'DYNAMICS OF HINDUTVA': POLITICS OF BHARTIYA JANTA PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation titled 'Dynamics of Hindutva: BJP politics in Rajasthan' submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.

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CHAPTER-1

INTRODUCTION

Hindutva politics is though a modern concept but its future relies totally on the past, the history. The past of an individual is an important element in the study of his political preferences. For Hindutva it becomes even more important as it has been survived on the cards of identity politics. The sense of 'pastness' has been defined by some of the scholars as an excuse to fight against the anxieties and insecurities which are the result of the changing and dynamic nature of the present day world. In other words, associating oneself with his/her past can provide him with some peace of mind of having some king of permanency in the world against the temporariness of the present day world. And therefore the national identity becomes the religious, cultural, caste based identities. It could be seen as seeking identity in an identity crisis scenario. People relate to certain past identity as they lack the security about their present identity. This becomes the basis of mobilization efforts by BJP and many other regional parties. This therefore is the logic behind any kind of mobilization done in the name of religion or caste.

'Political Hindutva' is one of those political tactics of the modern times that uses the past for its gain, it that product of modernity which is nothing without the history. Hindu National movement when started in 1930s used culture to unite people but after independence the same culture became the source of communalism and created divides between various religious communities. The quest for past doesn't end here and this is the reason Hindutva cards are still relevant and it will be important till the attainment of permanency factor in the identity of the nation. One's past lies in one's mind, it's that unseen snake that nobody recognizes but leaves significant impact on one's decisions in life. Past as we know is not a good memory for everyone, no everybody can cherish and enjoy his/her past, and it could be glorious for some and could be sad for some. Relating to ones past and searching one's identity from the past is not an easy task therefore, in that case if people don't have their own past to rely upon they are given one and made believe that it's their own. Creating myths, rituals, stories, folklore is the first step in creating one's

¹ Badri Narayan, Fascinating Hindutva (Sage, New Delhi, 2009) p.3.

past to rely on. The dalits and the tribal therefore who has no glorious past to rely upon are presented a Hindu past to join the main stream league.

One of the most significant developments in the post colonial India has been the emergence and rise of the Hindutva politics. This rise is accounted to the emergence of *Bhartiya Janta Party* (here on BJP), which is the political wing of Hindutva, as an important force in the electoral politics in India. Though the exact nature of Hindutva ideology is still a contested area even among the Hindutva followers, BJP's approach remained more or less clear towards the nature of Hindutva ideology till the recent times. The politics of Hindutva has remained a significant factor to influence the local life, communal relations between the religious communities in the country. BJP has got a strong hold over the national politics; it is seen as the only alternative to the congress in this coalition government era. Still in some states where BJP has emerged as a dominant party, it happens only on the cards of Hindutva politics it plays, projecting and formulating the ideology based strategies. Though there are some other states where BJP is no longer able to hold the power merely on the basis of Hindutva ideology, therefore we see a sea of changes in the strategies of mobilization that BJP adopts now even at the cost of the severely criticized contradictions to the major guidelines of the party.

Table 1 Electoral Performance of BJP so far in the elections for the Lok Sabha seats

Year	o 1984	1989	1991	2004	2009	
election						
% of votes	7.4	11.4	20.1	22.16	18.8	

Source: Election commission of India website,

http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/electionanalysis/election_analysis.asp, accessed on 15th July, 2011 at 2.30 p.m.

BJP performance at the centre and the kind of popularization it gained because of Hindutva among the Hindu population in India is apparent in the above table. A set of upper caste population remained the standard support base for BJP from the beginning. Then later on

changes in the party's stands and policies expanded the social base more. The clear rise in percentage of votes in 1991 election, accounts for the increased social base of BJP. Christophe Jafferlot in his book, 'The Sangh Parivar', talks about Yogendra Yadav, Sanjay Kumar, and Oliver Heath using the term 'new social bloc' comprising of population beyond the traditional upper caste supporters, for BJP. He quotes them, 'The BJP and its allies secured the support of 60 per cent of upper caste Hindus and 52 per cent of the dominant Hindu peasant castes such as Jats, Marathas, Patidars, Reddys, and Kammas'. Though the upper caste supporters declined in this election BJP was on new horizons with this new social bloc support. In 1999, BJP aimed at wooing more Other Backward Castes voters by taking a U turn on the reservation issue. While earlier its stand was formal equality and uniform opportunity for all communities, it now came down to the process of 'mandalization' which obviously helped it to expand its social base. The most important role in this case remained of that of regional allies of BJP which forced BJP to negotiate on these lines.

Thus we see a constant change coming in the approaches of BJP in its need to get support from the various sections of the country. Adopting the changes in its opinions on reservation or caste system is still of less relevance for us because these are not something the 'Hindutva ideology' draws any line on. What remain important here are the moderations that came up in the ideology of the party. As Christophe Jafferlot quotes Lal Krishna Advani in his book 'The Sangh Parivar-A Reader' where he justifies the moderations and compromises that are coming up with BJP at the centre, referring to the 1996 elections where BJP won but could not form the government due to lack of majority, he says, "though we were the largest party, we failed to form a government. It was felt that on an ideological basis we couldn't go further. So we embarked on the course of alliance based coalition..."

Thus with the formation of the National Democratic Alliance which was not agreeing with BJP's Hindutva agenda, BJP had to make an adjustment by not including the Hindutva agenda in the election manifestos. Till then what remained the most important agenda of

² Yadav, Y., S. Kumar, O. Heath, 'The BJP's new Social Bloc', Frontline, 19 November 1999, pp.33

³ Interview of L.K.Advani in *Outlook*, 25 October 1999, p.38

BJP politics that included uniform civil code, Abolition of article 370 and building the Ram Mandir in Ayodhya on the site of Masjid demolition, were all discarded in the election on the basis of the declaring the NDA as genuinely committed to the concept of secularism. In addition to this the party also had to distant itself from the 'Swadeshi' model of Hindu socialism, which earlier, was one of its major stand. This was done in the wake of liberalism and economic development around the world along with Congress's threat from the economic liberalization programmes that it initiated during the same period. 'Swadeshi' also was not included in the election manifesto of NDA. Commitment for good governance became the central idea of NDA and BJP had to give up its ideological agenda and promises.

At policy level, BJP did come up with acts like Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act (here after POTA) was implemented during its last regime. POTA is alleged to be a tool to be used against the Muslim minority. Some efforts in the direction of implementing uniform civil code were also done during the same period. In addition to this, instances of communal riots and violence were noticed in various parts of the country, during this period. The reforms in the schools text books was the most criticized and controversial thing that BJP did in this regime. As Ram Puniyani puts it:

This period also saw the total change in the school text books, by making them communal, the RSS versions of History and understanding was dished out in these books, which apart from other things were academically substandard. Education system was further mauled by bringing in the obscurantist subjects like Jyotishi, Karamkand and Astrology in the universities, dressed up as scientific disciplines. The attempt was also made to tamper with democratic fabric of the constitution.⁵

The school textbooks was the most basic place from where Hindutva could be installed into the mind of the psyche of the people and thus BJP's this step need to be seen as a preplanned strategy which it was able to implement even in an alliance.

⁴ Christophe Jafferlot, 'The Sangh Parivar- A Reader' (OUP, New Delhi, 2005) p.289

⁵ Ram Puniyani, 'Contours of Hindu Rashtra: Hindutva, Sangh Parivar and Contemporary Politics', (Kalpaz Publications, New Delhi, 2006) p.18

The one side of the picture remained that of BJP going through serious moderations in the ideological setups but still trying to keep hold of it, if in power, at the policy and implementation level, the other Hindu organizations kept on working on their Hindutva led objectives. The RSS's mission for culture and tradition of the Hindu religion was on full swing by setting up educational institutions, youth training centers in various parts of the country, various tribal welfare programmes where the effort was to bring them into the Hindu fold what they call the process of 'acculturation'.

Whereas at the national level, the party kept on going through major alterations in the ideology and still keeping hold of it through the policies, all the Hindu nationalist groups affiliated to the ideology, be it Rashtriya Swemsevak Sangha⁶ (hereafter RSS), Bhartiya Janta Party, Bajrang Dal⁷, Vishwa Hindu Parishad ⁸(here after VHP), plays their role mobilizing people in the name of religion, tradition and culture of the Hindu community. At the state level BJP seems to take on to 'region-specific' approaches. At the same level on other hand, BJP is also carrying on the project of drawing the tribal and dalits among the Hindu fold in the name of Tribal welfare projects in various areas of the country. The approach within the states is not similar though and derives from the historical, social structure of the particular state. I want to uncover all these factors at various platforms to alter the BJP's strategies.

Similar kind of variances can be located at the state level politics. My idea through this dissertation is to have a closer look into the changing stands of BJP on Hindutva. The central problem is the variances present in the mobilization strategies of BJP both at the national and state level politics. I want to locate presence of 'Hindutva' or the absence of the same in these strategies. I want to explore the changes that BJP is adopting in its strategies even at the cost of diluting its ideology and compromising with its ideological commitments. I take up the case of Rajasthan whose historical and ecological situation provides more variance to the BJP politics of ideology.

⁶ RSS is a right-wing Hindu nationalist, paramilitary, volunteer, and allegedly militant organization in India, established in 1925 by K.B. Hedgewar.

⁷ Bajrang Dal is another militant Hindu Organization which was established in 1984.

⁸ VHP was founded in 1964 with an objective to consolidate Hindu society and protect the Hindu 'dharma'.

Thus we see that BJP's ideology politics is not under its own control but the social situation has to decide what elements of Hindutva BJP will carry with it and what it will keep in back. This is the reason BJP governments in different states carry forward different agenda. The factors that determine its nature varies from caste and religious composition to dominance of Hindutva in the psyche of the people of that state and that again is determined by the cultural history of that very state.

Therefore we find that Hindutva has emerged as a dominant player in the Indian politics and it has attracted large number of scholars in the field of academics. Most of them have argued that Hindutva has an ideology in which communalism against the minority is a dominant component. However the case of Rajasthan throws a real challenge to this formulation where not only the ideology as in case of Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat but caste is also playing a major role.

My major concern is to understand the ideology of BJP in Rajasthan as to depict what strategy does BJP adopts in Rajasthan. I want to know whether BJP has adjusted its strategy according to the regional needs.

Rajasthan is a historical land whose present day study of politics cannot be done without getting into the historical structure of power and dominance. My idea is to put forward the distinctiveness of Rajasthan that other states that BJP deals with and therefore the strategy that it adopts differs automatically. I have two arguments to make to present the scenario of Rajasthan as a different case in Hindutva Politics. Firstly the much talked and glorified Rajputana history and its impact on the power structure till date and secondly some post independence developments that stand just in contrast to it.

Talking about the pattern of dominance in the Political governance in Rajasthan, it is important to understand that the History and Ecology of the state has given a distinctive pattern socio-economic and socio-political life to the people of Rajasthan. This is what makes it different from the other state as the brahiminical model of dominance cannot be applied to this region and thus the 'Hindutva' politics of BJP has a different base to deal with in Rajasthan. To expand this argument I have tried to define the concept and idea of Rajput Hindutva, in the second Chapter, whose roots lies into the historical realities. The

present day shape of the power structure in the society is the product of the Rajput linkages and people's idea of Belongingness to this concept. Therefore we see this historical link in many parts of the state especially the places which has been the centre of administration or flow of power for the Rajput rulers. For example Jodhpur, Udaipur, Jhalawar, Kota, Bundi etc. The customs, practices by the Rajput rulers are still alive here and people despite of their original community linkages associate themselves to the Rajput identity. These are the spots where glorifying the Rajput warriors and promoting the traditional practices are helpful in mobilizing the crowd.

This was the first aspect and one portion of the state's different case, the next being its opposite which says that there are certain regions in the state which don't go along the first argument of having any similarity with the power structure to the historical Rajasthan. There are certain regions and communities that show to correspondence to the historical realities of the state. These refers to the post independence developments in the state, where certain strong peasants communities raised to the elite power structure and are now strong enough to determine fate of any political player in the state. This is quite a similar case of the emergence of the OBC in other northern states of the country but case of Hindutva still finds distinctiveness.

The regions like Sikar, Jhunjhunu, Bharatpur, Dholpur are the Jat dominated regions where the fate of a political player depends solely upon the decision by the community. What becomes important here is to take account of the historical realities of the community itself that provides it with the strength of unity. The division between the Jat votes has been less, general trend has been that most Jat votes goes to a single leader. Other important thing to take notice of is the charisma and popularity that these Jat leaders have because of their community service feeling much prior to the service of the people in general. The concept of Rajput Hindutva actually fails to mobilize this community which constitutes around 10% of the total population of the country. Thus BJP's approach and strategy to mobilize these people has to be different and could be more or less similar to the OBC mobilization in the other states. The issues of reservation, peasant upliftment seems to be the key here.

The central argument that I would like to make is that BJP in Rajasthan adopts a political strategy and adapts its ideology to suit the local needs, which is different from that of the rest of India. This, I think, is because of the fact that the social context of Rajasthan does give the opportunity to use the Hindutva card in any significant way. In other words the ideological agenda of the party takes a back seat in Rajasthan despite of the presence of RSS and other Right wing organizations. There is different set of caste dynamics present in Rajasthan that owes to the princely and feudal history of the place and I think this explains the difference in the nature of BJP's ideology and strategy in the state. The developments in the post independent India in terms of land reform and other anti feudal policies have transformed the power and authority structure in the state. The way these policies have worked out in Rajasthan has defined the nature of polity in a way that is has emerged almost as a unique case. For BJP this was a different ground compared to the other states and this has contributed to the internal stress regarding the ideology and strategy to be adopted. It is interesting to note that BJP projects itself more as development oriented party in the state but also once in power it begins silently adopting the communal agenda. One can easily take note of the fact that once BJP is in power the right wing organizations of the Hindutva family become very active.

Structure of the argument

The major objective of the Chapter is to understand the elements of Hindutva that we find part of the present day politics of BJP. I have analyzed the works by Golwalkar and Savarkar in this chapter to draw the structure of Hindutva to the basic elements of its ideology as conceptualized by its founding fathers. I have explored contemporary literature to understand the academic picture of Hindutva politics of the present day. The major part literature I have covered is on the Sangh Parivar and its organizations. I have explored the literature on BJP to find out the self image of the party.

The second Chapter deals with the case of Rajasthan as to understand the historical roots of power structure. The objective here is to find out the elements of Hindutva being part of social milieu historically. Other than the establishment, projects, planning and organization of the Sangh Parivar in Rajasthan, in this chapter, I have tried to present a clear picture of the caste dominated politics. It seems that the main determinant of Rajasthan politics is

caste that makes it compulsory for BJP to change its cards here. For this chapter the sources that I have used are mostly secondary includes major literature on BJP and Hindutva in Rajasthan. The history of caste relations and Jat-Rajput, Upper caste-lower caste relations, social situation of tribal of the state all finds place in this chapter.

The third chapter has everything to do with the electoral data of the Lok Sabha and assembly elections from the year BJP came into power till date. It has been done to understand the region specific approach that BJP carries on in the state. It provides empirical evidences to my argument that I put forward in the previous chapters. I am also looking into the policies of BJP like the Anti-conversion bill that it came up with in 2006 and 2008, to prove my argument that it has a different approach towards Hindutva itself at the mobilization and policy making level. Though it does not project the Hindutva objectives at the beginning but in the end it does fulfill that.

The last segment of the chapter deals with the election Manifestos of released by BJP at national and state level in Rajasthan so as to compare the difference between the agenda at the two levels. The idea is to know how and when the party places its ideology concerned agenda more apparently in the public. The major focus is on the Hindutva elements that are projected at the state level declarations which I argue are none in case of Rajasthan. I will try to read and analyze the visibly present and visibly absent factors in the Party declarations before elections that can give us the clue about how it projects itself in the public. This is necessary to prove my hypothesis arguing a different case of Rajasthan in terms of Hindutva politics. The apparent difference in the approach tells us much about the BJP's projection in the state as different from that of any other place.

Election Manifestos that every party releases at state level comprises of all the objectives that they set for themselves in the particular state along with all the promises that party seems to believe catchy for the people. Setting up of the party objectives and promises is compilation of the party agenda along with the factors that party think people are in dire need. The prior motive is to get votes and if some space remains the party agenda adjusts. In case of state politics, with some exceptions, generally the party agenda never comes up and it comes up only after they have won the elections especially when the agenda is communal in nature like that of Hindutva politics.

CHAPTER-2

MAKING OF HINDUTVA IDEOLOGY

1.0 INRODUCTION

Hindutva has been subject to multiple definitions, various perspective and shifting meanings and therefore remained an area of debate in the academics from its very origin. The dispute among the commentators and academicians is regarding not only its meaning and definition but also about its usage in public sphere and political sphere. This chapter attempts to understand the fundamental elements of Hindutva, how RSS, Bajrang dal and other right wing organizations use it and also the internal complexities present in BJP that make it all together different to it both at national and state level politics.

In this chapter, I have put forward the argument that from the very beginning of BJP's origin in the Indian politics, there has been an internal tension in the ideology itself regarding the components of Hindutva that it should include in its realm of politics. This stress is rooted in the differences in the ideas of the two forefathers Golwalkar and Savarkar. BJP adopted Savarkar's ideas rather than Golwalkar's whereas RSS kept on working as a cultural organization, what Golwalkar wished for. Secondly, for the in the realm of politics, BJP has no option but to dilute the ideology that the forefathers of Hindutva proposed.

The chapter is divided in three parts, the first part deals with the ideology of Hindutva as it was given by the founding fathers of concept of 'Hindu-Rashtra'. I have discussed the major differences between Savarkar and Golwalkar. It also discusses the debate regarding whether Hindutva can be seen from the lens of fundamentalism like the Islamic forces. This topic has been hotly debated in previous decades and academicians have strong arguments both in oppositions and favour of it. The second part deals with the emergence of RSS as the Hindu right organization and that of BJP as a political party and tries to understand the element of Hindutva that they incorporate and its relation, if any, to the fundamental texts. Their role in shaping up the Indian politics also finds place in this part.

Later we try to understand the changes that are coming up into its approaches of the party with respect to its ideology.

The internal tension that party is caught in is making it necessary for it to make its approaches region specific. The character of the party thus is being defined by this complexity within its ideological formulation. On the other hand, other right wing organizations are stuck to the original ideology, which again creates certain differences between the various organs of the Sangh Parivar. The stress that BJP faces is quite visible even in the party's functioning in different states. In this scenario of ideology crisis at the functional level the still relevant components of Hindutva of BJP are the history and tradition.

Though Hindutva has remained a subject of criticism in the field of academics from as early as its emergence as the Hindu Nationalist movement in the freedom struggle in 1930s, there are certain very strong defenders as well who need not necessarily be conservatives in their approach but speak against strong presumptions against Hindutva that persists in the field of academics. Some of them go as far as defining the BJP as an evolving party, welcoming the changes that it is adopting at the cost of diluting its ideological structure.

2.0 HINDUTVA- THE IDEOLOGY

The term 'Hindutva' had been coined by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar in his book "Hindutva: who is a Hindu" published in 1942. It has then been extensively used by various right wing organizations with a clear objective to redefine India as a "Hindu-Rashtra". This they demand on the basis that majority of population in the country are Hindus and thus they should be provided with privilege. This is the way the Hindu Nationalism gets differentiated from Indian Nationalism. This ideology is sometimes seen as cultural nationalism and sometimes as regional nationalism. Hindutva's scope and

⁹ Richard H.Davis, 'The cultural Background of Hindutva', in the book, 'In India Briefing Takeoff at Last?' Eds. Alyssa Ayra and Philip Oldonburg (Asian Society, New York, 2005) p.111.

area of understanding is so vast that it could not be defined very properly even when so many scholars got attracted to it. The interpretation of the original texts is done by people's own presumptions and biases. In this section I am trying to put forward some definitions and understandings of Hindutva from relevant contemporary sources to show that there is no commonly agreed definition of Hindutva in the contemporary literature. In the next section, therefore, I try to explore the concept of Hindutva as developed by its founding fathers i.e. Vinayak Damodar Savarkar and Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar. This is an attempt to understand as to what are the basic components of Hindutva as have been put by them.

