


RACISM AS A VARIABLE IN THE DEPENDENCY OF LATIN AMERICA

*Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the award of the degree of*

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled “**Racism as a Variable in the Dependency of Latin America**” submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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Dedicated to
My Mother and My Brother

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
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Preface

The emergence of the dependency approach in the mid-twentieth century played an important role in promoting the cause of industrialization in Latin America. But it did not confine itself to economics. Its expansion into other disciplinary fields like sociology, political science and to aspects of economic history transformed it into an inter-disciplinary approach. Its discussion flourished till the late twentieth century through the work of both its proponents and its critics. Compared to the dependency approach, work on racism in Latin America is of recent origin. It started from the late 80s of the twentieth century and picked up steam during the 90s. This has produced a proliferating body of literature which continues to flow till the present day. But despite voluminous literature on both the subjects, the rigorous examination of the inter-relationship between the two subjects has either received marginal attention or has been completely ignored, not only in the works of the *dependentistas* but also in the work of race specialist. Given the limited time frame within which the study is made and the availability of resource materials, more particularly those emerging in Spanish and Portuguese, the present study makes a humble attempt at exploring the inter-relationship between both these subjects. In the process, it employs an eclectic approach, by drawing on theoretical insights from different disciplines, and a historical-sociological understanding of the socio-cultural relations to draw inferences between the two subjects. To draw a balance between the limited nature of the present study and the diversity that exist in the Latin American region, the present study focuses on the socio-cultural process in Mexico to arrive at broad generalisations. For this purpose, it relies on selected secondary sources emerging in English literature. They are necessarily limited but highlight important points which enable one to visualise possible linkages between racism and dependency.

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CHAPTER I

INRODUCTION

The engagement with the relationship between racism and dependency is not a new one. It can be dated back to the early 1970s when scholars got together in a graduate seminar to discuss the political economy of Latin America with special emphasis on rejuvenating the dependency approach (Chilcote 1974: 6). As imperialism took the front stage in explaining dependency, scholars' contribution galvanised around Marxist categories. This took place, in spite, of Frank Bonilla's assertion that the Marxian analysis maintained an ambivalent position with regard to important categories like "ethnicity, caste, culture, racism and nationalism" (ibid.12). The present study takes a departure from this early engagement by revisiting the concept of dependency through the prism of racism with a special focus on socio-cultural and structural processes. In a certain way, it expands on the work of Bonilla, but without an ideological baggage in the background.

The conceptual framework for racism is drawn from Tuen Van Dijk (2005) who perceives racism as forms of domination, discrimination and institution. As a system of domination, racism¹ enables particular social groups to exercise power over others, which implies differential access to and power over scarce social resources. The 'power abuses' involved in such a process results in social inequality (ibid. 1-2). As a system of discrimination, it forms a part of the socio-cognitive processes which reproduces discriminatory practices in everyday life that result in the problematisation, marginalisation and exclusion of non-Europeans by Europeans (ibid. 3). This discrimination is felt more by the victim groups than by the ones who exercise that power (ibid. 3). And as a form of institution, forms of domination and discrimination are organised to maintain "the balance of power in favour of the white dominant majority" at the macro level (ibid. 4). Stigmatisation through the press, exclusion from the political process, and discrimination in education and research are some of the key areas around which racism is organised at the macro level (ibid. 4-7). This takes place despite the proclaimed official 'anti-racist' position (ibid. 7). Thus,

¹ Here, "racism is based on constructed differences of ethnicity, appearance, origin, culture and/or language" (Van Dijk 2005: 2).

discriminatory practices through institutionalised racism enables a dominant group to exercise power over racially inferior groups.

The conceptual framework for dependency is drawn from Theotonio dos Santos's definition of dependency. He posits that a relation between economies and, thereby, with the international trading system turns dependent when some countries (dominant ones) within the system expand as self-sustaining units, while others (dependent ones) expand only as a result of the former's expansion. The dependency of the dependent countries that entails through this system of interdependence can have significant effects in their development process (dos Santos 1970: 231). Michael Todaro (1991) argues that development in the 1960s and 1970s was understood as a synonym for growth in the national income along with GNP per capita. This understanding was known as the 'trickle down' effect, which held that with an overall increase in growth rate, economic opportunities will trickle down to the rest of the population (ibid. 87). Thus dependent countries can also possibly experience growth and development without altering the historic status of being dependent. The economic undertone of dos Santos' definition and its relation with other socio-political and cultural variables are examined in some detail in Chapter IV

Literature Review

Prior to reviewing the literature on dependency that originated in the 1950s, an assessment of the socio-economic ideas that preceded the period can serve a useful purpose. There is a general agreement among economists that 'development economics', as a separate branch within economics, emerged in the mid-twentieth century (Basu 1998: 7). Its emergence was sought to assess the conditions of underdevelopment in the post colonial countries of Asia and Africa, and then prescribe measures for correcting them to achieve rapid economic development.

In Latin America, the corresponding idea for development during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was "progress". Progress implied increase in material welfare. This was sought through a rise in the amount of wealth. For the warring *caudillos* of the nineteenth century, increase in wealth was of paramount importance not only for achieving progress but also for their political survival. This emphasis on increased wealth had some mercantilist connotations, that is, earning

bullions through surplus exports. This position was despite their proclaimed support for free trade. Modernisation, embedded to the idea of progress, was sought through expansion in railways, telegraph, electricity etc. financed by revenues generated by exports. But, it was a modernisation without industrialisation. Furtado points out that until 1929 the share of industrial production to national production in Argentina was 22.8 per cent, for Mexico 14.2 per cent, for Brazil 11.7 per cent, for Chile 7.9 per cent and for Colombia it 6.2 per cent (cited in Veliz 1980: 252). The low rate of industrial production reflects the low rate of industrialisation. The deduction of primary processing industries, if taken into account, would lead to a further fall in the rate of industrialisation. The social structures that facilitated such modernisation were not only extremely hierarchical but also highly dependent. Late nineteenth century positivism reinforced the exploitative social structures to produce types of modernity and notions of progress that excluded basic industrialisation and marginalised a large section of the population. Herein lays the significance of Raul Prebisch's 'terms of trade' thesis, which emphasised the need for basic industrialisation in achieving rapid economic development. In other words, the mode of acquiring wealth has to change from primary products to industries.

The dependency debate emerged with the formulation of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis² in the 1950s. The hypothesis postulates that, over a period of time, prices of primary commodities fall in relation to manufacturing commodities, leading to a secular decline in the 'terms of trade'. And being primary producing countries, Latin American countries faced the prospect of declining export earnings to finance their development projects. This disadvantaged position emanating from international trade put them in an unequal position vis-à-vis the industrialised countries.

Exploring the internal dynamics of underdevelopment, Brazilian economist Celso Furtado (1967) argued that underdevelopment "is a special process due to the penetration of modern capitalistic enterprises into archaic structures" creating hybrid structures within underdeveloped countries, consisting of a subsistence structure, a structure oriented towards export, and an industrial nucleus (ibid. 138). The problem within this hybrid structure is that its different components do not interact sufficiently

² This hypothesis emerged with Prebisch's seminal paper "The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems" submitted to the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America in 1950.

to integrate into a unified system. Furtado argued that to maintain its competitive advantage, the most dynamic sector adopts more capital-intensive technology which precludes the absorption of more labour from the other two sectors, with the subsistence sector remaining almost immune from any changes taking place in the dynamic sector. As a result, a primary pre-capitalist occupational structure emerges along with a dynamic sector in such underdeveloped societies with “a large portion of its population cut off from the benefits of development” (ibid. 139).

Mexican sociologist Pablo Gonzalez Casanova (1965) brought the conceptual framework of ‘internal colonialism’ into the ‘hybrid structural’ analysis. But he gave a more historical analysis of the phenomenon of ‘hybrid structures’. For him, such structures come into being due to contact of ‘two civilisations’. In the case of Latin America, this took place through the process of colonisation (ibid. 31). In the post-colonial period the colonisation of indigenous people by foreigners was replaced with colonisation by the new Republics, which he attributed to ethnic differences. Casanova arrived at this position through his work on the relations between the *ladinos*³ and the indigenous people in Mexico. Rodolfo Stavenhagen acknowledged the presence of internal colonialism. But he connected it to the broader metropolis-satellite structure that facilitates extraction of surplus by ‘dynamic zones’ from the ‘peripheral zones’ (cited in Cristobal Kay 1989: 75).

Andre Gunder Frank, belonging to the more radical stream of the *dependentistas*, incorporated this important conceptual tool in his work to build the metropolis-satellite model of expropriation and appropriation (Frank 1971). Through this framework he contested the dual society hypothesis. In his book *Underdevelopment or Revolution*, he argued that it was dialectics and not duality which existed in underdeveloped countries and if someone attempted to find one than it would be an exercise in covering up imperialism and preventing revisionism (Frank 1970: 221). He argued that capitalism, far from being a fragmentary and discontinuous process, was more integrative in nature, but it integrates different societies and as such countries in an asymmetric manner. Thus for him, the “metropolis-satellite relations are not limited to the imperial or international level but penetrate and structure the very economic, political and social life of the Latin

³ In Latin America, *mestizos* (people of mixed racial ancestry with elements of both European and Native American descendants) or Hispanicised people are referred to as *ladinos*.

American colonies and countries (ibid.7). And it was only through a major rupture from the capitalist structure that Latin American states can attain the path of self-sustained national development.

Cardoso and Faletto's work goes a step further to include internal class relations into the framework of dependency. This extraction follows from the Marxian perspective of hierarchical organization of production, and of material and spiritual life which assures "the unequal appropriation of nature and of the results of human work by social classes and groups" (Cardoso and Faletto 1979: ix). Thus "it is through socio-political structures sustained and moved by social classes and groups with opposite interests that capital, as an economic 'form' (with its 'logic of expansion') is realised in human history" (ibid. xx). Development and underdevelopment, therefore to them, resulted from socio-political frictions caused by conflicting classes in their pursuit of interest which are again inextricably linked to the external world.

Theotonio dos Santos' work focus on forms of 'new dependency' that relate to the operation of multi-national corporation which is more technological-industrial in nature (dos Santos 1970: 232). It is the technological monopoly exercised by the dominant metropolis that constrains the productive capacity of the dependent countries (ibid. 233). This when combined with the possibility of financing development projects through foreign borrowing exacerbates the dependency of the dependent countries (ibid. 233).

Barring Pablo Casanova, the above review reflects a potential flaw in the dependency framework. It has not paid adequate attention to several relevant socio-cultural variables in the analysis of dependency and underdevelopment in Latin America. Though the charge of economic determinism cannot stick to the dependency framework all the time, the political economy approach nevertheless seems to have emphasised predominantly on global capitalism that shaped and inserted the Latin American region as a resource export dependent one; a dependency centring on the 'core'/ 'metropolis' zone. This requires a brief explanation. While the work of Prebisch, Frank and dos Santos focused primarily on the role of external factors, those of Furtado, Cardoso and Stavenhagen focused on internal factors. Externality for Prebisch meant the role of asymmetric trade relations; for Frank it meant the integrative role of transmigrating capital; and for dos Santos it meant the intrusion of

large multinational corporations with their superior technological skills into the economies of the underdeveloped countries. Internalities, for Furtado, meant the rigid economic structure within Latin American societies which fails to integrate with the dynamic element in the economy; for Cardoso and Faletto it meant the nature of internal class relations that connect the national economy with the international; and for Stavenhagen it meant the manner in which different classes are tied together to different patterns of economic relations. It was Pablo Casanova, who introduced the dynamics of racism into the nature of the internal structure. But his analysis was always at the constant risk of being subdued into the category of class in the work of subsequent *dependentistas*. It is the aspect of racism that the present study seeks to expand upon, exploring a more integrated view of cultural ideas and social structures. The second aspect, which this study proposes to analyse, is that of reading agency. Being structurally loaded, the dependency approach precludes the possibility of reading agency (agency being crudely understood as the capability of agents to effect and influence structure through their actions). Agency both has a reproducing and transformative quality through agents' actions. And it is actions guided by transformative ideas that permit the possibility of effecting change. In the Latin American context, action of actors within these societies reproduced the system rather than bringing transformation within it. This can be attributed to culturally mediated ideational factors that shaped social structures, and thereby its influence on dependency.

The next variable for the study is 'racism' which is supposed to be a part of the socio-cultural process that shapes and influences social structures. Many scholars term race, and thereby racism, as a 'human' or 'social construct' (Wade 2010: 12). The basic tenet of 'constructivism' holds that "meaning is socially constructed" (Hurd 2008: 300). This is because human beings are born into different contexts with different languages, belief systems, food and dress habits and others. The fact that they grow in different contexts shapes not only their perception about themselves but also about 'others'. In other words, human beings are 'socially constructed'. The problem with social constructs is that they are 'relatively stable' but not 'permanent'. This implies that as human beings grow and evolve, their perceptions about languages, values, dresses, food habits, norms and others also change through the process of, what sociologists terms as, 'symbolic interactionism'. That is, it is the

interaction of humans with their immediate surroundings that shapes, sustains and transforms meaning for them. Thus, as a product of ‘social constructs’ and also the principal agents for their transformation, human beings play a dual role in the evolution of societal structures, and thereby of societies. Racism is a part of this broader social construction which influences human actions and reproduces human societies in particular manners. Its endurance depends on the strength of “collective meaning” (borrowed from Hurd) that members of societies ascribe to it.

In Latin America, the *criollo* elites, given their mental worldview and material interest, subscribed to the idea of racial hierarchy and exclusion; this was part of their larger view of ‘nation’, ‘progress’ and ‘modernization’. And since its impact was enormous, racism also played an important role in the perpetuation of dependency in Latin America, well into the second half of the twentieth century.

The next question that arises is: what is racism? And what has been its specific attributes in the Latin American context? Or to put it in a more contextual framework, what counts as racism in Latin America? These questions necessitate the analyses of the discourses on racism in Europe and in North America, where it was much discussed and debated. The genesis of modern racism may be traced to the days when modern European societies, after attaining information and knowledge about the multiplicity of human existence, began classifying human beings (Bernasconi 2001:12-14; Curtoni and Politis 2006: 94). The idea of race attained a more biological form by the eighteenth century in which human physical variation and behaviour was attributed to individuals of particular races (Wade 2008: 177). During this era of ‘scientific racism’, quasi-scientific disciplines like phrenology (reading of the skulls) and physiognomy (reading of faces), related to a branch called socio-biology, were used because they acknowledged the European value laden character of supremacy of the white race (West 2002: 101). The German philosopher Immanuel Kant included ‘colour’ as the most consistent character in the existing categories in determining human reasoning capabilities and character (Bernasconi 2001: 18). Thus, according to Kant, the colour having the ‘superior’ reflective and reasoning power is the ‘white race’, followed by the yellow, the black and then the red (Eze 1995: 117-119). Eze points out that in Kant’s table of moral classification, while the Americans were completely uneducable as they lack ‘affect and passion’, the Africans can be trained

as 'slaves' through physical coercion and corporal punishment (Eze 1995: 116). Thus, biological categories like, the colour of the skin, size of the skull, shape of the nose and cheeks, thickness of the lips and other somatic features formed the basis of racial differentiation, with colour predominating all the other categories.

Race was not only a biological construction but also a sociological one. David Roediger points out that in the first Congress, convened under the Constitution in 1790, made 'whiteness' an essential criteria to acquire US citizenship through the process of naturalisation (Roediger 2002: 325). But considerable confusion surrounded around the term 'white nationalities'. This confusion was marked by the existence of what John Bukowczyk terms as 'not-yet-white ethnic' immigrant population who could be Irish, Italian, Hungarian or Jewish. Thus, many groups now termed as white were historically considered as non-whites or population of debatable racial heritage (ibid. 329). This confusion persisted way into the twentieth century as Robert T. Devlin, United States Attorney at Sans Francisco, understated in 1907 that: "There is considerable uncertainty as to just what nationalities come within the term 'white persons'". Capturing the late recognition by the court, Roediger points out that "The courts thus discovered in the early part of this century what historians belatedly have learned in its latter stages: that the social fiction of race defies rigorous definition" (ibid. 325). Social construction through constant reproduction makes even unstable ideas like race relatively stable and enduring with some variances at the local level. Therefore, to have a better understanding of race, this study will focus on both the biological and sociological construction of racism in the context of Latin America.

How these ideas transmitted to Latin America? There has been a top down spill over of racial ideas from the Europeans to the *criollo* elites and from them to the *mestizos/ mulattoes* and the Indians. These ideas subsequently got institutionalised into the socio-cultural structures of Latin American countries. Antonio Garcias Cubas, a Mexican demographer writing in 1870 "stressed the decadence and degeneration in general of the Indian (indigenous) race and the few elements of vitality and vigour that it provides for the Republic's progress..." (Powell 1968: 21). Similar ideas defined relations between the *ladinos* and the indigenous people as was highlighted by Casanova and Stavenhagen in their works. Thus, racial ideas not only shaped social identities, say a *criollo* or a *mestizo*, but also defined relations among them. As Nancy

Applebaum aptly points out “race”, in Latin America, “has been more pervasive, resilient and malleable than recognized by previous scholarship” (Applebaum 2003:13).

However, there was divergence in the operation of racism in these countries, depending upon the outlook of the *criollo* elites and variation in the ethnic-racial make-up of the societies. Thomas Skidmore (Skidmore 1997) argues that in post-independent Brazil “race was seldom discussed” by the liberals; instead they “talked of slavery”. During this period, the abolitionists who stood against slavery were outnumbered by the defenders of slavery who “argued that it was a necessary evil in order to maintain the economy” (ibid. 8). Lurking behind this debate was the issue of ‘whitening’ the population. Though “the abolitionists believed that slavery was a moral, economic and political drag on the nation’s development”, they supported European immigration to increase the ‘white’ element (ibid. 10). After the abolition of slavery from the country, scholars became vulnerable to European theories of race. During this period, “the black became a target of study”. Nina Rodrigues, a legal expert on medicines, not only “attempted to catalogue African social customs as they had been transmitted to Brazil by the slaves”, but also “studied the social behaviour of blacks and mixed bloods”. For instance, criminal tendencies among blacks were explained by analyzing their skulls (ibid. 11). Skidmore argues that it was only by 1918, Brazilian intellectuals like, Jose Maria Belo, openly criticised the deterministic racist ideas emanating from Europe (ibid. 18). In Argentina, Aline Helg (1997) points out that the economic expansion of the country in the post independent period “led most intellectuals to glorify the Europeanization of their country”. These intellectuals “based their interpretation of Latin America and Argentina either on the work of social Darwinist and positivist Europeans or on the writings of North American scholars about race, psychology and history (ibid. 39). One notable among them include statesman and educator Domingo Faustino Sarmiento. Sarmiento denounced the congenital, alcoholism, laziness and ignorance widespread among the Indian population, and believed that they had “no capacity for civilization”. He was, however, “more confident about the ability of blacks to progress”. Among Europeans, “he had little regard for the Spaniards, whose brains had supposedly been atrophied by five centuries of Inquisition, a damage aggravated among Spanish Americans by their intermarriage with races with an even lesser brains”. It is for this reason

“Sarmiento hoped that together with appropriate education, Anglo-Saxon immigration could transform the mentality of Argentina” (ibid. 40). Similarly, “prerevolutionary Mexico had drawn on racist theories to justify the disappropriation of Indian communities, as well as a particular model of economic development and project for nation building” (Graham 1997: 4).

The operation of racism in Latin America and its metamorphosis into varied socio-cultural patterns should be understood in its earlier transmission through colonisation (Fredrickson 2002: Chapter 1), and its later transformation during the post-Independence period. The idea remained but its manifestation changed. It was this changing nature of racism that ordered socio-economic and political relations. Twentieth century ideas of ‘*mestizaje*’ and ‘*Indigenismo*’ also fit into the framework of racial hierarchy through the rise of the *mestizo*.

This study proposes to traverse through the historical evolution of racism in Latin America and its role in shaping, modifying and ordering social structures, and the transformation it underwent itself. In the process it would deal with the following broad puzzles: was dependency adequately represented by the *dependentistas*? How socio-cultural ideas created dependent social structures? What was the nature of these dependent structures? How these structures influenced the process of dependency? Are these structures dead or has acquired a new form? How does Sen’s capability approach account for the lack of agency within dependent structures?

