies in Iraq. This accord marks the first easing of 1990 sanctions, whereby Iraq agreed to UN terms, on **oil for food deal**.¹⁴

On 9 December 1996, UN Secretary General **Boutros Ghali** gave final approval to a deal that allowed Iraq to resume its exports of oil. On 10 December 1996, Saddam

¹². Hudson, Michael C. - 'The Clinton Administration and the Middle East'. Current History, February 1994, vol.93, no. 580, p.52.

¹³. Facts on File, vol. 56, no. 2881, p. 94.

¹⁴. Facts on File, vol. 56, no. 2894, p. 349

Hussein symbolically marked his country's re-entry into international oil market after 6 years.¹⁵ This agreement was reached on the condition of Iraqi dismantlement of its weapons of mass destruction.

UN RESOLUTIONS - AN APPRAISAL:

On 2 August 1990 the armed forces of the Iraqi regime launched a surprise aggression on Kuwait and occupied all its territory, in a move that shocked the conscience of the world. Many justifications were offered by the Iraqi regime as a pretext for its aggression, but it soon revealed its real objective, after amassing about half a million soldiers in Kuwait supported by tanks and aeroplanes, when it issued a resolution on August 8, 1990 annexing Kuwait to Iraq. This was followed on August 28, 1990 by an Iraqi Republican Decree declaring Kuwait an Iraqi governorate.

Iraq's aggression, occupation and annexation of Kuwait did not meet with the approval of any state. The world community, in unflinching relentless determination, stood up to this aggression and condemned it through the Security Council United Nations and its different organs.

As for Kuwait, its official and popular institution carried on their business with full determination as

¹⁵.Facts on File, vol. 56, no. 2923, p. 905

usual. The Government resumed its affairs on 3 August temporarily from Saudi Arabia. The embassies of Kuwait all over the world remained open and pursued their functions and flew Kuwait's flag as a testimony by States of their recognition of the legitimacy of the independent State of Kuwait.

Immediately after the aggression, on August 2, 1990 the Security Council adopted **Resolution 660** in which it condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and demanded that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces. Four days later, and in response to the continued Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the Security Council adopted **Resolution 661** dated August 6, 1990 in which it expressed its deep concern that "the invasion by Iraq of Kuwait continues with further loss of human life and material destruction in violation of international legitimacy", and Security Council Resolution 660 which calls on Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait Resolution 661 further stipulates:

"Affirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter.

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations : 1 - Determines that Iraq so far has failed to comply with paragraph 2 of resolution

660 (1990) and has usurped the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait..."

In this resolution, the Security Council decided to impose a full-scale economic embargo against Iraq, and "Calls upon all States.... to act strictly in accordance with the provisions the present resolution..". It also calls on all states to protect the properties of the legitimate Government of Kuwait and "not to recognize any regime set up by the occupying Power".¹⁶

In response to the declaration by Iraq of a "comprehensive and external merger" with Kuwait proclaiming it an Iraqi governorate, the Security Council adopted **Resolution 662** of August 8, 1990 in which it.

1. Decides that the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq under any form and whatever pretext has no legal validity, and is considered null and void;
2. Calls upon States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize that annexation, and to refrain from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of that annexation;

¹⁶. 'The Crime, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait', Events and documents from day 1 to liberation. The Kuwait Information Centre in Cairo. 1991. p. 26.

3. Further demands that Iraq rescind its actions purporting to annex Kuwait..".

The atrocities of Iraq continued. Foreigners were held hostage and prevented from leaving Kuwait and Iraq; they were used as human shields distributed all over strategic locations in Iraq. In view of this, Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 664 on August 18, 1990, in which it demanded that "Iraq permit and facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq of the nationals of third countries and grant immediate and continuing access of consular officials to such nationals..."¹⁷.

As Iraq continued to refuse to comply with the UN resolutions and persisted in its occupation of Kuwait, the Security Council adopted Resolution 665 on August 25, 1990 in which it stated that it is

"Determined to bring an end to the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq" and that it "

"Deplores the loss of innocent life stemming from the Iraq invasion of Kuwait and [is] determined to prevent further such losses...." .

It also "Calls upon those Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait which are deploying maritime forces to the area to use such measures

¹⁷. *ibid.* p. 45.

commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions related to such shipping laid down in resolution 661...".

On August 13,1990 the Security Council adopted **Resolution 666**, which stated:

"... Recognizing that circumstances may arise in which it will be necessary for food stuffs to be supplied to the civilian population in Iraq or Kuwait in order to relieve human suffering..." requests the Security-General to ensure the supply of food stuffs to "Persons who might suffer specially, such as children under 15 years of age, expectant mothers, maternity cases, the sick and the elderly".

Iraq persisted in committing acts of violence against diplomatic missions and their personnel in Kuwait. The Security Council adopted **Resolution 667** on September 16,1990 in which it stated that it was:

"Outraged at recent violations by Iraq of diplomatic premises and at the abduction of personnel enjoying diplomatic immunity and foreign nationals who were present in these premises", it

considers "That the above actions by Iraq constitute aggressive acts and a flagrant violation of its international obligations which strike at the root of the conduct of international relations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations".

The resolution also demanded that Iraq immediately and fully comply with its international obligations; it also decided to

"Consult urgently to take further concrete measures as soon as possible, under Chapter VII of the Charter, in response to Iraq's continued violation of the Charter, of resolutions of the Council and of international law".

Many states suffered as a result of their compliance with the embargo imposed on Iraq. The Security Council adopted **Resolution 669** on 24 September 1991 in which it entrusted the sanctions Committee to examine requests for assistance under the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter.

Iraq, however, continued to violate Security Council resolutions in spite of The Secretary-General's use of his good office to advance a peaceful solution based on the relevant Security Council resolutions. The Security Council therefore, adopted **resoluton 670** on September 25,1990 which condemned "The treatment by

Iraqi forces of Kuwaiti nationals, including measures to force them to leave their own country and mistreatment of persons and property in Kuwait in violation of international law". The Security Council also decided "That all States, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into or any licence or permit granted before the date of the present resolution, shall deny permission to any aircraft to take off from their territory if the aircraft would carry any cargo to or from Iraq or Kuwait..." It further decided that "all States shall deny permission to any aircraft destined to land in Iraq or Kuwait, whatever its State of registration, to overfly its territory". It also decided "to consider, in the event of evasion of [these] provisions... by a State or its nationals or through its territory, measures directed at the State in question to prevent such evasion"¹⁸.

Iraq's aggressions on human rights in Kuwait continue. The pillage and destruction of property including those of the educational establishment went unabated. In view of this continued danger, UNESCO Executive Committee, in its 135 session, adopted

¹⁸. *ibid*, p.85-88.

Resolution 135 EX/DR on 4 October 22, 1990 in which it condemned: "The destruction of the educational, cultural, and scientific institutions in Kuwait", and the various measures taken by the Iraqi occupation forces in Kuwait. It also expressed its grave alarm over the painful situation and grave losses inflicted on the peaceful people of Kuwait, the violation of human rights, the suspension of education, the intentional inflicting of destruction of the scientific and educational institution and property and erasing the national cultural identity of the people of Kuwait".

The Security Council adopts **resolution 674** on 29 October, 1990 in which it condemned Iraqi violations in Kuwait and reiterated its call on Iraq for unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. It also invited " States to collate substantiated information in their possession or submitted to them on the grave breaches by Iraq.. [of the Security Council resolutions, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Vienna Conventions of Diplomatic and Consular Relations [and] general principles of international law...". The resolution went on to remind "Iraq that under international law it is liable for any loss, damage or injury arising in Kuwait and third States, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq". The Security Council also "Invites States to

collect relevant information regarding their claims, and those of their nationals and corporations, for restitution or financial compensation by Iraq with a view to such arrangements as may be established in accordance with international law". It also "Requires that Iraq comply with the provisions of the present resolution and its previous resolutions, failing which the Security Council will need to take further measures under the Charter".

