

**SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS KOREAN CRISIS,
1945-53**

*Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the award of the Degree of*

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DECLARATION

Certified that the dissertation entitled, SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS KOREAN CRISIS, 1945 - 1953, submitted by Ms. RAISA BANO, is in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY of this university. This dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this or any other University. This is her own work.

We recommend that this dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

USSR and Development of the Korean Crisis :

During the early post - world war II period the Korean crisis emerged as one of the biggest and most dangerous problems which caused the biggest ever danger to world peace, when the Cold War politics was taking shape between the super power blocs i.e. USSR and USA. This new phenomenon created a vicious atmosphere based on propaganda and misinformation between the two opposite camps, who were expanding their spheres of influence through out the world. The Korean crisis took a hot war shape between the two super powers, it seemed that another world war might begin out of the Korean crisis as the newly liberated China involved itself in the war with the American forces. It was obvious that China intervened on behalf of the Soviet Union. Behind this background Soviet diplomacy took sharp turn in the Korean crisis. since the USSR had to suffer enormous losses during the world war period, it did not want to

involve itself directly in any such crisis. This is how the Soviet leadership under Stalin succeeded in bringing its new revolutionary friend China directly involve in the war against the South Korean and American forces. Before going into details of the various aspects of the Soviet policy towards the Korean crisis, it is pertinent to begin with the geo-strategic importance of Korea as a whole and especially for the USSR.

Geo-Strategic Importance :

Although USSR had only 10.4 mile boundary with Korea, yet, located in the centre of triangular competition among China, the Soviet Union and Japan, Korea has held a strategic position, though in varying degrees at different times. Hence Korea had earned the title of "The Palestine of East Asia"¹In terms of Soviet foreign policy, the original interest in Korea can be traced back to the 1860 Sino-Russian treaty of Peiking, delimiting the Tumen border, and the 1895 treaty of Shimonoseki which marked the establishment of Russian

¹. Robert Simmons, The Strange Alliance, New York, Free Press, 1975. pp.3.

power and China's decline. The 1905 treaty of Portsmouth signalled the limits of Russian power and the rise of Japan. With the conclusion of Korea-Japan treaty of Annexation (1910) was signed to bring about 'stability and peace' on the Korean peninsula. The Communist government in Russia began to show special interest in the Far Eastern countries including Korea in order to spread the communist influence and foothold for organised communist parties. The Korean delegates participated in a conference of 'toilers of the East' in Moscow in 1922.²

In February 1945, Stalin met US President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill in Yalta to discuss the matters concerning Soviet participation in the war against Japan and treatment of post-war questions. In return for joining the war against Japan, with which it was bound by a treaty of non-aggression, the USSR was promised at Yalta Conference that it would regain its

². E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, vol.III, (Penguin, 1967), p.519.

former territory and other various concessions in the Far East.³

USSR and Division of Korea :

On 22 September, 1945, after the Japanese surrender, general MacArthur required the Japanese government to issue directions to its forces in Korea North of the 38 Parallel to surrender to the Soviet forces and to those south of the 38 parallel to surrender to the United States force. Thus Korea come to be divided of the 38 parallel, though it was not intended to be a permanent division. It was adopted because of the immediate needs of the moment.

On 26th December, 1945, the USA, USSR and Great Britain held a conference at Moscow where they have agreed to set up a provisional Korean democratic government for all Korea in consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organisations

³. Text of 'Secret Agreement Regarding the Entry of the Soviet Union into War against Japan', in A.Z.Rubinstein, The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, (Random House, New York 1972), pp.177.

under guidance of joint Commission and to form a four power trusteeship composed of USA, USSR, UK and China for five years.⁴

Following Moscow agreement, the joint Commission was set up on 20th March, 1946 at Seoul but reached an impasse very soon owing to divergent positions of American and Soviet authorities in Korea. The Soviets insisted upon consulting only those organisations who were in support of trusteeship in the spirit of Moscow Agreement. Since it was more favourable to leftists, the USA refused to accept the Soviet stand and joint commission was deadlocked.

On May 8, 1946 general Shytkov called upon general Hodge and informed him that after having communicated with higher authority he had received orders to stop work and return to North Korea with his entire delegation. In a final statement on Soviet position, Shytkov told Hodge :

⁴. USSR, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Soviet Union and Korean Question, (Soviet News, London, 1950) pp.7-8.

"The main reason why the Soviet delegation insisted on barring certain persons from consultation is that Russia is a close neighbour to Korea and because of this, it is interested in establishing in Korea a provisional democratic government which would be loyal to the Soviet Union. The Koreans who objected to the Moscow decision and raised their voice against the Soviet Union slandered Soviet Union and smeared it with mud. If they seized power in the government, the government would not be loyal to Russia and its officials would be instrumental in organizing hostile action on the part of the Korean people against the Soviet Union.⁵

In the meantime, in the North zone, the Soviet authority had consolidated its position by implementing the radical measures to reorganise the political and economic structure. The Communists were brought into the fore front and given the leadership of the Soviet zone.

In May 1947, the joint commission resumed its work but in vain. The Soviet delegates stuck to the earlier argument of inclusion of only the 'democratic elements' who were not opposed to the Moscow Accord.⁶ The American delegates again rejected this criterion. In

⁵. Quoted in Hakjoon, Kim, Unification Policies of South and North Korea, 1945-1991, (Seoul National University Press, 1992), pp.32-33.

⁶. The Soviet Union and Korean Question, op.cit, p.32.

August, 1947, USA made a proposal to hold the elections under the UN supervision for the formation of provisional national government for all Korea but it was also rejected by the Soviet authorities.⁷

After the failure to work together for the joint Commission, the USA 'unwilling to permit this situation to delay further the realisation of Korean independence', took the matter to the UNO. The Soviet Union took the position that the Korean question was outside the purview of the UNO and called for the withdrawal of both the Soviet and US forces from Korea by the beginning of 1948.⁸ In reply to Soviet proposal, the US maintained that 'the question of withdrawal of occupation forces from Korea must be considered an integral part of the solution of the problem'.⁹

The USSR rejected the US proposal to set up a UN Temporary Commission in order to supervise the proposed elections to National

⁷. Ibid, p.35.

⁸. Ibid, p.35.

⁹. V.P.Dutt (ed.), East Asia : China, Korea, Japan, Selected Documents, (Oxford Univ.Press. Bombay, 1958, p.348.

Assembly in both the zones of Korea which would assume the full powers including the negotiations for withdrawal of foreign troops. The USSR accused the USA as 'violator of the Moscow Agreement'.¹⁰

The US resolution for UN Temporary Commission was adopted by the UN Assembly with the boycott of the USSR and its allies. The USSR refused to work in the commission. The Temporary Commission was composed of Australia, Canada, China, El Salvador, France, India, Philippines, Syria and Ukraine. But Ukraine refused to work in accordance with Soviet policy.

Despite initial hurdles in its work, the Temporary Commission decided to implement the decision of the UN Assembly to hold the elections only in the South Korea. The USSR and other forces opposed to Syngman Rhee opposed this move because it would lead to the permanent division of the Korea. Even Australia and Canada had voted against this decision of the UN Assembly on the similar

¹⁰. The Soviet Union and Korean Question, op.cit., p.46.

argument.¹¹

On 23 April, 1948, a united conference of representatives of both the Korea was held in Pyongyang in which 545 delegates participated including 240 from the South Korea. It passed resolutions calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops and the establishment of a government for the whole of Korea. Another conference of the leaders of both the zones was held in Pyongyang on 30 April, 1948 in which they issued a public statement announcing the resolve not to recognise the results of elections in South Korea and to unite to form a provisional government for the whole of Korea and hold free elections for a national Korean democratic government.¹²

Responding to the message of the Korean unity conference, the Soviet government recognised the need of withdrawal of foreign

¹¹. Hajkoon Kim, Unification Policies of South and North Korea, 1945-1991, op.cit, p.40.

¹². The Soviet Union and Korean Question, op.cit, pp.53-54.

troops and also to form a single National Democratic Government without foreign interference. It said 'already in September 1947, the Soviet delegation made a proposal to this effect in the USSR-US joint commission, suggesting that a definite date should be appointed for the withdrawal of the troops - in the beginning of 1948'.¹³ This proposal was repeated by the Soviet delegation at the session of UN general Assembly in October 1947. However this proposal was not accepted. In its response, the Soviet government made it a condition that the US troops also be withdrawn from Korea simultaneously. On the following day a reduction in the Soviet Army of occupation was announced and replacement of General Karotkov by General Merkulov.¹⁴

The election in South Korea held in May 10; 1948, resulted in the expected victory of Dr. Syngman Rhee. How far the elections were free and fair has been a matter of controversy. The UN Temporary

¹³. Ibid, p.55.

¹⁴. Max Beloff, Soviet policy in the Far East (1944-1951), (Oxford Univ.Press, London, 1953), p.172.

Commission was satisfied that a reasonable degree of free atmosphere existed during the elections and stated in its resolution of 25 June, 1948 that the 'results was a valid expression of the free will of the electorate'.¹⁵ However the commission's observations were naturally limited to small areas and allegations of intimidations and other unfair practices were levelled not only by the leftists but also by moderates and rightists of various shades.

The Soviet response to the South Korean elections had been the following :

'The methods and machinery of the supervision exercised by the UN Commission over the elections in Southern Korea smack of those methods now being used by the US ruling circles to bend the various UN organs to their imperialist purposes. The commission employed more than 400 collaborators from the American military command in Southern Korea to act as 'observers'. It turned out that the Americans organised the elections, the Americans supervised them, and the American reported on their progress'.¹⁶

¹⁵. Dutt, op.cit, pp.368.

¹⁶. Soviet Press Translation, vol, 3, p.643.

The National Assembly met on 31st May 1948, adopted a constitution for the Republic of Korea on 12th July and elected Syngman Rhee as its first president. The Soviet government called Rhee government as a 'reactionary puppet regime wielded by the American imperialist as a weapon in the realisation of their predatory plans to enslave Korea'.¹⁷ Further, the Soviet government denounced the various agreements signed between the Rhee regime and US authorities holding the view that it would guarantee the USA to intervene in the internal affairs of the Korea.

As had been feared, the moves in South Korea provoked similar measures in North Korea. The North Korean leaders announced the elections in August 1948 for a Supreme People's Assembly in order to establish a single Korean government. Elections to this assembly were held on 25 August and followed the Soviet pattern of a large proportion of the voting population in South Korea had also secretly participated in the elections. The People's Assembly proclaimed the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on September 9, 1948.

¹⁷. Ibid, p.643.

It also adopted a constitution and named Kim-Il-Sung, the head of the People's Republic. On 10 September the supreme People's Assembly appealed to both the occupying powers to withdraw their troops from Korea.¹⁸ The Soviet Union replied on 19 September that it would withdraw all its troops by 1 January 1948. It informed the US government through a letter of its decision and calling upon it to do likewise.¹⁹ The USA announced on 21 September that it would reduce its troops in Korea but that there would be no final withdrawal until the forthcoming Third session of the UN General Assembly had considered the Korean question.²⁰ In its reply of 28 September to the Soviet Note, the American government maintained that the withdrawal of troops was an integral part of the entire Korean question which would be considered by the General Assembly at its next meeting.²¹

¹⁸. Dutt, op.cit, p.332.

¹⁹. The Soviet Union and Korean Question, op.cit., pp.61-62.

²⁰. Dutt. op.cit, p.437.

²¹. Ibid. p.333.

The Korean question once again came up for discussion before the General Assembly in its Third session in December 1948. The first question that led to heated discussion was the attempt made by both the North Korean as well as South Korean government to secure the recognition of the UNO. The Czechoslovak delegation introduced a resolution with a view to getting a North Korean representative to take part in the discussion on the Korean question while China opposed it with a resolution by inviting a South Korean representative to speak to the political committee. The committee rejected the Czech resolution by a vote of 34 to 6 and accepted that of China by 39 to 6. Regarding the general question of Korea, a joint resolution was moved by Australia, China and USA providing for the recognition of the South Korean government and the setting up of a UN Commission in Korea to Supervise the withdrawal of occupying forces and to lend its good offices for the unification of Korea. The Soviet Union on the other hand, moved a resolution which called for the termination of the Temporary Commission on Korea without providing for any successor to it. On 8 December 1948, the political committee adopted the three power joint resolution and rejected the

Soviet resolution. The General Assembly endorsed this decision on 12 December by 48 to 6 votes with one abstention. On 1 January 1949, South Korea was recognised by the USA and UK and many other countries of western Europe and Asia followed Suit.²²

On 30 December 1948, the Soviet Union announced that it had completed withdrawal of its troops from Korea.²³ The USA also informed the UN Commission to withdraw all combat forces from Korea by the end of June 1949 and accordingly American troops withdrew by 29 June, 1949. But the USA left behind a military advisory group to train the forces of the South Korea.

