

# **DISSIDENT MOVEMENTS: A STUDY OF THE PERSIAN GULF COUNTRIES**

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University  
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**CERTIFICATE**

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled, "DISSIDENT MOVEMENTS: A STUDY OF THE PERSIAN GULF COUNTRIES", submitted by SIMA BAIDYA, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy (M.Phil)** of this university, is, to the best of our knowledge, her own work and has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other university.

We recommend that this dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation for award of the degree of Master of Philosophy.

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*To  
Phams*

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## PREFACE

*Movement in the context of Persian Gulf countries is a subject of peripheral interest. Scattered material or almost non-availability of the material on this topic proves it a difficult one. Still I got encouragement from some good books e.g. Anotnius George's **Arab Awakening: The Story of Arab National Movement**, Elizer Tauber's **The Emergence of the Arab Movements**, Al-Ayaman Yasini's **Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia**, Helen Lackner's **A House Built on Sand**, Emile E. Nalakh's **Bahrain: Political Development in a Modernizing Society** and stuck to my research proposal and finally wrote my M.Phil dissertation on this unconventional topic. More divergence and less commonality make me to discuss this subject in the countrywise breakup—though they are interrelated in one way or the other.*

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# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

### DISSIDENT MOVEMENTS IN DEMOCRACY, AUTHORITARIAN AND RENTIER SYSTEM: AN OVERVIEW

Dissent means refusal to abide by or accept the doctrines of the established Church. Nature of dissent is defined by the political culture of a system. Heterogeneity of the political culture breeds dissent in any society. And peaceful coexistence of different opinions makes the favourable environment for different clusters of dissent. An amalgamation of different ideological base provides the structure for dissident movements. Since democracy by definition refers to a plural political culture, dissent is interlinked with political culture.

The linkages between political culture and the dynamics of political system in a way fosters dissent. Political culture can be regarded as a component of important political process. "Political culture is composed of attitudes, beliefs, emotions and values of society that relates to the political system and to political issues".<sup>1</sup> It is a dynamic concept. It cannot be defined through static conception. The level of political participation, the share and percentage in the decision making process determine the nature of political culture. The developed political culture has a direct connection in the making of dissident movement a legitimate force. If people can express their grievances properly within the system, then it is good for the existence of the

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<sup>1</sup> A.R. Ball, Modern Politics and Government, (London: Macmillian, 1971), p.56

system.

Robert A. Dahl has singled out political culture as a factor explaining different pattern of political opposition whose salient features are:

- (a) Orientation of problem – solving; are they pragmatic or rationalistic?
- (b) Orientations to collective action; are they co-operative or non-co-operative?
- (c) Orientation to the political system are they allegiant or alienated?<sup>2</sup>

In Democracy political culture can be classified into three categories i.e. parochial political culture, subject political culture and participant political culture.

Participatory political culture exists in developed societies, where people feel themselves as a part of polity and actively take part in political sphere. But the "vast store of political will as Easton elsewhere calls it," forms a reservoir of favourable attitudes... that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to their wants."<sup>3</sup>

Minoritarian politics<sup>4</sup> provides space for political dissent which is denied by majority political groups. So, it can be crushed very easily. Behind this the level of political participation plays a very important role. Political

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<sup>2</sup> R. Dahl, Political Opposition in Western Democracies (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1966).

<sup>3</sup> David Easton, Political System. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953).

<sup>4</sup> R. Serge Denisoff, and Robert K. Merton, (ed.), The Sociology of Dissent (New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Atlanta: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc., 1974).

participation can be defined as a "process whereby individuals engage in activity that impinges directly upon the national power and authoritarian structure of society."<sup>5</sup> And the level of political participation has been determined by the nature of political culture.

There is a difference between opposition and dissent or rebellion. Dissent is sporadic, in effect it may pose challenge to the system in the short run or long run. Most of the cases it deals with the non-committal approach to the system, which can be organised or not organised. Dissent is more sociological term, it covers not only refusal to political system, but socio-economic system also., On the other hand 'opposition' is more political term. Opposition has to do with the concept of government.<sup>6</sup> "Opposition is opposition to government, understood as a process, an 'authority' and as an output".<sup>7</sup> Government is concerned of rule-making, rule-application and rule-adjudication "Opposition is expected to match government term to term, to provide an alternance while being a necessary part of the system".<sup>8</sup> Opposition is recognised by the system and modus operandi of the system is accepted and maintained by opposition. Dissent may be tolerated by the system, but it cannot go alongwith the system. The emergence of opposition movements in the Arabian peninsula derive from a juxtaposition of forces generated by internal socio-political developments and by policies of external

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<sup>5</sup> S.J. Ansari, Political Modernization in the Gulf (New Delhi: Northern Book Centre, 1998).

<sup>6</sup> Jean Leca, "Opposition in the Middle East and North Africa", Government and Opposition, vol.32, 1997, p.568.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

powers towards the area.<sup>9</sup>

Democratic society is a heterogeneous society. So the different pockets of the societal norms are very much there. The nature of the society provides the qualitative difference between different dissent groups. Actually the sociological explanation of the dissident movements is that it is a sort of deviation from the mainstream politics.

In democracy ideological dissent talks about the quantitative difference or the qualitative departure from the existing ideological system or value base. The sociology of dissent<sup>10</sup> depicts the theoretical base of dissent i.e. deviance theory. Deviance theory of political system analyses the genesis of dissent; where it cannot accept the existing rule of governance and search for an alternative.

The basic logic of the system is that the rules of the government and governed are different. The rule of the governed promotes the dissident movements. But the basic question is that what is the reason behind the genesis of the dissident movements?

The genesis of the dissent is directly interlinked with the political culture. Behind the genesis of dissent economic reason has to be there. As Marxian principle explains this that there has to be some sense of deprivation. This deprivation can be economic, social or political - when one privileged

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<sup>9</sup> Anat Kurz (ed.), Contemporary Trends in World Terrorism. (The Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies, Telaviv University, Memsell Publishing Limited, 1987).

<sup>10</sup> Denisoff, The Sociology of Dissent, op.cit.

group enjoys more and more facilities; others feel alienated and deprived. They feel that system is not for them. They cannot get anything from that system. If dissent is ideological, then economic reason is the core of the ideological difference. Apart from that racial dissent is also gaining prominence. Dissent is implicit in the political system of the Persian Gulf countries.

James D. Wright<sup>11</sup> has dealt with the question of dissent in a democracy. Dealing with the dissent, he asked many basic questions regarding the genesis of the discontent. He asked what accounts for the level of discontent at a given historical moment? Here the main thrust of the discussion is alienation. Obviously he has followed the same path led by Marx and Engels in the theory of alienation. In a democratic society alienation is seen as the inevitable consequences. Wright said that alienation will be the most intense among those who live at the "cutting edge" of massification - the geographically and socially mobile, the urban dwellers and these in the "peripheral" groups and social classes. "Similarly in pluralist society, affiliation that counter act the loss of community necessarily forestall its consequences. Thus, participation in voluntary associations, multiple memberships, and so on are thought to decrease the level of discontent."

Some scholars are also dealing with the basic questions of discontent and dissent. Among them consensus theorists Easton and Denis have most consistently articulated this view. In their version, the major crisis of

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<sup>11</sup> James D. Wright, The Dissent of the Governed: Alienation and Democracy in America (London: Academic Press, 1976).

democracy is that demands continually outstrip the ability of the regime to produce. The basic crisis occurs in democracy at two phases – first phase is that when resources are inadequate and demands are too much and the system cannot fulfil the demand at any condition. But in other phase resources are plenty but the people are not in a position to purchase. The economic level of the people is so worst that they loss their purchasing power and in this case they succumb. Deteriorating system pushes the people in a position where demands go unmet. “For those related reasons, then the regime constantly been a group of losers “where allegiance must, nevertheless, be secured in order for the system to pursuit.”

So, here in democracy the question of dissent is related with the persistence of the system. The ruler of this system has always taken into account this question. They always keep an eye so that system should not be disturbed. If the system is not disturbed, then dissent can be permissible. “Regimes of course, have a number of mechanism at their disposal that may restrain the looses from active opposition; but permanent among them is political socialisation.”

In USA dissent has been institutionalised or socialised through political process. And it can get along with the system. The nature of dissent is as such that it helps to maintain the system. In democracy dissent grows out of frustration or strives for power. In democracy dissent can be channelised through legitimate ways. In democracy apart from opposition there are some groups or clusters, which are being marginalised by the political system. In

American democracy opposition plays an important role to maintain the legitimacy of the system.

James D. Wright also critically discussed the theme of the reservoir of diffuse support. He elaborated the view of the consensus theorists, as they are of the view "members of a democratic regime ought to regard those who occupy positions of political authority as responsive agents and the members themselves ought to be disposed to participate."<sup>12</sup>

Economic deprivation is the basic casues behind any dissent in any political system. Although dissentient voices are still heard, the relevance of economic analysis to poor countries is now more readily accepted. Over a wide range of issues this relevance is not in question, since some of the propositions of economics derive directly from the universal limitation of resources. Their relevance is recognized in the practice of governments in underdeveloped countries of taxing commodities and activities to be discouraged and subsidising these to be encouraged."<sup>13</sup>

As the question of authority comes to the forefront – the dividing line can be seen between democracy and authoritarian regime. From the failure of democracy the success of authoritarianism comes. Authoritarian governments enjoy popular support for a limited period of time. In that period it may try to develop certain fiscal instruments.<sup>14</sup> But after a period of time the

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Peter Tamas Bauer, Dissent on Development Studies and Debates in Development Economics (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971).

<sup>14</sup> Giacomo Luciani, "Economic Foundations of Democracy and Authoritarianism: The Arab world in Comparative Perspective", Arab Studies Quarterly, vol.10, no.4, 1988.



hard decision makes authoritarian government extremely unpopular. The distributive justice is not found in reality. It has been observed that authoritarian governments have failed to provide distributive justice. It is a revealing fact itself that how the two extreme poles of the political system look into or delve into the question of dissent.

Authoritarian system can be categorised into so many different political system. And moreover all authoritarian systems are not totalitarian. Totalitarian system reflects that kind of authoritarianism where everything is encompassing by the system in totality. So, the basic question comes – how it is possible to grow dissent in authoritarian or totalitarian system. Though there is no such word as dissent in the dictionary of authoritarian political system, but the ground reality is that because of less scope of diffusion of political grievances, dissent is a force there.

And only economic analysis cannot suffice to the analysis of the process of breeding dissent. The most demanding behind the genesis of dissent in authoritarian system is the conceptions of freedom and civil rights. “The issues of legitimacy, dissent and political obligation require examination. The philosophical issues – in particular, these related to the issue of human freedom, i.e. of autonomous self-control – are derived from the philosophy of systematic pragmatism.”<sup>15</sup>

Denial of political rights of citizens and the incogential environment

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<sup>15</sup> Morton. A. Kaplan, Dissent and the state in peace and war : An Essai on the Grounds of Public morality (New York: University Press of Cambridge, 1970).

prevailing in the political system to have different opinion other than official views fuel fire to the dissident movements. The dream of seeing the society as homogeneous and monolithic naturally leads the political society to take the repressive measures against any kind of dissenting voices. The role of political culture is overshadowed by the role of individual. It provides the articulative link of the political system.

Though it is often said that authoritarian system lacks mass base, but it is not absolutely true. Sustenance of the authoritarianism depends on the two polarities of the dynamic political process. As S.E. Finer has observed in his book Man on the Horseback that military plays the most important role in the perseverance of the system. But the duration of militarization of political culture, where people become habituated or are used to have authoritarian rule. Where people can't dare to raise the voice against injustice or deprivation. To much repressive measures receptionist deny political space to dissident movement.

It has been observed that the political input of the authoritarian system is the antithesis of the democratic movement vis-à-vis dissident movement. The linkage between democratic movements and dissident movements are very important. Sometime, democratic movements pave the way for dissent. But whether this corollary is important for the genesis of dissident movement - the presence of democratic system or the existence of democracy is important.

The question of democracy is not limited to a particular political system i.e., democracy. Democracy and democratic process are important for the

political system itself. Though there would be a second opinion whether democratic process plays a very important role in the making or unmaking of authoritarian system. So, the question of political freedom is very important. Lack of political socialization or so to say the question of political indoctrination has a reverse effect in breeding the dissent. The extent of dissident movements and the impact of the dissident movements in the political society of authoritarian system as a whole reveals that rentier-authoritarian system talks about economic questions as well as political and social questions.

Economic question from the perspective of society meant that question must have dealt with the question of inequality and widening gap between rich and poor. Generally all these questions are not the concern of the dissent in authoritarian systems. Authoritarian dissent has started dealing with all the more different questions. The question of political freedom. Freedom of speech, public opinion, democracy, right to organization, right to form political party, right to assemble and organize meetings deviance of the political nature of the society i.e., demand for pluralist society and denial of the character of homogeneity.<sup>16</sup> Whether dissent movements in authoritarian system are able to articulate the demand of the people and desire and aspiration of the people still that is a question mark. But there dissident movement had drawn too much international sympathy and support not only political but financial also.

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<sup>16</sup> Rudolf, L. Tokes, Dissent in the USSR: Politics, Ideology and People (London & Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975).

And if we deal this question more deeply i.e., from authoritarian to rentier state, it manifests the different political scenario. The term movement is not new in Arab history.

Political system in Persian Gulf countries is as such where dissent cannot be permitted and it cannot mingle with the system. So the comparison is far from the democratic system. Though the degree varies from country to country and alongwith the measures of the repression also. The mandatory authorities resort with punitive measures which only harden the popular will and there ensure a movement of passive resistance of a kind hitherto unknown in the annals of any other Arab country, which was as remarkable for its universality as far it discipline and perseverance – both of them unfamiliar traits in the Arab character.<sup>17</sup>

Authoritarian rentier states are sustained by their law of economic allocation. A rentier state depends, on external sources for a large portion of its revenue.<sup>18</sup> Their revenues from abroad or so to say without production the revenues are called rent. "Oil states often foster their own civil opposition because of the revenues are deployed. The rentier frameworks is limited because it relegates political choice to a back seat behind structural economies".<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> George Antonius, Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1955).

<sup>18</sup> Gwenn Okruhlik, "Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise of Opposition", Comparative Politics, vol.10, no.3, April 1999.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

The law of economic allocation, is the parameter to obtain political legitimacy. The present challenges of dissent groups are coming from the groups'. Sense of relative discrimination in the regime's allocations of the resources of the state. Here distributive justice is far from reality. As scholars argue "wealth generated through oil receipts is a catalyst for oppositions to the state rather than a tool to placate dissent". Enough resource mobilization and the inequitable distribution may help to gain tribal allegiance, which in turn breeds the politico-ethnic religious cleavages and between advantaged and less-advantaged groups. Consequently, comparatively powerful groups gain cross-country and external alignments, as well as internal alignments with other opposition groups within their state.

The ideological value system has deep impact on the dissident movement in the Persian Gulf. The categorization of the existent political value system in the Persian Gulf countries are the following.

1. Religious conservative ideologies of fundamentalist Islam, best represented by Shi'ite groups in Iran.
2. Arab Nationalist ideologies represented by Iraq's Ba'thism.
3. Marxist-Radical ideologies of rebel groups, e.g. PFLO in Oman.

Though these ideologies do not reflect the totality of the dissident movements. Political Islam provides the basis of potential legitimacy for the monarchical-authoritarian-rentier regimes. Dissident movements tend to grow within Islamic framework, but the ground realities show that their nature of

demand is much more different than their genesis - it is more deeper than a demand for theocratic state or religious concession. Making dissident movements more Islamic in nature political Islam shows its credibility on a component of political ideology or culture in a rentier polity.

These ideological system are dynamic. Each is in the process of development. The changing nature of a group or the value system has put a remarkable mark on the political process also. That evolves rewind the components and interaction of the inputs and consequently resulted in opening up of the system and some changes in political institution (though at present cosmic changes) and some political concession. Side by side overt and covert activities or subversive activities may pose threat to the regime which in effect attack the stagnancy of the system or a whole.

In recent years the countries of the middle East have been experiencing a phenomenon known in western academic and media circles as "Islamic Revivalism".<sup>20</sup> It has been manifested through various ways and degrees. And Islam has come to play an increasingly active role in a number of different ways including law, education culture and politics.<sup>21</sup> Islamic judiciary system is gaining prominence day by day. And major agenda of some dissident movement in the Gulf is the agenda of more Islamic state based on Islamic political system judiciary, culture and put more emphasis an sharia', so that Islamic values can be recaptured.

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<sup>20</sup> I. Ibrahim (ed.), Arab Resources: The Transformation of a Society Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies (London: Croom Helm, 1983).

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

It is true the struggle for democracy and people's demand to replace autocracy with democratic structure is a relatively recent phenomenon in the Gulf societies.<sup>22</sup> So from comparative point of view aspirations for democratic structure and aspirations the two divergent issues of dissent movements. In democracy dissent has been grown up within the system and the main aim is to overthrow the system and establish an alternative political system. But in Gulf countries politics does not follow the linear path. As democracy is an illusionary word, but democratic aspirations are there; but religious discourse provides the structure and main base of ideology. So amalgamation of religious aspiration along with democracy are being expressed through dissent movements.

In democracy it has been observed that political factors contain the much more seeds of dissents than economic factors. As Luciani observed, it is commonly assumed that democracy is not well suited to implement the difficult decision that crisis and adjustment necessitate".<sup>23</sup> From economic point of view democracy shows the picture of adjustment or maladjustment of economic development. Though some culture argue that democracy and development can't go well and one has to choose either one. And successful democracy is the story of adjustment. Troublesome democracy inherently contains the seed of maladjustment. And in that case the other factors of democracy start expressing themselves through democratic norm and

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<sup>22</sup> A.K. Pasha, Aspects of Political Participation in the Gulf States (Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 1999).

<sup>23</sup> Giacomo Luciani, *op.cit.*

convention. Thus in a democracy economic condition itself breeds dissent. And often a points of time dissent takes the form of opposition though it is not true in all the cases.

But the analysis of the dissident movements in Persian Gulf countries, can't be oversimplified by the democratic aspiration. Rentier economy widens the gap between democracy and rentier polity. Rentier polity still is not so matured or so to say the nature of the polity itself is like; that it is not able to manifest its democratic aspiration. And the other way round it is also not true that democracy is the main objective of the dissident movements. Here, in Persian Gulf countries dissident movements tend to grow in two different ways. One is more fundamentalist demand, demand for the state in a more Islamic way and the other is a demand for little bit opening up of the system. These two polarities of the dissident movements give the uniqueness of the movement in this region. Interactions, conflicts and co-operation of these two divergent tendencies of dissident movements in a way reflect the dynamic character of the Persian Gulf region.



## CHAPTER II

### DISSIDENT MOVEMENTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF COUNTRIES: GENESIS AND PROFILE

Dissent and dissident movements in the Persian Gulf countries are determined by the domestic socio-political conditions of the region. The polity in the Persian Gulf countries is characterised as rentier-authoritarian in nature. Rentier economy which is premised on the allocation of resources promotes a rentier state. In a rentier state rulers try to get legitimacy by favouring groups and it can be called tribal allegiance. To get legitimacy one group becomes privileged and another becomes deprived. Though in Persian Gulf countries resources are plenty and it seems that there is no deprivation at all. But the sense of relative deprivation is there. Out of their relative deprivation dissent is coming out. Changing nature of the state and erosion of state's capacity<sup>1</sup> to govern would be the focus of the main theme of political instability of Gulf region from the binocular of social mobility. Dissent has been a recurring phenomenon in the traditional Gulf monarchies - i.e. Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and UAE. Which reflects the traditional phase of rentier polity and in a way it reflects the character of rentier mentality.

Dissent in the rentier state is connected with rent distribution and the latter is difficult to subject to public political discourses. Power in a rentier state is almost naturally vested in an authoritarian ruler i.e. arbitrarily allowing

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<sup>1</sup> Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

for political graduation of economic reward. Differences in taxation structures have important implication for several aspects of economic policy and development and not just for the determination of total revenue. The authoritarian government may be able to impose sacrifices in the short run - because they can resort to repression, but if they fail to develop an equitable fiscal system, they only increase the need for more repression in the long run. Resort to deficit spending or manipulation of inflation is one way in which weak democracies or authoritarian govts; lacking the legitimization which would be needed to increase taxes and bring revenue in line with expenditure, try to avoid facing this problem.

Thesis of State Exhaustion<sup>2</sup> is another way to analyse the domestic dissent in the Persian Gulf countries. This exhaustion is not in terms of resources but in terms of governance. Otherwise "a rentier economy is thus an economy where the creation of wealth is centred around a small fraction of the society, the rest of the society is only engaged in the distribution and utilization of this wealth". The inherent discrepancy of the rentier polity in a way breeds dissent. Total lack of diversification of the economy and relative deprivation are the undercurrents of Persian Gulf countries.

After the great oil shock of 1973/74 Gulf has been facing major industrialization drive. Transition to market has two distinct phases. In the first phase, the state is expected to invite the market by creating a favourable

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<sup>2</sup> Philip S. Khoury, Islamic Revivalism and the Crisis of the Secular State in the Arab World: A Historical Appraisal in I. Ibrahim (ed.), Arab Resources: The Transformation of a Society, Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies, (London: Croom Helm, 1983)

regime. In the second phase market is supposed to replace the state from its absolute position.<sup>3</sup> The sudden rise in the price of oil thus led to an immediate change in the distribution of Arab GNP in favour of a small fraction of Arab population. The six states Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain, which in 1981 formed the Gulf Co-operative Council with less than 8 per cent of the Arab population increased their share of Arab GNP from 26 per cent in 1972 to 46 per cent in 1975.<sup>4</sup>

The following charts will show the patterns of structural changes in the Gulf.

**Table 2.1**  
**Economic Structure: Arab World Countries, 1975**  
**(Per cent of gross domestic product)**

Country	Agri.	Oil Mining	Manuf.	Distr.	Service	Const.	Non Oil GDP	Absorption
GCC Countries								
UAE	0.8	67.1	0.9	15.6	4.5	10.9	32.9	54.6
Bahrain	1.6	27.8	23.0	24.1	17.8	5.4	72.2	78.8
Saudi Arabia	1.0	75.8	5.3	5.6	6.9	5.5	24.8	37.5
Oman	2.8	67.2	0.3	11.1	8.5	9.8	32.8	83.1
Qatar	0.7	68.2	2.6	12.8	7.4	7.8	31.8	36.6
Kuwait	0.3	70.4	5.7	9.1	12.1	6.0	37.3	71.2
<b>AVERAGE</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>62.7</b>	<b>6.3</b>	<b>13.1</b>	<b>9.5</b>	<b>7.6</b>	<b>38.6</b>	<b>60.3</b>

Source: Adopted from Robert E. Looney, "Structural and Economic Change in the Arab Gulf after 1973", *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol.26, 1990.

<sup>3</sup> Girijesh Pant, The Arab Gulf Economics: From Crisis to Reform (New Delhi: Har Anand Publications, 1996).

<sup>4</sup> Abbas Alnasrawi, "The Arab Economies: Twenty Years of Change and Dependency", Arab Studies Quarterly, vol.9, no.4, p.367.

**Table 2.2**

**Economic Structure: Arab World Countries, 1980**  
**(Per cent of gross domestic product)**

Country	Agri.	Oil Mining	Manuf.	Distr.	Service	Const.	Non Oil GDP	Absorption
GCC Countries								
UAE	0.8	64.4	3.8	16.0	6.4	9.0	35.6	56.6
Bahrain	1.0	30.5	14.7	29.3	16.8	6.9	69.5	79.0
Saudi Arabia	1.2	61.8	5.0	9.9	10.3	11.2	38.2	67.3
Oman	2.5	62.0	0.8	17.7	10.1	5.7	37.9	74.7
Qatar	0.5	67.2	3.3	11.9	11.4	5.4	32.8	40.0
Kuwait	0.2	65.2	5.7	12.2	12.1	3.7	34.7	53.6
<b>AVERAGE</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>58.2</b>	<b>5.6</b>	<b>16.2</b>	<b>11.2</b>	<b>7.0</b>	<b>41.5</b>	<b>62.0</b>

Source: Adopted from Robert E. Looney, "Structural and Economic Change in the Arab Gulf after 1973", *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol.26, 1990.

**Table 2.3**

**Economic Structure: Arab World Countries, 1985**  
**(Per cent of gross domestic product)**

Country	Agri.	Oil Mining	Manuf.	Distr.	Service	Const.	Non Oil GDP	Absorption
GCC Countries								
UAE	1.4	45.3	9.3	22.3	13.1	8.9	54.7	72.0
Bahrain	1.1	18.1	11.3	35.3	23.1	9.6	81.9	96.8
Saudi Arabia	2.9	34.5	8.1	18.0	21.3	13.1	65.5	109.5
Oman	2.8	47.8	3.2	22.1	14.8	7.0	52.2	85.8
Qatar	1.0	43.2	7.1	16.2	25.7	6.1	56.8	59.3
Kuwait	0.5	50.2	6.2	17.0	19.7	3.4	49.8	100.6
<b>AVERAGE</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>39.9</b>	<b>7.5</b>	<b>21.8</b>	<b>19.6</b>	<b>8.0</b>	<b>60.2</b>	<b>87.3</b>

Source: Adopted from Robert E. Looney, "Structural and Economic Change in the Arab Gulf after 1973", *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol.26, 1990.