The Iraqi regime proceeds with its policies to evict the people of Kuwait from their homeland, the destruction of Kuwaiti demographic records and the civil records maintained by the legitimate Government of Kuwait, changing the names of areas and streets in addition to school text books and curricula, and burning all that is related to the cultural identity of the people of Kuwait.

In response to these grave policies, the Security Council adopted unanimously **resolution 677** on November 28, 1990 in which it condemned these Iraqi attempts and mandates the Secretary General to take custody of a copy of the population register of Kuwait, the authenticity of which be certified by the legitimate Government of Kuwait and which covers the registration of the population upto 1 August 1990 . The Security Council was also requested "To establish, in cooperation with the

legitimate Government of Kuwait, an Order of Rules and Regulations governing access to and use of the said copy of the population register"¹⁹.

The Security Council, the UNESCO and various UN organs passed many resolutions condemning Iraq and its practices calling on it for immediate unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait . Other similar efforts were extended by many States, renowned international leading personalities, non-governmental organizations, relatives of hostages and detainees and many others in order to arrive at a peaceful agreement with the Iraqi regime to put an end to the tragedy that may stop the blood-shed and the sufferings of the peaceful people in Kuwait. They tried to secure the unconditional withdrawal of the aggressive Iraqi forces from Kuwait, in order to avoid confrontation with the allied forces that were ready to establish legitimacy and confront the aggression, which violated all human norms and principles upheld by the international community.

But all this went in vain. Iraq went on with its obstinacy in continuing to occupy Kuwait. The world community had no alternative but to adopt Security Council resolution 678 on 29 November, 1990 "To allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill" to

¹⁹. *ibid*, p.132-133.

comply fully with resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions. The Security Council also notes that -"Despite all efforts by the United Nations, Iraq refused to comply with its obligations to implement resolution 660 (1990) and the ... subsequent relevant resolutions, in flagrant contempt of the Security Council,

Mindful of its duties and responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance and preservation of international peace and security.

Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions. acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,

1. Demands that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660, 1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and decided, while maintaining all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill, to do so;
2. Authorizes Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements... the foregoing resolutions to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area...."

The Iraqi regime refused to comply with international legitimacy and persisted in occupying the

State of Kuwait continued violating human rights in Kuwait, and adhered to the logic of force and violence in clear defiance of the international will.

The deadline set for Iraq by the Security Council and the Allies that stood beside Kuwait in its just cause elapsed. The battle for liberating Kuwait started at dawn of Thursday 17 January 1991 with an air battle, followed at dawn of 24 February 1991 by the ground battle. After forty hours of the ground attack, the Iraqi forces announced their withdrawal in complete disarray unprecedented in the history of modern warfare. At 9.00 hours on 26 February 1991 the Kuwaiti flag was flown high over its mast in the heart of Kuwait City.

By the end of 27 February 1991 the Iraqi permanent representative to the UN informed the President of the Security Council of Iraq's unconditional full compliance with the Security Council resolutions and requested a cease-fire, announcing that "Its full withdrawal from Kuwait will be completed within the next few hours".

In light of this, the Security Council adopted **resolution 686** on 2 March 1991 in which it took note of the intention of Iraq to comply fully with the twelve resolutions adopted by the Security Council and its intention to release prisoners of war immediately.

The Resolution also "...Demands that Iraq implement its acceptance of all twelve

resolutions....(and)

- a) Rescind immediately its actions purporting to annex Kuwait;
- b) Accept in principle its liability under international law for any loss, damage, or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and Third States, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait...
- c) Immediately release under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross.... all Kuwait and third country nationals detained by Iraq..."
- d) Immediately begin to return all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, to be completed in the shortest possible period...."

The Resolution also demanded Iraq to "Designate military commanders to work with counterparts from the forces of Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait... to arrange for the military aspects of a cessation of hostilities at the earliest possible time...."

International legitimacy pursues its journey in maintaining and preserving peace and security and terminating the aftermath of aggression on Kuwait by establishing bases for permanent peace between the two countries under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. For this

purpose, the Security Council adopted **resolution 687** on 3 April 1991 "Welcoming the restoration to Kuwait of its sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity and the return of its legitimate Government".

Affirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait and Iraq...". The Resolution goes on "Reaffirming the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions in the light of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait".

The Security Council also laid down the rules in light of which the boundary demarcation between Kuwait and Iraq is to be implemented. It notes that "Iraq and Kuwait, as independent sovereign States, signed at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 **"Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters"**, thereby recognizing formally the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait and the allocation of islands, which were registered with the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations and in which Iraq recognized the independence and complete sovereignty of the State of Kuwait within its borders as specified and accepted in the letter of the Prime Minister of Iraq dated 21 July 1932, and as accepted by the Ruler of Kuwait in his

letter dated 10 August 1932.

The resolution also "Demand that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the international boundary and the allocation of islands set out in the "Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters, signed by them in the exercise of their sovereignty at Baghdad on 4 October, 1963..".

The Resolution also "Call upon the Secretary-General to lend his assistance to make arrangements with Iraq and Kuwait to demarcate the boundary between them, drawing on appropriate materials, including the map transmitted by Security Council documents S/22412".

The resolution also explicitly stated that the Security Council undertakes the boundary demarcation under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which is a basic element in the UN collective Security System. It was therefore the duty of the Security Council "to decide if peace is threatened or violated or aggression has taken place, and to submit recommendations regarding suitable measures to be taken according to the provisions of Articles (41) and (42) for maintaining and preserving international peace and security".

According to Chapter VII the Council can use "air,

sea and ground forces to implement whatever measures may be required to restore international peace and security".

Based on this mandate, the Council decided in **resolution 687** to "Guarantee the inviolability of the...international boundary (between Kuwait and Iraq) and to take as appropriate all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations".

According to this resolution, the following committees were formed :

- * A United Nation observer mission to monitor the Khor Abdullah waterway and the demilitarized zone which extend ten kilometres into Iraq and five kilometres into Kuwait to deter violations of the boundary through its presence and to observe any hostile or potentially hostile action mounted from the territory of one State to the other.
- * A special commission for the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless of all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and related subsystems and components, and all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres.
- * A UN commission for demarcating the international borders between Kuwait and Iraq as outlined in the

Minutes signed by the two States on 4 October 1963 and registered with the UN.

- * A special commission for compensation to administer the said fund.

Other bodies were established by other resolutions as well: in the context of **resolution 686** a senior UN official was appointed to coordinate the return of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq. **Resolution 661** established a '**Sanctions Committee**' to prevent the sale or supply of arms to Iraq and to monitor the sanctions specified in resolution 687 according to the recognized principles. Moreover, according to resolutions 706 and 712 (1991), - referred to below, the Committee is responsible for monitoring the sale by Iraq of 1.6 billion worth of oil or oil products that was approved for the purchase of supplies for essential human needs and their distribution inside Iraq under the supervision of the Committee.

The Security Council also adopted the following resolutions²⁰:

- * **Resolution 689** of 9 April 1991 establishing the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission.
- * **Resolution 692** of 20 May 1991 establishing a Compensation Fund and a Commission to administer

²⁰. Refer to The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict 1990-96.

it.

