

AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO RUSSIA-EUROPEAN UNION RELATIONSHIP

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled "AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO RUSSIA-EUROPEAN UNION RELATIONSHIP" submitted by me in fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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INTRODUCTION

2023-2024

CHAPTER: 1
INTRODUCTION

Let the voice of the state tell his experience with words. Maybe relations among and between states is born of the exploration of a shared circumstance, or as an answer to a state's painful or happy experiences. Few words in this dissertation will be a reflection, not only of the intellect, but of the human being all flesh and blood. Behind them there will be, of course, all that is called a vision of the world. From there on talks on values originates and whose existence is perhaps doubting, perhaps blundering. From there on again begins a distinction of truth from false in emotions and in words, to see the difference between that which is honest and that which is fictitious, rhetorical or sentimental.

This is a study concerning the profound interrelationship between ideas, power and institutions in the field of international relations. Their interaction is examined in three different fields: in the study of International Relations, in the constitution of the international society and in the actual institutionalized practices between the European Union and Russia. To be more specific, the work deals with the problems of institutionalization in Russia-EU relations during the post-cold war period and how these processes have been to bear in their interaction.

Even the cursory glance at contemporary commentary concerning the relationship reveals that the political dialogue is being conducted in an acrimonious manner and no more often than not Russia fails to send its representatives to the meetings of the PCA sub-committees. The Russia-EU relationship is grounded in the 1997 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) which a political and legal basis and which is unique to Russia and the EU. The PCA is a good basis to consolidate and extend cooperation and

its displays mutual ambition. The area of the four common spaces also provides scope for cooperation in areas of politics such as security, which could give Russia-EU relations a truly geopolitics and strategic dimensions. The parties seem to be having serious problems in agreeing on a concrete joint agenda that would take the relationship forward, as exemplified by the meager results following the adoption of the so-called four common spaces in the EU–Russia summit in May 2005 and the current difficulties the parties are having in even beginning the negotiations for a new post-PCA agreement.¹

As early as 2001, a Russian scholar Igor Lechukov characterized a relationship as being a ‘vicious circle’. more recently, a western European analysts has gone so far as to condemn the partnership and its main institutional embodiment, the PCA, as failing in its main goal, namely the promotion of greater ‘political conditionality’(freedom, rule of law, democracy) in Russia.

Irrespective of an endeavor to exhibit cooperation on various fronts, there is a persistent uneasiness on the part of both EU about Russian domestic policy (like need for a stronger state than during the Yeltsin years, more precision on the front of democracy and human rights) and Russian foreign policy (like encouraging reinforced cooperation within the CIS but condemning Russian interference in sovereign states).equally there is unease on the part of Russia about the EU enlargement process (Russophobia in some new EU member-states and infringement on Russia’s natural sphere of influence) and EU apparent ability to formulate and enforce common position in foreign policy matters, which induces Russia to privilege bilateral relation (e.g. with U.K on energy).

The increase in the number and severity of problems seems somewhat perplexing, however. This is especially so when one compares the current state of affairs with the enthusiastic and optimistic mood of the immediate aftermath of the cold war when the EU and Russia were forging the present structures and institutions of cooperation. Now,

¹ PCA, the contractual framework on which the relations between the EU and Russia have rested since 1997 expired in December 2007. this has not resulted in a legal vacuum in the relationship, however as the agreement is automatically extended on an annual basis, provided that neither party explicitly informs the other of its intentions to withdraw from it completely (PCA,Article 106)

the question arise what accounts for the recurring and escalating problems in the Russia-EU relationship?

The question becomes even more curious when one considers the current state of affairs between Russia-EU. It is often the essential incompatibility of wider value systems that is seen as residing behind the problems. The existence of such difference can be problematic, as the Russia-EU relationship is built on the assumption of an existing foundation of similar values and goals between the parties and on the expectation of the compatibility of their future endeavors in Europe. Infact the main aim of PCA is not the gradual rapprochement between the EU and Russia, but a process whereby Russia is envisaged as the party that has to do all the adjusting and converging as the cooperation aims at facilitating the transition of Russia's increasing harmonization with its values, norms and standards.

an interesting question that follows is why it is that Russia and EU seem to perceive the problems and the hard bargaining that relates to cooperation as being particularly problematic and not a natural part of the "policy coordination " between the parties? Is the incompatibility of wider value system is seen as residing factor behind the problems in Russia-EU relation instead of the clashing interests?

In this work instead of taking the value diffences at face value, the proposition is turned into a hypothesis that will be subjected to empirical scrutiny. In essence, the work at hand seeks to develop a conceptual framework and its empirical application through which the hypothesis of divergent worldviews can be put to the test and to see whether the question-why, despite the initial promise enthusiasm, has the actual process of Russia-EU interaction proved to be so problematic and failed to meet the parties expectations? - can be answered. This is done by linking the issue with debates concerning the international institutionalization, especially within the neoliberal institutionalist research

programme². In this respect it is the nature of the interaction between the Russia-EU within a certain institutionalized context that is of primary interest here.

This dissertation frames the question of divergent value system between Russia-EU in terms of the indigenous worldviews that the two possess. Following Goldstein and Keohane by worldviews they mean collective conceptions of particular thought and discourse. It is well known also in IR theory that different worldviews in effect lead people to perceive the world and the issues at stake differently. If the problems in Russia-EU relations do indeed spring from those differences, then it prompts one to ask whether the parties perceive the normative foundation of the Russia-EU institution differently. Normative foundation means a set of understandings concerning the norms and rules that pertain to the scope, the nature of objects of contention, the relationship with sovereignty and the logic of interaction in a given international institution. Therefore the main **research question** of the work can be formulated using institutionalist vocabulary as follows: **can the differences in the degree of commonality concerning the normative foundation of the Russia-EU institution be used in explaining the recurring difficulties in the Russia-EU relationship?**

It is well known in IR theory that different belief system in effect leads people to perceive the world differently. If the problems in the Russia-EU relations indeed spring from differences in worldviews, then the central question why, despite the initial promise and enthusiasm, the actual process of Russia-EU cooperation has proven to be so problematic and failed to meet the actor's expectation can be answered with the variable of commonality (it does not signify however here that commonality means detecting similarity between the actors in the dissertation but to use it as a tool to detect differences in those attempts made by the two actors in order to evolve cooperation).

In order to understand the central question it is imperative to know that substantial amount of theoretical work is required. This theoretical aspect would be discussed in this introductory part itself. In the following, Robert O Keohane's notion of commonality is

² Although himself a father of 'neoliberal institutionalism', Keohane himself has more recently emphasized on the term 'institutionalist' instead.

taken as a theoretical starting point. The task is not entirely straightforward and it will entail grappling with the key concepts that the institutionalist research programme especially in its mainstream American variant, has put forward. A question may arise as to why the issue of Russia-EU interactions be related to institutionalism? It is important to note that in IR there is something cyclical in theoretical debates, where 'theories keep re-appearing and debate between them is continuous' as **Clive Church** has mentioned in his book '**European Integration Theories in 1990**'. accordingly, the work at hand seeks to reinvigorate some of the issues and debates by bringing them into a new and previously unexpected context in the belief that some aspects of institutionalism still have untapped theoretical potential.

This is especially the case when one considers the role of differences in commonality in explaining the problems of international institutionalization. As will be argued in this introduction itself that, this has been largely due to the strict rationality assumptions of institutionalism that have made the commonality variable largely empty and uninteresting. This is so because although institutionalists were themselves among the first to acknowledge the power of ideas in international cooperation, they have approached the concept in a somewhat problematic manner. As **Walter Carlsnaes** writes in his book '**Handbook of International Relations**', that 'institutionalists treat ideas in a rather oxymoronic way, denying the constitutive nature of ideas and treating them instead as mere 'ideational variables' that have a certain (minimal) role in the rational calculus of utility-maximizing actors. This dissertation strictly however challenges stringent rationalistic accounts of actors and the role of ideas and treats the role of values and norms in the Russia-EU relationship in a way that is in certain respect closer to the one put forwarded by constructivists. However, it is important to note that the relationship between institutionalism and constructivism does not have to be seen in entirely antagonistic terms. Accepting certain constructivist insights does not necessarily have to entail a drastic break with the premises of institutionalism, as the study of institutions itself can be seen as having two facets, 'rationalistic' and 'reflective'(Keohane) , which both has its own merit. Therefore, in order to probe the commonality in a meaningful way, this work has departed from institutionalism's strict rationality, which allows

room for subjective elements to in preference formation. By this move this work can possibly bring the question of diverging worldviews in the fore.

The onus of this dissertation is to seek that both Russia and European Union considers different institutional approach (Strategic Papers reflects that and to be dealt in the second chapter) and this due to the fact that both the actors in question bears different worldviews (chapter three testifies this empirically).Defining the Russian-EU relationship in the context of English School will show actor's different approachment toward their institutionalization. This would further entail their underlying differences in worldviews.

The task in hand is therefore to discuss the meta-theoretical underpinnings of a study in the introductory part itself. In other words, the work will probe theoretical complementarity between the different strands of IR theory primarily to engross both power and ideas in defining international relationship. In essence, the theoretical aspect seeks to establish the criteria on the basis of which such a process (converging both ideas and values) can take place. It will contend that the process is not straightward but one that has to be approached with great care and modesty. In a nutshell, such a process is severely constrained by the need to remain within the ontological and epistemological commitments of the initial conceptual starting point, entailing that the process of theoretical convergence is always path-dependent.

Converging theories to bring normative content:

The learning of various theories of International Relations is often done in the context of certain paradigms. The essence of paradigm can be understood in the writing of philosopher of science by Thomas Kuhn in the 1970's.International Relation (IR) explained in an essence of pragmatic approach of Kuhn has to an extent pitted different school of thoughts in the study of IR against each other. This was the case in the debate between Positivist and Post-Positivist case in 1980's and 1990's³ and more recently,

³ Positivism is an epistemological perspective and philosophy of science which holds that the only authentic knowledge is that which is based on sense experience and positive verification. Post-positivists believe that human knowledge is based not on unchallengeable, rock-solid foundations, but rather upon human conjectures. As human knowledge is thus unavoidably conjectural, the assertion of these conjectures

debate between rationalist and constructivist meta-theoretical stances⁴ on the study of IR as well. This conflict among various schools of thoughts in IR is an outproduct of the goal among its various scholars showing the superiority of an approach chosen and preferred by them. The pragmatic approach in IR has also largely prevented scholars from building theoretical models of multi-causal mechanism in IR. Instead of looking for complementarity, different theory with different causal mechanism beats each other to a pulp. But IR is not alone in this tendency, political science infact the social sciences in general as well as humanities suffered from same syndrome.

as **Steve Martin** in his book **“The Self Image of a discipline : Genealogy Of International Relations Theory”** has noted that this debates were only a series of statement of faith with existing social and political factors determining which voice (IR theory) is heard. This relentless debate has produced unfortunate result of shifting the emphasis away from empirical works and practical problems of crippling ontological and epistemological battles within the discipline. As a consequence, what was previously a concrete issue like war and peace has to a degree become an exercise in bad, or at least shallow, philosophy of science and social science. This state of affairs largely stems from the post positivist notion that all observation is essentially theory-laden or in other words there is no scope for the reality without the concepts we employ to approach it.

Accepting this raises difficult questions concerning the role of research vis-a vis notion of truth and the objective nature of the reality we are seeking to grasp and explain with our theories. As **Imre Lakatos** has argued in his book **“Falsification and the methodology of Scientific Research Programme”**, we can never tests theories directly against the world, but only against other theories in the light of the world. This adds to more difficulties in the research programme by effecting researcher’s chances of making

is warranted, or more specifically, justified by a set of warrants, which can be modified or withdrawn in the light of further investigation.

⁴ Rationalists analyzed international relations in formal terms, taking identities and interests as given in order to model strategic interaction and sometimes referring more broadly to those who emphasized material power considerations. Constructivists attempted to demonstrate the importance of identities, ideas, and discourses in IR.

informed choices and comparisons between rival theories. The field of philosophy of science is however, strongly divided, with some scholars like Thomas Kuhn, Willard Quine arguing against the possibility of comparing different theories or at least ranking them in any possible way in relation to the notion of truth. And few more scholars like Karl Popper, Ilkka Niiniluoto has through the idea of truthlikeness⁵ sees a fruitful way in comparing theories and making an informed choice. Larry Laudan, Bhaskar Roy and like scholars has founded a middle way between the two polar oppositions, accepting epistemological relativism, nevertheless argues that the referent object of theories ('the world') is ontologically real, therefore giving grounds to meaningful comparison between rival theories. This approach is to echo the subject-matter of this dissertation.

This criticism should not be taken to mean that the proliferation of different strands of theorizing is an altogether a negative phenomenon. In fact, the plurality in theorizing can be seen as a source of strength for the discipline as well. Lakatosian/Quinean/Kuhnian idea of the ultimately theory-laden nature of observation may make for a search for commonalities between different strands of theorizing. Hence, no theoretical approach has a monopoly on the truth as of now. This colour of pluralism in IR will assist the work of dissertation to leap forward.

According to **Thomas Schelling's 'Social Mechanism and Social Dynamics'**, "a social mechanism can be defined as a plausible hypothesis or a set of plausible hypotheses that could be the explanation of the social phenomenon. The explanation being in terms of interaction between individuals or between individuals and some social aggregates" (institution as the dissertation deals with the problems of institutionalization in EU-Russia relation).but scholars like Hedstrom and Swedberg identifies social mechanism as merely claiming the middle ground between identifying scientific laws and providing mere description. According to these scholars social mechanism allows explanation but no prediction.

⁵ Verisimilitude or truthlikeness is the problem of articulating what it takes for one false theory to be closer to the truth than another false theory. This problem was central to the philosophy of Karl Popper, largely because Popper was among the first to affirm that truth is the aim of scientific inquiry while acknowledging that most of the greatest scientific theories in the history of science are strictly speaking false. If this long string of purportedly false theories is to constitute progress with respect to the goal of truth then it must be at least possible for one false theory to be closer to the truth than others.

In recent years scientific or critical realism has gained momentum also in IR. While accepting the theory-laden nature of the scientific enterprise, social scientists are more concerned with the intransitive objects of science as opposed to transitive objects of science. It might not construct reality as conventionalist Thomas Kuhn in his book has asserted but it would definitely offer a potential truth like description and also be essentially mind-independent reality. (NII-a reality where mind is not rather mind like entity is reformulated like human will, desires, and values.).

For scientific realists, causal relations are seen as operating within the open system of conflicting tendencies which are not conducive to prediction yet it does not rule out the possibility of giving explanatory accounts of the events we observe. It entails building multi-causal social mechanism models that adequately account for the generative mechanisms. This idea of mechanisms is the very heart of the multi-theoretical approach. What is required is the evolution of the multi-faceted reality of International Relations.

The approach of multi-causal relations is a tedious approach in IR due to the overarching trend of mono-causal effect in major paradigm in IR theory. For example, realists advocates for power as an interplaying factor in anarchical international system constructivists accounts for ideas or in other words it is the social construction of the anarchy that counts. Although neo-liberal institutionalism seeks for the role of both ideas and power but the theory has relegated ideas as an 'intervening variables' in a game largely decided utilitarian substantive rationality and material power.

The prevalence of mono-causal accounts in IR often led scholars to seek to reduce the complexity of studying IR by simplifying theoretical models with the hope of waxing the explanatory power in academic orientation of the IR. But this tendency has led to the problem of "Parsimony" in theoretical models along the line of Occam's razor models⁶. One more problem attach to the study of IR is that of 'over determination' .however there is a substantial difference between overdetermination and multi-causality:

⁶ "Entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity". This word is being attributed by an English logician Franciscan William of Ockham. The concept says that it is effective to settle for the least complicated sufficient account for the phenomenon at stake instead of asking how it really is.

In over determined explanations there are several factors that are individually sufficient for an outcome, and in multi-causal mechanism several factors may jointly sufficient for a particular outcome.

In the outcome, multi-causality in IR requires theoretical convergence or at least bridge-building between different and competing paradigms in the discipline. Thus the work in hand will take up complementarity in IR theories which in turn will help in adopting multi-causality.

The justification for pondering theoretical integration can be couched in terms of scientific progress. Niiniluoto has argued that in addition to theoretical innovation and proliferation, science can also progress by reducing the amount of available theories by building bridges that seeks to combine them. Hence, two different models of theoretical rapprochement can be envisaged. The first is the so-called umbrella models⁷ that bring together different branches of science that deals with the overall research problem. This necessarily does not lead to an actual reduction in the number of rival approaches but seeks to map the area of commonality between them in case of a certain application. In other words, a multi-disciplinary approach can be adopted in social sciences that seek to employ several theoretical approaches while appreciating their differences and keeping them separate in the applications⁸.

In the following dissertation this approach of multi-discipline will be called seeking theoretical complementarities as opposed to the theoretical convergence and/or integration, which is the second theoretical rapprochement. It is the approach by which we mean a process that leads to set of previously separate theories being merged resulting in an actual reduction in the number of theories in the field of IR. This however need not conflated with the reduction in the conceptual plurality within a given discipline, however, as the new theory should, by definition, be able to give an account of all the

⁷ 'the umbrella model' was first introduced by James N Rosse, Professor of Economics at Stanford University in the mid-1970s.

⁸ Ian Hacking a member of 'Centre for Interdisciplinary Approaches' asserted that collaborations between disciplines is not a tale of breaking down of disciplinary boundaries, but of mutual respect, which, may create a new discipline

success of the previous theories while ideally providing some further conceptualization as well.

Contemporarily in the field of IR, there are an incremental efforts to synthesize rationalistic and constructivist strands of theorizing⁹. Perhaps the most exciting rallying call has come from **Andrew Moravcsik** in his book called “**Theory Synthesis in International Relation**”. Who has argued that seeking synthesis is not only possible and desirable but is constitutive of any coherent understanding of IR as a progressive and empirical social science. The tendency to call for unification has been especially clear in the study of international institution, a rubric under which the present work also falls.

The reason for synthesis has surfaced owing to the growing realization of the limits of IR theories in explaining IR in an exhaustive manner. Thus, it can be observed that combining theories of different perspectives can assist in gaining more insights in to various issues of concern in IR. As **Oran R. Young** in his book “**International Cooperation: Building Regimes For Natural Resources And Environment**” has argued “that regime theory could act as a vehicle within which a reintegration of the subfields of international politics, economics law and organization could yield significant new insights into the working of international institutions.” **James Fearon and Alexander Wendt** in “**Rationalism Vs Constructivism :A Skeptical View**” have suggested that seeking such a synthesis is justified on the ground that the most interesting research is likely to be work that ignores zero-sum interpretations of their relationship and instead directly engages questions that cut cross then rationalist/constructivist boundary as it is commonly understood.”

Although this line will be attempted in the work at hand, a serious caveat is in order. The search for points of theoretical convergence cannot be treated as what Feyerabendian relativism like to put it as “anything goes”. It is therefore imperative to grapple with the issue of how to make informed theoretical choices. **John Vasquez** in his book “**The**

⁹ The call for unity is apparent in other disciplines as well. For example political scientists have come to realize the need to blend together different varieties of new institutionalism in order to have a more complete perspective on the political structures and process. In addition, the economists Douglass C. North has argued how ‘integrating individual choices with the constraints institutions impose on choice sets’ would constitute a major unifying step not only in economics but in wider social science research as well.

Post-Positivist Debate: Reconstructing Scientific Enquiry and International Relations Theory after Enlightened's Fall" has tried to chart a way out of relativism by arguing that empirically we know enough about the world already to conclude that 'not every imaginative narrative can be imposed on it. To him the word reality means the resistance of the world to conform to every trend of imaginative conception that human being creates. Vasquez then goes to criticize the main post-positivist claim of having no theory –independent realities against which to test theories. He says although it is true that all datas are theory laden this does not mean that they will have to be biased in favor of any given theory in a sense that they will always result in the confirmation .Had it been so we should have thousands of strong findings in IR. Vanquez concluded in his book that "...in international relations the most frequent finding is the null finding."

Thus, the above argument has opened the avenue for the comparing theories. However, although a comparison can be made perhaps but a significant question can be raised as to on what grounds the theories can be combined? As Steve Smith pointed out that the three prevailing paradigms in IR- realism, liberalism and constructivism –each has different vision of seeing the world and is therefore highly incommensurable. Therefore researchers should exhibit no sign of 'eclectic and casual' approach while proceeding with the research dealing theoretical convergence. **Clifford Geertz's "The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essay"** has summed up Steve Smith very commendably. He said 'Eclecticism is self-defeating not because there is only one direction in which it is useful to move, but because there are so many: it is necessary to choose.' Although the above concern of Smith is not an insurmountable concern but rather that something should be keep in mind as it implies embarrassing theoretical pluralism based on the reorganization that theories can shed different yet meaningful light on different aspects of same research problem. As Colin White oppositely commented that inter-paradigm is feasible and does not require a set of common standards. To him, what is required instead is an acknowledgement of the fact that instead of living in 'different worlds' constitute by the rival paradigms, scholars are in fact probing same single world with at least partially overlapping conceptual schemes.

Imre Lakatos's work on scientific research programmes never refers to the integration of theories. Instead he was trying bridge the fine line between the rampant relativism implied by the theory –laden nature of scientific rationality and progress through a comparison and consequent eliminations of rival theories. His notion of scientific research programmes would be our starting point when looking for points of complementarity between rival theories. Lakatos's Scientific Progress consists of two kinds of conceptual entities: the 'Hard Core' of negative heuristic that essentially tell us what path of research is to avoid, and the positive heuristic pointing towards the forms of investigation that are permissible. For Lakatos research is progressive if each new theory has some novel, hitherto unexpected fact. Therefore for Lakatos the proliferation of new and rival theories is in fact a driving vehicle within which science progresses. In other words, hoping for theoretical integration can be too tall an order but still should be attempted in the research. By contrast, a research programme is degenerating if it fails to yield new empirical insights and only results in tinkering with the 'protective belt' of the positive heuristic and auxiliary hypotheses around the hard core of the programme.

Since, the dissertation is deeply concerned in seeking complementarity in IR; it is pertinent to consider two progressing rather than degenerating programmes. It is only through the carefully mapping of areas of commonality between different strands of thought that our chances of improving current theories and consequently our general understanding of international relations are plausible. Lakatosian hard core amounts to a set of metaphysical statements concerning the world, which cannot be derived from a theory-independent reality. As such, theory cannot be falsified or refuted on empirical grounds. Instead, it is only replaced by a rival and supersedes it by a further display of heuristic power¹⁰

It is perhaps not very adamant attitude from the above discussion that it is indeed only on the basis of Lakatosian 'hard core' of the heuristics that the quest for theoretical

¹⁰ Popper ('Rationality of Scientific Revolution') has advocated a similar position according to which a new theory should be able to account for its predecessor's successes as well as challenge them by contradicting some of their key tenets. Thus, in some cases 'the predecessor theory must appear as a good approximation to the new theory; while there should be preferably other cases where the new theory yields different and better results than the old theory.

convergence can take place. Therefore when pondering the possibilities of complementarity, even integration, between theories, three steps can be taken:

1. We must pin ourselves down to a certain research programme.
2. We must identify its hard core.
3. We must look for points of complementarity with other research programme in its vicinity.

For the purposes of theoretical convergence it would seem to make sense to make the initial selection of a theory on the merit of both ontological and epistemological scope.

Theories can be nested into each other given that they have at least some points of compatibility or complementarity upon which theoretical integration can consequently be built. But it is important to emphasize that the process boils down to the initial conceptual choices and it is this option of 'first choices' that restricts the range available to the researchers subsequently. As a consequence, a certain kind of conceptual path dependence exists when one seeks to combine theories.

As the central theme of the dissertation is to conceptualize the relations between the Europe Union and Russia as a process of international institutionalization, three different approaches to international institutions can be taken to consideration- the English School, Institutionalism and Wendtian thin constructivism. Among these three schools of thoughts it is more prudent to accept the English school of thought in IR as a starting point of the dissertation owing to its wide epistemological and ontological scope. Whereas, the institutionalist research programme has a predominantly material and Wendtian constructivism has an ideational ontology as its matter of study, the English school of thought has always stressed the relevance of both material and ideational factors in explaining international relations.