I shall begin with the introduction of the definitions that has been provide to Hindutva in the academics and then come to the discussion about the conflicts and stress that it carries within itself. Supreme Court defines Hindutva in a court judgment:

These Constitution Bench decisions, after a detailed discussion, indicate that no precise meaning can be ascribed to the terms *Hindu*, *Hindutva* and *Hinduism*; and no meaning in the abstract can confine it to the narrow limits of religion alone, excluding the content of Indian culture and heritage. It is also indicated that the term *Hindutva* is related more to the way of life of the people in the subcontinent. It is difficult to appreciate how in the face of these decisions, the term *Hindutva* or *Hinduism* per se, in the abstract, can be assumed to mean and be equated with narrow fundamentalist Hindu religious bigotry, or be construed to fall within the prohibition in sub-section (3) and/or (3A) of Section 123 of the R.P. Act. 10

Supreme Court's in this judgment makes it clear that 'Hindutva' has more to do with the way of life of the people of this country rather than being seen as limited to the religion. It should not be equated to a religious fundamentalism rather it should be understood as a synonym of *Indianisation*, i.e., development of uniform culture by obliterating the differences between all the cultures co-existing in the country.

Hindutva ideology has been evolved in years, right from the British era till now it's evolving and altering its form. But like every ideology it has certain basic elements to

¹⁰ Premendra Agrawal, Supreme Court on Hindutva and Hinduism, JUDGMENT: J. S. Verma J, Source: http://www.newsanalysisindia.com. Accessed on 15th July 2011 at 12.57 pm.

cling upon which we can say it will never change, may it changes the ways to accomplish its objectives. As Clifford Geertz puts:

Belief systems develop in response to cultural, social and psychological strains which develop when existing symbolic models of authority, responsibility, and civic purpose do not adequately explain the social situation.¹¹

Hindutva too draws from the Hindu past to construct its belief system. But despite this, Hindutva cannot be labeled as a pre-modern concept, though it draws itself from the past and cultural history of the nation, it is entirely a modern concept which has been advocated by many scholars. Some scholars like Partha Chatterjee looks at Hindutva as Hindu nationalism where the main source of nationalism is the history of the nation. As he puts in his book Nation and its Fragments:

The idea that Indian Nationalism is synonymous with Hindu nationalism is not the vestige of some pre-modern religious conception. It is an entirely modern, rationalist and historical idea. Like other modern ideologies, it allows for a central role of the state in the modernization of society and strongly defends the state's unity and sovereignty. Its appeal is not religious but political. In this sense, the framework of its reasoning is entirely secular. ¹²

For Chatterjee, Hindu nationalism is not a pre-modern religious conception but an entire modern idea. The concept of Hindutva is modern not only from its origin as it emerged in the post colonial era, but also from its approach to look at the modern democratic institutions and their developmental role.

Among contemporary writers, Subramaniam Swami¹³ in his latest writing the ideology of Hindutva carries a revivalist nature being committed to the concept of Hindu Rashtra. He says that Hindutva is a multi-facet concept of identity, socio-constitutional order, modernity, our civilization history, economic philosophy and governance.¹⁴ This can be related to what Chatterjee had said about Hindu Nationalism. Further Swami opines that

¹¹ Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in Ideology and discontent, ed. By David E. Apter, p.53.

p.53.

12 Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Post colonial Histories (OUP, 1995), p.110.

¹³ Subramanium Swami is apparently a important leader of Janta Dal who also write extensively on Hindutva and its future strategies.

¹⁴ Subramanium Swami, 'Hindutva and National Renaissance', (New Delhi, Har Anand Publications, 2010) p.no.34

"Sanatana Dharma"¹⁵ is an integral part of the Hindutva ideology and this is the element that makes it secular by nature. And he explains the position of Sanatan Dharma:

Sanatana Dharma is eternal because it is based not upon the teachings of a single preceptor of a chosen prophet but on the collective accumulated wisdom and inspiration of great seers and sages from the dawn of civilization.¹⁶

He therefore makes a point that Sanatana Dharma gives the context and root meaning to the Hindutva ideology which then later was put by Savarkar in a political framework. He says that concept of Sanatana Dharma is proximate to science through its inquiry with spirituality as its logic to that. The concept of Sanatana Dharma is therefore the one that makes Hindutva ideology more inclusive in its approach and segregates it from the more exclusive approaches of Islam and Christianity. Hindutva is the practical and political manifestation of Sanatana Dharma. Hindutva, therefore is the most pluralistic and inclusive ideology according to Swami.

Hindutva can be most simply put forward as 'the consciousness of the identity of being a Hindu in social, cultural, political and regional terms'. The right wing organizations do nothing more than making the people self aware of their common identity to mobilize them in the name of protecting and glorifying the claims of Hindus and assert the cultural primacy of Hindus over the territorial entity of the country and to define that India primarily belongs to the Hindus.¹⁷ This includes the use of historical figures as symbols for mobilization of the people. This has been extensively explained in case of Rajasthan in the third chapter. The glorification of the tradition and culture by making the historical figure as the saviors of the same is the strategy.

¹⁶ Subramanium Swami, 'Hindutva and National Renaissance', (New Delhi, Har Anand Publications,

¹⁵ Sanatana Dharma is the element of Hinduism which was further explored by Aurobindo Ghosh. It is a spiritual tradition of Hinduism which let the individual to explore the spiritual realms.

²⁰¹⁰⁾ p.no.34

17 Pratabh Bhanu Mehta, Introduction to the Omnibus, Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics (OUP,2004)

This idea of tradition and its role in Hindutva has also been discussed As M.S Chitkara in his book "Hindutva", he says:

Tradition plays an important role in development of self-respect. At the national level tradition infuses energy in building of strong character. The nation gradually acquires an indomitable profile rooted in tradition. In India Rana Pratap and Padmini are the fine examples how sense of tradition manifest in valou and patriotism. The former fought despite knowing his cause was hopeless, Padmini and the ladies in her entourage burnt themselves to death rather than surrender only to uphold the pristine glory of Hindu tradition. ¹⁸

BJP does understand the importance of these figures in the Indian politics in order to mobilize people in the call of tradition and culture. The use of Hindu rulers of pre colonial period who fought with the foreign invaders is done intensively by Sangh Parivar. This approach though can also be seen in a regional approach in some parts of the country. For example, BJP carried the symbol of Jat ruler in Bharatpur- Dholpur constituency of Rajasthan during the election campaigning in 2008 state assembly elections. The third chapter discusses it more extensively while analyzing the strategies of BJP in Rajasthan.

Thus we find that the concept of culture and tradition, as part of the Hindutva ideology, still have the scope to survive even in the regional approaches that BJP carries in some parts of the country.

2.1. HIDUTAVA AS DEFINED BY THE FOUNDING FATHERS

The great works which are said to structure the 'Hindutva' ideology the most important are by M.S.Golwalkar and V.D.Savarkar, two most important thinkers of the ideology. My idea is not to draw a comparison between the two texts but to define the present day Hindutva as extracted from both of them for the electoral purposes.

¹⁸ M.S.Chitkara, Hindutva (APH Publications, New Delhi, 1997) p.15

'We or our nationhood defined' is considered as the bible of their ideology by RSS while 'Hindutva- Who is a Hindu' by Savarkar, seems more parallel to the present day structure and formulation of the ideology by BJP. The ideology of Hindutva as presented by Golwalkar has its roots into the theory of Aryan invasion, where some historians also believe that Aryans who settled in India had formed a nation and that nation endorsed the Hindu culture later on. The history as represented by him says that it was then invaded and exploited by many invaders which settled here, some of them left some remained here. Though, the historians have a contested opinion about the history that Golwalkar uses to support his arguments. The Aryan invasion, belongingness of the Aryans to the country, weather Aryan culture is the Hindu culture is still problematic arenas for the historians. As Romila Thapar puts it:

Attempts are being made to extend the importance of Aryan culture by trying to prove that the Harappan culture was also an Aryan culture, in spite of the fact that the archaeological evidence is quiet contrary to the theory. The attempt to prove India as the indigenous home of the Aryans, apart from whatever historical validity it may have is essentially an attempt to pander to a false sense of national pride and maintain that Aryan culture which in certain circles is believed to be the nucleus of Indian civilization was completely indigenous.¹⁹

Golwalkar has thus been accused of using and interpreting the historical realities for proving his own points about race and culture of Indian. The Aryan theory has been extensively used by Golwalkar to prove which stand void according to many historians. Another contested area about use of history in Golwalkar is the use and interpretation of Upanishads like Rig Veda to glorify the Indian culture and its spiritual relevance in the period through the ancient literature. This has been contested by the Historians pointing out the fact that he has deliberately ignored the spirituality of the other countries surrounding India. The idea that was to be popularized was the spiritual superiority of Indian culture and also an excuse for not getting into the process of Industrialization like

¹⁹ Romila Thapar, Communalism and The Writing of Ancient Indian History, in 'Selected Writings on Communalism' (PPH, 1994) p.no.11

the western country as the people were keeping away from it and more into the world of spirituality.²⁰

Golwalkar relies totally upon these contested theories of Aryan invasion for proving his arguments about the Hindu race. Thus the idea of race is caught by the historians to be very vague and based on the mis-interpretation of the historical facts and realities. This is also the view Savarkar puts forward, he believes that the Hindu-ness of the country rests on three pillars: geographical unity, racial features and a common culture. Though unlike Golwalkar the element of caste and religion, to some extent, was reduced in Savarkar but his idea of Hindu-ness and common culture included the idea of India being the fatherland of the country and thus excludes Muslims and Christians from this only on the basis that they look upon some other land as their holy land.

Though there lays fundamental differences between the approaches these two texts adopts, the concept of Hindu Rashtra is prominent in both of them. An important difference as pointed out by some historians like Gyanendra Pandey that in Golwalkar's idea of Hindutva, caste system remains very important. He praises the ancient India where caste system prevailed with the domination of the values of the Brahmin. Therefore the characterization of Hindu nationalism as 'upper caste racism' by the historian like Pandey is perfectly relevant here. 21 For Golwalkar the purity of race is very important element in making a Hindu Rashtra, since Hindu religion and culture gave unique identity to the Hindu nation.

Anderson and Damle in 'Brotherhood in Saffron' 22 explains that Savarkar's emphasis was more on turning the Hindu Mahasabha²³ into a political party against the congress as an opposition party. Golwalkar and Hedgewar were keener to keep this as a cultural organization which carries on the task of culturization.

²¹ G.Pandey, Which of us are Hindus?, in G.Pandey,ed., Hindus and others- the question of Identity in India

Today (New Delhi: Vikings, 1993)
²² Damle and Andersen, *Brotherhood in Saffron, The RSS and The Hindu Revivalism*, (Vistaar Publications, New Delhi, 1998) p.no.16
²³ Which was established in 1915 and Savarkar was made its head in 1937.

2.2. Elements of Hindutva

Golwalkar provides five 'ingredients' that he states as essential elements to constitute a nation, they are, Territory, Race, Religion, Culture and Language. All of these five elements are indissoluble from the Nation.

The nation Concept compromises the five constituent ideas-country, race, religion, culture and language-as necessary and indispensable ingredients, in the existence of which five in a homogeneous whole, the nation exists and in the destruction of any one of which the Nation itself experience extinction.²⁴

All the five elements can be seen connected and well knitted into each other. He draws a definite link between the five. The territoriality which he defines as the concept of holy land or fatherland which comes from the history and thus becomes a hereditary territory forms a bond with the community which in turn relates to the culture and religion. Secondly, while he talked about race, he sees it as the origin of the culture and he defines it as a society having common culture, practices, language and common shared historical memories. He talks about the mother race, which ought to be the original race of the country, i.e. Aryans in case of India, and talks about the assimilation of the foreign races into the mother race. The Race being the body of the Nation should not be segregated and thus he favors building a national race which defines the culture and customs of the country which again need to be homogeneous according to him. Culture which he doesn't actually separates from Religion, again is the product of history and age long customs, traditions and religious beliefs and ancient philosophy of the Hindu Religion. The last one being Language is discussed in the next paragraph.

2.3. Language and Hindutva

Language for Golwalkar reflects the culture, religion, history and traditions of the country.²⁵ Golwalkar's concept of language and his idea about the Sanskrit language is another factor that makes us believe that his Hindutva is more casteist and based on brahiminical superiority. Sanskrit has always remained the language of the upper caste

²⁴ Golwalkar, We or Our Nationhood Defined, 1939, P.no.28

²⁵ Golwalkar, We or Our nationhood Defined, p.26 (Nagpur, 1939)

Hindus, the lower caste were not even permitted to study or use the language still Golwalkar makes it an essential component of a Hindu nation. Golwalkar claims Sanskrit to be the mother of all Indian languages where he ignored the languages in India which are even older than Sanskrit and have greater literary heritage. By making all these claims he is keeping, deliberately, a large area of India and a large section of Hindu population out of Hindu nation. Though it was something from which BJP had to keep away after few decades when it realized it being a blunder for its electoral win. This is because by making Sanskrit the mother language, he is excluding not only the minority belonging to other religious communities but also excluding a large portion of age long backward Hindu castes and groups who have been kept aloof from Sanskrit from ages and whose chief language is vernacular and not Sanskrit. In fact, RSS under Golwalkar soon realized that the myth of Sanskrit was not resonating and it had to shift to Hindi as the constitution element of Hindu nation which in turn raised new questions. ²⁶

Coming back to Golwalkar and Savarkar's ideas, the concept of Hindu nation as given by Golwalkar is very intolerant to outsider's religions and demands a greater loyalty to the nation's identity i.e. the Hindu. Both Golwalkar and Savarkar provides instances from the sacred literature and the history of the nation building but Savarkar arguing about how the element of the Hinduness lies in each and every religion of the country no matter from where they have come. History remains the most important factor for both Savarkar and Golwalkar in their formulation of the Hindutva ideology as discussed earlier the accusation from which both of them suffers of misinterpretation and misusing the historical facts, by historians like Thappar. Savarkar's approach seems to be more inclusive than Golwalkar's as both of them are trying to define the essentials of the Hindutva; Golwalkar draws more rigid lines in the definition. He believes that Hindu nation always remains the end an ultimate destination for Hindus who according to him are the real residents of India. Here the term 'Hindu' is defined not on the basis of their birth in the Hindu religion but five elements, as discussed earlier, i.e. country, race, Religion, Culture and language. His idea was to project India as more strong state that could only be done if the people here are united by their identity. He provides a historical

²⁶ Shamsul Islam, introduction to the *critiques of Golwalkar's We or our Nationhood Defined*,(Pharos, New Delhi,2006) p.18

account to prove the incontrovertibility of these five elements of the nation. Hindus have been a distinct nation even more than 80 to 100 centuries. All the five elements are necessary but, religion and culture remains the most important components of a nation.

We are what our great religion has made us. Our race spirit is a child of our religion and so with us culture is but product of our all comprehensive religion, a part of its body and not distinguishable from it....a nation, does profess and maintain a national religion and culture, these being necessary to complete national idea.27

He draws a comparison between the western conception of a nation and his own ideas. Golwalkar's motive is to bring the idea of religion to the central stage. His approach is more exclusive in nature where no other community can claim to be integral part of the Indian nation as they might lack in at least one or of these five elements.

Golwalkar also projects Hindus as learned and enlightened and the others as uncivilized and barbaric religions. 28 He makes an attempt to prove the superiority of Hindus in front of all other communities. He prefers using Hindus to Aryan and 'Bhartiya' and which makes it apparent that his theory was more concerned with the Hindu religion and culture. He himself uses these two terms, religion and culture, interchangeably in the book We or Our Nationhood Defined. And the reason why he would not use the word Arya is that he won't agree to the theory of Aryan invasion as explained by the historians. He would rather rely on depictions from Ramayana and Mahabharata. The interpretation of history therefore also leads to the change in the sources of information which are highly non reliable sources.

Savarkar on the other hand, provides a more broad and inclusive definition to Hindutva. He says:

A Hindu is who looks upon the land that extends from Sindhu -from the Indus to the Seas,-as the land of his forefathers-his Fatherland (Pitribhu), who inherits the blood of that race whose first discernible source could be traced to the Vedic Saptasindhus and which on its onward march, assimilating much that was incorporated and ennobling much that was assimilated, has inherited and claims as his own the culture of that race as expressed chiefly in their common classical

 ²⁷ Golwalkar, we or our nationhood defined, p.22
 ²⁸ Ibid.p.no. 23

language Sanskrit and represented by a common history, a common literature, art and architecture ,law and jurisprudence, rites and rituals, ceremonies and sacraments, fairs and festival; and who above all, addresses this land, this Sindhusthan as his Holy land, as the land of his prophets and seers, of his god men and gurus, the land of piety and pilgrimage.²⁹

Savarkar's view is therefore, when compared to Golwalkar's, is more broad and inclusive as it has not identified an essential Hindu set of beliefs and has not provided and suggestion for the reform of the Hindu practices that Golwalkar seems to have presented more powerfully. He does not make any strong religious belief to determine the nationality to the country. His focus remains history and culture that could be same for all the communities despite of their religious beliefs. The only demand that Savarkar is making, pointing out the Muslims and Christians in the country, is that they should consider India as their holy land as well as fatherland. They should not refer to some place located outside the country for the religious and spiritual reference. This he makes condition of being a pure Indian.

2.4. Creating the Other

Whether to consider Hindutva as fundamentalist ideology or not has been an area of argument ever since the academicians are getting attracted towards Hindutva and are writing extensively on it. Though, the broader view has been not to locate it into the fundamentalist category. If we see fundamentalism from the lenses of modernity and find the two antagonistic to each other as most of the fundamentalist groups are pre-modern both by origin and nature. Thus one of the basic arguments that can be put forward to defend that Hindutva is not being a fundamentalist ideology, is the very origin of Hindutva, which says that it is majorly a modern development and thus obliviously, unlike the actually fundamentalist religious groups, Hindutva does not have a conservative outlook towards the modernity. Rather it has been very active and innovative as it is not totally discarding the past neither has made any antagonism to the

²⁹ Savarkar, *Hindutva*, p.no.116

modernity. It has strategically selected few religious values from the past and seeks to adopt principles of modernity, which seems necessary for development perspective.

We need to understand what fundamentalism really means here, it denotes the religious fundamentalism where one returns to the fundamentals of a particular religion like in case of Biblical literalism or implementation of Shari' a in which, when compared, Hindutva fits nowhere.³⁰ Another argument is the location of Hindutva in the theory of Sanatana Dharma which no ways fits into the fundamental category. Davis thinks that this Ideology is inclusive from its very pedestal and should not be counted as a fundamentalist group.

Arguing in this direction weather to consider Hindutya as a fundamentalism remains an important question. The answer lies in the differentiation provided by Savarkar on Hindutva and Hinduism, Hindutva cannot be considered as fundamentalism. The contemporary literature often, while arguing about the pluralism and inclusiveness of Hindutva, misses out this differentiation. If we see fundamentalism as being near to orthodoxy, traditionalism or communalism, Hindutva ideology is more near to preservatism along with the revivalist tendency. It does utilize the religion and tradition but to respond to the contemporary needs and to meet the challenge of a secular democratic polity. According to Savarkar, Hinduism is just a derivative, a fraction of Hindutva. Unless it is made clear what is meant by the latter the first remains unintelligible and vague. Failure to distinguish between the two has given rise to much of understanding and mutual suspicion between some of those sister communities that have inherited this inestimable and common treasure of our Hindu civilization.³¹ If we go by this distinction between Hindutva and Hinduism, the ideology seems clear on its stand that it builds a nation not on the basis of religion but cultural history and thus includes all communities bounded into a common culture and cultural history. Savarkar's conception Hindutva is not based on any kind of religious dogma or creed. For him Hinduness and not Hinduism can stand parallel to the meaning of Hindutva. From the term Hinduness, he denotes the people who are having a historical cultural similarity irrespective of their

³⁰ Richard H.Davis, 'The cultural Background of Hindutva', in the book, 'In India Briefing Takeoff at Last?' Eds. Alyssa Ayra and Philip Oldonburg (Asian Society, New York, 2005) p.no.12 ³¹ V.D.Savarkar, Hindutva- Who is a Hindu, Essentials of Hindutva, p.3

religion and since it is the Hindu religion that shares the most common part of it, all are termed as Hindus.