- * **Resolution 699** of 17 July 1991 regarding the destruction of the offensive weapons of Iraq and all aspects of specified in Section C of resolution 687 (1991) including the destruction of biological, chemical and ballistic missiles, and the inspection required to prevent its future possession by Iraq including all nuclear weapons.
- * **Resolution 700** of 17 June 1991 approving the guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of the arms ban imposed on Iraq.
- * **Resolution 705** of 15 August 1991 deciding that the compensation to be paid by Iraq shall not exceed 30 percent of the annual value of the exports of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq.
- * **Resolution 706** of 15 August 1991 laying out conditions for the sale of Iraqi petroleum for different reasons mainly to meet basic humanitarian relief needs under appropriate UN monitoring and supervision.
- * **Resolution 707** of 15 August 1991 condemning Iraq's serious violation of a number of its obligations under section C of resolution 687 (199 I); including nine demands addressed to Iraq.
- * **Resolution 712** of 19 September 1991 which sets a ceiling on the sale of Iraqi petroleum products to

meet essential humanitarian relief needs at the value of \$ 1.6 billion.

- * **Resolution 715** approving the general security plan suggested by the International Atomic Energy Agency for monitoring and inspecting nuclear establishments and facilities in Iraq and Iraq's required cooperation with the designated commission.
- * **Resolution 773** of 26 August 1992 regarding the finalization of the demarcation of the land boundary on the ground, welcoming the work of the Planning Committee in this respect and urging the Committee to demarcate the eastern part of the borders which include the sea borders, as early as possible so that the committee's work be concluded.
- * **Resolution 778** of 2 October 1992 regarding the release of the Iraqi assets representing the sale of Iraqi petroleum and products, and transferring such funds to a credit account to meet the costs of the UN activities including those specified in Resolution 706.
- * **Resolution 806** of 5 February 1993 which reaffirms the guarantee of the inviolability of the international borders between Kuwait and Iraq and also expands the mandate of the UN Observation Unit in Iraq, and Kuwait so as to include more missions.

Operations carried out by the UN for monitoring inspecting, and following up the implementation of various Security Council Resolutions continue to face sometimes obstacles and lack the cooperation required for full compliance with these resolutions.

The above analysis of all Security Council Resolutions and the stance of the world community vis-a-vis the Iraqi invasion on Kuwait, its atrocities, and repercussions is meant to portray a comprehensive picture of the magnitude of this aggression and the achievement of the international will in confronting it. This analysis further concentrates on the basic mission of standing upto Iraqi aggression, viz. the issue of demarcating the boundary between Kuwait and Iraq and transferring these borders from being a means of blackmail and pressure, exploited by Iraq in spite of the 1963 Minutes approved by both countries to borders demarcated on the ground by using the most advanced technological equipment available and outlined by documented co-ordinates and permanently set-up signs, in addition to a map ratified by the commission formed by the UN for this purpose.

The UN Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission accomplished its mission on 20 May 1993 and submitted its final report to the UN Secretary-General who

referred it on the same day to the Chairman of the Security Council on 27 May 1993, the Security Council convened and passed at its 3224th meeting **resolution 833** in which it "Welcomes the resolutions of the UN Boundary Demarcation Committee Between Kuwait and Iraq". It also demanded that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the international borders which the Committee had finally demarcated and also to respect the right to navigational access.

In this resolution, it emphasizes that the resolutions of the Commission are final and "Reaffirms again its resolution to guarantee the inviolability of the international borders finally demarcated between the two States". It also states that any violation of such borders will "Necessitate that due measures be taken as required to achieve this objective under Chapter VII of the Charter and Security Council **resolution 687 and 733**".

The report of the UN Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission adopted by the Security Council Resolution 833 Council makes it clear that the work of the Commission is simply technical, limited to the actual demarcation of the boundary and is not political in nature. The Commission was able to achieve its mandate because of the concerted research, legal, and technological expertise available at the highest

international level.

In accordance with the Commission's mandate and functions spelled out by the Security Council, it was not reallocating any territory to Kuwait or Iraq, as made clear in Resolution 773 of 26 August 1993. The end result of the Commission's work are the coordinates which specify on the ground and in the maritime section the boundary between Kuwait and Iraq in accordance with the agreed Minutes signed by Iraq and Kuwait in 1963. The pillars established in their positions to demarcate the border and the ratified map endorsed by the Security Council is the abiding reference point for the international Community with respect to the Kuwait-Iraq borders.

In the Gulf War of 1991, United Nations did indeed ratify American actions, but resistance to Iraqi aggression was hardly an application of the doctrine of collective security. Not waiting for an international consensus, the U.S. had unilaterally dispatched a large expeditionary force. Other nations could gain influence over America's actions only of joining what was in effect an American enterprise, they could not avoid the risks of conflict by vetoing it. Additionally, domestic upheavals in the Soviet Union and China gave the permanent members of the UN Security Council an incentive to maintain America's goodwill in the Gulf

War, collective security was involved as a justification of American leadership, not as a substitute for it.²¹

The international community, the people of the world, and the UN organs which bitterly suffered from the aggression and its aftermath hope that these resolutions will put an end to a phase of aggressions, violence, disintegration, dissent, violation of human rights, and the abrogation of international legitimacy. It is expected that the world will turn over a new leaf towards full compliance with UN resolutions as a means of restoring peace and cooperation to the region so that future generations may learn that cooperations international understanding, respect of others' rights and maintaining basic human principles are prerequisites for progress and flourishing of human civilization so as to achieve development and prosperity.

²¹. Kissinger, Henry - Diplomacy, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1994, p. 250.

CHAPTER-IV

AN ASSESSMENT

"The end of Cold War changed the structure of the world. The Gulf War merely revealed it".

- Charles Krauthammer

'The New Republic'.

GULF WAR - A WATERSHED IN THE MIDDLE EAST:

The success of Operation Desert Storm is the result of 21 years post- Vietnam evolution of the way the U.S. military equipped, trained and organised for combat. The lingering lessons of previous conflicts and incidents were all found somewhere in the fabric of Operation Desert Storm.

The principle shortcomings of the Vietnam War viz. incremental buildup of forces, fascination with statistical measures of success, divided service oriented command and micro management from Washington, were scrupulously avoided during this war, (Rep. Les Aspin, House Armed Service Committee, U.S. Congress).

The way Washington handled Desert Storm was also influenced by the humiliation faced by America during 'Desert One' the failed attempt to rescue the American hostages from Iran in 1979. The failure of military at that time to have effective, deployable special operations forces capable of a successful rescue mission led to a considerable investment of resources and effort

to remedy the problem. As a result, a mature and flexible special forces were able to contribute to the success of Operation Desert Storm.

The Grenada Operation of 1983 had a special relevance to Operation Desert. In stark contrast, Operation Desert Storm featured the first truly unified military operation under the firm control of the theatre Commander in Chief (CINC) as required by the **Goldwater-Nichols legislation**, Department of Defence Reorganisation Act of 1986.¹

The military experience in Beirut was also marked by a disastrous fragmentation and ambiguity of command that led to the death of more than 200 marines. As a contrast to this, Operation Desert Storm had clear cut established direct lines of authority, where orders travelled from the White House to the Secretary of Defence, through the Chairman - Joint Chief of Staff to the Military Officer in charge of the operation - General Norman Schwarzkopf. As such the amount of casualty could be put to the barest minimum.

Operation Just Cause of 1989 in Panama, validated the use of overwhelming force to achieve limited military objectives. Taking a hint from Operation Just

¹. Aspin, Les and Dickson, William - Defense for a New Era: Lessons of the Persian Gulf War. Brassey's, Washington. 1992. p.76.

Cause, a massive deployment of manforce, about 550,000 men, contributed their best in defeating Iraq.

