

**MILITARY ASSISTANCE AS A FACTOR IN AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY: A STUDY OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL
1992 TO 2004**

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
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
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
CERTIFICATE

It is certified that the dissertation entitled "Military Assistance as a Factor in American Foreign Policy: A Study of Egypt and Israel 1992 to 2004" submitted by Stuti Banerjee in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other university and is my own work.


Stuti Banerjee.

We recommend that this dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


Chairperson


Supervisor

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PREFACE

With the end of the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, which lasted from 1945 to 1991, the world has entered a period of American hegemony. This truth, that there is a need for American leadership without which no major decisions can be successfully achieved, has been acknowledged by the international leaders,.

The theme of this study is to understand American foreign policy decisions and actions which are expressed through its aid and assistance programs with emphasis on foreign military assistance to Israel and Egypt from 1992 to 2004 in the Middle East region, a term applied to the countries of South west Asia and North East Africa lying west of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.

As outlined by several official documents of the United States government, military assistance is an integral part of the United States peacetime engagement strategy. It contributes towards attaining American national security objectives. Since the Second World War, the United States has provided the Middle East with trillions of dollars of aid and assistance and trade subsidies. This aid is continuous and substantially larger than the economic aid.

The principal components of the military assistance programs are Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Training Programs, and transfers of Excess Defense Articles (EDA). The military assistance programs are put together to facilitate friends and allies to acquire American equipment, services, and training for their legitimate self-defense and for participation in multinational security efforts. By enhancing the capabilities of its friends and allies to address conflicts, America is strengthening deterrence, encouraging defense responsibility sharing among allies and friends and increasing interface between coalition partners through the transfer of defense equipment and training. This strengthens the ability of the partners to fight alongside American forces in coalition efforts. Therefore, when American involvement becomes

necessary, these programs help to ensure that foreign militaries can work more efficiently. Military assistance efforts thus, support the primary foreign policy goals of safeguarding American security.

The United States has paid particular attention to Egypt and Israel as allies and friends. It hopes to enhance them to provide the modern leadership required to wean away the Middle East from radical religious politics. Israel and Egypt receive the largest percentage of military assistance from the United States. The primary objective of the United States in providing Egypt with assistance is to capitalize on the Egyptian leadership to provide stability in the region. Israel, on the other hand, shares a 'special relationship' with America based on their shared values of democracy, human rights and justice for all.

The United States has a number of strategic concerns in the Middle East region, ranging from the support to the state of Israel, the peace processes, protecting Egypt's nascent democracy and encouraging it to become a model for other states in the region to follow, the protection of vital petroleum supplies and the fight against terrorism. The attacks on American on 11 September 2001 have renewed a sense of urgency in continuing the policy of working with Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Turkey to fight against the threat of radical Islamic movements and organizations.

The proposed study is a modest attempt to examine the relation between America and Israel and Egypt, along with trying to understand the relations between the countries vis-à-vis their relations with America. It endeavors to analyze the significance, failures and achievements, of the continuation of foreign military aid and assistance as a tool of foreign policy for the United States in the region. The focus of the study has been towards understanding how far the United States has been able to achieve the proposed goals of its foreign policy for the region and what are the domestic influences that have an impact on the formation of an assistance policy.

The first chapter titled **United States Policy towards Middle East: A Historical Overview of 1950's to 1980's** is introductory in nature. It introduces the various stages and process of policy making in America with regards to aid and assistance policies. It defines America's interest in the Middle East and the specific American interests in the states of Israel and Egypt.

The second chapter titled **United States Relations with Israel and Egypt: Continuity and Change from 1990's to Present** examines the relationship between Israel, Egypt and America. It attempts to analyze the impact of the military aid and assistance that is given to these countries to the relations between the three states

The third chapter titled **Institutional Dynamics of Military Assistance Policy: President, Department of State and Department of Defense** examines the importance of the role of the Presidency and the various executive departments like the Department of State and Defense in formulating foreign military aid and assistance policies and analyzes the conditions under which assistance has been given.

The fourth chapter titled **Congressional Debate, Accommodation and Concurrence on the United States Military Assistance to Israel and Egypt** deals with the Congressional perspective on the various aspects of foreign military assistance to Israel and Egypt. The chapter explores the debates and deliberations within the Congress in granting assistance to the two countries and the conditions which have obliged this aid and assistance to be given.

The fifth chapter attempts to draw the **conclusions** based on the study.

Chapter One:

**United States Policy towards Middle East: A
Historical Overview of 1950's to 1980's.**

The notion of America providing assistance to countries has been perceived as both a self-serving device dictated by national interests and an unprecedented act of unselfishness. This use of a single program to diverse military, economic, political and humanitarian purposes has at once highlighted and confused the image of America.

In the view of some experts, American assistance to other nations is not just a manifestation of its national conscience. This view could be as misleading as to recognize its significance only for national security¹. This view further contends that the seemingly contradictory operations of, on the one hand providing American supplies to a country in the form of weapons and military advice, and on the other encouraging economic development and social improvement through loans, grants and technical assistance and humanitarian relief is puzzling. It is neither just humanitarianism nor is it just 'real politik' that has dominated the diplomacy of American foreign aid and assistance; both are present in varying degrees. Be that as it may, further examination of American military assistance policy can provide helpful analysis of this seeming contradiction.

It has to be recognized that the results of American assistance are not always related to the intentions for which assistance was given in the first place. With some countries having progressively large developed economies and extensive administration vast amounts of aid has been unable to show corresponding vast amounts of development. On the other hand, military aid intended to strengthen the prospect of political stability against external forces can disturb the domestic balance, as well as the regional balance of the recipient. In its various forms American assistance and aid has worked towards a foreign policy goal that Americans called a stable and decent world order.² In 1948 President Truman urged the development of a world order in which the nations of the world could be secure under laws and requested assistance to create economic conditions under which free institutions could survive and flourish. This was the essence of the "*Truman Doctrine*".

¹ John D Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid: American Experiences in Southeast Asia, (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1962), p 11.

² Ibid ,p 12

The use of foreign assistance for the creation of a stable world order has generally been envisaged and conceived along military lines. It was largely seen from the perspective of the challenges that were presented by the threat of the 'Reds' or the communist dominating the world. The American diplomatic responses to the Cold War began with a number of defensive moves through out the non-communist world, where alliances were formed, allies were provided with arms and economic assistance and the neutrals were strengthened so that they could be better able and equipped to defend their independence from the oppressive regimes.

However, it must be kept in mind that there are some negative aspects of American military assistance. For instance, the somewhat all-encompassing goal of security for a particular nation may threaten the larger aspect of reliability in the region. Better military resources available to the existing regimes can contribute to regional instability by reinforcing intra-regional rivalries. Military assistance also tends to improve the political position and capacity of a nation to the point that it starts to threaten the security of another nation thereby, starting an arm race and further deteriorating the situation into a possible-serious crisis. In particular, the United States military assistance policy would present vital evidence as to how such a policy affects the region and some countries specifically. In the Middle East, for example, a study of American military assistance to Egypt and Israel is useful to analyze the overall patterns and impacts of such a policy.

For Egypt its geography, population, history, military strength, and diplomatic expertise gives it extensive political influence in the Middle East. Egypt has been the intersection for Arab commerce and culture for a very long time, and its intellectual and Islamic institutions are at the center of the region's social and cultural development. The United States and Egypt enjoy a strong and friendly relationship based on shared mutual interest in Middle East peace and stability, revitalizing the Egyptian economy and strengthening trade relations, and promoting regional security. It is a key partner of the United States in the search for peace in the Middle East and resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Over the years, Egypt and the United States have worked together assiduously to expand Middle East peace negotiations, hosting talks, negotiations. United States assistance to

Egypt's military modernization program and Egypt's role as a contributor to various United Nations peacekeeping operations continually reinforce the U.S.-Egyptian military relationship. An important pillar of the bilateral relationship remains United States security and economic assistance to Egypt, which expanded significantly in the wake of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1979³. One of the cornerstones of American policy towards the Middle East has been its relations with Israel. The broad issues of Arab-Israeli peace have been a major focus in the United States-Israeli relationship. The American efforts to reach a peace settlement in the Middle East are based on the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 224 and 338⁴. Israel and the United States are bound closely by historic and cultural ties as well as by mutual interests.⁵

This chapter attempts to take a look at some of the major contours of United States military assistance to Middle East in general, and Israel and Egypt in particular, from the end of the Second World War to the Regan administration. It would also attempt to point out the major factors in United States foreign policy that have promoted a policy of military assistance or determined in some way not to give any. This study bases itself on two assumptions. Firstly, that American institutional decision making needs rigorous examination in order to accurately locate its policy on foreign military assistance. Secondly, the mapping of executive developments is necessary to contextualize the changes in American foreign policy from within. In particular the goals in American foreign policy and its impact on United States military assistance programs to Israel and Egypt provide illuminating arguments about the influences that shaped American foreign policy towards the Middle East.

³ US Department of State, "Egypt", URL- <http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/e/35830.html> Internet site accessed on 13 January 2005

⁴ United Nations Resolution 224 - Following the June '67, Six-Day War, the situation in the Middle East was discussed by the UN General Assembly, which referred the issue to the Security Council. The key issue was the insistence of the Arab states on a provision for total Israeli withdrawal. The resolution established provisions and principles for the same.

United Nations Resolution 338- after the Yom Kippur War the resolution was passed to establish a cease fire and implementation of the above resolution.

⁵ US Department of State, "Israel", URL- <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3581.html> Internet site accessed on 13 January 2005

United States Military Assistance Policy: An Overview.

Middle East is a term which is applied to the countries of South West Asia and North East Africa lying West of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Thus, defined it includes Cyprus, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan, Iraq, Iran , Egypt and Libya and the countries of the Arabian peninsula -Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait. In the twentieth century the Middle East has been the scene of political turmoil and major warfare, including First World War, Second World War, the Arab-Israeli Wars, the Iran-Iraq War and the Persian Gulf Wars.

The Middle East-its people and the disputes- have for long dominated American foreign policy both in making and application. From the creation of Israel, its defense and interests have influenced how goals were deemed as crucial for the framing of American foreign policy. Americans have looked romantically to the aspirations of those who had once ruled the holiest of the biblical cities. In a country imbued with 'Old Testament' Protestantism, with its belief that miracles were possible, a Jewish return to Palestine was anticipated by many. "I really wish the Jews in Judea –an independent nation" wrote John Adams in 1818. Later in 1891, William Blackstone a successful real estate entrepreneur of Chicago presented President Benjamin Harrison and Secretary of State James Blaine a memorandum signed by four hundred and thirteen prominent Americans proposing that Jews be restored to Palestine. In response the American consulate in Jerusalem pointed out that firstly "Palestine is not ready for Jews" and secondly "Jews are not ready for Palestine"⁶.

The continued conflicts in the Middle East between Israel and her Arab neighbors in the years after the Second World War had thus made American policy of military assistance an attempt to influence if not to determine not only the nature but the direction of America's foreign policy towards the conflict and the participants.

⁶ Steven L Spiegel, The Other Arab- Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy from Truman to Regan, (Chicago, The University Press of Chicago, 1985), p 1.

Internal Divisions Affecting American Policy.

Over the years many have argued that American policy is being sabotaged by those who hold opposing views. For the supporters of Palestine, American policy on the Middle East is directed by Tel- Aviv. They feel that the pressure on politicians to form a pro-Israeli opinion regarding the Middle Eastern policies comes from the powerful Israeli lobbies functioning in America. A prominent example of a powerful lobby is the *American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)*, which was founded in 1951. The *New York Times* has called it the most important organization affecting America's relationship with Israel, while *Fortune* magazine has consistently ranked the organization among America's most powerful interest groups. One of its goals is '*Defending Israel against Tomorrow's Threats*' and '*Educating Congress about the U.S.-Israel Relationship*'⁷

However, the supporters of Israel while not denying the visible Israeli lobby was strong and much powerful equally blame the 'Oil Propaganda' processed by the "Arabists". The argument is that very few American's know that the money they spend on fuel goes in to financing fresh propaganda against Israel. The oldest Arab lobby is the National Association of Arab Americans which was established in 1972 but did not make its presences felt in the Capitol Hill till about 1978.⁸ It works to strengthen United States relations with Arab countries and to promote an evenhanded American policy based on justice and peace for all parties in the Middle East. As the premier Arab-American political organization, is the only such organization registered with Congress. It is involved in a wide range of issues pertaining to American-Arab bilateral relations. These include: all dimensions of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including Jerusalem, the Middle East peace negotiations, democracy and human rights issues, the reconstruction of Lebanon, American foreign aid, and Regional security and stability⁹.

⁷ AIPAC, "AIPAC Issues: Who are we?", URL- <http://www.aipac.org/documents/whoweare.html> Internet site accessed on 13 January 2005

⁸ Allan I Cigler & Burdett A Lommis, *Interest Group Politics*, (Washington DC, CQ Press, 1995), p 374-375.

⁹ The National Association of Arab Americans, "The National Association of Arab Americans", URL- <http://www.cafearabica.com/organizations/org12/orgnaaa.html> Internet site accessed on 13 January 2005

Thus the American policy makers had to contend with both sides of the argument. On the one hand, they have to concern themselves with those who are the supporters of Israel. Remembering the Holocaust; this group places the survival of the Jewish people in a Jewish state before all other considerations. Other observers would like to look at the demands of the Palestinian refugees, as displaced people, who have the right to self determination.

Several other non-partisan views of Middle East are also available as part of a much larger global conflict. They favor the side that seems to be more compatible with the policies that they are advocating at that given point of time. For example, President Eisenhower, who's overriding concern, was fighting the Communist and President Carter who was in favor of a détente with the Soviets, viewed the Arabs as crucial to the achievements of their aims in the Middle East. In his State of the Union Address in 1980 he said,

“We are working with our allies to prevent conflict in the Middle East. The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel is a notable achievement which represents a strategic asset for America and which also enhances prospects for regional and world peace. We are now engaged in further negotiations to provide full autonomy for the people of the West Bank and Gaza, to resolve the Palestinian issue in all its aspects, and to preserve the peace and security of Israel.... In the 1950's we helped to contain further Soviet challenges in Korea and in the Middle East, and we rearmend to assure the continuation of that containment. The region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance:... The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic position, therefore, that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil... This situation demands consultation and close cooperation with countries in the area which might be threatened.”¹⁰

President Eisenhower considered the Israelis an impediment to the fight against the communist but President Nixon with similar views saw them as an asset.¹¹ In his State of the Union address in 1974 he said, “...we have committed ourselves to an active role in helping to achieve a just and durable peace in the Middle East, on the basis of full

¹⁰ Jimmy Carter, “State of the Union Address 1980”, January 28, 1980, URL-<http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml> Internet site accessed on 13 January 2005

¹¹ See footnote 5, Steven L Spiegel, p 2

implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The first step in the process is the disengagement of Egyptian and Israeli forces which is now taking place.”¹²

In essence the decision to give a particular type of assistance to the countries of the Middle East, particularly Israel and Egypt includes the following:

1. The global approach- the impact of a decision on the global scale.
2. The regional approach- the impact of the decision on the other nations of the region
3. and the actual area in conflict approach- the impact of a decision on the people who are leaving in the conflict zone.¹³

As scholars have pointed out, all three approaches are aimed at producing results that are peaceful and agreeable to all.

Institutional Setting of United States Policy

The importance of policies that are made by the institutions that contextualize military assistance to these two countries is relevant to the understanding of its eventual application. In doing so, it may be possible to understand the agenda and look at the actual policy goal of American military assistance policy towards the Middle East.

Congress

The role of the Congress in the shaping of the Middle Eastern policy is very important. The Congress can not make policy decisions on American position on the various issues like future borders between Israel and Jordan or the best approach to negotiations or even the legal status of Jerusalem. These continue to remain the prerogatives of the executive but the instrument of the implementation of any policy remains with the Congress because of its control over the budget. The Congress has to approve of the assistance that is being given to both Israel and Egypt. The Congress can review major

¹² Richard Nixon, “State of Union Address 1974”,
URL-<http://www.janda.org/politxts/State%20of%20Union%20Addresses/1970-1974%20Nixon%20T/RMN74.html> Internet site accessed on 17 January 2005

¹³ Stephen Zunes, “The Strategic Functions of US Aid to Israel!”,
URL-http://www.wrmea.com/html/us_aid_to_isreal.html. Internet site accessed on 14 January 2005

arms sales deals, arms aid and assistance programs and can also block the said through legislative action. Apart from this, the Congress plays an important role in influencing public opinion. Leading Congressmen can attract attention to a particular policy through speeches, debates, news articles and press conferences¹⁴.

The Electoral Cycle

There are a number of reasons why the electoral process assumes a very significant aspect in the Arab –Israeli conflict. It is because peace and war has come to affect the common man much more than ever before because of the complex web of interdependency that binds the world together. The other main reason that the issue continues to play such a large role in the domestic arena, especially in the presidential elections is because of the number of Arabs and Jewish people living in America. They, particularly the Jews are concentrated in the states that play a crucial role in the election of any presidential hopefuls and they also contribute generously to the party funds needed during extensive campaigning by the candidates. In contrast, the Arab or more accurately the oil interest that emanate from Multi National Companies (MNC) also play a significant role albeit more covertly, in campaign funding.

The Role of the Interest Groups

The pro-Arab and the pro-Israeli groups argue their cases with great resources and passion. In the context of mainstream American politics, their views can be characterized as follows: Arab sympathizers argue that the Middle East's problems can be attributed to the existence of Israel¹⁵. On the other hand the Israeli sympathizers argue the reverse. They say that the conflict in the Middle East that the world is seeing today is a result of Arab instability rather than the birth of Israel.

The pro-Arab side encourages America to build ties with all the Arab states whereas the pro-Israeli side prefers the development of America's ties with non-Arab states in the

¹⁴ William B. Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics, (Washington D.C., The Brookings Institute Press, 1986), p 7

¹⁵ Daniel Pipes, "Breaking all Rules: The Middle East in U.S. Policy",
URL- www.danielpipes.org/article/169. Internet site accessed on 14 January 2005

Middle East like Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran and with those countries that are Arab states but are willing to pursue peace with Israel like Egypt and Lebanon. Thus while the pro-Arab group would point out the advantages of a close Saudi- Arabia –United States relation because of the strong business ties, the pro-Israeli group would point out to the differences in the values and foreign policy interests of the two nations.

However, the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict has made the peace between Israel and Egypt; dominate the Middle East policy of America. Several analysts point to the importance of these outside pressures on the various institution and the various individuals who are part of the American foreign policy making, yet have argued that a vibrant executive can and should conduct United States military policy.

The Role of the President

Besides the Congress and the electorate, the President and the other members of his staff play a very important role in the formulation a policy especially as related to military assistance provided to the states in the Middle East.

According to some, the priority that is given to the Arab -Israeli conflict by any administration in the United States depends on the amount of attention that is being given to the matter by the President and his key advisors. If the issue is low priority then the attention given to it has to be minimal and it is then that the influence of the bureaucracy, the Congress and the interest groups will increase. When the issue is important to the President, the interest groups and agencies will have less access to the policy processes unless the administration wishes to make use of certain agencies or to have the reaction of specific groups for its own purposes. A specific group may also have more access to a particular administration. However, one has to understand that not all public activity by an interest group necessarily turns in to influence. For example the AIPAC was unable to stop the sale of fighter planes to Saudi Arabia in 1981 despite a strong protest against it.¹⁶

¹⁶ See footnote 8 Allan I Cigler & Burdett A Lommis, p 374

In sum the critical factors that determine the content of the American policy are: the basic assumptions of the President, the individuals on whom he relies for advice and the resulting decision making system which converts ideas into policies. Indeed some argue, all Presidents enter the White House with specific assumptions that have proved to be resisted the effects of the outside forces be they interest groups, bureaucracy, events or crisis.

Early Phase of American Foreign Policy:1950 to 1974

President Harry S Truman was the first president who was forced to deal with the issue and presided over a very critical period of the American policy making towards the region. The president had to confront a number of restraints. Globally he had to take a position that would not endanger American interests but at the same time would not benefit the Soviet Union. Regionally, he had to maintain the delicate balance of the relations between the Arab world and America. Besides these, there was the domestic pressure in the form of the people of America with a view to the upcoming elections. With the General Assembly of the United Nations adopting Resolution (181) calling for the partition of Palestine into two independent states-one Palestinian Arab and the other Jewish with the city of Jerusalem internationalized. An eleven member Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was formed at the first special session of the General Assembly in April 1947. It was the recommendation of the majority of the committee members that Palestine be partitioned into an Arab State and a Jewish State, with a special international status for the city of Jerusalem under the administrative authority of the United Nations.

The plan included:

- The creation of the Arab and Jewish States not later than 1 October 1948;
- Division of Palestine into eight parts: three were allotted to the Arab State and three to the Jewish State; the seventh, the town of Jaffa, was to form an Arab enclave within Jewish territory.

- The international regime for Jerusalem, the eighth division, to be administered by the United Nations Trusteeship Council¹⁷.

Through resolution 181 (II), the Assembly also set up the United Nations Palestine Commission to carry out its recommendations and requested the Security Council to take the necessary measures to implement the plan of partition. The plan was not accepted by the Palestinian Arabs and Arab States on the ground that it violated the provisions of the United Nations Charter, which granted people the right to decide their own destiny. The Jews accepted the resolution despite their dissatisfaction over such matters as Jewish emigration from Europe and the territorial limits set on the proposed Jewish State. The Jewish people declared their independence on May 14, 1948, as the State of Israel. America became the first nation in the world to recognize the new state.

However, the official policy of the United States towards the region remained distant. On the advice of the Department of State the president had approved an arms embargo to the Middle East. According to the Near East Division of the Department of State the supply of arms could result in a war. After the war began the United States official policy was to comply with the United Nations call for an arms embargo to the entire region so as to bring pressure on the warring sides to negotiate. But the Congress did approve an aid package in the form of a \$135 million Export-Import Bank loan in order to take in holocaust survivors and provide them with homes¹⁸.