On 8 October, 1948 Kim-II-Sung addressed a request to J.V.Stalin for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and North Korea. Stalin indicated his willingness in his reply of October 10, 1948. The relations between the two countries were cemented with the signing of the Agreement of Economic and

²². Ibid.

²³. The Soviet Union and Korean Question, op.cit., p.82.

Cultural cooperation on 17 March, 1949.²⁴ The agreement of ten year's duration while providing for the promotion of trade relations and for cooperation in the fields of culture, science, and the arts was couched in rather general terms. It was accompanied by an unpublished agreement on trade turnover and payments providing for considerably increased trade in 1949 and 1950, an agreement for the grant to Korea of credits to pay for goods supplied in excess of the trade turnover agreement, and finally an agreement on the grant of Soviet technical assistance.²⁵

In contrast to the agreements signed by the USSR with other friendly states including Communist China, there appeared to had been no general treaty of friendship mutual assistance with North Korea although Soviet press comment referred to the 'all round assistance that the Koreans could expect from the USSR'.²⁶ Possibly the Soviet Union was already considering the likely repercussions of

²⁴. Ibid, pp.449-50.

²⁵. Beloff, op.cit., p.177.

²⁶. Ibid. p.177.

a conflict over the unification of Korea and wished to avoid public commitments which would directly oblige her to go to the assistance of the North Koreans.

The government of North Korea persisted in treating itself as the government of the whole country and drafted in May 1949, a rival land reform act for the South Korea. This was allegedly for the propaganda purposes only. During May, 1949, the Soviet press gave publicity to support in both North and South Korea for a plan for the formation of a United Korean Patriotic (or fatherland) Front. (This was abbreviated as UPPF or UDFP). A consultant assembly of UPPF opened at pyongyang on 25 June and was attended by representatives of 80 parties and public organisations of North and South Korea. It adopted a programme of calling for the unification of Korea, the immediate withdrawal of American troops and extension of the Northern regime to the South. Soviet reports also dwelt upon the economic and industrial recovery of North Korea.²⁷

²⁷. Ibid, pp.178.

From the military point of view, the North Korean regime was undoubtedly stronger than the South Korean, despite the much larger population of South Korea. In 1949 it was estimated that the North Korean army was about 1,50,000 strong, well equipped, trained and organised by the Soviets. In South Korea, however, the armed police which was the nucleus of the army, was reported to number only 26,000 when the Republic took over in August 1948; but it grew rapidly since there were several semi military youth organisations which could be drawn upon, and latter estimates gave a figure of 1.25 million. On the other hand its equipment probably remained inferior. The South Korean government made much of the American aid. But apart from equipment transferred to the South Korean regime when the US occupation troops left, no direct aid reached South Korea until June, 1950, despite the provisions made under the mutual Defence Assistance Programme in October 1949 and an agreement under it with the South Korean government signed on 26 January 1950. The weakness of the South Korean did not prevent rather blustering language on the part of their leaders. Syngman Rhee gave the impression that it was only American pressure and fear of

precipitating a world war that prevented him from calling on his troops to over run North Korea.²⁸

Soviet policy towards the further developments of the Korean situation must be considered in the light of the impression given by the USA that Korea was not a country in the defence of which particular American interests were felt to be involved. In a speech on 12 January, 1950, the US secretary of State, Dean Acheson has said that "the Republic of Korea would have to depend for its defence upon its own efforts backed by the commitments of the entire civilized world under the charter of the UNO".²⁹

In the meantime, efforts on the part of UNO through the United Nation's Commission to resolve the Korean problem were continued and it arrived at Seoul at the end of January 1950. But after five and a half months of the work, it reported that the unification of Korea could not be achieved without an agreement

²⁸.. Ibid. p.180.

²⁹. Ibid.

between the USSR and USA. The Soviet press continued to show hostility to the very existence of the commission.

In May, 1949, elections were held in South Korea and according to the United Nation's Commission, properly conducted. Immediately after these elections, the Central Committee of the UDFP met and on 7 June, an appeal was issued to the Korean people dismissing the elections as unfree and making the following new proposals :

- A) From 5 to 8 August general elections should be held throughout Korea for a unified supreme legislative organ.
- B) On 15 August the fifth anniversary of the liberation of Korea, a session of this supreme legislative organ should be held at Seoul.
- C) Meanwhile from 15 to 17 June, a conference of the representative of the democratic political parties and public organisations of North and South Korea, who desired the

peaceful unification of the country, should be convened immediately. North or South of the 38th parallel in order to determine the conditions for the peaceful unification of Korea and the procedure for the general elections and to choose a Central Committee to direct the elections. Those responsible for obstructing the peaceful unification of the country and 'National Traitors' should be debarred and interference by the United Nations' Commission on Korea should not be tolerated. The authorities of North and South Korea should be responsible for the maintenance of public order during the conference and the elections.

The South Korean authorities took all possible steps to prevent the dissemination of the appeal and since no response was forthcoming, the Central Committee of the UDFP passed another resolution on 19 June. This proposed a new move towards unification by the merging of the two legislative bodies of the North and South Korea into a single all-Korean legislature which should draw up a constitution and prepare for general elections. 'national Traitors' were

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to be arrested and freedom was to be restored in South Korea, a united government was to recognize, on democratic foundations, the army and the police force, the United Nations commission was to be requested to leave the country immediately. All these measures were to be completed by 15 August. The Soviet press gave much space to the activities of the UDFP and to this document which by the naming of a date for unification, could almost be described as an ultimatum. But no editorial comment upon it gave any indication that the North Koreans intended to proceed to forcible measures. Thus when the North Koreans made a direct attack across the 38th parallel, there was nothing precise that could be pointed to as indicating Soviet responsibility or even fore knowledge. Later on, however, the North Korean successes led some students to take the view that the Soviet government had deliberately planned the attack.³⁰

It is of course true that but for the help given by the Soviet Union in equipping and training the North Korean forces, the successes they gained would have been inconceivable, just as at a

³⁰. Ibid, pp.181-183.

later stage in the war they depended on Chinese assistance. But the precise nature of the co-ordination existing between Moscow and the Chinese and North Korean governments at the time remains obscure.

Beginning of The Korean War :

The North Korean forces attacked South Korea on the 25 June, 1950. The Soviet press, however, immediately accepted as correct the declarations of the North Korean radio which alleged that the attack had come from the South and that the North Korean army had been instructed to repel it.³¹ Subsequently, the Soviet press attempted to justify the accusation that the South Korean regime, had been urged on to attack by the USA. Particular attention was given to the visit of Mr. John Foster Dulles and to the alleged activities of W.L.Roberts, the chief of the United States military advisory group in Korea. The various bellicose speeches of South Korean political leaders were also recalled, but no details of the alleged attack were

³¹. The Soviet Union and Korean Question, op.cit, pp.87.

offered.³²

When the UN Security Council met to discuss the matter of aggression against the South Korea, the USSR boycotted the meeting owing to non-inclusion of the communist China in the UNO. In the couple of days, the Soviet press had given relatively little attention to Korean fighting. The security council resolution of 25 June, 1950, called upon the North Korean forces to withdraw, but it was not binding as a legal decision since it was not passed unanimously by the permanent members of the Security Council. and the legality of Security Council decision had been basis of the subsequent Soviet policy towards the activities of the UNO concerning Korea.

Since the North Korean regime had taken no notice of the Security Council resolution of 25 June, US President Truman made a statement on the 27th at noon noting that the resolution calls on members of the UNO to render assistance to the United Nations in its execution and announcing that he had ordered American naval

³². Beloff, *op.cit.*, pp.183.

and air forces to give the Korean government troops cover and support. Taking the attack on South Korea as proof that Communism had adopted the tactics of armed invasion, he had ordered the American Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa, while calling on the Chinese Nationalists to refrain from attacking the main land. Same day (27 June) the American secured a new security council resolution recommending the furnishing of assistance to the South Korean's.

On 27th June, the Soviet government received two letters, one from the Secretary General of the UNO informing about the security council's decision, and the other from the US ambassador to Moscow. The latter stated that since the USSR had not participated in the meeting on 25 June, the US government found it necessary to call the attention of the USSR to North Korean aggression :

In view of the universally known fact of the close relations between the USSR and the North Korean regime, the United States government asks an assurance that the USSR disavows responsibility for the this unprovoked and unwarranted attack, and that it will use its influence with the North Korean

authorities to withdraw their invading forces immediately'.³³

The Soviet response to both the letters repeated the legal argument about the decisions of the security council. It also said that the Soviet Union had withdrawn its forces from Korea before the United States and had thereby confirmed its adherence to the policy of non-intervention to which it still continued to adhere.³⁴

On July 4, 1950, A.A. Gromkyo, the Deputy Minister of foreign affairs, circulated as an official document for the Security Council on 'American Armed Intervention in Korea'. He declared that the USA has resorted to direct intervention in Korea, ordering its air, naval and subsequently its ground forces to take action on the side of the South Korean authorities against the Korean People. In addition to repeating the customary argument about the illegality of security council decisions and 'legitimate' right of Communist China to represent the UNO, Gromkyo developed a new theory. The crisis in

³³. The Soviet Union and Korean Question, op.cit., pp.91.

³⁴. Ibid, pp.91-92.

Korea, he stated was 'a civil war among the Koreans', and he compared the action of the United States in intervening to that of Great Britain during the civil war of America and to that of the great powers which had intervened in Russia after the October revolution. His statement also directly attacked the UN secretary-general for permitting an 'illegal procedure' to be used. It also declared the Soviet government continued to support the principles of strengthening world peace and of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other nations, and expressed the hope that the UNO would fulfil its duty and stop US aggression. But it gave no indication that the Soviet Union prepared to take any action with regard to the war.³⁵

Despite the support given by the Americans, the South Korean forces continued to lose ground. On 4 July the American ambassador notified the Soviet government of the American blockade of the Korean coast. On 6th July the Soviet reply had reasserted its view that the security council decision had no legal force, and therefore

³⁵. Ibid, p.93-98.

could not serve as a basis for a blockade.³⁶

On 7 July, the Security Council adopted a resolution on a unified command under the United States for the United Nations forces in Korea, and general McArthur was appointed to the post by the president Truman on the following day. In reply to a communication from the secretary-general, the Soviet government repeated its views about the illegality of the security council's proceedings. Pravada Commented :

By this resolution the command of the American interventionist troops will operate under the cloak of the United Nations and will be supposed to be acting under the authorisation of the United Nations. For this propose the troops of the American interventionists are to be supplemented by military formations from certain other countries...Thus under the flag of the United Nations an attempt is being made to form a coalition of plunderers for the bloody suppression of the Korean people.³⁷

³⁶. Beloff, op.cit., p.187.

³⁷. Ibid, p.188.

An attempt was made by the Indian government to bring about a peaceful solution of the Korean problem, on 13 July Nehru sent personal messages to Stalin and Acheson to persuade both the governments to find a permanent solution to the Korean problem.

On 15 July Stalin replied, welcoming the Indian suggestion that the problem should be solved in the Security Council with the participation of the Chinese People's Republic and added that it would be useful to give a hearing to Korean people. Nehru sent his thanks for immediate Soviet reply and said that he was entering into negotiations with the other powers. But no progress was made in this regard due to Soviet government's chief concern with the Security Council's refusal to admit Communist China into UNO and it appeared to be the main obstacle to a restoration of peace. The Soviet government also maintained its direct contact with the British government which was known to differ from Washington on the issue of Chinese representation.³⁸

³⁸. Ibid, p.189.

On 1 August the normal rotation in the presidency of the Security Council was due to bring the Soviet representative into the chair, and Y.A.Malik, permanent Soviet representative to UN, announced on 27 July that he proposed to return to the Council. He submitted a provisional two-point agenda : the recognition of the representative of the Communist China as the delegate from that country; and peaceful solution of the Korean question. The American delegate proposed that the more urgent problem, the complaint of aggression against the South Korean Republic, should be dealt with first. Malik, in a speech on 3 August, developed Gromkyo's argument that conflict in Korea was a civil war and consequently, the intervention of the United States was an act of aggression.

