India and China :

Reconciling Cultural Differences in Security Negotiations

Dissertation Submitted for the Degree of
Master of Philosophy
of the Jawaharlal Nehru University
School of International Studies

MANISH DABHADE

India and China :

Reconciling Cultural Differences

in

Security Negotiations

Center for Studies in Diplomacy,
International Law and Economics
School of International Studies

CERTIFICATE

This dissertation titled "**INDIA AND CHINA: RECONCILING CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN SECURITY NEGOTIATIONS**" Submitted by **MANISH DABHADE**, for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** is an original work and has not been submitted so far, in part or full for any other degree or diploma of any university. This may be placed before the examiners for evaluation for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy.

(Signature of the Student)

Prof. V.K.H. Jambholkar
(Supervisor)

Prof. K.D. Kapur
(Chairperson)

Contents

Preface

'Cultural' aspects of national and international security policies and practices have increasingly become the focus of attention in several different strands of analysis. Of course, cultural explanations, from the most trivial to the most essential, have long been woven into the fabric of international security politics.

Now, the 'multiteralization' and 'regionalisation' of security, the rapidity of global change and the interdependence of states and regions have meant that the cross-cultural aspects of contemporary security dialogues have assumed a much more prominent place in research and policy analysis.

***Chapter I** titled **Introduction** is an introductory chapter. The purpose of introduction is two fold. First, drawing upon the various literatures that examine the cultural dimensions of international politics, it elaborates the various concepts of culture that are relevant to security issues. Second, it brings these elements together in a template that serves, to define more clearly the concept of a 'security culture' of a country, and outlines the possible cultural dimensions of*

security negotiations, as the basis for more focused explorations in the case studies of India and China that follow.

Chapter II *titled* **Indian Culture in its Security Negotiation Practice** *examines the way in which culturally conditioned ideas, images and 'institutional scripts' shape India's contemporary international security policies and practices. It, more specifically, points out how these cultural factors exercise significant influence on Indian security negotiation practice by studying the Indian position in Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations.*

Chapter III *titled* **Chinese Culture in its Security Negotiation Practice** *examines how, and to what extent, China's rich cultural and historical tradition legacies and heritage both influence the way in which the country defines its national security interests, and the security negotiation practice it chooses to adopt. Here also, the Chinese position in Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations is thoroughly examined.*

Chapter IV *titled* **Conclusion** *identifies the conceptual problems associated with studying cross-cultural dimensions of security negotiations as found out in the case studies examined in this work.*

With the nuclearisation of Asia, firstly by China in 1964 and then, India (and Pakistan) in 1998, it becomes significant to examine how these two countries with a long civilisational existence view security and how these cultural influences impinge on their security negotiation practice. This study is an attempt to provide a base to focus on the problems and prospects of Sino-Indian security dialogue initiated after the 1998 nuclear tests.

The primary sources used in this study include policy statements , Annual Reports of the Ministry of External AffairsGovernment of India,official records of the Conference on Disarmament, and the United Nations General Assembly. There is a sufficient secondary source material in the form of books and articles in journals, periodicals and newspapers (vide detailed select bibliography at the end).

Acknowledgement

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The human experience is one of cultures. Culture and cultural differences have been at the heart of human behaviour throughout the history of international politics. Indeed, at the end of the twentieth century, the significance of culture was being reaffirmed, in terms of the rethinking of the international order that took place as a result of the end of the East-West Cold War and the process of 'globalisation'[1].

'Cultural' aspects of national and international security policies and practices have increasingly become the focus of attention in several different strands of analysis. Of course, cultural explanations, from the most trivial to the most essential, have long been woven into the fabric of international security politics. In the context of a bipolar, ideological struggle, the Cold War made relatively unproblematic some of the cultural factors affecting national security. Theories that abstracted from these factors offered important insights. Now, with the end of the Cold War, the mix of factors affecting national security is changing. Issues dealing with norms, identities and culture are becoming more salient. Now, the 'multilateralization' and 'regionalisation' of security, the rapidity of global change and the interdependence of states and regions have meant that the cross-

---

[1]   See Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New Delhi: Penguin Books,) who is the most prominent exponent of this new rethinking of international order .

cultural aspects of contemporary security dialogues have assumed a much more prominent place in research and policy analysis.

The dominant assumption is that cross-cultural differences not only reflect differences in specific policy issues, but also often reflect more fundamental differences concerning motivations, events and their contexts that result from different philosophical, ethical or cultural traditions.[2] Reaching security-building agreements across the cultural divides in international relations may thus involve a process of mutual education and dialogue, and ultimately of transformation of perceptions.[3]

Glen Fisher, rightly believes that, culture impinges on negotiation in four crucial ways: by conditioning one's perception of reality, blocking out information inconsistent or unfamiliar with culturally grounded assumptions, projecting meaning on to the other party's words and actions and possibly impelling the ethnocentric observer to an incorrect attribution of motive.[4]

The purpose of this introduction is two fold. First, drawing upon the various literatures that examine the cultural dimensions of international politics, it will elaborate the various concepts of 'culture' (diplomatic, political and strategic) that are relevant to security issues.

---

[2]   Raymond Cohen, Negotiating Across Cultures: Communication Obstacles in International Diplomacy (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1990), p.4.

[3]   Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p.39.

[4]   Glen Fisher, International Negotiation: A Cross-Cultural Perspective (Yarmouth, Me: Intercultural Press, 1980), p.21.

Second, it will bring these elements together in a template that serves to define more clearly the concept of a 'security culture' of a country, and outlines the possible cultural dimensions of security negotiations, as the basis for more focused explorations in the case studies of India that and China follow.

A significant clarification offered here is that it would be naïve to claim that a focus on cultural elements will provide a Holy Grail (to use a culturally bound reference) or a panacea to the difficulties that are encountered in security negotiations. Material or 'objective' issues of disagreement and clashes of interests are the greatest obstacles to these negotiations. But to stop at this point is to ignore both the role that inter-subjective and perceptual elements can play in the unfolding of these disagreements, and the fact that behind so-called objective clashes of interests lie sets of ideas which give practical content to states' definitions of their interests. There is no separate relationship between two distinct things, 'cultural ideas' versus 'material' interests: the point is rather that the way in which decision-makers define their security interests is derived from their collective historical, social, cultural experiences and understandings.[5] As Price and Zannenwald point out with respect to nuclear and chemical weapons:

---

5   Michael Mazaar, 'Culture and International Relations: A Review Essay', *Washington Quarterly*, Vol.19, No.2 (1996), p.188.

"In order to understand the anomalous status and patterns of non-use of chemical and nuclear weapons, it is necessary to understand how particular social and cultural meanings become attached to certain kinds of weapons, how these normative understandings arise historically.... and how they shape actors' conceptions of their interests and identities".[6]

SIGNIFICANCE OF CULTURE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

A debate exists in international relations thinking on the significance of culture. The dominant tradition of western thought – Realism – suggests that factors such as culture are of second order significance and subsumed by the logic of power and of the state in the anarchy of the international system. Faced with the facts of realpolitik, all states essentially act in the same way. Notwithstanding, realist logic, however, it is difficult to look at the international system and not see culture. The international system itself – characterized by the territorial state, and by notions of sovereignty, the balance of power, international law and diplomacy – emerged from Renaissance Europe, and was subsequently expanded to the rest of the world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The state system formed an international society that was built on European based cultural understanding and aspirations.[7]

---

[6] Price and Zannenwald, in Katzenstein, Culture of National Security, p.115.
[7] For an extensive discussion see John Duiffield, Theo Farrell, Richard Price and Michael Desch in "Isms and Schisms: Culturalism vs Realism in Security Studies", International Security, Vol.23, No.1 (Summer 1998), pp. 156-180.

Culture is also meaningful in the international system to the extent that it has an impact on behavior, and in particular in the way it embodies and defines difference. Communities identify themselves as distinct, and by doing so, identify those outside the group. The history of the 'other' or of the alien, is as ancient as civilisation itself.

Culture has been defined in various ways. To Clyde Kluckhohn, culture is fundamentally a property of information, a grammar for organising reality, for imparting meaning to the world. "Culture", he posits, "consists in patterned ways of thinking, feeling and reaction, acquired and transmitted mainly by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional ideas and especially their attached values.[8] Cultures are 'relatively stable patterns of behaviour actions and customs' or 'the outward expression of a unifying and consistent vision brought out by a particular community to its confrontation with such core issues as the origins of the cosmos, the harsh predictability of the natural environment, the nature of society, and humankind's place on the order of things'. The emphasis has to be on 'culture' as a quality of groups, not of individuals, that is acquired by people through socialization, and that each culture is a 'unique complex of attributes' that changes and evolves over time.[9] Hence it is desirable to go beyond

---

[8]   Clyde Kluckhohn, 'The Study of Culture' in D. Terner and H.D. Lasswell (eds.), the Policy Sciences (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1951), p.86.
[9]   Raymond Cohen, Negotiating Across Cultures, pp.8-9.

5

the broad invocation of an 'Islamic' or 'Confucian' idea of the world, or an Asian practice of 'consensus – building', to show how such ideas and practices could manifest themselves in particular arenas of international relations and security policy.

Such simplistic notions of culture, however, as a bundle of attributes or customs may help to avoid diplomatic or social incidents, but they tend to be contradictory, neglect the ability of individuals to move 'fluently' among different cultures, and underplay the real issues at stake that have brought individuals, groups or states to a security dialogue.[10]

In this respect, the idea of 'culture' has been modified by at least three adjectives that provide good entry points for international relations and security studies and research: diplomatic culture, political culture and strategic culture. Elements of all three of these are elementany for grasping the potential and pitfall of process of security-building.

Diplomatic Culture

'Diplomatic Culture' generally refers to the rules of conduct that govern the interactions of state representations in formal and informal contexts. These include specific procedures and protocols, the use of a particular terminology in agreements and more general 'signals'

---

[10]   Ibid, p.13

between states.[11] To an outsider, these procedures, terms or signals can appear incomprehensible or pointless; to insiders, they perform a critical function in smoothing the operation of the international system and reducing the possibility of misunderstanding and misperception.

The existence of a near universally shared diplomatic culture has led to the conclusion that cultural elements play almost no role in international relations. Diplomats learn the same language, often have attended the same schools, travel in a fairly tight international circle and repeatedly encounter each other in different contexts. As I. William Zartman and Maureen Berman put it, 'by now the world has established an international diplomatic culture that soon socialises its members into similar behaviour.[12] To anyone who has observed the unfolding of a conference or meeting, or read the traffic associated with it, the steps taken with it appear fairly precise and even predictable, without regard for differing socio-cultural backgrounds.

But to concede from this that culture does not matter is misleading in three senses. First, the acceptance by all players of the need for a smoothly operating diplomatic culture attests to its importance. Culture need not be exclusively a negative factor that impedes security-building agreements. It may be important to recognise it when the lack of a shared diplomatic culture may be

---

[11] Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p.27.
[12] I. William Zartman and Maureen Berman, The Practical Negotiator (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), p.226.

creating obstacles to dialogue that could be relatively easily resolved. Second, the existence of a shared diplomatic culture may in fact allow other, deeper cross-cultural disagreements to be more clearly expressed. Third, and most importantly, while the participants in diplomacy are members of this diplomatic culture, at the same time they carry other cultural identities, must assume other roles, and answer to other masters. The existence of a shared but thin or weak global diplomatic culture does not prevent contrasting cultural styles of negotiation.

Political Culture

Diplomats and negotiators find themselves operating in multiple and overlapping 'cultures' leads directly to the 'political cultural' dimension of international politics. The notion of political culture is used to explain differences in domestic political institutions and arrangements, and to uncover the societal underpinnings of political cultural influences is the impact of particular institutional and legal arrangements on political outcomes. The role of a professional and non-partisan civil service in Westminster parliamentary systems, or the colonial heritage of imposed political systems that efface traditional patterns of accommodation and conflict resolution can all have real consequences in the security arena. The second manifestation of political cultural elements is the external expressions or projections of these domestic political arrangements and traditions.

It is not easy to trace linkages between domestic and international political praxis, but by narrowing the focus of 'political culture' to these two elements – the impact of domestic political institutions and structures, and the outward projection of domestic political traditions and arrangements – a better grasp of the possible influences on policy and behaviour in the security realm can be gained.

Strategic Culture

'Strategic Culture' draws upon the tradition of political culture, but turns it towards a specific set of issues concerning war and the military.

Alastair Johnston defines strategic culture as:

"An integrated system of symbols (e.g. argumentation, structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficiency of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these perceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious".[13]

Johnston's definition draws attention to two important elements. First, he indicates where strategic cultural elements are

---

[13] Alastair Johnston, 'Thinking about Strategic Culture', *International Security*, Vol.19, No.4, (Spring 1996), p.46.

'lodged' in the symbol systems used by policy makers in their debates and discussions. Second, he notes that a strategic culture is a form of power that could be used to occlude other perspectives or to preserve the institutional power of particular groups. However, this understanding of culture can be used in either nuanced or a crude way. As Johnston points out, "done well, the careful analysis of strategic culture could help policy makers establish more accurate and emphatic understandings of how different actors perceive the game being played... Done badly, could rein force stereotypes about the strategic dispositions of other states and close off policy alternatives.[14]

Desmond Ball has argued that different countries and regions approach the key issues of war, peace and strategy from perspectives which are both quite distinctive and deeply rooted, reflecting their different geostrategic situations, resources, history, military experience and political beliefs. These factors, profoundly influence how a country perceives, protects and promotes its interest and values with respect to the threat or use of force.[15]

Towards "Security Culture"

The above mentioned different ways of analysing the potential impact of cross cultural differences on international politics can now

---

[14]   Ibid, pp.63-4.

[15]   Desmond Ball, 'Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific region' *Security Studies*, vol.3, no.1 (1993), pp. 44-45.

be brought together and focused specifically on security negotiations. But how precisely to draw upon these different ideas of diplomatic, political and strategic culture of a specific country remains to be clarified. Ball's definition of strategic culture offered above is close to a conception that is useful for our analysis, but in order to draw in elements from political and diplomatic culture the crucial requirement is take one further step away from thinking in 'strategic' terms, towards thinking in terms of a 'security culture' since national policies towards security-building, or broader attitudes towards peace-making and how to achieve security are extensions of fundamental strategic positions and decisions, what applies to 'strategy' in the narrow military sense is also directly relevant to the security realm.

Security culture is defined as:

"Culture, as it refers to non-proliferation, arms control, disarmament and security-building issues, consists of those enduring and widely shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes, and symbols that inform the ways in which a state's/ society's interests and values with respect to security, stability and peace are perceived, articulated and advanced by political actors and elites".[16]

This definition builds upon the work on strategic culture but moves away from its more or less strict emphasis on military affairs and the use of force to broader issues of 'security, stability and peace'.

---

[16]   Keith Krause (ed.) Culture and Security: Multilateralism, Arms control and Security Building (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999), p.14.

It also evokes the specific issues associated with arms control, highlights the importance of political actors and elites, and emphasizes the enduring character of cultural elements.

Figure 1

A Schema of Cultural Influences on Security Negotiations

Political Culture
- institutions and traditions
- colonial or historical legacies
- attitudes towards violence, dispute resolution
- societal patterns of authority/ hierarchy
- stance towards multilateralism

Strategic Culture
- experience of war and peace
- role of armed forces.
- threat perceptions, security doctrines
- enemy images
- unilateral or mutual security posture

Security Culture
Enduring and widely-shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes, and symbols that inform the way in which a state's/society's interests and values with respect to security, stability and peace are perceived, articulated and advanced.

Diplomatic Culture
- negotiating strategies
- international standing
- accept rules of the game

[Source: Keith Krause (ed.), Culture and Security: Multilateralism, Arms Control and Security- Building (London: Frank Lass Publishers, 1999), p.15]

Figure 1 expands upon the given definition of security culture, by illustrating in a schematic form how various cultural influences could play a role in determining state policies towards security building in general and arms control in particular, and how they could shape the complex calculations of material capabilities or interests that lie behind policy making. Conceptually, the diagram treats the various aspects of diplomatic, political and strategic culture as general manifestations of 'culture'. Similarly, the three sets of concepts overlap and share many characteristics, and the boundaries between them are not sharp. At the centre, however, are elements of security culture. Security culture is in a sense a subset of political, diplomatic and strategic culture. It draws upon the same wellsprings as, and shares same characteristics of political, diplomatic and strategic cultures, while being distinct from each of them.

