

THE EVOLUTION OF AN ALLIANCE:

**A Comparative Study of The Security Treaty Between the United State of America
and Japan of 1951 and The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960**

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**A Comparative Study of The Security Treaty Between the United State of America
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PREFACE

On 8 September 1951 Japan signed at San Francisco a mutual security treaty with the United States. Earlier in the day she had signed a Peace Treaty with 48 nations thus bringing to an end the state of war which existed between her and others. The justification for Japan's defence alliance with the United States was that she had the right to individual and collective self defence. She had been disarmed by the Occupation authorities during 1945-50 and had thus been deprived of the means of self defence. For an independent nation this was not a very happy situation, especially in view of the existence of the Sino-Soviet alliance of February 1950. Evidence now available shows that as early as 1947-48 the Japanese leaders themselves had conceived of the idea of seeking American protection when their country became free; in those days they were not clear whether this would involve a permanent stationing of American troops on Japanese soil or would merely imply an American guarantee in a crisis. Nonetheless, by the time Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida put his signature on the document at San Francisco the situation had changed so much that the question whether American troops should or should not be stationed on Japanese soil had become irrelevant. It was accepted by responsible Japanese leaders that the notion of deterrence had no meaning if the deterrent could not be stationed on Japanese soil.

The provisions of the Security Treaty of 1951 enabled the United States to maintain land, air and sea forces in Japan. They were there for the defence of Japan as well as the maintenance of peace and order in the Far East. It also provided for the use of American troops, at the request of the Japanese Government to put down domestic disturbances created either by domestic forces or instigated by outside powers. The conditions governing the disposition of American forces in and about Japan were laid down in administrative agreements signed subsequently.

The signing of the Security Treaty was not endorsed by a section of the Japanese population. To a large number of left-inclined intellectuals and the Socialist and Communist Parties, the security treaty meant acceptance of American occupation even after April 1952. Apart from a general dislike towards arms, war and alliances, they were ideologically committed to see that American influence was eliminated from Japan in toto. To their ideologically-coloured eyes it appeared that their country had fallen into bad company and had become less acceptable to a large number of countries because of its association with the United States. In particular the provision regarding the use of American troops to quell domestic disturbances was galling to them. They were equally concerned about the unrestricted use of military bases in Japan for combat operations in the Far East. This, in their eyes, was a source of danger; willy

nilly Japan would be involved in someone else's conflict.

The revision of the original Security Treaty came in January 1960. It introduced certain modifications in the earlier treaty. For instance, the clause regarding the use of American troops was deleted. Secondly, provision was made for joint consultations on matters involving peace and security in the Far East. Under a separate note exchanged between Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi and Secretary of State Herter, the United States agreed to consult the Japanese Government in advance regarding matters involving major changes in the deployment, equipment and movement of American forces stationed in Japan. The new Treaty also committed Japan more firmly to rearmament - this was an old commitment made at the time of peace negotiations when John Foster Dulles had insisted that Japan make a firm commitment to undertake rearmament in return for an American guarantee of its security. More than the security and political aspects, it was the cultural and economic aspect which received prominence when the Japanese leaders tried to explain the need for continued alliance with the United States. This did not satisfy the dissidents and when the Treaty went before the Diet for ratification in May-June 1960 there were violent demonstrations, protests and walk-outs.

This study is an attempt to examine the circumstances which led to the revision of the treaty in 1960 and the different provisions in the two treaties. The objective

obviously is to see whether the new treaty accorded Japan a degree of equality which she had been demanding from the United States in matters relating to Far Eastern military and political problems. It has been also tried, in the process, to examine the emerging alliance between the United States and Japan on the basis of the two treaties. The study would be on the following lines: The background of the Security Treaty (discussion of the Peace Treaty), the nature and objective of the US-Japan Security Treaty of 1951 and the subsequent Administrative Agreements of 1954, circumstances leading to the revision of the original treaty in 1960, and a comparative assessment of the provisions in the two treaties.

It would have been difficult for me to complete this work without the tremendous help and guidance of Dr. P.A.N. Murthy and Dr. K.V. Kosaran. I express my sincere gratitude to them for encouraging me from the initial planning stage to the final drafting.

In closing, I must thank the library staff of the Sapru House Library and 313 Library specially Mrs. C. Andrade, Mr. Pradip Narayan Jha and Mr. Chintamani. All of them have been very cooperative and helpful throughout and I once again thank them all.

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

On 26 July 1945 the Potsdam Declaration was signed by the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of United Kingdom and the President of the Nationalist Government of China. A little later, the Soviet Union also joined the signatories. In this Declaration the Allies set forth minimum terms for Japanese Occupation and called upon the Government of Japan, "to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action." (1) The Japanese Government responded on 14 August 1945 when it agreed to unconditional surrender to the Allied powers on the basis of the Potsdam Declaration. The Declaration had set the following terms for surrender:

(1) The authority and influence of militarists and ultranationalists should be eliminated, and that a new order of peace, security and justice should be established;

(2) Stern justice should be meted out to all criminals;

(3) Japanese sovereignty should be limited to the four main islands and such minor islands as might be determined later;

(4) Japanese armed forces abroad, after being completely disarmed, were to return home;

(1) For text see Edwin O. Reischauer, The U.S. and Japan (London, 1965), Appendix. pp. 341-42.

(5) Freedom of speech, of religion, of thought, and other fundamental human rights were to be established in Japan;

(6) Japan was to be permitted to maintain such industries as would sustain her economy and allow the extraction of a just reparation in kind. To this end Japan was to be permitted to have access to raw materials, and to be allowed to eventually participate in world trade;

(7) The Occupying forces were to remain in Japan until their objectives were accomplished and there had been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

Immediately after the surrender, the Chief of the Allied Armed Forces in the Pacific Douglas MacArthur, American General was appointed as the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers to supervise the Occupation. Both General MacArthur and the organization over which he presided came to be known as SCAP.

The Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan provided that "the Supreme Commander will exercise his authority through the Japanese governmental machinery and agencies including the Emperor..." (2) In accordance with the directive the occupation machinery was organized in Tokyo.

(2) Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Report of Government Section, Appendix A: Political Reorientation of Japan: September 1948 (Washington, D.C., 1949), p. 413.

The predominant role of the United States in the Pacific war made it logical for that country to play a paramount role in the Occupation of Japan. Nevertheless, the United States realized that its Allies would seek some participation in the administration of the occupied country. On 21 August 1945 the United States submitted to China, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, a proposal for the establishment of a Far Eastern Advisory Commission to make recommendations to the participating governments on the policies and the steps which should be taken to ensure Japanese compliance with the surrender terms. (3) China and the Soviet Union promptly accepted the American proposal. The United Kingdom objected to the advisory character of the Commission and suggested that a Control Council should be set up in Japan. Australia and New Zealand also wanted a share in the occupation. In the face of British objections and American unwillingness to share authority with the Allied powers nothing could be done.

At the London Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers in September 1945 the Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov, requested that the question of the control of Japan be placed on the agenda and expressed his government's dissatisfaction with

(3) George H. Blakeslee, The Far Eastern Commission: A Study in International Co-operation 1945 to 1952, Department of State Publication 5135 (Washington, D.C., 1953), p. 12. referred in Mallappa Amravati, Relations Between Japan and the United States Since 1945 with Special Reference to the Peace Treaty and the Security Pact (ISIS, Ph.D. Thesis, New Delhi, 1969), pp. 12-13.

the implementation of surrender terms in Japan by General MacArthur. He particularly objected to the fact that the demobilized Japanese troops were not treated as prisoners of war and were not made to work. (4) He urged the establishment of a Control Commission for Japan in which the Soviet Union would have an equal voice with any other member. During his stay in London, the United States Secretary of State, Byrnes, was able to persuade the British Government to agree to the establishment of a Far Eastern Commission (FEC) by conceding a place on the proposed Commission to India and by agreeing that the Commission should be authorized to meet in Tokyo as well as in Washington. Consequently, the United States announced on 21 August 1945 that the first meeting of the Commission would be held in Washington on 30 October 1945. Meanwhile the Soviet Union decided to reverse her position and complained that she was neither informed nor consulted about Japan and that her representative in Tokyo Lt. General Kuzuma Derevyenko, has been treated like a "piece of furniture". (5) Consequently, he was recalled to Moscow. The Soviet Union refused to participate in a purely advisory body and again suggested the formation of a four power Control Commission for Japan.

The FEC Commission held its first meeting on 13 October

(4) James B. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York, 1947), p. 214.

(5) Ibid., p. 217.

1945 in Washington, without the Soviet Union's participation. After the election of Major General Frank R. McCoy as its chairman the Commission adjourned for a week in the hope that the Soviet Union would change her mind and attend the Commission, but Russia ignored the meeting. The fact of the matter was that the United States though willing to share the responsibility of the Occupation of Japan with those Allies who had fought against the former enemy in the Pacific, was not prepared to forfeit the favoured position which she had won during the war. The U.S. wanted that General MacArthur should have a dominant position in the occupation and that he should be responsible to the U.S. administration alone. It also wanted that MacArthur be given the power to act directly in times of emergency. Finally, it expressed a fear that a Control Council in Tokyo would complicate the Occupation of Japan and impinge on the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers authority. (6) Many conferences and long debates took place before the Allies finally could agree upon a draft proposal for a FIC and an Allied Council for Japan.

At the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in December of 1945, the Ministers agreed to the formation of a FIC which would meet in Washington and which would be empowered to formulate policy for the occupation. They also agreed to

(6) F. C. Jones, Hugh Borton and B. H. Pearn, Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946: The Far East 1942-46 (London, 1955), p. 399.

form an Allied Council for Japan in Tokyo to advise the Supreme Commander.

The FIC was composed of the representatives of Australia, Canada, China, France, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. Later Pakistan and Burma also joined the Commission. Under its terms of reference, the FIC had two principal functions: first, "to formulate the policies, principles, and standards in conformity with which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the terms of surrender may be accomplished"; and second, "to review, on the request of any member, any directive issued to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Power or any action taken by the Supreme Commander involving policy decisions within the jurisdiction of the Commission". In addition, the Commission was empowered "to consider other matters as may be assigned to it by agreement among the participating governments reached in accordance with the voting procedure provided for in Article V. 2." The task of the United States was to issue directives for the guidance of the Supreme Commander in accordance with the policy decisions of the Commission. (7)

The Commission was designed to put certain limitations upon the freedom of the United States to formulate policies for

(7) Activities of the Far Eastern Commission. Report by the Secretary General, 25 February 1946-10 July 1947. Department of State, Washington, pp. 2-3.

Japan. But within these limitations, the United States had considerable freedom of action which enabled it to retain a predominant position in the occupation of Japan.

For the sake of convenience, the Allied Occupation of Japan could be divided into three successive phases which might be described as periods of (1) Reform; (2) Rehabilitation; and (3) Revision. These phases were not separated by a sharp division of time; each phase was characterized by certain types of activity and attitude on the part of both the Americans and the Japanese. (8)

The first phase of the Occupation started with the formal surrender of Japan on 2 September 1945, and concluded with the unsuccessful efforts of the United States to call a peace conference in July of 1947. It was the period in which the most extensive and drastic reforms were undertaken to ensure Japanese democratization.

By the spring of 1947, the corrective and reformatory measures of the Occupation which were aimed at the complete overhauling of the Japanese system had largely been completed. These reforms were initiated by General MacArthur and his staff and covered political, social and economic aspects of the Japanese life.

Under the programme of political reforms the political prisoners including Communists were released. The power of police

(8) Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan Past and Present, 3rd edn. (Tokyo, 1964), pp. 209-10.

to control the speech and thought of the citizens was eliminated. The laws were revised to insure legal respect for the civil liberties regarded as fundamental by the Americans. The most important reform was the grant of a new constitution. (9)

Under the new constitution the Japanese people were guaranteed right to maintain a proper cultured living, right to receive equal education, right to work, right to academic freedom etc. etc. In the new constitution the "Imperial Institution" which had helped the militarist to gain power and held autocratic powers was reduced to a symbolic institution in the British manner. His authority was to be derived from the will of the people. It was made obligatory for him to uphold the constitution and to act with the advice and approval of the cabinet, having no powers related to government. (10) Another important constitutional change made the Legislature (Diet) supreme over the cabinet and bureaucracy.

In pre-war days the Diet had never been able to establish unquestioned control over the cabinet and the vast bureaucratic structure it administered. The cabinet under the new

(9) The draft of the new constitution though drawn by the Japanese government was considerably advised and presurized by the Occupation authorities. It was made public in March 1946 and was adopted by the Diet with few modifications and was in effect from 3 May 1947 onward. For text see Shin'ichi Fujii, The Constitution of Japan: A Historical Survey (Tokyo, 1965), Appendix II, pp.308-23.

(10) Edwin O. Reischauer, n. 8, pp. 215-16.

constitution was made fully responsible to the Diet. The Diet was made a fully elected body. (11) Women were not only given the franchise but also full legal equality with men and equal educational opportunities.