Nevertheless, there are limits of the English School. It has been predominantly interested in the so called primary or foundational institutions, (such as sovereignty, territoriality and fundamental principles of international law) and is ill-suited to the study of what can be called secondary or procedural institutions, (ideas and norms that underlie and regulate

interactions and transactions between state-actors.) of which Russia-EU relation can be surmised. Yet an English school reading of primary institutions is indispensable, as secondary procedural institutions rest on the very basis of more foundational institution. But from the vantage point of the present work, the interrelationship of the two is more profound and interesting. In a sense the secondary institution can be likened to micro-climates where the wider constitution of the international society takes its effect. In fact the secondary procedural institution entails that they are the main fora where the international society is reconstituted.

Therefore it is the nature of the institutionalized practices crystallizing within the procedural institution which has the power to either make or break any given constitution of the international society. Thus, as is understood one must study the wider constitution of an institution as it sheds light on the nature of the game in which the components (state actors/non-state actors) interplays in the context of the secondary institutions. It is also imperative that without the full appreciations of the dynamics at play at the secondary level any analysis of the institutional relations among its members merely provides the static snapshots with relatively less analytical value to the possible changes taking place in the working of its members and the institution as a whole.

In practice, therefore, international institutions provided by the English school must be complemented with a more grass-root theory that deals with international procedural institution (to impart secondary institutional element to the English School of thought). In the work at hand, this is done by essentially nesting the institutionalist research programme into wide and extensiveness of the theoretical structure ingrained in the English School. However, the careful weaving of theories is required in order to avoid the common problems of pandemonium while exploiting the multiple theories when explaining the basic crux of the dissertation to avoid logical inconsistencies and contradictions in the theory.

In this respect it is imminent to notice that the methodology of theoretical complementarity applied in the dissertation does not violate the basic tenets of the English school as by its proponents it is always willing to embrace theoretical pluralism in an

integrative way. In this context therefore, it is even not deleterious to combine the Institutionalist research programme with the English school of thought owing to the presence of ample ground for common concern and key theoretical issues like –

1. Both are Grotian¹¹ and therefore are related to the rights of humanity. In the sense they deem rules and values to render high esteem in the study of IR.
2. They also consider the tenets of power and interests to be central to the understanding of IR.

Thus, the two theoretical approaches are essentially mutually complimentary. The Institutional theory would give the English school perspective of the secondary institution. Finally the resting of institutional theorizing into the framework of the English school requires the relaxation of the strict rationality assumption by supplanting the substantive with more contexts- sensitive notion of contextual rationality. This would be dealt subsequently. It is also important to acknowledge that sociological or thin Wendtian constructivist insights concerning the role of culture is required too for heralding relative homogeneity between the worldviews of individual players in International Relations.

The main theoretical argument will also put Russia-EU relation in the context concerning the constitution of the international society in both its ideational and material aspects, helping the work to envisage the relationship as an instance of secondary institutionalization that is always constrain by the primary institutions while acting as a factor that shapes them (a reason why there is different world views). Thus, first, the strict rationality assumptions of institutionalist research programmes will be relaxed by adopting a concept of contextual rationality, which allows for a subjective element in the conditions for utility maximizing. This is not to deny that actors make choices based on self-interests, but this utilitarian rationality is modified by their underlying worldviews which affects their readings of the situation at hand and what their particular interests are in a given situation. The existence of distinctive worldviews makes it meaningful to talk

¹¹ Grotian tradition views international relations where states are not only bound by the rules of prudence and expediencies but also by morality and law.

about differences in terms of commonality concerning the normative foundation of the Russia-EU relationship. Second, merely locating the differences in the worldviews is not enough. Although it has clear descriptive value, the salience of these differences also needs to be explained therefore the work has tried to bring in power into play by conceptualizing Russia and EU as situated actor.

Theorizing Russia-European Union interaction:

To begin with, the existence of interaction at the unit level is the basis of international relation and the conceptual emergence of the international system/society. When individual exchanges between actors first became the common place, they can become institutionalized. As **Guys Peter** in his book **‘Institutional Theory in Political Science: The New Institutionalism’** stated that “as a consequence institution transcends individuals to pattern interactions that are predictable, based upon specified relationships among actors”. “More often than not, institutionalization is the result of conscious settlement born out of struggle and bargaining between the group of actors. And as such they reflect resources and power but crucially also the ideas of those who enact them” says **John Campbell’s “Institutional Change and Globalization”**. The institutionalized interaction and consequent practices that rest on a normative foundation creates expectation concerning future behavior within the institutionalized setting. In other words, there should be some sense of shared values and meaning among the member of the institution. The normative foundation of an institution can be formally codified in a treaty, but need not be and can rest on informal assumptions and practices instead.

Traditionally international institutionalization, be it in the form of institution or regimes has been envisaged as an issue-specific process¹². For example, **John Ruggie** in his book called **“Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization”** has emphasized that ‘institutionalization represents agreements that certain aspects of national behavior and not all will be channeled into certain direction’. Even IR scholars like Robert Cox and Oron Young contended that some regimes may encompass several

¹² many scholars like Herbert Simon, L.Martin have pointed out that from the beginning of the 1990 the term ‘institution’ has replaced ‘regime’ but often some scholars uses them interchangeably like Keohane

issue areas but within well-defined geographical areas, such as Svalbard regime¹³ or Antarctic Treaty System¹⁴. This concept reiterated by the scholars is closely related to the notion of sovereignty. States are more unwilling to delegate more authority than is absolutely necessary to international institutions and want to do only in strictly defined circumstances and limited issue-areas. There is no *carte-blanche* for international institutions to take over states as the final guardian and arbiters of national and international life. For the same reason, international relations portray an underinvestment in explicit and binding compliance mechanisms, with states preferring more informal and less binding form of conflict resolution. This coupled with the fact that there is usually no higher authority to interpret the true meaning of provision is of course another factor that highlights the importance of the commonality variable in explaining the problems in international institutionalization.

Usually international institutions are also seen as fora of hard international – interstate bargaining. Their working is seen as reinforcing rather than undermining the sovereignty of the participating states. Yet the Russia-EU relationships is not an ordinary international institution, but one where we are dealing with highly institutionalized treaty-based structures and procedures, giving grounds for speaking of a post-sovereign international institution. The post-sovereign international institution is one of the main conceptual innovations of this study and it is the main theoretical concept through which the problems of institutionalization between Russia and European Union are gauged in. The concept has never been practically conceptualized specially in the context of international institution. In comparison to the traditional concept of institution as explicated retrospectively, it challenges the essence of issue-specificity, strict sovereignty and the very logic of interaction and in certain respect is more akin to integration rather than traditional interstate cooperation. To be sure, the coexistence of several issue-areas in itself constitutes hardly a new phenomenon in IR but what is new in IR is the linking of

13 Svalbard Treaty, was signed on February 9, 1920, recognizes the full and absolute sovereignty of Norway over the arctic archipelago of Spitsbergen (now called Svalbard). All signatories were given equal rights to engage in commercial activities (mainly coal mining) on the islands

14 This treaty regulate international relations with respect to Antarctica, The treaty, entered into force in 1961 and eventually sets aside Antarctica as a scientific preserve, establishes freedom of scientific investigation and bans military activity on that continent

an unprecedented number of different issue-areas into a wider political architecture based on political conditionality and the Unions insistence on the universal applicability of its own internal mode of governance for the third parties. What is more is the envisaged relationship within the institution is asymmetric, with the EU preferring bilateral agreements in which it can use all its economic and normative clout. as **Robert O Keohane** in one of the chapters in an edited **book** by Smith “**Ideas and Ideal: Essays In International Theory**” asserts although internally pooling of sovereignty might be an apt description of European Integration, in its external policies the EU has a more variegated logic whereby it advocates a host of sovereignty challenging practices while seeking to preserve its own sovereign prerogatives in full. This too is a characteristic that sets a post-sovereign institution apart from more traditional undertakings that usually entail a more symmetrical limitation of sovereignty from all sides. Taken together these characteristics give us grounds to argue that the Russia-EU relationship is based on the Union’s attempt at regional normative hegemony.

In essence the nature of Russia-EU relationship as a post sovereign institution implies that the room for misunderstandings and outright lack of shared understandings is much wider than in more traditional arrangements. This highlights the main hypothesis – namely could it be that the parties perceives the normative foundations of Russia-EU institution differently and deters the situated actors in the context of the institution. This can be probe in the light of IR theory of Institutionalism, neoliberalism and constructivism. Neoliberalism is often seen as having most prestigious history. According to **Kenneth Waltz** in his **book** “**Theory of International Politics**”, ‘the neorealist stressed the centrality of the material factors in explaining international life. International relations are basically a function of the distribution of power within an anarchic international system and it is that structure of the system which conditions the behaviour of its primary units- the states’. As a consequence in neorealist argumentation the ideational factors are given only scant attention .states has fixed preferences and unproblematic or unvarying and acontextual identities. For realists, the name of the game, the struggle for power, is well known to all the participants in the international system and entailing full commonality also between the actors. The anarchic nature of

international system ensures that states are always interested in preserving their own freedom of maneuver, thus making them averse to legally binding normative entanglements that would jeopardize their sovereignty and consequent autonomy. Therefore for realists institutions do not really make a difference at the international level. Instead, they are mere surface reflections of underlying process that involves the dynamic of power and their relevance is mainly diagnostic as the changes in them are really helpful in gauging the evolution of the structure of power in international society.

This brief discussion shows that neorealism poses a problematic starting point for conceptualizing secondary institution. If we assume the basic tenets of post-sovereign character of the Russia-EU institution and the possibility of divergent interpretation concerning its normative foundation, then material factors alone are clearly not sufficient in grasping and explaining its basic dynamism. Thus we must seek to incorporate ideational factors into the equation as well. It is however important to emphasize that material factors are by no means discarded altogether from the analysis. The next straw of IR that would be taken into consideration is the 'institutionalism'.

The culture of institutionalism as a theory in this dissertation will bring in a new dimension to inter-state relations. The institutionalists think that the degree of institutionalization 'prescribes the behavioral roles, constrains activity and shapes expectation' of states interacting within the international system¹⁵. The institutionalists do not deny the relevance and even the primacy of material factors in framing international relation. But they emphasize that the strict logic of anarchy propagated by neorealist is moderated by the need and the ability to cooperate. This understanding has been expressed perhaps most elegantly in Keohane's functional theory of international regimes.¹⁶ Combining the rational choice analysis with micro-economics, Keohane argues that it is in fact the anticipated effects of the institutions that explain their causes. This

¹⁵ This definition can be compared with the one rendered by Oran Young in his book on International Cooperation. He has linked international institutions with roles. Social institutions are identifiable practices consisting of recognized roles linked by clusters of rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of these roles.

¹⁶ Keohane asserted that cooperation is only possible in the climate of conflict and not in harmony. Cooperation should be understood in opposition to conflict and not in absence of conflict



'anticipated effects' aide in overcoming the deficiencies that makes it impossible to consummate even mutually beneficial agreements' in international relations. By reducing the uncertainties and the cost of making and enforcing agreement, international institution helps states achieve collective gains. For Keohane these useful functions that international institution can perform have resulted in the emergence of a host of institutions in international politics.

Keohan's definition included an important new facet into the discussion by drawing attention to the degree of institutionalization in the international system as a factor that prescribes the behavioural roles, constrains activity and shapes expectations of states interacting within the international system. The constraining quality of the institutions stems from the adoption and the development of persistent and connected set of rules, which in addition to structural factors stressed by neorealist; act as a basis of international relations. Therefore instead of an international system the picture of institutional life painted by institutionalists resembles that of international society developed by the English School where the logic of anarchy is tempered by commonly accepted norms and values. In fact in 1980's the so called consensus definition of international regime (congruence of material interests and values) hinted that there is more to international institution than a mere cool calculus and clashing interests. By defining regimes as set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor's expectations converge in a given area of international relations;¹⁷ a distinguished American scholar opened the door for the examinations of subjective and even inter-subjective dimensions of international institutionalization. Thus as discussed in the first chapter that how when the precincts of neorealist is overarched on institutionalism, the epistemological and ontological scope of institutionalism widens and

¹⁷ According to Krasners an IR scholar, principles are beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice'. Instead of defining Russia-EU relation on disaggregating normative terms this work will draw the concept of commonality to define the relation in a consolidated manner.

provides a more fruitful conceptual starting point for the operation of the procedural institution¹⁸.

According to Keohane international institutionalization can be measured along three dimensions: commonality, specificity and autonomy. Specificity refers to the scope, while autonomy can be seen as having a strong bearing on the degree of sovereignty-challenging aspects in a given international institution. By contrast commonality cannot be defined in a one magnitude rather, it refers to the overall definitions of institutionalization and is thus taken as most relevant variable in discussing the central question of the research in this dissertation. Keohane has defined commonality 'as a degree to which expectations about appropriate behaviour and understanding about how to interpret actions are shared by participants in this system'. Therefore the main research question of the work can be reformulated using institutionalist vocabulary as: can the difference in the degree of commonality concerning the normative foundation of the Russia-EU institution be used in explaining the recurring difficulties in the Russia-EU relationship?

However, the mainstream IR theorizing about international institutions has two problematic foundations that needed to be modified to suit this dissertation. First considering the key realist's tenets at the face-value that attaches too much importance to the question of cooperation. And second, the application of the strict rational choice theory that makes the commonality variable largely empty, meaningless and uninteresting. The mainstream institutionalists have not been far removed from the premises of the neoliberalism which has meant that the problem of cooperation has been acute and difficult one in its own right. The institutionalists have first and foremost been interested in perhaps even obsessed with explaining 'why' states cooperate rather than 'how' they cooperate the focus has been put on the emergence and persistence of international institutions and the constraints placed on them by the structure of the anarchic international system. As explained very well by **Robert Axelrod's book 'The**

¹⁸ Procedural institution includes ideas and norms that underlie and regulate interaction and transactions between the separate actors including the conduct of both conflict and normal interaction like diplomacy, war, trade.

emergence of cooperation among egoists', "When one accepts the fact that international institutions do make a difference, it is only natural to shift the attention to the studies of the interaction between and among institution, ideas and material conditions in international relations."

Or in other words, it can be said that the attributes of the institutionalization also demands that institution as a definition should also departs from strict rationality as that would inhibits and excludes the drawing of attention to common beliefs or shared values. In fact, **Keohan** has pointed succinctly in the **book "International Institutions and state powers: Essay on International Theory"**, "International cooperation does not necessarily depend on altruism, idealism, personal honour, common purposes, internalized norms or a shared belief in a set of values embedded in a cultural. At various times and places any of these features of human motivation may indeed play an important role in process of international cooperation..."

As already has been mentioned that the main factors explaining the theoretical and empirical underdevelopment of the commonality variable stems from the strict rationality assumptions of the institutionalist research programme. Like neorealists, institutionalists subscribe to the tenets of rational choice theory that proceeds from the principle of methodological individualism. rational choice theory assumes a highly idealized or an abstract set of actors who act to m maximize their utility functions and who have the rational capacity, time and emotional detachment necessary to choose a best course of action, no matter how complex the choice. Admittedly rational choice has proved to be a powerful analytical tool. Its usefulness stems from its simplicity and not to the extent of being parsimony, its ability to explain and at times even predict large number of possibly a large number of complicated facts with the help of small number of fairly simple hypotheses about the goals and objective of a given actor. However, it has also attracted a host of criticisms-specially in its strictest forms. But by modifying its rigid postulates we can arrive at a conception of contextual rationality that is well situated in the study of worldviews and the role of commonality in the international institutions. thus, instead of rejecting actor rationality altogether, the approach adopted in this peace of work takes stock of the existing literature in order to find out what can be salvaged- and what

perhaps needs to be modified –in order to meet the theoretical needs at hand. In fact **Barry Hines** in **‘Political Choice and Social Structure: An Analysis of Actors, Interests and Rationality’** has said, “Rationality is a property of actors who have given well-ordered ends. Actors are rational insofar as they choose between them in a consistent fashion, and they select the most appropriate of available means for the pursuit of their ends.”

According to the book **‘Advances in Understanding Rational Behaviour’** by **Harsanyi John C**, the elegance of rational choice theory’s assumption concerning preference formation stems from the fact that human behaviour in general is goal-directed. For example, business people are after economic profit and money, statesmen are looking after national self-interest, with the deviation from this rule being mainly down to ‘Freudian-type emotional factors’ (A mental state that arises spontaneously rather than through conscious effort and is often accompanied by physiological changes). Harsanyi is not alone in these sentiments. Herbert Simon cited how the twin assumptions of utility and substantive rationality have freed economics (and by extension the rational variants of political science and International Relations as well.) from any dependence upon psychology. But Harsanyi’s elegance overlooks the facts that money and national self-interests are not commensurable variables. Money is a fairly straight ward concept –it is after all a commonality that is highly fungible and something that is easy to quantify but ‘national self-interests’ is a more amorphous concept and that is much harder to pin down.

We cannot take national interests as a given atleast some level of simplicity and robustness as we can take a concept like money. As Keohane has pointed out that it is a mistake to assume that interests are stable and given properties of actors and/or that they are structurally determined instead the specification of interests is always open to disputes and we must thus ask whose national interests we are talking about. This is a question that leads us invariably into admitting that it is at the end of the day the perceived (national) self interests we infact needs to be probing. Thus, inviting to ask the question about the subjective side of preference formation, namely the mental and cognitive processes that inform the perception of what is in the self-interest of a given

actor. Rational choice theorists like Harsanyi call these factors emotional problems and in this work it will be recognized as worldviews.

Before sketching out the approach of this dissertation, it is important to discuss another form of rationality namely bounded rationality. This form of rationality has to some extent assisted in tackling the shortcomings in the rational choice theory. The concept of bounded rationality has stems from the work of Simon and it seeks to address the question of whether the actors will in fact be able to consistently select the most appropriate responses to different situations. The answer is that although occasionally state actors might be lucky and succeeded in their tasks, it is highly unlikely that this could be achieved consistently. As Simon has argued that proper responses to the situation would require cognitive and computational capabilities that are not within human reach. Hence, he has proposed that instead of 'maximisers' people are 'satisfiers' settling for good enough instead of always aiming at the best possible deal.

However it is crucial to bear in mind that Simon's original argument was a narrow one. It dealt only with the technical constraints on rational behaviour-that is the limitation of human computational capability and the deficits in the organization and the utilization of human memory. Simon's bounded rationality does not move far enough in qualifying human rationality. The line of inquiry pursued in the dissertation is where the finitude of human brains per se in is not seen as the primary source for variation in the reasoning processes. Instead it introduces the concept of 'worldviews' and relaxes the strict rationality assumption of substantive and even bounded rationality by adopting the concept of contextual rationality in their stead. The study of worldviews has a long and established pedigree in the social sciences. The origin of the concept can be traced back to German Romanticism and the ideas concerning the role of 'Weltanschauung' in the writings of the Wilhelm Dilthey and Max Weber. The empirical application of this concept also exists especially in the cultural philosophy, sociology, history and comparative religion.

World view is not entirely alien to the study of IR. Previously various IR scholars like Mirium Steiner, Martin Griffith has employed the concept in approaching the

presuppositions that the researchers themselves had in mind towards their subject matter. Interestingly one of the leading proponents of rational choice approaches to the study of institutions, Robert O Keohane has, together with Judith Goldstein, also employed the concept. as such worldviews come close to the concepts of belief system and strategic culture which have been applied frequently and squarely in IR. It also has close kinship with the so called ‘operational code’¹⁹ and ‘cognitive mapping’²⁰. It is however worth pointing out that most of these concepts were part and parcel of the behaviourist era and therefore concentrated on the belief-system of individual policy-makers. In a useful recent contribution, **Pascal Vennesson**, while analyzing EU worldviews in his book **‘European Worldviews : Ideas and the European Union in Politics’**, have sought to marry the concept of the worldviews with the individualistic approach of operational code analysis concerning the worldviews of key EU decision makers. Although the strict methodological individualism makes the approach largely incompatible with the approach of study (collective worldviews) proposed here, their work can be seen as highly relevant and useful in uncovering the micro foundations of collective worldviews which the dissertation takes an interests in.

Following the book **‘Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institution and Political Change’** by **Keohane and Goldstein**, worldviews can be defined as collective conceptions of possibility that are embedded in the symbolism of culture and that deeply affect modes of particular thought and discourse. To them, “They are not purely normative, since they include views about cosmology and ontology as well as about ethics. Nevertheless, world views are entwined with people’s conceptions of their identities, evoking deep emotions and loyalties the world great religions provide worldviews but so that the scientific rationality that is emblematic of modernity.”**Christopher Hill and William Wallace** in their book **‘The Actors in**

19 Operational code is an approach to the study of political leaders and focuses narrowly on a set of philosophical beliefs embedded in the political leader or originating from the cultural matrix of the society.

20 Collection of beliefs, experiences, and information that a person uses to orient himself or herself within an environment such as a social setting. It is a network of ideas that indicated the way the idea is leading to.

Europe's Foreign Policy' have aptly summed up the constitutive role of the worldviews in the making of foreign policy as this:

“Effective foreign policy rests upon a shared sense of national identity, of nation-states ‘Place in the world’ its friends and enemies, its interests and aspirations. These underlying assumptions are embedded in the national history and myth, changing slowly over time as political leaders reinterpret them and external and internal developments reshapes them. Debate on foreign policy takes place within the constraints this conventional wisdom about national interests sets upon acceptable choices; the symbols and reference points they provide enabling ministers to relate current decisions to familiar ideas”.

The thought has not been alien to pure practitioners, either. The first president of Russia; Boris Yeltsin has also acknowledged the constraining effects that a worldview has on a decision maker. Commenting on the factors shaping his decisions he asks:

“Upon what does president Yeltsin himself ultimately depend? Or upon whom? First, I am obviously dependent upon my ego, on the image that I created and that those around me have created – that of a willful, determined strong politician. Second, I am very depended upon the opinion of people I respect, and there are quite a few of them....finally, I am dependent on my notions and principles, which like the majority of normal people, I can't do anything about. Such beliefs are absorbed in childhood, and they are stronger than we are.”

Yeltsin is speaking about the centrality of worldviews in framing ones thoughts and consequent actions. The dissertation is likely to understand worldviews in a more dynamic rather than in deterministic manner we need to acknowledge that worldviews do not operate in a vacuum, but are conditioned by other social and equally importantly material factors and structures of international society.

When invoking the difference between worldviews of the state actors as explanations for the problems of internationalization of institutionalism, this dissertation at first instance will be involving in intentional as opposed to the causal analysis. The work will eventually leads to the causality. For the sake of keeping the work going, the starting point is that of intentional analysis where the actors are always assumed to be have reasons for their actions. The concept can be understood by this example:

Environment is contemporarily is a site of conflict between competing perspectives, values and interests among different groups and communities that represents them. Each states attaches their perspectives and prerogatives while deciding on the environmental issues. So called developed nations like UK, US, Australia are having difficult political time getting their industries to swallow the fact that big changes needs to happen and thus, industries needs to clean up its acts. These nations prefer to shift the responsibility of environment cleansing on the developing nations. The developing nations on the other hand depart from the real issues by reiterating the need to priorities nations' development in order to rise along the scale of human development index.