The United Nations' forces formed under the command of general McArthur landed from the sea behind the North Korean lines at Inchon, reoccupied Seoul, and cut the North Korean army off from its homeland. In such a situation, the Soviet policy needed the change owing to failure of North Korean army on battlefield. The Soviet planners instead of extending their frontiers, had the only option of

protecting North Korea along 38th parallel. This change in soviet policy was conditioned in three stages : first, the intervention of US ground forces in Korea in July; Secondly, the successful UN defence of the Pusan perimeter in South-East Korea in August; and finally, the sea-borne landing of Inchon and break-up of the North-Korean army in september.³⁹

There were in theory two courses of action open to the Soviet Union. first was to cut her losses in Korea and leave North Korea independently to work by making peace terms with the UNO in order to maintain status-quo of North of the 38th parallel. But this course had two serious objections : to admit defeat in Korea so soon after the failure to subdue Yugoslavia and to drive Britain, America and France out of Berlin would have been humiliating. Secondly, with no army and smarting under its military defeat, could the North Korean regime subsequently maintain itself in power unaided? There must had been serious doubts on this point in Moscow and therefore all the

³⁹. T.M.mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, (Oxford Univ.Press, New York, 1963), p.44.

more weight was probably given to the second possible course of action; to continue the war. This meant foreign communist intervention in practice, either by Soviet or Chinese forces. Since there were few North Korean troops left to fight, intervention by the Soviet troops might have turned a limited war into a global one. The choice therefore fell upon the Chinese.⁴⁰

The advance plan of Chinese involvement to launch limited war in Korea was substantiated with the evidences. The release of soldiers in the Chinese army of Korean origin in february 1950 followed closely on the lengthy conference in Moscow between Stalin and Mao-Tse-Tung. And soon after the war began the Chinese propaganda machine swing into full real action against the United Nations and the United States for aggression in Korea. The Chinese intention to involve in Korea was not open until the Chinese army moved from their headquarter in Manchuria to the Korean border on 14 October. The sign that the Chinese Communists were prepared for serious military operation in Korea came between 30 September and

⁴⁰. Ibid, pp.46-47.

10 November 1950, when first indication reached the United Nations Command that unity of the Third Field Army, until that moment detailed for the invasion of Formosa, had begun to move northwards to Manchuria.⁴¹

The movement to Korea of this field army containing China's most experienced troops allegedly indicated that the Chinese government was prepared to go farther than merely defending China's frontier on Korean soil. The defence of China's border could have been defended by the already deployed Fourth Field Army in Manchuria. But the deployment of another Field Army meant that China had undertaken to protect the North Korean Communist regime and to restore and perhaps improve the original Communist perimeter as a major commitment.

The Chinese offensive in North Korea which began in November 1950 drove the UN forces South of the 38th parallel, but was halted by a series of counter attacks in January 1951 during

⁴¹. Ibid, pp.48-89.

which Seoul was re-taken by the UN forces. A line was established roughly along the 38th parallel at the end of April 1951. The second Chinese Communist offensive opened but failed to achieve a major success and the line was stabilized once more near the parallel. At this point, when two major Chinese offensives had failed to destroy the United Nations forces, the first suggestion for a cease fire came from the Soviet side. On 23 June 1951, Mr Malik, stated in a UNO broadcast :

'The Soviet people believe that, as a first step, discussions should be started between the belligerent for a cease fire and an armistic providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel'.⁴²

On 25, the Chinese press endorsed this proposal, and the United Nations Command decided to take it up at once. On 10 July, 1951, the first meeting between the two sides took place at Kaesong. The negotiations were slow and difficult, and more than once were suspended or interrupted by the resumption of large-scale fighting at the front; particularly because of the different positions adopted by

⁴². Ibid.

the rival parties on the issue of the line of demarcation for the cease-fire and repatriation of the prisoners of war. And no armistic was signed while Stalin was alive. It in fact took about two years and finally signed on July 27, 1953.

This agreement provided for a demilitarized zone, establishment of supervisory and repatriation commission and called for a political conference on Korea. The armistic ended three years of bloodshed in Korea, removed flash point of another World War and helped to ease the international tension. The armistic reflected the changes in Soviet foreign policy that were directed towards the peaceful co-existence between cold war powers. These changes were effected due to Soviet failure to seek satisfactory gains in the Far East and shift in Soviet priority towards Europe.

Chapter II

Ideology in Soviet Policy Towards Korean Crisis, 1945-1949

There had been a close relationship between the Marxist ideology and Soviet foreign Policy since the foundation of the Communist state in Russia. Marxist ideology was not taken as something static by Lenin or Stalin who modified it from time to time. Pragmatism had all along been the feature of the Soviet foreign policy. But Soviet leaders had also tried to explain this pragmatism in terms of ideology.

Stalin's 'socialism in one country' was a response to the situation in which a world socialist revolution had failed to occur and the USSR was constrained to consolidate and build socialism by its own efforts on consequence of this doctrine was that USSR to a large extent behaved like a normal nation-state in the world affairs. But this posed problems for the USSR which could not escape its commitment to support the national liberation movements and revolution in other countries.

To support the national liberation movement and struggle for revolution in other countries had been one of the basic tenets of the Soviet foreign policy. In the context of Korea, the USSR from the very beginning had been the great inspiration for the Korean people in their struggle against Japanese colonialism. The Soviet Union due to its ideological commitment, not only had been an important instrument in the liberation of Korea from the Japanese regime but also in the formation of the Communist state in North Korea. The Soviet policy towards Korean question was greatly influenced by the Cold War consideration which again was an ideological struggle between the policies of 'Containment of Communism; and 'Proletarian internationalism'.

Ideology had played an important role with regard to the Korean question in Soviet foreign policy. In fact, the Soviet authority during 1945 to 1949 period had succeeded in Korea to establish a Communist regime in North Korea which has 'satellite' relationship with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had a direct control over

North Korea in three fold, these included 1) the use of Koreans,¹ raised in the USSR and members of Communist party of the Soviet Union, in key positions in the party, army and administration, 2) the reliance of Kim-Il-Sung and his Soviet trained entourage, the nominal leaders upon support from these Soviet Koreans, and 3) the reliance of the North Korean economy and armed forces on day to day inputs from the Soviet Union in order to continue functioning.²

The Soviet principles of proletarian internationalism is reflected in this statement of Stalin after giving consent to sign the agreement on economic and cultural co-operation between the USSR and DPRK. It says 'The Soviet government, which unswervingly upholds the right of Korean people to create their united independent states welcomes the formation of the Korean government and wishes

1. The Soviet Koreans were individuals whose families had migrated from Korea to the Soviet Union between 1905 and 1945, while their homeland was under Japanese rule in 1945, there were about 2,00,000 Korean resident in the Soviet Union of these, it has been estimated that between 10,000 and 30,000 returned to North Korea with the Soviet troops.

2. Jounghwon Alexander Kim, 'Soviet Policy in North Korea' World Politics, vol.22, (January, 1970), pp.235-51.

it success in its activities in behalf of the national resurgence and democratic development of Korea'.³

On the conclusion of above mentioned agreement the 'Pravada' commented :

"The Soviet Union true to the principles of international cooperation, which is based on respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples great and small, in strictly observing the international obligations it has assumed, extends support to the Korean people in their aspirations for independence, unity and democratic development of Korea. In Moscow conference of foreign ministers of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain in the joint Soviet-American Commission on Korea, in the sessions of the general assembly of the United Nations organisations, as well as in all its practical activities, the great socialist power has invariably spoken in defence of the vital interests of the Korean people. The Soviet Union has always extended, and continues to extend disinterested aid to the Korean people in the restoration of the republic national economy and in its reorganisation on a new democratic basis, in the unification of democratic Korea and the revival and development of Korea's national culture".⁴

Writing on the first anniversary of the agreement on economic

³. The Soviet Union and Korean Question, op.cit, p.65.

⁴. Pravada, March 21, 1949, in Soviet Press Translations, vol.5, (London, 1950), pp.266-67.

and cultural co-operation between the USSR and the DPRK, Kim called it 'a manifestation of the disinterested and fraternal aid extended to the Korean people by their liberator, the great Soviet Union - a manifestation of ever stronger friendship between the peoples of Korea and the USSR.'⁵

From the ideological point of view, the beginning of the Communist activities for the Korean liberation goes back to pre-Bolshevik revolution period in Russia, when Korean revolutionaries and immigrants in Russia accepted and fought for the cause of Bolshevism. The early centres of the Korean movement were in the Russian Maritime Province and in Siberia. The Communist International (Comintern) encouraged the Korean revolutionaries to organise the movement for the Korean liberation against the Japanese regime. The Korean delegation represented the second congress of the comintern which discussed the problems of Communist strategies and tactics among the colonial and dependent

⁵. Pravda, March 22, 1950 in Soviet Press Translations, vol.5, (London, 1950), pp.297.

nations of the East.

The first congress of the toilers of the Far East was held in Moscow and Petrograd from January 21 to February 2, 1922. It had a significant influence on the development of various Communist movements of the Far East including Korea.

On September 1928, the Communist party of Korea with other communist parties was admitted formally into the Communist international.⁶ On December 10, 1928, (special) resolution on the Korean question was adopted by the executive committee of the Comintern. The resolution declared :

“The main political and organisational task of the Korean communist organisations in the area of mass work in the near future must consist in giving priority to the national liberations struggle uniting with the workers and peasants, all other strata of toilers,

⁶. Dae-Sook-Suh, Documents of Korean Communism, 1918-48, (Princeton Univ. Press, 1970), p.239.

artisans, the intelligentsia and the petty and middle-bourgeoisie'.⁷

Thus the Soviet support to Korean people's National struggle continued till the liberation of Korea from the Japanese Yoke in 1945.

After the surrender of Japanese forces, when the Soviet, army occupied the Northern Korea. according to the Moscow Accord of 1945, the Japanese army and police was disarmed and the administrative authority was transferred to the South Piyongan province preparatory committee. The Soviets were allegedly acting behind the scenes. A new order to form a new committee was issued containing an equal number of Communist and non-Communists. soon, there were indications that the Soviets were determined to make the Communist party of Korea the dominant political force as soon as possible. Because it was not a formidable force in the Northern Korea and nationalist elements under the leadership of Cho-Man-Sik were considered the strong political force. No Communist leader was as popular as Cho and other several

⁷. Ibid, pp.265.

nationalist. Hence, the 'opening stages of the political drama had to be played carefully by the Communists, particularly since their most prominent leaders were in the South.⁸

The Soviet authorities confined to follow the techniques of reorganizing the various Seoul based preparatory committee for national construction into people's Committee with the objective of giving more and more representation for Communists. In this fashion united front politics was developing in North Korea but it was more influenced by the Communist. Because the Soviet authority was there to help always the Communist vis-a-vis non-communist.⁹

When the Soviets occupied the authority in August, 1945, they did not come with the fixed ideas regarding the Communist party in Korea. They had to face the following question regarding the scattered nature of the Communist party. Could it be unified? Who

⁸. Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee; Communism in Korea, vol. 1, (University of California Press, California, 1972), pp.315-16.

⁹. Ibid, pp.317.

would lead it? What relations could and should be established with the Communist party in the South?

The Soviets had to confront the problem of promoting Communities workers to the supreme leadership of the Communists in Korea, given the dismal record of the ceaseless factionalism and the inability of the Korean leaders to establish a meaningful party in Korea after 1928.

At least in the first stage, the Soviets intended to depend heavily upon Soviet-Korean, a large number of who came in with the Soviet troops. Later, the 'Kaspan faction'¹⁰ joined this group. This combination of soviet-Koreans and the young Kaspan group operating under Soviet direction represented a formidable force, particularly since the Soviet themselves were making all the basic political decisions. They key Soviet group was making policy for North Korea,

¹⁰. Kaspan group was identified with those Koreans, who merely spent the wartime period in the USSR but most of the time lived in Manchuria. This group included Kim-Il-Sung. This came to be know Kaspan group after the name of Kaspan Mountains.

commanded by Major General Romanenko. Unlike the Americans in Seoul, the Soviet operated with maximum of discretion and secrecy. They were rarely seen in Korean administrative quarters. But the Koreans visited them. The Soviet general and his staff operated through a team of forty-three men which was composed mainly of key Soviet-Koreans and Kaspan members. Ramanenko's office was the nerve centre of the Soviet authority, the ultimate source of political power in North Korea.¹¹

In search of providing leadership to the Communist movement in Korea, the Soviet general intervened and introduced Kim-Il-Sung to the gathering of Nationalist and Communist leaders, praising his record as a great patriot who had fought against Japanese imperialism. With the full Soviet support, Kim-Il Sung emerged as the biggest leaders of North Korea. The Soviet preferred a young Kim in comparison to such veteran as Cho-Man-Sik, Pakhon-Yong because the Soviets did not want to see the factionalism again which they had

¹¹. Scalpion and Lee, Communism in Korea, op.cit, p.318.

experienced with the old Communist earlier.¹²

The Soviet authority claimed that the Red Army had only liberated the Korean people and had no intention of subjugating them by establishing a Soviet political system or acquiring Korean army.