The 'realisation' of earlier military/strategic incompetence led to the refinement and redefinition of U.S. foreign military policy, paving the way for a euphoric victory of the Allied Forces under the banner of United Nations. Operation Desert Storm, further more, put to test the misgivings of the Vietnam War and subsequent operations. It is the success of this operation, in the deserts of Arabian Peninsula, which would now serve as the yardstick to measure most significant military hardware and policy questions for future operations. The Washington - officials had never been able to figure out how to achieve all, even any one, of their objectives in the Middle East - Israel's security, Syria's relationship with Israel (which it hated) and Egypt (which it disliked), the Kurdish problem, the question of terrorism and placating the strong anti-Israeli feelings in oil rich Arab Kingdoms, especially Saudi-Arabia. Middle East being a mine field of religious, racial and national rivalries is an area that could explode instantly.²

The Gulf Crisis of 1990-91 had often been referred to 'as a watershed' - one of those moments in history

². Tillman, Seth P. - The United States in the Middle East. Bloomington Ind. 1982. p.275.

when profound changes, even a reconfiguration of political reality occur. Some pundits were disappointed that sweeping changes did not occur instantly. Others have been overly hasty in declaring that the Middle East is returning to business as usual. This impatience in an age of instant news when history plays out before our eyes is explicable, but the history of Middle East teaches us that the full impact of epochal change is felt over months and years, not hours and days. The consequences of earlier turning points in the modern Middle East the breakup of Ottoman Empire after World War I, the 1948 Arab - Israeli War, 1956 Suez Crisis, 1967 Six Day War, the 1973 October War and the revolution in Iran - are still being felt today.³

Aggression remains hard to stop and difficult to reverse; internal political, ethnic and religious conflicts in many developing countries appear no closer to settlement; indeed some are increasingly likely to lead to civil war. While the apparent end of the Cold War has reduced the risk of super power confrontation and nuclear war, it has not fundamentally changed either the ways in which states pursue their national objectives or many of the threats to international

³. Muslih, Muhammad and Norton, Augustus Richard - Political Tides in the Arab World. Foreign Policy Association. New York, Summer 1991, No. 296, p.12

stability.⁴

According to Dr. Madeleine K. Albright and Dr. Allan E. Goodman⁵ the international system of the 1990s could be one in which there will be substantial upheaval because :

- i) the end of Cold war may make regional conflict and intervention more likely,
- ii) the savings anticipated from nuclear arms control and force reductions in the European theatre may have to be spent offsetting the high costs of regional crisis and on re-equipping the military establishments of both the US and other powers for rapid and prolonged deployment in places and against threats (especially chemical warfare, terrorism and drugs trafficking) that will be very hard to counter.

A WAR OF MISCALCULATIONS:

Foremost, to the war, was the miscalculation by Kuwait and the Arab countries that supported the allied forces, that Saddam would ever unleash his military power against them. As already mentioned the countries that made up the allied forces, in the past, had sold

⁴. Albright, Madeleine K. & Goodman, Allan E. - 'U.S. Foreign Policy after the Gulf Crisis'. Survival. Nov.-Dec. 1990. Vol.XXXII; No.6. p.533.

⁵. ibid, p.533-534

massive amounts of arms to Saddam Hussein. So it was equally difficult for these countries to accept the fact that Saddam would hit back at them with the same weapons they had supplied.

Moreover, US failed to assess the implications of Iraq's defeat of Iran in the 1980's war, which shifted the balance of power in the region. The consequences of the Iraq - Iran war further shifted the US policy towards Iraq from accommodation to containment.

Finally, the major miscalculation was on the part of Saddam Hussein who believed that Soviet Union will not negatively respond to annexation of Kuwait, for the Soviets had for many years built up the Iraqi armed forces through training, equipment and military aid. And United States, it thought, after the Vietnam War will not venture away from its shore, much less to the far away Gulf region. Saddam also believed that the Arab States will not oppose his (mis) adventure and his version of Arab Imperialism. Moreover, he played his cards well by linking the Palestinian question and the withdrawal of the Syrian forces from Lebanon.

These few miscalculations on part of the US and Allied Forces, the Arab States and Saddam Hussein led to the escalation of the crisis commensurating in war.

Saddam Hussein's timing was very unfortunate for him. He failed to appreciate the end of Cold War, the

unification of Germany and the signing of an agreement in November 1990, to reduce conventional forces in Europe, and the significant changes in the erstwhile Soviet Union - a momentous step in Soviet policy towards fostering reconciliation with the West.

In the summer of 1990, America and the Western democracies were celebrating the advent of a decade of non-proliferation and peaceful conflict resolution and were moving a step closer towards crisis management. Least did they know that their patience and future hope on above lines would be put to test by the green beret dictator in the Gulf - Saddam Hussein.

In 1990, in Washington the talks on Capital Hill was all about cuts in defense, about bringing American soldiers home from Europe and using the 'peace dividend' to lift America out of recession. Wars of conquest by ruthless dictators were phantoms from the past. In such a situation an American would never have believed that a war in the desert was brewing.

Saddam Hussein was actually basing his conquest on this disbelief of the Americans. He knew too well the American reaction to the war in Vietnam, and so was convinced that the Americans will not go to war unless they themselves were on the gallows. The, then, Soviet Union which had for many years built up the Iraqi armed forces through military aid, equipment and training,

would according to Saddam's reckoning turn a deaf ear to the entreaties of US or the UN. Even the US had shown more official and unofficial sympathy towards Iraq, than Iran, during the war between them in 1980. Undoubtedly, Saddam believed that the Arab States of the Gulf, South West Asia and North Africa would live upto their well deserved reputation for finding excuses not to oppose his version of Arab Imperialism.⁶

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait finally shattered the comforting illusions the Western World had thought of. The fact that the invasion caught the West completely by surprise was a considerable political and intelligence failure. Analysts suggest that there simply was not the political will in the West to co-ordinate a unified response which might have presented a real challenge to Iraq's ambitions. The imposition of sanctions, as the U.S. Congress recommended, would not have found international agreement. As the Bush administration argued, any business lost by US firms would have been picked up by other countries. Even Europe, then Soviet Union and the Arab World were not in support of strong US measures. The political and economic realities meant that it was only with the actual invasion of Kuwait,

⁶. Cimbala, Stephen J. - Force and Diplomacy in the Future, New York, Connecticut, Westport, Praeger, 1992, p.61,

that the West and other countries could adopt a unified position.

Saddam saw his invasion as involving much more than just the Iraq's rights to Kuwaiti territory. He viewed it as a necessary response to an extensive imperialist conspiracy bent on emasculating Iraq's power. By occupying Kuwait he was furthering his ambition of diminishing US and Western influence in the Gulf and consolidating Iraq's position as the regional hegemony. He never doubted that the US would try to resist his expansionist drive. But he radically miscalculated the forceful US response.

In the immediate aftermath of the invasion of Kuwait it appears that Saddam believed he had performed an irresistible 'fait accompli', that the Gulf States were now his vassals, and that the west would not have the political will to reverse his aggression.

Instability in the Middle East:

The Middle East will undoubtedly be plagued by major political, social, and economic upheavals in the coming decades, and no amount of American good intentions will be able to alleviate all of them. The chaotic struggles involving decaying traditional monarchies such as Saudi Arabia, religious fundamentalism symbolized by Iran and its supporters throughout the region, and ruthless military dictators

such as Saddam Hussein who espouse a more secular version of nationalism will be intensified. Among other factors, diminishing economic opportunities will make it more and more difficult for the existing conservative regimes to meet the rising expectations of their mainly young and radicalized citizen. The American search for and support of "reformers" or "good guys" either in Israel or in the Arab world has little prospect of success. Washington does not have the power to make the Middle East safe for democracy.⁷

Indeed, American move to contain "extremist" forces or to back "moderate" elements typically backfire. The Reagan administration's decision to prevent a victory by Teheran during its war with Iraq helped to solidify the power of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad. Similarly, the moves by the Bush administration to help the Israeli Labor party by encouraging the fall of the national unity coalition in Jerusalem have resulted in the emergence of the most nationalistic regime in Israel's history. The decision to bolster the conservative Saudi regime by sending in American troops may well antagonize Arab populations throughout the region.