In the decade of the sixties the Eisenhower administration was not very pro- Israeli. Israel was unable to stop the formation of the Baghdad Pact- a mutual security agreement that was signed by the United States, Great Britain, Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan. Nor was it able to gain arms for itself or achieve an American -Israeli defense pact. For the administration the Middle East was important because of its geo-political and strategic importance and the value of its oil resources. It was the belief of the president that the only solution to ever lasting peace in the region was if the Arabs could also come together

¹⁷ United Nations, The Question of Palestine and the United Nations Booklet DPI/2276, (Washington DC, United Nations Department of Public Information, March 2003), p10.

¹⁸ Anon., "US Assistance to Israel", URL- www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/isource/us-isreal/us_assistance_to_israel Internet site accessed on 21 January 2005

with America. What frustrated the administration was the Czech- Egyptian arms deal, the nationalization of the Suez Canal by President Nasser of Egypt and the subsequent invasion of Egypt in 1956 by French, British and Israeli forces. The Americans felt that they had a commitment to the victim in this case the state of Egypt; the alternative was that Russia may enter the Middle East.

The crises did not improve relations between Egypt and America. Even though America had sided with the Egyptians, Nasser was seen as pro-Soviet Union. The crisis also brought a direct confrontation between the United States and Israel. But it showed the military strengths of the Israeli army which did not go unnoticed by the American bureaucracy especially in the Pentagon. The '*Eisenhower Doctrine*' was recommended- a program of economic and military assistance should any country request assistance to thwart any aggression from any nation controlled by international communism. The Doctrine for the first time put the Israelis in a multilateral program sponsored by the United States. In 1959 the military aid and loan program was started, though before that Israel was being supplied with food assistance and economic assistance for its development¹⁹. Relations with Egypt deteriorated further with Nasser supporting the rebels in Lebanon in the struggle against the United States.

After a period of relative calm, border incidents between Israel and Syria, Egypt, and Jordan increased during the early 1960s, with Palestinian guerrilla groups actively supported by Syria. The escalation of threats and provocations continued until June 5, 1967, when Israel launched a massive air assault that crippled Arab air capability. The war, which ended on June 10, is known as the Six-Day War. However, the overarching importance of the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union cast United States Middle East policy into a prism rather than look at its own importance.

The war saw the end of any relations between Egypt and America and the beginning of new relations with Israel. President Nixon and his Secretary of State William P Rogers did

¹⁹ Clyde R. Mark, "Israel- United States Relations",
URL- <http://www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organisation>. Internet site accessed on 21 January 2005

place enormous priority to creating a frame work for resolving the conflict. Yet they believed that the key to stability in the region lay in an agreement between the two super powers. This was the beginning of the era of 'Détente'. What was different was the fact that rather than confrontation détente provided stability between Egypt and the United States. President Nasser had severed diplomatic ties at the role that was played by the Americans in the War of 1967, continued when Israel occupied the whole of the Egyptian Sinai peninsular, the Golan Heights and the West Bank including Jerusalem and the Gaza strip or all that remained of Palestine. Nasser felt that the United States had the power and the resources to stop Israel but chose not to employ them.²⁰ But following the October War in 1973, relations between the two states were soon rejuvenated. The United States felt the tremors of the war enough to make it reconsider its previous position of total support for Israeli policies. The war brought forth the realization for urgently finding a comprehensive solution to the Arab -Israeli conflict that was now threatening the economy and the security of the world. The Arab displeasure and the oil policies tipped the scales further. The oil embargo represented the apogee of Arab solidarity²¹. The United States was handicapped by a serious disagreement within the government on the nature of the problem. The Department of State's perception was that the root of the entire problem in the Middle East was the Arab- Israeli conflict over territory. They felt that once this problem was resolved the region would experience peace. However, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was of the opinion that the problem had other sources namely, Israel's conquest of the territories, Israel's very existence, social, economic dissatisfaction among the people of the region and opposition to western influence. Solving the Arab Israeli conflict would address only the first two problems and leave the major problem of Arab radicalism as it was. He proposed to work towards a solution that could be achieved best with the help of America's friends the moderates. He believed that this would help check the growth of Arab radicalism that was fast spreading in the Middle East²². A year later Kissinger, Secretary of State to President Nixon, started his 'Shuttle Diplomacy' between Egypt and Israel. The result of the diplomacy was the

²⁰ Robin Wright, Sacred Rage: The Crusade of Modern Islam, (London, Andre Deutsch, 1986), p 182.

²¹ Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, The Camp David Accord, (Boston, Routledge & Kegan Paul Publishers, 1986), p 10

²² Henry Kissinger, The White House Years, (Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1979), p.558

Disengagement Agreement between Egypt and Israel (1974). The agreement called for Israel and Egypt to observe the cease fire on land, sea and air called by the United Nations Security Council and refrain from the time of signing the document from all Para-military or military actions against each other²³. The agreement also called for the separation of the forces of the two nations based on certain principles agreed upon. It was the culmination of the strategy to thwart a victory of Soviet arms, to prevent the humiliation of the Arab, to convene a peace conference...and to cement the ties with Egypt, which was courageously willing to show the way.²⁴ Many accounts point to the view that the agreement caused some problems for Egypt vis-à-vis its Arab neighbors and friends as it was believed that the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat had signed this agreement without consulting the other Arab nations.

Thus the relations between United States and Egypt improved to the point that President Nixon made an official trip to Cairo. The relations went a step further when Presidents Ford and Anwar Sadat developed similar ties not just at work but also personally. This was the period that Egypt along with Israel started to receive the lion's share of world wide American security assistance allocation about a hundred billion dollars²⁵. This was accompanied by a great distancing of the Soviet Union from Egypt. It was in this situation that President Carter came to occupy the White House in 1976 and Likud Party coalition under Menahim Begin formed the government in Israel.

Second Phase: 1977 to 1986.

President Carter came to office with comparatively very little experience in global politics as compared to his predecessors. However, right from the start he had shown a clear commitment to the issues of civil rights and human dignity. Thus it came as no surprise that the Middle East was to be of particular interest to the President. He was lead both by his belief in his religious learning of the lands of the bible as well as his belief

²³ Israel- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Israel- Egypt Force Agreement 1974", URL- <http://www.mfa.gov.il>. Internet site accessed on 25 January 2005

²⁴ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, (Boston, Little, Brown and company, 1982), p. 799

²⁵ Duncan L. Clarke, "US Security Assistance to Egypt & Israel: Politically Untouchable?", *Middle Eastern Journal Vol.53 No.3*, (Washington DC, Middle East Institute, Summer 1999), p 364.

that real peace could be achieved in the region. Finally it was his commitment to the theme of Human Rights of the homeless people of Palestine that entailed a genuine concern for peace between the Arabs and the Israelis²⁶.

Besides these influences for his background there were the influences from the real politics. The 1973 Arab –Israeli war contributed enormously to the increase of oil prices all around the world which in turn had stimulated inflation and the slowing down of economic growth. President Carter was determined to avoid a similar situation from arising if possible. He believed that a stable oil pricing required a stable Middle East, which meant defusing the Arab –Israeli conflict. This also was part of his comprehensive energy policy and his concern for energy reinforced his belief that progress has to be made.²⁷ However, the hall mark of the Middle East policy was the forging of the peace accord between Israel and Egypt.

The Camp David Accords (September 1978) signed by the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and the Israeli Prime Minister Mebachem Begin lead to an Egypt –Israeli peace treaty in March 1979. It contains nine articles, a military annex, an annex dealing with the relation between the parties, agreed minutes interpreting the main articles of the treaty, among them Article 6, the withdrawal schedule, exchange of ambassadors, security arrangements and the agreement relating to the autonomy talks. The treaty was seen as a step forward to producing a peace formula for resolving the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. One of the main points of the treaty stated “...Egypt-Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the United Nations Charter²⁸”

²⁶ See footnote 6 William B. Quandt., p 30

²⁷ Ibid, p 32

²⁸ Article 33 states: 1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. 2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means. The article appears in Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter

and "...Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions ...apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors — Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.²⁹"

President Jimmy Carter is rightly seen as the architect for this accord and the peace treaty that followed it and is given due credit for the peace that followed the accord. It is seen as one of the major successes of his foreign policy. However, he was unable to make much head way in the accords that concerned with the Palestinians. The question that many have asked is why he was able to make so much head way in the accords but was unable to transfer much of that in to action with regards to the Palestinian issue? The answer to that question can be found in the nature of the American political system, especially the electoral system, which leaves the president with very little time to focus on foreign policy and which highlights the importance of the domestic political calculations.

The accord was struck in lengthy negotiations that lasted some eighteen months. With these two states at peace at peace with each other and closely tied to the United States the strategic map of the Middle East was fundamentally altered. Though the Americans are of the opinion that the accords stand out as a major achievement of the US foreign policy, but for many in the Middle East the connotations of the agreement did not hold that much positive signs. Some Israelis feel that they gave up to much for too little, where as the Egyptians feel that their President should have got for more for the Palestinians. And as a consensus everybody feels that the accords fell short for resolving the Palestinian question that is the core of the Arab- Israeli conflict in the Middle East.

After 1973, the United States has been able to carve out for itself a record, as a negotiator of limited agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors. A classic example of this was the 'Shuttle Diplomacy' of Henry Kissinger that lead to some partial agreements. He was able to monopolize the entire negotiations after the war which resulted in the first disengagement agreement between Israel, Egypt and Syria in 1974. The oil embargo was

²⁹ US Department of State, "Camp David Accords: Frame work for Peace in the Middle East", International Information Program USINFO.State.gov, URL- http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/Archive_Index/The_Camp_David_Accords.html Internet site accessed on 27 January 2005

lifted and year later Egypt signed a second agreement with Israel; with caused considerable rift in the Arab world as Israel did not make a similar commitment with Syria. The United States has over the years acquired the reputation as the major party that could bring the Arabs and the Israelis together and also provide commitments to both sides of the conflict.

The late seventies saw Egypt pressing America to play a more forceful role in the Middle East. The United States had by degrees progressed from being a mediator to a full time partner in the peace process. It was for this reason that the Egypt concentrated on American public opinion. Sadat spent endless hours with media persons, senators and representatives and the leaders of the Jewish community. The much publicized visit to Jerusalem was as much for the Israeli people as it was for the American public.

In the first three years of Sadat's rule the United States continued to provide support to Israel. The American's paid very little attention to the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories after the 1967 war and was at the time more occupied with its war in Vietnam. The proposal by Sadat in 1971 to opening up the Suez Canal did not bring about the attention that Egypt was hoping for. The 1971 expulsion of the Soviet advisors by Egypt caught the attention of the American policy makers and it provided the catalyst for the formation of new relation to develop between the two nations. The War of 1973 was able to bring to Washington's notice the seriousness of the situation but more importantly it brought to the attention of the United States and the world that the Arab world could and did act as one. They could take initiatives and cause considerable harm to Israel. The use of oil as a weapon was a show that they could also in effect harm the American interests in the region.

Given this backdrop the military assistance policy became a major pillar of the United States frame work for Middle East peace. Military cooperation between the two states took the form of various arms supplies, transfer of technology, provision of military facilities and joint training and maneuvers. In 1975 Egypt decided to diversify it supplies of arms. It started with British and French weapons. The United Sates decided to enter

the Egyptian markets very slowly and gradually. It was with the signing of the second disengagement agreement that America decided to supply Egypt with transport airplanes. Military relations developed at an unprecedented level after the visit of Sadat to Jerusalem. The cost of arms sales from the United States to Egypt jumped from \$68.4 million in 1976 to \$937.3 million in 1978³⁰. In 1979 Egypt was offered further military credits making the United States the major arms supplier. During 1980-84, the United States sold to Egypt nearly \$6 billion in military equipment, only Saudi Arabia and Britain bought more³¹.

Military relations between the Egypt and America also included the licensing and co production of arms. The two nations decided to cooperate in the manufacturing and assembly of armored vehicles and electronic equipment. As another form of cooperation Egypt offered the United States the temporary use of its airfields near Cairo in Ras Banas on the Red Sea but resisted the idea of making the base available to the United States Army through a formal agreement/ the base is a strategic point in relation to the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean. Given its importance as a route for oil, shipped out of Saudi Arabia through pipelines up to the red sea through the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean, this move was well calculated. It was also the time that the Americans collaborated in joint training of its forces with the Egyptians to practice various contingencies with regards to the deployment of troops to the Middle Eastern deserts in the event of any emergency

Eighties: Change and Continuity

By the time President Regan came into office the policy implications of a dramatically different view became clear. President Ronald Regan's policy agenda was to have a profound impact on the consequences of the Arab-Israeli processes of normalization of relations. However, other developments namely the Iran hostage crisis and the Islamic

³⁰ Samuel F. Wells Jr. & Mark A. Bruzonsky, Security in the Middle East: Regional Change and Great Power Strategies, (London, West view Press, 1987.), p79

³¹ Congressional Research Service, The Middle East, (Washington D.C., Congressional Quarterly, sixth edition 1986), p 71.

Revolution in Iran, the attack on Lebanon by Israel, trading arms for hostages and the Soviet Unions invasion of Afghanistan all brought about changes in the American view of the situation in the region..

When Regan became President in the United States, Israel and Egypt were well on their way to making peace due to the Camp David accords that also provided the initial framework towards the steps for an Israeli -Palestinian agreement. The agreement was pushed aside as Regan and his team of advisors which included Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Elliott Abrams. They approached the Middle Eastern region in a more tough- minded manner than the Carter administration³². The Cold War atmosphere was '*regenerated*' by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The invasion paved the way for in a new era of East- West distrust that was reduced to some extent by the détente between the Soviets and the Americans. The efforts to 'contain' Moscow's ambitions was revived and the new administration in America started to build a 'strategic consensus' around Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Somalia and Kenya³³.

Israel saw this as an opportunity to deepen its ties with America that it was unable to so under the Carter administration because of the President's great stress and tiresome concern with regard to Gaza and the West Bank. The Regan administration introduced new terms like "*rouge states*" and Israel was regularly referred to as a "strategic asset"³⁴ Israel was described as a loyal, friendly and democratic ally in a sea of hostile Arab states some of them allied to the Soviet Union. But this is not to deny that they were friendly Arab states that were strategically important to the United States. President Regan's Secretary of State Alexander Haig developed a "strategic cooperation" concept for the administration which embodied the belief, contrary to the views of all previous administrations including Carter's that it was possible to have an open strategic alliance with Israel and at the same time pursue strategic relationships with key Arab countries.

³² William B Quandt, "Cold War on Regan's Middle East Legacy", URL- http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=5&article_id=5888. Internet site accessed on 1 February 2005

³³ T.G. Fraser, "The Arab- Israeli Conflict", (London, Macmillan Press, 1995), p 127.

³⁴ See footnote 6, William B Quandt, p 36

He believed that America could work with two sets of allies in the region to checkmate the Soviet threat³⁵.

During the eighties the United States developed an increasingly elaborate pattern of military –to- military relation with Israel, including joint planning for contingencies, joint exercise programs for the armed forces and enhanced intelligence cooperation. In November 1981 an agreement of strategic cooperation was signed between the then Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon and the then American Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger. The agreement stated that “The main objective was to deter Soviet threats in the Middle East. There would be joint military exercises, land, sea and air; there would also be planning for the establishment and maintenance of joint readiness activities. Joint working teams will deal with specific military issues. The Arab world and the Soviet Union were highly critical of this agreement, which they felt would impair America's ability to deal fairly with the peace process in the Middle East³⁶. However, the bone of contention between Jerusalem and Washington was the proposed sale of Air borne Warning and control systems aircrafts to Saudi Arabia. Israel felt that it would seriously threaten its air superiority. In March 1985, the then Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger invited Israel to participate in the Strategic Defense Initiative commonly known as the “star wars” program announced by the President in 1983. By 1986 the Department of Defense had proposed a joint Anti tactical Ballistic Missile (ATBM) program. Under this program Israel has pursued the development of the ‘Arrow missile’³⁷. Since 1988, the United States has provided Israel with one billion dollars for research and development of the missile. In March 2000, Israel deployed the first battery of these missiles and now seeks more funding for a second and third battery³⁸

³⁵ Samuel W. Lewis, “The United States and Israel: The Evolution of an Unwritten Alliance”, *Middle East Journal Vol. 53 No. 3*, (Washington DC, Middle East Institute, Summer 1999), p369

³⁶ Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of United States and the Government of Israel on Strategic Cooperation”,

URL-<http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/US-Israel+Memorandum+of+Understanding.htm>. Internet site accessed on 1 February 2005

³⁷ Duncan E. Clark, “The Arrow Missile: The United States, Israel and Strategic Cooperation”, *Middle East Journal, Vol. 53 No. 3*, (Washington DC, Middle East Institute, Summer, 1999), p 476.

³⁸ Clyde R. Mark, *Israel –US Foreign Assistance, 2002*, (Washington DC, Congressional Research Service, 2002), p 8

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On a parallel level the eighties also witnessed the coming together of Egypt and United States. By the time Anwar Sadat was assassinated in 1981 Egypt was the main ally and investment of America in the Arab world, evident in the two billion dollar annual assistance that was given to it. The level of trust was reflected in the joint American - Egyptian military maneuvers and the fact that American planes had been given permission to refuel in Egypt en- route to the (aborted) rescue mission of the American hostages in Iran³⁹. In addition to this the Foreign Military Finance provided to Egypt during the eighties was used to produce in cooperation with America tanks for the defense of Egypt, along with this the United States also provided nearly five billion dollars in military loans and thirteen billion dollars in military grants and twenty million dollars in International military education to Egypt over a period of fifteen years⁴⁰.

Thus it is very evident that for America the Middle East is not just a strategic location, it is a region where the United States perceives a need to protect its vital interests. Whether it is couched in its promotion of democracy in the region or promoting its oil interests or defending Israel, it has relied on military assistance to bolster its policies that became evident in the 1980's and 1990's. In fact as several analysts have pointed out the politics of oil to reflect one of the critical concerns of the United States in the region.

Significantly the end of the eighties then utilized Haig's Strategic cooperation concept with both Israel and modern Arab states as a major focus of American foreign policy in the Middle East. Further, American perceptions that the rise of radical Islamic movements, whose primary target has been the US -its citizens and property, has propelled the continuation of the policy of working with the countries of the Middle East to fight against the threat that these organizations represent. The United States perceives that any peace in the region is pivotal to the American national security.

The United States has paid particular attention to Egypt and Israel, as allies and friends that require American assistance so as to enable them, to provide modern leadership to

³⁹ See footnote 10, Clyde R. Mark, p 185.

⁴⁰ Clyde R. Mark, Egypt- Israel Relations,2003, (Washington DC, Congressional Research Services,2003), p 10

the Middle East, away from radical religious politics to democracy. Foreign military aid and assistance to Israel and Egypt is an important constituent of the overall American foreign policy for the region.

Chapter Two

United States Relations with Israel and Egypt: Continuity and Change from 1990's to Present.

The Cold War came to grinding halt during the astounding developments of 1989-91. The Berlin wall fell, the east European countries freed themselves from Soviet domination and the Soviet Union itself disintegrated after witnessing a failed coup aimed at restoring a communist dictatorship. Suddenly the 'evil empire' was no more and the rationale for most of the post World War Two foreign policy of the United States vanished. As the lone super power the United States now had a singular opportunity to promote its interests and values abroad. It also had an unprecedented access with which to expand its power and idea brings with it also the problem of new danger to the national security of the United States, however, necessitated in changing the nuances of its military assistance policy especially in the Middle East.

The abrupt and unpredictable collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire caused the end of the bipolar regime of the Cold War era, affected the United States and its standing in the international system and its position in the various regions particularly the Middle East. Moreover, as the main themes in the campaigns and the results of the 1994 Congressional elections in the United States show, global changes do affect domestic politics. The elections demonstrated that, though not entirely disinterested in the international affairs, great segments of the American public regarded domestic politics as having greater priority over international affairs and commitments.

Most regions and states including the Middle East were greatly affected by these sweeping changes. With regard to the United States relations with the Middle East as a whole and with particular states of the region these global developments caused a major alteration in both the political and economic structures in which all actors had set their patterns of bi-lateral and multi-lateral behaviors. The global transformations that eliminated the Soviet Union as a major force in Middle Eastern politics, meant, the well defined American and Soviet spheres of influence in the region have been eradicated. Overall these structural changes have marked a significant increase in the prestige and influence of the United States in the region.¹

¹ Gabriel Sheffres, United States –Israel Relations at a Crossroads, (London, Frank Cass & Co.,1997), p.1

Indeed the United States has improved its position in the region to the extent that it is the only super power. Its power is such that it was able implement a strategy, previously unthinkable, to form a coalition consisting of a wide range of states including Arab states to launch the 1991 Gulf War, defeat Iraq and impose sanctions on Iraq with the support of these states.

Some have optimistically opined that these structural and behavioral changes are paving the way towards the 'normalization' of the Middle East. The developments are also conducive of the normalization of Israel's position as an accepted member of the international community. Thus, like a number of countries that during the Cold War period had a pariah status like South Africa, Chile and Taiwan, Israel no longer belongs to the category of the rejected states²,

It is important that while there are some salient features of the region that are continuing from the past there are also some salient features that are not a continuation of the past. For example, the hostilities between Egypt and Israel, official' ended with the Camp David accords. Before the accords were signed they had fought three wars, today even after twenty seven years there is peace between the two. In 1994, Jordan became the second Arab state after Egypt to sign a treaty with Israel. It has steadily distanced itself from the Palestinian issue and would like the peace process to accommodate Israel. However, the larger issue of the Arab Israeli peace and the issues relating to the status of Palestine and Palestinian refugees remains. There have been phases in trying to find the solution to the conflict but it has not ended.

