

**PAKISTAN AND THE AFGHAN CRISIS, 1988-1996**

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**CERTIFICATE**

Certified that the dissertation entitled **Pakistan and the Afghan Crisis, 1988-1996** submitted by **Ms. Nasreen Chowdhory**, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of this University, is her bonafide work. This dissertation has not been submitted in part or full for the award of any other degree of this or any other university.

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**To**

***Mother, who has borne me and my conflicts and brought me peace.***

***Father, who has tried to get engaged in whatever I have done.***

***Sister, my pillar of stability.***

***Jijo, whom I argue with and win.***

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## PREFACE

The present Afghanistan state is undergoing a crisis of immense proportions. The rapidly changing nature of power dynamics in Afghanistan precludes any definitive termination of the crisis. In Afghanistan's history external actors have been instrumental in influencing its internal power dynamics, which has been possible primarily because of its landlock existence and strategic location.

These powers, after involving themselves in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, imposed their solutions to the crisis on the Afghans. These solutions were, however, unacceptable to the Afghans. The Afghans resented the interference of both the regional and extra-regional actors, who attempted to act as peace brokers, and this often culminated in a conflict situation. Both the Peshawar and Islamabad Accords can be cited as examples where Pakistan's and Saudi Arabia's endeavours failed to bring peace to Afghanistan. The same can be said about the Geneva Accord, where the external actors had failed to replace the existing Kabul regime with a broad-based representative government. The Soviet withdrawal from the region triggered a civil war situation, whereby the intra-Afghan rivalry became more evident than ever. The Geneva Accord was brokered to end this internecine war among the various Mujahidin groups.

With the Soviet invasion there was a change in the power dynamics in the region. The Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union came to the fore in the region. In this conflict, the Afghans fought as proxies in the global rivalries of the super powers. It was later that these super powers, which were instrumental in the signing of an accord between the warring parties, negotiated the peace accords through indirect talks. Since the various accords failed to bring peace, many questions arise. Were the terms of the accords flawed? Were there any vested

interests that wanted the conflict to continue? Did not the accords reflect Afghan aspirations? These questions merit examination.

Pakistan has been accused of meddling in Afghanistan's affairs. The various accords and agreements were not in tune with the implicit policy objectives of the Pakistani state, though Pakistan always maintained that it was genuinely interested in resolving the Afghan crisis, and resolving the differences amongst the different parties, ever since the departure of the Soviets in the interest of the Afghan people. The various Mujahidin factions were not representative of the people. This led to the continuation of strife in Afghanistan.

An end to the continuing crisis situation in Afghanistan does not seem near. Hence, an understanding of the state itself is a necessity. The crisis that began as a struggle for power between the various groups of urban elite, which attempted to capture power in Kabul, transformed into a civil war situation. Since the intervention of the Soviets in Afghanistan to their consequent withdrawal, the civil war continued. It was accentuated by Pakistan's endeavour at attempting to drive them out. The kind of interference and the subsequent help extended to the Resistance groups in driving away the Soviets pushed the country into a conflict situation.

Upon the Soviet withdrawal, peace was not immediately restored. On the contrary, the goal of a broad-based representative government continued to remain a dream. The post-communist civil war precipitated another crisis in Afghanistan. The Taliban stormed Kabul and pledged to bring stability and peace to Islamic Afghanistan. The Taliban, alleged to be the brain child of Pakistan, has made tall promises. It is being met with stiff resistance from the Mujahiddin factions. Afghanistan has once again gained strategic importance, which it had lost in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal, whereby international and regional actors have pledged to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. This study makes a modest

endeavour to examine Pakistan and the Afghanistan crisis since 1988. An attempt has been made to give a historical background since the inception of the state of Afghanistan. Besides, the events that preceded the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the invasion, and the Geneva negotiations are discussed in detail in order to understand the Afghanistan crisis in a holistic perspective.

Chapter one, presents a historical perspective, tracing the internal developments in Afghanistan till the Soviet invasion in 1979.

Chapter two, deals with the protracted negotiations which led to the signing of the Geneva Accord and after. In this chapter, an analytical understanding has been attempted to explain why the invasion occurred and resistance meted out. The rationale behind the invasion has been explained. The chapter traces the developments from 'proximity' to 'Geneva talks' and its final signing.

Chapter three, makes an endeavour to study the impact of the Afghan civil war on Pakistan's society, politics and economy.

Chapter four, deals with the intra-Afghan rivalry soon after the Soviet withdrawal, till the Taliban's coming to power.

Chapter five, presents the conclusions which are based on the conclusion drawn from each chapter and the issues highlighted.



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*Nasreen Chowdhury*  
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## CHAPTER - 1

### AFGHANISTAN : A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The modern state of Afghanistan had its origin, seven centuries ago, well before Ahamad Shah Durrani founded the Afghan Empire in the eighteenth century. The term Afghanistan was applied to a territory much smaller in size than the present state, which comprised of territories east of the Durand Line extending as far as the Indus with the Sulaiman mountain at its centre. This territory was inhabited by the Pushtuns, referred to as Avagana and A-po-kien from which the term 'Afghan' seems to have been derived.<sup>1</sup> Though 'Afghan' originally denoted only a particular ethnic group, it now legally and constitutionally encompasses all ethnic groups living in Afghanistan.

The modern day Afghanistan is a product of external forces, where its boundaries were formed by the interaction of the British Empire on the Indian subcontinent and the Russian Empire in Central Asia.<sup>2</sup> The tough character of the Afghan people has emerged out of the land's ruggedness. Landlocked and placed in a challenging location, it is bound by Tajikistan and Turkmenistan in the north, Pakistan in the east and south, where they share of narrow strip of border with China in the north and Iran in the west. It was therefore dependent on its neighbours.

Afghanistan is inhabited by about 121 tribes and nationalities including 21 large ethnic groups. Pashto, Dari and Persian are three main languages spoken in Afghanistan.<sup>3</sup> Afghanistan lacks both ethnic and geographical cohesion (see map 1 for the ethnic diistribution in Afghanistan). Yet, national unity was forged by a

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<sup>1</sup> A.H. Habibi, "Afghan and Afghanistan", *Arianna* (Kabul), no. 3, 1348 (1969), pp. 1-5.)

<sup>2</sup> Henry S. Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union* (Durham, 1983), p. 9.

<sup>3</sup> K. Bahadur, et al., eds, *Inside Afghanistan* (New Delhi, 1986), p.9.

combination of Pashtun and Tajik political and cultural dominance. But, with Communists capturing power in 1978 emphasis was given to the ethnic differences in a manner that weakened this unity.

## **POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT**

Afghanistan wedged between Russia and the British Empire had always been the focus of a great strategic game played by these countries. The British invaded Afghanistan twice, out of fear that Russia would establish its influence. Both the times they were rebuffed and had to retreat in the face of fierce Afghan hostility. The first time was in 1839 when Dost Mohammed appealed to Russians for help in recapturing Peshawar from Sikh control. Resistance to British occupation of Kabul forced a retreat beginning on January 6, 1842. In 1878 British invaded Afghanistan. This time their tutelage of Afghanistan lasted for forty years.

Amir Habibullah Khan was able to keep the frontier quiet for the duration of World War I. The Amir disliked Afghanistan's subservience to Britain in matters of foreign relations. He firmly believed in the common destiny of trans-border Pashtuns and the people of Afghanistan. However, it was the imperative for survival that necessitated the maintenance of a balance and made neutrality the natural choice. The British led the Amir to believe that if he maintained his neutrality and upheld the alliance, they, in turn, would recognize Afghanistan's full independence at the end of the War. With the defeat of the Central Powers in 1918 the Afghan people resented their Amir. They believed that by supporting the British and maintaining a neutral stance, he had betrayed Turkey by not defending Islam against the infidels.

The first task undertaken by Amanullah, son of the late Habibullah, was proclaiming Afghanistan's independence and requesting Britain to negotiate a new treaty of friendship on the basis of equality. When the British responded inadequately the Amir sent Mohammad Wali Khan to Moscow, where he was received rather warmly by Lenin on October 18, 1919. The third Anglo-Afghan War, also known as the War of Independence, ended in the beginning of June 1919. A *de facto* armistice between the regular forces of the two antagonists came into effect. By the end of May, the independence of Afghanistan was officially recognized by Soviet Russia.<sup>4</sup>

The Treaty of Peace between the British government and the independent Afghan government was concluded at Rawalpindi on August 8, 1919. In a letter, A.H. Grant, of the Foreign Secretariat of the Government of India, assured Ali Ahmad that 'the said treaty and that letter left Afghanistan officially free and independent in its internal and external affairs. Moreover, this war had cancelled all previous treaties'.<sup>5</sup> However, article v of the new treaty stated, 'the Afghan government accepts the Indo-Afghan frontier accepted by the late Amir'. Thus, in spite of their efforts, the Afghans did not succeed in canceling the one treaty that they wanted to abrogate, the Durand Agreement.

The relations between Britain and Afghanistan deteriorated on account of the harsh treatment meted out to trans-Durand-Pashtuns; the Amir could not remain a mute spectator. Moral and material assistance was extended to them, especially to those who had fled British repression and sought refuge in Afghanistan.

A treaty was signed in 1921 between Afghanistan and Britain to regulate

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<sup>4</sup> Abdul Samad Ghaus, The Fall of Afghanistan (Washington, 1988), p. 33.

<sup>5</sup> Ludwig W. Adamec, Afghanistan, 1900-1923 (Berkeley, 1967), p. 142.

relations until the day Britain relinquished control of the subcontinent. A trade convention was signed in 1923. In spite of such endeavours, relations between Afghanistan and Britain did not improve.

Gradually, Afghan reliance on the Soviets increased with British-Afghan relations taking a nose dive. They began helping the Amir to build an embryonic Afghan air force, which the British referred to as the 'Russofication of the Afghan Air Force'.<sup>6</sup>

On October 17, 1930, a Jirga of tribal lashkars proclaimed Mohammad Nadir Khan king of Afghanistan and a Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly), reconfirmed his accession to the throne in September 1930. He adopted necessary means and mechanisms to consolidate the monarchy and also to reconstruct the country. Nadir Shah, well versed with British imperial methods, believed in the necessity of a degree of disengagement from the Soviet Union and adopted a friendlier stance towards Britain. He succeeded in establishing close relations with Iran and Turkey. In 1932, Afghanistan signed treaties of friendship with Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Nadir Shah was motivated to balance the influence of the Soviet Union and Britain in Afghanistan.

A commerce treaty, signed in 1936 between Afghanistan and the USSR, ensured transit rights for Afghanistan across Soviet territory. In 1936 the Soviet-Afghan Pact was extended till March 1946<sup>7</sup>. In 1938 the two countries agreed, by mutual consent, to close their respective consulates, as a result of Afghanistan's fear that the Soviet consulates in northern Afghanistan could be used for subversive purposes.

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<sup>6</sup> Ludwig W. Adamec, Afghanistan's Foreign Affairs to the Mid-Twentieth Century, (Arizona, 1974), p. 108.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 375-76.

Afghanistan's neutral policy came under duress as it witnessed the gradual coaxing by the great powers, that is Britain, Germany, Italy and Russia in order to earn Afghan allegiance during the Second World War. Afghanistan established diplomatic relations with the United States directly, on June 6, 1942. The Americans opened a consulate in Kabul and the first resident American minister, Cornelius Van H. Engert, came with secret orders to prepare the ground for an alternative land-based transit route to Russia and China, should German and Japanese offensives interrupt these through Iraq and Burma.<sup>8</sup>

## **AFGHANISTAN IN POST-WAR ERA**

World War II concluded with the United States emerging as the most powerful economic and military power. The British, shortly after the War, decided to withdraw from the Indian subcontinent. This sudden termination of the Raj resulted in the establishment of two independent countries, the Union of India and the Islamic State of Pakistan.

The post-War period gradually decapitated into cold war situation dividing the Allies into two antagonistic camps, one led by the United States and the other by the Soviet Union. The USSR, shaken by the War, nonetheless, emerged from the war as a super power with half of Europe, including half of Germany, under its direct control, while its imperial rival, Britain, was absent from the Asian scene.

On February 20, 1947, Attlee announced the intention of the British government to transfer power. Thus, on 3 June 1947, Mountbatten announced with the consent of the Congress Party and Muslim League that the subcontinent would

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<sup>8</sup> Leon B. Poullada, "Afghanistan and the United States: The Crucial Years." The Middle East Journal, vol. 11 no. 2, spring 1981, p. 181.

be partitioned into India and Pakistan. The British Prime Minister, in his statement in the House of Commons, stated 'a provision that a plebiscite in British India (but not the princely states) should give the population the choice of joining either India or Pakistan.'<sup>9</sup> The princely or native states had three alternatives: (1) join India (2) join Pakistan or (3) remain independent for a specified period until a decision could be made to join India or Pakistan.<sup>10</sup>

The NWFP, situated west of Indus River and a part of the Frontier, composed mostly of lands formerly belonging to Afghanistan, was inhabited by the Pashtuns. The Afghan government protested to the proposed plebiscite, asking that two additional choices be offered to the NWFP - union with Afghanistan or the establishment of a separate Pashtun nation. This essentially meant that the future status of British-administered North West Frontier Province (NWFP) would be determined by a plebiscite enabling it to join one of the new states.

The plebiscite was held in the NWFP without the Pashtuns being offered the additional choice for independence. Khan Abdul Ghafar Khan, along with other leaders, boycotted the plebiscite. India and Pakistan became independent in August 1947 and NWFP became an integral part of Pakistan, on the basis of the plebiscite.

A series of Jirgas were held with the tribal leaders of the Tribal Agencies in 1947, where the leaders opted for attachment of Tribal Agencies to Pakistan. They expressed the wish that the tribes should 'preserve the same relations with Pakistan as they had with the British'<sup>11</sup>: The tribes were autonomous in their relations with Britain, so the tribal elders strongly favoured the continuation of this autonomy.

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<sup>9</sup> Arnold Fletcher, *Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest* (New York, 1966), p.249.

<sup>10</sup> Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton, N.J., 1973), p. 489.

<sup>11</sup> George Cunningham, "The North West Frontier and the Tribes," *Sunday Statesman* (New Delhi), 29 May 1949.

The Pashtun leadership objected to the outcome of the tribal Jirgas on the ground that they were organised by British colonial officers. Afghanistan declared the NWFP plebiscite and the tribal Jirgas null and void. Afghanistan proclaimed its non-recognition of NWFP and the Tribal Agencies as a part of Pakistan. The declaration was justified on the ground that they were Afghan kith and kin, united by ethnic, historical and cultural ties. Therefore, any attempt at separating them would be firmly resisted.

Pakistan-Afghanistan relations have had a history of discord and antagonism. When Pakistan came into existence, its application for membership in the UNO, in September 1947, was vehemently opposed by Afghanistan. Although it withdrew its negative vote on October 20, 1947, the episode had an impact on the consequent history of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations.

In June 1948, the government of Pakistan arrested Abdul Ghafar Khan and his brother Dr. Khan Sahib and a score of other Pashtun leaders. Subsequently, they were accused of encouraging subversive activities on the Frontier and were sentenced to prison. Furthermore, Pakistan increased its military vigilance in Tribal Agencies.

## **THE PASHTUN ISSUE**

The Pashtunistan issue, in essence, is a demand based on the right of self determination of the Pashtuns living east and south of the Durand Line for the constitution of an independent nation. In August 1949 a meeting of Afridi and other tribes took place at Tirah Bagh, where the assembly of tribes proclaimed the establishment of Pashtunistan.



Pashtunistan was constituted and a flag was adopted for the new nation. The government of Afghanistan pledged its full support to Pashtunistan, as proclaimed by the tribal Jirga, and decreed that each year August 31st would be celebrated as Pashtunistan Day in Afghanistan.

The protagonists of 'Greater Afghanistan' added new demands, whereby claims were made to merge Pashtunistan with Afghanistan. They also called for incorporation of Baluchistan, which would give to landlocked Afghanistan an outlet to the Indian Ocean. About 90,000 Baluchis lived in southern Afghanistan forming part of the Afghan nation.

The annexation by Pakistan of Kalat and the rest of Baluchistan was as arbitrary as that of the annexation of NWFP and the tribal areas. Due to close Afghan-Baluchi ties, Afghan sentiments were aroused by the injustice done to the Baluchis and these sentiments found expression in the official pronouncement of the Afghan government much to the dislike of Pakistan.

The government of Pakistan dismissed Pashtunistan as a figment of imagination of the Afghan rulers who were determined on detaching territory from Pakistan. To exert pressure on Afghanistan, as a counter-move, in addition to hampering Afghan transit trade, Pakistan incited the tribes against the Afghan government.

As tension increased between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the former attempted to mobilize international support on certain issues. It was part of Afghan general policy to seek rapprochement with Russia. It intended to consolidate USSR - Afghanistan relations, which would ward off dangers from the north. Additionally, it would also bring benefits like transit facilities, increased trade, and aid. On the other hand, it could only hope for better relations with America, as it had great

faith in American idealism and wealth.<sup>12</sup> The Soviet Union and Afghanistan concluded two agreements to commemorate their friendship, a river boundary agreement in 1946 and a barter and transit treaty in 1950. The river boundary agreement, where both sides accepted the thalweg (middle of the main Channel) of the Oxus (Amu Daria) as the river boundary between the two countries. The significant aspect of the barter and transit agreement was that it 'provided for duty-free transit of Afghan goods over Soviet territory'.<sup>13</sup> In 1957, a frontier regime treaty, regulating all matters pertaining to the boundaries between the two nations, was signed between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.

Therefore, despite its close relation with USSR, Afghanistan continued its endeavor to maintain better relations with the United States. It wished to involve America in Afghanistan's economic development programme, and also to obtain its support for safeguarding Afghanistan's political independence. In 1946, the Afghans requested the Americans for economic assistance to repair old irrigation dams, build new canals and make other improvements in the Hilmand River Valley in southern Afghanistan. The Afghan's request for financial assistance to launch an integrated long-range development plan on Hilmand project, where the initial request was for \$118 million, was turned down. This was due to the fact that the Americans found it to be 'too vague in economic concepts'.<sup>14</sup>

However, but in November 1949, \$21 million was loaned to Afghanistan through the US Export-Import Bank, to be spent specifically on the Hilmand project.

Under Truman's 'Point Four Program' Afghanistan began receiving modest

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<sup>12</sup> Ghaus, n. 4, p. 134.

<sup>13</sup> Anthony Arnold, The Russian Invasion in Perspective (Stanford, Calif, 1981), p. 30.

<sup>14</sup> Ghaus, n. 4, p. 78.

U.S. assistance from U.S. International Cooperation Administration in fields like education and agriculture.

Afghan efforts to receive military aid from America were related to the political stance that the latter had taken on the Pashtunistan issue. Afghanistan was willing to have America as a mediator between the two parties viz. Afghanistan and Pakistan. America on different occasions had offered to mediate. It had also suggested the offices of Egypt and Turkey for the same purpose. Afghanistan, quite impressed with the American ability to get Pakistan on to the negotiating table, was most willing to have American intervention, but Pakistan rejected it on the basis that the issue was an internal matter for Pakistan and it did not require any external intervention. Afghanistan's conciliatory attitude, however, did not cut much ice with America as it showed in America's response to Afghan request for military aid.

Afghanistan continued its attempts to acquire military assistance from the United States. In August 1951, it made a formal request for armaments to the U.S. and enclosed a list of arms that it wished to receive. The United States replied in November that 'the arms requested will cost \$25 million dollars. The amount would be paid in cash. Transit through Pakistan would have to be arranged with no help from the United States. The sale would have to be made public and it would help if the Pashtunistan claim was dropped.'<sup>15</sup> The Prime Minister of Afghanistan termed this as a 'political refusal', as the terms and conditions were not only not acceptable but they betrayed American political sensibility vis-a-vis Afghan relations with Pakistan.

Early in September 1953, Shah Mohammad resigned, and on September 20 it was announced that King Zahir Shah had placed General Mohammad Daoud at helm

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<sup>15</sup> Poullada, n. 9, pp. 186-87.

of affairs, the Afghan government was determined to have a substantial acceleration in Afghanistan's economic development. For this more financial and technical assistance had to be procured from foreign sources.

The previous government was unable to break Afghanistan's political isolation, which had restricted the provision of foreign aid, prevented Afghanistan from attracting support for the Pashtunistan issue and impeded the vital modernization of the army.

In view of the west's negative attitude towards Afghanistan's problem, Mohammad Daoud's regime decided to concentrate on developing closer bonds with the USSR. However, before embarking on a major shift in its policy, Afghanistan decided for the last time to enlist U.S. financial aid for its development programmes. In 1953, Nixon then Vice President of US, who was on a tour of several Asian countries, arrived in Kabul in December 1953 for a two-day visit and held a series of meetings with Afghan leaders. His promise for US economic aid was conditional to the Afghans giving up the Pashtunistan issue, which, in his opinion, had no justification and created useless friction with Pakistan.<sup>16</sup> Disappointed by the American attitude, Afghanistan did not raise the issue of military assistance. But another effort was made by Afghanistan to join, the US umbrella scheme of financial aid in October 1954, which also failed.

Gradually it seemed obvious that Pakistan, an ally of US, was being equipped militarily. Pakistan's privileged position facilitated its obstruction of any US military assistance to Afghanistan the regional arrangement viz. the Baghdad Pact (later remained, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) after the withdrawal

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

of Iraq and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)<sup>17</sup>.

Not only might such help have irritated Pakistan, but probably a genuine fear existed in Washington that the arms delivered to Afghanistan would be used in overt or covert operations against its ally Pakistan.

This made Afghanistan look decisively towards Russia for financial help. In January 1954, the first Russian loan of \$3.5 million was extended to Afghanistan to assist in the construction of two grain silos and flour mills, one in Kabul and the other in Pul-i-Khumri.<sup>18</sup> The initial loan was soon followed by \$2.1 million which the Russians lent in August 1954 to finance the building up of an asphalt factory and the paving of Kabul's Streets, a project that had been rejected earlier by the U.S. Import-Export Bank. With the increase in economic cooperation between Afghanistan and the USSR, Russo-Afghan relations grew closer. The Soviet Union very subtly expressed sympathetic appraisal of Afghanistan's stand on Pashtunistan. In this manner the way was being paved to fill the vacuum created by Western disinterest in Afghanistan's future.

## **ONE-UNIT SYSTEM**

Early in March 1955, Pakistan emboldened by its membership in the SEATO (it joined the Baghdad Pact a year later) and American political and military support, announced the fusion of all West Pakistan's three provinces and the Baluchistan state union into a 'one unit' system. Although the Tribal Agencies were not made part of the unit, the grouping together of NWFP in a simple political-administrative and legislative unit with the more populous, more advanced and prosperous Punjab

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<sup>17</sup> Pakistan had entered SEATO in September 1954, and, the following year, it joined CENTO.

<sup>18</sup> Arnold, n. 13, p.34.

was viewed by the Pashtuns and the Afghans as a major step towards undermining Pashtun identity. They feared that Pashtun culture, language and their national characteristics would erode, the waning of Pashtun pro-independence stance.

While the Pakistanis may have had various motives for the consolidation of west Pakistan into one unit, the Afghans felt that the destruction of Pashtun identity was their primary goal. The government of Afghanistan submitted an official protest to the government of Pakistan, citing the action as further evidence of Pakistan's determination to suppress the rights and aspirations of the Pashtun people. Pakistan replied that the measure was an internal matter and therefore should be of no concern to Afghanistan.

The formation of 'one unit' caused the eruption of a new wave of violence on the frontier. In March 1955, a mob attacked and damaged the Pakistan embassy in Kabul and burned Pakistan's flag. In a retaliatory move, to the so-called 'flag incident', Afghan consulates in Peshawar and Quetta were attacked and Afghan flags too were burned. In the wake of the flag incident Pakistan once again 'imposed blockade on Afghan transit which did grievous harm to the Afghan economy'.<sup>19</sup>

The flag incident was settled through the good offices of Egypt, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia and the Pakistanis lifted the economic blockade; but Afghan-Pakistan relations continued to remain tense.

A Loya Jirga was convened in November 1955 to ponder over the constitution of 'one unit' in Pakistan and its consequence for the Pashtun people, who unanimously endeared the Afghan government's stand on the issue of Pashtunistan. The Loya Jirga demand that the inhabitants of the territory be accorded the right of self-determination. It also approved the Pashtunistan policy and

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

authorized the strengthening of Afghan armed forces through the procurement of military equipment and training.

Soviet military assistance played a crucial role in modernizing the Afghan army. However, it which was not publicly proclaimed till the middle of 1956. A long-term low-interest loan was extended to Afghanistan for the purchase of Russian armaments, infantry assault rifles, machine guns, tanks and aircraft. Periodic exchanges of military missions took place to evaluate the continuous requirements of modernizing and structuring the Afghan army.

Therefore, in the issue of three vital areas, of economic and military assistance and the issue of Pashtunistan, the Russians succeeded in forging close ties with Afghanistan.

In 1956, the United States renewed its interest in Afghanistan's economic development. The US International Co-operation Administration (ICA) decided to extend long-term educational improvement, building hard surface roads, continuation of the valley project and construction of airports.<sup>20</sup> In 1958, the U.S. Export-Import Bank also agreed in principle to extend a loan to Afghanistan for the construction of a rail road link between Kandahar and Chaman.

Ayub Khan's coup d'etat and his uncompromising nature contributed to the deterioration in Afghan-Pakistan relations twice, in September 1960 and May 1961. Afghan irregulars and 'army troops dressed as tribesmen crossed into Bajour to assist pro-Pashtunistan elements resisting Pakistani pressure'. Pakistan put them down with the help of American built F-86s.<sup>21</sup>

In view of these incidents, Pakistan decided to close its consulates in

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid., pp.29-30.

<sup>21</sup> *ibid.*

Afghanistan (Jalalabad and Kandahar) and requested the Afghan government to close its consulates and trade agencies in Pakistan (Peshawar, Parachinar, Quetta and Chaman). The closing down of Afghan-Pakistan border adversely affected the Afghan economy in 1961; the same was true for Pakistan's economy as well, when they lost large amounts of money that they usually received from servicing Afghans in the transit trade.

Severance of all diplomatic and trade relations with Pakistan propelled the crisis in Afghanistan. At this point Mohammad Daoud decided to resign and give the new regime an opportunity to renew ties with Pakistan. Although the Shah of Iran had given the best shot to normalize relation between the two, it did not prove to be effective.

## **DIR ISSUE**

Dir is a strategically located area situated between Chitral and the tribal territory of Bajaur in the North-West Frontier. The British had desired that Dir maintained independence and therefore did not recognize Amir's claim to its allegiance. Lord Lytton had decided to recognize and assist Rahmatullah, Chief of Dir, to become the principal chief in the countries north of Peshawar. He had also promised to grant allowances to the chiefs of Bajaur and Swat, provided they agreed to act in subordination to the chief of Dir.

After the British withdrew, the federal authorities, conscious of the Afghan hostility towards Pakistan and the strategic position occupied by Dir, Swat and Chitral, moved slowly for the reconfirmation of obligations with the frontier princes that were executed with the British government. The Nawab of Dir did not send his representatives to the Assembly established under the 1956 Constitution,



rather he was aware of its special status, granted by an earlier declaration. It said that the North West Frontier province states will not be merged with the proposed West Pakistan unit since they had been accorded the status of special areas.<sup>22</sup>

On 28 September, 1960, Pakistan Foreign Minister Qadir reported that the Afghan troops, supported by a few tanks, had concentrated on the border, west of Bajaur and the Afghan government had called nearly 70,000 reservists.<sup>23</sup> The Khan at Khar had been able to resist these intruders without any Pakistani support. The people of Dir turned against the Nawab and what followed was a tribal fight between the Khan of Khar, who was aided by Pakistan and the Nawab of Dir, supported by the Afghans. The Khar forces emerged victorious, Pakistan took advantage of this opportunity to depose the Nawab of Dir and occupied the territory.<sup>24</sup>

The Pakistan government admitted on 6 April 1961, that it had been forced to bomb two houses in the Bajaur area. In May 1961, war broke out between the Pakistan and Afghan forces in the Bajaur area. The Pakistan government explained that bombing operations were meant to curb Afghanistan's anti-Pakistan activities forthwith, its planes had bombed the areas well within the Pakistan side of the Durand Line.<sup>25</sup>

The United States offered its good offices as 'services to help improve relations between the two countries'. President Kennedy sent separate letters to King Zahir Shah and President Ayub Khan towards the end of September 1961, in order to bring an early rapprochement between the two countries. The Shah of Iran also

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<sup>22</sup> Dawn (Karachi), 10 December 1954.

<sup>23</sup> The Times of India, 8 December and 10 December 1969.

<sup>24</sup> J.W. Spain, "The Pathan Borderlands", Middle East Journal, vol. XV, no. 2, spring 1961, p. 173. and Selig Harrison, "The Pathan Issue?" The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 30 May 1961.

