

# **GOVERNMENT PROGRAMMES AND HUNGER IN KALAHANDI**

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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled "GOVERNMENT PROGRAMMES AND HUNGER IN KALAHANDI," submitted by Sartik Bagh is in partial fulfilment of Master of Philosophy degree of this University. This dissertation has not been submitted for any degree to any other University and is his own work.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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**TO  
MAA AND BAPA**

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## ABBREVIATION

A. D. A. P. T.	Area Development Approach For Poverty Termination.
B. L. S	Bonded Labour Scheme.
D.P.A.P	Drought Prone Areas Programme.
D.R.D.A	District Rural Development Agency.
D.W.C.R.A	Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas.
E.A.S	Employment Assurance Scheme.
E.R.R.P	Economic Rehabilitation of Rural Poor.
I.A.Y	Indira Awaas Yojana.
I.J.R.Y	Intensified Jawahar Rozgar Yojna.
I.R.D.P	Integrated Rural Development Programme.
J.R.Y	Jawahar Rozgar Yojana.
M.F.L.A	Marginal Farmer and Landless Association.
M.H.U	Mobile Health Unit.
N.R.E.P	National Rural Employment Programme.
O.R.C	Orissa Relief Code.
P.D.S	Public Distribution System.
P.M.M.P	Prime Minister's Massive Programme.
R.L.E.G.P	Rural Landless Employment Gurantee Programme.
T.R.Y.S.E.M	Training of Rural Youth for Self Employment.
U.N.I.C.E.F	United Nation International Children Emergency Fund.
W.H.S	Water Harvesting Structure.

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## CHAPTER-I

### An Overview of Famine and Drought Policy During Pre and Post-Independent India

Famine is a situation of widespread scarcity among large section of the population. It may be because of man-made or natural causes. In the past it used to be treated as a divine visitation. It affected and caused massive death, depopulation, migration and economic ruin. Famine is being described as "suffering from hunger on the part of large classes of the population", but also as "temporary dislocation of employment among large number of the population, consequent upon failure in ordinary crops of the season"<sup>1</sup>.

Regarding the occurrence of past famine reliable evidence are wanting. In this context people like Charles Blair wrote, "It is not until we come to the days of our own rule that records of passing events are available, and even of the memorable famine of 1770, which occurred shortly after we undertook the fiscal administration of Bengal, specific details are to a great extent wanting"<sup>2</sup>.

However, though no precise and authentic accounts are available on past famine, it has been widely believed that

1. Loveday (1985). The History and Economics of Indian Famines. Mehra Offset press, P-1.
2. Blair, Charles. Rept (1986). Indian Famines. Agricole Publishing Academy, New Delhi, P-5.

famine was not an unknown affliction in ancient India. Writing about it, Dereze and Sen say "Meghasthenes, the envoy of Seleukos Nikator to the court of the Indian emperor Chandragupta Maurya in the fourth century BC, wrote - perhaps to impress his gullible Greek readers, that famine was completely unknown in Maurya India. But Kautilya the Indian political economist, who was an official adviser to Chandragupta, wrote extensively on how to deal with famines." There is no unanimous opinion about numbers of famines occurred in Pre-Independence era. Walford provides a list of 17 famines that occurred in Pre-British India. Loveday, on the other hand mentions forty<sup>4</sup>. Regarding the frequency of famines, B.N. Bhatia in his book "Famines in India" writes that in the earlier times a major famine occurred once in every 50 years. From the beginning of the eleventh century to the end of the seventeenth century there were fourteen famines almost all of which were confined to regions very much limited in area. In 19th century it showed a disconcerting increase. In a period of about 90 years, from 1765 when the British East India Company took over the Diwani of Bengal to 1858, the country experienced twelve famines and four "severe scarcities"<sup>5</sup>. The frequency of famines showed

3. Dereze, Jean and Sen, A. (1989) Hunger and Public Action. Oxford : Clarendon Press, New York, P-1.
4. Alamgir, Mohiddin. (1980) Famine in South Asia : Political Economy of mass starvation, Cambridge, Oeigeschlager Gunn and Hain Publishers, PP, 53-55.
5. Bhatia, B.M. (1988). Famines in India, Konark publishers, New Delhi. PP, 7-8.

direct rule of India by Britain. Between 1860 and 1908, a still further increase during the first fifty years of the direct rule of India by Britain. Between 1860 and 1908, famine or scarcity prevailed in one part of the country or the other in twenty out of the total of forty-nine years.

With this background, an attempt has been made to deal with the famines occurred in ancient and British rule in the country in this part of the chapter.

One of the most noted famines in ancient India occurred in Kashmir in 917-18. This was a famine precipitated by foodgrain availability decline, combined with foodgrain price increase. Excess mortality was a natural outcome, as Loveday mentions, there was an evidence of steps being taken by the government to mitigate the distress. During the reign of Mahammad Bin Tuglag, famine occurred in 1344-1345 which can be attributed to excessive land taxes that ruined the cultivators.<sup>6</sup> The causes of this famine in later stage was perceived that. " It appears that, primarily, the famines which occurred during his (Mahammad Bin Tuglag) life were artificial, being the result of maladministration"<sup>7</sup>. However, he took some measures to mitigate the people affected in famines. He made provisions of loan and digging of wells, encouraged for migration, bringing uncultivated land under

6. Alamgir, Mohiddin. (1980) Op. Cit., P-54.

7. Blair, Charles. Historical Famines P-15.

cultivation, selling of provisions to people of Delhi (for six month) at a fixed price and distributing cooked food.

During 1396 famine in Southern India, Sultan Mohmud\* kept a train of ten thousand bullocks on his own for going to and from Malava and Gujarat for grain and to supply his stricken kingdom of Bahmini. It was a severe famine and caused by prolonged drought.

A number of severe famines have been recorded during the reign of Akbar. During the famines of 1555 to 1562 Habib makes a reference to people eating seeds of Egyptian thorn, wild dry grass, and cowhides. Besides famines also occurred during 1574-1575 in Gujarat and 1595-1598 in northern India (Lahore and Kashmir) due to failure of rain. To mitigate the affects of these famines, Akbar instituted some short and long term measures to help the famine victims. He instituted free distribution of food, provided employment in fort building and appointed a special famine officer. Collection of tax in kind (food grain) to build up emergency stock a food kitchen, and a viable administrative framework to supervise famine relief became part of his long-term policy to combat famine. So far as the relief organisation was concerned a significant departure marked by SahaJahan during the famine of 1630-32 which is considered by some to be the most destructive of all recorded calamities. The areas affected were Golconda, Ahmednagar, Gujarat and part of Malawa. The major cause of the famine was the failure of

rain, but it was partly attributable to the difficulty of grain transport due to demands placed by Emperor Shahajahan's army encamped at Burhanpur.

Shahjahan initiated some best known relief efforts in history. The three major actions taken were distribution of cash among the poor, free distribution of cooked food among the needy and remission of taxes. The Mughal land revenue system provided for relief in tax payments during bad years, but the peasants were obliged to pay arrears in later years. Large remissions were allowed in famines during 1630-32.<sup>8</sup>

The next famine occurred in 1660. War of succession and failure of rain were the main causes of the famine that engulfed Sind, Punjab (Agra, Delhi, Lahore) and Gujarat. Focussing on the effects of this famine historians like Muhammad Rajwiny notes of dog's flesh being sold for goat's flesh and men began to devour each other and the flesh of a son was rather preferred. Aurangzeb supposed to be a conservative ruler, rose to the occassion for providing relief to famine victims. His efforts in this regards was acknowledged by the Famine Inquiry Commission of 1880. A severe localized famine also occurred in Dacca, the capital of Bengal, during 1662-1663. The effects of this famine was deadly. Thousands of souls perished due to this famine.

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8. Alamgir, Mohiddin (1980) Op. Cit., P-56.

Not much information is available of two other famines. The first one occurred in 1677 in Hyderabad and the cause was attributed to excessive rain. The other one was caused by siege during the war of Golconda. Historians are of the views that war related activities during the reign of Aurangzeb (second half) aggravated the situation resulted into famine. Reference is found about great Deccan Famine of 1702-1704 which took the massive toll of over two million people in mortality case. No information is known about the relief efforts undertaken by the government.

Alamgir in his book "Famine in South Asia" has made the following observation as the features of famines occurred in Pre-British India : (1) Famines visited India periodically; (2) Most famines were localized; (3) "Years of large scale mortality might have been few, but when they did come around, the amount of depopulation could have been frightful" (4) Bengal as a region was largely free from famine; (5) Drought was the most important cause associated with famine; (6) Famine initiated large scale migration of population from one region into another. Redistribution of population was often associated with the upsetting of balance of basic economic activity (that is agriculture), (7) Most of the famines except one instances of general famine (1344-1345) and another of regional famine (1630) were recorded; (8) Government policies sometimes increased the intensity of

suffering of the famine victims; (9) Government in some instances provided famine relief.

### Famines in British India

Famine of 1770 - This famine happened to be the first of its kind occurred in Bengal in the wake of the fiscal management of Bangal which was switched over to the East India Company in 1765. Failure of rain was the main cause. Official estimates in 1772 suggest that about one-third of the population (or about 10 million people) perished in this famine. Conditions of the people worsened accompanied by administrative inefficiency, absence of adequate relief measures and the exploitative profit motive of the company officials. As to the relief measures initially government refused to reduce the land tax. After the bad consequences came to the fore, like depopulation, fall in agricultural production and revenue collection, prompted the government in 1772 to resort to provide incentives such as reduction of land tax and advances to induce cultivators to migrate from other regions to Bengal. Also as a part of its measures, this led to Regulating Act of 1773 passed by the parliament to improve the administration.

It can be said that for the first time British became aware of the responsibility to mitigate distress of the

9. Alamgir, Mohiddin (1980) Op. Cit., P-59.

common people. And so far as Bengal is concerned this was the first time Bengal was affected by a catastrophe of such magnitude.

Looking at its nature and extent of effects, this famine in terms of its typology it was a class famine, but considering rural urban areas separately, it approached to be a regional famine in that the rural population was affected across the board. One of the worst famine that affected both Madras and Mysore occurred in the year 1783. Madras was severely affected in famine owing to crop failure and Mysore by the effects of war. This famine witnessed an important shift in formulating the relief policy of the government. For mitigating the effects of this famine government of Madras adopted a many number of measures such as remission of import duties on grain, appointment of a "Grain Committee" with power to fix price, traders to keep stocks, sale of food grain under the government account and deportation of paupers to northern districts. This marked the first important government intervention to fix the food grain price. But the success did not follow as it was supposed to be. In later stage, government took the resort to control the food grain trade and favoured to accomodate demand of the trading community which was not conducive for government intervention for price control. In the end of 18th century, one more famine is said to have occurred in

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10. Ibid, P-60.



1790-1792. But the detail information regarding its causes and the consequences followed are wanting.

The 19th century ushered into a new era of famine recurrence which witnessed some worst famines at the very beginning of the 19th century. Passing references may be given to the Bombay, Madras, and Northern Indian Famine of 1802-1804, the Madras Famine of 1807, the Bombay and Madras famine of 1812-1814, and the Madras famine of 1823. Unfortunately this period also coincided with British territorial expansion, settling down of East India Company, permanent settlement and strong advocacy to free trade policy. Each of it had a very deadly consequences. Focussing on the consequences of the permanent settlement of land, Alamgir in his book "Famine in South Asia" writes", the peasantry was subjected to various forms of surplus extraction, legal rent, illegal exactions, and interest payment on wars. Increasing indebtedness became a new dimension of social life."<sup>11</sup>

During this period, inspite of frequent famine, government relief measures rendered no significant breakthrough. Infact, government made no significant attempt to frame a comprehensive famine relief and prevention policy. Rather it relied on adhoc measures to combat the famines whose failure was an obvious fact. Unmindful of its

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11. Ibid. P-62.

consequences, government pursued a trade based on laissez-fair principles.

The next two major famines occurred in 1832-33 and 1837-1838. The 1832-1833 famine affected the northern districts of the Madras Presidency popularly known as Guntor famine. There is no detail information of its causes, but it is noted that mortality was high and it affected to a limited area. The measures taken were similar to that of the earlier one. Here also government remained reluctant for direct intervention.

The famine of 1837-38 broke out of failure of rain and it left with disastrous consequences whose vivid elaboration find expression in the book "The History and Economics of Indian Famines", "During the entire period of East India Company, no significant efforts were made to combat the famines. There were no permanent famine official, there were no codes, there were no regular reports on crops."<sup>12</sup> One improvement the East India Company made in the administration of relief before its final abolition in 1858 was during the famine in Bellary, when it handed over the general management of road building undertaken as relief works to an expert engineer.

Famine of 1860 was the first famine that occurred soon after the introduction of direct British rule in India. As

12. Loveday. (1985) Op. Cit., P.

to its causes were the after-effects of disturbances of 1857 revolt and failure of rain during 1858-60. It affected for two years and took a massive toll of 200,000 lives. At the request of Bengal Chamber of Commerce, Baird Smith enquired into this famine. His enquiry happened to be the first systematic investigation into the famine. In his report to it, Baird Smith came out with the conclusion that immediate causes were reinforced by the longterm and adverse effect of land revenue demand on the rural economy. In terms of its typology, it was a class famine and it was associated with the lack of employment. So Loveday quotes Baird Smith, who was of the opinion that "Our famines are rather famines of work than of food."<sup>13</sup>

In this famine foreign trade was affected. Unlike previous famines, this period saw no social tension, however, an increase in petty crimes are noted. As to the relief measures it included gratuitous relief and relief work. Government assumed the responsibility of famine relief. It set up first poor house which became a model in later period. It also set up special relief works for "purdanashan" women and advances to cultivators for the purpose of seed and cattle.

Although in respect of relief measures, some improvement was made, yet it did not mark the big departure from the doctrine of free trade. Coupled with it the recommendations

13. Ibid. P.

given by Baird Smith, who made an inquiry of this, was rejected by the British government in England, though it was endorsed by Viceroy Lord Canning.<sup>14</sup>

The famine of 1866 affected a larger area covering Orissa, parts of Bengal, Bihar and Madras. It is also popularly known as the "Orissa famine" as Orissa was the worst victim of this famine. The significant decline of production and food grain availability combined with excessive export to Bombay from Orissa worsened the famine situation in 1866.<sup>15</sup> Not only this, the negligence done to take some preventive measures inspite of early warning of local officials aggravated the situation more. As to the relief measures taken were poorly administered. A good thing that came out of relief measure was the system of village relief where provisions were being made to provide relief assistance to the distressed people at their own residence.

One more government response was the Famine Commission appointed to investigate the causes of the 1866 famine and suggest remedial measures. In its report it advanced the following measures : Liberal assessment of land revenue; removal of intermediaries from land; strengthening of land occupancy rights; improvement in terms of existing settlement; expansions of railways, lands, and roads, and improvement of

14. Mathur, K and Jayal, N.G. (1993), Drought, Policy and Politics in India : the need for longterm perspective, Sage publication. P-23.
15. Alamgir, Mohiddin (1980) Op. Cit., P-67.

irrigation system. Although it made a liberal recommendations it (report) contained no suggestion to deviate from free trade principles. However, it approved of imports, if necessary.

