

**GREAT POWERS AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND
SECURITY : A STUDY OF INTERVENTION
IN AFGHANISTAN**

DARVESH GOPAL P.

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School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
Centre for International Politics &
Organisation
NEW DELHI - 110 067


(DARVESH GOPAL P.)

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PREFACE

The interests of the Soviet Union and the United States are globally oriented. Detente has become ineffective in the aftermath of the Afghanistan crisis. This study begins with the conceptual problems pertaining to the political and strategic problems created by intervention of Great Powers in the Third World countries.

At the strategic level, the Soviet Union and the United States wish to avoid a nuclear confrontation, yet each wishes to exploit developments which can undermine the influence of the other Super Power. This leads to the exploitation of regional developments and the maintenance of one's hegemony.

In the case of Afghanistan, the study attempts to assess the intentions of the Soviet Union and the United States. It also explains the chain of developments which led to the use of Soviet troops. The study seeks to trace and analyse the salient factors which have produced a complex interaction of the

Super Powers in this conflict. Different proposals for "political settlements" of the Afghanistan crisis are also studied; and the policies and interests of Super Powers at the global and regional level, are examined.

The desire of the Third World countries to preserve a balance between the two Super Powers finds expression in their support to the policy of detente. But the military presence of one Super Power produces concern for the protection of the criteria and values for maintenance of "sovereignty and independence".

The First Chapter deals with East-West confrontation arising out of the Cold War and the consequences for the Third World. The image of Soviet conduct is related to Third World perceptions which have become much more complex since these countries first entered the international stage. The Soviet military action in Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, has brought "far reaching" developments and circumscribed in various ways the whole process of detente and peaceful-coexistence and pointed to unstable and ambiguous developments particularly in the Third World.

The Second Chapter discusses the new phase of Soviet-American confrontation and the resulting insecurity in the Third World countries. The Soviet Union's Friendship Treaties are examined in terms of its own security interests and global interests, and political costs for the countries concerned.

The Third Chapter covers the reaction of Third World countries both from Asia and Africa to the Afghanistan crisis. It also examines how far Third World public opinion has created moral pressures on the Soviet Union and discusses the ambiguities and disparities which have created a new policy environment in the Third World.

The Fourth Chapter describes the currently canvassed political solutions and negotiations of Afghan crisis. Our conclusion favours a wide political settlement which would promote regional stability.

In the Fifth Chapter, Third World peace and security problems in the context of areas of strategic competition are evaluated. The strategic calculations of both the Super Powers do not help to preserve

an equilibrium among the Third World countries. A new hierarchy of priorities for a durable detente may begin to emerge if the United Nations seeks to pursue the dialogue in order to defuse regional tensions over Afghanistan, and regional powers like India, Pakistan and Iran have an important role to play in creating a useful working agenda for peace.

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CHAPTER - I

DEFENCE: PROBLEMS AND POLICIES IN THE THIRD WORLD

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DETENTE : PROBLEMS AND POLICIES IN THE THIRD WORLD

I. Super Power Competition in the Third World

When analysing the major factors of the Cold War period, third world images of Soviet conduct emphasised the concern for national security and ascribed Soviet domination in Eastern Europe to the need to strengthen defences against a renewal of military aggression by others. The distinctive Third World view of detente considered positive changes in international relations in which the co-existence of states with different social systems would be guaranteed by stable factors and trends in the foreign policies of the two Super Powers. In particular Third World opinion assumed that the development of internal processes of liberalisation in the Soviet Union would ensure sustained effort to strengthen detente on a global level.¹ In the course of normalising Soviet-American political and economic relations, it was further expected that the process of detente would spread to the Third world. It is true

1. For detailed emphasis, see, Lieutenant John W. Jensen, "Nuclear Strategy: Differences in Soviet and American Thinking", Strategic Digest (New Delhi), vol.II, no.2, February 1961, pp.171-87.

that the possibility of eruption of new sources of tension and conflict could not be excluded on account of the power and influence of the Military-Industrial Complex (MIC) in the United States, but from the point of view of movements like Nonalignment it was generally accepted that in a period of relaxation of international tension the Soviet posture of peaceful coexistence would compel labor elements in the United States to keep the Military-Industrial Complex under firm control. Non-aligned leaders and political analysts seemed convinced that the Soviet support of detente was in line with the basic principles of Nonalignment. It was confidently asserted that there was objective threat to any non-aligned country from the Soviet Union and any aggressive military posture by Moscow towards the nonaligned was ruled out since Soviet foreign policy working on the Soviet formula of peaceful coexistence was opposed to the "positions of strength" strategies sometimes advocated by the other Super Power. Third World decision makers did not hide their satisfaction that the achievement of strategic parity with the U.S. by the Soviet Union would ensure the strengthening of detente. Several contentious issues arose between one or the other nonaligned country and the Soviet Union, but the long range joint interests created a belief in the infallibility of the Soviet Union in promoting a general

relaxation of international tension and strengthening non-interventionism in the Third World.

Against this background we can consider the acute sensitivity in the Third World on the issue of the deployment of military force by the Soviet Union in hitherto nonaligned Afghanistan. A plausible case was made by many Third World leaders for Soviet intervention in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. But in the case of Afghanistan the Third World images of Soviet military conduct were generally far from favourable. Here was a clash between the short-range military action by the Soviet leadership and the long range course of action advocated by the Soviet world view of detente and support of nonalignment on which the Third World had built its image of Soviet conduct.

The objective of the present chapter is to explore the context in which Soviet action in Afghanistan altered Third World expectations and thus to provide a useful over-view of the general fear of escalation in the Third World:

The head-on confrontation between the Super Powers makes it imperative for the Third World States to play the game with skill and caution. They are being enlisted in the new struggle, and increasingly

go with risks which are out of proportion to the controversial issues. Some will succumb as they already have, and they will offer bases in return for aid. Others will go further and utilize the compulsions of international politics and teach distant powers' lessons about their toughness, and thus give credence to the notion that the rules of the game are indeed changing.

For reasons which need not be belaboured here the cold war is in full swing again.² From the Middle Eastern problem in 1974 which shut out the Soviet Union, to Angola in 1975 and finally to Kabul in 1979-80, detente has faltered. Super Powers offer a wide range of 'services'.³ They can help Ethiopia combat separatism and deal with an irridentist neighbour; they can help Egypt snub the Arab world; they can help the Syrian regime maintain hold of seats over a disaffected population that resents the political dominance. The

2. See, Leslie H. Gold and Richard H. Ullman, "Keeping Cool at the Rhyber Pass", Foreign Policy (New York), Spring 1980, pp.3-4.

3. For detailed analysis see, Ronald Ajami, "The Fate of Non-Alignment", Foreign Affairs (New York), Winter 1980-81, pp.550-55.

over dramatized political and diplomatic reaction of Washington to military aid which the USSR and Cuba have given to Angola and Ethiopia and in recent times, to the aid which USSR has offered to Afghanistan has been one of the major factors which has disturbed the logic of the real politik of Soviet-American relations in the last few years.⁴

The American press has been claiming for years that while United States and Soviet Union seem to have agreed on stabilizing the world situation, the Soviet Union has been destabilizing it by its actions. In point of fact, that they charge that the Soviet Union has 'broken the rules of detente'.⁵ The extremely sensitive issues in the developing world have been among the main pretexts used by Ford and Carter Administrations in domestic debates to try to justify their own abandonment of the policy of detente.

In this respect, the failure of American lesson in Vietnam had global, not just local repercussions.

4. William L. Griffith, "Super Power Relations After Afghanistan", Survival, (London), vol. XII, No. 4, July-August 1980, pp. 146-67.

5. Leo Henry Trofimzenko, "The Third World and the US-Soviet Competition": A Soviet View", Foreign Affairs, Sum of 1981, pp. 1021-28.

The people of the developing countries wished to get rid of US neo-colonialist domination, but fearing to do so because of American might, learned from the example of Vietnam.⁶ As a general comment it can be said that the Soviet Union never demonstrated the kind of moderation that detente had seemed to promote. Even in the heydays of detente, in the early 1970s, the Soviet Union never missed an opportunity for a closer linkage between political strategy and expansionist designs.⁷

Even before the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan which has finally signalled the death of detente and start of a 'second cold war',⁸ the Russians fuelled wars in the Middle East (1973), in Vietnam (1975), in Angola (1976), in Ethiopia (1977), and in Cambodia (1978). As a result their position became stronger in Southern African Horn, the Persian Gulf and Asia.⁹ The Russians have asserted themselves as predominant power

6. Ibid.

7. For detailed emphasis see, Chaudhry, Golan S., "Triangular Diplomacy, Washington, Moscow, Beijing", Asia-Pacific Community (Tokyo), vol.1, no.3, 1979/80, pp.6-14.

8. Ibid.

9. Zelman Khalilzad, "Super Powers and Northern Tier", International Security (Cambridge, Massachusetts), vol.1, no.3, 1979/80, pp.6-14.

in the vortex of world politics.

But the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan on December 27, 1979 has produced 'earth shocking' developments altering the whole process of detente and coexistence and killing hopes of 'peace in our generation'.¹⁰

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has shown that for the first time since World War II, Soviet leaders are ready to undertake military adventures outside the Eastern Europe. To many observers the Soviet direct military intervention against its Southern Asia neighbour is part of a 'strategic plan for global domination'.¹¹

Today Soviet forces or their surrogates, the Cubans and the Vietnamese, operate over a huge arc of territory, known as the 'crescent of crisis',¹² Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, Afghanistan, Southern Yemen and Ethiopia - are all countries that have placed under the Kremlin's influence since 1975.

10. Lec, Choudhry, Golan, U., n.7, pp.50-62.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

President Carter formulated the 'Persian Gulf Doctrine' and warned the Soviet Union that the United States would use armed force to repel the Soviet thrust at Persian Gulf.¹³

Further, the goals of Soviet Foreign Policy (either shortrun or long term) toward Third World countries have included the weakening of the western alliance system in the region, through providing 'aids' such as military, economic, social and ideological propagandist expansionism, etc., vis-a-vis the United States.

However, these are the important factors of the Super Powers for weakening the development of the Third World countries.

For example: US Economic aid to Pakistan totalled \$652 million between 1954 and 1976.¹⁴ A similar chain of events took place in the case of events which took place in respect of a number of other Western allies. In order to pressurize Pakistan, Soviets increased aid to India, as well as domestic

13. For detailed analysis, see, Khalizad, n.9, pp.17-18.

14. Cited in, *ibid.*, p.16.

dissidents. The Bangladesh War between Pakistan and India, after the later had signed a treaty with the Soviet Union in August 1971 brought about second Pakistani disappointment with its Western alliances and decrease relations with China.

In this way, domestic as well as regional developments provide risks and opportunities for both Super Powers. Whether the Soviets are successful in taking advantage of instabilities in the Third World depends not only on the nature of crisis, but also on Soviet capabilities and policies, as well as on those of United States.

(a) Concepts governing intervention in the Third World

Yet the Third World, as we have seen is still economically and culturally dominated by the Industrial capitalist nations.¹⁵ Since the Third World countries are generally economically backward in certain cases the super powers started giving 'aid' to the third world countries through international forums.¹⁶ The

15. See, Gerard, Challand., Revolution in Third World (England, 1977).

16. Trefonko, n.5, pp.1021-49.

concepts governing 'intervention' in the Third World by outside powers is super power competition to strengthen relations with the Third World countries or forge alliances to utilise military equations.¹⁷

However, Soviet policy towards the developing countries was a response to American efforts to create an alliance system in Asia as part of the policy of containment. In the mid 50s the Soviet leadership initiated a 'policy of denial'¹⁸ aimed at ensuring the neutrality of those developing countries - especially Afghanistan, India and Egypt which professed a non-aligned approach to foreign policy and opposed the intrusion of military alliances into their regions. The Soviets sought to expand their ties with such countries in order to prevent the uncontested growth of western political and military influence to ensure that gaps would remain in the US sponsored alliance network, and to win the support of these nonaligned countries for issues that were of importance to the Soviet Union.¹⁹

17. Golman, U., n.7, pp.50-62.

18. See, Robert H. Donaldson (eds.), The Soviet Union in the Third World: Success and Failures (Westview Press, 1987), pp.303-31.

19. Ibid.

The Soviet role of economic assistance to developing countries dovetailed with the overall policy of peaceful coexistence. Soviet assistance supposedly provided the newly independent states with the possibility of developing their economies and breaking their economic dependence on the imperialist West.²⁰

According to Ann Van Wynen Thomas, unfortunately there is no satisfactory agreement among jurists as to the meaning and content of intervention in international law. Not only the authorities, but also the practice of States are in confusion. State practice has for the most part been motivated by power politics, with little resort to legal principles. Bonfile, for example, says: "(there are) few subjects which have given rise to more controversies than that of the duty of non-intervention or the alleged right of intervention. All jurists are agreed upon the seriousness of the act and its consequences. But in their estimates of the juridical issue one can only find trouble and confusion".²¹

20. Ibid.

21. See, Ann Van Wynen Thomas, A.J. Thomas, Jr., Non-intervention - The Law and its Importance in the Americas (Southern Methodist University Press, Dallas, 1956), p.67.

The Super Powers, in short, could claim political, military and psychological leverage in Third World Countries, and each judged the concept of intervention either in terms of self imposed restraint or in terms of strategic deployments and potential economic and political benefits to the other Super Power.

(b) Super Power Differences Over Non-Alignment

The birth of the concept of non-alignment is to be traced to the broadcast made by Jawaharlal Nehru on 7 September, 1946 as Vice-Chairman of the Viceroy's Executive Council giving an outline of India's foreign policy, said:

We propose as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another which have led in the past to World Wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale. We believe that peace and freedom are indivisible and the denial of freedom anywhere must endanger freedom elsewhere and lead to conflict and war. We are parti-

cularly interested in the emancipation of colonial and dependent countries and peoples and in the recognition in theory and practice of equal opportunities for all races. We repudiate utterly the Nazi doctrine of racialism wherever and in whatsoever form it may be practiced we seek no dominion over others, and we claim no privileged position over other people.²²

The conditions which led to the adoption of non-alignment by several newly liberated Asian and African as well as countries in the Caribbean, Latin America and Europe after the Second World War are all well-known. After centuries of colonial rule, racial oppression and domination by Big Powers, these countries are anxious to consolidate their independence so that they pursue their own political, economic and social development without foreign interference and pressure and to participate in the making of global decisions affecting their future. They also wanted to eliminate all vestiges of

22.

See, K.P. Misra and K.R. Narayanan (eds.), Non-alignment in Contemporary International Relations (New Delhi, 1981), p. 122.

colonial rule, racial oppression and domination by big powers throughout the world. To achieve these objectives, they found it necessary to assert their independence from the great powers and for military alliances, to maintain their freedom of judgement and action and to promote the concept of peaceful co-existence, in order to dedicate themselves to economic and social reconstruction.²³

We cannot allow the non-aligned movement to be used as a vehicle of instrument for the propagation of any single ideology or for the promotion of the interest of any great power, directly or indirectly.²⁴

The policy of non-alignment should therefore, be seen as a unique method adopted for the promotion of national interest within the overall framework of peace, co-existence and co-operation. And this is what distinguishes the non-aligned country.

The non-aligned movement will never forget that in the very early years of the movement, the then U.S.

23. Ibid., pp.1-14.

24. Ibid.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, call it "immoral". In the era of American military predominance, the United States tried to win over leaders of the newly free developing countries to their side in the cold war which Dulles had pursued with vigour.²⁵

The credibility of the Dullenian effort was undermined from the beginning because non-alignment stands for abstention from power politics, for peaceful co-existence and for active international co-operation among all States aligned and non-aligned. Negatively it means a calculated and deliberate refusal to enter into any military or political commitment with any of the super powers allied to them and to permit foreign military bases on one's territory.²⁶

(c) Military Aid to Third World Regimes

All wars since 1945 have been fought in the Third World, with weapons designed and generally produced in advanced industrial nations.²⁷ Super Power "aid" to the Third World countries in recent years has

25. H.D. Malvi, Non-alignment Onward March (New Delhi, 1981), pp.72-73.

26. H.S. Rajan, Non-alignment: India and the Future (Mysore, 1970), p.11. Also see, N. Mitra, "Non-alignment Today", IDSA Journal (New Delhi), vol. XIV, no.2, October-December 1981, pp.285-306.

27. See, Kaldor Mary and Eido Asbjorn (ed.), The

increased as a result of aggravation of conflict there was retardation of Third World economic, social, political all-round development.

Arms transfers represent an expanding share of international economic transfers. Arms and munitions are only the more visible aspects of military trade, which predominantly consists of spare parts and auxiliary equipment. The Americans were spending \$29,000 million a year on the war in Vietnam.²⁸

Decisions taken in United States, the Soviet Union and China have all contributed to increase in Third World military potential but the desire for power and control is not a sufficient explanation for their massive investments. Economically, military transfers to the Third World are important in maintaining as large as possible a capacity for military production especially production of the most advanced and sophisticated equipments.²⁹

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World Military Orders: The Impact of Military Technology on the Third World (London, 1979), p.2.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., pp.2-3.

Finally, arms transfers have a preemptive function as part of the overall US-Soviet competition.³⁰ In 1973, the Soviet Union supplied arms to thirty-two third world countries, while the US supplied arms to seventy. According to US Disarmament Agency, the Soviet Union was the second largest supplier of arms on the third world market during the last fifteen years. More than half of these transfers went to five third world countries. Egypt, North Vietnam, North Korea, Iran and Indonesia.³¹

Indeed US has a major interest in a strong pro-Western Iran for political-economic and strategic reasons, a special relationship between the two started after the *debaele* in Vietnam.³² Iran is a large and populous and resource rich country located on the periphery of the Soviet Union and between the North-East and South Asia. The flow of oil from Persian Gulf is vital to the economies of Western Europe and Japan and to a lesser extent to the US.³³ A quick survey shows that during the 1970s Iranian arms purchases became the

30. Trofimovko, n.5, p.1049.

31. Keldor Mary & Eide Abjorn (eds.), n.27, p.4.

32. Albert Wohlstetler, "Meeting the Threat in the Persian Gulf", Survey (London), vol.25, no3, Spring 1980, p.129.

33. Bredthor, "The US & Iran: The Recent Phase", Foreign Affairs Report (New Delhi), vol.4, n.9, April 1979, pp.50-60.

backbone of the US arms industry, and trade was increasing rapidly.

Following illustration given below shows the US arms sales to Iran (1972-1978).³⁴

Table I

Year	Orders from Iran (\$ bn.)	Deliveries to Iran (\$ bn.)
1972	0.520	0.214
1973	0.160	0.233
1974	4.150	0.510
1975	2.490	0.913
1976	1.680	1.460
1977	5.800	2.240
1978	2.580	2.500
TOTAL	19.360	8.091

Source: IISS, The Military Balance 1977-78, and 1978-79 (London), The Washington Post, 7 November 1978.

With a conventional and nuclear arms build up, the Middle East and South Asia measured in terms of political contacts, economic relations (including assistance) of military aid, became the primary areas

³⁴. Ibid.

of Soviet involvement, and they offered Moscow a wide range of options.³⁵

The following chart shows Soviet Exports of Machinery equipment and transport materials to developing countries.³⁶

Table II
(In Roubles)

	1977	1978
Total exports	6,246.4	6,991.4
To Socialist countries*	4,438.1	4,939.4
To capitalist states of which to LDCs	1,808.0 1,808.0	2,052.0 2,052.0
Exports to LDCs, % of exports to all Capitalist States	52.2%	55.4%
Export to LDCs for projects being constructed under cooperation agreement	0,552.6	0,967.0
Project Exports to LDCs as % of total exports	56.4%	51.6%

*Including Yugoslavia

Source: SSR Ministers tvo Vneshnani, Vneshnaini
Torgov lii SSOR U 1978; Statisticheskii
Sbornik, Moscow, 'Statistika' 1979,
pp.45-47.

35. See Donaldson (eds.), n. 18, pp.303-15.

36. Ibid., p.351.

In short Military 'aid' to the Third World countries by the Super Powers is based entirely on the risk calculus to the Soviets and the Americans and Third World countries are compelled to adjust their economic and political relationships.

(d) Divergent Conceptions of Regional Security:

Any attempt to understand the effect of the divergent conceptions of regional security held by the two Super Powers requires a recapitulation of the situation in South Asia after the eruption of the Afghan crisis.

In retrospect, it is clear that the Regional Security built by Islamabad was directly linked to Brezhnev's visit to India. Pakistan's concept of its security generally differs from the concept of other countries.³⁷

In fact a many great Indian's have been puzzled about the war psychosis seen in both the countries in the last three months of the year just ended. To some extent the statement by Mrs. Gandhi were a direct result of the atmosphere built up in Pakistan. The puzzlement

37. Times of India (New Delhi), 12 March 1981.

was largely because there is no outstanding issue between India and Pakistan that needs to be resolved through recourse to arms. In this context, the theory has been held out by Indian officials that Pakistan deliberately mounted the campaign to preempt the Soviet Union from arming India and secondly, to preempt both India and the Soviet Union from making blatantly anti-Pakistani statements in the context of the Afghanistan crisis.³⁸


Whatever the reason for the war psychosis, although it lasted for a brief while, it has served to focus attention on the Security imperatives of a growing Super-Power rivalry.

The Soviet intrusion into Afghanistan,³⁹ and the Vietnamese presence in Kampuchea and the growing militarisation of the Indian Ocean and Gulf areas all components of the factors intended to test the strength of the commitment of the Super Powers and lead to the deteriorating security environment in these parts of the world.⁴⁰

38. S. Viswam, "Depressing Asian Security", Democratic World (New Delhi), January 11, 1981, p.10.

39. Ericson, John, Asian Affairs (London), vol.12, n.1, February 1981, p.8.

40. Times of India, March 23, 1981.



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These are two factors that need to be taken into account while assessing the prospects for peace:

First it needs to be considered whether the possibility exists at all of a Super Power o.g. Soviets withdrawing from Afghanistan. This question assumes considerable relevance given the fact that the future of the Indo-Pakistan relations is directly linked to the easing of the Afghanistan crisis.

Secondly whether it is possible to conceive of a situation where the two superpowers will willingly, not only undertake to reduce but in fact readjust their national priorities, eg. reduce their military presence in the Indian Ocean.⁴¹

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan impinged on American strategy for deterrence and defence in Asia and the United States decision-makers started giving regional security considerations a prominence unmatched since 1975.⁴² Accordingly U.S. policy began to elucidate and re-evaluate both non-aligned groups and regional

41. S. Viswan, n.58, p.11.

42. Fred, Greene,, "The United States and Asia in 1980", Asian Survey (Berkeley, California), vol.21, n.1, January 1981, p.1.

organisations like the League of Arab States, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) the Regional Cooperation Development (RCD) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). These littoral states in majority in the Indian Ocean were expected to face increasingly critical security problems and their strategic location was crucial.⁴³

For the Soviet Union, it was of major political consequence that it gained a foothold in the periphery of the gulf in the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDY), Iraq, Ethiopia and in Afghanistan.⁴⁴

(e) Third World Issues Relating to Disarmament:

'Disarmament' according to its first principle is a process in which arms are destroyed and not replaced.⁴⁵ It is implied in any process of arms reduction. Within the framework of the UN which created 'to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war',⁴⁶ the charter of the UN attached primary importance

43. See, A.H.N. Abidi, "Islamic Revivalism Impact on Indian Ocean", Mainstream (New Delhi), vol.19, n.24, February 14, 1981, p.9.

44. Ibid., pp.10-11.

45. Lord Kennet, "Disarmament Thirty Years of Failure", International Security, vol.2, no.3, Winter 1978, p.33.

46. Arms Control; A Survey and Appraisal of Multilateral Agreements, SIPRI, London, 1978, p.1.

to collective security and made only passing reference to disarmament and regulation of armaments have been included in the general principles of cooperation in the main tenance of international peace and security.⁴⁷

However, the events which have taken place in various parts of the world make it clear to us that the problems facing the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America have their root causes in unequal and discriminating treatment resulting from the hierarchical stratification of the international system. Even after "decolonisation" the Third World is at the receiving end of the aggressive and expansionist actions, together with the bellicose policies engendered by the nuclear rivalry of the Super Powers.⁴⁸

Still acting as rivals and endeavouring to obtain new positions in the world, the SALT talks have been correctly described as "secret and esoteric dialogue". These talks do not lessen the competitive interventionism of the Super Powers in the Third World.

47. See, UN Document A/o - 1017, 23 May, 1970, p.4.

48. UN Document A/1 - 10/PV 24, 9 June, 1970, pp. 31-41.

Within the non-aligned movement attempts have been made to impose ideologies in-keeping with bloc interests, and thus create groups or allies and distort the original basic principles of non-alignment.⁴⁹

Strategic expectations of a Super Power like the Soviet Union, have led to intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and there can be little doubt that political as well as military functions were involved in the decision to intervene in Afghanistan.⁵⁰

When the Super Powers adhere to the Partial Test Ban Treaty or the Antarctic Treaty, they claim that they want peace and security in the World and in its various regions, but in practice they have sought to achieve their goal at a minimum cost and where necessary they have deliberately generated pressures against security, peace, tranquility, independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the developing countries of the world.⁵¹

49. Ibid.

50. Jiri Valenta, "From Prague to Kabul: The Soviet Style of Invasion", International Security, vol.5, n.3, 1980, pp.114-19.

51. UN Document, n.48, p.16.

II. US - Soviet Military Balance and the Adoption of the Strategy of Detente

It is important to recognise the general nature of the phenomenon in order to understand the potential causes of Super Power confrontation and the possibilities of maintaining military balances.