Diplomatic culture is the heading that least taps into domestic 'sources' drawing as it does upon shared international or Westphalian norms. Nevertheless, under this heading one can still look for a state's unique or distinctive orientations towards diplomatic practice, such as negotiation strategies, international standing (non-aligned, great power, former colony) or for whether or not a state participates fully in the global diplomatic network or accepts the 'rules of the game'.

Political cultural elements represent the external projection of domestic political arrangements. Specific domestic political institutions and traditions can facilitate or impede participation in

security building processes such as arms control. Similarly, societal attitudes toward the use of force and violence or the historical experience of state building, can also play a role in influencing a state's stance towards diplomacy or its preferences for specific kinds of security agreements. Political cultural elements could also include the external projection of specific socio-cultural patterns of authority, hierarchy and decision making that are reproduced in a society, such as egalitarian versus hierarchical structures; consensual versus majoritarian decision making, and clan, caste, or religious authority.

Finally, strategic cultural influences can perhaps have the largest impact on how a state chooses to pursue its security. Again this has an internal and external dimension. From the domestic side, recent experiences of war can affect the orientation towards unilateral or mutual, forceful or peaceful, means to achieve greater security. From a more structural perspective, the particular social weight and the role of the armed forces can shape both security policies such as arms control as well as the influence of other actors on security policy-making. Externally, the existence of a regional affinity community that shapes perceptions of living in a basically hostile or friendly world, or images of potential enemies and threats, can crucially circumscribe the scope of security building efforts. The question of whether or not a state's/ society's strategic culture is laden with ethnocentric influences and whether or not current doctrine and policy recognise the mutuality and interdependence of

security, may also be crucial to the way in which it defines and pursues its security interests.[17]

A strong consensus seems to be emerging that security culture plays an important role in shaping a state's attitudes and behavior in security negotiations. It matters in at least three ways. First, it affects the content of national security interests and security policy. Traditional approaches, either realist/ neo-realist or liberal institutionalist, focus structure and rather actors and presume national security interests as something objectively pre-existing and thus largely take them for granted.[18] This leaves unanswered such important questions as why states facing similar structural constraints and opportunities may behave differently, or why some states act in irrational manners. The difficulty in accounting for these 'deviant' phenomena arises because of one important fact overlooked by social science inquiry: that states interests are as much what they are as what they are seen to be. This is where cultural factors enter the picture. A second level of influence relates to strategies and tactics. How are objectives to be reached and which means are best or, more appropriately, which achieve ends and advance the national interest? In other words, the manner in which actions are taken can be just as important as the actions themselves. And finally, security culture of a state can manifest itself in institutional and procedural

---

[17]   Ibid., pp. 14-18.

[18]   Kalzenstein (ed.) Culture and National Security, pp.1-32.

expressions and thus influence the style of diplomacy and negotiations. These are important elements in the decision-making process and negotiations, which affect the security-building process, agenda and outcomes.[19]

The security culture of a state, however, is only one element in the complex of interests and ideas that affect security negotiations and perhaps only seldom is it the most important one. But despite the fact that the national cultural elements are particularly difficult to pin down, the widely shared perception among security analysts in different regions that they have assumed a larger role in security negotiations makes some attempt to come to grips with the security cultural dimension of security-building processes essential. The case studies of India and China that follow are steps towards this goal.

With the nuclearisation of Asia, firstly by China in 1964 and India (and Pakistan) in 1998, it becomes significant to examine how these two countries with a long civilisational existence view security and how these cultural influences impinge on their security negotiation practice. This study is an attempt to provide a base to focus on the problems and prospects of Sino-Indian security dialogue initiated after the 1998 nuclear tests.

---

[19]   Keith Krause (ed.) Culture and Security, pp. 85-86.

CHAPTER II

INDIAN CULTURE IN ITS SECURITY NEGOTIATION PRACTICE

This chapter examines the way in which culturally conditioned ideas, images and 'institutional scripts' shape India's contemporary international security policies and practices. It, more specifically points out how these cultural factors exercise significant influence on Indian security negotiation practice by studying the Indian position in Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations.

Indian Security Culture

Indian security culture must be understood as a set of widely resonating ideas that have evolved out of a long historical experience and that are deeply rooted in the shared consciousness of the Indian political class.

At the current historical juncture, Indian security culture can be said to comprise four distinct elements. The first of these is a powerfully resonating set of beliefs about the nature of the international politics. The second is cluster of enduring representations regarding nature of the threats faced by the Indian state in global security environment; the third is a collection of deep convictions regarding India's natural vocation in the international system; and the fourth is a set of beliefs regarding the proper conduct of Indian diplomats and practitioners of statecraft. All

four of these clusters of beliefs are deeply rooted in Indian history, culture and politics.

Nature of International Politics

Indian political elites are divided on their basic views of international politics. Three perspectives dominate their thinking. The first and still dominant perspective is that of Nehruvian internationalism. The second is Gandhian cosmopolitanism. And the third is Hindu civilisational. These are separate but not altogether incommensurable views. In practice, a core, synthetic perspective dominates with tendencies and inflections that are more or less Nehruvian, Gandhian and Hindu civilisational.[1]

Fifty years after independence, and almost a decade after the end of the cold war, Nehruvian internationalism, a form of "left liberalism", continues to undergird Indian thinking about international order[2]. The key elements of Nehru's essentially Fabian socialist view of the world remains the bedrock of India's security culture.

The Nehruvian view first of all takes for granted that there is an international system constituted primarily by more or less sovereign

---

[1]   Kanti Bajpai in paper 'War, Peace and International Order: India's view of World Politics' Published by Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies in 1999, p.1-2.

[2]   For the notion of left liberalism. See Rajeev Bhargava, "the Right to Culture," in K.N. Pannikkar, ed, Communalism in India: History, Politics and Culture (New Delhi: Manohar, 1991), pp. 165-172.

nation state operating in an anarchic order in which the "state of war" is a constant shadow. This is a system which is regulated by the cultivation and use of power and in which states pursue their national interests with vigor and single mindedness. That said, it is also a realm in which states can perceive and pursue common interests under the aegis of commonly held norms, rules, and institutions; conflict and the state of war can be transcended. Nehruvian internationalism accepts the central assumptions and concepts of a realist view of international politics but posits that states can, indeed must, overcome the rigors of anarchy and fashion at least seasons and locales of peace and cooperation. They must do so because power politics is flawed and will end in catastrophe. The pursuit of one's national interest and the enlargement of one's power only leads others to do so as well. Self help and power seeking therefore in the long term will produce instabilities and war.[3]

Five decades after India became free, there exist vestiges of the legacy of Mahatma Gandhi. Gandhi died within months of independence and did not play a direct role in fashioning Indian thinking about security issues. However, a central concern throughout his life and teachings was how to overcome violence between individuals, communities and states.

---

[3]   See Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (New Delhi: The Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund and Oxford University Press, 1981), pp.536-66.

Gandhian cosmopolitanism recognises that nationalism is a powerful liberating force at a stage in history and that it represents the possibility of a people's rise to self consciousness, emancipation, and freedom. In recognising nationalism and therefore the inevitability of a nation state, Gandhianism accepts the fact of an international system. But for Gandhi and his followers, humanity must and will go beyond the nation state. For the Mahatma, individuals are the irreducible subjects of social and political life: they are moral and ethical agents who in the end are obliged to treat others with dignity and tolerance regardless of their class, caste, religion, or nationality. The nation state may survive as a formal entity. But in order for it to contribute to the moral and ethical life of its citizens it must be a radically decentralized institution which devolves decision-making power to face-to-face community governments, the panchayats. The international system in this vision is important only in the transition to a world community which may formally comprise nation states but in which social and political affairs are ineluctably local. Peace will result from interactions within and between small, economically self sufficient, face-to-face communities which are the real, acting units of world politics and the key characteristic of those interactions is non-violence and satyagraha or truth power.[4]

---

[4] Mahatma Gandhi's views are scattered over many writings J.D. Sethi, "For an International Nonviolent Non-cooperation Movement", in Radhakrishna and Mahendra Agrawal, eds. Arms and Survival (New Delhi: Satvahan, 1982), pp.260-65 covers a number of points made here about the Gandhian view.

Hindu civilisational or *Hindutva* is the third stream of Indian thought about security matters. The Hindutva view of world politics is one of struggle between civilizations and civilization states. The struggle is cultural and may become militarized. Hindu society must therefore strengthen itself by going back to its basic principles, precepts and practices and by equipping and organizing itself for militant struggle. In the Hindutva cosmology, peace results either from an acceptance of the Hindu way of life or from a balance of cultural and military power between civilizations. In the power political logic, Hindutva is reminiscent of realism except that the basic unit of world politics is the civilization not the nation state.[5]

The Nehruvian, Gandhian, and Hindutva viewpoints are three dominant among other tendencies in Indian thinking about the world. However, there are few pure Nehruvians, Gandhians, or Hindutva civilisationists. Indian elite views are a complete mix of all three tendencies. Nevertheless, the Nehruvian vision has thus for predominated. Gandhianism resides increasingly in the shadows. Hindutva is declaring itself publicly and winning supporters, but full-blown Hindutva is still a minority view.[6]

---

[5] On Hindutva, see the influential writings of M.S. Golwalker. We or Our Nationhood Defined (Nagpur: PN Indurkar/ Bharat Publications, 1939) and Bunch of Thoughts (Bangalore Vikrama Prakashan, 1966).

[6] For detailed discussion, see Kanti Bajpai, War, Peace and International Order, pp.4-9

Beliefs Regarding Global Security Environment

A state is the referent of security, the entity that must be protected. That the state is the primary referent is a classical formulation in the Indian Arthashastra tradition as in Aristotle, a secure state is regarded as a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for the security of other social entities and individual citizens[7]. Security lies in the protection of a set of interdependent values: territorial integrity, foreign policy autonomy, military strength, economic development and internal order. Among the five core values, it can be inferred that territorial integrity and political autonomy are primary, for they are intrinsic to the notion of sovereignty. The other values- military strength, economic development and internal order- can be regarded as secondary or instrumental values in that they are necessary for the fullest attainment of sovereignty. In other words, control of one's territory and the freedom to choose one's enemies and friends depends on military, economic and domestic political resilience- a classical national security formulation.

The Indian political class has developed a number of enduring beliefs regarding the nature of the threats faced by India. This 'threat discourse' comprises a number of powerfully resonating and widely shared beliefs regarding the sources of danger and menace in the global security environment. These threats are constructed through a series of

---

[7]   A.P Rana, Imperatives of Non-Alignment (Delhi: Macmillan, 1976) p. 149.

discursive claims about the nature of the neighbouring states (especially China and Pakistan) and about the implacable hegemonic or neo-colonial purposes of the West[8].

India's security culture views the Indian security horizon as series of circles or rings (Mandala)[9]. The first circle is India itself. The second circle encompasses India's small contiguous subcontinental neighbours: Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, Maldives and Pakistan, the only subcontinental state that has dared to challenge Indian regional military power. The third circle includes China, India's giant Asian rival and the erstwhile Soviet Union that was India's best friend and partner in the geopolitical sphere of Asia, and perhaps the world. The Indian Ocean region as a whole forms a fourth ring, which Indians believe contains both opportunities and threats. The final circle includes the more distant Western powers led by the United States.

---

[8]   See J N Dixit., "Changing International Environment and Indian Security", Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), vol. 17., no.8 (November 1994), pp. 933-34. See also former Chief of the Army, General K. Sundarji, "The World Power structure in Transition from a Quasi Unipolar to a Quasi Multipolar state and the options of a middle power in this Milieu, " U.S.I. National Security lectures, United Services Institution of India, New Delhi, 1993. Pp. 1-19.

[9]   The Mandala concept is based on Kautilya's Mandala, but applied more broadly here. According to the concept, a nation's continuous neighbours are always seen as enemies and their outer neighbours as friends, in a series of circles. See Kautilya's 'Arthashastra' translated by Dr. R. Shamasastry (Mysore: Mysore Printing and Publishing House, 1967 pp. 22-4).

Kauitlya, a Brahman adviser to the Mauryans, used the mandala concept in describing his work on the art of government.

India's most pressing strategic security concern is its own internal unity. Thus, the first element of the Indian threat discourse derives from domestic communities involved in secessionist movements, religious conflicts and inter-communal strife. Reflecting a particular interpretation and representation of the history of the subcontinent, Indian political and military leaders place a very heavy emphasis on containing these movements; for in their eyes such movements undermine the secular, nationalist ideology which has bound together the Indian nation since 1947, and hence constitute a real threat to the long-term survival of the Indian nation[10]. Maintaining the integrity of the nation, of course, is a concern of all states. In the Indian sense, however, both distant and contemporary history serve to reinforce the drive to prevent fragmentation. This, coupled with the rise of challenges to the unifying ideology of secularism, and the explosion of violence that at least in part derives from these challenges, has meant that internal security and peacekeeping have become an important element of the Indian security culture.[11]

---

[10]   K. Subrahmanyam, "Covert operations pose New Challenges for Indian security" World Affairs (New Delhi), vol.1, no. 4 (October – December 1997) pp. 38-49, NN Vohra, " Growing Concerns About India's Internal Security," World Affairs (New Delhi), vo..1, no.3 (July, September 1997), pp. 73-75.

[11]   See M.K. Narayan, "National Security: The Internal Dimension", RG ICS Papers No.16, Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies, Rajiv Gandhi Foundation, New Delhi, 1994, pp,1-47.

The Indian elites have noted that in the past, India failed to defeat most of the invasions because of both internal disunity and technological backwardness. Indians thus see a close relationship between internal security and outside aggression. They know that without internal unity, external defence will remain difficult and hazardous.[12]

Kashmir illustrates the conjunction of the dual threats stemming from weak internal security and outside aggression. Insurgency is brewing in Kashmir which is supported by Pakistan. It explains why much of Indian elites refuse to compromise on this issue. To do so would be a major and potentially catastrophic compromise of India's most vital interest- its own internal security and unity as well as its belief in a secular state.[13]

The Indian Subcontinent: Points of Vulnerability:

Partly reflecting the legacy of the British colonial tradition, the Indian elite continues to assert what it considers to be a legitimate droit de regard with respect to countries falling within the 'natural' frontiers of the subcontinent. Put simply, the Indian elite is, and always has been,

---

[12] See George Tanhem, "Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretative Essay (Rand Corporation, 1991) pp.48-52 for history of India's obsession with internal unity and integrity.

[13] Ibid, p.49.

concerned that the intrinsically unstable post-independence settlement in South Asia poses a threat to Indian security.[14]

None of its smaller subcontinental neighbours-except perhaps Pakistan poses a serious military threat to India. However, India sees these neighbours as threatening in other ways.

First, with the exception of Sri Lanka, India's neighbours have been ruled predominantly by non-democratic governments. Second, these states have ethnic and communal problems similar to those of India, and some of these problems spill over present political boundaries, creating security problems for India. Third, these small states have often sought support and aid from powers outside the immediate region so as to balance India's preponderance of power. Fourth, India suffers from a pervasive fear of the 'foreign hand' at work among India's unstable neighbours and in India.[15]

Therefore, Indians believe that their security must take priority in the region and that it generally benefits all of South Asia[16]. Thus, India's regional security strategy suggests two core perceptions:

---

[14] Andrew Latham, "Constructing National Security: Culture and Identity in Indian Arms Control and Disarmament Practice", in Keith Krause (ed.) Culture and Security. Multilateralism, Arms Control and Security Building (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999), p. 120.

[15] For details see George Tanhem, Indian Strategic Thought, pp.52-53.

[16] See JN Dixit,` India's security concerns and their Impact on Foreign policy' in Lalit Mansingh et. al (ed.), Indian foreign Policy: Agenda for the 21st century (New Delhi: Foreign Service Institute, 1997) pp. 143-158.

♦ India will not allow a neighbouring state to undertake any action in foreign affairs or defence policy that India deems potentially inimical to Indian security.