Entirely a different scenerio surfaced during the 1876-1878 famine. Controversy between Provincial Government and government of India escalated to an unprecedented level. Generally controversy intensified on three major questions, such as food grain purchase by the Provincial Government, wage controversy and controversy on land revenue. The controversy over the purchase of foodgrains by the provincial government became clear when Madras government had arranged an amount of 30,000 tons of foodgrains with the idea of using it to soften market pressure if necessary. But the government of India rejected in toto.

The second controversy arose around the wage. The Madras government had made an arrangement for providing employment to adult male at one and half pounds of foodgrain per day. But Sir Richard Temple did not approve of employment at this rate as he thought that it would encourage more people to seek relief work than was justified by their actual need.

Finally, debate over land revenue prolonged when Sir Richard Temple recommended to suspend only land revenue (to be collected later) and not to allow general remission as desired by the Madras authorities. Although in certain

cases, remission was granted, Madras government's argument did not come to be considered.

At this very backdrop, the first Famine Commission headed by Sir John Strachey was appointed in 1878 and submitted its report in 1880. Prof. Mathur quotes the remark of the Report that", a very long period elapsed before the conviction was attained that Indian famines are necessarily recurring calamities, against which such precaution as are possible must be taken beforehand and emphasises that it is the duty of the government to do its utmost in devising some means of protecting the country and to preserve in its attempt till some solution of the problem has been attained".<sup>16</sup>

The report observes that dependence on agriculture was the main reason of famine and emphasised on industrial development. Among other thing it suggested for village relief, distribution of cooked food, remission and suspension of revenue and taccavi loans for cultivators. It also recommended for Department of Agriculture for agricultural improvement and relief. It focussed on collection of vital and agricultural statistics, irrigation and railways, laws to protect peasants and etc. The worth mentioning thing that came out was the adoption of the 1877 Mysore Famine code into a provisional famine code for India in 1883 which was to be used as the model for provincial government to frame their own Famine codes.

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16. Mathur, K and Jayal, N.G (1993) Op. Cit., P-30.

The famine of 1896-1898 affected Bihar, Bengal, Bombay, Madras, North Western Provinces, Oudh Central Provinces, and Punjab. It was also triggered due to failure of rain but aggravated more in Bombay, Madras, and Bengal by excessive export of food grain. It resulted into price rise. But government made no serious attempt to reduce prices.

Reliefs were organised as devised in the famine code, a new system was evolved known as the piece work system which was implemented in North Western provinces, Central provinces, and Bengal.

Unlike the previous ones, second Famine Commission headed by Sir J.B. Lyall appointed in December 1897 to examine the effectiveness of provincial famine codes in alleviating distress of the affected people. More or less this famine commission endorsed the principles laid down in 1880 except recommendation for a liberal wage and a fair extension of gratuitous relief as observed by Famine Commission, 1901. The 1898 commission also made specific recommendations for the relief of hill and tribal people, diversion of Famine Insurance grant from railways to irrigation works and policy towards the projects of princely states.

The famine of 1899-1900 severely affected Central provinces, Berar, Bombay, Ajmer and Merwara, and the Rajputna states. It engulfed 28 million people over an area of 189  
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17. Ibid. P-33.

thousand square miles. This famine simultaneously was a crop famine, fodder famine and water famine. In terms of mortality both human and cattle was high. The peculiarity of this famine lies in the fact that this famine occurred even before the people could recover from the effects of the 1896-98 famine. Unfortunately majority of people affected in this famine were all cultivators. The relief measures initiated were relief work programmes, gratuitous relief, advances, and suspension of revenue. Large work programmes constituted the backbone of relief policy.

The third Famine Commission was appointed under the chairmanship of Sir A.P. MacDonnell in 1900. In its Report, the commission emphasised the need for standing preparation involving the system of intelligence, effective relief work programmes, food reserves of government establishment, and reserves of tools and plants. It also suggested that an order should be followed while implementing the relief measures. Besides, it advocated that a test work were to be converted into a relief work. It also suggested for preservation of cattle by growing fodder crops, the grant of loans for purchase of fodder and the opening of cattle camp. The significance of this famine lies in a trend more towards decentralisation of relief works and modification of government attitude towards famine relief and famine prevention.



Its attitudinal change reflected when it amended the Famine Code of 1898. But, inspite of change of attitude regarding food supply and price control, it strictly adhered to the principle of non-intervention. And this continued till the Bengal famine of 1943.

The famine that occurred in the year 1943 known as the Great Bengal Famine was one of the worst famines in twentieth century so far. The preceding years of 1943 saw some troublesome phase that attributed severly to the Great Bengal Famine of 1943. The year preceding to it marked by increase in foodgrain price and fall in food availability which led to decline in foodgrain supply to the people. In terms of demand and supply side there was a big gap between food availability and the rise of demand for it. Combined with it the inflationary pressure and influx of Burmese refugees worsened the situation more. Besides the failure of the government price control measures, poor management of government procurement scheme, apathy on the part of government and political difficulties at the state level faced by Bengal, all these together made the situation into a disastrous one.

In terms of mortality, there is no agreed view on it. K.P. Chattopadhaya estimated it at 2.7 million whereas Famine Inquiry Commission fixed it at 1.5 million. But it is acknowledged that the loss it caused in terms of morality was very unprecedented.

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18. Alamgir, Mohiddin (1980) Op. Cit., P-76.

The 1943 famine was a class famine where the agricultural labourers, fishermen and other similar occupational groups undergone a severe hardship and became the worst victims of famine. "As the famine distress unfolded in the form of excess mortality, migration, wandering, disintegration of families, and the long trek of people into cities, particularly Calcutta the Bengal government was forced to react by organising relief measures." <sup>19</sup> It has also been noted that, a large number of people died of starvation on the pavements of Calcutta, not a single person among the dead belonged to greater Calcutta.

So government now initiated relief measures by way of gratuitous relief in the form of gruel, uncooked food grains and cash; test relief work wages; agricultural loans; sale of foodgrains at cheap rates to the poor. Medical facilities also extended although it was inadequate and poorly managed as it was acknowledged by the Famine Commission of 1944.

The most remarkable feature of the government measure in Bengal famine was that for the first time in the history of famine administration in India since 1860, an attempt was made by the government to meet the Bengal crisis in 1943 by control of prices and regulation of trade in food grains. But the government failed to carryout successfully its policy of price control because it allowed the crisis to develop

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19. Bhatia, B.M. (1988) Op. Cit., PP,324-325.

first and took action only when the situation had gone out of  
hand.<sup>20</sup>

The peculiar things that happened to surface during this famine were the growing pauperization, and polarisation in rural areas of Bengal and the strengthening of semi-feudal tendency.

In the meanwhile, Famine Inquiry Commission was appointed. In its Report on Bengal, it recommended, among other thing the following measures :

- 1- It suggested for a "Grow More Food" campaign looking at the scarcity of food availability.
- 2- Suggested for government monopoly in procurement and distribution of foodgrain in deficit areas.
- 3- It recommended for a foodgrain reserve of 500,000 tons.
- 4- It enjoined upon the state the responsibility to provide enough food for all with a view to prevent starvation and to create a healthy and vigorous population as well.
- 5- It recommended for expansion of irrigation facilities, increased use of manures and fertilizers, protection against pests and diseases and introduction of mechanization.
- 6- Rejected collective farming and joint farming and recommended for multipurpose village cooperative societies.

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20. Ibid. PP, 324-325.

7- Finally, it also recommended that "Farm workers should also be encouraged to organise themselves, in order that they may enjoy reasonable wages which would be conducive to increase efficiency and Production."<sup>21</sup>

With the Bengal famine of 1943, ended the British regime in independence of our country coupled with it also say the departure of famine from drought. But drought continued to occur in post independent India resulting in crop failure almost every year in some parts of the country or other. To cite recent examples, 156 districts in Bihar, U.P, West Bengal, Rajasthan, Gujarat, M.P, Mysore and Maharastra were affected by drought in 1965-67, 227 districts in Maharastra, Rajasthan, A.P, Gujarat and West Bengal in 1971-72 and 1972-73 and in 1979, so almost all parts of the country. 1982-83, 1984-85 and 1986-87 were also years of drought. Significantly, the strategies for dealing with drought adopted after independence have undergone a sea change compared with that during colonial period. This has precisely been mentioned by P.R. Dubhasi in his paper "Drought and Development" which is given below.

Drought Management Strategy : British Period

Food	:	Free trade
Employment	:	Relief work on test
Gratuitous relief	:	Charity
Indirect relief	:	Inadequate
Infrastructure	:	Irrigation and railways

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Drought Management Strategy : Post Independence

Food : PDS

Employment : National Rural Employment,  
Employment Guarantees

Gratuitous relief : In coordination with voluntary  
agencies.

Indirect relief : Rural institutional credit  
(conversion of short term  
cooperative credit into medium  
term)

Infrastructure development : Protective irrigation, rural  
electrification.



The above mentioned post independence strategy has now been envisaged in the newly replaced scarcity manual and adopted these strategies in different states affected by droughts. During the famine of Bihar and Maharashtra, PDS and Fair price shops were opened to cater the needs of the affected people. Employment was made available to affected people at different place during the Bihar drought of 1965-67. In Maharashtra 5 million people constituting fifty percent of the total working population were employed on relief works. Employment wages were fixed and provided the affected people in cash to enable them to purchase enough food to support their families. And to provide food at a reasonable prices, fair price shops were opened.

During Bihar drought gratuitous relief were provided to

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the people incapable of doing work due to old age or physical infirmity in terms of grain and cash or cheap breads in packets or through free kitchens.

Similarly during Maharashtra drought also similar doles were provided. "Sukhadi" consisting of corn, soyabean oil and milk were blended with jugglery and distributed through kitchens run by a philanthropic organisation. Besides it, subsidised loans were given to cultivator to save crops by resolving short term crops, construction of a "Kutchha" well to tap the underground water resources and installation of electric pumps. Looking at strategies adopted in post independence to deal with the drought, significant changes both in quality and quantity are witnessed.

Soon after independence, the concern for drought mitigation found a due assessment in various successive five year plans. So drought occurred in different parts of the country received a due attention and shaped the policy formulation of the government. Now the policy aimed at both providing access to food and maintaining the quality of lives of the affected people.

Drought mitigation policy begins with the first five year plan giving primary importance to agriculture. In second five year plan soil conservation in dry region (the desert of Rajasthan) received attention inspite of the fact that industrialization being given the highest priority. In

third plan, in a very comprehensive way initiatives on irrigation was emphasised. As a result thirteen major multipurpose river valley projects were taken up.

In fourth plan, some major initiatives were taken up. Dry land Agriculture was initiated, a well realized Rural Works Programme started. And very significantly Drought Prone Area Programme (DPAP) was launched during this plan which was preceded by the appointment of a Task Force of the Planning Commission on Integrated Agricultural Development in drought prone area in 1973. In its report, after expressing its concern over the expenditure being not accompanied by a corresponding impact on drought mitigation, it underlined the importance of area specific strategy of drought prone area, strategy to restore ecological balance and wanted the district to devise its own development strategy.<sup>22</sup> It was for the first time that, the Task Force emphasised upon the longterm strategy for the development of drought prone areas. To meet these needs, the DPAP was launched.

In fifth plan, Desert Development Programme was introduced in hot arid zone. To review the progress made under the fifth plan, a Task Force was appointed by the Government of India in 1980. In its report it emphasised (1) the nexus to be established among different development programmes, (2) reiterated the need of watershed approach as -----

22. Mathur, K and Jayal, N.G (1993), Op. Cit., P-40.

a basic unit of development, (3) and identified block as a basis of development in dry region.

Although DPAP was introduced during mid-term appraisal of the fourth plan, its implementation and result could not be realized as it was expected as observed by the National Committee on the Development of the Backward Areas appointed in 1981. Among otherthings, it again emphasised the need of the watershed approach.

Apart from these two major programmes of drought mitigating policy, several employment generating programmes were introduced in different five year plans. IRDP (including all the previous employment schemes) has been introduced to make it more effective and fruitful in its purpose. Food for Work Programme, a part of public works in rural areas, was renamed as the National Rural Employment Programme (NREP) in sixth five year plan and integrated into poverty alleviation strategy. The Rural Landless Employment Gurantee Programme (RLEGP) was launched in 1983 with the purpose of providing employment opportunities for the rural landless for atleast one hundred days per year, and of creating durable assests. But it has been found to be haphazard in its implementation.

Though, these schemes of employment generation have been integrated into the over all drought mitigating policy, but over the years, planning for drought has been neglected. So



Prof. Mathur and Nirja in their book " Drought, Policy and Politics in India" write, "\_\_\_\_\_ a relief-oriented approach to drought centres on the essentially limited nature of relief measure which may be effective in the short run, but make no contribution to the task of mitigating the impact of future droughts. In this perspective, therefore, the vast resources expended on relief, particularly when they are far in excess of plan expenditure on development programmes, may be seen as wasteful more so in the context of the recurrence of drought."<sup>23</sup>

The 1987 drought evoked altogether a different response from the government. The administrative set up and approach of government response changed towards the better to mitigate the effects of drought at a earlier possible moment. Now it started showing more concern over the drought mitigation. In its assessment of 1987 drought: Response and Management (1989), Prof. Mathur quotes " the approach to relief policy, therefore is more towards drought mitigation and is preventive in nature rather than merely curative. The Relief Scheme is, therefore, not to be conceived in isolation but is integrated with the development ethos and programmes under implementation under five year plans."<sup>24</sup>

But this open endorsement of its attitudinal charge has no self-propelling corresponding changes in the real front of

23. Ibid, P-42.

24. Ibid, P-48.

work. The other side of the story highlights the many shortcomings in the government policy and its implementation. It has been rightly brought to notice by different committees and Task Forces appointed by government of India which are summarised below.

1 - In spite of oft-repeated emphasis over the dry land areas development and planning for dry land areas have not succeeded.

2 - The much-emphasised watershed development approach remains simply as a hallow commitment on the part of government which has not been realized so far.

3 - In the process of formulating an appropriate strategy for drought mitigation, people's initiatives for public programmes has never been encouraged and individual as a unit has been given primary rather than on groups. In the policy measures also farmers' coping strategies against drought has been ignored.

There is need to revitalise farmers' strategy through technological and other means, as they are as relevant to day as was in the past. Learning farmers as a drought managers, public policies should not artificially isolate drought management from overall development strategy for dry areas. The strategy for drought management should be looked upon as an integral part of sustainable development, a

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Jodha, N.s (1991) Drought Management, Farmers' strategies and their policy implication, Economic and Political Weekly, September 28, P.A-98.

pattern and process of development without erosion of the Nation's stock of natural resources and the approach to drought management should not be adhoc, but longterm. There is an urgent need of having a policy on proper natural resource management.

We have come a longway facing the droughts in the country, to tackle it the above suggestions need to be emphasised while formulating the policy. The removal of shortsightedness in policy making and a determined political will would be helpful effects.