Methodology

One principal methodological puzzle that cropped up during the study was that of ‘presentism’, that is, imputing prevalent ideas to events and incidents of the past. This argument seemed more plausible in the present case because ‘racism’ is considered as an early twentieth century construct, whereas the study tries to trace racism back to the colonial days and way back into the sixteenth century. In fact, Magali Carrera (2003), one of the authors included in the study as a secondary source, refuses to identify her work with that of race and racism. This was despite the fact that her entire work was based on the paintings of *castas* in New Spain (or colonial Mexico). But as Wade (2010) points out “race do exist as social categories of great tenacity and power”; and that people are discriminated on the basis of racial differences “is a social reality of paramount importance” (ibid. 13). In Latin America,

indigenous and black people had experienced discrimination since the initiation of the process of colonisation. Here, Van Dijk's formulation, cited earlier, on racism serves as an important guide. This is captured more precisely by Colin Hay (2006) who argues that "ontology logically precedes epistemology" (ibid. 81). This implies that something must exist prior to the naming of a particular phenomenon. That existence may vary, but the nature of this varied existence may be the same. This is more so in the case of socio-cultural processes which operate through deeper continuities. These continuities may acquire different forms in their process of evolution, but their essence remains the same. The present study draws inspiration from some of these insights.

Methodologically, the study proceeds with an eclectic approach to trace the evolution of racism in Latin America from a historical-sociological perspective to examine its influence in structuring the region's societies. This structuring is then related to the variable of dependency to draw possible linkages among dependency and racism. For this process, the study relies on selected secondary sources that exist in English literature, which also reflect the limitation of the study.

The central argument of this study is that racism reproduced not only dependent social structures but also made them more resilient which led to the perpetuation of dependency in Latin America. The study argues that the historical evolution of the socio-cultural and structural processes influenced by racialised ideas structured societies in Latin America. These processes determined the organising principle of societies, the structure of domination and discrimination, inclusion and exclusion of members in the national life (broadly perceived in terms of participation in the political process), the nature of economic relations among the constituting sectors or strata, and, more particularly, the share of the different groups in the national economy. These factors, in turn, interacted with the socio-cultural processes to reproduce dependent internal structures which prolonged the phenomenon of dependency in the region.

The present study is divided into four Chapters. The second Chapter explores the evolution of racism in Europe and its subsequent transmission to Latin America. It also explores the evolution of racism within Latin America and the ordering principle that emerged. The third Chapter examines the role of different socio-cultural

processes through which dependent social structures emerged and evolved, and which helped in maintaining the ordering principle. The fourth Chapter explores the work of various dependency scholars and their critics. Through this Chapter, an effort is being made to map out an understanding of and the relationship between development, underdevelopment and dependency. The fifth Chapter seeks to establish a relationship between dependent social structures mediated through racism and the process of dependency.

CHAPTER II

THE IDEA AND REALITY OF RACISM IN LATIN AMERICA

Racism, as an idea, emerged at a particular point of time, contested with other ideas, attained a degree of relative stability, and finally fell from grace with the emergence of new ideas. This evolution was supported by formal and informal practices which were institutionalised into the social framework. Official rejection of institutionalised racism gave way to informal practices that preserved its prevalence. Historical events, thus, gave it a concrete form, and it was historical events that made its presence illusory.

Racism travelled from Europe to the rest of the world through the process of colonisation. In the process, it structured human societies and affected million of human lives. For this affected millions, racism was not simply an idea but also a harsh reality. Two most known examples in history are the Jim Crow system⁴ in the US and the experiences of the Jews in Nazi Germany.

The examples cited above are mere episodic slices of some visible historical phenomena. More subtle forms remain outside the purview of dominant understanding. The present Chapter seeks to explore the more subtle forms in Latin America through insights provided by the above discussion. In the process, it argues that despite being a 'social construct', racism acquired structural forms in variegated ways, both in Europe and in Latin America. And it was the informal diffusion and flexible institutionalisation of racism in Latin America that rendered its existence invisible.

The Chapter is divided into five sections: the first, deals with the discursive practices which led to the evolution and structuring of racism in Europe; the second, discusses the principle of *limpizea de sangre* or purity of blood as an ordering

⁴ The 13th Amendment to the US Constitution (1865) abolishing slavery saw the disparagement of laws banning black-white marriage in certain states. But, a US Supreme Court ruling in 1883 permitted segregation in 'all relations involving close personal contact'. Close personal contact in this sense implied contact in churches, trains, buses, libraries, parks, theatres, swimming pools and other public amenities. This enabled the Southern states to enact "Black Codes" which led to the infamous Jim Crow system (after a 'blackface' character played by whites) closely guarded by vigilante group like the Klu Klux Klan. Groups like the Klan by the late nineteenth century specialised in something, and that was lynching. Between 1890 and 1900 about 1100 blacks were lynched for transgressing the colour line (Rattansi 2007: 43-44). The rationale behind these laws and actions was the fear of contamination of the white stock by the blacks which prompted such laws and actions.

principle; the third, discusses the experiences of the indigenous and the blacks in the region; the fourth, discusses the period of *Caudillismo* and the rise of the *mestizos*; the fifth, discusses the impact of positivism, 'scientific racism' and the conception of progress in the late nineteenth century; and finally the sixth, discusses the changes in the ordering principle that was brought about by *mestizaje*.

Evolution of Racism in Europe

The evolution of racism in Europe centred upon two broad theories—monogenism and polygenism. Monogenism holds that all humans had a common ancestor, while polygenism postulates separate origins for different human types (Wade 2010: 6, 9). Given the moral and spiritual authority of the Papacy, ideas associated with monogenism dominated the European landscape from the middle ages to roughly the eighteenth century (Fredrickson 2002, Chap. 1).

The edifice of monogenism was built upon the idea that “all humans had a common genesis, being the progeny of Adam and Eve”, and the differences which existed were attributed to variation in environment that also influences social and political institutions (Wade 2010: 6). Thus, Christianity was represented in an all encompassing form with possibilities of inclusion for non-Christian others, including Jews⁵ and Africans⁶, through baptism. In the middle ages, the Papacy was the guardian of this ideal. Any views to the contrary resulted in people ending up their lives at burning stakes. Political developments during the sixteenth century led to the expansion of this ideal. After the end of the crusades in 1492, Christianity not only consolidated itself in Europe but also made an outward expansion along with the process of colonisation, thereby, assimilating new populace into the fold of Christianity. But this benign ideal did not preclude the possibility of discrimination. The Jews became the initial target of discriminatory practices, which was later followed against the Africans.

The discrimination against the Jews was guided more by theological concern rather than on biological distinction. Judaism's assertion that the New Testament preceded the old one and the refusal of the Jews to accept Christ as their Messiah

⁵ Jews were regarded as forming the 'race and stock of Abraham' through their prophet Moses (Wade 2010: 5).

⁶ The Africans figured in this imagination through Moses' Ethiopian wife (Wade 2010: 6).

made the Jews the prime target during periods of religious adventurism (Fredrickson 2002: 18). To compound their problem, various stigmatising mythologies like the ‘blood label’⁷ circulated among the common populace. Thus, their “deliberate disbelief” and “less than human image” made them capable of committing “crime imaginable and unimaginable” (Cecil Roth, cited in Fredrickson 2002: 21). Therefore, when ‘Black Death’⁸ occurred in the fourteenth century, “thousands of Jews were massacred” in countries which did not expelled them; not because Christians were dying of the disease but because of the conviction that the “Jews had poisoned the wells” (ibid. 22).

In contrast, the Negroes or the Blacks were accorded a better position vis-à-vis the Jews during the same period (Fredrickson 2002: 26). In fact, there was a “late medieval Negrophilia” surrounding around the cult of ‘Prester John’, a non-European Christian monarch from the kingdom of Ethiopia, who was supposed to help European monarchs in their struggle against Islam. But the refusal of the Ethiopian Coptic Church to accept the authority of the pope in a conference in Florence led to the breakdown of a probable alliance between the Europeans and Prester John (ibid. 27-28). Historians argue that the association of Africans (blackness) with servitude emerged from the Iberian Peninsula where the Christians learned about it from the Muslims who passed on the myth of Ham⁹ to them (ibid. 29). The myth of the curse of Ham is based on the book of Genesis, according to which “Ham drew the wrath of God because he viewed his father, Noah, in a naked and apparently inebriated state and mocked him” (ibid. 43). For this violation, his son Canaan and all his descendents were condemned to perpetual servitude. This reference was used differently by the Jews and the Arabs. While the Jews used it to justify their conquest and subjugation of the Canaanites; for the Arabs involved in slave trade, the importance shifted from Canaan to Ham, who was widely believed to be the ancestor of all Africans, and the blackening of the skin being the result of the curse. But there was considerable uncertainty among the Europeans, as to who were the cursed ones. It was only with

⁷ See Rattansi 2007: 15.

⁸ In European history it is known as the ‘great plague’ which took millions of human lives, and drastically reduced the size of population in many European countries. Once infected the colour of the skin turns black from which the event derived its name.

⁹ “Ham derives from the Hebrew Ch’m, associated with being black and burnt” (Rattansi 2007: 17).

the Portuguese exploration of West Africa by the mid-fifteenth century that the curse of Ham became more attractive to the Europeans (ibid. 43).

Polygenism holds the view that different typologies of human beings had different origin (Wade 2010: 9; Fredrickson 2002: 54). This idea took root during the period of the European Enlightenment. The European Enlightenment¹⁰ (dubbed as the ‘age of reason’; when the spirits disappeared and matter took form) supported the cause of polygenism which expanded the number of racial typologies, thereby differentiating individual races with essentialist¹¹ markers. These typologies were substantiated by pseudo-scientific disciplines like phrenology, physiognomy etc., providing a scientific basis to legitimise discrimination and domination by superior groups upon groups deemed as inferior. A movement known as the ‘eugenics movement’ too emerged during this period to improve the breed of the stock by removing undesirable traits acquired from lesser breeds. No wonder critical race theorists trace the cause of the subsequent maladies of the blacks and other marginalised racial groups to the Enlightenment.

Cornel West (2002) relates the evolution of modern racism with the ‘structure of modern discourse’ which controls “metaphors, notions, categories, and norms that shape the predominant conceptions of truth and knowledge in the modern West”. Three historical processes determined these instruments of truth and knowledge: “the scientific revolution, the Cartesian transformation of philosophy, and the classical revival”. The scientific revolution not only laid down the “authority of the sciences” but also justified “new modes of knowledge and new conception of truth and reality” based on the ideas of “observation and evidence” (ibid. 93-94). The philosophical basis of this new science was laid down by Francis Bacon and Rene Descartes. Bacon’s philosophical aim was to enhance human control over nature through scientific “discoveries and inventions”. Descartes emphasised on “the primacy of the subject and the pre-eminence of representation”, thereby associating the scientific task of “predicting and explaining the world” to the philosophical task of “picturing and representing” it (ibid. 94). In other words, Descartes helped in internalising the result

¹⁰ It is interesting to note that the Enlightenment itself had to contest with some of the ideas and superstitions emanating from the Church which exercised considerable influence upon the minds of the people.

¹¹ “Essentialism asserts that a person or a category of persons or indeed anything in the world has a core essence that defines its character in important respects”. (Wade 2002: 26)

produced through scientific research as true representative of real truth, thereby facilitating a movement from doubt to certainty. Viewed from this perspective, Newton's theory of gravitation (based on scientific observation and evidence) is not a mere abstraction of the human mind but a truth in reality¹². The classical revival took place with the Renaissance¹³ that brought "Greek ocular metaphors and classical ideas of beauty, proportion and moderation..." into prominence (ibid. 96). West argues that Greek ocular metaphors like eye of the mind, mind as mirror of nature etc. coupled with the Cartesian notion of "knowledge as inner representation" were employed to compare objects of retinal images with that of the inner mind and then draw conclusion about the objects precision (ibid. 96-97).

How was racism affected by these developments? First, the development of positive sciences questioned the authority of the Church to interpret the world in its own ways. Spiritual values held closely by the Church started dissolving, which also had its impact on the theory of monogenism. Thus, unity of humanity through the spirit gave way to diversity of humanity through matter. Starting from the French physician Francois Bernier's classification of human races into Europeans, Africans, Orientals and Lapps in 1648 (West 2002: 99), further buttressed by Swedish naturalist Carl Linnaeus in his work "*Systema Naturae*" (1735), to the development of phrenology and physiognomy, human diversity took shape that supported the theory of polygenism. Secondly, application of sciences to the human world led to a deterministic understanding of social phenomena, as they were considered to be scientific (objective, value-free, conclusions being error-proof etc.). Therefore when racism acquired a scientific form (usually referred to as 'scientific racism'), the invoker was relieved from the burden of justifying it because it was already proved. Thirdly, the classical revival privileged a form of beauty that was found in ancient Greece and Rome. It was reflected in Enlightenment artist J. J Winckelmann's work 'History of Ancient Art' which laid down rules governing "the size of eyes and eyebrows, of collarbones, hands, feet, and especially noses" that reflected Greek and

¹² One might question the validity of such a complex understanding. But the fact is that Descartes was living in a period when even a slight act of heresy, like questioning the idea of monogenism or the Holy Trinity, could end up one's life in a burning stake. So at a time when the existence of human life was explained and controlled through invisible spirits, Descartes' argument that scientific research represents real truth challenged the validity of the prevalent invisible spirits.

¹³ The Renaissance started from the early fourteenth century to the sixteenth century, which continued till the Baroque period of the mid-eighteenth century (West 2002: 96).

Roman notions of beauty (ibid. 97). As the blacks and the indigenous people did not fit into this form of beauty, they were relegated to an obscure position in the world of arts and aesthetics.

Given this background, it would be interesting to trace the path of 'scientific racism' which justified and stabilised racial discrimination based on physical markers for a long period of time. The theoretical prelude to scientific racism was set by the ethnological writings of Enlightenment scholars of the eighteenth century. Carlous Linnaeus is one of the most frequently cited scholars of that period. What make his work interesting are his association of human virtues with physical features and the pigmentation of one's skin. "White Europeans are gentle, inventive... and governed by customs; whereas black Africans are craft, indolent.... and governed by caprice" (cited in West 2002: 100). Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, considered the father of physical anthropology, in his work 'On the Natural Varieties of Mankind' (1776) believed that all humans had a common ancestry, but it was the Caucasians (by which he implied the whites) who were the original human race; the others degenerated from them (Fredrickson 2002: 57). Beauty was correlated with intelligence by German philosopher Christoph Meiners in his "Outline of the History of Humanity" (1798), where 'fair' people were presented as superior in both respect and 'dark coloured people' were presented as 'ugly' and 'semi-civilised' (ibid. 59). Robert Knox, Scottish medic and author of "The Races of Man" (1850), declared that "Race is everything: literature, science, art – in a word, civilisations depend on it" (Wade 2010: 10). These value laden ideas were supported by the "pseudo-scientific" disciplines of phrenology and physiognomy (West 2002:101). Through reading of the skull and reading of the face, both phrenology and physiognomy tried to link them with "character and capacities of human beings" (ibid. 102).

The peak of scientific racism was marked by the 'eugenics movement'¹⁴. Social Darwinist influenced by 'scientific racism' appropriated Darwin's theory of evolution and propounded the notion of "survival of the fittest". It was, in fact, Herbert Spencer who introduced the notion and argued that in the competition amongst races, the white race has proved itself 'fit' to rule over the others (Rattansi 2007: 54). This laid the basis for eugenics which is associated with Francis Galton, a

¹⁴ The eugenics movement was the product of "an alliance of social policy and sciences that aimed to restrict the breeding of 'races' seen as less 'fit'" (Wade 2002: 2).

scientist and cousin of Darwin. Galton's interest was in mapping difference in intelligence among humans. He along with eugenicists brought out the doctrine of 'intellectual dysgenesis'. According to this doctrine if the less intelligent classes were allowed to reproduce more than the intelligent one the latter would be outnumbered, thereby resulting in "an overall dilution of intelligence and a collapse of social institutions"; and that the solution lied in selective breeding, that is, "encouraging the classes with higher intelligence to produce more children" (ibid: 55). The movement had a strong impact in Europe, the US and also Latin America (Wade 2010: 11). The Nuremberg Laws of 1935 in Germany, the Jim Crow System of the US and the 'Whitening' principle in Latin America reflected the 'Eugenic Spirit', which called for government intervention through measures like immigration restriction, interracial marriage prohibition, mass elimination of certain category and others to neutralise the lower breeding stock.

How did scientific racism materialised? Peter Wade (2010) argues that two historical processes facilitated the rise of 'scientific racism': i) first, after the abolition of slavery and slave trade in most part of the world by the mid-nineteenth century, some innate and permanent markers reflecting inferiority of the earlier people in servitude was required to maintain the dominance of the white race. Scientific racism carried out this task with the full backing of sciences. Besides, slavery was abolished not because of the abolitionists' concerns for the slaves but mainly for economic reasons. As the market economy in Europe expanded, enabling it to produce goods on a mass scale, search for new markets emerged, which was better served by wage economies than the ones based on slavery. And ii) secondly, with the rise of imperialism from the early nineteenth century, which expanded rapidly into Asia, Africa and the Pacific, the need for an authoritative rule by the rational man over the irrational ones was required. This purpose was served by 'scientific racism' (ibid. 10).

Thus, the genesis of racism, therefore, can be traced back to the period of monogenism when spiritual and mythical belief about human nature assigned qualities and taboos to 'differing others'. This took place despite the Catholic Church curb on essentialised human differences. The Enlightenment marked the beginning of the idea of polygenesis, which coupled with the rise of modern discourse along with an assertive positive science substantiated human differences, thereby challenging the

dominant Church belief on monogenism. Development of positive sciences not only led to the rise of 'scientific racism' but also to its fall.

Limpieza de Sangre and the Social Ordering Principle

Spain was among the first European countries which invoked the doctrine of *limpieza de sangre* (or purity of blood) officially against its 'converted others', thereby paving the way for proto-racism in Europe. The main targeted groups were the *Conversos* (Jews who converted to Christianity) and the *Moriscos* (Muslims converted after the *Reconquista*). Spain was also one of the early European countries which colonised and then transmitted some of these ideas to the 'new world'. Fredrickson (2002) points out that during the twelfth and the thirteenth century Spain was a tolerant plural society. This changed by the early fifteenth century with increasing conflict with the Moors, which in turned fuelled religious zeal against the Jews and the Muslims. This resulted in a wave of pogroms in 1391 in the kingdom of Castille and Aragon. Discriminatory legislation in 1412 and the final expulsion of Jews in 1492 led to mass conversion, as the Jews chose baptism to expulsion. This category of 'New Christians' were termed as *Conversos*. To the Spaniards, the problem with them was that despite their conversion, some of them retained their old rituals. A rebellion in Toledo (1449) resulted in violence against the *conversos* employed by the Crown, and subsequently in their expulsion. As a consequence, by the sixteenth century number of institutions enacted 'pure blood' laws. The archbishop of Toledo applied this doctrine to all church bodies under him in 1547. Thereafter certificates of pure blood were made compulsory for admission into both ecclesiastical and secular organisations. Even the conquistadores and missionaries for the 'new world' were selected from among the faithful (ibid. 31-33).

In the Americas, application of the same principle implied lack of indigenous or black heritage. This stood in contravention to the acknowledged 'cleanliness' of indigenous blood by the Crown (Wade 2009: 69). But widespread miscegenation complicated the situation. However, there were few openings for the *castas* or non-white classes. First, people had to prove purity for only two generations, the earlier ones before them were ignored. This provided opportunities to the *castizos* (Spaniard and *mestizo* mixture) to purify them through race mixture. The status of a person also determined ones whiteness, that is, if he is publicly accepted as white. Besides,

individuals can also attain a *gracias al sacar* (a royal dispensation), decreeing them as white for public purpose (ibid. 70). But the application of these openings was very rare and varied from place to place. Purity of blood was also linked to 'legitimacy'. Illegitimacy was considered an obstacle to political and economic power in fifteenth century Spain, which was also tied to 'purity of blood'. This idea transmitted to the Americas where people of the mixed descent were considered as illegitimate (ibid. 69). The *castas* (or the non-white class), including the *mestizos*, "because of their 'unclean blood' and the reputation of illegitimacy, found it very difficult to aspire" for honour (ibid. 69-70).

