

**POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION IN SOUTH KOREA  
SINCE 1992 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION**

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
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## CERTIFICATE

This Dissertation entitled "*Political Transformation in South Korea Since 1992 Presidential Election*" by Mr. T. S. Chandrasekar for the Degree of **Master of Philosophy** is an original work and has not been previously submitted for any degree of this or any other University.

We recommend this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

  
16/7/96  
Supervisor  
(R.R. Krishnan)

  
Chairman  
(G.P. Deshpande)

*THIS DISSERTATION IS  
DEDICATED TO  
MY GRANDMOTHER*

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## *CHAPTER- I*

## DECEMBER 1992 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION:

### BACKGROUND AND ISSUES

One of the most important issues in the political and constitutional history of the Republic of Korea has been the office of the President of the Republic. The issue has had several dimensions including the manner of electing the President, his tenure and powers, and his place and role in the political and constitutional system of Korea<sup>1</sup>.

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1. For Political and Constitutional System of Korea Since 1948, Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1968), pp.148-191; Bong gi Kim, Political development in Modern Korea (After Liberation)(Seoul: The Korean Information Service, Inc); Pak Chi Young, Political opposition in Korea, 1945-60 (Seoul: National University Press, 1980); Se-Jin Kim, The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1971); Jang-Jip Choi, "Political Cleavages and Transition in a Military Authoritarian Regime: Institutionalization, Opposition and Process in South Korea", paper presented at the Yokohama Conference, July 1986; Myung Gsoon Shin, "The Impact of Political Protest on Governmental Decision-making in Korea" Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation (Illinos: Evanston, 1986); C.I. Eugene Kim, "Korea at the Crossroads: The birth of the fourth Republic", Pacific Affairs, Summer 1973; Young - Whan Kihl, "Korea's fifth Republic: domestic political trends", Journal of North-East Asian Studies, Vol.1, No.2. June 1982; James Cotton (ed), Political and Policy in the New Korean State From Roh Tae Woo to Kim Young Sam, (Melbourne: Longman, 1995); Frank Gibney, Korea's Quiet Revolution From Garrison State to Democracy, (U.S.: Walker, 1992).



All the nine odd amendments to the constitution since it was proclaimed in August 1948 by the National Assembly have been concerned in one way or the other with the office of the President<sup>2</sup>. Thus a close relationship has subsisted between the issues revolving around the office of the President and the pattern of political developments and discourse in Korea.

In this chapter an attempt has been made to trace the history of the office of the President and highlight the background, controversies and outcome of the Presidential Elections in Korea since the convening of the National Assembly following the 10 May 1948 elections in the area South of the 38th parallel.

Since the liberation of Korea there have been fourteen Presidential Elections. The National Assembly carried out first and fourth Presidential Elections. Second, third, fifth, sixth and seventh Presidents were directly elected. Eighth, tenth and eleventh Presidential elections were held by the National Conference for

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2. Korea's Constitution established on 12 July 1948, promulgated on 17 July 1948, First amendment on 7 July 1952, second 29 November 1954, third 15 June 1960, Fourth 29 November 1960, Fifth 26 December 1962, sixth 21 October 1969, Seventh 27 December 1972, Eighth 27 October 1980 and Ninth 29 October 1987. Upto 1981 amendments see pp.426,427,428,432. Andrew C. Nahm, A History of the Korean People: Korea Tradition and Transformation, (Seoul: Hollym, 1988), pp.143-145.

Unification. The twelfth President was elected by the electoral college, the thirteenth and the fourteenth President were elected directly by the people<sup>3</sup>. The fourteenth Presidential election was by itself a record with none of the candidates with any military background.

The Government of Republic of Korea was inaugurated on 15th August 1948, on the third anniversary of Korea's liberation. "The National assembly held its first meeting on 31 May, and Dr. Syngman Rhee was elected Chairman on 3 June. He informed United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (hereafter UNTCOK) that a temporary liaison committee of the National assembly had been created and he invited UNTCOK's consultation with the assembly on 12 June. A democratic constitution was adopted, and on 20 June, Dr. Rhee was elected the first President of the Republic of Korea by an overwhelming majority".<sup>4</sup> The United Nations General Assembly on 12th December 1948 adopted a resolution that "under the U.N. Mandate a lawful government of Republic of Korea was established".

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See also Korea Annual (Seoul: Yonhap, 1993).

3. For Presidential Elections From First to Fourteenth See pp. 153-8. Korea Annual (Seoul: Yonhap, 1994).

4. Note 2, Andrew C. Nahm, p.363.

During the regime of President Syngman Rhee there were several political upheavals revolving around the issue of constitutional amendment. The Korea Democratic party, which was one of the most influential political parties at that time, came up with a constitutional bill aimed at establishing the cabinet responsibility system. When the Constituent National Assembly was drafting and enacting the constitution, Dr. Syngman Rhee opposed the cabinet system and urged the Assembly to enact the United States style Presidential system. Syngman Rhee was opposed to the cabinet system as it made President powerless. More importantly he was sure that he would be elected the President.

During the preparation for the election of the second President, the Syngman Rhee government submitted a constitutional amendment bill that sought to introduce "direct election of the President and Bicameral National Assembly". The government and the ruling Liberal Party which was keen to get Rhee re-elected argued that "the people want to elect the President the Head of the State, directly under the constitutional principle that the sovereignty rests with the people"<sup>5</sup>.

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5. Note 1, Bong gi Kim, p. 16.

"The excerpt Constitutional Amendment Bill was put to vote at night session of the National Assembly on 4th July, 1952. Those assemblymen who had been arrested were taken to the floor under police escort for mustering a quorum required for the passage of the bill, out of the fear that some opposition assemblymen might flee out of the floor, the government even placed some gate keepers at the Assembly Hall and the lawmakers were forced to stay for a few days inside the Assembly Hall.

The bill was placed with the attendance of more than 2/3 of duly seated numbers of assemblymen as required for the constitutional amendment through the extra ordinary method of standing by rollcall"<sup>6</sup>.

Having ensured the re-election of Syngman Rhee as President through devious means, it was not surprising that Rhee supporters began another exercise before long to extend the consecutive terms of the President from two to three. Thus the exercise for the next constitutional amendment began during the Third National Assembly in 1956.

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6. Ibid. p.19.

"The Liberal Party advocated the constitutional amendment under the plea that 'the constitution be purified in the direction of the Presidential system' by means of wiping out some conflicting elements contained in the excerpt constitutional amendment in which the Presidential system was mixed with the cabinet responsibility system"<sup>7</sup>.

When the Liberal Party submitted the constitutional amendment bill to enable President Syngman Rhee to run for a third consecutive term it was put to vote on 27 November, 1954. During this secret voting on 27 November, 1954, 135 voted for the amendment. This meant that it was just one vote short of the legally required quorum for the passing of the amendment with two thirds of the total number of Assemblymen duly seated (203). "The Presiding Officer, Vice-Speaker Sun-Ju choe, declared the bill turned down. But on the following day, the presiding officer at the plenary session rescinded the previous day's declaration and announced that the bill had been approved by virtue of the mathematical theory that a fractional figure between 0.5 and 0.9 could be counted as

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7. Ibid. pp 21-22.

full one. This caused the so called "Sasaoip Constitutional Amendment"<sup>8</sup>.

During the middle of the Third National Assembly before the 15 May 1956 elections for the third President and Vice-President, the political forces in Korea were divided into three major groups- the Liberal Party, the Democratic Party and the Progressive Party. Due to the sudden death of Democratic Party's Presidential candidate Shinicky, Liberal Party candidate Syngman Rhee was elected to the office of the President with John Chang, Democratic party candidate as Vice- President.

Only four months before the beginning of the fourth National Assembly Elections early in January 1958, the Syngman Rhee government arrested Progressive Party chairman Pong am Cho and other leading members of the party on charges of violation of National Security Law in relation with the espionage case involving Chung ho Pak and U-Kap Chang. Finally, in February the Progressive Party was outlawed and all party members except Pong am Cho were declared innocent. and Pong am Cho was executed on 31 July 1959 on charge of espionage activities.

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8. Ibid. p.23.

The fourth Presidential election was held on 15 March, 1960. The Liberal Party nominated Rhee and Yi Bung to run for Presidency and Vice-Presidency respectively. The Democratic Party lost a chance for power because of the death of its nominee. "Subsequently the Liberal Party forcibly conducted the unprecedented infamous March 15th rigged election igniting the raging anger of the people.

The opposition Democratic Party managed to obtain directives regarding methods of rigging elections, issued by the Liberal Party government of Syngman Rhee, and exposed the whole picture of the plot to the general public. The methods included 'prior voting by 40 percent of total voters' and 'open voting by 60 percent of voters'<sup>9</sup>.

The Chang Myon government came to power following the election conducted by interim Ho-Jong administration (April-July 1960). The government was based on cabinet responsibility system.

Even as the Chang Myon government was trying to stabilize the political situation and ensure an era of

9. Ibid. p. 30.

constitutional and democratic government with clear mandate of the people, Major General Park Chang Hee's coup d'e tat on 16 May, 1961, overthrew the government<sup>10</sup>. "The coup was waged by a small group of officers. In order to stay in power, they needed the backing of some 800,000 men in the Korean armed forces, and to secure their support they co-opted many non-coup military leaders into their rank. At the outset, the Korean CIA and intelligence networks were quickly developed to counteract any activity subversive of their power. Being also keenly mindful of their non-civilian origins in the assumption of power, leaders purposely coopted intellectuals and other civilian leaders into their military and civilian complex"<sup>11</sup>.

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10. For 16 May 1961 military coup see p.19 HAK KYU Sohn, Authoritarianism and opposition in South Korea (London: Routledge, 1989); also see Note. 2, Andrew. C.Nahm. pp.442-447; C.I.Eugene Kim, "The South Korean military coup of May 1961, its causes and the social characteristics of its leaders", in Jacques Van Doorn (ed) The Armed Forces and Society (Mouton: Sociological Essay's 1968).

11. C.I. Eugene Kim, "The Formation of civil military coalition: South Korea", a paper presented in The Role of the State in Economic Development: Republic of Korea, James E. West Centre, UCLA, 14-16 August, 1987, p.19; Also see Note 1 Gregory Henderson, pp.334-360; Mark L. Clifford, Troubled Tiger: Businessmen, Bureaucrats, and Generals in South Korea(New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994);



Park Chang Hee sought to legitimise his rule when he ran for the Presidency on 15th October, 1963. He defeated Yun Po-son, the opposition candidate. He again contested and won the Presidential election in 1967, and gave the assurance that he would quit the office at the end of the constitutionally permissible two four year terms. However, in the midst of his second term, he initiated the process for the amendment of the constitution which would allow him to run for third consecutive term. This move in 1968 plunged Korea into major political upheaval. There were widespread and prolonged agitations against the proposed constitutional amendment. On 17 October 1968 the National referendum approved this revision amidst violent political protest and political boycott by the opposition group. Following the constitutional revision Park ran for his third term and won.

