


QUEST FOR INDEPENDENCE : 
A STUDY OF RELATIONSHIP OF THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST
PARTY WITH THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA
(1966-1979)

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TO MY PARENTS

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
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This is to certify that the dissertation,
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CHRONOLOGY

(The Japanese Communist Party Congresses: 1945-1980)

- December 1945 - The Fourth Congress of the JCP adopts action programme, party rules, elected Central Committee, Tokuda Kyuichi as Secretary General.
- February 1946 - The Fifth JCP Congress.
- December 1947 - The Sixth JCP Congress.
- July-August 1958 - The Seventh JCP Congress. Nosaka Sanzo elected Party Chairman, Miyamoto Kenji Secretary General.
- July 1961 - The Eighth JCP Congress adopts new programme.
- November 1964 - The Ninth JCP Congress.
- October 1966 - The Tenth JCP Congress. Emphasis on Party's autonomy.
- July 1970 - The Eleventh JCP Congress. Affirms its autonomous stand.
- November 1973 - The Twelfth JCP Congress.
- July 1976 - The Thirteenth Extraordinary JCP Congress adopts "Manifesto on Freedom and Democracy".
- October 1977 - The Fourteenth JCP Congress.
- February-March 1980 - The Fifteenth Congress of the JCP.

PREFACE

After a long history of ups and downs including clandestine struggle, imprisonment, exile, internecine wars and frequent reversals of ideological line, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) has achieved a new measure of recognition and respectability. With about 4,40,000 claimed members, flourishing publications and the support of communist backed mayors in different urban areas, the JCP, at present, in terms of membership is the largest non-ruling communist party outside Europe and the second largest political party in Japan.

A cursory glance at the records of the JCP may lead us to conclude that there is little in it that could be termed unique, still it has some distinctive features that set it apart both from the communist parties of the advanced countries of the west and less modernised countries of Asia.

- (i) Among the major Asian nations, Japan alone escaped colonial domination by the west. So in contrast to the communist movement in other parts of Asia, the Japanese communists couldn't play on an anti-colonial theme.

(ii) Japan alone in Asia was capable of modernising rapidly and successfully enough to attain the technological level of the west. Thus, the Japanese communists faced some conditions, which we consider typical of the advanced countries of the west, but there were other conditions, which bound it to Asia geographically and culturally. That might be one reason for the Japanese communists to follow a contradictory strategy i.e., one of militant and ideological purity associated with the revolutionary movements of Asia and the other pragmatic search for an adjustment to the national environment.

The 'quest for independence' by the JCP from the strongholds of the communist party of the Soviet Union and China cannot be judged in isolation. The monolithic structure developed cracks in the aftermath of the World War II. Mao contributed to Marxism-Leninism by concentrating on the countryside and finding a revolutionary elite within the peasantry. He rejected the expediencies of post-Stalinist Soviet thought by vigorously criticising Khrushchev. The emergence of a communist power, not mouthing the same phrases as those of Moscow, not toeing the line as dictated by Kremlin paved the way for the Sino-Soviet rivalry. This naturally had its impact on other communist parties of the

world. Hostility to the regimented Stalinisation erupted in Hungary in 1956 only to find Soviet tanks entering Budapest and the execution of Imre Nagy and other figures under the dreaded phrase 'counter revolution'. These developments created wide spread resentment among the communist parties of West-Europe and Asia, who felt that without taking the national sentiments into consideration, the communist revolution in a country would not be a success. They realised that the "monolithic structure" of communism was merely a fiction to safeguard the interests of the Soviet Union. Thus emerged the trend of 'quest for independence', to which the JCP could not remain a silent spectator as it was also affected by these tremendous happenings.

JCP, which was founded in 1922, derived its inspiration from abroad, primarily from the Soviet Union and after the war from China. After the war the JCP under Nosaka Sanzo spoke of a "peaceful path of power" and the creation of a party 'beloved by the people' and it didn't pay. But following Stalin's criticism they adopted a hardline strategy, taking cue from Mao's guerrilla warfare. The consequences were disastrous. Membership dropped, electoral support dwindled and they were politically ostracised. Realising its mistakes, the JCP tried to discard this unrewarding strategy, which it couldn't do until the 8th Congress of 1961.

By the time of the 8th Congress, the rift between the Soviet Union and China had become well known and the party was watching it with great caution. But such a cautious posture couldn't be continued for too long in view of the deepening of the Sino-Soviet conflict. JCP broke off its relationship with the CPSU on the question of Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the pro-Soviet communists were purged. Differences also arose soon with the CPC on the theoretical grounds and on the Vietnam question. The pro-Chinese elements were eventually expelled. The 10th Party Congress of 1966 confirmed JCP's self-reliant and independent policy.

Keeping such developments at the background, the present dissertation is intended to study the relationship of the JCP with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) during the period from 1966 to 1979. The year 1966 is important as it saw the party's 10th Congress approving proposals for a policy line independent of the International communist movement. On the other hand, the year 1979 also marks another important development in the revival of relations between the JCP and the CPSU after a time gap of fifteen years. The specified time period is also important in the sense that the JCP, during this period, left no stone unturned to free itself from the Soviet and Chinese

influences. Since 1966, in every sphere starting from domestic to international affairs, the JCP has tried to show an independent posture. The pattern of its relationship with the CPSU and the CPC raises several questions, which are as follows:

- (i) How far the domestic settings have influenced the JCP for its 'quest for independence'?
- (ii) What are the factors which led the JCP to normalise its relationship with the CPSU, inspite of differences over several ideological and political matters?
- (iii) What are the factors that stand on the way of similar rapprochement with the Chinese communists?
- (iv) To what extent JCP's estrangement with the CPC and the CPSU has affected its prospects in the Japanese political sphere?

With these questions in mind, the dissertation has made an effort to do an analytical study of the relationship of the JCP with the CPC and the CPSU and the extent of success, which has emerged out of its 'quest'.

For a better understanding of the roots of the JCP's quest, it is pertinent to have a brief survey of certain important themes or nodal points in its history till the 10th Congress, 1966. The purpose here is to pick up certain crucial themes in the history of the JCP, which have a bearing on the subsequent developments. This

thematic study has been undertaken in the first chapter. The second chapter studies the factors responsible for its 'quest' and its credibility in the context of the international communist movement. The third chapter deals with the factors responsible for its rift with the CPSU, their relationships during the period 1966 to 1979 and factors leading to their rapprochement in 1979. The fourth chapter attempts to analyse the reasons for its rift with the CPC, their relationships during the period 1966-1979 and the obstacles hindering the path of a rapprochement. The final chapter carries the concluding remarks.

The study is primarily dependent on the materials like party declarations and programmes. There are several books on the JCP dealing primarily with developments of the party in the post-war years. But there is hardly any book on the period dealt within this dissertation. But this has proved to be an advantage in the sense that it has helped me to throw some new lights on the relationship between the JCP on the one hand and the CPSU and the CPC on the other.

Chapter I

THE BACKDROP

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The origin of the Marxist thought in Japan can be traced back to the last decade of the nineteenth century when it was introduced from the west as one of the socialist theories. It aroused the interests of a handful of Japanese intellectuals, who were critical of their country's social and political order. As one author puts it, "Marxism came to be one of many diverse components, none of them neatly delineated or organized of the incipient Japanese political movement."¹ Within this movement, Marxism fought for pre-eminence with two more influential trends such as a moderate christian and humanist type of socialism on the one hand and a radical, revolutionary anarcho-syndicalism on the other. Initially, christian social democracy was the predominant form of socialist expression, but after 1905 anarcho-syndicalism steadily gained strength until it was challenged by the Russian revolution of 1917 and the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism.²

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1. Paul F. Langer; Communism in Japan: A case of political naturalization (Stanford, Cal: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), p.3.
 2. For details see, Robert A. Scalapino; The Japanese Communist Movement 1920-1966 (California, University of California Press, 1968), pp.1-20.

Marxism gained momentum in Japan during and immediately after the World War I with Japan's rapid transformation into an industrial society and the parallel growth of a labour movement. Paul F. Langer says, "The increasing glaring inequalities of the nation's social and political system, and severe economic fluctuations combined with the influx of radical literature and ideas from abroad - primarily from the United States and Western Europe - to impel many reformist socialist towards acceptance of the class struggle and other Marxist revolutionary tenets."³ This trend was also powerfully stimulated by the Bolshevik revolution,⁴ which marked a turning point in the history of the Japanese communist thinking. From that time onwards, it was possible to speak of a communist movement in Japan, though it took several more years to be organized.

3. Paul F. Langer; Fn.1, p.3.

4. To many Japanese intellectuals, the case of Russia and of Lenin's revolution there, seemed directly relevant to Japan. They compared their own emperor system to the rule of the Isars and equated Japan's rigid class structure with seemingly similar conditions in Russia. They detected other parallels in the problems faced by the Russian and Japanese people, including those posed by absentee landownership the transition from semi-feudal agrarian to industrial societies, sharp distinctions between the privileged and unprivileged and particularly the oppressive weight of the military and police apparatus on the people's freedom of expression. For a detailed account, see Scalapino; Fn.2; See also, Rodger A. Swearingen and Paul F. Langer, Red Flag in Japan: International communism in action, 1919-1951 (Cambridge, Havard University Press, 1952).

An organized Marxist communist movement made its appearance in Japan on July 15, 1922, as a result of the joint efforts by several Japanese marxists who had been staying abroad, a few resident Japanese radicals and the influence and guidance of the Comintern.⁵ It took the form of an illegal, secret communist party functioning as a branch of the Comintern, and the date of its appearance is considered as the official birthday of the Japanese Communist Party (Nihon Kyosanto; JCP).

But the JCP in 1922 was nothing but a frail offshoot of the Japanese Socialist Movement. It was in the hands of a tiny band of Japanese intellectuals who had little or no connection with the main intellectual stream

5. Prominent among the Japanese Marxists staying abroad was Katayama Sen who had resided in the US since 1914 after serving a term in a Japanese prison for anti-government activities. He joined the US communist party in 1919 and became a central figure in a small Japanese communist group of exiles. Two years later, responding to a Comintern invitation, Katayama went to Soviet Russians and spent the rest of his life at Comintern headquarters at Moscow, advising on communist strategy and propaganda in Asia. Katayama was joined by a number of Japanese radicals who were selected by a Comintern emissary to go to Moscow. The delegation headed by Tokuda returned to Japan in 1922 after having received funds, instructions and theoretical guidance from Comintern officials. For details see, Scalapino; Ibid.

in Japan. The mainstream was dominated by theories of nationalism, democracy and social reform. The predominance of the intellectuals biased the party towards a pre-occupation with the theoretical arguments over Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Its failure to attract a base of support among the people divorced the party from the Japanese public life.

These features were accentuated by the special nature of the party's "enemy", the Japanese imperial Government. The Japanese state was modernising and successfully competing with the West at a time when the other Asian countries succumbed to western economic and military domination. So, unlike the other communist parties of Asia, the JCP was more concerned with its fight against the militaristic and expansionist Government. So, the party was called upon "to fight an indigenous home grown variety in the form of a militaristic and expansionist Government, supported by an extremely efficient and ruthless police force, whose full strength was brought to bear against the weak communist organization."⁶

6. Paul F. Langer; "The New Posture of the CPJ", Problems of Communism, Vol.20, Jan-Apr 1971, special issue, p.15.

The JCP operated as an illegal and secret organization from 1922 until the end of the World War II, when the Japanese Government's repression either made most communists recant or forced them into exile or prison. Besides, internal factionalism over certain tactical issues⁷ weakened the party to a large extent. After 1927, the Japanese Marxists, both within and outside the JCP, continued to argue whether Japanese capitalism had reached sufficient maturity for proletarian revolution or whether the task of Marxist-Leninist was to complete a bourgeois democratic revolution and move on to Socialism. The final programme of the pre-1945 era the "1932 thesis" insisted

7. One tactical issue which divided the pre-war communists was whether to maintain a formal party or to concentrate instead on labour and student movements, thereby avoiding constant police suppression. Thus in 1924, after the first party organization had been smashed, communist leaders decided to dissolve the party. The Comintern in 1925 criticised it and insisted that the party be re-established. Yamakawa Hitoshi and follower, as a protest to it, left the party to maintain an independent Marxist position, which was again rigorously criticised by the Comintern. Fukomoto, a bright young theorist trained in Germany, quickly emerged after 1925 as the leader of JCP. He had insisted that the doctrinal purity had to be established and unsound elements weeded out of the party. The position re-inforced by some highly militant tactics caused the party to move away from the Japanese Socialists. However, on July 15, 1927, after lengthy deliberations on the "Japan problem" a Comintern Committee issued a thesis, severely criticising "Fukomotoism" as well as a "Yamakawaism". For details see, George M. Beckmann and Genji Okubo; The Japanese Communist Party, 1922-1945 (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1969).

that the Japanese revolution had to be a two-stage process, "that the feudal remnants including the emperor system had to be crushed at all costs and that the revolution could succeed only through violence."⁸ It was an exceedingly militant document. But the party scarcely had the power and the time to execute its provisions. Continuous arrests and serious internal friction reduced the Japanese communists to a mere shadow. With the arrest of Hakamada Satomi, the Chairman of the party's central committee in early 1935, party activities practically ceased on an organised basis. Japanese communism from now until 1945 consisted mainly of secret thoughts nurtured in the minds of a few "true believers", most of whom were either in prison or in exile.

Being weakened by mass arrests and internal factionalism, the JCP was unable to provide continuity of leadership, organisation and strategy. Under these circumstances, the Japanese communists quite naturally sought guidance and support from abroad. As we have seen, Comintern sources from the very beginning intervened repeatedly in the internal affairs of the JCP. Soviet funds and guidance

8. Robert A. Scalapino; "Japan", in Witold S. Worakowski (ed.) World Communism: A hand book, 1918-1945 (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1967), p.244.

created the party. This pattern continued throughout the pre-war period. Leaders were made and discarded. Programmes were drafted in accordance with current Comintern policies and altered when these policies changed. In pre-war Japan, the JCP operated as the branch of the Comintern as it had been founded to be.⁹

Numerically and financially feeble JCP's over-dependence on the foreign communist parties placed a tremendous constraint on it to evolve in the direction of a truly national political party. It faithfully reflected the shifts in Soviet strategy and changes in the Soviet leadership and outlook rather than changing conditions in Japan itself. JCP's closeness to the Comintern and the Soviet Union naturally aroused the suspicions of the Japanese people. Many Japanese viewed the communists as traitors which affected both the communist ideological and programmatic positions.

Throughout the pre-war period, the role of the intellectuals in the JCP was also a vital one. Writers,

9. This is not to say that the party's relationship with the Comintern didn't pose a problem for the Japanese communists. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, some of them questioned this relationship and because of it left the party. Further, an important segment of the left-wing Japanese socialism - the Ronoha or labour-farmer faction owes its existence to this.

artists, journalists and academicians composed a significant portion of the party. They remained "largely within the realm of intellectualization and intensified their natural tendency toward barren scholastic quarreling, intellectual inbreeding and mental and political isolation."¹⁰ So, such theoretical hobnobbing restricted the party leadership among a handful of intellectuals who neither had the clarity nor experience.

Among the other factors contributing to the weaknesses of Japanese communism, the power and efficiency of the Japanese state must be underlined. 'Japanese democracy' in this era didn't provide the political protection for the communists, which was available in certain western societies. Civil liberties were limited by law. Communism by definition, was always an illegal activity in Pre-war Japan and was subject to heavy penalties. The centralised character along with extensive police and judicial system made it possible for the authorities to wipe out the party time after time.

This was the legacy that pre-war communism bequeathed to the post World War II era. To sum up, the role of the

10. Paul F. Langer; "Independence of Subordination: The Japanese Communist Party between Moscow and Peking" in A. Doak Barnett (ed.) Communist Strategies in Asia: A comparative analysis of governments and politics (Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 1963), p.65.

JCP in the interwar period, it can be said that the JCP symbolised a glaring example of a communist movement, which was established in an inhospitable environment and whose energies were absorbed in its struggle for survival and which was alienated from the potential sources of domestic support by acting as an instrument of a foreign power. It is now appropriate to examine how this legacy was continued or altered and how it affected the initial efforts of the party after the war when Japan passed through a most traumatic period.

JCP IN THE POST WAR ERA (1945-1966):

The history of the JCP as an organisation actively participating in the Japanese politics really begins from the year 1945, following the defeat of Japan in World War II. On October 4 of that year, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) issued a directive to the Japanese Government which abrogated all laws restricting freedom of thought and assembly. His directive guaranteed freedom of speech, religion, assembly and political activity and ordered the immediate release of all political prisoners.¹¹ These

11. See, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Deptt. of Government Section: Political Re-orientation of Japan (Washington D.C., Government Printing office, 1949), 463-65, for the full text of the directive.

included communists and members of various outlawed radical and religious sects. The communist leaders soon became active in their efforts to revive the party.

The problem with the leaders of the Communist party was that they were, on account of a long period of exile or imprisonment, slow to absorb the drastic changes which were taking place at home and abroad. Japan had become one of the world's most open and politically permissive societies. The drastic post war reforms allowed different ideologies and organisations to flourish. At a time when Japan was passing through fundamental changes, the JCP naturally looked for a programme suited to the new environment.

Tokuda Kyuichi and Shiga Yoshio, two of the best known communist leaders who came out of the jail, began the activities of the JCP by an "appeal to the people" which was published in the first issue (after the war) of the JCP's newspaper Akahata (Red Flag).¹² It thanked the Allied Powers for starting the democratic revolution and pledged support for their new policies. The appeal demanded the elimination of militarism, police politics and monopoly capitalism. It further wanted better conditions for the

12. For the summary see, Scalapino, Fn.2, pp.48-49.

workers and wider distribution of lands eliminating the concentration of land in the hands of a few landlords. But their strongest attack was against the Emperor system which included the Emperor himself, the court, military and administrative bureaucrats and the nobility.

Such an appeal was clearly manifested in the programme adopted at the 4th National Congress of the JCP held on December 1-2, 1945.¹³ The report illustrated the strong, continuing influence of the 1932 thesis and the JCP's tactical line of the pre-war era. It was natural that the leaders who had been in prison for a long period would tend to pick up, where they had let off.

But with the reappearance of Nosaka Sanzo,¹⁴ a veteran of the Comintern, who returned from Mao Tse-tung's

13. See, ibid., p.50.

14. During World War II, while surviving leaders were either imprisoned or exiled, one of them, Nosaka Sanzo was active in China, thinking about the future of Japan and the JCP. In Yen-an, with the Chinese communists, Nosaka carried on anti-war propaganda among Japanese defectors and tried in various ways to undermine the discipline of the Japanese forces fighting in China. He established a school in Yen-an for the indoctrination of the true Japanese progressive cadres. Though he arrived in Yen-an in 1940, his presence was not disclosed until 1943. After the Comintern was dissolved, the Chinese announced that Comrade Okano Susuma his Pseudonym in China, a representative of the JCP, had just arrived and been warmly welcomed by Mao Tse-tung and members of the Central Committee. While coming back to Japan after the war, he also faced lot of problems. An American airforce plane took off from Yen-an for the North on September 10. Nosaka, three of his companions

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wartime headquarters in Yen-an in 1946, a somewhat revised set of tactics and policies was developed. The remarkable success of the Chinese communists in winning the peasantry to their side and the slogan of the 8th Route Army: "Army love the people; people love the army!"¹⁵ made a lasting impression on Nosaka's mind. He realized that the appalling economic conditions coupled with political instability which prevailed in Japan soon after the end of the war provided ideal conditions for the JCP. Compared to other parties, the JCP was the sole political group that could claim that it bore no responsibility for the war and its consequences.

So in Nosaka's interpretation, after the bitter experiences of war, the existing conditions in Japan did not necessitate a violent revolution advocated by the 1932 thesis. The changed atmosphere required a party to be supported, believed in and loved by the people. He believed that the JCP could make its way into the Japanese politics by winning the public support. The JCP he declared

14. contd...

in the Emancipation League were permitted to board. The plane flew only as far as Ling Chiu on the Shansi-Hopei Border, from there Nosaka and his friends worked their way by foot, horse cart, truck and train, to Kalgan in Manchuria, to Pyongyang, Nosaka to American occupied South Korea and finally across to Hakata in Kyushu by Ferry and on to Tokyo where they arrived on January 13, 1946, four months after boarding the plane in Yen-an.

15. John K. Emmerson, "The JCP after fifty years", Asian Survey, Vol.12, no.7, July 1972, p.568.

"should be a party loved by the people, and must not create the kind of impression that makes people run away whenever they hear its name. If this happens, it is the party members who are at fault."¹⁶

So in the immediate post war period, the Japanese communists sought to erase the party's pre-war image of a closed, secretive, foreign directed radical organisation and to create a 'lovable' communist party. The party also attempted to create a 'United Front' with the socialists, but in its efforts it was rebuffed. It adopted a strategy of 'Two Stage Revolution' - first, the bourgeois* revolution leading to the establishment of a democratic government; second, the socialist revolution led by the JCP, for which "some violence might be necessary".¹⁷ The basic thrust of the party's programme, however, was to rely on the process of peaceful change. The party played down the role of the United States and declared Japanese imperialism to be the principal enemy of all the progressive forces in Japan.

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16. Ebata Kiyoshi, "The Japan Communist Party: Its development since the war", Japan Quarterly, Vol.V, no.4, Oct/Dec. 1958, p.427.
 17. Hans H. Baerwald; "The Japanese Communist Party: Yoyogi and its rivals" in Robert A. Scalapino (ed.) Communist Revolution in Asia (Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1965), p.200.

The new line paid off and in four years Nosaka had built an organization of 100,000 members. In the election of January 23, 1949, the JCP's popular vote jumped from 3.7 per cent it had obtained in the election of 1947 to 9.7 per cent and in place of 4 members, elected in 1947, 35 entered the Lower House in 1949.

COMINFORM'S CRITICISM AND AFTERMATH:

The JCP's electoral triumph of January 1949 proved to be shortlived. In January 1950, a new strategy of militancy and outright violence was forced upon the JCP from outside, when the Cominform journal in an article denounced the JCP for its grave errors. The article made a scathing criticism of Nosaka and his views. He was accused of trying to prove that all necessary conditions were present in Japan for bringing a peaceful transition to socialism. He was strongly criticised for his argument that American occupation forces were playing a progressive role, helping in the furtherance of Japan's development towards socialism by peaceful means. The conclusion of the article said:

"As we see, Nosaka's "theory" has nothing whatever in common with Marxism-Leninism. Actually Nosaka's 'theory' is anti-democratic, anti-socialist theory. It serves only the imperialist occupiers in Japan and the enemies of the independence of Japan. Consequently, Nosaka's 'theory' is an anti-patriotic and anti-Japanese theory." 18

18. Cited, Scalapino, Fn.2, p.61.

By implication the Cominform, i.e. the Soviet leadership, intimated strongly that it was high time for the Japanese party to align itself openly with the international communist movement in its struggle against 'American imperialism'. On January 17, before the Central Committee of the JCP could make a final determination of the party's position, Jen-min Jih-Pao (People's Daily) published an editorial supporting the main themes of Cominform article.¹⁹ The editorial charged that Nosaka had been guilty of "serious mistakes of principle" and that his view that the JCP could use a bourgeois parliament to gain state power by peaceful means under the conditions prevailing in Japan was false. Though the language of the Peking editorial was more restrained than the Cominform article, its viewpoint was essentially the same.