Closely tied to the doctrine of *limpieza de sangre* was the principle of 'honour'. These two principles formed the basis of determining status in the social hierarchy. But these principles were gendered. For instance "a man's and a family's honour depended on the sexual virtue (chastity, continence) of wives, mothers and daughters". Men excluded themselves from this requirement (ibid. 90). This can be illustrated with the help of an instance recorded in the ecclesiastic court in New Spain dating back to 1789 as provided in the work of Magali Carrera (2003). It was brought to the notice of the court by Christobal Ramon Bivian, a Spaniard resident of Mexico City, that his wife Dona Margerita Castenada's name was wrongly placed in the baptismal record of *libro de castas* or *libro de color quebrado* (book of mixed blood, or people of broken colour) instead of *libro de espanoles* (book of Spaniards). And if this record were to be made public, Carrera points, it can tarnish Don Bivian and his family' reputation (ibid. 1). As Dona Margerita's lineage certificates were not produced before the court, the court judged her on "person, judgement and circumstances" provided by four witnesses. The court took consideration of the facts that: she was always seen in the company of other Spaniards in social gathering along with her husband or servant; never been to places where people of mixed-blood were regularly found (like bars, public baths, legal courts etc.); had good judgement (that is, she spoke in a decorous and modest manner as was expected of Spanish women); and had a good command over Spanish (ibid. 5). Finally, on September 1789 it was decided by the court that Dona Margerita qualified as a quality of Spaniard and had Spanish parentage (ibid. 3). This judgement, Carrera argues, was based on the social body of Dona, characteristics which are not to be found among non-Spanish identity (ibid. 5). In other words it was the 'honourable womanhood' of Dona that determined

her lineage or status (in this case the '*caldid*' or quality of being a Spaniard). The social body, in this case, was a racialised body constructed through European notions of human superiority that privileged 'whiteness'.

Why was this appeal important for Don Bivian? For Don Bivian the baptismal record was important for his offspring "because parent's and grandparent's baptismal document was required to prove one's ancestry in order to be admitted to universities, professions, certain guilds, and noble orders; to avoid paying tribute (required from Indians and mulattos, those of mixed Spanish and Black African Blood) or imprisonment for debt; and, of course to, prove as right to legal heir" (Carrera 2003: 4).

Who were the mixed bloods from whom Dona was trying to distance herself? Theoretically, the mixed bloods of the Americas are historical creations that emerged out of individuals placed in asymmetrical power relations belonging to different cultures spaces, yet juxtaposed into a single geographical place. The process bringing life to them is known as *mestizaje* or mixture. Miscegenation in Latin America produced different layers of *castas* (breeds or lineage, usually referred to the mixed or the lower classes). Prominent among them include the mixture of *mestizos* (from white and Indigenous), *mullatos* (from whites and Africans), *zombos* (from Black and Indigenous), and *cholos* (mestizos and Indigenous) (Wade 2010: 27, 39). Peter Wade (2009) points out that due to: i) the relatively small numbers of whites, ii) the early scarcity of white women, iii) the lack of control over large areas of the territory and iv) the legal measures that allowed the slaves to buy their freedom, these mixed bloods came to occupy various intermediary roles within the society (ibid.: 86). This led to stratified social structures based on values of 'honour and purity of blood' defined by the whites. Consequently, *criollos* or *creoles* (Spaniards born in Latin America) consolidated themselves in the upper strata of the society while the *Indios* (indigenous) and the blacks were pushed to the fringes. Wade argues that "the governance of this racialised social order, focused on protecting white elite positions and maintaining the subordination of indigenous, black and mixed-race people....to produce a specific set of practices and structures of power" (ibid. 87).

Thus, although the *limpieza de sange* doctrine transmitted to the new world, it modified itself to create a structure of power and domination through the principles of

honour as was reflected in the purity of blood and in association with some social markers, thereby effectively excluding a large section of the colonial people from the structures of power.

The Indigenous and the Blacks in Latin America

Columbus had an ambivalent attitude towards the indigenous¹⁵ people, who were both noble savages (those who were friendly towards him) and wild beast (those who were hostile towards him) at the same time (Rattansi 2007: 21; Fredrickson 2002: 36). Europeans did not find much difference among the various indigenous groups as their languages were unknown to them. Therefore, clubbing them together as 'Indian' seemed the most simplified way to represent them. This obstructed the sights of differences that existed among them and in their world views. Nevertheless, Columbus' ambivalent attitude towards the natives led the great debate which took place in Valladolid in 1550 between Juan Gines de Sepulveda and Bartolome de las Casas (Fredrickson 2002: 36). The critical question that confronted them was whether the natives possessed reason to be categorised as human beings (ibid. 36). Sepulveda argued that the natives were "barbarous and inhuman peoples abhorring all civil life, customs and virtue" and therefore should be subjected to enslavement to make them amenable to Christianity. las Casas, who had witnessed the misery of the enslaved natives in the Antilles, took a more sympathetic view towards the natives. Operating on the general principle that "all the races of the world are men, and the definition of all men, and each of them, is only one, and that is reason", las Casas argued that the natives possessed reason and the ability to lead a civil life (ibid. 37). Therefore, the natives can be converted to Christianity and made meaningful subjects of the Crown through persuasion (ibid. 38).

From a religious perspective, las Casas points supported the dominant Church theory of Monogenism prevalent in those times. This coupled with the possibility of spreading the message of the gospel by adding new followers made the Church conform to las Casas views. Fredrickson (2002) also cites a myth attached to the American natives in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe. According to this, the American natives were the descendents "from the lost tribes of Israel" who "were not

¹⁵ The word 'indigenous people' gained currency in 1982 with the creation of United Nations Working Group on Indigenous People (Gray, cited in Pena 2005: 718).

burdened with the hereditary guilt of the Old World Jews; for they had been ‘lost’ before the coming of Christ and thus had not rejected him or been implicated in the Crucifixion” (ibid. 37). Whatever may be the veracity of this myth it supported the cause of las Casas.

From a political perspective, Veliz (1980) argued that the Crown was apprehensive about the possibility of creating powerful feudal lords in a colony situated far away from Spain. This was because under slavery slaves owed allegiance to their masters and not to the crown, thereby transferring power from the Crown to the landlords. To prevent this situation, the natives were brought under the Crown as ‘protected subjects’ and not as slaves (ibid. 47). As the objective of both the Crown and the Church merged with that of las Casas, his position became the official position of Spain. The *encomienda* system which evolved as a compromising position between the needs of the Crown and the needs of the colonist, stipulated that the *encomiendero*, as representative of the Crown, would take care of the physical and spiritual necessities of the natives in return for their services rendered to the Crown. But the *encomienda* was not hereditary. It was renewable and was subjected to the approval of the Crown (ibid. 58). The status of ‘subjects’, however, did little to alleviate the position of the indigenous people within the colonial system. They were subjects but unequal ones vis-à-vis the Spaniards.

For the blacks, the question of propriety did not emerge. By the time of colonisation they were already viewed as products of the curse of Ham. With the full spiritual backing of the papal authority to wage ‘just wars’ against the African infidels whose redemption lied in their enslavement, the Portuguese became a major player in the ‘Atlantic Slave Trade’ (Wade 2010: 26). And as most of the ‘slave hunting’ was done by the Africans themselves, legitimacy of slave trade was never a problem. Besides, with the need for labour becoming an essentiality in the plantation and mining areas of the new world, incentive to question the ethical perspectives of this trade died out (ibid. 26). Ali Rattansi (2007) points out that during the period of slavery nearly 20 million Africans were crammed into ships in the most inhuman conditions to be transported to plantation and mining sites. A large number of them died during the journey itself and those who survived were sold in exchange for goods (ibid. 30). While building a case for the natives in Latin America, las Casas did not objected to the deployment of enslaved Africans in plantations and mines

(Fredrickson 2002: 37). This position also reflected the social ranking of the Africans in Latin America vis-à-vis the natives.

In the post-colonial period, the status of the indigenous people changed amidst rhetoric and actual experiences. *Criollo* and *mestizo* elites, who came to dominate the political landscape of Latin America during this period, were inspired by European ideas of modernity and progress. Their perception that communal landholdings were unproductive led to large scale appropriation of indigenous land for producing exportable primary commodities. This led to mass dislocation of indigenous people from their land. Dawson (2011) counts the process as one of the greatest tragedies of Latin America in the nineteenth century. This in fact constituted an enduring grievance of the indigenous people against the states of the region way into the twentieth century, reflected sporadically in violent uprising in Mexico (1910), Bolivia (1952), Peru (1968) and perhaps in Mexico (1994) again (ibid. 62). Another process, which led to their diminution or disappearance, was that of state supported process of acculturation. Some of the communities resisted, but the greater majority were assimilated through the process of *mestizaje*. As a consequence, the indigenous way of life disappeared from mainstream discourses. The economic exigency of 'progress' necessitated the transformation of the population into effective labour force; a view that was antithetical to an indigenous way of life.

The status of the blacks in the post-colonial period did not improved either. It was only in Brazil and Cuba, with sizeable black population, that integrationists approach was taken (Wade 2010: 33). In most other parts of Latin America, they stood next to the indigenous people. The fact that Independence did not imply equal rights for them was best exemplified by the Cuban example as is cited by Dawson. The contribution of the Afro-Cubans to the independence movement was phenomenal. Thousands of them flocked together to fight for the cause of Independence. Accordingly, the 1902 Constitution of Cuba granted rights to vote to all male members irrespective of their colour. Based on this constitution they demanded more privileges, like access to bureaucracy, pensions etc. White Cubans began discriminating them on the basis of their cultural practices, particularly religious ones. Afro-Cubans were increasingly targeted as non-Christians for their witchcraft, sacrifice of humans and animal, etc., and thereby were considered incapable of civilisation. Facing widespread discrimination and demonization,

veterans from the Independence war got together and formed the Independent Party of Colour (*Partido Independiente de Color*) in 1908 which was immediately banned by the Cuban Congress. As efforts to portray them as seditious grew, the PIC supporters took to the streets which in 1910 led to speculation of race wars. Based on violent actions by PIC supporters in 1912, the army entered the scene. The ensuing action of the Cuban army led to the death of about 9000 PIC supporters (Dawson 2011: 70-72).

Thus, the imperial imaginary of the indigenous people was that of benign ignorance. This image was reflected by the Spanish Crown's endorsement of las Casas position, which implied state patronage for them. The very idea of 'state patronage' embedded the notion that indigenous people were incapable of protecting themselves. This idea of inferiority itself relegated the indigenous people to a lower position in the social hierarchy. With the establishment of the 'new republics', the "Indian Problem" emerged that impeded the path of progress. As a solution to this problem, the republics increasingly resorted to measures like land expropriation, bonded labour in the increasing number of *Haciendas*, and annihilation on opposition, in relation to the indigenous. *Mestizaje*, in the twentieth century, revived the imperial system of patronage which was reproduced to assimilate the indigenous people through acculturation. The imagery of the blacks, however, remained the same as that of slaves, and in the social hierarchy occupied the lowest strata in it.

Caudillismo and the rise of the Mestizo

An important phase in the evolution of post-colonial Spanish America was the 'age of the *caudillos*'¹⁶. With the dissolution of central authority of the Spanish Crown after the Wars of Independence, the central power dissipated into the hands of regional strongmen called *caudillos*. The political system that emerged during this period was known as *caudillaje*. Wolf and Hansen (1967) assign four salient characteristics to the system: i) the recurrent formation and reformation of client-patron sets, "cemented by personal ties of domination and submission", with an objective to obtain wealth through use of force; ii) the 'absence' of institutionalised means for succession to office; iii) the use of violence in political competition; and iii) competition induced changes in chieftainship (ibid. 169). This period was marked by

¹⁶ During the nineteenth century, *Caudillos* were generally identified with military men on horseback who commanded large following through their personal charisma. In the twentieth century, they were also identified with political leaders like a Peron in Argentina or a Vargas in Brazil.

frequent internal conflicts on the basis of both political and economic interests with *caudillos* scrambling to assert regional or national dominance.

An important feature of this period was the rise of the *mestizo*. The *mestizo* during the colonial period constituted a part of the dispossessed people, being looked upon as “Indian forced out of their communities, manumitted and run-away slaves, illegitimate and unclaimed offspring of *criollos* and non-*criollo* women and descendents of impoverished colonists (cited in Wolf and Hansen 1967: 172). Being of lower social order, *mestizos* had limited access to strategic resources and so had to eke out their living through individual wits by exploring extra-legal possibilities; possibilities considered marginal to the established order (ibid. 172). It was a paradox that the *criollos* both hated and feared the *mestizos*, and yet had to rely on them as their ally. The rise of the *mestizo* during the Wars of Independence provided them the opportunity to move up the social hierarchy, and acquire wealth and power through political endeavour (ibid. 173). The *mestizo*'s ascendance in the social hierarchy transformed their role within the social establishment. This transformation was an important one, but not too revolutionary to challenge the established social hierarchy. The assertion of *mestizaje* since the early part of the twentieth century, in a certain way, reflected this transformative role of the *mestizos*.

The system of *caudillaje* was organised under a *criollo* or a *mestizo* chieftain. For the followers in the group, the selection of the leader is of paramount interest. He should possess the dual quality of i) displaying interpersonal skills to maintain the unity of the group; and ii) judicious distribution of wealth for cementing relationship (Wolf and Hansen 1967: 173-174). The first skill is usually discussed as the possession of masculinity, commonly known as *machismo*. It “implies a social ordering between a dominant leader and a following which suffers his dominance and admires his prowess” (ibid. 174). Masculinity can be displayed in various occasions that are charged with potential violence. The claimant to victory should demonstrate his willingness to violence against his opponent publicly, and the loser should either submit or face death at the hands of the victor (ibid. 174). Masculinity was also proved through the organising capability of the *caudillo*. He organised “minimal bands into a maximal faction” and hold the group together. In this, he was assisted by “a core of right-hand-men (*hombres de confianza*)” (ibid. 174). Apart from these qualities, the *caudillos* also possessed “access vision” that entailed abilities like

selecting the right wealth for pillage; the wealth need of group members; predicting behaviour and power of opponents and others (ibid. 175).

Regional *caudillos* were connected to the national through “informal patronage networks” to maintain stability beyond the local level (Dawson 2011: 38). Powerful regional *caudillos* may forge an alliance with other regional *caudillos* to maintain stability at the national level. But those alliances were always instable as new forces both national and international kept cropping up to challenge them (ibid. 39). For instance, Chile, an obscure country during the colonial period, was able to establish a stable oligarchy in the post-independence period. Besides, through export of minerals and marine products, Chile was able to finance its development process. The inability of Bolivia and Peru, the two more prized locations during the colonial period, to initiate economic development through a stable polity left them with battered economies (ibid. 39-40). So, when the War of the Pacific broke out in 1879, Bolivia and Peru lacked spirited resistance and was defeated by Chile. As a consequence, while Peru lost territories, Bolivia lost its only access to the sea.

The age of the *caudillos* was marked by political instability with powerful regional *caudillos* competing among themselves for power and wealth. Alliances were forged to maintain some semblance of stability but they come under increasing pressure due to both internal and external factors. As a result, frequent fratricidal wars broke out among warring groups. This led to increased militarisation of the region from the immediate aftermath of the independence period to the late nineteenth century. Through this process, the military started playing an important role in the political life of the region.

Thus, the genesis of this phase lies in the Wars of Independence when the *criollos* started arming the lower groups within the social hierarchy, particularly the *mestizos* and certain communities among the indigenous population, to form a broader alliance against the *peninsulares* (Spaniards born in Spain) rule. This led to the rise of the *mestizos* in the social hierarchy throughout Latin America who were earlier conceived as illegitimate offspring's of the Spaniards and the indigenous, with both groups disowning them. With the disappearance of the Crown as the centre of power, loyalty of the masses shifted towards local *caudillos* or local strongmen who mobilised them to serve their own political ends. *Caudillismo*, therefore, led to the

extensive expansion of client–patron relations through the creation of strong armed militias loyal to powerful *caudillos*, whose ‘*macho*’ personalities galvanised others under their banner for deriving economic and political benefits.

Positivism and Progress

Positivism¹⁷ draws its insights from the knowledge derived from observable phenomena (Meri Clark 2010: 53). It came into prominence primarily through the work of French sociologist Auguste Comte. Comte’s aim was to create a ‘scientific sociology’ that can explain phenomena of human society in a scientific manner. He argued that social beliefs were products of historical experiences and not on *a priori* logic, and that social sciences can be based upon laws and principles as revealed by history (Davis 1972:100). Thus, for positivists, the social phenomenon of the human world was similar to the physical world, and that it displayed patterns of regularities from which scientific laws can be formulated through systematic studies.

Nineteenth century positivism was optimistic about the possibility of improvement in human society through scientific methods (Clark 2010: 55). Herbert Spencer, the renowned social Darwinist, posited that “species and societies adapt in relation to environments and towards a state of equilibrium”. He, thereby, conceived of a ‘perfected human society’ through sociological engineering (ibid. 54). Positivist believed that as human societies evolve and progress, active intervention from the ruling class is required to move it to perfection (ibid. 58).

Latin American elites in the nineteenth century were greatly influenced by positivism through which they sought “to establish national sovereignty, defend ‘civilisation’ and correct ‘multiracialism’” (Clark 2010: 55). There was a concern among them that political transformations did not modify societies immediately. And that “social reform was a slow process” which was integral to the process of modernisation of Latin America (ibid. 53). Thus, the positivist strand in the region sought to introduce changes through a gradualist approach rather than through violent revolutions, which they abhorred. This was visible in Comte’s work, who witnessed the upheavals generated by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. This

¹⁷ A major section of this work is liberally borrowed from Meri L. Clark (2010) “The Emergence and transformation of Positivism” in *A Companion to Latin American Philosophy*, Susan Nuccetelli et. al. (eds), Oxford: Blackwell.

prompted him to declare that “the primary goal of social reorganisation should be to promote progress and ensure order”. He posited that “the ‘scientific spirit’ and ‘spontaneous ability’ of ‘positive politics’ would support order and progress” (ibid. 57). This emphasis on ‘order and progress’ appealed to many positivists in the region. Positivism manifested differently in different countries. The key to its success lied in the ability of its follower to forge important political alliances, and thereby influence government policies. Despite its country wise variation, it was tied together in the region through three broad features: i) its origin in the region can be traced to liberal idealism; ii) it modified and transformed itself into strong state conservatism; and iii) it was used as an ideological tool to justify authoritarianism (ibid. 53). This section examines the case of Argentina and Mexico to gauge the trends of positivism in Latin America.

In Argentina, positivism took shape under the stewardship of Juan Bautista Alberdi, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento and Jose Ingenieros. These positivists were also known liberals of their times. Argentine positivists believed that their country was not fit for liberal democracy and, therefore, advocated for a strong institutionalised state (Clark 2010: 59). For the purpose of bringing civilisation and correcting multi-racialism, they advocated a state-directed system of education and European immigration to ameliorate “the social and racial ‘degeneration’ inherited from the colonial era” (ibid. 59). They not only shaped government policies, but some of them like Sarmiento, also executed policies of the government.

Positivism, in Mexico, had a deeper penetration than other Latin American countries. It developed as a “survival mechanism” against the constant threat of the Hapsburgs and the United States (Clark 2010: 60). Its initial manifestation, which was “liberal, anti-clerical and progressive”, found its expression through Gabino Barreda, Benito Juarez’s education minister. Barreda, through public education, emphasised on the political and moral bondage between Mexicans and in their relation to the state (ibid. 60). This initial manifestation underwent considerable change during the rule of Porfirio Diaz. During the Porfiriato, as Diaz rule was commonly known, positivism was shaped by the *cientificos*¹⁸. They considered themselves “as the vanguard of reform that would help the government to compel gradual changes, encourage

¹⁸ They were known by this name “because they claimed to study social and political problems” scientifically, and formulate reform proposals on the basis of such scientific studies (Clark 2010: 60).

material progress and realise true independence” (ibid. 61). Though the *cientificos* opposed centralisation of power under a dictatorship, their abhorrence for revolution tied them closer to the Porfiriato. Porfirio Diaz with the active support of the *cientificos*, including Justo Sierra, commanded over a rapidly growing economy. He was credited by his patrons in the West with not only restoring order in the war ravaged countryside, but also presiding over “the country’s railway network, the recovery of the silver mines, and the prosperity of agricultural export production” (Donghi 1993: 181).

