

**NON — ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM)  
AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST  
SOUTH AFRICA**

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled "NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM) AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA", submitted by Milly Chatterjee in fulfilment of nine credits out of total requirements of twenty four credits for the Degree of Master of Philosophy (M.Phil) of this University is her original work according to the best of my knowledge and may be placed before the examiners for evaluation. This dissertation has not been submitted for the award of any other degree of this University or of any other University.

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## PREFACE

It is to note that the limitations of the military instruments of statecraft with simultaneous increase in the application of economic instruments of statecraft is gaining popularity in international relations. Economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy has come to be regarded as an useful non-violent method to penalise any violator of international law. Non-aligned studies has always fascinated. Thus this is an attempt to see NAM's approach in this context.

Chapter I, in two parts seek to see the relationship between economic statecraft and international relations with special emphasis on economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy as conceived by different scholars of International Relations. Chapter II reviews the application of economic sanctions as an instrument to achieve foreign policy objectives by the nations of the world. Chapter III and IV focus on NAM's approach to this instrument with special reference to South African case and attempts to evaluate the impact of this instrument there. We hope we have succeeded in our attempt to focus on the major problem of implementing this

instrument although it remains to be a popular instrument of foreign policy in the present day world.

I owe a great sense of gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Sushil Kumar for his valuable suggestions, constructive criticisms, continuous support, and encouragement at all stages of my work. I am extremely grateful to Prof. K. P. Misra for his help and guidance.

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## CHAPTER - I

### ECONOMIC STATECRAFT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The relations among nations may either be cooperative, conflictive or indifferent in nature. By means of cooperation and conflict nations strive to achieve their cherished goals subject to domestic and foreign restraints.

The foreign policies are thus strategies for action designed by the respective governments, to terminate, reduce or increase cooperation and conflict.

In conflictive situation that the concepts of power and influence become relevant and influence plays an additional role in the establishment, maintenance and expansion of a purely cooperative enterprise. To preserve the accepted pattern of international order that governments have been exercising power and influence vis-a-vis one another from time immemorial.

Economic power appears in the withholding of or in the promise of economic advantages for example trade, investment, developmental aid. In these ways,



economic power may be employed to threaten or directly to weaken or strengthen another state.

Economic pressure used to achieve political ends is not a recent phenomena but has been used by group of states against one or more target countries, with a view to achieve either a foreign policy objective or to enforce compliance with an international norm. It has also been used by such International Organisations as League of Nations in the past and United Nations at present.

Economic power is an important component of national power. The emergence of economic blockade as an accompaniment of economic sanctions. Moreover, increased participation in international trade gave new scope and dimensions to economic warfare for e.g. Britain and Belgium became extremely vulnerable to interference with their imports of food and raw materials.

Different scholars of International Relations have emphasised on the use of economic measures in pursuit of foreign policy goals. Baldwin uses the concept of economic statecraft in this context :

1. The type of policy instrument used for exercising influence on the target nation.
2. Domain of the influence attempt that is participation of other international actor(s).
3. Scope of the influence attempt that is some dimension(s) of the target(s) behaviour (including beliefs, attitudes, opinions, expectations, compotions and/or propensities to work.<sup>1</sup>

Klaus Knorr used the term 'economic leverage' to discuss how economic factors can be used "as means of to achieving state policy"<sup>2</sup>

Broadly defined, the concept of economic statecraft include three overlapping foci; economic sanctions, economic warfare and foreign aid.

### **Economic Sannctions**

These include the use of economic meausres to enforce either international law or objective of exercising influence over some international actor.

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1. Baldwin. D.A. Economic Statecraft, Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press, 1985, p. 6.
  2. Knorr Klaus and Trager Frank N ed "International Economic Leverage and Its uses" in Economic Issues and National Security, Lawrence : Regents Press of Kansas 1977, p 99.

Economic sanctions are of two types : positive and Negative Tables 1 and 2 itemize the various measures included under these types :

TABLE 1

MEASURES OF ECONOMIC STATECRAFT : NEGATIVE SANCTIONS

Trade	Capital
Embargo	Freezing assets
Boycott	Controls on Imports and Exports
Tariff increase Tariff discrimination (Unfavourable).	Aid Suspension Expropriation
Withdrawal of "Most Favoured Nation" treatment	Taxation (unfavourable)
Blacklist	With holding dues to international organisation.
Quotas (import and Export)	Threats of the above
Dumping	
Preclusive buying	
Threats of the above	

Source : Baldwin, David Economic Statecraft p 41.

TABLE 2

POSITIVE SANCTIONS

Trade	Capital
Tariff discrimination (favourable).	Providing aid
Granting "Most - Favoured Nation" treatment	Investment guarantees
Tariff reduction	Encouragement of private Capital (import & Export)
Direct purchase	Taxation (favourable)
Subsidies to Exports and Imports	Promises of the above
Granting licenses (Export & Imports)	
Promises of the above	

Source : Ibid

These tables only reflect the typical use of such techniques which might be employed by the diplomats to pursue a wide variety of foreign policy goals that might eventually lead to a change in the political system or capabilities of the target state or also might help in the denial of access to goods and services of a third state, to the target.

## Economic Warfare

The concept of Economic warfare has been viewed by some as means while by other as effects. Consequently some writers have portrayed the bombing of industrial targets during the Second World War as economic warfare.<sup>3</sup>

Economic warfare supplemented military action and it is a means to coerce or simply to overwhelm or resist an adversary. It is to weaken the economic foundation of the target's powers. Klaus Knorr contended this as 'standard one'<sup>4</sup> that has been applied directly toward destroying the economic sinews of the opponent's power.

From historical viewpoint this has been practised frequently although usually by means of military operations eg. Napoleon's grandiose continental Blockade represented an effort at breaking Britain's economic base by cutting alltrade with the European Continent. But it was during World War II that

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3. Doxey, Margaret Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement, New York, Oxford University Press, 1980 p 13.

4. Knorr Klaus The Power Of Nations Basic Books, Inc Pub. 1975, New York, p 139.

economic warfare pursued by economic and military means was carried on especially by United Kingdom and United states against Germany, on an unprecedented scale and with extreme ruthless determination.

The principal, non military measures of economic warfare are designed to reduce or terminate the enemy country's imports of crucial material in the hope of causing him serious bottlenecks in wartime production, a decline in military equipment and supplies and if possible, his economic collapse.

Thomas Schelling conceived that the concept of economic warfare is most closely related to the concept of "economic statecraft" and defined it in terms of the "economic means by which damage is imposed on other countries or the threat of damage used to bring pressure on them"<sup>5</sup>

In practice, the effectiveness of economic warfare is difficult to measure because the economic policies involved are usually only one factor and certainly not the weightiest in determining the outcome of the war.

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5. Knorr Klaus International Economies Boston, Allen and Bacon; p 487.

Regarding World War II, economic warfare hardly caused the downfall of Germany and Japan, although it contributed to their eventual collapse.

It is obvious that economic warfare makes sense only in the event of a protracted war of attrition. It is a game of big powers waging prolonged war against big powers and this restricts the ranks of possible players in the contemporary world of two : The USA and the USSR.

#### **Foreign Aid :**

International aid serves complex and diverse political, economic and humanitarian purposes. Here emphasis is on the use of economic aid as an instrument of diplomacy. This view has been held by number of scholars as Morgenthau. H.J. Reference is to his article 'Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy'. Nonetheless the humanitarian and other aspects are not discounted by this emphasis on instrumental use of diplomacy. Humanitarian aspects is not been emphasised because it is not relevant to in the present study. Initially an undertaking of the Western Powers to participate in the economic assistance activities, has

also been adopted by the socialist and OPEC states as an important mechanism of their international behaviour. The cooperation that aid symbolises continues to be shaped by the rivalry among states. What began as a defensive and short term measure designed to bolster regimes threatened by internal subversive Communist movements has become a major tool of international economic management and international politics.

Klaus Knorr has rightly maintained that "international aid transactions are always motivated by government interests on both sides", the extent to which the relationship "reflects a voluntarily cooperative mutuality of interest" is crucial to his analysis of aid and influence. For Knorr, there is a clear difference in principle between compliance that is "bought" and that which is "freely given". This distinction has led him to define aid given for some advantage to be received by the donor as "pseudo-gift"<sup>6</sup>.

Foreign aid is much like an ordinary commercial exchange transaction in that one party uses economic

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6. Knorr Klaus, The Power Of Nations pp 172-175



resources to get another party to change his behaviour. Moreover, from the stand point of estimating the strictly economic costs to donors and benefits to receivers of aid, it makes sense to discount loans and tied aid in order to determine the 'grant equivalent' of such aid<sup>7</sup>.

Influence derives not only from the giving of aid but also from promising to give it, cutting it off and threatening to cut it off. Dependency on aid stems from the opportunity costs of forgoing the relationship. Thus, the longer the costs of forgoing aid the greater is the dependency on aid. The most asymmetrical case of aid dependency would be one in which one party (the recipient) values the relationship very highly i.e., experiences large gains from aid and the other party, the donor, places little or no value on the relationship. Such a situation maximizes the potential influence of the indifferent party since the former can make costless and credible threats to end the relationships<sup>8</sup>. Recognition of this

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7. Pincus John Trade Aid Development New York Mcgrow Hills 1967, pp 308-342 and Economic Aid and International cost sharing Baltimore, John Hopkins Press 1965, pp 113-145.

8. Baldwin, David Interdependence and Power

factor underlies George Liska's contention that "for the donor to remain in control, he must be visibly ready to accept the costs of terminating or reshaping the relationship"<sup>9</sup>.

According to klaus knorr "there are no international norms prohibiting monopolist profiteering, just as there are none prohibiting other exercises of economic power"<sup>10</sup>. Since the Second World War, there is continued controversy about which norms are relevant to which forms of economic statecraft and the questions like can aid be given without intervention or whether U.S.A. committed 'economic aggression' when it eliminated the subsidy to Cuban sugar prices or can one state legally apply economic pressure on another state, arose.

International law with respect to economic techniques of statecraft is obscure. With respect to the settlement of international differences, traditional international law divided techniques of statecraft into amicable and non-amicable or compulsive

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9. Liska, George New Statecraft : Foreign Aid in American Foreign policy University of Chicago Press p 69.

10. Knorr Klaus Power of nations p 101.

means of settlement. The latter group included such measures as severing diplomatic relations, embargoes, boycotts, "pacific blockades, and war"<sup>11</sup>. "Pacific", Inis claudé has pointed out is a relative term. In the context of the overriding concern with ridding the world from the 'scourge of war' that marked not only the San Fransisco Conference but also the whole International Organisation Movement in the preceding three decades, economic measures were regarded as a peaceful alter native to war rather than as a subcategory war. John Foster Dulles and Sir Anton Bertram captured the mood of the interwar period in these words.

"The great advantage of economic sanctions is that on the one hand they can be very potent while on the other hand, they donot involve that resort to force and violence which is repugnant to our objective of peace. If any machinery can be set up to ensure that nations comply with either Covenant to renounce war, such machinery must be sought primarily in the economic sphere".<sup>12</sup>

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11. Oppenheim L International Law : A treatise London, Longmans Green 1952, pp 3-176; Stone Julius Legal controls of International conflicts New York Rinehart 1954 pp 67-293.

12. Dulles John Foster Praticable sanctions in Boycotts and Peace in Clark, S ed p 21.

In a situation when technological weapons have made the military power in pursuit of foreign policy goals almost counter productive and mutually annihilating the use of non-military economic measures in furtherance of policy objectives has become more relevant. Economic statecraft is thus a more common and more relevant strategy in International relations in this part of the 20th Century. But still the effectiveness of this measure cannot be judged simply by its prevalence and use in contemporary times. It has to be judged on the basis of case studies of the use of economic measures in recent times. The present study aims to make such a case study.

## ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

From the very inception of modern international system, statesmen and diplomats showed a genuine concern about legal principles, rights and obligations that should govern the nations in their interactions with one another. But in the international arena, there is no effective global community that may compel all member - states to submit to law and to collective monopoly of force. Moreover, there is a lack of true legislative mechanism which can override minority opposition. Such judicial apparatus as exists is hemmed in by the need of voluntary submission of the parties and by the absence of specific sanctions. States insist on retaining their full sovereignty and independence in the face of all pleas that such a position makes the establishment of a real international legal order virtually impossible. Although their public declarations are generally in accordance with the traditional rules of law, their actual foreign policies are often at odds with them.