**Table 2.4**

**Structural Change in the Arab World : Industrial Diversification  
(factor sources)**

Country	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
<b>Gulf States</b>						
UAE	-0.75	-1.35	-1.26	-0.75	-0.45	-0.61
Bahrain	1.89	2.72	1.47	1.42	1.39	1.68
Saudi Arabia	1.20	0.93	0.64	0.23	-0.18	-0.20
Oman	-1.99	-1.64	-1.86	-1.99	-1.97	-1.73
Qatar	-0.96	0.12	-0.19	-0.67	-0.52	-0.28
Kuwait	0.64	0.09	0.46	0.78	0.78	1.87

Source: Adopted from Robert E. Looney, "Structural and Economic Change in the Arab Gulf after 1973", *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol.26, 1990.

Study of the tables reveals the following propositions:<sup>5</sup>

- a) The manufacturing sector along with agriculture has retained a more or less steady share of GDP.
- b) Share of the construction sector is constant.
- c) During the 1975-85 period the most significant structural shifts for the GCC countries as a group were towards the service sectors - (i) housing, (ii) government services, (iii) other services. During this period, the share of service activities increased from 9.5 per cent of GDP in 1975 to 11.2 in 1980 and 19.6 by 1985.

<sup>5</sup> Robert E. Looney, "Structure and Economic Change in the Arab Gulf After 1973", in *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol.26, 1990, p.515.

- d) The distribution sector (i) commerce, restaurants, and hotels, (ii) transportation, communication and storage, (iii) finance insurance and banking, experienced a similar pattern, with its share increasing from 13.1 per cent of GDP in 1975 to 16.2 in 1980 and 21.8 in 1985.
- e) Because of its fall in price and reduction in the rate of productions, the oil (here including mining) sector fell from 62.7 per cent of GDP in 1975 to 58.2 per cent in 1980 to 39.9 per cent by 1985.

The above mentioned economic analysis - what does it imply? Is there any link between privatization vis-a-vis industrialization and political dissent? It has been observed that dissident groups generally don't have economic demands but the undercurrents of the dissention is obviously economic. But not only economic reasons but other reasons are also important for the genesis of dissident movements in the home soil.

But the inward and outward nature of security and state system do not allow dissent at all. Dissent is not permitted in any form in Persian Gulf countries. So, whether dissent in Persian Gulf countries outway reaches to the stage of opposition i.e. direct confrontation to the government that is a big question. Some scholars<sup>6</sup> use the term dissent and opposition interchangeably. And henceforth classified the opposition in Gulf states. As a broad category they have classified opposition into a fourfold<sup>7</sup> categories.

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<sup>6</sup> Jean Leca, "Opposition in the Middle East and North Africa", Government and Opposition, vol.32, 1997, p.559.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p.559.




Opposition to the Ruler, which reflects the personal or factional opposition. **Opposition to policy**, which can be allowed to the extent that it is either non-political or non-public. **Opposition to the regime**, best example of the category is the Iraqi dissident. The main agenda is to change of regime and last **opposition to the state** which is qualitatively different and more important than opposition to the state.

Manifestation of various dissident groups suggests that the reasons behind the genesis of dissent is multi-dimensional and multi-directional. Rentier polity vis-a-vis rentier mentality provides the base for the genesis of dissent. But far from this economic analysis or deprivation socio-political or religio-political discourse reflects particularistic feature in the Persian Gulf countries. The present form of dissent shows that the question of political Islam plays a very important role.

Religion and politics interplay in many different ways in the Persian Gulf countries.<sup>8</sup> Religionwise Persian Gulf countries are all Muslim countries. And here the role of Islam is pervasive. In the whole state affairs and that too from executive to judiciary there is imprint of political Islam. Though in some countries formal constitution is there; but the working principle of the constitution is Sharia'. All the principles to govern the state are based on Sharia' and judiciary system is also based on Sharia'. And contrary to general conception Islam is not manifested here in a monolithic way.


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<sup>8</sup> Ibrahim A. Karawan, "The Islamist Impasse", Adelphi Paper 314, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1997.




Map 1 : Persian Gulf States





Map 2 : Persian Gulf States and Neighbours




Map 3 : Smaller Gulf States

So, the different version or different interpretation of Islam is causing dissent in Persian Gulf society. The general form of dissent in that region. What has been seen is that dissent is based on political Islam, i.e. the main agenda of some groups are more and more Islamic from of government and they are dissenting against the reform of the political system. The main point of objection of all the groups is that by accepting the reform programme - they are deviating from the Islamic path. So, the main currents of dissent in the Persian Gulf countries has been manifested through the Islamic way.

But it cannot be assumed that there are only demand for more Islamic state in their agenda. Some groups are also asking for more freedom and other human rights. As in Persian Gulf countries, the demonstration and political activity and political participation are not allowed, so they sometimes take the Islamic form. Most of the Persian Gulf countries it can be seen that the one important agenda of political dissent is the demand for Majlis-Ash-Shura i.e. more representation in the constitutional body. There are also demand for election along with this demand. But the immaturity of the political system or the low level of institutionalisation do not fulfil their demands. Dissent is growing up in the following line. And it is wiser to discuss individual Gulf Countries, as each country is different from other country - be it a political, cultural, ethnic or religious difference.

### **Saudi Arabia**

Saudi Arabia falls into the category of major powers in the Persian Gulf countries. Political instability caused by the dissent inside the country owes to



**Map 4 : Saudi Arabia**

the various factors. Different components from the economic factors to socio-cultural vis-a-vis religious factors and above all political dimensions cause the emergence of dissent in this area. The recent debate of the stability vs. destabilization indicates the existence and directions of the dissident movements.

Saudi Arabia has the distinct advantage of being a surplus capital society.<sup>9</sup> The rentier economy of the Saudi Arabia provides only allocation activities not production. In the absence of production, distributive justice takes a low profile in the political map of the country. The changing nature of the distributive system and extraction instead of production in a way contains the seeds of comparative deprivation. This comparative deprivation leads to dissent in a broad way, which can be cleared from the following ground realities.

In 1986, Saudi Arabia experienced a highly fluctuating oil markets sharp decline of oil prices from \$28 barrel in January 1986 to a low of \$8 indicated the serious dilemmas of Saudi Arabian economic system.<sup>10</sup> The direct connection between decline of oil price and budget allocations indicates the hard decisions of the government. Announcement of the deficit of SR 52,700 million (\$14,055 million) proves that assumption which caused the cut in public development project.

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<sup>9</sup> Bernard Schechterman, "Political Instability in Saudi Arabia and its Implication", Middle East Review, vol.14, 1981, p.22.

<sup>10</sup> Robert E. Looney, "Saudi Arabian Budgetary Dilemmas", Middle Eastern Studies, vol.26, 1990, p.76.

**Table 2.5****Saudi Arabia : Actual Revenue and Expenditure  
(Billion Riyals)**

	<b>1982</b>	<b>1983</b>	<b>1984</b>	<b>1985</b>	<b>1986</b>
Total Revenue	386.0	246.2	206.4	171.5	131.5
Oil Revenue	328.6	186.0	145.1	121.3	87.7
Other Revenue	39.4	60.2	61.3	50.2	43.8
Total Expenditure	236.6	244.9	230.2	216.4	181.5

	<b>Rate of Growth 1982-86</b>	<b>Rate of Growth 1986</b>
Agriculture	12.2%	13.0%
Mining	-4.4%	-3.3%
Non-oil manufacturing	4.0%	-9.8%
Construction	-12.6%	-20.0%
Wholesale and Retail Trader	-0.5%	-11.7%
Transport and Communication	1.4%	-11.8%
Ownership and Dwellings	-3.5%	-10.0%
Finance	-5.2	-15.7%
Services	0.0%	-3.9%

**Source:** Robert E. Looney, "Saudi Arabian Budgetary Dilemmas", Middle Eastern Studies, vol.26, 1990.

Analysis of the government's expenditure shows gross domestic product (GDP) was more than 24 percent lower in 1986 than in 1982 when

national production was at its highest.<sup>11</sup> So, the dilemma in budgetary level and downward trend of GDP, in a way reveals the polemics of Saudi Arabia's economy and politics. In every society the inherent factor behind any kind of dissent or opposition to the political system stands for the economic components of the political process and Saudi Arabia is no exception of it. Taking the base of the Saudi Arabia economy as a parameter, dissident movements can be discussed in different perspectives.

Before discussing the Saudi Arabia's dissent, it is necessary to have a look into the tribes of the Saudi Arabia which reveals the ethnic pattern of Saudi Arabia and are responsible for the undercurrents of opposition. Among many tribal groups following are very important. Shammar, Dhafir, Awazim Harb, Mutair, Ajman, Bani Khalid, the Al-Murra. Earlier Shammar tribe was very powerful tribe. Dhafir tribe faces continues intra-tribal conflict Awazim tribe lives in the Saudi-Arabian Kuwait neutral zone. Ajman was originally part of the Yam tribe. And Al-Murra is one of the most powerful tribe in Saudi Arabia.<sup>12</sup>


On the surface there are the Shia-Sunni conflicts and the confrontation with alien populations are there. In Saudi Arabia Shiites constitute only 5 percent of the population.<sup>13</sup> They are the most deprived section of the society and they also suffer from religious discrimination because the Sunni Wahhabi

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p.77.

<sup>12</sup> Alvin J. Cottrell, The Persian Gulf States: A General Survey (London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).

<sup>13</sup> L.G. Martin, Unstable Gulf, (Washington D.C.: D.C. Heath and Company), p.83.



**Map 5 : Tribes of Saudi Arabia**



religious readers is of the view that Shiites have been practicing 'misguided religious rites'.<sup>14</sup>

To analyse the dissent in religious sphere in Saudi Arabia, the explanation of religious sub-sects is very important. And R. Hrair Dekmejian rightly observed: "although the employment of revivalist Islam as a protest movement against secular state authority has become a pervasive pattern in contemporary Arab politics, in the Saudi case the Islamist protest is directed against an avowedly Islamic state. Thus, Islam has become, once again, a two-edged political instrument - as the Kingdom's primary medium of self-legitimation, and as the main venue of protest for opposition elements".<sup>15</sup>

The rise of political Islam is a recent phenomenon. But way back into the first half of the 20th century it can be found the opposition from different sects of religion on different strata of religious elites. The Wahhabi doctrine was derived from the Hanbali school of sunni Islam. It was first preached in Najd in Central Arabia in the 1740s by a native Muslim school, Muhammad Ibn Abd al Wahhab.<sup>16</sup> In Saudi Arabia 90 percent people are from Wahabi sect. Wahhabi preachers are known as Mutawwi'ah. The reinforcement of Wahhabi sect was first found in the early 20th century. The then leader Ibn Saud's

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<sup>14</sup> Tim Niblock (ed.), State, Society and Economy in Saudi Arabia, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), p.118.

<sup>15</sup> R. Hrair Dekmejian, "The Rise of Political Islamism in Saudi Arabia", Middle East Journal, vol.48, no.4, Autumn 1994, p.627.

<sup>16</sup> Joseph Nevo, "Religion and National Identity in Saudi Arabia", Middle East Studies, vol.34, no.3, July 1998, p.36.

ambition was to demolish tribal power and strengthen his own position.<sup>17</sup> To fulfil his ambition he took the step of administrative reform. The most important was the settlement of Ikhwan. It is a kind of 'religio-military encampment', with a daily four point programme of prayer, study of religion, cultivation of land and military training.<sup>18</sup> It was a sort of military army. But the first major challenge came from this section. "The first serious rebellion occurred in 1929 when the Ikhwan leaders, Faisal-al Dawaish and Sultan bin Humaid libn Bijad jointly challenged Ibn Saud's leaderships". Main objective of this old Ikhwan movement was to continue jihad or holy war against the infidels.

In 1929 Ibn Saud was successful to quell the old-Ikhwan movement. but again religious opposition resurfaced with full action. On November 20, 1979 a group of fundamentalist seized the Grand Mosque of Mecca and denounced the Saudi regime. this group was known as the neo-Ikhwan. Leader of the group was Juhaiman al-Utaiby. Objective of this group was to reconstruct an Islamic society in the model of seventh century Arabia. It was an Islamic uprising<sup>19</sup> where muslim rebels protested against the degeneration of the Saudi rulers.

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
<sup>17</sup> M.R.K. Nadwi and Ishtiyagne Danish, "Religion and Socio-Political Change in Saudi Arabia", Journal of West Asian Studies, no.12, 1998, pp.17-18.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Ayman Al-Yassini, Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985), p.123.

Table 2.6

Saudi Arabia: Genealogy of the Al Saud



Another important group from the religious opposition was **Organization of the Islamic Revolution**. It has a direct link with Iran and it represents the Shii' interests in Saudi Arabia. Khomeini was their ideological leader. They were against the Saudi regime because "they use the cover of religion to legitimate their otherwise unIslamic rule".<sup>20</sup> Their objectives were broad based from democracy to economy to fight against imperialism, which is

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

very obvious in their own words: Followings are the most important objectives.

OIR demanded:-

- 1) We deplore the dictatorship of Al Saud and demand that an Islamic constitution be introduced to secure democracy and progress for people.
- 2) Our Muslim people in the Arabian Peninsula are one people, regardless of sect, condemning the regime's sectarian policy of inciting Sunnis against Shi'tes.
- 3) We demand social justice to end mass poverty.
- 4) We demand the abolition of all treaties signed with the United States.

From 1950s dissent has started showing its mark. Dissent inside the ruling family came to the forefront in 1960. Prince Talal Ibn Abdel Aziz started demanding constitutional reform and slowly pressure of constitutional reform was growing up. To reinforce his position in the state, King Saud took some measures which resulted prince Talal to take shelter in Egypt.<sup>21</sup> Though in 1964, Prince returned to Saudi Arabia,<sup>22</sup> but that time his political death was already occurred.

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<sup>21</sup> Helen Lackner, A House Built on Sand: A Political Economy of Saudi Arabia (London: Ithaca Press, 1978).

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

Political opposition to the Saudi system and its King is not permitted, still it can be categorized the following opposition to the House of Saud:-

- 1) Undercurrents of grievances are flowing in a large number of merchant families who are suffered due to fall in recession.
- 2) Middle class entrepreneur are suffered losses in the business of trading.
- 3) The technocrats and urbanized elements of the military and paramilitary forces are dissatisfied for the mismanagement of Saudi defence budget and they too are demanding political reforms.
- 4) Because of the abroad-based education system, Saudi middle class abroad returned students are highly dissatisfied with their middle level or lower level job.

Economic grievances or so to say specifically the labour protest movement was found in Saudi Arabia in 1953 and 1956, when ARAMCO workers was protesting against "Labour and Workmen Regulations Act" of October 1947<sup>23</sup> and used the weapon of strike unknown in the Persian Gulf countries. And most surprisingly they got success also, with ARAMCO introducing the following reforms<sup>24</sup>:-

- 1) "a housing programme for workers;
- 2) an increase in the minimum daily wages;
- 3) improvement of promotion policies;

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<sup>23</sup> Alyman Al-Yassini, p.117.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p.118.

- 4) restoration of food and clothing subsidies;
- 5) construction of the first school of the worker's children;
- 6) shortening of the work week;
- 7) a communication committee which was established as a channel between workers and management."

The success of the 1953 strike resulted in the formation of **Workers' Committee**.

Another cluster of the political society which shows dissent, is military. Though some scholars<sup>25</sup> argue Saudi Arabia has never experienced a serious challenges from military, still we found there was coup attempt in 1969. It was reported that was attributed to the **Movement of Arab Nationalist**<sup>26</sup> same year, another coup attempt was foiled. Leader of that coup was Ahmad Tawil alongwith Ali Zein Abdine, Abdullah Aysi.<sup>27</sup> After these two coup attempts Saudi government started taking too much repressive measures to uproot the opposition. In a way Saudi government is successful and virtually they have stopped any kind of movement in the home soil.

Still in recent years some movement are found with the help of outside powers. In Saudi Arabia's Najran area Yam tribe uprising caused a real concern for the Saudi government. They defied the government and carried out a storming operation. 'The state cannot enter that region, which is under the

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<sup>25</sup> Quandt, op.cit.

<sup>26</sup> Helen Lackner, op.cit., p.107.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

full control of Yam tribe".<sup>28</sup> They were able to gather support from other strong tribes and obviously neighbouring state. In recent time this movement is a landmark of Saudi opposition movement. It has reached such a point that Saudi interior minister prince Nayif has started negotiation with the Yam tribe, putting a different condition i.e. surrender of 400 fighters in exchange of release of elderly tribesmen. As the offer was turned down, the state started taking too much repressive measures i.e. a purge of civil employees and military men belonging to the Yam tribe. In spite of knowing Yemeni influence over Yam tribe Saudi government prefers to underestimate their influence and started negotiating with Yemen on international land and maritime border at the official level.<sup>29</sup>

So, to conclude the Saudi dissident movements inside the country - the applicability of the stability thesis shows if stability means both the absence of change and predictability - in that measurement Saudi Arabia appears to be a poor candidate for stability. 'Change will certainly continue, no doubt with some surprising consequences, and Saudi policies will not be fully predictable'.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> "Tension Continues in Najran, Opposition says", BBC. SWB ME/3867, 15 June, 2000. Text of report by Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia MIRA web site on 13 June 2000.

<sup>29</sup> "Saudi Arabia, Yemen issue joint communique at the end of Salih's visit", BBC. SWB. Third Series ME/3866, 14 June, 2000.

<sup>30</sup> William B. Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: Foreign Policy, Security and Oil (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981), p.104.

## Kuwait

In Kuwait dissention comes out within the system itself. 50 per cent of the Kuwaiti population and 70 per cent of the work force are aliens or migrated labourers.<sup>31</sup> Among aliens Palestinians, Jordanians and Egyptians play the most important role. Nature of Kuwaiti aliens can be cleared in the following chart.

**Table 2.7**

**Kuwait: Migrant Population by Country or Area of Origin,  
1965, 1970, and 1975**

Country or area of origin	1965		1970		1975	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Jordan and Palestine	77,710	31.4	147,700	37.7	204,180	39.0
Egypt	11,020	4.4	30,420	7.8	60,530	11.6
Iraq	25,900	10.5	39,070	10.0	45,070	8.6
Syrian Arab Republic	16,850	6.8	27,220	6.9	40,960	7.8
Lebanon	20,880	8.4	25,390	6.5	24,780	4.7
Saudi Arabia	4,630	1.9	10,900	2.8	12,530	2.4
Democratic Yemen	2,640	1.1	8,600	2.2	12,330	2.4
Oman	19,580	7.9	14,670	3.7	7,310	1.4
Yemen	140	0.1	2,360	0.6	4,830	0.9
Arab Gulf	2,010	0.8	5,520	1.4	4,060	0.8
Sudan	420	0.2	770	0.2	1,550	0.3
Other	6,140	2.5	230	0.1	1,060	0.2
Arab countries	187,920	76.0	312,850	79.9	419,190	80.1
Iran	30,790	12.4	39,130	10.0	40,840	7.8
India	11,700	4.7	17,340	4.4	32,100	6.1
Pakistan	11,740	4.7	14,710	3.8	23,020	4.4
Other	5,130	2.1	7,240	1.8	7,600	1.4
Non-Arab countries	59,360	24.0	78,420	20.0	103,560	19.8
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>247,280</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>391,270</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>522,750</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Birks and Sinclair, *International Migration and Development in the Arab Region* (Geneva: ILO, 1980), p.149.

<sup>31</sup> Middle East Economic Digest (MEED), June 3, 1983.



These aliens create tremendous political and economic pressure on the Kuwaiti government. They act as a pressure group in the system and their charter of demands always show their interest. One of the most important demands of the demand of naturalization and demand for more land and more political rights. Among all the aliens Palestinians are the most active group. And it has been reported that "in 1976 the regime dissolved the National Assembly in the face of mounting protests, particularly by Palestinians, against the regimes ambivalent foreign policy in the Lebanese Civil War of 1975-76 and Egypt's disengagement agreement with Israel in September 1975".<sup>32</sup>

Other than this alien politics social groupings also cause the dissention among the Kuwaiti society. The transformations have polarized Kuwaiti society along certain traditional divides: e.g. city vs. desert, Shiite vs. Sunni; old money vs. new money; men vs. women.<sup>33</sup> Some broad categories of classes show the dynamic change of the Kuwait. Though in Kuwait student unrest or protest movement has been not been reported so far - but some authors realized the possibility of threat it can pose in the society - so students progress can be described as "a crisis in the making".

Let alone Shiite group, which is know to create dissention among almost all the Gulf countries. They also migrated from Arabian peninsula and

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<sup>32</sup> L.G. Martin, Unstable Gulf, p.95.

<sup>33</sup> Shafeeq Ghabra, "Kuwaiti and dynamics of socio-economic change" in Middle East Journal, vol.51, no.3, Summer 1997.

Iran.<sup>34</sup> So, Iranian influence was very much there among the Kuwaiti Shiites. Iranian revolution created "a wave of religious revivalism". With the inspiration of Iranian revolution seven groups have been formed. Among them **Islamic National Alliance (INA)** was formed in 1992. It has a roots in al-Jamiyya al-Thaqafiyya, a cultural organization.<sup>35</sup> Though later they were involved in subversive activities, but it has expressed its commitment towards peaceful opposition. And it believed in parliamentary democracy and ready to perform its function as a opposition party with two members in parliament. Sunni groups are also no far behind. Two Sunni Islamist political groups have emerged in Kuwait since 1992. The Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM) has its roots in the Muslim brothers in Kuwait and in al-Islah al-Iytimaii (Social Reform) is also gaining importance. The Islamic Popular Alliance or al-Salah (Ancestral), has its roots in the Jamiyyat Ihya'al Turath (Society for the Revival of Islamic Tradition).<sup>36</sup>

In Kuwait we can see the fierce battle between opposition and government. Though recently Kuwaiti parliament has rejected the voting right to women and obviously its a shameful act in modern democracy. In spite of everything article six of the 1962 Kuwaiti constitution states "The system of government in Kuwait shall be democratic under which sovereignty resides in

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<sup>34</sup> James Bill, "Resurgent Islam in the Persian Gulf", in Foreign Affairs, vol.63, no.1, Fall 1984.

<sup>35</sup> Shafeeq Ghabra, "Kuwaiti and dynamics of socio-economic change" in Middle East Journal, vol.51, no.3, Summer 1997.

<sup>36</sup> Shafeeq Ghabra, "Democratization in Kuwait 1993", in Middle East Policy, vol.111, no.1, 1994.

the people, the source of all powers". This touch of democracy we can find in the recent attempt to open up the political system.

In 1963, the government allowed the formation of voluntary associational groups. Earlier all these groups were banned. After that Kuwaiti political society has been the mushrooming of voluntary associational groups. Some groups changed their earlier names and mingled with the political system. The Teachers Club was renamed as the Society of Kuwaiti Teachers. Merchants established a Chamber of Commerce. The establishment of the Women's Cultural and Social Society (al-Jamiyya al-Thaqafiyya al-Iytima'iyya al-Nisa'yya and Labour Federation were among the many tendencies of Kuwaiti opposition.<sup>37</sup>

**Kuwaiti Democratic Forum (KDF)** is the main political opposition. This organization is comprised of Arab Nationalists, Nasserists and Leftists. During Iraq-Kuwaiti war its role has been criticised severely. As KDF has connections with Palestinians, likewise **Islamic Constitutional Movement** is also linked with Muslim Brotherhood along with the link to the Pan-Islamic Social Reform Society. As this group's activity reminds us with the much used preposition - "the opposition in Kuwait has never challenged the system of government but has merely called for the Al-Sabah family to strictly and sincerely adhere to the 1962 constitution".<sup>38</sup> Islamic Popular Alliance is linked to the Heritage Society

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<sup>37</sup> Shafeeq Ghabra, "Voluntary Association in Kuwait: The Foundation of a New System?", in Middle East Journal, vol.45, 1991.

<sup>38</sup> A.K. Pasha, Kuwait Strategies of Survival, (New Delhi: Har Anand Publication, 1995), p.237.

with a religious bent of mind and demand for the implementation of Sharia'. The constitution block is the organization of merchant families in Kuwait. Leader of this organization is Jassem Abdel Aziz al-Saqr. Another group i.e. Parliamentary group under the leadership of National Assembly speaker Ahmed Al-Saadoun takes part in parliamentary democracy. it was formed after the 1986 dissolution of Assembly. Among other constitutionalist **Democratic Forum (DF)** is important. Leader of this party is Dr. Khateeb. Main objective of the Democratic Forum is "the Emirates of the Sabah and power to the people".<sup>39</sup> Other than this independents also show interests in the opposition politics many consists of Kuwaiti intelligentsia. Leading figure of this organization is Mr. Hamad al Jouan.

As already mentioned student organization has also gained importance specially during the time of repression. When the Independence Club of the Arab Nationalist forces was closed by government decree in 1976, then that vacuum was filled by the Graduate Society. This society was formed in 1964 and by nature in a social organization. After the victory of National Union of Kuwaiti students, efforts were there to politicize the Graduates Society. They elected a politically active board and in 1971, organized the second International Conference on Palestine. Political party is banned in Kuwait, but trade Union movements also show their maturity. The Kuwaiti Trade Union Federation has divided into two major groups: the oil and Petrochemical Industries' Workers and Trade Union Federation of Government Sector

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid., p.243.

