

**PAKISTAN OCCUPIED KASHMIR (POK): GEO-STRATEGIC
IMPORTANCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION**

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for award of the degree of*

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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2012



Date: 26 July 2012

DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled “Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK): Geo-Strategic Importance and Implications for the Region” submitted by me for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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Dedicated to

My Parents and Friends

For what they have been to me. . .

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First and foremost I want to thank Almighty for enabling me to complete this work in its present form. I shall fail in my duty if I do not express my gratefulness to a number of persons without the active support of whom this work would not have been possible.

First of all I want to express my deep gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Sangeeta Thapliyal. She shared her boundless knowledge with me, and showed me a way out whenever I found myself in the Dark. It is under her infallible guidance that I was able to take up this challenge. She always welcomed me with my queries and solved my problems. Just like a potter, who with his dexterous hands turns formless clay into beautiful pots, she moulded my nebulous thoughts into concrete ideas. She is not only an able scholar, but also one of the nicest human beings I have come across. I consider myself fortunate to have worked under her unfailing guidance, and hope to do so in future as well.

I will thank my parents for the kind of upbringing they have given me, which has made me the person I am. They have always stood by me in important decisions of my life. I know they struggle with the objections and the cynicism of the society in endowing me with higher studies. Though they have never complained to me about this, their silence speaks.

My cordial thanks are due to Rohan, Puyesh, Amitanshu and Abhi , without whom this work would not have seen the light of the day. Their contribution in the completion of this work is enormous. They have paid the price of being my best buddies, but never complained. They always cheered my spirits whenever I was disheartened or nervous during the course of writing this dissertation. They have been a continuous source of motivation to do good work.

I am thankful to the staff members of JNU Library and Teen Murti Library for their timely rendered assistance in finding out the right materials on right time. I convey my gratitude and thanks to our schools and centre's staff for their source of inspiration.

Last, but not the least, my thanks-giving is also due to my M.Phil batch mates: Abhijit, Lobzang, Shivam, Antar, and, especially, Abhishek. Interactive discussions with them created new ideas in me and more possibilities of improving this work.

NISHANT BHARDWAJ

ABBREVIATIONS

AJK	Azad Jammu and Kashmir
AKRSP	Aga Khan Rural Support Programs
ALG	Advanced Landing Ground
BRO	Border Roads Organisation
CCS	Cabinet Committee on Security
CENTO	Central Treaty Organisation
CFL	Cease Fire Line
CRBC	China Road and Bridge Corporation
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FCR	Frontier Crimes Regulations
GBUM	Gilgit-Baltistan United Movement
HUJI	Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami
J&K	Jammu and Kashmir
IAF	Indian Air Force
KANA	Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas
KKH	Karakoram Highway
KLC	Kashmir Liberation Cell
LAC	Line of Actual Control
LeJ	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi

LeT	Lashar-e-Toiba
LOC	Line of Control
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NA	Northern Areas
NAAC	Northern Areas Advisory Council
NALC	Northern Areas Legislative Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NC	National Conference
NFC	National Finance Commission
NLI	Northern Light Infantry
NWFP	North-Western Frontier Province
PMDC	Pakistan Mineral Development corporation
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SEATO	South East Asia Treaty Organisation
SSC	Special Service Group
TTP	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
UNCIP	United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNMGIP	United Nations Monitoring Group for India and Pakistan
U S	Unites States of America

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CHAPTER ONE:

INTRODUCTION

Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), a landlocked region located between the two Asian giants - India and China is unique because it was the counterpoint of British and Russian empires in the 19th century.¹ The significance of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir in terms of geo-strategy seems to be rising, given the fluidity of strategic equations in South Asia.² Beginning with the partition of India in 1947, Pakistan with the help of tribal *lashkars* invaded the princely state of J&K and soon afterwards the ruler of the state acceded to India. India succeeded in repulsing the invaders from the valley, but, when the Indian army sought to clear the state of these *lashkars*, it was confronted with regulars from the Pakistan army. This is taken as Pakistan's first war with India over Kashmir in 1947, wherein the ceasefire of 1949 resulted in Islamabad illegally taking over a portion of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).³

The area of J&K under the control of Pakistan is known as Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. It sizes up to approximately 85,793 sq kms and was further divided in 1970 into two separate administrative divisions, namely, Mirpur-Muzaffarabad (commonly referred to as Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) by Pakistan) and the Federally Administered Gilgit-Baltistan. Being the northernmost part of POK, Gilgit-Baltistan was earlier referred to as the "Northern Areas" in Pakistan.⁴ Thereafter, the government of Pakistan had also ceded a huge portion of territory of the Shaksgam Valley of POK, worth 5,180 sq kms to China in a border agreement of 1963.⁵

Situated between the Hindu Kush and Karakoram Range of mountains in the north and western Himalayas in the south, the geo-strategic placement of POK makes it ever more significant momentous for India, Pakistan and China. The region borders Pakistan's Dir, Swat, Kohistan and Kaghan districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in the west, the Wakhan Corridor of Afghanistan in its northwest, Xinjiang Province of China to its east and

¹ Lamb, Alastair (1994), *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy*, Karachi: Oxford University Press: 20.

² Chansoria, Monika, "Gilgit-Baltistan is of immense geo-strategic significance", *TheSundayGuardian.com*, (Online: web) Accessed on 15 January 2012, URL: <http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/gilgit-baltistan-is-of-immense-geo-strategic-significance>.

³ Singh, Jasjit (1995), "Pakistan Occupied Kashmir" in Jasjit Singh (ed), *Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Under The Jackboot*, New Delhi: Siddhi Books: 7-9.

⁴ Ibid: 3.

⁵ Stobdan, P.S. (1995), "North-west Under the Maharaja" in Jasjit Singh (ed), *Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Under The Jackboot*, New Delhi: Siddhi Books: 44.

northeast, Indian part of Jammu and Kashmir to the southwest, and a 480 km-long Line of Control (LOC) running alongside India in the southeast.⁶

Pakistan Occupied Kashmir is home to an unusual intersection of Asia's massive landmass, as it connects parts of West Asia, Central Asia, South Asia and China. The economic linkages and benefits established through this region are visible and evident, especially in relation to nations such as China, Tajikistan and Afghanistan. The region provides for a passage to the critical trading routes stretching from West Asia and Africa through to China.⁷

In order to access the mineral and energy-rich markets of Central Asian countries including Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, POK's geographical location has made it a focal point for China. It is only natural that Pakistan and, for that matter, even China, have underscored and demonstrated the significance of this steep corridor by constructing Karakoram highway (KKH) and Dry port at Sust in Gilgit. The two countries are planning to link Kashgar and Xinjiang through rail network to further their geo-strategic objectives in the region.⁸

On the other hand, the South Asian countries can access Central Asian markets through this region. Countries like Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are rich in uranium, cotton, oil and gas resources. It is proposed that in future, the oil and gas pipeline from Iran to China will also pass through this mountainous corridor.⁹ Basically the alliances between China, Pakistan and the Middle Eastern countries are being built by using POK as a connecting link. The situation is compelling the Western countries as well to take interest in the region.

⁶ Karim, Afsir (2009), "Strategic dimensions of Trans-Himalayan Frontiers" in K. Warikoo (ed), *Himalayan Frontiers Of India*, NewYork: Routledge: 59

⁷ Chansoria, Monika , "Gilgit-Baltistan is of immense geo-strategic significance", *Thesundayguardian.com*, (Online: web) Accessed on 15 January 2012, URL: <http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/gilgit-baltistan-is-of-immense-geo-strategic-significance>.

⁸ Bansal, Alok (2007), "Growing alienation in Gilgit Baltistan: the Future Potents", in Virendra Gupta and Alok Bansal (eds.), *Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: The Untold Story*, New Delhi: Manas Publications: 221.

⁹ "Geo-Strategic Relevance of Gilgit Baltistan", *Gilgitbaltistan.us*, (Online: web) Accessed on 16 November 2011, URL: <http://www.gilgitbaltistan.us/Facts-about-GB/geo-strategic-relevance-of-gilgit-baltistan.html>.

Taking into consideration the sheer strategic importance of the region and the changing security- environment in the same, the major global actors are now getting interested in the region and are trying to determine largely their future themes of a new world-order in this part of the world by creating dissension and volatile campaigns. As such, there is an pertinent need for, and a much larger scope of action for counter-balancing such nefarious foreign designs and themes.¹⁰

The ‘Great Game’¹¹ has been revived after 9/11, as shown by the subsequent developments in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), founded in Shanghai in 2001, with Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as its members, is another manifestation of the ‘Great Game’ and points to the strategic importance of the central Asian region. It is also getting obvious that China is playing a leading role in establishing and strengthening the SCO for gaining a strategic foothold in this region and the trans-Himalayan region has gained added importance in this environment.¹²

The increased Chinese engagement in POK and its strengthening alliance with its historic ally – Pakistan - is creating tension in the regional security environment, as this is directly posing a threat for India’s national security. On the other hand, the enhanced position of the rising China in the region has attracted U.S. in this game. Considering the current security condition of the region, both India and U.S. are working as an alliance to procure their respective strategic interests from the region. For India it shall be immensely

¹⁰ Zain, Omar farooq (2010), “A Socio-Political Study of Gilgit Baltistan Province” *Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences (PJSS)*, 30 (1): 181-190

¹¹ "The Great Game" (Online: web) Accessed on 15 January 2012, URL: www.sras.org/the_great_game, it is a term often used to refer to how world politics affect Central Asia and India. Most historians see a distinct continuity in this political struggle starting from 1813 with a near-century of British-Russian imperial animosities. The game continues through the conflicts which arose regarding the spread of Communism after 1917 and through the Cold War, when the US usurped Britain as the world’s other superpower and Great Game’s other major player. Many studies continue to use the term to describe and better understand the current relations between Russia, China, and the US, as these countries compete for influence in the resource-rich but politically volatile region, The School of Russian and Asian Studies,

¹² Karim, Afsir (2009), “Strategic dimensions of Trans-Himalayan Frontiers” in K. Warikoo (ed), *Himalayan Frontiers Of India*, NewYork: Routledge: 64.

beneficial as U.S. presence in the region will help India to re-assert its claim over POK and will possibly end the Kashmir dispute.¹³

Common to the interests of both, India and USA, is to gain an access to the Northern Areas of Pakistan to launch a joint offensive campaign against China. As according to media reports, the U.S. Army in Afghanistan's province Badakhshan is on a move to set up sensitive military installations near the Afghan-China border which is adjacent to the Gilgit Baltistan Province.¹⁴ American officials are also using their influence in Afghanistan following their support to the Muslim extremist outfits in China's Sinkiang province which shares a long border with Gilgit Baltistan. Therefore, the Indo-U.S. alliance poses an imminent threat to China as well as Pakistan.¹⁵ This needs to be addressed by launching an all out counter effort to set the house in order. Equally significant will be the role of China in the future developmental projects, which will definitely make them capable of redesigning the future course of action in the region.¹⁶

Within this broader perspective, this chapter aims to analyze, examine and interrogate concepts related to geo-strategy and other relevant issues associated with it. It provides theoretical background to the proceeding chapters, and tries to understand geo-strategic importance of the region and how the action of the regional and global players, in order to pursue their respective interests, has changed the security environment of the region. Primarily divided into two parts, the first part of the chapter explores the concept of geo-strategy and how this sub field of geo-politics emerged rapidly in the latter half of the twentieth century. The final section explains the historical background of POK till 1947.

The concept of Geo-strategy

Geo-strategy is a subfield of geopolitics, so in order to have a detailed understanding of geo-strategy, the description endeavors to begin with a brief description of the concept of

¹³ Kapila, Subhash (2010), "China's obtrusive presence in POK: implications for India and United states", South Asia Analysis group, Paper. 4036, September 13, 2010, Accessed on 24 January 2012, URL: <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers41%5Cpaper4036.html>.

¹⁴ Rehman, Hamud-Ur, "Some observation on U.S. plans in Northern Afghanistan", *The Daily Times*, Lahore, 11 July 2009.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Zain, Omar farooq (2010), "A Socio-Political Study of Gilgit-Baltistan Province" *Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences (PJSS)*, 30 (1): 181-190.

geopolitics. Geopolitics, as thought and practiced, is linked to the establishment of states and nation-states as dominant political institutions. Geopolitics, especially, is historically/temporally connected to the end of the nineteenth century, a period of increasing mounting competition between the most powerful states. Geopolitics was initially understood as the realm of inter-state conflict, considering only the powerful Western countries. In other words, there was a theoretical attempt to separate geopolitics from imperialism, the dominance of powerful countries over weaker states.

However, the term Geo-politics was originally coined in Sweden by Rudolph Kjellen in an article in 1899, the word *geopolitik* was first introduced into German in a review of Kjellen's work in 1903 and subsequently by Kjellen himself in 1905. However, the concept was popularized most famously by Karl Haushofer,¹⁷ under the term 'Wehr-geopolitik', several English and American writers of political and military science attempted the adequate translation of the customary German term, Wehr-geopolitik "Defense-geopolitics" but it does not explained the aggressive characteristic of this field of German political geography,¹⁸ General. Frederick L. Schuman refers to Wehr-geopolitik as "geo-strategy" in his article monograph, "Let Us Learn Our Geopolitics" This seems to be the most forceful translation of the original German expression coined by General Haushofer.¹⁹

Halford Mackinder was another well known and influential of the geo-politicians who emerged at the end of the nineteenth century. He applied the concept of geopolitics in international politics via his Heartland Theory. In a thesis titled "The Geographical Pivot of History," Mackinder theorized that in the industrial age, the natural resources of Central Asia 'the great pivot' are so vast that it will serve as the geostrategic instrument for the state that controls it to become 'the empire of the world.'²⁰ Mackinder saw global politics as a "closed system" meaning that the actions of different countries were necessarily interconnected, and that the major axis of conflict was between land- and sea-

¹⁷ Tuathail, Gearoid O, Toal Gerard (1994), *Problematizing Geopolitics: Survey, Statesmanship and Strategy*, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New series, 19 (3): 259-272.

¹⁸ Gyorgy, Andrew (1943), "The Geopolitics of War: Total War and Geostrategy". *The Journal of Politics* 5 (4): 347-362.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Mackinder, H. J (1962). *The Geographical Pivot of History*, New York: Norton and Company: 241.

powers. He defined the geography and history of land-power by defining, in 1904, the core of Eurasia as the Pivot Area, which in 1919 he renamed the “Heartland”.

Though Mackinder was greatly influenced by the work of Alfred Thayer Mahan in, “Influence of Sea-power upon History” (1890) and The Interest of “America in Sea-power” (1897) under which Mahan made a historical distinction between land and sea-powers that was to influence geopolitical thinkers through the Cold War. He believed that great powers were those countries whose insularity, coupled with an easily defensible coastline, provided a secure base from which, with the aid of a network of land bases, sea-power could be developed and national and global power attained and enhanced.²¹

On the contrary to the theorizing of concepts of geopolitics by the Anglo-American thinkers, the German school of geopolitics was responsible for an early application of principles of power politics to military science and for the mobilization of politics and geography in the service of world-wide warfare. Accordingly, Haushofer created a geopolitical vision that unified two competing political camps in inter-war Germany: the landed aristocrats, who wanted to expand the borders of Germany eastwards toward Russia and the owners of new industries such as chemicals and engineering who desired the establishment of German colonies outside of Europe to gain access to raw materials and markets.²² This German process illustrated a key feature of classic geopolitics: the classification of the earth and its peoples into a hierarchy that then justified political actions such as empire, war, alliance, or neglect. This process of social stratification operates in an analogy with a regionalization of the world into good/bad, safe/dangerous, valuable/unimportant, peaceful/conflictual zones.²³

After tracing the historical evolution of the concept of Geopolitics, it can be defined as a theory that describes the relation between politics and territory both on local and international level. It comprises the art and practice of analyzing, proscribing, forecasting, and the usage of political power over a given territory. Specifically, it is a method of foreign policy analysis, which seeks to understand, explain and predict

²¹ Fint. Colin (2006), *Introduction to Geopolitics*, New York: Routledge: 20.

²² Abraham, D (1986), *The Collapse of the Weimar Republic*, second edition, New York: Holmes and Meier.

²³ Fint. Colin (2006), *Introduction to Geopolitics*, New York: Routledge: 20.

international political behavior primarily in terms of geographical variables. Those geographical variables generally are: geographic location of the country or countries in question, size of the countries involved, climate of the region the countries are in, topography of the region, demography, natural resources available in the territory and technological development.²⁴

Academically, the study of geopolitics involves the interdisciplinary scrutiny of geography, history and social science with reference to spatial politics and patterns at various scales (ranging from the level of the state to international). It is multidisciplinary in its scope, and includes all aspects of the social sciences with particular emphasis on political geography, international relations, the territorial aspects of political science and international law.²⁵

In the abstract, geopolitics traditionally indicates the links and causal relationships between political power and geographic space, looks to geographic or Earth-centered physical and spatial characteristics for its explanatory power.²⁶ The unit of analysis is the state. Its location, size, resources, and population are placed in the context of political ideology, socio-cultural values, and technology to assess the dominant forms of war in a given time. The manipulative application of this knowledge is called geo-strategy, a state dominant assessment of the geospatial bases of power in plans or strategies for continuing military, economic, diplomatic, and socio-cultural advantage.²⁷

Whereas, in the post-cold war era neo-classical geopolitics emerged, which is more concerned with the strategic value of geographical factors (resources, access to the sea, etc.) correspond to more realistic of geopolitics. Therefore, the geographical position and other geographical features imply a direct influence on the foreign policy of a state and its relations with other states. In neoclassical geopolitics, the strategic value of specific

²⁴ Evans, G and Newnham, J (1998), *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*, London: Penguin Books: 37.

²⁵ Hyndmann, Jennifer (2012), *The Geopolitics of Migration and Mobility*, Geopolitics, Centre for Refugee Studies, York University, Toronto, Canada, Routledge: 243-255.

²⁶ Parker, Geoffrey (1986), *Western Geopolitical Thought in the Twentieth Century*, New York: St. Martin's Press: 199.

²⁷ Dolman, Everett Carl (2012), "New Frontiers, Old Realities", *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, 6 (1): 80.

attributes of territories plays the leading role, which led to the development of Geo-strategy as a core concept.²⁸

In an environment of relative scarcity wherein the interests of states overlap, and conflict can be expected, Geo-strategy can be explained as a study of the capacity of a state to recognize the geographically advantageous positions and capacities that enhance state power and attempts to control those positions or at a minimum deny control of those positions to an opponent, to ensure the continued health and growth of the state.²⁹

It is a new science ignoring strategic impossibilities and willing to exploit militarily any phase of human life, any reality of the natural or man-made world. It is a continuous and relentless national strategy in which peace-time diplomacy and war-time military power are alike aimed at fighting the enemy.³⁰ Geo-strategy is a type of foreign policy guided principally by geographical factors as they inform, constrain, or affect political and military planning. As with all strategies, geo-strategy is concerned with matching means to ends, a country's resources (whether they are limited or extensive) with its geopolitical objectives (which can be local, regional, or global). Strategy is as intertwined with geography as geography is with nationhood.³¹

Geo-strategists, as distinct from geo-politicians, advocate proactive strategies, and approach geopolitics from a nationalist point-of-view. As with all political theories, geo-strategies are relevant principally to the context in which they were devised: the nationality of the strategist, the strength of his or her country's resources, the scope of his or her country's goals, the political geography of the time period, and the technological factors that affect military, political, economic, and cultural engagement.³²

²⁸ Makinen, Sirke (2008), *Russian Geopolitical Visions and Augmentation: Parties of Power Democratic and Communist Opposition on Chechenya and Nato 1994-2003*, Ph.D Thesis, Tampere: University of Tampere: 23.

²⁹ Dolman, Everett Carl (2012), "New Frontiers, Old Realities", *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, 6 (1): 80.

³⁰ Gyorgy, Andrew (1943), "The Geopolitics of War: Total War and Geostrategy", *The Journal of Politics* 5(4): 347–362.

³¹ Andre. David J. (1995), "The Art of War—Part, Present, Future", *Joint Force Quarterly*: 129, (Online: Web) Accessed on 2 July 2012, URL: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/2909.pdf

³² Rogers, James and Simon (2010), Luis, "Think Again: European Geostrategy", (Online: web) Accessed on 16 November 2011, URL: <http://europeangeostrategy.ideasononeurope.eu/2010/03/14/think-again-europeangeostrategy/>

However, academicians, theorists, and practitioners of geopolitics have agreed upon no standard definition for "geo-strategy." Most of the definitions, however, emphasize the merging of strategic considerations with geopolitical factors. While geopolitics is ostensibly neutral, examining the geographic and political features of different regions, especially the impact of geography on politics, geo-strategy involves comprehensive planning, assigning means for achieving national goals or securing assets of military or political significance. It is the geographic direction to a state's foreign policy. More precisely, geo-strategy describes where a state concentrates its efforts by projecting military power and directing diplomatic activity.

The underlying assumption is that the states have limited resources and are unable to conduct a multi-dimensional foreign policy. So they must focus politically and militarily on specific areas of the world. Geo-strategy describes this foreign policy thrust of a state and, therefore, is not necessarily motivated by geographic or geo-political factors. A state may project power to a location because of ideological reasons, interest groups or simply the whim of their leaders.³³

Geo-strategy can function normatively, advocating foreign policy based on geographic factors, describing how foreign policy is shaped by geography or predicting a country's future foreign policy decisions on the basis of geographic factors.³⁴

The present changed global security environment has led the geo-politicians and the geo-strategists to concentrate more over the aspect of 'Security'. The term 'Security' has generated a more concrete and practical meaning to research in the field of Geo-politics and Geo-strategy (including military strategy and regional strategies for development). The modern global changes are leading geo-strategy out of its traditional military-political meaning and necessitating its wider interpretation in the context of various natural, ecological, cultural and socio-economic aspects of global and regional security.³⁵

³³ Jakub J. Grygiel (1972), *Great Powers and Geopolitical change*, The Johns Hopkins University Press: 21-22.

³⁴ Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan (1999), "*Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy*", London and Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass: 3

³⁵ Roussev, Marin, "Political-Geographic, Geopolitical and Geostrategic Dimensions of Security", (Online: web) Accessed on 15 May 2012, URL: http://marinrusev.com/uploads/files/MR_1_51.pdf

A basic geo-strategic motive of modern policy is the desire for control over geographic areas which are geo-strategically important and are rich in natural, human or economic resources as well as control over such areas that can be used in the blocking of important world communications. Relating and applying these observations over the concept of geopolitics and geo-strategy to this research work, it clearly explains the current security environment of POK and the political struggle over the region, in which the three major stake holders: Pakistan, China and India are contesting for their respective interests.

As mentioned above the modern geo-strategic policy is to get control over a geographic area of geo-strategic importance, this policy is aptly followed by China in POK. The geographical location of POK between India, China, Pakistan and Afghanistan makes it of sheer paramount geostrategic importance. Besides the geographical positioning of POK, the region is rich in water and other natural resources, the description about these resources is given in the second chapter.

According to Jakub J. Grygiel, “It is the geographic distribution of centers of resources and lines of communication, assigning value to locations according to their strategic importance”.³⁶ Considering this statement, it can be argued that China has analyzed the centers of resources in POK and is carrying out extensive infrastructural development projects in POK which, in turn, is providing China a progressive control over the region that is rich in natural resources and is therefore, of immense economic importance to China. This region also provides pathway towards the Central Asia under its revival of ancient silk-routes strategy and also towards energy rich Middle-East through the Karakoram Highway, which ultimately ensures China a hold over the lines of communication of the region. Hydrocarbon resources and issues of energy security is expected to enhance POK’s importance in the regional strategic environment because of its location in relation to the resource base and countries with high and increasing consumption and demand of the resources.

India and China are going to comprise the largest market of hydrocarbons in the coming decades. As noted earlier, the source of this resource is located in the Persian Gulf and

³⁶ Jakub J. Grygiel (1972), *Great Powers and Geopolitical change*, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press: 41.

Central Asia. By virtue of this reality, POK would remain a key factor in the future energy needs of both India and China, besides its role in the regional energy transportation landscape. The geographic location astride the transportation routes for the hydrocarbon riches of the Persian Gulf-Central Asia makes it one of the most important countries in spite of being energy deficient. The geography also places POK in a dominating position to influence the strategic picture. Karakoram Highway, connecting Xinjiang with the Gwadar port, providing an easy access to the 600 km Makran coast, opens up to the energy and trade routes out of the Strait of Homuz.³⁷

Analyzing the other modern geo-strategy of controlling a region of geo-strategic importance to block other countries from establishing communication linkages, applies clearly in the case of POK, as the occupation of the parts of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir by Pakistan deprived India of its direct border linkage from Afghanistan through the Durrand Line. Pakistan is intentionally denying the claims of India on the region, as it fears that India will gain the strategic link with Afghanistan which can be a security challenge for Pakistan.

The analysis of the factors having influence over the contemporary geo-strategic behaviour of China and Pakistan is quite dynamic. It is distinguished by increasing efficient and effective mechanisms for exerting influence over the region of POK through force. Consequently, migrations provoked by ethnic confessions (shia-sunni conflict), socio-political (delusive representation of masses in Politics) and ecological factors, the cross-border infrastructural projects (Chinese undertaken projects), the fast spreading of ecological dangers hazards (ecological imbalance from the construction of Diamer-Bhasha dam), illegal trafficking of drugs, weapons, and international terrorism - all these aspects are dealt with in detail in the following subsequent chapters. The above analysis clearly and cogently explains the application of Geo-politics and Geo-strategic theories in the region, and the actions of the involved countries in the region.

