

PROBLEMATIC OF REGIONAL SECURITY AND THE DYNAMIC OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION

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CERTIFICATE

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INTRODUCTION

Regional security and regional integration are salient issues in international relations. The second half of the twentieth century has often been referred to as the 'age of integration'. This is owing to the fact that from Western Europe to the former iron curtain countries, from East Africa to Latin America, from South East to South Asia, in both the developed as well as developing countries, the desire and endeavour for regional integration seem to be gaining ground.

Joseph Nye aptly points out that regional frameworks are the most effective ones in which to achieve order and stability within particular regions, because of a sense of common interest. Economic integration tends to inhibit conflict and increase incentives for managing it. Moreover cohesive regional units would reduce the scope for intervention by outside powers.¹

Increasing interaction and interdependence create both increased scope for conflict as well as new opportunities for cooperation in world politics. End of the cold war has marked a multipolar world and dramatically changed the strategic context of the world. The disintegration of the USSR, reduction in incentives for big power intervention, rise of new economic powers--these have created conditions for more autonomous regional spaces to emerge. Security related issues have

¹ Joseph S. Nye, *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

increasingly become regional. So, the process of regional integration has assumed new significance today and the emergence of regional blocs is seen as an important feature of the emerging 'New World Order'.

For a considerable period of time the sole level of analysis in 'security studies' was the nation state. Change in military-economic technology especially the development of nuclear weapons and missiles has tended to undermine the physical defensibility or impermeability of states.

Dynamics of technology has also led to the shortening of social, economic and political distances and the movement of people, ideas and information. Interaction and interdependence of people and events further led to a rise of issue areas, overlapping of local and global horizons, and a reduced capacity of states to satisfy the demands and needs of the people.

So, a collective approach may offer greater psychological support in the world-setting, particularly to the more vulnerable smaller units. Regional integration in different parts of the world can be seen as a defensive reaction to what was happening in many of the other parts. Regional integration is increasingly looked upon as pooling of resources to cope with interdependence, to increase the importance of the area and to diminish external dependence.

The history of Europe is replete with wars. But today staunch enemies of the past have become allies and partners. The greatest security that the European Union represents is not only

economic, which itself is of enormous significance, but the fact that now the members have left wars way behind.

ASEAN was formed in 1967. Today it has often been said that regional integration has brought ASEAN on the brink of what Karl Deutsch has called a 'pluralist security community' where no nation continues to accept war as an instrument of policy against other community members.

However, this sense of regional security is not evident in many developing regions, SAARC being a classic instance. But this does not mean that beneficial effects of a free trade zone do not exist; they do, as they exist all over the world. What is lacking is the perception of common enemy and common threat that was the driving force in Europe, coupled with the lack of internal cohesion.

The UN Charter recognises the importance of the regional approach to peace and security. Article 52(1) reads "Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or against its dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security..."

Regional integration is an adjustment by concerned states for mutual benefit, to solve or at least peacefully manage conflicts.

Regional Integration & Security in International Relations Theory

Defining the term 'region' is the essential first step in any scholarly analysis of regional integration in international

politics. There are a multiplicity of views regarding the most important factors that must pre-exist before a tract of territory could be called a region.

Regions could be delineated on the basis of:

- geographical proximity
- common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social, religious customs
- political and economic level of development
- similarity of threat perceptions
- identical political systems with similar ideological beliefs
- common foreign policy objectives
- internal recognition as a distinctive area
- external recognition of its distinctiveness
- common membership in international organisation

However none of these factors is enough in itself.

What underlines this pattern of demarcating regions is the fact of 'interaction', i.e. states within a region interact with each other. This interaction could be cooperative, conflictual or competitive. So regions could also be earmarked on the basis of the pattern and regularity of interaction--amicable or antagonistic.

Regions are different from alliances owing to the permanent character of the former. Regions are not equal, some are subordinated or penetrated by external forces, either state or non-state actors from superior regions.

The usage of the term 'integration' is often confusing. The dictionary definition of 'forming parts into a whole' leaves open a wide range of ambiguity. The word is used with many meanings including political unification, economic unification, economic and political cooperation and free trade.

Several scholarly and policy approaches have deeply affected regional integration in the past years. Federalism is a political and legal approach towards integration. Creation of supranational authority possessing coercive and political power to ensure collective defense of members is central to this approach.

The goal of functionalists was not regional integration but creation of a world community of states. But it had a profound influence on regional integration endeavour. It was based on the premise that form must follow function. It attributes integration to institutional inadequacies of the nation-state system, and its inability to work for the well-being of people owing to modernization, which led to the shrinking of the world and rise of non-state actors. So effective international institutions would emerge to coordinate various activities and as interdependence grew, reliance on still more of these institutions would gradually spread.

The neo-functionalists point out that the creation of limited supranational institutions to handle complex technical problems would gradually bring political elites and interest groups of the countries involved to support further integration

(spill over) because they saw benefits in it for themselves.

The transactionalist approach relies heavily on analysis of transactions -- political, economic, social and cultural across national frontiers. In this, integration is stressed as a process produced by interest group demands upon decision-making elites, amongst which the bureaucracy occupies a significant position.

Another debate very relevant to the issue discussed here is the dilemma between globalization and regionalism. The argument usually put forward is that the aims and activities of the UN are being hindered by the activities of regional organisation. Unless regional units are controlled, regional particularism will impede attainment of an orderly world. Moreover, regional integration might give rise to hegemons which will dominate and exploit weak partners. The counter argument points to regional integration being a more practicable approach to peaceful international order as it is easy to find convergence of interests among countries at the regional level than at the global level. Moreover the regional approach could reduce the UN burden to a large extent in security matters and also ensure that local conflicts are resolved locally instead of being internationalized. Some even see regional integration as a way of containing a regional hegemon.

The term 'security' itself appears to be extremely difficult to clearly conceptualize, as it refers to a series of widely held desires to be 'free from threat'. For long, realists

had dominated security studies, taking the state as the exclusive unit of analysis and concerned with military threats emanating from outside its borders. But the security problematic can no longer be defined solely in external oriented military terms. Most of the Third World countries suffer from threats emanating from within their borders to a substantial extent.

The distinguishing characteristic of post-cold war world politics is the absence of what international security analyst Lawrence Freedman calls 'the strategic imperative'--the motivation among the major states to compete for military power. Today economic warfare is being seen as replacing cold war military concerns. Environmental security issues like deforestation, resource scarcity, pollution, global warming, ozone layer depletion are also increasingly finding their place in the literature on international relations. Most of these problems are transnational in nature calling for a wider regional approach. Thus the waning tensions of the Cold War have coincided with rising concerns over a variety of non-military threats to security.

However, this does not mean that non-military threats to security did not exist earlier. It is only that they have emerged with great clarity in the post-Cold War period. Nor does it mean that military threats have vanished. Several regional conflicts have continued unabated, new ones have emerged. Hence there is an ongoing need to evaluate security in a comprehensive framework of military, political, economic, environmental,

cultural and social threats, at local, national, regional, inter-regional and global levels.

✓ Regional security seems to be an essential intermediary stage between national security and international security. However it is also a qualitatively different type of security. International security deals with the issue of war and peace at the international stage. National security deals with protection of territorial integrity, well-being and development of people therein. Regional security involves both avoidance of war at the regional level as well as maintenance of territorial integrity and well-being of people.

In fact, all the three levels of security are interrelated. State conduct is conditioned by the international system. International regimes affect the opportunities available to them. International security is what happens within regions and between them.

Much is said about global interdependence but regional interdependencies of the cultural, economic, political or military kinds are equally significant. The regionalists have drawn attention to local sources of regional conflicts including ethnic rivalries, long-standing territorial disputes, complicated by external interventions. So, there is a need to study external and internal dimensions of regional security. Regional integration has an external purpose of thwarting external intervention and an internal purpose of dealing with regional conflicts peacefully. So security and integration are

linked and mutually reinforcing. The regional approach does promote regional security, but for the success of regional integration approach resolution of regional security problematic is essential.

Literature Review

According to Raimo Vayrynen,² a region is a dynamic socio-political entity. The dynamism implies that regions and the people living therein, are continuously transforming both in terms of their socio-political practices and cultural consciousness.

Barry Buzan talks of the 'security complex'³ dealing with a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely so that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.

In yet another work, Barry Buzan discusses various interpretations of the 'security concept'.⁴ His analysis attempts to transcend the limitations of the idealist approach to peace and the realist focus on power.

² Raimo Vayrynen, "Regional System and International Relations", in Helena Lindhoch, *Approaches to the Study of International Political Economy*, Padrigu Papers (Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg, 1992), pp.119-37.

³ Barry Buzan, "A Framework for Regional Security Analysis" in Barry Buzan et al., *South Asian Insecurity & the Great Powers* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986), pp.3-33.

⁴ Barry Buzan, *People, States & Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1983).

In the works of Karl Deutsch, the central concept is that of a 'security community'⁵ which is a group of people who have attained within a territory a sense of community, institutions and practices which are strong enough to assure peaceful change for a long time to come.

Ernst B. Haas⁶ views integration as the process by which political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new and larger centre, whose institutions possess jurisdiction over the nation states.

Leon Lindberg⁷ takes a very cautious conception of political integration, limited to the development of devices and processes for arriving at collective decision by means other than autonomous action by national governments.

Stanley Hoffman⁸ argues that for a successful integration attempt the involved units must be political communities in the

⁵ Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community & the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

⁶ Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Economic and Social Forces, 1950-57* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958).

⁷ Leon N. Lindberg, *Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963).

⁸ Stanley Hoffman, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe", *Daedalus*, Summer 1966, pp.862-915.

formal sense, i.e. domestic integration of ethnic groups, tribes or classes is a prerequisite.

Paul Taylor⁹ argues that on the one hand regionalism as a general phenomenon had received relatively little attention after the mid 1970s; on the other hand, evidence from the 1980s suggested that regional organizations are increasing in numbers at a rapid rate. Paul Taylor explains the implications for regional integration of a relatively recent theory developed in the context of the discipline of comparative government, namely 'consociationalism', explaining the symbiotic character of both state and the regional system being mutually supportive. Taylor argues that even in the advanced case of European Community, regional integration has strengthened existing states. Sovereignty serves as the basic principle but the concept itself has gone through fundamental change.

Joseph S. Nye¹⁰ made a significant contribution by drawing attention to the role of external factors in the process of regional integration.

⁹ See Paul Taylor, "Regionalism: The Thought and the Deed", in A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor (eds.), *Framework for International Cooperation* (London: Pinter, 1990), pp.151-71 and Paul Taylor, *International Organization in the Modern World: The Regional & the Global Process* (London: Pinter, 1993).

¹⁰ Joseph S. Nye, *Peace in Parts: Integration & Conflict in Regional Organization* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971) and "Central American Regional Integration", *International Conciliation*, No.56, March 1967, pp.1-66.

Lynn Mytelka¹¹ discusses three models of integration for the Third World. The first is a laissez-faire integration scheme which leads to an asymmetrical system of exchange resulting in instability and disintegration. The second model and involves attempts to distribute integrative gains more equitably. The third model goes further and tries to take measures to reduce the pattern of dependence on developed countries.

Moving towards the concept of security Dietrich Fisher argues that security does not imply mere preservation of status quo, but is a dynamic concept that includes human development and redressing of injustice, as well as physical security.¹² Similarly Simon Dalby¹³ highlights the economic, ecological, ethnic and secessionist threats to security.

Mohammed Ayoob¹⁴ writes that the western notion of regional security retains the external thrust. As a result of the centuries old process of development, the modern state

¹¹ Lynn Mytelka, "Regional Integration in the Third World, Some Internal Factors", in *International Dimensions of Regional Integration in the Third World*, Proceedings of the 5th International Conference of the ICI (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1975), pp.15-39.

¹² Dietrich Fischer, *Non-Military Aspects of Security: A Systems Approach* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993).

¹³ Simon Dalby, "Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourse", *Alternatives*, Vol. 17, 1992, pp.95-134.

¹⁴ Mohammed Ayoob, "Regional Security and the Third World", in Mohammed Ayoob (ed.), *Regional Security in the Third World* (Beckenham: Croom Helm, 1986), pp.3-23.

system starting from Westphalia has been conferred 'unconditional legitimacy', whereas the Third World is still in the process of nation-building and still faces internal security problems.

Sukhumbhand Paribatra and Chai-Anan Samudavanija¹⁵ argue that regional security deals with the absence of threats among regional countries as well as between these states and extra-regional powers stemming from geostrategic, political, socio-economic and psychological sources.

Jasjit Singh¹⁶ argues that the very concept of nation state as it evolved in the Westphalian system contains the seeds of insecurity since each state searching for its own security must do so at the cost of security of other states.

Rama S. Melkote¹⁷ points out that in Europe, economic development took place more or less as an integrated process, i.e. transition from feudalism to capitalism and modern industrialized societies came into being without any external power dominating. This is not so with regard to the Third World where regional organizations are less successful. Given their

¹⁵ Sukhumbhand Paribatra and Chai-Anan Samudavanija, "Internal Dimensions of Regional Security in Southeast Asia", in Mohammed Ayoob (ed.), *Regional Security in the Third World* (Beckenham: Croom Helm, 1986), p.57.

¹⁶ Jasjit Singh, "Conclusion: Security in a Period of Change" in Jasjit Singh & Thomas Bernauer (ed.), *Security of Third World Countries* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993), pp.151-61.

¹⁷ Rama S. Melkote (ed.), *Regional Organisations: A Third World Perspective* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1990).

colonial legacy they lay greater stress on relations with advanced North than development through regional cooperation.

Objectives of the Study

The main intent of this dissertation is to examine and gain a theoretical understanding of the concepts of region and regional integration which are characteristic of international relations today. The study will further investigate the interrelationship between regional integration and the concept of regional security--how the two affect each other. The traditional and new concepts of security will be analysed.

The following aspects will be studied. Regional integration and regional security share a basic conceptual relationship. The process of regional integration enhances regional security. Cooperation at the regional level provides concerned countries with greater security and stability. But the resolution of the regional security problematic is an essential prerequisite for regional integration. For the efforts towards regional integration to succeed it is vital that the countries involved are able to resolve their security problems or at least manage them quite peacefully.

The regional integration dynamic cannot be comprehended without taking into account non-military threats to regional and national security. The traditional military-strategic security concept has given way to new and wider concept of security which assumes greater significance in today's interdependent world.

Regional security has both internal and external dimensions, i.e. regional security is conditioned by both intra- and extra-regional actors and events.

Regional security is not merely an intermediate level of security between national and international security but rather a qualitatively different but interrelated type of security. Regional security involves both avoidance of war at the regional level, protection from extra-regional threats as well as the maintenance of territorial integrity and development and well-being of the people.

Chapterization

The first chapter 'Region and Regional Integration' will systematically examine the concept of 'region' based on geographical, cultural, historical and other factors. The concept of 'regional integration' will be analysed through a study of various approaches: federalism, functionalism, neofunctionalism, transactionalism and consociationalism. The chapter also deals with the types of regional integration -- economic, political and social. Finally, the concept of natural economic territory (NET) is examined in some detail.

The second chapter 'Security and Regional Security' will analyse the concept of security not only in military-strategic terms but in non-military terms also, including economic, environmental, transnational organized crime, threats to nation building and demographic movements; external and internal dimension of regional security; and regional security as

different but interrelated to other levels of security.

The third chapter 'Regional Security and Regional Integration' will draw from the preceding chapters and analyse the interrelationship between regional security and regional integration.

The concluding chapter will recapitulate the study done in the preceding chapters. Inferences will be drawn on the basis of observations set out earlier. The threads will be picked up and well knit into a viable pattern that is tenable in contemporary times.

Chapter One

REGION AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

Defining the term 'region' is the essential first step in any scholarly analysis of regional integration in international politics. Ernst B. Haas once remarked that the study of regions is required "in order to gain insights into the process of community formation at the international level."¹

However, the concept of 'region' seems to be theoretically fuzzy. It is rather difficult to mark the precise attributes of an area for it to be called a region. The concept of integration too is problematic with no fixed definition. Therefore it is vital to have a theoretical understanding of the concept of 'region' and 'integration'. This chapter will be in two sections. Section I deals with the concept of region and Section II will address the issue of regional integration.

Section I

What is a Region?

Though there is no standard academic definition of 'region', the term is most often used geographically because geography seems to be a more permanent factor than others. After all, India and Pakistan are part of South Asia and neighbours situated in close proximity. Neither state can take itself to

¹ Ernst B. Haas, "The Challenge of Regionalism", *International Organization*, Vol.12, No.4, Autumn 1958, pp.440-58.

some other place.

Werner Feld and Gavin Boyd write:

States in the group are in several respects interdependent, mainly because of their geographic relatedness; that this relatedness is a source of cultural and other affinities between those states; that consciousness of area identity can motivate some or all of those states to deal collectively with outside powers; that policies towards any in the group should take account of the likely reactions of its neighbors.²

Geography, by itself is only a partial guide for delineating a region. Bangladesh is a part of South Asia, Myanmar (Burma) may be, but Thailand definitely is not. If we look at the globe geographically, than the whole world can be called a single region; every state, leaving island states, is located in some other state's close proximity. Turkey and the former USSR are in Europe and out of it. Indonesia, while being primarily a South East Asian state, borders on Papua New Guinea and hence on the South East Pacific. Egypt has both African and Middle Eastern concerns.³

This explains that geographical proximity in itself cannot be a significant criterion to delineate a region. William R.

² Werner J. Feld and Gavin Boyd, "The Comparative Study of International Regions" in Werner J. Feld and Gavin Boyd (ed.), *Comparative Regional Systems: West and East Europe, North America, The Middle East and Developing Countries* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), p.3.

³ Robert O'Neill, "Regional Security and World Order in the 1980s", in Mohammed Ayoub (ed.), *Regional Security in the Third World: Case Studies from Southeast Asia and the Middle East* (Beckenhem: Croom Helm, 1986), p.41.

Thompson in this context opines, "Regional subsystems need not be geographical regions per se. Rather, the subsystems consist of the interactions of national elites, not the physical entities of political units, of which the interactions are observed to have more or less regional boundaries."⁴

However this is not to say that geography does not play any role in defining what a region comprises. For most states in the international system, apart from major powers, low power capabilities definitely constrain their commitment to external pursuits. Kenneth Boulding believed that a state's influence declines with increasing distance from home.⁵ This explains why, although in an international system all states might be related in one way or another, yet proximate states are more related.

Oran R. Young opines that "a conception of region that abandons the notion of physical contiguity as a necessary characteristic opens up the possibility that entities related to each other with respect to one or more attributes will meet the requirements for consideration as a region ... (therefore) the term 'region' is apt to become so inclusive that it is useless".⁶

⁴ William R. Thompson, "The Regional Subsystems: A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.17, No. 1, March 1973, pp.89-117.

⁵ Kenneth E. Boulding, *Conflict and Defense* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962).