<sup>25</sup> The Times of India, 25 November 1969.

offered to mediate, but the Tehran meeting scheduled to be held on 12 September 1962, was postponed indefinitely. After the resignation of Daoud in 1963, the two countries met in Tehran, and in the presence of Iranian Foreign Minister an agreement was concluded on 28 May 1963, to resume diplomatic relations. The two governments agreed to make an endeavor to create an atmosphere of goodwill, friendship and mutual trust. On 17 July 1963, the agreement was confined to the resumption of diplomatic, consular and trade relations. The Dir issue, primarily a domestic variable, became a policy output. It had adverse political and economic effect on both countries. The event proved to be an important determinant, leaving an impact on both internal and external policies of the countries.

## **INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN**

Zahir Shah announced a new constitution in October 1964. The Parliament was declared as the fountain-head of all power, but no clear division of power was made between the powers of the King and those of the Parliament. As Zahir Shah never signed the Parliamentary bill to formalize this arrangement, this created confusion as it neither made Parliament powerful nor did it make the King the constitutional head. Zahir Shah's democratic experiments were in contradiction with the nature of Afghan society. The tribal customs did not provide adequate basis for the establishment of a representative government, as envisaged by him.

The 1964 constitutional reforms gave Afghan middle-class intellectuals a unique opportunity to express themselves. In 1965, thirty people met at Noor Mohammed Taraki's house to form the 'Hizbe democratic Khalq Afghanistan' or the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). A deal was struck between Taraki and Karmal. The founders of the new party chose Taraki as the General

Secretary and Karmal as the Secretary. The basic mission of the party was described as the resolution of Afghan society's 'fundamental contradictions. The Party believed that within the span of a lifetime state capitalism would transform Afghanistan into an industrial society. For this purpose they set up a 'national government' which, in turn, would lead them to national democratic phase, meaning the eradication of feudal land holdings, nationalization of import and export corporations, nationalization of major industries and the promotion of state-held industries. On foreign relations, the PDPA supported ties with the Soviet Union and maintenance of Afghanistan's neutrality.

However, the differences between Taraki and Karmal reached a point in May 1967, when two separate parties emerged. Both claimed themselves People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) having similar manifestoes, constitutions and objectives. Karmal formed a separate central committee, spearheaded by him, and Taraki followed suit. The factions officially broke into Khalq and Parcham parties, but a number of splinter groups comprising smaller nationalities came into existence in the political scenario of Afghanistan. Both factions were keen to establish their anti-Soviet credentials. The Soviet embassy strove to bring an understanding between the two, but failed. The most pragmatic approach adopted by Soviets was their decision to give financial assistance to both.

Between May 1967 and July 1977, the Karmal and Taraki groups evolved into separate political parties - the Parcham and the Khalq. Karmal was permitted in 1968 to publish his party organ, also called Parcham. It was his dream to put an end to feudalism and imperialism while staying within the ambit of constitutional monarchy.

Taraki had once described Khalq as a 'Teachers factory,' because of

Hafizullah Amin's connexion with educational institutions. It was Amin who had challenged Karmal's stronghold; so with the latter's exit, it facilitated the former's entry. Thus, in 1969, Amin returned to Parliament. It was only in 1980 that the Karmal and Parcham groups claimed the sole ownership of the PDPA, with Karmal as the 'honoured revolutionary'.

Zahir Shah's democratic experiment proved fatalistic for the Afghan tribal society, especially to its economy. The establishment of the first Assembly immediately led to a steep fall in foreign credit. Between 1967 and 1971, externally raised loans shrunk from \$62.2 million to \$27.5 million. This led to a concomitant loss in employment opportunities which further contributed to changes in the citadel of power. The first contender was Sardar Daoud Khan, former Prime Minister and the country's most diehard Pashtun nationalist and reform-minded politician.

Sardar Daoud Khan declared Afghanistan a 'Republic on 24 July, 1973, and announced the end of kingship in Afghanistan. Daoud declared himself Afghanistan's President and Prime Minister, while emphasizing that the true bastion of power was a fifty member Central Committee, as nominated by him.

Although the new regime in Afghanistan was recognized by Pakistan on July 22, 1973, it was clear that Mohammad Daoud's assumption of power was not appreciated. He was perceived as the most serious hard-liner among the five Afghan leaders, who would rake the Pashtunistan issue. Pakistan had genuine reason to fear Daoud's accession to power. In his address to the people of Afghanistan on July 17, 1973, Daoud had said, 'Pakistan is the only country with which we still have a political difference, the question of Pashtunistan. Our constant effort to find a solution will continue.'<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> The Times (London), 27 July 1973.

By the beginning of 1974 Afghanistan's relations with Pakistan had deteriorated considerably due to intensification of the revolt in Baluchistan and mounting unrest in the NWFP, which had resulted in a ruthless war of subjugation of the former and increased Pakistani repression of the latter. The periodic violent eruptions had come to a head after Bhutto dismissed Baluchistan's provincial government and the governor, in February 1973, and imprisoned NAP's Baluchi leadership. Soon, the outspoken NAP governor of NWFP, Arbab Skandar Khan Khalil, was replaced by Aslam Khattak, one time ambassador to Kabul. As a result of these events, the alliance ministry of NWFP-headed by the late Mawlana Mufti Mohmoud, the coalition of NAP (National Awami Party) and Jamait-i-Uama-i-Islam (JUI) members, resigned in protest against Bhutto's actions in the two provinces.

The war waged by the Pakistan army against the Baluch people resulted in an increasing number of Baluchis fleeing to Afghanistan. They sought refuge in different parts of Kandahar and Kalat provinces, as they had done in the past during Baluchi upheavals against Ayub Khans regime. Bhutto accused Afghanistan of aiding and abetting the Baluchistan insurgency, which he claimed continued because of Afghan instigation.

Iran provided \$ 300 million annual assistance to Pakistan and also contributed to its war effort in Baluchistan by sending thirty U.S. - supplied Huey Cobra military helicopters. The assistance was extended in the name of stemming the spread of communism in Baluchistan which could spillover to southern Iran.

China was unhappy with the establishment of the Republic in 1973. Moreover, its championing of the right of self determination for the Pashtun and Baluchi people living within the borders of its close ally, Pakistan, was viewed with

cynicism.



Meanwhile, Bhutto organized an Islamic summit in Lahore, on February 21, 1974, in order to establish Pakistan as the champion of Islam and also to endear himself to the Arabs.

Daoud sent veteran diplomat Adbur Rahman Pazhwak as his special envoy to the Lahore summit. The special envoy made an emphatic reference to the upheaval in Baluchistan and explained the existing political dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pazhwak pleaded with the Islamic countries to find a peaceful solution to these issues. Pazhwak's statement at the summit was not received favourably by fellow Islamic nations.

The crisis in NWFP worsened the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It was intensely aggravated by Islamabad's actions in Baluchistan and the NWFP. Pashtun nationalists could not be blamed for their violent reaction against the government of Pakistan. The imprisonment of NAP leadership and the dissolution of the party angered the people in the frontier province and in the tribal areas.

Afghanistan continued to raise this issue at all international forums. The Pakistanis viewed this primarily as Afghans mischief, indirectly questioning their sovereignty over the NWFP and Baluchistan.

The trial of Khan Abdul Wali Khan and other NAP leaders lingered. Mutual friends of Afghanistan and Pakistan renewed their proposal that the two countries should try to scale down their hostile propaganda. Through their embassies in Kabul and Islamabad, the Afghans and the Pakistanis worked out a code of conduct for the media in both countries aiming at reducing, and eventually eliminating, hostile propaganda. This agreement was observed by both sides.



Later, Prime Minister Bhutto readily accepted the invitation of Afghanistan's premier Daoud Khan to visit Kabul. Bhutto reached Kabul on June 7, 1976. He stated that he was profoundly committed to the betterment of relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan, but regretted that, since his last visit to Kabul to thank King Zahir Shah for Afghanistan's neutrality in Indo-Pakistan war, relations between the two countries had deteriorated. Bhutto accepted the fact that the crisis continued due to the arrest of NAP leaders. As a reconciliatory gesture Bhutto released Pashtun leader Khan Abdul Ghafar Khan from jail. Bhutto blamed the Pashtun leaders' negative and obstructive attitude for what he termed as the 'abnormal and unwanted situation' in Pashtun areas. The Afghans, however, expressed their differences. Bhutto and Daoud issued a joint communiqué the language of the text of the communiqué which implied that Afghanistan and Pakistan aimed to solve their political differences on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. The Afghans contended that a general commitment by both sides to solve their problem peacefully was sufficient, since Pakistanis had not taken any step to redress Pashtun-Baluchi grievances. The acceptance of the principles accorded official recognition to Durand Line as the international line demarcating the boundary for Afghanistan. Such an acceptance would tantamount to rendering Afghanistan's effort on Pashtunistan and Baluchistan issue meaningless. Daoud Khan was concerned that, if accepted, the five principles of peaceful coexistence should be binding on both sides and that none in the government wanted Pakistan to repeat its incursions of the previous year into the Afghan territory.<sup>27</sup>

At the conclusion of the first round of talks in Kabul, relations between the two countries improved dramatically. They expressed their approval to the joint

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

communiqué, which was published later. The ice was broken and what came to be called the 'spirit of Kabul' was born. As a consequence, there was now abundant availability of Pakistani railway wagons for Afghan transit trade. There were no more violations of Afghan air space.

Two factors facilitated the normalisation of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. First, the acceptance by Pakistan that a dispute existed between the two countries and second, its recognition that Afghanistan had the right to feel concerned about the fate of the Pashtuns living east and south of the Durand Line. Consequently, it could discuss the fulfillment of their aspirations with the government of Pakistan. The Pashtun leaders opted for autonomy within Pakistan by accepting the Pakistan Constitution of 1970 and 1973 and decided to participate in its elections as Pakistan politicians. This gave more flexibility to the Afghan stand on the Pashtunistan issue. Afghanistan desired that, by consolidating this autonomy Pashtun culture and identity be preserved, and their social, economic and political rights safeguarded.

The second round of talks between Daoud and Bhutto took place in Pakistan (Islamabad, Lahore and Murree) from August 20 to August 24, 1976, following the Afghan head of state's participation in the non-aligned summit conference in Sri Lanka. Bhutto's contention was that the situation had improved substantially in Baluchistan and that the law-and-order condition was much better in the NWFP. In sum, he refused to release political prisoners, since Baluchistan, as of now, had not yet returned to normalcy. Hence, the army could not be withdrawn, too.<sup>28</sup>

A package deal was adopted by the two delegations led by Aziz Ahmad, the Pakistani Minister of State for Defence and External Affairs, and Afghan Deputy

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<sup>28</sup> Ghaus, n. 4, p.248.



Foreign Minister Waheed Abdullah. The package deal included granting freedom to political prisoners and recognition of the Durand Line as the international border. There were certain obligations attached to the deal, chief among them was the necessity of a formal declaration by Afghanistan that it had abandoned the issue of Pashtuistan. This declaration was to convey the agreement that had been reached between the government of Pakistan and Afghanistan on Pashtun-Baluchi political rights. Waheed's reaction was not favourable and they, therefore, agreed to adjourn the meeting.

In order to arrive at a settlement, a joint communiqué was issued, at the conclusion of Daoud's official visit to Pakistan, in which both sides reaffirmed the principles enunciated in the earlier Kabul communiqué and pledged to continue their discussion in the spirit of Kabul.

On 9 June 1977, Bhutto visited Daoud, on his way from Tehran, apprised Daoud of the then abnormal situation in Pakistan and said that the matter of the prisoners was still under consideration.

In 1977 Gen. Zia replaced Bhutto in a coup and became the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Later, he visited Kabul, held talks with Daoud Khan, and promised to have close relations with Afghanistan. He proposed that a high-level joint economic commission be created to promote economic co-operation, including the establishment of joint economic ventures. He also proposed broad cultural exchange programmes between the two countries. The joint communiqué never materialized, as Gen. Zia didn't favour one. Moreover, acceptance of Durand Line as international border and giving up the Pashtunistan issue were in direct confrontation with the interests of Afghanistan. At the conclusion of his stay in Pakistan, President Daoud told a press conference, on March, 8 that his visit had

been 'an important step towards the betterment of relations between the two countries.'<sup>29</sup>

The Soviet Union was the first country to recognise the advent of the Republic of Afghanistan on July 20, 1973. On July 26, the Soviet leadership stated in a message to Mohammad Daoud, 'the genuinely good-neighbourly relations of friendship and all-round co-operation existing between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan will successfully develop further.'<sup>30</sup> The Kremlin leadership was happy to have Mohammad Daoud back in power as he represented the 'leftist' regime in Kabul. However, the Russian leaders repeatedly assured the King, Daoud and other Afghan leaders that the Soviet Union would refrain from any act that could be interpreted by the Afghan state as hostile. Russian leaders, from Khrushchev to Brezhnev, maintained that they were interested in nonalignment and the stability of Afghanistan. It was hoped that Afghanistan's friendship with Russia would serve as a counterbalance to the potential dangers stemming from the American military assistance to Pakistan.

Mohammad Daoud was upset with the ostentatious pro-Soviet bias, the excesses, the inefficiency and the frequent insubordination of the leftists in various branches of the government, including the Central Committee and the Cabinet. Daoud, in order to save the state apparatus from Soviet influence, decided to purge the military of Soviet influence, in a discreet manner.

Daoud was critical of Russia's African adventure. He expressed disapproval of the role played in this aspect by Cuba. In his meeting with President Podgorny the President put the responsibility for increasing international tension squarely at

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Pravda (Moscow), 31 July 1973.

the doorstep of 'American imperialism' and 'Chinese hegemonies'.<sup>31</sup>

The Kabul communiqué was agreed upon before Podgorny departed for Moscow. Both sides expressed their firm 'determination to do everything possible to further develop Soviet-Afghan friendly relations and fruitful co-operation between the two countries in political, trade, economic, cultural and other spheres'. They regarded their relations as 'the valuable property of the peoples of the two countries'.<sup>32</sup> A protocol extending the 1931 Soviet-Afghan Friendship and non-aggression treaty for a further period of ten years was signed by Daoud and Podgorny on December 10.

By mid-1976 Moscow decided to bring the two rival factions of the PDPA, Parcham and Khalq, into one unified party. The Russians always considered the PDPA as an instrument of their policy and were naturally concerned about its prospects. On the other hand, Mohammad Daoud was upset by flagrant Soviet interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs, as exemplified by their increasingly active and visible involvement with local communists. During the second half of 1976, intelligence reports continuously depicted Russian subversive activities aimed at organizing and revitalizing the Afghan communist elements.

The Russians, on the other hand, had undoubtedly become increasingly disturbed by the emergence of new and expanded ties between Afghanistan and its Islamic neighbours, a situation they felt would reduce the Soviet Union's importance, and, consequently, and its control.

The economic co-operation between the USSR and Afghanistan was

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<sup>31</sup> Kabul Times, 6 June 1974.

<sup>32</sup> *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (London)/USSR International Affairs, South Asia*, III J I II7.

progressing normally. The Soviets 'gave the Afghans \$ 437 million in economic credit during 1975. In 1976 the two nations signed a trade agreement calling for a 65 per cent increase in commerce by 1980. By September 1977, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan was greater than that of any other foreign power'.<sup>33</sup> This further proved that the Soviet were not taking chances with the Afghans.

## THE APRIL REVOLUTION

The April revolution was spearheaded by Major Mohammad Aslam Watanger and Colonel Abdul Qader who had both experience in organising a coup in 1973, when Daoud had seized power. The crisis arose out of the political assassination of Mir Akbar Khyber, an important theoretician and writer of the Parcham faction on 17 April. The scale of the demonstration alarmed Daoud's government, which felt its own control over the capital challenged by the popular upsurge of feeling and suspected left-wing manipulation by anti-imperialist sentiments. Arrests of prominent PDPA'S members added to the complexity of the situation.

It was the Khalq that succeeded in seizing power through the tactics generally similar to those employed by the Parcham-Daoud coalition in 1973. Heavy fighting confirmed, around the palace. Daoud refused to surrender while and thirty members of his family congregated in a conference room. It has been said that in the gun-battle that ensued, Daoud, his brother Mohammad Naim and most of the royal family members were killed.

On 27 April, Taraki, Amin, Karmal and other Marxist leaders were freed from prison. The Marxist organization, a central revolutionary committee, named Taraki

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<sup>33</sup> Alfred L. Monks, The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan (Washington, D.C., 1981), p. 14.

the president of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and Prime Minister of its Cabinet Amin and Karmal were appointed Deputy Prime Ministers. The Cabinet struck a delicate balance where eleven ministers were taken from Parcham faction and ten from Khalq.

The acceptance of the Marxist regime lasted until the autumn of 1978. They had committed a few violent acts, where in the surviving members of the royal family were either expelled or imprisoned. There were waves of expulsion's. The Parchams were being gradually removed many of them imprisoned. These developments left the Soviets in an uncomfortable relationship with the Marxist government, as they were committed to support it. In October 1978, Karmal and his senior colleagues were branded as traitors of the revolution and ordered to return to Afghanistan for trial.

Taraki, however, gained popularity by announcing a positive policy with regard to minorities; virtually for the first time the official media used the Uzbek, and Baluch languages. Despite the strong Pushtun inclination the recognition of these minorities became an official policy. Another symbolic beginning of a new era was the declaration on 19 October 1978, that the national flag would be redesigned after Pattern of the Soviet Union. The most distinctive feature of the new flag was that the dominant colour was red.

In November the government announced economic reforms, whereby some three million acres of land were to be transferred to approximately 300,000 poor farming families. The following spring it claimed that this task had been completed. But there was evidence that a large number of plots were taken over by the largest holders. Many tenants were driven away so that the owners could claim that members of their own families could cultivate the land. The confusion created by

the land transfers affected the both rich and poor. Introduction of marriage regulations, which reduced the bride price to a nominal fee, and a marriage license was a legal necessity. The government attacked the foundation of authority within the family, thereby threatening the relations within the households, which made the Afghans feel uneasy.

The local communities resisted almost all reforms, yet isolated acts of resistance and nearly all were directed at the atheism and Soviet domination of the government, that was symbolized by its red flag. The friendship Treaty signified that the radical transformation of Afghanistan would be underwritten and guaranteed by Soviet power. By the end of 1978 the people had unmistakable evidence that their way of life could not survive unless they could manage to remove the Khalq regime.

By early 1979 the Khalq government faced a revolt that affected all but three or four of the twenty eight provinces. The first indication that the opposition seriously threatened the regime came from Herat on March 22nd, after Pashtuns and Shias seized control of the city. Some reports claimed that at least 5,000 were killed in a city with a population of some 85,000.<sup>34</sup>

The Khalq government conveniently blamed Iran for the uprising. The immediate aftermath of the Herat uprising was a sweeping reorganization of the Khalq government, which brought Amin close to effective control. Taraki remained as President of the Republic and leader of the party, but Amin took over the Prime Ministership and began to assume control over government agencies and departments.

By April 1979, there were over 1,000 Soviet military advisers in Afghanistan.

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<sup>34</sup> The Economist (London), 22 September 1979, p. A1.

The Soviet mission was augmented in April with the arrival of career diplomat Vasiliy Safronchuk who as deputy chief of mission, apparently had responsibility for dealing with Afghan problems and insurgency.

There was a sudden upsurge of violent resistance to the Khalq government. The fragmented resistance movement was divided along regional, ethnic and sectarian lines, the most prominent groups were the Nuristanis, Badakshans, Hazaras and the numerous Pashtun tribes. Since 1978, these organizations have established headquarters in Pakistan. Their leadership and ideological programmes represented a wide spectrum of Afghan society and political ideology.

The organization that made the first effort to bring all resistance together was the Afghan National Liberation Front, under the leadership of Sibghatullah Mojadidi. It was founded in 1978 just after the coup, with the support of Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf States.<sup>35</sup> By the end of 1978, Mojadidi's National Liberation Front had established headquarters in Peshawar, Pakistan.

Under the leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Front of Sayyid Ahmed Effredi Gailani a large organisation of Mujahidin (Muslim holy warriors) was formed. Receptive to modern reforms, Gailani attempted to cooperate with the Khalq government. He fled Kabul when the Marxist programme had been implemented.

The emigre' group Hizb-i-Islami, or the Islamic Party of Gulbudin Hikmatayar, which resisted unification or joint policies, developed its cadre of religious conservatives from those who had fled Daoud's regime after 1973 and organized themselves into an armed strike-force, with the aim of seizing power and creating a fundamentalist political system that would tolerate no political rivals. Hikmatyar's group was an offshoot of the Afghan branch of the Muslim

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<sup>35</sup> Korean Herald (Seoul), 28 March 1979.

Brotherhood, led by Muhammed Niazi, which attempted to attack the Daoud regime from within, but was repressed.

Conservative and more accommodating towards its rivals, the Jamiat-i-Islami was led by Burhanuddin Rabbani. This group aimed to establish a government based on the literal reading of Islamic law, but it permitted an openly competitive political system, in which the modernists also could participate.

Other émigré organizations included the Islamic Revolutionary Movement under the leadership of Maulawi Muhammad Nabi and the Shola Jowid, a Maoist splinter group that escaped after the April 1978 coup.

In January 1979, the government launched a concerted crackdown on religious leaders; 120 were arrested and many executed in these assaults. Survivors either joined the Resistance or fled the country.<sup>36</sup>

In early February, the killing of the American ambassador, Adolph Dobs, had an indirect impact on the political situation in the country. The American policy prior to this had been to ignore the Khalq government's alliance with the USSR. Since the killing, the attitude of the US towards Afghanistan hardened. On the other hand, the resistance movement consolidated itself to overthrow the Khalq regime.

## **SOVIET INVASION 1979**

From August to December 1979, the Soviets had attempted to replace Amin, but had failed. Taraki, was characterized as a repressive leader. This exacerbated the situation.

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<sup>36</sup> David Chaffetz, "Afghanistan, Russia's Vietnam?", Special Paper no.4, Afghanistan Council of the Asia Society, p.6.



Early in December 1979, American intelligence sources had begun to pick up evidence that Russian troops were gathering up on the northern banks of the Amu Dariya (Oxus) river, the boundary between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, where there were nearly 100,000 Soviet troops. It seemed apparent that Soviet logistical arrangements had been made to replace Amin through military force, not long after Taraki died.<sup>37</sup> Until his death, Amin had led the Khalq government with Soviet support. The Soviets continued to claim that Amin's government asked for mere military assistance and that they had merely obliged. The Soviet Union claimed that it had involved its troops as a response to the committee's call for help.<sup>38</sup> According to the USSR, the rebel forces, supported by China, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United States, threatened the survival of the Kabul government. The Soviet assistance was sought to stop outside intervention and to stabilize the political situation in the country.<sup>39</sup>

On December 27, following a three-day airlift, that witnessed 75-120 flights per day, a few hundred Spatnatz troops were deployed at the Darulaman Palace outside Kabul. This destroyed the armed guard and its eight tanks, which finally killed President Amin.<sup>40</sup> The Soviet troops captured most of the Central government facilities in Kabul. Serious fighting in the city concluded by the 28th December.<sup>41</sup>

Babrak Karmal was proclaimed President of the Revolutionary Council, General Secretary of the PDPA and Prime Minister. The Soviet bloc argued that the invasion introduced no change in the international situation. Since the Khalq

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<sup>37</sup> Nancy P. Newell and Richard S. Newell, The Struggle for Afghanistan (London, 1981), p. 108.

<sup>38</sup> New York Times, 28 December 1979.

<sup>39</sup> New York Times, 1 June 1980.

<sup>40</sup> Time (New York), 22 November 1982.

<sup>41</sup> Bradsher, n. 2, pp.175-88.

government had been thoroughly dependent on the Soviet support, the USSR was already heavily involved militarily. They argued that the introduction of 100,000 troops, in addition to the already present 10,000 troops, did not bring about any change. The argument ignored the fact that the Kabul government was taken over with the support of a military force far stronger than its own army. They literally took over the struggle of the country. The change was fundamental and not incremental.<sup>42</sup> The Soviet invasion came as a result of Khalq's failure to maintain control. The invasion was a unilateral attempt to use force to change the course of a civil war, which transformed the situation entirely. Until December 27, 1979, the Soviet Union had the option of withdrawing without risking a catastrophic defeat. But, by invading, it gave up that option, which left the Soviets with no politically acceptable alternative, but to impose their will on the Afghan people.

The Soviets viewed this intervention as an extension of their established 'friendship policy', since they were already giving aid to the Afghans. In opting for military intervention without attempting to establish a viable political alternative, the Soviets made a choice whose costs reached far beyond the casualties and the expenses of mounting a large expedition to control a difficult country.

## **INTERNATIONAL REACTION**

The United Nations General Assembly voted 104 to 18 (with 30 absences or abstentions) to deplore the armed intervention in Afghanistan. Not mentioning the Soviet Union, the General Assembly went on to call for the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan.<sup>43</sup> More than

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<sup>42</sup> Newell, Newell, n. 34, p. 110.

<sup>43</sup> New York Times, 15 January, 1980.

two-thirds nonaligned countries voted against the USSR in the General Assembly.

Iran strongly objected to the Soviet invasion.<sup>44</sup> The Soviets were relegated by Iran to the position of a secondary enemy and the Soviet influence with Iran was reduced by their invasion. Soviet involvement with the Kurds and the Tudeh party was compounded by the Soviet refusal to denounce the interventionary provisions of the 1921 Treaty of Friendship. Afghanistan simply became another serious irritant in this important bilateral relationship.

The Soviet occupation increased Chinese fears of a future move against its ally Pakistan. They stepped up military aid to Pakistan and completed works on the strategically important Karakoram Highway connecting the two countries. From October 1979 to November 1981, China and Pakistan exchanged ten high-level military and naval delegations.

The US reaction to the invasion was strong in its condemnation of the act. President Carter announced a series of stiff measures -

1. Blocking the export of 17 million metric tons of grain.
2. Stopping the sale of computer and high-technology equipment.
3. Boycotting the Moscow Olympics,<sup>45</sup> an action later joined by 55 other countries. Besides, President Carter withdrew the Salt II Treaty from active consideration for ratification by the Senate and announced the Carter Doctrine: 'An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of US. And such an assault will be

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<sup>44</sup> Zalmay Khalilzad, "Islamic Iran: Soviet Dilemma", Problems of Communism, no. 33, January-February 1984, pp. 1-20.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

repelled by any means necessary including military force<sup>46</sup>

In a related move, the United States reaffirmed its 1959 agreement 'to help Pakistan preserve its independence and its integrity'.<sup>47</sup> The invasion contributed to greater Chinese-US co-operation. The US granted China most favoured (MFN) nation status and agreed to sell the Peoples Republic 'non-lethal' military equipment.

The Soviets soon realized that they were not an army of occupation. They followed a 'modified enclave strategy' for survival. The strategy was directed at holding the major centers of communications, limiting infiltration and destroying local resistance strongholds at minimum cost to their own forces.

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<sup>46</sup> State of the Union Address.

<sup>47</sup> New York Times, 4 February 1980.

## CHAPTER II

### THE ROAD TO GENEVA ACCORD AND AFTER (1979-88)

The change of political scenario in Afghanistan was looked with caution by Islamabad; especially, the implications of the communist government in Afghanistan did not go unnoticed. Pakistan was particularly weary of the raking up of Pakhtoon issue by new leaders, though Taraki had already promised to find a peaceful solution to the entire problem. One of the dimensions of the April takeover was a large inflow of refugees into Pakistan. In February 1979, there were about 12,000 Afghan refugees in NWFP and 20,000 in Baluchistan.<sup>1</sup> Pakistan initially refused to obtain international assistance for maintaining the refugees or to arm them against the Taraki regime.

### DEVELOPMENT IN AFGHANISTAN IN THE WAKE OF SOVIET INVASION

Taraki in a speech delivered on 3rd May 1978, emphasised, the nationalist character of the revolution, denied its communist nature and expressed allegiance to Islamic tenets.<sup>2</sup> He took extraordinary care not to be identified with the Soviet Union. However, it did not stop him from concluding a Treaty of friendship with the Soviets and securing a promise of further aid in December 1978. The Russians offered to extend support to the new regime and sent over 5,000 advisers.<sup>3</sup> Relations soured in 1979 between Taraki and Hafizullah Amin when the latter decided to drop Interior Minister Col. Mohammad Aslam, Watanjar and Frontier

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<sup>1</sup> P.R. Chari, "Deep Unrest in Afghanistan", The Tribune, (Chandigarh), 21 February 1979.

<sup>2</sup> The Hindu (Madras), 16 May 1978.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

Affairs Minister ~~was~~ Maj. Sherjan Mazdoryar without consulting Taraki, who was in Moscow. Taraki called Amin for a meeting after returning from Moscow. Amin suspected foul -play and only decided to attend on the personal assurance of Major Daoud Taroon.<sup>4</sup> At the President's house when shots were fired at Amin he managed to escape unscathed.

After eliminating Noor Mohammad Taraki Amin also ordered the arrest of the functionaries of the party loyal to Taraki. He assured the people of a new constitution, where he proposed to introduce measures that would set the country on the path of socialism, while providing for religious freedom. But the amnesty order, constitutional concessions and other promises made by Amin failed to win over the rebels, who, by their guerrilla operations, continued to harass and destabilize the government. The situation became serious when the regular troops revolted and joined the rebel forces to fight against Amin's regime.