³⁷ Singh, Jasjit, "The Evolving Strategic Environment: Advantage Pakistan", in Ajay D. Behera and Mathew Joseph C. (ed.), *Pakistan in a Changing Strategic Context*, New Delhi: Knowledge World: 82-83.

Geo-strategic Location of Jammu and Kashmir and its Historical Dimension

The princely state of Jammu and Kashmir in the northern most part of India had an area of 84,471 sq. miles before the occupation of few areas of the state by Pakistan in 1947. Kashmir valley is surrounded by hilly and mountainous terrain. The areas of Jammu, Poonch, Muzzafrabad, Gilgit, Baltistan and Ladkhakh constitute the ring of highland that stands sentinel over the valley. These areas share borders with Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Xinjiang province of China. Only a few miles separate it from the Central Asian Republics of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan being the nearest.³⁸ The Geo-strategic location of Jammu and Kashmir has assumed its own strategic importance in the Himalayan region, in the Pamir-Karakoram-Hindukush tri-junction, where the huge land mass of the five nations meet. This massive land area is of great historical importance and is known by yet another name – the northern Areas, a place where many pathways of culture and civilizations have inter-mingled, an entrepot of many cultures with rare complexities and sophistication.³⁹

The northern areas, in particular of Jammu and Kashmir, have been in focus as an important milepost on the famous Silk route in the pre-colonial period. What was mainly a route for a vibrant exchange of trade and cultures, and conquests by Mughals and predatory raids by Ghazanavis, beginning with Alexander's campaign, underwent fundamental changes. The silk route became a road of colonial confrontation between Tsarist Russia expanding to the South and the British colonial power rushing to the Indus line in search of the geographic border for the empire.⁴⁰

The history of Kashmir goes back to antiquity, it finds a mention in the Hindu scriptures - 'Puranas'. Emperor Asoka brought Buddhism to Kashmir in 3rd century BC Kanishka held the third Buddhist council in Kashmir. Among the most famous Kashmiri rulers was Lalitaditya (AD 697-738), who heralded a golden age. A Kashmiri Brahman Kalhana wrote 'Rajatarangini'- a metrical historical chronicle of north-western Indian

³⁸ Chopra, V.D (2006), "*India's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*", New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House: 189

³⁹ P.N. Jalali (2009), "The Gilgit Dimension to the Kashmir Frontier" in K. Warikoo (ed), *Himalayan Frontiers Of India*, NewYork: Routledge: 36

⁴⁰Ibid.

subcontinent, particularly the kings of Kashmir - in 12th century CE in Sanskrit. Muslim rule in J&K dates back to around AD 1339 when Shah Mir of Swat and Reinchin Shah from Tibet fought back the Tartar invaders. Reinchin Shah converted to Islam. His reign was followed by that of Shah Mir who occupied the throne, taking the name of Shmsuddin. During the 14th and early 15th century a large number of adherents to the Sufi school of Islam came to Kashmir from Persia and Central Asia.⁴¹

Zainul Abedin, who ruled Kashmir from 1417 to 1469 was reputed for tolerance. He patronized fine arts, undertook the building of infrastructure and established a responsive administration. His half century reign was followed by a period of turbulence after which order was restored in 1589 when the Mughal Emperor, Akbar, established his supremacy. After Akbar, during Aurangzeb's reign Kashmir again relapsed into disturbance and fell into the hands of Pathans. The Pathan period was considered as the cruelest in the history of Kashmir.⁴²

The Pathans were defeated by the Sikh ruler Ranjit Singh, who finally gained ascendancy over Kashmir in 1819. The Dogra, Gulab Singh⁴³ was appointed as the Governor of Jammu under the Sikh Darbar and his General Zorawar Singh conquered Ladakh and Baltistan. The rise of Sikh power, however, brought the Lahore Darbar into Conflict with the British. In 1846, at the conclusion of the Anglo-Sikh wars, the British handed over the mountainous terrain between the Ravi and the Indus to Gulab Singh for a consideration of Rupees 75 Lakhs.⁴⁴

Gulab Singh had already annexed the Buddhist kingdom of Ladakh in the 1830s and the predominantly Muslim majority area of Baltistan in 1841. Over the next three decades, he and his successors, with British support, erected a mini-empire, penetrating the outermost

⁴¹ Schofield, Victoria (2003), *Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War*, New York: I.B.Tauris: 1-2.

⁴² Ibid pp 3-5, The Kargil Review Committee Report (2000), *From Surprise to Reckoning*, New Delhi: Sage Publications: 34-35.

⁴³ A vassal of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, the founder of the Sikh Empire in the Punjab, Gulab Singh remained neutral during the first Anglo-Sikh War in 1846, facilitating British victory; the British elevated him to the title of Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir under the Treaty of Amritsar of 1846.

⁴⁴ The Kargil Review Committee Report (2000), *From Surprise to Reckoning*, New Delhi: Sage Publications: 34-35.

reaches of India's northern frontier and establishing their suzerainty over what was then referred to as Dardistan.⁴⁵ This predominantly Muslim region included the former principalities of Gilgit, Hunza, Nagar and other territories bordering Afghanistan and Xinjiang province of China.

The 1846 British Boundary Commission determined the frontier of the newly created state of Jammu and Kashmir.⁴⁶ Attention focused on the Ladakh and the Gilgit routes.⁴⁷ Because of the strategic location of this territory, the British, concerned that a Russian advance could threaten their hold over India, therefore, they were unwilling to give the Maharaja a free hand in conducting relations with his neighbours. By the 1860s Czarist Russia was not only on the brink of establishing a common border with Afghanistan but was also moving close to Chinese Turkestan.⁴⁸ British policies towards India's northern frontier, hence, were shaped until Pakistan and India's independence in 1947 by the need to thwart Moscow's expansionism.

The British eventually developed this impression that Gulab Singh's son and successor, Ranbir Singh, was attempting to devise and conduct his own foreign policy by establishing direct links with the Czarist Russia. They, consequently, monitored his activities not just in Ladakh but also in Dardistan, particularly in Gilgit. Lying on the foothills of the Karakoram Mountains, Gilgit controlled access to Hunza in the north-east

⁴⁵ Mock, John (1996), "Dards, Dardistan and Dardic: An Ethnographic, Geographic and Linguistic Conundrum", in Nigel J. R. Allan (ed.), *Northern Pakistan: Karakoram Conquered*, New York: St. Martin's Press, The term "Dardistan" was coined by G. W. Leitner, an Anglo-Hungarian orientalist who visited the Northern Areas in the 1860s and recorded his findings in *Dardistan in 1866, 1886 and 1893* (Karachi, 1889/1985). Some experts believe that he erred by placing all tribes in the area into one category, the Dards, ignoring their differences.

⁴⁶ Marshall, Julie G. (2005), *Britain And Tibet 1765-1947: A Select Annotated Bibliography Of British Relations With Tibet And The Himalayan States Including Nepal, Sikkim And Bhutan*, New York: Routledge: 159.

⁴⁷ _____, (2007), "Discord in Pakistan's Northern Areas", *International Crisis Group Asia Report* 131, (Online: web) Accessed on 17 February, URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/131_discord_in_pakistan_s_northern_areas.pdf, Imperial India's northern frontier ran along the Karakoram and its associated ranges, which created the primary watershed between the Tarim Basin in Xinjiang and the Indus River. Two major routes ran across this watershed, the Ladakh route in the east into Xinjiang by way of the Karakoram Pass, and the Gilgit route in the west from Gilgit through Hunza to Kashgar in Xinjiang via the Khunjerab and other passes of the western Karakoram range. Because of the Kashmir dispute, in 1947 the northern frontier was partitioned. India acquired the Ladakh route; the Gilgit route went to Pakistan and eventually evolved into the Karakoram Highway. This highway, the world's highest paved international road, links Pakistan with China.

⁴⁸ Lamb, Alastair (1994), *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy*, Karachi: Oxford University Press: 20. Older English-language reference works often refer to the area as Chinese Turkestan.

and the passes into Chinese Turkestan. Towards the west, it was possible to travel from Gilgit to Chitral on the Wakhan Corridor - a narrow strip of Afghan territory separating British India from Russian-controlled Central Asia. Sikh rule had been extended to Gilgit in 1842.⁴⁹

The British transferred control of the territory to the Dogra rulers of Jammu and Kashmir⁵⁰ by the Treaty of Amritsar of 1846. Six years later, a rebellion by local tribal leaders under Dogra rule led to the ouster of the Maharaja's forces. In 1860, however, Ranbir Singh recaptured it and annexed it to the state of Jammu and Kashmir as the capital of the Gilgit *Wazarat*.⁵¹ Clearly knowing the geo-strategic potential of Dardistan, The British agreed to give Ranbir Singh military aid in exchange for the stationing of a British agent in Gilgit to "supervise the conduct of policy on this frontier" in 1877.⁵² The existence of this agency, however, was short-lived, because of the strained relations between the Maharaja and the political agent, Major John Biddulph. In 1881 the agency was withdrawn. To limit the Maharaja's control over the territory, the British again established a presence in Dardistan.⁵³

In 1889 Colonel Algernon Durand re-established the agency. The first challenge came to him from the rulers of Hunza and Nagar, who had joined forces against the Dogras and posed a threat to the Maharaja's control over Gilgit as well. The rebellion was quelled, and Hunza and Nagar were absorbed into Gilgit Agency. The Gilgit garrison was supplied by 2,000 Jammu and Kashmir state troops, employed by the Maharaja. The

⁴⁹ _____, (2007), "Discord in Pakistan's Northern Areas", *International Crisis Group Asia Report* 131, (Online: web) Accessed on 17 February, URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/131_discord_in_pakistan_s_northern_areas.pdf

⁵⁰ Gulab Singh and his successors were Dogras, a Hindu tribe in Jammu.

⁵¹ *Wazarat*: ministry; *wazir*: minister.

⁵² Lamb, Alastair (1994), *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy*, Karachi: Oxford University Press: 28-29.

In the 1870s, the British government considered that "as a substitute for direct British rule, its best interests lay in supporting the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir in establishing his influence in these northern tracts of Dardistan" to prevent Russian advances from northern Afghanistan.

⁵³ *Ibid*. The Russians appeared to be moving towards northern Afghanistan from present-day Turkmenistan. There was evidence of Russian contacts with the rulers of Chitral and Hunza. The British also believed that Ranbir Singh's successor, Pratap Singh, was in "treasonable correspondence" with Czarist representatives. They "could only conclude that the defence of the Northern Frontier was too grave a matter to be entrusted to the Maharaja".

locals were not recruited until 1913, when the Corps of Gilgit Scouts was formed.⁵⁴ Powers and responsibilities were divided, with defense, foreign affairs and communications falling under the British government while the Maharaja controlled civil administration through his representative, the *Wazir-e- Wazarat*.⁵⁵

By the 1930s events in the agency's neighbourhood,⁵⁶ along with the Maharaja's attempts to reassert his independence, led the British to again change their policy towards Dardistan. On 26 March 1935 the Maharaja leased exclusive control of the part of Gilgit Agency north of the Indus to the British for 60 years. This arrangement remained in place until 1 August 1947, when the impending termination of British rule in India led to the premature dissolution of the lease agreement and the return not just of the leased area but also the rest of Gilgit Agency to the Maharaja's control.⁵⁷ With the termination of the 1935 lease and the lapse of paramountcy the entire area of Gilgit wazarat and Gilgit agency was restored under the control of the Maharaja of Kashmir. The Gilgit wazarat was returned completely as before the Gilgit agency through the direct relationship with Mirs and Rajas concerned.

In view of the lapse of paramountcy and its strategic importance the state government decided to bring about certain administrative changes to treat Gilgit as a governor province, naming it the 'Frontier Province'. Accordingly, Brigadier Ghansara Singh was deputed by the Maharaja as governor of these areas. Although, the local rajas welcomed

⁵⁴ Schofield, Victoria (2000), *Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War*, New York: I.B. Tauris: 12-13. The Scouts comprised 600 locally recruited men, trained and led by British officers. Even though half the cost of the Corps came out of the Jammu and Kashmir exchequer, it did not buy the allegiance of the troops who remained loyal to their British commanders.

⁵⁵ Khan, F.M, Habib R. Sulemai, (ed) (2002), *The Story of Gilgit, Baltistan and Chitral: A Short History of Two Millenniums AD 7-1999*, Michigan: Eejaz.

⁵⁶ Bolshevik Russia was proving an even more formidable threat to British control over India's northern frontiers than its Czarist predecessor.

⁵⁷ Schofield, Victoria (2000), *Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War*, New York: I.B. Tauris: 62. Until as late as 1941 the British government was of the opinion that Hunza and Nagar were under the suzerainty of Jammu and Kashmir but were not a part of it, nor were the areas of Chilas, Koh Ghizar, Ishkoman and Yasin. But when the plan to partition India was announced on 3 June 1947, these areas were returned to the Maharaja's control.

the return of Maharaja's rule, the Gilgit scouts was put under the administration of an British national, Major William Brown⁵⁸.

Brigadier Ghansara Singh in his work 'Gilgit before 1947' enunciates that the general impression was that the British officers did not like this change, although the common man was pleased by it. On 31 October 1947 governor was arrested and imprisoned. The British apparently played on the religious sentiments of the Muslim soldiers in the Maharaja's army and the Gilgit scouts encouraged them to revolt and detach northern areas from the rest of the Kashmir.⁵⁹ After occupying Gilgit the rebels captured Baltistan in the east. For 17 days these areas were known as "Peoples Republic of Gilgit and Baltistan" and a provisional government was formed by the rebels under Major Brown. On 4 November 1947, Maj. Brown hoisted the Pakistani flag in Gilgit, on the other side Pakistan also sent Sardar Mohammad Alam their first political agent. Pakistan made this transfer formal by signing an agreement with the president of 'Azad Kashmir' and the Muslim Conference on April 28, 1949.⁶⁰

Undoubtedly the British not only fostered the seeds of separation in Gilgit for a long time under the veil of safeguarding the imperial strategic interests vis-a-vis Russia, also became instrumental and indeed carried out the operation against the governor of Kashmir in Gilgit, as well as Gilgit's annexation to Pakistan. Pakistan thus got Gilgit as a gift from the British officers and the mutinous demands of the British commanded Gilgit scouts is portrayed by them as a separate freedom struggle not linked with the Kashmir issue.⁶¹

This study will make an attempt to explain the geo-strategic importance of POK for India and at the regional level, and will delve into the reasons behind Pakistan's policies to

⁵⁸ He was the commandant of the Gilgit Scouts and volunteered to preside over the transition from the British administration.

⁵⁹ Stobdan, P (1995), "Gilgit and Baltistan: The Historical Dimension" in Virender Gupta and Alok Bansal (ed), *Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: The Untold Story*, Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi: Manas Publications: 44

⁶⁰ Dewan, Pervez (2004), *Jammu-Kashmir-Ladakh: Kashmir*, New Delhi: Manas Publications: 129-31. Also cited from Karim, Afsir, "Strategic dimension of the trans-Himalayan frontiers", in K. Warikoo (ed), *Himalayan Frontiers of India: Historic, Geo-political and strategic Perspectives*, Routledge, New Delhi, 2009, pp 60-61.

⁶¹ Brown, William A., *The Gilgit Rebellion 1947*, London: Ibex 1998:

bring China in the region. The study will also focus on the sudden increase of the Chinese presence in POK and its future prospects in the region. It will examine Pakistan's policies towards China in POK and why it is providing access of Northern areas of POK to China and how their working alliance in the region has changed the current security environment in the region and has attracted the involvement of global actors. Furthermore, this work will cover different aspects of this contest between India, China and Pakistan in the region, like analysing the anti-India agenda of Pakistan by collaborating with China, China's economic, military and geo-strategic interest in the region, instability of governing institutions in POK and India's threat perceptions from POK and its *de jure* claims over POK. Finally, the study will bring to the fore how the negligence shown by India in claiming its authority over POK is going to affect the future security paradigms of India and its territorial integrity, and what should India do to secure its interests in the region.

POK has always been an untrodden area in terms of academic research, as media has been restricted in the area region and not much of literature is available to study the region. The paucity of literature on the subject is an indication that this is an ignored area of research and a lot needs to be done to explore the region and its socio-cultural, economic and political milieu and aspects.

Flowing from the rationale and scope of the study, the research seeks to answer some pertinent questions. How the absence of any legitimate democratic structure of governance in POK can be an opportunity for India to re-claim its authority over the region? What are the major security threats arising from POK for India after the changed security environment in the region? What policies should India follow to counter the security threats rising from increased Chinese presence and Sino-Pak collaboration in POK? Will it be a viable option for India to re-assert its claim over POK?

The objective of the study is to understand the importance of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir for the region as well as for India. It attempts to examine the policies of Pakistan towards POK. It also analyzes the future prospects of Chinese investments in POK and how it helps to consolidate Pakistan's claim over POK. It delves to understand the working of

China-Pakistan axis in POK and its impact on India's security. In the end it critically analyses India's Policies towards countering threats emanating from POK.

Taking into consideration the above mentioned research questions and objectives, this study attempts to test two hypotheses. Firstly, Pakistan has gained a tremendous strategic position in POK by bringing China in the region. Secondly, the growing Chinese presence has increased POK's significance in India's strategic calculations

The methodology for the proposed study would utilize both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources of data include documents of the government agencies, press release, joint statements and organizational reports, and the secondary source of data include books, news reports, various journals' articles, newspaper clippings and various academic papers. This research also uses information and data collected through various seminars, symposiums, think-tank analysis of world-wide organizations and internet sources. The study compares the geo-strategic importance of POK for India, Pakistan and China and uses historical, comparative methodology.

This study is divided into five chapters. The first chapter analyses concepts related to geo-strategy, geo-politics and its relation with this research. It provides theoretical background to the proceeding chapters. This chapter explains the geo-strategic importance of POK and how its immense relevance in the contemporary changing security environment has led to different actions and counteractions by the regional actors. The chapter will introduce POK as a momentous and turbulent region by elucidating its historical background from the dawn of 19th century till 1947.

The second chapter discusses in detail the condition of POK since 1947 and explains the emergence of the territorial dispute between India and Pakistan from the time of partition of India. It will also look into the turmoil in the internal politics of POK, Pakistan's policies towards POK and how it is impacting India's national security.

The third chapter deals with the historic background of the linkages between China and Pakistan and the revival of those historic linkages in the recent decade. It will also analyze China's strategic interests, and its growing presence in POK and its future prospects.

The fourth chapter discusses the importance of POK for India and how it has always been a case of neglect by India. It will also explore the future prospects of the current security condition of POK and what impact it can lay on India's national security. It will also analyze the involvement of global actors, and changing security environment in POK and the threats rising from it.

The concluding chapter highlights the observations and congregates the assessments of each chapter. An effort is made towards summarizing the various findings during the course of this study. It will test the hypothesis and will try to answer the research questions.

CHAPTER TWO

PAKISTAN'S POLICIES TOWARDS POK

After the Partition of India in 1947, the princely states were given the option of joining either India or Pakistan. However, Hari Singh, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, wanted Jammu and Kashmir to remain independent. In order to buy some time, he signed a stand-still agreement with both India and Pakistan, which sidestepped the agreement that each princely state would join either India or Pakistan.¹

However, following the declaration of partition between India and Pakistan, communal riots erupted in Punjab between the Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims when the state was being divided between India and Pakistan. In September 1947, the riot spilled into Kashmir against the Muslims. The Muslims in the Western part of Kashmir rebelled against the Maharaja and established their own independent (Azad) Kashmir government. Seeing this as an opportunity to force the Kashmir to accede to Pakistan, on 22 October 1947, the armed-Pathan tribes of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) invaded Kashmir and got to fifteen miles from the state's capital city, Srinagar.² Alarmed by this invasion Hari Singh sought India's military assistance, but India refused to help unless the Maharajah signed the instrument of accession, a standard procedure under which other princely states had acceded to India or Pakistan.³

India agreed to the accession after receiving the consent of Sheikh Abdullah, the secular and popular leader of the National Conference (NC) in the state. Maharaja Hari Singh signed the accord on October 27 and on the same day Indian armed forces entered Kashmir to repel the raiders. The local Muslims, mostly members of the NC, provided the logistical support for the Indian troops.⁴ This intervention by India infuriated Pakistani Governor-General Mohammed Ali Jinnah. On the evening of October 27th, he ordered Lt. General Sir Douglas Gracey, Chief of the Pakistan Army, to dispatch Pakistan regular troops into Kashmir, but Field Marshall Auchinleck, the Supreme Commander of the transition period persuaded Jinnah to withdraw his orders. In November, Jinnah

¹ "The J&K conflict: A Chronological Introduction", India Together, (Online: web) Accessed on 22 September 2011, URL: <http://www.indiatogether.org/peace/kashmir/intro.htm>.

² Lamb, Alastair (2002), *Incomplete Partition: The genesis of the Kashmir dispute, 1947-1948*, Oxford University Press: 136-137, also cited from Schofield, Victoria (2000), *Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War*, New York: I.B. Tauris: 60.

³ See Appendix IV.

⁴ Dewan, Pervez (1995), "A History of POK- Pakistan Occupied Kashmir" in Jasjit Singh (ed), *Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Under The Jackboot*, New Delhi: Siddhi Books, 1995, p 106.

approved the transfer of military supplies to the raiders and in early 1948 sent Pakistan regular troops to join their effort as “volunteers” and did not admit to Pakistan’s direct involvement until much later in July 1948.⁵

Meanwhile in the Northern Areas of J&K, Gilgit Scouts, a local militia, which was earlier formed by the Britishers to assist the Maharaja of the Jammu and Kashmir regarding the security of Gilgit, led by Major William Brown, a British officer, and the subverted troops surrounded the house of Brigadier Ghansara Singh, the governor appointed by Maharaja Hari Singh, and forced him to surrender. After the Governor’s arrest a provisional government of ‘People’s Republic of Gilgit and Baltistan’ was set up.⁶ It was headed by one local Rais Khan and included Major Brown, Captain Ihsan Ali, Capt Hassan (both of State Forces), Captain Sayeed, Lieutenant Haider, Subedar Major Babar Khan (all three from Gilgit Scouts) and Wazir Wilayat Ali. On 4 November 1947 Pakistani flag was hoisted at the Gilgit Scouts lines by Major Brown.⁷

Brown termed his action as a ‘*coup d’etat*’ and informed the authorities in Peshawar about Gilgit’s accession to Pakistan. Sir George Cunningham, the governor of the NWFP, on learning about Brown’s coup directed him to restore order in Gilgit.⁸ Subsequently, the rulers of the enclaves of Hunza and Nagar, within the Gilgit Agency, which were vassals of the Maharaja of Kashmir also declared their accession to Pakistan.

Major Brown sent frantic wireless messages to Pakistani authorities in Peshawar to take over the area and as a result Pakistan sent Sardar Mohammad Alam as its first political agent. The accession was formalised by signing an agreement with presidents of ‘Azad

⁵ Lamb, Alastair (2002), *Incomplete Partition: The genesis of the Kashmir dispute, 1947-1948*, Oxford University Press: 136-137

⁶ Stobdan P (1995), “North West under the Maharaja” in Jasjit Singh (ed), *Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Under The Jackboot*, New Delhi: Siddhi Books: 41.

⁷ Hassnain, F.M (1978), *Gilgit : The Northern Gate of India*, New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1978, pp 157-158.

⁸ Singh Sarila, Narendra (2005), *The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India’s Partition*, New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers India: 333-334.

Kashmir' and Muslim Conference on 28 April 1949. The agreement attempted to legitimise Pakistani administrative control over Gilgit and Baltistan.⁹

On 1 January 1948, India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru following the advice of British Governor General Lord Mountbatten and contrary to the wishes of his Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Patel, lodged a complaint with the UN Security Council invoking Articles 34 and 35 of the UN Charter to call for a peaceful settlement of the dispute over the state of Jammu and Kashmir.¹⁰ In the complaint, as it had already been pledged by Mountbatten in his letter to Hari Singh on 26 October, India reiterated its pledge of its conditional commitment to a "plebiscite or referendum under international auspices," once the aggressor was evicted.

On 20 January 1948, the Security Council established a three-member UN commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to send them to Kashmir to investigate the situation and exercise mediation. On April 21, the Council expanded the commission to five and authorized it to restore peace and arrange for a plebiscite after the withdrawal of tribal troops. Following Minister Mohammed Zafrullah Khan's admission on 7 July 1948, that his country's regular troops were in Kashmir, the UNCIP on 13 August passed a resolution calling both on India and Pakistan to conduct a plebiscite after they agreed to a cease-fire and after Pakistan's regular troops and tribesmen were completely withdrawn.¹¹

The cease-fire went into effect on 1 January 1949, while Pakistan was still in control of one-third of the state. Based on its resolution of 13 August 1948, the UNCIP sent a Monitoring Group for India and Pakistan (UNMGIP) to the region on 24 January, to monitor the Cease-Fire Line (CFL). This line was renamed in 1972 as the Line of Control or Line of Actual Control (LAC). The presence of the UNMGIP was approved by India

⁹. Stobdan P (1995), "North West under the Maharaja" in Jasjit Singh (ed), *Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Under The Jackboot*, New Delhi: Siddhi Books: 41.