Positivists, in Latin America, did not remain immune to racist discourse emanating from Europe. They were equally concerned, like their eugenicists counterpart in Europe, over the possible consequences of the sizeable indigenous, black and mixed population in their societies. This racial dimension was clubbed under the “Indian Problem”. Despite demographical constraints, some of them advocated for ‘social engineering’ to diminish the indigenous and the black strain among the population (Clark 2010: 65). And a majority of them believed that the ‘weakest’ members (usually Indians, Blacks and racially mixed) will be liquidated from the onslaught of rapid industrialisation and social change (ibid. 65). By the twentieth century, with economic prosperity and greater concentration of power in the hands of the state, the state’s embarked on a campaign to annihilate or reduce “categories of people deemed ‘deficient’, diseased or otherwise problematic” (ibid. 65). In Argentina, this was marked through the ‘Campaign of the Desert’ against the Araucanians under Julio Roca. In Mexico, after their defeat in early 1900s, Porfirio Diaz forced 15,000 Yaquis to work as labour in henequen plantation away from their home (Dawson 2011: 61). This was preceded by the appropriation of indigenous communal lands, called *ejidos*, which were turned over to rich *hacendados* to produce goods for the export sector.

Elites of Latin America felt that socio-economic processes, like the emancipation of slaves, the dynamic forces unleashed by the economic boom in exports, the mobility of people, large immigration from Europe and other factors were undermining their position (Davis 1972: 105). Under such conditions, the positivist preoccupation of *criollo* elites with race gave them justification for their continued rule, even when it did not provide any solution to prevalent problems (ibid. 106).

Thus, positivism in Latin America, that borrowed much of the text and content from Europe, with its idea of social regeneration and progression appealed to a large section of the elites. It included politicians, academicians, physicist, criminologists and others. Their attempt at scientific analysis of social and political problems, and their prescription to solve those problems to embrace modernity became the order of those days. Positivists' negation of revolutionary method and their advocacy of gradualism made them more appealing to the elites, as it enabled the latter to pursue economic progress through social and political order. Their support for state-sponsored social engineering led to increasing concentration of power in the hands of the state. However, their passive acceptance of some of the versions of racism led to the marginalisation, disappropriation and even annihilation of indigenous people.

***Mestizaje* and Changes in the Social Ordering Principle**

Independence in Latin America was driven by secular ideas. As a consequence, after Independence most of the new Republics adopted anti-clerical measures. This saw the abolition of the Inquisition (the Spanish one in 1834 and the Portuguese one in 1821) which removed the official interest in 'purity of blood' (Wade 2009: 113). In addition, lot of colonial laws and practices were either abrogated or came into disuse. These includes abolition of slavery (which almost all states wrote off by the mid nineteenth century), legal discrimination against non-white free people, tribute system imposed on the indigenous (which was replaced by standard taxes), constitutions granting "nearly universal citizenship rights to adult males" (Wade 2009: 114; Dawson 2011: 60) among others. But the educated, urban, liberal, white people who became the ruling elites, and who scripted these constitutions did not conceive people from the lower *castas* as equals. As such formal discrimination was replaced by unofficial practices that accomplished the same ends (Dawson 2011: 60).

The social hierarchy which influenced the political order in the post-colonial period derived its existential source from the colonial codes of honour with an expanded definition. In addition to birthright status, honour was also defined in terms of acquired characteristics like occupation, education and virtues of hard work (Wade 2010: 117). What remained unchanged was women's sexual virtue which continued to define honour (ibid. 117). The upper class easily made claims to honour vis-à-vis the

lower classes whose lower status, sexual practices, unruly behaviour and blackness make them dishonourly beings (ibid. 117). As a result, slaves, servants, labourers and indigenous people were deprived from full citizenship rights (ibid. 123). The rise of certain sections of the mixed *castas* led to marginal modification into the structure of the hierarchy. But courts of law devised a solution. They raised the bar of respectability and honour of the elites to such an extent that plebeians could be judged honourable in a court of law but they cannot be as equal as the elites (ibid. 123). Thus “plebeian men could be incorporated into the body politics, defined as (quite) white , as long as they were virtuous patriarchs, controlling and defending the honour of their families and the sexuality of their women” (ibid. 123). In other words, the racialised social structure reordered a little, but the hierarchy persisted.

Social Darwinism, as was manifested by eugenics, also posited a problem for the elites. As is discussed in the above section, it considered interracial sexual exchanges as a threat which would lead to degeneration. Considering the vast mixture that was produced through *mestizaje*¹⁹, elites by the end of the nineteenth century failed to provide a counter-discourse against those emanating from Europe. It was only by the early part of the twentieth century that the idea of *raza cosmica* (or cosmic race) formulated by Jose Vasconcelos emerged. It was supposed to be a blend of all races “which would eventually take over the world” (Wade 2009: 115). Gilberto Freyre in Brazil claimed that interracial mixture defines Brazil’s national identity and was progressive and democratic (ibid. 115).

But *mestizaje* or mixedness does not preclude or transcends racism. In fact, it is itself a racialised category. Wade (2009) provides two arguments for this: first, to eulogise *mestizaje* as a symbol of national unity does not imply the lack of discrimination in everyday practices, especially to people considered as black, indigenous or barbaric. It would merely take consideration of mixtures of lighter skin people; and second, mixedness was visualised “as a process of progression towards whiteness and ‘civilisation’”. It also envisaged possibility of progression for the darker races towards modernity, as whiteness was equated with modernity and progress (ibid. 116). As a consequence ‘softer miscegenation’ was applied in Latin America as

¹⁹ It is dealt more extensively in the next Chapter.

tools of eugenics to whiten the population that included “targeted social hygiene and an emphasis on education and living condition to improve reproduction” (ibid. 113).

Two more points can be added to the ones cited above. First, *mestizaje* was a top-down approach. As scholars point out that it was a non-indigenous construct and privilege certain type of mixedness which excludes the *indios* and the blacks. Second, it also served the political needs of the rising *mestizos* with their new transformative role as administrators.

To sum up, transmission of racism led to the formation of a social hierarchy. But, the social structure so formed was not a random one; it had an essential qualification. That qualification was the ‘purity of blood’. The essential qualification privileged people from Spanish or Portuguese descents to be members of the dominant group, relegating the rest to subordinate or dependent status. But, important changes took place during this long evolution. Despite the best efforts of the colonial administration to maintain segregation among various colonial groups (viewed mostly on racial grounds, which embeds the notion of superiority of one group over another), it failed to contain the spread of miscegenation among them. These ‘mixed’ categories, which were cast off as illegitimate offspring’s of their original parents, played an important role during the struggle for Independence. The rise to power of the *mestizos* elevated their position in the social hierarchy through political endeavours. *Mestizaje*, as a state ideology, further buttressed their position among the ruling circles. At the same time this phenomenon also denigrated people from indigenous and black origins to the bottom of the hierarchy. Thus, the racialised hierarchy as domination, discrimination and institution, as was formulated by Van Dijk, continued to order Latin American societies.

CHAPTER III

RACISM AND THE SOCIO-CULTURAL PROCESSES IN LATIN AMERICA: THE CASE OF MEXICO

The previous Chapter discusses the historical evolution of racism in Europe which spread to Latin America through the process of colonisation. Through various historical processes, the social hierarchy of Latin American countries were structured around racialised norms that transmitted from Europe. The present Chapter seeks to explore the socio-cultural processes which led to the reproduction of this hierarchy in the post-Independence period. By sociological processes, it implies the processes which influence the nature of the social structure, its forms and manifestation. And by cultural processes, it implies the gamut of cultural practices with which a given society identifies and reproduces itself. This Chapter, however, confines itself to four broad processes, namely patrimonialism and clientelism, Hispanicisation, *mestizaje* and internal colonialism. To narrow down the analysis, Mexico has been selected as the focus of this Chapter.

It argues that racism influenced the socio-cultural processes to reproduce a dependent social hierarchy in Latin America, including that in Mexico. It also argues that the pervasive influence of these processes enabled the elites of Mexico to project their country as a racially homogenous one, despite widespread practices to the contrary.

The Chapter has been divided into five sections. The first section deals with the process of patrimonialism and clientelism; societal processes that are unique to the region. The second deals with the process of 'Hispanicisation' at a broader macro level. The third deals with the process of evolution of *mestizaje* and its consequences on the hierarchical structure. The fourth deals with the process of 'internal colonialism' as was expounded by Mexican sociologist Pablo Gonzalez Casanova and developed by fellow colleague Rodolfo Stavenhagen. Finally, the fifth examines the operation of these processes in Mexico.

Patrimonialism and Clientelism

Patrimonialism exists in a social set up where individuals in a society are tied to one another in an extremely hierarchical and, to a large extent, irreversible social

order. Here, social, economic and political resources are the prerogatives of the dominant social group with the bulk of the other groups dependent on the dominant one for access to critical resources necessary for social and economic survival. Critical economic resources include access to cultivable land, water sources, firewood, foodstuff and goods of everyday requirements. Critical social resources include the recognition of other groups as social beings by the dominant group and their inclusion into the broader social surrounding. For the dominant group, this inclusion is, however, partial and not complete as it depends on the loyalty of the dominated groups towards them. Disloyalty or defection may result in immediate punitive actions or worse extermination. For the dependent groups, loyalty was a function of the dominant group's ability to provide critical resources. Inefficiency, lack of provision or excessive repression might lead to shifting loyalties or provoke violent rebellion. Usually, under patrimonialism the relation between the patriarch and his subordinates lasts from the 'cradle to the grave'.

Clientelism²⁰ too exhibits the same sets of characteristics like patrimonialism, namely: i) development of relations between clients and patrons of unequal status, wealth and power; ii) reciprocal exchange of non-comparable goods to maintain the relationship; and iii) physical interaction among the patron and the client for the persistence of the relationship (Powell 1970: 64). Unequal relation implies the patrons' greater command over economic, social and political resources than the client. Patrons acquire this status through stratified social systems based on caste or racial hierarchies, or through political and economic initiative. Reciprocal exchanges, similarly, takes place in terms of unequal commodities. In this exchange, patrons exchange more tangible goods and services, like land, gifts, facility to avail credit etc., in return for less tangible things like loyalty, personal service, votes etc. The persistence of both the above form of exchanges necessitates the presence of close physical interaction between the client and the patron. Absence of face-to face relations might signal the demise of the relationship (ibid. 84).

However, there is a slight difference between both the processes. The first difference lies in the depth of the relations. Under patrimonialism, the relation is

²⁰ Marquez (1992) defines clientelism as "the structuring of political power through networks of informal dyadic relations that link individuals of unequal power in relationship of exchange" (ibid.: 94).

much more intensive, covers both material and non-material aspects of life and, therefore, is more enduring. On the other hand, under clientelism the relation is less intensive, limited to few goods and more temporary in nature. As such, there is a greater probability of shifting alliance under clientelism than under patrimonialism. The second difference lies in their extent and malleability. Being temporary and based on limited need, clientelism is more flexible and may adopt itself under varying circumstances. This is in contrast to patrimonialism, which requires a fixed, definitive and irreversible hierarchical structure for its existence. This, however, does not imply that structures based on paternalistic lines do not change. Powell (1970) argues that with the penetration of modern markets and the state, the patriarch also acts as a broker mediating between the larger society and the rural society (ibid. 413).

In Latin America, the geographical distance between the colonial and the colonising regions, the dispersed colonial settlement over a huge land mass, lack of proper communication among settlements, the perceived inability of the natives to be effective agents of the colonial rule, the personal ambition of the *conquistadores*, etc.; all merged together to form a colonial social structure which was not only hierarchical but also to a great extent irreversible. The irreversibility²¹ of this structure made the natives, the mixed bloods and the African slaves' dependent upon the colonial administration for their physical and social existence.

The best known socio-economic structure during the colonial period was the *encomienda* system. Its corresponding equivalent in colonial Brazil was the *captaincy*. The *encomienda* system was not a hereditary one. Its existence and privileges depended upon the benevolence and desires of the Crown. But it laid the basis for a paternalistic and hierarchical social structure in the region on the basis of racialised ideas. In the post-Independence period, it took the form of the *Hacienda* or the *Latifundia*.

²¹ The structure became irreversible due to lack of unified resistance to the colonial rule. Resistance from the indigenous people were scattered and sporadic, as the category 'indian' implied a wide variety of heterogeneous groups with considerable internal differences amongst themselves in terms of their language, dress codes, food habits and the broader world view. These heterogeneous groups did not provide a unified coalition against the Spaniards. In fact some of them collaborated with the *conquistadores* against some of their stronger adversaries during the initial period of the 'conquest'. For further elaboration see Steve J Stern (1993), "Early Spanish-Indian Accommodation in the Andes", Delaware: Jaguar Books. But once subjugated they form a part of the colossal social structure in the colonies.

In the *Hacienda* or *Latifundia*, the domination of the indigenous people takes the form of personalised services of the Indians or of their family members. The indigenous people were supposed to provide service for fixed number of days as was required by the *haciendado*, both in the field and in the city. In return, they were allotted tracts of cultivable land; access to firewood, water, pastureland etc.; and receive payments in gifts and loans; practices which reproduces them socially (de la Torre 2000: 35). The indigenous people negotiate exchanges with the outside world through the *hacienda* model of offering gifts to access public services.

Clientelism may assume complex relations. To have a broader idea of this relationship, one could start with the labourer. An industrial labourer is tied to his union boss in a clientelist manner. This union boss is vertically connected to the head of the labour union at the national level. The national head would again be tied with the state bureaucracy from whom he demands benefits for his followers. It may also be the case that the national boss of the labour union might be tied to the bureaucracy through his son, who is a part of the state bureaucracy. This reflects a pattern of horizontal relationship (Lomnitz 1982: 58-59). And both are tied to the state leadership vertically from whom all benefits flows. Similar linkages take place among the bureaucracy and also among industrial interests with significant overlaps in between (ibid. 59-62). This vertical and horizontal integration of group members makes the rise of a racially inferior group very difficult, if not impossible. This is because social relations are mediated not only by political and economic interests but also by cultural structures and practices.

Thus, patrimonialism and clientelism are two structural processes that reinforce racial practices and, in turn, are also influenced by racism. This two way processes reproduces a dependent social hierarchy that is influenced by racism.

Hispanicisation

An important area which has remained unexplored or perhaps ignored by scholarship, working on race and racism in Latin America, has been the process of Hispanicisation. This section attempts to highlight the importance of Hispanicisation in reproducing norms and practices of racism in Latin American societies, which naturalises the process of racism in the region.

The process of miscegenation in Latin America has considerably blurred the distinction between various phenotypical forms, and, as such, somatic features do not enable one to understand the depth of the racial divide. It is in the realm of cultural practices that the divide becomes more visible. This has been pointed out by many important scholars. Rodolfo Stavenhagen (1965) argued that in the region of *Altos de Chiapas* between Mexico and Guatemala cultural factors play an important role in distinguishing a *ladino* from an Indian, and not racial ones (here race is conceived of as a biologically determined). These cultural factors include not only mastery over Spanish and change of dress but also the ability to be mobile, that is, detachment from communal ties (ibid. 67-68). In other words, there is a possibility of upward mobility for the indigenous people both individually and collectively to become *ladinos* by adopting a Hispanic way of life. This process also brings about a tendency that: (noted by Robert Redfield in a Guatemalan village) as the mobility of the *ladinos* increases, they become more contemptuous of the Indians, and this is reflected in their identification of the lower-class *ladinos* with Indians. Similarly, the lower-class *ladino* acquires this tendency and consider themselves superior to the Indians (cited in Stavenhagen 1965: 68). Alan Knight (1997) also observes similar patterns in Mexico. He posits that “Indians” (indigenous people) were defined not only in somatic terms but also through a range of other racial or ethnic (he prefers the term ethnic) markers like- “language, dress religion, social organisation, culture and consciousness”. And as these markers were social rather than essentially biological, indigenous can pass over as *mestizos* through education, migration, and occupational shifts (or what he refers to as ‘acculturation’ or ‘de-Indianisation’) (ibid. 73). Peter Wade (2010) similarly points out that ‘*indios*’, a term used to refer to the indigenous people, can also ‘pass over’ as ‘*mestizos*’ or ‘blacks’ (negroes) as ‘*mulattos*’ (ibid. 39).

The above analysis reveal that there was sufficient possibility for “passing over” from indigenous to *mestizos* (or *ladinos*) or *mulattos* through the process of Hispanicisation. The ‘pass over’ process enables people from indigenous background to gain greater social acceptability in the broader ‘whitened’ or ‘lightened’ society. The very process also internalises the contempt and disdain for the ones below their position; a position which they once occupied. But this process, as Stavenhagen points out, was by no means easy. The *ladinos* ability to restrict membership to their exclusive group by denying recognition to newly ‘pass over’ members made the

process a difficult one. Thus, a group may profess itself to be *ladino*, but they may not be recognised by the very group to which they profess their membership. Sociologists argue that ‘elites’ within societies continuously devise new strategies to keep themselves distinct from their subordinates in the hierarchy. Through this strategy they also effectively limit the number of new entrants into their group.

Thus, the process of Hispanicisation, by providing space for upward mobility, leads to the continuous expansion and reproduction of a social hierarchy through various cultural practices. The relationship between the *ladinos* and the indigenous people in Mexico is a notable example in this regard. Hispanicisation, thus, serves the dual purpose of naturalising the social hierarchy among the societal members and also makes racial discrimination invisible to the external world. This leads to a fallacious notion of Latin America being racially tolerant or, more radically, that the region is a zone of “racial democracy”.

Mestizaje and Indigenismo

There are two approaches to the process of *Mestizaje* (also considered as *Indigenismo* in the Peruvian highlands). The first approach denounces it as a non-Indian discourse, which is characterised by cultural and power differentials, and in which hierarchies are justified to further the colonial “aims of exploiting, subordinating and silencing Indians” (Tarica 2008: xi). The second approach holds a sympathetic account of the process, and is considered as anti-imperialist, socially progressive and even revolutionary. From this point, it is viewed as a critical response to the conquest and colonialism of indigenous people, promoting certain forms of Indian resistance, and advancing notions of common belonging and co-existence cutting across racial and ethnic lines (ibid. xi). What explains such wide contradiction within the same process? The most important explanation perhaps, lies, in the theorisation of *mestizaje* and its actual practice. This section deals with the evolution, theorisation and the practice of *mestizaje*.

Cultural processes do not take place in isolation from other socio-economic and political processes. They are always tied together by history in its evolutionary course. Therefore, it will be pertinent here to point out a few historical events that preceded the process of *mestizaje*. First, was the rise of the *mestizos* during the war of Independence; second, was the rise of positivistic sciences like eugenics during the

late nineteenth century which associated 'mixedness' with degeneration; and third, was the concerns for progress with the vast mass of indigenous people. The role these factors played in influencing *mestizaje* varied from country to country. But as a constellation of factors, they, nevertheless, shaped the ground for *mestizaje* in Latin America.