⁷. 'Iraq and Israel : The Elephant and the Hawk'. The Economist, Vol. 21, No. 7, April 1990, p.50.

The "road to Armageddon" scenario of a nuclear or chemical war between Israel and Iraq, which has been used to justify an active U.S. role in the Middle East, is exaggerated. Neither side would further its current agenda by launching an all out war. Jerusalem's main priority is to absorb the Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union; Iraq seeks to achieve economic recovery and consolidate its position as the leading power on the (Persian) Gulf. Moreover, the existence of highly destructive weapons in the arsenals of both sides creates a balance of terror similar to the one that kept the superpowers from going to war.⁸

There is little doubt, however, that political and economic factors will from time to time explode into limited regional conflicts. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait reflects the shape of things to come. Other sources of potential regional instability include,

- * possible renewal of the war between Iraq and Iran;
- * unrest in and secessionist demands by the Moslem republics of the Soviet Union;
- * Israeli attempts to topple the regime in Jordan, which could lead to Iraqi and Syrian military

⁸. Hadar, Leon T. - 'The Rise of Middle East Bogeyman : Towards Post Cold War Interventionism'. Foreign Policy Briefing, No.2, September 5, 1990, p.

intervention; and

- * moves by Turkey, in its efforts to join the new European Union are rejected and it loses its value as a strategic asset to NATO and the United States, to play a growing role in the Middle East or to renew its military conflict with Greece.⁹

Such developments would not directly undermine American interests, but they would have a major impact on Europe and the Soviet Union.

U.S. INTERESTS IN THE GULF - VITAL OR PERIPHERAL:

While it is widely acknowledged that the end of the Cold War has reduced the strategic significance of the Persian Gulf region, there is considerable disagreement about the nature and importance of the remaining American interests there. Proponents of an activist U.S. role argue that America has vital security interests in maintaining unhindered access to gulf oil at a reasonable price, preventing nuclear proliferation in the region, and preserving (or creating, depending on one's viewpoint) regional stability. Those objectives may hold superficial appeal, but a closer examination indicates that none of them is vital to American national security.

⁹. ' U.S. EC Rebuffs Force Turkey to Book elsewhere', Middle East Times, July 24-30, 1990, p.6.

That the gulf oil is a vital American interest was the chief national security rationale put forth by the Bush administration to stimulate public support for the gulf war. According to Bush, Iraqi control of Middle Eastern oil reserves would pose a threat to the American way of life, a sentiment echoed by his Secretary of State, James Baker, who contended that Saddam Hussein could "strangle the global economic order, determining by fate whether we all enter a recession or even the darkness of a depression".¹⁰ The Clinton administration shares that view. "Despite the end of the superpower rivalry, the Middle East remains of vital interest to the United States", proclaimed Lake, citing oil as one of America's vital interests in the region.

Unhindered access to gulf oil is certainly desirable, but it is not so essential to the American economy that it rises to the level of a vital interest. A large portion approximately 65 percent of the world's known oil reserves is in the gulf region, and those reserves currently account for 25 percent of world oil production. During the Cold War, the possibility that the Soviet Union could gain control of that oil was a

¹⁰. Seib, Gerald F & Greenberger, Robert S. - 'Bush wants US to forgive Egypt debt; Prolonged Presence in Gulf is indicated' Wall Street Journal, Septembers 5, 1990, p.A.3.

formidable threat, but not now.¹¹

The same danger could not arise from any potential regional hegemon. They are heavily dependent on oil revenues for development projects and the purchase of most of their military equipment. They can threaten to increase the price of oil, but the fungibility of oil and the vulnerability of regional economies to financial and trade counter measures from the advanced industrial economies limit the range of blackmail scenarios..... The United States, like other strong industrial powers, does not need control of regional events or even dependent clients to secure its basic energy requirements.¹²

Even if a regional hegemon were to control the oil supply and drive up the price, that would have a relatively minor impact on the American economy. In the highly improbable worst case scenario put forth during the gulf crisis that Saddam would control the oil of Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates the effect would have been to raise the price of oil from the pre crisis level of \$20 per barrel to \$30, perhaps

¹¹. Lake, Anthony - 'The Middle East Moment'. Washington Post, July 24, 1994, p.C1.

¹². Hermann, Richard K - 'The Middle East and the New World Order'. International Security. Vol.6, Fall 1991, p.44-45.

\$40, per barrel. The ultimate cost to the American economy would have been a loss of from one-half of 1 percent to 1 percent of real gross domestic product, or \$30 billion to \$60 billion.¹³ Yet the United States was spending nearly \$50 billion per year for defense of the Gulf in peacetime, and mounting the gulf war cost even more. As Nobel laureate Milton Friedman noted at the time, "There is no justification for war on the grounds of oil". Access to Gulf oil is no more valid a justification for war now than it was in 1990.

Another frequently cited vital U.S. interest in the Middle East is the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons. Both Tehran and Baghdad appear to have ambitious nuclear weapons programs. It would be more comfortable for the United States if both countries could be persuaded to give up their programmes, but experience has demonstrated that there is relatively little, the international community can do to deter regimes that are intent on becoming nuclear powers. Israel, India, and Pakistan all acquired nuclear capabilities during the Cold War, against the will of the international community. So did South Africa, even though it was regarded as an international pariah. Since

¹³. Carpenter, Ted Galen (Ed) - 'American Entanglement : The Persian Gulf Crisis and its Consequences. Washington, Cato Instittue, 1991, p.41-45.

the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Moscow's waning control over Soviet nuclear technology, it has become considerably more difficult to prevent nuclear proliferation. Unpalatable though it may be, Washington must adjust to that new reality.¹⁴ Washington should also recognize that even if Iran and Iraq were to develop nuclear arsenals, they would not necessarily represent an intolerable threat to the security of the United States. Possession of a handful of nuclear weapons does not in itself confer a decisive military or diplomatic advantage. Israel's status as the sole nuclear power in the Middle East, for instance, has never afforded it a measurable advantage in dealing with its nonnuclear Arab enemies. Nuclear arms are useful primarily as deterrents, not as offensive weapons.¹⁵ The magnitude and certainty of retaliation would make a nuclear first strike by Iraq, Iran, or any other renegade state at Israel, Europe, or (assuming the aggressor had managed to acquire a long range delivery system) the United States suicidal. So while the United States has an interest in preventing nuclear

¹⁴. Gordon, Michael R & Wald, Mathew L. - 'Russian Controls on Bomb material are leaky'. New York Times, August 18 1994, p.41

¹⁵. Maynes, Charles William - 'Dateline Washington : A Necessary War?' Foreign Policy, No. 82, Spring 1991, p.168.

proliferation when possible, failure to do so does not necessarily pose a mortal threat to U.S. security. A nuclear-free Gulf is a peripheral, rather than a vital America interest.

The final supposedly vital U.S. interest in the Gulf is regional stability. UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright, for instance, denounced the Iraqi troop movements near the Kuwaiti border in October 1994 as having "disrupted the stability of the region", implying that such a disruption justified the Clinton administration's strong response to the Iraqi maneuvers.¹⁶ But the Middle East has believe that the prospects for stability there have improved. Historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr., has commented that,

"stability is not a likely prospect for a region characterized from time immemorial by artificial frontiers, tribal antagonism, religious fanaticisms and desperate inequalities. I doubt that the U.S. has the capacity or the desire to replace the Ottoman Empire, and our efforts thus far have won us not the respect of the Arab rulers but their contempt".¹⁷

¹⁶. Francis, Samuel - 'In Defense of Stability or Oil prices?' Washington Times, October 14, 1994, p.A21.