A brief point may be made about the general trend in the evolution from the famine code to scarcity manual (Drought policy). Now we don't use famine code rather we use Scarcity Manual (which replaced the Famine Code after the independence) to distinguish from famine to drought. Earlier under the Famine code an area as famine affected used to be declared when the situation was becoming more aggravated by the famine. When the famine used to be more rampant and widespread, Government was taking measures to combat it. It implies, there was no well framed precautionary measure or standing preparation to tackle the famine. After independence, it has been done away with the Famine Code used in colonial period. The Scarcity Manual has been formulated to take away the shortcomings of Famine Code. Under this Scarcity Manual, enough precautionary measure is taken so

that drought situation is easily solved. The significance of the Scarcity Manual is that it uses drought instead of famine and prescribes certain indication to know the possible occurrence of drought. That is why as soon as some indications are found, relief measures are poured into the affected area before it becomes a fullfledge drought. However, the recurrent droughts in the country provide enough evidence that, its provisions are not carried out properly.

Now a view about how relief expenditure is obtained in post independent India would be a step further to focus a clear picture of financing the relief expenditure. The task of making provisions of relief expenditure has been assigned to Finance Commission which in a periodical manner recommends the appropriate financing of relief expenditure. The first concern over the relief operation found expression in the report of the second Finance Commission submitted in 1957. The second Finance Commission, in its report emphasised the need for making more regular provision to meet the unforeseen expenditure on natural calamities like famines, droughts and floods.

The Sixth Finance Commission which was assigned to look into the feasibility of establishing a National Fund for relief operation. It made some significant observation in its report : First-it observed that "Famine Codes are available in many of the states and some of them have been updated

these codes, despite many deficiencies, assured a reasonable measure of uniformity among the states in their approach to problems of relief. However, the practice, envisaged in these codes of keeping ready a list of works to be taken up for execution as relief programmes appears to have fallen into disuse in many states. The result is that an emergency relief works are in many cases taken up on an adhoc basis with inadequate attention to their longterm utility." 26

Second, it observed that, the sharp increase of relief expenditure since 1966-67 was difficult to explain in terms of the increasing severity of the natural calamities and made it clear that avoidable waste in relief expenditure incurred, could have been properly used with better plan and organisation. Then it pointed out the constraint of resources for development programmes in the plan which in a few cases led to pressures by the states on the centre for larger assistance in the form of drought relief. Third-it stressed the present arrangement for relief expenditure to be overhauled and expressed its dissatisfaction of relief are usually constituted at short notice and have to complete their assesment of the situtation within a short period. Fourth-it wanted both the medium and longterm programmes to be integrated with the plan. It urged that instead of incurring large scale relief expenditure on adhoc basis on -----

26. Sixth Finance Commission, P-63.

schemes of dubious role, provision should be made on a much larger scale for the development of drought and flood prone areas in the Fifth Plan both in the state and central sectors. Finally it provided for a substantial increase in the present margin under "64-Famine Relief."

Regarding the National Fund which was to be a contributory fund, looking at its pros and cons concluded that the establishment of a National Fund led by central and state contributions is neither feasible nor desirable.

The Seventh Finance Commission, for the first time made a distinction between different calamities. It distinguished droughts from floods, cyclones and earthquakes. The distinction was made on the grounds of differences in the nature of the calamity and the consequent difference in the measures required for relief of distress. While it fixed the margin money for drought relief, it also stipulated that, the expenditure over and above the margin money should be met by the state out of the contribution from its plan outlay which was not supposed to exceed five percent of the annual plan outlay of the state. This was to be covered by the release of "advance plan assistance" by the Government of India adjustable within five years following the end of the drought. It also recommended that in case of severe drought situation, the government should go beyond that limit of five

percent, whose assistance was to be treated as fifty percent grant and fifty percent loan. It also recommended for non-plan grant for repair and restoration of public work following floods, cyclones and earthquakes.

The Eighth Finance Commission conceded the scheme suggested by the Seventh Finance Commission and increased the quantity of margin money for all states and suggested that margin money should be shared on a matching basis between the centre and the states.

The Ninth Finance Commission was assigned with the task of establishing National Insurance Fund. Like the sixth Finance Commission, it made series of consultation with the LIC and GIC over the feasibility of having National Insurance Fund independent of government concluded that "It is not possible to run away from the basic fact that the primary responsibility for providing relief to the persons affected by natural calamities is that of the government. No corporate body or agency independent of government can ever cope with the multitude of problems left by a natural calamity in its trail. The execution of the relief programme therefore, can't be delinked from governmental responsibility. Having heard the states and after having given serious thought to the entire gamut of inter-related issues we also feel that the establishment of a National Insurance Fund is not possible."<sup>27</sup>

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27. Ninth Finance Commission, P-25.

It pointed out that the present arrangement for financing relief expenditure should be replaced by a new one where greater autonomy, accountability and responsibility are placed upon the states and they are provided adequate means to carry out the same. The Ninth Finance Commission wanted to replace the existing arrangement with the following important features :

1 - It recommended for a Calamity Relief Fund for each state with a contribution both from state and centre.

2 - The contribution is to be of 75 percent in the form of non-plan grant. The rest is to be from the state concerned.

3 - Following the creation of this fund, it will be the responsibility of the state governments to meet all expenditure arising out of natural calamities.

4 - This fund would be operated under the control of a committee headed by the chief secretary of the state.

5 - The commission also recommends the distinction between drought on the one hand and floods, cyclone, fire etc on the other hand, be done away.

6 - It recommends the centre to form an Expert Group to monitor the relief work done in the states utilising the Calamity Relief Fund.

7- Finally it emphasises the government to take appropriate action when the situation warrants to be very much severe.



Now a general trend of the Finance Commission may be briefly looked at. Since independence the Finance Commission has been instrumental in formulating different strategies for the relief expenditure. Its recommendations have been held in high by the government which formulates policy accordingly. It has been a major agency in influencing the government policy making. It introduced margin money to meet the relief expenditure. In its report, the Ninth Finance Commission, recommended for the Calamity Relief Fund which has been adopted by the government- a major step in the relief operation.

Looking at the active role played in terms of its recommendation and influence it exerts the Government, its role is now on increase. It is no more a recommending authority, but forming an important component of Government policy making.

Although different Finance Commission reports have formulated different strategies for the relief expenditure, in the long run it has not been able to formulate an objective criteria for its assessment. The central team sent to the affected state fails to give an appropriate assessment of relief expenditure as the central team is formed at a shortest notice and at best they give a cursory views of it. Besides government makes little effort to monitor and evaluate relief expenditures in terms of their impact on the

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rural economy of drought region. And finally the assessment at a political level has also bearing up on the effectiveness of relief expenditure.

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28. Ibid, P-26.

## CHAPTER-II

### A brief profile and socio-economic and political dynamics of the district - Kalahandi.

Location, Area and Population - Kalahandi, one of the districts of Orissa is located to the South-Western part of the State and situated between 19.3° N and 21.5° N latitudes and 82 degree.20' E and 83 degree.47' E longitudes<sup>1</sup>. It is one of the land locked districts of the state surrounded by the districts of Bolangir, Sambalpur, and Raipur to its north, on the south by the district of Koraput (undivided), on the West by the district of Koraput and Raipur (M.P) and on the east by the districts of Koraput and Phulbani. Its total area is 11.835 sq. Km and ranks 4th among the districts of Orissa.<sup>2</sup>

Now Kalahandi has been bifurcated into Kalahandi and Nawapara (one of its subdivision -now a new district) on 1st April 1993.<sup>3</sup> The total population of undivided Kalahandi, according to 1991 census is 1130903 out of which a population of 1052740 live on rural area and rest population of 48163 live in urban area. Out of total population mentioned above 192366 are scheduled caste and 326648 are scheduled tribe population in the district.<sup>4</sup>

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1. Senapati, Nilamani and Kuanr (1980), Kalahandi. Orissa District Gazetters, Bhubaneswar, P-1.

2. Ibid, P-3.

3. Lokadrushti (1993) A workshop Report on Hunger and under development ! Is there a way out for Kalahandi. P-5.

TABLE-1

Decadal variation in population, sex rate and growth rate of population in the district since 1901.

Decade	Variation in Population Charges in			Decennial the sex ratio growth (Females per 1,000 males)	Decennial rate of popu- lation (6)
	Person	Male	Female		
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1901	4,44,137	2,24,150	2,24,987	1,004	-
1911	5,40,495	2,69,062	2,73,433	1,024	(+) 20.34
1921	5,50,358	2,71,045	2,79,313	1,031	(+) 1.82
1931	6,55,194	3,66,250	3,79,063	1,035	(+) 19.05
1941	7,45,313	3,66,250	3,79,063	1,035	(+) 13.75
1951	8,05,675	3,98,978	4,06,697	1,019	(+) 8.10
1961	9,46,874	4,99,646	5,10,008	1,020	(+) 17.53
1971	11,63,869	5,78,929	5,84,940	1,010	(+) 22.92
1981	13,39,192	6,66,163	6,73,029	1,010	(+) 15.06
1991	15,91,984	7,95,939	7,96,045	1,000	(+) 18.88

Source - District Statistical Hand Book 1990-91 -Kalahandi  
page -10

Table-2

Literates in state and district by residence and sex, 1991  
census

State/District	Total/Rural/ Urban	Literates, 1991 (Provisional)		
		Total	Male	Female
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ORISSA	Total	1,29,11,905	83,92,320	45,19,585

	Rural	1,03,03,681	68,06,202	34,97,479
	Urban	26,08,224	15,86,118	10,22,106
Kalahandi District	Total	4,03,026	3,04,379	98,647
	Rural	3,49,332	2,70,577	78,755
	Urban	53,694	33,802	19,892

Source - District Statistical Hand Book, 1990-91. Kalahandi,

page-10

Administrative set up: The undivided district consist of three subdivisions, viz, Bhawanipatna (the district headquarter), Dharmagarh and Nawapara (now forming a separate district) with an area of 3,408 sq. Km. Alongwith three-subdivisions, it has 7 Tahasils (5 in Kalahandi and 2 in Nawapara), 18 police station (12 in Kalahandi and 6 in Nawapara).

Topography : the district may be broadly divided into two distinct natural divisions, the hill tracts and the plain country. The former chiefly comprises the ranges of hills which runs from the north-east to the south-west of the district and the western portion of the Nawapara sub-division and the latter constitutes the river valleys of the Tel and its tributaries and the Jonk. The hill tracts in colloquially known as Dongarla which makes its presence at a distance of 8 kilometres away from the district headquarders of Kalahandi.

4. Orissa Economic Survey 1993-94, P-137.

5. District at a Glance (1993) Kalahandi, Directorate of Economics & Statistics

6. Senapati, Nilamani and Kuanr, DC (1980) Op. Cit., P-5.

It occupies a vast area of about 3,665 sq.km on the eastern side of the district and extends southwards to the Koraput border. The hill tracts with its scenic beauty and widespread spectrum of natural green cover stands like a wall which is visible for many miles. The hill tracts is covered with dense forest and fertile soil with the perennial source of water helping the hilly people to cultivate rice and other cereals suited to the hill tracts.

The principal plateau lands are the Karlapat, Thuamul - Rampur ranges and the Baphlimali hill, a fine plateau on the district border near Mahulpatna; these in parts reach an elevation above sea level of 1,220 metres and over.<sup>7</sup> In these hills rises the river Indravati at a village nearby Thuamul - Rampur which flows to the southern direction of the district. Of late a dam has been constructed under the Upper Indravati Project over the river Indravati at Katiguda with a purpose of generating hydro electricity.

The other part of mountainous tract extending almost to the entire western part of Nawapara sub-division from north to south contains a broad plateau varying from 610 to 915 metres in height cut off from the plains below by a range of precipitous hills.<sup>8</sup>

The river Tel which forms the part of plain tract flow in between the two natural mountain division - north east hill

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7. Ibid, P-5.

8. Ibid, P-6.

tract and western part of Nawapara sub-division. On its way it receives a number of tributaries, both large and small, whose valleys constitute the plain fertile regions. The river Utei whose valley covers a larger portion of Madanpur -Rampur and Narla police station is an important one. The river Tel also creates fertile tracts of the Dharmagarh sub-division and Joypatna police station and extends towards the plains of Nawapara sub-division across the Deobhog police station area of M.P. The area between Dharmagarh sub-division and Nawapara sub-division marks the presence of mountain blocks, some continuous and others scattered and broken intermittently by narrow valleys.<sup>9</sup>

Forest : Nearly half of the total geographical area of Kalahandi (5,859.57 sq.km) is covered with forests.<sup>10</sup> But over the year total forest cover has been declined and now it has comedown to 5144.03 sq. km which marks the net decline of 715.54 sq.km.<sup>11</sup>

For the administrative purpose the forests of the districts are divided into two divisions, Kalahandi Forest Division with headquarter at Bhawanipatna and Khariar Forest Division with headquarter at Khariar.

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9. Ibid, P-8.

10. Ibid, P-22.

11. District At a Glance (1993) Op. Cit.

The forests are grouped into three categories:

1- Sal Forests - It is of a moderately moist type. It corresponds more or less with champions moist peninsular sal.<sup>12</sup>

The area under sal forests are found in Lanjigarh and Madanpur - Rampur with 80 percent coverage, some places it is 90 percent.

2- Dry Mixed Forest - The protected forests of Khariar Division comprising 73 forest blocks fall into this category of deciduous mixed forests wherein the common miscellaneous species found are teak (*Tectona grandis*), Asan (*Terminalia tomentosa*), Dhaura (*Angeissu Latifolia*) and soon.<sup>13</sup>

3- Bamboo Forest - Solia bans (*Dendrocolamus strictus*) is only important bamboo. It constitutes small consociations surrounded by mixed forest and sometimes by sal. The most-extensive areas under this type are to be found in Madanpur-Rampur and Lanjigarh.

Till 1949-50, the reserved forests in Kalahandi district were being worked on royalty basis by large firms like the B.T.T. Co and B.N. Dutta and Co, that were mainly involved in exporting timber outside the district whereas in the plains, trees were being cut under coppice system to meet the needs of the local people.<sup>14</sup> But this royalty system was abandoned and in its place open action of coupes was introduced. On

12. Senapati, Nilamani and Kuanr, DC (1980) Op. Cit., P-23.

13. Ibid, P-23.

14. Mahajan, Anil (1993) The Human Situation in Kalahandi : An Eco- Developmental Analysis in (eds) Human Encounter with Drought Reliance, New Delhi., P-18.



the longterm basis leases for bamboo trees were given for a period of 9 years to the Orissa paper mills from the year 1954-55.

It may be noted that some of the areas (453 sq.km) under this forest division of Kalahandi was under the direct control of Zamindar. But soon after independence the Zamindari forests came under the State Government on 27th November, 1952, with the abolition of the Estate.<sup>15</sup>

The forests of Nawapara sub-division was under the governance of Khariar Zamindari and to some extent the Deputy Commissioner of Sambalpur had also certain statutory powers to control the Zamindari forests, but it was inadequate in its purpose. The forests of this sub-division were so much exploited that big timbers were seldom left in the forests - as authenticated in the Raipore District Gazetteer 1909.<sup>16</sup> After independence, the attempt to stop the mindless deforestation in this forest division has been placed a top priority in its overall forest policy of the government. Now more close look at the forest conservation and scientific management draw due attention of the government.