¹⁰ Deora, M.S. and R. Grover (ed), *Documents on Kashmir Problem*, New Delhi: Discovery Publishing House, 1991, p. 28.

¹¹ The Kargil Review Committee Report, *From Surprise to Reckoning*, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2000, pp 43-44.

and Pakistan through an agreement in Karachi on 27 July 1949.¹² Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, an American, was appointed as the plebiscite administrator by the UN Secretary General,¹³ but he could not assume his functions as India and Pakistan objected to its implementation based on their varying interpretations of the UNCIP resolutions on the issue of demilitarization. In December 1949, the Security Council entrusted its President General A. G. L. McNaughton of Canada to negotiate a demilitarization plan in consultation with India and Pakistan. Pakistan agreed to simultaneous demilitarization but Indian government refused to demilitarize its troops, on the grounds that Pakistan being the aggressor state should vacate captured areas and India claimed the legality based on the instrument of accession signed by Maharaja Hari Singh. Without India's support the initiative failed. Consequently in 1949, the cease-fire line separating the Indian and Pakistan controlled parts of Kashmir was formally put into effect.¹⁴

After accession, the Indian part of J&K followed the democratic path as per Article 370¹⁵ of the Indian constitution while the area under Pakistani occupation was bifurcated into two - 'Azad Jammu and Kashmir' (AJK) and the 'Northern Areas', which consisted of Gilgit-Baltistan. The leaders of AJK surrendered the Northern Areas to Pakistan under the Karachi Agreement of 28 April 1949.¹⁶

¹² Dawson, Pauline (1996), "Partition of Kashmir", *The Peacekeepers of Kashmir: The UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan*, Review by A. G. Noorani, *Economic and Political Weekly*, 31 (5): 271-273.

¹³ UN Security Council, "Resolution 80 (1950) of 14 March 1950 S/RES/80 (1050)", (Online: web) Accessed 23 June 2012, URL: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f1b710.html>

¹⁴ Blinkenberg, Lars (1997), *India-Pakistan: History of Unresolved Conflicts*, Volume One: Historical Part, Copenhagen: Odense University Press: 110. Pakistan asked for a synchronised withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani troops; requested not to disband and disarm the 'Azad Kashmir troops'; and put India and Pakistan in a position of absolute 'equality vis-à-vis plebiscite.

¹⁵ See Appendix II.

¹⁶ _____, (2007), "Discord in Pakistan's Northern Areas", *International Crisis Group Asia Report* 131, (Online: web) Accessed on 17 February, URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/131_discord_in_pakistan_s_northern_areas.pdf, The agreement was signed as per the text between Pakistan and Azad Kashmir Governments. Mushtaq

Ahmed Gurmani, Minister without Portfolio, Government of Pakistan represented the Pakistan government while Sardar Mohammed Ibrahim Khan, the president of Azad Kashmir and Choudhry Ghulam Abbas, Head of All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, represented the government of Azad Kashmir. This agreement was signed exactly three months before the ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan which delineated the ceasefire line that divided Jammu and Kashmir.

Pakistan's Policies towards POK:

Administration of AJK

The 'Azad Jammu and Kashmir' government got established in POK on October 24, 1947. After the 1949 ceasefire, the Azad Jammu and Kashmir government saw its original role of a government in exile “overtaken by the demands of having to administer the land to the west of the ceasefire line on a day to day basis”.¹⁷ In 1950, the Rules of Business (RoB) were framed in order to run the administration of AJK under which the President of AJK was the holder of all executive and legislative powers. Usually, the person holding the confidence of the Working Committee of the Muslim Conference was nominated as the President of AJK. Consequently, an office of 'Supreme Head of State' was created above the President in the central government of Pakistan who had the power to appoint the president, members of the Council of Ministers and the chief justice and other judges of the AJK High Court.¹⁸ The supreme head's authority was, however, exercised within the parameters framed by KANA.¹⁹ The position was replaced by the position of president in 1952.²⁰

In 1948, some introductory judicial structures were created for running the judicial administration and some laws of former Jammu and Kashmir State were adopted for use. The RoB were revised in 1952 and sought to define both executive as well as legislative authority. Another revision of the Rules of business took place in 1957. In the system, which prevailed from 1947 to 1960, the person holding the confidence of the Working Committee of Muslim conference was nominated as the president of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. For sometime in the earlier years, the office of Supreme Head also existed who approved the legislation for Azad Jammu and Kashmir. As mentioned above this office

¹⁷ Schofield, Victoria (2000), *Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War*, New York: I.B. Tauris: 89.

¹⁸ Ibid: 90.

¹⁹ In 1950, Pakistan's ministry of Kashmir affairs “established initially to deal with matters related to the Kashmir dispute”, later renamed the ministry of Kashmir affairs and Northern Areas (KANA), assumed administrative control over Gilgit Agency, including Baltistan, Ministry of Kashmir affairs and Northern Areas, (Online: web) Accessed on 9 September 2010, URL: www.pakistan.gov.pk/divisions/ContentInfo.jsp?DivID+17&Path+155_156&ContentID+259.

²⁰ The website of the AJK government provides a detailed history of the evolution of the administrative structure in AJK, (Online: web) Accessed on 15 September 2011, URL: <http://www.ajk.gov.pk/>

was abolished in 1952 and, thereafter, only the President was the Executive Head, who was assisted by some Ministers.²¹

In 1960, after the onset of military rule in Pakistan, the Presidential Election System through the “votes of basic democrats” was introduced in Azad Jammu and Kashmir with another body known as 'Azad Jammu and Kashmir State Council' which was also elected by the basic democrats, a system which was also introduced in the rest of Pakistan by Ayub Khan. Another body known as 'AJK State Council' was introduced which was to be elected by the basic democrats. This Council consisted of 12 members elected by the people of AJK, whereas another 12 members were elected by the refugees of Jammu and Kashmir State settled outside AJK, in Pakistan.²²

In 1964, this system was replaced by the AJK Government Act, 1964. Under this Act, the provision for the State Council was amended; eight of the State Councilors were to be elected by the basic democrats.²³ In 1965, the provision was made for nomination of two members by the President from amongst the refugees settled in Pakistan. The Chairman of the Council was to be nominated by the Chief Advisor (usually a representative of the central government), under the Act, from amongst the council members. The Chairman had to act as the ex-officio President of AJK. Further, in 1968, the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government Act, 1968, came into force and eight members were elected, while four members were to be nominated by the Chief Advisor from amongst the refugees settled in Pakistan. The Chairman of the Council was elected by the Councilors, who was also ex-officio President. In 1969, a caretaker government was inducted into office. In the elections to the above positions, limited people from AJK had the right to franchise.

In 1970, major constitutional changes were introduced in AJK. The system of adult franchise was adopted through the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Act, 1970.²⁴ A democratic

²¹ _____, (2011), “Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Changing the Discourse”, *IDSA PoK Project Report*, Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi: 12-13.

²² “Azad Jammu And Kashmir - An Introduction”, Legislative Assembly of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, 2007, [Online: web] Accessed on 12 October 2011, URL: <http://www.ajkassembly.gok.pk/ajkintroduction.htm>.

²³ Mahapatra. Debidatta Aurobinda,(2006) “J&K and POK: A Comparison Constitutional and Political”, *Across LOC*, University of Jammu, July-September 2006: 1-7.

²⁴ “Azad Jammu And Kashmir - An Introduction”, Legislative Assembly of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, 2007, [Online: web] Accessed on 4 June 2012, URL: <http://www.ajkassembly.gok.pk/ajkintroduction.htm>,

setup was introduced in AJK. For the first time, the Legislative Assembly as well as President of AJK were elected on the basis of adult franchise by the people of AJK, and the refugees of the State of Jammu and Kashmir settled in Pakistan. The Assembly consisted of Twenty five elected members and one co-opted female member.²⁵ The presidential system worked for about four years, after which in 1974, the parliamentary system was introduced in AJK under the AJK Interim Constitution Act, 1974. This has undergone about 11 amendments so far. Initially, the Assembly consisted of 40 members, elected on the basis of adult franchise and two co-opted female members. The Assembly now consists of 41 elected Members and eight co-opted members (five females, one member from Ullema-e-Din or Mushaikh, one from amongst AJK technocrats and other professionals, and one from amongst Jammu and Kashmir nationals (state subjects) residing abroad).²⁶

Since 1975, the Prime Minister has been elected by the members of the Legislative Assembly. He is the Chief Executive of the state, whereas the President is the constitutional head. Besides the Executive and the Legislature, a full-fledged Judiciary was also introduced through this Act. The Supreme Court, High Court and subordinate courts are now present, in addition to many other courts, established under various laws.²⁷

All these changes in POK's administrative and constitutional structures were made through executive decrees by the Pakistan government. These were not based on any recommendations or representations made by any representative body of the people. Their prime object was to introduce a pattern of administration in the AJK which would be similar to the one prevailing in Pakistan with the exception, that AJK would have a Council, with Prime Minister of Pakistan as the Chairman, six elected members, three ex-officio members including President AJK (Vice-Chairman of the Council), the Prime

also cited in, ____, (2011), "Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Changing the Discourse", *IDS A PoK Project Report*, Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi: 13.

²⁵ Mahapatra. Debidatta Aurobinda,(2006) "J&K and POK: A Comparison Constitutional and Political", *Across LOC*, University of Jammu, July-September 2006:1-7.

²⁶ Mahapatra. Debidatta Aurobinda,(2006), "The Politics of Azad Jammu and Kashmir: A study", in P Stobdan (ed), *Security and Society*, 2 (2), Centre for Strategic and Regional Studies University of Jammu: 83.

²⁷ For detail information about judicial system of AJK consult articles 42 to 47 of "The Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act of 1974", [Online: web] Accessed on 28 August 2011, URL: http://www.ajkassembly.gok.pk/AJK_Interim_Constitution_Act_1974.pdf

Minister of AJK or his nominee, Federal Minister for Kashmir Affairs, and five Members to be nominated by the Prime Minister of Pakistan from amongst the Federal Ministers and Members of the Parliament. The Council remains a constitutional body and has extensive powers under the third schedule of the 1974 Act. The Council has exclusive power to legislate on Defence, Security, Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, Currency and Coins and matters related to UNCIP resolutions, which are the responsibilities of the Government of Pakistan.²⁸

The AJK Council is also responsible for the collection of income tax from the territory of AJK. The AJK Council Board of Revenue and its attached department, the Commissioner of Income Tax with its offices in all the seven districts of Azad Kashmir undertake the collection of income tax. Eighty per cent of the collected income tax is released to the AJK Government while the balance goes to the Council's Consolidated Funds. In sum, the AJK government enjoys only nominal powers and it functions under strict control of the Pakistani state. The Ministry of Kashmir and Northern Areas (now renamed as Gilgit-Baltistan) is the de facto body which controls by remote the affairs of the AJK government.²⁹ The politics of the state, for all practical purposes, is dependent on Pakistan in its domain of governance. It will be further explained after reading the following two provisions of the AJK interim constitution act of 1974. Subsection 3 of article 31 reads, "Neither the council nor the assembly shall have the power to make any law concerning: (a) the responsibilities of government of Pakistan under the United Nations Council for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) Resolutions; (b) the defence and security of Azad Jammu and Kashmir; (c) the current coin or the issue of any bills, notes or other paper currency; or (d) the external affairs of Azad Jammu and Kashmir including foreign trade and foreign aid."³⁰ Considering another section of the constitution, article 19 (2) states that the government of AJK has to comply with the rules made by the Prime Minister of Pakistan. For instance, Article 7(2) denies elected office to any individual

²⁸ "Azad Jammu And Kashmir - An Introduction", Legislative Assembly of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, 2007, Online: web) Accessed on 4 June 2012, URL: <http://www.ajkassembly.gok.pk/ajkintroduction.htm>.

²⁹ ____, (2011), "Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Changing the Discourse", *IDSIA PoK Project Report*, Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi: 14-15.

³⁰ "The Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim constitution Act of 1974", [Online: web] Accessed on 28 August 2011, URL: http://www.ajkassembly.gok.pk/AJK_Interim_Constitution_Act_1974.pdf

who “propagates against, or takes part in activities prejudicial or detrimental to the ideology of the State’s accession to Pakistan”³¹

The above facts clearly explain that the administration of AJK has been nominal under an elected government while the real power rested with the government of Pakistan. Every government in Islamabad has tried to install a government of its own choice in AJK in total disregard of democratic principles, which has led to a continuous turbulence in democratic setup of AJK. The first government led by Sardar M. Ibrahim Khan was dismissed in 1953 as were subsequent governments led by Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, Colonel Sher Ali and Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah, between 1953 and 1962. Following popular protests against Pakistani control in Poonch and Mirpur, the Pakistan government imposed Martial Law in AJK in 1955.³² After imposition of military rule in Pakistan in 1958, the first elected government headed by K.H. Khursheed (one time secretary of Mohammad Ali Jinnah) under Ayub Khan's basic democracy system, was also dismissed in 1964. Even after the 1974 Interim Act, the ground situation remains the same. Various elected AJK governments have been forced to take the lead from the central governments in Islamabad, both civilian and military, which have treated the government of AJK with absolute contempt.³³

The situation is not very different today. Even after sixty years of occupation, AJK is under the direct rule of the federal government of Pakistan, though it is called 'Azad' or independent. The primitive political structure in AJK is neither representative nor democratic. It excludes political groups who oppose the idea of accession to Pakistan. The people wielding power in AJK even when selected by a proper electoral process, hardly exercise any authority and are merely puppets of Pakistan. They have no independent policy and no right to raise issues pertaining to the overall welfare of the people.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Faruqui Ahmed, Azad Kashmir Today, Dawn.com, [Online: web] Accessed on 2 July 2012, URL: <http://archives.dawn.com/archives/32490>.

³³ Qureshi, Amir Humza, “Revolt Brewing in the so-called Northern Areas of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir” [Online: web] Accessed on 21 April 2012, URL: <http://www.jammukashmir.com/insights/insight980201.html>

The continuing political subjugation by Pakistan over the decades has led to an acute sense of alienation amongst the people. In March 2010, the AJK Supreme Court challenged the authority of the Pakistan Supreme Court on the issue of the “unconstitutional appointment of AJK chief justice”. A bench comprising chief justice of AJK Supreme Court, Riaz Akhtar Chaudhry, passed an order which stated: “The Supreme Court of Pakistan has no jurisdiction to entertain any petition regarding appointment of judges of superior courts of AJK. Such kind of petition does not come within the jurisdiction and sphere of Supreme Court of Pakistan”.³⁴

The order further stated that: “The Supreme Court of Pakistan has no authority to extend its jurisdiction to the area of Azad Jammu and Kashmir because the territories of Pakistan have been defined in Article 1 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The Supreme Court of Pakistan cannot go beyond the territories defined in Article 1 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan.”³⁵ Such a juridical position reflects the assertion of the people of AJK vis-à-vis Pakistan in regard to the continuous interference in the affairs of AJK.

The Situation in Gilgit-Baltistan

As has been stated earlier, the other part of POK, i.e. Gilgit-Baltistan, came under direct rule of the central government of Pakistan after the Karachi Agreement and was termed 'Northern Areas'. However, the region is not mentioned in the constitution of Pakistan. The people of the region did not enjoy the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights that people in the rest of Pakistan do. They were ruled directly by a joint secretary in the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas (KANA) Affairs (now Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit Baltistan).³⁶

Constitutional development in the Northern Areas has followed a markedly different route as compared to AJK. A political agent was initially given charge of the region,

³⁴ “AJK SC challenges Pakistan SC in a new constitutional row”, *The Statesman*, March 24, 2010 [Online: web] Accessed on 2 March 2012, URL: <http://www.thestatesmen.net/news/ajk-sc-challenges-pakistan-sc-in-a-new-constitutional-row>

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ The details about Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan can be obtained from <http://www.kana.gov.pk>

following the imperial British model of centralised control. After a brief period under NWFP's administrative control Gilgit Agency, including Baltistan, was placed under KANA in 1950. As in the Federally Administered Tribal Agencies (FATA),³⁷ the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) was applied to Gilgit Agency.³⁸ Local rulers were co-opted through the payment of subsidies and were allowed to retain most of the revenue collected in their domains. While the rulers of Hunza and Nagar were accorded executive, judicial and legislative powers, these were exercised in accordance with the political agent's directives.³⁹

In 1952, the KANA joint secretary, a mid-ranking civil servant, was given the additional responsibility of administering the Northern Areas as political resident based, however, not in Gilgit but in the federal capital. This arrangement remained in place until 1967, when the position of political resident of the Northern Areas was created with its headquarter in Gilgit. As the federal government's representative, the resident had extraordinary powers. He headed the local administration and judiciary, was responsible for enforcement of the FCR and was also the financial and revenue commissioner. Two political agents assisted the resident, one in each of the two agencies after Baltistan was given the status of a separate agency. The resident also exercised legislative powers in the Northern Areas in consultation with the federal government.⁴⁰

Pakistan's second military ruler, General Yahya Khan, created a Northern Areas Advisory Council (NAAC) in 1969 but it was devoid of decision-making powers and subordinate to the resident.⁴¹ Under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the country's democratically elected Prime Minister, major administrative changes were made. The agency system, along with the FCR and the rule of hereditary princes, was abolished in 1974 and Gilgit and Baltistan were transformed into districts like those in Pakistan's settled areas. The

³⁷ _____, (2006), "Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants", *International Crisis Group Asia Report* 125, [Online: web] Accessed on 17 February, URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/125_pakistans_tribal_areas___appeasing_the_militants.ashx

³⁸ Ibid: 5.

³⁹ Dani, Ahmed Hassan (2001), *History of Northern Areas of Pakistan : upto 2000 AD*, Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications: 409.

⁴⁰ Ibid, p.406.

⁴¹ Kruetzman Hermann (2008), "Kashmir and the Northern Areas of Pakistan: Boundary making along contested Borders", *Erdkunde* 62 (3): 209.

resident became a resident commissioner, while the political agents became deputy commissioners. A Northern Areas Council (NAC) replaced the NAAC in 1974, with members elected by direct adult franchise.⁴²

Although Bhutto changed the Northern Areas' administrative structures, he denied them the institutions of government created in AJK by the Interim Constitution of 1974, which included its own president, prime minister, legislative assembly, supreme court, high court, public service commission and even flag and anthem.⁴³ The members of the AJK assembly, as in any parliamentary democracy, are directly elected and select the prime minister from among their own members. Pakistan controls areas like defense, foreign policy and communications through the AJK Council and KANA but the AJK government has autonomy in many internal matters.

Interestingly, in March 1993, on being petitioned about the status of the Northern Areas, the AJK High Court in its verdict took serious note of the unrepresentative and arbitrary administrative system and denial of fundamental rights in the 'Northern Areas'. It directed the AJK government to immediately assume charge of the region and asked the government of Pakistan to assist the AJK government in this task. The Pakistan government appealed against this judgment in the Supreme Court, which in its verdict on 14 September 1994, stated that: "the Northern Areas are part of Jammu & Kashmir state but are not part of "Azad Kashmir" as defined in the "Azad Kashmir" Interim Constitution Act, 1974". The administrative arrangement underwent some change subsequently and a rudimentary system of representative governance was introduced in the Northern Areas in October 1994 by the formation of the Northern Areas Executive Council, with 26 members which had advisory powers but no legislative authority.⁴⁴

⁴² Ministry of Kashmir affairs and Northern Areas, (Online: web) Accessed on 2 July 2012, URL: www.pakistan.gov.pk/divisions/ContentInfo.jsp?DivID=17&cPath=155_584&ContentID=3845.

⁴³ ____, (2007), "Discord in Pakistan's Northern Areas", *International Crisis Group Asia Report* 131, [Online: web] Accessed on 17 February, URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/131_discord_in_pakistan_s_northern_areas.pdf

⁴⁴ Ganguly Sumit (2010), "Pakistan Neither A State Nor Nation", in Jacques Bertrand and Andre Laliberte (ed), *Multination States in Asia: Accommodation Or Resistance*, Cambridge University Press: 97 also cited from: "Northern Areas of Pakistan: A strong yearning for autonomy" Report of an HRCP mission, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 2005.

The real power continued to be wielded by the joint secretary to the government of Pakistan in the Ministry of Kashmir and 'Northern Areas' (KANA) and the 'Northern Areas' continued to be governed as a colony of Pakistan. This situation continued till 28 May 1999, when the Pakistan Supreme Court took note of the “dictatorial and colonial system at work in Gilgit and Baltistan”, and directed the Pakistani government to act within six months to put in place an elected government with an independent judiciary in the Northern Areas and to extend fundamental rights to the people of the region. The Pakistan government announced a package that provided for an appellate court and an expanded and renamed Northern Areas Legislative Council (NALC). Elections to the NALC were held in November 1999, but the body had few real fiscal and legislative powers.⁴⁵ Hence, the Northern Areas have no representation in any federal constitutional or political forum, so the stakeholders cannot articulate demands or grievances of the masses. The Northern Areas’ executive serves the federal executive and has no local electoral constituency and hence has no accountability to the people. Absent from decision-making forums in Islamabad, the Northern Areas also have no voice on the budget. Federal allocations to the provinces are made on the basis of the National Finance Commission (NFC) Award.

Since the Northern Areas are not represented, it is up to the sole discretion of KANA to advance the demands of the people of Northern Areas. While local wings of the mainstream national parties are in the NALC, there is little they can do to promote the Northern Areas’ political or economic interests since the region is completely subservient to the federal executive.⁴⁶ In January 2007, the chief executive of the Northern Areas declared that Islamabad was in the final stages of preparing a package of constitutional reforms, which would be sent to the federal cabinet for approval.⁴⁷ The extent to which the package will address the local grievances and would constitute meaningful change was yet to be seen.

⁴⁵ ____, (2011), “Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Changing the Discourse”, *IDSA PoK Project Report*, New Delhi: Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis: 17.

⁴⁶ ____, (2007), “Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas”, *International Crisis Group Asia Report 131*, [Online: web] Accessed on 17 February, URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/131_discord_in_pakistan_s_northern_areas.pdf

⁴⁷ Muhammad, Yasin “Northern Areas Representatives to get Constitutional Powers”, *The Dawn*, 17 January 2007.

Consequently, 'Northern Areas' was renamed 'Gilgit-Baltistan' under the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self Governance Order of August 2009. Under the package, Gilgit-Baltistan will have a Governor as in the other four provinces of Pakistan, without constitutionally being made a province. The leader of the Legislative Assembly will be known as chief minister; the Assembly will have 33 members, of whom 24 are to be directly elected; it will have powers to legislate on 61 subjects. In addition, the Governor will head a 12-member Council, with half the members from the Assembly and half appointed by the Governor. A fresh election for the Legislative Assembly is to be held by November. The territory will also have its own chief election commissioner and a public service commission. The government has described it as a “province-like” status for Gilgit-Baltistan. But the new measures have failed to satisfy any segment of the Gilgit-Baltistan population.⁴⁸

The order was made to satisfy the long standing demand of political parties and people for autonomy. However, this package does not meet the genuine demands of the people of the region, who have rejected this as being inadequate. The new leadership emerging in the region regards Pakistan's presence in Gilgit-Baltistan as illegal and argues that Pakistan's, “unilateral decision to impose herself on the land and people of Gilgit-Baltistan is a clear violation of the resolutions of the UNCIP on Jammu & Kashmir”. The Gilgit Baltistan United Movement (GBUM) termed this package illusory. Manzoor Hussain Parwana, chairman of the GBUM, which is demanding total independence from Pakistan, in his reaction to the package noted: “The so-called provincial set-up is fraudulent and a blackmailing offer of the government, which aims to conceal the political atrocities and brutal colonial control on the people in the occupied region”⁴⁹

The Pakistan media commented that other than recognizing the identity of the people of the region through a change in nomenclature, “rest of the package was a pack of gimmickry”. It was described more as a “symbolic gesture of empathy towards the people rather than a real change in the governance structure of the area”.⁵⁰ It was not meant to

⁴⁸“Gilgit-Baltistan autonomy package wins few friends”, *The Hindu*, 15 September, 2009.

⁴⁹ Khattak, Iqbal “New frontiers”, October 2009”, *Himal*, [Online: web] Accessed on 2 July 2012, URL: http://www.himalmag.com/New-frontiers_nw3563.html

⁵⁰ Ali, Abbas “A powerless Legislature for Gilgit-Baltistan”, *The Dawn*, 13 September 2009.

address the concerns of politically and economically deprived people of POK. The elections that followed were a fabricated exercise. In reality, the Legislative Assembly and the council will have to function under the strict control of Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan (the successor of KANA) in Islamabad.⁵¹

International NGOs have reported gross irregularities in the electoral process in Gilgit-Baltistan.⁵² Pakistan's dual policy on Kashmir has also been evident from its hesitation in declaring Gilgit-Baltistan to be one of its provinces, in spite of the reform package. However, it has not yet felt confident enough to claim it as an integral part of Pakistan because the 209 reforms were extra constitutional and out of the framework of settlement of Kashmir issue provided under the UNCIP resolutions.⁵³

The reform package best reflects Pakistan's dilemma towards Gilgit-Baltistan. A rational analysis of the situation has been made by some Western observers who figured out that the, “region is not included in the Pakistani constitution and has no constitution of its own, meaning there is no fundamental guarantee of civil rights, democratic representation, or separation of powers”.⁵⁴

POK’s importance for Pakistan

This region is strategically important for Pakistan, as it is the only region which has borders with Afghanistan, China and the Indian part of Kashmir. The possession of POK provides Pakistan to restrict India’s reach to the Central Asian Republics, as the demarcated Durrand Line between India and Afghanistan falls under the Northern Areas of POK. This deprivation of India’s border linkage with Afghanistan bestows Pakistan a strategic advantage over India. Historically looking, POK has provided strategic eminence to Pakistan in both the cases of Siachen Conflict and Kargil War. Considering

⁵¹ ____, (2011), “Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Changing the Discourse”, *IDSa PoK Project Report*, New Delhi: Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis: 17.

