

**THE POLITICS OF TRADE: THE ENGLISH  
EAST INDIA COMPANY IN KATHIAWAD  
AND KUTCH 1784-1810**

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University  
in partial fulfilment of the requirements  
for the Degree of*

**MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

**NANDINI S. BHATTACHARYA**

**CENTRE FOR HISTORICAL STUDIES  
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY  
NEW DELHI-110067  
INDIA  
1995**

*Dedicated to*

*Baba & Ma.*

*whose love has been unconditional*



जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय  
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY  
NEW DELHI-110067

CENTRE FOR HISTORICAL STUDIES  
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

**Certificate**

Certified that the dissertation entitled **The Politics of Trade: The English East India Company in Kathiawad and Kutch-1784-1810** submitted by **Nandini S. Bhattacharya** is in partial fulfilment for the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of this University. This dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University and is her own work.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiner for evaluation.

**Prof. B.D. Chattopadhyay**  
Chairperson

**Prof. Dilbagh Singh**  
Supervisor

---

## CONTENTS

---

*Page*

### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

INTRODUCTION ..... 1-10

#### Chapter 1

TERRAIN, TRADE, POLITICS:  
HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIPS ..... 11-43

#### Chapter 2

PROVINCES AND POLITICS:  
THE ANTECEDENTS ..... 44-57

#### Chapter 3

RESPONSES AND NEGOTIATIONS :  
ENCOUNTERING THE COMPANY IN  
KUTCH AND KATHIAWAR ..... 58-113

CONCLUSION ..... 114-117

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..... 118-121

APPENDIX ..... 122

LIST OF MAPS ..... 123

## *Acknowledgements*

*I am indebted to my supervisor Prof. Dilbagh Singh for his meticulous attention and his patience with my efforts in the course of this work.*

*I am deeply grateful to Dr. L. Subramanian of Calcutta University. She took a personal interest in my work and encouraged me to raise the questions that form the basis of this enquiry.*

*I have also benefitted from discussions with Prof. Sabherwal, Prof. Mukhia, Dr. Rajat Datta and Dr. Seema Alavi of CHS, JNU, and from Prof M.J. Mehta of Gujarat University.*

*Most of the research for this dissertation has been done in the National Library, Calcutta, Nehru Memorial Library, New Delhi, and Maharashtra State Archives, Bombay. I thank the staff of all these institutions for their cooperation.*

*My parents and brother have encouraged me always. Tanu has lived this work as much as I. Pratik has shared my work and my fears and disappointments. Samira, Prashant, Rochana, Shalini have had faith in me despite their better judgements. Avinash, Nayana, Udai, Mahesh and Uma have made the formal submission of this work possible.*

*I also thank M/s. A.P. Computers for the painstaking efforts which went into the typing of the manuscript.*

*Nandini S. Bhattacharya*

## INTRODUCTION

This work is an account of the politics of the English East Indian Company's penetration in peninsular Gujarat and Kutch from the last two decades of the eighteenth century onwards. The trade of Gujarat was beginning to orient itself towards the Company's part of Bombay from the latter half of the century. In this period the Company emerged as the dominant political power in western India. The patterns of trade and the trading world of Gujarat had undergone several notable changes in the course of the eighteenth century. In its first two decades, the great trades of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, connecting Surat with networks of merchants, brokers and weavers to far inland into the Gangatic doab and other parts of the Mughal empire, had declined. A Dasgupta has admirably explored the processes of the decline of Surat and the changed world of the shipowner - merchant of Surat in this period.<sup>1</sup>

As he has pointed out, "Coastal Gujarat has always been the home of one major oceanic port, supported by a string of others. This principal port was Cambay in the 17th century, Surat in the 18th."<sup>2</sup> The smaller ports of Kathiawad such as

- 
1. A. Dasgupta, Indian Merchants and the Decline of Surat, Weisbaden, 1979.
  2. ibid, p.1.

Diu, Rander, Gogha were chiefly though not solely transit points for the coastal trade. By the latter half of the 18th century, Bombay had emerged as the major emporium in western India. The character of the trade of Surat had changed to a great degree. Its major exports were no longer indigo or textile manufactures. Most of its exports began to be concentrated on funneling raw cotton to Bombay to be reexported by the English merchants. The other ports in the Gulf of Cambay and Kutch were similarly functioning as the satellite ports of Bombay.

In the eighteenth century, moreover, the Company emerged as one of the contenders for political power in western India. The Bombay Presidency was a back water for much of the period. But from the 1780s onwards, the rapid increase in the Company's China trade yielded enormous profits and was the principal motivation for its drive towards territorial acquisitions in Gujarat. Pamela Nightingale has argued that it was the interests of the private traders, principally the English agency houses, that directed the course of the Company's acquisitions of fertile cotton growing areas, and the strategic outlets on the coastline.<sup>3</sup> The regions of Kathiawad and Kutch assumed

---

3. P.Nightingale, Trade and Empire in Western India, Cambridge, 1970.

importance to the Company in the last two decades of the eighteenth century in this context.

Nightingale has further argued that though the then Governor of Bombay in his letters to the Governor General justified the Company's annexations in Gujarat and the subsidiary alliance with the Gaekwad of Baroda in terms of countering such threats on the western coast, attempts to control the ports of Gujarat, Kathiawad and Kutch were directed by commercial, not strategic considerations. She has used mainly the records of the East India Company, besides several selections of private papers and correspondences of the Company officials and private traders.

Nightingale provides one with a fairly comprehensive understanding of the network of the Company and the private trading interests that was a feature of the Bombay Presidency till the turn of the century. There was by 1806 a "conflict of interests" between the English private traders and "the once homogeneous society of civil servants governing in the interests of their own private trade had been gradually breaking up since the turn of the century, and the triumph of the shipping interest in the Court of Directors made absolute the divisions between those who wanted to serve the commercial interests of the Directors



and those who wanted to serve their own".<sup>4</sup>

That the Company's political influence in peninsular Gujarat and Kutch was paramount is undisputable. The attempt here has been to study these regions through their trading networks in the period of the Company's political incursions there. One has focussed on the interactions of the Company's interventions. In this period, the Company's thrusts were towards annexations, "settlements", and pacificifications.

Nightingale perceives the course of the Company's interventions thus: "Even if the immediate problems of peace and security could be overcome the territory had to be developed economically and opened to trade; settlements of cultivations had to be organised, roads built, ports opened capital invested and a whole agricultural and commercial community built from a waste land. This scheme demanded British military force and administration."<sup>5</sup> (Emphasis mine)

The attempt in the face of such assertions is to locate the political penetration of the Company in the period from the context of local networks of trade and the dynamics of political power in Kutch and Kathiawad. One has tried to understand the interactions of political elements in Kutch

---

4. ibid, p.230.

5. ibid, p.239.

and Kathiawad with the Company and their response to its agenda of directing the trade of the region to its specific needs.

This was centred mostly around the control of the ports and harbours on the coastline. In Kathiawad, the Company effected the regularising of the Gaekwad's revenues. The mulkgiri expeditions were stopped. A great deal of information on the nature of the terrain, descriptions of forts, the numbers of armed retainers at every village was compiled. Much attention was given to the problem of piracy on the coastline. One has tried to study the responses of the chieftains of peninsular Gujarat and Kutch and their attitudes towards the Bombay Marine's claims to the complete control over the coastal waters of the Gulfs of Cambay and Kutch.

M.N. Pearson has studied the responses of political powers in Gujarat to the Portuguese attempts to direct the shipping of the coast to its own ports in the sixteenth century and to monopolise the trade of selected commodities and routes.<sup>6</sup> He has argued that there was a gap between Portuguese policy and practice. They were unable to enforce

---

6. M.N. Pearson, Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat: The Response to Portuguese in the 16th Century, New Delhi, 1976.

their monopolies on the Indian Ocean. They did succeed in controlling the entrances to the harbour in the Gulf of Cambay. But their cartaze system was used for generating revenue rather than controlling trade per se. Besides, private Portuguese traders traded in partnership with Asian merchants and" were in no way distinguishable within the very heterogeneous trading world of Indian Ocean in the sixteenth century."<sup>7</sup>

In the latter half of the eighteenth century, however, the English Company's control of trade in western Indian impinged much more on the politics and the trading world of our region. Particularly so after its treaties with the Peshwa and the Gaekwad when it made its territorial inroads in Gujarat. The nature of its political influence was very different from the Estado da India of the Portuguese which had merely possessed a string of strategic forts and harbours in the Indian Ocean.

There was no distinction between the empire of the ocean and the empire of the continent in the late eighteenth century. The politics of the passes issued to the ships on these ports therefore had deeper implications. It was not

---

7. M.N. Pearson, "India and the Indian Ocean in the Sixteenth Century", in A.Das Gupta and M.N. Pearson ed., Indian and the Indian Ocean 1500-1800, OUP, 1987, pp.71-94.

only a means of generating revenues for the Company. The English pass issued to all the vessels in the Company's ports implied the Bombay Marine's attempt to streamline the trade on the western coast. The other aspect of the Company's political programme was to rid the hinterlands of the coastal outlets in peninsular Gujarat and Kutch of lawlessness and banditry.

In the process, the Company had to negotiate with the coastal chieftains as well as those in the interior of the peninsula. One has tried to explore the points of conflicts and compromises of these chieftains. It is necessary to point out here that the chieftains were not the only political elements in the region. The coastal pirates also possessed small fortified harbours and a few country crafts and issued passes to the trading vessels in the nearby ports. All ships which did not take recourse to their passes were potentially vulnerable to their raids. Besides, there were large areas in central and northern Kathiawad and in Kutch inhabited by the Kolis and the "Wagads" -all classed as bandits by the Company. The Kathis and the Kolis inhabited the Central parts of Kathiawad and made the inland roads passing through to Ahmedabad in Gujarat unsafe. The "pacifying" expeditions of the Company had to contend with them. One has tried to understand the Company's eventual political dominance in these regions in terms of the responses of the local political elements in this period.

There is also the question of the position of the traders of political power in the region. L.Subramanian and M. Torri have studied the relationship of the merchants and brokers in Surat in the eighteenth century. L.Subramanian has argued that it was at this politically turbulent transition period that some sections of Indian traders (shore-based merchants, not ship owners), the banias of Surat looked increasingly to the Company for political patronage.<sup>8</sup> She has further argued that the Company utilised the resources of the Surat banking families to service and finance its political projects. This alliance she had termed the "Anglo-Bania order" which began with the "Castle Revolution" of 1759 when the Banias of Surat petitioned the Company to take over the Castle of Surat.

One has tried to understand the position of the traders of Kutch and Kathiawad who were linked in a complex network with the coastal pirates and the chieftains in this period.

Finally, the trade and politics of peninsular Gujarat and Kutch have been demarcated in terms that are some what distinct from those in mainland Gujarat. These distinctions have been made on the basis of the geographical

---

8. L.Subramanian, "The West Coast of India - The Eighteenth Century", Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Viswabharati University, 1984. I am obliged to Dr. L.Subramanian for allowing me to refer to her Ph.D. Thesis.

particularities and political formations of Kutch and Kathiawad.

The first chapter maps the terrain and trade routes of Kathiawad and Kutch and traces the historical relationship with the political formations in the two regions, distinguishing them from mainland Gujarat.

The second chapter is a sketch of the chieftaindoms of Kathiawad and Kutch. One has sought to understand the ways in which the politics of the region affected its trade.

The third chapter is in three sections. The first traces the growth of the Company's motivations for the thrusts towards Kathiawad and Kutch. The second section describes the Company's attempts to neutralise piracy on the coast and the resistances towards their efforts. The third section explores the network of interests of the chieftains and merchants on the coast over their points of negotiation with the Company. An epilogue traces the narrative to the nineteenth century and discusses the British Government's efforts to regulate the trade in the region.

The construction of the narrative has been directed by the nature of the archival sources at one's disposal. Mostly they comprise the records of the English East India Company preserved in the Maharashtra State Archives. Two specific series have been consulted: the Commercial Department

Diaries and the Political and Secret-Department Diaries.<sup>9</sup>

The other sources are printed, and from a slightly later period. They are surveys and reports from the 1850s onwards conducted by the British Government on the ecology of peninsular Gujarat, and reports on the regulations in Kathiawad and Kutch by the British government.<sup>10</sup>

One realises that it is problematic to use the Company's records to historicise the perceptions and attitudes of resistance. Therefore, the conflicts, negotiations and compromises of the local chieftains, traders and pirates have been looked at from the Company's perspectives. One has focused on those points of interaction which the Company had focussed on and had recorded. This leaves one with silences with respect to many aspects of the problem. The politics of coastal trade has been marked but, not that of the inland trading networks. A more in depth study of the economy of the hinterlands, the trading operations of the traders are two aspects that had to be ignored.

---

<sup>9</sup> The Commercial Department Diaries and the Political Department Diaries comprise of letters and consultations to and from Bombay to its factories in Cambay, Baroda, Muscat, Surat etc. They also contain the minutes of meetings by the Governor in Bombay. Through the letters one senses the numerous twists and turns the confrontations and negotiations with the chieftains and pirates had taken.

<sup>10</sup> Though none of them date before the eighteenth century they have been used to form an idea of the geographical aspects of the regions in the eighteenth century. The government reports moreover enables one to take a glimpse though fleetingly, at the continued patterns of defiance of the government's regulations in the nineteenth century.

## CHAPTER 1

### TERRAIN, TRADE, POLITICS: HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIPS

There were then, as there are still, three rather different Gujarats, only with the backward technology of the times the differences seemed greater. To begin with, there was coastal Gujarat, marshy, irregular, often broken by estuaries of the rivers and dotted with tidal flats which were submerged in the high tide. This strictly speaking, was not a habitat proper for the merchants. It was peopled by the truly maritime men who fished and who sailed the vessels on which trade depended. The coastal cities usually stood back a little and positioned themselves where the marshes met the plains, especially the plains of central and southern Gujarat. This Gujarat of the plains was the true territory of the merchant and for their trade. Much of it was encircled in the north, south and east by hills.... In the river valleys, especially along the Narmada and Tapi, you encountered the famous black soil belts so kind to the cultivation of cotton. But it was a constricted world, nowhere wider than it was to the south of Baroda, which was 125 km. In Gujarat you would not leave the plains for towering mountains, but the ground would rise, turn rocky and overgrown with forests, if you ventured anywhere far into the interior. The merchants and their trade moved along the rivers though not necessarily on them...The rocky ravines were not only inhospitable, they were hostile, threatening travellers with banditry.<sup>1</sup>

The province of Gujarat, a Mughal Suba at the period that Dasgupta alludes to was in this way demarcated by him in terms of its trade. Through his distinctions between three rather different Gujarats one senses the primacy of one particular area of the Suba, the region between

---

1. A. Dasgupta, Indian Merchants and the Decline of Surat, Weisbaden, 1979, p.2.



Ahmedabad and Surat, 'mainland' Gujarat, as it were. Within this area the famed intricate textiles of Gujarat were woven, indigo was produced and it was here that:

the produce of much of northern and western India, including some pumped into Indian communications from Central Asia, would be gathered in the Gujarati port city (of Surat) and moved out into the Indian Ocean....The Indian Ocean, supported again partly by the Atlantic Ocean, since the sixteenth century, would convey its produce and its money to Gujarat's port to be funneled into the system of production and distribution stretching away towards the heat of the continent.<sup>2</sup>

This was how Ashin Dasgupta demarcated the Mughal suba of Gujarat and its premier port, Surat in the 17th century. Of the two chief land routes to Surat, one was through Burhanpur through subas Malwa and Agra. The second was to the north, through the major manufacturing towns of Gujarat - Cambay, Bharuch, Baroda, Ahmedabad, through Udaipur and Jaipur in Rajasthan to Delhi and Agra. The areas beyond the region one has demarcated as mainland Gujarat were to a great extent the domains of several petty chieftaindoms which ringed the directly administered imperial areas.

The distinct divisions of the area that forms the single state of Gujarat today have long histories. This is what a historian says of Chalukyan Gujarat (C.941-1297)

in ancient times, western India comprised three different provinces differently named Saurashtra, Anartta, and Lata. Except in the case of

---

2. ibid., p.1.

Saurashtra, which was the name of the whole peninsula, the boundaries of Anartta and Lata were mentioned....during the thirteenth century, a large part of Gujarat was famous as the territory of Gujarat, but did not include Lata and Saurashtra which continued to maintain their separate political identities. Only in the fourteenth century, when the Mohamedans conquered northern and southern Gujarat along with Saurashtra and governed them from there provincial headquarters at Anhilapura, the term Gujarat came to be applied to the whole region. <sup>3</sup>

He goes on to demarcate Gujarat into the plains of central Gujarat north of the river Mahi, Saurashtra and Kutch, which are grouped together as the western half of Gujarat, southern Gujarat that is the land south of the river Mahi up Darvan and further south upto Thana, and fourthly, the vast coastline extending from the Gulf of Kutch in the north west to Thana in the south. He goes on to assume a homogeneity of sorts, nevertheless:

Though these divisions differ widely in their soil agriculture, and people, they present a homogenous region with common tradition and culture having a strong inclination towards trade and commerce .<sup>4</sup>

This wide and irrelevant sweep is justified inadequately:

---

3. V.K. Jain, Trade and Traders in Western India (A.D. 1000-1300), New Delhi, 1990, pp.10-11.

4. ibid., p.11.

The whole region differs widely, climatically and geologically, though in its physical evolution it may be treated as one unit with features and characteristics remarkably distinct from those of its neighbours of the peninsular interior and the central provinces. Its orientation towards the sea in the west along with routes through the northern and eastern ranges and the alluvial plains in the centre and along the coast give it the ideal setting for the development of trade and commerce. <sup>5</sup>

One would submit that neither homogeneity in purely geographical terms, nor ecologically determined demarcations are helpful in an understanding of a region.<sup>6</sup> Surat in the seventeenth century burgeoned into a major port of call as well as one of redistribution in the context of Gujarat being incorporated into the Mughal empire.

The fact that at one time, Surat's hinterland stretched to Delhi, Agra, Lahore or Patna, has had direct connections with the establishment of Mughal rule over the Indo-Gangetic doab and beyond. The frontiers of trade are not entirely autonomous of political sovereignty. Or, to state one's problem, defining a region through its trade involves the locating of the region politically as well.

---

5. ibid., p.10.

6. Lucien Febvre, A Geographical Introduction to History, Lionel Batallion, London, 1925, Reprinted 1950.

Chalukyan Gujarat had Anhilwada as its capital. Cambay was its chief port. Gujarat mandala, the land ruled by the Chalukyas, included the towns of Anhilapura, Stambhatirtta, Cambay, Darbhavati or Dabhoi, and Dhavalaka or Dholka. Neither southern Gujarat or Lata, nor the Stambhatirtta peninsula or Kutch, the isolation of which was even more marked were ever their seats of power.

The annexation of the Chalukyan Kingdom by the Sultanate of Delhi in 1297 did not significantly change the areas of imperial control. Anhilwad Patan remained the provincial capital; there appears to have been no large scale overthrowing of Rajput power or establishment of political control over territories beyond those of mainland Gujarat. "The Turks succeeded in breaking down the apex of the Rajput power structure...but not its power echelons. Important and powerful Rajput strongholds remained hostile and unsubdued; the whole of Saurashtra (then known by the Prakritised name of Sorath) continued to be virtually unaffected, except for passing raids. Even for the plains the smaller Rajput landholders remained undisturbed, on the acknowledgment of the suzerainty of the new rulers and the payment of tribute".<sup>7</sup>

---

7. S.C. Mishra, Rise of Muslim Power in Gujarat, Baroda, 1963, p.66.

A more determined effort at consolidation of imperial power from Ahmedabad followed with the establishment of the independent Sultanate of Gujarat (1407 A.D.). However, throughout its history, till it was finally annexed to the Mughal empire in 1572, the Sultanate had to contend with the Rajput Kingdoms of Jalor, Idar, Nandod~~and~~ Champaner (till Mahmud Begada finally reduced it and made it his capital). This apart from the politically distinct Sorath and Kutch which were raided, but never permanently held.