In essence this means that actions flow from the actors beliefs and desires and an intentional actors chooses an action that it believes will be a means to its goals. Therefore as different actors have different belief system, existing different worldviews among states is not a surprise. However it is true that the intentional analysis does not tell anything about the coherence and consistency of the thought process resulting in a certainty of decision. But the intentions of actors do entails that there is not much difference between the Lakatosian idea of theory-laden observation in science and in the reality of international politics. As **Christer Jonsson** in his book **“Communication in International Bargaining”** has put in:

“A cognitive scientist emphasizes the theory driven nature of perception when addressing the question of meaning. individuals process information through pre-existing ‘knowledge structure’(system of Schematized and abstract knowledge which scientists tends to label ‘belief-systems’ or ‘schemata’ when referring to people they study, ‘theories’ when referring to their own scientific activity and ‘prejudices’ when referring to their rivals and enemies).However, the main difference between scientific and intuitive theories is that the former are formalized and available to public scrutiny, whereas the latter are implicit and used below the level of awareness”²¹

²¹ Personal constructs (explanation or interpretation) come into use at various levels of our awareness. Construing at a high-level involves what we usually call "conscious awareness" or "thinking". Construing at this high level of awareness also means that the alternatives (or opposite poles) specified in each personal construct are available to us. At the lowest level there is preverbal construing which has no verbal labels attached it, and so cannot be consciously "thought about". Although Kelly states that preverbal construing may or may not occur before the onset of speech - and so have no verbal labels attached to it - in general practice constructs that have been developed after the onset of language are more often referred to as "non-verbal constructs". It has been suggested that an alternative term for such construing is tacit construing.

In addition to the cognitive limitations on the preference formation of actors there are also psychological factors affecting the actors and therefore explains differences of world views:

Decisions are often made more on the grounds of consistency with past actions, reduction of strains within the individual's belief-system²² (cognitive dissonance) or normative orientations, than through the calculation of the most efficient means to given ends...New information is not dealt with in a neutral way. Rather, it is fitted into existing patterns of belief and often ignored if it cannot be so construed (this is somewhat similar to the adage "grapes are sour" in Aesop fable's 'fox and the grapes').

It is worth pointing out that by following the above line of reasoning impacting states worldviews and thereby effecting actors decisions, the work may succumb to the criticism of practicing 'folk-psychology'²³ But this criticism can be countered by two further avenues of investigation rather than merely considering 'actors reasons as given. A question may ask as to why reasons are not to be considered as causes (given).since the intentional theory attaches reasons of an actor action to the belief system in grained in an actor, it is imperative to consider that there exist normative relations between the actor's reason and its action. This criticism can be countered by pursuing two avenues of investigations rather than just taking into consideration that the actor's reasons are given. Therefore, this work will argue that the desires stemming from beliefs are in effect grounded in worldviews that have both individual and collective dimensions and the causal mechanism that will link worldviews in this work is the commonality variable and the role given to material factors in conditioning their (worldviews) salience in the actual working within the institutionalized context of Russia-EU interaction.

²² Cognitive dissonance is an uncomfortable feeling caused by holding two contradictory ideas simultaneously. The theory of cognitive dissonance proposes that people have a motivational drive to reduce dissonance by changing their attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors, or by justifying or rationalizing them.

²³ It is a set of assumptions, constructs and a conviction that makes up the everyday language in which people discusses human psychology with no critical thinking like pain, pleasure etc. and is not subjected to experimentation characteristic of empirical science.

The assumption of intentionality requires that the actors in question command some cognitive faculty with which to assess the prevailing international situations and reach decisions on them. Although it is been argued that actors operate within the bounds of rational choice, whether bounded or substantive, **Hindess Barry's book 'Political Choice and Social Structure: An Analysis of Actors, Interests and Rationality'** has suggested, actors intentionality does not necessarily have to entail that the procedures and outcomes must be particularly rational, at least not in terms of the substantive rationality. But it should be pointed out that accepting Hindess's fact does not mean that the procedures if not rational have to be irrational. Jon Elster, political theorists has made a useful distinction between thin and broad rationality. To him thin rationality does not require more than internal consistency in three levels: within the belief system within the system of desires and between desires and belief system on one hand and the action for which they are reasons on the other hand. Martin Hollis, an IR scholar, calls it 'weak rationality'. Broad rationality however requires rationality in more substantive sense as well.

The stand taken in this work is that of thin rationality. To revisit the definition of thin rationality in a consolidated form:

Thin rationality means that preferences 'do not appear arbitrarily out of nowhere, they are not structurally determined nor can they be regarded as fixed or given properties of actors' as rational choice assumes this entails that there is no need to talk about the real interests of the given actors as this 'real' interests would brings in assessment process of actors by the researchers and that invites actors preferences being identified or perceived as being the reflection of actors self-interests. However Andrew Hindmoor, rational choice theorists, has pointed out that 'by and large preference-formation remains as much of a mystery to psychologists, sociologist and historians as it do to a rational choice theorists. Social scientists know a great deal about what people want but they know far less about why they want it?' infact according to him by keeping actors preferences a priori fixed, the proponents rational of choice have been able to direct their attention evolving models of conflict and cooperation. But pursuing this line of inquiry in this dissertation as Hindmoor have pointed out would not be feasible as it will not allow this

paper to probe potential differences in commonality. In essence in the very beginning some working assumptions is to be considered to keep the flow of this work uninterrupted. Thus, it is assumed that differences between values and interests should be seen as a false dichotomy. It is the value embedded in wider worldviews that informs the interests of a given actor. Or in the famous works of Max Weber- “although it is not the ideas but material and ideal interests that directly govern people conduct, very frequently the world images that have been created by ideas have determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamics of interest”. This is what James March, a propounder of rational choice theory, called contextual rationality.

In contrast to Simon’s bounded rationality, contextual rationality draws our attention to ‘the extent to which choice behavior is embedded in a complex of other claims on the attention of actors and other structures of social and cognitive relations’. It is to these others structures that our attention is turned when we speak about worldviews. This is not to deny the relevance of other processes affecting and contextualizing rationality such as group dynamics like groupthink as well as other forms of social pressures and bureaucratic politics. But for the reasons of theoretical simplicity and economization of research it is prudent to proceed from the assumption that the role of the worldviews is the most important variable in tackling the research question at hand (differences in worldviews led to incompatibility in Russia-EU relationships).In addition, some of these other factors will be included in the framework of the research while discussing the role of learning and socialization in the formation and reproduction of worldviews.

In a nutshell, then actor’s rationality is a contextual; variable that derives its content from the interplay between (perceived) events and the meanings given to them in the light of the worldviews in question. The actor’s reasons for their meaningful actions always precede them temporarily and they are derived in interaction between the external stimuli (events) and the internal cognitive process that are rooted in wider worldviews. As **Richard Dewitt** in his book ‘**Worldviews: An Introduction to the History and the Philosophy of Science**’ aptly captured the profound role that worldviews play in the life of the scientists and laypersons alike:

“We have direct evidence for surprisingly small number of the beliefs we hold. For most of our beliefs (maybe almost all of them), we believe them largely because of the way they fit in with a large package of interconnecting beliefs. In other words, we believe what we do largely because of the way our belief fits into our worldview.”

Constructivists regard worldviews and both similar subjective factors as collective or inter-subjective, phenomena. By contrast, the first generation of belief system theorists and cognitive mappers like Kevin Lynch, Aron Beck saw them as strictly individual-level schemata. This work however adopts a middle ground position making two different claims concerning worldviews. Ontologically, worldviews are collective part and parcel of the cultural milieu within which individuals are immersed. Epistemologically, we have no other way but to approach worldviews than via individuals²⁴. Therefore it is unwise to argue for an absolute position at either end of the collective –individual continuum.

Metaphorically, as **Searly John** in his book **‘Construction of Social Reality’** mentioned that cognitive process residing within individuals can be seen as the hardware, with culturally conditioned worldviews being the software affecting the system. The point of dissimilarity between the computer and human being lies in the fact that human hardware comes in various ranges and shapes. Even the functional capacities between the two are uneven. The software too reflects heterogeneity. The set of rules that governs the programming of the human system accounts for mankind’s remarkable diversity and incompatibilities.

These cultural differences which the dissertation like to refer as differences in worldviews renders communications among human being more difficult. **Alexander Wendt** mention in his book **‘Social Theory in International Politics’**-

“As such culture can be defined as the transmission from one generation to other via teaching and imitation of knowledge values and other factors that influence behaviors.”

²⁴As Thomas Kuhn has admittedly said that groups does not have mind through which the collective worldviews could be accessed. Even Keohane asserted that it the individuals who can have beliefs.

As **Raymond Cohen** in **‘International Communication: An Intercultural Approach; cooperation and conflict’**, talked of three main characteristics of culture layers of culture exist at the following levels:

“Each culture is a complex of attributes subsuming every area of social life. It is not an individual quality but a quality of the society that the individual is part of. It is acquired by the process of socialization of the individual by the society in which she is embedded. Cultures define the way individual processes and utilize information.”

Worldviews affect perception by framing issues in certain ways, enabling things to be viewed as feasible or rational in the first place. It can be argued that individual’s worldviews act as a bridge connecting the cultural layer²⁵. To a large extent, however, there is a problem with the lack of knowledge concerning the effect of psychological and neural process that affects the decision makers as human being. Nor those neuroscientists could ever truly discover how the human minds work. As a consequence any biological effect on the actor’s decision making capacity will have to be black boxed for the sake of defending the study at hand from being derailed.

It is worth stressing that the thinking process is not entirely conscious. We as human being do not know why we think and act the way we do. That said it is also an understanding that people are not helpless puppet of their underlying worldviews either. A helpful way of thinking about the effects of worldviews is to see them in probabilistic terms: in certain cultures, certain tendencies are much more likely than others. For examples, ‘Folklore’ has an important place in the culture of every tribal society. It uses folklore as a medium to transmit its tradition and traditional knowledge systems from one generation to another. As opposed to the tribal society, modern (cosmopolitanism) society is more a protégée of new technological innovation in the area of communication. One should not expect worldviews to be the direct spring of action. Rather they frame reality in certain ways enabling and inhibiting certain kinds of behavior. Worldviews in a given environment may lead to action that is to be preferred as feasible alternatives. Thus,

²⁵ People even within the same culture carry several layers of mental programming within themselves. Different layers of culture exist at the different levels- The national level (nation), the regional level (ethnic, linguistic, or religious differences), the gender level (gender differences), the generation level (child and man), the social class level (educational opportunities), and the corporate level (particular culture of an organization) with the cognitive process residing within the individuals.

although in most cases the heuristics (experiment based technique) act as convenient shorthand and guide for action, people are also capable of reflecting upon their worldviews.

The fact that the underlying worldviews are at times brought into consciousness (action) opens up the door for reflection, learning and consequent change in them. This also opens up the possibility of change in interests of an actor. Evolution and transformation of the underlying worldviews will in turn effects the preference formation and the perceived self-interests of a given actor. This means that difference between the worldviews need not remain irreconcilable. But the worldview differences can be reconciled through mutual adjustment or convergence of expectations among actors that takes place through learning. But as **Robert Jervis** in the '**journal of political psychology**' mentioned while defining 'Belief' that 'Belief-system tends to be highly resistant to the changes. This is also true at the level of collective actors who have stratagems for diluting information that challenges the structure of existing expectations in order to save a preferred hypothesis or policy.'

But it can be emphasizing that the process of worldviews impact on actors choice of actions have their limits. This is so because there are forms of feedback where reality (world) indicates and often brutally shows whether the worldviews in questions are correct or not, whether the policies and the actions are depended on them or not actually works. For example democracy is a viable political option in evolving an ambiance that accounts for development as opposed to dictatorship of any degree. However the development graph indicates that Singapore has created a modern economy focused on industry, education and urban planning. Irrespective of the fact Freedom House ranks Singapore as "partly free" in its "Freedom in the World report". The People's Action Party (PAP) often dominates the political process and has won control of Parliament in every election since self-government in 1959. The government has also chosen not to follow some elements of liberal democratic values. There are no jury trials and there are laws restricting the freedom of speech as a pre-emptive measure to prevent breeding of ill will or cause disharmony within Singapore's multiracial, multi-religious society. This instance or other instances of similar kind open the door of opportunity for actors to

reflect upon the validity of their worldviews in the light of experience they have gained about the world. Here it is worth mentioning that envisaging the validation of worldviews as an interplay between subjective and objective factors means a departure from the existing literature at hand because this work stressed predominantly on social or inter-subjective orientation to the validation of the worldviews²⁶. However, the feedbacks which can render worldviews meaningless are:

An actor's behavior may change the external environment, precipitating a new understanding of its own place and role in the changed situation and structure. The above example shows that how Singapore in spite of representing a 'hybrid-democracy' (something very different from European version of democracy) has managed to pull foreign exchange and cater to expatriate student.

Second the structure of the external environment may in itself make the actor's self-representations meaningless or impossible by restricting its freedom of maneuver to such an extent as to make the underlying worldviews empty. Faced with the grim reality of the uselessness of her worldviews, an actor may be persuaded to reassess her underlying assumptions about the nature of that reality and her own place in it.

It is already been mentioned that the dissertation is more intent to study the social aspect of an individual for evaluating the validity of the worldviews. Learning as a process of socialization plays a significant part for appraising worldviews of state actors. Learning can be of two types as mentioned by 'Chris Argyris' a famous American theorists –

Single-loop learning: this learning result in changes in the actor's strategies in ways that leave the core values informing those strategies intact. In essence the learning entails the detection of errors and the consequent correction in the actor's strategies of action.

²⁶ Contemporarily David Naugle in *Worldview: the history of concept* suggested that every worldview must face three tests to be viable: a tests of coherence, or whether the different facets of a *Weltanschauung*; a test of correspondence of whether it is able to provide people with accurate descriptions of external reality and a pragmatic test of whether the worldview in question is helpful in solving the everyday tasks of human and social life.

Double-loop learning links the detection of error or anomaly both to strategies of action and to the norms and values by which actions are evaluated, often resulting in more profound change in the actor's worldviews.

Thus, learning directs changes at the level of individual which then get articulated within the wider cultural milieu. The double-loop learning is not very simple process because changes in values and norms may not be desirable from the vantage point of a given actor because the actors generally loathe giving up their core values even in the face of the gravest difficulties and existential dangers. Such a situation has the potential to result in an internal conflict that will have to be solved eventually in order to reach a new equilibrium. Argyris rightly suggested two new avenues for reaching a new satisfactory level of equilibrium-

First, new strategy can be invented which in fact, circumvent and capture the perceived incompatibility between the strategies required and the worldviews that inform them. This amounts to finding the single-loop (here the need is only to find new strategy) solution to a double-loop problems. Thus, preserving the underlying norms and values intact.

Second, the actor may have to act out and consequently solve the inter-personal and inter-group conflicts in order to arrive at a new equilibrium concerning the world views in question. As a result, the new understandings, priorities and reframed norms become inscribed in the images, maps and programmes of the collectives.

The goal behind discussing the factors affecting worldviews is to ascertain that worldviews can be rigid but not unchangeable and thus, the existence of different belief-system among actors is not an unintended trait in IR.

It is subsequently derivable that various treaties or documents emphasizing on cooperation among state-actors has been historically plausible because there remains a probability of linking various worldviews masquerading international politics. In this dissertation the variable of commonality has been taken to weave separate worldviews together. Although institutionalism have failed to develop the commonality variable

much further conceptually. But this does not mean that useful work has not been made in other fields of IR. International bargaining and negotiation is one of the branches where not only game-theory but also more cognitive approaches have flourished. As **Charles Lockhart** in his book **“Bargaining in International Politics”** said that:

“Since each party to a conflict reacts not to the situation as perceived by the other but rather to the situation as seen from his own perspective, the nation is not reacting directly to each other. Under these conditions it is necessary to understand the perspective guiding each national unit’s activity and thus, how these perspectives differ, in order to grasp the actual flow of strategic interaction.”

In reference to the Lockhart reasoning, commonality may be viewed as the scope within which the actors can be seen as having overlapping perspectives and understandings concerning the issues as well as the wider institutionalized context at hand. One can envisage a continuum ranging from full commonality where everything is understood in a similar way (1) to no commonality (0) at all. In other words, the greater the overlap between actors, the closer to full commonality we are. It is useful to keep in mind that, the dichotomies differentiating traditional and post-sovereign institutions, both ends of this spectrum are ideal type but do not likely to be encountered in empirical reality. Full commonality is unrealistic for the obvious reason that even people with higher similar worldviews perceive reality differently. In fact total commonality even at the level of a single individual is unlikely at least for a longer period of time, as people often tend to disagree even with them, or even change their minds over time. Simultaneously total lack of commonality is also not perceivable as people at least agree to disagree. Thus, reaching certain level of commonality about the absence of genuine commonality concerning certain issues is indeed probable.

It is important to emphasize that the relative importance of differences in commonality is dependent on the given institutional context within which actors are interacting. In traditional institutions centered on single issue-areas, the question of worldview can be seen as less burning and one that can be settled through bargaining that will result in a mutually beneficial equilibrium. For example trade union. This institution has evolved for collective-specific purpose to protect workers rights. Therefore any conflicts over the issue of values and ethics among the members of trade union is overarched by bargaining

to reach a status quo for the validation of greater interests. However the above condition under traditional institution may not be taken granted. for example As **John Lewis** in his book '**The Cold War**' revealed that - in 1972 Basic Principle Agreement Concerning the ground of rules of mutual coexistence between the United States and the Soviet Union soon faltered owing to unresolved disagreements and ambiguities that were interpreted differently by the two sides. However in multi-issue post-sovereign institutional context involving actors with different worldviews, the question of commonality can become the key variable in explaining problems of international institutionalization. In this context the dissertation will refer to the Russia-EU problems in institutionalization.

But beside it is explicated what the term commonality entail, there is a need to expand the concept. This is because the definition given by Keohane that is the degree of expectation about appropriate behaviour and understanding about how to interpret actions are shared by the participants in the system is too static. As **John Ruggie** has pointed out in '**Essay of International Institutionalism**' that "Any given expression of the collective situation will not capture the individual situations of all participants equally well and it will not conform to the individual situation of any single participant perfectly. Thus any given collective situation is inherently unstable. It may change as knowledge of cause/effect relations changes, as prevailing configurations of interdependence alter as capabilities or objectives change. Each collective situation is subjected to continued renegotiation, which become ever more likely and pressing if and as individual situations move further away from it".

International system is a dynamic process and not a static end-state (set of required conditions that define achievement of the member state's objectives). Accordingly, therefore it is a necessity to modify Keohane's definition of commonality by adding a new dimension - 'convergence of those expectations and understandings', a concept that has been a central element in regime theory and also as exemplified by the consensus definition as referred to by Ruggie above. Theoretically, the term convergence is neutral about the nature and the process of interaction. Whether it is possible to converge, or to converge unidirectional, or no convergence is possible to depict only empirically. It is here that there is a need to add that the scope for consensus leaves no room for

divergence. But then it is not impractical either that understandings or expectations also can diverge in the process of interaction. Cumulatively, convergence and divergence amounts to change in commonality the divergence factor in terms of worldviews leading to change in commonality is a centre of study in this dissertation.

It is important to bear in mind that the perceived self-interests and underlying worldviews do not operate in vacuum. Instead they are conditioned by a social structure, which can take two different forms. First, any actual procedural institutional arrangement rests on the wider constitution of the international society. As Oran Young has rightly put it:

“Specific regimes are regularly nested in international orders in the sense that they built on the foundation provided by more general institutions rather than offer arrangements that are unconnected to broader orders orb that even conflict with the provisions of such institutions.”

The above saying can be exemplified as- the impetus behind the initiation of nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was the outcome of the concern for the safety of the world with many nuclear states. The idea for arms reduction evolved with the waning of cold war deterrent relationship between United States and erstwhile Soviet Union.

As such any given international institutions or regime can be envisaged as secondary to the extent that its existence and operation are dependent on a set of more primary institutions such as sovereignty and territoriality (liberal institutionalists like Krasner, Holsti definition of institution).But the second form determining the worldviews and self-interests of an actors is the material structure of the material society. Thus, there is a need to temper the highly subjective account (state actors cognizance) with the objective structure (surroundings impacting the state actors) as well. Robert Keohane has pointed out the way forward by arguing that although by learning and other ideational phenomena are important ‘a structural analysis of constraints ...is necessary to put the phenomenon of actor cognition into its proper political context’.

For policy-makers the interplay between the unit and the system level variables has been obvious. George F. Kennan in his famous long Telegram in 1947 wrote:

“The political personality of Soviet power as we know it today is the product of their beliefs (subjective) and circumstances (objective). Ideology inherited by the present Soviet leaders from the movement in which they had their political origin and circumstances of the power which they now have exercised for nearly three decades in Russia... a psychological analysis to trace the interaction of these two forces and relative role of each in the determination of Soviet conduct is difficult. Yet attempt must be made if that conduct is to be understood and effectively countered.” for example, Stalin inscribed to the ideology of the victory of communist party in Russia but his actions were largely determined by his inner fear of being politically ineffectual and existing International Politics. Like at some point of his political journey, he desperately turned against once closed aide Bukharin, right-wing communist party leaders. This was directed by the fear of rising role of the right-wing party in international politics like in Spanish Civil War in 1936 and Hitler’s coming to power by the back-deal with the right-wing parties in Germany.

Martin Hollis in ‘**The Cunning Of Reasons**’ remarked how social life always means something beyond itself the Russian revolution for instance was not a self-contained episode and especially not one which could be understood just by knowing what the actors had in their conscious minds. This remark has two consequences for the study at hand. This dissertation shall not be solely concentrating on the individual worldviews but their interaction in order to understand the differences in commonality between actors. Probing commonality in the case of Russia-EU interaction is a step towards achieving this (to be dealt in the introductory part of this dissertation). And second this work makes an attempt to link the worldviews into some notions of a wider social structure. Therefore in contrasts to constructivists, the work in question shall pursue a path of more material structure by invoking the concept of ‘situated actors’²⁷. Therefore, the analysis would concentrate on how the multitude of different power resources between the Russia-EU interactions. This move is very much in line with the theoretical complementarity and it will enable the work to proceed towards the realist tenants without considering it on its

²⁷ It means an actor’s action being determined by political, economic and strategic context within which it is situated.

face value. (That much relevance of power is considered as has been incorporated while defining institutionalist research programme).

According to **Colin Hay** in **'Theory and Methods in Political Science'**, he defines 'situated actor' is an intentional agent that is located in structured social context which defines the range of the agent's potential actions the logic of situated actors shares certain characteristics with 'structurisation' a term coined by Anthony Giddens. From the perspective of IR theorizing 'structurisation' is not new. For example, Waltzian's neorealism is an international system, which is formed through interaction at the unit level but which nevertheless acquires a life of its own, constraining and enabling the states which constitute the system. Wendtian constructivism also explicitly adopts structurisation as one of its main theoretical starting points.²⁸ But studying co-constitution of the agents and the structures creates very difficult epistemological and methodological problems indeed. Instead it should be asked whether and to what extent it is the structure or the agent that can be seen as primary in explaining international life. This dissertation has taken a stance of favoring agent over structure. But this choice is little modified by the acknowledgement that as 'situated actors' both Russia-European Union are constrained by the structure of the international system in their policies and interaction.

Jon Elster, in his book **'Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences'** captured the logic of situated actors by arguing how 'actions are explained by opportunities (people can do) and desires (people want to do). **Sten Rynning** **'understands the European Union's External Relations'** has spoken about 'vision' and 'material power' as the key dimensions of a strategic actor. An actor's desire is in turn dictated by their perceptions concerning the given situation which in turn largely rests on the worldviews of the individual actors. By contrasts, what they actually can do and often end up doing emerges from the interplay between the actor's desire (ultimately rests on the worldviews) and the constraining qualities of the wider social structures. Therefore differences in

²⁸ Neorealist argues that structural constraints like observation, nature, rules that guides social action has its impact over the agent's strategies and motivations. And constructivists recognize structural constraints on state actors but actors also transform structures by thinking about them and acting on them in new ways.

commonality and underlying worldviews are imperative and it is prudent to understand the accounts for the potential changes in worldviews and their changing salience.