Workers<sup>40</sup> experience in the Gulf societies and it is very clear in the words of Hasan al-Uha, a founder of the Kuwaiti Trade Union Movement - "The Islamic forces are new to the traditions of the labour movements. They cannot fight the campaign for labour rights throughout the end. Large sectors of the Islamic movement have commercial and financial interests deep within the middle and higher classes that restrict their appeal to the majority of the work force".<sup>41</sup>

Discussion of the Kuwait opposition cannot be completed without the mention of the Social Reform Society. it was formed in 1962 and known to have direct connections with Muslim Brotherhood. Though it has been reported that Kuwait chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood is an existing organization. Ismail al-Shatti is one of the leader of the Social Reform Society. The ideological position of the Social Reform Society was infused by Islamic Revivalism. Earlier i.e. during 1950s and 1960s. Islamic revivalism was not in a position to pose a threat to the system. It is a well organized group with one weekly magazine, 'al-Mujtama' and its distributes its activities through several committees to promote cultural education, Qaranic studies and other philanthropic activities.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Shafeeq Ghabra, "Voluntary Association in Kuwait: The Foundation of a New System?", in Middle East Journal, vol.45, 1991.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

After Gulf war Kuwaiti was very active politically. Virtually all Kuwaiti organised political groups united in rejecting the new cabinet<sup>43</sup> they were demanding a timetable for election for the dissolved parliament. And before that also they were demanding the restoration of the Old National Assembly, suspended by Amir in 1986.<sup>44</sup> Apart from that Kuwaiti authority continues to torture aliens in Kuwait e.g. "even Palestinian not physically or administratively compelled to leave Kuwait realise they have no future there as the post war terror inflicted on their community underlined".<sup>45</sup> Though Shaikh Saad Abdullah told that "policeman and soldiers, who were kidnapping non-Kuwaitis had to be stopped; that the population was living in terror of a crime wave and that the Kuwait's international image was being damaged by the coverage of the treatment of expatriate population".<sup>46</sup>

## **Oman**

The first notified dissent against the authority was an uprising led by Talib Ali in 1957. This organization is known as Oman Revolutionary Movement. Leaders of this movement are Ghalib, Sulaiman b. Himyar, and Sulaiman b. al-Hirhi. Though they used to get support from Saudi Arabia, but the main aim of this group was to restore the imamate in Oman. Heavy


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<sup>43</sup> "Kuwait: Holding Operation - Opposition Unreconciled", Middle East International, 3 May 1991, no.399.

<sup>44</sup> Shireen T. Hunter, "The Barriers to Democracy in the Middle East", Middle East International, 13 September 1991, no.408.

<sup>45</sup> "Kuwait: Looking for Protectors: The Flight of the Palestinian", Middle East International, 30 August 1991, no.407, p.9.

<sup>46</sup> "Kuwait: Deteriorating Image", Middle East International, 31 May 1991, no.4, p.12.



Map 6 : Oman and its Neighbours

fighting was took place between ORM and Sultan's force. ORM was strong enough to resist Sultan's oppression with Saudi-supplied US arms and mines. So, to quell this revolt Sultan asked help from British and with the help of Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF) and outside help they put down the revolt.

The second echoes of political discontent was heard in the southern province of Dhofar in 1963.<sup>47</sup> It has been reported that Dhofar insurgency has of Marxist nature. It had direct link with Yemen. And it can be called domino effect of civil war in Yemen in 1963. After that Dhofar Liberation Movement began to gather strength<sup>48</sup> "Between 1965 and 1971 the movement developed on the basis of the classic communist theory of class struggle. The struggle in Dhofar was described as peasant struggle".<sup>49</sup> Behind the Dhofar rebellion basic reason was deprivation and total lack of distributive justice.

But before that should analyse the ethnic composition of this country. It shows "an incredible ethnic diversity". Oman originally exhibits tribal culture and there tribes are numerous though majority position holds Arabs. Other notified minority groups are Shihuh in Ru'us al-Jibal, Indians and Balcuhis in Muscat, Jiblis in Dhofar.<sup>50</sup> The largest component of the Shihuh divided between the Bani Hadiya and Bani Shatair tribes. A second component is the Dhahriyin. Another tribe of the Ru'us al-Jibal is Kumazarah. Shihuhs are Sunni

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
<sup>47</sup> B.K. Narayan, Oman and Gulf Security, (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1979) p.81.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., p.82.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p.84.

<sup>50</sup> Calvin H. Allen (Jr.), Oman: The Modernization of the Sultanate, (London: Westview Press) p.7.





Map 7 : Dhofar

but they practice animism. Among other prominent groups are Bayarira. Zatutis there are also religious sect division Bahamahs are Shiite community whereas Sonaras are Sunni Muslims of the Barra caste from India. "And in Dhofar most of the people are Arab, although Sunni rather than Ibadi".


As Oman ethnic composition reflects diversification. So Sultan were very prone to face opposition from religious and tribal group. The real situation has been expressed in the following words, "Religious opposition is yet another cause for concern. Throughout its 240 year history, the Al-Said regime has been at odds with the Omani tradition of an elected imamate. During the early years of Qaboos' reign religious opposition was occasionally expressed, symbolically at least, by the flying of the white banner of the imamate over his new mosque in Nizwa or the ruins of Tanuf, a stronger hold of imamate support during the 1957-1959 restoration movement. The popularity of Qaboos and the supposed diminishing of tribal allegiance and authority argued against any religious challenge to the regime, though. The Sultan was also very supportive of religion to deflect any potential criticism from that direction".

From this religious and ethnic bisection, it has been noticed that Dhofar people they are little bit different from other Omanis. Virtually, there is not racial, national or tribal bond between mot Dhofaris and most Omanis.<sup>51</sup> So, the Dhofar rebellion sprouted its head with direct support (ideological and financial) of PDRY. So, this insurgency took time to die down. In spite of the

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<sup>51</sup> John Townsend, Oman: The Making of a Modern State, (London: Croom Helm, 1977).

**Table 2.8**  
**Oman : Al-Sa'id Royal Family**



fact that Sultan took harsh measures to put down the rebellion and took international support of Iran, Jordan and Britain.

## **Bahrain**

The source of political instability comes from the renaissance of militant Shiism inspired by the Iranian revolution.<sup>52</sup> Reason behind this, too much inspiration of Iran is there in Bahrain, 60 per cent of the Muslims are Shiias, but the ruling family is Sunni. And among Shiite group, 20 per cent are of Iranian origin.<sup>53</sup> Christian and Jewish groups are there along with 1.5 lakh Indians. "Among Bahrainis there are Sunni tribal origins, Sunni non-tribal, Sunni 'Hawala' or emigres from the Persian coast, Sunni of African descent, Shii Arabs and Shii of Persian origin". Dissention was there along the ethnic line.

But unlike other Gulf countries, role of labour is very important in Bahrain. In Bahrain only we can see the seeds of trade union movement that is so far unprecedented in the lesser actors of Gulf states. Bahrain has been showing long tradition of protest movements. And there has been attempt to categorize the Bahraini movements on the part of West Asian scholars. Democratic movement in Bahrain can be categorized into six phases. The categorization<sup>54</sup> are in the following:-

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<sup>52</sup> Ian Richard Netton, Arabia and the Gulf: From Traditional Society to Modern State, (London: Croom Helm, 1986) p.186.

<sup>53</sup> A.K. Pasha, Aspects of Political Participation in the Gulf States, (Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 1999) p.18.

<sup>54</sup> Gary G. Sick and Lawrence G. Potter (ed.), The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essays in Politics, Economy, Security and Religion, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997).

- a) Administrative Reforms (1919-20).
- b) The Growth of Political Awareness (1938-52).
- c) The Popular Uprising (1953-56).
- d) The Uprising of March 1965.
- e) The first National Assembly (1972-75)
- f) The Shura Council (1992).

Among the above mentioned phases, politically most vibrant phase was 1953-56. But long before that industrial labour movement began in 1932 and first labour strike "indeed in the entire Gulf" occurred in 1938. 1953 uprising began by clashes between the Sunni and Shiia population. This group was known as "The Network" (Khuri). They started taking initiative to form new political organizations and demanded establishment of an elected parliament. Throughout these years course of political interaction was on totally unfamiliar in the history of Gulf but "organized mass meeting with workers demanding popular participation in government and recognition of the right to unionize" were the regular features of the political system.

The most important organization of Bahrain during that time was **Committee of National Union**.<sup>55</sup> Earlier known as Higher Executive Committee. It came into being on 13 October 1954 and was active till 6 November 1956. Their demands of charter were mostly labour related issues and to get more and more recognition from government. And their demands

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<sup>55</sup> Emile A. Nalakh, Bahrain: Political Developpment in a Modernizing Society, (Mount Saint Mary College, Lexicon Book D.C. Heath and Company, 1976) p.78.

were partially fulfilled also, when in April 1955 Bahraini government formed a tripartite Law Ordinance Advisory Committee. this body was an elected body with 120 members and eight member executive council.

In the absence of political parties - the clubs and societies have played the essential function performed by political parties in other political system.<sup>56</sup> During 1972 some groups emerged and performed the role of political parties.

**Table 2.9**  
**Bahrain: Clubs and Associations 1967-71**

Type of Club	1967	1968	1979	1970	1971
Literary and Cultural	13	13	15	16	18
Sports and Cultural	61	65	68	63	69
Women's welfare societies	2	2	2	5 <sup>a</sup>	5 <sup>a</sup>
Music clubs	3	3	3	6	2
	79	83	88	90	94

**Source:** Adopted from Emile A. Nalakh, Bahrain: Political Development in a Modernizing Society (USA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1976).

Among them The People's Bloc, The Religious Bloc and The Independent Middle are important. To analyse these groups' activities' ideal the diversification of Bahraini political societies can be observed. Religious Bloc was a Shii dominated group in favour of rural population, whereas the People's Bloc was "comprised of the socialists, the Communists and various Arab nationalist movements including the Popular Front for the Liberation of Gulf and Oman".

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., p.41.

**Table 2.10****Bahrain : A Sample of the Clubs and Societies**

<b>Men's Club</b>	<b>Location</b>
Ahli Club	Manama
'Arabi Club	Manama
'Asifa Club	Manama
Bahrain Club	Manama
Firdawsi Club	Manama
Islah Club	Manama
Ittifaq Club	Manama
Ittihad Club	Manama
Jaza'r Club	Manama
Jufair Club	Jufair, Manama
Lulu Club	Manama
Na'im Club	Manama
Nil Club	Manama
Nusur Club	Manama
Oudabiyya Club	Manama
Shu'a Club	Manama
Shuruq Club	Manama
Taj Club	Manama
Tirsana Club	Manama
Umm al-Hasam Club	Manama
'Uruba Club	Manama
Watani Club	Manama
Wila' Club	Manama
Yarmuq Club	Manama
Yaqatha Club	Manama
Basatin Club	Muharraq
Dayr Club	Dayr, Muharraq
Hala Club	Muharraq
Jazira Club <sup>a</sup>	Muharraq

Jil Club	Muharraq
Khalij Club	Muharraq
Muharraq Cultural Club	Muharraq
Murrikh Club	Muharraq
Nahj Club	Muharraq
Nasr Club	Muharraq
Qalali Club	Qalali, Muharraq
Shat al-'Arab Club	Muharraq
Shu'lat al-Shabab Club	Muharraq
Ta'aruf Club	Muharraq
Taqaddum Club	Muharraq
East Rifa' Club	Rifa'
West Rifa' Club	Rifa'
'Ali Club	'Ali
Barbar Club	Barbar
Budaya' Club	Budaya
Dayh club	Dayh
Daraz Club	Daraz
Daraz Sa'iqā Club	Darz
Dar Kulayb Club	Dar Kulayb
Hidaya Club	Samahij
Hidd Nahdha Club	Hidd
Intaj al-Rif Club	Jidhafs
Irshad Club	Bani Jamra
'Isa Town Club	'Isa Town
Ittihad al-Rif Club	Shaharakkan
Jidhafs Club	Jidhafs
Karzakkan Club	Karzakkan
Khamis Club	Khamis
Ma'amir club	Ma'amir
Malkiyya Club	Malkiyya
Nabi Salih Club	Jazira



Nuwaydrat Club	Nuwaydrat
Safa' Club	Dayh
Samahij Club	Samahij
Sanabis Club	Sanabis
Shabab al-Daraz Club	Daraz
Sitra Club	Sitra
Tbli Club	Tubli
Zallaq Club	Zallaq
<i>Women's Societies<sup>b</sup></i>	
Jam'iyat Awal al-Nisa'iyya	Muharraq
Jam'iyat Nahdat Fatat al-Bahrain	Manama
Jam'iyat al-Rifa' al-Nisa'iyya	Rifa'
Jam'iyat Ri'ayat al-Tifl wa al-'Umuma	Manama
<i>Mixed Societies</i>	
Jam'iyat al-Hilal al-Ahmar (Red Crescent Society)	Manama
'Usrat al-'Udaba' wa al-Kuttab fi al-Bahrain (Society of Writers)	Manama

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Source: Adopted from Emile A. Nalakh, Bahrain: Political Development in a Modernizing Society (USA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1976).

Presently - three main opposition groups<sup>57</sup> are notified. These are the followings:

- (i) Bahrain Islamic Freedom Movement [Harakat Ahrar al-Bahrain al-Islamiyah] - This group was formed by a former member of parliament and a member of 'Religion Bloc', Sheikh Abd al-Amir al-Jamri. This organization is rural based and Shiite dominated. And its has been reported that their organization is not very organized.

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<sup>57</sup> Gary G. Sick and Lawrence G. Potter (ed.), The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essays in Politics, Economy, Security and Religion, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997) p.179.

(ii) The National Liberation Front [Jabhat al-Tahrir al-Wataniyah] - This movement was ideologically leaned towards Marxism. Composition of this opposition is ideological. This group comprised of Marxists, Socialists and Arab Nationalists. But government took too much repressive measures to crush them. And partially government was successful to destroy their power have in home soil. Main objective of this group is the restoration of democracy in Bahrain.

(iii) The Popular Front for the Liberation of Bahrain [Al Jabha al-Sha'abiya kli-Tahir at-Bahrain] - This movement emerged out in 1971 out of the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Arabian Gulf which was formed in 1968. Initially it has wide mass base among workers, students and intellectuals. To crush this group government took harsh measures. Their main objective is the restoration of democracy. "At present the two secular movements are in the process of merging to form one strong movement calling for reforms and restoration of democracy".<sup>58</sup>

At present the wave of anti-government protests swept Bahrain which led to the harshest crackdown since independence.<sup>59</sup> Opposition claimed the demonstrations were "an expression of popular anger at Bahrain's deteriorating economic conditions specially growing unemployment".<sup>60</sup> This

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid., p.180.

<sup>59</sup> Najm Jarrah, "Bahrain and the GCC: Sounding the Alarm", Middle East International, 6 January 1995, London, p.12.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

movement spread from mosque in Manama to Shiite villages to the west and to the University.

## **Qatar**

Qatar is one of the small countries in Gulf region. An analysis of the political system reveals that there are no political parties in Qatar and the political culture is also very low. 'The only political authority with which they have had experience until the 1950s was the central figure of the ruler'.<sup>61</sup> Tribal loyalty towards the ruling family is deep rooted in Qatar. And also Explanatory Memorandum of the constitution clearly says that ruler should be vested with authorities and power because the ruler is elected by consensus in accordance with the procedure of the Sharia' law and it demanded 'absolute obedience to the Ruler in the fear of God'.<sup>62</sup>

That was the general political situation in Qatar year after year; and this situation was expressed clearly by West Asian scholar 'Qatar has no internal or external threats'. But the changing dynamics of other Gulf countries has also touched Qatar. After the Gulf war the situation has started changing. Petition fever also touched Qatar. In December 1991, 54 prominent Qataris gave one petition to Emir saying:

"The Obstacles facing us have reached a point that threatens' the fruits of achievement 'through cooperation, consultation, and the rule of law'".<sup>63</sup> "They

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<sup>61</sup> Rosemarie Said Zahian, The Creation of Qatar (London: Croom Helm, 1979), p.109.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., p.109.

<sup>63</sup> A.K. Pasha, Aspects of Political Participation in the Gulf States (New Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 1999), p.65.

demanded freedom of expression and the establishment of a consultative body that has wide legislative and investigative authority and through which actual political participation is provided. They also wanted a permanent constitution that guarantees the establishment of democracy".<sup>64</sup> But the Emir didn't pay heed to their demands. In January 1992 again Qataris presented another petition 'demanding the establishment of an Assembly with legislative powers and reforms of the economy and education system'.


The influence of Al-Thani family is deep rooted in the minds of Qatari people. Still we can see revolt/coup within the family itself. But this change of leadership was occurred by vote on 22 February, 1972. Crown prince and the then Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa became the new ruler deposing Emir Sheikh Ahmed. This coup cannot be called bloody coup in the conventional term. Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa's image was better compare to Sheikh Ahmed. Sheikh Khalifa proclaimed Qatar's independence and at the same time Sheikh Ahmed had been charged with corruption and lack of managerial management of government. So this coup can be called as bloodless coup or Palace Coup engineered by Al Thani family.

Second coup took place on 27 June 1995. Emir Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad as Thani was overthrown by his son Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani. Behind this successful coup throne was the only consideration. After that to consolidate his position. Sheikh Hamad established good relations with neighbouring West Asian countries and USA as well.

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

**Table 2.11**  
**QATAR :The Al-Thani Family: Genealogical Table**



So, the protest movement or dissident movement from the point of view of mass-base politics can't be traced here. Apart from the 'petition fever' governance is still the Al-Thani family affair where power sharing with people is a taboo.

In recent years also coup attempt has not been stopped. But good thing is that even if it is putsch (failed coup) - this attempt has been made not from Al-Thani family members but outsider in 1996. And the spectre of coup is still haunting Qatari authorities. They have arrested a new suspect Muhammad Hadi Mu'ayqal al-Jalhab in the failed 1996 coup attempt.<sup>65</sup> Criminal court issued its preliminary verdict in the case on 29 February acquitting 85 people and sentencing 33 other suspects to life in jail. The final verdict is yet to come, it will be issued on 17 September 2000. To search the suspects of the 1996 coup attempt authorities have started combing operation. They are also indulging in the case of the new suspect who has not been referred to the court but has been handed to the police.

## **UAE**

UAE is a unique example of federal structure in the Persian gulf region. 'But the tug of war between centralism and parochialism reflects a dialectical interaction between two currents of opinion that have been operating in the local environment ever since the idea of a federation was born'. On the one hand, there are Wahdawis, Unitarians, who idealistically view the union

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<sup>65</sup> "Authorities reportedly arrest now suspect in 1996 coup attempt", BBC, SWB. 12 June 2000. (Text of Report by London-based Arabic newspaper 'Al-Hayat' on 8 June 2000).

concept in totalistic terms. They are of the view that step by step integration is a sign of weakness and it will serve only narrow parochial interests. And on the other hand the ittihadis or federalists, who believe that step by step approach is the best approach.<sup>66</sup>

So, right from the beginning conflict of interests was there. Though it has been reported because of the low level of political participation alongwith the parochial political culture. UAE was never intensely faced internal opposition. And the UAE enjoys only one geographical advantage. The Arabian Gulf shields it from some more powerful and potentially hostile states.<sup>67</sup> In 1929 and 1934 Dubai uprising were important events in the history of protest movements in UAE. Main objective of this uprising which was against Sheikh Said B. Maktum was to seize power. This uprising was led by his cousin. Another 'short lived movement of October 1938 to march 1939' projected much broader objectives including some reformist step.<sup>68</sup> Reform was the demand of the opposition camp which later realised by Sheikh Said's son Rashid. Followings are the main causes of the Dubai movement. (1) The growth of ruler's power, (2) demand for the control of the oil revenues, (3) the impact of the political and nationalist press.<sup>69</sup>


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<sup>66</sup> Ali Mohammed Khalifa, The United Arab Emirates: Unity in Fragmentation (London: Croom Helm, 1979), p.93.

<sup>67</sup> The Emirates Occasional Paper. Emirates Lecture, no.18. (Abu Dhabi, UAE: The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, 1997).

<sup>68</sup> Muhammad Morsy Abdullah, The United Arab Emirates: A Modern History (London: Croom Helm, 1978), p.126.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., p.128.



Map 8 : United Arab Emirates



The second incident resurfaced regarding the 'area of business in transport services'. Maktum b. Rashid protested against Sheikh Rashid and 'threatened to stop all cars belonging to Rashid'. Moreover, opposition to the Sheikh was encouraged by the success of the movement in Kuwait as well as current political demonstrations in Bahrain.<sup>70</sup> In 1950s also the Buraimi dispute invoked military action.<sup>71</sup> Like Bahrain, in UAE, also the rule of succession has been almost institutionalised. Still the 'palace coup' has been occurring time to time. Four of seven rulers at present have come to power by takeover or in the aftermath of assassination. Sheikh Ahmad of Umm al-Guiwain came to power following the murder of his father in 1929; Sheikh Sagr of Ras al-Khaimah, by deposing his uncle in 1948; Shaikh Zayed of Abu Dhabi, by takeover in 1966; and Shaikh Sultan of Sarjah, murdering his brother by a deposed ruler in 1972.<sup>72</sup> Political history of UAE has been witnessing seizure of power in the form of coup or assassination. And to follow this tradition 1987 coup attempt<sup>73</sup> has left its mark in the political history of UAE.

### **Islamic Republic of Iran**

Iran is a country of ethnic diversity. Among them most important are Azarbaizanis the Turkemans, Baluchis, Qashqais, Arabs, Bakhtiaries and Lurs.

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid., p.129.

<sup>71</sup> Abdullah Omaan Taryam, The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates (London, New York, Sydney: Croom Helm, 1950-85), p.24.

<sup>72</sup> Ali Mohammed Khalifa, The United Arab Emirates: Unity in Fragmentaion (London: Croom Helm, 1979), pp.104-105.

<sup>73</sup> Shahid Jamal Ansari, op.cit.

Azaries is the largest ethnic group comprising 13 million persons. Turkemans are approximately 500000. Main reason of their grievances are the demand for autonomy, their one series protest involving the need for central regime military action in 1979.<sup>74</sup> Baluchis also subscribe same demand. But the Pakistani and Afghanistani connections make Irani government more courteous. They framed the Islamic Unity Party in 1979 and become successful to muster support from other Baluchi organizations in foreign states. The concept of diaspora is very much pervasive among the Irani ethnic groups.

The most prominent reflection of this we can see in the Iranian Kurd struggle for autonomy of the Iranian Kurd attracts the international attention". The Kurds, Iran's largest ethnic, linguistic and sectarian minority, 2.8 to 3.5 million in strength, were the first to place their demands before the revolutionary government".<sup>75</sup> The Kurdish armed resistance to the new Khomeini regime started with the initiative of Sheikh Izz al-Din Husayni, the Sunni leader along with the leftist Iranian Kurdish Democratic Party. With the joint venture of Marxist Komeleh Party and the Marxist Fedayeen-i-Khalq. Kurdish Democratic party of Iran believes in socialism and they claim the mass bare of the party. The claim they have the support of Perh Margna militia based in the Kurdistan villages.<sup>76</sup> The main charter of demands of the Irani Kurds include - absolute power to govern local affairs except in federal matters

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<sup>74</sup> L.G. Martin, Unstable Gulf, op.cit.

<sup>75</sup> A.H.H. Abidi, op.cit.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

such as defence, foreign relations and economic affairs.<sup>77</sup> Pull and pressure of demands continue - how they would be successful to achieve their demands that is a big question mark, but they are totally successful to gather international support and support of the guerrilla groups including MKO.

Other ethnic groups include Qashqais, Arabs, Bakhtiaries and Nurs. Qashqais turned violent and clashes were reported. They turned against the regime and organized armed resistance.<sup>78</sup> Though there is no sharp division along or fierce political battle along the Shiia-Sunni line, but as a strong ethnic group Arab shows the sign of grievances. "The unrest among the Arabs that followed the Iranian Revolution focussed mainly on economic grievances, and riots occurred over demands for increased pay and promotion".<sup>79</sup>

Economy all the time plays the most important role. 1973 economic boom fell apart just after two years. "The alarming dislocations and disruptions of the boom were clear. The ports and railways were checked: skilled manpower had proved grossly inadequate and huge numbers of foreigners had been brought in to meet this deficiency; there had been a massive influx of the rural population into the capital, creating grim problems of inadequate housing and social deprivation".<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> L.G. Martin, Unstable Gulf, op.cit., p.92.

<sup>79</sup> Lois Beck, "Tribe and State in Revolutionary Iran: The Return of the Qashqai Khans" in Iranian Studies, vol.13, 1980.

<sup>80</sup> Ian Richard Netton, Arabia and the Gulf: From Traditional Society to Modern States, (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986), p.117.

**Table 2.12**

**Iran : Inequality Measures Based on Size Distribution of  
Household Expenditures : 1977-79**

	<b>Rural Areas</b>	<b>Urban Areas</b>	<b>Whole Country</b>
1977	0.448	0.520	0.530
1982	0.416	0.420	0.441
1983	0.427	0.434	0.454
1984	0.433	0.425	0.453
1985	0.427	0.424	0.452
1986	0.458	0.426	0.466
1987	0.412	0.436	0.446
1988	0.408	0.417	0.438
1989	0.418	0.418	0.438

**Source:** Massoud Karshenas M. Hashem Pesaran, "Economic Reform and the Reconstruction of the Iranian Economy" in Middle East Journal,

Process of structural change and measures to sustain economic development make Iranian government to take unpopular measures if not called harsh. Total industrialization and foreign exchange provision left its impact on the Iranian economy. Though there were three schemes for alleviating the adverse effect on the poor and vulnerable group i.e. universal direct price subsidies, targeted direct price subsidies and income supplements of the poor.<sup>81</sup>

<sup>81</sup> Massoud Karshenas M. Hashem Pesaran, "Economic Reform and the Reconstruction of the Iranian Economy" in Middle East Journal, p.107.

Obviously underpinning of this economic analysis is ideological. It has been observed Iranian groups and people are easily influenced by the leftist ideology. "The proliferation of the left was not a unique phenomenon. What distinguishes Iran is its geopolitical location and history of almost continuous conflict with regimes that controlled Russia".<sup>82</sup> Whatever may be the reason following groups of dissent have been notified so far.<sup>83</sup>

**The National Front :** It is a composition of groups. The National Front or Jebh-e-Milli is an umbrella organization which is comprised of seven groups. Internal dissention was very much there. Premier Bakhtiar's Iran Party started the flow of breaking. There were several divisions. National Democratic Front was set up by the breakaway group of Iranian society of National Socialist leader the grandson of Muraddaq, Dr. Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari. The Jonbish-e-Inqilab-e-Musaemanaan-e-Jran (JAMA) also broke away and aligned with Mojahedin-e-Khalq. And the exit of the Iran Millet Party was also reported.