Scholars trace the idea of *mestizaje* to the *libertador's* (Simon Bolivar) letter from Jamaica (1815) and his address to the Venezuelan Congress in 1819. In his letter from Jamaica, he describes the in-between 'ness' of the *criollo*. He declared that the *criollos* "were neither Indian nor European, but a species midway between the legitimate proprietors of this country and the Spanish usurpers", he who with his birth in the Americas derive his rights from Spain by positioning those rights against the rights of the natives, and at the same time had to defend himself against the Spanish invaders (Miller 2004: 8). He echoed the same sentiments in his address to the Venezulean Congress in 1819. This in-between 'ness' had an important political symbolism attached to it. On one hand, it linked the *criollo* to the land of Latin American, so as to project him as the rightful defender of the motherland; and, on the other, it made an effort to delink the previous colonial rule and support the projected *criollo* rule. He also observed that while the mother for all had been the same; the fathers were different in origin and blood, and also alien to the land (ibid. 9). These positions of Bolivar was, however, tempered by his attitude towards the 'whites' reasoning capabilities. He held (in "The Hope of the Universe") that though in minority in relation to the blacks and the indigenous, whites "possesses intellectual qualities which confer on them relative equality and an influence which may seem excessive to those who have not been able to judge for themselves of the moral situation and material circumstances in South America" (Simon Bolivar, cited in Miller 2004: 9-10). He also ruled out the possibility of conflict between the indigenous and the gentile descendents of the Spaniards in the 'New World' (ibid. 10).

The next proponent in this initial formulation was Cuban statesman and poet Jose Marti. Marti eulogised the sacrifices made by the whites and the blacks in Cuba's struggle of independence from Spain, and declared that: as there were no races, there can be no racial animosity (Miller 2004: 12). He asserted that the whites, Negroes and mulattos had fought side by side and made valuable sacrifices for Cuba during the

struggle, and that their “souls have risen together in the air”. His apprehensions or rather convictions about the US expansionist design in the region made him to proclaim the rise of *mestizo* as the guarantor of Latin American autonomy (ibid. 12).

The idea of *mestizaje* received its epitomic formulation under the aegis of Mexican educator Jose Vasconcelos. For Vasconcelos, *mestizaje* was “providential, progressive, and beneficial” not only for Mexico but also for Latin America (Miller 2004: 28). He, thus, resonated a pan-Latin American identity as was expounded by Bolivar that superseded conditions of race. In his seminal work “*La Raza Cosmica*” or “The Cosmic Race”, he blended the biological and aesthetic definitions of race to “a dual mission of ethnic and spiritual fusion of peoples” (ibid. 30). In response to Alfred Schultz’s work “Race or Mongreal” (1908), where Schultz attributes all the bad qualities of the blacks and the whites to the ‘mongreal’ (a derogatory reference to *mestizos* and *zombos*), Vasconcelos argued back that *mestizaje* or mixedness was intellectually, morally and biologically grounded. And that in this position, the four main racial stocks: the white, the indigenous, the black and the Mongol would blend together to form a fifth race, “imbued with the best traits and characteristics of all its constituencies”. The expansion of this race would unify the American soil with triumph of fecund love as human races improve (ibid. 34).

Mestizaje developed differently in Mexico and the Andes but had the following features in common. The primary object of this process was, as Tarica points out, to ‘nationalise’ the indigenous as they were regarded as key assets integral for modern progress and prosperity. The indigenous people served various purposes: as economic agents, they were valuable as labour for the nascent industries; as political and military agents, an ally in the struggle against oligarchic class by the empowered middle-class; and as symbolic agents reflected the distinct cultural formations of Spanish-American nations (Tarica 2008: 2). Another broader objective was the legitimisation of the *mestizo*. The *mestizo* was illegitimate both in the norms of the dominant Eurocentric culture and the communitarian norms of the indigenous people. Through the invocation of *mestizaje* and *Indigenismo* in the twentieth century, “*mestizo* nationalism aimed to rewrite the law, and thus to certify and destigmatise specific kinds of experiences” (ibid. 22). From this perspective, *mestizaje* acted as a source of redemption for the *mestizos* through the valorisation of the indigenous people. Two more objectives can be added to the process of *mestizaje*. First, the rise of

mestizaje can also be attributed to the rising role of the *mestizo* as a ruling class. This transformation occurred during the Wars of Independence when military and political exigencies pushed the *criollos* to arm the *mestizos* as an ally in their fight against Imperial forces. It led to the rise of new ‘military *caudillos*’. These *caudillos* made strategic alliances in the post-independence period to acquire political power. *Mestizaje*, in a certain way, expressed this transformative role of the *mestizo*. Second, the postulation of eugenics that mixed races symbolises degenerates, clashed with the transformative role of the *mestizos*. *Mestizaje*, in this case, resurrected the *mestizo* from degeneration.

There were multiple channels through which *Mestizaje* diffused into many Latin American societies. It diffused through the practices of the state, elites, intellectuals, and also through the services of the church in the twentieth century. It humanised and made the indigenous people more familiar, thereby “transforming the cultural and racial self-conception of Latin American subjects” (Tarica 2008: xiii).

Critics, on the other hand, point out that the discourse and practices of *mestizaje* has consolidated the position of the middle-class ruling elites, who are predominantly of mixed racial background, and through them of the states. By transforming the natives as subjects of state control, it continued the historical process of “exploiting indigenous labour, appropriating indigenous lands, and transforming indigenous cultures in order better to subordinate them to non-Indian rule” (Tarica 2008: xii). The most damning indictment of the myth of *mestizaje* was provided by Jeffrey Gould in his empirical work on Nicaraguan Indians. Gould (1998) argued that the myth²² rendered “the people of central and western Nicaragua largely invisible to intellectuals, politicians, and most city folk throughout the twentieth century” (ibid. 3). Officially, this can be gauged from the chaotic official census reports. For instance, the 1920 census in Nicaragua reflected that the indigenous population has “dropped ‘precipitously’ from 30-40 per cent to under 4 per cent between 1906 and 1920”. This, to Gould, omits the *cobrizos* or copper-coloured people in the communities of Sutiaba and Masaya, and around 30,000 to 40,000 ‘*indios bravos*’ of

²² Gould was initially appalled by the lack of interest of the younger generation of natives in Yucul, a Canada between Pancasan and the city of Matagalpa, to know about their local history, some of whose grandparents had fought a decisive battle in 1916 (Gould 1998: 2-3). This he attributed to the myth of *Mestizaje*, as one elderly point out that the youth considered local history as the story of the Indian caste (*la casta indigena*) to which they were not interested. This was because they considered themselves to be *Ladinos* (or *Mestizos*) and not *indigena* (ibid. 3)

Chontales and Matagalpa (ibid. 17). In contrast, Gould's reconfiguration of the same census projects an estimate of 15 to 20 percent indigenous people in the national composition of Nicaragua's population. He argued that these reports were used to justify the official position of disappearing Indian population by the end of the century (ibid. 17-18). In fact, the triumph of *ladino* civilisation over barbarian Indian one was so complete and powerful that "many Indians, out of fear or shame, shed the markers of their indigenous identities: their distinctive dress and their language" (ibid. 6). In 1983 Guajiquiro, La Paz, an interviewed indigenous women revealed that her mother scolded her for listening to her elders talking in Lenca, "warning her that if she repeated the indigenous words she would be treated as 'india'" (ibid. 7). Thus, *ladinisation* (or better Hispanicisation) in Nicaragua was a multi-dimensional process in which the church, the state, political parties, local intellectuals, and landed elites, interacted and influenced indigenous psyche in a manner as to justify both physical and structural violence of the *ladinos* over them (ibid. 10).

Mestizaje, thus, was a socio-cultural formulation that reflected the rising role of the mestizo in Latin American societies. It sought to trace its roots by rejuvenating the indigenous past, providing greater legitimacy and political acumen to the *mestizos* in the process. The indigenous were invoked, but subsequently were overlooked and dissolved into the cult of *mestizaje*.

Internal Colonialism

Building up on the racial background of the colonisation process, Pablo Casanova (1965) points out that racism appears in all colonies where two cultures interact, including in Latin America (ibid. 31). Economic and commercial interests are immediate to the process of colonisation. Colonial domination grows stronger with the extension of the "economic and cultural monopoly through military, political and administrative domination". This monopoly enable the colonisers to exploit the colony extensively through various institutionalised measures like economic exchange in unequal conditions, modifying laws to help maintain a trade deficit of the colony vis-à-vis the parent economy, depriving the colonising people from the benefits of their resources and labour etc. The transformation of the colonised country to cater to the resource need of the colonising country integrates the former as a dependent unit of the latter. This leads to erratic and irregular changes in the colonies (ibid. 30).

Throughout this process, the colonising people place a social hierarchy upon and enforce discipline over the colonised natives by expressing their racial superiority. As Casanova points out, “racism and racial segregation are essential in the colonial exploitation of some people by others”. He elaborates it through the psychology of the ‘colonial personality’ which place the colonisers and the colonised in a complicated ‘web of etiquette’ that fixes the terms of addressing among themselves and towards others; the ‘degrees of courtesy or rudeness acceptable’; and the ‘types of humiliation that are natural’. Here, even the most banal words, reflected through gestures, may ascribe to a particular nature of the colonial personality. This complicated ascription is always followed by the dehumanisation of the colonised. The ‘colonial psychology’, thereby, reduces the colonised person as a thing who can be manipulated and discriminated; broader discrimination being institutionalised in juridical, educational, linguistic and administrative practices (ibid. 32).

For Casanova, “internal colonialism corresponds to a structure of social relations based on domination and exploitation among culturally heterogeneous, distinct groups”. Distinguishing it from class domination, he argues that it is a relation of domination and exploitation of one complete population by another, each consisting of distinct classes. This takes place because two different races, cultures, or civilisation, which did not had previous contact, are juxtaposed together at a particular historical moment (ibid. 33).

According to Rodolfo Stavenhagen (1965), the second half of the nineteenth century marks the period of internal colonialism, when Indians, to their utter dismay, found that they had lost their lands “were forced to work for the ‘strangers’, were integrated against their will to a new monetary economy, and fell under new forms of political domination”, as capitalism expanded. Unlike Casanova, who distinguish colonial relation from class relation; as it was racial and cultural differences which characterised the former, Stavenhagen argued that colonial and class relationship were always enmeshed with one another since the colonial period. Colonial relations predominated in the first two form of colonialism: i) under the Spanish Crown; and ii) under internal colonialism starting from the second half of the nineteenth century (ibid. 71). But with the expansion of the capitalist system and the corresponding consolidation of state power, colonial relations will give way to class relations. One important obstacle to the formation of class relationship is the conservativeness of the

inter-ethnic system, which preserve values in a differentiated manner among its members (ibid. 73). Comparing Mexico and Guatemala, Stavenhagen points out that internal colonial (he prefers the term endo-colonial) situation is more pronounced in Guatemala than in Mexico. This is because with the failure of the bourgeoisie revolution in Guatemala (1954), the difference between the regional dominant class and the national dominant class became identical, which was represented, predominantly, by the *ladinos*. In contrast, in Mexico, the revolution displaced the old *latifundists* with 'developmentist' bourgeoisie which tried to forge alliance with rural bourgeoisie, "composed of traders, neo-*latifundists* and public employees", leading to the formation of class alliance. Therefore, the predominance of the colonial or class relation depends on the "dependent-underdevelopment dichotomy and the dynamics of national class structure" (ibid. 74).

Cristobal Kay (1989) classified the critiques of internal colonialism under five sections: i) class as residual; ii) homogeneity of ethno-cultural groups; iii) lack of historical specificity; iv) identifying culturally distinct groups; and v) idealised view of capitalist development (ibid. 77-82). Barring the fifth (which he associated with Casanova's fascination for capitalist development), and rejecting the fourth as a non-relevant one (as it does not reflect the basic tenets of exploitation and discrimination), Kay reduced the initial three critiques more in terms of class relation than in terms of ethnic differences. Internal colonialism, Kay argues, was proposed at a time when it had lost much of its sheen in Latin America. This is because "the majority of the Latin American population was by then *mestizo* or *ladino* and urban, and the industrial bourgeoisie and proletariat had become the main protagonists in the class conflict" (ibid.80).

At a more polemical level, it might be argued that Kay was also blindfolded by the cult of *mestizaje*. But, empirically, the *Zapatista* movement, which broke out in 1994, four years after the work of Kay was published; and the rise of ethnic solidarity through, what scholars' term as, new social movements points to the fact that an early obituary to the ethnic (or better racial) differences risks oversimplification. For it would fail to explain the changes made by the Mexican Congress in Article 4 of the Mexican Constitution in 1992, which "recognise the Indian as part of the nation", or the declaration of Ecuador as *plurinational* state to be followed by Bolivia (Poynto 1997: 66).

Thus, internal colonialism, as a sociological process, defined the broader social relations between the *ladinos* and the indigenous community during their moments of personal exchange. These exchanges were unequal and culturally loaded, as two unequal groups interacted. This inequality was shaped by racial ideas of domination and discrimination, which was expressed, as Casanova points out, through various informal means. The cultural practices associated with this unequal exchange reproduced the unequal relations among culturally heterogeneous members. Class relations too overlapped within this exchange, but its significance remained more ambiguous.

Mexico and the Socio-Cultural Processes

The Mexican war of Independence produced numerous military *caudillos* like Agustine de Iturbide²³, General Vicente Guerrero²⁴, General Antonio Lopez de Santa Ana, General Nicolas Bravo, General Guadalupe Victoria, General Anastasio Bustamante and others with political ambitions. The immediate fallout of this military predominance was the extension of military dominance into civilian life. As a consequence, the military became the chief arbiter in the political life of Mexico in the immediate aftermath of the Independence period. Although they were divided into centralist and federalist, a division commonly denoted by ‘Scottish Rite’ and ‘York Rite’ respectively, the Presidency of Mexico came under the rule of Generals (be it centralists or federalist) till the early nineteenth century, with a brief pause of civilian rule under Benito Juarez and his successor Lerdo. Factional politics led to deep rivalries among groups, resulting in fratricidal wars which destabilised the whole political system. Constitutions were written, purged and rewritten, depending on the ideological group that retained the Presidency. Internal instability led to two major foreign interventions in the nineteenth century: i) the US intervention in 1847 over Texas that culminated in the loss of half of Mexico’s territory (which included Texas, New Mexico and California); and ii) the French, English and Spanish intervention in 1861, and the subsequent French occupation which led to a temporary reinstatement

²³ After proclaiming independence from Spain, Iturbide assumed the title of Justin I and declared himself as the emperor of Mexico (cited in Jan Bazant, 2002: 426).

²⁴ Writing several years after Guerrero’s death, Zavala, minister of finance in Guerrero’s government (April 1829- December 1829), wrote that being of mixed blood, opposition to Guerrero’s presidency came mainly from the land owning *criollos*, clerics, generals and Spanish residents in Mexico, who did not forgot the threat of social and racial subversion brought about by the war of independence (Bazant 2002: 434).

of a European monarchy under Maximilian (1864-1867) (Bethell 2002, Chapter 10). These two foreign interventions were unique to post-colonial experiences of the region. They were unique because no other Latin American country, during that period, experienced direct European intervention, leading to displacement of their ruling government. The US again intervened during the revolutionary period to take side with the Constitutionalist against Huerta. Post-revolutionary Mexican elites were more alert about this aspect while guiding their country during the twentieth century.

Juarez did not live long to witness the triumph of liberalism. Soon after his death another general, Porfirio Diaz from Oaxaca, took the reign of the country in 1877. Diaz personalised the government machinery by inducting loyal clients into the system and set the prelude for future clientelistic politics. Diaz ruled Mexico with the policy of “bread and club”. This policy relied on both co-optation and coercion to regulate loyal and disloyal or belligerent clients respectively. It worked impressively to bring the necessary order in the political landscape of Mexico to achieve the envisaged economic progress. Mexico, under Porfirio, experienced remarkable economic growth with booming exports of mines and agricultural products, expanded railway connectivity and large scale development of light industries like “paper, glass, shoe, beer and food processing” (Katz 1998: 29). In fact between 1884 and 1900, Mexico achieved a growth rate of eight per cent, which was unprecedented in those times (ibid. 28). The growth, however, was achieved with an inherent contradiction. In an attempt to accelerate agricultural exports, large expropriation of *ejido* (or communal) lands took place, displacing large number of indigenous communities from their lands. Those who resisted, like the Yaquis of Yucatan, were defeated and put into perpetual servitude. Pancho Villa of Chihuahua and Emiliano Zapata of Morelos build up their followers from among the peasants and indigenous people who were displaced from their land during the Porfirian regime of ‘progress’. These peasants and indigenous people played an important role during the revolutionary period (Bethell 1998, Chapter 1).

The Mexican Revolution which started in 1910 continued for another ten years. The interim years saw the resumption of infighting among military *caudillos* (like Huerta, Madero, Carranza, Obregon and others) with Villa and Zapata, representing the peasants and indigenous cause, swinging among these *caudillos*. It was Alvaro Obregon’s ascendancy to the Presidency in 1920 that marked the

culmination of the Revolution. Thereafter, the elites of Mexico started the process of rebuilding the country on nationalistic lines. Obregon started the process of consolidating the powers of the presidency and that of the federal government by relying on three key sectors: the army, the organised urban labour and the *agraristas*, consisting of the agrarian leagues and the *Zapatistas*. Depending on political exigencies, he employed urban labour and the *agraristas* against the army and, alternatively at times, the army to break strikes and fight rural militias (Meyer 1986: 159). The presidency of Calles, earlier interior minister under Obregon, institutionalised the revolution through the formation of PNR (*Partido Nacional Revolucionario* or the National Revolutionary Party) in 1929, laying down the foundation for a national forum for the expression of sectoral interest through official channels (Bethell 1998, Chapter 2 and 3).

Lazaro Cardenas, the successor of Calles, completed the process of institutionalisation by bringing three important sectors within the fold of PNR: the peasant sector through the CNC (*Confederacion Nacional Campesina* or National Confederation of Peasants; its members drawn primarily from the *ejidos*), the urban workers through the CTM²⁵ (*Confederacion de Trabajadores Mexicanos* or Confederation of Mexican Workers) and the popular sector (Stevens 1977: 232). The military sector was dissolved in 1940 and brought under civilian rule (ibid. 233). The popular sector, to which some of the members of the military also drifted, found its expression through the CNOP (*Confederacion Nacional de Oganisaciones* or National Confederation of Popular Organisation) formed in 1943. Business interest found its expression through the CONCANACO (National Chambers of Commerce) formed in 1936 and the CONCAMIN (Confederation of Industrial Chambers) in 1937 (ibid. 235). The inclusion of broad sectors within the party apparatus not only made the PNR and later the PRI (*Partido Revolucionario Institutiucional* or Institutional Revolutionary Party) a resilient party, but also enabled it to accommodate presidencies from varied political spectrums drifting from left, centre to the right²⁶ into its fold. It was Vicente Fox, of PAN (*Partido de Accion Nacional*), who broke the long legacy of the PRI in 2000.

²⁵ For further see Leslie Bethell (1998) (ed) *Latin America Politics and Society Since 1930*, Chapter 5.

²⁶ The PRI exhibited an amazing flexibility in accommodating presidents from the Left, Centre to the Right. This is vividly shown in a chart by Skidmore and Smith 2005: 282. For the political evolution of Mexico since the 1930s see Leslie Bethell (1996) (ed) *Cambridge History of Latin America*, Volume VII, Chapter 1 and 2.

Patrimonialism or the client-patron relation which earlier existed among the *haciendados* and their peons, or *caudillos* and their followers, or the rural *caciques* and the indigenous people, as an informal social relation was institutionalised into a broader nationalist framework under the PNR. Stevens (1977) point out two changes introduced in the 1933 Convention of the PNR which made this institutionalisation inevitable. First, the abolition of regional groupings weakened the regional and local institutions, as a result of which local and regional leaders became dependent on their national leaders for support and patronage. And second, the party conventions, which earlier nominated candidates, were abolished and plebiscitary procedures were put in their place. This made the process of candidate selection invisible to the public (ibid. 231). In other words, voters had the option of selecting either an official candidate of PRI or someone from other parties. It was never a multiple choice from within PRI.

The mammoth political structure created by the PRI through the inclusion of three sectors led to sectoral competition for extraction of states' resources. And it was the popular sector, consisting of the middle class (the white collar employees), that appropriated a major share of the state resources. The second in line was the urban labour class whose collective bargaining power along with the ability to shut down urban centres through strikes enabled it to push for periodic state revision in wages. The peasant sector, comprising of indigenous people attached to the *ejidos*, formed the most deprived sector among all the three; whom Pablo Casanova refer to as the "marginals", that is, those who were excluded from the distribution of economic and political benefits emanating from the growth process of the country (cited in Stevens 1977: 234). It is the "big farmers" from the agricultural sector which receive disproportionate allocation from the government vis-à-vis the *ejidatarios*.