♦ India will not permit foreign governments to establish a presence or influence in neighbouring states that India views as unfriendly.[17]

In the perception of the Indian elite, shared widely by the political public the Indian state is the legitimate successor to the British Raj as the strategic and political manager of the subcontinent. As the preeminent and pivotal power in the region, India perceives itself much as the United States has traditionally perceived itself in relation to Americas.[18] This vision of India's managerial role in South Asia was most clearly embodied in the so-called "Indira Doctrine" formulated in 1983 during the early stages of the Sri Lankan civil war. It was propounded for the express purpose of deterring external powers from meddling in South Asian affairs[19]. The Gujral Doctrine propounded in the mid- 1990s was the more benign version of the "Indira Doctrine". It was essentially an attempt to acquire greater legitimacy for India's predominance in South

---

[17]   Ibid, pp.53-54.
[18]   For details of this argument see Mohammed Ayoob, "India in South Asia: The Quest for Regional Predominance", World Policy Journal, Winter 1989-90, pp.107-33.
[19]   For detailed discussion on Pakistan, see Ramesh Thakur, Politics and Economics of India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994) pp. 33-64: Also see Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: A study in India-Pakistan Relations (New Delhi: Asia Publishers, 1966) pp. 29-56.

Asia by demonstrating its capacity as well as willingness to act as the provider of collective good in the region.[20]

At the regional level, it is widely believed in India that Pakistan continues to pose a threat to Indian security. This powerfully resonating sense of threat is to some extent a function of Pakistan's resistance to India's vision of itself as the dominant actor in the region. Ever since independence and partition, India has pursued a policy of 'manifest destiny' within the natural frontiers of the subcontinent, arrogating to itself the role of regional hegemon. Perhaps not surprisingly, Pakistan has rejected the second-class role which this policy has implied and has taken great efforts to assert its status as an equal, sovereign neighbour. This basic structural conflict has been compounded and exacerbated by mutual animosity generated by conflicting nation-building ideologies, by unresolved border disputes, by trans-border communal and sectarian conflicts, by powerful Indian historical memories of invasion from the north west and by Indian perceptions that Pakistan is supporting insurgency in Kashmir and earlier in Punjab[21].

[20]   For details of Gujral Doctrine, see Bhabani Sen Gupta, "India in the Twenty First Century", International Affairs, vol.73, no.2, 1997, pp.308-10.

[21]   According to this formulation, "India will neither intervene in the domestic affairs of any states in the region, unless requested to do so, nor tolerate such intervention by any outside power; if external assistance is needed to meet on internal crisis, states should first look within the region for help. Quested in P. Venkateswar Rao, Ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka: India's Role and Perception," Asian Survey, April 1998, p. 422.

There is a common belief in India that China poses a major military threat to Indian security. Indian policy-makers argue that China continues to lay claim to Indian territory, and to deploy the conventional military forces required to press this claim should the need and/or opportunity arise. The memories of the 1962 defeat at the hand of China continue to resonate in the collective consciousness of the Indian national security community[22]. Also, many Indian elites believe that China will become a revisionist and expansionary power. Economic power being fungible, China will develop formidable military strength in the service of its political and geostrategic goals. As it catches up with the west and even surpasses it in aggregate, it will seek to settle old scores and foist its preferences on the rest of the world. It will demand recognition of its status, globally and in Asia. An expansionary China will also demand a restructuring of global norms and rules to satisfy its needs.[23]

---

[22]   For an excellent summary of Indo-Chinese relations see Surjit Mansingh, `An overview of India-China Relations: From when to where', Indian Defence Review', 1992, pp.7078.

[23]   For this view on China, see Amitabh Mattoo,"India's Nuclear Policy in an Anarchic World", in Amitabh Mattoo, ed., India's Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran II and Beyond (New Delhi: Har Anand, 1998)pp.18-23. On China as an expansionary, offensive minded power, see Alastair Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

The Soviet Union

Generally hostile relations between India and China in the late 1950s, and the latter's increasing support to Pakistan, caused India to turn more and more to the Soviet Union for friendship and aid. India's relationship with the USSR came easily and naturally, as Nehru and other early Indian leaders had long admired the Soviets and their way to development as a model for other developing countries.

The sudden disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 shocked Indians and in some way left them feeling unprotected. Although the 1971 Soviet-Indian Friendship Treaty was not an alliance, India considered the Soviet nuclear capability a protection against the Chinese. The Indian security has not forsaken Russia, though it sees it as a declining power. Russia is, in fact, seen as a major strategic ally in its fight against Islamic fundamentalism and US hegemony.[24]

The Indian Ocean Region

Within the Indian political class there is a widespread belief that India's unique position in the Indian Ocean means that it has a range of maritime interests that it must protect.[25] Quite apart from concerns regarding western encroachment and intervention, these beliefs are

---

[24] AP Venkateswaran, 'To end with a whimper', Indian Defence Review, January 1992,p.23.

[25] For a detailed discussion, see George Tanhem, Indian Strategic Culture, Washington Quarterly, Vol.15, No.1, Winter 1992. pp. 136-139.

largely related to a desire to secure India's expanding maritime trade routes through the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. These interests are likely to become even more important as India accelerates the exploitation of its 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone, it's continental shelf and the adjoining deep sea-bed. Current Indian thinking, tempered some-what by resource constraints, is that these interests can only be protected by a blue water navy capable of demonstrating sea power from the Horn of Africa to the Straits of Malacca[26].

The US-led Concert

The Western states led by the United States are perceived by Indians as dangerous, at one level, purely in structural terms. The inequality of power, is itself a threat because asymmetric capabilities encourage thoughts of imperial control. Beyond this, Western hegemony is dangerous because westerners are seen as patronizing if not racist towards non-westerners and as voracious in their desires. The west cannot tolerate the success and ways of others and it must therefore attempt to change or dominate them. It is also insatiable in its need for resources and an ever-more comfortable level of material existence, and in the end, it will do whatever is necessary to extract and use the world's

---

[26]   See Varun Sahni,' India as a global power: Capacity opportunity and strategy' in Lalit Mansingh et.al (ed.) Indian Foreign Policy,p.25.

limited resources, even if this means taking it away from others.[27] Western hegemony led by the US is so powerful that it is not principally a military threat to international stability. Its military, economic and cultural power make the use of violence unnecessary in most cases. The West is therefore primarily a diplomatic political threat.

Indians understand that the West has an array of means other than violence to achieve its aims. The West has at least three methods: preponderance; control of institutions; and divide and rule tactics.[28]

The Indians thus view that the west, and particularly the United States, can and will use its military might to compel 'second-class' regional powers to modify their domestic and foreign policies to suit American interests.[29]

Enduring Beliefs Regarding India's Identity and International Vocation

Given that states operate in a global political order in which intangibles such as prestige and stature can materially affect a state's ability to thrive in such a system, it is hardly surprising to find that many states acquire arms not for military-strategic reasons but to

---

[27] For this kind of view, see J.N. Dixit, Across Borders:Fifty Years of Indian Foreign Policy(New Delhi:Picus Books,1998), pp. 391-95.

[28] See Kanti Bajpai, War, Peace and International Order, pp.16-18, for the methods employed by US in detail.

[29] See, for example, Ambassador A. Ghose, 'Negotiating the CTBT: India's Security Concerns and Nuclear Disarmament', Journal of International Affairs,vol.51,no.1(Summer 1997), p.4

achieve the essentially political goal of enhancing their international status. This seems to be particularly true of those states hoping maintain their great power status as well as those aspiring to or attempting to assert their regional great rank. For powers such as these, the acquisition of arms and the development of indigenous arms production capabilities are not driven solely or even primarily by military-strategic considerations, but by the belief that they must have certain military capabilities if they are to be able to advance their claims to great power status.[30]

In addition to this instrumentalist 'pursuit of prestige' imperative, states also pursue international security policies as a consequence of national self-perception. One of the lessons of history is that some nations view themselves as great powers destined by virtue of their size, resources and 'national genius' to play a major role in regional and/or global politics. The instrumental imperative is different from what might be called the 'identity imperative' in that whereas in the case of the former prestige is simply another element of power to be deployed in the pursuit of the national interests, in the case of the latter it is a reflection or consequence of national character or self-perception.[31]

---

[30]   For an interesting discussion of the symbolic content of weapons see Scott D. Sagan, 'Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of A Bomb', International Security, Vol.21, No.3 (Winter 1996-97), pp.54-86.

[31]   Andrew Latham, Culture and Identity in India Arms Control and Disarmament Practice, p.142.

It is of course, difficult to disentangle these two sets of symbolic imperatives; for it is never quite clear where one ends and the other begins. What is clear, however, is that in the Indian case these two imperatives have helped forge a security culture that places considerable emphasis on enhancing India's international prestige generally, and an establishing India's centrality in regional and global affairs more particularly.

From the days of the nationalist struggle Indian elites have regarded their country as destined to be a major if not global power. For Nehruvians, India would play an honest broker in international society and its influence would be via diplomatic power. In short, India would be a *suasive* power. For Gandhians, too, India would play a major role, principally as the conscience keeper of the world. Non-violence and satyagraha were active stances, not passive ones. India was obliged to lead a moral revolution in world affairs. Power in this sense was conceived of as ethical leadership. For Hindu civilizationists; India as a civilisation state would recover its ancient glory as one of the three or four leading centers of cultural, economic, and technological attainment.[32]

---

[32] For an extensive discussion on Indian standing in power structure, see Kanti Bajpai, War, Peace, and International Order, pp.11-13.

Representing India: Enduring Elements of Indian Diplomatic Style

There are two elements of Indian diplomatic style that bear consideration in the context of a discussion of Indian security culture. The first has to do with India's enduring preference for bilateral over multilateral diplomacy; the second concerns the persistent tendency of Indian diplomats and practitioners of statecraft to adopt a moralistic posture with respect to international security issues; and the third has to do with the influences of the dominant Hindu culture on Indian foreign policy practices.

The Preference for Bilateral Diplomacy

Since Independence, Indian security-building policy has reflected an enduring preference for bilateral as opposed to multilateral initiatives, at both the global and regional levels. India 'remains chained to the notion' that bilateral advantage outweighs any gains that might be derived from dealing with neighbours on a multilateral basis.

This preference for bilateralism is rooted in interpretations of three historical developments. First, India's aversion to global multilateralism can be traced to its early failure to achieve a leadership role in what eventually became the Non-Aligned Movement (which in turn was a function of the cultural predisposition of Indian diplomats to see India as

the natural leader within that movement).[33] Second, India's aversion to regional multilateralism can be traced to Indian self-perceptions that India is a global rather than simply a regional power. Dominant Indian thinking about regional politics remains wedded to the notion that India, as a major power, gains more advantage from participating in developments outside its subsystem than cooperating in the regions. Third, India's uneasiness about multilateral forums can be traced to an enduring belief that such forums are simply arenas within which India's regional rivals and global adversaries can criticize Indian policies and practices. This perception is clearly rooted in India's Kautilyan tradition of inter-state relations, which emphasizes the adversarial nature of politics.

The Ideal Indian Diplomat

Under the powerful conditioning influences of the Gandhian and Hindu religious myths, since independence there has evolved within the Indian foreign ministry an image of the 'ideal' Indian diplomat. Such a diplomat is 'one who looks for and says the truth, is not afraid of speaking up, exercises self-control, seeks solutions that will please all the parties involved, respects the other party, does not use or threaten violence or insults, and appeals to the other parties spiritual

---

[33] For an extended discussion of the 'genealogy' of India's aversion to multilateralism, see Arthur Rubinoff, 'The Multilateral Imperative in India's Foreign Policy', The Round Table (1991), pp.319-320.

identity'.[34] Of these, perhaps the most salient is the commitment to 'principles'. Although this often appears to non-Indian observers as moralizing and rhetorical posturing, the ideal of adhering to principles, almost regardless of the consequences, is clearly bound up with the Gandhian myth.

This also reflect Indian notions of leadership, which are derived in part from the Hindu understanding of Utopia (*Ramarajya*) as 'a patriarchy in which the ruler, by his moral quality and habitual adherence to truth, always expresses the collective will'.

The Effects of Hindu Cultural Norms on Foreign Policy Style

Hindu cultural norms also exercise an important influence on the style of substance of Indian diplomacy. This operates in two ways. First, the caste-dominated and highly stratified nature of Hindu society contributes to a shared understanding of global society as being rigidly hierarchical. 'The Indians' view of society as a hierarchy serves...as a basis for their view of the world. They see a hierarchical layering of nations according to wealth and power and believe that India should be in the top rank of the world hierarchy- a Brahmin idea of the world'.[35] This culturally derived world-view in large part accounts for the

---

[34] Jocelyn Boryczka et.al., 'Culture and Strategic Factors in South Asian Nuclear Arms Control, paper presented at the 37th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, California,(April 1996), p.18.

[35] George Tanhem, 'Indian Strategic Culture' , pp.136-137.

commonly held belief in India that New Delhi must resist efforts to treat India as a 'second-class' country.

Second, the Hindu tendency toward moral relativism, coupled with a culturally derived disinclination to take a clear and unambiguous stand on issues, can lead to what appear to Western observers to be inconsistent and even contradictory foreign policy initiatives. As Barbara Crossette has argued: 'India often produces muddled responses to international issues, as intense national pride and a sense of manifest destiny collide with an unwillingness to make bold policy moves. Wild allegations and abstractions are hurled around and sanctimonious speeches made, but concrete proposals or rational analyses rarely follow'.[36]

After examining these aspects of Indian security culture, it becomes important to understand the unique position of nuclear weapons in Indian security culture and how it impinges on security negotiations.

Nuclear Weapons in Indian Security Culture

India's national identity and normative aspirations have shaped its nuclear policy choices.[37] The capacity to master the atom represented

---

[36] Barbara Crossette, India: Facing the Twenty-First Century (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), p.11.
[37] George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.448.

modernity, potential prosperity, transcendence of the colonial past, individual and national prowess, and international leverage.

India's national identity is constructed around the determination to be an independent, great state that transcends its colonial past and is morally superior to its colonizers and the dominant states of the international system. Two vital norms coexist uneasily within this national identity: one, India should achieve major power status in the international system, and two, India should demonstrate moral superiority over the world's dominant states, which have been perceived as exploitative, overly militarized, and insensitive to the needs and aspirations of the world's majority of poor people. These two norms have clashed in the nuclear policy arena.

Acquisition and demonstration of nuclear weapons capabilities could plausibly fulfill the norm of achieving great power status in an international system led by nuclear weapons states, but possession of nuclear weapons also could undermine the moral norm. India's two great moral exemplars, Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, have been perceived to represent humanity's and India's moral campaign against nuclear weapons.

Thus, Indian elites sought the power and prestige associated with nuclear weapons capability. While insisting that India preferred nuclear disarmament and would not build nuclear weapons, Indians have

insisted that the emphasis in disarmament reflects a strategic judgement that India would be more secure in a world without nuclear weapons and that India has gained political power through its moral purposefulness.[38]

Even after the May 1998 tests the Indian Prime Minister reinvoked India's normative calls for nuclear disarmament and equivocated on the question of going forward to deploy nuclear weapons.

The above mentioned norms have been deeply reflected in India's approach to security negotiations especially in the nuclear arena.[39]

Commitment to Global Disarmament

India has long been an opponent of nuclear weapons and consistently championed the goal of reducing the threat posed by nuclear weapons. Indian policy-makers however, have always made a clear distinction between 'global nuclear disarmament', 'regional arms control' and 'non proliferation'. Having identified horizontal proliferation and vertical proliferation as two sides of the same coin, India has consistently argued that both of the aspects of the nuclear issues must be addressed simultaneously. India tends to evaluate all proposals related to the management of nuclear weapons against the yardstick of 'global disarmament'.

---

[38] Ibid, pp.448-450, Perkovich gives an interesting analysis of India's normative behaviour vis-à-vis nuclear weapons.