Less than two years after he got himself elected for the third term, Park made known his intention not only to contest for yet another term but also sought determinedly to enhance his power and change the manner of electing the Presidency from direct to indirect way through what was termed as "Shiwol Yushin" or October

Revitalization Reform in October 1972. In fact, these proposed changes were so sweeping and so fundamental that the Yushin Reform came to be called Yushin Constitution.<sup>12</sup>

According to Yushin constitution the President would be elected by National council for unification, a new institution specified by the constitution and composed of 2,000 to 6,000 delegates. These delegates were not themselves affiliated with a political party but elected by a popular vote without political debate. Article 39(1) stated that the "election of the President by the National Council for Unification was also to be held without

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12. Yushin Constitution; Constitution: Korea Background series. (Seoul: Korea Overseas Information service, 1973). See chapter 2,3,4, and 7 for emergence, establishment, consolidation and collapse of the Yushin system in Note 10, HAK KYU SOHN also see Min ha KIM's, "Political Philosophy of President Park", Korea Observer, Vol. IX No.1 Spring 1978; R.R.Krishnan, "President Park's Gamble" Hindustan Times, (New Delhi), 8 November 1972 also see R.R.Krishnan, "Crucial issues in South Korean Poll" The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 28 April 1971. also see, Park Chung Hee, Our Nation's Path (Seoul: Hollym, 1962); Park Chung Hee, The Country. The Revolution and I (Seoul: Hollym, 1962); Shin Bum Shik, Major Speeches by Korea's Park Chung Hee (Seoul: Hollym, 1970);

The term Yushin was coined by the minister of culture and information Yun Chu-Young, who on announcing the draft amendment to the constitution, referred to the special declaration of 17 October as 'October Yushin'. Tonga Iibo, 27 Oct 1972.

political debate". The President was empowered to dissolve the National Assembly under Article-59. The constitution concentrated more power in the President's hands. President was "Constitutionally the National Leader above three branches Executive, Legislature and Judiciary". There were no restrictions on the number of times he could run for office.

In the following year, the National referendum was conducted under the martial law which approved the "New constitution" by the sweeping margin of 91.5% of those who voted. Under this New constitution Park Chung Hee was elected by National Conference for Unification members. His rule as a virtual dictator continued until his assassination on 26 October 1979.

The 12 December 1978 military mini coup saw the beginning of General Chun doo Hwan's regime<sup>13</sup>. His regime compounded matters by the bloody massacre of KwangJu in

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13. 12 December military mini coup see pp-556-557, Sung Chul Yang, The North and South Korean Political System A Comparative Analysis, (Seoul: Seoul Press, 1994); Young Whan Kihl, "Korea's Fifth Republic: Domestic Political trends", Journal of North East Asian Studies, Vol.1, No.2 June 1982; Eric Nordlinger, Soldiers in politics: Military coups and governments (Prentice-Hall, 1977); Kenneth Fidel (ed), Militarism in Developing countries (U.S.: Transaction Books, 1975); Chong Sik Lee, "South Korea 1979: Confrontation, Assassination and Transition", Asian Survey, XX, 1, Jan 1980. pp. 63-70. May 1980.

"The anti-regime democratic movement did not cease with the death of Park because one of the major objectives of the movement was directed against domination of the State apparatus. In the people's perception what had taken place following the assassination of Park was one set of Generals replacing another set of Generals, in bizarre factional struggles. As the democratic movement spread to several cities and assumed unprecedented proportions, Martial Law was proclaimed which in turn touched off a massive rebellion in the South West, centering around Kwangju. Students and ordinary citizens drove away the Martial Law troops, took over Kwangju and surrounding towns for a week in May 1980 and resisted the reinforcement of troops from outside. However, the army now under the total control of Chun Doo Hwan, re-established Martial Law authority in Kwangju and suppressed the rebellion with brutality and loss of life.

Three months after his success in Kwangju, Chun got himself elected as the "11th term President" of the 4th Republic under the Yushin System. Within a year, he was re-elected as President, now of the "Fifth Republic" preceded by a "National Referendum" for a new constitution (eighth amendment of the 1948 Constitution). The writing of

the Constitution and the referendum took place under conditions of national emergency, denial of civil liberties for all the likely political opponents of Chun and an extended Martial Law was proclaimed on May 17, 1980" 14.

When President Chun Doo Hwan issued a declaration on 13 April, 1987 postponing the revision of the Constitution until after the 1988 Seoul Olympics, once again large scale protests erupted across the country. The calls for constitutional revision grew stronger, led by students and opposition parties. No revision of constitution meant that his successor would be selected under the existing electoral college system before the end of the year. Chun Doo Hwan's move was a surprise attack on opposition. The government had clearly decided to take the offensive and quickly started to prepare for a Presidential election using its might to suppress the protest of the opposition. On 10 June 1987 the Democratic Justice Party nominated Roh Tae Woo, its chairman, as its candidate to succeed Chun as

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14. Krishnan, R.R., Stability-Security Syndrome in Korea: Some observations: A paper presented at National Seminar on Development in the Pacific Region, Institute for Defence studies and Analysis, (New Delhi) 1-3 December, 1987.

President. On the same day the opposition forces held a joint rally in Seoul for realizing a constitution. The rally marked a major turning point. After 10 June, demonstrations were held almost continuously day and night.

During this complex political situation Roh Tea Woo made a surprise announcement on 29 June that sought to accommodate the demands of the opposition. These included revision of the constitution for a direct Presidential election, amnesty and restoration of civil rights for the opposition leaders. On July it was announced that the ruling and opposition parties had successfully negotiated a draft bill on revision of the constitution for holding direct Presidential election. A new constitution featuring direct popular Presidential election and improved civil rights was endorsed with the overwhelming support of the people in a National Referendum<sup>15</sup>.

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15. For Special declaration of 29th, June, 1987 of Roh Tae Woo see pp.317-321 in list of documents in James Cotton (ed) Korea under Roh Tae woo; Democratization, Northern policy and inter Korean relations. Allen and Unwin 1993. For Constitution of October 29, 1987, see Appendix 5 the constitution of The Republic of Korea in Note.12, Sung Chul Yang, pp.933-968.

During the 13th Presidential election Roh was elected on 16, December, 1987 beating a divided opposition, the first of its kind in a direct popular voting in sixteen years. Roh's decision before the 14th Presidential election to resign from the ruling party and also to ask the cabinet to resign enmasse and replace it with a caretaker neutral team headed by an academician to ensure fairness in the ensuing Presidential election was a further boost for democracy in Korea. His achievement brought about a remarkable transformation in the nature of politics from "authoritarian to democracy and from dissident underground politics to open participatory politics<sup>16</sup>.

Except during the Chang Myon period 1960-61, the Presidential system has continued in Korea since 1948. During the Syngman Rhee period, the head of the state, the head of the executive branch and the chief legislator was the President. President also exercised the Judicial powers such as executive clemency, appointment and reappointment of the Judges.

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16. R.R.Krishnan, Significant Achievements of the Roh Presidency" Korean News (New Delhi), Vol.XXI. NO.4 Winter, 1992.

Under the Chang Myon regime, the President's powers became ceremonial, as the government adopted cabinet responsibility system. The President was not allowed to be affiliated with a political party and veto power could not be exercised by the President. Real executive powers were vested with the State Council headed by the Prime Minister.

The Presidential system was restored with more powers under the Park Chung Hee regime. The State Council, instead of being a collective decision making body became the President's deliberated body. The National Assembly could be dissolved by the President. The removal of the Prime Minister and the members of the State Council upon the consent of its majority members. The Yushin constitution of 1972 made the President de facto and de jure head. President was empowered to take emergency measures in the name of National security. These measures were not subjected to Judicial review. Park regime also saw the abolition of direct Presidential Election and removal of the three term restriction on the Presidency.

Presidential powers were sought to be curtailed to some extent during Chun doo Hwan regime 1980-88 albeit on



paper only. According to Article 45 and 129 of 1980, the Presidency was limited to one seven year term. If the majority of the National Assembly members requested the lifting of Emergency measures, now the President had to comply. The Emergency measures were subjected to Judicial review. The President could not dissolve the National Assembly, within one year of its formations. The President was elected by Electoral College System.

After the June, 1987 amendment to the constitution or what came to be called 1987 constitution, President was elected by direct popular vote, his period limited to one five year term. The new constitution prohibited the dissolving of the National Assembly.

It was against this background that the fourteenth Presidential election took place in December 1992 and it was a landmark development in the political history of Korea. Kim Young Sam, a civilian with impressive democratic credentials was elected President in a keen contest. Unlike in the past, all the three Presidential candidates were civilians. Both the opponents of Kim Young Sam were renowned public figures but with different backgrounds. While Kim Dae Jung was probably the most

well known opposition political figure in Korea who had also contested the Presidential election in 1971 and 1988, Chun Ju Young was also an equally famous and Korea's leading industrialist, founder and honorary Chairman of Hyundai group<sup>17</sup>.

Kim Young Sam like his long-standing political rival Kim Dae Jung was in the forefront of the democratic movement during the long years of the authoritarian rule, first under Syngman Rhee, later under Parkchung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan. However, unlike Kim Dae Jung, Kim Young Sam joined and merged his Reunification Democratic party in 1990 with the ruling Liberal Democratic party, which had been established and presided over by Roh Tae Woo. It was therefore, not easy for Kim Young Sam to be elected as the official candidate of the ruling LDP, especially when some of the stalwarts in the party with long years of association with Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan were keen to be Roh's successor. To what extent Kim Young Sam's association with the ruling party almost on the eve of the election would help or hinder his prospect of winning the crucial Presidential election became an

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17. See R.R. Krishnan, "The fruits of a democratic revolution" The Pioneer (New Delhi) 21, December 1992.

important issue. Whether the ruling party could or would transform itself from its somewhat sullied image of a military authoritarian oriented party or whether Kim Young Sam would be bold enough to carry out reforms including purges of the pro-military authoritarian elements within the party as an essential and integral part of the proposed political transformations of Korea were some of the issues being raised.<sup>18</sup>

Kim Young Sam, although a late comer to the election scene, set the tone and tenor of the election and projected himself not only as a trenchant critic of what he described as "Korean disease" but also as the man who was destined to provide a cure for the disease and transform the body politic of Korea.

To put it differently, he thrust himself into the campaign as both a critic of old Korea and a crusader of New Korea. His campaign slogan was "Koreans on the move again with Kim Young Sam leading". He was determined to make Korea a country which all Koreans would be proud of and urged compatriots at home and abroad to help him build

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18. Ibid, also see "Inauguration of Kim Young Sam's government and A "New Korea Policy", Korean Annual, (Seoul: Yonhap, 1993), pp. 58-88.

a New Korea with "shin param" (new or fresh wind). He also sought to convince the citizens that he wanted to root out corruption, help launch another phase of the Korean "miracle" while freeing the government of economic intervention and unleashing private initiatives and creativity at all levels of business activity<sup>19</sup>.

"After 28 days of official election campaigning, Kim Young Sam was elected with 42 percent or 9, 977,332, of the 24,085,170 ballots cast. Kim Dae Jung, the first runner up, of the Democratic party cornered 33,82% or 8,041,284 votes, while billionaire candidate Chung Ju-Young of the United Peoples party was a distant third with 16.32% or 3,880,067 votes<sup>20</sup>.

Kim Dae Jung on the morning of December 19 congratulated Kim Young Sam saying "I humbly accept the people's Judgement and I wish the President elect success. I firmly believe in his ability to develop democracy in Korea and lay the groundwork for national reunification"<sup>21</sup>.

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19. Ibid, p.64.

20. For 14th Presidential Election see Ibid p. 157.

21. Ibid pp. 61-62.

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"The graciousness, shown by the losing opposition candidates, confirms that Korea passed an important test for democracy with flying colours". "This is a process of democracy, isn't it? The losing ones were swift in accepting defeat and sending congratulation to the President elect for the first time in the Nation", said a citizen.