**The National Democratic Front:** This group is known as secular and liberal. Leader of the party is Dr. Hedayatollah Matin Daftari. He straight forwardly attacked clergy for the trampling on the democratic rights of the people and were again leading to suppression. His demand of charter also included freedom of press.

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<sup>82</sup> Sepehr Zabih, The Left in Contemporary Iran: Ideology, Organization and the Soviet Connection, (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986), p.14.

<sup>83</sup> A.H.H. Abidi, Iran at the Crossroads, op.cit.

**Jonbish-e-Radical (Radical Movement):** The most important demand of the Radical Movement is of the belief of the separation of religion from politics. Leader of this group was the former Governor General of the East Azerbaijan province, Rahmatollah Moqaddam Maraghe'i. "The dissent by the Radical Movement was extremely mild and the leader can be called as an Islamist reformer than a serious challenger".

**Jonbish-e-Ineqilabi-e-Musraemanaan-e-Iran (JAMA):** Leader of this group was Dr. Kazam Sami'i. "The were unhappy with the liberal approach and policies of Bazargan". The persistent dissatisfaction against the political system make them to continue their revolutionary zeal.

Among other political dissident groups, followings are important.

**The Republican Party (Hizb-e-Jambonrie)** has the favour of Zoroastrians, Jews, Armenians, Chaldeans and Assyrians. Leader of this party is Dr. Abol Hasan Baqaikeamani. They were not against religion but at the same time critical against clerical interference in politics.

**Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI) (Nehzat-e-Azadi-e-Iran)** can be called a mass based political party. It has formed in 1950s with the leadership of Engineer Mehdi Bazargan. **Ansare Hizbollah**<sup>84</sup> founded in 1995 known as religious militant group, still interested in political process. **Majma-e-Hezbollah** founded in 1996 has known for its leader Abdollah Nouri. It was formed by deputies in the Majlis. Nehzat Zadi (Liberation Movement of Iran)

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<sup>84</sup> Middle East and North Africa, Europa Publications, 2000.

founded in 1961. Leader of this party Dr. Ibrahim Yardi. Interesting this about this organization is that it protests against the violation of human rights in Iran and put more emphasis on the Islamic version of human rights. **Sarmane Peyker dar Raha Azadieh Tabaqe Karger (Organisation Struggling for the Freedom of the Working Class)**. Ideologically, it has a leaning towards Marxism and Leninism. And the diagonically opposite of this organization is **Pan-Iranist Party**. Leader of this party is Dr. Mohsen Pereshkpour. Demand of this rightwing party is the demand of greater Iran.

In recent years students revolt erupted in Iran. violent clashes between police and students are normal phenomenon in Tehran and other citizens. "Student leaders made fiery speeches demanding social change, there were repeated clashes with riot police and for the first time, there was open criticism of the country's spiritual leader, Ayatollah Khamenei".<sup>85</sup> Though there is no consensus in Iran about the significance of the student protests that shook the political establishment,<sup>86</sup> but there were reports in the Tehran press that some Revolutionary Guards units might be contemplating a coup d'etat against President Khatami and his reformist allies.<sup>87</sup>

Though the reformists led by President Khatami have triumphed in the recent parliamentary elections - they still do not have a free hand "to change

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<sup>85</sup> "Iran: The Student Revolt", Middle East International, 16 July 1999, p.12.

<sup>86</sup> "Iran: Reining in the Right", Middle East International, 30 July 1999, no.605, p.17.

<sup>87</sup> "Iran: Guards Rally round", Middle East International, 20 August 1999, no.606, p.20.



**Map 9 : Iran and Iraq**



the face of Iran".<sup>88</sup> But the interplay between conservatives and reformists is set to continue.<sup>89</sup>

## **Iraq**

General conception about the Iraqi opposition inside the country is such that opposition-in-built revolves round either the ethnic line or major powers support home grown opposition. "The imposition of the state apparatus has reinforced the existing social division and fostered mutual antagonism and suspicion. The tribesmen, the majority of the population, feel little enthusiasm for centralized government and the Shi'is or dissatisfied with the Sunni dominance and resent the small share allocated to them, while the Kurds have rejected Arab rule".<sup>90</sup>

Iraq is a war torn country. Let alone the civil disturbances in 1968, but 1980 Iran-Iraq war and 1991 Gulf war made Iraq a war devastated country. It is true in Iran-Iraq war. Iran lacked the capability for a major breakthrough, but intrusion into Iraqi territory by which it could have achieved to upset internal order and to cause the overthrow of the Ba'th regime in Baghdad however to be Tehran's declared goal since it expelled the Iraqis from its territory.<sup>91</sup> So, Iraq to maintain its own political and economic identity started the process

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<sup>88</sup> M.K. Dhar, "Reaching out to Iran", National Herald, New Delhi, 2 June 2000.

<sup>89</sup> "Dissecting Iran's Internal Politics", Middle East international, 15 October 1999, no.610, p.22.

<sup>90</sup> Abbas Kelidar, "Iraq: The Search for Stability", Middle East Review, vol.XI, no.1, Fall 1978, p.27.

<sup>91</sup> Ursula Braun, "The Iraq-Iraq War: Its Regional and International Dynamics", Orient, vol.27, 1986, p.607.

(knowingly or unknowingly) of making enemies outside its territory, which in turn come forward to fund and give shelter to opposition group in Iraq.

But in spite of everything miserable economic conditions of Iraq which general people are suffering are the main agenda of Iraqi opposition groups which want to cash Iraq's miserable economic conditions. In the following table the cost of war was been estimated, that part of the national output which would have been produced if Iraq's economy had not been disrupted.

**Table 2.13**

**Iraq : Estimation of Potential GP, 1980-86**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Actual GNP</b>	<b>Potential GNP</b>
1980	15.8 (45.8)	20.6 (59.7)
1981	11.1 (32.2)	25.9 (75.1)
1982	12.6 (39.1)	26.6 (82.5)
1983	13.1 (40.6)	25.8 (80.0)
1984	13.9 (43.1)	24.3 (75.3)
1985	16.8 (52.1)	24.3 (75.3)
1986	17.1 (54.7)	21.8 (69.8)
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.4 (306.7)</b>	<b>169.3 (518.5)</b>

Sources: The International Financial Statistics, 1987 Year Book and United Nations Economic Commission for Western Asia.

**Table 2.14**

**Iraq : Estimation of Potential Oil Revenue, 1980-86**

	Actual Oil Prices	Actual Oil Exports	Actual Oil Revenue bn Dinars	Potential Oil Exports	Potential oil revenue bn Dinars and
Year	US\$	'000 tonnes	US\$bn (brackets)	'000 tonnes	US\$bn (brackets)
1980	32	120400	7718 (22.4)	160533	10291 (29.8)
1981	37	34100	3068 (8.9)	164386	12934 (49.6)
1982	34	39300	3014 (9.3)	164386	13287 (41.0)
1983	29	32500	3000 (9.3)	183290	12903 (40.0)
1984	28	33500	3495 (10.8)	183290	12168 (37.6)
1985	28	48549	3862 (11.9)	183290	12168 (37.6)
1986	26	62100	3782 (12.1)	183290	10908 (34.9)
<b>Total</b>		<b>370449</b>	<b>27939 (84.7)</b>	<b>1222465</b>	<b>84659 (265.6)</b>

Source: *International Financial Statistics, 1984 Yearbook*

But this cost does not include the human loss incurred to the whole population. It does not include inflationary costs, the loss of services and earnings by the many hundreds of thousands of peoples killed, the depletion of national resources, the postponement of crucial development projects or the cost of the delayed training and education of the young people.<sup>92</sup> And the story of the post-Gulf period is even more worse. Economy has totally devastated and the reconstruction process has not been started yet fully. So the question

<sup>92</sup> Kamran Mofid, "Economic Reconstruction of Iraq: Financing the Peace", *Third World Quarterly*, vol.12, no.1, January 1990, p.53.

comes how far Iraqi population and the percentage of Iraqi people want to involve in dissent activities. General opinion is such that, general people they don't want any kind of war, they want only stability and peace. If Saddam Hussein can ensure that they don't have any problem to support Saddam Hussein.

In spite of this bottom line internal dissention are crept into the region. Iraqi Kurdish opposition is the most important among them.

### **The Kurdish Democratic Party**

Kurdish Democratic party was established on 6 August 1946. It has a journal of its own named Khebat (struggle). It addressed the Kurds' nationalists goals and their desire to live in a state of their own.<sup>93</sup> Mustafa Barzani was President and Hamza Abdallah was Secretary General of this organisation. Later this group has been splitted as Talibani group- and Barzani group. This intra-rivalry inside the KDP made this organization two step backward from its goal.


### **The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan**

Jalal Talibani came out of Barzani influenced KDP and formed the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in 1975 in Damascus. Objective of this organization is "autonomy for Kurdistan, democracy for Iraq". It advocated Marxist principles.<sup>94</sup> Though KDP and PUK are the ethnic group, still they have

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<sup>93</sup> Michael M. Gunter, "The KDP-PUK Conflict in Northern Iraq", Middle East Journal, vol.50, no.2, spring 1996, p.227.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid., p.229.



Map 10 : Kurdish Areas of Iraq

managed to retain their popularity because they link their Kurdish ambition with democratic aspiration or return of democracy in Iraq.

Some authors used the term Intifada to discuss the internal dissention in Iraq.<sup>95</sup> It is not possible to predict now internal dissention has developed in the regime.<sup>96</sup> Though the condition of Iraq was not such, but sometimes it reminds the situation of violence that could only reign supreme after all politics had ended.<sup>97</sup> Though Iraqi Ba'th Party was committed to "socialism, freedom and unity which are not different names for different things... but different facets of one basic law from which they spring".<sup>98</sup> But they were in loggerhead with Iraqi communist party. Party to party relation was never good. Objectives of the ICP are the abolition of social inequalities and domestic injustices. They continue their struggle against the modern bourgeoisie and big landlords.<sup>99</sup>

Back to the same position of the history of internal dissention - it will be cleared with the following data.

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<sup>95</sup> Chibli Mallat, "Aubsätze and Hintergrundberichte", Orient, vol.35, no.2, 1994, (The search for Law and Stability, in Iraq).

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., p.200.

<sup>97</sup> Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, (New York: Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich, 1973), pp.421-22.

<sup>98</sup> Joh Devlin, The Ba'th Party: A History from its origin to 1966 (Standford: Hoover Institution Press, 1966), pp.36-37.

<sup>99</sup> Samir al-Khalil, Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq, (London: Hutchinsen Radius, 1989), p.239.

Table 2.1F

Iraq : Purges of High-Ranking Officers, Bathist Old Guard and Politicians of Ministerial or Higher Rank Since July 17, 1968

Name	Date Purged	Method Used	State Position After July 1968	Regular Occupation	Party Affiliation
Abdul Razzaq al-Nayed	July 30, 1968	Arrested, then exiled. First assassination attempt in London 1973. gunned down in London, July 1978	Prime Minister, member of RCC, July 17-30	Army officer	None
Ibrahim al-Daud	July 30, 1968	In Jordan at time. Stayed in exile	Minister of defence; member of RCC, July 17-30	Army officer	None
Nasir al-Hani	November 1968	Taken by group of Ba'thists at night. Body found in ditch riddled with bullets	Foreign Minister	Career diplomat; scholar; literary critic	None
Ibrahim Faysal al-Anbsari	December 1968	Dismissed, then arrested, accused of conspiracy. Sentenced to twelve years imprisonment	Chief of Army General Staff	Army officer	None
'Ad al-Rahman al-Bazzaz	October 1969	Tortured and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment for "spying for Israel"	None	Career diplomat and scholar	None

'Abdul 'Aziz al-Uqaili	1969	Arrested and sentenced to death	None	General in Army	None
Hardan al-Takriti	October 15, 1970	Dismissed from all positions. Assassinated in Kuwait on March 30, 1971	Deputy premier; minister of defence; deputy commander in chief of the Army; member of RCC	Army officer	Ba'thi since 1961
Hasan al-Naqib	October 1970	Dismissed and made Ambassador in Spain. Retired from Army	Deputy chief of Army General Staff	Army officer	Ba'thi after 1958
'Abdullah Sallum al-Samarra'i	1970	Dismissed from all positions, then made ambassador to India	Minister of information; minister of state; member of RCC	Party man	Ba'thi from the 1950s (member of Regional Commands)
Salih Mahdi 'Ammash	September 28, 1971	Dismissed from all positions, then made ambassador to Finland	Deputy premier; minister of interior (1968-70); member of RCC	Army officer	Ba'thi since 1952 (member of Regional and Pan-Arab Commands)
'Abd al-Karim Mustafa Nasrat	August 1971	Stabbed to death at his house	Minister	Army officer	Ba'thi from late 1950s
'Abd al-Karim al-Shaikhli	September 28, 1971	Dismissed and appointed to UN. Later assassinated in his car	Foreign minister; member of RCC	Party worker	Ba'thi (member of Regional and Pan-Arab Commands)
Fuad al-Rikkabi	November 1971	Murdered in prison	None	Engineer	Ba'thi since 1950; party leader 1952-58



Salah 'Umar al-'ali	1972	Dismissed. Made ambassador to Sweden	Minister of guidance; member of RCC	Party worker	Ba'thi (member of Regional Command)
Hammad Shehab	June 30, 1973	Killed by Kazar in coup attempt	minister of defence; chief of Army General Staff; member of RCC	Army officer	Ba'thi after 1968
Nadhim Kzar	July 8, 1973	Executed	Chief of Internal Security	Party workers	Ba'thi since 1950s
Muhammad Fadel	July 9, 1973	Executed	Head of Ba'th Military Bureau	Army officer	Ba'thi
Na'im Haddad	July 1973	Imprisoned	?	Party worker (?)	Ba'thi (member of Regional Command)
'Abd al-Khaliq al-Samarra'i	July 1973	Sentenced to life imprisonment. shot in July 1979 purges	Member of RCC	Municipal Clerk became party theoretician	Ba'thi (member of Regional and Pan-Arab Commands)
Hasan Mustafa	1974-75	Imprisoned	General in Army	Army officer	Not known
Saddiq Mustafa	1974-75	Imprisoned	General in Army	Army officer	Not known
Taha Shakarchi	1974-75	Imprisoned	General in Army	Army officer	Not known
Husain Hayawi	1974-75	Dismissed. Appointed military attached in Pakistan	Commander of Air Force	Army officer	Not known

Dawood al-Janabi	mid-1970s	Dismissed	Commander of Republican Guard (elite units in Baghdad)	Army officer	Not known
Dr. 'Izzat Mustafa	March 1977	Dismissed. Kept under house arrest	Minister of health (1968-69); minister of labour (1976); minister of municipalities (1977); member of RCC (1968-77)	Physician	Ba'thi since late 1940s, early 1950s (member of Regional Command)
Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr	June 1979	Placed under house arrest. Gradually stripped of all positions	President; commander in chief of Army; minister of defence (1973-77)	Army officer	Ba'thi since early 1950s (Secretary General Ba'th Regional Command; member of Pan-Arab Command)
Muhyi 'Abd al-Husain Rashid	July 20, 1979	Forced to "confess" to RCC, then shot along with whole family	Secretary of RCC	Party man	Prominent Ba'thi (member of Regional Command)
Khaled Abed Osman	July 1979	Executed	Minister of Kurdish affairs; member of RCC		Ba'thi
'Adnan Husain	July 1979	Executed	Deputy prime minister and chief of President's Bureau; member of RCC		Ba'thi (member of Regional Command)

Mohammed Mahjoub	July 1979	Executed	Minister of education; member of RCC		Ba'thi (member of Regional Command)
Mohammed Ayeh	July 1979	Executed	Minister of industry; member of RCC		Ba'thi
Ghanin Abdul Jalil	July 1979	Executed	Chief of vice-president's office; member of RCC		Ba'thi (member of Regional Command)
Muhammed 'Ayish	July 1979	Executed	Member of RCC	Leading party organizer	Ba'thi (member of Regional Command)
Adnan Hamdani	July 1979	Executed	Director general of president's office; minister of planing (1976- 79); member of RCC and Committee on Oil Affairs	Lawyer and party man	Ba'thi
Riyadh Ibrahim	June 1982	Executed	Minister of health	Party worker	High-ranking Ba'thi

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Source: Samir al-Khalil, Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq, (London: Hutchinsen Radius, 1989), p.292.

In recent years, internal dissention has been growing up. Revolt was there inside the family. Disturbance by his own son Uday was quelled tactfully, even he was shortly ostracised in 1989. And disturbance was there with Khayrallah Tulfah. Apart from family dissent and pervasive economic dissention, a report was published on 24 April 1986 on the formation of a dissident movement within Iraq's Ba'th Party.<sup>100</sup> Leader of this group is former minister of information, Salah Umar Ali al-Tikriti. He was dismissed from the party in 1970 and sent as an ambassador to the UN which he held until 1982. Main objective of this group is to overthrow the Saddam Hussein's regime. Moreover putsch/failed coup attempt was there. On August 4, 1985 coup was carried out by General Taha al-Shakarkhi.<sup>101</sup> Iraqi Muslim revolutionaries started anti-regime attack. They laid mines on the Baghdad-kut highway destroying an Iraqi army convey and killing colonel Hamid Takriki, a friend of Saddam Hussein and several officers.<sup>102</sup> An several attempt to assassinate President Saddam were foiled. It was suspected the attempt was made by agents who had infiltrated the security organization of Ba'qabah.<sup>103</sup> Besides that the conditions of political prisoners in different Iraqi jail is creating dissention among different dissent group and human rights organization. Over 100000 prisoners are detained in several Iraqi prisons. Spokesman for the International Human Rights Federation, Yves Laurin, expressed his concern

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<sup>100</sup> MidEast File, vol.5, no.4.

<sup>101</sup> BBC, SWB, August 15, 1985.

<sup>102</sup> MidEast File, vol.5, no.2.

<sup>103</sup> BBC, SWB, October 16, 1985.

regarding the situation: Many have been tortured and summary executions occurred in November 1985. Supporters of various Islamic movements are executed. Urdieh clans have been singled out for persecution.<sup>104</sup>

Analysis of the dissident movements shows that there are very less commonality among all the dissident groups. Except Iran and Iraq - all the six Persian Gulf countries, the level of institutionalisation and the level of political participation and political culture are very low. So, the main agenda has been started with the more Islamic form of government to more participation and representation. Islamic revivalism on the one hand and on the other hand more demand for representation - be it in Majilish-Ash-Shura or National Assembly. In Iran Islamic agendas are with the government's side. And recently reformists have won the election but conservatives have grievances. In Iraq main agenda of the dissident movements are to change the regime. Regime change is at the top priority of the Iraqi dissident. So, the level of political participation determines the nature of dissent.

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<sup>104</sup> "Rights are up cites Regime's political prisoners" MidEast File, vol.5, no.4.

## CHAPTER III

### DISSIDENT MOVEMENTS IN EXILE: GENESIS AND PROFILE

The genesis of dissident movement in exile seemingly deals with the denial of the political space by the state. In recent years the growth of dissent and the globalization have enhanced the potentialities of politics in exile. Denial of political space by the authoritarian-rentier regime and the exclusionary policy of the government in a way breeds dissent in exile. It is the immaturity of political culture and the absence of civil society; which have accelerated the pace of exile politics. Dislocation of political activism has taken different path which talks about different politics and political behaviour vis-a-vis political attitude. History offers example of governments or people in exile, particularly during the process of decolonization.<sup>1</sup>

Tolerance of any dissident movement not only from organisational point of view, but ideological point of view is also rare in Persian Gulf countries. The ideology of reform is the alien ideology and government policy shows different attitude — that it cannot be fitted into the gulf politics. Marxism-Leninism and its broad currents all over the world in one hand and on the other hand Islamic revivalism vis-a-vis the emergence of fundamentalism put Persian Gulf observers in a dilemma. But the bottom line is that any kind of opposition is supposed to be crushed in the beginning. This type of government's attitude

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<sup>1</sup> Claude Bontems, "The Government of the Saharawi Arab Republic", Third World Quarterly, vol.19, no.1, January 1987.

i.e. the exclusionary politics of Gulf countries which is a practicing regime's rule, in a way makes road to exile politics.

Pervasive ideologies and revolution inside the Gulf e.g. Nasserism and Iranian Revolution were very successful to make inroads into the lesser actors of Gulf countries. Internal tension among Persian Gulf countries sometimes provides help to sustain exile politics inside the Persian Gulf countries e.g. after the consolidation of power in South Yemen by late 1960s, they started helping Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) which led the Dhofar rebellion<sup>2</sup> and Iran and Bahran, Iraq and Kuwait, Yemen and Saudi Arabia - their relations directly or indirectly form the base of exile politics.

Moreover the expatriate labour which form the major work force in different countries - they too form their base in exile. And here in Persian Gulf exile politics the use of the term 'refugee' i.e. "an exiled person is ordinarily thought to be a sub species of the category 'refugee'" is not pervasive.<sup>3</sup> To look into this situation we have to go back by the human resource development and more specifically the education system of the Gulf. Easier way to go abroad and take the facility to study there, in a way creating the bubble of liberal mind in the students abroad of the Persian Gulf countries. Formation of radical groups and organization and spread of revolutionary

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<sup>2</sup> L.G. Martin, Unstable Gulf, (Lexington, Massachusetts, Toronto: D.C. Heath and Company, 1984).

<sup>3</sup> Craig Etcheson, "Civil War and the Coalition of Democratic Kampuchea", Third World Quarterly, vol.19, no.1, January, 1987.

literature have been witnessing this fact. The role of human resource development to spread radical ideas or opposition in exile is the proposition which supports the above mentioned hypothesis.

Besides that the direct link between the information technology in the Gulf countries reinforces the domestic politics. As it has been observed that in most cases the manifestation of dissent can be seen in Islamic form, but the agenda is broader than this. Most of the dissident groups working in exile have access to the information and communication technology. There is no death of funds in exile. So, the linkages between global as well as local politics reinforce their strength in exile. Territorial distance as the regime wants to create between its citizens and dissidents - does not keep them away from the local politics.

Though most of the governments are reluctant to permit anything including internet that might be used as a tool of political opposition, still the information revolution has touched the Gulf countries. Obviously in a closed political space where 'freedom of speech, political association and political action' are almost banned, there information revolution are not supposed to be encouraged there. "The ability of individuals to communicate with one another and with potential co-conspirators abroad, outside the immediate purview or control of the state is regarded as unacceptable".<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Jerold D. Green, "The Information Revolution and Political Opposition in the Middle East", Middle East Studies Association Bulletin, vol.33, no.1, Summer 1999.



State law of the host country to provide political asylum in one side but on the other hand through global communication technology, dissents in exile pressurises its own government. The ideology is local but the main concern of these groups are their own country politics. The on going process of globalization in the information technology provides the access to make it a global issue. It can be seen in Eric Rouleau's discussion of the growing importance of communication technology in Iran.<sup>5</sup>

How dissident groups can create pressure to the regime would be clear from the following example Saudi dissident Dr. Muhammad Mas'ari and his supporters have kept up "an endless stream of faxes - up to 700 a week, according to some sources - into Saudi Arabia attacking the Saudi government and detailing instances of corruption and misrule".<sup>6</sup>

Unlike other third world countries people in exile are in a very comfortable position e.g. The pattern of education in Gulf and the human resource development create congenial environment for going abroad. Quite a lot of students go abroad to study there and make comfortable relations and connections to both the countries - country of their origin and country of their habitation. Though to search a clue of diaspora among dissent people outside the country is useless. But most of the cases they are critical about the present regime. Grievances among the student community abroad is a widespread

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<sup>5</sup> Eric Rouleau, "The Use of Information Technology" in Danier Werner's, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East.

<sup>6</sup> George Joffe, "Dissident Sparks Crisis" from London in UK and Saudi Arabia. Middle East International, 19 January 1996, no.517, p.11.

phenomenon in recent years. In some countries they take part in open political activities, but in other countries even if they do not take part; after coming home they go against the regime because of the employment pattern of the government. Highly qualified abroad returned students get low level and middle level job. So, this group of the society provides dissent moral supports and most probably funds also or sometimes they do not come home, they search job in abroad and conciously or unconsciously become a part of dissent in exile.

But knowing the fact that the political crises have been polarised and how a new type of contradiction has thrown states and their people into opposition camps straightforwardly analyse the growth of the phenomenon of exile in recent decades.<sup>7</sup> Process of exclusionary politics coupled with the immature political culture and low level of political participation make exile politics a strong current. The exile politics in different Persian Gulf countries has been discussed in the following:-

### **Saudi Arabia**

Saudi Arabia reflects major dissident activities in exile. Saudi political system does not give a place to dissent and repression towards dissent makes dissent group to take shelter in exile. The most important Saudi dissent group is **Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Right**. Established in May 1993. This group was formed by six Islamic scholars and lawyers. Chief Spokeman

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<sup>7</sup> Herbert D'Souza, "Return Ticket to Brazil" in Third World Quarterly, vol. 19, no.1, January 1987.

and leader is Muhammad al-Masari. Immediately after its birth Saudi activities named this group and arrested CDLR leader Muhammad al-Masari. They were not allowed to enter the country. Through in the meantime an attempt to patch up was there. But the leaders and activities of CDLR leaders realized that they cannot pursue their activities in Saudi Arabian soil, so they established and relocated their organization in London in April 1994. Though there was pressure of deportation. But British government considered the Al-Masari's care. In April 1996 al-Masari has granted exceptional leave to remain in the United Kingdom for a period of at least four years.<sup>8</sup>

But there was rift in CDLR Conflict had grown up between Al-Masari and Dr. Sa'd al-Faqih, former Secretary general of the CDLR. At last CDLR splitted away and Al-Masari took charge of new reorganized CDLR and the break away group of the CDLR henceforce has been known as Islamic Reform Movement Main objectives of the CDLR are "the elucidation of the concept of human rights in Islam education the Saudi People about their legitimate rights, exposing Saudi Arabia's massive violation of human rights, providing justice to the oppressed, endeavouring to establish an independent judiciary and restoring people's right to supervise the performance or their government."<sup>9</sup>

Though there are attempt to shift all blames of violence to CDLR. The main mouthpiece of the dissidents, the London based CDLR "was always

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<sup>8</sup> Middle East and North Africa, Europa Year Book 1999.