Climate - Kalahandi which is located in the north-eastern corner of the Deccan plateau is more or less similar to that of the main Deccan plateau. The year may be divided into four seasons. The summer season begins in March and ends in

15. Senapati, Nilamani and Kuanr, DC (1980) Op. Cit., P-25.

16. Ibid, P-25.

May followed by the South-West monsoon season from June to September. October and November constitute the post monsoon season. The cold season is from December to February.

Rainfall - There are eighteen numbers of rain recording stations in the district which record the rainfall pattern through out the year. The normal annual rainfall in the district is 1378.2 mm, but the actual rainfall in the district does not correspond to the average annual rainfall. It varies to a considerable extent. In a long span of 48 years from 1902 to 1950 the highest annual rainfall occurred in 1919 which was 139 percent of normal rainfall. 1923 was the year with the lowest rainfall which was only 66 percent of the normal rainfall.

On an average there are 65 rainy days (ie, days with rainfall of 2.5 mm - 10 cent - or more) in a year. This number varies from 59 at Nawapara to 69 at Bhawanipatna. June, July, August and September are the months of heavy precipitation whose average rainfall stands at 294.25 mm and August alone accounts for 385 mm - the maximum rainfall in a year.

Temperature: Generally hot season begins from March. May is the hottest month when mean daily temperature touches about 41 C and the mean daily minimum temperature is about

17. Ibid, P-30.

18. Ibid, P-30.

19. District Statistical Hand Book (1990-91) Kalahandi, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Orissa, Bhubaneswar, P-9.

28<sup>o</sup> C. On individual days the maximum temperature may reach 47<sup>o</sup> C. In this context heat wave around is not uncommon to see. With the arrival of South - West monsoon by the second week of June, temperature starts declining and throughout the South - West monsoon, the weather generally remain cool. December is the coldest month with the mean daily maximum at about 28<sup>o</sup> C and the mean daily minimum at about 13.0<sup>o</sup> C. Some times the minimum temperature goes down to about 6<sup>o</sup> C. Generally this minimum temperature is an observed phenomenon in the hilly areas of the district.

TABLE-III

Normal and Actual Rainfall in the district

Month (1)	Number of rain recording stations (2)	Normal rain fall (in m.m) (3)	Actual Rain fall (In m.m)				
			1986 (4)	1987 (5)	1988 (6)	1989 (7)	1990 (8)
January	18	11	28	11	-	-	-
February	18	15	36	2	37	-	33
March	18	14	5	10	9	8	49
April	18	24	41	7	35	1	44
May	18	34	31	48	15	22	184
Jun	18	228	442	106	211	310	226
July	18	343	309	316	224	220	391
August	18	385	270	214	215	299	459
September	18	221	128	190	191	188	310

20. Senapati, Nilamani and Kuanr, DC (1980) Op. Cit., P-31

October	18	82	52	78	41	18	397
November	18	18	13	67	-	-	71
December	18	3	7	-	-	6	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>1,378</b>	<b>1,362</b>	<b>1,049</b>	<b>978</b>	<b>1,072</b>	<b>2,214</b>
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Source	-District. Statistical Hand Book 1990-91, Kalahandi- Page-91.						

Mineral Resources- Kalahandi has got three<sup>21</sup> commercially viable minerals - Graphite, Quartz and Bauxite. The first two are already being worked upon where as the third being located at a remote place which involves lot of difficulties so far as its mining is concerned.

Bauxite - Bauxite of good quality occurs as blankets and lenses within the above 1000 m. M.S.L. laterite on purana shales of Khariar high lands, on Khondalite groups of rocks<sup>22</sup> on Karlapat.

Graphite - The graphite deposits of this district occur in the rocks of the Eastern Ghats group being confined to the<sup>23</sup> contact zones of Khondalite with the granite gneiss. The individual occurrences of graphite have been noticed at Komna, Billanjore, Baghmunda, Babupali and so on.

Manganese - Besides Graphite, Quartz and Bauxite, deposits of manganese is also found in Kalahandi district which stretches over a belt of 27 km from near Boriputtu in Koraput district

21. Mahajan, Anil (1993) Op. Cit., P-39.

22. Senapati, Nilamani and Kuanr, DC (1980) Op.Cit., P-15.

23. Ibid, P-16.

to Minakhunti in Kalahandi district. Besides these minerals, recently at some places nearby Junagarh some precious stones are also found whose commercial viability is yet to be explored. Clandestine effort is being made by some people to sale these minerals outside the district. Although commercial potential of mining of the above minerals are observed in the district, to a limited extent its mining has been exploited which does not ensure enough employment opportunities to the local people. Coupled with it the lack of permanent basis of government policy towards the mining of these minerals present a very deem prospect of any solution which can compensate the tragic effects of the droughts in the district.

Socio - Economic and Political Dynamics of the District.

The district, Kalahandi has evolved to its present state of being due to the interaction of many forces and factors at different points of time.

To begin with, in the early historical period, perhaps the river valleys like Indravati, Hati, Tel, Jonk, Udanti and Sunder provided favourable conditions for settled<sup>24</sup> cultivation and growth of civilisation in Kalahandi. The archaeological excavation at Asurgarh (Kalahandi) also authenticates the existence of a developed civilisation in

24. Deo, Fanindam. (1991) Historical Experiences in Kalahandi, paper presented at a workshop on Hunger and Underdevelopment. Is there a way out for Kalahandi, Lokadrusti, Khariar, P-1.

its ancient time. Besides, the large quantities of punch-marked coins found at some places which date back to 3rd century B.C reinforces an idea of growth of civilisation in the district.

It has been found that the earlier inhabitants of the districts were cultivators by occupation. They had a well built indigenous irrigation system such as bunds, sagars or big tanks whose legacy is now very much on decline failing to cope with the scarcity of water. There had also been existence of forts, temples and towns at Maraguda, Asurgarh, Gudhandi, Belkhandi etc. But in course of time these centres disintegrated. Due to lack of proper archeological excavation in these area there is paucity of evidence.

Since the beginning of 1st century A.D. Kalahandi was under the reign of various Hindu dynasties. But the last four decades of 12th century Kalahandi became a vulnerable zone which fell victims to different outside forces. With the disintegration of the Gangavansi empire Kalahandi became a zone of friction between different powers of Orissa, Chhatisgarh and Andhra Pradesh.

In this process the rulers came both from among the adivasi communities and from outside. Around the emergence of rulers in Kalahandi in this very state of fluctuation a mythological view is depicted, where it is believed that in the beginning of 13th century, in a feud and the anarchic

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25. Ibid, P-3.

state of affairs involving succession to the throne, the Kondhs (a tribal group) persuaded a minor heir to the throne to return to the kingdom and was assured protection, help and assistance in managing the state of affairs. It is said that a Kondh called Pat Majhi crowned this king. This was the beginning of the custom of the king of Kalahandi being crowned by the Pat Majhi at Jugsaipatna, now deserted.<sup>26</sup>

At the beginning of this succession the kings had a loyalty and patronage towards the tribal people and its culture. It was simply a compulsion for them to justify their rule, nearly achieved status and surplus accumulation. The kingship in the district was not genuinely linked to the soil and surrounding of the district. As surplus accumulation was one of the motives of the rulers, this led to take resort of invitation to the non- adivasi particularly the Kulthas who were better at the agricultural technology than the adivasis. Now this situation led to diffusion of agricultural technology amongst the adivasi and it resulted in other cultural borrowings between the various groups.<sup>27</sup>

The arrival of non adivasis not only led to diffusion, acculturation and assimilation amongst the tribal people, it also led to tribalisation as the incoming non- adivasi accepted much from the adivasis in their day to day life. At the same time a trend of sanskritization also became evident

26. Mahajan, Anil (1993) Op. Cit., P-19.

27. Deo, Fanindam (1991) Op. Cit., P-4.

when the tribal people aspiring for the Kshatriya status.

Regarding the political control, it is not very clear whether the Mahrattas were able to establish their sovereignty over Kalahandi and other neighbouring states. But in the last quarter of 18th century in a case involving two claimants for the Kalahandi throne, there is evidence that the decision was made by the Bhonsla of Nagpur. A Takoli (tribute/land rent) of Rs 5330/- per year was known to be paid to the Bhonsla by the rulers of Kalahandi. By the beginning of 19th century, the intervention of East India Company officials in the polity and administration of Kalahandi became a regular feature.

The penetration of colonial rule into the district saw a landslide change in the pattern of administration. The colonial rulers made alliances with the local rajas to protect their interests. The local rajas so far dependent on the adivasi now enjoyed an independence status which upset the traditional balance existed between the local rajas and the adivasi. As the rulers did not depend any more on the adivasis, they invited skilled cultivators from outside, settled them in adivasi villages and initiated revenue collection. For regular realisation of revenue villages were given on theka or auctioned, Nazrana was demanded.

The revenue collection and thekadari system changed the relatively egalitarian adivasi structure. They lost their

28. Ibid, P-6.



rights over the shifting cultivation. The sense of freedom associated with shifting cultivation had to give way to the constraints of settled cultivation and to the obligations to the thekadars.

The regular revenue payment system was so rigid that the adivasis began to mortgage their land to "alien" Kultas, who came from Sambalpur, to money lenders and horse traders. This was the beginning of the process of alienation among the tribal people. They lost their lands to the Kultas. The traders, the Brahmans, the Kultas purchased their lands. Their women folk became menial servants. Gradually the adivasi became labourers on what had been their own land.

Against such an exploitative order the adivasis rose into an uprising known as Kandh meli of 1882. It was directed against the raja-sarkar-thekadar nexus. The rising was suppressed by British troops. The arrested leaders of the rebellion were all given capital punishment.

From 1882 to 1894, British government directly managed Kalahandi state. In 1894 Raghu Keshri Deo, who was educated at a college in Jabalpur and had imbibed Western mannerisms, obtained gadee but was murdered in 1897. Brajamohan Deo, son of Raghu Keshri Deo, was made the ruler in 1917 and in 1918 conferred the title O.B.E (Order of the British Empire) and in 1926 with the title of Maharaj.

29. Ibid, P-7.

30. Ibid, P-8.

31. Ibid, P-10.

32. Mahajan, Anil (1993) Op. Cit., P-20.

The succession of Brajamohan Deo marked significant changes in economic and cultural life of the district. The credit for the spread of English in the district goes to him. He also made serious attempts to improve agriculture and streamline revenue administration. He also abolished forced labour, created a P.W.D for the construction of roads and buildings in the state, modernised the police system and the laws prevalent in British territories, regarding stamps, endowment etc were adopted in the district.

On the otherhand the Zamindari of Khariar had a similar history except being shallow history of the princely family. After the merging of the princely state of Kalahandi and the Zamindari of Khariar with the Union of India in 1947, for the first time on 1st August, 1962, the Kashipur police station was transferred from Kalahandi and tagged to Rayagada subdivision of Koraput district. And recently in 1993 Nawapara subdivision has been made a separate district. This division of the district may bring overall development and overcome the present crisis.

The present undivided Kalahandi is not isolated from the way it evolved to its present form. The deep rooted links with its past evolution and many ups and downs it experienced over the period of time, shaped the district Kalahandi only to be exposed and faced with the human tragedy of hunger and starvation. The infiltration of exploitative elements into the district in its past created and imposed a different kind

of social structure linked with the feudal agrarian system which persists in Kalahandi in different form. In post independent period, the government intervention strategies have not been able to make much headway. Government has not been able to alter the exploitative system which persists today. It does not show government's limitation rather reflects apathetic attitude, incapability and lack of committed will which Government knows no better than the people affected and passed through a traumatic stage of droughts and its immediate consequences.

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### Chapter-III

#### Provisions of Orissa Relief Code and Drought Situation in Kalahandi.

Prior to 1980, the Orissa Famine Code, 1930 was the mainstay of the relief operation in the state. As the radical changes in the concept of relief in a welfare state became a necessity, the Orissa Famine Code of 1930 became outdated or obsolete. The present Orissa Relief Code, 1980 has been compiled to serve as an operational guide in relief matters in the changed context. Consequently this code<sup>1</sup> supercedes the Bihar and Orissa Famine Code, 1930.

The present Orissa Relief Code, 1980, clearly contains the provisions for relief arrangement in respect of natural calamities in the state. The Orissa Relief Code, 1980 takes note of different dimensions of natural calamities such as (a) Natural calamities which are fairly widespread, eg, drought, flood, cyclone and tidal disasters, earthquakes, volcanic eruption etc, and (b) those that are localised, e.g. galewind, whirl-wind, tornales, hailstorm, distress resulting out of fire accidents, accidents relating to communication and transport services, lightning,<sup>2</sup> thundersquallo, virulent epidemics locust menances, etc.

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1. The Orissa Relief Code (1980), Government of Orissa. P-3.
2. Ibid. P-3.

One of the significant departure of the Orissa Relief Code, 1980 is that it does not foresee the outbreak of famine in the state. Regarding it the code clearly mentions that "Famine indicates a state of extreme paucity of food due to complete failure of crops consecutively for more than one year and acute form of human distress as well as acute distress to animals and birds on account there of. With the development of quick transport and communication facilities and with improvements in the food production situation in the country, the condition of famine could not be said to appear on any local failure of rains. Hence at present the question of declaration of any areas as "Famine affected" does not arise."<sup>3</sup>

**Objective of relief measures:**

The objective of the relief measures is not only to ensure that no one should die of starvation but also to prevent physical deterioration and destitution of the people and to enable them to resume their ordinary pursuits of life on return of better times and simultaneously to encourage the village community in making concerted and continuous effort to fight a common misfortune. Boosting of the morale of the public in times of disasters is very much necessary and is, therefore, an important objective of the relief operations. The approach to relief in the present context has to be both

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3. Ibid, P.3.

preventive as well as maintenance of a common standard of economic health of the people, the Orissa Relief Code, mentions.<sup>4</sup>

General principles regulating relief measures :

The general principles under which relief measures are to be regulated are as follows :

(a) provision for labour intensive work - As the entire provision of the Orissa Relief Code, 1980 emphasises the need to have an arrangement aimed at integration of development and relief planning of the areas affected by natural calamities, so is the provision for labour intensive work. This provision talks of shelf of schemes or contingency plan to be functioned in the areas affected by natural calamities. It may include employment-oriented works, like reclamation and management of saline land, raising of shelter belts in the coastal areas, plantation of economic species in forests, mining, irrigation, digging and renovation of tanks and wells, setting up of village industries by artisans, and the like. While preparing for this contingency plan, it should be properly linked with IRIP-SFDA, MFAL, DPAP, TDA/ITDP, HAD and CAD.

(b) Provision of Food and Drinking water - Under this provision, at a time of serious scarcity, adequate

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4. Ibid, P-3.

arrangement is made to provide food and drinking water to the people affected by the natural calamities. Generally, the landless as well as small and marginal farmers fall prey to this situation. The contingency plan prepared becomes the mainstay to provide food and drinking water to these people.

