

**THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF
NATIONALISM IN THE CONTEXT OF
GLOBALIZATION**

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled “**THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF NATIONALISM IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION**”, submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work and has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other University.

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Dedicated to my parents and brothers

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Chapter 1- Introduction

Nationalism has been a great moving force in history that has transformed the lives of millions of people around the world, for better or for worse. Self-proclaimed nationalists and politicians have often used nationalism as the main tool in their political rhetoric, while critics have deplored it as a negative and irrational phenomenon that must be rooted out from human society, but there is no denying the fact that nationalism continues to shape the lives of millions of people around the globe. Nationalism was seen to have been manifested in the chauvinistic politics of Europe that led to two devastating world wars in the first half of the twentieth century, and to the emergence of the right to self-determination of colonial countries against their imperial masters. And then, it was predicted by some social scientists and observers that nationalism would finally settle down at its final resting place- the dustbin of history. This prediction was based partly upon the moral argument that nationalism was a negative force that would only cause further wars and destruction, and partly upon the belief that nationalism had become a spent force that is no longer viable in a period of economic interdependence and globalization. At best, nationalism was seen as a passing phase in the future course of human history.

Unfortunately, practical realities on the ground have proved that confident predictions about the demise of nationalism have turned out to be a little too premature at this point in time. Contrary to these predictions, the world has witnessed several ethnic conflicts and nationalist movements since the end of the Cold War. In post-colonial states, there has been a resurgence of ethnic conflicts and nationalist movements demanding secessionism, separatism or autonomy when it was thought that nationalism had already done its job of liberating these states from the yoke of colonial rule. In the developed states of the west, regions claiming nationhood or greater autonomy have showed renewed vigour.

The proliferation of ethnic conflicts and nationalist movements has bewildered those observers who believed in the ultimate demise of nationalism. The resilience of nationalism also reflects the apparent failure of social scientists to grasp and explain the nature and consequences of this powerful force. Historians and social scientists might argue among themselves concerning the modernity or primordiality of nations and nationalism, but hardly anyone can ignore these phenomena and their continuing magnetic appeal to countless peoples around the world. But what explains the

continuing salient power of nationalism in today's age of globalization? Finding persuasive answers to this question is the main objective of the thesis. This objective will be guided by the theoretical underpinnings of nationalism offered by various paradigms.

The dissertation will be divided into four sections (including this chapter). Chapter 2 will make a detailed exploration of the various approaches put forward by various schools of thought and assess them within a comparative and integrated framework. These approaches would include the Modernist approach as put forward by Ernest Gellner and others; the Ethno-symbolist approach as advanced by Anthony D. Smith; Primordialism; and Perennialism.

Chapter 3 will use the available theoretical approaches in order to understand the persistence of nationalism within the context of globalization. In this chapter, I will explore four main themes and discuss them in the context of globalization: immigration and national identity, the European Union and supranational identity, Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism, and globalization and the nation-state. I would argue that nationalism, just like other isms like liberalism, communism and cosmopolitanism is one among many ideologies that shape and are shaped by current developments, especially globalization. The continuing salience and power of nationalism could be seen as a response to globalization. The sense of insecurity, accompanied by the withdrawal of state welfare provisions and unemployment, the sense of helplessness as decisions taken at one place affect another, economic instabilities and uncertainties produced by increasing globalization has made nationalism a meaningful and ostensibly secure rallying point for the marginalized and discriminated sections of societies. I would further argue that nationalism both shapes and is shaped by the pulls and pressures exerted by the forces of globalization. The view that globalization induces cultural homogeneity and dismantles national barriers has increasingly come to be questioned because globalization involves both diversities and uniformities acting at various levels- local, national and transnational. On the one hand, the threat that the homogenizing tendencies of globalization will break down national barriers often tend to make people realize their attachment to a specific territorial space. On the other hand, globalization itself involves both diversities and uniformities that reinforce the specific beliefs that people have about their histories, culture, territory and ancestry.

Chapter 4 will be the conclusion of the dissertation. This chapter will contain the findings made in the previous chapters and make coherent arguments and offer explanations for the continuing appeal of nationalism within the context of globalization. This chapter will summarize the main issues raised throughout the research, and conclude that although the expression of nationalism has changed over the years in different ways, its salience and power has remained unaltered.

Chapter 2- The Major Paradigms

This chapter will present the definitions of various terms to be used in the dissertation, and explore the main approaches to the study of nations and nationalism. As we will find out in this chapter, there is wide disagreement among scholars over the meaning and connotations of the concepts to be used in the study. There are also various paradigms through which theorists have seen the phenomenon of nationalism.

Definitions

Before proceeding with the research on nationalism, it is important to consider the definitions of the concepts to be used in the thesis. These include: nation, national identity, nationalism, and *ethnie*. The concept of 'nation' has proved to be notoriously difficult to define, and any single definition always runs into the danger of including too much or too little. The ambiguity with the concept of the nation has to do in many ways, with the fact that both objective and subjective factors are attributed to the meaning of the term 'nation'. In objective terms, nations are seen by some observers as cultural entities, composed of such elements as a shared language, religion, common historical past, common territory, and so on. Subjectively, the nation is seen as a distinct political community whose members share common perceptions, sentiments, and sense of belonging to that particular nation. The following are some of the prominent definitions of nations.

John Stuart Mill: "A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality, if they are united among themselves by common sympathies, which do not exist between them and any others—which make them cooperate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves, or a portion of themselves, exclusively" (Mill 1861: 287, Quoted in Hechter 2000: 11).

Max Weber: "In the sense of those using the term at a given time, the concept undoubtedly means, above all, that one may exact from certain groups of men a specific sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups. Thus, the concept belongs in the sphere of values. Yet, there is no agreement on how these groups should be delimited or about what concerted action should result from such solidarity" (Weber [1922] 1978: 922, Quoted in Hechter 2000: 11).

Hans Kohn: “Nationalism is first and foremost a state of mind, an act of consciousness . . . The collective or group consciousness can center around entirely different groups, of which some have a more permanent character—the family, the class, the clan, the caste, the village, the sect, the religion, etc.—whereas others are of a more or less passing character—schoolmates, a football team, or passengers on a ship. In each case, varying with its permanence, this group-consciousness will strive towards creating homogeneity within the group, a conformity and like-mindedness which will lead to and facilitate concerted and common action” (Kohn 1944: 11, Quoted in Hecter 2000:11-12).

Karl Deutsch: “Membership in a [nation] essentially consists in wide complementarity of social communication. It consists in the ability to communicate more effectively, and over a wider range of subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders People are held together 'from within' by this communicative efficiency, the complementarity of the communicative facilities acquired by their members. Such 'ethnic complementarity' is not merely subjective. At any moment, it exists as an objective fact, measurable by performance tests. Similar to a person's knowledge of a language, it is relatively independent of the whim of individuals. Only slowly can it be learned or forgotten. It is a characteristic of each individual, but it can only be exercised within the context of a group” (Deutsch 1966: 97, Quoted in Hechter 2000: 12).

Benedict Anderson defines a nation as an “imagined political community- and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. It is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations” (Anderson 1991: 6-7).

Ernest Renan sees the existence of nations as ‘daily plebiscites’ through which human beings ‘will’ themselves into, or agree to form nations. In Renan’s view, it is not dynasty, race, religion, language, economic interest, or geography that makes the nation. Instead, the nation is the product of common experiences of past sacrifices and the willingness to make further ones in the future (Renan: 1928, Cited in Christie: 39-48).

However, Anthony Smith correctly points out that stressing subjective factors alone such as will, imagination, sentiment, and perceptions as criteria of the nation make it difficult to isolate nations from other entities such as regions, tribes or city-states that can also attract such subjective attachments (Smith 2001: 11). On a similar note, Ernest Gellner also finds similar problems with the subjective definition of Ernest Renan (Gellner 1983: 53-54). Gellner argues that such as a broad and subjective definition blurs the distinction between nations and other collectivities like clubs, gangs, teams, parties, and the like that were formed by will, consent and imagination but not necessarily on nationalist principles (Gellner 1983: 53-54). Moreover, ignoring objective factors unduly restricts the scope of the definition of the nation.

Therefore, it is important to bridge the gap between subjective and objective factors in delineating the criteria of the nation, without obfuscating the boundaries of what constitutes a nation. Anthony Smith tries to achieve this with his definition of the nation as “a named human community occupying a homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a common public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members”. Smith differentiates the nation from an ethnic community or ‘*ethnie*’ which he defines as “a named human community connected to a homeland, possessing a common myths of ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of shared culture, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites. In Smith’s definition, an *ethnie* is not a nation because it lacks a common public culture and sometimes even a territorial dimension. A nation, on the other hand, must occupy a homeland for a considerable length of time, and aspire to attain nationhood and possession of its homeland or for some degree of autonomy in order to constitute itself as a nation (Smith 2001: 13).

For Smith, there are continuous overlaps between *ethnies* and nations. In his view, ethnic groups are ubiquitous in every age and continent depending upon the need of human beings to have shared cultures and common ancestry. These pre-existing and often pre-modern ethnic groups have often become the foundations upon which modern nations have been built. (Smith 2005: 23-31).

However, Smith’s definition of nation is far from being a unanimously accepted one. This stems from the fact that there is a major divide about the modernity or antiquity of nations. For Ernest Gellner, nations are neither an inherent attribute of humanity nor a universal necessity. Instead, nations are relatively recent formations of the modern era, characterized by industrialization and mass public

literacy. Gellner emphatically argues that “nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent though long-delayed political destiny, are a myth” (Gellner 1983: 6; 49)

Eric Hobsbawm also follows a similar approach to Gellner. For him, nations are invented traditions that belong to a particular period in recent history, and it makes sense to discuss nations and nationalism only in so far as they relate to the modern territorial state. In other words, “nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way round” (*ibid*). The political use of the term ‘nation’ is quite young historically (from about 1830 onwards). Prior to that period, the term was used to mean quite a lot of things- birth and descent groups in medieval France, guilds or corporations, foreigners, or other associations. For Hobsbawm, the fact that most states of any size were not homogeneous in ethnic, linguistic or any other terms meant that even conceptions based on common descent could not be equated with nations (Hobsbawm 1990: 9-10; 16-18).

Another concept that is at the centre of the debates on nationalism is that of ‘national identity’. Anthony Smith defines national identity as “the continuous reproduction and reinterpretation of the patterns of values, symbols, memories, myths and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of nations, and the identification of individuals with that pattern and heritage and with its cultural elements”. Smith identifies two levels of identity. The individual level of analysis emphasizes the ‘situational’ character of national identities- people can identify with several collective affiliations at the same time, and they can move from one identity to the other. But this level of analysis looks at collective identities only from the view of the individual member and reduces collective identities to a simple aggregate of individuals, thereby ignoring the contexts and constraints placed by shared values, norms, memories and symbols on the actions of individuals at the collective level (Smith 2001: 18-19).

National identity is much more durable and resistant to abrupt changes compared to other collective identities such as classes and regions since it is based on cultural elements that are themselves persistent and binding such as memories, values, symbols, myths and traditions. Although cultural communities and identities undergo changes and discontinuities, they generally do so at a slow rate and over a long duration. Smith also admits that there is often a continuous process of reinterpretations of the patterns of the distinctive elements of national identities from

one generation to the other that involves reselection and recombination of older elements as well as the addition of new ones. However, he is quick to add that such reinterpretation can occur only within the clear parameters set by the nation in question. This explains the certain degree of the sameness and stability of national identity over the long duration (Smith 2001: 18-19).

The fourth concept that needs to be defined is nationalism. Nationalism has been seen and defined in various ways, revealing the complexity and multidimensional nature of the phenomenon. But the main theme running across these definitions is the overriding concern with the nation. Nationalism has acquired several meanings over its life span- as a process of formation of nations; psychological consciousness of belonging to a nation; as a socio-political movement; as a language and symbolism of the nation; and an ideology (Smith 2001: 5-20).

Anthony Smith has offered a working definition of nationalism as: ‘an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute an actual or potential “nation”’ (Smith 2001: 5-20). Gellner defines nationalism as ‘primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent’ (Gellner 1983: 1). This political definition is accepted by other authors like Eric Hobsbawm and John Breuilly for whom nationalism is inconceivable without the modern territorial state (Hobsbawm 1992; Breuilly 2001: 33-52).

However, the assertion that nationalism cannot be conceived without connecting it to the modern territorial state prematurely rules out the possibilities of different manifestations of nationalism. Not all nationalisms explicitly state their goal as the creation of a sovereign territorial state. In this regard, I think Walker Connor’s distinction between patriotism and ethnonationalism is relevant. Connor emphasizes the point that there has to be a distinction between state loyalty on the one hand, and loyalty to the nation on the other. He uses ‘patriotism’ to describe loyalty to the state, and ‘ethnonationalism’ to mean identity with and loyalty to the nation. This is an important corrective to the flawed habit of using nationalism to mean both loyalties to the state (regardless of the national composition of the state) as well as to the nation (as a form of human grouping). As Connor points out, both forms of loyalties are different and may often come into conflict (Connor 2002: 24-25).

Forms of Nationalism

The concept and phenomenon of nationalism is not monolithic. Rather, it is manifested in various forms, and distinctions have been drawn about them. However, it is important to bear in mind that these distinctions have overlaps and common characteristics. This section seeks to explore and explain the manner in which these distinctions have been made by various scholars in the literature on nationalism.

Perhaps the most significant and controversial distinction is made between civic nationalism (Western) on the one hand, and ethnic nationalism (Eastern) on the other. While the former is somehow deemed to be liberal, democratic, inclusive and political in orientation, the latter is often considered as illiberal, undemocratic, exclusive, collectivist and authoritarian. There is certainly an analytical distinction between the two forms. However, they intertwine in various settings and both can assume liberal and as well as illiberal forms. As Margaret Moore points out that minority nationalisms in Quebec, Catalonia, Flanders, and Scotland are led by liberal nationalists who support global economic integration, and traditional liberal democratic rights and the rule of law (Moore 2001: 48).

The term 'civic nationalism' is used to refer to a sense of community in which the members of the nation reside in a historic territorial homeland irrespective of their ancestry, possess a civic culture and legal-political equalities and share a mutual commitment to the institutions of the state and civil society in order to progress towards a common destiny. (Smith 2005: 177-183; Brown 2000: 52-53). On the other hand, 'ethnic nationalism' is viewed as a cultural form in which descent, birth and common ancestry are supreme criteria of membership of the nation. Unlike the Western civic model in which an individual could choose to which nation he or she belongs, the ethnic model allows membership of the nation to only those who were born into it (Smith 2005: 177-183).

The intellectual foundations of this distinction can be traced back to the German historian Friedrich Meinecke. He distinguished between '*Staatsnation*' to refer to the individual and collective self-determination of people based on the free will of the individual, and '*Kulturnation*' as a cultural community that is:

founded upon seemingly objective criteria such as common heritage and language, a distinct area of settlement, religion, custom and history, and does not need to be mediated by a national state or other political form. Consciousness of unity,

the sense of belonging together, develop independent of the state... It leaves individuals little scope to choose to which nation they belong. (Quoted in Brown 2000: 53)

Meinecke's approach was followed by Hans Kohn, who distinguished between a benign form of Western nationalism, and a virulent one that developed in East-Central Europe and Asia. In Kohn's view, nationalism emerged first in the West in concurrence with the formation of a future national state. It was primarily a political occurrence, emerging from the Enlightenment age of reason and was connected with liberalism, democracy and rational cosmopolitanism. This development was supported and spearheaded by a politically and economically powerful and vibrant bourgeoisie under a pluralistic and open society. By contrast, Eastern nationalism emerged much later, primarily as a reaction against Western nationalism and in a backward stage of socio-political development. This Eastern nationalism regarded the nation as an organic whole, and based around the foundations of ethnic and common descent with inseparable bonds with the 'mythic past' but no immediate connection with the present. In many ways, this Eastern form was militant, excessive, xenophobic and authoritarian. (Brown 2000: 54; Smith 2005: 177-183; Smith 2001:39-42; and Spencer and Wollman 2005: 199-200).

For Kohn, German nationalism was the ideal model of this form of nationalism that was:

held together, not by the will of its members nor by any obligations of contract, but by traditional ties of kinship and status... [and by] the infinitely vaguer concept of 'folk' which...lent itself more easily to the embroideries of imagination and the excitations of emotion. Its roots seemed to reach into the dark soil of primitive times and to have grown through thousands of hidden channels of unconscious development, not in the bright light of rational political ends, but in the mysterious womb of the people, deemed to be so much nearer to the forces of nature. (Kohn 1944 and 1962, Quoted in Brown 2000: 54)

Kohn's distinction is reflected in John Plamenatz's work. In Plamenatz's view, although people in the West were somehow at a disadvantage, they were culturally equipped to succeed and excel, measured by the prevailing dominant standards of

cosmopolitanism that first arose in their societies. In contrast, the Eastern model represents the nationalism of those peoples who were culturally backward and hitherto unaccustomed to the new standards of cosmopolitanism. These peoples could not be nationalists unless they transformed themselves and recognized their backwardness and wanted to overcome it (Plamenatz 1976: 33-34. Cited in Spencer and Wollman 2005: 199-200).

Plamenatz further argues that since the Slavic nations of Central and Eastern Europe suffered from a sense of inferiority of their cultures, they had to imitate other more successful nationalisms such as that of the Germans, the French or the English. However, such an imitative model born out of frustration and inferiority complex leads to extremism such as the rise of Fascism and Nazism. Interestingly for Plamenatz, both Germany and Italy belonged to the liberal and civic West since both already possessed strong cultures even though liberal developments in these states were impeded by Nazism and Fascism. In contrast, the Slavic peoples had always been backward and, as such, they had to create both their states and national identities themselves. These peoples developed an ambivalent relationship with the West, characterized by a mixture of admiration and envy of the West. All of these factors meant that Eastern Europe was perpetually tied to a nationalism that was mostly illiberal in character (Plamenatz 1973: 22-37. Cited in Auer 2004: 10-11).

Such distinctions keep appearing in contemporary debates, albeit with modifications. For instance, having noted the criticisms of Kohn's dichotomy between the 'Voluntarist' Western conception of the nation and the 'Organic' conception of the East, Smith claims that it still holds some grain of truth, although it describes normative types that are based on ideological criteria (Smith 2001: 49-40).

Michael Ignatieff, in his recent book, "Blood and Belonging", claims that:

Civic nationalism maintains that the nation should be composed of all those- regardless of race, colour, creed, gender, language or ethnicity- who subscribe to the nation's political creed. This nationalism is called civic because it envisages the nation as a community of equal, rights bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values (Ignatieff 1994: 3-4. Quoted in Spencer and Wollman 2005: 203).