Thus, the PNR and later the PRI, which evolved through a historical process, institutionalised the processes of patrimonialism and clientelism by creating competing groups within the party's structure. Its inclusion or rather co-optation of the socio-political system was so comprehensive that opposition parties remained peripheral to the political system. Within this structure, the white 'collar workers' or the popular sector forming the urban professionals, bureaucracy and sections of the military, appropriated a larger share of state benefits who incidentally were also from racially superior groups. Marginal to this structure was the peasantry or the *ejidatarios* who enjoyed "mobilisation without representation" (Stevens 1977: 238).

In other words they were politically mobilised but not represented. Their expression always echoed through the voice of the big farmers or through political leaders who exhibited paternalistic attitude towards them. And incidentally, they belonged to the racially inferior groups.

In Mexico, the cult of *mestizaje* evolved in a unique way and subsequently took a hegemonic form. This took place through eminent nationalist *indigenistas* who put forward their version of *mestizaje* and *indigenismo*. During the Porfiriato, Justo Sierra claimed that the *mestizo* element among the Mexican population was the most dynamic one (Knight 1997: 85). Andreas Molina Enriquez in his work '*Grandes Problemas Nacionales*' posited that the future progress of the country lied in "the continuation of the *mestizos* as the dominant ethnic element and as the controlling political base of the population" (cited in *ibid.*); and that the demographic growth should be achieved not through immigration but through the expansion of the *mestizo* element, which is both nationalistic and patriotic. This position resonates with that of Jose Marti, who regarded the *mestizos* as the defenders of Latin American autonomy against US imperialism. The imminent threat of the US was not lost upon the ruling elites of Mexico. *Mestizaje* bloomed in Mexico in the post- revolutionary period under the influence of Manuel Gamio, Alfonso Caso, Luis Cabrera and, more importantly, Jose Vasconcelos. Manuel Gamio compared the state to a statue whose "pedestal is Indian and whose body is forged of all the races" (Tarica 2008: 3). He argued that the leaders of post-Independent Latin America had failed to forge such a statue nation because they ignored the indigenous element. He, therefore, held that the goal of the revolution was to complete the process of Independence (*ibid.* 3) through the expansion of the "national race" as is encoded within the *mestizo*, "the carrier of the national culture of the future" (Knight 1997: 85). Luis Cabrera similarly argued that the unification of Mexico should be achieved through the *mestizo* element which was numerous and homogenous (*ibid.* 85). As the *mestizo* was a bridge to the future and one who possesses distinctive features, Jose Vasconcelos advocated the process of *mestisation* not only in Mexico but also throughout the region (*ibid.* 86).

For the revolutionary elites of Mexico, *mestizaje* was an appealing philosophy because: i) it was nationalist and helped in political mobilisation; ii) it fitted the image of the ruling elites who were predominantly *mestizos*; iii) it helped in distancing

themselves from past revolutionary rhetoric without falling into the trap of either socialism or communism (Knight 1997: 86).

Alan Knight (1997) points out the following salient features of *mestizaje*: i) This process was a top-down one, which was imposed on the indigenous from outside; ii) It was believed that acculturation in a guided, non-coercive and enlightened way would lead to the preservation of the positive attributes of the Indian culture and the negative ones purged; iii) it reproduced many assumptions of ‘western racism’ of the earlier period, which it officially opposed (ibid. 87). More specifically, the third feature led to the evolution of three different layers of *indigentista* thoughts: first, those who supported the extreme position proposing the superiority of the *mestizo* and the Indian over the white, leading to reverse racism; second, those who accepted innate racial difference as a truism, but not with the implication of subordination or super ordination; and third, those of the mild kind who only talk of race, but with a meaningful connotation (ibid. 87). Seen from these perspectives, racism in Mexico shifted from innate biological trait to traits linked to environment and history with inherent cultural baggage (ibid. 93). For instance, while refuting biological racism, Ramos held the view that Mexican Indians were: psychologically incapable of accepting technology; did not possessed the spirit of dominance; and did not belong to the race of rapacious men; qualities which were evidently displayed by the “white sector” (ibid. 84). These indigenous inertias, though historically and psychologically determined, were considered as deterministically inescapable (ibid. 84).

The Mexican Revolution and the cult of *mestizaje* dissolved earlier “castelike ethnic barriers”, but perceptions on indigenous inferiority abounded. That took place despite the official position to the contrary (Knight 1997: 100). For instance, the Indian from Hueyapan or monolingual Tarascans from Acajo were continually frowned upon in post-revolutionary Mexico (ibid. 100). The persistence of racism can also be attributed to cultural practices which are innate to Mexican culture, like, in Sierra de Puebla, *mestizos* considered themselves to be more respectable than the *Nahuatl* speaking Indians, who were considered as coyotes (ibid. 101). Thus, Alan Knight posits that: “the demise of biological racism by no means spells the end of racism, which may be predicated upon other deterministic factors, and which is likely

to survive, irrespective of shifts in official ideology, so long as socio-political circumstances are propitious” (ibid. 101).

Pablo Casanova (1965) argued that despite the official veneration of the Indians in post- Revolutionary Mexico, the agrarian reform, sustained development and industrialisation or even cultivation of folk ideology, the least of the acculturated Indians experienced exploitation and discrimination as under internal colonialism. This took place under two broad forms: i) the dominant metropolis centres not only exercised monopoly over indigenous commerce but through unequal exchange also led to the decapitalisation of indigenous communities, which leads to monoculturism, deformation and dependence of the latter’s economy; and ii) exploitation of the Indian population by different classes of the *ladino* population through “a mixture of feudalism, slavery, forced and salaried work, peonage, etc. Discrimination ranges from difference in linguistic and modes of dress to higher judiciary, political and trade union discrimination. This takes place due to the maintenance of colonial attitudes by local and federal functionaries and *ladino* political leaders. Casanova posited that experience of exploitation and discrimination varied in accordance to the degree of acculturation with the least acculturated ones experiencing the highest discrimination (ibid. 35).

The combined operation of *mestizaje* and internal colonialism made the indigenous people of Mexico invisible to the external world through what Knight terms as “statistical ethnocide”. This was also pointed out by Gould earlier in the case of Nicaragua. For instance, in the 1930s Chiapas was officially 38 per cent ‘Indians’, but critics pointed out that it were 80 per cent (Knight 1997: 74). Though both the positions seemed polemical, the real figure lied somewhere in between. Similarly, Casanova points out that in the 1960s around 10 per cent of the Mexicans were indigenous if language is taken into consideration. But if indicators other than language is taken, the number ranges between 20 and 25 per cent (Casanova 1965: 34). Deborah Yashar drawing data from different sources calculated the indigenous population of Mexico between 1978- 91 as ranging from 12- 14 per cent (Yashar 2005: 21). This implies that the percentage of indigenous people is sufficiently low. But the picture is not so clear. Alicia Puyana (2002) citing the 1991 census of Mexico points out that 52 per cent of Mexican territory belonged to *ejidos* or communal lands (ibid. 401). Combining both the figures reflects that only 12- 14 per cent of the

indigenous population hold 52 per cent of Mexico's total land. To compound the problem the EZLN (Zapatista National Liberation Army) waged an armed struggle in 1994 against the Mexican state to protest the large scale land acquisition by the *Haciendas* in the region of Chiapas, which was facilitated by the modification of Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution. The point which this discussion seeks to reflect is that reality is not in figures but in the culture of Mexico and thereby the whole of Latin America. It is cultural processes that had shaped relation of the *criollos* and the *mestizos* towards the indigenous and the blacks. Attempt to trace relations in figures might prove illusory in this case.

Conclusion

The Chapter begins with the argument that certain structural processes led to the reproduction of dependent social structures in Mexico. The processes included in this Chapter are: patrimonialism and clientelism, Hispanicisation, *mestizaje* and internal colonialism. This Chapter posits that racism operated upon these processes to give them a unique form in Latin America, a position which is a slight departure from one that categorise these processes themselves as racist. For instance, it was the operation of racism within Latin American societies which gave patrimonialism and clientelism a unique form. The inclusion of the peasant sector, consisting of the large indigenous population, into the mechanism of PRI, and yet its lack of political representation make it unique to Mexico. Again, Hispanicisation from the point of choice is unproblematic. But its forceful imposition on a subdued population, and in a way that privilege superiority of one category over others, as was expounded through *mestizaje*, can be argued to be problematic. The same argument also extends to the process of 'internal colonialism', namely, that it was the operation of racism which provided greater visibility and explanatory rigour to the process. The summation of all the processes has been the reproduction of dependent hierarchies at the local, regional and the national level.

The Chapter highlights the various structural processes of Mexico that were tied to the idea of racism, and which led to the reproduction and perpetuation of hierarchical and dependent structures within Latin American countries. This leads to the question of dependency and the role of dependent structures in its perpetuation. These issues are followed in the next Chapter.

CHAPTER IV

DEVELOPMENT, UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND DEPENDENCY

Concerns for 'dependency' in Latin America emerged out of concerns for economic development. Dependency was, therefore, related to lack of development or presence of underdevelopment. The broad understanding of dependency can be found in the definition provided by Theotonio dos Santos, as is mentioned earlier. To dos Santos, when the development of some countries is 'conditioned' by economic events in some other countries in a system of interdependence, a state of dependency is said to exist. Accordingly, the 'conditioned' countries are tied to the 'conditioning' countries in terms of dependence. Explanations provided by other *dependentistas* provide a similar understanding on dependency. Given this broad understanding, *dependentistas* are grouped or classified into overlapping categories, like reformist, Marxist, conservatives, radicals and others, on the basis of their analyses and their prescriptive suggestion to ameliorate the situation of dependency. This Chapter, however, avoids such classification and examines selected *dependentistas* through their major works independently. Besides, to link it up with the present study, the Chapter will focus on works that highlights or reflects on internal structures and their influence on dependency.

The Chapter argues that *dependentistas*, in their analysis of internal structures, overlook or ignore the role of cultural ideas (here, racism) in influencing dependent structures. These culturally loaded ideas made the dependent structures more resilient by reproducing them through informal practices.

The Chapter has been organised into three broad sections. The first examines the works of prominent *dependentistas*, namely, Raul Prebisch, Celso Furtado, Andre Gunder Frank, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Falleto, and Theotonio dos Santos. The second examines the critiques from different perspectives. And, the third examines the work of *dependentistas* on internal structures.

The *Dependentistas*

One of the enduring contributions of the Dependency School in Latin America has been its heritage of critic. This critic was not confined to critiquing others but also within, revealing in the process a rich diversity of voices and contenders to

differentiated theorising. The Chapter tends to take the reader through the broader terrain of dependency, chiefly through the work of Raul Prebisch, Celso Furtado, Andre Gunder Frank, Cardoso and Falleto, and Theotonio Dos Santos, reflecting fault lines and linkages among its advocates as they critique the broader disciplines of economics as well as amongst themselves. The present analysis has to be necessarily selective and limited²⁷, and would focus on the core premises of these scholars. The scholars in this section should not be read in a chronological way as all of them were contemporaries of each other and interacted meaningfully (essentially through their works) amongst themselves to produce their subsequent versions of understanding.

Raul Prebisch: Expounded in the 1950s, the Prebisch- Singer thesis was an economic explanation of the role of trade and its consequences on the development process of national economies, particularly those of Latin America. In his pioneering work *The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems* (1950), Prebisch starts off with a critic of the comparative advantage theory, which as a theoretical concept exercised considerable influence during the nineteenth century, resulting in the transformation of ‘peripheral’ Latin American countries as major exporters of primary products thereby precluding the possibility of industrialisation in these countries vis-à-vis the industrial ones (Prebisch 1950: 1). Here the relative price factor and the nature of exportable and importable has been emphasized to reflect the asymmetrical trade relations between developing (countries producing primary goods) and vis-à-vis the developed (countries producing manufactured goods) ones. This is captured by, what economists’ terms as, the commodity ‘terms of trade’ and is expressed as P_x/P_m , where P_x and P_m represents export and import price indexes calculated on the same base period (Todaro, 1991: 376). The terms of trade is said to ‘improve’ if P_x/P_m rises, i.e., if export prices rise relative to import prices; and ‘deteriorate’ if P_x/P_m falls, even though the volume rises over a period of time. Taking UN data from 1870s to 1930s, the thesis exemplified that the relative prices of primary commodities has a tendency to decline secularly over time vis-à-vis manufacturing ones. And as a consequence, the terms of trade of primary producing exporting countries have on the average tended to worsen over time while showing a relative improvement for developed countries (Todaro, 1991: 376).

²⁷ This work has been pursued with an important limitation, that is, the lack of Spanish and Portuguese citations which are not only voluminous but also more rigorous.

What were the implications of this thesis in the Latin American terrain? Four broad implications were deduced by the Latin American *dependentistas* from the historical experience of the region: i) the theory of comparative advantage, liberally borrowed from the principle of laissez faire liberal, proved to be the biggest theoretical blockage in the progress and, as such, of development in the region; ii) as a consequence of the first, Latin American countries not only continued producing primary goods but also over-expanded its base with the bulk of the manufacturing surrounding around the processing of these manufacturing goods till the middle of the twentieth century; iii) since it was beneficial for Latin American economies to specialise, export and earn foreign exchange through primary goods, as the comparative advantage suggested, the ruling elites in these countries did not emphasised on the industrialisation of their countries, with the effect that these economies became prone to cyclical fluctuation occurring in the primary market, the demand for which was primarily decided by the markets of Western Europe and North American over which Latin American countries had no control; and iv) as a consequence, Latin America's development process became dependent on economic decisions of the centre.

What was the way out? As a way out of this developmental impasse, Prebisch and the ECLAC (United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) School, with which Prebisch was associated, propounded the idea of Import Substitution Industrialisation or ISI for achieving a rapid rate of economic growth. In addition, he also advocated regional integration to broaden the size of the market for manufactured goods. Thus, industrialisation was seen as a remedy to address not only the developmental needs of the region but also to break the cycle of dependence by diversifying the industrial base that generated demand from within the economy rather than outside it

Celso Furtado: Celso Furtado rejected other dominant economic theories prevalent in those times²⁸. In his particular line of fire was Rostow's theory of economic development, the basic implication of which was that since most of the countries of the developed world progressed in different 'stages', it followed that all the developing countries had to follow the same trajectory. In contrast, Furtado point out

²⁸ It included those of Nicholas Kaldor and the more popular Harrod-Domar model which he considered were "abstract models" derived from "limited historical experiences" (Furtado 1967:116).

that “economic development is a markedly uneven process: it arises at particular points, propagates itself with lesser or greater facility to others, acquires greater vigour in some places, is aborted in others, and so on. It is not and cannot be a uniform process, for each area has its cluster of resources and factors” (Furtado 1967: 83-84).

Developing his theory of underdevelopment, Furtado argued that European capitalist penetration took place in broadly three different geographical spaces: i) in the developed nucleus itself; ii) in “unoccupied land with characteristics similar to those in Europe” through “displacement of frontiers” like Australia, Canada and the Americas; and iii) in “already inhabited regions” possessing “archaic structures” like Latin America, Asia and Africa. It is the penetration of capital into these archaic structures that created hybridities, “part tending to behave as a capitalist system and part perpetuating the features of the previously existing system” (ibid. 128-129). And that “the phenomenon of underdevelopment is precisely a matter of this type of dualistic economy” (ibid: 129).

Tracing the growth process of the developed economies, more particularly of England, Furtado narrated that in the early phase of the industrialisation process, the dynamic industrial sector was able to dislodge the old artisan and craftsmen sector by offering goods at competitive prices. On the one hand, since price became an important factor in the production process, increasing innovation in technology was resorted to in production to keep prices at the competitive levels, wherefrom the relation between technology and industry emerged. On the other, dismemberment of the old sector led to release of labour into the industrial sector helping in maintaining the wage rate at a low level. And as the benefits of technology worked on the side of the industrial entrepreneurs than the workers, it led to a gradual accumulation of surplus in the hands of the industrial bourgeoisie who reinvested within the economy leading to greater integration of labour from the other sectors of the economy. During the second phase when labour supply became more elastic and “the supply of savings” tended to grow faster, some redistribution of income took place in favour of the working class raising their disposable income and thereby creating a domestic market for the goods produced. This redistributive effect had the tendency to reduce the growth rate and also profit. Historically, the industrialised countries, more

particularly England, tied over this problem through “a great international offensive” (ibid. 117-127).

In contrast, penetration of European capital into “archaic structures” led to different forms of underdevelopment. In the more simple ones, foreign enterprises producing exporting commodities existed along with a wide range of subsistence activities. And in the more complex ones, three sectors co-exist: a subsistence structure, a structure oriented towards export and, an industrial nucleus (Furtado 1967: 138). The problem with these sectors is that they do not interact sufficiently to bring about structural changes. Furtado was particularly concerned by the failure of the industrialised sector to integrate the surplus labour from the subsistence sector. This he attributed to the induction of capital intensive technology in the industrialised sector. The rationale for the industrialised sector to become capital intensive lies in its objective to remain competitive in the international market by offering goods at lower prices through use of better technology. This led to lower absorption of labour force in underdeveloped countries for which the occupational structure in these countries remained unchanged. As a result, the population affected by the process of development remain minor and the population dependent on subsistence sector remained large (ibid. 139).

Three broad reasoning can be drawn from Furtado’s work. The first reason, which he flagged off but did not dealt adequately, was the location of such economies in a particular historical epoch. But he seemed to be consciously aware of the fact and implied it when he talked of penetration of European capital into archaic structures of underdeveloped economies, and that their experience on development was different from those of the developed countries. The second reason which followed was the availability of technological knowhow which were generated at particular points of time. Given a country’s location in a technological time scale, it can be either the creator and hence the leader of a particular technological knowhow, or it might just be an imitator of the given knowhow. For Furtado the second condition explained the situation in underdeveloped economies. Geared to external demand, the dynamic export sector, in order to maintain its competitive edge, used imported technological knowhow which were more capital intensive and, as such, less labour integrative. This did not lead to the desired dislodgement and the subsequent migration of labour from the subsistence sector to the dynamic sector as experienced by the developed

economies. In fact this sector employed merely around 5 per cent (ibid. 130) of the total working population. And since it was the subsistence condition of labourers rather than the prevailing wage rate which determines the cost of labour, producers always reaped substantial profit. This then lead us to the important third factor of capital reinvestment. Furtado argued that in England whatever had been the degree of capital appropriation it was always reinvested into the economy by the industrial bourgeoisie. This was not so in the case of underdeveloped economies which resulted from two major outflows; a) through expenditures on costly importable goods, and b) through profits repatriated by multinational corporations, operating in these countries.

So what was the way out? Furtado (1963) advocated a process of ‘gradualism’ to overcome these problems, more particularly in the case of Brazil. He contended that despite the income inequality, deprivation, poverty and death experienced by a major section of the population, a Marxist-Leninist type revolution is not suitable for an “open society” like Brazil. He believed that it would be a political retrogression if in the process of introducing social change Brazil comes under one form of dictatorship or other. He, however, called for a fast and effective change in the country’s archaic agrarian structure that was the breeding ground for all types of discontentment. This he proposed to do through “the path of constitutional change which will permit agrarian reform...” (ibid. 535). In other words, he argued for a greater role of the state in the social and economic development of the country.