(c) Gratuitous Relief -There may be certain vulnerable section of the society who can't be supported in any other way at a time of serious natural calamity. In such a situation gratuitous relief has to be given. Similarly children both non-school going and school going and expectant and nursing mothers have to be provided with a supplementary feeding programme in order that their physical condition may not deteriorate.<sup>5</sup>

(d) Assistance to cultivators to retrieve loss - Whose crops are damaged to a great extent owing to flood, drought and other calamities the state comes to help the cultivators to retrieve the loss suffered in Khariff crops by way of increasing production in next rabi and Khariff crops by providing :

(i) easy availability of seeds seedling for resoning and transplantation of the crops or for raising alternative crops;

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5. Ibid. P-4.

- (ii) arrangement for quick supply of pumps for lifting water from rivers, nallahs, etc;
- (iii) quick energisation of irrigation tube wells ;
- (iv) adequate supply of credit for purchase of seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, bullocks etc; and
- (v) undertaking prompt and effective measures for eradication of widespread pest attack if any.

Other aids in the form of remission and suspension of collection of loans are also given to cultivators with the same objective in view.

(e) Assistance from non-Government sectors. The Orissa Relief Code, 1980, also takes note of non-government institutions and voluntary organisations coming forward to carry out relief measures.

(f) Best utilisation of resources - The Orissa Relief Code also takes note of proper utilisation of limited resources of men and material in times of relief operation.

**Nature of relief measures :**

As soon as any major calamity occurs or a particular area is declared by Government to be "distreas" or affected from such a calamity, one or more of the following measures as deemed fit may be undertaken subject to the directive of the Board of Revenue/Special Relief Commissioner and then the scales of relief are



given as per modifications to be affected by government from time to time.

- (i) Labour intensive works including relief works.
- (ii) Gratuitous relief.
- (iii) Nutrition supplementary feeding programme,
- (iv) Relief measures by non-official organisations,
- (v) Care of orphans and destitutes,
- (vi) Strengthening of public distribution system,
- (vii) Health measures and veterinary measures,
- (viii) Agricultural measures including provision of credit supply,
- (ix) Special relief to weavers and artisans,
- (x) Arrangements of food stuff and stocking of food grains in strategic place,
- (xi) Provision of drinking water,
- (xii) Provision for immediate irrigation facilities,
- (xiii) Remission and suspension of collection of land revenue and loans;
- (xiv) Grant of educational concession,
- (xv) Enquiry into starvation cases and prompt action taken on such reports, and
- (xvi) Action on press reports.

Financing the relief measures:

Prior to 1974 the amount available for relief expenditure was Rs 1.25 crores. Additional Central Assistance was being made available to the state Government for relief expenditure on account of natural calamities as and when required under the principles enunciated in Government of India in 1965. However, such expenditure was sharable between the Government of India and the state Government.

The policy and arrangements in regard to financing of relief expenditure was referred to the sixth Finance Commission set up in 1972 and with their recommendation Government of India decided to dovetail relief programmes with development programmes. However, in order to enable the state Government to meet localised situations of distress with a central assistance, a "margin money" of Rs 3.58 crores was fixed for this state and this was made effective from the Financial year 1974-75. Government of India further issued instructions that this amount should be kept in a fund created for the purpose and invested in easily negotiable securities for realisation of when relief expenditure was necessitated by a natural calamity.

To supplement the provisions of plan and Non-Plan schemes, "Food For Work" schemes are also taken. For the functioning of these two, margin money may be utilised. In -----

6. Ibid, P-5.

certain cases, Government of India may be approached to provide advance plan assistance by the state concerned. Regarding the pattern of utilisation of the resources meant for relief expenditure, the Government of India emphasised (in letter No 7.9.73 SR dated the 7th Feb, 1973) the need of demarcating between the "productive and unproductive" works and creating productive assets from the outlays earmarked for relief works. They broadly indicated that schemes relating to soil conservation, afforestation, minor irrigation etc would fall under the category of productive works whereas road works, especially rural roads, which were normally of temporary in nature were unproductive. Thus, the government of India desired utilising the margin money meant for relief works mostly for permanent asset creating productive schemes.

Government of India have further revised the quantum and the matter of utilisation of margin money of the recommendations of 7th Finance Commission which have come into operation with effect from the 1st April 1975 as follows:-

(a) A sum of Rs 871.00 lakhs as Margin Money is provided in the state's Budget every year and the unspent balance out of the same is to be invested in easily encashable securities so that it can be drawn upon in times of need.

7. Ibid, P-5.

(b) In case of drought, if the relief expenditure is in excess of margin money, the state should make a contribution from its plan for providing employment opportunities as a measure of relief. The extent to which the state Government should contribute from its plan in this manner is to be assessed by a central team deputed by the Government of India after completion of necessary formalities of presentation of Memorandum approved by the State Government. The ceiling fixed in this respect is that the plan contribution may not exceed five percent of the annual plan outlay. This plan contribution of the State Government should be treated as an addition to the plan outlay in that year and covered by advance plan assistance as were the arrangements in force during 1974-79 . The adjustment of the advance plan assistance against the ceiling of the state plan should be effected within 5 years following the end of the drought period. If the expenditure requirement as assessed by the Central Team and approved by the Central High Level Committee can't adequately be met in a particular case after the state plan contribution is taken into account, the

extra expenditure should be met by the central assistance half as grant and half as loan.

(c) In case of expenditure on relief and repair and restoration of public works following flood and cyclone and other calamities of this nature, central assistance should be made available as non-plan grant not adjustable against the plan of the state or against central assistance for the state plan to the extent of 75 percent of the total expenditure in excess of the margin money.

(d) At a time of severe calamity it may be necessary for the Central Government to extend assistance to the state even beyond the mentioned schemes.

(e) The state Government has enacted a law called "Orissa Famine Relief Fund Regulation 1937." According to this Regulation on modified upto 31st October 1979 every year the State Government shall place an amount of Rs 8.71 crores (i.e the margin money referred to above) to the credit of the fund. The purposes for which the fund may be utilised have been laid down in the Regulation as follows :-

(f) For relief of distress caused due to famine, severe drought, flood or fire, cyclone, earthquake or other natural calamities;

- (g) For the construction of repairs of embankments after serious floods;
- (h) For establishment charges in connection with relief measures,
- (j) When the Fund exceeds Rs 1 crore, State Government may utilise inter alia the excess:-
- (i) in execution of protective irrigation works and other works, if and when required for prevention of famine;
  - (ii) in grant of loans to cultivators under the Agriculturists Loan Act, 1894;
  - (iii) in grant of loans to institutions undertaking to advance loans for building fire-proof houses in villages which are often affected by fire;
  - (iv) if approved by a special resolution passed by the Orissa Legislative Assembly in any other capital expenditure which is to be recouped after a term not exceeding five years.
  - (v) contribution from the non-official source may also be entertained.

As the natural calamities like drought, flood or cyclone occur every year, to tackle these, the Orissa Relief Code, 1980 takes note of precautionary arrangements. Solely for

this purpose, Control Rooms are functioned in different offices including the offices of collectors, Revenue Divisional Commissioners, Board of Revenue and Special Relief Commissioner specially from the 1st of May to the 30th November during which there is likelihood of occurrence of major natural calamities like floods, cyclones and tidal disaster.<sup>8</sup> Drought conditions may also develop in case of erratic and inadequate rain fall in which case the Control Rooms may function also beyond November. It may also function in sub divisions and other offices according to the direction of the Collector.

#### Administrative Relief Organisation

In a welfare state Government has assumed the responsibility of rendering relief to the people affected by a natural calamity. In such times of widespread distress, the entire Government machinery is switched on to render relief to the people. The Revenue Department and the Board of Revenue co-ordinate the work of all the Departments of Government and Heads of Departments in regard to relief operation.

Here briefly may be mentioned of the authorities concerned with administrative relief organisation.

1. Board of Revenue Special Relief Commissioner :-

The member, Board of Revenue \Special Relief  
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8. Ibid, PP, 6-7.

Commissioner at the state level is directly responsible to the Government for all kinds of relief operations in the affected areas. The Board of Revenue has got statutory powers and responsibilities under section 4 of the Orissa Board of Revenue Act, 1951 to exercise supervision of the work done by the Revenue Divisional Commissioners and Collector and this applies to relief operations also.

(2) Revenue Divisional Commissioners

The Revenue Divisional Commissioners are responsible for advising the State Government in all matters connected with fire, famine, flood, etc. They have thus a statutory responsibility to regulate and control relief operations undertaken by the Collectors as a result of any natural calamity subject to the control of the Board of Revenue/S.R.C.<sup>9</sup>

(3) Other Heads of Departments

Heads of the different Departments of Government are responsible for relief measures within their respective jurisdiction subject to the overall control of the concerned Department of Government and the Board of Revenue/S.R.C.

(4) Collectors

The Collectors are responsible for relief operations in their districts. They have to coordinate the relief activities of the District Level Officers of different -----

9. Ibid, PP, 11-13.



departments. They have been delegated with the necessary powers for undertaking the relief measures.

(5) Sub Divisional Officers

The subdivisioanal officers are responsible for all relief operations in the sub-division. They have to co-ordinate and supervise the work of Relief Officers, Tahasildars and the Block Development Officers. Their responsibility is to see that relief measures are expeditious and according to the instructions of Government and the Board of Revenue/S.R.C and relief actually reaches the people for whom it is meant.

(6) Tahasildars and Block Development Officers

Besides the above mentioned authorities, the services of the Tahasildars, Additional Tahasildars, Block Development Officers, Additional Block Development Officers and other officers of the Revenue and Block administration may be utilised for relief measures undertaken in the district. In case the number of officers of a district affected by a natural calamity is found to be inadequate such officers from other districts are to be transferred.

Besides these, Government is also required to form committee at different level to ensure association of people's representatives with the administration of relief.

- (a) State Level Committees on National Calamities -  
Government has consituted a state level committee on

Natural calamities in which some of the Members of the Legislative Assembly have been taken in as members. The Committee when meets reviews the situation arising out of the natural calamities and advises Government on relief matters.

(b) District Level Committee on Natural Calamities - Government has constituted a District Level Committee on Natural Calamities in which members of the Legislative Assembly and members of parliament of the district have been taken in as members. The chairman of Panchayat Samities are invited to attend the meetings of the committee whenever considered necessary. The Panchayat Samities and Grama Panchayats are associated in organisation of relief measures in the Blocks. The officer in-charge of the Relief circle should see that the people's representatives are properly associated with all relief measures.

The Orissa Relief Code and Declaration of Drought :

The ORC makes a detail provision as to the declaration of drought. Generally declaration of drought is made by Government after taking into consideration the crop assessment report submitted by the Collector together with the views of the Revenue Divisional Commissioners and the Board of Revenue/S.R.C. Government in special circumstances

before completion of such report by the field officers declare certain areas as drought affected after considering the monthly situation reports, the special report submitted by the Collector together with the views of the Revenue Divisional Commissioners and the Board of Revenue\ S.R.C and such other materials as are available with Government. As soon as drought is declared by the State Government in respect of any area, a report shall be submitted immediately to the Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, Department of Agriculture (Relief).

Soon after the drought is declared, a Master plan for drought prone areas shall be prepared separately in which durable, remunerative, productive and asset creating schemes and projects should be included for execution as long term measures towards permanent solution of the drought problems. Similarly, there should be a contingency plan of such works and as soon as drought situation develops, or the situation worsens, these project may be switched on to without loss of time.

As soon as drought is decalred, following measures are taken to meet the eventualities of drought.

(a) Ensuring supply line of food:

Soon after decalration of drought, the Collector shall see if food stuff available in the district is adequate and to take steps to supply essential food

articles to the people through the public Distribution system and otherwise.

(b) Provision of Drinking Water, it includes :

- (i) construction of surface walls and tanks.
- (ii) deepening of walls and renovation of tanks.
- (iii) installation of tubewells.
- (iv) repairs of tubewells and supply of drinking water through temporary pipe line.
- (v) additional provision of water for cattle and for other use.
- (vi) provision for immediate irrigation facilities.
- (vii) suspension of collection of taccavi loans.
- (viii) relief to students and educational institutions through grant of full freeship; distribution of text books free of cost to primary school children; remission of payment of full deficit to aided institutions may also to be considered.

In case of incidence of starvation death, the Collector shall cause an enquiry into the allegation. After the receipt of the enquiry report, the collector shall review the relief measures undertaken in the area and also if he deems proper, may visit the area himself or depute a senior

officer to take stock of the situation and be satisfied about the adequacy of labour employment, food position, and other relief arrangements.

Besides alleging starvation deaths, reports on large scale migration of population on account of lack of work, scarcity of drinking water, outbreak of epidemics etc. appear in the press very often. The Collector shall take steps to get such reports immediately verified by proper enquiry or otherwise and if found he should take immediate remedial action.

Drought relief operation should ordinarily continue till the onset of next rainy season i.e till the end of June. Now no new relief project or relief work should be taken up in June. The aim should be to complete all the incomplete works by May and June. In case of continuance of any programme beyond the 30th June, specific orders of the Board of Revenue/Special Relief Commissioner shall be taken. The same process is followed for the supply of drinking water.

The Orissa Relief Code provides in many aspects a well planned framework for providing assistance during times of crisis, and for promoting developments designed to enhance the ability of the vulnerable to maintain food security. If rigorously and efficiently implemented, such interventions may establish an effective "Safety net" for protecting the vulnerable by as far as possible safeguarding access to

important facilities such as drinking water, health care,  
10  
credit and so on.

But the gap between the theory and practice in the implementation of relief measure is found in case of Kalahandi. The recurrence of drought since mid 80s and its multiplying effects leading to baby selling, hunger and starvation, out migration never augur any conformity and complacency to the Orissa Relief Code. Again the incidence of starvation death confirmed by the Orissa High Court rules out the non-acceptance of famine situation in Orissa by the Orissa Relief Code. As to the relief administration, there exists certain discrepancy in implementing properly the relief measure owing to the negligence and half hearted approach by the government officials.

#### Drought Situation in Kalahandi

The district Kalahandi is the most drought prone area in the State. Although since the mid 80s, the district is more aggravated by the successive droughts, it is not a new phenomenon for Kalahandi except the degree of severity. There was famine and food scarcity in Kalahandi district in 1868, 1897 and 1899. Drought vulnerability and frequency seem to  
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have increased since 1910. Drought conditions were

10. Currie, B. (1993), Food crisis, Administrative Action and Public Response : Some General Implications from the Kalahandi Issue, Unpublished Doctoral Thesis submitted to University of Hull, U.K., November. P-239.
11. Samal, Kishor. C. (1994), Drought and its toll in Kalahandi, Mainstream, Vol. XXXII, No 14, February 19, P-24.

reported in 1919-20, 1922-23, 1925-26 and 1929-30. The District Gazetteer reports the history of drought in the region. In the period after 1947, when the estate was transferred from the Maharaja, drought continued to visit the area. A severe drought hit the district in 1954-55. The magnitude of failure of crops has been described as follows : "Taking the normal yield to be 75 percent, the failure of the crops in Bhawanipatna was about 40 percent, in Nawapara sub-division 30 percent and in Dharmagarh sub-division about 20 percent. In certain pockets, however, the loss was more." <sup>12</sup>

To mitigate the effects of the drought the government had opened 11 mid-day meal Centres in different parts of the district. <sup>13</sup> One more severe drought occurred in 1965-66. The drought was responsible for the loss of nearly three - fourths of the total crop production. The effect was so severe that its impact was to be felt during 1966-67 also. The expenditure on relief grant amounted to about Rs 60 lakhs of which about Rs 34 lakh was on test relief and Rs 14 lakhs for providing drinking water. Besides it, an amount of Rs 1.38 crore was expended in the form of loans and advances. The drought also drew the large number of relief

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12. Drought and Poverty (1985) A Report from Kalahandi, Economic and Political Weekly, November 2, P-1858.
13. Dash, Jagannath (1993), Impact of Drought on the Agricultural Production, Forest Utilisation and Migration in Nayak, P.K and Mahajan, Anil (ed) Human Encounter with Drought, New Delhi, Reliance Publishing House. P-56.

organisations which came to 2,471 and the beneficiaries were about 2.03 lakh, forming about one-fifth of the total population.