Liah Greenfeld makes a distinction between what she calls 'individualistic-libertarian' nationalism and 'collectivistic-authoritarian' nationalism. The former is based upon

the individualistic popular sovereignty of the 'people' in which each individual member of the nation actually exercises sovereignty. For Greenfeld, this interpretation of popular sovereignty serves as the foundation of an individualistic-libertarian and civic form of nationalism, in which citizenship is open and voluntaristic. In the latter case, the sovereignty came to signify the very uniqueness and distinctiveness of the people as a collectivity, as being members of a unique nation. In this sense, sovereignty is vested upon the nation which is seen in unitary terms. This interpretation gives rise to a particularistic, authoritarian and collectivist nationalism. This nationalism is more or less ethnic in character since the criteria of membership to the nation has 'nothing to do with individual will, but constitutes a genetic characteristic' (Greenfeld 2000: 563-567).

However, the historical development of nations and nationalism in various settings suggests that strict dichotomies between a civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism can hardly be feasible. It is true that we can certainly isolate some elements of nationalism and point out whether they are liberal or more generally illiberal or authoritarian in character. But there is no *a priori* reason to believe that civic nationalism does not use elements that are deemed to be exclusive to ethnic nationalism or to assume readily that the so-called ethnic nationalism cannot incorporate democratic elements. This is clearly a problem in Western Europe and the North America, where civic nationalism is believed to have originated. It is obvious that choices are bound to be made in defining what national identity should be composed of, which in effect often means inclusion of some elements of national identity of one particular group at the cost of exclusion of those of other groups. This has often led to secessionism and autonomy movements in some developed states of the West.

Will Kymlicka makes a useful analysis that seems to be consistent with the above-mentioned point. He seems to suggest that 'civic nationalism' is inclusive while 'ethnic nationalism' is exclusive, which, I assume is true only when these two forms are seen as ideal types. Kymlicka qualifies this distinction by saying that both forms involve the politicization of ethnocultural groups since both needs to develop a common societal culture. He argues that contrary to the thesis that modern industrialized states are civic nations in the sense that they are neutral towards the cultures present in them in contrast to the so-called ethnic nations, these states are not always neutral when it comes to dealing with language or culture. He cites the

example of the US, where the government actively promotes the English language and argues that the life-chances of getting employment and participation in the institutions of the US crucially depend on learning the English language which he terms as constituting a common societal culture. Although this 'common culture' in terms of English-speaking Americans is thin as it does not preclude differences in terms of religion, personal values or family relationships, attempts to integrate diverse groups of people into such a common culture have sometimes been met with resistance, since some groups do not want to tie up their life-chances with the language of the dominant majority. 'So the idea that 'civic nations' are neutral between ethnocultural identities is mythical' (Kymlicka 2000: 12-14).

Nonetheless, Kymlicka also argues that states engage in nation-building efforts in order to integrate different cultural minorities into a common societal culture without necessarily possessing an ethno-cultural prejudice or seeking to impose cultural imperialism on these minorities. These nation-building efforts are needed in order that all citizens enjoy equal access to opportunities within the state. As long as these nation-building efforts are seen by groups as promoting equality and freedom and not as expressions of ethnocentric prejudices, these groups would give their consent and participate in these efforts. However, there are some minority groups with their distinct language and culture that have refused to join in integration with the societal culture of the dominant group, e.g. in Canada, Belgium. Therefore, minorities face a choice of either integration or to maintain their distinct identities. As integration often spells danger for their identities, minorities often oppose integration into the majority culture. Kymlicka further disagrees with the view that a strong commitment to one particular culture is illiberal and inconsistent with individual autonomy because, 'individuals find meaningful autonomy by exploring the options and practices available in their own societal culture' (Kymlicka 2000: 17-9; 29-32).

The historical evolution of Western states such as France, Britain, the United States, and Canada shows that they were not necessarily inclusive or liberal even at the time when civic nationalism was believed to have emerged. Large sections of the citizens were denied voting rights, and women achieved suffrage only in the twentieth century after long periods of struggles. Moreover, other groups like the Blacks and the Native Indians faced widespread social exclusion and discrimination in the United States, which would make one wonder whether national identity was sought to be forged around the culture of the dominant majority in these states.

Philip Spencer and Howard Wollman claim that nationalism, whatever form it takes, has a logical tendency towards the exclusion of the 'outsider' or the 'other' from the political project of nation-building. This exclusionary logic of nationalism could also apply to citizenship rights. Spencer and Wollman point out that citizenship in the 'civic' nations of the West is no longer open, especially as immigration continues to pose questions about national identity. Neither is it the exactly the case that citizenship was unambiguously and consistently unconditional and 'free-for-all' in these civic nations in earlier history ((Spencer and Wollman 2005: 198; 211-216). Similarly, David Brown argues that the characterization that ethnic nationalism is illiberal because it is a regressive and reactionary force while civic nationalism is liberal because it has an internal self-generating logic has one problem. In his view this problem is faced by both civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism: all nationalisms are 'necessarily reactive in that their origin is in assertions of an identity demarcating the us from the them'. This applies as much to American nationalism that grew out of a reactive rebellion against British rule, as it does to German nationalism (Brown 2000:64-65).

The claim often made that civic nationalism is benign, tolerant and peaceful while ethnic nationalism is virulent and war-prone is also not very convincing. Michael Billig, for instance, criticizes Ignatieff for his failure to acknowledge the fact that some of the bloody wars waged by democratic states were driven by nationalistic rhetoric in spite of the fact that many of these wars were accompanied by public patriotic fervour. Billig further argues that Ignatieff does not consider how myths are created by civic nationalists to create their own nation-state; how they recruit citizens during times of war; and how they protect their territorial boundaries in violent manners against those 'outsiders' who threaten to rearrange them (Billig 2005: 194).

Another related distinction is made in terms of political nationalism and cultural nationalism and their separate roots of origin. The former is seen to have emerged in the West with the objectives of securing democratic principles of liberty and equality and as a way of revolt against absolutism. On the other hand, the latter emerged as a cultural movement in the East, and was basically a reaction against the alien but progressive and liberal form of Western nationalism (Kohn 1965, Cited in Spencer and Wollman 2005: 201-2). But as Spencer and Wollman argue, nations that have been purportedly built on principles of political nationalism display not only chauvinistic pride in the superiority of their own cultures and practice assimilationist

policies but also feel insecure and threatened by other cultures. Thus it is necessary to note the cultural underpinnings of apparently political nationalisms (Spencer and Wollman 2005: 201-2)

More recently, John Hutchinson has also made a distinction between political nationalism and cultural nationalism. But unlike Kohn's dichotomy, Hutchinson's analysis is not set in terms of an East/West or liberal (good) / illiberal (bad) nationalisms. On the contrary, Hutchinson's motive is to reveal the positive and evolutionary force of cultural nationalism in the process of formation of nations. In Hutchinson's view, political nationalism and cultural nationalism are two distinct processes with different strategies and goals. Both share an antipathy towards the bureaucratic state, but while political nationalism has the goal of securing a representative state based on civic laws, cultural nationalism views the nation as an organic entity with an individuality of its own that was brought into being by its unique history and civilization. Unlike the political nationalist who wishes to do away with all forms of traditional life and replace it with a legal-rational order, cultural nationalists seek the continuous regeneration of the nation by the harmonious integration of both the traditional and modern aspects of the nation (Hutchinson 2003: 13).

Cultural nationalism, in contrast to political nationalism, is concerned primarily with the moral regeneration of the national community through invocations of historical memory (rather than language) to serve as an authentic blueprint for national progress, especially in times of crisis that is often generated by modernization. Led by the intellectuals (chiefly historical scholars and artists) and the intelligentsia that together constitute the 'ethnic revivalists', the historicist ideology of cultural nationalism and myths and legends are sought to be used to perceive the cultural nation as a regenerative force. "For the revivalist, the past is to be used not in order to return to some antique order but rather to re-establish the nation at a new and higher level of development" (Hutchinson 2003: 8-9).

In Hutchinson's view, cultural nationalism is not the regressive and atavistic force used by the small elites of backward societies in order to overcome the inferiority complex brought about by increasing contacts with other progressive and modern societies. Instead, it is a positive and forward-looking force that provides a vision for the modernizing socio-political development of the community. Thus for Hutchinson, cultural nationalism, although often a defensive reaction against outside

modernizing forces that threaten the status quo in some societies, is never a call to retreat back to a traditional and pristine past. Rather, it recognizes that the project of nation-building depends on the integration of the traditional with the modern in order to develop the nation as a dynamic force capable of staking its place in the world. According to Hutchison, cultural revivalists such as Vivekananda in India did not seek a wholesale and blind imitation of the ideals and values of the modern West, neither did they advocate a return to an obscurantist vision of the traditional past. What they cultural revivalists sought, and continue to seek is the integration and fusion of a progressive and polycentric modernism with the traditional ties of community and family. But what is of vital significance is that this integration is to be achieved with the goal of regenerating the nation with its own unique evolutionary path (Hutchinson 2003: 30-5).

In Hutchinson's view, cultural nationalism is a recurrent movement that often arises in times of crisis even in the industrialized countries of the West, contrary to the assumption that it has been replaced by political nationalism. This is because both forms occur in alternating cycles, each eliciting the other. While cultural nationalism often takes an institutionalized political form in order to obtain state power, political nationalism often draws on traditional cultural symbols as it feels the imperative to reconnect with the masses in times of crisis. (Hutchinson 2003: 41-42).

The alternating cycle between political nationalism and cultural nationalism occurs in the following manner, according to Hutchinson's analysis. The communitarian orientation of cultural nationalism changes to a state-centred nationalism for two main reasons: to consolidate the nation-state domestically and to strengthen its place among the community of independent states. With the establishment of the state and without the fear of an external 'foreigner', differing conceptions of the nation emerge among different sections of the population within the state, which could lead to civil wars and secessionism. Thus the governing elites must strengthen the state as a protector of the nation against both sectional interests at home and external and foreign pressures. This leads the governing elite to abandon nation-building efforts and adopt state-building measures with a strong political nationalism in order to build a distinct homogeneous national identity from existing diverse identities. However a state-led nationalism with its legal-rational, civic orientations and homogenizing tendencies from above alienates several sections of the population, particularly in countries where there is little or no civic tradition. "This

atmosphere of conflict and disillusion creates the conditions for another wave of ethnic revivalism among the intellectuals, disenchanted with mere political solutions and eager to rediscover the original historico-cultural ideals". (Hutchinson 2003: 313-314).

Earliest Proponents of Nationalist Thought

It has often been said that nationalism does not have a philosophical forefather in the sense that other traditions like liberalism and socialism have. Or in the words of Benedict Anderson, 'unlike other isms, nationalism has never produced its own grand thinkers: no Hobbeses, Tocquevilles, Marxes, or Webers' (Hobsbawm 1991:5). However, this should not be taken to mean that nationalism does not possess an intellectual tradition. This should be clear from the thoughts of the following thinkers.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau. He was one of the first political theorists to articulate views that could be considered nationalist. For him, the key to establishing an ideal system of government was the achievement of congruence between the governor and the governed by way of founding a nation that suits the government, which in effect meant, the achievement of cultural homogeneity. However, in order to achieve this project of nation-building, what are vital are not just constitutions and institutional frameworks, but education and civic religion also have vital roles to play in inculcating a common national character. But in addition, Rousseau also believed advocated a nationalism that is based on low culture manifested in sports, festivities and ceremonies (Cited in Birch 1989:14-15; Qvortrup 2003: 74-94).

Johann Gottfried Herder. Regarded as one of the founding fathers of the German Romantic Movement, his views do not constitute a full theory of nationalism. Nevertheless his main contribution to nationalist thought is his belief that people have deep emotional attachments and sense of belonging to distinct cultural communities. He used the term '*Volk*' to describe each cultural community that had an identifiable character, each of which was shaped by its physical environment, by the language of its people, and by the education through which customs, traditions and values were passed from one generation to another (Cited in Spencer 1997:1; Birch 1989:17-18).

However, Herder's use of the term '*Volk*' was not confined to one particular form of association and he often uses it interchangeably with 'nation'. He employs the term Volk when referring to ancient communities as diverse as the Phoenicians, Greeks and Romans as well as those peoples that the Romans subjugated, and to a variety of communities in the eighteenth century such as the indigenous peoples of

North America, Africa, the Philippines, the English, the French, and the Germans. Although there are disagreements concerning the distinctive features of the modern nation among recent works on nationalism, it is clear that his wide application of the term Volk/Nation differs from modern conceptions of 'nation' which are generally regarded as post-eighteenth century formations (Cited in Spencer 1997:1; Birch 1989:17-18).

Unlike many modern theories of nationalism, Herder did not identify the nation with the state, and his use of the term 'Volk' is not contingent with the requirement that nations must coincide with the boundaries of political units. Neither did he believe that cultural and political communities have always coincided in history. Thus what distinguishes Herder's conception of the nation is that he saw it in purely cultural terms, and his application of the term is broader in the sense that it is broadly applied to cultural communities rather than to the political notion that nations that should logically and inevitably be autonomous states (Cited in Spencer 1997:1; Birch 1989:17-18).

Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Fichte's contribution to nationalist thinking is essential for his strong views on national pride, and chauvinism that were later incorporated in the political programmes of many a nationalist politician. Starting out as a liberal and an admirer of the French Revolution, he became a staunch exponent of German nationalism after the defeat of Prussia in the hands of Napoleon in 1806. Subsequently, his work entitled '*Addresses to the German Nation*' became the famous exposition of German nationalism (Cited in Birch 1989: 19-21).

Like Herder, Fichte believed that language was the essential foundation upon which a nation should be built. But for Fichte, it is not just any language but the purity of language that determines national identity. He argued that Germans as one common people owe their national identity to the uniqueness of their language. In his view, any displacement of the boundary between the pure and native German on the one hand, and other foreign words or elements on the other would disturb national identity (Cited in Birch 1989: 19-21).

For Fichte, the very uniqueness and purity of the German language gave German culture and people advantages of progress over speakers of other languages. Further, Fichte claims that German culture has developed much further than other cultures and so, it is being beckoned by history to guide the future of Europe, and indeed of mankind (Cited in Birch 1989: 19-21).

Major Paradigms

The study of nations and nationalism can be divided into four main paradigms or schools of thought: Primordialism, Perennialism, Modernism, and Ethno-symbolism. Of course, these paradigms have various sub-divisions. The purpose of this section is to elucidate the main arguments of the proponents of each of these paradigms.

Primordialism

This approach is inspired by the 'organic' view of nations and nationalism as espoused by the German Romantics, and sees humanity as naturally divided into primordial nations, while nationalism becomes the ubiquitous and universal human expression and quest to belong to nations. The key to the power of the nation and persistence of nationalism lie on the human bases of ethnicity, kinship, and genetic ties (Smith 1999:4).

Smith identifies three strands of Primordialism. The first type of primordialism is the organic and nationalist. It sees the nation as existing in the state of nature, often lying dormant and forgotten but always ready to be awakened at certain points in time. According to Smith, the problem with this view of nations and nationalism is that it does not explain the existence of nations beyond the affirmations of nationalists or explains the affects of migration, colonization and intermarriage on the compositions of modern nations. Neither does it explain why nations should lie dormant and when and why some of them wake up while others fail to do so (Smith 1999:4).

The second type, influenced by socio-biology simply argues that nations are extensions of kinship and family ties and correspond to their biological and genetic ancestry. However, ethnic groups and nations are often formed of mixed biological ancestry. Genetic factors can hardly explain the wide-ranging variations in patterns of ethnic formations through absorption and dissolution or the large-scale cultural transformations that ethnies have undergone throughout history. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to extend biological or genetic ancestry of a group of people to much larger population (Smith 1998:4; 1999: 147-150).

A third type of Primordialism is advanced by Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz, who locate the focus of attention on deep-seated ties and attachments to culture, religion, language, territory, and the like. For them, the foundations of ethnicity must be traced back to 'cultural givens' of human society such as primordial

ties of kinship and religion as expressed in rituals and public ceremonies. Edward Shils was the first to identify and distinguish between the public, civil ties of the modern state and the primordial ties of family, religious and ethnic groups. In Shils' view these primordial attachments remain entrenched in people's lives through rituals and ceremonies even in a secular state (Cited in Smith 1998: 151).

This theme was picked up by Clifford Geertz, who argued that primordial attachment stems from the givens ... of social existence. One is bound to one's kinsman, one's neighbor, one's fellow believer, *ipso facto*; as the result not merely of personal affection, practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself ...For virtually every person, in every society, at almost all time, some attachments seem to flow more from a sense of natural- some would say spiritual-affinity than from social interaction (Quoted in Dawisha 2002: 3-4).

In Geertz's view the primordial attachment to the cultural givens of human society is so powerful that it could threaten to supersede and dissolve the civil ties of the modern state. Thus, the persistence of ethnicity in colonial societies of Asia and Africa can be explained by the fact that people in these societies were bound together more by the primordial ties of language, religion and so on than by civil ties of a rational society. Geertz argues that new states are particularly susceptible to disaffection due to the opposition between these two types of attachments (Cited in Smith, 1999: 151-53).

However, the Primordialist approach is not without its critics. Paul R.Brass advances some criticisms. First, primordial attachments are variable across time and space. People can be bilingual; and languages can change and shift, be adopted or rejected, or be devoid of emotional attachments. Even religious identification is subject to change, and one's place of birth and kinship connections can lose their emotional appeal over time. Secondly, Brass rejects the proposition that 'recognition of distinct primordial groups in a society is sufficient to predict the future development out of them of ethnic communities or nations'. Thirdly, Brass rejects the primordialist notion that ethnic attachments reflect the 'non-rational part of the human personality and, as such, are destructive of civil society' for two reasons: *first*, ethnic identity may be pursued or adopted for quite rational reasons or to pursue an end

through the collective action of the community; and *second*, there is no *a priori* reason or empirical evidence to suggest that primordial attachments are more dangerous or disruptive of civil order than economic or class conflicts (Brass 2000: 880-881).

There are other critics who believe in the ability of the so-called 'political entrepreneurs' to manipulate primordial or ethnic attachments or even to construct 'cultural givens' where do not, in fact, exist. However, Smith concurs with Steven Grosby's view that human beings place importance to different kinds of beliefs or cognition that attach to certain objects of primordial nature (Cited in Smith 1999: 156). Similarly, Horowitz argues that it is debatable whether politicians can depart significantly from prevailing forms of cognition if ethnicity is commonly experienced primordially. Moreover, he argues that political entrepreneurs could themselves be primordialists if they believe in the immutability of traits of their own communities (Horowitz 2002:80).

According to Smith, the merit of this 'participant' primordialism is that it invites and encourages us to pay attention to the long-term significance of peoples' deep attachments to kinship and cultural bonds and why people are often ready to kill or die to defend such attachments, rather than omit this issue altogether in our explanation of nations and nationalism as is often done by many scholars. Though this approach in itself does not provide explanations for the widespread appeal of nationalism, it does highlight the problem significantly. (Smith 2000:1).