⁶ Oran R. Young, "Professor Russett: Industrious Tailor to a Naked Emperor", *World Politics*, Vol. 21, No. 3, April 1969, pp.487-88.

What I am emphasising is not the abandoning of the geographical factor but just that it works in conjunction with other attributes.

Regions as Subsystems

The study of regions in the late 1950s tend to move away from prescriptive, descriptive and institutional concerns of earlier writings towards formal analysis and methodology to find some framework or theory. The concept of 'system' or of 'subordinate international system' has come to be used frequently in the study of regionalism to probe individual areas as well as to undertake the comparative study of regions. Some regional subsystem analysts view the world political arena as a network of system levels, i.e. global, regional, national and local. But this does not solve the complexity associated with the definition of a region.

To delineate a regional subsystem a number of criteria are used. Bruce Russett conducted an exercise in 'inductive taxonomy'.⁷ He attempted to delineate regions based on five criteria:

- i) Socio-cultural homogeneity.
- ii) Similar political attitudes and behaviour, as reflected in voting pattern in the UN.
- iii) Common membership in international organisations.

⁷Bruce M. Russett, *International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), p.182.

- iv) Economic interdependence, measure by trade as a proportion to national income.
- v) Geographical contiguity.

Russett found each set of regions fairly stable over time, i.e. the regions in the early 1960s based on world trade patterns or UN votes or membership in international organizations were roughly the same ones that existed in the early 1950s. He argues that in spite of the change in governments, change in leadership, position on issues once adopted in the UN hardly changed. This emphasises that international system affects nation's behaviour more than domestic factors.

However common membership in international organizations alone cannot be a basis for delimiting a region. When we talk of regional organizations or alliances it becomes all the more complex because a state may belong to different regional organizations or military alliances. There might be cases where all the states in a region are not included in an international organization but states from distant continents could be a part of an organization or alliance.

Secondly, economic criteria by themselves cannot suffice either. If we take intra-regional trade patterns as a single attribute to judge a region, then by this definition Israel cannot be a part of the Middle East. Similarly, most of the Third World underdeveloped countries have intense trade relations with either former coloniser-country or other

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developed countries rather than the countries within their own geographical area which seem to share similar underdeveloped structures.

Another way to demarcate a region is to define a set of criteria which a subsystem must meet and then apply them to empirical cases. Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel used this method. They describe subordinate system as consisting of "two or more geographically proximate and interacting states which share in some degree common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social and historical bonds and whose sense of identity is sometimes increased by the actions and attitudes of states external to the system."⁸

On similar lines are the features of Michael Brecher's⁹ subordinate system: limited geographic scope; at least three members; recognition by others as a region; considered distinct by the members; inferior to the dominant system; more affected by the changes in the dominant system than vice versa.

Brecher described subordinate system in terms of its members and their location (core, periphery or outer ring) which is the same way Cantori and Spiegel differentiated between a 'core sector' (consisting of a group of states with shared,

⁸ Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, "International Regions: A Comparative Approach to the Subordinate Systems" *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 13, No. 4, December 1969, p.361-80.

⁹ Michael Brecher, "The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia" in James N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 153-66.

political, social, economic or organizational background producing a central focus of international politics in that region), 'peripheral sector' (alienated from core by economic, organizational, social or political factor) and 'intrusive' (dealing with politically significant participation of external powers).

But one point that arises is the striking conclusion that Cantori and Spiegel have reached. As far as 'social cohesion' (based on ethnic, language, history and culture) goes, Cantori and Spiegel conclude that it does not have much impact on regional stability. It is the core of the Middle East which comes first in respect of high level of social cohesion, and South East Asia last -- though the Middle East is the most conflictual zone and South East Asia shows great tendency of cooperation.

Similarly while 'economic cohesion' seems to be more in Western Europe, followed by Latin America, the Middle East and South East Asia, it is again the least cohesive region which shows great tendencies of being a successfully integrated region. These two conclusions stress that high level of social and economic cohesion at least in the core area cannot guarantee regional stability or movement towards integration.

William Thompson in 1973 attempted to specify elements and characteristics of regional subsystems in a 'propositional

inventory'.¹⁰ He listed 21 different attributes which were stressed by different analysts for identifying regional subsystems (Table 1.1). Table 1.2 matches the various attributes cited by the respective analysts in their definition. Table 1.3 gives the result of Thompson's dyadic index of interanalyst agreement.

It was derived by counting the shared number of attributes cited by each pair of analysts and dividing by the total number of items given by both members of the pair. As explained by Thompson, if writer X uses attributes 1, 2, 4 and 6 and writer Y uses attributes 1, 4, 7 and 8, they share attributes 1 and 4. If the total number of attributes given are six (1, 2, 4, 6, 7 and 8): The X-Y index of interagreement would then be $2/6$ or 0.333.

Though the average mean for 'interanalyst' agreement was a dismal 0.21, yet at least two attributes were included by 86% of analysts:

- (a) geographical proximity
- (b) actors pattern of relations or interactions exhibit a degree of regularity and intensity.

After going through all this exercise, Thompson's conclusion sounds very pessimistic. He viewed the concept of regional subsystem as very immature and incapable of explaining

¹⁰ William R. Thompson, "The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory" *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 1, March 1973, pp. 89-117.

Table 1.1

REGIONAL SUBSYSTEM ATTRIBUTE LIST

-
- (1) Proximity or primary stress on a geographic region.
 - (2) Actors' pattern of relations of interactions exhibit a particular degree of regularity and intensity.
 - (3) Intrarelatedness -- a condition wherein a change at one point in the system, affects other points.
 - (4) Internal recognition as distinctive area.
 - (5) External recognition as distinctive area.
 - (6) One or more actors.
 - (7) At least two actors.
 - (8) At least three actors.
 - (9) Small powers only.
 - (10) Unity of power are relatively inferior to units in the dominant system.
 - (11) Subordination in the sense that a change in the dominant system will have a greater effect on the subsystem than the reverse and there is more intensive and influential penetration of the subsystem by the dominant system than the reverse.
 - (12) Geographical-historical zone.
 - (13) Some degree of shared ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social, historical bonds.
 - (14) A relatively integrated and unified area.
 - (15) Some evidence of integration or a professed policy of achieving further economic, political, and social integration.
 - (16) Functionally diffuse.
 - (17) Explicit institutional relations or subsystem organization.
 - (18) Autonomy-intrasystem actions and responses predominate over external influences.
 - (19) A distinctive configuration of military forces.
 - (20) A regional equilibrium of local forces.
 - (21) Common developmental status.
-

Source: William R. Thompson, "The Regional subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No.1, March 1973, p. 93.

Table 1.2
ANALYST-ATTRIBUTE MATCH

	Attribute Numbers																				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
Binder (1958)										NOT EXPLICIT											
Hodgkin (1961)										NOT EXPLICIT											
Modelski (1961)	x	x						x	x		x					x					
Aron (1962)	x	x		x	x							x						x			x
Brecher (1963)	x			x	x			x		x	x									x	
Hoffmann (1966)				x	x							x									
Schwartzman (1966)					x								x				x				x
Reinton (1967)	x	x													x		x				
Zartman (1967)	x		x								x						x	x			
Kaiser (1968)	x	x		x																	
Young (1968)										NOT EXPLICIT											
Bowman (1968)	x			x	x			x		x	x	x		x							
Hellmann (1969)	x	x		x														x			
Sigler (1969)	x													x		x					
Cantori and Spiegel (1969)	x	x			x	x								x							
Haas (1970)	x	x					x														
Thompson (1970)	x	x		x				x	x		x										
Yalem (1970)										NOT EXPLICIT											
Miller (1970)	x	x			x	x								x							
Shepherd (1970)		x						x								x					
Dominguez (1971)		x	x																		

Source: William R. Thompson, "The Regional Subsystems: A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No.1, March 1973, p. 94.

Table 1.3
INTERANALYST AGREEMENT

	Modelski	Aron	Brecher	Hoffmann	Schwartzman	Reinton	Zartman	Kaiser	Bowman	Hellmann	Sigler	Cantori & Spiegel	Haas	Thompson	Miller	Shepherd	Dominguez	Mean Agreement	
Modelski		.18	.33	.00	.00	.25	.22	.29	.30	.25	.13	.22	.29	.71	.22	.29	.14	.22	
Aron			.30	.38	.10	.22	.20	.43	.27	.38	.11	.33	.25	.30	.33	.11	.13	.24	
Brecher				.25	.11	.11	.22	.29	.86	.25	.13	.22	.13	.50	.22	.11	.00	.24	
Hoffmann					.14	.00	.00	.17	.22	.14	.00	.13	.00	.11	.13	.00	.00	.10	
Schwartzman						.14	.13	.00	.10	.00	.17	.29	.00	.00	.29	.00	.00	.09	
Reinton							.29	.40	.10	.60	.40	.29	.40	.25	.29	.40	.20	.26	
Zartman								.14	.20	.29	.14	.11	.14	.22	.11	.00	.17	.15	
Kaiser									.13	.75	.20	.33	.50	.50	.33	.20	.25	.29	
Bowman										.22	.11	.20	.11	.44	.20	.22	.00	.22	
Hellmann											.17	.29	.40	.43	.29	.17	.20	.28	
Sigler												.33	.20	.13	.33	.20	.00	.18	
Cantori & Spiegel													.33	.22	1.00	.14	.17	.23	
Haas														.29	.33	.20	.25	.22	
Thompson															.22	.29	.14	.28	
Miller																.14	.17	.27	
Shepherd																	.25	.14	
Dominguez																			.12
Average Mean																		.21	

Source: William R. Thompson, "The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 1, March 1973, p. 94.

and relating to existing empirical generalizations.

As said earlier, the system analysis in International Relations is responsible for much of the theoretical sophistication in the study of regions. Yet the system construct has in some ways posed complications for regional analysis. Most of the studies seem to treat regions as 'separable' level-of-analysis which can be interposed between the nation state and the international system.

Raimo Vayrynen's work on the issue is really commendable. He observes:

The discussion on system vs subsystem dominance of the international system neglects, however one crucial issue. It does not address the question in which way the global system and the regional subsystem are in reality linked to each other. A simple answer would be that the dominant structure of the global system constrains the choices available to regional subsystem and especially to their smaller members.¹¹

According to him it is vital to analyse the international power structure through an intermediate layer between core and periphery -- the 'semi-periphery'. These countries, if moving upward in hierarchy, will experience industrialization; if going down, will experience deindustrialization.

According to Raimo Vayrynen,¹² regions are historically

¹¹ Raimo Vayrynen, "Regional Conflict Formations: An Intractable Problem of International Relations", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.21, No.4, 1984, pp.337-59.

¹² Raimo Vayrynen, "Regional Systems & International Relations" in Helena Lindhoch, *Approaches to the Study of International Political Economy*, Padrigu Papers (Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg, 1992), pp.119-137.

constituted and are located both in time and space. Thus a region is a dynamic socio-political space. The dynamism implies the changing character of the region and the people in terms of their socio-political practices and cultural consciousness.

Capitalist world economy has penetrated through different historical processes into peripheral territories and regions of the world. Penetration naturally is an uneven process imposing both a measure of homogeneity on the regional subsystems by harmonizing economic processes, and heterogeneity because they are located in different structural positions in the world economy. So, the nature and extent of penetration gives insight into the degree of autonomy of the subordinate system and its units.

Feld and Boyd¹³ list the configuration of the region which is built up by mapping the basic attributes of the states in the area and their major pattern of relations. The most important feature of a regional configuration is its relative degree of balance and complementarity and the extent to which the states are oriented towards integrative behaviour. A relatively balanced distribution of economic capacities leads to equality in relationships. Moreover complementarity in economic capabilities tends to develop between industrialized democracies

¹³ Werner J. Feld and Gavin Boyd, "The Comparative Study of International Regions", in Werner J. Feld & Gavin Boyd (eds.), *Comparative Regional Systems: West and East Europe, North America, The Middle East and Developing Countries* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), pp.3-17.

owing to market-oriented specializations depending on liberal or neomercantilist policies of government. The level of economic complementarity between developing countries tends to be low.

Werner and Boyd demarcate the following order of regions based on balance and complementarity in the economic sphere. Western Europe comes first, followed by Africa in terms of balance only. East Asia follows Western Europe in terms of complementarity but there are much greater economic disparities among the members. Marked contrasts in economic power levels and in degree of complementarity are evident in North America, Latin America and South Asia. In the Middle East there is less disparity in economic power but little complementarity exists.

Furthermore, as far as a sense of regional identity is concerned, Western Europe again tops the list with strong feelings of regional identity, based on geography and cultural affinities. Latin American societies in the Third World show strong consciousness of regional identity. In Africa, this sense is somewhat weaker. In the Middle East it is very high. In East Asia feelings of regional identity are quite weak.

If we look at this closely, it will be very clear that even a sense of regional identity is not a sufficient factor for regional stability, for in spite of having a high feeling of regional identity the Middle East is a conflict zone whereas East Asia in spite of an area of low regional identity sense is relatively stable.

Approaches to the Study of Regional Subsystem

Raimo Vayrynen¹⁴ discusses two approaches while defining a regional subsystem in international relations -- inductive and deductive. The former aims at dividing the territorial units of the world into regions on the basis of physical distinctiveness, interdependence, homogeneity and loyalties. This kind of an approach may be useful for comparative purposes, but in addition to being state centric, it is inherently static in character. However, in the deductive method the concept of region is deduced from certain theoretical premises. Here also there is a problem that the concept gets its meaning from relying on the theoretical premises only and no direct test of historical or present reality is undertaken.

In weighing the relative advantages of the two approaches, the inductive approach seems to be better suited to the delineation of cooperative regions based on economic interactions or common membership in international organizations. The deductive approach, on the other hand, is more appropriate for the study of regional security complexes. This approach focuses more on systematic functions and nature of the region rather than boundaries and internal characteristics.

'Regional Security complex' is another interesting concept

¹⁴ Raimo Vayrynen, "Regional Systems and International Relations", in Helena Lindhoch, *Approaches to the Study of International Political Economy*, Padrigu Papers (Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg, 1992), pp.119-37.

in the study of regional integration. Barry Buzan¹⁵ defines the security complex as a "group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another." This definition does not give a clear idea as how to determine the geographical scope of the complex. On the contrary, the international system as a whole contains a large number of security complexes, some of which overlap and some of which fit inside each other. Buzan recognizes this complicated pattern. As a concept, the security complex suggests that states in the region interact both negatively, because of rivalries, and positively, because of shared interests. This interdependence shows that a distinct subsystem of security relation exists among a set of states owing to the geographical proximity they share. (This concept will be analysed in detail in the next chapter).

Concept of Shatterbelts

Most of the wars fought in the present century among the major powers have originated in shatterbelts (see Table 1.4). This statement suffices to show the importance of the concept of shatterbelts in international relations.

Kelly defined shatterbelts as:

¹⁵ Barry Buzan, "A Framework for Regional Security Analysis", in Barry Buzan et al., *South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986), pp.3-33.

Table 1.4

TWENTIETH-CENTURY MAJOR POWER WARS

Major power war	Shatterbelt	Non-shatterbelt
Russo-Japanese (1904-1905)	X (East Asia)	
Italo-Turkish (1911-1912)	X (Middle East)	
World War I (1914-1918)	X (Middle Europe)	
Manchuria (1931-1933)	X (East Asia)	
Italo-Ethiopian (1935-1936)	X (Middle East)	
Sino-Japanese (1937-1941)	X (East Asia)	
Russo-Japanese (1939)	X (East Asia)	
Russo-Finnish (1939-1940)	X (Middle Europe)	
World War II (1939-1945)	X (Middle Europe; East Asia)	
Korean War (1950-1953)	X (East Asia)	
Sinai (1956)	X (Middle East)	
Sino-India (1962)		X
Vietnam (1964-1974)	X (South East Asia)	
Angola (1977 -)	X (Sub-Saharan Africa)	
*Ethiopia (1977 -)	X (Sub-Saharan Africa)	
*Mozambique (1977 -)	X (Sub-Saharan Africa)	
*El Salvador-Nicaragua (1979 -)	(X)	X
*Russo-Afghanistan (1979-)	(X)	
Falkland Islands (1983)		X
		X

Source: Philip L. Kelly, "Escalation of Regional Conflict: Testing the Shatterbelt Concept", *Political Geography Quarterly*, Vol. 5, No. 2, April 1986, p.172.

* When Philip L. Kelly wrote the article, these wars were ongoing--now these have come to an end.

... a geographic region over whose control Great Powers seriously compete. Great Powers compete because they perceive strong interests for doing so and because opportunities are present for establishing alliance footholds with states of the region. Consequently, a high potential exists for escalation of conflict to major power warfare. A shatterbelt originates when rival Great Power footholds are present in an area.¹⁶

Six contemporary world regions were identified by Kelly as shatterbelts: the Middle East, East Asia, South East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle America and South Asia. However Saul B. Cohen¹⁷ seems to differ with Kelly for he recognises only one shatterbelt region -- the Middle East, that too he argues is in the period of transition.

Thus, scholars and policymakers have used different criteria for defining the boundaries of a region. Though there is no denial that conceptually 'region' has within itself a sense of boundary, yet we cannot say that patterns of interaction stop somewhere. What can be said is that interaction is more intense among certain nations which happen to form a region.

Moreover patterns of interaction are not static. They

¹⁶ Philip L. Kelly, "Escalation of Regional Conflict: Testing the Shatterbelt Concept", *Political Geography Quarterly*, Vol. 5, No. 2, April 1986, pp.161-80.

¹⁷ Saul B. Cohen, "Geopolitics in the New World Era: A New Perspective on an Old Discipline", in George J. Demko and William B. Wood (eds.), *Reordering the World: Geopolitical Perspectives on the 21st Century* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), pp.15-48.

change according to political change as conditions and interests are redefined. It depends on the perception of the elite and the people.

Chilean Judge of the International Court of Justice, Alejandro Alvarez opines "There is no rule to determine regions. Their existence must be shown by circumstances and in particular, by the agreements made by the states who constitute them."¹⁸

Thus regions are basically zones of interaction. States interact with each other be it cooperative, conflictual or competitive. It all depends on regularity of interaction.

In this study I propose to identify regions with an emphasis on geographical contiguity; common ethnic, cultural, and social customs; political and economic stage of development; common historical experience; similarity of threat perceptions; and, common membership of international organizations.

Section II

Though the concept of regional integration has been widely discussed in the social sciences, there is still little agreement about the meaning of the concept. Adding to the complication are a plethora of necessary conditions or background variables important to it, different approaches,

¹⁸ Quoted in Norman Hill, *International Organization* (New York: Harper & Row, 1952), p.87.

various levels or stages of integration.

What is Integration?