Change in worldviews comes from three sources: changes in knowledge (learning) which has already been explained and changes in relative power capacities (structure).thus although worldviews are important in their own right, power matters a great deal as well. In fact the salience of worldviews is always conditioned by material factors. To be precise, in cases where competing claims concerning the normative content of an international institution exist, there also exist pressure, or at least potentials for change. And when such differences exist, the initial differences and the consequent shifts in the distribution of power invariably manifest themselves in commensurate changes in the content and the nature of international institutions. thus, institutional change must be understood as a dynamic complex stemming from the differences in worldviews and the power asymmetries that enable one party or another to effect change in the existing institutional arrangements (structure).**Henry Goverde**, in the book **‘General Introduction : Power in Politics’** enumerated that the study political power can be conceptualized in different approaches, ranging from the traditional understandings of power that particular agents have ‘over’ other agents to ‘postmodern congeries of complex circuits of power swirling through social life.’ **John Stoessinger** in **‘The nature of Nation-State and the concept of politics’** has reckoned relational concept of power (contextually).according to him, power stems from a host of tangible (geography, natural resources population and government) but also intangible (national character, morale, ideology and leadership) resources. Power only comes into effect in actual circumstances and in conjunction with other actors with their own capabilities and agendas.

The role of coercion is an important component power. Its exercise always entails the overcoming of resistance. Without coercion power application holds no validity and assumed a meaning of different phenomenon which can be termed as persuasions or attractions. Instead while analyzing the power; another side of the equation should be included. In other words, it is not enough to probe the degree of a given actor’s ability (capacity) to affect others. Rather it is equally important to take into consideration those other actor’s ability resist the power. John Galbrith calls it ‘the dialectic of power’ or ‘the

role of resistance to the application of power....'in fact gabrilth goes as far as suggesting 'a rule' according to which all manifestation of power will invariably attract an opposite although such implication of power from the resistant may not be of equal valor to that of the applicator of power. This means that in the last instance, a useful power analysis can be carried out only in conjunction with actual cases where power is being applied and the 'dialectics of power' is being played out.

Hard power

Military power is the hard core power. It is the currency that has traditionally been playing the primary role in international relations. Although both Russia-EU do engage in a dialogue that deals with issues of foreign, political, security and defense policy, the hard capabilities do not factor as such in their interaction. For example, not once has the use of military force been brought up in the context of the Russia-EU relationship. Russia's choice is dictated first by a certain economic reality and the mutual economic complementarities. The key challenge for Dmitriy Medvedev and his administration is whether Russia can modernize without destroying its power base, which is the product of the past. Nevertheless the question of hard power deserves a mention. It is not entirely inconceivable that its salience could grow in the future, especially if the EU proceeds to develop its own military capabilities and even collective defense. also the Russo-Georgian conflict in August 2008 showed that Moscow will not shy away from using military force to protect its interests if necessary moreover, the question of hard power might also have latent dimensions to it, especially as the Russian preponderance in terms of nuclear weapons could act as a psychological factor, increasing Russian prestige in the eyes of the EU while also boosting Russian self-confidence in certain respects. Probable military unevenness in the process of interaction between Russia-EU in turn will have impact on the supremacy of normativism of an actor over the other prospectively.

Market Power

Market power includes economic power. It is an instrument of economic statecraft²⁹ as David Baldwin liked to put it. However Baldwin has also noted the fact that economic statecraft is more than economic power, as it includes the possibility to include or exclude other actors in one's own market and also entails the possibility of framing the terms of reference within which such market access will take place. The value of an incentive depends on a recipient's perceptions of the situation and the baseline of previous expectations. The intended beneficiaries of an incentive offer will always be the final judge of its effectiveness, which makes the assessment of a recipient's subjective feelings crucial to the prospects of success. One often finds a kind of bilateral deal in which it can exercise economic power in an overwhelming way. Often the EU did not indulge in actual trade negotiations but imposing its pre-agreed positions on its partners (application of anti-dumping and other protective measures against key Russian industries). It is believed by many scholars that the external commercial policies of the EU are determined by the overarching need to construct "Europe" by defining its internal and external identity through relations with non-Europeans.

The discrepancy in economic power between Russia and the EU is striking and at least at first sight it would appear that Russia is indeed heavily dependent on the union. The overall trade between them accounts for 52.3%. The EU exported €105 billion of goods to Russia in 2008 and Russia exported €173, 2 billion to the EU. Also, EU exports to Russia are diversified and they include machinery and transport equipment, chemicals, manufactured goods and food and live animals (European Commission). However, Russia's seemingly strong asymmetric dependence on the EU is to a degree balanced by the fact that nearly 70 percent of Russia's exports to the union consist of oil, gas and other raw materials. Key commodities for Russia could at least potentially find new customers for its resources. However, the critical role of infrastructure, especially gas and oil pipelines, as a factor constraining the Russian freedom of manoeuvre, which in essence results in a situation of rather high interdependence. Recently, however, Russia has started

²⁹ Economic statecraft is often utilized to exercise economic power. It is the power in which the causal condition of success is an economic base value.

to take step towards diversifying its customer base, for example Russia and India have established a new milestone in bilateral trade and economic relations. Russia is also reducing its perceived dependence on European transit facilities like the new flagship Primorsk port near St. Petersburg (Baltic Pipeline System). The BPS gives Russia a direct outlet to northern European markets, allowing the country to reduce its dependence on transit routes through Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. However, EU is largest single market in the world and this gives it leverage higher than Russia. Until Russia is accruing membership in the WTO it is unlikely that Russia can score much brownie point in the process of institutionalization.

Normal Power

The concept of power as discussed so far is very much revolves around the Lukesian first dimension of power³⁰. the power to secure outcomes despite the opposite of others. Another facet of power is the power to determine the conditions and the ways under which the eventual struggles are conducted. There is nothing particular 'soft' in the application of this power, (the concept of 'soft' power has been evolved by Joseph Nye) the ability to frame the very nature of issues and the resultant interaction in certain ways is a very robust form of power indeed. According to Ian **Manners book 'The concept of Normative Power in World Politics'**, EU normative power stems from its ability to shape conception of, normal, in international relations'. For him, the notion of normative power Europe was never a primarily analytical device but a normative one. Therefore Mannersian idea of normative power needs to be clarified to give it a more analytical approach. The scheme of normativism is based on too passive an understanding of the EU as a norm entrepreneur in international relations. Instead of relying on passive diffusion alone, the EU is taking more measures in promoting its norms and values. This is so especially in Europe, where the Union's enlargement can be seen as a main instrument of its normative power. In fact, the EU can be envisaged as a regional normative hegemony that is using its economic and normative clout to build a set of

³⁰ Lukes's 'first dimension' is characterized by open disagreements or acts of persuasion where one actor succeeds in securing domination through decisions that are positive with respect to their own values or interest position.

highly asymmetrical bilateral relationships that help to facilitate an active transference of its norms. As the fact has already cultured retrospectively, an actors normative power does not operate in vacuum. Its application is always played out in the wider constitution of international society as well as in conjunction with normative power is always dependent also on the efficacy of other forms of power.

Weakness Power

Thomas Schelling in **'The Strategy of Conflict'** wrote that weakness is the most curious kind of power. To him, if power is underlined by the statement that power has the capacity of securing certain outcomes, then weakness can also be seen as a form of power or at least of influence. This seems to apply in the case of Russia, where repeatedly in the course of Soviet history Russia has been able to obtain scores of concessions from other powers precisely because of its weakness and the potentially disastrous instability that continuation of the weaknesses might bring. Russia has used the instrumental manipulation of external environment concerns over the poisonous Soviet environmental legacy to enhance its negotiation position in relation to certain key western actors and donors. It can be said that Russia continues to pose perhaps the biggest potential security threat to the West; its bargaining power is consequentially 'far above the average'. For example, for some years, the United States negotiated with Poland and the Czech Republic for the deployment of interceptor missiles and a radar tracking system in the two countries. In response, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin claimed that such a deployment could lead to a new arms race and could enhance the likelihood of mutual destruction. On 14 July 2007, Russia gave notice of its intention to suspend the CFE treaty and in September 2009, US President Barack Obama announced that the planned deployment of long-range missile defense interceptors and equipment in Poland and the Czech Republic was not to go forward.

A useful way of understanding the mechanism through which weakness power might operate comes from the literature concerning interdependence. Usually the concept has

been associated strictly with economic linkages and consequent interdependence.³¹ But **Peter Willetts** in his book **‘The Politics of Global Issues: Cognitive Actor Dependence and Issue Linkage’** argued that defining ‘Interdependence’ within the precinct of economics need not to be a sticking factor rather the definition of interdependence can be relaxed to allow for other facets of international life to be included in its analysis. According to Willetts ‘sensitivity’ and ‘vulnerability’ that is identified with interdependence can be understood as follows;

‘Sensibility’ is essentially a short-term phenomenon: exposed to externally induced costs before there has been time and opportunity to initiate remedial policies.

‘Vulnerability’ being the continued exposure to such externally induced costs even after remedial policies have been sought and implemented.

It is this difference between sensibility and vulnerability that makes the former particularly pertinent in understanding the operation of weakness power. It is only against sensibility interdependence that one can seek remedies or protection. this can entail trying to insulate or shield oneself from the source of negative externalities or seeking to engage it by offering help, concessions and other incentives to overcome the problem. Therefore, according to Willetts, “sensibility derived weakness power will be a function of three features ; the immediacy of the effect of the pertinent external development upon the dependent actor, the salience of the affected actor and finally the short-term adaptability of the actor in the face of problems created by the given development. Each of these aspects of sensitivity, it should be noted, rest both upon objective features of the situation in which actors find them and upon their subjectivity-based perceptions and policy orientations”.

³¹ According to Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, interdependence is characterized not merely by economic interconnectedness, but by economic relations that are mutually costly to break. States are said to be vulnerable if they would suffer significant long-term costs if normal economic relations were to be disrupted, but only sensitive if policy options are available to them that would mitigate long-term costs. In other words, economic interdependence refers to the importance of economic relations to national economies and the magnitude of costs that would accrue in the event of their termination.

It is only in conjunction with actual cases that we can ascertain its existence and the potential effect it might have. There is no independent way of gauging the weakness power of any given actor.

This broad outlines and contours of power are not entirely without their significance. They gave us rough estimation of the overall playing field between the actors within which the individual encounters will then be acted upon. Therefore explaining the 'dialectics of power' within the context of Russia-EU interactions is significant. Therefore in conclusion, this chapter contends that in order to probe commonality in Russia-EU relations the strict notions of actor's rationality in the institutionalists research programme has been relaxed. This was done by adopting the concept of contextual rationality which allows for a subjective element to be inculcated within the paradigm of utility-maximizing nation of actors. Although, contextual rationality do not deny actors self-interests in making choices in decision making process, but this utilitarian rationality of an actor is modified by the implications of worldviews that involves both the actors cognitive capacity and their presumed ability to absorb existing situation at hand (world) the existing of differences in worldviews makes the study meaningful to talk about variance in commonality concerning the normative foundation of the Russia-EU relations.

In this dissertation the method of study is to develop a version of frame analysis that will be used to uncover the potential differences in underlying worldviews between Russia and European Union. Basically the work at hand falls within the precincts of the qualitative studies. Qualitative study is most appropriately employed where the aim of research is to explore people's subjective experiences and the meaning that they attach to those experiences. In a study of worldviews, the qualitative method is therefore a natural starting point. In order to ensure a good 'fit' between theory and method, the method of retrodution will be applied. Retrodution method will show how different theoretical facets and the empirical part actually fit together. Finally, the methodology will be completed by applying 'case study' method. A case study is conducive to theory development as well as helps in understanding the empirical question.

Methodology

Methodological reflection includes more than mere technical information concerning data collection and analysis. It is part and parcel of the basic conceptual work related to doing social scientific research in general and should be seen as an integral part of theorizing and a conscious choice made in favour of one or many methods in the light of ontological and epistemological assumptions and choices made. According to **Alexander George's** and **Andrew Bennet's** book named "**Case Study and Theory Development in Social Sciences**" said that "an essential and prerequisite for choosing a method is therefore that it is based on a sufficiently good 'fit' between the theory on the one hand and the empirical on the other." To put it simply, method is the bridge that binds the empirical with the conceptual and helps the researchers to derive the right conclusions and meanings out of the sea of raw data.

In order to ensure close 'fit' between theory and method a retroductive approach³² has been adopted in this dissertation. Retroduction is very closely related to the critical scientific realism³³. The reason for choosing the retroduction as the logic of inquiry stems from the fact that one of its central features is the ability to seek to combine different methods in a single work. In the present context this will entail combining a version of 'Frame Method'³⁴ that will enable in probing the degree of commonality with a 'Case study Method'³⁵ that is helpful in assessing the actual salience of the potentially diverging worldviews in the light of actual institutionalized practices between the Russia and EU.

Unlike deductive reasoning, retroduction is synthetic as it makes claim that do not follow logically from the premises. According to the **book 'Approaches to Social Enquiry'** by

³³ Even critical scientific realism capitalizes on asserting both transcendental realism and critical naturalism in understanding both the natural and human society.

³⁴ Frame analysis involves looking for patterns in the way political actors collectively put forward particular views of the certain issues they are engaging and for way(s) in which contending frames might be impeding communication between or among policy-relevant groups.

³⁵ Case study methods involve an in-depth, longitudinal (over a long period of time) examination of a single instance or event: a case.

Norman Blaikie, “Retroduction proposes something that may not have been observed or could not be observed directly....while involving a process of reasoning, it does not lead to certainty; it culminates in finding a solution to the research problem”.

The way of arriving at this solution is through what Charles Pierce called ‘colligation’³⁶: by drawing together observations one is in the end overwhelmed by an organizing principles or idea arising from the empirical data. According to Pierce, writes Blaikie, “The sensation is so strong that it cannot be resisted”. Although there is something rather metaphysical about Pierce description of how one arrives at this organizing idea, but it cannot be denied that intuition does play a role in hypothesis formation. For example Karl Polanyi emphasizes the role of intuition and tacit knowledge in science. This in fact is in line with Karl Popper’s suggestion that researchers should put forward unusual or even outrageous hypotheses. **Kenneth Waltz** in his book ‘**Theory of International Politics**’ too, has noted “how theories cannot be constructed through the induction alone, for theoretical notions can only be invented not discovered.”

1. According to Blaikie, “one should however keep in mind the theory-laden nature of all observation when thinking about the role of colligation in hypothesis formation. Unlike induction, retroduction does not take place in a conceptual vacuum but the process of becoming overwhelmed by the organizing principle (the hypothesis) is in fact guided by the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the theoretical framework.” to him, a hypothesis, must satisfy following criteria:
2. It must eliminate the puzzlement that arises from observation/s. In this work, the puzzle is treated first by accepting and then put to test the notion of the divergent value system being the main cause of problem in institutionalization between Russia and EU.
3. It must answer the research question. The research question in this dissertation is: can the differences in the degree of commonality concerning the normative

³⁶ To Pierce the first step to inference is to bring together certain propositions which we believe to be true but have not been hitherto considered unitedly because the inference is new in concept. This step of conjoining various notions is called colligation.

foundation of the Russia-EU institution be used in explaining the recurring difficulties in the Russia-EU relationship? By referring to the documentation between the two nations (PCA) in the introductory part itself, an attempt is drawn to reflect the institutional endeavor between the parties and simultaneously focusing the point of irk that volatiles the Russia-EU relationship.

4. It must be testable. The differences in worldviews of both Russia and EU has been put to task by the help of retroduction, frame method and case-study analysis (case study has been dealt in the second and third chapter).

Retroduction is based on the idea of constructing hypothetical models that seek to uncover the observable and real structures and mechanisms that lie behind the observed empirical phenomena. According to Roy Bhaskar,

“ the construction of an explanation for....some identified phenomenon will involve the building of a model, utilizing such cognitive materials and operating under the control of something like a logic of analogy and metaphor of a mechanism, which if it were to exist and act in the postulated way would account for the phenomenon in question...the reality of the postulated explanation must then of course be subjected to empirical scrutiny...once this is done the explanation must then in principle itself be explained. and so one has in science a three-phase schema of development in which in a continuing dialectic, science identifies a phenomenon (or range of phenomena), constructs explanations, leading to the identification of the generative mechanism at work, which now becomes the phenomenon to be explained, and so on. “

Martin Hollis and Steve Smith writes in the book **“Explaining and Understanding International Relations”** that in essence, retroduction and the wider scientific worldview of critical realism that informs it transcend the traditional description/explanation dichotomy in the (social) sciences. For critical realists ‘the answer to why question (to request for the causal explanations) requires answer to how and what questions as well’. In order to understand why a certain event change in the previous state of affairs took place, it is important to understand what changed and how it happen .hence arriving at an adequate explanation requires first grasping of the natures and essence of things which is firmly rooted in the descriptive mode of reasoning.

Therefore according to Blaikie, as a research strategy, retrodution is cyclical involving seven consecutive steps which when taken together have the potential to form an adequate explanation of the phenomenon at hand:

1. In order to explain observable phenomena (recurring difficulties in the Russia-EU relation) and the regularities that obtain between them (attempt of cooperation), scientists must attempt to discover appropriate structures and mechanisms (difference of worldviews).
2. Since these structures and mechanisms will typically be unavailable to observation, we first construct a model of them (dealing PCA and strategy document), often drawing upon already familiar sources.
3. The model is such that, were it to represent correctly these structures and mechanism, the phenomena would then be causally explained ('political conditionality' attached to the process of cooperation).
4. The work then proceeds to test the model as a hypothetical description of actually existing entities and their relations. To do so, the dissertation works out further consequences of the model that can be further stated in a manner open to empirical testing (differences between Russia and EU with regards to the human rights promotion).
5. If these tests are successful, this gives good reason to belief in the existence of these structures and mechanisms.
6. It may be possible to obtain more direct confirmation of these existential claims by the development and use of suitable instruments (frame method other than the case-study).
7. The whole process of model building may then be repeated in order to explain the structures and mechanisms already discovered.

However **Russel Keat** and **John Urry** in the book **“Social Theory and Science”** have noted that for the realists a model is only a relatively early stage in actual theory-building, when its status as a correct representation of reality is still highly speculative. It is only

through rigorous testing and the consequent improvement of the theoretical model that the researcher can hope to manage to explain the phenomenon in question.

This work is a qualitative study. The use of retroduction as a primary methodological tool allows countering at least some of the criticisms leveled at the use of qualitative methods. Usually the criticism has stemmed from two sources in the main;

1. It is seen at producing unrepresentative and atypical case studies mere 'snapshots' of the world that do not yield reliable generalizations, which are after all the aim of the (positivist) conception of science and
2. It is seen as inherently unreliable method. The process of drawing inferences usually remains hidden and validity of the method is thus almost impossible to assess externally.

In essence, qualitative methods produce 'soft' and unscientific results. Perhaps the most pejorative appraisal of aspirations of generalization has come from the qualitative researcher Norman K. Denzin's words:

"The interpretive rejects generalization as a goal...every instance of social interaction, if thickly described, represents a slice from the life world...[that] carries layers of meaning, nuance, substance and fabric and these layers comes in multiples and are often contradictory...every topic of investigation must be seen as carrying its own logic, sense of order, structure and meaning."

However, accepting this would rob social scientific enterprise of its rationale and very meaning. A more suitable way of thinking about the issue is to admit that qualitative studies always work at two levels simultaneously: they are both particular and general. By offering detailed snapshots of a particular case they reveal something of the wider social pattern as well. Therefore with the application of the retroduction process the study at hand receives an internal rigor that is often lacking in other qualitative method. It also makes the logic of drawing inference from the research question via theory and method all the way to the empirical data and that at least in principle opens the door for more reliable critical evaluation and reflection.

With regards to the point of generalization, it can be said that the level of most fruitful generalization is not necessarily to be found at the level of empirical. Instead, it is at the level of theory that one can expect the prospects of generalizability to be strongest. **Robert E. Stake's** in his book **“Case Study Method in Social Inquiry”** argues that, case study researchers should concentrate not on providing generalizations but rather on properly describing the case studied, so that its unique features can be captured and conveyed to others. By referring Lincoln and Guba, Stakes writes that the only choices for the researchers should not be between “broad gnomic generalizations” and “unique, particularized knowledge” and that there are “some ways of stating outcomes that might hold in one Context that has already been ‘discovered’ in another Context. They enquire what could be the “bases for transferability, if not of generalization, from one context to another”. Lincoln and Guba suggested the notion of ‘fittingness’. They defined it as “the degree of congruence between sending and receiving contexts”, and also noted that “if the two Contexts are ‘sufficiently’ congruent, then working hypotheses from the sending originating context may be applicable in the receiving context”. To achieve this, Lincoln and Guba advocated ‘thick description’ of cases in the sense Geertz, Clifford³⁷ used it in anthropology. Similarly, Lincoln and Guba argue that the researchers should provide substantial contextual information and enough detail on the unit of analysis, so that other researchers may judge the degree of fit and whether the study of the case and context in hand offers any knowledge which can be transferred to the study of other cases and context. They called this ‘fittingness’ which according to them is a more fruitful way of thinking about the wider applicability of qualitative findings than generalization which are more suited to ‘context-free’ natural science. By contrast, fittingness amounts to a conscious analysis of a case making it suitable for other researchers to take interests when dealing with other cases. This implies recognizing contextual nature of human behavior and the fact that any attempt to generalize in a qualitative study can be achieved by improving fittingness.

³⁷ According to Geertz, thick description of human behavior is one that explains not just the behavior, but also its context and symbolic importance, so that the behavior becomes meaningful to an outsider.

Thus, in the rest of the work the analysis will follow two tracks. First, a frame analysis is used to uncover potential differences concerning commonality between the Russia and EU. This is followed by a case-study method whereby the interaction between the two is examined with a view to assessing the salience of these differences and ascertaining what the real life practices that are constantly evolving asserts about the actual logic of interaction be it sovereign or be it post-sovereign between the two.

Marcus Jachtenfuchs in his book **“International Policy-Making as a Learning Process”** writes that in international relations the frame method has been used only fairly recently. By comparison, it already has an established pedigree in organization studies, communication and public opinion studies, critical geopolitics, environment policy and social movement studies. Previously, the frame method has been employed mainly in two different ways.

First, frames has been seen as the heuristics through which actors themselves make sense of any kind of social situation³⁸.this is also the way in which Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahnemann, the creator of the concept of cognitive science originally saw the role of frames as a source of psychological mistakes affecting and tainting the rational decision-making of individuals. This way of ‘framing’ the frames however, emphasis their aberrational nature which has led to an unfortunate discounting of cognitive factors in IR theory as ‘irrational’ and consequently not worthy of serious study.

Second, frames have also been envisaged as collective action frames, or deliberate mental constructs that actors employ in order to promote specific worldviews in the hope of affecting their strategic interaction. This interpretation is in line with constructivist reasoning, in which inter-subjective understandings and shared identities emerge.

For the purpose of the present study that is to answer the research question, the frames method is used in a third way as a diagnostic tool in order to find out whether the model we have arrived at through retrodution is indeed correct and to locate the possible differences in underlying worldviews between Russia and EU. It is in this crucial respect

³⁸ The concept here is coming close to the notion of contextual rationality

that the way the frames are employed in this study differs from the two mainstream applications above: it is not the actors themselves but the researcher that is granted subjectivity in devising the frames. Hence, frames are employed only as a diagnostic tool that helps the researcher to uncover whether the differences in commonality postulated by the hypothesis do indeed exist. In this respect, the version of frame method adopted in this work has certain similarities with qualitative content analysis (because this kind of content analysis focuses on investigating the ‘object’ of the research).

Recapping the theoretical assumption it can be said that the work deals with the question of whether the recurring problems in the Russia-EU relationship are due to the fact that the understandings concerning the normative foundation and the actual institutionalized practices are not shared equally by the partners. The theoretical model postulates that the varying degree of commonality (that is the degree to which expectations about the appropriate behavior and understanding of how to interpret actions are shared by the participants in the system) can be used in explaining the problems the two sides are facing in developing institutionalized cooperation. Although the problem of commonality can be seen as endogenous to all institutional arrangements, it is assumed that its relevance is underlined by the fact that the Russia-EU relationship can be understood as a post-sovereign international institution, which increases the scope for misunderstandings and disputes over what the institution is and should be about. Furthermore, the theory assumes that the possible differences in commonality between the Russia and EU are not merely superficial or tactical (in other words, only reflection of conflicting material interests) but are ingrained in their respective worldviews (values like democracy, human rights.)