Perennialism

This approach claims that nations are a recurrent phenomena throughout recorded history, though they are not a part of a primordial entity of the state of nature. This approach does not see much difference between ethnicity and nationality. Although it accepts nationalism as a political movement and ideology that is modern and a recent phenomenon, it regards nations either as new forms of ethnicities or as cultural collectivities that have always existed alongside ethnicities in all ages and in all continents. But unlike the Primordialists, they do not see nations as biological or natural entities; rather they are historical and sociological formations recurrent throughout history. One variant of it, known as *continuous perennialism* claims that some nations are only centuries old while others are recently new. Another variant, known as *recurrent perennialism* claims that, in general, nations come and go, and

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often dissolve but reappear in certain periods of history and in certain areas of the world. But while it might be possible to demonstrate that certain nations have shown continuity throughout history, there is always the danger of conflating national identity with other local, regional or cultural identity, especially when it can be shown that many nations and nationalist ideologies are of recent vintage (Smith 1998:159; Smith 1999: 5).

Harald Haarmann emphasizes the importance of language as a marker of ethnic identity. In his view, since the beginning of recorded history, people have been aware of language as a marker of ethnicity. 'The best proof of the validity of language as a marker of ethnicity in antiquity is the concept of the barbarian' which was invented by the ancient Greeks to raise the prestige of their own culture. The main criterion of barbarian was his language, because the Greek word *barbaros* means "a person who speaks inarticulately'. Thus the use of language as the criteria to differentiate one ethnic group with another has been present since antiquity to the modern age of nationalism (Haarmann 1999: 64-6).

Similarly, Joshua Fishman, by tracing the history of ethnic belonging from the Greeks and Hebrew stresses the bond between language and ethnicity, and seeks to reveal the immemorial ubiquity and subjectivity of unmobilised ethnicity in everyday life. This ethnicity is not static and can be reinterpreted but changes must be authentic and rooted to ethnic sense of belonging. Thus Fishman is interested in revealing the power, longevity and ubiquity of ethnicity/nations and to explore its deep roots in history (Cited in Smith 1998: 159-160). But Smith argues that Fishman captures the deep sense of belonging that people of well documented histories feel towards their ethnic ties, but fails to address the problems of ethnic groups who have ambiguous pasts and histories or have been the products of migrations and multiple cultural elements. Both does his analysis touch upon the problematic of nations and nationalism since ethnicity seems to have been equated with nations (Smith 1998: 159-160).

John Armstrong is another writer who emphasizes the recurrent pattern of nation-formation. Armstrong suggests that nations are products of recurrent patterns of ethnic identification throughout history, and ethnic group differentiation has been sustained the persistence of myths and symbols. In his view, these myths and symbols provide the elements for the development of ethnic boundaries that are reflected in the group attitudes of people For Armstrong, ethnicity is vital for the formation of

boundary mechanisms, and that ethnic values and forms of ethnic myths often vary very little. What ultimately matters is the perception of group differences in terms of defining 'insiders' and 'outsiders' (Armstrong 1982: 4-7; 291).

Modernism

Represented by such prominent personalities as Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, Benedict Anderson, and John Breuilly, Modernism regards nations and nationalism not only as recent but also as novel formations of the age of modernity. For them, nations as primordial or pre-existing entities is an illusion. For Gellner and Hobsbawm, nationalism precedes nations and it makes sense to discuss about them only in relation to the modern nation-state (Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1992).

Probably the most influential modernist account of nationalism has been given by Ernest Gellner. The main proposition of Gellner that nations and nationalism are logically and inevitably contingent upon certain novel traits of modern industrial societies rests on his analysis of the transition from agro-literate to industrial to modern industrial societies. The starting point of Gellner's theory rests on his definition of the concept of the nation. Neither 'will' nor shared culture by themselves can define the nation because they both bring too rich a catch. If nations can *will* themselves into communities, so can other social groups such as clubs, conspiracies, gangs, teams, parties and other associations of the pre-industrial era which are not necessarily defined according to the nationalist principle. Any definition of nations in terms of shared culture is also not useful because human history is replete with cultural differentiations and discontinuities, making it difficult for cultural boundaries to neatly coincide with political units, especially in the agrarian world. That is why nations can be defined in terms of both will and culture only in terms of the special factors that are present in the age of nationalism. These special factors are: the establishment of a pervasive high culture (standardized, homogeneous, and centrally sustained), pervading entire populations and not just elite minorities (Gellner 1983: 53-55).

Why are there no nations and nationalism in an ago-literate society? In an agro-literate society, literacy divides the population into self-enclosed communities: the minority elite class (the administrative, military, clerical and commercial classes) on the one hand, and the majority class of agricultural producers, in which communication is context-bound and not intelligible to everyone. There is a great

stress on cultural differentiation rather than on homogenization both between and within the two broad classes. For Gellner, 'almost everything in it (agro-literate society) militates against the definition of political units in terms of cultural boundaries'. In other words, culture tends to be defined either horizontally by social caste, or vertically to define small local communities. Thus, there is neither the possibility nor the desire to attain a single homogenous culture, and, hence, no possibility of nations and nationalism, as defined by Gellner (Gellner 1983: 9-11).

But everything changes when men are ushered into the modern industrial society from the agrarian one. The new society thrives on innovation and is characterized by a perennial thirst for sustained growth and progress. This thirst for growth is incompatible with the stability of the old social structure of the agrarian society, in which social roles and occupations were often hereditary and tied to social status. Thus, a high degree of occupational mobility sets in, individuals must be able to shift from one activity to the other, and they must be able to communicate with each other in a context-free language that is intelligible to everyone (Gellner 1983: Chapter 3).

Unlike the agrarian society in which work essentially involved physical labour, work becomes increasingly semantic in modern industrial society that involves the exchange of communication in a standard idiom understood by all. This means that the greater part of education in an industrial society must be generic and common to all followed by specialist training for a job. The implication for the members of such a society is that their dignity and livelihood crucially depends on their getting the generic training or exo-socialization as Gellner often terms it. Unlike the agrarian society, in which education was specialized, contextual and restricted to the children of elites, the successful operation of an industrial society depends crucially on a mass, standardized education in a context-free written language and script. In the industrial society, a homogenized and high literate culture replaces the diversified, locality-tied and illiterate culture. The centralized and generic educational structure is very large and expensive to sustain. Only the modern state is capable of shouldering this enormous burden. Thus, the imperative of the norm of exo-socialization intimately ties up the state with culture, 'whereas in the past their connection was thin, fortuitous, varied, loose, and often minimal'. This explains why we live in an age of nationalism (Gellner 1983: Chapter 3).

But what is nationalism for Gellner? It is 'primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent'. Nationalism is, essentially the replacement of a low culture by a high culture (a school- cultivated, standardised, education-based, literate culture). Gellner also identifies a low culture as a 'wild' culture generated spontaneously without conscious design, supervision, and surveillance, or special nutrition. Whereas a high culture is a 'garden' culture that has to be cultivated often from low cultures, and sustained by literacy, distinguished personnel, and specialized institutions of learning. Thus nations are societies characterized by the replacement of wild cultures with garden cultures (Gellner 1983: 1; 50-52; 57).

In Gellner's view, the industrial age inherited both low and high cultures along with the political units of the agrarian age. But only a few low cultures are able to transform themselves into high cultures and aspire to become viable nation-states, while the rest have to bow out meekly and dissolve into other cultures. Thus nationalism as the self-affirmation of nations as ever-present entities is weak, because not every wild culture can become a high culture and, hence, not every claim of potential nations succeeds in becoming nation-states (Gellner 1983: 43-52).

Once a successful high culture is imposed on the population of the state, the role of nationalism is to cultivate and sustain it, often using elements from wild old cultures. Thus nations as a:

Natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent though long-delayed political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: *that* is a reality, for better or worse, and in general an inescapable one (Gellner 1983: 48-9).

Gellner further explains the relationship between low cultures and high cultures, and the sociologically novel feature of nationalism as having deep roots in the current condition of modernity:

It is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way round. Admittedly, nationalism uses the pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation of cultures or cultural

wealth, though it uses them very selectively, and it most often transforms them radically. Dead languages can be revived, traditions invented, quite fictitious pristine purities restored. But this culturally creative, fanciful, positively inventive aspect of nationalist ardour ought not to allow anyone to conclude, erroneously, that nationalism is a contingent, artificial, ideological invention.... The cultural shreds and patches used by nationalism are often arbitrary historical inventions. Any old shred and patch would have served as well. But in no way does it follow that the principle of nationalism, as opposed to the avatars it happens to pick up for its incarnations, is itself in the least contingent and accidental (Gellner 1983: 55-6).

Gellner then explains two important principles of fission that appear with the onset of modern industrial societies. The first, he calls 'the principle of barriers to communication, barriers based on previous, pre-industrial cultures. In Gellner's analysis, folk cultures try to turn into literate high cultures not because of calculations of material advantage but because of the necessities to deal with increased labour migration and bureaucratic employment. In stable self-contained communities, peasants took their cultures for granted, but when mobility and context-free communication became the fundamental features of their social life, they learned the difference between those who were sympathetic to their culture and those who were hostile to it, and the culture in which they had been *taught* to communicate becomes the core of their identity (Gellner 1983: 58-62).

To put it another way, the early period of industrialization divides the population into two groups: the urbanized centre and its population who possess a literate high culture and communicate in a context-free linguistic medium; and the new entrants into the new social order of industrialization who possess folk cultures and speak a different language than those of the more advanced centre. This contrast between the better-off who spoke one language, and the impoverished and exploited groups who spoke dialects recognizably similar to each other enables the exploited group to conceive and express their sentiments and resentments collectively, which ultimately engenders the concept of a nation that is opposed to that of the dominant high culture (Gellner 1983: 58-62).

The second fissure in the transition from an agrarian society to an industrial one occurs due to the persistence of what Gellner calls entropy-resistant traits. These are traits that have a marked tendency to resist eventual dispersion throughout the entire society, even after a considerable length of time since the establishment of an industrial society. In an agrarian society, such traits were not a problem, but were instead reinforced and encouraged to be fitting and appropriate. But in the industrial society, these entropy-resistant traits are a serious source of problems as they create fissures in the society (Gellner 1983: 63-87).

But the fissures created by these entropy-resistant traits are different from those that result merely because of cultural differences and communication problems that arise in early industrial society, although they have certain affinities and overlaps. In the previous case, problems due to communication barrier can be remedied by either of the two methods: a successful nationalism, or assimilation, or both. In the early periods of industrialization, egalitarian expectations and aspirations are accompanied by the realities of inequalities and miseries suffered by some disadvantaged groups. But in the later industrial period, these general inequalities can be dissolved as communication barriers are removed and people are able to communicate even across diverse languages. But there are entropy-resistant traits whose persistent fissiparous tendencies cannot be remedied by correcting the communication gap alone. There are deeply engrained religious-cultural habits possessing a vigour and tenacity that cannot be easily assimilated into the homogenous literate high culture of an industrial society. These create the possibilities of new nations and nationalism (Gellner 1983: 63-87).

Eric Hobsbawm is another theorist who belongs to the modernist paradigm in the study of nations and nationalism. His analysis of nations and nationalism can be found in his historical account of the rise of nations from about 1830 onwards. He starts by accepting Gellner's thesis that nations and nationalism are relatively recent and novel formations, and that nations are the products of inventions and social engineering. In Hobsbawm's view, nationalism is a political programme whose primary goal is to establish a nation-state, and it is pointless to discuss nations or nationalisms except in so far as they relate to this goal.

Nations exist not only as functions of a particular kind of territorial state or the aspiration to establish one- broadly speaking, the citizen state of the French Revolution- but also in

the context of a particular stage of technological and economic development (Hobsbawm 1992: 9-10).

In Hobsbawm's analysis, with the advent of the citizen-mobilizing and administrative modern state and the onset of democratization, questions of the loyalty of citizens to the state or to the nation became supremely important. In addition, traditional guarantors of loyalty such as dynastic legitimacy, divine ordination, historic right and continuity of rule, or religious cohesion had weakened considerably. Increased democratization meant that rulers had to acquire legitimacy and loyalty from the masses and, hence, the need for state-directed patriotism became very important. On the other hand, a counter-nationalism against the state may emerge, which, if integrated with state patriotism could be a powerful asset of the government and become its emotional content. Thus the massive scale of administration of citizens by modern states and the technical requirements of economic development required the state to adopt an official national language of communication. This, in turn, required universal literacy and mass educational systems in order to enable the state to communicate with their citizens and to inculcate a sense of identification with the flags and symbols of the state, often inventing traditions or even the 'nation' in the process (Hobsbawm 1992: chapter 3).

However, as explained by Hobsbawm, selection of an official national language was hardly a matter of pragmatic selection, especially in multilingual states because the adoption of one language as the national language meant the exclusion of other languages. As we shall see in Hobsbawm's analysis of ethnic-linguistic nationalism, language becomes a prominent criterion of nationality for the ideologists of nationalism from the end of the nineteenth century onwards (Hobsbawm 1992: chapter 3).

Hobsbawm distinguished between two types of nationalism. The first type is that of mass, civic and democratic political nationalism, created by the French Revolution and American Revolution that flourished in Europe from about 1830-1870, especially in Germany and Italy. This type operated on a threshold principle: in this classical period of liberal nationalism, only those nations that were viable both culturally and economically could claim the right to self-determination and become sovereign nation-states. In Hobsbawm's analysis this type of nationalism had little or nothing to do with the identification of the citizens of a territorial state with such objective criteria as ethnicity, language, religion and the like. 'The original,

revolutionary-popular, idea of patriotism was state-based rather than nationalist, since it related to the sovereign people itself, i.e. to the state exercising power in its name. Ethnicity or other elements of historic continuity were irrelevant to “the nation” in this sense, and language relevant only or chiefly on pragmatic grounds’ (Hobsbawm 1992: 32; 19-20; 87).

But why were objective criteria such as ethnicity and language irrelevant to the formation of nations during this phase of nationalism, often described by Hobsbawm as the ‘Mazzinian phase of nationalism’? The first reason is, of course, that groups of people claiming to be a nation and aspiring for statehood must cross the ‘threshold principle’. Secondly, the fact that most nation-states were ethnically and linguistically heterogeneous was readily accepted. Thirdly, the national heterogeneity of nation-states was accepted because it seemed clear that small and backward nationalities stood to gain by merging into greater nations. (Hobsbawm 1992: 33-4).

In practice, there were only three criteria that could distinguish a people as a nation, provided it had already passed the threshold principle.

The first was the its historic association with a current state or one with a fairly lengthy and recent past. The second criterion was the existence of a long-established cultural elite, possessing a written national literary and administrative vernacular, such as those possessed by the Germans and Italians. Third, it must provide a proven capacity for conquest and expansion (Hobsbawm 1992: 37-8).

But how could the concept of nationalism, so remote from the real experiences of people be such a powerful force, and why should people identify themselves only with this particular entity called the ‘nation’? Hobsbawm contends that in order to understand the reasons for the power of nations and nationalism, we must venture beyond the analysis of nations as ‘constructions from above’ into one that also accounts for the formation of nations ‘from below’ in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people. It is in this context that Hobsbawm brings in the analysis of what he calls ‘proto-national’ bonds. These bonds are either the supra-local bonds stretching beyond the actual spaces in which people live such as ties of religion, or the political bonds that tie people more directly to pre-modern states. But he argues that neither can be identified as the progenitors of modern nationalism

because they had or have no *necessary* relation with the unit of territorial political organisation which is a crucial criterion of what we understand as a 'nation' today (Hobsbawm 1992: 10-1; 46-7).

In Hobsbawm's view, it is extremely difficult to find out what precisely constitutes proto-nationalism, because it is difficult to discover the sentiments of the illiterate masses at the grassroots level who were the overwhelming majority of the world's population before the twentieth century. Moreover, it would be illegitimate to extrapolate from the nationalist writings of a few elites to the illiterate masses. Language was hardly a criterion of nationhood in the pre-literate era, except for the rulers and the literate, and the identification of nationality with language was confined to the ideological construction of nationalist intellectuals.

'Language in the Herderian sense of the language spoken by the *Volk* was therefore plainly not a central element in the formation of proto-nationalism directly, though it was not necessarily irrelevant' (Hobsbawm 1992: 48; 56: 59).

Ethnicity in terms of biological or genetic descent and race are also plainly irrelevant to modern nationalism, except in so far as they mark out visible differences in physical appearances that reinforce the distinctions between 'us' and 'them'. Religion and holy icons too cannot be markers of proto-nations since they are either too wide or too narrow. Only the consciousness of having belonged to a historic or actual state present or past can generate proto-nationalism among the masses, or even lead to modern patriotism (Hobsbawm 1992: 63-5; 72-3; 75).

Thus for Hobsbawm, proto-nationalism alone is not enough to form nationalities, nations or states. Although proto-nationalism, wherever it existed, made the task of nationalism easier, it does not follow that one inevitably and logically leads to the other. Moreover, a proto-national base is not essential for national patriotism or loyalty to an already existing state (Hobsbawm 1992: 77-8).

The second phase of nationalism that Hobsbawm identifies came in the period 1870-1914 when mass civic nationalism was transformed into ethnic-linguistic kinds of nationalism. This new type was different from the Mazzinian phase of nationalism in three respects:

First, it abandoned the 'threshold principle' which, as we have seen, was central to nationalism in the Liberal era. Henceforth

any body of people considering themselves a 'nation' claimed the right to self-determination which, in the last analysis, meant the right to a separate sovereign independent state for their territory. Second, and in consequence of this multiplication of potential 'unhistorical' nations, ethnicity and language became the central, increasingly the decisive or even the only criteria of potential nationhood. Yet there was a third change which affected not so much the nation-state national movements, but national sentiments within the established nation-states: a sharp shift to the political right of nation and flag, for which the term 'nationalism' was actually invented in the last decade(s) of the nineteenth century (Hobsbawm 1992: 102).

The emergence of ethnic-linguistic nationalism as novel ways of inventing or imagining nationalities was the product of a combination of several socio-political developments: the conflation of race, language and ethnicity during this period; the resistance of traditional groups who felt threatened by the surge of modernity; the novel and non-traditional classes that developed in urban societies of developed countries; and unprecedented migrations of multiple diasporas (Hobsbawm 1992: 107-109).

In Hobsbawm's view, nationalism in the late twentieth century is 'no longer the historical force it was in the era between the French Revolution and the end of imperialist colonialism after World War II', although he does not deny the dramatic impacts of ethnic or nationalist politics. But nationalism is no longer a global political programme that would shape the history of the world. It is rather a complicating factor or a catalyst for other developments. Nations and nationalism will be present in the immediate future, but in subordinate and minor roles (Hobsbawm 1992: 169; 191).

In Hobsbawm's view, the collapse of the Soviet Union into several nationalities was the result of several political developments. Nationalism was not the factor that brought forth these developments. It was rather the beneficiary of these developments. The Soviet Union collapsed not because of some inherent national tensions, but because of its enormous economic difficulties and due to the weakening of the hold of the Communist regime over its constituent republics. As for the national liberation movements of the Third World, they attempted to create states based on Western nationalist model of an ethnically and linguistically homogenous nation-state

but ended up creating states that were generally opposite to such a Western model (Hobsbawm 1992: 168-9).