A country's interests normally define the goals of its foreign policy which in turn leads to a definition of commitments and capabilities to defend them. At

this juncture of the development of world community there is a requirement for new political thinking which necessitates recognition of realities and equilibrium of interests by all participants in international relations.

The study of statecraft is to consider the instruments used by the policy makers in their attempts to exercise power, that is, to get others to do what they would not otherwise do Baldwin has identified four instruments of foreign policy derived from Lass well's taxonomy of techniques of state craft that are available to the policy makers in their way to achieve their foreign policy goals : information, diplomacy, economics and force.

As Quincy Wright has pointed out that the fields of economics and politics 'overlap', therefore economic statecraft may be defined as governmental influence attempts relying primarily on resources that have a reasonable semblance of a market price in terms of money.<sup>13</sup>

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13. Wright Quincy The Study of International Relations  
p 239.

Baldwin has suggested that economic sanctions can work through other noneconomic influence bases, such as imposing a sense of isolation from the world community for example, European communities sanctions against South Africa.

A heated international debate cropped up at the event of the US grain embargo against the Soviet Union and the US restrictions on Soviet European pipeline, over the use of economic sanctions in pursuit of foreign policy goals, which continues to rage today, in the context of proposals to extend sanctions against South African policy of apartheid and advocates consider this measure as an important weapon in the arsenal of economic warfare.

G. Clyde Hufbauer and J.J. Schott define economic sanctions to mean the deliberate governmental inspired with drawal or threat of with drawal of "customary" trade or financial relations".

Economic sanctions entered the diplomatic armoury long before World War I. The technique was used in ancient Greece. The most celebrated occasion was 'Pericles' Megarian decree enacted in 432 BC in response to the kidnapping of three Asparian Women.

Like other fashions economic sanctions, wax and wane in popularity. After World War I, great hopes were held out for the economic weapon with President Woodrow Wilson, the leading advocate.

The basic theory of economic sanctions postulates that economic deprivation will result in the desired political change in the behaviour pattern of the target state.

Sanctions may be defined in the words of A.L. Epstein "a promise of reward for fulfilment of the norms or behaviour that are socially recognised and accepted or in the liability to suffer the consequences that attend their breach"<sup>14</sup>. Thus they are conformity defending and conformity inducing modalities, upholding a particular value system and discouraging any deviation from the norm. Sanctions are indicators of the parameters of individual and group behaviour "designed to confront" as Arens and Lasswell put it "all standard participants in the culture with the probability that non - conformity will prove more deprivatory in terms of their net value position than

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14. Epstein A.L. 'Sanctions' International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences New York; 1968 vol:14 p 1.



conformity"<sup>15</sup>. According to them, the objectives of sanctions are, first of all, deterrence, with a view to anticipating non-conformity towards the community prescription by encouraging the expectation on the part of those who consider deviation that they will be well off by conforming rather than by deviating secondly, restoration, which aims at stopping further deviation and restoring the original situation in so far as the acts of deviation could be withdrawn. Thirdly, rehabilitation i.e., rehandling the values that have been just destroyed as a result of non-conformity. Fourthly, Prevention which attempts to diminish provocation to non-conformity and to strengthen the factors making for conformity. Fifthly, institutional reconstruction, that is, revolutionising public and civil order in ways that would permit closer approximation to the basic goal in the management of sanctions. Lastly, individual reconstruction enabling non-responsive, non-conformists to achieve a responsible level of participation.<sup>16</sup>

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15. Arens and Lasswell's article "Towards a General Theory of Sanctions" Iowa Law Review (IOWA) vol 49 (1963-64) no : 2, pp 233-76 quoted by Chandroke Neera in The Politics of UN Sanctions. Gitanjali Publishing House; New Delhi; 1986.

16. Ibid no 5 pp 244-45 by Chandroke Neera

Thus, the significance of the theory of sanctions is that, a set of sanctions should be capable of inducing conformity with the value structure. Then the question automatically arises that it is self-evident that the values should be readily identifiable and familiar to the members of the group and that there should be a competent authority recognizable as such to enforce measures against a norm breaker.

But group values are comparatively well defined at the state - level. Actually, the entire concept of sanctions derived from the domestic law model. At the level of international politics sanctions are measures of foreign and/or collective policy against an offender state. J. Galtung defined sanctions as "actions initiated by one or more international actors (the "senders") against one or more others (the "receivers") with either or both of the two purposes; to punish the receiver by depriving them of some value and/or to make the receiver comply with certain norms the sender deems important.<sup>17</sup> It then may be seen that the value structure it is sought to be upheld is "subjective"

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17. Galtung J "On the effects of International Economic Sanctions with examples from the Case of Rhodesia" World Politics April 1976; p 379

that is, to say it is decided and subscribed to by the senders.

Consequently, it follows from above that sanctions may be applied, first, by one state against another, second, by a group of states and lastly by an international organisation against a norm - breaker.<sup>18</sup> Peter Wallensteen had tabulated the following cases (1933-67) where sanctions were applied unilaterally, by a regional organisation or by an international organisation.

Year	Sender	Receiver
1933	United Kingdom	USSR
1935-36	League of Nations	Italy
1941	USA	Japan
1945	Arab States	Israel
1948	India	Hyderabad
1948-55	USSR	Yugoslavia
1948-49	USSR	Berlin
1948	USA/NATO/ Western Countries	Soviet Russia/China
1951-54	UK	Iran
1954-60	India	Goa
1960-62	USA	Dominican Republic
1960	USA	Cuba
1961	USSR	Albania
1963	African States	Portugal
1965	UK/UN	Rhodesia
1967	Arab States	UK/USA/W.Germany
1967	Nigeria	Biafia

18. Wallensteen Peter p 249.


Sanctions applied by an international organisation against a state or group of states by way of punishment for the breaking off an internationally accepted norm are qualitatively different from the sanctions employed as an instrument of the foreign policy of a state. This is so because any technique that an international organisation may use has the advantage of immediate legitimacy as R.St. Macdonald has pointed out that "collective measures are theoretically more desirable than individual sanctions the reason being that the coercion is here being mobilized in support of and in no significant way in opposition to, the decisions of the organised community and this sole factor provides legitimacy"<sup>19</sup>.

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Thus it may be observed that the value structure of an international organisation, at a particular moment is governed by the thinking of the dominant group existent at that particular period of time, which may not have universal support though it makes no difference to the legitimacy, on account of its adoption by an international organisation.

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19. Macdonald R.St "The Resort to Economic Coercion by International Political Organisation" University of Toronto Law Journal (Toronto, Ont) vol 17 11967, pp 86-169 Quoted by Chandroke, Neera.



The traditional techniques available to the international organisation against a recalcitrant state, range from diplomatic measures such as verbal denunciations of that state, passing of votes of censure, suspension from international bodies and specialized agencies and rupture of diplomatic relations, to the use of military measures.

Economic sanctions are often applied in wartimes in the form of economic blockades and embargoes which are secondary to military measures. There is a fundamental and qualitative difference between sanctions employed in times of war with the aim of destroying the infrastructure of the offending state and that which are employed as a method of non-destructive coercion" with the objective of enforcing law<sup>20</sup>.

Margaret Doxey has commented that "there are important differences in the status and purpose of economic measures used as techniques of warfare either in conjunction with military measures or independently and economic sanctions employed by an inter national

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20. Loyd Brown John C Multilateral Sanctions in International Law : A Comparative Analysis, New York : Praeger, 1975. p 1

organisation as a part of constitutionally authorized enforcement process"<sup>21</sup>.

The League covenant institutionalised economic sanctions as an instrument of coercion in the hands of international community to be applied against a transgressor state, the nature of which was framed by the American President Woodrow Wilson, during the deliberations at Versailles as follows : "Suppose somebody does not abide by these engagements; then what happens. An absolute isolation, a boycott!. The boycott is automatic ... when you consider that the League is going to consist of every considerable nation in the world except Germany, you can see what the boycott would mean. No goods can be shipped in or out, no telegraphic message can be exchanged except through the elusive wireless perhaps there should be no communication of any other kind between the people of the other nations and the people of that nation"<sup>22</sup>.

In the League Covenant, the concept of sanctions was tied up with the question of aggression, while in

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21. Doxey, Margaret p9.

22. Doxey, Margaret, International Organisation pp 525-550

the United Nations sanctions are related to collective measures to uphold international peace and particularly to the maintenance of purposes and principles of the United Nations. Chapter VII of the charter conferred upon the Security Council the competence to "determine the existence of any threat to peace, breach of peace or act of aggression and also the power to decide upon the measures needed to 'maintain or restore international peace and security.<sup>23</sup> If satisfied that a threat to the peace exists, the Security Council may initiate economic action against the offending state under Article 41 which includes complete or partial interruption of economic relations and/or rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Macdonald spelled out these sanctions as follows:  
1 of all the management of access to a flow of goods, services and money as well as to markets, with the end of denying the target state such access while maintaining it for one self.

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23. United Nations Charter Chapter II Art 39. This can be read with Art I of the Charter that states the purposes of the United Nations

2. the blocking or freezing of target country's assets;
3. the imposition of import and export embargoes total or selective;
4. Black listing of foreign firms and individuals who deal with the target state,
5. drying up of foreign supplies by preclusive buying;
6. Control of re-exportation from a non-participant territory;
7. Control of shipping through selective admission to credit, insurance, stores, fuels, ports, and repair facilities.
8. The monetary system of the target state may be substantially impaired by skilful manipulation of foreign exchange markets;
9. Withdrawal or refusal of credits;
10. dumping of large quantities of currency to compel the target state to pay in gold.
11. by psychological methods designed to cast doubt on the target-state's ability or willingness to pay; and
12. by simple counter feiting of currency.<sup>24</sup>

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24. Macdonald pp 86-87. quoted by Chandroke Neera



Each of these forms of economic coercion may be applied independently or in combination with others. A total application or imposition would lead or mean a complete expulsion of the target state. But experience has shown that this is practically unattainable as it calls for a firm stand of all the participants to apply all these measures or in other words, calling for a total boycott would also affect the participants' economies too and would also make them look for and find out new sources of raw materials and new markets for their products and reorient their own trade - patterns.

Consequently, an alternative to this total boycott, the participants may embargoed those commodities of the target state which have a high loading effect on its economy, which would be more effective in the case of a country that is dependent on any particular sector of production for export. Moreover, if the target state's trading activities are limited to a minimal trade partners, it would be vulnerable to the sanctions that may be imposed by those partners.

The theory of sanctions as may be observed is based on the assumption that economic deprivation would lead to political change that there is a direct cause-effect relationship between the two and an embargo on international trade with that country result in depressed economic conditions leading to alteration of political stance of the target state. The precise manner in which economic sanctions would cause strain has been variously interpreted.<sup>25</sup> But it has been particularly agreed that one of the important consequences of the application of sanctions is that the income level go down by and large i.e., the real income suffers a decline, the ensuring shortage of foreign exchange put in evitable restraint on crucial imports and loss of foreign markets leads to a deterioration in the balance of payments position. In short, the economy is thrown out of the main stream of international economic intercourse which inturn saps the morale of the people of the target state and leads to their no confidence in the existing regime that account for political instability out of which arise

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25. On this point see Barkenov CC "Sanctions and Rhodesian Economy" Journal of Economics Mar. 1969 pp 44-75, Mayona J.K. "The political Economy of Sanctions and Implications for Future Economic Policy" Journal of Southern African Affairs V 112 Oct. 1977 pp 493-520.

conditions that are considered desirable by the sanctioneering states.

Although the sanctioneering effort is ambitious but it is impossible. The development of international trade and commerce has made the modern state an integral part of the world economy rather than a self-sufficient economic unit. Therefore, economic isolation can very well undermine the economic structure of the target state. It is axiomatic that economic stability is a pre-condition for the preservation of political structure of a state, so if adequate pressure is brought to bear, the economic weapon has every chance of succeeding.