Some contemporary scholars also suggest that Fundamentalism need to have a historic and religious specificity which makes it different from the resurgent religious movements across the world. Therefore many of them don't consider Hindutva as fundamentalist, it needs to be rather seen as a symptom of social, economic, and political factors rather than being essentially about, or motivated by, religious concerns.³² What becomes the context for the rise of Hindutva is the colonial rule in the country and thus seen as a post colonial formation. Secondly, the Hindu religion itself seems to be soft in its approach with some exceptions, it's based totally upon the feeling of humanity, kindness, truth, tolerance and faith. The rise of Hindu militancy therefore is a more recent phenomenon and Hindutva cannot be termed as fundamentalist from its very origin. Many scholars also believe that rather than calling it fundamentalism, it would be better to call it 'communalism' or 'Hindu Nationalism' when to connote its communal nature.

Many scholars, like Sumantra Bose believes that the birth of Hindu Nationalism is a combined result of divide and rule policy of the British government, which made the gaps between Hindus and Muslims deeper, and the religious insecurities that grew as a result of partition. He also takes it to as long as 1980s and blames the state's inability to cope with the developmental and social crisis that resulted into the rise of the Hindu Right as the only way of expression for the common man. Therefore the inability of the Indian state to fulfill the socioeconomic and political demands after independence resulted into class and caste tensions which came up as the Hindu right movements. Political Parties started using secularism as a tool, getting it on and off, to create divisions among the religious and caste communities for political gains³³.

Savarkar's Hindutva which became the basis for BJP thus constituted with a theory of nationality but free from religiosity and even language unlike Golwalkar's. It rather tries to bind the nation with the help of common history and culture. Why BJP chose Savarkar

³² Juergensmeyer, M., 'The debate over Hindutva', Religion (1996) p.no.130

³³ Sumantra Bose, "Hindu Nationalism and the Crisis of the Indian State: A Theoretical Perspective", Sumantra Bose and Ayesha Jalal (eds.), *Nationalism, Democracy and Development*, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 104-165.

and not Golwalkar to define its elements of Hindutva has been discussed in the next segment.

3.0. Hindutva of BJP

Bhartiya Janta Party's view of Hindutva is a clear adoption from Savarkar's Hindutva, where reasons too seem to be very apparent. Savarkar's Hindutva makes an appeal to larger section of the country's population, whereas Golwalkar's idea is very exclusive in its approach. The idea of binding people through their cultural identities seems to be the major criteria of BJP's selection of Savarkar's thoughts. Another important element of Savarkar's idea of Hindutva is the presence of territorial dimension of nationalism, which is absent in Golwalkar. This makes his approach more similar to the fascism which solely relies on the conception of race. The scope of including the minorities in the Hindu Rashtra dies there only in case of Golwalkar. Savarkar on the other hand talks about the territorial nationalism when he talks about the 'concept of fatherland'. For him its neither caste nor race but the blood and common culture that connects all the Hindus. In his words, 'Because a moment's consideration would show that these two qualifications of one nation and one race-of common fatherland and therefore of a common blood –cannot exhaust all the requisites of Hindutva'. And thus he suggests:

The majority of the Indian Mohammedans may, if free from the prejudices born of ignorance come to love our land as their fatherland, as the patriotic and nobleminded amongst them have always been doing. The story...is too recent to make them forget, even if they like to do so, that they inherit Hindu blood in their veins.³⁵

The contemporary literature on Hindutva suggests that Hindutva as an ideology in its actual form has not been put forward as a question of religion or caste but as an identity of the Hindu cultural history which, as advocated by Savarkar, includes all religious communities inhabiting in the country. And in reality, it has been the common culture only that has been able to unite the various communities of the country. The idea of culture, therefore, is very important. Some scholars compare the Indian scenario with that of Pakistan, while the Indian constitution makers made the secularism, religious freedom,

35 ibid

³⁴ Savarkar, Hindutva-who is a Hindu?, p.94

tolerance as the base of Indian constitution, Pakistan was made a religious country. Though Indian state has many problems implementing the concepts but despite of all the tensions among communities the idea of common culture still binds them. And on the other hand Pakistan saw the failure of the two nation theory where the newly made nation on the basis of religion, Pakistan actually could not find it aloof from the Hindu identity and suffers from identity crisis even after so many years of separation. The cultural connections is bigger than the religious connections which Pakistan definitely had with some of the Arab Muslim nations, but still it could not relate itself to them than they way it is to India. ³⁶

Escaping the history of the origin of BJP and its link with RSS, which are more or less factual information, next we come directly to the present day politics and approach of BJP. We are thus, going to discuss about the BJP's policies and ideas with respect to its commitment to the Hindutva ideology, while analyzing that we will look into the political scenario at the central politics and problems that BJP faces in the central politics with that strategy. What changes it adopted therein and what results they brought out is another area of concern. We are doing this to understand and draw a comparison between the different situations lying in different states and BJP's strategy accordingly. That is to understand where it could afford to act moderately and where it did not move from its ideological commitments. This is an attempt to understand the situation of Rajasthan in this respect.

3.1. BJP Strategy for Ideology's sake

Most of the literature work on BJP suggests that BJP had two sets of programmes in its strategy which included two levels, one at the centre and national politics and another at

³⁶ Bhambhari C.P., *Hindutva: a challenge to multi-cultural democracy*, (Shipra Publications, New Delhi, 2003,) p.no.140.

the state level. First, being in the opposition it has to raise important issues like the introduction of a uniform civil code, the elimination of Article 370, the eviction of unauthorized Bangladeshi migrants. Time and again these issues have formulated BJP's tone in national politics. The second level remains those areas which it can alter and influence by being at the position of being a ruling party in some of the states. The issues like Ram Mandir, altering the textbooks keeping in view the party's Hindutva ideology. The Ram Mandir issue though has emerged as an important national level issue though mobilization beginning from the main state. The political agenda exclusive to the party are essentially connected by the umbilical cord of the Hindutva ideology.

The present day politics of BJP also suggests that BJP prefers to be more radical in its strategy creating greater electoral dividends. The extremist approach of it does help it to mobilize people but it has a compulsion to being more moderate to get support from the political allies to remain in power. Thus we see that the Jan Sangh and the later Bharitya Janta Party have always oscillated between a militant and a moderate approach to politics.³⁷ It fact, BJP never came up with an approach directly linked to the militant propagation of Hindutva at the central level politics after 1991. In 1996 it had to forcefully adopt the moderate electoral strategy to be in power, possible only through making new alliances. It had to join alliance even with the parties having no ideological affinities with the Hindu Nationalism. The ideological commitment of the party and its prior principles became ambiguous with the coalition politics. In this emerging environment of coalition politics, the Sangh Parivar's tradition of ideological homogeneity and purity, of discipline and centralized devising of strategies, and of commitment to the building of a strong, incorporative national culture, polity and state, may prove to be a liability rather than an asset for the BJP. 38 Jafferlot while talking about the Rise of BJP to power gives the idea about BJP's two major constraints that came up after 1980s namely, regionalization and the rise of lower caste mobilization. According to Jafferlot the Hindutva ideology of BJP restrained its vote bank to the urban intellectuals

(New Delhi: Penguin India, 1996)

38 Thomas Blom Hansen and Christophe Jafferlot, B.JP and the Compulsions of Politics in India (OUP, New Delhi, 1998) p.3.

³⁷ This is one of the major arguments in Jafferlot, C., *The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics* (New Delhi: Penguin India, 1996)

only, the illiterate and poor rural population was untouched by the mobilization tactics of BJP even when it come out a little from the periphery of the Hindu nationalist idea.

Jefferlot believes that BJP's main problem lied with its aversion to an adoption of the so called mandalization process ³⁹. In other words, BJP was devoid of a large portion of Indian rural population with this aversion towards the mandalization. For BJP, an alternative to this remained to grow alliance with the regional parties as they were based on community, caste identities and thus were very popular among the low and intermediate castes. This kind of arrangement was already present in Maharashtra where the RSS and then its political offshoots, the Jan Sangh and the BJP, tended to be associated with the Brahmins, while the Shiv Sena recruited many supporters among the intermediate and low castes ⁴⁰. This Jefferlot terms as indirect mandalization where BJP joined hands with the regional political parties in states where it could not come in power otherwise. This brought considerable success to BJP in most of the northern states.

BJP was formed in 1980 when the Janta dal got divided on the issues of its relation with RSS; BJP thus emerged as a party having objectives connected to Hindutva ideology and its members retaining clear connections with RSS. In order to further enlarge its appeal to the masses it included Gandhian concepts of development. The change and modification in the constitution of the party once it got separated from the Janta dal was an apparent return to the Hindutva ideology which otherwise got subdued in Janta dal period. The party shall be committed to furthering national integration, positive secularism, Gandhian socialism and value based politics. The party stands for decentralization of economic and political power. The party believed that there is an acute moral crisis that India is going through, the highest sufferers because of that is the poor of the country. BJP was then lead by Atal Bihari Vajpayee and though congress was criticized by BJP on its policies but the national agenda like Uniform civil code, article 370 were nowhere in the strategy

³⁹ He calls it 'direct manadalization', the process of nominating a large number of the OBC leaders within the party apparatus.

⁴⁰ Hansen, T. Blom, 'The vernacularization of Hindutva: Shiv Sena and the BJP in Rural Maharashtra', Contributions to Indian Socilogy, vol 30, no 2(1996) pp 177-214

Contributions to Indian Socilogy, vol.30, no.2(1996) pp.177-214

All Partha S. Ghosh, BJP and the evolution of the hindu Nationalism, (Manohar Press, 1999) p.86.

of the party at that time. rather more focus was on the unpliftment of the poor on the basis of Gandhian strategies of decentralization and providing socio-economic justice to the people through land reforms, control of price line and improving upon the fiscal and monetary policy. This was the first phase of BJP, as suggested by Partha Ghosh, where it projected itself as a liberal force based on Gandhian socialism, this face of the party was not paid off electorally. At social level though the Hindu militancy of the groups like VHP kept growing which were seen as part of BJP. The difference between what BJP says and does hampered the party image, In fact the congress taking advantage of BJP's image, eroded it completely from Jammu and Kashmir declaring it as an anti-Muslim party⁴².

When Advani took over the post of the president of the party, he criticized the pseudo secularism of congress and made the political agenda of BJP clearer. He tried raising the party as a true patriotic party, 'Ours is a nation first party, and it aspires to become heartbeat of India ⁴³.' BJP has always projected itself as the only ideologically pure political party, in fact as mentioned earlier not a party but it has tried to project itself as a movement.

Coming back to the previous argument BJP mobilized Hindus in the early 1990s as a movement that culminated in the destruction of the Babri Masjid and as a result of it BJP gained considerable electoral benefits. But when the party leaders realized that returns to the extremist politics is making them decline they shifted to the more moderate and centralist politics. At present, BJP is coming back to the extremist side while before that it has to project itself as a party of stability and good governance and that only was the political position that favored it to capture the ruling party position. The contemporary literature on BJP suggests that BJP should be seen as a political movement rather than a political party. The moderate approach that party adopts is more of a compromise to be in power than its true agenda in the Indian politics. The support of the coalition allies becomes more than necessary for it when it has no clear majority in the winning situation

⁴²Ghosh Partha, S., BJP and the evolution of the hindu Nationalism. (New Delhi: Manohar Press, 1999), p.no.22

⁴³ Yogendra MAlik and V.B. Singh, Hindu Nationalists in India: The Rise of BJP(New Delhi : VIstaar, 1994),p.76.

as well. That implies that BJP has been forced to moderate its ruling strategy. As suggested by Atul Kohli, the logic of democratic institutions has become stronger than the extremist forces. ⁴⁴ BJP's decentralization approach is thus one of the supporting factors for it. Atul Kohli suggests that a relatively well organized and hierarchical political party like BJP is represented by variety of regional allies. And this, if seen along with Jafferlot's argument, is the only savior of the BJP in the present day casteist and regionalist political scenario.

4.0. BJP's positive secularism

BJP's Hindutva has always opposed to the minority policies of the Indian constitution and had named the Congress policies for the minority as pseudo-secularism. If we go by the fundamentals of Hindutva i.e. the elements of Hindutva as given by Golwalkar or Savarkar, there is no such concept like privileges to be provided to the minority communities in the name of secularism. But BJP in its Hindutva talks about and gives the principle of positive secularism where it proposes the unification of the all the religious communities under the uniform code of conduct, rights and responsibilities. This concept of positive secularism is however has been criticized of being biased to the majority Hindu code. Dr. Koenraad Elst says,

The only explicitly Indian contribution in the cited BJS/BJP self-declarations is of doubtful value: "positive secularism" defined as "sarva-dharma-samabhava", "equal respect for all religions". We let the difference with the original European concept of secularism pass, and focus on the problematic meaning of the slogan defining this "positive secularism". Two meanings are attested: the political meaning apparently given to it in the cited BJP texts, viz. that the state must be equidistant from Hinduism, Islam, Christianity and any other religion; and the religious meaning given to it by Mahatma Gandhi and his followers, viz. that a religious person should have equal respect for Hinduism, Islam etc., because all these religions are equally good and satisfying.⁴⁵

Thus positive Secularism is another important element that BJP needed to adopt to fit in the politics in India with Congress's secularism in competition. Positive secularism

⁴⁴ Atul Kohli, Success of Indian's Democracy, (CUP, 2001) p.10

⁴⁵ Dr. Koenraad Elst "Equal respect for all religions", Source: The Koenraad Elst site, http://koenraadelst.bharatvani.org/books/bjp/section2.html

though is not all together different concept than what Savarkar's conception of religious tolerance.

Conclusion

It makes it clear that BJP actually does not move as a Hindu nationalist movement everywhere in the country, just in order to survive it has to adopt to the features of the regional parties, of specific configuration of caste politics and the peculiar compulsions and idioms of the different political fields it engages with, the intensity and method of all this differs in different states. If BJP does not adopt different strategies at different states, it's likely to shrink to the northern and western states but since its strategical lines are drawn differently at different places they need a deeper analysis. As also suggested by the present literature, at the centre, BJP cannot afford to adopt its real Hindutva strategy. My argument in that scenario is that its role and position at the state level thus becomes more important as far as Hindutva ideology is concerned. The element of Hindutva are and need to be more apparent at the state level politics and particularly in the states where it is not going through any indirect mandalization, that is states where it rules or has ruled in majority support.

Regarding Rajasthan the literature provides a difference of opinion, since not much work has come up on the Hindu nationalism and BJP's working in Rajasthan, it is difficult to come up to a conclusion without having a deep study of the BJP's history in Rajasthan. While in most of the states, BJP tried to broaden its electoral appeal by making an effort to reach out the Dalits, OBC, and tribal people while at the grassroots level carrying forward its ideological agenda. While in some states its strategy has no link with the ideological parameters as it has to go by the regional specificities of caste social outlook. According to Rob Jenkins, Rajasthan is an exceptional case where BJP carry out both of these strategies. The feudal history of Rajasthan provides an ample scope to BJP to not to move very far from its ideological lines while mobilizing the people along with the caste politics though not so strong as in some other states. It would be interesting to counter this argument by Jenkins while analyzing the actual role that caste and region plays while

⁴⁶ Jenkins Rob, The BJP and the Compulsions of Politics in India, (OUP: New Delhi, 1993) p.no.106

analyzing the election scenario Rajasthan in the next chapter. This argument is thought provoking also because it indicates that Rajasthan has got more scope for BJP's success in comparison to the other states as not just it takes care of the ideological interests of Hindutva but also the caste politics.

CHAPTER 2

BJP in Rajasthan: Handling the Complexity

1.0 Introduction

In this chapter I am looking into the BJP's politics and its determinants in the state of Rajasthan. The central argument, in continuation to the first chapter, is that despite of the stress within the party at the national level, we cannot say that it functions autonomously in the states. I have taken in the case of Rajasthan, as the Hindutva in this state is carrying even more diversity within it. The caste relations and feudal history makes the Hindutva different from both the Hindutva projected in the fundamental texts and Hindutva of the party in general. The chapter is divided into four sections. First, I am looking into the demographical, ecological and historical situation as the state that is said to have an influence on the politics of the state. It includes the feudal history of the state along with the caste relations, power and authority structure in the state.

Secondly, I have discussed the case of BJP in Rajasthan, looking into the history of the party in the state; the main argument here is that BJP performs more as a regional party in Rajasthan, adjusting itself to the local politics. I have discussed about the strategies that it has adopted to mobilize people. The major determinants of BJP in Rajasthan are discussed in this section. The Rajput Hindutva and Jat-Rajput relations have a strong influence on BJP's strategies in the state which is discussed briefly in this section.

Thirdly, the chapter looks into the RSS led 'Hindutva' mission in Rajasthan which includes the mobilization of the tribes and the 'culturalization' projects that it is carrying on to bring the tribal people into the main Hindutva fold in parts of the state. And the main argument here is that the Hindutva agenda that BJP remains unable to fulfill are done by RSS as in most of the parts of the country. In other words, ideology based mobilization that BJP is unable to do now is done by RSS through various culture based projects.

This includes the tribal welfare projects led by RSS, educational and training institutes that it has come up with and popularizing the Hindu symbols and festivals among the masses. The visible idea behind all this is to unite the country under one cultural and traditional bound but the idea which remains invisible most of the time is mobilizing the masses for BJP. In case of Rajasthan, my argument is that despite of RSS's efforts the projects are not paying up in the BJP's electoral performance which again proves that BJP is unable to bring its sectarian end at the level of mobilization. My idea for the reason behind this is a much more complex case and nature of Hindutva in Rajasthan. The evidence to this argument, through the electoral performance of BJP in the concerned constituencies, is to be discussed in next chapter which is followed by the efforts in the Hindutva direction that it makes through its planning and policies only once it comes into power.

Lastly, the chapter looks into the incidences of caste atrocities and communal violence in the reign of BJP in the state. The aim of this section is to understand the sectarian ends that the Sangh Parivar tries to gain going beyond the state apparatus. This section is aloof from the ideology objectives that BJP achieves through reforms in policies and programmes, in fact, this again is the depiction of the strategy of BJP to use its Sangh Parivar partners to realize its Hindutva agenda. This is to throw a light and give us the context for how BJP deals with the Muslim minority and dalits issues in the state which turns out to be its normal approach.

1.2. Locating the state

Rajasthan is the largest state in the country with a presence of unusual diversity. It shares boundaries with Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Haryana and Gujarat. Talking about the geography, nearly 60 per cent portion of the state is under semi-desert or desert area mainly the western part of the state. The districts like Barmer, Jaisalmer, and Jodhpur are mostly under desert area. The most important geological feature of the state that actually determines its geography is the Aravalli Ranges that runs from Madhya Pradesh in the south-west towards Delhi in the north east, it runs parallel to the monsoon winds responsible for rains in the northern India. This is the chief reason for lack of

rainfall in the western part of the state whereas the eastern portions still have some watered region. The geographical look on the state becomes important to know the flaturally backward district of the state. Islanimer, Barmer are one of them, these are the most sparsely populated districts not only in the state but in the country. As far as economy is concerned agriculture remains not so developed due to the harsh climatic conditions and low water table. Only food crop grown amply around all districts is Bajra, which is a low nutrition level staple food grain crop of Rajasthan. Rajasthan basically is a grain-deficit state. As far as industry is concerned, Rajasthan never had a strong financial back to support the industrial growth. The historical cause for this is the absence British Raj in Rajasthan, it was only Ajmer district that remained under direct rule of the British Raj, it was only in 1956 state reorganization that 22 princely states came under the state of Rajasthan. The therefore lagged behind in terms of industrialization, literacy, education and health standards. The traditional handlooms and various small scale industries are very popular source of income in rural Rajasthan especially the western regions which otherwise lack in agricultural output. The governments at present are trying to promote these small scale industries and handloom business as that would also benefit the tourism industry of the state.