Kim Young Sam with his vision to create New Korea, to cure Korean disease, and with his four major goals like clean government, sound economy, healthy society and peaceful unifications assumed the office of the President on 23 February '93. Thus finally a truly civilian government came to be established, with a clear commitment to change and reform with stability.

The triumph of Kim Young Sam was seen as much more than a triumph of the individual. It was perceived by the world press as a triumph of a cause, a movement for democracy. This was the reaction and response of the world press to the December 1992 Presidential election. The Washington Post said "South Korea swears in first leader free of military ties".

\* The Boston Globe, "civilian takes oath to lead South Korea"

- \* The Washington Herald "Changing Korea gets new leader"
- \* San Francisco chronicle "A civilian leads South Korea"
- \* The Economist "South Korea changing picture "
- \* Daily Times "Democracy triumphs in South Korea"

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\*The Washington Post, 26 February, 1993; The Boston Globe, 3 March, 1993; The Washington Herald, 1 March, 1993; The Economist 27 March, 1993; Daily Times 25 February, 1993

## *CHAPTER- II*

## CHAPTER-2

### DISMANTLING THE OLD ORDER: POLITICAL, ADMINISTRATIVE AND ECONOMIC REFORMS

The election of Kim Young Sam as President in the keenly contested election on 22 December 1992 was an event of historic significance in the political history of Korea. As the first civilian Chief Executive and head of State in more than three decades of military rule, Kim Young Sam sought to usher in a new era of stable democratic rule, which was the long cherished goal of the people. There were both challenges and opportunities to the new government. The challenge was the dismantling of the old order. It was a formidable order which had been created, sustained and supported by the military dominated institutions and ethos. The ramifications of the awesome order affected almost all sections of the society. The challenge was to take the initiative and create a new political order which could be supported by credible institutions and ethos that would be based on democratic values, respect for dissent and tolerance, transparency and open participatory processes in resolving the vital National issues. In other words the issue in the 1992 December election was not a mere symbolic but a



substantive, sweeping change in the polity and political paradigm and the manner and methodology of governance. The most important issue was how far or how well the regime would reflect the citizens long suppressed democratic urges and how to ensure that the citizens could have credibility and trust in the democratic objectives and orientation of the regime. To respond to the challenges and opportunities, consolidating the democratic gains that had emerged from the elections and broadening the democratic base of the new government, were seen as an essential prerequisites by the Kim Young Sam government. Probably Kim Young Sam himself and the millions who voted for him knew of the relationship that came to be established after Kim Young Sam Reunification Democratic Party, Kim Jong Pil's Democratic Republican party and Roh Tae Woo's Democratic Justice Party had merged in 1990 to form the Liberal Democratic Party. The most important agenda for the new government was the sweeping political reform. However, he was aware of the difficulties involved in such a programme. It was also apparent that the dismantling of old order and ushering in of a new order would not be achieved by restricting the agenda only to political reform, however imperative and important it might have been. Parallel administrative and economic

reforms were considered necessary to complement political reforms.

In the following sections, we will examine the various aspects of political, economic and administrative reforms. In his inaugural address Kim Young Sam stressed the need to eliminate official corruption to invigorate the flagging economy and restore a sense of National discipline. Upon assuming office on 25, February 1993, President Kim Young Sam pledged to carry out bold reform policies aimed at building a New Korea. His efforts in the beginning were marked by his appointment of reform minded people to key positions. Unlike his predecessors, Kim Young Sam directed that the road in front of Chong Wa Dae (the Presidential office - residence complex) and nearby Mt. In Wang San - be opened to public. This indicated his determination to make government more accessible and transparent to the people.

"President Kim Young Sam well recognized the social force of reform and has launched to revamp the political leaderships structure. The first target was the military. The politics of diversion did away with the previous military authoritarianism, but left the military

unchanged. Thus one of the aims of democratization was accomplished, but not the other, the reform of military. Here Kim Young Sam started with the reform of the military. He thought the restructuring of the military would clear the way for setting up his civilian control of government"<sup>22</sup>.

This began with government appointing reform minded people in 'Hanahoe' (one mind) society. Earlier its members included former Presidents Chun doo hwan, Roh Tae Woo. Hanahoe was founded in late 1950's by young officers. Over the years their members included not only top military brass but also top political figures. Even Kim Young Sam's administration included many officers connected with Hanahoe. Hanahoe had been a part of ruling elites in military as well as in politics. Removal of Hanahoe members from the military not only reorganized the politicized military into a more professional meritocracy,

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22. Dal - Joong Chang, "Theoretical Lessons of the Korean Democratization", Topics on Korean Affairs, (Seoul), No.4 1995. See Chung - In Moon and Kang Mun Gu "Democratic opening and military intervention in South Korea comparative assessment and implications". Note 15, James cotton (ed.) pp.170-191.

but it also meant the elimination of military influence on political leadership<sup>23</sup>.

In earlier regimes the ruling elite consisted of military, bureaucrats, and businessman, where military occupied top position. The new civilian regime now consisted of party politicians, intellectuals and socially influential new ruling elites. For more details see Table 1,2,3,4 (page 49-52).

President Kim Young Sam realized the need to bring about perceptible changes in the major Governmental institutions if he had to continue with the political reforms and secure popular backing. It was not surprising that after taking bold measures to neutralize the power and influence that the high officials of the army had wielded for three decades, he would have to transform the

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23. Note 21 Dal - Joung Chang, p.13.

For reform of Hanohoe see Soong-Hoom Kil, "Political reforms of President Kim Young Sam and the emergence of New Political force in South Korea", Topics on Korean Affairs (Seoul), No. 5. October 1994 pp 3-14; Gaston J. Sigur., "South Korea's reform Democracy", Topics on Korean Affairs (Seoul), No. 5. October 1993. pp 3-16; Young Ho Min., "South Korea's reform Policy and South North relations", East Asian Review, (Institute for East Asian studies), Vol. V.No.3, Autumn 1993; Park in Chul "Army intelligence Agency seeking New Image", Korean Newsreview (Seoul), 16. October 1993. pp 7-8.

(KCIA) Korean Central Intelligence Agency. This agency had been used ever since its creation in 1960's as one of the most powerful institutions of the military authoritarian regimes. The dreaded KCIA had often been described as an omnipotent, omnipresent and omniscient institution of Government especially in 70's and 80's. It is not that the citizens were unaware of the power of KCIA and its role in curbing political and intellectual dissent or how the KCIA had come to represent the authoritarian profile of the state and yet nobody could dare to dismantle or restructure the institutions. Indeed one of the reasons for the growth of the democratic movement as well as the objective of the movement was to curb the powers and change the character of the KCIA.

Therefore Kim Young Sam accorded primacy to the task of restructuring KCIA, and there by reinstilling confidence instead of fear in the citizens toward regime and state. He took a series of measures that included forcing Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA also the agency for National Security Planning) and Presidential security service which had been symbols of authoritarianism to yield their unlimited powers. Kim Young Sam appointed a civilian as (the KCIA's) director

and reshuffled 70 percent of officials in the position of bureau director-general and nearly 50 percent of section chiefs. He also abolished the fourth bureau which was conducting domestic political surveillance. The Agency for National security plan local branches was cut from 22 to six and the director was forbidden to attend cabinet meetings and ministry conferences.

In the Defence security command, Kim Young Sam reduced the rank of the commander and abolished the department which was collecting intelligence and information on civilians. Nearly 1,000 agents and local branches were reduced. Now the commander was placed under the defence minister. Earlier he was directly responsible to the President. The Presidential security service was made responsible for protecting the President and prohibited from handling government business. His rank was now reduced to vice-minister <sup>24</sup>.

As we have noted democracy in Korea came to imply the hegemony of the civilian rule, non-involvement of military in politics. Kim Young Sam made drastic changes. All the Joint Chiefs of staff, Army commanders were shuffled. Nearly 73.3% of commanders, belonging to the

rank of lieutenant general and 68.3% of commanders ranked major general were replaced.

President Kim Young Sam, exposed military corruption. (Kim Young Sam's anti-corruption drive is dealt with after the military reforms).

In April 1993, former Naval Chief of staff Kim Jong-ho's prosecutors announced that he had received a total of 370 million Won for promoting some of his subordinates. He was arrested along with Cho Ki-Yop, former commander of Marine Corps, and Chung Young-Hoo former Air force chief of staff, on the same charge. Cho Ki-Yop had (himself) given 200 million won to Kim Jang ho for his own promotion and had taken from his subordinates nearly 30 million won. Nearly 190 million won were received as bribes by Chung Young Hoo.

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24. "The Civilian Governments Reform Policy and Anti corruption campaign" Korea Annual (Seoul) 1994 pp 58-59. R.R. Krishnan "Kim Young Sam's year of Reform New Socio-economic and Political Order", Korean News (New Delhi), vol. XXI. No.2. March - April 1994. pp 8-9. "Assets of 1,187 Government officials made public", Korea News-review (Seoul), "September, 1993, p.4. "Wealth through illegitimate means unparadonabale Kim", Korea Newsreview (Seoul), 11 September, 1993, p 5. Lee Sung-Yui, "political whirlwind expected", Korea News review, 11 september 1993, pp 5-6. Cha Vitor D. "Politics and Democracy under the Kim Young Sam government: something old, something new", Asian Survey, 33 (9); September 1993: pp 849-63.

In the Yulgok military build-up project and defence supply contracts, former Defence ministers Lee Jung-Koo and Lee-Sang-Hoon, former Air Force Chief of staff Han Chu-Sok and former Naval chief of staff Kim Chul-Woo were arrested by prosecutors for accepting bribes in July 1993 for Yul gok military build up project. Kim Chong Whi former special Assistant to President for foreign and National security was suspended for involvement in it <sup>25</sup>.

The army generals who were discredited on charges of corruption and various scadals could not regroup themselves and pose a threat to Kim Young Sam. Those army personnel who were in positions of political power were removed, demoted, discredited and denied future any future role.

Kim Young Sam's its first steps to get rid of corruption among Government officials and politicians began with his " Declaration for severance of political money". He vowed not to accept "any political money"

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25. "The Civilian Government Refrom Policy and anti-corruption campaign", Korea Annual (Seoul) , 1994, pp. 62-64; and also see Chung Sung - Woo "Presidential Decree Deals strong blow to corruption", Korea News Review (Seoul, 28 August, 1993.



during his term. This was in contrast to the earlier Republic where the Blue House provided political funds to the ruling party and raised money. Kim Young Sam put an end to it. He disclosed his family's assets, thus setting the stage for a wide ranging anti-corruption movement, beginning at the highest levels of government. He asked his Blue House advisors, ministers and deputy ministers in the administration, and all the DLP members likewise to make public their personal assets.

The message was clear and quickly followed. Politicians and ranking officials began to make public their properties as a way of vindicating themselves. This unprecedented and apparently well-intentioned step has gone a long way towards bringing greater transparency and honesty into the financial and political activities of leading public figures<sup>26</sup>.

After President Kim Young Sam's dramatic disclosure of his personal assets, Prime Minister Hwang In Sung and Bureau of Audit Inspection (BAI) Chairman Lee Hoichang disclosed their assets, followed by post holders of DLP,

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26. Editorial Korea Newsreview(Seoul), 13 April, 1993.

cabinet ministers, top government officials, 161 DLP law makers and 125 Vice ministers and senior administration officers.