⁵² “Pak NGOs reports massive irregularities in Gilgit-Baltistan Elections”, *The Indian News*, 17 November 2009, [Online: web] accessed on 21 April 2012, URL: http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/south-asia/pakngos-reports-massive-irregularities-in-gilgit-baltistanelections_100276072.html

⁵³ Hussain Altaf (2009), “The Gilgit-Baltistan Reforms 2009”, *Forum of Federations project in Pakistan*, [Online: web] Accessed on 21 April 2012, URL: www.forumfed.org/.../Gilgit-Baltistan%20Reforms%20AHussain%20FinalDec09.doc

⁵⁴ Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2010 -Kashmir (Pakistan)*, June 24, 2010, [Online: web] Accessed on 2 July 2012, URL: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c231240c.html>

the close proximity of areas of POK with Indian part of Kashmir, Pakistan has used this territory to carry its covert military expeditions in both Siachen and Kargil.

Additionally, the region connects Pakistan and China through 885 kilometre-long Karakoram Highway (KKH) which was constructed in 1978 with Chinese help “without paying” any royalty to the people.⁵⁵ On the other side, same highway proved strategically significant for importing M-11 missiles and Chinese nuclear equipment to Pakistan.⁵⁶ This Highway was constructed after ceding 2500 square miles of Shaksgam Valley, a part of the former State of Hunza to China, without taking the people of region into confidence. In present geo-economic (and geo-strategic) context, KKH is again ready to play exclusive role by linking Gwadar port to Gilgit.⁵⁷

None of the provinces in Pakistan provides such strategic benefit. Physically connecting Pakistan with its ‘all weather ally’ China through the Karakoram Highway (KKH) which runs through the Northern Areas is of sheer importance. Gilgit, the administrative head quarter of the Northern Areas is a major strategic point in KKH. Since June 2006 Pakistan has started a bus service between Gilgit and Kashgar to enhance communication linkage.⁵⁸

There are further plans to expand the economic cooperation between the two countries in the region. According to a report, China has promised to invest \$ 350 million enabling Pakistan to open its northern borders for trade with China and Central Asian states.⁵⁹ The Sust dry port, a joint effort by Pakistan and China, built at the cost of \$1.26 billion has been functional since 2005.⁶⁰ There are also grand plans to expand the KKH and have railway and gas pipelines built along with it. General Musharraf has hinted in 2006 that building of such a connection would remarkably increase the cooperation between the two.⁶¹

⁵⁵ Inqalabi, S. (2007), “Economic Exploitation of Gilgit-Baltistan”, in Virendra Gupta and Alok Bansal (eds.), *Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: The Untold Story*, New Delhi: Manas Publications: 190.

⁵⁶ Behera, N.C. (2007), *Demystifying Kashmir*, New Delhi: Pearson Longman: 192-193.

⁵⁷ Khan, Safdar “Karakoram Highways Gwadar link likely”, *The Dawn*, Karachi, 5 July 2006.

⁵⁸ “Pakistan-China Bus Service Inaugurated”, *The Dawn*, Gilgit, 16 June 2006.

⁵⁹ Sahi, Aoun “Going the Karakoram way”, *The News*, 12 January 2007.

⁶⁰ “Sust dry port starts functioning”, *The Dawn*, Gilgit, 3 June 2005.

⁶¹ “Karakoram Highway’s Gwadar Link Likely”, *The Dawn*, Gilgit, 29 July 2006.

The economic significance of the KKH is enormous. If the road is closed even for a short span of time, it inculcates significant losses. Taking the example of 2003 road closure because of the SARS threat in china, Pakistan and the northern areas had to bear the major brunt. According to a report, in one month the traders in the northern areas suffered loss of Rs 100 million, the northern areas trading corporation lost Rs 5 million, customs fell to Rs 49.18 million, Rs 800,000 was paid by the importers whose consignment were blocked and had to pay charges to truckers in china and the hotels around the KKH lost around Rs 1.8 million.⁶²

KKH is also significant for exploiting the tourist potential of this region. Though there are air services to Gilgit and Skardu from Pakistan, the bulk of the tourist movement takes place through the KKH. However, the scenario changed after 9/11 and at present the increasing sectarian violence in the region has affected the tourist inflow. Today the KKH assumes even more importance for two other factors- the Chinese investments in the northern areas and also elsewhere, especially in Gwadar⁶³ and the proposed rail link and gas pipeline.

With the development of KKH and its linkage to Gwadar port, trade has been facilitated between the two countries, while Pakistan has become the energy corridor for China as it opens up China to the Arabian seas through the Gwadar port. On the other hand, the turmoil in POK has turned this strategically and economically important Karakoram highway into a highway of death. The demographic and sectarian struggle in Northern areas of POK has led to the destruction of each other's business entities on the Karakoram highway that leads up to the Khunjerab pass and has a direct bearing on the trade from china.⁶⁴

Exploitation of Natural Resources

POK is abundantly rich in natural resources. The region has huge reserves of gold and other minerals. There are 1,480 gold mines, out of which 123 have ore with gold content 112 to 238 parts per million (ppm), many times higher than the world famous mines of

⁶² "Border Closure Causes Rs 156 Million Loss", *The Dawn*, 7 June 2003.

⁶³ Chinese interests and investments are discussed separately in the third chapter.

⁶⁴ Ahmed, Khaled "The Sectarian state in Gilgit", *The Friday times*, 15-21 July 2005.

South Africa which possess only 20 to 31. Pakistan is planning to exploit these gold mines through an agreement with the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). According to the agreement, more than half of total share (56 per cent) will go to AusAID, and rest (46 per cent) will be equally divided between the Pakistan Mineral Development Corporation (PMDC) and the Pakistan government, namely Ministry of Kashmir and Northern Areas Affairs (KANA) and the Northern Areas administration.⁶⁵

The region also possesses thick forest range in the Dardistan province of Balwaristan, which covers almost 11000 hectares of the land. These forests yield to the government of Pakistan a revenue of more than Rs 1.5 billion by way of timber, even after misappropriation by the Pakistani officials. However, the local people of the region are paid a meagre amount as royalty and are also denied of traditional usage of the forests.⁶⁶

POK is also strategically important for Pakistan's water security. In 1980s, Islamabad proposed to construct Kala Bagh dam in Punjab to meet the shortage of water in Punjab, but owing to the strong opposition of other three Provinces (NWFP, Sindh and Baluchistan), it was eventually pressurized to drop the plan.⁶⁷ Islamabad has laid out the foundation for building up the Bhasha Dam which has further added to the long list of grievances of the people of the Northern Areas. On January 17, 2006, Pakistan president General Musharraf announced this plan when he dropped Kalabagh Dam Project due to threats from Sindh province.⁶⁸

This decision shook the region's people, as they were never informed about this sudden development. The Diamer district of the Northern Areas has been chosen for excavation. This dam will submerge 30-32 villages (thousand of kanals of agricultural land along with 125 kilometer Karakoram Highway) and uprooting approximately 26,000-40,000

⁶⁵ Inqalabi, S. (2007), "Economic Exploitation of Gilgit-Baltistan", in Virendra Gupta and Alok Bansal (eds.), *Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: The Untold Story*, New Delhi: Manas Publications: 189.

⁶⁶ Ibid: 190-191.

⁶⁷ "KARACHI: Govt urged to drop dam project: Indus delta conference", *The Dawn*, December 21, 2005, <http://archives.dawn.com/2005/12/21/local5.htm>.

⁶⁸ Samuel Baid (2007), "Suppression of Gilgit-Baltistan", in Virendra Gupta and Alok Bansal (eds.), *Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: The Untold Story*, New Delhi: Manas Publications: 153.

people. The dam will be built at Diamer in Gilgit-Baltistan, but the power plant will be situated in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.⁶⁹

The dam has been opposed by local people on the grounds that it will inundate vast tracts of arable land and will have an adverse impact on the local environment. The entire dam is situated in Diamer yet it will be called Bhasha Dam (Bhasha is small village in Kohistan in NWFP). Experts believe, like the prejudiced past experiences (as Indus River originates from the Northern Areas but, ironically, its royalty is being paid to NWFP), it is another trick by Islamabad to deprive people from royalty.⁷⁰ Apart from this, the construction of this dam will also have immense demographic and ecological impacts, as 28,650 will be displaced and 37419 acres of agricultural land will be submerged. Due to the construction of the Project, over 50,000 trees would be lost and an anticipated damage to fish stocks due to discharge of effluent in river water.⁷¹

The expert “economists from All-Parties National Alliance” argue that “the Northern Areas should also receive a sum of Rs 1,470 crore every year in royalties from Islamabad for using the water resources of Indus River.” Instead, Islamabad gives the area only Rs 225 crore, which helps little to improve its almost “nonexistent infrastructure and rampant unemployment”.⁷²

Afzal shigri, on these issues made the following important observations for Pakistan, “the FO (foreign offices) suicidal push to include this area in a future united state of Kashmir has serious repercussions for Pakistan. The country’s biggest water reservoir and lifeline cannot be allowed to be situated in a weak and unstable political entity. It is therefore vital that the constitutional status of this area is settled once and for all and this area is integrated in Pakistan with representation and in the national assembly and senate and its

⁶⁹ Bansal, Alok and Priyanka Singh (2009), “Bhasha Dam: A Tomb Stone of Gilgit-Baltistan's Aspirations”, *IDS Comment*, [Online: web] Accessed on 21 April 2012, URL: <http://www.idsa.in/node/802/92>

⁷⁰ Ibid

⁷¹ Projects For Friends of Democraric Pakistan (FODP), Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority, March 2011, [Online: web] Accessed on 2 July 2012, URL: <http://www.wapda.gov.pk/pdf/BrochureFODPMarch2011.pdf>

⁷² Behera, N.C (2007), *Demystifying Kashmir*, New Delhi: Pearson Longman: 191.

own provincial set up”⁷³ elsewhere he also commented, “the Northern areas comprise a very sensitive and important region that opens up Pakistan to China and Central Asia”.⁷⁴

Analysts have argued that the people of the region who were once “autonomous and self-sufficient in food”, due to rich reserves of natural resources, are “today dependent on the KKH [Karakoram Highway] for most of their needs. In recent years, a lethal mix of earthquakes, floods and political crises has rendered this crucial lifeline vulnerable, jeopardizing the lives of over a million people”.⁷⁵

Pakistan’s policy to change the Demographic composition

“Sectarianism has provided a convenient outlet for releasing the frustration engendered by political neglect”, said the local PML-N leader, Hafeez-ur-Rehman. “Wherever there is a lingering sense of deprivation, the eventual outcome can only be chaos and destruction”.⁷⁶

The demographic composition of the Gilgit-Baltistan region of the PoK has undergone a severe change since 1947 as a result of a deliberate strategy of the Pakistani government to turn the original inhabitants of the region (mostly Shia) into a minority. Musharraf initiated a policy of bringing in Punjabis and Pakhtoons from outside and settling them in Gilgit and Baltistan in order to reduce the Shias to a minority in their traditional land and the process continues to this date. The rapid settling-in of Punjabis and Pakhtoons from outside has created a sense of acute insecurity among the local Shias.⁷⁷ The Northern Light Infantry (NLI) deployed in the Kargil war by Pakistan, was originally made up of recruits from the region but has of late been increasingly staffed by non-locals, as the local Shias are not trusted anymore. This shows the level of prejudice against the very people belonging to the place. Moreover, as a UNHCR report states, the “appropriation of land in the Northern Areas by non-Kashmiri migrants from elsewhere in Pakistan, with the tacit encouragement of the federal government and army, has led to dwindling

⁷³ Shigri, Afzal, “Bhasha Dam, The Northern Areas and Pakistan”, *The News*, 9 January 2006.

⁷⁴ Shigri, Afzal, “Kashmir Dispute and Status of Northern Areas”, *The News*, 8 December 2005.

⁷⁵ Khan, M. Ismail, “Avoiding the Highway of Death”, *The International News*, Karachi, 5 May 2005.

⁷⁶ Crisis Group interview, Islamabad, July 2006, quoted from Mahapatra D.A and Seema Shekhawat (2008), “Kashmir Across Loc”, New Delhi: Gyan Publishing house: 118

⁷⁷ *The Friday Times* of October 15-21, 1992,

economic opportunities for the local population and an increase in sectarian tension between the majority Shia Muslims and a growing number of Sunnis.”⁷⁸

Though the discontentment amongst the people of Gilgit and Baltistan had been brewing ever since Pakistani occupation in view of the denial of constitutional mechanism to voice their grievances, yet the situation began changing for the worse with “the construction of the Karakoram Highway in the 1980s”, which “connected this once inaccessible region to the rest of Pakistan” and “brought with it religious fanatics, who have managed to spread sectarianism in the area”.⁷⁹

The attempts by Zia-ul-Haq to introduce Sunni Deobandi Islam in the region exacerbated the sense of alienation in Gilgit and Baltistan. As a result the Sunni Deobandi militant groups especially Sipah-e-Sahaba spread their tentacles in this remote tribal region and the Shias and the “Ismailis were made to submit to their puritanical aggression”.⁸⁰ The local population perceived the local administration to be siding with these Sunni extremists. This resulted in the first major violent manifestation of their discontent by the majority Shias in Gilgit in May 1988. This was perceived by Pakistani establishment to be an Iranian sponsored ‘Shia Revolt’. Zia put a Special Service Group (SSG) group commanded by then Brigadier Pervez Musharraf to suppress the revolt and Musharraf responded by transporting “a large number of Wahabi Pakhtoon tribesmen from the NWFP and Afghanistan” to Gilgit “to teach the Shias a lesson. These tribesmen massacred hundreds of Shias”.⁸¹

According to media reports, In May 1988, low-intensity political rivalry and sectarian tension ignited into full-scale carnage as thousands of armed tribesmen from outside Gilgit district invaded Gilgit along the Karakoram Highway. Local administration did nothing to stop them. “They destroyed crops and houses, lynched and burnt people to death in the villages around Gilgit town. The number of dead and injured was put in the

⁷⁸ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2010 -Kashmir [Pakistan], June 24, 2010, [Online: web] Accessed on 2 July 2012, URL: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c231240c.html>

⁷⁹ Khan, M. Ismail, “Avoiding the Highway of Death”, *The International News*, Karachi, 5 May 2005.

⁸⁰ Ahmed Khaled (2002), *Pakistan: The State in Crisis*, Lahore: Vanguard Books (pvt) Ltd: 38.

⁸¹ Raman, B, “Biography of General Pervez Musharraf: His Past and Present”, (Online: web) Accessed on August 26, 2011, URL: <http://www.angelfire.com/al4/terror/musharraf.htm>

hundreds”.⁸² The savagery of these intruders from Pakistan’s ‘Wild West’ left the peaceful residents of Gilgit and Baltistan stunned. Since then the locals have always perceived the Pakhtoons both from NWFP as well as refugees from Afghanistan, as agents of Pakistani establishment.⁸³

“After 1988 sectarian riots became a regular feature of Gilgit and Baltistan. The pattern showed that that whenever the populace in Gilgit and Baltistan demanded their constitutional rights, there were riots”.⁸⁴ On Zia’s death anniversary on 17 August 1993, there were massive riots and over 20 persons were killed before the situation was brought under control by the Army. Army had accused that Shias had amassed “weapons in mosques”, which included M-46 bombs, which were brought from Iran. This followed persecution of Shias and a large number of Shias were arrested.⁸⁵

Since 1988, increased persecution has created a strong sense of alienation in the populace of Gilgit-Baltistan and has led to the creation of ultra nationalist political groupings like Balwaristan National Front. During 2003-04, Shias objected to certain portions of the school course curriculum, particularly the contents of Islamiyat and Urdu text books, and the popular discontentment was so high that the authorities were forced to accept the Shia view point after the violent riots in June 2004.⁸⁶ Imam Aga Syed Ziauddin Rizvi, the local Shia cleric, helped the authorities in trying to resolve the issue to the satisfaction of Shias.⁸⁷ However the issue was so emotive that all schools in Gilgit and Baltistan

⁸² Sorbo, A.H. “Paradise Lost”, *The Herald*, June 1988: 31,

The attack was triggered by a quarrel between Shias and Sunnis in Gilgit. On 17 May 1988, Shias celebrated Eid-ul- Fitr, the festival marking the end of the Muslim fasting month, Ramadan, a day earlier than the Sunnis. Sunnis, who were still fasting, clashed with Shias, as a result of which a Shia student leader was seriously wounded. As violence escalated, two people were killed. After news of the violence spread to other parts of the region and beyond, Sunni mullahs in NWFP declared a jihad against Shias and called on volunteers to join.

⁸³ Khaled Ahmed (2002), *Pakistan: The State in Crisis*, Lahore: Vanguard Books (pvt) Ltd: 38.

⁸⁴ “Sectarian Conflit in Gilgit-Baltistan”, *Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparence*, [Online: web] Accessed on 15 May 2012, URL: http://www.pildat.org/publications/publication/Conflict_Management/GB-SectarianConflit-BackgroundPaperEng-May2011.pdf

⁸⁵ Samuel Baid (1995), “Northern Areas” in Jasjit Singh (ed), *Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Under The Jackboot*, New Delhi: Siddhi Books: 139

⁸⁶ Bansal Alok, Violence rocks Gilgit Baltistan again: 5 killed, 50 injured, Daily Bhaskar.com, New Delhi, 4 April 2012, (Online: web) Accessed on 18 February 2012, URL: <http://daily.bhaskar.com/article/WOR-SAS-violence-rocks-gilgit-baltistan-again-5-killed-50-injured-3058122.html>.

⁸⁷ Behuria, Ashok (2004), “Rumblings in Northern Areas” , *Journal of Peace Studies*, 11 (4): 79.

remained closed for one full year till April 2005 and could only be reopened after all controversial portions were removed to the satisfaction of all sects.

Extremism and *Jihadi* influence in POK

Pakistan has used the territories, resources and people of AJK and Northern Areas to achieve its internal and external national objectives. Militarily, the territory has served as a launching pad for a low intensity proxy war by installing terrorist camps in the region by the Pakistan government to annex the Indian part of Kashmir.⁸⁸ Also keeping in purview the geo-strategic location of POK helps in establishing links with extremists in Xinjiang, Central Asia, Indian Kashmir and Afghanistan. Geographical terrain is rugged and barren, so it provides easy hide outs for the terrorist groups.

Pakistan has also not infringed over the issue of increasing extremism in POK despite much opposition by the native people. For instance, in September 2011, a local civil society organisation 'Press for Peace' claimed that a large number of women protested against recent activities of some banned jihadi groups in the Neelum Valley. According to the PFP, the women also approached the Pakistan Army in Athmuqam the district headquarters of Neelum Valley, and urged the officers to stop the "militants" from crossing into the Indian side of Kashmir.⁸⁹ The main reason behind Pakistan being dormant over the issue is that Pakistan wants the Islamic groups to make hold in the region because in this way it will dilute the Shia majority in the region.

Absence of any legitimate democratic structure of governance in POK can also be taken as one of the predominant reasons that the region has become a safe haven not only for terrorists operating in Kashmir but also for those linked with international terror outfits like Al Qaeda. As the political and the legal rights of the people of POK are diminished there is no political representation, which can raise voice against the increasing jihadi hold in the region.

⁸⁸ Behera, N. C. (2007), *Demystifying Kashmir*, 2007, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press: 170-171

⁸⁹ Anita Joshua, "Women in Neelum Valley protest against presence of terror groups", [Online: web] Accessed on 21 April 2012, URL: <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article2456959>

The 1980's witnessed the rise of religious fundamentalism in POK under the aegis of Pakistan. The radical Islamization policy of General Zia provided a major push to the growth of Islamic fundamentalism in the region. Pakistani leaders calculated that with absolute control of AJK and NA affairs with Islamabad, they can carry on a low cost tactical proxy war against India, especially in Indian part of Kashmir.⁹⁰ In order to provide continuous support and help, a Kashmir Liberation Cell (KLC) was established in Muzaffarabad in 1987 under the patronage of Pakistan's ISI. The Prime minister of AJK constituted a five member committee to suggest measures for making the cell effective.⁹¹

At least 55 training camps are said to be located in the region and their cadres' number close to 5,000. The proximity of these camps to Kashmir and the terrain of the region make infiltration much more convenient especially during summers. Muzaffarabad and Kotli are known epicentres of such camps and dreaded militant organizations such as Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and Hizbul Mujahideen have their operational headquarters there. Terrorist camps are noted to be widespread in Bhimber, Bakryal, Balakot, Chawari, Kotli, and Mangla. Lashkar has two camps in Muzaffarabad – Abdul-Bin-Masud and Danna. Hizbul has one in Muzaffarabad and the other in Mangla. Jaish-e-Mohammed also has a strong foothold in the region even though it operates chiefly from Balakot (North West Frontier Province).⁹²

Terrorist groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba developed strong linkages with the local population after the 2005 earthquake because of the extensive relief they provided to the people under the guise of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, a self proclaimed 'social welfare organisation', which has since been banned in Pakistan. The victims of the earthquake who were left to fend for themselves were provided much solace by these terror groups at least in the critical phase of the relief work. The spurt of arrests in Muzaffarabad and the adjoining areas after the Mumbai incident are a pointer to the existence of terror camps

⁹⁰ Mahapatra, Debidatta Aurobinda (2006), "The Politics of Azad Jammu and Kashmir: A study", in P Stobdan (ed), *Security and Society* 2 (2), Centre for Strategic and Regional Studies University of Jammu: 89-90.

⁹¹ "Kashmir Liberation Cell to be Reorganised", *The Dawn*, Muzaffarabad, 7 March 2002.

⁹² Singh Priyanka(2009), "Militant Training Camps in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir: An Existential Threat", *Strategic Analysis*, 33 (3), Special Issue: India-Pakistan Relations: 10 Years After Kargil: 334-335.

and militant activities in POK.⁹³ The militants have found it easy to operate there because of the poor socio-economic and political development of the region. Following the 2005 earthquake, AJK received the attention of the international relief agencies. The large-scale arrival of international NGO workers forced the Pakistani government to shift Jihadi camps and establishments to interior areas. This brought about a slight reduction in their militant activities against India, particularly in J&K.⁹⁴

However, recently under General Kayani, a rapprochement of sorts has been achieved with a section of the LeT and the Hizbul Mujahideen and anti-India Jihadi activities are resurfacing in PoK. In 2010, the report by Freedom House brought out by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), stated⁹⁵ A number of Islamist militant groups, including those that receive patronage from the Pakistani military, operate from bases in Pakistani-administered Kashmir. Militant groups that have traditionally focused on attacks in Indian-administered Kashmir are reportedly expanding their influence and activities in Pakistani Kashmir, including the establishment of new madrassas (religious schools) in the area. They have also increased cooperation with other militants based in Pakistan's tribal areas, such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). In August, the Pakistani government banned 25 militant groups operating within the country, including those focused on Kashmir.

Although the government claimed to have raided and sealed off the Muzaffarabad headquarters of the LeT, also known as the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, other reports indicated that the group continued to operate training camps in the region. Tension between Islamist pro-Pakistan groups and pro-independence Kashmiri groups as well as some local residents has reportedly increased in recent years.

Several suicide attacks on Pakistani security forces have been reported in the media since June 2009. There have been references to a new militant outfit, Lashkar-e- Zil (LeZ)

⁹³ Mahapatra. Debidatta Aurobinda,(2006), "The Politics of Azad Jammu and Kashmir: A study", in P Stobdan (ed), *Security and Society* 2 (2), Centre for Strategic and Regional Studies University of Jammu: 92.

⁹⁴ ____, (2011), "Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Changing the Discourse", *IDSA PoK Project Report*, New Delhi: Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis: 27.

⁹⁵ Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2010 -Kashmir [Pakistan]*, June 24, 2010, [Online: web]Accessed on 2 July 2012, URL: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c231240c.html>

operating out of the area. LeZ is supposedly an amalgamation of several militant outfits including Tehrik-e-Taliban, Pakistan (TTP) led by Commander Hakimullah Mehsud, the Azad Kashmir chapter of the Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HUJI) led by Commander Ilyas Kashmiri, and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) led by its jailed leader Akram Lahori.⁹⁶ The situation in the PoK is expected to worsen further as the Pakistan military is under pressure to clamp down on militant outfits.