Under present plans, for example, the US army is to have a total of 16 active divisions while the last count the Soviet Army had more than ten times - as many as 168. The overall man power ratio by contrast, is of the order of 2.15 to 1. It is known that only about one third of the Soviet divisions are deployed continuously at full strength, so that the direct comparison would have to include American reserve and National Guard Forces also.⁵²

Moreover, US army divisions are of course much larger than their Soviet lines with smaller divisions (i.e. with diminished man power in support and service units outside division) and with the same proportion of understrength units the US army could deploy roughly

52. Edward N. Luttwak, "Perceptions of Military Force and Defence Policy", Survival, vol. 19, no. 1, January-February 1977, p. 2. See also, Jairam Ramesh "The Super-Power Strategic Balance: Myth and Reality", IDSJ Journal, vol. XIV, no. 3, October-December 1981, pp. 151-65.

76 divisions, with present man power level, thus reducing very considerably the apparent numerical imbalance between the two armies.⁵³

In today's strategic environment the USSR has reached something akin to parity with the USA. Through the early 1960s, Moscow had concentrated on securing the survival of its as yet limited strategic potential: It built reinforced silos, experimented with mobile missiles and with ballistic missile defence (BMD) began to move a portion of its missile force to sea, and finally succeeded in greatly improving its command and control systems. By the mid 1960s, the Soviet Union, might be said for the first time to have acquired a secure 'second strike' force deterrent. It thus proceeded through the late sixties and early seventies with a qualitative building priority aimed at matching the larger panoply of the US strategic arsenal with its resulting flexibility of options.⁵⁴

In recent years, American military strength has been moving in a vicious circle. It has been unable to get out of the impasse created by Washington's desire to

53. Cited in *ibid.*, p.3.

54. C.R. Jacobson, "The Achievement of Parity in the Strategic Balance", International Perspective (Ottawa), January-February, 1977, p.12.

outstrip the Soviet Union in Strategic arms and by the practical impossibility of achieving this aim.⁵⁵ Each time, the US defence department intends to strengthen a new component of its forces, or to introduce a new strategy, it invariably sets about 'prove' that 'the Soviets have already acquired such a capability' and hence that the US must follow suit.⁵⁶ Replying on a programme of strategic arms build up of unprecedented scale beginning in the early 1960s US military government officials in reality believed whatever they said publicly, that the US was 'more equal' in strategic equation. They believed that the US could more effectively deter the Soviet Union than vice-versa. But as Moscow never intended to be the first to attack, the point at issue was actually not a greater deterrence of the Soviet Union.⁵⁷ The United States and the Soviet Union have been militarily antagonists since the World War II, but the character of this relationship has changed substantially over this period as the USSR has become a power of global rather than essentially continental dimension.⁵⁸

55. Henry A. Trefinenko., "Counter Forces Illusion of a Panacea", International Security, vol.9, no4, 1981, p.28.

56. Ibid., p.29.

57. Ibid., p.35.

58. Holcut, Sonnenfeldt., "Russia America and Detente", Foreign Affairs, No.2, January 1978, p.276.

In any case, the advance of military technology and the increasing domination of post war international politics by Soviet rivalry with the US already a strategic power with global concerns. As the process of building large and diverse military forces went forward a powerful military industrial group evolved within the industrial group evolved within the Soviet political structure.⁵⁹ Along with the increase in Soviet strategic and regional power, there has also emerged a substantial and still growing capability for military intervention at large distances from the USSR.⁶⁰

For example, USSR has been aiding a 'national liberation' struggle. In Angola, for the first time overseas, the Soviets actually transported and equipped a proxy expeditionary force to intervene in conflict. To quote from the Reports of the Central Committee to the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held in 1966.

...while regarding the existence of ties with different social systems as a form of class struggle between the socialism and capitalism, the Soviet Union consistently advocates normal and peaceful relations

59. Ibid., p.277.

60. Ibid., p.280.

with capitalist countries and a settlement of controversial inter-state issues by negotiation, not by war. The Soviet Union firmly stands for non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, for the respect of their sovereign rights, and inviolability of their territories.⁶¹

Candidly Tsarist Russia had followed an actively expansionist and interventionist policy towards the countries south of its borders, a policy that gave rise to resentment in Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey.⁶² Under pressure of Soviet troops still in Iran, a treaty of friendship was signed between the two countries on February 26, 1921. Article 6 of the Treaty reserved to the Soviets the right to send troops into Iran should it become a base for 'anti-aggression'. The treaty with Iran was followed by similar treaties with Afghanistan and Turkey.⁶³ The Soviets provided these countries with weapons, military advisors and economic aid. They also concluded non-aggression treaties with all the three countries.

61. Report of the Central Committee to the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of Soviet Union (Moscow, 1966), p.50.

62. Zalumay Khalizad, n.9, p.8.

63. Ibid., p.9.

(a) Central Elements in Soviet and American Strategic Thinking and Changes in World Pattern of Power With Special Reference to China.

When President Carter came to office in January 1977, the relationship with China was low on the list of his policy priorities. However, after US Soviet relations had run into difficulties in mid 1977, the administration suddenly turned its attention towards China and attempted for the first time to use its 'China Card'.⁶⁴

When President Carter's national security advisor visited Beijing in May 1978, however, the reception he got was decidedly different and highly favourable. Unlike the Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, Brozozinski was a strong advocate of a tough policy against Moscow and saw China as a potentially global anti-Soviet United front.⁶⁵ Moreover Beijing has also benefitted considerably from its shrewd manipulation of the Washington connection. To become a friend of the US has not only pre-empted the possibility of US-Soviet collusion against Chinese interests, but has also enhanced immensely Beijing political leverage vis-a-vis Moscow.⁶⁶

64. Farris H. Chang, "China Card or American Card?", Asia Pacific Community, no. 11, Winter 1981, p. 119.

65. Ibid., p. 120.

66. Ibid., p. 128.

For all benefits that China has reaped from playing 'American Card' the costs and risks having been surprisingly low. This seems a tribute to high successful Chinese diplomacy. Thus not withstanding Beijing high sounding call for Unity of action against Moscow in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.⁶⁷ Much of the future relations between Washington and Beijing is likely to hinge on Soviet actions. If Moscow continues with its aggressive designs and keep up its expansionist activities, Washington is going to seek greater degree of military cooperation, including transfer of arms joint military planning and even joint military action with Beijing.

(b) American Involvement and Withdrawal from Vietnam

The story of Vietnam of Southeast Asia and the US policy there during the past twentyfive years forms a broad case study of involving major global problems.⁶⁸ The decision of the Truman administration in early 1950s to provide a financial aid to the French military

67. Richard Holleran., "Beijing Reported to Offer More Guns to Afghan Rebels", The New York Times (New York), January 17, 1980.

68. William P. Bundy., "The Path to Vietnam: Ten Decisions", Orbis (Philadelphia), vol.II, no.3, Fall 1977, p.247.

effort in Indo-China was taken against the background of the fall of nationalist China and the arrival of communist China and the arrival of communist Chinese troops on the Indo-Chinese border in 1949. The Ho Chi Minh regime had just been recognized as the government of Vietnam by the Soviet Union and Communist China.⁶⁹ Mao's government provided sanctuary, training and heavy arms to Viet Minh (Revolutionary League for the Independence) which, despite the trappings of a mere nationalist movement, was increasingly into a party openly committed by organization and ideology to the communist sphere.⁷⁰

American assistance was accompanied by pressure upon the French to complete the independence of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.⁷¹ China and the United States were antagonists by this time and in a sense Vietnamese war was already a Sino-American war.⁷²

The final outcome of the Geneva Conference has been the subject of much misunderstanding. The failure of the South Vietnamese government, since 16 June 1954,

69. Guenter Lowy., America in Vietnam (New York, 1978), p.3.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. O. Edmond Clubb., "Our Indo-China War", Current History (Philadelphia), vol.63, no.376, December 1972, p.243.

headed by Ngo Dinh Diem, to accept national elections in 1956 as provided by the final declaration of the Geneva conference has been held for insurgency in South. Lao's Cambodia and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) did not expressly associate themselves with the declaration.

The South Vietnamese delegate filed a protest against the armistice agreement which he asked to have incorporated in the final declaration. South Vietnam specifically objected to the date of the elections and reserved itself freedom of action guarantee the sacred right of the Vietnamese people to territorial unity national independence and freedom.⁷³ In Vietnam the solution of at first appeared to be less critical. The initial actions of Kennedy administration were confined to increase of a few hundred men in our military training personnel⁷⁴ to train their Vietnamese counterparts.

In October, Kennedy had sent his military advisor, Gen Max Well D. Taylor, on a fact finding tour to Vietnam. Taylor, returned to Washington on 3 Novem-

73. Lowy, n.69, pp.8-9.

74. Bundy, n.68, pp.654-55.

ber, and among other measures proposed, the dispatch of military task force of 6000-8000 men in order to raise South Vietnamese morale and demonstrate the seriousness of US intent to resist a communist take over.⁷⁵ As late as November 1961, the total military strength in South Vietnam numbered 11,326.⁷⁶ However, by the instability and military ineffectiveness had reached the critical point. US policy makers had three apparent choices to continue the existing policy while attempting to improve its implementation, to take new and major military measures while adhering to the same basic objectives or to move toward withdrawal.⁷⁷

South Vietnam and US has been joined by military forces of five other area nations - South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Austria and New Zealand.⁷⁸ The landing of the US troops in the Thailand to counter the Chinese troops.⁷⁹ The major changes in the South East Asian, situation may be dated from 1968. In that year

75. Ibid., n.69, pp.20-21.

76. Ibid., pp.22-23.

77. Eundy, n.68, pp.657-58.

78. See, Ibid., p.662.

79. Jean Claude Pomoti, "South Vietnam Paying of the Mortgage", Current History, vol.63, no.576, December 1972, pp.245-48.

President Johnson decided not to stand for re-election. Underlying the decision was the American frustration over its role in Southeast Asia. Increasing losses in men, money and material in Vietnam so demoralised the US that desperately sought an honourable withdrawal.⁸⁰

In 1971, the Japanese 'special relationship' with the US was jolted by the 'Nixon shocks' - the American President's dramatic announcement to visit China without the expected prior consultation with Japan. The rapprochement between the US and China resulted in relaxation of tension in the region.⁸¹ The agreement on ending war and restoring peace in Paris on January 27, 1973, by the parties participating in the Paris conference on Vietnam. According to the Agreement signed by the four parties, the US undertakes to respect the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam; the US will withdraw all its armed forces and military personnel and those of its allies from South Vietnam within 60 days, will not continue its military involvement or intervention in the affairs of South Vietnamese

80. L.R. Cardenas, "Peace in Vietnam and the Security of South East Asia", China Report (New Delhi) vol.3, no.5, July-August 1973, p.7.

81. Ibid., p.16.

people's right to self determination; the South Vietnamese people shall decide themselves the political future of South Vietnam through general elections.⁸²

(c) American Rationale for Detente

World Power today is primarily in the hands of the US and the Soviet Union.⁸³ Super Power detente is not based on an identity of the value systems of two countries, which continues to be mutually antithetical. Nor it is based on a compatibility of their National interest, which in many areas remain competitive. At a press conference on 28 December, 1973, the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger emphasised this point.

...We do not say that detente is based on the compatibility of domestic systems. We recognise that the value and ideology of both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China are opposed and sometimes hostile to ours. We do not say that there is no conflicting interests. We do say that there is a

82. Peking Review: "Greeting the Signing of the Paris Agreement", Peking Review (Peking), vol. 16, no. 5, February 2, 1973, p. 6.

83. Joseph, S. Clark., "The Prospects for Peace", Orbis, vol. 16, no. 1, Spring 66, pp. 27-41.

fundamental change in the international environment compared to any other previous period. Kissinger went on to say that the United States was making a 'conscious effort to set up rules of conduct and to establish a certain interconnection of interests and above all to establish communications between officials at every level, that makes it possible in times of crisis to reduce the danger of accident or miscalculations'.⁸⁴ It is the sense that US regards detente.

Super power detente was only a part, albeit the most important part, of the US decision to harmonize its policy environment. The fact that the Soviet Union had attained nuclear parity with the US made the task of achieving super power detente much more urgent.⁸⁵

(d) Soviet Rationale for Detente

The Soviets claim that, historically speaking the theory of peaceful coexistence or detente of states was first by one of earliest decrees of the Soviet government - namely the Decree on Peace issued

84. N.E. Rajan, "Road to Detente: A Synoptic View", International Studies (New Delhi), vol. 13, no. 5, October-December, 1974, pp. 567-75.

85. See, Ibid., p. 582.

on 8 November, 1917, Soviet government proposed any war except in defence of the Soviet State against foreign intervention, and called for a determined class struggle on the national, international levels against capitalist social systems.⁸⁶

The Report of the Central Committee to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, provided a new perspective on Soviet theory and expectations:

The Establishment of firm friendly relations between the two biggest powers of the world - the United States and the Soviet Union - would be of great significance for the strengthening of world peace. To think that if the wellknown five principles of coexistence - underline the relations between the USSR and the US, that would be truly great importance for all mankind and, of course, be no less useful to the people of the US than to the Soviet Peoples and all other people...We propose this with good intentions, without holding a knife in (sic) our back.⁸⁷

86. Frank Daruaby., and Carol Schorf., Disarmament and Arms Control (New York, NY 1972), p. 115.

87. Ibid., p.622.

On May 1972 the basic principles of mutual relations between the USSR and USA were signed which stated among other things 'the prerequisites for maintaining and strengthening peaceful relations between the USA and the USSR are the recognition of the security interests of the parties based on the principles of equality and the renunciation of the use or threat of force.⁸⁸ The Soviets have nowhere given up their belief in ideological superiority, and they perceive the US as a declining power. "Detente" does not, therefore, imply a lack of desire to assert Soviet will power in international politics.

(c) The Strategy of Detente and the Decentralisation of the International Security System

Recent Soviet American relations can now be divided neatly into two historical periods. The first lasted for a quarter century after World War II. During those days, the US was unmistakably the strongest power. Then in 1972, the policies of both nations changed. The United States decided to grant the Soviets

88. See, V. Nannontov., Disarmament the Command of the Times (Moscow, 1979), pp. 111-12.

at least a symbolic status of equal super Power, and that was the beginning of the second period, labelled 'detente'.⁸⁹

In May 1972, when Richard Nixon went to Moscow to formally inaugurate detente: For the Soviets detente was meant to provide not just the appearance of Super Power equality but the reality too. The idea that the US and USSR could some day share responsibility for managing the entire world.⁹⁰

In any case, the advance of military technology and the increasing domination of post war international politics by Soviet rivalry with the US, already a strategic power, with global concerns, virtually ensured that the USSR would gradually acquire forces that could be brought to bear beyond the confines of the Eurasian land mass.⁹¹

Along with the increase in Soviet Strategic and regional power, there has also emerged a substantial and still growing intervention at large distances from

89. Robert C. Kaiser., 'US - Soviet Relations: Goodbye to Detente', Foreign Affairs, no.3, 1980, p.500.

90. Ibid., p.501.

91. Sonnenfeldt, n.59, p.277.

USSR.⁹² Due to the increased competition in military sophistication between Super Powers, escalation of a crisis may lead to precipitous decline in regional stability and in this sense, the Super Powers may have to accept decentralisation in the control of the international security system.

III. Problems of Regional Instability in the Third World

This is indeed the case in South Asia, where India and Pakistan have fought three wars since independence where the disparity between them in conventional power is extreme, and where both countries - as well as neighbouring Iran - have been experiencing regime instability.⁹³

Although the crucial international rivalry is between India and Pakistan, on the strategic level a number of other countries are involved. China whose border dispute with India is unresolved since the

92. Ibid., p.280.

93. Richard K. Betts., "Nuclear Proliferation and Regional Rivalry: Speculations on South Asia", Orbis, vol.23, no.1, Spring 1979, p.276.

1962 war is the principal threat that determines Indian strategy and has been a source of support for Pakistan.⁹⁴

In the Indian subcontinent, the keystone of its policy in the region, the USSR now enjoys the reputation of powerful, rich and potentially beneficent state anxious and able to exercise a stabilizing influence.⁹⁵ Developments in Afghanistan as well as in South Yemen and Ethiopia illustrate a change (which began in 1971-77) in the mode of Soviet ideological and political expansionism in the Third World.⁹⁶

For example, the emergence of pro-Soviet Marxist-Leninist government in Kabul has intensified the security concerns of Iran and Pakistan because Afghanistan is in a particularly good position to help pro-Soviet forces in these two countries only parts of 1000 mile border between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the 400 mile stretch between Afghanistan and Iran.⁹⁷ The Pakistanis are particularly worried for the existence of a

94. Ibid., p.277.

95. See, Geoffrey, Wheeler., "The Indian Ocean Area: Soviet Aims and Objectives", Asian Affairs, vol.59, October 1972, p.171.

96. Hannah, Negeran., "The Afghan Coup of April 1978: Revolution and International Security", Orbis, vol.23, no.1, Spring 1979, p.93.

97. Ibid., p.105.

Marxist-Leninist government in Afghanistan extends Soviet influence to within 350 miles of the Arabian sea.⁹⁸ The increased Super Powers arms supplies to the Third World countries, is also one of the major problem to create instability in the Third World.

(b) Inter Play of Historical Forces in the Third World

The role of Super Power strategic doctrines in international relations, has promoted a more flexible range of options.⁹⁹ The stability of central strategic balance during the past 15 years or so has been based on primarily on the acceptance by both Super Powers of what amounts to military defeat, both sides have agreed to loose in the face of overwhelming nuclear capability as well as adequate credibility. In consequence of this tacit acceptance of strategic defeat, stability at the nuclear level has been secured.

A Common understanding of the limits and the dangers of brinkmanship produced a pattern of crisis where

98. Ibid., p. 106.

99. Lord Trevelyan., "The Balance of Power in 1975", India International Centre Quarterly (New Delhi), vol. 3, no. 1, January 1976, p. 38.

100. Lawrence S. Hagen, "Potente derailed: The Dilemmas of a Misbegotten Concept", Journal of International Studies (Toronto), vol. 8, no. 1, Spring 1979, p. 64.

the tensions of Berlin and Korea were replaced by the relative calm and restraint of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the Vietnam Conflict and the Czechoslovakia invasion of 1968.¹⁰⁰

It might be argued at this point the relative equanimity with which the Soviet Union - United States have reacted to events in Indo-China and Iran indicate that the 'disaggregation' of crisis outlined earlier with respect to Vietnam and Czechoslovakia has been successfully repeated in these cases.¹⁰¹ For example the Middle East still possesses a substantial risk of hostilities which could involve the Soviet Union and the United States. For thirty years, through four Arab-Israeli conflicts, Soviet and American interests have been interlocked in the Middle East.¹⁰² The strategic equation in the Third World are related to the strategic East-West confrontation, but they are ultimately the result of volatile developments with historical roots which cannot be ignored.

100. See, Lawrence S. Hagen., "Detente Derailed: The Dilemma of a Misbegotten Concept", Journal of International Studies (Toronto), vol.8, no.1, Spring 1979, p.64.

101. Ibid., p.65.

102. Marshall L. Shulman., "U.S. - Soviet Relations in the American Perspective", Survival, vol.xii, no.1, January/February, 1978, p.28.

(b) The Dynamics of Regional Conflicts in the Third World

It is possible to put together the following observations on regional conflicts:

(1) West Asia (Arab-Israel Conflict): Early in 1967 border incidents between Israel and Arabs increased enormously, especially on Israeli-Syrian border.¹⁰³

As expected, the crisis at once brought the Super Powers into the dispute.¹⁰⁴ President Lyndon B. Johnson of the U.S. stated that the closure of the Gulf of Agaba had added a "new and grave dimension" to the crisis. He declared that the U.S. considered the Gulf to be an "international water way" and that the blockage was "illegal" and potentially disastrous to the cause of peace.¹⁰⁵

The Soviet government promptly issued a statement in which it blamed Israel for the dangerous aggravation of tension in the near East. It alleged

103. H.S. Agwani, "Issues and Prospects", World Focus (New Delhi), no.8, August, 1980.

104. New York Times, 10 April, 1967.

105. A.G. Naidu, "The United States and the Arab-Israel Conflict of 1967", International Studies (New Delhi), vol.19, no.2, April/June 1980, p.161.

that Israel was receiving direct/indirect encouragement for its aggressive actions from certain "imperialist circles which were determined to impose colonial oppression", on the Arab East. It warned: Should any one try to unleash aggression in the Near East, he would be met not only with the united strength of Arab countries but also with strong opposition to aggression from the Soviet Union and all peace-loving countries.¹⁰⁶

The two super powers thus took a diametrically opposite views of the crisis.¹⁰⁷ Since 1967 Israel has been consistently taking about the preservation of its security and the achievement of peace with its Arab neighbours.¹⁰⁸

The outbreak of the war of 1973 was caused mainly the Arab attempts to put an end to the statement produced by such policy. Thus Super Power involvement brought the antagonism and deterioration

106. Ibid.

107. Ibid.

108. op.cit., n.103, p.4.

between the two countries.¹⁰⁹

II. The Gulf: Iraq-Iran Conflict

The Iraq-Iran war brought tension throughout the world.¹¹⁰ Iraq's dissatisfaction with the 1975 Algerian agreement.¹¹¹ Its involvement in the recent Iranian Kurdish uprising, several border skirmishes between the two states and Iranian border.¹¹² Ayatollah's call to Iraqis to raise against the Saddam government all indicated the growing tension between the two countries. President Saddam's dissatisfaction with Algerian settlement. In November 1979 he officially asked Iran for the abrogation of the treaty and the return of small border areas and the Shat-al Arab to Iraq.¹¹³ He also demanded autonomy for what he considers 'oppressed national minorities' i.e. the Kurds and Baluchis. This was followed by his repudiation of the 1975 agreement five days later, on 22 September, the Iraqi forces launched the offensive.¹¹⁴

109. H.S. Agwani., Politics in the Gulf (New Delhi), November 11, 1980.

110. Sreedhar, "The Iran-Iraq War: A Preliminary Assessment", Foreign Affairs Report, vol. XXIX, no.2, December, 1980, p.250.

111. Times of India (New Delhi), November 11, 1980.

112. Ibid., 113. Ibid.

114. Mehrunnisa Ali., "The Impact of the Iran-Iraq War", Pakistan Horizon (Karachi, vol. XXXIII, no.4, 1980, p.21.

Deterioration in Iraq-Soviet relations was evident in the Kremlin's behaviour during Iran-Iraq war.¹¹⁵ Soviets seemed to have refused Iraq's request for the resupply of arms during the early days of the fighting,¹¹⁶ and were even rumoured to have offered military aid to Tehran.

Moreover, Moscow chose Iraq's movement of maximum danger to enter into a new political and military relationship with Syria, one of the few Arab countries openly critical, of Iraq in its war against Iran.¹¹⁷

Secondly, probably Egypt's withdrawal from Arab politics in the wake of the Camp David agreement.¹¹⁸

Iran's revolution and gulf war were shown that oil is the most insecure commodity. There seems to be a great threat to the developed economy in their failure to appreciate the full range of problems in

115. Times of India, November 15, 1980.

116. Ibid.

117. M.R. Brett Crowther., "Iraq and Iran at War: The Effects on the Developments", Round Table (London), no.218, January 1981, p.163.

118. See, Adood I. Davisha., "Iraq: The West Opportunity", Foreign Policy, no.41, Winter 1980-81, pp.130-39.

switching from oil to nuclear energy and in their continued industrialization to the detriment of all that is nonmechanical.¹¹⁹

III. Africa: Angolan Conflict

The collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire and the acceleration of the struggle for black majority rule have to make South Africa one of the Centres of contemporary international conflict.¹²⁰ Unfortunately, however, although not unexpected by Soviet American rivalry has also been interjected into South African Affairs adding additional tension and danger to an already volatile situation. The second major change was the successful intervention by Soviet Union and Cuba in Angola which alone ensured the triumph of popular liberation movement (MPLA).¹²⁰

The Angolan affair falls into three categories:

Firstly, establishing and improving relations with the front line states of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, strengthening and supporting national liberation movement.

119. M.R. Bratt Croxther, n.117, p.65.

120. Robert H. Donaldson (eds.), n.18, p.69.

121. Please see for detailed information, Legun Colin and Hodges Tony, After Angola the War Over Southern Africa (London, 1976), p.4.

Secondly, the reduction of Western Europe influence in the area and the PRC influence in the area.

Finally and perhaps most important of all, obtaining military base rights and reconnaissance rights in the area; reducing Western European access to the rich mineral resources of the region; and threatening the oil supply lines of the US and Western Europe, thereby accelerating the so called Finalization.¹²²

The Soviet motivations in Angolan situation in 1965-74 looking at the internal dynamics of Angolan politics, it is clear that the Soviet Union always favoured the Marxist MPLA over its rivals, the FNLA and UNITA.¹²³

Once the MPLA declared the establishment PRA and Soviets extended immediate recognition. The FNLA and UNITA had actually instituted a rival government in the city to Nova Lisboa (Huambo),

122. Donaldson, n.18, p.70.

123. Nathaniel Davis, "The Angola Decision of 1975: A Personal Memoir", Foreign Affairs, Fall 1978, pp. 120-21.

but not one state extended official recognition.¹²⁴

True, Moscow had had long association with NGTO's popular Movement for Liberation of Angola (MPLA) could emerge victorious¹²⁵ the point to note then that USSR intervened, with the aid of Cuba to the extent it did simply to maintain the status quo with the Western powers.

(iv) Kampuchea

The most unexpected and fateful development in a region which had only recently seen the end of a devastating war involving external power was the violent struggle between Hanoi and the Polpot regime in Kampuchea (Cambodia), culminating in the Vietnamese backed dissident takeover only in 1979. This was exacerbated by a bitter dispute between Vietnam and China with all its overtones of Sino-Soviet rivalry.¹²⁶

124. op.cit., n.18, pp.79-124.