This is how, historically, mainland Gujarat had remained the centre of political power and at least in the Mughal times the focal point of economic activity. Sorath, and certainly remote Kutch were in many ways peripheral to the structure of political power in Gujarat. The political marginalisation of these two regions was one aspect of their distinctiveness. Some of the other aspects were in commercial terms.

So far one has discussed Kutch and Kathiawad in terms of their relative isolation from mainland Gujarat. This is not to say that these two regions were homogenous in themselves. Though contiguous, they were distinct from each other.

Kathiawad is the peninsular part of Gujarat. Interrupted by forests, ridged in by hills, its face towards

the sea dotted by hundreds of small bunders, Kathiawad in our period was as diverse in its physical aspects as it was numerous in its chieftaindoms.

Kutch on the other hand was all but an island cut off almost entirely from peninsular Gujarat by the desert stretch of the Rann. It had a seaboard to its south, the river Indus to the west and an expanse of desert that stretched up to Sindh to the north. Its political autonomy from regional powers -the Gujarat Sultanate or later the empire building Mughals was even more pronounced. However, the rule of one Rajput clan over the entire region after the twelfth century gave its polity relatively more apparent stability than Kathiawad.

The Maratha raids on Gujarat had begun with Shivaji's sacks of the city of Surat first in 1664 and then again in 1670. These were followed by repeated incursions into the Suba of Gujarat until, with the surrender of Ahmedabad to the Marathas by the Mughal governor in 1758, even the semblances left of Mughal authority over Gujarat came to an end. The sovereignty over (and the revenues of) Gujarat was shared then between the Gaekwads who went on to base themselves in Baroda and their nominal overlord, the Peshwa. However, Maratha sway over Gujarat as also Kathiawad was even more tenuous than that of the Mughals. As has been pointed out,

This political revolution...had been slowly in operation for over a generation prior to 1758, and had been so gradual that the new order, including the transfer of power from the Mughal to the Maratha, appeared, when it finally established itself, were in the nature of an evolutionary process than a revolutionary transformation .<sup>8</sup>

There were several areas - vast tracts in the Kathiawad peninsula as well as closer, in the mainland, which were not even formally under Maratha rule. Among the chieftaindoms that declared their independence were Radhanpur, Balasinor, Cambay, Surat, Bharuch, Palanpur.

The Gaekwads did not seek to annex parts of the Kathiawad peninsula. A large part of the revenues of the state of Baroda came from the peninsula. The collection of revenue was not however in accordance with a well organised revenue collection mechanism. Revenue was collected in Kathiawad through the imposition of chauth. Every year, just before the harvest, the Gaekwad's armies would raid the chieftaindoms of the peninsula. If the demands for chauth were not met with, the countryside would often be ravaged.

Therefore authority over the terrain of Kathiawad was never a part of the agenda of the state of Baroda. Its de

---

8. M.S. Commissariat, History of Gujarat, vol.2, 1957, p.560.





facto control over the region was of course even more tenuous and its assumptions over the revenues of the chieftaindoms of Kathiawad more precarious than that of the Mughal state.

The relative political autonomy of Kathiawad vis a vis the politics of Gujarat was thus a continuous element in its history. We have seen how politically, Kathiawad remained peripheral to Gujarat: remote, inhospitable even hostile.

The peripherality of Kathiawad with respect to mainland Gujarat thus was an intermesh of its terrain and its interactions with succeeding dominant political power in Gujarat.

Yet the peninsula was linked to mainland Gujarat on the one hand and Kutch and Sindh on the other helped sometimes by the physical aspects of its long coastline, for one. Often these communications were maintained despite the terrain and the obstructions they imposed.

One shall now try to examine some of these links and the contexts in which they were sustained in the eighteenth century.


The peninsula of Kathiawad jutted out from the straight line of the Gujarat coast with the Gulf of Kutch to its north and the open Arabian Sea to its west and south.

Through a belt of salt land in the east which during the rains was flooded, caravans until the early part of the nineteenth century passed through to reach the Gulf of Cambay.<sup>9</sup> The long jagged coastline made possible the existence of several ports and harbours. Some of these were small, called, baras, which could accommodate only small country crafts (hodas). Others were larger through which plied bigger ships carrying several hundreds of tonnages

Other networks of local trade were made possible through these ports - Ghogha, Dhollera, Bhavnagar, Mangrol, Porbandar, Veraval, to name a few. These were distinct from their utility as 'satellite ports' catering to the redistributive networks of the premier ports -Surat and Bombay, increasingly so in later periods. The term 'local networks' has been used to distinguish the trade of the small ports that were linked to each other along the western coast in exchange for commodities such as ghee, grain as well as cloth, spices etc. These sea trading networks linked the ports of Makran ,Kutch, the smaller ports of Gujarat, down the coast to Malabar. The supplement to the Mirat, for instance, lists 27 ports and 45 baras in the suba of Gujarat.

---

9. Imperial Gazetteer of India, (Provincial), Bombay Presidency, vol.2, (First Published, Calcutta, 1909), New Delhi, 1985, p.346. Henceforth Imperial Gazetteer 1909.




The commodities of trade of the Kathiawad hinterlands were chiefly cotton, cattle, and some grain exported mostly through these coastal ports of which more than one third are located on the coastline.<sup>10</sup> It had been the conventional notion that though blessed with a long coastline, the Kathiawad peninsula did not possess any large ports that could draw from a vaster hinterland or harbour ships trading in the larger Indian Ocean network due to its shallow creeks and jagged coastline.<sup>11</sup> That was one aspect of the history of the ports of Kathiawad that they were not politically powerful enough to develop a port that could sustain wider maritime networks. Particularly so when there were powerful contenders from rival ports in Cambay and Surat in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and in Bombay from the eighteenth century. One instance of how political power did intervene decisively, independent of geographical contours, is that of Diu. The port of Diu off the Gulf of Cambay in the Kathiawad peninsula was in the domains of the Sultanat of Gujarat in the sixteenth century. The governor of Diu, Malik Ayaz, had relative autonomy; and the source of his power was the revenues from the port of Diu which was

---

10. Supplement to the Mirat-i-Ahmadi, Ali Mohamud Khan, tr. Nawab Ali and C. N. Seddon, Baroda, 1924, pp.229-230. Henceforth Supplement Mirat-i-Ahmadi.

11. Imperial Gazetteer, 1909, p.347.



21


TH-5453

rapidly flourishing during his tenure. This was the period of Portuguese armed intervention in the Indian Ocean. Malik Ayaz had considerable interest in the revenues of Diu and had taken some steps to develop the trade of two ports. Malik Ayaz resisted Portuguese attempts to monopolise trade through armed conflict which culminated in 1509 when the Portuguese armada defeated a combined Gujarati and Egyptian fleet.<sup>12</sup> The Portuguese made every ship on the coastline stop once at Diu so that they could collect customs from it. Diu owed much of its prosperity to the political power of the Portuguese.

The Kathiawad peninsula in our period thus, did possess a few major ports and several small harbours. However, there was no definite continuity. Some ports assumed particular importance in the mid-eighteenth century such as Bhavnagar, which was a relatively new port. Others like Mangrol or Veraval were reduced to sheltering smaller country crafts and fishing boats. This is not to suggest that these fluctuations and disruptions were arbitrary but only to point out the interactions of several determinants—political, geographical and commercial which together contributed to the patterns of trade in the region.

---

12. M.N. Pearson, Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat, New Delhi, 1976.



72°

There was another aspect to its coastline - its small inlets and creeks were possibilities for safe shelters for smaller crafts and these were used in Kathiawad for centuries to conduct piracy (Kathiawad had a long tradition of piracy). The Arab traders had complained of piracy on this coastline since the tenth century. The Gujarat Sultanat too had to contend with them. These pirates controlled very little territory, never more than a few villages at the mouth of a few inlets and harbours. The English East India Company records marked these groups of villages as "piratical states" -these were hardly small thakurdaris. The population of these villages were classified as "Piratical Castes". Inhabited by a few thousand people each, they were an important aspect of the trading of the region. Their small vessels had the advantages of agility and manouverability on the coastline and trading vessels had to contend with them as they did with the nature of the coastline itself.

Moving further away from the coastline, some trade routes traversed through difficult forest areas and rocky terrain controlled by Bhils and Kolis, all of whom were classed as bandits by the Company records. Often the Bhils and the Kolis spilled from the Gir forest or beyond the valley ridges of the Girnar and plundered neighbouring cultivated fields. They also disrupted the few land routes

that linked the peninsula to the mainland. Further, north beyond Jhalawad and Wadhwan stretched the marshy salt desert of the little Rann which met the arm of the Gulf of Kutch that separated the peninsula from Kutch. Land routes to Kutch and Sindh were difficult of access. They were more easily reached by the country craft which moved along the coastline dotted with numerous ports and harbours.

Of the few land routes, one passed from Wadhwan in Jhalawad in the northern part of the peninsula to Ahmedabad passing through Shahpur and Sarkhej. The ports on the Gulf of Cambay-Dhollera, Ghoga, Dhanduka, and later, Bhavnagar and Ratlau, the hinterlands of which extended to Jhalawad in the north. Hallar in the north west, had a few land routes that passed through Sindh and from Wadhwan through Vivelia, Paliad, Ranpur and Dhanduka to Dhollera. There was also a land route of some importance from Gohelwad in the south-east to Ahmedabad, through Dhollera, Dhanduka, Varnala and Siler again parts of which were sparsely populated, forested and rocky. This route was nevertheless important for the pilgrims to Palitana traversed through it. From the mid- eighteenth century onwards, when the bulk consignments of raw cotton became the most important commodity of trade, these land routes appear to have been less utilised. The ports Dhollera, Dhanduka and Bhavnagar



channelised most of the trade. The opening of several railway lines in the mid-nineteenth century, after colonial intervention, had again changed the patterns.

These outlined some of the links between the networks of trade and the geography of the peninsula.

These trade routes and networks of ports can only be discussed in terms of the contexts of trade the agricultural produce of the land, the commodities of trade, small centres of manufacture and of course, the traders themselves. A discussion on these contexts of trade leads to explorations of the aspects of the region's ecology and its links with its politics.

Kathiawad was traditionally divided into ten tracts of various sizes in the mid eighteenth century. These prants, as they were termed, corresponded to ecological particularities rather than specific political boundaries, though there were some connections. Each prant was linked to the territories held for centuries, sometimes traced back to the eleventh and twelfth century A.D. In the mid eighteenth century however, these clan holdings had been at places subdivided, at others taken over by newer tribes of conquerors; yet another was a nawabi sliced out of the Mughal faujdari of Junagadh. The traditional divisions of the prants, however, still retained their names, though they no longer

corresponded accurately to political sovereignty.

Jhalawad was to the north, the area of the Jhala Rajputs, which in our period comprised fifty chieftaindoms, large and small, some of them thakurdaris of not more than a few villages. Machhu Kantha, a smaller prant lay to the west of Jhalawad. The province of the Hallar was to the north west, originally named after the Hala branch of Jadeja Rajputs who had migrated from Kutch. To the west of Halar was Okhamandal, a small projection at the tip of the peninsula facing the Gulf of Kutch to its north and the open Arabian Sea to its west and south. The prant of Sorath was to its south, a large tract, much of it in our period occupied by the Nawabi of Junagadh. Further south along the coast of the Gulf of Cambay was Gohelwad, named after the Gohel Rajputs who held much of that territory in our period. A large area in the central part of the peninsula was held by the Kathis, a tribe that had migrated from Kutch and who gave their name to the entire peninsula in the 18th century. Babriawad so called from the Babria tribe of Kolis and Und Sureya, lying along the Sheturji river were the other two prants in the central part of the peninsula.<sup>13</sup>

---

13. Imperial Gazetteer, 1909 p.340,, A.Burgess, Report on the Antiquities of Kathiawad and Kachch Being the Result of the Second Season's Operations of the Archeological Survey of Western India, 1874-75, Varanasi, 1971, p.11.

Most of Kathiawad was undulating terrain, much of it rocky. The Gir range of hills run almost parallel along the coast from Gohelwad, to the north of Babriawad and Sorath upto Girnar, the highest mountain in the region. Much of Kathiawad, Sureya and Babriawad was forested, sparsely populated and inhospitable to agriculture.

A nineteenth century British survey of Kathiawad had this to say about the ecology and the possibilities of cultivation in the peninsula, seeing it as a homogeneous region:

Kathiawad peninsula has the essential features of a prosperous agricultural country. The climate is on the whole temperate, the rainfall moderate, streams abound ponds and wells are fairly numerous and there is much variety in the texture, quality and depth of soil. On the other hand, the peninsula is thinly peopled, cultivators take up more land than they can till; and the style of farming is slovenly. The soil is of two main classes black or red, the red being considered the less valuable. Of the first class is the deep black soil known as kampal, suitable for the growth of cotton while the better kinds of red soil are famous for the production of irrigated wheat and barley. A saltish earth, impregnated with clay and impervious to water, is not uncommon.<sup>14</sup>

The ecological diversity of the peninsula of course delineated in many ways its agricultural produce, its manufactures, the commodities of its trade. In other ways

---

14. Imeprial Gazetteer, 1909, p. 354.

the politics of the region determined them. Kathiawad may have had "the essential features of a prosperous agricultural country." But the "essential" (presumably ecological) features were by no means either spread evenly over the peninsula or independent of the instabilities of the politics of the region in our period.

Some of the richest tracts were around Sorath watered by the Bhadar river. These were regions of black soil, where the growth of cotton was most favourable.<sup>15</sup> Apart from cotton the other agricultural produces were bajra, jowar, mung and other pulses which were rotated with cotton. Coarse cotton cloth was manufactured, but much of the exports were of raw cotton, itself sent to the manufacturing towns of Gujarat - Surat, Bharuch, Cambay, Baroda, Ahmedabad. This pattern underwent a steady change from the 1780s onwards, when massive amounts of raw cotton began to be shipped to Bombay for the reexport trade to China.<sup>16</sup> There are no statistics available of the extent of the area under the growth of cotton before the phenomenal rise in demand for raw cotton for the China trade. But even prior to the growth

---

15. ibid., p.355; Selections from Records of Bombay Government New Series, vol.37. "Notes-----" by Captain J.T. Brar, 1854, pp.111-112. Henceforth, Notes Brar.

16. P. Nightingale, Trade and Empire in Western India 1784-1810, Cambridge, 1970.

of this demand, much cotton was grown and exported from the region, to the manufacturing centres in mainland Gujarat.

With a seaboard of 500 miles, and no place more than 75 miles from the coast, produce of Kathiawad finds a ready outlet. Every little creek provides a means of access and has its trade centre.<sup>17</sup>

Among the more important of the ports of Sorath were Veraval, Porbandar and Navabandar in the late eighteenth century.<sup>18</sup>

In the prant of Halar, north of Sorath and along the coastline, cotton was again an important crop. Much of the country was flat, though it was interrupted by the Barda hills. Here again, the cultivation of cotton was rotated with grains, chiefly jowar.<sup>19</sup> Since the cultivation of cotton was more or less correspondent with the black soil, the northern district of Jhalawad could not grow much of it. The ground there was "chiefly middling", rocky and hilly not conducive to cotton. Coarse grains such as bajra and jowar were grown. These hilly tracts, moreover were locations for the breeding of cattle. Wool from sheep was a commodity of regular trade, which was carried overland

---

17. Gazetteer of Bombay Presidency, vol.5, 1901, p.236.

18. ibid., p.240.

19. Notes Brar, pp.114-116.

through Palanpur and Radhanpur to Ahmedabad.<sup>20</sup> The rest were channelised to the port of Dhollera.

Gohelwad, too, was conducive to the large scale cultivation of cotton, some of which was used locally to produce coarse cloth; the rest shipped through the ports, which were chiefly Bhavnagar, Gogha, Dhollera, Talaja and from the 1780s onwards, Ratlau.

Machhu Kantha was another prant which grew some cotton and grain. It shipped its commodities through the ports of Vavanai and Jodia Bandur.<sup>21</sup>

Large tracts in Kathiawad and Babriawad were sparsely cultivated. This had as much to do with the inhospitable terrain as difficulties in communication through these regions, inhabited as they were by Kolis and Bhils, who could not be suppressed by the neighbouring chieftaindoms, and rendered all communication through those areas hazardous.

The local networks of trade which carried basic commodities such as grain, ghee and salt were often carried through the caravan routes. The small ports and country

---

20. ibid., pp.121-124.

21. ibid., pp.131-133.

crafts were used as often. In the years of famine and scarcity which were recurrent in the latter half of the eighteenth century, particularly in the prants of Jhalawad, Machhu Kantha, ports of Kathiawad and Halar, there was considerable migration of population. There are again no definite statistics prior to the mid-nineteenth century colonial surveys as to what exactly the extent of cultivation was in proportion to areas devoted to pasture lands. Particularly in the northern areas, this proportion would have fluctuated according to the vagaries of the monsoon. A mid-nineteenth century British famine report that draws on remembered histories of the regions and projects backward, mentions recurring famines from 1740s onwards at least once every five years.<sup>22</sup> Famine relief measures were seldom organised by the chieftaindoms on any well organised basis and depended on random state and private charities.<sup>23</sup> Land for cultivation and pasturage could not have been rigidly demarcated. Economic existence in those areas was precarious at the best of times. Large-scale depopulation and migration of entire villages to the more hospitable regions of Babriawad or Gohelwad or to northern Gujarat across Palanpur and Radhanpur was common. Nor were these

---

22. A.T. Etheridge (Compiled), Report on the Past Famines in the Bombay Presidency, Bombay, 1868, p.30.

23. ibid., p.20.

migrations often with whatever cattle that had survived the drought one sided. Often migrations would spill over from Kutch to Kathiawad and vice versa as far north upto Sindh and Parkar, political boundaries notwithstanding. These seasonal migrations were yet another aspect of the links between the terrain, communications, and the economy of the region.

Kutch, or the 'sea coast land', was almost an island, cut off from mainland Gujarat through the marshy salt desert of the Little Rann and bounded by the Gulf of Kutch on the south and the open Arabian Sea to its west. A nineteenth-century gazetteer compiled by a British administrative officer of the Bombay Presidency remarks,

A belt off the continent of India...From its isolated position...The special character of people...the peninsula of Cutch has more of a distinct nationality than any other of the dependencies of the Bombay Government.<sup>24</sup>

As argued earlier in the context of Kathiawad one could yet again submit that geographical distance was nuanced in political terms. The mere fact of Kutch's relative remoteness to the "continent", that is mainland Gujarat, is to be explored in terms of its politics and the intercourse between the regions.

---

24. Gazetteer of Bombay Presidency, J.M. Campbell, Bombay 1880, vol.5, p.1.



Kutch was, from c.1200 at least, occupied by the tribe of Samma Rajputs who migrated from Sindh, driving out, it is said, the Kathis, who fled to the region now known as Kathiawad. The consolidation of the power of the Jadeja branch of the Sammas began from the fifteenth century onwards. In the sixteenth century, a branch of the royal family of the Jadejas broke off from Kutch and founded the chieftaindom of Nawanagar or Jamnagar in Kathiawad.<sup>25</sup> In 1548, Rao Khengar I, who founded the capital city of Bhuj, acknowledged the nominal suzerainty of Mahmud Shah Begada, the Sultan of Gujarat.<sup>26</sup> Beyond paying a peshkash to the Sultan, no other obligations were imposed on the Rao of Kutch from Gujarat. This was the general trend of relationships with the Mughal empire as well.<sup>27</sup> The Mirat lists Kutch as a zamindari that paid nazrana and gives detailed knowledge of the entire region.<sup>28</sup>

With Sindh, on the other hand, there were repeated skirmishes but Kutch was raided several times across the desert, and once (in 1762) the capital city of Bhuj run over.