Following Chinese Communist's criticism, the Central Committee in its meeting on January 19, passed a resolution 'unanimously' agreeing with the 'positive contribution' of the criticisms. Nosaka promptly issued a 'self-criticism' in which he explained his position and confessed that he was incorrect in suggesting that a

19. Probably this editorial came as a great disappointment to the JCP leaders. It was possible that they had hoped for some aid from Peking. Relations between Nosaka and Mao were supposedly close. Ibid. p.64.

People's Government could be established by parliamentary means even while remaining under foreign occupation.

A new thesis "On the Basic Tasks of the JCP in the Coming Revolution: A Draft" prepared in Moscow and supported by the Communist Party of China (CPC) was adopted in 1951 and was often referred to as the 1951 thesis.²⁰ According to the new line, the US was the foremost "imperial force" and had brought the Japanese people "only chains and slavery". It was now to be prime object of attack, with the forces of "Japanese Monopoly Capitalism", a secondary, but important target. Instead of a bourgeois democratic revolution, the new objective was a "national liberation democratic revolution" aimed at establishing a people's democratic republic". The emphasis was still on building a united front of workers, peasants and "progressive" bourgeoisie under the leadership of the proletariat, with "peace" and "national liberation" as the basic issues. However, the goal of a peaceful revolution was abandoned, and violence was accepted as an indispensable pre-requisite for success. The shift from United Front tactics to guerrilla warfare,

20. Lydia N. Yu; "The Japan Communist Party", Japan Quarterly 21(3), July-Sept. 1974, p.266.

essentially a Chinese formula, became the official party doctrine.²¹ In a sense, the 1951 thesis can be described as an amalgam of Stalinism and Maoism.²²

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21. For the text see, "Immediate Demands of Communist Party of Japan - New Programme", For a lasting peace For a People's Democracy, November 23, 1951, p.3.
22. In early 1952, Tokuda, in analysing the new programme, made it clear that the model for Japan was China, though he was careful to cite at length from a report presented by Stalin to CPSU leaders on Aug. 1, 1927, which sought to differentiate the role of the bourgeois in different revolutionary situations. In imperialist countries, the bourgeoisie was reactionary, according to Stalin, and had to be fought as an enemy. In colonial or dependent countries, however, the national bourgeois may support the movement as an element in the struggle for emancipation. "Tokuda said, "This is the theoretical basis of our new programme." On the 30th anniversary of founding the JCP, "For a lasting peace, For a people's democracy: July 4, 1952. Moreover, evidences indicate that the 1951 thesis was in reality drafted by Tokuda after extensive contact both with Russian's Chinese leaders. In a letter of April 18, 1964, the CPSU Central Committee wrote to JCPCC, "One of the main questions about which the delegation of the CPJ complained was that the CPSU had allegedly "imposed" upon your party the 1951 programme..." As for the programme, the delegation of the CPSU drew the attention of your comrades to the fact that its draft was completed by Stalin at the request and with the direct participation of the leaders of the CPJ - Comrade Tokuda, Nosaka and others - and is known to have been ~~not~~ with full approval by your party". 18 April 1964 letter from the CPSUCC to the JCP CC, Translation on International Communist Development (TICD), 636, JPRS 26, pp.29-30.

Abandoning its pragmatic approach, the Japanese Communist leadership instantly reverted to its tradition of absolute faith in the correctness of Soviet guidance. The period between 1950-52 saw the JCP adopting violent tactics and most of the party apparatus went to underground and leaving the party stuffed with "Second-echelon" leaders, while the majority of the top officials took refuge in Peking. Mao's writings on guerrilla warfare became required reading for all party members. With the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950, "Communist activists in Japan began to form "nucleus self-defense corps" trained according to General Chu Teh's military manual on guerrilla fighting. Communist "youth action corps" appeared in the streets to battle Japanese police with home-made "Molotov cocktails" and "lemonade bombs". There were also scattered assaults against American military personnel."²³ By the end of 1950, little trace of Nosaka's "Lovable Communist Party" remained.

But the new formula did little to advance the cause of Japanese Communism. The strategy of anti-Americanism was a dismal failure, because the JCP was not successful in materially weakening the American position in Japan or in slowing down Japanese assistance in support of United Nations military operations in Korea. The Japanese

23. Langer, Fn.1, p.48.

Government "having recovered full national sovereignty in 1952 from the Allied occupation, had no trouble for riding out the feeble communist assault."²⁴ Those young terrorists who didn't manage to escape to China were captured and given lengthy prison terms. The party rapidly became a symbol for extremism, and any previous links with

24. On June 6 and 7, 1950, General MacArthur, in two letters addressed to the then P.M. Yoshida Shigeru, ordered the Japanese government to purge from public office the entire Central Committee of the JCP and the editorial staff of Akahata. On the day after the outbreak of the Korean war, MacArthur ordered Akahata to suspend publication for one month and, even before the month was over GHQ ordered the Japanese government to suppress the publication at all communist newspapers and all offending party-line publications of whatsoever nature.

Japanese government suppression of communist publications and harrasment of hard core communists and alleged sympathisers reached prodigious proportions in the years that followed. Not only there was a systematic weeding out of suspects from govt. employment but the purge made substantial inroads into the ranks of those employed in private industry. Like the purge which had been initially (i.e. in 1946 and 1947) applied to large members of individuals for their participation in the war effort, the red purge of 1950 and 1951 cut deeply and not always with ^{the} sense of discrimination or fair play.

See Baerwald, Fn.17, pp.202-20.

the masses were rapidly broken. Membership dropped²⁵ sharply and the electoral support dwindled. The percentage of JCP votes in the succeeding elections in 1952 dropped to 2.5% and the party lost all 35 seats in the H/R. The pre-war image of a conspiratorial party controlled from abroad was revived and the communists found themselves harassed by police and politically ostracized by the non-communist left.

On the other hand, the Cominform criticism of 1950 intensified the party strife between two existing factions in the JCP i.e. the "Mainstreamers" and the "Internationalists". The supporters of Nosaka and Tokuda, the "Mainstreamers"²⁶ lined up^{on} one side. Nosaka was quite willing to go along with the Soviet demand for an

25. Party membership:

December 1945	:	1,180
February 1946	:	7,500
December 1947	:	70,000
April 1950	:	108,693
July 1952	:	20,000

26. In April 1951, the "Mainstreamers" organized the fourth national conference of party members. All members of the international factions were excluded. At this conference, a policy of armed revolution was decided on for the first time. The Internationalists claimed that the conference's actions were invalid and in the elections to local assemblies in April 1951, the JCP was split into two factions which fought with independent candidates of their own. Ebata Kiyoshi, "The JCP, its development since the war", op.cit., p.430. The JCP leaders, mostly underground were busy fighting with each other and had lost control over the sections of party members. For a short time, the JCP was virtually without leadership.

active anti-Americanism but was reluctant to jeopardise past communist gains within Japan. While he agreed in theory with the Cominform recommendations, in practice, he never lost sight of the Japanese political realities. Obviously, the communists were weak in Japan and the American position was one of considerable strength.

The "Internationalists" on the other hand, led by Politburo members Shiga Yoshio and Miyamoto Kenji argued that the Japanese communists had for years followed a dangerously deviationist course. The Cominform's criticism had saved the JCP from losing its identity in the midst of social democratic reformism. So, a thorough re-examination of past policy was the need of the time.

It is not clear exactly how and when the two feuding factions were reconciled. 'Certainly, "advice" from Peking and Moscow to stop feuding and work together played a significant role.' 27 During the summer of 1951, Shiga and other prominent 'Internationalists' agreed

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27. In any case, both the CPSU and CPC threw their support to Tokuda and his followers. They indicated that support first by printing Tokuda's speeches and reports in prominent party organs. The 1951 thesis was officially endorsed by the Cominform journal on Nov. 23, by Pravada on the following day, and by Peking Radio one week later on December 1. The exhortation for unity is evident from the editorial of Peking's People's Daily (3rd Sept. 1950) which claimed, "Due to lack of experience, the JCP had committed certain errors, but these had been corrected after January and a proper general line for the party had been defined. Certain JCP members had doubted for rejected the correct central committee line. Such an attitude was wrong. The dissidents should unite with the majority."

to subscribe to the party programme (1951 thesis) worked out by the Secretary General Tokuda and this document was adopted at a secret party conference some time during the latter half of 1951.

Thus the Chinese and Soviet inspired formula proved ill-suited to the Japanese condition. As early as 1953, the catastrophic results of the violent revolution prompted the JCP leaders to re-examine their policy. But it was only two years later, the party was allowed to abandon the strategy of sabotage and violent revolution because such a formula no longer served the needs of Moscow and Peking. Stalin was dead and had been unceremoniously toppled from his pedestal by Khrushchev. China, on the other hand, was displaying the 'Bandung Spirit' in her foreign policy by reassuring her Asian neighbours of her determination to avoid confrontation with the United States in the Far East. Tokuda had died in Peking in November 1953. At this juncture, the JCP, ideologically and organisationally in disarray, resumed its search for a programme in order to revive its pre-1950 image.

In January 1955, the JCP announced that it would dissociate itself henceforth from all "ultra-leftist adventurism". The party felt that at the moment, "the forces of reaction are still strong while the forces of democracy are weak. It is, therefore, a serious mistake

to consider that the time is ripe for revolution. The only way to alter the present balance of power is to work up united action by the people by means of daily activities in the service of the masses."²⁸ This idea was stated in a still clearer fashion at the 6th National Conference on July 27 when JCP said that it had changed its policies. Despite this, the 1951 platform was still held to be correct and the latest move merely represented a change of tactics.

While the Japanese Communists abandoned the strategy of violence imposed from abroad as soon as the international conditions permitted, they found it difficult to reach an agreement on the three basic questions dealing with Communist strategy in Japan: (1) who should be considered the principal enemy: Japanese capitalism or US "Imperialism"? (2) what stage of economic development has Japanese society attained and what type of revolution should the party therefore promote? (3) what tactics should be employed? The discussion and deliberations over these questions intensified the factional strife within the party. The changing international environment exerted a tremendous influence on the internal alignments

28. Cited, Koyoshi, Fn.16, p.431.

of the party. The late 1950s witnessed the beginning of Sino-Soviet rift as well as of intensive discussion among the communists everywhere regarding the meaning and role of "revisionism". This was the time when the Italian communist leader Togliatti's structural reform theories²⁹ entered Japan and found many supporters among the communists. Along with the realisation of the futility of the violence in 1955 the consolidation of their disrupted organisation became necessary. The same year saw a compromise being worked out between Shiga Shigeo, the strong man of the Mainstream faction and Miyamoto and both the rival groups merged in the spring of 1955.³⁰ Nosaka became the first Secretary of the party and headed a new leadership group which included Miyamoto and Shiga. Miyamoto's emergence as the Party's Secretary General at the 7th Party congress in 1958 marked a turning point in the history of the JCP.³¹

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29. The theory contended that Japan was an independent advanced capitalist country which was ready to proceed to the "Socialist Revolution" like Italy and other western European countries through peaceful parliamentary means.
 30. Hong N. Kim, "Deradicalisation of the Japanese Communist Party under Kenji Miyamoto", World Politics 28(40); July 1976, p.276.
 31. Miyamoto's emergence as the party S.G. may be attributed partly to his non-involvement in the formulation of the party's military strategy from 1951 to 1954 and partly to the fortuitous circumstances involving the downfall of the Shigeo Shida who had been the real power in the JCP during 1951-55. ibid. For a detailed discussion of his role, see Chapter II.

At the 7th Party Congress, Miyamoto was still overshadowed by the Party Chairman, Nosaka in terms of prestige and popularity. After that, he began to build up his power base within the party, but it was not until 1966 that he became the undisputed leader of the JCP. During the intervening eight years, Miyamoto had to wage a series of struggles against his opponents within the party and with their mentors in Moscow and Peking.³²

The first serious challenge to the Miyamoto leadership was posed by a group headed by Kasuga Shajiro, a party veteran who was closely identified with Moscow. This group wanted the party to adopt a programme on the basis of the "Structural reform theory" advanced by Togliatti. So, opinion within the Japanese party tended to polarise around two basic positions - a strategy closely akin to the Chinese Communist formula advanced by the group led by Miyamoto and a revisionist strategy that owed much for its inspiration to the structural reform theories and was ideologically close to the Soviet views.³³ Thus one faction saw the principal enemy in "US imperialism" while the other contended that Japan had completely regained its national independence and the fight, therefore, should concentrate on Japanese capitalism

32. For details, see Kim, Fn.30, pp.273-280.

33. Scalapino, Fn.2, pp.102-3.

at home. Further, one faction saw Japan in need of a "Democratic revolution for national liberation", while the opponents viewed Japan as a fully developed, highly capitalist country ready for an immediate socialist revolution. Finally, regarding the tactics to be employed, one side wished to keep open the option of violent action; the other advocated exclusive use of peaceful revolutionary tactics to lead smoothly from the capitalist present to a socialist future.³⁴

Such differences were rampant during the 7th Party Congress and nearly one-third of the delegates were opposed to Miyamoto's draft programme, which had a strong Chinese flavour. After the inconclusive 7th Party Congress, the new party leadership made the Kasuga group its central target and prepared itself for the final showdown, which took place in the 8th Party Congress in July 1961. At the Party's Central Committee meeting, Miyamoto succeeded in overcoming Kasuga group's opposition and secured the Committee's endorsement for the adoption of his draft programme. Shortly thereafter, the leaders of the Kasuga faction withdrew from the JCP.³⁵ At the 8th Party Congress, the Kasuga group was officially ousted from the party and

34. For details, see Ibid., pp.97-135.

35. Ibid., p.109.

there was little opposition to the new party programme presented to the Congress by Miyamoto.

In this party document, the JCP held that Japan, a highly developed capitalist country, was virtually dependent on the United States. Accordingly, the document argued, the Japanese Communists should wage a struggle against the two principal enemies, "US imperialism" and "Japanese Monopoly capitalism", to bring about a people's democratic revolution before undertaking a socialist revolution. In the words of the resolution:

"Striving for the establishment of such a society, the communist party of Japan will persistently fight, for the present moment, against the rule by US imperialism and Japanese monopoly capital to the end and for a victory of the people's revolution which will realise genuine independence and democracy."³⁶

This first stage of revolution should be carried out by a multiclass "National Democratic United Front" led by the JCP. As for the revolutionary strategy and tactics, the party programme stipulated that the communist led United Front should seek to capture as many parliamentary seats as possible, because if a majority of seats could be won, then the parliament could be transformed from a

36. Programme of the Communist Party of Japan, adopted by the Eighth Congress on July 27, 1961 on the Problems of the Party programme, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Japan, Tokyo, 1966, p.23.

tool of reaction to an instrument of the people.³⁷ So, according to the newly adopted programme of the party, the JCP was to pursue the basic strategy of the Parliamentary path of revolution instead of the strategy of violent revolution. However, unlike Kasuga's proposal, the programme didn't preclude the possibility of violent revolution.

On the basis of the newly adopted party programme, Miyamoto made strenuous^{nu} efforts to rebuild the JCP after 1961. The task was complicated by the conflicting pressures exerted by Moscow and Peking. The communist giants attempted to pull the JCP into their respective orbits as a part of their growing contest for the leadership of the world Communist Movement. So, the intensification of the Sino-Soviet rivalry drastically affected the Japanese party. Initially, the JCP sought to maintain a strict neutrality between the two communist giants and was watching the entire development with great caution. By 1963, however, the JCP was no longer able to sustain this position and found itself compelled to take a stand on a host of issues - Yugoslavia, Albania, the Sino-Indian

37. For the English text of the resolution, see Ibid., pp.1-23.

border dispute, Cuba and the limited Test Ban Treaty. On all these issues, the leaders sided with Peking. Moreover, the party became increasingly critical of Khrushchev's tactics within the communist world. The climax was reached in 1963, when the Soviet Union signed the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. JCP's relations with Moscow received a serious setback soon when the Pro-Moscow Diet members of the Party, Shiga Yoshio and Suzuki Ichizo, were expelled from the party following the support to the ratification of the nuclear Test Ban Treaty in violation of party discipline. Moscow denounced JCP's actions and made attempts to discredit JCP leadership. JCP, in response, purged most of its pro-Soviet members from the party by the fall of 1964. The purged members, in turn, organized with Moscow's patronage a group called "the voice of Japan". So by the end of 1964, both the Communist Parties drifted apart.³⁸

Even more serious than the Soviet challenge to Miyamoto's leadership were the attempts by the CPC. It was widely assumed at the time of the expulsion of the pro-Soviet elements from the JCP in 1964 that the party

38. For a detailed discussion on the factors responsible for the rift between JCP and CPSU, see Chapter III.

had drifted towards Peking's orbit.³⁹ When the Chinese Communists attempted to dictate militant policies to the JCP and when in March 1966 Miyamoto visited Beijing, he sought, in vain, to find some common ground with Mao on two basic issues: (1) the question of promoting Sino-Soviet cooperation in Vietnam; and (2) the proper revolutionary strategy to be adopted by the Japanese Communists. Mao ruled out the possibility of cooperating with the Soviet Union in Vietnam and didn't endorse the JCP's parliamentary path to revolution. Instead, he advocated the necessity of armed struggle in Japan. When Miyamoto didn't give in to the Chinese demands, Mao refused to issue the joint communique. Upon his return from Peking, Miyamoto carried out purges against the pro-Peking elements, who in turn organised splinter groups known as the Japanese Communist Party (left) and got all-out support from the Peking.⁴⁰ Since 1966 the JCP's relations with Peking had not shown any marked trends towards improvement.

39. See, J.A.A. Stockwin, "The JCP in the Sino-Soviet dispute - from neutrality to alignment" in D.B. Miller and T.H. Rigby (eds.), The disintegrating monolith: (Canberra, ANU Press, 1965), pp.142-43; Scalapino, Fn.2, p.97-135. Kyosuke Hirotsu, "The strategic triangle: Japan" in Leopold Labedz, (ed.) International communism after Khrushchev (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1965), pp.123-30.

40. For a detailed discussion on the causes responsible for the rift between JCP and CPC, see chapter IV.

With the elimination of the pro-Soviet and pro-Peking elements from the party, Miyamoto became the undisputed leader of the JCP. At the 10th Party Congress of 1966, he was not only re-elected Secretary General, but also his trusted lieutenants were placed in key positions at the top echelon of the party hierarchy. The Congress also reaffirmed JCP's policy of 'self-reliance and independence' in its dealings with other communist parties of the world.

A CRITICAL APPRAISAL:

A brief look at the history of the JCP from 1922 to 1966 makes it evident that the communist parties of the Soviet Union and China exerted a dominant influence on the party. In pre-war times, the JCP was guided by the Soviet Union through the Comintern. After 1945, the JCP once again found itself subjected to foreign influence after an initial period of relative autonomy. For the first four years of the post war era, the JCP was relatively free of foreign influence. Several factors contributed to it, which may be enumerated as follows:

- (i) Those who assumed the leadership of the JCP in the immediate post war period, had been reared in Comintern tradition and were well known as proven defenders of Soviet interests. So, Moscow had no reason to suspect their loyalties.

- (ii) Further, Moscow was too pre-occupied with the post-war settlements pertaining to Eastern Europe especially to give adequate attention to the JCP.
- (iii) The dispensation was also due to the realisation by the Soviet leaders that little could be achieved by an all-out anti-American agitation, so long as Japan was firmly under American control.

But the sudden interest of Moscow and Peking in 1950 was the outcome of a changed international situation. The US-Soviet understanding had given way to the cold war and China had come under the communists. The Korean Peninsula had become an area of East-West military confrontation. In this situation, a militant anti-American JCP could be useful. It meant that the communist strategy in Japan had to be re-oriented. As a result, in 1950, the JCP leadership behaved as it always had in the past when confronted with Soviet demands or advice.

Such posture did not change even until the latter part of that decade. By the late 1950's the situation had changed in view of the split within the Sino-Soviet bloc. From 1960 onwards, the JCP came under the influence of conflicting pulls and pressures exerted by the two rival giants to ensure JCP's allegiance. The JCP leaders were invited frequently to tour China and USSR and their views and opinions were given importance in the Soviet

and Chinese journals. It has been rightly said that 'when big animals fight, it is the poor grass which suffers'. The eagerness of both Moscow and Peking to have the allegiance of the JCP had obvious repercussions on the latter. It intensified the factional strife within the party.

During this period, JCP's subservient attitude to the CPSU until 1962 was evident from its stand on 'Kurile Islands' - the chain of islands occupied by the Soviet Union during the World War II. The JCP regarded the claim of the Japanese Government for an early return of the islands as revanchist and proclaimed that the matter had already been settled. Its central committee declared in May 1962:

"Thus from whatever point of view one may choose to look at it, the question of "Northern Territories" (Kurile Islands) had been settled." 41

But a new tone became evident in 1964, when it declared:

"(Moscow) suggests that our party's stand on the Kurile islands is one of the worst manifestations of anti-Soviet elements... (but) it is quite clear that the handing over of the Kurile islands (after World War II) was an unfair act." 42

41. The Policies of the CPJ, Central Committee/CPJ Tokyo, May 1962, p.47.

42. Cited, Langer, Fn.6, p.23.

It shows that the Soviet policies continued to have the unquestioned support of the JCP till the end of 1962. However, as tensions began to build between Moscow and Peking, the JCP leaders for the first time had to respond to the intending pulls of the two rival communist giants. For a number of reasons,⁴³ including the greater affinity, the JCP felt for the Chinese than for the Russians. Peking had the advantage in this competition until the mid 1960's. Then the JCP's 'quest for Independence' began as the ruthlessly 'dictatorial' and 'unrealistic' behaviour of Mao and his aides forced a rupture of relations in 1966. The loss of a few thousand members due to estrangement with the CPSU and the CPC didn't weaken the party; rather it strengthened its claim to being an independent, national Japanese party.