In the pre-war Japan judiciary used to be merely a branch of the executive controlled through the Justice Ministry. Under the new constitution an independent judiciary under a Supreme Court was established which was the final arbiter of the constitutional matters, and was to protect the rights and freedoms of the people. (12)

In the field of education reforms undertaken aimed at liberalizing the education. Text books were entirely revised to eliminate militaristic and nationalistic propaganda. (13)

While coming to the economic aspect it was tried through reforms to break the hold of feudals and Zaibatsu over the Japanese economy. These cliques were responsible for the militarization of Japan in prewar days. It was clear, however, that the elimination of zaibatsu domination would not alone be sufficient to provide a solid economic foundation for the democratic order. So the effort was made to develop the political consciousness and power of industrial labour and peasantry. (14)

(11) Ibid., p. 217.

(12) John M. Maki, Government and Politics in Japan (London, 1962), p. 51.

(13) Edwin O. Reischauer, n. 8, p. 220.

(14) John M. Maki, n. 12, p. 52.

Now it was for the Japanese themselves to adjust the new rules to Japanese realities through assimilation and adoption. The time had come for the Occupation forces to withdraw in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration which stated that the occupying forces of the Allied shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives had been accomplished. As early as September 1946, on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Allied Occupation of Japan, MacArthur publicly favoured an immediate conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan. (15) The Supreme Commander believed that a speedy peace settlement would strengthen Japan's newly acquired democracy. To this end, MacArthur sent George Atcheson, Jr, the Diplomatic Advisor to Supreme Commander for Allied powers, to Washington, but his trip was unsuccessful. On 19 March 1947, MacArthur again made a statement, in a Press Conference at Press Club in Tokyo, emphasizing the need for an early peace settlement with Japan. (16)

(15) While describing one year's occupation achievement he favoured the "furtherance of a durable peace, which must be consolidated and extended if we would discharge our responsibility as victory has given us that responsibility." See MacArthur, "Statement First Anniversary of Surrender, 2 September 1946", Political Reorientation of Japan (U.S. Government, Washington, 1949), p. 756.

(16) MacArthur in the course of the interview said that the major portion of the occupation job had been completed and "the time is now approaching when we must talk peace with Japan". When he was asked by a correspondent "would you care to elaborate a little more on the peace treaty. When do you think it should be?" His reply was: "I will say as soon as possible." Interview with Press Correspondents, 19 March 1947 released by Associated Press. See ibid., p. 765.

There was also great pressure being exerted in USA in favour of concluding a treaty very quickly. Much of this pressure came from economy minded Congressmen and citizens. (17) In July 1947 the United States Government proposed to the other ten members governments of the Far Eastern Commission that a peace conference be held on 14 August 1947, to discuss a peace treaty for Japan. (18) In the face of Soviet objections to the procedure to be adopted for the proposed peace conference, the idea of an early peace settlement for Japan was abandoned.

The disagreement on the question of Japanese peace settlement convinced the United States that it had to reckon with a prolonged Occupation. But Washington was very keen to lighten its own financial burden arising out of the Occupation of Japan. Consequently, it decided to deviate from the post-surrender policy directive which restricted its economic activities in Japan to the prevention of widespread unrest and disease and it embarked on a programme of economic reconstruction in order to enable the Japanese to attain a fair degree of economic stability. The change was officially announced in the Far Eastern Commission on 22 January 1948, as a new American

(17) Frederick S. Dunn, Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan (Princeton, I. J., 1953), p. 62.

(18) Department of State Bulletin, 27 July 1947, p. 182.

policy for Japan. "Japan", declared General McCoy, the American representative in the said Commission, "should be made self-supporting as soon as possible with a reasonable living standard, so that she will not be too heavy a burden on the American tax payer". (19) The Far Eastern ^{F E C} Commission, under the pressure of the United States reluctantly endorsed this change in attitude.

Steps towards the rehabilitation of the Japanese economy had been initiated as early as 1947. On 22 March 1947 MacArthur issued a stern warning to the Japanese government, emphasizing that it had to readjust the entire economic policy of Japan and that, if drastic and effective steps were not taken by the Japanese themselves, further assistance from the Allied could not be expected. He asked the Japanese government to institute an Economic Stabilization Board for centralizing the economic measures to be taken. In the light of this directive Katayama cabinet launched rehabilitation programmes one after another. (20)

Already on 20 February 1947 the Supreme Commander with a view to give a boom to the Japanese trade had ~~allowed the Japanese trade~~ had allowed the Japanese government to increase its

(19) Quoted in Aaron L. J. Lewe Van Aduard, Japan from Surrender to Peace (New York, 1954), p. 81.

(20) In the middle of June 1947 an 11 point economic emergency programme was announced followed at the end of June by a 7-point plan to promote a national movement for economic reconstruction. For details see ibid., p. 74.

cotton, spinning capacity 4,000,000 spindles. In April 1947 permission was granted for the reconstruction of the Japanese rayon industry. In June the Allies announced formally that Japan would be allowed to participate in world trade within two months. In August 1947 private foreign commercial relations were resumed, ^{and} on 400 private foreign trade representatives were allowed to enter the country. The Assistant Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, in a public announcement on 8 May 1947 while expressing the views of the State Department went to the extent of saying that "the U.S. is prepared to take up the reconstruction of Japan and Germany independently, without waiting for an agreement of the four Great Powers". (21)

In the year 1948 the attempts to rehabilitate the Japanese economy continued. America gave increased assistance to Japan's economy. A further expansion of textile industry was planned. As the export of manufactured textile goods had always been one of the main sources of foreign income for Japan, much attention was paid to its rehabilitation. In January 1948, a technical mission of three prominent members of the American Cotton Manufacturer Association visited Tokyo to advise the Supreme Commander on the problems of Japan's textile sales abroad. In May private banking circles in the United States granted an extra loan of 60,000,000 dollars for further inducement to the

(21) Quoted in ibid., p. 75.

textile industry. (22) At the beginning of January 1948 Japan was allowed to revive its iron and steel production based on the 1933-35 level.

The implementation of this revised American policy required a high degree of co-ordination. Thus several high level conferences were held. The State Department, in February 1948, despatched its chief planner George Kennan to Tokyo to explain the changed attitude of Washington. During March the Under Secretary of the Army, Draper, was sent to Japan, accompanied by a high level economical industrial advisory group. This advisory group had Percy J. Johnson as the Chairman and consisted of prominent American businessmen. (23)

One major hurdle blocking the path of economic recovery of Japan was the payment of reparations to the countries which had suffered at the hands of Japanese militarism during Second World War. When America changed its policy and decided to help the rehabilitation of the Japanese economy, certainly the question of reparation payments had to be reconsidered. In April 1947,

(22) Already in 1947 a fund of 500,000,000 dollars had been raised for industrial loans, combined with the institution of the 100,000,000 dollars revolving fund for cotton credits.

(23) As a matter of fact it was not the first time that the official economic missions from the USA visited Japan to study its economic problems. In 1946 Ambassador Pauley had made a general survey in connection with reparations problems. In the autumn of 1946, a group of technicians

the United States delegate in the FIC submitted a final plan for solving the reparations problem. When it became evident that the Commission could not come to a decision in this important matter, Washington announced a unilateral solution. It decided on an advanced transfer reparation programme, covering roughly 30 per cent of the anticipated reparations. By this announcement it could be very well made out that only this programme would be executed and that the remainder of the reparation would never be forthcoming. Clifford Strike who visited Japan twice in course of 1947 and was especially sent to Tokyo by the U.S. War Department to study the economic situation and the reparation programme recommended much more lenient reparation than previously suggested under the Pauley Plan. (24) He even went to the extent of suggesting an immediate repeal of the

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headed by Clifford S. Strike, had made a more thorough study of the reparation problem. They had cautioned against reparations payments and had emphasized that failure to restore the economic plight of Japan would result in a continued burden on the American taxpayer.

- (24) The Pauley Plan was formulated by President Truman's personal envoy Edwin W. Pauley who was sent to Japan in 1946 to make a general survey in connection with the reparations payments. He had declared, "we will remove everything that is not needed for useful minimum economy." Under the Plan heavy industries were dismantled and machine tools were sent as reparations to China, the Philippines, Great Britain and the Netherlands.

Pauley Plan. Draper who visited Japan, accompanied by a high level economic and industrial advisory group under the chairmanship of Percy J. Johnson, also warned against extracting further reparations from Japan. Draper's point of view was vigorously supported by Percy J. Johnson's influential group.

Unfortunately, the Japanese response to the American appeal for the revival of the Japanese economy was far from satisfactory. The Japanese doubted the intentions of the United States and viewed the change with distrust. (25) A wave of strikes on top of notorious scandal and rampant black-marketing rocked the country. As the situation in Japan deteriorated, Washington became more and more alarmed.

On 10 December 1948, the United States issued an interim forceful directive to Supreme Commander for Allied Powers, authorising MacArthur to order the Japanese government to adopt immediately "whatever measures might be required to achieve fiscal, monetary, price and wage stability in Japan and to maximise production for export". (26) The directive contained nine measures such as achievement of a balanced budget, and effective system of tax control. MacArthur transmitted the directive to the Japanese government. President Truman appointed Joseph H. Dodge to supervise the programme. Therefore, the nine point measure was called the Dodge Plan. (27)

(25) See Aduard, n. 19, p. 88.

(26) Peter Calvoccaressi, Survey of International Affairs 1947-48 (London, 1952), p. 344.

(27) Joseph M. Dodge was a special emissary of the U.S. Government who was sent to Tokyo to supervise the rehabi-

Shortly after the announcement, in January 1949, Japan went to the polls. Yoshida's conservative liberal party scored a definite victory. This victory was significant and proved helpful for the implementation of Dodge Plan. (28) His victory was welcomed as a fortunate development, for Yoshida would show himself a great statesman and a remarkably successful politician in bringing his country back to advantageous cooperation with the Occupation and finally to the San Francisco Peace Treaty." (29)

The next attempt at the peace settlement with Japan was made in October 1949 when the State Department prepared a draft treaty. This draft treaty embodied the National Security Council decision of 1948. (30) It was the first Japanese treaty draft

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litation of the Japanese economy in accordance with the 9 point directive issued by Washington. Dodge was given virtually dictatorial powers in the economic field. As Special Financial Adviser to SCAP, he got a free hand in straightening out the economic difficulties of the Occupation.

- (28) Yoshida while heading the caretaker ministry before the January elections had fully endorsed the Dodge Plan. Yoshida had also assured the Supreme Commander when he communicated the Nine-Point directive to him, that the matter would be seriously considered by the Japanese government. See Aduaró, n. 19, p. 94.
- (29) Ibid., p. 94.
- (30) This decision of the National Security Council has not been published but some of its contents are known from later memoranda: Japan was to be strengthened economically and socially, so that after the termination of the Occupation it would be stable and friendly to the U.S. As

(footnote contd.)

with full awareness of the cold war and the "Containment Policy". The underlying concept of the draft was the restoration of sovereignty with as few restrictions as possible. The FIC, the Allied Council for Japan, and SCAP were to be abolished and no control or inspection agency was to take place. The reform and reconstruction programmes were not specifically mentioned and were left to the discretion of the Japanese themselves. Japan remained obligated to make reparations. This draft treaty contains no security provisions as these were to be inserted after collaboration with the Defence Department. (31)

The October draft described as "thoroughly realistic" (32) had to be abandoned because of divergent attitudes towards the problem of peace with Japan in the United States, Japan and other capitals of the world. The difference of view between State Department and different departments was the most crucial one. As an alternative to the State Department proposal to restore full sovereignty to Japan, and as a step toward a compromise, the Defence Department suggested in March 1950 a "half-treaty". This would nominally restore sovereignty and would allow the Japanese to exercise authority in civil matters, but it would

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steps toward this end, SCAP was to shift responsibility as rapidly as possible; Japan would be allowed to assimilate the reform programmes as its own pace and in its own way; and the psychological impact of the Occupation on Japan would be reduced to a minimum. See Dunn, no 17, pp. 77-78.

(31) Ibid., pp. 83-85.

(32) Ibid., p. 85.

retain SCAP and Occupation troops. Japanese opinion was also complex and heterogeneous. There was widespread popular disapproval of a separate peace and of the commitment of Japan to either side in the Cold War. (33)

Although the responsible officials of the State Department were willing to risk a peace treaty without the participation of the Soviet Union, there was by no means general acquiescence on this idea in other capitals of the Commonwealth countries; India and Australia strongly opposed to a separate peace. India was opposed to it because it was following a neutralist course in international affairs. Australia, on the other hand feared the build-up of Japan that would result from a peace strictly on American lines.

In the wake of all these complications John Foster Dulles was appointed on 6 April 1950 as Foreign Policy Adviser to the Secretary of State. And on 18 May he was assigned to handle the much controversial Japanese peace treaty. (34) Dulles went

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- (33) A public opinion poll conducted as early as 21 November 1949 indicated that only 20.5 per cent of those interviewed favoured dependence on the United States for future security. See ibid., p. 93.
- (34) On the same day President Truman told his press conference that the Japanese peace treaty was the responsibility of the Secretary of State, thus resolving a long standing controversy over jurisdiction between the State and Defence Departments and assuring that the Secretary of State would have his support in any conflict with the Department of Defence regarding the peace settlement. Ibid., p. 93.

ahead with his task with two basic concepts. First, the provisions of the treaty should be governed by Justice. According to Dulles the lesson of Versailles was that justice, fairplay and humanity were the essential ingredients not only for a moral peace settlement, but also for one which in the long run would be safe and successful. (35) Second, the greatest threat that the world faced was Communism. He held that in the post-World War II era the greatest threat to peace was the Communist threat which was dedicated to consummating the world revolution.