[39] See Kanti Bajpai, War, Peace and International Order, pp.36-40 for contemporary Indian attitude towards nuclear weapons viz post-tests)

Non-Discrimination and Equity

All global NACD (Nuclear proliferation, Arms control and Disarmament) arrangements, according to India, should be agreed and implemented on the basis of the principle of non-discrimination. Reflecting the historical legacy of both Gandhi and Nehru, India's political elites have demonstrated a consistent and enduring commitment to the principle of global nuclear disarmament. In policy terms, however, this commitment has been tempered by a number of other elements of Indian security culture of particular importance in this respect has been the emphasis put on 'equity' in the context of nuclear NACD proposals.

Role of Indian Culture in Security Negotiations: The Case of The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Cultural forces play a significant role in determining both the form and content of Indian approaches to security negotiations. The example of the CTBT negotiations demonstrates the way in which culture and 'rational' considerations interact to shape both the form and content of India's diplomacy in the security realm.

Following a US thermonuclear test in the March 1954, the then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru suggested a "standstill agreement" in nuclear testing in the Indian Parliament on April 2, 1954.[40] India, since then has consistently been a strong supporter of nuclear test ban treaty right through the 1990s. In fact India cosponsored UN general assembly resolution 48/70 seeking a test ban along with the US and more than 100 other states in 1993.

But the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) at the NPT extension and review conference held in April-May 1995, forced India to change its negotiating position on CTBT by making disarmament high on its agenda. India's position taken to a logical conclusion made it to reject the CTBT in 1996. New Delhi cited national

---

[40]   For a text of Nehru's proposal see "Statement by the Indian Prime Minister to Parliament regarding Nuclear Test, April 2, 1954," Documents on Disarmament 1945-59 (US Department of State, August 1960),p. 408. This proposal was forwarded to the UN on April 8, 1954 and is found in the UN document. DC/44.

security reasons for not signing the CTBT: first, that countries around India (a reference to China and Pakistan, although New Delhi did not directly specify these countries) continued their nuclear progresss, and second, that the CTBT was not a measure of disarmament and thereby permitted the declared nuclear powers to retain and make qualitative improvements to their nuclear weapons, which were suggested to be a source of security concern for India.

The real reasons, however, are far more complex having to do primarily with a number of the most basic principles underlying India's security culture.

India's Commitment to Disarmament and the CTBT

For India, the aim of the CTBT was to prevent the testing of nuclear weapons and thereby inhibit both vertical and horizontal proliferation. A June 1994 Indian statement at the CD clearly placed the CTBT within the framework of the 1988 Rajiv Gandhi Action plan for Disarmament. It said that the CTBT "has a very important place in the context of nuclear disarmament. It finds a place in the first stage of India's Action Plan for achieving the goal of a nuclear weapons-free and nonviolent world order". (para 3)

In the context of the NPT extension, Indian policy-makers came to believe that the nuclear weapon states were determined to continue to

43

rely on nuclear weapons for their security. Also, the CTBT negotiations clearly showed that the nuclear haves visualized the CTBT not as a serious disarmament measure but merely as an instrument against horizontal proliferation.[41]

Thus, the treaty became primarily as a means of advancing what India considered to be the western goal of preventing the further diffusion of nuclear capabilities, rather than as a means of pursuing the Indian goal of universal nuclear disarmament.

Once cast in these terms, the treaty became an anathema to the Indian foreign policy establishment as it violated a fundamental tenet of the dominant Indian security culture: the long-standing belief that horizontal and vertical proliferation are two sides of the same coin and that both must be addressed simultaneously.

India's Commitment to Equity and the CTBT

India's July 1993 statement at the CD that the CTBT should cover "all states for all times" (July 1993 CD statement, para5) showed Indian insistence on equity in negotiations. India has been a strong votary of equity and non-discrimination in the international system.

---

[41]   See June and August 1996 CD statements for details on Indian objections pertaining to disarmament.

In as much as Indian foreign policy makers came to view the CTBT as an instrument of non-proliferation, they were naturally inclined to view it also as discriminatory and hence inimical to India's vision of a just and desirable international system. This was so because given the prestige and military clout associated with the possession of nuclear weapons,the CTBT placed the non-nuclear states at a political and military disadvantage.

Indian opposition to the CTBT also derives from two additional equity-related considerations. First, throughout the negotiations Indian diplomats continually decried the fact that the proposed treaty would only ban test explosions, not other forms of testing such as computer simulations and subcritical tests. Second, towards the end of the negotiations, when it became clear that Chinese reservations regarding verification were going to be addressed, Indian diplomats began to grate at the apparent willingness of the west to accommodate China but not India.[42] This touched a cultural nerve in India that contributed to India's opposition to the treaty.

None of this, of course, should be taken to mean that 'national security' considerations(as explained earlier) did not play an important role in shaping India's opposition to the CTBT. The official reasons given

---

[42]   See Arundhati Ghose: "Negotiating the CTBT: India's Security Concerns and Nuclear Disarmament", pp. 252-253.

for rejecting CTBT amply point out the significant national security considerations for rejecting CTBT. But as India's ambassador to the UN put it in a statement regarding India's decision to oppose the CTBT: "While a country's position in arms control and disarmament is necessarily a product of its political, economic and strategic environment and its national security perceptions, it is equally a product of its unique historical experiences which have determined its fundamental world view."

CHAPTER III

CHINESE CULTURE IN ITS SECURITY NEGOTIATION PRACTICE

This chapter proposes to examine how, and to what extent, China's rich cultural and historical tradition legacies and heritage both influence the way in which the country defines its national security interests, and the security negotiation practice it chooses to adopt.

Chinese perceptions of threats and security have over the millennia been influenced by two distinct yet not completely separable paradigms of strategic culture. The Confucian-Mencian approach to order and governance through morality exemplars and non-violent statecraft, and the parabellum or realpolitik view of the world that places a strong emphasis on the use of force to maintain peace and order. Both have had a profound impact on contemporary thinking and practice in Chinese security.

Chinese Strategic Culture

The concept of strategic culture refers to a nation's traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat and use of force.[1]

---

[1] Ken Booth, 'The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed' in Carl G. Jacobsen (ed.), Strategic Power: USA/USSR (London: Macmillan, 1990), p.121.

Chinese strategic culture can be traced back to such classics as 'The Art of War' by Sun Tze and 'The Seven Military Classics', which stipulate the relationship between political ends and military strategies, the efficacy of the use of force, and specific military tactics.[2] Underlying these treatises of stratagems run deeper debates on how the Sino-centric order could be promoted, protected and perpetuated. Within the broader Chinese cultural tradition these differing approaches have variably been paired into the ying-yang, or ru-fa dichotomy. These were informed by China's unique history and experiences in organizing domestic social and political order and its foreign relations, and in turn competed as the alternative guiding principles for the dynastic rulers.

Confucian-Mencian Paradigm

The Confucian-Mencian paradigm forms the core of what is called the yin approach to China's external relations, which views the world as harmonious rather than conflictual and which assumes and promotes a world order with China the 'Middle Kingdom' (zhongyuo) as the centre. This Sino-centric view was reinforced by the fact that from the Xia-Dynasty until the mid-nineteenth century, China virtually dominated and reigned over what is now East and Southeast Asia. China's external relations for the most part could be characterized as one of a vague

---

[2]   The English Texts can be found in Ralph Sawyer, Trans., Sun Jze: Act of War (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1994) and Sawyer, The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1993)

48

pattern of zoning that consisted of the royal domain, subordinate tributaries, and foreign countries.[3] What followed were over two thousand years of hierarchically structured tribute systems of various kinds, with China as a benevolent hegemonic state in the East and Southeast Asian international system. The dynasties managed their external relations largely through cultural supremacy and a range of diplomatic methods: marraiges, border trade, envoys, trade concessions, and occasionally the use of force.

Imperial China's external relations fall neatly into what may be called the 'Confucian ethical values on inter-state affairs' or a Chinese world order that consists of three categories: 'the respect of the superior status of the Chou royal house, the observations of legitimacy of authorities at different levels and their mutual relationship thereof, and the distinction between the Chinese and foreigners.[4] Two distinct features are readily apparent. One is the practice of conducting external relations as an extension of managing domestic affairs. The characteristics of such an order were the emphasis on hierarchy and the absence of the recognition of egalitarianism in inter-state relations.[5] The other is that external relations were treated more as intercultural rather

---

[3]   Cho-yun Hsu, 'Applying Confucian Ethics to International Relations', Ethics and International Affairs, no.5, (1991), p.15.

[4]   Ibid., p.20.

[5]   John K. Fairbank, 'A Preliminary Framework in Fairbank (ed.) The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 1-19.

than international or interstate relations.[6] This formed the core of the sino-centric inter-state order. The maintenance of such an order relied more on moral persuasion and the appeal of cultural superiority than on the use of coercion and outright seizure and annexation of foreign territories.[7]

Parabellum Paradigm

This predominantly non-realpolitik and non-violent characterization of Chinese strategic culture has been challenged arguing that such interpretations, deriving either from the classic texts or from thousands of years of dynastic chronicles, reveal only its epiphenomenal and ideational dimensions. Contrary to conventionally held views, there is a deep-rooted realpolitik hardcore in Chinese strategic culture that not only can be detected in these same texts but actually was predominant in dynastic practices as well. This Chinese realism reflects the yang approach to external relations that emphasizes diversity over uniformity, conflict over harmony, and economic/ military power over moral persuasion. Alastair Johnston refers to this as the parabellum

> "or hard realpolitik strategic culture that, in essence, argues that the best way of dealing with security threats is to eliminate them through the use of force. This preference is tempered by an explicit sensitivity to one's relative capacity to do this... this is consistent with what Vasquez calls an 'opportunity model' of

---

[6]   Akira Iriye, 'Culture and Power: International Relations as Intercultural Relations', Diplomatic History, vol. 3, no. 2 (Spring 1979), pp. 115-128.
[7]   Hsu, 'Applying Confucian Ethics', p.30.

realpolitik behavior, where states need no special motivation to threaten or use force: rather they are always predisposed to do so, unless restrained by contextual variables".[8]

The parabellum paradigm of Chinese strategic culture views the world as conflictual rather than harmonious, conflicts are a constant phenomenon of human life and inter-state conflicts are zero-sum in nature. Peaceful environments are but a temporal hiatus during which time potential adversaries are planning for future attack. The use of force is not a choice but rather an imperative for the advancement of state interests and indeed, sometimes state's survival. The best way to ensure security is to eliminate the sources of insecurity which in most cases, are potential as well as actual adversaries. Since the use of force is inevitable, its offensive use rather than defensive application becomes paramount. Order is to be achieved not by virtue and moral persuasion but through legalistic stringent and inflexible measures.

Contemporary Chinese strategic thinking

Contemporary Chinese attitudes toward the threat and use of force are particularly rooted in the nation's experiences with foreigners. The opium war of 1839-42 marked the beginning of western imperialism in China. Since then, the search for survival has entailed a hard struggle, marked by damaged pride, disdain for things foreign and a deep feeling

---

[8] Alastair Johnston, Cultural Realism, Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p.x

of 'national humiliation'. The images of 'foreign devils' western gunboats, unequal treaties and international settlements with signs of 'no Chinese and Dogs Allowed' planted distrust and hatred toward foreigner, and the deepening crises at the turn of the century led to the emergence of patriotic movements. The 'May 4th' movements (1919) became the banner of Chinese patriotism. The Japanese invasions (1931-45) heightened the fear of beaming a wangguolu (slave without a nation). September 18th the date of the Japanese invasion of China's Northeast in 1931- and the 'Nanjing Massacre (1937) are inscribed in Chinese history as monumental reminders of the nation's suffering and humiliations inflicted by foreigners. The search for a way to survive also led to new visions such as 'self strengthening', learning the superior barbarian technique with which to repel the 'barbarians', using the barbarians against the barbarians' and forming a united front against foreign invasions. The call for 'national liberation'- the recreation of an independent and sovereign China and the restoratation of the nation's prestige in the world-appealed to the Chinese people.

It was in the midst of this popular anxiety and aspiration for a 'new China' that Mao Zedong (1893-1976) and his fellow revolutionaries emerged. Throughout his political career, Mao took as his primary goal the complete liberation of the nation from imperialist dominance. He and his comrades were determined that a 'new China' should resume her

rightful place among the nations[9]. In formulating a revolutionary line Chinese communist leaders led by Mao undoubtedly learned from the contributions and writings of Marxist revolutionary leaders and other thinkers from various ages. But, it was from the rich Chinese experience of warfare, along with the long history of peasant uprisings and Chinese communist revolutionary wars, that they obtained and formulated the essence of their military thought.

Maoist strategic thinking :

As a communist, Mao inherited a distinctively Marxist-Leninist philosophy of conflict. He accepted class struggle as a framework to conceive the origins and nature of a modern war[10]. Based on the teachings of Engels and Lenin, Mao regarded war as the highest form of struggle for resolving contradictions, between classes, nations, states, or political groups[11]. Accepting wars' inevitability as long as there was a class struggle, Mao found war and politics closely related. Quoting Clausewitz that 'war is the continuation of politics', he asserted that 'war is politics and war itself is a political action'[12]. In his view, only by

---

9   Stuart Schram, Mao Tse- Tung (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1972), p. 16.

10   Xia Zhennan, 'On the Relationship between War and Politics, Mao Zedong Sixiang Yanjia [Studies of Mao Zedong Thought], no.3, 1987, pp. 48-9. Also see Bob Avkian, Mao Tsetung's Immortal Contributions (Chicago: RCP Publications, 1979) pp. 39-40.

11   Mao, 'Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War', December 1936, SMW, p.78.

12   Mao, 'On Protracted War', May 1938, ibid, p.226.

examining war from a political point of view could one fully understand the essence of warfare[13].

The relationship between war and politics led Mao to believe that victory is inseparable from the political aim of the war[14]. In his view, the common masses would only support a just war. Popular support would create a vast sea in which to drown the enemy, create the conditions that will make up for (one's) inferiority in arms and other things, and create the prerequisites for overcoming every difficulty in the war[15]. Settling the political aims has therefore remained a top priority for the CCP leadership whenever; they have contemplated use of force.

Mao defined political mobilization as a means of telling the army and the people about the political aim of the war.' It is absolutely necessary for every soldier and civilian to understand why the war must be fought and how it concerns his or her interests. To do so, Mao advocated popular and extensive war propaganda[16]. Given political mobilization's immense importance, the CCP's leaders devoted enormous efforts to winning popular support in the civil war with the nationalists. There exists a consensus among the leaders that the CCP's final victory owed a great deal to political and mass mobilization.

---

[13]   Ibid, p. 227.
[14]   'Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War', Ibid, p. 81.
[15]   On Protracted War, Ibid, p. 228.
[16]   Ibid, pp. 228-9

The CCP maintained a long tradition of politicizing its armed forces. Mao himself had vehemently advocated the party's absolute control of its army. Such control must be hinged upon 'the system of Party Representatives in the army, which was particularly important at company level'. With party branches organized on a company basis the party representatives would be able to guide political training and indoctrination. Mao found it imperative that all the military affairs be discussed and decided upon by the party before being carried out. Mao's teaching on political control and indoctrination have fostered a persistent institutional culture that has shaped the force and command structure of the People's Liberation Army.

Mao maintained that military capability was where one's military-strategic thinking should begin. However, without downplaying the objective conditions such as weaponry, equipment and other war materials, he placed greater emphasis on 'subjective conditions' of war waging capability, by which he meant the spirit, attitude, belief, political quality and morale of the armed forces. Mao regarded war as the highest manifestation of a human's 'conscious dynamic role' and the supreme test of the human spirit in transforming the objective world. 'War is a contest of strength', he wrote in 1938, but the 'decisive factor is subjective effort -winning more victories and committing fewer errors. Although the objective factors would make such a change possible, Mao thought 'in order to turn the possibility into actuality both correct policy

and subjective effort are essential. It is then that the subjective plays the decisive role'[17].

The belief in human superiority has persistently guided the Chinese leadership , the military and the nation. The slogans of ren de yinsu di yi (the human factor is the first and utmost important), and ren ding sheng tian (man will triumph over nature) have dominated the psychology and mindset of the leadership. Despite it recent emphasis on junshi xiandai hua (military modernization), the Chinese communist leadership's reliance on the human dynamic remain unaltered.