¹⁷. Schlesinger Jr., Arthur - 'White Slaves in the Persian Gulf'. Wall Street Journal, January 7, 1991, p.A14.

The United States has long survived great instability in the Middle East, even during the Cold War, when the Soviet Union sought to exploit the turmoil. There is no reason to think that instability in the post-Cold War era somehow suddenly represents a threat to American security. It is important to remember, too, that many Middle Eastern states view regional instability as a strategic tool, which they hope to exploit to their benefit. There are a number of intra-Arab disputes in which uncertainty is valued as an alternative to accepting the status quo. As long as Middle Eastern players do not seek regional stability, there is little the United States can do to advance it. Indeed, stability in the Gulf region is so chimerical an objective that it could not even be called a legitimate peripheral interest, much less a vital U.S. interest.¹⁸

In the absence of any vital national security interest in the Gulf, there is no justification for undertaking a policy as ambitious and costly as dual containment. America's only legitimate peripheral interests access to Gulf oil and preventing nuclear proliferation do not merit allowing the United States to be drawn into regional turmoil or another Gulf War.

¹⁸. Conry, Barbara - 'America's misguided Policy of Dual Containment in the Persian Gulf', Foreign Policy Briefing. No. 33, November, 10, 1994, p.4.

CRUSADE FOR A WORLD ORDER :

After initially emphasizing the need to protect oil supplies, Bush administration has increasingly denied that the Gulf crisis is solely, or even primarily, over oil. Responding to hecklers at an Iowa campaign rally in mid-october, the President stated : "You know, some people never get the word. The fight is not about oil. The fight is about naked aggression that will not stand". Earlier Bush had contended that Iraq's invasion was "more than a military attack on tiny Kuwait, it was a ruthless assault on the very essence of international order".¹⁹ On another occasion, he held out the vision of "a new world that is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we have known", a world characterized by "international stability" and respect for the sovereignty and freedom of nations. In his view it was clear that a successful international (i.e. U.S.-led) response to Baghdad's aggression was a prerequisite for the creation of his utopian vision of global harmony.

Three so-called world order objectives underline the U.S. build-up in the Gulf : defending Saudi Arabia, forcing Iraq to leave Kuwait, and punishing aggression and deterring other ruthless leaders like Saddam. The

¹⁹. Bush, George - Address to the 'Veterans of Foreign Wars', Washington Post. August 21, 1990, p.A16.

Bush administration insisted that initial deployment of an 82nd airborne division brigade-supported by U.S. air and naval power was to deter an impending Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia and to buy time for other nations threatened by Iraqi aggression to organize effective collective resistance. Yet, from the beginning, Washington's purposes were more ambitious, and the U.S. deployments was far in excess of what was needed to dissuade Baghdad from invading Saudi Arabia.

Washington could achieve that result through diplomacy, economic pressure, or military force. The United States has all but fore-closed the option of negotiating with Baghdad, however, President Bush and Secretary of State James. A. Baker III have stated repeatedly that a complete and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal must precede any negotiations (which raises the obvious question of what there would be left to negotiate).

GLOBAL ENTANGLEMENTS OR STRATEGIC INDEPENDENCE?

Western Europe and Japan are far more dependent on Middle Eastern oil than is the United States, and the Europeans have more significant geopolitical stakes. While Saddam poses no threat to American security, other nations (e.g. Iran, Syria, Turkey, and Egypt) are directly threatened by his bid for regional predominance. Those regional powers also have more than

sufficient military capabilities collectively to contain Iraqi expansionism. Just the nations bordering Iraq have military forces that substantially outnumber those of Iraq. They have 1.8 million troops to Baghdad's million, 9,900 battle tanks to 5,500, and nearly 1,300 combat aircraft to Iraqi's 513.²⁰

President Bush insisted that Saddam threatened the world and that allied countries were behind the U.S. The fact suggest otherwise. Despite much propaganda about the "international" response to Iraqi aggression, the multinational force was an overwhelmingly American enterprise. As it did repeatedly during the Cold War, Washington pursued a large U.S. military initiative behind a multilateral facade. Even the U.S. effort to get its principal allies to share the financial burden of the "multinational" military effort against Iraq has elicited a mixed response. Although Saudi Arabia and the oil-rich Gulf Sheikhdoms have agreed to provide significant sums. Japan and the members of the European Community have groused and made grudging, minimal contributions.

Given their reluctance to share the financial burden, it is not surprising that Washington's allies

²⁰. Carpenter, Ted Galen & Layne, Christopher - 'Arabian Nightmares; Washington's Persian Gulf Entanglement'. Policy Analysis No.142, November 9, 1990, p.10.

have been even less cooperative on the more crucial matter of risk sharing. Some West European nations sent a few ships and aircraft to the gulf, and Britain and France have sent small contingents of ground troops to Saudi Arabia, but the massive U.S. build-up utterly dwarfs those deployments. Washington has sent more than 200,000 troops, the largest European continent (France's) is barely 13,000, including a mere, 5,000 ground troops a token effort. Japan and Germany have conveniently hid behind Constitutional provisions that supposedly prevented them from making any military effort in the region, despite the contentions of some constitutional experts in both nations that the alleged restraints are less than clear. Even the Arab nations that have the most to lose if Saddam prevails (e.g. Egypt and Syria) have sent only modest numbers of combat forces to Saudi Arabia.

Already there is an undercurrent of anger in the United States about "burden sharing" inequalities and allied free riding. Those complaints are somewhat incongruous when uttered by the same people who urged the United States to plunge into the Gulf militarily. Other governments are not stupid. If they know Washington is going to assume the costs and dangers of defending their interests, they have every incentive to sit back, relax, and let it do so.

As history has shown repeatedly, the balance of power usually works. Threatened States typically form coalitions to check an aggressor unless someone else graciously offers to assume the costs and risks of protecting their security for them. Washington should reverse its misguided massive military build-up while there is still time to choose a more prudent course.

U.S. policymakers should formulate an entirely new strategy for the post-Cold War era. The decline of the Soviet threat offers the United States an opportunity to shed numerous, obsolete Cold War security burdens and to chart an independent course. Such a strategy, based on a less expansive definition of America's vital security interests, would greatly reduce the costs and risks to the American people. The Gulf crisis offers a sobering lesson on the probable consequences to the United States if it persists in waging dangerous and unprofitable "world order" crusades.

THE FAILURE OF DIPLOMACY :

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 evoked a strong response from the industrial powers, in fact, two rather different responses. The first was an array of economic sanctions of unprecedented severity. The second was the threat of war. Both responses were initiated at once, even before Iraq's annexation of the invaded country. The first response had broad support.

The second is pretty much limited to the U.S. and Britain, apart from the family dictatorships that had been placed in charge of the Gulf oil producing states. As leader of the two-member coalition, the U.S. moved quickly to ensure that sanctions could not be effective and to bar any diplomatic initiative.

President Bush declared that "America stands where it always has, against aggression, against those who would use force to replace the rule of law". While some questioned his tactical judgment, there was widespread admiration for the President's honorable stand, and his forthright renewal of U.S. traditional dedication to nonviolence, the rule of law, and the duty of protecting the weak and oppressed. A noted Cambridge University Professor of Political Science wrote in the **Times Literary Supplement** (London) that "Our traditions, fortunately, prove to have at their core univesal values, while theirs are sometimes hard to distinguish with the naked eye from rampant (and heavily armed) nihilism. In the Gulf today, President Bush could hardly put it more bluntly. "Others too basked in self-adulation, though it was conceded that US had not always applied to traditional values with complete consistency". These past lapses are commonly attributed to US understandable preoccupation with defense against the Russians, now of lesser urgency with the U.S.

triumph in the Cold War.