The insurgents' offensive attacks were directed at gaining control of strategic provinces from the government forces. The Mujahidins captured Faizabad, capital of the remote north-eastern province of Badakhshan, after six months of heavy fighting. In this operation the rebels used American, Chinese and Pakistani weaponry. After the fall of Faizabad, the entire province of Badakhshan, including the governor's house, passed into their hands.<sup>5</sup> On 7th December 1979, Burhanuddin Rabbani, Chief of the Jamait-i-Islami of Afghanistan and leader of the anti-government operations in the Badakhshan region, claimed that the rebels had seized arms and ammunition being guarded by the Soviet troops in Zeebaq district

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<sup>4</sup> The Times of India (New Delhi), 18 September 1980.

<sup>5</sup> The Tribune, 5 May 1978.

and had captured the surviving Soviet troops.

To stem the tide of anti-government activities, Amin ordered a major military counter-offensive against the rebels. About 300 armoured vehicles and tanks, backed by MI-24 ground attack helicopters and MIGs, were used by government forces to bomb and strike rebel positions in Djaji and Menjal areas, which were close to the border with Pakistan. This was done to quell the rebellion.

The situation grew extremely difficult for Amin. He not only had to suppress the rebels but also had to deal with leftist opponents in the party and the army. Amin tried to improve relations with Pakistan. Though he had issued an invitation to President Zia-ul-Haq such a meeting was not to materialise in view of Pakistan's support to the Afghan rebels. Subsequently, Afghanistan deployed its troops along the Pak-Afghan border.

Tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan gradually escalated due to the former's involvement in training and equipping the refugees against the Afghan government. At such a time, the Pakistan government announced in a communiqué that 228,000 Afghan refugees had sought sanctuary in NWFP and Baluchistan.<sup>6</sup>

In the beginning of November 1979 about one hundred Soviet soldiers arrived in Kabul to defend Amin's regime against the Muslim guerrillas. Moscow had increased its aid in response to Afghan leader's urgent requests to save socialism in Afghanistan. With the passage of time Soviet military presence in Afghanistan increased, and on 3 November 1979, about 20 Soviet battalions were rushed to Afghanistan.<sup>7</sup> The movement of Soviet troops across Afghanistan

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Nikolai Cherikov, "The Soviet Mi-24 Hind Attack Helicopter", International Defence Review, vol.

indicated that the Kremlin lacked confidence in President Hafizullah Amin's ability to control the Muslim insurgency.

Hafizullah Amin was suspicious of the Russian's intentions, especially in terms of their military build-up in Afghanistan. *Kabul Radio*, on the night of 27 December 1979, announced that ousted President Amin was executed after having been convicted by a revolutionary trial court for crimes against the Afghan people.<sup>8</sup> With Babrak Karmal coming to power the PDPA was deeply divided between the urban-based and elitist Parcham (Flag) and the rival-oriented and hard-line Khalq (people), factions.

To accommodate the interests of both the factions, Karmal's government had two Deputy Prime Ministers—one, a Khalqi, Assadullah Sarwari, and the other a Parchami, Sultan Ali Keshtmand. Members of the party organisations were nominated from both the groups.

During Karmal's time the inter-factional rivalry between Khalq and Parcham was manifested in the struggle between the Ministry of the Interior and the Department of Intelligence in order to weaken the Interior Ministry, which was headed by Taraki's 'adopted' son, Syed, Gholabzoi (who was also a known Khalq supporter). Karmal brought about the separation of the Intelligence Department (KHAD) from the ministry, setting it up as an independent entity. Karmal patronised Najibullah, made him a Brigadier in 1982 and a Lieutenant General in 1983. The KHAD was equipped with an army division complete with helicopters, tank and armoured cars. The infighting between the KHAD and the Interior

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14, no. 9, September 1981, pp. 1131-33.

\* For details see The Times(London), 28 December 1979.



Ministry continued quite openly.

The differences between the two groups increased primarily because the Parcham members were humiliated during the Khalq regimes of Taraki and Amin. Assadullah Sarwari, Chief of secret police in the regime of Noor Mohammad Taraki and later Deputy PM in Karmal's government, was responsible for the torture of Parcham political prisoners, including Sultan Ali Keshmand, who too was a Deputy Prime Minister in the same regime. President Karmal purged the Khalq faction from the ruling PDPA and the government.

Karmal wanted to diffuse the crisis between the two factions, even if it meant relinquishing Prime Ministership. On 11 June 1981, Sultan Ali Keshmand became the new Prime Minister with new deputies. The Soviet Union was in favour of a rapprochement between the two factions of the PDPA.

Besides satisfying the interests of the rival factions within the PDPA, Karmal had to contend with rebels who opposed Russian presence in Afghanistan. In May 1980, President Karmal, for the first time, openly referred to the anti-government resistance and admitted that the insurgents had succeeded to a certain extent.<sup>9</sup> Besides admitting that insurgency existed, the government acknowledged the occurrence of rebel attacks on Herat and student demonstrations in Kabul.

Meanwhile, the Khalq-Parcham conflict continued unabated. In July 1980, the 14th Armoured Brigade revolted when the government attempted to relieve its Khalqi commander. By fall 1980, many lower-rank Khalqis were actually fighting alongside the Mujahidin.<sup>10</sup> Early in 1981, the Soviets had divested party head

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<sup>9</sup> The Indian Express(New Delhi), 9 June 1980.

<sup>10</sup> Wafadar, "Afghanistan in 1981. The Struggle Intensifies", pp. 148 - 150.

Karmal of the Prime Ministership in favour of a Khalqi, Sultan Ali Keshtmand.

However, Karmal was no more successful in generating national unity than he was in generating PDPA unity. Karmal promulgated a new Constitution which failed to revive the faith of Afghan citizens in their government. He sought to broaden his political support by assembling the National Fatherland Front(NFF), a coalition of 'national, democratic and progressive forces' in June 1987. The government raised the limit on land ownership and repealed debt laws. But it was largely a ploy to generate mass opinion in favour of the reforms, which failed to evoke any reaction from the people.

### **RATIONALE BEHIND THE INVASION**

The Soviet analysts, in the wake of the invasion and the installation of the Babrak Karmal regime, clearly laid out the need for national reconciliation. 'The April revolution in Afghanistan entered a new stage. The most distinctive features of this stage [were the] unprecedented cohesion of the whole people, the strengthening of unity and the growing role of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.....'<sup>11</sup> The invasion of Afghanistan was designed to unseat Amin and install Babrak Karmal, who had stopped the PDPA's ongoing fighting and helped to rebuild the army and restore order. The Soviet invasion was to be a shield, a temporary army of occupation.

The invasion of Afghanistan displayed both congruity and incongruity. In calculating their move into Afghanistan, the Soviets repeatedly sent experienced

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<sup>11</sup> Iurii Kornilov and Ravil Musin. Commentary, TASS, January 5 1980, *FBI/S-SOV-80-004* (January 7 1980), D4.

observers to gather information. The circumstances before the invasion were such that the Soviets faced a new probability of American involvement. They had partially miscalculated the US reaction. The Soviets attempted to make the 'invitation' appear genuine. Throughout their operations in Afghanistan the Soviets continued to wear a rather transparent cloak of international law, citing the 'invitation', the Friendship Treaty and even the UN Charter as legal justifications. In keeping with the pattern described above, perceiving a security threat on the border, the Soviets, at the outset, used massive and concentrated force, given their apparent belief that they would essentially be serving as an army at occupation.

When Soviet troops had moved into Afghanistan the United States was preoccupied with the hostage crisis in Iran. Furthermore, the type of forces that it had in the Persian Gulf were ill-suited to deter or combat the invasion of a land-locked country by the Soviet ground forces. Pakistan possessed neither the will nor the forces to directly combat a Soviet army, which ultimately led Zia to moderate his 'interference'. The U.S. move to aid Pakistan could be (and was to some extent) directed to offset the Soviet moves towards India. Increased US naval presence in the Persian Gulf had given enough indication that the United States was emerging from the 'post-Vietnam syndrome'. But the Soviets refused to take due cognizance of all these factors. In all probability, if they had then they could have averted a catastrophic experiment.

The Soviet intervention hinged primarily on one major factor: that their occupation of Afghanistan would provide a reinvigorated PDPA with the opportunity it needed to restore order in Afghanistan. But it was not to be. By June 1980, the withdrawal of a few armour and missile units and the construction of

bases indicated that the Soviets were adapting to the counter-insurgency situation and were evolving a long-term perspective of the problems in Afghanistan.

### **The Soviet Strategy**

From June 1980 to December 1984 the Soviet strategy was to hold the major centres of communications, limit infiltration and destroy local strongholds at minimum risk to its own forces. Use of helicopters, chemical weapons and the employing of what may accurately be called terror tactics, were the chief instruments in their strategy. Although the Soviets had inflicted hundreds of thousands of casualties on the Afghans and had driven one-thirds of the population into exile, their hold on Afghanistan did not improve.

The USSR's military objectives in the early 1980s were to: (1) retain control over main urban areas eg, Kabul, Herat, Khandahar, Kunduz, etc (2) eliminate rebel positions 'at minimum costs to their own forces'.<sup>12</sup> To accomplish these goals, the Soviet Union employed well over 100,000 troops,<sup>13</sup> composed mainly of the 40th Army and spetsnaz (elite commando units) with forces supported by helicopter gunships and ground attack aircraft.

The Soviet invasion initially bore the marks of a quick thrust, designed to support a short-term occupation. This move might have provided Karmal with a cushion with which he could have built an effective government and a loyal army. However, Karmal's government made little progress towards this goal during this period.

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<sup>12</sup> Joseph J. Collins, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, (Massachusetts, 1986), p.145.

<sup>13</sup> The Times, 24 April 1984.

Throughout this period, the Soviet assessment of the situation in Afghanistan in the long-run was negative. Many officials expressed concern over the problem. Yuri Velikanov, a Soviet diplomat stationed in the strategically important Seychelles Islands, called the situation in Afghanistan 'an embarrassment' and 'noted that there were mistakes when they went in, and were looking to ways to get out'.<sup>14</sup>

Despite Brezhnev's declaration that 'the USSR would withdraw its military contingent from Afghanistan as soon as the reasons that caused their presence disappeared and the Afghan government decided that their presence was no longer necessary',<sup>15</sup> it did not occur.

Mikhail Gorbachev was quoted as having told Indian journalists in Moscow that his country had no bases there (Afghanistan), nor was it exploiting Afghanistan's mineral resources or raw material. Regarding the arrival of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, he said, 'we entered Afghanistan on the request of its government.'<sup>16</sup> After signing the Treaty of 5 December 1978, the Afghan government was entitled to summon the Soviet army any time it felt the need to do so (such military movements are allowed under Article 51 of the UN Charter). The arrival of the Soviet army, in 1979, was in response to the Afghan's request, the Soviets argued.

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<sup>14</sup> New York Times, 20 April 1981.

<sup>15</sup> B. Sengupta, Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society (London, 1986), p.133.

<sup>16</sup> Dawn (Karachi), 25 November 1986.

## United States' Strategy

The United States revived its security links with Pakistan by supplying modern weapons. It gave categorical security guarantees vis-a-vis the Soviet threat which would enable Pakistan to resist/withstand Soviet pressures.

However, with the Soviet military intervention of 27 December 1979, the United States finally entered the Afghan conflict in a direct manner. Accusing the Soviet Union of aggression against a small, non-aligned, Islamic country, it declared its full moral and material support for the rebel forces. By 1985 the United States had invested nearly 625 million dollars in the Afghan rebels.<sup>17</sup> The Reagan Administration provided them with 250 million dollars.

There were reports in the American press, in 1986, that, in order to motivate the Afghan rebels, the CIA provided them with funds. According to the *Washington Post*, the US government had deposited a sum of \$ 250 million in Swiss banks for the use of Afghan rebels. The money was spent on acquiring Soviet and Chinese weapons.<sup>18</sup>

Pakistan, the worst affected country since the Soviet intervention, demanded an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops. It joined hands with those who shared a similar view in building pressure on the Soviet Union at various international fora, especially the UN, NAM and OIC, to force them to withdraw.

The United States offered both economic and military assistance to Pakistan in 1987. The Soviets charged Pakistan of providing military bases to the United

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid, 7 February 1985.

<sup>18</sup> *Jang (Urdu)*, London, 4 Dec. 1986 quoting Washington Post and Reuters reports.

States, which the latter allegedly used to pursue its strategic goals in the region. This allegation was vehemently denied by Pakistan.<sup>19</sup> They argued that Pakistan had become a major bridge-head for aggression against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.<sup>20</sup> Pakistan's effort to obtain AWACS aircraft from the United States was criticised by the Soviet Union in strong terms and dubbed as an 'unfriendly step' and a 'provocation' which it could not ignore.<sup>21</sup> Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko said, in 1981, that the US aid to Pakistan threatened the 'balance of forces in Southern Asia', and that Pakistan was serving as a 'bridge-head against the Soviet Union and the countries of South and Southwest Asia.'<sup>22</sup>

The Soviet Union offered a security pact to Pakistan which would guarantee its security, provided it de-linked itself from the US policy in the region and withdrew support to Afghan resistance groups.

## THE RESISTANCE

The Afghan Resistance was formed as a response, at the village level, to external aggression. The soldiers of the Resistance were villagers organised into local committees and virtually autonomous in relation to the parties with which they were theoretically affiliated.

Resistance against the Russians and their Parcham clients had risen virtually everywhere. Student groups, Afghan army units, city mobs and individual citizens, as well as guerrilla units, took part in the ongoing fight against the Soviets.

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<sup>19</sup> Dawn, 23 November 1983.

<sup>20</sup> Yuri V. Gankovsky et. al., 'Soviet Relations with Pakistan, in Hafeez Malik ,eds, Soviet American Relations with Pakistan Iran & Afghanistan (London,1987), pp. 182-98.

<sup>21</sup> The Frontier Post(Peshawar), 6 and 13 May 1987.

<sup>22</sup> International Herald Tribune(Paris), 10 August 1981.

Various parties joined the Resistance to give it a political expression, both at the international and local levels. Being politically autonomous, the Resistance was able to fight effectively. They gained legitimacy through Islam. The major resistance groups were Hizb-i-Islami (Gulbuddin Hikmatyar), the Jamiat-i Islam (Burhanuddin Rabbani), the Harakati Enqelab-i-Islami (Mawlawi Mohammad Nabi) and the Shura-yi Enqelab-i Ettafaq-i Islami-i Afghanistan (Sayyed Behesh). There were also members of small parties such as the Shola-yi Jawid which represented left-wing urban youth; the Selam-e Melli, the party of young students of Badakshan in revolt against Pushtun domination, which showed a nationalist component and often regarded as national socialist; the Hizb-i- Moghul, the party of progressive Hazara youth; the Jebbe-yi Mell-yi Nejat-i Afghanistan (Mojaddidi); and the Mazah-i-Melli-yi Islam (Gailani).

The Afghan Mujahidin's tactics against the government and the Soviets conformed to the classic principles of guerrilla warfare; small group actions using the cover of night, using territory remote from centres of power, and a supporting population to inflict damage on an entrenched authority with vastly greater military resources. The larger part of the Mujahidin's strategy was to make their presence known through assassinations, attacks on outposts and installations and blocking of roads, etc.

In spite of a shortage of modern weapons, factionalism, rivalries and a lack of a tradition of unified action on a national scale, the Mujahidin controlled most of the countryside.

As the resistance grew strong the Soviet presence became more galling.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Nancy Peabody and Richards Newell, The Struggle for Afghanistan ~~3~~, (London, 1981), p.



Afghan army units became increasingly inclined to join the Mujahidin. Negotiations between the Mujahidin and commanders of the more remote garrisons, too, was more noticeable. Agreements on joint-operations against Soviet troops and provincial capitals produced better results for the Resistance. The seizure of Bamiyan, part of the Panjshir Valley, and the Faizabad airport, were examples of such operations.

Estimates of the Soviet casualties varied widely. At the end of May 1980, a Resistance spokesman put the number of Russians dead at 7,000 to 10,000. But the western analysts put the figure at one-tenth that number.<sup>24</sup>

Despite the frequency of the Soviet and DRA army unit attacks on rebels, the Mujahidin proved their staying power. Indicating their willingness to continue, they stepped up attacks. Karmal said, in September 1982, that the government was 'unflinchingly following its principled policy for the total elimination of counter-revolutionaries.'<sup>25</sup> The Mujahidin continued their operations even in the wake of major offences against them. The 'dushtmani' (bandits), as the Soviets called the Mujahidin, were successful in carrying out raids on particular targets.<sup>26</sup> But as early as 1984, the Mujahidin had become bold enough to attack the Darulaman Soviet military headquarters.<sup>27</sup> The introduction of blowpipe and stinger missiles into the Mujahidin arsenal in 1986 meant that the Soviet and Afghan armies would suffer more in order to hold on to their gains.

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<sup>24</sup> Christian Science Monitor(Islamabad), 28 May 1980, p.1.

<sup>25</sup> Kabul Radio, 17 September 1982, in USSR and the Third World, vol. 1, 13, nos 1-2, 7 July - 6 November, 1982, p. 50.

<sup>26</sup> New York Times, 29 May, 1980.

<sup>27</sup> Karachi Radio, 22 February 1984, in USSR and the Third World, vol. 14, nos 2-3, 7 January - 6 May, 1984, p.6.

This indicated that Afghanistan's dependence on the Soviet Union grew considerably with the destruction of its economy. Afghanistan had to import a wide variety of goods -- from arms to industrial machinery, to foodstuffs.

The resistance movement was not uniform. three different patterns emerged which characterized the history of the resistance parties, throughout the entire period:

1. The moderate parties comprised of a loose coalition of a multiple groups made of local fronts corresponding to different segments of the Afghan society
2. Jamiat-i-Islami
3. The Hizb-i-Islami of Hikmatyar.

These parties failed to come up with consistent policies and they often attempted to unite this loose conglomeration with a single point agenda i.e. to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan.

The Jamiat tried to organise a counter-coup supported by a popular uprising in Herat. The Hizb adopted a long-term strategy and went on developing its international connections with Iran and other fundamentalist governments and groups of the Persian Gulf. The split with the Khalqi's took place in 1979 because the latter was anxious to engage in concrete action and got involved in the ~~ix~~ Paktya and Nangrahar uprisings.

The Soviet invasion changed the perspective of the West towards parties based in Peshawar. They constituted the link between the Resistance inside the country and the outside world, which could be used effectively against the Soviet Union on the international stage. It was decided to extend every possible help.

through the intermediaries of the Pakistan government, to tackle the Soviets. Though the Pakistani's permitted weapons to flow through their country, they placed a quantitative and qualitative limit on these. They were not to exceed certain caliber - 14.5-mm for machine-gun and 82 mm for mortars.<sup>28</sup> Ceiling was imposed on the degree of technological sophistication, which barred certain categories of missiles and up-to-date weapons.

Soon after the Soviet intervention, the parties in exile in Peshawar took a strong stand by protesting against foreign power's presence on the soil of Afghanistan. During that period, the Afghan Islamists enjoyed the support of the left in Pakistan (Pakistan People's Party), the army and the Jama'at-i-Islami of Pakistan, as well as received money from the Saudis. Pakistan's support was not ideological but strategic. The Afghan Islamists were opposed to a nationalist ideology and the claims made at Kabul concerning Pakistan.<sup>29</sup> They were the best defenders of Pakistan's integrity.

Pakistan feared that the Resistance would assume the shape of the Palestine problem, involving the interests of thousands of refugees. So their objective was to keep the Resistance divided. The Pakistanis granted the same facilities to each of the six (Peshawar-based) groups while ignoring the activities of minor groups. It was, thus, the Pakistanis who ensured the continuance of a major split in the movement, at least until 1984.

General Massoud was one of the foremost military leaders of the resistance movement. He was aware of the counter-insurgency strategy of the Russians, which

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<sup>27</sup> ...

<sup>28</sup> Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge, 1985), p. 75.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

would aim at isolating territories from each other. To counter the Russian strategy he created self-sufficient mobile groups to carry out raids from their bases, attack the main axes of communication, through coordinated attacks.

The system in Panjshir was called the 'qarargah' which comprised of two types of guerrillas: the locals (Mahalli), and the 'mobile groups' (Grup-i-Mutaharek). The Mahalli ensured the security and defence of the territory in case of attack; there were several well armed groups in each qarargah and they carried on their daily activities. The Grup-i-Mutaharek were well trained professional soldiers. Each group consisted of 33 men divided into three sub-groups, each with its own commander.

The Resistance had very few expert commanders, who could lead sabotage, infiltration of enemy lines and place explosives on strategic targets.

The amount of covert American aid to the Afghan resistance had risen steadily, with \$ 280 million earmarked for Afghan resistance for the financial year 1985-1986. Total American aid to the guerrillas added up to \$625 million in six years, or roughly \$100 million a year.<sup>30</sup> This was a kind of investment, which was intended to keep the Resistance alive and not necessarily directed at throwing the Soviet forces out of Afghanistan.

All supplies from abroad, whether weapons, ammunition or medicine, passed through Pakistan. The actual amount received was extremely low. Nonetheless, Massoud's military organisation was the best in Afghanistan. The largest Soviet offensive was in Panjshir, in 1984, where the Russians occupied one-

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<sup>30</sup> New York Times, 28 November 1984. The allocation for 1985 was double that of 1983. In 1983 Saudi Arabia chipped in with \$100m.

thirds of Panjshir Valley, including the villages of Astana and Barak, as well as the lower Andarab valley. Massoud and his guerrilla forces were still in shape and launched a counter-offensive, when they gained control over the government base of Pushghur, in half an hour, with fifty men, and the Soviet commander was unable to rescue the 126 officers, who were taken prisoners.

As is evidenced, there was very little possibility of the Resistance being crushed with military strength. The Russians failed at driving a wedge between the civilian population and the Resistance.

Moreover, the Resistance could not have assumed the proportions it had if Pakistan had refused to harbour the refugees or had not allowed them to wage 'jihad' against the Marxist regime. The Soviets became the armed defenders of the revolution with their intervention, and the American cold war riposte made Washington the principal opponent of the Soviet intervention. The Afghan Resistance carried out large scale guerrilla operations when both Pakistan and the United states decided to play an active role in the movement, both militarily and financially.

The Afghan refugees, operating from Peshawar in Pakistan, were divided into a number of feuding factions and were unable to offer the people of Afghanistan a political alternative to the Marxist regime in Kabul. The resistance groups within Afghanistan lacked both the level of forces and weapons to inflict any permanent damage on the Soviet forces. Besides, the pluralism in the groups evidenced a lack of political cohesion and unity, even if there existed a limited measure of coordination of guerrilla efforts.

## A SECURITY THREAT TO PAKISTAN?

Internal instability, and some extent the creation of Bangladesh, deteriorated the political scenario in Pakistan. Pakistan's survival as a nation seemed to be questioned. Pakistan's vulnerability at this juncture seemed greater because of the April 1977 military-overthrow of an elected government and the execution of its former Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. General Zia assumed power in 1977 with a promise that civilian government would soon be established. Yet he survived in power, without wholly lifting martial law, for the next eleven years.

The security predicament of Pakistan worsened with the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the Soviet entry into Afghanistan. Pakistan suddenly became a 'front line' state, and a host to thousands of Afghan refugees seeking sanctuary from Soviet repression.<sup>31</sup>

The institutionalization of the Islamic Republican Party government of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran gave rise to the predicament whether active Iranian support would be extended to the Afghan Resistance movement. It was rather unclear for some time whether the Khomeini regime would appraise potential Soviet threats in the region. The displacement of Afghan refugees from the Herat region to Iran was on a much smaller scale than Pushtun influx into Pakistan. Pakistan wanted Iran to step-up material support to the Mujahidin in Afghanistan, which would not only ease Pakistan's burden would also extend the risk factor.

U.S security assistance to Pakistan was of crucial political significance, though not devoid of military content, 'especially as it related to the Soviet threats'.

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<sup>31</sup> Allen K. Jones, "Afghan Refugees : Five Years Later," (Washington, D.C. American Council for Nationalities Service, U.S. Committee for Refugees, Issue Paper, January 1985

The central purpose, therefore, was to strengthen Pakistan politically, to instill in it a sense of security, which would provide its leaders with confidence in standing up to Soviet political and military pressures. The security assistance, particularly the sale of the closely held F-16s, was a signal to the Soviet Union that it was risky to interfere with Pakistan's security. The F-16s underlined, far better than words, the importance that the United States attached to Pakistan's security.

The assistance offered by the U.S. to Pakistan was intended to help the Mujahidin-- to arm them, to carry out offensives against Soviet occupation forces.

Pakistan's main dealings were limited to certain spectrum of groups which had their base in Peshawar and ignored the rest. Its dual policy is, thus, evident.

Gen Zia's personal commitment and involvement made the Afghan issue the central theme of his government and its foreign policy, and, indeed, of Pakistan's politics. The USA, with the support of its allies, would probably be prepared to go to war with the USSR over the Gulf states, which cater 60% of the West's oil requirements, but it would not go to war in case of a Russian attack on Pakistan through Afghanistan. So efforts were directed to bring about a solution to the Afghan issue.

Pakistan had to face two problems.

- (1) the Soviet invasion
- (2) the inflow of refugees

Gen. Zia, even with his active Afghan policy, could not afford to buy a political settlement of the Afghan issue from the Soviets. For that would have involved a refugee-inflow within the region again. His active role in perpetuating

the crisis situation could escalate the conflict further, which, in turn, would discourage the refugees to go back.

## THE POLITICS BEHIND GENEVA TALKS

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had raised the specter of geo-political destabilization in the adjacent region of Southwest Asia, whereby Pakistan emerged central to the US-sponsored strategic consensus in the region.<sup>32</sup> This convergence of interests with Washington enabled Islamabad to obtain economic and military assistance to modernize its armed forces, which were in a dismal state.<sup>33</sup> Pakistan's security was further enhanced by the emergence of a broad coalition of international forces supporting the effort to expel Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

The first negotiated settlement of the Afghan issue came from the European concern over the collapse of détente, which was prompted by their apprehension that with the passage of time international pressure on the Soviets would diminish and permit them to consolidate their advance. In February 1980, the European Community Foreign Ministers met in Rome to adopt a proposal, initiated by (British) Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Lord Peter Carrington, for guaranteed neutrality of Afghanistan, provided Moscow withdrew its troops.<sup>34</sup> The Soviets rejected it accusing 'the authors of neutralization proposals' of attempting to decide the fate of the Afghan people.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Hafiz Malik, "Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan and its Impact on Pakistan's Foreign Policy", in Malik, ed., Soviet-American Relations with Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan (New York, 1987), p. 131.

<sup>33</sup> Stephen P. Cohen, "South Asia After Afghanistan", Problems of Communism, January-February, 1985, pp. 18-31

<sup>34</sup> New York Times, 20 February 1980.

<sup>35</sup> New York Times, 12 March 1980. Soon after Kabul also rejected the EC proposals. The Muslim (Islamabad).



The Soviets had reservations that an international conference on Afghanistan would internationalize the Afghan issue. Brezhnev's offer in December 1980, which was initially to discuss the security of the Gulf with Western nations, to assuage their concerns over the safety of oil laws,<sup>36</sup> was revised in February 1981 to include "the international aspects of the Afghan problem"<sup>37</sup> But, it made no reference to the withdrawal of Soviet forces, which also excluded the internal dimensions of the issue.

However, the idea of withdrawal was expressed by Brezhnev, in February 1980, when he stated that the Soviets would 'be ready to begin withdrawing troops as soon as there was a complete cessation of all forms of outside interference directed against the government and people of Afghanistan. [If] the United States, together with Afghanistan's neighbours [guaranteed] that, ... then the need for Soviet military aid would cease to apply.'<sup>38</sup>

Gradually, the Soviet Union found it difficult to put down the growing unrest in Afghanistan, neither could it pacify international concerns. The immediate factor was the 14 May 1980 proposals by Kabul, where a significant Kabul-Moscow initiative became evident which also laid the structures for Soviet-Afghan dialogue for later negotiations.

The focus was on the possibility of a direct bilateral dialogue between the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), and Pakistan and between DRA and

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2 April 1980. The neutralization proposal entail provision for an international arrangement to bring about cessation of external intervention and establishment of safeguards of prevent such intervention in the near future.

<sup>36</sup> TASS, 10 December 1980 (FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union), 11 December 1980.

<sup>37</sup> FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 24 February 1981, SUP 20.

<sup>38</sup> Pravda (Moscow) 23 February 1980. FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 25 February 1980 .

Iran. With the former, the dialogue was to work out on the basis of 'bilateral agreements on the normalization of relations', where the principles of non-interference and good neighbourliness would prevail, and 'concrete obligations on in-admissibility of any armed or hostile activity from one's territory against the other'. The proposal envisaged 'appropriate political guarantees', specifically on behalf of the Soviet Union and the United States, in addition to any other states agreed upon by the parties to the proposed bilateral accord to become a party to the political settlement. The cessation and 'guaranteed non-recurrence' of military invasions and other forms of interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan were seen as a prerequisite for the resolution of 'the question of withdrawal of the Soviet military contingents from Afghanistan.'<sup>39</sup>

The proceedings of the Eleventh OIC Foreign Ministers Conference on the Afghan issue were noteworthy in a number of respects. They provided the modality for pursuing a political settlement of the issue and an active participation of Iran. The OIC resolution gave a mandate to the Foreign Ministers of Iran and Pakistan and the Secretary General of the OIC 'to seek ways and means, including appropriate consultations as well as the convening of an international conference under the auspices of the United Nations or otherwise,' for a comprehensive solution of the Afghan crisis, 'provided it is not inconsistent with the resolution.'<sup>40</sup>

They were similar to the proposals enumerated in the earlier United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution, namely,

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<sup>39</sup> Riaz M. Khan, *Untying the Afghan Knot: Negotiating Soviet Withdrawal*, (Lahore, 1993), p. 29.