Two starting points have to be kept in mind when referring to the frame analysis in the present case.

First, there is no direct or immediate access to be gained to the cognitive process concerning the underlying worldviews in the case of either Russia or the EU. In order to

be realistic in our aims it is admitted here that the only medium through which it is possible to access the potential differences in these worldviews is an indirect one, namely an examination of the assertion that the actors put forward concerning various issues at stake. In this respect the frame-method is chosen precisely for the reason that it has been found useful in uncovering the underlying logics, such as worldviews, actors might have. As Jachtenfuchs argued by not taking the interests as given (as the rationalistic models often do), but putting them into the very centre of the examination, the frame method offers a means of accessing the ways in which the issues (interests, problems etc.) at stake are perceived by the actors themselves. In this view, the most convenient way of accessing the role of commonality between Russia and EU is to compare is to how in their assertions, they frame their interaction in the context of actual issues and cases. Doing so shifts the focus from the monolithic worldviews (same pattern of belief system) to contextual frames (different pattern of belief-system) that vary over time and place. However, it is important to keep in mind that these frames flow from or are embedded in the worldviews only thus, enabling to recognize differences in worldviews. This is equivalent of the Geertzian 'microscopic scope of thick description'. According to him, "it is the microscopic behavior must be attended to, and with some exactness, because it is through the flow of behavior- or, more precisely, social action- that cultural forms find articulation....whatever, or wherever, symbol system in their own terms may be, we gain empirical access to them by inspecting events, not by arranging abstracted entities into unified pattern."

Second, there is no theory-independent way to assess the content of the assertions the actors made. Unlike the group of behaviouristically inclined IR scholars in the 1960's, this work do not simply say with certainty that the worldviews in question 'can be sought, discovered, sorted, compared, analyzed and assessed'. Instead it is only in the light of a theory that one can give the seemingly disconnected utterances their meaning and assess their relevance. Therefore, this dissertation is grappling with two sets of questions: practical and principled.

The first principled question deals with the so-called antecedents of content. This work is tackling with the assertions made by both Russia and EU from time to time while

discussing various issues in order to make inferences about underlying worldviews that reside behind the assertions made. Often attempts at going beyond the manifest content (actual content or the opinion that has been openly put forward by the actors) in content analysis has been severely criticized by various scholars. but the requirement for the latent content analysis in this work (that is to go beyond the manifest analysis) has from the rigid criteria for objectivity in the coding process³⁹ of manifest analysis, as content stemmed analysis has traditionally being used as quantitative technique. For the porpoise of this work objectivity analysis is not prudent course of action as more qualitative action is adopted here. In qualitative method less objective role is readily accepted giving room for maneuver required to move back and forth between manifest and latent content analysis of the assertions of the actors⁴⁰. However the research can not be ideally be left only at the mercy of the researcher alone. Therefore various scholars like M.Q Patton, E.G Gauba, Y.S Lincoln and N.K Denzin has referred to the concept of 'validity' and 'Reliability' in the qualitative research. However, owing to the logistical limitation of this research, the credibility of this work is left to the empirical citation reflecting different worldviews between Russia and EU.

The second principled question stems from the first and relates to the potential problem of circularity in reasoning. in fact, the problem of using meaning derived from the behavior of the actors in question in explaining their actions is one of the main weaknesses of what Shapiro has called 'interpretive accounts' in human sciences and at first sight it may seem that frame analysis is in the danger of lurching into the same pitfall. Therefore and although the frame method has its merits, it is only a descriptive tool and as such sufficient only in the 'understanding' side of the understanding/explaining dichotomy. using the frame method in this weak form is not only permissible but the only possible way to identify the existence of the underlying worldviews that this paper is interested in. that said, it is important to emphasize that the

³⁹ Coding is a process for both categorizing qualitative data and for describing the implications and details of these categories

⁴⁰ Even in the case of more traditional content analysis. Ole Holsti has suggested that we need to make the distinction between the coding where one must strictly stick to the manifest content and interpretation where the investigator is free to use all of his power of his imagination and intuition to draw meaningful conclusions from the data.

difference perhaps uncovered through the use of frame method alone cannot be used in explaining the problems in Russia-EU interaction. In the words of **Peter Schmidt**, 'general attitude [worldviews] has no direct effects at all on behavior. But, they have important indirect effects by affecting the framing process that structures any choice situation'. (**The Impact of General Attitude on Decision: A Framing Approach**) Therefore the salience of the possible differences in the worldviews has to be established and explained through and not merely assumed. And the only way to ascertain the salience of these differences is to look at the institutional practices and the bargaining and the possible power differentials that emerge from Russia-EU interaction in the light of the actual cases. This is where the second step in the research process comes into existence- Case Study.

According to **Arend Lijphart's 'Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method'** there are at least six different types of case studies of these the present study is interested in interpretive and hypothesis-generating case studies. That said, the work can by no means be dubbed atheoretical as it seeks to put forward a set of theoretical as well as meta-theoretical propositions that are expected to have validity also across cases in the future for example while dealing with the border conflict between Russia and EU. However this work has not referred to such case and it is interested in dealing a single case of Russia-EU interactions.

The practical side of the research deals with sampling that is defined in terms of identifying the key players to be analyzed. Sampling is the key stages where the validity of the given approach is most crucially affected. In this work selecting communication sources is most important. North suggested that they should be the key decision makers. It means that the persons/agent responsible for binding their country by committing resources in pursuit of goals on the international level'. They dissertation has two relevant players-Russia and European Union. The institutional structure of Russia:

The President and Presidential Administration

Traditionally the president has been the locus of Russian Foreign policy decision-making. This was already the case under the latter part of the Boris Yeltsin's presidency and trend was only strengthened during Vladimir Putin's tenure. More recently, under the new president, Dmitri Medvedev, there has been a sign that the decision-making might be moving away from the president towards the government, which is now headed by Putin as the prime minister. The presidential Administration- which incidentally, is housed in the former offices of the communist party of Central Committee is the true national government, ultimately responsible for the strategic guidance of the Russian politics, both domestic and foreign.

The Security Council

The Security Council is a weekly meeting of the key Russian figures dealing with foreign affairs and national security. It is an exclusive tool for the president who enjoys the privilege of appointing its members. Although originally intended to act as a Politburo of sorts in foreign and security matters, the Security Council has practically never played a key role in Russian foreign policy. During Putin's tenure, however, the profile of the Security Council was upgraded. But once we are faced with rather secretive and closed nature of decision-making in Russian foreign policy.

The Foreign Minister and Foreign Ministry

Officially entrusted with the implementation of presidential foreign policy, at times foreign ministers have become powerful figures in their own right. This was the case especially when Andrei Kozyrev and Yefgeny Primakov were foreign ministers. The foreign ministry and its officials can be seen as influential figures especially when it comes to Russia's relations with the EU.

Other Governmental Figures

Traditionally, prime ministers in Russia have been fairly insignificant implementers of the presidential directives. More recently, however, since Putin became prime minister, the authority and the power of the office have grown immensely and it has assumed a

The Council of the European Union:

The Council of the European Union is the institution in the legislature of the European Union (EU) representing the governments of member states, the other legislative body being the European Parliament. On certain areas of policy, such as foreign affairs, the Council is the sole decision-maker of the EU. The Council of the European Union is the institution in the legislature of the European Union (EU) representing the governments of member states, the other legislative body being the European Parliament. On certain areas of policy, such as foreign affairs, the Council is the sole decision-maker of the EU.

The Council also comprises the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, better known as Council Secretariat, assists the Council of the European Union, its Presidency and the President of the European Council. The respective Secretariats of the Western European Union, Schengen Agreement and European Political Cooperation have in recent years been integrated with the Council Secretariat. The Council Secretariat plays an important role in the EU's intergovernmental conferences (IGC), because it provides the IGC Secretariat. Apart from legal advice, it also tries to be an honest broker among member states. Close observers have argued that the Council Secretariat, together with the Presidency, is the most important actor in the IGC. The Council Secretariat plays a particularly important role when it comes to the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defense Policy. Because the member states were afraid of losing sovereignty to the supranational European Commission, they have instead delegated authority to the Council Secretariat in this policy area. Within the Secretariat's directorates there are a substantial number of people working on foreign policy issues.

The Commission

Although the Commission works as collegiums, not all the Director-Generals are equally important. In this context two institutions can be highlighted, External Relations (RELEX) and External Trade. Together with the Council of the European Union (the Council), it forms the bicameral legislative branch of the EU and has been described as one of the most powerful legislatures in the world.

Actors Controlling the Executive

Only the European President warrants any discussions in this context. In particular its Committee on Foreign Affairs has been remarkably active in tabling several reports on EU relation with Russia. In addition, the plenary sessions of the parliament have been actively following developments in Russia, often inviting individual commissioners and member-state representatives to appear before the Parliament and accepting resolutions on Russia and the Union's relations with it.

After identifying the correct set of actors the work leans towards the kind of material that will be analyzed in this work. In essence with this present work, the frame method will analyze the documents (PCA and Strategic Papers). In this context documents must be understood in a broad manner as including all forms of official communications. Like, journals, speeches, news paper articles, editorials, government publications, treaties and agreements. For Gauba and Lincoln, documents are a 'natural' place to look for traces of underlying worldviews.

"Not only are they in fact an 'in context' source of information- that is, they arise from the context and exist in it -but they consist of information about the context....(d)ocuments records variety of...evidence about the environment and people's perceptions of it. They are thus repositories of well-grounded data on the events or situations under investigation."

The frames are constructed in this work by analyzing the assertions of the EU or Russia. Assertions are linguistic elements (article, text etc) that can be seen as containing a single interpretation related either to the normative foundation or to the actual institutionalization practices concerning Russia-EU relations. This assertion acts as a raw data out of which an actual assertion (difference in worldviews) can be built, at least theoretically. As such a frame can be presented in a single assertion or identifying one can require the combinations of several assertions. It is usually the task of the researcher to devise the frames with the ideal type⁴¹.

41 "An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual

At this juncture it is important to note that although the material to be analyzed consists of linguistic elements, this is not discourse analysis. Discourse analysis⁴² is interested in studying and uncovering the use of language in the social construction of reality. Accordingly, critical discourse analysts examine ‘discursive formation’ as one that produces knowledge of the world. This process is then connected ‘to the broader social and political processes of which they are part, enabling to discover the power configuration inherent in the discursive practices in the world. By contrast, the version of the frame method put forward here is merely interested in using language as a medium through which the differences in commonality between the two actors can identified and located. Hence there is no need to ‘deconstruct’ texts in a fairly cumbersome manner. Rather, establishing the possible differences is enough.

The version of frame method adopted in this work has some similarities with the content analysis which has been useful in gaining the ‘systematic information concerning the cognitive and evaluative or effective states of those persons whose decisions are binding upon the states they represent’. this is well in line with the present work which for reasons of epistemology can only approach worldviews at the level of individuals who act as a bearers content analysis, as traditionally, content analysis has been used in examining individuals. For Example, the attitudes of John Foster Dulles towards the Soviet Union have been analyzed by **O.R. Holsti**, in “**Enemies in Politics**” or the 1914 crisis that resulted in the First World War has been analyzed by a group of scholars using content analysis (**North, Holsti, M.George in Content Analysis: A Handbook With Application for the Study of International Crisis**).therefore with some modification the basic approach h to content analysis can be applied4 to the study of frames as well.

Usually content analysis is seen as involving the following stages:

phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct...”-Max Weber.

⁴² Discourse analysis or discourse studies, is a general term for a number of approaches to analyzing written, spoken, signed language use or any significant semiotic event. The objects of discourse analysis—discourse, conversation, communicative event, etc.—are variously defined in terms of coherent sequences of sentences, propositions, speech acts

First, the research question, theory, and hypotheses are formulated. The sample is then selected and the categories are defined. Next, documents are read and coded and then the items placed in each category may be scaled, whereupon counts in frequency or intensity are made. And finally, interpretations of the findings are made in light of the appropriate theory.

The first step is taken in the form of retroduction. The frame method (involves analyzing assertions) will take care of the subsequent steps. However because the work at hand is after all qualitative and not quantitative, the strict rules on scaling and counting are omitted from the approach employed here. The final step is however entirely applicable to the method chosen here. The categories in the frames are constructed and evaluated in the light of ideal types that are derived from the theoretical framework which informs the works. The ideal types are organized as pairs representing opposite's extremes of the traditional/ post-sovereign continuum of international institutions.

Finally, when analyzing assertions one is always forced to grapple with the question of data reliability that is their sincerity and their true value. It is unlikely that this work will be able to gain access to documents in which decision-makers' unburden themselves' in the forms of internal memoranda, personal diaries and such communications. The lack of such materials to build frames that will reveal something about the actor's underlying worldviews, the question of personal documents at times become mandatory. However, this work seeks to increase the reliability of the frame method by stressing the need for consistency in public assertion in two ways: Consistency between individuals and Consistency over times. If the underlying world views operate at the collective level, traces of them should be present in the assertions put forward by different individuals operating in the shared cultural milieu.

That said there is hardly any need to be too rigid about the requirement of consistency. As **Robert Jervis** has noted in the book **'Understanding Beliefs: Political Psychology'** that scholars value consistency while actual practitioners often have no trouble in accepting the contingent nature of the event and the consequent incongruence in their own action. At the same time a slightly forgiving stance is required in this respect

because the study not only is interested in locating certain static differences between actors but also aspires to find out whether there has been a change in them. Thus a particular case has been forwarded to show changing worldviews with regards to the value of human rights. The possibility of change brings a dynamic component in the dissertation any fixation or consistency in the methodology might deter detecting changing worldviews. The empirical part of the text has great deal of space to present samples showcasing the frames of the actors in question.

In a nutshell it can be said that this work seeks to explain and understand the Russia-EU institutional interaction and more specifically the differences in the level of commonality concerning its normative foundations. In other words this work in its introductory part itself deals with the nature of 'original' normative foundation of the institution as codified in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 1994 and concerning commonality: what was the biggest point of contention in the negotiating process of 1992-94.

Establishing this baseline is crucial for two important reasons: First, the PCA is a mutually agreed, negotiated, adopted and ratified document between the EU and Russia. As such it can be expected to provide a reliable snapshot concerning the way in which the main actors in this study were initially able to mutually frame their relationship at that time.

Second, the documents represent a useful baseline against which normative angles between Russia and EU can be compared.

How, if at all, the mutual expectation has hampered in other cases, has been a question that has been dealt in the discussion of the 'Strategy Documents' (chapter 2) between the actors. On a more concrete level the question lays what accounts for the difference in the worldviews? Is it change in perception that is learning and from which side or change in policy are the reflections of the structural factor like various configuration of powers-weak, economic, military- while underlying worldviews infact remaining the same. It will

show the differences in worldviews on ground and intermittent negligence in the consideration of such values giving way to the vested interests.

However, the differences in the commonality, namely in the degree of overlap in the understandings and expectations concerning the issues at hand and consequently in the wider underlying views in which they are grounded, do not take place in vacuum. But rather, they are based on the cognitive factors, especially learning. But on the other hand, the change in actual practices of a given institution, an actor has to have powers too change the rules of the game. This interpretation can also be turned the other way round. Changes in relative power will not affect the institutionalized practices unless the understandings and expectations concerning its content change.

Traditionally when seeking to answer the research question one could have followed two different avenues: see the problems as symptomatic of clashing material interests both Russia and EU have in different issue-areas or one can look for answer from the realm of ideas (essentially values and norms). However these two explanations must not necessarily be seen as being exclusive but as will be argued, while establishing the baseline between the two actors (PCA) that the ideas are embedded in wider worldviews that affects an actor's perceived interests which in turn effects the institutionalized interaction as a whole.

PCA: Establishing the baseline

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and the emergence of the Russia Federation as a sovereign entity in its stead resulted in a radically different political setting in Europe. This called for new policies on the part of the European community/ Union and Russia⁴³. For the community the most urgent challenge was to define a new agenda of substantial political reapproachment and economic integration that would ensure a modicum of orderly transition to a post Soviet era. For Russia the main task was to secure a firm place in the new emerging architecture in post cold-war Europe. With its

⁴³ The Maastricht treaty entered into force in November 1993, turning the European Community into the European Union. While referring to the events prior to that date, the term EC is used. After that 'community' is refer as the first pillar of the European Union.

provision on limited trade-related cooperation, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) that had been signed with the already frail Soviet Union in December 1989 was clearly inadequate for the task at hand. As **Heinz Timmermann** rightly said in the **Journal of 'Communist Politics'** ("**The Relation between Russia and European Union: Agreement on PCA**") that this was acknowledged by the community as early as the end of 1990 when the European Council instructed the commission to look for the possibilities for the broader agreement with the USSR that would include 'political dialogue and all aspects of a close economic as well as cultural cooperation.'

To be sure the interests, in the first instance were mainly a negative one. The reason, writes **Lippert Barbara** in '**The Former Soviet Union and European Security: between Integration and Disintegration**' is to prevent the further disintegration of the former Soviet space and the significant rise in the EC's responsibilities in the region that would obviously ensue. Therefore the policy line chosen was based on the need on the need to solidify a new and stable order in the post cold-war Europe. **Karen E Smith** in the book "**The Use of Political Conditionality in EU Relations with Third Countries: How Effective?**" has summoned up the EC's line of reasoning by arguing that its approach was to be based on economic aid that was intended to facilitate economic reforms: reforms would help reintegrate each country into the world economy and this would help create a new 'European regional security order'. In addition to this, one more piece of the puzzle was also certain: full accession into the EC was not on the cards especially for the cards of the former Soviet Union (FSU), with the notable exception of the three Baltic States.

Regardless of the membership perspectives the EC's policy line towards the east was based on the uniform assumptions that the eventual interaction and integration was to be based on common norms and values. This understanding followed logically from the developments at the end of cold war. The spirit of the age was 'the age of triumphalism' of western liberal values, mood that was captured by **Francis Fukuyama** in his '**End of History**' thesis. For Fukuyama, the third wave of democratization from the 1970s onwards showed that the ideal of liberal democracy remains the only coherent aspiration that spans different regions and cultures around the globe'. The collapse of Soviet Union

was part and parcel of this process, which would result in the further homogenisation of the world. Irrespective, of the possible flaw, what is nevertheless important is that Fukuyama did manage to capture in his book the zeitgeist⁴⁴ that informed the expectation towards the ‘new democracies’ and the eventual policies towards Eastern Europe, Russia included therefore the destination ahead was certain –liberal democracy and market economy and the road to be taken was that of transition to western liberal norms and values. It is against this backdrop that the Union’s enhanced attention to the role of political conditionality based on liberal principles in the Union’s relations with third parties during the post-cold war era becomes understandable. Despite the crucial differences in the nature of the community’s offer in the Partnership And Cooperation Agreement (PCA) and the Europe Agreement that resulted in EU accession, the, logic of arrangement is largely the same that is, with the offer being made conditional upon meeting the criteria put forward by the community itself in exchange for adherence to a set of ‘European Values’ (largely derived from several key charters of the United Nations, as well as EU’s own treaties) and the implementations of liberal economic programme. In essence in devising a dense network of bilateral relations with the countries in Eastern Europe, the community not only responded to the external demands but also showed strategic actorness by consciously seeking to impose its views about good governance on its new partners. Thus, it can be argued that the policy choices at the beginning of the 1990’s are the starting point for the current claim of the regional normative hegemony as exemplified best by the accession and European Neighbourhood Policy (NEP) processes.

Russia, for its part was facing an entirely different situation, grappling with the process of disintegration and essentially lacking a clear concept of national identity and consequently possessing rather dim understanding of its foreign policy priorities. Russia was also facing with rather mundane and pressing concern as it had to struggle with an economy that was in free fall leaving for a little room for long term strategic thinking. As a consequence, at the beginning of a 1992 Yeltsin and Kozyrev outlined the two fundamental principles of Russian foreign policy: to seek full membership of the

⁴⁴ This term refers to an era representing certain political, cultural ,ethical matrix.

'community of civilized states' and to gain maximum external support for Russia's attempt at political, economic and societal reforms (**Kozyrev, s 'Russia: A Chance of Survival' writes in 'Foreign Affairs'**). Seeking a place in the post cold war world would entail joining the civilization mainstream through accepting and even embracing the pre-existing normative agenda and the institutional framework of the west. In part, this stemmed from Yeltsin and his team's earlier decisions to undermine Gorbachev and seek recognition from the west by programmatically becoming everything that the western capitalist democracies could wish for. Yeltsin and his entourage were, in the word of **Mc Faul's book 'Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities'**, 'anti-communists, pro-market, pro-democracy, pro-west most important sought to dismember what Ronald Reagan once called the "evil empire". According to Mc Faul, these tactical choices then locked Yeltsin's Russia into embracing the same set of values at the beginning of its own sovereign existence. For example the first Foreign Policy Concept in 1993 made a reference to a 'common understanding of the main values of world civilization' upon which the search for common interests with foreign partners would consequently be built. Therefore it seems evident that at the time Russians themselves also believed that joining western values and institutions was the prudent and indeed the only available course of action for the country. or to be precise, there was a profound lack of understanding and knowledge concerning Russia's own national interests and worldviews, for which the substitute was to jump on the bandwagon of the western 'End Of History' triumphalism. in a sense, Gorbachev had re-steered Russians back into the fold of universal values and after the cold war this commitment was now operationalise by Yeltsin to entail the universality of western liberal values and applicability also in the Russian context.

But embracing certain principles common to all humanity did not imply that Russia wanted to lose its identity 'among our new friends', as the then Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrov noted back in February in 1992. Instead, the task at hand facing Russia was a duel one of becoming 'normal' democratic country while also preserving the original and unique contour of Russia. In fact, in a speech in April of the same year, Yeltsin likened Russian new stance to that of the tsarists westernizers whom while trying to catch up

with the modern world 'never meant "to imitate blindly other countries or import from abroad ready-made patterns for building a state and organizing the economy". Instead Russia is looking for its own mechanism of renewal by making good use of all of humanity's experiences' (Quoted in **Kozyrev's 'A Strategy for Partnership' in the journal 'International Affairs'**).

Thus at the beginning of 1990's there was a clear asymmetry between the Russia and EU; the Union was consolidating its actorness and relishing its role as the prime engine that set the pace for the emerging new European architecture. For its part, Russia was only beginning to rise from the ashes of the Soviet Union and was essentially a demandeur for economic assistance and political support with clear expectations of being placated for having ended the cold war. It was in this mood that the parties approached the negotiations concerning a new contractual basis for their relations in 1992.

According to **Michele Knodt's book 'Understanding the European Union's External Relations'** a useful way of characterising the initial situation between the parties is to use terminology developed in the context of so-called two level games. In international negotiations, actors are often forced to play in both domestic and international fora simultaneously. They are constrained both by what the negotiating parties are willing to accept at the international level and by what can be sold back home to the domestic audience. At the end of the day all politics is local and is played with the goal to procure salable outcomes. This factor in turn constrains the room for maneuver of the negotiator internationally.

Now where from the domestic constraints originate from? For **Robert Putnam's 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games'**, drawing from the rational choice theory asserts that the impediments to the so-called win-set of the given actors comes from compulsions from domestic and coalition politics. In essence it can be said that it is the diverging (material) interests between the different coalitions and their relative bargaining powers internally that dictates negotiator at international level. But for the sake of the work at hand it would be more convenient to modify and rather contend that in essence, the domestic preferences infact reflect the differences in

underlying worldviews and not a set of objectives interests of the given actors. Keeping in mind the basic differences in the structural situations of the two actors in mind, one could make a priori assumption that the EC's win-set (constrain on the power to internationally negotiate) would have been rather limited as the EC can be seen as having been in a situation where it could have effectively dictated its conditions to its interlocutor. Three reasons exist that justify this conclusion-

1. The EC was not a demandeur, as Russia was. Instead, for reasons explicated above, the community was clearly operating from position of economic, political, institutional and even moral strength.
2. In addition, EC owing to a multitude of challenges both external and internal making its capacity to engage Russia in a substantive way. Like, certain members within the community are opposed treating Russia too generously. This constraint EC's win-set further.
3. By contrasts, the dire nature of Russia's circumstances and the higher cost of failure lying at the Russia's side, it can be expected that Russia would have to settled for a much broader win-set in order to be able to accommodate the community's preponderant negotiating positions.