Rising Discontent among the people of POK

POK has been in turmoil since its occupation by Pakistan, it has been considered more as a colony than a regular province. Analyzing the above mentioned facts, Pakistan has followed extreme exploitation policies in the region to serve its own interests which has resulted in the deterioration of the people and the region as well. Despite, “abundance of resources”, the region represents the “most backward areas in entire South Asia”.⁹⁷

The Aga Khan Rural Support Programs (AKRSP) along with some other NGOs have under taken efforts to initiate economic programs in the Northern Areas. Otherwise the region was deserted due to total neglect of Pakistan government. The region has no university, no professional college and moreover, the entire region does not have any kind of industry. Over 85% people live below the poverty line. The government has set only 12 high schools and two regional colleges without any post-graduation facilities.⁹⁸ The main source to earn livelihood is government service. The “natives joining the civil service are paid 25% less than personnel from Pakistan’s Punjab province posted in the Northern Areas on deputation”. This has become another factor of resentment among the locals.⁹⁹ Although there have been efforts by local NGOs to set up village schools, literacy remains very low. While 45-50% of boys are now enrolled in school in some villages, the enrolment of girls is much lower (less than 15 per cent in many cases).

⁹⁶ Mir, Amir “Lashkar-e-Zil Behind Azad Kashmir Suicide Hits”, *The News*, 11 January 2010. According to this report there were four incidents of suicide attacks in Azad Kashmir between June 26, 2009 and January 6, 2010, which killed 20 people, 10 of them security forces personnel and 10 civilians.

⁹⁷ S. Inqalabi (2007), “Economic Exploitation of Gilgit-Baltistan”, in Virendra Gupta and Alok Bansal (eds.), *“Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: The Untold Story”*, New Delhi: Manas Publications: 185-186.

⁹⁸ India Resource, “Azad Kashmir’ and ‘Northern Territories’ or ‘Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK)?”, August 2002, (Online: web) Accessed on 1 October 2011, URL:http://members.tripod.com/~INDIA_RESOURCE/pok.html

⁹⁹ Behera N.C (2007), *Demystifying Kashmir*, New Delhi: Pearson Longman: 192.

After 55 years of Pakistani annexation, adult literacy in the Northern Areas is 14% for males and 3.5% for women¹⁰⁰. Although tourism provides certain support to the local economy, the lack of adequate infrastructure remains an obstacle to explore it in professional manner. Even slightest tourism left behind to support the stumbling economy of the region, declined further after Pakistan went nuclear, followed by the 9/11 terrorist attack.¹⁰¹ According to official estimates some 80% of foreign tourists coming to Pakistan visit Northern Areas every year. However, while Islamabad earn over Rs. 4.5 billion from the tourists who visit the region it does not pay anything to the locals.¹⁰²

Consequences of Pakistan's policies are resulting in making the security environment of the region more volatile. The region has become a stage for violent protests by the marginalized population due to continued subjugation by the Pakistan government, and being a Shia minority they believe that their ethno-cultural and religious identity is threatened. The discontentment within the populace of POK has been increasing over the years and besides ethnicity has a strong sectarian undertone. "Rebellion and resentment that have been brewing among the people of the Northern Areas and AJK is fast reaching a crescendo against persecution by the Pakistan's armed forces, the continued denial of political and legal rights, economic exploitation, sectarian divide and devious attempts at demographic engineering in this strategic region".¹⁰³

Pakistan's policies towards POK since its occupation have worsened the condition of people and the region. The continued subjugation, economic exploitation, demographic dilution, bringing of Islamic Fundamentalism and denial of legal and political rights of the people of POK by the Pakistan government has led to turmoil in the region. These strong discontents among the people have an adverse impact over the security environment of the region, as continued sectarian strife and hatred, illiteracy and unemployment leading the youth of the region to join extremist groups. These outcomes

¹⁰⁰ India Resource, "Azad Kashmir' and 'Northern Territories' or 'Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK)?", August 2002, [Online: web] Accessed on 1 October 2011, URL:http://members.tripod.com/~INDIA_RESOURCE/pok.html

¹⁰¹ Ali, Farman "Gilgit -Baltistan residents request border crossings at Skardu", *The Herald*, April 2005.

¹⁰² S. Inqalabi (2007), "Economic Exploitation of Gilgit-Baltistan", in Virendra Gupta and Alok Bansal (eds.), "*Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: The Untold Story*", New Delhi: Manas Publications: 187.

¹⁰³ "Northern Areas : A tale of neglect, Denial?" New Indian Express Website [Online: web] Accessed on 30 September 2011, <http://www.newindpress.com/NewsItems.asp?ID=IEP20060529092431&Page=P&Title=Nation&Topic=0>

of the policies of Pakistan towards POK are affecting the security of both India and China respectively.

CHAPTER THREE

CHINA'S INTERESTS IN POK

There are no permanent friends and foes in international relations. The only permanent thing is national interest. It is a nation's self interest which determines its foreign policy. Pakistan's international relations have also seen ups and downs depending upon the prevailing regional and international situation. For instance, Pakistan's relations with the US are said to be like a roller coaster, some time going very high and at others very low. But the relations between Pakistan and China have remained constant from the very beginning. The reasons may be many. Both countries are immediate neighbors. There is no conflict between them. Both countries have cooperated with each other diplomatically. Their friendship is based on sovereign equality, brotherhood and mutual cooperation. Although China is a great power, it has shown no hegemonic designs and has never interfered in the internal affairs of Pakistan. Their strategic partnership remains as reliable as ever.

The essence of their "all weather" relationship is deeply embedded in the history of their relationship. The continuity of their relations despite the changing international and domestic environment is considered a pivotal aspect of their equation. While it can also be assessed that it was the 1962 Sino-India war, which sowed the seeds of Sino-Pakistan friendship, this reflects an incomplete picture. The relationship between the two nations started taking shape in the 1950s itself. The historical aspect continues to be a characteristic feature of China and Pakistan's assertions about their all-weather friendship, which is why it is imperative to deliberate upon the same.¹

Ever since its birth as an independent nation, Pakistan's foreign policy and its relationship with other countries have been dictated by its security concerns. Pakistan's history reflects a deep sense of insecurity, which seems embedded in their choice of forming alliances with other countries of the world. Pakistan was the third non-communist country and the first Muslim country to recognize PRC on 4 January 1950 after breaking its relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan).² However, owing to

¹ Malhotra, Aditi (2011), "Revisiting the early years of China-Pakistan Relations", *Centre for Land Warfare Studies*, Paper 1932. [Online: web] Accessed on 15 January 2012, URL: http://www.claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=933&u_id=119

² Rizvi, Hasan-Askari (2004), "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Overview 1947-2004", *Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency*, [Online: web] Accessed on 15 January 2012, URL: <http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/FP/PakistanForeignPolicy-AnOverview.pdf>

Pakistan's dire need for sophisticated arms and economic assistance, there could have been no better ally than the United States which infused money for Pakistan's economic survival and helped enhance its military capabilities. Pakistan joined the American sponsored SEATO in September 1954 and the Baghdad Pact or CENTO in 1955.³ Despite this, Chinese remarks about the decisions seemed subdued.

However, it was the Bandung Conference in 1955 which paved way for a strengthened Sino-Pakistan friendship. The conference was an assembly of Asian and African countries in Bandung, Indonesia from 18 to 24 April 1955.⁴ This conference was representative of the growing Third World non-aligned movement in the face of international Cold War politics. During the Bandung Conference, two friendly talks were held between Premier Zhou Enlai and Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra where they discussed about cooperation in various spheres that could strengthen their relations further. Pakistan utilized this opportunity to alleviate any possible Chinese fears about its agreements with the United States and assured them that the alliance was, in no way, against China and in case the US waged a war against China, Pakistan would not be a partner to it.⁵

One can infer that Pakistan was having the fear about the Indian threat on its borders, considering the fact that India was more superior to Pakistan on both military and economic front. To counter this threat it can be assessed that Pakistan joined the SEATO and CENTO, which can be referred as a valid justification for its dealings with the West. However, China was far more realistic in assessing Pakistan's rationale for participation in the Cold War defense alliances. It comprehended Pakistan's security compulsions vis-à-vis India and continued to pursue a policy of friendship with Pakistan. The bond between China and Pakistan which initiated at Bandung was subsequently fostered

³ Kapila, Subhash (2001), "United States Strategic Over Evaluation of Pakistan", *South Asia analysis Group*, Paper 313, [Online: web] Accessed on 15 January 2012, URL: <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers4%5Cpaper313.html>

⁴ Khan Masood, "Pakistan-china friendship: a lush green tree", *Daily Times*, 8 July 2011.

⁵.Kapila, Subhash (2001), "United States Strategic Over Evaluation of Pakistan", *South Asia analysis Group*, Paper 313, [Online: web] Accessed on 15 January 2012, URL: <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers4%5Cpaper313.html>

through continued cultural and high-level exchanges. Though with low political quotient, these exchanges further enhanced the general tone of Sino-Pakistan relations.⁶

The degree of realistic assessment by the Chinese became a characteristic of China-Pakistan long term relations. As noted by Air Marshal Asghar Khan, during President Ayub's visit to Beijing on September 19, 1965, when he seemed apologetic about Pakistan's continued membership of SEATO and CENTO, Zhou Enlai assured him that China did not mind it and stated that it ensured Pakistan got hardware and armaments that China was unable to provide.⁷

However, Sino-Pak relations which seemed to be on an upward trajectory were marked by a period of distrust starting in 1957. The general optimism was slowly fading because of several factors, notably due to China's adoption of a neutral stand on the Kashmir issue.⁸ Also, as Islamabad's military and economic reliance on Washington increased, a shift was seen in its attitude towards China. The period from 1957 to 1960 was marked on low ebb to Sino-Pak relations. Between 1957 and 1960, Pakistan followed the West with regard to its position on restoration of China's legal status in the UN, and Taiwan Tibet questions, so the political relations between the two countries were affected.⁹

The Sino-Pak entente post-1960 resulted from the changing geopolitical scenarios. These include deteriorating Sino-India ties.¹⁰ This was coupled with Pakistan's sense of frustration due to its Western allies, which provided India with arms against China.¹¹

⁶ Malhotra, Aditi (2011), "Revisiting the early years of China-Pakistan Relations", *Centre for Land Warfare Studies*, Paper 1932. [Online: web] Accessed on 15 January 2012, URL: http://www.claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=933&u_id=119

⁷ Kapila, Subhash (2001), "United States Strategic Over Evaluation of Pakistan", *South Asia analysis Group*, Paper 313, [Online: web] Accessed on 15 January 2012, URL: <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers4%5Cpaper313.html>

⁸ Amb. Cheng Ruisheng (2010), "Sino-Indian Relations: Sixty Years of Experience and Enlightenment" *IPCS Special Report*, New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies:2-3.

⁹ "China-Pakistan relations", *China Daily*, November 11, 2006, [Online: web] Accessed on 2 July 2012, URL: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-11/14/content_732562.htm.

¹⁰ Amb. Cheng Ruisheng (2010), "Sino-Indian Relations: Sixty Years of Experience and Enlightenment" *IPCS Special Report*, New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies: 4. After the Tibet rebellion in 1959, both sides over-estimated the seriousness of their differences on the Tibet question and later on the China-India boundary question and failed to give first priority to the overall interest of safeguarding their friendly relations, leading to the conflict and confrontation between the two sides in 1962.

¹¹ Pierre, Tristram, "The Second Kashmir War (1965)", *The New York Times*, 7 September 1965, cited from, *Middle East Issues*, About.Com, [Online: web] Accessed on 2 July 2012 url: <http://middleeast.about.com/od/pakistan/a/second-kashmir-war.htm>.

Other reasons include Pakistan's move to diversify its connections and the emerging Sino-Soviet split.¹² Such developments prompted both, China and Pakistan to review their present alliances and re-ally in order to suit the changing geopolitical environment. A major move by Pakistan that renewed the fading Sino-Pak relations was Pakistan's support of China in the fourteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. In December 1961, Pakistan abandoned its previous stand and supported China's legitimate claim to a seat in the UN.¹³ Also, during the days of 1950s and 60s, Pakistan opened an air corridor for China, connecting it to the world, at a time when it suffered due to Western blockades.¹⁴

The 1962 Sino-India War created a rift between the US and Pakistan, primarily because Pakistan considered India a bigger threat than China, which was viewed by the US as the primary threat. After the 1962 War, China's victory deteriorated the image of India at the regional level and consolidated Sino-Pak ties.¹⁵

Taking the new dynamism into consideration, President Ayub Khan restructured his foreign policy and the choice was to lean towards China. Sino-Pakistan relations flourished swiftly from 1961 and reached a new high. The period 1961-63, can be considered a transitional phase when the countries were eliminating the retardation factors in their relations and nurturing it further. The Sino-India War fortified the bond further illustrating the phrase, 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend', but the war should not be considered the only influence at work in the new phase of Sino-Pak equation. Subsequently, China and Pakistan signed few agreements, namely, the Border Agreement

¹² Ford, Harold P. "Calling the Sino-Soviet Split", Central Intelligence Agency, Apr 14, 2007, (Online: web) Accessed on 17 February 2012, URL: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/winter98_99/art05.html#rft0, (accessed on April 24, 2012).

¹³ United Nations General assembly, Fourteenth Session, 81st Plenary Meeting, New York, 9 December 1959, [Online: web] Accessed on 17 February 2012, URL: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/dag/docs/apv851e.pdf>

¹⁴ Speech on Chinese National Day by Ambassador Luo Zhaohui on PTV, Islamabad, October 1, 2007, <http://pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/zbqx/t368840.htm>

¹⁵ Kapila, Subhash (2001), "United States Strategic Over Evaluation of Pakistan", *South Asia analysis Group*, Paper 313, [Online: web] Accessed on 15 January 2012, URL: <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers4%5Cpaper313.html>

of 1963, an Air Travel Agreement in 1964, and a Cultural Agreement in 1965, out of which the border agreement between the two was of crucial importance.¹⁶

The area over which the border agreement between china and Pakistan was signed is known as the Trans Karakoram Tract.¹⁷ The Trans-Karakoram Tract is an area of nearly 5,800 km² that, India claims, was transferred by a border agreement from the Pakistani-administered Northern Areas to China in 1963 with the proviso that the settlement was subject to the final solution of the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan says that it was a no-man's un-demarcated border land; hence no question arises of its being transferred. The transfer is disputed by India which claims the Tract as part of Indian administered Jammu And Kashmir State.¹⁸

Sino-Pakistan Frontier Agreement

The 1963 Sino-Pak Boundary Agreement was signed between the governments of Pakistan and China, to establish the border between the two countries. It resulted in China ceding over 5,180 square kms (2,000 sq mi) of northern Areas of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir to and Pakistan recognized Chinese sovereignty over this region. However, the agreement is controversial as the part of land over which the agreement was signed is disputed and India strongly condemned the agreement.

However, the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Pakistan mutually agreed, with a view to ensure the prevailing peace and tranquility on their respective border. Hence, decided to formally delimit and demarcate the boundary between China's Xinjiang province, which was under the actual control of Pakistan on the basis of the ten principles as enunciated in the Bandung conference. Being convinced

¹⁶ Rehman Khalid and Rashida Harmeed (2010), "Sino-Pak Relations and Xinjiang: Writings of Pakistani Scholars", *Institute of Policy Studies Islamabad*, 6 (2).

¹⁷ Wang, Hongwei (1998), *The Himalayas Sentiment: A Study of Sino Indian Relations*, Beijing: China Tibetan Study Press: 157-159.

¹⁸ Haq, Noor ul (2011), "Sixty Years Of PAK-CHINA Diplomatic Relations (1951-2011)", Islamabad Policy Research Institute, IPRI Publications: Lahore, [Online: web] Accessed on 17 February 2012, URL: http://humansecuritygateway.com/documents/IPRI_SixtyYearsofPakChinaRelations.pdf.

that this would give full expression to the desire of the people of China and Pakistan for the development of good neighborly and friendly relations.¹⁹

China had been claiming certain parts of Pakistan in 300 miles long undefined border between Xingjian and occupied Kashmir as they were doing with India. During Chou-en-Lai's Indian visit in 1956 anticipating a possible Sino-Indian Border Agreement, Pakistan warned India not to surrender Kashmir territory in the Aksai Chin area of Ladakh. After 1959, however, the Pakistanis began their journey of rapprochement with Beijing. In the process, they abandoned not only Aksai Chin, which in any case lay well beyond their grasp, but also Jammu & Kashmir territories across Karakoram, like Raskam & Taghdumbash Pamir.²⁰ In this frame of mind, they had come to a border agreement with China in March 1963. The agreement based on McDonald proposal of 1899 abandoned Hunza claims of approx 4000 sq km over Taghdumbush and Raskam.²¹ The agreement signed on 2nd March 1963 between Chou-en-Lai and Z. A. Bhutto, has formally delimited and demarcated the boundary between China's Xinjiang and contiguous areas "defence of which is under the actual control of Pakistan."²²

After understanding the agreement, the Article I of the agreement recognizes that the boundary in this sector has never been delimited and explains that the agreement is based on "traditional customary boundary line including natural features." The treaty alignment follows the main Karakoram watershed. Shaksgam valley, which Pakistan has given to China, is on the southern slopes of Aghil ranges. According to K. Mason, who surveyed

¹⁹ Mahapatra D.A and Seema Shekhawat (2008), *Kashmir Across LOC*, New Delhi: Gyan Publishing house: 57.

²⁰ Verma, Virendra Sahai, "SINO-INDIAN Border Dispute at Aksai Chin a Middle Path for Resolution", [Online: web] Accessed on 15 May 2012, URL: <http://chinaindiaborderdispute.wordpress.com> in May 2010.

²¹ On March 14, 1899, the British described the so-called Macdonald line to China in an effort to "recognize the frontier [i.e. boundary] as laid down by its clearly marked geographical features." This delimitation, which was never acknowledged by the Chinese, commenced "...on the Little Pamir from the Peak at which the Anglo - Russian Boundary Commission of 1895 ended their work, it runs south-east, crossing the Karachikar stream at Mintaka Aghazi; thence the main ridge of the Muztagh range. It follows this to the south, passing by the Khunjerab Pass, and continuing southward to the peak just north of the Shimshal Pass. At this point the boundary leaves the crest and follows a spur running east approximately parallel to the road from the Shimshal Pass to the Hunza post at Darwaza. The line turning south through the Darwaza post crosses the road from the Shimshal pass at that point, and then ascends the nearest high spur, and regains the main crests which the boundary will again follow, passing through the Mustagh, Gasherbrun, and Salto Passes by the Karakorum..."

²² See Appendix IV.

the Shaksgam valley in 1926, the Shaksgam (Oparang) river drains the plains (which seem like Lingzi Tang) between Karakoram and Aghil ranges and proceeds northwest to join Yarkand river.”²³ The article VI makes the agreement provisional’ as after the settlement of Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India, the Sovereign Authority concerned will reopen negotiation with the Government of the people of China on the boundary and replace this agreement. As per ‘The Times’ 21 June 1965, about 3400 square km of border were overlapping on Pakistan and China’s maps. “The compromise border now agreed upon leaves about two thirds of it (2050 sq. miles) on China’s side, but while Pakistan has given up only claims on maps, China will be withdrawing their frontier forces and administration from about 750 sq. miles”²⁴ The agreement laid the foundation of Karakoram highway which was built jointly between Chinese and Pakistani engineers in 1970s.

“The disputed nature of Kashmir’s northern boundaries with Xinjiang in the context of the greater intensity of Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistani confrontation served as an incentive for Pakistan to engage in the Kautalian realpolitik of forging a tacit alliance with China.”²⁵

The treaty had laid the base for all weather friendship between the two countries giving immense benefits to both and had adverse affect on the geo strategic balance against India in south Asia. India’s reaction to the Sino-Pak agreement was highly critical. It issued a lengthy statement on March 16. India also lodged a protest with the United Nations regarding this agreement as violating the late 1940s UN Security Council Resolutions.²⁶ In response, Pakistan’s clarified its position saying that Northern Areas were integral part of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir, and their fate is yet to be

²³ Vohra, Sachdev (1992), “The Karakoram Hindukush Routes from China and Russia.” *USI Journal*, July-Sep 92: 340.

²⁴ Woodman Dorothy (1970), *Himalayan frontiers: a political review of British, Chinese, Indian and Russian rivalries*, London: Praeger: 309.

²⁵ S Mahmud (1999), *Cold War in the Himalayas: The USA, China and South Asia in 1950’s*, New York: St. Martin’s Press: 185.

²⁶ Hussain Altaf (2009), “The Gilgit-Baltistan Reforms 2009”, *Forum of Federations project in Pakistan*, [Online: web] Accessed on 21 April 2012, URL: www.forumfed.org/.../Gilgit-Baltistan%20Reforms%20AHussain%20FinalDec09.doc

India sent a letter dated 16th March 1963, addressed to the President of the U.N. Security Council in order to lodge a protest against the Sino-Pak Agreement and termed the agreement as violation of the resolutions of the Security Council and the U.N Commission for India-Pakistan (UNCIP).

decided along with the rest of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, through a plebiscite as provided in the U.N. resolutions. The Government of Pakistan further clarified that the Boundary Agreement (between Pakistan and China) would not affect the status of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir.²⁷

Apparently, the agreement proved to be advantageous for Pakistan both economic and politically, as it diminished potential for conflict between China and Pakistan and also placed China formally and firmly as a third stakeholder over the Kashmir issue. The agreement further diminished the hopes of settlement of the Kashmir issue between Pakistan and India.²⁸ On the other side, the agreement bolstered the ties between China and Pakistan and opened a better linkage for trade and politico-economic activities. It can also be assessed that this agreement also fruited for the initiation of the construction of Karakoram Highway.

Construction of Karakoram Highway Linkage with POK

The Karakoram Highway (KKH) is the highest paved international road in the world. It connects China and Pakistan across the Karakoram mountain range. On 10 June 1976, the Chief Martial Law Administrator, General Zia-ul-Haq and the Chinese Vice Premier, Keng Piao, inaugurated the 800-Km Karakoram Highway,²⁹ also known as the “Friendship Highway” is the land route, linking Pakistan with China through the Northern Areas of Gilgit and Baltistan of Pakistan.³⁰

The Highway begins in the Chinese city of Kashgar, passes through Tashkurghan, and continues south into Pakistan over the Khunjerab Pass, which, at 15,514 feet, is said to be the highest border crossing in the world.³¹ Beyond Khunjerab pass, the Karakoram highway is connected with the Chinese network in western Tibet which links with

²⁷ Institute of Policy studies Pakistan Policy Perspectives, 1 (1), cited from: Hussain Altaf (2009), “The Gilgit-Baltistan Reforms 2009”, *Forum of Federations project in Pakistan*, [Online: web] Accessed on 21 April 2012, URL: www.forumfed.org/.../Gilgit-Baltistan%20Reforms%20AHussain%20FinalDec09.doc

²⁸ “Pakistan: Signing with the Red Chinese”, *Time Magazine*, 15 March 1963.

²⁹ Kak B.L (1979), *Z.A. Bhutto: notes from Death Cell*, New Delhi, Radha Krishna Prakashan: 32.

³⁰ Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation (April-June 1978), *The China Quarterly*, 75.

³¹ Tayler Jeffrey (1999), “On Top of the World: Days of adventure and moments of transcendence along the Karakoram Highway”, *The Atlantic Online*, [Online: web] Accessed on 2 July 2012, URL: <http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/99mar/ontop.htm>.

Kashgar in the Sinkiang province. Through the Highway China has found a new access to the Arabian Sea, which is another route to the west and as an outcome of the construction of the highway the Chinese security personnels (soldiers) and maintenance experts are permanently stationed along the Karakoram Highway for the security and maintenance of the Highway.

China's Western Highway, also known as the Lhasa-Kashgar/Xinjiang Highway connects Xinjiang to Tibet. From Quilanaldi, the road branches off to the Khunjerab Pass and, subsequently, becomes the Karakoram Highway right up to Gilgit.³² The significance of the Karakoram Highway lies in the fact that it cuts through the zone between Asia and the Indian subcontinent, wherein China, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan come within 250 km of each other. The 1,300 km long Karakoram Highway remains the only all-weather road linking Gilgit-Baltistan with the rest of Pakistan, besides connecting China and Pakistan at an altitude of 4,693 metres, through the Khunjerab Pass. Upgrading the Karakoram Highway is of critical significance to China, since this region offers Beijing a window to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.³³

The Chinese have been systematically building roads, not to promote trade and commerce but to open another back door towards the Arabian Sea. The strategic passes on the Indian border with Chinain the area currently under the occupation of Pakistan are Kilik Dawan, Mintaka, Karchanai, Parpik, Khunjerab, Shaksgam, Arghil, Marpo and Karakoram. The traditional boundary of Kashmir in the west of Karakoram Pass runs along the watershed dividing the tributaries of the Yarkand River and those of the Hunza River. It lies along the Kilik Dawan, Mintaka, Karchanai Parpik and Khunjerab Passes. It then crosses the Shaksgam River and lies along the Arghil mountains, passing across Arghil, Marpo and Shaksgam Passes, to the Karakoram Pass.³⁴ The Pakistani's openly acknowledge that in view of the geo-political situation in the region, the road is of vital

³² Chansoria Monika (2011), "China makes its presence felt in Pak occupied Kashmir" *Centre for Land and Warfare Studies*, Article 2025, [Online: web] Accessed on 12 September 2012, URL: http://www.claws.in/index.php?action=details&m_id=1026&u_id=28

³³ Bhushan, Shashi (1978), *Kashmir road Dominationistic conspiracy of China in Kashmir*, New Delhi: Secretariat of Congress Socialist Forum: 3.