<sup>40</sup> Resolution 19/11 - P, OIC Declarations and Resolutions of Heads of State and Ministers of Foreign Affairs Conference 1389-1400 H, 1969-1981 (Jeddah, 1981), p. 533.

- (a) the immediate, total and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops
- b) respect for the right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government and to choose their own economic, political and social system, free-from outside pressure or interference
- c) respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and nonaligned status of Afghanistan (in the case of the OIC resolution an additional reference was made to the Islamic identity of Afghanistan).
- d) creation of conditions that would permit the early return of the Afghan refugees to their homeland in safety and honour.

The Soviet Union and Afghanistan opposed a UNGA debate on the resolution on Afghanistan, reiterating that it constituted an interference in the internal affairs of that country. Pakistan and the non-aligned countries viewed this as an instrument of pressure against the Soviet Union. The UN initiative was necessary as the OIC reached a dead end on the issue.

The United Nations served as a buffer between the super powers by conducting negotiations that were nominally between their Afghan and Pakistani proxies. Pakistan rejected demands for a direct government-to-government dialogue that would have implied recognition of the then existing Kabul regime. Instead, its Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi, insisted on a UN-sponsored dialogue in which Kabul would not be represented by the government. The Soviets also had developed an understanding with Karmal, by means of which the demand for direct talks was dropped by January 1981, and it was agreed that the UN could use its good offices.

Perez de Cueller's appointment to office of the UN Secretary General in January 1982 was viewed with optimism. Cordovez flew into Islamabad and Kabul to prepare the ground for the first of the 12 rounds of negotiations in Geneva. in June that year. The difficult task was to devise a format and an agenda to break the stalemate.

Pakistan's demand for withdrawal was countered by both the Soviet Union and Afghanistan with the demand for a prior termination of Pakistani interference to be guaranteed by Washington. Pakistan, in turn, raised the issue of 'self determination' which was unacceptable to both Moscow and Kabul. The only issue they agreed upon was the return of 2.5 million Afghan refugees from Pakistan 'in safety and honour'.

Cordovez evolved the concept of 'comprehensive settlement in which agreement on the withdrawal, mutual non-interference, guarantees on the return of the refugees would be settled. However, differences persisted on the question of involvement of Tehran as it remained aloof from the proceedings. But, a compromise was drawn. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan agreed to the formula under which Cordovez would keep Tehran informed through periodic visits.

## **THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS**

Brezhnev's successor, Yuri Andropov, admitted that pressure was being exerted on the Soviet Union on the Afghan conflict. There was a heightened sense of optimism when Andropov reportedly told President Zia-ul-Haq that the Soviet Union wanted to get out of Afghanistan and that it would withdraw quickly if

Pakistan ceased its support to the Resistance.

The Afghans focused on direct talks, a bilateral agreement with Pakistan, non-interference and international guarantees limited to non-interference. The Pakistanis did not recognize the Kabul government which ruled out the possibility of a bilateral agreement. They were in favour of a UN initiative, where the 'Afghan refugees' would be consulted. Pakistan wanted a balanced and comprehensive settlement, with irreversible withdrawal, within a short time-frame and guarantees to cover the entire settlement. Pakistan came under criticism for accepting the Geneva negotiations without the participation of the Mujahidin. Therefore, it insisted on consultation with the refugees as a means to ensure that the Mujahidin were associated with the Geneva negotiations.

In August, after two shuttle missions to Kabul and Islamabad, Perez de Cuellar reported that Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed on the following four-point agenda: withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan; non-interference inter-linked with guarantees; pledges by both countries to refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs; and the return of the refugees.<sup>41</sup>

The third shuttle mission was undertaken by UN representative Diego Cordovez, who visited Islamabad, Kabul and Teheran. Teheran, for the first time, received a UN negotiator. This resulted in the **first round** of Geneva negotiations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It began on 16 June 1982.

The agenda items comprised of inter-relationships and the issue of withdrawal. A dead-lock situation was reached when Pakistan linked the

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<sup>41</sup> Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 August 1981, p. 10.

withdrawal with the return of refugees, while the Afghans linked withdrawal to stoppage of outside interference. Pakistan was more concerned with the time-frame for withdrawal, which the Afghans viewed as a bilateral issue between the Soviets and the Afghans.

Non-interference: Pakistan rejected the linkage between non-interference and withdrawal. Pakistan was concerned with 'inviolability of frontier', and wanted an assurance on implicit recognition of the Durand Line by Afghanistan. The basis of reciprocity was emphasized by the Afghan side and it also laid special emphasis on cessation of interference, which was essentially the key to the normalization of relations, as well as to a decision on withdrawal. That the normalization of relations could proceed without the 'demarcation of border' was their contention.

On the question of international guarantees, ambiguity was maintained.

Return of refugees: Pakistan considered the requirement of consultation with the refugee-leadership as a moral requirement and a political necessity, along with voluntary return, when the situation became conducive.

Cordovez injected the principles of the integrated character of the settlement and of simultaneity in the implementation of each component. He provided dates and time-frame for each component, which were to be determined taking into account the time frame for the implementation of the other component elements of the settlement on the basis of 'an integrated set of agreed provision'.

On the question of Iranian involvement not much could be achieved, as the Iranians rejected the Geneva talks on the pretext that the Mujahidin were only entitled to negotiate the 'terms for Soviet withdrawal'. They were persuaded to

agree to be kept informed by the Pakistani side through their Charge d' Affairs in Geneva.

### **Geneva II, 11-22 April and 12-24 June 1983**

The draft provided by Cordovez was divided into four sections, corresponding to the four items.

Section I was on inter-relationship and withdrawal, which stated that the gradual withdrawal of foreign troops will commence-days from the date of (this) comprehensive settlement and left a blank space for defining modalities for withdrawal. This was unacceptable to Pakistan.

Section II was on non-interference in all essential respects. It was on the non-admissibility of intervention and interference in the internal affairs of states, which was supported by both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The phrase, 'existing internationally recognized boundaries' was substituted by 'the international borders'. It was also agreed that the settlement would come into effect thirty days after the date of signature or enunciation of the settlement, sometimes referred to as the D-day.

Section III focused exclusively on third-state support for the commitments on non-interference.

Section IV dealt elaborately with the terms and conditions of voluntary return of refugees, along with responsibility assigned to the UNHCR.

The text of Section II posed several problems. The Pakistanis asked for the restoration of the phrase 'existing internationally recognized boundaries'. The Afghan side demanded deletion of the reference to 'the international borders'.

The time-frame, too, posed a problem. Pakistan wanted a date (terminal) for withdrawal, acceptable to the guarantors and the refugees. It always emphasized that consultation with the refugees was a political requirement.

On international guarantees, it was evident that the Soviets would never agree to give a commitment of withdrawal to a third state. For Pakistan, restricting guarantees to non-interference, along with the language of section II, was tantamount to admission of guilt by Pakistan and the United States. So, the guarantees had to apply to the entire settlement.

On the question of resuming direct talks, Zia-ul-Haq did not agree to a Soviet offer to replace Karmal by Kishmand. From Pakistan's point of view a meaningful, broad-based government, marked by political compromise, possibly involving Zahir Shah, was desirable.<sup>42</sup>

Yaqub Khan undertook visits to Riyadh, Peking, London, Paris, Washington and Moscow to resume Geneva II. He held extensive talks with Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Under Secretary Eagleburger, in addition to meeting Vice President George Bush.<sup>43</sup> Both Shultz and Eagleburger pointed to the success of these negotiations and viewed the UN process in a positive light.

The negotiations soon lapsed into a stalemate. The Afghan side started by demanding direct talks. Pakistan complained that there was virtually no progress on withdrawal.

A new element was introduced, namely the Iranian dimension. The Afghans felt that Iran should undertake an oath of non-interference.

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<sup>42</sup> Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 June 1983, p. 27.

<sup>43</sup> New York Times, 27 May 1993.



### **Geneva III, 24-30 August 1984**

The fifth shuttle mission was resumed primarily because of Cordovez, who visited Tehran, Kabul and Islamabad, in April 1984. The Soviet policy had hardened under Chernenko, who took over after Andropov's death.

A change was made in the revised text of the draft comprehensive settlement with its four sections intact, with a draft bilateral agreement based on Section II. A new paragraph was introduced in Section I to say that withdrawal of the foreign troops would be 'in accordance with an agreement between Afghanistan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics'.

After Geneva III, Yaqub Khan expressed Pakistan's readiness to sign an agreement. The text of the draft *ipso facto* became Pakistan's basic position.

Cordovez undertook his sixth shuttle mission from 25 to 31 May 1985. Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed on 'a bilateral agreement on non-interference and non-intervention, a declaration on international guarantees and a bilateral agreement on voluntary return of refugees.'<sup>44</sup>

### **Geneva IV, August 1985**

The advent of Mikhail Gorbachev on 10 March 1985 on the Soviet political scene increased the expectations that the new leader would bring progress on the issue.

Cordovez's shuttle mission aimed at making Pakistan accept the format of a bilateral agreement for non-interference, to be signed by the two parties and to

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<sup>44</sup> United Nations, Report, October 1984, para 9, pp. 2-3.

leave the remaining part to be treated separately.

At the fourth Geneva round of proximity talks, Cordovez presented four separate instruments.

Instrument I, bilateral agreement on non-interference. The old objection, 'existing internationally recognized boundaries', was revived. According to the Afghan argument, Section II had been converted into a bilateral agreement and retention of the phrase in the new context could accord recognition to the Durand Line.

Instrument II, on international guarantees, became the bone of contention.

Instrument III, Pakistan's insistence on consultation with refugees in the negotiations to 'ascertain' whether the arrangements and conditions incorporated in the text for voluntary return were acceptable to them. The Afghans opposed the UN's consultation with the refugees. They proposed a trilateral, mixed commission, consisting of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the UNHCR.

Instrument IV, the Afghans persisted with their demand for direct talks.

Moscow and Kabul rejected Pakistan's demand for a parallel negotiation and a withdrawal agreement as proposed by Pakistan. They contended that it could be done only through direct talks.

In late 1984, American aid to the Resistance increased by leaps and bounds. It showed an upward trend from \$120 million in 1984 to \$250 million in 1985, \$470 million in 1986 and \$630 million in 1987. Since 1980 it had totaled some \$2.1 billion.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Selig Harrison "Inside The Afghan Talks," Foreign Policy, no. 72, Fall 1988.

## **Geneva V, 27-30 August 1985 and Geneva VI, 16-19 Dec. 1985**

At the fifth round in June 1985, Cordovez emphasized the need for Moscow to commit directly to withdrawal. The question revolved around direct talks, which Pakistan refused to concede.

The focus of the diplomatic process shifted to the UN General Assembly. The Afghan government, supported by the Soviets, waged a campaign for direct talks. At the United Nations they took the position that a settlement was in sight if only Pakistan was to agree to direct talks. Pakistan's rejection of any direct talks was politically motivated, as it would amount to recognition of the existing Kabul regime and also weaken the Resistance. The Afghan conflict gradually became a bilateral issue between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the General Assembly, the direct talks issue failed to have any impact.

Soviet representative Nikolai Kozarev proposed a new approach. The instruments would incorporate sections of the existing text: bilateral Islamabad-Kabul agreements on refugees, and non-interference and a superpower-guarantee declaration. A fourth, Islamabad-Kabul overview with time table withdrawal on protocol. Moscow and Washington were to co-sign this key fourth instrument.

In the 6th Geneva round, the State Department's Afghan coordinator, Charles Dunbar, gave Cordovez a verbal assurance of U.S. readiness to serve as a guarantor.

## **Geneva VIIA, VII B**

The seventh shuttle mission in March 1986 took Cordovez to Moscow, Islamabad and twice to Kabul. The question of format was resolved temporarily

with Kabul agreeing to continue with indirect talks.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Arnold Rapheal, persuaded Whitehead and Shultz to take a formal pledge of willingness to be a guarantor.

Meanwhile, in late March, Karmal left for Moscow for medical treatment and on 5 May 1986 he was replaced by the security chief, Dr. Najibullah<sup>46</sup>, as the President of Afghanistan.

On the other hand, the newly elected Pakistan Prime Minister, Muhammad Khan Junejo, had a more liberal attitude than Zia. He was keen on finding a solution to the Afghan problem.

Geneva VII A lasted from 5 May to 23 May 1986. The informal talks between Yaqub Khan and Cordovez dwelt on the significance and implications of the change at the top in Kabul. The four-year-time-frame and the Afghan draft of Instrument IV was passed to Pakistan at Afghanistan's insistence. It had the provision for withdrawal of one-thirds of the forces in the first year and the remaining two-thirds in the next three years, provided there was compliance of the provisions of non-interference and guarantees.

Afghan Foreign Minister Shah Mohammad Dost raised the issue of Iran, while Pakistan raised the issue of consultations with the refugees. The new Soviet representative at Geneva, Nikolai Kosyrev, criticized the Pakistani position on withdrawal within three to four months. The time-frame was negotiable.

In Geneva VII B, Pakistan insisted on a monitoring role for the UN. In a

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<sup>46</sup> Kabul New Times, 31 March 1986.

Vladivostok address. on 28 July 1986, Gorbachev initiated a wide-ranging policy towards China and the Asia Pacific and made an important detailed statement on Afghanistan. Announcing the withdrawal of six regiments from Afghanistan by the end of 1986, he also demanded reciprocity through curtailment of outside interference.

Instrument IV had 5 textual issues.

1. Phasal withdrawal.
2. Unconditionality paragraph.
3. Balance obligations (symmetry).
4. The form of Instrument IV.
5. The monitoring of the settlement.

Pakistan insisted on a definition of 'phase' for the purpose of monitoring, and primarily because of refugees, who would be keen to return. Cordovez, deleted the unconditionality paragraph and pointed that the guarantee of Soviet withdrawal was Pakistan's observance of Instrument I on non-interference.

The Soviets and Afghans objected to the UN role in monitoring withdrawal, thereby raising the question of the UN's *locus standi*.

The proposal restricted bilateral consultation between Pakistan and Afghanistan on the implementation of the agreement. The task was entrusted to the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP).

The Soviet's Afghan position, taken at Geneva VII C, was similar to the one taken by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Shevardnadze, who linked the time- frame

with the issue of national reconciliation. Cordovez was also interested in exploring the possibility of a broad-based government. Since conciliation could not take place under the leadership of Najibullah, Zahir Shah was the next option.

During the final phase of the Geneva negotiation new politically changed issues of 'symmetry' and additional 'safeguards' were raised. This was made on the plea that the structure of the Geneva instruments, envisaging a cut off of assistance to the Mujahidin, was justified in the context of a three to four-month time for withdrawal.

The final Geneva round began in early March amidst the political uncertainty surrounding Islamabad, whether it would sign the settlement without a prior agreement on an interior government, (for details see Appendix A).

The controversy revolved around the question of 'symmetry'. Moscow could not accept the US proposal for a moratorium on supplies to all Afghan factions, including the regime in Kabul. The issue was a 'positive symmetry' based on an ambiguous Soviet acquiescence to the assertion of the USA that it would have the right to provide military assistance to the Afghan factions, should the Soviet Union continue assistance.

Prime Minister Junejo favoured settlement, provided appropriate safeguards were taken into account, unlike Zia, whose primary aim was to replace the Kabul government. The demand for 'safeguards' was essentially an alternative to the interior government.

The question of gradual cut-off of supplies to the Mujahidin became an issue of debate. Efforts were made to aid the Alliance to come out with a political

initiative. They ruled out any contact with the PDPA representatives, but for direct talks with the Soviets in regard to safe withdrawal, exchange of prisoners and cease-fire.

During his time, Zia wanted Cordevez to seek an internal political settlement without delay and was not in favour of signing any accord with the Kabul regime. Within Pakistan there was controversy over Geneva settlement and internal differences were accenuated.

The formula for 'transitional government' by the Afghan Alliance, formerly known as Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahidin (IUAM), envisaged a 'grand council' of the seven leaders and a separate 'broad-based transitional government' to replace the Kabul regime and to sign the accord. This proposal failed to take off primarily because it came too late to serve any purpose. for the moderate leaders favoured the Zahir Shah option.

The signing of the Accord got muddled with the symmetry issue between the two guarantors. The logic of symmetry was to neutralize the discrimination against the Afghan Resistance. The Geneva settlement implicitly entitled Kabul to receive military assistance, while barring supply of weapons to the Resistance.

The United States and Pakistani sides were pursuing 'negative symmetry' namely mutual cut-off of arms supplies to all Afghan groups since the date of implementation of settlement. Zia-ul-Haq and the ISI preferred 'positive symmetry' permitting continuation of supplies to both sides.

Shultz provided details of the US proposals for a 'mutual moratorium on military assistance' for the period of withdrawal plus three months, and thereafter.

It was evident that the Soviets had not agreed.

Pakistan formalized its position in a letter addressed to the Secretary General by Noorani, delivered on the morning of 14 April, 'the government of Pakistan signs the Accord on the basis of the understandings reflected in exchanges between the guarantor states'.<sup>47</sup>

The signing was a grand occasion for the United Nations, the eventful day was 14 April 1988.

The Accord came into force on 15 May, the date specified for the beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The Accord specified no procedures for enforcing, verifying or even monitoring the withdrawal of Soviet troops. By February 1989, the Soviet troops were to leave Afghan soil.

## **POST-ACCORD**

The Geneva Accord represented the culmination of a process of consultation intended to create the conditions for a peaceful settlement of the crisis in Afghanistan. On 15 May 1988, the Soviet troops began their withdrawal and if all provisions were to be implemented, the last Soviet contingents were to be withdrawn by February 1989.

The Geneva Accord consisted of four documents. The first, signed by Afghanistan and Pakistan bound the contracting parties to abide by the established principles of non-interference and non-aggression. The second was a statement signed by the Soviet Union and the United States as 'guarantors'. They agreed to

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<sup>47</sup> Washington Post, 14 April 1988.



respect the sovereignty of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The statement also contained the commitment of the two nations, made earlier in the first accord. The third dealt with refugees in Pakistan. It guaranteed to all the refugees, who would return to Afghanistan, equal rights with other citizens to participate in the affairs of the government. The fourth was a statement on inter-relationships between all the accords, which provided for the phasal withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

In addition to the four accords, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz had sent a note to UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar. The note read ‘...The United States had advised the Soviet Union that the US retains the right, consistent with its obligations as guarantor, to provide military assistance to parties in Afghanistan’.<sup>48</sup>

The American attitude towards the Accord was reflected in Senator Humphrey’s statement. He bitterly assailed the Geneva Accord as a ‘slow motion sell-out’.<sup>49</sup> Simple withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan was not the only demand. Installation of the Mujahidin government, and the right of self determination of the people of Afghanistan were the issues that remained untouched.

Shultz, on the other hand, described the Accord as, ‘a major national and international success in bringing about the removal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and setting the conditions for the return of refugees in dignity and safety and for the development of a government of Afghanistan under the wishes of

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<sup>48</sup> B.K. Srivastava, United States and Afghan Accord, in V.D. Chopra, ed., Afghanistan: Geneva Accord and After, (New Delhi, 1988), p.82.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid*, p. 83.

the people of Afghanistan' President Reagan had called it 'historic'. He stated, 'We take great pride in having assisted the Afghan people in this triumph' and he assured them of 'continued support'.

A programme of 'national reconciliation' was adopted by the PDPA and the government of Najibullah. PDPA General Secretary Najibullah proposed a ceasefire and appealed to all patriotic Afghans to enter into talks to achieve national reconciliation. He had proposed that once national reconciliation was achieved, state and local power would be established with the participation of representatives after they reached an agreement. He welcomed back all those who had left Afghanistan due to 'deception, threat or persecution and announced general amnesty'.<sup>50</sup> He stated that they (the DRA government), were negotiating with 417 armed groups that were fighting against the DRA government<sup>51</sup>

It was believed that with the Soviet withdrawal, Najibullah's regime would be toppled. Contrarily, it got reinforced. The political uncertainty became evident when the resistance groups failed to arrive at a consensus on the future of Afghanistan. They continued their vow to topple the communist regime.

Priority was accorded to creating a broad-based Afghan Interim Government (AIG). On the advise of the ISI's Director General, Hamid Gul, an assembly or Shura was called in February 1989.<sup>52</sup> The Peshawar parties had agreed to a sharper division of powers and a council-elected leadership, replacing the seven-party

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<sup>50</sup> Kabul New Times, 13 May 1987.

<sup>51</sup> National Reconciliation Documents, Kabul, 1987, p. 13.

<sup>52</sup> Marvin G. Weinbaum, Pakistan & Afghanistan: Resistance & Reconstruction (San Francisco, 1994), p. 39.

Alliance. The mechanism adopted, it was felt, would dissuade any of the Afghan leaders from monopolizing power. Hamid Gul was involved in bringing about the 1989 negotiations to an end and bringing the Iranian-based resistance parties into the Interim Government.

With Benazir at the helm of affairs in Pakistan, 'there was no major change in Pakistan's Afghan policy, except for shifting Hamid Gul, who continued to be consulted by the intelligence services. The AIG failed to be a representative government, as envisaged, and Pakistan failed to involve the Iran-based Shi'ite resistance parties.

## CHAPTER III

### THE CIVIL WAR AND ITS IMPACT ON PAKISTAN

The Geneva Accord established the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) to monitor and implement the provisions of the Accord. The UNGOMAP included a military section under a Finnish General and a political section under Benon Sevon, an Armenian from Cyprus and a veteran UN diplomat. The Mission was empowered to receive and investigate complaints from both sides about the violation of the Accord.

The Accord had said nothing about the future government of Afghanistan. Gorbachev wanted to ensure that the Kabul regime remained stable enough to assure an orderly withdrawal of all Soviet troops by February 15, 1989. Yet, during the signing ceremony, all parties to the Accord stated that they had asked the Secretary General of the United Nations, through his personal representative, Diego Cordovez, to use his good offices to help the Afghans to form a transitional government. The signatory powers had agreed on an explicit policy of positive symmetry, but sources confirmed that they had agreed on implicit negative symmetry (mutual restraint)<sup>1</sup>. But, by mid-1989, the United States and Saudi Arabia had agreed that each would supply \$ 600 million-worth of arms. However, by the end of the year, the United States had sent another \$ 100 million, making a total of \$ 3 billion. These weapons included stingers, heavy artillery and other

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<sup>1</sup> New York Times, 15 April 1988.

arms, considered appropriate for a shift from guerrilla tactics to a more conventional warfare.<sup>2</sup>

In December, Gorbachev presented a new proposal for Afghanistan, in a speech to the UN General Assembly. He supported the formation of a transitional government based on an 'intra-Afghan dialogue'. He urged for negative symmetry-as a component of a settlement. He also proposed a cease fire and a UN peacekeeping force between the two sides. This essentially meant that the Najibullah regime would control the Central government, at least at the beginning of the transition.

The seven recognised Sunni parties chose an Interim Islamic Government of Afghanistan (IIGA), at a Shura held in Pakistan, while the last Soviet troops pulled out in February 1989. The Council was composed almost entirely of Peshawar-based party officials, mostly Pashtuns from eastern Afghanistan. The IIGA was the result of Pakistani-ISI and Saudi manipulation of the Shura's electoral process.<sup>3</sup> ISI Director Hamid Gul promised the Presidency to Mojaddidi, to prevent him from walking out in protest. Sayyaf became Prime Minister in deference to the Saudi's wishes, who had promised to fund a conventional Islamic Army for the government if their Wahabi sect was adequately represented.<sup>4</sup> The domination of the sub-ethnic groups in the Shura intensified ethnic tensions. The 'invisible' hand of both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia did not help. It failed to establish itself as a representative of Afghans; it was a government in exile rather than an interim

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<sup>2</sup> The Independent, 20 June 1989.

<sup>3</sup> Barnett. R. Rubin, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State (New Haven, 1995), p. 103.

<sup>4</sup> The Independent, 2 February 1989.

government. Moreover, the United States had never recognised the IGA and it continued its assistance separately to different parties.

The American-Soviet dialogue continued. Shevardnadze and James Baker met in Houston, USA, on December 11, 1990, and prepared a joint statement. They agreed to support a UN -sponsored transitional organ, which would replace the current government to end all weapons' supplies and a precise structure of the transition after UN consultation with the Afghan parties.

Simultaneously, certain changes were occurring at the international level. In August 1991, a coup in Moscow finally led to the dissolution of the USSR. The Americans came out victorious in the Gulf war by brow beating Saddam Hussain. and Shevardnadze had already resigned in the USSR. In the midst of such changes. on September 13, 1991, Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Parkin and US Secretary of State Baker agreed to the text prepared in Houston during the previous December. for a time frame with dates for the implementation of negative symmetry. It was decided that the transition mechanism would be worked out through an intra-Afghan dialogue, sponsored by the United Nations. Both the sides (USSR & USA) would cut -off all weapons' supplies at the end of the year and work towards the 'withdrawal of major weapons systems', namely the scuds and stingers'.<sup>5</sup>

Pakistan's military viewed the possibility of gaining in 'strategic depth' against India by installing a friendly Islamic regime in Kabul. Iran and Saudi Arabia used the various Mujahidin forces as proxies for rivalry within the Islamic world. With increasing cooperative relationship between the Soviet Union and the

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<sup>5</sup> Washington Post, 14 September 1991.

United States, the regional powers were given a greater deterministic role to play in resolving the transitional government's crises.

It became evident that each of the regional powers, viz.: Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, had an interest in installing a regime of their choice in Kabul. The strategy adopted by Pakistan, with the help of the United States, was to turn the Mujahidin guerrillas into a conventional force by improving their command and control capabilities and by increasing their supplies of rockets and heavy weapons. The purpose was to create a conventional Mujahidin army that would consist of eight battalions, based in Pakistan, under the command of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. His conventional force came to be called as the Army of Sacrifice (Lashkar-i-Isar). Iran's Afghan policy was closer to that of Gorbachev's, because it tried to balance the pressure from the US-Pakistan-Saudi coalition. Iran induced the Shia parties in Afghanistan to form a single party, the Hizb-i-Wahdat (Unity Party).

The Soviet withdrawal left a power vacuum. The intra-Afghan rivalry made it evident through their struggle for succession to power. The Mujahidin were fragmented to the extent that it became almost impossible to believe that the troops had already left. Easy access to guns and money, which had come from Moscow for the Khalq regime, and the resistance leader's persistence in levying tributes on road transport-traders, smugglers and government created a situation of total anarchy. Supply lines from Peshawar became more secure than ever. European and UN aid programmes, dealt at the commanders level, made the implementation of some programmes easy.

The 'Supreme Revolutionary Council of the Jihad' was formed, which had the task to explore means and ways for the organisation and coordination of warring

groups in Afghanistan and help the oppressed nation of Afghanistan exercise its right of self-determination.<sup>6</sup> Towards that end, a National Commanders Shura (NCS) was convened in Kunar. But, at Hikmatyar's orders his commanders boycotted it; Sayyaf also forbade his commanders from attending, yet a few of them did attend. The matter was finally resolved by the US diplomats in Pakistan, who promised to directly supply arms to Massood and other commanders. A significant amount of arms and supplies began to flow to Massood and other leaders in the NCS.<sup>7</sup>

To consolidate his hold, Najibullah had to rely increasingly on local commanders, thereby, contributing to a further increase in factionalism within the regime (Kabul). He created a military command structure for the northern zone placing Pashtun generals in charge of coordinating the activities of non-Pashtun militias. This led to defections. Many joined Hikmatyar, while some joined the Iran-based Shia parties.

As the UN and some important powers were deliberating on an Interim government in Afghanistan, speaking on television and radio, on March 18, 1992. Najibullah said that he was willing to relinquish control and that he would resign.

After the fall of Najibullah, four principal groups fought for power in Afghanistan. Each earned money from levying local taxes, drug trade and other enterprises.

Abdul Rashid Dostum, former commander of the Afghan Army, led an Uzbek group, which included members of other ethnic groups from northern

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>7</sup> Washington Post, 1 April 1991.



Afghanistan. He received support from the Karimov government in Uzbekistan and, perhaps, also from Russia. Massood and Rabbani, Tajiks hailing from the northeastern ethnic groups, received patronage from Saudi Arabia. Hikmatyar received aid from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Hizb-i-Wahdat received aid from Iran.

The predominance of Massood and Rabbani alienated the Hizb of Hikmatyar and Dostum. In 1991, Iran created tensions between Rabbani and Massood. In December 1992, Massood launched an offensive to take control of the Shia neighbourhoods of Kabul, leading the Hizb-i-Wahdat to sign an agreement with Hikmatyar in January 1993. Dostum openly allied with Hikmatyar, when they launched an offensive against Massood's forces in Kabul.

Massood urged the leaders in Peshawar for a Mujahidin-led interim government. Soon ethnic conflict became inevitable as the interests of the various Mujahidin groups clashed. Dostum and Massood on one side and Hikmatyar bombarding Kabul city, it became evident that the struggle for the seat of power had begun.