"We live in one of those rare transforming moments in history", **Secretary Baker** declared, with the Cold War over and "an era full of promise" just ahead, if we can avoid, "the self-defeating path of pretending not to see". Commentators marvelled at the "wondrous sea change" at the United Nations, which is "functioning as it was designed to do... for virtually the first time in its history" and thus offering "a bold pattern of peacekeeping for the post-Cold War world" (**New York Times**). The standard explanation is that with the U.S. victory in the Cold War, Soviet obstructionism and the "shrill, anti-western rhetoric" of the Third World no longer render the U.N. ineffective.

Professing high principle, Washington moved vigorously to block all diplomatic efforts, restricting its own contacts with Iraq to delivery of an ultimatum demanding immediate and total capitulation to U.S. force what George Bush called "going the extra mile to achieve a peaceful solution". Perhaps most troublesome for Bush in his effort to create a 'new world order', one reporter observed plaintively, is the fact that "a surprising number of Europeans believe that the United States is in the Gulf not to free Kuwait or punish Saddam Hussein but to bolster its own influence and power". A poll reported in the same paper the same day

(Boston Globe, January 13, 1990) revealed that a surprising number of Americans share these delusions, believing that control over oil is the "key reason" for the U.S. troop presence (50%), not "liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation" (28%) or "neutralization of Iraq's weapons capabilities (14%).

Washington's explicit rejection of any form of diplomacy was welcomed as a "sensational offer to negotiate" (in the words of a British loyalist), a forthcoming willingness to "explore any diplomatic avenue", along the "diplomatic track" that had been effectively blocked. There was eloquent rhetoric about Iraqi human rights abuses, and the anguish they caused George Bush.²¹

Rejection of diplomacy was explicit from the outset. New York Times chief diplomatic correspondent **Thomas Friedman** (in effect, the State Department Voice at the Times) attributed the administration's rejection of "a diplomatic track" to its concern that negotiations might "defuse the crisis" at the cost of "a few token gains in Kuwait" for the Iraqi dictator, perhaps "a Kuwaiti island or minor border adjustments" (August 22). Anything short of capitulation to U.S. force is

²¹. Chomsky, Noam - 'The Gulf Crisis'. Z Magazine, February 1991, p.2.

unacceptable whatever the consequences.

Iraqi proposals continued to surface, along with others. As of January 15, the last known example was made public on January 2, when U.S. officials disclosed an Iraqi offer "to withdraw from Kuwait if the United States pledges not to attack as soldiers are pulled out, if foreign troops leave the region, and if there is an agreement on the Palestinian problem and on the banning of all weapons of mass destruction in the region"²². The offer did not state any claims to the islands in the Gulf and the Rumailah oil field.

Two weeks before the deadline for Iraqi withdrawal, possible parameters of a diplomatic settlement appeared to be these : Iraq would withdraw completely from Kuwait with a U.S. pledge not to attack withdrawing forces; foreign troops leave the region; the Security Council indicates a serious commitment to settle other major regional problems. Disputed border issues would be left for later consideration. Once again, we cannot evaluate the prospects for settlement along these - surely reasonable lines, because the offers were flatly rejected, and scarcely entered the media or public awareness. The United States and Britian maintained

²². Knut, Royce - Newsday, January 3, 1991.

their commitment to force alone. France made a last-minute effort to avoid war on January 14 by proposing that the Security Council call for "a rapid and massive withdrawal" from Kuwait along with a statement that Council members would bring their "active contribution to a settlement of other problems of the region", in particular, of the Arab-Israeli conflict and in particular to the Palestinian problem by convening, at an appropriate moment, an international conference to assure "the security, stability and development of this region of the world". The French proposal was supported by Belgium, a Council member, and Germany, Spain, Italy, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and several non-aligned nations. The U.S. and Britain rejected it (along with the Soviet Union, irrelevantly). U.N. Ambassador **Thomas Pickering** stated that the proposal was unacceptable, because it went beyond previous U.N. resolutions on the Iraqi invasion.

CONCLUSION :

INSTRUMENTISATION OF UNITED NATIONS BY THE US.

Deviation from the Charter :

Provisions for collective security are outlined in Chapter -VII of the United Nations Charter, entitled 'Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression'. Under **Article 395**

the Security Council is authorized to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression' and to decide on measures to maintain or restore peace. Moreover, Security Council decisions taken in accordance with Chapter VII are legally binding on all the members of the United Nations, as specified in Article 25.

The Security Council's abdication of its prerogatives, first in authorizing states with naval forces in the vicinity of the Gulf to enforce the sanctions, and subsequently in allowing member states 'to use all necessary means' to repel Iraqi forces from Kuwait are of particular concern'. As **Brian Urquhart** points out, neither **resolution 677** nor **resolution 678** placed enforcement actions under the control of the Security Council or its Military Staff Committee, although the need for such control was clearly implied in Articles 46 and 47 of the Charter.²³

The ability of the United Nations to implement military sanctions under Article 42 was severely undermined by two factors. Most importantly, the Military Staff Committee played virtually no role during

²³. Urquhart, Brian - 'Learning from the Gulf', in Frances Barnaby (Ed.) - Building a more Democratic United Nations : Proceedings of CAMDUN, London, Frank Cass, 1991, p.294.

the Gulf crisis. Although the committee held two private meetings, all the Security Council resolutions were adopted without its advice.²⁴ It also meant that the United Nations lacked effective military leadership to assume command in a crisis. Thus, it was easier and more expedient at least in the short run to allow individual members to take action under United States command. But the opportunity costs of this abdication were threefold; the operation was

- (i) out of United Nations hands,
- (ii) the United Nations was marginalized in the area that is its primary *raison d'être*, and
- (iii) the operation became closely linked with American Foreign Policy objectives rather than with United Nations priorities.

The ability of the United Nations to conduct its own collective security operations was further frustrated by its members' failure to fulfil their obligations under Article 43 of the Charter, which requires them 'to make available to the Security Council, on its call.. armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and

²⁴. Baehr, Peter - 'The United Nations in the 1990s. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1992, p.76.

security'. Such provisions would permit the rapid deployment of troops by the Security Council. It would also facilitate better planning and greater effectiveness because standby troops could be trained in the special skills required in peacekeeping and the United Nations would know in advance what troops it could expect to have under its command in a crisis.²⁵

Concerns have also been raised over the Security Council's willingness to resort to force without assessing the effectiveness and adequacy of non-violent measures. As Urquhart has argued. 'The goal of Chapter VII is action short of force, if possible. The Charter therefore places an important condition on the ultimate use of force (under Article 42 which legitimizes use of force after sanctions have proven inadequate). No determination about the inadequacy of sanctions [in the Gulf crisis] has ever been made by the Council'.²⁶ Whether the economic sanctions would have proved adequate to get Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait remains a moot point. Nonetheless, in not even assessing their effectiveness before authorizing the use of force in resolution 678, the Security Council was in breach of

²⁵. Dixon, Elizabeth Riddell - 'The United Nations after the Gulf War'. International Journal No.XLIX, Spring, 1994, p.259.

²⁶. Op.cit. 22, p. 296.

Article 42.

Another concern about deviations from the Charter is related to the rising consensus, especially in the West, that priority principles and structures. The principle of state sovereignty, enshrined in Article 2.7 of the Charter, has been the cardinal tenet guiding the United Nations throughout its fifty years of history. While retaining its primacy, the principle has increasingly had to compete with demands for intervention within state boundaries to maintain peace and security, to protect human rights, and to safeguard the environment.