The current wave of essentially separatist and divisive ethnic movements do not reflect a positive programme or prospect and offers no relevant solution to the problems of the late twentieth century. They are simply defensive reactions of weakness and fear against the forces of the modern world. In Hobsbawm's view, these reactions are fuelled by real or imagined threats posed as a result of the 'combination of international population movements with the ultra-rapid, fundamental and unprecedented socio-economic transformations so characteristic of the third quarter of our century'. The deep anguish and disorientation, expressed in terms of the need to belong is just another response to the social dislocations and disorganization, that in turn, leads to the creation of illusions of nations and nationalism as irresistibly rising forces in the present era. Thus in Hobsbawm's final analysis, nations and nationalism are way past their peaks, are not relevant to current socio-economic developments and, hence are not prime movers of history anymore (Hobsbawm 1992: 170-1; 177).

A third influential historical account of the origins and rise of nations and nationalism within the modernist framework is given by Benedict Anderson, chiefly through his seminal book *Imagined Communities*, published in 1991. Anderson views nations and nationalism subjectively as cultural artefacts of a certain kind. His initial problem is to understand the anomaly of nationalism for Marxist theory, and he argues that the

'end of the era of nationalism', so long prophesied, is not remotely in sight. Indeed, nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life our time (Anderson 1991: 3).

Anderson then goes on to formulate his famous definition of the nation as 'an imagined political community- and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign'. He explains that it is imagined because the fellow-members of the nation will never meet or know each other or even come face to face, 'yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion'. It is imagined as limited 'because it has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations'. It is imagined as sovereign because it was born in an age of Enlightenment and Revolution and aspires for freedom in the form of a sovereign state. Finally, it is

imagined as a community, 'because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship' (Anderson 1991: 6-7).

The existence of nations depends on two perennial conditions: the two great fatalities of death, and Babel or the diversity of languages. The inevitability of death and the threat of oblivion which it brings frighten human beings. Religion provided explanations about death, rebirth and the links between the dead and the unborn. But the dawn of nationalism in eighteenth century Europe was accompanied by the dusk of religious thought. Hence in a secular age, collective memory of the nation helps human beings in facing the threat of oblivion. The second fatality is the enormous diversity of human languages and the impossibility of a general linguistic unification. But the mutual incomprehensibility between the diverse languages could be historically significant in the imagining of nations only with the convergence of capitalism and print technology to create monoglot mass reading publics (Anderson 1991: 11-2; 43).

In Anderson's analysis, what made the imagination of a new form of community possible was the convergence of the fatality of linguistic diversity with the emergence of print-capitalism. Print-languages laid the foundations of national consciousness in three ways: by creating fields of communication below Latin and above the spoken vernaculars, thereby enabling the hundreds of thousands and millions of speakers of the same language to view each other as belonging to one nationally imagined community; by standardizing and providing fixity to language, thereby helping in emphasizing the antiquity of nations; and by creating languages-of-power, thereby creating hierarchies of dialects and language (Anderson 1991: 42-45). In Anderson's view, nationalism cannot be understood without understanding the three great cultural systems that preceded it, and against which it came into being. The possibility of imagining the nation arose historically only at a time when, and where, these systems lost their axiomatic grip on the minds of men. These systems were the great religious systems; the sacred monarchical high centres; and cosmological time (Anderson 1991: 36).

The first of these systems, the great religions of Christianity, Islam, and the Chinese Middle Kingdom, imbued with the confidence of the uniqueness and sacredness of their truth languages conceived of themselves as all-encompassing and cosmically central communities linked to a superterrestrial order of power. However, their power

waned steadily after the late Middle Ages due to the European exploration of the non-European world, but also due to the gradual demotion of the sacred languages and the corresponding ascendance of vernaculars (Anderson 1991: 12-8).

The second system was the monarchical dynastic realm that derived its legitimacy not from subjects or citizens but from divinity, and organized around a high centre. These monarchical states ruled over heterogeneous populations situated in porous and fluctuating boundaries through a combination of warfare and dynastic marriages. But from the seventeenth century onwards, the sacred legitimacy of monarchy declined in Western Europe, so that by 1914, the remaining dynastic states had to abandon their earlier principle of sacred legitimacy and search for the 'national' alternative (Anderson 1991: 21-2).

The third system that underwent dramatic transformation was the pre-modern human conception of time that eventually made the imagining of the nation possible. Medieval men and women had 'no conception of history as an endless chain of cause and effect or of radical separation between the past and present'. Earlier conceptions viewed time as an endless 'simultaneity of past and future in an instantaneous present'. This has been replaced by an idea of 'homogenous, empty time' that is transverse, cross-time and measured by clock and calendar. This transformation was possible largely through the spread of rapid communications, most notably the spread of newspapers and novels in vernaculars (Anderson 1991: 22-36).

One important point of departure for Anderson is that he locates the first origins of nation-ness or nationalist consciousness not in mid-nineteenth century Europe but in the creole¹ Americas. But why did the colonial provinces in America develop such consciousness? Economic exploitation of the provinces and the ideological impact of Liberalism and the Enlightenment certainly provided the ammunition to protest against and criticize imperial policies. But they did not in themselves create the kind or shape of the community imagined by the creole peoples of North and South America. In Anderson's analysis, the process of imagining the creole nation distinct from its European metropolitan centres was helped by a host of factors. Firstly, each of the new South American republics had been administrative units from the sixteenth century onwards. Due to the vastness of the Spanish empire,

¹ Anderson defines creole as 'person of (at least theoretically) pure European descent but born in the Americas (and, by later extension, anywhere outside Europe). See in Anderson, Benedict (1991), *Imagined Communities*, London: Verso, Revised Edition.1991, pp. 47 footnote.

the enormous varieties of topography and climates, and the immense difficulty of communication in a pre-industrial era, these units acquired a separate and self-contained character. Secondly, the self-contained character of the provincial units was reinforced by the 'administrative pilgrimages' undertaken by creole officials who were always forced to hold subordinate posts in the administrative hierarchy of the Spanish empire in contrast to those Spanish who held superior posts by virtue of being born in the Spanish mainland in Europe. But finally, and most importantly, the most decisive role was played by creole printmen in helping shape the first imaginings of the nation (Anderson 1991: ch.4).

In Europe, on the other hand, 'national print-languages' and history played crucial roles in delineating the models of the nation. It was the energetic activities of professional intellectuals such as vernacularizing lexicographers, grammarians, philologists, and litterateurs that was instrumental in the development of nineteenth-century mass-mobilizing European nationalisms. Once the model of the independent national state was formed by the second decade of the nineteenth century, it was ready for pirating and exporting across Europe and elsewhere (Anderson 1991: ch.5). From about the mid-nineteenth century, official nationalisms developed inside Europe which were '*responses* by power-groups-primarily, but not exclusively, dynastic and aristocratic- threatened with exclusion from, or marginalization in, popular imagined communities'. Such official nationalism was also pursued by the imperial masters in their empires in Asia and Africa (Anderson 1991: ch.6). The 'last wave' of nationalisms that emerged in colonial Asia and Africa were a response to global imperialism made possible by industrial capitalism. These models of colonial nationalism copied, adapted or even improved upon the models provided by the preceding creole, vernacular and official nationalisms (Anderson 1991: ch.7).

John Breuilly offers a state-oriented and political explanation of nationalism within the modernist paradigm. For Breuilly, nationalism cannot be understood without treating it as a form of politics that developed in close conjunction with the emergence of the modern, sovereign territorial state. In Breuilly's analysis, the development of the modern state shaped nationalism in various ways. In nineteenth century continental Europe, there emerged the constitutionally limited and territorially bounded state which located its right to rule not from some divine order but from the consent of political community upon which it ruled. In such as a setting the powers of the state were embodied in specific institutions, and it could establish and enforce its

sovereign power only on the basis of the consent of the political community, to which it had to concede various rights and liberties (Breuilly 2001: 31-52; 2005: 61-73) .

As the state took on a 'public' character and made more and more claims to represent the public interest, it had to appeal to the public in national terms. Therefore, nationalism came to acquire a mobilizing and co-ordinating role, as industrialization required the mobilization of economic, military and cultural resources on a massive scale. This requirement became all the more imperative as inter-state competition and conflicts intensified, and as state intervention in such fields as education and social welfare increased. These earlier nationalist movements were reform nationalism as in France and Britain (Breuilly 2001: 31-52; 2005: 61-73).

However, in other areas of continental Europe and beyond it, the relationship between the state and nationalism generated movements that were either for unification or for separation, and deployed the appeal to cultural identity more explicitly. In Breuilly's analysis, two major situations can account for these movements: in Europe, where the modernizing state has a decentralized political structure but a wide range of cultural distinctions between the populations of different regions; and outside where the modern colonial state has been imposed on peoples of non-European origin (Breuilly 2001: 31-52; 2005: 61-73) .

Ethno-symbolism

The fourth major paradigm in the study of nationalism is Ethno-symbolism or as Anthony Smith often calls it 'Historical Ethno-symbolism'. Represented by such distinguished scholars as Anthony Smith, and John Hutchinson, this paradigm usually begins with a critique of the historical and theoretical accounts of nations and nationalism that have been given by modernist approaches. In fact, modernism and ethno-symbolism can be said to represent two opposite paradigmatic divides in the study of nations and nationalism.

Ethno-symbolism is a principal participant in one of the main lines of debate that concerns the antiquity or modernity of nations and nationalism. The foremost exponent of ethno-symbolism is Anthony Smith. Smith readily accepts that nationalism as an ideology and movement is relatively recent, dating back to the nineteenth century, but he argues that there could be powerful links between modern nations and pre-existing and pre-modern ethnic identities. Therefore Smith's concern is to explore possible links between the two. However, he does not want to give a

retrospective reading of nationalism as the uninterrupted causal connection of ethnies and nations, or that one logically and inevitably leads to the formation of the other (Smith 1998: 170; 2005: 25).

Smith argues that modernism suffers from a systematic failure to accord due weight to cultural factors and ethnic ties of modern nations, thereby precluding an understanding of the deep roots and widespread popular appeal of nationalism. Smith contends that this failure stems from some limitations of the modernist account that includes: a failure to distinguish between genuine constructs from long-term processes and structures; overemphasis on elite actions at the expense of popular beliefs and actions; and 'a neglect of the powerful affective dimensions of nations and nationalism' (Smith 1999: 9).

Smith argues that nationalism derives its power from the myths, memories, traditions, and symbols of ethnic heritage. These elements can be discovered and reinterpreted by modern national intelligentsias to form national identities. These historical and cultural elements provide the parameters within which cultural projects and political goals can be pursued (Smith 1999: 9).

The ethno-symbolists make a number of claims that include: firstly, in order to understand the power and shape of modern nations and nationalism, we must trace the origins and formation of nations as well as their possible future course over long periods of time. Nations are historical phenomena not only because they are embedded in particular collective past but also because they 'embody shared memories, traditions, and hopes of the populations designated as parts of the nation'. Therefore, historians have played a vital role in discovering and reinterpreting the ethnic heritages of modern nations (Smith 1999: 10).

Secondly, the relationship between the national past, present and future has three basic elements: recurrence, continuity and reappropriation. The first element suggests that modern nations may have pre-modern ethnic precursors that are diffused throughout history; the second element suggests that there is persistent continuity of cultural components such as myths, symbols, languages and customs that are handed down from generation to generation; and the third element means that the nationalist intelligentsia seeks to delineate the image of the nation by the discovery and reappropriation of the cultural components of the ethnic past. However, the relationship is highly complex and is not a linear progression of history; the links may

differ and ethnies and nations could co-exist or compete with one another in different settings (Smith 1999:11; 2001: 83).

Thirdly, most modern nations are built on the foundations of pre-ethnic ties or ethnic cores that are to be found in all continents throughout recorded history. These ethnic communities possess the following attributes: 'an identifying name or emblem; a *myth* of common ancestry; shared historical memories and traditions; one or more elements of common culture; a link with an historic territory or 'homeland'; a measure of solidarity, at least among the élites' (Smith 1999:12-3).

The fourth major claim of ethno-symbolists, according to Smith is that 'the pre-existing components and long-term continuities of ethnic communities and nations are cultural and symbolic rather than demographic'. These components that include myths, memories, symbols, values, traditions, and historic ties to a particular homeland not only serve as the marker of the boundaries of particular *ethnies*, but they also 'serve to unite the members of each *ethnie* and structure their relations and activities'. Particularly important components of ethnicity are: myths of origins and descent that serve as principal boundaries between particular *ethnies*; myths of ethnic elections that exalt the *ethnie* either by assigning them god-given tasks and goals (missionary myths of election) or by setting a chosen people apart from the profane surroundings (covenantal myths of election); and symbols of territory and community such as flags, totems, coins, ritual objects, hymns and anthems, special foods and costumes, representatives of deities, monarchs, and heroes (Smith 1999: 14-6).

Another major theme of ethno-symbolism is *ethno-history*, that is, the ethnic members' subjective memories and understandings of their communal past or pasts. However, such ethno-history is always multi-stranded, contested, subject to change, and unevenly diffused around the globe. Given the multiplicity of interests, needs and outlooks of the present, the past is always reinterpreted and revised by the members of ethnic groups in response to internal difference and external stimuli (Smith 1999: 16-7).

A further central argument advanced by the Ethno-symbolist position of Smith concerns the different routes of nation-formation. In Smith's analysis, nations basically take two routes towards their formation, depending on the kind of pre-modern *ethnie* from which they have originated. There are two basic *ethnies*: *lateral and vertical*. The former are aristocratic and extensive with ragged and imprecise boundaries, but they rarely seek to integrate middle or lower classes either culturally

or socially. The latter are demotic and intensive with compact boundaries and strong barriers to entry but they are spread among all classes. But there are also immigrant *ethnies* that have hived off from the main body to set up immigrant colonies and separate *ethnies* (Smith 1999: 17-8; 1998: 193-4).

It is from these three ethnic bases that it is possible to trace the routes that modern nations have taken. The first route is that of *bureaucratic incorporation* by which a bureaucratic *ethnie* transforms into a strong territorial nation. In this case, the bureaucratic state itself forges the nation by gradually incorporating outlying regions and lower classes into the ethnic core of the upper-class. The second route is *vernacular mobilization* through which the demotic *ethnie* is transformed into an ethnic nation largely by the indigenous intelligentsia who uses folk culture and reappropriate the authentic elements of the ethno-historic past to mobilize the lower strata. Finally, there is an *immigrant-colonist* route whereby the *ethnie* of founding immigrant-colonists is supplemented by the successive waves of culturally different colonizers who together create a polyethnic immigrant nation 'within an overarching political, legal and linguistic national identity' (Smith 1999: 17-8; 1998: 193-4).

The final theme of ethno-symbolists, according to Smith, is the belief that modern nations and nationalism are so powerful and durable because they can draw sustenance from the pre-existing memories, myths, symbols, and traditions of each ethnic community and region. Although nationalism as an ideological movement is relatively modern, nations and aspirations to nationhood can be found even in pre-modern period. This suggests that nations and nationalism are likely to be recurrent phenomena in the future, as long as nationalism can draw on pre-existing elements of memories, myths, symbols and traditions (Smith 1999: 17-8; 1998: 193-4).

John Hutchinson is another prime exponent of the ethno-symbolist approach. Like Smith, Hutchinson is also of the belief that state-oriented and purely political analysis of nations and nationalism is unduly restrictive. That is why he wants to focus on the cultural aspects of nationalism with its invocation of the past and historic memory for the moral regeneration of the national community, without denying the existence of political nationalism (Hutchinson 2003: 9).

Cultural nationalism is independent of political nationalism. The latter's chief goal is a civic *polity* of educated citizens united by common laws and mores like the *polis* of classical antiquity'. Their objectives are

essentially modernist: to secure a representative state for their community so that it might participate as an equal in the developing cosmopolitan rationalist civilization. (Hutchinson 2003: 13).

By contrast

the cultural nationalist perceives the state as an accidental, for the essence of a nation is its distinctive civilization, which is the product of its unique history, culture and geographical profile. (Hutchinson 2003: 13).

Thus for cultural nationalists, nations are primordial expressions of the creative force of nature; they are natural solidarities as families; they are living organic personalities. But cultural nationalism is not regressive. Neither is it a form of retrogressive traditionalism. Rather, 'cultural nationalism is a movement of moral regeneration which seeks to re-unite the different aspects of the nation—traditional and modern, agriculture and industry, science and religion—by returning to the creative life-principle of the nation' (Hutchinson 2003: 14).

Hutchinson places great emphasis on the role that historians play in the moral regeneration of the nation. In his view, they are no mere scholars. They are rather 'myth-making' intellectuals who combine a search of the mythical past with all its triumphs and disasters with a scientific zeal in order to enable the members of the nation to rediscover their authentic purpose and chart the course of the nation's destiny (Hutchinson 2003: 14-5).

In Hutchinson's view, the effectiveness of cultural nationalism 'rests on its ability to evoke and appropriate genuine communal memories linked to specific homelands, cultural practices and forms of socio-political organization'. Once invoked, these memories could gain a momentum of its own, directing group politics. Hutchinson draws three conclusions from his analysis of nationalisms in Eastern Europe. The first is that historical memory is important for the formation of nations. Secondly, there is internal competition in the conceptions of nation and this competition is usually resolved only by 'trial and error in the course of interaction with neighbouring groups'. Thirdly, cultural symbols are central in group formation because they convey an attachment to a specific historical identity (Hutchinson 2003: 20-21).

Cultural nationalism is a recurring movement 're-emerging at times of crisis even in the advanced industrial societies... and in response to deep-seated conflicts of identities between the worlds of religion and science'. Indeed, 'cultural and political nationalisms are competing responses—communitarian and state-oriented—to this problem'. They appear in recurrent and alternating patterns along with political nationalism, each eliciting the other (Hutchinson 2003: 40-1).

Chapter 3- Nationalism in the era of Globalization

In the previous chapter I introduced the definitions of terms to be used in the paper. In addition, I also reviewed the main approaches to the study of nations and nationalism. In this chapter, I will further explore the phenomenon of nationalism in the context of globalization and four main themes, namely, immigration and national identity, supranational identity, cosmopolitanism, and globalization and the nation-state.