Drought also occurred in 1974-75 after ten year. There are not many published records of this drought. The number of death registered in 1975 jumped to about 13,000 from 6,070 in the previous year. The yield of paddy declined from 7.33 to 3.03 quintals per hectore in the autumn and from 15.57 to 7.88 quintals per hectore in the Winter season. The District Statistical Hand book of 1974-75 is rather silent on the drought except for recording that " the actual rain fall (739.7 mm) as recorded during the year 1974 was much below the normal rain fall which caused a severe drought in the district."<sup>14</sup>

The 1985 drought had a long history of recurrence preceding it, but this history has not produced an infrastructure to combat it. After this drought, late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited Kalahandi in 1985 and again in 1987, some programmes were launched at the direct initiative of the PM's office. Unfortunetely these have not been sustained and once again there was recurrence of drought and out migration in 1992-93 which brought Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao to the district. Besides 1985 drought, one more severe drought occurred in 1986-87. Madanpur Rampur, Narla,  
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14. Drought and Poverty (1985) Op. Cit., P-1858.



Lanjigarh, Junagarh, Dharmagarh and Koksara were the worst affected blocks of 1986-87 drought. In this drought the Khariff paddy crop was above 50% in 11 blocks of Kalahandi District. On the basis of paddy crop cutting experiments conducted by the Revenue Field Staff, drought situation was reported from 779 villages covering to 139 Gram Panchayats in 11 blocks of Kalahandi District affected by the drought and the total population affected was 5,99,592. Instructions in the Relief code are that a village will be treated as drought affected only if there is 50 percent or more damage to the standing Khariff paddy crop. But the district administration lost sight of the fact that non-paddy crop constitutes 60 percent of the cultivable area and poor people of the locality depend more on coarse grains like Ragi, Jowar, and minor millets. It is not known why Government did not issue instructions to assess the damage to the non-paddy crop and arrange relief for the distressed scheduled caste and scheduled tribe people who depend on them.

However the drought situation followed the relief measures including labour intensive work, feeding programme, extensive public distribution system and various measures related to agriculture in the district. The significant aspect of this drought situation was the appointment of a

15. The Samaj (1987) Interim Report submitted by the Orissa Legislative Assembly (House Committee on Drought and other natural calamities). Cuttack, September 29, P.A

"House Committee on Drought and other natural calamities," consisting ten members (the speaker as Chairman) of the Orissa Legislative Assembly on 09.4.87 to look into the problems concerning drought and other natural calamities in order to suggest short term and long term measures to the Government.

After the extensive enquiry, the Committee submitted its report with the following recommendations :

(a) The Committee reiterates that all allegations of starvation deaths published in news paper should be enquired into by some gazetted officer within 48 hours after it comes to notice. (The Committee during its enquiry came across the 128 case of starvation death which were not enquired).

(b) The committee found that Medical Officers in charge of the Primary Health Centre and sub-ordinate officers have not enquired into causes of death cases reported during November to February in the affected areas. This has led to the controversy around whether the death occurred because of disease or starvation. The Committee takes note of this and emphasises to enquiry the death causes by reviewing the old system.

(c) In order to assess the damage due to drought and flood, crop cutting experiments are conducted in respect of Khariff paddy crop only. As a result,

distress due to failure of non-paddy crops are not taken into account while reporting drought damage in the district of Kalahandi. The Committee is firmly of the view that Government instruction for crop cutting experiments should be modified in order to cover all the non-paddy crops which are staple food of the backward class people in the district.

Regarding the measures taken by the Government the committee felt that while the normal development programmes are under implementation in the district, there is no special programme to combat the drought situation.<sup>16</sup> However, not much is known about the implementation of any measures suggested by the Interim Report (by the House on drought and natural calamities) submitted to the Government of Orissa.

Before ending this chapter it would be clear enough to focus on any effective and well thought out measures taken by the Government. The Central Government initiated Drought Prone Area Programme (DPAP) introduced in 1974-75 in Kalahandi alongwith the district Phulbani. In the sixth plan the norm under DPAP was Rs 1.5 lakh per block and now it is raised to Rs 15 lakh. Though financially Rs 15 lakh per block looks a big amount, it is not sufficient to solve the drought situation on a permanent basis. There is faulty

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16. The Samaj (1987) Op. Cit., P. C.

implementation for scattered approach owing to the so-called  
equal distribution of the DPAP funds among the blocks.<sup>17</sup>  
There is no longterm plan nor any big project due to  
inadequacy of funds. As a result, coping with the drought has  
become a difficult task. The relief operation meant for the  
drought and poor people get diverted and siphoned off. It  
fails to reach the target group. In this process some  
capable affected people desperately try to build up their own  
alternative strategy to cope with the situation and other  
people who become a vulnerable group flourish in misery,  
starvation, hunger and take resort to migration.

The tragedy for Kalahandi is that there is no serious  
analysis of situation nor the preparation of an action plan  
for it. More emphasis is given on relief-oriented programme  
instead of work and earn approach.<sup>18</sup> Ecologically indifferent  
programmes are undertaken whose impact is not visible. The  
performance of DPAP is a pointer to this observation.

A special programme, Area Development Approach for  
Poverty Termination (ADAPT) was initiated directly from the  
Prime Minister's Office in 1988 and terminated in 1990. An  
amount of Rs 11 crore was earmarked under ADAPT. Inquiries  
made in December in 1991 revealed that the bulk of this  
amount remained unspent. Moreover, what had gone through the  
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17. Samal, Kishore C. (1994) Op. Cit., P-26.

18. Ibid. P-26.

process of implementation had made little impact on the people. A small section of intermediaries had cornered most of the benefit.<sup>19</sup>

Then the question arises, what is to be done? No permanent basis of strategy to overcome the drought has been possible. The existing relief based measures can't be a solution to ever increasing suffering from drought. The role of relief schemes brings out the fact that drought and starvation deaths are not the result of inadequate food and supply but the consequences of an economic system which does not enable every one to have adequate income or other forms of entitlements to have access to sufficient amount of food.<sup>20</sup>

As the drought in the district is induced by the erratic rain fall, there is need of successful completion and functioning of different irrigation projects suiting people's needs.<sup>21</sup> There is need to have extensive plantation. There should be proper utilisation and management of water resources with crop diversification as well change in the cropping pattern, and soil and water conservation through biological treatment. Vigorous land reforms with proper utilisation of land including wasted and common properly resources should get the utmost priority.

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19. Mohanty, Manoranjan (1992), Kalahandi Awaits, Mainstream, April 18, P-7.
20. Samal, Kishor. C (1994), Op. Cit., P-26.
21. Dash, Jagannath (1993), Op. Cit., P-89.

However, as the people's right over water, land and forest (Jal, Jamin and Jungal) is shrinking, serious attempt It would pave a new path of development and take away the drought prone Kalahandi into a new horizon of prosperity.

## Chapter -IV

### Anti- Poverty Programmes in Kalahandi

In a welfare state the concern of people's welfare occupies a central place in the governance of the country. The role of the state expands for the betterment of the people. The prevalence of mass poverty in the country and its concern to eradicate the poverty of the people, the Government has assumed the role of an agency of social welfare and has been set in motion in its effort to root out poverty through different Five Year Plans.

The first three Five Year Plan though did not have direct measures for poverty eradication, through the emphasis upon the development of industrialisation, agriculture and self-reliance, it was expected that development would filter down to the grass root level and alleviate the poverty of the people. But the direct concern for the development of common man and the "less privileged" was emphasised in the Fourth Five Year Plan through different programmes such as S.F.D.A and M.F.L.A etc. In the Fifth Plan the objective of "removal of poverty" was given categorical emphasis. The Sixth Plan contained a number of "poverty alleviation programmes. The Seventh Five Year Plan emphasised to generation of employment. It mentioned, in the employment front the planning strategy has to shift from adhoc or even

general schemes to specific scheme for generation and optimization of employment". This plan emphasised both the self or wage employment programmes.

In the Eighth Five Year Plan. We see a different trend. New approaches and programmes have been devised to deal with mass poverty and unemployment. The programmes have been specifically focussed specific backward areas and deprived groups like agricultural labourers, freed bonded labourers, small and marginal farmers, artisans, scheduled castes and schedules tribes etc. In short, they seek mitigation and redressal of acute poverty. Besides Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY) an Intensified Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (IJRY) has been introduced in 120 chronically backward district, where there is concentration of unemployment and under employment, labour migration and natural resource depletion. Similarly, the Employment Assurance Scheme (EAS) which was commenced in October 1993 with the intention of providing assured employment to the rural poor for 100 days during the lean agricultural season has been securely grounded and indeed widely welcomed as an important

1. Patnaik, Sasmita, 1993, Absolute Poverty and its Eradication in Rural Nawapara in Nayak, P.K. and Mahajan, Anil (ed) Human Encounter with Drought, New Delhi, Reliance, p.96.
2. Annual Report, 1994-95, Ministry of Rural Development, New Delhi, p.1.
3. Ibid, p.12.



initiative in tackling chronic unemployment and under employment in the rural areas. Over ten million people have already registered under this scheme, which is an important and vital mechanism for providing a degree of security of employment and food to the poorest in the backward and resource poor blocks in the country.<sup>4</sup>

In this plan "MPs Local Area Development Scheme" is also in operation. Under this scheme, each MP will have the choice to suggest to the District Collectors. Works to the tune of Rs 1 crore per year, to be taken up in their respective constituencies, with each individual work not exceeding Rs 10 lakhs. Members of Rajya Sabha may select any district from the state from which he/she has been elected for exercising the choice of works under this scheme. On the basis of suggestions made by MPs priorities will be drawn according to these guidelines.<sup>5</sup>

Besides these different existing poverty eradication programmes have been strengthened and widened their coverage to the maximum possible extent. Now with the available data and informations an attempt is made to look at the anti-poverty programmes functioning in the district of Kalahandi over the different periods of time. Here it may be mentioned that

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4. Ibid,p.2.

5. Programme for Social Change, 1995, Ministry of Rural Development, New Delhi,p.28.

only available informations on different poverty eradication programmes are enumerated below under the scope of different kind of poverty eradication programmes such as (a) Wage employment and infrastructure development, (b) Self employment and income generation programmes, (c) Special Area Programme. Apart from these three, special emergency scheme, special component for women and bonded labourers have also been discussed.

(a) Programmes on wage employment and infrastructure development

(i) Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY)

Rural poverty is inextricably linked with low productivity and unemployment including underemployment. While the normal process of growth itself has to generate increased productive employment opportunities, there is continued need for special employment programmes and creation of sustained employment opportunities for securing a certain minimum level of employment and income for the rural poor.

With the above objective in view, various schemes of employment generation were taken up from time to time. In the last year of the Seventh plan, i.e from 1st April, 1989, the then existing two employment programmes viz.

National Rural Employment Programme (NREP) and the Rural Landless Employment Guarantee Programme (RLEGP) were merged into a single rural employment programme known as Jawahar Rozgar Yojana.<sup>6</sup> This programme is functioning in Kalahandi since its inception.

#### Objectives

The primary objective of JRY is generation of additional gainful employment for the unemployed and underemployed men and women in rural areas. It also includes certain secondary objectives, as follows:

- . Creation of sustained employment by strengthening the rural economic infrastructure.
- . Creating community and social assets.
- . Creating assets in favour of the rural poor for their direct and continuing benefits.
- . Positive impact on wage levels.
- . Overall improvement in the quality of life in rural areas.

#### Achievements

In the year 1992-93, Rs 1421.17 lakhs was available out of which Rs 1047.32 lakhs was spent and 25.39 mandays was generated. Some more informations are given in the table below:-

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6. Ibid, P-1.

Financial Achievement under JRY for the year 1989-90

TABLE-1

Total (In Lakh)	Expenditure	Balance	Manday generated
311.401	280.613	30.788	14.460

Source - DRDA, Bhawanipatna, Kalahandi.

Financial achievement under JRY for the year 1990-91

Table-2

Allotment (In Lakh)	Total	Expenditure	Balance	Manday generated
465.895	491.497	240.671	250.816	5.282

Source - DRDA, Bhawanipatna, Kalahandi

Employment Generation under JRY for the year 1992-93

TABLE - 3

Funds Available (Rs in Lakh) (1)	Expenditure (Rs in Lakh)			Employment Generated (in Lakh Mandays)			
	Cash (2)	Kind (3)	Total (4)	S.C (5)	S.T (6)	Others (7)	Total (8)
1421.17	1040.02	7.30	1047.32	8.83	8.57	7.99	25.39

Source - Economic Survey 1993-94, Government of Orissa Pg-160.

(ii) Indira Awaas Yojana (IAY)

Housing is vital for human survival and therefore, essential for socio-economic development. The need for improved housing is most acutely felt among the rural poor. As a part of the efforts to meet the housing needs of the rural poor, Indira Awaas Yojana was started in May 1985 and in the same year it was introduced in Kalahandi. This programme is now implemented as a sub scheme of the Jawahar Rozgar Yojana.

Objectives

This programme aims at construction of dwelling units free of cost for the poorest of the poor. Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and the freed bonded labourers in rural areas are given preference.<sup>7</sup>

Achievement

During the years 1991-92 and 1992-93, under this scheme 1540 houses were taken for construction of which 1493 were completed and the rest 47 were under progress. Further information in its achievement are given in the table below :-

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7. Ibid, P-4.

Achievement under Indira Awaas Yojana in the district

TABLE - 4

Items (1)	Unit (2)	1985-86 (3)	1986-87 (4)	1987-88 (5)	1988-89 (6)	1989-90 (7)
1-Total expenditure during the year	Rs in Lakhs	----	50.92	74.06	40.42	26.77
2-Asset created	Nos	----	513	582	516	160
a- SC	Nos	----	193	204	231	80
b- ST	Nos	----	310	370	263	76
c-Bonded labourers	Nos	----	10	8	22	4
3-Mandays	In Lakhs	---	2.10	2.26	3.05	2.59

Source - District Statistical Hand Book, 1990-91, Kalahandi pg-65.

(iii) N.R.E.P- National Rural Employment Programme.

Before it merged into JRY in 1989, the total funds to the tune of Rs 982.891 lakhs was allotted to this district out of which Rs203.861 lakhs was spent during 6th plan period leaving a balance of Rs 79.03 lakhs at the beginning of the Seventh Plan on 1.4.1985. During the period 1985-86 to 1987-88 houses constructed for SCs and STs under N.R.E.P are as follows :

No of house taken up	No of house completed till 31.7.1988
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478

455

Amount utilised for these houses was Rs 32.87  
8  
lakhs.