The concept of sanctions may be seen from two dimensional perspectives. First, is from the stand point of international community which calls for, the identification of the violation of peace decisions to infer measures, goal - setting and the selection of appropriate measures that leads to the problem of cost determination and cost allocation. Consequently, the essential feature of a structure of sanctions demands an international control system exclusively empowered to supervise and monitor the application of sanctions

and determining allocation of costs equally among sanctioneering states.

Johan Galtung has listed seven conditions for the success of sanctions which will succeed if;

1. the imports of the target state have a very high loading effects on important sectors.
2. there is no integral substitute for the imports.
3. a high percentage of important imports come from the sending nations applying sanctions;
4. there is no external substitute for these imports so that the target cannot change its trade partners.
5. the imports make up a very small part of the exports of the sending nation [s] and/or that they can form alternative trade relationships.
6. the exports of the target are sent mainly to the states applying sanctions and that it cannot find new markets easily; and
7. these exports of the target can be obtained easily from other sources by the former trade partners so that the nations applying sanctions do not suffer economically.<sup>26</sup>

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26. Galtung, Johan p 383.

Robin Renwick in his work on economic sanctions noted that 'in current international usage sanctions are conceived essentially as the imposition of economic penalties to bring about a change in the political behavior of the country against which they are directed.'<sup>27</sup>

A still more conceptual bias in the study of economic statecraft is the denial that economic exchange process involve power and influence. Klaus Knorr has distinguished between economic exchange on one hand and transactions involving politics and power on the other.<sup>28</sup>

'Economic sanctions' asserted Milton Friedman 'are likely to do us as much harm as they do their intended target.'<sup>29</sup> This idea has been supported by Bienen Gilpin who argued that 'the probable success of economic sanctions may very well turn on whether the ultimate costs involved are higher for the sanctioned or the

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27. Doxey, Margaret Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement p 2.

28. Knorr Klaus Power of Nations pp 80-81, 135-171, 310-314.

29. Newsweek Jan. 21, 1980 p 76.

sanctioning state.<sup>30</sup>

The question that whether it is rational to impose sanctions that hurt the sender more than the target cannot be answered in advance but must be approached in terms of sender's value-system and his perceived alternatives. In some situations the policy makers may have no choice because all of their policy alternatives involve bigger costs for themselves than for the target. K.J.Holsti has concluded that "past experience suggest that little is to be gained from using these [economic] instruments..... compared to other techniques, particularly subversion and warfare..... they might seem particularly in expensive. That is not to say, they are more effective"<sup>31</sup>

The effects of economic sanctions are very difficult to predict as it is beset by many difficulties which are not very obvious as most modern states maintain professionally trained cadres to implement diplomacy. Difficulties may arise about the organisation of contemporary states for the conduct of

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30. Comments by Gilpin in New York Times Jan 30, 1980.

31. Holsti, K.J. International Politics Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1967, p. 239.

foreign affairs than about the inherent drawbacks of economic sanctions.

It is important for the policy makers to understand the general characteristics of techniques of statecraft, but it is more important for them to know the distinctive traits of different kinds of statecraft. For unlike journalists and academicians, policy makers must choose among alternative techniques. If academicians and journalists are to say something about economic statecraft that is potentially useful to policy makers, they must clearly label comments applicable to statecraft in general as opposed to those that differentiate one kind of statecraft from another.

In sum, economic statecraft like any other foreign policy instruments can be used for good or evil. The general rule is that means used should be proportionate to the ends pursued. For most economic techniques of statecraft, moral status must be determined in the context of foreign policy contingency framework in which they are applied or contemplated. Moreover, in the nuclear age, elucidation of alternatives to military statecraft becomes especially important.

Policy science focuses on the means by which statesmen may pursue their goals. Stanley Hoffmann in his book Contemporary theory has warned that this approach runs the risk of becoming a study of manipulation, through excessive emphasis on the skills of policy making and of developing a fascination with the strategies of power. Despite, he noted that one of the roles of scholarship is to help the policy makers to understand the situations and choose the appropriate alternatives



## CHAPTER II

### ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY

The instruments of foreign policy are numerous and varied ranging from diplomacy to economic pressures from military warfare to the use of ideological beliefs in order to win over opponent nation. This makes it a difficult task for the policy makers by demanding an artful endeavour towards proper coordination and application of these multitude measures including the threat to use them, for achieving their foreign policy objectives.

The experiences of the Great War compelled the international personalities to rethink the rational use of foreign policy instruments for avoidance of massive destruction and save the mankind from the 'scourge of war'. Accordingly, earlier the League Covenant and at present, the United Nations' charter pronounced the use of economic statecraft to military statecraft which implies that in case of a violation of an international norm by any state should be retaliated collectively or individually by the international community, by

imposing economic sanctions to alter the behaviour of the violator.

The question arises, why does a nation in a given situation prefer economic sanctions to alternative courses of policy?

An international organisation is set up on a constitutional basis underlie certain limitations regarding what kind of a decision the organisation may make or take under certain given situations. The members of the international organisation too are not free to choose between 'ad hoc' solutions. When a political problem of international character springs up, the organisation react in accordance with its constitutional basis.

The League Covenant in Para graph 16 which is derived from the principles of collective security and 'rule of law' as basic international rule of conduct, prescribed the use of economic sanctions. But the crying need of the international community is some commonlaw to which all state would submita obey to and which would help in the replacement of vicious game of power politics.

Sanctions are a tool to coerce target governments into particular a venues of response. They may be viewed as the sender - country's attempt to 'interfere' in the internal affairs of the target government.

If one look into the history of application of economic sanctions to achieve foreign policy objectives, one observes that they are mostly employed by the Big powers which pursue an active foreign policy to influence events on a global scale. This point becomes clear as one looks into a chronological list of cases of economic sanctions, from the First World War to date. This list is given in Appendix I.

This chronological list of economic sanctions clearly brings out that there are cases when an individual country has imposed sanctions or a group of countries have imposed it on a certain country or a case where an international organisation in cooperation with any of the big powers has done so. But one significant thing can be noticed that as Hufbauer and Schott has pointed out that "demonstration of resolve has supplied the driving force behind the imposition of sanctions." which is particularly true of the United

States that has frequently deployed this measure to assert leadership in international politics

One can see that the sender country aims to gain five objectives from the imposition of sanctions. Firstly, within a specific period of time through meaningful restraints, the sender country seeks the alteration in the policies of the target state, as can be seen in Human Rights and Non-Proliferation cases secondly, to destabilize a target government. This has been frequently aimed by the United States, and USSR, the significant ones are that of United States campaign against Cuba in 1962 and USSR's campaign against Yugoslavia in 1948-55, to destabilize Castro's and Tito's governments respectively. Thirdly, to disrupt minor military adventures for e.g. United Kingdom's action against Argentina over Falkland islands. Fourthly, to weaken or damage military potential of the target as was done in the First and the Second World Wars against Germany mainly and Japan. Lastly, in order to achieve major policy changes in the target state for e.g. United Nations campaign against South Africa over Apartheid and control of Namibia.

### **Individual Sanctions :**

When a country employs economic sanctions against another country in its individual capacity as has been frequently used by United States at different periods of time against different individual target countries separately, one may notice a decisive element that the sender countries did not disclose their true intentions or announce their goals clearly. This statement can be justified by the destabilization cases where the sender countries always imposed sanctions with the motive to overthrow the respective governments of Castro, (Cuba) Sukarno (Indonesia) Tito (Yugoslavia) under the veil of either an attempt to discourage Cuba from foreign military adventures or to cease 'Crush Malaysia' Campaign of Indonesia or an attempt to compel Yugoslavia to rejoin Soviet Camp. But most of the destabilisation cases were unsuccessful due to lack of total international cooperation for that period of time which would have made the sanctions effective to attain its goals. The main objective behind the imposition of economic sanctions by only one country against another is to attain its own self interest, to enforce those norms which the sender, personally, considers to

be observed in a relation and any violation of which should be countered to reinforce it.

#### **Collective Sanctions :**

When a group of countries or a single country in cooperation from an international organisation impose sanctions on a single country, for e.g. the League of Nations sanctions against Italy in 1935-36, the United Nations sanctions against 'Rhodesia in 1965 and at present against South Africa for its inhuman apartheid policy, the Allied Powers against Germany and Japan in 1939 - 45. The main aim behind the imposition of sanctions collectively is to reestablish those global norms which the international community deems essential for maintaining international law and order that inturn would give stability and peace to the international system as a whole. This collective effort always sought to improve the human rights condition. Thus the international community should take a collective sanctions package against the Pretoria regime of South Africa for its continual defiance of human rights to its majority of the population in name of Apartheid.

In the process of imposition of sanctions, a number of national and international factors play a vital role in restricting the sender to achieve the foreign policy goals which it aimed at. In justification to this statement one can cite the e.g. of the League of Nations sanctions against Italy in 1935-36, where the major powers Britain and France, in the fear of upsetting the political balance of Europe on the eve of national election were reluctant to cease the advancement of Italian Army in Abyssinia compelling the League Council to seek appeasement by ceding some Abyssinian territory to Italy.

There also underlie a number of political and economic variables in any sanctions episode.

The political variables, as has been pointed out by Hufbauer and Schott as firstly, 'companion policy' used by the sender that include the covertaction of destabilising the target government, stationing of troops at the border to armed hostility. Secondly, time - span of sanctions in force i.e. the exact date of onset and termination of sanctions. Thirdly, the most important influential factor i.e. international cooperation, for e.g. there may be no cooperation i.e.

when a sender imposes sanctions in its individual capacity as has been several times employed by the United States as has been discussed above. There can be some degree of support to the sender but for a specific period of time and coverage, as was in the Cuban Case. Again, political stability and economic health of the target is an important determinant for e.g. Uganda in the later years of Amin regime was an easy prey to the British sanctions whereas a strong and stable country can withstand the pressures of sanctions as was the case with USSR at the time of Afghan invasion. Lastly, the warmth of prior relationship between the sender and the target which was evident from South Korea and Taiwan's accede to mild US pressures and to forgo construction of nuclear processing plants in the mid 1970s.

The economic variables include, the cost imposition on the target country i.e. higher the cost, more the chances of target altering its policies. The commercial relations marked by the degree of trade too, largely influences sanctions. Then, the respective economic size of the country measured by the ratio of their GNP (Gross National Product) values play a vital



role. Lastly, the type of sanctions i.e. whether it is trade or export interruptions from the sender.

It is generally believed that sanctions have a deterrent action as the sender by increasing the associated costs discourages objectionable policies of the target, in the future. But if one looks into the United States imposition of sanctions against USSR over Afganistan from 1980-'81, one would find it difficult to determine whether sanctions are an effective deterrent against future misdeeds as the Soviet Union was virtually unaffected by that imposition of sanctions.

There are three ways by which the sender attempts to aggravate the costs on the target. First of which involves trade interruption. Secondly, by restricting imports. But this is rarely used as the target can find new markets and some countries do not possess legal authority to impose import controls for foreign policy reasons for e.g. United States only under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and International Emergency Economic Powers Act can do so. Lastly, by impeding finance including reduction of aid which aims at freezing target state's assets.

Thus it may be concluded that economic sanctions are employed to achieve political ends by economic measures.

The recognition of the importance of moral factors in International Relations called for collective action to sustain prevailing norms. The experience of Great Wars generated the feelings of opposition to the use of force and imposition of economic sanctions were thought to be pragmatic against a norm breaker rather than the use of military measures to alter the offender's behaviour.

Though the objectives behind the imposition of sanctions are multidimensional, they may be categorised as primary related to the action and behaviour of the target e.g. it was a primary objective to stop Italy attacking Abyssinia. Secondary related to the status, behaviour and expectations of the sender e.g. American politicians in order to receive domestic support took action against Cuba in 1962. Thirdly, tertiary concerned with broad international considerations related either to the structure or function of the international system or parts that are important e.g. it was America's tertiary motive in Cuba

to stop the spread of Communism in the Western Hemisphere.