The dictionary definition of integration 'forming parts into a whole' leaves open a wide range of ambiguity. In the literature on regional integration, the word is used with meanings including political unification, economic unification, economic and political cooperation, and free trade. For Federalists¹⁹, political integration meant the creation of federal institutions; for Neo-Functionalists²⁰, it meant supranational dealings on increasingly important and controversial tasks which nations are unable to cope with today; for Transactionalists²¹, it refers to the probability that conflicts will be resolved without violence; for Consociationalists²², integration is concerned with the intermediation of the interests of segments of society which have a high degree of autonomy.

Furthermore, some scholars define integration as a

¹⁹ For an understanding of the federalist approach see P. Hay, *Federalism and Supranational Organization* (University of Illinois Press, 1966).

²⁰ For example, see Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-57* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958).

²¹ For a detailed study see Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organizations in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

²² Paul Taylor, *International Organization in the Modern World: The Regional and the Global Process* (London: Pinter, 1993).

condition (that either exists or does not exist) and others as a process. If we treat it as a condition, integration could be a 'security community' of Karl Deutsch, a pioneer in the work on regional integration. Deutsch writes that a security community is a group of people which have become integrated, i.e. they have attained "within a territory ... a 'sense of community' and institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a 'long' time, dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among its population."²³

On the same lines are the views of Philip Jacob and Henry Teune, "Political Integration generally implies a relationship of community among people within the same political entity. That is, they are held together by mutual ties of one kind or another which give the group a feeling of identity and self-awareness."²⁴

In fact, there is no consensus among scholars about whether a particular view of integration implies a process or a condition. If a few scholars like Leon Lindberg and Stephanie G. Newman argue that Deutsch views integration as a condition, others like Ernst Haas feel that Deutsch takes it to be a process. In my opinion, Deutsch and Jacob and Teune view

²³ Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p.5.

²⁴ Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune, "The Integration Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of Political Community", in Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (eds.), *The Integration of Political Communities* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964), p.4.

integration as a condition.

The conceptualization of integration as a condition has been criticised on the ground that it allows only a general discussion of environmental factors influencing integration and fails to make a distinction between the condition prior to integration and that prevailing during the process. For this reason Ernst Haas insists on looking at integration as a process. He argues that "Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states."²⁵

Claude Ake also implies that integration is a process in his definition of an integrated political system: "to the extent that the minimal units develop in the course of political interaction a pool of commonly accepted norms regarding political behaviour and commitment to the political behaviour patterns legitimised by these norms."²⁶

However even these conceptualizations of integration have to undergo criticism. Viewing integration as a process does not

²⁵ Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Economic and Social Forces, 1950-1957* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 16.

²⁶ Claude Ake, *A Theory of Political Integration* (Dorsey Press, 1967), p.3.

clearly specify what would be the end product, or how one would recognise it. Moreover it does not clearly show which commonly accepted norms, or how much cohesion, indicate an integrated political or social unit.

Haas later abandoned his strict process-oriented definition based upon the activities of subnational actors, now insisting that regional integration theory is "concerned with explaining how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they mingle, merge and mix with their neighbours so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict between themselves."²⁷

Thus the problem of defining integration is a complicated one. It rests upon how it is perceived, either as a condition (it could be a 'terminal' condition with a clearly specified end-product, or an intermediate condition leading to some other 'terminal condition') or as a process (a 'mechanism for moving towards integration').

As Fred Hayward observes, "The term 'integration' may be defined in an endless number of ways without violating the standards of scientific investigation,"²⁸ yet lack of agreement

²⁷ Ernst B. Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration", in Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold (eds.), *Regional Integration: Theory and Research* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p.6.

²⁸ Fred M. Hayward, "Continuities and Discontinuities between Studies of National and International Political Integration", in Leon Lindberg and Stuart A. Schiengold (eds.), *Regional Integration: Theory and Research* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p.316.

on a common definition make the concept very confusing.

Approaches to Regional Integration

The study of regional integration in international relations is full of prolonged debates among scholars regarding the accuracy of various theories and schools of analysis that emerged -- federalism, functionalism, neo-functionalism, transactionalism and, relatively recently, consociationalism. All of these had influenced regional integration theory at one time or the other. Federalism and neo-functionalism are not exclusively regionalist -- oriented. In fact, mainstream functionalism does not favour the regionalist approach to world order. Nevertheless, it definitely has had an impact on the study of regional integration.

Federalism

The federalist view envisages a supranational goal on the lines of federated state unit, a supranational state dealing with the institution of warfare characterizing the anarchical system of states and also taking care of human welfare on a global scale. Institution building is one of the main tasks in the federalist approach. It stresses the importance of constitution, calling for a division of power between supranational and national institutions in favour of the former.

However, federalism in its pure form was soon discredited as integration movements specially in Europe did not resemble federalist notions. Moreover in actual practice the states find

it hard to give up their sovereign rights so easily as federalism envisages.

Functionalism

Functionalists argued that with the globalization of technology, in the highly interdependent world society, certain social and economic problems overwhelm the capacity of the individual state to deal with them and meet citizens needs. So, functionalism attempts to identify common international social and economic problems and creates regional or global organizations to deal with them. David Mitrany, the foremost exponent of functionalist approach says functionalism is a method "which would ... overlay political divisions with a spreading web of international activities and agencies, in which and through which the interests and life of all the nations would gradually be integrated."²⁹

A distinction is being made between issues concerning 'high politics' and 'low politics'. The former deal with sovereignty, defence and foreign policy, and latter with socio-economic functions. As the 'low politics' issues have low salience in the minds of the public in terms of association with sovereignty, it will be easier to redirect these functions to international organizations. Once successful this will have a 'spill-over' impact on other areas as well.

²⁹ David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1966).

However, functionalism too lost ground to other theoretical approaches in explaining integration. When officials directly experience effective and beneficial cooperation in international institutions, they do adopt favourable attitude towards it, but do not become gradually more attached to it than to their own national communities as the functionalists had assumed. Moreover the distinction between high and low politics is quite invalid.

Still we should not undermine the contribution of the functionalist in seeing the origins of international cooperation in the realms of governmental transnational actors.

Neo-functionalism

This approach is closely associated with the work of Ernst Haas and Joseph Nye. Haas attempted to correct the functionalists avoidance of politics. Haas began with the contention that the creation of limited supranational institutions to handle complex technical problems would gradually bring political elites and interest groups of the countries involved to support further integration because they saw benefits in it for themselves.

Neo-functionalists were often called 'federalists in disguise' owing to their acceptance of the pluralist mode of society. Both sets of scholars were sceptical of distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesseleschaft*, the former translated as 'community' and the latter as 'society'. Society is based on competitiveness and transactions based on contract. On the other hand 'community' is described as a sense of belonging together,

common loyalty, values of kinship.

In 1964 Haas and Philippe Schmitter³⁰ developed a conceptual framework that they suggested would highlight the process of regional integration in the European as well as the less developed areas of the world. Integration can be conceived as involving the gradual politicization of the actor's purposes which were initially considered technical or non-controversial. The Haas-Schmitter model specifically addresses the question of automaticity of the link between economic and political integration. They believe that "under modern conditions the relationship between economic and political union had best be treated as a continuum". Having developed the dynamic of politicization, Haas and Schmitter construct three sets of observable variables: *background conditions* (dealing with the size of units, rate of transactions among them, degree of pluralism and complementarity); *conditions at the time of economic union* (degree of shared government purposes and powers delegated to the union); and finally, the *process conditions* (decision making style, post integration rate of members' transactions and adaptability of government in case of crisis and conflicts).

The major criticism of this model was on the question of 'spill over'. It is been argued that the pace of European

³⁰ Ernst B. Haas and Philippe Schmitter, "Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Utility in Latin America", in *International Political Communities* (anthology) (New York: Doubleday, 1966), pp.259-99.

integration had diminished. (Though today with the Maastricht Treaty one can no longer say that about Europe). Others argued that the model is not suitable for comparative study as the problem of underdeveloped nations is of 'premature over politicization'.

At another place Schmitter,³¹ on the basis of aggregate data tried to construct operational indicators of the 'relative size or power of units' participating in integrational efforts. He proved his hypothesis that the greater the rank incongruence between a set of potential size power variables, i.e. the more heterogeneous the members, the greater the chance of voluntaristic progress towards integration. However, arrangement with a single member securing highest in all measures is likely to face severe distributional problems.

To test rank incongruence, he used a statistical instrument called Kendell's Coefficient of Concordance (W) shown in the data from maximum possible (perfect) agreements. If the rank orderings on all variables were identical, the integrative arrangement would score a 'perfect' +1. If there is complete divergence W would be 0.

To demonstrate the technique Schmitter chose eight variables and arrived at the conclusion that Central American integration movement benefits more from much greater rank congruence than the Latin American integration movement (Table

³¹ Philippe Schmitter, "Further Notes on Operationalizing Some Variables Related to Regional Integration", *International Organization*, Vol.23, No.2, 1969, pp.327-36.

1.5).

Joseph Nye's³² contribution to integration studies is significant. He argues that both external actors and events should be included as a 'process mechanism' within the evolution of integrative schemes. The way regional decision makers perceive the nature of the external situation and their response to it is an important conditioning factor in further integration.

Nye further draws attention to the one reason frequently given to explain the failure of intergration, namely 'nationalism'. In the sense of widespread consciousness belonging to community associated with a particular state, nationalism is stronger in Europe, yet this has not prevented a considerable degree of European integration.

The first major theoretical revision of neofunctionalism came from Lindberg and Scheingold³³ who argued that the process of integration may result in 'encapsulation', meaning self maintaining international subsystem, or 'spill back' might occur whereby in response to tensions actors consequently withdraw from their original objective, downgrading their commitment to mutual cooperation.

³² Joseph Nye, *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971) and "Central American Regional Integration", *International Conciliation*, No.562, March 1967, pp.1-66.

³³ Leon Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, *Europe's Would-be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Princeton Hall, 1970).

Table 1.5
RANK INCONGRUENCE BETWEEN INDICATORS OF
SIZE-POWER IN CACM AND LAFTA, 1960

Rank Orderings	Total GNP \$	Per Capita GNP \$	Total Area km ²	Rate of Economic Growth	Industry as Percentage of GNP	Rate of Inflation (Inverted)	Per Capita Governmental Budget	Total Military Forces
CACM								
Costa Rica	3	1	4	2	2	5	1	5
Nicaragua	5	2	1	5	4	1	5	3
Honduras	4	5	2	3	5	2	4	4
El Salvador	2	3	5	4	1	4	2	2
Guatemala	1	4	3	1	3	3	3	1 W = .09
LAFTA								
Argentina	3	1	2	9	1	10	4	2
Brazil	1	6	1	3	3	8	5	1
Chile	6	4	8	6	5	9	2	5
Uruguay	10	3	11	10	4	7	3	11
Paraguay	11	10	9	8	8	6	10	10
Bolivia	9	11	6	11	11	11	11	9
Peru	5	8	4	4	7	4	6	4
Ecuador	8	9	10	5	9	1	9	8
Colombia	4	7	5	7	6	5	7	6
Venezuela	7	2	7	1	10	2	1	7
Mexico	2	5	3	2	2	3	8	3 W = .43

Source: Philippe C. Schmitter, "Further Notes on Operationalizing Some Variables Related to Regional Integration", *International Organization*, Vol.23, no.2, 1969, p.330

Haas³⁴ too later embraced the central concept of federalism 'sovereignty' which he had previously denounced as alien to neo-functional theory. He criticised the 'pretheories' of regional integration for their failure to agree on a 'dependent variable' i.e. the end-product.

Transactionalism

Also known as the communication or pluralist approach, transactionalism is closely associated with the work of Karl Deutsch. It transposes laws from cybernetic theory and applies them isomorphically to the relations between groups of people, using the volume of transactions as its major indicator. It suggests that an intensive pattern of communication between national units will result in a 'community'. In the work of Deutsch integration refers to the probability that conflicts will be resolved without violence. Integration may come about through several types of security communities, 'amalgamated' or 'pluralistic', implying respectively either the presence or the absence of any real central decision-making institutions or delegation of national autonomy.

The essential element of integration was the development of a 'sense of community'. "By 'sense of community' we mean a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social

³⁴ Ernst Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing" *International Organization*, Vol. 24, No. 4, Autumn 1970, pp.607-46.

problems must and can be resolved by processes of 'peaceful change' ".³⁵ This 'sense of community' requires some particular habits of political behaviour on the part of individuals and social groups involved. People learn these habits in the face of background conditions.

Deutsch found nine conditions essential for an amalgamated security community: mutual compatibility of main values; a distinctive way of life; expectations of stronger economic ties or gains; a marked increase in political and administrative capabilities of at least some participating units; superior economic growth on the part of at least some participating units; unbroken links of social communication; broadening of political elites; mobility of persons; a multiplicity of ranges of communication and transaction. Later he added three more to the list; a compensation of flows of communications and transactions; a not too infrequent interchange of group roles and considerable mutual predictability of behaviour. However even in the presence of these conditions, the disintegrative conditions could prevent, destroy or at least endanger an amalgamated security community. These include excessive military commitments, steep increase in regional, economic, cultural, social, ethnic or linguistic differentiation in the community or any participating unit and political awareness of such differentiation.

³⁵ Karl W. Deutsch, et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p.5.

Like all approaches this approach has also faced criticism. William Fisher³⁶ argues that Deutsch's sociocausal paradigms show weaknesses on two fronts:

- (1) He highlights Deutsch's failure to relate the key variables of social interaction and political integration and the exclusion of both internal and external variables.
- (2) He contradicts Deutsch's assertion that integration in Western Europe was declining. On the contrary, Fisher finds a seven-fold increase between 1953 and 1964.

However, in spite of these criticisms Deutsch's concepts are still considered as useful for the analysis of disintegration and fragmentation as well as integration.

It has often been said that regional integration has brought ASEAN to the brink of Karl Deutsch's 'security-community', where no state thinks of violence as part of conducting relations with other member states. In fact ASEAN seems to go against the 'spill over' logic from 'low politics' to 'high politics' of the functionalists. ASEAN's main aim during the period of Cold War was to counter-balance communist Vietnam, apart from containment of intra-regional conflicts. Today, we might say that ASEAN has recorded significant achievements in the economic field, but the fact remains that its initial motive was politico-strategic.

³⁶ William Fisher, "An analysis of the Deutsch Sociocausal Paradigm of Political Integration", *International Organization*, Vol. 23, No.2, Spring 1969.

Consociationalism

The theory of consociationalism developed in the realm of comparative studies seems to be of much relevance to the study of regional integration. Paul Taylor³⁷ argues that integration in the 1980s and early 1990s in Europe had a symbiotic character i.e. both the state and the regional system were mutually supportive. It is not necessary that an attempt at regional integration should lead to the weakening of the nation state. Consociationalism is very relevant for explaining this symbiotic process.

The theory argues that in some ways international arrangements may challenge rather than reinforce the development of a transactional socio-psychological community. In fact consociationalism seems to alter the base of integration theory by indicating an end situation of maintenance of segmented autonomy within a cooperative system.

The process of regional integration could be reconciled with the existing interests of elites. They could look at it as a means of consolidating their power. Moreover the appearance of the regional arrangement provides a forum for the leaders of minorities to get increased specific returns and separate representation. What keeps a consociational system alive is the cost of disintegration which in terms of national tensions and outside intervention could be high.

³⁷ Paul Taylor, *International Organization in the Modern World: The Regional and the Global Process* (London: Pinter, 1993).

Thus the different approaches to the study of regional integration lay stress on different aspects. However they are not completely, mutually exclusive. Both functionalism and transactionalism seem to believe that stability in society is dependent upon consensus. On the other hand neo-functionalists and federalists accept a pluralist model. Federalists and consociationalists both are concerned with the behaviour and interests of elites and a preparedness to find ways of reconciling their differences with a common system of government.

Types of Regional Integration

Most of the early theoretical work conceived of integration as a unidimensional phenomenon which could be measured on a 'single aggregate continuum'. However scholars like Nye and Lindberg argue that integration can best be studied in multidimensional terms.

In this section we will be studying three types of integration: economic integration, social integration, and political integration. These are not mutually exclusive but are interrelated in several ways.

Political Integration

According to Leon Lindberg political integration deals with a "group of nations coming to regularly make and implement binding public decisions by means of collective institutions

and/or processes rather than by formally autonomous national means."³⁸ Jacob and Teune state that "political integration generally implies a relationship of community ... a feeling of identity and self awareness". They further state that the essence of the integrative relationship is seen as "collective action to promote mutual interests."³⁹

Hence, political integration has several aspects: (1) some rudimentary institutional structure, (2) inter-dependence in policy formation, and (3) a sense of mutual identity and obligation. They correspond roughly to the first three of the following types of political integration (PI): institutional (PI₁), policy (PI₂), attitudinal (PI₃).⁴⁰ A fourth type could be Deutsch's security community (PI₄) which we have already discussed.

1. Institutional Integration

Federalists hold that strong central institutions are vital for a high degree of other types of integration. Neo-functionalists too have made "political institutions capable of

³⁸ Leon Lindberg, "Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon Requiring Multivariate Measurement", *International Organization*, Vol. 24, Winter 1970, pp.649-731.

³⁹ Philip Jacob and Henry Teune, "The Integrative Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of Political Community", in Philip Jacob and James Toscano (eds.), *The Integration of Political Communities* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964), p.4.

⁴⁰ Joseph Nye, *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict and Regional Organization* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

translating ideologies into law the cornerstone of their definition" though at a lower level than the federalists. Nye further differentiates institutional integration into two subcategories: bureaucratic and jurisdictional.

2. Policy Integration

Policy integration is concerned with the extent to which a group of countries act as a group in making foreign and domestic policy decisions.

3. Attitudinal Integration

Attitudinal integration is concerned with the extent to which a group of people have developed a common sense of identity. We find disagreements among scholars regarding the importance of such attitudinal attributes. Federalists argued that in the case of low levels of regional identity strong central institutions are vital to promote such a growth. Neo-functionalists prefer increasing policy interaction and assume that identity and loyalty will follow interests in supporting institutions associated with policy integration.

Thus Federalists, Functionalists, Neo-functionalists all have laid stress on different variables (categories). These can be presented as follows:

- (1) Federalism--High PI_1 (B+J) necessary for $PI_{2,4}$
- (2) Functionalism--High PI_2 makes PI_1 and PI_3 irrelevant for PI_4
- (3) Neo-Functionalism--High PI_2 and intermediate level of PI_1 will lead the higher PI_3 , possible higher PI_1 and PI_4 .⁴¹

⁴¹ Ibid.

Here PI stands for political integration, B for Bureaucratic and J for Jurisdictional Institutional Integration.

Social Integration

It refers to the growth of communication and transactions across borders. Peter Cocks defines social integration as "the degree of ideological support that masses and elites will give to new integration structures."⁴² Subcategories of social integration include mass social integration as measured by indicators of general transactions and elite social integration as measured by contacts among special groups or elites.

Levels of social integration can be defined in terms of the sensitivity of societies to changes taking place in other societies. Those can be deliberately fostered or discouraged but definitely cannot be controlled by individual governments specially in today's age of technological and communication advancement.