At the beginning of January 1992, the EC foreign ministers gathered in Brussels to assess the situation in the former USSR. The dissolution of the Soviet Union required a response, and it came in the form of a new framework of agreements to be negotiated with the 'emerging democracies' in the region. In essence the key position of the PCA in the context of Russia-EU relationship was based on market access in exchange for normative convergence in Russia. In early may 1992, the Commission announced the first blueprint for new agreements. The plan had four key features (**European Report No.1766, May, 1992**)

1. It envisages extending the new agreements to all the countries of the former Soviet Union (excluding the three Baltic States which had already been earmarked for different treatment in the form of the association and accession process)

2. The plan outlined the possibility of a gradual liberalization of trade throughout the former Soviet Union, started with the suspension of the quantitative restrictions followed by the introduction of the system of Generalised Preferences to these states.
3. The plan outlined the process of political dialogue that would take the new agreements well beyond the limits of the TCA.
4. And finally all these developments were to be made conditional not only on the continuation of economic reforms as previously but also and more substantially on the recognition of the Human Rights and a commitment to and respect for the principles of democracy.

Although, but even though agreement was reached in principles, several outstanding issues remained for the member states to agree upon. The role of political conditionality was one significant issue other than the level of trade openness, extension of European Investment Bank loan facilities etc. that has been hindering any plausible attempt to institutionalize Russia-EU relationship. But the negotiating process between Russia and EU remained intermittent due to difficulties and delays owing to Russia's refusal to accept any of EC's economical or political proposals at the face value⁴⁵. For the various EU members, the Russian's maneuvering around the issue of political conditionality was also seen as being particularly unacceptable as it would have undermine the consistency of these principles as the cornerstone of the Union's external activities and on the other hand, the EC's insistence on political conditionality was a source of concern for the Russians, resulting in difficulties in the evolution of any pattern of relationship between Russia and EU.

In order to access the significance of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in institutionalizing Russia-EU relations, it is imperative to understand the Trade and Cooperation Agreement of 1989. For the work at hand, the definitions of international institution can be gauged along four dimensions-its scope, the nature of contention,

⁴⁵ European Report Nos. 1816,28 November reflects that Russia stressed their commitment to the new relationships based on the negotiation on 25 November 1992 but expressed apprehension as to how 'any partnership can only develop on the basis of common political values'.

autonomy and the underlying logic of interaction. When viewed in the light of these dimensions, the TCA is well in line with more traditional international institution in all respects as; it was centered on single-issue-area like that of trade and commercial and economic cooperation. It made no reference to the values as a possible object of legitimate contention. It claimed no power of jurisdiction over the internal structures and domestics and policies of the parties, thus preserving their sovereignty in full and it made it clear that the logic of interaction was that of international are gaining based on and over the commercial interests of the contracting parties (TCA Articles 1,10,15,18).

Much like the TCA, PCA, too, is primarily and economic agreement. Each party is required to grant the other most favored nation (MFN) status. In essence, this means that the suppliers from the Russia or the EU must not be disadvantaged in the market of either side compared to competitors from other countries (except in textiles and steel). In addition, the two sides also agreed to guarantee freedom of transit for goods in their respective territories. But in comparison with the TCA, the PCA is much more wide-ranging and ambitious in its scope. For example, whereas the TCA consists of 26 articles, the PCA contains 112 altogether. The real difference between the agreements is not however, to be found in their internal complexity, but in the four dimensions of the agreement that warrant the PCA being labeled as a post-sovereign international institution in stark contrast to the much more traditional nature of the TCA.

First, regarding its scope and unlike its predecessor ,the PCA is not centered on the single issue-area of trade and economy exclusively, but includes other sectors of cooperation as well .In the agreement the economic aspects of relationship are complemented with a range of other sectors – including political dialogue, social and cultural cooperation and education, science and technology with a view to providing a ‘framework for the gradual integration between Russia and wider area of cooperation in Europe’. This is indeed a very different and much more ambitious agenda for reapproachment and convergence compared with mere trade and cooperation as envisaged by the TCA.

The more crucial aspects that warrant the PCA being called a post-sovereign international institution stem from the other three dimension of the agreement. As regards

the nature of the object of contention and in stark contrasts to the TCA, values have a prominent role in this respect. This however is not an entirely accurate reflection of the role of values in the partnership as they are not seen as being contentious at all in the PCA. Instead, the basic compatibility of the value systems and the existence of ‘common European values’ between the EU and Russia are taken as the starting point in the agreement⁴⁶.

The assumption of the basic compatibility at the level of values is complemented by the expectation of convergence at the level of norms. Infact the agreement spells out the main mechanism for future Russia-EU rapprochement, namely ‘economic convergence...[that] will lead to more intense political relations’(PCA, Article 6).it is indeed here that the two last dimension of the PCA as an essentially post-sovereign international institution –the relationship with sovereignty and the logic of interaction –comes into the picture.

In the PCA these norms are mainly derived from the EU’s *acquis communautaire*-the body of community law. They are used to varying degrees as both models and yardsticks against which the convergence of third parties, in this case Russia, with EU legislation and consequently the level and depth of market access are assessed. Being a highly developed legal system, the EU seems to expertise a great deal of difficulties in dealing with the partners that do not operate under the logic similar to its own. This has resulted in the drive to promote convergence at the level of community norms with the third parties, namely adopting the same structures and normative basis for its external cooperation that it uses internally. In this respect EU’s Russia’s policy is no exception.

For EU the existence of a set of shared value with its partners and Russia here has two functions: they act as the very foundation and prerequisite on which the relationship rests in the first instance. And also they act as a benchmark against which the future breadth and depth of interaction are measured. It is here that the primary modus operandi of EU foreign policy and external relations, political conditionality, comes into the picture. In Jonathan Weiler’s words, the Union’s emphasis on political conditionality is part and

⁴⁶ The PCA refers to the historical links existing between the Community, its Member-States and Russia and the common values that they share.

parcel of wider trends debate on 'good governance' or the 'second wave' of political conditionality that have become prevalent during the post-cold war era of "Governance, good governance and Global Governance". Taken together, the stronger role given to norms and values and the role of human rights in the PCA constitutes the post-sovereign core of the Russia-EU relationship.

The preamble of the PCA makes numerous references to 'common values'. The main article in this respect is Article 2, which codifies the primacy of common values as the foundation of the partnership:

Respect for democratic principles and human rights as defined in particular in the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, underpins the internal and external policies of the Parties and constitutes an essential element of partnership and of this Agreement.

This is the suspension clause that proved to be a persistent source of problems during the negotiations. The work will reflect that this normative provision in Russia-EU relation restricts their attempt for institutionalisation. International law has not considered violation of human rights or other liberal values as grounds for the suspension or termination of the treaty. However, under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, a treaty can be suspended or terminated only if the treaty so provides or if 'material breaches' - such as violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty - have taken place. By insisting on establishing democracy and human rights as an 'essential' element of the PCA as well as practically every agreement the EU has concluded since the end of the cold war - EU has reserved for itself a legal right to consider a breach of certain 'European values' as being sufficient to warrant the termination or suspension of the agreement.

However, it can be said that the PCA is neither solely concerned with the material interests nor values. There is an emphasis on both the highest relevance of material interests is made understandable by the fact that the PCA is primarily an economic agreement. What is important and worth stressing is the large role that norms and values are given in the

PCA. First, they are elevated into the essential element in the agreement in the sense that a breach of 'democratic principles and human rights' is seen as being sufficient for the invoking of the suspension clause. Second and more importantly, the PCA do not see the role of values as being especially contentious to begin with. Instead the basic compatibility between Russia and EU value systems or worldviews is seen through harmonization of Russia's norms and values along European models. The final stages of the negotiation from autumn 1993 onwards witnessed sea change in Russia foreign policy, with the notions of spheres of influence, respect for sovereignty and overall equality between Russia and its western partners replacing the ideas of universal values and joining the community of civilized states' at all costs. Because of the sovereignty Russia did not have to sign any agreement until it had arrived at one that was to its satisfaction. The Russian hard bargaining attitude is well reflected in the comment by an anonymous Russian source in September 1993, who said that:

Russians.....would rather suffer extended negotiation which would result in a 'good agreement' than have a bad agreement within the next few weeks. If we had been prepared to settle for anything we could have had an agreement in Copenhagen in June 1993 (European Report No. 1889, 29 September 1993).

According to **Sergei Prozorov's "Understanding Conflict between Russia and EU: The Limits of Integration"**, in Russian circles in particular there exists an understanding that the PCA and the consequent post-sovereign institution have been unilaterally imposed on Russia. To be fair, this is exactly even what IR theory would reveal that especially after the wars, economically and even normatively, preponderant victors are in a position to impose institutionalized arrangement on the losers. However, the analysis given in this chapter shows that instead of unilateral imposition the negotiations leading to the adoption of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in June 1994 was mutual and tough. Interestingly, it seems that the hard bargain driven by the Russians themselves was the key factor that has some unexpected consequences for the nature of subsequent Russia-EU interaction, resulting in the logic of post-sovereignty being injected into the relationship.

Despite the strong asymmetries between the two actors discussed here, Russia was ultimately able to extract more concessions from its partner. This more of a surprise because post-dissolution, the prevailing understanding in Russia seems to have been that Russia was in desperate need of a new agreement and the market access and economic aid that would follow. Heinz Timmermann has summed up the Russian situation and consequent motives rather well by arguing;

“Russia was motivated by the economic reasons: the urgent need to gain access to the European markets: certainly the wish to obtain western aid. The political implementation of the treaty – a commitment to common values- was probably of secondary importance to Russia. To overstate point: for the economic gains, political implications were accepted as necessary and only after lengthy negotiations.”

The negotiation process PCA reveals how Russia did not negotiate from any position of strength vis-à-vis the Union. Russia remained steadfast in refusing to accept the EU's offers and seemed willing to let the process drag indefinitely, essentially hoping that it could wait out and consequently exhaust the EC and resolve of its negotiators. Importantly, it seems to be the case that at the end of the day it was not Russia's power but its weakness that resulted in a series of important breakthroughs in the process. For example, in 1993, Boris Yeltsin could successfully led EU to seek new mandate which would have included an evolutionary clause opening the prospects of free trade area when 'political and economic circumstances allowed it' (European Report No. 1847, 27 March 1993). In essence EU was siding with the Russian in all the important issues of contention, calling for the EC to include textiles, steel and nuclear products in the agreement. This unilateral concession was with the aim that all these measures were required to ensure that the PCA would be successful in establishing a stable democratic political order, protecting human and minority rights.

But once again the optimism behind the PCA negotiation proved to be premature. There were two main reasons: first, encourage by their success Russians decided to keep pushing harder for new concessions from the community. Second, the adoption of the suspension clause created a new set of difficulties for the negotiations. The Russia felt that the concept of 'democracy' was too abstract and the whole idea of linking trade and human rights is too suspicious to be allowed to be the key ingredients in the agreements.

Russia argued that the clause is of one-sided in nature. The fact that EU can unilaterally suspend the agreement without consultation was the main hitch point for Moscow (European Report No. 1897, 27 October, 1993). Briefly, it can be said that Russia's hard bargaining posited her under the legal obligation to deliver and implement a set of 'ready-made' pattern against which Yeltsin has protested as early as 1992. The PCA would also serve as a focal point in explaining different degrees in commonality concerning the logic of interaction between Russia's and EU's worldviews.

The next two chapters will establish the existence of certain clear differences between Russia and European Union concerning the framing of the normative foundation of their institutionalized relationship. Yet the existence of differences at the level of abstract worldviews tells nothing about their salience. Therefore, to gauge their significances, it is important to look for concrete case where these differences are being played in the context of dialectics of power. Finally the dissertation will conclude with a chapter that analyzes further the institutionalization of Russia and European Union relationship.

CHAPTER: 2

COMPARING THE STRATEGY DOCUMENTS: DIFFERENCES IN WORLDVIEWS

This chapter will take a look at how Russia and European Union have individually framed their relationship. This is done by looking at host of their policy papers sketching strategies of the concerned actors. The aim of this chapter is to discover the underlying differences of worldviews between them and also reflects how their interaction can be contextualized in two separate perception of institutionalization. Comparing the strategy documents between the EU and Russia bears crucial importance in locating the possible differences concerning the normative foundation of the strategic partnership between Russia and EU.

The possible differences of worldviews between the two actors concerned are because of two reasons:

first, the very word strategy and the process of drafting a document worthy of the name, calls for purposive and concerted action to ponder what is essential in the object of any given strategy (' the vision thing') as well as outlining the paths via which the preferred end-state can be achieved. The strategy documents of both the Russia and EU can be seen, by their very nature, as highly salient in terms of reflecting the underlying worldviews of the actors in question.

Second, precisely because they have not been negotiated and mutually agreed upon, the documents are of major relevance in terms of highlighting the indigenous approaches and the worldviews that both Russia and EU might possess and connects it to any issues they concern.

Thus, as the first step, the EU documents of the strategic nature concerning Russia are discussed in order to discern an EU worldviews followed by similar treatment to the Russia's documents related to EU member-states in order to enumerate the above two reasons.

The Russia-EU strategy documents can be identified in to two relevant contexts:

The internal context relates to, Union's own quest to become a more efficient and coherent international actor. The repeated attempts at devising a more strategic common foreign and security policy have been one of the mainstays of the developments in the field of 'European foreign policy' during the 1990's. The two Russian strategies should be seen as part of the Union's own attempt at finding a coherent set of ideas and common interests in the field of external relations, as well as devising the institutional structures and policy instruments to deal with the challenges arising externally.

The external context behind the documents naturally deals with the challenges the EU had face in its relations with Russia. Russia's image as a prickly and difficult partner has been only reinforces by the Russia's military campaign in Chechnya in 1994-96 (subsequently dubbed as a first Chechen War). Russia action in Chechnya cast doubt on Russia's commitment to common European values and forced the EU to halt the ratification process of the PCA, which was only fully resumed after the cessation of hostilities in Chechnya. According to **Antje Herrmann** in his book **'The European Union and Russia: Towards a New Ostpolitik'** analyzed that the war led EU to believe that the PCA alone was not sufficient in guaranteeing the strategic guidance and flexibility of EU action vis-à-vis Russia. In addition, the severe economic and financial crisis in Russia in August in 1998, together with some problems in the implementation of the PCA, gave further impetus to the need for a more strategic approach towards Russia. Once again, Russia's weakness acted as a catalyst for policy innovation in the union: the adoption of the first common strategy particularly on Russia in 1999 reflected the EU's need to kick-start the ailing partnership in the aftermath of the First Chechen War and the 1998 financial crisis.

The first EU strategy towards Russia was mooted after the first Chechen war and was based on the European commission's communication initially presented at the Gymnich⁴⁷ meetings of the EU foreign ministers in Carcassone in March 1995. The communication can be read in two different ways.

First, it can be seen as reflecting the Union's own Russia analysis after the signing of the PCA and the commencement of the first Chechen War. In this respect, the communication reveals a rather clear and level headed analysis of Russia as an economically ailing and politically turbulent country. Russia was seen as finding itself at a crossroads, the key question being 'whether she turns inwards upon herself seeking to implement reform and develop her economy with limited inputs of foreign expertise and investment, or whether she takes her place in the world economy in full and responsible partnership with the European Union and others (European Commission, 1995). Therefore the forthcoming Duma and presidential elections in December 1995 and June 1996 respectively were in particular seen as being of crucial importance for the European Union as well. In the commission's view, the unpredictability of Russia's future trajectory, combined with its relative weakness, merited a qualified and moderated approach on the part of the Union whereby, it 'must strike a balance between giving expression to its concern over process of reform in Russia' (European Commission, 1995). In essence, Russia's weakness power once again played a role that was explicitly acknowledged by the union and that had a moderating effect on its stance towards Russia.

The need for a more moderated approach was reinforced by the domestic changes within Russia. By 1995 the tide had clearly turned in Moscow, with the enthusiastically 'romantic' leaning towards the west having been replaced with a much more assertive Russia. This change was also taken into account in the tone of the commission stressed the importance of coordinating the Union's economic strategy with a political one that took the Russian security interests into account, including among other things the question of possible NATO enlargement and the treatment of Russian minorities in the Baltic states.

⁴⁷ Place in Germany where the first informal EU foreign ministers meeting took place in 1974. These meetings are informal in that participants engage in free and in-depth discussion on a limited number of subjects, but they do not draw up any formal conclusions.

The second way of reading the communication is according to how EU's strategic approach framed EU's own understanding concerning its relationship with Russia. Importantly, the communication did not doubt the reformist course of Russia. In EU's view the reforms could take place either in inward-looking manner or in concert with the global economy, but their essential continuation was not in doubt. Thus, the strategic goal vis-à-vis Russia was clear for the union: the contribution to Russia's evolution as a 'democratic and a progressive nation' and the development of a mutually beneficial partnership with Russia based on 'responsiveness and respect for human rights'. In determining the relation between Russia and EU it can be said that the scope of the relationship is broad, with the onus being put on a transformative logic based on set of European values. The main avenues through which the realization of these goals could come about were respect for western liberal values (democracy, human rights, individual liberties and rule of law) as well as further progress towards economic reform in order to 'ensure Russia's economic liberalization and establishment of the market economy'.

The Madrid European Council in December 1995 took note of the commission's communication and adopted on the basis of the earlier General Affairs Council (GAC) formulation of 20th November, the first official EU strategy on Russia. For the Union, the aim of the partnership with Russia was (European Commission, 1995) to promote the democratic and economic reform process, to enhance the respect of human rights, to consolidate peace, stability and security in order to avoid new dividing lines in Europe and to achieve the full integration of Russia into the community of free and democratic nations.

In May 1996 the first Russian Strategy process reached its completion when the GAC adopted an action plan for Russia. It was noted however that the actual combined impact of the first Russia strategy and the action plan that followed remained rather limited. For example, the former Finnish ambassador to Moscow, Marcus Lyra has commented that the documents were too all-encompassing in terms of challenges without elaborating enough concrete measures on how to achieve the aims of the Union. But criticizing these documents for their lack of strategic credentials misses the point somewhere. This is so

particularly because one can argue that the first Russia strategy was indeed important for at least two reasons. First, it enables the EU to take stock of the present as well as the future trajectory of Russia's development of Russia development. In this respect it is worth re-emphasizing the significance of a frank and realistic reading concerning Russia, which was to be found especially in the commissions communications: Russia's present conditions as well as the wide variety of challenges pertaining to it was noted openly without the softening of the language that is usual characteristic of public diplomacy documents. Second, it presented the union with an opportunity to reassess its own policy approach towards Russia, which was duly found to be on the right track. It is therefore understandable that Russia required more support from the Union. The political inexpediency that hounds Russia warrants a slightly more qualified policy stance from the Union especially when it comes to criticize Russia's activities in Chechnya.

The adoption of common strategies on Russia by EU in the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 stemmed from the perceived shortcomings in the union's own internal common foreign and security policy processes. In the journal **'International Security'** titled **'European's Uncommon Foreign Policy'**, **Philip Gordon** writes that these shortcomings were most painfully revealed in the tragic wars that followed the dissolution of Yugoslavia where the union's powerlessness to stop the bloodshed in the Balkans had become evident. Numerous scholars at the time expressed pessimism about the future prospects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). For example, **David Allen** noted in his concluding remark in the book **'The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy'** how it had reached a certain 'plateau' beyond which it was 'hard to see how the CFSP can develop beyond the ceiling that it has already reached'. Other scholars like Regelsberger and Wessels captured this gloomy mood when they wrote that the 'mood in expert circles is depressed' and the first experiences of the CFSP are 'on the whole negative'. Michael E. Smith went even further by describing the CFSP as 'a serious disappointment, if not a dismal failure, in the view of its practitioners, informed observers and even EU citizens.

Jorg Monar writes in **'The European Union's Foreign Affairs System after the Treaty of Amsterdam...'** that one of the biggest stumbling blocs on the road to a

coherent EU foreign policy was seen to lie in the rigid decision-making procedure in the Council, which since the Treaty of Maastricht, had been based on strict unanimity. The scholarly community in particular was quick to point out how unanimity principle had resulted in constant delays in the decision-making process, while the decisions finally taken were usually watered down to the lowest common denominator. Thus, it was obvious from the beginning of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), which resulted in the Treaty of Amsterdam the year after, that the development of a more coherent and effective CFSP with an increased possibility for flexibility, mainly through constructive abstention and an increase in the use of qualified majority voting (QMV)⁴⁸ in Council is high on the agenda. It is against this backdrop that the adoption of common strategies has to be examined as a mechanism through which the common positions on the basis of common strategies would be taken by qualified majority voting. As such, the European Council was too decided on common strategies unanimously on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers. The common positions and joint actions adopted on the basis of common strategies would then be taken by QMV.

This brief reference into the negotiation process of common strategies is warranted for two reasons:

First, it shows that the main motivation for the adoption of common strategies was internal, mainly institutional and had in fact very little to do with the perceived need to have a more strategic approach to Russia.

Second, the perceived high stakes in the adoption and content of eventual common strategies lend add credibility to frame analysis of the content of the first common strategy on Russia. The reconstruction of the negotiating process need not be repeated on this occasion. Suffice it to say that although the document might represent the lowest common denominator approach to a certain degree, the keen interest expressed in its drafting by the member-states also makes it much more likely that it indeed reflects the

⁴⁸ Changes however has been brought with the Treaty of Lisbon including the move from required unanimity to double majority voting.

common position of the member states enabling us to probe the worldviews residing behind the document in more reliable manner.

This common strategy states that: a stable, democratic and prosperous Russia firmly anchored in a united Europe free of new dividing lines, is essential to the lasting peace on the continent....the European Union welcomes Russia's return to its rightful place in the European family in a spirit of friendship, cooperation, fair accommodation of interests and on the foundations of shared values enshrined in the common heritage of European civilization.

Interestingly, the CSR took a security rationale as its point of departure, linking Russia's domestic transformation and its eventual integration into European structures with a 'lasting peace' in Europe. This starting point which is absent from the PCA is rendered understandable by the first Chechen war, as well as the August 1998 financial crisis, which in the eyes of the Union, had the combined effect of making the Russia Federation look very fragile. Despite, the accentuated concerns over security, the vision in effect repeated the key post-sovereign tenants of the EU's previous Russia Policy: Russia's 'return' to the fold in 'the European family' was facilitated but also conditioned by the existence of shared European norms and values.

In other words, the actual strategic goals were elaborated in the form of four principle objectives:

First, consolidation of democracy, rule of law and public institution in Russia. Second the integration of Russia into a common European economic and social space. Third, cooperation to strengthen stability and security in Europe and beyond. Fourth, common challenges on the European continent.

In essence the first two principle objectives are based on the logic of a post-sovereign international institution : the aim of the strategic partnership that is the logic of interaction was to engage Russia in a process of broad societal and economic transformation, which was to be based on the European and the wider international essentially western-norms, values and models. Thus, for the Union's the main task was

just ‘to support Russia in the consolidation of its public institution, particularly its executive, legislative and judicial bodies and its police, in accordance with democracy principles’.

EU strategy approach has usefully captured the CSR’s ‘sovereignty-challenging’ approach by noting how the EU’s goal on Russia were essentially ‘domestic policy objectives that constitute the essential prerequisites for achieving the second objectives, which is Russia’s “return to its rightful place in the “European Family”’. In essence, this approach entailed that it was to be carried out ‘in the context of a comprehensive and sustainable economic programme approved by the IMF. Thus, Russia’s integration into a multilateral trading system was depended on meeting the requirements for World Trade Organization accession including legislative and institutional reform, which the EU hope to support and encourage.