Thus C. Lloyd Brown has correctly pointed out that economic sanctions alone cannot be employed to achieve primary objective in that case it becomes a victim of 'over expectations'<sup>1</sup>.

Economic sanctions must be regarded as a marginal instrument of influence which can achieve best political result when employed in conjunction with other measures.

Time plays an important role in politics. Circumstances change, the sharp edge of initial criticism are blunted and other issues arise in the international relations to steal attention.

With the technological advancement the world has become more close knit resulting in greater complexities and conflictive relations among nations. Simultaneously it has obviously dictated the nations to adopted economic to military measures of statecraft to achieve the foreign policy objectives. Thus we may  
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1. Brown, Lloyd C., "Multiple sanctions in International law". International Affairs, 1979. p.3.

conclude that it is here where lies the keystone of success of economic sanctions as one of the important tools of foreign policy which the nations would at large employ as long as International Relations continue.

## CHAPTER III

### NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

#### A CASE STUDY OF SOUTH AFRICA

The post second world war tensions between the USA and the USSR further aggravated which led to the formation of alliances and counter alliances; as a policy of containing each other.

This generated a sense of worry and fear in the minds of the newly independent nations which were reluctant to get involved in this largely European nations. Conflicts between USA and USSR that was increasingly trying to engulf all the nations of the world to serve their purposes.

The new nations sensed a threat to their independence and sovereignty, in this political process. They made determined effort to keep out of cold war politics on one hand and to promote a peaceful world on the other. Non-Alignment was an effort in this direction.

Non-aligned movement (NAM) has become a powerful world movement which aims to reform the character of the contemporary inter national system. Gradually Non-

aligned Movement has been able to enlarge its membership (present strength is 102) which helped it to mobilise support of a large number of Third World countries to its political objectives. This large membership has given NAM some weightage in International Relations for which the superpowers find it necessary to take it into account while formulating their policies.

NAM seeks to influence international developments through the United Nations' General Assembly mainly where it enjoys majority support. In fact non-aligned majority has become an instrument of NAM's foreign policy especially relating to reform in the international system. NAM has tried to bring about changes in International Law in tune with the needs of the newly independent countries. They have also attempted to generate world public opinion in favour of certain burning issues of international relations, for e.g. Disarmament and Development and to mobilise international pressures for the solutions to those issues relating to vestiges of colonial era. One such burning problem has been the question of racial discrimination of South Africa.

International efforts to effect South Africa's internal situation and international concern with the distribution of power within that country began almost literally with the birth of the United Nations. Racial policies and practices of South Africa have engaged the attention of the international community. The notion that South Africa's internal situation was of international concern voiced as early as 1946 when the Indian delegation at the General Assembly charged that the Indian settlers in South Africa were suffering progressively for this policy of discrimination. In September 1952, thirteen countries requested the inclusion of an item in the agenda of the General Assembly entitled "... the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Union of South Africa" and these countries alleged that the policies and practices of the Government were creating a dangerous and explosive situation which constitutes both a threat to international peace and a flagrant violation of the basic principles of human rights and fundamental freedom which are enshrined in the charter.

The international community has unanimously felt the need to impose economic sanctions (although in

varying degrees) in order to compel the Pretoria regime to abandon its policy of apartheid.

In recent years, South Africa has been subjected to a wide range of international sanctions which are of diverse in nature - economic, communications, cultural and sporting imposed by United Nations, individual states, regional and specialised agencies.

In recent times, the UN General Assembly had adopted three resolutions, one 43/13 C (in 1988 entitled "Comprehensive mandatory sanctions against the racist regime of South Africa" retained all the essential elements of the 1986 Resolution No:41/35 B and 42/23 C of 1987 Resolution such as urgently requesting the Security Council to take immediate action under Chapter VII of the charter with a view to applying sanctions. Also urged that the Governments of United Kingdom and United States to reassess their policies in this regard. Along with this, the Resolution of 42/23 G which called for 'concerted international action for the elimination of apartheid' urged the Security Council to consider without delay the adaption of effective mandatory sanctions to pressurize Pretoria.



Most of the Western countries were opposed to the idea of imposition of comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions because its impact on the Western economies would be sustained, creating unemployment in certain sectors of the industry by denial of critical minerals to the West, compelling them to look for an alternative source i.e., Soviet Union, endangering not only their economies but security structures too.

Despite this Western reluctance, the active enthusiasm and continuous endeavour of the Non-aligned countries have achieved an attitudinal change in the Western policies. Recently they too, have favoured the imposition of sanctions of some selected items against South Africa, which can be seen in the chart below:-

TABLE 3  
SANCTIONS AT A GLANCE

United Kingdom (Commonwealth and EC)

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* Arms Embargo	* Ban on imports of gold coins
* Oil Embargo	* Ban on Govt.funding for trade mission
* Ban on sensitive equipment to political & military	* Ban on imports of iron and Steel

- \* Ban on nuclear collaboration
- \* Voluntary ban on new investments
- \* Ban on Government to government bank loans
- \* Voluntary ban on the promotion of tourism

#### West Germany, Italy, France (EC)

- \* Arms Embargo
- \* Ban on imports of iron and Steel
- \* Oil Embargo
- \* Ban on imports of gold coins
- \* Ban on nuclear collaboration
- \* Ban on import of Coal (France only)
- \* Ban on new investments

#### United States

- \* Termination of landing rights for South African Airways
- \* Ban on bank loans except for black upliftment
- \* Ban on imports of coal, iron, steel, uranium and gold coins
- \* Arms Embargo
- \* Ban on South African Agricultural products including food and sugar
- \* Oil Embargo
- \* Ban on new investment
- \* Ban on sale of computer and hightech goods to military and police tech goods to military and police
- \* Ban on nuclear collaboration.

### Japan

- \* Investment ban on imports of iron and steel
- \* Agreement on to undermine US ban on imports of South African coal.

### Switzerland

No sanctions

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**Source :** Battersbay, John D, South Africa : Sanctions; Africa Report Vol.: 32, 1987.

Despite these large scale international concerted effort, comprehensive sanctions policy is difficult to be implemented because there is a lack of confidence about the desired consequences and strong doubts about the approach of the international community to make them really effective. In addition, the economies of the neighbouring states of South Africa may be wrecked as obviously the white Government might definitely try to divert the adverse impact of sanctions on its black population, which acts as a constraint in regidly implementing econmic sanctions against South Africa.

The Non-aligned countries have taken a firm stand on this issue and the imposition of economic sanctions on South Africa goes to their credit. The justification of this statement can be traced back to

their efforts at various Non-aligned Conferences and other international conferences and as one has seen above at the United Nations.

The non-aligned countries initiated proposal for the suspension of relations with South Africa along with the imposition of voluntary arms and oil embargo from the Cairo conference in 1964 to the Belgrade conference of 1989. It repeatedly decided to take severe measures against the exponents of colonialist policies of South Africa and maintained that the individual countries of the West should withdraw their support and assistance from the racist regime.

But realising the difficulty of receiving a consensus on the question of imposition of economic sanctions, it took a drastic step in the Algiers conference of 1973 by proposing for the implementation of chapter VII of the charter (that calls for imposition of sanctions) against South Africa for its obstinate defiance of United Nations decisions.

The Colombo Conference of 1976 called for the eradication of apartheid and for the exercise of the right of self determination by the people of South Africa.

Despite these endeavours, the depth of frustrations was prominent among the Africans as the approach for a solution by the Non-aligned countries in the United Nations met with opposition by those who assisted South Africa.

Irrespective of this, the Non-aligned countries strived hard in this direction in the Seventh Eighth and Ninth Summits respectively. In the event of South Africa's retaliatory measures against its neighbours, the Non-aligned countries called for the imposition of comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions and decided to set up a solidarity fund to assist the Frontline states, to help them to fight the Pretoria regime, which still continues to date.

Apart from their own summit conferences, the Non-aligned countries have voiced their anti-apartheid stand at various international platforms. Consequently on Dec.8, 1989 at the opening session of the weeklong Common Wealth Heads of Government (CHOGM) at Kuala Lumpur, the Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe said all forms of pressures including economic sanctions should be maintained on South Africa, until

positive political change in line with the acceptable, democratic principles, occurred.<sup>1</sup>

The outgoing Commonwealth Secretary General Shridarth Ramphal of Guyana, called upon the commonwealth member countries to press on with sanctions against South Africa until the Pretoria regime abandoned its apartheid policy. He said the capacity for advancing solution to world problems imposed responsibilities more in relation to South Africa where the commonwealth countries sustained stand against apartheid has earned both respect and acknowledgement worldwide.

The Non-aligned countries have strived for the application of economic sanctions along the line of UN charter as the United Nations is the only organisation that can mandate sanctions that are virtually universal, under chapter VII of the charter.

Thus, the UN Security Council on Dec 13, 1988 reaffirmed 1977 embargo of arms export to South Africa and voted unanimously to request that "all the states

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1. The Hindu, thursday, Oct.19, 1989: CHOGM for stronger sanctions against South Africa.

refrain from importing arms ammunition of all types and military vehicles produced in South Africa.<sup>2</sup>

The attitudes of the Non-aligned countries was that they tried for almost a decade to keep oil from reaching South Africa, specially in 1983 Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe criticized the Reagan Administration Policy of "constructive engagement" that encouraged South Africa "to become more aggressive" towards neighbouring black ruled nations. The Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda had called on the West to Pressurize South Africa asking "why action in (Poland) and no action in (South Africa)?<sup>3</sup>.

#### **NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS**

Inorder to understand the Non-aligned countries attitudes towards the use of economic sanctions as an instrument of diplomacy it is necessary to study it in terms of the patterns of relationship between the initiating and the target countries Which can be understood in the following four patterns of relationship.

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2. Washington Post, 14 Dec, 1984 A46.
3. Washington Post 2 April 1983, A16; 19 Aug'83 A14

The following case studies pertaining to each pattern have been chosen. The cases to be studied are given below:

1. United States' imposition of economic sanctions against Cuba (1962)
2. Indonesia's imposition of economic sanctions against Malaysia (1963-66)
3. Indonesia's imposition of economic sanctions on Netherlands (1957-62)
4. United States impositions of economic sanctions against USSR (1983)

## 1. US SANCTIONS ON CUBA

### Background

The problem presented by F. Castro and his government, is that it had supplied communism with a bridgehead to the Americas. It has turned itself into an arsenal for arms and ammunitions from the communist world with communist help. Castro has built up the largest military establishment in Latin America.<sup>4</sup>

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4. Documents on American Foreign relations 1962 council on Foreign relations, Harper and Row Publishers, New York and Evanston, 1963.



The installation of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba, threatened the American security system. When the United States war with Spain ended, the entire Cuban economy came under US dominations. The Cuban population fell into abject poverty because the primary interest the US had in Cuba was sugar and the population was forced to grow this single crop.

In Washington, the administration adopted a hard line approach to Cuba from the very beginning of the Castro Revolution on January 3, 1961, President Eisenhower broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba and month later ie, February 3, 1961, newly inaugurated President J.F. Kennedy ordered a suspension of all commercial relations between U.S and Cuba. On March 3, he banned all sugar imports from Cuba with the objective of bringing about a collapse of the island's economy.

On October 14, 1962, a US spy plane discovered two missile bases on Cuban territory. On October 22, 1962, President Kennedy declared that the sole purpose of these two bases was to attack US and thus ordered a Naval Blockade of Cuba and urged soviet leader

Nikita.S. Krushcher to dismantle both bases and "abandon the quest for world domination".

Mankind found itself on the threshold of war on October 24, 1962. Krush Chev's sound reason prevented a tragedy. On October 28, he agreed to dismantle Cuban missile bases after the US has pledged not to intervene in Cuba again and not to permit anybody to use US territory as a base for striking at Cuba. Still, the aggressive and piratical operations did not cease until 1973, when Cuba's enemies finally realised that they would not succeed in provoking a crisis of the Castro-Government.

### **Reactions of the non-aligned countries**

In this situation in the Colombo conference, the Non-Aligned countries denounced threats and new aggression against Cuba made by U.S imperialism and also reiterated its condemnation of the blockade imposed by U.S imperialism in an effort to isolate and destroy the Cuban Revolution and demanded that it be immediately and unconditionally lifted. It also recognised that the people of Cuba have suffered

extensive economic losses due to the blockade which must be rectified.