---

25. A.Burgess, op.cit, pp.197-199.

26. ibid., p.200.

27. M.S. Comsissariat, History of Gujarat, vol.2, 1959, pp.553-54.

28. Supplement Mirat-i-Ahmadi, ed., Seddon, Baroda, 1924.

Kutch's political autonomy was neither absolute nor uninterrupted. Here it is important to stress a point, I shall elaborate in the next chapter that though unlike Kathiawad, Kutch was one single chieftaindom, the Rao's sovereign control over his bhayads\* fluctuated. The boundaries of Kutch were, for instance, repeatedly violated throughout the eighteenth and even in the first half of the nineteenth century by Kolis from Wagad bordering Kathiawad. In the desert tracts, control over political boundaries fluctuated and the nominal sovereignty of the Rao often had little sanctity.

Traditionally Kutch has been divided into seven zones which once broadly corresponded with territorial holdings of some of the tribes after whom they were named. Pavai, along the southern margins of the Rann, and founded on the south by the Chorwad range of hills was said to be the original home of the Kathis.<sup>29</sup>

The nineteenth century gazetteer goes on to describe the physical aspects of Kutch

The coast of Cutch is in some places very slightly raised and fringed with mangrove swamps. on other parts it rises in forms of sand hills, or as in the north west in broken rocky cliffs.

---

29. Burgess, op.cit., p.189.

\*. Bhayads - clan members.

Inland especially south and east, are broad plains some deep soiled and well tilled others bare and filled with water courses. Beyond these plains lie the central lands of the provinces, in places relieved by bright coloured rocks and pastures of tillage but over most of the area brown uplands deep in loose sand, broken naked peaks, and bordered by bare ridges of low dirt coloured hills .<sup>30</sup>

The soil of Kutch, mostly semi-arid, was cultivated generally for bajra and millet, and coarse red rice. In the south and east, cotton of an inferior variety was grown earlier, for local production of coarse cloth which was used for trade with the East African coast. From the latter half of the eighteenth century the redistributive trade of raw cotton for Bombay re-export to China sucked in much of the raw cotton cultivated in Kutch.

Kutch was not merely a desert with patches of tilled land-it had a long sea board, and several ports which carried on country trade with the Kathiawad west, down south upto the Malabar. Kutch had a long sea faring tradition. One look at the varying sizes of boats - battellas, pattamars, carrying from 250-800 tons, to small fishing boats of various winds of tomage upto 80 Khandis, (28 1/2 tons) in the port of Mandvi in the early nineteenth century substantiates this.<sup>31</sup>

---

30. Campbell, op.cit., p.2.

31. ibid., p.115.

What did these vessels trade in and where? There were distinct patterns to the networks of trade of Kutch in the late eighteenth century. One was the export of cotton, horses, wool and ghee for supply to Bombay, which had by then emerged as the chief emporium of trade in western India. It also traded with the Malabar coast, importing chiefly teak, timber, some rice and pepper for re-export.

The other aspect of the patterns of trade was Kutch's flourishing trade with the East African coast-from where it imported rhino hides, horns, and ivory and exported in large amounts, coarse cotton, mashru and piece goods.

A third pattern of trade routes was by sea and across the land to Sindh and to the Makran coast. It involved the re-export of Malabar rice, Bombay cloth ~~and~~ finer cloth from Malabar.<sup>32</sup>

This is a British report on the coastal trade of western India in 1821:

Taking Bombay as the emporium, the coasting trade may be divided in Northern and Southern. The Northern trade is more important in terms of the number of vessels employed and the capital used...These vessels navigate coastwise from Cape Camorin to the Gulf of Kutch and often run across to Muscat and the Red Sea and sometimes a solitary one to Ceylon. During the eight fair months from

---

32. ibid., pp.117-119.

May to October the batellas perform five-six trips to Daman, Surat, Cambay, Broach, Jambusar and Cutch bringing from these ports where they often manage to winter and where many of them reside, cotton, ghee, oil, pulses, wheat, cotton cloth, hemp, and return to the northern ports laden with the produce of Europe, China, and Bengal...<sup>33</sup>

The report goes on to estimate,

...capital employed in the Northern trade even in minor articles of commerce is immense, to the annual amount of one fifty lacs and including cotton, to much more.<sup>34</sup>

In the late eighteenth century, the maritime trade of Kutch was chiefly through the ports of Mandvi and Mundra. This nineteenth century survey of the trade of Mandvi refers to its long established maritime traditions of trade:

Mandvi in Kutch, the population of which has been estimated at 50,000 has long held a high place among the mercantile ports of Western India, and bears the character of sending forth some of the most skillful pilots, good seamen, adventoures merchants, strong boats that tread over eastern seas.<sup>35</sup>

This report refers to the distinct patterns of coastal trade in Mandvi: "The foreign trade of Mandvee may be divided into the following branches: The Bombay, the

---

33. The Asiatic Journal, vol.XII July-December 1821, Letter dt.August 13 p.351.

34. ibid.

35. Lt.R.Leech, Memoir on the Trade, and Commerce, of the Port of Mandvee in Kutch by the late Lt.R.Leech, Bombay Engineers, Submitted to Government in May 1837 (Bombay Government Selections), p.129 (Government of Selections, NMML, Microfische).

Malabar, the Sind, the Makran, the Arabian and the Zanzibar".<sup>36</sup>

The following chart lists the directions of the flow of commodities in Kutch:

Markets of areas referred to	Imports	Exports and Transit
East Coast of Africa	Ivory, rhinoceros horns, hides.	* Cotton cloth.
Bombay	Timber, teak, fine rice, fine cloth.	Cotton, wool, red rice, white rice, <u>moth, mag, adad</u> , clarified butter, oil.
Cochin	<u>Sisum, pemail</u> and alupla for mast and yards, jackwood, coconuts, <u>suparis</u> .	Not mentioned.
Sindh	Red rice, millet, turmeric, lotus seed.	Iron, lead, sugar, dried dates, cloves, cardamoms frankincense cotton cloth from the Malabar and Bombay.
Land trade to Sindh & Parkar	Rice, millet, <u>jowar</u> maize, indigo, bullocks and buffaloes.	Alum, dates, coconuts madder, molasses, ivory, gold and silver work, cotton and silk cloth.

36. ibid.

Markets of areas referred to	Imports	Exports and Transit
Parker	<u>Bajri</u> , millet, dyes, gram, clarified butter.	Dates, Coconuts, ginger, pepper, chillies, garlicks sugar, molassess cloth.
Ahmedabad	Rice, tobacco, safflower, cumin, dry mangoes, gold and silver brocade.	Opium, Kango (a brown mineral dye), ivory, gold and silver work embroidery.

- Source: (i) Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, 1880.  
(ii) Leach, Memoir on the trade and commerce of the port of Mandvee in Kutch. Submitted to Government 1837 (Bombay Govt. Selections.  
(iii) The Asiatic Journal, vols. XII, XIII.

Being nineteenth century surveys, they do not include two important commodities of trade in Kutch: horses and slaves. Both the trades had flourished in the eighteenth century but had declined in the nineteenth. The Kutchi horses were in demand by the Company in our period. The Company's agent in Kutch and Kathiawad, Sundarji Saudagar, who was the mediator in the negotiations between the chieftaindoms and the Company, was a dealer in horses and had undertaken to supply the Company's army with Kutchi horses.<sup>37</sup> The Kutchi horses declined in value in the nineteenth century.<sup>38</sup>

37. Political and Secret Department, Diary no.114, p.5163, year 1801.

38. Campbell, op.cit., vol.5, Bombay.

We see thus, that the trading networks of Kathiawad and Kutch in this period functioned at several levels. On the one hand, the sea ports of coastal Kathiawad and Kutch were the satellites of Bombay which had emerged by the late eighteenth century as the major emporium on the western coast.<sup>39</sup>

On the other, these ports were 'core areas' and transit points engaged in both country trade on the western coast of India as well as the east African and Makran coasts. A third pattern of networks linked these regions' overland communications to Gujarat and Sindh.

The commodities traded to Bombay were not so much manufactured goods as raw material: chiefly cotton, besides grain, ghee, wool, etc. However, though Mandvi was not a major manufacturing town as compared to Surat or Ahmedabad it produced coarse cotton cloth in bulk drawing on its hinterlands in Kutch and northern Kathiawad for export to the east African coast and Makran. Lt. Leach lists the varieties of cotton cloth exported from Mandvi:<sup>40</sup>

---

39. Holden Furber, Bombay Presidency in the mid Eighteenth Century, 1965,

40. Leach op.cit., p.214. Kori was the local Kutchi currency, 1 Kori being equal to 349 Bombay rupees.



Cloth	Prices
Tonkapara	3, 3 1/2 guz per kori
Merkula	2 1/2 guz per kori
Jhalawad	2 guz per kori
Moorbee	2, 2 1/2 guz per kori

The varieties 'Jhalawad and Morbee' had certainly derived their names from the neighbouring regions of Kathiawad, from where they were presumably carted to Mandvi and Mundra for shipment to Muscat, Zanzibar and Mokha.

Though the English East India Company records do not mention the overland trade routes of these regions except very briefly, communications of Kutch with Sindh, Parkar and Kathiawad with the Gujarat peninsula and Kutch through caravan routes could not have been inconsiderable. There were thus networks of trade through these land routes, that linked Kutch with Sindh and Parkar to the north and linked Kathiawad through Wagad. The opium trade was one such. No opium was produced either in Kutch or Kathiawad, but it was brought from Malwa and Ahmedabad to Kathiawad and Kutch and exported from their ports.<sup>41</sup>

The grain trade was another, which sustained overland routes to Sindh. This became crucial particularly in the

---

41. See Chapter 3.

years of famine or scarcity, which occurred often enough; at least once every five years in our period.<sup>42</sup>

Not only did these land routes effect the passage of grains; large scale migrations of populations, with their cattle in the years of drought made through these routes.

The more immediate effect of a scarcity in this province is the emigration of a large portion, varying from a quarter to a third of the population to Sind with their cattle where they have always found the means of gaining a livelihood till the return of better times in this province.<sup>43</sup>

The famine report goes on to record,

the statement of Wora Muckonjee, who states that the following is partly from hearsay, and partly from his own observations - Samvat 1860 A.D. 1804 was a year of drought and the necessaries of life were very dear...In Samvat 1869. A.D. 1813, famine...was felt in Kutch and other places on this side...All those who died by starvation belonged to Kattywar...They crossed the Ran and came to Wagur...The Amirs of Sinde extended liberal protection to the people of Kattywar and Kutch, who succeeded in reaching that country by engaging their in diverse canal works...This great famine raged only in Kutch, Kattiawad, and Marwar.<sup>44</sup>

These networks of communications through land routes linked northern Kathiawad with Kutch, Sindh and Parkar. Till the late nineteenth centuries, these internal trade routes were in use, with caravans and people driving their cattle

---

42. Etheridge, op.cit., p.30.

43. ibid., p.21.

44. ibid., p.22-23.

across the deserts of the Rann or the arid lands of Wagad for trade, and often for survival.

Across the little Rann there were several routes to mainland Gujarat - through Palanpur to Ahmedabad on the one hand, and north to Ujjain and Marwar on the other. The laying of railway lines in the mid nineteenth century changed some of the contours of these local trade routes but until then they existed despite political boundaries and the evident difficulties the route represented.

These were some of the aspects of the geography of Kutch and Kathiawad. As one has been arguing against geographical determinism devoid of context, one will try in the next chapter, to view the political structures of power of Kutch and Kathiawad in the mid-eighteenth century and explore the ways in which they defined the trade of these regions.

## CHAPTER II

### PROVINCES AND POLITICS: THE ANTECEDENTS

#### Section 1

##### Kathiawad

It is impossible to give geographical boundaries to any of the states in Kattiawar, they are so interlaced, and as no survey has been made, no estimate can be formed as to the area in square miles.<sup>1</sup>

The numerous chieftaindoms of Kathiawad (about 193 native states in the nineteenth century) were, as mentioned before, of varied ancestry. Some were clan holdings that traced their settlements back to mythical origins in the eighth century, such as the Jethwas of Jethwad, later known as Porbandar. Some others had emerged more recently, either through fresh migrations such as the tribe of Kathis who migrated in groups from Kutch from the eleventh century onwards and generally settled down in the central part of the peninsula, which region came, to be known as Kathiawad. There were still newer chieftaindoms, slices carved out by adventurers in the context of dissipating Mughal authority in the eighteenth century. One's objective here is not to trace the incredibly intricate courses the political

---

1. Notes related to the Petty States In the Province of Kattywar by Capt. J.T. Brar, Acting Political Agent. Selections from Records of Bombay Government New Series, Vol.37, 1854. p.110. Henceforth Notes-Brar.

narratives of the various cheftaindoms followed over a millenium. One could, more modestly, try to delineate the limits of political power in the peninsula and thus lay the groundwork to examine how, and if at all, they defined the trading networks of the region in the late eighteenth century. This will help as to analyse their responses to British attempts to make political inroads in the region from the 1780s onwards.

As stated in the first chapter, Kathiawad traditionally was divided into ten Prants that had roughly corresponded to the holdings of various clans that had claimed territorial rights over them. In the eighteenth century, these divisions were not clear cut - and every prant was divided and subdivided into several chieftaindoms, most of them members of the ruling clan who had branched off from the main line.

In the mid eighteenth century, as for most of the thousand years before, the chieftains of Kathiawad owed only nominal allegiance to the dominant political power in mainland Gujarat. In the context of the declining authority of the Mughals in the mainland, the political autonomy of the chieftains was more pronounced.

The first Maratha raids in the peninsula began from 1722 onwards, and then became a regular annual feature.<sup>2</sup> The mulkgiri expeditions of the Marathas, even when systematised under the Gaekwad state, seldom had long lasting effects in the interior of the peninsula. Neither the Gaekwad nor the Peshwa had any political stakes in annexing territories in Kathiawad, apart from the ports of Dhollera, Ranpur, Ghogha on the gulf of Cambay, which were later surrendered to the East India Company. However, until the Company's interventions in the late eighteenth century, continued Maratha incursions into Kathiawad did not translate itself into political control of any depth or permanency.

The dominion of the Marathas over Kathiawad never took the form of an occupation of the country, and to this day there are probably fewer Marathas to be found in it than any of the peoples constituting its population.<sup>3</sup>

Some of the more powerful chieftaindoms in the peninsula in our period were Junagadh, Nawanagar in Halar, and Gohelwad or Bhavnagar as it later came to be known. The Company's interventions from the 1780s onwards affected these chieftaindoms the most, particularly Junagadh and

---

2. Imperial Gazetteer of India (Provincial) Bombay Presidency vol.2 First Published Calcutta 1909 Reprint New Delhi, 1985, p.352, Henceforth Imperial Gazetteer (1909).

3. Capt. H. Wilberforce-Bell, The History of Kathiawad from the Earliest Times, London 1916, p.139.

Bhavnagar which gained prominence from the latter half of the eighteenth century onwards.

Gohelwad/Bhavnagar: Gohelwad, the south eastern part of the peninsula, had been the domain of the Gohel Rajputs from the thirteenth century onwards.<sup>4</sup> Their clan is said to have migrated from the northern part of the peninsula.<sup>5</sup> Formerly their capital was in Sihor, but with the Maratha incursions pushing dangerously close, particularly after a long siege of the fort by the Marathas Sardars Kantoji Kadam Bende and Pilaji Gaekwad in 1722, it was no longer considered safe against further Maratha invasions. Raja Bhavsinhji therefore chose the site for a new capital, preferably "at a site from which he could escape easily".<sup>6</sup> Bhavnagar, the capital on the sea, was founded in 1723. By the middle of the eighteenth century, it attracted considerable trade and rivalled the nearby ports of Ghogha, Surat, and Cambay.<sup>7</sup>

In the 1780s when the cotton trade became significant in the peninsula, Bhavnagar was already an important chieftaindom. Its biggest port, Bhavnagar, catered to ships

---

4. ibid., p.279.

5. Imperial Gazetteer (1909), p.352.

6. Wilberforce Bell, op. cit., p.124.

7. ibid., pp.128-29.

both in the country trade as well as in the wider networks.<sup>8</sup> Thus, Bhavnagar's rivalry with other nearby ports - Gogha, Dhollera, or Dhanduka on the Gulf of Cambay was a factor in determining its policies. Gogha, for instance, was formerly under the charge of the then faujdar and later nawab of Junagadh. In 1730, Raja Bhavsinhji of Bhavnagar succeeded in persuading the Mughal governor (who till 1759 had some formal authority) to remove Sher Khan Babi from Gogha and instead grant him a jaqir at Bantwa near his faujdari at Junagadh. Having done this, however, the Mughal governor Sohrab Khan himself acquired Gogha, which later passed on to the Peshwa. Bhavnagar's rivalry with Gogha and other ports on the Gulf of Cambay was a factor in determining the latter's interactions with the English East India Company and its responses to its acquisitions of Dhollera, Dhanduka, and Ghogha from the Peshwa after his defeat in the Anglo Maratha war of 1802. As we shall see in the next chapter, the relationship between Bhavnagar and the Company, though one of alliance, was not always smooth.

Junagadh: The nawabi of Junagadh formed much of the prant of Sorath. It was a faujdari in the Mughal period.<sup>9</sup> In

---

8. Notes Brar, p.134.

9. Supplement to the Mirat-i-Ahmadi, Ali Mohammed Khan tr. S. Nawab Ali and C.N. Seddon, Baroda 1924, p.204, Hence forth Supplement Mirat-i-Ahmadi.



1748, Sher Khan Babi, till then nominally the Mughal faujdar of Junagadh declared himself the nawab. Under him, and his son and successor Mahabat Khan (1758-1775), Junagadh became one of the most prominent chieftaindoms in the region. Much of it was owed to the Dewan of Junagadh, Amarji, who resisted the incursions of other chieftains of Junagadh with the consequence that when the settlements of tribute to the Company and the Gaekwad with the peninsular chiefs was made, several small chieftains around Sorath also acknowledged the overlordship of Junagadh and agreed to pay a tribute annually (zortalabi) to Junagadh.<sup>10</sup>

At the turn of the century, the ports of Junagadh - Veraval, Nawabandar and Sutrapada all catered to the trade in cotton and grain. Cotton particularly, was exported through these ports to Bombay.<sup>11</sup> Besides these, Junagadh was also a significant chieftaindom in the peninsula, from the Company's point of view in another respect- its physical proximity to the "piratical" ports of the western tip of the peninsula. The complex relationship the Junagadh chieftains had with these "piratical" ports and its reactions to the Company's determination to eliminate the

---

10. Notes Brar, p.115-125. The States Paying Zortalabi to Junagadh included Nawanagar, Gondal, Dhrol, Kotra Sangani, Dhrangadhra, and Wankhaner.

11. ibid., pp.110-111.

pirates, are aspects which are crucial to the trading of the region. These will be analysed in detail in the next chapter.