Finally, by an agreement brokered by Pakistan, on April 26, the Peshawar Accord came into existence. This was a mechanism to bring peace to war-torn Afghanistan, whereby S.Mojaddidi was to be acting President, followed by Rabbani for four months. At the end of the six-month interim period, the government was to hold a Shura, to choose a government for the next eighteen months, after which elections had to be held. The acting President was answerable to a Council composed of the leaders of Mujahidin parties. Massood was made minister of defence. The Interim government reached Kabul from Peshawar on April 28 and proclaimed the establishment of the Islamic State of Afghanistan.

## PAKISTAN: A VICTIM OF ITS OWN FATE

Pakistan's direct involvement in Afghanistan became apparent after the communist coup of April 1978, when Zia's regime allowed those opposing the Kabul government to escape to Pakistan. Arms from the United States and some Arab countries reached Pakistan by both ship and aircraft, and were then trucked under military supervision to the border areas of Afghanistan. At the Frontier, weapons were monitored as they entered Afghanistan; for in this manner, Pakistan was able to control the flow of arms and ammunition into that country.<sup>8</sup> However, the ISI distributed these arms, which were at this point of time not the heavier weapons sought by the Mujahidin. Besides, they were not provided the intelligence guidance and logistic support that was requested.<sup>9</sup>

These arms came from several sources. The cost of the operation, as late as 1983, was no more than \$ 50 million, with the United States financing about half the cost and Saudi Arabia most of the rest.<sup>10</sup> Throughout the decade, more than \$ 2.5 billion was set aside by Washington for the Afghan resistance. Iranian assistance was confined to the Shiite resistance groups, whereas Pakistan's assistance went to selected Sunni parties. It was believed that seven camps were operating simultaneously in 1987; four near Peshawar and three in the vicinity of Quetta, where training was given to 80,000 Afghan fighters.<sup>11</sup> Pakistani authorities, however, continued to deny any kind of active involvement. The Kabul regime

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<sup>8</sup> Edward Girardet, Afghanistan: The Soviet War (New Delhi, 1986), p. 67.

<sup>9</sup> Robert G. Wirsing, "Repatriation of Afghan Refugees", Journal of South Asian and Middle East Studies, vol. 12, no. 1, fall 1988, p. 35.

<sup>10</sup> New York Times, 4 May 1983.

<sup>11</sup> Mohammad Yousaf and Major Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story (Lahore, 1992), p. 117.

repeatedly accused Islamabad of employing regular troops for logistic support to the Resistance. Infact, the seven parties based in Peshawar had no territorial base inside Afghanistan. Yet, these parties claimed to be representing Afghanistan's broad-based government.

It cannot be overlooked that the Soviet intervention transformed the status of Pakistan in the international arena. It was interpreted by President Carter as a security threat to the US. The American response was two-pronged; one, a strategic doctrine delineating vital US interests in the region, and two, a series of punitive sanctions to demonstrate the US's indignation. So, in the name of helping Pakistan to defend its independence and its national security, the United States renewed good relations with Pakistan, thereby, transforming it into a 'front-line state' to halt Soviet aggression.

The job was undertaken through a gradual build-up of CIA-ISI nexus to counter communism in Afghanistan. The Afghan resistance movement continued its existence on the basis of help accorded by different external actors. Pakistan continued to exercise complete control over the assistance extended to sustain the Resistance, much to the dislike of the Americans. At no point of time of the Resistance did Pakistan feel the necessity to relinquish its control over the Alliance of Seven based in Peshawar.

Though Pakistan never spelt its Afghan policy except saying that it had a brotherly concern for Afghanistan, Zia never let the situation go beyond a certain point. He kept the Afghan imbroglio in a constant state of chaos. He kept the pot boiling without allowing it to spill over into Pakistan. But, this policy could have continued if he had not expired.. With his untimely demise and the then Prime

Minister Junejo giving his consent for the final phase of the Geneva Accord. Afghanistan became a problem-child for Pakistan politics.

Though Zia had never intended the pot to spill over, yet, when it occurred, Pakistan became the first victim of that spill over. The direct fallout of the Afghan crisis was the perpetuation of 'Kalashnikov culture' and the drug problem. But, the immediate price for Pakistan was the large refugee-presence, which not only threatened peace and tranquillity but also the stability of the country itself.

### **DRUG PROBLEM IN PAKISTAN**

Afghanistan is a major poppy producing country and Pakistan is the leading manufacturer and exporter of heroin and hashish.<sup>12</sup> The areas of poppy cultivation in Pakistan and Afghanistan can largely be defined as mountainous, along the western offshoot of the Himalayas and the Hindu Kush.

Opium had long existed in the history of Afghanistan as a narcotic for consumption. It rose to prominence primarily due to an increase in the external demand for narcotics. In the 1960s and 70s, the Iranian market was the major incentive for Afghan drug traffickers. The situation underwent a drastic change as small amounts began to be transited to Pakistan on their way to western Europe and North America. The link, however, broke when Vietnam and Laos fell in the mid-1970s, thereby disrupting the link between the Golden Triangle of Burma, Thailand and Laos and the United States.

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<sup>12</sup> Ikramul. Haq, "Pakistan-Afghan Drug Trade in Historical Perspective", *Asian Survey*, vol. 35, no. 10, October 1996, p. 962.

Political change in Iran, with the Shah's fall from power in 1979, disrupted the opium cultivation. The Afghan drug traffickers learnt refining opium into heroin and discovered new outlets in Europe and North America. One of the reasons for this switch to opium cultivation was that war conditions had disrupted the agricultural production factors, while the government had done little for the need of the agricultural sector of the country. Opium cultivation provided finished products like heroin, which brought revenue for the country. 40 per cent of the country's drug crop was cultivated in Helmand River Valley. It has been alleged that the Mujahidin leaders and the poppy growers often used middlemen, including other Mujahidin factions such as the Hizb-i-Islami, and some Pakistani military officials, to coordinate the guerillas' arms supplies.<sup>13</sup>

Zia had promulgated the Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Ordinance of 1983, providing for life imprisonment or not less than four years imprisonment to those found in possession of heroin or other narcotics. He had amended the Hadd Order of 1979, under which the import, export, transport or trafficking in opium and coca leaf was punishable with life imprisonment. But, these laws did not dissuade the dealers from smuggling heroin to Pakistan. A nexus was established between the Afghan Resistance and heroin traders with the active involvement of some politicians.

The situation became worse, and on May 13, 1990, the *Washington Post* published a report charging that the United States had failed to take action against Pakistan's heroin dealers because it did not desire to offend a strategic ally, the

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<sup>13</sup> John Jennings, "Afghanistan: Efforts to End opium cultivation Hit New Snags", Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 June 1990, p. 22.

Pakistan's military establishment. It was alleged that the Mujahidin brought opium across the border and sold it to Pakistani heroin refiners, who operated under the protection of (late) General Fazle Haq, governor of the NWFP. By 1988, there were an estimated 100 to 200 heroin refineries in the Khyber District of the NWFP alone.<sup>14</sup> The Afghan Mujahidin soon discovered that their reliance on external aid could be reduced, because of the financial potential of the drug trade. Soon, the strength of heroin-addicted-population in Pakistan exceeded the two million mark, thereby endangering the social balance of the society. The phenomenon of heroinization gripped the country and threatened the socio-economic norms of Pakistani society.

The heroin crop was so large that drug abuse swept Pakistan itself in the early 1980s, making it one of the world's largest addict population. In 1982, it was reported that out of the 1.3 million addicts in Pakistan about 100,000 were heroin addicts. But, in 1986, the number of heroin addicts rose to 1,901,225 from 657,842, which indicated the effect of narcotics on the Pakistani society.<sup>15</sup> However, Pakistan's opium harvest, which was 800 tons in 1979, went down to a low of 45 tons in 1984.<sup>16</sup> The Pakistani authorities blamed Afghanistan, which produced 300-400 tons of opium annually. This gradually increased over the years, and in 1994 it produced 1,278 metric tons.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Kathy Evans, "The Tribal Trail", Newshine (Karachi), December 1989, p. 26.

<sup>15</sup> The Muslim(Islamabad), 24 July 1987.

<sup>16</sup> Debra Denter, "Along Afghanistan's War-Torn Frontier", National Geographic, June 1985, p. 788.

<sup>17</sup> U.S. Dept. of State; Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, International Control Strategy Report (Washington, D.C., March 1995), p.124.

The most significant development during the Zia regime was the expansion of the drug-refining capacity within the poppy-growing areas of Pakistan. However, after the death of Zia, with the restoration of civilian rule, it was thought that Benazir Bhutto would be able to curb the drug nexus and trade. But, after ten years of unchecked growth under Zia, the country's drug trade was so entrenched that it needed more effective policy action rather than simple police action. Conservative economists estimated that the total annual earnings from heroin trade were \$8 - \$10 billion, far larger than the government's budget and equal to one-quarter of the country's entire gross domestic product.

Apprehension ran high in political circles concerning Pakistan's policies, taking after the Colombian example, where drug lords called the shots. Benazir Bhutto, while replying to a no confidence motion in the National Assembly, claimed that Pakistan was, indeed, going the Colombian way, where she also alleged that heroin dealers had paid Rs. 194 million to vote against her; many found her argument credible.<sup>18</sup> The tribal population of N.W.F.P. was determined to protect its opium harvest at any cost. Benazir was unable to bring a consensus for opium suppression in Pakistan.<sup>19</sup>

The need of the hour was a more cooperative attitude of the West towards Pakistan in fighting the drug problem. It was tragic that the United States reduced its aid to the anti-drug programme in Pakistan, especially for the economic upliftment projects in the poppy cultivation areas, which alone could have weaned the farmers away from poppy profits.

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<sup>18</sup> Evans, n. 14, p. 24.

<sup>19</sup> Rahimullah Yasufzai, "Poppy Polls", Newsline, December 1989, p. 29.

## REFUGEES

Afghan migration to Pakistan was not a new phenomenon. Prior to the Soviet intervention, 75,000 Afghans crossed the border annually.<sup>20</sup> Due to the nature of the existing relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the porous border between them, crossing over was a recurring phenomenon. Linguistic, cultural and religious ties between residents of either side of the border further accentuated their similarities leading to the expression of a sympathetic attitude towards their own kith and kin. There were three stages of refugee flight, each corresponding to specific political events in Afghanistan. The first was in July 1973, following the overthrow of the monarchy by Muhammad Daoud Khan. Though their number, during this flight, was small, the Pakistan government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had adopted a sympathetic attitude. The second exodus began after the events of April 1978, when Nur Muhammad Taraki overthrew the government of Daoud. Pakistan was caught unawares and appealed to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) for assistance. The third, and the largest influx, was after the Soviet intervention in December 1979. Throughout most of the war-period the number of Afghan refugees sheltered in Pakistan exceeded 3.2 million.

Though it is difficult to classify the inflow of refugees into different phases and count their number, it can be roughly estimated that it increased as and when political uncertainty in Afghanistan grew. Pakistan was not prepared to house and feed such an overwhelming number of refugees. Pakistan failed to visualise the

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<sup>20</sup> Grant M. Farr, 'The Impact of the Afghan Refugees on Pakistan', in Craig Baxter, ed., *Zia's Pakistan: Politics and Stability in a Frontline State* (Boulder, 1985), p. 94.



long-term problem of settling refugees within its territory and, therefore, the policies it adopted to handle the situation proved haphazard and inadequate.

It cannot be denied that Pakistan received the refugees with genuine concern and sympathy. The refugees also felt quite at home with their own kith and kin. Having established their cultural links with those living in Pakistan, the refugees flocked more in the NWFP and Baluchistan than in other provinces. The Pakistani authorities tried to confine them to certain areas, and definitely, away from Punjab. Refugees moved into areas where they shared the same ethnolinguistic similarities with the local population, namely Pashtuns.

Afghan refugees in NWFP and Baluchistan constituted 20 per cent of the population. In some areas the ratio of refugees to local population was one-to-one and in a few areas they out-numbered the local population, thereby tilting the existing ethnic balance in favour of the ethnic Pathans, over the ethnic Baluch. Therefore, the fear of Afghan refugees eroding Baluch predominance made the latter to adopt a hard stance towards the former.

Moreover, the refugees had strong ties with the Resistance fighters, which meant that they had access to arms and ammunition given to these holy warriors. Soon, refugees were charged for any crime that was committed in their localities. They were held responsible for any act of terrorism that took place, primarily because of their easy access to arms and the drug nexus. They were held responsible for perpetuating the 'Kalashnikov culture'.

It was on the advice of the UNHCR that camps were established and moved away from the border in the two western provinces, NWFP and Baluchistan.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 161.

Pakistani Chief Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees (CCAR), was established to administer and monitor the refugee problem. By the mid-1980s, the government of Pakistan took official responsibility for 45 per cent of the cost of maintaining the refugees, the UNHCR 25 per cent, World Food Programme 25 per cent, and others--Saudi Arabia and Kuwait as well as the Red Cross--the rest 5 per cent.<sup>22</sup>

Each camp was under the control of Pakistani officials. These officials had to have an understanding with the Afghan camp heads, or Maliks, who were also called 'ration Maliks', whose task was to put these refugees on a ration list. It was difficult to have all the refugees on the ration list due to over enumeration, done deliberately by Pakistani government, primarily because of the international funds that were flowing into the country in the form of assistance.

Pakistan was critical of the role played by private voluntary organizations (PVOs) i.e., nongovernmental organisations, working along with international agencies. They were worried that these organisations would establish their aid programme strong enough to tackle the refugee situation with or without the help of Pakistan. By 1983, 17 PVOs had started operation; among them was the International Rescue Committee. By the end of the decade, of the 75 foreign organizations 43 were from Europe and 14 from North America. Most of these organisations received assistance directly from the UNHCR.<sup>23</sup>

The donor countries were interested in handing over funds to a central organisation instead of entangling themselves with Afghan inter-party struggles, or in the rivalries between regional commanders and Peshawar party leaders. On the

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<sup>22</sup> Askari Rizvi, "Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Influx, Humanitarian Assistance and Implications", *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. 36, no. 1, 1989.

<sup>23</sup> *Frontier Post*(Peshawar), 17 February 1990.

other hand, demands were made to place the PVOs under the supervision of Afghan people. For this purpose, in cooperation with Pakistani authorities, USAID, in 1988, established the Afghan Construction and Logistic Unit. This unit was involved in employing many Afghans.

As mentioned earlier, the refugees had to register themselves in order to obtain ration.. A considerable number of them lived outside the camps. The refugees living in camps primarily spoke Pushtu. The non-Pushtu ethnic groups could not reconcile with those refugees who were living in Pushtu-dominated camps; they were Tajiks, Hazaras and Turkomans, whose ethnic antagonism towards the dominant Pushtuns was old and deep.<sup>24</sup> Refugees who lived in the border cities of Peshawar and Quetta were denied refugee- status. But many of them moved to Islamabad and Karachi. The ethnic differences among the refugees were ignored by both the UNHCR and the Pakistan Refugee Commissioner's office, which later proved fatal for Pakistan's interest.

A substantial number of refugees were living in Iran. According to some estimates, the number was more than two million.<sup>25</sup> Eighty refugee camps, or guest cities as they were called, were built, but less than 10 per cent of the refugees lived there. More freedom was accorded to them than those living in Pakistan.

What can not be refuted is the treatment of refugees in Pakistan. In spite of their growing number they were welcome, partly due to the common tribal origin of the local population. The refugees were allowed to move freely and seek

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<sup>24</sup> Craig Baxter, ed., Zia's Pakistan: Politics and Stability in a Frontline State (London, 1985), p. 93.

<sup>25</sup> Marvin G. Weinbaum, Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstruction (Oxford, 1994), p. 56.

employment. There are conflicting views about these facilities i.e., about free movement of refugees without any restrictions.

The refugee-outflow provoked an unprecedented humanitarian response. The political actors, namely the USA and the UK, acted on the basis of their fears of the spread of communism and their determination to block the strategic objective of the Soviet Union of extending its sphere of influence.

Both the UNHCR and the World Food Programme allocated substantial resources to support the Afghan refugee population. Food aid was first provided in 1980. There had been variation in this assistance, which was often linked to the interest of political actors, who were concerned with the Afghan situation. Further reduction was suggested following the UN Food Assessment Mission's recommendations. Initially, each person was receiving 500 gms. of wheat per head per day and 30 gms of edible oil, in addition to a supply of kerosene for cooking. Since 1 January 1991, ration was reduced; the quantity of wheat was reduced to 400 gms and that of oil to 20 gms.

The erratic implementation of food aid became evident during the years 1985 and 1986, when there was a dramatic increase in the US food aid provisions for Afghan refugees. In April 1985, President Reagan had issued a National Security Directive which called for efforts to drive out Soviet forces 'by all means available'.<sup>26</sup> In addition to military assistance, the USA had started to provide food aid directly to particular Mujahidin groups, from 1985 onwards, in connection with

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<sup>26</sup> Peter Marsden, "Afghans in Pakistan: Why Rations Decline", Journal of Refugee Studies, vol. 5, nos. 3/4, 1992, pp.18-22.

the military efforts, and this increased steadily until 1989. There was no means to find out whether food aid was actually received by the concerned parties.

The fall in the provisions in 1989 could be attributed to the expectations of the donors that the refugees would return home following the withdrawal of the Soviet Union on 15 February. The UN had also embarked on a process of withdrawal of assistance, though alternatives like funds, etc., had been arranged to improve the agricultural base within Afghanistan, so that the refugees would feel the urge to go back. Priority was given to enable the Afghan refugees to take up income-earning opportunities in order to become self reliant.

These uncertainties added to Pakistan's difficulty in tackling the refugee issue. The attitude of the donor countries made the refugees vulnerable. A statement by the Pakistani Home Secretary, following disturbances in the summer of 1990, said, 'It will be appreciated that the increase in population on the one hand and the decline in the quantum of assistance on the other have induced a sense of frustration in the refugees and such frustration ultimately surfaces in acts of violence in and outside the camps.'<sup>27</sup> The statement echoed the fear that refugees would react violently if assistance was withdrawn.

It cannot be denied that since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan had received military aid from the USA. Yet, with its refugee situation, and their growing number, Pakistan had become a victim of its own policy. Pakistan had to pay a very heavy price for housing and feeding an overwhelming number of refugees, who threatened to destabilise its society, politics and economy.

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid., p. 298.

Though Pakistan took great pride in stating that the Afghan refugees had absolute freedom and that they were not prisoners, one aspect which could not be denied was that the continuing presence of a large number of refugees left its impact on that country's domestic politics. This commenced when the Jamiat -i-Islami was accorded free access to refugee camps. This generated an apprehension among different political parties, which began to wonder about the consequences if these refugees did not leave the country and became a vote-bank for the privileged Jamiat.<sup>28</sup> It became further evident in 1986 when the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD), in a resolution, alleged the increasing involvement of the Afghan refugees in the politics of Pakistan.<sup>29</sup>

## ECONOMICS

Trickling in of refugees was accompanied by three million heads of livestock, which proved detrimental to the environment because of scarce pasture land and fragile soil. There was heavy deforestation in Pakistan's Chitral, Dir, and Hazara border, where the refugees continued to abuse the forest for fire wood, which was essential for cooking.

The Afghan refugees entered the mainstream employment market which caused resentment among the locals. Being a cheap source of labour, they had an advantage over the locals. Their availability depressed wages, thereby, rendering thousands of locals unemployed. The competition was extended to trade and crafts, too. This was because of the UN's efforts in providing opportunities, to Afghan

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<sup>28</sup> Jung(Karachi), 28 June 1986, reported that large number of refugees had already enlisted themselves as regular voters on Pakistan electoral roll.

<sup>29</sup> The Muslim, 4 February 1986.

refugees, in income-earning programmes. These programmes included training in weaving, carpet making, etc leading to self-employment.

Afghans, being an enterprising lot, also entered the transport and communication sector. Most of the refugees who fled the country had their own trucks, which helped them to set up their own transport business, which meant competition with local transporters.

The authorities placed many restrictions on the refugees in order to dissuade them from joining the mainstream. They were not permitted to purchase immovable property. Some of the wealthier Afghan refugees began to invest in big commercial pursuits like real estate, which caused a boom in that business. A sharp increase in estate prices, often accompanied by corruption, sent Pakistanis out of business. This generated ill-feeling among the locals towards the refugees. Though identity cards and domicile certificates were needed to enter these sectors of business, a lack of these, however, did not prevent them from doing so. On the contrary, they found means to acquire these, revealing thereby, the existing loopholes within the system.

Social problems were linked to those of economics. The refugees were made scapegoats for the deterioration in the law and order situation in Pakistan. Many violent ethnic conflicts in the metropolitan areas of Sindh were blamed on the refugees, even if only indirectly.<sup>30</sup> The illegal sale and spread of weapons throughout Pakistan was also linked to the Afghans. It was widely believed that

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<sup>30</sup> Aftab A. Kazi, "Ethnic Nationalism and Super-Powers in South Asia: Sindhis and Baluchis," The Journal of Asian and African Affairs vol. 1, no. 1, July 1989, p. 7.

about a quarter of the arms from the United States, Saudi Arabia and China were diverted for use by Pakistani secessionists, bandits and others<sup>31</sup>

There was a lot of resentment simmering among the people on account of the privileged treatment meted out to the refugees, especially the cash payment made to them. Some of these facilities clearly alienated the refugees from the locals. In some areas the refugees' settlement upset the existing sectarian balance. For example, the refugees' settlement in Kurram Agency altered the existing sectarian balance and created tensions.<sup>32</sup>

The refugees, on the other hand, complained about the Pakistani Chief Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees (CCAR's) and the Provincial Administration for Relief Efforts. Cash subsidies and provisions intended for them were often delayed and fees exacted for the registration of refugees.

#### **Repatriation of Refugees:**

It was expected that with the withdrawal of the Soviet forces, Afghan refugees would pull out of Pakistan. The United Nations had announced 'Operation Salam' in order to raise money to implement programmes for reconstruction and rehabilitation inside Afghanistan. But, as fighting increased and war prolonged, 70,000 more refugees entered Pakistan and registered themselves, in 1989. By 1991, the UNHCR's financial assistance for the refugees, which had been \$200

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<sup>31</sup> "Silent Voices # 1", a report by the Refugee Council in association with the British Agencies Afghan Groups, reprinted in Afghanistan Forum, vol. 19, no. 2 March 1991, p. 14.

<sup>32</sup> The Nation, 29 July 1987 and Rizvi, n. 23, p. 53.



million annually, was reduced to \$20 million.<sup>33</sup> The reduction affected not only refugees but also Pakistan.

Corruption and conflict among the refugees made the donor countries weary. The US programme worth \$30 million in food aid to the Mujahidin was temporarily suspended in early 1990, after it was detected that wheat deliveries had been siphoned off by ISI officials for private gains.<sup>34</sup>

The resistance groups based in Peshawar were not keen on repatriation, as the situation in Afghanistan, according to them, was not conducive. So, they discouraged any repatriation process at that stage. The refugees were torn between the Pakistani officials, who found the burden too cumbersome to carry on, and the resistance groups, that refused to let them return, as they felt that it would tantamount to betrayal of the 'Jihad'.

## **EFFECT OF CIVIL WAR ON POLITICS IN PAKISTAN**

The influx of lakhs of refugees and the adoption of the Afghan cause of national liberation against the Soviet-backed communists gave a boost to the Zia regime.<sup>35</sup> The Afghan crisis had given Zia the necessary space to consolidate his position and also enabled him to further delay the much promised election. It gave him the necessary legitimate ground to institutionalize his dream to establish a state governed by Islamic Law - a policy as adopted by him to further legitimize his rule.

Zia had pursued an active Afghan policy, which adopted all mechanisms to sustain the Resistance. The Mujahidin were waging a holy war as interpreted by

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<sup>33</sup> Frontier Post, 2 November 1991.

<sup>34</sup> The New York Times, 2 February 1990.

<sup>35</sup> Weinbaum, n. 25, p. 79.

him. But, gradually, there emerged a section among the public that wanted the Afghan issue to be sorted out within Pakistan. Probably, this was reflected in the hurried attitude of Prime Minister Junejo, who signed the Accord in the summer of 1988, and also got sacked for it. The importance of Afghanistan diminished when Benazir came to power, later, in 1988.

The pro-Mujahidin bias persisted inside Pakistan's military, where many wanted Pakistan to continue its active involvement in Afghan politics, which they did, violating the very spirit of the Geneva Accord. However, with an increasing number of refugees residing in Pakistan, no government could sit idle. Hence, their involvement remained a constant source of contention between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The UN officials refrained from pressing the refugees to return home; but, incentives were provided to them in the form of cash, if they returned. They were offered \$130 and approximately 140 pounds of flour on turning- in their ration passbooks.<sup>36</sup> Financing became problematic for the UNHCR, owing to the demands elsewhere on UN refugee funds. By comparison, refugees willing to return from Iran were not initially given material inducements. This was despite an agreement that had been reached with the UNHCR in summer 1992 for the voluntary repatriation of 500,000 Afghans, under which it was to provide the Tehran government with \$15 million.<sup>37</sup> The pace of repatriation picked-up considerably by Fall 1993. Repatriation became much slower primarily because of the war of succession that broke out between the different factions of the Mujahidin.

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>37</sup> The Economist, 16 October 1993.

With the fall of the Kabul government, Pakistan-Afghanistan relations entered a different phase. The resistance forces came to believe that Pakistan would actually see them through to the end of the conflict. Especially, the faith that the 'Alliance of Seven' exhibited in Pakistan further reconfirmed that it was, indeed, an ally of Afghanistan, and that it would help in building a broad-based representative government.

Pakistan had a lot at stake. If a peaceful settlement to the Afghan problem could not be found, its promise of a broad-based government, as per the choice of the Afghans, which would represent their interests and reflect their concerns, would go unmet. At the same time, Pakistan wanted a pro-Islamic regime which would continue to consider it an ally.

Pakistan had to extract a promise from the regime, or at least ensure that the Pushtunistan issue would never be raised. In order to ensure this, it was essential to accord highest priority to Afghanistan. Pakistan had to consider the possibility of an alliance between all Mujahidin factions, which would not go against its own interest. Pakistan was apprehensive that an alliance of the northern ethnic forces, and the possibility of a rump Pashtun state, in a fragmented Afghanistan, would revive the old Pashtunistan cause in Pakistan.<sup>38</sup> Pakistan had favourite factions among the Mujahidin. They favoured the Hizb-i-Islami, which was more interested in preserving the integrity of Afghanistan, apart from continuing to be under the tutelage of the ISI. It happened to be ISI's favourite.

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<sup>38</sup> Frontier Post, 1 September 1992.

The Afghan factor in Pakistan's politics was immensely significant and though Afghanistan was a liability, Pakistan had to ensure that it had the last word in its politics.

## CHAPTER IV

### INTRA-AFGHAN RIVALRY: A STRUGGLE FOR POWER

The final withdrawal of the Soviet forces did not bring peace to Afghanistan. The various resistance groups were unable to bring down Najibullah's government. The failure was attributed to the factional rivalry between the various groups. The regime, supported by Moscow and led by Najibullah, continued in power for nearly three years after the Soviet departure. When it finally collapsed in April 1992 (primarily because of the withdrawal of aid by the Soviet Union, while the disintegration of the Soviet Union was the last straw), a struggle for succession ensued among the various Mujahidin factions, which pushed Afghanistan from one crisis to another.

The Afghan resistance was never a homogenous social movement; it embraced a diverse range of political parties, commanders, combat units and sympathizers; fragmented on the basis of ethnic identity, segmentary lineage and locality.<sup>1</sup> The fractional nature of the resistance movement notwithstanding, it never lost sight of its objective, i.e. to drive the Soviet troops out of Afghanistan. However, they failed to evolve an ideology in order to restore a broad-based government in Kabul. With the fall of Najibullah, handling the power vacuum became difficult for these groups, as they could not stop the process of fragmentation of their interests and objectives in their struggle for power.

Various proposals were evolved to restore normalcy in Afghanistan. In March 1992, U.N. special envoy Benon Sevan presented his formula for a broad-

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<sup>1</sup> Olivier Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan* (Cambridge, 1990), p. 42.

based government in Afghanistan. The major elements involved were: the Najibullah regime, the Peshawar-based Alliance, the Tehran-based Alliance and the Pakistani and Iranian governments. It was decided that a Loya Jirga would be convened to shape and decide on the composition of a transitional government. The UN plan came in for sharp criticism and was rejected by Mawlawi Khalis, who accused Sevan of attempting to undo the Islamic struggle of the Resistance, and of transferring power to anti-Mujahidin and pro-Western Afghans at the behest of the USA and other enemy forces.<sup>2</sup>

The parties in exile drew support from various external powers. Jamiat-i-Islami, under Burhanuddin Rabbani, was tolerated by Iran, considered to be moderate it was acceptable to Iran, while Hizb-i-Islam of Hikmatyar enjoyed the patronage of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) and from 1985 onwards received a large proportion of US-funded military support for the resistance.<sup>3</sup> The party also enjoyed the support of Saudi Arabia. The Hizb-i-Wahdat represented the Shia interest and enjoyed Iranian support.