It may not be correct to say that in the present world order only military strength is important, economic power is also very vital. Nonetheless, one has to keep in mind that economic power is more widely dispersed than military power. Thus, a country may be weak militarily but may be a powerhouse of economic strengths; it may boast of valuable economic resources or may be vital as a market America's changing economy is strong and getting stronger. It is building on its existing economic powers to propose new initiative to help nations. Economic assistance has been provided by America to states to

² Ibid p 2

help in the growth of their economies³. It is believed that economic prosperity contributes towards United States security. Economic power nevertheless, is becoming increasingly privatized in the hands of the banks, multinational cooperation and financial markets.⁴

There is no question that the principal American interest in the Middle East during the Cold War was its significant role in the American- Soviet competition for global domination. During the 1950's the Middle East assumed importance as the location of the Baghdad Pact in which the Arab states were expected to provide bases to the American military forces to both deter threats and to threaten the Soviet Union. The beginning of the strategic relation between Israel and the United States started with the protection of pro-west Jordan by Israel from the pro-Soviet Syrian invasion⁵. During the Regan Era the strategic cooperation between Israel and America reached record levels largely because of Israel's assumed importance as a buffer against the Soviet expansionism. The end of the Cold War witnessed scholars and policy makers analyzing American foreign policy towards the Middle East with renewed vigor. Major studies conducted in this theme revealed key perceptions.

With the demise of the Soviet Union the central interest to contain Moscow is no longer the guiding principal of United States foreign policy. However, this does not mean an end to American interests in the Middle East. Several analysts argue that in a world where the importance of a many regions will see a significant drop, (namely Europe); the overall level of importance of the Middle Eastern region to the American interests will remain roughly as it was during the Cold War. This will be so for three basic principal reasons. Firstly, instability and war will continue to characterize much of the region. Secondly, any turmoil in the region will threaten the key American interest of oil and concerns

³ US Department of Commerce, "Strengthening America's Communities Initiatives."

URL-<http://www.commerce.gov/SACI/index.htm>, Internet site accessed on 5 February 2005

⁴ See footnote 1 Gabriel Sheffers p 81

⁵ Relations between the two countries have been estranged since the British left Palestine in 1949 and the neighbouring Arab States which, included Syria among others, attacked the new state of Israel. Border conflicts have often graduated to major military interventions. The Golan Heights is the major area of friction and contention between Israel and Syria after the 1949 armistice. Relations between the two countries over the issue can be divided into two periods. The first is the period before 1967 when the Heights were under Syrian control. The second period, from 1967 to date, is characterized by Israeli occupation of the Heights, and Syria's attempt to regain sovereignty over them.

about the spread of nuclear weapons and lastly America will continue to maintain its ties with Israel while trying to balance out its other security concerns⁶ continuing American economic and security assistance to Israel acknowledges these ties and signals United States commitment. The broad issues of Arab-Israeli peace have been a major focus in the American-Israeli relationship⁷. Not only has the end of the Cold War not undermine these concerns it will in reality perhaps highlight them.

It also became clear that any assumption that the end of the Cold War will usher in a new era of peace has been shattered. The security issues did not disappear, as it became evident that there are circumstances in which a new security threats might arise. The destruction of the "old order" seems to have freed enemies to revive conflicts in a new mode. What it meant was a continuous attention towards security. In effect the post Cold War security environment was different but not better.

In the Middle East the sources of conflict are indigenous to the region and will not go away because of the absence of the great power rivalry. The super powers had aggravated the clashes in the region through arms sales. Now the United States in the words of Richard Haass finds itself a "reluctant sheriff" of managing regional instabilities. The realization that the Israeli- Palestine peace process would be unlikely to end the instability in the region as there are a number of conflicts that do not stem from the Arab-Israeli dispute, mounted the concerns of the United States.

The insecurity and the instability in the region also accumulated the concerns of the United States as it imported half of its petroleum needs from here. Fro instance the fact that the Persian Gulf states controls the majority of the world reserves of oil and natural gases, has made it a critical factor in the formulation of United States Middle East policy especially with regard to Israel and Egypt. Some have argued that the America's dependence on Persian oil will not threaten American interests as the market forces will

⁶ See footnote 1 Gabriel Sheffer p 94

⁷ US Department of State, "Israel", URL- <http://www.state.gov/p/nea/ci/israel/>, Internet site accessed on 5 February 2005

protect these interests. Other point out that due to the impact of culture and religion, economic, rationales alone have not necessarily worked in the Gulf region. Thus any instability in the region may cut of oil production regardless of the economic costs. A vivid example of this was seen by the United States when after its defeat in the 1991 Gulf War, Iraqi forces burned the Kuwaiti oil pipelines. America has realized that if the Persian Gulf oil is disrupted for a long period of time it could lead to disastrous consequences for the American economy.

Other global concern also impacted United States foreign policy towards the Middle East. Apart from oil the American perception of the major threat to American interests was from nuclear proliferation. A nuclear attack represents to America a physical threat to its people and allies. As a consequence far from allaying the fears, the disintegration of the Soviet Union increased concerns about nuclear proliferation. In particular now, that there was no restraining influence of the Soviet Union on the global proliferation and on its Community of Independent (CIS) Nations⁸. Further, American assessment included the danger of the spread of biological and chemical weapons in the wake of he end of the Cold War that has compelled a redefinition of the national interests thus accelerating a shift that had begun to emerge because of the rising levels of interdependence and the appearance of new issues on the international arena.

Assistance Programmes in United States Middle East Policy.

With the end of the Cold War, aid levels to the Middle East did not change notably. Military aid to the Middle East continued to be the highest. Evidence also pointed to the fact that most of the bilateral security aid was devoted to Israel and Egypt. Israel and Egypt remained important allies of the United States in a region that was perceived to be fundamentally unstable and dangerous. In particular, Egypt's political stability was an important factor in the Middle East peace process. Not only did it have along term

⁸ CIS, community of independent nations established by a treaty signed at Minsk, Belarus, on December 8, 1991, by the heads of state of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. The organization was conceived as the successor to the USSR in its role of coordinating the foreign and economic policies of its member nations.

relation with the American military, it was also a voice that the Arab world was most likely to listen to. Israel's importance was undiminished given its proactive American policy.

The continuing American support to the peace process meant that there were distinct objectives. Amid all the alliances and "special relationships" that abound Americas foreign policy in several regimes, the United States-Israel connection stands alone in its complex, tenacity and domestic political impact. Several analysts suggest that this tiny nation of six million people half-way across the world often occupies and indeed preoccupies more of the United States public landscape and political energy than even its oldest allies, Great Britain and France or its nearest neighbours, Canada and Mexico.⁹ Further it also suggests that the American interests will continue to be engaged by developments in the Middle East because America will continue to be concerned about Israel. Israel, in this view, occupies a position of being a 'super power' in the Middle Eastern region solely because of American arms assistance policy. Its vast military strength is without parallel in the Arab world and it is this foundation of military power that has given Israel a decided advantage over the other nations of the region. Implied in this view is the inestimable support provided by the United States in the post Second World War years. To illustrate Secretary of State Warren Christopher describing the relation between Israel and the United States had said that, "the relationship between the United States and Israel is a special relationship for special reasons. It is based upon shared interests, shared values and a shared commitment to democracy, pluralism and a respect for the individual."¹⁰ The emphasis is on both countries sharing the same values and that they are both democracies with a commitment to preserving the rights of the individuals.

However, it was during the Cold War that the relation became strategically important. Describing the significance of the bilateral relationship, an astute observer pointed out that in the fifty years since the creation of the state of Israel the United States Israel

⁹ Samuel W. Lewis, "The United States and Israel: Evolution of an Unwritten Alliance", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 53, No. 3 (Washington DC, Middle East Institute, Summer 1999), p.364

¹⁰ Alex Chapman, *Begin's Israel Mubarak's Egypt*, (London, WH Allen, 1983), p.13.

relations have involved from “cool and distant” relationship to one which is very special to both. The Cold War was one of the most significant elements guiding United States Middle East policies from 1945-1990. ‘Israel’s key interest in the United States was Washington’s support in the Arab Israeli dispute. The supply of weapons and aid, diplomatic support and intelligence cooperation were crucial during the heights of the conflict ... the American strategic interest in Israel on the other hand, focused on the global cold war competition with the Soviet Union. Israel was western and democratic in orientation and occupied important strategic ground in a region speckled with pro-Soviet Arab regimes.’¹¹ In effect, both sides for different reasons promoted better ties with each other. Military assistance became the centerpiece of this burgeoning relation. While this continued during the 1960’s and the 1970’s, the Carter presidency moved the policy towards peace between Israel and its neighbours. For instance it was during the Presidency of Jimmy Carter that America started playing an active role in initiating the Arab Israeli Peace process. ‘The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel remains an enduring testimonial to President Carter’s relentless presidential diplomacy.’¹² During the Reagan era, the relationship with Israel was once again seen through the Cold War lens, with Israel as the loyal ally. However, President George H.W. Bush, like President Carter before him, realized that brokering an Arab Israeli peace was in the vital interests of the United States. American initiatives thus continued to build on Israeli Egypt peace treaty.

In the aftermath of the victory of American arms in the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91 a period of significant hope and promise for the Middle East dawned¹³. President Bush continued the momentum by initiating the *Madrid Peace Conference* (1991) which was the first instance of face to face negotiations between Israel and its immediate enemies. The conference, jointly sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union on October 30, 1991, which was laying the foundation of the Middle Eastern Peace Process, was the result of American Secretary of State James Baker's shuttle diplomacy in the eight months following the Gulf War. ‘For the United States, this was the first “opportunity” to

¹¹ Adam Garfinkle, “US-Israeli Relations after the Cold War”, *Orbis*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Philadelphia, Foreign Policy Research Institute Fall 1996), p 558.

¹² *Ibid*, p 560

¹³ Augustus Richard Norton, “America’s Approach to the Middle East: Legacies, Questions and Possibilities”, *Current History*, Vol. 101, No. 651 (Philadelphia, Current History Inc., January 2002), p. 6

reshape the strategic balance in the Middle East without the countervailing influence of the Soviet Union and in the absence of a single Arab power that professed responsibility for mutual deterrence vis-a-vis Israel'¹⁴. The conference was designed to serve as an opening forum for all the participants, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, having no power to impose solutions or veto agreements. Two parallel negotiating tracks were established by Madrid: the bilateral track and the multilateral track. Four separate sets of bilateral negotiations put Israel together with Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinian delegation, intended to resolve past conflicts and sign peace treaties. These were the first ever direct talks between Israel and its immediate Arab neighbors and were followed by a dozen formal rounds of bilateral talks which were subsequently hosted by the US Department of State in Washington. The multilateral negotiations targeted issues that concerned the entire Middle East, such as water, environment, arms control, refugees and economic development.

A notable feature of the Madrid Conference was the absence of a separate delegation representing the Palestine Liberation Organisation. The Palestinian delegates were part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. This was primarily because the Palestine Liberation Organisation's position in the post Gulf War period was weakened by its alignment with Iraq. Although the Organisation denied supporting Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the Organisation was widely seen as Saddam's most enthusiastic supporter outside Iraq. During this period military assistance to Egypt and Israel continued. They got military assistance worth two and three billion dollars respectively. However there were tensions between Israel and America over disagreements over the \$10 billion that Israel had requested in loan guarantees¹⁵. However this in no way affected the military assistance that was being given to Israel.

The election of President Clinton introduced a significant change of emphasis in the United States approach to the Middle East Peace Process. The administrations security

¹⁴ Naseer Aruri, "Oslo's Muddled Peace", *Current History*, Vol.97, No.615 (Philadelphia, Current History Inc., January 1998), p. 7

¹⁵ Congressional Quarterly, *CQ Almanac 1991*, (Washington, Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1992), p.269.

programs were designed to support economic development as well as peace and democracy. President Clinton demonstrated his administrations strong willingness to support democratic regimes because of his stated belief that democracies are more peaceful and make better allies than any other type of governments. Thus, in the military sale one sees that the United States continued to supply Israel with arms. During Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's visit to the United States in 1997, both the President and the Prime Minister agreed to increase contact between the Arab states and Israel for better ties. They stated that for meaningful peace terrorism has to be defeated for "...the pursuit of terrorism and peace are incompatible..." They decide to review there "...shared efforts to combat terror including a two year \$100 million program to allow Israel to invest in research and development for new technologies to procure state of the art security equipment..."¹⁶ President Clinton also assured the Israeli Prime Minister of United States unshakable determination to continue helping Israel meet its security needs by providing F-15I fighters to strengthen the Israeli defense forces and cooperation of the theater missile defense through early warning systems and defensive programs like the Arrow to reduce Israel's fears of an attack from the enemy¹⁷. During a visit by the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in March 1997, President Clinton said, "Since the Camp David Accords in 1979 Egypt has been a powerful force for peace in the Middle East. Egypt's role is vital to complete the circle of peace with the revival of negotiations between Israel, Syria and Lebanon."¹⁸ He went on to say that the US-Egypt partnership for economic growth and development has made a real difference by creating new growth opportunities for the people of Egypt and the Middle East.

The emerging security environment and the dynamic' nature of threats to the United States moved from conventional weapons to issues of 'weapons of mass destruction' and nuclear non proliferation. Given these facts the United States was going to continue to maintain strategic tie with Israel so as to a have dependable ally in its concerns over the

¹⁶ William J Clinton, Public Papers of the President, Book I January 1 to June 30 ,1997,(Washington, USGPO, 1998), p.152

¹⁷ Ibid, p 152.

¹⁸ William J Clinton, Public Papers of the President, Book I January 1 to June 30, 1997, (Washington, USGPO, 1998), p.269

spread of the weapons of mass destruction, the spread of Islamic radicalization and the impact of terrorism. However, the President realized early on that it would be impossible to maintain a relation with Israel by overlooking the relations that America shares with the other nations in the region and the relation that Israel (its principle ally) shares with its neighbours. To achieve peace in the region he undertook several initiatives, these are the Oslo Accord (1993), Israel-Jordanian Peace Treaty (1994), Oslo II (1995), Wye River Memorandum (1998), and Camp David II (2000).

‘In the early days of the Clinton Administration, conventional wisdom saw it as the most Israel friendly administration ever. Both in its rhetoric and behaviour, the administration bolstered this perception ... diplomatically no other issue of US foreign policy received greater attention than Arab-Israeli peace.’¹⁹ Although he clearly emerged as an Israel sympathizer, Clinton also managed to instill confidence in the Palestinian leadership urging them to come to the negotiating table. ‘Clinton offered himself as a mediator and as an approachable President. In reality he had made it clear that his election mandate was an ‘America-first’ approach. Whereas the Bush administration had a globalist outlook, the Clinton Administration’s prime concern in its foreign policy was to subordinate United States foreign involvements to American interests.’²⁰

The spirit of *Oslo* replaced the spirit of Madrid in September 1993 which represented a real change in Arab-Israeli diplomacy. In September 1993 the governments of Israel and the Palestinian delegation representing the people of Palestine agreed to put an end to the decades of confrontation and conflict and to recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation²¹ through the political process that had been agreed in Madrid in 1991 Officially called the ‘Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government

¹⁹ Shibley Telhami, “From Camp David to Wye: Changing Assumptions in Arab Israeli Negotiations”, *Middle East Journal*, Vol.53, No.3, (Washington DC, The Middle East Institute, Summer 1999), p.379

²⁰ Paul J White and William S. Logan, *Remaking the Middle East*, (Oxford, New York: Berg, 1997), p 270

²¹ *Declaration of Principle on Interim Self Government*, URL-<http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsourc/Peace/dop.html>, Internet site accessed on 6 February 2005

Arrangements,' the accords were negotiated secretly by Israeli and Palestinian delegations in 1993 in Oslo, Norway, guided by Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Jorgen Holst.

They were signed at a Washington ceremony hosted by American President Bill Clinton on September 13, 1993, during which Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin shook hands, ending their decades as sworn enemies. The Oslo Accords, as they came to be known, laid out the long-term goals to be achieved, including the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and the Palestinians' right to self-rule in those territories. Accordingly, the two sides agree to establishing a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years. Permanent issues such as Jerusalem, refugees, Israeli settlements in the area, security and borders were deliberately excluded from the Accords and determined as not prejudged. The interim self-government was to be granted in phases. Until a final status accord was made, West Bank and Gaza would be divided into three zones:

Area A - full control of the Palestinian Authority.

Area B - Palestinian civil control, Israeli military control.

Area C - full Israeli control²²

The break through of this agreement was that the Israeli government recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people while the Palestine Liberation Organization recognized the right of the state of Israel to exist and renounced terrorism, violence and its desire for the destruction of Israel. It also helped that 'shortly thereafter , President Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher rounded up dozens of foreign leaders to attend a "pledging conference" to promise more than two billion dollars of economic aid for the West Bank and Gaza to help launch the new Palestinian Authority to be put in place under the Oslo

²²URL- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oslo_Accords, (this site is an online encyclopedia) , Internet site accessed on 5 February 2005

agreement.²³ In contrast to the confidence instilled in Clinton by the Israelis, 'the Palestine Liberation Organization, which in the past saw Washington as the key to deal with Israel, ultimately decided to negotiate directly with Israel in Oslo without the United States, partly because it did not believe that it could get much out of the Clinton administration.'²⁴

In the following year the agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho was signed between the two in Cairo whereby Israel transferred the authority to govern the Gaza Strip and Jericho to the Palestinian authorities. The Oslo accords are the foundation on which current peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians are based.

The 'Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip', called *Oslo II* or Taba, was signed September 24, 1995 in Taba in Egypt, and countersigned four days later in Washington by Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. It was a follow up on the Oslo agreement that was signed in 1993. However, unlike the first time the Oslo II agreements were not a result of Norwegian diplomacy but American and Egyptian diplomacy

The actual content of the Oslo II, concerns the West Bank, and covered security issues, Palestinian elections, transfer of land, transfer of civil power from Israel to Palestine, trade conditions between the two countries and release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli prisons²⁵. Among its major provisions, it calls for further Israeli troop redeployments beyond the Gaza and Jericho areas. The agreement divided the West Bank and Gaza into three areas, each with distinctive borders and rules for administration and security controls.

The reactions to the agreement were divided, and some groups on both Israeli and Palestinian side reacted negatively, as did a couple Arab governments. On Israeli side, the

²³ see footnote 5, p.371

²⁴ see footnote 11, p. 383

²⁵ URL-http://i-cias.com/e.o/oslo2_ag.htm, (this site is an online encyclopedia), Internet site accessed on 5 February 2005

negative reactions from Likud were of special importance, due to the coming elections in 1996 (where they won, and took office). But in general, the agreement was considered positively as a continuation of the process started two years earlier in Scandinavia.

Military Assistance to Israel and Egypt in the Nineties

During the years that the agreements were being negotiated one finds that the military assistance and aid that was being given to Israel had increased marginally. Israel was allowed to spend the money allocated for military purposes and keep the proceeds and was also given defense equipment worth seven hundred million that was being removed from Europe. Israel received PATRIOT anti missiles fire units. In 1996 the Congress approved the authorization for an additional fifty million to be given to Israel for its counter terrorism programs. In the 1997 budget it was allocated one hundred and nine million for various projects by the department of defense budget.²⁶ Looking at these figures one comes to the conclusion that Israel was being rewarded by the American administrations to take part in the negotiations that were to bring peace to the region. Ones again military assistance remained a central concept in United States relations with Israel.

Thereafter, in 1998, the *Wye Agreement* was brokered between Israel and the Palestinians under the government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, brokered by the Clinton administration. It was intended to reinstate implementation of the Oslo II agreement, which had stalled as a result of growing mistrust between Israel and Palestine. Under the Wye River Memorandum signed by both sides, Israel would relinquish 13 percent of the land of which 10 percent would be turned over to Palestinian control and the rest would be turned into nature reserves. In return, Arafat agreed to take measures to prevent acts of terrorism against Israel. However, the optimism created at Wye was short lived. The main reason for this was Arafat's failure to meet the commitments he made at Wye. He went so far as to announce his intentions of unilaterally declaring an

²⁶ Clyde R. Mark , *Israel-US Foreign Assistance*, URL-<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization.pdf>, Internet site accessed on 10 February 2005

independent Palestinian state. In response, the Israeli government on December 20, 1998, reached the decision to halt Israeli implementation of the Wye Memorandum until after Arafat retracted his statement and reaffirmed his commitment to halt violence and collect illegal weapons.²⁷

The Wye Agreement was unsuccessful. In 1999, Israel put the peace process on hold. Despite this the Clinton administration in February 1999 requested six hundred million dollars in military aid for Israel and three hundred million dollars each for the fiscal year 2000 and 2001, to implement the Wye agreement.²⁸ This was in addition to the one point nine billion given in military assistance. The US which had historically taken positions on most of these matters was now reluctant to reaffirm those stances arguing that it was up to the parties to reach agreement through direct negotiations.²⁹ Finally opting for summit diplomacy, President Clinton invited the Israeli and Palestinian leaders to Camp David on 11 July, 2000 for a sustained effort to bridge the substantial gaps that still existed between them. The Camp David talks although undertaken with good intentions fell apart on a number of contentious issues including refugees, the question of Jerusalem, the problem of settlements among others. The main aspect that continued through all these developments was the military assistance.

In the case of Egypt its two most important international relations are with the United States and then Israel. A fact that underlines the Egypt-Israeli relation and cannot be denied is the total annulment of state of war between them, since signing the peace treaty in 1979. Both states have covertly and consciously avoided entering into a confrontation with each other. The durability of this fact has been tested against the backdrop of actions taken by both the sides that can be interpreted as provocative (e.g. Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, while Egypt not only reconciles relation but also welcomes Arafat). President Mubarak of Egypt has emphasized the importance of

²⁷ The Jewish agency for Israel, "The Wye Agreement 1998",

URL-<http://www.jafi.org.il/education/100/maps/wye.html>, Internet site accessed on 5 February 2005

²⁸ Clyde R. Mark , Israel-US Foreign Assistance, URL- <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization.pdf>, Internet site accessed on 5 February 2005

²⁹ Clyde R. Mark , Israel-US Foreign Assistance, URL- <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization.pdf> , Internet site accessed on 5 February 2005

negotiations over direct military action to settle disputes. In an interview to an Israeli correspondent, he re-emphasized the idea, 'If any problem arises, there is a bilateral agreement between us and we have two governments that understand each other. We will sit down and talk.'³⁰ Cooperation in the predictable area of interests has been retarded because of a spectrum of reasons from the fear emanating from the belief that cooperation with Israel will lead to domination of the Egyptian economy by Israel to extremely restrictive government policies.