Andre Gunder Frank: For Frank development and underdevelopment were not merely comparative categories but were also related ones, a relation which has evolved through a common historical process. He argued that underdevelopment was a historical legacy which developed in close relation with the capitalist development of the developed countries. And the connecting point between these two processes was the process of colonization (Frank 1975: 1). For him,

...every single one of the countries that are by common agreement classified as underdeveloped have had a colonial position within the world capitalist system. Most continue in a colonial or neo-colonial position and remain underdeveloped, indeed continue to underdevelop ever more. (ibid. 7)

This leads to the question: how the process of colonisation operated to work in favour of the colonisers to the detriment of the colonised? To this question Frank’s answer was that the contradiction of expropriation and appropriation. He derived this

framework first, from Marx whose “analysis of capitalism identified and emphasised the expropriation of the surplus value created by producers and its appropriation by capitalists”, and secondly, from Paul Baran who “emphasised the role of economic surplus in the generation of economic development and also of underdevelopment” (Frank 1971: 30). In addition, Baran also “placed greater emphasis on ‘potential’ or potentially investible economic surplus which is not available to society because its (capitalisms’) monopoly structure prevents its production or (if it is produced) it is appropriated and wasted through luxury consumption” (cited in Frank 1971: 30). It is through this monopoly structure of capitalism which makes expropriation and appropriation possible. Extending this framework to Chilean underdevelopment, Frank argued that “Chile has always been subject to a high degree of external and internal monopoly” and that external monopoly has led to expropriation of a substantial economic surplus produced in Chile which was appropriated “by another part of the world capitalist system” (ibid. 31).

The second capitalist contradiction, according to Frank, was the polarisation of the system into metropolitan centre and peripheral satellites. Here, “the metropolis expropriates economic surplus from its satellites and appropriates it for its own economic development” (Frank 1971: 33). As a result of the lack of this surplus the satellites remain underdeveloped. This relation was exemplified not only among countries but also within them; among their regions/ provinces and between rapidly developed urban and declining agricultural districts (ibid. 34). Once converted into a satellite, the metropolis-satellite structure reorganises and reproduces the same structure in “the domestic economic, political, and social life of the people” in the satellites (ibid. 54). Thus “...a combination of these contradictions, once firmly implanted, reinforces the processes of development in the increasingly dominant metropolis and underdevelopment in the ever more dependent satellites” (ibid. 33). It therefore follows that when Western Europe colonised Latin America, the whole “continent and its people were converted into a series of minor economic constellation, each with its own minor metropolis and satellites, these in turn being composed of still more metropolis with their satellites, all of them directly or indirectly dependent on the European metropolitan centre” (ibid. 40).

For Frank, there an agent within the structure, who reproduced and thereby perpetuated dependence of the said structure. Concurring with 19th century Mexican

writer Mariano Otero's observation that the dominant sector of the bourgeoisie developed direct interest through the colonial and class structure with the external world and that by utilising the state apparatus this sector spawned "policies of economic, social, cultural and political underdevelopment for the "nation" and for the people of Latin America" (Frank 1974: 4), Frank categorised this sector as 'lumpenbourgeoisie' who were interested in keeping Latin America in "a state of wretched backwardness" through the medium of foreign trade that benefits the foreigners, a state characterised as 'lumpendevelopment' (ibid. 5).

The Latin American bourgeoisie emerged out of the Independence movement who challenged the authority of their colonial masters during the early part of the 19th century. Frank points out, quoting Guizot, that the bourgeoisies, who successfully replaced the colonial power structure, were divided into two great parties – the European and the American (Frank 1974: 51). The 'European' ones "favoured the closest possible relation of dependence on the European metropolis" with "firm political and military support from that quarter". It included enlightened spokesmen like Moreno, Belgrano, Rivadavia, Sarmiento and others (ibid. 51). The 'American' ones, on the other hand, were rooted "in the interest of the provinces, which sought protection for local industries struggling against the ruinous competition imposed upon them by the "European" policy of the cattle raising exporters" (ibid. 52).

The struggle for supremacy that ensued between the so called European and the American groups "ended with the definitive victory of the former- the heirs of Independence" (Frank 1974: 58). 'Prosperity' or the 'export boom' in Latin American countries by the late nineteenth century, fortified the economic and political power of the Liberals, enabling them to introduce liberal reforms (ibid. 64). One important consequence of these reforms was the growth in the number of *latifundias*, which to Frank "grew at a pace and to proportions unknown in all previous history, especially in Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Cuba, Mexico and Central America" (ibid. 69). This phenomenon saw the appropriation of indigenous lands for gearing them to export-oriented production goals, like agricultural, livestock or mining. In all possibilities, the indigenous were forced to "surrender unconditionally" to the call of foreign demands (ibid. 66). Frank was critical of these Liberal bourgeoisies who accused the Conservatives of feudal exploitation and clericalism, but when they rode to power they imposed greater dependence on the domestic economy. And when their policies

led to various social, political and economic tensions, these bourgeois did not hesitate to use repressive measures, even supporting military dictatorship to serve their own economic interest (ibid. 66).

Through his analysis, Gunder Frank took a critical stand on many dominant underdeveloped models and theories of his time. Accordingly, refuting Rostow's Stages Theory, Frank argued that: "The now developed countries were never underdeveloped, though they may have been undeveloped"; and that although contemporary underdevelopment is believed to be the reflection of a country's own structures, it (underdevelopment) "is in large part the historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations between the satellite underdeveloped and the now developed metropolitan countries" (Frank 1970: 4). Refuting the diffusion model of development, which holds that underdeveloped countries and regions move to a path of progress through a process of diffusion of "capital, institutions, values, etc. ... from the international and national capitalist metropolises", he argued that development in these countries can occur independently of these relations of diffusion (ibid. 4). Regarding "dual society" thesis, he claimed that, "I am confident that future historical research will confirm, that the expansion of the capitalist system over the past centuries effectively and entirely penetrated even the apparently most isolated sectors of the underdeveloped world" (ibid. 5), thereby nullifying the said thesis.

Was there a way out of this all encompassing structure? Frank was sceptical about the bourgeoisie's ability to break out of the dependent circle. Be it Furtado's 'gradualist approach' (Frank 1970: 333) or of Helio Jaguaribe's endorsement of the military's role in the development process (Frank 1974: 141), he vociferously rejected them. He didn't spare even the moderate left of Latin America. This includes some illustrious names like Victor Haya de la Torre of Peru, Lazaro Cardenas of Mexico (he was, however, appreciative of the fact that it was Cardenas who made the biggest land redistribution possible in Mexican history in a single tenure) and others. His critic of Cardenas through Pablo Gonzalez Casanova is very interesting. Pablo Casanova, dean of the School of Political and Social Sciences at the National University and also a prominent member of the MLN (National Liberation Movement), suggested that: "We think that General Lazaro Cardenas has indicated the right road: support the institution and organise the people" (Frank 1970: 316). To this suggestion Frank asks the question to "organise the people for what"? Simply

wresting the control of the people's destiny from the bourgeoisie and the PRI was not enough. If that was the only objective, Frank argued, than other Latin American countries would move much ahead of Mexico through radical revolutions. And to prove his point he cited the example of revolutionary Cuba (ibid. 316).

Frank, therefore, called for the broadest possible political alliance and popular mobilisation against the immediate class enemy, that is, the local bourgeoisie "at the local and the national level" in Latin America, so as to overthrow them through an armed struggle to break the chains of dependency and thereby of imperialism (ibid. 371-373).

Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto: Development, according to Cardoso and Faletto, is a social process (Cardoso and Faletto 1979: 8). It takes place in a dialectic way through the opposing forces of the dominant groups and the groups opposing them. This process presupposes the existence of social structures which "are the products of man's collective behaviour" (ibid. x). Social structures are organised in a hierarchical way for "the production of material and spiritual life" (ibid. ix). This hierarchy "serves to assure the unequal appropriation of nature" and of human labour by "social classes and groups" (ibid. ix) through "processes of domination". These structures, although self-perpetuating and as such relatively stable, are "continuously transformed by social movement" (ibid. x). Therefore, to have a better understanding of these structures, they should be analysed through the historical events of "conflicts, social movements and class struggles" (ibid. x).

From an economic perspective, "a system is dependent when the accumulation and expansion of capital cannot find its essential dynamic component inside the system" (Cardoso and Faletto 1979: xx). This view presupposes the existence of an economic centre and an economic periphery which were tied together by the process of capitalist expansion. In fact, it is "the economic drive of advanced capitalist economies, which were responsible for the formation of a capitalistic periphery and for the integration of traditional non-capitalist economies into the world market" (ibid. xvii). But, unlike Frank, Cardoso and Faletto "do not see dependency and imperialism as external and internal sides of a single coin with the internal aspect reduced to the condition of "epiphenomenal" (ibid. xv). They conceive this relationship as forming a complex whole between external and internal force whose structural links, on the one

side “are rooted in coincidence of interests between local dominant classes and international ones, and on the other side, are challenged by local dominated groups and classes” (ibid. xvi). Then “external domination in situation of national dependency implies the possibility of the internalisation of the external interest” (ibid. xvi). This argument does not preclude the proposition of “imperialist penetration of external social forces” into dependent socio-political structures. It simply affirms that it is “through the social practice of local groups and classes” which tries to enforce foreign interest “the system of domination reappears as an internal force” (ibid. xvi).

Prior to capitalism based on multinational corporation, two situations of dependency prevailed: “dependency where the productive system was nationally controlled and dependency in enclave situations” (Cardoso and Faletto 1979: xvii). In the former (nationally controlled) one, capital accumulation takes place as a result of appropriation of natural resources and exploitation of labour by local entrepreneurs, the final goods of which are sold in the international market. In the latter (enclave) one, external capital is incorporated into the productive processes where the value of capital is increased by exploiting local labour force and “transforming nature and goods”, which are sold in the external market (ibid. xix). In capitalist expansion through multinational corporations, the enclave economy is reproduced with one important difference vis-à-vis the old ones, that is, “a substantial part of the industrialised production is sold in the internal market” (ibid. xix).

Forms of dependency may vary according to “the size and type of working class as well as of the bourgeoisie, the size and type of the “middle class”, the weight of bureaucracies, the role of armies, forms of state, the ideologies underlying social movements and so forth” (Cardoso and Faletto 1979: xx). Therefore, in the context of Latin America to trace the expansion of capital, an analysis of the interaction between divergent groups and classes is required because “it is through socio-political structures sustained and moved by social classes and groups with opposed interests that capital, as an economic “form” (with its logic of expansion”) is realised in history” (ibid. xx).

Criticising the “structural dualism” hypothesis, which is based on the dual existence of a traditional and modern sector co-existing with each other in developing countries, Cardoso and Faletto argues that both these concepts does not encompass all

possible social situations, Besides, they do not show how “different economic stages are linked to various types of social structures” it “involves a series of relation among social groups, forces and classes, through which some of them try to impose their domination over society” (ibid. 10).

The developmental process is the sum total of historically specific economic and social events at both the national and international levels. Here, the economic is related to the social- first, because “every economic link is, by itself, a social link”, and second, because “economic relation supposes some degree of stability and recurrence in the relations of exploitation, which reinforces “a given social order”, the order itself a historical product of social struggle (ibid. 13-14). Thus, development ensures through “interaction and struggles of social groups and classes that have specific way of relating to each other” (ibid. 14).

How do structures of domination take shape? To Cardoso and Faletto, a given socio-political structure of domination is formed when a group or an alliance of a group, thorough the political process, tries to impose its/ their control over other group or classes “to develop an economic order consistent with their interests and objectives. But its/ their political action is limited by the “mode of economic relation” (ibid. 15).

The asymmetric integration of the underdeveloped countries to the world market requires an analysis of “a definite structure of relations of domination” not only at the level of the international groups, classes and interest, but also domestically within as to how “social groups defined the outward-directed relations implicit in underdevelopment” within a historical framework (ibid. 17). This is because “national economic groups” are linked to their external counterparts in variegated ways with differing consequences during the process of development. Besides, “the internal system of political alliances is often modified by international alliances” (ibid. 20). Therefore, only an economic perspective of development might overshadow some other socio-politically relevant processes which could enhance ones understanding of its dynamics.

What is underdevelopment or “national underdevelopment”? It “is a situation of objective economic subordination to outside nations and enterprises and, at the same time, of partial political attempts to cope with “national interest” through the

state and social movements that try to preserve political autonomy” (ibid. 21). The situation of dependency is brought about by the interaction of local classes or groups, which identifies their economic and political interest with that of the external ones, and it is contested by those who are adversely affected by the dependent status (ibid. 22). Thus, any explanation of dependency is incomplete “without taking into consideration the links that internal social groups have with external ones” (ibid. 22).

Theotonio dos Santos²⁹: dos Santos (1970) contribution to dependency lie in his idea of technological-industrial dependency, which he distinguished from the earlier colonial and financial-industrial dependency, referred to by scholars as new dependency (Chilcote 1974: 15). This new form of dependency “is conditioned by the exigencies of the international commodity and capitals market”, which puts two limits upon the dependent countries – a) first on export earnings, and b) on procurement of machines which are sold as capital and not commodities due to the monopoly over patents of developed countries (ibid. 232).

These above limits impose three broad constraints in dependent countries: first, as export income constitutes an important source to finance industrialisation, the export sector is boosted which were monopolised by decadent oligarchies which limits the growth of the national markets, and in enclave economies greater outflow of profits, which reduces the availability of capital; second, high monopolisation of international market, foreign control of the dynamic sector and foreign financing of development exposes the process of industrialisation to the vagaries of fluctuation in the balance of payments; and third, due to their monopoly on technology, dependent countries had to import machineries from the MNCs (multinational corporations) at market prices as capital goods which are obsolete, thereby accentuating the dependency of the dependent countries (dos Santos 1970: 233-234).

The following, according to Dos Santos, are the effects on the productive structure – first, the necessity for conserving the export sector leads to reproduction of the metropolis-satellite structure (as propounded by Frank) from the international to the internal between internal metropolitan centres and internal interdependent colonial centres. Second, the industrial and technological interest works in favour of the

²⁹ This subsection is drawn primarily from dos Santos work “The Structure of Dependence” published in the *American Economic Review* (May, 1970).

multinational corporations and to the detriment of the dependent countries. Third, “the same technological and economic-financial concentration is transferred without any alteration in the economic and social life of the dependent countries, exhibiting high concentration of income, underutilisation of installed capacity etc. (ibid. 235).

Capital accumulation is characterised by – first a cheap labour market which is combined with a capital intensive technology, leading to a high rate of exploitation of labour power. This is further aggravated by the enforced high prices of industrial products made possible through protectionism, exemptions and subsidies by national governments and “aid” from hegemonic centres. The above analysis enables one to “see that the alleged backwardness of these economies is not due to a lack of integration with capitalism but that on the contrary, the most powerful obstacles to their full development come from the way in which they are joined to this international system and its laws of development” (dos Santos 1970: 235).

The Critics

Given the diverse formulation and understanding within dependency, its critics too are diversified. Some of the critics which follows attempt to critique broader methodological, empirical and theoretical dimensions of dependency.

Economic critics of dependency by Bates and James (1976) place the following propositions:

- i. Methodologically, dependentistas tend to accept and promulgate a particular line of argument without dealing with reasonably with contrary views. For instance, they point out that dependency analyst cite Prebisch’s hypothesis without caring to provide any critical comments. This despite the fact that Prebisch arbitrarily selected a set of time series data but also through two reference points of Britain (representing all industrialised countries) and Latin America (representing all developing countries) went to make an overarching generalisation.
- ii. Referring to Gunder Frank and Arturo Bonilla’s scepticism about the link between population explosion and its implication for economic backwardness, Bates and James argues that “high rates of population growth exacerbate the already staggering problem of absorbing redundant labour productively and

concomitantly contribute to the social, economic and political marginalisation of large segments of the population” (ibid. 29).

- iii. Regarding science and technology, they argue that there is substantial degree of autonomy available to Latin America to design and put into place laws suitable for its technological requirements. Citing the Andean Pact countries and Mexico, they point out that laws relating to technological requirements are rigorous. In the latter law applies “not only to contracts involving patents and licenses, but can be applied to blueprints, engineering specifications, etc, Besides, the region could do a lot on its own to develop its field of research and development which would have large spill-over effects.
- iv. Regarding MNC’s, they argue that it is not only a question of the centre and the periphery but between the MNC’s and nationalism, and that Canada and France has been the most militant countries against foreign investments. Besides, it the collective co-operation of nation states which would help in regulating the large MNC’s.
- v. Regarding policy prescriptions, they argue that *dependentistas* are rather vague on the “complete design envisioned for the future”.

Despite varied criticisms, Bath and James were appreciative of dependency’s emphasis on income redistribution, the hypothesis that small and micro-level decisions could lead to outflow of valuable resources; and the possibility of the radical writers within dependency who are engaged in more productive and inventive historical research.

Out of the many suggestions, one important which Bath and James suggests is that of linkage politics which is based on a four level analysis: “the character of the international system, the external groups and their relationship to the polity, the internal linkage groups and their relationship to the polity as well as to external groups and the character of the polity itself” (ibid. 33-34).

A second set of criticism comes from the historical perspective. One of the fundamental propositions of dependency is that it was the expansion of capitalism into the underdeveloped countries which, through a policy of free trade, integrated the latter into the world capitalist system and continue to remain so as a dependent member within it. D C M Platt seeks to refute this argument through a historical critic

whose evidence dates back to the 19th century. Quoting O'Brien, Platt points out that as investment decisions flowed from the metropolis, the economic growth and the socioeconomic formation are exogenously determined. And "by concentrating on primary product exports, Latin America was unable to develop an autonomous capacity for growth and change" (Platt 1980: 115). This seems to support the reflection that opportunities for an autonomous development were lost in the 19th century for Latin America. Contrary to this, Platt argued that Latin America did not transform into a producing house of primary exportable and a ready market of manufactured importable because Western Europe was well supplied by its colonies in both raw materials and foodstuff (ibid.115). Statistically, British exports to the principal markets of Latin America was 2.49 million pound sterling for 1831-40, 3.31 million pound sterling for 1841-50 and 5.45 million pound sterling for 1851-60, while the corresponding total exports for Britain was 43.53 million pound sterling, 41.74 million pound sterling and 99.27 million pound sterling respectively during the same period (ibid.: 116). Besides, British imports for 1856-60 from the whole of Latin America was 14.86 million pound sterling which, in comparison to 36.59 million pound sterling from the US (a single country), would form only small fractions for individual countries.

Quoting Safford, Platt argues that after the London financial crash of 1825-26, British capital and merchants withdrew from the uncertain Latin American environment to the colonies or to the US or to Britain itself. This stands in sharp contrast to the claims made by historians that during that period Britain was reaping a supposed "great harvest" through its capitalistic expansion (ibid. 117). In fact, he argues that foreign trade in Latin America "was unimportant and stagnated" and that the so called "dependent" region was "independent" and "self-sufficient against its will" till the first half of the nineteenth century (ibid. 117).

The second half of the nineteenth century saw the spectacular rise of Argentina in the region owing to its wheat and beef boom, attracting large foreign capitals, predominantly British, and immigration from Europe. Platt argues that prior to being an exporter of wheat; Argentina was net importer till the late 80s of the nineteenth century. It was only by the 1890s that Argentina became a net exporter of wheat (ibid. 121). The country's export of cattle and beef similarly did not start till the last two decades of the nineteenth century with boom in beef exports starting from the

early decades of the twentieth century. And although consequently there was a surplus of both wheat and meat, other food items like wine and sugar were produced and consumed domestically without leaving any surplus (ibid. 122). What Platt wants to point out is that the exports in Argentina completed a full natural circle - first replacement of imports by increased production; second complete satisfaction of the domestic market; and finally the disposal of surplus through exports, rather than being dictated by the needs of the metropolis, as is assumed in dependency theory (ibid.122).

Due to unfavourable endowments of factors, Platt points out; independent industrial growth did not take place in Latin America. To flag off some: there was a shortage of skilled labour; industrial fuels was in short supply be it wood or coal; the size of the market was small for mass production; important metals like iron-ore was in short supply and so forth with the consequence that “domestic manufacturing was slow to develop in Latin America with or without the machinations of the metropolis” (ibid. 123). Therefore the necessary path for industrialisation, he argued, lied in the creation of agricultural or mineral wealth, as the case may be (ibid. 122) which was more geared to domestic circumstances rather than planning in the distant metropolis (ibid. 123).