1.1 History of Religious and caste distribution

Rajasthan is a large state and so is its social and political diversity both in terms of religious and caste compositions and historical realities. It is quite obvious therefore that just the district wise analysis of the electoral data will not provide a true picture of BJP's social base in Rajasthan. Considering the historical development along with the present scenario of BJP's politics is necessary. Dividing the state into historical divisions that include regions once ruled by different rulers and regions dominated by various feudal communities is obligatory; this includes ancient division like Marwar, Mewar, Shekhawati, Bharatpur, Hadaoti etc. which are till now somewhere or the other dominated by the same respective communities. Now along with this division another important thing to consider is the demographical and geographical conditions of the state to keep in mind, the present scenario of the state. These two considerations will give us

the true analysis of BJP's social base in Rajasthan as well as the length of its roots into the feudal history in various parts of the state with or without its major beliefs.

Table 1

The Principal Castes of Rajputana (by regions)

Castes	Population (%)	Regions
Jat	9	Bikaner, Jodhpur,
		Shekhawati, Jaipur,
		Matsya
Brahmin	8	Matsya, Jaipur, Bikaner, Kota, Udaipur
Mahajan	7	Jaipur, Jodhpur, Bikaner
Rajput	6	Jodhpur, Bikaner, Udaipur
Chamar (SC)	6	Matsya, Jaipur, Kota, Bikaner
Bhil (ST)	6	Udaipur, Banswara
Meena (ST)	5	Matsya, Jaipur, Kota, Udaipur
Gujjar (OBC)	5	Jaipur, Matsya, Kota
Kumhar	3	Matsya, Jaipur, Udaipur, Bikaner

Source: Census of India, 1931.

As far as the historical distribution of religion is concerned the followers of Islam constitute around seven percent of the total population on an average, majority of them residing in the district Jaisalmer. Sikhs are important minority present in the northern districts of Ganganagar and Hanumangrah which are adjacent to Punjab and Haryana.

Jains are more evenly distributed in the state. Tribes like Bhils and Meenas are a main inhabitants in the southern Rajasthan. According to the 2001 census, Rajasthan have a total population of 5,65,07,188 persons, with 5,01,51,452 Hindus and 47,88,227 Muslims.

As far as caste is concerned, major backward caste residing in the state are the landlord and small farmers castes like Jats, Gurjar, Mali, Saini, Yadav. The Last time when caste based census was done in the state was in year 1931 and according to that the Jats have the highest percentage among all the caste living in the state, the contributed 9.03 % of the total population followed by Rajputs (5.5%) and Brahmins (7.51%). (Table no.1)

2.0. BJP in Rajasthan

In this section my objective is to discuss the major component of Hindutva in Rajasthan. I am also going to compare it to the BJP's Hindutva which we have discussed in the earlier chapter. My main concern is to see how the historical and social realities of Rajasthan has not only made the party alter its approach than the general strategy, but also that all this has given BJP the opportunity to survive in a different way in the state. My focus therefore is this difference in the approach as well as the opportunity that BJP faces in this state. The Hindutva ideology itself has a different perception and framework in the feudal state of Rajasthan. I am starting with the emergence of BJP in Rajasthan followed by the elements of Hindutva in Rajasthan and different ways with which BJP deals with them.

My central argument here is that In the Hindutva politics of Rajasthan the most important element is tradition and history and that plays the most important part in the mobilization strategies of BJP with respect to the ideology. This is the basis on which right wing organizations carry on the mission of bringing the tribes under the Hindu fold through the process named 'accultuarization' that has been discussed later in this section. The other politics of BJP remains the caste based mobilization strategies which is totally based the unique feudal history dominated caste relations in the state.

When we talk about politics in Rajasthan, two names that stand ahead of all are Mohanlal Sukhadiya who was from Indian National Congress and ruled the state for 17 years and the second one is Bhairon Singh Shekhawat who always remained a threat to the congress party in Rajasthan. Shekhawat was the first to form a non congress government in Rajasthan in year 1977 through the Janta Dal alliance. After the split in the party in 1980, he joined BJP and became chief minister again in year 1990. Bhairon Singh Shekhawat, therefore was the tallest BJP leader in Rajasthan, he defined BJP politics in Rajasthan by indulging strategies above and beyond ideological orientation.

BJP from the very beginning has tried to adopt a catch all orientation. Though, the strategy that has worked for BJP in Rajasthan might not have worked in a similar way in other states. While congress since independence came to power through the support of traditional upper caste, from the very starting BJP has tried to get hold of the intermediate and backward caste groups in the state. But that does not mean that BJP has left the upper caste support base, the concept of 'Raiput Hindutva' makes the Hindutva different in Rajasthan and provides it ample scope to get support of the upper caste for BJP in the Rajasthan state. Also BJP has extended a hand of friendship to the Muslims of the state which has actually caused severe loss to the congress monopoly of the area. According to an article in 'Frontline' by T.K.Rajalakshami, during the political campaign for the 2004 General elections led by BJP in the state, RSS under its new outfit named 'Rashtriwaadi Muslim Manch⁴⁷, and held its meeting in Jaipur in April,2004 which was led by Indresh Kumar⁴⁸ an important leader of RSS. This meeting summoned some Muslim leaders and intellectuals, hold a discussion about the issues like unity and harmony in the country. The theme remained of national Harmony, identity, the convergence of communities and resolution of differences but through the narrow perspectives of the organizations. This could be understood from the question which was posed in the meeting, 'Why don't muslims in the country call their creature 'Bhagwan' instead of 'Allah'?' The article also shows how BJP has been using the dargah Qazi's

⁴⁷ RMM is the RSS's brain child based in Jammu and Kashmir was formed in year 2002. The main mentor of the outfit is Indresh Kumar the all-India 'Sah Sampark Pramukh' of RSS.

⁴⁸ Ironicaly, Indresh Kumar is the same person who has been figured under the charge sheet for the Ajmer blasts of the year 2007

⁴⁹ T.K.Rajalaxami, 'Defying vote-bank stereotypes', Frontline, vol.21, May 8-21, 2004

and influencial muslims leader who are alleged to being sold themselves to BJP for its political campaigns, they forced these people from Delhi to release fatwa to Rajasthani Muslims from Muslim dominant constituencies of Barmer and Jodhpur.

In such a scenario, due to the broadening of the democratic space and because of intense political competition even as more and more communities are joining the political bandwagon they are left with less and less political option⁵⁰. This is the reason other political players have less scope to come in and also the appeal for playing sectarian mobilization is limited in the state, so the political system that prevails in Rajasthan is a bipolar system one where both the parties i.e. Congress and BJP need to be populist and not relying completely on some sections.

Therefore we see that BJP and Congress have evolved as two major political players with a huge support base and they share more than 90 per cent of their popular votes. The scenario at present is that they keep tossing the ball of power from one to another on a regular basis. Both of them seem well aware of the fact that any kind of intra regional sectional mobilization can inflict damage on either of them. Both the main players are trying hard to enlist the support of as many social groups as possible by promising whatever is being asked for, i.e., backward status to Jats, Rajputs and Brahmins, minority status to Jains, tribal status to Gujjars, sops to government employees. Though the major beneficiary of the bi-polarization of politics in Rajasthan is BJP and is playing cards more efficiently. The BJP has manufactured a social support bloc comprising of upper castes and economically prosperous groups as the core supplemented by support from powerful intermediate peasant castes and increasing penetration of the dalits and the adivasis.

Growing disenchantment with the Congress and the aggressive mobilization forays of the saffron groups has helped the BJP to woo the dalits and the adivasis. 52 And as far as these

⁵⁰ Yadav, Yogendra and Palshikar Suhas (2003): 'From Hegemony to Convergence: Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States, 1952-2002', *Journal of Indian School of Political Economy*, Volume15, Nos land 2.

⁵¹Sanjay Lodha, 'Rajasthan: India Shines as BJP Trounces Congress', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 39, No. 51 (Dec. 18-24, 2004), pp. 5457 ⁵² Ibid.

groups are concerned, growing disenchantment with the Congress and the aggressive mobilization forays of the saffron groups has helped the BJP to woo the dalits and the adivasis. Sustained projection of leaders from these communities has also helped the party in enlisting their support. What has further made the BJP acceptable to these groups is the absence of any other alternative. The most redeeming feature of this social alliance formation is that where required the BJP has managed to successfully cement long-standing local caste rivalries, i e, Rajput vs Jat in Marwar, Brahmin vs Rajput in Mewar, adivasi vs non-adivasi in tribal dominated areas. The fragmented and plural nature of the social fabric in the state has helped the BJP in achieving this feat.

2.1.BJP as a regional Party in Rajasthan

The common criticism of the rigid ideology based political parties like left and BJP is that they tend to be preoccupied with just one aspect of the Indian society. Like in case of left which talk about the class, no other element seems to be that important in its politics. Similarly, BJP has always been seen as an ideology based party whose ideology revolves around the religion, Hindu identity being the base of it and hatred for other religious identities being the central focus of it. So in various states in the country, the regional parties taking the rest over important factors, take hold of the politics, these factors can be the regional identities, language based solidarities and castes in some cases. Regional parties therefore play the local politics with the help of dominant factors which generally are not the elements of the national parties especially the ideology based parties which are based on some broad perspective. But among the recent developments in the approach of BJP is that it has started behaving more and more as a regional party in many of the states. This is how it got hold over the OBCs in the northern belt and that it did by changing its approach towards reservation which was averse in the beginning but changes later on. It promised reservation to the OBCs of the country during in its 1999 election manifesto which of course was a U-turn from its previous approach. Christophe Jafferlot says in his book The Sangh Parivar:

These electoral promises were in tune with the National Agenda that the BJP has negotiated in 1998 with the regional allies-in fact the latter were probably responsible for their insertion in the agenda and then in the NDA manifesto, but BJP readily obliged them. Vajpayee himself, while campaigning in Rajasthan

where the Jats were asking for their inclusion in the OBC category, promised then that his government would accede to their demand if voted to power and even declared that it would implement the reservation policy in right earnest.⁵³

Thus seeking the local demands even at the cost of diverting from its previous stands, BJP is performing more a regional party to get support from the voters of all the segments in a state.

The very fact that the caste configurations vary diversely from state to state and even varies region to region within a state sets things difficult for BJP to survive on the ideological support only. BJP had to leave its previous stand because these two strategies (the ideology based and regional approach based) seems to be antagonistic to each other and can't go together. But Rajasthan is an exception to this case. As Rob Jenkins puts it,

Rajasthan is an exception to this pattern. Both strategies (of social broadening and regional specificity) are not only in effect, but also supported by the elaboration of a set of corresponding ideological justifications. This is possible in Rajasthan because its history provides ample scope for strategies within the Sangh Parivar to wed nationalism to regionalism, and regional identity to a broadly (though not entirely) inclusive form of caste politics.⁵⁴

In the states like Rajasthan which has its own rich history, regional identities is indeed a decisive factor. BJP in Rajasthan is therefore adopts a different perspective and outlook than its national approach. It provides no regional party the scope to survive on the grounds of regionalism like in case of some of the southern states. BJP works both as a national state level and regional level party in Rajasthan even more than congress as it gets hold of the caste politics as well including all the OBC mobilizing strategies. BJP in Rajasthan has managed to link the region, caste as well as the 'Rajput Hindutva' factor.

The contemporary analysis of the BJP electoral performance in Rajasthan reveals that BJP don't only survive on the Hindutva politics in Rajasthan but has been reaching out to OBCs through caste politics and along with that trying to get along the dalits and the

 ⁵³ Christophe Jafferlot, "B.IP at the centre" in the book "Sangh Parivar: A Reader", ed.by Christophe Jafferlot, (OUP, 2005) p.no.286
 ⁵⁴ Rob Jenkins, "Rajput Hindutva, Caste Politics, Regional Identity and Hindu Nationalism in

³⁴ Rob Jenkins, "Rajput Hindutva, Caste Politics, Regional Identity and Hindu Nationalism in Contemporary Rajasthan", in the book "The BJP and the compulsions of Politics in India", ed. By Thomas Blom Hansen and Chritophe Jaffrelot (OUP,1998) p.no.102

tribal as well in contrary to its image of a movement dominated by the upper castes. Therefore we see BJP doing broad ideological adjustments in Rajasthan through various grassroots development activities in the southern part of the state Rajasthan. The rigid lines of caste divisions are been molded by BJP itself in this part of the country. The country's wide and diverse social and economic circumstances that sustains prominently among the Indian states cannot be tackled with one rigid exclusive ideology base and this is quiet an apparent phenomenon in Rajasthan where BJP is trying to customize both the movement's message and its mode of organizing through running various 'regionspecific mobilization campaigns, 55 what makes the case of Rajasthan different from other states is its historical realities which give ample space to BJP to have a unique set of strategy here. BJP strategy therefore needs to be looked not into a state basis but region basis where the demographic, social and historical realities play quiet a vital role. As far as regional parties are concerned, while in other state like Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Himanchal Pradesh, BJP's fortune have ebbed and flowed and even when in power it had to rely on the support of the regional parties of the respective state, in Rajasthan has not only maintained its rule till last elections but also has been successful in capturing half of the parliamentary seats. It would not be therefore, wrong to say that BJP itself has behaved as a regional party in Rajasthan which is because of the unique social structure that the state possess and the support that history provides to Hindutva ideology.

3.0.Rajput Hindutva

The nature of Hindutva in Rajasthan again is very different from that of other states and national level politics, 'Rajput Hindutva' is the most apt term that can be used for the kind of Hindutva that persists in the state. The term has been used extensively by scholars like Rob Jenkins and other how have written about the Rajasthan politics. The Rajput identity, rather than just being the upper caste identity, is a 'khatriya identity' which is based not just on the so called natural superiority or Brahmanism kind of character, the

⁵⁵ Rob Jenkins, 'The BJP and the Compulsions of Politics in India' (OUP, New Delhi, 1998)

one that seeks its relevance in purity pollution relations.⁵⁶Rather it is based on the act of bravery performed by the Rajput rulers from time to time in the history to save and preserve the social order in the state. Raiputs were frequently praised for their martial prowess, bravery, moral and ethical code, protection of the poor and helpless (for example, from foreign, and typically Muslim, invasion), and maintenance of law and order. Above all, kings controlled land and resources. Gift-giving - a central theme in the legend of Man Singh - allowed kings to enhance their name (naam) and demonstrate their honour (ijzat or man). The tribes associate to the Hindu religion not through the theory of purity pollution but with the theory of karma. For them the Raiput rulers were the ideals in that scenario. "Raiputs in Raiasthan stands as the embodiment of martial values and perform the functional role played by the Brahmins in the other parts of India."57 Even if we talk about the process of sanskritization, it's more like process of 'Kshatriyanization' where the lower-status castes sought to adopt the practices of the Rajput. 58 One good example of this is the Sati Pratha which basically was part of Rajput royal clan but in later part of history during the British rule adopted and practiced by many backward groups in the state. No doubt, sati remained a topic of debate even after so many years of independence and its glorification still persists in the state irrespective of the state intervention.

This one of the important line of mobilization strategies and also these are the features that are absent in other kind of Hindutva in any other part of the country. In fact, not only by the Hindu castes but some other religious groups have also adopted the Rajput practices and thereby tried to uplift them, socially, in that manner. The best example for this that can be cited here is that of the Meo Muslims who are basically found in every part of the state, they have adopted the rituals relating to the marriage ceremonies from the Rajputs, this has also been pointed out by Raymond Jamous in his study of Meo

⁵⁶ By Brahaminism I mean the sort of Hindutva identity which finds the imperative part of the Hindu mythological believes and makes the basis of narrowed vision of Hinduism especially before independence when caste system was more strong.

⁵⁷ Narain, Iqbal and P.C.Mathur, 'The Thousand year Raj: Regional Isolation and Rajput Hinduism in Rajasthan before and after 1947', in Francine Frankel and M.S.A. Rao, *Dominance and State power in Modern India*, vol.II (OUP,1990), p58

⁵⁸ Ibid.

Muslims in Rajasthan ⁵⁹ Therefore Rajputs has always been the 'ideal' for other communities in the state be it any field, they have been seen as the superiors and hence to be imitated irrespective of the caste, religion or class lines.

The Sangh Parivar in Rajasthan does not rely upon obscure points of theological doctrine or scriptural authority to denounce caste dimensions as a way of unifying the Hindu community. Instead, the emphasis is on exploiting a pre-existing regional identity-one heavily imbued with what has been called Rajput ethic-and reinventing it for its own purposes. Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph define the Rajput ethic as 'valor without regard to consequences'. And this is where the Hindutva in general differs from the Rajput Hindutva as it emerges even more strongly and binds all communities in feeling of belongingness. Other important point to be noted is that the symbol of Ram worship used by Hindutva forces is very strong in other parts of the country; but it is not so in case of Rajasthan as that is not a very dominant practice in Rajasthan. As pointed out by Rob Jenkins:

The attributes of the martial acumen and valour associated with the Rajput warrior/princes are not only venerated by all communities in Rajasthan, but they also conform closely to the sort of assertive nationalism that the Sangh Parivar is attempting to project as a homogenized form of Hinduism. The BJP's tendency to privilege the symbol of Ram, deity by no means dominant in practices of worship in Rajasthan, nevertheless accords with the prevailing status yardstick of martial honour. It is not particularly relevant to many followers of the Hindutva movement in Rajasthan that the privileging of the Ram myth, particularly its martial aspect, runs contrary to the doctrinal diversity that is seen by many to define Hinduism. That the BJP is 'semiticizing' Hinduism is not a rebuttal that finds favour with the vast bulk of Rajasthan' people.⁶¹

The symbols of deities though are important but not so dominant in case of Rajasthan than the association with the Rajasthan warriors and princes in the history of Rajasthan.

⁵⁹ Raymond Jamous, 'Kinship and rituals among the Meo of Northern India', (OUP, 2003)

Rob Jenkins 'Rajput Hindutva in Contemporary Rajasthan', in BJP and the Compulsions of Politics in India ed. by Christophe Jaffrelot and Thomas Blom Hansen (OUP,1998) p.no.104.
 Rob Jenkins 'Rajput Hindutva in Contemporary Rajasthan', in BJP and the Compulsions of Politics in

India ed. by Christophe Jaffrelot and Thomas Blom Hansen (OUP,1998) p.no.104

BJP had no other way but to alter its mode in case of Rajasthan which on the other hand changes the very nature of the party in the state.

The basic idea behind the Rajput Hindutva is glorifying the past of Rajput community even with all its ambiguities and inconsistencies. The element in Rajput Hindutva which makes it stand parallel to the Hindutva ideology of Savarkar is the point of preservance of the traditional value and culture which the Rajputana, being the ideal Kshatriya has always done. Rajputs have preserved the state from the foreign invaders as well as the Muslim rulers from Delhi which makes them part of the mission led by Sangh Parivar. And they by design become the analogous to the Hindutva ideology in general.