The Hizb and Jamiat were always at loggerheads and both staked claim to form a transitional government. Ahmed Shah Massoud, a Jamiat commander, urged the party leaders in Peshawar to arrive at a consensus solution to replace the communist regime, after Najibullah's resignation on 16 April 1992.

Najibullah's government collapsed in April 1992 when northern Afghanistan's Uzbek and Ismaili Hazara militias, affiliated to elements of the Parcham faction, allied themselves with the Tajik Mujahidin of Jamiat-i-Islami to

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<sup>2</sup> The Muslim (Islamabad), 3 February 1992.

<sup>3</sup> Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Unfold Story (London, 1992), p. 131.

defeat his cause.<sup>4</sup> The Jamiat commander, Ahmad Shah Massoud, who had founded the region-wide Supervisory Council of the North (SCN), was the spokesman for this coalition.

Talks had begun in Peshawar between the Pakistan government and the Mujahidin Resistance leaders on finding a successor to Najibullah.. The resistance leaders at the talks included Pir Sayed Ahamd Gialani, Burhanddin Rabbani, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar's deputy, Engineer Qutabuddin Hilal, son of Professor Sibghatullah Mujaddedi, Dr. Najibullah, commander Amin Waqad, Ayatullah Mohsini and Javed.<sup>5</sup> Pakistani involvement was viewed with cynicism. Nonetheless, it was instrumental in forging an agreement.

### **PESHAWAR ACCORD**

The Peshawar Accord was signed on April 24, 1992, by nine Pakistan-based Mujahidin groups wherein they agreed to establish a 51-member Interim Islamic Jihad Council It was to comprise of 30 field commanders, 10 Islamic clerics and 11 members nominated by the various Mujahidin groups.

The Accord replaced the earlier UN proposal to form a neutral council, when the UN Secretary General had made a declaration on 21, May 1991, based on UN General Assembly resolution of 7 November 1990, which was rejected by the Mujahidin groups. It enumerated five principles for a settlement:

'recognition of the national sovereignty of Afghanistan; the right of the Afghan people to choose their own government and political

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<sup>4</sup> Barnett R. Rubin, "Afghanistan in 1993 : Abandoned but Surviving", *Asian Survey* , vol. 34, no. 2, February 1994, p. 186.

<sup>5</sup> Amera Saeed, "Afghanistan : Peshawar Accord and After," *Regional Studies* , spring 1993, vol II, no.2, p. 131.

system; the creation, for an interim period, of an independent, credible and authorized mechanism to oversee free and fair elections to a broadly-based government; a UN monitored cease fire; and the donation of sufficient financial aid to facilitate the return of the refugees; and economic and social reconstruction’.

Though this declaration was welcomed, both by the then Kabul regime and Pakistan, it failed to impress the AIG.

The Peshawar Accord (see Appendix B for further details) provided for a ‘Transitional government’, which was to be installed for a period of two years. Its provisions consisted of 12 clauses to deal with the structure and process for a provisional period, which was to last for six months. It aimed to evolve an Islamic State in Afghanistan.

The first clause envisaged a body of fifty one persons, which would establish power in Kabul, headed by Sibghatullah Mujaddedi, who would also be President for a period of two months. After the lapse of this period, a 10 member Leadership Council, composed of Mujahidin chiefs, presided by Prof. Burhaunnddin Rabbani of the Jamiat-i-Islami, was to succeed Mujaddedi. Rabbani’s tenure was to commence two months after the transfer of power, or from end-June 1992, and last till October 1992. The third provision was a significant sentence standing all by itself, which spelt the core principle, ‘The above mentioned period will not be extended even by a day’.<sup>6</sup>

Clause 4 provided for a second-level of administration. A Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet were to be constituted from the ‘members of the

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 107.



Tanzeemaat' (or the Mujahidin organisations), with the discretion of their respective heads. Clauses 5 to 10 dealt with important portfolios. Clause 12 specified a time frame for the entire period of six months, by which time a Transitional government was expected to have been installed for a period of two years.

Mojaddedi, on 28 April 1992, took over as the President of the new interim Afghan administration. He, in consultation with the Islamic Jihad Council, announced the formation of a Council of Ministers; Massoud was made Minister for Defence. Syed Gailani, the leader of the Mahazi-i-Melli-i-Islamic (National Islamic Front), was elected Minister for Foreign Affairs, while the Premiership was set aside for Ustad Abdul Sabur Farid, a Tajik commander from the Hizb-i-Islami. Though Mojaddedi had declared amnesty, clashes continued between Dostum's Uzbek forces and Hikmatyar's men, as the former had been denied any official role.

On 28 June 1992, Rabbani convened the Leadership Council in order to succeed the Islamic Jihad Council (as per the Peshawar Agreement, after two months). Mojaddedi surrendered power to the Leadership Council, whereby the Presidentship was offered to Rabbani. The latter announced the adoption of a new Islamic national flag and the establishment of an economic council.

The uneasy truce did not last long and inter-Mujahiddin violence continued unabated in Kabul. Hikmatyar, who thus far had been denied any official status, continued his attacks on Kabul.

By September 1992, Rabbani had announced an advisory council, which came to be known as the Resolution and Settlement Council (Shura-e Ahl-e Hal

wa Aqd), that was to be convened by the end of his Presidential tenure. The mandate given to the advisory council was to act as a Constituent Assembly, to legislate for the country, and to elect the future President. Upon assumption of power as President, Rabbani could not stop the inter-Mujahidin feud, especially the one between Massoud and Hikmatyar. As the former had been denied official status in the government, he continued to give vent to his disappointment by bombarding Kabul.

Rabbani asked for a renewal of his tenure. The Leadership Council agreed to extend Rabbani's tenure by 45 days. This was regarded as 'illegitimate' by Hikmatyar, Mojaddedi and the Hizb-i Wahadat-i Islami, who denounced the 1,335 member council for re-electing Rabbani as President. This was disapproved of by other Mujahidin factions, although Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia consented.

Heavy fighting commenced among the Mujahidin groups after the re-election of Rabbani as President. Due to a deterioration of the situation, all Western diplomats left the country. Though Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia made efforts to arrange for a cease fire, efforts were mainly directed at striking a bargain between the Hikmatyar faction and government forces. As civilian casualties rose, the neighbouring countries started exerting pressure on President Rabbani to bring a compromise between them. As a result, Rabbani, Hikmatyar and Mojaddedi met in Islamabad to resolve the immediate crisis and broker peace.

The Peshawar Accord had some striking loopholes. The 51 member body was silent on its composition, and the specific measures it would take to 'establish power'. The Accord did not provide for power sharing between

Dostum and Hikmatyar. It did not lay any emphasis on economic priorities and not to mention the repatriation issue, which was not addressed at all.

While the terms of the Peshawar Accord were being discussed, factional struggle for power already commenced. After the Accord was signed violence erupted on a much larger scale, especially when Dostum realised that his authority had failed to earn him a seat in the Jihad Council. Consequently, when Rabbani took over he, too, failed to improve the situation, and his insistence on continuing in power enraged Hikmatyar further. It drove Hikmatyar and Dostum to forge an alliance to unseat Rabbani.

It was under these circumstances that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia decided to play the role of peace makers. The result was a new accord, called the Islamabad Accord.

### **ISLAMABAD ACCORD**

After intense deliberations, on 7 March 1993, another agreement was signed in Islamabad, at a meeting attended by Rabbani, Hikmatyar and the representatives of five other resistance groups. This provided that Hikmatyar would assume the office of Prime Minister and form a Cabinet, in consultation with the President and leaders of the Mujahidin parties.<sup>7</sup>

The signatories to this Accord agreed on the formation of an Interim Government, which was to hold power for 18 months. It was decided to have an effective cease fire and form a new Council of Ministers. It further promised to hold legislative elections within a period of six months. The Islamabad Accord

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<sup>7</sup> United Nations, Afghan Peace Accord, UN documents S/25435, 19 March 1993.

was officially approved and signed by Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia( see Appendix C for further details).

Hikmatyar deliberately avoided inducting former Minister of Defence, the Tajik General Ahmad Shah Massoud, into his Council of Ministers. The new government had at its hand the monumental task of restoring the authority of the Central government, establishing law and order, providing peace, and security, and rehabilitating three million refugees from Pakistan. Given the ethnic and sectarian diversity of the Afghans, the task proved to be more difficult than ever. In July 1993, the UN reported that 1,361, 243 refugees had returned to Afghanistan since the beginning of 1992, while an Iranian official stated that a further 752,000 had returned from Iran.<sup>8</sup>

However, trouble began when ethnic minorities such as the Uzbeks and the Tajiks in the northern province, and the Shiites, a religious minority in the west, did not favour the authoritarian domination of the Sunni Pashtuns. Besides, the trouble on the Afghan-Tajik border did not help Hikmatyar's task. The Tajik Islamic groups were opposed to a communist linkage in the government of Tajikistan. These Tajiks had to seek refuge in Afghanistan, from where they launched armed attacks on there government. Hikmatyar sympathized with the Tajiks, championed their cause and provided them with weapons. Rabbani, on the other hand, was sensitive to this Afghan-Tajik border issue and his attitude was more conciliatory than that of the Prime Minister. His aim was to commence a socio-economic reconstruction programme, rather than pursuing an ambitious policy towards Afghanistan's neighbours. On 30th August 1993, the Afghan and

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<sup>8</sup> United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Afghan Digest, no. 61, 28 July 1993, p. 1.

Tajik governments issued a joint communiqué underlining their commitment to respect the inviolability of their respective borders.

Hikmatyar and Rabbani differed in their respective approaches to various issues. Hikmatyar was ideologically committed, while Rabbani aimed at conciliation and consensus. There was a clear cut demarcation of functions and duties between these two leaders. Hence, differences between them often reflected in the implementation of any policy.

Though the Islamabad Accord was aimed at bringing peace to the region it had certain basic flaws. It was a product, not of consensus amongst Afghanistan's elites, but was a consensus brought primarily by external pressure, namely Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The clashes between the Hizb-i-Whadat and the Ittehad-i-Islami were, largely, a result of the machinations of Iran and Saudi Arabia.<sup>9</sup> Pakistan had a vested interest in having Hikmatyar at the helm of affairs in Afghanistan. These external powers' involvement, active as it was, did not help the situation. The Interim Government failed to bring stability to the country, primarily because of the creation of two potentially strong executive offices, which set the stage for institutional incoherence. The differences between the two stalwarts were too obvious to have been disregarded by the external powers, which laid down the terms of the peace accord.

## **POST-ISLAMABAD ACCORD SCENARIO**

Differences between Rabbani and Hikmatyar reached a flashpoint in 1994. Hikmatyar's main objection was Rabbani's continuation as President after his term had formally ended. He offered to step down if Rabbani did the same, with

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<sup>9</sup> Peter Hopkirk, *The Great Game : On Secret Service in High Asia* (Oxford, 1990), p. 10.

power being transferred to a neutral government, which would oversee the election procedure. But, Rabbani insisted on the appointment of a new leader, to whom he could hand over the Presidency. Their irreconcilable differences had set in another stage of political crisis in the already existing chaotic situation. This ultimately led to a political deadlock, which contributed to the break down of the peace accord.

Consequently, fighting spread to the provinces of Baghlan, Balkh, Faraiyab, Samangan, Kunduz, Wardag Jawzjan and Takhar, resulting in heavy casualties. The fighting was attributed primarily to a shift of alliance, where Gen. Dostum transferred his allegiance to his arch-enemy, Hikmatyar. The supporters of the two joined to confront the forces of Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud(see map 2 for areas under the control of different Afghan Groups)..

There were five power centres on the Afghan scene in 1994, two of which fought each other, while the other three remained neutral.<sup>10</sup> Rabbani, who considered himself the legitimate President, was supported by Ittehad-e-Islamic of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, Massoud and Ismail Khan(see Map 2 for areas the under control of different Aghan groups) .

Hikmatyar of Hizb-i-Islami enjoyed the support of three parties, National Islamic Movement (Dostum), Hizb-e-Wahdat-(Ali Mazari), Jabh-e-Nijat-e-Milli (Mojaddedi). Fierce fighting broke in and around Kabul and it became a virtual battlefield. In northern Afghanistan, the Rabbani-Massoud forces lost control of

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<sup>10</sup> Zalmay, Khalilzad, "Afghanistan in 1994 : Civil war and Disintegration," *Asian Survey*, vol. 35, no. 2, February 1995, p. 148.

Kunduz to the Hikmatyar-Dostum coalition. Both fought for control over the Salang highway.

Rabbani's coalition was able to drive away the Wahdat forces from Kabul University. Hikmatyar's forces blocked the main road from Kabul to the east, which ran through Sarobi and Jalalabad to the Pakistan border. To the north, Dostum blocked the road in the Salang area. Rabbani's refusal to step down from the post of Prime Ministership triggered a civil war during the post communist period. This evoked a strong international reaction.

Attempts were made by external actors to devise a plan. Accordingly, several proposals were made to end the civil war. In mid-May, the special envoy of the UN Secretary General met the former king of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, who called for a Loya Jirgah (Supreme National Tribal Assembly) to be summoned. This proposal was endorsed by Rabbani. But, it failed to meet the approval of Hikmatyar, who reiterated his demand for the establishment of a neutral government to oversee the general election.

The three neutral parties headed by Gailani, Mohammadi and Mohseni proposed a transfer of power in Kabul, from Rabbani and Massoud, to a council composed of the leaders of nine Mujahidin parties.

On February 12, 1994, Secretary General Boutros Ghali named former Tunisian Minister Mahmoud Mestiri as his special envoy to Afghanistan. The mission visited eight cities and towns in Afghanistan, and received over three hundred peace proposals, letters and requests.<sup>11</sup> These essentially reflected the

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<sup>11</sup> Barnett R. Rubin., The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System (London, 1995), p. 105.

aspirations of the Afghans, who wanted restoration of normalcy in the region. The Afghan people proposed a UN-monitored cease fire; a neutral security or peacekeeping force; a transitional period, leading to elections; and the disarming of the population and the principal belligerents.

Mestiri proposed the meeting of a forty-member Afghan 'advisory council' in Quetta. The council proposed that Rabbani hand over power to an authoritative council, which would oversee the disarmament process and prepare for a Loya Jirga to decide on the future of the country. This plan was in principle endorsed by both Rabbani and Hikmatyar because it was endorsed by the United Nations Security Council on November 30, 1994.

Though the United Nations enjoyed a reputation among Afghan warring factions of being neutral and trustworthy, the main protagonists of the civil war tried to use the U.N. mission to reinforce their position. Nonetheless, the relentless effort of the United Nations came to a naught when a new military force, known as the Taliban, of which the UN was earlier unaware, emerged on the political scene of Afghanistan.

## **ORIGINS OF THE TALIBAN**

It has been alleged that the Taliban came into existence with the 'backing' of the United States. Several eminent analysts in Islamabad and Peshawar have stated that the Taliban have been organised not by the notorious Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) but by Pakistan's Interior Minister, (Retd) Major General Naseerullah Babar as well, under whose plan they were trained to use arms.



Indeed, the Taliban are nicknamed 'Babar's boys'.<sup>12</sup> None of these allegations can be proved. Despite the mystery surrounding their origin, it is known and established that they are Afghan theology students, belonging to Khandahar, who were educated in Pakistan's NWFP and Baluchistan-based Madrassas that were meant for Afghan refugees, run by Fazlur Rehman's Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam, from where they turned into a force of 28,000, fully equipped with tanks, fighter jets and other sophisticated weaponry. Besides religious training, they acquired expertise in handling weapons.

According to Mullah Dawood, a Taliban leader, 7,000 Taliban had taken part in the uprising against the Mujahidin, 'and the ultimate plan was to cleanse Afghanistan of those who had become killers, thieves and robbers in the name of Islam. He stated that their aim was to restore peace and ensure an end to looting, dishonouring of women and lawlessness. Taliban would purge the country' of such elements.<sup>13</sup> The Taliban is a fact of life, according to Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam's (JUI) Information Secretary, Hafiz Hussien Ahmad. It is also believed that their presence is a natural reaction and an outcome of the frustration among Afghans over the continuing civil war.

### **Rationale Behind the Emergence of the Taliban as a Force**

It has been years since the last of the Soviet troops were pulled out of Afghanistan. The down fall of Najibullah, the most cherished dream, occurred later. It incidentally triggered off a power struggle within the various Afghan

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<sup>12</sup> News Time (Hyderabad), 10 March 1995.  
In an interview with A.-G Ravan Farhadi, permanent representative of the Islamic State of Afghanistan to the United Nation. The view was re-confirmed by the Ambassador.

<sup>13</sup> The Tribune (Chandigarh), 7 February 1995.

factions. It was these 'holy warriors' who were instrumental in driving away the infidels. Yet, when the time came to set up a much expected broad-based government, which would be truly representative of Afghan aspirations, they failed to keep their promises.

The civil war situation continued in post-communist Afghanistan. The war was now internecine, having earlier been against the Soviets. The intense struggle for power became evident when the Islamabad Accord failed to distribute power between the Jamiat and the Hizb. In this task, each was supported by its respective patron power.

With the Taliban entering the fora of Afghan politics, with their brand of ideology, many war-weary Afghans looked at it as a positive sign. They hoped that this group would bring peace to the country. Mullah Mohammad Qmar Akhund, leader of the Taliban, is believed to have been instrumental in rescuing a group of girls who were abducted by the Mujahidin commanders. This act, probably, presented them in good light to the Afghan people. The excesses committed in the name of Jihad and Islam may have motivated the Taliban to take to arms.

They clashed directly with the other Afghan Mujahidin groups in order to establish their vision of Islam. Their inception, according to some, was, intended, to purge the country of all atrocities and excesses that were being committed in the name of religion. According to Mullah Boorjan, a Taliban military commander, their immediate aim was to disarm and discredit the former Mujahidin groups and install a new government in Kabul.

Given the circumstances under which the Taliban came into existence, it was not devoid of any political interest. The patrons of Taliban had definite plans

for them, to establish a Sunni fundamentalist regime in Kabul. The Pakistani denial of propping up the Taliban did not stop them from making conscious efforts to enable the Taliban to gain a foothold in Afghanistan. Armed with modern weaponry, the Talibs captured various seats of power, which included Ghazni and Mazar-i-Sharif. Saudi Arabia was happy to see a Sunni fundamentalist group gaining power in Afghan politics. The Taliban represented the Deobandi school of thought, which was inspired by the Wahabi version of Islam that is enforced in Saudi Arabia.<sup>14</sup> Though the United States had misgivings about Taliban, it could not do much because Iran, an adversary, had no control over the Taliban. Probably, Iran was one among the few countries that raised objection to the rise of Taliban keeping the interest of Shi'as in mind, especially when the chief of Hizb-i-Wahadat, Mazari was killed by Taliban forces.

There is the possibility that the creation of the Taliban may eventually backfire on its mentors. Such apprehension has already been voiced by experts and analysts in Pakistan, especially in the case of the Pakhtoonistan issue.

### **TALIBAN CAPTURES POWER**

In December 1994, the Taliban secured the release of a Pakistani convoy which had been ambushed and hijacked by a local warlord. It had been said that after this incident the ISI had supported the Taliban in an unprecedented manner. Large quantities of kalashnikovs and diverse ammunition were supplied to them. They were provided training and logistic support, too. But, there are contradictory reports on the exact time of the commencement of the ISI's logistic support.

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<sup>14</sup> Rahimullah Ysufzai, "Here Come the Taliban," Newsline, February 1995, p. 28.

The Taliban won a major victory when it captured the city of Kandahar from the forces of Hikmatyar, who had hitherto dominated the southern provinces of the country. In February 1995, the Taliban had been instrumental in ousting Hikmatyar from his stronghold in Maidan Shahr (30 k.m. south of Kabul). Charasiyab, too, was captured, forcing Hikmatyar and his men to flee.

However, the Taliban's great success was in overthrowing Gen. Ismail Khan from Herat and the capture of the Kandahar-Herat-Khustka road. It was, indeed, the first strategic victory for Taliban, especially keeping the geo-strategic importance of the area in mind. This provided a major land access to the natural gas fields of Turkmenistan.

In a multi-pronged strategy, the Taliban militia moved towards Nangahar province from Pakhtia and seized Jalalabad. The fall of Jalalabad proved to be of strategic significance for the Taliban, as it opened the eastern flank of the capital. The fall of Sarobi brought them further close to their target, Kabul (see map 3 for the position of warring groups in Afghanistan).

On September 27, 1996, Kabul was captured by the Taliban, who, upon capturing it, dragged the former communist President Najibullah from the UN office there, executed him publicly and hanged him from a lamp post.

Mawlawi Mohammad was declared acting chief of the six-member Interim Council, under whom would be enforced a complete and pure Islamic system in Afghanistan.

Since the rise of the Taliban to the final fall of Kabul, Rabbani benefited immensely. The ongoing civil war between the Taliban and Gen. Dostum, who

was on the defensive for the first three years, persuaded Rabbani to renege on his earlier promises of stepping down from the Presidency, on March 21, 1995. This resulted in the trading of arguments and accusations between him and the UN Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Mohamood Mistiri. Rabbani claimed that he was prepared to hand over power but would do so only when a transitional council, representing all the provinces and major Mujahidin factions, would be agreed upon by all the concerned parties. The Taliban, however, refused to participate in any such transitional process.

The Taliban captured the Shindad airbase, in Farah province, in western Afghanistan, which is the second-most important airport in the country after Kabul. After losing strategic locations on the southeast and western parts of Kabul, the Tajik militia, led by Massoud, launched a fierce counter-attack, thereby, successfully opening a corridor between Kabul and its home base in the Panjshir valley.

The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan (SCCIRA), formed in 1994, had been guided by the instinct of self-preservation and a desire to become the fulcrum of the power game in the country. Initially, the Taliban and Hikmatyar, who had been inducted into the SCCIRA coalition to tackle Rabbani, had been using Pakistan as their base. In spite of Pakistan's denial, its involvement was evident.

General Dostum later joined the SCCIRA against the Rabbani-Massoud coalition. This just goes on to prove that factional conflict within Afghanistan is still vibrant.

The quick spate of the Taliban's impressive successes persuades one to wonder if it received external assistance. Although Pakistan assiduously denied giving any military assistance to the Taliban, it, nonetheless, made every effort to explore means of supporting the new regime, as well as according legitimacy to it. A flurry of diplomatic activity was undertaken by (Retd.) Gen. Naseerullah Babar, Izlal Zaidi, the Afghan coordinator at the Prime Minister's secretariat and JUI chief Moulana Fazlur Rehman, who visited Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgystan, to gather support for the Taliban. Babar shuttled between Kandahar, Kabul and Mazar-e-sharif but was unable to forge any kind of understanding between Dostum and the Taliban. His plea for a broad-based government was basically intended to provide recognition to the centrality of the Taliban as a *de facto* force in Afghanistan. His effort was directed at curbing anti-Taliban activities.

Seemingly, the United States, during this period, did not play a very active role. On the contrary, it was only when Najibullah was hanged that the U.S. reaction became palpable. The US Administration was probably embarrassed by the radical groups' distorted interpretation of Islamic law. But, Washington was quick enough to detract from this position later on, and unnamed US officials said that they were misled by Pakistan into initially supporting the Taliban regime.<sup>15</sup> This did not stop UNOCAL, a US-based energy company, from seeking to build a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan's Daulatabad gas fields through Afghanistan to Pakistan, at an estimated cost of \$ 2 billion.

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<sup>15</sup> The Hindu(Madras), 3 October 1996.

## INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO THE TALIBAN

US Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphael, who headed the US delegation to the UN meeting of November 1996, said, 'If we want to moderate their policies, we should all engage with them.' She, however, added that having such contacts did not confer recognition to the Taliban. It provided, a window for mutual understanding and, hopefully, future cooperation.<sup>16</sup> The statement reflected the United States' attitude towards the Taliban. Afghanistan's proximity to the Central Asian States, which are rich in oil resources, endeared it further to Pakistan. The United States feared that the rising Islamic fundamentalism in the region needed to be contained. The United States viewed that Pakistan's moderate Islamic disposition would help the Central Asian States in not going the fundamentalist way. Hence, Pakistan, being the only ally, would prove to be a potential stabilizing factor in Central Asia. Moreover, the necessity to contain Iran was essential for the United States. Like the Soviet Union in the cold war years, Iran became an anathema to the US in the post-cold war period.

American interest in Afghanistan was revived once again, after a gap of five years (1989-1993), due to UNOCAL Corp., the world's largest oil and gas producer. UNOCAL joined Saudi Arabia's Delta Oil Company, in mid-1995, to exploit the oil and gas resources of Turkmenistan. Two pipelines, worth over \$ 4.7 billion, would be laid from Turkmenistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan.<sup>17</sup> Pakistan's initiative was, therefore, evident through its method of having a friendly regime in Kabul.

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<sup>16</sup> The Pioneer(New Delhi), 21 November 1996.

<sup>17</sup> Frontier Post (Peshawar), 18 April 1996 and POT, 22 April 1996.

Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati engaged in shuttle diplomacy to extend every possible help to the anti-Taliban forces to stop the progress of the Taliban. He approached the Central Asian States to shore up support for the Dostum-Massoud alliance. Iran sponsored a regional conference on Afghanistan which was attended by all countries of the region, except Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. In its public statements, the conference called for a cease fire and a broad-based government in Kabul. The UN Security Council held a meeting on Afghanistan but failed to devise effective steps to end foreign intervention and disengage the warring factions.<sup>18</sup>

Iran's interference and concern grew on account of the Taliban's treatment of the Shi'as of Hazarat. After capturing Kabul, the Taliban directed their interest towards Mazar-i-Sharif. According to some reports 2,000 troops of Ismail Khan had ousted the governor of Herat, who fled to Iran. Russia seems to be favoring Iran, as it was dispatching military supplies to the northern forces through Turkmenistan by air and Uzbekistan by road.

The international outcry against the Talibs became evident when Najibullah met his end in their hands. Yet, Pakistan was the first country to recognise and grant legitimacy to the activities of the Taliban. For the West, interest was confined to having access to oil from Central Asia through Afghanistan, probably even at the prospect of accepting the Taliban at the helm of affairs.

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<sup>18</sup> Ajay D. Behera, "The Battle for Kabul : Interplay of Geopolitics and Cold War Logic," Strategic Analysis, vol. xix, nos.10-11, p. 1384.



Ironically, the Taliban-brand of Islam might not be confined to the areas under its control in Afghanistan. Their kind of religious bigotry may infect Pakistan as well.<sup>19</sup>

### **TALIBAN IMPOSES SHARIAT AND INTERNATIONAL REACTION**

The Taliban imposed Shariat in the provinces they controlled. In accordance with their brand of Islam. Strict observance of Islamic principles was made a necessity. This included men growing beard, praying five times daily, and women folk wearing 'burkha'. It essentially meant that women were debarred from going to schools and they were strictly instructed to stay indoors and never venture out without a male escort.

While international protest against the Talib's insistence on Sharia' was emanating, they continued to march forward and gained control over twenty per cent of Afghan territory.

In September 1996, the Head of the United Nations Special Mission for Afghanistan, UNSMA, Dr. Norbert Holl, urged the Taliban-led Islamic Revolutionary government to devise a 'constructive solution to meet the UN concern of the human rights situation'.<sup>20</sup>

In October, Dostum, Massoud and Karim Khalili of the Hizb-i-Wahdat signed a pact of military alliance to establish a permanent government in the nine provinces not under control of the Taliban. This pact also formed a body formed a body called the the Supreme Defence Council of Afghanistan (SDCA), which required council members to help each other's side, if attacked by the Taliban.

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<sup>19</sup> Zahid Hussain, "Islamic Warriors," Newsline, February 1995, p. 23

<sup>20</sup> International Herald Tribune(Paris), 20 September 1996.

Upon assuming power the six-member Taliban Interim Government formally asked the United Nations and other countries to recognise it . Barring Pakistan, which had made several overt gestures of supporting the Taliban's capture of power, many could not bestow recognition due to international pressure.

Amnesty International condemned Kabul's new rules for what it termed as 'reign of terror', saying that at least 1,000 people had been arrested on different pretexts since the Taliban's assumption to power.

The Taliban, on the other hand, sternly warned Iran to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of its country. Pakistan's Interior Minister, Nasserullah Babar, was the first foreign dignitary to visit Kabul since the Taliban assumed power. He was accompanied by Maulana Fazlur Rahman, both of whom held talks with the Taliban.

At the international level, in Teheran, on October 29, a meeting was held, called the 'Friendship of Afghanistan' where emphasis was laid on ending the hostilities in Afghanistan. Three point plan was adopted to solve the Afghan crisis. The first, any decision-making in Afghanistan was to be undertaken by the Afghans. Second, non-interference principle was adopted. Three, a broad-based government, consisting of all the ethnic and religious groups should be endeavoured for. This meeting was boycotted by Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia and some Afghan factions. The participants at the meeting were India, Iran, China, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, the EU and the UN.

The Teheran meeting, on October 30, 1996, made a declaration known as the Teheran Declaration (for details see Appendix D). The signatories to the

Declaration emphasized the necessity of cessation of foreign interference in Afghanistan and urged other countries to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan. The Declaration was signed by nine regional countries which supported the UN effort to convene an international conference of 'states with interest and influence'<sup>21</sup>.