Dulles issued first memorandum on Japan on 6 June 1950. In this memorandum after a brief discussion of the internal Japanese situation, the contents of a would be treaty were discussed. Provision was to be made for a progressive reduction of the military occupation. The reforms of the occupation period were to be preserved. There were to be no reparations or economic restrictions. Provision was to be made for Japanese application for admission into the United Nations. The memorandum also suggested that independently of the treaty, but simultaneously, a security agreement should be concluded. This should involve all the nations participating in the preliminary conference on peace with Japan. It could include the U.S.S.R.

(35) See Broadcast of 1 March 1951 in Department of State Bulletin, vol. 24, no. 610, 12 March 1957, pp. 405-06.

also, whose role in the security arrangements was not specified. To solve the problem of the two Chinas, both the nationalist and Communist regime would be invited to send delegates and each would be given one vote in case of disagreement but only one vote between them on any issue which they agreed upon. (36)

The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 strengthened his conviction in the two concepts and made him to haste with his plans of a "just" treaty with Japan. (37) He believed that the Korean War was, "made because of the strategic importance of Korea in relation to Japan. It showed the lengths to which the Soviet Imperialism was prepared to go to dominate Japan." (38) At the time of outbreak of Korean War Dulles had gone on a visit to Japan in order to carry out negotiations for the peace treaty with Japan. In Tokyo Dulles discussed the treaty with General MacArthur. The General agreed with the thesis of Dulles that the Japanese deserve a just settlement. Dulles also held

(36) Dunn, n. 17, pp. 99-102.

(37) Dulles said, "Neglect and indecision in Japan could lose the great gains of General MacArthur's superb administration. We could, indeed, lose more in Japan than can be won in Korea." "Korean Attack Opens New Chapter in History". Dulles' speech on 31 July 1950. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 23, no. 579, 7 August 1950, p. 209.

(38) "Japanese Peace Treaty Viewed as a Positive Step in Free World's March Toward Peace", Address by J. F. Dulles on 1 October 1951. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 25, no. 642, 15 October 1951, p. 317.

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conversations with a number of prominent Japanese, both inside and outside the government. But to his surprise, "he found many of the Japanese vague on methods of guarding Japan's security. Yoshida himself had no concrete programme and would not commit himself on basis... The divergence and vagueness of Japanese opinion worried Dulles for he felt that negotiations and ratification of a treaty and a security agreement by the Japanese government would, in the long run, proved to be insufficient unless most of the country strongly concurred." (39)

In the face of the Korean War it was argued by the Pentagon, after Dulles's return to the U.S., that no further step should be taken towards drafting a Japanese peace treaty until after the Korean War was over, on the ground that U.S. military position in Japan under the Occupation was far superior to what it would be under any conceivable peace settlement. Dulles, contrary to it, argued that the Korean crisis was even more an appropriate reason for hastening the conclusion of peace treaty since the Japanese were awakening to the threat of Communist expansionism and would be more anxious than ever to regain their sovereignty under the terms offered by the Western powers.

After his return to the United States Dulles settled down to prepare a tentative draft of the treaty, by September

(39) Dunn, no. 17, p. 104.

1950 three different drafts were prepared and circulated among different officials of the Pentagon and the Department of State. At this time the successive drafts included, in the section on security, a provision for keeping American military forces on Japanese soil. In the meantime on 14 September 1950 President Truman authorized the State Department to enter into preliminary discussions with interested nations for the purpose of concluding a peace treaty with Japan. Thus with the President's approval, Dulles drafted a Seven-Point Programme as a basis for his explanatory talk with the representatives of EEC countries. (40) Fortunately the General Assembly of the U.N. was in session throughout this period. Dulles took advantage of it and held talks with all the representatives of the EEC member countries on the basis of Seven-Point Memorandum.

The Memorandum came under heavy fire from the delegation of the Soviet Union. This was but natural. The representatives

(40) This Seven-Point Memorandum was kept confidential till 24 November 1950 when it was made public. The first point laid down that the U.S. envisaged a treaty with Japan which could be joined by any or all nations at war with Japan which were willing to make peace on the basis proposed and agreed. The remaining six points concerned Japanese membership in the U.N.; retention of U.S. and perhaps other forces in Japan, pending effective security arrangements within the U.N.; adherence by Japan to treaties touching narcotics, fisheries and international trade; mutual renunciation of claims; and compulsory reference to the International Court of Justice in case of conflict. See Aduard, n. 19, pp. 166-67.

of Australia, New Zealand and Philippines also raised objections on the ground that no restrictions were placed on the Japanese rearmament and the reparations payment had been dropped. The reaction of the British Commonwealth governments was also not very hopeful. They had already set up a working party in pursuance of a decision taken at the Colombo Conference. It met in London from 1 May to 17 May 1950, some four months before the circulation of Seven-Point Memorandum. This working party had produced a report on the same subject which was forwarded to the State Department in September 1950. When after the submission of Seven-Point Memorandum the State Department pressed Great Britain and other Commonwealth countries they suggested that instead the much fuller report of the Commonwealth Working Party should serve as the basis of further discussion. Dulles was against using the report as a basis of discussion because half-a-year had already passed since the meeting of Commonwealth delegation and things had moved ahead. (41)

(41) The difference between Memorandum and Working Party's report was mainly on the omission in the Memorandum of many points discussed in the latter. The U.S. held that these points should not enter into the treaty as it would be a step backward - a retreat towards restrictions and controls which were out of keeping with the progress made by Japan under the Occupation and with developments in the contemporary world conflict.

Dulles with full realization of all these difficulties embarked on a trip of direct negotiation with Allied governments on the details of the proposed treaty. Before going to the Allied capitals he visited Tokyo in order to clarify certain misunderstanding in the Japanese political circle. Upon his arrival in Tokyo on 25 January 1951 he declared, "We look upon Japan as a party to be consulted and not as a vanquished nation to be dictated to by the victors." Aduard wrote, "those words sound music to Japanese ears. They would certainly avail themselves of that opportunity". (42) Major politicians in Japan, except the socialists welcomed Dulles' speech. He was able to create unity of thinking in the Japanese political circles over the peace treaty problems. Then he confidently proceeded to Manila, Canberra and Wellington. In all the three capitals he found the statesmen fearful of remilitarized Japan. They demanded effective measures to check the re-establishment of aggressively nationalistic societies in Japan. They also insisted on the payment of reparations. Dulles in these capitals found the mood like that of France in 1919. Dulles tried to explain to them that if they insisted on their own conceptions of security problem, they would end up by facing a combination of Russia, Communist China and Japan. Australia and New Zealand agreed to go along with the kind of peace treaty U.S. wanted but for their own pro-

(42) Aduard, n. 19, p. 178.

tection they desired a security pact that would bring the U.S. to their aid against a revived and rearmed Japan. On this demand Dulles agreed to submit a three power security draft to the government at Washington for consideration. (43) After his return to the U.S. he announced that, "we have now reached a point where it ought to be possible to draft promptly the actual text of a Japanese peace treaty which would genuinely promote peace in the Far East". (44)

Now onward Dulles went ahead as rapidly as possible towards the preparation of final draft of the peace treaty. He knew that after his trips to Japan and South Pacific a favourable atmosphere prevailed and that it should soon be capitalized by making an immediate attempt for the conclusion of a peace settlement. Moreover, the British Foreign Office was also working on a draft and he was anxious that the American draft should be ready first and should be the basic document for discussion. But the recall of MacArthur in April 1951 by President Truman shocked Dulles. MacArthur had great political influence in Japan and his removal could create hundreds of apprehensions in the minds of the Japanese politicians. At this point he refused to proceed with his mission of peace unless he was satisfied that the administration was determined to proceed with the peace treaty

(43) Ibid., p. 181.

(44) Department of State Bulletin, vol. 24, no. 610, 12 March 1951, p. 407.

along the lines already worked out. Both President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson gave a prompt assurance to Dulles and urged him very strongly to return at once to Tokyo and try to reassure the Japanese leaders that their intentions were to proceed with the negotiations without change. With this assurance he proceeded for Japan in April 1951. Dulles through his conversations was able to reassure the Japanese government and people in general that the removal of MacArthur had brought about no significant change in the attitude of the U.S. towards Japan and the peace settlement.

In the meantime, the United Kingdom draft of the peace treaty had been circulated in early April, a copy being made available to the U.S. also. This was lengthier than the American one and differed in many ways.

The differences related to subjects like the representation of Communist China, reparations, references to Japan's militant regime and territorial claims of Japan over many islands.(45) Moscow tried to exploit these differences to its advantage and to counter it. Dulles presented his compromise formula through which treaty had to be drafted jointly. This suggestion was welcomed in London. This joint text was ready by 3 May 1951. But still the differences persisted and to resolve those Dulles took up another journey to London and Paris. The main problems still left were,

(45) For details see Dunn, n. 17, pp. 137-40.

the question of China's participation in the settlement, and various questions relating to the economic and financial clauses of the treaty. In London the question of the Chinese participation proved to be the most difficult and no compromise could be arrived at. After fruitless discussions Dulles left London for Paris. The French raised three demands: (1) that Japan should pay them two billion dollars in reparations; (2) that Japan should conclude a commercial agreement protecting French trade interests in Indo-China against "dumping"; and (3) that the three associated states and Indo-China-Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam - should participate in negotiations and signing of the treaty. On the last point the French suggestion was agreed to and for the rest it was decided to carry on talks through proper diplomatic channels.

The diplomatic negotiations continued after Dulles' return to the US and finally an accord was reached on the terms of the treaty and the procedure for concluding it. The final draft was virtually ready in July 1951. U.K. had agreed to be the co-sponsorer of the draft treaty. It was decided to hold peace conference in San Francisco which was ultimately called into session on 4 September 1951, and after four days deliberations on 8 September 1951 the treaty was signed in San Francisco by 49 nations, including Japan. India, Burma and Yugoslavia did not accept the invitation to attend and no delegate from China had been invited owing to disagreement between Britain and the United States on this point.

Throughout the deliberations of the conference, the Soviet bloc (U.S.S.R., Poland, and Czechoslovakia) zealously tried to wreck the Conference but due to the tactful handling of the conference proceedings by the American Chief Delegate, the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson who later became President of the Conference, all attempts failed. (46) After failing in their attempts to install the proceedings of the conference they refrained from signing the treaty.

The treaty provided for recognition by the Allied Powers of the full sovereignty of the Japanese people over Japan and her territorial waters. (47) Japan recognized Korea's independence and renounced all her claims to Formosa, Pescadores, the Kuriles, Southern Sakhalin and certain Pacific Islands, as well as her interests in China. Japan agreed to accept any U.S. proposal to the United Nations to place the Ryukyu and certain other islands occupied by the U.S.A. Under the United Nations' trusteeship with the USA as the sole administering authority. All occupation forces would be withdrawn from Japan within 90 days of the treaty coming into force, but provision was included for agreements with any allied power or powers under which foreign troops could be

(46) All Soviet attempts for amendments were lost since in the very beginning the President of the Conference gave a ruling which stated that the treaty would have to be signed without the reconsideration of any of its terms. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 25, no. 638, 17 September 1951, p. 450.

(47) For text of the Peace Treaty see, Department of State Bulletin, vol. 25, no. 635, 27 August 1951, pp. 349-55.

retained in Japan. Japan would accept the obligation of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, but her right of self-defence under Article 51 be recognized. (48) Pending the negotiations of trade agreements with Allied Powers, Japan would undertake on the basis of reciprocity to grant for four years most favoured nation treatment in respect of imports and exports and grant national treatment in respect of shipping, navigation, and the activities of persons and companies. Japanese inability to pay reparations was recognized but she would undertake to assist countries which had suffered war damage by making available Japanese skill and industry. She would also undertake to transfer any Japanese assets in countries which were neutral during the war to the international Red Cross for indemnification of former allied prisoners of war and their families.

Provision was included to ensure that China, though not a signatory, would be entitled to the benefit arising from Japanese renunciation of rights and interests in China. Japan was to be permitted to conclude a bilateral treaty of peace on substantially the same terms with any state which being a member of the United Nations and at war with Japan had not signed the

(48) Article 2 of the UN Charter recognized the equality and sovereignty of all the member nations, renounced force as an instrument for settling international disputes, and asked the member state to refrain from assisting any state against which the U.N. is taking action.

For text of the Charter see U.N. Year Book 1963 (New York, UN Publications), pp. 683-94.

San Francisco peace treaty. Should Japan make a settlement with any state granting greater advantage than those provided by the treaty, those advantages were to be extended to the parties to the present Treaty.

Chapter II

**THE NATURE AND OBJECTIVE OF THE SECURITY TREATY
BETWEEN U.S.A. AND JAPAN OF 1951**

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The signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty on 8 September 1951 was followed by concluding a Security Pact between U.S. and Japan the same evening. Secretary Dean Acheson representing the United States delegation in his speech characterized the Security Treaty as the first step towards security in the Pacific, and Yoshida said that the treaty safeguarded a Japan deprived of her own defenses. (49)

Following acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, Japan had been made to disarm completely, and the renunciation of war formed one of the articles of the post-war Japanese constitution. It was thought at one time that the spirit of Article 9 of the constitution might also be included in the terms of the Peace Treaty. (50) In the event of such a development, the conclusion reached by the Japanese Foreign Office was that Japan should ask for a collective guarantee of her security from Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, China and other countries while at the same time declaring permanent neutrality. But many of them especially U.S.A. and U.K. were not, at all sure if this could be arranged or, if done,

(49) For details see Department of State Bulletin, 11 September 1951, vol. 26 (Washington), pp. 463-64.