Five vice ministerial level officers were in trouble with the unprecedented asset disclosure. Nearly 242 officials quit their jobs. 1,363 public servants were relieved of their positions for their misdeeds. In his anti corruption campaign major cases within 1993 besides the already mentioned irregularities in the military, was the scandal in slot-machine business. In 3 months investigations in this case revealed those who recieved bribes. Rep. Park Chul-un, once powerful ruling DLP lawmaker(now who in UPP), Lee Kun-Kae, chief prosecutor of the Taejon High prosecutors office; and Eum Sam-Tak former head of the office of coordination at the Agency for National Security Planning. Even Vice Justice Minister Shin Kuhn, Lee Kunkae and Cheon Jae-Ki, President of the Legal Research and Training Institute were forced to resign.

The Ahn Young Mo bribery affair resulted in the arrest of one Kim Chong-In from the political circle. In the irregularities in the casino industry the company's

President, Kim Sung Jin, was arrested on charges of tax evasion. Investigation against in Park Tae Joon, Honorary chairman of Pohang Iron and Steel Co (Posco) by the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office, were launched upon receiving complaints from the National Tax Administration. Park Tae Joon, who then was chairman of ruling LDP was found guilty of accepting nearly 3.9 billion won as bribery from companies dealing with POSCO. As he was in Japan prosecution were suspended against him but it resulted in arrest of Hwang Kyung-Ho former POSCO chairman, and Yoo Sang Bu former POSCO Vice - President.

The investigation of Kim Sgung -Youn, chairman of the Hanhwa business group resulted in his arrest for violating foreign exchange laws. His arrest was a shock to many as the government was energizing itself to revitalize the national economy and kim was also a head of a big business group. In the Rep. Kim Moon Kee case the ruling DLP lawmaker, who was attacked publicly for accumulating personal wealth through real estate, was arrested after his disclosure of assets for receiving 600 million won from parents of seven students for back door entrance in Sang Ji University in Wonju where he was director of board of trustees.

Democratic party Rep. Lee Dong-Kun was arrested by Seoul District Prosecutors office for charges of forcibly selling advertisements to Ohang Iron and Steel Co., and taking 170 million won not to publish a damaging article on the company in the monthly magazine "Observer" which he owned 27.

May 1993 enactment of Public Servants Ethics also prescribed that top ranking government officials, National Assembly men make public their assets. "It is expected that public officials who failed to register their assets honestly or have problems in the way they accumulated their wealth will be advised to resign voluntarily from their services. Problems with their assets will be referred to the Prosecution or the Nation's Tax administration for their inspection and possible forcible dismissal"28.

President Kim Young Sam on 12 August 1993, in a surprise move enforced the mandatory use of real names in

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27. Note 24, Korea Annual(Seoul) 1994, pp 62-65

28. Note 22. Soong-Hoom Kil p. 20-21; also see Lee Sung Yul, 'Bill on Asset disclosures; Epoch making legislation', Korea Newsreview (Seoul), 29 May, 1993.

all financial transactions by invoking emergency Presidential Economic Decree on 19 August. The National Assembly approved it. The Enactment of the Public Servants Ethics Law and the implementation of the real name system were the most important of the reforms Kim himself has instituted since his inauguration in Feb., 1993. The gist of Real name financial system is "A real name accounting will be applied to all financial transactions, including deposits, instalments, savings, checks, certificates of deposits, stocks and bonds.

Those holding accounts of financial institutions must confirm their real names without such confirmation withdrawal of any money from financial institutions will be banned.

Such inevitable cases as the payment of principal on loans and the payment of less than 1 million won using cash cards will be excluded from the obligatory confirmation.

Penalty fees for violating the real name confirmation procedure will be raised from the present 1 million won to 5 million.

Holders of financial assets under aliases must register their real names within the coming two months.

Investigations on the source of funds will be excluded for those possessing financial assets of 50 million won or less under aliases. The maximum limit will be 15 million won for minors aged 15 or younger.

A maximum 60% of the penalty will be levied on those converting aliases to real names after the two months deadline. Heavy penalty in taxes amounting to 96.75% will be imposed on interest and dividend incomes stemming from financial assets registered under aliases.

The officer of National tax administration will conduct a special tax probe on those withdrawing money exceeding 30 million won from financial institutions designated two months period.

In order to keep money from flowing abroad by disguising it as commercial transactions or remittance to individuals the government will keep a list of those who have sent more than \$3,000 abroad and also investigate those who own real estate"<sup>29</sup>.

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29. Korea Newsreview, (Seoul) 21 August, 1993, p.14; see Huh Young., "Laws alone cannot bring Political Reform", Korea Focus (Seoul), vol.2, No.3 1994.

The implementation of the real name financial transaction was central to establishing a clear and fair political climate in Korea. Two basic weaknesses of Korean politics had been, politics-business collusion and the uneven distribution of political resources between the ruling and the opposition parties. Political funds are required to cover expenses in elections, party operations and other political activity. In case of Korean politics, however these funds are frequently criticized for being the source of the system's destruction. 'Black Money' 'Money Politics' and dirty politics all have been used to describe the under the table political contribution. Therefore this should be checked for clean Democratic system in Korea.

#### **Amending the Politics related law**

The enactment of political reform legislation comprising the Unified Election Law, the Political Fund Law and the Law of autonomous local - governing bodies was another major achievement of the Kim Young Sam government. The establishment of a clean political climate in which politicians do not need enormous money to win elections was the basis KIM Young Sam of drafting these laws.

According to this new political reform legislation, a candidate for the National Assembly is allowed to spend up to an average 45 million won. The Government has increased at the same time the amount of state financial assistance to candidates. Printing campaign posters and other publicity and mailing violation of election law results in harsher punishments.

Candidates receiving political contributions have to issue receipts provided by the Central Election Management Committee. In order to eliminate the political businessmen collusion the Political Fund Law was strengthened.

The DLP followed the President's call for reform, by decreasing the size of the party's organizations and the number of paid party officials, including a 47% cut in personnel at the party level. The ruling and opposition parties agreed to form a committee to reform the National Assembly to a productive legislature<sup>30</sup>.

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30. Korea Annual (Seoul), 1994, p. 59. also see Shin Yong Bae "Assembly passes Political Reform Bills", Korea Newsreview (Seoul), 12 March, 1994. and also "Kim urges Assembly to pass Reform Bills", Korea Newsreview (Seoul), 30 October, 1993.



### **Kim Young Sam: Economic Reform**

'A five year plan for a new economy' was introduced soon after his inauguration to Presidential office by President Kim Young Sam to wipe out bureaucratic inefficiency caused by Government control. He reformed the system to help realize the potential of the Nation's Economy. Kim Young Sam's Real Name Financial Transaction System was a framework for a new economic and social order. Though there was some concern about rapid introduction of real name - system, the Government was successful in overcoming temporary difficulties through flexible currency operations and a currency stabilization policy. A fair financial order was also laid down by government, the government also established a system of commodity distribution that equals that of advanced Nations, and reformed the management of business enterprises.

In order to check the suspected favoritism shown to select business groups and collusion between politicians and businessman, the Kim Young Sam administration offered transparent tenders for large national projects. (Instance of this was the Seoul-Pusan highspeed railway project. The cable television business was based on

objective evaluations).

Next step of President Kim's economic reform was that of imposing a heavy burden on those having excessive real estate holding's. Kim Young Sam expressed his firm resolution to end speculation in land. As a result, the number of real estate holders dropped and the prices of land and buildings stabilized. Additionally, the government relaxed many regulations as part of its policy to encourage self-imposed control by private companies. Specifically it selected 245 regulations and eased 225 of them 31.

Knowing that relaxation of regulations should be felt directly by companies, a senior Presidential secretariat for economic Affairs was established in the Presidential office to make sure that the eased regulations were being enforced. The government also enforced the principle of fair trade while guaranteeing the independence of financial institutions from the state in their business operations and personal management.

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31. Korea Annual (Seoul), 1994, p.60; and also see "Reform Bill aims at more equitable Tax burden", Korea Newsreview (Seoul), 27 August, 1994. Kim Jong Chan "Reforms Anti corruption campaign success of first six month", Korea Newsreview (Seoul), 28 August, 1993.

Roh Tae Woo was arrested on 16 November 1995 on charges of corruption. He had also publicly confessed to amassing \$650 million (it was between 1988 and 1993) in "slush funds". In it 330 billion won had been used for political activities. Out of the remaining 170 billion won 36 billion was hidden in property holdings under the name of Roh Tae Woo's relatives as found out by the Prosecution's findings. Roh Tae Woo admitted that half of the slush fund was collected from Chaebol-the 40 huge conglomerates that dominate South Korea Economy. "The President Blue House were the venue where pay off were made for concessions and special favours such as awarding of lucrative contracts"<sup>32</sup>. Nearly 36 executives were questioned. The government indicted its first Cheabol Chairman Chung Tae so of the Hanbo group, for the reason that he had helped Roh Tae Woo to escape new anti-corruption laws.

The former president Roh Tae Woo's corrupt

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32. "Roh's Prosecution: impetus for change", The Hankook Ilbo, (Seoul), 17 November, 1995. For more details " A Time for New politics", Dong Allbo (Seoul), 12 March 1996; government business relations allowed Roh to accumulate a Kim Dong Hyun, "Development Experience and Future direction of Korean Government", Korea observer (Seoul), 25 (2); summer 1994: p.116.

leadership and close ties with big business have dramatically brought to light the dark side of the politics of previous military backed regimes. Nebulous massive slush fund for political and personal use. The sensation surrounding the scandal had stirred a public outcry and rekindled the public's fervent call for an eradication of past misdeeds<sup>33</sup>.

Chun doo Hwan was arrested on 3 December and indicted on 21 December on charges of playing a principle role in the military mutiny in December 1979 and the brutal suppression of the Kwangju prodemocracy up rising in 1980.

Another notable feature in Korean political history was the announcement by President Kim Young Sam that his government would introduce legislation allowing the prosecution of those involved in the 1979 coup and the subsequent Kwongju massacre.

"It is our understanding that this was President Kim

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33. Ahn Byung - Young, " Korean Politics Affer Slush fund scandals; Korea focus (Seoul), vol. 3, No 6, 1995. see also Youn Dae Kyu., "Constitutional Change in Korea; Retrospects and Prospects", Asian Affairs, 25 (2): June 1994, pp. 178-87.

Young Sam's intention when he called in late November for enactment of a special law was to punish those responsible for the military crackdown of the May 18 Movement"<sup>34</sup>

The other notable feature of Kim Young Sam's government was, distancing himself from the past administration by taking a highly and open liberal political stance. He granted amnesty to some 40,000 prisoners or ex-convicts. Rev Moon IK-Hwan, the long-time dissident who was in jail for an unauthorized visit to North Korea, was among the thousands of the people released.

"The by-elections held in the three electoral districts on August 2, 1994, to fill three vacant seats in the National Assembly drew keen public attention because they were the first elections under the political reform laws. The elections turned out to be unprecedentedly clean. This strengthened the prospect that the Korean electoral landscape that had been smeared by official intervention and money power for so long was now being cleaned up. Notably, the DLP yielded the electoral advantage that used

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34. "Arrests of two former Presidents", The Chosun Ilbo(Seoul), 4 December, 1995.

to be enjoyed by ruling parties in the past (official intervention in their favour and generous campaign donations by business benefiting from or seeking government favours). This was proved by the fact that the DLP lost in two districts"<sup>35</sup>.