³⁴ Ibid , pp 4-5

strategical importance to them.³⁵ As a result putting this road into operation, all kinds of communication between Pakistan and China have become easier. China is in a position to whatever load it likes to anywhere in ‘Azad Kashmir’. The existing communication line, along with the Karakoram Highway, provides China with a direct and quick outlet to the Arabian Sea leading directly to Middle East and Africa.³⁶

China’s strategic interests in POK

The shift in the strategic nature of POK that the construction of a highway between China and Pakistan through the Northern Areas would entail was apparent to India which in June 1969 accused Pakistan of making it easier for Chinese troops to access occupied territory in Aksai Chin and from Tibet to the Gilgit area which lay immediately to the north of the ceasefire line in Kashmir. It stated that the road posed a threat to the peace and tranquility in the region.³⁷ Years later, on the completion of the KKH, China’s Deputy Premier Li Xiannian would publicly declare that the Highway “allows us to give military aid to Pakistan.”³⁸ The KKH has also increased China and Pakistan’s control over their frontiers and ability to deal with security threats emanating from India and elsewhere. The KKH, it is believed has been used for the transfer of nuclear and missile equipment to Pakistan.³⁹

Chinese and Pakistani plans to link the KKH to the southern port of Gwadar in Balochistan through the Chinese-aided Gwadar-Dalbandin railway, which extends up to Rawalpindi are being carried out with the intention would be that in the case of hostilities between India and China, the PLA Navy would find Gwadar the most convenient logistic location on the Indian Ocean. Prior to hostilities actually breaking out, it would be supported by material transported over the 1300km long Highway and stockpiled at the

³⁵ In the opinion of Major General G S Butt of Pakistan Army, Pakistan Times, June 18, 1978.

³⁶ Roy Meera Singh (2006), “Pakistan’s Strategies in Central Asia” *Strategic Analysis Journal*, 30 (4), New Delhi: IDSA.

³⁷ Alastair Lamb (1993), *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990*, Karachi: Oxford University Press,: 275, also cited from: Garver, John (2001), *Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press: 207.

³⁸ Haider, Ziad, “Clearing clouds over Karakoram,” *Daily Times*, 4 April 2004, [Online: web] Accessed on 21 April 2012, URL: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_4-4-2004_pg3_3.

³⁹ Raman, B (2001), “Gilgit & Baltistan, China & North Korea”, *South Asia Analysis Group* , SAAG Paper 289, [Online: web] Accessed on 15 January 2012, URL: <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers3/paper289.html>

port.⁴⁰ Once conflict had started however, the highway would in many stretches, especially in Gilgit and Hunza be vulnerable to disruption by air attacks.⁴¹ In addition, no traffic occurs from January to June because of the winter snowfall.

It also needs to be noted that there were reports that China was upset with Pakistan for allowing the US to establish listening posts in Pakistan's Northern Areas and was unwilling to provide financing for the Gwadar port as a result.⁴² Among China's overall strategic aims could be access to the air base in Gilgit and listening posts for itself. In a competitive game of acquiring bases and listening posts that has been underway between the major powers in Central Asia, Gilgit and Skardu airfields provide ideal locations for expansion and up-gradation and China must fancy its chances.

From this brief outline of Chinese strategic interests in POK, three implications might be considered. One, while the Chinese claims to Hunza appear to have been settled by the treaty of 1963, the region is of increasing importance to China for the reasons stated above. Here, considering the Indian experience vis-à-vis the Sino-Indian boundary dispute might be instructive. The Chinese position on the issue has changed over the years with the mid-1980s witnessing a hardening of the Chinese position on the eastern sector. The western sector is no longer considered as the main area of dispute owing perhaps to the fact that the road through Aksai Chin is no longer as critical to China as it had been in the 1950s. The eastern sector meanwhile with its rich natural resources is now considered too valuable to give away in addition to significant political and strategic reasons. Given, the fact that the 1963 treaty is subject to revision depending on the eventual resolution of the dispute over Kashmir and given the recent improvement in Indo-Pak relations, the possibility of Chinese revising their position or strengthening their interests in POK must be considered.⁴³

⁴⁰ T. Jacob, Jabin (2008), "Chinese Strategic Interests in POK", in P. Stobdan and D. Suba Chandran (ed), *The Last Colony: Muzaffarabad-Gilgit-Baltistan*, New Delhi: India Research Press: 125.

⁴¹ John Garver (2001), *Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press: 289-91.

⁴² Niazi, Tarique (2005), "Gwadar: China's Naval Outpost on the Indian Ocean", *The Jamestown Foundation*, China Brief, (Online: web) Accessed on 21 April 2012, URL: <http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2528.html>.

⁴³ T. Jacob, Jabin (2008), "Chinese Strategic Interests in POK", in P. Stobdan and D. Suba Chandran (ed), *The Last Colony: Muzaffarabad-Gilgit-Baltistan*, New Delhi: India Research Press: 153-155.

Two, access to the Northern Areas also provides another route by which the Chinese might approach Afghanistan. Besides military goals, western intervention in Afghanistan also has nation-building objectives, therefore there can be a possibility that China will have an interest in getting its own say in such projects where possible. Considering, China's historic interests in Afghanistan from the instance, when KKH was used to supply arms against the Soviets.⁴⁴ However, China is also interested in developing trade economic linkages with Afghanistan and other Central Asian Republics. To execute this a direct land access to Takikistan be constructed by negotiating a lease out of the small Wakhan corridor with Afghanistan in exchange for giving it transit facility to China via the Karakoram Highway.⁴⁵ Today, perhaps it is taking a longer-term perspective combining strategic aims, historical links and modern infrastructure.

Three, China is also discovering that expansion beyond its boundaries is a two-way street. China not only exports influence, but is influenced in turn and not always for the best – Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism and separatism are problems that China has begun to contend with increasingly following the opening of its overland links to Pakistan and other Central Asian countries. China will, therefore, be increasingly interested in how Pakistan and by extension, Afghanistan deal with the rising Islamic sectarianism and fundamentalism, in order to safeguard its own domestic interests.⁴⁶

Recent developments by China in POK

China is gaining an increasing stranglehold on Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). There are roughly 9,000 People's Liberation Army (P.L.A.) troops stationed in POK, proving a substantial Chinese military presence in this area. According to the statement made by the Indian Army commander General V K Singh, "Chinese presence in Gilgit-Baltistan and the Northern Areas is increasing steadily. There are many people who are concerned about the fact that if there was to be hostility between us and Pakistan, what would be the

⁴⁴ Sena Caṅakya, Bhabani Sen Gupta (1982), *The Afghan Syndrome: How to Live with Soviet Power*, London: Croom Helms Limited: 169.

⁴⁵ "NACCI for declaring Northern Areas as Special Economic Zone", *The Nation*, 8 November 2002, (Online: web) Accessed on 15 May 2012, URL: <http://www.nation.com/pk/daily/081102/national/oth6.htm>

⁴⁶ T Jacob Jabin (2008), "Chinese Strategic Interests in POK", in P. Stobdan and D. Suba Chandran (ed), *The Last Colony: Muzaffarabad-Gilgit-Baltistan*, New Delhi: India Research Press: 154.

complicity of Chinese. Not only they are in the neighborhood but the fact that they are actually present and stationed along the LoC,"⁴⁷

With the reported stationing of a unit of PLA soldiers near the Khunjerab Pass and Chinese military officials frequenting the Field Command Office of Gilgit, which happens to be Pakistan's military headquarter in the region, a pervasive Chinese intent of establishing a military edge in India's northern sector cannot be negated. Amidst growing pressure following a report published in the New York Times last year, regarding Chinese military presence in Gilgit-Baltistan, the report stated an estimate of 7000-11000 PLA soldiers present in Gilgit-Baltistan.⁴⁸ Beijing issued a very disinclined and delayed response. The discomfiting part of the entire exercise was when the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Jiang Yu, declined to issue a "categorical denial" over PLA troop presence in the region. Instead, Jiang chose to comment on the larger dimension of "attempts being made by a few" to fabricate stories so as to jeopardise China-Pakistan or China-India relations.⁴⁹

Of course China's encroachment into POK has other future implications besides energy trade.

The most obvious of these is that increased Chinese military presence, with P.LA troops stationed to the East in Aksai Chin and to the West in Gilgit Baltistan, will create a strategic chokehold around India. The Line of Control in Kashmir, separating Pakistan and India, is already an extremely tense arena now, Chinese military presence in this area will raise security concerns in troubled Kashmir to an extremely volatile level. These new developments will also give China a more central position as a decision-maker in the Kashmir debate. So far its role was largely peripheral when it came to the Kashmir issue but it is gradually trying to carve a more prominent position for itself, evidenced by the stapled visas it issues to Indian passport holders from Jammu and Kashmir, rather than stamping the visas on their passports and recent cases regarding contested depictions of

⁴⁷ "China's presence in PoK 'increasing steadily': Army commander", *The Times Of India*, 5 April, 2011.

⁴⁸ Harrison, Selig S., "China's Discreet Hold on Pakistan's Northern Borderlands", *The New York Times*, 26 August 2010.

⁴⁹ Chansoria Monika (2011), "China makes its presence felt in Pak occupied Kashmir" *Centre for Land and Warfare Studies*, Article 2025, [Online: web] Accessed on 12 September 2012, URL: http://www.claws.in/index.php?action=details&m_id=1026&u_id=28

Kashmir in its maps. Down the line in September 2010, China denied visa to Lt General B S Jaswal, the GoC of the Indian army's northern command, for official talks in Beijing on the grounds that he was commanding troops in a disputed area.⁵⁰ The political message from China is that Jammu and Kashmir henceforth as a disputed territory, in Chinese perceptions enables China to now interfere directly in the internal politics of Kashmir Valley.⁵¹ Evident of this was China inviting the Kashmiri secessionist leader Mirwaiz Farooq to China for discussions.⁵²

In this context, the Chinese plans for the development of Xinjiang, which demonstrate its increasing interest in the area, is likely to have considerable impact on Gilgit Baltistan in particular and the issue of Jammu and Kashmir in general. This clarifies Beijing's move is aimed at questioning the status of J&K vis-à-vis the Indian Union, thereby providing diplomatic support to Pakistan unambiguously.⁵³

Major Projects Being Undertaken by China in POK

POK being rich in natural water resource, China is also exploring these water resources and investing hugely in few dam projects like Neelum Jhelum, Diamer Bhasha and Bunji and China is also heavily engaged in building and extending a network of roads and expressways in this area.⁵⁴

Bunji hydropower project, it is run of a river project proposed to be located on Indus River, with dam and powerhouse 85 and 60 km respectively from Gilgit city in Northern Areas of Pakistan. The dam and powerhouse areas are accessible via KKH, 610 and 560 km respectively from Islamabad. The project would utilize Indus river drop in a loop of 45 km through 7.8 km long headrace tunnels. The proposed Bunji dam project is estimated to cost up to US \$ 7 billion and will have a capacity to generate 7,100

⁵⁰ "Visa row: China in damage control mode", *The Times of India*, August 27, 2010.

⁵¹ Jacob, Jabin T. (2007-08), "China and Kashmir", *Swords and Ploughshares*, 16 (1): 19-21, (Online: web) Accessed on 1 October 2011, URL: <http://www.ideals.illinois.edu/handle/2142/15471>.

⁵² Kapila, Subhash (2010), "China's Obtrusive Presence in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Implications For United States and India", *South Asia Analysis Group*, Paper 4036, [Online: web] Accessed on 17 February 2012, URL: <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers41%5Cpaper4036.html>

⁵³ Jacob, Jabin T. (2007-08), "China and Kashmir", *Swords and Ploughshares*, 16 (1): 19-21, [Online: web] Accessed on 1 October 2011, URL: <http://www.ideals.illinois.edu/handle/2142/15471>.

⁵⁴ Fisher Jr. Richard (2006), "PLA Modernization", *Sino-Indian*, [Online: web] Accessed on 15 May 2012, URL: <http://sinoindian.wordpress.com/2011/10/21/pla-modernization-by-richard-fisher-jr/>

megawatts of electricity. Under the deal, undertaken on a build-operate-transfer basis, all the investment will be made by Chinese entrepreneurs.⁵⁵ Secondly China has assured Pakistan that it will be providing financial assistance up to \$4 billion for 4500 MW Diamer Bhasha Dam project to be built on Indus River in Diamer district in Gilgit-Baltistan. The aid will be in the form of project financing for various components of the \$11.2 billion project. The assistance will expedite the project which will have gross capacity storage of 8.1 million acre feet (MAF) of water.⁵⁶

During Zardari's visit to China in August 2009, both the countries signed MoUs on cooperation for development of hydel, thermal and solar energy projects, and for promotion of river fisheries and related technologies by cooperation between the Indus River Fresh Water Fisheries Research Institute and the Pearl River Fishery Research Institute of Guangzhou. It is believed that the Zhejiang Design Institute of Water Conservancy and Hydroelectric Power (Zhejiang province) has already carried out feasibility studies for building small and medium-sized dams in POK. The media in Pakistan has reported that such deals between China and Pakistan are not transparent and often Chinese companies are awarded contracts without open bidding, “contrary to relevant government rules and regulations as well as basic norms of transparency”.⁵⁷ Therefore, it will help China meet its growing energy needs from investing in the hydel projects in POK.

It also clearly implies that Chinese projects also expedite the exploitation of natural resources in Gilgit, like water and precious stones. Gilgit currently has a large quantity of mineral resources, according to a joint report prepared by the Australian Agency for International Development (AUAID) and Pakistan Mineral Development Corporation (PMDC) in 1995, there were 1480 gold mines in this area, out of which 123 have ore where the gold content is many times higher than the world famous mines of South

⁵⁵ Projects For Friends of Democraric Pakistan (FODP), Pakistan Water and Power Development Auhtority, March 2011, url: <http://www.wapda.gov.pk/pdf/BrochureFODPMarch2011.pdf>

⁵⁶ “China to provide \$4 Billion for Diamer-Bhasha Dam project”, *Pakistan Today*, December 8, 2011, Islamabad, [Online: web] Accessed on 15 May 2012, URL: <http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2011/12/08/news/profit/china-to-provide-4b-for-diamer-bhasha-dam-project/>.

⁵⁷ Khan, Kamran, “Secret \$2.2 bn Pakistan Steel deal without bids”, *The News*, August 18, 2009, [Online: web] Accessed on 15 May 2012, URL: <http://paktribune.com/news/print.php?id=218208>

Africa. During the study as many as 2380 stream sediment samples were analysed and they were discovered to have significant contents of silver, copper, zinc, nickel and bismuth. Only 70 of them are estimated to be worth 500 trillion dollars.⁵⁸

The reserves of the remaining are yet to be estimated but due to the lack of adequate Pakistani technology and investment, exploitation of these resources has been relatively low. As Chinese companies are investing and exploring into this region however, mining and trade of these precious stones will greatly favor the Chinese economic interests. Freshwater is another resource that is becoming increasingly precious and having control over water-rich areas like G-B in the future means having control over one of tomorrow's most valued commodities.

On the other hand, China decided to improve the condition of Karakoram Highway, according to a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in June 2006 between China's state-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission and the National Highway Authority (NHA) of Pakistan, the Karakoram Highway is being widened from 10 metres to 30 metres, resulting in its operational capacity going up threefold, accustomed for military/heavy vehicular movement in extreme weather conditions.⁵⁹ Subsequently, in July 2010, during the visit of Pakistan's President, Asif Ali Zardari to China, NHA signed MoU's with China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) for the Karakoram Highway Project Phase-2, connecting Thakot Bridge to Sazin and widening the Jaglot-Skardu road. The repair, upgrade and maintenance of the highway are slated for completion in 2012. The highway allegedly has also been used for the clandestine transfer of nuclear material from China to Pakistan. This has multiple strategic implications for regional security especially that of India has been underscored by many experts.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Shafqat Inqalabi, "Economic exploitation of Gilgit-Baltistan", in Virendra Gupta and Alok Bansal (eds.), *Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: The Untold Story*, New Delhi: Manas Publications 2007, pp187-189.

⁵⁹ Chansoria Monika (2011), "China makes its presence felt in Pak occupied Kashmir" *Centre for Land and Warfare Studies*, Article 2025, [Online: web] Accessed on 12 September 2012, URL: http://www.claws.in/index.php?action=details&m_id=1026&u_id=28

⁶⁰ Raman, B. (2009), "Unrest in Gilgit Baltistan", *South Asia Analysis Group*, SAAG Paper 1241 [Online: web] Accessed on 15 January 2012, URL: <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers13%5Cpaper1241.html>, also cited from: Raman, B. (2009), "Gilgit Baltistan: The A Q Khan Proliferation Highway", Part VIII, *South Asia Analysis Group*, Paper 405,

It was only recently that China's State Council released guidelines to further augment the Kashgar and Korgas economic development zones located in western and southern Xinjiang, which borders Pakistan. The infrastructure investment announced by Beijing includes construction of a railway link with Pakistan. Acknowledging the decision of the State Council, Pakistan's ambassador to China, Masood Khan, underscored the 750 kms long railroad, which will connect the town of Havelian in Abbottabad district in Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to the Khunjerab Pass.⁶¹

The two countries have agreed to cooperate in modernizing and strengthening existing Pakistan Railways tracks and converting them to meet international standards. China is to send its experts to assist in feasibility studies for the railways projects, which would be carried out on a build-own-operate basis. Pakistan Railways has also purchased 69 locomotives, of which 15 were delivered as completely built units and are in use by Pakistan Railways. The remaining 54 are to be built at Pakistan Railways' locomotive factory. The Chinese locomotives are 37% cheaper than the European locomotives.⁶² Besides this, China has also constructed a dry port at Sust 140 km North of Gilgit, which was inaugurated by General Musharraf on July 4, 2006.⁶³ It now intends to expand and realign the Karakoram Highway which will enable it to access the port to Facilitate exports from Chinese factories located in the north-west of China.

One of the main drivers behind this situation is China's plan to gain unfettered and efficient access to the Middle East and Central Asia in order to secure its prospects for energy trade in the future. China intends to connect its Eastern province of Xinjiang to Pakistani deep sea ports like Gwadar in Balochistan through high speed railway lines, dry ports, underground pipelines and via the Karakoram Highway; all of this would cut the transportation time for oil and gas to the Gulf from roughly 20 days to less than 4 days. It could provide an important sea route to china's rapidly developing Western regions, Afghanistan and Central Asian states; and that an understanding has been reached to

[Online: web] Accessed on 15 January 2012, URL: <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers35%5Cpaper3408.html>

⁶¹ T Jacob Jabin (2008), "Chinese Strategic Interests in POK", P. Stobdan, D. Suba Chandran (ed), *The Last Colony: Muzaffarabad-Gilgit-Baltistan*, New Delhi: India Research Press: 139.

⁶² Haider, Syed Fazl-E. "China Pakistan Rail Link on Horizon", 24 February, 2007, (Online: web) Accessed on 15 May 2012, URL: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IB24Df02.html

⁶³ Khan, Safdar, "Karakoram Highways Gwadar link likely", *The Dawn*, Karachi, 5 July 2006.

upgrade KKH; and feasibilities for railway link, gas pipelines, oil refining and storage facilities at Gwadar are under preparation.⁶⁴ Building oil and gas pipelines through this Corridor significantly improve China's military postures in Western Tibet and Xingjiang both against India and countering the NATO's Eastward creep towards China's peripheries. Notwithstanding that the Karakoram Corridor initially passes through disputed territory, China has gone ahead with this major project as the major portion traversing Pakistan gives a strategic advantage to China in not only in outflanking US embedment in Afghanistan but also places a strong 'strategic pressure point' in China's hand against the United States when coupled with Chinese naval presence at Gwadar Port in proximity of the Hormuz Straits.⁶⁵

Impact of China's presence over the region

On the other side, there are some repercussions emanating for China from the construction and linkage of KKH with the Xinjiang Province of China. Xinjiang is the hub of trade and interaction between China, Central Asia and provides routes of trades into Central Asia, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. This area is, therefore of immense strategic importance to China.⁶⁶ This autonomous region has been targeted of jihadi and Muslim separatist groups due to its proximity to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asian Republics allows them safe haven. Jihadi groups have easy access into Xinjiang from POK through KKH. Especially, the rising extremism in POK is becoming a matter of grave concern for China, as the rising fundamentalism in POK is also percolating to Xinjiang, which is already dominated by the Uighur Muslims. The KKH link between POK and Xinjiang is also becoming the pathway for religious fundamentalism. Chinese are extremely worried of Islamic fundamentalism seeping into Xinjiang from this region and any turmoil in the region will have a bearing on the sino-Pak relations. The area around the KKH from Gilgit to China border is dominated by the Shia militant whereas

⁶⁴ Rehman, Fazal Ur (2007), "Prospects of Pakistan becoming a Trade and Energy Corridor for China." *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 27 (2) (Summer 2007), See also Butt, Muhammad Ijaz (2007), "*Focus on China: Relations with Pakistan Domestic Concerns*" Washington, London, Lahore: Council of Contemporary Affairs.

⁶⁵ Kapila, Subhash (2010), "China's Obtrusive Presence in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Implications For United States and India", *South Asia Analysis Group*, Paper 4036, [Online: web] Accessed on 17 February 2012, URL: <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers41%5Cpaper4036.html>

⁶⁶ Karim, Afsir (2009) "Strategic Dimensions of Trans-Himalayan Frontiers" in K. Warikoo (ed), *Himalayan Frontiers Of India*, NewYork, Routledge: 62

the area to the south west of Gilgit upto Manshera is under the influence of Sunni extremists.⁶⁷ Some of them have sympathies towards the Uighur nationalists in Xinjiang. Now China's concern is to curb the rising religious fundamentalism in POK to cut down the support to the Uighur militants of Xinjiang.

It can be assessed that the increased development of Chinese projects can also expedite the exploitation of natural resources in Gilgit, like water and precious stones. Gilgit currently has a large quantity of gem stones but due to the lack of adequate Pakistani technology and investment, exploitation of these resources has been relatively low. If Chinese companies are brought into this region however, mining and trade of these precious stones will greatly increase. Freshwater is another resource that is becoming increasingly precious and having control over water-rich areas like Gilgit-Baltistan in the future means having control over one of tomorrow's most valued commodities.

At a micro-level increased Chinese presence in POK is also affecting the democratic rights of the people. Freedom of movement will be heavily curtailed in and around Chinese operated zones, and this has already begun to surface as Pakistanis are barred from the 22 tunnels being built in secret locations by China in the vicinity. The already ailing press freedoms in Gilgit-Baltistan will either be severed, in order to wipe out any information about covert Chinese operations in POK.⁶⁸

On a more macro-scale, an increased Chinese presence in POK could even spark off a proxy war between the U.S. and China. With a strong and acknowledged presence of anti-U.S. groups like Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, involvement in South Asia is very important for the U.S. As China wins more and more control over Pakistan the U.S. is becoming increasingly tense that it will soon be edged out of the Afghanistan-Pakistan equation. Though the probability for this projection is low, Kashmir along with other territories could become the next theatre for a proxy war, providing a ground upon which China and the U.S. will vie for greater influence in South Asia and creating a security orbit that can deteriorate the conflict between India and

⁶⁷ Bansal, Alok, "Karakoram Impasse", *The Pioneer*, May 30, 2005, New Delhi.

⁶⁸ Bakshi Geetanjali (2011), "A Chinese Hand in POK", *Strategic Foresight Group*, [Online: web] Accessed on 12 September 2012, URL: http://www.strategicforesight.com/chinese_handpok.htm.

Pakistan. Such a situation can lead to grave humanitarian, economic and environmental losses.

However, the approach is diametrically opposite while explaining sharp strategies put in place by Beijing in so far as dealing with significant regional challengers is concerned. Notwithstanding the debate surrounding the amount of Chinese PLA soldiers present in POK and prospects of Chinese investments in POK, the fact of the matter remains that Beijing has firmly alighted itself in POK alongside the 772 km long Line-of-Control between India and Pakistan. This can have direct multi-dimensional impact over the security of India. The major impact over the Indian security due to the changed regional security environment by the presence of China in POK will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

INDIA'S POLICIES AND RESPONSES

The significance of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) in terms of geo-strategy only seems to be rising, given the fluidity of strategic equations in South Asia.¹ The Chinese ‘strategic indulgence’, Indian ‘reticence’, Pakistani ‘opportunism’, political ‘activism’ of the indigenous people of the area, and economic ‘imperatives’ of the region define the current geo-political scenario in the area. A strategic design is unfolding that is having direct implications over the security of India.