By now, Soviet policies were taking shape. The political tactics of the Soviets were simple and generally effective. On the one hand, non-Communist organisations and leaders were allegedly placed under the closet surveillance, and eliminated if necessary. On the other hand, the development of a Communist dominated united front - both at the local levels and on a 'national' (that is Northern) level - would be vigorously supported. Already the tide of events was impelling the Soviets to give increasing support to Kim-Il-Sung and to the idea of a unified Northern -based Korean Communist party under his leadership.¹³

¹². Ibid, p.324-26.

¹³. Ibid, p.332.

When the idea of trusteeship came, the overwhelming majority of non-Communist organisations opposed it and consequently became the pretext for the dissolution of joint commission and so ended any chance for the Korean unity. The Soviet delegation as mentioned earlier, insisted upon the exclusion of all the parties and organisations which were opposed to the idea of trusteeship in the Moscow Accord of 1945. This complicated the possibility of establishing any representative political body or coalition government in Korea.¹⁴

The deadlock over the issue of trusteeship cannot be separated from the broader context in which it had taken place. The Soviet Union and the USA were rapidly moving from cooperation toward confrontation and Korea was only one of many issues between the, In fact it was quite logical that both the powers had pursued the policies from their respective ideological views and political objectives.

¹⁴. Ibid, p.337.

When the possibility of unity between the Communist and non-Communist organisations over the issue of trusteeship were looking very dim, the Soviet authority took the tactical position of reducing the non-Communist nationalist force to impotence. Having done that the Soviet authority now took the first concrete steps towards establishing a separate North Korean state. Presumably, like their American counterparts, the Soviet were now moving towards the view that Korean unification was an exceedingly remote possibility. Hence on february 8, 1946, an enlarged conference of the North Korean democratic powers, social organistaions, the five provinces administrative bureau, and the people's political committee was convened in Pyongyang. This was clearly a major effort on the part of the Soviets. The North Korean provisional people's committee was organised with the objective of planned, unified development of North Korean politics, economics and culture. Such a step had the approval of the Soviet authorities.¹⁵

¹⁵. Ibid, p.340.

Meanwhile, the North Korean Communist formed a North Korean democratic national united front in order to unite the entire North Korean people and the entire Korean people' round this front. By the end of 1946, there was a single leftist party in both North and South Korea. On August 29, the North Korean workers party was formed with Stalin as honorary president. In South Korea also, South Korean worker's party was formed but with painful experience. Because in the absence of the Soviet support, the leftist of the South were much less coordinated and disciplined.¹⁶

Thus by the end of 1946, the deepening Soviet-American disagreement in Korea, and elsewhere made the prospects of Korean unification look dim. Despite the complexities of the quarrel over Korea, the issue boiled down to a single, simple question which forces, Communist or non-Communist, would control a unified state? Since there was no easy way to compromise that issue, the impasse remained and the lines grew more and more rigid.

¹⁶. Ibid, p.363.

With regard to the Communist activities, there was increasing dominance of North over South Korea, and within North Korea, the continued rise of the Soviet Kaspan faction led by Kim-II-Sung.¹⁷

With failure to reach an agreement on procedure for Korean unification, a chain of events led to the establishment, on September 10, 1948, of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea with Kim-II-Sung as the head of the state. Many a political institutions were modelled after the Soviet system such as the supreme people's Assembly as the highest organ of the government. Thus North Korea came to Communism not via an indigenous revolution, not through a union of Communism and nationalism, but on the backs of the Red Army.

By fall of 1948, Kim-II-Sung with solid support of Soviet authority had established himself in the power. Although, the Soviet forces were withdrawn, yet the Soviet role in North Korea was not there by affected to any large extent. The head quarters of the Soviet

¹⁷. Ibid, p.364.

command was merely transferred to the Soviet embassy in Pyongyang, where soviet political advisors continued to work with each of the North Korean ministers, reviewing basic policy decisions.¹⁸

At lower levels, Soviet technicians and military specialists played a crucial role in the industrial and military development. Thus, the system, established during the Soviet occupation, of close interaction with and complete loyalty to Soviet authorities on the part of Korean Communist leaders. continued with appropriate adjustment in the post occupation era.

One prominent aspect of Soviet influence in North Korea had been the presence of Sovietized Koreans in positions of majors influences. Most of these Sovietized Koreans or Soviet-Koreans as they were often called, held dual citizenship.¹⁹

¹⁸. US Department of State, North Korea : A Case Study in the Techniques of Takeover, (Washington, D.C. : US Government printing press,, 1961), pp.100-102.

¹⁹. Chong-Sik Lee and Ki-Wan O, 'The Russian Faction in North Korea', Asian Survey, April, 1968, pp.283-84.

The Soviet authority immensely contributed in strengthening the military of North Korea. From late 1945 onward, North Korean youths were taken to USSR for military and technical training, and some of them stayed as long as three years. It has been estimated that at least 10,000 military men were given such training prior to the Korean war. When they returned, they were put in charge of the advanced Soviet equipment that was now flowing into North Korea. In the early months of 1950, the Korean people's army expanded rapidly to some 1,50,000 men. During April and May 1950, large shipments of arms were received from the Soviet Union, including heavy artillery, truckes, tanks, automatic weapons, and new propeller driven aircraft.²⁰

The Soviets continued to serve as divisional advisers. In 1949, some 20 Soviets were assigned to each division, this was reduced in 1950 from three to eight Russians per division. By the time of Korean war, the North Korean armed forces numbers between 1,50,000 and 2,00,000 troops, organised into ten infantry divisions, one tank

²⁰. Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, op.cit, pp.391-92.

division, and one air force division. Their numbers had grown significantly in the 1949-50 period, not only because of sharp increases in the defence budget but also because some Korean divisions had been transferred from Manchuria. The South Korean forces were less in numbers and also lacked heavy equipment.²¹

Thus, the objective of Soviet foreign policy in terms of ideology was to establish a united Communist Korea friendly to Moscow. But it could succeed in half way, by establishing a Communist regime in North Korea which had been loyal to the Soviet Union. Because of the ideological reasons, the USSR fought for the inclusion of Communist China in the UNO which in turn complicated the resolution of the Korean crisis. But again the Cold war rivalry between the 'socialist camp' and 'imperialist camp' was also there to make it a battleground for the great powers.

²¹. Ibid, p.393.

Chapter III
Soviet Attitude Towards Korean War,
1950-51 (The China Factor)

The Soviet policy towards the Korean war was influenced by its larger interests in Europe, Japan, Politics of cold war and the domestic compulsions. The Soviet Union not was a direct participant in the Korean war although it had helped both the Chinese Communists as well as North Korean forces to fight the war in a great manner. There had been a wide view especially among the western scholars that Soviet Union was the main culprit to formulate the war plans in Korea. But it is based more on prejudice than on hard facts.

The view point which is more based on facts is the following :
Kim Il Sung formulated the war strategy. Stalin advised Kim Il Sung to give second thought to the war strategy. Stalin advised Kim Il Sung to assurance of definite victory in the war. Only then, even war

with hesitation due to possible US intervention, Stalin supported Kim Il Sung's war plan.

USSR and the Outbreak of the Korean War :

The Korean war broke out on 25th June, 1950 with the allegedly surprise attack on South Korea by the North Korean forces. Who started the war had been the matter of great controversy. North Korea supported by the Communist bloc held the view that 'South Korean puppet regime has crossed the 38 parallel' and that its Peoples Republic Army succeeded in repulsing the enemy force'. In North Korean view it was 'a just Fatherland's liberation and civil war'.¹

The Soviet view as to who started the Korean war had been in support of the North Korean position : It follows :

'On June 25, 1950, South Korean Troops began the US

¹. Kim Il Sung, Selected Works (Pyongyang, 1971), p.288.

orchestrated aggression against the PDRK, stating a civil war. At some point they penetrated the territory of the PDRK. To repulse this aggression and ensure the nation's security the Govt. of the PDRK ordered its troops to mount a counter offensive throw the enemy back and pursue him on the territory of South Korea.²

There has been a strong view among the scholars that Stalin was the mastermind in the origin of the Korean war. David J. Dallin holds the view that Korean war was planned, prepared and initiated by Stalin.³ Much had been written in past on Soviet-Chinese-North Korean conspiracy theory. But for the purpose of this study, suffice it to say that unlike the conspiracy school view, stalin was very reluctant to approve the North Korean war strategy. He was doubtful about the prospects for this risky venture in which there was a greater possibility of US intervention. There is no evidence to prove

². Gromkyo, op.cit, p.151.

³. David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin (Philadelphia, 1961) p.60.

that Stalin ordered or instigated the invasion. This is not because Stalin was uninterested in having all Korea under Communist rule, but because he had many pressing domestic problems and Eastern Europe to worry about. Kim Il Sung had to make a series of pleas to the Soviet leader to receive hesitant approval for the attack.⁴

In his memoirs, Khrushchev says, that 'the war was not Stalin's idea but Kim Il Sung's. Kim was the initiator. Stalin, of course, did not try to dissuade him. In my opinion, no real communist would have tried to dissuade Kim Il Sung from his compelling desire to liberate South Korea from Syngman Rhee and from reactionary American influence'⁵ Now, the opinion held largely is similar to that of Khrushchev's view and also North Korea as an initiator of the war, accepted even by the Soviet scholars although belatedly.

Then what had been Stalin's calculations and strategy to support the war plan or to choose the tactics of what has been called

⁴. Kim Chullbaum, op. cit, pp.264-65.

⁵. Khrushchev op.cit, pp.62.

the limited war in Korea. The following hypothetical answers were development by the scholars to the question :

1. It is based on the concept of diversion of pressure. The Korean war was intended to divert the mounting US military pressure in Europe (as exemplified by the formation of NATO) to the Far East⁶
2. The USSR may have had directed the Korean war to counteract the US unilateral move to sign a separate peace treaty with Japan. The US decision in 1949 to proceed with a treaty with Japan, by passing the USSR might have been interpreted as an attempt to prepare another defense organisation like NATO in Asia by establishing an anti-communist state in Japan. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950, reflecting such fear was directed against the rebirth of Japanese imperialism and a repetition of aggression on the part of Japan or any other state which may unit in any form

⁶. Hak-Joon Kim, The Unification Policy of South and North Korea, (Sepul National University Press, Seoul, 1977) p.89.

with Japan in acts of aggression'.⁷

Under this perceived threat of 'American imperialism' and with a seemingly bright prospect of easy victory in Korea, Stalin may have directed the war to ensure the safety of Asian Communism and at the same time to weaken the US position in Japan. Since the USA had pulled out its forces from Korea, in January 1949, the US secretary of State, Dean Acheson had stated that South Korea was outside the US defence perimeter⁸ and also setback suffered by Rhee in South Korean elections of May 1950, altogether these developments might have encouraged Stalin to go for such a step.

3. The US failure in stopping China to become communist state generated a feeling in the Soviet mind that in case of North

⁷. Text of Treaty in A.Z. Rubinstein (ed.) : The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, (Random House, New York, 1972), pp.236-38.

⁸. On the impact of Acheson statement on Korean War, see David McHellan, 'Dean Acheson and the Korean War', Political Science Quarterly, vol. 83, No.1 (March, 1968), pp.16-39.

Korea attacks the South, there was no possibility of US intervention. But it proved false.⁹

4. The USSR tried to test the resolve, or the capacity, or resistance on the part of the USA. It contends that in preparation for launching its 'grand strategy for world communisation', Stalin wished to seek the reaction of the USA and the Western world. In actuality, this viewpoint heavily influenced Truman's decision to intervene in the war. Equating, the North Korean attack to Hitler's invasion of Poland, Truman believed that Stalin's aggressiveness if not checked in Korea, could extend to other parts of the world, as did Hitler's mistopped step by step invasions.¹⁰

5. It refers to the Soviet military power, with successful communisation of whole of Korea through war, thus revealing

⁹. Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence : The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-67 (New York : Frederiek A Prager, 1968), p.514.

¹⁰. Hak, John Kim, op.cit p.46.

the weakness of the USA, the USSR hoped to display its prestige and military strength by way of encouraging communism in Asia.