43. See Chapter IV.

Chapter II

QUEST FOR INDEPENDENCE (1966-1979)



One of the most important consequences of JCP's severance of ties with Moscow and Peking was its liberation from foreign domination. For the first time since the establishment of the party in 1922, the JCP's leadership became free to map out its own strategy, unhindered by Soviet or Chinese interference. It declared its intention to pursue an "independent course of action" by "creative application of Marxism and Leninism" to the political problems in Japan. At the Tenth Party Congress (1966), the report of the Central Committee stated:

"As a party independently responsible for a revolutionary movement in Japan, the JCP has learned from the split in 1950 and subsequent serious experiences and is firmly convinced of the importance of adhering to its own independent stand on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and Proletarian internationalism. Thus it has consistently maintained its stand. At both the seventh Party Congress (1957) when we solved the problem of the split in 1950, and the Eighth Party Congress (1961), when the programme of the party decided upon, the independent attitude was upheld... For this reason, the Party was able to effectively struggle against modern revisionism and also to exercise vigilance over the dogmatic and sectarian

tendencies, and to energetically fight for the strengthening of Marxist-Leninism for the international communist movement." 1

At the time when Communist parties in East Europe and the West were becoming increasingly critical of the Soviet Union and those in Asian countries were showing anti-Soviet tendencies, it was not unexpected or extraordinary that the JCP also advocated an independent line and was anxious to prove that it was not a Soviet or Chinese tool.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF AN INDEPENDENT LINE:

Karl Marx made international solidarity the inviolable principle of the Communist movement, symbolizing the idea in the slogan "The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains... working men of all countries unite!" Historically, this principle had never been demonstrated. Marx thought that a proletarian revolution would break out in highly developed capitalist countries. He predicted that as a result of the development of capitalist production, large scale production would spread, coming into conflict with private ownership and requiring the

1. Cited, Kyosuke Hirotsu; "The new line of the Japanese Communist Party for the 1970's; Review, no.26, Sept. 1970, pp.11-12.

socializing of the means of production. In keeping with the changes in the economic structure, a political change would come as a political revolution. Revolution, therefore, would be confined not to one advanced country, but would be a chain-reacting phenomenon expanding to countries in similar conditions. For this reason, the unification of the proletariat would transcend states and was inevitable. Hence an international tie of the proletariat would be the basis for revolutionary force.²

Lenin did not think that revolution would be successful in a backward country such as Russia, and his European Socialist Federation was the Marxian theory applied to the actual European situation.³ Ironically, revolution was not achieved in an advanced European country, but in Russia alone. As a result, Russia had to rely on itself for the defense of its revolutionary regime. The safety of the Soviet regime was dependent upon the development of a worldwide revolutionary movement.⁴ As Lenin did

2. See, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels; "Manifesto of the Communist Party" in Selected Works, vol.1 (Foreign Language Publishing House, Moscow, 1950), pp.21-61.

3. See, V.I. Lenin; "The State and Revolution" in Marx, Engels, Marxism (Foreign Language Publishing House, Moscow, 1947), pp.341-363.

4. At the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party in March 1919, Lenin stated: "We live not only in a state but also in a system of states. It is inconceivable that the Soviet Republic should for a long period exist side by side with the imperialist states. One side or the other must prevail eventually. Until that time, some
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not believe in peaceful co-existence between the Soviet and imperialist systems, he adopted his policy to promote a worldwide revolutionary movement which would hinder the formation of an anti-Soviet alliance of capitalist countries. For this purpose, the Comintern was formed in March 1919.⁵

During the period of Stalin, the turmoil and revolutionary trends in the aftermath of the World War I were cooled down and Stalin laid down the thesis that the formation of an anti-Soviet alliance should be prevented by making good use of the clash of interests between capitalist countries, with socialism established in one country alone.⁶ The thesis took for granted that relations with capitalist countries should be promoted and that no international movement should be developed which in any way was detrimental to the existence of the Soviet state. Within this framework the Soviet Union felt that revolutionary activities should be fostered in various countries, provided they did not harm the Soviet position in the world. So the slogan to defend the Soviet Union, the father land of socialism, was passed through the Comintern to various communist parties.

4. contd...

very dreadful collisions between the Soviet Republics and bourgeois states will be inevitable. This means that, if the ruling proletariat wants to rule, and indeed is going to rule, it must demonstrate that demonstration even by organizing itself militarily."

5. For details see, Leopold Labedz and G.R. Urban (Eds.) The Sino-Soviet Conflict (Eleven Radio discussions) (London, The Bodley Head, 1965), pp.17-32.

6. See, Isaac Deutscher; Stalin - A political biography (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1968), pp.383-450.

Thus the "monolith" unity of the pre-war international communist movement was only "a fiction devised at the expense of other communist parties."⁷ After the World War II, however, the flame of hope for world revolution was not burning in the Soviet Union alone and the fiction was destroyed by the advent of several countries ruled by communist parties. So, trends towards independence and assertiveness were soon noticeable within the communist parties of several countries depending upon their domestic conditions. Although no communist parties were able to challenge the Soviet lead which had historically been formed, after the Sino-Soviet confrontation in the late 1950's and the Chinese challenge to the Soviet Union, the Italian and the French communist parties began to show signs of independence and many Asian communist parties followed suit.⁸ At present the independent line has become an accomplished fact among many communist parties.

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7. Sadachika Nabeyama; "The Japan Communist Party and tactics of peaceful revolution", Review, No.25, June, 1970, p.11.
 8. See, R.A. Longmire, "Communist International Relations and the Asian Communist Parties" in J.D.B. Miller and T.H. Rigby; The Disintegrating Monolith (Canberra, ANU, 1965), pp.123-136; Robert A. Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement: 1920-1966 (California, Univ. of California, 1968), pp.102-109, 258-259.

THE INDEPENDENT LINE OF THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY:

The trace of an independent line in the JCP was evident from the policies which Nosaka adopted in the immediate post World War II period which lasted till the criticism of Cominform in 1950.⁹ As is evident from his slogan of the "party to be loved by the people", his aim was to realise a democratic revolution through a united front. Nosaka's idea of "Peaceful Revolution" was based on the concept of the prevailing situation that Japan's leading classes were in confusion due to the recent defeat; the army and police had been disbanded and weakened; political liberty was assured; and the communist party had been legalized.

When on January 6, 1950, this policy was severely criticised by the Cominform, the first reaction of the JCP was that it knew best the direction of the communist movement in Japan. This confidence was shattered when it was learned that communist China supported the Cominform criticism. One reason for it was that at that time no "separate road to socialism" doctrine was recognised. The success in Yugoslavia in 1948 to resist Stalin was due to the freedom of action which the Yugoslavian Communist Party enjoyed as a party in power.

9. For details, see Chapter I.

The dismal consequences of accepting the Cominform's criticism in 1950 compelled the JCP leadership to look for a new strategy. The bid for the same resulted in accepting "the line of Peaceful Revolution" in the Eighth Congress of the JCP in July 1961. But the new strategy was not necessarily connected with an independent line policy. The peaceful revolutionary line as decided upon at the Eighth Congress in the new programme defined Japan as a highly developed capitalist country and urged it to develop a movement in accordance with its political, democratic conditions. Such stress on Japan's own conditions led it to the rejection of blind obedience to foreign experience, directives, or compulsion and think in terms of an independent line. As we shall soon discuss, the JCP first opposed the Soviet Union at the outset of the Sino-Soviet confrontation and then turned its back to China, which forcefully demanded Japan to engage in an anti-American national liberation struggle. Finally, the party established its own independent line.

Further the intensification of the Sino-Soviet tensions in the late 1950's had repercussions in the ideological realm of the JCP. In the beginning, the JCP sought for a while to prevent destructive ideological struggles within the party by playing down the differences between the two camps and by including both Mao and Khrushchev in

its platform. This position soon proved untenable and the JCP found itself being drawn more towards Peking.¹⁰ After a brief struggle, the pro-Moscow moderates and the structural reform followers lost out and were expelled from the party. The party remained dedicated to Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy and opposed to the "revisionist" tendencies of the West-European communist parties.

During the early 1960's, therefore, Moscow's contribution to the Japanese Party's ideological posture was limited to Lenin and the JCP disseminated Mao's works in ever-increasing numbers. But as disagreements between the Japanese and the Chinese parties developed, Mao's writings also disappeared from JCP reading lists. The Japanese communists had since lashed out against the errors of Khrushchev and Mao, notably against "big-power chauvinism"¹¹ by them. The shelves of the loyal JCP members were cleared

10. The 1961 draft resolution of the 8th Party Congress was a glaring example. For details see, Chapter I.

11. Miyamoto in his report to the 11th Party Congress (1970) said: "...It is not right to recognize a special position for that particular country and party (CPSU) and to for that party's line upon other parties... To confuse these issues and to insist that since that party has played a great historical role or, objectively speaking is now playing a big role, it is therefore proletarian internationalism to praise that party's actions unconditionally - such a position cannot stand up under scientific security." In the same report he told about the CPC that "...But in interfering in our party, they tried to force through the proposition - not only within China but internationally - that the so-called Mao-tse-tung thought constitutes the highest principle of world

...contd.

of all these writings except the early Marxist classics and Lenin. The writings of Japanese such as the early Communist Katayama Sen and the top JCP leaders were added to the basic Japanese communist library. The party started talking about the "creative application of Marxism-Leninism to Japan". As one scholar had rightly pointed out at that time, this may be merely a prelude to another attempt by party intellectuals to re-examine Marxism-Leninism in the contemporary Japan,¹² which had been done in subsequent party Congresses from time to time.¹³

Among the most important factors which drove the JCP to adopt an independent line was the intervention by the CPSU and the CPC in the internal affairs of the party.¹⁴

11. contd...

revolution - that the Chinese revolutionary formula should be the revolutionary formula for all countries and that those who do not accept this are nothing but counter-revolutionary elements and traitors..."
For details, see Main Documents of the XI Congress, 1970, Tokyo, 1970.

12. Paul F. Langer, Communism in Japan - A case of political naturalization (Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1972), p.80.

13. Ibid.

14. The editorial of the Akahata on Nov. 10, 1963 maintained, "As accepted by every fraternal party, there is no party either to lead or to be led in the international communist movement. With regard to the relationship between fraternal parties, no party can itself above any of (the) other fraternal parties. Nor can any party force other parties (to) obey a certain party. Bulletin-Information For Abroad, The CC of the CPJ, December, 1963, p.8.

The strategy of violence imposed on the JCP by Moscow and Peking in 1950 had caused the Japanese communists not only to doubt the wisdom of their mentors but to suspect the purpose of that strategy. The suspicion grew as both Moscow and Peking began to interfere in JCP affairs more and more openly in their struggle for the supremacy within the communist world system. The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet position on the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Soviet insistence on its legitimate rights to the Kurile islands and Sino-Soviet border incidents of 1969 all strengthened JCP's suspicions of the Soviet Union. Side by side Mao's intervention in Japanese party affairs further convinced Japanese communist leaders that the Russians and the Chinese were "great power chauvinists" rather than communist internationalists.

Moreover, the independent line of the JCP partly emerged out of the realisation that JCP's own strategy should take into consideration Japan's traditions, national character, political, social, economic and other conditions. Under democratic conditions in highly industrialized countries, there was no other way for the communist parties to extend their influence. Thus neither the Russian revolution nor the Chinese revolution could be useful as

a model for the revolutionary movement in Japan where a high degree of democracy and capitalism had already developed. Hitherto, dependence on the CPSU and CPC and safeguarding their interests in Japan by following their strategy had created an atmosphere of distrust among the Japanese people and deprived the JCP of a national perspective while formulating policies. Thus an independent strategy could dispel the public distrust that the JCP was no more a tool of the Moscow or Peking.

Furthermore, in the arena of the International communist movement, the hegemonistic attitude of both the CPSU and the CPC met with resistance from some of the East European as well as West European communist parties. With the intensification of the Sino-Soviet rivalry, they began to seek an equal footing and started losing faith in the concept of single communist system headed by Soviet Union. Their resistance was based on the agreements reached in the Moscow Declaration of 1957 and the Moscow Statement of 1960.¹⁵ This prompted the JCP along with

15. Moscow Declaration of 1960 said, "All the Marxist-Leninist parties are independent and have equal rights: They shape their policies according to the specific conditions in their respective countries and in keeping with Marxist-Leninist principles." "For unity of the International communist movement, For a resolute struggle against the two enemies", Bulletin - Information for Abroad, Jan. 1962, p.46.

some other communist parties of Asia i.e. Indonesia, North Korea, North Vietnam, to play an independent role in the sphere of the international communist movement.

Apart from these considerations, the JCP leadership had other reasons to feel inclined to pursue a line independent of CPSU and CPC. With its streamlined party organisation of over 250,000 members, the JCP had succeeded in electing 14 members to the lower house of the Diet, polling 3,199,031 popular votes or 6.8 per cent of the total in the December 1969 election.¹⁶ As the party expanded, its financial conditions improved. According to the reports to the Ministry of Autonomy, its accounts increased as follows:

Table I¹⁷

<u>Year</u>	<u>In 1,000 Yen</u>
1961	378,720
1962	490,820
1963	744,400
1964	990,740

16. John K. Emmerson, 'Japan', in Richard F. Staar (Ed.); Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (1970) (Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1971), p.600.

17. Cited, Nabeyama, Fn.7, p.20.

The firm organizational as well as financial position no doubt strengthened the party's inclination towards independence.

So, as matters stand today, the Japanese communists no longer place high value on the existence of a single communist world system. They warn against "blindly following foreign examples", advocate the "creative application of Marxism-Leninism" to national conditions, and stress equality within the single communist family of nation. The 'independent' line of the JCP, it maintained did not deny mutual assistance and international solidarity between the Soviet Union, the Chinese People's Republic, other socialist countries and their Communist parties. Nor its independent position contradicted the concept of 'Proletarian Internationalism'. In the words of Nosaka:

"The self-reliant and independent position of our party in no way contradicts the position of proletarian internationalism. On the contrary, it is part and parcel of proletarian internationalism in the present stage, when the self-reliance, independence and equality of the communist parties of all countries, have become an essential pre-condition for the communist movement's international cohesion." 18

18. Sanzo Nosaka; "What has assured the advancement of the CPJ"; Peace, Freedom and Socialism 13(5); May, 1970, p.29.

In other words, independence, equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of a fraternal communist party in no way hindered the spirit of proletarian internationalism; rather these were necessary ingredients of it.

JCP AND THE THEORY OF PEACEFUL REVOLUTION:

"Peaceful Revolution" through parliamentary means, the other pillar of the new JCP policy, stands side by side with independence. The JCP had already experienced successfully with the parliamentary strategy under the leadership of Sanzo Nosaka during 1946-49. Following the disasters wrought by the violent revolutionary strategy of 1950-55, the Central Committee of the JCP had agreed, as early as 1956, to consider a new programme for "peaceful parliamentary revolution" because the 1951 'thesis' did not fit the situation in Japan. As a result of such awareness, the adoption of the 1961 thesis¹⁹ notwithstanding, it was not until after the break with Peking in 1966 that the JCP became really serious about the "Parliamentary path to revolution". During the intervening years, the

19. For details, see Chapter I.

Chinese influence was still substantial within the JCP²⁰ and the JCP was more concerned with the struggles against the United States. After 1966, the JCP's justification for the "Parliamentary path to revolution" took the form of rejecting the violent revolution advocated by the Chinese communists on the grounds that:

- (a) Japan, being a highly advanced capitalist country, was comparable to the Western European countries;
- (b) accordingly, the peaceful transition to revolution was feasible in Japan as in the West European countries.

According to Tetsuzo Fuwa, who as Miyamoto's confidant articulated the JCP's viewpoints on the parliamentary path, the communist revolution in highly industrialised countries such as Japan could be peaceful and non-violent. He maintained that since the Japanese Diet

20. See, J.A.A. Stockwin; "The Japanese Communist Party in the Sino-Soviet dispute - From neutrality to alignment?" in D.B. Miller and T.H. Rigby (eds.) The Disintegrating Monolith (Canberra: ANU Press, 1965), pp.142-43; See also, Hirotsu Kyosuke; "The Strategic Triangle: Japan", in Leopold Labedz (ed.), International Communism after Khrushchev (Cambridge; MIT Press, 1965), pp.128-29.

enjoyed substantial constitutional powers within the Japanese state apparatus, the capture of the majority seats in the Diet would permit the JCP-led united front of coalition Government, which could transform the existing Diet into a "People's democratic Parliament".²¹ In Fuwa's theory of "People's parliamentarism" one can detect the basic ingredients of the doctrine of a peaceful transition to socialism" which European and Soviet communists have propounded since the late 1950's.²²

21. See, Hong N. Kim; "The JCP's Parliamentary Road", Problems of Communism; 26(2), March-April, 1977, pp.19-35.

22. According to Cyril E. Black, "in discussing the prospects for revolution in the years ahead, Soviet doctrine places most exclusive emphasis on "peaceful transition to socialism" which it defines as the "transition of individual countries to socialism without an armed rising and civil war. The Soviet conception of "peaceful transition" is not necessarily peaceful in the same sense as the transfer of power in a democratic system is peaceful, but may involve threat of violence and readiness to use violent methods in the event of unforeseen opposition. That's why Soviet writings distinguish the theory of "peaceful transition" from the heresy of the "revisionists" or "reformists" which denies the necessity for "class struggle" and precludes the possibility of non-peaceful revolution". For details, see "The Anticipation of Communist Revolution" in Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton (eds.); Communism and Revolution: the strategic uses of political violence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp.438-39. See also Raymond L. Garthoff, "The Advanced Countries", ibid., pp.407-9.

At its 11th Party Congress in November 1970, the JCP conducted vigorous propaganda about peaceful revolution. The report of the central committee at the 11th Party Congress stated:

"If a democratic coalition government is attacked by illegal violence and resort to such means, this is a typical case of resorting to violence when the enemy wills to do so. In this case, the party cannot be blamed for not being "absolutely Pacifist". For otherwise, the legally elected coalition government would be forced to surrender without resistance."²³

The 11th Party Congress not only reaffirmed its intention to follow the parliamentary path but also emphasized the necessity of establishing a "democratic coalition government" in the 1970's as a prelude to setting up a national democratic united front government. In the resolution, the JCP claimed to be an "independent, democratic political party", pursuing its ends by parliamentary means in order to fulfill its "historic duty to establish a democratic coalition government during the 1970's on the basis of an "anti-imperialist united front dedicated to peace, neutrality and democracy."²⁴

23. See, Main documents of the XI Congress, Fn. 11, pp.153-214.

24. John K. Emmerson; 'Japan', in Richard F. Staar, Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (1971), p.593.

Thus, with 10th and 11th congress JCP readied itself to enter into the parliamentary politics in a more concerted and planned manner with the proclaimed policies of "Independence" and "Peaceful Revolution through Parliamentary means".

JCP'S PARLIAMENTARY STRATEGIES:

In the aftermath of the JCP's decision to seek power through parliamentary means, it became unmistakably clear to the leadership that without an increase in the party's electoral strength it would be unrealistic to expect any success in the implementation of the "Peaceful transition to revolution".²⁵ In order to increase the JCP's electoral strength, however, drastic changes were needed to improve the party's image, to streamline the party's operations for electioneering and to adjust the party's political style and behaviour for purposes of elections. As a result, the leadership deradicalised²⁶ virtually every aspect of the party's activities in recent years.

25. Hong N. Kim; "Deradicalization of the Japanese Communist Party under Kenji Miyamoto;" World Politics 28(2); Jan. 1976, p.283.

26. For a detailed analysis, see, Ibid., pp.273-99.

(i) JCP and the Image of Violence:

The JCP made systematic efforts to divest itself of the taint of violence and create a new democratic image. To that end, the JCP had taken a number of steps, which can be enumerated as follows:

(a) In order to erase the impression that the JCP was a secretive party, for the first time in the history of the party, the 11th Congress of 1970 was open to the public.

(b) Furthermore, in order to dispel the popular fears on JCP's attitude to individual rights, liberties and the right of the opposition parties to exist under a Government led by the JCP, the party pledged in the same Congress that if it were ever to capture power, it would not institute one party dictatorship like in the USSR and China and would guarantee the rights and liberties of the citizens. It would permit the functioning of opposition parties "so long as they did not attempt to destroy the democratic system by violence".²⁷ The resolution of the 11th Congress proclaimed as follows:

"In an independent and democratic Japan, it is natural in view of its system that the freedom of activity will be guaranteed to all the political parties including parties which take a critical attitude to or an

27. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1971, p.598.

attitude against the Government so long as they do not act to destroy the democratic system of the people by violence, and that a political party which gains the majority in the Diet through election will take political power.

The freedom of speech, press, meeting and association will be guaranteed as the basic rights of the people and actual material security will be so established that the working people may really enjoy these rights."²⁸

In the 12th Congress held in November 1973, the JCP party also renewed the pledge that a JCP-dominated government would maintain a multi-party system with opposition parties "free" to compete for power. Regarding individual rights and liberties, apart from 12th Congress, the 13th Extraordinary Congress of the party held in July 1976, went a step forward by passing a 'Manifesto on Freedom and Democracy' unanimously. The manifesto declared, the party as the guardian of three basic freedoms: "the right to existence", "the right to political participation" and "the right to nationality".²⁹

28. Main Documents of XI Congress, Fn.11, p.177.

29. The manifesto says: "At present in Japan, under the politics of three evils, plutocracy, war criminality and national betrayal by the liberal-Democratic Government in subordination to US imperialism and in the service of big business, a general crisis has been deepening in political, economic and cultural-moral fields, and the crisis of freedom and democracy is becoming much worse.

The people have the right to enjoy three freedoms, viz. Freedom of existence, Civil political freedom and Freedom of the nation, the integrity of which must be completely guaranteed; but in Japan, there is serious suppression and infringement on each of these three freedoms. For the English text of manifesto see, 13th Extraordinary Congress of the CPJ. CC/CPJ, 1976, pp.65-95; Bulletin, No.359, Oct. 1976, pp.1-45.

The document³⁰ promised support for a multi-party system; called for continuing and strengthening the principle of separation of powers and affirmed guarantees of human rights, freedom of speech, press, reporting, assembly, thought, belief, conscience, scholarship, research, travel and change of domicile. It also pledged respect for the rights of women. Other guaranteed freedoms would be liberty to leave the country, freedom of choice of nationality, and freedoms of taste, hobbies, fashion and sports. It argued for the termination of the US- Japan military alliance and the mutual security pact and Japan's undue economic dependence on the US which placed limitations on Japan's sovereignty. The manifesto also further declared that in a socialist Japan, nationalisation would be confined to key industries.³¹ The manifesto pledged that in the society of the future, "no matter what happens, the communist party will work within a multi-party system complete with an opposition and will abide by peaceful changes of government as is the custom in states run by cabinets responsible to duly elected parliaments."³² Koichiro Ueda, Chairman of the JCP's policy

30. See, Ibid., p.65.

31. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (1977), p.310.

32. Arima Sumisato; "The Japan Communist Party", Japan Quarterly 25(2), April-June 1977, p.159.

committee held that the "new manifesto shows a determination on the part of the party to establish socialism by linking the problem of civil and political liberty with such problems of institutional guarantees as changes of regime, parliamentary democracy and the separation of the three powers."³³ The new line, according to party spokesman, was the proper evolution of Marxism in the Japanese context.

(c) To allay the fears and suspicions of the non-communist parties as well as the public, the JCP after 1970 was painstakingly toning down the traditional communist doctrine on the dictatorship of the proletariat. For instance, at the 12th Party Congress of 1973, the party officials decided to replace the term "dictatorship of the proletariat" (Puroretaria dokusai) with "regency of the proletariat (Puroretaria shikken). In the 13th Extraordinary Congress, it decided to delete the whole phrase and the new statement of principles now insists on the guaranteeing of the rights of the working class. Tetsuzo Fuwa explains the reason that "the word dictatorship has been used as a synonym for power, but it also has connotations from the Russian revolution and the Comintern

33. K.V. Narain, "New Soft Line by Communists", Hindu (Madras), 1st Sept. 1976.

era. This shade of meaning is quite different and has nothing to do with the parliamentary system of elections."³⁴

Moreover, the party deleted "Marxism-Leninism" from the bylaws and programmes and replaced it with the blander phrase "scientific socialism" (kaḡakuteki shaka-ishugi). Fuwa explains it as "Marx, Engels and Lenin played an important and great role in developing and improving the theory. But in the problems of our age and to cope with the problems in our future, we won't be able to find all the solutions and answers in the past.