125. See, Oye Ogunbadejo., "Soviet Policies in Africa", African Affairs (London), vol.79, no.316, July 1980, p.309.

126. Mohammed Ayoob (ed.), Conflict and Intervention in the Third World (New Delhi, 1980), p.12.

The Communist Party of Kampuchea's experience however had been one of the intense and violent class struggle against the bureaucracy, whether headed by Sihanouk or by Lon Nol. Thus the seizing of the power the communist party led by the Polpot.¹²⁷ On the other hand, Peking pursued its balance of power policy in South East Asia (SEA) with the aim both of rallying, third world support against Soviet hegemony and of isolating the Vietnamese. This dualism became increasingly unmanageable, however, as Kampuchea and Vietnam were drawn into conflict.¹²⁸

(v) Afghanistan

The Russian intervention in Afghanistan, has shaken the world and it has inaugurated a new period of strategic competition.¹²⁹ Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has brought the conflict between Super Powers to the doors of Indian sub-continent.¹³⁰ It will also

127. Ibid.

128. Ibid.

129. Time (London), 7 January, 1980, pp.50-51.

130. Nirmala Joshi, "Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan", Foreign Affairs Report (New Delhi), vol. xxix, no.7, July 1980, p.125.

have an impact on developments in the entire Indian Ocean region; the fact is that the military intervention in Afghanistan is an important departure from the confirmed Soviet behavioural pattern,¹³¹ and has affected the perception of many Third World countries of the reliability of the Soviet Union as an ally.

(d) The End of Detente and the Implication of Super Power Confrontation for the Third World

The year 1980 has been marked by growing tension and conflict on the international scene. East West relations have become strained by a new spiral in the nuclear arms race in Europe and also the Afghanistan crisis.¹³²

The Afghanistan crisis was more part of an on-going process of aggravation in International relations, clearly seen well in advance. It was reflected in the mounting clashes of the imperial interests between the Super Powers around the globe.¹³³

131. Ibid.

132. Marek, Theo., "The World in Tension: The Drift from Detente to Confrontation", Bulletin of Peace Proposal (New York), 1980, p.103.

133. Hagen., n.100, pp.51-64.

Obviously, the Afghan resistance to Soviet domination, actively supported by neighbouring states, spools out protracted military operations. The real danger to world peace stems from competitive interplay and clashes of interest with the US decision-makers talking of selective targetting in order to gain potential control over highly sensitive energy resources around the Persian gulf.¹³⁴ Given the volatile political situation in the region - the rapid strike forces not withstanding relatively inadequate to respond to possible contingencies, nuclear escalation becomes a threatening perspective.

IV. Political Problems in Extending Detente to Third World Countries

The sheer complexity of detente balancing - holding the Soviet Union, China, the Western allies in a complicated net work of associations with the United States involves conflict as well as cooperation.¹³⁵ When the Soviets use the word 'detente' to mean the same thing as peaceful co-existence they make it

134. Marek Tucek, n.132, p.106.

135. See, Richard Rosecrance, "Detente or Entente?" Foreign Affairs, April 1975, vol.53, no.3, p.464.

clear, it implies no change in their basic objectives, while they expect that current tactics will weaken the West and strengthen the socialist states.¹³⁶

The Middle East War of 1973 raised important and still unanswered questions about detente's value in both Moscow and Washington. Meanwhile the oil crisis had signalled new and yet undigested shifts in economic power and compounded the already grave twin problems of inflation and recession throughout the world.¹³⁷ American critics claim that the United States has gained little and lost much from its 'special relationship' with the USSR. In Middle East crisis of 1973, it is contended that the Soviet Union first did little to restrain its clients but then threatened to intervene to save them from Israeli counter offensiveness.¹³⁸

136. *Mitze.*, vol.54, no.2, January 1976, p.120.

137. *Roscrance*, n.135, p.465.

138. See *Ibid.*, p.468.

(a) Relationship between Internal and External Conflicts:

Internal conflicts are those within the State with some ideological differences. Whereas external conflicts are those in this current phase arising out of Super Power involvement in the third world countries. The peculiar character and problems of a region are submerged in extraneous considerations when strategy for external conflicts is developed at Super Power level. In an era when both sides are keen to provide superior fire power to the parties to the conflict, the Third World is bound to experience dangerous vulnerability at the political and military levels.

(b) Changing Nature of Conventional Warfare:

The Soviet use of force outside the Warsaw Pact countries threatens to upset the trends towards peaceful coexistence in the Third World, which seemed hopeful after the end of war in Indochina. There is no way in which dangerous conflicts can be prevented from escalating into warfare unless the two Super Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States reduce their over commitment.¹³⁹ The changing

139. Dimitri, Sines., "The Anti-Soviet Brigade", Foreign Policy (New York), Winter 1979-80, pp.28-42.

character of warfare is directly related to the sort of political instability the world is witnessing. While there is talk of balanced and mutual force reductions in Europe, the role of military force is becoming more important in the Third World. The wars of liberation in the African territories under Portuguese rule showed that political purposes could not be achieved without the employment of military power. But there is no denying the fact that the military environment was made more complicated by the induction of foreign troops such as the Cubans and the South Africans.¹⁴⁰ Conflicting ideologies and political rivalries produced strategic interactions and force postures which nullified efforts to extend detente to the Third World. The decision-makers who have to conduct "internal wars" have to constantly relate themselves to the changing political and legal structure in the country. Each side in the conflict promotes the image of being revolutionary and calling the other counter-revolutionary. Super Power help by airlifting military equipment was of decisive importance both in the case

140. See, Weeks, Albert Loren., The Troubled Detente (New York; ~~New York University~~, 1975).

of Soviet help to Syria and Egypt and of American help to Israel. While on the one hand efforts have been made to strengthen international security, the changing nature of conventional warfare has made the task of multilateral diplomacy for peacemaking more difficult in local situations. Each protagonist in a crisis can take advantage of the balance of forces and thus exercise disproportionate influence on the Super Power policy makers.¹⁴¹ In the case of a regional crisis like Afghanistan the increase in international tension and instability provides the interaction between global and regional relationships and also leads to miscalculations.¹⁴² The possibilities of guerrilla warfare and terrorism may radically change the situation to the extent of even changing the military posture of a Super Power, leading it to huge concentration of troops which may turn out to be counter-productive.

(c) Third World Perceptions of the Soviet American Strategic Balance

The USA and USSR as the new centres of power were making an all out effort to form global alliance

141. Pat, McGowan, (eds.), Threats, Weapons and Foreign Policy (Sage, 1980).

142. Michael, Nacht., "Toward an American Conception of Regional Security", Daedalus (Cambridge, Massachusetts), Winter 1981, pp.1-22.

to contain each other's power and influence. As such issues affecting the Third World like the remaining vestiges of European colonialism, racism and racial discrimination and problems of economic under-development, were perforce relegated in the background to the overriding demands of East West confrontation. A number of Third World countries were lured into the alliance system by economic and military aid programmes and also in response to the promittings of their individual domestic setting.¹⁴³

The subsequent events in Cambodia, Laos, Somalia, Ethiopia, Angola, South Yemen and Zaire, though not all to Soviet advantages, gave evidence of Soviet determination (with the aid of Cuba and other proxies) to expand the sway of Soviet influence across Africa and the routes of access to the Persian Gulf. The revolution in Iran and later seizure of US diplomats as hostages and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan demonstrated the much more convincingly the depth and extent of the problem.¹⁴⁴

143. See, for detailed analysis, S.C. Tiwari, "Third World Issues: Problems and Prospects", The Indian Journal of Political Studies, (Jodhpur), vol.5, no.1, January 1979, p.80.

144. Paul H. Nitze, "Strategy in the Decade of 1980s", Foreign Affairs, vol.59, no.1, Fall 1980, p.86.

(d) Conflict and Regional Order in the Third World: The Need for Structural Adjustments for Maintaining and Extending detente

Since the World War II, too violence and conflict have continued to plague the world. Asia has passed through conflict situations more frequently than any other continent. These regions of the continent - South East Asia, South Asia and West Asia have witnessed specially bitter conflicts.¹⁴⁵ These conflicts in the region escalated due to the weak political systems, and low level of economic development. As a result of this taking 'aid' from the Super Powers in turn Super Powers domination over third world countries.

It is difficult to accept the contention the purpose 'of American power in Persian gulf' is to solely ensure access to the region's oil supplies'.¹⁴⁶ As we have argued, Super Powers' military aid is one of the key factors which enhances instability in the region, since it is related to pressures for globalization.

145. See, K.P. Misra., "The Concept of Security", India International Centre Quarterly, vol.3, no.2, April 1976, p.86.

146. William, Zarnan., "The Power of American Purposes", The Middle East Journal (Washington, DC), vol.35, no.2, Spring 1981, p.164.

The need for structural adjustments for maintaining and extending detente should make us skeptical about the role of deterrence in all Third World conflict situations. The overriding goals of Third World policies should be cooperation, tension reduction and improvement of domestic policies. Improvement of domestic societies refers to stability through egalitarian democracy. The instruments of national power base to be modified to fulfil detente related propositions. This means a less hierarchical system with a qualitative international politics perspective.¹⁴⁷

Indeed, cooperation between Super Powers and the Third World countries, may be sustained by a common endeavour to dismantle strategic and convention military build up wherever it has taken place in the Third World.

147. See for detailed analysis, Erich Weede., "Threats to Detente: Intuitive Hopes and Counterintuitive Realities", European Journal of Political Research (Amsterdam), vol.5, no.4, December 1977, p.407.

The Data for the Study: A Note on the Questionnaire and Interviews

This study begins with the premise that relationship of great powers to international peace and security cannot be considered adequately without taking into account the political costs of deployment of military forces in the Third World. We are concerned with the structural and behavioural consequences of the "Intervention in Afghanistan" and important policy choices must be made by Third World political elites and foreign policy decision-makers if their countries are not to face endemic conflicts, tensions and crises. In order to analyse the political causes of the intervention in Afghanistan and to understand the traditionally volatile nature of Afghan politics and to relate it to the conflictual aspects of the global system, it was considered necessary to ascertain the views of Afghan elites, and professional classes. It was not easy to obtain access to the interests concerned in Afghanistan proper: the Soviet forces, the Karmal regime or the "freedom fighters". The presence of Afghan refugees in New Delhi and frequent official visitors from Kabul to India, however, provided an opportunity for meaningful examination of political processes and institutions relevant to the Afghanistan

crisis. To obtain evidence on the interlocking factors affecting other Third World countries structured interviews were conducted with officials and academic scholars from Pakistan, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, the Palestine Liberation Organisation, Ethiopia, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia. Finally detailed discussions with Indian academics and present and former officials with first hand experience of Afghanistan were immensely profitable to understand Soviet Indian and Afghan perceptions of the military intervention in Afghanistan. Perception of key issues and the evaluation of contradictory pressures was sought under both regional and global levels but what was of interest to the argument of this study was the range of policy orientations which would reduce Afghanistan's vulnerability to Super Power interventionism. The Questionnaire utilised deliberately chose to interrelate information relating to: the U.S. - Soviet strategic balance, the Soviet military intervention, the insurgency, the Islamic-Marxist syndrome, the cross-interests represented at the Nonaligned Conference and the Islamic Conference. Data was sought to be obtained on attitudes and roles which could generate a peace dynamic leading to a political solution.

The Super Powers and Afghanistan

- Q.1 From a cursory review of the strategic developments from 1975 - 80, what are your conclusions regarding the effects of the United States - Soviet strategic balance on Afghanistan's security relationships? Is the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan related to changes in the strategic doctrine of the Soviet Union?
- Q.2 In your view, is the solution of the Afghanistan crisis related to the framework of strategic stability between the Soviet Union and United States?

The Soviet Presence in Afghanistan

- Q.3 Evaluate the evidence produced by the Soviet Union that the consent of the Afghan Government was available from the outset for the induction of Soviet troops.
- Q.4 Can Soviet military action be justified as legitimate self-defence? On whom would you place the responsibility for escalating conflict?
- Q.5 What are the basic imperatives for the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and what are the disincentives?

- Q.6 Evaluate Soviet will and ability to sustain a long-term military presence in Afghanistan?

The Guerrilla Actions and Political Struggles

- Q.7 What is your assessment of the relation between civil resistance and violent forms of action in Afghanistan?
- Q.8 Evaluate the chances of an Afghan guerrilla struggle achieving success against the Soviet occupying forces?
- Q.9 What is the nature of support available to the Afghan guerrillas from: (a) US and Western Powers; (b) China; (c) Muslim countries?
- Q.10 Evaluate the legitimacy and support of the Afghan resistance groups?

Islamic-Marxist Relations in Afghanistan

- Q.11 What are the political and doctrinal reasons for the confrontation of Afghans upholding traditional Islamic values and 'Marxist' 'modernisers'? In your view is there a realistic possibility of a modus vivendi between the two?

Q.12 What are the prospects that the Afghan Government (Karnal) can succeed in promoting the acceptance of the emphasis of Marxism-Leninism on the course of social development? What are the implications of the links between Afghan nationalism and Islamic religious affiliations of the people?

The Non-aligned Conference and Afghanistan:

Q.13 How does the Afghanistan problem pose a challenge to the Non-aligned movement? What are the conditions for a successful initiative by the non-aligned countries?

The Islamic Conference:

Q.14 What are the practical consequences - including financial commitments and other tradeoffs - of the role played by the Islamic political community?

The Political Solution Prospects:

Q.15 What kind of restraint in Super Power competition is necessary to promote a political solution?

- Q. 16 What are the flexible political options which can be adopted by each of the parties which are influencing the Afghan situation?
- Q. 17 How do you see the pattern of priorities in a successful bargaining process?
- Q. 18 What are the economic, political and strategic influences which can influence a consensus for a political solution?
- Q. 19 What will be the nature of strategic interactions after Soviet troop withdrawal?
- Q. 20 What will be the general credibility and impact of a Political Solution?

CHAPTER - II

**THE DETERIORATION OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS
AFTER AFGHANISTAN**

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The manoeuvrability of the Soviet Union and the United States vis-a-vis each other was lastingly effected by the new force structures which were established following the acquisition by the Soviet Union of nuclear weaponry and the need to arrive at a new measure of strategic balance by 1951. The Soviet Union's contiguity to large areas of the Third World and the appeal of its revolutionary ideology together with the new diplomatic and military choices which Khrushchev from 1955 offered to Third World countries had a profoundly disturbing effect on American perceptions of Soviet "expansionist" policies. In this respect there were some examples of American overreaction and search for simple remedies to solve the problems posed by the Soviet challenge. Those who looked exclusively at American military assets, even considered scenarios in which the United States would utilise the opportunity provided by the favourable balance of military power to launch a preemptive attack on the Soviet Union and eliminate the communist danger to the

world once for all.¹ Of course the evidence that such proposals were seriously considered at highest decision making level is quite ambiguous and incomplete. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 showed that the Super Power military relationship could lead to destabilizing results although both the Super Powers wished to avoid a nuclear confrontation. The difficulties in Soviet-United States relations had therefore to be seen in a wider strategic context particularly when Super Power intervention policies disturbed indigenous and regional balances in the Third World. The American intervention in Vietnam added to Soviet suspicions and exacerbated America's relations with Third World countries.

The persistent deficiency of conventional force levels in the United States security policy as well as NATO policy led to an emphasis in American decision-making circles either on theatre nuclear postures or on wars by proxy. The United States intervention in Third World conflict areas often showed insensitivity to

1. See, Adam Ulam, "How to Restrain the Soviets", Commentary (New York), December 1980, pp.38-41. See also Paul Nitze, Strategy in the Decade of the 1990; Foreign Policy, Fall 1980, pp.82-101.

the constraints which the newly independent countries wished to impose. The United States' dependence on foreign strategic raw materials often brought it close to viewpoints which were derived from colonial legacies.²

It was only by the late 1960s that the goals of both the Super Power actors included the recognition of the equal status of both of them as global powers. Although deeply enmeshed in Vietnam, the United States began to have altered perception of international security as it discovered that its use of military force was costly domestically and insupportable in the long run. As the Sino-Soviet dispute created a new hierarchy of political issues, the United States began to contemplate playing the China card. The Sino-American normalisation provided the United States with more room for manoeuvre in the post-Vietnam phase, but it did not exert enough pressure over international security issues in such a way as to keep the U.S. - Soviet competition within narrow bounds. Thus for Great Power intervention in the Third World to be contained in an overall structure model would require precise prescrip-

2. Colin Gray and Keith Payne, "Victory is Possible", Foreign Policy, Summer 1980, pp. 14-27.

tions for policies which could produce equilibrium patterns in Third World international relations.³ Summit conferences could have helped to keep the competitive element in Great Power relationships under control. As we shall see, it will not be an overstatement to argue that fluidity rather than equilibrium has influenced the power capabilities of the great powers leading to interventionism in the Third World.

The United Nations Security Council was expected in the Charter framework to prevent conflicts and situations escalating through the rise of international tensions. The failure of the U.N. system to function in this arena is the direct result of Soviet and American assertiveness. Peace and security in the Third World in the face of perceptible power politics required that the Security Council should have prevented outside interference in the internal affairs of the developing nations. Instead of developing Soviet-American relations for the accomplishment of ideals

3. William H. Kincaid and Jeffrey D. Porro, Negotiating Security: An Arms Control Reader (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1979).

like those enunciated in the "Basic principles of mutual relations between the USSR and the USA" at the summit on 28 May, 1972, the two Super Powers have been drawing the lines of potential conflict in the Third World. Events like the Arab use of the oil embargo and the Iranian Revolution have created new centres of decision and of political action and also effected the balance of regional forces. Instead of extending detente to the military field Super Power actions have failed to provide advantageous solutions. The SALT negotiations were jeopardised and the promised US-Soviet negotiations for denuclearisation of the Indian Ocean were indefinitely postponed, although at the Vladivostok summit Brezhnev had emphatically urged that the Soviet Union and the United States should cooperate to eliminate the remaining hotbeds of tension.⁴ The European Security Conference (CSCE) appeared to strengthen the trend towards detente and the trade offs between the two sides in Europe were expected to be part of a broader processes towards peaceful coexistence. The Soviet intervention in Afghanis-

4. See, Leonid I. Brezhnev, Socialism, Peace, Freedom and Independence of the Peoples (Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1982).

ten with the direct involvement of Russian troops in a non-aligned country was perceived as a dramatic reversal of the principles for Super Power consensus.

Soviet-American relations deteriorated during the late 1960s, largely although not entirely as a result of the Vietnam war. But the relations once again deteriorated after the leftist coup in Kabul in April 1978 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 created critical situation for the United States, complicating its relations with the USSR and with the neighbouring states of the region as well as threatening its strategic interests in the Middle-East and South Asia.⁵ In particular, the Carter Administration saw the military build up, combined with its expanded means of projecting power overseas, as a serious threat to vital American security interests around the world. This assumption lay at the root of the so-called Carter Doctrine, defined in President Carter's State of the Union message in early 1980: "Any attempt by any outside power to gain control over the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital

5. See, Leon D. Poulada, "Afghanistan and the United States: The Crucial Years", The Middle East Journal, vol. 35, no. 2, Spring 1981, p. 178.

interest of the United States of America and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including 'military force' ".⁶ Implicit in the Carter Doctrine was the notion that the United States would erect a military shield around the Persian Gulf to safeguard oil supplies vital for the West. The United States sent aircraft carriers and other naval units to waters near Persian Gulf and declared the region "off limits" to the Soviet Union.⁷ The recent Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan a strategically important country close to the rich oil fields of the Persian Gulf, is a dangerous development with serious repercussions for world peace and security. It is not just national problem of 15 million Afghans or a regional problem of South Asia, or even a problem involving only the special or exclusive interests of some countries of Western Europe and the United States. It is a major international problem concerning freedom and independence of nations and peoples.⁸

6. See, Alfred L. Monke, The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan (Washington, D.C., and London, 1981), p.32, also see, Pravda, January 26, 1980.

7. Ibid.

8. For detailed analysis see B. Vivekanandan, "Afghanistan Invasion Viewed from India", Asia Pacific Community, no.9, Summer 1980, pp.63-82.

In his strongest language he had ever directed against Moscow, President Carter said, "such gross interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan is in blatant violation of accepted international rules of behaviour and a grave threat to peace".⁹ President Carter conveyed the same harsh message to Leonid Brezhnev personally on the rarely used White House - Kremlin "hot line".¹⁰ At the same time, the President got in touch directly with the Western European leaders and President Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan, among others in an attempt to obtain a collective condemnation of Moscow. As a result Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher was dispatched to London over the weekend to discuss the situation with the US allies.¹¹ Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was roundly condemned by an overwhelming majority in both UN and Islamic conference organisation.¹²

9. International Herald Tribune, December 29-30, 1979.

10. New York Times, 1 January 1980.

11. Time (London), 7 January 1980, pp.50-51 and also see Strobe Talbott, "US-Soviet Relations: From Dad to Horse", Foreign Affairs, vol.58, no.3, 1979, p.517.

12. See for detailed information, UN Document A/ES-6/FV.2, 10-16 January 1980. In General Assembly, January 14, 1980, 104 called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and only 18,

Carter summoned home from Moscow his Ambassador, Thomas J. Werten, Jr., sharply cut-back on the sale of grain and advanced technology to the Soviet Union, and he asked the Senate to postpone indefinitely its consideration of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty.¹³

Apart from these adverse developments in Afghanistan, the most memorable and outrageous event during 1979 had been the death of US Ambassador to Kabul, Adolph Dubois. SALT II inevitably fueled an already vigorous debate and as a result relations between the Super Powers deteriorated.

1. The Return of Cold War Politics

Soviet move into Afghanistan relates to the character of international politics. With a new Cold War in the offing, the struggle between the USSR and the US has again become the dominant fact of international politics.¹⁴

.../..

including the Soviet Union, Byelorussia and the Ukraine voted against. In the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference in Islamabad, January 26, 1980, at least 36 members of the Islamic conference organisation condemned the Soviet Union for its "military aggression" against Afghanistan.

13. See, Talbott, n.11, p.518.

14. Monks, n.6, p.33.

The Soviet attitude and reactions to the events in this area have to be viewed against the developments in the strategic relationship between the two Super Powers over the last three years. There were distinct signs that detente between the Super Powers was breaking down and each Super Power accused the other of responsibility for deterioration in the relationship.¹⁵

In the first twenty years after the Second World War, the United States was the true Super Power which had reached the mobility while the Soviet Union was struggling to catch up with American capability. During the first Cold War, when the Soviet Union was an inferior Super Power, it had to backdown in a number of confrontations when the United States of America threatened to escalate them. Since the events of 1979 in Afghanistan the Soviet Union having become, and been accepted as a Super Power in the same class as the United States, cannot be expected to backdown from confrontations, as it used to do in fifties and sixties.¹⁶

15. K. Subrahmanyam, "The Afghan Situation and India's National Interest", Foreign Affairs Report, vol. xxix, no. 8, August 1980, p. 149.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 148-49.

However, the change of international system from Cold War bipolarity to a detente near-multi polarity was, to Kissinger, a transformation from a revolutionary order to a legitimate order. Kissinger believed that the Soviet leaders had come to realise that maintaining the status quo was in their favour, and pursuing a revolutionary policy entailed too heavy a price. In other words, the Soviet leadership had come to assume a legitimate orientation along with the United States. As both the states were at the summit of international power and status pyramid and were also aware that other forces and nations in world politics might rise to challenge their ascendancy, they established detente as the mode of relationship between them.¹⁷

As a result of the 1979 Afghanistan invasion, there will undoubtedly be a flow of weapons across the highly porous Afghan-Pakistan frontier.¹⁸ Thus the Soviet intervention has once again brought "Cold War" between Super Powers to the doors of the Indian sub-continent.¹⁹

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17. For detailed emphasis, see, Richard Rosceranco, "Detente or Entente", Foreign Affairs, vol.53, no.3, April 1975, p.474.
 18. Hullman, "Keeping Cool at the Khyber Pass", Foreign Policy, no.38, Spring 1980, p.13.
 19. Shafiqat Hussain Naghmi, "A Return to Cold War: Soviet American Relations After Afghanistan", Strategic Studies (Islamabad), vol.iv, no.2, Winter 1981, pp.47-59.

(a) Hegemonial Ambitions of the Super Powers

It is now new experience for the nations of the Third World to find their region an arena for the conflicts of the world's Great Powers.²⁰ Since the World War II, the United States has assumed the major responsibility for the defence of western interests and for confronting or containing the southward push of Russian power. With two Great Powers, or Super Powers in the world after the Second World War, ideologically hostile and fearful to each other's intentions, it was inevitable that the areas lying between them should be drawn into global competition known as Cold War.²¹

Hegemonial ambitions of Super Powers are understandable in the Third World countries. Afghanistan is the eighth country in Asia and Africa to fall under Soviet control within the last five years. It comes after Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Benin, South Yemen, Laos and Kampuchea, one may add even Vietnam in this

20. See Andre Fontaine, History of the Cold War (London, 1970), pp.461-90.

21. See, Rosceranco, n.17, pp.461-90.

category since it is practically a client state of the Soviet Union.²² Further during Daoud's period, increased Soviet-American presence to balance Soviet influence and that American aid has been increased to provide an alternative to compete Soviet domination and preserve Afghanistan's freedom and non-alignment.²³ For their self interest Soviets took an active part in the overthrow of Mohammed Daoud. There appears to be some evidence in the pressure exerted by the Soviet Union on the two factions of Afghan Communists to unite on the eve of the April Revolution in 1978.²⁴

The Soviet involvement is a bold example of interference in the internal affairs of a country. In retrospect, it would not be wrong to generalise that the Soviet Union initially uses non-military methods to achieve its vital objectives in areas of crucial importance and that it does not hesitate to use military means to achieve its objectives where non-violent methods fail.²⁵

22. Vivchanandan, n.8, pp.75-76.

23. Foulds, n.5, p.104.

24. See, Nirmala Joshi, "Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan", Foreign Affairs Report, vol.xxix, no.7, July 1980, pp.130-31.

25. Ibid., p.131.

In the name of Treaty of Friendship, good neighbourliness, and cooperation with Afghanistan, Soviet military advisors swelled from about 350 to 1,000 by December 1978 and to 1,500 to 2,000 by June 1979.²⁶ Thus, the Super Powers' hegimomial attitudes are increasing for their interest and deteriorating the economy of the poor countries.