Mao found in the history of war that wars were usually found under only two circumstances: An absolutely strong power found against an absolutely weak power, or a relatively strong power battled a relatively weak power, but mostly wars were found among the latter. He then maintained that a transformation between the weak and the strong might occur in a dialectic manner. This law of the unity of opposites, Mao believed, governed the change, 'from inferiority to parity and then to superiority'[18].

Chinese Security Calculus

If the Confucian-Mercian and the parabellum paradigms of Chinese strategic culture define the broader perceptions, at the

---

[17]   Mao, 'On Protracted War, SMW, p. 235.
[18]   Ibid, p. 217.

operational level, there are several distinct traits or features that have been nurtured and perfected over the millennia of evolution and development and especially their more recent applications and adaptations in contemporary international relations. These in turn variously guide, influence and shape the ways in which Chinese state managers, strategists and negotiators approach security-related issues.

It is, thus, the national culture and historical experience, which constitute the larger milieu in which nation's specific security calculations are made. They have important implications for China's general view of the world, assessments of the global security environment, military posture and external behavior.

The first of these is the Chinese sense of impermanence. Chinese leaders and international relations specialists believe that the world is in constant flux as national power increases and decreases relative to other nations. Stasis is seen as an abnormal and deceptive condition. Disequilibrium is the norm. Constant and careful attention is therefore, paid to incremental shifts in the balance of power and constituent elements of power. According to Chinese elites, at any given time, some nations are in the ascent while others are in relative decline.

Since power is seen as relative and constantly changing so too are national interests and international relationships. The Chinese belief in the essential impermanence of relationships requires maintaining

independence and maximum flexibility. Alliances and binding commitments are to be avoided because they limit independence and freedom of maneouvre. Alliances with foreign nations are distrusted because the partner frequently has its own agenda that it wishes to pursue, attempts to manipulate China for its own purposes and draws China into extended disputes with the partner's adversaries.[19]

China has a basic distrust of interdependence for the same reasons. China's officials see islands of national sovereignty in an ocean of world affairs. This propensity makes China an extremely reluctant and difficult partner for other nations and international organizations, whose raison d'être is premised on universalistic principles or interdependent realities. China is thus extremely reluctant to join multilateral security arrangements.[20]

The second defining characteristic of Chinese concepts of security is comprehensiveness. While western definitions of power and national security tend to be based on military strength, the Chinese view has always been far more comprehensive. Even though the Chinese have a straightforward term for national defence (guofang), protection of national security goes beyond the mere military protection of national

[19] Allen Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975), pp. 2-19.

[20] See Harry Harding, 'China's Cooperative Behavior', in Thomas Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds.) Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 375-400.

borders. For them, the term for security (anquan) has strong social and political connotations. The term bao (preserving) is also frequently used and indicates the far-reaching and comprehensive nature of Chinese definitions of security. For example, baoguo (preserve the state), baozhong (preserve the race), baojiao (preserve the civilisation) and baomin (preserve the people) all figure prominently in Chinese strategic thought.[21] Importantly, economic and technological processes are key variables in Chinese assessments of national power, while national cohesion and will are also seen as important assets. Military power is seen as only one aspect of national power; strength is comprehensive.

Third, there exists a certain determinism in Chinese security calculations: Chinese elites tend to believe that nations behave according to their position in a particular historical epoch and type of political-economic system. The Marxist, Leninist and Maoist stage theories of history and international relations still implicitly underline many Chinese assessments of world affairs and international security. Lenin's theory of imperialism and Mao's concepts of hegemonism are till significant aspects of the Chinese worldview. While Chinese assessments of imperialism and monopoly capitalism are no longer rigid, the belief that nations at this stage of development hold expansionist ambitions is still an operative assumption. Anti-hegemonism remains the sine qua

---

[21]   See the discussion in Wiang Jisi, Comparing Chinese and American Conceptions of Security (Toronto: North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue, Working Paper no. 17), p.2.

non of Chinese foreign policy, deriving largely from modern China's historical experience of encroachment, partition and manipulation by foreign powers.[22]

The historical weakness of modern China leads to the fourth underlying characteristic of Chinese security calculations – the imperative need for a strong state and unified nation. Chinese experience demonstrates that a weak state and divided nation invites foreign aggression and leads to retarded development. Both concerns suggest an essential linkage between internal and external security in the Chinese calculus. Chinese elites are fearful that there will be 'disorder under heaven', civil strife will erupt and the nation will fragment into warring fiefdoms. Chaos (luan) is the most feared prospect in the Chinese psyche. In Chinese tradition, only a strong state can maintain internal order and hence ensure external security. There is little sense that civil society and a social compact can ensure domestic tranquility.

Further, national security is defined not merely as territorial security but also as protecting China's core culture from external contamination. Since dynastic times culture has been an important element in China's national security calculus.[23]

---

[22]   For details regarding hegemony, see Harry Harding (ed.), China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 1-40.

[23]   Wang Jisi, Comparing Chinese and American Conceptions of Security, p.5.

That said, China's longtime approach to security appears to be primarily a persistently realpolitik one, keyed to the cardinal principle of strategic interdependence and reinforced by China's predominant self image as a relatively weak yet rising great power deserving greater status and respect from other major powers. Many of these powers bullied and coerced China during its "century of humiliation" from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century. That experience pervades much of current Chinese strategic thinking. Many Chinese appear to believe that China must reclaim its long-standing and proper historical status as a preeminent power in Asia and should be accorded equal consideration and respect by those powers that oppressed it in the past. This mind-set is reinforced by an apparently deeply socialized view that China's rise will be uniquely non-threatening and that to believe otherwise is to contribute to the perpetuation of the "China threat theory". Such beliefs leave less room for common security concepts, and more space for competitive, statecentric nationalism in conceptualizations of the international system.

Chinese Negotiating Styles

As culture significantly fashions Chinese security calculus, so are Chinese negotiating styles influenced by culture whose application depends on who China's counterparts are (great powers like the United States, or small neighbours such as the Philippines), the settings

(bilateral or multilateral) , issues (security trade, investment, etc.) and the circumstances (importance of negotiations to China and the broader international geopolitical context).[24]

Moralizing

One characteristic of Chinese negotiating behavior is its proclivity for high-sounding principles, moralizing and rhetoric. While this tendency belies the fact that Chinese foreign policy is increasingly based on practical considerations, this may reflect more China's recognition of its own limitations rather than a reluctance to carry through what it preaches.[25] In other words, limited means constrains the scope and attainment of ends that fit Chinese views of world order. Following the strategic culture tradition, the act of moralizing serves to compensate for the lack of actual capabilities to achieve certain goals.

Commitment to Principles

Another important characteristic is a strong emphasis on principles and less on technicalities. The announcement of and commitment to principles at the beginning of negotiations serve two purposes. One is for bargaining, the other is to allow counterparts to

---

[24]   Paul H. Kreisberg, 'China's Negotiating Behavior', in Robinson and Shambaugh (eds.) Chinese Foreign Policy, p. 469.

[25]   Alfred Wilhelm, Jr., The Chinese at the Negotiating Table: Style and Characteristics (Washington D.C.: National Defence University Press, 1994), p. 213.

tackle details first, and hence the commitment to 'principles' serves to establish ground rules. Domestic politics can also have a strong influence on both the substance and process of negotiations. An old China hand observes: 'as a general rule, it can be assumed that the more rigid and posturing a Chinese negotiator or the more "irrational" a PRC negotiating position seems to be, the more factional political pressures are influencing the negotiating process'.[26] Sometimes, principles would be repeated and empirical evidence shown or demonstrated to indicate seriousness of commitment. Chinese negotiators do not seek to trade off short-term benefits for long-term disadvantages. Other tactics often resorted to by the Chinese include a united front strategy; playing bureaucratic politics; allowing face-saving measures for one's opponent, and making certain concessions at the eleventh hour.[27]

Swaying Tactics

Yet another set of Chinese negotiating tactics is what Ogura Kazuo termed 'swaying tactics'. These are not directly related to the substance of the negotiations nor are they intended to draw more concessions from the other side. Rather, they aim to undermine the position and prestige of the other negotiators and in some cases to influence and modify their

[26] Richard Solomon, 'Friendship and Obligation in Chinese Negotiating Style', in Hans Binnendijk (ed.), National Negotiating Styles (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, 1987), pp.3-4, quote on p.3.

[27] Jaw-ling Chang, 'Negotiating of the 17 August 1982 US-PRC Arms Communique: Beijing's Negotiating Tactics', The China Quarterly, no.125 (March 1991), pp.33-54.

outlook.[28] These can include: testifying friendship and loyalty; making use of the other's faults and errors; and making appeals to seek sympathy from 'friendly elements' on the other side.[29] Indeed, interpersonal relationships are an important element of Chinese culture to get things done.[30]

Additional tactics include:

- agenda setting to exclude one's own weak points;

- presenting a hypothetical historical trend or course of history;

- concentrating the attack on the opponent's weak points by finding faults and errors and contradictions in the other's logic and arguments and exploiting them to the fullest extent;

- letting the other speak first;

- calling the other's concessions an indication of 'progress' and seeking more concessions;

- insisting on setting up certain principles, which in turn define the rules of the game favourably to the Chinese.[31]

---

[28]   Ogura Kazuo, 'How the "Incrutables" Negotiate with the "Inscrutables": Chinese Negotiating Tactics vis-à-vis the Japanese', The China Quarterly, no.79 (September 1979), p.530.
[29]   Ibid, pp.530-535.
[30]   Kreisberg, 'China's Negotiating Behavior', pp.458-459.
[31]   Kazuo, 'How the "Inscrutables" negotiate with the "Inscrutables", pp.535-545.

China and Security Negotiations

It is in this background that Chinese approaches towards security negotiations in general and arms control negotiations in particular can be properly analysed.

China's views toward and involvement in Non-proliferation, Arms Control And Disarmament (NACD) processes have changed substantially since the late 1970s. During the Maoist period, the Chinese approach to arms control was highly negative and dismissive. China criticised arms control regimes as discriminatory serving to "limit the activities of the have-nots while placing no requirements on the haves to disarm". Beijing thus refused to participate in multilateral arms control processes and denounced these processes, as well as the US-Soviet bilateral arms control agreements, as sham disarmament or as efforts by the superpowers to institutionalize their hegemony.

The reform period has witnessed a shift in Chinese perspectives from viewing arms control as largely an adjunct of the East-West struggle and without any benefits to China, to a recognition that China could gain from arms control efforts and would have to become involved in international arms control regimes.[32] As a result of this shift China

---

[32]   Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, "Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control", International Security 20, No.3 (Winter 1995-96), p. 46.

began to develop a more comprehensive, less-dismissive, stance toward arms control. In the past 10 to 15 years Beijing has signed onto agreements or made arms control commitments that it had previously opposed vigorously. Thus, it is only since the end of the Cold War that Beijing began considering arms control and disarmament not just a game for scoring political points but an important policy arena in which to balance a number of national security interests.

China's NACD Policies

China's NACD policies have been guided by several principles persistently stipulated over the years. First and foremost is the argument that since the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia possess the largest nuclear and conventional arsenals in the world, they bear a primary and unshirkable responsibility in disarmament. Second, all NACD measures are but steps toward the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons. In other words, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear test bans, fissile material production cut-offs, etc, are not the goals themselves but are specific measures and steps toward the ultimate objective of eliminating all nuclear weapons. In addition, China insists that NACD will not succeed unless the root causes of global/regional conflicts are addressed. This involves economic, political, as well as military and NACD measures. Third, as the danger of nuclear war threatens the entire human race, every country has the

equal right to participate in the discussion and settlement of the question of nuclear disarmament.[33]

That the superpowers bear primary responsibility for reducing their arsenals has been the most consistent theme in Chinese positions on NACD. China maintained that as the two superpowers hold the largest nuclear and conventional arsenals, they should take the lead in halting the testing, production and deployment of all types of nuclear weapons, drastically reducing and destroying such weapons deployed at home and abroad. Indeed, Beijing laid out specific targets as preconditions for itself and other medium-sized NWSs to participate in nuclear disarmament. In June 1982 China first spelled out a '50 percent reduction' as such a precondition. This position was later amended to an unspecified 'substantial reduction' as the superpowers appeared to be approaching and even bypassing this target. Recent Chinese positions have implied that 'substantial reduction' means that the United States and Russia should reduce their nuclear arsenals to a level comparable to that of the medium-size NWS, which would require a cut-down of 95 percent or more in their arsenals.[34]

---

[33]   Alastair Johnston,'China and Arms Control: Emerging Issues and Interests in the 1980s'. Aurora Papers 3 (Ottawa: The Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1986); Alastair Johnston, 'China and Arms Control in the Asia-Pacific Region', in Frank C. Langdon and Douglas A. Ross (eds.) Superpower Maritime Strategy in the Pacific (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), p.176.

[34]   Garrett and Glaser, Chinese Perspectives, pp.43-48.

China has long insisted on the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons as the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament and the only effective way to prevent nuclear war. Until such goals are attained, specific measures such as no-first use and negative security assurances by all NWSs, as well as negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and fissile materials production cut-off will contribute to nuclear disarmament.[35] Moreover, China holds that effective NACD must go hand in hand with measures to deal with the source of arms races and weapons proliferation. For this purpose, efforts must be exerted to address the root causes of global and regional conflict.

Equal participation in global NACD activities by all countries is another principle. Obviously, Beijing is sensitive about being seen to share the concerns of the "have nots" while being one of the nuclear 'club'. This obliges Beijing to affirm the principle of the inalienable right of non-nuclear weapon states to discuss and settle nuclear issues. Pushing for equal participation and decision-making serves Beijing's interests in at least two ways. It demonstrates China's solidarity with Third World countries and hence partially dilutes any negative connotation of being one of the nuclear powers. At the same time, the democratization of global arms control and disarmament processes

---

[35]   Wendy Frieman, 'New members of the Club: Chinese Participation in Arms Control Regimes 1980-1995', The Nonproliferation Review, vol.3, no.3, (Spring-Summer 1996), pp. 14-19.

reduces superpower domination in agenda setting. It has been observed that while China is strongly inclined toward bilateralism in dealing with security issues in general, in arms control and disarmament it seems to favor multilateralism.[36] In practice, though, this has not been easy, since China must carefully balance between the need to protect its fundamental security interests and the need to maintain its image as a peace-loving, responsible power.

China and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Negotiations

While the Chinese have persistently enunciated their principles over the years, in handling specific NACD negotiations and dealing with particular issues, they have managed to present policy positions in ways that both preserve core national security interests and appear in conformity with declared principled stance.[37] Elements derived from the 'yin' approach tended to characterise the declaratory policies, while those from the 'yang' approach guided the practical policy operations.

China entered the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in 1980. In 1981 Beijing signaled that it would not oppose setting up a working group on nuclear test bans in the CD and then indicated it would join

---

[36]   Wu Yun, 'China's Policies towards Arms Control and Disarmament: From Passive Responding to Active Leading', The Pacific Review, vol.9, no.4 (1996), p.590.

[37]   J. Mohan Malik, 'China's Policy toward Nuclear Arms Control in the Post-Cold War Era', Contemporary Security Policy, vol.16, no.2, (August 1995), pp.1-43.

such a group in 1985. In 1986 China announced it would no longer test nuclear weapons in the atmosphere (it had in fact stopped doing so in 1981) in effect committing itself to the same constraints on testing as found in the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963. China had denounced that treaty for years and still refuses to sign it formally. In 1993, China for the first time showed a willingness to participate in negotiations for a CTBT and to conclude the treaty by the end of 1996.

China's signing of the CTBT in mid-1996 suggested Beijing's willingness to place some restraints on its nuclear modernization effort, given the presumed importance of continued nuclear testing to that endeavor.