(50) For text of the constitution, see n. 9, Appendix II.

it would be sufficient to guarantee Japan's security. (51) With the growth of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, and its effects upon the international situation, the prospect of ensuring security to Japan underwent a change leading to a major shift in the attitude of the Western Allies. In his New Year message of 1947, President Truman stated that Japan and Germany could not be left for ever in a state of uncertainty in regard to their future. (52) The same year in March General MacArthur stated at a press conference that a time had already come for concluding peace with Japan. (53) By May both Dean Acheson and Herbert Hoover were advocating the immediate conclusion of a separate peace with Japan. (54)

The atmosphere was now favourable for the opening of private and unofficial talks between the United States and Japan concerning a Peace Treaty and the related question of the Japanese security. At first, however, the Americans themselves were not quite sure as to what should be done in regard to the question of security. George Acheson, the American Representative on the Allied Council for Japan, once told the Japanese Foreign

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- (51) Miles W. Vaughan, "American policy and future security of Japan", Contemporary Japan, vol. 18, nos.4-6, April-June 1949, pp. 155-73.
- (52) Annual message of Truman, Documentation on American Foreign Relations, vol. 9, 1947, p. 2.
- (53) Political Reorientation of Japan, n. 15, p. 765.
- (54) Frederick S. Dunn, n. 17, p. 63.

Office privately that he thought it quite possible that his government might suggest Japan's referring the question of her security to the United Nations, to which the Japanese replied that, unless the organization of the United Nations was one upon which absolute reliance could be placed, there did not seem to be any way for Japan to defend herself against foreign invasion except by an alliance with a third power. This sort of informal exchange of opinions was followed by more positive official efforts by the Japanese government during the time of Katayama and Ashida Cabinets. As U.S.-Soviet relations were becoming ever more strained, the American view was changing to that of the need to guarantee Japanese security as part of world security. The Japanese ideas also began to tend in the direction of having the United States reinforce their defences, rather than relying upon what was then still the problematical organization of the United Nations to assist them in the event of need. (55)

This development in their thinking was made clear in a written statement entrusted to the care of General Eichelberger, the Commander of the U.S. Eighth Army, to be delivered to Washington when he departed from Japan on leave in September of the same year. The document was drawn up by Hitoshi Ashida,

(55) For detailed description see Shigeru Yoshida, The Yoshida Memoirs (Heinemann, 1961), pp. 263-65.

then Foreign Minister in the Katayama Cabinet, and Suehiro Nishio, the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, and written in the name of Tadakatsu Suzuki, who was then Head of the Central Liaison Office. Its purport was that, while Japan was in a position to deal with internal disturbances without outside aid, the best way of safeguarding her independence in the present conditions of international stress was to enter into a special pact with the United States against external aggression by a third country, while at the same time reinforcing her own land, and sea forces and that, further, it was thought that, so long as the United Nations was not yet capable of fully enforcing the terms of its Charter, the Japanese people desired the security of their country to be guaranteed by the United States. (56) This proposal did not specifically request the continued stationing of U.S. forces in Japan, but its conception was the same as that on which the US-Japan Security Treaty was later to be based. When Yoshida became Prime Minister in October 1948 it was adopted by his cabinet without change, although actually there were no further developments in that direction until the coming of Dulles to Japan in January 1951. (57)

The conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Friendship in February 1950, which was directed against

(56) Ibid., p. 263.

(57) Ibid., pp. 163-65.

Japan also seemed to have influenced the thinking of conservative leaders on the problem of peace and security. (58) The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Aid was signed on 14 February 1950 in which the high contracting parties agreed that they will "undertake jointly to adopt all necessary measures at their disposal for the purpose of preventing the resumption of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or any other state that may collaborate with Japan directly or indirectly in acts of aggression." It further states that "in the event of one of the contracting parties being attacked by Japan or any state allied with her and thus being involved in a state of war the other contracting party shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal". (59)

This was immediately followed by the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950. The war undoubtedly made the Japanese

(58) After the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty the Japanese government very rightly feared that it was aimed at them. The Sino-Soviet press and leaders too were not shy of telling it. As Pravda stated that "the chief purpose of the treaty is to prevent the resurgence of aggression on the part of the Japan or any other state directly or indirectly linked with Japan in acts of aggression".
As quoted by William D. Ballis in "The Pattern of Sino-Soviet Treaties 1945-50", The Annals, (Philadelphia) vol. 277, September 1951, p. 168.

(59) For text of the Sino-Soviet Treaty see Henry Wei, China and Soviet Russia, (New York, 1956), Appendix X, pp. 343-44.

think seriously of the security of their country.

The war strengthened the idea that "the danger of communist threat" to their country was real and immediate and that the protection to Japan could come only from the United States. As Japan itself had been stripped of all armed forces and war industry, they realized that they were completely dependent on America's willingness and power to defend their country. (60)

The United States entered the Second World War because of its refusal to assent to Japanese domination of the Far East. Its paramount war aim in the Pacific was, therefore, to destroy the threat that a militaristic Japan posed to its peaceful neighbours. The crushing defeat of Japan disposed of that threat, but left a power vacuum in the Far East. The success of the Chinese Communists in seizing authority in China opened the way for the expansion of Soviet-Chinese power to fill this vacuum. There re-emerged a new threat more insidious than that previously presented by Japan.

Japan was placed under an Allied Military Occupation predominantly American in composition and under an American Commander. Although the final responsibility for policy rested with FEC, the United States had the right to issue interim directives to SCAP on matters of urgency. The Basic Post-

(60) Aduard, n. 19, p. 142.

Surrender Policy for Japan, issued by the FIC in June 1947, was substantially a reaffirmation of the Initial Post-Surrender Policy of the United States on which the earlier directives to SCAP were based. Although the war had left Japan so crippled economically and militarily that it was no longer capable of self-support or self-defence, the chief initial pre-occupation of Allied policy were disarmament, demilitarization and democratization.

By 1948 the United States had begun to be seriously concerned over the problem of rendering Japan self-supporting. It was recognized that the American economy could not continue indefinitely to bear the burden of making up the deficit in the Japanese economy, then amounting to about 400 million dollars annually. There was also a growing realization that it was idle to expect the Japanese people to be either peace loving or democratic unless they could look forward to a reasonably satisfactory economic future. Accordingly, the United States suspended reparations removal from Japan and directed SCAP to cause the Japanese government to initiate a comprehensive programme for economic recovery. Moreover, SCAP permitted a lenient interpretation of earlier directives relating to economic decentralization. They realized that Japanese economic problem could be solved if international commercial relations of Japan were regularized by the conclusion of a Peace Settlement.

As early as July 1947, the United States proposed a

conference of the powers represented on the FIC to discuss a peace treaty. The Soviet Union blocked the proposal by insisting that four Major Powers should make the treaty, a proposal that would have subjected the negotiations to the veto of any one of these powers and virtually excluded the nine other members of the FIC from participation. Other complications, including a reported lack of unanimity within the United States Government and among the western democracies on the terms to be offered to Japan and differences as to whether the Nationalist Government should speak for China, stood in the way of resolute action to break the deadlock.

Outbreak of war in Korea furnished an incentive more compelling than the economic one for moving ahead with the treaty, for it then became apparent that a treaty was a prerequisite to Japan's playing an active part in maintaining itself against a Communist threat. A sense of urgency narrowed such differences as existed among the Western countries with regard to treaty terms. Revised draft treaty was drawn up despite the objections of the Soviet Union and her allies. The essential purposes of the United States throughout the negotiations were to restore Japanese sovereignty, to bring Japan into the United Nations system and to free Japan from restraints that would keep it economically and militarily weak. Ultimately, Peace Treaty between Japan and 48 other countries was signed on 8 September 1951. The three communist states the U.S.S.R.

Poland and Czechoslovakia refrained from signing.

The security provisions in the peace treaty were necessary if the treaty was to restore sovereignty to Japan. The delegate of the United States asserted that "to give a sovereignty which cannot be defended was to give an empty husk".

One of the provisions of Peace Treaty gave sovereign Japan the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense referred to in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and that Japan may voluntarily enter into collective security arrangements. It was stated by the American spokesman that in accordance with this provision, the Japanese government concluded the security pact between itself and the United States in its capacity as an independent sovereign government.

Similarly, America was also interested in signing the Security Pact with Japan. America's most important objective in signing this pact as has been noted, was to face the communist threat which was clearly indicated by the Sino-Soviet Treaty and the Korean War. Moreover, the conflict in Korea had brought many Americans to believe that without effective Asian allies neither the United States alone nor with the western democracies could successfully check the extension of communist aggression in Asia. And in this matter no other country was better than Japan. They realized that they could not give up Japan to the communists in case of war. Japan in the hands of the Soviets could constitute a most serious threat to the security

of the United States. It would open to Stalin the possibility of creating air and sea forces, built in the workshops of Japan and operating from Japan's numerous bases. As such it would enable the Soviet leaders to organize those components of his armed forces which he was lacking in the Pacific theatre. On 22 April 1950 the US Secretary of the Army, Gray in his annual report to the Congress emphasized the need of maintaining the security of Japan by stationing U.S. forces in that country, even after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty. (61)

The conclusion of defence pact with Japan was another forward step of USA in strengthening the whole Pacific position. The United States and the Philippines Mutual Defence Pact, the Tripartite Defence Alliance between United States, Australia, New Zealand, and the US-Japan Security Treaty stood mainly as a part of the security system containing the communist threat. (62) As a matter of fact the US-Japan Security Treaty was an improvement over the Security Treaties viz., the US-Philippines and the ANZUS signed on 30 August and 1 September 1951 respectively and the SEATO signed in 1954. (63) President Truman stated

(61) Aduard, no. 19, pp. 151-52.

(62) John M. Haki, Conflict and Tension in the Far East: Documents 1894-1960 (Seattle, 1961), p. 213.

(63) As stated by K. V. Kesaven, "The ANZUS Pact and the US-Philippines Security Pact are much broader in scope than the SEATO in that they do not confine themselves merely to the containment of any possible Communist threat. But they are also much narrower than the SEATO

on 18 April 1951 that these treaties constitute "natural initial steps in the consolidation of peace" in the Pacific area. (64) The pact furnished advantage to the United States for it is quite evident that if Japan fell to a communist power America's Pacific defence would also crumble. By means of the Security Pact the United States believed she could keep Japan out of the clutches of the communist bloc for the immediate future. (65) From the standpoint of American policy as developed under the influence of the Soviet threat, Japan was not merely a vanquished enemy ripe for redemption but also a vital element in the new strategy of "containment of Communism".

(previous footnote contd.)

in that they do not contemplate action in the event of internal subversion. The US-Japan Security Pact of 1951 combined the features of both. Like the ANZUS Pact and the U.S.-Philippines Pact, it did not limit the US commitment only to resisting communist aggression. Secondly, like the SEATO, it provided for the utilization of the armed forces of the US for assistance...at the express request of the Japanese government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers". Japan's Relation with Southeast Asia 1952-60 (Bombay, 1972), pp. 138-39.

- (64) President Truman on 18 April 1951. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 24, no. 617, 30 April 1951, p. 699.
- (65) Hitoshi Ashida, Japan's Foreign Policy: Conservative and Socialist Views (Tokyo, Japan's Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958), p. 2.

Thus United States and Japan both had their own objectives in signing the Security Pact.

The preamble to the Security Pact referred to the conclusion of the Peace Treaty, to Japan's disarmed condition, to the right conferred upon Japan by the Treaty to enter into arrangements for collective security, and to the recognition embodied in the charter of the United Nations of an 'inherent right of individual and collective self-defence' on the part of ~~all~~ nations. Therefore, Japan desired, as a provisional arrangement, that the USA should maintain armed forces in and about Japan to guarantee her security. The US agreed to do, "in the expectation, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defence against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter". (66) Therefore, by the first article of the pact, Japan granted to the USA the right to dispose land, sea and air forces in and about Japan. These forces were to be employed to aid in maintaining international peace and security in the Far East, and the security of Japan against armed attack from without. They could also be used "at the express request of the Japanese government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or

(66) For text of the Security Pact see Appendix I.

intervention by an outside power or powers".

By Article II Japan agreed not to concede any bases or any kind of military privileges to any third power without the prior consent of the USA. (67) Article III provided for subsequent agreements between the governments of the USA and Japan upon the details of the stationing of American forces in the latter country. (68) By Article IV, the Treaty was to expire whenever, in the opinion of both governments there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan area. (69) The fifth (and final) article provided for the ratification of the pact by the two contracting parties and for the exchange of ratifications in Washington, after which it came into force. (70)

Thus the United States armed forces in Japan were not maintained exclusively for the protection of that country against external aggression, they were an integral part of the United States military postures in Asia. As it was mentioned in article one of the pact, "such forces may be utilized to

(67) Ibid.

(68) Ibid.

(69) Ibid.