Economic Integration

Ali M. El Agra opines, "International economic integration is concerned with the discriminatory removal of all trade impediments between the participating nations and with the establishment of certain elements of cooperation and

⁴² Peter Cocks, "Towards a Marxist Theory of European Integration", *International Organisation*, Vol.34, No.1, Winter 1980, pp.1-40.

coordination between them."⁴³

Different forms or types of economic integration can be envisaged:

- 1) **Free trade areas**: In free trade areas the member nations remove all trade impediments among themselves like tariffs or quotas but retain their freedom with regard to the determination of their policies vis-a-vis the outside world or non-member countries. For example the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) and North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA).
- 2) **Customs unions**: Here in addition to elimination of barriers to internal trade, member nations must pursue common external tariffs (CETs) on imports from non-member states.
- 3) **Common markets**: Common market has all the elements of a customs union but also follows free factor mobility across member states i.e. factors of production, capital, labour should move unhindered between participating countries.
- 4) **Complete economic union**: It includes all attributes of common market, with complete unification of monetary and fiscal policies i.e. full unification of economic institutions and policies.

However actual agreements for regional economic cooperation seldom conform exactly to such ideal types. One type gets often mixed with the other.

⁴³ Ali M. El Agra, *The Theory and Measurement of International Economic Integration* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), p.1.

In 1950, Jacob Viner⁴⁴ challenged the assumption accepted by liberal economists till then that any customs union would increase the sum total of welfare. He differentiated between trade diversion (TD) and trade creation (TC). The former is the replacement of expensive domestic production by cheaper imports from a partner and the latter is the replacement of cheaper initial imports from the outside world by more expensive imports from a partner. Viner argues that TC is beneficial while TD is harmful and the relative strength of the two will determine the Customs Union formation.

Viner faces criticism from several quarters. It was argued that both TC and TD could be beneficial. In fact TD is preferable for it does not call for sacrifice of domestic industrial production.

However, these are static effects of trade which are far less useful in practical policy than dynamic effects on economic growth via influences on competition, investment, etc. As John Pinder⁴⁵ pointed out, reasons for joining an economic union, free trade area or customs union have political motivations more than economic calculations.

⁴⁴ Jacob Viner, *The Custom Union Issue* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950).

⁴⁵ John Pinder, "Positive Integration and Negative Integration: Some problems of economic union in the EEC", *The World Today*, Vol. 24, March 1968, pp. 88-110.

In fact this is the basic argument on which Balassa's⁴⁶ five categories (free trade area, customs union, common market, economic union, complete economic integration) (Table 1.6) were criticised.

Nye⁴⁷ also criticised Balassa's categories. First, they have little relevance to planned economies. This criticism does not seem to hold good today in view of disintegration of the USSR and a surge of market economics in the breakaway republics. The second criticism which still holds good is that no adequate place was given to non-trade categories of economic interdependence between nations, such as shared services which can sometimes be of considerable magnitude.

So we should focus on the other aspects associated with specific measurement of behaviour: trade interdependence (EI_1) and shared service (EI_2) (Table 1.7). The first involves proportion of intra-regional exports to the total exports of the region. The second is the total of annual expenditures by jointly administered services as a percentage of GNP.

Thus, studying the phenomenon of integration by breaking down the concept into political, social, and economic integration and further into their subcategories is an interesting and useful approach.

⁴⁶ Bela Balassa, *The Theory of Economic Integration* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969).

⁴⁷ Joseph Nye, *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

Table 1.6
CATEGORIES OF ECONOMIC INTERGATION

	No. Tariff or Quotas	Common External Tariff	Free Flow of Factors	Harmonization of Economic Policies	Unification of Policies, Political Institutions
1. Free Trade Area	X				
2. Customs Union	X	X			
3. Common Market	X	X	X		
4. Economic Union	X	X	X	X	
5. Total Economic Integration	X	X	X	X	X

Source: Bela Balassa, *The Theory of Economic Integration* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969).

Table 1.7
REGIONAL INTEGRATION DISSECTED

Type of Integration	Subcategories	Type of Evidence and Measurement Operations
Economic (EI)	Trade (EI _t)	Regional exports as per cent of total exports
	Services (EI _s)	Expenditure on joint services as per cent of GNP
Social (SI)	Mass (SI _m)	Transactions (trade, mail etc.)
	Elites (SI _e)	Intra-regional air passengers; Students in neighbour countries as per cent of total students, etc.
Political (PI)	Institutional (PI ₁) Bureaucratic (B)	Budgets and staff as per cent of budgets and administrative staffs of all member countries
	Jurisdictional (J)	Supranationality of decisions, legal scope, expansion of jurisdiction
	Policy (PI ₂)	Scope (per cent of ministries or equivalent affected) Saliency (ranking of fields by experts and by expenditure by fields) Extent (Lindberg scale of focus of decisions)
	Attitudinal (PI ₃)	Elite and mass polls probing identity, intensity, urgency Bargaining behaviour, flexibility in length of tune and number of fields
	Security Community (PI ₄)	Case Studies

Source: Joseph Nye, *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organisation* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1991), p.49.

Regional Integration in the Third World

Most of the analysis thus far has been of integrative structures suited to the developed world, Europe being the most discussed region. The model of regional integration for the developing world has to be different because of the underdeveloped structures and totally different conditions, with prevailing economic imbalances, weak/underdeveloped infrastructure, lack of internal cohesion, ethnic, racial, linguistic conflicts, and problems of state legitimacy. Though there seems to be a realization of this aspect of the problem but not much work has been done in this regard. Most of the time the models developed for the western world were applied to the developing world with little success.

In terms of classical liberal economic theory it was assumed that the states involved in any sort of cooperative endeavour would already be conducting substantial trade among themselves. However in developing countries usually the economic structure is competitive rather than complementary. Their trade relations are more with the developed nations rather than amongst themselves.

Lynn Mytelka⁴⁸ adapted three models for integration in the Third World:

⁴⁸ Lynn Mytelka, "Integration in the Third World: Some Internal Factors", in *International Dimension of Regional Integration in the Third World, Proceedings of the 5th International Conference of the ICI* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1975), pp.15-39.

Type I

The first model is a laissez-faire integration model based on the neo-classical theory with the primary purpose of expanding intra-regional trade. This model of trade liberalisation leads to asymmetrical patterns of exchange and polarization. Resulting disequilibrium creates forces of instability and disintegration.

Type II

The second model is the result of the problems faced in the operation of the first model. It includes redistributive measures of both a corrective and cooperative nature for solving issues of unequal gains and polarization collectively. So, this scheme is much more complex structurally as it requires a significantly higher level of commitment to act in areas of 'high politics' and requires measures like development planning on the regional level and regional development banks.

Type III

The third model of integration goes further down the road and tries to tackle the condition of 'dependence'. Thus, measures were adopted to overcome or reduce the dependence on developed world like a regional policy regulating foreign investment.

Axline⁴⁹ has examined some obstacles to these models. He argues that the central aspect of neo-functional theory is

⁴⁹ W. Andrew Axline, "Underdevelopment, Dependence and Integration: The Politics of Regionalism in the Third World", *International Organization*, Vol.31, No.1, Winter 1977, pp.83-105.

the 'logic of spill over' from modest beginnings of economic integration to a high level of political integration. However in the developing countries integrative efforts tried at low level will not succeed. In order to be successful they have to start at a high political level.

The Concept of Natural Economic Territories

The concept of Natural Economic Territories (NETs) is very relevant to the study of regional integration. As Amos A. Jordon and Jane Khanna write, "... sub-regions of nation-states are developing economic links with neighbors that may be more vital than links with the political centres of powers that govern them".⁵⁰

Economic growth along China's south eastern coast has appreciated significantly since Special Economic Zones (SEZs) led to increased growth in the early 1980s. A decade later capital and other inputs from Taiwan and Hongkong had created an economic boom.

Sub-regional economic cooperation in South East Asia have far more official government help than Greater China NET. In the Fourth Summit of ASEAN in Singapore in January 1992 the 'growth triangle' approach was endorsed as a parallel mechanism for regional economic cooperation:

- (1) The Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT)

⁵⁰ Amos A. Jordon and Jane Khanna, "Economic Interdependence and Challenge to the Nation State: The Emergence of NET in Asia Pacific", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.48, No.2, Winter 1995, pp.433-61.

- (2) The Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT)
- (3) Golden Quadrangle consisting of parts of Northern Thailand, Yunnan province in Mainland China, Northern Myanmar and Laos.

Conclusion

Thus, we come to the conclusion that regional integration is one of the most interesting aspects of international relations since the end of second World War. But within the framework of integration studies the failure of theorists to agree on certain common elements and their inability to predict actual events on the world scene led many scholars to criticise the existing theories.

However in spite of these criticisms we cannot negate the contribution of integration theories and their continued conceptual relevance. Integration studies prepared the way for a radical transformation of our conception of international relations in view of rising interdependence, the role of non-state actors and the importance of issue areas.

Moreover today, with the end of Cold War and rising interdependence, regional integration efforts seem to have more chances of success. Already Western Europe has made a lot of progress in this direction, and other regions like South East Asia, Latin America and North America are following suit. So, all this opens up new avenues for theoretical research. In fact, the study of regional integration is all the more relevant today because of its underlying sense of noncoercive

efforts. It has been remarked, "Theories of regional integration have a lot to teach us still about non-violent methods for collectively solving international problems.... They can find a place in the intellectual armoury of studying alternative world orders. But this armoury must be stocked with new concepts as well."⁵¹

Thus, integration is a dynamic concept. It calls for an institutional framework with a collective decision-making body meant for accomplishing some specific tasks, with an inherent objective of peace and welfare, in the process giving a distinguished identity to the member countries. Integration is a multinational effort acknowledging the interdependence of members and this effort succeeds when member countries develop a common sense of well being both at the political and the societal level, thereby paving the way for cooperation to win over conflict.

⁵¹ Ernst Haas, "Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Intergration", *International Organization*, Vol.30, No.2, Spring 1976, pp.173-212.

Chapter Two

SECURITY AND REGIONAL SECURITY

Regional security in a broad sense can be taken to mean the degree to which relationships among states of a previously defined region as well as between those states and extra regional actors are free from violence or threats of violence stemming directly or indirectly from a number of possible geostrategic, political, socio-economic and psychological sources both internal and external to that region.¹

Pursuit of security has always been a matter of highest priority for human survival. Within the framework of the state centric system, security is commonly thought of in military terms as the capacity of one state to thwart armed invasion by the other. That meaning has increasingly been called into question as the waning tensions of Cold War coincided with the rising concerns over a variety of non-military threats to security.

The distinguishing characteristic of post-Cold War politics is the absence of what international security analyst Lawrence Freedman calls the 'strategic imperative' -- the motivation among the major states to compete for military power.

However this does not mean that non-conventional threats to security did not exist earlier. They were always there, only they have emerged with greater clarity in the post-Cold War period. Nor does it mean that military threats have vanished.

¹ Sukhumbhand Paribatra and Chai-Anan Samudavanija, "International Dimensions of Regional Security in Southeast Asia", in Mohammed Ayoob, *Regional Security in the Third World* (Beckenham: Croom Helm, 1986), pp.57-91.

Several regional conflicts have continued unabated and new conflicts have emerged. Hence there is a need to evaluate security in a comprehensive framework of military, ideological, political, economic, environmental and cultural threats at the local, national, regional and international levels.

Much is said about global interdependence but regional interdependencies of the cultural, economic, political or military kinds are equally significant. The regionalists have drawn attention to local sources of regional conflict including ethnic rivalries and long-standing territorial disputes. These were complicated by intervention, direct or through proxies, by the major powers, due to the larger struggle for international power. So there is a need to study external and internal dimensions of regional security.

This chapter is in two sections. The first section focuses on the meaning of 'security'. What does, security traditionally mean in international relations, and how has this meaning changed? Non-conventional threats to security will be analysed in this section. Section II will look into the concept of regional security, focusing on its external and internal dimensions. This section will also analyse how different and how interrelated regional security is from other 'levels' of security, i.e. national security and international security.

Section I

What is Security?

The Traditional and the Modern Concepts of Security

Security has always been an 'ambiguous symbol'.² The realist/neorealist paradigm has dominated the field of security studies for very long. The primary 'metaphor' utilized within the realist school of thought to describe the security problematic of national states is the 'security dilemma'. In a condition of international anarchy, states, by seeking to enhance their own security, create insecurity for other states. Deeply embedded in western thought, realism centres around this assumption.

Walter Lippmann states, "a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war".³ Arnold Wolfers while reacting to Lippmann's definition argues that it "implies that security rises and falls with the ability of a nation to deter on attack or to defeat it."

Thus three points follow from the realist perspective.

(1) As is quite explicit 'state' is taken as the basic unit.

² Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essay on International Politics* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1962).

³ Walter Lippmann, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1943), p.51.

- (2) Security is externally oriented i.e. threats to a state security arise from outside its borders.
- (3) Finally security threats faced by states are military in nature.

The Realist conception can be traced to Thomas Hobbes' view of international anarchy -- "the war of all against all".⁴ To end this state of affairs citizens defer to a powerful sovereign in order to secure domestic peace and safeguard the life and the property of the people against any foreign threat. As the nation state system lacks law enforcement institutions, diplomacy and war are the primary means of furthering national causes and so the nation states are the main actors.

Realists do accept that there are many actors other than states trying to shape international policy. However only the states are significant for only they have the power to determine the political outcome. It can also be mentioned here that neo-realism, which has emerged as an attempt to update classical realism, gives particular weight to the role of hegemonic powers like the US or the former Soviet Union in establishing and maintaining order in the global system. In an effort to create a parsimonious theory at the system level, Kenneth Waltz gave explanatory weight to the nature of the system, the number of actors and the distribution of capacities. He attributed the absence of war to bipolarity which he maintained was less war-

⁴ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968).

prone than multi polarity.⁵

There were some scholars who did focus on international security rather than national security. But even they were more worried about reconciling security, viewed as freedom from external threats, with systemic security concerns. They argued, as Martin Wight said: "If there is an international society, there is an order of some kind to be maintained, or even developed. It is not fallacious to speak of a collective interest, and security acquires a broad meaning: it can be enjoyed or pursued in common."⁶

As opposed to the realist view, Immanuel Kant⁷ proposes a scheme of 'perpetual peace' based on the conviction that a system of nation states can be restructured by an enlightened political order to forge a community of mankind. The rational moral commitment of citizens will be the force behind the nation state's will to subsume their national interests under the rule of international law. His views provided guiding outlines for the liberal tradition.

⁵ Kenneth Waltz, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better", *Adelphi Paper*, No. 171, 1981 pp.3-8

⁶ Martin Wight, "Western Values in International Relations," in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds.) *Diplomatic Investigation* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), p.103.

⁷ Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace* (Los Angeles: US Library Association, 1932).

The League of Nations, formed in the aftermath of the First World War, was viewed as providing an alternative to the European balance of power system, by creating a system of collective security. It rested on the view that a threat to the security of one member is a threat to all and required collective action. In the Wilsonian scheme all states in the new system were supposed to cooperate in the common cause of providing security and justice for all rather than engaging in competition and coercion. Realists like E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau challenged the Wilsonian argument on the grounds that it presupposed a harmony of interests among states governed by the principles of morality, while in reality relations among states are ruled by national interest and power considerations.

The system-oriented theorists in the post-World War II period viewed various segments of the international system as linked. Their security and welfare were regarded as dependent of each other. Helga Haftendorn writes, "In the 1960s, with the Cuban missile crisis as a catalyst it was increasingly recognised that 'the security dilemma'... that an increase in one state's security decreases the security of others--was not necessarily a zero sum game but could be overcome by cooperative strategies." Further, with the "recognition that even a modified strategy of national security might not prevent a nuclear holocaust, emphasis shifted to a paradigm of international

instead of national security."⁸

However one thing common both to the realist and the systemic level theorists was the concept of security as externally-oriented. This development could be traced back to the evolution of the European state system beginning from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The process of domestic state building within the European state system led to the legitimization of the system and the individual states, with security being considered synonymous with the protection of a state from external threats.

The Cold War, by perpetuating the balance of terror, succeeded in giving the western strategic definition of security an upperhand. The concept of alliances for security purposes kept the external notion of security intact. Moreover the security of the international system as a whole revolved around that of the European industrial states and North America.

However some theorists did start questioning the relevance of the state centric paradigm and the external orientation of security analysis with the technological, communication and transportation revolutions which blurred the distinction between 'high' and 'low' politics issues and domestic and foreign policy issues. Rise of non-state actors and new issue areas questioned the validity of the conception of the state as the only actor in

⁸ Helga Haftendorn, "The Security Puzzle: Theory Building and Discipline Building in the International Security", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 1, May 1991, pp. 3-17.

the international system.

Thus, Richard Ullman opines:

A threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private non-government entities within the state.⁹

Traditionally realists have given less weight to economic factors in international relations. They have considered economic phenomena either to be autonomous or to be subsumed within more fundamental political phenomena.

In today's changed scenario, Francis Fukuyama argued that changes in the international system, decline in communism and the emergence of democracy signalled an ideological watershed. Economic calculations will replace security concerns in terms of global importance, "the death of ... ideology means the growing common marketization of International Relations and the diminution of the likelihood of the large scale conflict between states."¹⁰

Another problem with the traditional security view is that it assumed that concepts developed for Europe will readily translate into other regional contexts. The difference in culture and values affecting actions of government and

⁹ Richard Ullman, "Redefining Security", *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 1, Summer 1983, pp.129-53.

¹⁰ Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History", *The National Interest*, Summer 1989, pp. 3-18.

transnational actors in other parts of the world were neglected.

The 'security-dilemma' metaphor when applied to the Third World fails on account of the differing conditions there. The threats to security faced by these states are usually internal. Brian Job suggests an 'insecurity-dilemma'¹¹ for understanding Third World security problematic. It is what one calls the 'weak state'¹² syndrome. The Third World faces internal economic, social and political divisions resulting in the lack of cohesion, civil strife and vulnerability to external influence. Johan Galtung has introduced the concept of structural violence¹³ to denote human suffering on account of unjust social structure.¹³

So, broadly, security not only implies defending a state from its external and internal enemies, but of ensuring that the people do not suffer undue hardships and conditions are created for their all round development. Some theorists argue that social security and justice are not vital for ensuring political or physical survival in the sense that people are not prepared to fight for these. It could also be argued that including all

¹¹ Brian L. Job, "The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime and State Securities in the Third World", in Brian L. Job (ed.), *The Insecurity Dilemma* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1992), pp.11-35.

¹² Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear* (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1983).

¹³ Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.8, 1971, pp.81-117.

possible threats to the well being of the people into definition of security would drain the term of its meaning. But one needs to keep in mind that the traditional definition of security presents a distorted perception of global realities. Article 55 of the UN Charter, though seldom invoked, also recognizes the link between peace, stability and the broad approach to security:

"With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations ... the UN shall promote:

- a) higher standards of living, full employment and conditions of economic and social progress and development.
- b) solutions of international economic, social, health and related problems."