In 1947, when the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was attacked by the *tribals* from Pakistan, the Maharaja of the state signed an instrument of accession with India, stating the will to merge the state of Jammu and Kashmir with India. This decision of the Maharaja was much objected by Pakistan and, contrary to the instrument of accession, Pakistan continued its control over the parts of the state captured by the *tribals*. On 1 January 1948 India took the Kashmir issue to the UN Security Council on a charge of aggression by Pakistan.² This was the first measure taken by the Indian government to claim its authority over the region. Despite the above, Pakistan, in 1963, ceded the Shaksgam Valley of Northern Areas of POK to China under a border management agreement. In response to this India again approached the UN Security Council and lodged a protest against the Sino-Pak agreement, and termed and declared the agreement as the violation of the resolutions of Security Council and UN commission for India and Pakistan.³

Analyzing the capacity and the practicality of these initial responses, India is pursuing a more pragmatic approach in reforming policies to tackle the current situation. Especially, the sudden drift in the security equation of POK due to recent increase in the Chinese presence in the region has raised the eyebrows of Indian policy makers. Now they are condemning the encroachment of China in the region and are compelling China to stop its

¹ Chansoria, Monika , “Gilgit-Baltistan is of immense geo-strategic significance”, *Thesundayguardian.com*, [Online: web] Accessed on 15 January 2012, URL: <http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/gilgit-baltistan-is-of-immense-geo-strategic-significance>.

² The Kargil Review Committee Report (2000), “*From Surprise to Reckoning*”, New Delhi: Sage Publications: 42.

³ Hussain Altaf (2009), “The Gilgit-Baltistan Reforms 2009”, *Forum of Federations project in Pakistan*, [Online: web] Accessed on 15 January 2012, URL: www.forumfed.org/.../Gilgit-Baltistan%20Reforms%20AHussain%20FinalDec09.doc

investment and other projects in POK, as it is a disputed territory.⁴ Taking into account the above mentioned milieu, Firstly this chapter will assess the impact of the combined policies of China and Pakistan in POK over India's Security. Then, it will analyze the policies and responses pursued by India to tackle this security challenge.

Impact on India's Security

The increasing popular resentment against Pakistan and the growing footprint of China in the region adds yet another strategic dimension to the discourse on POK. India's security environment on the Northern and Western frontiers facing China and Pakistan acquired ominous and threatening military overtones, with China succeeding in establishing an obtrusive strategic presence in the Northern Areas of POK. Pakistan facilitated the Chinese military presence in this crucial region under the guise of flood relief and reconstruction in the year 2010.⁵ China, so far, had studiously avoided getting involved in Pakistan's disputes with India in Kashmir and has moved in with involvement with multiple infrastructure-development projects in Occupied Kashmir under Pakistan's control.⁶

The recent increase in Chinese presence in POK has changed altered the geopolitical and geostrategic equations in this critical region which borders China, India, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan. The deployment of Chinese troops in the region, even though for the ostensible purposes of infrastructural improvements of the 'Karakoram Corridor', heralds a new phase of China marking its prominence not only against India but also significantly against the United states in the global context.

Karakoram Highway, carrying immense strategic significance for both China and Pakistan, has grave security concerns for India. Since its opening in 1969 it has helped underpin the Sino-Pakistan nexus and served as the route for covert Chinese nuclear and missile transfers to Islamabad. The Karakoram Highway has been used by China for

⁴ "Keep off PoK, India warns China", *The Times of India*, New Delhi, 16 September , New Delhi.

⁵ "China sends technical assistance to avalanche-hit Siachen", *The Hindu*, Beijing, 15 April 2012.

⁶ Kapila, Subhash (2011), "India's Security Environment 2010 Reviewed", [Online: web] Accessed on 17 February 2012, URL: <http://www.boloji.com/index.cfm?md=Content&sd=Articles&ArticleID=10402>, also cited from: "South China Sea Exploration: China asks India to stay away", *The Economic Times*, New Delhi, 26 March 2012.

sending arms and ammunition and even the forces. In the 1971 Indo - Pakistan war it was used for this purpose.⁷

The Karakoram Highway enables the Chinese not only to move, when necessary, their troops to the Himalayan border with India, but it also enables them, in coordination with Pakistan, to declare their military presence in the region of POK. According to the MoU signed between Sino-Pak in 2006,⁸ the KKH needs to be expanded and broadened to facilitate the movements of goods through it. China has also provided a considerable amount of technical equipment, repair bases, storages of fuel and other necessities, in order to accomplish the repair project of KKH in the most difficult parts of Northern Areas. This is clear evidence that the Chinese have their long-term plans for the region. Huge amount of trade is taking place through this passage, regulars from the Chinese army are guarding the highway and the other important projects are being undertaken by China in the region.⁹ It is also said that Pakistani troops present in the region are backed by the Chinese army and we can assume that in the condition of a confrontation with Indian army Pakistan army will easily receive reinforcements from the Chinese troops. This explicitly impinges a serious threat on India's security.

Connecting the expansion and renovation of the Karakoram highway, with the help being provided by the Chinese in completion of the Gwadar port, clearly explains China's grand strategy in the region. Linking the KKH with Gwadar is likely to create a strategic-multiplier effect. Furthermore, the completion of the Gwadar project will enable the

⁷ Chellaney, Brehma (2008), Assessing India's Reactions to China's Peaceful Development Doctrine, *National Bureau of Research*, 18 (5): 27-28.

⁸ "Pakistan, China Sign MoU on Energy Cooperation", China.org.cn, Xinhua News Agency, 29 April 2006, (Online: web) Accessed on 4 June 2012, URL: http://www.china.org.cn/international/2006-04/29/content_1167194.htm, Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for energy cooperation between Pakistan and China was aimed at initiating studies to build an energy corridor for China to access the oil and gas resources of the Central and Western Asia. The statement said that the agreement would also accelerate oil and gas exploration activity in Pakistan. The MoU would promote development of renewable energy resources and capacity building in hydrocarbon research and development, according to the statement. The agreement would encourage private sectors as well as financial institutions of both countries to participate in the energy cooperation for realizing joint venture and investments.

⁹ "India's paranoid threat perception", *Pakistan Daily*, 1 September 2010.

Chinese navy, with its access in Burma, to operate on both sides of the Indian peninsula.¹⁰

Ominously, China's up-gradation of the Karakoram Corridor on Pakistan's behalf enables China's strategic outreach to the North Arabian Sea and the Gulf. Building oil and gas pipelines through this Corridor significantly improve China's military postures in Western Tibet and Xingjiang both against India and countering the NATO's Eastward move towards China's peripheries. Notwithstanding that the Karakoram Corridor initially passes through disputed territory China has gone ahead with this major project as the major portion traversing Pakistan gives a strategic advantage to China not only in outflanking US embedment in Afghanistan, but also in placing a strong 'strategic pressure-point' in China's hand against the United States when coupled with Chinese naval presence at Gwadar Port in proximity of the Hormuz Straits.

China's strategic presence at the Gwadar Port project, which got inaugurated on 20 March 2007¹¹, projected displayed its might in the subcontinent. Construction of the port began in March 2002 after the Chinese agreed to provide \$198 million of the \$248 million required for Phase I of the project.¹² China has also invested in support-infrastructure by financing a highway link from Gwadar to a central Balochistan town, connecting Karachi and Quetta. It is relevant and worthwhile to note that China was initially reluctant to help with the construction of the port, though it finally agreed to fund the same, provided that it had "sovereign guarantees to the port facilities." Pakistan agreed to this condition, resulting in a disgruntled United States.¹³ Just 250 miles from the straits of Hormuz, through which nearly 40 per cent of the world's oil supplies flow, the port is strategically located to serve as a key shipping point in the region. It is of great

¹⁰ Chellaney, Brehma (2008), Assessing India's Reactions to China's Peaceful Development Doctrine, *National Bureau of Research*, 18 (5): 28.

¹¹ Ministry of Ports and Shipping, Government of Pakistan "Inauguration of Gwadar Port", [Online: web] Accessed on 12 September 2012, URL: http://202.83.164.25/wps/portal/Mops!/ut/p/c0/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os_hQN68AZ3dnIwML82BTAYNXTz9jE0NfQwNfA_2CbEdFAA2MC_Y!/.

¹² Government of Pakistan Board of Investment Report "Gwadar", [Online: web] Accessed on 21 April 2012, URL: <http://www.pakboi.gov.pk/html/Gwadar.html>

¹³ Niazi, Tarique (2005), "Gwadar: China's Naval Outpost on the Indian Ocean", *The Jamestown Foundation*, China Brief, [Online: web] Accessed on 21 April 2012, URL: <http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2528.html>

strategic value as it augments Pakistan's importance in the region, while allowing China to diversify and secure its crude oil import routes and simultaneously gain access to the Persian Gulf.

According to the MOU signed between China and Pakistan on 30 June 2006, China is also going to build a 90 km highway link connecting the Chinese side of the Karakoram highway to the Russian built highway network that already connects all the five Central Asian Republics. This regional highway network will directly link Gwadar to Xinjiang and the landlocked Central Asian Republics.¹⁴ The Karakoram highway and the coastal highway will both serve as vital trade routes and, considering that the existing Karakoram highway already connects Western China to Pakistan, any further expansion of the line along with prospective linkages to Gwadar via the planned Ratodero-Khuzdar road would make it the shortest and most viable route connecting Gwadar to Western China.¹⁵

This manifests China's attempt to exert its influence far beyond its borders in order to sustain its security interests, as well as to consolidate its friendship with Pakistan through large scale collaborative projects. Through the construction of the Gwadar port Beijing also will gain considerable influence in the region, giving it a strategic entrance to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, while allowing it to closely monitor US naval activity and US-Indian maritime cooperation. This, doubtlessly, is a cause for alarm and unease to both India and the US, as the port will enable China to monitor its energy shipments from the Persian Gulf while simultaneously offering it the option of a safer alternative passage for energy imports from Central Asia in the event of a hostile situation. American suspicion of Chinese intentions at Gwadar is corroborated by an internal report prepared for the Pentagon entitled "Energy Futures in Asia" which states that Beijing has already set up electronic eavesdropping posts at Gwadar which monitor ship traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Sea.¹⁶

¹⁴ Chaturvedi, Rajeev Ranjan (2006), "Interpreting China's Grand Strategy at Gwadar", Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, China-Articles Paper 1939, [Online: web] Accessed on 15 January 2012, URL: <http://ipcs.org/article/china/interpreting-chinas-grand-strategy-at-gwadar-1939.html>

¹⁵ Jehanzeb (2007), "The Trade Potential and Industrial Development in Gwadar", *Journal of Management Sciences*, 1 (1): 96.

¹⁶"China builds up strategic sea lanes", *The Washington Post*, January 17, 2005, [Online: web] Accessed on 21 April 2012, URL: <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2005/jan/17/20050117-115550-1929r/>.

In addition, the port and the other supporting infrastructure will help integrate Pakistan into the Chinese economy by outsourcing low-tech, basic production and manufacturing jobs, making it into a giant factory floor for China. Having invested \$400 million in the project, the port will be accessible for Chinese imports and exports through overland links that stretch across the Karakoram Highway.¹⁷

For Pakistan as well the benefits are profound to quote President Musharraf, “as and when needed the Chinese navy could be in Gwadar to give befitting replies to everyone.”¹⁸ This statement was further reinforced by Pakistan’s recent designation of the port area as “a sensitive defence area.”¹⁹ Gwadar would inhibit India’s ability to blockade Pakistan, and permit China to supply Pakistan by land and sea during wartime. Pakistan, essentially, is interested in the project to gain strategic leverage so that it is less vulnerable to the dominant Indian navy.

The construction of the port and the highway, by making Pakistan a regional trade-hub for commercial traffic, will also boost domestic economic development and influence the geo-strategic environment in the region. The port will enable the transfer of Central Asia’s vast energy resources to world markets, earning Pakistan significant profits in transit fees, as well as attract considerable investment into Balochistan. In addition, discussions are already underway to designate the Gwadar port as a free trade zone, while some members of the Pakistani business community advocate the eventual designation of the Gwadar port as an export processing zone with special incentives extended to Chinese companies.²⁰

China, in terms of political and strategic signaling to its adversaries, does not act impulsively and, therefore, the Chinese challenge of changing the strategic *status-quo* in

¹⁷ Niazi, Tarique (2005), “Gwadar: China’s Naval Outpost on the Indian Ocean”, *The Jamestown Foundation*, China Brief, [Online: web] Accessed on 21 April 2012, URL: <http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2528.html>

¹⁸ Chaturvedi, Rajeev Ranjan (2006), “Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy at Gwadar”, Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, China-Articles Paper 1939, [Online: web] Accessed on 15 January 2012, URL: <http://ipcs.org/article/china/interpreting-chinas-grand-strategy-at-gwadar-1939.html>

¹⁹ Government of Pakistan Board of Investment Report “Gwadar”, Accessed on 21 April 2012, URL: <http://www.pakboi.gov.pk/html/Gwadar.html>

²⁰ Haider, Ziad (2005), “Baluchis, Beijing, and Pakistans’ Gwadar Port”, *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, 6 (1), [Online: web] Accessed on 15 January 2012, URL: <http://journal.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/6.1-Haider.pdf>

South Asia has to be viewed as a well thought-out and calibrated Chinese strategy to counteract what it perceives as growing reinforcing of the US-India Strategic Partnership.

These combined moves by China and Pakistan seem to have been coincidentally timed with the United States wavering commitments in Afghanistan and an India emasculated by strategic indecisiveness and lacking strategic audacity in tackling its military threats from China and Pakistan, both singly and jointly.

Taking off from the above is that in the ongoing United States-China power games Pakistan's active assistance in enhancing the capacity of the Karakoram Corridor allows China to establish a meaningful and substantive strategic foothold in close proximity of the strategic Straits of Hormuz vital for American embedment in the Gulf Region and global energy supplies. Pakistan has, hence enabled force-multipliers to China against the United States when the Karakoram Corridor is coupled with Gwadar Port and Pakistan Navy bases on the Makran Coast.²¹

China, with the ongoing joint moves with Pakistan, is now in a position to outflank United States' military presence in Afghanistan. Further, with such enhanced strategic advancement, China can be inclined to be less helpful in solution of the Afghanistan conflict. China's military presence in areas adjoining Afghanistan is likely to be used as a strong leverage by China against the United States.²²

Analyzing the above mentioned facts, it can be discerned that an increased Sino-Pak alliance in POK could even spark off a proxy war between the U.S. and China. China's increased involvement across South Asia is creating a tense situation for the U.S. With a strong and acknowledged presence of anti-U.S. groups like Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the Afghanistan, Pakistan and POK region, involvement in South Asia is very important for the U.S. and, as China is grasping more and more control over Pakistan, the U.S. is

²¹ Kapila, Subhash (2010), "China's Obtrusive Presence in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Implications For United States and India", *South Asia Analysis Group*, Paper 4036, [Online: web] Accessed on 17 February 2012, URL: <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers41%5Cpaper4036.html>

²² Ibid.

becoming increasingly tense and fearful that it will soon be edged out of the South Asian region.

The military implications for India arising from China's increasing profile in POK can be viewed at multiple levels, namely, in the overall context of the China-India military stand-off along India's long borders with China's Tibet, next in the context of India's defense postures in Ladakh, and finally in the scenario, of a combined military threat by China and Pakistan.

In the overall context of the China-India military standoff along the India-China's Tibet border, China is getting apprehensive of India's strengthened defensive postures in the North-East in Arunachal Pradesh, which, by its present maneuvers in POK, shall be able to trifurcate India's military responses in the event of hostilities.

Further, China was militarily most vulnerable in its Western military deployment opposite India's Ladakh region due to logistic limitations, especially in terms of fuel supplies necessary to prosecute sizeable military operations against India. With the development of infrastructure in the Karakoram Corridor, and especially the oil pipelines,²³ China's oversized military deployments against India would now be strongly sustainable logistically.

Taking into consideration India's defense postures in Ladakh, the challenge of China's growing presence in POK and its involvement in roads network emanating from the Karakoram Highway and running towards Skardu and other locations opposite Ladakh and Siachen Sectors opens up the possibilities of China surpassing Indian military deployments in Ladakh. In any future confrontation, China could open a direct route to Leh along the Indus Valley without fighting India's main defensive deployments opposite the Tibetan border. Such an outflanking move from the rear could unravel India's entire defence posture in Ladakh.

²³ Sakhuja, Vijay (2010), "The Karakoram Corridor: China's Transportation Network in Pakistan", *China Brief*, 10 (20), [Online: web] Accessed on 15 January 2012, URL: http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37017&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=414&no_cache=1

Finally, in the context of a combined China-Pakistan military threat against India, the development of strategic infrastructure by China in the Gilgit-Baltistan region running eastwards towards Indian defenses in the Ladakh Sector would facilitate speedy and enlarged Pakistan Army deployments, which were earlier limited by infrastructural inadequacies. This would enable the Pakistan Army to complement China's main military offensives against Ladakh to the consequent military advantage of both. It could also facilitate China in opening up a direct outflanking front against India by Chinese troops acting in concert with the Pakistan Army.²⁴

These realities are certain to impinge on India's long-term security interests and, therefore, it is incumbent upon Indian policy makers to adopt and pursue a prompt and immediate proactive approach towards POK which is an integral part of India. India has to rethink and redevise its approach strategy in order to mobilize international opinion against bad governance and unlawful occupation of POK by Pakistan since 1947. The demographic map of POK has changed significantly since its occupation by Pakistan in 1947. Moreover, Chinese and *jihadi* influences are on the rise.

India's Response

Against this backdrop India's response to the developments in POK, which is legally its own territory, has been rather lukewarm, callous and reticent. It should try to reshape international opinion on Kashmir which has so far, not understood the Indian stand clearly. As due to Pakistan's contentious claims over Kashmir, too much focus is given laid on the Kashmir valley (which is just 7 per cent of the total area of J&K and 15 per cent of the area is under Indian administration) while the rest of state, including POK, Jammu and Ladakh, hardly receives any critical attention.

There is seldom any concrete and pressing effort shown by India to clearly define its objectives on POK which is regarded as an integral part of its territory. India can reassert its claim on POK as per the 1994 Parliamentary Resolution. There is a greater and urgent need for India to clearly define and contrive its strategic objectives with regard to POK

²⁴ Kapila, Subhash (2010), "China's Obtrusive Presence in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Implications For United States and India", *South Asia Analysis Group*, Paper 4036, [Online: web] Accessed on 17 February 2012, URL: <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers41%5Cpaper4036.html>

and also elucidate how it intends to fulfill those objectives. This requires that policy-makers and analysts in the government have to frame out their objectives on POK more transparently, sincerely and seriously. The Parliamentary Resolution of February 22, 1994, which outlines India's approach to the state of Jammu and Kashmir, can serve as a guideline:

- The state of Jammu & Kashmir has been, is and shall be an integral part of India and any attempts to separate it from the rest of the country will be resisted by all necessary means;
- India has the will and capacity to firmly counter all designs against its unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity; and demands that –
- Pakistan must vacate the areas of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, which they have occupied through aggression; and resolves that –
- All attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of India will be met resolutely.²⁵

Supplementing the above mentioned resolution, claiming India's authority over POK, India, militarily, is pursuing special policies to consolidate its hold over its boundary to keep a check over the moment across the boundary. Accordingly, Indian military is planning to form a mountain strike corps in addition to the two new divisions coming up in the north-east. The three existing strike corps are based in the plains and focused on Pakistan. According to the sources, the proposal could cost the government around 12,000 crore, two new mountain divisions numbering 35,000 troops that the Indian Army has already raised. These are based in Nagaland and Assam, just south of the disputed province. However, the strike corps will consist of a further 40,000 troops, and its presence will significantly alter the Himalayan dynamic, with Indian forces in the region previously adopting a more defensive posture.²⁶

²⁵ Indian Parliamentary Resolution on Jammu & Kashmir, February 22, 1994. Parliamentary Debates: Official report, Volume 170, Issue 2, 1994, given in Appendix V

²⁶ "India's New Strike Corps", august 27, 2011, *The Diplomat*, [Online: web] Accessed on 15 May 2012, URL: <http://the-diplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2011/08/27/indias-new-strike-corps/>

The focus will be on developing highly fragile and flexible formations which could be mobilized rapidly. The proposal also stressed on the need to speed up the existing border infrastructural projects and to take up new programmes like adding more airports in the North-East and preparing advanced landing grounds. The Border Roads Organization (BRO) has undertaken 39 projects on the Sino-Indian border to increase connectivity.²⁷

India has not only massively upgraded its navy and air force, including an Indian-Russian arms deal worth more than \$3.3 billion to build 42 new long-range, multirole Su-30MKI fighters to be deployed near the Chinese border, but has also joined a new Quadrilateral Initiative with Australia, Japan and the U.S. Although the Quad members claim that their strategic partnership is only aimed at maintaining regional security and is not targeting any particular power, analysts see the Quad as a concerted effort to contain the rising Chinese power.²⁸

In 2006 the Indian government gave green signal for a host of road and other infrastructural projects in border areas – building of 72 roads, three airstrips and numerous bridges in the border areas along the undefined Line of Actual Control (LAC) that would enable the Indian military to “swiftly move forces into the region and sustain them logistically in the event of any untoward trouble or emergency.”²⁹ However, only nine of the 72 roads earmarked for construction along the Sino-Indian border have been built till now.³⁰ There are huge delays due to pending mandatory clearances from the Ministry of Environment and Forests and inadequate funding.

In June 2009 the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, while announcing its 100-day agenda, stated that it had allocated Rs. 13,397.2 crore (\$2.8 billion) for road

²⁷ Singh, V.K., “Army Presents Three Point Plan to Counter China”, *The Mail Today*, 19 May 2011, New Delhi, (Online: web) Accessed on 15 May 2012, URL: <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/indian-armys-three-point-plan-to-counter-china/1/138605.html>.

²⁸ “Aggressive China Pushing the Envelope IMR Report”, *Indian Military Review*, October 2010, [Online: web] Accessed on 15 May 2012, URL: <http://www.idyb.com/imr/details.php?id=162>

²⁹ . Malik Mohan, “India-China Competition Revealed in Ongoing Border Disputes,” PINR Report, 9 October 2007, [Online: web] Accessed on 15 May 2012, URL: http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=695&language_id=1.

³⁰ 27 fall in Arunachal Pradesh, 19 in Uttarakhand, 14 in Jammu & Kashmir, seven in Himachal Pradesh and six in Sikkim. While 27 of these roads are being constructed under the aegis of the home ministry, 15 are with BRO. The remaining 12 are to be constructed by CPWD or state PWDs. The plan is to construct the 72 roads in a time-bound manner by 2012 to counter the rapid pace of military development in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR).

development in Jammu and Kashmir and the North-East. The Ministry also set a timeframe for 30 projects so that they are implemented on a fast track basis. As per the agenda the Ministry plans to construct 7,000 km of road network every year. The projects to enhance road connectivity in Jammu and Kashmir include the four-laning of the Jammu-Srinagar national highway at an estimated cost of Rs. 9,628.82 crore. The plan also includes improving the national highway 1D (Zozila-Kargil-Leh road) and construction of a 3 km two-lane road at national highway-1B (Batote-Kishtwar). BRO is executing these projects at an estimated cost of Rs.100 crore. The Ministry has also cleared two more projects worth Rs. 768 crore for the state.³¹

In September 2009 the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) cleared a few projects — to build a more reliable second approach to Ladakh with the upgrading of the Manali-Leh road; to construct the 8.8 km Rohtang tunnel (which had been waiting for CCS approval since 2002, Rohtang Pass at a height of 13,050 feet remains unconnected by road linking Leh-Himachal almost the entire winter season due to heavy snowfall); to develop railway networks in border areas of Jammu & Kashmir and linking them with other parts of the nation (Kashmir valley with the Himalayan foothills, originally planned by 2009, but only the lines in the plains are operational so far). Additionally, the government plans a new railway project to link Ladakh to the rest of India (Bilaspur in HP).³²

In May 2010 the BRO undertook the building of 61 roads near the India-China border, with a total length of 3,429 km. It also plans to construct 285 roads with a total length of over 4,890 km and an all-weather road to Ladakh. Despite these initiatives the pace of infrastructure building has been alarmingly and disappointingly slow. The BRO, in particular, has been directed to complete construction of the roads stretching from Ladakh to Diphu La in Arunachal, about 608 kms at a cost of Rs. 992 crore (203

³¹ “Government to Revamp Road Infrastructure in Kashmir and Northeast,” *Indo Asian News Service*, New Delhi, 30 June 2009.

³² Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai and Kailash Prasad, “Sino-Indian Border Infrastructure: Issues and Challenges”, Observer Research Foundation Issue Brief, Issue 23, August 2010, [Online: web] Accessed on 15 May 2012, URL: http://www.observerindia.com/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/issuebrief/attachments/Ib_23_1283150074942.pdf.

million USD), by 2010.³³ However, it is nowhere near completion. Meanwhile, the government has also approved the construction of four strategic roads in Ladakh – part of the wider infrastructure-building effort across the Himalayas.

India will upgrade the Advanced Landing Ground (ALG) of the Indian Air Force (IAF) at Nyoma in Ladakh. A proposal to modernise the compact airstrip at Nyoma, located just 23 kms from the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with Chinese occupied Tibet, has gone to the Defence Ministry for approval. From Nyoma IAF fighters will be able to fly missions to the Chinese border. Modern fighters, particularly the Sukhoi-30MKI, are designed to operate from such high altitude airfields. In 2008 India decided to station frontline Sukhoi-30MKI fighters at four IAF bases in northeast India — Tezpur, Bagdogra, Chhabua and Hashimara — close by its border with China. Coupled with building of road links in the region, reopening of such ALGs will create more access points for the armed forces to border areas.