Beijing's position in the CTBT talks seemed to have been largely designed to slow down the process in the view of many CD delegates and non-governmental observers. Specifically, China had posed several preconditions for successful completion of the treaty that were generally unacceptable to other participants in the talks and that would seriously delay its signing and implementation. These included the right of declared nuclear states to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions(PNEs), no-first-use and negative security assurances commitments by the nuclear states, and the exclusive use of an international monitoring system (IMS) that would then exclude the use of national technical means (NTM) by individual states for treaty verification. China also had

proposed a lengthy procedure leading to the treaty's Entry Into Force (EIF) following its signing. Indeed, many CD members suspected that Beijing wanted to delay talks past 1996, possibly in order to permit it to complete the modernisation of its nuclear warheads.[38]

Regarding the inclusion of a clause on PNEs in the CTBT, China's view was that only nuclear explosions with an overt military purpose should be prohibited. Beijing argued that PNEs could have potential civilian benefits for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.[39] It has been suggested that China's PNE proposal was nothing but a standard negotiating tactic. As Rebecca Johnson argued. 'China's argument on PNEs was initially viewed as little more than a delaying tactic. Then it was judged to be a bargaining chip, for which Beijing might demand a high price elsewhere. However, as China continued to hold stubbornly to this demand, the fear [grew] that it could be "treaty breaker" unless some face-saving compromise were found.[40] China eventually dropped its demand for the PNE exemption clause on the condition that the treaty would undergo review after ten years.[41] One of the reasons for this last-minute 'softening' of position may be the political cost of holding out to

---

[38]   Garrett and Glaser, "Chinese perspectives", pp.53-60; Frieman, "Introduction to Chronology of Chinese Arms Control Behavior", pp.5-7.

[39]   CTBT article on, "Peaceful uses of nuclear energy and peaceful nuclear explosions", Chinese working paper, DC/NTB/WP,167, 23 August, 1994.

[40]   Rebecca Johnson, 'Endgame Issues in Geneva', Arms Control Today (April 1996), p.13.

[41]   Robert Karniol, 'China to sign pact after one more nuclear test', Jane's Defence Weekly', 19 June 1996, p.25.

the PNE demand and potentially wrecking the treaty, especially given the fact that China's position was not supported by the developing countries.[42]

Chinese positions on verification issues are that any verification clauses and arrangements should be strict, effective, fair and reasonable, and provide and equal rights and obligations to all treaty members. Fair verification should accord each party equal access to verification-related information, resources and technology. For this purpose; China had suggested that countries with advanced NTMs transfer them to those that do not possess such capabilities and equipment to ensure equal access. An IMS would presumably serve this purpose, since it would not only embody the principle of equality amongst all state parties, but also prevent inequality and discrimination resulting from disparities due to their different levels of technical capacities.[43] Out of concern over potential abuse, China was strongly opposed to the use of NTMs in CTBT verification and had made it clear that it "will not accept the integration of NTM into the CTBT verification regime and will not accept the triggering of an OSI by NTM data or "any other information".[44] Finally, China had proposed number of principles for on-site inspections (OSIs) ranging from the objective, the triggering procedure and the limits of

---

[42]   Johnson, 'Endgame Issues in Geneva', p.15.
[43]   Ambassador Sha, DC/PV. 717, p.6; CD/NTB/WP. 266, p.1.
[44]   Ambassador Sha, DC/PV., 717, p.7.

such inspections.[45] OSIs should be minimally intrusive and applied only as a last resort after all other means of verification have been exhausted.

In addition, China seems to genuinely believe that pledges regarding the first use and negative security assurances enhancing international security are not simply political statements. In fact, China apparently believes a NFU pledge by all nuclear powers would provide a greater deterrent to war than the CTBT or nuclear arms reduction agreements.[46]

In addition to all these concerns and perhaps most important, China had long been cautious about signing the CTBT because it feared that the viability of its nuclear deterrent would be undermined in the future by the deployment of ballistic missile defense systems in the United States or Russia.[47]

On the other hand, China also realised that any obvious move to delay or dilute a CTBT could tarnish its image among a large group of developing states who saw the treaty as a core pillar in the extension of the non-proliferation treaty. There had been a wave of international protests of Beijing's nuclear tests in 1995 and 1996.Beijing finally

---

[45]   'China's position on CTBT on-site inspection', Working Paper, CD/NTB/WP. 266, 5 September 1995, p.1; Ambassador Sha, DC/PV. 717, p.7.

[46]   Garrett and Glaser, "Chinese Perspectives", pp.60-69.

[47]   Ibid., pp. 73-74.

ceased nuclear testing in late July 1996 , but indicated that it wants the issue of peaceful nuclear explosions to be reexamined in a decade.

In May 1996 China dropped its potentially treaty killing positions on no-first use and peaceful nuclear explosions when a "clean" draft treaty eliminating this language was accepted as the basis of endgame negotiations. After intense negotiations, primarily with the United States, over a compromise on the intrusiveness of the CTBT verification regime, China signed the Treaty.

In the absence of evidence of technological or financial side-payments to join, and given the constraints the regime places on China's ability to modernize its nuclear warheads, a powerful reason, then, for China's participating in and acceding to the treaty seems to be a concern about image and status. Once it was clear that the CTBT was supported by an enormous majority of states who saw it as a pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, China had little choice than to sign it. The language used to justify the decision is the language of status and image. China could not buck this "great international trend". There was "psychological pressure" to join once the other P-5 had joined the negotiations and there was clear support from developing countries. China's signature was consistent with its being a responsible major power, and joining the treaty was part of a "global atmosphere", such

that China would have been isolated had it opposed or sabotaged the treaty.[48]

Role of Chinese Culture in Security Negotiations

Several observations can be made about the abovesaid Beijing's NACD principles and specific policy positions as they relate to the influence of Chinese strategic culture and negotiating tactics.

CTBT and Chinese Historical Experience

Beijing's suspicion of arms control initiatives such as the CTBT, especially in the early phase, reflects the parabellum conception of threats, the nature of inter-state conflicts and national security. Clearly the historical experience of humiliation informs the conceptualization of national security interests: one must be strong enough to be reckoned with. The superpowers' call for arms control was taken as a scheme to subject China forever to an inferior position through the freezing of the development and improvement of China's own nuclear weapons.

CTBT and Chinese Holistic Approach

Chinese positions on CTBT were strongly influenced by the holistic approach to security and NACD negotiations. This whole-part dialectic explains why Beijing is more interested in the overall impacts of NACD

---

[48]   Garrett and Glasser, "Chinese Perspectives", pp.53-69.

agreements such as the CTBT on its security than on the specifics and details.

CTBT and Chinese Securing of Undefeatable Position

China is hardly in a position to compete with the superpowers in the arms race; however, it must make sure that its NACD commitment or even participation will not compromise its maintaining an undefeatable position. This, in nuclear jargon, means to maintain the capacity for deterrence.

Yet another feature is an aversion to formality and a high sensitivity about sovereignty. This is clearly reflected in China's insistence on a slow approach to institution-building in the Asia-Pacific and particularly concerning the scope and methods of verification in arms control treaties such as the CTBT. Also, contrary to the conventional wisdom that China is more interested in principles than in technicalities, recent Chinese negotiating tactics have focused exactly on the technicalities to either advance its broad interests or at least prevent developments that could affect these interests negatively. Chinese positions on the use of NTMs or OSIs in verification, for example, reflect this consideration. At the same time, a holistic approach has also resulted in China's eleventh-hour concession such as its dropping of the PNE clause in the CTBT talks.

The Qi-Zheng conceptualization and the use of 'swaying tactics' are also quite noticeable in Chinese approaches. Regarding the former, China's position during the NPT Review Conference leading up to the treaty's indefinite extension are a good example. Except for the general principles, it is uncertain where China really stood as it both sought to maintain its identity as an NWS and showed that it shared concerns with NAM countries. Also ambiguous has been China's position regarding the fissile materials cut-off negotiations. The 'swaying tactics' have been used regarding a number of issues in a way to shift focus so that negotiations could proceed in directions that would least affect China. An example has been to emphasize superpower responsibilities in nuclear weapons disarmament. China would challenge the superpowers to take the lead in drastically reducing their arsenal thereby seeking to defer carrying out its own obligations. In addition, by challenging other NWS to adopt the NFU pledge, China also is trying to make the argument that its nuclear weapons should be of a less of a concern to NNWSs since it steadfastly observes the NFU pledge[49].

And finally, seeking the moral high ground and a united front with most developing countries both aims at promoting China's 'just world' [50], and separates it from the 'haves'.

---

[49]   Jing-Dong Yuan, Culture Matters: Chinese Approaches to Arms Control and Disarmament in Keith Krause (ed.) Culture and Security: Multilateralism, Arms control and Security building (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999), pp. 113-115.

[50]   Chih-yu shih, China's Just World: The Morality of Chinese Foreign Policy (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1993) p.1

Constructing National security: Role of Chinese Culture

It is very important to study the influence of culture on the conceptualization of Chinese security calculus to understand its impact on security negotiations. The so-called 'realism with Chinese characteristics' derives from China's unique cultural and historical roots. Chinese realism developed from a cultural hegemony that was Sino-centric and continues to reflect a tension between the belief in its supremacy and the recognition of the limitation of its material base. The need to balance the 'ti' and 'yong' and how best to combine the two in protecting national security interests generates a version of realism that is at once power sensitive and moralistic. Chinese discourses on human rights, as well as increasingly sophisticated perspectives on NACD issues, reflect not so much the signs that fundamental changes are in the wing as specific tactics adopted to address the issue of image. In sum, if the Chinese version of realism is any different, it is because of its different and unique cultural/historical underpinnings. It is a realism with the Confucian-Mencian values as the 'ti' and the parabellum, realpolitik as the 'yong'.

The cultural roots which inform and shape its political elites' perception of their approaches to national security issues in general influence Chinese positions in arms control and disarmament negotiations.

Self-Help Principles

The Chinese elites have a strong belief in self-help as the only reliable assurance for the nations' fundamental security interests. Despite the fact that China's security environment has significantly improved since the late 1980s, the parabellum or realpolitik theme continues to reinforce the imperative of self-help in an international system of anarchy, which in turn cautions against endorsing arms control and disarmament negotiations that would constrain China's ability to realise its various national security goals. Chinese positions in NACD negotiations reflect these fundamental considerations of threat, security, stability and peace[51].

Focus on "High Politics"

Since parabellum thinking remains a guiding principle for Chinese security calculus in the post-cold war era, its arms control policy of necessity must be based on self-help, balance of power, and free-riding rather than security interdependence. This being the case, Chinese participation in various NACD negotiations largely reflects a political concern lest China look isolated rather than a sincere belief that arms control and disarmament advance national security interests. At the same time a multilateral forum on arms control and disarmament would

---

[51]   ´ David Shambaugh, 'the Insecurity of Security: the PLA's Enshinign Doctrine and Threat Perceptions towards 2000, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, vo.l.13, no.1 (spring 1994)

normally focus on the superpowers nuclear arsenal and may force the two to reduce their arsenals in ways that China in bilateral contexts would not achieve without some constraints on itself in return[52]. Reservations about the utility of arms control and disarmament are also reflected in efforts to modernize China's nuclear arsenal, which in turn affects China's willingness to conclude arms control and disarmament treaties[53].

The way in which Chinese elites define their national security interests remains strongly influenced by a deep-rooted cultural, historical, and social experience. This in turn guides the Chinese negotiating positions on arms control and disarmament.

Alastair Johnston observed that China's NACD behaviour appears to be influenced by two basic concerns – the degree to which NACD threatens or benefits Chinese conceptions of military security, and the degree to which NACD affects China's international image[54]. But the conception of military security itself is a function of strategic culture, while the concern over image reflects traits of such a culture.

Security concerns would explain why China has been wary about arms control processes in certain areas. Both a CTBT and fissile

---

[52]   Garrett and Glaser, Chinese Perspectives, p. 43-78.
[53]   Alastair Johnston, "China's New "Old Thinking", the Concept of Limited Deterrence, International Security, vol.-20 No.3, (Winter 1995-96), pp.5-42, Alastair Johnston, Prospects for Chinese Nuclear force, Modernization: Limited Deterrence versus Multilateral Arms Control, China Quarterly, No. 146 (June 1996) pp. 548-76.
[54]   Alastiar Johnston, 'China and Arms control in the Asia-Pacific Region, p. 175.

materials production cut-off seriously affect China's current and future nuclear weapons modernization programmes .China has conducted the fewest nuclear tests among the NWS[55]. The CTBT freezes the gap of nuclear warhead design and testing between China and the other NWS. Taken in this light, Beijing's efforts to try as much as possible to exclude its core security interests from NACD processes reflect its needs to be concerned with potential nuclear attacks on itself now that it is surrounded by declared, de facto, and potential nuclear weapons states.

Chinese elites also perceived regional NACD as placing undue constraints on its defence modernization programmes. In the Asia-Pacific context, China is the focus of any multilateral NACD processes. Its image as a weaker, militarily inferior and largely defensive country would not play well in a regional context; instead, China will be seen as a strong, superior and sometimes aggressive power. Electing to be constrained by regional NACD measures may harm its military and security interests. On the other hand, refusing to participate in the regional NACD processes will tarnish China's image as a major force for global/regional peace and stability[56].

---

[55] Dingli shen, 'China', in Eric Arnett (ed.), After the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1995), pp. 25-6.

[56] Johnston, 'China and Arms control', pp. 184-5.

Free-Riding Principle

The above explains why free riding has been a key characteristic of China in NACD negotiations. Such behavior is not determined by a cynicism of NACD in general , but rather reflects Beijing's belief that a level playing field must precede any fruitful NACD negotiation. In this spirit, China has raised the price tag of its participation in NACD negotiations from the 50 percent reduction of superpower arsenals to a 'substantial reduction' in both quantitative and qualitative terms[57].

A second feature is China's proclivity for high-sounding rhetoric and moral preaching. China has persistently held to a number of highly unrealistic principles it has proposed over the years. This serves to boost its own image in the international community as a responsible power. Indeed, image consideration has been an important fact in Beijing's formulation and proclamation of arms control and disarmament policies. It explains why for a long time China refused to accede to the NPT while quickly signing on to regional NWFZs. The former demonstrates that China was not part of 'them' (haves) but a representative of the 'have nots', despite the fact that China has possessed nuclear weapons since 1964. The latter would reinforce the former as it shows that China did

---

[57]   Malik, 'China's Policy toward Nuclear Arms control in the post-cold war era', pp.1-43.

not exploit its 'have' position but rather acted as a more responsible power by indicating its support of the concerns of the 'have-nots'[58].

Image consideration also explains China's persistent advocacy of NFU and NSAs, and how Beijing tries to use these to dispel concerns of third world and NAM countries.

There is an inherent contradiction or conflict between normative and geostrategic concerns. The former can be regarded as image while the latter security considerations. This is clearly reflected in China's attitudes towards, and participation in, NACD negotiations. Normative considerations would have China announce all NACD activities short of complete and thorough disarmament as 'sham disarmament'. It was only in the early 1980s that Beijing moved toward embracing partial disarmament measures. What followed has been the practice of maxi/mini principle, that is, 'the maximisation of security benefits and the minimization of normative costs'. Observed Kim Samuel. 'Chinese NACD behavior is thus marked by selective activism on global NACD issues and selective aloofness on Asia-Pacific regional NACD issues[59].

While the gap remains between policy declarations and practical behaviour, this does not mean that the Chinese are resigned to their inability to translate their moral preaching into adopted norms on the

---

58   Johnston, 'China and Arms Control', p. 176.
59   Samuel S. Kim, 'China's International Organisational Behavior', in Robinson and Shambaugh (eds.) Chinese Foreign Policy pp. 418-21.

international stage. Indeed, one can argue that via different channels, using different methods, the Chinese wanted their voice heard, in particular regarding those issues that affect China's security interests. NACD issues are high among them. At the same time, there is the recognition that non-participation creates a negative image and that free-riding seems to be less effective in the post-cold war environment, especially as the United States and Russia move forward 'with drastic nuclear weapons reductions'. If a holistic approach is the trademark of China's involvement in NACD negotiations, then the degree of China's commitment depends to a large extent on the balance between the perceived and actual benefits of participation and the associated costs[60].

Image concerns have sometimes rendered Chinese opposition to certain NACD initiatives difficult, if these were supported by a large number of NAM countries. Recognizing that voting against or being an uncompromising holdout could do serious damage to its preferred image of a responsible power, China occasionally dropped its original positions; other times, China simply chose not do participate in voting. China's unexplained absence in two important votes (the one setting up the UN Register of Conventional Arms and the other approving the UN expert group study on verification) may be largely driven by such considerations.