The DLP tried to reform itself with introducing the principles of free competition in the conduct of affairs within the party. It also sought to recruit into its fold up-and-coming leaders from all walks of life and to establish experts and professionals in various fields in order to strengthen the party's ability to develop ideas and policies. The main intention here was for the DLP to reform itself so that it will be a model for all other Korea's political parties.

"Various decisive steps have been taken by the administration to revitalize the Korean Economy, which had been in a slump for a couple of years prior to President Kim Young Sam's inauguration. Aided in part by the strong

35."Achievements of the Kim Young Sam administration during its first two years", Korean Overseas Information service (Seoul), No.131, 14 February 1995, pp.14-13; also see "By election results" Korea Newsreview (Seoul), 9 June, 1993; Tun Jen Cheng and Brantly Womact, "General elections on informal politics in East Asia", Asian Survey Vol. XXXVI, No. 3, 1996.

Japanese Yen which adds to Korea's competitiveness in the international market place - the Korean Economy grew by 8.3 percent in 1994, while the inflation rate was held down to 5.6 percent. Thus, the administration was able to meet its economic targets, and now the Republic's GNP is the 12th largest in the world".<sup>36</sup>

Kim Young Sam in his 1996 New Year address elaborated in the various aspects in the wide ranging reforms that he had initiated. Commenting on the arrest of former President on corruption charges Kim Young Sam said "for the first time in our constitutional history, two former Presidents, who have been respected and beloved by the people of this country, have been arrested in recent months. Their evasion of the law and mind boggling corruption that has come to light during the prosecution's investigation has generated a deep sense of anger, frustration and despair."<sup>37</sup> He further illustrated that unless we go through this process, however, we willn't be able to correct the wrongs of history. Through this

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36. Note 34, p.4

37. "To build a first class nation by righting the wrong of past and improving the quality of law", Backgrounder (Seoul), Ministry of Information, No. 137, 10 January, 1996.

process and by liquidating the former unfortunate and anachronistic legacy of military coups d'etat, we will be able to reclaim the true role of the military and our National pride. His intention was 'Righting the wrongs of hisotry is an effort get on the right track for the future.'<sup>38</sup>

On corruption in high places he said he had always believed that the way politics was conducted in this country was wrong. So he disclosed his personal assets as soon as he became President, so that politics should be free of the Yoke of money. "I initiated the real name financial transaction system in order to block any attempt at collusion between politicians and businessmen. Had it not been for the realname financial transaction system the investigation of the irregularities and corruption of the former Presidents, would not have been possible"<sup>39</sup>.

In his regime, the eradication of corruption and wrong doings, the reform of the military and intelligence organizations, the registrations of personal assets of public officials the enactment of politics related laws and the

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38. Note 36, p.2.

39. Note 36, p.3.



real name financial transaction were implemented for making Korean political society clean and competitive.

Table-1.

Proportion of military elites as a representative in the National Assembly

Sessions	Number of Assembly members	Number of Military elites	%
<u>Third Republic</u>			
6th (1963-67)	175	31	17.7
7th (1967-71)	175	37	21.1
8th (1971-72)	203	35	17.2
<u>Fourth Republic</u>			
9th (1973-78)	218	49	22.4
10th (1978-79)	231	37	16.0
<u>Fifth Republic</u>			
11th (1981-85)	276	26	9.4
12th (1985- )	276	30	10.9
Total	1,555	245	15.8

Source: The data were aggregated based on Kim Hoo Kyung (ed.), Prominent Members of the Korean Government in Picture (Seoul: Kook Sa Pyunch an Wiwonhoe, 1986).

Notes: The Session was shortened owing to the declaration of the vitalization Regime that enabled the President Park Chung to be on power until unification. It was the beginning of Fourth Republic.

Table-2.

Military Elites in the Position of the  
Committee Chairperson of the Assembly

Committees	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	12th	Total	ME <sup>a)</sup>	%
Legislation & Justice	XX <sup>b)</sup>	XO <sup>c)</sup>	X O	O	OX	X	10	4	40	
Foreign	OX	XO	X	XO	X	XX	X	11	3	27
Home	OO	OO	O	OXX	O	XO	O	12	9	75
Finance	XO	OX <sup>d)</sup>	X	XX	X	OX	X	11	3	27
Economic & Science			X	XX	X	OX	O	7	2	29
National Defence	OO	OO	O	OO	O	OO	O	11	11	100
Education & Public Info.	OX	XX	O	XX	X	XX	X	11	2	18
Agriculture & Fisheries	XX	XX	X	XO	X	OO	O	11	4	36
Commerce & Industry	XX	XO	O	OX	X	XO	XX	12	4	33
Health & Social	XX	XX	X	XXX	O	XX	X	12	1	8
Transportation & Comm.	OX	XX	X	OO	O	OX	O	11	6	55
Construction	XO	XX	O	XX	O	OX	O	11	5	45
Steering	XO	XO	X	X	X	OO	OX	11	5	45
Total	24	24	13	26	13	26	15	141		
ME	10	0	5	9	6	13	7		59	
%	41.7	37.5	38.5	34.6	46.2	50.0	40.6			41.8

Source: Cha Doo Sam, "A Study on Military Elites and Political Development in Korea," MPA Thesis, Seoul National University, 1984, 60.

Notes: a) ME stands for military elite.  
 b) X stands for civilian elite.  
 c) O stands for military elite.  
 d) Committee on Finance and Committee on Economy and Science were merged in one committee for 6th and 7th Sessions.

**Table-3.**  
Proportion of Military Elites as a Board Director  
in the Central Government, 1964-1986.

	3rd Republic (1964-1972)	4th Republic (1973-1979)	5th Republic (1980-1986)	Total
Position	78	84	92	254
ME <sup>a)</sup>	37	30	32	99
%	47.4	35.7	34.8	39.0

Source: Ibid.

Note: a) ME stands for military elites.

**Table 4.**  
Proportion of Military Elites as a Vice-Minister  
in the Executive, 1964-1986

	3rd Republic (1964-1972)	4th Republic (1973-1979)	5th Republic (1980-1986)	Total
Position	145	121	137	403
ME <sup>a)</sup>	23	20	30	73
%	15.9	16.6	21.9	18.1

Source: The data were aggregated based on Kim Hoo Kyung (ed.),  
op.cit.

Note: a) ME stands for military elites.

**Table-5.**  
**Proportion of Military Elites as a Minister in**  
**the Cabinet, 1964-1986.**

	3rd Republic <sup>c)</sup> (1964-1972)	4th Republic (1973-1979)	5th Republic (1980-1986)	Total
Positions <sup>a)</sup>	172	142	151	465
ME <sup>b)</sup>	73	45	37	155
%	42.4	31.7	24.5	33.3

Source: Ibid.

- Notes:
- a) The ministerial positions include the Prime and Deputy Prime Minister whose position was not counted independently from the Minister of the Economic Planning Board. The positions, however, exclude the Chief Aide to the President and the Chief of the National Security Planning Board.
  - b) ME stands for military elites.
  - c) The month of each year is as of June, except for 1986 month of which is April.

*CHAPTER- III*

## CHAPTER-III

### LOCAL AUTONOMY AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS

#### Local Autonomy Elections:

When President KIM Young Sam assumed office in February 1988 one of his objectives was to expand opportunities and ensure participation of the citizens in political processes. A glaring and much discussed short coming of the authoritarian politics of earlier regimes was to deny or deprive the citizens of any say in running the affairs of the local townships and city administration. The administration of the cities, town ... was in the hands of Mayors or governors who were nominated by the central government in Seoul.

A brief reference to the history of the local autonomous system may be useful for a proper understanding of the background of the local elections.<sup>40</sup>

Korea's Local Autonomy history goes back to 4 July 1949, when the first law concerning local Autonomy was promulgated. Local Autonomy was not implemented until 25 April, 1949 inspite of existing law. On 25 April, 1952,

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<sup>40</sup>."Local Government", A Handbook of Korea(Seoul:Korean Overseas Information Service,1993),pp.286-287.

the members of small city and "UP" and "Myon" township councils were elected. After two weeks, elections were held to elect the members of provincial councils but the heads of local autonomous bodies of all levels were chosen indirectly by respective councils.

The 1952 partial implementation of local Autonomy was due to President Syngman Rhee's attempt to get himself reelected by changing the mode of Presidential elections, from indirect election through the National Assembly which was controlled at that time by his adversaries, to a direct popular election with support from local council members.

The system of indirect election of local autonomous bodies lasted until 1956, there after the members were chosen by direct elections. The system was changed after 1958 with central government directly appointing the members.

The short lived democratic administration led by Prime minister Chang Myon ensured that all local autonomous body heads and council members were chosen through direct popular elections. The local autonomous system was altogether suspended upon the outbreak of the

1961 military coup which catapulted Maj-General Park Chung Hee to power.

The local elections were however partially restored in 1991 with councils of major cities, provinces, small cities, countries and wards of major cities were set up through elections.

The 166th extraordinary session of the National Assembly which was held from 17 February to 4 March 1994 unanimously passed in its plenary sitting on 4 March the three political reform bills-The Integrated Election Law, the Political Fund Law and the Local Autonomy Law. The objectives of these laws were many. These included clean elections, restricting election expenditure, expansion of the public management system for elections, and stringent punishment for violations of the electoral laws<sup>41</sup>. Against this background the historic local elections were held on 27 June 1995. The elections were held for fifteen heads of large area autonomous bodies (these included mayors of five major cities and governors of 10

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41. "National Assembly: The 166th EXTRAORDINARY SESSION (17 February 4 March 1994) Korea Annual (Seoul), 1995 p.121. also see Shin Yong Bae, "Assembly Passes Political Reform Bills", Korea Newsreview (Seoul), 12 March, 1995.



provinces); nine hundred and seventy two (972) members of the councils of five major cities and ten provinces; two hundred and thirty (230) heads of basic area autonomous bodies, namely, the mayors or commissioners of small cities, counties and major city boards and lastly four thousand five hundred forty one (4,541) members of the councils of small cities and major city wards.

The Ratio of candidates in Governors metropolis mayors was 3.7:1 (3.7 contested for one post); like wise in city county ward chiefs 4.1:1; in provincial metropolis councilors it was 2.8:1; lastly in city county ward councilors 2.9 candidates fought for one seat

(See Table -5, Page-84,85)

The DLP focussed on the election as an occasion to elect persons with administrative skills rather than political ambitions. It trusted its candidates as those best suited for local government.

The opposition Democratic party came up with the local elections as a midterm vote of confidence on President Kim Young Sam.

In the free and fair election that took place

opposition parties and independents made an unexpectedly strong showing in the three of the four local elections where the political parties were allowed to participate. In the 15 major cities mayor and province governor's elections only five went to the DLP, four to the Democratic party and another four to the United Liberal Democratic; the remaining two went to the independents.<sup>42</sup>

In the prestigious Seoul Mayoral election, Cho Soon of the Democratic party emerged victorious. The Seoul Mayoral seat was very important for opposition party as it was the centre of intense competition and speculation. Cho Soon got 42.31% of the total votes polled. Park Chan Jong, the Independent candidate who had appeared the likely winner got only 36.2% and DLP's Chong Won Shik, one time Prime minister, took 20.7% vote.

In the small city, county and ward chiefs, DLP, secured 70 small city mayors, county commissionership and ward chiefs out of 250 seats. DP won 84, ULD 23 and independents won remaining 53 seats.