Nawanagar: The chieftaindom of Nawanagar was ruled by the Rajputs of the Jadeja clan. After several years of incursions from Kutch, a branch of the Jadeja Rajputs had consolidated themselves around Nawanagar in 1540 under the Chieftainship of Jam Rawal in 1540.<sup>12</sup> Nawanagar was in 1661, captured by Qutab-ud-din the faujdar of Sorath<sup>13</sup>, who annexed it to imperial dominions and renamed it Islamnagar. The Jam was later reinstated in 1671, but until the death of Aurangzeb, a faujdar remained at Nawanagar, while the Jam lived at Khambalia, a few miles away. After the decline of Mughal authority, Nawanagar became a powerful chieftaindom in the eighteenth century. Nawanagar also possessed ports engaged in the country trade: besides the port town of Nawanagar, Jodiya bandar and Salaya were other significant harbours.<sup>14</sup> Nawanagar too was located close to the "piratical" ports and its interactions with them were of interest to the company when at the turn of the eighteenth century it made its incursions into the region.

---

12. Wilberforce-Bell, op. cit., p.100.

13. ibid., p.118.

14. Notes Brar, pp.114-116.

Besides these established chieftaindoms, moreover, there were other small states, such as Wankaner, Wadhwan, Limbdi, etc. in Jhalawad which too grew in importance in the cotton trade, in our period. These were landlocked states; the trade was thus chiefly through the port of Dhollera. Dhollera had belonged first to the Peshwa and then to the Company.<sup>15</sup>

Another significant aspect of the politics and trade of the Kathiawad peninsula were the piratical ports along the coastline. They possessed very little in territorial terms, but their significance in the trade of the region was not inconsiderable. Besides the few ports situated at the western tip of Kathiawad, Jaffrabad was another piratical port of some significance. It was ruled by the sidis, who acknowledged as their overlord the Sidi of Janjira south on the Konkan coast. Piracy, therefore, was a constant factor which the chieftaindoms as well as the Company had to alternately negotiate with and combat over as late as the nineteenth century.<sup>16</sup> In the next chapter we shall see what were the responses of the chieftains and pirates to the political ambitions of the Company.

---

15. ibid., pp.115-121.

16. C.U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, vol, 6. Calcutta, 1909, p.217-219.

## Section 2

### Kutch

As Cutch is of old a feudal land no detailed account is found in the imperial records. At present the Zamindar of Cutch is one of the wealthiest in the province, holding about eight thousand villages and many ports.<sup>17</sup>

The geographical location of Kutch with respect to mainland Gujarat was an aspect of its relative political distance from the Mughal empire. As noted earlier, Kutch's political autonomy from the Sultans of Gujarat and then from the Mughals was neither absolute nor uninterrupted. In this section one would delineate the political history of Kutch upto the period of British interest in that region, and examine the contours of Kutch's political communications with Sindh on the one hand, and Gujarat on the other. This would lead to the question whether the political communications of Kutch contributed in any way to its trade links with Gujarat or Sindh.

Kutch was conquered by the Samma Rajputs of Sindh who migrated from Sindh from the ninth century onwards. Their possession of the lands in Kutch thereby displaced the Waghela, Chavda, and Solanki clans of Rajputs, who had settled there earlier and had acknowledged the suzerainty of the Chavda, and later, the Solanki rulers of Anhilwada in

---

17. Supplement, Mirati-Ahmadi, p.218.

Gujarat. It was at this time that the tribe of Kathis had spread eastward through central Kutch and established themselves in Kanthkot in Wagad, where Kutch was linked to the peninsula of Kathiawad.

The Sammas migrated from Sindh in larger numbers after the Arab conquest of Sindh. They settled in Kutch and in some instances, intermarried with local Rajput clans, such as the Chavdas.<sup>18</sup>

The Jadejas, the ruling family of Kutch, trace their line from Lakho, who was adopted by a Samma called Jad and thereby called himself Jadeja, or the son of Jad.

Tradition attributes Lakho Jadeja's conquest of western and southern Kutch to be around 1147 A.D. After the death of Lakho's grandson Raydhan (1215 A.D.), his territories were divided among his four sons. The lineage since then continued to be traced from Otha, the second son of Raydhan, who inherited the capital of Lakhiarvira and shifted it to Ajapur, north east of Bhuj. Thus, there were some periods

---

18. L.F. Rushbrook Williams, The Black Hills: Kutch in History and Legend, A Study in Indian Local Loyalties, London 1958, pp.69-77. L.F. Rushbrook Williams has extensively used bardic traditions to thread the narrative of the political history of Kutch, since no written records exist. He corroborated the Kutchi bardic annals with those of Gujarat (with Forbes' Rasmala) and Rajasthan (with Tod's Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan).

where there was centralised rule, but the degree of authority of the Rao fluctuated and often Kutch was divided into three or four, or more autonomous chieftaindoms:

Jadeja power... was loosely organised and vassals of the three main branches of Jadejas occupied positions of virtual independence in these hill forts.... But the clans could unite for certain purposes as when they joined together early in the thirteenth century to drive out the Kathis.<sup>19</sup>

Though cut off from mainland Gujarat and Sindh to the north by the Rann, Kutch's communication with Sindh on the one hand, and Kathiawad on the other, were never entirely cut off. The Samma branch of Rajputs who had established themselves in Sindh, continued to migrate to Kutch. There is a tradition that Abdasa, on the western coast of Kutch, was founded by Jam Abda who reached there from Kutch, fleeing from Allaudin Khalji's army.<sup>20</sup>

With the establishment of the Sultanat of Gujarat, particularly with its consolidation under Sultan Mahmud Begada (1458-1511), some parts of Kathiawad came under the direct rule of Ahmedabad. It facilitated to some degree, Gujarat's political communication with Kutch through the

---

19. ibid., pp.94-95.

20. A.K. Burgess, Report on the Antiquities of Kathiawad and Kachch, being the Result of the Second Season's Operations of the Archaeological Survey of Western India, 1874-75, Varanasi 1971, pp.196-198.

Kathiawad peninsula. Mahmud Begada marched upto Wagad in 1472 when all the branches of Jadejas acknowledged his suzerainty. During his reign, Rawal of the Bada (western) branch of the clan ousted the Jadejas of Lakhiarvira from their domains. Two of the princes escaped from Rao Rawal and fled to Ahmedabad, from where, with Sultan's help they regained their possessions. Rao Khengar I, the prince of Lakhiawira drove the Bada branch out of Kutch whereupon they fled the province and established the chieftaindom of Nawanagar in the Kathiawad peninsula.

With the overthrow of the Samma Jam of Thatta in 1520, the occasional interventions of the Rao of Kutch in Sindh politics was sought to be subdued by Sultan Shah Hussian of the Arghem dynasty of Sindh, who crossed the Ram, (as did Ghulam Kalhora 250 years later) and defeated the Kutchi forces in the first battle of Jhara.

Gujarat and many parts of Kathiawad were brought under direct Mughal rule in 1572. Kutch remained an autonomous chieftaindom. The Rao acknowledged Mughal overlordship of handing over the fugitive last Gujarat Sultan, Muzaffar Shah II, to Mughal authorities.<sup>21</sup> In Jahangir's reign, on his visit to Gujarat in 1618 A.D., the Rao went personally to pay his respects to the Mughal emperor and presented him with Kutchi horses and gold mohurs. At this time, Jahangir

---

21. L.F. Rushbrook Williams, op.cit., p.103.

freed Kutch from tribute on the condition that the Rao should give Muslim pilgrims a passage to Mecca free of charge.

Kutch was, however, invaded twice from Gujarat in the eighteenth century; once during the reign of Rao Desal I (1718-41) by the subadar of Gujarat, probably when pressed for funds due to declining revenues in Gujarat. However he withdrew without engaging in battle. In 1721 again, Shujat Khan the subadar sent a force against Kutch, which withdrew after being paid 6,75,000 mahmudis (2 1/4 lakh rupees). Yet another expedition under the subadar Sarbuland Khan took place, but the Mughal forces had to retreat without being able to exact any tribute from the Rao.<sup>22</sup>

With the decline of Mughal rule, when Maratha armies raided and exacted mulkgiri tribute from the chiefs of Kathiawad, Kutch was not raided. Possibly this was due to its relative remoteness and the hazards of sustaining a plundering raid across the Rann. The only other route to Kutch was through the sea; the Gaekwad's armies never had any sea power to effect a raid on the Kutch coastline.

By the eighteenth century, the ports of Kutch - Mandvi, Mundra and Anjar, as well as Lakhpat Bandar were flourishing. Mandvi, particularly, by then carried on trade not only with the Sindh, Gujarat, and Malabar coasts, but as

---

22. M.S. Commissariat, History of Gujarat, vol.2., 1957, p.409. L.F. Rushbrook Williams op.cit., states the feudal obligations of the Maharaos of Kutch. "The customary tribute and service of 5,000 cavalry", p.117.



far as the east African coast. The revenues of the Raos of Kutch were limited since most of the land was distributed among the members of the Jadeja clan. The Maharao was entitled by custom to certain dues from the Jadeja bhayads, as well as to their military service when the need arose, and to a customary nazrana on special occasions. In addition, he had certain customary rights over chiefs who were not Jadejas from the Waghela thakurs, for instance, many of whom had been in occupation of their holdings from times prior to the Jadeja occupation of Kutch. The only substantial revenues upon which the Maharao depended came from his own ports of Mandvi and Mundra, and his own lands.

From the time of Rao Desal in the eighteenth century, there began a tradition of employing members of a trading caste, the Lohanas, to manage the treasury of the Rao. From Devkaran Seth under Rao Desal I to Punja Seth and other dewans employed by Rao Lakho, who ascended the throne in 1741. The successor, Rao Raydhan, 1778 too continued with this tradition.<sup>23</sup> As we shall see in the next chapter the appointment of traders to the posts of diwan was significant, as was the fact that much of the Rao's revenues, in the late eighteenth century, depended on the trade of the ports of Kutch. This was an important factor in Kutch's resistance to British incursions on the coast.

---

23. This account is based on Rushbrook Willims, op.cit., pp.136-164.

## CHAPTER III

### RESPONSES AND NEGOTIATIONS: ENCOUNTERING THE COMPANY IN KUTCH AND KATHIAWAD

#### Section I Laying the Ground: Trade and Political Expansion

The expanding network of private British trade... was to raise Bombay out of insignificance to the position of the greatest port of India.<sup>1</sup>

The rise of Bombay as the premier entrepot in western India in the late eighteenth century was a slow process. Surat had been in decline for decades then as a commercial center.<sup>2</sup> But it was not until the 1770s that Bombay emerged as the alternative emporium on the western coast.<sup>3</sup> The rise of Bombay corresponded with the growth of English Agency Houses, as the private English firms in Bombay were known. "By the 1780s, there had grown up in Bombay several powerful English trading firms or agency houses, which had amassed a large capital."<sup>4</sup>

Behind these agency houses were the networks of Surat financiers, traders and merchants who could provide the

- 
1. P.Nightingale, Trade and Empire in Western India, 1784-1806, Cambridge, 1970, p.16.
  2. A.Dasgupta, Indian Marchants and the Decline of Surat, 1700-1750, Weisbaden, 1979.
  3. Holden Furber, Bombay Presidency in the mid Eighteenth Century, Bombay, 1963.
  4. P.Nightingale, op.cit., p.18.

capital and the retail organisation which the English agency houses exploited.

The power of these Agency Houses increased markedly from the 1780s when a 'commercial revolution' gave western India a key position in the Asian and European trade.<sup>5</sup> By 1789, raw cotton had ceased to be exported in any great quantity from Gujarat to Bengal, but it went instead to China.<sup>6</sup> The great increase in the trade began about 1784 when the Commutation act caused the East India Company. to increase enormously its purchases of tea at Canton. The problem of paying the Chinese for tea in the absence of any profitable commodity from Europe could only be met by sending raw cotton from India.

According to Nightingale, the expansion of trade was carried out not so much by the East India Company as by the agency houses of Bombay. In 1789, the chief of the Surat factory estimated that about 50,000 bales of cotton were exported from the "northward", but only 4,500 bales had gone into the Company's account in 1787, 11,448 in 1793, and 2,000 bales in 1796. The rest of the trade was in the hands

---

5. Holden Furber, John Company at Work, Harvard, 1948.

6. Commercial Department Diary, 1789, p.149, Henceforth C.D.D.

of private merchants, who often freighted their goods on the Company's ships.<sup>7</sup>

These agency houses had a key role in Britain's vital China trade, for they transferred the proceeds from the sale of their cotton and Indian spices to the East India Company's treasury at Canton in returns for Bills at London. In this period, moreover, there was in the Bombay Council little distinction between the Company's trade and that of the Agency Houses. Many Company officials were themselves engaged in private trade, freighting their cotton on the Company's ships. Their capital was indispensable for the Company's tea trade at Canton. In 1789, the minutes of a meeting of the Governor in council wrote:

...the wish of our superiors to purchase on their own account, in order to benefit by the profit arising from there and with a view of supplying funds in China for purchasing their investments may be granted on the belief that the whole of their India Bond debt had been transferred to England.<sup>8</sup>

The meeting further estimated the quantity of cotton exported to China from Bombay -

To Madras - 15,000 Bales  
To China - 75,000 Bales.<sup>9</sup>

- 
7. Nightingale, op.cit., p.23.
  8. C.D.D., 1789, p.194.
  9. ibid, p.196.

The East India Company's and the agency houses' interest in the procurement of raw cotton as also piece goods for export to Europe made them take an interest in territorial expansion in Gujarat. The Company's political hold in Gujarat was marginal in 1784; it had controlled the castle of Surat since 1759. The rest of Gujarat was shared between the Gaekwad and the Peshwa. But Surat produced no cotton; it was primarily a manufacturing center. Most of the cotton came from other parts of Gujarat, particularly Bharuch, Amod and Jambusar.

Cotton is produced from seeds and throughout the country the seed is nearly the same in quality. Only one kind of cotton is used by cloth manufacturers, but this varies considerably in value according to the part it comes from, the difference arising, in great measure, from the soil, and also, in some degree, from the manner in which the cotton is extracted from the pod - the last reason particularly affects and lessens the nature of the Bownugger cotton, it being always full of leaf and dirt....The best cotton is produced in the districts of Jamboosar and Ahmood, and throughout the parganah of Broach. Good cotton is also grown near the country near Surat but is of inferior variety to the Broach or Ahmood and the Bownugger cotton is the worst of all.<sup>10</sup>

However, besides Gujarat, cotton 'Bhavnagar cotton' which included most of the produce of Gohelwad in the Kathiawad in peninsular Gujarat, was sent to Bombay for re-export to China. A small proportion was used for piece goods production locally.

---

10. *ibid.*, pp.139-141.

### Cotton Exports: Estimates<sup>11</sup>

Regions	Produce in Candies	Home Consumption in Candies	Export in Candies
1. Surat Pargana	5,000	2,000	3,000
2. Bharuch	12,000	3,000	9,000
3. Jambusar and Amod	12,000	3,000	9,500
4. Bhavnagar	14,000	1,500	12,500

Even in Surat, the Company's officials could not maintain the desired control over the quality of cotton supplied. The commercial department diaries abound in the loud laments of the agency houses as well as the Company officials about the quality of cotton and the quantity of dirt and dust, fraudulent adulterating of the raw cotton by the brokers and agents. The agency houses repeatedly demanded the Company's intervention in the matter. The following letter, signed by the leading cotton merchants of Bombay, including the Agency houses, is typical in tone. It stressed the importance of the cotton trade to the Company's interests and demanding its intervention to ensure better quality of cotton:

---

11. ibid., p.141. Also see W.R. Cassel, Cotton: An Account of Its Culture in the Bombay Presidency, Bombay, 1862, p.6.

The importance of the cotton trade from this port to China from the great number of ships which it employs and the large sums which are thereby thrown into the Company's treasury are so well-known and generally admitted... Owing to the uncommon demand for cotton at Canton for the two years last past, the merchants of Bombay by their agents made contracts in 1785... for the delivery of very large quantities... these contracts were duly fulfilled, as to quantity, but by no means to our satisfaction or that of the Chinese merchants as to quality, owing to the contractors at Surat, Broach, etc. taking advantage of the increased demand...and leaving much larger quantities of seed leaves and dirt in the cotton than had before been customary. Broach and Jamboosar cotton has at all times had a larger quantity of seed mixed with it than that of the production of Bownugger and Cutch.

....We have engagements this season, Honourable Sirs and Gentlemen, with the Chinese merchants for quantities of cotton far exceeding those of last year.... But how far our just expectations have been disappointed... not one bale can be called merchantable.... All the ships belonging to this port and all the ships in India proper for the cotton trade are freighted by us or our constituents for transporting to China the crop of the season...

We...propose... that you should name a certain number of respectable merchants or brokers to take out 3/4 bales or misters from every parcel of cotton tendered to us by the contractors, which should be deposited in warehouses ....at a future period... be cleared under the inspection of the merchants or brokers above mentioned and that of a notary public and a deduction to be made to us from our contract prices in proportion to the quantity of seed.<sup>12</sup>

---

12. C.D.D., 1787, pp.69-74. This was signed by all the leading agency houses, as well as five Parsi merchants.

The Company could not politically enforce such regulations. Its response to such an appeal was noncommittal, though sympathetic:

From the state of the Company cotton recently imported from the Northward we are sensible that the complaints represented... are justly grounded....We have our selves taken the necessary measures to ascertain the quantity of seed contained in the Company cotton in order to found a claim ....for the loss which may accrue, and it is at the option of the merchants to adopt the same means or any others that may appear to them more eligible to redress themselves....<sup>13</sup>

Nevertheless in the next few years, the Company made sustained efforts to politically intervene in Surat, Bharuch, and Cambay in its commercial interests. The Governor in council wrote to John Griffith, the Chief of Council at Surat that,

we persuade ourselves that your exertions will be unremitting to fulfill the expectations of our Honourable Employers...Every expense incurred in their political capacity ought to be viewed as ultimately working to the Protection of Trade...The Company therefore while subject to such expenses ought to look for correspondent advantages...<sup>14</sup>

In the next few years, the Company made sustained efforts to politically intervene in Surat, Bharuch, and Cambay in its commercial interests.

---

13. *ibid.*, p.74.

14. C.D.D., 1792, pp.16-17.



The nawabi of Surat was ultimately done away with in 1800 after the period of dual administration which had begun in 1759, when several local merchants had appealed to the to the Company to take over the administration of the fort of Surat in 1759.<sup>15</sup> A riot occurred in Surat in 1795 when some bania merchants in a merchants' locality alleged that a Muslim fagir was trying to burgle the house of a prominent merchant. The riots continued for a few days during which Muslims, many of whom were weavers of the piece-goods exported by Surat, looted the houses of merchants, mostly banias. The bania merchants of Surat appealed to the Company for protection, particularly so when it was apparent that the soldiers of the nawab had done little to protect the merchants' property in the riots.<sup>16</sup>

The Company's annexation of Surat in 1800 marked the beginning of its acquisitions with the aim of ensuring, through political means, its supplies of cotton for the China trade as well as piece goods and some cotton for the Europe market. The attempts were directed towards using coercive methods to force the agents to comply with the demands for procurements, as well as to change the pattern

---

15. L.Subramanian, "Capital and Crowd in a declining Asian Port City: The Anglo-Bania order in the Surat riots of 1795", Modern Asian Studies, vol.19, 1985, pp.205-239.

16. *ibid.*

of production of cotton piece goods, overriding the traditional norms and customs of the weavers. The Chief at Surat in 1792 noted,

from the great stricktness observed in providing the Company's goods, it happens near one third of the pieces sent by the contractor are rejected....These goods are immediately bought up by the Brokers for the foreign factories, or individuals, and frequently at a higher price than what the Company allow... This has been in a very great measure, the case with the present contract, and in addition to the death of weavers in the late Famine...it is considered that each branch of the manufactures of this place is confined to one set of people, who by ancient as well as religious custom can never be persuaded to change their occupation<sup>17</sup>

They further went on state clearly the helplessness of the Company due to resistance from the Gaekwad's and the Peshwa's interests in the region-

The Peishwa and Gaichwar chauthes often throw obstacles in the way of our contractors in providing dooties at Barodah and other places and many impediments are thrown in the way by the oppressive government of Cambay.<sup>18</sup>

He further suggested guidelines for political interventions in the region: "In order to remove the chief of these obstacles it will be absolutely necessary to insist on a preference being given to the Company's concerns and

---

17. C.D.D., 1792, pp.92-93.

18. *ibid.*

that the necessary number of weavers be compelled to work for the Company which from their political character and the relation in which they stand towards other powers." This was with a clear sighted realisation that only coercion through annexation could serve the Company's interests best.