Thus recognizing the need to broaden the concept of security to include environmental, economic, transnational organized crime, internal stability and demographic movements, we will discuss security threats in the following pages. One point that needs to be kept in mind is that all these security issues are interrelated in one way or another.

Economic Threats to Security

Economic security could be seen as access to resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. The end of the cold war, disintegration of the prime enemy of the US and the rise of new economic giants like Japan giving direct competition to the US has led many

western theorists to argue that economic warfare is replacing military threats. Noted political economist Albert O. Hirschman argues: "It can indeed be shown that even if war could be eliminated, foreign trade would lead to relationships of dependence and influence between nations."¹⁴

However, for the developing countries the situation is much more precarious. In fact, for them insecurity is a product of the Bretton Woods system, perpetuating the hegemony of the developed few, subordinating all others to the peripheral position. After the Second World War, a self-conscious effort was made to create a free trade oriented liberal international economic order due to the widespread belief that economic nationalism was a major contributing factor in the outbreak and spread of the Second World War.

This economic dimension was broadened to include the newly independent non-industrialized states of the Third World. However the economic institutions did not adjust to take into account the need of the developing countries. Moreover the complex system of interdependence increased politicization of economic issues and made the state all the more vulnerable to the international economic system. The mechanisms of production, consumption and finance spread beyond state boundaries to the point that human needs, in any one country, become dependent on

¹⁴ Quoted in Joseph J. Romm, *Defining National Security: The Nonmilitary Aspects* (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1993).

activities and events in many others.

The major problem for most of the Third World countries is how to balance their payments i.e. how to achieve financial equilibrium between cost of their imports which often exceed the money earned from exports. Usually the states take recourse to borrowing from The International Monetary Fund. The IMF as a guardian of the post war monetary order in which the Third World has no influence, has come to be seen by the developing world as an instrument of western domination, impinging on their sovereignty by imposing unwelcome condition on the loan it gives. It has been often argued that domestic aims and values has been thwarted by the application of IMF remedies and political conflict in the domestic setting has been heightened, Jamaica being a classic example.¹⁵

Even the Brandt Commission Report (1985) criticised the IMF for putting the burden of adjustment primarily on the poor countries. As many poor countries export primary products for which demand is fairly inelastic, devaluation worsens trade conditions.

A related issue is the external debt crisis, which threatens the financial stability of developing nations. Usually the present debt crisis and its origin in the 1970s is blamed primarily on the 'oil price shocks' and deficient policies and

¹⁵ See, Caroline Thomas, *In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1987).

corruption in developing countries. At first, higher oil prices created the need for external borrowing by major oil importing developing countries. Later, however it was the easy availability of external credit which led to the growing debt. To quote Masood Ahmed and Lawrence Summers: "A key lesson of the debt crisis is the commercial banks are inefficient instruments for channeling long-term investment finance to the poorest countries."¹⁶ The period of repayment is shorter and rate of interest higher. As Table 2.1 suggests the cumulative debt of developing countries surpasses \$1 trillion in 1986 and interests payments in the late 1980s exceed \$70 billion a year. Net transfers of capital to developing countries turned negative during the same period.

The multinational corporations too with their immense economic power are altering both national and international class structures, creating new social, economic and political divisions. Moreover, powerful nations have often used economic means either through sanctions, threat of sanctions, and aid, to interfere in poor countries or to make them tow their line. In fact for political gains sanctions are applied in the economic field. The US used the economic medium in the aftermath of the Second World War to contain the spread of Communism. The embargo on the export of grain to the Soviet Union by the US that followed the military occupation of Afghanistan and more recently the sanctions on Libya, are other examples.

¹⁶ Cited in Girish Mishra, "The Third World Debt Problem", *World Focus*, Vol. 14, No. 1, Jan. 1993 p.5.

Table 2.1

SUMMARY DEBT DATA (1970-1993) (US \$ millions)

	1970	1980	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993*
Total debt stock	--	658,148	1,217,623	1,381,177	1,373,221	1,411,348	1,518,448	1,605,933	1,662,173	1,770,065
Total debt flows										
1. Disbursements	13,250	118,181	116,925	124,697	125,683	123,804	143,098	142,931	167,039	176,611
2. Principal repayments	6,809	46,172	82,674	95,184	97,685	93,854	99,438	95,938	104,057	104,565
3. Net flow on debt	15,970	118,734	38,112	48,042	42,173	50,467	64,095	71,275	87,495	89,674
4. Interest payments	--	53,292	73,853	73,114	83,149	78,871	76,816	79,726	74,438	78,287
5. Net transfer on debt	--	65,441	-35,740	-25,071	-40,976	-28,404	-12,722	-8,450	13,057	11,387

* Projected

Source: World Bank, "World Debt Tables: External Finance for Developing Countries 1993-94", *Analysis and Summary Tables*, Vol.1 (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1993), p.170.

In today's interdependent world, national and international economic security are closely related. Depression at the global level may lead to recession at home. The notion of financial collapse of a state has haunted the financial markets of the world countries in the wake of the Mexican Crisis. The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties dealing with issues like permanent sovereignty over natural resources and indexation of prices is ineffective without the support of western industrialized nations.

Food Security

For the majority of people inhabiting our planet the most fundamental cause of insecurity is the lack of food. The traditional western concept views the problems of famine and starvation in Malthusian terms: rising populations overtake the growth in the food supply, and with population outstripping food availability, shortages result. Without negating the importance of population control, we would however like to make it clear that "Ultimately the food problem is not concerned just with the availability of food but with the disposition of food. That involves economics, politics and even law. Starvation and malnutrition related ultimately to ownership and exchange in addition to production possibilities."¹⁷

¹⁷ Amartya Sen, "The Food Problem: Theory and Policy", in A. Gauhar (ed.), *South-South Strategy* (London: Third World Foundation 1983), p.103.

Famines occur not due to the lack of overall availability of food but due to lack of access to it. Internally class conflicts might lead to vested political interests blocking the agrarian reforms either from being adopted or implementing them. External causes include machination of state and non-state actors with the former using food as a political weapon, and the latter, in the form of agribusiness, pursuing profit. Moreover violence and hunger are interrelated. A UN study showed that in 1985 nations most seriously affected by hunger had civil war, like Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad and Angola.

Environmental Threats to Security

Broadly speaking environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend. Far from being a zero sum game, it is a critical dimension on which many states and in many important respects humanity as a whole will gain or lose together.

Global climate change has received the most attention in the last few years due to the discovery in 1985 of a hole in the ozone layer over Antarctica, which protects life from the Sun's harmful ultraviolet rays. 1988 was the warmest year till 1990, a year of heat waves, famines, and droughts. Here too the brunt will be felt more by developing countries. Robert D. Kaplan writes:

Part of the globe is inhabited by Hegel's and Fukuyama's Last Man, healthy, well fed and pampered by technology. The other, larger part is inhabited by Hobbes First Man, condemned to a life that is poor, nasty, brutish and short. Although both parts will be

threatened by environmental stress, the last man will be able to master it, the First Man will not. The Last Man will adjust to the loss of underground water tables in the Western United States...even as the Maldiv Islands of the coast of India, sink into oblivion¹⁸

The expected doubling of heat trapping greenhouse gases over preindustrial levels by the middle of the next century is projected to raise the average temperature of the earth between 1⁰C and 5⁰C over the next century. Such radical changes would lead to an ecological catastrophe of unimaginable proportions.¹⁹

Similarly acid rain destroys animal and plant ecosystems. The US and Canada are facing this threat. Though the Rio Summit and major global treaties on natural resources and environment protection (Table 2.2) did show that the world is moving towards recognising the disastrous impact of environmental degradation, but it will be too naive to believe that the world is fully conscious of it today.

Energy and Resource Security

Resource security, an inherent part of environmental degradation, refers to access to both non renewable resources like strategic minerals and fossil fuels as well as renewables like water and marine resources including fish. In terms of renewable resources, resource security is usually discussed as

¹⁸ Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy", *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 273, No. 2, Feb. 1994 pp. 44-76.

¹⁹ Joseph S. Romm, *Defining National Security: The Nonmilitary Aspects* (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1993).

Table 2.2

**MAJOR GLOBAL TREATIES ON NATURAL RESOURCES
AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION**

	Date	Resource Protected	Number of Participating States
Antarctic Treaty	1959/1980	environment and marine resources	40
Nuclear Test Ban	1963	atmospheric protection from radioactive fallout	122
Ramsar	1971	wetlands, waterfowl habitat	61
World Heritage	1972	natural heritage	108
Ocean Dumping	1972	marine protection from dumping	72
CITES	1973	endangered species	109
MARPOL	1978	marine protection from oil spills/pollution	85
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Europe (LRTAP)	1979	regional atmospheric protection from transboundary industrial pollution	32
Migratory Species	1979	wild animals	46
Law of the Sea	1982	access to common-property marine resources	137
Ozone Layer	1985	ozone layer protection	68
Montreal Protocols	1987	atmospheric protection and CFC ban	69
Basel Convention	1989	protect land and water by restricting trans-boundary movement of hazardous waste	52
Bamako Convention Africa	1991	transboundary hazardous waste movements	17
Climate Treaty	1992	reduction of atmospheric greenhouse emissions	160
Biodiversity	1992	protection of biotic resources, especially tropical rain forests	150

* Participating countries are either contractors or signatories to the agreements.

Source: World Resource Institute, *World Resources 1992-93* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

security of production and supply.

A key resource scarcity issue is the growing scarcity of fresh water. Israel started the 1967 war in part because the Arabs were planning to divert the water of the Jordon River System. Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 partly to secure access to the Litani River.²⁰ Water is also a contentious issue in South Asia for example, the issue of distribution of the Ganga water between India and Bangladesh. The devastating 'soccer war' in 1969 between El Salvador and Honduras involved environmental factors (Table 2.3).

Deforestation is taking place at an alarming rate. Some like the tropical rain forests harbour previous biological diversity of species.

Thomas Homer Dixon²¹ distinguishes between three types of conflicts:

(a) **Simple Scarcity Conflicts:** They arise when states calculate their interests in a zero-sum or negative sum situation such as those that arise from resource scarcity.

(b) **Group Identity Conflicts:** These are explained and predicted by group identity theories. Such conflicts are likely to arise from the large scale movements of population brought about by

²⁰ Norman Myers, *Ultimate Security: The Environmental Basis of Political Stability* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1994).

²¹ Thomas Homer Dixon, "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict", *International Security*, Vol.16, No.2, Fall 1991, pp.76-116.

Table 2.3**SELECTED TWENTIETH-CENTURY TRANSNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICTS OVER NATURAL RESOURCES**

	Countries/Conflicts	Resources in disputes
1932-1935	Paraguay-Bolivia (Chaco War)	oil
1967	Arab States-Israel (Six-day War)	water
1969	El Salvador-Honduras (Soccer War)	arable land
1972-1973	Iceland-United Kingdom (Cod War)	fish
1974	China-Vietnam (Spratley Islands Dispute)	oil
1982	United Kingdom-Argentina (Falkland-Malvinas War)	fish, oil
1991	Iraq-United Nations Coalition (Persian Gulf War)	oil

Source: A.H. Westing (ed.), *Global Resources and International Conflict: Environmental Factors in Strategic Policy and Action* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

the population change.

(c) **Relative Deprivation Conflicts:** As developing societies produce less wealth because of environmental problems their citizens will probably become increasingly discontented by the widening gap between their actual level of economic achievement and level they feel they deserve resulting in violent reaction.

The main objective of energy security is to assure "adequate, reliable supplies of energy at reasonable prices and in ways that do not jeopardize higher national values and objectives."²²

The 1970s oil crisis brought the issue of energy security to the forefront of world politics. The position is further aggravated by the fast depletion of fuel wood as a source of energy.

Today we are straining the Earth's carrying capacity (the largest number of any given species that a habitat can support indefinitely). Part of this could be attributed to the process of modernization. What is needed is environmentally sustainable economic growth.

Transnational Organized Crime

Transnational organized crime is growing rapidly and represents a global phenomenon that is penetrating political institutions, undermining legitimate economic growth, threatening

²² Daniel Yergin, "Energy Security in the 1990s", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 67, No.1, Fall 1988 pp.110-32.

democracy and rule of law.

(a) Transnational Drug Cartels

Illegal drug trafficking is a big problem in South and South East Asia. In other states like Columbia when the government tried to control drug trafficking, drug syndicates declared 'total war' on the government and unleashed a war of terror. While the heads of drug cartels evaded arrest, the nation's justice ministers and judges capitulated to the threat and resigned. The drug lords thus established a state within-a-state.²³

(b) Terrorism

The spectre of political violence and terrorism has come to acquire a grave significance. Terrorist organizations resort to piracy, kidnapping, looting of public and private property and killing to achieve their ends. In many cases such acts get national and foreign patronage making the state in question all the more vulnerable.

In the west, a new term is coming into vogue to describe inter- and intra-state violence -- 'low intensity conflicts'. Terrorism may or may not come under low intensity conflicts. Basically terrorists target the non-combatant population to inculcate a feeling of terror, whereas low intensity conflicts could be between two armed groups without civilian involvement. As nuclear and other sophisticated weapons had increased the

²³ See, Michael J. Dziedic, "Drug Trade and Regional Security", *Survival*, Vol.31, No.6, Nov./Dec. 1989, p.533-48.

power of a modern state beyond measure and put a lid on high intensity conflicts, it has been argued that dissident groups are more likely to resort to 'low intensity conflicts' than to launching an open civil war.

Threats to Nation-building

Security threats are primarily related with the process of nation-building in many Third World states. The boundaries of Third World states have been drawn for administrative convenience during the colonial period showing immense disregard for existing cultural and linguistic heterogeneity. There exist within each state minorities not always willing to accept or identify with the majority rule resulting in social conflict.

Adding to the problem is the lack of infrastructure and poor communications that these nations faced after independence. Nation-builders had to attempt a transfer of the loyalty of the people from traditional centres of authority to the state.

Moreover economic growth was planned with focus on urban-based industrial promotion believing that there will be 'trickle-down' effects. However this has not happened in practice thereby aggravating disparities. It is not easy for any traditional society to accept change in its cultural values and ethos which modernization brings with it, thus creating instability.

Barry Buzan characterizes these states as weak states. Weak states have,

as their principal distinguishing feature ... their high level of concern with domestically generated threats to the security of the government Weak states either do not have or failed to create, a domestic political and social concern of sufficient strength to eliminate the large-scale use of force as a major and continuing element in the domestic political life of the nation.²⁴

On top of this it is expected that the Third World states should accomplish the enormously complicated and traumatic process of nation-building without any violence in a matter of three or four decades. In the western experience of the state building the process was very violent "... building of states in Western Europe cost tremendously in deaths, suffering, loss of rights and unwilling surrender of land, goods or labour Building differentiated, autonomous, centralized organization with effective control of territories entailed eliminating or subordinating thousands of semi autonomous activities ... Most of the European population resisted each phase of the creation of the strong state."²⁵

We can say that in the same way 'weak states' will evolve into a secure nation-state with time. Ayooob says "time is therefore the crucial variable in explaining the difference in the security circumstances of today's Third World as opposed to

²⁴ Barry Buzan, *People States and Fear* (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1983).

²⁵ Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

other modern states."²⁶

But one has to take account of the changed international scenario. The colonial experience of the developing states has no equivalent in the European experience, nor can we negate the peripheral role of the Third World in the global economy or the pervasive presence and influence of the media and global communication networks.

Demographic Threats to Security

Jessica Tuchman Mathews²⁷ argues for broadening of the security concept to include 'demographic issues'. A highly cohesive population with a pride in national identity may achieve much more than a larger population with internal fragmentation. Population pressure is often felt at the economic and environmental level. Resource problems in countries like Mexico and Egypt are directly connected to population growth. Rain forests forming a larger carbon dioxide sink are being cut down because of population pressure. Population growth slows down the growth of per capita income. Economic and environmental refugees crossing over borders create a conflictual situation in the receiving state as well as in inter-state relations.

²⁶ Mohammed Ayoob, "The Security Problematic of the Third World", *World Politics*, Vol.43, No.2, 1991, pp.257-83.

²⁷ Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.68, NO.2, Spring 1989, pp.162-77.

Deforestation in Nepal may have worsened the 1988 flooding in Bangladesh that led to an exodus to India. In the Western Hemisphere, the Haitian exodus to the US in the late 1970s and 1980s was at least partly due to environmental degradation.

Thus non-conventional threats to security interrelate at various levels of analysis, national, regional and international as they go beyond the state's capacity to deal with them. Moreover as said earlier, economic, environmental, internal or demographic security issues all are interrelated. Economic security will not be for long if it is achieved in an environmentally unsustainable fashion. Similarly ecological deterioration could have serious social consequences like fall in per capita food production.

Section II

What is Regional Security?

Security has been widely examined at both the state level and at the level of international system.

However, the regional level, comprising the dynamic of security relations among the local states has been the least studied aspect. Perhaps this is due to the fact that while systemic and the unit levels are easy to define, the intermediate level poses a problem due to the contestability of the concept of 'region' in the literature on international relations.

Broadly speaking, regional security calls for peaceful relations among regional states, within regional states and with extra-regional states not only in the military sense but also in terms of economic growth, environmental sustainability and social development. According to Mohammed Ayoob the concept of regional security is "... often used in both the Third World and the West to denote an ideal type of regional order in which members of a particular regional subsystem are somehow able to attain a form of political 'nirvana' by either finding acceptable solutions to regional problems or by sweeping them so firmly under the carpet that they are not able to re-emerge to haunt them for at least the next few decades".²⁸

The following assumptions are inherent in the concept of regional security:

- (a) that the external states interested in the affairs of the region would either stop interfering in the affairs of the region or would be effectively deterred from doing so due to the existence of regional solidarity.
- (b) that the regional states would have succeeded in successfully managing the ethnic, communal or economic problems within the regional states themselves thus eliminating intra-state sources of inter-state conflict.
- (c) that inter-state tensions of the region are manageable and institutional mechanisms are available for resolving

²⁸ Mohammed Ayoob, "Regional Security and the Third World", in Mohammed Ayoob, *Regional Security in the Third World* (Beckenham: Croom Helm, 1986), pp.3-23.

differences.

These assumptions highlight the Western experience of decades old process of regional integration and centuries old process of state formation and legitimization of state-structures. This again stems from the Western definition of security, traditionally defined as immunity of a state from threats external to its boundaries. However, for Third World states, threats are usually internal.

Internal Dimension of the Security

The internal dimension of the regional security problematic pertains to intra- and inter-state conflicts. Developing countries lack what has been called 'unconditional legitimacy'. In the Weberian concept of legitimacy one component is a common belief in a given political and social order which is quite absent here.