## 2. INDONESIAN IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON MALAYSIA

### Background

Indonesian objections to the creation of the Federation of Malaysia began when President Sukarno, first publicly rejected the idea on January 8, 1963. The Indonesian policy of confrontation began soon after. In February, Indonesian infiltrators crossed the border into the Malaysian territory of Sarawak. Sukarno seemed to soften somewhat in April, agreeing to a conference in Manila to be attended by the foreign ministers of the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia. By May, Sukarno and the Malaysian leader, Prince Abdul Rahman were again "Vying each other to search for the most offensive epithets to hurl across the Java sea".<sup>5</sup>

In Tokyo, later the same month, Sukarno met with Prince Abdul Rahman and established "Cordial and personal relations."<sup>6</sup>

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5. Ledge J.D. Sukarno a political biography New York, Praeger Publishers, 1972 P.366.

6. Ibid.

In June, the concept of MAPHILINDO (Malaysia-Philippines-Indonesia) was established consisting of a permanent arena for the settling of disagreements among the three countries. Publicly, Sukarno based his rejection of the establishment of Malaysia on a small uprising in North Borneo, citing it as evidence that not all of the peoples encompassed by the arbitrarily set boundaries of the Federation of Malaysia truly wished to become part of the state. In a summit meeting, at the end of July, the foreign ministers of Indonesia and Malaysia agreed that the United Nations Secretary General U-thant would send an envoy to Borneo to determine if those residents wanted to be included in the Federation. Further, the formal announcement of the formation of Malaysia originally scheduled for August 31, 1963 would be postponed pending the results of the United Nations envoy's mission. Some minor problems resulted with the personnel make up of the United Nations mission-Indonesia complained that it wanted more Indonesian nationals to accompany the UN team.

On August 29, Prince Abdul Rahman announced that the Federation of Malaysia would formally come into existence. On September 16, Sukarno charged the

Malaysian leader with violating the Manila Agreements. The Federation of Malaysia nevertheless, came into being on the 16th Sukarno immediately announced his "crush Malaysia" policy and called on twenty-one million Indonesian volunteers to achieve this goal. He also severed all economic ties with Singapore, which upto that point had been Indonesia's primary trading partner and principal port.

At the end of September the UN envoy determined that Borneo should in fact be included in the Federation., Sukarno, however, did not alter his stance. He was firmly committed to a policy that would dictate the direction of Indonesia's foreign policy for almost two years.

### **Reactions**

The majority of the members of the United Nations Security Council, including Ivory Coast and Morocco, were not persuaded that the Cannons of UN charter could be disregarded in such a blatant manner just because one of its members regarded Malaysia as an anachronistic substitute for empire.

Disappointed in the security Council, Sukarno turned his attention towards the second non-aligned conference which convened in Cairo in October 1964 and to which Malaysia had been refused admission. Though the picture seemed clear for Indonesia to achieve its aim in the absence of Malaysia but he failed to secure satisfactory endorsement of confrontation against Malaysia in the final programme of the Conference both the members of the NAM and Afro-Asian fraternity refused to perceive Malaysia as a manifestation of neocolonialism.

### 3. INDONESIA'S IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST NETHERLANDS (1957- 62)

#### Background

Indonesia claimed sovereignty over the West Irian, asserting that the Netherlands had relinquished it to Indonesia as a part of the agreement recognising Indonesian independence.<sup>7</sup> The Netherlands which had been in control of West Irian for several centuries, in effect denied that the territory had been included in

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7. UN General Assembly official Record 16th Session, Plenary 617-18 (A/PV 1050 ) 1961.

the agreement and proposed that the future of the area would be determined in accordance with the wishes of its people.<sup>8</sup> Indonesia rejected recourse to International Court of Justice for the solution of the dispute as to the location of sovereignty on the ground that in a dispute of this kind before the Court, the former colonial power would always have an advantage.<sup>9</sup> West Irian was a colonial sword poised over Indonesia. So as long as the Dutch retained control of the territory a threat would be posed to the integrity of the socially diverse and distended archepalagic state. Thus Sukarno's strategy for the restoration of this territory was the employment of economic diplomacy.

Consequently, the way in which this claim was treated in United Nations General Assembly, prompted the riposte of a decisive challenge to Dutch economic interests in Indonesia. In 1957, following another debate in UN General Assembly on West Irian, the Dutch enterprises had been boycotted in Indonesia and it

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8. Id at 587-89 (A/PV1049); Id. Annexes, Agenda Items 88 and 22 (a) at 24 (A/L354) 1961.

9. Netherlands proposal of adjudication see id plenary 589 for Indonesia's rejection of proposal see id at 848 (A/PV 1065).

increasingly played on American fear of communism in order to bring indirect pressure on the Dutch.

### **Reactions of non-aligned countries**

Afro-Asian Governments entertained a mixed feelings towards Indonesian President's stand on the issue. They were happy to applaud his fulminations against Imperialism but less impressed with his nostrums or by the extent he became a source of division within their ranks. India and Pakistan had given assurance to Indonesia's effort to regain West Irian. General reaction was to write them off as Sukarno bluster. Malaya was in favour of Indonesia other Asians had hoped to see United Nations to take constructive steps towards settlement of this dispute. Phillipines and South Korea sympathised with Indonesia on the issue.

### **US IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON USSR (1983)**

#### **Background**

Korean Airline (KAL) flight 007, traveling from New York to Seoul disappeared from the radar screens Anchorage, Alaska and Tokyo on 30th August 1983. It



is reported initially as having landed safely in Soviet territory on Sakhalin Island.

On 1st September, U S secretary of state George Shultz accused soviets of having shot down airliner after it strayed off course and into soviet airspace over sensitive military facilities. On the following day, the UN Security Council, at the request of US, and Korea opened debate on shooting. USSR admitted only that its fighters fired warning shots and plane flew out of its airspace. Soviets contended that plane was on deliberate spying mission sent by us, was flying without navigation lights and did not respond to signals. Shultz accused the Soviet Union of covering up truth and US called on the allies to halt all air traffic to and from USSR for at least 60 to 90 days.

#### **Reactions of the non-aligned countries**

On the KAL incident, the Korean Foreign Minister stressed that the Soviets should comply with their justified demand and which he pointed out had been backed by majority of votes at the United Nations. He also said that his primary mission would be to meet as much foreign ministers of the Non-aligned countries, as

possible in order to sound their opinion on the incident.

India behaved indifferently as few days afterwards the Indian External Affairs Minister, Mr. P.V.Narasimha Rao met his Soviet counterpart A. Gromyko and they were to sign in the next few days a new trade agreement. In addition to this, for the United Nations summit on the 20th of the same month, the NAM members told Mrs. Gandhi "You as the chair person represent all of us. You alone need to be there." Moreover, countries like Pakistan, Srilanka, Zambia along with several other non-aligned countries informed their inability to attend because of unavoidable circumstances. This reveals that on the KAL issue, the non-aligned countries were divided within the set framework.

A careful scrutiny of the cases in Chapter II projects one important factor that the mode of behaviour, change on differ according to the target. In most cases Economic sanctions have been either used to overthrow a particular government which the sender is opposed to or to improve human rights conditions in the target country.

But one significant thing is revealed from an indepth study that behavioural differences are due to/according to the national interest of the countries involved with the target for which one may find sometimes lack of collective will to side the sanctioneering country. The United Kingdom's imposition of economic sanctions against Rhodesia in 1965 is a case in hand where there was a huge support for the imposition. the Byrd Amendment of 1971 implied that the import of Rhodesian chrome and strategically important materials cannot be prohibited for their import was imperative in the national interest of the United States.

So this is an eloquent testimony to the fact that dedication to sanctions is best tested when it clashes with national interest.

In the South African case, the non-aligned countries reaffirmed their full support for the oppressed people of South Africa and declared that any aggression by the Pretoria against independent African states would be considered as an act of aggression against the Non-aligned countries and international community. Despite this, some of the Frontline states

as lesotho Botswana, Swaziland, who are members of NAM are involved in channelising South African products thereby minimising the loss from sanctions.

Moreover, in the same Colombo Conference the resolution that called for the implementation of the Chapter VII of the Charter, in the Cyprus case there too, many non-aligned countries objected the implementation of Chapter VII as Bahamas, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates for their respective political and economic interests.

This explains one vital aspect, that although NAM advocates its anti-colonialist and anti-racist stand, in actuality, when their or some of its members' interests conflict with the actions to be taken, its implementation is impossible or doubtful. Because at this situation the countries want to take a mid course of action by imposing milder measures on the target that would save their face while be useful in protecting their national interest vis-a-vis the target. In such cases, the economic sanctions becomes ineffective as it lacks the biting capacity or fails to

injure or pressurize the target to comply with international law.

This is the problem presently faced by the international community in the South African case. The Western apposition to comprehensive sanctions is making the Economic Sanctions an ~~empty~~ ineffective instrument of foreign policy to pressurize South Africa to give up its inhuman policy of apartheid. Although morally, at least on the surface, the West has been committed to basic civil rights for the majority of South Africans. Yet because of extensive economic ties have been reluctant to take meaningful action that would culminate in the eradication of apartheid.

Thus conclusion may be drawn that while NAM advocates the establishment of world order with respect for human rights and political independence of the peoples all over the world. NAM find it difficult to act effectively. The main objective of all and sundry in the international arena is to preserve and maximise its own gain and national interest.

Following is an attempt to illustrate the attitude of countries on question of Economic Sanctions. : (See in Appendix II for elaboration)

TABLE 4

Voting result on Resolutions relating to Comprehensive and Mandatory Sanctions Against Racist Regime of South Africa (SEE APPENDIX II)

	For	Against	Abstention	Absent
Resolution 41/35 B 1986	129	8	18	2
Resolution 42/23 C	125	11	17	4
Resolution 43/13 C	145	None	2	10

Table 4 shows an increase in the number of countries voted against the resolution in 1987 by three. Those are Canada Israel and Netherlands, all of them abstained from voting in 1986 and a remarkable development may be noticed in 1988 in the behaviours of Canada and Netherlands who voted in favour of the resolution while Israel was absent.

Then if one looks into the abstention position of the countries, though one may see a decrease in number from 1986 to 1987. But an important factor in that some Countries as Australia, Austria, Denmark Finland, Greece Iceland, Ireland Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Spain and Sweden maintained their earlier stand by

abstaining from voting in both cases. But one may notice that Malawi and Malta from favour in 1986 went for abstention in 1987 from voting. Lesotho and Swaziland who were not present in 1986, in 1987 abstained from voting on the resolution. Here too, a drastic change may be noticed in 1988, all those who formerly abstained from voting voted in favour of the Resolution and United States and United Kingdom from against the Resolution in both 1986 and 1987 abstained from voting in 1988. Regarding the absentee cases, only Chile and Paraguay maintained their earlier stand by remaining absent in both 1986 1987 and 1988 respectively while in 1987 Dominica from favour in 1986 remained absent in 1987 and favoured in 1988. Botswana was absent for the 1987 voting session. The 1988 development shows an increase in number of absences by six compared to 1987 of four countries of this six countries those who were in favour of the Resolutions in 1986 and 1987 and in 1988 were absent are Barbadoes, Granada, Samoa, Solomon Islands and Surinam. The sixth country is Israel who was against the Resolution in 1987 remained absent in 1988.

In general now, one can see from comparing the three resolutions of three different years that from

a numbers of eight and eleven in case of the countries against the resolution had come to zero in 1988 i.e. none of the countries is against the resolution. This may be seen as an achievement, the credit of which should go to the Non-Aligned countries for their consistent endeavour in this direction. Simultaneously the major powers as United Kingdom and United States's abstention from voting would be a serious hindrance in implementing the resolution. This inturn, would not give the required efficacy to economic sanctions.

So this lack of collective common behaviour on the part of the non-aligned countries must also be attributed to the cause of preservation of their national interest.

Moreover, it is a fact that despite repeated endeavour of the non-aligned countries along with the others, to punish the violator could not meet with a substantial degree of success because no mutual agreement can be reached so far regarding the ways and means of achieving and dispensating policies to this end.