It may be objected that, if the Company offer a higher price the measure will give their work the preference...but... experience has proved to me that the reverse occurs daily and that the indolence of disposition and contentiousness inherent in the Natives of India urges them at all times to dislike a strict performance of their Engagements and to take every advantage of those who are obliged to employ them.<sup>19</sup>

After Surat it was Dhollera, Gogha, and Bharuch, all of which were crucial to the growing cotton market and the Company's trade. Bharuch and Dhollera cotton were much prized.

The two chief varieties of the plant grown in Gugarat are the often and close podded cottons, the latter being generally known as Dhollera cotton, and to production being confined to the western side of Cambay. The pod does not burst when ripe, like that of the other variety known as the Broach cotton, but merely opens a little at the top;...Dhollera cotton is esteemed for its whiteness.<sup>20</sup>

In 1802, after the second Anglo-Maratha war, the Peshwa ceded the rich cotton growing tracts of Dhollera and Gogha

---

19. *ibid.*

20. A. Mackay, *Western India: Report addressed to the Chambers of Commerce in Manchester and Liverpool, etc.* London: 1853, pp.43-44.

to the Company.<sup>21</sup> Bharuch had been ceded to the Company in 1776 under the Treaty of Purandhar.<sup>22</sup> It had then paid half its revenues in cotton.<sup>23</sup> However, it was ceded in 1783 to Sindhia, the cessation being lamented as a "death blow to our hopes in Gujarat by the Company."<sup>24</sup>

In 1802, a subsidiary alliance treaty was concluded with the Gaekwad, which installed 2,000 of the Company's troops and artillery in Baroda, to be paid for in money or cessation of territory. The treaty also confirmed the cession to the Company of the Chowrasi pargana and the Gaekwad's share of the chauth of Surat.

In the next year, the Company acquired from Sindhia the port of Bharuch.<sup>25</sup>

By 1803, the Company had thus emerged as a major political power in mainland Gujarat. Its alliance with the Gaekwad set the groundwork for its incursions in Kathiawad and Kutch.

---

21. P. Nightingale, op.cit., pp.202-203.

22. W.R. Cassel, op.cit., p.8.

23. ibid.

24. P.Nightingale, op.cit., p.30.

25. ibid., pp.208-209.

Section II      Pirates, Chieftains and Merchants: Networks  
and Resistances

From the turn of the eighteenth century, the English East India Company was no longer a marginal political power in Gujarat. Its territories covered "one fourth of the cotton growing areas of the peninsula."<sup>26</sup> For the next few years its efforts were towards politically subduing the chieftains of the peninsula as well as establishing some kind of political residency in Kutch.

One is suggesting that despite the Company's and its new subordinate allies's, the Gaekwads', political supremacy in Gujarat and nominal overlordship of the Kathiawad peninsula, the chieftains while professing friendship with the Company had spaces to resist the Company's attempts to control the ports of the region. This was directly evident in the case of the Kathiawadi pirates who were politically insignificant in the sense that they had neither the territory nor the military might to challenge the Company. Nevertheless in the first decade of the nineteenth century they continued their piracies on the coastal vessels. One would not term their acts as resistance but for the fact that they had a clear idea that the Company's attempts to suppress them would prevent them from practising their

---

26. A. Mackay, op.cit., p.2.

"ancestral" occupations and snatch of them their livelihood which consisted not only of the proceeds from pirated vessels, but also of the customary right to the cargo of any vessel shipwrecked on the coast. This was the right also of all the chieftains who held territories on the coastline.

The relationship of the chieftains with the pirates was complex. On the one hand, they conducted periodic raids on their coastal forts, for on the safety of the coastal vessels depended much of their revenues.<sup>27</sup> On the other, some of them shared some of the spoils of the pirates' loot and afforded them covert support. In the next few years, there was no direct challenge to the Company from the chieftaindoms of the peninsula or from Kutch. Their tactics were to covertly resist the Company's political supremacy when it conflicted with their interests. The records of Company in this period continually refer to such conflicts of interests.

A third group involved was the merchants of Kutch and Kathiawad. What were their interests: who did they ally with and how did the Company's incursions affect them? And what part did they eventually play in the emerged colonial order?

---

27. The Rao of Kutch owned in this period a small fortified harbour in Okhamandal called the Kutchi Garh which had been built by one of his predecessors to control piracy in the nearby areas.

At which points did their interests clash with those of the Company and the English trading firms of Bombay and where did they share a commonality?

One may submit that there was no consistency of alliances: the merchants, too, sought the Company's protection for their trade on the coasts; there were others who were involved with the trade of the resale of pirated cargo-and helped the piratical villages in several ways. Besides most of them ignored with ease the punitive embargo imposed on the vessels of some peninsular ports by the Company. And not always were the merchants governed by their commercial interests alone. Particularly when the Company attempted attacks on certain fortifications to neutralise coastal piracy totally, it had to face the resentment of the Hindu merchants to whom Beyt and Okha were sacred places.

Moreover, outside of the interests of the Company's and the Agency Houses' commercial interests, there were spaces for the local merchants to operate in: the coastal trade to the Makran and East African coasts, for instance. On the other hand, there were direct violations of the Company's interests in the illicit trade carried on in opium on which the Company had imposed a monopoly which it could never enforce to much effect.

Some form of action on the "Northern Piracies" was on the Company's agenda more so since the cotton trade to China was related to Bombay's trade with peninsular Gujarat and Kutch.

Our communication with the Northern Ports being on the point of closing, while a considerable part of our cotton...remains to the Northward, are circumstances which render us exceedingly anxious to have the means of getting it down... we therefore beg leave to solicit your Honourable to address a letter to the chief council at Surat with instructions....to dispatch the Batellas as they may arrive at Surat Bar from Broach and Jamboosar under the protection of armed fishing boats...<sup>28</sup>

The pirates were not indiscriminate; they issued passes (cowls) to traders on the coast for a fee, which were then under their protection and free from their attacks. Since the vessels of the Company or the Agency Houses, or even several merchants at Bombay disdained these passes, they were vulnerable to plunder.

From 1800 onwards, the Company had to negotiate and renegotiate with the headmen of the villages of Okha , Beyt, Aramra and Positra. The one other "piratical state" the island of Jaffrabad off the peninsular coast occupied by the Sidi sailors and priates who owed allegiance to the

---

28. C.D.D., 1789, p.512-513, Letter addressed to the Governor in Council, Bombay, by the Agency Houses of Adamson, Forbes and Smith, and three Parsi Merchants.



Sidi of Janjira south on the western coast had been 'neutralised' with a friendship treaty between the Company and the Sidi earlier.<sup>29</sup> The Company's other option, to militarily crush those villages and fortifications was also considered. But it was acknowledged that even with the help of the chieftains of Kutch, Junagadh and Nawanagar who were in any case not willing to participate in any such action, the Company's naval fleet would find it difficult to pursue the pirates in their hideouts in the creeks of the coast.

In 1802, Capt. D. Seton, the Company's Resident at Muscat was sent to Kutch with the aim of establishing a Residency. He also conducted enquiries on the layout of the piratical ports.<sup>30</sup> He sent a detailed report:

The situation of the province of Ocka, to the windward in the north east monsoon, of every seaport on this side of India gives the pirates a great advantage in taking vessels, it besides commands the entrance of the Cutch, and the Persian Gulphs, and is the key to all the northern parts of Guzerat by land.<sup>31</sup>

After which a sketch of their strategic locations he described the fortifications in detail:

---

29. C.U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries Calcutta 1909, pp.217-219.

30. Political and Secret Department Diary, no.133, p.7717. Henceforth P.S.D.

31. *ibid*, 7727,

there is a port on the extreme point of Jagat which looks to the sea without the Gulph, and communicates with the creek within this port, and another towards the Cattawar frontier beyond Dwarca might be held by half a battalion... and the other half subsidized on Cutch would render us complete masters of both.<sup>32</sup> (emphasis mine)

He further opined that, at all events it would be a great object to destroy these pirates and would relieve our trade of an yearly loss of several lacs....The fort of Beyt is square, with four towers, and two gateways, about the same strength as Cutchee Guree it is situated about the middle of the island within the creek to which there are two entrances, .... this fort once taken would be a safe harbour with supplies of provisions and water for shipping... Dwarca is much stronger...when in possession of it, boats could enter the creek near Dwarca.<sup>33</sup>

That year the Governor in Council rejected the idea of a naval attack.<sup>34</sup> There were several more instances of piracy the next year in 1803. Seton was once more sent with instructions to negotiate with the headman of Okha. He reported:

Regarding the cotton boats taken by pirates at Ocka... I wrote to Moorah Manuck the headman at Dwarca, demanding the two boats, to which I received the enclosed answer - He acknowledges the capture of the two boats, but says that he sent one to Beyt, and the cargo of the cotton has been sold, the boat he has got, and desires me to inform the Honorable the governor that stealing is his only livelihood, and how is he to subsist if

---

32. *ibid.*

33. *ibid.*, p.7731.

34. *ibid.*

he leaves it off....All enquiries certify that the cotton boats were taken by his own cruisers.... in consequences of the demand made lately by the Honorable the governor the headman has raised his share from one tenth of the captured property, to one half, as he is now made answerable for their robberies.<sup>35</sup>

The headman of Okha clearly perceived the Company's interference as violating his traditional occupation: while he negotiated with the Company's official he increased his share of the captured cargo in view of the heightened risk he, as headman, was taking since he alone would be responsible for the piracies. He did not contest overtly the Company's claims for reimbursement for the vessels captured but stated, simply, that his customary livelihood was endangered by the Company's policies:

Moorah Manack the present headman of Dwarca, is of... Fisherman caste, the majority of his subjects are also the same...they are forced to subsist by piracy.<sup>36</sup>

The chieftain of Beyt adopted similar tactics. Seton wrote in his next report:

The headman at Beyt sent over five principal people, two Banyans and three of his own cast, to give security they would not take own boats,... but would not give any money they are empowered to act for the man at Dwarca, and Cutch shroffs willing to be their security.<sup>37</sup>

---

35. P.S.D., no.134, pp.123-124.

36. *ibid*, p.137.

37. P.S.D., no.148, pp.6115-23.

Seton however squarely expressed his opinion regarding their intentions "they will never leave off stealing."<sup>38</sup>.

It is apparent that the pirates were not acting in isolation, for their mediators were traders from Kutch - the "Cutch shroffs" who are not mentioned by name. It is possible that they were traders through whom the pirated goods were sold into the market.

The pirates were further assisted by political elements in Kutch, for Seton had had occasion to write earlier in the same year:

There is no doubt that they (Bait) are assisted from Mundra by Mohammed Seta and also by the Raja of Nugger<sup>39</sup> who to reimburse himself for the money advanced them, has appointed an agent of his to collect the customs at Beyt - their assistance in men was from Ocka, the inhabitants of which as a joint cause assembled there.. Other Banyans in Cutch and Hallar furnished money to save their places of worship from falling into the hands of strangers.<sup>40</sup>

The network of interests that knit some of the local merchants, the pirates, the chieftain of Nawanagar as well as Mohammad Seth, a rebel commander who with support from

---

38. *ibid.*

39. Nawa Nagar.

40. P.S.D., no.141, dt. 13/5/1803, p.2649.

Jamadar Fattedh Mohammad of Kutch was in possession of the port of Mundra, were complex. The pirates wished to protect their livelihood which, apart from the pilgrim taxes levied at Okha and Beyt consisted of their share of the pirated cargoes. The chieftain of Nawanagar and Mohammad Seth, in all probability, received a share of the spoils of the pirates. The merchants whose resources were utilised by the pirates for their defence as well as when negotiating with the officials or the agents of the Company's were involved probably, in the trafficking of the pirated goods. Significantly, they were also motivated by concerns other than commercial ones. Both Beyt and Dwarka were holy places which were to be protected against desecration once they fell into the hands of "strangers". The identities of these merchants remain nebulous: they are referred to merely as "banyans". Of their specific subcastes or their trading networks nothing can be ascertained, except that they were located in Kutch and parts of Kathiawad. Their support for the pirates is intriguing for they could well have been victims of piracy themselves. It is apparent however that the pirates were not indiscriminate in their attacks on coastal vessels ships which carried the passes issued by them were safe from harassment.

Unremitting pressure from the Company continued on the pirates and next year Capt. Seton restarted negotiations to force the piratical villages to give verbal assurances of good conduct. He reported initial success:

Sudaram of Bait being determined to to make those under him respect the English flag and colours has taken from the captors, a pattamar the property of a merchant in Bombay taken on her way from Goa, and has sent Kesoram Batia the principal merchant in Bait to know from one, whether it would be agreeable to send the pattamar here, or to dispatch her from Bombay... Kesoram was also instructed to declare that no other English property had been brought into Bait for twelve months....but if any English subject can trace his property within that date it shall be made good to him.<sup>41</sup>

Even then the headman of Beyt refused to be considered an outlaw; what he sought was that the Company should recognise him as a chieftain and negotiate with him on his terms. Seton wrote,

Kesoram also was instructed to make proposals for an adjustment between Bait and Bombay but as they referred only to Bait I suggested to him, that the terms for such an agreement, ought to include all of Ocka... Otherwise there would be no greater security for the Company's trade than at present, as they would only carry their prizes to other ports, what we offered on this head will I think give satisfaction.<sup>42</sup>

---

41. P.S.D., no.156, pp.1296-98.

The Company agreed to negotiate with and consider granting certain political concessions to the trading vessels of Okha and Beyt. Seton had occasion to write a few months later:

Sudaram headman at Bait... made proposal for an agreement and offer, of a free communication with his harbour and Bombay and permission for our vessels to cruise in it...<sup>43</sup>

Next year the Company sent a prominent merchant of Kathiawad, who was also their agent, Shivji Sundarji, to negotiate with certain chieftains of Kathiawad and with both the rival political elements in Kutch. He was also asked to conduct dialogues with the piratical ports. He wrote to Major Walker, the Company's Resident at Baroda:

You wrote a letter... on the subject of the batella that was plundered, I sent a man to Moorah Manick. He answered that the grain which was taken in the boat was plundered by the boatmen, and that none of it came into his possession, and the boat was plundered by different people, that if the English will be friends with him... whatever remains, he is willing to restore... He puts off by saying he will pay the grain but until this time no money forthcoming, I am of the opinion they will never be paid."<sup>44</sup>

---

42. *ibid.*

43. *ibid.*, p.1606.

44. P.S.D., no. 162, pp.4636-38.

There was nothing the Company's agent, Shivji Sundarji could do to retrieve the pirated goods or force a compensation. What he did was to communicate the headman's verbal assurances to the Resident:

Moorah Manick and Sudaram have agreed not to take any vessels under the protection of the English.<sup>45</sup>

The piracies continued despite such assurances. The Council at Bombay recommended in 1806 an embargo to be imposed on all boats arriving from the "piratical ports".<sup>46</sup> Besides, all vessels from these ports then anchored at the Bombay harbour were detained. How effective the embargo was is difficult to estimate. The merchants of Okha and Beyt carried on their trade by using passes issued by the Company to its merchants at Surat, Gogha, and Cambay. The Customs Master at Bombay reported of one of the vessels detained at the Bombay harbour:

From the information I have received I have too much reason to infer that the petitioner is one of those many persons there, who are in the habit of selling their name and support to the merchants of Ocka-Baite and Dwarca to the ruin of our own merchants and fair traders.<sup>47</sup>

---

45. *ibid.*

46. P.S.D., no.165, p.806.

47. P.S.D., no.165, pp.808-809.



The Governor-in-Council proposed several measures to enforce the embargo. The acting collectors of customs at Surat and Bharuch, and the Resident at Baroda were instructed:

to stop all boats or other vessels belonging to the pirate ports... that may be found within their respective Districts and to report the names of owners and navigators of all such vessels or boats as may thus be placed under detention.<sup>48</sup>

Despite this, Shivji Sundarji had occasion to report a few months later:

The chief of Ocka is in friendship with Fätteh Mohammad and is at present with his boats which are now at sea to plunder the merchant vessels of Bombay or any other nations.<sup>49</sup>

It was, thus not only the pirates who defied the Company's embargo despite its repeated efforts at alternate negotiations and coercions. The chieftains of the region felt the Company's intrusions to be a direct threat to their interests and lent the pirates covert support, despite their internal differences. Shivji Sundarji urgently warned his masters,

If an English Gentleman, with a full commission, a large ship and some small ones was to come well

---

48. *ibid.*, p.810, Minutes of the Governer in Council, Bombay, Feb.1805.

49. P.S.D. no.173, p.5352.

armed to Mandavee with a design to punish the people of Ocka he might have some hope, and if the Government delay this business the armies of the chiefs of Sind will have joined Fatteh Mohammad and Hansraj and Ocka.<sup>50</sup>

Shivji reported the capture of twelve vessels by the chief of Okha, Beyt, and Gomti and Positra that season.<sup>51</sup>

The Governor-in-Council at the end of the year submitted to the Governor General its opinion that "nothing short of the destruction of piratical islands could crush the pirates."<sup>52</sup>

Next year, the Company deputed yet another agent, Maulvi Mohammad Ali, for talks with the various Kathiawad chieftains as well as the headmen of the piratical villages. There was stubborn resistance by the chieftains on coast as well as his friendly overtures. Though he was not physically harmed, he was coldly received and ordered to abandon his surveys of the region. He narrated his encounter with the headman of Dwarka:

I replied that I had a letter of friendship from the English govt...and was going to deliver it in order to increase the friendship between the Company and him. He said that some days since the chief of Nawanugger had written to Baba Sudaram,

---

50. *ibid.*

51. *ibid.*, p.5645.

52. *ibid.*, p.5646-47.

chief of Beyt - that a writer of the Honourable Company was coming into his Parganah, to give information about the country, and this fort and therefore not to allow him.<sup>53</sup>

His next visit was to Okha, where the headman was equally direct about the effects of the Company's intervention.

You see I live in a jungle, and do my people cultivate the ground? Or is the ground fit for cultivation? This Pagoda and river which many people come to see compose my revenue, and the remainder arises from the plunder of vessels, which has from ancient times been my support.

In these days, all merchants have taken to flag and protection of the Honourable Company and if I abstain from plundering them, where can I procure food? and if I continue I fall under the displeasure of the Company.<sup>54</sup>

The sentiments of Sudaram, the headman of Beyt were more belligerent but on similar lines.

Before this the ships of the Company fought with me, and departed. Have they forgot this, that they have sent a Moonshee to make friendship?<sup>55</sup>

When negotiations failed, the Company resorted once more to the seizure of all vessels from those they

---

53. P.S.D., no.185, pp.6131-32.

54. *ibid.*, p.6133.

55. *ibid.*, p.6134.

identified as the piratical ports. Some sixteen vessels were captured in several expeditions.<sup>56</sup>

Besides the Jam of Nawanagar, the nawab of Junagadh too appears to have colluded with the pirates. In 1807, the Agency Houses of Bruce, Fawcett and Company wrote to the Governor objecting to the nawab's reluctance to take punitive measures against the pirates who were officially his subjects. They suggested that the Company demand an indemnity from the Nawab.<sup>57</sup>

The pirated cargo had moreover been sold in the nawab's ports. Bruce Fawcett and Company pointed out:

a boat on which we had freighted 143 bales of cotton from Broach has been captured and carried into the port of Nova Bunder where the cotton has been exposed for sale without any apparent interference from the government of that plac and... we have positive information that the coolies' boats belonged to Rajapur a place very near Novabunder in the dominons of the Nabob of Joonagurh.<sup>58</sup>

Major Walker wrote to the nawab demanding an explanation for the piracy committed and his non interference in the matter of the sale of the pirated cargo.