<sup>9</sup> Fax Message of CDLR. P.O. BOX: CDLR London. WC 1 N 3 XX, London UK.

disavowed violence and taken care to ensure that it is not branded as terrorist by the west".<sup>10</sup> And it was reported CDLR supporters were sentenced to jail and tortured to death in jail and one supporter Abdullah al Hudhaif was executed also.

All these groups based in exile sometimes fail to pursue the exile government too. As it has reported Yemeni authorities have extradited some Saudi dissident to Saudi government. Among these dissident there are people from "Jihad Tendencies' who fought in Afghanistan and sought refuge in Yemen. As in Yemen Saudi groups are very active and try to pursue their activities in Yemeni soil. But after the Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayif Bin Abd al-Aziz's visit in Yemen, Yemen started taking repressive measures against Saudi dissident groups active in Yemen. The Islamic Reform Movement leader Dr. Sa'd al-Faqih said that Yemeni authority arrested same 20 Saudi opposition members and handed over to Saudi Authorities.<sup>11</sup>

Apart from that there are some individual person who are active and vocal against Saudi regime. A sizable number of Saudi citizens are there in abroad. Though King Fahd is announcing some reform measures time to time, but Saudi people in abroad are very vocal against the Saudi government Because of their opposition they are facing repressive measures from Saudi government. In June 1994, Muhammad al-Khiweli, a diplomat at the Saudi

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<sup>10</sup> Najm Jarrah, "Bombing in Riyadh", Middle East International, 17 November 1995, London.

<sup>11</sup> Text of report by London based newspaper 'Al-Quds al-Arabi' 20 October 1996.

mission to the UN head quarter in Newyork sought political asylum in the USA, accruing the Saudi government of human rights violations, terrorism and Corruption.<sup>12</sup> Same Year another diplomat residing in USA Ahmad az-Zahrani sought political asylum in the United Kingdom.

Osama bin Laden is a name, who has been attracted international attention. According to the US version i.e. by the former US secret service chief for Foreign Intelligence and ex-CIA man David Breset, Bin Laden has been described as a "radical Saudi financier of terrorist organisation".<sup>13</sup> Recently US officials have released the statement of an informant who claims to have belonged to 'al-Qaida'. 'Al-Qaida' is the organisation occurred of bombing the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.<sup>14</sup> That informant in CS-1 (Confidential Source 1) declares "al-Qaida was founded by Bin Laden and several others with the intent to use the military experience gained by Mujahedin in Afghanistan to attempt to fight western governments and overthrew governments in Muslim Countries, deemed not to be Islamically correct."<sup>15</sup>

But Bin Laden denies any kind of involvement in the bomb attack and viewed retaliation against the United States after missile strikes on his operation in Afghanistan.<sup>16</sup> Bin Laden at present is in Afghanistan and one of

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<sup>12</sup> Europa Year Book 1999.

<sup>13</sup> Ronaldo Munck and Purnaka L.de. Silva (ed), Post Modern Insurgents: Political Violence, Indentity, Formation and Peacekeeping in Comparative Perspective. (Great Britain: Macmillan Press, 2000) p.225.

<sup>14</sup> "Embassy Bombings: Mystery Informant", Middle East International, 15 January 1999. no.591. p.15.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Post Modern Insurgents. op cit.

the condition for his remaining in Afghanistan is that he would refrain from political or military activities<sup>17</sup> and not to make anti-American propaganda. In spite of lambasts against America Bin Laden is confident that Taliban would not deport him from Afghanistan.

Group activities against Saudi Government are pervasive. The Saudi Opposition group Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA) has worldwide connections and they have their own website.<sup>18</sup> Recently MIRA has commented on the establishment of a royal family council, saying that it could be the prelude to the abdication of King Fahd and its replacement by crown prince Abdallah.<sup>19</sup>

Opposition popular Front for the Liberation of the Arabian Peninsula convened a meeting in December in 1982 to try the Saud family. Their demand and main objections are that Saudi Government is less Islamic and they are imposing their hegemony over the holy places.<sup>20</sup>

Though it might sound different, but we can trace out some leftist movement in Saudi Arabia. In 1970s Pre-Moscow leftist Party was organized but as the ideological soil of Saudi Arabia is different so, it has failed to garner mass support. Another group **Arabian Peninsulan People's Union APPU** has

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<sup>17</sup> "Bin Laden Speaks Out", Middle East International, 15 January 1999. no.591, p.6.

<sup>18</sup> [www.miraserve](http://www.miraserve).

<sup>19</sup> "Saudi Arabia: Opposition Group Comments on Setting up Royal Family Council", BBC.SWB.ME/3861 MED/11, 8 June 2000.

<sup>20</sup> "Arab Peninsula Front's call to try the Sa'ud family" in Mid East File vol. 2 no. 2

set up by Nasser in the early 1960s.<sup>21</sup> This APPU is based in Beirut and involves in gurrilla activities inside and outside the Country.

Third group is known as Popular Democratic Union. It has been reported that it is the breakaway group of APPU. PDU has a link with Palestine Guerrilla.<sup>22</sup>

The Khobar towers incident happened in Suadi Arabia on June 25, 1996 which killed 19 US servicemen and wounded more than 500 people. It has come as intelligence reports said three Saudi men are involved in the bombing who have taken refuge in Iran. The three are thought to be affiliated with a Shiite Muslim extremist group known as Saudi Hezbollah.<sup>23</sup>

Saudi Arabia's dissident movements in exile can be discussed in the perspective of domestic politics. Some of the group may be originated in the Saudi Arabia but at present, because of the regime's repressive measure and country's law; all went underground and started operating in exile. Following are the most prominent groups.

**Workers Committee** was set up in 1953 with 'a developed political perspective'. Direct influence and initiative of Egyptian President Nasser and the Labour situation specially 1953 Aramco strike were the immediate reason of its formation. It was an underground organisation.

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<sup>21</sup> Sreedhar, The Gulf: Scramble for Security (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1983).

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> International Herald Tribune, 30 September 1999.

Egyptian nationalism and Yemen's ideology have a tremendous impact on Saudi Arabian dissident movements. **Sons of the Arabian peninsula** and **National Liberation Front** continued to send and distribute leaflets in Saudi Arabia.<sup>24</sup> As the composition of the Saudi Arabia work forces shows the divergence of Palestinian, Yemeni and Egyptians - they become the important component of the oppositional forces. "The most active period for the opposition started in late 1962 after the 26 September Revolution in North Yemen". Fear of the 'the export of revolution' by Yemen was already there and when the people's mood was "the people must revolt after having heard the voice of truth rise in Sana'a, Baghdad and Damascus". In 1966 there was a rumour of attempted coup and 1966 was a year of intense political unrest along with the repressive measures taken against Egyptian, Palestines and Yemenis. Still in May leaflets were distributed in Mecca and Riyadh announcing the launching of underground resistance by the *Society for the Liberation of the Holy Soil*.<sup>25</sup>

**Popular Democratic Party** was formed in 1970. Al-Nidal is its own journal. "The PDP believes in Marxist economic policy, as well as armed struggle to 'liberate' not only the Arabian peninsula but the whole of the Arab World'. Later the break away group of PDP formed **Popular Struggle Front** in 1971.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Helen Lackner, *A House Built on Sand: A Political Economy of Saudi Arabia*, (London: Ithaca Press, 1978). p.99.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Ayman Al-Yassini, *Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia* (London: Westview Press/Boulder, 1985).



**The Union of People of the Arabian Peninsula (UPAP)** was a Nasserist Organisation. Leader of the group was Nasser said. Throughout the 1960s it was very active. Stronghold of this group is to be found mainly in army and among Shammar tribe.<sup>27</sup>

**Saudi Branch of Ba'th Party** was also engaged in dissident movements. This group was founded in 1958. Though within 5 years of its inception in 1963; it became the largest opposition group, but it suffered a jolt following the split between the Syrian and Iraqi Ba'th in the mid 1960s. Currently, they are working/most active among Saudi students in the United States and this faction is a pro-Iraqi faction which has a regular journal Saut al-Tali'a to propagate their views.<sup>28</sup>

**The National Reform Front** was formed in 1956. Composition of this group includes Communists and former members of the Workers' Committee. Predecessor of this group was the Reform Front. Objectives of this group are "Far reaching change in all aspects of Saudi Arabian life, we are for a state system that would speak for the people's interests and pursue a policy against imperialism, zionism and reaction. They demand a democratic constitution ensuring basic rights, including the right to set up political parties, trade unions and other mass public organisations, the right to strike, hold

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<sup>27</sup> Helen Lackner, p.104.

<sup>28</sup> Ayman Al-Yassini, p.122.

demonstrations, meetings".<sup>29</sup> In 1975 the National Liberation Front changed its name to the Saudi Arabian Communist Party.

### **Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, UAE**

In Kuwait parliamentary debate and vibrant opposition are the ground realities though they have links with other dissident groups in Arabian Peninsula. But, it has not been reported that Kuwaiti dissident groups are working in exile. Kuwait as a case study of exile politics in Persian Gulf Council shows the nature and political system. Kuwait is less closed political system and in recent years it has provide enough political space for home grown variety of dissident. Kuwait has a link will Muslim brotherhood.

Jidda conference held on 13-15 October 1990 is the most important political event in the Kuwaiti exile politics. Though this group cannot be categorized as the qualitatively and ideologically radical group. This group demanded the reinstatement of the deposed government during the occupation. Jidda Congress was attended by all Kuwaiti political forces including former parliamentarians and government leaders. Main objective of them was expressed by the words of Jabir al-Ahmad and crown Prince Saad al-Abdallah,- 'a commitment to a democratic process and Kuwaiti constitution'.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Helen Lackner, p.104.

<sup>30</sup> Shafeeq Ghabra, "Voluntary Association in Kuwait: The Foundation of New System?", Middle East Journal, vol.45, no.2, Spring 1991.

Because of the dislocation made by the Gulf War. The character of the exile politics has been changed. It has been reported two-thirds of the country's citizens are still abroad.<sup>31</sup> The homecoming process has not started yet and transformation of demography and the western backing obviously would have same impact on exile politics.

In Bahrain and Oman dissident activities are in full swing. Bahrain is the hotbed of dissent politics. The most important Bahraini dissident in exile is in Tehran. Leader is Hadi al-Mudarrasi name of this group is **Islamic Front of the Liberation of Bahrain**. Hadi al-Mudarrasi is the close aides of Khomeini.<sup>32</sup> The National Front for the Liberation of Bahrain and the popular Front for the Liberation of Bahrain have direct links with PFLO. And they were planning to share some platform. Islamic Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Bahrain is Britain based. The Front was founded in February in 1979, by Hadi Mudarrasi. He had an ambition to become Bahrain's President." The Front established secret cells in Britain<sup>33</sup> and piled weapons in Britain.

Bahrain dissident movement in exile has a direct link with the domestic politics. Consolidation of domestic politics through global pressure is the main aim of Bahraini exile politics e.g. Said Shihabi, a London based spokesman for the Bahrain Freedom Movement issued statement regarding jailed dissident

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<sup>31</sup> "Kuwait: Holding Operation-Opposition Unreconciled", Middle East International, 3 May 1991, no.399, p.8.

<sup>32</sup> Joseph Kostiner, "The Rise and Fall of Militant Opposition" in Anat Kurz (ed.), Contemporary Trends in World Terrorism, The Jaffe Centre for Strategic Studies (Telaviv University, Mensell Publishing Limited, 1987).

<sup>33</sup> Mid East File vol. 5. no. 1.

Shaykh Abd al-Amir al-Jamri Said Shihabi gave more emphasis on "popular participation in running the country".<sup>34</sup> But needless to say, in exchange of that Bahraini security forces took more repressive measures. "The Bahraini security forces have sent into exile Shaikh Ali Salman, the young Shiite clergyman whose arrest on 5 December helped trigger anti-government protest".<sup>35</sup> Bahraini authority took a different step to quell the political unrest. Salman joins a total of around 100 Bahraini dissidents who are barred for political reasons. Deportation is the weapon Bahraini authority uses frequently. But in a way it strengthens the Bahrain's politics in exile. "The opposition Bahrain Freedom Movement said that Saudi National Guardsmen had been actively involved in confronting demonstration and manning roadblocks and some Bahraini detainees had been bussed across the causeway into Saudi Arabia".<sup>36</sup>

Bahraini government is well aware of the facts of the exile politics and the forces behind it. "By emphasising the role of exiled dissidents, alleged Iranian involvement and biased foreign media coverage in fuelling the unrest, the government is making common cause with other Arab states increasingly upset by what they see as their western allies' excessive indulgence of their

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<sup>34</sup> Simon Taggart, "Waiting on the New Amir", Middle East Interntional, 26 March 1999, no.596, p.18.

<sup>35</sup> Najm Jarrah, "Dissident Banished", Middle East Interntional, (London), 20 January 1995.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

opponents"<sup>37</sup> Bahraini dissident movement is also based in Beirut.<sup>38</sup> As it was reported Bahraini government is facing problem with modern communication technology than "the sanctuary which friendly western countries are perceived to be affording dissidents".<sup>39</sup>

It was reported that some accused British commanded security forces were behind the distribution of anti-Shiite and anti-Sunni leaflets 'causing alarm about sectarian tensions coming to the fore'.<sup>40</sup>

Another Bahrain dissident group in exile is Article 19 organization. (Munazzamah al-Madah 19). It is based in London.<sup>41</sup>

Main Omani dissident group in exile is the Aden-based popular Front of the Liberation of Oman (PFLO). The PFLO limited its opposition to specific government policies concerning economic issues and Oman's pro-Western inclination. It further declared its aim to co-operate with non-Marxist bodies under the new name of the United Omani National Front.<sup>42</sup>

The voice of the Oman Revolution (ADEN) broadcast the PFLO National Act Programme for Oman between 21 October and 1 December 1974. Followings<sup>43</sup> are the main aims of the National Act.

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<sup>37</sup> Najm Jarrah, "Blaming Foreign Agents", Middle East International, (London), 3 February 1995, p.10.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> "Getting Tougher", Middle East International, 14 april 1995, p.11.

<sup>41</sup> BBC. SWB. 26 Oct 1996.

<sup>42</sup> BBC. SWB: The Middle East and Africa 31 July August 2, 10. 1982.

<sup>43</sup> John Townsend, Oman: The Making of a Modern State (London: Croom Helm, 1977).

"Preamble - The Omani people are struggle for self-determination and real democracy, not the false democracy of Qaboos and the British. This is a dictatorship which oppresses and terrorise the majority of the Omani people".

First - The Liberation of Oman from occupation and imperialism.

Second - Establish a national democratic rule.

Third - To provide political and democratic freedom.

Opposition to the Sultanate continued from abroad. Training camps were set up in Saudi Arabia and later Iraq and the propaganda office is very active in Cairo.<sup>44</sup>

In Qatar and UAE very less oppositions have been reported so far. We can't say there opposition groups are working in exile. But one thing can be said that they have links with other guerrilla groups. It has been reported that UAE dissent group has a link with Muslim Brotherhood and Ba'thism.

### **Islamic Republic of Iran**

Some scholars have categorised Iran as inclusionary state. Iran may be one step forward in establishing democracy; but ruling forces and counter forces continuously interact with each other; and as a major actor in Persian Gulf, Iranian opposition tries to reinforce its position from outside. The point of dislocation was very much there. But apart from that a large portion of the Iranians live outside their own country for their own individual reasons. In

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<sup>44</sup> Calvin H. Allen (Jr.), Oman: The Modernization of the Sultanate (Westview Croom Helm, 1997), p.69.

1986 the Jewish, Armenian and Iranian population in Los Angeles was estimated at about 15,000 each and Bahais at 1200.<sup>45</sup>

The exile politics in Iran started its journey during 1978-79. Fear of new politics and virtually no room in the changing political situation made Iranian people to flee abroad and formed their own groups. Though some groups are the product of the revolution; others are based in abroad or exile; because of their own choice. Ideological connections and undercurrents of ideological sinification make Iranian exile group to perform their job from exile; which they fit better. The major Iranian exile groups are the following:-

**The Council of National Resistance:** It was founded in October 1991 in Paris. The council consisted of major political groups i.e. Mujahedin-e-Khalq (leader was Massoud Rajavi); the Kurdish Democratic Party (leader Abdul Rahman Qassemlou), The National Democratic Front (leader Hedayat Matin-Duftari), the united left of small socialist grouping and Abolhasan Bani Sadr. Initially, they were in favour of the Shah regime. But after that they 'warned of a creeping fascism which deprived people of their civil liberties while amassing power in the name of Islam'. Abolhasan Bani-Sadr had close relation with Khomeini in Paris. He also identified with the National Front legacy of Mossadaq and Bazargan and aimed to bridge the widening gap between the secular modern middle class and the Islamic Republic.<sup>46</sup> After the dismissal of

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<sup>45</sup> Mehdi Bozorgmehr and Georges Sabagh, "Survey Research among Middle Eastern Immigrant Groups in the United States: Iranians in Los Angeles", MESA Bulletin, vol.23, 1989.

<sup>46</sup> Annabelle Srebeany Mohammadi and Ali Mohammadi, "Post-revolutionary Iranian Exiles: A Study in Impotence", Third World Quarterly, vol.19, no.1, January 1987, p.111.

Bani Sadr, he and Rajavi fled Iran for Paris and they formed Council of National Resistance (CNR) in October 1981. It is an umbrella organisation and the main objective is "to return power to the hands of the Iranian people". In December 1981 the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) leader Qassem-lou and the National Democratic Front of Hedayat Matin-Daftari joined the council and they called for the establishment of a Democratic Islamic Republic. Since 1981 leader of the CNR Rajavi started 'mass armed struggle'. Iran too started taking repressive measures. during this time, "Mujahedin have been active in canvassing opinion and soliciting funds abroad in order to support their efforts. They have secured endorsements by American congressmen and senators. British members of Parliament and French intellectuals and have periodically organised small but dramatic demonstrations in many cities, including Washington, Vienna, London, New Delhi and Karachi".<sup>47</sup> But, personality conflict started between Rajavi and Bani Sadr. Bani Sadr left CNR in 1984. His main objection was Rajavi's growing links with the Iraqi government. Rajavi, at present is the secretary of council of National Resistance, shifted his base from Paris to Iraq and formed a National Liberation Army as the military wing of the Mujahidin-e-Khalq.<sup>48</sup> In 1985 Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran left the council because of the conflict between Rajavi and KDPI. Clashes between Mujahedin supporters and minority Fedayeen group took place in Paris.

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid., p.113.

<sup>48</sup> Middle East and North Africa 1999, Europa Publication



Mujahidin Khalq, the largest exiled Iranian opposition<sup>49</sup> is reported never gained the support of Iranian moderates because they are often considered extreme<sup>50</sup> in their activities. Islamic Republic of Iran also consistently propagated against Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MKO). Right from the beginning in 1979 i.e. immediately after Iranian revolution MKO's name was not in the good book of Islamic Republic of Iran. They termed MKO as terrorist organisation and started publishing photos and other documents regarding the activities of MKO.<sup>51</sup> In spite of the different version MKO is able to muster his support from a large portion of students and young people MKO is a force to reckon with.

**The Fedayeen-e-Khalq Organisation: (Cherik-e-Fedaiyan-e- Khalq/Warrior of the People)**

This organisation (FKO) was formed in 1970s. founding members were Amir Parvin Poyan, Bizhan Jazani, Masoud Ahmadzadah, Hamid Ashraf, Behrooz Dehqani and Ashraf Dehqani.<sup>52</sup> Prior to its inception core group of this organization was the Sezamane Cherikhaye Fedayi Khalgue Iran (Organization of Iranian People's Fedayeen Guerrilla, OIPFG). It came into existence with the merging of Jazani-Zarifi and Ahmadzadeh-Pouyan group. "Marxism-Leninism

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<sup>49</sup> International Herald Tribune, 28 October 1999.

<sup>50</sup> "Post Revolutionary Iranian Exiles". op. cit.

<sup>51</sup> Felonies of the MKO Terrorists in Iran, A study of the Use of Terrorism, Force, Threats and Torture by the MKO Hypocrites to demoralize and subjugate Muslims: Members fo the Party of God, Published by Islamic Propagation Organization, P.O. Box 2782, Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran.

<sup>52</sup> A.H.H. Abidi, Iran at the Cross Roads, (India: Patriot Publishers, 1989), p.151.


was the official ideology of the group".<sup>53</sup> The role of FKO in the left movement is very important. Ideological debate with Tudeh Party and FKO's stand in favour of people's democratic revolution instead of Tudeh Party's national democratic revolution has made its stand acceptable to the people of Iran. And they started thinking FKO as the alternative of Tudeh party. Later FKO was splitted into two different groups - Majority and Minority fraction on the issue of majority's support towards Tudeh party and Khomeini regime and minority's (led by Ashraf Deghani) objection, to this on the ground that they are 'subservient to Soviet Union and not genuinely revolutionary'. "But the abolition of pro-Soviet and pro-Tudeh factions in 1983, and the return to a more natural posture of opposing rather than supporting the regime in power, could have major consequences for the New Left Organization".<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Sepehr Zabih, The Left in Contemporary Iran, (London: Croom Helm, 1986).

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., p.155.

**Table 3.1**  
**Iran : Fedayeen's Fragmentation**



**Source:** Sepehr Zabih, The Left in Contemporary Iran, Ideology, Organisation and the Soviet Connection (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986).

## **The Tudeh Party of Iran**

It is the oldest political party in Iran. It is founded in 1941. Distinct feature of the Tudeh party is that "along with its distinct ideology and objective the Tudeh identified itself with the main revolutionary mainstream and the revolution was interpreted as a people's national liberation movement".<sup>55</sup> The direct connections of Soviet Union Tudeh got the international attention. They are critical against government's anti people policy. They also opposed human rights groups 'urging the government to be less brutal in its suppression of opposition forces'.

Till 1983 Tudeh party was not banned. But in early 1983 government started taking action against it. Thousands and thousands people were arrested including Secretary General of the party Nureddin Kianouri and Ehsan Tabari. Many led to Afghanistan and Soviet Union. Repressive measures had reached such a point that it seemed it suddenly disappeared from the domestic scene. A new central committee of the party has been formed with Ali Khavari as Secretary General. But they had not lost the battle and took vow to continue struggle and publish Tudeh papers and journals i.e. Name-ye Mardom People's Bulletin from Sweden and Setad (star) from London.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> A.H.H. Abidi, Iran at the Crossroad The Dissent Movement, (Patriot Publishers, India, 1989), p.160.

<sup>56</sup> Annabelle Sreberny Mohammadi and Ali Mohammadi, "Post-Revolutionary Iranian Exiles: A Study in Impotence", Third World Quarterly, vol.19, no.1, January 1987.

## Independent

A variety of progressive, democratic socialist and leftist factors are scattered across Europe and the USA.<sup>57</sup> They analyse domestic politics in the perspective of international politics. The most important feature of these groups is that they want to propagate their ideology through print media. Some political organisations have their own party organs, like Raha'i (Liberation), of Etehad-e Kommonist (Communist Unity); Jombish-e Socialist (Socialist Movement) of Sazamane Socialist Iran, (Organisation of Iranian Socialists); Rahe Kargar (The Way of Labour) of Rahe Kargan. Apart from that there are journals like Dowlatt ra Enghelab (State and Revolution) and Nimeh-ye Digar (The other Left), a feminist journal, both published from London, Ketab-e Jome (Fridays' Book), Socialisme va Enghelab (Socialism and Revolution) from Paris; Elme va Jame'e (Science and Society) from Washington D.C. and the Satirical paper Ahanger published from London.

**Monarchistists:** Monarchists in exile can be categorised as regressive force of the revolution, who fled into exile. Among the prominent figure of this category are Farah Pahlavi, the ousted queen; she took shelter in Massachusetts. Ashraf, the ex-Shah's sister<sup>58</sup> fled to Manhattan and started running of a radio station in Baghdad. Princess Azadeh organised the Azadegan (The Free People) group. One of the most important leader of this group was Aryana. Apart from that people still believe and try to establish

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid., p.124.