34. The draft resolution of the 13th Congress says, "Marx and Engels used the equivalent of "Shikken of the proletariat" and "power of the working class" and "political rule by the working class" as interchangeable terms to express the view of scientific solution on the character of socialist power. When they introduced the 'Shikken' concept into the state theory of scientific socialism, it has unique significance, in that it emphasized that the working class seizes the whole state power, the entire power structure including the legislative and the administrative executive organs and even the coercive apparatus. But in these days, the very terms "state power" or "power" are used as expressions in social science to mean the entire power structure, including the executive organ. In the same connection, the essential reason for use of the term shikken has disappeared, a term which is difficult for people to apprehend without special explanation. See, 13th Extraordinary Congress of the CPJ, Fn.29, pp.58-62.

We cannot accept every word said by Marx and Engels hundred years ago or the words of Lenin written at the beginning of this century as valid today."³⁵

(d) Concurrent with its assiduous attempts to improve the JCP's image, the Miyamoto leadership had engaged in systematic efforts to deradicalise its political operations. The JCP's 'soft-line' was reflected particularly in the editorial policy of Akahata. Until the mid 1960's, the party organ had been of little interest to non-communist readers because of its heavy use of communist jargon and radical editorials. In 1968, the JCP leadership drastically

35. Amrita Bazar Patrika (Calcutta, 30 Aug. 1976). Further, the draft resolution of the 13th Extraordinary Congress, said, "with almost one century ago since Marx and Engels wrote, and more than half a century since the death of Lenin, the doctrine and movement of scientific socialism cannot be confined within the scope of the theories developed by these three men. Both the doctrine and movement of scientific socialism are full of rich lessons from the subsequent development of the world communist movement and science and their future is related to the future of mankind extending over an even longer range of time. In particular, the name "Marxism-Leninism" is deeply reflected in the theoretical developments made by Lenin, who applied this doctrine to the realities of his time... In Japan, however, we have to take into consideration the fact that the creative development of scientific socialism is being sought as a revolutionary movement in a highly developed capitalist country, with completely different historical conditions from those existing at the time of the revolutionary movement when Lenin was active and developing its theory.

13th Extraordinary Congress of the CPJ, Fn.29, p.64.

changed the format of the paper by diversifying its sources of information and introducing an entertainment section that features comics, interviews with show-business celebrities, chess and go games and the like.³⁶ The deradicalisation of Akahata had made it one of the most widely circulated party-operated newspapers in Japan. By 1978 it had a daily circulation of 700,000 and a Sunday circulation of 2,500,000.³⁷ The JCP's success in expanding Akahata's circulation not only strengthened the party's propaganda apparatus, but also increased its income.³⁸

(e) Moreover, to create confidence in the minds of the public, the JCP-affiliated students, during the height of campus revolts in 1968 and 1969 frequently helped police to quell disorders staged by the more radical "anti-Yoyogi" Zengakuren elements.³⁹ The JCP also vehemently denounced the extremist groups, such as the Sekigun (Red Army) faction which highjacked a Japanese

36. Kim; Fn.25, p.285.

37. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (1978) Fn. 11, p.268.

38. See, George O. Totten; "The people's parliamentary path of the Japanese Communist Party Part II, Local Level Tactics", Pacific Affairs, Vol.46, Fall 1973, pp.398-99.

39. See, Ichiro Sunada, "The Thought and Behaviour of Zengakuren: Trend in the Japanese Student-movement", Asian Survey, IX (June 1969), p.457, 74.

Airliner to North Korea in 1970 and the Rengo Sekigun (United Red Army) faction which shocked the Japanese through atrocities committed against its own members in the form of torture and mass murders in 1972.⁴⁰

(ii) JCP's Election Politics:

JCP's approach to the elections after 1966 was also marked by considerable flexibility. As the JCP became serious about the parliamentary path to revolution, it began to focus more and more bread-butter issues that often determine the outcome of elections, rather than on the foreign policy issues. Thus, while downgrading the revolutionary theme in its policy statements, the party had focused its attention increasingly on the mundane but politically potent issues of pollution, taxation, inflation and public health. Furthermore, in order to garner votes the JCP and its front organisations had also made all-out efforts to organise grass-root activities such as bowling, table-tennis, games and other sports and entertainments. They also maintained consulting facilities to advise and help the voters in their common daily problems by providing tax counselling,

40. John K. Emmerson, "The Japanese Communist Party after fifty years", Asian Survey, XII (July 1972), pp.571-72.

medical service and the like. For example, the JCP set up party affiliated clinics to 24 hours medical services in under-privileged neighbourhoods, legal aid societies to offer help at reasonable fees, and even members of commerce to back financially unstable small shops.⁴¹ Akahata had been especially building channels of communication between the JCP and the alienated voters dwelling in urban areas. No sooner does a voter subscribe to the newspaper than he begins to be fed with party's viewpoints on policy matters as well as favourable information regarding its candidate for public office.

Parallel with the stepped-up activities geared to electioneering, the JCP has also introduced changes in its approach to the nominations of party candidates. The party's nomination for candidates in national elections was now more frequently given to party members who had 'voter appeal'. Accordingly, physicians, lawyers and other professionals with moderate and respectable images

41. For details, see, Hong N. Kim, Fn.2; Karl Dixon, "The growth of a 'popular' Japanese communist party", Pacific Affairs, 45; Fall 1972, 387-402; Arima Sumisato, Fn.36, 157-159; Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (Chapter on Japan), 1973, 1977, 1980.

received the endorsement of the party more frequently than others.⁴² Emphasis has also been placed on projecting a youthful, dynamic image of the party in nominating candidates for public office. Once elected, the communist representatives endeavour to be responsive to the individual complaints of their constituents and try to establish their reputations as effective representatives.

Such vigorous activities paid off and in the election of December 1972, there were 38 communists in comparison to 14 communists in 1969 in the House of Representatives. For the first time after 1949, the JCP was able to enter into the Diet Steering Committee.⁴³ Though the Party's strength reduced to 17 seats in the election of 1976, it managed to improve its position in the election of 1979 by securing 41 seats in the House of Representatives. The following table shows the statistical records of the JCP's achievement in the elections to the House of Representatives after 1949.

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42. Of 38 communists elected to the Lower House in December 1972, 12 were lawyers, 2 were medical doctors, 6 were teachers, and 4 were leaders of communist controlled local businessmen's association. The remaining 14 were either local union leaders or party 'bureaucrats'. See, Kim, Fn.25, p.287.
43. A party is not entitled to a seat in this committee unless it has twenty one seats or more.

Table - II

The JCP Vote in Elections for the House
of Representatives
(1946-1979)

Election	% of total vote	Number of candidates elected
1946	3.8	5
1947	3.7	4
1949	9.8	35
1952	2.5	0
1953	1.9	1
1955	2.0	2
1958	2.6	1
1960	2.9	3
1963	4.0	5
1967	4.8	5
1969	6.8	14
1972	10.88	38
1976	10.4	17
1979	10.42	39

44. Sources, upto 1969, Hong N. Kim, Fn.25, p.297.
From 1972, Yearbook on International Communist
Affairs, 1973, 1977, 1978.

Since 1972, inspite of ups and downs in the number of seats, the JCP has been maintaining a consistent voter's base. The setback in 1976, may be attributed to various reasons, which we are going to discuss later. Apart from elections to the national legislature, the communists have also increased their legislative seats in various local assemblies in recent years. By the end of 1980, the party held 3,598 of the approximately 76,000 seats in the local assemblies, making it second only to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in terms of numerical strength.⁴⁵

Moreover, the communists' electoral success has been most remarkable in the highly industrialised urban centres of the crowded pacific coastal belt where nearly two-thirds of the Japanese population is located. This success can be ascribed not only to the effective mobilisation of the party's organisational and propaganda apparatus in elections, but also to the ruling LDP's inability to cope with urban problems, such as traffic congestion, housing and land-shortages and photochemical pollution, which became serious by the end of 1960's.

45. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1981, p.153.

The LDP, essentially a rural and semi-rural political party, has not been able to respond effectively to the demands of the urban population for solving these problems. As a result, the decline has become quite pronounced in the urban centres.⁴⁶

At this point, one may ask as to why JCP's progress came to a halt after 1972 and why it was not able to improve its voters base. The sudden decline in the previously rapid expansion of the JCP can be attributed to a number of factors:

- (a) One of these was the concerted effort made not only by the LDP, but the Komeito and the DSP to stop the communists. In the election of 1976, Kasuga Ikko, the Secretary General of the DSP revived 40 years old 'spy lynch case'⁴⁷

46. See, Hong N. Kim; "The crisis of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party", Current History, April 1975, pp.158-62.

47. The outline of the case was as follows: Miyamoto was arrested on 26 Dec. 1963 on the charge of murdering a member of the JCP Central Committee who was interrogated by the Committee as a suspected Government spy. Hakamada Satomi, a member of the present standing committee of the Presidium, was later arrested on the same charge. Miyamoto and Hakamada were sentenced life imprisonment and 13 years of imprisonment respectively. Although Miyamoto was not a political prisoner, he was released on 9 Oct. 1945 at the time when all political prisoners were freed under the civil rights directive issued by MacArthur on 11 October. His civil rights were restored in 1947. Kasuga's point was that the release and restoration of rights were illegal since he was a convicted criminal. The JCP's position was that the victim was clearly a government spy and died due to heart failure during interrogation. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1977, pp.313-14.

to criticise the JCP. Being alarmed by the electoral success of the JCP in 1972, the LDP made vigorous propaganda against the JCP in the succeeding years. On December 2, 1973, in a paid newspaper advertisement the LDP pointed out the incompatibility between the policy position outlined in the JCP's programme of November 1973 and the programme adopted in 1961.⁴⁸

- (b) A second reason would lie in the nature of the voters' support commanded by the JCP. It was highly unlikely that the 'floating voter', when casting his ballot for a communist, was in any way showing his approval for the JCP's two stage revolution. All that the voters in mind might be to show their disapproval of the incumbent LDP's monopolising the reins of government. The emergence of Komeito had reduced the status of the JCP among the 'lower echelon' circle of the society. In spite of all its deradicalised policies, there were still many people who might be sceptical about JCP's true spirit of tolerance.
- (c) Furthermore, the JCP had not been able to make any inroads in the labour union movements. After the World War II, when JCP came out to rebuild itself, the

48. Kim, Fn.21, p.25-26.

Japanese socialist party had already established its dominance in the labour union movements. Though due to the consistent efforts, the JCP had infiltrated in the lower ranks of the Sohyo (General Council of Trade Unions), still it was not a potent force to be reckoned with.

Thus, despite the deradicalisation of the party's policy orientation and vigorous propaganda activities, the JCP was not able to overcome the popular fearpsychosis.

(iii) JCP and the Proposal for a Democratic Coalition Government:

The electoral success scored by the JCP encouraged the party to seriously think in terms of a democratic coalition Government. According to the resolution adopted by the 11th Party Congress in 1970, the JCP declared itself an 'independent democratic' political party pursuing its ends by parliamentary means for establishing a 'democratic coalition Government' in the 1970's.⁴⁹ This point was stressed in the 12th Party Congress, 1973, which adopted a resolution on "The programme of the Democratic Coalition Government".⁵⁰ According to the JCP's 1973 document, the

49. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1971, p.598.

50. See, Main documents of the 12th Congress of the CPJ, Central Committee, CPJ, 1970, pp.251-328.

party was willing to form such a Government with other opposition parties on the basis of commonly acceptable policy programmes which would include (1) the termination of the US-Japan Security Treaty; (2) the protection of people's livelihood; and (3) the preservation of the democratic parliamentary system of Government.⁵¹

In order to bring about an alliance with the JSP, the JCP during the years preceding the election of 1976, declared to 'shelve temporarily' its demand for the abrogation of the country's security treaty with the United States.⁵² On December 1, in a desperate move to improve the party's electoral prospects, Miyamoto declared that the JCP would form a Coalition Government with any party, regardless of their political orientation on the basis of three fundamental planks: (1) opposition to fascism, (2) further investigation of Lockheed scandal, (3) promotion and protection of people's livelihood.⁵³

But JCP's flexibility did not evoke any enthusiastic response from the JSP. JCP's right wing was strongly anti-communist and the left wing was also apprehensive about the danger of losing influence by forming a united front with

51. Ibid.

52. Times (London), Dec. 3, 1976.

53. Japan Times, Dec. 2, 1976.

the JCP, which was better organised and had greater financial resources. Though, the JCP and JSP had come together to put up jointly sponsored candidates in the local assembly election, still there is little likelihood of JSP's forming a united front with the JCP in the near future. Prospects for the formation of a united front with other opposition parties are even worse. The anti-communist DSP was adamant in opposing a united front with the communists, a sentiment reciprocated by the JCP. The Komeito had serious reservations about the JCP and would continue to distrust the communists.

Because of basic differences in their approaches to a coalition Government, this trend is likely to continue. For instance, the non-communist parties are quite apprehensive about the JCP's pronounced intention to transform the 'Democratic Coalition Government' into a 'People's Democratic Dictatorship', which is clearly unacceptable to those non-communist opposition parties. Furthermore, they are opposed to JCP's professed intentions to seek institutional amendment including the revision of Article IX of the Constitution (the renunciation of war clause) and the abolition of the Emperor system. Unless and until these problems and differences are not solved, it is unrealistic to expect the development of an 'united front Government'.

AN OVER VIEW:

Thus, 'People's parliamentarism' at home and complete independence from Moscow and Peking were the two main planks of the JCP. Since 1966, the JCP had not looked back; it hammered out its own strategy and pursue it vigorously through its own methods. It had resulted in the emergence of the JCP as a force to be reckoned with in the Japanese political arena.

The quest for independence had led the JCP to promote better relationship with the like-minded communist parties in Asia--primarily North Korea and Vietnam and in Europe. There was clear realisation among the JCP leaders of the parallels between their own situation and that of western communist parties. That's why the changes in the ideological realm of the JCP were more prone towards the "Euro-communist" policies. The changes of the expressions like "Dictatorship of the Proletariat" and 'Marxism-Leninism' not only showed that the JCP was following the Italian and French communist parties, but also shows that the JCP had marched one step further. While the former parties never challenged the ideological values of Marx and Lenin, the latter had replaced it on the ground that enough changes had taken place in the world since the days of Lenin. Its identification with the Euro-communist policies also strengthened its desire to pursue the 'Parliamentary path of revolution'.

Thus, out of its quest for independence, the JCP emerged as a potential force. The party's influence reached in all parts of the Japanese society. In the international front, with an autonomous orientation, the JCP had been well represented at international meetings of the communist parties.

Chapter III

THE JCP AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION: FROM SUBORDINATION TO EQUALITY (1964-1979)



The Japanese Communist Party started as a Loyal Comintern Party with strong ties with the Soviet Union. In pre-war times, Moscow's control over the JCP was complete.¹ The leaders, who assumed control over the party had been reared in the Comintern tradition and were well known in Moscow as proven defenders of Soviet interests. Thus, even if Nosaka started advocating for the creation of a 'lovable party' and expressed his faith on the 'peaceful revolution', Moscow had no reason to suspect the loyalty of the post war JCP's leaders. Their policies were, therefore, apparently little scrutinised in Moscow, especially since the Soviet Union was then pre-occupied with Europe. At any rate, Japan, under American occupation and cut off from contacts with outside world, was beyond Soviet reach.

1. For details, see Chapter I.

But with the change of international situation, Soviet Union wanted to re-assert its control over the JCP to thwart the ambitions of the United States in Japan as well as in the Far East.² So, when the Cominform's criticism was published in 1950, the JCP leaders behaved as they always had in the past when confronted with Soviet demands and advice. It was evident from the statement of late Secretary General Tokuda Kyuichi, who declared in 1952:

"As I look on the past thirty years of our party life, I feel most keenly how absolutely essential it is to observe strictly the guiding principles of the knight of peace, the great leader of the workers, comrade Joseb Vissariono Vich Stalin." 3

The way the draft of 1951 entitled "Immediate Demands of the Japanese Communist Party - A New Programme" was drafted by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) with the help of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the way Stalin got the assent of the JCP leaders makes an interesting reading.⁴

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2. For factors, see Chapter I.
 3. Cited, Paul F. Langer, "The new posture of the CPJ", Problems of Communism, V.20, special issue, Jan-April 1978, p.20.
 4. The factional strife within the JCP over the Cominform's criticism of 1950 was strongly resented by Stalin, who reportedly told Hakamada Satomi, a stalwart of the

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As a result of the Cominform's criticisms, the JCP adopted a suicidal hardline strategy and started guerrilla warfare activities in Japan, which had a disastrous effect on the party. Fortunately, for the JCP, the violent episode was rather short. By the end of 1955, the JCP was allowed to abandon the strategy of 'violence' as it no longer served the purposes of the Soviet Union.⁵ But the JCP's attempts to re-arrange the shattered organisation were

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opposition group, in the meeting which discussed the draft programme of 1951 that: "Comrade Hakamada, I have heard from our Japanese comrades that there is a fierce factional strife in Japan. This is not good. I would like the party to unite on the basis of the presently adopted directive. Therefore, it is imperative to have Comrade Hakamada's self criticism. I think you should write it now and send it to the comrades in Japan." Hakamada had no other alternative but to write the self-criticism, because all those present reinforced Stalin's dictum without any whimper.

For details, see, Peter Berton, "The Soviet and Japanese Communist Parties: Policies, Tactics, Negotiating behaviour"; Studies in Comparative Communism, 15(3), Autumn 1982, pp.273-275.

5. For details, see, Chapter I.

complicated by the conflicting pressures exerted by Moscow and Peking. As tensions began to build between Moscow and Peking, the two communist giants made strenuous efforts to establish a monopoly of influence⁶ over the JCP leadership. These attempts created tensions within the Japanese organisation and accentuated the already existing differences between two factions i.e. the "Mainstreamers" and the "Internationalists".

In the realm of Sino-Soviet conflict, though the party was discreet enough to maintain an image of neutrality in the public, still for a number of reasons,⁷ the Japanese communists felt greater affinity with the Chinese than with the Russians. The two countries had historic and cultural affinities. Furthermore, during the war, Nosaka made China his home base and later Peking was the heaven to which the exiled communist leaders fled from Japan. The Chinese communists had assisted their Japanese friends in many ways during the post-war period, while Moscow seemed to have been content to let the Chinese deal

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6. For details, see, Paul F. Langer, "Independence or subordination: the JCP between Moscow and Peking", in A. Doak Barnett (ed.); Communist Strategies in Asia - A comparative analysis of Governments and Parties (Connecticut, Greenwood, 1963), pp.80-83.
 7. See, J.A.A. Stockwin; "The JCP in the Sino-Soviet dispute - From neutrality to alignment" in J.D.B. Miller and T.H. Rigby (Eds.); The Disintegrating Monolith (Canberra, ANU, 1965), p.137.

directly with the Japanese party. On the substantive issues, the Chinese position also appeared to have had much greater appeal in Japan. Soviet strategy in the late 1950's, characterised by the concept of 'peaceful co-existence' and other issues, was interpreted in Japan as a status quo policy unworthy of a communist power. Such emotional and ideological hang ups with Peking didn't allow the JCP to maintain its stand of neutrality for a longer period and it culminated in the estrangement of relationship with Moscow.

THE JCP AND THE CPSU (1960-1964):

By the end of 1958, the "Mainstreamers" consolidated their power base with the return of 1500 Japanese communists who had been to China in between 1953 and 1957. These returnees came to form the nucleus of the pro-Chinese faction within the JCP and monopolised all the important party positions in the 7th Party Congress.⁸ Miyamoto, who was said to be neutral, was still overshadowed by the Party Chairman Nosaka in terms of prestige and popularity, who was mostly associated with the pro-Chinese faction. On the other hand, the 'Internationalists' headed by Kasuga Shojiro, looking at the growing importance of the

8. Kyosuke Hirotsu, "The strategic triangle: Japan", in Leopold Labedz (Ed.) International communism after Khrushchev (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1965).

'Mainstreamers' urged the party to clarify its official position over the Sino-Soviet dispute before sending JCP representatives to the Moscow conference of 1960.

Thus the first official discussion of the Sino-Soviet dispute took place within the JCP Central Committee in November 1960. The Miyamoto report, in essence, seemed to have been a studied attempt to follow a neutralist line. Though some of the positions, like the impracticability of trying to eliminate force as a revolutionary tactics as long as imperialism continued to exist, were taken according to the Chinese emphasis, Miyamoto argued that it was not necessary for the JCP to take a position on the struggle between the Soviet Union and China. Rather, the party should determine its stand on concrete issues, solicit the friendship of all communist parties and serve whenever possible as mediating influence.⁹

But the JCP couldn't go along with its 'superficial' conciliatory approach for a long time. The victory of pro-Peking forces within the JCP in the 8th Party Congress, 1961 meant the elimination of pro-Moscow elements from leading party posts. The JCP thus lost a number of leaders

9. See, Robert A. Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966, (California, University of California, 1968), pp.101-106.

and cadres, which included several Central Committee members, who had been attracted by the structural theories of Tog Liatti and by other aspects of what Peking attacked as 'revisionism'.

With the consolidation of their power base, the JCP, under heavy influence of the 'Mainstreamers', for the first time in its history, came in direct clash with Moscow in the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, held in October 1961. In the Congress, Khrushchev's public attack on Albania and Chou En-lai's sharp retort, followed by his abrupt return from Moscow before the end of the Congress, represented a significant escalation of the Sino-Soviet conflict. In the face of the insistence by the CPSU that the JCP should also criticise Albania, the JCP showed defiance. Nosaka, Chairman of the Japanese delegation, simply confined himself in his speech to urging unity on the basis of the 1957 and 1960 Moscow agreements.¹⁰ But upon returning home, party leaders expressed views similar to those voiced in Peking, i.e. that Khrushchev's attack on the Albanian party was a revolution of the Moscow declaration of 1957.¹¹

10. For the text of the speech, see, Bulletin, Information for Abroad, CC/CPJ, Jan.1962, pp.45-47.

11. Hans H. Baerwald, "The Japanese Communist Party" in Robert A. Scalapino (Ed.) Communist Revolution in Asia (New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1965), p.214.

The Albanian incident marked only the beginning; by the end of 1964, it became clear that the JCP's position on a host of issues was diametrically opposed to that of the Soviet Union.

- (a) With respect to the Sino-Indian border dispute, the JCP supported the Chinese in contrast to the studied coolness with which the CPSU viewed Peking's actions.¹² In an article on Oct. 31, 1962, Akahata supported China unequivocally and blamed the Indians for aggravating the situation.
- (b) During the Cuban Missile crisis, the JCP mounted a barrage of criticisms against American imperialism. The 'victory of reason' propounded by Khrushchev to justify the withdrawal of the missiles didn't get any words of praise. Akahata, according to the views of the Chinese communists, appealed for the maintenance of constant struggle against 'American imperialism'.
- (c) Branding the Yugoslavian leaders as 'revisionists' the JCP, in a letter on 26th August, criticised the CPSU for its attempts to rehabilitate the communist league of the Yugoslavia and depicted it as a move to split the socialist world. Akahata also reprinted the whole of the CPC's attacks on Tito.