(b) Atlantic Unity Under Stress and Strain

"Stability" it has been said, "is a first priority objective of a Great Power in the nuclear age". In fact, since the Second World War, the fundamental strategic objective of the United States' defence policy has been to maintain the stability of two closely inter-related balances: (a) the Soviet-American strategic nuclear balance; and (b) the theater military balance in Europe.²⁷

It is also very clear, however, that the security of the United States cannot yet be decoupled from that

26. Ibid., p.134.

27. See, Alan Ned Sabrosky, "America in NATO: The Conventional Delusion", ORBIS, vol.25, no.2, Summer 1981, p.293.

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of Western Europe which has been and remains, ultimately dependent on the ability of the United States to maintain a stable military balance in the European theater. There is little doubt that Europe is the key theater of operations for U.S. forces. It is the principal area of direct confrontation between Soviet Union and the United States, and the US commitment to the Defense of Europe provides the principal rationale for maintaining the US army at its present force level.²⁸

On 1980s, NATO faces new strategic challenges which will require innovative and courageous responses. The primary factor understanding the current military situation is the unabated growth of Soviet military power over the past 15 years. In the 1960s, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact found themselves in a position of inferiority in strategic nuclear and theater nuclear forces.

Until the 1970s, the Soviets invested their resources to maintain a numerical advantage in men and equipment. But in recent years, they have directed their efforts both toward maintaining their quantitative lead and towards eliminating the qualitative advantage on which western security has depended.

28. Ibid., p.294.

But it is in the area of quality that the Soviets have made their most impressive gains. In the last decade they have deployed the mobile SS-20 ballistic missile, attack air crafts, the most heavily armed attack helicopters in the world, over 10,000 modern T-64/T-72 tanks etc.

The relentless growth and modernisation of Soviet military power has resulted in an increasingly adverse force balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact.²⁹ The broadened strategic environment contains the added menace of the demonstrated Soviet willingness and capability to project her military power abroad for political purposes. East Berlin in 1953, Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968, the USSR demonstrated her willingness to employ her combat forces against her European neighbours. The most recent example of Afghanistan signifies her readiness to employ Soviet combat forces outside Europe under an extension of the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine.³⁰

More importantly, by virtue of Afghanistan invasion, the Soviets have acquired a better position to

29. General Bernard W. Rogers, "Increasing Threat to the NATO's Security Call for Sustained Response", NATO Review (Washington, D.C.), vol.29, no.3, June 1981, pp.1-2.

30. Ibid., p.3.

threaten a reason whose resources are indispensable to the economics and the military readiness of the West. Thus, due to the increased Soviet capability over USA and employing their combat forces outside Europe are the main reasons for the Atlantic Unity stress and strain.

(c) Soviet Political and Ideological Framework: Issues and Responses

The first priority of Soviet Union is security.³¹ In terms of global interests, the Soviet Union is concerned with the new economic grounds for Soviet expansionism.³² Developments in Afghanistan as well as in South Yemen and Ethiopia, illustrate a change (which began in 1971-1974) in the mode of Soviet ideological and political expansionism in the Third World: Through treaties, the following illustration shows the Soviet treaties of friendship and cooperation:³³

31. Cited in Monks, n.6, p.20.

32. Eoweryn Bialor, "The Harsh Decade: Soviet Politics in the 1930s", Foreign Affairs, vol.59, no.5, Summer 1981, pp.1016-17.

33. See, D.N. Soth Singleton, "The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan", Air University Review (Washington, D.C.), vol.xxxii, no.3, March/April 1981, p.11.

Table - 1Soviet Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation

India	..	1971
Egypt	..	1971 (abrogated March 1976)
Iraq	..	1972
Somalia	..	1974 (abrogated November 1977)
Angola	..	1976
Mozambique	..	1977
Vietnam	..	1978
Ethiopia	..	1978
Afghanistan	..	1978
South Yemen	..	1979

A drive to encourage the establishment of Pro-Soviet governments in countries whose regimes are nationalistic or neutralist or slightly anti-Western. This change of policy is a reflection of Moscow's disappointment in the Soviet Union's relations with non-Marxist-Leninist regimes of the Third World, and of greater confidence in Soviet capabilities which have grown enormously in the past decade, and a heightened willingness to seize opportunities to damage western interests.³⁴ But the recent military coup in Afghanistan 1978, and invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, that Moscow viewed the unstable

34. See, Hannah Nogarani, "The Afghan Coup of 1978", ORBIS, vol.23, no.1, Spring 1979.

situation in Afghanistan as a threat requiring immediate resolution is understandable, considering the Soviet perception of the declining number of friendly powers. With China seen as increasingly hostile, with the military build up in Western Europe and resurgent Islamic movements gaining power in the Arab world, the Soviet-Afghan border has become all the more important to overall security interests. Further, the opening of the new Chinese Kere-Korun highway with Pakistan may have caused the Soviets to fear that they were being encircled and might be confronted by a block consisting of China, Pakistan and United States of America.³⁵

Moscow faced a serious dilemma in Afghanistan. The Afghan people are fiercely independent and nationalistic; they are devoted to Islam and to their ancient tribal traditions, honor, revenge tenacity, and survival have long been honoured qualities. Because of both the fighting will and tenacity of the Afghans, as well as rugged topography of the country, guerrilla warfare appeared likely to go on for a long time in Afghanistan. The military balance could easily shift, for instance, if the Soviet Union was unable to find enough allies with Afghanistan to maintain political stability and the face of government.³⁶

35. See, Konks, n.6, p.20.

36. Ibid., p.21.

(d) Comparing the Lessons of Vietnam and Afghanistan

There are those who ask whether Afghanistan would turn out to be the Soviet Union's Vietnam. From one angle it cannot be; its geographical proximity with the Soviet Union and the fact that it has a common border make all the difference.³⁷ The Soviet Union, it would appear had a wider range of options and may still avoid some of the dubious assumptions which were revealed in the Pentagon Papers.

II. Towards Anarchy in the International System

After the 1973 coup, Mohammed Daoud brought an end to the monarchy in Afghanistan and established the Afghan Republic.³⁸ In Afghanistan itself the Soviet Union did considerable opade work either directly or through the Communist Party of Afghanistan (distinguished as the People's Democratic Party), established in 1965. Between 1973 and 1978, it carefully forged instruments of domination in Afghanistan through more than thirty agreements with Afghanistan, and President

37. Vivekanandan, n.s, pp.78-79.

38. Nancy Peabody Newell, Richard S. Newell, The Struggle for Afghanistan (Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1981), pp.66-67.

Daoud's move to get Afghan military officers trained in the Soviet Union, while the Soviet Union was making these moves at the government level, the workers of the Afghan party sought to infiltrate every branch of the Afghan administration. They massively infiltrated the Afghan army and air force also.³⁹

Besides a large number of Russians were inducted into all levels of both the civil and military administrations in Afghanistan in the form of "advisers" making it impossible for the Afghan government to do anything without the approval of Soviets. Reportedly, there were about 6,500 Soviet advisers - 1,500 in the army and 5,000 in civil jobs in Afghanistan in October 1979.⁴⁰

Prime Minister Amin's control over the inner workings of the government was total. This situation produced friction between Amin and Tarakki. Naturally, therefore, the Soviet Union decided to secure Amin's early "elimination" by supporting Tarakki faction.⁴¹

Reportedly, when Tarakki was on his way back home from Havana after attending the non-aligned Summit con-

39. See, Vivekanandan, n.8, p.65.

40. The Statesman (New Delhi), October 11, 1979.

41. News, n.36, p.88.

ference in Cuba, Tarakki had spent two days in Moscow. One result of these talks was a conspiracy between Tarakki and Soviet leaders to "eliminate" Amin.

When Amin had dismissed three pro-Soviet Officers, Col. Muhammed Aslan Watanyar, Maj. Shejan Mazdooryar and Col. Syed Mohammed Gulbzo. Tarakki and Amin called in the Soviet Ambassador, Alexander Mikhailovich Puzanov, to tell him that if the Soviets continued their interference in the affairs of Afghanistan, and Amin made it clear to the Ambassador that he would not hesitate even to revoke the Afghan-Soviet Friendship Treaty, the "legal" instrument they had created to subjugate Afghanistan.⁴² After this Moscow sent its troops into Afghanistan to "eliminate" Amin and installed a puppet government under Babrak Karmal, who was then in exile in Soviet Union.

Brezhnev has directly conveyed to President Carter that the Soviet troops would not be withdrawn from Afghanistan until they have completed their work.⁴³

It is obvious that the present Afghan President, who has few political alternatives available to him, is not in a position to ask Soviet troops to leave Afghanistan in the foreseeable future. In retrospect one can find

42. Vivekanandan, n.s., p.67.

43. Hindustan Times (New Delhi), January 11, 1980.

evidence that Babarak Karmal is also certain that as he is known as a Soviet "nominee" he is thoroughly unpopular among the Afghan people, he cannot survive in the presidency even for a day without the Soviet Army's protection.⁴⁴

(a) Perceptions of Power and Overreactions

In April 1978, the latest coup in Kabul was staged with Russian weapons. It was carried out by Russian trained Afghan army and airforce officers. They placed in power men known as pro-Moscow communists to run an Afghan government which got more aid from Russia than anywhere else, and which began to transport most of its trade through the Soviet Union. Moscow was the first capital diplomatically to recognise Afghanistan. President Brezhnev quickly sent a congratulatory message signalling increasing Soviet control over Afghan politics and implicitly informing Pakistan of appropriate unilateral steps. Three times since 1947, Pakistan-Afghanistan relations have deteriorated to the point where the border has been closed,⁴⁵ and there can be little doubt that the Soviet purpose is to bring Pakistan into line with its Super Power diplomacy.

44. Vivekanandan, n.s., pp.77-78.

45. See, Harvey Stockwin, "A New Great Game of Consequences of the Coup in Kabul", Round Table, no.27, July 1978, p.245.

Having committed to the Afghan adventure, the Soviets claim that they will not allow themselves to appear to be forced out, either by Western actions or local resistance. The global difficulties that the invasion has caused them, however, create pressures towards accommodation.⁴⁶

On the same day of invasion, December 28, Carter activated the hotline to protest to Brezhnev that the Soviet intervention would severally and adversely effect the relationship now and in the future between US and USSR.⁴⁷ Both the Super Powers had been unable to prevent mutual misperception of actions and responses.

(b) Redefinition of Super Power Goals and Commitments

Moscow's initial argument that its troops went into Afghanistan on the formal invitation of that country's government is quite untenable. The rationale of Soviet intervention, though not its justification, lies elsewhere. Soviet intervention was essentially a defensive reaction to a developing unstable situation in Afgha-

46. For detailed account see, Harold Novik and Joyce Starr, (eds.), Challenges in the Middle East Regional Dynamics and Western Security (George Town, University, New York, 1981), p.31.

47. New York Times, January 1, 1980.

nistan, believed susceptible to manipulation by its enemies. In that sense it was a pre-emptive move and hence essentially defensive with an apparently limited objective of stabilizing the internal situation in Afghanistan. The installation of the trusted Babrak Karmal regime was part of an overall plan,⁴⁸ but it clearly constituted a precarious base for long term policy-making.

(c) Divergent Strategic Doctrine

The Soviet Union found its image of power was illusive, and there was an asymmetry here. For the United States, the product is strategic doctrine, the formula by which she spells out the integration of the different levels of war and seeks to mobilize the leverage to be had by drawing strength from across the various categories of American military capabilities. For the Soviet Union the product turned out to be simply the strength of war, common military strategy. The essential difference is that the U.S. has, or aspires to have a strategic Doctrine, the Soviet Union does not. She persists with only the concepts of war.⁴⁹

48. See, P.S. Seth, "Afghanistan in Global Politics", IESA Journal, vol.XII, no.2, October/December, 1980, pp.197-98.

49. Robert Legvold, "Strategic Doctrine and SALT: Soviet American View", Survival, vol.XXI, no.1, January-February 1979, p.2.

(d) Failure of SALT-II Negotiations

After the Soviet action in Afghanistan in 1979, on January 3, 1980, Carter asked the Senate to delay its consideration of SALT-II. After exchange of "Hot Views" between President of American and Brezhnev, the American President outlined the following measures:

1. Indefinite delay in the opening of new new U.S. and Soviet consular facilities;
2. A request to Congress for renewal of military assistance to Pakistan;
3. A possible boycott or transfer of Olympic games;
4. A ban on sales of high technology or other strategic equipment pending a review of licensing policy;
5. A curtailment of Soviet fishing privileges within the U.S. 200 mile fishing zone meaning a loss of 35,000 - 360,000 tons per year; and a collection of grain sales above the contractual level of 8 million tons per year.⁵⁰

And as a result SALT-II negotiations between USA and USSR was a failure.

50. See, Starr, n.46, p.17.

III. Arms Race

Since the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by atomic bombs in 1945, there has grown up a subtle but important assumption among nations that nuclear weapons represent a uniquely horrific kind of violence.⁵¹ Despite that there is an increase in the size and number of arsenals in the world, now estimated to total nearly 50,000 weapons and overgrowing sophistication of weapons delivery systems,⁵² Ironically, the prospect that we have learned to fear most, the wholesale destruction of cities in a "spasm" nuclear exchange between the Super Powers, is probably no longer the most terrifying, or the most likely vision of a future war. Today the fingers on the hypothetical button are not only Soviet and American, but British, French, Chinese and Indian. Western intelligence sources concede that Israel probably has a small nuclear arsenal. At the time the recent Iran-Iraq war broke out those same analysts predicted that the world might be only two years away from the Islamic atomic bomb. South Africa, Turkey, Brazil, Argentina, Taiwan and Spain are each either thought to be working towards a bomb or to be

51. Grogg Herken, "Nuclear War: What are the Prospects?" Current (Washington, D.C.), no.230, February 1980, p.57.

52. Richard Knox, "Nuclear War: Could We Survive it?" Current, no.233, June 1980, pp.50-55.

approaching the capability to build one. By some estimates as many as 40 countries would have nuclear weapons by 1985, 100 by the end of this century.⁵³

SALT-I has come and gone, and SALT-II is in limbo. As the US entered SALT-I negotiations, the common American assumption, challenged by only a few analysts of Soviet Strategic Doctrine, was that Soviet leaders hold perceptions of the strategic balance similar in most respect to those held by American leaders.⁵⁴ Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), Strategic Parity Deterrence, and Force Stability were all concepts that were accepted equally in Washington and Moscow, it was assumed. However, as negotiations for SALT-II progressed, the degree to which Washington and Moscow shared perceptions of the Strategic balance became the subject of considerable debate.⁵⁵ The failure so far to implement the SALT-II treaty, coupled with a lack of progress in all other forums, has led to a critical stagnation of the whole disarmament process.

The arms race not merely produces insecurity and aggravates tension; it also diverts huge resources into

53. See, Horken, n.51, p.60.

54. Dr. David S. Papp, "Soviet Perceptions of Strategic Balance", Air University Review, vol. XXII, no.2, January/February 1981, p.2.

55. Ibid.

non-productive purposes. The current militarisation is a heavy drain on both material and human resources on domestic economies but also on the international economic and political system.

Table - 2
The Big Military Spenders

Country	In million US Dollars
USA	111,000
USSR	107,000
China	040,000
Federal Republic of Germany	022,000
France	019,000
Saudi Arabia	018,000
United Kingdom	016,000
Japan	009,000

The higher the share of GDP devoted to military expenditure, the more probably it becomes that military budgets will be increased at the expense of social security and privy consumption.

The following Table shows U.S. - Soviet arsenals 1970-81.⁵⁶

56. Janata, "Analysis of Disarmament Problems", Janata (New Delhi), vol. XXXVII, no. 2, Annual Number 1982, pp. 39-43.

Arsenal	Country	1970	1981
ICBM	USA	1,054	1,052
	USSR	1,487	1,389
SLBM	USA	0,656	0,600
	USSR	0,248	0,950
Long Range Bombers	USA	0,512	0,548
	USSR	0,156	0,156
Total Strategic Warheads	USA	4,000	9,000
	USSR	1,800	7,000

The outgoing Carter administration proposed significant increases for the Pentagon. The incoming Reagan administration determined to demonstrate a new tougher position to the world increased its defence budget from a total of \$142.2 billion in fiscal year 1980 to \$178 billion for the current 1981 fiscal year and to \$222.2 billion for 1982. These new totals represent a massive \$44.2 billion rise in one year from 1981 to 1982 or 24.8 per cent and a \$80 billion rise in two years from 1980 to 1982, or 56.3 per cent.⁵⁷

57. For detailed information see, John Isaac's, "From Washington Reagan's 'Defence' Budget", The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (London), vol.37, no.5, May 1981, p.14.

Soviet strategic capability and the shield it allegedly provides for Soviet aggression have been the focus of much recent concern. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is a case in point. They argue that the Soviets would never have dared to subjugate that country without at least strategic parity with the United States.⁵⁸

(a) Setback to Arms Control

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and delay for the ratification of Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and the American reaction to Afghanistan are the main points for the setback to arms control. As a result of the 1980s events there is tremendous increase in arms budgets of the Super Powers.^{58a} The two leading suppliers, the United States and the Soviet Union have since 1977 been engaged in bilateral talks on conventional arms transfers. They have not led to any concrete results.⁵⁹

58. Papp, n.54, p.2.

58a. See, Strobe Talbott, "US-Soviet Relations: From Bad to Worse", Foreign Affairs, vol.58, no.3, 1979, pp.515-25.

59. Mohammad Ayoob, "Super Powers and the Third World", IDSJ Journal, vol.XIII, no.3, January/March 1981, p.343.

(b) Acquiring Capabilities in the Gulf

US naval build up and the search for bases in the vicinity of the Gulf, although ostensibly meant to counter the Soviet move into Afghanistan, are perceived in large parts of the Third World, and rightly so, as part of a US strategy of military intervention in the oil rich Gulf when its interests in the region are threatened not as much as a result of a Soviet drive towards the oil reserves of the Gulf as of another outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East or an escalation of tension in the region following the collapse of the Camp David process or, and above all, as a result of changes in regimes in the fragile politics of the oil rich Arab countries in the Gulf littoral States.⁶⁰

(c) Technology Transfer and Arms Trade

Arms transfers are essentially reciprocal. Transfers based on Strategic grounds, have two general characteristics. First suppliers and recipients use each other for their own strategic purposes which may or

60. See, Mohammed Ayoub, "Super Powers and the Third World", ISDA Journal, vol. XIII, no. 3, January-March, 1981, p. 343.

may not be compatible, that is each manipulates the other for its own design. Second the exchange almost inevitably affects third states with differential impact on the suppliers and recipients' internal and external security relations.⁶¹

It has traditionally been argued that arms races are unavoidable because governments have to respond to other states' arms build up in order to maintain military balance and their own national security. This leads to endless action reaction cycles without increasing anyone's security; on the contrary quite an opposite effect is caused by Moscow and USA's influence through aiding forums to the Third World countries and concluding agreements for their interest.⁶² Then due to heavy demand for equipment, resupply resulting from Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 and Arab-Israeli war of 1967, Soviet arms exports increased dramatically in the late 1960s.⁶³ Most of the arms aid and sales activity during the early 1970s reflected the continuing military build up and modernization

61. Stephanie G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkavy (eds.), Arms Transfers in the Modern World (New York, 1979), p.9.

62. Janata, n.56, p.59.

63. See, SIPRI, The Arms Trade With the Third World (New York), Humanities Press 1971, pp.190-91.

in India after the December 1971 conflict with Pakistan and Arab countries following the October 1973 war.

From 1974-79, Soviet weapons sales to the Arab countries, as well as to Ethiopia, Iran and India, increased enormously. Total Soviet military equipment transfers estimated at \$34 billion during the six year period, with the Soviet Union thus accounting for about a quarter of the world arms market, while ranking second to the US as a weapon supplier.⁶⁴

Following table indicates a regional distribution of Soviet arms transfers over the course of the programme.⁶⁵

Table - 3

Regional Distribution of Soviet Arms Transfers to Non-Communist Developing Countries (Cumulative 1975-79) (Million \$ US).

	Agreement	Deliveries
North Africa	10,960	07,169
Sub-Saharan Africa	04,635	03,530
East Asia	00,890	00,885
Middle East	00,970	00,675
South Asia	24,465	18,675
	<u>05,410</u>	<u>04,410</u>
	47,310	35,340

^{64.} Roger F. Pajak, "Soviet Arms Transfers as an Instrument of Influence", Survival, vol. XXIII, No. 4, July/August, 1981, pp. 166-67.

Source: CIA, Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1979 (Washington, D.C., October, 1980), p.14.

In the 1980s, the global balance of terror between the United States and the Soviet Union, the military stalemate in Europe, and the containment of the Soviet Union by a U.S. led system, of Security alliance prompted a revision of Soviet Strategic Doctrine.⁶⁷

During the 1970s there has been a marked shift in US arms supplies in three aspects - the recipients have changed, the weapons have changed, and the arms of the deliveries have changed.⁶⁸

The following table shows the U.S. arms transfers agreements, 1950-78.

Table - 4

	1950s	1960s	1970-73	1974-78
Grants	2,213,877	1,080,855	3,159,863	06,086,259
Sales				
FMS Agreements	1,062,371	1,010,749	2,523,730	12,509,100
Commercial exports	--	--	0,405,029	01,016,522
Total current	2,376,248	2,091,604	6,088,622	14,121,181
Total constant dollars)	6,137,887	5,292,785	9,769,081	16,393,333

67. See, Harkavy, n.61, p.39.

68. SIPRI Year Book 1980, World Armament Disarmament (London, 1980), pp.66-67.

Source: Report by the Comptroller General of the United States, ID-79-22 (US Government Accounting Office, Washington, D.C., 21 May 1979), appendix-I.

Table - 5

Commercial and Government to Government arms Sales, 1969-1978

<u>Year</u>	<u>Government to Government Sales</u>	<u>Government to Government Sales Agreements</u>	<u>Commercial deliveries^a</u>
1969	01,200		0,400
1970	01,200		0,400
1971	01,400		0,400
1972	03,100		0,500
1973	04,500		0,400
1974	10,700		0,500
1975	13,900		0,500
1976	13,200		1,400
1977	11,300		1,500 ^c
1978	13,500		1,900 ^c
1979	14,400		

a Represents what is believed to have been exported. The 25 April 1979 GAO report, US Munitions Export Controls Need Improvement (ID-78-62), concluded that State Department Statistics on Commercial are inaccurate. Discrepancies in the export values were found in 50 per cent of all expired or returned 1976 and 1977 licences. The licences are used to prepare reports on commercial reports.

b Includes transitional quarter

c Preliminary⁶⁹

Source: Report by the Comptroller General of the United States, ID-79-22 (US Government Accounting Office, Washington, D.C., 21 May, 1979), Appendix-I.

69. See, Ibid., p.70.

Thus the arms transfer to the Third World countries by the Super Powers in a large scale deteriorating the international peace and security.

(d) Perception of Super Power Military Postures in the Third World

Super Power responses to developments in the Third World is that one of them might interpret it as being so disadvantageous to its global and/or regional objectives that they need some sort of military response. This of course, is a situation not unique to the 1980s. Both Super-Powers have on occasions intervened militarily outside their borders more than once since 1945. The landing of U.S. marines, for example, in the Dominican Republic or in the Lebanon, during 1950s and the 1960s. The US military involvement in Vietnam was, of course, the high point of the exercise. It was the negative outcome of the Vietnam adventure that led the US to exercise greater military restraint in its dealings with the Third World during the 1970s.

On the other hand, Moscow's new found capacity to intervene outside of Eastern Europe, their intervention in Afghanistan took this strategy one step further. The Soviet action was the result of Moscow's calculation that unless it intervened militarily its influence in

Kabul would be drastically reduced either by Hafizullah Amin attempting to plan the Role of an Afghan Tito or by the total collapse of the Marxist government and the subsequent development of a near chaotic situation in Afghanistan.⁷⁰

The situation in which the countries of South West Asia - the Gulf and Afghanistan - find themselves today epitomises the problems that the Third World in general faces vis-a-vis the Super Powers, especially in terms of actual or potential acts of military intervention. The Super Power rationale rests on its feeling threatened not so much by the other Super Power as by certain indigenous forces operating within the Third World countries which act autonomously of both the Super Powers.⁷¹

iv) The Impact of Armed Conflict in Afghanistan Values, Attitudes and Images of the Super Powers in their Search for Coexistence

For the Afghan people, the Soviet invasion and its aftermath have been devastating. In a country of 15 million people, tens of thousands have been killed

70. See, Aycoob, n.60, p.342-43.

71. See, *ibid.*, p.344.

and wounded. Soviet helicopter gunships have emptied most villages, forcing more than two million men, women and children to flee into neighbouring Pakistan, where they make up the largest refugee population in the world today.⁷²

The result is an emerging anti-Soviet alliance - the United States, China, Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia - that, in the judgement of American planners is effectively countering the most blatant Soviet aggression of post war era. The Russians have lost their grip on the roads linking Afghanistan's principal cities. They have suffered an estimated 6,000 casualties, with 2000 killed. Several thousand more Russian troops are ill. Resistance forces are now initiating the fighting, combining the tactics of guerilla warfare with increasingly sophisticated weaponry. According to a secret White House Report, at least 60 Russian helicopters have been shot-down - many by surface to air missiles. The Soviets have failed to develop their political or military strategy to deal effectively with the Afghan resistance. The U.S. has provided \$20 million to \$30 million for the purchase of arms from International market.⁷³

72. New Republic, "Arms for Afghanistan", New Republic (Washington), July 18, 1981, p.8.

73. Ibid., p.9.

Soviet intervention in Afghanistan created a strong reaction on the part of the vast majority of members of the United Nations. The continuing occupation and conflict in Afghanistan was viewed as a major threat to the security in the region. The vast number of refugees reflect the terrible costs. And the conflict in the region is barrier to the development of a more constructive East-West relations.⁷⁴ The armed conflict and intervention in Afghanistan profoundly influenced the course of Soviet-US relations. The detente which characterised the relations between the Super-Powers and constituted the foreign policy environment of other nations in the 1970s is in serious trouble, if not altogether dead. As a result of the Soviet intervention, suspicion against Soviet Union has been aroused and opposition to detente has grown stronger in the United States.⁷⁵

The increased opposition to the present regime comprises religious groups, several nationalist groups; the Muslim Brotherhood is the strongest. Under its leadership anti-Marxist groups have co-operated in

74. Department of State Bulletin, "New Initiatives on Afghanistan and Kampuchea", Department of State Bulletin (Washington, DC), vol.81, No.2053, August 1981, p.39.