(70) Ibid.

contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and the security of Japan against armed attack from without..." (71) It suggested that the United States forces could not only move freely up and down the Japanese islands but they could also be deployed to any trouble spot in the Far East which would automatically involve Japan in an act of belligerency without its assent. Thus the treaty gave Japan little option and committed that country to the cold war as well as to direct combat. (72)

Under the treaty, the United States also had right to bring atomic weapons into Japan without consultation or the assent of the Japanese government. The provision for the United States to intervene in certain cases of internal disturbances

(71) Ibid.

(72) This treaty was criticized and condemned vehemently by the Sino-Soviet bloc. Their criticism was but natural. They said that the treaty had deprived Japan of all sovereignty and contained seeds of another war in the Far East. It was alleged that through this treaty the Americans conspired to perpetuate the Occupation, caused insult to the Japanese people and was a threat to their nation existence. To quote, "Through the Security Treaty the American Occupation of Japan is to continue indefinitely. This treaty not only gives the U.S. permanent title to the air and the naval bases it now controls in Japan; it will also place at the disposal of the Pentagon the Japanese divisions the American imperialists so badly need to carry out their aggressive programme in Asia". New Times (Moscow), 12 September 1951, no. 37, p. 2.

in Japan was obviously designed to deter a Communist led revolt supported either by the Soviet Union or Communist China. It had two implications: (1) it gave the impression that any support on the part of the population to the communist could be considered as subversive activity likely to disturb public peace and security, and such an occasion would give the Japanese government an excuse to bring the United States forces into action; and (2) the conservative leaders could also use the United States forces to suppress any popular uprising by branding it as communist inspired. This provision was not consistent with Japan's status as a sovereign and independent nation. It implied that the Japanese government was incapable of quelling internal disturbances and maintaining peace and order at home. This provision subsequently came in for severe attack especially at the hands of the opposition parties who contended that this provision perpetuated the U.S. occupation administration in Japan.

The treaty prescribed no time limit for its expiration. By so doing it gave the Americans a blank cheque. But as we will see later, some of the provisions of the treaty dealing with the use of bases, and the right of the U.S. to intervene to quell internal subversions proved unpopular and inconsistent with Japan's independent status, and the need for changing these terms became inevitable in 1960.

Chapter III

CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THE REVISION OF THE
SECURITY TREATY OF 1951

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Soon after the signing of the Security Treaty, steps were taken by both the countries in accordance with Article III of the pact to draft an Administrative Agreement that would determine the detailed conditions concerning the armed forces in Japan. (73) For this purpose the American government sent Dean Rusk as Special Ambassador to Japan, and he was assisted by Earl D. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of the American Army. Negotiations for this purpose commenced on 29 January 1952 and the Administrative Agreement was formally signed on 28 February 1952. The preamble referred to the Security Treaty and to the desire of two governments to conclude administrative arrangements which would give effect to their respective obligations under the Security Treaty and strengthen the close bonds of mutual interest and regard between their two peoples. (74)

The Administrative Agreement, which laid down the detailed conditions for the presence of U.S. troops in Japan, as an executive agreement between the two governments did not

(73) Article III of the Security Treaty stated: "The conditions which shall govern the disposition of armed forces of the USA in and about Japan shall be determined by Administrative Agreement between the two governments".

(74) For text see Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), vol. 26, no. 663, 10 March 1952, pp. 382-89.

come before either the Diet or the Senate for ratification, and it automatically went into effect with the Security Treaty on 28 April 1952. This long and technical contract, with its preamble and twenty-nine articles, provided for the practical operation of the Security Treaty dealing with such matters as transportation, access to bases and communications, public utilities and services, procurement of labour, customs, taxes, claims for damages, foreign exchange control, and the legal status of U.S. troops and departments. Special Ambassador Dean Rusk said, at the time he negotiated the agreement that, they were willing to try to find arrangements for the U.S. forces in Japan which would impose the least possible burden upon her. He said, "we (the Americans) and you (the Japanese) felt it important that U.S. forces be enabled to perform the task for which they are here. On the other hand, you and we have been agreed that the presence of our forces should interfere as little as possible with the economic and social life of Japan". (75)

The agreement allowed for a good deal of flexibility and consultation between the two governments, but the United States was granted "...the rights, power, and authority within the facilities and areas which are necessary or appropriate for their establishments, use, operation, defense, or control,"

(75) Statement issued by Ambassador Dean Rusk on the occasion of the signing of the Administrative Agreement under the US-Japan Security Treaty, 28 February 1952. For text see Contemporary Japan, vol. 21, 1952, pp.142-3.

(Article III) as well as some other rights which gave her a strong hand in carrying out the terms of the treaty. The agreement set up a Joint Committee (Article XXVI) to handle the problems that might arise, and disagreements on the committee level were to be referred to higher levels in Washington and Tokyo for settlement.

But even the Administrative Agreement did not complete the security arrangements as the question of the number and location of U.S. bases was left to subsequent negotiations. It was not until 26 July 1952 that an agreement was reached (after five months of talks) by the Joint Committee. This agreement gave U.S. troops the use of "not more than" 1,400 installations and area. All the areas were to be provided to the United States free of charge, and Japan agreed to contribute an additional \$155 million in Yen annually. The Japanese Diet was told in March 1953 that the total area being used then by US troops was 245,000 acres (two-thirds of which was for manoeuvre grounds). The land under U.S. control thus amounted to about two-tenths of one per cent of Japan's total area. These then were the arrangements which governed the U.S. military presence in Japan. (76)

There were many Japanese intellectuals, academicians, politicians and statesmen who never reconciled to the Security treaty and subsequent agreements. Most of them believed, especially the progressives, that the security

(76) George R. Parkard III, Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960 (Princeton, N.J., 1966), pp. 6-8.

Treaty and other agreements were designed to perpetuate the Occupation of Japan. They argued that the Security Treaty with the U.S. would not really provide protection for the country because the American forces and military bases would merely serve to invite retaliation upon Japan from the opposite camp. In view of this possibility, they believed that neutrality would provide the best possible defence of the country. They stood for "unarmed neutrality". Their policy of neutrality was partly based upon the thesis that the national interest was best guaranteed by a policy of internationalism which made no military commitments to either of the two blocs. (77)

The Socialist Party was divided into two groups on the problem of the security of Japan. The right wing in the party believed that the Communist bloc posed a threat to the

- (77) Not only the progressives but, "the overwhelming majority of the rank and file of the people would prefer a course of neutralism, i.e. not taking sides with either the Communist bloc or the free world. They simply want to be left alone... This sentiment is particularly strong and widespread among the young people and intellectuals. They seem to be persuaded that the next war will be between America and Russia and not one by or for Japan - they want none of it." Tatsuji Takeuchi, "Basic Issues in Japan's Foreign Policy", Far Eastern Survey (New York), vol. 21, no. 16, 19 November 1952, p. 162.

security of Japan. The left wing of the party, however, emphasized that Communist China and the Soviet Union posed no threat to Japan. A split took place in the Socialist Party at the time of the ratification of the treaties as a result of long standing differences of opinion between its right and left wing factions on many matters including the issue of Communist threat to Japan. The right wing voted for peace treaty and rejected the Security Treaty, while the left wing rejected both. (78) Socialist members in Diet described the Peace Treaty and Security Treaty as one-sided, unequal, and slavish and maintained that the treaties reduced Japan to a colonial status. The Administrative Agreement which was concluded after the ratification of the treaties without the consent of the Diet was considered as a challenge to the constitutional law of Japan. The socialists accused the ruling party of having indulged in secret diplomacy. (79)

(78) Theodore McNelly, Contemporary Government of Japan (Boston, Mass., 1963), p.

(79) The late Asanuma Ineichiro, the one time General Secretary of the Japan Socialist Party echoed sentiments of all leftist groups in Japan when he said, that, "we must struggle for peace and independence and carry on the struggle - for the return of the Okinawa to Japan, the struggle for restoration of normal relations with Communist China and the struggle against nuclear bombs. We must combine all these struggles into one struggle for revision of the unequal security pact and connect the struggle for the people's welfare". Quoted in Malappa Amravati, n. 3.

Similarly, the Communist Party rejected both the treaties. It characterized the Peace Treaty as humiliating and shameful. The security pact was identified with the "United States Imperialism" and called for "liberation". In a document entitled, "Present Demands - A Draft" drawn up in the fall of 1953, it was stated that, "our entire life-industry, agriculture, commerce and culture - is controlled by the U.S. Occupation forces", (80) through a system of pacts and treaties. It further demanded an overall peace guaranteeing national liberation and Japan's sovereignty and immediate withdrawal of all Occupation forces from Japan. (81)

The Diet no doubt, ratified both the Peace Treaty and the US-Japanese Security Treaty by large majorities, but not before the government had been closely questioned. Dissatisfaction with the treaty was expressed both in the Diet and press on such points as the post-treaty position of American troops in Japan and the cost of rearmament. (82) Even, the conservatives who dominated the Japanese politics and government certainly did not want to be overrun by the Russians or Chinese,

(80) Quoted in Rodger Swearingen, "The Communist Line in Japan", Far Eastern Survey (New York), vol. 23, no. 4, April 1954, p. 60.

(81) Ibid.

(82) Miriam S. Farby, "Japan and U.S.: Post Treaty Problems", Far Eastern Survey, vol. 21, no. 4, 27 February 1952, p. 38.

or by the native communists. But they were getting rather tired of American tutelage. Their national pride rebelled at taking any more orders, which was always the case, from the Americans after Japan had regained her freedom. (83)

The Administrative Agreement was a particular target of resentment in Japan because of its shortcomings in certain respects. It denied the Japanese government criminal jurisdiction over the United States armed forces, civilian components and their dependents. This exemption included all kinds of offences, whether committed while on duty or off duty. (84) The privileges bestowed upon the American forces in Japan were more extensive than those granted in similar agreements. For example, the British forces stationed abroad did not enjoy such extraordinary prerogatives, not to mention privileges accorded to American and other armed forces under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Thus, according to Reischauer "the semi-extra-territorial status of the American military, with all the unfortunate 19th century associations of extra-territoriality, is a specific irritant stimulating this fear of American Colonialism", and many of the Japanese see "American military

(83) Ibid., p. 34.

(84) However, it was altered in October 1953 when crimes by US troops against Japanese persons or property committed during off-duty hours were made subject to the Japanese jurisdiction.

bases in Japan as potential stepping stones to an outright colonial domination of Japan by the United States". (85)

In law and theory the United States forces in Japan were supposed to be 'considerate' guests of the people of that country. In fact they were a consistent reminder to the Japanese that the Occupation had not really ended. The mere change of terminology from "members of the occupation forces" to "members of the security forces" did not substantially alter the attitude of the GI's and the civilians toward the Japanese and their government. American military personnel tried to hang on to the physical facilities such as the Dai Ichi building and the Imperial Hotel the two symbols of the Occupation, choice housing in certain areas, golf courses, resort hotels and to their former status in the country. Moreover, hundreds of military bases retained by the Americans created social and political problems for the Japanese. The Japanese charged that the American bases in their country constituted an infringement on human and individual rights. The appropriation of farm land for the expansion of American bases in Sunakawa, a suburb of Tokyo, in September 1955, led to a clash between students and police. The sense of pride and consciousness of independence made the Japanese resent the presence of foreign forces in their

(85) Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan and America Today (Berkeley, Calif., 1953), p. 8.

country. (86)

The Security Treaty raised problems from the very outset, and opponents were quick to point out that Japan entered into it while still an occupied nation, so it had no legitimacy. In accordance with the Charter of the United Nations which noted that all nations have the right of individual and collective self-defence. The United States in the preamble of the Security Treaty expected Japan to "...increasingly assume responsibility for its own defence against direct and indirect aggression..." But this was in direct contravention to the to the Article 9 of the Japanese constitution which read: "...Land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potentials, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized." (87) Moreover, Article 1 of the treaty gave the

(86) According to one Kyushu University Professor, with the presence of the American troops in Japan, "what we lost in concrete form, are the rights to use the best buildings and houses in the cities and wide spaces and our agricultural lands. In the spiritual and abstract sense... "we first lost the independence of Japan..." Yoshitaka Takahashi, "Weight of race consciousness," in "Japan Looks Back on the Occupation: A Symposium of the Japanese views", Far Eastern Survey, vol. 22, no. 3, 25 February 1953, p. 29.

(87) Because of this dualistic attitude of the American government, it was accused of hindering the development of Japanese democracy. Rearmament which was in direct violation of the Japanese constitution definitely retarded the growth of constitutional democracy in Japan. By giving encouragement to all the old; prewar ruling groups Japan was being remilitarized. The Japanese

(footnote contd.)

United States the right to station troops in Japan and spelled out the purposes for which those troops could be used: to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan. However, more weightage was given to the security of the Far East than that of Japan. The treaty gave to the US freedom to rush Japan based troops or supplies to meet trouble anywhere in the Far East, but "the US did not undertake any legal obligations whatsoever in the pact" to defend Japan. (88)

The original security treaty was concluded in 1951 when Japan was still shocked and confused in the wake of the

(previous footnote contd.)

government continued the remilitarization without any constitutional amendment. "Ironically it was not the communists but the US Occupation forces and the pro-American conservatives regime that first infringed upon one of the basic provisions of the Japanese constitution". This realization on the part of the Japanese people further increased the distrust of American designs in Japan.