The historical experience in the Third World both under colonial rule and after political decolonization has been very different from the modern European nation-state system. These boundaries are drawn by colonial powers with complete disregard of ethnic, religious or cultural heterogeneity resulting in ethnic conflicts. This has serious repercussions for the regional security environment. This can spill over and challenge the regional configuration of states where a group want reunification with another state. This regional problem would have international repercussions with extra-regional major power interference.

Moreover, economic growth and technological change brings with it another source of conflict and tension. Regional security can be achieved only when each state in the region feels a stake in maintaining regional security. Intra-regional or intra-state alienation is an obstacle to regional security. South Asia is experiencing this problem today. On the one hand the region is going through a period of tension on its way to modernization and growth and on the other hand an atmosphere of frustration with the whole process is also evident.²⁹ The former is positive in the sense that it challenges the traditional intra-regional concept, or strategy, of security. This is created by new networks of roads, railways and waterways connected with development. Such tension requires accommodation to a larger view of security.

On the other hand, the tension of frustration is negative. It leads to alienation both internally and externally. Khanal argues that three wars between India and Pakistan reflect external alienation. Frustration might lead to an increase in crime, a law and order problem which can take the shape of insurgency or rebellion if some strata of society feel neglected or left-out in the development process.

Internal problems become externalized with severe a consequence on regional security in a number of ways:

²⁹ See Yadunath Khanal "Presiding Chairman Yadunath Khanal's Summary", in Sridhar K. Khatri (ed.), *Regional Study in South Asia* (Kathmandu: Tribhuvan University, 1987), pp.35-39.

(a) This could lead to intervention and subversion from outside. As Mohammed Ayooob points out, "fragile polities, by definition, are easily permeable".³⁰

(b) Second, this could lead to the growth of militarization. Fragility emanating from the lack of unconditional legitimacy forces these states to more or less depend on instruments of coercion. This in turn adversely affects regional security in the following ways:

- i) Military build up requires procurement of arms from the great powers, providing them an open chance to interfere in regional affairs and further aggravating the situation.
- ii) Military build up by one state enhances the threat perceptions of other regional states creating a tension in the region.
- iii) Counter-insurgency operations can spill into contiguous territories creating or increasing conflicts. Thai-Malaysian and Thai-Burmese relations are examples.³¹

(c) Third, the promotion of external conflict can be resorted to in order to unify a divided state. "Groups seeking self preservation and no more may be driven to a foreign policy of conflict--if not open war--in order to defend themselves against

³⁰ Mohammed Ayooob, "Regional Security and the Third World", in Mohammed Ayooob, *Regional Security in the Third World* (Beckenhem: Croom Helm, 1986), p.14.

³¹ Sukhumbhand Paribatra and Chai-Anan Samudavanija, "Internal Dimensions of Regional Security in Southeast Asia", in Mohammed Ayooob (ed.), *Regional Security in the Third World* (Beckenhem: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 57-91.

the onslaught of domestic rather than foreign enemies.³²

The internal dimension of regional security also includes threat perceptions.³³ Policies are formulated not on the basis of objective reality but on the basis of interpretations of that reality. These interpretations may or may not correspond to the reality because it might be affected by preexisting psychological images, for example that of enemies.

Threat perceptions can exist along the following dimensions:

(1) **Geopolitical Dimension:** Threat perception may arise due to geographical proximity, discrepancy in size, or in geographically disadvantageous location.

(2) **Historical Dimension:** Memories of bad experiences like wars and domination by foreign powers.

(3) **Doctrinal Dimension:** Each state has its own value system inculcated in people through the socialization process. When two or more value systems collide, mutual threat perceptions increase.

(4) **Socio-Cultural Dimension:** Perceptions of threat arise from enmity with another socio-cultural group, or fear of another country supplying help to a potentially rebellious group.

³² Ernst B. Haas and Allen S. Whiting, *Dynamics of International Relations* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956), p.62.

³³ Klaus Knorr, "Threat Preceptions", in Klaus Knorr (ed.), *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems* (Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1976), p.98.

(5) **Economic Dimension:** Threat perceptions arise from fear of economic domination by a minority group in a country or fear of economic domination by another country.

National Role Conception

National role conception of a state in the external environment is closely related to threat perceptions. National role conception relates to how states define their commitments, rules and actions for themselves in various issue milieus. These national role conceptions might be stronger in a particular group of leaders or at one point in history than at others.

Sukhumbhand Paribatra and Chai-Anan Samudavanija give the Kampuchean example to show the inter-linkages between internal dimensions of security in a state and regional security. In South East Asia internal tension had an adverse impact on regional security specially when the external dimension is also present, like conflict and rivalry between great powers.

The Kampuchean problem rose and got aggravated due to the:

- (a) Failure of four successive regimes in Kampuchea to establish and maintain legitimate rule.
- (b) Mutual threat perceptions between Vietnam and Thailand based on geopolitical, historical and ideological reasons.
- (c) Mutual threat perceptions between Vietnam and China based on geopolitical and socio-cultural factors.
- (d) Vietnam's conception of its own role as the leader of entire Indochina, champion of anti-imperialist forces which stands in juxtaposition of Thailand's conception of itself

as a frontline state, a faithful ally to Laos and Kampuchea, and also PRC's conception of its role as a great power and the champion of the Communist Revolution.

- (e) Conflict and rivalry between the PRC, the Soviet Union and the US.³⁴

The External Dimension of Regional Security

The external dimension of regional security is often related to the question of dependency, hegemony and conflict of interests. The more intimately a major power is committed to support regional security of a particular region, the more dependent upon it the regional powers tend to become. In those cases where regional states are situated in close proximity to a major power, regional states might slide under the hegemony of an extra-regional major power, thereby surrendering their freedom of action in many respects.

The question of cooperation with external powers is another contentious issue having security repercussions. If a regional state unilaterally decides working with an extra-regional power, it might arouse tension amongst regional states. Moreover, sometimes actions of regional states themselves provide an extra-regional power with a chance of interfering in internal affairs of the region. The nature of internal communist threats and Soviet support for Vietnam were two of the reasons for the

³⁴ Sukhumbhand Paribatra and Chai-Anan Samudavanija, "Internal Dimensions of Regional Security in Southeast Asia", in Mohammed Ayoob (ed.), *Regional Security in the Third World* (Beckenhem: Croom Helm, 1986), pp.54-91.

natural tendency of ASEAN members to look to the West for security support.³⁵ However, external power could also act as a catalyst in forging the regional security notion among the regional states.

Regional Security Complexes

Very relevant to regional security studies is Barry Buzan's concept of the regional security complex. Buzan views the decentralization of the international security system and the indigenous patterns of regional security as increasingly important feature of the system in the twenty-first century. Buzan defines the security complex as a "group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another".³⁶ As a concept, the security complex suggests that states in the region interact both negatively, because of rivalries, and positively, because of shared interests. Buzan argues that security complex rests more on interdependence of rivalry rather than on shared interest.

One can specify the concept further by making distinction

³⁵ Robert O' Neill, "Regional Security and the World Order in the 1990", in Mohammed Ayooob, *Regional Security in the Third World* (Beckenhem: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 33-48.

³⁶ Barry Buzan, "A Framework for Regional Security Analysis", in Barry Buzan et al., *South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers* (Basingstok: Macmillan, 1986).

between lower and higher level security complexes on the basis of the national capabilities of major participants. In a lower level complex the power of states is limited to the range of immediate neighbours, while the higher level complex either appears in the global context or is dominated by great powers.

Two key components of essential structure in a security complex are:

- 1) pattern of unity and enmity; and
- 2) distribution of power among the principal states.

Shifts in either of these will lead to a redefinition of the complex. Power shifts resulting from internal factors can be the disintegration of an actor itself, like Pakistan in 1971, or the merger of two or more actors, for instance German reunification. Shifts could also be the result of differences in the rate of development among actors. External forces could affect the complex either by joining it if adjacent, or by making alignments within it. A security complex can exist and function regardless of whether or not the actors involved recognize it.

Regional Security: Comparisons with National and International Security

Regional security seems to be an essential intermediary stage between national security and international security. However, it is also a qualitatively different type of security.

International security relates to the issue of war and peace at the international system. National security pertains to

the protection of territorial integrity and the well being and development of the people therein. Regional security involves both avoidance of war at the regional level as well as maintenance of territorial integrity and well being of people.

Thus from the national security perspective the main concern is well being of the state. Military power is the principal instrument for ensuring this. However, the concept of national security today calls for a much broader view. It is about the physical, social and psychological quality of life of a society and its members.

On the international level, the end of the Cold War has changed the international security scenario. The ideological reason for interference in other parts of the world has been lost. However, for economic reasons too, both the US and Russia will desist from expensive commitments and wars in the Third World. Some argue that withdrawal of superpowers will open up traditional regional disputes in the Third World. On the other hand superpower withdrawal could also help in diffusing local conflicts and more freedom to work for peace. However it is important to remember that this is a period of change with continuity. Deep rooted structural relations of the North-South gap still exist. There still exists deep polarization of the world's population into small areas of relative wealth and much larger areas of relative poverty.

On a different level of analysis we find regional security concerned with the existence of peaceful relations among

regional states, safety from extra-regional threats as well as the internal development and growth of regional state. Regional security is determined by the external effects of domestic policies as well as domestic consequences of the regional level scenario.

However, we cannot understand the security problematic by dividing the three levels into watertight compartments.

Interrelatedness of the Three Levels of Analysis

National security, regional security and international security are all interrelated and interdependent in many respects. State conduct is conditioned by the international system. International regions affect the opportunities available to states. Thus international security is about what happens within regions and between them.

Regional stability is vital for intra-state growth and development. Lack of stability and widespread conflict at the regional level has led states to welcome external involvement which has in turn intensified internal cleavages and distorted developmental priorities.

External intervention in a regional security system is related to the strategic importance of the region. The Gulf area derives its importance with regard to international security because of the existence of interests vital to the Western world. These deal with the continuous flow of oil from the Gulf and the freedom of transport and movement throughout the area. A recent example is the Gulf War.

Moreover domestic economic growth and development is related to the establishment of a sound international economic system of trade for the developing countries to ensure greater access to world markets and resources. The effect of an unjust international economic system can be dealt with to some extent by regional stability and co-operation in matters of common exploitation of resources, providing markets to other regional partners for their products. Greater economic co-operation will help the political atmosphere also. "Past experience makes it clear that close and enduring cooperation in the political field must rest on a sound foundation of cooperation in economic matters."³⁷ Conflicts at the regional level will divert essential resources needed for national development.

Thus, regional security is prelude to national security so that precious resources need not be diverted to economically unproductive military tasks. Regional security gives a state psychological confidence. Peace in the region will attract foreign investments and technology for economic growth.

Conclusion

During the Cold War period security studies were dominated by military arms race and ideological confrontation. The politico-military emphasis was high. As the Cold War recedes, economic, environmental and societal issues are pushing their

³⁷ Robert Pollard, *Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War 1945-90* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), p. 13.

way into the top ranks of the global security agenda. But this is not only a period of change. The East-West conflict might be over but the North-South differences still exist. In fact it has often been asked today whether new fault lines have come to the forefront, in the sense of inevitability of North-South confrontation? Issues like oil supplies (we already have the example of Gulf war) and environmental destruction back this argument.

According to Helga Haftendorn, "A new paradigm of security should specifically meet the following demands:

(1) It should explain diversity and change -- differences in various regions, transition from one dominant concept to another, systems transformation; (2) it should be multifocussed, not limited to a single issue, area or level of analysis."³⁸

As different regions of the world have some salient internal dimensions quite distinct from other regions, so western notions of security cannot be universalized. In fact one of the primary benefits of regional studies is its comparative approach.

Thus regional security is a dynamic concept. Today studying of regions and regional players is vital to understand the interplay between the state and the international system.

³⁸ Helga Haftendorn, "The Security Puzzle: Theory Building and Discipline Building in the International Security", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 1, March 1991, pp.3-17.

Chapter Three

REGIONAL SECURITY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

Regional integration has been an important process in international relations since World War II. It has increasingly been seen as an effective way of achieving peace, security and development. Countries with different political, social, economic and religious backgrounds seem to be getting involved in regional integration efforts for mutual benefit, though some efforts are more successful than others. However, today with the end of the Cold War, a brighter future for regional integration efforts could be in the offing.

Modern technology and expanding economies have made countries interdependent and have forced them to take a broader view of their political and economic interests. Moreover, states today face many problems that need coordinated multinational effort. The process of regional integration is a recognition of these facts.

A regional approach in this context not only promotes beneficial cooperation in diverse fields of activity but also provides an institutional framework for peaceful resolution of conflicting issues among member countries. Regional cooperation is likely to enhance the bargaining power of regional states vis-a-vis great powers or adversaries or other regional groups. But in actual practice, how far regional integration has been successful in promoting regional security is an important

question. Regionalization of international politics has an apparent impact on regional security. In fact both seem to be reinforcing each other: though regional integration does enhance regional security, resolution of the regional security problematic is essential for the success of the regional integration efforts.

Regional Integration Enhances Regional Security

The ultimate objective of regional integration is to enhance 'security' broadly conceptualized. Thus how far a regional integration effort has been successful will depend on the security it has provided to its members. As W. Andrew Axline argues:

Ultimately the outcome of regional cooperation will depend on its ability to respond to the interests of its member states as determined by the individual economic, social and political characteristics of each member state. It is possible to make a judgment whether the regional organization has succeeded or not. The first test of success is whether the organization has survived institutionally and as a functioning organization. An understanding of the reasons for success or failure will lie in the ability of the organization to meet its regional goals and to satisfy the interest of individual member states.¹

Regional integration could in many ways contribute to minimizing tensions and conflicts within the region. In fact regional security could be a prelude for national security in the sense of avoiding the diversion of precious resources to

¹ W. Andrew Axline, "Comparative Case Studies of Regional Cooperation Among Developing Countries, in W. Andrew Axline (ed.), *The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation: Comparative Case Studies* (London: Pinter, 1994), pp.7-33.

economically unproductive military tasks. Regional integration could promote greater domestic stability in the member states through economic, political and security cooperation and also deter the aggressive designs of extra-regional powers. It would also lessen the dependence of members on external security guarantees.

The European Community is the oldest and most highly developed example of institutionalized regional integration. Starting with the integration of coal and steel among six countries in the early 1950s the EU has moved a long way. "Left to themselves severally, they would have been reduced either to medium or small ranking nations in Europe and perhaps they would have once again returned to the inter-war chaotic pattern of multilateral collision course."²

Steven J. Rosen and Walter S. Jones write:

Acting in concert, the member states of the European community comprise one of the most productive, and therefore most powerful and influential, actors on the international stage.... Together, they are working to restore Western Europe as a principal world center rather than an area of Soviet-American competition or a hand maiden of American foreign policy.³

The fundamental postulate of the regional framework was the recognition that economic and security interest at the regional level are indivisible. Thus the collective approach that emerged

² H.S. Chopra, "The Franco-German Reconciliation: Its Relevance to the Indo-Pak Perspective on South Asian Peace Order", in L.L. Mehrotra, H.S. Chopra and Gert W. Kueck (eds.), *SAARC 2000 and Beyond* (New Delhi: Omega Scientific Publishers, 1995), p.327.

³ Steven J. Rosen and Walter S. Jones, *The Logic of International Relations* (Cambridge, Mass: Winthrop, 1980), p.89.

turned Western Europe into a peace zone. The EU has been able to give a sense of stability to the region. Stability inside the region allows concentrating of all resources for the development of societies. Moreover, without a joint army, the EU has become a security union in the sense that none of the members could think of war as a possible means of resolving mutual disputes.

As far as the effects of integration on welfare and growth are concerned, one can differentiate between static and dynamic effects. Traditional customs union theory distinguishes between two welfare effects: trade creation (beneficial) and trade diversion (harmful).⁴ Bela Balassa argued that in the initial phase of European integration "trade creation has been substantial in absolute terms and has exceeded trade diversion several times."⁵ This applied only to manufactured goods. The Common Agriculture Policy resulted in trade diversion and welfare costs. In the presence of scale economics, however, it has been shown that two additional welfare directives can be expected: cost reduction and trade suppression. The first (beneficial) arises if integration increases the scale of existing domestic production. In this case, specialization results in lower average costs of domestic supplies. Trade suppression (detrimental to welfare) occurs when imports from

⁴ See Jacob Viner, *The Custom Union Issue* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950).

⁵ Bela Balassa, "Trade Creation and Diversion in the European Common Market", in Bela Balassa (ed.), *European Economic Integration* (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1975).

outside the union are replaced by newly established domestic supplies which, despite the fall in average costs due to the integration, would not survive without protection. Here again cost reduction is found to be substantial for the original six EC members.

As far as dynamic effects are concerned, it has long been postulated that economic integration produces substantial growth effects through better exploitation of scale economics and greater competition resulting in higher productivity.

It has often been argued that the European Monetary System (EMS) has been highly successful. It has induced a greater degree of exchange rate stability but is sufficiently flexible to allow orderly and deliberate change. It has also encouraged a greater degree of convergence in member countries' monetary policies and inflation rates.⁶ However success cannot be achieved without some cost. All member countries have to go through radical political changes and social tensions associated with the sharp rise in unemployment. Yet the EMS has survived these strains.

The European Common Market was effectively launched when in 1992 all cross border controls were abolished to promote free movement of goods and services. Since then, 350 million consumers of the EU are benefiting from lower prices. According to the latest survey released by the EU, closer economic

⁶ For details see George Zis, "The European Monetary System 1979-84: An Assessment", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.23, No.1, Sept.1984, pp.45-72.

integration in the 15-member EU created 900,000 new jobs, raised investments and reined back inflation. Thus the positive economic effects of economic and monetary union will help resolve some of the complicated problems created by the single market. EMU will boost the political influence of the smaller countries on monetary conditions inside the EC as well as enhance the image of the community at the international level.⁷

Moreover, the concept of common European Foreign Policy might still be far away but many observers feel that developments are definitely going in that direction. Over the issue of Helms-Burton Act highlighting the controversial US anti-Cuba policy and the West Asia peace process, the EU has produced a collective response. EU countries have close economic and political relations with major Arab governments in the region and the European clout has much creditability. The EU provides large economic and financial aid to Palestinians. Today EU officials feel that it should now effectively co-sponsor the West Asia peace process.

Environmental security is another dimension that has been added to the modern security problematic. An interesting notion of regional environmental security is the issue of climate change and the interaction among states in a region. Cooperative strategies involving some level of integration enhance regional environmental security. This argument can be supported by the

⁷ For example see, Carlos S. Costa, "EMU: The Benefits Outweigh the Cost", *European Affairs*, Vol.4, No.3, Spring 1990, pp.22-27.

work of William D. Nordhaus and Zili Yang on the Regional Integrated Model of Climate and the Economy (RICE).⁸ The RICE model integrates economic activity with the sources, emissions and consequences of greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. It analyses different national strategies in climate-change policy: pure market solutions, efficient cooperative outcomes, and noncooperative equilibria (See Table 3.1). This study came to the conclusion that cooperative policies show much higher levels of emissions reduction than do noncooperative strategies thus enhancing regional environmental security.