Immigration and national identity

The flow of human populations across countries and continents has been a prominent feature of human history. These migrations were fuelled by such factors as wars, natural disasters, and trade, and so on. So what is new about the human migrations in recent times or, more specifically in the age of globalization? In general terms, we could all agree that one of the most visible aspects of the era of globalization which distinguishes it from earlier eras is the tremendous speed and volume with which human populations are able to cross national frontiers and continue to do so. The revolutionary advancements made in communications technology and the transport industry, and the relaxation of border controls to facilitate freer exchange of trade in goods and services have all contributed to the ease with which people can cross borders in recent times. According to Mark Mitchell and Dave Russell, what is also new about immigration in the current age is that 'anti-immigration campaigns are often legitimised by presenting immigration as a threat to the integrity of the nation' (Mitchell and Russell 1996: 73). In Stephen Castles' view, globalization is not just economic in nature: flows of capital goods, services are accompanied by parallel flows of ideas, culture and people. He further argues that although migration has been a constant in history, it hardly threatened the power and sovereignty of the nation-state. In his view, under conditions of globalization, it has become easier for migrants to cross borders and harder for states to enforce stricter border controls:

- Migration tends to increase and migrants to become more diverse in social and cultural characteristics. States do their best to encourage certain types (skilled and entrepreneurial migration) and stop others (unskilled labor migration and asylum-seekers) but find it hard to make clear distinctions and to enforce rules.

- New developments in information and transport technology increase the volume of temporary, repeated and circulatory migration.
- Increasing numbers of migrants orient their lives to two or more societies and develop transnational communities and consciousness.
- Such trends are linked to the increasing strength of informal networks as a mode of communication and organization which transcends national borders. This can undermine state control policies and reduce the efficacy of traditional modes of migrant incorporation into society (Castles 2002: 1146-1147).

Types of migrants

It would be useful for our purposes to distinguish between different kinds of migrants in terms of their ethnicity. First, there are immigrants who are culturally and socio-economically similar to the majorities of the host country such as British immigrants to the US, Australia and New Zealand. Secondly, there are immigrants such as Asians in the UK and the US who are racially distinct from the majority of the host country, who live within relatively closed ethnic communities, and who are often the victims of racial discrimination and exploitation (Guibernau 2007: 63).

In addition, international migrations are also of various types, in terms of their movements and their socio-economic status. First, there are highly-skilled migrants like IT professionals and doctors who migrate from developing states of Asia and Africa to developed states in search of better job opportunities. This type of migration has been stimulated by the decline in the workforce of the Western developed states due to low birth-rates, and the corresponding high birth-rates and proliferation of skilled professionals beyond the capacity of the states of Asia and Africa to provide them with adequate employment opportunities. Second, there are low-skilled migrants from poor states to richer states who work menial jobs in factories or plantations or, as domestic servants in the homes of affluent elites in the developed states. Examples would include the Mexicans in the US, South Asian workers in the Middle-East, and construction workers from Eastern European states in the UK. Most of these low-skilled migrants cross national border through clandestine and illegal means and are, therefore, vulnerable to abuse and exploitation due to lack of rights. Thirdly, there are forced migrations of people: asylum-seekers, people fleeing civil wars, and people

displaced by natural disasters or by development projects such as dams and industrial projects (Castles 2007: 1146-1147).

Consequences of immigration on national identity

The cross-migrations of peoples across national frontiers have had vital consequences for nations because immigration inevitably changes the demographic make-up of a nation. The immigrants bring along with them not only skills, but also tradition, culture, and their ways of seeing life. Thus, immigration has the potential to change the face of a nation and the identities of those who proclaim to belong to that particular nation. In the contemporary age, the issue of, for example, what it means to be an American, or French has become entwined with the issues of increased immigration from developing countries.

Although in practice, hardly any nation-state has a purely homogenous population, yet in principle, most nation-states tend to operate with the traditional principle of homogenization of their citizens by forced assimilation into a dominant culture and language in order to create a distinct national identity. Thus, there is the pre-eminence of the Castilian language and culture in Spain, and White Anglo-Saxon culture and values in the USA. This has led Montserrat Guibernau to argue that the nation-state is not ethnoculturally neutral and that the process of nation-building is ethnically charged (Guibernau 2007: 61). Similarly, Will Kymlicka cites the dominance of the English language in the US to assert that the notion that Western liberal states are 'civic' in the sense that they are neutral between ethnocultural identities is a myth (Kymlicka 2000: 12-14). As we shall see later, this has had several implications for nation-states in terms of citizenship rights and national identity, especially at a period of increased trans-border migration of people.

National identity has often been asserted by the exclusion of those who do not belong to the nation- the 'Other'. In today's age of unprecedented migration, this assertion has implications both for the migrants as well as for the receiving host country. The problem is exacerbated when the migrants bear distinct markers such as physical attributes, race, culture and ethnicity that are seen to be alien by the members of the host society. Some migrants also do not abandon their culture or language and assimilate with the dominant culture of the host society. This often creates distrust and suspicions in the minds of the members of the host society about the migrants.

Extreme hostility towards migrants, often legitimized as a defense of national identity is also coloured by racism and xenophobia. In a study of immigration across

Europe, Mitchell and Russell argue that the issue of immigration across Europe has never been solely about the number of immigrants. In their view, it is the migrants and asylum-seekers from the Second and Third World countries who are identified as problematic by the potential host countries of Western Europe. In their view, not only do they not possess the necessary cultural capital to participate in the accepted ways of living in Western societies; but they often do not show much interest in acquiring the values and traditions of the West, leading the members of the concerned host society's members to see them as a threat to the integrity and identity of the nation. In Mitchell and Russell's view, racism and xenophobia in European countries is not a simple knee-jerk reaction against asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants. Rather, they also have as their main targets 'the millions of EU citizens of non-European descent as well as non-EU citizens who are more or less permanently domiciled in Europe'. (Mitchells and Russells 1996: 56; 74). Similarly, Guibernau observes that open hostility against migration shown by radical right-wing parties across Europe do not stand against all migration but solely against those immigrants who are seen to pose a cultural threat to Western cultures and values (Guibernau 2007: 145). Since the terror attacks on the US on September 11, 2001 and the London bombings of July 2005, the attitude towards diversity has changed in Western countries, and Muslims, and other non-White and non-Christian people have been targeted as threats to security, social cohesion and Western cultural identity.

Nationality, Citizenship and Immigration

There are complex links between nationality, the models of citizenship, and increased immigration, depending upon individual cases of states. By principle, a democratic nation-state ought to integrate all of its citizens and treat them with equality. However, globalization and increased migration has complicated issues for citizenship and national integration for several states. In order to deal with increased migration, nation-states have followed three basic approaches: assimilation, multiculturalism and a third model that has been termed as 'differential exclusion' by Stephen Castles (Castles 2002: 1154-55).

The first approach requires that migrants abandon their earlier cultural, linguistic or other identities in favour of the culture, language and national identity of their newly adopted country. Park and Burgess defined assimilation as 'a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons and groups and, by sharing their experience

and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life' (Park and Burgess [1921] 1969: 735, Quoted in Guibernau 2007: 65). Thus immigrants are encouraged and often even coerced through overt or covert means to learn the language and adopt the culture of the receiving community. This is what Stephen Castles calls the '*obliteration of difference*', by which the immigrants are forced to adopt the culture of the dominant group of the host country (Castles 2005: 303).

However, assimilation of ethnic groups have not always been successful either because the migrants seek to counter policies of assimilation or because the dominant group of the host country do not try to assimilate all migrants, and instead follow the attitude of exclusion and segregation. Moreover, policies of assimilation have often come under heavy criticism. Nevertheless, as cross-border migration has multiplied in recent years, and as concerns about social cohesion have been raised, assimilationist policies have returned in some countries. For instance, France is often seen as a 'civic' nation in which citizenship is determined by the principle of '*ius soli*', that is, in which all citizens are free and equal and citizenship can be acquired, subject to the willingness to accept certain political rules and identify with the national culture. However, some observers argue that, it is not always possible to sustain a strict distinction between a purely civic nation and a purely ethnocultural one, even in the case of France. This would imply that assimilationist tendencies can be found even in France, one expression of this tendency being the emergence of extreme right-wing parties across Europe such as the Front National in France. As Guibernau observes: 'the new radical right exploits a mounting hostility against migrants and refugees and has managed to attract the support of significant sectors of the population'. However, the rise of anti-immigrant radical right wing parties is not limited to France alone. In Austria, the Freedom Party (FPO) obtained 27 percent votes during the 1999 Austrian election by taking a highly anti-immigrant stance and arguing that 'Austria is not a country of immigrants' (Guibernau 2007: 87; 152).

However, assimilationist tendencies often work in tandem with the exclusionary ones which is the second approach taken by nation-states to deal with immigration. In the case of Germany, citizenship is solely based on '*ius sanguinis*', or citizenship by birth or in other words, only the children of German citizens can claim to belong to the German nation. Therefore, only those who are German by birth can claim German nationality and citizenship, while other asylum-seekers and migrants automatically do not belong to the German nation by virtue of not being German by

birth. Thus Germany follows an exclusionary principle of citizenship and nationality (Mitchell and Russell 2006: 66). However, strictly speaking, both '*ius soli*' and '*ius sanguinis*' are ideal types and, in practice both forms of the principle of citizenship are applied in different combinations by different countries.

Exclusionary approaches often lead to 'ghettoization' of particular ethnic communities, in which close-knit communities remain in isolated neighbourhoods. The members of such ethnic groups often do not identify with the culture of the dominant group of the host society. Instead, they tend to maintain close links with the culture of their country of origin. Ghettoization is a consequence of socio-economic marginalization and racism (Guibernau 2007: 64-5). In Stephen Castles' view, racial differentiation or ethnicization leads to the formation of closed communities of ethnic minorities who are clearly identifiable. In the initial stages of the migratory process, immigrants cluster together and develop their own infrastructure- business, religious institutions, etc., and gradually successful migrants move into the mainstream society and move out into other areas. However, when such efforts are blocked by racial discrimination and socio-economic opportunities are denied, minorities tend to develop community solidarity by preserving and promoting their distinct languages and cultures, and start to develop their own religious, political and economic institutions with an inward-looking focus on their own community. This in turn raises suspicions in the minds of the majority population of the host country that minorities are creating 'alien enclaves' within their territory (Castles 2005: 312-314).

The globalization of communications technology have made it easier for migrants and ethnic minorities to maintain close cultural links between themselves and their country of origin. The immigrants demand equal citizenship rights based on their residence in the host country rather than on descent, which presents fresh challenges on the concept of a national identity that is presented as homogeneous and based on the exclusion of those who are culturally different from the majority population.

It has become clear to many that all ethnic groups cannot and have not been assimilated fully in all countries. Even traditionally immigrant countries have found out that migrants often tend to preserve their distinct cultural identity through second and third generations. Philip Spencer and Howard Wollman argue that the claim that American identity is continually reshaped by immigration obscures the fact that immigration has always been based on selective criteria of control, and 'understates

the efforts put in to define who can and who cannot be American' (Spencer and Wollman 2005: 212).

As the difficulty of assimilating immigrants and disparate ethnic groups into a homogeneous cultural identity became clear to countries with multi-ethnic populations, a third approach, known as multiculturalism began to be employed. Broadly speaking, in the view of Castles and Miller, multiculturalism 'implies that immigration should be granted equal rights in all spheres of society, without being expected to give up their diversity, although usually within an expectation of conformity to certain key values' (Castles and Miller ([1993] 1998: 248, Quoted in Guibernau 2007: 67). A distinction is often made between 'laissez-faire' multiculturalism as practiced in the USA in which the state accepts the presence of ethnocultural diversity in the private sphere but do not shoulder the responsibility of ensuring social justice, and multiculturalism understood as government policy to guarantee equal rights for minorities, as in Canada, Australia and Sweden (Guibernau 2007: 67; Castles 2002:1156).

Today, there are multiple and often overlapping identities. Bhikhu Parekh identifies three most common forms of cultural diversity found in modern societies: first is what he calls 'subcultural diversity that includes groups like gays, lesbians and those who follow unconventional lifestyles but seek to find a limited space for their divergent lifestyles within the mainstream society; secondly, there are those groups like feminists who are highly critical of some of the central principles or values of prevailing culture and seek to reconstitute the dominant culture along appropriate lines, and, Parekh terms these groups as belonging to perspectival diversity; lastly, there are self-conscious groups who are more or less well-organized and live by distinct values and practices, e.g., newly arrived immigrants, religious communities, and culturally concentrated groups of people such as the Basques, the Catalans, and the Scots (Parekh 2000: 3-4).

In Parekh's view, from the vantage point of multiculturalism, no one particular way of thinking and living is perfect or the best and no particular political doctrine or ideology can claim to represent or encompass the whole truth of human existence. Parekh argues that a multicultural society cannot sustain itself if its members do not feel a genuine sense of belonging, and for Parekh such sense of belonging cannot be ethnic or cultural but political in nature based on a shared commitment to the political community (Parekh 2000: 338; 341).

However, Parekh also argues that the dominant group in a multicultural society cannot be persuaded to change their views on un- or misrecognized groups through intellectual and moral argument alone. This is because misrecognition has both a cultural and material basis. That is why misrecognition can be countered only by a combination of 'a rigorous critique of the dominant culture and radically restructuring the inequalities of economic and political power. Since the dominant group often resists both the critique of their culture as well as any attempt at radically restructuring redistribution, the politics of recognition often involves violence (Parekh 2000: 342-3).

Thus multiculturalism involves the recognition of and respect for different identities. But why would immigrants seeking permanent residence and citizenship not assimilate to the dominant culture of the host society and shed their previous identities even if they are provided with equal opportunities to lead a good life? In Charles Taylor's view, human beings have an innate yearning to discover and know their original or authentic selves that helps them to make sense of their desires, aspirations, hopes and opinions. But this discovery of our true identities do not work in isolation; it is shaped by the dialogue with and sometimes by struggles against significant others who form opinions about what we should or should not be. Thus there is an intimate connection between identity and recognition. In Taylor's view, equal recognition of our identities is a vital human need; denial of recognition or misrecognition can inflict severe damage on those who are denied it. Taylor argues that denial of equal recognition can amount to a form of oppression, a premise that undergirds contemporary discussions of multiculturalism (Taylor 1994: 25-36).

Thus states have followed three main approaches to deal with issues of citizenship and nationality in the context of ethnocultural differences in their resident populations and increasing migration (and often a mixture of all the three approaches). The manner in which these approaches have been followed differs according to the different discourses on the nation, national identity and nationality followed by different countries.

However, increased immigration in recent decades has complicated the issue of national identity. Questions about how to accommodate ethnic minorities in multiethnic states remain vexed problems. As the notion of a homogeneous and mono-ethnic nation-state become undermined, xenophobia and racism have resulted from a sense of a threat to national identity. Many states have tightened border

restrictions and toughened up immigration rules in the face of increased flows of people, ideas and cultural products across national frontiers.

The New Radical Right and Immigration

Increased immigration has undoubtedly raised concerns and fears among the majority population of many countries in Europe that national identity is in danger of being diluted or hybridized due to the influx of disparate ethnic groups. In the changed socio-economic and political scenario, driven in large measures by globalization, the new radical right has been able to attract quite a large constituency of supporters by projecting itself as a defender of national identity that is increasingly being threatened by the 'alien immigrant' and the 'alien asylum-seeker'.

In Montserrat Guibernau's view, the new radical right has been able to reciprocate to the fears of insecurity and uncertainty fuelled by rapid change, and it has addressed these concerns by delineating a difference between those who belong and the 'Other'. He further argues that although most Western societies are individualistic, the insecurities, uncertainties and angst felt by individuals in the current context of rapid change lead them to search for a common belonging with shared interests and goals, which is ultimately provided by national identity. The new radical right has been able to anticipate the importance of national identity in such a situation and expresses the need to protect it against what it sees as foreign contamination (Guibernau 2007: 142).

One of the aspects of economic globalization and a restructuring of the global economy is the lack of security of the labour force due to outsourcing of jobs to cheap labour countries, "downsizing", and the use of migrant workers who agree to do certain jobs (accepting much lower wages than would usually be paid to the citizens for the same job) that the nationals of a developed Western country often refuse to do. In addition, economic decline, deregulation and privatization along with the disappearance of some social security blankets often make things much harder for the middle and working classes of the state. One of the overlooked factors in studying the impact of increased migration is the relative decline in human population in many of the developed Western countries in contrast to the rapidly increasing population in less-developed countries where the state has not been able to provide adequate opportunities for employment and means of livelihood. In the above circumstances, the migrant and the 'ghettoized' ethnic minority are often made the scapegoats for all

the problems affecting the socio-economic scenario- rising unemployment, decline of social welfare provisions and so on.

Thus the condition becomes ripe for the new radical right parties to project the prevailing changed socio-economic scenario as the result of unchecked foreign contamination and who, then goes on to highlight the dire necessity of protecting the national identity against all foreign influences. Writing about the rise of the new radical right party in France, the Front National, Pascal Perrineau argues that the 'scapegoat today is no longer the key figure of the Jew, the Protestant or the foreigner (although now and again these representations reappear) but that of the North African immigrant considered to be the author and bearer of all evils'. The Front National promises to ensure the reestablishment of 'tradition' in France by purging those elements that promote 'decadence' (Perrineau 2000: 253-4).

So what is the central tenet of the new radical right that is relevant for our study? Two main themes of the new radical right is 'nativism' and its proclaimed commitment to stem immigration. The new radical right is often conflated with fascism or neo-fascism. But according to some analysts, this is a flawed understanding. Unlike fascism that is fundamentally anti-liberal and anti-parliamentarism, the new radical right freely endorses free-market capitalism, is mostly liberal and accepts the rules of parliamentary democracy although it is critical of many of its aspects (Betz 2003: 74-5; Guibernau 2007: 144). In Betz's view:

what distinguishes the contemporary radical right from other movements is less their stance on democracy and the rule of law; rather it is their espousal of an explicitly radical nativist position reflected in an overtly 'ethnopluralist' notion of cultural protectionism, based on the notion that cultures and ethnicities are incompatible with each other and that cultural mixing should therefore be resisted (Betz 2003: 77).

Although there are some contemporary radical right parties that subscribe to the idea of national preference and a part of the 'White Resistance' movement that raise concerns that the White race along with Western culture and Western civilization is in great danger of being wiped out due to such factors as mass immigration from developing countries and affirmative action for minorities, not all parties on the new radical right are overtly racist and some of them even oppose racism. In fact, according to Betz, the majority on the radical right advocate a 'post-racist' position of 'ethnopluralism' which stresses the objective of protecting and preserving one's

culture, values and way of life, rather than disparaging or subjugating other cultures (Betz 2003:83-4).

Thus the ethnopluralism as advocated by the new radical right argues for the need to maintain cultural difference but, at the same time, also stresses the need to maintain cultural purity and protect cultures from hybridization (Guibernau 2007: 156). The new radical right might well proclaim its post-racist or anti-racist and ethnopluralist position, but it cannot escape the fact that these positions are inevitably posed in the context of immigration and the fears it raises about ethnocultural inter-mixing and hybridization. In other words, the ethnopluralist position seeks to place a requirement upon the immigrant that he or she should not migrate to the concerned host country because that could lead to cultural hybridization and loss of national identity of the host country. This in turn, means that the immigrant becomes the 'other' that could be a potential or real threat to the purity of the national culture of the host society. The result has been that other non-Western cultures and ethnicities such as Muslims and Asians are looked upon as threats to Western culture and values. Does the emergence of the new radical right in Western Europe imply that the majority of the population is growing apprehensive about the security of their national identities? Are the xenophobic reactions against immigrants more about the fears of losing national identities or are they simply a matter of people's inability to obtain material requirements such as job security and social welfare? Globalization has undoubtedly contributed to the rise of the new radical right, although the links are not always clear. The integration of the global market and labour has led to the easy availability of semi-skilled and unskilled workers from less-developed countries which, in turn has often lowered wages and induced job insecurity in many countries.