4.0. Jat -Rajput Rivalry

"The Jat-Rajupt Rivalry particularly in the north-west Rajasthan and the Shekhawati region has no parallel elsewhere in the state." This rivalry has a long history, which need a quick glance before we start talking about the post independence developments in the relation between the two communities. During the British Raj, Jats were an important agricultural community in most of the parts of the state and were against the autocratic rule of the Rajput landlords and rulers. The historical reasons for that are mentioned by historians like Col. Todd who gave a in depth analysis of history of the Rajputana. There have been certain claims by the historians that Rjaputs were not the original clan of the land rather they came from outside. Another group of historians believe that Rajputs were actually the decendants of Jats, Ahirs and Gujjars majorly and the hun tribes minorly 63. Rajputs however decline any historical relation with these communities and tribes. They rather like to associate themselves to the Saraswat Brahmins. They have therefore adopted and nourished the Brahiminical, more dogmatic practices among their religious practices.

It is believed among the historians that the territories like 'Chittor', 'Jaipur' which belonged to the Jat rulers till 8th century was taken over by the Rajputs. Jodhpur and

⁶² Vyas, Rajendra Sharma & Lavleena, 'From Feudalism to Democracy: Emergence of New Power Elite in Rajasthan', *Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 11, No. 1, (2004) pp.92

⁶³ Todd, Col James, 'Annals and Antiquities of Rajast'han or the Central and Western Rajpoot States of India', Volume 2 (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London1873) p.32

Bikaner were taken over by Rajputs in 11th century. This is the first and foremost historical reason that widens the gulf between the two communities. ⁶⁴ Secondly, the religious beliefs and practices that into and other agricultural communities adopted were different from that of the Rajputs. In other words these communities never indulged into the process of imitating Rajputs as far as their religious beliefs are concerned. Rajputs were closer to the Brahiminical or 'Pauranic Mat' and in almost all Rajput clans Brahmin pundits had an important role to play. Jats, on the other hand, denied it as a dogmatic belief and thus were discredited as the devils or evil by the Brahmin Pandits. It is believed that the evil practices like child marriages, ill treatment of the widows, sati practice originated in the Rajput clan and speared among other communities in the state.

Thirdly, the historically sour relations made Rajputs rulers discriminate against Jats prior and post independence. After independence, Rajputs kept themselves away from Congress as it was behaving a pro-farmer political party by organizing Kisan Sabhas in most of the parts of the country⁶⁵. Rajputs considered congress a an anti- Rajput political party because of congress's major initiative like Kisan Sabha's, Praja-Mandals⁶⁶ and land reforms⁶⁷ in the state. There was no single Rajput household, who earlier was landlords, who didn't get influenced by the coming up of the land reforms in the state. This automatically worked in favour of political players like Jan Sangha and Ram Rajya Parishad (RRP) which became the only options for the Rajputs. The communities which followed the Rajputs also came along these parties extending their hands in support. Therefore the situation of Rajputs was more like a wounded tiger that is now to be counted amongst other animals of the jungle. Adult franchise and Panchayati Raj Institutions worsen up the situation for the Rajputs as the long nourished hatred among peasant communities against the oppression they suffered by the Rajputs for long years, never allowed them to be important player in elections at village or block level. They had

⁶⁴ Vyas, Rajendra Sharma & Lavleena, 'From Feudalism to Democracy: Emergence of New Power Elite in Rajasthan', *Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 11, No. 1, (2004) p.92. ⁶⁵Ibid. p.90.

⁶⁶ Praja Mandals were very strong the peasant movements initiated by congress after independence whose major participants were the jat leaders of the state.

major participants were the jat leaders of the state.

67 Rajputs were basically unhappy with the aboilition of jagirdari system that came up under congress rule at the centre.

to leave all their power and privileges by coming up of democracy at every level of institutions.

Knowing the scenario well, Congress government at the centre also tried to appease and rehabilitate the princes and jagirdars by offering them positions like Raj Pramukh, Maharaj Pramukh, and diplomatic assignments to keep under check their disappointments and frustrations. Despite of all this None of the princes with the exception of Maharani Gayatri Devi of Jaipur and Maharaja Harish Chandra of Jhalawar⁶⁹ could stay in politics for a considerable period of time.

The Jats on the other hand were more united as a caste community now. The difference in the religious outlook made them a distinct group with an already strong law and order system of their own. In Rajasthan, Jats were one of the few caste groups who were the most benefited from the Panchayati Raj institution and the Land reforms. The Jat leaders like Harlal Singh, Kumbha Ram, Nathuram Mirdha reached the highest post as soon as the institutions reformed in the state.

After the split in the Janta Dal in 1970s and few years of indecisiveness, Bhairon Singh Shekhawat⁷¹ joined BJP in 1980 and showed new path of cooperation to Rajputs and jats of the state. He was a charismatic leader who is the sole candidate from any political party who reached the office of Chief Minister, that also four times. The sole credit for the Jat –Rajput solidarity goes to Bheron Singh Shekhewat. The fact remains important that he was different from other Rajput leaders, neither was he carrying a royal family tag nor he actually was working for Rajput community only. He was more committed to the

⁶⁹ The one to whose family Rajasthan's last Chief Minister Vasundhara Raje belongs.

⁶⁸ Narain, Iqbal and P.C.Mathur, 'The Thousand year Raj: Regional Isolation and Rajput Hinduism in Rajasthan before and after 1947', in Francine Frankel and M.S.A. Rao, *Dominance and State power in Modern India*, vol.II (OUP,1990), p58

⁷⁰ Vyas, Rajendra Sharma & Lavleena, 'From Feudalism to Democracy: Emergence of New Power Elite in Rajasthan', *Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 11, No. 1, (2004) p.92

⁷¹ The most important Rajput leader in Rajasthan, ex-vice president of India, major face of BJP in Rajasthan. Another important thing to take note about Shekhawat is that he was not from a royal Rajput family like his other contemporary Rajput leaders instead, he was a small landowner and thus more close to the peasants.

party decisions. Though the Jats of some parts of the state like Jhunjhunu could never form the desired alliance with BJP, that was also because of the fact that the leaders from Jhunjhunu were already into congress and ultimately it remained a congress dominated constituency only. The second chapter discusses more about the election scenario.

Some academicians are having the opinion that BJP in Rajasthan is more secularized in its approach. The politics of Hindutva therefore is not very ideology oriented rather the multi-caste scenario makes it bound to play secularized politics⁷². This can be partially true as the caste relations in Rajasthan have been different from the other parts of the country. In the feudal scenario it rather remained relation between the oppressed and the oppressor. With the coming up of the democratic institutions, Land reforms and decentralization the feudal structure of authority went upside down. Thus we know that caste relations in Rajasthan have changed rapidly and since the caste polarization is so strong and the relation between castes communities has been historically adversary that one important element of Hindutva that is, hatred towards Muslims and other religious communities remain blurred and not so apparent among the masses.

The communal harmony in the state has remained balanced most of the time, it was only when politicians provoked it for the personal balance or the feeling of communalism came flying from some other part of the country that some violent incidents did take place in the state. In 1990s there happened some communal riots which were apparently planned by BJP and the people used for the mobs were dalits in most of the cases. The question of secularization still remains unsolved thus. But the study of the election manifestos of the party at the end of the next chapter does take up the question again and try to understand the communal nature of Rajasthan as to what flourishing grounds it provides to the Hindutva politics.

⁷² Narain, Iqbal and P.C.Mathur, 'The Thousand year Raj: Regional Isolation and Rajput Hinduism in Rajasthan before and after 1947', in Francine Frankel and M.S.A. Rao, *Dominance and State power in Modern India*, vol.II (OUP,1990), p58

5.0.RSS mission in Rajasthan

Other than all these distinctiveness of BJP politics in Rajasthan, I would like to give a brief account of the work carrying on by the right wing organizations in the state which indeed, like in other parts of the country remained an indirect mobilization approach of the BJP. The RSS has been working as an important cultural organization carrying on the work of 'character building'. In Rajasthan, it the RSS therefore which carry the sectarian interests of the right wing more than the BJP could do. It, through its Shakhas, carries on the fascists interests with the help of the self appointed activists and paramilitary vanguards mostly through targeting the selected religious groups. So keeping aside the political activities the burden of carrying the ideological part is more on the shoulders of the organizations like RSS, ABVP and even 'Vanavasi Kalyan Parishad' in the tribal areas as there are lots of Hindu tribes residing in the southern part of the state.

The central concern of RSS in Rajasthan has been to transform the Hindutva ideology in to an idiom. RSS does not have a long history in Rajasthan as that could be in case of Maharashtra or UP, it started its work in Rajasthan only from year 1939 from Ajmer though the headquarter was later on transferred to Jaipur in 1951. From that time it has a handful activist from the Hindu society which RSS uses to spread the Hindu nationalism even to the extent of agitating riots from time to time in various parts of the state. RSS's weakness with regard to a weak historical base lies again in the nature of the Rajput Hindutva as that might not have much to do with the religious hatred towards other communities especially Muslims.

Rajput rulers had a different relation with the Mugal emperors, they even intermarried with them and many were trusted advisors and generals. Only one important name that we hear in the history of Rajasthan was Maharana Pratap who fought with the Mugals to preserve his kingdom, though he loses the scope of being used as an icon by the right wing organization as he was defeated in the battle. RSS might regret Maharana Pratap's defeat as that cannot be utilized by them they way they use Shivaji's character. Since they lack the kinds of idols they can glorify in terms if Hindus' pride, they create their own issues to highlight the Hindutva issues. Therefore any happening in the state that could be related to the inter religion hatred is taken up by the organization to communicate the

hatred. So Maharana Pratap is being used as a brave Rajput ruler who fought with the Muslim kings from Delhi Sultanate even at the cost of his death. He stood for protecting his culture and traditions. He stinds as an icon for the whole Rajasthan and not any particular community, the fact that BJP highlights is the protection of the culture that Maharana Pratap dies for. This is one mode of strategy i.e. mobilizing people in the name of culture and history.

Another ruler who has been used by BJP in electoral mobilizations has been 'Maharaja Suraj Mal'who was the ruler from Bharatpur in Rajasthan. He also stands as an icon for BJP as he also fought for the protection of the culture and tradition. He was the only Jat ruler and this is the sole reason why BJP uses his name. The difference lies in the community BJP addresses here. The caste based mobilization strategies seem to be different from the ideology based strategy. But BJP tries them putting into the same line of culture and tradition.

5.1. RSS festivals

RSS led the popularization of Hindu festivals in order to provide a 'national thrust to ancient customs'. As Shubh Mathur, in his book, Everyday Life of the Hindu Nationalism (2008) quotes Golwalkar:

"Everyone remembers celebrating festivals since childhood and the pleasure this gives. There are many different kinds of festivals, some are religious, some are natural, some historical and some relates to national identity. Whatever the type of festival, it produces a new alertness in mind, bodyand the entire life. Festivals serve the purpose of public entertainment, but also serve to strengthen national feeling. They give individuals in society a feeling of solidarity and community, which weaves communal/social life strongly together."⁷³

Therefore following the Golwalkar's line, RSS started popularization of the Indian festivals with an objective to transform the existing meanings of the rituals and customs.

⁷³ Golwalkar, n.d., Hamare Utsav, Lokahit Prakashan, Lucknow, 1986

As Shubh Mathur puts it, "The transformation of culture involves the changing meanings, of taking names, roles, institutions, practices and rituals, and giving them a new content."74

Festivals in Rajasthan are more or less linked to the royal clans, the teej, gangaur, are some of the most popular and old festivals which comes from the Rajput rulers and as has been told earlier the nature of these festivals has less to do with the Hindu religion. RSS therefore adopted a strategy to popularize some other festival sin the region and it choose six of them according to the Hindi calendar namely, vijayadashami (i.e.the day of victory), Makar Sakranti, Varsha Pratipada, Hindu-samrajya Dinotsava(shivaji's Birthday), Guru Purnimostava, and Rakhshabandhan Mahotsva. This accounts to the Golwalkars's perception of importance of festivals in drawing morals for the political activities. Vijayadhashami is a festival of win of good over the bad or devas over the ashuras, RSS celebrates it by worshiping the weapons as Golwalkar had stated them as the symbol of the power. Along with this it carries, rallies, special meetings at the shakhas. The entire festive cycle carries its political message, of power, cohesion, return to Bhartiya or authentic Indian customs, conquest of Muslim enemy, questioning devotion to the RSS flag and sacrifice to purify the homeland 75. Second important festival is Makarsakranti, which gives the message of victory of the light over the dark with the dedicated hard work and strategically effort, third being the new year according to the Hindu calendar has remained important trough out the nation to the RSS i.e. Varsha Pratipada, coincidently it falls on the birthday of Hedgewar. Next is Hindu Samrajya Dinotsva, the day Shivaji established his kingdom after defeating Mugual forces. This festival stands as an inspiration for the youth to defeat the Muslims in their attempt to destroy the Hindu culture and religion. It is to carry forward the dedication to make a Hindu Rashtra free to rule them, just like Shivaji did it. Guru Pornima and Rakhsha Bandhan are two other important festivals popularized by the right wing organization which stands for respecting the gurus who carried the Hindu legacy and brother sister These are few of the attempts lead by RSS to link the Hindu bound respectively.

⁷⁴ Shubh Mathur, 'The everyday life of Hindu Nationalism', (three essays collective, New DEelhi 2008)p.113
⁷⁵ Ibid.p.no.116

festivals to the political arena along with including the other communities from the Indian cultural history.

5.2. Subaltern and the Right wing in Rajasthan

As we can remember from our study of the literature review of the first chapter, there are certain communities which though have remained suppressed for years under the Hindu caste system but are now can be included in the definition of the Hindu nation by the right forces. The central idea behind this inclusion is not to let the subaltern group come and join the mainstream in the development but to make the local community to be incorporated into the politics and the violence of the Hindu Right. Subaltern history in Rajasthan on the other hand is unique; Rajput dominance has never let the Dalits to come on the equal platform even till now.

The cases of atrocities are still high especially at the village level and many of them still goes unnoticed. The Hindu Organizations started with the social welfare projects for these communities in Rajasthan and ended up with their use in the communal violence against the religious minorities. These communal violence solves two purposes of the Hindutva forces firstly, they solve the very ideology of the party where in minorities are suppressed on the lines of Savarkar's argument that they don't belong to this land as they seek their beliefs from some foreign land and secondly, it helps BJP as the political wing of the organization to win electoral gains through building of solidarity among the disprivilaged groups over the violence. Though the question is that why subaltern groups, supports this act that actually has nothing to do with their interests but only of the dominant groups. The answer to this question lies in the Marxist theory of consciousness, in simple terms when so much investment is made on the subaltern groups in the form of social welfare; they tend to believe that it's their interest to have a Hindu state. Also they feel associated to the dominant classes only by contribution to their cause and getting the higher status of being 'the defenders of the Hindu society'. It is often believed that the mob is carried on by the criminal elements but in reality it's the people living in the neighborhood who sets the houses and properties on fire. Fairly good example of this has

been stated in ethnographical study of Subh Mathur in Rajasthan of the 1992 communal violence in Jaipur and Tonk where the Muslim houses were set on fire by the neighboring communities like Jats, Kahtiks and Yadavs, as per the police officers' and eyewitnesses account over the violence. The police also say that whenever such tensions arises, the history-sheeters tend to go hiding even before the riots begin as they know that they will be the first suspect.

5.3. Instances of Communal Violence

Though Rajasthan has no history of communal violence but after 1989 riots kept on happening in some places especially where RSS had a good hold over the public. Another important trend has been the expansion of the violence in the tribal areas along with simultaneous expansion of the welfare projects for the tribal in southern Rajasthan which otherwise remained aloof from communal tensions from a longer time period. The districts like Kota, Banswara, Bhilwara, Rajsamand, Udaipur where the majority of tribes like Bhils, Garasias, and Meenas live did faced these welfare projects followed by communal tensions. This makes the motive of the 'accultuaisation' projects of the VHP and RSS clear, they are not the initiators of the process rather they just continued the process of getting the tribes into the Hindu fold stated by national congress and Arya Samai during the nationalist movement. Though this time the mobilization led by RSS is also to keep the left forces inactive in the tribal areas so that no naxal movements could be organized which can be very well done by getting the tribals in confidence that they are the part of the Hindu class. No doubt RSS has been remained successful in this multi motive strategy and not only conducted communal tensions, kept the left handicapped and gained electoral support for the BJP.

Among the major threat to BJP has remained the conversion of religion for which the tribes in Rajasthan are very prone. There are certain communities like Mehrat has formally started practicing Islam while their way of living, eating, marriage customs still remains Hindu. From time to time the Christian missionaries have been the subject of suspicion and many regulations were passed during the BJP rule in the state against the Christian missionaries. Most recent being during the Vaundhara Raje government in 2005 when a missionary school chief was arrested on the basis of the allegations that he

receives funds from the foreign Christian institutions to carry on the work of conversions of the dalits and tribes to Christianity. It was alleged that the orphanages that these missionaries regulate are basically a home of religion conversion. Since the number of Christian missionary schools has been on an increase in last two decades; many regulations and rule have been circulated from time to time during the BJP rule to control the circulars in Christian missionary schools. With the need and demand of the modern education system the number of people sending their students to the Christian schools has also increased and this has led to raise in insecurity among the Hindutva forces. Attack on the school principles and institutions had remained a frequent occurring during the last BJP regime.

5.4. Caste Atrocities

The contradiction that the activities of right organizations have with their projects is their inability and in fact their closing the eyes to the SC/ST atrocities in the state. The history of atrocities against the tribes and schedule castes has been dreadful in Rajasthan. There has been hundreds of case where the feudal Rajputs killed, burned, raped the dalit families who broke the age old caste decorum. Recently there has been a case in Bikaner in 2010, where a dalit family was burned alive after they refused to carry the 'chapals' in their hand when they crossed the landlords house, whereas the actual tradition was to carry the 'chapals' on your head, another point to be noted is that this has never been a traditional custom as earlier dalits were not even allowed to wear 'chaplas'. Even when some mob takes place out of some mis-happening in the village or villagers protesting against the police, it's the dalits or the Muslims who are victimized. Very recent example being the Swai Madhopur incident where mob was been carried out by the villagers against the police for not being able to arrest the culprits of a rape and suicide by a youth in the same line, a Muslim police officer became the target of villager's anger and was burnt alive while he was in his car. The officer named Phool Mohamad was an easy target for the mob where all other 'Hindu' officers could ran away saving their lives. The investigation of the incident is still undergoing as per the orders of the present Congress government.

Subh Mathur in his ethnographical account talks about a folk story that the right activists use to gain the confidence of the tribes, it's a story of a lion that was brought up by the jackals and with the pass of time he actually believed that he was a jackal.

When he grew older, another lion who was surprised to see him behaving like a jackal, told him that he is a lion. The lion did not believe him so he made him see his reflection in the water and then believed that he is a lion in reality. It's the same way the tribes don't know that they are Hindu as they have been kept in isolation and cut off from the mainstream, the RSS activists make the believe that they are not the coward, scavengers, skulking jackals but the brave, proud, noble lions i.e. the Hindu. Another important epic that they use to associate the tribes to the Hindu mythology is the description of Ram as 'vanvasi' as according to the epic Ramayana he spends 14 years of his life in exile in forests.⁷⁶

Another important district is Ajmer where the Muslim population is significant, the Hindu forces carry on their agenda of communalism by provoking the Hindus that they have forgotten their Hindu customs and traditions. Ajmer is an important both in terms of its location, demography and cultural significance. It is situated on the route leading to south from Delhi to Gujarat and to the Deccan. Other significance is that important Hindu-Muslim pilgrimage sites are located in the region, the famous dargah of Khwaja Muiudin Chishti and Brahama temple in the nearby Pushar city makes the district important from the Hindu Muslim relation perspective. The Hindutva forces claim that the Dargah was a Shiva temple during the rule of the Chuhans and remained so until 1947. The Dargah has remained under constant attacks by the Hindu forces from 1992 onwards; the communal relations were much hormonal in the district earlier than now. Though the Dargah holds an important place of harmonization as Hindus too are the frequent visitors there, the Muslims there now live in fear as the attacks have been spreading towards the rural areas as well. Ajmer has been an important place for the Christian missionaries as well because during the time of British Raj, it was developed as a education city for the benefit of the British children. The Mayo College, the Sophia College for girls still holds important position not only in the district but the whole state. Royal families have the tradition to educate their children from the Mayo College which still persists.