The DP swept 23 of the 25 ward chiefs in Seoul, and the remaining two seats went to DLP. In South Kyong-Sang

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42. For more details see Korea Newsreview(Seoul), 4 July, 1995.

province, which is known as Kim Young Sam's traditional power base, the ruling party won only in 10 out of the 21 small cities and counties. Independents took 11 seats. In Pusan, of the 16 wards ruling party won 14 seats and the Independents won remaining two.

In Inchon the DLP and the DP equally shared the ten wards. In Kyonggi province, 13 of the 31 county and small city mayoral posts went to the DLP, 11 to the DP and seven to Independents. In South ChungChong province, ULD candidates swept all the 15 small cities and counties, while DP nominees took all the areas of Kwangju and south and North Cholla provinces. Only three independents were elected in south and North provinces. They were de facto DP members, who had failed to obtain the DP's nomination.

Out of 8 seats in Taegu, where anti-DLP sentiments were known to be strong, the DLP managed to win only in two wards, the ULD in one and the independents in five. In North KyongSang province, the DLP, won only in five small cities and counties. 14 seats went to independents.

In the North ChungChong province, a stronghold of the ULD, the ULD failed to sweep small city, county and

ward chiefs. It ended in winning in only two areas while the DLP won in four areas, two were won by the DP, and three by independents.

The DLP did well in Kangwon province by winning in nine areas. One area each was won by the DP and ULD while independents won in seven areas. In Cheju province, the DLP swept three of the four areas. An independent got the remaining post.

In the Major city and province councils, of the total 875 council members (not including the 97 set to be filled under the proportional representation system) only 286 or 32.7% of the total went for the DLP; 355 (40.6%) were won by the opposition DP; 83 seats were won by ULD (9.5%) and independents won 151 (17.3%).

The election of 133 Seoul council members saw, the Democratic party sweeping 122 seats while the ruling DLP won 11. The Democratic party also seized the majority of seats in the councils of KwangJu and South and North cholla provinces by winning all 23 seats, 62 of the total 68 and 49 of the 52 respectively.

In Pusan, South and North KyongSang and Kangwon provinces, the DLP swept council elections by winning 50

of the total 55, 52 of the 85, 50 of the 84, and 27 of the 52, council seats.

In Kyonggi province (57 to 52) and Inchon (17 to 13) the Democratic party out performed the DLP, and it formed "the largest floor negotiation groups there".

The DLP came to dominate the councils of Pusan, Kangwon province and South and North KyongSang provinces; the Democratic party in Seoul, KwangJu and South and North cholla provinces; the ULD in Taejon and South ChungChong province; and independents in Taegu.

Out of the 31, 048, 566 eligible voters, 21,217,417 people took part in the local elections making a turn out rate of 68.3%. Compared with the 1991 local elections and the average turn out in the three 1994 by elections with 51.6% participation in the June 27 local elections when the percentage polling was high. It was said that the high turn out was because of "those involved in central politics campaigned actively in the elections and because regional sentiments emerged as one of the hot campaign issues"<sup>43</sup>.

The other factor behind the high turn out was the staging of four separate local elections, increased public

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43. "Local elections: Voter turn out", Korea Annual (Seoul), 1995, pp. 60-61.

interests in the elections as a result of candidate appearance on television programmes, and the calls by candidates for participation, taking advantage of their regional and kinship links in the provincial areas.

The traditional trend of high turn out in rural areas and low participation in urban areas remained unchanged in this election's also.

The Cheju province recorded the highest turn out rate of 80.5%, while 62.0%, the smallest rate, was registered in Inchon. Seoul registered 65.9%. Polling was 66.3% in Pusan, 64.01% in Taegu, 64.9% in KawangJu, 67.0% in JaeJon, 63.3% in Kyonggi province, 74.8% in Kangwon province, 72.7% in North ChungChong province, 73.8% in South ChungChong province, 73.7% in North Cholla province, 76.1% in South Cholla province, 76.8% in North KyongSang province and 73.1% in South KyongSang province.

1,790 candidates or 33.6% had previously ran in any elections. The 3,542, remaining candidates were experiencing their candidacy for the first time. 1,042 electorate who had previously ran in elections were elected in the past, 1,025 of them only once. A total of 322 candidates were elected without contest since they

were the sole candidates in their respective election areas in the local elections. They included a total of 41 members of the councils of major cities or provinces and 202 members of small city and ward councils. In the large areas it was council members it was 32.

A total of 97 members of major city and province councils were selected under the proportional representation system under the law, this was among the political parties in proportion to the total votes each party earned. DLP got 49, 38 for the DP and 8 for the ULD.

Political parties were allowed to nominate their candidates, in the three elections of large city mayors and province governors, members of large city and province councils, and the heads of small cities, counties and wards. The three major parties swept their respective strongholds. However, the elections indicated that "regionalism" was as staunch as the wins the three parties scored might indicate <sup>44</sup>.

The DP swept in the Honam area comprising KwangJu and South and North Cholla provinces. The ruling DLP

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44. Lee Hyung "Local election Mark return of regionalism", Korea Focus (Seoul), vol. 3 No.4, 1995.

earned 23.2% of all the ballots cast in Mayoral and gubernatorial elections, 16% in the election of small city, county and ward heads, and 15.9% in the election of the members of major city and province councils.

In TaeJon and North ChungChong province, DP did relatively well where its influence had been traditionally weak. The opposition party won 17.6% of the votes cast in the mayoral and gubernatorial elections, 15.6% in the elections of small city, county and ward chiefs, and 18.2% in the elections of mayor city and province council members.

The ULD, secured 22.36% of the ballots cast in the mayoral and gubernatorial elections of South and North Kyong sang province, Taegu and Inchon.

Country wide, among the three political parties in the three elections, the DLP won the largest number of votes. It led the rival DP 33.2% to 30.2% in the mayoral and gubernatorial elections, 31.8% to 28.7% in the elections of small city, county and ward heads, and 36.4 to 32.7% in the elections of the members of the councils of major cities and provinces.



The DLP won the largest number of votes even though it was out-performed by the DP in the number of the heads of small cities, counties and wards and the members of major city and province councils. This was because of its putting up the largest number of candidates across the county.

The DP candidates won an average of 565,000 votes per person compared with the average 458,000 votes earned by DLP candidates in the mayoral and gubernatorial elections. DP candidates also earned more votes in the two other elections than their rival DLP counterparts, on average.

In all the three elections where political parties were allowed to take part, 440 DP candidates or 58.6% of the total 750 candidates put by the party were elected. In the elections of major city and province council members, the DP candidates election's ratio was as high as 60.3%.

Among the total 1,057 DLP candidates only 361, or a low elections rate of 34.1% were successful. As for independents, 1381 persons ran in the three elections as independent among them 206 or 14.9% of the total got elected.

The outcome of the massive, multi tiered, keenly contested, fair and relatively less expensive, lively local autonomy elections had a far reaching impact on the South Korean political system. Although Kim Young Sam's ruling party received a major set back and failed rather badly, the 27 June 1995 elections was seen as a positive, and successful step for developing and strengthening the democratic processes and in encouraging and ensuring participatory politics which was one of the major objectives of the nascent political reform. The unexpected results only went to prove that there was in fact enormous value and strength in the secrecy and power of ballot and sanctity and autonomy of the electoral system to which Kim Young Sam had committed himself to.

It is also clear that a true beginning, though belated, of decentralizing the levers of power and initiating what may be described as 'grassroots democracy' had been made. This was particularly significant in the context of power getting concentrated in smaller groups of people with military background who were loyal to an individual, to a President who was also chief executive and head of the state.

The massive exercise of local elections created for the first time a new trend in Korean politics. It saw the emergence of a strong and vibrant multiparty system and polarization in politics. The three decades of military authoritarian rule had tried to create virtually an uniparty system controlled and often manipulated by those who were wielding political rule and had military background. Thus political parties which became the ruling party were created by the regime like Democratic Justice Party or Liberal Democratic Party.

### **The National Assembly Election**

#### Background

On 14 February 1946 United States military governments in Korea (USAMGIK) constituted MinJu-ei-won (Democratic council) as their advisory board and a few months later on 3 June Ipbop-Eiwon (the legislative council) was created. The Constituent Assembly whose members were elected by direct popular votes in the South of the 38th parallel under the United Nation's supervision on 10 May 1948 can be said to have been the official beginning of Korea's legislative history<sup>45</sup>.

The hope that the Korean National Assembly, the first representative body in the history of Korea ever, will play an important role in ensuring a democratic polity was, however, soon belied. The history of this legislature was marked by crisis, confrontations and conflicts which cumulatively eroded the credibility of which could have been a powerful institution reflecting the people's aspirations and hopes. There were almost unending tussle and tension between the office of the President, his powers, role and responsibility, and the institution of the National Assembly and its keenness to play its legitimate and constitutionally assigned role and responsibility of the voice of the people in the affairs of the state.

The 1948 constitution gave the power of impeachment for National Assembly with no less than fifty members and they could pass it with approval of the two thirds of its members. The 1952 constitutional amendment reduced the requirement for an impeachment proposal from fifty

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45. see Sung Chul Yang "North and South Korean political systems: A Comparative Analysis" (Seoul), 1995,p.464; "Parliament tides over political ups and downs", Korea News review, 29 October 1994."National Assembly pushing political reforms. (Seoul), Korea News review 29 October 1994.

members to thirty. But passing required a majority rather than two thirds of its members. In 1969 Constitutional amendment made fifty plus a requirement, rather than 30. The 1972 revision and the 1980 constitution made a majority vote necessary to initiative an impeachment. But later the Impeachment Court was entrusted with the final impeachment<sup>46</sup>.

The 1987 amended constitution wanted more than a third of the National Assembly member's consent to pass impeachment motion against any executive branch. If they wanted to impeach the President more than 2/3 of the assembly member must pass the motion (Article 36). If the impeachment motion was passed then the constitutional court would check the merits of the impeachment motion. In the Park Chung Lee period the Impeachment Court was renamed the Impeachment Council. During Yushin period and Chun Doo Hwan regime the impeachment council was replaced by the constitutional committee.

The President's power to dissolve the National

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46. Note see. Park Chan -Wook "Characteristics of Korean parliamentary politics" Korea Focus (Seoul), vol. 4, No.2 1996; "Reflections on April 11 General elections" Dong-A'Ibo (Seoul) 12 April 1996.

assembly is found in Article 86 of 1962, 59 of 1972 and Article 57 of the constitution of 1980. "The current constitution however prohibits the Presidential power from dissolving the National Assembly. In short, by design and in practice, the National Assembly members of the ruling party have been more or less the errand boy of the Executive Branch while the opposition members have behaved like helpless 'cry babies'. One example is sufficient to establish this point. 'It took just two minutes and 30 seconds for the National Assembly (without participation and the knowledge of the opposition members) to pass the entire 1987 budget"<sup>47</sup>.

The President had the power to dissolve the National Assembly, but National Assembly had the power to recommend to the President, the removal of Prime Minister and members of the state council with the consent of a majority of its members. The 1972 Yusin constitution made the President 'dictator'. He was empowered to take emergency action in various areas of state affairs including domestic and foreign affairs in the disguise of national security or public safety. They were not subject to Judicial review.

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47. Note 52, Sung Chul Yaung, p.466.