<sup>58</sup> Margaret Laing, The Shah (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1977).

monarchy started operating in exile. Among them Ali Amini, a Prime Minister of the Shah in 1960s was there. 'Raza Pahlavi has toured the USA and Western Europe to encourage and galvanize his supporters'. The main objective of these group is the restoration of the monarchy and to serve only their self interest. No progressive element was involved in these groups. They are the main force which can taken Iran for the backward journey.<sup>59</sup>

**League of Iranian Communist:** This group was formed in 1975-76. This is the most radical group among all the leftist organisations in Iran. Whether this can be categorized as exile group that is a problem. It is the amalgamation of the two factions i.e. Komanisthaye Enghelabi (Revolutionary Communist) and the other the Pouya. It has a direct connection with the Confederation of Iranian students abroad. Long before the merger, way back in 1957 they started a newspaper called Haghghat. "The same name as the first communist newspaper published by Iranian Social Democrats as early as 1917 in Baku, the capital of Russian Azarbayjan. Haghghat means truth, which is the name of the community party's organ in Russia and in several other communist states. At any rate, the newspaper reflected the party's attitude toward most political issues of the era, including the struggle against the regime between 1976 and 1979".<sup>60</sup> Main objective, of this group are disseminate socialist consciousness among working class and masses. They have a closer look on

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<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Sepehr Zabin, The Left in Contemporary Iran, (London: Croom Helm, 1986), p.158.

the issue to resolve problems of Iranian revolutionary movement along with the end of the practically of the monarchical regime.<sup>61</sup>

## **Iraq**

Most important Shiite group involved in dissident activities is Iraq's al-Diwah-al-Islamiya (the Islamic Call). This movement has started in 1960s in Najaf.<sup>62</sup> It has a close connection with Iran. Before 1980 the war like situation and in 1980 war between Iran and Iraq. So, the official or governmental level rivalry between the two countries helps to bridge the gap between Iraqi dissident groups and Irani political figures or Irani political parties. It has drawn its political ideals from Iran, specially Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-sadr and highest Irani Shiite clerical authority Ayatollah Muhsin-al-Hakim.<sup>63</sup> Some times it is also called Hizb al-Diwah al-Islamiyya. Though Da'wah akin to Iran's Muslim Republican Party.

The significance of the name of Hizb ul Diwah-al-Islamiya i.e. Party of Islamic call is that a call for a return to God and it propagates for 'social revolution' against injustice and exploitation and obviously which will be of universal character.

This organization is the members of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution Iraqi guerrilla Sheikh is the leader of this organisation Al- Assefie.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid, 159.

<sup>62</sup> Hanna Batau, "Iraq's Underground Shia Movements: Characteristics Causes and Prospects", Middle East Journal. vol.35. no. 4. 1981.

<sup>63</sup> Anat Kurz (ed.), Contemporary Trends in World Terrorism, The Jaffee centre for strategic studies, (Telaviv University, 1987), p.45.

<sup>64</sup> Middle East and North Africa, Europa Year Book 1999.

It is a radical organization. Main objective of this Organization is to overthrow Saddam Hussein's government and installation of a new Islamic regime. After Iranian revolution in 1979, it come into prominence and started taking part in subversive activities. It has been observed that they were involved in the suicide bombing of the its embassy in Kuwait in December 1983. The hijacking of a Kuwaiti airliner to Tehran in December 1984 and the attempt on the life of the Amir of Kuwait in 1985.<sup>65</sup> Through it may seem patriotic act from the point of view of Iraq-Kuwait rivalry. But we have to take into account one fact that it is a Shiite group and emerged originally as a Shiite response to the social distress of Iraqi Shiites. As it will be cleared in the following Chart:

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<sup>65</sup> Anat Kurz (ed), Contemporary Trends of World Terrorism, op.cit.



**Table 3.2**  
**Iraq: Population and Religious Institution in Urban and Rural**  
**Shiite District in 1947**

Old (and new) Name of province	Population in 000's	Number of religions institution	
		Urban	Rural
<b>Mixed Shiite Sunni Arab Provinces</b>			
Baghdad	522	266	1303
Basra	136	220	188
<b>II. Over whilmingly Arab Shi Provinces</b>			
Karbala	95	33	725
Diuaiya	80	297	82
Hillah	72	189	308
Amarah	60	246	98
Muntafiq	54	287	71
Kut	48	175	36
<b>III. Other Provinces</b>	<b>336</b>	<b>1247</b>	<b>2017</b>
<b>IV. Total fan Iraq</b>	<b>1604</b>	<b>1960</b>	<b>4828</b>

**Source:** Government of Iraq. Ministry of Social Affairs Directorate General of Concur Concur of Iraq 1947 (Baghdad, 1954)

This group has connections in other areas also. Radical Lebanese Muslim Students Union (al-itti-vad-al Lubnani lit-Talaha al- muslimin) founded by Shiite student at the Arab University of Beirut. They had their own journal al-Mutalaq and their main patron is Fadlallah. Fadllahals holds the important

position in the Lebanese branch of the Underground Iraqi Hizb al-Dawah.<sup>66</sup>

There was report on April 24, 1986 on the formation of a dissident group led by Iraqi's former minister of Information salab Uman Ali al-Tikriti has formed to overthrow the regime.<sup>67</sup> This group is published by emperor of Arab Gulf states.

Though it has a connection and it can be is aid good connection with France and other European countries like two Iraqi activists Hana Hasi Faazi and Hussein Khayr al-Din. Through Iraq and France talked on February 19, 1986 regarding their Repartition In his came France took initiative to end the state of terrorists bombing in Paris.<sup>68</sup>

Followings are some groups active in exile so far notified by reporters and scholars.

The Islamic Movement in Iraq. This is a Shiite group based in Tehran. Main aim of this organization is to overthrow Saddam Hussein's government leader of this group is Sheikh Muhammad Mahdi Al-Kalisi. Jund-al-Iman (Imam Soldier) this is also a Shiite group. Shiite population has a sizeable impact on Saddam Hussien's Government. Leader of this group is Ahu-Zaid. Saudi Arabia based opposition group is the **Islamic Alliance**. But his group is a Sunni Group Leader is Abu Yasser Alovvi other then this some leftist groups are also may vocal against Saddam Hussein's government e.g. the Iraqi

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<sup>66</sup> Martin Krames, "Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah" in Orient vol. 26, no.1. March 1985.

<sup>67</sup> Mid East File. vol. 5. no.4.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

Socialist party, the Arabs Social Movement, the Nasserite Unionist Gathering and the National Reconciliation Group. Though ruling party of Iraq is the Socialist Ba'lh party still instead of Co-operation and Reconciliation, owe see the rift among them. These are the very small organization.

Apart from that the Islamic Action organization this group is based in Tehran and its leaders so Taqi Modarresi.<sup>69</sup> Its founder was Sayyid Hasan Shirani assassinated in Beirut in 1980s. Close links with Lebanon on and Iran are its main feature. Most important feature of this group is that it openly claims terrorist activities. As its leader Muhammad Traqi "In one week I can gather 500 of the faithful Who are prepared to launch suicide operations. No boarder will stop them. It dreams its Membership from other countries. But there are some fear about the relations between other countries and his group. Some authors feared that too much dependence on Iran may turn this group subservient to Iran.

Iran-Iraq has a tremendous impact on Iraqi dissidents." Iran lacked the Capability for a major inroads into Iraqi territory, by which it could have achieved to upset the internals order and to cause the overthrow of the Ba'lh regime in Baghdad".<sup>70</sup> As **Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq (SAIRI)** decided in 1985 to transfer its headquarter to Iraqi territories, captured by Iran.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> Europa 2000.

<sup>70</sup> Ursula Braun, "The Iran-Iraq War: its regional and international dynamics", Orient, vol.27, 1986.

<sup>71</sup> Mid East File. vol. 5 no.2.

In 1983 a political opposition group united front of Iraqi political opposite group has formed on 6 February 1983 in Tripoli, Lihya. Before that "Conference of political opposition Forces and patties in the Arab World has held more than 19 Iraqi parties, nationalist organizations and individuals decided to immediately stop infighting between opposition groups and mark together to overthrow Saddam Hussein's government.<sup>72</sup> In why a on February 7, 1983 Iraqi opposition groups met and agreed to unite broad national front.<sup>73</sup>

Another important opposition group Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq has formed in Tehran in November 11982, header of this group is Hojatoleslam Muhammad Baqir Hakim main objectives of his group in his hand it will assume the task of overthrowing the Iraqi president Saddam Hussein and Bath Party.<sup>74</sup>

Another small but active opposition group had in Paris plays also important role as a dissident group and they are involved in subversive countries this group is called the Iraqi Muslim Organization.<sup>75</sup>

Islamic Revolutionary Army of Iraqi also involves in terrorist actives. In 1982 they claimed responsibility for the bomb attack. This organization consists of Iraqi Sunni and Shiite Muslims, and they regard Khomeini as their spiritual leader.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> Al Hadaf, vol. 14, no. 666. February 14.

<sup>73</sup> BBC, SWB February 1983. 8. 1983.

<sup>74</sup> Mid East File, vol. 2, no. 2. 1983.

<sup>75</sup> Mid East File, vol. 2, no. 1.

<sup>76</sup> Iran Press Service no. 85 August 19. 1982.

Iraqi Democratic National Front systematically campaigns against the Iraqi regime and consistently they attack Iraq. They were against the fight of Iran and Kuwaits. Main objective of this group is to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime.<sup>77</sup>

Most important group of Iraqi opposition is Iraqi National Congress. It is a wonder based organization. It is an Umbrella organization of several Iraqi Opposition group. Leader of this group is Masoud Barzani presidential Council Consists of General Hassan-a Naquib, Muhammad Babr Al ohoum. They are also trying to unite not only Babrians opposition groups not rook part in a Conference of Iraqi Kurdistan.

After the Gulf war Washington has taken an open policy to overthrow the President Saddam Hussein's regime.<sup>78</sup> The Clinton administration has decided to finance 'non lethal' activities by Iraqi opposition groups against President Saddam Hussein's regime following a meeting in Washington on 24 May 1999 with Secretary of State Madeline Albright. It was the highest-profile event in months of American efforts billed as being aimed to oust Saddam Hussein.<sup>79</sup> Assistance such as communication equipment to spread anti-Saddam regime propaganda and to open office in London, New York, and in the Middle East alongwith the training in civil administration are to be

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<sup>77</sup> BBC-SWB. July 30, 1982.

<sup>78</sup> Najm Jarah, "Iraq: Sponsoring the Opposition", Middle East International, 11 December 1998, no.589, p.12.

<sup>79</sup> Donald Neff, "Moulding the Opposition", Middle East International, 4 June 1991, no.601, p.14.

provided. Regarding this arrangement Martin Indyk, the assistant secretary for Near East Affairs said "This is a political effort from the outside to delegitimise Saddam". A combined delegation of **Iraqi National Congress** and a newly termed **Democratic Centrist Current** attended the Washington meeting.<sup>80</sup> Democratic Centrist Current was founded by London based factions of INC, who are critical of the controversial INC Leader Ahmad Chalabi. US has consistently in the process to form an umbrella organization which can lead to topple Saddam Hussein's regime. They gave more emphasis on collective leadership in a meeting outside London in April. That meeting was attended by Chalabi, leader of INC, the National Accord group of ex-Ba'thists and the Shiite Islamist Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.<sup>81</sup>

Iraqi opposition groups are so strongly supported by international actors that they have warned of activities by Iraqi government against Iraqi dissidents abroad and against their families and relatives in Iraq. This statement was signed by the Iraqi Islamic call party, the Iraqi Communist Party, the Kurdish Communist Party, the Kurdistan Communist Party, the Council of Iraqi Tribes, the Islamic Action Organization and the Islamic Accord Movement.<sup>82</sup>

In exile so many Iraqi opposition groups are coming up Iraqi Jews have joined together to form an Iraqi opposition party, i.e. the Democratic Brothers

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<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> BBC-SWB. Third Series, ME/3866. 14 June 2000.

Party. Objectives of this group are 'to build a democratic and free Iraq where people of all religious land races will co-exist in freedom, security and peace'. And obviously to confront Zionist ambitions in Iraq and the rest of the Arab homeland. This group started its activities in United States. Leaders of this group are Dr. Ibrahim Manshiyah, Dr. Naji Yahuda, Dr. Samir Karji, Meir Moshe Ya'qub, Samirah Cohen, Dr. Dalal Aziz Sasun and R. Amir Cohen.<sup>83</sup>

Though regime-change in Iraq has become the talk of the global politics, but President Saddam Hussein has hinted that he is seriously willing to issue a 'special pardon' of any Iraqi political opposition figure residing outside Iraq who decides to return to Baghdad and take part in a host of reform steps.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> "Iraqi Jews reportedly form Opposition Democratic Brothers Party", Text of report by Jordanian Weekly Al-Majid. BBC-SWB, 27 October, 1996. ME/2750/MED/19.

<sup>84</sup> "Iraqi leader reportedly willing to issue special pardon for opposition figures", Text of report by London based newspaper 'Al-Quds al Arabi' on 16 May, BBC-SWB, 19 May 2000, ME/3844 MED/10.

## CHAPTER IV

### DISSIDENT MOVEMENTS AND THE POLITICAL PROCESSES IN THE PERISIAN GULF COUNTRIES

Myriad forms of the dissent are manifested in the political society. From home grown variety to dissent in exile in a way are becoming the most important components of the political process. Political system connotes 'a set of interrelated variables conceived to be politically relevant'. It 'directs attention to the entire scope of political activities within a society, regardless of where in the society such activities may be located'. The macro variables and the micro variables which bind the components of the political system can be used interchangeably. David Easton in his book *A System Analysis of Political Life* deals with the conception of the existence of a system.<sup>1</sup>

Here the analysis of dissent under study is to deal with the question of stability and instability of the system. Instability in the domestic political condition does not always connote a change of regime. "What is meant is not merely change of government or change of controlling party or leadership, a change in legitimizing principles, such as from democracy to dictatorship, monarchy to republic".<sup>2</sup> Second meaning of domestic instability entails the changes to the integrity of the political community of a state.<sup>3</sup> Here the state is

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<sup>1</sup> J.C. Johari, *Comparative Politics*, (Sterling Publishers Private Limited).

<sup>2</sup> L.G. Martin, *Unstable Gulf*, (USA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1984).

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.



based on Islamic laws, rules and regulations. And Islamic statecraft makes this study a difficult one which cannot be categorized as one system or cannot be generalised.

"Dr. Roger Owen's paper addresses the question of regime stability in the Arab world. The 1970s was a decade of great stability whether in monarchical states like Saudi Arabia or Iraq - the regimes were able in spite of economic and political pressures at the intra-Arab and international level to stay in power. In the author's view, this "remarkable stability" is related to the growth of the State bureaucracy, its sizeable role in the field of economic activity and the growth of security apparatus".<sup>4</sup>

Dissent is not a normal phenomenon here and dissent is the outgrowth or the anomaly of the system. Dissent as a broad category acts as a pressure group or sometimes they make their presence felt also. But how far they are successful to articulate interest? Whether the function of interest articulation can be treated as the first priority - is yet to be judged. So, it is better to judge the impact of dissent from that point of view.

Impact of dissident movements can be discussed through the concept of institution building. The whole political process is based on the institution building vis-a-vis the concept of political development. Institution is a social system - sometimes loosely structured practice, relationship or organization

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<sup>4</sup> I. Ibrahim (ed.), Arab Resources: The Transformation of a Society, Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies, Washington D.C., London: Croom Helm, 1983.

significant in a given society.<sup>5</sup> In a given society such as Persian Gulf countries, organizational base and practices are far from satisfactory level compare to democratic institution building. Growth of the institution has come out of the system and consequently it causes systematic change. In that case, dynamics of political environment either sustain the institutional change or rejects it. Lerner's causal link between political and economic change or Huntington's search of the kind of relationship in which the problems of rapid development are so disruptive as to require an almost impossible level of institutionalization.<sup>6</sup>


In dealing with the institution building some authors argue that no matter what the orientation of a country's political system, changes in social institution normally affect their periphery leaving the core of the institution intact. But the existing value system specially where religion plays structural role follows the following inter-relationships among different components of the change.

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<sup>5</sup> I. Ibrahim (ed), Arab Resources: The Transformation of a Society, Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies, (Washington D.C., Croom Helm, London, 1983), p.105.

<sup>6</sup> Roger Own, The Political Environment for Development in I. Ibrahim (ed.), Arab Resources: The Transformation of a Society, Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies, (Washington D.C., Croom Helm, London, 1983), p.139.

**Table 4.1**  
**Different Components of Change**



Arab thought has undergone a thorough change and the theme of change comes from (a) the internal dynamics of the Arab society, (b) encounters with the west, and (c) the onslaught of various challenges.<sup>7</sup> The dynamicity of the political process or so to say the political environment in some countries, where people based political system is absent, there governance speaks about politics. And here comes the question of 'social alienation'. Exhaustion of the value system and interest articulation lead to the formation of unfavourable attitude towards their incumbent regimes. The effect of rapid expansion of mass communications and education have begun to combine with the impact of the processes of rejuvenation and intensified political consciousness. this may be resulted the rise of new 'politicized' middle class. And the owner

<sup>7</sup> Halim Barakat, Ideological Determinants of Arab Development, in I. Ibrahim (ed.), Arab Resources: The Transformation of a Society, Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies, (Washington D.C., Croom Helm, London, 1983), p.170.

argue this expanding political awakening is not expressed exclusively in Islamic idioms.<sup>8</sup>

In spite of the recognition of the fact that the national and political awakening in the Gulf states goes back to the pre-oil era.<sup>9</sup> But the recent changes are qualitatively different in many respects. Whether this change can be explained by the theory of componential change - yet to be analysed. Huntington, proponent of the theory of componential change is of the view that relationship between political participation and political institutionalisation should be taken as the central theme of political change.<sup>10</sup> In Huntington's analysis a political system is comprised of five components: culture, structure, groups, leadership and policies. Interactions among the five components act as a catalyst of political change. So, whether the political changes in Persian Gulf countries can be treated as an osmosis process<sup>11</sup> or Eisenstadtian epithet "an institutional framework capable of continuous absorption of changes" - has to be the central focus of the present study.

### **Culture**

Claude Levi Strauss defines culture as "the complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, customs and other capabilities and

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<sup>8</sup> H. Richard Sindelar III, Cross Currents in the Gulf (For the Middle East Institute Washington Roulledge, London & USA), p.138.

<sup>9</sup> B.R. Pridham (ed.), The Arab Gulf and the Arab World, (London: Croom Helm, 1988), p.119.


<sup>10</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change: Modernization Development and Politics", Comparative Politics, vol.3, no.3, April 1971, pp.283-322.

<sup>11</sup> Hilal Khashan, "The Quagmire of Arab Democracy", Arab Studies Quarterly, vol.14, no.1, Winter 1992, p.18.

habits by man as a member of society"<sup>12</sup>. Political culture is determined by the frequency of different kinds of cognitive, affective and evaluative orientation in general<sup>13</sup>— attitudes of the people towards political activity. The pattern of orientation to political action can be termed as political culture.

**Table 4.2**

**A Morphological Illustration of Political Culture and Political System**



**Source :** J.C. Johari, Comparative Politics, (Sterling Publishers Private Limited).

<sup>12</sup> Claude Levi-Strances, Structural Anthropology, (New York: Basic Books, 1963).

<sup>13</sup> G.A. Almond an Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1963, p.7.

The rippling effect of dissident movement which percolates to the bottom, in effect causes the modernizing effect and consequently aggravates pace of change vis-a-vis development. The study of the concept of political culture 'constitutes an examination of the sociological aspect of the subject of political development'. Lucian Pye is of the view - 'cultural diffusion and adapting, fusing and adjusting old patterns of life to new demands'.<sup>14</sup>

Coming down from in-built assumption to ground reality - the 'explosion of question process' that has spurred the incipient process of democratization and test of legitimacy of Arab regimes in the Gulf<sup>15</sup> area have occupied the central focus of political analysis. Such as Saudi society provides very little space for assessing public sentiment or for allowing organized political activity.<sup>16</sup> Though any discussion of political beliefs in Saudi Arabia demands a closer examination of Islam, as it embodies the religious values of the people and dictates cultural and political norms.<sup>17</sup> In spite of the reinforcing factor of political Islam or so to say the literal meaning of Islam i.e. "Submission"<sup>18</sup> is the outline of the Saudi political culture, but Saudi people have been able to

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<sup>14</sup> Lucian Pye, "Introduction: Political Culture and Political Development" in Pye and Sydney Verba (ed.), Political and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

<sup>15</sup> A.K. Pasha, Aspects Political Participation in the Gulf States, (Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 1999), p.1.

<sup>16</sup> William B. Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: Foreign Policy Security and Oil, (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981).

<sup>17</sup> Summer Scott Huyette, Political Adaptation Saudi Arabia: A Study of the Council of Ministers, (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985), p.5.

<sup>18</sup> George A. Lipsky, Saudi Arabia: Its People, its Society, its Culture, (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1959), p.35.

come out of the system. Two recent incidents, i.e. women's car driving (November 1990) and Saudi intellectuals open letter to King Fahd (12 April, 1991), marked the activated sign of political culture. On May 18 1991, about 500 religious scholars presented a petition to King Fahd demanding: consultative council, greater Islamisation, fundamental changes of the army and arms purchases, equitable distribution of resources, radical judicial reforms and opposition to pacts and treaties with West.<sup>19</sup> In keeping pace with the changing graph of political culture, Saudi state cannot divorce itself completely from its 'political culture', the sum total of the values norms and rules which underlie, enable and constrain political behaviour in the country.<sup>20</sup>

This trend or tendency of protest can be called 'development syndrome' in Saudi Arabian context. Though the relation between political culture and political development varies from state to state, country to country, region to region. "The realization has, therefore, now come to stay that the attitudes, sentiments and cognitions that inform and govern political behaviour in any society - 'are not just random congeries but represent coherent patterns which fit together and are mutually reinforcing, that in any particular community there is a limited and distinct political culture, which gives meaning, predictability and form to the political process, that each individual must, in his own

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<sup>19</sup> A.K. Pasha, Aspects of Political Participation, op.cit., p.25.

<sup>20</sup> F. Gregory Gause III, Oil Monarchies Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States, (New York, 1994), p.4.

historical context, learn and incorporate into his own personality the knowledge and feeling about the policies of his people and his community".<sup>21</sup>

So, to say the nature of politics depends on the political culture - be it developing society or developed one Muhammad Abid al-Jabiri, distinguished Magribi writer considers the Arab mind in terms of a body of thought and way of thinking and treats the former in terms of Arab specificity and the latter as a product of certain methods and ways of thought.<sup>22</sup>

The political process in Kuwait is witnessing a sea change. The intensified debate in Kuwait National Assembly accelerates the pace of political growth. Dialogue among interactive parties and the limited role specified by the Kuwaiti opposition itself are the trademark of Kuwaiti political culture, opposition in Kuwait has not challenged the system during crisis - this type of attitude and belief and loyalty towards political authority share immature development of radical political culture. The analysis of the broad category of political change i.e. the traditional, the neo-traditional and the modernizing or post-tradition<sup>23</sup> put Kuwaiti political culture as a midway. Though in Kuwait the question of legitimacy<sup>24</sup> goes or loaded heavily in favour of ruling family, still the tolerance towards different opinion and the

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<sup>21</sup> A.K. Ball, Modern Politics and Government, (London: Macmillan, 1971), p.56.

<sup>22</sup> Hisham Sharabi, "Cultural Critics of Contemporary Arab Society", Arab Studies Quarterly, vol.9, no.1.

<sup>23</sup> Shahid Jamal Ansari, Political Modernization of the Gulf, (New Delhi: Northern Book Centre), p.88.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p.89



heterogeneous culture or amalgamation of different political culture keep Kuwait a step forward as a political unit.

To analyse the Bahraini political system, Emile E. Nalakh, he himself told that Almond's established four input functions common to all political systems: interest articulation, interest aggregation political communication recruitment and socialization cannot yet be clearly discerned in the Bahraini political system.<sup>25</sup> Though the 'petition fever' has touched upon its political system too. In July a petition signed by over 200 Bahrainis was given to the Amir, demanding the importance of implementing the constitution and reviving the elected National Assembly. Even if it is in a very small scale, but people's voice has been heard in Bahrain and the process of the formation of public opinion has started. The evolving pattern of political dynamics reflects the mode of public opinion, "the modes by which variant opinions find political expression, to the systems under which conflicting opinions are elicited, registered channels and brought to bear on government and to the devices by which government is made responsive to the trends and tides of opinion."<sup>26</sup> But unlike political process in democracy freedom of press is a far-off thing, in spite of the fact it has a flourishing paper industry resulting two daily Arabic newspaper: Akhbar al Khalij and Al Ayam and English daily Gulf News Daily are strictly controlled by government.

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<sup>25</sup> Emile A. Nalakh, Political Development in a Modernizing Society, (Lexicon and Massachusetts: Mount Saint Mary's College, Lexicon Book/D.C. Heath and Company, 1976), p.39.

<sup>26</sup> MacIvers, The Web of Government, p.208.

Oman, Qatar, UAE are not behind in the race of political activism. Oman can be called as an island of stability in a turbulent corner of the world by President Carter.<sup>27</sup> but the ground reality reflects too much pressure on military or Sultan's Armed Forces which began in the early 1980s. Growing impact of educated youth and changing popular expectations<sup>28</sup> made Sultan Qaboos to endeavour in involving "large measure of participation of the citizens in the efforts which are being made by the government to implement in economic and social plans in a manner that leads to projecting and supporting the capabilities of the people... and contributes to realising our desired hopes in all fields of development".

Political history of Qatar can be marked by its coup. And obviously S.P. Huntington's categorization of coup fits this into the bill of Palace Revolution<sup>29</sup> and cannot be termed as reform coup. The first petition given by fifty four prominent Qataris in December 1991 noted "The obstacles have reached a point that threatens the fruits of achievement since independence and that can be saved through cooperation, consultation and the rule of law", demanding a permanent constitution 'that guarantees the establishment of democracy' along with freedom of expression and establishment of a consultative body. Again in January 1992 they submitted another petition

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<sup>27</sup> Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran, (New York: Random House, 1983), p.30.

<sup>28</sup> Dale E. Eickelman, "Oman's Next Generation: Challenges and Prospects" in H.E. richard Sindelar III and J.E. Petersen (ed.), Crosscurrents in the Gulf, (London & USA: Routledge, 1998), Chapter 8, p.176.