(iv) Employment Assurance Scheme (EAS)

The growth of population and labour force has led to an increase in the volume of unemployment and underemployment. The Eight Five year plan aims at reducing unemployment to a negligible level within the next ten years. It has been realised that larger and efficient use of available human resources is the most effective way of alleviating poverty; reduction in inequalities and sustainance of reasonable high<sup>9</sup> pace of economic growth.

Accordingly as announced by Hon'ble Prime Minister on the Independence Day, 15 August, 1993, Employment Assurance Scheme for generating employment opportunities to the rural poor on an assured basis has been launched from 2nd October 1993. In the same year it has been introduced in Kalahandi.

8. DRDA, Bhawanipatna, Kalahandi.

9. Programme for change, 1995, Op Cit., P-6.

## Objective

The primary objective of the scheme is to provide gainful employment during the lean agricultural season in manual work to all able-bodied adults in rural areas who are in need and who are desirous of work but can't find it. The secondary objective is the creation of economic infrastructure and community assets for sustained employment and development.<sup>10</sup>

Under this programme, initially in 1993 six blocks of Kalahandi (The Rampur, Lanjigarh, Narla, Madanpur Rampur, Kesinga and Golamunda) were covered with an outlay of Rs 338000. In 1994 another five blocks (Bhawanipatna, Junagarh, Jaipatna, Kalampur and Dharmagarh) have been covered with an outlay of Rs 675,0000.

## Achievement

Under this programme till March 1994 1,26326 (in lakh) have been registered and one lakh people have been provided with employment card".<sup>11</sup>

## (b) - Self Employment and Income -Generation

### Programmes

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10. Ibid, P-6.
11. DRDA, Op. Cit.,



(i) Integrated Rural Development Programme  
(IRDP)

It was introduced in Kalahandi in 1980-81. It is a major self employment Programme for poverty alleviation.

Objective

The objective is to enable identified poor families to cross the povertyline by providing them productive assets and inputs in the primary, secondary or tertiary sector through financial assistance by way of government subsidy and term credit from financial institution.<sup>12</sup>

Achievement. During Seventh Plan the percentage of SC and ST was 60.6% and of women was 34.9% to the total achievement.<sup>13</sup> In the year 1993-94 the total beneficiaries were 7235 of which 1560 were women. Some more informations in the table.

IRDP - Its achievement in 7th Five Year Plan in the district

Year	Target	TABLE - 5 Result		Total	Women
		SC	ST		
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
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12. Programme for Change, 1995, Op.Cit., p.8

13. DRDA, Op.Cit.,

1988-89	7047	2329	3261	10154	4606
1989-90	12486	2042	2971	9717	2978

Source - DRDA, Bhawanipatna, Kalahandi.

IRDP - Its achievement in 8th Five Year plan in the district

TABLE - 6

Year	Target	Result		Total	Women
		SC	ST		
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1990-91	7357	1254	1858	6245	1990
1991-92	6968	1258	1487	5420	2295
1992-93	5807	1006	1277	4468	1240
1993-94	10591	1863	2507	7235	1560

Source - DRDA, Bhawanipatna, Kalahandi.

IRDP - Financial Achievement

Year	Opening balance	Fund from Govt (in Lakh)	Total	Expenditure	Balance
1988-89	(-) 43.30	266.18	230.18	225.44	4.74
1989-90	4.74	141.79	146.53	121.88	24.65
1990-91	24.65	171.79	196.44	155.08	41.36
1991-92	41.36	192.81	329.74	153.02	176.72
1992-93	178.83	105.44	284.27	163.47	120.80
1993-94	120.80	273.33	409.78	332.91	76.87

Source - DRDA, Bhawanipatna, Kalahandi.

(ii) Training of Rural Youth For Self Employment

- (TRYSEM)

The Training of Rural Youth for self Employment is supporting component of the IRDP. It was started in August, 1979 with a view to facilitating diversification of IRDP activities, away from the primary sector to the secondary and tertiary sectors through acquisition or upgradation of skill.

Objective

The programme aims at providing basic technical and managerial skills to rural youth from families below the povertyline to enable them to take up self-employment and wage employment in agriculture and allied sectors, industries, services and business activities.

Achievement

In the year 1992-93 a number of 518 trained people were rehabilitated under the scheme. Further information is given in the table below:-

Achievement under TRYSEM in the district

TABLE - 8

Items (1)	1985-86 (2)	1986-87 (3)	1987-88 (4)	1988-89 (5)	1989-90 (6)
1- Persons trained	322	779	1.766	1.106	792
(a) SCs	78	173	482	262	272

14. Programme for Change, 1995, Op.Cit., p.12.

(b) STs	59	216	467	313	134
(c) Other castes	185	390	817	531	386
Out of which Women	-	278	726	383	316
2. Persons rehabilitated	287	400	1,506	1,328	553
(a) SCs	71	104	454	315	159
(b) STs	87	101	427	411	115
(c) Other castes	129	195	625	602	279
Out of which women	-	82	1,191	634	173
3. Persons who have settled up self employment	-	-	1,428	1,182	428
(a) SCs	-	-	425	269	101
(b) STs	-	-	399	384	102
(c) Other Castes	-	-	604	529	225
Out of which Women	-	-	1,118	609	145
4. Persons who have Taken up wage employment	-	-	78	146	125
(a) SCs	-	-	29	46	58
(b) STs	-	-	28	27	13
(c) Other Castes	-	-	21	73	54
Out of which women	-	-	73	25	28

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Source - District Statistical Hand Book 190-91,  
Kalahandi, Pg-64

(iii) Development of Women and Children in  
Rural Areas (DWCRA).

The programme of Development of women and children in Rural Areas was initially launched as a pilot programme in 50 selected districts in 1982 with UNICEF cooperation to strengthen the women component of poverty alleviation programmes. In 1983-84, it was introduced in Kalahandi with an outlay of Rs 0.25 lakh.

#### Objective

The objective of the programme is to raise the income level of women of poor households as to enable their organised participation in social development towards economic self-reliance. The primary thrust in the formation of groups of 10-15 women from poor households at the village level for delivery of services like credit and skill training, cash and infrastructural support for self-employment. Though the strategy of group formation, the aim is to improve women's access to basic services of health, education, childcare, nutrition, water and sanitation.

#### Achievement

In the initial year of its inception in the district total number of groups

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15. Ibid,p.10.

sanctioned and formed were 540, of which 10,800 were the beneficiaries. Out of 540 groups formed, 485 groups started income generation activities. During the two financial years 1989-90 and 1990-91 (till march) total number of groups sponsored were 492 and 353 were sanctioned of which 231 were disbursed.<sup>16</sup>

(c) Special Area Programme

(i) The Drought Prone Areas Programme (DPAP)

The Drought Prone Area programme conceived as a long-term measure for restoration of ecological balance by conserving, stock and human resources. In the year 1974-75, it was introduced in Kalahandi.

Objective

(i) To minimise the adverse affects of drought on production of crops and live stock and productivity of land, water and human resources through integrated development of the natural resources base of the area and adoption of appropriate technologies.

(ii) To conserve, develop and harness land, water and other natural resources including rainfall for restoration of ecological balance in the long run.

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16. DRDA, Op. Cit.,

17. Programme for Change, 1995, Op. Cit., p.15.

## Achievement

During Fifth Plan period, the approved outlay for the district was Rs 100.00 lakhs per annum. In the Sixth Plan it was raised to Rs 165.00 lakhs (Rs 15.00 lakhs per blocks). Measures taken under the DPAP in the district.

(i) Minor Irrigation - Under the DPAP 32 Minor Irrigation Projects were taken till the end of Sixth Plan.

(ii) Lift Irrigation - Upto Sixth Plan, 74 Lift Irrigation Points were installed creating additional irrigation facilities in 3080 hectares during khariff and 1412 hectares during Rabi.

The expenditure for this was Rs 41.794 lakhs.

In 1985-86, One Lift Irrigation Point installed at the cost of Rs 2.11 lakhs for the irrigation of 40 hectares. In 1986-87, 7 Lift Irrigation Programmed to be installed with DPAP share of Rs 0.377 lakhs.

(iii) Soil Conservation - Under this head different steps were taken as follows.

(a) (i) Irrigation - Till sixth plan - Rs 119.067 lakhs spent for the purpose of irrigation.

(ii) Water Harvesting Structure - In 1985-86, 16 W.H.S completed

creating additional irrigation potential of 190.5 hectors.

(iii) Construction of 92 W.H.S with 42 units at a total cost of Rs 71.00 lakh was programmed.

( b) Plantation - It included

(i) Mixed fruit tree plantation in 2540 hectors.

(ii) Coffee plantation - 150 hectors.

(iii) Social Forestry - 11296 hectors.

Till the 6th plan it (plantation) covered 13986 hectors. Avenue plantation covering 478 kms was done at the cost of Rs 157.810 lakhs. Besides these, measure being taken to cover the following heads.

(iv) Soil and water Management

(v) Horticulture.

(vi) Animal Husbandry - The main programme under the Animal Husbandry sector taken up were Artificial Insemination Centre, Natural Service Centre, Feeder Seed Farm, and Chik Rearing Centre.

(vii) Pisi culture.



(viii) Agriculture - New cropping method in dry land farming.

(ix) Sericulture.

(x) Afforestation - Social Forestry and Avenue Plantation.

Some more information on assistance to beneficiaries under this programme was provided as follows:

TABLE - 9

Scheme	Year	No of families received assistance
Water Harvesting schemes	1989-90	81
Percolation tank	1989-90	48
Kachha Channel	1989-90	14

Source: Currie, B. (1993), Food Crises, Administrative Action and Public Response: Some General Implication from the Kalahandi Issue, p.274.

Besides the above programmes, there are two more programmes need to be discussed.

#### Bonded Labour Scheme

It was introduced in 1980-81 in Kalahandi. As on 14.88 total number of bonded labourers identified were 3629 and was released to the same number of bonded labourers 3629 of which 3616 bonded labourers were rehabilitated. During the year 1989-90 and 1990-91, 91 people (65 in 1989-90 and 26 in 1990-91) were

18. DRDA, Op.Cit.,

identified and total 80 released bonded labourers (56<sup>19</sup> in 1989-90 and 24 in 1990-91) were rehabilitated.

Prime Minister's Massive Programme (PMMP)

It was introduced in Kalahandi from the year 1983-84. During the period 1983-84 to 1987-88 total amount (in lakh) sanctioned was Rs 256.21 and the amount spent was Rs 258.74 of which Rs 0.47 was the balance.

Achievement

Under this scheme from 1983-84 to 1987-88 number of beneficiaries covered were 10,7352 of which 27500 were scheduled caste people and 31657 were scheduled tribe<sup>20</sup> people. Apart from the above enumerated Anti-poverty schemes or programmes, some other programmes such as SEVY, RLEGP, E.R.R.P, MWS, etc are in operation in the district, because of lack of access to relevent informations on these programmes, no information could be given in this Dissertation.

(d) Special Emergency Scheme

(i) Area Development Approach for Poverty Termination (A.D.A.P.T) Programme.

The year 1985 set in a divide line owing to its widespread effect of drought and its follow up consequences on the common people of the district. Though the droughts occurred prior

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19. Ibid,

20. Ibid,

to 1985 had also a major impact leading to widespread crops damage and suffering of the poor people, but it did not make much headway in terms of its publicity and concerned attention of the government. The 1985 drought brought home the message of hunger, starvation death, outmigration, selling of babies and etc. The cruelty continued in 1987, 1988, and 1989 successively escalating further the previous impacts of droughts.

In this very backdrop, after a visit to Kalahandi in 1987, the late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi introduced a special programme "ADAPT" in 1988 directly from the PMO to mitigate the affects of drought and to promote development in the district. The Area Development Approach for poverty Termination (A.D.A.P.T) programme was implemented during 1988-89 and 1989-90 in Nawapara, Komna, Khariar, Boden, Sinapali, Golamunda, Lanjigarh and Th.Rampur blocks. The amount sanctioned for this special programme was Rs 11 crore.

#### Achievement

As part of this programme 571 water harvesting structures were introduced at a cost

of Rs 845.21 lakhs; 32 lift irrigation points were installed at a cost of Rs 81.32 lakhs; 7 minor irrigation points were introduced at a cost of Rs 29.00 lakhs; and 2102 dug wells had been completed at a total cost of Rs 204.76 lakhs.

It would be more clear to see the achievement with reference to a particular ADAPT block. This is shown in the table:

Target/Achievement of ADAPT Programme in Nawapara Block

TABLE - 10

Name of the Programme taken up under ADAPT scheme	Target/Achievement in the Nawapara Block
1. Flow Minimum irrigation	3 Projects
2. Dugwell - Jiwandhara Scheme	5,000 (in the whole subdivision)
3. Agriculture and allied non traditional crop	Ground nut 30 ha
	Arhar 30 ha
	Mung 20 ha
	Biri 20 ha
	100 ha

21. Currie, B. 1993, Food Crises, Administrative and Public Response: Some General Implications from the Kalahandi Issue, Doctoral Thesis submitted to University of Hull, U.K., p, 273.

4. Minor millets and ground-nut	1,510 ha
5. Khariff	5,200 ha
6. Village Programme	190 ha
7. Social Infrastructure	1 CDS Project
8. Short term credit	Target - Rs 20 Lakh
	Achievement-Rs 8.79 Lakh

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Source: Human Encounter With Drought, P-104.

Under ADPAT Feeding programme was also initiated which continued till 30.9.90. Total No of beneficiary covered under the scheme was 40,247 from the eight blocks of the district as follows, 1. Nawapara, 2. Komna, 3. Khariar, 4. Boden, 5. Sinapali, 6. Golamunda, 7. Th. Rampur and 8. Lanjigarh.<sup>22</sup>

An Analysis. With the varieties of purpose, the poverty eradication programmes have been introduced in the district. The objectives spelt out behind every programme have partially been achieved and partially remained as paper commitment. During my field study I have not come across any official appraisal of these anti-poverty programmes to substantiate the result achieved at different period of time. The mass poverty continues to persist in its extreme forms (hunger, starvation, and outmigration) which only calls for the redefinition of the scope of anti-poverty programmes launched in the district. Even after more than two decades of its operation (some of the programmes introduced in the 4th

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22. Parida, Srustidhar, 1990, Kalahandi Brief Published in Berhampur (Ganjam) p.17

Five year plan such as SFDA and M.F.L.A), the rate of achievement hardly corresponds to the aims and objectives set in under the different anti-poverty programmes. The year 1985, which I consider as the divide line in the history of mass suffering in the district clearly shows the failure of Government's Anti-poverty programme which could not strengthen the position of the target group. Of course, the suffering was induced by drought which in turn was triggered off by the erratic rainfall, but it does not rule out the other side of the story that it was equally a man made phenomenon also.