Thus, the relationship operates at two levels between Egypt and Israel. On the official level Egypt seems to be playing by the rules and refraining from taking any action that might lead to military action. But on the unofficial level, the hostility remains. It's manifested through the immense negative propaganda that Egyptian media conducts against Israel. The Egyptian government partially and unofficially continues to support the general economic boycott with the other Arab states. Implicitly, the American role and its goal of promoting democracy in the Middle East have had an impact on the Israel–Egyptian relations. In particular there is a growing recognition that American strategy would continue to place Egypt in a leading role in the years to come as a moderate democratic Islamic state.

The basic aim of American policy towards Egypt since the mid- 1970's has been first, to encourage it to make peace with Israel and second, to preserve and then expand the peace by drawing in other Arab regimes as well as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). More recently the United States has begun to view Egypt as a major ally in its own right , both in terms of helping to preserve the western access to gulf oil and in the maintenance of the a general American –Israeli inspired Middle Eastern Security system. Egypt's role in this system of security is to provide bulwark to the major threats that are seen by Israel and America such as a combination of state terrorism, nuclear proliferation and the activities of rogue states. America's principle weapon in the pursuit of these goals

³⁰ Michael Bard, "How Fare The Camp David Trio?", *Orbis*, Volume 34 (Philadelphia, Foreign Policy Research Institute ;Spring 1990) p 76

has been the provision of American military and economic aid at levels equal to those that are given to Israel.

The rules of this relationship are well understood in both Cairo and Washington. Egypt has to play its role in the Arab –Israeli peace process without becoming a direct party to the negotiations (until called upon). Any movements outside the narrow parameters that have been set are subject to heavy reprimand. Egypt knows that what is really at stake is the annual two billion dollars military and civilian aid that it receives from the United States and the threat that it could be reduced or be put at risk in some other way³¹ is enough to make the Egyptian government follow the path that has been shown to the by the American administration.

After President Sadat's assassination, President Mubarak has shown great foresight and sensitivity in developing relations with Israel and at the same time managing to reintegrate Egypt in the Arab League, which had boycotted her after the Camp David Accords. Thus Egypt has followed a policy of dualism. On one hand, it promoted and supported peace with Israel, while on the other hand it championed the Arab cause. Egyptian reaction to aggressive action taken by Israel has been marked with caution, despite its disapproval of the actions. Further, Egyptian relations with Israel is conditioned by its endeavors to end the Arab imposed ostracism against it. Thus, despite the peace treaty, it continued to support the Palestinian Arabs and has linked its solution to the normalization of relations between them. This seriously disillusioned the Israelis who hoped for a separate peace with Egypt that would promote Israel in the region. For this reason, Egypt has become an important intermediary in the Arab Israeli peace process.

On 15 September 1989, President Mubarak put forward the '*Mubarak Plan*' towards an independent Palestine and ending the state of belligerency between the two sides. It was a 10-point plan that included steps like withdrawal of Israeli troops, free elections in the occupied territories etc. Shamir and the other right wing Israeli hardliners initially

³¹ Robert Chase, Pivotal States, (New York, WW Norton, 1999), p.124-125.

rejected the plan, but were later persuaded to accept it, especially when the American Secretary of State, James Baker reformulated it into a more acceptable 5 point plan. Egypt later formed part of the delegation along with the United States that met with the Israeli foreign minister. Mubarak had also offered to host in Cairo the opening dialogue between Palestinian authorities and Israelis to discuss the Shamir Plan. Egypt played an important role in ending the state of violence between the Palestinians and the Israelis. Israel trusted her because of their alliance that had been established through the Camp David Accords and as an Arab state, Palestine could depend on it. As one writer commented, “suddenly the entire peace process seemed to hinge on the Egypt’s ability to persuade the PLO to give green light to the Palestinians in the occupied territories to enter into a dialogue with Israel on election proposal...”³² Thus Egyptian role as an intermediary between Arabs and Israelis became established, especially after her boycott to the Arab League ended in 1989.

The Gulf War Of 1991 that began with Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, was followed America taking military action against Iraq with the support nations world wide, including a number of Arab states, once again threw this volatile region in turmoil. Egypt was opposed to Saddam Hussein’s aggression against Kuwait and by virtue of this played an essential role in the resulting Madrid Peace Conference in 1991. Egypt was involved in both the multilateral and bilateral talks, which was attended by both the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel. Egypt’s role as an intermediary to the peace initiatives reached a new epitome, as it became a crucial negotiator in the historic Oslo Peace Process in 1993 and played an extremely high profile role in the implementation of the various phases of the Oslo agreement. Egypt carried forth its role in improving relations between the other Arab states and Israel by encouraging states like Syria and Jordan to enter into a dialogue with the Israeli authorities. In 1996 Egypt participated in a conference in Damascus with Syria and Saudi Arabia to discuss peace initiative with Israel.

³² Walid Khalid, Palestine Reborn, (London, I.B. Taurus and Co. Ltd.; 1992), p.172-173

Egypt has thus, played a crucial role in the evolution of the Israeli Arab peace. By being the first to enter into a peace treaty with Israel, it helped the other Arab states cross an important psychological barrier. Its constant efforts have been aimed at the integration of Israel in the Middle East. Egyptian initiative is however not based alone on ideological principles, but is also influenced by the fact that it had a crucial role to play as a regional hegemonic power, by virtue of its unique position as the only and later the oldest Arab State to have relations with Israel. It could thus serve both Arab and Israeli interest. However, one has to acknowledge the fact that the Egyptian regime does not function in a vacuum. It has to take into consideration the various domestic and international factors that condition its responses.

One of the factors that it has to keep in mind is the concern its actions would evoke in the United States and its consequent reaction that might affect the aid granted to it. It has been said that “all Israeli bodies are certain that the Egyptians are still committed to peace with Israel – not out of love for Zion, but because they wish to preserve strategic ties with the United States and the annual flow of billion dollars from Washington...”³³. Egypt is the second largest receiver of American aid. As part of the 1979 Camp David peace accords, the United States agreed to provide substantial amounts of aid to Israel and Egypt to promote economic, political, and military security. That aid, which for years totaled five billion for the two countries, is paid through the Economic Support Fund (ESF) and the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. Of that total, Israel received three billion (one point two billion in economic funds and one point eight billion from the military financing program), and Egypt received two billion (eight hundred and fifteen million from the ESF and one point three billion from the FMF program)³⁴. Between 1991 and 1995 Egypt has signed an arms deal worth nine billion with the United States alone. Israeli defense experts believe that this effort on Egypt’s part to increase her defense capability should be taken seriously. Especially considering the fact that Egypt’s

³³ Council for Foreign Relations, “Strengthening US Egyptian Relations”, URL-www.cfr.org/pub4603/special_report/strengthening_the_usesyptian_relationship.php , Internet site accessed on 10 February 2005

³⁴ Congressional Budget Office, “150 International Affairs”, URL- <http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=1845&sequence=5>, Internet site accessed on 11 February 2005

to rearm itself comes after nearly twenty five years of adhering to the peace treaty. They argue that the main reason behind Egypt's drive to arm itself is related to Israel's nuclear position. 'The United States' relationship with Egypt, and particularly with Egypt's military, is a critical asset to it's interests. The American military presence in the Gulf and the region at large is dependent on a logistical pipeline that runs through Egypt. No matter how vocally Cairo may oppose American diplomatic tactics or military planning, it has never failed to grant America over flight rights, basing, or transit through the Suez Canal. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, American aircraft flew across Egypt to the Gulf, and during the October 1997 crisis with Iraq, Egypt granted passage through the canal for the USS George Washington in an unprecedented 12 hours. Sustaining American military operations in the Gulf without Egyptian cooperation would be difficult, if not impossible. The political and strategic reality is that decreases in American assistance are sure to affect Egypt's willingness to cooperate so speedily and effectively. Furthermore, American military aid enhances Egypt's ability to operate jointly with American forces.³⁵ Moreover, it is important to recall that Egypt has, in the past, committed troops on several occasions to support U.S. policy initiatives. Thus some would argue that an assessment of the costs and benefits of America's one point three billion in military aid suggests that maintaining the program at current levels "no increase, no decrease" is the approach that best advances U.S. interests.

The American military cooperation has helped Egypt modernize its armed forces and strengthen regional security and stability. Under FMS programs, the United States has provided F-4 jet aircraft, F-16 jet fighters, M-60A3 and M1A1 tanks, armored personnel carriers, Apache helicopters, antiaircraft missile batteries, aerial surveillance aircraft, and other equipment. The United States and Egypt also participate in combined military exercises, including deployments of American troops to Egypt. Each year, Egypt hosts Operation Bright Star, a multilateral military exercise with the United States., and the

³⁵Robert Satloff & Patrick Clawson, "US Military Aid to Egypt",
URL- <http://meria.idc.ac.il/news/1998/98news11.html#U.S.%20MILITARY%20AID>, Internet site
accessed on 15 February 2005

largest military exercise in the world. Units of the American 6th Fleet are regular visitors to Egyptian ports.³⁶

Egypt has been concerned with talks in the American congress with view to reducing the amount of military assistance that is being provided to Egypt. Egypt-Israeli relations has undergone a severe setback in the wake of reports that Prime Minister Sharon has himself asked the American president for a roll back on Egyptian aid. A bill was approved by the congress to accept a ten year gradual reduction/phase out of aid to Israel and a fifty percent reduction in aid for Egypt³⁷. Israel on its part has proposed phasing out its \$1.2 billion a year in economic assistance payments while increasing its military assistance by six hundred million dollars a year. The 1999 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act endorsed that proposal with a ten-year phase-in. As a result, it cut economic aid to Israel by a hundred and twenty million and increased military aid by sixty million dollars. The conference report also reduced economic assistance to Egypt from eight hundred and fifteen million in 1998 to seven hundred and seventy five million in 1999--and proposed cutting it to four hundred and fifteen million by 2008--while keeping military aid constant. It asserted that increased military assistance to Israel was necessary because "the [country's] security situation, particularly with respect to weapons of mass destruction, has worsened."³⁸

As for Egypt, some analysts say U.S. assistance to that country is not being spent wisely or efficiently and it is the reason that its military assistance has remained constant at about two billion dollars. However, there are others who point out that with the increase in the peace initiative as a result of the number of peace treaties that have been signed, threats to Egypt have been reduced to a large extent. As part of the 1979 Camp David peace accords, the United States agreed to provide substantial amounts of aid to Israel

³⁶ Anon, "Egypt Military Facilities", URL- <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/egypt.html> , Internet site accessed on 16 February 2005

³⁷ , Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation: A Review of Government and Politics 105th and 106th Congress, Vol. X, 1997-2001, (Washington DC, Congress Quarterly Press,2002), p186

³⁸ Congressional Budget Office, "150 International Affairs", URL- <http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=1845&sequence=5> , Internet site accessed on 11 February 2005

and Egypt to promote economic, political, and military security. With the level of cooperation increasing between Israel and Egypt and with Egypt being able to recover the position that it lost in the Arab world as a result of signing a peace treaty with Israel in 1979 it has been understood that security threats to Egypt have greatly decreased.

The rivalry between Egypt and Israel is not confined to achieving a better understanding with United States alone, but has translated into a competition for regional hegemony. Cairo is determined to retain its role as the Arab leader and does not want to be absented from any major peace process that might lead to reintegration of Israel into Middle East. Egypt is also concerned about the fact that Israel's peace with other Arab states might make it lose the dominant role as the crucial intermediary between Arabs and Israelis, and hence its position as an authoritative power in the Middle East affairs. This might also have an extended consequence in terms of American aid. If Israel enters into peace with the other Arab states, Egypt's utility as an ally for American backed interest shall decline and might affect the huge aid that it receives. Hence, Egypt is at constant loggerheads to prove it worth in the region in competition with Israel.

Israel for its part wants to bypass Egypt as an intermediary in the peace process. It is eager to establish direct relations with the other Arab states without any interference from Egypt. It is aware that if it achieves peace with these states it will not only solve its security issues, it will also achieve over lordship over these state.

To argue that Egypt and Israel share a 'Cold Peace' would be too hurried. Though the period immediately following the Camp David agreement might have seen little development towards normalization it is incorrect to say that there has been minimal interaction between the two states. Even if they disagree with each other they do maintain relations. Moreover with the increased number of peace initiatives that have been initiated, both are in invariable contact with each other. Undoubtedly, Egypt and Israel both have grievances against each other and differences, which need to be resolved. But this should not undermine the success they have achieved in staying out of a conflict and their ability in trying to resolve issues through diplomatic initiatives.

War on Terrorism and Foreign Military Assistance

A 'war on terrorism' was declared by the American President George W. Bush after the World Trade Center towers were attacked by terrorist on September 9th 2001. The attacks lead to the death of over three thousand people and damage worth millions of dollars. This war on terror was actually a war that was being re-declared. The first such declaration was twenty years before, when the Regan administration had declared a war on terrorism as the core of the American foreign policy. That was had been declared on state sponsored terrorism, the most virulent form of "the evil scourge of terrorism"³⁹. The difference that has come about since the last time war was declared on terrorism is that today terrorism is mostly a stateless phenomenon. There are a number of states that may be supporting a terrorist organizations but the organization in themselves are stateless and therefore very difficult to fight.

As many analysts have observed, today militant Islamic fundamentalism is different from its terrorist predecessors. They do not seek personal renown. They are not for hire. They sacrifice their lives for the triumph of Islam. They are believers in the service of Allah. Contrary to the terrorism of 1960's and 1970's they do not strike at random. They are part of an organization that has set objectives. They are committed to their leader and are ready to die for the cause⁴⁰. They are much more dangerous than the 'ordinary terrorists'. Experts attribute the Muslim hatred for the west in general and America in particular to their support for Israel. This is true only to a certain extent. To them the west represents the last attempt to destroy their distinct way of life. Thus for them the only way out is through the destruction of the western civilization of which America is the leader. As Osama Bin Alden has said "The Americans are the main enemy"⁴¹.

In discussing the war on terror the President Bush expressed the view that the terrorist assault on American soil "was the culmination of decades of escalating violence -- from

³⁹ Noam Chomsky, Middle East Illusion: Peace, Security and Terror, (New Delhi, Penguin Publishers, 2003), p 235.

⁴⁰ Fereydoun Hoveyda, The Broken Crescent: The Threat of Militant Islamic Fundamentalism, (London, Praeger Publishers), p 143

⁴¹ Ibid p 149

the killing of U.S. Marines in Beirut, to the bombing at the World Trade Center, to the attacks on American embassies in Africa, to the attacks on the USS Cole. In another way, September the 11th provided a warning of future dangers -- of terror networks aided by outlaw regimes, and ideologies that incite the murder of the innocent, and biological and chemical and nuclear weapons that multiply destructive power.”⁴²

The events of September 9, 2001, according to Vice President Dick Cheney, changed the way America “...thinks about threats to the United States. It changed about our recognition of our vulnerabilities. It changed in terms of the national security strategy that we need to pursue.” The administration argued that they see the world differently because the world is different. The attacks thrust the United States into a new and different global awareness. The transformation in worldview has in turn altered the global environment and for better or for worse the world is increasingly one of the United States’ making.⁴³

In the United Nations the Security Council adopted resolution 1373 calling for suppression of finances o terrorist organizations and individuals and improving international cooperation. The most important aspect of this resolution was that it called upon all the states to report to the United Nation within ninety day the progress that they had made in implementing the resolution. Post September 9, 2001, the administration has focused all its foreign and military policy on the war on terror. Apart from the brief period of cooperation what one sees is the administrations unilateralism in decision making. The Bush administration has undertaken several innovations in its military doctrines. This includes *military preeminence* –which is to serve a set of enduring national interests that are to be secured by force, if necessary. *Capacity building planning-* which gives more priority to anticipating the capacities an advisory may employ. And *preemptive war-*the administration feels that our best defense is offense. Immediate threat is no longer the trigger for preemption the threat is immanent.⁴⁴

⁴² Office of the Press Secretary , “President Discusses War on Terror, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair”, March 8, 2005, URL- <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050308-3.html> , Internet site accessed on 23 February 2005

⁴³ Neta C.Crawford, “The Road to Global Empire: The Logic of US Foreign Policy After 9/11”, *Orbis*, Vol.48, No. 4,(Philadelphia, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Fall 2004), p 684-686

⁴⁴ *ibid* p 693- 695

In its national-security doctrine of pre-emptive military strikes against “evil” regimes the United States has sidelined both the United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty Organization members in the search for a “coalition of the willing” to oust Iraq’s Saddam Hussein. Though both Israel and Egypt were named as not part of this coalition they were part of the “economic coalition of the willing” and also provided political support to the actions undertaken by America. And in support for this Israel was given an additional six hundred million dollars above its military assistance package to fight terrorism and other threats. In February 2003, for the first time, Congress voted to cut aid to Israel against the wishes of the pro-Israel lobby and the government of Israel. The 0.65 percent deduction was not aimed at Israel; however, it was an across the board cut of all foreign aid programs for fiscal year 2003. The lobby and government also suffered a defeat when Congress deleted an administration request for an extra two hundred million dollars to help Israel fight terrorism. Even while cutting aid to Israel (which still was budgeted at two point one billion for military aid and six hundred million for economic assistance), put this in congress chapter too Congress included a number of provisions in the aid bill viewed as favorable to Israel, including a provision that bars federal assistance to a future Palestinian state until the current Palestinian leadership is replaced, and that state demonstrates a commitment to peaceful coexistence with Israel, and takes measures to combat terrorism. The setbacks were also temporary as the Administration approved a supplementary aid request in 2003 that included one billion in Foreign Military Financing and nine billion in loan guarantees to aid Israel's economic recovery and compensate for the cost of military preparations associated with the war in Iraq. One quarter of the FMF is a cash grant and three quarters will be spent in the United States. The loan guarantees are spread over three years and must be spent within Israel's pre-June 1967 borders. Each year, an amount equal to the funds Israel spends on settlements in the territories will be deducted from the loan amount, along with all fees and subsidies. The total does not include funds for joint military projects like the Arrow missile (for which Israel has received more than one billion in grants since 1986), which are provided through the Defense budget.⁴⁵ American foreign policy post September 2001 attack combines both

⁴⁵Mitchell Bard, “U.S. Aid To Israel”, URL-http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/foreign_aid.html, Internet site accessed on 15 February 2005

fear and urgency. However, this current logic is dangerous for two reasons; firstly, though the vulnerability of American and Americans has not reduced the fear has become institutionalized in the foreign policy which is leading it to preemptive strikes and isolation in the international arena. Secondly, the belief that to achieve the end of global peace any steps the United States takes is justified is fuelling resentment and distrust, especially with the Muslim world.

Chapter three

Institutional Dynamics of Military Assistance Policy: President, Department of State and Department of Defense

Between Wilson Churchill's famous speech saying "an iron curtain has descended across the continent..." in 1946 to the building of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and then the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait in 1991, a global era had ended. The collapse of the Warsaw pact, the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet States are milestones in history. They represent the success of the decades of consistent effort on the part of the United States and its allies. However, the demise of the Eastern Bloc was the ending of one era but the beginning of another era for the United States.

The aftermath of the Cold War was very different from the aftermath of the two world wars. The Cold War had shaped American foreign policy but with the end of the Cold War the set of paradigms or themes that unified and determined the American foreign policy were no longer available to the foreign policy advisors and decision makers. America's role in the international system was no longer defined by a single existential threat. American primacy was unprecedented and uncontested

It became obvious that the nation no longer needed to devote the same level of resources to military defense. A new strategy that balanced the military and the other instruments of national power had to be devised. It was also realized that the patterns of engagement that had shaped American foreign policy especially its policies regarding military security would not suffice for the future. Further, the policies have to rigorously be measured against competing domestic requirements and possibilities¹. It was recognized that there must be new and compelling reasons for the engagement of the American people in the outside world.

There were other changes that impacted the American policy making. For instance, it was perceived that traditional conflicts between and within states harm the innocent common man, while, regional instabilities transmit shock waves throughout the interconnected global world. American perceptions of major global phenomenon also paved the way for the different things, for example, globalization shortened distances, and created new opportunities for economic growth. It is expanding the exchange of ideas, providing an

¹ Brand Roberts, US Foreign Policy after the Cold War, (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1992), p.6

impetus for political freedoms. Conversely, it is also adding in the spread of unconventional weapons technology, along with the unmatched power of the terrorists to harm the United States, its allies and its friends have proved to be very dangerous. The latter aspect has been driven home when the 11 September 2001 attacks occurred in New York City.

The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11 2001 forced America to see clearly that foreign policy still matters. After the attacks many Americans asked the question 'why did they do that to us.' In trying to find the answers the Americans have realized that they affect the lives of others in an increasingly interconnected global world. It made the administration in the United States aware that if it did not want engage with the world, the world will engage with it through ways and means that it may not find acceptable. Many would say that the attacks brought into focus the defense policies of America. Once again Americans are in a period of increasing contention over foreign policy. In such a dangerous world a renewed focus on military assistance policy in the Middle East became significant. Threat assessment by both the Departments of States and Defense revealed that American policy in the Middle East was in the process of major overhaul. The military assistance policy, in particular, became part of the overall National Security Strategy (NSS), to meet the new challenges of global terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and rogue states.

Foreign Military Assistance: Role of Department of State and Department of Defense in Aid to Egypt and Israel.

Within the Executive Branch, the Department of State is the leading agency for foreign affairs, and has often been termed within the cabinet as 'first among equals'. The Secretary of State is the president's foremost foreign policy advisor. This is in part because the State Department is the sole agency of the government which is charged with the coordinating the entire range of American activities overseas. It is also the department

that houses the Foreign Service, the professional diplomatic corp. of the United States². The Department continues its objectives of influencing American interests in determining a freer, more secure, and more prosperous world through its primary role in developing and implementing the President's foreign policy.

The principal aims of the Department of State and United States Aid Agency (USAID) are anchored in the President's *National Security Strategy*. The strategy is based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of its values and its national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better³. The strategy has three underlying and interdependent components- diplomacy, development, and defense.