This picture of a clear-cut post-sovereign international institution is contrasted somewhat by other parts of the common strategy where more traditional understandings of international institutionalization can be also found. Compared to the first two principle objectives, discussed above, the last two principal objectives – cooperation to strengthen stability and security in Europe and beyond and common challenges on the European continent-reveal this trend. Therefore, in the field of security, the Union proposed ‘that the strategic partnership develop within the framework of a permanent policy and security dialogue designed to bring interests closer together’. The process envisaged by the CSR in this conjunction is one that is closer to more traditional forms of bargaining, implying and indeed giving Russia a central role, too. The same also applies in the case of common challenges on the European continent, which include issues such as organized crime, illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings and drugs. Here the proposed way forward was the development of ‘common responses’ that would yield equally ‘common solutions’ and ‘increased cooperation...by creating the necessary tools and forms of cooperation’ between Russia and EU. The letters of CSR is more akin to the traditional international institutions than the post-sovereign one as far as the first two principle objectives are concern.

This goes to show that despite the First Chechen War, the political and economic turbulence in Russia and the difficulties experienced at the beginning of the implementation of the PCA, the fundamentals of the union's approach to Russia had remain intact. The Russian scholars Yuri Borko concurs and seems to accuse the Union of somewhat unresponsive attitude towards Russia when he claims that 'the CSR repeats the same guidelines of the PCA and stays silent about the claim of the partner'. **David Gowan** also mentioned in his book, '**How EU Can Help Russia**' has also complained about the way in which the CSR was little more than a restatement of current policy. Although from a policy perspective the criticism might be sound but the very fact that the readings propagated by the EU concerning its relationship with Russia seem to remain constant would appear to lend added to the claim of this work that it is indeed probing research question that are based on underlying worldviews which are not readily susceptible to change.

Interestingly, analysis of the CSR reveals an internal distinction and tension in the Union's approach to Russia: on the one hand it is based on the strict understanding of post-sovereignty, with Russia being put under an obligation to uphold certain European values and converge towards a host of EU norms. but on the other hand there lies set of issues, mainly in the field of security and 'common challenges' where the expectation is of bargaining within a more traditional international institution. It seems evident that the coexistence of two different logics in the Union's own constitution is also present in its foreign policy and relationship with Russia. Yet despite this variance; it is nevertheless clear that for the Union the emphasis in its relationship with Russia was put on the post sovereign mode of interaction. In other words, relationship between them to be edifies on the basis of norms and values – a condition for integration towards Russia.

The Russian response to the CSR came in October 1999. The sequencing of the document alone indicates that it was the EU's decision to adopt a unilateral strategy document that acted as a catalyst for the subsequent Russia decision to adopt one as well. According to **Yuri Borko's** writing in the book '**The EU Common Strategy To Russia** ', 'despite the fact that the union did seeks to inform Russian about the process, the strategy seeks to have come as something of a shock to the Russian elites. This was reflected in the nature

of mid-term strategy itself in which according to the British analysts can be described as a demanding and an irritable response to the CSR. Indeed referring to Timofie Bordachev, Yuri had argued how the unilateral adoption of the CSR was seen as policy statement from which two unsettling messages were being deciphered in Moscow:

A) to let Russia know that the EU countries considered it more as an object of foreign policy of the united Europe, rather than an equal partner. B) The European Union is capable of developing a really concerted position on Russia, which will underlie national foreign policies of the EU member countries and be reflective of their interests.

Although the discussion above of the CSR's genesis shows that at least the latter interpretation was in effect misguided it nevertheless became clear to the Russian side that a response of their own that would have spelled out an alternative vision of the strategic aims and prospects of cooperation was clearly warranted. Here it seems that it was the scholarly community that was able to seize the initiative. According to Borko, the institute of Europe of the Russia Academy of Sciences wrote the letter to vice Prime-minister Vladimir Bulag in January 1999 suggesting the drafting of a Russia counterpart to the Union's CSR. The initiative was the success and the Russia Medium-Term EU Strategy was drafted between February and September and presented by Prime Minister Putin at the EU - Russia summit in Helsinki in October 1999.

The difference between the CSR and the Russia mid-term strategy are manifold:

First, and obviously, they differ in terms of background. The CSR was able to benefit and draw from the previous strategy exercise of 1995-96. on the other Russian side the issue of cooperation with the EU was more and less a blank canvas with hurdle any previous official thinking and writing on the matter⁴⁹. One can say that the mid-term strategy of 1999 was the first attempt to formulate a consolidated Russian policy in relation to the European Union. Although this attempt had also been provoked by the EU adoption of

⁴⁹ Russia foreign ministry bulletin reflects documents related to EU are absent between 1992 and 1996. It is scarce in 1997 and 1998. it only with the Mid-Term Strategy that EU begins to feature more prominently.

the Common Strategy on Russia, the importance of an integrated Russian document on relation with the EU cannot be underestimated.

It is important to note that the Medium term strategy did not emerge from the vacuum. Here, as in case of CSR, we must take into account the political and institutional context from which the document eventually sprang. Its emphasis tone and style stem from the wider foreign policy rethink that has been continuing since the beginning of the 1990's and which has acquired increase impetus in the aftermath of the war in Kosovo in 1999. The finalization of the document also coincided with the rapid escalation of hostilities and the consequent deterioration of Russia-EU relations during the second Chechen war. Taken together they resulted in what **'Yuri Borko'** called in the book **'The European Union Common Strategy in Russia'** 'latent feeling of uncertainty and doubt with regards to the validity of the CSR and the very concept of partnership with the EU.'

This rethinking culminated in the adoption of a host of key documents in 1999-2000 outlining the main Russia Foreign and security policy tenets at the beginning of the then Putins presidency in 2000. Thus, the medium-term Strategy was soon complemented by the adoption of the National Security Concept (January 2000) and the Foreign Policy Concept (June 2000). The last, although perhaps only a semi-official document with importance in this respect, is Putin's 'Russia at the Turn of the Millennium' manifesto which was published in the pages of 'Nesavisimaya Gazeta' as well as the government internet pages in December 1999 while he was still serving as Prime minister⁵⁰. These documents not only reaffirmed but also added nuances to the readings put forward in the strategy document. They were also instrumental in both voicing the Russian elites certain dissatisfaction with the result of its rapprochement with Western and European partners during the 1990's and cementing a new foreign policy consensus for the new Post-yeltsin period. It is precisely because of their consensual nature that they can be seen as especially valuable windows into the thinking of key players in Moscow and consequently the underlying worldviews at play.

⁵⁰ For the purpose of the frame analysis the manifesto can be seen as an especially interesting draft because according to Sakwa's book Putin's Russian Choice, the manifesto bears Putin's own comment and corrections thus giving direct access to his thinking.

The most unequivocal manifestation of the basic Russia dissatisfaction is to found in the Foreign Policy Concept according to which along with certain strengthening of the international positions of the Russia Federation, some negative tendencies have manifested themselves. Some of the expectations for the emergence of new, equitable and mutually beneficial relations of partnership between Russia and the surrounding world.....have not materialized⁵¹

The most worrying tendencies stem from ‘a focus on restricted-membership Western institutions and for in addressing issues of international security, with a weakening role of the UN Security Council’. Although obviously a reference to the US-led NATO decision to intervene militarily in Kosovo without a UN mandate, some of these negative tendencies are associated with the strategic partnership that has been perused with the EU as well. Therefore, in a later passage the Union is seen in a similar vein as also both being exclusionary and undermining Russian sovereign statehood: (Russia’s Foreign Policy concept).

Integration process in particular, in the Euro-Atlantic region often assumes a selective and restrictive character. Attempts to belittle the role of the sovereign states as a fundamental element of international relations create the arbitrary interference in international affairs.

Consequently, the key imperative for Russian foreign policy in the light of these Challenges is seen to be ‘preserving and strengthening its sovereignty’ and seeking ‘a full scale and equitable role in drafting the fundamental principles that would govern the functioning of the world financial and economic system in the present conditions’.(Foreign Policy Concept).

These are all statements stressing the inviolability of Russian Sovereignty, and they challenge the key EU tenets concerning the applicability of post-sovereign principles for the development of the Russia-EU relationship. Therefore instead of adopting the norms and values promoted by the EU, Russia itself aspires to the role of norm-maker. This line

⁵¹ This quotation taken from the English version of the foreign policy concept published in the journal of international affairs.

of reasoning has been captured in former foreign minister **'Igor S Ivanov's'** book **'The New Russian Diplomacy'**, where three separate passages express both the current Russian analysis and the envisaged way forward in a nutshell:

“In this regard it is telling that Russia decided in the early 1990s to throw in its lot with accelerated integration into the Euro-Atlantic structure. Unrealistic goals were set forth for example, to establish an ‘alliance’ relationship with the West for which neither our country nor the West was prepared. Indeed, each side understood the concept in a completely different way. Many in the United States and Western Europe bought into the scenario that they had beaten Russia in the cold war and did not see a newly democratic Russia as an equal ally. At best, Russia was given the role of junior partner.”

Ivanov continued that “two fundamentally opposed approaches to a new international system have come into competition in recent years. One of them advocates a one-size-fits all model. In this model, the international arena is dominated by a group of more – developed countries, enjoying the military and economic support of the United States and NATO, while the rest of the world community must live according to the rules established and occasionally, enforced by this elite club. Russia is highly interested in the specific nature of the international economic system into which it is trying to integrate. For this reason, we have vested interests in the collective search for ways to manage globalization and must be involved in decisions that guide long-range economic trends and shape global economic processes.”

But, **Alla Kassianova** writes in **'Europe-Asian studies'** that, Russia attempt at becoming a norm maker have been hampered by its weak economy and societal backwardness. In fact, the pragmatic or realistic, acceptance of Russia's current weaknesses and determined work to improve its lot has been one of the key drivers behind the Russia's Foreign Policy during the Putin's era writes **'Bobo Lo'** in his book **“Russian Foreign Policy Under Putin: Reality, Illution And Mythmaking”**. In this respect there is certain similarity in Russian and EU understandings. For example, the Russian National Security concepts reveal that Russia also sees its internal problems and developments as the most pressing security issue. Therefore stagnating economy, rising poverty, rampant diseases and falling life expectancy as well as internal weakness of the federal structures and a host of ecological problems are seen as threatening Russia's national security. Moreover,

the external threats are seen to stem largely from Russia's own weakness: a weakening of the country's influence in the world, together with the emergence of the unipolar world order dominated by the preponderance of the United States, are seen a key challenges for Russian security.

In a similar vein, former president **'Vladimir Putin's'** in **'New York Times'** reportedly argues that the threat is indeed existential for Russia:

'For the first time in the past 200-300 years, Russia is facing a real threat of sliding to the second and possibly even third, echelon of world states. We are running out of time to remove this threat. We must exert all the intellectual, physical and moral forces of the nation. We need coordinated creative work. Nobody will do it for us. Everything depends on us and us alone...on our ability to see the size of the threat, to pool forces and set our minds to hard and lengthy work.'

On the strategic level the question for Russia therefore boils down to achieving great power status again. That Russian wants to re-achieve that status is not in doubt as the thought is present in all the documents that would be discussed in this dissertation. Thus Putin's manifesto asserts how 'Russia was and will remain a great power. It is preconditioned by the inseparable characteristics of its geopolitical, economic and cultural existence'. The Foreign Policy Concept too characterizes Russia as a great power and an influential centre in the modern world'. Equally, the National Security Concepts asserts Russia's place as 'one of the world's major countries with centuries of history and rich cultural traditions'. And finally, the Medium-Term Strategy also makes it plain that the goal of the strategic partnership with the EU is aimed at 'ensuring national interests and enhancing the role and image of Russia in Europe and in the world'.

But when it comes to the tactical level of how best to achieve the coveted Great Power status, the record is however somewhat more ambivalent. On the one hand the imperative Russia to modernize along Western /European lines is widely acknowledged. For example, Putins manifesto as published in 'New York Times' echoes the logic of Francis Fukuyama's 'End of History' thesis when arguing how Russia is completing the first transition stage of economic and political reforms. Despite problems and mistakes, it has entered the highway by which the whole of humanity is traveling. Only this way offers

the possibility of dynamic economic growth and higher living standards, as the world experience convincingly shows. There is no alternative to it.

But from some of the Post-Sovereign tenants that has also advocated by the EU, Putin nevertheless then goes on to qualify the applicability of actual post-sovereign methods in the Russian case. He said;

“The experiences of 1990’s vividly show that our country’s genuine renewal without any excessive costs cannot be assured by a mere experimentation in Russian conditions with abstract models and schemes taken from foreign textbooks. The mechanical copying of other nations’ experience will not guarantee success either. Every country, Russia included, has to search for its own way of renewal...We can secure hopes for a worthy future only if we prove capable of combining the universal principles of a market economy and democracy with Russian realities.”

Despite acknowledging the imperative for reforms along western models Russia is insisting on its sovereign rights to pick and choose the right combination of reforms as well as deciding on how best to implement the reform to suit its own needs. The Foreign Policy Concept in particular is full of references to the importance of preserving, enhancing and buttressing Russian sovereignty and this attitude implies not only to the case of western international institutions such as EU but also in the face of more generic phenomena such as globalization.: ‘it is necessary to enhance the effectiveness of political, legal, foreign-economic and other instruments for protecting Russia’s state sovereignty and its national economy at a time of globalization ‘.(Foreign Policy Concept).

This is the context and the political background from which the Russian Medium-Term Strategy emerged. Therefore it can be said that whereas the EU departs from the notion of common values, Russia takes its own interests as the starting point. **Vassily Likhachev** writes in ‘**International Affairs**’ that whereas, the CSR sees the importance of assisting Russia’s transformation in terms of interdependence between the two partners, the Russian thinking departs from ideas of self-sustainability and the pooling of the countries own internal resources to tackle their domestic problems. in short it can be reiterated that when EU was pondering the question of whether and to what extent it could integrate Russia into wider European normative and institutional structures, the Russian question

revolves around the issue of devising acceptable forms of cooperation with the EU that would prevent the further disintegration and dismemberment of the federation while preserving Russian sovereignty to the highest possible degree.

In this vein Russia's strategic vision for its interaction with the EU in Russia's Mid Term Strategy departs from an instrumentalist vision⁵² :

Russia's relation with the European Union...are part of a consistent evolution of the general foreign policy concept of Russia...[that] stems from the objective need to establish a multipolar world....the strategy is primarily aimed at ensuring national interests and enhancing the role and image of Russia in Europe and in the world through establishing a reliable Pan-European system of collective security and by mobilizing the economic potential and managerial experience of the European Union to promote the development of socially oriented market economy in Russia based on fair competition and further construction of a democratic state and the rule of law.

In essence, **Vassily Likhachev** in the journal '**International Affairs**' writes that the Medium-Term Strategy spelled out a dual process of a cultivation of a strategic partnership with the EU that would serve Russian needs and interests in two main respects:

1. It would enable Russia to modernize and develop its own state, economy and society.
2. While allowing Russia to further strengthen its role and presence in Europe and also contributing to the emergence of increasingly multi-polar world where the US primacy and NATO centrism would be mitigated.

The difference between Russia and EU strategic visions is obvious. Likhachev captured the difference and consequent tension between the actors by quoting Timofei Boedachev:

"Russia and the European Union's view on the charter, method and ultimate goals of mutual relations are essentially different. The overall objective of the EU policy vis-à-vis

⁵² **Instrumentalism** is the view that a concept or theory should be evaluated by how effectively it explains and predicts phenomena, as opposed to how accurately it describes objective reality.

Russia is deep internal transformation of this country on the basis of gradual acceptance of a complex of European Union norms and values....Russia's policy in relation....to the European Union was subordinated to the global problem of economic modernization of the country and securing its competitiveness in the world market. The European Union is considered by Moscow as the most important source of modernization resources for Russia. Thus, even the broadest cooperation with Europe should not constrain the sovereignty of Russia nor lead to an EU intervention in its internal affairs. A competitive Russia shouldbecome an equal partner and if necessary competes with the EU under the conditions of 'formation of a multipolar world.'

The key word in the Russia Medium-term Strategy is sovereignty. This did not go unnoticed in the EU either. For example in November 2000 the European Parliament's report on the implementation of the Common Strategy on Russia noted how 'Russia clearly wants to participate in the European structures on its own terms'. In actual fact, this translated into a policy line in which Russia rejected the idea of a conditional partnership with EU. Instead, writes **Yuri Borko** in the book **"The European Union Common strategy on Russia (ed.)"** that 'the emphasis was put on mutually beneficial cooperationbut under the condition of maintaining a firm defense of national interests'. This rejection of unnecessary normative entanglements and the conditionality they would imply is reflected in the Medium-Term Strategy in which Russia renounces any pretensions to accession or association with the EU. The Mid -Term Strategy says that:

"As a world power situated on two continents, Russia should retain its freedom to determine and implement its domestic and foreign policies, its status and advantages of a Euro-Asian state and largest country of the CIS, independence of its position and activities at international organizations."

Indeed one of the sub-aims of the strategic partnership with the EU is to cement Russia's role as the leading country in the CIS area. In addition the strategy also explicitly states its opposition to any EU infringements to Russian prerogatives in the region. However, Hiski Haukkala while writing about changing normative parameters in Europe towards Russia indicates that 'instead of allowing the Union greater access to the CIS area, there is a re-emergence of the idea of using the EU as a model for organizing post-Soviet space'. Once again in a very similar manner to the debates concerning the applicability of the EC experiences of invigorating the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

(CMEA) at the end of 1980's, the strategy states how 'the positive experience of integration within the EU' could be used to consolidate and develop integration processes in the CIS area too.(Haukkala)

The rather hard-nosed tone of the Medium-Term Strategy was reaffirmed in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation from June 2000:

“The ongoing process within the EU is having a growing impact on the dynamics of the situation in Europe. These include EU enlargement, transition to a common currency, institutional reform and the emergence of joint foreign and security policies and a common defense identity. Regarding the process as an objective component of European development, Russia will seek due respect for its interests, also in the sphere of bilateral relations with individual EU member countries. The Russian Federation views the EU as one of its main political and economic partners and will strive to develop intensive, sustainable and long-term cooperation with it, cooperation that would be free from any opportunistic fluctuations.”

The passage reveals two things;

First, it shows a growing and more sophisticated understanding of the internal process of the EU and its role in Europe as well as the consequent impact this might have on Russia.

Second, it acts as a blueprint for future Russia's EU policy during Putin's presidency: realism, emphasize on Russian national interests and a preference for bilateral dealings with some key member states⁵³.

In essence what we have here is a vision of the Russia-EU relationship as a traditional international institution based on material interests and bargaining. In fact, certain hankering after the concert system of the nineteenth century is to be detected in Russia as well: Moscow prefers to portray itself as one of the Great Powers in Europe, willingly conducting its business with its equals mainly Britain, France and Germany, while sidelining the EU institutions. (Foreign minister Sergey Lavrov speech)⁵⁴

⁵³ Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov rightly said in 'The New Russia Diplomacy' that 'the fundamental tenets of Russia's European Policy are the expansion of the bilateral relations with individual countries'.

⁵⁴ Excerpts from the MGIMO University on 3rd September, 2007, where Lavrov makes his wish explicit: ".....Europeans are beginning to define their own interests and act according to their own analysis."... The

Finally, the issues of normative convergence and legal approximation the very core of the Union's post-sovereign approach are clearly sensitive for the Russian. Although the Medium-Term Strategy acknowledges the basic need for such a process, it omits the interpretation concerning the legally binding obligations Russia had assumed in the PCA. Instead the issue is framed in terms of protecting Russia's sovereignty with a clear attempt at restricting the sectors where legal approximation and harmonization are warranted:

“While preserving the independence of the Russian legislation and legal system, to pursue a line to its approximation and harmonization with the EU legislation in the areas of the most active Russia-EU cooperation, in particular, through the parliamentary Cooperation Committee.”

The same also applies to standards and regulations:

“ While preserving Russia systems of standards and certification to harmonize them with the respective system in the areas of the most active trade and technical cooperation between Russia and the EU...to pursue a line to the mutual reorganization of certificates, in particular, through establishing joint certificates centers.”

For Russia the issue seems to boil down to its ability, or rather its inability to affect the content of the norms and values that are to be adopted. Thus, according to one Russian commentator, **Konstantin Khudoley** in “**Russia and the European Union: New Opportunities, New Challenges**” said that Russia's endeavor to have its laws brought into line with the rule established by the European Union in no way means that it would automatically adhere to those international requirements that has been drafted and put into effect without Russia being involved in the process.

At times the issue is framed in the context of democracy. **Timofei Bordachev** in the book “**Rethinking the Respective Strategies of Russian and the European Union.**”

conditions of freedom dictate the necessity of collective leadership by the key states of the world. This may be called a “concert of the powers of the 21st century.”... In the present-day conditions equilibrium is an integral element of strategic stability which excludes a temptation for one of the sides to use nuclear arms in order to achieve its foreign policy goals.It is open for business and... We welcome all who would like to take part in the extensive modernization of our vast country..... But any attempts to politicize economic matters – directly or through proxy countries – would be counterproductive....The example of certain of our European partners illustrates one more common problem for many countries: it is easier to concern oneself with the affairs of others than one's own...We see no other ways to strengthen trust, which must by rights become a super task of European and world politics....

borrowing EU norms and rules creates ‘a huge democracy deficit in Russia- EU cooperation and even makes the entire Russia-Europe project illegitimate’.

But the crux of the issue might lie elsewhere than in the concept of sovereignty and democracy. To Bordachev it could be that, the Russian elites still do not have an adequate picture of the character of the Union....Moscow also underestimates the strategic consequences of rapprochement with the EU....Recognizing in practice the opportunity for the further rapprochement of Russian and European legislation, Moscow nevertheless expects to retain all its sovereign rights.

The frame analysis provided in exploring the Strategic papers of both Russia and European Union reveals clear differences between them concerning the normative foundation of their institutionalized relationship. In short, the level of commonality between the two strategic partners would seem to be very low. The EU reading is very close the one codified in the PCA and it aims at using post-sovereign methods to transform Russia along the lines of European values and models. By contrasts, Russia envisages itself as a completely independent world power that tolerates no inference with its foreign or domestic affairs from the Union. That said, it is important to emphasize that Russia does not reject all of the multifaceted dimensions of its relationship with the EU. Importantly, the Russia reading is a hybrid between the traditional and the post-sovereign modes of international institutionalization. **Borko Yuri** in his book **“The European Union’s Common Strategy on Russia: A View”** writes Russia embraces the transformative logic of the Russia-EU relationship but, in stark contrast with the EU’s approach, Russia defines it as a goal to be achieved by the Russia own proactive measures .therefore the integrationist and post-sovereign sides of the relationship are challenge by Russia as it is centered more on sovereignty, the transform of certain sectors and on very traditional ends- buttressing sovereignty, global status and not simply not join European Union diction of values and norms as envisaged by PCA and the Union’s own Common Strategy on Russia.

CHAPTER: 2

The Second Chechen War: An Empirical Case-Study

In the introductory part of this dissertation establishes certain clear differences between Russia and European Union concerning the framing of the normative foundation of their institutionalized relationship. Yet the existence of differences at the level of abstract worldviews tells us nothing about their Salience. In order to gauge their significances it is important to look at concrete case, actual practices and the dialectics of power where these differences are being played out. This chapter will argue one key case when the lack of commonality regarding the nature of institutionalization became an underlining factor between the two - Second Chechen War from August 1999 to June 2000.

The initial response of Russia's plight was sympathetic. On 13th August 1999 the Finnish presidency issued a declaration on the behalf of EU in which the Union recognized the territorial integrity of Russia. However EU cautiously traded over this issue by emphasizing on 'proportionate force' in restoring order in Dagestan. Instead of internationalizing the situation, Russia insisted that Chechnya was an internal matter to be dealt with by an 'anti-terrorist operation'. In essence, this meant perusing the brutal military option and alienating the EU and other western actors in the process. However there was certain change of voice when on 7th October 1999 EU troika met in Moscow. the former Finnish foreign minister Tarja Halonen, leader of the delegation reaffirmed the Union's support Russia's territorial integrity but simultaneously condemned the methods Russia was applying in restoring order in Chechnya by insisting on international human rights norms (**European Report No. 2441, 9 October 1999**). In reply the then foreign minister of Russia Igor Ivanov noted that Moscow did not need any mediators or third parties to handle what essentially constitute a domestic problem for Russia.