---

56. P.S.D., no. 217, pp.8242-43.

57. *ibid.*, p.8312.

58. *ibid.*, p.7778.

The nawab replied that at the time of the piracy Una and Dilwara were not under his control. When he did acquire Nawa Bandar from the rebels, he "Kept Nova Bunder waste and expelled some robbers on the high roads."<sup>59</sup>

Walker was not mollified and pointed out that at the time of the piracy, the nawab "had not the disobedient Karbarees you speak of."<sup>60</sup>

Even if it had been true that the nawab of Junagadh had not directly colluded with the pirates, the fact that he had no control over the headman in whose territory the pirated goods were sold indicates that the pirates were linked to and received support from, various chieftains from the neighbouring territories of Okhamandal.

This does not appear to have affected the traders of these ports, though the headmen of Okha, Beyt, Dwarka, Aramra and Positra must have suffered losses in the fees for the passes they issued to the trading vessels of their ports. The merchants carried on their trade by availing themselves of English passes and flags issued at the Company's ports. A report to the superintendent of Marine, Bombay, in December 1807 remarks:

---

59. P.S.D., no. 226, p.3142.

60. *ibid*, pp.3143-44.

I found almost all vessels of this coast, to whatever port they belong, have English pass and colours, which I understand their owners procure through the medium of their correspondence in Bombay.<sup>61</sup>

The official on further enquiries was told by the navigator of the vessel that he (the navigator) was a resident of Mangrol, and had produced his pass from a Bhatia trader at Bombay.<sup>62</sup> At Porbandar where the Company's ship docked for supplies a "Banyan" was sent by the Raja of Porbandar informing him that the boat belonged to the navigator and henceforth should be released. The official adds, "the Banyan informed that it was very common for this coast to procure passes from Bombay."<sup>63</sup>

The official released that particular boat, but warned his masters at Bombay:

If passes can be procured at Bombay through the medium of a correspondent, the Cruisers belonging to the pirates may with ease procure theirs from friends at Cutch and Porbunder, and the Dingy which I took in Baite harbour and which the crew themselves owned to be the property of Pirates, not only the Nugger people, but the people of Poorbunder, have requested me to deliver up as their property. Thus by their ready zeal to serve their piratical friends they have given me reason to doubt the veracity of either...I have received intimations that at some port in the Gulph of Cutch a fleet of thirteen large Dingeys and a Ketch is filled out for the express purpose of

---

61. P.S.D. no.217, pp.8242-43.

62. *ibid.*, p.8312.

63. *ibid.*, p.8213.

catching our small squadron...but I much fear they will not attempt to put their threats into execution.<sup>64</sup>

Constant patrolling by the Company's naval squadrons reinforced by the trade embargo was resented by the Company. As we have seen, neither was totally effective. By the end of 1807, however, constant political pressure on the chieftains of Porbandar, Nawanagar and Junagadh had the eventual effect - they were more wary of colluding with the headmen of the piratical villages. There was another significant shift -the local merchants gradually switched over to obtaining through their contacts in the Company's ports to English passes and flags. While the flow of their trade was not affected, they no longer appear to have allied themselves with the pirates or considered their passes as the only protection necessary for the safety of their vessels. They continued to use the pirates' passes, but if the Company were to prolong the embargo, the passes would be rendered redundant. The pirates were isolated. The merchants on the one hand and the chieftains of the Gulf of Kutch distanced themselves. They were compelled by the seizure of many of their vessels, to reduce their operations. The Governor in Council at Bombay was informed in Dec. 1807, for instance, that "Sudaram of Bait released a boat he had

---

64. *ibid.*, p.8315.

captured while it was on its way from Lakhpat Bandar to Nawanagar in 1806."<sup>65</sup> The report cited compulsions: "This act (was) the operations of interested feelings rather than the dictates of generosity and reformed sentiments... The chieftains of Dwarca and Bait were interceding through various channels, for the release of their vessels.. under detention at this port and Surat."<sup>66</sup>

By 1808, the year when there were comprehensive "settlement campaigns' by the joint forces of the Company and the Gaekwad to 'pacify' Kathiawad, Sunderji Shivji was sent to make settlements with the "piratical states" as well.

Even when settlements were eventually made, the Company conceded to their insistence on being allowed to issue their own passes. The merchants residing in Okhamandal and surrounding areas continued to use the passes issued by the chieftains of Okha, Beyt, Aramra and Positra. The Company limited itself in the security of the vessels of its own ports. Major Walker, the Resident at Baroda, wrote to the Governor:

The object of the arrangement is to prohibit and extirpate piracy without any restriction or exception - but should it be the policy of the

---

65. *ibid*, pp.8360-62.

66. *ibid*.



Honourable Company to confine their protection to their own commerce... the pirates will.. accede it may be consistent with the policy of the Hon. Company to permit the chief of Dwarca to continue to grant his come to the merchants who are not subject of the Hon. Company and who may wish to receive the protection of any of these chiefs.<sup>67</sup>

He admitted that the Company wished to eliminate piracy entirely but that it was beyond the Company's means to coerce any further. "Our real interest and the safety of our own commerce... would lead us to root out piracy entirely.. it could probably be equally provided to confine the Company's passports to the vessels and property of merchants who are British subjects.<sup>68</sup>

The chiefs of Okha, Beyt, Aramra and Positra further insisted that the agents of the Company posted there should be merchants familiar to them "of the caste of Sunderjee Shivji" which had further to be acceded to.<sup>69</sup>

It is significant that while the headmen of Okha, Beyt, Dwarka and Aramra entered into agreements with the agent of the Company Sunderji Shivji, the headman of Positra put up a stiffer resistance.<sup>70</sup> Positra was not a pilgrimage centre

---

67. P.S.D. no.220, p.60.

68. *ibid.*

69. *ibid.*, p.76.

70. *ibid.*, p.79.

like the others, so its revenues were totally dependent on piracy. It had to be persuaded by the other piratical chiefs. A few miles of Positra was Dinghey, the Wagher chieftain of which was of the same caste as the chief of Positra. He too had to be persuaded and threatened before he signed an agreement to renounce piracy.<sup>71</sup>

The "settlements" of 1808 did not eliminate piracy entirely from the coast. The chief of Positra who was still recalcitrant was sent vessels and other resources by Fatteh Mohammed of Kutch the next year.<sup>72</sup>

The Company recorded, since the settlements, a great reduction in the incidents of piracy out it appears that their "ancestral occupations" were not abandoned by the seamen of the Gulf of Kutch. Piracies on the coast were recorded till as late as the latter half of the 19th century.<sup>73</sup>

To understand the phenomenon of piracies of the coast, it is necessary to remember that piracy was one of the occupations of the coastal population of the region. It was a part of the seafaring tradition that had had a long

---

71. *ibid.*, p.93.

72. *ibid.*, p.81.

73. A piracy was recorded as late as 1903 on the coast. Imperial Gazetteer, 1909, p.353.

history on the coastline. Coastal trading and coastal piracy were aspects of the same tradition. There were several seafaring castes on the coast who manned the merchant vessels as well as the piratical expeditions. Fishing was yet another occupation. Every small port on the coast shared these seafaring histories. "These people", observe the Company records," are spread all over the coast of Gujarat... those only living at places where piracy is encouraged navigate pirate vessels... In other places they negotiate the boats of merchants."<sup>74</sup> The same seafaring tradition on the coasts of peninsular Gujarat and Kutch that the Company recruited for their ships and called them "the best seamen in India" made possible the piratical traditions there.<sup>75</sup> The chieftains on the coast, who had access to revenues from sources other than piracy, too, shared the spoils of piracy, lent them support and contested the Company's interventions on what they considered their customary rights: the right to the cargoes of shipwrecked vessels, for instance. In the next section one would explore in what ways they had resisted the Company and what the points of their negotiations had been.

---

74. P.S.D., no.220, p.83.

75. See next section, Negotiations and Intrigues, p.92

### Section III - Negotiations and Intrigues: Fencing with the Company

From 1802 to 1808, the Company's interest frequently clashed with those of several chieftains in Kathiawad and in Kutch. One significant aspect of this was the support of several chieftains for piracies in the Gulf of Kutch. One has seen how the Jam of Nawanagar, the Nawab of Junagadh, as well as Fatteh Mohammad Seth in Kutch on occasions allied themselves with the pirates of Okhamandal in defiance of the Company's interventions.

The Company's political invasions in peninsular Gujarat and Kutch were opposed in other ways. This was evident particularly in the cases of Bhavnagar and Kutch, the two chieftaindoms which had sizeable ports that traded to the Gulf and the East African coast. Even when, for instance, the Diwan of Kutch Hansraj negotiated with the Company against his political rival Fatteh Mohammad, he sought terms of agreement favourable to the trade of Mandvi. Eventually, the Company's terms of trade had to be accepted by both Fatteh Mohammad and Hansraj Shah. The point is that the Company's incursion contested and the trading interests of the chieftaindoms motivated the contestation.

The Case of Kutch. In 1802, political power in Kutch was contested between two groups each seeking to legitimise

its claims to rule on behalf of Rao Raydhan II who was held prisoner alternately by the two groups in Bhuj.

There is one interesting aspect in the years of conflict between Hansraj, Fatteh Mohammad and the Company: the points of conflict were centred around the control of the ports of Kutch: Mandvi, Anjar, Mundra, Lakhpat Bandar. Large arid and semi-arid tracts in central and northern Kutch were mostly ignored. Coastal trade appears to have provided the revenues and directed the contours of political power.

The Company's interests in political interventions in Kutch were three fold-to use its political power to procure cotton for its China trade: to neutralise piracy on the coast, and, at a more general level, to "pacify" the region for the safety of its own trade.

Capt. David Seton was sent to Kutch in 1802 on a survey mission to investigate possibilities of establishing a Residency there. A few years ago another official, Mr. Lowell, had been expelled from Kutch by Hansraj Shah, when he had been sent to take possession of some artillery and other goods belonging to Tipu Sultan after his eventual defeat.\* The letter of instruction warned Capt. Seton:

---

\* Tipu Sultan had sent some artillery to Kutch and had a small establishment there.

From what was learnt...by Mr. Lowett there is a strong reason to believe that there is a strong predisposition to European influence as were particularly exemplified at that period, by Hans Raj who was then only Kawdar of Mandvi, a town on the coast, which together with Mundra appear to constitute the principal, or at least at present, best known accesses to Kutch.<sup>76</sup>

In the course of the conflicts between Fatteh Mohammad and Hans Raj, the latter had had the possession of the port of Mandvi. The Rao was under his protection at Bhuj. Hans Raj had appealed to Shivji Sunderji, the Company's agent for assistance from the Company in the form of troops and artillery. The Company sent Capt. Seton with clear instructions to explore the possibilities of setting up a Residency or at least a factory in Kutch to facilitate the Company's commercial interests in the region.

You are in general to consider it very desirable, that this undertaking should proceed upon similar principles to those on which the Honourable Company's Interposition in the affairs of Guzerat was last year extended by holding in ultimate view the establishment of a Political Residency with the government of Kutch, and engaging it to subsidize a permanent military force. But you will be cautious not to enter on any discussion of this ultimate object...rather be that the propositions may come from themselves.<sup>77</sup>

Seton was further instructed to report on the "piratical states" in the Gulf of Kutch.

---

76. P.S.D., no.129, p.6183.

77. *ibid*, p.6196.

He reported two months later:

There are two parties in this country who may be termed the moneyed and the landed interests, but are called here the Banyans and Girassias, the power is in the hands of the first who are the weakest but united in themselves, the others are divided; and by keeping part of them in their pay the Banyans rule them. The Girassias or holders of land on a hereditary tenure of military service, are of the Jadeja or Rajput caste, and by the introduction of a regular force would be in danger of losing their influence...the Banyans are also not hearty in it.<sup>78</sup>

Seton estimated that besides the above mentioned problems, the revenues of Kutch amounted to around Rs.10 lakhs per annum, therefore the chieftaindom of Kutch would be unable to subsidise a permanent British force.<sup>79</sup> In any case, the Company's troops in western India at that time were engaged with the Peshwa and Holkar. The Governor instructed Capt. Seton to collect information about Kutch and then leave.<sup>80</sup>

That year, Hansraj concluded a temporary truce with Fatteh Mohamad and informed Seton that he was no longer in need of English troops.<sup>81</sup> He however sent to the Governor in Council at Bombay, a blueprint for a treaty with Kutch.

---

78. P.S.D., no. 133, pp.7717-7720.

79. *ibid.*

80. *ibid.*, pp.7720-22.

81. *ibid.*

The proposed articles of agreement included an offensive and defensive alliance between Kutch and the Company and the Rao's banning of any other European (particularly French) setting up a factory at Kutch. Hans Raj further proposed that the Company's exports from Kutch, which included piece goods, cotton, horses, and imports into Kutch such as broad cloth, copper, tin, lead, iron and steel should pay a duty of 5%, which was half the duty paid by other merchants in Kutch. He also promised the Rao's assistance in the event of the Company's attack on the pirates at Okha, and its neighbouring harbours. Significantly enough, Hans Raj also proposed that if a factory were to be set up by the Rao at Bombay, his commodities would also pay half the duties paid by other merchants as the Company would at Kutch.<sup>82</sup> Seton remarked to the Governor:

He (Hans Raj) has... endeavoured as much as possible to make an apposite demand for the Raja to everything he has offered to the Company... (it)... might be rejected as giving room to innovations in the customs by his sending his own goods as the Raja.<sup>83</sup>

---

82. *ibid.*, p.7725.

83. *ibid.*, p.7727.



The Governor acknowledged Hans Raj's letter but was non-committal in tone. He did not directly refuse to grant the concessions demanded by Hans Raj.<sup>84</sup>

However, the Governor in Council resolved later that month that an offensive and defensive treaty with Kutch would be superfluous, since

there is not the least probability of the British Government ever making such a call on the Government of Kutch except perhaps in the case of a limited operation against the Pirates of Okhamandal.<sup>85</sup>

The Governor had further objections to Hans Raj's proposals, and concluded,

the Raja will we apprehend, from the very inconsiderable concern that he can himself be supposed to take in commerce find it easy to forego, any Expectation of particular favour being shown to his own Trade at the Port of Bombay, as such an exemption is incompatible with the Company's general system...in the event of Raja's any...article to import/export from Bombay our government might...accept it...as a point of courtesy and not a positive right by the Treaty.<sup>86</sup>

---

84. *ibid*, p.7736.

85. *ibid*, p.7737.

86. *ibid*.

He further demanded a more reduced rate of duty than that suggested by Hans Raj.<sup>87</sup>

The Governor nevertheless sent a letter to the Governor General at Calcutta listing the advantages of a partnership with Kutch. Besides commercial ones, he pointed out the strategic implications of the partnership, due to Kutch's proximity to Sindh as well as Okhamandal.<sup>88</sup>

Though Hans Raj repeatedly asked the Company's troops for assistance against Fatteh Mohammad, he insisted that any agreement between the Company and Kutch would have to be on terms of equality. Capt. Seton had occasion to write again to the Governor next year in 1803.

Hans Raje had said...that he was convinced that the government sought a permanent friendship with the Raja, which could only be secured on any agreement equally advantageous to both.<sup>89</sup>

Within a few months, however, Fatteh Mohammad, already in possession of the ports of Anjar and Mundra, advanced towards Lakhpat Bandar. Hans Raj once more asked for the Company's troops and promised to destroy the boats and

---

87. *ibid.*, p.7739.

88. *ibid.*, pp.7739-41.

89. P.S.D., no. 137, p.956.

dinghies of the pirates of Kutch as well as pay to the Company eleven lakh rupees annually from the port of Mandvi which was in his possession.<sup>90</sup> However, since the Company's troops were engaged in war with Daulat Rao Sindhia at that time, the Company could not spare any troops for Mandvi.<sup>91</sup>

The Company maintained a continuous interest in Kutch and Shivji Sundariji, its agent at Kutch as well as Capt. Seton sent detailed reports on the fluctuations in the balance of power between Fatteh Mohammad and Hans Raj.<sup>92</sup> The ultimate object of the Company was to acquire possession of any of the coastal ports, preferably Mandvi. Seton suggested to the Governor,

to secure the Company a permanent influence in the country, beyond the reach, of accident or caprice a territorial possession is necessary but the attainment of this should be left to time and the necessities of their Government...which will probably render it necessary for them to raise a large sum of money by the cession of some port and district, if any money is raised here. They will demand the Company's security and could it be managed that, the territory should revert to them on the clearance of the Shroffs' demand, the object would be attained.<sup>93</sup>

The advantages of acquiring the territorial possession of a port in Kutch, particularly Mandvi was stressed.

---

90. P.S.D., no.148, pp.6123-25.

91. *ibid*, pp-6130-31.

92. *ibid.*, pp.4397-99.

93. P.S.D., no. 156, pp.1310-11.

It does not appear to me that Cutch will ever be an advantageous acquisition to the Honourable Company in respect to revenue, but it possesses advantages in political and commercial point of views...it is surrounded with countries, whose grain, and manufactures, supplies Bombay, Malabar, Arabia and Africa. In its Gulf, it possesses a harbour equal to Bombay, which possess every inducement for the India merchants to resort to it.<sup>94</sup>

Seton further remarked

let a correct statement of imports from the Gulph of Cutch at the Bombay Custom House be drawn up and an equal allowance be made for Malabar, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and coast of Africa...and the value of such a situation would appear...other ports in the Gulph send vessels to India, but the trade of Arabia and Africa is confined to Mandvee, the imports to which are sent inland to Marwar, Multan and the interior of India. It also has an inland trade with Guzerat and Sindh.<sup>95</sup>

By the next year, continued skirmishes appear to have exhausted both Fattedh Mohammad and Hans Raj's resources. There had been several attempts at negotiations for peace, none of which had reached any conclusive agreements.

Seton had occasion to write to Bombay:

nothing will remain, but their both applying to the Honourable Company to give all opportunity of making a permanent agreement...The Honourable Company are their only resource as the one has no troops, and the other no money, and both are alarmed for fear of a foreign invasion threatening from Sindh.<sup>96</sup>

---

94. *ibid.*, pp.1611-13.

95. *ibid.*, pp.1313-14.

96. *ibid.*, pp.1611-13..

It appears that the eventuality of the Company's troops and agents mediating peace between the two groups did not deter either Fatteh Mohammad or Hans Raj from actively resisting the Company's influence. Fatteh Mohammad and Mohammad Seth were in league with the pirates of Okhamandal.<sup>97</sup> And the Company's agent on a special negotiating mission to Kutch and Kathiawad, Maulvi Mohamad Ali, commented of Hans Raj -

Hans Raj Sa to answer his own views will cultivate and profess on his own part, the greatest friendship with the British Government. But when he has no occasion for their interest or assistance his professions of friendship and attachment will all vanish into nothing; thus in everything he does he considers only his own good...<sup>98</sup>

The Company's interest was in the acquisition of the port of Mandvi. Almost all of the overseas trade of Kutch was carried on from that port. After the acquisition of Gogha and Dhollera, the prized port of Mandvi would have rounded off the Company's control of all the important outlets in peninsular Gujarat and in the Gulf of Kutch.

Establishing a Residency in Kutch had been ruled out because the revenues of Kutch would not permit the expenses of maintaining the Company's troops on a permanent basis.