In its mission statement, the Department of States outlined successfully its new focus on global terrorism, international crime, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction are new challenges born of traditional ambitions. Confronting these threats effectively is beyond the means of any one country, and calls for principled American leadership aimed at achieving effective coalitions that magnify our efforts to respond to these critical challenges. These aims strengthen Americas traditional alliances and help it to build new relationships to achieve peace and security, but when necessary, to act alone to protect its national security.⁴ Regional instability has been a most important concern of the Department, as it fears that the escalation of conflicts would put a strain on the existing alliance of the United States. For instance, the Israeli Palestinian issue has been of major concern because of the United States special relation with Israel. As has been noted, America will negotiate peace in the region but not at the cost of a threat to the security of Israel.

² Charles W. Kegley & Ugin Wittpkof, *American Foreign Policy: Policy, Patterns and Processes*, (New York, St. Martins Press, 1996), p.343

³ White House, *US National Security Strategy*, (Washington, USGPO, 2002), p 1

⁴US Department of State, "Mission Statement: Strategic Plans Fiscal Year 2004-2009",

URL <http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/23503.html> , Internet site accessed on 16 March 2005

In its 'Mission Statement' for fiscal years 2004 to 2009, the Department of State affirmed that it wanted to create a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international community. The statement declared the strategic objectives and goals as the Department and USAID are committed to protecting American national interests and advance peace, security, and sustainable development. The key priority areas are the Arab Israeli Peace process and democracy and economic freedom in the Muslim world⁵. Through the *Middle East Partnership Initiative* (MEPI), which was launched in April 2003, the Department has established a model of providing assistance. The initiative started by the department promotes efforts to expand democracy in the Greater Middle East, including doubling funding to \$80 million for the National Endowment for Democracy and increasing funding to \$150 million for the Middle East Partnership Initiative⁶. The department is focusing on bringing about economic reforms in the Middle East especially in Egypt, which is not just a close ally but as the moderate leader of the Muslim world the most likely to be followed on the path of reform by the other states in the region.

In its request for military assistance appropriation in the fiscal year 2004 the department stated that the foreign military assistance programs are critical foreign policy tools that are used to promote American interests around the world by insuring that coalition partners are equipped and trained to work towards common security goals. It affirms that the majority of the funds, about 78%, provide continues assistance to the Middle East. It is a tool to boost the legitimate needs of countries such as Israel, Egypt and Jordan, who have demonstrated their keen desire for peace by taking part in the various peace processes⁷. In its Congressional Budget justification for the Fiscal Year 2005 the department clarified that the United States has a strong interest in a stable, democratic and economically and militarily strong Israel. It stated that maintaining qualitative edge of the Israeli Defense Forces in the regional balance of power enhances Israel's security; helps prevent regional conflict and builds the confidence necessary for Israel to take

⁵ ibid

⁶ US Department of State, "Department of State and International Assistance Programs", URL- <http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/aid/fy2005/FY05.html> , Internet site accessed on 15 March 2005

⁷ US Department of State, Budget Request Fiscal Year 2004, (Washington, USGPO, 2003), p 199

calculated risks to achieve peace⁸. In justifying the foreign military assistance that is being provided to Israel by the United States, the department maintained that aid is crucial for Israel's multi-year defense modernization plans and maintain its Qualitative Military Edge. It emphasized that the cash flow will help the Israeli government in the procurement of American origin systems such as the F-16 fighter aircrafts, attack helicopters and advanced armaments⁹.

Within the Department of State, the *Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PMA)*, headed by an assistant secretary, is the principal linkage between the Departments of State and Defense. The bureau is in charge of harmonizing various programs of the Department of State and Defense so that there is smooth functioning and the resources are utilized optimally. The Bureau offers strategy direction in the areas of international security, security assistance, military operations, post-conflict stabilization, and defense trade. The bureau is instrumental in the State Department's efforts to accomplish three major goals under the United States Strategic Plan for International Affairs:

- **Combating Terrorism:** in the War on Terrorism being fought globally the bureau works towards that includes securing base access and coordinating the participation of coalition combat and stabilization forces, and promoting critical infrastructure protection.
- **Regional Stability:** It promotes stability around the world by fostering effective defense relationships with key friends and allies; regulating arms transfers; promoting responsible American defense trade; controlling access to military technologies; combating illegal trafficking of small arms and light weapons; negotiating status of forces and base access agreements; and facilitating the education and training of international peacekeepers and other foreign military personnel.

⁸ US Department of State, *Congressional Justification for budget for Fiscal Year 2005*, (Washington, USGPO, 2004), p7

⁹ *Ibid*, p421

- Humanitarian Assistance: The bureau manages humanitarian mine action programs around the world and works with the Defense Department to provide assistance¹⁰.

In the war against terrorism the State Department has been eager to reward and reinforce America's allies. To do so the United States has stepped up military assistance to allies old and new. The State Department request for the budget for fiscal year 2003 was \$25.4 billion, which was more than \$1.4 billion up from the previous year's budget. About \$5 billion of \$25.4 billion international affairs budget request is officially designated for the war on terrorism. This includes: \$3.4 billion for programs such as Foreign Military Financing and Economic Support Fund.¹¹ Top recipients include major allies in the war on terrorism such as Israel and Egypt. In its annual report on the '*Patterns of Global Terrorism*' (2003) the State Department expressed that the Middle East continued to be the region of greatest concern in the global war on terrorism. The Egyptian and United States Governments continued to deepen their already close cooperation on a broad range of counterterrorism and law-enforcement issues in 2003. Israel has also maintained staunch support for American led counterterrorism operations as Palestinian terrorist groups conducted a large number of attacks in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip in 2003¹². While these numbers pale in contrast to the budget presented by the Pentagon, security assistance has increased substantially. In addition, limitations on military assistance and arms transfers to regimes involved in human rights abuses, support for terrorism, or nuclear proliferation have been lifted for a number of countries in exchange for their support in the American administration's war on terrorism.

While The Department of State is the 'program manager' for military assistance programs it is the Department of Defense (DOD) that implements these programs. The

¹⁰ US Department of State, "Bureau of Political Military Affairs", URL- <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/> , Internet site accessed on 15 March 2005

¹¹ Figures have been taken from an article by Michelle Ciarrocca "Increases in Military Spending and Security Assistance Since 9/11", An Arms Trade Resource Center Fact Sheet, URL-<http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/news/SpendingDOD911.html> , Internet site accessed on 16 March 2005

¹² US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism-2003:Middle East Overview, URL-<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/31638.html> , Internet site accessed on 15 March 2005

Department of Defense has enormous policy making influence because of the size of the organization and its monetary powers. Historically it has been considered to be the most powerful among all the other departments. The Department of Defense is responsible for defending the United States of America while helping to promote American interests globally. The Secretary of Defense is the president's chief advisor on matters related to American defense. Both the departments share these responsibilities, of planning, development, and execution of foreign military assistance programs.

For the Defense Department the foreign military assistance programs are very helpful. It aids friends and allies of the United States to deter and defend against aggression and contributes to sharing the common defense burden. The Security assistance programs of the department allow the transfer of defense articles and services to international organizations and friendly foreign Governments via sales, grants, leases, or loans to help friendly nations and allies deter and defend against aggression, promote the sharing of common defense burdens and help foster regional stability. It also includes such diverse efforts as the delivery of defense weapon systems to foreign governments, and assistance in establishing infrastructures and economic bases to achieve and maintain regional stability¹³. The reason behind providing such assistance is that when the United States assists these nations in meeting their defense necessities, it is contributing towards its own security as well. For the Defense Department the Military assistance enhances national security and helps reduce regional tensions and promote regional stability.

According to the departments the Quadrennial Defense Review 1997, the foremost threat of coercion and large-scale, cross-border aggression against American allies and friends in the Middle East, the potential for conflict will remain until there is a just and lasting peace in the region and security for Israel. Of particular concern to the defense department, is the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery; information warfare capabilities; advanced conventional weapons; stealth capabilities; unmanned aerial vehicles; and capabilities to access, or deny access to, space. The proliferation of these weapons especially in the Middle East, where the

¹³ URL-[http://www.dsca.osd.mil/PressReleases/faq.htm#What%20is Security%20Cooperation](http://www.dsca.osd.mil/PressReleases/faq.htm#What%20is%20Security%20Cooperation) (this is a Department of Defense website) , Internet site accessed on 17 March 2005

proliferation of advanced technologies provides means to threaten regional security and terrorize Israel and Egypt¹⁴.

The department has constantly maintained that military assistance to Israel and Egypt along with the other states of the Middle East is required to protect the United States geopolitical interests. The department feels that the assistance is helpful in its “new planning construct which calls for maintaining regionally tailored forces forward stationed in the Middle East¹⁵” to safe guard against any contingencies.

Within the department of defense the *Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)* is the principal organization through which the Secretary of Defense carries out its responsibilities towards the various military and non-military assistance programs.

Though the Departments of State and Defense play an important role in foreign policy making especially in foreign assistance programs, it is the president who is in control of the policy making processes. According to President Regan, “In the areas of defense and foreign affairs, the nation must speak with one voice, and only the president is capable of providing that one voice.¹⁶”

The American President combines the roles of chief of government and chief of state. He holds the most powerful office in the world. Because the presidency embodies both these roles the general public tends to evaluate it by standards that are contradictory¹⁷. It has been noted that while the public would like the Congress, the other constitutional body that they elect which they tend to trust more than the office of the chief executive, to take a more dominant role in policy making yet in practice the presidents they like are the ones who take the lead and the Congress they like is the one that follows¹⁸.

¹⁴ US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 1997,
URL- <http://www.comw.org/qdr/97qdr.html> , Internet site accessed on 17 March 2005

¹⁵ US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2001,
URL- <http://www.comw.org/qdr/010qdr.html> Internet site accessed on 17 March 2005

¹⁶ See footnote 2 Charles W Kegley & Ugin Wittpkof, p.338

¹⁷ Garry S Brown, The American Presidency, (New York, WW Norton & CO,1988), p, 3

¹⁸ Michael Nelson, The Presidency and the Political System, (Washington DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1990), p.13-15

Presidents and Foreign Military Assistance

The 1990's have been dominated by presidents who had very strong personalities.

President George H. Bush was elected in 1988. Before taking over the office of the president he had served as vice president in President Reagan's administration. His administration was witness to the dramatic events in Eastern Europe in 1989 followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union eliminating the Cold War. The end of the Cold War brought with it the criticism of military assistance and aid by members of the Congress and public. The *1991 national security strategy statement* envisioned security assistance supporting three fundamental elements of American defense strategy: Crisis response, reconstruction and the forwards presence of American armed forces. The statement asserted that the security assistance "must enhance the ability of other nations to enhance our deployment". The 1993 national security document reiterated these themes but also said that the time had come to 'refashion' security assistance.

It was in his presidency that the Gulf War (1990) was fought when Iraq invaded the neighbouring state of Kuwait. For America, access to the gulf's vast oil resources, was intrinsically critical for its economy and security. The president led a coalition of thirty two nations including Britain and France. The coalition also included a number of states from the Middle East, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Egypt was, in fact, instrumental in gathering support for the America in the Middle East before the war after it had tried to resolve the issue through mediation but failed. The very fact that the President allowed Egypt to assemble support for the American led war points to the significance that Egypt has achieved in American Middle East policy. Egypt is a pivotal country in the Arab world and a key American ally in the Middle East. America, knows that Egypt as a regional power and because of its moderate views is trusted both by the America itself as well as the Arab nations.

It has been in the interest of America to maintain the support to Egypt towards its policies. America has made all possible contributions to the development of Egypt. The United States on the request of the president provided \$4.6 billion in military loans, \$12.6 billion in military grants and over \$20 million in international military education and

training funds to Egypt over the decade of the nineties with an average of \$1.1 billion a year. In September 1990 President Bush requested the Congress to transfer Egypt's entire \$6.7 billion military debt to the Defense Department so that it could be canceled. The President felt that Egypt was critical to the entire Middle East peace process and the coalition¹⁹. This was the reward Egypt received for being a part of the 'Operation Desert Shield' against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The Senate signed in to law the proposal by the President, thus providing the canceling Egypt's military debt to the United States²⁰.

It was only after the end of the Gulf war in 1991, that the United States could turn its attention towards the Arab Israeli peacemaking, believing that there was a window of opportunity that could be used for political gains, as a result of the victory over Iraq. The victory of American arms in the Persian Gulf War inspired a period of significant hope and promise for the Middle East²¹. But unlike other American efforts, President Bush did not believe that there was any need for new assistance and aid commitments²². He initiated the *Madrid Conference* in the fall of 1991 laying the foundation of the Middle East Peace Process. The peace process represented the most ambitious Arab- Israeli negotiations since the Camp David Accords signed under the presidency of President Carter. For the United States, this was the first "opportunity" to reshape the strategic balance in the Middle East without the countervailing influence of the Soviet Union and in the absence of a single Arab power that professed responsibility for mutual deterrence vis-a-vis Israel²³. It symbolized the result of the eight months of shuttle diplomacy done by Secretary of State James Baker following the Gulf War. The Madrid peace conference was a watershed event. For the first time, Israel entered into direct, face-to-face negotiations with the Palestinians. For Israel the conference was important because the talks were held under the premise of the Security Council Resolution 242 (1967), which calls on all parties to the conflict to negotiate a solution and states that Israel will

¹⁹ George Bush & Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, (New York, Alfred A Knopf, 1998), p 360.

²⁰ Clyde R Mark, *Egypt-United States Relations*, (Washington, Congressional Research Service, 2004), p. 10

²¹ Augustus Richard Norton, "America's Approach to the Middle East: Legacies, Questions and Possibilities", *Current History*, Vol. 101, No. 651 (Philadelphia, Current History Inc. January 2002), p. 6

²² Scott Lasensky, "Paying for Peace: The Oslo Process and the Limits of American Foreign Aid", *The Middle East Journal* Vol. 58 No. 2 (Washington, The Middle East Institute, Spring 2004), p. 215

²³ Naseer Aruri, "Oslo's Muddled Peace", *Current History*, Vol. 97, No. 615 (Philadelphia, Current History Inc., January 1998), p. 7

withdraw its forces secure borders in exchange for peace guarantees from the Arab parties. The conference also recognized the importance of Security Council resolution 338 which calls on all parties to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately. But the Madrid process seemed to go nowhere after eleven round of talks between Palestinian and Israeli delegations in Washington, Rome and Moscow.

The election of President Bill Clinton initiated a considerable change in emphasis that was given to the Middle East Peace Process by the United States administration. He took several initiatives in bringing the parties to the negotiating table to discuss contentious issues. Notable among these are the Oslo I (1993) and Oslo II (1995) Accords, Wye River Memorandum (1998), Camp David II (2000).

The central objective of the Clinton administration, that came to occupy the White House in 1993, was to promote democracy and stability and free market economies. It was under the Clinton administration that the United States truly started to follow a post containment foreign policy. This was nowhere more evident in the President Clinton's national security statement that linked four principle elements of foreign policy to security assistance: maintaining strong military forces with a peace time forward presence commitments, responding to global threats that are posed by terrorism²⁴ and the spread of biological and chemical weapons, supporting multilateral peace operations and perhaps the most important was the promotion of democracy and human rights. These statements gave the security assistance a prominent role in strengthening America's ties with its allies and friends.

Regionally, foreign military assistance continues to be synonymous with the Middle East. Israel and Egypt are the largest recipients of military assistance from the United States. As a consequence of the various peace processes Jordan and the West Bank/ Gaza Strip have also received assistance.

²⁴ James Lindsay & Randall Ripley, US Foreign Policy after the Cold War, (Pittsburg, University Press of Pittsburg, 1997), p 226

After the failure of the Madrid conference, *Oslo* (1993) came to represent a new Arab-Israeli diplomacy. The Declaration of Principles, which was signed, laid the foundation of peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. It was decided by both the parties that they would invite the Governments of Egypt and Jordan to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives, on the one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them.

The *Oslo II* or *Taba* was the second stage in a three-step process agreed upon in the Declaration of Principles. The first phase in the process was finalized in May 1994, when an accord was signed in Cairo, Egypt, for the pullout of Israeli troops from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank town of Jericho and the handing over of administrative duties to the Palestinian National Authority, led by Arafat. The final agreement on the second stage of eventual Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian lands was finalized in Taba, Egypt. In 1999, Egypt once again made accessible its good offices for the *Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum* which restated the commitment of the two sides to full implementation of all agreements. The memorandum was signed in Egypt by Ehud Barak, newly elected Prime Minister of Israel, and Yasser Arafat. The ceremony was attended by Hosni Mubarak, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, His Majesty King Abdullah, King of Jordan, and Madeleine Albright, United States Secretary of State. President Clinton said that Egypt deserves credit for holding these talks "...and it could have taken place in no other place other than Egypt."²⁵

In 1996, the President designated Egypt a Major Non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization Ally. For the United States, Egypt represents a somewhat 'democratic regime' in an area that is predominantly ruled by centralist, authoritarian governments. Consequently, there is a commitment on the part of the American administration to continue to support Egypt despite claims of violation of human rights. It is also the one moderator that both parties in the Middle East conflict are willing to trust; as a result the United States has time and again allowed Egypt to play such a significant role in the Middle East peace process.

²⁵ William J Clinton, Public Papers of the President: January 1 to June 30 1996, (Washington, USGPO, 1997), p 439.

America recognizes the importance of Egypt as regional power that supports the American position with regards to peace in the region. The United States wants to promote regional peace and security by encouraging Egypt's continued participation and leadership in Middle East peace efforts.

The Wye River Memorandum (1998) was signed between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization. It marked a clear transformation for the America's role since its minimal role in the Oslo peace process. Previously the United States acted as a facilitator and mediator using its political office and security assistance but with the Wye agreement America assumed the role of an arbitrator and a referee, and with this new role came an even greater reliance on American assistance and aid

To fund the movement of troops and military installations out of the occupied areas as agreed upon in the Wye agreement Israel requested the United States for an additional \$1.2 billion aid. In February 1999, the American administration requested \$ 600 million in military assistance for Israel and \$ 300 million each in military assistance for the fiscal year 2000 and 2001 to implement the Wye agreement²⁶. This was despite the fact that Israel laws not complying with the accord. This assistance was asked under the Wye agreement supplementary aid issues. The Bush administration also lobbied hard for the supplementary aid bill to be a part of the fiscal year 2000 foreign aid bill. Though the Congress approved the bill some members were irked by what they saw as "Clinton's commitment rather than an American commitment". In March 1999 the defense department announced the sale of arms to Egypt that amounted to \$3.2 billion. The congress also approved an addition \$ 425 million in military assistance as part of the Wye agreement even though his administration had not requested the additional funds²⁷.

While presenting the 1999 budget the president stated that our strategic interests in peace in the Middle East is as strong as ever. The peace process has achieved much already. America plays a unique leadership role in the efforts to craft a durable, comprehensive

²⁶ Clyde Mark, Israel- US Foreign Assistance, (Washington, Congressional Research Service, 2003) p. 2

²⁷ Clyde Mark, Egypt- United States Relations, (Washington, Congressional Research Service, 2003), p. 10

regional peace. In his budget he proposed \$5.3 billion for security assistance to sustain the Middle East peace process. The budget also provide the state department with \$2,8 billion to maintain its world wide operations²⁸ for compliance with security needs of America. The President after the Wye agreement had said that, "the United States is determined to help in whatever way it can²⁹." In a press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the President agreed to increases the contact between the two countries as well as contact between Israel and its Arab neighbours for better ties. They stated that terrorism had to be defeated for the "pursuit of peace and the practice of terrorism are incompatible...³⁰" The two heads of state decided to review their shared efforts to combat terrorism including a two years \$100 million program to allow Israel to invest in research and development for new technologies, to procure state of the art security equipment. The President took this opportunity to reaffirm "...Americas unshakable determination to continue helping Israel meet its security needs. This included the delivery of F-15I fighters to strengthen the Israeli air force and cooperation of theater missile defenses through the early warning systems and defensive programs like the Arrow..."³¹ to reduce the fears of Israel of a missile attack by the enemy.

The Bush Administration's foreign policy is based upon a clear-eyed understanding of the challenges of this new century. It comprehends both the traditional and the transnational factors shaping the post-post-Cold War world. It is guided by the principle of integration, but recognizes that success is by no means inevitable. There is a natural tendency in any system toward entropy.

The basic factors that influenced the Bush Administration in its policy toward the Middle East conflict were Clinton's failures in that area. There is also continuity between the Bush and Clinton approaches to security policy in the Middle East. Both are premised on vigorously exercising the unique prerogatives that attend America's status as the world's sole military superpower. Both see America's unmatched capacity to act wherever it

²⁸ US Government, Budget Fiscal Year 1999, (Washington, USGPO,1998), p 127

²⁹ William J Clinton, Public Papers of the President of the United States: July 1 to December 31,1998, (USGPO, Washington, 2000), p1837

³⁰ William J Clinton, Public Papers of the President of the United States: January 1 to June 30, 1997, (Washington, USGPO,1998), p152

³¹ Ibid, p 152.

might choose worldwide as a pivotal asset in the effort to maintain United States global leadership. The Clinton administration phrased this activism in terms of containing instability and expanding the democratic space in the world. George W. Bush has a more defensive approach -- but it is neither less active nor less globalist³².

The Bush administration initially had a "hands-off" policy toward the Middle East. However, the al-Qa'ida terrorist attack on the United States of September 11, 2001, had a defining impact on the administration. Following the terrorist attacks the Bush administration officials repeatedly said that "everything has changed", it aroused uniquely strong and persistent support among Americans for vigorous military action abroad.

There has been a definite shift in American foreign policy after the September attacks. In a major policy statement issued in September 2002 and titled the National Security Strategy, the president declared, "It is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength," and he detailed two significant new uses of that might: pre-emptively attacking would-be enemies, as in Iraq, and preventing rivals from even considering matching America's strength³³.