The infrequent, extremely limited duration of the sessions of the assembly reduced the various functions assigned to the assembly as a watchdog of the executive's omissions and commissions. It had become a mere rubber stamp of the executive actions initiated and supported by the President. Though in its forty years' history, the National Assembly had fourteen representative bodies, the average duration of the legislative bodies was about three years with the exception of the Fifth National Assembly. The Korean legislature has been unicameral but the method of electing the legislators have changed many times over the years.

The fourth National Assembly period was cut short because of the April 1960 student uprising. The 5th National Assembly was dissolved as a result of military coup d'etat in May 1961. Likewise, the eighth National Assembly was dissolved with the introduction of the Yushin reform of 1972. The tenth National Assembly was closed by military intervention in May 1980 due to the assassination of President Park Chung Hee in October 1979. Lastly the Twelfth National Assembly came to an end early when the constitution was virtually rewritten following pro democracy demonstrations in 1987.

The manner and the method of repeatedly amending the constitution without a detailed, unfettered debate on the floor of the House on the merits of the proposed amendments emanating from the office of the President virtually emasculated the National Assembly and denied it of its primary role of initiating and carrying out legislation in the true letter and spirit of the constitution.

In the history of National Assembly upto 1994, the National Assembly has changed the administration's proposed budget by mere three percent, only twice. Otherwise, every year changes came within just one percent of administrative proposal. Sometime bills were adopted so hastily that in the Thirteenth National Assembly ninety nine bills were adopted just three days after they were originally proposed and nearly 114 were passed within a week of their introduction. It had even no right to confirm the Presidential appointments of high ranking officials except during the brief period of Chang Myon when parliamentary cabinet system was experimented with.

It is against this background of rather an unedifying history of National Assembly that the election to the Fifteenth National Assembly took place on 11 April, 1996.



However the policies and performance of the President Kim Young Sam and his record of reforms to usher in a new civilian led democratic order, especially the successful local autonomy elections in June '95, had already brought about a perceptible political transformation. Even his worst critics conceded that Korea never witnessed a greater measure of popular participation and more open policy debate and discourse than in the little over three years of Kim Young Sam administration. As far as Korea was concerned, it was the first time that a situation had emerged when a President who had proven his democratic credentials and commitment after assuming office, was keen to prove beyond doubt that not only would the National Assembly election be held in fair and free atmosphere but also a new meaningful relationship between the Executive and the Legislature would emerge. By creating the New Korea Party President Kim Young Sam had also sought to give the impression that he had completely severed his ties with the Roh Tae Woo led Democratic Liberal Party and Roh's administration.

On 11 April, the elections for the 15th National Assembly were held. There were tensions with North Korea before the polls on the extremely sensitive security issue

of alleged violation of the Armistice Agreement. According to some pre poll analyses<sup>48</sup>, the New Korea party (hereafter NKP) would fail to win the majority and NKP may take the support of Independents or opposition parties help.

The National Congress For New Politics (NCNP), the newly founded party of Kim Dae Jung, was projected to win some 90 seats, including the uncontested National Assembly seats. Kim Jong Phil's United Liberal Democrat (ULD) was projected to win 40 seats and Democratic party (DP) 15 seats. The analyst had said that in around sixty constituencies, both ruling and opposition parties were running in a close race, so any unexpected results could come. It also said that North Korea's nuclear threat, perception might have an affect on swinging votes infavour of NKP.

In these elections there were forty six National constituency seats which were to be distributed among the top four political parties according to the proportion of votes they secured in direct popular voting.

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48. "Pre poll Analysis", Korean Herald (Seoul), 11 April, 1996.

For President Kim Young Sam the National Assembly elections were very important. As the first and probably the only President in the world who had put two former Presidents, Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo, in prison on corruption charges, he looked towards the outcome of the election with great expectations. For him it was a referendum on his bold reform policies, politics behind starting a new political party and his standing. To Kim Dae Jung who had come out of self-imposed retirement during local elections may be forced to retire from politics if his party were to have poor showing"<sup>49</sup>.

The 12 April, 1996, National Assembly election was therefore crucial for the future of the ruling and opposition stalwarts. An impressive 1,389 candidates were running for 253 seats. The total electorate was tentatively 31,488,294. Candidates competing at an average 5.49 compared to 4.4 to 1 in 1992<sup>50</sup>.

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49."Results seen as bell wether of Korea's political fut  
Korea Herald (Seoul), 11 April, 1996.

The ruling party DLP in 1992 was able to control National Assembly under its control with one weak ruling party and two parties that had merged was able to win 38.5% of vote. Democratic party with Kim Dae Jung leading had won 29.2% of the vote. But Kim Dae Jung left the Democratic party with his supporters to create the National congress for New politics.

50.Korea Newreview (Seoul), 30 March, 1996, p.6.

The ruling and opposition parties perceived the stakes in elections differently. Lee Hoi Chang, campaign manager of the ruling NKP, had stated that his party should win a majority in the elections to push for the government led reform drive amid political stability; "vote for our party and give us the courage with which we can complete reforms initiated by the Kim Young administration". Political stability was the main campaign theme for the ruling party. If there is an strong opposition party, the nation would be in chaos Lee said. He said the stability was important with recent military threat by North Korea. He said that if we fail to defuse the inter Korean tension then we will be behind other countries in the 21st century. He urged the voters not to abstain from voting in the elections as he described it as a 'choice for the promising 21st century'. "Your precious votes will help the Nation emerge as a world class county in the years ahead."

The main opposition NCNP came down heavily against the ruling party's plank of stability. " Even with an absolute majority of parliamentary seats, the ruling party has brought about only political instability" said Chung Hee-Kyung, a top campaign leader of the NCNP, To hold Kim

Young Sam administration in check a strong opposition is necessary. The incumbent administration is like a car without brakes, running down a steep hill carrying some 45 million people, she said. To put brakes on it, her party needs to win at least a third or some 100 seats of the 299 in the elections<sup>51</sup>

If they get the number of seats they are expected then NCNP would hold a parliamentary hearing to throw light on President Kim's campaign fund for his successful 1992 Presidential race, Chung said. They alleged that the 1992 President campaign of Kim Young Sam was partly financed by the slush fund raised by his predecessor, Roh Tae Woo. United Liberal Democrats described elections as a judgment on the three years of misrule by the Kim Young Sam administration and urged the voters to support their candidates. "The current Presidential system has reached its limit. Vote for us so that we can introduce a parliamentary system of government, which we believe effectively ensures the sharing of power" Kim Joung Pil

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51. "Last-ditch efforts target undivided voters", Korean Herald (Seoul), 11 April 1996; also see Shin Yonbae., "Kwanhun Club debate: Test political leaders", Korea Newsreview (Seoul), 16 March, 1996; kwanhun club fraternity of senior Journalist made it rule to invite politicians and other celebrities who were in the spotlight of the news for airing their views.

said . Lastly, Hong Sung Woo, of Democratic party, asked the voters to support his party as his party never has come to terms with corruption "only when our party wins the elections, the nation's politics will become clean. We are the cleanest party fighting against the corruption - ridden old politics dominated by the three Kim's, the leaders of the rival parties.

In order to conduct the election in free, fair and violence free manner the police had been on alert against any disturbances. They stepped up patrols and other security measures until the completion of the counting of ballots. Two policemen were placed at each of over 16,300 polling stations throughout the nation. At the end of the polling the ballot boxes were carried out at 300 counting places under the escort of the police.

Commenting on the North Korea's timing of demonstrating its stand on Armistic Agreement, an observer said "When Korea was busy in the elections Pyongyang tries like a Jealous child vying attention, to make itself heard over the shouting matches of the campaigners"<sup>52</sup>.

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52. Mark B.Kim "Politicians face new priorities", Korean Herald (Seoul), 11 April 1996; see "Time for the U.N. to act", Korea Herald (Seoul), 11 April 1996.

North Korea's unilateral violation of the armistice agreement of 1953, and North Koreans sending 120 to 180 soldiers in Joint Security Area in Panmunjom truce village, carrying machine guns, rifles and grenade launchers, were all seen as provocative acts, and made the situation explosive. This act of North Korea also became an unexpected issue. The opposition parties accused the ruling party of exploiting the situation to continue in power, saying that "danger requires stability and stability means continuation of power". They also accused the ruling party for letting the situation develop to such an extent.

In the election almost one out of every three eligible voters did not vote<sup>53</sup>. Only 63.9 percent cast their vote. This was the lowest vote turn out in the history of assembly election.

Region-wise, the voter turn out was highest in North Kyong Sang Province with 71.6%, CheJu with 71.1%, South Cholla with 69.8% and Kangwon Province with 69.2%. The lowest voter turn out was at Inchon with 60.1% .

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53. "New Korea party losing majority: Expected to gain control by drawing in independents", Korea Herald (Seoul), 12 June, 1996.

Voter turn out in provinces

Seoul	61.1
Pusan	60.5
Taegu	60.9
Inchon	60.1
KwangJu	64.5
TaeJon	63
Kyonggi	61.5
Kangwon	69.2
N.ChungChong	68.3
S.ChungChong	68.7
North Cholla	67
South Cholla	69.8
North KyongSang	71.6
South KyongSang	66
CheJu	71.1
Total	63.9% of votes

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Source: Talled by CEMC, Korean Herald April 12, 1996.

The New Korea Party bagged 139 seats, while main National Congress for New politics won 79 seats, the minor opposition United liberal Democrat 50 and the splinter opposition Democratic party 15 and 16 independent.

Votes tally by party



New Korea Party = 34.5%  
 National Congress for New Politics = 25.3%  
 United Liberal Democrats = 16.2%  
 Democratic Party = 11.2%.  
 Independent = 11.9%.

The 15th National Assembly constitute according to party  
 NKP = 139  
 NCNP = 79  
 ULD = 50  
 DP = 15  
 Independent = 16.

It also includes proportional representation

#### Election Results by Region

	NKP	NCNP	ULD	DP	Ind.	Total
Seoul	27	18		1	1	47
Inchon	9	2				11
Kyonggi	18	10	5	3	2	38
N. ChungChong	2		5		1	8
S. ChungChong	1		12			13
TaeJon			7			7
N. Cholla	1	13				14
S. Cholla		17				17

Kangwon	9	2	2	13
Taegu		8	2	3
N.Kyong Sang	11	2	1	5
S.Kyong Sang	17		2	4
Pusan	21			21
CheJu	3			3
KwangJu	6			6

Source: Korea Herald 13 April 1996.

NKP = New Korea Party  
 NCNP = National Congress for New Politics  
 ULD = United Liberal Democratic.  
 DP = Democratic Party

Kim Young Sam might have been disappointed at the fact that his NKP did not gain an impressive victory and did not win a two-thirds majority in the Assembly. But yet, he might have been satisfied at the fact that the main opposition parties especially Kim Dae Jung's National Congress, for New Politics didn't perform well and could not threaten the ruling party. He said, "I whole heartedly appreciate that the people had confidence in and gave support to the government and the ruling party"<sup>54</sup>. He also

54. Chin Shi Young "Kim expected to continue push for reform of political landscape", Korean Herald (Seoul), 13 April, 1995; For a review of election results editorial, The Korean Herald (Seoul), 13 April, 1996; "A Time for New Politics," The Dong-a Ilbo (Seoul), 13 April, 1996.

said that the people supported his programme of correcting the old style politics and achieving transparent and clean politics. The ruling party was particularly keen to win where it had suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the opposition at the local elections.