75. K.P. Misra (eds.), Afghanistan in Crisis (New Delhi, 1981), p.52.

forming the Rescue Front, whose headquarters are in Pakistan.⁷⁶ The Soviet control of Afghanistan is regarded by some analysts as the first step towards "warm water ports" either through Iran or Pakistan. The Pakistan-Iran-Afghanistan region provides a land corridor to any northern power to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.⁷⁷ During the weeks immediately following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, there were reports that both the Super Powers had begun strengthening their naval power in the Indian Ocean.⁷⁸

The emergence of a Pro-Soviet Marxist-Leninist puppet government in Kabul has intensified the security concerns of Iran and Pakistan because Afghanistan is in a particularly good position to help Pro-Soviet forces in these countries.⁷⁹ Keeping in mind the domestic political uncertainty in the countries of the region, America increased its supply of arms to its allies encouraging security co-operation among regional

76. See, Hannah Negaran, "The Afghan Coup of 1978", ORBIS, vol.23, no.1, Spring 1979, p.104.

77. Mustaba Razvi, "Politico-Strategic Impact of Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan", Pakistan Horizon (Karachi), vol.XXXIII, no.3, 1980, p.15.

78. *Ibid.*, p.16.

79. Negaran, n.76, p.105.

powers, and persuading other Industrial powers and China to increase their role in regional security; and supplying arms to its allies in the region combined with a demonstration of America's commitment to the region's Security through bilateral agreements.⁸⁰ And the Soviet Union's counter-measure to American arms supplies to its allies has resulted in the April 1978 Revolution, ending Afghanistan's century old buffer status and has brought that country under the domination of a pro-Soviet Marxist-Leninist party.⁸¹

The Soviet action has imposed a severe strain on detente. It has magnified the competitive aspect of the relationship and it has very negatively affected the cooperative aspects. Detente has certainly been injured.⁸²

(a) The Principles of Co-existence and the Afghanistan Syndrome

As was already known Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on 27 December 1979. Amin was killed and Afghan armed units were disarmed by Soviet advisors and troops.

80. Ibid., p.110.

81. Ibid., p.113.

82. Time, "An Interview With Brezezonski", Time (Chicago), vol.115, no.2, 14, 1980, p.13.

A new Afghan government headed by the pro-Soviet Babrak Karmal was installed. This was a clear case of violation of existing international principles governing the relations among nations and United Nations Charter.

By 1979, unrest among the Afghan masses had found its expression in widespread guerrilla warfare. Units of the Afghan army deserted to the rebels, while whole provinces freed themselves from central control.⁸³ The two years of Russian intervention in and occupation of Afghanistan is a tragic story of a new form of aggressive colonialism. Finding that 85,000 troops were unable to control the situation in Afghanistan, the Russians have brought in two more divisions in August 1981 making a total of 12 divisions having 120,000 men.⁸⁴

(b) Perception of New Security Threats

The invasion of Afghanistan, which could be taken as a carefully designed first step in extending Soviet influence into the sub-continent and as a working to the United States against establishing military coopera-

83. Honks, n.6, p.15.

84. Pradip Dose, "Afghanistan-two years After Russian Occupation", Janata, vol.XXXVI, no.42, December 20, 1980, p.5.

tion with China, has improved Soviet capabilities to gain control of the whole or parts of Iran and consequently the eastern shores of the Persian gulf and has exacerbated the already existing threat to peace and stability in South West Asia.⁸⁵ Brezhnev declared that the accord "will not only provide the foundation for the further strengthening of Afghan-Soviet friendship, but will also serve the interests of peace and security in Asia and thereby, all over the world".

The most authoritative statement on the Soviet position on Afghanistan came from Brezhnev himself on February 22, 1980. By that time the American campaign against the Russian intervention had peaked the contradictions between the U.S. and the European allies and middle eastern and South-West and South-Asian clients stood more or less exposed "It has become obvious" said Brezhnev, "that the present leadership of the United States is pursuing a line of undermining detente and aggravating the international situation."⁸⁶

85. Taner Baytek, "Recent Development in the Middle-East and South-West Asia: Impacts on Western Security", NATO Review, no.4, August 1981, p.10.

86. Shabani Sen Gupta, The Afghan Syndrome: How to Live With Soviet Power (New Delhi, 1982), pp.87-89.

(c) Limited War Scenarios

On July 17, 1973, Prince Mohammed Daoud organised a coup d' etat that ended the 40 year reign of his cousin brother-in-law, King Mohammed Zahir Shah. Daoud had once served as Zahir's Prime-Minister, but he resigned in 1963. In the following decade, Afghanistan underwent a series of cautious experiments in political liberalization and constitutionalism, while pursuing a non-aligned foreign policy that took account of traditional Soviet sensitivities.⁸⁷ However when the Revolution did take place and the Khalq-Parchan coalition took over in Kabul, the Soviets lost no time to recognise the Marxist regime.⁸⁸

Reportedly, on the eve of the Soviet action 99% of Afghanistan was "uncontrolled revolt" and that the country was under a "beleaguered and tottering regime" in an article in Observer, February 17, 1980, it is suggested that even under Amin the government had control of only two or three provinces".

(d) Priority to Military Power

On December 28, 1979 largescale reinforcements were sent into consolidate Babark Karmal's regime against the

87. Starr, (eds.), n.46, pp.9-10.

88. Gupta, n.88, p.85.

rebels as well as against Khalq and army units loyal to Amin.

As a result, Soviet commanders were forced to extend their operations to the countryside and call for reinforcements. Another airlift began on January 11, 1980 and by the middle of the month Soviet troops' strength was estimated at 85,000 - 100,000. As Soviet involvement intensified casualties mounted, and some western sources reported 1,500 - 2,000 combat deaths by the end of the month; rebel claims, of course, were very much higher.⁸⁹

The events in Afghanistan in one sense represent the culmination of these trends in that the Soviets are directly using their forces.⁹⁰

Speculation on Future Trends in Soviet-American Attitudes on Afghanistan

There is an important school of thought in the United States which believes that the Soviets were tempted into military aggression into Afghanistan by United States'

89. Time, February 4, 1980, p.31.

90. For detailed account see, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, "Implications of the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan for East-West Relations", NATO Review, no.2, 1980, p.184.

retrenchment following Vietnam. On closer scrutiny this view does not take into account the political framework relevant to the Third World where the power realignments are of a different order. Indeed the United States while concentrating on a Middle East settlement missed several opportunities for accommodation of national interest both in South Asia and in the Gulf region.⁹¹

The Soviets have initially not made any serious effort to cope with the regional crisis into which their efforts to control Afghanistan have plunged them. Political succession in the Soviet Union may provide a fresh starting point if Brezhnev's successor makes an effort to legitimise his policies in the eyes of the Third World countries. The restoration of political detente may in any case provide further incentive for arms control and disarmament negotiations, and a decisive element with respect to Afghanistan could be that efforts to mediate between the powers in the Gulf may lead the Soviets to fresh political considerations, including Soviet troops withdrawals from Afghanistan.⁹²

91. Joseph Churba, "The Eroding Security Balance in the Middle East", Orbis, Summer 1980, pp.353-61.

92. See, Anthony Arnold, Afghanistan, the Soviet Invasion in Perspective (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 1981).

The United States has not favoured institutionalised crisis-management in Afghanistan but has concentrated on the question of responding through militarisation of Pakistan and of the Gulf through a Rapid Deployment Force. In the uncertainty which surrounds the extent to which its European allies will support the United States strategic demands, it is not unlikely that the United States' policymaking may develop modified prescriptions to resist Soviet expansionism in Afghanistan. A new policy mix need not have the injection of more military power as its essential underpinning.

The political problems faced by the Soviets and the Americans will certainly not generate any high level of confidence between them in the foreseeable future. Yet our assessment criteria should not be shaped by the official claims of the two sides. One can distinguish between the Cold War issues on which the decision-makers in Washington and Moscow always take inflexible stands and the nature of the balancing process in the Third World in which even formidable sectional interests could combine and interpose themselves between the two Super Powers in a political sense.⁹³ This may

93. See for full emphasis, Collins, John H., U.S. - Soviet Military Balance, Concepts and Capabilities 1960-1980 (McGraw Hill, 1980).

be an unsatisfactory concept in a European setting but conflicting strategic demands have in the past been offset if regional forces have shown will and capability to deal with Third World conflicts. Such an optimistic scenario may not unfold quickly but the machinery by which a settlement may be implemented should be created and kept in being so that whenever the chances of peace improve neither Pax Americana nor Pax Sovietica should be imposed.

CHAPTER - III

THIRD WORLD REACTIONS

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I. Radical, Moderate and Conservative Regimes in the Third World: The Soviet Image and Consensus and Disagreement over the future of Afghanistan.

Ever since the Soviet combat troops entered into Afghanistan at the end of December 1979, many countries, collectively or individually have been calling for a solution to the Afghanistan problem. The years 1980-82 saw several unsuccessful attempts to secure withdrawal of Soviet troops. Although many resolutions were passed and proposals put forward by Third World countries, these failed to exert a decisive influence on the attitude of the Soviet Union. The situation in Afghanistan remains therefore substantially the same as it was two years ago,¹ inspite of strong pressure from Third World public opinion.

The UN was the first body to be seized of the matter. An emergency session of the General Assembly,

1. See, P.B. Sinha, "Search for Political Solution to Afghan Problem", Strategic Studies, vol.V, no.10, January 1982, p.513.

passed a resolution which "strongly deplored" the military intervention in Afghanistan and demanded all foreign troops withdrawal from Afghanistan.²

Looking at the change in Third World attitudes after the Soviet military intervention, one can confidently assert that the era of unbridled optimism about the Soviet aspirations has ended and a new historical perspective marked by anxiety and uncertainty underlies the fabric of Soviet-Third World relations. The extent of "demonstrative" annoyance with the Soviets varied considerably and depended on the rules of the political game according to which political elites considered themselves as instruments for legitimisation of radical or conservative ideologies. In general the type of frontal attack on Soviet aims was unprecedented and gave rise to a pervasive awareness in the Third World that the realisation of political Utopias came up against the large scale power projection capabilities of a Super Power, albeit a socialist one. The differences in assessments prominently revealed the extent to which the domestic struggle for power in Third World

2. See, UN Document, A/ES-6/2, 14 January 1980.

countries had created a network of integrative relationships with the Soviet structure of political and ideological norms. A distinction should be made between the diminished payoff available to the Soviet Union from its cautious and subtle diplomacy and the outcomes of the new and more bold assumptions about the course of Soviet military policy in the Third World. Suffice it to say that most Third World countries have been engaged in redefining their national priorities as a repercussion of the Soviet military adventure in Afghanistan; And in many cases the traditional focus of Soviet ideology and its overriding sense of righteous "proletarian" purpose has been replaced by the new features of the Soviet preparedness to use its military organisation. At this stage the key variable in Third World behaviour can only be guessed at, but the first reactions clearly showed that pluralism and independence were indispensable ingredients of the heterogeneity of the Third World. The justifications advanced even by those who supported the Russian line showed that the ruling elites could recognise at some level their isolation from the main trend of opinion in the Third World.

The strength of the condemnation of the Third World countries varied from country to country. While

some criticised severely, a few others chose to soft pedal it for various reasons either for serving their short time tactical interests or because their foreign policies were in basic agreement with the interests of the Soviet Union.

In order to appreciate the force of these opinions, it would be useful to have a clearer view of the reactions and statements made by some of the countries as under:

We have selected the following countries movements for analysis of Third World reactions to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan because of their intrinsic significance for geopolitical reasons and their value for illustrative purposes: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Southern Yemen, the PLO, Ethiopia, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Pakistan, India.

It is also appropriate to give due prominence to the objectives pursued by the Chinese government after the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. Official statements, speeches and articles in the media emanating from Beijing were all part of the Chinese effort to exert influence on the Third World and to expose the Soviet Union's "Social imperialism".

Egypt: The Egyptian government announced on 06 January, 1980 that the Soviet embassy staff in Cairo would be reduced and that the severance of relations with Moscow would be considered. Hassan, Minister of State, said on 06 January, 1980 that Egypt was prepared to give military training to Afghans in Cairo and to send arms to Afghanistan.³

Since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has lost its image, a second UN General Assembly resolution passed on 21 November, 1980 demanded the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan.⁴

This concern for security is linked to the Soviets' desire to preserve Afghanistan as a Soviet protectorate in order to maintain a credible presence in South West Asia. To let Afghanistan fall would weaken Soviet regional status and correspondingly result in a decline in Soviet influence in the Middle East and South West Asia.⁵

Saudi Arabia: Considers the flagrant aggression against Afghanistan as a aggression against a neighbouring

3. Ibid.

4. Alfred C. Monks, The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan, p. 18.

5. Ibid., p. 9.

sister country with which we have close relations in matters of religion, tradition, culture and common interests and demanded urgent and effective measures for the termination of that aggression and withdrawal of foreign military troops from Afghanistan.⁶

Protests against the Soviet action were also registered by Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand.⁷

Iraq: Forcefully opposed to any attempts aimed at turning the area into an arena of rivalry between the big powers for the sake of achieving their ambitions and carrying out their strategic schemes at the expense of independence, sovereignty and security of the countries in the area.

President of Iraq stated: "Recent events in Afghanistan gave imperialism a further pretext for intervention in the area and the jeopardizing of freedom, sovereignty and wealth".

6. For full emphasis see, UN Document A/EG-6/PN 3, 11 January, 1980, pp.47-50.

7. Kessings Contemporary Archives (London: Longman Group Limited, 1980) Day 9, 1980, p.30255.

Indeed for all reasons Iraq voted in favour of draft resolution and it also disapproves of intervention such as that which took place in Afghanistan.⁸

South Yemen: Democratic Yemen considers that the problem arises out of the adventures of the imperialist forces aimed at finding new pretexts for launching aggression against the peoples of the region.⁹

The P.L.O.: Consideration deals not only with the "situation in Afghanistan" but also with "its implications for international peace and security".¹⁰ However PLO voted in favour of Soviet Union and it urged to all the imperialist powers not to interfere in the internal affairs of any country.

Ethiopia: Socialist Ethiopia is categorical in its opposition to the attempt by certain outside powers to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan

8. UN Document A/ES-6/PV.7, 15 January 1980, pp.82-83.

9. Ibid., p.11.

10. UN Document A/LS-6/PV.7.15 January, 1980.

by recruiting, financing, organizing, training arming and encouraging subversive elements to create instability and disturb peace and tranquility inside Afghanistan. Socialist Ethiopia cannot but oppose such moves, which are clearly detrimental to the peace and stability of the region and of the world as a whole.¹¹

Sri Lanka: A small, strictly non-aligned state, is opposed to interference by any country in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, a member of the non-aligned since its inception.¹⁰ On 3rd January, 1980, called upon the Soviet Union to withdraw its military contingents from the territory of Afghanistan.¹²

Malaysia: The Soviet Union's action in sending thousands of troops into Afghanistan backed by tanks and aeroplanes and its direct involvement in ousting the legal Government of that country, which it has replaced with one to its liking, are beyond any doubt a clear intervention in the internal affairs of that country.

11. UN Document, A/ES-6/PV.6, 16 January, 1980, pp.42-45.

12. UN Document, A/ES-6/PV.6, 16 January, 1980, p.61.

Malaysia expressed that, Russia's intervention in Afghanistan is a blatant violation of the principle of respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of states - the principle which enshrined in our charter and which we are all duty bound to uphold and respect.¹³

II. The China Factor and the Assessment of Soviet Hegemonism

The Chinese Government vigorously condemns this hegemonistic action of the Soviet Union and firmly demands the cessation of this aggression and intervention in Afghanistan and the withdrawal of all Soviet armed forces. The current armed aggression in Afghanistan is a big show of Soviet hegemonism. People have come to see more clearly the source of the main threat to World Peace and the true nature of this so called 'natural ally' of the Third World ...The Chinese Government and people will work tirelessly with all countries and people who love peace and uphold justice to frustrate Soviet acts of aggression and expansion.¹⁴

13. Ibid., pp.5-6.

14. For full emphasis see, "State of the Globe, the Afghanistan Crisis", Bulletin of Peace Proposal, 2/1980, p.175. See also, Keessings Contemporary Archives, May 9, 1980, pp.50239-240.

III. India's Conception of a Political Settlement and its Operational Implications

When the crisis first erupted, India was in the throes of a general election under a caretaker government. Charan Singh, as the head of that government, immediately conveyed to the Soviet Government through its Ambassador in New Delhi, "India's deep concern at the substantial involvement of Soviet military forces in Afghanistan" and sought their withdrawal as soon as possible.¹⁵ This position remained unchanged until Indira Gandhi assumed India's Prime Ministership in the middle of January 1980. Even before Indira Gandhi took the oath of office in January 1980, she said, "I am strongly against any interference. But in Afghanistan the Soviet interference is not one sided. Other interferences are going on."¹⁶ Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi had clearly stated her view with regard to Moscow's entry into Afghanistan with its armed forces. She said in her statement in Lok Sabha on 30 January 1980: "I have stated our own view which is that we do not approve of foreign presence or intervention anywhere in the

15. K.P. Misra (eds.), Afghanistan in Crisis, p.77.

16. Indian Express (New Delhi), January 3, 1980.

world. However, we do not believe in a one sided condemnation and we have been watching with concern the build up in the Indian Ocean and some other countries, which is now being stepped up even further with Pakistan becoming one of the important bases for this.¹⁷

In this context, recent developments in Afghanistan have naturally been engaging the serious attention of the Government. India has close and friendly relations with the Government and people of Afghanistan and we are deeply concerned and vitally interested in the security, independence sovereignty and territorial integrity of this traditionally friendly neighbour of ours; and we believe that they have every right to safeguard them.¹⁸

In the UN General Assembly, B.C. Mishra of India said Afghanistan has every right to safeguard its sovereignty, integrity and independence. India hopes that the people of Afghanistan will be able to resolve their internal problems themselves without any interference from outside. India hopes that the Soviet Union will

17. See, Perala Ratnam, Afghanistan's Uncertain Future (Tulsi Publishing House, New Delhi, 1981), p.56.

18. Ibid., pp.57-58.

not violate the independence of Afghanistan and that Soviet forces will not remain there a day longer than necessary.¹⁹ Since the beginning of Afghanistan crisis India does not approve of foreign presence or armed intervention in any country anywhere in the world.

IV. Impact on Pakistan's Politics (and Politics of Baluchistan).

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has grave implications for the security of the Indian Ocean region. However, strategically speaking, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has established in Asia by its growing militarism.²⁰ As the Soviets are just about 250 miles away from Karachi and close to the straits of Hormuz through which the oil tankers pass, there is every reason to believe that the West would not allow Moscow to establish a direct opening to the Indian Ocean through Baluchistan and would do everything to fortify Pakistan heavily against any further Soviet drive towards the South.²¹

19. For detailed emphasis see, UN Document A/ES-7/PV. 3, 11 January 1980, p.16.

20. See, B. Vivekanandan, "The Indian Ocean as Zone of Peace: Problems and Prospects", Asian Survey, vol.XXI, no.12, December 1981, p.246.

21. Ibid., p.247.

The Soviet invasion had several consequences of relevance here it brought the Soviet army for the first time to the borders of Pakistan.²³ It greatly increased the flow of Afghan refugees into Pakistan where nearly 2.5 million Afghans have sought refuge preferring to face a life of great hardship away from their ravaged hearts and homes.²⁴ This will have far reaching consequences for international peace and security and it is a matter of grave concern for the entire world and most particularly the Islamic world²⁵ and the presence of refugees has placed heavy burden on limited resources of Pakistan.²⁶ On the other, it under rates the danger that Moscow will pursue its objectives more flexibly through a combination of political and military means, perhaps utilizing allied Baluch groups

23. William E. Griffith, "The USSR and Pakistan", Problems of Communism, vol. XXXI, January/February 1982, p.42. See also, Selig S. Harrison, Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, Washington D.C. 1981), p.199.

24. UN Document, A/36/PV, 23, 5 October 1981, p.62.

25. For full emphasis see, "Inaugural speech of the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan delivered at the Extraordinary session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers at Islamabad Pakistan 27th January 1980", Strategic Studies, vol.111, no.2, Winter 1980, p.13.

26. UN Document A/ES-6/PV.2, 11 January 1980, p.65.

as proxies. For example, while not ruling out the possibility of a naked Soviet thrust comparable to the Afghan invasion, Pakistani and Iranian leaders are more concerned that Moscow might help Baluch nationalist factions to achieve their long standing goal of an independent Baluchistan through guerrilla warfare. Alternatively, Moscow might seek to use the threat of a Baluch insurgency to pressure Pakistan or Iran, or both, into granting the use of Baluch ports for military purposes.²⁷

Some observers assume that a decisive factor deterring a Soviet adventure in Baluchistan is the likelihood that Moscow will be bogged down in Afghanistan for some time to time. Moscow's desire to punish Iran and Pakistan for providing sanctuaries to Afghan resistance forces could prompt Soviet retaliatory action in the Baluch areas.²⁸ However, Pakistan

27. See, Solig S. Harrison, "Baluch Nationalism and Super Power Rivalry", International Security, vol.5, no.3, Winter 1980-81, p.155. See also same author's article Solig S. Harrison, "Fanning Flames in South Asia", Foreign Policy, no.45, Winter 1981-82, pp.84-102. See also Dorothea Seelye Franck, "Pakhtunistan - Disputed Disposition of a Tribal Land", The Middle East Journal, vol.VI, Winter 1952, pp.49-68.

28. Ibid., pp.162-63.

under the pretext of countering Soviet intervention, secured massive economic aid from the oil rich arabs in the name of Islamic solidarity.²⁹ Truly, the steady growth of Baluch discontent in Pakistan offers the Soviet Union an attractive opportunity. Moscow can afford to bide its time in deciding weather to play its Baluch card as long as Pakistani and Iranian leaders fail to make meaningful moves toward political settlements with the Baluch.³⁰ In this way the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and its support for Baluchistan has created destability on the borders of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran.

V. Perceptions of Soviet Commitments After Afghanistan

Brezhnev said: After Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, as for the Soviet military contingent, we will be prepared to withdraw it with the agreement of the Afghan government. Before this is done, the infiltration of counter-revolutionary gangs into

29. Inaugural Speech of the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, n.25, pp.11-29.

30. Ibid., no.7, p.69.

Afghanistan must be completely stopped. This must be secured in accords between Afghanistan and its neighbours. Dependable guarantees are required that there will be no new intervention. Such is the fundamental position of the Soviet Union, and we adhere to it firmly.³¹ He went on to say: Today the opponents of peace and detente are trying to speculate on the events in Afghanistan. Mountains of lies are being built up around these events and a shameless anti-Soviet campaign is being mounted". Elaborating on the course of events in Afghanistan, he said that from the first days of the 1978 revolution that country had encountered external aggression and "Kurd interference" from outside in its internal affairs, tons of thousands of insurgents, armed and trained abroad, whole armed units in fact", were sent into Afghanistan and "in effect imperialism, together with its accomplices launched an undeclared war against revolutionary Afghanistan". The Soviet Union had warned those concerned that if the aggression was not stopped it would not abandon the Afghan people in their time of trial; "as is well known, we stand by

31. See, The Truth About Afghanistan Documents, Facts Eyewitness Reports (Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow 1981), p. . See also Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 14 March, 1980. See Ibid., 15 March, 1980.

what we say".³² However, Brezhnev, stated "we will be ready to announce the withdrawal of our troops as soon as all forms of outside interference directed against the government and people of Afghanistan are fully terminated. Let the United States together with the neighbours of Afghanistan guarantee this and then the need for Soviet military assistance will cease to exist". In reference to Carter's call for a boycott of the Olympic Games, Brezhnev said that "the unity of the Soviet people manifests itself with special force precisely when attempts are made to talk to us in the language of threats."³³ Soviet Union's stay in Afghanistan will not be a short one, comparisons of such present super powers intervention in that country are inevitable with other super power intervention in the 1960s in Vietnam³⁴ and Soviet leaders would leave Afghanistan unless the survival of President B. Karmal's government was guaranteed.³⁵

32. Keenings Contemporary Archives, May 9, 1980, p.30236.

33. Ibid., August 1, 1980, p.30581.

34. Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 2 July, 1980.

35. The Times, 2 July 1980.

Vice-President of the USSR said: The Soviet troops were sent to Afghanistan only on the request by the government of that country.³⁶ The Soviet presence in that country is merely a help to the Government and they would stay there as long as they are required by the Afghanistan Government he said in reply to a question. The Afghan army is capable of fighting and the Soviet troops will stay till a solution is reached.

VI. A New Policy Environment in the Third World?

The peoples of the developing "Third World" countries - i.e., most of the States of Africa, Asia, and Latin America - have traditionally been regarded by Soviet theoreticians as potential allies of the communist world.³⁷ One of the most consequential instruments in the transformed Soviet approach toward the developing countries was a newly conceived program of foreign assistance, patterned somewhat after that of the West.³⁸

36. National Herald (New Delhi), 11 August, 1980.

37. Robert H. Donaldson (ed.), The Soviet Union in the Third World: Success and Failures, p.384.

38. See, Ibid., p.385.

The leaders of many Third World countries motivated by their own political and economic aspirations, were warmly receptive to the post-Stalin changes in Moscow's policies and were generally prepared to accept Soviet foreign assistance.³⁹

Foreign assistance immediately became an important policy tool for expanding Soviet influence in the Third World. Much of the attractiveness of Soviet military assistance to the Third World countries has been due to the comparatively low prices and favourable terms offered by Moscow.⁴⁰ For example, in the period 1955 through 1978, an estimated 44,000 military trainees had gone to the Soviet Union for various types of training with another 6,000 having received some military instruction in East European countries.⁴¹ Largely reflecting the size and importance of the key aid recipients, the vast majority of the military trainees have gone from eight countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Syria, and Somalia.⁴² In addi-

39. Ibid., See also Joseph De Douglass, Jr., Annette M. Hoerber, Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 1979).