⁷⁶ Shubh Mathur, 'En everyday life of Hindu Nationalism-An ethnographical account' (three collective essays 2008)p.198

Conclusion

Therefore we find that BJP plays cards beyond Hindutva in Rajasthan, it is not even possible to survive on that. The Rajput Hindutva makes the case of Rajasthan different from other parts of the country but the caste situation is even worst then some. The tribes in Rajasthan seems to be fooled in the name of development projects by RSS. The minority doesn't hold important position as far as the BJP mobilization strategy is concerned. The central game remains of that of caste mobilization. The elements of Hindutva thus, that we can say are present in Rajasthan politics are caste, culture (from Rajput Hindutva), community. And those which are absent are language and religion. The ideology at the mobilization level becomes very vague in Rajasthan. Also the mobilization strategy of BJP alters region-wise as the caste composition alters. This I shall discuss and prove through electoral performance data in the next chapter.

Chapter 3

REFLECTIONS OF COMPLEXITY: EMPIRCAL EXPLORATION

1.0. Introduction

This chapter aims at analysis of the electoral performance of BJP in Rajasthan in order to provide evidences to support my central argument that BJP as a political party does have the internal stress regarding the Hindutva ideology and its not carrying forward an autonomous approach in all the states at the mobilization level but it does carry forward the Hindutva agenda at the policy making and planning level. With this objective this chapter is divided into three major parts. Firstly, the election data to understand the diverse contexts in which BJP runs its diverse approaches. Secondly, the election manifestos which further clear up things in direction of the same argument. And lastly, the planning and policies that BJP adopts in order to achieve the ideological ends.

2.0 ELECTION DATA

I have divided the constituencies of our use into four brad categories.

- 1. Constituncies with princely impact- Two constituencies in this category are Ihalawar and Kota
- 2. Constituencies with significant number of Muslims- Ajmer and Tonk-Swaimadhopur
- 3. Constituencies with good number of tribals and RSS grassroot activities going on-Banswara and Beawer
- 4. Constituencies which are Jat dominated-Bharatpur and Jhunjhunu

So on an all we have eight constituencies to talk about, each of them showing a unique and region specific strategy of mobilization by BJP. It deals with the district wise analysis of the general elections in Rajasthan. It tries to find out the linkages between the demographic structures of the state with the BJP performance. The traditionally BJP supporter districts and the caste and religious composition of the particular districts tells us about the mobilizations strategies that BJP adopts tells us about the modes that BJP

has not left in the otherwise changing scenario of the party. The major focus of this portion is the Jat dominate districts like Bharatpur and Karauli, the districts under natural influence of BJP due to the princely and feudal history and its relations with the Sangh Parivar.

Under the first category where I have included Ajmer and Tonk primarily due to the BJP's performance there despite of a significant number of Muslims in both the constituency. Ajmer has been a centre of mugal administration thus the Muslim population is significant. It was the last district of Rajasthan left by the Brtitish Raj which makes it a important historical place. The unique combination of highest Muslim and Hindu religious places makes it a perfect place to study the communal harmony in post colonial era. Other than all this, it has been an important constituency for BJP and this makes it an curious case as to what factors despite of the significant presence of the minority and modern presence of the place, contribute to the success of BJP in the district

Secondly, Tonk is "Lucknow of Rajasthan" as it is known for its elegance. Tonk is full of mosques, mansions and havelis. In the ancient times, Tonk was ruled by the tribes of 'Pathans' from Afghanistan. And then was under the mugaul empire for a significant time. Along with this, it is another important tribal region for BJP with Gujjar and Meena tribes living in significant number. I chose this constituency because of BJP unparallel performance here till last general election, when the votes got polarized between the Gujjar and Meena candidates from BJP and congress respectively, despite of its varied caste and religious composition. The Assembly elections constituencies of the region are Gangapur, Bamanwas, Sawai Madhopur, Khandar, Malpura, Niwai, Tonk and Deoli-Uniara. The caste does play important role in polarizing the votes and deciding the winner but the role of minorities could not be underestimated in it, this is what make Tonk-Swaimadhopur an interesting case for our study.

Ajmer is known as the heart of Rajasthan, is the place for religious harmony and peace due to the presence of 13th centuray 'Khawaja Mui-uddin-Chishti's' dargah which is a place of belief for every community residing in Rajasthan. Both Muslims and Hindus are frequent visitors of this dargah known as the Mecca of the east.

Under the second Category, Kota and Jhalawar are included. Kota-Jhalawar which are those two constituency that are said to be the permanently BJP dominated constituencies, Kota on the account of charismatic leadership from BJP and developmental works that the region gained and Jhalwar on the account of the presence and popularity of the royal family of the Scindias'. BJP has still declined as a popular party in Kota due to some reasons but Jhalawar still remain the home constituency for BJP leaders from scindia family. My idea here is to understand the policies against the minority that BJP is carrying on in Kota and the royal family tag takes it how far in Jhalwar. A comparative picture of Kota Jhalawar tell us better about the resons behing BJP's popularity in the southern Rajasthan. The purpose of this section is to see the politics of royal family and to understand who do they mobilize people.

Tribal dominated ares of Banswara, Beawer and Udaipur. These are the regions where RSS is carrying forward it agenda tribal Hinduization in the disguise of tribal welfare. The presence and activity of Chritian missionary are also significant here. Banswara which the southernmost part of the state with maximum tribal population. I chose this constituency because this is the only tribal constituency which doesn't support BJP despite of the largest effort of tribal welfare by RSS-VHP going on here from years. However the tribal welfare projects are very successful but that does not provoke people to vote for BJP. This is the question I want to explore here.

Jat dominated regions- Next is Bharatpur-Dholpur which are the important Jat dominated area of the state which has been the place of experimentation for BJP for a long while. When and how this experiment succeeded and how did it fail are my major question to look at thrughh the electoral data. Next, Chittorgrah which is historically a princely state and now a days a very important constituency for BJP but not on the account of any linkage to the royal family. The first motive is to understand this and secondly the process of sanskratization and clear use of symbolism to mobilize the tribe is best seen in this constituency. Followed by Jhunjhunu which is the obvious choice in the diversity seeking scenario as it is the only Jat dominated areas where BJP is out of scene. Unlike Bharatpur- Dholpur, Jhunjhunu, which is one of the most literate regions of the state, is out of BJP's reach. The election data might reveal some reason.

Within the subheadings of the Lok Sabha constituency seats only, the chapter ties to analyze the election data of the state assembly elections for the 200 seats. The election senerio and BJP performance in important state constituencies will be looked at so that the region specific approach can be located easily and we can compare it with the larger approach that BJP had in the same district. Within this data analysis only, I tried to analyze the election manifestos and agenda rise up by the BJP government at constituency level government in particular and state level in general. This will tell us about the BJP approach towards the ideology gains and we could locate the difference between the two levels.



Figure 1 Parliamentary Constituency map in Rajasthan for year 2008 Source:Maps of India.com, accessed on 20 July, 2011, at 9.30 p.m

Figure 2 Number of seats won by BJP in Rajasthan

Source: Election commission of India, website linkhttp://eci.nic.in/eci_main/StatisticalReports/ElectionStatistics.asp, accessed on 5 June, 2011 at 4.30 p.m



Figure 3 Congress and BJP congress constituencies in 2009 general elections

Source- Mapsofindia.com, accessed on 3April, 2011 at 2 pm

(Congress in Blue, BJP in Yellow, Others in Pink)

The above map shows the overall performance of BJP in Rajasthan in year 2009. The total seats BJP won were on four out of 25. This was a sharp fall in BJP votes from last general elections. The constituencies that remained with BJP were Jhalawar –Baran in the south east, Jalore-Sirohi in the south west, Churu and Bikaner in the north.

The state is divided into 33 districts out of which the Prataphgrah is the recent one. Total numbers of parliamentary constituency's seats however are just 25. The important

districts from our purpose are Ajmer, Bharatpur, Chittorgrah, Kota, Jhalawar, Tonk, Jhunjunu and Banswara. The reason behind selecting these eight constituencies is their unique regional politics which provide perfect evidences to my hypothesis my hypothesis. Through these eight constituencies and BJP's electoral performance here, I have tried to analyse the elements of Hindutva ideology that BJP could rely on in these constituencies. My hypothesis is analyzed here by looking into the diverse region specific approach that BJP adopts in each of these constituencies. The agenda and policies that look for the sectarian end are thus easy to look at after this analysis. It include all the possible diversities in the state, right from the tribal dominated region to princely dominated area, Jat dominated to Muslim dominated constituencies and the BJP performance in these constituencies is either too good or too bad to suit my case study.

2.1. Constituencies with significant muslim population

2.1.1.Ajmer is the district located at the heart of Rajasthan; its population constitutes of 85.67% Hindus and 11.19% Muslims. It has been an important constituency both for BJP and Congress.



Figure 4 BJP v/s congress in Ajmer

Source: Election commission of India

From the above graph, it is evident that BJP has a huge support base in parliamentary constituency of Ajmer. Rasa Singh Rawat of BJP has been a consistent winner five times from general elections in 1991, 1996, 1999 and 2004. It was only in the last general elections that due to delimitation he was allotted some different constituency and BJP lost it seat in Ajmer. The Muslim population in Ajmer is one of the largest in Rajasthan. Referring to the table 2, Muslim constitutes 11.19% of the total population. The presence and renounce of the thirteenth century Khwaja mui-udin-chichti's dargah makes it leading holy place, not only among Muslims in the country but whole south Asia.

2.1.2.Tonk-Swaimadhopur

This constituency in located between the south-eastern and middle part of the state. In north to Kota-Jhalawar-Baran and south to Jaipur-Ajmer. This constituency has around 2.30 lakh Meenas and 1.70 lakh Gujjars. Meenas are a dominant caste in Sawai Madhopur, while Gujjars dominate in Tonk and The Muslims account for about 1.60 lakh.⁷⁷

Tonk as introduced earlier is a historical place with a population comprising of Hindu majority and significant percentage of Muslims and Schedule Tribes. And in last general elections, as BJP had a fear of losing due to polarization of votes on the caste basis, so it happened. BJP's candidate *Gujjar* leader Bhisala lost the election to Namonarayan Meena of Congress. But this won't possible without the support of the Muslims in the region. Therefore though the *Gujjar* vote got segregated the other backward caste and Muslims supported *Meena* for the win.

⁷⁷ Source: census of India, 2001




Figure 5 BJP and Congress in Tonk-Sawaimadhopur

Source-Election Commission of India- Past elections

2.2. Constituencies with princely history and leadership from royal families

2.2.1.Kota-Jhalawar

Located in the southern part of the state adjacent to the state Madhaya Pradesh, Also known as the Hadoti plateau. This area is important for us as it has been the home constituency of Vasundhara Raje. Jhalawar royal family and their link ups with the BJP makes it an important constituency as far as the factor of kingship influence is concerned. Kota on the other hand is the major hydro-electricity producer of the state. Kota is a home of a significant percentage of schedule tribes. The handloom industry like khadi and handmade cotton cloths of Kota-Jhalawar are world renowned. The soil and climate

favours cotton cultivation as the soil is blck and the location near Malwa plateau. Kota has emerged as a major industrial city and educational city in the state. The location of limestone mines favours the cement factories other than the handloom industry in the region.

Coming to the electoral performance of BJP in the region and talking about Kota first, BJP has been a front player in Lok Sabha elections in all these years except for last year when INC candidate and prince of Kota royal family Illiyaj Singh ⁷⁸ defeated BJP candidate Shayam Sharma. BJP's position in kota assembly elections constituencies has been very strong in constituencies like Ladpura, Digod, Ramgajmandi, Pipalda. If we look the profiles of MLAs that BJP put in these conctituency we find a different approach of BJP here, these constituencies including the constituencies from Jhalawar-Baran are the territory of BJP and we never saw a huge shuffle in the profiles of the BJP candidates. BJP always played a safe game in the region until the last assembly elections when the surprising results came from the so called permanent constituencies of BJP.

The BJP regime in Rajasthan, which took over in December 2003, has been of great help to the Hindutva brigade. Kota has diverse population composition comprising a significant population of Christians among minority because of Kota being an educational city and presence of Christian missionaries. There have been many incidents that make the stand of BJP clear against the minority and tribals of the area. Firstly, they made *Vande Matram* mandatory in the assembly prayers in hostels run by the state social welfare department. This was the first step towards the hindutva agenda of the party in the region. Next thing that happened was that in a meeting with the senior officials, then state tribal area development minister, Kanak Mal Katara issued instructions that some steps had to be taken to exclude the converted Christian tribals from the list of Scheduled Tribes. Though they made a U turn after this, saying that no such move has been made, when the civil right organisations came up with the issue. Although the government move had been pre-empted, it had already provided fuel for the Sangh Parivar's propaganda

⁷⁸ Ijyeraj Singh is son of the former ruler Brij Raj Singh, he is the richest Loksabha candidate in 2008 general elections

machine to start rolling.⁷⁹ (Singh D., 2004). Sangh activists went around threatening the Christians, saying it was high time they re-converted or else they would be deprived of their ST status. And though the move created a sense of insecurity among Christian tribal – as voiced by several civil rights organizations – there was no attempt by the government to allay their apprehensions.

Secondly, Under the BJP rule in year 2005 RSS and Bajrang dal lead a massive campaign against the Christian missionaries located in and around the Kota city. They alleged that the organization named Emmanuel Mission International which regulates a number of schools and orphanages in the country are carrying on mass conversion of Hindu students into Christianity. Rather than going by the law procedure or informing the police the young activists of the Sangh Parivar attacked and molested the Christian missionary officials. The allegation was that in the name of annual convocation poor Hindu students from the orphanages in Karnataka are being carried to the place in order to carry on their religion conversion process. Though the police took over the situation in Kota but the same thing was repeated in Udaipur after some time. The same institution branch in Udaipur was attacked and members of the organization were assaulted with an allegation that they are carrying on conversion of religion. The Vasundra Raje Scindia government has taken a belligerent stand on conversions, the point to take special notice of is that this was the same year when ban from the Trishuls was uplifted and this is something that made it clear in the eyes of the general public of Rajasthan that sectarian motives are far prior to the BJP government that the welfare of the state. The objective behind the mob was clear, it was to unite and mobilize the Hindus against the Christians giving them the fear of loss of their identity. Even a probe committee was set up against the EMS group and the head of the institution Archbishop M.A. Thomas was questioned in the Jodhpur high court.

Kota is the best example to understand BJP's approach towards the Muslims and Christian minority, since it has been an almost permanent constituency for BJP; the

⁷⁹ D.K. Singh, 'Rajasthan: Draw Adivasis into the hindu fold, part2', *Communalism Combat* – October, pp15-25

sectarian motives are even easier to be carried on here. People are better mobilized by targeting the minority communities that also flourish the hatred amongst the communities.




Figure 6 BJP performance in Lok Sabha constituencies of Kota and Jhalawar-Baran

Source-Election Commission of India- Past elections

The graph above depicts the position of BJP in Jhalwar- Baran and Kota, these two constituencies that has been considered as the home constituency for BJP are now on a decline in the number of votes. The apparent reason being the ideological tilt of the party, the agenda of which it has tried to put in these safest considered constituencies. While

Jhalawar –Baran has been in BJP's hand due to royal families' influence over the public, Kota is in the hand of congress in that manner. Vasundhara Raje has fought from the Jhalawar constituency from last four consecutive years and this year after losing the Lok Sabha elections, she was allotted the Jhalarapatan constituency while Jhalwar was given to Dhushyan Singh. Both of them won but other constituencies were a bit disappointing for BJP.

2.3. Jat dominated constiruencies:

2.3.1. Bharatpur

Bharatpur is a jat dominated district located in the north-east of the state adjacent to the neighbouring Uttar Pradesh districts of Mathura Virandawan. It has been one of the important constituencies for BJP from the very beginning and is the most appropriate example of BJP's strategy of tragetting individual communities. Jats from Bharatpur are spreading all over Rajasthan and that makes it even more important in diverting the jat votes in the state.BJP has been using Maharaja Suraj Mal, the establisher of the Bharatpur kingdom in 17th century, as an icon of Hindutva. BJP has given him the tag of 'Hindu Dharma Rakshak' and in the last general elections Vasundhara Raje's posters during campaign rallies accommodated Suraj Mal's photo (Nandi, 2008). Every second year BJP organizes Jat rallies in Bharatpur and jats from all over the state take participation in it. The last big rally took place in year 2008 and though general elections were near, party defines the rally as an apolitical event as it was Maharaja Suraj Mal's 300th anniversary and BJP puts him among major warriors of the state and thus a historic figure who tried to save the community and culture from the mugal invaders.




Figure 7 BJP Performance in Bharatpur

Source-Election Commission of India- Past elections

As we can see from the above graph, BJP has a stronger support base in Bharatpur as early as its emergence in the state. Pleasing the jat peasants residing in the district has been the key to BJP's success in the district. Th jat mobalization strategy was intiated by Bheron Singh shekhawat who despite of the Jat-Rajput rivalry, got both the communities into BJP's influence.

2.3.2. Jhunjhunu

Jhunjhunu is the only Jat dominated district where BJP never came. The vote share in the graph below reveals that the popularity of BJP has been very less in the region. The most obvious reason being the Jat- Rajput rivalry in the region. When on the one hand this Jat

- Rajpur Rivalry was not even taken care and the unity of the two anti communities was used for political gain by Bheron Singh in Bharatpur-Dholpur, here it is the reason for BJP's failure.




Figure 8 Winning party v/s BJP in last 5 general election s in Jhunjhunu

Source-Election Commission of India- Past elections

2.4. Constituencies with significant tribal population-

2.4.1. Chittorgrah

As apparent from the graph, Chittorgrah has been an equal battle field for both Congress and BJP as far as the vote percentage is concerned. But still it is an important constituency for BJP for its ideology politics. Girja Vyas from INC is the present

Member of Parliament from Chittorgrah, she defeated BJP candidate Srichand Kriplani but from a little margin. Srichand Kripalani was the same MLA who lost his seat in Chittorgrah constituency assembly elections and it seems BJP had no option other than him to stand for MP from the same seat.




Figure 9 comparison between Congress and BJP percentage of votes in Lok Sabha elections

Source-Election Commission of India- Past elections

Chittorgrah which is located in the southern part of Rajasthan is the chief producer of Opium and there is huge legal and illegal market associated with it. Its relation with the politics is the providence of license to the opium growers. This therefore has been a key factor in deciding votes⁸⁰.

According The Opium law of 1950, the control over the production of opium is to be determined and regulated by the Central Government. The Nacrotics department handles the manufacturing and liscencing for the opium cultivation in accordance to the existing laws. The Government of India announces the licensing policy for cultivation of opium every year. It determines a minimum qualifying yield to issue the license, maximum area that can be allowed for opium cultivation per farmer, maximum compensation that the cultivator will get if the crop is damaged as the opium cultivation is more prone to damage. Chittorgrah- Jhalawar are one of the largest producers of opium not only in Rajasthan but in India, so this area is notified by the government of India as the opium producer. (government opium and alkaloid factory) But the every year renewal of the license is a tough task for the farmers.

Knowing this scenario, BJP has always promised Opium farmers to provide them 'pattas' and land for opium cultivation. It has kept hold of the constituency by these opium votes for a long time. More than 7000 farmers were stopped from doing Poppy cultivation once when it was banned in year 2006 by the central government based on the researches about the increasing drug addicts as opium is the most easily available drug. It was though opposed by BJP giving the anti-farmer slogans against the Congress party. Then later annual licensing policy came up.