President Bush called the War on terror- "the first war of the twenty-first century". The events of 9/11 were both world changing and world view changing. President Bush stated in a joint session of the Congress, "that American's have known the casualties of war but never in a peaceful cityand never before on civilians." According to Vice President Dick Cheney the vent has "changed the way we think about threats to the United States." and Secretary of State Collin Powel said that, " ...it's a new kind of threat."³⁴ In his address to Congress nine days after the September 11 attacks, President Bush declared war on global terrorism and announced his intent to deploy "every resource at our

³² Carl Conetta, "The Pentagon's New Budget, New Strategy, and New War: Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Report #12", URL- <http://www.comw.org/pda/0206newwar.html> Internet site accessed on 21 March 2005

³³ James Sterngold, "After 9/11, U.S. policy built on world bases", San Francisco Chronicle, URL-<http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2004/03/21/MNGJ65OS4J1.DTL> Internet site accessed on 21 March 2005

³⁴ Neta Crawford, "The Road to Global Empire: The Logic of US Foreign Policy after 9/11", *Orbis Vol.48, No.4*, (Philadelphia, Current History Inc. Fall, 2004), p.685.

command" to defeat terrorist networks and to treat states that harbor and support terrorism as "hostile regimes."³⁵ As reported by the *Post* the Bush administration sent a classified memorandum to Congress on 2 November 2001, proposing the additional arms sales to Egypt. The Department of State publicly acknowledged the proposal on 29 November 2001 in a press briefing. The goal was ostensibly to help improve the security of a friendly country "which was and continues to be" an important force for political stability in the Middle East.

Immediately after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the United States sought to build a coalition, including Muslim states. In perhaps no corner of the world does the counterterrorism paradigm have the potential to transform U.S. policy more than in the Middle East. In its attempts to gain Arab support, the United States announced its support of a Palestinian state. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon agreed to let Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and Arafat to establish yet another ceasefire, despite the fact that Palestinian violence had not stopped.

It was only after the victory of America over the Iraqi forces of Saddam Hussein in 2002 that the Bush administration was finally able to divert its attention to launch the *Road Map* for peace from the Middle East. However, once the road map was launched President Bush did nothing to make sure that Israel complied with the provisions of the accord. This was blamed largely on the administration's lack of understanding of the issues that were involved and its reluctance to confront the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon³⁶ especially after the support that he had provided America in its war in Iraq (2000). There were also domestic pressures from the supporters of Israel in America.

The road map was supposed to be a performance-based and goal-driven roadmap, with clear phases, timelines, target dates, and benchmarks aiming at progress through reciprocal steps by the two parties in the political, security, economic, humanitarian, and institution-building fields, under the auspices of the Quartet which included the United

³⁵ James B. Steinberg, "Counterterrorism: A New Organizing Principle for American National Security?" *The Brookings Review*, Vol. 20 No. 3, (The Brookings Institution Press, Massachusetts, Summer 2002), p. 4.

³⁶ Kathleen Christison "All those Old Issues: George W Bush and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 2, (Berkeley, University of California Press, Winter 2004), Pg. 38

States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia. It was a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will only be achieved through an end to violence and terrorism³⁷. The Middle East roadmap makes clear that all sides must take immediate steps towards this two-state vision which meant an immediate end to violence and terrorism in the region. The Bush administration has signaled its intention to keep the Middle East a region of priority but they have indicated that their priority in the area at the moment is Iraq and Saddam Hussein. The administration's Middle East Arms control initiative is aimed at halting the proliferation of conventional and unconventional weapons in the region³⁸. In the authorization bill that was passed by the congress in 2000 for the fiscal year 2001, the Middle East was authorized \$3.1 billion in military aid and counter proliferation programs. This was much more than what President Clinton had requested. The extra money was requested because 98% of the money was going to Egypt, Israel and Jordan for the Middle East peace process. The bill provided two million to Israel in military assistance. The bill also authorized a number of counter proliferation programs.

The United States has provided Israel with over \$95 billion in economic and military assistance since 1949 and Israel continues to receive the largest share of American security assistance worldwide. Foreign military training, both as provided under the Foreign Military Financing and from the Department of Defense funded non-security assistance, is important in maintaining Israel's qualitative military edge. The principle behind the United States commitment to Israel's qualitative edge is straightforward: Israel will always be militarily outnumbered with regard to the artillery, tanks, and combat aircraft that can be deployed by a coalition of Arab states. By providing both technical expertise and exposure to American military culture and personnel, these programs contribute significantly to the strengthening of American-Israel military ties. It is in the national interest of the United States to promote a stable, democratic and militarily strong Israel that is at peace with its neighbors. However, during the 1990's, scholars started to

³⁷ Department of State , "A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Press Statement", URL- <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.html> Internet site accessed on 23 March 2005

³⁸ Congressional Quarterly Researcher, "The Middle East Conflict", (Washington Congressional Quarterly Inc. Winter 1999), p288.

question Israel's qualitative edge against whom? which countries are counted as part of the combined threat potentially facing Israel. The issue of how to treat countries that have signed peace treaties with Israel was delicate. On one hand, the United States has argued that Egypt is not a threat to Israel, and the entire military aid program to Egypt is based on the premise that Egypt is at peace with Israel. On the other hand, the America tactically accepted Israel's point that it cannot ignore Egypt's capabilities when calculating the military balance in the region, because a change of government in Egypt could change matters³⁹. President G W Bush has reiterated the steadfast America's commitment to Israel's security, to the maintenance of its qualitative military edge, and to strengthening Israel's ability to deter potential aggressors and defend itself. Maintaining Israel's qualitative military edge in the regional balance of power enhances Israel's security and helps prevent regional conflict.⁴⁰ Since the attacks the United States is giving more than \$4.5 billion in military and economic assistance to Israel and Egypt this is more than 30% of the total assistance that was proposed for the fiscal year 2002, of this Israel is getting \$2.7 billion. President Bush has proposed a \$5.1 billion increase in foreign military aid and a \$38 billion increase in defense spending⁴¹ to prepare America to fight the global war on terrorism. This massive aid being given to Israel has raised question of whether increasing foreign aid will help America fight terrorism its number one concern at the moment. The former secretary of state Madeline Albright has said that American foreign aid program is preparing the people in counterterrorism and strengthening democracy. It has been able to achieve a number of goals that are a part of American national security⁴².

Egypt plays a key role in America's Global War on Terrorism and in fostering regional stability by acting as a dependable alliance partner. It also offers its invaluable support to the Middle East Peace Process. Funding under the Department of Defense

³⁹ Jewish Center for Public Affairs, "Maintaining Israel's Qualitative Military Edge: Dilemmas for the Bush Administration", URL- <http://www.jcpa.org/art/brief1-12.htm> Internet site accessed on 18 July 2005.

⁴⁰ Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, "Foreign Military Training: Joint Report to Congress, Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005 Report, State Foreign Policy Objectives--Near East Region", April 2005, URL-<http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2005/45675.html> Internet site accessed on 23 March 2005

⁴¹ CQ Researcher, "Foreign Aid After September 11" Vol.12, No.16, (Washington, Congressional Quarterly Inc, April 2002), p 365

⁴² Ibid, p382

Counterterrorism Fellowship Program provides the Government of Egypt the ability to maintain its counterterrorism framework in supporting Operation Enduring Freedom. Since 9/11, Egypt has granted over-flight permission for a large number of American military fighter planes and the planes of the coalition partners. It has granted permission for the passage of over eight hundred American Navy ships.

As a return for the assistance that Egypt has been providing the United States, America has supplied Egypt with numerous incentives. Egypt has been replacing its outmoded Soviet-era equipment with smaller quantities of more capable and sustainable American equipment. Increasing the amount of American origin equipment in the Egyptian inventory augments America's interoperability with Egypt. It also enhances Egypt's value as a coalition partner and increases its negotiating powers within the Arab world so much so that Egyptian officials and businessmen visited in Israel early 2005 to discuss the creation of Egyptian-Israeli qualified industrial zones (QIZs), which would give them free trade access to America markets. They seek to emulate Jordan's example, the most successful example to date of United States-Arab free trade⁴³.

Egypt's military capabilities and personals funded and trained under the foreign military assistance programs of the United States improve counterterrorism operations. Attendance at the United States military command and staff colleges and service academies advances leadership skills and improves understanding between our militaries. All of these programs directly enhance joint training. Egypt participates in a number of annual joint military exercises, and hosts the biennial Operation Bright Star, the largest United States military training exercise in the world.

Egypt is and will remain a strategic ally for the United States. Egypt has been at peace with Israel for over two decades. Its strategic location and control of the Suez Canal make it a critical transit point for general commerce, and petroleum shipments, as well as for

⁴³ Benjamin Orbach, "Egyptian Officials Visit Israel to Discuss QIZs", Daily Star (Beirut), March 25, 2004, URL-<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=519> Internet site accessed on 23 March 2005

transiting U.S. forces. The importance of Egypt's cooperation for Suez Canal access and security, as well as over flight clearances cannot be overstated⁴⁴.

The United States, like all other countries, seeks to make a foreign policy that is in accord with its interests. American diplomacy in the 21st century is based on the fundamental beliefs that its freedom is best protected by ensuring that others are free; American prosperity depends on the prosperity of others; and our security relies on a global effort to secure the rights of all. The United States has an immense responsibility to use its power constructively to advance security, democracy, and prosperity around the globe and will pursue these interests and remain faithful to its beliefs.

The principle cold war justification for foreign assistance has vanished with the disintegration of the 'red army threat', thus it is understandable that the levels of assistance especially foreign military assistance would fall. However, there is still a rationale for continuing with foreign assistance programs. In the post cold war environment they were used for strengthening American presence abroad, assisting newly democratic countries, maintaining ties with old allies and key friends and supporting the Middle East peace process⁴⁵ and recently the America has linked its foreign assistance programs to the support to fight and end terrorism. The United States has invested huge amounts of financial capital in the Middle East and has used foreign military assistance diplomacy as a key instrument for protecting its interests and promoting its policies there. Since 1973, America has provided the region with assistance that exceeds \$100 billion. There have been different reasons for providing this assistance. After 1993, it has primarily been used to play a major role in promoting an Israel-Palestinian political settlement. Nonetheless, the United States has to understand that while foreign assistance from

⁴⁴ Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, "Foreign Military Training: Joint Report to Congress, Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005 Report, State Foreign Policy Objectives--Near East Region", April 2005,

URL-<http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2005/45675.html> Internet site accessed on 28 March 2005

⁴⁵ See footnote 24, James Lindsay & Randall Ripley, p.233. See also United States House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Middle East and Central Asia of the Committee on International Affairs, Hearings, "The Future of US- Egyptian Relations", 108th Congress 2nd Session, 16 June 2004,

URL- http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intrel/hfa94279.000/hfa94279_of.htm Internet site accessed on 18 July 2005.

Washington represents the tangible manifestations of United States' political and security guarantees, underwriting peace is not the same as buying peace⁴⁶.

The challenge for American foreign policy is to understand its strength and into develop them into something long-term, a world where its way of life is secure and universal. The values it promotes are embraced as principles, not exceptions nor are they seen as threats to existing morals. George Kennan stressed over five decades ago one of the major weapons in American foreign policy arsenal was "the cultivation of solidarity with other like-minded nations on every given issue of foreign policy." In the post-Cold War world, it still is.⁴⁷ With Egypt, the administration positioned that the search for a comprehensive Middle East peace remains a part of the bi-lateral relations with Egypt. Annual assistance policy of \$1.9 billion in the year 2004 is part of the American strategic engagement with Egypt who is expected to play a role with respect to Iraq, promotion of regional economic activities and support for the War on Terror⁴⁸ Aid is central to Washington's relationship with Cairo. The money is seen as bolstering Egypt's stability, support for US policies in the region, US access to the Suez Canal, and peace with Israel⁴⁹. As to the assistance Secretary for political and military affairs confirmed, the twenty five year legacy of strong United States-Egypt military relations would continue to advance United States strategic interests. He stated how a non NATO ally (since 1996) has been a strategic partner of United States governmental regional stability objectives in the Middle East. He cited Egyptian support in Operation Enduring freedom (OEF), Operation for Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and the Road- Map for peace as evidence of the continuation of United States assistance policy. Security assistance is the 'bedrock' of American political military relations with Egypt and provides strategic benefit to America. The focus in 2005 would include International Military Education and Training (IMET) (\$1.2 billion

⁴⁶ See footnote 22, Scott Lasensky, p 233

⁴⁷ Dick Howard, "What's New After September 11?" URL-<http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/howard.html> Internet site accessed on 28 March 2005

⁴⁸ United States House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Middle East and Central Asia of the Committee on International Affairs, Hearings, "The Future of US- Egyptian Relations", 108th Congress 2nd Session, 16 June 2004, URL- http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa94279.000/hfa94279_of.htm Internet site accessed on 18 July 2005.

⁴⁹ Charles Levinson, "\$50 billion Later: Taking Stock of US Aid to Egypt", (The Christian Science Monitor 12 April 2004), URL- <http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0412/p07s01-wome.html>. Internet site accessed on 18 July 2005

in fiscal year 2005 budget) which spur interoperability and coalition activity. Also in place are the annual Military Cooperation Committees (MCC) chaired by the Secretary of Defense. These meetings are seen as the 'core elements' in the strategic dialogues that discuss the challenges of working together. It was also pointed out that the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) would manage weapons release while keeping a close watch on the Qualitative Military Edge of Israel. For Israel American assistance is seen as a guarantee to sustain its military an edge over its neighbours and deter any potential adversaries.

As President George W. Bush expressed, American foreign policy in the 21st century, is "distinctly American internationalism" with the "great and guiding goal" of extending democracy and peace to the citizens of war torn autocratic undemocratic regimes of the world. According to the president the goal can be achieved, only when the United States is "focused, patient and strong" and concentrates on its long-term national interests, while working closely with its allies and remaining active and involved in the world. The United States has to now actively support the nations of the Middle East, the Baltics, and Central Asia, to promote regional peace and economic development and opening them to world.

Chapter Four

**Congressional Debate, Accommodation and
Concurrence on the United States Military
Assistance to Egypt and Israel**

The collapse of the Soviet Union forced the first major rethinking of the foundations of American foreign policy in more than forty years. The demise of the Soviet empire fuelled the debate over the new goals of American foreign policy. Along with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United States was facing the rising powers like of the China and its sale of ballistic missiles technology to many of the third world countries. The erosion of American's economic competitiveness at the international scale along with the continuing strength of the economies of the East and South East Asia and the economic unification of Europe seemed to threaten America's power. As one study noted the choices that America makes with regards to these foreign policy issues today will determine the role that it will play in world affairs in the next few years.¹

United States foreign policy involves both the Executive and the Congress. However, scholars have paid little interest to the unique role that Congress plays in this². Discussions mainly revolve around the question of the 'proper role' that the Congress should play. Evidently the role designed for the Congress in the formation of United States foreign policy is in contrast to the role played by the president. While the constitutional structure the executive branch headed by a single individual- the president- has more importance than the Congress in making foreign policy decisions, many argue that it does not undermine the importance of the legislative branch. They point to an array of Congressional influences that are visible in matters that are routine yet very significant. These include the details of foreign assistance both economic and military, humanitarian assistance and international trade.

Congressional Role in United States Foreign Policy

The American Congress is arguably the most powerful legislature in the world. It possesses four characteristics that combine to make it unique.

¹ Randall P. Ripley & James M. Lindsay, Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol Hill, (Michigan, University of Michigan Press, 1993), p.3

² Herbert F. Weisberg & Samuel C. Patterson, Great Theater: The American Congress in the 1990's, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 248

- It is the single most important institution for determining the substance of the American public opinion.
- It serves as a forum for the expression of genuine disagreements over policies.
- Its members are chosen by routinely recurring free, honest, competitive elections.
- Vigorous national print and electronic media subject the institution and its members to constant scrutiny.³

The Congress shares its policy making powers principally with the executive branch. The interaction between the two branches is responsible for the detailed decisions about what specific policies to pursue⁴.

It has to be kept in mind that the Congress's role in foreign policy matters is not restricted to the passing of laws. The Congress uses three major indirect routes to influencing foreign policy; one is to engage in behavior that will result in predictable behavior in the executive branch. A second is the passing of the procedural laws and the third involves the Congress to try to frame public opinion⁵. Thus its role is vital to the formation of any policy.

The power of the Congress to authorize expenditures and to allocate funds for the operation and programs of the government remains one of its most potent instruments for shaping both foreign and domestic policy. The legislative prerogative in the foreign affairs is the "power of the purse" or the congressional control over expenditure of funds for governmental programs both at home and abroad. It is within the power of the Congress to determine the course of American diplomacy by virtue of its control over the expenditure of the federal government. In order to legislate wisely and effectively the lawmakers must acquire information relating to the conditions and problems that are being faced by America at home and abroad. It is on the basis of this information that the legislators are better prepared to evaluate alternative courses of action that may be available to the federal government for responding to the problems both inside and

³ Randall Ripley, Congress: Policy and Process, (New York, WW Norton, 1988), p.3

⁴ Ibid p.5

⁵ See footnote 3 Herbert F. Weisberg & Samuel C. Patterson, p 250

outside of the United States. In addition to having the power to investigate, the Congress has the power to evaluate existing programs and judge its merits as well as the performance of the officials who administer it. Congress has the responsibility of determining if its programs are being executed as intended and if the money that it appropriated is being spent on the purposes for which the money has been authorized. Oversight is the method for supervising both the program and the bureaucrats who administer it.⁶

The Congress in the Isolationist Era-

In the first hundred and fifty years there is much to support the views of Hamilton's strong presidential role in matters of foreign policy. George Washington established that the president had the right to initiate the conduct of foreign policy, represent United States in its foreign relations and negotiate international treaties. Yet historical records point towards a congressional role in foreign policy. When James Monroe proposed the *Monroe Doctrine* the Congress considered it to be over stepping his authority and refused to consider the resolution endorsing the doctrine. The Congress's role in foreign policy grew much more after the Second World War, so much so that it was called the era of the "congressional government", "congressional supremacy", or "government by the Congress". Congressional pronouncements in matters of foreign policy were exercised through the Senate's treaty making powers.⁷

The ability of the Senate to use treaties to shape directions of foreign policy reached its zenith during the presidency of Woodrow Wilson. He proposed the famous fourteen point during the Paris peace talks without the consultation of the senators who were part of the delegation, with the result that the treaty was rejected by the Senate after the president refused to accept the changes in language that the Senate had proposed. As a result the United States was not part of the treaty of Versailles, whose failure was greatly blamed for the start of the Second World War.

⁶See footnote 3 Randall Ripley p 23.

⁷ James Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of US Foreign Policy, (Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 1994), p.14

With the outbreak of the Second World War the balance of power shifted from the isolationist forces on the Capitol Hill but even now any measure that was passed by the Congress that gradually committed the United States to the Allied cause was greatly debated and passed by very small margins. It was only with the attack on Pearl Harbor that the split within the Congress over the direction of American foreign policy was removed. In fact, the era of the fifties and sixties have been termed as being characterized by bipartisanship in the Congress over foreign policy goals.

The Congress has become more active in foreign policy since the 1930's. The Congress of today involves itself in an array of foreign policy issues. Some sense of the congressional activism can be made from the fact that in the 1960 edition of the *Legislation on Foreign Relations* ran a mere 519 pages, whereas the 1990 edition of the same has 5,483 pages in four volumes. While the Congress has never shied away from major issues it has become more assertive. Whereas President Lyndon B. Johnson was able to pass the *Gulf of Tonkin Resolution* through the Congress with only two dissident votes, President George H. W. Bush saw the authorization of the use of force in Iraq during the 1990 Gulf War pass by only five votes in the Senate. This has led to the question of whether the Congress is gaining powers relative to the president and the claims that the Congress is harming American foreign policy, by behaving like the imperial Congress.

Although irreconcilables and skeptics both have dominated the debates over congressional activism in foreign policy, neither have been able to describe the Congress's role accurately. The irreconcilables have grossly exaggerated the extent and effect of congressional activism. While the Congress challenges the White House the members are by no means in control of the United States' foreign policy. The president and his subordinates continue to lead.

The skeptics on the other hand equated the passing of legislation with the ability to influence policy preferences. Yet one has seen that even when the members of Congress fail to dictate the substance of foreign policy they are able to influence indirectly.

Congress and the Imperial Presidency

The cooperation between the Congress and the White House during the late 1940's had its roots in war. After the end of the war executive- legislative relations were marked by a mix of cooperation, deference and hostility. Cooperation between the two branches of the administration on foreign policy always gave way to congressional deference during a crisis. But this is not to say that the Congress always followed the lead of the White House, members of the Congress greatly debated the provisions of the annual foreign aid budget, quantity of assistance both economic and military being given to a particular country and the amount of money that was being spent on defense.

However, by the 1960's the members of the Congress had given up much of their powers over foreign policy matters to the president. Unlike in the years after the war members were not willing to demand out of the president that he consult the Congress. The era of the congressional deference came to an end with the Vietnam War. In the 1970's the Congress passed such legislation as the War Powers Act, which required Congress approval before the president committed troops to war, to curtail the growing powers and misuse of authority on behalf of the presidency.

Influences on the Congress

In the making of any policy the members of the Congress are under constant pressure from numerous sections, like the *White House*, the President and the executive branch are the most important source of external pressure exerted on the Congress. In August 1992, President Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin agreed on terms for a five year package of loan guarantees. The deal easily gained the support of the Congress. However, in September, the President asked the Congress to delay the action on the request. Many members lambasted the President and then quietly agreed to delay the matter⁸.

The *media* makes use of a lot of pressure on the Congress. The Congress faces a two way relation with the media, while on the one hand the members of the Congress have to face

⁸ US Government, *Congress and the Nation* Vol.VIII, 1989-92, (Washington USGPO, 1993), p272

intense media scrutiny for all the actions that they take, but they also have to rely on the media to inform the public of their legislative achievements and accomplishments. Further more the congressmen and women have to face the pressure of expectations of their constituents. Few members aversely oppose issues that are of vital impotence to their constituents. In the United States Jews have been viewed as very important political constituents. They constitute 2.3 percent⁹ of the electorate, yet they are a deciding factor in elections. The population is concentrated in key 'swing states' like New York that are very important for any election victory. Political parties and the political establishment have sought to be responsive to the Jewish community and its agenda. Jews, in turn, perceive themselves as political activists, engaged in advocacy, policy development, and the electoral process. Arab American voters are also important for the candidates especially in states like Michigan, but they are yet to achieve the influence cancel their Jewish counterparts sway.