40. Ibid., p. 386.

41. Ibid., p. 339.

42. Ibid.

tion, a number of small arms and ammunition plants have been constructed in countries such as Afghanistan and Egypt.⁴³ Moscow directly concluded arms deal directly with Afghanistan and Syria and subsequently with Egypt.⁴⁶

Soviets' new policy environment in the Third World is one of the most significant factor for instance, military assistance accordingly has proven to be one of Moscow's most effective, flexible and durable instruments for establishing a significant presence in the non-aligned countries.⁴⁵

Thus the military aid along with economic aid in the Third World led to enhanced Soviet interest in the political-military implications in a number of countries such as Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Angola, Kampuchea etc.

Through its military training and technical assistance program, in conjunction with economic assistance and academic training, the Soviet Union has expo-

43. Ibid., p.391.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid., p.394.

and many of the nationals of these countries to a communist orientation - an exposure which Moscow hopes will influence institutional developments occurring in the Third World.⁴⁶

Through our Questionnaire and oral interviews we asked our respondents from Third World countries to list the difficulties created by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan which led to a significant re-examination of their hopes and expectations from the Soviet Union. These answers broadly reflect the dominant long-range ideological orientations of the Third World regimes, although in some cases the perceptions were ambiguous, which suggests that caution should be observed in assessing the results.

In the first place and descriptions of respondents from Third World countries with conservative regimes show a strong emphasis on "the growing Soviet military power" and make sombre assessments of "the intense activation, through both open and clandestine means in the political developments in the Third World. These respondents feel that the Soviet Union has deliberately created a situation in Afghanistan of turmoil

46. Ibid., pp. 395-96.

and conflict which is a sign that the Soviets are no longer interested in the stabilisation of the Third World. These respondents see a perpetuation of tension between their countries and the Soviet Union.⁴⁷

The second set of perceptions is from respondents belonging to the countries which can be listed by meaningful standards as moderate regimes. Although there are wide differences of opinion about the possible future of Afghanistan, these respondents stress the particular circumstances under which the Soviet Union adopts restrained behaviour towards Third World countries or pursues expansionism (including military intervention). These respondents do not credit the Soviet leaders with any grand design of imperialist expansion into the Third World. According to this view the Third World experience with the Soviet Union points to the Soviet support to political stability in the developing countries and shared aspirations which do not conflict with the independence and territorial integrity of Third World countries. Even after condemning Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, these respondents do not view the Soviet Union as a country "exporting revolution" with military action as a generalized model.

47. Interview with a Government official.

There is a continuous attractiveness of Afghanistan as a special case, and in the view of these respondents, this should not be extended to all Third World situations.

The Third set of respondents reflect those regimes or movements which can be described as radical. These replies suggest that the Third World is ripe for revolutionary change and the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan has actually enhanced the attempts of the Third World peoples to free themselves from the hegemony of Western nations. In this view the use of Soviet military power is justified as supporting the vital interests of Third World in its historical progress. These respondents do not generally attempt to understand Soviet strategy.⁴⁸

The values, beliefs and perceptions reflected in the Third World respondents' replies reflect the diversity of interests represented. It can of course be objected that the substance and scope of "Soviet intervention" are defined quite ambiguously and therefore the answers express only the confusion and uncertainty

48. Interview with a Member of Parliament, (New Delhi) on 1 April, 1982.

of the respondents. For the purpose of this study the important question is whether our approach to the consequences of the events in Afghanistan for the perceptions of the Third World countries is an optimal one or not. Third World reactions, both governmental and non-governmental certainly provide indications of vital debates within political, intellectual and decision-making circles over the likely developments in Soviet-Third World relations in the post-Afghanistan phase. Certainly Third World reactions do not provide any evidence of a rejection of the entire spectrum of Soviet policies and actions in the Third World after the Afghanistan intervention. But the Soviet Union paid a heavy price by creating a backlash by the projection of its naked military power. Our survey, though far from exhaustive, points to five problems which will dominate the future concern with the nature of Soviet Power in the Third World since the impact of the Soviet intervention has pointed to "basic disparagement of the Soviet experience" in the developing countries.⁴⁹

49. R. Legwold, "The Nature of Soviet Power", Foreign Affairs, vol.56, no.1, October 1977, pp.55-56.

1. The direct Soviet military advance to the Khyber Pass makes it apparent that Soviet politico-military activism is now related to Super Power ambition of a new order. It would be quite unrealistic to expect the Soviet Union not to take advantage of its expanded military organisation. It is commonplace to say that the Soviets are viewing their long range interests threatened as Communist China proceeds towards a Super Power role in Asia. The new attempt at self-assertion in fulfilling the credibility of its commitment to the Karmal regime shows that the Soviet Union perceives its policy environment from a strategic point of view, in which military factors are integrated with internal political relationships, ideological issues and geographical and demographic realities.
2. In the Soviet view the new policy environment must include multiple causality. The Afghanistan intervention has accentuated the difference between the "revolutionary challenge" of the Soviet Union and the Soviet threat system as a phenomenon in Third World international relations.
3. The Soviets are aware of a range of checks exercised by United States - Soviet military competition as well as the cost and risks of their involvement in internal

conflict in Third World countries. Soviet decision-making, however, seems to be based on the expectation of a large payoff from increased political pressures on states which enter into the neighbourhood of Soviet power.

4. In the Third World undoubtedly a larger array of options exists whose exercise can make it extraordinarily difficult for either Super Power to make clients out of nonaligned countries. In order to increase the risks and inconveniences for the Super Powers the indivisibility of detente must be stressed.

5. Neither Super Power wants to lose its military or political assets. The Soviets especially are concerned about the overall correlation of forces. The Third World can raise the cost of intervention to the Soviet Union or to the United States by exploiting Super Power bilateralism and bipolarity and by coordinating regional security requirements.

CHAPTER - IV

POLITICAL SOLUTION AND NEGOTIATIONS

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I. Does the Brezhnev Doctrine Apply to Afghanistan?

According to this "Brezhnev Doctrine", the Soviet Union has the right to intervene in any communist country in order to safeguard established socialism.¹ But until Afghanistan, the Kremlin had not applied the Brezhnev Doctrine to the Third World. It had relied on proxy armies of Vietnam and Cuba to advance its causes. In June 1978, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko seemed to underscore the point that in Africa, Asia and Middle-East, Moscow's policy was to send military aid and advisers but not its own troops. "Not one Soviet soldier with a rifle in Ethiopia", he declared.² They have used force to restore "stability" and maintain or bring into power friendly, pro-Russian or pro-Soviet regimes. Since World War II these have been the reasons for three interventions: East Germany

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1. Cited in Jiri Valenta, "From Prague to Kabul: The Soviet Style of Invasion", International Security, vol.5, no.2, Fall 1980, p.119. See also Babani Len Gupte, The Afghanistan Syndrome (Vikas Publishers, New Delhi, 1982), p.9.
 2. Erik P. Hoffmann and Frederic J. Floron, Jr., eds., The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy (Aldine Pubs. Company, New York, 1981), p.739.

in 1953, Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968.³

Now, there are Soviet riflemen, paratroopers, tanks and jets all over Afghanistan. For the first time since World War II, the Kremlin has thrust its own armies into a new strategic arena, outside the established Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. It has immediately and drastically increased the jeopardy of Iran and Pakistan and awakened the fear that Moscow - stronger and more confident than in the 1950s and 1960s - may now be prepared to imply a much bolder strategy of force in the Middle East.⁴

In refusing to let the Afghan Marxist regime go under the Soviet Union extended Brezhnev Doctrine to Asia. The charges that the United States, China, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were combining to destroy the Marxist regime in Kabul were intended to obscure this pivotal change in Soviet behaviour.⁵ Economic aid was designed to broaden Soviet appeal and influence among non-

3. Valenta, n.1, p.119.

4. Floron, Jr., ed., n.2, p.739.

5. Nancy Peabody Newell Richard S. Newell, The Struggle For Afghanistan (Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1981), pp.108-09.

military Afghan elite. Few of such assistance programmes were intended to benefit directly the impoverished majority of the population. These programmes provided the dual benefit of laying a foundation for economic progress and creating the logistical means of getting physical control of the country.⁶

Soviet behaviour in Afghanistan is so reminiscent of Soviet behaviour in Czechoslovakia that references to the Brezhnev Doctrine are inevitable. The analogy is overtly formal; ideological factors should not be allowed to obscure other similarities and thereby exaggerate the implications.

Afghanistan borders along the Soviet Union even before the 1978 revolution was within a Soviet security zone. In this respect, it is like Czechoslovakia but quite unlike other progressive states, such as Syria, Ethiopia, or South Yemen, which might be considered targets of an extended Brezhnev Doctrine. The Brezhnev Doctrine was not a sudden act of will but an articulation of existing political-geographic realities, which cannot be transferred arbitrarily to the

6. Ibid., p.112.

Third World. The likelihood of future Soviet assaults on Third World countries should therefore be viewed within the context of the rules of the game, that is as a problem of proxy forces, subversion, and political warfare.

In Eastern Europe itself, however, the significance of the Brezhnev Doctrine is much more apparent. There Soviet control aims at both a defence barrier and an ideological glacis against Western capitalism; hence internal development on the Afghan model might well result in Soviet action on the Afghan model.⁷ In Czechoslovakia, as in Afghanistan, the Soviet plan was to surprise and replace the existing regime in a short time and thereby prevent any strong, organised defence. In both the cases the invasion came as a strategic surprise. Most of the Afghan leaders, like most of the leaders in Czechoslovakia failed to anticipate it.⁸

II. Soviet Union - Internal Problems and the Future of the Afghanistan Regime

The USSR has faced endless economic difficulties,

7. Nimrod Novik and Joyce Starr (eds.), Challenges in the Middle East: Regional Dynamic and Western Security, pp.25-26.

8. Jiri Valenta, "Perspectives on Soviet Intervention: Soviet Use of Surprise and Deception", Survival, vol.24, no.2, March/April, 1982, p.56.

including minor workers rebellions, and there is no doubt that they are sensitive to this. They are not in a position actually to starve the country for reasons of power politics as Stalin was.⁹ But it is clear that they are determined to put the maximum into military and the minimum into consumer economies that they feel politically practical. When it comes to agriculture, the actual starvation preventor, they have made comparatively large investments but have remained quite unwilling to alter the essentially hopeless collective farm system; for politico-ideological reasons.¹⁰ Moscow's internal prestige particularly in the Muslim world, has clearly been damaged by the invasion of Afghanistan.

Secondly, well-educated Soviet Uzbeks, for example, believe that there are five million Uzbeks in Afghanistan and they also believe that two or three million Uzbeks live in Iran. The perceptions of these groups (Muslims) and particularly of Soviet Muslims group about their co-ethnics in Middle-East may be a more significant factor in their reaction to the Soviet occupation of

9. Report on Afghanistan, Asian Lawyers Legal Inquiry Committee on Afghanistan (New Delhi, 1981), p.38.

10. Ibid., p.38. See also, Francis Fukuyama, the Future of the Soviet Role in Afghanistan: A Trip Report (Santa Monica, California, September 1980), p.24.

Afghanistan.¹¹ Indeed, the Soviets probably stand to lose more than they stand to gain by occupying Afghanistan.¹² It is almost certain that in future these war-like activities on the Afghan-Pakistan border area and other lands will increase both in volume and intensity and cause serious dislocation and create international tensions. If this happens, Moscow will find itself in a dilemma whether to continue to stay in Afghanistan with its troops, or not.¹³

III. The Relation Between Super Power Detente and Political Solution

It must be conceded that the improvement in the Soviet-US relationship was both real and substantial and detente served both sides well.¹⁴ In final days of 1979 and the first days of 1980, after Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Soviet-American relations plummeted into full blown crisis when the USSR invaded Afghanistan, and the United States retaliated with an array of diplomatic protests, economic sanctions and

11. This information is based on first hand account by specialists with expert knowledge of Central Asia. For example, see, Eden Eby, "The Ethnic Factor in Soviet Afghan Relations", Asian Survey (Berkeley, California), vol.20, no.3, March 1980, p.241.

12. Porala Ratnam, Afghanistan's Uncertain Future, p.81.

13. *Ibid.*, p.80.

14. I.K. Gujral, "Warsaw Pact, Many Grievances", World Focus, vol.2, no.2, 14 February, 1980, p.11.

political threats.¹⁵ The very structure of peaceful relations of states with different social systems, which was being built in the 1970s, was now in danger.¹⁶ In the last thirteen years we have seen the pursuit of detente by Brezhnev going alongside considerable improvements in Soviet military power.¹⁷

For example, the Third World that interests the Soviet Union the most is that which adjoins its long strategically vulnerable southern frontier. This perimeter is an area of a primary importance and the theatre of its most determined political, economic and military activity. Suffice it is to say that two-thirds of all foreign military and economic aid extended by the USSR between 1974 and 1972 went to six countries located in this region (India, Egypt, Iran, Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey).¹⁸

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15. Strobe Talbott, "US-Soviet Relations: From Bad to Worse", Foreign Policy, vol.55, no.3, 1979, p.516.
16. For detailed analysis and role of Soviet-American Relations, Peter Boychuck, "Detente: Problems and Prospects in Rallying the Masses", Problems of Peace and Socialism (New Delhi), vol.8, no.12, December 1980, p.23.
17. For the full account of detente see, Geoffrey Jukes, "Perspectives in Soviet-American Relations With Special Reference to SALT", India International Centre Quarterly, vol.5, no.1, January, 1978, p.3.
18. Floron, Jr., ed., n.2, p.370.

The sudden killing of President Amin and his replacement by Babrak Karmal, and the move into Afghanistan of large Soviet military forces, on 27 December 1979, raised a serious question as to the future of detente. The Soviet Union may have designs on the oil resources of the Gulf, but the occupation of Afghanistan provides neither evidence of such aspiration nor a secure stepping stone to achieve it. Nor was the Soviet decision determined or even influenced by considerations of resoluteness of American policy or the global military balance. In the Soviet view the US and the West have no vital interest in Afghanistan and the Soviet Union does. Therefore, they believe their actions there should not preclude detente in bilateral Soviet-American (and East-West) relations.¹⁹

The world is now confronted with a very dangerous situation and unless both sides see sense, the future of the world can jeopardise. The alternative to negotiations would be an unbridled arms race which would bury detente very deep.

Brezhnev in his New Delhi speech has indicated Soviet willingness to work an arrangement regarding pre-

19. Ibid., p.759.

servation of oil interests of the West in the Gulf area. The Soviets have also made a move in favour of talks regarding settlement of the Afghanistan tangle,²⁰ including the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.²¹

For political solution of the Afghan problem within the framework of principles set out by the OIC the non-aligned Movement and the United Nations, Zia said, according to the principles, the Soviet troops must withdraw, the Afghan refugees must return to their homes with honour and dignity, the Afghan people should have the right to choose their own system of government and the non-aligned Islamic status of Afghanistan must be restored.²² Moreover, a Soviet attack across the Pakistani border would create serious international problems for Moscow. The US signed an executive agreement with Pakistan in 1959, pledging to come to Pakistan's assistance in the event of an attack by the Soviet Union.

20. Gujral, n.14, p.13. For detailed information see Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi), vol.26, no.12, December 1980, pp.285-96.

21. The Truth About Afghanistan: Documents, Facts, Eye Witness Reports, p.41.

22. The Muslim (Islamabad), 10 March, 1982. See also Fukyuama, no.10, pp.26-27.

IV. Resume of Political Activity in Quest of a Political Solution

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 evoked general and almost universal condemnation at the international level. The consensus of world opinion was that the Soviet Union should withdraw promptly its troops from Afghanistan and start political negotiations.

Firstly, UN General Assembly called Sixth Emergency Special Session on 14 January, 1980. Many countries, strongly condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and demanded the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops. The speeches made by the representatives of various countries (104 member state in favour, 18 against, 18 abstentions; the membership of the UN is 152; twelve nations including Romania did not participate in the vote), have shown that the whole world is viewing with serious concern the grave impact on the development of the world situation being exerted by the extraordinary step made by the Soviet Union as a Super Power in total disregard of all norms governing international relations.²³

23. For detailed analysis, see UNGA, Sixth Emergency Special Session, 10 January to 16 January 1980, UN Document A/ES-6/PV.7, 15 January 1980 and also see III Chronicle (New Delhi), vol.17, no.2, March 1980, pp.3-16.

Similarly the 36 nation Islamic Conference which met in Islamabad in January 1980, unanimously condemned the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The conference reiterated its demand for the immediate, total and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed on the territory of Afghanistan. It reaffirmed respect for the inalienable right of the people of Afghanistan to determine their own form of government and choose their economic, political and social systems free from outside interference or coercion and called upon the states to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned status of Afghanistan and the Islamic identity. The conference strongly urged the creation of the right conditions for the early return of the Afghan refugees to their land in security and honour, and reiterated its appeal to all states and peoples to provide assistance in order to alleviate the sufferings of the Afghan refugees.

The conference expressed the hope that the Non-aligned Movement will play an active role in search for a comprehensive solution of the Afghan crisis, consistent with the resolution, in order to consolidate security and stability in the region and the world and to reinforce

the objectives of the Non-aligned Movement.²⁴

UN General Assembly discussion for political solution to the Afghanistan problem renewing its earlier call for the withdrawal of "foreign troops" from Afghanistan and asking the appointment of a UN Special representative to promote a political solution of the Afghan problem.

Voting on the resolution co-sponsored by 42 countries was: 111 in favour and 20 against, twelve countries including India abstained.²⁵

Soviet action in Afghanistan had revealed Moscow's brutal disregard for accepted rules of international behaviour for public opinion, and for the principles laid down in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 signed by

24. See for detail emphasis "Inaugural Address by President of Pakistan General Zia-ul-Haq to the Eleventh Session of the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference", *Strategic Studies (Islamabad)*, vol.3, no.3, Spring 1980, pp.31-32 and see also *ibid.*, vol.3, no.2, Winter 1980, pp.11-29; see also The Time (London), 28 January 1980.

25. For full emphasis, see, GA A/RES/35/37, 26 November 1980. Also see UN General Assembly Calls for Pullout from Afghanistan, Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 20 November, 1980.

Brezhnev himself. The British Prime Minister went on to add that for the first time since the Soviets had sent a large military contingent backed by tanks, gunships and helicopters into a country which was a member of a non-aligned movement and posed no conceivable threat to Soviet security or interest.²⁶

Britain has condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as an unprovoked act of aggression against an independent country, representing a serious threat to world peace and an unprecedented development in the history of post-war Soviet expansion.

It has supported resolution in both the UN Security Council and General Assembly calling for immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. The Security Council resolution voted by the Soviet Union, and General Assembly resolution was overwhelmingly approved by 104 votes to 18, with 18 abstentions.²⁷

V. Soviet Approach to Political Solution

Brezhnev (USSR) approach to political solution and peaceful settlement of conflict, proposed to the United

26. The Times, 19 January 1980.

27. Afghanistan, Survey of Current Affairs (DIA, London), vol. 10, no. 1, January 1980, p. 15.

States, other Western powers, China, Japan, all the states which will show interest in this, to agree on the following mutual obligations:

- Not to establish foreign military bases in the area of the Persian Gulf and adjacent islands, not to deploy nuclear or any other weapons of mass destruction there;
- Not to use and not to threaten with the use of force against the countries of the Persian Gulf area, not to interfere into their internal affairs;
- To respect the status of non-alignment, chosen by Persian Gulf states; not to draw them into military groups with the participation of nuclear powers;
- To respect sovereign right of the states of the region to their natural resources;
- Not to raise any obstacles or threats to normal trade exchange and use of sea lanes that link the states of that region with other countries of the world.²⁸

West European Approach

The European Council (i.e. the heads of the governments of the 10 member states of European Community) launched on 30 June a set of proposals for international negotiations on the Afghanistan issue, and

28. Leonid Brezhnev, "USSR Relationship with the U.S., Afghanistan and Middle-East", Vital Speeches of the Day (New York), vol. 57, no. 8, February 1981, p. 229. See also, L.I. Brezhnev, Socialism, Peace and Freedom and Independence of the Peoples (Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1982), p. 128.

these were presented on 5 July to the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko, by Lord Carrington, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.²⁹

The European Council recalls its earlier statements notably those issued at Venice on 13 June, 1980 and Madrid on 24 March, 1981, which stressed the urgent need to bring about a solution which would enable Afghanistan to return to its traditional independent and non-aligned status free from external interference and with the Afghan people having the full capacity to exercise their right to self determination in keeping with the Resolutions voted by the United Nations, the Islamic Conference and Non-aligned Movement.

European Council attempted to open the way to a political solution to the problem of Afghanistan through international conferences consisting of two stages.

The purpose of stage one would be to work out international arrangements designed to bring about the cessation of external intervention and the establishment of safeguards to prevent such intervention in future and thus to create conditions in which Afghanistan's independence and non-alignment can be assured.

29. The Times, 30 June, 1981.

The European Council proposes that in due course the Permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, Pakistan, Iran and India and the Secretary General of the Islamic Conference, or their representatives be invited to participate in stage one of the conference.

The purpose of stage two would be to reach agreement on the implementation of the international agreements worked out in stage one and on all other matters designed to assure Afghanistan's future as an independent and non-aligned state. Stage two would be attended by the participants in stage one together with representatives of the Afghan people.

The European approach to political solution to the problem of Afghanistan, and the European Council firmly believes that the situation in Afghanistan continues to demand the attention of the international community to support it fully with the aim of reducing international tension and ending human suffering in Afghanistan.³⁰

30. Bulletin of the European Communities (Brussels), vol. 14, no. 6, July 1981, Point 1.1.13, p. 9.

Non-Aligned Approach

In this context the Ministers viewed the situation in Afghanistan with particular concern. They urgently called for a political settlement on the basis of the withdrawal of the foreign troops and full respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-aligned status of Afghanistan and strict observance of the principles of non-intervention and non-interference. They also affirmed the right of the Afghan refugees to return to their homes in safety and honour.

"The Ministers expressed their appreciation for the sincere efforts made in search of a political settlement of the situation in Afghanistan. They called on all states to exercise restraint and to avoid further endangering the peace and security of the region and to take such steps as would lead to the creation of conditions conducive to stable and harmonious relations among the states of the region based on the non-aligned principles of peaceful co-existence, respect for sovereignty, national independence, territorial integrity and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of states".³¹

31. Kassina's Contemporary Archives, 1981, pp. 30914-15. See also Hindustan Times (New Delhi), October 15, 1981.

VI. The Road to A Political Solution: The Place of Norms of Non-Intervention

The road to political solution of the Afghanistan problem can be possible with the strict and prompt observance of the United Nations Charter, "based on mutual respect and benefit, non-aggression, respect for each other's sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity and non-intervention in one another's affairs, and to fulfil the purposes and the principles of the Charter."³² And within the framework of Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference,³³ and Non-aligned Movement,³⁴ all states to make every effort to strengthen internal peace, and to develop friendly and co-operative relations and settle disputes by peaceful means as enjoyed in the United Nations Charter.³⁵

First there is wide agreement that the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan constitutes a violation of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Afghanistan. It constitutes a

32. For a detailed description see, General Assembly Resolution 1236 (XII) of 14 December, 1957, p.5.

33. Foreign Ministers Conference, n.24, pp.12-39.

34. Foreign Affairs Record, vol.33, no.2, February, 1931, p.62.

35. Resolution, n.32, p.5.

clear interference in the internal affairs of another country, in contravention of established principles of international law including those of the UN Charter.³⁶

Norms of non-intervention, survives but for that, strong political base is required to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Afghanistan. Indira Gandhi called upon Super Powers to progressively reduce their presence in the Ocean and essentially eliminate altogether.

Secondly, after Soviet troops withdrawal from Afghanistan, strong cooperation from the neighbouring countries is required to eliminate any Super Power intervention of rivalry in the region and to respect the norms of non-intervention, and to defend sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.

Despite indications that pressure from world public opinion has not been effective in securing any modification in the scale of the Soviet occupation force in Afghanistan, the Soviets have a special

36. For a detailed analysis, see, UN General Assembly, see A/ES-6/PV-2, 11 January 1980, p. 19. See also, n. 31, October 16, 1981.

interest in not undermining the considerable leverage it enjoys in the Third World. With the Reagan administration in Washington possessing dangerous and destabilising consequences in the Soviet view, the stakes of the game have increased. Pressure on Pakistan and inducements to India and Iran have not gained the diplomatic support the Soviets expected. The long term effect of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan will create strong feelings of disaffiliation of the Islamic and nonaligned countries against the Soviet Union.³⁷ The Soviet Union cannot afford a growth of American influence in this important international constituency at its own expense. The present intransigent attitude of Moscow's decision-makers does not exclude the possibility of real peace negotiations. Some observers are convinced that time is on the side of the Soviets in Afghanistan. The Soviets may have good reasons to promote this thinking through their friends, but the premises on which this argument is based is fundamentally flawed. The Soviet Union has consistently sought to leave all its options open. It is instructive to recall that on November 4, 1980, Brezhnev sought to convey in New Delhi a long

37. Author interviewed a senior external affairs top official.

tern view of events in Afghanistan and in West Asia.³⁸ Although he did not offer any concessions, it is possible to identify the relationship and different valuations of how and when to maximise Soviet bargaining power. Brezhnev's suggestions fall into three categories: 1. No bases in the Gulf area for all major powers and no deployment of nuclear weapons. 2. Respect for the non-aligned status of the Gulf states and avoidance of military alliance with nuclear weapons states, and 3. Protection of sea lanes passing through the Gulf.