The Western countries are opposed to the idea of imposing economic sanctions on South Africa because of their economic and political interests with South Africa made them reluctant to take any action against it. They are in favour of banning some selective items to pressurize South Africa to alter its policies simultaneously preserving their respective national interests vis-a-vis South Africa.

One significant factor is highlighted here that under international pressure the powers are compelled to be little tactful by not revealing their true self but camouflaging their vital interest under the cover of abstention.

The table presented above, is to justify the conclusion that the countries in the international arena behave the way that would help them to maximise their pay-off matrix, in preservation of national interest vis-a-vis others. So international relations will remain to be conflictive, co-operative or indifferent depending on the gravity of the circumstantial issues that crop up from within the relations among nations, contributing to this fluctuating unpredictable behavioural mode for years to

come as the attempt would always be to maximise advantage even in situation when some global value is sought to be promoted through cooperative action including the enforcement of economic measures against a defaulting country.

The present situation in South Africa prevents any stern measures to be taken by UN as some of the great powers are not in support of UN's strong action. As Chester A Crocker has pointed out that "the dismantling of apartheid and the creation of a new non-racial order is not going to take place through a sudden drastic act.... only negotiations and decisions can change the South African situation<sup>10</sup>. So it may be concluded that some western as well as non-aligned countries are not in favour of a sudden and rapid change. While some of the radical non-aligned countries want to change the South African situation by imposing comprehensive mandatory sanctions. Thus only mutually acceptable measures and negotiations the countries on this issue would be able to provide a desirable result to the South African case.

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10. Grocker Chester A "South Africa : A stratigy for change" Foreign affairs (N.Y.) Vol. 59 winter 1980/81 p. 327.

## CHAPTER IV

### IMPACT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA

This chapter attempts to assess the impact of economic sanctions on South Africa. The main aim behind the imposition of economic sanctions was to pressurize South Africa to abandon its policy of racial discrimination and dominance and to take measures for the establishment of a free democratic society. South Africa is vulnerable to a range of sanctions which have already had a major impact on the prospects of economic growth through adversely affecting business confidence in that country. As the President of South African Foundation stated at the end of 1987:

"There is no doubt that the (sanctions) package has had an adverse effect on domestic confidence. This lack of confidence is again and again emerging as the most important single factor inhibiting growth in this country".<sup>1</sup>

Roger Riddell has emphasised that any assessment of the sanctions episode should take five factors into

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1. Financial Times, London, 11th Nov., 1987.

consideration that affect it. Firstly that all countries would not be collectively interested at present or in future, to apply comprehensive mandatory sanctions on South Africa, that would act as a counter balancer. Secondly, apart from the sanctions, the economy of South Africa is vulnerable to number of factors as for example price of gold, which can reinforce the effects of sanctions. Thirdly, the counter action taken by the South African government and business house would affect the impact of sanctions. Fourthly, time factor is important in rendering effectiveness to sanctions. Lastly, experience has proved that widespread economic impact is not always a pre-condition for achieving political objectives.

Like most of the developing economics South Africa's economic development too is influenced and shaped by external conditions such as on its economic, financial, transport and technological relationships. Consequently, the high rate of growth of capital of the early period were made possible through a rapid expansion of external trade, large inflows of foreign capitals, skills and technology and the development of external transport routes. Recently, a substantial

increase in the number of unemployed youths necessitated to widen this economic and financial contacts where the 'sanctions' element comes into economic equation.<sup>2</sup>

The climate of uncertainty arising from external and internal pressures have greatly affected the rate of investment from 1981 and the increase in external debt from 6.4% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1980 to 27.11% in 1984<sup>3</sup>. Along with this, the fall in the international value of Rand in conjunction with the effects of monetary and fiscal policies contributed to a high rate of inflation.

#### IMPACT OF FINANCIAL SANCTIONS

The decision of the major Western countries to impose a voluntary ban on new investments at the end of 1986 accounted for the reluctance of the new creditors and investors to commit new funds to South Africa which was reinforced by the action taken by

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2. Riddell Roger, 'New sanctions against South Africa' Development policy review (SAGE LONDON), New Delhi, vol. 6, 1988.

3. Seaga, Edward : "Impact of Eco. Sanctions on South Africa" The Round Table, 1988.

Transnational Corporations (TNCS) to scale down their operations in South Africa.

The direct and immediate effect was that it had greatly undermined the confidence of the business community and foreign capital inflows. As the South African economy is highly dependent on this foreign capital inflows consequently a cessation of inflow while the capital outflow remaining the same (through dividend, net interest, debt repayment and disinvestment) which has to be met from the domestic savings, has profoundly affected its economy.

Although South Africa has a relatively high-rate of gross domestic savings but this accelerating rate of capital outflow should be checked in order to sustain a positive growth-rate. Based on certain assumptions about savings, depreciation of existing stock, inventory changes and capital outflow ratio, an unpublished study estimates that with zero net inflow of external capital, the South African economy could grow at an annual average rate of 1.3% in the next five years (1987-92). But under this assumption of Rs.5-6 billion annual capital outflow the economy is bound to

remain stagnant for the next five years<sup>4</sup>.

Thus, undoubtedly, the reasons for declining levels of real investment lie in the actual and anticipated action of the international community against South Africa that has adversely affected the business climate and confidence among the investors. Moreover, the decision of the major international banks in July 1985 to call in short term loans and freeze new lending to South Africa, worsened the situation as now it has been isolated from the access to foreign finance.

Therefore, a combination of raising capital outflow, ceasing new funds, earliest repayment of debts and refusal to liquidate or reduce credits would contribute to the maximization of impact of financial sanctions on South Africa.

#### IMPACT OF TRADE SANCTIONS

Within the ambit of trade sanctions to date, are the selective South African merchandise exports such as agricultural products, coal, iron and steel and

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4. Riddell, Roger : "New Sanctions Against South Africa" Development Policy Review, 1988, Vol. 6.

uranium. But the exclusion of agricultural products and coal by EEC and Japan from their sanctions packages have given South Africa an opportunity to have a regular market for these commodities thereby weakening the affect of trade bans on the whole.

South Africa's exports have averaged to 27% of GDP over the last four years and current trends in total exports are shown in the table 5 below:

**TABLE 5**

Recent trends in South Africa's total exports

Year	Total exports (bn)		US\$ bn	Total exports to US % of SA exports
	Rand	US\$		
1984	25.3	16.9	2.6	15.4
1985	36.7	16.2	2.1	13.0
1986	42.1	18.3	2.5	13.7
1987	42.7	21.6	1.4	06.5

**Source :** Riddell, Roger.: New Sanctions Against South Africa " Development Policy Review. 1988, vol. VI p. 251.

They reveal a rising trend in exports after 1985 and a significant decline in the United States in 1987



following the implementation of the comprehensive Anti apartheid Act of 1986. Agricultural products earn total 6% of the South African export and hence an important area where foreign exchange earnings can be restricted. Uranium export accounts for less than 2% of total South African foreign exchange earnings from export. Coal is an homogeneous product with an export value of \$ 1.3 bn so an extensive restriction on its export to Britan, Japan, South Korea, Italy, France and West Germany would cause a major impact on South Africa's export earnings. Recent import trends in South Africa is shown in Table 6 below

TABLE - 6

Recent trends in South African Imports

Year	Total South Rand (bn)	African Imports US \$ (bn)
1984	21.7	14.8
1985	23.0	10.4
1986	27.0	11.2
1987	28.7	14.5

Source : Ibid. p.253.

About 65% of South Africa's oil requirements are obtained from abroad which meets about 20-25% of the economy's primary needs and accounts for 80% of the energy consumption of the transport sector. Thus an effective oil sanctions can give a definite crippling blow to the economy of South Africa as South African government is forced to produce highly expensive oil from coal and maintain a large strategic stock pile of oil.

The last enquiry concerning sanctions on South African export relates to a possibility of inclusion of those products in the import ban that would be very effective that is, Gold, which alone accounts for 33% of South Africa's total export earnings. The taxation of the gold mining companies provide a major source of revenue for the South African government. A rise in the gold price from \$ 444 to \$ 480 an ounce would cancel out the total effect of import ban imposed by the United States in 1986. The gold price was about \$ 450 an ounce in mid 1988. The would supply of gold has exceeded demand in the last four years from 204 tonnes in 1984 to 436 tonnes in 1987, the latter figure

amounting to 31% of the total world production<sup>5</sup>. So it is essential to bring down the price of gold in order to make other trade sanctions truly effective.

#### THE FRONTLINE STATES & THE SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa dominates the regional economy of Southern Africa. All one third of all African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) imports come from South Africa and it is the destination of 7% of the region's exports. In addition, about 70% of the extra regional trade of the land locked countries of the region passes through South Africa. Moreover, some are more dependent and linked with South Africa as Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland whose 80% of trade pass through and 40% of exports are purchased by South Africa (See Appendix - III).

Consequently this dictates that sanctions should not be employed against South Africa as these states would then have the lion's share of the impact of sanctions. But rationality commands that this could

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5. Riddell, Roger : "New sanctions against South Africa" Development Policy Review, Vol. 6, 1988.

South Africa's recent regional policy of not be an excuse to be used for not imposing sanctions on South Africa.

South Africa's recent regional policy of destabilisation has greatly affected these states by reductions in production levels and compelling them to divert their scarce resources to defence, repair and rehabilitation.

Automatically so the SADCC states favour international sanctions in the hope that increased international pressure would help in bringing apartheid and its regional cost to a rapid end, reactivating SADCC's most cost effective transport and trade routes culminating in high rate of economic growth. Simultaneously South Africa too had an important long term interest for not retaliating these sanctions although at times it might be in conflict with short term objectives.

There are three areas in which, thus, the Frontline states seek the assistance of the international community. First of all, rapid ending of the system of apartheid. Secondly, help in resisting Pretoria's covert and overt actions and lastly, disengagement of their economy from South Africa.

All these call for a coordinated strategy by the western countries against South Africa while at present we see the western policies are far more contradictory than harmonised on the question of imposition of sanctions which accounted and contributed to the cause of combating evasion of sanctions by South Africa.

South Africa has achieved success in this regard by diverting her trade to Taiwan and South Korea so much so that that South Africa Taiwan trade has risen from \$ 135 m in 1985 to \$ 911 m in 1987. Moreover, Israel has been a major channel of trade for products banned by other countries<sup>6</sup> although recently pressures has been applied by United States to scale down these contacts by compelling its close allies to publish their detailed statistics. In addition, data for 1987 showed that Japan has become the largest single important trading partner with total trade valued at \$ 4.27 bn in 1987. Although in terms of Yen the total South Africa-Japan trade has fallen by 24% from 1984 to 1987 still the effectiveness of trade sanctions depend on to a large extent on Japan. Again, South Africa is

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6. Bert Hallahmi : The Israeli Connection, New York, Panthon, 1987.

selling goods under Swaziland label.<sup>7</sup>

Despite these, the fact remains that economic sanctions would have a considerable and adverse impact upon South Africa. With sanctions, the unemployment figure would be 9.8 million by the year 2000<sup>8</sup> that is, sanctions could destroy two million unskilled jobs between now and the end of the century. Its adverse effect is widely accepted both inside and outside South African government circles as the Minister of Finance observed in his 1988 budget speech, the economy is one "hamstrung by sanctions"<sup>9</sup>.

The major factor in the internal political dynamics will be the external pressures which people believe would help in whatever marginal success sanctions can achieve in making South Africa to move towards the path of democracy. But question arise how far the sanctions will be successful in achieving those political objectives for example as President R. Reagon has observed in his statement to congress in the autumn

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7. African Economic Digest, Nov., 22 1986.

8. Battersby John D "South Africa - Sanctions', Africa Report, Vol. 32, 1987.

9. Financial Times, 17 March 1988.

of 1987. " I regret I am unable to report significant progress leading to the end of apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial democracy in South Africa<sup>10</sup>.