Platt, however, acknowledges that the theory of dependency may be applicable for the smaller countries but not definitely for Chile, Argentina and Mexico. He also acknowledges that there were a few strong economies and a large group of weak economies, who maintained some degree of isolation from international trade and finance (ibid. 127). To provide a final statistics, British imports from the whole of Latin America rose from 17.62 million pound sterling in 1880 to 61.08 million pound sterling in 1913, with imports from Argentina constituting 40.73 million pound sterling in 1913. And if Brazil and Argentina is left out than, Britain’s import from the rest of the Region increased only from 10.87 million pound sterling to 15.76 million pound sterling (ibid.127). Through the above figure Platt wants to convey the message that instead of integrating Latin America as a dependent partner in the world economy, Independence reintroduced half a century of independence from foreign trade and finance, thereby refuting *dependentistas* claim that Latin America’s development was reflected in “the expansion of the dominant countries”, or that the

internal dynamics and its underdevelopment were conditioned by its position in the international economy (ibid. 128).

David Ray's critique from political economy perspective of dos Santos and Susan Bodenheimer has led him to point out three basic fallacies in Dependency theorising: first, the claim that "dependency is caused by the economics of capitalism" lacks comprehension and is illogical; second, the assertion that "foreign investment is exploitative and invariably detrimental to Latin American development" is an oversimplification, which is based on misleading evidences; and third, the suggestion that "dependency/ non-dependency is a dichotomous variable, thereby implying that non-dependency (which is left carefully undefined) is a potentially achievable alternative" fails to recognise them as continuous variable and also ignores policy alternatives that could possibly reduce dependency (Ray 1973: 7).

In his observations on Imperialism, Ray argues that it flows both in capitalistic and non-capitalistic systems. If the US could be held responsible for imposing dependency on Latin American countries than the same holds true also for the erstwhile Soviet Union which imposed its will upon its satellites like Hungary and Romania (Ibid: 8). So the "common denominator is not capitalism, but simply disparity of power" (ibid. 9).

On foreign investments, Ray argues that both "Dos Santos and Bodenheimer treat foreign investment as a monolithic phenomenon" without any variegated form. For instance they ignore the third type of foreign investment, that is, "investment in enterprises that seek to expand the domestic market". This would definitely have a different impact than investment in extractives or domestic industry and hence on development (ibid. 11). Another area in which recipient countries could gain from international investment is through "acquisition of technology", which could help in increasing the productive efficiency of the country.

One of the most fundamental fallacies, according to Ray, is that it "conceptualises dependency/ non-dependency as a dichotomous variable" rather than as a continuous one. This leads to a zero-sum game where a country is either dependent or not without any intermediate solutions (ibid. 14). But the possibility of non-dependency through a break off from the capitalist system leaves scope for a potentially achievable alternative (ibid. 15). This alternative is, however, limited by

two realities: first, a country could sell what other wants to buy; and secondly, despite a country's ability to sell various items, it tends to specialise in the production of one item in which it is most efficient (ibid. 15-16). As these realities are too difficult to overcome, it is unlikely that underdeveloped countries could break out of the capitalistic market. So should one be pessimistic about this situation? To this Ray's answer is a firm no. Dependency/ non-dependency, according to him, are continuous variables with significant differences in the degree of dependence. This makes possible the case for what Kindelberger terms as "bilateral monopoly", where there is the possibility of reducing dependency by increasing ones relative bargaining strength (ibid. 17).

Internal Structures and Dependency

This section draws from the work of the *dependentistas* discussed in the first section to analyse the role of internal structures in the dependency of the region. For Furtado underdeveloped structures are characterised by 'hybrid structures'. This takes place due to the penetration of capital into 'archaic structures'. The result is the co-existent of both pre-capitalist and capitalist structures which does not interact sufficiently to bring about structural changes; changes which are essential for economic development. Thus, for Furtado, although these hybrid structures are internal to the system, they are predominantly economic in nature. Development, from this perspective, can be achieved by modifying the nature of these structures through government intervention.

For Gunder Frank, internal structures are conditioned and shaped by the appropriation of internal resources through the metropolis-satellite system. To facilitate the process of appropriation, capitalism shapes the internal structure of the satellite economies as an exploitative instrument to extract the maximum surplus. Underdevelopment follows due to the transfer of this surplus from the satellites. dos Santos also concurs with this view. Like Frank, he believes that it is international relations that shape the internal productive structures of underdeveloped countries. These structures are tied unequally between metropolitan and colonial centres; or between advanced and backward sectors (dos Santos 1970: 234). From this perspective, internal structures do not possess dynamics of their own. It is externalities that shape internal structures.

It is Cardoso and Faletto who deals adequately with internal structures in the process of development. They acknowledge the role of social structures in the process of development. These structures are arranged hierarchically to organise the production of material and spiritual life on the principle of domination, which also facilitates unequal appropriation of goods by groups and classes. These structures also change continuously through historical events generated by class struggles, social movements and internal conflicts. They are tied to international structures through internal groups whose interest converge with those of international ones. Capital as an economic form, according to Cardoso and Faletto, is realised through the struggles generated within these internal structures among various groups and classes.

Thus, Furtado perceives 'hybrid' internal structures as economic ills, which can be corrected through economic interventions of the government. Frank and dos Santos perceives them as products of capitalist penetration, which can be corrected by delinking them from the capitalistic mode of development. These approaches ignore the sociological perspective of internal structures; that is, once formed these structures assumes a life of their own, and create an internal dynamics. They can be influenced, but cannot be altered significantly. From this perspective, the arguments of Cardoso and Faletto seem more plausible. Their plausibility lies in their formulation of a dominant hierarchical structure that reproduces itself for the organisation of societies as productive and ethical units. But their emphasis on class conflicts precludes the possibility of other relevant factors which might influence internal structures. In Latin America racism, as a cultural idea, played an important role in shaping internal social structures.

This leads to the question: how is class relation different from race relation? From a Marxian perspective, class relation, as a sociological relation, stratifies societies into the groups of 'haves' and 'have not's'. This relation is determined predominantly by the division of labour in the productive system. The capitalist owning capital and the workers owning labour are integrated to the productive process through the factors they own. At the risk of simplifying complex social relations, it can be stated that such relations predominates in countries which had achieved sufficiently higher rate of industrialisation. Race, on the other hand, is a sociological relation that is shaped and influenced by cultural production. It is cultural beliefs and practices that define race relations. Like class relations, race relations also create

social hierarchies. But the hierarchy created by the latter is much more rigid and fixed than the former. Unlike class relations where one's position in the productive system defines one's occupation, in race relations the cultural production of one's position in the hierarchy defines one's occupation. Race relation, therefore, inhibits both social and economic mobility of the racially inferior ones. Such relations, mediated by culture, predominate mostly in pre-industrial or traditional societies. In Latin America, the limited penetration of the process of industrialisation ensured that race relations dominated over class relations till the second half of the twentieth century in major parts of Latin America.

Cultural processes, as pointed out in the last Chapter, refer to the gamut of cultural practices with which people identifies themselves and, thereby, facilitate their reproduction. Cultural practices which are engendered in cultural processes deeply influence societal behaviour. An important cultural practice that has been continuously reproduced and informally reinforced in Latin America is racism. As an ordering principle it not only organised the social hierarchy, but also reproduced the hierarchy through various socio-cultural processes. Thus, from an institutionalised form during the colonial period, it found expression through informal practices in the post colonial period. This is captured through the 'internal colonial' model of Pablo Casanova. Casanova defines internal colonialism as a social relation, which is structured upon domination and exploitation, between culturally heterogeneous groups. It is different from class domination because it represents domination of one complete population over another, each consisting of different classes. Class relation may enmesh with race relation and can even dilute race relations in the long run. But as Stavenhagen points out that, in an inter-ethnic system, people preserve cultural values in a differentiated manner which requires longer time to dissolve. In fact, race identity may revive and become predominant in relation to class identity under certain conditions.

A closer analysis of the above discussion reflects that racism in Latin America, through various cultural processes, reproduced dominant internal structures. The hierarchy of these internal structures, based on racialised norms, privileged the dominance of the *criollos* and the emerging *mestizos*, but left out a large size of the indigenous and black people from the benefits of development. The hierarchy opened up in a limited way for the vertical ascent of the *mestizos*, but remained immune to

other categories. Whiteness, in short, defined the nature of these hierarchies. This norm has been expanded to accommodate lighter colours, but its essence has remained the same for a long period of time, that is, the practice of discrimination to exercise domination over darker colours. This cultural aspect of Latin American internal structures has been missing from the broader framework of the dependency approach.

To sum up, dependency, as an approach, emerged in the disciplinary realm of economics in Latin America. It expanded and evolved through the works of various *dependentistas* to acquire a more inter-disciplinary form. As a result, it took a broader political economic form, which also included dimensions of sociology. But it left out the role of cultural ideas and its impact on sociological processes. The present Chapter seeks to broaden the horizon by including this aspect through the idea of racism. Racism, transmitted through the process of colonisation, evolved itself within the Latin American context to restructure a social order that privileged the rule of a minority over a large majority. As the society evolved, new contenders to the hierarchy emerged. They were accommodated with the broader essence of the system remaining the same. Thus as an ordering principle, racism exerted an important influence in shaping internal structures. The role of racially mediated internal structures in influencing dependency is discussed in the next Chapter.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Racism, as discussed and analysed in the second Chapter, originated in Europe and spread to the rest of the world through the process of colonisation. One of its manifestations emerged in Latin America through the principle of *Limpezia de Sangre* or 'purity of blood'. This doctrine reorganised colonial, both Spanish and Portuguese, societies on the basis of proto-racial norms. The social hierarchy that emerged privileged people of European origin and their descendants over the indigenous communities. This hierarchy, as the third Chapter argues, continued and persisted into the post-colonial period through various informal structural processes. Importantly, the persistence of a racialised hierarchical structure led to the continuation of dependent social structures. As has been argued, an important internal factor influencing dependency of Latin America has been the persistence of these very complex dependent social structures, which are influenced and shaped by racism. The influence and moulding of these dependent social structures and, thereby, also the structure of dependence, the fourth Chapter argues, largely remains unacknowledged in the various thoughts of dependency.

The present Chapter seeks to synthesise the thoughts, observations and arguments of the previous Chapters under three broad themes to arrive at some broad linkage between a stratified racial worldview and economic dependency. The first theme concerns the idea of racism and its role in shaping and influencing dependent structures. The second theme concerns the relationship between dependent structures and dependency. And, the third concerns the possibility of reading relations between racism and dependency through the capability approach.

Racism and Dependent Structures

Three factors that are important in understanding the background to racism in Latin America are: i) the principle of 'purity of blood' that preceded the period of scientific racism; ii) the Spaniards and the Portuguese formed a minority during the period of colonisation; and iii) the phenomenon of miscegenation that took place throughout the region.

The principle of 'purity of blood', to begin with, was more theological than biological, although somatic features as the colour of the person also played an important role in determining the purity of a person. It was invoked, as was highlighted earlier, to detect, discriminate and exclude the *conversos* and the *moriscos* in the Iberian peninsula, more particularly in Spain after the *Reconquista*. Purity was, thus, inextricably bounded with Christianity. And it was the Church which maintained records and certified people whether they were of 'pure blood' or of 'mixed blood', ascribing thereby a higher status or otherwise in terms of purity in faith. This certification was essential for people who aspired to hold public offices under the Crown. As such, there was a clear collaboration between the Church and the Crown in the formulation and maintenance of a racialised public position and status in the society. This principle transmitted to Latin America with a small variation. In addition to the *conversos* and the *moriscos*, the category of indigenous and blacks were added to the 'excluded' list. In other words, purity implied lack of indigenous and black blood. This principle defined a new set of rules and codes between the rulers and the ruled. The establishment and evolution of this hierarchy enabled the colonisers to enforce social and political order in the colony, and command loyalty from the colonised people. It also facilitated the rule of the minority over the teeming majority, as the colonisers formed only a small section of the colonial population. When the phenomenon of miscegenation blurred the distinction over time between the colonisers and the colonised, marriage rules became more stringent and increasing recourse was taken to endogamy to protect the 'blood line' by the late colonial elites.

The Wars of Independence witnessed the rise of a new group that had remained, relatively, obscure and despised during the colonial period. This new group was that of the *mestizos*. Their role in military campaigns and their military ability created a new genre of military *caudillos*. With the disappearance of the Crown as the source of overarching authority, central power dissipated into the hands of powerful regional *caudillos*. Much of Spanish Americas' internal squabbles in the immediate aftermath of the post-Independence period owe its origin to the dissipation of this central power and the rise of military 'strongmen'.

Three structures of power emerged in the post-colonial period in Spanish America: i) the traditional *Hacienda/ Latifundia*, which replaced the colonial *encomienda* system, in the hinterlands; ii) the national oligarchy in the urban areas;

and, iii) in Mexico, the local *caciques* (rural leaders), who acted as intermediaries to the *Haciendas/ Latifundias* and the oligarchy. There was substantial overlapping between the first two structures, as powerful *hacendados/ latifundistas* also formed a part of the national oligarchy. These three power structures combined together to shape the nature of the political system, the path of economic development, and the nature of social relation that was to be maintained. The combination took shape in the form of various alliances negotiated and sustained on the basis of political ideologies, which was also mediated through various forms of social and economic interest.

The above power structures were undergirded by two broad social structures: i) patrimonialism; and, ii) clientelism that tied sections of the society in a hierarchical clientelistic network with the patron, i.e., caudillo and the regional bosses. These two dependent structures shaped, influenced and modified national politics in most of the Latin American countries. These structures were dependent because they relied primarily on states resources for their survival without enhancing the state resource base. Lack of resources or state intervention at redistributive efforts shifted the dynamic coalition, leading to political reshuffles, purges, exiles or even military coups.

These structures were not only dependent but also hierarchically organised along racial lines. Although the doctrine of purity of blood was disparaged, after Independence in almost all the countries, soon older forms of racial discrimination reappeared in more subtle forms. For instance, Peru and Bolivia re-imposed the colonial head tax on the Indians. In fact, 80 per cent Bolivia's state revenues between 1835 and 1865 came from this source (Donghi 1993: 99). During the second half of the nineteenth century, states encroached upon large tracts of indigenous 'communal' lands for expanding export production. This 'land grabbing' process resulted in the displacement of thousands of indigenous people from their lands, reducing many of them to perpetual servitude in the newly formed *Haciendas*. Credit discrimination at various institutional levels was also practiced on the basis of ethnic backgrounds. The racial organisation of the dependent structures led to disproportionate appropriation of state's largesse by the privileged groups, thereby marginalising a substantial majority from the fruits of economic growth.

Dependent Structures and Dependency

Dependentistas, both from the reformist and Marxist approaches (as Cristobal Kay classified them), argue that capitalist development assumed particular form in Latin American countries (Kay 1989: 129). An important derivation which can be drawn from this proposition is that capitalist penetration does not lead to automatic homogenisation of the production structure. This is because the penetrative power of capital is always mediated through different socio-cultural structures. These structures mould capital and give it a unique form. Capital too influences these structures, but with certain limitations. Limitation on capital is placed by the nature of a given social structure, and the values and practices which reproduce or maintain the said structure. Unless the structure and its conforming values and practices change, the desired transformation from a traditional to a capitalist form of society does not occur. It may also be the case that societies when they follow the capitalist mode of development, maintain social structures and observe practices which work to the contrary. For instance, the *hacienda* system, based on patrimonialism, was geared to a mode of production which was outward looking and export oriented, but relied on a system of labour, that is hereditarily bonded, which inhibited the integration of labour in that very mode of production. This immobile system, which was based on the 'racial' birthright of *hacendados* to utilise indigenous labour for the latter's presumed inferiority, stood in contradiction to the need of a mobile and trained labour force as is demanded by the capitalist system. Similarly, industry in Latin America, instead of being in the hands of innovative entrepreneurs, was a family business of the propertied elites. The enterprising ability of these industrialists was due not to continued innovation but to state patronage. Their proximity to the ruling elites, through clientelism (through both horizontal and vertical relations), enabled them to extract various benefits from the state and also acquire necessary foreign capital and technology.

Thus, dependent structures reinforced dependency not only internally, but also externally. Inherent inability of the industrial structure to diversify itself and generate adequate investible surplus posed two problems for the state: i) it had to rely on primary exports to meet its revenue needs, leading to the persistence of the *Haciendas*; and, ii) to meet the needs and demands of different sectors of the economy, including the inefficient industrial one, the state either had to resort to

deficit (or inflationary) financing or rely on external borrowings to finance its development projects. Both the processes led to greater instability and perpetuate external dependence.

Racism and Dependency

One probable grey zone for further analyses and exploration of the relation between dependency and racism is provided by the ‘capability approach’³⁰, as was expounded by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. For Amartya Sen (2000), development, in its broadest sense, should lead to “the expansion of the ‘capabilities’ of persons to lead the kind of lives they value – and have reasons to value” (ibid: 18). Capability enhancement through expanded freedoms has both an intrinsic and an instrumental value. Intrinsically, existence of substantive freedom provides the rationale for people to value the choices they make. The instrumental role lies in enabling people to make necessary changes within internal structures; changes that leads to a self-sustaining development trajectory. This is possible, to Sen, only through freedoms which enhance the capabilities of individuals.

Sen’s approach serves a dual purpose. On the one hand, they encourage individuals to be active partners in the process of economic development, raising their stakes (what he terms as ‘value’) in it. On the other hand, by enhancing the agency of members, these freedoms empower societal members to bring about necessary changes in the developmental structure through negotiated settlements within the structure.

In Latin America, the debate between the reformists and Marxists *dependentistas* has revolved around some of the broader issues of change (or development). The reformists were interested in inducing change (or development) through changes within the capitalist structure, whereas the Marxists or neo-Marxists were interested in inducing change through socialist revolution by overthrowing the capitalist structure. The only similarity between them is their emphasis on the role of capital and their perspectives on development. As is discussed earlier, economic growth and, as such, development was conceived, by the *dependentistas*, as growth in

³⁰ This approach was initially developed by Martha Nussbaum in her work “Nature, Function and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution” in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* (1988). It was further developed in her subsequent work with Sen, *The Quality of Life* (1993). Here, we focus more on Sen’s work *Development as Freedom* (2000).

national income. Dependency is a product of the inability of national economies to produce that surplus income for financing further developmental activities. Sen considers this view as imprisoning oneself into a 'little box' (Sen 2000: 289). For him, rise in income per capita is a necessary, as it helps in achieving other freedoms, but not a sufficient condition for development. This approach not only ignores the distributional aspect, but also aspects of other critical freedoms like participation in the political process. Absence of these freedoms also has an important bearing on the developmental process. Latin America, again, is an example. Despite experiencing periodic booms, these countries had failed to translate the resources of those periods as engines of future development due to structural rigidities emanating from the socio-cultural realm. These structural rigidities, Sen would argue, entails number of unfreedoms which should be overcome to attain self-sustained growth.

Sen's approach, thus, throws some important light on the role of socio-cultural structures which inhibited the process of development or, from a Latin American perspective, exacerbated dependency. These structures, mediated and moulded by racialised ideas, created internal structures of dependency within the region's societies, thereby increasing the possibilities of external dependence. Unless these structures did change, possibilities of political instability and neo-dependence continued to persist. From this perspective, metamorphosis of racism served both an intrinsic and an instrumental purpose in furthering the cause of dependency and entrenched dependent social structures which scuttled any possibility of participation through substantive freedoms. Racism in Latin America is associated with a long cultural tradition of exclusion, marginalisation, discrimination and domination, and structures of patrimonialism and clientelism.

In conclusion, the relationship between racism and dependency is not a direct one. They are connected to each other through varied dependent but dynamic socio-cultural structures. Again, socio-cultural structures are influenced by various factors and 'racism' is just one of them. The influence of racism lies in the ordering principle of the societal structure. The fact that racism in Latin America has played an important role in the constitution of a dominant hierarchical structure is an evident one. Economic development and political changes has shrunk some of that influence, but the ordering principle has enabled elites in the hierarchy to retain its dominance. This explains the persistence of dependency dynamics in the region notwithstanding

changes in the forms of industrialisation, urbanisation, social mobility, and birth of new classes, more importantly middle and working classes, and political changes, i.e., spread of democratic processes and socialistic experiments. Whether racism influenced dependency or dependency influenced racism are issues that require further probe. The effort here lies in unearthing these linkages to set a framework for further exploration.

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