Impact of Lobbies on Military Assistance.

The first amendment to the American constitution is the basis to the most powerful influence in American foreign policy decision-making — the lobby. Lobbyists and lobbies play an active part in the legislative process. They have always been a part of the American politics. There are a number of areas in which any change in the federal policy may spell success or failure for many special interest groups. The commercial and industrial interests, professional organizations, state and local level government representation of foreign interests have all sort to exert pressure on Congress to achieve their legislative goals¹⁰ and foreign policy is no different. The rapid increase in the number of interest groups in international matters is due to a number of reasons. There is a growing interdependency in world – this means that not only do governments have to work together, the decision that the government makes in foreign affairs has a direct impact on the domestic interests too.

⁹ US Census Bureau, "Statistical Abstract of the United States 2000", Section One Population, p. 62, URL-www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical-abstract-us Internet site accessed on 9 April 2005

¹⁰ Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and Policy Process, (Washington DC, CQ Press, 2001), p.30-35.

As many studies have indicated the most powerful lobby in the United States is the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) that tries to influence the Congress in favor of pro- Israel policies. In 1999, Fortune Magazine named it the second-most powerful lobby in Washington. Its other more visible components are the biggest Jewish organizations, the Anti-Defamation League, the American Jewish Committee, and the American Jewish Congress, but there are also a number of others, not the least of which is the extreme right wing Zionist Organization of America, which at the moment is extremely influential in Washington. Ardently pro-Israel American Jews are in positions of unprecedented influence within the United States and have assumed or been given decision-making positions over virtually every segment of American culture and body politic.¹¹ The American Jewish Congress is motivated by the need to ensure the creative survival of the Jewish people to advance the security and prosperity of the State of Israel and its democratic institutions, and to support Israel's search for peaceful relations with its neighbors in the region and remain vigilant against anti-Semitism¹². It takes action by drafting and promoting legislation in the Congress. The Zionist Organization of America is the oldest, and one of the largest, pro-Israel organizations in the United States. it was founded in 1897 to support the re-establishment of a Jewish State in the ancient Land of Israel. Today works to strengthen American-Israeli relations, through pro-Israel legislation on Capitol Hill, and by combating anti-Israel bias in the media pro-Israel legislation on Capitol Hill, and by combating anti-Israel bias in the media¹³.

There are a number of Arab groups that try and compete with AIPAC, but none came close in support or effectiveness. From the start, the Arab lobby faced not only a disadvantage in electoral politics but also in organization. The formal Arab lobby is the National Association of Arab-Americans (NAAA), a registered domestic lobby founded in 1972. Like AIPAC, NAAA makes its case on the basis of American national interest, arguing pro-Israel policy harms those interests¹⁴. However, the Arab nationalities living

¹¹ Jeffrey Blankfort, "The Israel Lobby and the Left: Uneasy Questions",

URL-<http://www.leftcurve.org/LC27WebPages/IsraelLobby.html> Internet site accessed on 9 April 2005

¹² The American Jewish Congress, "The American Jewish Congress",

URL- <http://www.ajcongress.org/about.html> Internet site accessed on 9 April 2005

¹³ The Zionist Organization of America, "The Zionist Organization of America",

URL-<http://www.zoa.org/aboutzoa.html> Internet site accessed on 9 April 2005

¹⁴ Mohammed Alkhereiji, "The way lobbies operate in US", URL- <http://www.inminds.co.uk/boycott-news-0050.html> Internet site accessed on 9 April 2005

in the United States are not as well organized as the Israelis. They have differing views on what is important for the region and how they should try to influence the congressmen to achieve their goals. Unlike the Israelis they do not have a very powerful organization that speaks for all of them. There are a number of organizations that represent the individual interest of the Arabs states. Thus they suffer from a negative image unlike the pro- Israeli groups. But Israeli lobby and government also suffered a defeat when Congress deleted an administration request for an extra two hundred million dollars to help Israel fight terrorism. Even while cutting aid to Israel (which still was budgeted at two point one billion for military aid and six hundred million for economic assistance).

Impact of Congress on Foreign Military Assistance Policy

Military assistance is a valuable instrument of United State's national security and foreign policy. It helps its friends and allies discourage and defend against aggression. It contributes towards the thought of sharing the common defense burden. Military assistance is a range of programs that enable friends and allies to acquire American equipment, services, and training for legitimate self-defense and for participation in multinational security efforts, such as coalition warfare.¹⁵

Military assistance is a valuable foreign policy tool. It promotes cooperation among nations; it provides the United States with overseas attendance and peacetime engagement by improving the defense capabilities of allies and friends, without encountering any problems such as allegations of forceful occupation of bases, deployment of troops and monopoly over the military equipment. Military assistance provides the United States with the opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to defending the common interests that it shares with its friends.

It has also been argued that sufficient military capability among allies decreases the likelihood that American forces will be essential if a conflict arises. Even more particularly should the need arise for the presence of American forces, they will find a

¹⁵ Anon, "Military Assistance", URL- http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr95/appendix_j.html Internet site accessed on 9 April 2005

relatively favorable situations they work with the same equipments and with troops with whom they have conducted military exercises.

As an integral part of peacetime engagement, military assistance programs contribute to American national security by enhancing deterrence, encouraging defense responsibility sharing among allies and friends. Military assistance enhances American national security by sustaining and adapting vital United States security relationships that reduce regional tensions and promote regional stability.

Programs under military assistance include Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Military-to-Military Contact Programs (MMCP), Voluntary Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). The structure of each program provides the capability to respond to the needs of foreign friends and allies by addressing their security concerns while supporting U.S. armed forces and promoting American foreign policy and national security interests.

Congressional Committees and Military Assistance.

Along with the controversies over the Vietnam War, a second factor that contributed towards the resurgence of congressional activism was the collapse of what is called the 'text book Congress'¹⁶. After the World War the major decisions of the Congress were made by a handful of very senior congressmen who were members or chairs of the various congressional committees concerned with foreign policy. But the ability of the few members to speak for the Congress as a whole began to fade with at the beginning of the 1970's. Although the committee on foreign affairs of both the House and the Senate remained important congressional actors in foreign policy but with the election of new members the Congress adopted new rules that greatly reduced the powers of the committee chairs.

¹⁶ see footnote 7 James Lindsay, p. 26-27

Congressional activism in the 1990's has been accelerated by the fall of the Soviet Union and the intense economic rivalry that the United States is facing from Japan, China and Europe. The pressures of large neglected social and economic issues on the domestic front has also meant that a number of congress men and women have tried to reign in diplomatic incentives that they deem are excessive.

Congress takes a keen interest in foreign assistance and aid. The foreign aid bill is the only regularly scheduled foreign policy debate in Congress. It is with foreign assistance, especially military assistance, that the Congress can affect foreign policy more directly than any other measure. Since foreign assistance involves the transfer of American tax payer's dollars to nonvoting foreigners, the Congress also has an incentive- albeit a highly selective one- to oversee the executive's expenditure of the funds.

Today the United States has a large number of foreign policy commitments and military bases to look after which means that the Congress has, both, many more programs to oversee and find new tools with which to influence foreign policy. One notices that over that last decade of the nineties and in to the new century the Congress has become less insular and more permeable to outside forces than before. This change has been brought about by the broader changes in the international environment.

There is a clear indication that the less the threat from the international system the more room there is for congressional involvement. Rises in threats from the international environment like war affect the capacity of foreign policy committees in questioning the executive officials.

It is well documented that the Congress functions through the various committees that it has- whether it pertains to foreign or domestic affairs. These committees are the "little legislature" within the Congress and for long, have been arenas for much of the law making work that happens in the Congress. How committees function, therefore, has a direct bearing on how the two chambers of Congress approach foreign policy. Committee's deliberations set the stage for legislating on the floor of the House or

Senate. Yet the congressional committees are marked more by stability than by change—the recent Republican changes notwithstanding. Though the Republican speaker had promised sweeping changes in the committee system there has hardly been a change. Committees in the Congress continue to function like they used to for the last hundred years.

Traditionally, the committees with primary responsibility for foreign affairs are the *Senate Foreign Relations Committee* and the *House International Relations Committee*. Both the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations have a very long and rich history. The Foreign Affairs Committee dates its roots to 1775 and its existence as a standing committee of the House since 1822, while the Senate Foreign Relations committee was established in 1816 when standing committees were first established in the Senate. The Foreign Relations Committee has been identified as the ‘ranking’ committee in the Senate and the Congress because it was the first committee identified in the resolution establishing standing committees in the Congress of the United States.¹⁷

Both have different roles and reputations within the Congress. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is seen as the more powerful and prestigious of the two because of its dual involvement in both the legislature and executive affairs of the state. The committee has the responsibility to review all treaties and foreign policy nominations and thus has more authority than most of the other committees of the Congress.

In contrast the House Foreign Affairs Committee has traditionally portrayed itself as a shadow of the Senate committee with a limited agenda and responsibility. The committee is perceived to pass very few pieces of legislation especially the foreign aid and assistance bill and take few foreign policy initiatives. When the committee does act it is to respond to the executive preferences.

¹⁷ See footnote 1 Randall B. Ripley & James Lindsay, p 115

Both the House and Senate committees have various sub committees which are either issue based like International Economic Policy and Trade, and International Operations and Human Rights or region based like the various sub-committees on Near East, Africa Asia and Europe. These sub-committees have their own jurisdiction and staff and conduct their own research to help the full committees

Though both the committees deal with foreign policy, the two panels oversee the nation's foreign policy and authorize the international affairs budget, which provides funding for the State Department and foreign assistance programs including military assistance. In a hearing before the committee on 'Strategies for Reshaping US Policy in Iraq and the Middle East', the committee pointed out that the United States "needs to take broad steps to encourage evolutionary political, economic, and demographic reform in the region and needs to prepare its security ties to every friendly state in the Gulf, and to key neighboring states like Egypt and Jordan."¹⁸. This according to the committees would be very vital for preparing for the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq. But the Committee went on to say that it would not take any steps that would compromise on American commitment towards the security of Israel. In the Foreign Affairs Budget hearing the committee discussed the issue of aid to Israel and Egypt. In the hearing the Secretary of State said that, "Today, our number one priority is to fight and win the global war on terrorism. The budget furthers this goal by providing economic, military, and democracy assistance to key foreign partners and allies, including \$4.7 billion to countries that have joined us in the war on terrorism¹⁹.", which include the states of Israel and Egypt. In recent years the Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate have become more influential in foreign policy because of the frequent failure of Congress to pass authorizing legislation for foreign aid. Since 1980 the International Relations and Foreign Relations Committees have only once -- in 1985 -- been able to get an overall

¹⁸ US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing, "Strategies for Reshaping US Policy in Iraq and the Middle East," 109th Congress 1st session, (Washington DC, USGPO, 2005), URL- <http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senate11sh109.html> Internet site accessed on 10 April 2005

¹⁹ United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing, "Foreign Affairs Budget", 108th Congress 1st session, (Washington DC, USGPO, 2003), URL-<http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senate11sh108.html> Internet site accessed on 10 April 2005

foreign aid authorization bill through Congress and signed into law²⁰. The reason, say congressional sources, is because it is hard to get a consensus on legislation dealing with a broad range of foreign aid programs²¹. Instead what happens is that, on a case by case basis, where consensus exists, separate authorizing bills are passed.

Congressional Scrutiny over Foreign Military Assistance to Egypt and Israel.

Congress has played a dominant role in many areas of foreign policy like in foreign military assistance and economic aid policies. Over the years there has been considerable pressure from within the Congress to reduce the cost of American foreign aid with the recipients of the two largest foreign assistance programs, Israel and Egypt, coming under scrutiny. This is not the first time that assistance to Egypt has come under attack. During the 1980's with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the escalating Palestinian intifadas and the growing influence of the Likud party of Israel on the Jewish lobbies in America, voices in the Congress demanded that assistance to Egypt be reduced considerably in view of its human rights records and Egypt's inability to introduce economic reforms. However, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and Egypt's decisive stance against the aggressors reversed the opinions of the congressman and women who were demanding a reduction in aid and assistance.

Historically, the Congress collaborated in forging the historic concept of massive aid by one nation to restore the other nation's health. In the 1950's after the Suez crises secretary of state Dulles was convinced that the power vacuum that was left behind would be filled by the Soviet Union. It was during this period that the President

²⁰ Authorization establishes the programs or policies where as appropriation funds the authorized programs and policies. However, in both cases the bills have to be passed by the Congress and presented to the President for his approval or rejection through the veto. The Congress passes an authorization bill that establishes an agency or program and provides it with the legal authority to operate. Appropriation bills on the other hand are of three main types:

- Annual- also called the regular or general bill
- Supplemental- the bill is to address the unexpected contingencies

²¹ US Department of State, "Congressional Committees and the Foreign Policy Process", URL-<http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0796/ijpe/pj9commi.html> Internet site accessed on 17 April 2005

announced what later came to be known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. The essence of this was to "...convince that the best insurance is to make clear our readiness to cooperate fully and freely with our friends of the Middle East..." To accomplish this task he asked the Congress to authorize to extend economic aid to the region and provide military assistance to those nations in the region requesting it. The doctrine was met with enthusiasm from the republicans and some asperity by the democrats. Middle East was generally not regarded as an area of primary interest to the United States. The democrats claimed the President's request as a 'blank cheque'. In the House foreign affairs committee the Congress was unwilling to pass the bill.²² However, the bill was endorsed by the Congress but after refusing the military assistance request.

Military assistance reached its peak during the 1950's as a result of the Korean War. In 1960's President Kennedy requested that the Congress approve of the new legislation to demarcate military aid from non-military aid and replace the mutual security act. During the 1960's the Congress based on the recommendation of the committees of Gen. CD Clay, set up to study foreign aid and in 1968 appropriated the lowest aid in the twenty years of aid programs²³. It enacted a number of restrictions for the sale of arms and military equipments to foreign nations including the states in the Middle East. It was concerned with the militarization of small nations but it did ask the president to hold talks with Israel for the sale of fighter planes for its 'security from aggressors'²⁴. In the 1975 Congress conferred a total aid package of \$1.082 billion for the Middle East of which \$100 million was earmarked for military assistance, \$65.2 million for security supporting assistance and \$330 million for military credit sales. In addition, Senate agreed to earmark \$300million in military sales to Israel and released it from repaying \$ 100million of that amount²⁵. In the 1980's the Congress was opposed to the administrations decision to sell arms to Israel because of the rise in the tensions between Israel and Lebanon, despite the Congressional opposition the sale went through after much lobbying. To

²² Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation: The Government and Politics in the Post War Years, (Washington, CQ Press, 1965), p120

²³ Ibid, p.161

²⁴ Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation: Vol.V. 1965-1968, (Washington, CQ Press, 1969), p 86

²⁵ Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation Vol. IV 1973-1976, (Washington, CQ Press, 1977), p 860

stabilize the region Egypt was given aid which through arms sales was able to procure American tanks.

The foreign affairs panel continues to earmark aid for the recipients of American assistance. The committee approved two billion dollars in military and economic aid to Egypt and three billion dollars to Israel for the fiscal year 1993 and it proposed that military aid to Israel be raised in view of the boycott that it was facing²⁶. There was also a debate in the Congress to try to 'stem' the flow of weapons in to the Middle East; the administration was criticized for being too slow on non-proliferation²⁷. The Congress in 1991 did not clear a regular foreign aid appropriation bill for the fiscal year 1992. This deferred the debate on the loan guarantee that Israel had requested²⁸. However, in 1993 the Department of State wanted the Congress to approve of \$55 million for the resettlement of refugees in Israel; the Congress gave \$80 million. This despite the fact that the Department of State's assertion that the number of refugees to Israel had fallen considerably²⁹.

Assistance Debates in the 1990's.

In the aftermath of the Gulf War President Bush renewed the push to negotiate a peace treaty between Israel and the Arabs. But the Israeli Prime Minister's refusal to stop his government's controversial policy of building Jewish settlements in areas that Israel had occupied during the 1967 war. America felt that these settlements would be a hindrance in the peace talks. As a result President Bush recommended the Congress to delay a \$10

²⁶ The Arab boycott, in existence since 1946, operates at three levels: primary, secondary and tertiary. The primary boycott is a refusal by Arab states to conduct any economic relations with Israel. The secondary boycott denies Arab business to firms that materially contribute to Israel's economic and technological development. The tertiary boycott involves a denial of trade with firms that have business ties with blacklisted companies.

²⁷ Congressional Quarterly, Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1991, (Washington, CQ Press 1992), p 472

²⁸ Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation 1989-1992, (Washington, CQ Press, 1992), p 269

²⁹ Congressional Quarterly, The 49 Annual Almanac, 103rd Congress I session, 1993, (Washington, CQ Press 1994), p 614

billion loan to Israel to absorb the hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants. The Congress did agree to delay the loan but it was very critical of the President. During the congressional testimony the then Secretary of State James Baker that if the Congress wanted to part with additional aid then it should not do it under circumstances that would compromise the long established policy of peace of the United States. His remarks were in reference to the American policy of regarding Israel's building of settlements in the occupied territory (since the 1967 war). The secretary also countered Representative Benjamin Gilman's (Republican- New York), that Israel had a excellent record of repaying loans by stating that it is "because we appropriate the money up here with which to repay ourselves." Representative David r Obey (Democrat-Wisconsin) chairman of the House Appropriation sub committee on foreign operations while focusing on the loan guarantee warned Israel that "American taxpayers- given their understanding of what this proposition is – would be, to a very large extent, opposed to the provision of these guarantees³⁰. It was only with a political change in Israel that renegotiations for the loan were possible within the Congress and the Presidency.

If one looks at the amount of military assistance that Israel has received from America one can see that during 1989-1995 Congress has provided Israel with \$1.8 billion dollars. The Senate armed service committee approved the \$263.3 billion defense authorization bill. However, it rejected the amendment that was proposed by Malcolm Wollop (Republican-Wyoming) that would have barred the deployment of United States forces on the Golan Heights as part of the Middle East Peace settlement, until the president reported to the Congress on the potential risks, cost, duration and impact on the overall combat readiness of the American forces. The amendment was rejected by the Congress with support from the Secretary of State, who strongly objected to the amendment warning that it could derail the peace process between Israel and Syria³¹. The appropriations committees of the house on foreign affairs approved the \$3.1 billion dollars aid for Israel and \$2.1 billion dollars for Egypt. Congress supported the funding but without the spending mandate. The

³⁰ Congressional Quarterly, The 48th Annual Almanac 102nd Congress 2nd session Vol. XLVIII 1992, (CQ Press., Washington DC, 1993), p 541-542

³¹ Congressional Quarterly, The 49th Annual Almanac 103rd Congress 1st session Vol. L1993, (CQ Press, Washington DC, 1994), p 425

Congress viewed the earmarks as an important symbol of United States support for Israel and its commitment to promote peace. In this endeavor it was strongly supported by the Jewish organizations. However, the House appropriations committee chairman David R. Obey (Democrat-Wisconsin) sharply criticized the 'hardball' lobbying tactics employed by the advocates for foreign governments and complained of the tendency of the lawmakers to accede to their demands³².

Both chambers of the Congress passed legislations designed to slash foreign aid and reorganize the nation's foreign policy bureaucracy. In 1995 the Congress Republicans made deep cuts in the \$12.2 billion foreign aid package proposed by the Department of State. The House was divided sharply over party views; the Republicans supported the reform cuts while the Democrats were opposed to it³³. However, the politically popular assistance programs for Israel and Egypt were left untouched. It was felt that America had made a commitment to the two countries. The American aid was seen as a guarantee for negotiations to continue to bring stability to the region. America has made it clear time and again that peace in the Middle East is very important for American national security. During 1996-1998 Israel received \$3 Billion dollars. It was during this period that the Oslo II agreement (between Israel and Palestine Liberation Organization)- the agreement involved autonomy for parts of Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and had Palestinian independence as an obscure goal, and the Wye River memorandum- for the implementation of the Oslo II agreement were signed between Israel and Palestine Liberation Organization. After 1998 the Congress has provided Israel with military assistance at an average of \$2 billion dollars³⁴. In an emergency legislation \$1.9 billion was provided to Israel, Egypt, Jordan and West Bank to support the Wye River memorandum and the Sharm-el-Sheikh interim accord. The Congress also provided the 2001 request for the Economic support fund of \$2.3 billion and foreign military finance of \$3.5 billion to promote stability and progress made in negotiations made between

³² Ibid, p 505-507.

³³ Congressional Quarterly, The 51st Annual Almanac, 104th congress 1st session Vol. LI 1995, (CO Press, Washington DC, 1996), p 103

³⁴ Figure have been taken from Congress and the Nation A Review of Government and Politics, Vol.VIII 1989-1992, p.189, Congress and the Nation A Review of Government and Politics, Vol.IX 1993-1996 p.208-209, p 231, Congress and the Nation A Review of Government and Politics, Vol.X 1997-2001, p.183-186,p 210-214, p 229

Israel and its neighbours. However, as requested the economic security fund levels for Israel were reduced and the military aid was increased. The congress passed the \$1.8 billion in economic support and \$3.4 billion in foreign military sales for the Middle East³⁵. \$5.2 billion assistance was being asked by the government to sustain the Middle East peace process. In addition a \$1.9 billion military assistance and economic support to meet the priority needs arising from the peace conferences. Supplementary military finance was being asked for Israel to help offset some of the costs of redeployment for its forces and meant the strategic defense requirements³⁶.