With the conquest of Jabul -us -Siraj, the Taliban moved closer to its targets, the Salang highway and the Panjshir valley in northern Afghanistan. After the fall of Kabul both Rabbani and Hikmatyar retreated. Though general amnesty was granted to all officials by the Taliban, it did not include leaders. Pakistan, on the other hand, agreed to recognise the Taliban administration as the new legitimate government of Afghanistan( see Map 3).

The Clinton Administration claimed to have maintained neutrality in Afghanistan. The United States did not 'favour any particular faction' and reportedly urged Afghanistan's neighbours to follow a similar policy.<sup>22</sup>

India's reaction to the Taliban's ascendancy in Afghanistan was rather delayed. Especially since the Soviet intervention, India had not played an effective role in Afghanistan.. So, the Taliban's bursting on, on to the scene, left India totally unaware. India refused to recognise the Taliban-led Kabul regime and still continues to consider Rabbani's government as the legitimate regime in Kabul.

The UN mission in Afghanistan has a double task at hand. One, to explore the prospects for a broad-based government, with the Taliban being the kingpin, and two, investigating the Taliban's potential staying power as an independent Afghan faction.

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<sup>21</sup> The Times of India (New Delhi), 6 October 1996.

<sup>22</sup> State Department Spokesman Nicholas Burns as quoted in The Times of India, 6 October 1996.s

## **TALIBAN MEET RESISTANCE FROM OTHER FACTIONS**

The defection of Gen. Abdul Malik from Dostum was interpreted by an analyst as the triumph of the Taliban. The anti-Taliban groups were instrumental in capturing many military airports, and later overrunning the Charikar base.

Though the Taliban has captured power and imposed Shariat, fierce resistance continues. The 'northern alliance' was formed by Dostum and Massoud against the Taliban. Afghanistan is going through another phase of civil war. The Taliban are being actively supported by both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in their efforts.

Malik has captured Jabul -us- Siraj and has also cut off the only road link between Kabul and northern Afghanistan by blowing up the mouth of the Salang tunnel.

The new National Liberation Front, the anti-Taliban faction comprising Malik, Massoud, Rabbani and Khalili is self-proclaimedly determined to brow beat the Taliban, though, at the moment, it appears as if they have been browbeaten; this is merely a momentary loss for them.

The Taliban's existence had been attributed to the war-inflicted conditions in Afghanistan. Yet, their coming to power did not improve the situation. The initial hopes of peace proved fatal for the Afghans. The refugees fled more than ever before, in greater numbers, into Pakistan, thereby creating another political chaos.

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSION

Afghanistan's geographical location at the crossroads between India, Iran, Central Asia and Pakistan has provided a long history of imperial competition and conquest.<sup>1</sup> The subsequent conquest by the British of Afghanistan and the Russian control over Central Asia meant that Afghanistan would be used as a buffer state. British interest was confined to utilizing the state as buffer by gaining control over its foreign policy, establishing recognized frontiers and promoting the development of a stable state structure in that internally fragmented country. Despite such conquest and intervention, the fierce and independent nature of the Pushto-speaking people could not be suppressed.

Afghan history is fraught with violence and crisis, often generated by extra-regional actors, who found bases in the internal actors in Afghanistan. Afghan internal dynamics have enabled the external actors to play an active role in its politics. However, by virtue of its existence, Afghanistan a landlocked state, had to depend on its neighbours, which over a period of time, gave them the opportunity to interfere in its politics and political process.

Pakistan-Afghanistan relation is characterized by this kind of dependency and antagonism. The countries had to bear the brunt of the Durand. Line Treaty controversy, wherein Afghanistan refused to accept the related terms of the Treaty on the ground that the Treaty segregated the Pashtuns, which created the Pashtunistan issue. Pakistan, a newly independent nation, refused to consider

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<sup>1</sup> Richard Tapper, ed., The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan (New York, 1983), p.93.

Pasthun sentiments and did not pay much heed to the Afghan's demand. This was the beginning of a conflictual relation that determined the course of the bilateral relations between the two countries. Mutually perceived threats often reflected in the foreign policies of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan could never reconcile itself to the irredentist claims of Afghanistan on Pakistan's North Western Frontier Province, and the latter could not abandon a cause which went against the sentiments of its kith and kin.

Afghanistan endeavoured to have close relations with the United States in order to gain the latter's support on certain contentious issues between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Soon, Afghanistan found a strong ally in the Soviet Union, which was entrusted the task of modernizing the Afghan army. The Soviet Union was sympathetic towards it on the Pashtunistan issue. Besides, it lent political and military support too. However, the political differences between the ruling classes in Afghanistan and Pakistan, over the issue of Pashtunistan, reconfirmed the former's allegiance to the USSR, when it became evident that Pakistan had found an ally in the United States. This became more evident when Soviet Leader Khrushchev, in his visit to Kabul, articulated his country's policy, 'we have earned the Afghan's trust and friendship and it has not fallen into American trap.....'<sup>2</sup>

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto attempted to exert pressure on Kabul to permanently foreclose the Pushtunistan issue,<sup>3</sup> thereby straining Pak-Afghan ties further. However, it was Bhutto's policy of actively supporting the opposition forces within Afghanistan (the Islamic fundamentalists), in 1973, during the

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<sup>2</sup> Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (Boston, 1970), pp. 507-8.

<sup>3</sup> Afghanistan, Afghanistan's Republic Annual, 1975 (Kabul), p. 246.

Contentious issues between Afghanistan and Pakistan include the Durand Line, Dir, One Unit plan and Pushtunistan.

Premiership of Daoud, that all the more destabilised and disturbed their bilateral relations.

Such inherent internal contradictions provided opportunities for the involvement of extra-regional powers in Afghanistan, besides that of the regional powers. The ultimate victory of the Soviet Union came with the communist-led coup in 1978 in Afghanistan, which brought these external actors into the country. The United States could not remain aloof from these developments; though it was part of Afghanistan's development programme, it had never adopted a deterministic attitude toward Afghanistan, unlike the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, in fact, was the first country to extend diplomatic recognition to the Republican regime in Afghanistan in 1973, with commitment to provide economic and military assistance. In this manner it was able to involve itself in the intricacies of Afghan politics, and, thereby, maintained a grip over its developments.<sup>4</sup> The United States, on the other hand, was more inclined towards Pakistan, which made Afghanistan look for an ally in the USSR.

Under such circumstances, and because the provisions of the Friendship Treaty, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, upon invitation from Hafizullah Amin. The invasion triggered strong international condemnation as well as a demand for its immediate withdrawal. The United Nations General Assembly resolution, without naming the Soviet Union, called for the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan.

Ironically, the pretext under which the Soviet troops had entered Afghanistan later gave them enough reason to withdraw from Afghanistan. The

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<sup>4</sup> First UNGA resolution from Sixth Emergency Special Session addressed the issue Resolution ES-6/2, 14 January 1980.

ostensible purpose of the Soviet invasion, of reinvigorating the Peoples' Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), never materialized. On the contrary, the Khalq and Parcham factions of the PDPA never reconciled their differences, and the Soviet Union continued to stay on, on the pretext of sustaining the communist regime in Kabul.

The invasion immediately enhanced Pakistan's international status. Pakistan's security became a great concern for the United States and it was accorded the highest priority by President Carter, who offered military assistance to repel a possible Soviet attack. President Zia-ul-Haq used this event of intervention as a pretext to make Pakistan a self-reliant state, with American financial and military aid. Thus, evolved the concept of 'front-line state'.

Soon after the invasion, Afghanistan witnessed a further involvement of external actors, whose interest was directed at building a strong Resistance movement to fight the 'infidels'. Both the regional and extra-regional actors made Afghanistan a cause which needed immediate solution. The Resistance groups fought the communist Kabul regime with the active participation of the United States, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Infact, the group of Seven Alliance, formed in Peshawar, which was later to capture power, drew support from these forces. The super powers intensified their cold war rivalry in this region through their respective allies and triggered a civil war situation. The Afghan civil war got entangled with global and regional conflicts. The fighting escalated in which the Afghans fought not only to pursue their own goals (as determined by their patrons) but also as proxies in the global rivalries of the super powers.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Syed Ali Gowher Rizvi, South Asia in a Changinig International Order (New Delhi, 1993), p. 87.



However, the urgency of the USSR to pull its troops became evident from the statement made by Yuri Velikanov, a Soviet diplomat, who termed the intervention as an 'embarrassment'.<sup>6</sup> In a statement, Brezhnev, too, categorically pointed the desire of the USSR to withdraw its military contingent from Afghanistan, as soon as the situation improved in the country,<sup>7</sup> for it had become evident that the USSR's military presence would definitely provoke counter-containment by the USA. Moreover, the Soviet willingness to withdraw its forces was a result of the confidence that it had in the pro-Soviet Kabul regime's ability to sustain its authority without direct external assistance.<sup>8</sup>

This dilemma regarding withdrawal later culminated in the UN-sponsored 'proximity' talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Agreements were reached on various issues: the repatriation of refugees; ending of external interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan; a super powers' guarantee of the peace settlement; and an agreement on monitoring the compliance of the settlement by the UN. But, differences persisted on the time-frame for withdrawal, which was sorted out. The Geneva Accord was signed on 14 April 1988, between the Communist Kabul regime and Pakistan, with the USSR and the USA as gaurantors. Ironically, it was these super powers which had differences over the type of 'symmetry'. Though a concensus was reached and good faith restored, Iran and the Mujahidin factions refused to be a part of this entire proceedings.

It is rather interesting to note that an Accord that came into existence with the UN initiative, directed at bringing peace to a country, failed to fulfill its basic

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<sup>6</sup> New York Times, 20 April 1981.

<sup>7</sup> Bhabani Sengupta, Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society (London, 1986), p. 133.

<sup>8</sup> Nayan Chanda, 'Commitment to leave: Moscow wants 1988 to end military involvement', Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 January 1988.

objectives even before the ink of the guarantors had dried on it. The failure of the Accord could be attributed to the basic clauses that it contained. The Accord did not involve the Mujahidins. The negotiations were confined to securing withdrawal of troops, without addressing the problem of transitional government. Besides, there were no sanctions against external interference. Moreover, the withdrawal did not create conducive conditions for the repatriation of refugees residing in Pakistan. These drawbacks nullified the objectives of the Accord. The only objective of driving the Soviets out of Afghanistan was fulfilled. Pakistan's involvement and pursuit of an active Afghan policy became more evident than ever.

After the Soviet withdrawal, there was little or no change in Afghanistan. The civil war raged and Najibullah continued in power, much to the dismay of the US and Pakistan. The difference, probably, was that Pakistan's involvement was a fact of life and every Afghan had to live with it. Though the Resistance groups had been instrumental in driving out the Soviets they failed to end the communist regime. Moreover, the Afghans looked up to Pakistan to dismantle Najibullah's regime, and instead evolve a broad-based representative government. It is interesting to note that President Zia did not sign the Accord. Instead it was Prime Minister Mohammed Khan Junejo who had signed it, much against the wishes of the President, and, in the process, got thrown out of office.

The Afghan civil war left an impact on Pakistan's politics, economy and society. It soon became a victim of its own fate. Though millions of refugees residing in Pakistan were welcomed initially they soon became a burden when international aid decreased. The Afghan refugees became a liability on Pakistan. They swamped the mainstream employment market, thereby generating unrest

among the locals. Moreover, the drug and Kalashnikov culture in Pakistan, a direct fallout of the civil war in Afghanistan, disturbed the socio-economic norms of Pakistan. The infamous CIA-ISI nexus made the availability of weapons easy for these refugees, who were often held responsible for any kind of unrest and crime in Pakistan.

Within Afghanistan the scene was as chaotic as ever. By 1992, Najibullah resigned leaving a vacuum on the political scene of Afghanistan. The scramble for power that began in Afghanistan set-off another civil war, only this time the communists were no there on the scene. The various factions of the Mujahidins, Jamiat-i-Islami (B.Rabbani), Hizb-i-Islami (G.Hikmatyar), Hizb-i-Islami (Mohammad Yunus Khalis), Ittehad-i-Islami (Abdul Rashid Sayyaf), National Islamic Front (Pir Sayed Ahmed Gialiani) and Harkat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami Afghanistan (Maulavi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi) fought for power. The Afghan Interim Government that came into existence to take charge of the transitional government, under Sibghatullah Mujaddedi, was short-lived.

It was thought that with the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, peace, stability and normalcy would be restored. On the contrary, Afghanistan faced another crisis, as the interference of external actors continued unabated. Besides failing to overthrow Najibullah, the Mujahidin, upon his resignation, were unsuccessful in forming a truly representative and broad-based government in Kabul.

Under such circumstances, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia decided to assume the role of peace brokers. Seven Mujahidin factions - 2 Hizb-i-Islami, (Hikmatyar and Khalis); Jamait-i-Islami (Rabbani), Harakat (Nabi Mohammadi), the National

Islamic Front of Afghanistan (Gialani ) Ittehad-i-Islami (Sayyaf), Afghan National Liberation Front, formed the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahidin.<sup>9</sup>

“The efforts of this Islamic Unity were farcical, as the eight groups based in Iran, i.e. the Shi’ites, were not represented.<sup>10</sup> Sunni predominance in the government triggered another conflict, which was divided along sectarian lines.

Though Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran assumed the role of peace brokers, the Peshawar Accord, and later, the Islamabad Accord, could not restore peace and stability in Afghanistan. The terms and conditions of the Peshawar Accord spelt out the mechanism by which the various factions would gain recognition and legitimacy. Yet, it failed, primarily because of a lack of clear demarcation of powers between Hikmatyar and Rabbani. The Jamiat, being moderate in its disposition, was supported by Iran. Pakistan favoured the Hizb of Hikmatyar because his conservative ideology of Islam found echoes in late President’s Zia’s dream of having an Islamic government in Afghanistan, which would be a puppet in the hand’s of the ISI. Fighting persisted between the Jamiat and the Hizb-i-Islami.

The failure of both the Accords (Peshawar and Islamabad ) proved that external factors cannot determine the internal development of a country, even if there is religious and cultural affinity existing between them. The United States, at this stage, had lost interest in Afghan politics but followed the developments through Pakistan. There was a gradual waning of interest on the part of the United States, since the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. But, with the disintegration of

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<sup>9</sup> Oliver Roy, “The role of the militant religious and political groups in Afghanistan”, The Iranian Journal of International Affairs, vol. I, no. 4, winter 1989-90, pp. 593-601.

<sup>10</sup> Mushahid Hussein, ‘Profile of the 8-Party Alliance’, Frontier Post (Peshawar), 5 February 1989.

the Soviet Union and the formal ending of the Cold War, the United States emerged as the sole super power. Despite its lack of interest in the region it keenly watched the developments in the Central Asian states, which were rich in oil resources and showed tendencies of rising Islamic fundamentalism in the region. These states are land-locked and access is possible only through Afghanistan. They endeared themselves to Pakistan, which was also interested in them.

Pakistan maintained an active interest in Afghan politics, even at the cost of housing and feeding millions of refugees, hoping to maintain a grip over Afghan politics, to ultimately hedge its way into Central Asia via Afghanistan. Pakistan had promised assistance to a United States-based Company, UNOCAL, which desired to lay an oil pipeline to Turkmenistan via Afghanistan. In order to achieve this they needed the active support of Pakistan, as access to the Central Asian states could be gained by cutting across Afghanistan.

After the Taliban stormed and captured Kabul, Afghanistan once again assumed the international as well as the strategic importance that it had lost after the Soviet withdrawal. The Taliban, a group of Sunni religious scholars, trained in Pakistani Madrassas, in Kandahar, are said to be refugees. The Talib (as they are called) were trained in the art of weaponry apart from being imparted religious education. Pakistan's interest in having the Taliban in Kabul meant that in the long-run it would determine Afghan politics, as it did during the Soviet invasion, through the Resistance groups. Besides, this would ensure Pakistan a friendly regime in Kabul, which would never rake up any contentious issues with its neighbours. This was essentially a case where the refugees turned Talib were being used against their home country in order to realise and ensure the long-term goals of a host country (Pakistan).

The Taliban-ISI connection needs to be mentioned. The Taliban had been promoted by the right wing JUI and the ISI's linkages with fundamentalist organisations are a well established fact. With the Taliban becoming a force to be reckoned with,, the ISI left no stone unturned in supporting their move into Afghanistan. Pakistan wanted to install a firendly regime in Kabul so that it would take care of its interests. This made Pakistan turn the refugees against their home country to realise its goals, which included a route to Central Asia, a pliable regime in Kabul that would not cause trouble in Pakistan's North West Frontier province by raising the Pashtunistan issue and the early repatriation of refugees who had become a strain on a already weak economy.

But basing on the behaviour of the new Taliban regime in Kabul it can be argued that they are unlikely to show a consisent Pakistan policy. The interests and pressures generated by regional powers such as Iran, Turkeminstan, Tajikistan, India and the extra-regional powers such as U.S.A.and Russia would impinge on Afghanistan's policy towards Pakistan. It is also a fact to be noted that different cultural and ethnic groups, having affinity with those in the neighbouring countries, would also lead to pulls and pressures in policy making.

The Wahabi Islam that the Taliban are promoting is strongly opposed to Western ideas. Therefore, the Taliban are likely to draw the wrath of American policy makers for imposing religious laws

The United States is beleved to be indirectly supporting the Taliban, for in this manner it hopes to maintain control over the Central Asian states which showed tendencies of rising Islamic fundamentalism. Pakistan is viewed by the West as a moderate Islamic state and any effort of the former toward Afghanistan in terms of establishing a friendly regime in Kabul met the approval of the United

States. Moreover, President Clinton was more interested in containing Iran, as Reagan was during the Cold War, when he tried to stop the spread of communist regimes. But, with the imposition of Sharia, Islamic laws, which legitimizes the cutting of limbs as punishment etc., the United States began to shudder and no longer wants to support (directly or indirectly) such a group, but for how long? For, if one goes by the same logic, these Pakistani-trained refugees may one day turn against the wishes and interest of their mentors.

The Taliban have taken over Kabul. Yet, resistance is being meted out to them by the existing Mujahidin groups. The strong anti-Taliban forces have brought the various factions of the Mujahidin groups together. Uzbek Chief Dostum, Masoud and Khalili are giving a stiff resistance to the Taliban.

The continuing fighting in Afghanistan has forced more refugees to flee. The situation has reverted to old times, when each group was being actively supported by external forces. Presently, the Taliban is being supported by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and allegedly the United States, while the anti-Taliban groups are receiving support from the Central Asian states and India. It remains to be seen which faction comes out victorious, at what and whose cost, for they are now spilling their own blood, with external forces once again determining the course of events for them.

**GENEVA ACCORD**

**The Geneva Accords on the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan, 14 April 1988.**

**Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in Particular on Non-Interference and Non-Intervention**

The Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the High Contracting Parties.

Desiring to normalize relations and promote good-neighbourliness and co-operation as well as to strengthen international peace and security in the region.

Considering that full observance of the principle of non-interference and non-intervention in the international and external affairs of States is of the greatest importance for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the fulfilment of the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Reaffirming, the inalienable right of States freely to determine their own political, economic, cultural and social systems in accordance with the will of their peoples without outside intervention, interference, subversion, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever.

Mindful of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations as well as the resolutions adopted by the United Nations on the principle of non-interference and non-intervention, in particular the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, of 24 October 1970, as well as the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, of 9 December 1981.

Have agreed as follows:

**Article I**

Relations between the High Contracting Parties shall be conducted in strict compliance with the principle of non-interference and non-intervention by States in the affairs of other States.

**Article II**

For the purpose of implementing the principles of non-interference and non-intervention each High Contracting Party undertakes to comply with the following obligations.



- (1) to respect the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, national unity, security and non-alignment of the other High Contracting Party, as well as the national identity and cultural heritage of its people.
- (2) to respect the sovereign and inalienable right of the other High Contracting Party freely to determine its own political, economic, cultural and social systems, to develop its international relations and to exercise permanent sovereignty over its natural resources, in accordance with the will of its people, and without outside intervention, interference, subversion, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever;
- (3) to refrain from the threat or use of force in any form whatsoever so as to not to violate the boundaries of each other, to disrupt the political, social or economic order of the other High Contracting Party, to overthrow or change the political system of the other High Contracting party or its Government in to cause tension between the High Contracting Parties;
- (4) to ensure that its territory is not used in any manner which would violate the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and national unity or disrupt the political, economic and social stability of the other High Contracting Parties;
- (5) to refrain from armed intervention, subversion, military occupation or any other kind of intervention and interference, overt or covert, directed at the other High Contracting Party, or any act of military, political or economic interference in the internal affairs of the other High Contracting Party, including acts of reprisal involving the use of force;
- (6) to refrain from any action or attempt in whatever form or under whatever pretext to destabilize or to undermine the stability of the other High Contracting Party or any of its institutions;
- (7) to refrain from the promotion, encouragement or support, direct or indirect, of rebellious or secessionist activities against the other High Contracting Party, under any pretext whatsoever, or from any other action which seeks to disrupt the unity or to undermine or subvert the political order of the other High Contracting party;
- (8) to prevent within its territory the training, equipping, financing and recruitment of mercenaries from whatever origin for the purpose of hostile activities against the other High Contracting Party, or the sending of such mercenaries into the territory of the other High Contracting Party and accordingly to deny facilities, including financing for the training, equipping and transit of such mercenaries;
- (9) to refrain from making any agreements or arrangements with other States designed to intervene or interfere in the internal and external affairs of the other High Contracting Party;

- (10) to abstain from any defamatory campaign, vilification or hostile propaganda for the purpose of intervening in the internal affairs of the other High Contracting Party;
- (11) to prevent any assistance to or use of or tolerance of terrorist groups, saboteurs or subversive agents against the other High Contracting Party;
- (12) to prevent within its Territory the presence, harbouring, in camps and bases or otherwise, organizing, training, financing, equipping and arming of individuals and political, ethnic and any other groups for the purpose of creating subversion, disorder or unrest in the territory of the other High Contracting Party and accordingly also to prevent the use of mass media and the transportation of arms, ammunition and equipment by such individuals and groups;
- (13) not to resort to or to allow any other action that could be considered as interference or intervention.

### **Article III**

The present Agreement shall enter into force on 15 May 1988.

### **Article IV**

Any steps that may be required in order to enable the High Contracting Parties to comply with the provisions of Article II of this Agreement shall be completed by the date on which this Agreement enters into force.

### **Article V**

This Agreement is drawn up in the English, Pashtu and Urdu languages, all texts being equally authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

Done in five original copies at Geneva this fourteenth day of April 1988.

(Signed by Afghanistan and Pakistan)

### **Declaration on International Guarantees**

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States of America,

Expressing support that the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have concluded a negotiated political settlement designed to normalize relations and promote good-neighbourliness between the two countries as well as to strengthen international peace and security in the region.

Wishing in turn to contribute to the achievement of the objectives that the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have set themselves, and

with a view to ensuring respect for their sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment.

Undertake to invariably refrain from any form of interference and intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and to respect the commitments contained in the bilateral agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in particular on Non-Interference and Non-Intervention.

Urge all States to act likewise.

The Present Declaration shall enter into force on 15 May 1988.

Done at Geneva, this fourteenth day of April 1988 in five original copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

(Signed by the USSR and the USA)

**Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Voluntary Return of Refugees**

The Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the High Contracting Parties,

Desiring to normalize relations and promote good-neighbourliness and co-operation as well as to strengthen international peace and security in the region.

Convinced that voluntary and unimpeded repatriation constitutes the most appropriate solution for the problem of Afghan refugees present in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and having ascertained that the arrangements for the Afghan refugees are satisfactory to them.

Have agreed as follows:

**Article I**

All Afghan refugees temporarily present in the territory of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall be given the opportunity to return voluntarily to their homeland in accordance with the arrangements and conditions set out in the present Agreement.

**Article II**

The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan shall take all necessary measures to ensure the following conditions for the voluntary return of Afghanistan refugees to their homeland:

- (a) All refugees shall be allowed to return in freedom to their homeland;

- (b) All returnees shall enjoy the free choice of domicile and freedom of movement within the Republic of Afghanistan;
- (c) All returnees shall enjoy the right to work, to adequate living conditions and to share in the welfare of the State;
- (d) All returnees shall enjoy the right to participation on an equal basis in the civic affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan. They shall be ensured equal benefits from the solution of the land question on the basis of the Land and Water Reform;
- (e) All returnees shall enjoy the same rights and privileges, including freedom of religion, and have the same obligations and responsibilities as any other citizens of the Republic of Afghanistan without discrimination.

The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan undertakes to implement these measures and to provide, within its possibilities, all necessary assistance in the process of repatriation.

### **Article III**

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall facilitate the voluntary, orderly and peaceful repatriation of all Afghan refugees staying within its territory and undertakes to provide, within its possibilities, all necessary assistance in the process of repatriation.

### **Article IV**

For the purpose of organizing, co-ordinating and supervising the operations which should effect the voluntary, orderly and peaceful repatriation of Afghan refugees, there shall be set up mixed commissions in accordance with the established international practice. For the performance of their functions the members of the commissions and their staff shall be accorded the necessary facilities, and have access to the relevant areas within the territories of the High Contracting Parties.

### **Article V**

With a view to the orderly movement of the returnees, the commissions shall determine frontier crossing points and establish necessary transit centres. They shall also establish all other modalities for the phased return of refugees, including registration and communication to the country of return of the names of refugees who express the wish to return.

### **Article VI**

At the request of the Governments concerned, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees will co-operate and provide assistance in the process of voluntary repatriation of refugees in accordance with the present Agreement. Special

agreement may be concluded for this purpose between UNHCR and the High Contracting Parties.

#### **Article VII**

The present Agreement shall enter into force on 15 May 1988. At that time the mixed commissions provided in Article IV shall be established and the operations for the voluntary return of refugees under this Agreement shall commence.

The arrangements set out in Articles IV and V above shall remain in effect for a period of eighteen months. After that period the High Contracting Parties shall review the results of the repatriation and, if necessary, consider any further arrangements that may be called for.

#### **Article VIII**

This Agreement is drawn up in the English, Pashtu and Urdu languages, all texts being equally authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

Done in five original copies at Geneva this fourteenth day of April 1988.

[Signed by Afghanistan and Pakistan]

#### **Agreement on the Interrelationships for the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan**

1. The diplomatic process initiated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations with the support of all Governments concerned and aimed at achieving, through negotiations, a political settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan has been successfully brought to an end.

2. Having agreed to work towards a comprehensive settlement designed to resolve the various issues involved and to establish a framework for good-neighbourliness and co-operation, the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan entered into negotiations through the intermediary of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General at Geneva from 16 to 24 June 1982. Following consultations held by the Personal Representative in Islamabad, Kabul and Teheran from 21 January to 7 February 1983, the negotiations continued at Geneva from 11 to 22 April and from 12 to 24 June 1983. The Personal Representative again visited the area for high-level discussions from 3 to 15 April 1984. It was then agreed to change the format of the negotiations and, in pursuance thereof, proximity talks through the intermediary of the Personal Representative were held at Geneva from 24 to 30 August 1984. Another visit to the area by the Personal Representative from 25 to 31 May 1985 preceded further rounds of proximity talks held at Geneva from 20 to 25 June, from 27 to

30 August and from 16 to 19 December 1985. The Personal Representative paid an additional visit to the area from 8 to 18 March 1986 for consultations. The final round of negotiations began as proximity talks at Geneva on 5 May 1986, was suspended on 23 May 1986, and was resumed from 31 July to 8 August 1986. The Personal Representative visited the area from 20 November to 30 December 1986 for further consultations and the talks at Geneva were resumed again from 25 February to 9 March 1987, and from 7 to 11 September 1987. The Personal Representative again visited the area from 18 January to 9 February 1988 and the talks resumed at Geneva from 2 March to 8 April 1988. The format of the negotiations was changed on 14 April 1988, when the instruments comprising the settlement were finalized, and, accordingly, direct talks were held at that stage. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran was kept informed of the progress of the negotiations throughout the diplomatic process.

3. The Government of Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan took part in the negotiations with the expressed conviction that they were acting in accordance with their rights and obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and agreed that the political settlement should be based on the following principles of international law:

The principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;

The principle that States shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered

The duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

The duty of States to co-operate with one another in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples;

The principle of sovereign equality of States;

The principle that States shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

The two Governments further affirmed the right of the Afghan refugees to return to their homeland in a voluntary and unimpeded manner.

4. The following instruments were concluded on this date as component parts of the political settlement:

A Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in Particular on Non-Interference and Non- Intervention;

A declaration on International Guarantees by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America;

A Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Voluntary Return of Refugees;

The present Agreement on the Interrelationships for the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan.

5. The Bilateral Agreement on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in Particular on Non-Interference and Non-Intervention; the Declaration on International Guarantees; the Bilateral Agreement on the Voluntary Return of Refugees; and the present Agreement on the Interrelationships for the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan will enter into force on 15 May 1988. In accordance with the time-frame agreed upon between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Afghanistan there will be a phased withdrawal of the foreign troops which will start on the date of entry into force mentioned above. One half of the troops will be withdrawn by 15 August 1988 and the withdrawal of all troops will be completed within nine months.