<sup>29</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, Patterns of Violence and World Politics.

demanding the establishment of an elected National Assembly with legislative powers.<sup>30</sup>

In spite of the fact as Lorimer noted regarding the United Arab Emirates "the extreme unimportance of the events in the interior of the Emirates cannot be exaggerated".<sup>31</sup> In March 1993 a public meeting with the members of UAE Federal National Council supported the idea of writing a permanent constitution and direct election of council. UAE reflects "stable interethnic relations which presuppose a structure of interaction: a set of prescriptions governing situations of contact and allowing for articulation in some sectors or domains of activity, and a set of prescriptions or social situation preventing interethnic interaction in other sectors and thus insulating parts of the culture from confrontation and modifications".<sup>32</sup>

### **Structures**

Political participation can be defined as "a process whereby individuals engage in activity that impinges directly upon the national power and authority structure of society."<sup>33</sup> So, in that case structure of the state systems is very important. Generally, Persian Gulf countries can be categorized as monarchical system with less development of constitutionalism and if anything there, that is based on Sharia and Islamic law. "Any system is a

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<sup>30</sup> A.K. Pasha, Aspects of Political Participation, op.cit., pp.68-69.

<sup>31</sup> John Bullock, The Gulf [A portrait of Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and UAE], (London: Century Publishing, 1984), p.45.

<sup>32</sup> Fredrik Barth (ed.), Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, (Goston: Little Brown, 1969).

<sup>33</sup> James A. Bill and Carl Leiden, Politics in the Middle East, (Boston, 1984), p.28.

structure that is perceived by its observers to have elements in interaction or relationship and some identifiable boundaries that separate it from its environment".<sup>34</sup>

In Saudi Arabia form of government is a monarchical government with a council of ministers. It has its own constitution. An eight men committee under the chairmanship of Prince Nayef, Minister of the Interior was formed in 1980 to prepare a 200 article "basic system of rule".<sup>35</sup> In March 1992 royal decrees were issued that provided for the introduction of a basic law of government and for the creation of a Consultative Council Majlish-ash-shura - comprising 60 members and a chairman.<sup>36</sup>

"Saudi society provides few means for assessing public sentiment or for allowing organized public activity. There are no legal political parties or trade unions. There is no free press and no opinion polls. There are no elections or mass demonstrations".<sup>37</sup> But the internal disturbances and inherent opposition of the system create pressure for reform. So, Prince Talal rightly commented "opposing the tide of development and tide of history, and time was not on their (rulers) side". So the continuous pressure on the system or government

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<sup>34</sup> William D. Anderson, "The Persian Gulf as a Regional System" in Muhammad Mughisuddin (ed), Conflict and Co-operation in the Persian Gulf, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977).

<sup>35</sup> The Middle East and North Africa 1999, Europa Publication.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> William B. Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980s Foreign Policy, Security and Oil, (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981), p.92.

makes Saudi rulers to take some reformative action. As a result of this Majlis Shoura's membership has been increased to 90 in 1997.

In Kuwait first consultative council was established in 1921. Kuwait was increasingly affected by the ideas of constitutionalism and demands for political reform were seen to resurface.<sup>38</sup> Form of the government is constitutional monarchy, with a single parliamentary house, the National Assembly. The Amir exercises executive power through a council of ministers. But he reserves the right to appoint and dismiss ministers including Prime Minister.

The consultative council of 1938 paves the way for more concrete form of institution building. Constituent Assembly of 1962 states an elected National Assembly which consists of 50 members elected by secret ballot (Article 60). Article 107 says the Amir may dissolve the assembly once but must call for new elections within two months. Article 49 and 100 say Assembly members may put questions to the Prime Minister and the other ministers and raise debate on matters within their competence. Article 101 provides the right to re-confidence to people regarding individual ministers. Article 102 gives more power to Amir and only the Amir has the right to demand the resignation of the Prime Minister or the Cabinet as a whole.

The first election to the National Assembly was held in 1963. After that election was held in 1967, 1971 and 1975. But it was suspended in 1976. After

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<sup>38</sup> J.E. Peterson, The Arab Gulf States Steps Towards Political Participation (New York, 1988), p.29.

that election few fifth and sixth Assembly were held in 1981 and 1985 consequently. In seven Assembly polls Kuwaiti opposition gave a good fight. "Despite the ban on political parties, candidates from seven main opposition groups put up a fierce campaigns and in an unexpected development, the amorphous group of opposition political parties and independents and tribals supported by them secured a majority in the Kuwait Assembly".<sup>39</sup> So, in Kuwait structure provides the necessary change and helps to grow democratic culture. Unlike other Gulf countries continuous election in Kuwait makes its mark in the history of political development. Role of opposition in Kuwaiti politics is very important and push and pull factors of dissent make this country to take the step of structural reforms and in that way Kuwaiti National Assembly also performs important amendments regarding important issues.<sup>40</sup>

Bahrain has most of the features characterizing the 'era of turbulence'.<sup>41</sup> Though first election of the National Assembly was held in 1973. But later it was dissolved. In January 1993 the Amir appointed a 30 member consultative council to contribute "advice and opinion". Because of the internal dissention Amir had to announce reforms in April 1996 and Amir appointed a new 40 members council on September 28, 1996.<sup>42</sup> Demand of the opposition for more and more democracy has been pressurizing Amir to take the path of reform.

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<sup>39</sup> Shahid Jamal Ansari. Political Modernization of the Gulf, op.cit.


<sup>40</sup> BBC-SWB, 19 May 2000.

<sup>41</sup> A.K. Pasha, Aspects of Political Participation, op.cit.

<sup>42</sup> Middle East and North Africa 1999, Europa Publication.

Unlike other Gulf countries, Oman has no constitution or any basic law and absolute power vested in the hands of Sultan and decrees are the governing principles of sultan. The main executive body in the land is the council of ministers, headed by Prime Minister, who is appointed by Sultan. The council includes the nineteen ministers who administer the specialized agencies of the government. The ministry of diwan affairs acts as the secretariat for the council of ministers. The principal functions of the council of ministers are to prepare draft legislation for proclamation by the Sultan and to coordinate government policies and programmes.<sup>43</sup>

**Table 4.3**  
**Oman: Formal Government Structure, 1986**



Source: Calvin H. Allen (Jr.), Oman: The Modernization of the Sultanate.

<sup>43</sup> Calvin H. Allen (Jr.), Oman: The Modernization o the Sultanate, London: Westview Press, p.83.

The Sultanate of Oman's State Consultative Council (SSC-al Majlis al-Istishari lil-Dawla) is the youngest national council in the Gulf countries.<sup>44</sup> Initially the council was composed of 43 members but was expanded to 55 in 1983. 19 members belong to the government 11 under secretaries of the social service ministers and seven other officials were nominated. The original SCC Committee was responsible for selecting the members and sending their names to the Sultan.<sup>45</sup> Faced by dissent one after another - from Dhafar rebellion to 1970 coup, Sultan had to make changes, and it proves revolutionary impact which alters the fundamental structure of the society.<sup>46</sup> And the experience of Omani Consultative Council is an attempt to modernize its political institutions and introduce political participation to its people.<sup>47</sup> The OCC was based on the earlier SCC, inspite of the existence of SCC 'the decision-making process of the Omani government remained unchanged'. In 1991 OCC has been established. The new OCC represented the 59 Wilayat of Oman and had 59 members and a chairman. In November 1994. Sultan Qabus decided to introduce more reforms. The number of membership has been increased from 59 to 79.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Dale F. Eickelman, "Kings and People: Oman's State Consultative Council", Middle East Journal, vol.38, no.1, Winter 1984, pp.51-71.

<sup>45</sup> Shahid Jamal Ansari, Political Modernization, p.120.

<sup>46</sup> John Townsend, Oman: The Making of a Modern State, London: Croom Helm, 1977, p.167.

<sup>47</sup> Abdullah Juma Al-Haj, "The Politics of Participation in the Gulf Cooperation Council States: The Omani Consultative Council", Middle East Journal, vol.50, 1996, p.559.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.



**Table 4.4**

**Oman: Statistical Breakdown of Areas, Wilayat and Representation of the  
OCC**

Area	No. of Wilayat	No. of Representatives	No. of Men	No. of Women
Muscat	6	11	9	2
Al-Batina	12	20	20	0
Al-Shargiyya	11	14	14	0
Al-Dhahria	5	6	6	0
Al-Wusta	4	4	4	0
Dhafar	10	10	10	0
Musandam	4	4	4	0
Others	7	10	10	0
Total	59	79	77	2

**Source:** Abdullah Juma Al-Haj, "The Politics of Participation in the Gulf Cooperation Council States: The Omani Consultative Council", Middle East Journal, vol.50, 1996.

"The OCC has proven to be a stabilizing institution in the country because it has combined elements of increased political participation within an Islamic framework".<sup>49</sup>

In Qatar form of government is monarchical with a constitution. 1970 constitution vested Emir with the supreme power. It also specified a 10 members Cabinet appointed and led by the Emir.<sup>50</sup> Though like other gulf

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p.571.

<sup>50</sup> Dictionary of the Middle East.

countries structural changes have not been happened yet because of the internal disturbance or dissent, but upward pressure is there. And because of this upward pressure some changes are happening. From 1950s people of Qatar demanded a representative body. To show the respect to their demands. Advisory Council was appointed in 1964. The ruler is to serve as President of the Council and the deputy ruler as Vice-President. Proposed total number of membership of this body was 15 which were entirely drawn from Al-Thani family.<sup>51</sup> Still the council is not 'entirely a rubber stamp'. Tribal representation has influence and 'they are not afraid to oppose a policy of the government or Emir in the Advisory Council'.<sup>52</sup> Original number of the members of the Advisory Council was 20. Later expanded to 30 members in 1975 and 35 in 1988. Original tenure of this body was four years whose term was extended for six years in May 1975, for a further four years in May 1978, and for further term of four years in 1982, 1986, 1990 and 1994.<sup>53</sup>

### **Group**

'Groups are naturally the first type of structure which we encounter in the analysis of political systems'.<sup>54</sup> So if group theory can be put in the analysis of political life of Gulf countries — positive response can be

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<sup>51</sup> Shahid Jamal Ansari, Political Modernization in the Gulf (New Delhi: Northern Book Centre), p.102.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., p.113.

<sup>53</sup> Middle East and North Africa 1999, Europa Publication.

<sup>54</sup> Jean Blondel, An Introduction to Comparative Government (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989), p.59.

observed. The political structure of Persian Gulf countries are slowly but steadily showing the sign of group formation parochial political culture and the low level of participation are generally regarded as the regressive force of the political dynamics. The formation of numerous groups in that political region where political parties are not allowed and any kind of dissent cannot be tolerated - there it has to be regarded as the most important factors of political dynamics.

The ecology of group structure and the process involved in their formation depict the changing nature of political system. To analyse the impact of dissident movements on the political processes from the point of view of group theory reveals the credible impact which dissident movements have created. As a group "means" a certain portion of the men of a society, taken, however, not as a mass (of) activity, which does preclude the men who participate in it from participating likewise in many other group activities".<sup>55</sup> The entire study of dissident movement talks about the formation of various groups, its ideology, objectives, role in the political system; in a way it shows growing impact on political processes.

### **Leadership**

The question of legitimacy and power sharing in country are always interlinked with the nature of leadership. Leadership does not offer only the individual's set of mind and belief, instead it "usually espouse a set of more or

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<sup>55</sup> Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government: A Study of the Social Pressure (Chicago: Chicago University Press), p.211.

less persistent, integrated doctrines that purport to explain and justify their leadership in the system".<sup>56</sup> Justification of leadership in the Persian Gulf countries reveals the pattern of sociological analysis in the arena of ruling family. It would be clear from the following chart.

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<sup>56</sup> R.A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1964), p.104.

Table 4.5

**Rulers of the Persian Gulf Countries**

Emirate/State	Date of Accession	Date of Independence	Ruling Family	Tribe	Ruler
Saudi Arabia	1982	1932	al-Saud	al-Saud	King Fahdibri Abd al Aziz al-Saud
Kuwait	1977	1961	al-Sabah	Bani'Utub	Sh-Jabiral-Ahmad al-Sabah
Bahrain	1961	1971	al-Khalifa	Bani'Utub	Shaikh'isa b'in Sulman al-Khalifa
Oman	1970	1971	al-Taymur	al-Bu Sa'idi	Sultan Qaboos bin said al-Taymur
Qatar	1970	1971	al-Thani	Tamim-Bani	Sh. Khalifa bin Utub Hamad al-Thani
UAE	1971	1971	Zyid bin Sultan	al-Nhayyan	
Abu Dhabi	1966		al-Nhayyan	Bani Yas	Zayid bin Sultan (at-Bu Falah) al-Nhayyan
Dubai	1990		al-Maktum	Bani Yas	Sh. Maktam Rashid Bin said (al-bu Falasah) al-Maktum
Sharjah	1972		al-Qasimi	Al-Qawasim	Sh. Sultan bin Muhammad al Qasimi
Ajman	1981		al-Na'imi	alNa'im	Sh. Humayd bin Rashid (al-Bu Khurayba) al-Na'imi
Umm al-Gaiwaim	1981		al-Mu'alla	al-'Aji	Sh. Rashid bin Ahmad al-Mu'alla
Ra's al-Khayma	1948		al-Qasimi	Al-Qawasim	Sh. Saqr. bin Muhammad Al-Qasimi
Fujayra	1974		al-Sharqi	al-Sharqi	Sh. Hamad bin Muhammad al-Sharqi

Source: Gulshan Dietl, *Through Two Wars and Beyond: A Study of Gulf Co-operation Council*, Lancer Books, 1991.

Growth of dissident movements in the Persian Gulf countries has started making their mark on different political components. The organization of movement reveals the fact that it cannot be termed as 'mass-movement', so the changing milieu of dissident movements has failed in this aspect. The monarchical system and the activities of the ruling family reinforce the doctrinal position of the Islam, which is the base of the ruling family's governance. In Saudi Arabia 'a rigorously textualist-legal (Salafi) philosophy inspired by Ibn Taymiyya, its Ulama articulate a strongly microcosmic vision of law, and applying Hanbali Fiqh, exercise a broad independent jurisdiction in all three branches of government'.<sup>57</sup> Saudi Arabia is the one example which follows the rest. The components of ideological pattern of the ruling family or leadership in Persian Gulf countries would be cleared in the following table:-

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<sup>57</sup> Frank E. Vogel, "Islamic Governance in the Gulf" in Gary G. Sick and Lawrence G. Potter (ed.), The Persian Gulf at the Millenium: Essays in Politics, Economy, Security and Religion (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997).

**Table 4.6**

**Ideal/Practice, Tensions in (Sunni) Fiqh Governance Doctrines**

<b>The Ideal</b>	<b>The Evil to be Avoided</b>	<b>The Practice</b>
<b><u>Politics</u></b>		
Shura, nasiha/consultation, advice	fitna/civil war	ta'at za'ir/obedience to an evildoer.
Insan, mu'minin, umma/unity of humanity believers, the Islamic Community	asabiyya/tribal solidarity, division by worldly groupings	dawla, murlimun/regime, Muslims.
imama/caliphate	zulm, fawda/oppression, chaos	sulta, sultan/authority of de facto power.
<b><u>Legislation</u></b>		
ijtihad/independent reasoning	bid'a, jahl/heresy, ignorance	taqlid, sadd bad al-ijhhad/scholarly confirmism, closing of the door of ijtihad.
ikhtilaf mujtahidin/diversity of opinions all based on intihad	niza', shudhudh/conflict, bizarre opinions	ijma' madhhab aw al-madhahib/ijma' of a school or of the 4 sunni schools.
Siyasa shaiyya/broad legislative authority in the ruler	awamir sultaniyaa/sultanic commands	ilzam bi-madhab, qanun, tashri/imposing a single school as binding, human law, legislation.
<b><u>Executive</u></b>		
Siyasa Shariyya/Legitimate Siyasa	Siyasa zalima/unjust	Siyasa, farad al-zaman, darura/siyara, corruption of the times, necessarily.
maqnid al-shar/the objectives of the Sharia	masalin khasla/welfare of particular persons elites	masalin al-dawla, al-ras etc/utilities of the state of the people etc.
jihad/just war	hazima, khudu', fawda/defeat, subjugation, chaos	quwwa, sulta, 'izza/power, authority, might, glory.
<b><u>Judiciary</u></b>		
ijtihad al-qadi/judgement by Ijtaihah of qadi	nukur min al-hawa/arbitrary or self-interested judgement	taqlid, ilzam bi-qawl/qanun/taqlid, requiring a qadi to follow a particular legal view, state legislation.

ijtihad la yunqad/ijtihad cannot be reversed on appeal	tahakkum, fasad, jahl/arbitrarian corruption, ignorance	ri'asat al-qada, tafaqqud alqudah naqd/authority of chief qadi, appeal, reversal.
al-ijtihad shart wilayat al qadi/ijtihad - capability as a condition of appointment	jahd/ignorance	ta'yin al-aslah fala-aslah/appointment of whoever is the best person, whether on not duly qualified.
<b><u>Community</u></b>		
islam man ashhad bi-alleh wa-rasulih/ all who recite the shahada are Muslims	Kufr, zandaqa, tawa'if, fitna/unbelief, herery, sectarianism, civil strife.	islam man na khalaf al-ijma'/all are Muslim as long as they do not differ with ijma' (in its various degrees).
amr bi-al-ma'ruf wa-nahy'an al munkar/moral correction exerted only for doctrines with categorical revealed proofs	fasad, hawa, nifaq/deceit, passion, hypocrisy	takfir, ilzam bi-ra'y/calling other infidels, making mere opinion obligatory.

Source: Gary G. Sick and Lawrence G. Potter (ed), The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essays in Politics, Economy, Security and Religion, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997).

The whole Persian Gulf reveals the same picture regarding the ruling family. It is often said Kuwait is the al-Sabah and al-Sabah is the Kuwait. In Bahrain law of primogeniture and this principle has now been institutionalized and was clearly mentioned in the Bahrain's 1971 constitution,<sup>58</sup> and rest of ruling families follow this tradition.

The institutionalisation of leadership in Persian Gulf countries is the hardest hurdle even put by ruling family to thwart the ambition of dissident groups. Lenczowski's approach 'to describe and analyze ruling group as one of the many approaches to understand political reality' - offers the best analysis regarding leadership. To conclude leadership as a component of political

<sup>58</sup> Rosemarie Said Zahlan, The Making of Modern Gulf State ((London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), p.82.



process stands out as the most difficult arena of political system where the impact of dissident movements is very less. The lack of cohesive dissident movements, internal strife within the elite and above all no mass base of there organization make them not to achieve their goal vis-a-vis a change of regime and formation of a elected new government from top to bottom of the administration including head of the state.

### **Government Policy**

In Huntingtonian's thesis government's policy is one of the important components. Analysing the direction of government policy political changes can be measured. The whole Persian Gulf countries show the same trend regarding the government policy. Government policy is not at all people oriented and rentier economy vis-a-vis rentier policy reflect the character of Gulf political system - the rulers are not obliged or accountable to the people. The question of legitimacy has taken the backseat 'Legitimacy by default' is the normal phenomenon in Persian Gulf Countries. 'No other viable alternatives are acknowledged or allowed to evolve.'<sup>59</sup> But the question is whether dissident movement have some impacts on government policy or not - is yet to be judged. 'Petition Fever' and the pressure of unorganised dissent at least make Persian Gulf government to think beyond their own monarchical family and to announce some promises. And the growing incidents have shown that regarding policy all the rulers provides only lip services. So it can

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<sup>59</sup> Saad Eddin Ibrahim, The New Arab Social Order: A Study of the Social Impact of Oil Wealth (Westview: Croom Helm, 1982).

be said that till date dissent cannot become a force in Persian Gulf countries to change the government policy or its direction.

The analysis of Huntington's thesis of political change, in a way, is directly linked with political processes. This study of political change shows some different impact on the political processes e.g. dissent has been making an attempt to diversify the political culture, where structurewise there is no change. Group formation is obviously the contribution of dissent, where leadership maintains the status quo. And lastly there is no change in government policy also.

The entire gamut of the study of the dissent in Persian Gulf countries reveals the impact of dissent on the political processes and asks some basic questions; like whether dissident movements initiate the democratization process or not. In Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar and UAE - dissident movements manifest itself in a Islamic form. And two main undercurrents are flowing in the political system. One is more Islamic, the demand for more conservative and Islamic Republic and say no to any kind of reform. On the other hand there are groups surprisingly headed by Ulamas demanding for more representation and political participation. That's why 'Petition Fever' is a recurring phenomenon in recent years.

Within the structure of authoritarianism manifestation of dissent has been seen through the idiom of political Islam. But the analysis of their political discourse has not been confined only to the Islamic aim. Eagerness to

participate in the constitutional body reflects the inherent aspiration of democracy. But it can't be said that fulfilled democratization process has started in the Persian Gulf countries and the contribution of dissent in the democratization process has to be judged from the perspective of civil society. But the absence of civil society is the typical feature of the Persian Gulf countries; where Iran and Iraq are the exceptions. Considering all aspects of dissident groups, it can be said that inspite of marginalised role dissent has been playing, they are able to make their mark on the political process. The process of opening up of the system is the contribution of the dissident movements. Though dissent has not been tolerated in anyway in all the Persian Gulf countries; but time and again dissent is growing within the system; which in a cumulative way is creating rippling effect in the political system.

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSION

Analysis of the dissident movements from comparative point of the view reveals the polemics of the different components of the state as an institution. Dissent in democracy as a broad category channelises through opposition, i.e. in a more political way government to government basis. Democracy provides the political space to dissident movements and in a way diffuses the grievances of the political mass. The question of political mass is interlinked with the question of political culture. Participatory political culture, i.e. people's participation in political activities provides an institutional form of dissent in democracy.

But the absence of participatory political culture and the repressive measures to any kind of dissent in authoritarian system shows totally negative approach to the growth of dissent. Most of the authoritarian systems reflect the militarization of political culture vis-a-vis political system. The question of legitimacy is based on military, not people oriented policy. So, to stop or to cut the root of the dissent in authoritarian system — authority has to take the path of militarization of political culture. And history shows many examples where authoritarian political system excludes the dissent altogether by force.

The form and content of political culture i.e. the question of political culture as a broad category and the process of militarization reflect approach

to approach difference from democracy to authoritarian polity to rentier politics. In Persian Gulf countries, state system cannot be called as production system, it is the allocation state system, where rent is the determinant of the economy. Rent i.e. the external sources of the economy also in a way determines the nature of the authority. Here in Persian Gulf rentier system authority draws its legitimacy from rent not from the production. As there is not question of production; so the production relations are absent there. And authority does not have any accountability, as it does not draw its legitimacy from production, but allocation. In a way authority in the Persian Gulf countries does not have any obligation. As the rule of succession in these countries is almost institutionalised, so any kind of dissent has to be crushed from the root. And dissent cannot be tolerated in any condition.

In spite of the repressive framework in rentier-authoritarian-political system, presence of the dissent has been reported. Analysis of the agenda of dissident groups shows the importance of the religious discourse. Interactions of religion and politics in these countries mark the trend, which is heavily tilted towards religion. Islamic discourse can be found not only in shariati constitution or Islamic jurisdiction - but in whole state affairs and in the political mind of the people. So the role of political Islam, in a way, sometimes accelerates the pace of dissent activities. Following the argument of Namik Kemal, the leading thinker of the 19th century, it can be said that Islamic principle of ijma or consensus is the core of the state affairs.. And the main trend of dissent in Persian Gulf countries come from the Ulema or the

interpretation of Islam. It is not the negation of the very essence of the Islam; but the reinforcement of basic principle or law of Islam in its purest form.

Divergent form of dissent can be observed inside the Persian Gulf countries. Total ban on trade Union movements and political parties destroys the probabilities of potential growth of organised form of dissent politics in the Persian Gulf countries. Secular form of opposition sometimes expressed through unorganised workers' movement or students' movement. But at the same time, it can be said, they have been playing the marginal role. Demand for more freedom and human rights can be heard in Persian Gulf Countries. But the manifestations of this aspiration is covert. The process of democratization has not started yet in all those countries. So even the democratic aspirations are there among the dissident groups - it takes the form of Islam. They may be manifested their activities through Islamic form, but agenda and aspiration are broader than their limited manifested form.

The level of anomaly in the aspirations and manifestation, in a way reflects the exclusionary politics of Persian Gulf political system. Denial of political space by the rentier-authoritarian regime makes inroads for the growth of exile politics in the Gulf countries. Exclusionary politics vis-a-vis the dislocation of political mass coupled with the information revolution and communication technology have been established the new trends in Persian Gulf countries. The ideology of global linkages between the country of their origin and country of their habitation strengthen the position of dissent in exile, which in a way, expresses its main agenda directly on politics of the

home soil. Focussed upon the local politics, dissident movements in exile, in a way, successfully raise their demands in the international platform. Political asylum in the major powers alongwith the modernised and globalised technology reinforce its position in the Persian Gulf politics - though territorial distance obviously stands as a hindrance to the political participation vis-a-vis political activism.

But the consolidation of dissent in exile surprisingly reveals the effect of some domestic policies as well as policy of host countries. Human resource development in the whole Persian Gulf countries provides encouragements for going abroad for education. Liberal education alongwith the liberal ethos touch the mind of young generation of Persian Gulf countries; which in a way backfire against the rentier-authoritarian system. Consistent demand for more wage and more employment and a sense of relative deprivation make this section of society unhappy - which joints hands with dissent in exile. Though the feeling of diaspora in GCC countries is very less - still some sense of sympathetic attitude they can claims which in a way consolidates their position in exile. Apart from that deportation law of the western countries and too much problem for deportation in a way encourage dissent politics in exile.