Bilateral military cooperation between the United States and Egypt has been continually strengthened since the days of Anwar Sadat expelling Soviet military advisors. Over the past few years, the American Congress has provided \$3.6 billion in military loans, \$13 billion in military grants, and \$20 million in military education and training funds. Most recently, the Bush Administration has notified Congress that it plans to provide Egypt with \$400 million in surface-to-surface missiles.³⁷

Congress during 1997-2001 has provided Egypt with around \$1.9 billion dollars. Between 1989 and 1996 the American Congress has approved military assistance worth 1.3 billion dollars (average)³⁸. As a result of joining the American lead alliance against the occupying forces of the Iraqi army the Congress on the recommendation of the then Secretary of Defense announced that Egypt's entire military debt of seven billion dollars was being written off³⁹. America could not ignore the fact that Egypt's support during the Gulf War (1990) was central in gathering the support of the Arab participation in the war. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait an oil rich nation led to the largest military deployment of

³⁵ Office of the Management of Budget, Budget Fiscal Year 2001, (USGPO, Washington, 2000), p142.

³⁶ Ibid, p142-143.

³⁷ Anon, "Enduring Relationship Withstands Conflict",

URL-<http://www.internationalreports.net/middleeast/egypt/2001/enduring.html> Internet site accessed on 27 April 2005

³⁸ Figure have been taken from Congress and the Nation A Review of Government and Politics, Vol.VIII 1989-1992, p 189, Congress and the Nation A Review of Government and Politics, Vol.IX 1993-1996 p.208-09,p 231, Congress and the Nation A Review of Government and Politics, Vol.X 1997-2001, p.183-186,p 210-214,p 229.

³⁹ Ministry of Information, Arab Republic of Egypt, "Perennial Calls For

Pruning", URL- <http://www.sis.gov.eg/public/letter/html/text115.html> Internet site accessed on 27 April 2005

American troops since the Vietnam War. Thought the Congress was outraged at the act of aggression, it was divided. The Democrat supporters wanted tough economic sanctions against Iraq as an alternative to war. In the end it was a divided Congress that authorized the administration to use "all necessary means" to force Iraq out of Kuwait.⁴⁰

Since September 2001 it has become clear that the ties between Egypt and America are in some difficulty. Although the Egyptian government has stood shoulder to shoulder with the American's in there war on terror but the American Congress has expressed its reservations. Most of these have centered on allegations that the Egyptian authorities were using methods of extracting information from terrorist suspects through methods that are not approved by the international community. Congress has questioned the line that Egypt has taken with Israel on terrorism. The other reasons for the Congress's displeasure are the Egyptian government's 'dismal' record of Human rights that has not been improved. The Congress has also shown its dissatisfaction with the slow pass of economic and political reforms. According to the Congress, Egypt must reform itself, economically and politically. It must not rely on American generosity to completely support its economy However, similar dissatisfaction with the American administration exists within Egypt. The Egyptian public's perception that they are powerless is breeding alienation and intense anger. Despite its criticism of the Egyptian government, Egypt is the cornerstone of United States policy in the region, providing notable support and assistance to its Middle Eastern policies. This is a reflection of the importance that the United States places on Egypt's role in the Middle East; a role that it feels can not be taken for granted.

The Congress understanding the importance of Egypt has looks at it as a nation of great potential and to fully realize that potential. While discussing the future of Egyptian United States relations the House committee on international relations chaired by Henry J. Hyde (Republican-Illinois) stated, "Egypt, having seen struggle and despair in its past, saw the benefits that peace with its neighbors can bring. Through this realization, Egypt

⁴⁰“ Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, A Review of Government and Politics , Vol.VIII 1989-1992”, (Washington DC, CQ Press,1993), p 203

has risen to become over the years the second largest recipient of United States foreign aid after Israel. United States military aid to Egypt totals over \$1.3 billion annually and the U.S. Agency for International Development has provided over \$25 billion in economic and developmental assistance to Egypt between the years 1975 and 2002”⁴¹. The committee went on to say that while Egypt is an important ally and a strong partner of the United States, America has to take steps to ensure that the assistance that it is providing is yielding the desired results.

Congressional Concurrence over United States Foreign Military Assistance.

With the disappearance of the Soviet Union the rationale behind the many foreign policy decisions and programs evaporated and the inquiry accorded to the spending on foreign affairs increased enormously. There was a concern at Capitol Hill over the state of economic and social problems that were being faced at home. This further intensified congressional activism. The members tried to shift the resources from foreign policy to domestic policies. Nonetheless, the growing global interdependence has blurred the lines that separate domestic and foreign affairs. Issues such as drug trafficking, immigration, global warming and trade inevitably push the Congress in to the spheres of foreign policy as these international issues are very strongly connected to some very significant domestic interests. What seems clear is that the Congressional activities have eventually concurred with the administrations in the issues of foreign military assistance to Israel and Egypt but with some reservations. But it would seem that the Congress’s reservation with regards to the high levels of foreign military assistance being given especially to Israel and Egypt was addressed by President Clinton in his message to the Congress on the continuation of the national emergency with respect to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. He said, “Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues to

⁴¹ United States House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Middle East and Central Asia of the Committee on International Affairs, Hearings, “The Future of US- Egyptian Relations”, 108th Congress 2nd Session, 16 June 2004,
URL- http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intrel/hfa94279.000/hfa94279_0f.htm Internet site accessed on 18 July 2005.

pose and unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States⁴²” and the issue needs to be addressed.

Since the early 1990’s proposals for change in foreign aid and assistance programs have been put forward in Capitol Hill. A report by the Foreign Affairs Committee task force chaired by Reps. Lee Hamilton (D-Ind) and Benjamin A Gilman (R-New York), proposed scrapping the foreign aid law, along with the main United States foreign aid agency, the Agency for International Development (AID). The most controversial task force recommendation was the elimination of the ‘earmarks’- congressional requirements that the administration give specific amounts to certain countries and programs. The Congress earmarks nearly all major foreign aid accounts, like military assistance to Egypt and Israel, a practice that reduces the administrations flexibility to respond to changing circumstances. The major beneficiary of the earmarks was Israel for which the Congress annually set aside three billion in aid. The proposal was defeated after the lobbying by Israel and other private lobbies⁴³.

Within the great powers Congress has been able to demonstrate both continuity and change. The basic method of organizing work through the various committees and the sub- committees has prescribed; the openness of the institution to lobbying and interest groups. The central role of the party leaders has remained quite stable.⁴⁴

A fundamental strength of Congress lawmaking process has been its capacity to adjust and adapt to new circumstances. This has been a principal characteristic of the legislative process from the very beginning. Thus, what is conventional and orthodox for one era or for specific types of bill may be unconventional and unorthodox for other types of bills with the change in the different patterns of congressional decision making processes. However, at the same time a variety of external and internal forces have lead to a shift in

⁴² William J Clinton, Public Papers of the President July 1 to December 31 1997, (USGPO, Washington, 1999), p 1542.

⁴³ CQ Researcher, “Israel at 50”, *CQ Researcher Vol.8, No9*, (CO Press, Washington, March 1998), p 227

⁴⁴See footnote 3 Randall Ripley p.3

the basic nature of policy activities from one of creation new programs to one of adjusting past policies and programs to new realities.

Scholars are trying to explain the rise in congressional activism in the arena of foreign policy decision making. The explanations range from the Vietnam War, the internal congressional reforms to an increase in the activities of interest groups. However, one has to understand that the international system has changed its demands on United States foreign policy in a way that has affected Congress. The increase in global interdependence boosts similarities between foreign and domestic politics. The end of the Cold War has reduced the need for centralized decision making and presidential prerogative thus increasing the scope of congressional activity⁴⁵.

According to James Lindsay there are three developments that are going to make the role of Congress different from the pre Second World War situation and will tend to make congressional activism persistent. Firstly, there is a much wider range of foreign policy in which the United States is involved-from fighting terrorism to establishing peace in the Middle East- as a result giving Congress more programs to shape and oversee. Secondly, congress today is actively involved in giving advice and consent to major treaties thereby increasing congressional input into foreign policy. The congress also has the 'power of the purse' that it controls the finances that is required by the administration for its several programs. The Congress has since the end of the Cold War has repeatedly questioned the high levels of military aid that is given to Israel and Egypt. Though understanding the security need for military assistance to these two allies, it is questioning the rational behind providing them with the maximum assistance which is disproportionate to the size of the country. The Congress wants the administration to increase development aid especially to the countries in the African continent

But it should be remembered that activism should not be confused with influence. The president remains the dominant actor in foreign policy. He can veto legislation and enjoys

⁴⁵ Marie T Henehan, Foreign Policy and Congress: An International Perspective, (Michigan, The University of Michigan Press, 2000), p.28-29.

an unparalleled access to the media. He can act in secrecy and set the terms of any debate. He can take the initiative in any policy and present the congress with a 'fait accompli' Congress can not even begin to match these powers of the president (and by extension his advisers and the foreign policy bureaucracy).

Nevertheless it should be kept in mind that even though the Congress functions as a secondary actor it is an actor in foreign policy. Congressional activism is generally negative⁴⁶. It can force the president to build support public support for his policies. Nor can they be restricted to marginal issues as the Regan administration found in its policies towards Central America. The Congress plays a role in major foreign policy issues. The active role that the Congress has started to play in foreign policy, be it in foreign military assistance policy or economic aid, the consequence has been conflict with the White House. However, this should not be seen as a cause for dismay as democracies function on, arguments and political debates that are a result of the disagreement between the Congress and the White House.

In America the Congress- the legislature truly makes the laws of the land and in that sense if the keystone in the American democratic system. It is the representation of the American people showcasing their diversity, strengths and weaknesses, their needs and desires and their views. Through the Congress one can get a glimpse of and try to understand American society. They are the representatives of the people who come from cities great and small, from towns and hamlets, and a few from farms- who gather in the halls of the Congress of the United States.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ See footnote 1 Randall Ripley & James Lindsay, p 280

⁴⁷ Herbert F. Weisberg & Samuel C Patterson, Great Theater: The American Congress in the 1990's, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.3

Chapter Five

Conclusion

The United States of America is the most powerful democracy in the world both in terms of its economy as well as its military. It prides itself as its position as the leader of the free world which is against radical fundamentalism and terrorism and is also fighting for democracy, human rights and a nuclear weapons free world. However, it is well to remind ourselves that the chief purpose of any American action is for the security of America. The advanced military and economy are not the ends in themselves but a means to preserve national security. This view is reflected in its various foreign policy decisions and actions. One of the fundamental goals of United States foreign policy since the Second World War has been to support democracies around the world through a system of alliances.

Military assistance has played an important role in maintaining this system of alliance built by America. Military assistance is an integral part of the United States peace time engagements strategy and directly contributes towards Americas national security. The various programs have been designed to allow America's friends and allies to acquire American military equipment, services and training to counter legitimate threats to their security. It also strengthens the ability of the partners to fight along side the United States forces in coalition efforts similar to the ones taking place in Afghanistan and Iraq at present.

Military assistance programs while bolstering the military capabilities of the receiving country also allows the administration to keep a watch over the military capacity and capabilities of a country and how it is affecting the military balance of power in a region. With a view to looking at regional stability, balance of power, scholars have time and again questioned the need for the high levels of military assistance that is given by America to the conflict ridden Middle East especially Israel and Egypt. This continuous assistance is fuelling the already existing arms race and environment of mistrust, both of which are a hindrance to the United States goals of peace and prosperity for the region. The administration on its part claims that the Middle Eastern states, particularly Israel and Egypt, are allies who require assistance to face off legitimate threats to their security.

Today the tripartite relation between United States, Israel and Egypt is considered special by the governments of all these nations. However, the beginning of the relation as **discussed in the first chapter (1950' to 1980's)** could be characterized as 'forced' upon the United States. In the years after the formation of the state of Israel, America tried to balance its interests vis-a vis not allowing the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the region in the situation of turmoil that it was facing. While, America believed that for peace in the region it had to side with the Arab world, it was unable to establish relation with Egypt-a prominent member of the Arab community-under the leadership of the anti-imperialist, pro-non alignment Nasser even though the United States had supported Egypt during the Suez Crisis. The economic reforms and political stability are the essential objectives of American military assistance. The United States feels that these goals are necessary for Israel to reach agreements with its neighbours on a host of peace related issues. This in turn will be vital for American national security. Egypt on the other hand, is vital for furthering the goal of regional stability and promoting the establishment of democracies.

The Crisis made America take notice of Israel; nonetheless it was only after the 1967 war that the so called 'special relation' between the two developed. The 1973 oil embargo forced the United States to enter into negotiations with Egypt as well as recognize its importance in the Arab world. Of course, the pinnacle of the tripartite relations was in 1978 Camp David Accords. It can be safely said that the accords have cemented the relations between the three countries such that even after twenty eight years there is peace between Israel and Egypt.

Both Tel-Aviv and Cairo have greatly benefited from this relationship. Today, both have very advanced military capabilities, which enable them to deter any threat, largely due to the military assistance that is provided by America. One finds that since the 1970's Egypt has started to play an important role in the Middle East and has time and again encouraged the United States to play a more prominent role in the region particularly, in the peace process.

The events of 1989-91 leading to the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War had an impact on the Middle East along with the other regions of the world. Nevertheless, the level of military assistance to the region did not change remarkably as **has been discussed in the second chapter (1990 to present)**. Israel and Egypt remained the fundamental allies of the United States in the region. And as America intensified its support for the peace process during the decade of the nineties, one finds that military assistance was used by America as an incentive to cajole the parties to negotiate peace. However, the failure to achieve a positive outcome did not in anyway lead to a reduction in the military assistance.

As has been extensively discussed in the chapter, Israel today occupies the position of a 'super power' in the Middle East as a result of the military assistance that it has received from America. Egypt, on its part, was overtly anti-Israel- the two countries have fought three wars. Egypt during this period led the Arab world in their rhetoric against Israel. It was only in 1978 that peace was achieved between the two countries through the Camp David Accords. Under the accords the United States made a commitment to Egypt to provide it with assistance to maintain peace. Consequently, Egypt's efforts to promote peace and stability in the Middle East, by accommodating Israel in the peace process, are essentially perceived as processes that would yield it rich dividends. It is conscious of the fact that the amount of military and economic aid it requires to develop can only be arranged by America. . Egypt is well aware that needs the support of Washington to remain a major power in the region It realizes that to maintain its position among the Arab community it needs to be strong not just militarily but also economically. America has been able to influence Israel and Egypt to coincide their policies decision with American policies. Thus it can be said that American assistance does change the behavior of the states that receive aid. For America, Egypt is its only Arab ally that is democratic (to some extent). It is trying to modernize its economy based on American guidelines of free market and liberalization.

The American administrations that includes the President, the Department of State and the Department of Defense, have understood that, without Egypt's constant support

America would not be able to control its other allies like Saudi Arabia and Jordan in the Middle East. Though Egypt is not the only country in a position of power in the Arab world, but it is the only country that is trusted by the Arab states as well as the United States and Israel as has been very evident during the peace negotiations between Israel and the Arab states. This has been very evident during the negotiations leading to the formation of the coalition during the Persian Gulf War. **As has been discussed in the third chapter** the Departments of State and Defense along with the President formulate American foreign policy. Working together they put forward the principles that guide United States policy towards a country or issue. The Department of Defense has enormous influence because of its monetary powers and because it is the representative of the entire military establishment of America. The Department of State, on the other hand, is significant as it is the leading agency on foreign policy. However, it is the beliefs and the ideology of the Presidents that gives direction to the policy. A famous example of this kind of presidential legacy is the Camp David Accord signed during the Presidency of Jimmy Carter. In the 1990's President Clinton efforts to bring stability and peace in the Middle East led to the signing of the Oslo Accords. If one is to look at the presidency since the 1988, one finds that the three presidents who have occupied the White House have different views on American foreign policy and the direction that it should take in the Middle East especially military assistance to Israel and Egypt. President George H Bush had to fight the Persian Gulf War (1991). He used military assistance as a tool to gather support for the coalition that attacked Iraq and to ensure that the states especially the Arab states, complied with the sanctions that followed the war. From the Madrid conference to the Presidency of Bill Clinton, there was no substantial increase in the military assistance given to Israel and Egypt. However, on the request of Egypt America has been providing it with more economic initiatives and assistance to liberalize its economy. Israel, on the other hand, has requested a reduction in economic aid. During this period the President placed weight on the rights of the Palestinian people in Israel, the settlement building in occupied territories by Israel, the economic development of Egypt along with an improvement of its human rights records.

The events of 11 September 2001 propelled President George W Bush to renew the emphasis on military assistance. Significantly along with military assistance, Israel and Egypt are also getting additional assistance under the various Anti-Terror and Counter-Terrorism programs, which stress on the state using the assistance to provide protection against the threat of or attack from a terrorist organization. These programs have brought Egypt and Israel additional monetary assistance along with high quality modern security equipments.

The demarcation being made between military assistance and counter terrorism assistance being provided to these two countries has led to the question on why the two are being differentiated? It would seem that the Congress would not approve of such large scale military aid being given to just two nations despite the presence of lobbying groups supporting Israel that put enormous pressure on the Congressmen to provide aid to Israel. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is one of the prominent groups that works towards gaining more support for pro-Israeli policies. **As has been discussed in the fourth chapter**, the Congress since the end of the Cold War has repeatedly questioned the need for the high levels of military assistance. The Congress has tried to lay equal weight on economic assistance and other forms of humanitarian assistance. It has been famously said that 'the President proposes and the Congress disposes'. The Congress has the ability and the power to refuse to grant the requests being made by the President for foreign assistance authorization. The Congress comes to the decisions based on the intensive debates that take place among the various congressional committees of the House and the Senate that discusses military aid to Israel and Egypt. As has been seen in the chapter the Congress was more inclined towards development assistance. It felt that military assistance programs had to be reorganized in view of the changing international environment. The Congress laid stress on reforming foreign military assistance. As the Congressional debates and discussions show there were differences in the way assistance policy towards Egypt and Israel were put forward by the government. The differences related to the type of assistance, the distribution of the actual amount and the time frame for the repayment of any loans. There were also differences between the Democrats and the Republican views highlighting Egyptian criticism and non- support for United States

policies. There was however, a significant degree of support to the continuation of assistance and aid packages to both Egypt and Israel from the Congress but based on different objectives. While for Egypt, there was an emphasis on economic assistance along with military assistance. For Israel, it was to maintain its 'Qualitative Military Edge'. Overall Congressional perceptions of American strategic interests in the Middle East was based on the administration's understanding of the Middle East initiatives.

In trying to understand the decision making procedures of the Congress it becomes clear that just like the executive, this legislative body also faces numerous pressures from the lobbying groups, media and public opinions before it arrives at any decision. The congressmen and women have to pay more attention to the domestic constituencies than the President. For example if the percentage of the Jewish population is high in a particular constituency or state, it would be very difficult for the House representative to the Senator to support any anti Israeli policies.

In conclusion one can safely say that military assistance does play a very significant role in American foreign policy especially in relation to the Middle East. In the post 2001 world American objective for the Middle East can not be confined to the narrow definitions of strategic location alone. Nor can oil be regarded as the defining factor in the interest that America has shown towards the Middle East, though it can not be denied that it is important. The United States' continuous need to counter the conflicts in the Middle East has been to protect its oil interests. However, there are a number of other factors that justify American military assistance to Israel and Egypt as well as the continuous interest for the United States in the region. In the post 2001 world, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction have replaced communism as the enemy that threatens America. However, before the attacks, terrorism was not very high on the agenda of the United States. Even today, it is terrorism as defined by America- which is confined to the threats that are being faced by America and have yet to include the broader views of threats of terrorism that are being faced by other nations.

In today's, globalized, interdependent world security has also become interdependent. American national security is directly related to the security of its allies like Egypt and Israel. It is America's belief, reinforced by the attacks, that democracies are better for America national security. The result being that America has been trying to promote and establish democratic governments in the Middle East. Egypt, as an example of a moderate democratic Arab state, along with Israel are perfect representatives for democracy in a region that is dominated by authoritarian regimes and thus it feels the need to build the power both economically and militarily of these two nations. By promoting democracy America believes that it would be able achieve the dual purpose of improving the human rights conditions of the region. The Department of States annual human rights records has shown the region in poor light. America also believes that democracy will open up the economy to America interests.

However, it seems that in the war against terror the fight for democracy is losing out. America faces a very difficult task in Middle East. It has become the epicenter for the war on terror. Israel and Egypt as its principal allies in this war will get the maximum military assistance. Through, America has made it clear that the war on terrorism is not a war against Islam; unfortunately, religion and politics coexist here. Islam is the preferred form of government America and its ideas of democracy, free market are seen as threats to the 'old established values'. The situation has further deteriorated as it is the increasing radicalization of Islam that has come to largely represent terrorism.

American fears have been further fueled by the easy availability of nuclear, biological, chemical and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction to these terrorist organizations whose primary target is America. America finds itself caught in a vicious cycle in the Middle East-where to large extent due to poverty and unemployment people are being pushed to believe in the anti-America propaganda of the terrorist groups. They readily believe that America is the root cause of all their problems that they are facing. What further complicates the situation for America is that the majority of people in the Middle East are anti-Israel and the United States constant support both in the diplomatic arena and through the large quantities of military assistance and economic aid is used to

instigate anti-Israeli and anti-American feelings. It is to counter any threat that may arise as a result of these feelings that America continues to give Israel military assistance which is in turn used to further fuel anti America feelings.

It is to break this vicious cycle that America makes available aid to Egypt. Egypt has been criticized as a result of the peace accords with Israel which was seen by the Arab world as a betrayal of the Palestinian cause. America supplied Egypt with military and economic assistance to protect itself from any possible repercussion. On its part, Egypt has greatly benefited from this relationship; it has a strong military and a stable economy. In turn America has used Egypt to promote itself and counter the anti American feeling in the region.

Overall American assistance policy has long term implications for the region and Israel and Egypt in particular. It is a continuing facet of United States foreign policy supported by critical elements on congress and the government. The objectives however, are multi-level and the strategy is multi-pronged. Though questions have been raised on the rationale behind foreign military assistance as opposed to negligible development aid, one can say that military assistance is infused with a number of national goals and interests-political and economic- and in its new international environment it will make it very difficult to phase out foreign military assistance. In the last twenty five years policy makers have come to believe that despite the alarms of arms race and destabilization, military assistance has a definite part in the United States strategy in the Middle East.

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