All countries vehemently assert their rights and privileges as sovereign states, and any external interference in what they consider to be their domestic affairs sparks outrage. But there is a growing North South dichotomy over the relative importance of upholding sovereignty, on the one hand, and of allowing intervention to promote and protect 'humanitarian' objectives, on the other. The chances of these Northern states themselves being subjected to intervention is remote in light of their military and economic might and their control over four of the five vetoes of the Security Council. The vulnerability of the Southern states to economic penetration and military invasion by major powers, however, makes these states 'most

suspicious of the development of a "right" of international intervention as a subterfuge for domination by the major powers. For most of them, therefore, the principle of state sovereignty remains sacrosanct.²⁷

This struggle between respect for state sovereignty and the demand for intervention was highlighted during the Gulf War. At the beginning, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was a clear violation of state sovereignty. As such, it placed the conflict firmly within the United Nations mandate to handle conflicts between states. The plight of the Kurdish refugees following the war, however, engendered a clash in which priority was given to humanitarian intervention rather than to respect for Iraq soovereignty. The resolution broke new ground in linking humanitarianism with international peace and security and in giving the former priority over respect for state sovereignty.

The importance of the precedent set by **resolution 688** should not, however, be overstated. First, there just are not sufficient resources to permit intervention in every case where humanitarian concerns are at stake.

²⁷. Mathews , Robert O. - 'The State of United Nations, 1993 : North - South Perspectives'. ACUNS Reports and Papers, Providence RI : Academic Council on United Nations System, 1993, p.29.

Second, there is the problem of motivation; the West had particular reasons for urging the Security Council to take action to protect the Kurds, which may not exist in other cases of gross human misery. **Erskine Childers** notes 'for more than 30 years Western powers and their Israeli, Iranian and other clients have recurrently financed, armed and encouraged the Iraqi Kurds to rebel against Baghdad... to destabilise Iraq for their own 'realpolitic'.²⁸ Resolution 688 was thus compatible with the interests of Western States in general, and with those of the United States in particular.

The issue is entwined with the domination of the Security Council by industrialized countries. Intervention on humanitarian grounds, as currently practised, runs the risk of embroiling the United Nations in internal conflicts which, in its present institutional form, it cannot resolve. The outcome of the such attempts would be a poor choice of deployment for resources and the undermining of the organization's credibility.

Throughout this process, it is imperative that the United Nations retain its impartiality, which leads to an examination of current decision making in the

²⁸. Childers, Erskine B. - 'Gulf Crisis Lessons for the United Nations', Bulletin of Peace Proposal, June 1992, p.135.

Security Council. Resolutions were first agreed in private by the permanent members of the Security Council before being presented to the non-permanent members. Thus, only the most powerful participated in this vital decision making process. These private meetings also ensured that bargains were struck and consensus was reached without outside scrutiny. Such private meetings have subsequently become a regular feature of Security Council decision making, but they erode transparency and make it harder to hold individual members of the Council accountable. In addition, they leave no records.²⁹

The terms 'manipulate', 'bribe', and 'bully' have been used to describe the efforts of the Western powers to ensure that the resolutions on which they had agreed in private were passed by the Security Council as a whole. The use of the 'carrot' or inducements by the United States was particularly graphic. 'Virtually every developing country on the Security Council was offered new economic perks in return for a vote in favor of the U.S. war : Colombia, impoverished Ethiopia, and Zaire (already in full thrall to the U.S.) were all offered new aid packages, access to World Bank credits or re-arrangements of International Monetary Fund grants or loans. Furthermore, for the first time in more than

²⁹. Op. cit. 21, p. 265.

thirty years, the United States agreed to a meeting of Cuban and American foreign ministers.

While inducements were the preferred tool of influence, the United States also resorted to sanctions, as exemplified by its response when Yemen voted against resolution 678. Within minutes of the Council vote, Yemen's **Ambassador Abdallah Saleh al-Ashtal** was informed by a U.S. diplomat in full earshot of the world via the UN broadcasting system, that -

"that will be the most expensive 'no' vote you ever cast".

Three days later the U.S. cut its \$ 70-million aid package to Yemen, one of the poorest countries in the region.³⁰ To be sure, concerns about unbridled United States power predated the Gulf crisis. They had been widely voiced since the demise of the Soviet Union. But the dominance of the United States within the Security Council and in organizing and directing the war against Iraq had serious consequences for the credibility and independence of the United Nations.

³⁰. Bennis, Phyllis (Ed.) - Beyond the Storms : A Gulf Crisis Reader. New York, Olive Branch, 1991, p. 119-120.

United Nations Credibility:

The primary objective of the United Nations in the Gulf Crisis was the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait (and thereby the protection of Kuwaiti sovereignty). The objectives of the United States however, extended well beyond those of the United Nations "From the very beginning of the war", Adel Safety suggests, "it became clear that Washington's primary war aim was that of eliminating Iraq as a challenge to the new balance of power, established with the removal of Egypt from the Arab camp after its signing of a separate peace treaty with Israel".³¹ Resolution 687 which prohibited Iraq from developing its nuclear capability and called for United Nations inspectors to monitor the destruction of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons and longer-range ballistic missiles, was very effective in promoting the United States objective of dealing a crippling blow to Iraq's military powers. But the tough American stand against Iraq has been contrasted with United States support for both Israel's development of nuclear weapons and Indonesia's horribly brutal invasion and occupation of East Timor. Such contrasts inevitably bring charges of

³¹. Safety, Adel - 'The War against Iraq : a new World Order or the same old order'. Peace Research, No.23, May 1991, p.21.

a double standard, which in turn undermine the credibility of the organization that allowed itself to be 'hijacked' to serve the foreign policy objectives of its most powerful member.³²

But the Gulf Crisis also contributed to the disillusionment of the developing countries with the United Nations in another sense. It served to accelerate trends, already apparent in the post-Cold War period preceding the crisis, which were exacerbating the North-South divide. The Security Council no longer par-analysed by the Cold War intransigence of its permanent members has become the chief decision making body in the organization while the General Assembly, in which the developing countries have the greatest voice, is increasingly relegated to the sidelines. And the pattern of elitist decision making adopted by the permanent members of the Security Council during the Gulf Crisis has reduced the participation of the developing countries yet further.

From this discussion, it is clear that although some potentially creative precedents were set during the Gulf Crisis with respect to humanitarian intervention, overall the United Nations handling of the crisis resulted in negative longer term consequences for the

³². Op.cit. 21, p.136.

organization.

" By God, we've kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all!" so said President George Bush in a euphoric victory statement at the end of Gulf War suggesting how important was the victory in the war to the US psyche. The ghost of the Vietnam War that haunted the American Foreign Policy was put in its grave by the success of this war in the Gulf.

From the above discussions and arguments set-forth, it may be concluded that the Gulf War was not actually a war of the United Nations but of the United States, which was just reluctant to go war 'alone'. The war which the United States launched against Iraq on 16 January 1991 was infact a war to destroy Iraq's power, remove its leader Saddam Hussein, and impose on the region a political order which will respect American interests and legitimise its presence there.

The diplomatic process was abruptly ended by the US to unleash for its own ends a war devoid of legitimate sanction or purpose. Actually, the Iraqi syndrome signals the return of American political and military hegemony on a global scale. To sum it all, 1991 may be remembered as the year when the Vietnam syndrome was replaced by the Iraqi syndrome. Moreover, the '**carrot and stick approach**' followed by US, from the begining of the crisis to the end of the War, demonstrates the

American diplomatic strategy in the 'Unipolar World'.

The sanctions imposed and subsequently relaxed, by the United Nations was in reality sponsored by the United States. US as already mentioned, used various tactics to get consensus to its various resolutions. Therefore, it can be well concluded that United States used United Nations as an instrument to further its interests in the Gulf region.

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