Significantly, the South African government had made it clear that it does not intend voluntarily to bring about the ending of the fundamental structures of the apartheid system. As the report of the commonwealth Eminent Persons Group observed (1986 122:3) "While the government claims to be ready to negotiate, it is in truth not yet prepared to negotiate fundamental change nor to countenance the creation of genuine democratic structures, nor to face the prospect of the end of white domination and white power in the foreseeable future. Its programme to reform does not end apartheid but seeks to give it a less inhuman face. Its quest in power sharing without surrendering overall white control"<sup>11</sup>.

So the only way in which the South African government can be persuaded to give up its racist

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10. Riddell Roger, p. 264.

11. Battersby John D. Africa Report 1987.

policies is when it is convinced that such policies can no longer secure the interests of white South Africans as considerable economic strains develop from the cost of apartheid itself demanding government outlays on defence, law and order which entails an expensive machinery.

South Africa is more self sufficient and diverse and a important world suppliers of strategic and precious minerals and is not a landlocked country so incase of increasing troubles in the forth coming future if any businessman in Jahannesburg today is asked about the future of that oountry he will assure you confidently that there is life after Sanctions<sup>12</sup>.

Despite these possibilities, the South Africa's vulnerability and dependency an Western Countries for survival would account for its considerable strains as certain well-enforced negative economic sanctions are imposed by the major and important trading partners.

It is of course impossible to predict what a blend of domestic and international variables would bring aparthied to an end but rationality suggests that

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12. Seaga, Edward : "Impact of of Economic Sanctions on South Africa" The Round Table, 1988.



international community by using instruments of Economic state craft such as the imposition of Economic sanctions can affect the pace and nature of the desired transformation, not so much by existing economic pressure which often get circumvented through diversion of trade but more through mobilisation of International opinion calling for changes in the political structure of South Africa.

So far the actions adopted by the Western Governments clearly indicate that they are not in favour of drastic changes in South Africa where lie the roots of its survival challenging the efficacy of economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy.

## CONCLUSION

### NAM AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: AN OVERVIEW

The use of economic coercion is preferred to other modes of coercive diplomacy for effecting a change in the policies of the target country. In a world where consequences of sophisticated weapons cannot be confined within any definite and specific geographical boundary, political rationality motivates the substitution of military by economic measures.

The use of economic means to achieve political objectives is not a new instrument, as has been focussed in the Second Chapter, used from the days of the League of Nations to date. But such measures are not generally effective. This raises the question, if sanctions are not effective why then they continue to be a preferred mode of coercive diplomacy ?

Chapter II reviews the use of economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy. The past experiences till date, in most cases, show a relative ineffectiveness of this instrument in achieving the declared objectives. One can illustrate this, from the cases, first, during the interwar period League of

Nations sanctions against Italy (1935-36) and another United States imposition of sanctions on Cuba, both of which were not able to achieve their respective objectives.

The effectiveness of economic sanctions as a mode of coercive diplomacy depends on a number of factors. First, there is a means-ends relationship, in which case sometimes means are too meagre or ends too elusive. Second, the degree of interdependency between the initiator and the target that determines the fate of sanctions. Third, there are possibilities that target receives help from its powerful allies. Fourth, time plays an important role in giving efficacy to sanctions by providing opportunity to the target to adjust and to find new alternatives. But by far the most severe impediment in the way of its efficacy is the lack of collective will on the part of the international community. Moreover, if all the relevant countries do not share a common objective and confirm to an uniform sanctions package, it provides an opportunity to the target nation to get embargoed goods from the other nations thereby circumventing economic sanctions, as has been the case with South Africa.

Chapter III highlights attitudes of Non-Aligned countries on the question of economic sanctions. In order to elaborate this, four cases of economic sanctions have been selected involving different patterns of relationships between non-aligned and other countries. A perusal of non-aligned reactions to economic sanctions in these four situations bring out some important features of non-aligned attitudes on economic sanctions and direct their situational variables.

It becomes clear that two major types of political objectives are sought through economic sanctions :

1. Promotion of national, interest, as a function of foreign policy.
2. Promotion of a democratic and more human and just world order.

One may notice from Appendix I that United States has frequently used this instrument to attain its own national interest. On the other hand there are not many cases of collective action for promoting global values with a view to reform the international order.

In most cases, non-aligned countries generally favoured the use of economic sanctions for promoting a

global norm, while they are opposed to its use for furtherance of narrowly defined national interest.

South Africa is an exceptional case. Its large industrial economy has given it the flexibility to resist sanctions. Its western link and reluctance of the major powers like United States, United Kingdom, France, Federal Republic of Germany to impose comprehensive and mandatory sanctions has further provided South Africa a firm basis to minimize the effects of economic sanctions. The chapter emphasizes the fact that it is the international political will which is problematic and is consequently reducing the effectiveness of sanctions to coerce South Africa.

Though one must have noticed the ambivalent behaviour of the non-aligned countries in situations involving their national interest. But this weakness should not be misinterpreted as their support for this instrument for promoting narrowly defined national interest.

Chapter IV projects the vulnerability of South African economy at present on international trade and investment. In November 1985, the Standard Bank Review

noted that as a small relatively open economy, the country's prosperity is based to a large extent on its ability to freely sell products abroad.

Failure of economic sanctions in South Africa in due to political difficulties, the conflicting interests and purposes of the sanctioning powers.

The United Nations served as an useful framework to provide legitimacy and a moderating inference of sanctions. The measures recommended against South Africa to achieve fuller respect of that member for basic human rights have very little effect because the international political will to apply this instrument of foreign policy is not mutually agreed.

Consequently, the situation is that South Africa is importing the embargoed items from its western allies and selling under the label of neighbouring states which suggest that if economic sanctions have now come to mean a mere diversion in trade from one country to the other, then it loses significance as an effective policy instrument to get the violators compliance with international law.

The area where the non-aligned countries focussed their attention most is over the violation of human rights in South Africa. At the 15th and 16th session of the General Assembly in 1961, the Afro-Asian countries proposed diplomatic, economic and other measures against South Africa and the 17th session adopted specific measures to break off diplomatic relations, boycott of South African goods and refused landing and passage facilities.

When Nelson Mandela and other were charged under the sabotage Act in 1963, the Afro-Asian nations urged the General Assembly to condemn South Africa and called for unconditional release of all political prisoners.

One may note that to establish a global norm, the countries in the international arena have worked collectively, though with some restrictions, consequently, the South African policy of racial discrimination, a major negation of fundamental right to its large population has attracted the attention of the non-aligned countries which has consistently worked for the emancipation of peoples all over the world. NAM's continuous endeavour in this direction has helped to mobilize the international public opinion which in

turn has compelled South Africa to moderate its policies.

In words of the President of African National Congress, Oliver Tombo, in International Conference on sanctions against South Africa in Paris, May 1981.

"Action under Chapter VII is the ultimate peaceful sanction provided for in the United Nations charter. If sanctions are not imposed on so blantant an offence and so persistent a violator of the charter, as apartheid South Africa, then the efforts of the international community would have proved an excercise in futility".

Non-Aligned countries have launched an unceasing opposition to Racism and policy of Aparthieid in South Africa. They have used United Nations as an important forum for this purpose. In a way, they have proved the indispensibility of International organisation for the conduct of international relations through multilateral diplomacy.

One can hope that the policy makers in some of the western countries who are at present opposed to comprehensive and mandatory economic sanctions against



South Africa, would respond to world public opinion in favour of this non-military option of coercive diplomacy which would generate confidence in this instrument of state craft in changing and reforming the world order.

APPENDIX - I

THE CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF CASES OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Principal Sender	Target Country	Active Years	Goals of Sender country
U.K.	Germany	1914-18	Military Victory
U.S.A.	Japan	1917	1. Contain Japanese influence in Asia. 2. Persuade Japan to divert shipping to Atlantic.
U.K.	Russia	1918-20	1. Renew Support for Allies in World War I. 2. Destabilize Bolshevik regime.
League of Nations	Yugoslavia	1921	Block Yugoslav attempts to Wrest territory from Albania;
League of Nations	Greece	1925	Withdraw from occupation of Bulgarian border territory;
U.K.	USSR	1933	Release two British Citizens;
U.K. and League of Nations	Italy	1935-36	Withdraw Italian troops from Abyssinia.
U.K. and U.S.A.	Mexico	1938-47	Settle expropriation Claims.
Alliance Powers	Germany later Japan	1939-45	Military Victory
U.S.A.	Japan	1940-41	Withdraw from South East Asia.
U.S.A.	Argentina	1944-47	Remove nazi influence Destabilize Peron.
Arableague	Israel	1946-	Create a homeland for Palestinians.

1	2	3	4
USSR	USA, UK and	1948-49	1. Prevent formation of West German Government 2. Assimilate West Berlin into East Germany.
USSR	Yugoslavia	1948-55	1. Rejoin Soviet Camp. 2. Destablize Tito Govt.
USA & UN	North Korea	1950-	Withdraw attack on South Korea.
U.K. & USA	Iran	1951-53	Reverse the nationalization of oil facilities, Destabilize Mussadiqu Government.
USSR	Australia	1954	Repatriate a Soviet defector
India	Portugal	1954-61	Assimilate Goa into India.
Spain	UK	1954-84	Gain Sovereignty over Gibraltar.
USA & South Vietnam	North Vietnam	1954-	Impede military effectiveness of N. Vietnam, Retribution for aggression in S. Vietnam.
UK, USA and France	Egypt	1956	Ensure free passage through Suez Canal, Compensate for nationalization.
USA	UK & France	1956	Withdraw from Suez.
USA	Laos	1956-62	Prevent Communist takeover.
Indonesia	Netherlands	1957-62	Control of West Irian.
USSR	Finland	1958-59	Adopt pro-USSR policies.
USA	Dominican Republic	1960-62	Cease subversion in Venezuela, Destabilize Trujillo Govt.

1	2	3	4
USSR	China	1960-70	Retaliation for break with Soviet policy, destabilize Mao Govt.
USA	Cuba	1960-	Settle expropriation claims, Destabilize Castro Govt., Discourage Cuba from foreign military adventures.
USSR	Albania	1961-65	Retaliation for alliance with China, Destabilize Hoxha Govt.
UN	South Africa	1962-	End Apartheid, Grant independence to Namibia.
USSR	Romania	1962-63	Limit Economic independence.
USA	United Arab Republic	1963-65	Cease military activity in Yemen & Congo, Moderate anti-US, rhetoric.
USA	Indonesia	1963-66	Cease "crush Malaysia Campaign, Destabilize Sukarno Govt.
USA	South Vietnam	1963	Ease repression, Destabilize Diem, Remove Nhu.
UN and OAU	Portugal	1963-74	Free African Colonies.
France	Tunisia	1964-66	Settle expropriation claims.
UK and UN	Rhodesia	1965-79	Majority rule by black Africans.
USA	Peru	1968-74	Settle expropriation claims.
USA	Chile	1970-73	Settle expropriation claims, Destabilize Allende Govt.
USA	India & Pakistan	1971	Cease fighting in East Pakistan.

1	2	3	4
UK and USA	Uganda	1972-79	Retaliation for expelling Asians, Improve Human Rights, Destabilize Amin Govt.
USA	South Korea	1973-77	Improve Human Rights.
USA	Chile	1973	Improve Human Rights.
Canada	India	1974-76	Deter further nuclear explosions, Apply stricter nuclear safeguards.
USA	South Africa	1975-82	Adhere to nuclear safeguards, Avert explosion of nuclear device.
USA	Kampuchea	1975-79	Improve Human Rights, Deter Vietnamese Expansionism.
USA	Uruguay	1976-81	Improve Human Rights.
USA	Paraguay	1977-81	Improve Human Rights.
USA	Libya	1978-	Terminate Support of international terrorism, Destabilize Qaddafi Govt.
USA	Iran	1979-81	Release Hostages, Settle expropriation claims
USA	USSR	1980-81	Withdraw Soviet Troops from Afganistan, Impair Soviet military potential.
USA	Nicaragua	1981-	End support for Elsalvador rebels, Destabilize sandanista Govt.
USA	USSR	1981-82	Lift martial law in Poland, Cancel USSR - Europe pipeline project, Impair Soviet economic/military potential.