The EC too recognized the international dimensions of the environmental policy from the very beginning. It included:

- 1) Activities carried out in one country should not cause deterioration of the environment in another.
- 2) The EC and member states should act together in international organization and in promoting worldwide environmental policy.

The Single European Act gave legal force to several of these principles. The EC has now adopted over 280 items of environmental legislation. Several of these are very important such as that dealing with acid rain, an issue entering the realm of 'high politics'.⁹ Known as the Large Combustion Plant Directive, it limits emissions of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen

⁸ William D. Nordhaus and Zili Yang, "Regional Dynamic General Equilibrium Model of Alternative Climate-Change Strategies", *The American Economic Review*, Vol.86, No.4, Sept.1996, pp.741-65.

⁹ See Nigel Haigh, *EEC Environmental Policy and Britain* (London: Longman, 1990).

Table 3.1

ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION CONCEPTS FOR THE RICE MODEL

1. **Market RICE:** This strategy assumes that there is no correction for the climate-change externality and that there is therefore no abatement of CO₂ emissions.
2. **Cooperative RICE:** In this strategy, countries undertake policies that reduce greenhouse-gas emissions efficiently. The reduction of CO₂ emissions is efficient across countries and across time.
3. **Noncooperative RICE:** This strategic concept assumes that each country sets its CO₂ emissions controls to maximize its own economic welfare assuming that other countries control strategies are invariant to a country's policies.

Source: William D. Nordhaus and Zili Yang, "Regional Dynamic General-Equilibrium Model of Alternative Climate-Change Strategies, *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 86, No. 4, Sept. 96, p. 749.

oxides from such plants. The Commission had originally proposed that each member state should reduce emissions by 60 per cent by the year 1995. The economic, geographical and fuel supply circumstances were so different that a uniform reduction proved unacceptable to several countries. As a result a compromise was eventually achieved with different countries having quite different reductions that nevertheless should result in a 58 per cent reduction in overall EC sulphur dioxide emission by the year 2003. The EC has also agreed to cut the ozone layer-depleting chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) amounting to 50 per cent reduction by the turn of the century. In December 1990 the EC went further than the Montreal Protocol reduction programme and agreed to phase out CFCs by 1997.

Thus integration efforts have been highly successful in Western Europe providing all around growth, development and security to the states of the region. However not only the developed but developing countries have also benefited from regional integration.

ASEAN, formed in 1967:

...has given its member nations a sense of power and capability which has allowed them to behave not as objects but as subjects of the international political system. It has allowed the ASEAN states to adopt active foreign policies, to seek solutions rather than to have them imposed, to attempt to share their environment and their future.¹⁰

¹⁰ Noordin Sopiee, "ASEAN and Regional Security", in Mohammed Ayooob (ed.), *Regional Security in the Third World* (Beckenhem: Croom Helm, 1986), pp.221-31.

It has given its members a psychological sense of confidence and security by creating an ASEAN identity. It has further opened a mechanism of discussion and negotiation leading to trust and confidence among the member states.

ASEAN is often seen as representing Karl Deutsch's 'security community' where no member continues to think of war as a part of mutual relation. Within ASEAN, security has always been addressed through consultation and dialogue rather than through conventional collective security means. Michael Leifer writes, "The ideal aggregate expressions of 'national resilience' in South East Asia as a whole was seen as 'regional resilience' a condition in which regional cooperation would reduce external threat and prevent internal political disorder from spreading across common borders. Addressing security through a pursued synergy between national and regional resilience, repudiating both collective defense and conventional collective security, became ASEAN's operational security doctrine."¹¹

Thus ASEAN represents an ideal instance of what the developing countries can achieve through cooperation. The GDP of ASEAN member countries has risen steadily putting some of the regional states already in the company of the world's industrial nations in terms of the real GDP per capita leading to greater economic security. ASEAN's economic success could be primarily

¹¹ Michael Leifer, "The ASEAN Regional Forum", *Adelphi Paper*, No.302, July 1996, pp.1-66.

attributed to its export-led development policies and liberal investment policies. In less than two decades, from being exporters of primary commodities the ASEAN countries have emerged as major exporters of manufactured products. They are successfully competing with the developed countries even in several areas of advanced technologies. State participation in large scale industrial projects provided a complementary exchange of projects allocated to particular countries, thus assuring benefits to the less advantaged member countries. ASEAN comprises an effective package of expansive and distributive measures.

Moreover, as South East Asia is a main source of the opium poppy and its value added products, illegal opium and heroin production, distribution and marketing are activities that affect all countries of the region. To deal with this and other related issues of criminal activity such as terrorism and insurgency, ASEAN created the ASEAN Association of Police in 1981.¹²

The group of fast growing economies in South East Asia are now thinking beyond the year 2003 when their ASEAN Free Trade Area will come into force.

Another important development was the APEC. Started in 1989, it now comprises the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Mexico, Chile, Hongkong, South Korea, Japan, China, Taiwan,

¹² Antonio Hussey, "Regional Development and Cooperation through ASEAN", *The Geographical Review*, Vol.81, 1991, pp.87-98.

Papua New Guinea and the ASEAN group. APEC's more developed members were to reach the goal of free trade and investment by the year 2010 and the rest by 2020.

With the region no longer divided by the Cold War into two ideologically antagonistic blocs, ASEAN has been able to move towards fulfilling its ambition of encompassing all of South East Asia. Vietnam signed ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 1992 and became a full member in 1995. The way is also cleared for Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar to become members. The Treaty of Amity, Friendship and Cooperation serves a two-fold role. First, it establishes a code of conduct governing relations among South East Asian countries, a function which contributes to habits of conflict-avoidance. Second, the treaty provides a legal basis for the pacific settlement of disputes. Although the Treaty provides for the establishment of a 'High Council' for dispute-settlement, it has never been invoked; this is seen within ASEAN as a positive sign, as it testifies to ASEAN's success in reducing the prospects for serious inter-state conflict among the parties without having to resort to formal measures. In this sense, the treaty can be seen as being more an instrument of preventive diplomacy than of conflict control.¹³

¹³ Amitav Acharya, "ASEAN-UN Cooperation in Peace and Preventive Diplomacy: Its Contribution to Regional Security", *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol.22, No.1, 1994, pp.215-26.

The ASEAN ministerial conference agreed to establish an ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) whose first meeting was held in Bangkok in July 1994. Apart from ASEAN members Australia, Canada, China, the EU, Japan, Laos, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Russia, South Korea, the US and Vietnam attended the meet. Cambodia joined at the second meeting in Brunei in 1995 and India and Myanmar the 1996 meeting. Establishment of ARF increased the importance attached to greater openness and information-sharing in military affairs as part of the confidence building process. In preparation for the second meeting at Brunei, ASEAN adopted a 'gradual, evolutionary approach' in 3 stages:

- 1) Promotion of confidence building measures.
- 2) Development of preventive diplomacy mechanisms.
- 3) Development of conflict-resolution mechanisms.

Measures like maintaining a UN Register of Conventional Arms will also reduce suspicion among members.

Another point which needs to be highlighted here is that regional integration efforts could also be among unequal partners. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the US, Canada and Mexico is seen as an example of a free trade agreement involving partners of vastly different levels of development. The US is roughly ten times as large as Canada both in terms of population and GDP. The NAFTA is best seen not simply as an important economic step involving the three

countries but also having significant implications for their cultural interactions and political relations. Some believe that closer cooperation with the US will deepen and accelerate the Americanization of Mexican culture and loss of national identity. Although the process of modernization in Mexico has certainly reduced the cultural difference between the two societies, some of the basic values are still intact. In Mexico, the notion of community is stronger and has greater social legitimacy than individualism which is the base of Americanism.¹⁴

Drusilla Brown, Alan Deardorff and Robert Stern argue that NAFTA will deliver only modest gains if it is limited to tariff liberalization, but much more substantial gains will follow liberalization of non tariff barriers and investment measures. Moreover real income growth in Mexico will increase the demand for pollution abatement.¹⁵

In Latin America the basic reason for the formation of the Andean Group was to overcome the pressing limitations of the small market in 1969. During the initial period within a short time of signing the agreement, intra-subregional exports increased by 17 per cent on an average of 30 million dollars a year. However, unequal distribution of costs and benefits is one

¹⁴ Sidney Weintraub and M. Delal Baer (eds.), *The NAFTA Debate: Grappling with Unconventional Trade Issues* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1994).

¹⁵ See Drusilla Brown, Alan Deardorff and Robert Stern, "North American Integration", *The Economic Journal*, Vol.102, Nov. 1992, pp.1507-1518.

of the main causes of conflicts within the integration process experienced by developing countries and Latin America was no exception. I will come back to this point later on.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) might not be successful in resolution of all the conflicts within the region, but it did play a vital role at least in some cases. Since its inception in May 1963, the OAU has been involved in more than a dozen cases. In October 1963 armed warfare broke out between Algeria and Morocco in a Saharan area governed by the former but claimed by the latter. The OAU set up an ad hoc commission to study and make recommendations for settlement of disputes. In 1968, in private negotiations at an OAU summit this territorial issue was resolved.¹⁶ The OAU also assisted reconciliation between Tanzania and Uganda, and assisted President Julius Nyerere in replacing British troops with African in the aftermath of the Tanganyika army mutiny.

More recently in Rwanda, the OAU is involved in the program of return of refugees to Rwanda based on Anusha Peace Agreement of 1993. In the Congo, the OAU's special Representative was involved in signing of the Libreville Accord between the presidential coalition of parties and the opposition thus helped in averting a crisis. The OAU was also involved in a consultative capacity in the Somalia conflict.

¹⁶ See for Details, B. David Meyers, "Intraregional Conflict Management by the Organization of African Unity", *International Organization*, Vol.28, No.3, Summer 1974, pp.345-73.

Though all these effects towards regional integration did enhance regional security, there are many instances of regional integration efforts which are not very successful. SAARC has enabled the South Asian leaders to meet regularly and carry on informal discussions. This is no mean achievement given the level of interaction among them since independence. Moreover with the ratification of the SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement by all SAARC members in December 1995 and their decision to create a SAARC Free Trade Area (SAFTA) as early as possible have generated some optimism.

However, the fact remains that SAARC has shown slow progress and modest achievements over the past decades.

Resolution of the Regional Security Problematic

The failure of regional integration efforts in many parts of the world could be traced to the non-resolution of the regional security problematic. This could be made more clear if we look at Western Europe or South East Asia.

France and Germany fought three titanic wars between 1869 and 1945: Franco-Prussian War (1869-70), World War I (1914-18), World War II (1939-45). One of the major driving forces behind the success of the EU is the resolution of conflict between France and Germany and the determination to forge closer links between France and Germany to prevent occurrence of another war. H.S. Chopra remarked:

The Franco-German Treaty forms a substantive part of the movement for European unification. Without

reconciliation between these two erstwhile adversaries, European unification would have been no more than a pipe dream.¹⁷

Similarly William Wallace writes:

The development of the structure of West European integration was not a response to the problems posed by intense economic interdependence.... The motivation of its founders were fundamentally political, the containment of a divided Germany and its driving force has been that of Franco-German reconciliation.¹⁸

The establishment of ASEAN in 1967 flowed from the end of confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia, and also reflected a strong desire on the part of the original five members -- Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines -- to minimize the prospect for any further conflict among themselves. In the 1960s Malaysia and Indonesia were locked in a bitter political and military struggle. The formation of Malaysia in 1963 by the inclusion of the former British possession in Borneo -- Sabah and Sarawak -- led to a deterioration of Malaysia's relations with Indonesia as well as the Philippines. Reconciliation of these differences helped in the formation of ASEAN.

In Latin America too several long standing political disputes reinforce nationalism retarding the integration

¹⁷ H.S. Chopra, "The Franco-German Reconciliation: Its Relevance to the Indo-Pak Perspective on South Asian Peace Order", in L.L. Mehrotra, H.S. Chopra and Gert W. Kueck (eds.), *SAARC 2000 and Beyond* (New Delhi: Omega Scientific Publishers, 1995), pp.323-24.

¹⁸ William Wallace, *Regional Integration: The West European Experience* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994).

process. The hostility between EL Salvador and Honduras virtually derailed the Central American Common Market (CACM). In fact CACM did achieve a common external tariff and eliminated most interzonal tariffs. Then almost all momentum was lost in 1969 with the 'soccer war' between El Salvador and Honduras.

The South Asian states have not been able to get over old conflicts and rivalries as Europe and South East Asia have managed to do. The Indo-Pakistan relationship is central to the success of any South Asian regional integration effort. Absence of satisfactory resolution of the conflicts between these two has repeatedly cast its shadow on the working of SAARC. Every integration effort requires a minimum level of trust and goodwill among member states and SAARC is no exception to this.

The corollary to this argument of the resolution of regional security problematic is the second argument dealing with perception of common external threat of an 'enemy', which brings the nations together to collectively deal with this threat. War becomes less and less thinkable among the regional states as a means to achieve security. It has often been argued that intra-regional collective approach involving the pooling of resources with fellow regional countries is an economical way of approaching security. However, this approach is attractive only when a threat is common to all the countries and is so overwhelming as to defy the capability of one state to deal with it. Bhabhani Sen Gupta remarks, "If all members of a regional group of states feel threatened from a common enemy, their own

inequalities remain subdued, the smaller member-states even feel secure in the relative strength of the larger ones."¹⁹

A common external threat was one of the driving forces that spurred regional cooperation in Europe. "The historical context within which West European integration got underway was highly specific, set by the aftermath of war, the presence of a benevolent American hegemon and a malevolent external Soviet threat."²⁰

Even with regard to ASEAN, the founding members -- Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines -- were united by a shared anti-communist sentiment and by concern for the outcome of the Vietnam war and its effects on the US commitment to regional security. As the former Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik stated in 1974, "Although from the outset, ASEAN was conceived as an organization for economic, social and cultural cooperation and although considerations in these fields were no doubt central, it was the fact that there was a convergence in the political outlook which provided the main stimulus to join together in ASEAN."²¹

¹⁹ Bhabhani Sen Gupta, "Regional Organization and the Security of Small States", in M. Abdur Hafiz and Abdul Rob Khan (eds.), *Security of Small States* (Dhaka: Dhaka University Press, 1987).

²⁰ William Wallace, *Regional Integration: The West European Experience* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994), p.11.

²¹ Quoted by Roger Irvin, "The Formative Years of ASEAN, 1967-1975", in Alison Broinowski, *Understanding ASEAN* (London: Macmillan, 1982), p.14.

The Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea acted as catalyst for member-states of ASEAN to respond collectively. Chang Hong Chee writes, "The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea was God sent. It became the common cause energising the process of cooperation, galvanising ASEAN unity. Without Kampuchea, there was every likelihood that ASEAN would suffer internal dislocation on how to handle an emergent Vietnam and would be forced to confront the structuring of a long term security strategy in fluid external environment."²²

It is often argued that the absence of a common external threat has proved to be a big hindrance in the way of greater cohesiveness and efficacy of SAARC. Bipattaran Ghosh²³ argues that this notion need not be true. A common external threat might have forged greater unity in Western Europe vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union but failed to unite Arabs against Israel. However, Mohammed El Sayed Said²⁴ argues that the broader the scope of threat, i.e. the more the number of states facing the threat, the greater the incentive for solidarity in security fields and wider the base for potential regional security schemes. In the Arab World, where the greatest source of threat is represented

²² Quoted in Mohammed Ayoob, "The Primacy of the Politics: South Asian Regional Cooperation in Comparative Perspective", *Asian Survey*, Vol.25, No.4, April 1985, pp.443-57.

²³ Bipattaran Ghosh, "SAARC: Some Major Impediments to Its Success", *Asian Studies*, Vol.13, No.1, 1985, pp.30-45.

²⁴ Mohammed El Sayed Said, "The Arab League: Between Regime Security and National Liberation", in Mohammed Ayoob (ed.), *Regional Security in the Third World* (Beckenhem: Croom Helm, 1986), pp.254-72.

by the state of Israel, geographical distance from this source makes for illusions of natural immunity from aggression in a majority of Arab States.

Thus, externally oriented threat perception unites the countries of the region as they feel greater urgency to be 'one' against the common enemy. This type of common threat is not evident in South Asia. Within SAARC the smaller nations seem to have the same political-psychological attitude towards India. They want to counter balance India by forging alliance with the external powers. India accounts for about 77 per cent of the population of the region, 73 per cent of its total area and 77 per cent of its GDP.²⁵ Thus in size, population, economic and military power India is significantly better placed. The primacy of the Indian factor has generated Indo-phobia among the other states of the region. Thus, far from trying to keep the world powers out of the region the urge is to get them involved in the region. As for India, it is apprehensive of its security being undermined in what it considers to be its 'strategic perimeter'.

K. Subrahmanyam writes in those parts of the world where regional cooperation has taken roots "it is based primarily on a political or security consensus."²⁶ Mohammed Ayoob²⁷ remarks

²⁵ See Bipattaran Ghosh, "SAARC: Some Major Impediments to Its Success", *Asian Studies*, Vol.13, No.1, 1985, pp.30-45.

²⁶ K. Subrahmanyam, "Regional Cooperation in South Asia", *IDSJ Journal*, Vol.28, No.1, July-Sept. 1985, pp.1-9.

²⁷ Mohammed Ayoob, "The Primacy of Politics: South Asian Regional Cooperation in Comparative Perspective", *Asian Survey*, Vol.15, No.4, April 1985, pp.443-57.

that there is a growing identity of approach and convergence of interests in four critical areas where the idea of regional cooperation has succeeded:

- 1) Similarity of threat perception, both internal and external, which leads not only to identity of threat perception, but also to security cooperation in critical areas;
- 2) Identical political systems which lead to common political-ideological perceptions;
- 3) Common foreign policy stances in crucial global issues provide for a convergence of strategic perceptions;
- 4) An unwritten understanding on the role of pivotal power -- Indonesia in the case of ASEAN -- which provides internal cohesion and lessening of intra-state tensions in the region.

In the SAARC countries differences of opinion among the member countries exist regarding the nature of political system, internal or external threat perception, foreign policy orientation and the role of the dominant regional power.

Another point which can be mentioned here is the role of external power. Sometimes an external power can also act as a catalyst in forging closer integration as is the case of the US in Western Europe. "Successful establishment and enlargement of institutionalized regional integration required heavy political and military investment by American administrators over several decades, justified by the clear and present-danger of a

Soviet-communist advance into the region."²⁸ The US political and financial support played a vital role in the establishment and sustainability of the EC.