Holistic study of dissent from home grown variety to dissent in exile and the study from construction to deconstruction of dissent politics reveal the impact of dissent on the political processes. Political change as a parameter of political processes can be used to measure the impact of dissent. Categorization of Huntington's thesis subdivides the political change as

culture, structure, group, leadership and government policy — each as a component measures the impact of dissent. Dissent has initiated the process of diversification of political culture. Structure and leadership are the main components which show that impact of the dissident movements in the core area is totally marginal or very less, virtually nothing. Neither they are able to change the system; nor they can shake the political society. Status quoism persists in the government policy. Though in recent years, government is taking some steps to quell the mass grievances; but it can't be called policy change in any case. Among all the five components group is the only component — where dissident movements left its mark. Sporadic formation of groups and multifarious nature of dissident groups, in a way create some ripple in the society and that is the contribution of dissent in political process.

Finally, if we don't deal with the question of democratization and civil society — the discussion could not be completed. Absence of civil society and at the same time non-initiation of democratization process make it a different political society altogether. Lack of institutional development, in a way, helps the authority to retain its power in the same position years after year. So, it can't be called dissent in the Persian Gulf countries has initiated the process of democratization. Broadly speaking and to conclude, the study of dissident movements in the Persian Gulf countries, it can be said - though its existence cannot be ignored, because of the internationalization of this issue, still it has been playing marginal role so far the present time is concerned.



## APPENDIX A

### Major Dissident Activities in Saudi Arabia: 1970-1980

- May 17, 1970 : An uprising of Air Force Officers, reported to be Nasserites, took place at Bahrain air base.
- Feb. 11, 1972 : An uprising of National Guard Officers and 3 sons of deposed King Saud was reported.
- 1974 : An uprising of university graduates in collusion with King Saud's associates, backed by Iraq, was reported.
- An uprising of Arab communities led by Bassam al-Imari of Iraq was reported.
- Late, 1974 : An uprising of university graduates, air force and armored corps officers, supported by members of King Saudi's family, was reported.
- Nov. 1976 : The arrest and deportation of 16 PFLP activists was reported.
- July 17, 1977 : 1,500 conspirators (1,300 of them military officers and men) attempted a coup at Tabuk and Taif air bases, declaring they wanted to set up a republican, non-aligned regime. The conspiracy was backed by Libya, Iraq, and the Hejazi Brotherhood (led by Hamid Hassoun). It was suppressed by 3,000 Jordanian troops at Tabuk.
- Aug. 9, 1977 : The Hejazi National Movement, with Libyan support and seeking self-rule for Hejaz bombed public and private facilities in Riyadh and Jeddah.
- Aug. 27, 1977 : An uprising occurred of officers and men against the air force commanders at Hail and Hafaf military bases, with Iraqi support. Two leaders of the Arabian Gulf national Liberation Front escaped to Iraq on an Iraqi plane viz Kuwait. The coup was put down by armored columns led by Prince Turki.
- Sept. 23, 1977 : The fact that the Saudi National Liberation Front and the Hejazi National Movement (H.Q. in Mecca) are one and the same was verified. It is led by Saudis of Iraqi and Hejazi backgrounds.
- Oct. 30, 1977 : Officers at King Saud base attempted to subvert the garrison.
- Oct. 30, 1977 : A PFLP "hit team" including Iraqis was intercepted. Its mission was to kill King Kahlid and his six Sudairi brothers. The hit team admitted that the PFLP had established itself in Saudi Arabia in 1975 to await orders.
- June 1978 : three Iraqis officially working for Iraqi Airways, but in fact working for the Iraqi Communist Party, were arrested. 5 more at the Iraqi Mission in Jeddah were arrested and 3 working as engineers at the Hail military installation. All were in Saudi Arabia on missions of subversion.
- June 1978 : The al-Hasa National Liberation Front was formed.

- Sept. 1978 : Sunni Hejazis demonstrated against he bulldozing near the Holy Shrine in Mecca. Their violence led to the murder of the Governor of Medina by Hejazis. The Chief Engineer was killed the next day.
- Oct. 1978 : Resistance led by foreign workers, especially from India and south Korea, some of it very serious, was admitted.
- Oct. 29, 1978 : Brigadier Mahmoud, Commanding Officer of the Kharj military complex (French-built) defected to Iraq with 37 officers. He had refused to liquidate a six-weeks old al-Hasa tribal rebellion. The rebels had occupied a key oil and transport junction. The al-Hasa National Liberation Movement, backed by Iraq, had demanded autonomy.
- May, Oct., Nov., 1978 : Troops guarding the oil installations at Ras Tanurah, Daman, and Dharan defected to Iraq, Kuwait and Qatar. The number of defections since 1976 was thought to total 4,175.
- Oct. 27, 1978 : 5 sons of the late King Saud (Abdullah, Rashid, Abdul Azia, Said, Turki) were deported. They were in collusion with 24 senior officers at the Hufaf, Shegra. 5th Armored Brigade. Shjegra's commander escaped, with air force officers, to Libya.
- Dec. 1978 : 1,100 officers threatened to resign because of the surveillance system instituted over their activities.
- Dec. 1978 : 3 Iraqi diplomats were deported for aiding and abetting the al-Hasa and Hejazi dissidents, Iraq indicated that 2,500 Saudi military personnel had defected to Iraq since 1975.
- Dec. 21, 1978 : Al-Sadi Sheik Muhammad Said Nawaf, senior Sunni divine in Mecca, denounced the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam as alien to the true belief. He denounced the Royal Family for using force to gain power and ruling against the wishes of the Sunni majorities in al-Hasa, Hejaz and Shammar Regions. He said they would seek peaceful redress, but take up arms if they were not heeded.
- Jan. 5, 1979 : The Grand Mufti of Mecca called on the Hejazis to oppose Wahhabi domination. The existence of continued unrest among the military forces and the population in Hejazi and al-Hasa Provinces and admitted.
- Mar. 24, 1979 : The existence of an Arab International Communist Party was discovered among foreign employees. It worked with Hassawi and Hejazai dissidents and its objective was to overthrow the Saudi monarchy and establish an Arab People's Republic of Arabia. The discovery led to the exposure of a list of Saudi Communist Party members and its leader, Ibrahim al-Mahmoud.
- Apr. 1979 : Prince Fawaz, son of late King Saud, and his brothers, in absentia, plotted a coup in collusion with 100 air force officers and the armored forces commander at Diriyah military base. Saudi Air Force Deputy Commander and 17 co-conspirators defected to Iraq. south Yemen and Iraq were implicated in the conspiracy.

- May 11, 1979 : 10 air force officers at Jybal used planes to attack Damman and Dharan bases in coordination with army and armored forces. News of the uprising was leaded ahead of time and nipped in the bud. It was sponsored and backed by Iran at Khari and Harad.
- July 3, 1979 : A report by Prince Turki accused 43 princes of plotting against King Khalid. 21 were formerly charged. Reportedly implicated were air force and army officers, civilian counsellors to the royal Family and friends of the King.
- Aug. 3, 1979 : Attempts at simultaneous take-overs of the Sharga and Tabuk Kharj air bases and a plan to kill the Royal Family, backed by Libya, failed. The defection of the Nation Guard was scheduled to start with the murder of superiors at Hail, Gassim and Medina City Camps on Aug. 1. 118 persons were arrested, exposing infiltration and perversion of the National Guard.
- Sept. 1979 : Prince Sultan acknowledged that 3,000 air force personnel had been replaced by Americans.
- Nov. 20, 1979 : The Great Mosque take-over involved Otieba, Kharb and Shammar tribesmen. Egyptians, Yemenis, Kuwaitis, Moroccans and Pakistani's were also killed in the Suadi counter-attack. 3,000 dissidents, representing the Hejazi NLF, which demands full autonomy for Hejaz, were involved.
- Nov. 22, 1979 : Forces of the Hejazi NLF, some occupying the Great Mosque, also attacked the Taif air base and military complex. (There were some 4,000 NLF adherents in Taif itself.) The fighting continued to the end of November in Mecca and to mid-December in Medina and Taif.
- Anazah tribesmen and other Hejazi tribes also rebelled.
- Jan. 3, 1980 : 3 army and air force bases were raided by Public Security forces. The commanding officers and 93 other officers in the Huhuf, Abqaiq and Hubarraz Garrisons were arrested. The National Guard moved into the bases to facilitate the takeover by Public Security Forces.
- Feb., 1980 : 45 percent of Saudis sent abroad for military training in France and the U.S. reportedly refused to return home. The number of new cadets at the Saudi Military academy reportedly declined from 250 in 1971 to 37 in 1979.
- May 1980 : 17 officers of Huhuf Garrison defected to Kuwait, including the commanding officer. Iraqi influence along Saudi Arabia's eastern coast still caused concern to the government.
- Oct. 1980 : 50 Air Force officers were executed following an attempted coup.
- Dec. 1980 : An Arab student reported that he had witnessed demonstrations by Sh'ites in the Eastern Province oil fields.

Source: Adopted from Bernard Schechterman, "Political Instability in Saudi Arabia and its Implications", *Middle East Review*, vol.14, 1981.

## APPENDIX B

### Political Protests and Violence in Kuwait 1968-June 1989

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1968-69	1972-75
<p>1. November 14-16, 1968 Several bombs explode at different public places during the Shah of Iran's visit to Kuwait.</p>	<p>1. March 31, 1972 Assassination of Hardan Al-Tukriti, former vice president and defense minister of Iraq, in Kuwait; Iraqi secret agents are charged.</p>
<p>2. January 25, 1969 Bombay explode at the National Assembly, the residence of the minister of defense and interior, and the Ministry of the Interior, 21 persons, all Kuwaitis except one Palestinian, and all members of the Gulf Liberation Front, an offshoot of Arab nationalism, are charged and sentenced.</p>	<p>2. April 7, 1971 Explosion near the Jordanian embassy, with material damage.</p>
	<p>3. July 8, 1972 Explosion near the Prime Minister's residence; little damage.</p>
	<p>4. March 20, 1973 Iraqi troops attack a Kuwait border post; two Kuwaiti soldiers die.</p>
	<p>5. September 8, 1973 Five Arab hijackers fly to Kuwait, free hostages taken from the Saudi embassy in Paris, and surrender to police.</p>
	<p>6. November 11, 1973 Explosion near the British Council.</p>
	<p>7. February 6, 1974 Occupation of the Japanese embassy in Kuwait by Palestinians and Japan's Red Army; no casualties.</p>
	<p>8. April 11, 1975 Explosion near the office of the American Insurance Company. A cell of Arab communists arrested and charged; no casualties.</p>

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1976	1977
1. May 25, 1976 Explosion in the Shuwaikh industrial area destroys 40 cars; bombs exploded in an oxygen factory kill 3 persons; and a bomb threat in the National Assembly cancels the meeting.	1. June 5, 1977 A Lebanese hijacks a Kuwaiti airliner.
2. May 31, 1976 Bomb threat at Kuwait University.	2. June 20, 1977 Bombs explode at a car parked near the Iranian ambassador's residence in Kuwait; material damage.
3. June 10, 1976 Bomb threat at Kuwait's Telecommunication Centre.	3. July 8, 1977 Kuwaiti Airways plane is hijacked from Beirut; the passengers are released in Kuwait.
4. June 17, 1976 Explosion at <i>Al-Anba</i> newspaper; 5 persons injured including its editor.	4. July 12, 1977 Bomb threat at Kuwait airport.
5. July 1, 1976 Bomb threat at Kuwait Airport.	5. October 2, 1977 Hijacked Lufthansa plane makes refueling stop in Kuwait.
6. July 2, 1976 Bombs exploded at Syrian Airlines office in Kuwait; no casualties	6. October 3, 1977 Hijacked Japan Airlines plane refuels in Kuwait and departs for Damascus after releasing 7 hostages.
7. July 6, 1976 Bomb threat at Fahaheel.	7. October 18, 1977 Hijack attempt against a Czechoslovakian airplane in Kuwait.
8. August 25, 1976 Bomb threat at <i>Al-Watan</i> newspaper.	8. December 5, 1977 Demonstration against Sadat's visit to Israel; 30 students arrested.
	9. December 25, 1977 Bomb discovered at the office of Egypt Air in Kuwait.

1978	1979
1. May 23, 1978 Fire at Al-Manaquish oil facility destroys 3 oil storage tanks and damages oil pipeline.	1. March 25, 1979 Demonstration storm the Egyptian embassy in Kuwait after Sadat's peace treaty with Israel; no casualties.
2. June 15, 1978 Assassination of Ali Yassen, Chief of PLO office in Kuwait; Abu Nidal charged.	2. September 26, 1979 Sayed Abbas Mohri, Khomeini's special envoy in Kuwait, and 18 members of his family have their citizenship rescinded and are deported to Iran.
	3. November 21, 1979 Bomb threat at Al-Hamra movie theater.
	4. November 30, 1979 U.S. embassy is the target of several thousand anti-U.S. Shiite demonstrators.

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1980

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1. April 29, 1980  
Assassination attempt on Iranian foreign minister, Sadeq Qotbzadeh in Kuwait.
  2. May 2, 1980  
Kuwaiti diplomat shot and wounded in Teheran.
  3. May 21, 1980  
Two bombs exploded in front of Iran Air Office in Kuwait; no casualties.
  4. May 24-25, 1980  
Kuwait Airways plane hijacked en route from Beirut; no casualties.
  5. June 1, 1980  
Bomb explodes at the London office of Kuwait Oil Co.; no injuries.
  6. June 4, 1980  
Iranian embassy in Kuwait is damaged by explosions; no injuries.
  7. June 11, 1980  
Three Iranian aircraft violate Kuwaiti air space.
  8. June 21, 1980  
Assassination attempt on the chief of the PLO office in Kuwait, Awni Batash.
  9. June 26, 1980  
Attack at Kuwaiti embassy in Beirut; material damage.
  10. July 24, 1980  
Two Jordanians hijack Kuwaiti airliner en route from Beirut; no injuries.
  11. September 12, 1980  
Explosion at *Al-Rai al-Aam* newspaper building; 1 person dies and 6 are injured. Damages estimated at K.D. 4 million.
  12. September 20, 1980  
Kuwaiti freighter *Al-Farwaniah* is attacked by Iranian machine guns en route from Basra to Kuwait.
  13. September 21, 1980  
Kuwaiti freighter *Ibn Abdoun* is attacked by Iranian guns en route from Basra to Qatar.
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1981

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1. February 8, 1981  
Man carrying Syrian diplomatic passport, but thought to be an exiled Iraqi opposition members, is killed in Kuwait.
  2. February 9, 1981  
Kuwait University students strike to protest the cancellation of an Islamic culture course.
  3. February 12, 1981  
Bomb threat at Syrian embassy in Kuwait.
  4. March 28, 1981  
Explosions in 5 different places in Kuwait; no casualties.
  5. March 28, 1981  
Explosions at the office of the Iranian Shipping Co.; 1 person dies.
  6. April 30, 1981  
Kuwaiti seismic research ship *Western Sea* is confiscated by Iranian authorities; released May 19, 1981.
  7. April 30, 1981  
Three thousand non-Kuwaiti Arab oil workers strike for 5 days, demanding improved working conditions.
  8. June 31, 1981  
Three Iranian aircraft attack the Abdali border post.
  9. June 25, 1981  
Explosions in oil storage facilities in Shuaiba; damages estimated at \$50 million. Five put out after 2 weeks.
  10. June 26, 1981  
An attack against Kuwait Embassy in Beirut; material damage.
  11. August 25, 1981  
Bomb threat at Kuwait airport.
  12. August 30, 1981  
Bomb threat at Kuwait's Telecommunication Center.
  13. September 1, 1981  
Bomb threat at Kifan Cooperative Society (supermarket).
  14. October 19, 1981  
Iranian aircraft attack a petroleum complex at Um Al-Eish.
  15. December 19, 1981  
Bomb threat at Kuwait's Central Bank.
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1982

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| 1. February 26, 1982<br>Kuwaiti airliner hijacked at Beirut airport; no casualties.       | 8. June 4, 1982<br>Kuwaiti diplomat assassinated in New Delhi by the Abu Nidal group.   |
| 2. March 8, 1982<br>Bomb threat at the Hilton Hotel.                                      | 9. August 23, 1982<br>UAE diplomat shot and wounded in Kuwait by a Palestinian gunman.  |
| 3. March 28, 1982<br>Palestinian student demonstrators clash with police; dozens injured. | 10. September 16, 1982<br>Assassination attempt on Kuwaiti diplomat in Karachi.   |
| 4. May 1, 1982<br>Bomb threat at a high school.   | 11. September 16, 1982<br>Kuwaiti diplomat assassinated in Madrid by the Abu Nidal group.   |
| 5. May 9, 1982<br>Bomb threat at Mubarak Al-Kabir hospital.                               | 12. October 28, 1982<br>Shiite demonstration after an Ashura celebration in Kuwait. One Iranian and other arrested. Exchange of protests between Kuwait and Iran. |
| 6. May 10, 1982<br>Bomb threat at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.                        | 13. October 30, 1982<br>Bomb explodes in a public park in a residential area; little damage.  |
| 7. May 17, 1982<br>Bomb threat at Kuwait T.V. station.                                    | 14. December 9, 1982<br>Explosions at Kuwait Airways office in Athens; little damage.   |
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1983

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| 1. August 22, 1983<br>Iran confiscates 6 private Kuwaiti fishing boats.   | 3. December 24, 1983<br>Anti-Kuwait demonstration in front of the Kuwait embassy in Teheran. |
| 2. December 12, 1983<br>Explosions in seven places, including the American and French embassies in Kuwait, the airport control tower, and an oil refinery. Five persons die; 63 are wounded. Pro-Iran Islamic Jihad claims responsibility. Seventeen people arrested and charged. |  |

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1984

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1. January 6, 1984  
Bomb threat at a Saudi airliner in Kuwait airport.
2. February 12, 1984  
Bomb threat at Kuwait's Teacher Association buildings.
3. May 13, 1984  
Iran attacks the Kuwaiti commercial oil tanker *Um Qasbah*.
4. May 14, 1984  
Iran attacks the Kuwaiti oil tanker *Bahrah*.
5. May 16, 1984  
Bomb threat at Rikka Cooperative Society.
6. June 6, 1984  
4 Iranians arrested on charges of attempted explosions at the Ministry of Information.
7. June 23, 1984  
Bomb threat at Kuwait Investment Corporation.
8. July 13, 1984  
Iran attacks the Kuwaiti commercial freighter *Ibn Rashed*.
9. September 12, 1984  
Assassination attempt on the editor of *Anba* newspaper.
10. November 17, 1984  
Attack on the Kuwaiti embassy in Beirut; no casualties.
11. December 4, 1984  
Kuwaiti airliner hijacked to Teheran. Two die, several wounded. Plane is returned to Kuwait May 5, 1986.

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1985

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| 1. February 13, 1985<br>Assassination attempt on a candidate to the National Assembly.   | 9. July 11, 1985<br>Kidnapping of a Kuwaiti diplomat in Beirut.  |
| 2. March 1, 1985<br>Assassination of an Iraq diplomat and his son in Kuwait.   | 10. August 30, 1985<br>Bomb threat at the Entertainment City.  |
| 3. April 23, 1985<br>Editor of <i>Al-Siyassah</i> Palestinian charged.   | 11. September 4, 1985<br>Iran confiscates the Kuwaiti freighter <i>Al-Watiah</i> in the Gulf of Oman.  |
| 4. May 25, 1985<br>Assassination attempt on the Amir; 3 dead, 15 wounded. Islamic Jihad claims responsibility. Twenty people arrested, 5 Iraqis charged. | 12. September 9, 1985<br>Iran confiscates the Kuwaiti freighter <i>Al-Musailah</i> .   |
| 5. May 27, 1985<br>Bomb threat at the Colleges of Law and Art in Kuwait University.  | 13. November 25, 1985<br>Iran confiscates the Kuwaiti freighter <i>Ibn Bittar</i> .  |
| 6. June 10, 1985<br>Anti-Kuwait demonstration against the Kuwaiti embassy in Damascus.   | 14. December 25, 1985<br>Iranian aircraft attack the Kuwaiti ship <i>Kazmah</i> near Qatar.  |
| 7. June 20, 1985<br>Iran confiscates the Kuwaiti freighter <i>Al-Muharaq</i> .   | 15. December 30, 1985<br>Three Lebanese and a Syrian are arrested for allegedly plotting to blow up power and water desalinization plants in Doha, Kuwait. |
| 8. July 11, 1985<br>Bombs exploded in two popular seafront cafes. Ten people killed, 55 injured.   |  |
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1986

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| 1. February 22, 1986<br>Iranian helicopters intercept Kuwaiti fishing boats. | 3. June 17, 1986<br>Five explosions at 4 sites in the Mjina Al-Ahmadi and Al-Muqwah fields; no casualties. |
| 2. March 11, 1986<br>Anti-Kuwait demonstration in Teheran.                   | 4. September 18, 1986<br>Kuwaiti oil tanker <i>Al-Fintas</i> intercepted by Iranian navy.                  |
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1987

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1. January 19, 1987  
Three bombs explode in Kuwait city; material damage.
  2. January 21, 1987  
Iran launches Silkworm missile into Failaka island; casualties.
  3. January 24, 1987  
Parcel bomb explodes under a car in Salihyah. A new "Revolutionary Organization forces of the Prophet Mohammed in Kuwait" claims responsibility.
  4. January 31, 1987  
Security forces arrest 12 persons and charge them, plus 4 others who have escaped, with June 1986 explosions. All are Kuwaiti Shiite citizens.
  5. April 26, 1987  
A car explodes in front of Kuwait Oil Co.; damage to cars parked nearby.
  6. May 11, 1987  
Bomb explodes in TWA office in Kuwait before the arrival of U.S. envoy Richard Murphy. One dies.
  7. May 22, 1987  
Explosion in Mina Al-Ahmadi kills Kuwait Shiite who planted the device.
  8. June 1, 1987  
Iran confiscates 7 private Kuwaiti fishing boats.
  9. July 15, 1987  
Car bomb explodes in Al-Salhia business district, near the Air France office, killing the 2 Kuwaiti Shiites who planted the bomb.
  10. July 24, 1987  
An Iranian Silkworm hits the *Bridgeton* (an American-registered ship) in Kuwait; no casualties.
  11. August 1, 1987  
Iranian demonstrators, reacting to the Hajj killings in Mecca, ransack the Kuwaiti and Saudi embassies in Teheran.
  12. September 1, 1987  
Iran confiscates the Kuwaiti freighter *Jabel Ali*.
  13. September 3, 1987  
Iran launches a Silkworm missile into Kuwait's southern industrial territory; no casualties.
  14. September 4, 1987  
Five bombs in the College of Science, Kuwait University; material damage.
  15. September 7, 1987  
Kuwait declared 6 Iranian diplomats *persona non grata*.
  16. September 9, 1987  
Fire breaks out at Shamiyah secondary school; arson is suspected.
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1987

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| 17. September 10, 1987<br>Bomb explodes in front of the Kuwaiti-French bank in Paris; material damage.                              | 21. October 24, 1987<br>Explosion in a Pan American travel agency in Kuwait; material damage.                          |
| 18. October 15, 1987<br>Iranian Silkworm is launched into a U.S.-owned Liberian-registered <i>Sangari</i> tanker at Man: Al-Ahmadi. | 22. November 3, 1987<br>Car bomb explodes in Kuwait near the Interior Ministry building; material damage to some cars. |
| 19. October 16, 1987<br>Iranian Silkworm is launched into a Kuwaiti offshore oil island; 5 are injured.                             | 23. November 6, 1987<br>Bomb threat at the Andalus Theatre, Kuwaiti.   |
| 20. October 22, 1987<br>Iranian Silkworm is launched into a Kuwaiti offshore oil island.  | 24. December 7, 1987<br>Iran launches a Silkworm against Kuwaiti southern coasts; no casualties.                       |
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1988

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| 1. February 14, 1988<br>Palestinian student demonstrators clash with police. "Several dozen" people are injured and arrested.  | 6. April 26, 1988<br>Bomb blast at Saudi airlines office in Kuwait injures one security guard after Saudi Arabia severs diplomatic relations with Iran. |
| 2. March 30, 1988<br>Three Iranian speedboards attack Kuwait's Bubiyan Island military post. Two soldiers are injured.   | 7. May 7, 1988<br>Bomb explodes in Kuwait city's downtown Avis Rent-A-Car office; no injuries, material damage.   |
| 3. April 5-20, 1988<br>Kuwaiti airliner <i>Al-Jabriya</i> is hijacked en route from Bangkok to Kuwait and diverted to Mashad, Iran, Cyprus, and Algeria. Two Kuwaitis are killed. Hijackers believed to be extreme Lebanese Shiites. | 8. May 18, 1988<br>Car explodes near Kuwait Airways Office, killing 2 Kuwaiti Shiites who planted the explosion.  |
| 4. April 9, 1988<br>Bomb explodes in the Interior Minister garage in Kuwait; no injuries.  | 9. July 8, 1988<br>Iran captures 3 Kuwaiti fishing boats.   |
| 5. April 20, 1988<br>Iran launches a Scud-B missile against a Kuwaiti oil facility in Wafra, operated by the U.S. firm Getty Oil Company. No damage or injuries.   |   |
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Up to June 1989

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1. March 15, 1989  
33 persons, among them 18 Kuwaitis, indicted on charges of plotting to overthrow the government.
  2. March 28, 1989  
Airport receives false bomb threat on a Kuwaiti-leased aircraft.
  3. May 9, 1989  
Iran confiscates a coast guard gunboat and 8 men on board, 2 non-Kuwaitis, are released; the remaining 6 crew members are released June 17, 1989.
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Source: Adopted from Abdul Reda Aesiri, *Kuwait's Foreign Policy: City-State in World Politics*, Westview Special Studies on the Middle East (London: Westview Press, 1990).

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