---

[60]   Frieman, 'New Members of the club', pp.26-9

Thus, cultural elements clearly influence China's approach to NACD negotiations. Given the changing international environment since late 1989, China should feel more secure than at any time since 1949. At the same time, growing economic interdependence and China's increasing participation in various international organizations at the global and regional levels would both raise the cost of using force and provide more avenues and options for handling inter-state conflicts. However, the realpolitik conceptualization of international relations as conflictual, zero-sum and ultimately self-help seems to underline Beijing's overall views of security, peace and stability. While in an increasingly interdependent world the use of force can be costly and may not always be efficient, this has not deterred China's pursuit of building a rich country with a strong army and eventually restoring its past grandeur. Arms control, in particular with regard to such issue areas as the CTBT and fissile material cut-off, directly affects the means with which China seeks to defend its national security interests. Consequently, nuclear arms control and disarmament must be assessed in the broader context of both the structural constraints and ideational and cultural aspects.

If parabellum or realpolitik thinking remains the core of Chinese conceptions of threat and security, then changes in China's positions on arms control and disarmament negotiations should be taken as tactical in nature, or adaptation rather than learning, with the latter

representing a judgmental change in the conception of security threats and the most appropriate methods of achieving strategic ends. Active and constructive participation in arms control negotiations on the part of China may demonstrate a seasoning of diplomatic experience rather than changes in the internal conceptualization of 'security'[61].

Indeed, as Johnston points out, to assess the learning versus adaptation dichotomy it is useful to observe these four indicators: the establishment within China of an arms control and disarmament community and the transnational linkages with the outside world; the transmission and exchange of ideas and information about arms control and disarmament via these linkages; a shift in the central paradigm; and finally, changes in specific arms control and disarmament policies[62].

A summary of China's NACD positions over the past four decades indicates that the fundamentals have largely remained intact while the tactics have been much more multifarious and sophisticated thanks to China's exposure to international diplomacy. If anything, one observable consistency remains what Johnston calls the realpolitik calculus and free riding and what Samuel Kim refers to as the division between

---

[61] Johnston, Learning versus Adaptation: Explaining change in Chinese Arms Control Policy in the 1980s and 1990s', The China Journal No. 35, (January 1996) pp. 27-61.
[62] Ibid. p. 35

superpower responsibilities and others' rights in global arms control and

disarmament endeavors.[63]

---

[63]   Johnston, China and Arms Control, pp 175-84; Samuel Kim, Whither post-Mao Chinese Global
         Policy? ' International Organisation, vol 35, no.3 (summer 1981), pp. 442-6.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

The above case studies of India and China focused on the impact of 'culture' on security negotiations particularly those associated with NACD issues. It cannot be claimed that it is the most explanatory element. But cross-cultural factors cannot be ignored in various contexts and processes, and different sets of beliefs and traditions may prove to be crucial factors in some of the contemporary security negotiations that are unfolding around the world.

Conceptual Problems

Special difficulties are presented while concentrating on the cultural dimension of any social phenomenon, all of which are present in the international security arena. 'Culture' is often deployed in a casual manner to explain all residual phenomena that do not seem at first glance to have a 'rational' explanation. Culture is often used to amplify differences, or as a form of resistance to pressures from stronger actors or 'outsiders'. Finally, culture is often used confusingly to cover phenomena that range from micro-interactions between individuals, to macro-level 'clash of civilizations'. In order to make any analysis of culture useful to issues of security and strategy four key distinctions have to be taken into account.

First, cultural elements have to be seen as distinct from both 'structures' and 'behaviours', and must be more enduring than the latter, since issues that are transient are more likely to reflect tactical

manipulations by political elites than the influence of deeply held beliefs. Although 'culture' is not permanent and unchanging, cultural factors must persist or recur over a protracted period of time, or at least not change without major upheaval. Hence it may make sense to speak of persistent Confucian cultural elements in Chinese foreign policy, but it probably does not make sense to deploy cultural explanation for Indian resistance to signing the CTBT.

Second, one must recognize that cultures are often fragmented, with many sub-cultures intersecting and clashing. There are often considerable differences between elite and mass culture, between different social classes, and between elites within one society. A shared security culture may develop among diplomats and negotiators, for example, but this may not be rooted in or based upon authentic cultural traditions or in accordance with the constraints of domestic political culture. 'Fair' or even 'beneficial' deals may be rejected simply because sometimes no deal with former colonial powers (for example) could be sold to a sceptical public.

Third, security culture is a subset of broader political, strategic and diplomatic cultures. It is also not useful to draw sharp distinctions between political, strategic and diplomatic cultures, since all share overlapping elements, and draw upon similar sources in 'culture writ large'. On the one hand, security culture is in some sense the 'flip side' of strategic culture, concerned not simply with issues of war, the use of force and military institutions, but with issues of

peace, NACD, security and conflict management. On the other hand, the parameters of a security culture are often drawn by domestic political cultural factors, since security negotiations between states are always political as part of foreign policy. And at a third level most international negotiators share a common diplomatic culture that facilitates and channels their interactions into predictable and manageable forms; this diplomatic culture is part of an expanding elite 'global culture' that shares common symbols, aspirations and referents. In the security arena members of this global elite culture speak a similar language of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation and elites across countries may communicate more easily among one another than they do with non elites within their own states.

Finally, the concept of security culture is less useful for understanding how rational calculation of the best means to realize certain interests are made than for understanding the ends themselves: the backdrop of restraints and constraints against which policies are formulated or pursued. In other words, the idea of distinct security cultures helps elucidate the limits to what leaders and elites can do or cannot do. It also seems to be the case that cultural factors explain more of the process than the outcome, or more of the style than the substance. This is not to trivialize cultural factors, however, since the process and style might be as significant than the outcome at a stage in the security negotiations. Likewise, although cultural

differences may be manifested by different styles, these differences can affect the substance of negotiating positions, the way in which these are presented or responded to, the prospects for achieving agreements, and ultimately the way in which states and political elites define their interests[1].

Perceptual Factors in Security Negotiations

The case studies of India and China reveal that basic 'perceptual factors' seemed to set the parameters for security negotiations.

As pointed out earlier, the Chinese have two radically different views of war and peace: the Confucian-Mencian view, which sees the world as a harmonious order in which conflicts are deviant phenomena that must be managed through means other than brute force, and when force is inevitable, violence is not considered even the most important element of strategy and action, and the parabellum or realpolitik view, which argues that the world is not harmonious, that conflicts are zero-sum and constant, and that the best way to deal with security threats is to eliminate them through the use of force. Although there is strong evidence that the Confucian – Mencian view has been predominant at particular periods in China's history, it is not clear which influence is dominant today.

---

[1]   Keith Krause, (ed.) Culture and Security: Multilateralism, Arms Control and security Building (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999), pp. 220-221.

Somewhat analogously, Indian security policy points to its opposing tendencies: the kautilyan tradition, which portrays the 'external' domain 'as being an inherently violent place where conflict and violent competition was the rule, and where peace and stability were the exception', and the Gandhian tradition, which includes a commitment to peaceful change, non-violent inter-state relations, and pacific conflict resolution through negotiation.

Thus, the existence of different strands of thought in broad socio-cultural contexts reveals the fact that cultures are not monolithic and thus to the two-way relationship between 'cultures' and 'actors'. Thus, broad cultural idea, derived from ethical traditions, religion or philosophy, are often used instrumentally by different political entrepreneurs, depending on their circumstances and the challenges they face. But the fact that political leaders and elites can deliberately manipulate and use cultural referents in order to achieve specific ends in security negotiations does not mean that they are purely instrumental. Cultural referents can only be used in certain ways, and their broad parameters must be respected.

An important consideration here is that the historical legacy of conflict and the specific nature of the security challenges faced affect the underlying concepts of security and national interest that states, people and elites hold and their orientation towards specific elements of the NACD negotiating agenda.

The most profound legacy to be dealt in security negotiations is that of colonialism and the perception of discrimination, enveloped in the historical North-South relationship of dependence and subordination. In the cases of China and India, the sense of inadequacy or powerlessness about periods of oppression, colonialism, defeat, or even slippage from previous status, is strong, and creates countless difficulties for efforts to advance the NACD agenda.[2]

As seen earlier, underlying images of the region and regional security, and of the nature of cooperation between states, also affect orientations towards NACD negotiations. These mental maps often have a cultural dimension, both in how they define the boundaries of the region, and in how they define the relations among the members of the region.

China may be described as thinking unilaterally, pursuing issues bilaterally and posturing multilaterally, in part because 'historically, multilateral security measures either were alien to Chinese rulers or failed to protect Chinese security interests.[3] The Chinese stance towards multilateralism is mirrored by the Indian position, which in both cases perhaps reflects their sensitivity to issues of status and subordination, and their relative regional importance.

---

[2]   Noel Kaplowitz, 'National Self-Images, Perception of Enemies, and Conflict Strategies: Psychopolitical Dimensions of International Relations', Political Psychology, vol. II, no.1 (1990), p.51.

[3]   Jing-Dong Yuan, 'Culture Matters: Chinese Approaches to Arms Control and Disarmament' in, Keith Krause (ed.) Culture and Security, p.84.

These kinds of orientation derived from respective historical experience in different regions, have a direct impact on how states approach NACD negotiations, and how they prefer to tackle them. In China's case, it appears willing to discuss security issues in the Asia-Pacific only so as not to be left out or isolated .It exhibits a powerful preference, however, for bilateral 'hub-and-spoke' arrangements with its neighbours that keep Chinese policy at the centre. In India's case, its security policy remains chained to the notion that bilateral advantages outweigh any gains that might be derived from dealing with neighbours on a multilateral basis.[4]

Impact of Domestic Political Culture on Security Negotiations

The impact of cultural influence that have their roots in domestic political cultures is perhaps the most significant aspect of the cross-cultural dimensions of security negotiations. The case studies could find specific issues – ranging from concepts of 'honor' and 'face', to styles of decision-making, to altitudes towards conflict and violence - that projected themselves 'upwards' from the society to the international arena. This is so, since culture has to be rooted ultimately in the lived experiences of peoples and groups. Four distinct clusters of issues seemed to emerge as important, in an ascending order from the micro to the macro-social level: personal or individual social stances; collective decision-making and

---

[4]   Andrew Latham, 'The Role of Culture and Identity in India Arms Control and Disarmament Policy', in Keith Krause (ed.), Culture and Security, p.115.

implementation styles; socio-cultural attitudes; and concrete institutional expressions of the above.

Before addressing them, however, it must be noted that the interface between domestic and 'international' cultures is also the most subject to instrumental manipulation and entrepreneurial political leadership. By definition, if a security culture includes those enduring characteristics that influence the behavior and thinking of political elites, these characteristics must have some foundation in the broader 'popular' culture from which they arise. But this does not mean that popular or domestic political cultural factors should be understood as a straitjacket that imprisons political leaders. Instead, they should be seen as forming the 'language' of security negotiations in which all new proposals must be expressed. While domestic cultural factors thus set the broad parameters of what can and cannot be accomplished, the language can also be used more or less 'fluently' by different political elites or leaders.

The first cluster of issues, which implicate the individuals place and standing in society, included issues of face and honor, questions of prestige and status, and specific roles.

A second manifestation in decision-making is the recourse of weaker parties to formal/ legalistic formulae that appear to outsiders as designed to obstruct progress. In fact, such orientations are often effective weapons of the weak, since rhetoric and formalism can also

serve to obscure a relatively weak or low status in an international negotiation. No agreement is better than on in which weakness has been openly conceded. Chinese negotiators, for example, tend to begin discussions and negotiations with an attempt to secure agreement on a statement of broad and high-sounding principles rather than on practical or small concrete measures. These principles create a form of 'protection' for the negotiator, since the subsequent degree of rigidity or flexibility on specific issues is determined by the degree of factionalism or consensus that lies behind the broad principles.[5] Such an approach can, however generate difficulties when confronted with a more 'problem slowing' or pragmatic orientation to negotiation, in which the overarching principles are seen as one of the products of the negotiation, rather than as a pre-negotiated item.

The third cluster of issues can be located in socio-cultural attitudes towards territorial, cultural and political identity, including specific issues related to the societal role of violence, conflict, and conflict resolution mechanisms. The ideas of tolerance, pluralism and syncretism define Indian society and are based on its self-definition as a secular democratic state.[6]

Finally, the cases studied highlighted the concrete institutional expressions of these various cultural elements. In China, for example

---

[5]   Stella Ting-Zoomey and Mark Cole, 'Intergroup Diplomatic Communication: A Face Negotiation Perspective', in Felipe Korzenny and Stella zing Zoomey (eds.), Communicating for peace: Diplomacy and Negotiation (London: Sage, 1990), pp.77-95.

[6]   Latham, p.113.

the closed, secretive and highly concentrated policy making system reflects not only the practices of the Chinese Communist Party, but a 'cultural tradition of power bestowed to an idealized, benevolent and authoritarian leadership, with little open debate or broad channels of participation in the policy-making process.[7] In this case, it makes the evolution of security negotiation practice particularly dependent on changes in the world view held by a small core leadership.

Ultimately, any attempt to frame general conclusions runs into the basic point about security culture and cultural influences in general: all achievements in security negotiations are contextual, and all negotiating proposals/positions must be tailored to local circumstances and requirements. When well framed, such proposals/positions will not rest upon crude assessments of what are and are not the 'real interests' or 'bottom lines' of particular states and parties (India and China here), but will attempt to see how these are arrived at and how interests and 'bottom lines' are embedded in a broader socio-cultural context that can be used to facilitate progress in security negotiations. In other words, any negotiating strategy must assume that negotiators to some extent stand outside a specific cultural context, and attempt to determine when elements of a security culture pose greater or lesser barriers to cooperation, or when particular 'openings' can be found to advance security negotiations.

---

[7] Yuan, p. 231.

It remains, however difficult to disentangle and trace the broad and subtle impact of 'security cultures' or to uncover their influence in particular security isues such as the NACD. There is still some distance from a coherent framework for understanding security cultures that would link positions concerning NACD negotiations with particular diplomatic, historical, strategic or political cultural orientations. But in the end, these case studies of India and China illustrate that culture matters in the formulation of national interests towards non proliferation arms control and disarmament policies and in the negotiating stances decision-makers take towards participation in security negotiations.

Thus, an attempt has been made to treat cultural factors in India and China not as one more variable in a causal process, but to examine the way in which their widely shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes and symbols form an inescapable backdrop of framework of meaning for political actors, policy-makers and negotiators. Elements of this framework manifest themselves all the way from micro-level (in negotiating behavior, perceptions of the 'other') to macro-level (socio-cultural attitudes towards violence, vision of one's place in the world) processes. Although the influence of these cultural elements may often seem elusive or intangible, there is little doubt that they can and will exercise a powerful influence on security negotiations.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.

Conference of the Committee on Disarmament Documents

Foreign Affairs Record, Government of India.

Official Records of the Conference on Disarmament.

Official Records of the Disarmament Commission.

Official Records of the United Nations General Assembly.

United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament (Washington, D.C.: ACDA Publication)

White Paper on Arms Control (Information Office of the Peoples Republic of China), November 1995.

SECONDARY SOURCES

BOOKS

Abraham, I, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb (London : Zed Books, 1998).

Agrawal, Mahendra and Radhakrishna (eds.), Arms and Survival (New Delhi : Vatvaha, 1982).

Alam, Mohammed B, 'Evolution of India's Nuclear Policy', Journal of Political Studies (September 1988).

Anand, R.P, Cultural Factors in International Relations (New Delhi : Abninav Publications, 1981).

Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements : Texts and Histories of the Negotiations (D.C. : United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1990).

Arnett, Eric (ed.), After the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Oxford : Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1995).

ARTICLES

Avkian, Bob, Mao Tsetung's Immortal Contributions (Chicago : RCP Publications, 1979).

Ayoob, Mohammed, 'India in South Asia : The Quest for Regional Predominance', World Policy Journal, (Winter 1989-90).

Bajpai, Kanti, 'War Peace and International order : India's View of World Politics', paper published by Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies (1999).

Balachandran, G, 'CTBT and India', Strategic Analysis 19(3), (June 1996).

Ball, Desmond, 'Strategic Culture in the Asia Pacific Region', Security Studies, vol. 3, No.1 (1993).