6. The last hypothetical answer refers to the Soviet tactics to 'bring the USA in irreconcilable conflict with China'. It is held that Stalin was not happy with communist victory in China when, the US authorities showed their willingness to recognise China in the spring of 1950, Stalin was of the opinion that China's involvement in Korean war would prolong her recognition by the USA and also result in the China's dependence on the USSR - again such developments will provide dim possibility for US-China friendship in the near future.¹¹

Those who accept the view that Stalin took the initiative in starting the Korean war, failed to provide the facts based on the official records. Instead, they rely mainly on the subsidiary

¹¹. Hak, John Kim, op.cit. pp.46-47.

materials such as documents of US Department of State and South Korean defence ministry, personal memoirs of the leaders and other valuable studies done by the scholars. Reference is also made to the Soviet press comment of 'all round assistance that North Koreans could expect from the Soviet Union'.¹² This comment was made after the conclusion of Soviet-North Korean Agreement in March, 1949, on Economic and Cultural cooperation. 'The phrase, the all round assistance', was interpreted as including the military aid, but was intended on Soviet part as an evasive expression to escape direct responsibility for the Korean War. There was also an opinion that after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the modernisation and expansion of North Korean military forces was accelerated.

Between 1949 and June 1950, the Soviet Union supplied 10 reconnaissance planes, 100 Yak fighters, 70 bombers and 100T-34 and T-70 tanks as well as many heavy guns. Soviet military advisers

¹². Quoted in Beloff, *op.cit.* pp.177-78.

were attached to every North Korean division.¹³ Armed with these weapons and advisors, the North Korean forces were superior in terms of both the numbers and quality to South Korean forces in June, 1950.

To sum up with the greater military support extended to North Korean forces by the USSR and with the American declaration that South Korea would have to defend itself, subject to UN commitments, which clearly played an important part in influencing the Soviet strategic decision to use limited war to try to extend the frontiers of the Soviet bloc to include the whole of Korean Peninsula. We must assume, therefore, that Stalin came to believe in early 1950 that the North Korean attack on South Korea would not provoke US intervention. There were other factors supporting this view. Stalin probably thought that the UN security council would be unlikely to act either in the absence of the Soviet delegate, or against his veto because unanimity was believed to be essential for action in collective defence. South Korea was believed to be in a state of near to internal

¹³. Hak-Joon Kim, *op.cit*, p.94.

collapse. Communist led-partisans were active in the South-West of the country, where two or three divisions of South Korean forces were operating against them. This affected badly the South Korean security along the frontier bordering with North Korea. During the Spring of 1950, the North Korean army had made several incursions into South Korean territory, testing, no doubt the degree of resistance of the South Koreans. All these events convinced the Soviet authorities themselves that limited war could safely be launched in Korea, especially in a situation when South (Korean were in no state to resist the North Korean attack and that UNO would be powerless to act especially in view of the American's views on the defence of the peninsula.

The attack on South Korea began at dawn on 25 June 1950 by the rapid advance of North Korean troops on Seoul. South Korean forces were less prepared and Withdraw in disorder. The Soviets claimed that the South Korean army attacked the North Korea on this date. The UN Security Council met in emergency on 25 June, 1950 to consider the US complaint of aggression against South Korea.

An American resolution was adopted calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal of North Korean forces. The USSR did not represent the Security Council meeting because the USSR at that time was boycotting the organs of the UNO owing to their continued exclusion of representative of Communist China.¹⁴ When this resolution had no effect, a Security Council resolution on June 27 sanctioned the dispatch of United States military forces land, sea and air to support the South Korean. The US Seventh Fleet also was moved to the Taiwan straits in possibility of Chinese decision to attack Chiang Kai Sjek's regime. The Soviet relation to UN Councils decision of 25 June had been the following :

Attention is drawn here to the fact that the representative of the Soviet Union was absent from the meeting of the members of the Security Council on 25 June. The lawful representative of China, a second permanent member of the Security Council, was also absent. In as much as any decision on the substance of an issue in the Security Council requires the unanimity of the permanent member of the Council, in order that this decision should accord with the United Nations Charter, it is clear that ... the meeting of the members of the security Council could not on 25th June take any decision having legal force.¹⁵

¹⁴. Beloff. op.cit. p.184.

¹⁵. Quoted in Beloff, op.cit. p.184.

This argument remained the basis of the subsequent Soviet attitude towards the activities of the United Nations Concerning Korea. In a note to the Soviet government, the United States sought Soviet assistance in securing the withdrawal of the North Korean forces. The Soviet reply placed the blame on South Korea and maintained that Security Council was not competent to act in the absence of one of its permanent members. Soon afterward, the Soviets accused USA of intervening in a civil war,¹⁶ for carrying on an aggression, for practicing bacteriological warfare and assorted atrocities.¹⁷ The Soviet Union had also extended its propaganda through the world movement of the 'partisans of peace'.¹⁸

On 7 July the Security Council adopted a resolution on a

¹⁶. Soviet attitude towards the Korean war had been of civil war, not a war between two sovereign states but between two regions of one sovereign state that is why despite whole hearted support to Chinese and North Korean forces, Soviet authorities continued to avoid its direct help in the 'civil war'. Soviet representatives in UNO always raised their issue in the international legal perspective. See Soviet Press Translation, May 15, 1951, p.259.

¹⁷. Alvin, Z. Rubinstein, The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, op.cit, p.251.

¹⁸. Beloff, op.cit. p.187.

unified command under the United States for the UN forces in Korea and General Douglas Mc Arthur was appointed as the head of the UN command. In response to it, Pravda commented :

By this resolution the command of the American interventionist troops will operate under the cloak of the United nations and will be supposed to be acting under the authorisation of the United nations. For this purpose the troops of the American interventionists are to be supplemented by military formations from certain other countries...Thus under the flag of the United Nations an attempt is being made to form a coalition of plunders for the bloody suppression of the Korean people.¹⁹

By September, the tide had turned against the North Korean forces. The UN had landed at Inchon, re occupied Seoul and cut the North Korean Army off from its homeland. A general United Nations offensive from the South-east drove the North Korean Army in head long flight over the 38th parallel, which was reached by United Nations force along its whole length at the end of September.²⁰ The Soviet press, although few days later, accepted the severe setback to North Korean hopes and forced the Soviet authorities to review their

¹⁹. Pravda, 10 July, 1950.

²⁰. Machintash, op.cit. p.47.

tactics. In fact now the problem for them was not to extend the frontier but the protection of an integral part of their heartland - North Korea.

In the meanwhile, the Chinese government was not so reserved about its sympathy with North-Korea. On 24 August, a complaint had been sent to the Security Council charging the United States with direct aggression against the Chinese territory. On September 30, Chou En-Lai made a speech proclaiming the Chinese commitment that the North Koreans would win the final victory, and declaring that although, the China loved peace, it would never be afraid to resist an aggression for the sake of defending it: The Chinese nation will by no means suffer foreign aggression and cannot remain indifferent to the fate of its neighbours, subject to aggression from the side of imperialists.²¹ On 3 October Chou En Lai warned that if US forces move across the 38th parallel, Chinese forces will enter the war.

²¹. Quoted in Beloff *op.cit*, pp.192-93.

These Chinese reactions provided some solace to Stalin who was worried about the setback to North Korean troops. He thought that the Chinese involvement in the Korean War would keep Soviets away from the direct clash with the US forces. The direct intervention of Soviet forces might have led to third world war. With the advance of UN forces towards Yalu river - Manchurian border, the Chinese press accused the UN forces for the violation of its border. By mid of October, the Chinese People's Volunteers crossed the Yalu river into North Korea and launched a massive counter - attack in late November, 1950. Thus came the Chinese involvement in Korean war, though certainly desired by the USSR.

USSR, China and Korean War :

The Chinese involvement in Korean war in a direct way did not begin until October 14, 1950 when the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) crossed the Yalu River into North Korea. Before this, the US order for deploying the US 7th Fleet in Taiwan on 27 June, 1950 provoked not much Chinese reaction. However, as the US forces

reoccupied South Korea, there were increasing mentions of unifying Korea by force under a Western-oriented regime. At that stage China warned the US and the West through India that crossing of the 38th parallel by the Western forces and extinction of the North Korean regime would be regarded as a direct threat to China's security.²² The deliberate ignoring of this warning by the US and its allies further increased the Chinese fears when the US forces launched their final offensive to extinguish the North Korean regime after occupying most of North Korea, bombed the hydro-electric power stations on the Yalu river which was the border between China and Korea, the Chinese apparently felt that they had no option but to intervene directly to safeguard their own security.

The Chinese response and involvement in the Korean war had already been discussed in the first chapter of this study, the focus

²². Chou En Lai in a mid-night meeting with the Indian Ambassador to China, K.M.Pannikar, warned the Americans not to cross the 38th parallel [Extract from K.M.Pannikar, In two Chinas, Memoirs of a Diplomat, (Allen & Unwin, London, 1955), pp.109-11] See also Lawrence Alan China's Foreign Relations Since 1949 (Routledge, London, 1975), pp.39-41.

hereafter will be on the Sino-Soviet joint strategy in response to events and direct involvement of China in the Korean war.

There had been no clear signs of friendship between Mao and Stalin until June 30, 1949 when Mao made a famous speech called 'on the People's Democratic Dictatorship'. While criticising the United States as an imperialist power that wanted to control China, he announced that 'China was now on the Soviet Side'.²³

The Sino-Soviet relationship developed rapidly after 1949. In particular after the signing of a treaty of alliance, mutual assistance, and friendship, which provided China an opportunity to get extensive military and economic assistance from the USSR.

When Stalin after some hesitation finally supported Kim's plan for Korea unification, Mao although agreed with this plan, still he saw the possibility of US military intervention in Korea as low. Even after the Korean war had started, Mao had a different opinion from Kim Il Sung's strategy.

²³. Quoted in Kim Chilbaum, op.,.cit p.174.

However, A Mac Arther's landing operation at Inchon, made Stalin instantly pessimistic. Because this development was entirely against Kim Il Sung's strategy. He believed that the attack of the UN force could not be stopped without the direct intervention of the Soviet Union. Still, that was the last step, Stalin wanted to adopt. He wanted to avoid a direct military clash between the US and the Soviet Union. Stalin even rejected Khrushchev's suggestion to send Soviet military advisors for the sake of resisting UN forces effectively. He did not want North Korea to easily become a test case for a direct fight between the Soviet and the US forces.²⁴

On October 2, 1950, when Stalin heard that Mao had decided to dispatch troops to help Kim Il Sung, Stalin was happy that such a step on the part of China well not only be helpful in resolving its own crisis but it also provided the opportunity for Stalin to avoid a direct clash with the USA. Since, Stalin was doubtful about the capability of China to carry out a war with the USA, he promised to back Chinese forces with air support and supply 100 divisions of the

²⁴. Khrushchev, *op.cit*, p.65.

Chinese forces with Soviet weapons and other war materials. An understanding had reached that the Chinese and Soviet forces will take care of ground and air operations respectively.²⁵

Despite all this, Stalin still had the fears of direct clash between the USA and the USSR and was hesitant to give a green signal for Soviet air forces. To Stalin, using the Soviet Air force was risky, and also to resist Mac Arthur, to avoid World War III was the policy in the best interest of the Soviet Union. In addition, Stalin was worried about the possibility of the military clash between China and the US escalating if China participated in the war. If the US authorities decided to bomb Chinese coastal cities and industrial areas, the Soviet Union would be forced to support China according to the compulsory provision of the Chinese-Soviet mutual defence treaty that had gone into effect after Feb. 14, 1949.²⁶

²⁵. Kim Chullbaum, *op.cit*, p.174

²⁶. *Ibid*, p.198.

As a result of Stalin fears Mao decided to postpone his plan for sending the troops in the Korean war on October 10, 1950, Chou Enlai was secretly sent on urgent mission to Moscow to discuss with Stalin. Chou En Lai had to tell Stalin that if the Soviet Air Force was not sent, then China would have to postpone sending volunteers because they would not be confident of being able to stop Mac Arthur's attack without Soviet air support.²⁷

However, Stalin only promised to send the Chinese pilots who were in training, and only talked about how it would be good if the Soviet Air forces were not sent to the Korean peninsula at that time.

Stalin told Chou Enlai, that in this kind of situation, 'Comrade Kim Il Sung must form a government in exile in North China', and asked him to transmit his thoughts to Mao.²⁸

Between October 16 and October 13, Mao went without

²⁷. Ibid, p.198.