1	2	3	4
UK	Argentina	1982	Withdraw troops from Falkland Islands.
USA	USSR	1983	Retaliation for downing Korean airliner.
USA	Zimbabwe	1983-84	Temper opposition in UN to US foreign policy.
USA & Organization of Eastern Caribbean states.	Grenada	1983	Destabilize Bishop/Austin regime.

**Source :** Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffery J. Schott. Economic sanctions Reconsidered : History and Current Policy, 1985.

## APPENDIX II

VOTING PATTERN ON RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
"COMPREHENSIVE AND MANDATORY SANCTIONS AGAINST THE RACIST  
REGIME OF SOUTH AFRICA"

Countries	41/35B 1986	42/23C 1987	43/13C 1988
1. Afghanistan	F	F	F
2. Albania	F	F	F
3. Algeria	F	F	F
4. Angola	F	F	F
5. Antigua and Barbuda	F	F	F
6. Argentina	F	F	F
7. Australia	AB	AB	F
8. Austria	AB	AB	F
9. Bahamas	F	F	F
10. Bahrain	F	F	F
11. Bangladesh	F	F	F
12. Barbadoes	F	F	A
13. Belgium	AG	AG	F
14. Belize	F	F	F
15. Benin	F	F	F
16. Bhutan	F	F	F
17. Bolivia	F	F	F
18. Botswana	-	AB	F
19. Brazil	F	F	F
20. Brunei	F	F	F
21. Bulgaria	F	F	F
22. Burkina Faso	F	F	F
23. Burma	F	F	F
24. Burundi	F	F	F
25. Byelorussia	F	F	F
26. Cameroon	F	F	F
27. Cape Verde	F	F	F
28. Canada	AB	AG	F
29. Central Arab Republic	F	F	F
30. Chad	F	F	F

Countries	41/35B 1986	42/23C 1987	43/13C 1988
31. Chili	A	A	A
32. China	F	F	F
33. Colombia	F	F	F
34. Comoros	F	F	F
35. Congo	F	F	F
36. Costa Rica	AB	F	F
37. Cote'd Ivory	AB	AB	F
38. Cuba	F	F	F
39. Cyprus	F	F	F
40. Czechoslovakia	F	F	F
41. Daru Salam	F	F	F
42. Democratic Kampuchea	F	F	F
43. Democratie Yemen	F	F	F
44. Denmark	F	F	F
45. Djibouti	F	F	F
46. Dominica	F	F	F
47. Dominican Republic	F	F	F
48. Egypt	F	F	F
49. El Salvador	A	F	F
50. Equader	F	F	F
51. Equatorial Guinea	F	F	F
52. Ethiopia	F	F	F
53. Federal Repub. of Germany	AG	AG	F
54. Finland	AB	AB	F
55. Fizi	AB	F	F
56. France	AG	AG	F
57. Gabon	F	F	F
58. Gambia	F	F	F
59. German Demo cratie Republic	F	F	F
60. Ghana	F	F	F
61. Greece	AB	AB	F*
62. Grenada	F	F	A
63. Guatemala	F	F	F
64. Guinea	F	F	A
65. Guinea Bissau	F	F	F
66. Guyana	F	F	F
67. Haiti	F	F	F



Countries	41/35B 1986	42/23C 1987	43/13C 1988
68. Honduras	AB	F	F
69. Hungary	F	F	F
70. Iceland	AB	AB	F
71. India	F	F	F
72. Indonesia	F	F	F
73. Iran	F	F	F
74. Iraq	F	F	F
75. Ireland	AB	AB	F
76. Israel	AB	AG	A
77. Italy	AG	AG	F
78. Jamaica	F	F	F
79. Japan	AB	AB	F
80. Jordan	F	F	F
81. Kenya	F	F	F
82. Kuwait	F	F	F
83. Lao People's Democratic Republic	F	F	F
84. Lebanon	F	F	F
85. Lesotho	-	AB	F
86. Liberia	F	F	F
87. Libya	F	F	F
88. Luxumbourg	AG	AG	F
89. Madagascar	F	F	F*
90. Malawi	F	AB	A
91. Malaysia	F	F	F
92. Maldives	F	F	F
93. Mali	F	F	F
94. Malta	F	AB	F
95. Mauritania	F	F	F
96. Mauritius	F	F	F
97. Mexico	F	F	F
98. Mongolia	F	F	F
99. Morocco	F	F	F
100. Mozambique	F	F	F
101. Nepal	F	F	F
102. Netherlands	AB	AG	F
103. New Zealand	AB	AB	F
104. Niger	F	F	F
105. Nigeria	F	F	F
106. Norway	AB	AB	F
107. Oman	F	F	F
108. Pakistan	F	F	F

Countries	41/35B 1986	42/23C 1987	43/13C 1988
109. Panama	F	F	F
110. Papua New Guinea	F	F	F
111. Paraguay	A	A	A
112. Peru	F	F	F
113. Phillipines	F	F	F
114. Poland	F	F	F
115. Portugal	AG	AG	AG
116. Qatar	F	F	F
117. Romania	F	F	F
118. Rwanda	F	F	F
119. Saint Lucia	F	F	F
120. Saint Vincent	F	F	F
121. Samoa	-	F	A
122. Sao Tome and Principe	F	F	F
123. Saudi Arabia	F	F	F
124. Senegal	F	F	F
125. Seychelles	F	F	F
126. Sierra Leone	F	F	F
127. Singapore	F	F	F
128. Solomon Islands	F	F	A
129. Somalia	F	F	F
130. Spain	F	F	F
131. Sri Lanka	F	F	F
132. St. Christopher and Nevis	F	F	F
133. Sudan	F	F	A
134. Surinam	F	F	A
135. Swaziland	A	AB	F
136. Sweden	AB	AB	F
137. Syria	F	F	F
138. Thailand	F	F	F
139. Togo	F	F	F
140. Trinidad & Tobago	F	F	F
141. Tunisia	F	F	F
142. Turkey	F	F	F
143. Uganda	F	F	F
144. Ukraine USSR	F	F	F
145. United Arab Emirates	F	F	F
146. United Kingdom	AG	AG	AB

Countries	41/35B 1986	42/23C 1987	43/13C 1988
147. United States	AG	AG	AB
148. Uruguay	F	F	F
149. Vanuata	F	F	F
150. Venezuela	F	F	F
151. Vietnam	F	F	F
152. Yemen	F	F	F
153. Yugoslavia	F	F	F
154. Zaire	F	F	F
155. Zambia	F	F	F
156. Zimbabwe	F	F	F

**Source :** UN Press Release, Dept. of Information.  
Resolutions and Decisions adopted by the General Assembly During the First Part of its Forty - First Session (GA/7463), Forty - Second Session GA/7612, and Forty - Third Session GA/7814 respectively.

**Note :**

\*Stands for those countries absent from the voting but later advised the secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour of the resolution.

F = Favour  
AB = Abstention  
AG = Against  
A = Absent

APPENDIX III

INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE OF NEIGHBOURING STATES ON SOUTH AFRICA 1985<sup>1</sup>

	Botswana	Lesotho	Swaziland	Malawi	Mozambique	Zimbabwe	Zambia
Trade							
Main Partner	S.A.	S.A.	S.A.	S.A.	S.A.	S.A.	S.A.
Exports to S.A.							
Lm	36	*	42	9	9	76	3
%	17	*	20	6	5	17	1
Imports from S.A.							
Lm	393	286	286	64	59	130	64
%	88	95	90	36	14	22	16
Migrant Workers Number	29169	150422	13418	30603	59391	16965	-
% of Wage Labour force	23	86	15	8	20	2	-
Remittances (Lm)	21	99	9	11	43	20	-
South African Supplies							
Electricity (%)	19	100	50	-	33	1	-
Oil (%)	100	100	100	70	+	+	-
Food (%)	Most	Most	+	+	+	+	+
Overseas trade via S.A. (%)	100	100	33	+	-	66	33
Economy							
GDP (US \$m)	990	560	510	1090	4220	6150	2640
GDP per capita (US \$)	960	373	729	160	315	760	413

+ Small amount \* Negligible, - none

Source : Holland Martin, *The other side of Sanctions : Positive initiatives for Southern Africa*. The Journal of Modern African Studies. June 1988, No. 2, Vol. 26.

## APPENDIX IV

### Significance of selected trade measures adopted against South Africa.

#### A. Potential significance fo SA of ban items

Commodity	SA exports (US \$ Millions 1985)	As % of total Merchandise exports
Agricultural products	878	5.3
Uranium	300	1.8
Coal	1427	8.6
Iron & Steel particles thereof	1230	7.4
Textiles & Textile articles	475	2.9
Total value of banned imports	4310	26.0

Country/Group	Value of banned imports from SA (US \$ millions 1985)	
I) USA	Agricultural products	181
	Uranium	140
	Coal	43
	Iron and Steel	294
	Textiles	55
	Total	713

II) Common wealth		
Australia	Iron, steel, coal, agri. products	20
Canada	Iron and Steel	10
	Agricultural products	53
New Zealand	Agricultural Products	6
UK	Some Iron & Steel products	19
Hongkong	Iron and Steel	100
	Total	208
III) EEC (10) excluding U.K.	Some Iron and Steel	49
IV) Japan	Iron & Steel	200
V) Nordic		
Denmark	All imports	80
Sweden	Agricultural products	5
	Total	85
Overall Total		\$1255mn
as % of total SA Merchandise export (1985)		7.6%

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(a) Estimate: SA trade statistics donot provide figures for uranium exports. Source: Republic of South Africa Monthly abstract of Trade Statistics, Jan-Dec. 1985.

- (b) Estimates for HongKong and Japan are provisional as they include South African exports of ferro-alloys and some other iron and steel products which are excluded from their bans.
- (c) Imports in year ending June 1986.
- (d) Norway's comprehensive trade boycott, to be adopted by the end of March 1987 would affect \$ 31 million and Sweden's proposed embargo would affect another \$ 21 million of South Africa's exports (1985) South Africa's merchandise exports to Finland \$ 5 million in 1985, have virtually ceased due to the trade union boycott in that country.

## LIST OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES

### AFRICA

1. Algeria
2. Angola
3. Benin
4. Botswana
5. Borkina Fasso(Upper Volta)
6. Burundi
7. Cameroon
8. Central African Republic
9. Chad
10. Congo
11. Djibouti
12. Egypt
13. Equatorial Guinea
14. Ethiopia
15. Gabon
16. Gambia
17. Ghana
18. Guinea
19. Guinea Bissau
20. Ivory Coast
21. Kenya
22. Lesotho
23. Liberia
24. Libya
25. Malawi
26. Mali
27. Mauritiana
28. Morocco
29. Mkozambique
30. Namibia
31. Niger
32. Nigeria
33. Rawanda
34. Sao Lome & Principe
35. Senegal
36. Sierra Leone
37. Somalia
38. Sudan
39. Swaziland
40. Tanzania
41. Togo
42. Tunisia

43. Uganda
44. Zaire
45. Zambia
46. Zimbabwe

### ASIA

47. Afganistan
48. Baharein
49. Bangladesh
50. Bhutan
51. India
52. Indonesia
53. Iran
54. Iraq
55. Jordan
56. Kampuchea
57. North Korea
58. Kuwait
59. Lao
60. Lebanon
61. Malaysia
62. Nepal
63. Oman
64. Pakistan
65. PLO
66. Qatar
67. Saudi Arabia
68. Syria
69. UAE
70. Vietnam
71. Yemen Arab Republic
72. People's Democratic Republic of Yemen

### LATIN AMERICA

73. Argentina
74. Bahamas
75. Barbados
76. Belize
77. Bolvia
78. Columbia
79. Equador



80. Grenada
81. Guyana
82. Jamaica
83. Nicaragua
84. Panama
85. Peru
86. Santa Lucia
87. Belize(British Honduras)
88. Yugoslavia

#### ISLANDS

89. Cape Verde
90. Comoros
91. Madagascar
92. Mauritius
93. Seychelles
94. Cyprus
95. Maldives
96. Sri Lanka
97. Singapore
98. Vanuata
99. Cuba
100. Surinam
101. Trinidad and Tobago
102. Malta

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
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