This would imply that the new radical right attracts supporters who have been affected adversely by globalization. However, this is not always the case, and a causal linkage between rising levels of unemployment and job insecurity on the one hand, and support for radical right on the other is often problematic. As Guibernau observes, apart from a large chunk of the support coming from the working-class, the new radical right has succeeded in garnering significant support from the well-educated who perceive increased and unchecked immigration as a threat to national identity and as a source of cultural hybridization. In other words, it is the manner in which particular peoples and societies perceive issues related to immigration that could explain voting behaviour and support for the radical right rather than the simple

causal relationship between immigration and support for the radical right (Guibernau 2007: 145). In a similar way, Betz argues that the thesis that the new radical right is a protest by those who have lost out in the process of globalization is more complex than is often suggested. Betz observes that the radical right has done particularly well in those affluent Western European countries where unemployment levels are relatively low and welfare systems are generous enough to compensate the losers of globalization. Moreover, only a minority of the blue collar supporters of the new radical right belong to the poorly educated and unskilled workers who are likely to be affected the most by global change (Betz 2003: 86).

Supranational identity or national identity- the case of Europe

Globalization of capital, goods, services, technology, ideas and people in recent times has undoubtedly combined together in complex ways to challenge the jurisdictional powers of the nation-state and its capacity to render services to its citizens. In short, it is often argued that the role of the nation-state as the primary or dominant social, political and economic actor is in serious doubt, and that it would sooner or later cease to be the dominant actor in an interconnected and globalized world. Some would continue to add that virulent and violent manifestations of nationalism and extreme assertions of national identity are neither desirable nor feasible in the contemporary world. In such a situation, it would appear that national identities and nationalism would be replaced by such forms as supra-nationalism or regional identities that are more or less durable and better suited to meet the myriad challenges posed by globalization.

On the other hand, there is the view that the nation-state is still strong enough to withstand the pulls and pressures of globalization, and, that it still possesses the jurisdictional powers to regulate flows of capital, goods, services, ideas, technology and people across national borders. Although it is true that international financial and economic actors such as MNCs are often able to transcend national boundaries, yet as Smith argues, even MNCs are based in national territories and are subject to the policies and regulations of states (Smith 1995: 118).

However, a blanket assertion that nations and national identities would be transcended and even be replaced by supranational identities due to the current and developing scenario of globalization is a premature judgement. First, as mentioned before, nations are still durable and still conduct business among themselves either

through transnational institutions like the European Union (EU) and the United Nations, among others, or function independent of these institutions on a nation-to-nation level. Secondly, it would be a premature assertion because it is not clear whether a supranational identity would coalesce around a regional grouping like the EU that can challenge or even replace national identities as the primary object of people's loyalty. Nonetheless, the arguments in favour of a supranational identity should not be written off beforehand.

The aim of this section is to explore whether there can be a collective European identity in political, cultural and socio-economic terms that can transcend national identities: a European identity that can acquire the unquestionable loyalty of citizens as members of a unified European supra-nation. It is also the objective of this section to explore the contexts under which Europeans could be united or divided that could have repercussions for an idea of a European identity.

Geography

Is there a geographical parameter that can define what Europe stands for, what it includes and what it excludes? What constitutes Europe as a single continental landmass today is a product of several myths of origin and a long history marked by wars, political conquests, inventions and discoveries, and cultural and religious encounters, among many other myriad factors. The name 'Europe' came from Greek mythology, according to which a Phoenician princess named 'Europa' was abducted by Zeus, taken across the shores of Phoenicia and seduced on the island of Crete where she bore several sons by Zeus (Ichijo 2004: 60; Pagden 2002: 33-4). Although the ancient Greeks came up with the name of Europe, it remained a vague entity geographically and its precise location and shape remained vague. For the ancient Greeks, Europe was a landmass stretching westwards beyond the Aegean, separated from Africa by the Mediterranean and from Asia by the Sea of Azov and the Don River. During the Roman era, Europe as a geographical area was thought to have been composed of what we now call Europe, but excluding Scandinavia, the British Isles and the Iberian Peninsula. But most importantly, in antiquity, Europe as a geographical entity was not only vague but also lacked emotional meanings attached to it. The Greeks often equated Europe with what they regarded as the 'barbarian Asia', while the Romans regarded Rome as the centre of civilization (Ichijo 2004: 60-61).

The boundaries of Europe continued to shift and change throughout history often due to dramatic events. Most problematic has been the position of Europe vis-à-vis its eastern frontiers. Russia and later Soviet Union always had an uncertain relation with the European landmass and, especially as Communism emerged as an antithetical ideology to the Capitalist ideology followed by Western European states. However, dramatic events such as the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the unification of Germany in 1989, and the break-up of Yugoslavia clearly demonstrate that borders have kept on changing in Europe even in the recent past. Further, the claims of a predominantly Muslim-dominated Turkey and some Balkan countries to be included as members of the EU illustrate the problem of attributing a fixed geographical boundary to Europe (Guibernau 2007: 90).

Thus a geographical definition of what constitutes Europe seems to be a flexible one, without explaining much about who is included and who is excluded as a European. Moreover, since the European landmass is contiguous with the Asian landmass in the east, the explanation of Europe as a single entity in terms of geography is insufficient and problematic and does not tell us why citizens would bestow their emotional attachment and loyalty to Europe. But if geography alone does not tell us much about Europe as a single identity, what other factors could be useful in analyzing whether Europe is a single collective entity that is capable of capturing a shared identity and loyalty among its people or whether it is merely a patched-up entity composed of fragmented identities and loyalties?

Religion

If the geographical frontiers of Europe are beset with problems of inclusion and exclusion, could religion provide the common ground around which European nations could unite and form a distinctive European identity? Certainly Christianity and the Judeo-Christian system of values have been instrumental in the formation of an idea of Europe since the Middle Ages. The idea of Europe was blended with Christendom during the Middle Ages when Christian forces united under one banner in order to confront Islamic forces, despite the differences within Christianity between the Roman Catholics and the Eastern Greek Orthodox Church of the East (Ichijo 2004: 62-3).

However, Christianity as a united force was more an ideal than a reality since it was infected with divisions, first between the Eastern Christianity ruled by Constantinople and the Catholic Church that was controlled by Rome, and later

between the Catholics and the Protestants following the Reformation. So, the idea of Europe as represented by a united religious order was not as flawless as it seemed. All Christian sects had to deal with heresies, pagans and ethnic minorities frequently in order to strengthen their respective orders religious orders. Moreover, many wars fought during the Middle Ages and thereafter had their origins in religious disputes between states along with other factors. For instance, the series of wars that is now collectively termed as the 'Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) started as a religious conflict between Catholics and Protestants although the wars were also the outcome of bitter struggles for power and internal politics within individual countries.

The use of Christianity as a mechanism to include or exclude in the process of creating a common European identity has implications in the contemporary period. The debates over the proposed inclusion of Turkey are a case in point that has raised several controversies. Technically speaking, admittance to membership of the EU is based on certain rules and obligations to be fulfilled by a potential candidate for membership. These requirements are outlined in the so-called 'Copenhagen criteria' or 'Accession Criteria'. Broadly these requirements are guarantees of stable democratic institutions in the candidate country; rule of law and respect for human rights; protection of minorities; existence of a functioning market economy; and acceptance of the obligations and laws of the EU (Europa Glossary).

However, the issue of accession of Turkey into the EU has been more than just fulfilling technical requirements. It has thrown up debates not only about socio-economic and strategic considerations but also about the identity of Muslim Turks vis-à-vis a Christian-dominated Europe and vice versa. Although officially, member-states often raise objections to Turkey's accession in terms of economic and geopolitical concerns, considerations of Turkey's predominantly Muslim population and its non-Western past are part of unofficial discourses among the public of the EU member-states.

The impact of religion in nation formation or identity formation cannot be underestimated in spite of its relative decline in asserting authority over people's lives in Europe. The terror attacks on the US on September 11, 2001 and the 2005 London bombings by terrorists who were identified as British citizens have led to mistrust and mutual suspicions between Christians and Muslims in many parts of Europe.

However, there are still internal divisions within Christianity itself in Europe between Eastern Orthodox Christianity and Western European Christianity and,

further between Catholics and Protestants. Moreover, the extent and nature of the general public's allegiance to Christianity varies across different countries and contexts. In my opinion, Christianity alone cannot be a precursor or pre-requisite of a developing European identity not only because it suffers from internal differences but also because religion alone is insufficient to forge a sense of common identity among European peoples who are reluctant to give up their primary allegiance to their distinctive nations in favour of a European identity that is still in a nascent stage of development.

Culture and Values

If religion alone cannot define Europe or is inappropriate, are there any cultural traits that are specifically European in origin and nature? Can these cultural traits be utilized in defining the cultural frontiers of Europe? "Culture is formed by values, beliefs, customs, conventions, habits and practices which give rise to a particular identity uniting those who have been socialized within a particular society" (Guibernau 2007: 92). Thus, culture provides the framework that is used by individuals to develop a collective sense of belonging to a particular society and also as a barrier against those who are outside of that society.

The culture of a community is intimately connected with its history since the elements of culture such as myths, symbols, languages, heroes, anthems, sacred places, legends and traditions are inextricably bound up with the community's history (Guibernau 2007: 92). It is often argued that there has been a distinct secular idea of Europe as a separate and often superior civilization as the Renaissance and the Enlightenment led to the development of secular ideas and as European travelers explored new lands beyond the shores of the European mainland (Ichijo 2004: 65-6). Even though the superior connotations of Europe have been watered down in contemporary times, the civilizational idea of Europe is still used to distinguish it from Asian and African cultures. The all-encompassing European civilizational identity can represent various values that are seen to have their origins in Europe such as respect for human rights, individual freedom, a land of democratic values, and the fountain of rationality and scientific development (Ichijo 2004: 65-6). Thus in many ways, Europe is still projected as the chief example of material progress and modernity with the advancement that Europeans have achieved in science and technology compare to the underdeveloped areas of the rest of the world.

In Guibernau's view, the Enlightenment's ideas of rationality as a method and progress as an objective triggered the scientific revolution which culminated in the Industrial Revolution in Western Europe along with profound socio-economic transformations. This in turn, led to a radical division between the industrializing West on the one hand and Central and Eastern Europe that were still based primarily on rural economies (Guibernau 2007: 97). This division was accentuated much later in the twentieth century by the divisive politics of Cold War.

The ideas of the Enlightenment that developed in Western Europe have led to the secular and political culture of parliamentary democracy, respect for human rights and individual freedom. These principles are enshrined in the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) that has heralded a new phase in the process of European integration leading to the establishment of the EU. The commitment of the EU towards the fulfillment of these principles is a vital component that unites the Europeans (Guibernau 2007: 109).

Another aspect of European culture that can be a unifying factor can be seen in the context of Europe's keen desire to be seen as a co-equal of the US and also as a major regional power, capable of asserting a united European perspective on global issues such as the environment, global terrorism and so on. It was during the interwar period and the years after the end of the Second World War and the advent of the Cold War that the elites of Europe realized the dwindling power and prestige that Europe once possessed at a time when the United States began to emerge as a superpower in terms of not only economic and military might but also in the realm of cultural production. Since the post-war years, the US became the chief exporter of cultural products to Europe and elsewhere- democracy, liberty, Hollywood and pop culture. This situation created an alarm in European countries about the seemingly dangerous trend of overdependence on the US and the perceived threat it posed to a supposedly distinct European culture.

Confronted by Bolshevism in the East and the economic and military might of the US, a seemingly united pan-European movement was presented by eminent politicians of Europe. According to Arine Chebel D'Appopponia, during the postwar years, a form of European nationalism was sought to be developed that in fact was modeled according to the same criteria that applies to nation-state: 'historical memory-building, a common identity and culture for all of the entities grouped within the bounds of a given territory, and political and economic objectives destined to

ensure general prosperity and to defend the global interests of its participants' (D'Appollonia 2002: 178).

In the contemporary age of globalization, the technological advances made by the media have ensured that newspapers, the internet and Satellite television can penetrate much deeper areas of the globe than was possible otherwise. In such a context, 'Europeanization' can be seen as a possible line of defense against what is often perceived as 'Americanization' of European culture. Although the concept of a specific European culture is blurred and open to interpretations and contestations, it provides a powerful political phrase in the discourse on European identity. Thus European intellectuals and elites, especially the French intellectuals have demanded protectionist policies such as subsidization of European films and other measures in order to curb the increasing penetration of Hollywood and American culture that is perceived as an eroding influence on European culture. Europe's cultural elites understand the long-term implications of America's dominance in the audiovisual and entertainment industry on the development of the arts and politics in Europe (Van Ham 2001: 82).

European identity: Prospects, Problems and Challenges

The European Union is a novel institution that has come a long way since its early beginnings from the European Coal and Steel Community to its present form with its plethora of political organs that include the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, the Court of Justice, the European Economic and Social Committee and the European Central Bank. Set up in order to achieve the objectives of bringing peace and to end future wars, stability and prosperity, the EU today includes 27 member states with 10 new members admitted in 2004 and 2 more in 2007. Since its inception, the EU has integrated a single European market and introduced a single currency for monetary transactions, the 'Euro' in 2001.

The EU seeks to achieve further integration in such fields as culture, and foreign and military policy. However, the process of further integration has never been smooth and there is still lack of consensus on several issues, especially on matters of a common European foreign and military policy. The ability of the EU in further integration would depend crucially upon the common perceptions of the citizens of its constituent member-states. As of now, European integration has been predominantly an elite-driven process that is led by eminent politicians and

intellectuals, while the general public is largely unaware or ignorant of the values that underpin the institutions of the EU, leading some observers to argue that European integration is a top-down process.

The identity of the EU is still in a nascent stage that is strongly based upon several principles such as capitalism, social welfare, liberal democracy, respect for human rights, individual freedom, and the rule of law, and the continuing success of European integration would depend crucially upon the ability of the EU to sustain its economic success, and in protecting its citizens from the turbulences of economic globalization (Guibernau 2007: 115-6).

Is European identity than merely a manifestation of economic cooperation among nation-states whose sole claim to legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens is continued economic success? European identity in its current form does not and cannot supersede the deeply ingrained sense of national identity because it offers little in terms of common historical experiences, traditions, values, and shared symbols. Neither is it likely that there would emerge a European nationalism that is powerful enough to unify masses and elicit sacrifices from them in the name of Europe.

The geographical space encompassed by the EU comprises of several nations. Most of these nations would continue to show support for the EU not only because they would stand to gain socio-economically, but also because they could hope that their distinct cultural and national identities would be safe under the institutional structures and policies of the EU against unwanted outside influences. However, too much Europeanization or too much interference of the EU into the domestic cultural realm would arouse caution among citizens and lead them to turn to local, regional and cultural identities. As Guibernau argues, “nation-states are only partially interested in promoting a European identity focused on EU membership, since ‘too much Europe’ could potentially weaken national identity and eventually result in refocusing a people’s loyalty away from the nation-state” (Guibernau 2007: 113).

Cosmopolitanism or Nationalism

As I have indicated in previous sections, we are living in a hyper-mobile global world in which almost everything from capital, goods and services to cultural products and diseases are in constant motion across borders. The transformations brought about by globalization has meant that people’s lives are increasingly interconnected in myriad ways as problems and issues such as the environment, terrorism and transnational

migration assume global proportions. This has led some observers to argue that we are heading towards a postnational and cosmopolitan era. It is thus argued that cosmopolitanism is not a mere utopian ideal anymore but a realistic and practical project that is both desirable and indispensable to finding solutions to problems that have come to acquire global implications beyond what the territorially bounded nation-state can handle.

The cosmopolitan idea is not a recent invention. It was initially formulated by the pre-Socratic Stoics who were critical of the historically arbitrary nature of bounded territorial polities and their role in fostering differences between insiders and outsiders. They were highly critical of the undue emphasis placed on boundaries that tends to shift the focus away from the human condition by stressing differences rather than commonality among all human beings (Guibernau 2007: 159). The cosmopolitan idea was further enhanced by the writings of Immanuel Kant during the Enlightenment who argued that people should be allowed to 'enjoy a right to the free and unrestricted public use of their reason' by placing themselves beyond the limits placed on them by individual polities and by acting as members of a cosmopolitan society that is open to all (Schmidt 1998: 424, Quoted in Guibernau 2007: 159).

In recent times, the transformations brought about by globalization has brought new impetus to the debates about cosmopolitanism and its relations with issues that are seen to have global implications such as social justice and human rights, and laws pertaining to international migration, refugees, asylum-seekers, humanitarian intervention, among others. For my purpose, I am interested to know the relation between cosmopolitanism on the one hand and nationalism and national identity on the other. Is there a realistic prospect of an emerging cosmopolitan identity that can offer an alternative to national identity? What kind of loyalties and solidarities will characterize such a cosmopolitan identity? Will such a cosmopolitan identity be able to garner mass support that extend beyond the confines of the territorial nation-states or will it merely be a project of the global elite, while the majority population of the world remain excluded from this project?

The word 'cosmopolitan' and the derivative noun 'cosmopolitanism' can have multiple meanings. For some people, it is the love of mankind and the conviction that all human beings are of equal moral worth and possess an equal right to lead worthwhile and satisfying lives irrespective of national or ethnic differences. For others, cosmopolitan means a fluidity of culture, a celebration of the evaporation of

boundaries of culture as distinct entities and an anticipation of a world of fractured and mingled identities (Waldron 2006: 83). This is also known as cultural cosmopolitanism that is associated with the transnational elite of individuals who enjoy a privileged position and travel around the world which places them beyond ethnocentric views of culture and identity (Guibernau 2007: 189). For still others, cosmopolitanism refers to a philosophical position that espouses adherence to certain principles and values that are seen to be indispensable to attaining global social justice and distributive justice to all individuals irrespective of citizenship and other affiliations (Guibernau 2007: 189). This form of cosmopolitanism has a distinct ethical or moral nature. Charles Beitz defines moral cosmopolitanism as:

A doctrine about the basis on which institutions and practices should be justified or criticized. It applies to the whole world the maxim that choices about what policies we should prefer, or what institutions we should establish, should be based on an impartial consideration of the claims of each person who would be affected ... It aims to identify principles that are acceptable when each person's prospects, rather than the prospects of each society or people, are taken fairly into account (Beitz 1999: 125-40. Quoted in Luis Cabrera 2004: 28-9).