Important assembly constituencies in Chittorgrah are Mavli, Begun, Pratapgrah and Nimbahera. The population composition is majorly tribal *Bhils* and *Garasias* are the major tribes and constitute more than 13% of the total population with all the mobilization strategies on the schedule tribes, BJP has a strong hole over the region.⁸¹

⁸⁰ Sabestian, Sunny, News article, *The Hindu*, 11th May, 2009.

These tribes are Rajput tribes and the phenomenon of 'acculturation' has been discussed in the 2nd chapter.

2.4.2.Banswara-

located in the southern most portion of the state, Banswara is the major tribal district of Rajasthan. Banswara accommodate Bhils, Garasias and even Meenas which makes it an important region for RSS-VHP's acculturation project. As we have already seen the project of inclusion of the tribes into the Hindu fold begun from Banswara in as early as 1930s when the nationalists under congress were trying to bring social reform and get these tribes into the mainstream culture through process of sanskritization. The process was carried on by RSS but in an altogether different manner and with different agenda. The tribal here are not the isolated groups, they have always been subject to economic and cultural exchanges with the larger society, it's just that their way of livelihood makes them cutoff from the mainstream society. The Marvaris who were traders and moneylenders always had strong presence in the lives of these Tribes⁸².




Figure 10 BJP v/s Congress in Banswara constituency

Source-Election Commission of India- Past elections

⁸² David, Hardiman, 'Feeding the Banis: Peasants and Usurers in Western India' (OUP, New Delhi, 1996)

As its clear from the graph above, BJP never had a strong hold over the Banswara constituency despite of its efforts in the acculturation programme in the name of tribal welfare programme by RSS. Also, BJP is very keen to stop the Christian Missionary institutions in the constituency and

3.0. Reading of the Election Manefistos

Through this section my aim is to prove my argument projected earlier that since Rajasthan is an altogether different case for BJP, it projects a much different strategy here. Reading the election manifestos can provide us the picture of Hindutva that BJP projects in the state before the election, the scenario after the election can be discussed in the next section where I am going to look at the policies with the Hindutva agenda that came up during BJP's government in power. To put in other words, election manifesto provides the agenda of Hindutva that BJP popularize in the election campaigns. This image then can be compared to the Hindutva of the party at the national level. This along with the next section is the evidence to my argument that Rajasthan provides a different scope to BJP to project and implement its agenda.

The main highlights of BJP manifesto in Rajasthan contains are-

- The BJP in its 26-page document has offered to provide wheat at Rs 2 per kg to 2.5 million people living below poverty line, while it promises grain at Rs 5 a kg to 2.5 million middle class families. Presently, wheat is available for Rs.12 per kg in the market.
- The party has promised cheap electricity and loans to farmers. The BJP said if reelected to power, it would launch a "Ladli Lakshmi Yojna" aimed at curbing female infanticide in the state.
- Under the scheme, the government will open a fixed deposit account in the name of a newly born girl. The deposit would have a value of Rs.50,000 when the girl turns 21.
- It also promises free education to girls till graduation. The party has promised to provide food under the mid-day meal scheme to students up to class 12. At present, it is offered to students studying between class 1 and 7.

- The document promises doubling of seats in colleges and offers to provide financial and other assistance to eminent sports persons. Free bus passes will also be provided to the students till the graduation level, the party has promised.
- For unorganized workers, the manifesto promises a pension scheme and offers to provide 1 million jobs to the youths. For families living below poverty line, the party proposes a medical insurance scheme. 83

Analysis BJP calls it a populist manifesto and claims to have included each and every segment of the society. It has given new schemes for youth welfare and women empowerment in the field of education and employment. The major attraction remains the poverty eradication and food security programmes. But in the whole 80 pages document of 2008 Lok Sabha elections there is not a single mention of the minority community and its upliftment. The western districts like Jaisalmer and Barmer which has maximum population of Muslims are the major areas to be considered among the small scale industries and handicraft industries. It is important to take notice that most of the Muslims in this region are associated with these handloom industries.

While BJP talks about the development of the unorganized labour sector under the proposed scheme 'Rajasthan Aajeevika scheme' where it proposes to train the youth for employment, no mention about the minority community or problems that they are facing. It can be argued that may be it is presumed that minority is included when the overall development of the state is discussed but this scope also vanishes when we notice the specific mention of all the schedule communities prevalent in Rajasthan.

In last few years BJP has kept itself aloof from touching upon the sensitive issue of Hindutva at least before and during the elections. It carries on its agenda only after the elections are won through the concerned reforms and programme and policies in the state that we will talk about later. Party has promised free food grains to the people who are below poverty Level, it promises good reforms in the field of youth employment and child especially girl education. The manifesto stressed upon the development agenda of

⁸³ Election manifesto released by the party BJP in Rajasthan, year 2008

the state in spite of the allegations by the congress party that it failed handling the 'gujjar agitation' and the 'Ghadsana farmer protest' in the previous ruling years. No doubt, the state progressed in industrial sector during this terrain of BJP from year 2003-2008 and that is why it still wanted to focus on its achievements rather than getting into controversy by touching upon the sensitive issues. The attack and molestation of Christian institutions by the Sangh Parivar, alleging religion conversion, was also another hot topic in the hands of congress which was enough to set the minority against BJP.

We can better understand the manifesto of BJP in Rajasthan and the feeling behind that by comparing that to the national manifesto of the same year general election. As I have argued in previous chapters, BJP follows different strategy at the national and state level the later on depending upon the nature of Hindutva psyche in that particular state.

The national election manifesto of BJP for year 2009 contains a exclusive space for the minority development programmes whereas there is not even a single mention of minority or minority programme in the Rajasthan state election manifesto of BJP for year 2008. The national manifesto reads,

BJP is committed to provide modern education to the Muslims of the country – especially expansion of the education for girls through the national network. BJP will do this with the co-coperation of private and public. 84

Reading between the lines, the election manifesto for year 2009 includes the programmes for the expansion of basic and technical education amongst Indian Muslims by providing funds, especial emphasis on girl-child education, establishing computer centers at various minority dominated districts, sports and poverty eradication programmes were other mentions. The message that BJP provides through this manifesto is that development and education of Muslim minority is important and mandatory steps to stop terrorism. In the wake of 'Sacchar Committee Report⁸⁵', BJP is keen to solve the poverty problems of

⁸⁵ The Rajinder Sachar Committee, appointed by the Prime Minister <u>Manmohan Singh</u> of <u>India</u> was a high level committee headed by <u>Rajinder Sachar</u>, for preparation of a report on the social, economic and educational status of the <u>Muslim community of India</u>

⁸⁴ BJP, Election Manifesto, Lok Sabha elections-2009 (section on minorities)

Muslims in the country but with the context of terrorism back in its mind. But the feeling behind that is not so innocent and does not leave Hindutva alone.

But this was not the case in Rajasthan, whereas BJP mentioned the development of handicraft industries to provide employment to the Muslims, since many of the Muslims in the country are associated with the traditional handloom industries. The BJP manifesto in Rajasthan talks about no such thing whereas most of the Muslim population in western Rajasthan is indulged into this sector only.

3.0 POLICIES OF BJP SEEKING HINDUTVA AGENDA

The election manifesto of the previous Lok Sabha elections makes it clear that BJP does not make any special effort to put some policy/programme for the minorities, in the election manifesto. This could be interpreted in two ways, first that BJP have its grudges against the minorities, and BJP doesn't want to reveal its policy planning that it's going to act against the minorities once in power. Second, BJP has no thought of minorities while making the manifesto. The probability of the second way is the least, Muslims are significant minority in Rajasthan and a national level party functioning there cannot leave it out of its planning. Also the Christians missionary and Sangh Parivar's jolting during the previous government regarding the atrocities performed by the Sangh Parivar and the freedom of religion bill passed by BJP also makes it oblivious that BJP must be having some plan to further handle the issue it is having problem with.

I am arguing that BJP's approach towards the minorities in Rajasthan is more secretive in nature rather than openly coming up and condemning the minorities. If we compare the scenario with Gujarat, the BJP government in Gujarat is more expressive in their agenda even if that demands accusing the minorities. Also once the people of Gujarat led their support to Chief Minister Narendra Modi even after the homicide carried on by him at Godhra, now BJP knows and are confident about the psyche of the Hindus in Gujarat. In case of Rajasthan, its till risky to go on total communal line of hatred and humiliation as they results are quiet unpredictable. Though whenever the BJP rallies are organized in Rajasthan on the lines of hatred to the minority community people do support it in large

numbers. The last such rally happened in 2008 when Narendra Modi came to Ajmer for the electoral campaigning. The rally came up with a message of maintaining communal harmony in the state along with bringing up pluralism in the country. Another was L.K.Advani's Rath Yatra where again he also visited Ajmer was 'Bharat Uday Yatra' that was organized during the election campaign for 2008 General Election. Though the rally failed in its purpose, it was a hit during the time.

3.1. Against Christianity

According to a seminar paper on 'Pentecostalism movements' in Rajasthan by Wessly Lukose, says that Pentecotalism has been misinterpreted espisially by the sangh Parivar as the western product that is trying to spread the religion through conversions. The movement started in Rajasthan in the district of Banswara in 1930s where we find a significant population of tribes like Bhil and Meenas. It later spreaded in mojor parts of the state till 1967. As he puts it-

Pentecostalism in Rajasthan is predominantly a tribal movement. It has made inroads into many tribal communities in Rajasthan, and so a majority of its followers are from tribal communities. The spiritual means like healing and exorcism are the major means for the growth of tribal Pentecostalism, and their churches are called healing communities. At the same time identity concern also seems to be an important reason for the tribals turning to Pentecostalism. Many tribal pastors and believers have argued that they have gained a new identity through becoming Pentecostals.⁸⁷

So, it is apparent that Christian religion expansion is force in Rajasthan by some christain missionaries and rather being a forceful conversion it is based on charismatic approach of the Christianity to heal and support the otherwise undeveloped downtrodden tribal in Rajasthan. Lukose alleges that BJP has been trying to cover up the atrocities carried on

⁸⁶ Pentecostalism is a diverse and complex movement within <u>Christianity</u> that places special emphasis on a direct personal experience of <u>God</u> through the <u>baptism in the Holy Spirit</u>, has an <u>eschatological</u> focus, and is an experiential religion.

⁸⁷Lukose Wessly, 'Pentecostalism in Rajasthan, India and the Challenge of Hindutva' (Genepet Seminar, New York, 2006) p.5

by the right wing organizations in these districts. He condemns the atrocities that have happened where Christian nuns were raped, Christian priests and missionaries were burnt alive. BJP's approach to cover up the instance is even more condemnable. He alleges that instead to stopping these inhuman acts, BJP diverts the public attention it raising the issue of conversion.

Secondly, we can look at the policy making and implementation level when BJP in power tries to gain ideological benefits by using the state power. The last government brought out the Freedom of Rights bill, 2006 and Freedom of Rights bill, 2008. The bill of year 2006 states-

It has been observed by the State Government that some religious and other institutions, bodies and individuals are found to be involved in unlawful conversion from one religion to another by allurement or by fraudulent means or forcibly which at times has caused annoyance in the community belonging to other religions. The inter-religion fabric is weakened by such illegal activities and causes law and order problem for the law enforcing machinery of the State. 88

The first bill of 2006 defines the forceful religious conversion and defines the provision of punishment to the missionary which indulge in such offence of tempting some tribal or any person from a different religion by giving money or offering job, or threatening him or misinterpreting things. The freedom of religion bill of year 2008 further demarcates the punishment between the person who is converting and the person who is found forcing him. It asks for one month prior notice to the District Magistrate if somebody wants to convert his/her religion. He has to make it evident that he is not doing that under some pressure of greed. This bill had the objective that no mass conversion could be held in the state by any Christian missionary. Apparently, after much debate in the assembly, this bill of 2006 was not passed as the governor of the state Ms.Pratibha Patel refused to give her consent. A sign of big relief came upon the Christian minority community members in Rajasthan.

⁸⁸ Freedom of Religion Bill 2006

But the bill was reintroduced gain in year 2008 with even more rigid amendments and this time the Vasundhara Raje led government succeeded in its implementation. The chief arguments that flowed against the bill were that it's directly targeting the Christian minority. The provisions in the article makes Christian minority prone to the suspect of carrying on conversions in the area, thus hampers their projects at the social and educational reforms. Above all the freedom to religion is actually taking away the freedom to religion from an individual. There are provisions against the conversion from Hindu to any other religion but the vice-versa is not there. A Hindu if converted to Christianity forcefully or by fraud means, taking money or promise for a job will is illegal and punishable. But once converted, voluntarily or by force, if he is forcefully converted to Hinduism, there is not punishment provision for that. Also there are certain tribes who do not belong to the Hindu fold of religion, if some already Christian converted person is gain converted to Hinduism is not punishable. This leaves the space biased and unjust for the Christian community.

Wessly Lukose also refers to the confusion that Hindutva creates among masses by linking the conversion 'with colonial power, ecclesiastical expansion, political manipulation' and 'social disturbance.' Whereas Right wing sees conversion as a sociocultural problem, Christians indulged in that views it as a theological problem that they link to the social upliftment and social justice for the tribal.

BJP is thus working against these Christian missionaries at two levels; firstly it is trying to stop them at the policy formulation level using the state power to allege the forceful conversion and diverting the tribes giving. At the periphery outside the state power and control, it uses to perform atrocities on these missionaries which again are covered using the state apparatus. The use of both the constitutional and extra-constitutional means to suppress the Christian minority makes the situation uncomfortable for the minorities in BJP government irrespective of whether the allegations made by BJP are true or false.

3.2 Against the Muslim Minority-

Last Lok Sabha elections, when Narendra Modi came to Ajmer for an election campaign, people turned out in huge numbers. The fascination of Hindutva goes well a charismatic leadership; Modi had defiantly turned out to be an influential leader. He doesn't fake about minority issues, "he is determined to deny them any justice and is going ahead with its agenda. Modi also intends to delete Good Friday from the list of Holidays in Gujrat⁹⁰."

The issues that BJP raise against muslims in Rajasthan are not justified and proved most of the time. For example, the Meo muslims residing in the Mewat area of the state have been again and again alleged by the VHP for cow-slaughtering. They complaint the Chief Minister and ask him to stop this though without any evidence. The motive behind such kind of rumour is to create tensions around deliberately. As Shail Mayaram puts it in a Institute of Development Studies, Jaipur, article:

The Meos is accused time and again of cow slaughter. Dharma Sansad leader in an interview informs me how eastern Rajasthan, Haryana and an adjoining part of UP are a part of a cold belt as far as his organization is concerned. He elaborates on how the issue of cow slaughter has to be periodically raised to generate heat. The leader is alluding to the attempts of his and allied organizations to fabricate inter communal disputes. In Mewat, the area southwest of Delhi, where the Meo Population is concentrated, they take the form of allegations most often of cow slaughter. The interview was taken in the

⁹⁰ A.A.Engineer, Minorities and Election, EPW

aftermath of the riots that gripped the city of Jaipur in 1992 and, indeed, occurred through the country in the wake of the Rath Yatra. His perspective is not irrelevant even ten years later and provides and insight into the psychology of violence. This leader has been the part of the cow protection movement through much of our century. He was one of the key performers of the Roop Kanwar sati rites. He became one of the founders of the Bajrang Dal. The youth wing of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad. In 1992 he was one of the major orchestrators of the Babri Mosque demolition. 91

Maryam believes that the phenomenon that is referred to as cow slaughter is actually an illicit trade of the cow hide on which leather demands of the neighboring countries are fulfilled. The people involved in it are not necessarily Muslims and even if they are the motive is not related to the religious sentiments or beliefs. Mayaram complaints that media never highlights the main issue and that the rumour spread around to produce communal tensions. Mayaram provide us with an evidence that proves that the RSS linked groups and BJP government are trying to target the muslim minority on this issue, there has been a report in 1990s that a group of Banjaras were found involved in the cow trade in central Rajasthan, but they were let off by police at Hindu nationalists insistence that they were 'Hindus'. The ecologically bad situation of the area has been discussed extensively by Shail Mayaram and he believes that government should rather try to solve the problem of poverty in the area because cow trade is the product of that only. Also sine the area is dominated by the Meo muslims, government id rather uninterested in its development ⁹².

The hatred of the RSS activists towards the Meos is not a recent product, historical evidences tells that after independence there was a ethnic cleansing of these Meo muslims in Bharatpur and Alwar princely states. Led by the right wing organizations only. This was the partition led communal violence in which thousands of meos were murdered

⁹¹ Shail Maryam, Distorting the truth PUCL Bulletin, Nov., 2000, source: http://www.pucl.org/reports/National/meo.htm

⁹² ibid.

4.0.Conclusion

In this chapter I discussed four types of constituencies of BJP, the one with significant Muslim population, one with tribal population, one with Jat dominancy and one with royal family influence over the political leadership. These data are linked to my hypothesis that I pose in the last chapter, I will go one by one two show what does each kind of constituency tells us.

- The constituencies having significant Muslim population like Ajmer, Tonk-Swaimadhopur, BJP manages to either get or to divide the muslim votes. Especially in west Ajmer BJP manages to get sufficient muslim votes. And in constituencies like Jalore and Nagaur, though the Muslim population is significant yet the caste affiliations seems stronger than the communal relations. Thus we see that BJP manages in these muslim dominant areas both because of the demographical structure, caste relations and its strategies at the electoral level. No hate speeches, undue communal campaign are noticed in these aeas by BJP. In last few elections, BJP has even managed to put some good muslim leaders as candidates, for example in 2008 assembly elections, Ynus Khan from Deedwana, jalore and Habib-ur-Rehman from Nagaur constituency and both of them manages to win as well. 93
- In princely constituencies Royal family candidature is a conventional phenomenon and yet alive in Kota- Jhalawar and general trend is wining of the candidate belonging to the rulers due to caste preferences and historical beliefs.
- The Jat Rajput rivalry was one of the biggest threat for BJP in Rajasthan which was solved to large extent by Bhairon singh Shekhawat. Still we find that Jhunjhunu, Sikar are still dominated by Congress only as the key Jat leaders are in Congress.
- BJP thus plays both Hindutva aan caste politics cards in Rajasthan

⁹³ Election commission of India, websitehttp://eci.nic.in/eci_main/electionanalysis/AE/S20/a_index_right1.htm Accessed on 22 July, 2011 at 12.37pm

Thus we find BJP in a situation where at mobilization level it has got limited things to do. The traditionally BJP dominated areas are because of the princely presence where as the peasant castes have been mobilized by altering the idea on reservation. The Rajput Hindutva alone does not pay BJP much. The caste relations, becomes more important. At mobilization level BJP can't do much regarding the ideology but at the later stage BJP is using the state power to achieve the ideological ends when it comes into power. The previous chapter put an argument that since BJP is going through serious moderations in its ideology and at the cost of surviving in the politics, it need to leave alone its ideological agenda and thus RSS and other Hindu right organizations take up the responsibility of carrying forward the Hindutva ends. RSS led tactics in the public sphere was to be seen as the mobalization for the electoral politics for BJP. In case of Rajasthan, through electoral data we found that these mobilization strategies are not working. The tribal welfare programmne that RSS is carrying on in southern parts of the state are not paying up the party in elections.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Like any other ideologies, 'political Hindutva' of BJP too is determined by the social and political sphere it is functioning into and at the same time is determines the social and political sphere through its functioning. To simplify, the conditions prevailing in the belief system of a society gives the scope to any political player to formulate its strategies. But at the same time, the ideology also leaves impact on the social system through the policies and planning with its pre decided agenda. Sartori Giovanni divides ideology into two broad categories, namely, ideology of knowledge/or ideology of politics. ⁹⁴ Hindutva that BJP uses is definitely falling into the second category. And Ideology of politics has not everything to do with politics; it seeks identities for the individual from history, links it to culture and tradition and then uses it for its own politicsl gains.