²⁸. Ibid, p.199.

sleeping because he needed to make this extremely difficult decision quickly. The main reason that he decided to send Chinese troops to the Korean peninsula was to protect the safety of the newly established regime in China. However, he had the fear that the he would be fighting a war with the strongest country in the world and that if he failed in it, then the results would even become disastrous. On October 13, after contacting Chou Enlai in Moscow and discussing the matter with other party leaders, Mao Zedong made the final decision to order the CPV to attack without Soviet Air Force support.²⁹

On October, 18th, Mao sent a message to Chou Enlai in Moscow saying, 'At the end of consultations with different comrades in the Political Directorate, we estimate that it is advantageous for us to send troops to Korea. The Control Committee of the CPC decided that 'the Chinese Volunteers will cross the Yalu river on October 19th, 1950'.³⁰

²⁹. Ibid, p.199.

³⁰. Ibid. pp.199-200.

When Stalin heard of Chinese decision to participate in the war in Korea without Soviet Air Force support, he was so sympathetic with Mao's self-sacrificing internationalism and so impressed with the execution of operations by the Chinese Volunteers that he voluntarily decided to increase aid to China. Also at the end of 1950, the Soviet Union sent 2 Air force division (containing a little over 200 jet planes) and they were to protect the Yalu river bridges and volunteer's supply routes for 600 km. The Soviet pilots wore Chinese peoples Volunteer uniforms and in case they were captured they said they were minority Chinese of Soviet extraction.

Through the whole period of the Korean war, the Soviet Union supplied weapons capable of arming over 60 divisions, and supplied equipment capable of arming 10 air force divisions. Along with this, Moscow supplied 80% of the ammunition for the Chinese peoples volunteers (the volunteers consumed 3 million tons of war material and 2,50,000 tons of ammunition).³¹

³¹. Ibid, p.200.

On November 24 MacArthur announced the beginning of general and decisive offensive in Korea. MacArthur was confident of success. He promised his troops that they would be home by Christmas. But it could not happen so due to Soviet assistance in terms of weapons, ammunition, vehicles, fuel, food and medical help to both the Chinese and North Korean forces. Soviet air divisions were transferred to the North Korean forces. Soviet air divisions were transferred to the North eastern provinces of China. In the ensuing air battles Soviet pilots shot down dozens of US aircraft and reliably covered North east China against the air raids. Seasoned Soviet airman took part in the military operations. In the event the situation deteriorated the USSR made preparations to send five divisions to Korea to help repulse the 'US aggression'. As a result, the North Korean territory was liberated.³²

On Nov. 30, 1950 Truman threatened to use atomic bombs in Korea declaring 'we will take whatever steps are necessary to meet

³². Ibid, pp.159.

the military situation...that includes every weapon that we have.³³ Mac Arthur requested to permit the massive bombing of North-East China and also for the use of a force of 500,000 Nationalist Chinese in Korea. MacArthur was even 'ready to risk a general war' However, President Truman along with other state officials opposed these adventurist moves of Mac Arthur and came to the conclusion that the spread of the war on the Asian continent would involve the USA 'in the wrong war at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy'.³⁴

In the meanwhile, the efforts to resolve the crisis continued in the UNO. On Dec 14, 1950, UN group on cease fire for Korea was set up. Malik reacted that mere cease-fire including the withdrawal of foreign troops, will not succeed. Chinese representative, Wu Hsiu-Chuan rejected the proposal of cease fire. On 22 December, 1950, Chou En Lai repeated the rejection of the cease fire proposal : the cease fire group was illegal because China had not participated in

³³. Ibid, p.159.

³⁴. Ibid, p.159.

setting it up; the United States was committing aggression in Korea, Manchuria, and Formosa; all foreign troops should be withdrawn from Korea, United States forces should be withdrawn from Formosa and the Chinese People's Republic should be admitted to the United Nations.³⁵ The Chinese position was set forth in similar terms in a cable to the President of the Security Council from Chou Enlai on 23 December. And this position received full support from Malik at a meeting of the First Committee of the UN Assembly on 3 January.

On 11 January, UN cease fire group proposed five principles for resolving the Korean conflict. This was also rejected by the USSR along with China on the ground that the proposal on a cease fire was clear but the remainder of the proposal were ambiguous. The provision for a gradual withdrawal of foreign troops would enable the USA to retain her forces in Korea as long as she wished. The Soviet were opposed to brand China as aggressor.³⁶

³⁵. Beloff op.cit. pp.197-98.

³⁶. Ibid. p.198.

In the latter part of January 1951, the United Nations forces in Korea launched a new offensive which rapidly brought them once more across the 38th parallel. A line was established roughly along the 38th parallel.

In April 1951, there were reports of large concentrations of Soviet troops in Manchuria, but a Soviet denial was broadcast on 6th of that month. In reaction to the dismissal of Mac Arthur from the position of commander in-chief by Truman on 11 April, 1951, Pravda described it as the culmination of a crisis in American Foreign policy. At the end of April 1951, the second Chinese offensive opened, but failed to achieve a major breakthrough and the line was stabilised once more near the parallel. The United states had the feeling that China had unleashed the war under Soviet guidance and any escalation might lead to a final showdown between the United States and the Soviet Union.³⁷ The US policy, which in turn helped to avoid the full fledged war due to possible Soviet involvement in the

³⁷. Richard F. Rosser, An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy (Prentice Hall Inc. 1969) pp.273.

war, reflected in a statement of the US secretary of defence, George Marshal. It was made in reaction to MacArthur's idea of full fledged war against China. It follows :

General Mac Arthur...would have us, on our own initiative carry the conflict beyond Korea against the mainland of communist China, both from the sea and from the air. he should have us accept the risk involved not only in an execution of the war with Red China, but in an all out war with the Soviet Union. He would have us do this at the expense of losing our allies and wrecking the coalition of free peoples through out the world. He would have us do this even though the effect of such action might expose Western Europe to attack by the millions of Soviet troops poised in middle and Eastern Europe.³⁸

³⁸. Quoted in Parth S. Ghosh, Sino-Soviet Relations, 1949-59, (Delhi, 1981) p.145.

On the Soviet side, convinced that victory was impossible, anxious to localise the conflict, and disturbed by the acceleration of Western rearmament, Stalin advised the North Koreans and Chinese to enter into peace talks. Consequently the first suggestions for a cease fire came from the Soviet side. On 23 June 1951, Mr Malik, proposed that 'as a first step, discussions should be started between the belligerents for a cease fire and an armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel'.³⁹ The Chinese press endorsed this proposal on 25 June, 1951. The United States had also acknowledged that Malik's statement 'has produced a very serious reaction which we are having to combat on all sides'.⁴⁰ The Soviet initiative gave the impulse for the beginning of peace negotiations and through them for the restoration of peace in Korea. The US government instructed General Ridgway, the new Commander-in-chief of the UN forces to enter into talks on a cease fire and after some discussion about the venue, talks began on 10

³⁹. Text of Malik's Statement, 23 June, 1951 in William H. Vatcher Jr., Panmunjom, (Fredrick A Prager, New York, 1958) pp.271-76.

⁴⁰. Gromkyo op.cit, p.198.

July at Kaesong.

It is evident from the above analysis that Korean war planned by Kim Il Sung and Mao was compelled to involve in the war due to less of ideological factors than that of the security of the Chinese regime. Stalin supported the war without direct involvement. But he was always there to regulate the activities of China and North Korea.

Chap IV

The Soviet Union and Post - War Korea, 1952-53

Since the soviet supported plan of North Korea to unity whole of Korea under communist regime did not succeed the soviet policy during the period of truce negotiations had been of maximum bargaining in Korea as well as in other areas of strategic importance. And this had been one of the important factors which had absorbed about two years to conclude the armistice in Korea. The Soviet failure to seek its strategic gains in Japan, increasing American interests in Korea, and threat to Soviet influence in Europe combined with the domestic compulsions all these heavily influenced the Soviet decisions with regard to the post-war developments in Korea. Also, the change of guard after the death of Stalin in the USSR and the change of leadership in the USA and the change of leadership in the USA with the coming of Eisenhower and Dulles who from the very beginning adopted the aggressive posture against the USSR and communism led to

modifications in soviet foreign policy which talked about peaceful coexistence. As a result, the armistic was concluded in Korea although with no permanent solution to Korean problem. It is important to state here that the USSR was not a direct party to truce negotiations, but it had the key to regulate the activities and to influence the decisions of the chines and the North Korean leadership in Korea.

The soviet initiative on June 23, 1951 laid the foundations and it took about two years to sign the armistic (27 July, 1953) Sporadic but bloody fighting continued between the rival forces during this period. It is no coincidence that Malik's speech in which for the first time, the soviet suggested that an armistic could be arranged in Korea without the settlement of outstanding political issues or the withdrawal of American troops-came only two days after the collapse of Paris talks on Germany. No doubt the Russians felt it was unwise to exasperate the united states, and not to leave the door to peace affair. The proposals and subsequent truce negotiations omitted those items which were of the greatest interest to the chines communists, the problem of Formosa and that of the representation of china

in the UNO. This was an obvious Concession to American intractability on the subject but could not have been pleasant to chines¹.

Why the USSR agreed to cease-fire negotiations? the reasons for this had not been examined due mainly to the lack of documents. However, the following opinions have been made by the observers;

- I. The Soviet Union reached the conclusion that the United Nations forces could not be driven off the Korean peninsula without committing to the battle more war material than that the soviet authorities were willing to deliver;
2. The Korean war was encouraging western rearmament and Western armed bases around the Soviet Union;
3. Therefore it was beneficial for the USSR to try and encourage a negotiated settlement that would move American power away from

¹. Ulam op cit pp 533 -34

the Soviet Far Eastern Frontiers, and return Korea to the Status Quo in which Moscow would have a good chance of achieving control of the whole of Korea by political infiltration;

4. The soviet union eyed the forthcoming japanese peace conference at Sanfrancisco, and Knew well that she should not expect to forge any diplomatic gains at that time unless korean peace, was reestablished.

Why were two year absorbed to conclude the armistic while the negotiation began in July 1951? There is a view that it was the Soviet Union which decided that a complete cessation of hostilities in Korea and the release of a portion of American forces for service in Europe, was not in her interest. It is also held that the USSR wanted the continuation of the Korean problem so that it would lead to the discount in the American ruling circle which in turn with more American involvement might have handicapped the United States ability to concentrate on European issues and the build up of NATO².

². Ibid p. 534

The Soviet Union was not a formal participant in the true talks, therefore its response to the developments in Korea till the armistic was signed on 27 July, 1953, Could be understood only in terms of how North Korean and Chines communists negotiated, how the Soviet Union influenced the decisions of the UNO and other means through which the USSR has influenced the developments in Korea. The soviet union position could be said to be almost identical with that of the North Korean and the chinese communists.

The opening meeting of truce talks began on July 10, 1951, at the city of Kaesong, approximately at the thirty eight parallel. The North Korean and the thirty eight parallel. The North Korean and the Chines Communist delegates proposed the following as the first two items for discussion; (1) Establishment of the 38 parallel as the military demarcation line between both sides, and establishment of demilitarised zones as basic conditions for the cessation of hostilities in Korea; (2) Withdrawal of all armed forces of foreign countries from Korea³.

³. Kim Hak Joon op cit pp 130-31

The United Nations delegation was instructed to limit the discussions to purely military questions, and to avoid being drawn into general political talks. In consequence of this and other difficulties the negotiations dragged on very slowly. The Soviet press published reports of them from Chinese and North Korean sources, declaring that the major stumbling bloc was the refusal of the United Nations forces to discuss the withdrawal of the United Nations forces to 38 parallel, and all of foreign troops from Korea - a refusal designed to circumvent Malik's proposals⁴. On 25 July, the communists agreed to drop their insistence that the wider question of withdrawing foreign troops should be considered with the cease-fire, and agreement on an agenda was reached on 26th July. But they insisted on 38 parallel as the line of demarcation for the cease-fire, while the United Nations negotiators demanded a line roughly following the positions occupied by the two armies⁵. On 7 August various arguments in favour of the 38th parallel were printed in Pravda: It was pointed out that each side at present occupied a certain amount of territory on the other side of the parallel and that to adjust a line along it would be fair to both, whereas the line proposed by the

⁴. Beloff op cit pp 205 - 06

⁵. Pravda, 26 July 1951

United Nations involved leaving a large area of territory North of the parallel under the occupation of United national forces. Finally the argument was renewed that the 38th parallel was the original line that Malik had suggested⁶.