---

97. See second section : Chieftains, Pirates and Merchants.

98. P.S.D., no. 165, p.780.

The Company negotiated for the revenues of Mandvi and if possible its cession to the Company. The Company appears to have perceived no dispute from the bhayads of the Rao; its negotiations were with Fattedh Mohammad and Hans Raj, who were in possession of the ports of Kutch. Mandvi Mohammad Ali wrote in 1805:

the news from Cutch is as follows: the zamindars of the tribe of Jadeja of the same cast as the Rao who is the sovereign of Booj possess the half of the country of Cutch and several are possessed of forts but the whole are at enmity with each other and they entertain no other design than that of assuming possession of the parganah of another.<sup>99</sup>

It was apparent to the Company's agent that the ports of Kutch were the focal points of the region's prosperity.

Ease and Luxury are only enjoyed by the Banyans, Battias and Lohanas who trade, the Soucars of the Bandar of Mandvi carry on a great trade in Bang, horses and grain and rice from Sind and clothes from Marwar are carried to Arabia from which great profit is desired..the whole trade of the port of Mandvi is in the hands of Banyans.<sup>100</sup>

The revenues of the port of Mandvi were the source of Hans Raj's power. The Company to attain its objective of gaining a foothold in Kutch appears to have perceived no threats from the merchant community in general; if

---

99. P.S.D., no. 168, p.2735.

100. *ibid.*

negotiations with Hans Raj failed, the Company was prepared to force the trade of Mandvi to a standstill through an embargo in all of its ports on the western coast. In that event the Company could have assured a decline in the commercial activities of Mandvi, thereby also affecting Hans Raj's sources of revenues. Capt. Seton calculated, moreover that the merchants would have to force Hans Raj into a situation where he would have to negotiate on the Company's terms. He wrote to Walker in 1805:

All goods which merchants bring from any of the ports of Mandvie Hans raj acquired great emoluments on such as sugar candy, soft sugar, Bengal rice, and fine white Bengal and Deccanni cloths, Satin and other China cloths which come from Bombay-and cardamom, cloves black pepper, nutmeg, fine white cloth and many things of the kind which come from Malabar-and Kinkab, stuffs gold bullion Berhampore and Madras chintz which comes from the port of Surat. In short, all the merchants in Mandavie are dependent on the Company's ports; Lacs of rupees of property arrives and is carried to Marwar, Mewar, Sind, Peshawar and Cashmeer, and Merchants from every place come to buy goods of every kind...from Pallee and Judpoor which are near and on the road to catch to which great quantities of these goods go in the property being handed from the ship. Hans Raj Sa exacts a duty when the merchants of the town sell it to others, he exacts another duty where it is carried from the town to any other place...all his involvements are from the Port he has not another Parganah...There is no Port in Kathywar Cutch or Scinde equal to that of Mandavie...if for a season the Company's ports were shut against the merchants and Hans Raj's ships, I am certain that Hans Raj from the decrease of his revenues would be so much at a loss...that he would act according to the Company's desires...the advantage of the sea being

his income....The merchants of Mandvie are very independent and...they would come over to the side of the Company and the Company should acquire the Port of Mandvie without any trouble.<sup>101</sup> (emphasis mine)

The Company's points of interest were focussed along the coast, on the major ports and the sheltered harbours of the pirates. Seton said of the bhayads of Kutch:

If government thinks that the zamindars of Cutch will unite, and disturbances would increase it is not possible...and if they should nothing can happen because in the country of Cutch there are no rich zamindars.<sup>102</sup>

The next year, Hans Raj offered to cede a part of the revenues of Mandvi to finance the Company's troops in Bhuj and Mandvi.<sup>103</sup> The offer was repeated in 1808. Walker wrote to the Governor General,

similar offers by Hans Raj Sa have, at different times, been made to the Hon'ble the Governor in Council but probably never in so direct or formal a manner which renders it proper that these papers should be submitted to the notice of the Government.<sup>104</sup>

The next year in 1809, the Company and the Gaekwad signed two separate treaties with Fatteh Mohammad and Hans

---

101. P.S.D., no.173, pp-5334-37.

102. *ibid.*

103. P.S.D., no.185, pp.6138-40.

104. P.S.D., no. 232, pp.5475-76.



Raj, both Fatteh Mohammad and Hans Raj claiming to act on behalf of Rao Raydhan II. The treaties were similar. Both the parties agreed that Kutch troops would not violate the Wagad boundaries and cross over to Kathiawad. Both also promised to expel pirates from their respective territories along the coast. A third significant clause was that both parties agreed not to permit the setting up of factories or "any establishment whatever" by any European or American powers in Kutch. Hans Raj further agreed to accept an agent of the Company who would reside in Kutch and agreed to pay a nazrana of Rs.18600 annually to the Company's government.<sup>105</sup>

The treaties of 1809 marked the first decisive foothold the Company achieved in Kutch. It appears that the Company's control over the coastal trade of western India and the vital fact that commercial activities in Mandvi depended crucially on Surat, Gogha, Bombay—all of the Company's ports on the western coast. Probably the prospect of a blockade of Mandvi, Anjar, Mundra and Lakhpat Bandar finally coerced both Fatteh Mohammad and Hans Raj into a treaty with the Company.

In 1807, moreover, the combined troops of the Gaekwad and the Company marched to Kathiawad and "settled" formally

---

105. C.V. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, vol. VII Calcutta, 1909, pp.12-16.

with every chieftain and thakur, the amount of peshkashi to be paid by each to the Gaekwad. This ended the annual mulkgiri expeditions of the Gaekwad's army. The "settlements" concluded by Walker were directed to two ends. The first was to fix the annual income of its subordinate ally the Gaekwad. The second was to "pacify" Kathiawad to make it safe for the Company's trading interests and to safeguard its territories in Gujarat.

This agenda of "pacification" motivated the Company's agreements with Kutch to restrict the movements of the Wagads from Kutch to Kathiawad. In 1819, the Company finally marched its troops to Bhuj, forced Rao Raydhan II to abdicate and instituted his son as the Rao with the consent of several bhayads. One of its chief objections were to Kutch's inability or unwillingness to restrict the movements of the Wagads who, it was alleged, raided northern Kathiawad villages for cattle and moved back through the Rann of Kutch.<sup>106</sup>

The Company similarly sought to pacify coastal Kathiawad. The chieftains of Porbandar, Nawanagar and Junagadh had signed away by 1819, their customary rights to the cargoes of shipwrecked vessels in their territories, and

---

106. ibid., pp.19-28.

also their prerogative of taxing stranded vessels in their ports. They also formally renounced piracy.<sup>107</sup>

There was one other chieftaindom, Bhavnagar, which had stakes in the coastal trade of peninsular Gujarat and which was affected by the Company's attempts to direct the trade of the region to its own ports. As mentioned earlier (Ch.3, Section 1) the Company had acquired from the Peshwa the ports of Dhollera, Gogha and Ranpur in 1802. The Raja of Bhavnagar, however, had rights to the chauth of Gogha. This led to some confrontations with the Company. The crux of such clashes was that the Raja of Bhavnagar tried to direct the traders of the region to his ports, when the Company directed its attention to developing the port of Gogha. Walker wrote to Bombay in 1807 in replies to queries regarding the appointment of a Marine officer at Gogha,

the acknowledged superiority which the port possesses over the others in the Gulf of Cambay peculiarly point it out as a general place of Depot, for the Trade of the Peninsula...does not possess much, or any, Trade of its own manufacture. It is the convenience of the port that it would make it a place of general resort, and this result might be expected to increase in proportion to that convenience...Gogha is in respect to Guzerat what probably Bombay is to the surrounding country a port possessing much commercial convenience...except that which it has increased with its commerce.<sup>108</sup>

---

107. ibid., vol.6, pp.217-219.

108. P.S.D., no.217, pp.3910-12.

He recommended measures to develop the port of Gogha, which would eventually draw the trade of the surrounding regions to it. Walker wrote to the Governor,

probably therefore no measure can be better adopted to promote the rising of the port of Gogo, than the appointment of a Marine officer to the Superintendence of the Commerce of the port.<sup>109</sup>

The Resident further suggested

regulating the intercourse, and facilitating the resort of all merchants vessels...presence order and regularity among the people who come there.<sup>110</sup>

There were further plans to set up a manufacture of weavers eventually at Gogha and to recruit Kathiawadi seamen, "the best in India", as navigators for English ships.<sup>111</sup>

The Resident at Baroda realised that such a course of action would in all probability lead to confrontation with Bhavnagar, for he wrote,

over the port and town of Gogo the Honorable Company have an absolute jurisdiction, and I am

---

109. *ibid.*, p.3913.

110. *ibid.*, p.3943.

111. *ibid.*

not aware that is affected in any degree by the Bownugger's right of chauth...It does not appear therefore that the appointment of a marine officer would involve any point of discussion with the Bownugger Raja with whom it would be prudent for the officer to avoid any intercourse.<sup>112</sup>

This "prudence" advised on behalf of the Company's official was similar to clashes of interest earlier. The Company's agent at Baroda had written to Walker in 1803, immediately after the Company's acquisition of the port.

I came to Bownugger nearly two months ago but the Desays to this day have not satisfied me. After putting me of under various pretenses...at last the Desay Dewan declared that nothing would be done with regard to the customs (of Gogha) till the Raja received your letters....The truth is that they are slow to submit to any system and (put) thousand obstacles in the way of collecting customs as they have hither to done in all former deputed agents.<sup>113</sup>

By 1810, the Company's political influence was paramount in Kutch and Kathiawad. The Bhavnagar Raja may have resented the flow of traffic away from his ports, but it was not in his power to protest with much effect.

The "pacification" of Kathiawad and Kutch however did not end with the "settlements" of 1810. Till 1820, the Company had to conduct several expeditions in Kathiawad that were aimed at driving the Kathis into small pockets and in

---

112. P.S.D., no. 150, p.6958.

113. *ibid.*

clearing the prants of Kathiawad, Hallar and Jhalawar of disturbances and banditry.

### Post Script

To what extent the agreements signed with company were implemented by the chieftains of peninsular Gujarat or of Kutch is difficult to estimate. The study of one particular commodity of trade, opium, suggests that the British Government's attempts to monopolise the opium trade were ineffectual. The British government had coerced every chieftaindom in Kathiawad to sign agreements forbidding the passage of opium through their territories from Malwa through Ahmedabad, and Kathiawad on its way to Pali in Marwar, where it was processed.<sup>114</sup> A great deal of it was transported back by road and exported from the ports of Kathiawad and Kutch. A government report informs us that in 1873:


the importation of Malwa opium into territories subject to the Bombay Presidency is prohibited, except under passes granted by opium agents attached to central India for the purpose. This is the general rule, but it is not enforced in respect of opium entering Guzerat through the Myhee and Rewa Kantas...**(which)** pay a small transit duty to the petty chieftains through whose Talooka the road passes.<sup>115</sup>

---

114. Aitchison, op.cit., vol.6, pp.220-22.

115. Notes on the Manufacture, Importation and Consumption of Opium in Guzerat, Poona, 1873, p.3.

# APPROXIMATE ROUTE OF ILLICIT OPIUM TRADE



## REFERENCES

- APPROXIMATE ROUTE OF ILLICIT OPIUM TRADE ———— ←
- PLACE NAME ———— ○

32 16 0 32 64 96 Miles

The report further noted,

almost the whole of the opium consumed in Guzerat is smuggled...not 1/20th the opium consumed in Kattywar is licit.<sup>116</sup>

This resulted in great losses of revenue to the government. Some of the illicit opium was for domestic consumption, large quantities of it were estimated to be sent for export illegally, through ports other than Bombay, which was the only port in the Bombay Presidency which could legally export opium;

there are foreign ports at Damaun and in Cutch and Kattywar, over which government exercises no control, and which carry on a direct or indirect trade with the Straits settlements and China, and as untaxed opium can evidently reach those ports in any quantities there is little doubt that some of it finds its way there to China...If those two large provinces are able to smuggle sufficient for their home consumption, what is there to prevent their smuggling for export also...Not many years ago Persian opium was all but unsaleable in China, but that of late so called Persian opium has been in great demand...quantities are now yearly exported from Aden and the Persian Gulf. May not the explanation of this sudden rise in repute of the Persian drug be that it really is Malwa and Guzerat opium smuggled through Cutch and Kathywar.<sup>117</sup>

---

116. ibid.

117. ibid., pp.4-7.



It is difficult to form estimates of "illicit" trafficking of commodities from government reports such as these. They merely give hints of the phenomenon of the trade but are for obvious reasons not informative about either the magnitude or the mechanism of the trading operations. One may surmise, however, that even after 1820, throughout the nineteenth century the Company's attempts to streamline the trading activities were defied.

The other aspect of the trading networks of the region was that in areas where the Company had no direct commercial interests, the merchants of Kutch and Kathiawad continued with their trading activities. Here it would be pertinent to note the case of two trading communities in Kutch and Kathiawad, the Bhatias and the Lohanas who had emerged in the nineteenth century as shippers and traders to the east African coast. Many of them migrated from Kathiawad and Kutch to Bombay and to Zanzibar in the nineteenth century where they had large settlements. They flourished in the trading world of Bombay in the 19th century often using their community networks.<sup>118</sup> Many of these migrants, moreover, maintained close social and commercial links with Kutch and Kathiawad. These were sustained on the one hand

---

118. Christine Dobbin, Urban Leadership in Western India: Politics and Communities in Bombay City, London, 1972.

through generous charities related to public works such as the building of dharamshalas, libraries etc. On the other, there were their trading links which knitted Kutch and Kathiawad to Bombay.

Mandvi, as noted in the first chapter, was a flourishing port in the nineteenth century, its vessels plying regularly to the Gulfs, Makran, as well as to the East African ports. Bhavnagar was similarly a large port with wide networks. The processes which led to the eventual eclipse of Mandvi and the corresponding rise of Karachi on the western coast had only begun in the latter part of the nineteenth century.

## CONCLUSION

The rise in the export of raw cotton to China from Bombay had motivated the initial expansion of the Company's influence in peninsular Gujarat and Kutch. Its focus then were therefore on the cotton growing areas and the coastal outlets through which the cotton could be shipped to Bombay. By 1010 however its programme of political interventions in those regions had undergone a significant change in its magnitude. It emerged as the mediator between the chieftaindoms in the interior of peninsular Gujarat. The beginnings of which were made by signing the subsidiary alliance treaty with the Gaekwad in 1802. From the coasts the Company's agenda of "setting" peninsular Gujarat and Kutch prompted its interventions far inland in the forests and ridges of Kathiawad and the semi-arid stretches in Kutch.

There was often hardly a distinction between those the Company recognised as the girassias and the chiefs they termed bandits. Each minor chieftain raided neighbouring villages and the political boundaries of every chief appears not to have been demarcated decisively. The Company's settlement of the revenues of the Gaekwad gave it an opportunity to list the villages and forts possessed by every chieftain and to regulate the interactions among them. Several Chieftains had petitioned to the Company to protect

them from the raids of more powerful neighbours. The Raja of Morbi for instance appealed to the Company's agent for its intervention to protect himself from the raids of the Raja of Mallia from across the border in Marwar.<sup>1</sup> The Raja of Dhrol similiarly offered half of the revenues from his villages to the Company for its protection against the Jam of Nawanagar.<sup>2</sup> The troops of Kutch frequently corssed the border to plunder Morbi. The girassias of Wagad organised periodic plundering and cattle lifting raids into Jhalawad.

The Company's policy was to regulate these movements and impose its order in the territories of the feuding chieftaindoms. When Capt. James Macmurdo finally marched the Company's troops in Kutch his stated intentions were to control the movements of the "Wagad Bandits" from Kutch into Kathiawad.

The Company's policies were eventually on paper accepted and treaties signed. The Chieftains and the headmen of the piratical villages renounced many of their customary rights and accepted its restricitons on their movements.

This was achieved not without facing resistance from the pirates and the chieftaindoms. It has been argued

---

1. P.S.D., no. 185, p. 6125.

2. *ibid*, pp. 6129-30.

throughout that the political elements in these regions could seldom directly challenge the Company's interventions. Their intercourse was characterised more often by petty defiances and subsequent compromises. These actions one has termed resistances, for they appear to have viewed the Company's actions as intrusions on their customary rights and ways of life. The "pirates" the "thieves and bandits" and the chieftains, in various ways and in differing degrees constested the Company's political agenda in Kathiawad and Kutch.

Even after its alliances with the chieftaindoms, the Company's interventions were often contested. The Raja of Bhavnagar for instance, was an ally of the Company long before other chieftains had signed treaties with the Company. He not only covertly opposed the developing of the port of Gogha but also offered protection for some time to the rebel Malhar Rao Gaekwad when he had fled from the Company's troops to Kathiawad.<sup>3</sup> Some of the available evidence on the opium trade suggests that the chieftains and the traders of the region could manage to render the Company's policies ineffective even in the course of the nineteenth century.

---

3. P.S.D. no. 150 , p 6265.

Besides, in areas where the Company's interests did not directly confront theirs, the traders in Kutch and Kathiawad had spaces to operate in within the maritime trade of the Indian Ocean. The trade to the East African coast and the large settlements of Kutchi and Kathaiawadi trading communities such as the Bhatias and the Lohanas there was a trend that began in the late eighteenth century and reached its peak in the nineteenth century.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Primary Sources

**Unpublished Documents** : Maharashtra State Archives, Bombay  
Commercial Department Diary, 1784-1800.  
Political and Secret Department Diary, 1800-1810.  
Colonel Walker's Report, 1808.

### **Others**

Government of India Selections, (NMML, Microfische)

### Secondary Sources

#### **Published Reports, Gazetteers, Contemporary Journals**

Aitchison, C.U., A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, Calcutta 1909, vols. 6,7.

Birdwood, G.C.M., Catalogue of the Economic Products of Bombay etc. Bombay 1862.

Bombay Gazetteer, vol.5, 1901.

Cassels, W.R., Cotton: An Account of its Culture in the Bombay Presidency, Bombay, 1862.

Enthoven, R.E., Tribes and Castes of Bombay Presidency, Bombay 1904, Reprint New Delhi, 1975, 2 vols.

Etheridge, A.T., (Compiled), Report on Past Famines in the Bombay Presidency, Bombay, 1868.

Campbell, J.M., Gazetteer of Bombay Presidency, Bombay, 1808.

Imperial Gazetteer of India (Provincial), Bombay Presidency, vol.2, First Published 1909, Reprint edition, New Delhi, 1985.

Mackay, A., Western India: Report Addressed to the Chambers of Commerce in Manchester, Liverpool, etc., London, 1853.

Pritchard, C., Notes on the Manufacture, Importation, and consumption of Opium in Guzerat, with suggestions for the Repression of Opium Smuggling, Poona, 1873.

Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, New Series: vol. 15,37.

The Asiatic Journal, 1821, vol.XII and XIII.

### Books/Articles

Banga, Indu, (ed.), Ports and Hinterlands in India, 1700-1950, New Delhi 1992.

Braudel F., The Wheels of Commerce, Fontana Press 1984.

Braudel F., The Structures of Everyday Life: The Limits of Possible, Fontana Press 1984.

Burgess, A.K. Report on the antiquities of Kathiawad and Kachch, being the result of the second Season's operations of the Archaeological Survey of Western India, 1874-75, Varanasi 1971.

Chaudhuri, K.N., Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean, Cambridge 1985.

Cohn, B. "Regions Subjective and Objective, Their Relation to the Study of Modern Indian History and Society", in B. Cohn and R.Guha (ed.), An Anthropologist Among Historians, New Delhi, 1987.

Commissariat, M.S., History of Gujarat, vol.2, Baroda 1957.