Critics opine that the situations faced in the district Kalahandi is no more different from the situation faced by other parts of the country. From this opinion, a very simple conclusion may be derived to make it a point in the analysis. The conclusion would be that if any other parts of the country with the same problem don't come to be highlighted or exposed to or draw the attention of government, intellectuals, academic scholars, NGOs and social activists as in the case of Kalahandi, it shows that problems in those parts have better been solved with the existing anti-poverty programmes through proper implementation. If proper implementation of the programmes is assumed to be one of the important factor of bringing down the poverty in other parts of the country, then Kalahandi is a case of implementation failure. The different anti-poverty programmes

have not properly implemented which cause more hardship to the poverty stricken people of the district.

From the table 5 and 6, it becomes clear that although in some case beneficiaries are more than the target fixed by, in more cases there remain a gap between the target fixed and people benefitted from it. Not only the gap between target and actual beneficiaries is pronounced in the district, the financial achievement also presents a gloomy picture. It is seen from the table 7 that full utilisation of fund allotted for the programmes has not been made leaving a significant portion of allotted fund. The fate of JRY is also the same shown in table No 1 and 2. This gap between allotment and expenditure fails to deliver goods to the concerned people.

Here my observation is that actually the needy people are not able to get the help from the different anti-poverty programmes, it is very often the people who are able to provide certain amount of bribe to the officials (V.L.W, B.D.O, Bank officials etc) and the influential people of the villages avail the benefits from the different programmes. In some cases, it is the people from the well to do families of the villages corner the benefits. It shows that there is no objective identification of the target group. In the process the poor is deprived from the benefit. In fact they are alienated from the benefit of anti-poverty programmes. The problem of identification of target group is more

complicated by the middle men, influence one can exert (Gountias) and also caste factors.

One of the objectives of the IRDP is to provide some productive assets to the beneficiaries, but this has not been proved to be a reliable one. For this purpose, cows or goats are provided, but these can't be a durable productive asset. After their death, the beneficiaries become rather vulnerable. So this provision does not take care of the need of the beneficiaries in generating asset.

In Kalahandi it is found that the houses built under IAY programme does not serve well to the house less persons. The way it is constructed does not well survive to the heavy rain fall, cyclone, or hail storm resulting into collapse of the houses. Although this phenomenon is not regular phenomenon, it can not be ruled out. It is also seen that the space provided for construction of the houses are not spacious enough to a family causing hygenic and sanitation problems.

About the performance of DPAP, it is not very satisfactory. The fund Rs 15 lakh allotted to each block under DPAP is not sufficient to solve the drought problem on a permanent basis. Besides there is faulty implementation of this programme. It has failed to materialise the objectives it has set forth. One of the objectives of the DPAP is to minimise the adverse effects of drought on production of crops and livestock and productivity of land, water and



human resources through integrated development of the natural resource base of the area and adoption of appropriate technologies, but the recurrence of the drought since mid-1985 and its adverse effects on crops, live stock and productivity of land, water and human resource in the district provides the most revealing fact that it has failed to materialise the objective. It has not contributed much to withstand the effects of droughts.

And also the objective to restore ecological balance has not been met with success. The forest cover is declining year by year (pointed out in chapter two). The commercial exploitation of forest by private individuals (smugglers) making Kalahandi (once upon a time densely covered with the forest) a forest depleting area.

From the table 8, it is found that the number of people trained under TRYSEM are never fully rehabilitated. In the year 1989-90 number of people trained were 792 of which 553 were rehabilitated. The rest 239 trained people remained as balance. This is not the only year where discrepancy exists between the people trained and rehabilitated, rather it has become a trend every year. Besides, perhaps, TRYSEM is not a reliable source of employment for rural youth for which the rural youth do migrate to neighbouring states like Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh and so on.

Even after a decade of its implementation in the district the programme "Development of Women and Children in

Rural Areas (DWCRA) has not brought any significant change on women. The low level of literacy, low level of health awareness, lack of access to primary health centre, this all in combine prove to be inadequate in its functioning.

ADAPT introduced in 1988 and ended in 1990 has brought some change. An evaluation report prepared by the Orissa government on the ADAPT programme indicates that the visits of the Mobile Health Units (MHU) under the programme in eight blocks of Kalahandi district had a positive impact among the people. The positive impact of the scheme was the reduction of mortality rate, control of births and enhancement of life expectancy. It states that an attempt was made to calculate the death rate prevailing in the ADAPT and Non-ADAPT areas. Information relating to the number of deaths and the total family size of the beneficiaries was collected and used for calculation of death rate. It was observed that the position in the ADAPT blocks in this regard was highly satisfactory and far better than that in the Non-ADAPT blocks. While the death rate in all the four sample ADAPT blocks taken together was about 13 per thousand population, the death rate in the two sample Non-ADAPT blocks was 23 per thousand population.

Besides this, evaluation report states that prior to the implementation of the ADAPT programme the incidence of starvation was observed to be very high. It also observed

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23. The Hindu ,1993,Drought money goes elsewhere,New Delhi,  
june 16.

that the standard of living of the people is very low entailed by the very low percapita food consumption. This phenomenon is more pronounced in the tribal pocket of the district.

However, the evaluation report prepared by the Government of Orissa is silent about the financial achievement of the ADAPT programme, but later in an investigation done in December 1991 reveals that fund allotted for ADAPT programme has been misused. The basic shortcoming of ADAPT programme was its short span of time of two years which is not enough time to tide over the problems afflicted the people for decades. The programme of such kind should have been on a long time basis looking at the history of droughts in the district and its post effects.

The above short analysis of the different programmes reveals faulty implementation of the programmes, lack of objective identification of the target groups; lack of access of the poor people to different anti-poverty programmes, the nexus between the officials and the influential people of the villages, backlogs in the target of beneficiaries and financial allocation to the different programmes misutilization of the fund are some of the short comings of the different anti-poverty programmes.

In this back drop, the anti poverty programmes in the district should be viewed from a different perspective. As no programme is free from any shortcoming, emphasis should be

placed on revitalization of the anti-poverty programmes so as to make them active and a true agent of rural development in general and poverty eradication in particular. The shortcomings pointed out above need to be overcome and serious thoughts and approach should be given upon these drawbacks, so that anti-poverty programmes would make a success story in the district like Kalahandi.

In every drought, the worst sufferers are the small and marginal farmers, the landless labourers, and the tribal people of the district. Drought coping strategies should be made available to these people through DPAP and other available programmes.

In the district, there is no durable assured employment opportunities for the unemployed youth. Apart from TRYSEM and JRY every possible effort should be made by the government to provide assured employment opportunities to the unemployed youth and the landless agricultural labourers, be it through land reforms or through other alternative means. Simultaneously the TRYSEM and JRY should be made more vigorous in its implementation process and cover more beneficiaries every year.

Treating Kalahandi at par with other parts of the state or the country is a big blunder. The district is frequently hit by severe drought, but no special programme has been introduced except ADAPT. ADAPT needs to be reintroduced and made a permanent official body in the

district.

The problem in Kalahandi is more of a man made one. So it is not an impossible task to overcome it. Only the will and sense of responsibility on the part of government and people's representatives of the district would pave the new path for Kalahandi

## CHAPTER -V

### CONCLUSION

In this chapter, an attempt has been made to give a brief summary of findings found in each chapter. The first chapter gives an over view of famine and drought policy during pre and post independent India. Prior to and during British rule the famine had a multiple affects which led to high rate of mortality, migration of people from affected areas, acute damage of crops, non-availability of agricultural employment, desperate sale of cattle or sheep. The famine used to trigger of by erratic and inadequate rainfall. In maximum cases, the famine used to cover more than one state and sometimes it used to be a class famine. In pre British rule, the task of mitigating the famine victims was the responsibility of the Rajas who sometimes lacked the seriousness and responsibility.

During the colonial rule in India, the responsibility of famine victims passed over to British whose policy in the country more aggravated the situation. During British rule the Famine Code was the underlying central framework which guided the British famine policy in India. The Famine Code operated within the wall of many limitations. It was designed primarily to facilitate the continuances of policy of Laissez Fair. Coupled with the Laissez Fair, the lack of transport and communication used to aggravate the situation to the point of no return which made difficult whatever the

relief measures initiated by the British government to reach the affected area. The basic flaw of the Famine Code was the absence of provisions for any standing preparation to overcome the famine affects. Besides the Laissez Fair Policy never allowed the British ruler to intervene the foodgrain market so that the victims of famine could have availed the foodgrains from the government at a minimum affordable price.

This policy of Laissez Fair continued till 1943 famine which affected Bengal. The Bengal famine 1943 was the first instance where the British government intervened the foodgrain market and supplied it to the affected people in famine. One may also say that it was the last famine of British rule.

With the independence of the country, the shortsighted perception and approach associated with the Famine Code gave way to Scarcity Manual - an improvement over the Famine Code of British India. The Scarcity Manual is no more associated with famine rather it deals with drought and its relief measures which takes note of adequate preparatory measure against any possible occurrence of drought in future.

The significant change in the independent India is the task assigned to a constitutional body "Finance Commission" which recommends on a periodical basis as to the measure of financing the relief expenditure. It has been an instrumental in drought relief measure. Although over the years its role has been changed, it has not succeeded in its

efforts to have a long term policy of drought relief measures. Its recommendations are not fully implemented by the Government of India making it more of a recommending constitutional body. However, the nature of role played by the Finance Commission keeps changing with the change of government. The party led government influences the functioning of Finance Commission because it is the government which appoints the members of the Finance Commission.

The second chapter gives a brief insight of district profile and its socio-economic and political dynamics. The primary objective of this chapter was to inter relate the present problem with it. The district Kalahandi is in rain shadow area where the normal rainfall is 11,378 m.m. But the actual rainfall varies from year to year. Besides the monsoon period in Kalahandi cover a short span of time with high precipitation leading to flood in rivers which causes crops damage, loss of cattle and houses, and sometimes the loss of human lives. This phenomenon follows a spell of dry weather inducing drought in the district . The phenomenon of high precipitation over a short span of time is not always a trend in the district. In some year, it is in fact the inadequate rainfall leading to drought situation in the district.



The district has a deposit of three commercially viable minerals which can be better explored on a large scale basis. Mining of these minerals has been made possible to some extent, but it has not ensured adequate employment to the local people of the district. Government has also not come forward to make a feasibility study on a possible large scale exploration of the minerals. Apathy and lack of will of government reinforce the slow process of development in drought prone district of Kalahandi.

The socio-economic and political dynamics of the district presents a picture of evolution of Kalahandi. The problems which have surfaced in the district in the form of hunger, starvation, out migration are not isolated one, these are deeply rooted with the way the contemporary Kalahandi has been evolved over the years. In its past, Kalahandi was the seat of tribal people who had control over land and led a free life style. This phenomenon did not last long in the district. Since the Kingship and infiltration of British rule in the district, it saw a landslide change. The tribal economy shattered by the local rajas who resorted the immigration of Kultas (an agricultural community from Sambalpur) for the better cultivation in the district. The motive behind this resort to Kultas was to maximise production and appropriate surplus revenue. This was the beginning of the alienation of tribal people from the land of

their own. The excessive resort to land revenue by local rajas on the one hand and low yielding of crops compared to Kultas on the other hand made difficult for tribal people to pay the land revenue on a regular basis.

In the course of time to escape from this situation, they had to sale or mortgage the lands to the Kultas. This process led a complete alienation from their own land. However, the accumulated feeling of being suppressed and exploited found an echo in a rebellion popularly known as "Kandhmeli," but it was suppressed by the British rule.

Even after independence of the country, the fate of Kalahandi remains more or less the story of hunger, starvation, etc. Today also the poor landless people are exploited by the Gauntia (once upon a time the village head appointed by the royal Zamindars) and the tribal people do not have a sustainable means of livelihood and so on.

The third chapter focuses on provisions of the Orissa Relief Code (ORC) and drought situation in Kalahandi. The ORC provides a well planned framework for drought relief, but in practice, the state government has not fully materialised the provisions mentioned in the ORC. The frequent droughts and incidence of starvation death in Kalahandi throws ample light on the inadequacy in carrying out the provisions of the ORC. Contrary to it (the ORC) official negligence has been noticed as investigated by Baidyanath Mishra Committee.

Kalahandi is a drought prone district. It has been hit frequently by severe droughts. Since the first decade of the century Kalahandi has been engulfed by frequent droughts. This phenomenon has been more escalated since mid 1985. The years 1985, 1987, 1988, and 1989 are the years of severe droughts. The most affected area of all these droughts was Nawapara sub-division of the district. In spite of severe droughts affected to Nawapara sub-division, a full fledged irrigation facility is still a distant dream.

The Government intervention in respect to drought mitigation has been found to be inadequate and delayed. The DPAP has been functioning since mid 1970s in the district. But in the face of recurrent droughts, the relevance and adequacy of the DPAP is questioned. The special emergency programme ADAPT directly conducted from PMO in 1988, though it achieved some of its targets, failed to utilise the fund allotted to it. My observation is that even after decades of droughts, no fullproof drought coping strategy has been made by the government, pushing the district to the edge of more vulnerability.

The chapter four focuses the anti-poverty programmes primarily to see to what extent government has come forward to eradicate the poverty in the district. There is series of anti-poverty programmes including wage employment and

infrastructure development, self employment and special area programmes. An emergency programme ADAPT was also introduced in 1988 for two year. It was a central government sponsored emergency scheme. The result of these anti-poverty programmes are not satisfactory.

Some of the findings are as follows:

- \* Target of beneficiaries are not fulfilled every year. A gap between target of beneficiary fixed and actual beneficiaries vindicates this point.
- \* The poorest of the district do not avail adequate opportunities from the anti-poverty programmes while at the same time the people from well to do families avail the benefit. The nexus between the official and middle men and consideration of caste factor attribute to this deficiency.
- \* The full utilisation of allotted funds under different anti-poverty programmes has not been made. This holds true in case of emergency programmes also.
- \* From the above findings it can be concluded that Kalahandi is a case of implementation failure. There is series of anti-poverty programmes at the disposal of the district, but the proper implementation has not been made failing to arrest the growing poverty in the district.

With the above findings in regard to the functioning of the different anti-poverty programmes,

some constructive suggestions are given as follows :

- \* Emphasis should be given both to short term and long term measures. Short term measure is required to fulfill the basic needs and the long term measures for the sustainable development of the poor people. Assured employment opportunities should be provided to them.
- \* There is urgent need to break up the nexus between the officials and the middlemen so that actual benefit would percolate to those groups really deserving the benefits from the anti-poverty programmes.
- \* Emphasis should be placed more on the fulfillment of target of beneficiary every year. It will play a contributory role in reducing the poverty of the people.
- \* There is need to ensure that funds allotted to different anti-poverty programmes be fully utilised and reached to the target groups.
- \* People trained under the TRYSEM should be rehabilitated in toto.
- \* More central government sponsored programmes like ADAPT (including ADAPT) should be introduced in the district.
- \* The fund allotted to each block under the DPAP should be enhanced to avoid the financial crunch.

- \* Top priority should be given to irrigation facility and afforestation in the district.
- \* Ceiling land should be distributed among the poor people of the district to provide some permanent asset so that sustainability of these people will be ensured in one way or other.

The suggestions spelt out above will have a far reaching implication if they are implemented with the sense of urgency and responsibility. But in the face of apathy and negligence on the part of government, it is not expected much from the government. People in Kalahandi have lost their faith in government. They themselves have to rise up and fight for their own causes.

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