The talks continued without much progress being made, and were marked by repeated communist protests against alleged violations of the neutral zone set up for the talks by United Nation's troops and planes. On 23 August, 1951, the communist negotiators suspended the negotiations giving as their reason the alleged violation of the neutral zone , and there were subsequent accusations in the foreign communist press and I the Cominform Journal that the Americans had been doing every thing possible to drag out and frustrate the negotiations⁷. Fighting had never completely stopped and after the suspension of the negotiations had increased in intensity.

The arguments was developed with regard to the suspension of talks

⁶. Ibid, 1 August, 1951.

⁷. Beloff op cit p. 206.

because of enabling the Soviet negotiations at the San Francisco conference to use the possibility of a resumption of full -scale fighting as a threat⁸. And after the conclusion of the conference and signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty, talks were once again initiated with a view to bringing about the renewal of the cease fire negotiations at a new site of Panmunjom. At this time the major difference between the two sides was still the question of the 38th parallel. But the agreement on demarcation line with two and a half kilometers wide was reached on November 27,1951.

On January 2, 1952, the United Nations Command proposed the non-forcible repatriation for prisoners of war but rejected by the communists. On January 9, 1952 in a speech on the Korean question in the Political Committee of the UN General Assembly, A.V. Vyshinsky Criticized the role of the UN Commission in Korea that:

The united nations commission for the so called unification and rehabilitation of Korea has turned into a department of Ridgway's head quarters and its main purpose, as the report says, is to render assistance to promote the successful accomplishment of the tasks put forth by the hostilities. The report paints the picture as if the object

⁸. Ibid, p. 207

of the commissions work were to promote the rehabilitation of Korea by rendering assistance to the armed forces commanded by American generals. But what are these armed forces doing to accomplish such an aim as the rehabilitation of Korea? They are destroying villages, towns and the population⁹.

On January 12, 1952, Vyshinsky again submitted a resolution for the consideration of the UN assembly for the purpose of strengthening peace:

With regard to Korea, it advocate for:

(A) The countries participating in the hostilities in Korea immediately cease hostilities; conclude an armistic and withdraw their troops from the 38 parallel within ten days;

(B) All foreign troops as well as foreign volunteer units be withdrawn from korea within three months¹⁰.

On February 16, 1952, the communist delegation recommended a political conference at higher level on both sides to be held within three months after the armistice agreement was signed and became effective. This

⁹. A. Vyshinsky., Speeches at the sixth Session of the UN General Assembly (November 1951- January 1952) Published by Representatives of Tass in India , New Delhi ,1992 p. 299.

¹⁰. Ibid p. 334.

conference was to settle the questions of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea and deal with the peaceful settlement of the Korean nation. The United Nations command delegation agreed to this proposal. On the same day, the communist delegates submitted the name of the USSR to be one of the three members for their side on the Neutral Nations Supervisory commissions. The UN command said that it was not in agreement with this position. Both sides agreed to invite neutral nations acceptable to both sides which have not participated in the Korean war. In the eyes of Nations command, the USSR had not only contributed but also initiated the Korean war. The inclusion of the USSR was obviously for the bargaining purposes. The communist position was that:

The Soviet Union is one of the United Nations members which is not only most strictly opposed to interventions in the Korean war, but it also is most strongly in favour of a peaceful settlement of the Korean Question. If the Soviet Union could not be nominated as a neutral nation, there would be no neutral nation at all existing in the world¹¹.

Thus there were two issues that created disagreements between the negotiators i.e. the question on border and more importantly the repatriation

¹¹. William H. Vatcher TR., Panmunjom.: The Story of the Korean Military Armistice Negotiations (Frederiek A. Pnaeger, New York, 1958) p. 109.

of the prisoners of war. The latter question posed two fold problem- (A) the number of the prisoners and (B) The mode of repatriation. The number which the communists gave of prisoners they held was substantially less than the UN Command estimates. The communist list contained only 11,559 names, although North Korean had claimed in earlier broadcasts to hold over 65,000 prisoners of war, On the other hand, the united nations Command submitted a list containing 1,32,474 names¹².

Neither side was satisfied with the list which it received. Again, the United nations Command insisted that the prisoners should be released to choose either of the sides to settle an option to the choose either of the sides to settle in. The communists were opposed to this. They held that the prisoners should be unconditionally repatriated¹³. Since both the parties were reluctant to concede on their respective positions, the talks broke down in 1952 and were resumed in April 1953 after the death of Stalin.

On May 12, 1952, General Mark W. Clark formally succeeded

¹². Ibid p. 124

¹³. Hak - Joon Kin op cit p. 133.

General Ridgway as UN Commander. In the meantime, the communist continued to level charges against the UN commander in an effort to further discredit it. These charges were expanded to include violations of the Panmunjom site in the form of UN Commander leaflet drops and artillery shells, UN Commander bombing of Prisoners of War camps in North Korea, bombing Kaesong and the road from Panmunjom to Kaesong, slaughter of Prisoners of war on Koje island and pangam, and UN commander's use of bacteriological warfare. All of these charges were used to turn Asians against the members of United Nations command., particularly the United States, fighting 'communist expansion' in Korea¹⁴.

Commenting on the development in Koje island, Pravda equated American with Nazi leaders - a group whose cruelty was widely known to Europeans. It commented:

The speeches of orators exhale wrath ... noble wrath against these bandits in generals uniforms, the butchers in white gloves, the bloody bigot

¹⁴. Vatcher op cit p. 153.

and traders in death who have unleashed the most inhuman carnage in history. Warfare with the assistance of microbes, fleas, lice and spiders ... the Koje butchers will not escape¹⁵.

Communist propaganda attempted to portray the United Nations command as completely unfaithful to agreements. Various world peace conferences were also directed toward discrediting the Western nations. The conference held in Berlin in the summer of 1952 adopted a resolution calling for the immediate cessation of the Korean war. Pyongyang Radio announced on 13 July:

Should America fail to abide by the world peace conference resolution, it must be held responsible for the consequences. Koreans wholeheartedly supported the resolution. Korea will fight for the immediate cessation of the war, withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, so Koreans can determine their own future by themselves.

This persistent line was followed even into the Geneva conference of 1954¹⁶.

¹⁵. Quoted in Vatcher op sit, p. 154.

¹⁶. Ibid p. 155.

The Soviet Union was always there to support the Chinese and North Korean delegates. On September 28, the UN command delegation put forward three versions of the non-forcible repatriation policy. But these terms were rejected and as a result the talks were suspended.

In his essay published on the eve of the Nineteenth party congress of CPSU in October 1952 titled 'Economic Problems of socialism in the USSR', Stalin appeared to be modifying the two camp thesis which had guided Soviet foreign policy after the world war II. He held that theoretically it was true that the contradictions between capitalism and socialism were stronger than the contradictions among capitalist states. But war was much more likely between capitalist states than between the camps of socialism and capitalism. War between the two great economic systems threatened the very existence of capitalism. War between the capitalist states only challenged the supremacy of certain states within the capitalist camp. Although these modifications were less apparent in the Soviet foreign policy during the remaining few months of Stalin's life. Still it was a major shift in Soviet strategy. Perhaps it was intended to collaborate with the

European capitalist nations in an attempt to isolate the United States. Perhaps Stalin was less optimistic about the success of communism in Asia in the face of indigenous nationalism. It Stalin had decided upon a defensive shift in Soviet foreign policy perhaps he had realised that Soviet militancy during the cold war had further increased western fears of the Soviet Union, and had led to western rearmament¹⁷.

The above modifications in the Soviet foreign policy had their natural fallouts for Korea. Although these were effectively implemented after the death of Stalin in March 1953. When Chinese premier, Chou-En-lai, agreed to exchange sick prisoners of war and those unwilling to be repatriated to transfer to a neutral state on 30 March 1953 Soviet foreign minister V.M. Molotov in a broadcast on 1 April, 1953 declared that:

I am authorised to state that the Soviet government expresses its full solidarity with this noble act of the government of the Chinese people Republic and the government of the Korean Peoples Democratic Republic, and has no doubt that this act will find ardent support among peoples throughout world ... there can be no doubt the people of the whole world, desiring to put an end to the war in Korea and to promote the strengthening of peace and security of the world, will

¹⁷. Rosse op cit pp. 275-76.

welcome this proposal with warm sympathy and offer it full support¹⁸.

On October 24, 1952 the United States introduced the 21 power 24, resolution at the United Nations. On 4th December, 1952, the UN General Assembly endorsed the amended Indian resolution on non-forcible repatriation for prisoners of war.

On February 22, 1953, General Clark proposed an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners. On March 28, 1953 the exchange of sick prisoners agreed and Chinese Premier Chou-En-Lai also proposed on 30 March that those prisoners who are unwilling to be repatriated should be transferred to a neutral state. On April 20, the exchange of sick and wounded had began.¹⁹

On April 18, the 7th sessions of the UN assembly unanimously expressed the conviction that a just and honourable armistice in Korea will powerfully contribute to alleviate, the present international tension²⁰. The armistice talks resumed at Panmunjon on 26 April, 1953.

¹⁸. Vatcher op cit, p. 182.

The communist delegates put forward an eight points plan designed to solve the prisoners of war issue. In the mean time, the Eisenhower administration from the outset tried to put political pressure coupled with military threat to bring the Communists to negotiating table. He, thus tried to make it clear that any non-compliance on the part of the communists would lead to a resumption of war and even use to the ultimate weapon if found necessary²¹. The US National Security council decided that if conditions arise requiring more positive action in Korea, air and naval operations will be extended to China and ground operations in Korea would be intensified.

On may 22, 1953, the US Secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, visited India and hinted at future expansion of war by crossing the Yalu into manchuria²². On May 25, the UN command negotiating team put forward its final terms and was given permission to break off the talks if these were rejected. On 28 May, US ambassador to the USSR, Charles Bohlen met

¹⁹. Ghosh op cit, pp. 180-81.

Molotov and explained the position of UN command. On 8 June, 1953. Prisoners of war Agreement was signed which ensured that force would not be used in the repatriation of the prisoners.

On 4 June, there had probably been some consultations among Chinese, North Korean and Soviet leaders. This can be inferred from Molotov's apparent calculation during his meeting with Bohlen as to number of days left before negotiations were due to be resumed and his statement on June 3, 1953 that although the outcome of the negotiations did not depend on Moscow, he could say 'that the path to the successful conclusion of the armistic agreement has been mapped out'²³. Eventually on 27 July 1953, the Korean truce was signed and a long drawn out limited war came to an end.

The preamble of the armistic agreement noted that the aim of the agreement was to end the Korean conflict and achieve an armistic that would ensure the total termination of hostilities and all unfriendly actions in Korea

²⁰. Gromkyo, op cit, p. 199.

²¹. Ghosh, op cit. P. 183.

until a peace agreement was signed. The demarcation line was determined in accordance with the actual deployment of the troops of the two sides, mainly along the 38th parallel, with minor deviations in the west in favour of the North Korean and Chinese troops, and in the East in favour of the UN forces. A two and half kilometer wide demilitarised zone was established on both sides of the demarcation line. The agreement prohibited and deferred the functions of the armistice military commission consisting representative of both the sides and also the functions of the armistice supervisory commission consisting representatives of neutral countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden and Switzerland. The agreement established the procedure for the repatriation of prisoners of war. Provision was made for a political conference to be convened three months after the coming into force of the agreements to consider the question of Korea's unification and withdrawal of foreign troops²⁴.

Nothing was said to how or by whom such a conference was to be summoned nor was there any clarification as to who were to be participants.

²². Rosemary, Foot., A substitute for Victory: The politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks (Carnell University press, New York, 1990) P. 253.

²³. Ibid P. 177.

²⁴. Text of Armistice of 27 July, 1953, in Vatcher op cit. pp. 281-312.

These ambiguities naturally led to serious differences between the United States and the communists. So much so that it took nine months before the Conference could meet in Geneva in April 1954. In the meanwhile, the death of Stalin on March 5, 1953, provided a decisive turning point for a change in Soviet foreign policy in general and the Soviet attitude towards the Korean crisis in particular. After Stalin's death, with his succession undermined, the Soviet political leadership engaged in a behind-the-scenes power struggle which necessitated a momentary diversion of attention from global strategy to the domestic scene. None of the leaders could argue for adventurism abroad before consolidation of political position at home.