The tone of EU condemnation grew harsher commensurate with the escalation of violence and growing number of civilian casualties in Chechnya. On 12 October the General Affairs Council (GAC) called for a political solution to the crisis. On 22 October 99 joint statement was issued in Helsinki Russia-EU summit with strong words criticizing Russian actions that called for a rapid de-escalation of hostilities and the beginning of negotiations to reach a political settlement.

Few later the Russian offensive continued in the form of an article in the New York Times written by Prime Minister Putin. Once again instead of a war, Putin referred to the Chechnya conflict as an anti-terrorists campaign that Russia had been forced to wage in order to protect its citizen's from further danger. Putin also has referred to a link between Shamil Basayev and the Chechens and the Osama bin Laden, and the wider threat of Islamic terrorism. For Putin, the campaign was directed not against ordinary Chechens but against the murderers and Kidnappers who had taken the ordinary Chechens hostage; Moscow's main aim was to re-establish peace and normal life in the public. Finally, Putin sought to lay to rest the accusations concerning indiscriminate killings by Russian forces in Chechnya in a passage that is worth quoting at length:

“American officials tell us that ordinary citizens are suffering that our military tactics may increase that suffering. The very opposite is true. Our commanders have clear instructions to avoid casualties among the general population. We have nothing to gain by doing otherwise. The Chechens citizens, after all, are our citizens too. Our land and air forces strive to target only opposing armed forces. The whole reason we chose accurately targeted strikes on specifically identified terrorists bases was to avoid direct attacks on Chechen communities....Yet in the midst of war, even the most carefully planned military operations occasionally cause civilian casualties, and we deeply regret that.”

The worst came when Moscow finally decided to take Grozny by storm on 6 December the Russian Army dropped leaflets on the population of the capital, informing them that the city was completely surrounded and that they would have until 11 December to evacuate. The ultimatum has sparked off an international outcry. The US president, Bill Clinton said that Russia would pay a heavy price for its actions. In a similar manner, the

EU high representative, Javier Solana, noted how bombing a city of 50,000 people would constitute a criminal act and one that would force the Union to get through its dealings with Russia.

The European Commission was under substantial pressure from Germany and especially France to adopt a tough stance and threatened Russia with sanctions but not all member-states agreed on the wisdom of trying to apply sanctions against Russia. Notably, Britain's Prime Minister, Tony Blair, urged caution, stressing that the EU should not promise or threatened more than it could actually deliver. Nevertheless, the French insisted on a clear message being sent to the Russians, even if it had to be at the expense of specifying the actual measures eventually to be taken. Consequently, the Helsinki European Council, faced with what was believed to be a Russian ultimatum against the remaining citizens in the besieged and already heavily bombarded Grozny, issued a very harshly worded declaration.

In the declaration, the European Council condemned the intensive bombardment of Chechen cities. Although Russia's territorial integrity and its rights to combat terrorism were once again acknowledged, the declaration stated that such combat cannot under any circumstances, warrant the destruction of the cities, neither could whole population be considered as terrorists. Moreover, the European Council declared that Russia's action was in breach of the basic principles of humanitarian law and the commitments undertaken in the OSCE (The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe is the primary instrument for early conflict resolution) and the Council of Europe. The European Council thus called for Russian not to carry out the ultimatum against Grozny, but instead to end the bombing and the 'disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force' against the Chechen population, allow safe delivery of humanitarian aid to Chechnya and initiate political dialogue with the elected Chechen authorities.

The declaration also decided to draw the consequences from this situation that the implementation of the Common Strategy on Russia should be reviewed, some provisions of the PCA should be suspended and the trade-related provisions applied strictly, while Tacis 2000 (Technical Assistance for the commonwealth of Independent States) should

be limited to priority areas, including human rights, the rule of law, support for civil society and nuclear safety. The declaration explicitly states:

“Russia is a major partner for the European Union. The Union has constantly expressed its willingness to accompany Russia in its transition towards a modern and democratic state. But Russia must live up to its obligations if the strategic partnership is to be developed. The European Union does not want Russia to isolate herself from Europe.”

All in all sanctions adopted in above declarations were rather modest and did not hurt Russia in any significant way. This was surprising because in principle the EU had a vast array of measures at hand:

1. It could have suspended the PCA, including the trade access that Russia enjoyed.
2. It could have put in place selective trade and financial embargoes that would have hampered Russia’s ability to wage a war with Chechnya as a whole.
3. It could have issue visa ban on Russian offenders.

In reality, however, the reason why the economic end of the sanctions in particular lacked any serious bite was largely down to the Union’s own dependence on Russia. It could scarcely afford to hit Russian exports as they largely consisted of oil, gas and other raw materials that the Union needed. Furthermore, Rise in oil prices in 2000 in the world market ensured that Russia was no longer in need of short-term financial support from the western players anymore⁵⁵. On the contrary, the declaration was taken seriously in Moscow resulting to threat of negative consequences on the Russia-EU relations. Russian diplomats branded the forthcoming sanctions as an ‘inappropriate mix of trade and politics’ (European Report No. 2466, 15 January 2000). Indeed, it was the fear of alienating Russia from Europe that has prevented any prudent course of action that reflects EU’s attempt to thaw Russia’s Human Rights infringements in Chechnya.

EU as an institution though adopted Common Foreign and Security Policy and common Strategy on Russia as avenues through which they can expressed collective

⁵⁵ Energy Information Administration 2008 reveals that the price of crude oil has risen from less than US\$10 per barrel in 1998 to US\$30 by 2000.

disappointment of the Russian actions while using them simultaneously as a shield their bilateral dealings with Russia and carry out their usual business. **Isabelle Facon** in **'putin's Russia and Europe: A New Start?'**, exemplified that Britain's former Prime Minister Tony Blair defined Britain's relation with Russia as a one whose existence does not depend on the issue of Chechnya in entirety. And so is Germany that has publicly embraced Russia as a truly strategic partner. According to the **'International Herald Tribune 2000'**,

“The reactions of Russian leadership was measured stressing how Russia is defending not only itself but the interests of the entire Europe, protecting it from extremism....Russia will continue efforts to explain its stance and remain bent on integration into Europe”.

In a joint statement on 29 May 2000 in Russia-EU Summit, Russia emphasized its 'European vocation' and promised that it would remain 'a constructive, reliable and responsible partner in working towards new multi-polar system of international relations, based on strict implementation of the international law'. Interestingly, emphasis on principles of common interests, mutual benefits and adherence to international law shadows post-sovereign institutions over traditional institutions, a framework that can describe Russia's definition of institutionalism.

The Feira European Council

The Feira European Council conclusions witnessed the end of the increasingly inconvenient and dysfunctional Helsinki Declaration sanctions. They also brought about a new phase of 'constructive engagement' in Russia-EU relations. In the Presidency conclusions, the passage of Russia begins with the imperative: a strong and healthy partnership must be maintained between the Union and Russia (**European Council 2000b, 19-20 June 2000, "conclusions of the presidency"**). Interestingly, it was France, initially the fiercest critic of Russia's actions in Chechnya that has been instrumental in the formation of the new policy line. At the end of April, the former finance minister Laurent Fabius and foreign minister Hubert Vedrine had outlined a framework for 'a constructive new relationship' between the EU and Moscow. According to the ministers,

the future of Russia was essentials security and stability on the European continent. Therefore, the time had come to base the relationship on 'a new set of guideline for cooperation' with Russia that would be consistent with the security and political objectives of the European Union. The key should be helping Russia to continue reforms based on market principles, the rule of law and democracy, but doing so in a way that would refrain from 'export ready-made recipes for reform' while remaining clear on the EU's conditions. The key passage reiterates the above sentiments of EU:

"In standing ready to help Russia, the EU does not have to turn a blind eye to Russia's misbehaviour in Chechnya. Contrary to what some critics say, there is no contradiction between long-term and short-term objectives-between the imperatives of European values and the necessities of European geopolitical interests. Our fundamental disapproval of the way Russia has so far dealt with the painful Chechen problem, and our equally fundamental willingness to help Russia, is two sides of the same coin".

In essence this is the first outlines of the Union's new 'constructive engagement' or 'double strategy' of engaging Russia in mutually beneficial cooperation based on cooperation based on common interests, while continuing to criticize Russia for the lack of common values. At Feira the pragmatic maintenance of the partnership with Russia was set as the guiding principle in the Union's policy on the country. Even so the conclusions still insisted that the partnership was to be built on common values, especially respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Moreover the European Council offered its support for the continuous reforms in Russia and invited the Council and the Commission to review the situation in July and restart the implementation of Tacis in full.

On the basis of Feira conclusion in its 10th July session the General Affairs Council agreed that Tacis was to be reinstated and that in future, EU energies should be put into building relations with Russia instead of limiting them. However the GAC urged the EU institution to keep a sharp eye on all future Russian activities and urged the coming Council presidencies to gear their work more towards supporting economic and democratic development and strengthening independent media and civil society in

Russia. In addition, a decision was made that although the Union repeated its attachment to Russia's territorial integrity as well as its condemnation of terrorism and the indiscriminate use of force, its still emphasis the importance of a political solution in Chechnya (European Report No 2516, 12 July 2000).

On the face of it, the decisions at Feira represented a fairly balanced attempt at generating a positive momentum in the increasingly strained relationship with Russia while at the same time insisting on the importance of a certain normative baseline that the country would need to respect. As has been argued, the EU embarked on the course of 'constructive engagement' in the twin hopes of salvaging the key aim of its post-sovereign relationship with Russia- the transformation of the country on more normative values while preventing the self-imposed isolation of Russia from the rest of Europe. Yet the paradoxical outcome of this line of reasoning has been that it has, in fact, failed to win the Union the kind of leverage over Russia that it was aiming at. Instead of has further discredited the EU's post-sovereign agenda in the eyes of the Russian, who have increasingly come to view it with suspicion and even hostility as essentially anti-Russian attempts at undermining its sovereignty.

Finally another factor that might have influenced the Union's decisions to give up on sanctioning Russia were the strong positive signals it has received from Moscow during the first month of Putin's presidency. On several occasions Russia had declared its willingness to be a European power, reaffirming their importance of the EU in Russia's foreign relations and emphasizing its continued readiness for the development of the strategic partnership with the union. More often than not these positive assurances were accompanied by threats of how the EU risked alienating Russia from Europe indefinitely if it insisted on its stance concerning Chechnya.

The course of events in the second phase of Chechnya war reflects the ways in which Russia and the EU framed the war and the ways the conflict affected their institutionalized relationships. Russia viewed Chechnya primarily through three lenses-

In the first instance, the conflict was about fighting terrorism and halting the spread of radical Islam in North Caucasus. The Russians viewed the conflict as part and parcel of a longer historical continuum where Russia has repeatedly saves Europe from existential threats emanating mainly from the Far East.

Second, it was also about preserving the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, while restoring normality to the rebellious Chechen republic. This genuine belief in the righteousness of Russia's motives was displayed in both Russia's perseverance in the conduct of the campaign and its moral indignation at the EU's and other western actor's failure to be more forthcoming with unequivocal support and assistance. Part of the reason for the reason for Russia's perseverance stems from the fact that unlike during the first war, the Russian's perseverance stems from the fact that unlike during the first war, the Russian elites and public supported the military option in bringing down the Chechen resistance. Apart from the liberal party, Yabloko (**Russian United Democratic Party**) which has become increasingly marginalized during the Putin's two terms as president all the main parties in the Russian Duma unreservedly supported the conduct of a ruthless 'anti-terrorist campaign'. As a sign of this determination, a study of the most intensive operations which was conducted at the time, has shown how the Russian public was not even willing to consider basic human rights norms as being applicable to the Chechen people.

This meant that in the Russia framing Chechnya was seen as being strictly a domestic concern, with any reference to Kosovo or attempts at internationalizing the conflict simply being rejected. Consequently although Russia was willing to acknowledge the strains that the issue was placing on their dealings with the Union, the Russia-EU institutionalised relationship was not seen as having any relevance whatsoever to the handling of the conflict. In fact, Russia was waging its war according to its own strategy with minimal concern about the possible international opinion. In short, Russia was advocating the traditional reading of sovereignty based on non- interference in the internal affairs of states and viewed the role of international organization in an equally restrictive light.

By contrast, the EU framed the conflict in an entirely different manner. Although terrorism was condemned and Russia's defend its territorial integrity was widely recognized, the issue was mainly couched in terms of values. For the Union, at stake was the role of liberal values at core of a post-sovereign international institution that it has been advocating towards Russia. It was this basic incompatibility between the two agendas that drove the EU into a particularly hard collision course with Russia and in effect led to the threat and consequent adoption of sanctions.

It is interesting to note that EU has to some extent failed to pursue Russia to step in to their own line of thoughts regarding then Chechnya issue. Ideationally, with the Unions normative power and the ideas of post-sovereignty clashing with the concept of symmetric sovereignty of nation-states held by the international society itself, has helped Russia to justify its actions with references to territorial integrity and insisted on respecting its sovereignty in handling the issue internally.

Their also lies the fact that EU was constrained by the relative importance of its economic and market power. The EU was in no position to stop buying Russian energy and the other raw materials that formed the bulk of its imports from the country. The constant rise of the oil prices on the world market helped Russia to withstand the modest economic pressure exerted by the Union.

However to end this chapter it can be remarked that, the Second Chechen War has assisted the EU and its members in locating certain baseline in determining their relationship with Russia . Russia is seen as Europe's most important partner whose future is immensely depends on their own security. According to **Gorm Olsen's book "Exporting democracy: Rhetoric vs. Reality"**, 'if there is a conflict between democracy promotion and security, the EU will always gives higher priority to security' The line of communication between Russia and EU was kept open even at the expense of eroding and bearing short-term losses of values like democracy and human rights. This approach has given enough leverage to Russia.

CONCLUSION

The dissolution of the Soviet Union has been seen as a decisive in the international relations as well as in Russian statehood. In terms of the structure of the international system this can hardly be denied. It radically altered the bipolar balance of power and ushered in the 'unipolar moment' of American and wider western hegemony. The changes were also momentous in terms of the societal elements of the international system, as they in effect opened the door for the liberal hegemony of the west, the EU's policies included, enabling the spread of liberal values like market principles, democracy and human rights to an unprecedented degree in the predominantly global international society.

Yet when it comes to an effect these changes had in terms of Russian statehood and especially the underlying worldviews, the picture that emerges much more ambiguous. To be sure, the new situation did witness Russia returning to the fold in terms of (European) international society. Initially, this was reflected in the expectation that Russia would simply jump on the bandwagon of western liberalism. This expectation was based on a line of reasoning whereby the New Russia was essentially seen as a *tabula rasa*⁵⁶ upon which new liberal ideas could be made to stick with ease. For example, the father of the 'End of History' thesis Francis Fukuyama, noted at the time how Russians had an 'opportunity....to remake themselves and their self-conceptions so thoroughly, unencumbered by pre-existing domestic institutional structures or external commitments'

This quotation reveals a strand of thought that was rather typical at the beginning of the 1990's namely that the period represented what can be said a 'formative moment' for Russia. Following Ringmar, a formative moment can be seen as a period in the life of an individual or a society 'when old identities break down and new ones are created in their

⁵⁶ *Tabula rasa* is the epistemological theory that individuals are born without built-in mental content and that their knowledge comes from experience and perception.

places; times when new stories are being told, submitted to audiences, and new demands for reorganization presented'. In essence, the main characteristics of a formative moment would seem to be its plasticity. At times, identities or worldviews in the parlance of this work can be what the actors make of them.

But in the light of this work, it would seem that formative moments are not that absolute. Instead, the beginning of the 1990's has to be seen as a periods of complete intellectual confusion in the ruling circles of Russia. This disorientation opened the door for a brief and haphazard emulation of western /European ideas and ideals, followed by a growing rejection of them. For example, Yeltsin economic programme and its waning popularity in Russia. Although contemporary, Russian policies externally and even internally, for that matter, are very much focused on agendas concerning the domestic needs and prosperity. But it would be naïve to think that the Soviet world views. Instead, the stance put forward on this occasion is that even at moments of the most radical ideational restructuring there is a good deal of continuity in change asserts **W Jeffrey Legro** in his book **“Rethinking the world: Great Power Strategies and International Order”** In the case of Russia, the biggest factor that serves to explain the failure of the formative moment at the beginning of the 1990's is that the Soviet structures particularly cognitive, but to a degree institutional, political and even economic as well were not completely demolished in 1991-92. In fact, Yeltsin has been accused of making a serious mistake when he failed to disband the Supreme Soviet and called new elections in January 1992, deciding instead to rush in with the implementations of his own agenda and wait for the full parliamentary cycle to end, allowing ample time for nationalist and conservative forces to regroup. But the experience since then would seem to suggest that this is in actual fact a moot point. No amount of elections and quick parliamentary victories for the liberals would have made³ much of a difference without a radical restructuring of the elites in the ministries, army, industries and the regions perhaps in the whole of Russian society.

There was no radical interpretation of history, clear de-Stalinization or de-Sovietisation, no clear challenge to the previous Soviet worldview other than economic shock therapy and a momentary celebration of Russia's essentials compatibility with western/European

norms and values that proved to be rather short-lived. As Legro argued, that 'successful learning depends on the availability of viable alternatives and their initial success, which will help to consolidate the changes in underlying worldviews. In this respect it is noticeable that the liberal agenda of the early 1990's certainly qualified as such an alternative, yet the serious economic and political hardships associated with the ideas, together with the still relatively strong grip of Soviet mentalities, ensured that learning and ultimate changes in worldviews remained superficial, enabling the rather swift return to a more traditional forms of thinking.

It may be noted in this work that interaction has enabled both the actors to explain their own essential interests in the relationship for EU, the basic stability of Russia is important and for Russia, resistance to EU's normative hegemony has increasingly resulted into 'stable equilibria'. As exemplified by the Union's decision not to cut off relationship with Russia in the course of Chechen War. However, such a process cannot be envisaged as a certain convergence of expectations (commonality) at the level of worldviews. Russia has been pressing for dilution of EU's post-sovereign nature of institutionalism. EU hopes to witness substantial change in Russia's traditional institutionalism. However, such changes on both sides have failed to evolve with both the actors becoming more entrenched and hostile to each other.

The role of power in defining their relationship is pertinent to mention here. In terms of military power, it is a priori assumption of its inapplicability in the present context was borne out. No instances of military power would have played a role in the relationship between Russia and EU. The Chechen war was at least definitely not a military contest between them. In terms of market power the position of EU is certainly more preponderant. With non-WTO members it has the right to decide on terms of access to the single market a factor that accounts for the union's insistence on normative convergence on the part of Russia. Russia clearly enjoys certain advantages which have diluted EU's market power to a considerable degree.

The efficacy of using sovereignty as a form of 'power' emerged in the empirical analysis. Russia's success in resisting the Union's post-sovereign agenda stems from the fact that

despite its nature as a post-sovereign international institution, the PCA effectively rests on a wider international legal order that is still largely based on the principle of sovereignty. Russia's own sovereignty helped Moscow to resist the Union's attempt at projecting its norms and values, even in a post-sovereign institutionalized setting. Having said that even it is considered that Russia could successfully ward off EU's brand of institutionalism, dawning of new set of ideas that would be competitive in the wider marketplace of ideas is yet to arrive. Therefore whether, Russia could evolve a set of ideas especially along the lines of 'sovereign democracy' to challenge west's normative power opens a new field for research.

It seems clear that the problems in the Union's application of regional normative hegemony based on post-sovereign principles stem increasingly from the wider constitution of international society. Two trends merit discussion in this respect. First, EU's uneven and selective application and enforcement of liberal principles. The imposition of post-sovereign tenets as upheld by the EU has taken a backseat over material interests. **Sarah Mendelson** in "**Washington Quarterly**" titled "**Dusk or Dawn for the Human Rights Movements**" has traced the lack of international responses to systematic human rights violations. According to her these failings have resulted in a situation where certain actors Russia included have felt increasingly empowered to take a hyper sovereign mode rejecting any criticism of breaches of liberal values as unwarranted encroachments on national sovereignty. In fact Robert Keohane a scholar of institutionalism has suggested that one of the biggest stumbling blocks to a successful liberal western world order stems from the divergent conceptions concerning sovereignty between the EU and the United States.

Second and partially following on from the first point, there is certain essential 'westphalianness' of the current constitution of international society. in his magisterial overview of institutional change in world politics, K. Holsti an IR scholar has come to the conclusion that all the talk about 'erosion of sovereignty' and how we live in a 'post-westphalian world' is not backed by any empirical evidence for him, 'a good deal of the contemporary institutional context within which states pursue and defend their interests is recognizable in late seventeenth and early eighteenth century antecedents'

The recent and still emerging debates concerning the rise of economically successful but politically authoritarian powers writes ‘Azar Gat’ in “**The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers**” seems to indicate that one might be witnessing an era in which hegemony of western liberalism is eroding beyond repair. Moreover the severe financial and economic crisis that peaked in 2008-09 would appear to accelerate the current trend of powers and influence hemorrhaging away from the west to a more sovereign abiding China and wider Asia.

Now if this is the case, then the EU could be in danger of becoming increasingly marginalized with its post-sovereign approach to international relations. In fact, the conclusion can be drawn that Russia will have the option to approach other power centers (Asia-Pacific region) and normative agendas other than one represented by EU. Russia would always have the side of sovereignty-abiding international society as a source of legitimacy when seeking to circumscribe and subvert the Union’s normative hegemony in Europe.

Finally to sum up the dissertation it can be said that the dissertation has ponder over the issue of differences in institutional relationship between Russia and EU. The work has also noted that this issue has remained somewhat constant through out with only minimal changes emerging. For the EU the main aim of the relationship seems to be transforming Russia along European norms and values. The Union has been insisting on sovereignty-challenging normative hegemony on the part of Russia. It is also worth pointing out that the EU’s approach to Russia is not unique, but is a part of a wider pattern in the post cold-war era whereby it has sought to make its relations with external partners conditional upon their respecting certain key liberal norms and values. For the Union, fostering a set of bilateral post-sovereign institutionalized relationships has been the main way of ordering post-Cold War Europe.

By contrasts, Russia has had a much more traditionally sovereign understanding of its relationship with its Union. Although the role of normative convergence has been acknowledged in principle, Moscow has sought to restrict its applicability. Therefore instead of wide ranging normative convergence along the line envisaged in Article 55 of

PCA⁵⁷, Russia has promoted much more selective process, which will move ahead only if it benefits Russia in keeping its political and economic interests. In addition, Russia has insisted on political equality and preservation of its sovereignty, in effect excluding the EU from having any influence in Russia's domestic spheres, as particularly exemplified by the case of Second Chechen War.

In this respect it can be seen that both Russia and EU are contextual as well as intentional actors. The EU seeks to impose the values and norms in the belief that doing so is the most efficient way of spreading stability and prosperity in its neighbourhood. The Union sees it as being its own interests to seek the liberalization of Russian society and economy in future. By contrasts Russia seeks to resist the EU attempt in the belief that by protecting its own autonomy and sovereignty, its chances of resecuring a major role in the world will be enhances. Both agendas are contextually rational. Yet when they are combined, they are inherently incompatible leading to political crisis and lack of mutual understanding between the two 'strategic partners'.

The work concludes that the level of commonality between the two actors concerned here is very low when it comes to the normative foundation in fact, the presence of practically opposite and even conflicting frames in their relationship can itself be seen as a factor accounting for the formalization of institutionalization between the parties.

⁵⁷ "Russia shall endeavour to ensure that its legislation shall be gradually made compatible with that of the Community.

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