Dasgupta, A. and M.N. Pearson (eds.), India and the Indian Ocean, 1500-1800, OUP 1987.

Dasgupta A., Indian Merchants and the Decline of Surat, 1700-1750, Weisbaden 1979.

Dobbin, Christine, Urban Leadership in Western India: Politics and Communities in Bombay City, London, 1972.

Douglas, James, Bombay and Western India, 2 vols. Bombay 1892.



\_\_\_\_\_, Bombay and Western India, First ed., 1900 reprint, London, 1985.

Febvre, Lucien, A Geographical Introduction to History, London 1925, Reprint 1950.

Forbes, A.K., Rasmala: Hindu, Annals of Western India: With particular reference in Gujarat, 1878, New Delhi reprint 1973.

Furber, H., Bombay Presidency in the Mid-eighteenth Century, Bombay 1963.

Furber, H., John Company at Work: A Study of European Expansion in India in the Late Eighteenth Century, New York, 1970.

Ghosh, S.C., Peninsular Gujarat an the Early Nineteenth Century, New Delhi, 1977.

Greenburg, M., British Trade and the opening of China, 1800-1842, Cambridge 1969.

Guha, Amalendu, "Raw Cotton of Western India, 1750-1850". IESHR, vol.9, no.1,

Habib, Irfan, An Atlas of The Mughal Empire, Delhi 1982.

Jain, V.K., Trade and Traders in Western Indian A.D., 1000-1300, New Delhi, 1990.

Khan, Ali Mohammad, Mirat-i-Ahmadi, (Tr. M.F. Lokhandwala), Baroda 1924.

Khan, Ali Mohammad, Supplement to Mirat-i-Ahmadi, (Tr. S.Nawab Ali and C.N. Seddon), Baroda, 1924.

Lodrick, D.O., "Rajasthan as a Region: Myth or Reality", in Lodrick etal. (ed.) Idea of Rajasthan, vol.1, New Delhi 1994.

Mehta, M.J. "Maharaja Libel Case: A Study in Social Change in Western India in the Nineteenth Century", Indo Asian Culture, vol.19, no.4, 1971.

Mishra, S.C., Rise of Muslim Power in Gujarat, Baroda 1963.

Nightingale P., Trade and Empire in Western India 1784-1806, Cambridge 1970.

Pearson, M.N., Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat, New Delhi, 1976.

Rawal R.L., "Growth of the Port of Mandvi (Kutch) 1750-1850", in M.J. Mehta, (ed.), Urbanisation in Western India (Historical Perspective), Ahmedabad, 1988.

Subramanian, L. "Capital and Crowd in a declining Asian Port City: The Anglo-Bania order in the Surat riots of 1795." Modern Asian Studies, 1985, vol.19.

Tod, James, Travels in Western India Embracing. A Visit to the Sacred Mounts of the Jaints and the most Celebrated Shrines of Hindu Faith Between Rajpootana and Indus with an Account of the Ancient City, of Nehr Walla, London, 1832.

Torri, M. "Ethnicity and Trade during the dual govt. era - 1759-1800" IESHR, vol.27, 1980.

Wilberforce-Bell, H., The History of Kathiawad from the Earliest Times, London, 1976.

Williams, L.F. Rushbrook, The Black Hills: Kutch in History and Legend, a Study in Local Loyalties, London, 1958.

#### **Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis**

Subramanian, L., "The West Coast of India: The Eighteenth Century", Visva Bharati University, 1984.

TH-5453

## APPENDIX

The following tables are abstracts from Colonel Walker's report of 1808. They show detailed lists of every fort, bunder and the number of armed retainers at every village. They further list the number of every village under each chief and make estimates of his revenues and incomes.

The revenues of most of the chieftaindoms were, as the tables suggest, too insignificant to have invited the Company's intervention. This systematic gathering of information was directed towards the Company's agenda of settlements.

NAMES OF DISTRICTS	NAMES OF PROPRIETORS & CHIEFTAINS	AMOUNT OF PRODUCE OF REVENUE	DISTRIBUTION				PROPRIETOR'S REVENUE OR INCOME	VILLAGES			FORTIFIED PLACES	GHURRIE PLACES WITH TOWER	NUMBER OF INHABITANTS	NUMBER OF PLOUGHS	SEBUNDY		NUMBER OF HORSES KEPT BY EACH TALUKA	REMARKS
			INTERNAL EXPENSES	MOOLUCK-GEERY	INFERIOR BHYAD OR SHARER	SEBUNDY EXPENSES		INHABITED	WASTE	TOTAL					FOOT	HORSE		
<b>JHALAWAR</b>																		
JHALA	HARI SINGH	250000	30000	51931	43000	40000	67000	110	110	2	1	20000	50000	400	100	200	A	
BHYAD	SUNDRY PERSONS	100000	15000	19927	12000	12000	41073	70	70		1	6000	2000	400	125	125		
WUDWAN	JHELUM SINGH	125000	20000	28831	16000	25000	33000	40	40	3	1	7000	2500	300	150	450	B	
BHAYAD	SUNDRY PERSONS	40000	6500	12576	3500	5000	12483	70	70			4000	1500	200	100	150	C	
DRANGDREH	AMER SINGH	175000	20000	48909	53000	30000	23091	65	65	3	2	10000	6000	250	200	175		
WANKANEER	CHUNDER SINGH	85000	12000	13809	12000	18000	24191	50	50	1	2	6000	3000	200	150	100		
SYAILAH	WUKMAT SINGH	50000	6000	18782	5000	10000	10000	20	20	2		3000	1300	25	25	75	D	
MOOLEE	PARMAR SHOY	40000	5000	8908	11000	3500	11592	16	16			4000	1500	25	100	75	E	
CHEERA	JHALA SINGH	20000	4000	8853	2500	1500	3147	12	12			2200	100	25	10	25		
BUJANA	SUJAJEE	30000	5000	8115	7000	2000	7885	21	21			4000	1600	10	10	150	F	
LUCTUR	JHALA PUTTAJEE	25000	3000	7502	10000		4498	24	24			2000	1000	10		40	G	
KHESARIA	JAHALA AMERJEE	300	300															
BUNNODA	MULLU	7000	700	2103	1300		2892	3	3		1	700	300			15		
PATRI	WUCKUT SINGH BESSOY	40000	6000	5501	11500	6000	10999	12	12	1		5000	1500	125	50	25	H	
JENJIVARRA	PEETHOOJEE	35000	6000	12000	7000		10000	12	12			2000	1000			75		
DUSSURA	LATTO & MALICK MIYAH	42000	7000	15000	7000		13000	20	20			3500	1200			25		
<b>TOTAL JHALAWAR</b>		<b>1064360</b>	<b>146500</b>	<b>267992</b>	<b>201800</b>	<b>153000</b>	<b>274851</b>	<b>545</b>	<b>545</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>79400</b>	<b>74500</b>	<b>1960</b>	<b>1120</b>	<b>1405</b>		
<b>MUCHOO KANTAH</b>																		
MOORVEE	JAHUJAH JEHAJEE	250000	30000	60000	30000	40000	90000	125		2	3	24000	10000	125	200			
MULLIA	JAHUJAH DORAJEE	40000	3000		3000	4000	30000	12		1		3000	1000	50	50			
<b>TOTAL MUCHOO KANTAH</b>		<b>290000</b>	<b>33000</b>	<b>60000</b>	<b>33000</b>	<b>44000</b>	<b>120000</b>	<b>137</b>		<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>27000</b>	<b>11000</b>	<b>175</b>	<b>250</b>			

A. The Simree Rajah out of his own income pays 18069. .... to the Company for the villages in Dhundooka and Rampore.

B. Pays 2169 Rupees to the Company from his income for village on Rampore

C. Asmail reduction has taken place in one or two of the Bhyads

D. Pays 218 rupees Jama to the company's Perganan Rampore.

E. Asmail reduction also took place in this place

F. This Jumma is also put down at its correlated amount.

G. Ascertained since the report of Jhaliawar

H. The Jumma Chungy of this place was formerly estimated, it is now ascertained.

NAMES OF DISTRICTS	NAMES OF PROPRIETORS & CHIEFTAINS	AMOUNT OF PRODUCE OF REVENUE		DISTRIBUTION				PROPRIETOR'S REVENUE OR INCOME		VILLAGES			FORTIFIED PLACES	GHURRIE PLACES WITH TOWER	NUMBER OF INHABITANTS	NUMBER OF PLOUGHS	SEBUNDY		NUMBER OF HORSES KEPT BY EACH TALUKA	REMARKS
				INTERNAL EXPENSES	MOOLUCK-GEERY	INFERIOR BHYAD OR SHARER	SEBUNDY EXPENSES			INHABITED	WASTE	TOTAL					FOOT	HORSE		
<b>HALAAR</b>																				
NAWANUGGUR	JAM JEGSAJEE	120000	20000	105148		125000	400000	369852		550			5	12	75000	20000	3500	1500		
BHYAD	SUNDRY PERSONS	32000	4000	6661	2	10000	2200	9138	2	22			1	2	2910	1255	45	20		
PORIA	COWOSS SUGGARAM	75000	7000	11607		5000	30000	21393		21			1	1	6500	2000	300	150		
	KERGEE	30000	4000	2404		4000	10000	9596		15			1		3000	1000	75	75		
DHEROLE	BHOPUT SINGH	25000	4000	5346		8000	5000	2654		24				1	4000	700	60	40		
KESERAH	HOTEEJEE	16500	1500	2554		4000	4000	4446		12			1		1800	500	40	50		
	JUTHE SINGH	15000	2000	4001		4000	1000	3999		6			1		1800	800	20			
	SUNDRY PERSONS	99000	9000	20503		15000	16500	28997		53			2		8000	2450	125	70		
	DOSAJEE	38250	3125	6702		11100	3450	13873		39			2	2	3950	1735	58			
TONDUL	DOSAJEE	400000	45000	115005		70000	70000	99905		60			2	8	3000	6500	900			
BHAYAD		12000	2000	3684		2000	2000	2316		8				1	2400	800				
KOTRAH	JADEJA MOKHAGEE	30000	4000	11003		4000	7000	3997		15			1		3000	500	100	50		
SUNGANEE																				
BHAYAD		11000	600	1505		2700	1500	3695		5				2	750	275		10		
RAJPOOR	JAHREJAH MEROOJEE	17000	2000	3955		2500	3000	3545		4			1		1200	400	30	20		
<b>TOTAL HALAAR</b>		1991750	288225	300078	2	267300	555650	579495*	2	836			16	29	119310	38915	5311	2635		
<b>KATTYWAR</b>																				
TALUKA BHADLEY	KHACHER BANA	3000	300	601	2		1000	1098	2	6				1	700	150		10	25	
KARECOUCH	KHACHER DEVA	2600	200	1447			800	100		3	3	6			400	100	25	8	25	
KUMBHALA	KHACHER VAPILOOR	2500	300	538	2	400	700	561	2	3	1	4			300	100	2	3	20	
HUTHEESON & VILLAGES	KAHACHER VAPILOOR	3600	225	1256		550	575	994		5		5			285	130	12	5	6	
BERVALEH	KHACHER SOOREH	3000	200	1093		300	1000	407		5		5			400	125	15	10	10	
MOODHOKA	KAHACHER VASSA SOOR	5000	250	2101		500	1200	949		8		8			500	250	2	15	25	
SUNALEH	KAHACHER BHAN	500	50	150		100	100	100		1		1			40	20		2	1	
BABRA	VALEH ABHELE	9000	500	3500		1500	1650	1850		8	4	12		1	1000	200	5	15	75	
KOOTRA	VALEH POOLOL	12000	500	5236		1300	2254	21700		12		12		1	1500	500	10	15	15	
POOPANOO																				
SANATHELY	VALEH RAWHI	4500	200	1527		700	1000	1073		5	5	10			800	200	10	5	25	

NAMES OF DISTRICTS	NAMES OF PROPRIETORS & CHIEFTAINS	AMOUNT OF PRODUCE OF REVENUE	DISTRIBUTION				PROPRIETOR'S REVENUE OR INCOME	VILLAGES			FORTIFIED PLACES	GHURRIE PLACES WITH TOWER	NUMBER OF INHABITANTS	NUMBER OF PLOUGHS	SEBUNDY		NUMBER OF HORSES KEPT BY EACH TALUKA	REMARKS	
			INTERNAL EXPENSES	MOOLUCK-GEERY	INFERIOR BHYAD OR SHARER	SEBUNDY EXPENSES		INHABITED	WASTE	TOTAL					FOOT	HORSE			
SUMMUNDY		6450	500	1913	975	1057	2005	4	2	6		1	620	260	20		19		
BAHDELA		9000	500	1528	873	4000	2000	12		12	1	1	1300	350	25	25	25		
ULCOAT		8000	500	2149	1000	2350	2000	1		1	1	4	400	150	5	15	10		
ALLAG DHURDHANEE		14150	850	5891	1573	1695	44141	10	9	19			1280	635	36		139		
BUCKSARA	VALLA HURSON	7000	500	2996	1200	445	1859	4	8	12			400	200	20		25		
VADPANED	VALLA JAITA	3000	300	1001		700	999	5	5	10			400	150	14		15		
JAITPOOR	VALLA CANUCK	65000	5000	38253	4000	8750	8997	50		50	1		7000	1800	200	50	300		
CHITUL	DITTO-DITTO	6500	500	2102	801	1898	1200	1		1			700	250	25	25	100		
VILL. OF DITTO	DITTO-DITTO	24500	1525	13510	2	2281	2	10		16			2400	950	83	117	114		
BELKAR	VALLA OUGHUR	8000	300	3544	500	1156	2500	12		12		1	60	300	5	10	40		
JURDHUN		24000	2000	3610	4390	5000	9000	24		24		1	3000	1000	50	100	150		
VILL. OF DITTO		5900	400	1323	1175	731	2271	6		6			710	260	22		43		
DITTO ANUNDPUR		3500	500	202	900	298	1600	9	3	12		1	500	125	4		20		
MAWASSA	KAHCHER SANUD	1600	100	437	250	163	650	3		3			175	80	2		10		
SUNNOSANA	KAHCHER VARA	1200	100	282	200	118	500	2		2			200	50	2		7		
		1100	100	151	200	149	500	2		2			125	50	2		7		
AJMEER	THACKUR	800	75	175	100	150	300	1	1	2			100	40	2		5		
		1700	150	201		600	749	4	1	5		1	200	75	10	15	25		
		500	100	201	99		100	1	2	3			100	25			25		
		2000	200	700		100	1000	4	8	12		1	400	75			50		
		1200	200	300	200		500	1		1			200	40			50		
DHANKELPUR	THACKUR GODHAD	10000	1200	1700	1500	2500	3100	11		11	1		1200	700	25	25	100		
	THACKUR SADOOL	9000	1000	1700	2000	1300	3000	10		10			1500	500	15	10	100		
PAIHAD	THACKUR RAMA	8000	1000	800	2700		3500	5		5			500	200			40		
SUJUKPPOR	THACKUR SAPOOR	3500	500	800	500	200	1500	2		2			350	125	4		25		
<b>TOTAL OF KATTYWAR</b>		271300	20825	103018	2	32757	2	47217	2	256	52	308	4	15	30315	10165	672	480	1571

NAMES OF DISTRICTS	NAMES OF PROPRIETORS & CHIEFTAINS	AMOUNT OF PRODUCE OF REVENUE	DISTRIBUTION				PROPRIETOR'S REVENUE OR INCOME	VILLAGES			FORTIFIED PLACES	GHURRIE PLACES WITH TOWER	NUMBER OF INHABITANTS	NUMBER OF PLOUGHS	SEBUNDY		NUMBER OF HORSES KEPT BY EACH TALUKA	REMARKS
			INTERNAL EXPENSES	MOOLUCK-GEERY	INFERIOR BHYAD OR SHARER	SEBUNDY EXPENSES		INHABITED	WASTE	TOTAL					FOOT	HORSE		
<b>GOHELWARAH</b>																		
BHOWNUGGUR	RAWAL WUVKUL SINGH	70000	10000	74500	150000	170000	205500	614			4	5	50000	15000	1000	1000		
PALLITANAH	RAWAL CORRIJEE	35000	3000	7500	8000	7000	950	40			1	1	2500	1000	150	50		
LATHEE	GOEL SOOR SINGH	8000	500		2000	3000	2000	4				1	2000	250	75	50		
BHYADE	SUNDRY PERSONS	20700	1875	7499	3495	2750	5080	17			1		3175	750	57	17		
DEEWANEE	DHANAJEE	10500	800	5915	1921	770	109	7					1500	520	7	3		
HULLA	RAWAL MEHGAJEE	22000	2000	7132	6000	4000	2868	32			1		2000	500	50	50		
BHAYAD	SUNDRY PERSONS	3200	300	1539	623	338	400	3					400	150	3			
DHATTA	SUNVUJA HALLAJEE	30000	2000	4729	10000	7000	6261	20				1	3500	800	25	15		
PUCHANEE	RAWAL JESSAJI	5300	378	1757	1263	454	1448	7					680	215	10			
<b>TOTAL GOHELWARAH</b>		834700	110853	110582	183302	195312	234150	744			7	8	65755	19185	1377	1185		
<b>BOONADA</b>																		
POORBUNDER	RANA SURTAUNJEE KOVER HALLAJEE	140000	25000	30002	15000	30000	39998	80			2	11	15000	3000	300	100		
<b>SORATH</b>																		
JUNAGHUR	NAWAB AHMAD KHAN	550000	93000	75655	50000	250000	81345	500			19	15	50000	7000	2500	1000		
BHANTWA	MOOKHTIAR KHAN	50000	5000	32002	5000	5000	2998	45			1	5	8000	2000	200	100		
AMRAPOOR	FUTTEH KHAN	3500	200	552	800	500	1448	1				1	400	100	8	8		
<b>TOTAL SORATH</b>		603500	98200	108209	55800	255500	85791	546			20	21	58400	9100	2708	1108		

NAMES OF DISTRICTS	AMOUNT OF PRODUCE OF REVENUE	DISTRIBUTION						PROPRIETOR'S REVENUE OR INCOME	VILLAGES			FORTIFIED PLACES	GHURRIE PLACES WITH TOWER	NUMBER OF INHABITANTS	NUMBER OF PLOUGHS	SEBUNDY		NUMBER OF HORSES KEPT BY EACH TALUKA	REMARKS
		INTERNAL EXPENSES	MOOLUCK-GEERY	INFERIOR BHYAD OR SHARER	SEBUNDY EXPENSES	INHABITED	WASTE		TOTAL	FOOT	HORSE								
<b>ABSTRACT</b>																			
JAHALAWAR	1064300	146200	267992	2	201800	153000	274851	2	546	545	13	10	79400	74500	1900	1120	1405		
MUCHOO KANTA	20000	33000	60000		33000	44000	120000		137	137	3	3	27000	11000	175	250			
GOELWARAH	834700	110853	110582		183302	2	195312	2	744	744	7	..	53755	..	1377	1185			
BURDA	140000	25000	30002		15000	30000	39998		80	80	2	11	..	..	300	100			
SORATH	603500	98200	168209		55800	253500	85791		546	546	20	21	..	..	..	..			
HALAR	1991750	288225	300078	2	267300	556050	579420	2	836	836	16	29	119310	38915	..	..			
KATTYWAR	271300	20825	103018	2	32767	47217	67472		256	52	308	4	15	30315	70155	872	480	1671	
	5195550	722303	979882	2	788969	2	1287679	2	3144	52	3196	65	97	895180	65865	72503	6878	3076	



## LIST OF MAPS

1. Gujarat-Physical Features.
  2. Kathiawad and Kutch.
  3. Western India North of Bombay.
  4. Approximate route of illicit opium trade.
- All maps are handmade and may not correspond exactly to scales.