At the time of the conclusion of the Korean Armistice agreement in July 1953, the international relations atmosphere was improving. Hints of change came from George Malenkov, who had just assumed Stalin's place in the Soviet government, on the occasion of Stalin's funeral on 5 March 1953, the tone of Malenkov's speech was generally pacific in character and laid stress upon the possibility of peaceful coexistence between the East and the West. The new Soviet leadership soon gave the evidence, of the change

from the hard line policy to a milder policy by allowing Soviet citizens who had married to foreigners, to leave the country, reestablishing diplomatic relations with Greece, and Israel and later Yugoslavia, renouncing claims to Turkish territory most agreeing to an end to the Korean war²⁵. Ten days after the conclusion of the Korean armistic, Malenkov went one step further by declaring that:

‘We firmly stand by the belief that there are no disputed or outstanding issues today which cannot be settled peacefully by mutual agreement between the parties concerned. This also relates to disputed issues between the united states of America and the USSR. We stand as we have always stood, for the peaceful coexistence of the two systems. We hold that there are no objective reason for clashes between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. The security of the two states and of the world, and development of trade between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, can be ensured on the basis of normal relations between the two countries²⁶.

The USA soon responded to these Soviet changes by proposing to ease world tension through the United Nations and diverting nuclear power

²⁵ Kim Hak Joon Op.cit p. 161.104

²⁶ George, Malenkov. ‘Excerpts from the speech to the supreme Soviet of the USSR, august 8, 1953’ in Robert V. Daniels; A Documentary History of Communism, Vol 2. (University Press of new England, Hanover, 1984).

to peaceful purposes²⁷.

In the meantime, on August 28, 1953 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution approving the conclusion of the Korean Armistic agreement and welcoming the holding of political conference as recommended in paragraph 60 of the agreement. One part of the resolution designated, as participants for the side of UN command in Korea, the republic of Korea and the UN members contributing armed forces to the military action in Korea who derived to be represented and China and North Korea on the other. The USSR and India were not to participate.

Opposing the US proposal, the USSR proposed a eleven nation conference consisting of the United state, Britain, France the USSR, the People's Republic of China, India, Poland, Sweden, Burma, North Korea and South Korea. By implication such a proposal excluded from participation a number of states which had participated in the UN command. Moreover, by stipulating that only the signatories to the Armistic. Agreement would have

decisive voice in the conference, it tried to eliminate South Korea from a having significant role there in as it was not a signatory. The Soviet resolution, however was defeated by the General Assembly by a vote of 42-5, with 12 abstentions. Thus the issue of participants especially of the USSR in conference to be convened on the question of Korean unification dragged on till February 18, 1954 when the foreign ministers of the USSR, USA, France and Britain met at Berlin and decided to hold a conference in Geneva beginning 26 April, 1954 for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean Question. The Conference continued up to 15 June 1954.

The Soviet delegation backed the North Korea's proposal for restoring Korea's national unity by free elections to an all Korea National Assembly under the supervision of a commission of representatives of North and South Korea. This proposal also talked of withdrawal of all foreign troops. The Soviet delegate agreed to the wishes of UN forces for the international supervision by the neutral states. But the Communist proposal was unacceptable to the UN forces. As a result Korea remains divided to this day. A land monetarily divided for the sake of expediency was now

officially cut into hostile halves, hermetically insulated from one another and each headed by a leadership wholly dedicated to the proposition that its native rival across the demilitarised zone was its worst enemy'.

The question of Korean unification triggered off a heated debate between the Communist and Western sides.

Chapter V

Conclusion

The Soviet policy towards Korean problem was influenced primarily by the factors such as geo-strategic significance of Korean peninsula; Soviet commitments to support the revolutionary and national liberation movement of Korean people by establishing a communist regime in whole of Korea; and cold war politics. The Soviet tactics had to be changed several times while taking account of changes in Soviet perception of world situation in general and the US policy and goals in particular. But the basic Soviet strategy, to a greater extent, remained unchanged : establishment of communist regime in whole of korea which could be used as a base for the extension and strengthening of Soviet power in the Far east. Acceptance of 38 parallel necessitated the postponement of basic Soviet objective and there after focus was laid on installing a communist government in North Korea. Even after the defeat of North Korea and Chinese forces in Korean war, the sole tactics on

the part of Soviet Union during and post war period had been to restore status quo along 38 parallel in Korea and to seek maximum gains in far East by prolonging the true negotiations.

Although, USSR had only small boundary with Korea, yet located in the Far East, it had become an area of great strategic importance after the World War II period of cold war rivalry. At Yalta Conference, the Soviet Union was assured of regaining its former territory and other concessions in the far East. After the defeat of Japan, the Soviet forces got the responsibility to run the administration of Northern region of Korea along 38 parallel and the US forces to that of Southern Korea.

Very soon differences arose between the Soviet and US authorities regarding the implementation of Moscow agreement of 1945 which advocated trusteeship consisting of USA, USSR, UK and China by consulting with Korean democratic parties and social organisations. The differences over the identification of democratic parties and social organisations between the Soviets and Americans

owing to their divergent ideological and political positions resulted in the failure of formation of provisional Korean democratic government. The Soviets were adamant on exclusion of those organisations that were opposed to the idea of trusteeship. The Americans did not want this to happen because it was in the interest of the leftists. Work of Joint Commission of deadlocked very soon and finally Korean division along pro-Soviet and pro-American lines became permanent.

The USSR from the very beginning wanted a regime in Korea which would be loyal to the Soviet union. For this to happen, ideology was an important instrument in Soviet foreign policy. It had supported Communist activities in and out side Korea to liberate Korean people from the Japanese colonialism. It wanted to install a communist regime in whole of Korea. When it became clear that it is too difficult to unite Korea under the pro-Soviet regime, the Soviets shifted their priority for establishing a communist government in Soviet occupied North Korea and finally they had succeeded in that

The Soviet authorities were of great help to make the Communist party of Korea the dominant political force of Korea very soon. The Communists in the beginning period of Soviet rule were not a big force in North Korea and nationalists elements under the leadership of Cho-Man-Sik were considered the strong political force.

The Soviets were bit careful in the opening stages of the political drama to be played by the Communists since their prominent leaders were in South Korea. The Soviets followed the techniques of reorganising various people's committees with the objective of giving more and more representation for the Communists. The Soviets relied more upon Soviet -Korean in order to establish a meaningful party in North Korea. Later, the Kaspan group to which Kim Il Sung belonged joined this group. The Soviet-Korean and Kaspan formed the majority of team through which Soviet authorities exercised the political power in North Korea. The Soviet authorities were main instrument to bring Kim Il Sung to the supreme leadership of the Communist party of North Korea and finally Communist government was installed in 1948 with Kim Il Sung as

the head of the state of PDRK. The Soviet Union provided the technical and military assistance for North Korea. In March 1949, Soviet-North Korean agreement on cultural and economic cooperation was signed. The North Korean force were superior to South Korean forces due to Soviet military help which in turn helped Kim Il Sung to formulate and execute the war strategy.

After the failure to work together by the Soviets and Americans for the Joint Commission, the USA took the matter to UNO. The Soviet position was that since the Korean problem was a dispute between the two regions of the same sovereign state, it was not under the jurisdiction of the UNO. This approach-along with the issue of legality of security councils decision which needed the unanimity of all permanent members - became the guiding principle of the USSR towards Korean crisis. The USSR accused the USA as 'violator' of the Moscow agreement which had taken the Korean issue to the UNO. The USSR denounced the formation and activities of UN Temporary Commission on Korea and boycotted the UN meetings which discussed the Korean question. The Soviet Union insisted on

formation of a single National Democratic government through elections in whole of Korea without any foreign intervention. When the Korean war broke out, the USSR boycotted the UN security Council meeting owing to non-inclusion of Communist China in UNO. Soviet Union called the Korean war a civil war among the Koreans and denounced the UN intervention by equating it to that of Great Britain during the civil war of America. The war in Korea broke out with the attack on South Korea by North Korea. Stalin did not prepare the war plan. It was the work of Kim Il Sung. Stalin, with hesitation, supported Kim Il Sung's war strategy . Stalin probably thought that the USA would not intervene in the war since the US administration till then considered Korea out of its defence perimeter and Korean Security depended on the UN commitments. Still, Stalin had the fears of possible US intervention. Stalin finally, supported Kim Il Sung's war strategy by avoiding direct involvement in the Korean war and choose the limited war tactics to test the US intervention.

The setback to the North Korean forces with the intervention of U.S. forces under cover of UN umbrella, compelled Stalin to opt either to maintain Status quo by compromising with UN forces or to Continue the war. This meant the direct involvement of the Soviet Union with the possible consequences of third world war.

In the meantime, apart from ideological sympathy with North Korean regime and continued threat from the UN forces to the security of China after some initial hesitation compelled the Chinese to involve in Korean war against the UN forces. Such a step on the part of Communist China relieved the tension of Stalin to a great extent. Stalin was happy that it would provide an opportunity to avoid a direct clash with the US forces. Since Stalin was doubtful about the capability of China to carry out war with the USA, he promised to back Chinese forces.

Still Stalin was less optimistic to avoid a clash between the USSR and USA and he was hesitant to dispatch Soviet air forces to check the Chinese forces. After some deliberations with Stalin,

through Chou En-lai, Mao decided to cross the Yalu river on 19 October, 1951.

Stalin was very much impressed with Chinese decision and voluntarily decided to increase the military aid to China which had been of the great help for the Chinese action in Korea. In the meantime the USA intensified its action in Korea and threatened to use even the atomic bomb. Attacks and counter-attacks continued between the two rival forces. On the Soviet side, convinced that victory was impossible, anxious to localise the conflict, and disturbed by the acceleration of Western armament, Stalin advised the North Korean and Chinese to enter into peace talks. Consequently, the first suggestion for a cease-fire came from the Soviet side on 23 June, 1951. The UN commended responded positively to the Soviet suggestion and peace negotiations began on 10 July 1951 at Kaesong.

The basic Soviet goal towards the peace negotiations in the post-war Korea had been to maintain the status quo position of North Korea before the war and also to seek maximum gain in the far east.

In fact this could be a tactics on the part of the Soviet Union to prolong the signing of armistice in Korea. The Soviet Union was not a direct party to the peace negotiations,, yet, it had acted behind the scenes. The North Korean and Chinese who were direct participant in truce talks heavily depended upon Soviet advice. It could be that having convinced with the failure to seek any satisfactory gains in the Far East, the USSR wanted the US armament in Korea to continue so that it could consolidate its position in Europe by diverting US attention from the Europe.

It is only in latter part of 1952 that signs of shift in Soviet policy appeared when Stalin at 19th Congress of the CPSU in October 1952 talked of inner contradictions in Capitalist world in order to weaken the supremacy of the USA in the capitalist world. Stalin gave the signal for improving the relations with capitalist world. But these diplomatic changes were not seen until the death of stalin. And it was post-Stalin leadership of the Soviet Union that had effected the shift in Soviet foreign policy openly talking about the peaceful co-existence. It is also a fact that with the changes in US

leadership under Eisenhower and Dulles, USA adopted an aggressive posture towards Korean question. Thus finally the armistice was signed after consuming more than two years on 27th July 1953. Issue of Korean Unification was left unresolved. Only a halt to physical clashes was seen. The result : Korea remains divided even to this day. Soviet Union along with other Communist countries helped to reconstruct the North Korean economy.

To sum up, the outcome of the Soviet policy towards the Korean had been mixed. The Soviets gains were : first, the Soviet Union succeeded in establishing a faithful regime to it which was and could be used to expand the Soviet influence in Asia. Second, the USA was compelled to commit a large part of its strength to a remote and strategically peripheral area. It was a Soviet tactics to weaken the Western Europe's defence and to force to undertake a massive programme of rearmament that could have had the economic implications. In a sense, the West fought 'the wrong war, at the wrong time, in the wrong place'.

Third the Korean war confirmed the break between Communist China and the western world, thus emphasizing to the heavy dependence of the Communist China upon Soviet economic and military support. The existence of USA as a common enemy further strengthened the bonds linking the Communist world. Under such circumstances, Stalin could well be confident that China would not readily develop into a second Yugoslavia and; fourth, right from the beginning to the end, Soviet interests were put ahead of those of North Korea and China. For example the agenda for truce negotiations included neither the issue of Taiwan nor China's entry into the UNO. In fact, Soviet policy reflected mixture of internationalism and nationalism. The Soviet Union diligently used the Korean question to spread the Soviet power.

In terms of losses, the USSR failed to seek any major strategic gains in the far East, Japan became even more tightly locked into the American alliance. US intervention in Korea did not affect its security interests in Europe. The USA started a huge rearmament programme enabling it to engage military in Asia without reducing

its deployment in Europe.

Finally, the conclusion of armistice in Korea resulted in the defensive shift in Soviet foreign policy. And era of peaceful co-existence began with this new shift in Soviet foreign policy to be pursued by the post-Stalin leadership in the Soviet Union.

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