Reactivation of other ALGs like Daulat Beg Oldi and Fukche over the last couple of years had been done with the stated objective of connecting remote regions of Ladakh with the mainland to promote tourism and other economic activity. The IAF was also upgrading eastern sector ALGs like Pasighat, Mechuka, Walong, Tuting, Ziro and Vijaynagar as well as several helipads in Arunachal Pradesh.³⁴

Apart from the military responses, there are few policies which that India can follow to further its claim over the region. There is an opinion amongst some analysts in India that the POK should be renamed 'West Jammu and Kashmir' to underscore the fact that it is a part of the state of J&K and, hence, an integral part of India. There is, however, no unanimity on the change of nomenclature because of the overall sensitivity of the Kashmir issue. India has to take note of the changes taking place in POK, whether political or strategic, and make a serious, concerted effort to shape and orient its objectives in POK. Likewise, in 2006, students from Gilgit and Baltistan in POK

³³ Pandit, Rajat, “China Way Ahead on Border Infrastructure,” *The Economic Times*, New Delhi, 19 January 2009.

³⁴ Pandit, Rajat, “China Way Ahead on Border Infrastructure,” *The Economic Times*, New Delhi, 19 January 2009.

demanded reservation of seats in top Indian institutions like the IITs and IIMs.³⁵ This should not be very difficult for the Indian government to implement since it already has 25 seats reserved for members from POK in the Jammu & Kashmir Legislative Assembly.³⁶

So, India can make substantial advancement in these areas to get close to the people of the region and to have more proximity with them to solidify its claim over the region. Indian government can also provide scholarships to students from POK and engage the people in POK including the diaspora. It may also consider filling up the seats reserved for the people in POK in the J&K Assembly through representatives from the diaspora. The people of POK should be regarded as citizens of India and special documents should be issued to them in this regard. They may be allowed to visit India after proper check of their antecedents.

POK has enormous strategic significance for India: it is the gateway to Central Asia through the Wakhan Corridor and, at the same time, it is rich in natural resources. Thus, there is a greater need for India to take a more proactive approach on POK, not only because it is a part of its territory but also because of the high strategic stakes. Apart from the aforesaid, military preparations, still India has to develop, implement and enforce some concrete definitive and efficacious policies and decisions to define delineate its objectives and to change modify its strategies with respect to the changing security environment in POK.

³⁵ “POK students want seats in IIM/IITs”, 23 May 2006, [Online: web] Accessed on 15 May 2012, URL: <http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/may/23sheela.htm>.

³⁶ “Delimitation adds seats to POK quota”, *The Times of India*, July 7, 2006, [Online: web] Accessed on 15 May 2012, URL: <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Delimitation-adds-seats-to-PoK-quota/articleshow/1712043.cms>

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK), the disputed territory, shares its borders with India, Pakistan and China. Due to its strategic location it has an important momentous position in security and stability of the region. Recently, there has been a shift in the security equation of the region due to the marked presence of China. China has entered the region under the veil of infrastructural development projects, with the prospect to further its own strategic interests. Moreover, the presence of China has been facilitated by Pakistan in order to have a strategic edge over India. It can also be assessed that by inviting China in POK Pakistan wants to subdue India's claims over POK. Especially after the construction of Karakoram Highway with the help of China the communication linkage between POK and Pakistan has got consolidated. Consequently, it has enhanced Pakistan's capacity to deploy its army across LOC and evenly developing terrorist training centers for waging a proxy war against India. These changes in POK have serious security implications for India.

The study has evidently clarified the objectives of the research in the previous chapters sequentially. In this chapter, firstly, congregating conclusions are made with respect to the facts and analysis described in the previous chapters, and then the hypotheses of the study are tested. On the basis of the facts analyzed in the previous chapters the following conclusions are derived.

Considering the policies executed by Pakistan towards POK it can be inferred that these policies have resulted in the absence of any legitimate democratic structure of governance in POK, due to which there has been a continuous and persistent demand from the of the people to grant them more autonomy and independence in managing their own affairs. However, Pakistan has suppressed these demands advocating independence to participate in the elections, and has dealt with them with a heavy hand. Even the European Parliament's report drafted by Baroness Emma Nicholson in 2008 took note of the situation in 'AJK' and held that the area under Pakistan's control "suffers from extreme poverty and neglect, with enormous deficiencies in basic literacy, access to healthcare facilities, lack of democratic structures and major deficiencies in the rule of law and justice".¹

¹ Shabir Choudhry, "Emma Nicholson and EU Kashmir report", Asian Tribune, December 14, 2006, Published by World Institute for Asian Studies, Vol 11 no. 436, [Online: web] Accessed on 15 May 2012, URL: <http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/3652>.

The condition of the people of Gilgit-Baltistan has been even worse. As a Shia majority region, it has been the target of Sunni-sectarian violence since the 1980s. Apart from the sectarian attacks Pakistan is also applying a discreet policy of diluting the Shia majority of the region by infusing Sunni population from the other areas of Pakistan. Moreover, until 2009, they had no representative system and were ruled directly from Islamabad. Pakistan has gone on exploiting the natural resources of the region without giving any attention to the legitimate demands of the people. The popular resistance against the Diamer-Bhasha dam being built in this region with Chinese help is a clear indication of this. Pakistan's efforts to bring in nominal reforms in the system of administration have been met with widespread popular resistance. For example, the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self Governance Package 2009 was rejected by the people completely.

The sense of alienation prevalent since the last sixty years has been further accentuated due to the flawed and failed policy of governance of the government of Pakistan over the years. Therefore, the people of POK have expressed their disillusionment with the Pakistani state quite forcefully in recent years. This region, which is bountiful in natural resources, has been subjected to ruthless economic exploitation by Pakistan. For instance, POK, being rich in the water resource, has been a critical source for hydropower generation and irrigation for Pakistan.

Moreover, the construction of dams in the region has adverse ecological effects for the people inhabiting the region especially because it lies in an extremely sensitive seismic zone. The people of Gilgit-Baltistan have also raised and expressed concerns, worries and apprehension about the inundation of many rich archaeological sites due to the construction of the Diamer-Bhasha dam. While the reservoir would be in Gilgit Baltistan, the power-house is being deliberately built in Diamer, which is in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, to deprive them of their rightful share in the royalty.

Furthermore, the region also provides Pakistan with the strategic access to China, as the Northern areas share border with Xinjiang province of China. Pakistan ceded the Trans-Karakoram tract, a part of the POK, to China by in 1963. The strategic Karakoram Highway was built through this territory to link Pakistan with China. Due to its close proximity with the LOC between India and Pakistan it is proving to be an integral element for Pakistan to keep its military sustained against

India. On the other hand, the extension of KKH from Kashgar to Gwadar has provided China a direct link to Arabian Sea, which opens a gateway to the energy rich Middle-East.

China's strategic objectives in POK stem from the fact that the Xinjiang is contiguous to this region and, somehow, the Uighur terrorists of Xinjiang have made link with the Islamic fundamentalists of Pakistan via POK, which has created security drift in Beijing. So, China's presence in POK is also expected help in keeping a check over this rising threat. On the contrary, it can also be assumed that POK can serve as a pearl for China in its extension of the 'string of pearls' strategy around India.

China has gained considerable foothold in POK by way of infrastructure development and has helped Pakistan in exploiting the resources of this region. The Chinese presence profile in POK is increasing steadily. China is involved in the construction and upgradation of numerous roads, bridges and hydro-electric projects. On the other hand, the presence of Chinese troops in the contested region constitutes Beijing's direct involvement in the Kashmir dispute. Consequentially, this could, in principle, transform a bilateral dispute into a trilateral dispute, with China being the third stakeholder. That apart, the roads and bridges, being constructed with Chinese assistance, facilitate the Pakistan army operations against India in the region. This involvement further signals that "Pakistan is a frontline state of China's grand strategy" to strengthen the Chinese presence in South Asia. Hence, the Chinese link with Pakistan through the POK further accentuates Sino-Pak friendship which has been of great security concern for India.

Hence, this study evidently and undeniably proves testifies the first hypothesis that Pakistan has gained tremendous strategic position in POK by bringing in China. The bringing of China in the region has significantly altered the strategic security environment in the region, which is having direct adverse repercussions on the security perspectives of India. China's infrastructure development in the region has amplified Pakistan's economic and military power.

These developments are posing fresh military challenges to India not only along the India-China border but also along the Line of Control. Unlike earlier, when China had logistic limitations on India's Western front in terms of fuel supply for troops, the Karakoram Highway and the ongoing infrastructure development will facilitate military operations by both china and Pakistan

against India. China's intensified engagement in the region, the enhanced reconstruction and development, reflects an intensive move to alter the security situation in the region.

POK is of immense strategic importance to India, as the control of this piece of land will relieve India from a huge security burden. If the area will come under India's authority, it can provide India a direct access to Afghanistan via Wakhan corridor and will bring India more proximate to the Central Asian republics. The region can enhance India's strategic advantage (over Pakistan by cutting the Sino-Pak link through POK, which will stabilize the security of India. Control over the region will also lead to much suppression of the terrorist activities in Kashmir.

In this context however, Indian responses have been limited over the issue, the first parliamentary resolution claiming India's authority over POK came in 1994, which clearly demonstrates the kind of negligence and reticence India has shown. However, the recent developments in the region after the presence of China have raised concerns and discomfort among the Indian strategists and India is revitalizing its claim on this territory. Having achieved a breakthrough in promotion of cross LOC trade and people-to-people contacts, India should make prompt and earnest efforts to reclaim POK.

The study further proves the second hypothesis correct that the growing Chinese presence has increased POK's significance in India's strategic calculations. It can be assessed that it has shook the Indian strategists and compelled them to reconsider their negligent approach towards POK, as China's entrance in the region is going to have multiple deleterious impacts on India's security and, now, India has to be prepared to face the onslaught by both China and Pakistan from POK.

The study further found that there is a simmering unrest against Pakistan in POK which needs to be highlighted across the globe, especially amongst the countries who are strong and ardent advocates of human rights and freedom. Against the recent developments in the region POK can no longer be treated as one of the several issues pending between India and Pakistan. The emergence of China in the picture has added a new dimension which needs to be dealt with firmly to strengthen India's claim on POK.

Evaluating the current developments in POK due to the presence of China, it can be assessed that China is establishing POK as a pearl in its grand strategy of 'string of pearls', in order to encircle

India in its entire neighborhood. Subsequently, India has raised its ante against Pakistan's control over POK and Pakistan-facilitated presence of China in the region.

Pakistan, on its part, has allowed a foreign force in POK, a disputed territory, to accentuate its strategic interests in the region. The infrastructural projects being undertaken with the help of China are having serious impacts on the ecological balance of the region, creating resentment in the masses. On the other side, the policies of Pakistan have resulted in a demographic dilution in the region, which has furthered the feeling of animosity in the people. Hence, as it can be deduced, Pakistan has further jeopardized the security of the people of POK. The current situation is creating a vacuum in the region, which India can fill by drafting and executing special policies to address the grievances of the people of the region, and accommodating and resolving their issues.

POK's security environment in the coming decades is likely to unfold in strategically disruptive terms for India both in terms of her external security challenges and internal security challenges. China is going to engage more inquisitively in POK in the coming years, because its investment in POK is going to have multiple derivatives and benefits. Being in POK, China will try to curb the *Jihadi* menace in the region, which is having links with the Uighur terrorists of the Xinjiang province of China, which is quite an irritant for China. China is also well aware of the availability of the natural resources present in the Northern Areas of POK and of Pakistan to fetch those resources. So, China, in the name of infrastructural help, will definitely seek to exploit harness those resources to its own interests.

Moreover, talking about the growing energy needs of China, the strategic Karakoram Highway, which passes through POK, is a direct link of China to the energy rich Middle-East. This is precisely the reason why China is investing hugely in the developmental projects in the Gwadar port and the Makran Coast. Pakistan is emerging as the sole beneficiary of China's presence in POK, as both of these countries have historical ties with each other and, now, this particular move by China, or we can also interpret it as an invite given to China by Pakistan in POK, has provided Pakistan an upper hand in the security equation in the region. The improved infrastructural help to Pakistan in POK facilitates it to an enhanced and speedy deployment of army across the LoC and, thus, outflanks India.

Therefore, India cannot afford to be indifferent and callous to the emerging situation. And this is not only to ensure that India's geo-strategic interests are secured, according to the Parliamentary Resolution of 1994 which specifies India's stand over POK and, moreover, twenty four seats have been reserved in the J&K legislature for the areas under Pakistani control, necessitates it to respond as early as possible, giving it utmost diplomatic attention on priority-basis.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX I: Map of Jammu and Kashmir along with POK and Aksai Chin.



APPENDIX II: Map of Karakoram Highway



The red line in the map shows the route of Karakoram Highway, from Kashgar (China) to Rawalpindi (Pakistan).

APPENDIX III

ARTICLE 370 OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION

Temporary provisions with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir

(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,

(a) The provisions of article 238 shall not apply in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir; (b) The power of Parliament to make laws for the said State shall be limited to,

(i) Those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List which, in consultation with the Government of the State are declared by the President to correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of Accession governing the accession of the State to the Dominion of India as the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for that State; and

(ii) Such other matters in the said lists as, with the concurrence of the Government of the State, the President may by order specify.

Explanation For the purposes of this article, the Government of the State means the person for the time being recognised by the President as the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers for the time being in office under the Maharaja's Proclamation dated the fifth day of March, 1948;

(c) The provisions of article 1 and of this article shall apply in relation to that State;

(d) Such of the other provisions of this Constitution shall apply in relation to that State subject to such exceptions and modifications as the President may by order specify: Provided that no such order which relates to the matters specified in the Instrument of Accession of the State referred to in paragraph (i) of sub-clause (b) shall be issued except in consultation with the Government of the State: Provided further that no such order which relates to matters other than those referred in the last preceding proviso shall be issued except with the concurrence of that Government.

(2) If the concurrence of the Government of the State referred to in paragraph (ii) of sub-clause (b) of clause (1) or in the second proviso to subclause (d) of that clause be given before the Constituent Assembly for the purpose of framing the Constitution of the State is convened, it shall be placed before such Assembly for such decision as it may take thereon.

(3) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this article, the President may by public notification, declare that this article shall cease to be operative or shall be operative only with such exceptions and modifications and from such date as he may specify: Provided that the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State referred to in clause (2) shall be necessary before the President issues such a notification.

In exercise of the powers conferred by Article 370 the President, on the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, declared that as from the 17th Day of November, 1952, the said Article 370 shall be operative with the modification that for the Explanation in Cl. (1) thereof, the following explanation is substituted namely.

"Explanation - For the purpose of this article, the Government of the State means the person for the time being recognized by the President on the recommendation of the Legislative Assembly of the State as the Sadr-i-Riyasat (now Governor) of Jammu and Kashmir, acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers of the State for the time being in office."

(Ministry of Law and Order No. C. O. dated 15th Nov. 1952.)

APPENDIX IV

1963 SINO–PAKISTAN FRONTIER AGREEMENT.

Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Pakistan on the boundary between China's Sinkiang and the contiguous areas, the defense of which is under actual control of

Pakistan, signed in Peking, March 2, 1963. The Agreement delimited the boundary as follows:

Having agreed, with a to ensuring the prevailing peace and tranquility on the border, to formally delimit and demarcate the boundary China's Sinkiang and the contagious areas the defence of which is under the actual control of Pakistan, in a spirit of fairness, reasonableness, mutual understanding and mutual accommodation and on the basis of the ten principles as enunciated in the Bandung conference;

Being convinced that this will not only give full expression to the desire of the People of China and Pakistan for the development of good neighborly and friendly relations, but also help safeguard Asian and world peace.

Have resolved for this purpose to conclude the present agreement and have appointed as their respective plenipotentiaries the following

For the Government of the Peoples Republic of China; Chen Yi, Minister of Foreign affairs

For the Government of the Pakistan Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Minister of External Affairs

Who, having mutually examined their full power and found them to be in good and due form have agreed upon following.

Article 1

In view of the fact that the boundary between China's Sinkiang and the contagious areas the defence of which is under the actual control of Pakistan has never been formally

delimited, two parties agree to delimit on the basis of the traditional customary boundary line including features and in a spirit of equality, mutual benefit and friendly cooperation.

Article 2

(1) Commencing from its northwestern extremity at height 5,630 metres (a peak, the reference co-ordinates of which are approximately Longitude 74° 34' E and Latitude 37°03' N), the boundary line runs generally eastward and then southeastward strictly along the main watershed between the tributaries of the Tashkurgan River of the Tarim River system on the one hand and the tributaries of the Hunza River of the Indus River system on the other hand, passing through the Kilik Daban (Dawan), the Mintaka Daban (Pass), the Kharchanai Daban (named on the Chinese map only), the Kutejilga Daban (named on the Chinese map only), and the Parpik Pass (named on the Pakistan map only), and reaches the Khunjerab (Yutr) Daban (Pass).

(2) After passing through the Khunjerab (Yutr) Daban (Pass), the boundary line runs generally southward along the above-mentioned main watershed up to a mountaintop south of the Daban (Pass), where it leaves the main watershed to follow the crest of a spur lying generally in a south-easterly direction, which is the watershed between the Akjilga River (a nameless corresponding river on the Pakistan map) on the one hand, and the Taghdumbash (Oprang River) and the Keliman Su (Oprang Jilga) on the other hand. According to the map of the Chinese side, the boundary line, after leaving the southeastern extremity of this spur, runs along a small section of the middle line of the bed of the Keliman Su to reach its confluence with the Kelechin River. According to the map of the Pakistan side, the boundary line, after leaving the southeastern extremity of this spur, reaches the sharp bend of the Shaksgam or Mustagh River.

(3) From the aforesaid point, the boundary line runs up the Kelechin River (Shaksgam or Muztagh River) along the middle line of its bed to its confluence (reference co-ordinates approximately Longitude 76° 02' E. and Latitude 36° 26' N.) with the Sorbulak Daria (Shimshal River or Braldu River).

(4) From the confluence of the aforesaid two rivers, the boundary line, according to the map of the Chinese side, ascends the crest of a spur and runs along it to join the

Karakoram Range main watershed at a mountain-top (reference co-ordinates approximately Longitude 75° 54' E. and Latitude 36° 15' N.), which on this map is shown as belonging to the Shorbulak Mountain. According to the map of the Pakistan side, the boundary line from the confluence of the above-mentioned two rivers ascends the crest of a corresponding spur and runs along it; passing through Height 6,520 metres (21,300 feet) till it joins the Karakoram Range main watershed at a peak (reference co-ordinates approximately Longitude 75° 57' E. and Latitude 36° 03' N.).

(5) Thence, the boundary line, running generally southward and then eastward, strictly follows the Karakoram Range main watershed which separates the Tarim River drainage system from the Indus River drainage system, passing through the East Mustagh Pass (Muztagh Pass), the top of the Chogri Peak (K2), the top of the Broad Peak, the top of the Gasherbrum Mountain (8068) Indirakoli Pass (named on the Chinese map only) and the top of the Teram Kangri Peak, and reaches its southeastern extremity at the Karakoram Pass.

II. The alignment of the entire boundary line, as described in Section I of this Article, has been drawn on the 1/one million scale map of the Chinese side in Chinese and the 1/one million scale map of the Pakistan side in English, which are signed and attached to the present Agreement.

III. In view of the fact that the maps of the two sides are not fully identical in their representation of topographical features, the two Parties have agreed that the actual features on the ground shall prevail, so far as the location and alignment of the boundary described in Section one is concerned; and that they will be determined as far as possible by Joint survey on the ground.

Article 3

The two parties have agreed that:

- (I) Wherever the boundary follows a river, the middle line of the river bed shall be the boundary line; and that

- (II) Wherever the boundary passes through a Deban (pass) the water-parting line thereof shall be the boundary line.

Article 4

One: the two parties have agreed to set up, as soon as possible, a joint boundary demarcation commission. Each side will appoint a chairman, one or more members and a certain number of advisers and technical staff. The joint boundary demarcation commission is charged with the responsibility, in accordance with the provisions of the present agreement, to hold concrete discussions on and carry out the following tasks jointly.

- (I) To conduct necessary surveys of the boundary area on the ground, as stated in Article 2 of the present agreement so as to setup boundary markers at places considered to be appropriate by the two parties and to delineate the boundary line of the jointly prepared accurate maps.

To draft a protocol setting forth in detail the alignment of the entire boundary line and the location of all the boundary markers and prepare and get printed detailed maps, to be attached to the protocol, with the boundary line and the location of the boundary markers shown on them.

Two: the aforesaid protocol, upon being signed by representatives of the governments of the two countries, shall become an annex to present agreement, and the detailed maps shall replace the maps attached to the present agreement.

Three: upon the conclusion of the above mentioned protocol, the tasks of the joint boundary demarcation commission shall be terminated.

Article 5

The two parties have agreed that any dispute concerning the boundary which may arise after the delimitation of the boundary line actually existing between the two countries should be settled peacefully by the two parties through friendly consultations.

Article 6

The two parties have agreed that after the settlement of Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, the sovereign authority concerned will reopen the negotiations with the government of the People's Republic of China on the boundary as described in Article 2 of the present agreement, so as far to sign a formal boundary treaty to replace the present agreement, provided that in the event of the sovereign authority being Pakistan, the provisions of the present agreement and the aforesaid protocol shall be maintained in the formal boundary treaty to be signed between the People's Republic of China and Pakistan.

Article 7

The present agreement shall come into force on the date of its signature.

Done in duplicate in Peking on the second date of March 1963, in the Chinese and English languages both side being equally authentic.

APPENDIX V

The 1994 Parliamentary Resolution on Jammu & Kashmir

This resolution on Jammu & Kashmir was moved in both Houses of Parliament on February 22, 1994 by the presiding officers and adopted unanimously by the two Houses. It has neither been rescinded nor amended so far. Here is the full text of the resolution:

“This House”

Notes with deep concern Pakistan’s role in imparting training to the terrorists in camps located in Pakistan and Occupied Kashmir, the supply of weapons and funds, assistance in infiltration of trained militants including foreign mercenaries into Jammu and Kashmir with the avowed purpose of creating disorder disharmony and subversion:

Reiterates that the militants trained in Pakistan are indulging in murder, loot and other heinous crimes against the people, taking them hostage and creating an atmosphere of terror;

Condemns strongly the continued support and encouragement Pakistan is extending to subversive and terrorist activities in the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir;

Calls upon Pakistan to stop forthwith its support to terrorism, which is in violation of the Simla Agreement and the internationally accepted norms of inter-State conduct and is the root cause of tension between the two countries;

Reiterates that the Indian political and democratic structures and the Constitution provide for firm guarantees for the promotion and protection of human rights of all its citizens;

Regards Pakistan’s anti-India campaign of calumny, and falsehood as unacceptable and deplorable.

Notes with deep concern the highly provocative statements emanating from Pakistan urges Pakistan to refrain from making statements which vitiate the atmosphere and incite public opinion Expresses regret and concern at the pitiable conditions and violations of

human rights and denial of democratic freedoms of the people in those areas of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir, which are under the illegal occupation of Pakistan;

On behalf of the People of India,

Firmly declares that:

a) The state of Jammu & Kashmir has been, is and shall be an integral part of India and any attempts to separate it from the rest of the country will be resisted by all necessary means;

b) India has the will and capacity to firmly counter all designs against its unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity;

and demands that -

c) Pakistan must vacate the areas of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir, which they have occupied through aggression;

and resolves that -

d) All attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of India will be met resolutely.

The Resolution was unanimously adopted, Mr. Speaker: The Resolution is unanimously passed.

February 22, 1994

[Source - Parliamentary Debates: Official report, Volume 170, Issue 2, 1994, p. 237]

APPENDIX VI

Govt. of India, White Paper on Jammu & Kashmir, Delhi 1948,

Page 3:

Nevertheless, in accepting the accession, the Government of India made it clear that they would regard it as purely provisional until such time as the will of the people of the State could be ascertained.

Page 46:

Telegram, dated 25 October 1947, from Foreign, New Delhi, to C.R. Attlee, Prime Minister of UK.

From Prime Minister of India.[Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru]

"I should like to make it clear that [the] question of aiding Kashmir in this emergency is not designed in any way to influence the State to accede to India. Our view, which we have repeatedly made public is that [the] question of accession in any disputed territory or State must be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people and we adhere to this view".

Page 55:

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister, in a broadcast from New Delhi on 2 November said:

"We have declared that the fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people. That pledge we have given, and the Maharaja has supported it, not only to the people of Kashmir but to the world. We will not, and cannot back out of it. We are prepared when peace and law and order have been established to have a referendum held under international auspices like the United Nations. We want it to be a fair and just reference to the people, and we shall accept their verdict. I can imagine no fairer and juster offer."

Page 77:

Telegram, dated 31 December 1947, from Foreign, New Delhi, to Indembassy, Washington:

[On 26 October 1947] In order to avoid any possible suggestion that India had taken advantage of the State's immediate peril for her own political advantage, the Dominion Government made it clear that, once the soil of the State had been cleared of the invader and normal conditions restored, its people would be free to decide their future by the recognised democratic method of a plebiscite or referendum, which, in order to ensure complete impartiality, might be held under international auspices.

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