12. Scalapino, Fn.9, p.150.

Apart from these issues, possibly the most crucial indicator of the Pro-Peking posture of the JCP was the position that the party ultimately took with respect to the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (PNTBT). The CPC criticised that the treaty represented an attempt to keep China out of the nuclear club and preserve the present major power monopoly. Following the Chinese line, Akahata published an article in October 1963, which it strongly opposed the treaty on the following grounds.¹³

- (i) The agreement represented an attempt to contain the Chinese people's Republic.
- (ii) It attempted to weaken the true peace loving forces who espouse the complete abolition of nuclear weapons.
- (iii) It didn't provide for a check against the disposal of nuclear weapons by the United States.
- (iv) It was a facade behind which the United States could continue to pursue its aggressive policies.

Following the publication of the criticisms regarding the PNTBT, the CPSU made vigorous attempts to gain the assent of the party. Even the Soviet Union allegedly went to the extent of pampering some of the JCP members to oppose the

13. See, Baerwald, Fn.11, pp.214-15.

party line on the treaty, to which the JCP took a strong note.¹⁴ The JCP criticised it as the "big-power chauvinism" and "gross interference" in the affairs of the party. Against this background, talks were held in Moscow between the JCP and the CPSU in March 1964 in a futile¹⁵ attempt to iron out the differences between the two parties.

The JCP's rupture with the CPSU came shortly thereafter, when the Pro-Moscow Diet members of the JCP, Yoshio Shiga and Ichizo Suzuki, were expelled from the party after voting in the Diet for the ratification of

14. See, "CPJ CC's Reply to CPSU CC" (Extract), Peking Review, 7 (3e), Sept. 18, 1964, p.13.

15. The negotiations continued intermittently from March 2, until the 11th without any agreement. Yet, inspite of the lack of an agreement the Soviets insisted on insisting a joint communique. The Japanese refused to draft or to sign one, citing the lack of any agreement that could be mentioned in such a communique. But the Soviet delegation was determined to get a communique signed, and Ponomarev stubbornly persisted his effort to get Hakamada to sign a communique. He reportedly said the Japanese delegation while they were getting into the plane; "Comrade Hakamada, please sign a joint communique, otherwise I will be in trouble."

See, Peter Berton, Fn.4, pp.275-277.

the treaty in violation of the stand taken by the seventh plenum of the CC of the JCP in October, 1963.¹⁶ The CPSU naturally supported Shiga's stand and called him a 'patriot'

16. For the first stand taken by the seventh plenum of the CC of the JCP, and the resolution expelling Yoshioshiga and Ichizo Suzuki, see, "On the Punishment of Yoshio Shiga and Ichizo Suzuki for their violation of the party constitution and subversive activities against the party", Bulletin - Information for Abroad, CC/CPJ, June 1964, pp.4-13. After the voting, Mr. Shiga came up to the reporters' room and distributed the already prepared statement entitled, "Appeal to the Nation" and explained that he voted his approval to the bill, based on his conscience and belief as a communist.

At the Press Conference, Mr. Shigo laid the stress that it was far from his intention to leave the JCP, and yet, toward the end of his prepared statement, he said, "Over 40 years in the past, against all sorts of persecutions and oppressions, and nothing but the interest of the people and the party would motivate my action. I am determined to defend the flag, I have fought for, standing for peace, proletariat, internationalism and Marx-Leninism. Therefore, I will endeavour to put the JCP on the right track of Marx-Leninism in the future." These concluding words were enough to indicate that Mr. Shig's action on that day was taken after he had made full preparations against the contingency that he might be expelled from the party. On 16th night, the JCP held an urgent Diet members conference, and at the CC meeting held on the 21st, they decided to expel Mr. Shiga and Mr. Ichizo Suzuki, an upper house member. "The JCP firmly entrenched in the Chinese line", in Japan Socialist Review, No.64, June 15, 1964, p.47.

and faithful son of the People' and denounced JCP's action. In an attempt to discredit the JCP leadership revealed hitherto unpublished letters¹⁷ exchanged between the CPSU and the JCP during 1963-64. The JCP responded to the Soviet action by purging most of the pro-Soviet members from the party by the fall of 1964.¹⁸ The purged members, in turn, formed with Moscow's blessings, a rival communist party Nihon no Koe (Voice of Japan).

17. In the report to the 9th Congress of the JCP, Miyamoto stated, "...breaking the faith with a fraternal party it published in the middle of July, 1964, its letter dated April 18, in which various slanders distorting the facts were laid on our party. This is why in the latter part of August, our party published our reply to it refuting in details and while repeatedly protesting against the CPSU leadership's subversive activities against our party..... In spite of our protest, the CPSU leadership once again dared to publicly support Kamiyama and Nakana who stated openly in the latter part of September their subversive activities against the party in collusion with Shiga's group." See, The IX Congress of the Communist Party of Japan, Tokyo, 1964, pp.123-132.
18. Hong N. Kim; "Deradicalisation of the Japanese Communist Party under Kenji Miyamoto", World Politics, 28(2), Jan. 1976, p.278.

This had its repercussions on many other front organisations of the JCP like in the Council against Atomic and Nuclear bomb and the Japanese-Soviet friendship organisations. The tenth world rally of Gensuikyo, the Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen bombs, in the summer of 1964 proved to be two rallies rather than one. Significantly, the Russians sent delegations to both the JCP and the JSP dominated rallies and their reception was far less cordial at the JCP than at the JSP dominated rally. In its report to the 9th Congress, Miyamoto said, "...But the CPSU leadership enforced splitting intrigues towards the tenth world conference against the A & H Bombs in collusion with the right wing social democrats and the anti-party revisionists..."¹⁹

By the time of the 9th Congress of the JCP held in November 1964, the party daily Akahata published an authoritative and highly critical statement "on the intrinsic nature of the N.S. Khrushchev's peaceful co-existence line" in which it criticised that the concept of 'Peaceful co-existence' had underplayed the dangers of 'imperialism' against which the JCP had been fighting.²⁰

19. The IX Congress of the CPJ, Fn.17, p.132.

20. At the time of dismissal of Khrushchev, the JCP commented "that particular N.S. Khrushchev was dismissed from his posts of first secretary, Member of the presidium and Prime Minister by the CPSU presidium as well as by the Central Committee itself indicate that the domestic and foreign policies hitherto carried out by the CPSU leadership headed by N.S. Khrushchev have been faced

The 9th Congress of the JCP took place in 1964 and the JCP formally ended its relationship with the CPSU.

It declared:

"At the bottom of worsening relations between two parties, there exist many political and theoretical differences regarding appraisal of US imperialism and the partial nuclear test-ban treaty, assessment of the peaceful co-existence policy and so on, as is clear in the letters between the two parties, and these differences should be settled on the basis of the Marxist-Leninist principles. For that purpose, it is necessary, first of all, on the part of the CPSU leadership to cease all its subversive activities against our party. Our party will take further necessary measures for the genuine solidarity between the Japanese and Soviet parties to be based on the norms governing relations between fraternal parties on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and Proletarian internationalism." 21

In other words, the JCP was compelled to break away from the CPSU because of its 'big-power chauvinism' and the 'interference in the internal affairs' of the party. On the other hand, the rupture with the CPSU was regarded as a victory for the 'Mainstreamers' for whom CPSU's attitude towards PNTBT and continued support to the Shiga's

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with serious contradictions and difficulties. N.S. Khrushchev has played the chiefs role in the international current of modern revisionism which has created and extended disunity of the International communist movement and the international democratic movements. Ibid., p.139.

21. Ibid., p.133.

faction paved the way for a final showdown. Thus, with the 9th Congress, the JCP broke away from its earlier mentor and formally ended the era of subordination, which began since the year 1922.

THE JCP AND THE CPSU (1964-1979): A LONG ROAD TO NORMALISATION:

When the party's 'revisionists' or the 'pro-Soviet' elements were ousted, it was widely assumed that the organisation had come under Peking's control. To refute such a claim, the party declared that:

"Our party does not follow any other party indiscriminately or obey it blindly, but determines our approach to all matters including the polemics with the International Communist Movement independently and in accordance with Marxist-Leninist principle".²²

Although we cannot reject the claim outrightly, still it can be pointed out that the Chinese theories were finding greater acceptance inside the JCP. It was alleged that all attempts were made to prevent the JCP members from coming under the influence of the CPSU. It was further said that "the atmosphere at the JCP headquarter and organs at various levels is so forbidding that no one dares to read Pravada openly at their desk. Although the public

22. CPJ CC's reply to CPSU CC "Extract", Peking Review 7(38), Sept. 18, 1964, p.15.

information section (Soviet Union) having printed an enormous number of copies of Premier Khrushchev's speeches and Pravda editorials, tried to distribute them throughout Japan, the Kyokuto and Nauka book stores in Tokyo refused to display them at their stores and so the documents failed to reach the hands of possible readers."²³ The JCP, on the other hand, rejected this claim and blamed the CPSU for deliberately sending documents to the JCP members, which would harm the unity of the party. In its words, "the Soviet embassy in Japan has begun sending indiscriminately to the local organisations of our party, trade unions, democratic organisations and even party members, large amount of documents accusing other fraternal parties. This is to disturb the unity of our party, interfere illegally in its internal affairs..."²⁴ However, during the period from 1964-66 there was no attempt from the either side to normalise their bitter relationships.

With the deterioration of the JCP's relationship with the CPC, the CPSU was anxious to repair its relations with the JCP. Informal Soviet contacts with the JCP were

23. "Sino-Soviet dispute and the present condition of the JCP", Japan Socialist Review, No.47, Oct. 1, 1963, p.34.

24. CPJ CC's reply to CPSU CC, Fn.22, p.13.

re-established in 1966 after the JCP split with Peking.²⁵ In the meantime, the Soviet party sent a congratulatory message to Nosaka on his seventy-fourth birthday. In July 1967, on the occasion of the forty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the JCP, the Soviet party sent the following greeting, "The CPSU considers most important task to strengthening of the unity of the world communist movement and the unity of all progressive forces in the struggle against imperialism and reaction, and is prepared to co-operate with the JCP to achieve this end."²⁶

But these Soviet gestures did not contribute to repair their strained relations. The JCP continued to criticise modern revisionism even after Soviet overtures in October, and in a move calculated to assert its independence, declined to send to Moscow a delegation for the fiftieth Anniversary Celebration of October Revolution.

The year 1968 saw a few more steps taken by both parties to improve their relations. Secretary General

25. Moscow had in fact made at least one contact with the JCP when Viktor Grishin, Chairman of the All Union Central Council of Soviet Trade Unions, had an informal discussion with the JCP on a trip to Tokyo in June, 1966. Further discussions began in May 1967, when Soviet Central Committee member Ivan Kovalenko met with Nishizawa Tomio of the JCP Central Committee at the Soviet embassy in Tokyo.

26. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1968, p.355.

Miyamoto and others met with a CPSU delegation headed by Mikhail A. Suslov from 31st January to 5th February in Moscow. The joint communique published in Akahata on 8 February read in part:

"Both delegations examined the relations between the JCP and CPSU, severed since 1964, and in order to normalise them agreed upon joint resolution of mutual problems. Both delegations recognised the importance of adhering scrupulously to the principle of autonomy, equality and non-intervention in the other's domestic affairs as prescribed by the standards for fraternal parties as laid down in the statement adopted by the communist and workers' parties of 1960. We have agreed to normalize relations between parties on this basis." 27

This communique did indeed lay a foundation for the rapproachment sought by the Soviets, but with clear concessions to the JCP on party autonomy. The Soviets failed to wrest any concessions on the world communist party meeting or its preliminary consultative conference, both of which the JCP refused to attend. The JCP, on the other hand, had failed to convince the CPSU from withdrawing the latter's support to the Shiga faction.

However, even such favourable trends were marred by the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The JCP reacted rather slowly, but condemned the

27. Cited, Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1969, p.516.

invasion without reference to the Soviet Union. It declared that:

"No foreign parties have the right to intervene in the internal affairs of a fraternal party. Our party strongly demands that the governments and parties of five countries halt their illegitimate intervention in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia and withdraw their armed forces immediately." 28

After the Soviet Union consolidated its position in Czechoslovakia in October 1968, the JCP renewed its criticisms by calling it an "illegal act". The Soviets retaliated by charging the JCP for launching an anti-Soviet campaign and helping subversive elements and imperialist forces against the socialist community.²⁹ The developments which followed the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia virtually nullified the earlier hopes or prospects of any rapproach ment between the two parties.

28. Ibid., p.517.

29. Ibid., p.518.

In 1969, the JCP refused to attend the preparatory meeting³⁰ for the Moscow conference, which was convened on 23 May, and the conference itself on 5-16 June.³¹ But after the conclusion of the Moscow conference, the JCP Central Committee commented on 29th July that the meeting had been hastily arranged and had resulted in disunity and the creation of additional 'complex situations'. The main document issued by the conference was

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30. The reasons for refusal set forth in a statement issued on 5th June (Akahata) were as follows:
- (1) The conditions in the International Communist movement had not sufficiently matured since the meeting of 1960 to make solutions to problems possible now.
 - (2) The invasion of Czechoslovakia by communist countries created a new problem and meant that the conference would inevitably end up by rationalising and justifying this military action.
 - (3) The CPSU had not yet satisfactorily corrected the 'revisionists' and 'great power chauvinist' errors of the Khrushchev period.
 - (4) Opinions were seriously divided within the international communist movement on such issues as the non-proliferation treaty.
 - (5) There was tendency to give special status to the Soviet Union alone in the International communist movement and to judge erroneously the current situation in Japan.
 - (6) The lack of participation by prominent Asian parties raised doubts about the conference's effectiveness against American 'imperialism' and
 - (7) A conference of "the people of five continents as proposed by the JCP would be more principled and realistic than a conference of communist and workers' parties.

See, Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1969, pp.607-608.

31. Statesman (New Delhi), March 8, 1969.

attacked for unconditionally supporting the CPSU line on the PNTBT and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT) and for ignoring the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Central Committee declared that it would intensify its efforts to hold a conference of "anti-imperialist forces of five continents."³²

In the same year, Miyamoto attacked both Moscow and Peking for their armed clashes on the Ussuri river which, he said, had badly undermined the Japanese people's faith in the future of socialism.³³ In February 1970, the JCP complained to the Soviet embassy about Soviet fishing operation off the coasts of Chiba and Shizuoka prefectures. The JCP note admitted that the fishing was not a violation of International law, but contended that it was inconsistent with Soviet Union's extension of its own territorial waters to 12 nautical miles. In March the CPSU replied that Soviet boats had been engaged exclusively in scientific observation and fishing. It further charged that the JCP had 'violated the standards for mutual relations between communist parties by informing news media before discussing the matter with the CPSU.'³⁴

32. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1970, p.608.

33. Peggy L. Falkenheim, "Euro-communism in Asia: The CPJ and the Soviet Union", Pacific Affairs, 52(1), Spring 1979, p.65.

34. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1971.

Such mutual attacks remained until the time of normalisation between the two parties in 1979. Instead of dealing in a chronological way, it would be worthwhile to point out the major areas where the parties had serious differences.

MAJOR AREAS OF DIFFERENCES:

(i) Kurile Islands Question:

As the question of Okinawa approached settlement in the late 1960s, the Japanese public interest naturally turned their attention to also to the Kurile islands. The islands named 'Habomai, Shikotan, Etrofu and Kunashiri' are claimed by the Japanese, but have been occupied by the Soviet Union since the World War II. The territorial question aroused the emotions of the people and the JCP had to adopt a very cautious approach. In order to dispel the fear that the JCP was a Soviet 'Trojan Horse', the JCP started vigorous campaigning for an early return of the islands. On 6 March 1969, Akahata³⁵ published a lengthy statement detailing the JCP position on the Kuriles question. It demanded the return not only of those four islands,

35. Akahata, March 6, 1969, in Daily Summary of the Japanese Press (D: S.J.P.) March 7, 1969, pp.17-26. In 1956, the USSR promised to return the Habomais and Shikotan when a peace treaty was signed, but since then it has hardened its position.

but also of the middle and Northern Kurile islands. It called for the immediate conclusion of a Japanese-Soviet peace treaty and the return of Habomai and Shikotan on the basis of the 1956 Soviet-Japanese joint declaration. It desired that the reversion of the Kuriles should be discussed after the US-Japan security treaty was abrogated.

The JCP used its contacts with Soviet leaders to press Japan's territorial claims. For example, when Miyamoto visited Moscow in September 1971, in a renewed effort to improve inter-party relations, he voiced Japan's territorial demands in a meeting with Brezhnev, Suslov and other Soviet leaders. At a press conference on his return home, Miyamoto announced that the CPSU leaders had promised to give 'serious thought' to the territorial question 'as a diplomatic issue'.³⁶ However, subsequent Soviet denials made it clear that no change had occurred in the Soviet position and it put the JCP in an embarrassing position. Soviet intransigence on this issue had provoked a sharp JCP reaction. In September 1973, the JCP Diet members supported a resolution passed unanimously on the eve of Prime Minister Tanaka's visit to Moscow calling for the return of the Northern territories.³⁷ In the 12th

36. Japan Times, Sept. 28, 1971.

37. Tokyo Shimbun, Sept. 22, 1973, in D.S.J.P. Sept. 27, 1973, p.2.

Congress of the JCP 1973, a reference to the Kurile question was sharply criticised by the CPSU, which reportedly pointed out, " It is an unusual case in the history of the international communist movement to present territorial demands to a socialist state at a Congress of a communist party of a capitalist country", and the JCP "is inculcating... nationalist ideas" upon the working class of Japan, ...means an attempt to impose a revanchist platform "on the government."³⁸

In May 1977, the JCP Central Committee wrote an open letter to the CPSU on the Kurile issue; it criticised the Soviet attitude which "openly violates the principles of Scientific Socialism, which oppose the merging of territories of one nation into those of another."³⁹ The letter provoked rebuttal from Pravada, which on June 12, pointed out that the Kurile question 'has already been solved'. The JCP took a serious note of Pravada's statement. In an article in Akahata, it pointed out "The argument of Pravada that the territorial question has already been solved contravenes the past statements of the Soviet Government and the leadership of the CPSU, and is also contrary to the agreements with the JCP. It must be said that Pravada's claim betrays the truth."⁴⁰

38. Cited, "The Kurile Islands Question", Bulletin - Information for Abroad, No.319, 1974, p.25.

39. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1978, p.263.

40. "On the Pravada article on Chishima (Kurile) question", Bulletin - Information for Abroad, No.372, June 1977, p.2.

During the course of discussion regarding the normalisation of relations in 1979, both parties reached an agreement beforehand not to raise the territorial question in the course of their discussion. But the JCP has been critical of Soviet Union's stand on the question since 1979.

(ii) Fisheries' Issues:

Another issue on which there was disagreement between the CPSU and the JCP related to fishing. In 1969, the JCP clashed openly with Moscow over the issue of Soviet fishing in Japanese coastal waters. JCP's criticisms on Soviet fishing practices continued in the 1970s. In November 1976, a JCP member of the Upper House sent a letter to the CPSU in which he described the damages caused to the Japanese coastal fishermen by Soviet fishing fleets operating just outside Japan's territorial waters. The letter asked the Soviet Union to enforce the joint agreement of June 1975 regulating coastal fishing operations in order to prevent damage. The JCP Councillor also called for Japan's establishment of a twelve nautical mile exclusive fishing zone to protect the interests of coastal fishermen.⁴¹

41. Falkenheim, Fn.33, p.67.

Disagreement over this widened in 1977 when efforts were made to negotiate a provisional agreement regulating the Japanese fish catch in the newly established 200 mile zone. When these negotiations were broken off for a while on April 6, Miyamoto issued a public statement which blamed the USSR for the suspension of the talks. He pointed out that the delay in the negotiations was creating a "very grave situation" for medium, small and very small-scale enterprises and their crews, who had been operating in the sea areas concerned." The USSR was asked to respect the record of Japan's traditional fish catch in northern waters when setting the quotas and to refrain from including the sea areas around the Kurile islands in its 200 mile zone since these islands constituted Japanese territory.⁴²

(iii) Ideological Innovations:

In the 1970s, the JCP also adopted ideological innovations which challenged traditional Soviet ideas. Throughout most of the post-war period, the JCP supported a peaceful, parliamentary road to power, and called for the creation of a broad united front that would win a majority and establish a "democratic" coalition government.

42. Yearbook, Fn.39, p.263.

In order to reassure potential coalition partners and the electorate about its intentions, the JCP deradicalised its programme. In part, these changes were semantic, which could be exemplified by the deletion of the phrase "dictatorship of the Proletariat" and the replacement of the phrase of 'Marxism-Leninism' by scientific socialism.

However, the party had gone beyond the semantic changes when speaking about the policies it would pursue after the assumption of power. In a variety of statements and documents, the party pledged its support for freedom of speech, the press, assembly, association, religion, labour union autonomy, right to strike, a multi-party system, free elections, independent judiciary, very limited nationalisation of industry and protection of the working people's private property.⁴³ The expulsion of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, the Noble prize winning author, from the Soviet Union in 1974, was presented by other rightist parties in Japan as a proof for all to see the lack of freedom in a socialist state. The JCP took up the case in a series of articles in Akahata (3-5 March and 20th March) in which

43. For details, see Chapter II. See also, Shigetavo Izuka, 'The Japan Communist Party and Advanced country type of revolution', Oriental Economist May 1976, pp.14-18, Arima Sumisato and Imazu Hiroshi, "Opposition parties: organisation and policies", Japan Quarterly, 24, April-June 1977, p.159.

it stressed its adherence to freedom of speech. It expressed its unhappiness at the episode, but considered the case as an internal matter of the Soviet Union.⁴⁴

The JCP leaders also explicitly rejected the Soviet model as relevant for Japan, arguing that it was not appropriate for the construction of socialism in an advanced country. The 12th Congress of 1973 deleted the phrase 'Soviet Union as vanguard' from the expression "socialist block and the communists of the whole world with the Soviet Union as the vanguard", adopted by the party in its 8th Congress of 1961. In proposing the revision, the Congress affirmed that this reference to a past historic Soviet role was no longer consistent with reality.⁴⁵ Furthermore, a March 1976 joint statement by the JCP and a Spanish Communist party delegation led by its Secretary General Santiago Carillo acknowledged 'various negative phenomena' in 'existing socialist states', rejecting them as models.⁴⁶ Similarly, the joint statement issued by the JCP and the Italian Communist Party on January 20, 1977, stated that in advanced capitalist countries, new situation, "which are qualitatively different from past experiences, are needed for the construction of socialism."⁴⁷

44. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1975, p.354.

45. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1974, pp.478-79.

46. Falkenheim, Fn.33, p.59.

47. Ibid.

The JCP's ideological innovations were criticised by the Soviet Press. Following the 11th Congress of 1970, the CPSU newspaper Partiyanaya-zhizn accused the JCP leadership of "bourgeois nationalism" aimed at splitting the world communist movement and made it clear that the JCP could not hope for a return of normal relations with the CPSU unless it mended its ways.⁴⁸ The Soviet journal Party Life published an article by an Argentinian leader, Athos Fava, who criticised the policies adopted in the 12th Congress of the JCP. He maintained that the JCP's independent trend in the International communist movement "is essentially an attempt to set some fraternal parties against other."⁴⁹ Another example of criticism by A.J. Ivanov appeared in the February 1976 issue of Problemy dal'nego Vostoka, in which he suggested that the JCP's theoretical work on future socialist society would be facilitated if the party studied both the "concrete historical circumstances in Japan" and "the practical experience... of the USSR and other socialist countries."⁵⁰

48. Amrita Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), Aug.3, 1970.

49. Athos Fava, "Japanese Communist Stand: An Argentine Critique", reprinted in Mainstream 12(44), June, 1974, p.26.

50. Falkenheim, Fn.33, p.71.

(iv) Interference in the JCP's Internal Matters:

The JCP broke friendly relations with the Soviet Union because of Moscow's alleged intervention in its internal matters. After 1964, the JCP leaders consistently accused the CPSU of interfering in the internal matters of the party. CPSU's support to Shiga faction became a major bone of contention.