The exclusion of Afghanistan from the peaceful and non-interventionist perspective suggested for the Gulf is clearly evident of the fact that this Brezhnev proposal is not meant to be a solvent for the Afghanistan imbroglio. For Afghanistan, Brezhnev kept his powder dry by blatantly stating that Afghanistan was moving back into a "normal peaceful track" and he offered Afghanistan's neighbours nothing by way of resolution of conflict.³⁹ The zone of peace plan for the Gulf is only meant to isolate the aggressive U.S. led bloc and hence served Soviet propaganda goals and

38. Sec, Brezhnev, n.28, p.128.

39. Ibid.

purposes. In terms of probabilities, Soviet policy oscillations on Afghanistan will not come about openly denying the legitimacy of their activity in Afghanistan. The opportunities and incentives for the Soviet Union to extend the zone of peace plan to Afghanistan would only come about when long term Soviet strategic planning would evolve in a direction which require forestalling the strengthening of Third World ties with the other Super Power, the United States. It would be idle to speculate at this stage how a political solution would come about. The following propositions may express developments and conditions which may integrate Soviet policy and strategy choices and create conditions favourable to negotiations:

(a) If strong pressures are generated and sustained in the Third World (including the Islamic countries) which affect the general line of Soviet foreign policy, the Soviet Union will have to react. The internal disputes in the Nonaligned Movement and in the Islamic Conference are taken into account in both the thrust and timing of Soviet diplomacy in the Third World attitudes becomes less pronounced, the Soviets would first if all adopt a wait-and-see attitude. Most of the respondents to the Questionnaire who had experience

of dealing with the Soviets affirmed that the repercussions in the Third World were already quite painful for the Soviets.⁴⁰ The stalemate in the negotiating process can be overcome if the Third World countries distinguish between the specific Soviet threat to the independence and nonaligned status of Afghanistan and the general problem of raising the costs for further Soviet expansionism in the Third World.⁴¹ Over the next several years the Soviets may no doubt wish to take advantage of the Political instability in Pakistan and Iran. We can, however, make a general assumption that if the nonaligned countries can recapture the lost momentum of their movement, they can develop political will to resist the incorporation of Afghanistan in the Soviet bloc.

(b) Both the Soviet Union and the United States have broken the rules of detente.⁴² Empirical efforts for resolving the Afghanistan crisis must keep in view the requirements of a durable detente. For reasons of enlightened self-interest both the United States

40. Author interviewed with a Senior Member of Parliament.

41. Ibid.

42. Author's interview with the external affairs diplomatic official.

and the Soviet Union wish to maintain their strategic presence in the regions which are crucial to the changing relation of world forces. A durable detente would prevent reckless adventures by once again stressing the multilateralism of the United Nations system. With the development of its global reach, the Soviet Union's strategy may focus on increasing its military presence in Third World countries. The United Nations system can check the Soviet rationale for exaggerating the military factor in international relations provided it suggests balanced solutions which do not create unpredictable uncertainties for the Soviet Union. A new hierarchy of priorities for a durable detente may begin to emerge if the United Nations seeks to pursue the dialogue in order to defuse regional tensions over Afghanistan.⁴⁵

(c) The internal politics of Afghanistan inevitably enter into the calculations about the range of great power competition. What complicates the matter and limits the policy alternatives for Afghanistan is the manner in which loyalties and expectations of the people have become polarised. Even the formidable military

42. Author interviewed with the external affairs diplomatic official.

43. Ibid.

capabilities of the Soviet Union cannot be translated into political influence because the efforts to institutionalise political unity have miserably failed. In contrast with the political maturity of Austria's political parties and political leaders, the modalities of the withdrawal of the external intervention appeared quite promising once the Austrian state Treaty negotiations tended towards improved understanding in place of conflict. Some mechanism for accommodation between the political forces in Afghanistan (communist and non-communist) with the help to reassert the autonomy of the Afghan political system.

(d) Much of the bargaining activity for a political solution of a problem like Afghanistan deals with the substantive political and military relationships, but it cannot ultimately ignore the economic, social, cultural and psychological factors. The problem is not just to create some atmospherics through which the Karmal regime could negotiate with the Afghan opposition groups. Proposals for a peace settlement must be examined in a wider context.⁴⁴ Both the Super Powers can diminish their mutual mistrust by avoiding

44. Interview with a Government official.

relating all Third World situations to each other's global capabilities.⁴⁵ The Soviet Union articulates its policy moves in terms of universalist ideological goals and to counter these aggressive signals, the United States works to create substantive relationships like the United States - Chinese parallelism with respect to the "arch of crisis" along the western edge of the Indian Ocean. Both the Super Powers in their central thinking have not been able to take adequate account of the ideological disequilibrium created by Islamic Fundamentalism not only in Afghanistan and Iran but also in the West Asian and North African region as a whole.⁴⁶ It is noteworthy that respondents to our Questionnaire from the countries this region generally agreed that the nonaligned movement should utilise the cultural and psychological factors and play an important role in the balancing process and even conduct a wide-ranging campaign to secure the disengagement and withdrawal of both the Super Powers from this region.⁴⁷ In the 1980s local and regional affairs should progress towards stabilisation if the countries concerned do not simply rush

45. Paul Nitze, "Strategy in the Decade of the 1980s", Foreign Policy, Fall 1980, pp.82-101.

46. Author interviewed top Afghan rebel leader.

47. Interview with a senior diplomatic official.

into the embrace of the strategic consensus of one Super Power or the other.

(e) From a military point of view, it is fashionable to speak of deterrence only in the context of nuclear weapons. In fact the concept existed long ago and predates the nuclear age. The very concept of the buffer state provided the two sides an opportunity for effective deterrence to come into play at an appropriate level. The restoration of Afghanistan's status as a buffer state will offer a real change to broaden the peace process in the entire region.⁴⁸ The strengthening of the profile of a buffer state directly helps in modifying principles of strategy and tactics in favour of Super Power restraint and in avoiding direct confrontation.⁴⁹

(f) Political understanding at the regional level may reinforce positive attempts to produce patterns of interaction in favour of world order.⁵⁰ The assessments of former Indian diplomats among the respondents to our Questionnaire, by and large were in favour of the proposal of convening a Regional Conference to

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Richard Falk, A Study of Future World Order (New York, 1975), p.189.

define the objectives and tasks of restoring the political sovereignty and non-aligned status of Afghanistan. Even though such a conference would not have the authority to impose order, the majority of our respondents believed that a Regional Conference would act as a stabiliser. Ofcourse the proceedings of the Regional conference should strictly avoid the shibboleths of the Cold War and aim at stability and regional coordination through a realistic diagnosis of the conflict situation.

(g) It is now apparent that Non-interference and respect for Afghan non-alignment mean different things to the Russians and the Americans. Unless the Nonaligned Movement or the United Nations take the lead to induct a peace-keeping force, there will continue to be an increasing use of violence in Afghanistan.⁵¹ The peace-keeping force will have the clear and unambiguous role of helping the people of Afghanistan to achieve free expression of their political will.⁵²

(h) To establish and institutionalise democracy in Afghanistan will not be an easy task in view of the spill over of violence between various social and political groups. The Afghan refugees who answered our

51. Author interviewed with a Senior diplomatic official.

52. Ibid.

Questionnaire belonged to different factions and groups ranging from Islamic Fundamentalists to Communists of both Khalq and Parcham affiliations. Most significantly for the future, nearly all respondent accept the revival of the Parliament (Shura) composed of the House of the People (Nolesi Jirgah) and the House of the Elders (Mashrane Jirgah) as the most important step to meet the wishes of the people.⁵³ Views are divided on whether the constitution promulgated by King Zahir Shah should be revived or a new Constitution should be adopted.⁵⁴ In any case all respondent agreed that as the first step in starting the U.N.'s peacekeeping work in Afghanistan, the traditional Great Council (The Loya Jirgah) should proclaim the core values and interests of the Afghan people and their refusal to be victims of a great game now being played by the Soviets and the Americans which resembles the conflict engendered by the efforts at aggrandisement of the British and Russian empires in the 19th century.

(1) It has been the main thrust of polemical writing of the Afghanistan crisis to put the crucial relationships on a global scale. Such an approach under-

53. Author interviewed with different political groups of Afghanistan.

54. Ibid.

continues the strong desire of regional units to protect themselves from external great power intervention and general interference. If ideological extremism is avoided, both the Super Powers will find a natural interest in reducing the level of conflict in Afghanistan and West Asia. If Afghanistan is seen not as a case study in ideological polarisation but as an example of the general case of the negative consequences of great power intervention in the Third World, the key stabilising role of institutionalised regional detente can be recognised in the present case on the following lines:

1. A sustained process of restoration of sovereignty and nonaligned status to Afghanistan could be linked to expanding and institutionalising non-alignment in the neighbourhood of Afghanistan e.g. Iran, Pakistan etc.

2. The political feasibility of Super Power cooperation with all the countries in the region would require that both the Super Powers give up their projects of developing strategic consensus with client states.

3. The wider political settlement should be based on a military balance of forces which promotes regional stability. Neither United States nor the Soviet Union

nor any of the other Great Powers should foster arms races in the manner in which the Americans and the Soviets have triggered off one between India and Pakistan. On the other hand if countries like India, Pakistan, and Iran refuse to become confrontation states to oblige the interventionism of the Great Powers, this would be the first tangible step towards the elimination of the Afghan crisis.⁵⁵

4. Finally, the common security issues between the regional powers surrounding Afghanistan should be settled in a framework of depolarisation with a view to overall reduction of outside pressures. There is a role here of not so much secret diplomacy as of publically agreed limitations on arms levels and agreed ground rules, within the framework of nonalignment.

55. See, Colig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptation, pp. 7-5.

CHAPTER - V

**THIRD WORLD INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY:
CONCLUSIONS**

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The 1980s will be increasingly dominated by an increasing concern for security on the part of the Third World countries. Third World decision-makers will have to take into account the fact that though there are several sub-systems in the Third World, the operational problems facing each one of them are related to the projection of unpredictable future contingencies. A major source of flaws in their decision-making is that they tend to identify their capabilities and commitments in terms of the rigidities of their traditional conflicts. Our study of the Afghanistan crisis has shown that there are common denominators for Third World foundations of international security. The grim tragedy which affected the people of Afghanistan cannot be attributed only to the bitter political infighting which is said to be an endemic Afghan propensity,¹ for the major factors underlying the international security threats to Afghanistan are related to the imperatives of global powers.

1. John C. Griffiths, Afghanistan (Andre Deutsch, London 1981), p.200.

The policy needs of the two Super Powers were reinforced by theoretical frameworks which provided optimistic views on the benefits of cooperation between the two Super Powers.² Such studies have little analytical utility where there are multiple inputs shaped by pluralistic pressures arising out of the political situation and trends in the Third World. The Super Powers view the use of military power in international relations with utmost caution and care when the possibility of direct confrontation is involved.³ However at one time or another either Super Power has tended to exaggerate its military role in the Third World when there was no fear of direct military confrontation with the other. A closer look at Afghanistan reveals the contradictions in Soviet behaviour and policies. Under the pretext of countering the influence of the other Super Power, the Soviet Union has adversely affected the sense of security of Afghanistan's neighbours and has frustrated its own efforts to achieve detente. The Soviet move signalled a redefinition of goals and objectives to the United States which was

2. Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown 1977).

3. V. Fyodorov, "Renunciation of Force in International Relations", International Affairs, no.1, 7 July, 1978, pp.39-40. See also, William R. Van Cleave and W. Scott Thompson: Strategic Options for the Early Eighties: What can be Done?

alarmed that the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan had created a situation of imbalance in the Persian Gulf and would be a danger to the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. The strategic calculations of both the Super Powers did not help to preserve an equilibrium among the concerned Third World countries. Even a country like India which supported the Soviet Union on many central issues of international politics found that the legitimisation of Soviet presence in Afghanistan would immensely harm its strategic environment.

Whatever one thinks of the merits of the particular arguments of those who urge accommodation to Soviet Power by Third World countries⁴ a number of serious questions are raised if the threats to international security are to be met through cooperative management of strategic relations by Third World countries.

Arms transfers have become an important aspect of the foreign policies of the two Super Powers in the post-war period whereas there was hardly any dis-

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(White Plains, Maryland: Automated Graphics Systems and National Strategy Information Centre, 1979).

cornible link between arms transfers and supplier country's quest for access to areas of strategic interest bases and related facilities in the earlier periods. We can find a correlation between the types weapons supplies, donor recipient relationship and the degree of access provided to the supplier nation, especially the Super Powers. Important technological changes have also led to shifts in the strategic importance of heartland areas of the two Super Powers.⁴ It was the world of two giant powers, a world in which the rest of us have been obsessed by the catastrophic capabilities vested in Washington and Moscow.⁵ Indeed by aiding such countries as India, the United Arab Republic, Indonesia, Afghanistan and Algeria.⁶ For instance Afghanistan continued to be a major issue in international politics. The three major border violations which took place across the Durand Line from the Afghan side during this quarter brought out fully the implications of this problem for the peace and security of

4. For example see Harpreet Mahajan, Arms Transfer to India, Pakistan and the Third World (Young Asia Publishers, New Delhi, 1982), p.111.

5. Peter Calvecoressi, "The Future of International Conflict", International Relations (London), vol.XIII, no.2, November 1981, p.1104.

6. See, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Assessing Soviet Power in the Third World", Asian Affairs, vol.58, Part I, February 1971, p.10.

the region.⁷ It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the Soviet Union regards the present Pakistan Government as one of its principal obstacles to crushing the Afghan rebels.⁸

The Soviet Union used force on a large scale on three occasions: Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979. The threat of intervention has been both a defensive shield and an offensive weapon. Along with arms transfers and economic aid, the promised protective intervention has been one of the major forms of patronage that the Soviets have been able to offer Third World clients in their global competition with the United States for influence.⁹

The foreign policy of the Soviet Union serves three broad objectives, in a descending order of priority: to promote the security of the Soviet Union and the power of the Communist Party; to expand Soviet influence and control outside Russia; and to support and promote international communism in support of

7. Zuboide Mustafa, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy - A Quarterly Survey", Pakistan Horizon, vol. XXXIV, no. 4, 1981, p. 6.

8. For detailed information see Kasir Islam, "Islam and National Identity: The Case of Pakistan and Bangladesh", International Journal of Middle East (Cambridge, England), vol. 13, 1981, pp. 52-72 (This article also contains a useful discussion of Baluch and Pathan Nationalism).

9. Francis Fukuyama, "Nuclear Shadow-Boxing: Soviet Intervention Threat in the Middle East", Orbis, vol. 25, no. 9, Fall 1981, p. 579.

Soviet national interests.¹⁰ Soviet perceptions of priorities and interests and of the rules of the game of international politics.

- the protection and furtherance of Soviet national, state and party interests;
- the protection and retention of their political and military gains within their sphere of influence;
- the gradual Soviet expansion into promising areas of the world by means of probes in to "soft" areas which are not considered vital to the United States.¹¹

Brezhnev policy line appears to be one of high defence budgets, controlled expansion into the Third World,¹² Moscow's forcible replacement of Hafizullah Amin with B. Karmal as President of Afghanistan indicated a Soviet willingness to interfere in the internal affairs of a Third World client that had no direct precedent. The Soviets at the same time gained a distinct geopolitical advantage by outflanking Iran and putting the greater part of the Persian Gulf within the range of their tactical air power.¹³

The Soviet role in Afghanistan is of interest. The

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10. Roman Rokowicz, "The Military and Soviet Foreign Policy", The Journal of Strategic Studies (London), vol.4, no.4, December 1981, p.337.
11. Ibid., pp.333-39.
12. Ibid., p.353.
13. Francis Fukuyama, The Future of the Soviet Role in Afghanistan, p.7. See also Adam N. Carrinlio,

first concerns immediate threat to American interests posed by the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Second, Soviet threat to peace it includes such other countries as Pakistan and Iran.¹⁴ Thus it was that, between 1940 and 1947, Moscow took possession of Eastern Europe, bringing into its orbit more than 100 million non-Soviets. Likewise this is what happened to Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968) and Afghanistan (1980) when Moscow re-established its force the Marxist-Leninist order then momentarily threatened.¹⁵

I. The Military Situation in the Third World: Perceptions of Principal Actors

Middle East is important for Soviet Union. The military elites of this region have become allies of the Soviet Union in extending its influence. While pursuing detente talks with Washington, Moscow made inroads in the Middle East, winning over pro-US allies, such as Turkey. It was further facilitated by the desire and

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"America and Europe in the Middle East: A New Co-ordination", Orbis, vol.25, no.3, Fall 1981, pp.608-09. Also Yohannan Ramati (New York), vol.XXVII, no.7, August/September 1981, pp.3-6.

14. Ibid.

15. Garfinkle, n.16, p.653.

and willingness of these countries to acquire weapons from the Soviet Union, as they were satisfied with the Western suppliers. The Soviet supplies to Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Algeria were an effort to upgrade and augment the strategic bombing capabilities of these countries.¹⁶

Analysts do offer some explanations of course, proceeding from their heavy stakes in this neighbouring country. The Soviets presumably found that, after the ouster of monarchy in 1972 stability had not come to Afghanistan. One puppet after another was tried and eliminated till we came back to Babrak Karmal. But none could muster local support, and even the Afghan army was suspect. The regime had to be bolstered by Soviet military power.¹⁷

Since the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 when the arms build up in the region received a fillip picture of Middle East emerged. Already bristling with arms within, it was now militarised on its periphery as well. The countries most conspicuously involved in this connection

16. Mahajan, n.4, p.161.

17. Maharaj K. Chopra, "India Russia and the Middle East", U.S.I. Journal (New Delhi), January/March, 1981, p.6.

have been the USSR and USA, China and India,¹⁸ Third World military regimes fully dependent on the two Super Powers i.e. USA and USSR. As a result there is instability and governments bad management, miscalculations largely leading to the war among the Third World countries.¹⁹

Thus Soviets have threatened to intervene or have actually used combat forces in areas in or near the Middle East on several other occasions, such as in Yemen in 1967, Ethiopia in 1977-78 and most recently in Afghanistan at the end of 1979.²⁰ American intervention or even escalation to a more serious global level. Such is obviously not always the case. In the three instances where Soviet combat troops have actually intervened directly - Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979.²¹ Moscow took distinct risks in each case, in terms of a deterioration in long-term relations with the West, and in its standing among erstwhile allies and clients.

18. Ibid., p.10.

19. Amos Perlmutter, "The Comparative Analysis of Military Regimes", World Politics (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.), vol. XXIII, no. 1, October, 1980, pp.96-120. See also Irving Louis Horowitz, "Military Origins of Third World Dictatorship and Democracy", Third World Quarterly, vol.7, no.1, January 1981, pp.37-47.

20. Francis Fukuyama, Soviet Threats to Intervention in the Middle East 1956-1973 (Santa Monica, California, Rand., June 1980), p.4.

21. Ibid., p.30.

II. Security Dilemma in the Third World: Prisoners' Dilemma and Other Models

Increased tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union result from charges by both sides that the other party does not abide by the rules of "detente". The United States charges the Soviet Union with continuing its strategic and conventional arms build up and as having a greater propensity to intervene in Third World areas to upset the global balance. The Soviet Union charges the United States with not fulfilling its promises in the area of trade and finance and with the failing to ratify the SALT-II agreements. The Soviet Union believes that the erratic policies of the United States are responsible for the emerging misperceptions.²²

Both the Soviet Union and the United States have explained their projection of influence over much of the rest of the world as necessary to protect themselves against the other. Great Powers often do offensive things for defensive reasons.²³ Clearly such regional

22. Jusuf Wanandi, "Third World Conflict and International Security: A Third World Perspective", Conflict: An International Journal (Crane Russak, New York), vol. 3, no. 1, 1981, pp. 48-49. See also, article written by same author, The Indonesian Quarterly (Julan Kosohatan 111/13, Jakarta Pusat), vol. IX, no. 2, April 1981, p. 9.

23. Paul C. Warnke, "SALT: An Ongoing Process", Department of State Bulletin, vol. 78, no. 2013, Apr. 1978, pp. 1-30.

conflicts could be encouraged and used by major external powers.²⁴ The Super Powers for their part are showing greater interest in the Gulf and other Third World countries than ever before.²⁵

Third World security dilemmas and Super Power interests, this security aspect of the Third World can be applied on two person prisoner's Dilemma games that can provide a basis for comparison between two person and N, Person situations. N-Person Dilemma can provide a model for many problems of current social concern.²⁶ The theory of Prisoner's Dilemma can be applied to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Strategically located Baluchistan, which stretches across Western Pakistan, Eastern Iran, and Southern Afghanistan, the Baluch homeland commands more than 900 miles of the Arabian Sea coastline, including the northern shores of the Strait of Hormuz.

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24. Shohren Chubin, "Iran's Security in the 1980s", International Security, vol.2, no.3, Winter 1980, p.56.
25. Naila Sabra, "Regional Powers and Super Powers' Rivalry", Politica Internazionale (Rome, Italy), vol.11, no.1, Spring 1981, p.29.
26. Dwight J. Cochring, James P. Kahan, "The Uniform N-Person Prisoner's Dilemma Game", Journal of Conflict Resolution (Ann Arbor, Mich.), vol.20, no.1, March 1976, p.42.

The steady growth of Baluch discontent in Pakistan and Iran offers the Soviet Union an increasingly attractive opportunity. Though not yet disposed to act, Moscow might be tempted to manipulate Baluch nationalism if an anti-Soviet leadership comes to power in Teheran or if Islamabad continues to upgrade its military ties to Beijing and Washington. Moscow can afford to bide its time in deciding whether to play its Baluch card as long as Pakistan and Iranian leaders fail to make meaningful moves toward political settlements with the Baluch.²⁷ Military realities, however could well compel Moscow to relieve pressure on Afghan front by activating an insurgency in Baluchistan. Just as Soviet hopes for winning greater influence in Islamabad and Teheran deter Moscow from encouraging a Baluch insurgency, so Moscow's desire to punish Pakistan and Iran for providing sanctuaries and assistance to the Afghan resistance forces could prompt retaliatory action in Baluch areas.²⁸ In particular, the fundamental theorem of prisoner's Dilemma states the following:

27. Selig S. Harrison, "Fanning Flames in South Asia", *Foreign Policy*, no.49, Winter 1981-82, p.69. See also Fred Halliday, "Revolution in Afghanistan", *New Left Review* (London), no.112, November/December 1978, pp.4-5.

28. *Ibid.*, p.90. See also, Sir Michael Gillett, "Afghanistan", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society* (London, U.C. 2), vol.LXXI, Part III, October 1966, pp.232-48.

"Given the two players with diametrically opposed interests and with a finite number of strategies available to each, there exists an optimum strategy (which may be a mixture of the available ones) for each player. This optimum strategy has the property that if both players play rationally the strategy guarantees to each player that he will receive a pay off no smaller than he can expect given an equally rational opponent."²⁹

The Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) is a mixed motive experimental game in which two players each decide between alternative responses, analogous to competition and cooperation.³⁰

III. Internal Developments: Political and Military

During Daud Khan's period (1953-1963) both United States and the Soviet Union launched substantial aid programmes to Afghanistan. Also at this time the issue of "Pakhtoonistan" emerged as a linchpin of Daud Khan's regional policy. Afghanistan-Pakistan relations have been over this issue to a greater or lesser degree

29. Anatol Rapoport, "Various Conceptions of Peace Research", Peace Research Society Papers (International), vol. XIX, 1972, p. 701.

30. Vincent Skothe Daniel Languiyer, and David Lundgren, "Six Differences as Artifact in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game", Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. XIII, no. 4, December 1974, p. 707.

ever since the creation of Pakistan in 1947.³¹ Since then Pakistan also sought close relations with the United States. Pakistani leaders were hostile to the Soviet Union, because it had condemned as "politically bankrupt and reactionary" the Muslim League's demand for an independent Muslim State on the subcontinent.³² On the other hand the Persian Gulf region is regarded as of great strategic importance to the United States in view of the region's vital role in supplying oil to the West. The region's geographic proximity to the Soviet Union and the ability of the Soviet Union to mobilise massive forces rapidly near its own borders makes the Americans nervous and vigilant.³³

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31. Shoen F. Eil, "The Cabal in Kabul: Power Interaction in Afghanistan", American Political Science Review, vol.LXXI, no.2, June 1977, p.468.
32. Gen. D. Overstreet and Marshal Windmiller, Communism in India (Berkeley) University of California Press, 1959), p.118.
33. R.S. Thaper, "Confrontation in West Asia", Strategic Analysis, vol.IV, no.5-6, August-September 1980, p.201.

Since the Second World War and more so, after the fifties the US and the USSR have each been struggling to establish a foothold in the area.³⁴ In 1959, the US entered into a military alliance with Turkey and Iran (CENTO). At the same time she established strong bilateral relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia.³⁵ With Daud Khan's removal from Premiership in 1963, the "Pakhtoonistan" issue subsided. By the mid-1960s, Afghanistan had acquired a changing intercontinental perspective, perhaps reflecting the reduction in competitive assistance. Relying less on external aid, Afghanistan inevitably turned toward increased regional diplomacy in an attempt to improve relations with both Iran and Pakistan. It is not unreasonable to speculate that with Daud Khan's resumption of power in 1973, the re-emergence of "Pakhtoonistan" will again strain relations with Pakistan and possibly also with Iran.³⁶

The emergence of a communist government in Afghanistan following the April 1978 coup d'etat, in which President Daud was killed, has given a new aura of

34. Sobra, n.29, p.57.

35. Ibid., pp.57-58.

36. DII, n.30, pp.468-69.

credibility to the dire prophecies of Soviet expansionism perennially voiced by the Shah of Iran and the succession of Pakistani leaders in the most familiar of these worst-case scenarios, the Shah envisages a closely concerted Soviet-Afghan effort to secure access to the sea by stimulating separatist forces in Pakistan. Moscow and Kabul yield center stage to the 5 million Baluch tribesmen living in the inaccessible mountain and desert country of Western Pakistan, Iran and Southern Afghanistan, an area that stretches for nearly 750 miles along the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman. Armed with sophisticated Soviet weaponry, a determined Baluch guerrilla army, using Afghanistan as a staging area proclaims an independent People's Republic of Baluchistan in part of what is now South Western Pakistan.⁵⁷ Thus the Soviet interest in the Persian Gulf, to spark the creation of Pakhtoonistan and Baluchistan and reduce Pakistan to a miserable strip of territory. These are developments that led to arms race in the subcontinent.