Bhargava, G.S., 'India's Nuclear Policy', India Quarterly, 34(2), (April-June 1978).

Binnendijk, Hans. (ed.), National Negotiating Styles (Washington DC : Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, 1987).

Boryczka, Jocelyn et. al., 'Culture and Strategic Factors in South Asian Nuclear Arms Control', Paper Presented at the 37th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, California, (April 1996).

Breslin, William J and Rubin, Jeffrey, Negotiation : Theory and Practice (Cambridge, Mass : Harvard Law School Programme on Negotiation, 1991).

Bruckman, Daniel, Benton A.A, Ali F. and Bagur JS, 'Cultural Differences in Bargaining Behavior : India, Argentina and the US' Journal of Conflict Resolution, 20 (1976).

Carter A, Nuclear Policy and National Security (New Delhi : Mittal Publications, 1993).

Chan, Steve, 'Chinese Conflict Calculus and Behavior : Assessment from a Perspective of Conflict Management', World Politics, vol.30, no.3, (April 1978).

Chang. Jawling, 'Negotiating of the 17 August 1982, US-PRC Arms Communique : Beijing's Negotiating Tactics', The China Quarterly, No.125 (March 1991).

Chari P.R., India's Nuclear Policy : : New Directions', Foreign News and Features, (October 15, 1977).

Chari, P.R. et. al. (eds.) Nuclear Non-Proliferation in India and Pakistan : South Asian Perspectives (New Delhi : Manohar, 1996).

Cheema, Z.I., 'Nuclear Diplomacy in South Asia during the 1980s', Regional Studies 10(3), (Summer 1992).

Chellaney, B., 'South Asia's passage to Nuclear Power', International Security, (Summer 1991).

Chopra, A.K. Indias Policy on Disarmament (New Delhi : ABC Publishing House, 1984).

Cohen, Raymond, Negotiating Across Cultures : Communication Obstacles in International Diplomacy (Washington : US Institute of Peace, 1990).

Cohen, Stephen (ed.), Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia : The Perspectives for Arms Control (Westviews Press Inc, 1991).

Cohen, Stephen and Bajpai, Kanti (eds.), South Asia after the Cold War : International Perspectives (Boulder : Westview Press, 1993).

Colin, Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, Md : Hamilton Press, 1986).

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty : A Progress Report on the Negotiation, Strategic Digest, (April 1996).

Crossette, Barbara, India : Facing the Twenty First Century (Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1993).

Deshingkar, Giri, 'Strategic Thinking of Kautilya and Sun Zi, China Report 32 (1), (January- March 1996).

Dixit, J.N, Across Borders : Fifty years of Indian Foregin Policy (New Delhi : Picus Books, 1998).

Dixit, J.N., 'Changing International Environment and Indian Security', Strategic Analysis, vol. 17, No.8 (November 1994).

Duiffield, John, Farrell Theo, Price Richard and Desch Michael, 'Isms and Schisms : Culturalism us Realism in Security Studies', International Security, vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998).

Dutta, S., 'India and the Bomb', Adelphi Paper 30 (London : IISS, 1966).

Elgstrom, Ole, 'National Culture and International Negotiations', Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 29, No.3 (1994).

Fairbank, John K, (ed.), The Chinese World Order : Traditional China's Foreign Relations (Cambridge, Mass : Harward University Press, 1968).

Fisher, Glenn, International Negotiation : A Cross Cultural Perspective (Chicago : Intercultural Press, 1980).

Frieman, Wendy, 'New members of the Club : Chinese Participation in Arms Control Regimes 1980-1995', The Non-Proliferation Review, vol.3, No. 3 (Spring-Summer 1996).

Gaenslem, Fritz, 'Culture and Decision-Making in China, Japan, Russia and the US', World Politics, vol.39, No.1 (October 1986).

Gallagher, Nancy W.(ed.), Arms Control : New Approaches to Theory and Policy (London: Portland, 1998).

Garrett, Banning and Glaser, Bonnie, 'Chinese perspective on Nuclear Arms Control', International Security, vo. 20, No.3 (Winter 1995-96).

Ghose, Arundhati, 'Negotiating the CTBT : India's Security Concerns and Nuclear Disarmament', Journal of International Affairs, vol.51, No.1 (Summer 1997).

Ghose, S., 'Dynamics of Nuclear Arms Control', India Quarterly, 52 (4), (October-December 1996).

Golwalker, M.S, We or Our Nationhood Defined (Nagpur : P.N. Indurkar / Bharat Publications, 1939).

Golwalker, M.S., Bunch of Thoughts (Bangalore : Vikrama prakashan, 1966).

Gupta, Sisir, Kashmir : A Study in India – Pakistan Relations (New Delhi : Asia Publisher, 1966).

Harding, Harry (ed.), China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s (New Haven and London : Yale University Press, 1984).

Hsu, Cho-yun, 'Applying Confusion Ethics to International Relations', Ethics and International Relations No.5 (1991).

Huntington, Samuel, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New Delhi : Penguin Books, 1997).

Iriye, Akira, 'Culture and Power : International Relations as Intercultural Relations', Diplomatic History, vol.3, No.2 (Spring 1979).

Jacobsen Carl G. (ed.), Strategic Power : USA/USSR (London : Macmillan, 1990).

Jayaramu, P.S., 'India and the Nuclear Question : A case of Fresh Thinking', Journal of Strategic Studies, (September 1990).

Jisi, Wiang, 'Comparing Chinese and American Conception of Security' Working paper No.17, Toronto : North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue.

Joeck, N., 'Tacit Bargaining and Stable Proliferation in South Asia', Journal of Strategic Studies, (September 1990).

Johnson, Rebecca, 'Endgame Issues in Geneva', Arms Control Today (April 1996).

Johnston, Alastair John, Cultural Realism : Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1995).

Johnston, Alastair, 'China and Arms Control : Emerging Issues and Interests in the 1980s'; Aurora Papers 3 (Ottawa ; The Canadian Center for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1986).

Johnston, Alastair, 'China's New, "Old Thinking" : The Concept of Limited Deterrence', International Security, vol.20, No.3, (Winter 1995-96).

Johnston, Alastair, 'Thinking about Strategic Culture', International Security, vol 19, No.4, (Spring 1996).

Johnston, Alastair, "Learning versus Adaptation : Explaining change in Chinese Arms Control Policy in the 1980s and 1990s', The China Journal, No. 35. (January 1996).

Johnston, Alastair, "Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization : Limited Deterrence versus Multilateral Arms Control', China Quarterly, No. 146 (June 1996).

Kaplojitz, Noel, 'National Self-Images, Perception of Enemies, and Conflict Strategies : Psychopolitical Dimensions of International Relations', Political psychology, vol.2, no.1 (1990).

Kapur, A, India's Nuclear Option : Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Making (New York : Praeger, 1976).

Kapur, K.D. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Diplomacy : Nuclear Power Programmes in the Third World (New Delhi : Lancers Books, 1993).

Katzenstein, Peter J. (ed.), The Culture of National Security : Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York : Columbia University Press, 1996).

Kautilya, Arthashastra translation by Dr. R. Shamasastry (Mysore : Mysore Printing and Publishing House, 1967).

Kazuo, Ogura, 'How the "Inscrutables" Negotiate with the "Inscrutables" : Chinese Negotiating Tactics vis-à-vis the Japanese', The China Quarterly, o. 79 (September 1979).

Kim, Samuel S., 'China's Pacific Policy : Reconciling the Irreconciliable', In ernational Journal, vol.50, No.3 (Summer 1995).

Kim, Samuel, 'Whither Post-Mao Chinese Global Policy?' International Organ tion, vol. 35, No.3 (Summer 1981).

Kim, muel, China and the World : Chinese Foreign Relations in Post-Col r Era (Boulder, Westview Press, 1994).

Korzenny, Felipe and Zoomey, Stella Zing (eds.), Communicating for Peace : Diplomacy and Negotiation (London : Sage, 1990).

Krause, Keith R. (ed.), Culture and Security : Multilateralism, Arms Control and Security Building (London : Frank Cass Publishers, 1999).

Krishna, R., 'India and the Bomb', India Quarterly, 21(2), (April-June1965).

Langdon, Frank C, and Ross, Douglas A. (eds.), Superpower Maritime Strategy in the Pacific (London and NY : Routledge, 1990).

Larsen, Jeffrey A, and Rattray, Gregory J. (eds.), Arms Control Toward the 21st Century (Boulder; CELO, 1996).

Lewis, J.W. and Litai, X., China Builds the Bomb (Stanford University Press, 1988).

Lin, Chong.pin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy (Lexington, Mass : Lexington Books, 1988).

Malik, J. Mohan, 'China's Policy Nuclear Arms Control in the Post-Cold War Era, 'Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 16, No.2 (August 1995).

Mansingh, Lalit et.al. (eds.), Indian Foreign Policy : Agenda for the 21st Century (New Delhi : Foreign Service Institute, 1997).

Mansingh, Surjit, 'An Overview of India-China Relations : From when to where, Indian Defence Review, (1992).

Mattoo, A. (ed.), India's Nuclear Deterrent : Pokhran II and Beyond (New Delhi : Har Anand, 1999).

Mattoo, A., 'India's Nuclear Status Quo', Survival, 38 (3), (Autumn 1996).

Mautner-Markhof, Frances (ed.), Processes of International Negotiations (Boulder : Westview, 1989).

Mazaar, Michael, 'Culture and International Relations : A Review Essay', Washington Quarterly, vol. 19, No.2, (1996).

Mirchandani, G.G, India's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi : Popular Book Services, 1968).

Moshaver, Z, Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in the Indian Subcontinent (Houndsmills : Macmillan, 1991).

Narayan, M.K, 'National Security : The Internal Dimension' RGICS papers No.16, Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies, Rajiv Gandhi Foundation, New Delhi, (1994).

Nehru, J, The Discovery of India (New Delhi : Oxford University Press, 1991).

Nicolson, Harold, Diplomacy, 3rd edition (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1969).

Norris, Robert S, et. al, British, French and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder : Westview Press, 1994).

Olivier Faure Guy and Rubin, Jeffrey Z. (eds.), Culture and Negotiation : The Resolution of Water Disputes (Newbury Park, California : Sage Publications, 1993).

Pande, S, India and the Nuclear Test Ban (New Delhi : IDSA, 1996).

Pande, S., 'Approach to Nuclear Issues', Strategic Analysis, 16(8) (November 1993).

Pande, S., 'CTBT and India', Strategic Analysis, 19 (2), (May 1996).

Pannikar, K.N. (ed.), Communalism in India : History, Politics and Culture (New Delhi : Manohar, 1991).

Paranjpe, S., 'American Policy towards problems of Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia : An Indian perspective', Asian Affairs, (Winter 1989-90).

Perkovich, G, India's Nuclear Bomb : The Impact on Global Proliferation (New Delhi : Oxford University Press, 1999).

Poulose T.T, The Future of Nuclear Arms Control (New Delhi : ABC Publishers, 1987).

Poulose, T.T, CTBT and Nuclear Nationalism in India (New Delhi : ABC Publishers, 1996).

Rana, A.P, The Imperatives of Non-Alignment (Delhi : Macmillan, 1976).

Rao, Venkateswar P., 'Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka : India's Role and Perception', Asian Survey (April 1998).

Robinson, Thomas W. and Shambaugh, David (eds.), Chinese Foreign Policy : Theory and Practice (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1994).

Rubinoff, Arthur, 'The Multilateral Imperative in India's Foreign Policy', The Round Table, 1991.

Rubinstein, Robert A, 'Cultural Aspects of Peacekeeping : Notes on the substance of Symbols', Millenium, vol.22, No.3 (Winter 1993).

Sagan, Scott D., 'Why do states Build Nuclear Weapons? Three models in Search of a Bomb', International Security, vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996-97).

Sawyer, Ralph (translation) Sun Tze : Art of War (Boulder, Co : Westview Press, 1994).

Sawyer, Ralph, The seven Military Classics of Ancient China (Boulder Co : Westview Press, 1993).

Schram, Stuart, Mao Tse-Jung (Baltimore, Md : Penguin Books, 1972).

Segal, Gerald (ed.), Arms Control in Asia (London : Macmillan, 1987).

Sengupta, Bhabani, 'India in the Twenty First Century', International Affairs, vol.73, No. 2, (1997).

Shah, P., 'Nuclear Non-Proliferation Implications and the NPT Review : An Indian Perspective', Strategic Analysis, 16(2) (May 1993).

Shenker, Oded and Ronen, Simcha, 'The Cultural Context of Negotiations : The Implications of Chinese Interpersonal Norms', The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 23, (1987).

Shih, Chih-yu, China's Just World : The Morality of Chinese Foreign Policy (Boulder and London : Lynee Reinner, 1993).

Singh, J, (ed.), Nuclear India (New Delhi : Knowledge World, 1998).

Singh, Jasjit, 'India and the CTBT', Strategic Analysis, 19(6), (September 1996).

Singh, Jasjit, 'India's Nuclear Policy : A Perspective', Strategic Analysis, 12(8), (November 1989).

Singh, Jaswant, 'Against Nuclear Apartheid', Foreign Affairs, (September-october 1998).

Singh, S, (ed.), India and the Nuclear Bomb (New Delhi : S. Chand Co, 1971).

Solomon, Richard, Chinese Political Negotiating Behavior : A Briefing Analysis (Santa Monica, California : The Rand Corporation, 1985).

Stahl, Shelley A and Geoffrey, Kemp (eds.), Arms Control and Weapons Proliferation in Middle East and South Asia (New York : St. Martins Press, 1992).

Subrahmanyam K, (ed.), Nuclear Proliferation and International Security (New Delhi : IDSA, 1985).

Subrahmanyam, K, Our National Security (New Delhi EgS Research Federation House, 1972).

Subrahmanyam, K, Security in a Changing World (New Delhi : B.R. Publishing Corporation, 1990).

Subrahmanyam, K., 'Covert Operations Pose New Challenges for Indian Security', World Affairs, vol.1, No.4(October-December 1997).

Sundarji, K., 'The World Power Structure in Transition from a Quasi-Unipolar to a Quasi-Multipolar State and the Options of a Middle Power in this Milieu', U.S.I. National Seucity Lectures, United Service Institution of India, New Delhi (1993).

Tanhem, George, 'Indian Strategic Culture', Washington Quarterly, vol.15, No.1 (Winter 1992).

Tanhem, George, 'Indian Strategic Thought : An Interpretative Essay, Rand Corporation (1991).

Terner, D, and Lasswell, H.D, (eds.), The Policy Sciences (Stanford, California : Stanford University Press, 1951).

Thakur, Ramesh, The Politics and Economics of India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi : Oxford University Press, 1994).

Trimb, Phillip R, 'Arms Control and International Negotiation Theory', Stanford Journal on International Law 25(2), Spring 1989.

Venkateswaran, A.P, 'To end with a Whimper', Indian Defence Review, (January 1992).

Viswam, S, 'India and NPT', World Focus, 14(5) (May 1993).

Vohra, H.R., 'India's Nuclear Policy of Three Negatives', The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 26(4), (April 1970).

Vohra, N.N, 'Growing Concerns About Indias Internal Security', World Affairs, vol.1, No.3, (July-September 1997).

Wallerstein, Mitchel B., 'China and Proliferation : A Path Not Taken ?' Survival, vol.38, No.3 (Autumn 1996).

Whiting Allen S, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence : India and Indo-China (Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, 1975).

Wilhelm (Jr.), Alfred D, The Chinese at the Negotiating Table : Style and Characteristics (Washington, DC : National Defence University Press, 1994).

Yuan, Jing-dong, 'Conditional Multilateralism : Chinese views on Order and Regional Security', CANCAPs paper I (Toronto : The Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security, March 1996).

Yun, Wu, 'China's Policies towards Arms Control and Disarmament : From Passive Responding to Active Leading, The Pacific Review, vol.9, No.4 (1996).

Zartman, William I, and Berman, Maureen, The Practical Negotiator (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1982).

Zedong, Mao, 'Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War, December 1936, SMW.

Zhennan Xia, 'On the Relationship between War and Politics', Mao Zedong Sixiang yayia (Studies of Mao Zedong Thought) no. 3 (1987).