When in 1970, the Shiga's group celebrated Lenin's centenary, it was attended by two Soviet officials named I. Latishev, former Pravada correspondent in Tokyo and B. Posperov, member of the Far Eastern Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. On 30th April 1970, Akahata commented that such actions by Soviet officials virtually nullified the promise made in 1968 by the CPSU in a meeting with the JCP in Tokyo that it would have nothing to do with "anti-party" elements in Japan.⁵¹ On 5th May, Akahata published a lengthy article entitled "On new and grave interference in our party by CPSU controlled agencies and organisations", which denounced the presence of Soviet embassy officers in the meeting as an "act of direct hostility against our party". The article concluded with an warning about the future. It stated, "The normalisation of Japanese-Soviet party relations can by no means

51. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1971, p.604.

be expected under a situation in which such acts of intervention are repeated without any indication of self-examination."⁵²

In the same year, the JCP sent an official delegation to the Moscow celebration of the Lenin centenary, held on 21-22 April. Fearing that the Japanese delegation leader Isugane Sukechika would criticise the Soviet party, *the latter* arranged to have Isugane's address at a separate local meeting, where no foreign delegations were present. Pravada published his speech by systematically omitting his references to "the independence of each party and non-interference in the internal affairs of other parties."⁵³

It was not the only occasion, where the JCP raised this problem. In every attempt for normalisation, it questioned the CPSU's support to Shiga group, because the very support was intended to create another rival communist force in Japan. In the words of Miyamoto:

"We have no reluctance in our desire to exchange opinions. But any intervention affects the foundation of the existence of a political party; so we feel we cannot have exchanges with the CPSU merely by leaving such questions obscure trying to shelve them." 54

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Bulletin - Information for Abroad, No.367, April 1977, p.20.

Besides these major differences, the JCP had differed from the CPSU on several other points, which were as follows:-

- (a) After the signing of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 1970, the JCP contended that the support of the treaty meant agreement with the US imperialism and disagreement with the anti-imperialist, democratic forces. The JCP argued that the treaty in no way hampered the nuclear powers and encouraged US imperialism, 'the greatest enemy of peace'.
- (b) The JCP always criticised the CPSU that it was trying to dominate the world communist movement. It pointed out that the Soviet Union judged other communist parties merely in the context of its own theoretical rift with Peking. It accused the CPSU of coercing all communist parties under its control. Any party which did not toe the line was construed as 'anti-socialist'.
- (c) Another interesting point to note is that during the period of their unhealthy relationship, the Soviet Union saw the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) as an alternative to the JCP and the Soviet contacts with the JSP increased. The Socialist party was even invited to send delegates to Soviet party Congresses

and other gatherings. Moreover, Soviet analysts had generally described the JSP as a "left socialist party"⁵⁵ by praising its opposition to security treaty, Japanese rearmament and its support for PNTBT and NPT. The JCP had always denounced these developments as "collaboration" with a 'rightist reactionary force."

It is interesting to note that the 1970's witnessed the JCP and the CPSU having differences pertaining mainly to Soviet-Japanese bilateral questions. This is in contrast to the earlier period covering 1960's, when the two parties fought more on organisational and policy issues.

A LONG ROAD TO NORMALISATION WITH THE CPSU:

As has been pointed out earlier, with the open rift between the JCP and the CPC in 1966, formal efforts to normalise relations between the JCP and the CPSU began in 1968. But the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia destroyed the basis for the normalisation of relations between the two parties. The second attempt of reconciliation took place in 1971 when Nishizawa Tomio, a member of the JCP

55. Falkenheim, Fn.33, p.73.

presidium, met with Suslov in Moscow. But the follow up visit by Miyamoto to Moscow in September and his talks with Brezhnev did not lead to a breakthrough in the JCP-CPSU negotiations - because of the disputes over the territorial questions and the CPSU's support for Shiga clique. Although the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo was invited to attend the celebrations of the party's fiftieth anniversary in July 1972, Pravada subsequently criticised the JCP's stand on territorial issues which led to a lengthy response in Akahata refuting the Soviet charges.⁵⁶

The third Soviet attempt at reconciliation with the JCP took place between 1975 to 1977, when a series of lower-level preliminary meetings were held in Tokyo and Moscow.⁵⁷ These meetings did not produce any results, as the JCP continued to criticise Soviet policy towards Japan. In addition to the territorial issue, the JCP protested Soviet bombing exercises in the vicinity of Japan, Soviet fishing in Japanese waters, and Soviet Government's highhandedness in fishing negotiations with Japan.

56. "Intolerable Gross Distortions - On three Soviet articles concerning our Party's history", Akahata, Dec. 27, 1972, Bulletin - Information for Abroad, No.284, Feb. 73.

57. Peter Berton, "The Japanese Communists" Rapprochement with the Soviet Union", Asian Survey, 20(12), Dec. 1980, p.1215.

The successful attempts to normalise relations with the JCP were undertaken in the wake of the conclusion in August 1978 of the Treaty of peace and friendship between Japan and China and the subsequent visit of Deng Xiaping to Japan. When Miyamoto visited Moscow in the same year, he was met at the Moscow airport by leading Soviet JCP expert Ivan Kovalenko. This was followed by a congratulatory cable from the CPSU CC on the occasion of Miyamoto's 70th birthday in October, and an article in Pravada praising "the vanguard role of the Japanese Communist Party". The tempo of negotiations quickened in 1978. But the question of Soviet support to the Shiga faction posed an obstacle. The JCP was determined to extract from the Soviets an outright admission of its mistake on the Shiga issue. As Miyamoto explained, the significance of the Shiga question was not just a matter of difference of opinion but a "fundamental question affecting the very existence of the party, in that another party gave support to a Clique that has sought to overthrow the JCP leadership."⁵⁸

58. Sunday Akahata, April 29, 1979, Bulletin - Information for Abroad, No.421, Oct. 1979, p.5.

The meeting between the JCP and CPSU delegations from February 26 to March 1, 1979 in Tokyo was a breakthrough in that the Soviets admitted that their past actions were not correct.⁵⁹ Obviously, the Japanese wanted a joint statement to confirm these points. As a result of Nishizawa's efforts, a joint communique was issued in order to prepare the ground for the holding of a summit. The key paragraph of this statement said:

The representatives of the CPSU stated that the CPSU regards the JCP as the sole party representing the Japanese communist movement. The Soviet side also declared that any actions under the name of the communist movement by former members of the JCP or difficult groups are manifestations of anti-party activity and the Soviet side has no relation with the activities of such groups, whatever flags they may carry and whatever they may use. 60

On December 15, 1979, a six-man delegation headed by Miyamoto arrived in Moscow and two days later serious negotiations began between the two delegations, with Brezhnev attending the opening session. The final joint communique agreed upon after a week of negotiations, described "the atmosphere of the talks" as "comradely, friendly and frank."⁶¹

59. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1980, pp.262-263.

60. Bulletin - Information for Abroad, No.411, April 1979, pp.1-2.

61. For the English text of the Resolution, see Appendix I. See also, "Joint Communique" in Bogdon Szajkowski (Ed.), Documents in Communist Affairs, 1980, 191-193.

On the critical Shiga group question, the statement did not repeat any of the Soviet concessions previously extracted with such difficulty by the Japanese. The paragraph stated:

"First of all, the two delegations confirmed the agreement reached at the preliminary talks on the past problems that resulted in the disruption of formal relations between the two parties, and over a lengthy period had obstructed between the two parties must be developed by strict observance of the generally recognised norms of relations between communist parties, viz. independence, equality, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and solidarity in solving common tasks." 62

This must have been very disappointing to the Japanese because the JCP had considered a satisfactory resolution of the Shiga problem, the main stumbling block of their relationship for over a decade. From the review of the JCP-CPSU negotiations throughout 1979, it was clear that the "Soviets were not prepared to go beyond their concessions in the spring and the final statement does not reflect any of the JCP's desiderata beyond a cryptic reference to previous agreements."⁶³ The JCP clearly had to give up its attempts to get more official admission of past Soviet errors and had certainly failed to get any public apology from them.

62. Ibid., p.191.

63. Berton, Fn.57, p.1220. For details about negotiations see, Berton, Fn.4, pp.277-285.

The second important problem from the JCP's point of view was the territorial issue. Strictly speaking, this was not a legitimate issue for two parties to resolve and since the JCP was not in power, it could not negotiate the issue. Nonetheless, the JCP used the territorial issue to prove to the Japanese public that it was a nationalist party. The Soviet negotiators naturally took the position that this issue belonged to the state level and refused to make any concessions or even mention the discussion of the issue in the joint communique. The JCP, on the other hand, tried to include some references for domestic consumption. What indeed the Japanese obtained in the joint statement was only a vague and harmless reference:

"During the talks, the delegations of the JCP and the CPSU exchanged views in a comradely and frank way on problems^{of} their countries and peoples." 64 ^

Finally, the words "Marxism-Leninism" and "Proletarian internationalism" did not appear in the text of the agreement, undoubtedly on insistence of the Soviet delegation.⁶⁵ The Soviets were surely gratified that they had the JCP support on the entire Indo-China

64. Szajkowski, Fn.61, p.193.

65. Berton, Fn.57, p.1221.

question and although China was not mentioned in the statement, both sides "resolutely condemned as an outright act of hegemonism, completely foreign to socialism... the military invasion across the borders into the western and northern areas of Vietnam."⁶⁶ The rest of the statement was filled with denunciations of 'US imperialism', 'Japan-US reactionary forces', 'Japan-US aggressive military alliance', etc.

The Moscow Summit somewhat formally ended the long period of strained relations between two parties, but many differences remained. The agreement gave no satisfaction to either side. The JCP did not get an apology and gained only limited acknowledgement of the CPSU's past errors in supporting the dissident group. The Soviets did not allow the territorial issue to be mentioned in the agreement. As for the CPSU, it did not acquire a new loyalist party, as the JCP's recent criticism of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan demonstrated.

The JCP was motivated to seek better relations with the Soviet Union because of its continuing bad relations with the CPC. Improved Sino-Japanese relations, however, seemed to lead to a worsening of the JCP's relationship

66. Szajkowski, Fn.61, p.192-193.

with the CPC. The JCP no doubt felt slighted when the leaders of the other parties were invited to China and the JCP leaders were not. Moreover, Deng Xiaoping ignored the JCP during his visit to Japan. Party leaders no doubt believed that relations between Japan and the USSR had to improve and when that would happen, they could claim some credit. In fact, they may have felt that they would be able to negotiate a return of some or all of the northern islands claimed by Japan.

In the internal sphere, the JCP was suffering from an 'identity crisis' because of the "left wing of the JSP Holding high the banner of revolution - along with the votes of the major labour organisations."⁶⁷ A move towards the Japanese style of "Euro-communism" in the mid 70's didn't lead to a great change in the popular support. The increasing relationship between the JSP and the CPSU could be helpful in the event of a positive construction of a coalition government by the JCP and the JSP.

On the other hand, the stakes of the Soviet Union were more. A review of the entire normalisation process shows that the CPSU had been more keen on normalising its relations with the JCP. One reason that seemed to have

67. John Lewis, "Joining the Kremlin's Chorus", Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol.104, No.24, June 15, 1979, p.16.

influenced the CPSU was that in the changing political and security environment in the Far East due to the growing Tokyo-Peking-Washington axis, the Soviets were anxious to have a group in Japan, friendly to it. The electoral decline of the LDP and the fragmentation of the opposition parties had created sufficient uncertainty in the Japanese political situation, in which the Soviet Union wanted to exploit all possible avenues for gaining influence.

Perhaps another motivation for Soviet interests in the JCP might be due to the concern about Soviet authority in the International communist movement by the lack of support from the Asian communist parties. In the realm of the Sino-Soviet dispute, friendly relationship with the JCP, the largest non-ruling communist party in Asia would be a victory for the CPSU over the CPC.

To sum up, the JCP-CPSU normalisation realised the long standing dream of the JCP to be treated on an equal basis. For the first time, in the history of the relationship between the JCP and the CPSU, the principle of equality was established officially. The normalisation, did not, in any way, make the JCP, a satellite of the CPSU again, rather in the realm of its quest for independence, it added another feather to its cap.

Chapter IV

THE JCP AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA: JCP'S DISENCHANTMENT (1966-1979)

The emergence of Communist China in the late 1940's as a second major 'communist power center' altered the situation in Asia that existed during Stalin's time. By the end of 1960, China had proved strong and determined enough to challenge Moscow over world strategy. Meanwhile, Khrushchev's greater tolerance of 'different paths to socialism' and his declining hold over the communist parties outside the 'East-European bloc' tended to foster within the Asian communist movement the growth of ideological diversities and the adoption of a whole range of differing strategies that were related to local traditions and requirements. Each Asian communist party was beginning to develop a profile of its own. In this process, the JCP couldn't remain as an exception, which, after seeing the dismal consequences of the violent strategy that it adopted in 1950, was desperately looking for a new strategy, best suited to the Japanese conditions.

As has been noted, in October 1945, the JCP made a new start as a legal political party. Initially, more

fascinated with revolution than with parliamentary action, the party was deeply influenced by the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) and the Chinese model of violent take-over. This was reflected in its use in early 1950's of riots and violent tactics. China's influence on the JCP's policies can be traced back to pre-World War II period. At the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, the CPC made a close study of the internal situation in Japan. It organised its "Japanese prisoners of war and others into a league for the liberation of the Japanese people" and trained them for a future revolution in Japan. The Chinese communists also established an industrial and agricultural school in Yen-an where selected Japanese prisoners of war were taught the theory and techniques of revolution"¹ so that they could play a leading role in the Japanese communist revolution. The Chinese influence was evident from the statement of late Tokuda Kyuichi, the then Secretary General of the JCP, who said in 1952:

"I feel keenly that the thought of comrade Mao Tse-tung, who has applied Marxism-Leninism to the Chinese revolution and has opened up a new path, constitutes also for us an indispensable guideline." 2

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1. Kyosuke Hirotsu, "Trouble between Comrades: The Japan Communist Party's turn away from Peking", Current Scene 5(4), March 15, 1967, p.2.
 2. Cited Paul F. Langer, "The New Posture of the CPJ", Problems of Communism, 20, Special Issue, Jan.-April, 1971, p.21.

On the other hand, the JCP's fraternal ties with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union can be traced back to 1922, the year of its inception. That's why, throughout the 1950's and until the Moscow-Peking split became pronounced and open, the JCP maintained 'equal and harmonious' contacts with both, and it publicly spoke of its 'neutral' position in the realm of Sino-Soviet dispute. In spite of the proclaimed 'neutrality', the events starting from 1960, saw the pro-Peking leanings of the JCP. The expulsion of the Kasuga faction from the party for supporting the pro-Soviet line embodied in the 'Structural Reform Theory' followed by its stands on Albania, Cuba, Sino-Indian border dispute, Khrushchev's policy of 'peaceful co-existence' and the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (PNTBT)³ clearly showed the pro-Peking posture of the JCP. In March 1964, talks held in Moscow between the JCP delegation headed by Hakamada Satomi and the Soviet delegation headed by Leonid Brezhnev broke up and both parties began criticising each other by name. As a result, JCP's leaning towards the CPC became decisive and wholehearted. The expulsion of Shiga Yoshio and his supporters from the party for supporting the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty formally ended its relationship with the CPSU. So, by the time of the 9th Congress in

3. For details, see Chapter III.

late November 1964, the JCP had totally estranged itself from the Soviet bloc and it was widely assumed that the JCP had identified itself with the Chinese camp.

Before proceeding further, it is necessary to have a look at the reasons, responsible for the JCP's pro-Peking posture.

- (i) At first glance, China and Japan are located in the same part of the world and are linked by common cultural and historical experiences. Side by side, after the World War II, the "Communist China had continued over a number of years to provide vast sums of money, far beyond anything supplied by the Soviet Union, to support the JCP in its various campaigns."⁴
- (ii) Furthermore, we cannot ignore the existence, both in JCP's central headquarters and in the provinces, of a thick stratum of key party leaders having close personal ties with the members of the CPC. During the 'war of resistance' against Japan, the Chinese communists had given revolutionary education to a large number of Japanese prisoners. As the JCP moved underground on the eve of the Korean war, the late Secretary General Tokuda Kyuichi and most of the party leaders transferred their headquarters from Tokyo to Peking.

4- Omori Shigeo, "Realignment of the JCP", Japan Quarterly 14(4), Oct-Dec 1967, p.445.

- (iii) The factional strife between the "Mainstreamers" and the "Internationalists" and the ultimate victory of the former could be cited as another reason for the 'pro-Peking' posture. The so-called 'China-educated' group had close contacts with the CPC and formed the nucleus of the pro-Chinese faction. The adoption of a new party programme in the 8th Congress, 1961 was a personal victory for the pro-Chinese faction.
- (iv) It seems probable that another important factor contributing to the triumph of a pro-Chinese faction in the JCP "was the consolidation within the more powerful socialist party of leadership favouring the Soviet Union."⁵ Since 1960, the JSP had adopted 'Structural Reform' Theory, a doctrine declared heretical by the JCP leaders when they expelled Kasuga faction in 1961. As the Sino-Soviet dispute deepened, the alienation of the JSP from China might have persuaded the JCP leaders that as the unique left-wing champion of China, the JCP could get the support from many Japanese who thought in terms of close Sino-Japanese co-operation.

5. See, J.A.A. Stockwin, "The Japan Communist Party in the Sino-Soviet dispute. From neutrality to alignment" in J.B. Miller and T.H. Rigby (Eds.) The Disintegrating Monolith (ANU, Canberra, 1965), pp.144-146.

Thus in 1965, many experts concluded that the JCP, having evicted its pro-Soviet faction, had become a satellite of the Chinese communists.⁶ It was assumed that henceforth the JCP would subscribe unhesitatingly to everything which Peking might advocate with regard to Japanese or international communist strategy. But such views underestimated growing trends within the party towards greater independence.

ESTRANGEMENT WITH THE CPC:

The majority of the Japanese communist leaders felt a greater affinity for Peking than for Moscow, but an influential group among them had sought a position outside the two great communist power blocs. "These 'independents' in the JCP appear to have evolved rather gradually from an originally neutralist position between Moscow and Peking."⁷ Top JCP leaders including Miyamoto and Hakamada in addition to other lesser known members belonged to this group.

6. See, Ibid., p.144-146; Robert A. Scalapino, "Japan", in Witold S. Swora Kowski (Ed.), World Communism: A handbook, 1918-1965 (Stanford, 1973), pp.246-47.

7. Paul F. Langer, Communism in Japan: A case of Political naturalisation (Stanford: Hoover, 1972), p.74.

The increasing power of the 'pro-Peking group, however, suffered a set back in the year 1964. That year Miyamoto made a long visit to China. During his absence, the party leaders of the 'pro-Peking' group arbitrarily decided to oppose the "April 17" strike led by the socialist party affiliated trade union council Sohyo. At first, the JCP didn't oppose the strike, but on April 8, the party suddenly declared its opposition on the ground that it was a provocative move arranged jointly by American imperialism and Japanese anti-communists, rightism, social democrats to suppress the Japanese communists. This sudden change in attitude stemmed from a reckless attempt by the party "to snatch the leadership of the labour movement from the hands of the socialists."⁸ As a result, the JCP was criticised by all the Sohyo-influenced unions.⁹

On his return from China, Miyamoto called upon the pro-Peking party leaders to admit their mistakes and gradually began ousting them from party's key posts. In the 9th Party Congress, 1964, the Central Committee admitted its "serious mistake in opposing the April 17 strike."¹⁰ Along with it, many of the important party positions went to the Miyamoto group. By taking the advantage of April 17

8. Hirotsu, Fn.1, p.5.

9. For details see, Robert A. Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement 1920-1965 (California, University of California Press, 1968), pp.229-231.

10. Main Documents of the IX Congress, Central Committee/CPJ, p.55.

strike issue, Miyamoto and his followers placed the party under their control which certainly led to tension between the JCP and Peking.

Moreover, the differences between the JCP and the CPC increased in the year 1965 over two issues:

- (i) The problem of promoting Sino-Soviet co-operation in the context of Vietnam war; and
- (ii) proper revolutionary strategy to be adopted by the Japanese communists.

(i) In 1965, the US began bombing North Vietnam, rendering the situation in the North critical. About the same time, signs of disagreement began to appear between the Japanese and the Chinese communists. The Akahata on December 7, 1965 published an article "On the strengthening of International struggle against contemporary revisionism and American imperialism". This was the first open criticism against the CPC by the JCP and was probably an argument against the Chinese opinion published by the Editorial Boards of the People's Daily and Red Flag: "Refutation of the 'common action' called for by the New leadership of the CPSU". It said that the Soviet appeal for 'united action' against American imperialism was a deception to conceal the intrigue of the Khrushchevian line of co-existence, a treason against Marxism-Leninism.¹¹

11. Kyosuke Hirtosu, "Isolation of Communist China and JCP", Review, 12 March 1967, p.4.

The JCP didn't agree with the Chinese communists and argued:

"At this juncture, when people all over the world are crying for an international unity of peaceful and democratic forces against the American imperialist policy of aggression and war, it is most important that we should respond to the cry and strive strenuously to unite action for the international movement in opposition to the aggressive policy of American imperialism." 12

On February 4, 1966, an anonymous article in Akahata also reiterated for the need of an 'united front against American imperialism'. All these clearly showed JCP's firm opposition to China's position on this question before the visit of Miyamoto with other top party leaders to Communist China between February and April, 1966.

(ii) On the eve of the 20th anniversary, Sept. 3, 1965, of the Chinese victory in their anti-Japanese war, Red Flag of August 21 reprinted Mao Tse-tung's well known article written 28 years ago on "Strategic Problems of Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Warfare". In reproducing it, the editors of Red Flag prefaced the article as follows:

"As clear as crystal, the idea of the people's war clarified by comrade Mao Tse-tung in his article has today a very great realistic significance for the struggle of the Chinese people against American imperialism and its agents and of the peoples of the entire world, and

for the struggle of the Chinese people against American imperialism and its agents and of the peoples of the entire world, and for the struggle for liberation, in particular, of the oppressed peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America." 13

Subsequently, the article of Lin Piao, Defence Minister of China, entitled, "Long live the victory of the people's war in memory of the 20th anniversary of the Chinese victory in the Anti-Japanese war", reproduced on Sept. 17 in the Akahata, pointed out the dangers created by the American imperialism and Latin American countries to arm themselves for guerrilla warfare against American troops and military bases. Stressing Mao Tse-tung's opinion, Lin Piao considered revolution by violence the very essence of Marxism-Leninism.