The social bloc for BJP at the national level during its initial years of establishment were the upper caste section of the Indian society that shifted to peasant castes and the OBCs in next few years, it has to give up the communal issues and demands like Uniform Civil Code, abolition of Article 370 and 'Swadeshi' approach in the economic sphere, on which it was very rigid earlier, in order to form the alliance with the regional allies. This led to the moderation of the Hindutva ideology of BJP. Though it never gave up totally on the ideology and kept its commitments to it by implementation of the communal politics when it came to power. In future as well, as we see BJP as the only alternative to the Congress government, its not viable to expect from BJP to not to function on the Hindutva lines. But one thing we can be sure about is the way Indian politics is going to behave on Hindutva. There are certain basic conditions associated with being a ideology based party. If a party says, it sticks to certain specific principles then it draws an unseen constitution for the party. Even if BJP does not declare the source of its ideology as it

⁹⁴ Giovanni Sartori, 'Politics of Ideology and Belief Systems', in The American Political Science Review, vol.63, no.2, June, 1969

could not do it in its own favour, it may change in future. But as we have seen in all these chapters, there are certain features of Hindutva ideology that never disappears, it may behave as a regional party, it may mould itself according to the need of situation but still something is there that keeps it the 'Hindutva' and that is the basic feeling with which it came into being. I think it carries the insecurity for the traditional and cultural aspect of the nation. The threat with which it emerged into the Indian politics is that element which never leaves it. It main focus remains culture, tradition, religion and history.

Thus we find that the changes in the politics that came up in the politics of the country did influence the way BJP put the ideology at function. This was at the National level; the story at the state level is no different. The situations, in fact, become more complicated at the regional level. Rajasthan as a state rich in feudal history and having unique caste hierarchy and power relations and thus have its own set of determinates for the Hindutva functioning. My argument is that the state of Rajasthan is not only having an altogether different definition of Hindutva, in the form of Rajput Hindutva but also the caste complexities present in the state doesn't let the party play its Hindutva cards in the state. On the hand, the Rajput Hindutva changes the whole idea and conceptualization of Hindutva of BJP, the caste relations, the power and authority structure. This makes BJP to keep the real Hindutva agenda, as projected by the fore fathers, at the back seat. Even within the BJP leaders, there is no coherency regarding the definition of Hindutva. With these things in my mind, I took up the task of understand what constitute of Hindutva ideology formulated by its various organizations at various level. The idea was to explore the founding fathers' opinion about Hindutva as to understand what elements they said, constitute the ideology. Secondly, the BJP's ideology and politics keep swinging from moderate to militant formulation. This is not a good sign from the point of view of an ideology based political party and if one does so, its fall is obvious.

So I believe, Hindutva is not a fixed or standard entity, it is neither static nor its elements are irreversible as propounded by Golwalkar. The reason why academics never came on a conclusion regarding a single definition of Hindutva is that it behaves differently at different situations. There is a presence of hierarchy in the strength of Hindutva from top to bottom. The RSS, for example, which is a non-political player, is capable of

constituting the Savarkar's ideological apparatus. BJP at the national level is struggling to survive with its ideology and thus gave the responsibilities that are not related to politics, to the RSS. At state level, the ideological strength of BJP further decreases, the caste complications makes it behave like a regional party with a region specific approach. Even while following these region specific approaches, it gets into motion on Hindutva agenda as and when it comes into power. The policies and implementations then made by it carries a direct sectarian objective.

Rajasthan is an important area for the hopes of BJP, the unique set of Hindutva 'ingredients' make it even more important. The leadership that BJP offered in Rajasthan was also in favour of the state. Rajasthan has developed and flourished under the BJP rule in all sphere be it agriculture, economy, education but the sphere of social justice has not been always satisfied. The caste atrocities that took place under the leadership of upper caste leaders of BJP is condemnable, secondly, the struggle that minorities are doing against the anti-minority plans of BJP is another undue experience.

The 'Freedom of religion bill' has been alleged as a minority targeting effort by BJP. The recent Wekileaks found some information of the 'Dharma Swatrantra Bill 2006' introducted by BJP in Rajasthan. Geoff Pyatt, the Political Counselor in the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, said that "the checks and balances built into the Indian Constitution have so far successfully blunted this piece of anti-conversion legislation" The bill was deliberately targeted on the Christians of the state with a pre planned strategy.

The bill prohibited conversion from one's ancestral religion to another, allegedly only when conversion was by the use of force or allurement or by fraudulent means — though the opponents of the bill contested this. But it did not have a similar bar when it came to re-conversion to one's original religion. This led critics to argue that the provisions of the bill sought to target non-Hindu religions. 95

It makes clear that the concern of BJP government is not the forceful religious conversions that going on in the state but the conversion of Hindus be it on any basis. The civil society demonstrators were more than happy when the bill was not passed in the

⁹⁵ The Hindu, Wekileaks, April 13, 2011.

Assembly after being returned back by President Abdul Kalam. The population of Christians in the state is less than one/tenth of the total population and still it managed to keep

The state of Rajasthan is thus a mixture of caste politics and an altogether different set of Hindutva politics. The elements of Hindutva that we find at the fundamental level which actually not possible ideally for BJP to put forward. These elements thus keep on missing from upper to lower level. That means that it is different at the national level and something else at the state level. Though, the exception to this can be some of the state that favours the rise of Hindutva as it has the presence of the set of elements of Hindutva in its population. The key is that BJP's strategy and ideology depends on the support base it has in the state. In few years BJP is diluting its ideological frames and trying to make an adjustment in the national politics. The chief reason behind this is the rise of coalition politics where every party is worried about its image. BJP thus can not afford to lose its support. Another factor is the change in the psyche of vote bank for BJP, people are becoming less and less concerned about the communal issues rather they are more concerned about the developmental issue. Perhaps, this is the case with BJP in Gujarat where people actually got back to BJP even forgetting about the riots as their eyes were on the developing state rather than on the past unfortunate happenings. Though, this also shows that BJP tend to behave more and more double faced in the coming days. It projects an image before elections, does injustice to the minority when in power then does development for the common masses and get away with everything. This is what it did in Gujarat, tried doing in Rajasthan and Karnataka but failed.

The use of lord Rama at the National level is converted into the use of some local hero to mobilize the dalits and the tribals. Similarities and linkages between the two, the local hero and lord ram are found out and the myth thus created is used to mobilize the dalits. Quoting Badri Narayan here:

Thus Hindutva politics is shifting its sphere of operation from the global to the local and again from local to global. In the process the very meanings and forms of various local village societies and cultures are changing. From these redefined and reproduced saffron locals the BJP ultimately aims to develop a unified

national and global saffron Hindutva narrative which will unite all the Hindus under one common culture.⁹⁶

Another aspect of this kind of Dalit mobilization is is the their use against the muslims in the riots and violence.

The most important aspect of BJP politics in Rajasthan is the concept of Rajput Hindutva which is based on the concept of myth making as said by Badri narayan. The past remains an indispensable tool for BJP to mobilize people especially the dalits and the tribes who are the most insecure about the past and therefore most desired target for the past glorification. The Rajput customs and way of life being popularized among the dalits to make them included into the main fold Hindu politics. Also the Rajput warriors and rulers are glorified to present 'idols' who preserved and protected their culture and tradition at the cost of their life.


Thus it seems that there are three categories in Hindutva ideology. One, Hindutva as propounded by the founding fathers, Golwalkar and Savarkar; second, Hindutva that BJP adopts at the national level, mostly adoption of Savarkar; third, where BJP's Hindutva is limited to mobilizing the tribes and schedule castes on the basis of history and culture; also it works as any other regional party, getting the castes at its side by fulfilling their demands and making long term alliance with the princely constituencies and princely candidates. This dissertation suggests that it is the third type of Hindutva that we find in the operation in Rajasthan.

⁹⁶ Badri Narayan, Fascinating Hindutva(Sage, 2009) p. 29.

APPENDIX

❖ Table 1. Caste Support to BJP in Rajasthan, Source: 1931 Population census

Upper Castes 62.6 55.3 45.3 43.9 37.5 Brahmin 31.3 23.7 16.3 13.3 3.1 Rajput 9.4 7.9 8.1 16.3 18.8 Baniya/Jain 18.8 21.1 17.4 13.3 9.4 Khatri - - - 3.1 - 3.1 - 3.1 - 3.1 - 3.1 - 3.1 - 3.1 - 3.1 - - 3.1 - - 3.1 - - 3.1 - - 3.1 - - 3.1 - - - 3.1 - - - - 3.1 - - - - 3.1 - <t< th=""><th>Caste and Communities</th><th>1980</th><th>1985</th><th>1990</th><th>1993</th><th>1998</th><th></th></t<>	Caste and Communities	1980	1985	1990	1993	1998	
Brahmin 31.3 23.7 16.3 13.3 3.1 Rajput 9.4 7.9 8.1 16.3 18.8 Baniya/Jain 18.8 21.1 17.4 13.3 9.4 Khatri - - - - - 3.1 Arora 3.1 2.6 1.2 1 - Sindhi - - 2.3 - 3.1 Intermidiate castes - 7.9 4.7 11.2 21.9 Jat - 5.3 4.7 11.2 18.8 Maratha - 2.6 - - - - Bishnoi - - 2.6 - - - 3.1 OBC 6.3 15.7 11.8 6.1 18.7 18.8 Guijar 6.3 10.5 3.5 4.1 3.1 - Yadav - - 4.7 1	Upper Castes	62.6	55.3	45.3	43.9	37.5	•
Rajput							
Baniya/Jain 18.8 21.1 17.4 13.3 9.4 Khatri - - - - 3.1 Arora 3.1 2.6 1.2 1 - Sindhi - - 2.3 - 3.1 Intermidiate castes - 7.9 4.7 11.2 21.9 Jat - 5.3 4.7 11.2 18.8 Maratha - 2.6 - - - Bishnoi - - - - - - OBC 6.3 15.7 11.8 6.1 18.7 Gujjar 6.3 10.5 3.5 4.1 3.1 Yadav - - - - 3.1 Mali - - 4.7 1 - Kumhar - 2.6 1.2 - 3.1 Nai - - 1.2 1 - Other - 2.6 1.2 - -						18.8	
Khatri							
Arora Sindhi Si	•			-	-	3.1	
Sindhi - - 2.3 - 3.1		3.1	2.6	1.2	1	-	
Total Control Contro		-			-	3.1	
Jat - 5.3 4.7 11.2 18.8 Maratha - 2.6 - - - Bishnoi - - - - - OBC 6.3 15.7 11.8 6.1 18.7 Gujjar 6.3 10.5 3.5 4.1 3.1 Vadav - - - - 3.1 Mali - - 4.7 1 - Kumhar - 2.6 1.2 - 3.1 Nai - - 1.2 1 - Other - 2.6 1.2 - 9.4 Scheduled Castes 18.8 10.5 19.8 26.5 9.4 Scheduled Tribes 12.5 5.2 15.1 12.3 12.6 Meena 12.5 2.6 8.1 9.2 6.3 Other - 2.6 2.4 - - Religious minorities - - -	Intermidiate castes						
Maratha - 2.6 - - - 3.1 OBC 6.3 15.7 11.8 6.1 18.7 Gujjar 6.3 10.5 3.5 4.1 3.1 Yadav - - - - 3.1 Mali - - 4.7 1 - Kumhar - 2.6 1.2 - 3.1 Nai - - 1.2 1 - Other - 2.6 1.2 - 9.4 Scheduled Castes 18.8 10.5 19.8 26.5 9.4 Scheduled Tribes 12.5 5.2 15.1 12.3 12.6 Meena 12.5 2.6 8.1 9.2 6.3 Other - 2.6 2.4 - - Religious minorities - 2.6 1.2 - - Sikh - - 1.2 - - Unidentified - 2.6 1.2 - <td>-</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>•</td>	-						•
Maratha - 2.6 - - - 3.1 OBC 6.3 15.7 11.8 6.1 18.7 Gujjar 6.3 10.5 3.5 4.1 3.1 Lyadav - - - - - 3.1 Mali - - 4.7 1 - Kumhar - 2.6 1.2 - 3.1 Nai - - 1.2 1 - Other - 2.6 1.2 - 9.4 Scheduled Castes 18.8 10.5 19.8 26.5 9.4 Scheduled Tribes 12.5 5.2 15.1 12.3 12.6 Meena 12.5 2.6 8.1 9.2 6.3 Other - 2.6 2.4 - - Religious minorities - 2.6 1.2 - - Wullidentified - - - - <td< td=""><td>Jat</td><td>-</td><td>5.3</td><td>4.7</td><td>11.2</td><td>18.8</td><td></td></td<>	Jat	-	5.3	4.7	11.2	18.8	
DBC	Maratha	-	2.6	-	-		
Gujjar 6.3 10.5 3.5 4.1 3.1 Yadav - - - - 3.1 Mali - - 4.7 1 - Kumhar - 2.6 1.2 - 3.1 Nai - - 1.2 1 - Other - 2.6 1.2 - 9.4 Scheduled Castes 18.8 10.5 19.8 26.5 9.4 Scheduled Tribes 12.5 5.2 15.1 12.3 12.6 Meena 12.5 2.6 8.1 9.2 6.3 Other - 2.6 2.4 - - Religious minorities - 2.6 1.2 - - Sikh - - 1.2 - - Unidentified - 2.6 1.2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -		-	, -	-	-	3.1	
Nai	OBC						
Mali	Gujjar	6.3	10.5	3.5	4.1		
Kumhar - 2.6 1.2 - 3.1 Nai - - 1.2 1 - Other - 2.6 1.2 - 9.4 Scheduled Castes 18.8 10.5 19.8 26.5 9.4 Scheduled Tribes 12.5 5.2 15.1 12.3 12.6 Meena 12.5 2.6 8.1 9.2 6.3 Other - 2.6 2.4 - - Religious minorities - 2.6 2.4 - - Sikh - - 1.2 - - Unidentified - 2.6 1.2 - - Unidentified - 2.6 1.2 - -	Yadav	-	-	-	-	3.1	
Nai	Mali	-	-		1	-	
Other - 2.6 1.2 - 9.4 Scheduled Castes 18.8 10.5 19.8 26.5 9.4 Scheduled Tribes 12.5 5.2 15.1 12.3 12.6 Meena 12.5 2.6 8.1 9.2 6.3 Other - 2.6 2.4 - - Religious minorities - 2.6 2.4 - - Muslim - 2.6 1.2 - - Sikh - - 1.2 - - Unidentified - 2.6 1.2 - -	Kumhar	-	2.6			3.1	
Scheduled Castes 18.8 10.5 19.8 26.5 9.4 Scheduled Tribes 12.5 5.2 15.1 12.3 12.6 Meena 12.5 2.6 8.1 9.2 6.3 Other - 2.6 2.4 - - Religious minorities - 2.6 1.2 - - Muslim - 2.6 1.2 - - Sikh - 1.2 - - Unidentified - 2.6 1.2 - -	Nai	-			1	-	
Scheduled Tribes 12.5 5.2 15.1 12.3 12.6 Meena 12.5 2.6 8.1 9.2 6.3 Other - 2.6 2.4 - - Religious minorities - 2.6 2.4 - - Muslim - 2.6 1.2 - - Sikh - - 1.2 - - Unidentified - 2.6 1.2 - -	Other	-	2.6	1.2	-	9.4	
Meena 12.5 2.6 8.1 9.2 6.3 Color of the color of	Scheduled Castes						
Other - 2.6 2.4	Scheduled Tribes						
Religious minorities - 2.6 2.4 - - Muslim - 2.6 1.2 - - Sikh - - 1.2 - - Unidentified - 2.6 1.2 - - -	Meena	12.5			9.2	6.3	
Muslim	Other	-	2.6	2.4	-	-	
Muslim - 2.6 1.2 Sikh 1.2	Religious minorities						
Sikh 1.2 Unidentified - 2.6 1.2	•				-	-	
Unidentified 2.6 1.2		-	2.6		-	-	
2.6 1.2	Sikh	-	-	1.2	-	-	
	Unidentified		2.6	1.2			
Total 100.2(N=32) 99.8(N=38) 100.3(N=86) 100.0(N=98) 100.1(N=32) 99.8(N=38)	-				-	<u>-</u>	
	Total	100.2(N=32)	99.8(N=38)	100.3(N=86)	100.0(N=98)	100.1(N=32)	99.8(N




- Figure 3- Assembly constituencies in Rajasthan
- Source: http://www.mapsofindia.com/assemblypolls/rajasthan.html, accessed on 20 July, 2011 at 9.30 p.m.

❖ Table no.12 LOK SABHA ELECTION DATA

constituer	1989	1991	1996	1999	2004	2009
Ajmer	ВЈР	ВЈР	BJP	ВЈР	ВЈР	INC
Alwar	סנ	ВЈР	INC	ВЈР	INC	INC
Banswara	JD	INC	INC	INC	ВЈР	INC
Barmer	JD .	INC	INC	INC	вјР	
Bharatpur	JD	BJP .	BJP	ВЈР	ВЈР	INC
Bhilwara	INC	ВЈР	INC	ВЈР	ВЈР	
Bikaner	СРМ	INC	BJP	INC	BJP	ВЈР
Chittorgra	BJP	ВЈР	BJP	BJP	ВЈР	INC
Churu .	JD	ВЈР	INC	BJP	ВЈР	BJP
 Pausa	BJP	INC	INC	INC	INDEPENDENT	
Ganganag .	סו	INC	BJP	BJP	ВЈР	INC
Jaipur	ВЈР	ВЈР	ВЈР	BJP	ВЈР	INC
Jaipur Rur	ВЈР	INC	INC	INC	BJP	INC
Jalore	ВЈР	INC	INC	INC	ВЈР	BJP
Jhalawar-B	aran	ВЈР	BJP	BJP	BJP	BJP
Jhunjhuni.	JD	INC	AIIC	INC	INC	INC
Jodhpur	ВЈР	INC	INC	ВЈР	BJP	INC
Karauli	BJP	ВЈР	BJP	ВЈР	BJP	INC
Kota	ВЈР	ВЈР	ВЈР	ВЈР	BJP	INC
Nagaur .	JD	INC	INC	INC	ВЈР	INC
Pali	ВЈР	BJP .	ВЈР	ВЈР	ВЈР	INC
Rajsamand						INC
Sikar .	JD	INC	INC	ВЈР	BJP	INC
Tonk-Sawaimadhopu		ВЈР	ВЈР	ВЈР	ВЈР	INC
Udaipur I	BJP	INC	INC	INC	ВЈР	INC

Figure 11 General Elections since 1989

Figure 1. BJP vs Congress in General Elections in Rajasthan






Figure 12 State constituent assembly elections BJP vs Congress

	Hindus	Muslim	Christian	Jain	Sikh	Buddhist
All India	82	12.12	2.34	0.4	1.94	0.76
Rajasthan	89.08	8.01	0.11	1.28	1.48	0.01
Ajmer	15.67	11.19	0.52	2.19	0.36	0.008
Alwar	84.71	12.8	0.034	0.42	1.85	0.0003
Barmer	86.26	11.8	0.06	1.81	0.031	0.0015
Bharatpur	85.88	12.59	0.016	0.3	1.11	0.043
Bikaner	86.31	10.29	0.071	1.87	1.43	0.009
Churu	88.26	10.93	0.014	0.72	0.036	0.0093
Jaisalmae	75.48	23.64	0.11	0.33	0.41	0.008
Jhunjhuni	89.54	10.33	0.026	0.026	0.055	0.0013
Jodhpur	87.58	10.74	0.181	1.27	0.19	0.009
Kota	85.72	11.71	. 0.32	1.48	0.711	0.01
Nagaur	86.45	12.84	0.02	0.62		~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
			~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~		ioniya ayaa aayaa aayaa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa	
				,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,		

Table.no.13 Percentage wise religious distribution in Rajasthan

Source: Population census 2001



Map no. 4 District Map Rajasthan

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