Yet another connotation of cosmopolitanism is the project of attaining a cosmopolitan global order or world governance that is armed with political institutions and norms that match up to the goals of cosmopolitanism such as the attainment of universal human rights for every human being (Beitz 1999: 125-40. Quoted in Luis Cabrera 2004: 28-9; Waldron 2006:83). What is common to all these different perspectives or connotations of cosmopolitanism is the suggestion that national borders and nationalities are irrelevant to the fundamental needs of all human beings to lead satisfying and good lives.

According to Thomas W. Pogge, all cosmopolitan positions share three fundamental elements: first is *individualism*- human beings are the ultimate units of concern, rather than their specific attachments such as family, tribes, ethnicity, culture, religion, nation, state and the like; second is *universality*- that is, the ultimate unit of concern attaches to every human being equally and not to sub-sets such as men, Aryans, whites, or Muslim; third is *generality*- having a global force, this element places a special status on each and every person as the ultimate unit of

concern for everyone, and not only for their compatriots, fellow religionists and the like (Pogge 1994: 90).

Cosmopolitanism as a goal and project is often stressed as a necessary and maybe a desirable principle that is destined to reorient how human beings relate to each other under the changing circumstances engendered by globalization. Indeed, the ideal of cosmopolitanism coincides with the novel situation of interconnected spaces brought about by the tremendous technological advances made in communications and travel that, in turn, has sped up the cross-cultural encounters and exchanges between people of different cultures, ethnicities, languages, religions, regions and so on.

However, irrespective of whether a cosmopolitan order is desirable or undesirable, there exists a big gap between the principles of cosmopolitanism and their full realization in practical reality. It is true that there has been convergence of norms and legal treaties at the international level: the UN Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 is a case in point. However, efforts to develop institutions and mechanisms that can enforce compliance with common laws and conventions upholding cosmopolitan values have not met with much success; neither is there any institution or mechanism that is accepted by all human beings as having the power or capability to punish those who transgress cosmopolitan values and norms. Seyla Benhabib argues that cosmopolitan norms suffer from a central contradiction: this stems from the fact that states are themselves the signatories and enforcers of treaties and conventions through which international norms spread, although the states are increasingly subject to these norms. 'In this process the state is both sublated and reinforced in its authority'. As long as territorially bounded states are the sole legitimate actors of negotiation and representation, a tension exists between the 'prerogative to choose to be a party to cosmopolitan norms and human rights treaties, and the obligation to extend recognition of these human rights to all' (Benhabib 2006: 31).

Cosmopolitanism: legal/institutional and cultural elements

Cosmopolitanism is not an altogether unified school of thought and it exhibits different components and forms that are both complementary and conflicting according to how they relate to each other. For instance, a distinction is often made between moral cosmopolitanism and legal/institutional cosmopolitanism. While cosmopolitans as a whole emphasize the importance of attaining certain moral

objectives such as equal moral worth of all individuals irrespective of any affiliation, and attainment of global social justice and equal distributive justice for all individuals, they offer different routes to achieve them. Thus not all moral cosmopolitans are necessarily committed to legal/institutional cosmopolitanism. A moral cosmopolitan is not necessarily committed to the belief that the world should be reorganized as a unitary or stateless political and legal order. Thus the doctrine of human rights is underpinned by cosmopolitanism without being cosmopolitan in its requirements (Beitz 1994: 126-27).

According to Luis Cabrera, while moral cosmopolitanism is concerned with assessing the operations of institutions and practices of justice of rights regime, distributive regimes and other international institutions according to how individuals fare within them, legal/institutional cosmopolitanism has a prescriptive orientation of restructuring the global institutional structures in order to bring states under the authority of just supranational institutions, possibly within the jurisdiction of a global government (Cabrera 2004: 29).

Thus legal/institutional cosmopolitanism also has a political connotation in the sense that it envisages the establishment of a world government or world federation in order to fulfill the objectives of global social justice and distributive justice. In the process, legal/institutional cosmopolitanism challenges the monopoly and exclusive right of the nation-state to adjudicate and decide on what it perceives as issues that are common to all individuals across the globe such as human rights irrespective of nationality and other affiliations. Thus legal/institutional cosmopolitan embraces the political project of creating a world government or federation to which all individuals would feel a sense of belonging as world citizens.

What would be the antecedents or origins of such a world government as legal/institutional cosmopolitanism envisages? Institutional cosmopolitans are aware of the enduring legacy and continuing hold of the nation-state over the loyalty of its citizens and the fragmented identities of individuals around the globe. They are also cautious about the prospects of a full world government in the short term.

At present, there are several political institutions at the supra- and sub-state levels, in addition to transnational organizations like international NGOs and institutions that function at the local level. This has given legal/institutional cosmopolitans reasons to believe that such supranational and sub-state level institutions could serve as stepping stones towards further integration of the

cosmopolitan project of world governance in which global issues would converge on a uniform platform. These issues would be deliberated upon by global democratic institutions that can be held accountable by individuals whose interests are at stake.

However, there are enormous stumbling blocks to realizing a uniform set of global institutions that can transcend or bypass the jurisdictional powers of the state in deciding upon matters that affect citizens of individual states in different ways. As regards supranational organizations like the EU, most of them are inter-governmentalist in nature. Although the EU has supranational institutions that deal with issues that concern the whole of Europe such as economic integration and the environment, specific issues that directly affect the citizens of different member-states in varying degrees such as immigration means that individual member-states have to take their national constituencies into account in agreeing upon decisions. Thus for instance, although citizens of member-states are automatically citizens of the EU, there is hardly any convergence of a common European policy on immigration laws. As for NGOs working at both transnational and local levels, they are often viewed as propagating cosmopolitanism from below by taking up the causes of global environmental issues, human rights, and global poverty- issues that are seen as transcending national boundaries and requiring a global partnership. However, it is questionable whether all NGOs can shake off their national or regional affiliations as most of them have their origins in the developed countries and are not often mass-based and are directed by the educated and philanthropic elites. This should not mean, of course, that they have not highlighted global issues and influenced policy decisions on some of the key global issues. However, the fact is that, they do not always speak with one cosmopolitan voice that cut across socio-economic and cultural barriers. For instance, not all feminist NGOs can claim to represent the specific issues of women in developing countries. Moreover, international NGOs remain vulnerable to the power of the nation-state that jealously defends its exclusive access to political power.

If we consider that there is real potential for the development of political institutions operating at multiple levels of governance, promoting cosmopolitan values and pursuing cosmopolitan objectives, will there be a corresponding development of common identification with the laws and conventions of these institutions on the part of individuals whose lives and fortunes are affected by them? Will these laws and conventions be able to forge unity, consensus and a sense of belonging and common identity among individuals beyond their respective national

identities? These questions assume importance because cosmopolitanism has to come to terms with difference- nationality, ethnicity, culture, language, political affiliation, and family attachments and so on. Individuals will often have to make choices between their commitments towards their own immediate attachments and the commitment towards other fellow beings that are not part of their immediate attachments as the cosmopolitan project seeks to establish global institutions to promote cosmopolitan values and objectives.

Now, cosmopolitanism is suspicious of ascriptive attachments and regard particular attachments as impediments rather than constituents of a global cosmopolitan order. Individuals would need to feel a sense of loyalty, belongingness and commitment towards each other and the laws, conventions and goals of these cosmopolitan institutions, if they are to work effectively. Craig Calhoun argues that citizens need to be motivated by solidarity around certain laws rather than just be included by laws and become passive receivers and followers of these laws (Calhoun 2002: 153) However, sense of belonging and feelings of solidarity with laws and conventions are not the products of some overnight process; rather they are the products of long historical periods of political deliberations over laws and conventions. Therefore, laws and conventions can be created, but there is no guarantee that they would immediately attract solidarities and identities around them.

Another issue that legal/institutional cosmopolitanism would need to address is the democratic base and accountability of the institutions that would underpin the political project of cosmopolitanism. Many of the supranational legal and political institutions like the EU suffer from a democratic deficit and a lack of accountability to those whose lives are affected by their policies. People must be able to participate in democratic deliberations on norms and conventions that affect their daily lives. Otherwise, supranational institutions and their laws and conventions would be looked upon as elitist and as serving the ends of an authoritarian world governance. A cosmopolitan or global democracy that seeks to transcend or minimize the role of traditional units of democracy (a status monopolized by the nation-state through long historical periods) without adopting some sort of decentralization and some measure of citizen participation in political deliberations would be fraught with problems. Traditionally, democratic and political deliberations among citizens have taken place within the institutions designed by the nation-state, even if it is conceded that the role of the nation-state in presiding over these deliberations has become fragmentary in the

contemporary age. Jocelyne Couture argues that institutional cosmopolitanism should therefore, be more sensitive to the links between global democracy and democracy within national institutions. Minimizing the role of nations in the advent of global democracy means that cosmopolitanism is depriving itself of the most immediate base that is provided by the nation (Couture 2004: 76).

There is yet another interrelated sense in which there are links between political deliberation and democratic participation, and the prospect of supranational institutions being successful in furthering cosmopolitan norms, conventions and laws. These links are provided by the shared mutual trust, understanding and some feeling of commonalities among the participants of political deliberation. In Kymlicka's view some shared identity might be required to sustain participative and deliberative democracy. He argues that such a shared identity necessary for successful deliberative democracy might not be based on common religion or ideology or on ethnic descent. Rather, the primary forums for democratic participation in modern societies are provided by linguistic/territorial communities (Kymlicka 2001: 212).

In Kymlicka's view these 'national' linguistic/territorial communities are primary in two senses. First, democratic deliberation is more genuinely participatory within national/linguistic units than at higher levels such as the federal level in a multination state or the EU, where political debates involve mostly elites who are multilingual. He further argues that this is significant because the average citizen only feels comfortable when political issues are debated in their mother tongue, in contrast to the elites who have enough opportunities to learn and develop multilingual skills. Thus political discourse in the EU remains issue-specific and elite-dominated, conducted remotely from the public (Kymlicka 2001: 212).

Second, there is another sense in which these national/linguistic units are primary- they are the most important forum for assessing the legitimacy of both devolving power upwards to federal levels, or to the EU as well as of devolving power downwards to municipal or local governments. Kymlicka argues that such devolution of powers as well as the policy-decisions made by federal units of governments, or by the EU depends upon the consent of the national unit and upon the extent of legitimacy in the perceptions of the national unit. Consent to devolution of power as well as policy-decisions taken at the federal level or by the EU will only be given, subject to the condition that the national unit is able to maintain itself as a viable and self-governing society. What is even more significant is that decisions

taken at supranational levels such as the EU would be seen as legitimate if they serve the national interests and not if they serve the interests of say, Europe (Kymlicka 2001: 212-15).

In general terms, few would disagree with the fundamental moral objectives of cosmopolitanism and the attempts of institutional cosmopolitanism to attain those objectives. For instance, there is wide consensus that each and every human being is entitled to basic human rights wherever he/she belongs to; there is agreement over the imperative of reducing abject global poverty. However, it is in the details and empirical reality that cosmopolitanism finds obstacles and adversaries. It has already been noted that the nation-state is still a force to be reckoned with vis-à-vis supranational institutions.

An important element of the contemporary world is that cosmopolitanism is not the sole or dominant force that is riding the waves of globalization. Even as economic integration of markets and political integration of policies on global issues are being sought after, there are other forces at work in global politics that are often antithetical to cosmopolitanism. The 9/11 attacks on the US and other terror attacks in other areas of the globe has been a chilly reminder that global terrorism based on religious fundamentalism has become an enormous threat to global peace; and there has been backlash in Western countries against increased immigration from developing countries as exemplified by the recent electoral successes of Radical-Right parties in Europe, bringing into focus debates on issues of citizenship rights and criteria of exclusion/inclusion. In other words, to assume that institutional cosmopolitanism or cosmopolitanism as a whole is an inevitable or sole product of globalization is an oversimplification of the ground reality and an underestimation of the power of multitudes of conflicting forces at work.

There is another sense in which cosmopolitanism is significant, that is, in the sense of cultural cosmopolitanism. It is often argued that it is due to the increasing interconnectedness and interactions among nations and cultures that we are moving towards a global consciousness and a cosmopolitan culture. But what does cultural cosmopolitanism imply? Cultural cosmopolitanism espouses a worldview that concerns itself with the 'good' of the whole humankind beyond all particular identities and affiliations, and it celebrates the enormous diversity, hybridity and plurality of cultures, languages, art, cuisines and the like as a necessary and desirable aspect of human existence.

However, an important distinction should be drawn between global culture and cosmopolitan culture. Global culture may mean a homogenized culture built upon various cultural components drawn from various cultural traditions. However, this global culture cannot realistically hope to create a homogenized culture in the sense that traditional nation-states have attempted to do historically, because attempts at too much cultural or linguistic homogenization would be fiercely resisted by individual cultures. A cosmopolitan culture on the other hand, is not based on an attempt to homogenize particular cultures; rather it would be a common culture accommodating several cultural components in harmony with each other in such a way that it conforms to cosmopolitan values. Put it another way, while a global culture cannot be a cosmopolitan culture if it is inconsistent with cosmopolitan values, a cosmopolitan culture is both global and cosmopolitan by virtue of its adherence to cosmopolitan values.

The notion of cosmopolitan culture is not limited to academic interest; it also has political implications. This is because a proposed cosmopolitan culture would involve decisions about what cultural fragments are included and what are excluded. Can a genuine cosmopolitan culture develop and what kind of solidarities would it attract? Is a cosmopolitan culture merely a global culture in disguise that is mainly driven by Western culture with its homogenizing tendencies that is resisted by individual nations? Who would be the main agents to propagate this culture?

The dominance of the English language and the increasing penetration of American and Western mass culture into various societies would indicate certain homogenizing trends, although there are also trends that indicate hybridization and flows of exotic cultural products from developing countries to developed countries. But does this amount to a cosmopolitan culture? So far, cosmopolitanism in the sense of appreciating and enjoying cultural diversity has been a privilege and luxury available to a few elites- intellectuals and jet-setting businesspersons who are well-educated, possess the necessary resources to learn new languages, and wealthy enough to afford exotic cuisines and art-forms across different cultures. However, the vast majority of the global population does not have the option of indulging in such luxurious pursuits and remain ignorant or less-acquainted with other cultures (Poole 1999:162; Guibernau 2007: 167-168).

However, such a cosmopolitan culture is would be 'thin' in nature incapable of attracting strong emotional attachments from the majority world population in a

manner similar to attachments that people have with their own immediate affiliations like ethnic descent or family. At best, such a culture can only attract solidarities based on the context of how it is going to affect individual cultures and peoples. Not everyone can afford either homogenization or hybridization of culture because it is their attachment to their distinct cultures that provide them a rallying point to face the uncertainties engendered by globalization. For instance, transnational migrants are not necessarily cosmopolitan in their worldview, some of whom tend to maintain solidarities around their own communities and establish strong emotional bonds with their country of origin due to the very fact that they are not always welcomed with open arms by receiving countries as advocated by cosmopolitanism.

The issue of solidarity around a cosmopolitan culture can be illustrated further by the example of global warming as given by David A. Hollinger. He suggests that any solidarity that is big enough to be able to act effectively on an issue that is affecting a big arena like the globe is ill-suited to solve the problem of the human need of belonging, while any solidarity that is restricted to the human need for belonging cannot respond effectively to a problem that is commonly affecting a larger and more heterogeneous population. Although we are capable of holding multiple identities such as national, sexual and so on, priorities are bound to be set because energies, resources and affections of individuals are limited in supply (Hollinger 2006: 27). I would add that this problem is especially profound in developing countries that are trying to achieve economic development. The seemingly intractable process of reaching a global consensus over emission norms mainly due to disagreements over sharing responsibilities between developed and developing countries illustrates this problem. Furthermore, the issue of the environment is tied to people's rights over land and resources. Thus there have often been conflicts between on the one hand, environmentalists who speak from a larger global standpoint and the indigenous and tribal peoples on the other hand, over the issue of protecting resources such as forests, land ownership and so on.

Thus a cosmopolitan culture might not be embraced by each and everyone around the globe. This is not to say that a cosmopolitan culture is impossible or, that a cosmopolitan will be necessarily insensitive to concerns of particular cultures. But in the short term, a cosmopolitan culture will be able to attract only 'thin' loyalties that is not as strong as the loyalty and identification that an individual feels with his/her own culture and nation.

Cosmopolitanism versus Nationalism

Traditionally, the nation has been the primary locus of individuals' loyalty and identity, and the nation-state has monopolized the role of attaining the cultural homogenization of its population or the role of making the cultural and the political units coincide. On a global stage, no attempt has ever been made to create a world state or federation because the human community has never regarded itself as a single people or as belonging to the same cosmos. Rather, what we have witnessed throughout history is countless bloody wars between nations and states due to xenophobia, ethnic chauvinism, racial intolerance, religious bigotry- elements that have often been associated with extreme forms of nationalism. Therefore, it would seem that the odds are stacked up against the possible emergence of cosmopolitanism. Nonetheless, such a possibility should not be discounted beforehand.

Some pertinent issues should be addressed regarding cosmopolitanism and nationalism at this point. Are the two total opposites that are incapable of co-existing with each other or can they be mutually compatible or even complement each other? Can cosmopolitanism develop into a concrete political project capable of attracting strong emotional attachments or will it be an abstract global consciousness with weak bonds and fragmented attachments?

Throughout history the nation has provided the rallying point for the basic human desire to belong and has provided the feeling of self-esteem to those who belong to that nation. Of course people can hold multiple identities based on family ties, political ideologies and the like. But the fact that national identity and nationalism have been used by people both to unite the population and sometimes to divide territorial boundaries signifies the enduring power of nationalism. Very often, people do not have much choice when it comes to choosing their national identities because their life chances and worldview depends crucially on their membership to a particular nation, and inability to feel a sense of belonging to a nation often creates anomie and alienation in peoples' lives. In the contemporary age of globalization, massive transformations have considerably reduced the fixity in people's lives and introduced anxiety, risks and uncertainties. Nationalism provides a perspective that appeal to the need of people to face these anxieties and uncertainties. The problem with some proponents of cosmopolitanism is that they conceive cosmopolitanism as a way to transcend nationalism.

What about myths, historical memories, symbols, legends and attachment to a territory? How does cosmopolitanism deal with these elements? Human history is anything but similar to cosmopolitanism; rather it is marked by conflicts, conquests and wars. The brutal subjugation of indigenous peoples in the Americas by Europeans, and colonialism and imperialism imposed on the peoples of Asia, Africa and the Caribbean are still alive in our memories. Thus Anthony Smith asks whether a global culture can avoid some sort of cultural imperialism and become a truly cosmopolitan culture. He argues that too often the elements of a supposedly global culture cannot escape the fact that they owe their origins and appeal to the power and prestige of one powerful metropolitan centre or the other, and that the quest for a cosmopolitan culture is often subverted by realities of power politics (Smith 1995: 18-19). This would suggest that cosmopolitanism does not have a unifying common historical memory shared by every individual on the globe, and that such a cosmopolitanism cannot hope to build itself upon past memories in a way that nation-building does.