The Chinese communists were said to have pressed the above mentioned line of the people's war and revolution by violence to the communist parties of Asia and Africa on the occasion of their visit to Mainland China.¹⁴

13. See, Shigeo, Fn.4, p.446.

14. From this angle it may be worthwhile to reflect upon the "First Grand Sino-Japanese exchange between friendly youths". Between Aug.-Dec. 1965, the CPC invited more than 400 young Japanese to the mainland for a grand meeting of friendship, who were mostly the members of the JCP. On Sept. 14, Liao Chieng, Chairman of the China Asia-Africa Solidarity Committee spoke to the delegation that: "We should be equipped with armed forces for self-defence against the American war mongering, aggressive imperialism and adjust our systems to such needs... The Chinese people deem it their highest honour to be able to contribute at any sacrifice on their part to world peace. For them the advent of a happy, peaceful and independent Japan would be the greatest pleasure even at the expense of the devastation of Peking and Sanghai. In the present situation, China has already completed preparations for the worst." See, Hirotsu, Fn.11, pp.11-12.

Such pressure and such an interventionist attitude invited the invective of the JCP which gradually started getting intensified. In fact, Miyamoto and the 'Independent group' within the JCP had reservations about embracing Peking's militant strategy, which was further strengthened due to the failure of the bloody 'coup d'etat' by the Indonesian Communist Party on September 30, which had allegedly been influenced by Chinese theory of revolution.

With these developments at the background, the visit of the JCP delegation headed by Miyamoto to China in February 1966 marked a turning point in the history of relationship between the JCP and the CPC.

THE JCP VISIT: FEBRUARY-APRIL 1966

The JCP dispatched from February through April 1966, a delegation headed by Secretary General Miyamoto to China, North Korea and North Vietnam. Prior to the departure of the delegation, the Akahata in its February 4 issue, published an article entitled: "In order to strengthen the united front and united international action against American imperialism".¹⁵ The article followed the existing

15. For the English text see, "Daily Summary of the Japanese Press, US Embassy, Feb. 18, 1966, pp.1-38.

party policy in attacking American "imperialism" and criticising Soviet "revisionists" for believing in the possibility of peaceful co-existence with the United States. It went on to strike a different note that it was a mistake to regard socialist regimes collectively as the only anti-imperialist force, or underdeveloped areas ripe for revolution as the only regions in which the anti-imperialist struggle should be fought. There were, the article maintained three basic revolutionary forces; the socialist regimes, revolutionary movements in capitalist countries and national liberation movements in nations subject to foreign oppression.¹⁶ The most significant point in the article was a proposal for immediate joint action to combat US "agression" in Vietnam through an international communist united front including both China and the Soviet Union. Such action, the article declared, should not be postponed until the settling of the Sino-Soviet ideological controversy.

Shortly after the publication of this article, Miyamoto left as the head of the delegation. On February 13, Miyamoto's delegation held talks with the CPC delegation,

16. One commentator in a non-communist Japanese weekly suggested that this was a round about way of asserting the party's independence from Peking by saying that the JCP, as a revolutionary movement in a capitalist country, was in a different category from the Chinese Communist Party. Cited, J.A.A. Stockwin, "The Communist Party of Japan", Problems of Communism, XVI, Jan. Feb. 1967, p.8.

which was led by P'eng Chen, the mayor of Peking. However, no statement was issued after the talks, which meant that the JCP's proposal for a broad united front was apparently not acceptable to the CPC.

The rebuff of the JCP proposal was emphasized further by the fact that the delegation left for Hanoi on February 17 without meeting any other important Chinese dignitary. This visit to Hanoi culminated on February 27 in a joint statement calling for the consolidation of international united action.¹⁷ It is interesting to note that the CPC published the speech of Miyamoto, delivered in Hanoi, in its official organ People's Daily. But it is equally important to observe that Miyamoto's reference to the Sino-Soviet co-operation in the Vietnam was omitted from the text of the speech.¹⁸

On March 11, the JCP delegation left for Pyong-yang where its proposals and ideas had a better reception. In fact, the close relations between the JCP and the Korean Workers Party (KWP) had been established as early as December 1965 when the editorials in their respective

17. C.L. Chiou and Tsiu-Shuang Han, "Ideology and Politics in the 1966-67 split between the communist parties of China and Japan", Studies in Comparative Communism, XI (4), Winter 1978, p.363.

18. Stockwin, Fn.16, pp.8-9.

party organs indirectly criticised the Chinese communists for their uncompromising attitude toward a united front to oppose the US.¹⁹ After the conclusion of their talks with North Korean leaders, the JCP delegation returned to Peking on March 21.

On March 22, the Chinese leaders sent a letter to their Soviet comrades declining to attend the 23rd congress of the CPSU, which was to be held on March 29.²⁰ On March 25, three days later, the JCP also announced its decision not to attend the Soviet Congress. It was, of course, impossible to say for certain what prompted the decision, but very likely the following factors played a part. First, the Soviet Union was still actively supporting Shiga's Communist Splinter group, causing considerable annoyance and embarrassment to the JCP. Second, the pro-Chinese 'tough' faction within the JCP was conducting a vigorous campaign against Miyamoto's attempts to gain greater independence from Peking.²¹

On March 27, a meeting was held between the JCP visitors and Chinese leaders led by Chou En-lai and P'eng Chen, whereupon a joint statement was reportedly agreed

19. Chiou and Han, Fn.17, p.363.

20. "Chinese Communist Party cannot send delegation to CPSU 23rd Congress", Peking Review, 13, March 25, 1966, p.5.

21. Stockwin, Fn.16, p.9.

upon between the two. It was also stated that the joint statement stressed the importance of establishing a broad united front against "American imperialism" in Vietnam and called for the defense of the parity of Marxism-Leninism against "revisionism, dogmatism and sectarianism."²² After the statement had been drafted, Chou En-lai requested the Japanese delegation to withhold the publication of the text until their meeting with Chairman Mao Tse-tung.²³

In pursuance of Chou's desire, the JCP delegation met Mao on March 28, where the latter reportedly objected to the joint statement and suggested a few more points to be added to the statement, which according to Akahata were issues upon which the two delegations had been unable to agree in their previous encounters. The JCP's account of the meeting was:

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung demanded that a change be made in the content of the joint communique. The major point of this demand was that a denunciation directed against CPSU leadership be added to the portion dealing with the struggle against modern revisionism, and furthermore, the stand of a united front against the united states and the USSR be concluded in the communique."²⁴

22. Shigeo, Fn.4, p.448.

23. Chiou and Han, Fn.17, pp.365-336.

24. Ibid., p.366.

It was also reported that Mao further advised the JCP leaders to "immediately revise their party platform to make preparations for a violent revolution and a people's war in Japan."²⁵ Mao expressed his anguish at JCP's neglect of mass struggle and called upon them to pursue "revolution by force."²⁶

The JCP delegation rejected Mao's strategy of 'people's war' and violent revolution. Mao responded to the rebuff by assuming a tough stand. He said:

"If so, there is no need to issue a communique. It was a mistake on the part of China to have planned on issuing a joint communique. Let's say there never was a meeting between the JCP and myself." 27

JCP AND CPC REACTIONS TO THE ABORTIVE TALKS:

Upon the return of the delegation from China on April 4, Miyamoto gave a press interview affirming his party's determination to uphold its autonomy at all costs. The most decisive step taken by the JCP was at the fourth plenary session of the Central Committee on April 28, 1966,²⁸ where a report on the recent visit to

25. Hirotsu, Fn.1, p.6.

26. Shigeo, Fn.4, p.448.

27. Ibid.

28. The decision of the plenary session was kept secret for the time being. The reason for the delay was the fear that a sudden disclosure of this change of front might cause hopeless confusion within the party, which could break it up.

the Asian continent was approved and the party declared its decision to reverse its pro-Chinese orientation and to fight against contemporary dogmatism.

The Chinese reaction was understandably quick and sharp, although not as specific as the measures taken by the JCP. In early April, the Chinese leadership began making radio broadcasts and distributing propaganda in Japanese citing the 'universal appeal of Maoism'. The JCP countered the CPC's propaganda by saying that since 1966, Chinese leadership had been instigating rebellion among the members of the JCP during their visits to different prefectures. It also alleged that the CPC was even offering funds for fomenting disturbances.²⁹

The JCP-CPC tussle intensified in the period between late July and early August at the time of the 12th world conference against Atomic and Hydrogen bombs which was held in Tokyo. In a message of greetings to the conference, which was organised by the JCP controlled 'Gensuikyo' Chou En-lai warned that 'one should never include the CPSU in the international anti-US front,

29. Hirotsu, Fn.1, p.6.

still less take "united action" with them."³⁰ The conference provided a forum where the JCP and the CPC could discuss and air their views. The meeting was already underway, when it was learned on August 1 that Gensuikyo had accepted into the conference a delegation from the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), which was reputed to be under CPSU control. When the Gensuikyo rejected a request that the WFDY delegation be excluded from the conference, thirty-two delegates from sixteen countries withdrew from the conference.³¹ Delegates who withdrew from the Gensuikyo conference assembled in Peking, where a rally was held to denounce the actions and the JCP was criticised for allowing the WFDY delegation and was described as "philistines who sold principles."

30. A Jen-Min Jih-Pao article was more blunt in condemning "US-Japan-Soviet holy alliance against China". At that time, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko was visiting Japan and having talks with the Sata Government. Fulminating at close collaboration linking the "Soviet revisionist clique" with 'US imperialists and Japanese militarists', the article asked how then could "certain persons" (meaning the JCP) claim to be "waging struggles against US imperialism and domestic monopoly capital" and at the same time propose "joint action" with the Soviet leadership that was taking "united action" with the enemy. See, "US-Japanese-Soviet 'Holy Alliance' cannot stem revolutionary currents in Asia," Peking Review, 32, Aug. 5, 1966, p.17.

31. Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP), no.3756, Aug. 9, 1966, pp.36-37.

32. SCMP, no.3762, Aug. 17, 1966, p.37.

Within the JCP, relations with the pro-Peking elements also deteriorated. This was particularly so in JCP's Yamaguchi branch in western Japan,³³ which was allegedly under the control of the pro-Chinese elements on August 12, high-ranking officials were sent to Yamaguchi. Those brought under censure included five standing members of the prefectural committee and some important members of the Yamaguchi chapter of the Democratic Youths' Federation. Furthermore, one leading Central Committee figure, Nishizawa Ryuji, the son-in-law of Tokuda Kyuichi, the late Secretary General of the JCP, organised in September the publication of a monthly journal entitled "Studies of Mao Tse-tung's Thought". An article in the first issue entitled, "A critique of the Miyamoto line of the JCP" by Nishizawa,³⁴ criticised the draft of the "political report" which was to be presented at the JCP's 10th Congress in late October. The author rejected JCP's 'dual' assessment of the Soviet leadership as a "friend of the people" as a revisionist. Retaliation by the party was swift. On October 24, 1966, the first day of the 10th Congress of the JCP, Nishizawa was expelled from the party.³⁵

33. For details, see, Hirotsu, Fn.11, pp.19-20.

34. Reprinted in Global Digest, III, 12, December 1966, pp.29-34.

35. Chiou and Han, Fn.17, p.370.

The Tenth Congress itself was a milestone in the JCP history. At this Congress, it was declared:

"Today, we strongly protest the interference of a certain foreign influence, which is united with the evils of sectarianism, dogmatism and contemporary revisionism. It is of utmost importance that we hold steadfastly to our democratic unity in our democratic movement of Japan." 36

The report of the 10th Congress is notable for its following features:-

(i) At the time of 9th Party Congress, the "standpoint of Independence and Self-determination" was directed principally against ~~the Soviet Union~~^{the Soviet Union}. But in the 10th Party convention, it emphasized the extrication of the JCP from its position of subservience to the CPC.

(ii) The JCP formulated a new revolutionary policy which did not blindly follow the dictates of any foreign communist parties, but insisted on pursuing a line, best suited to the present Japanese conditions.

Then, in an obvious attempt to overwhelm the dissidents, one of the important pro-Peking figures Anzai Kuraji was dropped from the membership of the Presidium, while Miyamoto's supporter was appointed to fill the vacant

36. Cited, *ibid.*

position. After the 10th Congress, the party not only pledged to follow vigorously an 'independent path', but also the 'Miyamoto line' became firmly established as the JCP's official party.

In a sense, the JCP's estrangement with the CPC in 1966 and its pledge to sustain and strengthen the policy of 'independence and autonomy' which began from the debacles after 1950 events. After 1955, Miyamoto was generally regarded as the 'neutral' faction leader who, due to his vulnerable position in the party, couldn't afford to fight against the pro-Peking elements. The shrewd move to consolidate his power base in the early 1960's was evident from his alignment with the pro-Peking faction against the 'pro-Soviet group'. But by the end of 1964, when Miyamoto groups were well-placed inside the party, he tried to come out of the pro-Peking influence. The April 17 strike issue and differences with CPC over the Vietnam war and the adoption of a violent strategy paved the way for Miyamoto to carry on his struggle against the pro-Peking faction and ultimately he succeeded.

THE JCP AND THE CPC (SEPTEMBER 1966 TO 1979):

The JCP's decision to break away from the CPC and to pursue a path of independence didn't erase the latter's influence in the JCP fully. The pro-Peking group

not only formed another party, named the Japanese Communist Party (Left),³⁷ but also the conflict spilled into other JCP dominated organizations.

(a) In the Japan-China friendship Association, problems arose in September 1966 over the decision--whether to send youth delegates to China as a part of the Sino-Japanese friendship youth exchange programme in September 1966. The JCP members who held key positions in the association were either expelled from the party or otherwise penalised,³⁸ on the ground that they had violated the party policy for sending delegations to China. Those against the party policy created a new organisation called Jap-China Friendship Association (Orthodox).

(b) The JCP's new policy also caused internal problems in the Afro-Asian solidarity committee in Japan. The 29th meeting of the Committee's permanent directors in the month of August saw a heated discussion among the JCP affiliated directors on whether or not the committee should send delegates to China in the youth exchange programme. Following that came another animated controversy over how to evaluate the World Congress against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs. Attacks and counter-attacks took place between

37. See, Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1966 (Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1967), pp.338-339.

38. Ibid.

the anti-Peking JCP members, led by Director General Mishihiko Kanoko and the pro-Peking JCP members, led by Director General Tokumatsu Sakamoto. The smouldering feud burst into open at the 12th meeting of the permanent Directors in November when the pro-Peking group walked out in a group, precipitating a split³⁹ of the Afro-Asian solidarity committee in Japan.

(c) The split in turn affected related organisations such as the Japanese congress of Journalists. Those favouring Peking broke away to form the Japan Journalists' League,⁴⁰ which claimed the membership in Afro-Asian Journalists Association in place of the Japanese Congress of Journalists.

Apart from troubles in the JCP dominated organisations, the change in policy also created disorder among those members who were interested in Sino-Japanese trade. The dissolution of the Japan-China Trade Promotion Association was announced on October 26.⁴¹ Trouble in Sino-Japanese trade relations had started as early as late August when China unilaterally severed its traditional

39. Hirotsu, Fn.1, p.10.

40. Ibid.

41. "Saboteurs cast aside", Peking Review, No.46 (November 11, 1966), p.37.

ties with three Japanese firms - Matsumi, Sanshin Koeki and Haga Tsasho, who had close affiliations with the JCP.⁴² By the end of 1966, a new list of 'friendly firms' which included pro-Peking affiliates of the JSP and the left-wing of the LDP, was approved by Peking.⁴³ The withdrawal of trade from firms associated with the JCP must have meant a significant financial loss to the party, as the JCP had been attaching great importance to these firms as a chief source of funds.

Apart from these developments, polemics of an intense and vehement nature were exchanged between the Chinese Red Guards and the JCP. According to one of the articles in February 1967 by a group Red Guards, the JCP was put in the same category as Kautsky, Bernstein, and Khrushchev for advocating parliamentary struggle. They maintained that the advocacy of violent revolution or parliamentary struggle was the test that distinguished between revolutionaries and traitors.⁴⁴ In late February 1967, the diatribes between the Chinese and the JCP assumed a violent form. It arose as a result of the Zenrin (Good Neighbour) Student Dormitory incidents, when Chinese students housed in the Dormitory clashed with the pro-JCP faction of the Japan-China friendship association whose offices were in the same building.⁴⁵

43. Chiou and Han, Fn.17, pp.371-372.

44. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1968, p.353.

45. SCMP, no.3896, March 10, 1967, pp.22-28.

Party Chairman Nosaka, long time associate of the top Chinese communist leaders and previously a leading advocate of alignment with Peking, added new fuel to the fire of the dispute on the occasion of the JCP's forty fifth anniversary. He joined the controversy for the first time by making a speech in which he denounced the CPC. He said:

"A segment of the leadership group of the CPC has from about April 1966, taken hostile and destructive activities against the JCP. The CPC used 'big power methods' in an attempt to force upon the JCP its united anti-American front and anti-Soviet front including armed struggle in support thereof... Once the CPC failed in this attempt, it only began to take destructive action against the JCP." 46

The fact that Nosaka, the person most deeply connected with Mao, launched criticism, may be taken as indicative of the growing assertiveness of the party itself.

The final crisis soon followed when the JCP recalled its two remaining representatives in Peking named Sunama Ichiro, the JCP representative in China and Konno Junichi, the Akahata correspondent. Both of them had been subjected to increasingly severe pressure and abuse by Chinese Red Guard group. Despite their

46. Cited, Shigeo, Fn.4, p.443.

official recall, the Chinese Government delayed their departure for two weeks through a series of bureaucratic obstructions. Finally they were allowed to leave on August 3. But at the airport, they were attacked by a group of Red Guards and were not allowed to leave Peking until the following day. The Peking Airport incident represented the formal and final break in relations between the two parties.⁴⁷

As the conflict between the JCP and the CPC intensified, polemics continued at a high pitch. The JCP denounced the Maoist clique for its "anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist behaviour", to which the Chinese communists retaliated by labelling Miyamoto's revisionist clique as one of China's "four arch-enemies" - after American imperialism, Soviet revisionism and Sato reactionaries.⁴⁸ However, until the 11th Congress of 1970, the Party was always careful to level its criticisms against the 'Mao faction' or to avoid naming the CPC or China as a nation. Nosaka made it clear in a New Year T.V. interview (1970) where he stated that "There was no quarrel between the Chinese and Japanese communist Parties, but the JCP was on bad terms only with

47. SCMP, No.3997, August 9, 1967, p.39.

48. Langer, "Independence or sub-ordination: The JCP between Moscow and Peking" in A. Doak Barnett (Ed.); Communist Strategies in Asia: A comparative analysis of the Governments and Parties (Greenwood, Connecticut, 1966), p.74.

the Mao clique."⁴⁹ Until 1970, the major incidents, which took place, can be enumerated as follows:

- (a) In January 1969, the CPC strongly commended the violent student factions responsible for the Tokyo University battles in the same month and described the acts of militancy as "anti-American, patriotic, righteous battles". The JCP claimed that the 'blind actions' of a handful of violent 'Trotskyite students' were isolated and did not enjoy any support from the people.
- (b) In the same year, the JCP criticised the 9th Congress of the CPC, held on 1-24 April. The JCP called it a meeting of 'Maoist faction' and in an article entitled "Illegal National Congress by Maoists", Akahata on April 2, called the Congress, "a new offensive against the CPC and the Chinese people".⁵⁰ The selection of Lin Piao as Mao's successor was condemned as having no precedent in the history of international communism and showed their desperate attempts of "clinging to power".
- (c) Criticising the 'so-called cultural Revolution', the 11th Party Congress resolution dubbed it as an 'anti-socialist attempt to defy Mao Tse-tung and to establish

49. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1971, p.603.

50. Ibid.

the unlimited authority of his clique."⁵¹ The report made it clear that though the party had no intention to criticise the "Great Cultural Revolution", as it was a domestic question, yet it was compelled to do so because "silence at such a moment was bound to mean abandonment of its responsibility, lack of fixed principle, enervation and virtual capitulation to the barbarous intervention for the party who bears the responsibility for the revolutionary movement in Japan."⁵²

These incidents showed that the JCP was very cautious enough to confine its criticisms within the organisational level. But with the beginning of Sino-Japanese and Sino-American rapprochement in the early part of 1970's, the JCP started criticising the foreign policy questions and began to point out the inherent contradictions in the policies pursued by Communist China. In this regard, it would be worthwhile to examine the JCP's differences with the CPC in these normalisation processes.

51. See, Main Documents of the XI Congress, Central Committee/CPJ, pp.118-121.

52. Ibid., p.120.

SINO-AMERICAN RAPPROACHEMENT AND THE JCP:

The announcement on July 15, 1971 that President Nixon of the United States would visit Peking came as a greater shock to the JCP than even to the Japanese Government. Far from seeing the visit as contributing to peace in Asia, the JCP interpreted it as a deception designed to break the deadlock caused by the US intervention in Vietnam. The JCP's position can be enumerated as follows:

- (1) Nixon's announcement was not a surprise.⁵³
- (2) His objective was to break the stalemate for the United States in the domestic and international situations.
- (3) The visit was a bargaining transaction made over the heads of small and medium-sized countries which recalled Khrushchev-Eisenhower meeting at Camp David, which "beautified" Eisenhower, and
- (4) China's invitation to US President revealed the contradictions in its policy.

53. "Nixon and US imperialism", Bulletin - Information for Abroad, no.234, Sept. 1971, pp.1-26.

In March, Akahata produced a series⁵⁴ of detailed indictments of the US, the CPC, the Socialists and the splinter pro-Marxist Japanese groups. The article on March 25 was one of the most comprehensive attacks issued during the year. Nixon's objective was seen as diverting public attention to China and away from the war in Indo-China and the Chinese were criticised for receiving him 'warmly' in spite of continuing aggression in Indo-China and America's non-abandonment of its "two-Chinas" theory.

In the JCP's views, the CPC after normalisation with the US, started underplaying the dangers of "US imperialism", hitherto the chief enemy of both parties. Such a change was evident from the CPC's attitude towards US-Japanese security treaty, especially as seen in Chou's views expressed to visitors to China after President Nixon's trip. During the visit of the Diet delegation to Peking in 1974, in which the JCP was not included, the CPC leadership made the statement that Japan's maintenance of the security treaty with the US was understandable as a defence against the menace of the Soviet Union. From such

54. A seven part series running from 11 to 19 March discussed all phases of the international situation in Asia, from the war in Indo-China through the Taiwan question to the Sino-Soviet conflict, to China's changeable attitude towards the US to the US-Japan security treaty. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1973, p.488.

assertions, the JCP concluded that Chinese leaders, "who should spearhead the anti-imperialist forces, are beautifying the US nuclear umbrella and are supporting the security pact."⁵⁵

Thus since 1971, the JCP had been criticising the CPC for its flexible attitude towards "US imperialism". The CPC's soft attitude had not only infuriated the JCP, but also remained as a major bone of contention between these two parties.

SINO-JAPANESE RAPPROACHMENT AND THE JCP :

When the Prime Minister of Japan, Tanaka Kakuei in 1972, announced his intention to visit Peking for the purpose of normalising Japan's relations with China, the JCP faced a quandary. Although the JCP leaders had repeatedly advocated the renewal of Government-to-Government relations with Peking, they could not enthusiastically support the LDP purely on political grounds. Further, the JCP had strongly criticised Nixon's visit to China. It didn't further consider normalisation of relations with China as a priority issue at that point of time. Yet, with a general election round the corner, and judging the prevailing

55. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1975, p.358.

'China mood' among the Japanese people, the JCP leadership could not hold out as the sole dissenter on this issue. When all other political parties had shown favourable responses to it, it would have been very embarrassing for the JCP, if it had opposed the initiation of the normalisation process.