Yoshikazu Sakamoto, "Neutrality and Democracy in Japan" in Japanese Intellectuals discuss American-Japanese Relations, Far Eastern Survey, vol. 29, no. 10, October 1960, p. 155.

- (88) Masamichi Hiyama, "The US-Japanese Security Treaty : A Japanese View", Japan Quarterly (Tokyo), vol. 4, no. 3, July-Sept. 57, p. 290.

surrender and occupation. By 1957, however, the clouds of defeat and apathy were beginning to disappear, and a new sense of national pride was emerging hand in hand with the nation's growing strength and prestige. Though sharp ideological divisions still existed, there was an unspoken consensus that Japan must regain a leading role in world affairs. The trend was away from self-disparagement toward self-respect, from deep pessimism over the future to guarded optimism, from uncritical acceptance of foreign ideas and customs to a new search for the "Japanese essence" within the traditional culture. The good reasons for national pride were tremendous economic growth, important position on the world scene and

(89) In the Post War II period, specially after 1951 the Japanese economy showed a steady upward growth. After Korean war it began to grow by a per cent or more a year. The following table shows the rate of growth of National Income and GNP:

National Income	1934-36	1951-53	1954-56	1957-59
Annual Gain (%)	4.1	8.5	8.0	9.5
GNP (%)	19.0	28.6	26.9	31.3

William W. Lockwood, "Political Economy" in Herbert Passin, ed., United States and Japan (New Jersey, 1966), p. 101.

because it was able to establish good relations with USSR and Communist China. (90)

In the face of changed situation the treaty of 1951 was simply unsuited to the new Japan of 1957. Japan which was rising with a fresh dose of national pride and prestige could hardly be expected to live under a system in which she was made dependent on a foreign power, i.e. U.S. for her defence and economic stability. Thus, the demand for the revision of the security pact kept on mounting steadily.

The other reason which helped the demand for revision of the treaty to gain more popularity was the discontent with the presence of US troops and bases in Japan. The Japanese people, have traditionally been sensitive to the presence of foreigners in general and foreign troops in particular. The stationing on these crowded islands of 100,000 American servicemen of completely different cultural origin and economic status could not help but create tensions that no amount of good than

(90) Apart from the economic recovery Japan started gaining a prominent position on the international scene. She participated in the Afro-Asian Conference held at Bandung and through skilful diplomatic moves in the Conference made her presence felt in the Afro-Asian community of Nations. In October 1956 she was able to improve her relations with USSR. The Joint Declaration which was signed with Soviet Union on 19 October almost solved the long standing "Russian problem". It was followed in December by Japan's admission to the United Nations.

ideal, and a number of unfortunate incidents stirred deep resentment among the Japanese people.

The most celebrated of these incidents was the "Girad Case" in which U.S. Army Specialist 3/c William S. Girad shot an empty shell case from his grenade launcher and killed an elderly Japanese woman on a U.S. leased firing range on 30 January 1957. (91) The case became a national issue when Girad Commander refused at first to transfer him to Japanese jurisdiction. (92) Girad was ultimately tried in a Japanese Court and received a three-year (suspended) sentence in November 1957. But he returned to the United States immediately thereafter. The dispute and the trial received sensational publicity for the better part of a year, however, and Japanese opinion was informed at the very moment when Kishi was trying to launch a "new era" in U.S. Japanese relation in June 1957. There were other incidents that irritated the people and helped the left-wing to sow discontent. These were cases of murder, theft, and rape as well as flourishing brawls and marketeering. (93) None

(91) See Documents on American Foreign Relations 1957 (New York, 1958), pp. 324-27.

(92) His commander certified that Girad's act was "done in the performance of the official duty" and therefore US had primary jurisdiction. Ibid., p. 326.

(93) The left wing socialist Diet member Unjuuro Muto while describing the losses of the Japanese nation under the American occupation said that the most important thing

of these reached the proportions of the Girad case, but their recurrence and publicity must certainly have had a cumulative effect in convincing the Japanese people that they would be better off without the U.S. bases which were a source of disturbance and noise to thousands of lives in the surrounding areas.

Activists of the left-wing, particularly the communists, Zehgakuran student-, and some Sohyo Unionist, tried to turn the base problems into "base struggle". After Sunakara incident a national committee was set up to coordinate these struggles, and action squads were sent out to "educate" and organize the local farmers and fishermen. (94) Intensive

(previous footnote contd.)

lost was "chastity of young women... upto the occupation by the American armed forces, we had no such word as "Pan Pan", in the Japanese language. Of course, we had prostitutes, but certainly never in our history have seen such large scales brazen shameless traffic in female prostitution. It is a national disgrace indeed!" "Democracy and chastity" in "Japan Looks back on the occupation: A symposium of the Japanese views", Far Eastern Survey, vol. 22, 25 February 1953, pp.29-30.

- (94) George O. Totten, "Japanese Socialists Attitudes towards the Revised Security Pact with the United States Boston, Mass., 1960), p. 22.

propaganda campaigns were carried in areas effected by U.S. forces which were described as the arm of U.S. Imperialism ruthlessly exploiting the Japanese economy and crudely depriving the farmer of his ancestral land and livelihood.

The anti-base struggles all over Japan were often described by the foreign observers as the work of only a noisy minority of the Leftist students and intellectuals which failed to appreciate the need for American bases in Japan. (95) But an interesting study of public opinion on this matter was made by Douglas H. Mendel Jr, which led him to the conclusion that the American troops never enjoyed majority support in Japan and more people saw the treaty as a source of potential danger than of security. Far from believing that the American presence was vital to Japanese security, a plurality of voters in the Mendel's 1957 studies thought that American bases actually endangered their security (see table): (96)

"Do you approve or oppose the presence of U.S. bases in Japan?"

	1950-1958 (in percentage)				
	Sept. 1950	Feb. 1953	June 1953	Oct. 1957	Feb. 1958
Favour	30	33	27	18	8
Oppose	38	42	48	60	54
Don't know	32	25	25	22	34
Total	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
No. of Replies	2,641	2,498	2,515	859	2,422

(95) As one British journalist Hersell Tiltman, wrote on 26 February 1959 that "a majority of the Japanese people believed that the American presence is vital to the security of Japan". Quoted in Douglas H. Mendel, "Japanese Attitude toward American Military Bases", Far Eastern Survey, vol. 28, no. 8, Sept. 52, p. 130.

(96) Ibid., p. 130.

This opinion poll-strengthened the conclusion that the desire to revise/abolish the Security Treaty was not a sectarian demand confined only to Leftists. The anti-treaty struggle though organized by the left-wing had the support of non-leftist as well as a substantial part of the Japanese people. (97)

The more extreme leftists launched new and harsher attacks on the treaty, and for them this was the beginning of a drive not just to improve the treaty but to abolish it altogether. The popular demand, on the other hand was for removal of the inequalities, lessening the "danger of war", and paying due respect to Japan's new national status and self-respect. It was not until 1957 that the treaty issue took on a new urgency. Rising nationalism and the irritations over U.S. troops and bases created pressures against the treaty, and there were other developments that brought the issue into sharp focus in 1957 and gave rise to a reappraisal of Japan's entire foreign policy.

In 1957 Kishi Nobusuke became Japan's seventh Prime Minister since the war. Though he was to become extremely unpopular in 1960, made a reasonable estimate of the prevailing mood when, from 1957, he tied his political fortunes to the great issue of negotiating a new treaty.

(97) Ibid., p. 133.

In the spring of 1957, the low-keyed but widely shared mood was to take a critical and searching look at Japan's foreign affairs. It was a time when there was talk of Japan's serving as a "bridge" between East and West to relax world tension (a role which would also give her a stronger voice in world affairs). Another popular idea favoured a four power non-aggression treaty between Japan, communist China, USSR and the United States.

On 28 February 1957, five years after the signing of the Administrative Agreement, a declaration signed by 538 scholars and intellectuals was published under the title of "Reexamination of the Security Treaty and the Administrative Agreement". The declaration included the following sentences:

"The bloody incident at Sunakawa was a tragedy from which one would gladly avert one's eyes. The cause of this calamity lies in the San Francisco treaty organization, of which the US-Japanese Security Treaty and Administrative Agreement mainstay. The time has come for a thoroughgoing reexamination of the Administrative Agreement as such and in turn of the Security Treaty on which it is based." (98)

Perhaps it was in response to the mounting pressure for the revision of the treaty that at a meeting of the Upper House budget committee of the Diet on 2 March 1957 PM Kishi

(98) Quoted in Masamichi Hayama, n. 88, pp. 281-95.

stated, while replying to a question of a socialist member that, "I believe that, viewed from a Japanese standpoint, the situation has changed since the signing of Security Treaty. I do not, of course, think that Japan could now defend herself single-handed without relying on US-Japanese joint defense. I mean, rather, that Japan has by now acquired a certain ability to defend herself and that she has become a member of the UN. In the light of this I believe that while this is not the time to abolish the joint US-Japanese system, the situation is at least ripe for an overall reconsideration of the Security Treaty and the Administrative Agreement. Further study is needed however, as to which articles should in practice be revised and in what way". (99)

In the meantime after the assumption of office, Kishi had announced his plans to visit Washington. He seemed to be in favour of the revision of the treaty but his approach, was very cautious and vague. He never committed himself to precise objectives. He gave the impression that he was acting to meet popular feelings but took care not to make bold promises. He was aware of the problems he would face in Washington and of the political dangers of coming home empty-handed when public expectations of a happy "home coming" were high.

Kishi met with greater success in Washington during his

(99) Ibid., pp. 284-85.

visit in June 1957. A Joint Communique was issued on 21 June proclaiming a "new era" in U.S.-Japanese relations. The communique said that an intergovernmental committee would be established to study problems regarding the "disposition and employment in Japan by the United States of its forces". (100)

The more tangible prize for Kishi in the communique was the announcement that the United States would withdraw, within the next year, all of its ground combat forces from Japan. (101)

Since almost everybody in Japan had, at one time or another over the previous six years, called for changes in the Security Treaty, one might have expected that the U.S. agreement to negotiate a new treaty in September 1958 would be greeted with relief and satisfaction. But contrary to the expectations it further complicated the issue. The entire treaty question was suddenly reopened, and the nation plunged into controversies (the differences were over the mode and degree of revision. Leftists stood for total abrogation of the treaty) that almost tore it to pieces during the next two years. The conservatives fell into utter disarray as faction leaders contradicted each other and fought to capitalize on the treaty issue. Underlying this confusion were two factors: the painful dilemmas

(100) For text see Contemporary Japan, vol. 25, 1957, pp. 166-68.

(101) Ibid., p. 167.

of foreign policy that confronted Japan in this period and the complicated political infighting in the ruling party, i.e. Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). (102)

Only three official US-Japanese meetings could be held for the revision of the treaty in the fall of 1958. The tending within the LDP, and questions over how to revise the treaty brought negotiations to a standstill in December, when a four-month recess was called. Talks were reopened on 13 April 1959 between Foreign Minister Fujiyama and U.S. Ambassador MacArthur II and, after ten more official sessions, they halted for a summer recess on 13 July. During this period, matters such as the scope of the treaty, the internal disturbance clause, prior consultations, and the Administrative Agreement were discussed. It seemed as if the negotiations will never come to conclusion since there was hard bargaining on the details of the revision.

The U.S.-Japanese negotiations began again on 22 August 1959, and continued up to 30 December. The main hurdles seemed

(102) It was the factional struggle within the LDP, however, which formed the major and most direct reason for the sluggish progress made in the question. Faced with a great variety of views within his own party, PM Kishi wavered constantly. When opinions failed to correspond, he adopted his favorite "wait and see" policy. It is hardly surprising that the negotiations dragged on. The complaint was even heard that the security question had become a domestic rather than a diplomatic one. "The New Security Treaty", Japan Quarterly, vol. 7, 1960, p. 1930.

to be the question of prior consultations and rights under the Administrative Agreement, with Japan seeking more control over the entry and exit of U.S. servicemen and their families, customs and postal inspection, tax exemptions, labour procurement and the airways. Ultimately the differences were resolved at the twenty-second official meeting on 6 January 1960, when negotiations came to a close with revised treaty and Administrative Agreement ready for signing. (103)

It was arranged that Kishi and Fujiyama should go to Washington for the formal signature of the new treaty and of the revised Administrative Agreement of American bases and troops in Japan. But the left wing of the Socialist Party, the Communist Party and the even more extreme Zengakuren or National Students Federation, remained fiercely opposed to the conclusion of any treaty of alliance with America at all. So did Sohyo, the left wing trade union federation. As these groups represented only a minority view in the Diet and in the country generally and so were unable to secure their ends by constitutional means, they set themselves to prevent the conclusion of the treaties and to bring down the Kishi government by repeated strikes, demonstrations and riots. On 17 January Zengakuran student staged a riot at the Tokyo airport in an attempt to stop Kishi airport in an attempt to stop Kishi from leaving for Washington,

(103) Ibid., p. 129.

but he and his entourage circumvented them. On 19 January the treaties were formally signed in the White House with President Eisenhower looking on. (104)

The new treaty consists of ten articles. (105)

Article I generally corresponds to the comparable articles of other Pacific bilateral treaties to which the United States is a party. Under the terms of the first paragraph both parties reaffirm their solemn obligations under the Charter of the United Nations to settle by peaceful means any international disputes in which they may be involved and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations. In addition, the article provides both parties will endeavour to strengthen the United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace and security may be discharged more effectively.