As regards territory, cosmopolitanism seeks to encompass the whole planet as its focus, while nation-states are territorially bounded entities and stateless nations seek to create their own territorial space through secession or power-sharing within the existing state. However, as the dilemma of '*the tragedy of the commons*' as suggested by Garrett Hardin emphasizes, individuals often act independently according to their own self-interests in terms of utilizing a shared resource even when they realize that acting independently can harm the shared resource and even when it is clear that doing so is not in their long-term interest (Hardin 1968: 1243-1248). This would suggest that states would perceive a trade-off between protecting the planet and satisfying their own individual interests, and that states would be ready to commit themselves to a cosmopolitan goal like preserving the globe from environmental pollution only so long as their individual interests are not sacrificed.

One of the problems associated with cosmopolitanism is that it is too often conceived as a discourse that is antithetical to nationalism. Sometimes cosmopolitans themselves view the nation as an impediment to the cosmopolitan project rather than as a possible participant in such a project. This in turn, stems in part from the fact that some varieties of cosmopolitanism hold a compartmentalized view of all nationalisms as ethnonational, reactionary and xenophobic that are only capable of dividing people and leading them onto the path of bloody conflicts. However, doing so is to

underestimate both the enduring appeal of nationalism in the eyes of those who have been denied the right to self-determination, and to neglect the capacity of nationalism to use democratic and peaceful means to achieve its aims. As Craig Calhoun argues:

To treat nationalism as a relic of an earlier order, a sort of irrational expression, or a kind of moral mistake is to fail to see both the continuing power of nationalism as a discursive formation and the work—sometimes positive—that nationalist solidarities continue to do in the world. As a result, nationalism is not easily abandoned even if its myths, contents, and excesses are easily debunked (Calhoun 2002: 150).

Will Kymlicka and Margaret Moore emphasize a similar point in the context of minority nationalism. Kymlicka argues that although nationalism is perceived as anti-democratic, violent and expansionist, these are not the essence of nationalism and that there are minority nationalisms in places like Quebec, Flanders, and Catalonia that have been relatively peaceful and democratic in their quest for self-government. Kymlicka laments the fact that in the modern era, nationalism is always seen as opposite to cosmopolitanism because “nationalists need not, and often do not, disagree with basic cosmopolitan values of human rights, tolerance, cultural interchange, and international peace and co-operation” (Kymlicka 2001: 209, 220). Similarly, Moore contends that cosmopolitanism falsely identifies minority nationalism with exclusivist ethnic isolation, thereby underestimating the significance of cultural and national identity to most people (Moore 2001: 57).

Moreover, to argue that the emergence of a global cosmopolitan culture acceptable to each and every individual is inevitable is to underestimate the role of cultural and national identity in providing a context and perspective to the lives of individuals. More than a return to past antiquities and anachronisms, nationalism could also be interpreted as a reworking of the positive features of the past in order to deal with the present world that is increasingly challenging mores and established ways of life.

Certainly, some of the goals of cosmopolitanism- universal human rights for everyone, sustainable development and protection of the global environment, elimination of socio-economic inequalities and end of poverty- are laudable and not necessarily inconsistent with democratic forms of nationalism. However, at present, cosmopolitanism as a sociological reality is far from being achieved; we still live in a

zero-sum world that is still plagued by conflicts, hunger, deprivation and exploitation. Globalization brings with it not only material progress for some, but it has also fostered a sense of risk, anxiety and uncertainties in the lives of millions, and as long as this situation persists, nationalism will continue to provide an ethos of security to people's lives and cosmopolitanism will remain a utopian project.

Globalization and the nation-state

What are the implications of globalization on the nation-state? Is the nation-state withering away rapidly and on the verge of being replaced by other entities such as supranational federations or even a world-state? Or contrarily, is the nation-state adapting itself to the new challenges engendered by globalization in order to maintain its primacy as the dominant collective entity? These are the questions that I would attempt to answer in this section.

At the outset, I would like to point out that globalization is not only economic in nature or that it has only economic implications for nation-states and their citizens. Globalization is also cultural in the sense that it is marked by rapid and constant cross-cultural flows across national, local, transnational, and global networks; it is also political in the sense that it provides new challenges for the nation-state and other local, transnational and global actors while engaging in political debates about such issues as state sovereignty, global warming, wars, global crime, and global terrorism.

The major debates in the globalization thesis

There are major debates going on in the recent literature on globalization and, I would look at these debates in terms of how they perceive the nation-state. First, there are the '*globalists*' according to whom globalization is an inevitable phenomenon which cannot be altered or changed significantly by traditional political institutions such as the nation-state. In their view, globalization is characterized by interconnections of cultures, economies and politics flowing through networks of global flows in such a way that national boundaries have become irrelevant, and national differences, autonomy and sovereignty are being replaced by a global culture and economy. There is a further division among the globalists: On the one hand, there are *optimist globalists* who view globalization positively as a phenomenon that is to be welcomed for the reason that it has the potential to improve the quality of life, raise living standards and bring people together culturally and politically and foster a sense of belonging to the globe as a whole. On the other hand, *pessimistic globalists* see

globalization negatively as something that is leading to homogenization and dilution of national identities and sovereignty. They emphasize the dominance of major political and economic actors such as the US, Western Europe, and Japan and the uneven consequences of globalization on victims of globalization such as women and unskilled manual workers. Thus all globalists see globalization as an inevitable force but they differ upon whether globalization is to be welcomed or criticized (Held 2004: 22).

Secondly, there are *skeptics* or *inter-nationalists*. According to them, there is not much that is novel about globalization, and that it is a myth or that it is exaggerated as a distinctively new phenomenon. They argue that the global flows of trade and money we are witnessing today are just a continuation of a process of trading between nations that has been going on for centuries. Thus, it is still the powerful and wealthy nations that retain the capacity to negotiate terms and conditions in order to suit their own particular interests. They further argue that economically, the world is not as integrated as it seems because it is divided into major regional trading blocs, and also that it is divided by inequalities between advanced capitalist countries and Third World countries when it comes to setting norms and rules about international trade and finance (Held 2004: 23).

Lastly, there are *transformationalists* who accept globalization as an unprecedented phenomenon but questions its inevitability and, asserts that the consequences of globalization are complex, diverse and unpredictable. The transformationalists argue neither that the state is in significant decline and would wither away nor that the state is the only preeminent actor under the condition of globalization; rather they argue that the processes of globalization has compelled national governments to adapt their roles and functions resulting in the significant reconfiguration in the power, jurisdiction, authority and legitimacy of the state. Thus national governments have to collaborate and share their power with other local, subnational, supranational and global actors (Held 2004: 23-4; McGrew 2004: 120).

Withering away of the nation?

The nation, along with the national identity it provides to those who belong to it have undoubtedly been under tremendous pressure at various levels: by global multinational corporations; supranational institutions and agencies dealing with myriad global and regional issues; criminal networks that elude national border controls; international NGOs that have taken up issues ranging from child labour to

international finance; global terrorism and so on. Thus the point to be assessed is, whether the nation has considerably lost its grip over the loyalties of those who belong to it. Would the consequences of globalization necessarily mean the withering of the nation?

But in order to understand the implications of globalization on the nation, a conceptual distinction should be drawn between the 'state' and the 'nation'. As Anthony Smith argues, the 'decline of the state' is not the same as a decline of nations (Smith 1995: 18). Similarly Umut Ozkirimli asserts that in the case of the state, the issue is whether it can preserve its sovereignty in an age of cross-border economic transactions and politics conducted at transnational and supranational levels, whereas the question about the nation is whether there are other 'forms of community that offer alternative foci of belonging' (Ozkirimli 2005: 131). Do the consequences of globalization signal a transcendence and ultimate demise of the state? I reiterate the fact that the state's authority, legitimacy, jurisdiction and ability to render public services have been eroded dramatically in the age of globalization. In terms of capitalist economic globalization, the role of the welfare state to render such services as education for all and social welfare to its citizens has had to exist uneasily with such economic measures as privatization of public services, deregulation and disinvestment that became important policies precipitated by the ascent of neoliberal capitalist globalization. In the developing countries, the role of the state took a dramatic turn under the 'structural adjustment' policies proposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which included such policies as reduction of government expenditure on public services, privatization, deregulation and opening up of the domestic market to foreign trade. In short, the capacity of the state to render public services to its citizens has been eroded significantly in an age of increased cross-border flows of trade, capital and goods.

However, the state's overall ability to regulate its economy is still fairly intact. It is still states that are members of international trading and financial institutions such as the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the IMF, and it is still states that take decisions on policies within these institutions. As the several deadlocks over norms and rules about international trade indicate, individual states are willing to commit to trading rules only so long as they do not have adverse affects on their citizens. For instance, the deadlocks over agricultural subsidies provided by Western developed states to their domestic agricultural sector has been a constant source of

disagreements between developed and developing countries. Moreover, structural barriers and non-tariff barriers to international trade are still intact in subtle forms in many states.

What about the economic might of multinational corporations and the political clout they wield by virtue of their enormous economic and financial power? In absolute terms, the economy of a multinational corporation can often be bigger than that of an individual state. However, most of them still have to function within the jurisdictional laws of states and depend on state funds for research and development. William W. Keller and Louis W. Pauly make an important point that national origins of multinational corporations matter in fundamental ways, and that variation of multinational corporations by nationality still endures. Thus, in contrast to American corporations, German and Japanese corporations retain a clear sense of their distinct national identities (Keller and Pauly: 73-4). To sum up, at present, there is no common set of global norms and rules on trade and finance that are agreed upon by each and every economic actor who are participants in the global economy, and there still does not exist a fully integrated global market that can replace the state.

However, globalization is not just economic, it is also political. It is often argued that the power of the state has been in constant decline vis-à-vis supranational institutions such as the EU from above and vis-à-vis other non-state and transnational actors from below such as multinational corporations and NGOs. Certainly, issues such as global terrorism, global criminal and drug networks, and global warming have compelled the state to share some of its powers with non-state actors and to engage in dialogue with them. However, to say that this can lead to a uniform global framework that would replace the state is a far-fetched dream. In the first place, supranational institutions are the creations of states themselves that are designed to protect the interests of each member-state. Secondly, states are willing to delegate some of their powers to such institutions as long as their own survival as viable units of society is not threatened unduly.

It is also argued that state borders are being threatened by various sources: the mobility of labour and immigrants, the global spread of criminal networks, and the demands of secession and autonomy by minority groups within state borders. It is certain that due to the enormous advancements made in communications technology, it is much easier for people to travel across national borders today than ever before. However, national borders are not completely irrelevant and states continue to

monitor who gets in and who does not. This is more so, especially after the 9/11 terror attacks and the rise of global terrorism. Thus asylum-seekers and low-skilled and semi-skilled workers are not always welcome, especially as states seek to stabilize their economies and control the spiraling problem of job-loss and rising unemployment. The globalization of crime through shadow networks that escape state regulation seriously threaten to undermine the power of the state in maintaining control over law and order. These criminal networks deal in such illegal crimes as drug trafficking, human trafficking, smuggling of weapons, stolen art, and money-laundering that are not limited to two or three countries but interspersed across several states. State borders are also being challenged from below by minority nationalisms that demand either secession or some form of autonomy within existing state borders. While some of these minority movements have been violent, demanding outright independence and formation of their own territorial state, others have been relatively peaceful and have been accommodated within their respective existing states by devolution of power and federalism. Thus, sub-state nationalisms have emerged at a time when long-established states are struggling to maintain their sovereignty in the face of fragmenting implications of globalization. Nevertheless, only a few of these sub-state nationalisms have been successful in carving out their own separate nation-states and not all of them express a desire to do so as they remain content with autonomy within their parent state. Moreover, achievement of sovereign statehood crucially depends upon the recognition provided by the international community of states such as the UN, which is not easily forthcoming as states seek to protect their territorial sovereignty jealously.

What about the nation as a focus of people's allegiance and identity? Are there any other identities that are powerful and attractive enough to displace the nation? It is argued by some that the globalization of the mass media and culture is leading towards the development of overlapping, multiple, and overlapping identities. It is also argued that these developments would lead to some form of global consciousness and cosmopolitanism. But are these developments antithetical to nations or powerful enough in their own right to displace nations? Do these developments signal the emergence of a post-national world?

My argument is that nations are not on the verge of withering away and being replaced by some transnational or cosmopolitan culture. Rather, they would persist in the foreseeable future, changing and adapting itself to the pulls and

pressures exerted by globalization. It is certain that the globalization of communications, mass media, and mass migration have reduced the power of the state to forge cultural homogeneity among its citizens, as novel spaces of interaction open up and as new possibilities of multiple identities emerge. But there have hardly been homogeneous nation-states in the strict sense of the term through a coincidence between cultural and political units. Thus homogeneous nation-states have always been the exception rather than the norm in history. Moreover, the effects of globalization are not uniform across all states. While developed states in the West often become highly activist in guarding their sovereignty against the destabilizing effects of globalization, developing states that are still engaged in the process of nation-building struggle to hold themselves together.

But not all nations in the world possess their own states. There are stateless nations such as the Quebecois, the Scots, the Catalans, and the Basques that mainly operate at the sub-state level. This can be contrasted with state-directed nationalism. While stateless nationalism envisage the creation of new sovereign states or devolution of powers within existing states, state-directed nationalism seeks to prevent the development of such separatist tendencies within its population. Kymlicka makes a similar distinction between 'state nationalism' that aim to forge a common language, culture and identity among its citizens, and the 'minority nationalism' of ethnocultural minorities that strive to create their own separate states. These two types of nationalism often come into conflict whenever national minorities face pressures to assimilate into the culture of the dominant nation (Kymlicka 2001: 222-3).

It is argued that in the contemporary age of globalization, cultural homogeneity of nation-states is neither feasible nor desirable, and that multiculturalism has become the dominant model in most nation-states of today. However, multiculturalism has not turned out to be a grand solution to the problem of nation-building and its success has depended on particular socio-cultural contexts in different countries. Thus, while Canada's experiment with multiculturalism has been quite successful, staunch opposition have emerged in other countries that are struggling to maintain harmony between accommodating minorities through multicultural policies and the need to allay the fears of those who fear a dilution of their own national identities.

What about the development of a global culture that is supposedly weakening national bonds? No one doubts that global flows of cultural products such as satellite

television and cuisines are somehow impinging upon national cultures. However, there is wide disagreement over the pattern of these flows and their impacts upon different nations. What can be discerned is the fact that global flows of culture are complex and induce both homogenizing and heterogenizing tendencies, depending upon who is affected by these flows. It can also be asserted that the technologies that are used to spread these cultural products are available to both states and non-state actors. A powerful state with full access to the latest technology might be able to manipulate national and cultural symbols with the objective of protecting its national and cultural identity against the uneven patterns of global cultural flows. By contrast, a state with little access to cultural technology might not be able to do much to prevent the powerful global cultural forces from penetrating its population. In general, all nations, small or powerful would seek to protect their long-established mores, customs, and practices whenever they feel threatened by either the homogenizing or hybridizing trends of globalization.

Chapter 4- Conclusion

I have observed in previous chapters that globalization and nationalism are strange bedfellows in the contemporary age, sharing the same global space but following different trajectories. While globalization leads towards greater economic integration, and compression of time and space, nationalism based on particularistic elements refuse to fade away. The main objective of the dissertation has been to find explanations to understand the seemingly anomalous and peculiar relationship between globalization and the salient power of nations and nationalism to mobilize people.

I have argued that globalization is not only economic in its implications, it is also cultural in the sense that ideas and cultural products now possess the technological development necessary to disperse themselves around the globe. It involves global flows of capital, goods, and finance in complex and interconnected global networks. But crucially it also involves the movement of people as labourers, asylum-seekers, and tourists who carry their ideas and culture along with them. In terms of economic integration and economic interdependence, the world has more or less become one global space in an unprecedented, especially in the matter of global financial flows. However, we still do not see a weakening of national borders when it comes to labour flows and immigration. Instead, governments are resisting unchecked flows of peoples and making determined efforts to tighten border controls.

In the contemporary age of globalization, the power of the nation-state is being challenged at two main levels: at the top, it has got involved in competitions for political power with supranational and international institutions and other networks of power that exist in the fields of finance, capital, communications, crime, and global actors like international NGOs; below the nation-state, there are local networks of power such as ethnocultural groups, tribes, and myriad other actors. Thus the nation-state has had to contend with other layers of power both at the supranational and sub-state level.

However, I have argued that these developments do not mean that the nation-state is about to wither away soon. It is still nation-states that are the creators and sustainers of supranational and international institutions and their political power is derived from the membership of nation-states and states are ready to participate in such institutions only as long as their individual interests are not harmed. While some

global issues like sustainable development and global crime have moved beyond the purview of individual nation-states, states still hold considerable power in other fields such as immigration controls. Thus there are some trends that are weakening nation-states and some trends that are strengthening nation-states.

In recent decades we have witnessed a proliferation of nationalism below the state that has been known as sub-state or minority nationalism. Some of these nationalisms envisage the creation of their own nation-states while others are content with autonomy within the existing nation-state. Not all these nationalisms might have emerged as a direct response to the dislocating implications associated with globalization and some of them might have their origins before the contemporary age of globalization. What globalization has done is to provide the conditions that are conducive to fuelling such nationalisms. With the spread of highly developed communications technology, established nation-states have the necessary means to mobilize its citizens and try to forge common cultural and national identities. However, the process can work in the reverse manner also, especially when ethnocultural minorities resist efforts at cultural homogenization: whenever and wherever minority nationalisms have access to highly developed communications technology, they are better able to highlight their causes, promote their language and culture, and organize political actions on a scale that was previously unavailable. For instance, some of these nationalisms are also spread globally in the form of Diasporas that can be mobilized quickly through the communications technologies that are available today.

In the cultural realm, I argue that although there is no reason to believe that a truly cosmopolitan culture should not necessarily be counterposed against or be seen as incompatible with nationalism, empirical reality suggests that we it is not certain that such a cosmopolitan world would come about. At best, cosmopolitanism would co-exist with nationalism, sometimes as adversaries and sometimes as complementing each other.

The fact that nationalism is still powerful in the age of globalization does not necessarily mean that there are direct causal linkages between the two or that increasing globalization inevitably leads to proliferation of nationalism. Globalization provides enormous opportunities for nations to develop socio-economically and culturally. At the same time, globalization also brings along with it risks,

uncertainties, and anxieties about the future, and in such a scenario, nationalism provides a rallying point or framework for people to deal with risks and anxieties.

Nationalism is not necessarily a retrogressive ideology that harks back to a real or imagined pristine past. Rather, people can use nationalism as a way to negotiate the novel spaces opened up by modernity and globalization. Myths, memories, symbols and values are often invoked by nations not to return to the past but as a way to make sense of the present and the future. In future, globalization would continue and the process cannot be reversed because it has gained a momentum of its own. But this would not mean the end of nations and nationalism because globalization would not have uniform patterns and would affect different people in different ways. Although, other identities such as a cosmopolitan identity would emerge, the enduring appeal of nationalism in shaping how people view the world would not fade away in the foreseeable future.

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