For the first time ruling party had bagged more seats than the opposition in the capital Kim Young Sam was expected to call for a generational change of politicians. This was aimed at Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Pil. Kim Young Sam said he would carry on "reforms amidst stability" and efforts for "rightings the wrongs of history". Referring to legal punishment of predecessors "In order to pay back the people's trust, I will exert my utmost to strengthen national security, build up the economy and improve the quality of life of the people" he said. Ruling New Korea party leader Lee Hoi Chang said "The elections were meaningful in that they drew in new political faces. We will accept anyone who sympathises with our party political line" he said.

The unexpected poor performance of NKP even with eleven seats short shook the party and its President. Kim Dae Jung's NCNP won Just 79 seats of the total 299, where

he was persuading voters for 1/3. The party performed well in Honam area but it failed badly in Seoul and its surrounding Kyonggi province where he was staking his political future. Kim Dae Jung who was a strong contender for 1998 Presidential election even failed to obtain a seat for him self. He was placed on 14th spot of NCNP proportional representation list. Also his party did not bag enough vote to get him the seat. The NCNP only elected 13 candidates from proportional representation.

It was said by political analysts that Kim Dae Jung was turned down by voters, as he broke his earlier promise to stay in retirement and returned to politics last June. As he vowed that he would leave politics for good, his come back was not accepted. He was attempting to make NCNP the largest party if not a majority party, to groom it as a tool for his fourth attempt at the Presidency.

Kim Jong Pil of ULD said "It is the people's warning against the ruling party that they did not give the party a majority of National Assembly seats."<sup>55</sup>. He also proposed that the President meet opposition leaders to discuss how

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55. "Outcome seen a win over 'old fashioned politics", Korean Herald (Seoul), 13 April, 1996.

to manage state affairs and said his party will hold the ruling camp in check through an alliance with other opposition parties. The Democratic party after failing to win minimum seats to form a floor negotiating block in the National Assembly said it will be reborn as a new party.

Table-5

	Governors Metropolis Mayors	City Country Ward Chiefs	Provincial Metropolis Councillers	City, Country Ward Councilors
Seoul	9 (1)	99 (25)	402 (133)	1,912 (806)
Pusan	4 (1)	49 (16)	127 (55)	701 (320)
Taegu	5 (1)	28 (8)	124 (37)	444 (203)
Inchon	3 (1)	37 (10)	90 (32)	432 (206)
KwangJu	2 (1)	14 (5)	58 (23)	297 (125)
TaeJon	4 (1)	21 (5)	91 (23)	259 (107)
Kyonggi	4 (1)	148 (31)	343 (123)	1,631 (599)
N. Chung Chong	6 (1)	48 (11)	102 (36)	476 (180)
S. Chung Chong	3 (1)	65 (15)	153 (55)	658 (223)
N. Cholla	2 (1)	58 (14)	143 (52)	880 (283)
S. Cholla	3 (1)	86 (24)	182 (68)	1084 (343)
N. Kyong Sang	3 (1)	95 (23)	215 (84)	1071 (399)
S. Kyong Sang	2 (1)	93 (21)	227 (85)	1,249 (451)
CheJu	4 (1)	15 (4)	46 (17)	124 (51)
Total	56 (15)	943 (230)	2,448 (875)	12,965 (4,541)

Ratio of candidates to posts    3.7:1                    4.1:1                    2.8:1                    2.9:1

Source: CEMC, Korea Herald, 13, June.1995.

Table-2

Some other major city mayors and province governors elected were

Cities and Provinces	Name	Age	Party
Seoul	Cho Soon	67	DP
Pusan	Moon Jung Soo	55	DLP
Taegu	Moon Hi gab.	57	Independent
Inchon	Choi Ki-sun	49	DLP
KwangJu	Song So-Jung	51	DP
TaeJon	Hong Sun-Kee	58	ULD
Kyonggi	Rhee in Jee	46	DLP
N. ChungChong	Joo Byong-duck	58	ULD
S.ChungChong	Shin Dae Pyong	53	ULD
N.Cholla	Huy Kyong Man	56	DP
N.KyongSang	Lee Evi Keun	56	DP
S.KyongSang	Kim Hyuk Kyu	55	DLP
CheJu	Shin Koo-Bum	52	Independent

Source: Korean Newsreview 1 July, 1995

DP= Democratic Party

DLP= Democratic Liberal Party

ULD= United Liberal Democratic.

*CONCLUSION*

## CONCLUSION

In this study an attempt has been made to understand the compulsions, context, characteristics, course and consequences of the remarkable political transformation witnessed in South Korea since the historic Presidential election in December 1982. In the opening chapter the stormy history of intermittent political upheaval and constitutional crisis from 1948-1992 have been commented upon. The major developments that have been touched upon include the authoritarian rule of President Syngman Rhee, (from 1948 to 1960); the widespread protests against electoral fraud and highhandedness of the Rhee regime; the students' revolution of April 1960; the bold but ineffective attempts made by the Constitutionally and democratically elected Chang Myong government to introduce a cabinet system of government, guarantee freedom of press, assembly, expression, fair election etc; the military coup d'etat of 16th May 1961 led by Major General Park Chung Hee which toppled an elected government; a long period of military-bureaucratic authoritarian rule which gave an enormous power and authority to President as Chief



Executive and which neutralized, marginalised and emasculated the judiciary and the legislature and thus placed the President above constitutional and institutional checks; the indirect system of Presidential election following the most controversial Yushin system in October 1972; the modified version of Yushin system introduced by Chun Doo Hwan after he staged two coups to get power in 1979 and 1980; the bitterness created by the suppression of Kwangju civil uprising in May 1980 and the nexus between authoritarian regime and chaebol; and the various ramifications of the nexus including political corruption.

The conflict or contradiction between military-authoritarian regime and the democratic movement led by civilians sharpened since the late 70's and especially after the Kwangju civil uprising of May 1980. The democratic movement had several leaders and drew its strength and sustenance from the innumerable political struggles waged by citizens, especially students and youth. One of the leaders who was in the forefront of the movement was Kim Young Sam.

Kim Young Sam, although a late comer in the 1992 Presidential election, set the tone and tenor of election and projected himself as a trenchant critic of what he described as 'Korean disease'. He also claimed that he was the man who was destined to provide a cure for the disease and transform the body politic of Korea. To put it differently he thrust himself into the campaign as both a critic of old Korea and crusader of New Korea.

Kim Young Sam was determined to make Korea a county which all Koreans would be proud of and urged compatriots at home and abroad to help him build a New Korea with "shin param" (new or fresh wind). He also sought to convince the citizens that he wanted to root out corruption, help launch another phase of Korean "miracle" but free from government economic intervention and unleash private initiative and creativity at all levels of business activity.

In the second chapter President Kim Young Sam's agenda of "reform with stability" has been analyzed. He wanted to transform the polity, economy, bureaucracy and society and usher in a New Korea. His most important political agenda was neutralizing and marginalizing the

armed forces in the political sphere and thereby ending the three decade long hegemony of army in politics.

It was undoubtedly a formidable task and he was prepared to stake his Presidency on the issue. However, it was onething to try and end the hegemony of army in politics by taking full advantage of the strong sentiment of people for seprating the army from politics. It was quite another to enlarge and ensure the democratic processes and sustain their momentum for a transformed and transparent democratic order. He therefore included in his political agenda a series of reform oriented measures. Kim Young Sam gave a high priority to economic refroms. The most notable aspect of the economic reform which had a far reaching consequence was the introduction of Real Name Financial Transaction. It could be even said that the real name financial transaction shook not only the financial and economic domain but the entire body politic and structure of the society. This measure alone could be seen as a daring attack on the financial malpractices and on the place and role of black money in the politics and economy of Korea. The arrest and detention of two of his immediate predecessors Roh Tae Woo and Chun Doo Hwan on massive corruption charges could take place only because

of the overwhelming support from the citizens. He thus became the first incumbent President in the contemporary history who dared to put to trial two of his immediate powerful predecessors on charges of corruption and misuse of his own massive of power.

In the third and concluding chapter the background, issues and outcome of the local autonomy and National Assembly Elections have been examined. After 1961, the local elections were restored in 1991 (with councils of major cities, provinces, small cities, countries and wards of major cities through elections). Local election in 1995 was introduced with a vision to deepening and widening the participation of citizens in political processes.

The local election was an attempt to concretize the vision and ideas of clean elections, restrict the election expenditure, expand of the public management system for election and stringent punishment for violations of the electoral laws. The elections were held on 27 June 1995 for fifteen heads of large area autonomous bodies (those included mayours of five major cities and governors of 10 provinces); nine hundred and seventy two (972) members of the councils of five major cities and ten provinces; two

hundred and thirty (230) heads of basic area autonomous bodies, namely the mayors or commissioners of small cities, counties and major city boards and four thousand five hundred forty one (4,541), members of the councils of small cities and major city wards.

The DLP sought to project the election as an occasion to elect persons with administrative skill rather than political ambition and as a demonstration of its commitment to decentralize power. Also it trusted its candidate as those best suited for local government. The opposition Democratic Party viewed the election as a midterm vote of confidence on Kim Young Sam.

The elections were held in a free and fair manner. Although the outcome belied Kim Young Sam's expectation, the fact that his administration helped to launch a new democratic structure and enlarge the open participatory processes, enhanced the reputation and credibility of the regime. It was seen as his keenness to strengthen grassroot democracy. It also saw the emergence of a strong and vibrant multi-party system and healthy polarization in politics.

The election to the fifteenth National Assembly that took place on 11 April 1996 was another landmark development which saw more open policy debate and discourse. It was the first time that a situation had emerged when a President who ~~was~~ after assuming office was keen to prove beyond doubt that he not only wanted the National Assembly election be held in a fair and free atmosphere but also to establish a new, meaningful, positive, relationship between the executive and the legislature. By creating the New Korea party Kim Young Sam had also sought to give the impression that he had completely severed his ties with the Roh Tae Woo led Democratic Liberal Party and Roh's discredited administration.

As the first and probably the only President in the world who had put two former Presidents in prison on corruption charges, Kim Young Sam looked at the outcome of the election with great expectations. For him it was a referendum on his bold reform policies and on the politics of starting a new political party. For Kim Dae Jung, it was another crucial political battle and a test of his hold on the people. It was also important for his future

presidential aspirations. For Kim Jong Phil it was an attempt to stage a come back to the center stage of Korean politics.

The day before election there were tensions with North Korea on the extremely sensitive security issue of its violation of Armistice Agreement.

To make the elections free, fair and violence free elaborate police arrangements were made. But only 63.9 percent cast their vote. The NKP won 139 seats, NCNP 79, ULD 50 and splinter opposition 15 and independents 16.

Although Kim Young Sam could not get a majority he must have been satisfied with the fact that neither NCNP, ULD nor DP did better. They therefore, could not pose any threat to him, his party and his reforms. President Kim Young Sam has already completed three and a half years of his one-term five year tenure in office. Probably it is too early to arrive at any definitive assesment of the political transformation that has been wrought in the last about forty months. And yet what can be said without fear of being contradicted is that the last forty months have already wintnessed a significant and substantive

transformation in the body politic and social ethos in South Korea.

The task of dismantling the old order characterized by the hegemony of army in politics and affairs of state has been satisfactorily accomplished. What is no less noteworthy is on the debris of the military authoritarian order a new polity inspired by liberal democratic ideology and supported by credible institutions has emerged.

When viewed against the backdrop of South Korea's stormy political history and intermittent constitutional crisis for more than four decades, the last forty months have seen a truly impressive political transformation.



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