Article II reflects the broad community of interest of the United States and Japan in furthering the freedom and well-being of their peoples. Under its provisions both parties pledged themselves to contribute to the development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their

(104) Department of State Bulletin, vol. XLII, no. 1076, 8 February 1960, p. 183.

(105) For text see Appendix II.

free institutions and by promoting conditions of stability and well being. Further, they will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and encourage economic collaboration.

Article III obliges both parties to maintain and develop, subject to constitutional limitations their capacity to resist armed attack. Provision is made under Article IV for consultation regarding the implementation of the treaty and whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.

Article V explicitly obligates the United States to act "to meet the common danger" in case of an armed attack on either party in the territories under the administration of Japan, it does not obligate Japan to involve herself in case the U.S. is attacked outside this area. (106) The response of both parties to an armed attack in the treaty area is limited by their respective constitutional provisions and processes.

The new treaty like the old one, grants by Article VI the use of bases in Japan to US forces for the purpose of "contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East", a new administrative agreement is to be concluded to govern the use of these

(106) Okinawa and other islands under the "residual sovereignty" of Japan but administered by the United States were thus excluded from the treaty by the above wordings.

bases replacing the Administrative Agreement signed in February 1952. (107)

Article VII affirms that the obligations of the parties under the treaty do not affect in any way their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and recognizes the responsibility of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security.

Articles VIII and IX provide that the treaty will enter into force on the date of exchange of instruments of ratification in Tokyo and that the present security treaty will expire when the treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security enters into force.

Under Article X the treaty remains in force till both parties are of the opinion that United Nations arrangements have come into force satisfactorily providing for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area. It provides further that either party may give notice of its intention to terminate the treaty after the treaty has been in force for ten years, in which case the treaty is terminated one year after notice has been given.

The ratification of the revised treaty of the Diet caused one of the worst political crises in Japanese history which later

(107) A new Administrative Agreement, in accordance with Article 6 was signed simultaneously with the US-Japanese Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

on came to be known as May-June (1960) Incident. There can be no second opinion about the fact that the revision was not to the liking of a large number of the Japanese population. The simmering resentment needed a shock to explode. And the shock came when an American U-2 plane on an espionage flight was shot down on 2 May 1960 in Soviet Union. This incident made clear that similar flights "had ^{long} large been made from the Japanese bases. With U-2 incident the security pact became a matter of grave concern to the man in the street. Over one-third of the entire electorate signed a petition to the House of Representatives, urging it not to ratify the treaty. (108) But the government went ahead with its plan of ratification of the treaty. Through an unusual parliamentary tactics on 19 May the treaty was declared to be ratified by the Diet. The socialist party Diet members who tried to install the proceedings were dragged out by the 500 policemen who were summoned by the speaker. (109) On 19 June 1960 the treaty was automatically ratified by the Upper House of the Diet also. (110) But Kishi had to pay dearly

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- (108) Kenichi Fukuda, "The May-June Incident" in Japan Intellectuals Discuss American-Japanese Relations, Far Eastern Survey, vol. 29, no. 10, Oct. 60, p. 146.
- (109) For a detailed account of the incident see George H. Packard III, no. 76, pp. 221-330.
- (110) The new treaty entered into force on 23 June 1960 after the exchange of ratification papers at Tokyo on the same day.

for this ratification. In the wake of the mounting public protest he was forced to postpone the proposed visit of President Eisenhower to Japan which was to take place from 19 to 23 June, and to resign from the Premiership on 23 June.

In this chapter an attempt has been made to describe the circumstances which led to the revision of the Security Treaty in 1960. In the next chapter both the treaties will be examined comparatively.

Chapter IV

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF BOTH THE TREATIES

Chapter IV

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF BOTH THE TREATIES

The Security Treaty of 1951 was signed when Japan after her defeat in the World War II had been deprived of all defence potentialities. She stood alone in an hostile world - security being the main problem of the country. Security Treaty, clearly a condition of the peace treaty, was accepted with resignation and the belief that it could not be avoided. But by 1960 when the treaty was revised Japan had become economically strong and had developed international links. On the international scene Japanese diplomats and politicians were beginning to speak with new authority and confidence. In 1956 Japan joined the United Nations, and by 1958 she had been elected to a seat on the Security Council. Japan's presence on the world scene was coming to be felt again.

Yet the new prestige and national pride inevitably clashed with the realities of the world situation in which Japan found herself dependent upon the United States for military security and - to a degree - for trade and capital. The search for independence and self-sufficiency was frustrated by military and economic weakness, and the Security Treaty came to symbolize this frustration. The "unequal treaty", signed, as it was, when Japan was occupied, was regarded as a legacy of defeat that had to be either revised or abolished totally in accordance with Japan's new prestige.

The original Security Treaty of 1951 consisted of a preamble and five articles. Its main idea was that, since Japan was unarmed and yet had an inherent right to individual and collective self-defence, Japan by the treaty desired the United States to maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon Japan. Implementing details were left to executive agreements that were worked out later on.

The new treaty consisted of ten articles. It was more specific and differed from the old treaty in several respects. Firstly, the preambles of both the treaties differed in both essence and content. In the preamble of 1951 treaty it was only the military relations between U.S. and Japan which had been discussed. Whereas, in the preamble of 1960 treaty it had been desired, "to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between them, and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law..." It was further desired, "to encourage closer economic co-operation between them and to promote conditions of economic stability and well being in their countries..." The change was too explicit and apparent.

Secondly, the 1951 treaty was simply named as "Security Treaty Between United States of America and Japan" whereas the revised treaty was captioned as "Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan".

This change was very significant in the sense that in the new treaty it was "mutual co-operation" which was emphasized more and preceded the security aspect. Furthermore, the new treaty, was more of a "mutual" security treaty than one-sided affair as was the case with the older security treaty.

Thirdly, in the security arrangements under the new treaty Japan was treated on equal basis. The old treaty thought of Japan as an insignificant power militarily and had laid no military obligations on her, (111) whereas the new one obliges Japan to help, defend American bases, if attacked. (112) Moreover, the old one said that only U.S. forces "may be utilized" (113)

(111) Article I of the 1951 treaty stated: "Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose United States, land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers."

(112) As Article III of the 1960 treaty stated: "The parties individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack."

(113) See Article I of the 1951 treaty No. 111.

to contribute to the maintenance of the security of Japan against armed attack from without, the new one was more specific in recognizing an attack against Japan as an attack against the U.S., although each country was to respond to the danger in terms of the stipulations and practices of its own constitution. (114)

Fourthly, the new treaty unlike the old one contained the time limit on its duration. (115) The 1951 treaty without specifying anything, had simply stated under Article IV, that the treaty would continue in force until both the Japanese and

(114) As Article V of the 1960 treaty stated: "Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Art. 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security".

(115) As Art. X stated, "...after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may give notice to the other party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice have been given".

American governments agree that some other conditions have arisen that ensure international peace and security in the Japan Area. This meant that without American consent to end the treaty it would have continued forever. Thus, by mutually agreeing to a time limit Japan's equality was recognized.

The new treaty removed two features that had been objectionable to Japan in the old one; it deleted the clause permitting U.S. forces to intervene at the request of the Japanese government, help quell large-scale internal disturbances caused by an outside power (Art. I of the 1951 Treaty) and it also eliminated the requirement for Japan to get prior consent from the United States for granting military rights to any third party. (116) It also added an obligation for both parties to settle disputes in accordance with the U.N. Charter (Art. I), a major improvement in the eyes of the Japanese government.

Article I of the Security Treaty of 1951, gave the United States the right to station troops in Japan and spelled out the purposes for which those troops could be used; to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan. This gave the United States

(116) Art. II of the 1951 treaty had stated: "...Japan will not grant, without the prior consent of the United States of America, any bases of any right, powers or authority whatsoever, in or relating to bases or the right of garrison or of manoeuvre, or transit of ground, air or naval forces to any third power".

freedom to rush Japan-based troops or supplies to meet trouble anywhere in the Far East, but there was no specific commitment to defend Japan. (117) In the negotiations leading to the revised treaty of 1960, Japan corrected this omission and sought U.S. assurance that Japan would be consulted before U.S. troops become involved in a crisis outside Japan. (118)

The Security Treaty was revealed in stages so that it could not be seen in full until well after all arrangements had become faite accomplis. The treaty's final text was kept secret until it was signed, and then it rode the wave of satisfaction that greeted the peace treaty and the coming of independence. Critics directed their fire against the "one-sided peace" rather than the security arrangements. When the security treaty came before the Diet in October 1951, it was no more than agreement that Japan would allow American troops to stay on after the Occupation; the unpleasant details were not made public until the conclusion of the Administrative Agreement on 28 February 1952. Even then, hard bargaining on the designation of bases and revision of domestic laws to conform to the

(117) See Masamichi Royama, n. 8b, p. 291.

(118) As Art. IV of the 1960 treaty stated: "The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened."

treaty terms were put off until later. The result was that the treaty's opponents were unable to focus national attention on the whole pact at once.

This contrasted sharply with the situation in 1960 when the treaty and all its ramifications were well advertised in advance and when all eyes were turned on the Diet for a specific, limited, and tense period of national debate. It was not until 1960, in other words, that the opposition got a real chance to test its strength against the treaty.

The press took a generally resigned attitude toward the Security Treaty of 1951, though Prime Minister Yoshida was criticized for his "vague and arrogant" responses in the Diet. Japan's largest paper, the Asahi, agreed with the government that it was a treaty between two sovereign nations, but called for thorough Diet discussions and held that the United States should give its promise of aid in a more possible form. It asked Japan not to call ^{for the US aid to settle internal disturbances} and wanted the treaty to be kept purely defensive in nature. (119) Perhaps in part because the Occupation was not yet over, the press was calm during the Diet debate in contrast with its excited attitude of May and June 1960.

While the signing of the new security pact and its ratification by a Liberal-Democrat-dominated Diet logically

(119) Asahi Shimbun (editorial), 11 October 1951. As quoted in Packard, n. 76, p. 15.

brought to an end the campaign to prevent treaty revision, it by no means terminated the main Socialist opposition to it. The campaign had undoubtedly convinced many, including some of the most prominent people in academic and cultural circles, that the revision was not an improvement and that its abrogation was still something to be striven for. (120)

In the Japanese political circles the fear was expressed that treaty might tie Japan's hands just at a time when the United States and the Soviet Union were showing signs of moving on from a "peace based on strength" to a peace based on negotiated agreement". Examples were cited of Japanese government spokesmen (including Foreign Minister Fujiyama) belittling the significance of this trend saying that negotiation had always been used and that a summit meeting (Camp David Summit Meeting of September 1959 between Eisenhower and Khrushchev) in itself did not signify that there would be a lull in the cold war. (121)

(120) For instance on 7 July 1959 a "Society of the Security Pact Problem" was formed by a number of leaders from academic and cultural circles, such as Shigeto Tsuru, Rokuro Hidaka, Hideo Odagiri, and Saburo Matsuoka. They published an open letter on 17 October 1959 containing a series of questions addressed to Foreign Minister A. Fujiyama. This letter contained the brilliant exposition of the proposed revised treaty draft. For details see George C. Totten, *ibid.* 94, pp. 28-29.

(121) Foreign Policy Speech by the Foreign Minister at the 34th Ordinary Session of the Diet, 1 February 1960. See Contemporary Japan, vol. 26, 1959-60, pp. 599-602.

When the Secretary General of the Liberal Democratic Party (Kwajima) said that the Communist bloc would have to be dissolved before peace could be hoped for. His statement was criticized as openly challenging the principle of peaceful coexistence and as indicative of the government's and the Liberal Democratic Party's rejection or dislike of the trend toward bettering East-West relations and minimizing international tensions.

The other criticism concerned Japan's mission in the contemporary world, which the critics saw as leadership in world disarmament movement. The continuation of the Security Treaty in revised form, they held, would rob Japan of an outstanding opportunity to take the lead in this direction. Such leadership would not only be of benefit to mankind but, even if not successful, would be of immediate advantage to Japan in allaying lingering suspicions still maintained by Asian nations that Japan had not yet overcome her aggressive and militaristic tendencies.

It was also argued that while concluding the revised security treaty undue haste was shown. Foreign Minister Fujiyama himself was quoted as saying that he was anxiously awaiting the results of the summit meeting and President Eisenhower's visit to the Soviet Union in the spring. (122) (However, this

(122) Ibid., p. 599.

meeting never materialized because of U-2 Incident). If he was so anxious about those developments, it was asked, why did he hurry into concluding the treaty instead of waiting until May or June of 1960, to consider treaty revision in the light of the situation then?

To the argument that by placing a time limit of ten years on the new treaty Japan's sovereignty was recognized to a greater extent. The critics emphasized the loss of flexibility because of such a long duration. Criticism on this score also came from within the Liberal Democrats, particularly from the Kono faction. (123) If Japan wanted to end the pact and the United States did not, it would take ten years. Many critics, therefore, would prefer that the treaty should have got the same provision as contained in the American mutual defence treaties with China, Korea, and the Philippines, namely, that either party may terminate it one year after notice had been given to the other party.