So, on September 9, Miyamoto announced at a press conference that the JCP "approved the policy for re-establishing diplomatic relations between Japan and China being pursued by the Tanaka cabinet."⁵⁶ However, in order to save its face, the JCP presented a few points which, it thought, should guide Tanaka in his negotiations in Peking. It wanted Tanaka

- (i) to establish diplomatic relations during his visit;
- (ii) to confirm the position on 'one China'; and
- (iii) to revoke the Sato-Nixon joint communique relating to Taiwan.

On the occasion of the normalisation of relations in September 1972, the JCP declared

"As a party which has consistently demanded for the last twenty-three years since the establishment of the PRC that the diplomatic relations be restored with the PRC as the sole legal government, the CPJ welcomes the realisation of the restoration of China-Japan diplomatic relations." 57

56. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1973, p.489.

57. Cited, Bulletin - Information for Abroad, No.276, Oct. 1972, pp.2-4.

However, the JCP differed from the CPC over the question of the inclusion of a 'hegemony clause in the proposed 'peace and friendship treaty between Japan and China', which became a stumbling block to the signing of the treaty. The Chinese insisted in 1975 that a clause confirming opposition to hegemony of third powers in the Far East region be included in the body of the treaty. Because the Russians protested claiming that the clause would be directed against them, the Japanese Government hesitated to agree as it might close down the options towards Soviet Union. The JCP, accusing both the Soviet Union and China of hegemony, found the proposed clause in conflict with Japan's autonomous diplomacy. It cited the example of China's efforts to destroy the JCP and to interfere in the revolutionary and democratic movements in Japan was a glaring instance of 'hegemony'. Condemning all sorts of hegemony, the JCP rejected Chinese efforts to win Japan's collusion in attacking the Soviet Union by means of 'anti-hegemony' clause in the treaty.⁵⁸

The JCP's most vitriolic criticism of China came after the signing of the peace treaty in August 1978. While voting in favour of ratification, the JCP spokesman said that the party agreed to the treaty in principle but

58. Bulletin - Information for Abroad, June 1975, pp.2-5.

went on to assail Peking for its earlier insistence on the inclusion of an anti-hegemony clause. The party ultimately voted in favour of the ratification of the treaty in the Diet because of Government's clarification that the anti-hegemony clause was not directed against any country and that any hegemonistic action would be interpreted as such by Japan and China independently.⁵⁹

Thus, inspite of all its antagonism towards the CPC, the JCP could not afford to ignore the 'China mood' in the country and in its efforts to prove itself a 'nationalistic party', it supported the rapprochement.

However, its support for the Sino-Japanese normalisation process didn't tone down its antagonism towards the CPC. It differed and criticised the CPC over several other issues, which can be enumerated as follows:-

- (a) The JCP's shift in attitude towards Chinese nuclear weapon tests in 1973 was abrupt and surprising. Consistently, the JCP had drawn a distinction between the nuclear weapons programmes of capitalist and socialist countries calling the nuclear weapons maintained and tested by China and the Soviet Union as "defensive and unavoidable". But in 1973, the JCP

59. Bulletin - Information for Abroad, No.405, Oct. 1978, pp.3-4.

changed its position. It became critical of Chinese nuclear tests. Miyamoto explained that the "world situation had changed. The Sino-Soviet dispute had worsened and that nuclear tests by socialist countries could no longer be said to be defensive and unavoidable." ⁶⁰

- (b) In 1972, problems arose on the question of sovereignty over the Senkaku islands, which had since the war been administered by Japan as part of Ryukyus. It suddenly came into news in 1972 because of its suspected oil deposits. The Governments of both China and Taiwan started claiming the Sankakus as Chinese. On March 30, the JCP in another demonstration of Japanese nationalism, announced full support to the Japanese rights to the islands. ⁶¹
- (c) In 1979, when China invaded Vietnam to 'punish' the Vietnamese aggressors, the JCP condemned China's actions and called for a negotiated settlement, while unequivocally supporting Vietnam. Party officials had wanted the Japanese Foreign Ministry to try to persuade Deng Xioping, when he passed through Japan en route back to China from his US visit, to stop pressurising Vietnam. Subsequently, JCP leaders criticised the Government's friendliness towards China in the context of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict. ⁶²

60. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1974, pp.477-78.

61. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1973, p.490.

62. Bulletin - Information for Abroad, No.233, Sept. 1979, p.1.

The relations between the two parties were so strained that at the time of Chou En-lai's death in 1976, the JCP made a terse and indirect comment on it. It also didn't hesitate to mention that since 1966 Chou had played an important role in the Chinese policy of intervention in the affairs of the JCP. However, when Mao died in the same year, the Akahata gave prominence to a statement by Nosaka, who had been a close associate of Mao.⁶³ The only occasion, when the JCP supported China, was at the time of its entry into the United Nations in 1971. JCP's support was on the ground that it had no conflict with the Chinese people and China as a nation.

OBSTACLES HINDERING THE PATH OF NORMALISATION:

At least in the case of the JCP-CPSU relationship, attempts were being made by both parties to have a rapprochement. On the contrary, since 1966, neither the JCP nor the CPC has made any attempt to compose the differences. The JCP, being disturbed by the 'big-brotherly' attitude of the CPC had laid down the conditions that unless the CPC ceased from (i) trying to force a revolutionary strategy on the JCP and (ii) supporting the splinter organisations in Japan, the relationship between the parties could never be normalised.

63. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1977, p.317.

As has been discussed earlier, the attempt by the CPC to force upon a violent strategy on the JCP was one of the reasons for their estrangement in 1966. On the other hand, the Chinese recognition and support of the anti-JCP elements and alleged intervention in the internal affairs of the JCP had drawn particular ire of the JCP. The list of allegations made by the JCP is unending.⁶⁴ They can be categorised in the following manner:

- (i) to foster anti-party elements submissive to Mao Tse-tung to carry on machinations for overthrowing the JCP;
- (ii) to give anti-party elements trade concessions and to offer them funds through trade;
- (iii) to support, assist the counter-revolutionary Trotskyites on the condition that they would oppose the JCP;
- (iv) to directly attack the party by means of Radio Peking and printed matters; and
- (v) to invite Japanese people to China to urge them to oppose the JCP.

64. See, Bulletin - Information for Abroad, No.385, and 261; Dec. 1977 and April 1972, p.5 and pp.2-11 respectively.

So, according to the JCP, the principle of non-intervention must be firmly observed in relations between communist parties of China and Japan without which the JCP cannot move for a reconciliation. Though the revolutionary tone of the CPC has calmed down after its normalisation with the US, still its support for the anti-party elements has remained as a major bone of contention.

The CPC, on the other hand, has been equally obstinate in its approach towards the JCP. The latter's refusal to accept the Chinese view of 'armed revolution' and to join in an 'anti-CPSU front' had led the CPC to criticise the JCP leadership vigorously. Once they made it clear that, so long as Miyamoto heads the party, no reconciliation is possible.⁶⁵ To this end, apart from supporting the splinter groups, the CPC leadership had always made attempts to exclude the JCP in the realm of Japan-China relationship. Delegates from all political parties except the JCP were invited to visit China. In August 1977, Watanabe Takeshi, a JCP member of the Diet, was granted a visa by China and became the first JCP representative to visit China in ten years.⁶⁶ The significance, however, must be seen against the fact that

65. Yearbook, Fn.60, p.477.

66. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1978, p.267.

Watanabe was a member of a Japanese Parliamentarians' delegation and the leader of the group, a LDP man, requested the visa for him. Also, the visa was only a transit visa which allowed Watanabe a short stay in China en route to North Korea.

With the change of leadership in China in 1976, the JCP leadership hoped for a changed atmosphere. In the new year interview of 1977, Miyamoto said:

"Since the expulsion of the 'gang of four' various changes are taking place and I think there will be further changes. We are hoping that the CPC will now regard (that) the kind of treatment given to our JCP representative and the policy of supporting an anti-party faction are both incorrect and unjustifiable." 67

But the developments since 1976 had not shown any positive trend. Rather the normalisation with the CPSU and the JCP's support to Vietnam has drifted the party more from the CPC.

67. Bulletin - Information for Abroad, No.367, April 1977, p.20.

CONCLUSION

Although the JCP has just celebrated its sixtieth anniversary, for more than half of this period it was no more than an appendage of Moscow and Peking. During the pre-war years, the party was a small and docile branch of the Comintern which for all practical purposes ceased to exist owing to the repressive attitude of the Japanese Government. For the most part - intellectuals, the leaders of the Japanese communist movement have given little thought to how exactly they would realise their objectives in the face of an extremely repressive state apparatus. They seemed to have relied to a large extent on the inevitability of communism's victory throughout the world and on the aid and advice they were to receive from the communist power centre, Moscow.

Given the constraints of the American occupation after the war, the party leaders thought it prudent to project an image of a 'lovable' communist party. They stressed the parliamentary tactics, which gave them a measure of success in the election of 1949. But shortly thereafter,

in January 1950, Stalin, with the approval of the Chinese communists launched an attack on JCP for its soft posture. The CPSU's admonition caused a split in the party ranks. Eventually, the JCP adopted a suicidal hardline strategy and the leadership went either underground or to Peking.

Fortunately for the JCP, this violent phase was rather short. In March 1953, Stalin dies and the Korean war came to an end, so that there was no more need to disrupt the American base in Japan. Within two years, most of the communist leaders and cadres were back in Japan, and a serious struggle for power within the party ensued. It was clear that the only hope for the party in democratic Japan was to pursue the old pre-Cominform policies, but the divisions in the party hierarchy were very deep, with some of the followers of Stalin's line reluctant to allow full and public criticism of the strategy of 1950. The struggle for power was won by the present leader Miyamoto, who switched factions in order to become Secretary General and has since pursued a soft, parliamentary line.

JCP's reactions to the split in the International Communist Movement was to stay neutral and to work towards reconciliation of the two communist super-parties. By the early 1960s, however, most Asian communist parties including the JCP had begun to lean towards Peking. JCP's switch was

mostly due to the fact that its domestic policies of opposition to 'American imperialism' were more compatible with the Chinese position than with Khrushchev's peaceful co-existence line. The pressures exerted rather crudely by the CPSU on the JCP for ideological unity proved to be counter-productive. But the one issue in the Sino-Soviet dispute that had decisively pitted the Japanese party against the Soviet party was the signing of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in Moscow in 1963. The 9th Congress of the JCP ratified the split between the Japanese and Soviet parties, which was to last for fifteen years.

The break with the CPSU should have led to much closer relations with the CPC. And indeed for a while it did, but in early 1966, Mao Tse-tung personally intervened in the talks between the Japanese and Chinese parties and insisted that the JCP should endorse his rather extreme anti-Soviet positions. The Japanese delegation refused to sign on the dotted line. Thereafter the relationship between the two parties continued to deteriorate and with the onset of the cultural revolution, were completely broken off from both communist super powers, the JCP began to search for allies among other communist parties, who were also trying to steer a neutral course and to assert their independence from both Moscow and Peking.

After the rupture of the JCP's relationship with the CPC, the CPSU, between 1968 and 1979, made three unsuccessful attempts at reconciliation with the JCP. These attempts proved unsuccessful for some reasons. First, the JCP insisted that the CPSU should repudiate its support to certain anti-party elements. There were other reasons too, which included Japanese condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the expulsion of Aleksandr Solzhentisyn, the attacks on Spanish communist leader Santiago Carrillo, but most importantly the high handed policies towards Japan, especially the territorial dispute, the fishery negotiations and Soviet bombing exercises in the vicinity of Japan.

The conclusion of the Sino-Japanese 'Treaty of peace and friendship' in August 1978 and the development of closer collaboration between these two countries might have served as a catalyst for the Soviet decision to make some concessions in order to normalise relationship with the JCP. The JCP, on the other hand, was motivated to seek better relations with the CPSU because of its growing isolation in the sphere of the International Communist Movement. Although the December 1979 agreement did normalise relations between the Soviet and Japanese parties, the JCP failed to get any concession from the CPSU over

the territorial issues, a politically important issue for the JCP. Nor did the final agreement confirm any past Soviet culpability in supporting 'anti-party' elements.

However, the normalisation didn't make the JCP a satellite of the CPSU again. The more recent manifestations of the basic disagreements between the JCP and the CPSU are visible in the slogans of the fifty-third JCP May Day celebrations in 1982 and in the speeches at the sixteenth Party Congress held at the end of July 1982. Of the eighteen slogans, four contained anti-Soviet points: a demand for the withdrawal from Asia of the SS-20 and Soviet nuclear weapons; the immediate return of Haleomai and Shikotan islands and the return of the entire Kurile islands chain upon the conclusion of Japanese-Soviet peace treaty; the immediate termination of the military government in Poland, withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and opposition to all "hegemonism" and "great powerism".

On the other hand, the abnormal relationship between the JCP and the CPC still exists. Unlike the JCP-CPSU relationship, neither of the parties had made any attempt to normalise their relationships. In defending its autonomous status, the JCP sought to discourage the CPC from strengthening its factions in Japan and from intervening in party's internal affairs. The differences

between both parties range from organisational issues to bilateral issues between Japan and China. The present state of affairs will last until the Chinese leaders accept the notion that all situations are not amenable to Chinese solutions.

Another reason for JCP's 'quest' should be seen in its keenness to dispel fear from the public mind that it was no more a Soviet or Chinese tool. It emerged out of the party's determination to pursue vigorously the policy of parliamentary path to revolution. So the JCP has undergone a process of deradicalisation, since 1961 under the leadership of Miyamoto. This deradicalisation became necessary because of the dismal failure of the violent revolutionary posture from 1950 to 1955, which had crippled the party apparatus. Since 1961, the deradicalisation of the JCP has taken the form of an increasing commitment to the parliamentary path of revolution. As the JCP has succeeded in its drive for expansion of its organisational strength, it has further changed its policy orientation by gearing its activities to electioneering. As the trend shows, the JCP's adoption of the parliamentary path to revolution is likely to be retained by the party in the future.

It is clear that the JCP is not only subscribing the parliamentary path to revolution, but it is also increasingly following the strategy of the West European communist parties, with which the JCP has been increasing its contacts in recent years. The simple reason is that Japan, like France and Italy, is a highly industrialised, democratic society, where a 'peaceful transition to socialism' is possible.

It should be pointed out that JCP's parliamentary path to power can by no means assure the party of any spectacular electoral success in the short run. Despite the deradicalisation of the party's policy orientation, the JCP has not yet succeeded in overcoming the suspicions of the non-communists, many of whom are still quite apprehensive about the ultimate intentions of the JCP. Furthermore, since it is operating essentially within a conservative set up, the fulfilment of its electoral goals will not be quick. Unless the JCP deradicalises itself further so as to make it acceptable to the non-communist parties, it seems quite unlikely that it will be able to get into any coalition government, as and when it becomes possible.

Though JCP's independent posture free from the CPC and the CPSU has not resulted in any remarkable progress in the electoral field, it has emerged as a well organised

political party inside Japan. The 'quest' has paved the way for the party to hammer out its own strategy in the internal political sphere without any outside interference. It has devised its own ideological line and has challenged the big-brotherly attitude of the CPSU and the CPC in the sphere of international communist conferences and negotiations in which it has taken part. With the increasingly autonomous orientation of the JCP, the Japanese communists will no doubt play a more active and independent role in their relationship with other communist organisations. Thus it could be argued that the growing trend among the Japanese communists to make their movement a force that is truly independent of foreign influence and dedicated to the defense of the Japanese national interest, may provide the party with sufficient leverage to broaden its base, which it has not been able to do in the past. Such a trend is apparent and is beginning to pay off at the elections. But it seems quite unlikely that such a policy could produce dramatic changes in the political balance within the next few years.

Appendix

JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON TALKS BETWEEN THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION
AND THE
JAPAN COMMUNIST PARTY

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Talks between a delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union led by Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and a delegation of the Japan Communist Party, led by Kenji Miyamoto, Chairman of the Presidium of the JCP Central Committee, were held in Moscow from 17th to 24th December 1979.

Taking part in the talks, from the Soviet side, were Mikhail Suslov, member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; Boris Ponomaryov, candidate member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; V. Afanasyev and P. Fedoseyev, member of the CPSU Central Committee; R. Ulyanovsky, deputy head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee; and I. Koyalenko, head of a section of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee; and, from the Japanese side, T. Nishizawa and K. Ueda, vice-chairman of the Presidium of the JCP Central Committee; M. Kaneko, member of the Standing Bureau of the Presidium of the JCP Central Committee and

Deputy Chairman of the Secretariat of the JCP Central Committee; T. Sakaki and H. Tachiki, members of the Presidium of the JCP Central Committee; and S. Uno, member of the JCP Central Committee.

During the talks, which were held in a comradely, friendly and frank atmosphere, the delegation of the two parties had an extensive and all round exchange of views on relations between the CPSU and the JCP, topical international issues, including the present situation in Asia, relations between the two countries and nations, the world communist movement, and on other issues of mutual interest.

First of all, the delegations confirmed the agreement reached at the preliminary talks on the past problems which had resulted in a disruption of normal relations between the two parties and which subsequently, for a lengthy period, had obstructed their normalisation. They reaffirmed the need to develop relations between the two parties on the basis of strict observance of the generally recognised norms of relations between communist parties: independence, equality, non-interference in each other's internal affairs and solidarity in the solution of common tasks.

The sides expressed confidence that the present agreement on the past problems in relations between the two parties would be of positive importance also for the unity

and development of the movement for the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, and also for the other public movements in Japan.

The JCP delegation informed the CPSU delegation about the situation in Japan, about the activities and achievements of its party and about future prospects.

The CPSU delegation informed the JCP delegation about the situation in the Soviet Union, about the activities and achievements of its party in various spheres and about future prospects.

The delegations of the CPSU and the JCP discussed questions of the international situation and were agreed in acknowledging the following aggressive intrigues by imperialists, led by the USA, are continuing as before in Asia, Europe and other areas: the evident growth of the forces of peace, national independence and social progress is the main direction of world development, which finds its expression in the deepening of the crisis of world capitalism, in the continuous collapse of reactionary dictatorships and military regimes in various areas of the world, in the growth of anti-imperialist forces and the number of non-aligned states, and in the development of the struggle by the people of various countries; and the historic mission of the three main revolutionary forces - the socialist countries, the working class and the working

people of capitalist countries and the national liberation movement - is acquiring an increasing importance.

Ever greater importance is being acquired by the strengthening of the solidarity of the anti-imperialist progressive forces of the world in their struggle against the policy of aggression and oppression pursued by forces of international imperialism and reaction. The sides stressed that of particular importance for this is the defence of such principles of peaceful coexistence as mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, equality and mutual advantage and the right of nations to independence and freedom, the inadmissibility of anyone's claims to special rights and hegemony, and strict observance of the principle of settling outstanding issues through negotiations.

The two sides pointed out the danger of the arms race, particularly of the nuclear arms race, and emphasized again the need and urgency for the further development of the struggle for world detente and general disarmament, first of all for the complete banning of nuclear weapons and for the conclusion of an international agreement prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. The sides denounced the intrigues of Japanese-US reaction directed at turning Japan, and first of all Okinawa, into a nuclear base, and also the plans for deploying new nuclear missile weapons by the NATO states.

In this connection the two delegations positively assessed the proposal by the Warsaw Treaty countries that the participating countries of the European Conference on Security and Co-operation should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other.

They pointed out the particular importance of developing the movement of the broad popular masses and of mobilising the world public for the achievement of such aims as the banning of nuclear arms, disarmament and the ensurance of world peace.

The delegations of the CPSU and the JCP noted that US imperialism, after suffering a serious defeat in Indochina, is, in an effort to restore its relatively weakened role in Asia. Japan included, pressing for a strengthening of the military positions on the basis of the Japanese-US military alliance and resorting to various manoeuvres. Support for the Japanese-US aggressive military alliance and for the revival and strengthening of Japanese militarism, regardless of who gives this support, helps the forces of imperialism and reaction in the implementation of their plans and runs counter to the desire of the people in various countries for world peace and national independence.

The delegations confirmed that at present Indochina has become a new arena of international confrontation between the forces of imperialism and aggression on the one hand, and

the anti-imperialist peace-loving forces on the other. They stated that political and economic support for the people of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea was a common task of the international anti-imperialist and peace-loving forces. The sides expressed fervent solidarity with the people of the three countries of Indochina, who, in the struggle against aggressive wars and domination by imperialists of every kind, achieved national independence and now, encountering new difficulties and problems, are building a new society, and pursuing a policy of national self-determination, peace, good-neighbourliness and friendship. The violation of the borders and armed intrusion into the western and northern areas of Vietnam, accompanied by a rejection of peace talks, should be resolutely condemned as an act of outright hegemonism which is alien to socialism.

The sides support the Korean people's struggle for the independence and peaceful unification of Korea. The two parties stated that the achievement of this aim requires the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea.

The sides support efforts directed at a just and comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problems, which should be resolved, not by way of a separate deal, but with the participation of all interested sides, including the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO).

The sides again stated their support for and solidarity with all nations struggling against imperialism, colonialism

and neo-colonialism, against apartheid and reaction and for national self-determination, peace, democracy and social progress.

With the aim of effectively promoting - in the present difficult international situation - truly independent and democratic transformations and construction in each country on the basis of the right of the people to national self-determination, the sides came out against both 'export of counter-revolution' and 'export of revolution'. This does not contradict active support for and solidarity with the nations which are struggling against imperialist aggression and oppression and for national independence.

During the talks, the delegations of the CPSU and the JCP exchanged views, in a comradely and frank spirit, on problems of relations between the two countries and people. The sides noted that the conclusion of a peace treaty between the USSR and Japan was necessary for the development of friendly Soviet-Japanese relations on a long term and stable basis. Having frankly stated their views, they agreed to continue the exchange of views in the future. An improvement of relations between the two countries accords, with the cardinal interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union and Japan and with the interests of peace and security in Asia and in the world.

The Japanese side also made several proposals concerning fishing, the gathering of sea kale and visits to graves. The Soviet side expressed its agreement to study the question raised by the JCP delegation with due regard for the interests of the people of both countries.

Proceeding from the accord reached between the two parties, the sides agreed in the future, when necessary, to discuss issues of mutual interest, issues concerning relations between the two parties and countries. Having discussed further inter-party relations, the sides agreed also to draft a concrete plan for such relations.

The two sides affirm that each party has the right independently to decide its policy concerning the implementation of social transformations and social progress and concerning the choice of ways of transition to socialism, and also in building socialism and communism in accordance with the historical conditions and the concrete situation of their countries, proceeding from principles of scientific socialism and communism. In this no outside interference whatsoever should be allowed.

The sides stressed that the development of the solidarity of the world communist movement on a principled basis is of great importance for the strengthening of the solidarity of the world anti-imperialist forces in their

struggle in defence of world peace and of the sovereignty of various nations against the policy of aggression and interference by imperialists.

The present talks between the CPSU and the JCP have put an end to the long period of abnormal relations between the two parties and open a new road to the development of friendly relations between the two parties and nations. The sides are also convinced that the present talks are of great importance for the cause of world peace and progress and of the world communist movement.

Source: Bogdan Szajkowski (Ed.) Documents in Communist Affairs, 1980, (Macmillan, London, 1981), pp.191-194.

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