Soviet diplomatic support has been instrumental in strengthening Afghan claims against Pakistan. Afghan

57. Colig S. Harrison, "Nightmare in Baluchistan", Foreign Policy, no.2, Fall 1978, p.137.

calls for a Pakhtoonistan have been credible because of Soviet backing and it has been taken seriously by Pakistan. Soviet diplomatic support is used as an instrument for regarding the "correctness" of Afghan policy towards the USSR.³⁸ Afghanistan has traditionally been an area in which Russia has exerted influence or actively intervened.

Table - 1
Soviet Trade with Afghanistan
(in billions of dollars)

Year	Exports	Imports
1970	40.0	34.3
1971	50.3	38.4
1972	46.1	37.3
1973	45.5	40.3
1974	81.6	80.0 ^a
1975	93.7	68.7
1976	116.4 ^b	68.8
1977	154.5	104.0

- a. The two-fold increase occurred following the 1973 pro-Soviet coup in Afghanistan. Imports increased due to Afghan sale of gas to the USSR.
- b. The jump in exports was tied to Moscow's \$425 million credit extended in 1975 for Afghanistan's current seven Year Plan (March 1976 - March 1983). This represents the largest single commitment by the Soviet Union to Afghanistan.

³⁸. Robert H. Donaldson (ed.), The Soviet Union in The Third World: Success and Failures, pp.220-21.

Source: US Central Intelligence Agency,
Changing Patterns in Soviet
LDC Trade, 1976-1977, ER 78-10326,
May 1978, pp. 10-11.

Throughout the post-World War II period, Soviet major arms supplies to Afghanistan have been substantial. Restarting in 1956, supplies have included Mig-17s, Yak-11s, Il-28s, and Mig-21s and Mig-19s, and the later from 1966. Missiles and tanks were also supplied. In February 1979 the small US military and economic aid, worth \$250,000 was cancelled. In the wake of these developments in Iran and Afghanistan the United States may well decide to make a comeback on arms market in the region.³⁹

These are the internal political and military relations.

IV. Regional Alliances

The so called Western defence of the Gulf region, the revolution in Iran, the Iran-Iraq war, etc., have given the US an excuse to announce a new strategic doctrine in this region according to which it is going in

39. See, SIPRI Yearbook 1980, World Armaments and Disarmaments (Taylor and Francis Ltd., London, 1980), p. 118.

for a massive military build up in the Indian Ocean, acquiring military bases in several countries and preparing a special military force of few hundred thousand people which can be quickly developed in West or Southern Asia.⁴⁰ As far as regional alliances is concerned to settle the crisis which are passing through in the region is very complicated point. Because Pakistan is an American's alliance, Russia from the beginning and antagonistic policy of Pakistan and India are the main reasons making controversy for peaceful settlement of the crisis in the region.

South Asian countries viz., India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Nepal and Bhutan through co-operation play very important role in bringing peace in the region.

V. Decision-making Policy Options

In the past two decades the field of international relations studies has become increasingly diversified and is now marked by sharp differences over questions of scope, method and theory. In contrast to models of

40. J.D. Sothi, "Regional Cooperation", World Focus, vol.2, no.1, January 1981, p.40.

"pure" rationality in statistical theory and formal economics, efforts at rational decision-making political life are subject to constraints of the following kind: (1) the political actor's information about situations with which he must deal is usually incomplete; (2) His knowledge of ends-means relationships is generally inadequate to predict reality the consequences of choosing one or another course of action; and (3) it is often difficult for him to formulate a single criterion by means of which to choose which alternative course of action is best".⁴¹

Options for international peace and security "depend on solving the question of effective bilateral guarantees between concerned countries. For example, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan would be conducted within the context of the political settlement, i.e., between "Afghanistan, Iran and Afghanistan". The Karmal Government which would have to be present at all negotiations, also proposed that the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf be transformed into a "Zone of Peace" and that all military bases in those

41. Erik P. Hoffmann, Frederic J. Floron, Jr., The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 165-71.

arens be dismantled.⁴² On the other hand safe return of refugees to their homeland without any trouble and holding elections in the country under the auspices of the United Nations Organisation.

VI. The Third World Perspective on International Security: Policy Options in the 1980s

We have traced the evidence in the political events following Afghanistan intervention by the Soviet Union of an effective operational code of Super Power intervention which demonstrates a change in the political and military culture of the Soviet Union in the context of the Third World. Our study's purpose is, however, not only descriptive.⁴³ Our project can serve as a model for detailed studies of international security issues which may arise as a result of the deployment of force by any of the outside powers in the Third World. The implementation of foreign policy in the Third World results in failure on account of narrow and parochial considerations.

42. Alfred L. Monks, The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan, p.36.

43. Alvin Z. Rubinshtein, "Soviet Imperialism in Afghanistan", Current History, vol.79, no.459, October 1980, pp.60-65.

Ideological controversies relevant to the East-West confrontation or the popular diagnoses of the security problems of the NATO or the Warsaw Pact are often applied blindly to Third World conditions without clarity of plan or purpose. Third World decision-makers should be increasingly sceptical of solutions of important international security issues which are defined by political equilibria external to the Third World. The tendency to apply game theoretical models of conflict and cooperation evolved in the context of East-West international relations to the politically and socially diversified Third World does not have much justification.⁴⁴ No single formula can apply to all Third World situations, but foreign policy elites in the developing countries can work towards comprehensive peace settlements if they understand the role of outside pressures and discard simplistic notions about buying security at high cost from external parties.⁴⁵ Greater tolerance and mutual restraint among Third World countries are preconditions for preventing sharp policy oscillations which

44. Ibid., p. 103.

45. Holmut Sonnenfeldt, "Implications of the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan for East-West Relations", NATO Review, no. 12, 1980, pp. 104-92.

aggravate Super Power military competition and result in destructive consequences for the sovereignty of Third World countries. To conclude, if they interpret the significance of what has taken place in Afghanistan with the necessary realism, policy planners in the Third World should look ahead and lay the foundations of policy options and allocate the necessary political and military resources for meeting the challenge to international security:

1. Hitherto the Third World countries have been stressing the objective necessity of coexistence between the two Super Powers. The escalation of Soviet-American tensions operates as both cause and effect of destabilising phenomena in the Third World. If the Soviets consolidate their strategic gains in Afghanistan, options for flexibility will decline all round. In the short run it may be a prudent posture for a Third World country to overlook the Soviet strategic gains but in the long run it will only spur Soviet international ambitions, and also strengthen the propensities of both the Super Powers to discover caucus interventions in the tensions and crises of the developing world. To preserve the essence of Third World security interests, decision-makers should avoid formal commitments which facilitate opportunities for Soviet

or American penetration of the Third World.

2. Intra-regional problems, like the Pashtunization issues, should be seen in a pragmatic context to identify the structural causes of bilateral conflict. Third World decision-makers should lower their sights to perceive more clearly how global powers are exploiting regional instabilities.⁴⁶ Political and military values of states enjoying global power status should not be imported to exacerbate the regional relationships. The top leaderships of Third World countries should not hesitate to develop operational principles for implementation of regional security even if there remain unresolved disputes on other issues. The national leaderships should not accept the veto of military preferences in formulating foreign policies on important issues.

3. The decision by a Super Power to intervene in Third World is not made in a vacuum. The decision to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan was reinforced by some rough prediction that the political, economic and diplomatic costs in the Third World would not be too heavy in view of the heterogeneous elements involved.

46. Leon B. Poullado, "Afghanistan and the United States: The Crucial Years", The Middle East Journal, vol. 35, no. 2, Spring 1981, pp. 178-90.

A major obstacle to future Super Power intervention in the Third World could be created by an organisational arrangement which would register a sufficiently early aggregation of Third World interests opposed to deployment of troops by either of the Super Powers. The Soviets may well have had second thoughts about moving their troops into Afghanistan if they knew that they were incurring a high risk of jeopardising their relations with the vast majority of the Third World countries.⁴⁷

4. Super Power intentions and capabilities in the Third World are not unrelated to broader political concerns like detente. Qualitative and quantitative restraints on arms transfers are necessary in the Third World countries for extending and institutionalising detente at the regional level. The basic point to be stressed is that an attempt at institutional detente at regional levels is worth making because this will lead to greater willingness on the part of the Super Powers to institutionalise detente at the global level.

47. Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations.
See also Janandi, no.22, p.49-50.

5. If Third World countries wish to avoid politico-military confrontation among themselves, they have to join together in giving more attention to cooperative economic solutions to their problems. The greater their sensitivity to the promotion of regional prosperity and stability, the more likely that they will achieve a overall consensus which will help in a breakthrough even on intractable political issues.⁴⁸ Several examples suggest that both Pakistan and Afghanistan took economic actions injurious to each other. Removal of trade barriers and improved access to markets among Third World countries would not only constitute sound economic judgements but such steps would affect the political dimension favourably by helping to remove neo-colonial strings.

6. During the industrialising process Third World countries must not lose their diplomatic leverage by overcommitment to one side in the matter of raw materials, trade or investment. In the light of Afghanistan's experience with the Soviet connection, with hindsight it is possible to suggest an alternative set of

48. Michael Nacht, "Toward an American Conception of Regional Security", Daedalus, Winter 1981, pp. 1-15.

external economic policies. The underlying social problems of a Third World country cannot be solved by legitimising Super Power presence within it or by consigning it to the ideological backyard of Moscow or Washington. In framing economic policy, the Third World decision-makers must counterbalance the attractiveness of economic and technical aid by the dangers of one-sided military and diplomatic dependence. A tilt in favour of one Super Power creates a subtle and complex predisposition to accept outside pressures without real scrutiny.

7. Regional arms races have a far-reaching impact on the foreign policy decisions. For years the Soviets manifested a concern for strengthening the Afghan armed forces and the Afghan decision-makers who invited Soviet military assistance programmes would have perhaps found it inconceivable that consciously or unconsciously they were paving the way for a Soviet military presence which would jeopardise Afghanistan's national defence. Today the arms build up in the oil rich states in the Gulf may well be helping to create American or Soviet military options threats. Third World decision-makers should exercise considerable caution in permitting the flow of arms to their region.⁴⁹

49. Fukuyama, n.13, pp.1-3.

6. Third World countries can effect the diplomatic balance of forces, and in its heyday the Nonaligned Movement was able to widen the room for manoeuvre for its members. Neither of the Super Powers is a natural ally for the Nonaligned, nor are there any firm indications about the future strategic intentions of either the Soviets or the Americans towards the Third World.⁵⁰ The Third World decision makers should show special wariness in any move to convert the United Nations into an ideological forum. A peace settlement in Afghanistan would obviously require at some stage a face saving device for the Soviet Union and the utilising of peace-keeping techniques. It would be premature for this study to offer any formal solution for the Afghanistan crisis.⁵¹ Our conceptual model, however, suggests that the Third World has potential political leverage to resist the will of a Super Power to impose its will through sheer intransigence. The sheer military leverage of a Super Power can be counterproductive and the specific political priorities of a Super Power may be completely upset if regional powers can create a useful working agenda for peace.

50. Rubinstein, n.6, pp.7-8.

51. Harrison, n.47, pp.37-39.

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Chronology of Recent Developments Relating to the
Crisis in Afghanistan 1978-82

1978

April 18, 1978

Police kill Mir Akbar Khyber, popular PDPA figure, as part of crackdown by President Daoud.

April 20, 1978

Unprecedented demonstrations of 1500 people in Kabul protest Khyber killing.

April 26, 1978

Daoud arrests PDPA leadership as crackdown widens.

April 27, 1978

On orders of Hafizulla Amin, PDPA cadres and sympathizers in Afghan army topple Daoud regime. PDPA leadership released.

April 30, 1978

Nour Mohammad Taraki announces new government of PDPA, with himself as president and Prime Minister. B. Karmal ranks second in state and party posts.

APPENDIX

May 1978

First Trade Union formed with Government support, at Kabul Textile Mill.

May 09, 1978

Taraki speech outlines new 50 point "National and Democratic Programme.

May 15, 1978

Soviet news agency TASS announces Russian assistance setting up internal security force. Kabul announces State Radio will begin broadcasting in minority languages.

June 1978

Bloody fighting broke out in Afghanistan in between the rebels opposed to the pro-Soviet Taraki regime. The rebels had captured 900 rifles and 14,000 rounds of ammunition.

July 1978

Soviets concluded 250 million dollars military aid agreement with the new Afghan regime.

July 1978

Parham group removed from state positions, dispatched abroad as ambassadors. Karzal to Czechoslovakia.

July 12, 1978

Decree bans usury and abolishes many debts of peasantry.

August 1978

Several top army officers and ministers arrested, including the Chief of the Army's General Staff Major General Shahpur arrested, charged with conspiracy.

September 1978

Repression increases within bureaucracy intelligentsia.

October 1978

Decree 7 limits bride-price, establishes legal equality of women, guaranteeing right of marriage without parental interference.

October 23, 1978

New red national flag adopted.

November, 1978

The ruling PDPA formally expelled B. Karmal, former first Vice-President and later Ambassador to Czechoslovakia and eight other top leaders belonging to Pariban

group.

November 28, 1978

Land reform announced, to begin January 1, 1979.

December 25, 1978

25 year Treaty of Friendship between Afghanistan and Soviet Union signed in Moscow.

1979

January 1979

Serious rebellion begins in countryside.

February 1979

Taraki government brought an estimated 5,000 to 6,000 Soviet advisors to help it run the country.

February 18, 1979

Mr. Adolph Dubs, the US Ambassador to Afghanistan was killed.

March 1979

Herat garrison rebels, first sign of major dissent in army.

March 27, 1979

Government reshuffle responds to Herat events.
Amin takes over as Prime Minister from Taraki.

April 2, 1979

Homeland High Defence Council set up with
Taraki as head.

April 6, 1979

High level Soviet delegation arrives, led by
General Alexei Yegorov.

April 1979

Soviet policy co-ordinator Vassily Safonchuk,
moves into office next to Taraki.

June 1979

Some 1,500-2,000 Soviet military advisers were
in Afghanistan.

June 23, 1979

First major clash with rebels in Kabul as mili-
tary station is seized by Hazara group.

Spring/Summer 1979

Major defections from army. Airforce begins bomb-

ing rebel villages and helipads. Soviet advisers number more than 5,000.

July 1979

Soviet deploy first combat unit to Afghanistan by moving an airborne battalion of some 400 men to Bagaram air port, 20 miles outside Kabul.

July 27, 1979

Amin becomes Defence Minister and interior Minister. Control of State and party machinery now complete.

August 5, 1979

Purge of officer in Bala Hissar front in Kabul sets off mutiny that nearly topples regime.

September 10, 1979

Taraki stops in Moscow on way home from non-aligned conference. Plans made to broaden government, reduce Amin's powers.

September 11, 1979

Amin and Taraki clash. Amin insists four close Taraki associates be dismissed.

September 12, 1979

Taraki associates seek asylum in Soviet Embassy in Kabul.

September 14, 1979

Shotout between Taraki and Amin guards in House of the People. Amin escapes, prepares to overthrow Taraki.

September 16, 1979

Announcement that Taraki resigns due to "ill health". Amin elected President by Revolutionary Council.

September 17, 1979

Soviets send a cool congratulatory message letter to Amin.

October, 1979

Amin announces concessions national democratic program, committed to draft constitution, release of political prisoners.

October 6, 1979

Foreign Minister Shah Wali tells East block Ambassadors, Russians were responsible for September

events. Afghan government asks USSR to recall ambassador Puzanov. Document circulated to PDPA cadres make similar charges.

October 9, 1979

Announcement that Taraki has died of "illness".

October 14, 1979

Mutiny at Kishkour army base in Kabul.

November, 1979

Soviet Vice-Minister of Defence, Yen. Pavloski on mission to Kabul.

November 1979

The number of Afghans who were taken refuge from the civil war were 2,55,000 an increase of 27,000 in a week.

November 13, 1979

Afghanistan's interior ministry published a list naming 12,000 prisoners who died in detention in Kabul jails since the April 1978 revolution.

December 6, 1979

Brezhnev and Kosygin congratulate Amin on the Anni-

versary of the Friendship treaty and expressed confidence that the treaty will promote good relations in a "spirit of equality and revolutionary solidarity".

December 17, 1979

Third assassination attempt against Amin in three months.

December 24, 1979

Major airlift of Soviet troops and supplies to Kabul begins, land convoys cross border.

December 27, 1979

The Afghan President Amin was overthrown in a coup. B. Karmal took over as new President, former Vice-President and Deputy Prime Ministers under the late President Taraki. Karmal is also the head of the Parcham faction of PDPA which brought Taraki to power in 1978, Coup overthrowing late President Daoud Khan.

December 27-28, 1979

According to Soviet official sources, 150 Russian planes flew in to Afghanistan bringing military equipment and 500 combat troops. That brought the total number of Soviet troops and advisers in Afghanistan to 11,000.

December 28-19, 1979

There are now between 4000 to 5000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and the 5 divisions (about 50,000 men) on the Soviet border.

December 1979

50,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Heavy fighting in areas especially Kandahar.

December 30, 1979

An article reports that the Soviets sent in troops in response to a request for aid from the Afghan government under the friendship treaty and the UN Charter. Pravda says the Soviet aid is only to rebuff armed intervention from outside and that the Soviet troops will be withdrawn when there is no longer any need for them.

December 31, 1979

About 6,000 Soviet troops are estimated to be in Kabul patrolling the streets and guarding vital installations. As a result fighting between Russian forces and the Muslim rebel guerrillas about 400 guerillas were killed.

December 31, 1979

0100 million (85 crores) US arms aid to Pakistan

following the developments in Afghanistan arising from Soviet military intervention.

1980

January 1, 1980

There are about 40,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the Soviets are moving into major provincial capitals.

The UNHCR mounted a new appeal for international help for the 587,000 Afghan refugees officially registered in Pakistan.

January 5, 1980

The new regime attempts to disassociate itself from the Amin regime and promises to abandon past policies. The UN Security Council opens formal debate on the "situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security.

January 6, 1980

Several thousand political prisoners released.

January 7, 1980

The Soviet Union vetoes a security council resolution calling for immediate and unconditional withdrawal

of all foreign troops from Afghanistan.

January 11, 1980

New government announced including Parcham and Khalq members.

January 1980

New government programme includes: (1) continuation of agrarian reform; (2) equal rights for all, including women; (3) Abolition of usury; (4) respect for private property and religion. Karmal promises freedom for all political prisoners, unconditional amnesty for rebels.

January 1980

The UN General Assembly formally opens an emergency session on the Afghan invasion issue; third world countries introduce a draft resolution calling for immediate unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops.

January 14, 1980

The UNGA by a 104-18 vote, passes a resolution calling for immediate withdrawal. Among non-aligned nations the vote was 52-7 in favour of the Soviet Union reject the resolution.

January 20, 1980

President Carter says the US olympic team should not participate in 1980 Moscow Olympics if Soviet troops are not out of Afghanistan by February 20.

January 29, 1980

First Islamic Foreign Minister (FIFC) meeting in Islamabad, Pakistan passes a resolution calling the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan a "flagrant violation of International Law."

February 11, 1980

Appointment of a Personal representative by UN Secretary General.

February 13, 1980

The US urges the HRC in Geneva to support a draft resolution calling for immediate withdrawal from Afghanistan.

February 14, 1980

The UNHRC adopts the resolution condemning Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

February 17, 1980

Pakistan says the number of refugees from Afghanistan

has reached 5,00,000.

February 19, 1980

Rebel forces killed more than 100 Afghan government troops and members of the ruling Kunalg party in a recent battle in the rugged mountains of north eastern Afghanistan.

February 23, 1980

Kabul imposes martial law, Afghanistan authorities banned all gatherings by more than four persons.

February 24, 1980

Kabul shop keepers shut shops to protest Soviet presence. Martial law declared in Kabul.

February 1980

Government announces non-interference in trade and commerce, will no longer confiscate houses, trucks, other business property.

February 29, 1980

Britain formally presents to Moscow a proposal to establish a neutral Afghanistan press dispatches from Kabul indicate a weakening of the Karmal government following strikes and unrest. The US says Soviet troops inside Afghanistan have increased to 75,000.

March 1, 1980

Soviet-Afghan offensive against rebels begins with major push in Kunar province.

March 6, 1980

Pakistan's President Zia proposes stationing an international peace-keeping force in Afghanistan as a means of easing the crisis. The Paris based international federation of HRC says that it has confirmed Soviet use of poison gas in Afghanistan and casualties of the gas included women and children.

March 7, 1980

Foreign Ministers of European community ASEAN jointly condemn the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan declaring that the best solution for Afghanistan would be its emergence as neutral nation.

March 10, 1980

Military offensive broadens to Paktia province. Government says it will give fair trial to 42 Amin associates, claims 15,000 political prisoners released since December 17.

March 27, 1980

Afghan rebels raid a government jail in the North-

Eastern province of Kunduz and freed about 1,200 prisoners, a rebel organization claimed in Afghanistan.

March 31, 1980

Afghanistan President Karmal says there are only 19,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

April 3, 1980

Abdul Najid Kalkhani a front rank guerrilla leader of Afghanistan has been captured and probably killed.

April 21, 1980

New national flag with Islamic motif.

April 22, 1980

Afghanistan government replaces its present red flag with tri-colour flag (Barbrak Karmal said the flag recently approved by the revolutionary council was the "Symbol of Peace" freedom, social justice, progress and equality and was also the banner of Unity of the Afghan People.

April 25-30, 1980

Violent students protests at universities, schools, some said to be Amin followers.

May 14, 1980

Afghan government offers plan for Soviet troops pull out matched by US-Iran-Pakistan guarantees of non-interference rejected by US.

May 17-20, 1980

Second IFKC at Islamabad.

May 1980

Rebel efforts to form government in exile or united guerilla organization fail again despite pressures of Saudi, other conservative regimes.

June 4, 1980

Gromyko on a visit to New Delhi denounced OIC Committee June 4, 1980.

June 20-21, 1980

OIC 3 member meetings.

July 22, 1980

The Afghan interior Minister Lt. Col. Syed Mohammed Gulabzoi has been removed from his post and placed under arrest in the wake of the major administrative shake up announced by B. Karmal.

July 24, 1980

Two ministers shot dead in Kabul.

July 31, 1980

400 reported dead in Kabul "massive riots" radio Pakistan said.

August 8, 1980

Afghanistan authorities have rejected offers by the international committee to the red cross assistance mission to the country.

August 14, 1980

Kabul's plan.

August 26, 1980

Afghan Muslim rebels claimed to have attacked and destroyed the residence of the Afghan President B. Karmal, China's Xinhua news agency reported today Radio Tokyo.

September 13, 1980

Afghan Minister killed in attack.

September 14, 1980

Two Afghan cabinet Ministers and Deputy provincial governor were killed when they arrived by helicopter in rebel controlled town in Eastern Afghanistan, a rebel spokesman reported today, Radio Pakistan (Islamabad).

October 29, 1980

The strike launched last week by Professors and students at Kabul University against forced enrolment of a young Afghan in Army.

November 6, 1980

Iranian plea

November 20, 1980

UN General Assembly resolution

1981

1 January, 1981

President B. Karam of Afghanistan claims that the

January 15, 1981

Three MPs who went on a five day visit to Afghanistan have returned here with distinct impression that Afghan government is in full control.

January 25-28, 1981

Third Islamic Summit at Teif.

February 17, 1981

The Peshawar News says the number of refugees into NWFP in Decan bringing the number there to 1,200,000 settled in 250 camps another, 250,000 are in Baluchistan.

February 27, 1981

President D. Kerzal meets Brezhnev who is now in Moscow to attend the 26th session of the communist party of Soviet Union.

March 20, 1981

According to Radio Kabul more than 400 prisoners have been released from the jail of Herat (Western Afghanistan).

April 8, 1981

20,000 more Soviet troops in Afghanistan aimed heavy armed activity of air transport raising the troop strength above 110,000, a Western diplomatic source said.

May 22, 1981

More than 20 members of Afghan ruling party have been killed, since the beginning of this month, BBC said.

June 1981

EEC's proposals.

July 6, 1981

Lord Carrington goes to Moscow

October 7, 1981

Common Wealth Heads of government meeting.

November 18, 1981

UNGA for the third time since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan call for immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan.

December 26, 1981

Soviet troops have been in Afghanistan, their strength have increased from the original 85,000 to 110,000 deployed in 11 divisions around the country according to senior Asian diplomatic source.

December 27, 1981

Two year completion of Russian military stay in Afghanistan.

1982

January 9, 1982

Afghan guerrillas have captured the North-Eastern town of Herat after inflicting "heavy" casualties on Afghan government troops, BBC reported today quoting a spokesman for the guerrillas in Peshawar, Pakistan.

January 1982

A report broadcast by Radio Pakistan, meanwhile, said that "fierce" fighting was also going on in a number of other provinces between Afghan "Mujahideen" and government troops.

February 2, 1982


Cost estimated by some diplomats average \$7 million (Rs.6.3 crores a day for the Soviet Union).

February 2, 1982


The original 100,000 Russian soldiers that crossed into Afghanistan in December 1979 has now possibly increased to 120,000 reported in India Today of 15 February, 1982.

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Appendix - II



Appendix - III



Appendix - IV**AFGHANISTAN AND NEIGHBOURING REGIONS**

Source: Adapted from "Russian Advances in Central Asia", Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 324, and "Afghanistan", Ludwig Adamec, *Afghanistan Foreign Relations to the Mid-Twentieth Century* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1974), p. x.