The critics also argued that the claimed advantages of the revised treaty were worthless. For example, the fact that in the new treaty Japan would no longer had to shoulder part of the expenses of the United States forces based in Japan would not mean a reduction of expenses for Japan, because by entering

(123) The LDP was divided into three factions namely Kishi faction, Ikeda faction and Kono faction. The Kono faction was led by Kono Ichiro.

into a defensive alliance with the United States, Japan's obligations had actually increased. The critics' fears on this score were borne out in the cabinet's draft budget for fiscal 1960 beginning April 1. The defence appropriation were increased by 900 million Yen despite the fact that Japan would be relieved of sharing the cost of maintaining United States forces. (124)

Also the items on "consultation" were held to be meaningless. The critics pointed out two statements made by the Foreign Office in 1958 when the Seventh Fleet was sent to the Taiwan Straits and in 1959 when shipments of military supplies were sent to Laos by Japan - based United States forces. The statements claimed that these actions were for "peace and security in the Far East" and "in accord with the United Nations Charter". Japanese government's not making such interpretations in the future when Japan-based United States forces may become involved in military actions somewhere in Asia and thus bring Japan into war against her wishes.

Both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister made it clear that an attack against American military bases in Japan would be considered as an attack against Japan. But what the critics feared to a greater extent was that United States

(124) In 1959 the defence expenditure amounted to 153,665 million Yen whereas in 1960 it was raised to 154,565 million yen. Japan Times, 14 January 1960, p. 1.

forces outside of Japan might get involved in actions for the preservation of "international peace and security in the Far East" and that Japanese bases might be used in that event in accordance with the preamble and Articles IV and V of the new treaty. In the case of another flare-up in the Taiwan Straits, for instance, they were afraid Japan might be drawn unwillingly into war.

The critics further pointed out that the Art. 9 of the Japanese constitution allowed individual or national self-defence but did not recognize the right of collective self-defence. Nevertheless, any concerted United States-Japanese military action would in fact add up to collective self-defence and consequently even on the government's interpretation of the Japanese constitution, the revised treaty would be a constitutional violation.

Whatever might be the criticisms and disadvantages inherent in the revised security treaty of 1960 it would be wrong to commit that the said treaty changed nothing materially and was no improvement over the previous security arrangements. In spite of all the drawbacks there were four major improvements. The most important was, that in the new treaty the United States assumed a clear responsibility for the defence of Japan. This was clearly the heart of the revised treaty and yet the point was given least space in Japanese newspapers and journals discussing the issue. The second was the elimination of the

provision that United States forces could be used in suppressing internal uprisings. This clause a kind constant reminder of the days of U.S. Army Occupation, was scarcely appropriate in a treaty concluded with an independent country. (125) This revision put Japan one step further on the road toward an "equal" relationship with the United States. Thirdly the placing of a limit of ten years on the treaty was a significant improvement. The old treaty had no fixed term of validity. This was no proper state of affairs between two independent countries.

Lastly, in the revised treaty unlike the 1951 treaty, it was not only the military aspect which had been taken up but also the economic ties and relations were talked about. It showed that the US was realizing gradually that Japan was rising as an economic power and could not be treated merely as a minor military partner.

Apart from the treaty revision in 1960 the United States government was sensitive to the fast changing basis of its relationship with Japan. As early as in 1953 it had agreed to the revision of Art. XVII of the Administrative Agreement which dealt with the status of American forces in Japan. After this revision all the United States personnel were put under Japanese criminal jurisdiction for crimes committed in Japan. The number of men in Japan had been progressively reduced to

(125) Shintaro Iyu, "On the Security Treaty", Japan Quarterly vol. 7, no. 3, July-Sept. 60, p. 414.

about 60,000 mainly because of withdrawal of all army combat personnel in 1958. (126) Facilities, including buildings and land were returned to the Japanese government steadily since 1957 and by 1961 only two naval bases and about six air bases, with supporting radar and supply installations remained in United States hands. Perhaps equally important from a public relations view point, military facilities were moved outside major cities and uniformed personnel were encouraged to wear civilian clothes.

Nevertheless, the revision was not to the satisfaction of a large number of the Japanese politicians, intellectuals and common people. (127) Immediately, after the ratification it was demanded that the talks should be reopened for further

(126) Douglas H. Mendel, Japanese People and Foreign Policy (Berkeley, Calif., 1961), p. 98.

(127) According to a public opinion poll conducted immediately after the revision of the treaty and confined to Tokyo where the level of political consciousness was admittedly highest in Japan, 24.9 per cent were "for the new Security Treaty", 36 per cent "against" and 39.1 per cent "do not know" and "no reply". The number opposing the Treaty were 11 per cent more than those favouring it. Yoshikazu Sakamoto, "Neutrality and Democracy in Japan". In "Japanese Intellectuals Discuss American Japanese Relations", Far Eastern Survey, vol. 29, no. 10, October 1960, p. 154.

revision of the revised treaty of 1960. It was argued that the "Far East" clause which permitted the use outside Japanese territory of U.S. forces stationed in Japan should be deleted and Articles III and V which made room for rearmament and were in contradiction to the Article 9 of the Japanese constitution should be modified in such a way as to resolve the contradiction. (128)

(128) "On the Security Treaty", Japan Quarterly, no. 103, pp. 415-16.

CONCLUSIONS

CONCLUSIONS

The San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 which marked the end of the Allied Occupation heralded an era of Alliance between the two belligerents of the past - U.S.A. ; the victor and Japan; the vanquished. No one could have imagined on 7 December 1941 (the day Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and the USA became involved in World War II) that in less than 10 years a strange twist of history would impel the two nations - with such different pasts and cultures - to enter into a security alliance. But impossible was made possible by signing a Security Treaty, within hours after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty between Japan and 48 other nations of the world.

The Peace Treaty which was signed on the morning of 8 September 1951 ended the Allied Occupation and accorded Japan independence, sovereign status and right to self-defence. But, all these were meaningless since Japan had been deprived of all her resources and defence potentialities under the surrender terms. Peace without a viable security arrangement would have been an empty husk. This fact was taken into account by the peace negotiators, and specifically it was mentioned that Japan on her own could enter into collective security arrangement.

It became the basis of the Security Treaty of 1951. Interestingly, the two countries though, had willingly agreed to sign the treaty, yet they had different designs and aims to

achieve through this treaty. For America "containment of Communism" was of paramount importance, security of Japan being a part of it. The containment policy came to play a more prominent role after the signing of Sino-Soviet Treaty on 14 February 1950 and the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950. Whereas, the Japanese though sensitive to these developments around them, were basically interested in the Security Treaty because of their own country's security reasons. The Japanese leadership knew that with the shattered economy they had after the World War II it would be difficult to finance any security arrangement indigenously.

Under the Security Treaty arrangements as envisaged by the Security Treaty of 1951 and the subsequent Administrative Agreement U.S. held the predominant position in the security system, Japan's status being merely that of an onlooker. Japan was a junior partner in all respects. The Security Treaty was drawn in the name of both the countries, USA and Japan, but in reality it was almost a one-sided affair. Japan was to provide bases for stationing American army personnel free of cost and had to pay huge sums for their maintenance. The Japanese government could have no control over these bases or personnel. The American army machinery stationed in Japan could even intervene in the internal disturbances in the country thus carrying forward the legacy of the Occupation. The main purpose behind the treaty was the security of Japan but there was no explicit

commitment by the United States to fulfil it. On the contrary, in the treaty the Japanese consent and approval was taken for granted in any conflict in which the U.S. might get herself involved in the Far East.

But soon the clouds of defeat and apathy were beginning to disappear and the Japanese people were quick to realize the evils inherent in the security arrangement with the U.S.A. With the moment of defeat receded in the background Japan was gaining more and more self-confidence and realized the importance of national respect and honour. The war time shattered economy of Japan was also showing the healthy sign of steady upward growth. With admission in the United Nations in the year 1956 Japan came to play an important role on the international scene. A re-emerged and revitalized nation by the middle of 1960s became very vocal in doubting even the basic premises of the security arrangements under the Security Treaty of 1951. The Japanese government under the pressure of the mounting criticism against the treaty (which mainly came from the socialists and other progressive groups) and the American government conscious of fast rising anti-American feelings in Japan and radical changes on the international scene sat down to negotiate for the revision of the Security Treaty.

The revision led to the signing of a new Security Treaty on 19 January 1960 amidst violence and protest in Japan. Many groups were not satisfied with the revision and continued the struggle. However this cannot be denied that the new treaty was

an improvement over the old treaty in some respects and contained major changes. In the new treaty Japan was given a specific commitment for her security, a degree of control over the American armed forces in Japan, and the American forces could no more intervene in the domestic troubles of Japan. One crucial improvement was that a time limit of 10 years was put and was subject to termination after completion of its duration. In the new treaty the negotiators were careful and cautious in choosing words even. Unlike the old treaty this time words like "mutual cooperation" were inserted, so that the people of Japan could be convinced of its reciprocal nature and democratic character. Furthermore, the new treaty was broader in its scope. Apart from military cooperation and understanding, the economic bonds were also to be strengthened. This indeed was a major shift in the whole pattern of alliance being evolved between the U.S. and Japan.

A comparative study of the two treaties gives an insight into the different stages of the evolution of a system of alliance between the two countries. The time gap between the two treaties was that of almost a decade. In 1951, Japan being in no position to influence the events readily submitted to the designs of security as dictated by the major partner. It had no choice, no option but to follow as told. However, with the passage of time within few years, things had changed

materially. Japan had laid the foundation of a sound economy and had achieved an important place in the world. No doubt, the new treaty was signed among two nations of almost equal status.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

Security Treaty Between the United States of America and Japan (1)

Signed at San Francisco September 8, 1951
Ratification advised by U.S. Senate, March 20, 1952
Ratified by President, April 15, 1952
Ratified by Japan, November 19, 1951
Ratifications exchanged at Washington, April 23, 1952
Entered into force April 23, 1952

TREATY

Japan has this day signed a Treaty of Peace with the Allied Powers. On the coming into force of that Treaty, Japan will not have the effective means to exercise its inherent right of self-defense because it has been disarmed.

There is danger to Japan in this situation because irresponsible militarism has not yet been driven from the world. Therefore Japan desires a Security Treaty with the United States of America to come into force simultaneously with the Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and Japan.

The Treaty of Peace recognizes that Japan as a sovereign nation has the right to enter into collective security arrangements, and further, the Charter of the United Nations recognizes that all nations possess an inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.

In exercise of these rights, Japan desires, as a provisional arrangement for its defense, that the United States of America should maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon Japan.

The United States of America, in the interest of peace and security, is presently willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan, in the expectation, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armament which

(1) U.S. Department of State, Security Treaty Between the United States of America and Japan (Vol. 3, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, TIA3 2491), Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955, pp. 3323-3340.

could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

Accordingly, the two countries have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers.

ARTICLE II

During the exercise of the right referred to in Article I, Japan will not grant, without the prior consent of the United States of America, any bases or any rights, powers or authority whatsoever, in or relating to bases or the right of garrison or of maneuver, or transit of ground, air or naval forces to any third power.

ARTICLE III

The conditions which shall govern the disposition of armed forces of the United States of America in and about Japan shall be determined by administrative agreements between the two Governments.

ARTICLE IV

This Treaty shall expire whenever in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan Area.

ARTICLE V

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and Japan and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington.

In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty

Done in duplicate at the city of San Francisco, in English and Japanese languages, this eighth day of September, 1951

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

Dean Acheson
John Foster Dulles
Alexander Wiley
Styles Bridges

FOR JAPAN:

Shigeru Yoshida

APPENDIX II

Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan (1)

Signed at Washington January 19, 1960
Ratification advised by the Senate June 22, 1960
Ratified by Japan June 21, 1960
Ratifications exchanged at Tokyo June 23, 1960
Proclaimed by the President of the U.S. June 27, 1960
Entered into force June 23, 1960
With Agreed Minute and Exchange of Notes

TREATY

The United States of America and Japan,

Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between them, and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law,

Desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation between them and to promote conditions of economic stability and well-being in their countries,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,

Recognizing that they have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as affirmed in the Charter of the United Nations,

Considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East,

Having resolved to conclude a treaty of mutual cooperation and security,

(1) U.S. Department of State, Security Treaty Between the United States of America and Japan / and related documents / (Vol. 11, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, TIAS 4509), Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961, pp. 1633-1635.

Therefore agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

The Parties will endeavour in concert with other peace-loving countries to strengthen the United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace and security may be discharged more effectively.

ARTICLE II

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them.

ARTICLE III

The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE IV

The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.

ARTICLE V

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE VI

For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.

The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.

ARTICLE VII

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE VIII

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and Japan in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will enter into force on the date on which the instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them in Tokyo.

ARTICLE IX

The Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951 shall expire upon the entering into force of this Treaty.

ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area.

However, after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may give notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given.

In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done in duplicate at Washington in the English and Japanese languages, both equally authentic, this 19th day of January, 1960.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

Christian A. Herter
Douglas MacArthur 2nd
J. Graham Parsons

FOR JAPAN:

Nobusuke Kishi
Aichiro Fujiyama
Mitsujiro Ishii
Tadashi Adachi
Koichiro Asekai

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