As far as the Third World is concerned the basic fundamental conceptual relationship remains between the regional integration dynamic and the regional security problematic. But the domestic security problematic of nation-building and the need for quick economic development adds another dimension to it. As already explained in detail in the second chapter, Third World states face nation-building problems further complicated by the fact that most of these developing states are the artefacts of the colonial period with weak state institutions. The national identity is subverted by subnational identities. In fact these subnational ideas are usually transnational in nature as people of the same linguistic, and religious groups find themselves divided among several neighbouring states. This creates a peculiar primary security problem, with every state fearing subversion by its own neighbour, thus making the regional security problematic worse.

Amare Tekle²⁹ while talking about African states says that the class structure and dependence relationship that the dominant classes had developed with the colonial powers remained

²⁸ William Wallace, *Regional Integration: The West European Experience* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institutions, 1994).

²⁹ Amare Tekle, "The Organization of African Unity at Twenty Five Years: Retrospect and Prospect", *Africa Today*, Vol.35, No.3/4, pp.1988.

unchanged even after formal independence. Since each African power elite was determined to safeguard its privileged status, it was inevitable that it would lead to class conflict. Under these circumstances, African states could not share the same values or have a common perception of threats. Tekle further writes that even today it is not possible to accept that the members of the OAU have a common perception of the conditions which would lead to peace, security and stability within the region. African states fear their neighbours more than external powers. Thus it is difficult for a regional integration effort to touch new heights. Ernst Haas once remarked, "Countries which are poorly integrated internally make poor partners in a regional integration process because of the reluctance of leaders to further undermine their control at home."³⁰

However, this is not to deny the importance of the regional integration effort in enhancing security. As most of the ethnic problems are transnational in character, a regional approach will definitely help the regional states i.e. vulnerability to the forces of disintegration should be reduced with a cooperative foreign policy approach."³¹

Economic security is a vital aspect of the regional integration effort as there would be no bilateral, regional or

³⁰ Ernst Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration", *International Organization*, Vol.24, No.4, Autumn 1970, pp.19.

³¹ Quoted by Syed Anwar Hussain, "Ethnicity and Security of Small States: South Asian Context", in M. Abdul Hafiz and Abdur Rob Khan (ed.), *Security of Small States* (Dhaka: Dhaka University Press, 1987).

international cooperation with the exclusion of trade, industry and finance from its scope. Owing to the differences in the economic conditions of the developed and developing countries, the integration effort in the latter is judged by its contribution to development and not necessarily to greater efficiency. This changes the traditional dynamic of measuring success as the amount of trade creation and trade diversion and makes all questions related to integration in the developing world highly political.

Integration among underdeveloped countries aims not at the intensification of present economic patterns through the elimination of 'artificial' barriers but at structural changes. Attempts to establish 'partial' integration schemes which do not include measures to counter polarization and dependence are not likely to contribute to balanced regional development. They are therefore prone to instability and lack of unanimous support from member states.

From 1967 to 1971 total CARIFTA intraregional imports rose from EC \$95 million to an estimated EC \$188 million, an increase of 98 per cent for the period. Trade among the more developed countries of Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago accounted for over 60 per cent of the regional trade in 1967 and 69 per cent in 1971. During the same period intra-region trade between the less developed countries declined from 1.9 to 1.4

per cent of total regional trade.³² This pattern of trade polarization was strongly felt by LDCs.

Rafael Vargas-Hindalgo argues that the stagnation of the East African community in the 1970s can be traced to internal rivalries over the benefits to be obtained from the operation of jointly owned corporations, railways, postal services, ports, telecommunications and air transport services.³³ So to be successful economic integration efforts specially in developing countries need to incorporate measures of a redistributive nature to avoid polarization and for the equal sharing of benefits and costs.

Another basic point as far as the developing countries are concerned is the amount of intra-regional trade which is usually quite insignificant resulting in limited interdependence. For example as shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, the volume of legal intra-regional trade in South Asia from 1980 to 1994 has remained low and stagnant at little over three per cent as compared to their world trade.

EEC members enjoyed a homogeneous capitalist market which is geographically connected with the same socio-economic system.

³² W. Andrew Axline, "Integration and Development in the Commonwealth Caribbean: The Politics of Regional Negotiations", *International Organization*, Vol.32, No.4, Autumn 1978, pp.953-73.

³³ Rafael Vargas-Hindalgo, "The Crisis of the Andean Pact: Lessons for Integration Among Developing Countries", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.27, No.3, March 1979, pp.213-26.

Table 3.2
INTRA-SAARC TRADE IN RELATION TO WORLD
TRADE OF SAARC COUNTRIES

Year	Intra-SAARC Trade (Exports + Imports) (US\$ million)	World Trade of SAARC Countries (Exports + Imports) (US\$ million)	Percentage Share of Intra-SAARC Trade in World Trade
1980	1210.0	37885.3	3.2
1985	1088.7	43759.5	2.4
1990	1584.7	65490.0	2.4
1994	2919.0	83110.0	3.5

Source: Kishore C. Dash, "The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation in South Asia", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 2, Summer 1996 p. 202.

Table 3.3
INTRA-REGIONAL IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF SAARC COUNTRIES
IN RELATION TO THEIR TOTAL IMPORTS AND EXPORTS
(In Percentage)

	Intraregional Imports				Intraregional Exports			
	1980	1985	1990	1994	1980	1985	1990	1994
Bangladesh	3.6	3.4	6.8	12.8	8.6	7.6	3.6	3.2
Bhutan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
India	0.9	0.7	0.4	0.5	3.6	2.2	2.7	4.1
Maldives	23.3	9.1	11.4	17.5	26.5	17.0	14.0	-
Nepal	47.9	34.1	11.7	19.3	37.8	34.4	7.1	5.4
Pakistan	2.3	1.5	1.6	1.9	6.3	5.2	3.9	3.2
Sri Lanka	5.1	6.4	7.0	9.2	7.0	4.2	3.6	2.6
South Asia	2.2	1.8	1.9	3.4	4.9	3.6	3.1	3.7

Source: Kishore C. Dash, "The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation in South Asia", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 2, Summer 1996, p. 203.

Therefore with the unified efforts of its members the EEC could obtain steady development.

Most of the South Asian countries being producers of primary products tend to export similar items and thus compete with each other. Despite these factors specific trade complementarities can be created in order to foster greater intraregional trade in South Asia. What is needed is the political will to do it. This again leads us to the argument of settlement of political differences.

The EEC was successful as members felt a need for economic cooperation to build up their war-torn economies, to safeguard against a possible threat from the communist bloc, and today against possible US domination, or against the Japanese economic presence, or even the fast growing Asian economies.

As the Himalayan rivers flow through India, Nepal, Pakistan, Bhutan and Bangladesh close cooperation is required to harness the water resources for flood prevention, development of an inland navigation system, developing ecological watersheds, afforestation programs and controlling river pollution. It is estimated that the Himalayan rivers have a hydropower potential of 70,000 megawatts in India, and 83,000 megawatts, 1,772 megawatts and 21,000 megawatts in Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan respectively.³⁴ This will solve the regional energy crisis.

³⁴ W.R.H. Perera, *Perspective for the Development of Himalayan Resources* (Colombo: Mary Institute, 1984), pp.22-26.

In fact severe and spreading land degradation today alone costs the seven countries of South Asia a staggering 10 billion US dollars annually -- roughly 7 per cent of their total agricultural output. Soil fertility is dropping sharply. The impoverished land results in depleted yields and higher input costs. It further diminishes the ability of the people to obtain food and other basic necessities.

All these problems could be overcome by a common approach. An effective Integrated Regional Environment Management (IREM)³⁵ in South Asia can bring the untapped resources into productive use. IREM through the right mechanism would not only minimise the resource wastage but also give high economic returns. IREM is also instrumental in boosting trade cooperation among the regional countries. This will have a favourable impact on the implementation of SAPTA. Besides, a collective bargaining power would render better access in the global capital market. Thus IREM could be an interesting way of confidence building within the region but as said earlier all depends on the cooperation and political will of the members to find a resolution of their conflicting issues.

Conclusion

Thus, regional integration is not only desirable but necessary for achieving regional security and stability, which

³⁵ See Shamsur Rahman, "Towards an Integrated Regional Environment Management (IREM) in South Asia", *BISS Journal*, Vol.17, No.14, 1996, pp.536-99.

in turn would reinforce national security. Regional integration creates an atmosphere of goodwill and trust between regional states by making it highly unlikely that mutual differences could be resolved in the future through the instrumentality of war. On the economic front regional integration reduces dependency on the vulnerable and fluctuating international market, helps in mobilizing scarce resources of capital and skills, specially in developing countries, thereby further enhancing economic stability and leading to higher growth. Moreover, as Reinhardt Rummel remarks, "Stability does not mean status quo-policy or conflict free zone. It requires repeated adaptation, change in status emergence of dispute as well as rules and institutions to deal with them in a peaceful manner."³⁶

Regional integration provides a psychological sense of confidence and self-reliance to its members. Peace and stability in the region will not only help in dealing with extra-regional powers with confidence but also allow states to concentrate their primary attention on the domestic front of nation-building and social modernization.

However, for the regional integration effort to succeed a resolution of the regional security problematic is essential. This requires a common external threat perception which can bind regional states together. These factors were present in Western

³⁶ Reinhardt Rummel, "Transformation of the EC into EU: Its Saliency and Relevance to Regional Peace and Development in South Asia" in L.L. Malhotra et al. (eds.) *SAARC 2000 and Beyond* (New Delhi: Omega Scientific Publishers, 1995), pp.332-24.

Europe and South East Asia and today both are successful cases of regional integration.

The greatest security that the EU represents today is not only economic, which itself is of great significance, but the fact that the members have left wars way behind. "The greatest achievement of European regional organization has been to establish patterns of peace and cooperation in various fields, as preliminary steps to build community at the internal level by negotiation rather than coercion."³⁷

Similarly ASEAN too is often referred to as an example of a 'security community' where no member considers war as a possible means of resolving mutual conflicts. "The degree of success can be gauged from the fact that while in 1967, the year ASEAN was established, violent conflict among member states was a distinct possibility, in the late 1980s it has become highly unlikely."³⁸

Though the efforts of many Third World countries at regional integration might not be very successful, nevertheless regional integration is considered vital for growth and security. This can be gauged by the attempts to extend and revitalize the Central American Common Market and the move to relaunch the Andean Pact.

³⁷ Michael Hodges "Introduction" in Michael Hodges (ed.), *European Integration* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972), p.9.

³⁸ Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "Into the Third Decade: ASEAN and Issues of Peace and Security in Southeast Asia", *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol.17, No.1, 1989, pp.29-41.

The former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his Agenda for Peace Report noted:

What is clear is that regional arrangements and agencies in many cases possess a potential that should be utilized in serving the functions [of] ... preventive diplomacy, peace keeping, peace making and post conflict peace building ... regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with the United Nations could not only lighten the burden of the Council, but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs.³⁹

Thus all the regions have a potential for regional integration but none is immune to failure. Moreover, success always comes with certain costs. Thus, in order to have long-term benefits, states have to go through short-term losses and a process of political and social adjustments.

So, in order to "banish war, remove inter-state tension, improve living conditions and bring about peace and prosperity, regional cooperation has reached a new stage of development in the annals of human history."⁴⁰ The prospects of achieving regional security are definitely enhanced by the process of regional integration.

³⁹ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: Department of Public Information, 1995), p.64.

⁴⁰ L.L. Mehrotra, "Why Regional Cooperation", in L.L. Mehrotra, H.S. Chopra, Gert W. Kueck, (eds.), *SAARC 2000 and Beyond* (New Delhi: Omega Scientific Publishers, 1995), pp.13-26.

CONCLUSION

In the study we have analysed the concepts of region, regional integration, security and regional security and tried to gain an understanding of these concepts. We have also analysed the basic conceptual relationship between regional security and regional integration.

This century is marked by profound changes in the structure of international relations. The revolution in science and technology has resulted in the shortening of distances. The development of modern weaponry, particularly weapons of mass destruction, has already undermined the defensibility of territorial boundaries. The rise of 'issue areas' has further led to an age of stronger international interdependence. The response of states to these developments can be seen in the process of internal and external adjustment in all spheres--economic, political and military. The dimension of external adjustment is manifested in the process of regional integration, which has been gaining ground steadily since the Second World War.

Today, with the end of the Cold War, this movement towards regional integration seems to have gained new impetus. The end of the bipolar confrontation has led to a reduction in tensions and ideological strife, paving the way for a rapid expansion of inter-state ties. Regional blocs, it may be stressed are an established feature of the nascent 'New World Order'.

However, this is not only a period of change. We have a continuation of centre (North) -- periphery (South) relationships elaborated in the dependency literature of the 1960s and 1970s. 'Centre' here implies the globally-dominant

capitalist economies; and 'periphery' the industrially, financially and politically weaker states in an international system largely constructed by the Centre.

The components of dependency are the magnitude of foreign supply of vital factors of production like technology and capital, restricted developmental choices and domestic distortions for the peripheral countries. In fact, it has often been argued that new fault lines of North-South conflict have replaced the East West confrontation.

But even with regard to the North-South relations there is a change with the continuity. Change lies in the strategy of the security, development and growth pursued by the states of the South. Regional integration seems to be an alternative to the demand of New International Economic Order (NIEO) which calls for a systemic transformation. Regional integration in the South in a way undercuts the old logic of demand for NIEO and South-South solidarity.

The same could be said about the developed world where the European Union and North Atlantic Free Trade Area could be seen as undercutting G-7. However, here it does not make a drastic difference because of the dominant position of the developed countries.

But the South regional integration does imply that the emphasis is shifting from the old demand of systemic change to a new effort aimed at trying to have a better position in an international system which continues to be unfavourably structured. Thus, regional integration is seen as enhancing security conditions in a highly insecure world.

We have already discussed and analysed the different aspects with which we began the study. After a detailed study several inferences can be drawn:

First, the regional integration dynamic cannot be comprehended without taking into account non-military threats to regional and national security. The traditional concept of security took the sovereign state as the exclusive unit of analysis and was concerned primarily with external military threats. This notion of security has been called into question by the technological and information revolution, the rise of the non-state actors, rise of 'issue areas' like the environmental and the internal nation-building threats faced by Third World countries owing to their heterogeneous population with transnational ethnic allegiance.

With the end of the cold war, security studies seem to have been liberated from narrow military strategic confines. It has often been argued in the western literature that economic rivalry and competition will replace military warfare after the end of the Cold War. The rise of economic powers like Japan and the European Union giving direct competition to the US supports the argument. Similarly on the environmental front too, in order to avoid irretrievable disasters, issues like global warming, ozone layer depletion and deforestation need to be tackled now. Today more attention has begun to be paid to a comprehensive viewpoint encompassing both internal as well as external dimensions of threat, dealing with economic, environmental, food, and energy factors.

Military power does remain a crucial factor in the overall power of states but it alone is no longer sufficient for the

security of the state. The disintegration of the Soviet Union is a classic example of a uni-dimensional military power suffering from multi-dimensional problems and finally succumbing to their pressure.

Moreover, security threats today outweigh the capacity of a single state to deal with them. Security threats are increasingly becoming transnational and call for a regional cooperative endeavour. Be it transnational organized crime like terrorism, or penetration by the multinational corporations, or environmental hazards like river pollution, deforestation, flooding--they call for a regional approach. Thus, the regional security problematic calls for a broader approach by taking into account non-military threats to security. Already we have significant examples of wars being fought over natural resources.

Secondly, regional security has both internal and external dimensions. Internally, regional security deals with the intra- and inter-state conflicts. The threats emanating from within the boundaries of the states assume far more significance with regard to the Third World states as they face the problem of lack of 'unconditional legitimacy' owing to the non-existence of a cohesive society with weak infrastructure and extreme poverty. The resulting ethnic conflicts can spill over and create serious repercussions for the regional security environment. The internal dimension could be externalized with the intervention and subversion from outside.

Regional security can be disturbed by conflicts both among regional states as well as with extra-regional powers. Moreover, the more intimately a major power is committed to supporting

regional security of a particular region, the more dependent upon it the regional powers tend to become. However, an external power could also act as a catalyst in forging the regional security notion among the regional states.

Thirdly, regional security is not only an intermediary stage between national and international security but has a dimension of its own. Security has been widely examined at the 'state level' both in terms of the inherent stability of the state itself and in terms of its vulnerabilities to threats from outside. Security has also been studied at the 'international level' dealing with the structures and characteristics of the entire international system.

On a different, though related level of analysis, we find regional security concerned with the existence of peaceful relations among regional states, security from extra-regional threats as well as the internal development and growth of regional states. Regional security cannot be comprehended without taking into account the national and international security levels which condition regional security to a significant extent. State conduct is conditioned by the international system as it affects the opportunities available to states. Thus, International Relations is what happens between the regions and the states. Regional stability is vital for state level growth so as not to divert the precious resources to non-productive military tasks. Moreover lack of stability and widespread conflicts at the regional level invite external involvement further leading to the intensification of internal cleavage and distorted developmental priorities.

Fourthly, regional integration and regional security share a basic conceptual relationship. The process of regional integration enhances regional security. Regional integration promotes not only beneficial cooperation in diverse fields of activity but also provides an institutional framework for the peaceful resolution of conflictual issues among member countries.

Politically, regional integration will enhance the bargaining power of the regional states vis-a-vis the outside world. It would also deter the aggressive designs of extra-regional powers. Peace and stability at the regional level would help states in fully devoting their energy and resources for intra-state developmental tasks.

On the economic front, regional cooperation in matters of common exploitation of resources, and providing markets to other regional partners specially in the developing countries would help in better management of energy and also lead to higher economic growth.

At the environmental level too, a regional integrated arrangement provides better opportunities to collectively deal with transborder effects of greenhouse gases, river pollution, flood control, deforestation and better management of water resources.

Conversely, for the success of a regional integration effort, resolution of the regional security problematic is essential. France-Germany reconciliation led to the success of the European Union. Similarly ASEAN was the result of the end of Indonesian - Malaysian confrontation.

Here, perception of a common 'enemy' is considered vital as it unites the regional states and forces them to forget or at least subdue their mutual conflicts. The Soviet Union played this role in the case of West Europe. In ASEAN too the anti-communist and anti-China stand united the members. In the case of SAARC, non-resolution of regional conflicts, particularly between India and Pakistan, and no common external threat perception impedes effective regional integration.

In Third World countries, the basic conceptual relationship between regional integration and regional security is complicated by these states being colonial artefacts. Internal security threats based on issues of cultural and ethnic identity, coupled with immense poverty, add a crucial and complicating dimension to the regional security problematic.

However, this is not to deny the significance of regional integration for regional security. It creates an atmosphere of goodwill and trust within regional states making it highly unlikely that mutual differences would be resolved through the instrumentality of war. Regional integration is no panacea for the many social, economic, political, military and environmental problems that we face today, but it can definitely play a substantial role in preventing deteriorating conditions specially in the developing countries of the world.

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