6. The interrelationships in paragraph 5 above have been agreed upon in order to achieve effectively the purpose of the political settlement, namely, that as from 15 May 1988, there will be no interference and intervention in any form in the affairs of the Parties; the international guarantees will be in operation; the voluntary return of the refugees to their homeland will start and be completed within the time-frame specified in the agreement on the voluntary return of the refugees; and the phased withdrawal of the foreign troops will start and be completed within the time-frame envisaged in paragraph 5. It is therefore essential that all the obligations deriving from the instruments concluded as component parts of the settlement be strictly fulfilled and that all the steps required to ensure full compliance with all the provisions of the instruments be completed in good faith.

7. To consider alleged violations and to work out prompt and mutually satisfactory solutions to questions that may arise in the implementation of the instruments comprising the settlement representatives of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall meet whenever required.

A representative of the secretary-general of the United Nations shall lend his good offices to the Parties and in that context he will assist in the organization of the meeting and participate in them. He may submit to the Parties for their consideration and approval suggestions and recommendations for prompt, faithful and complete observance of the provisions of the instruments.

In order to enable him to fulfill his tasks, the representative shall be assisted by such personnel under his authority as required. On his own initiative, or at the request of any of the Parties, the personnel shall investigate any possible violations of any of the provisions of the instruments and prepare a report thereon. For that purpose, the representative and his personnel shall receive all the necessary co-operation from the Parties, including all freedom of movement within their respective territories required for effective investigation. Any report submitted by the representative to the two Governments shall be considered in a meeting of the Parties no later than forty-eight hours after it has been submitted.

The modalities and logistical arrangements for the work of the representative and the personnel under his authority as agreed upon with the Parties are set out in the Memorandum of Understanding which is annexed to and is part of this Agreement.

8. The present instrument will be registered with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It has been examined by the representatives of the Parties to the bilateral agreements and of the States-Guarantors, who have signified their consent with its provisions. The representatives of the Parties, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have affixed their signatures hereunder. The Secretary-General for the United Nations was present.

Done, at Geneva, this fourteenth day of April 1988, in five original copies each in the English, Pashtu, Russian and Urdu Languages, all being equally authentic. In case of any dispute regarding the interpretation the English text shall prevail.

[Signed by Afghanistan and Pakistan]

In witness thereof, the representatives of the States-Guarantors affixed their signatures hereunder:

[Signed by the USSR and the USA]

## **ANNEX**

### **Memorandum of Understanding**

#### **1. Basic requirements**

- (a) The Parties will provide full support and co-operation to the Representative of the Secretary-General and to all the personnel assigned to assist him;
- (b) The Representative of the Secretary-General and his personnel will be accorded every facility as well as prompt and effective assistance including freedom of movement and communications, accommodation, transportation and other facilities that may be necessary for the performance of their tasks: Afghanistan and Pakistan undertake to grant



to the Representative and his staff all the relevant privileges and immunities provided for by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

(c) Afghanistan and Pakistan will be responsible for the safety of the Representative of the Secretary-General and his personnel while operating in their respective countries.

(d) In performing their functions, the Representative of the Secretary-General and his staff will act with complete impartiality. The Representative of the Secretary-General and his personnel must not interfere in the internal affair of Afghanistan and Pakistan and, in this context, cannot be used to secure advantages for any of the Parties concerned.

## **II. Mandate**

The mandate for the implementation-assistance arrangements envisaged in paragraph 7 derives from the instruments comprising the settlement. All the staff assigned to the Representative of the Secretary-General will accordingly be carefully briefed on the relevant provisions of the instruments and on the procedures that will be used to ascertain violations thereof.

## **III. Modus operandi and personnel organization**

The Secretary-General will appoint a senior military officer as Deputy to the Representative who will be stationed in the area, as head of two small headquarters units, one in Kabul and the other in Islamabad, each comprising five military officers, drawn from existing United Nations operations, and a small civilian auxiliary staff.

The Deputy to the Representative of the Secretary-General will act on behalf of the Representative and be in contact with the Parties through the Liaison Officer each Party will designate for this purpose.

The two headquarters units will be organized into two Inspection Teams to ascertain on the ground any violation of the instruments comprising the settlement. Whenever considered necessary by the Representative of the Secretary-General or his Deputy, up to 40 additional military officers (some 10 additional Inspection Teams) will be redeployed from existing operations within the shortest possible time (normally around 48 hours).

The nationalities of all the Officers will be determined in consultation with the Parties.

Whenever necessary the Representative of the Secretary-General, who will periodically visit the area for consultations with the Parties and to review the work of his personnel, will also assign to the area members of his own Office and other civilian personnel from the United Nations Secretariat as may be needed. His Deputy will alternate between the two Headquarters units and will remain at all times in close communication with him.

#### **IV. Procedure**

(a) Inspections conducted at the request of the Parties

(i) A complaint regarding a violation of the instrument of the settlement lodged other by any of the Parties should be submitted in writing, in the English language, to the respective headquarters units and should indicate all relevant information and details.

(ii) Upon receipt of a complaint the Deputy to the Representative of the Secretary-General will immediately inform the other Party of the complaint and undertake an investigation by making on-site inspections, gathering testimony and using any other procedure which he may deem necessary for the investigation of the alleged violation. Such inspection will be conducted using headquarters staff as referred to above, unless the Deputy Representative of the secretary-general considers that additional teams are needed. In that case, the Parties will, under the principle of freedom of movement, allow immediate access of the additional personnel to their respective territories.

(iii) Reports on investigations will be prepared in English and submitted by the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General to the two Governments, on a confidential basis. (A third copy of the Report will be simultaneously transmitted, on a confidential basis, to the United Nations Headquarters in New York, exclusively for the information of the Secretary-General and his Representative.) In accordance with paragraph 7 a report on an investigation should be considered in a meeting of the Parties not later than 48 hours after it has been submitted. The Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General will, in the absence of the Representative, lend his good offices to the Parties and in that context he will assist in the organization of the meetings and participate in them. In the context of those meetings the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General may submit to the Parties for their consideration and approval, suggestions and recommendations for the prompt, faithful and complete observance of the provisions of the instruments. (Such suggestions and recommendations will be, as a matter of course, consulted with, and cleared by, the Representative of the Secretary-General.)

(b) Inspections conducted on the initiative of the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General.

In addition to inspections requested by the Parties, the Deputy Representative or the Secretary-General may carry out on his own initiative and in consultation with the Representative inspections he deems appropriate for the purpose of the implementation of paragraph 7. If it is considered that the conclusions reached in an inspection justify a report to the Parties, the same procedure used in submitting reports in connection with inspections carried out at the request of the Parties will be followed.

#### **Level of participation in meetings**

As indicated above, the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General will participate at meetings of the Parties convened for the purpose of considering reports on

violations. Should the Parties decide to meet for the purpose outlined in paragraph 7 at a high political level, the Representative of the Secretary-General will personally attend such meetings.

#### **V. Duration**

The Deputy to the Representative of the Secretary-General and the other personnel will be established in the area not later than twenty days before the entry into force of the instruments. The arrangements will cease to exist two months after the completion of all time-frames envisaged for the implementation of the instruments.

#### **VI. Financing**

The cost of all facilities and services to be provided by the parties will be borne by the respective Governments. The salaries and travel expenses of the personnel to and from the area, as well as the costs of the local personnel assigned to the headquarters units, will be defrayed by the United Nations.

**Statement by Diego Cordovez,**

**8 April 1988**

The following statement was made by Diego Cordovez when announcing that the full text of the instruments had been completed, on 8 April 1988:

I am authorized to state, at this time, that throughout the negotiations it has been consistently recognized that the objective of a comprehensive settlement implies the broadest support and immediate participation of all segments of the Afghan people and that this can best be ensured by a broad-based Afghan government. It was equally recognized that any questions relating to the government in Afghanistan are matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of Afghanistan and can only be decided by the Afghan people themselves. The hope was therefore expressed that all elements of the Afghan nation, living inside and outside Afghanistan, would respond to this historic opportunity. At this crucial stage, all concerned will therefore promote the endeavours of the Afghan people to work out arrangements for a broad-based government and will support and facilitate that process.

**Source: UN Press Release SG/1860, 14 April 1988.**

**Statements by Pakistan, the United States, and the Soviet Union, released on 14 April 1988**

**Statement by Pakistan**

The signature ceremony today brings to a successful end the process of negotiations on the situation relating to Afghanistan which began under the sponsorship of the United Nations nearly seven years ago. I have the honour to express the deep satisfaction of the Government of Pakistan on this occasion and to convey to Your Excellency our profound appreciation on the conclusion of these Accords. You, Excellency, initiated this process of negotiations and when you assumed your high office you continued to lend it your strong and consistent support. I would also like to place on record our gratitude and admiration for the hard work, dedication, perseverance and above all the remarkable ingenuity with which your distinguished Representative, His Excellency Mr. Diego Cordovez, assisted these complex negotiations in difficult and often trying circumstances. His contribution in their positive outcome is worthy of high praise and respect. It merits special recognition.

The Geneva Accords without doubt represent a triumph for the United Nations system in upholding the principles of international law and in redressing a grave injustice. We now earnestly hope that the implementation of these Accords, in both letter and spirit, will pave the way for the re-establishment of peace and tranquillity in Afghanistan, and

thus contribute to stability and cooperation in the region as well as to a safer and better global political environment.

The Accords signed today address the external aspects of the Afghanistan problem. It has long been accepted that restoration of peace and tranquillity inside Afghanistan requires the withdrawal of the foreign forces as also the establishment of a government acceptable to all segments of the Afghan population especially the Mujahideen and the refugees. Continuous efforts, therefore, will need to be made by all concerned to help the Afghans in the realisation of a government which truly enjoys their confidence. Meanwhile, the Government of Pakistan in view of the realities of the situation in Afghanistan and notwithstanding the Accords signed today, will continue to adhere to its policy, based on the decision taken by the Organization of the Islamic Conference, to withhold extending recognition to the regime in Kabul.

The Government of Pakistan understands that the rights and obligations assumed by the Guarantor-States are consistent with the principles of equality and reciprocity and in consonance with the right of the Afghan people to freely determine their own political, economic and social system. The Government of Pakistan signs the Accords on the basis of the understandings reflected in exchanges between the Guarantor-States.

The Afghan people must be enabled to determine their destiny in freedom for which they have rendered monumental sacrifices. They must be helped in the urgent and gigantic task of national reconstruction and re-building a society fragmented by the protracted conflict which has spanned nearly a decade.

#### **Statement by the United States**

The United States has agreed to act as a guarantor of the political settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan. We believe this settlement is a major step forward in restoring peace to Afghanistan, in ending the bloodshed in that unfortunate country, and in enabling millions of Afghan refugees to return to their homes.

In agreeing to act as a guarantor, the United States states the following:

(1) The troop withdrawal obligations set out in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Instrument on Interrelationships are central to the entire settlement. Compliance with those obligations is essential to achievement of the settlement's purposes, namely, the ending of foreign intervention in Afghanistan and the restoration of the rights of the Afghan people through the exercise of self determination as called for by the United Nations Charter and the United Nations General Assembly resolutions on Afghanistan.

(2) The obligations undertaken by the guarantors are symmetrical. In this regard, the United States has advised the Soviet Union that the U.S. retains the right, consistent with its obligations as guarantor, to provide military assistance to parties in Afghanistan. Should the Soviet Union exercise restraint in providing military assistance to parties in Afghanistan, the U.S. similarly will exercise restraint.

(3) By acting as a guarantor of the settlement, the United States does not intend to imply in any respect recognition of the present regime in Kabul as the lawful Government of Afghanistan.

#### **Statement by the Soviet Union**

Noting with satisfaction the successful completion of the Geneva diplomatic process, we pay tribute to the realism and responsibility shown by all participants in it.

The agreements signed in Geneva provide a solution on the external aspects of political settlement regarding Afghanistan. The principle of non-interference is recorded in them in totally clear terms, which place specific and definite responsibilities on all the parties.

The documents that have entered into force do not permit support for political or other groups acting on the territory of one of the contracting parties against the government of another contracting party. The Soviet Union will fully comply with the obligations contained in the Geneva agreements and will fulfill its treaty obligations to Afghanistan. The Soviet side will also provide assistance in resolving the problem of refugees and in contributing to Afghanistan's economic reconstruction and development.

The Soviet side is convinced that the rights and obligations of the parties to the Geneva agreements, including the USSR and the United States as guarantors, clearly follow from the texts of those agreements. It is assuming the relevant obligations as a guarantor of the agreements. The viability of the agreements will in the final analysis depend on their strict observance by the parties themselves, namely Afghanistan and Pakistan.

We would like to single out in particular the contribution of the United Nations, of its Secretary-General, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, and the Secretary-General's personal representative, Mr. Diego Cordovez, in reaching the accords signed here in Geneva.

**Opening and Concluding Remarks by United Nations Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar at the Signing Ceremony of the Geneva Accords on Afghanistan, 14 April 1988**

**Opening Remarks**

I wish to welcome you to the United Nations Office in Geneva for the signing ceremony of the agreements on the settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan. May I express my appreciation to Foreign Minister Wakil of the Republic of Afghanistan and to Minister of State Noorani of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for their tireless efforts. May I also express my appreciation to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Secretary of State Schultz of the United States of America for their governments' readiness to become guarantors of these agreements. I wish now to invite them to proceed with the signing of the documents.

**Concluding Remarks**

Excellencies,

The documents which have just been signed constitute a most significant achievement. They represent a major stride in the effort to bring peace to Afghanistan and a sure reprieve for its people. The challenge facing the people of Afghanistan is great, but it can and must be met by them alone. The agreements lay the basis for the exercise by all Afghans of their right to self-determination, a principle enshrined in the charter of the United Nations.

I am confident that the signatories of these agreements will abide fully by the letter and spirit of the texts and that they will implement them in good faith—for the sake of all the people of Afghanistan and for the wider objective of peace in the region and the world.

I have held a deep personal commitment to a peaceful solution of the situation relating to Afghanistan since the day seven years ago when, as personal representative of my predecessor, I participated in laying the groundwork for the agreements that have been signed today. I wish, at this stage, to express my warm appreciation to my personal representative, Mr. Diego Cordovez, for his skillful and patient endeavours as well as to the other member of the United Nations team.

The ceremony today is indeed a testimony to the capacity of the United Nations to attain positive results on the most complex of issues when backed by the political will of its Member States.

In closing, I wish to assure the people of Afghanistan that the United Nations and the international community stand ready to assist them, in this critical moment of their history, in meeting the serious humanitarian and economic needs of their country.

**Source: Text from copies released to the press by the United Nations on 14 April 1988.**

**UN General Assembly Resolution 35/37 on the Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security, 20 November 1980**

**The General Assembly,**

Having considered the item entitled "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security,"

Recalling its resolution ES-6/2 of 14 January 1980 adopted at its sixth emergency special session,

Reaffirming the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the obligation of all States to refrain in their international relations from the threat of use of force against the sovereignty, territorial and political independence of any State,

Reaffirming further the inalienable right of all peoples to determine their own form of government and to choose their own economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever,

Gravely concerned at the continuing foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan, in contravention of the above principles, and its serious implications for international peace and security,

Deeply concerned at the increasing outflow of refugees from Afghanistan,

Deeply conscious of the urgent need for a political solution of the grave situation in respect of Afghanistan,

Recognizing the importance of the continuing efforts and initiatives of the Organization of the Islamic Conference for a political solution of the situation in respect of Afghanistan:

1. Reiterates that the preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned character of Afghanistan is essential for a peaceful solution of the problem;
2. Reaffirms the right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government and to choose their economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever;
3. Calls for the immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan;



4. Also calls upon all parties concerned to work for the urgent achievement of a political solution and the creation of the necessary conditions which would enable the Afghan refugees to return voluntarily to their homes in safety and honour;

5. Appeals to all States and national and international organizations to extend humanitarian relief assistance, with a view to alleviating the hardship of the Afghan refugees, in co-ordination with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;

6. Express[es] its appreciation of the efforts of the Secretary-General in the search for a solution to the problem and hopes that he will continue to extend assistance, including the appointment of a special representative, with a view to promoting a political solution in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, and the exploration of securing appropriate guarantees for non-use of force, or threat of use of force, against the political independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of all neighboring States, on the basis of mutual guarantees and strict non-interference in each other's internal affairs and with full regard for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

7. Requests the secretary-general to keep Member States and the security Council concurrently informed of progress towards the implementation of the present resolution and to submit to Member States a report on the situation at the earliest appropriate opportunity;

8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item entitled 'The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security.'

**Source: Resolutions and Decisions adopted by the General Assembly during its thirty-fifth session, General Assembly Official Records, Thirty-Fifth Session, Supplement No.48 (A/35/48)(New York: United Nations,1981),pp.17-18.**

**PESHAWAR ACCORD**

**IN THE NAME OF ALLAH**

**THE MOST BENEFICENT**

**THE MOST MERCIFUL**

**22.10.1412 (22 Shawal)**

Salutation and peace be upon the Great Messenger of Allah and his Progey and Companions and after that:

The structure and process for the provisional period of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, was formed as under :-

1. It was decided that a 51 persons body, headed by hazrat Sahib Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, would go inside Afghanistan so that they could take over power from the present rulers of Kabul, completely and without any terms and conditions during the two months period. The head of this body will also represent the Presidentship of the State during these two months. After this period, this body will remain as an Interim Islamic Council, alongwith the Transitional State and its Chairmanship will be held by Hazrat Sahib. The period of this Council will also be for four (4) months.
2. It was decided that Professor Rabbani will remain as the President of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan and the head of the Leadership Council for four (4) months. He will commence his work officially at the time when the two months of the transfer of power will be elapsed.
3. The above mentioned period will not be extended even by a day.
4. The Prime Minister and other members of the Cabinet will be appointed from the second grade members of the Tanzeemat, on the discretion of the heads of the Tanzeemat.
5. The Prime Ministership was assigned to the Hezb-e-Islami, Afghanistan.
6. The Deputy Prime Ministership and the Ministry of Interior, to Ittehad-e-Islami, Afghanistan.
7. The Deputy Prime Ministership and the Ministry of Education, to Hezb-e-Islami, Afghanistan.
8. The Prime Ministership and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were assigned to the National Islamic Front.
9. The Ministry of Defence to Jamiat-e-Islami, Afghanistan.
10. The supreme court to Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami Organiqation.

11. It was also decided that the Leadership Council, in addition to making the division of appointments in the Ministries, will also determine Ministries for Hezb-e-Wahdat, Shura-e-Etelaf (Council of Coalition) Maulvi Mansoor and other brothers.
12. The total period of this process will be six months. As regards to Transitional Government, the Islamic Council, will make a unanimous decision. The period of this Transitional Government will be two (2) years.

## **APPENDIX C**

### **ISLAMABAD PEACE ACCORD**

Following is the text of Afghan peace Accord signed in Islamabad on 7 March 1993.

**“GIVEN** our submission to the will of Allah Almighty and commitment to seeking guidance from the Holy Quran and Sunnah;

**RECALLING** the glorious success of the epic Jihad waged by the valiant Afghan people against foreign occupation; desirous of ensuring that the fruits of this glorious Jihad bring peace, progress and prosperity for the Afghan people;

**HAVING** agreed to bringing armed hostilities to an end recognising the need for a broad-based Islamic government in which all parties and groups representing all segments of Muslim Afghan society are represented so that the process of political transition can be advanced in an atmosphere of peace, harmony and stability;

**COMMITTED** to the preservation of unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan;

**RECOGNISING** the urgency of rehabilitation and reconstruction of Afghanistan and of facilitating the return of all Afghan refugees;

**COMMITTED** to promoting peace and security in the region;

**RESPONDING** to the call of Khadim al-Harain al-Sharifain, his Majesty King Fahd Bin Abdul Azia, to resolve the differences among Afghan brothers through a peaceful dialogue;

**APPRECIATING** the constructive role of good offices of Mr Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and his sincere efforts to promote peace and conciliation in Afghanistan;

**RECOGNISING** the positive support for these efforts extended by the governments of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran who have sent their special envoys for the conciliation talks in Islamabad;

**HAVING undertaken intensive intra-Afghan consultations separately and jointly to consolidate the gains of the glorious Jihad, all the parties and groups concerned have agreed as follows:**

- I) Formation of a government for a period of 18 months in which President Burhanuddin Rabbani would remain President and Engineer Gulbaddin Hekmatyar or his nominee would assume the office of Prime minister. The powers of the president and the prime minister and his cabinet which have been formulated through mutual consultations will form part of this accord and is annexed.**
- II) The cabinet shall be formed by the prime minister in consultations with the president and leaders of Mujahideen parties within two weeks of the signing of this accord.**
- III) The following electoral process is agreed for implementation in a period of not more than 18 months with effect from December 29, 1992:**
  - a) The immediate formation of an independent election commission by all parties with full powers.**
  - b) The election commission shall be mandated to hold elections for a grand constituent assembly within 8 months from the date of signature of this accord.**
  - c) The duly elected grand constituent assembly shall formulate a constitution under which general elections for the president and parliament shall be held within the prescribed period of 18 months mentioned above.**
- IV) A defence council comprising two members from each party will be set up to, inter alia,**
  - a) Enable the formation of a national army.**
  - b) Take possession of heavy weapons from all parties and sources which may be removed from Kabul and other cities and kept out of range to ensure the security of the capital.**
  - c) Ensure that all roads in Afghanistan are kept open for normal use.**
  - d) Ensure that state funds shall not be used to finance private armies or armed retainers.**
  - e) ensure that operational control of the armed forces shall be with the defence council.**
- V) There shall be immediate and unconditional release of all Afghan detainees held by the government and different parties during the armed hostilities.**

- VI) All public and private buildings, residential areas and properties occupied by different groups during the hostilities shall be returned to their original owners. Effective steps shall be taken to facilitate the return of displaced persons to their respective homes and locations.
- VII) An all-party committee shall be constituted to supervise control over the monetary system and currency regulations to keep it in conformity with existing Afghan banking laws and regulations.
- VIII) A committee shall be constituted to supervise the distribution of food, fuel and essential commodities in Kabul city.
- IX) a cease-fire shall come into force with immediate effect. After the formation of the cabinet, there shall be permanent cessation of hostilities.
- X) A joint commission comprising representatives of the OIC and of all Afghan parties shall be formed to monitor the ceasefire and cessation of hostilities.

In confirmation of the above accord, the following have affixed their signature hereunder, on Sunday, the 7th March, 1993 in Islamabad, Pakistan.

President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, Professor Burhan-ud-din Rabbani, Jamiat-e-Islami; Engineer Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, Hizb-e-Islami; Professor Sibghatullah Mojadidi, Jabha-e-Nijat-e-Milli; Pir Syed Ahmed Gaillani, Mahaz-e-Milli; Engineer Ahmed Shah Ahmadzai, Ittehad-e-Islami; Sheikh Asif Mohseni, Harkat-e-Islami; Ayatullah Fazil, Hizb-e-Wahdat-e-Islami."

#### **Annex to Peace Accord**

##### **President, PM to act in consultation**

The peace accord had spelt out the powers of the president and the PM.

Under the agreement the PM would form the cabinet in consultation with the president that would be announced by president. The president would take oath of the cabinet. The cabinet would operate as a team under the leadership of the PM and would work on the principle of collective responsibility.

The other powers of the PM and the president spelt in the agreement are as follows:

The PM and the cabinet shall regularly act in close consultation with the president on all important issues. The president and the PM shall act in consultation with each other and shall try to resolve differences, if any, through mutual discussion. In case any issue remains unresolved it should be decided by a reference to a joint meeting of the president

and the cabinet. All major policy decisions shall be made in the cabinet, to be presided over by the PM. Ministers, deputy ministers and ministers of state would be individually and collectively responsible for the decisions of the government.

The formal appointment of the chiefs of armed forces shall be made in accordance with the existing practice and after mutual consultation.

### **Powers of the President**

The president shall have the following powers and duties:

- a) Appointment of the vice-president of Islamic state of Afghanistan.
- b) Appointment and retirement of judges of the supreme court, the chief justices, in consultation with the prime minister and in accordance with the provisions of the laws.
- c) Supreme command of the armed forces of the country in the light of the objectives and structure of the armed forces of Afghanistan.
- d) Declaring war and peace on the advice of the cabinet or the parliament
- e) Convening and inaugurating the parliament according to rules.
- f) Consolidating national unity and upholding the independence, neutrality and the Islamic character of Afghanistan and the interests of all its citizens.
- g) Commuting and pardoning of sentences according to the Sharjah and the provisions of law.
- h) Accrediting heads of Afghanistan's diplomatic missions in foreign states, appointing Afghanistan's permanent representatives to international organizations according to the normal diplomatic procedures and accepting the letters of credence of foreign diplomatic representatives.
- l) Signing laws and ordinances, and granting credential is for the conclusion and signing of international treaties in accordance with the provisions of the law.
- j) The president may at his discretion, delegate any of his powers to the vice-president, or to the PM.
- k) In the event of the death or resignation of the president, the presidential functions shall be automatically entrusted to the vice-president, who shall deputies TILL THE NEW PRESIDENT IS ELECTED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.
- l) Granting formal permission to print money.
- M) The president may call an extraordinary meeting of the cabinet on issues of vital national significance which do not fall in the routine governance of the country.

## **Powers of the Prime Minister**

The PM and his cabinet shall have the following duties and powers:

- a) Formulation and implementation of the country's domestic and foreign policies in accordance with the provisions and spirit of this accord and the provisions of law.
- b) Administering, coordinating and supervising the affairs of the ministries, and other, departments and public bodies and institutions.
- c) Redressing executive and administrative decisions of accordance with laws and supervising their implementation.
- d) Drafting of laws and formulating rules and regulations.
- e) Preparing and controlling the state budget and adopting measures to mobilise resources to reconstruct the economy and establish a viable and stable monetary, financial and fiscal system.
- f) Drafting and supervising implementation of the socio-economic and educational plans of the country with a view to establishing a self-reliant Islamic welfare state.
- g) Protecting and promoting the objectives and interests of Afghanistan in the world community and discussing and negotiating foreign treaties, protocols, international agreements and financial arrangements.
- h) Adopting measures to ensure public order, peace, security and Islamic morality and to ensure administration of justice through an independent and impartial judiciary.

**Source: Spotlight on Regional Affairs, Vol. XI, No.3, March 1993.**

## **APPENDIX D**

### **TEHERAN DECLARATION**

The following is the text of the declaration adopted by the two-day regional conference on Afghanistan, which concluded in Teheran on 30, October 1990.

Following the escalation of internal hostilities in Afghanistan, and on the initiative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, a Regional Conference on Afghanistan was held in Teheran on October 29-30, 1996. The Foreign Ministers, ministers and special envoys of India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, and the Republic of Tadjikistan, the Republic of Turkey, the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan, as well as the special representatives of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and observers from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Union participated in the Conference.

In two days of meetings, the participants carried out extensive consultations on the various aspects of the situation in Afghanistan, particularly in light of the recent developments.

The Conference expressed concern at the escalation of armed hostilities in Afghanistan, which has resulted in immense human losses and irreparable damage to the country in the economic, social and cultural spheres, and endangered regional peace, stability and security.

The conference deplored recent flagrant violations of human rights in Afghanistan, particularly the rights of women, and called for an immediate end to such practices in conformity with the relevant provisions of the charter of the United Nations.

The conference underlined the imperative of respect for sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan, and emphasised the necessity of cessation of foreign interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

The conference reiterated the urgency of cessation of violence and armed hostilities, and called upon conflicting Afghan parties to refrain from resorting to force and to settle their differences by peaceful means through inter-Afghan negotiations for a durable political solution and the establishment of the broad-based government. In this context, the conference endorsed the recent relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, especially Security Council Resolution 1076 (1996).

The conference underlined its support for the commendable effort of the United Nations and its special Mission to Afghanistan, and those of other International organisations particularly the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. For the restoration



of peace and tranquillity in Afghanistan. The participants declared their readiness to contribute effectively to these efforts aimed at arresting the internal conflict and commencing inter-Afghan dialogue for national reconciliation and the establishment of a broadbased government.

The conference supported the decision of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene an international conference in Afghanistan aimed at a concerted and joint search for a political settlement in Afghanistan.

The conference called upon all states and International organisations to extent all possible humanitarian assistance to the civilian population of Afghanistan and Afghan refugees.


The conference decided to take appropriate follow-up measures at the regional level within the framework of the United Nations, with a view to actively pursuing ways and means of bringing about cessation of internal hostilities and facilitating the on-going peace-making efforts, in contact and collaboration with various Afghan groups. Pertinent international organisations and other States with interest and influence.

The conference expressed its readiness to hold another meeting to review the latest development in Afghanistan, assess the progress made in the implementation of the Declaration and consider ways and means of implementing, on the regional level, the decisions of the international conference to be held under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.


The conference participants expressed their gratitude and appreciation to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran for convening the Regional Conference on Afghanistan and for the excellent arrangements.

**Source: Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), vol. xix, no. 10-11, January-February 1997.**

## Ethnic distribution in Afghanistan




SOURCE : K. B. K. (NEW DELHI).



AREAS CONTROLLED BY AFGHAN GROUPS

SOURCE : K.B.K. (NEW DELHI).

POSITION OF WARRING GROUPS  
IN AFGHANISTAN.



SOURCE : K. B. K. (NEW DELHI).

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