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### DECLARATION

*This is to certify that the dissertation entitled JAPAN'S PEACE POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD, submitted by Mr Badruddin, in the fulfilment of nine credits out of a total requirements of twenty-four credits for the Degree of Master of Philosophy (M.Phil.) of the University, is his original work and has not been submitted for any other degree of this or any other University according to the best of my knowledge. I recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.*

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# **JAPAN'S PEACE POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD**

**Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University  
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## ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
FBR	Fast Breeder Reactor
ICP	Integrated Community Project
IAEC	International Atomic Energy Commission
JAEC	Japan Atomic Energy Commission
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JPIDG	Japan Peace Issue Discussion Group
JSP	Japan Socialist Party
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
NDPO	National Defense Policy Outline
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PIDG	Peace Issue Discussion Group
SDF	Standard Defense Force
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
TPRG	Tokyo Peace Research Group
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade & Development
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

CHAPTER - I

JAPANESE SYSTEM : THE RATIONALE FOR PEACE

Questions about the evaluation of the international system bear directly on the issue of sustainable peace in the Third World. The recognised imperatives for cooperation between the advanced countries and the developing countries provide a new incentive for the consideration of the whole range of analyses of the problem of war and the concepts and arguments for building-peace.

The conditions of the world have been dramatically changed ever since the atomic bombs were dropped over Japan. The Japanese have aspired to reorient their conduct in foreign affairs and to move away from the policies of conflict and confrontation which led them to such disastrous results at the end of World War II. There is a wide range of evidence to suggest that the dominant Japanese ethos is in favour of turning their unique rôle to advantage in setting the agenda for international systemic transformation.

The challenges of technology and economic interdependence and immediate security issues in Japan have not been divorced from profound questions about philosophical perspectives on peace. The Japanese debate about peace issues has been conducted with overarching concepts, both those which are millennia old and those evolved by modern thinkers interested in evolving active peace strategies.



Academic writings in Japan feature classical sources of Greek philosophy. Even when new ground has to be broken and new strategies adopted, Plato's work "The Republic" is not without its importance for peace. Aristotle recommended world government as a method of ensuring sustainable peace. Other Japanese writing takes as its point of departure the recurring themes which are discernible in British philosophical perspectives on peace. John Locke<sup>1</sup> and Bentham<sup>2</sup> both insisted on the centrality of peace and aspired to find answers and develop norms which can help to develop new conceptualisations.

In analysing contemporary policies and norms, Japanese peace thinking has been inevitably drawn to the chief exponents of modern sources of peace research, John Galtung, Kenneth Boulding, Richard Falk, Quincy Wright, Anatol Rapoport, and others who have promoted interdisciplinary exchange and have stimulated theoretical and policy oriented contributions in Japan to the underlying problems of ensuring peace.

John Galtung, a Norwegian peace researcher has given the most elaborate and widely acceptable definition of peace. To understand peace, development, conflict, and future needs are

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1. Richard Cox, *Locke on War and Peace* (Oxford, 1960), p.150.
2. Mary P. Mack, *Jerry Bentham : An Odyssey of Ideas* (New York, 1963), p.121.

to be understood.

Development - it gives an opportunity to preserve basic values, basic trends, the state of affairs in the world.

Conflict-it given an opportunity to discuss what happens when values, goals and interests are in conflict, to discuss conflict, creation, conflict dynamics, and conflict resolution.

Peace-it gives and opportunity to discuss how development and creative approach to conflict can come together, in structural violence.

Future-it gives an opportunity to protect all of this on the screen of future, analysing trends, making progress for action.<sup>3</sup>

#### TOWARDS A DIFINITION OF WAR

There are sections of peace thinkers who havè emphasised the importance of war. Without understanding the nature of war, peace can not be understood properly.

*ACCORDING TO CLAUSWITZ : War is a rational means of national politics which every nation employs to achieve its political ends.*

*ADAM SMITH VIEWS WAR : as the ultimate, sole and absolute means with which a nation settles its differences with other nations.*

Werner Sombart considers war as the mother of all inventions and technological development, while Thomas Malthus accepts war as the natural providential "necessary evil". Hegal considers war as necessary for the healthy development of society.

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 3. "On Peace Education", in Christopher Wulf (ed.), *Handbook on peace Education* (Frankfurt : International Peace Research Association, 1974), p.171.

B. Russell<sup>4</sup> observes that war is no longer permissible in today's world inasmuch as if another global war breaks out, there will be neither victor nor vanquished. Since it is suicidal, man should make every effort to prevent it. Similarly Kenneth Waltz argues that war breaks out due to the evil nature of man, discontentment about the existing social system or economic policy, and lack of strong authority in the world.

In the light of these definitions, the importance of war can be evaluated.

#### DIMENSIONS OF PEACE

In the contemporary global system, the concept of peace has been broadened which needs interdisciplinary approach to study. It has many facets and dimensions like benevolence, decorum, compassion, law, harmony, and social principles. It is cross-disciplinary, cross-ideological, theoretically-oriented, and concerned with applicability. It also assists in understanding the problems and causes of confrontation and tension among the nations and helps in their reconciliation and normalization of relations irrespective of their ideological, economic, cultural, social and religious differences, and concentration on phenomenology of war, necessary conditions for survival, and future possibilities and the strength of nation in the creation of peace.

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4. Bertrand Russell, *Has Man a Future?* (Baltimore : Penguin Books, 1967), p.210.

*ACCORDING TO ADAM : Peace is related to political opportunity. It is a condition from which the individuals, groups of nations concerned gain more advantages than disadvantages. Ideally, it means something even more positive, harmonious and constructive.<sup>5</sup>*

The world becomes peaceful when the virtues of benevolence, righteousness, wisdom, and sincerity come to dominate society where faith, hope and love prevails. In peace, we must cultivate realisation of harmonious world through home management, moral and cultural statecraft. With broad premises in mind, we may find the basis of peace in the following three conditions : First, the basic rights of man must be guaranteed; second, the livelihood of man in terms of food, shelter, and clothes must be guaranteed; and finally, freedom of cultural activities and for the creation of new values should be open to all.

In addition to these, peace also stands for practical preventive measures of war, possibly through a series of mutual co-operative steps. In essence, it promotes the dialogue based on non-violence, mutual trust and collaboration, brings about relaxation of international tension, reduction of armaments, remove 'utilitarian' or ideological absurdities and injustice. It is based on mutual understanding and friendship through the promotion of cooperative ideas.

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 5. Adam Kurle, "Making of Peace", 'Introduction', *Bulletin for Peace Research*, no.2, 1976, p.I.

But these theoretical propositions no matter, howsoever plausible they are, are not enough to create a peaceful world. For a creative synthesis of theory and practice, we need to probe into reality of our world today which is running wildly with 'MAD' arms race and arming for another war.

Reflections of contemporary global war and violence indicate that at no other time of human history has the desire for peace been so acute as it is now. Today, the balance of power, having been upset by the clever abuse of 'detenté' in a limited political sphere, every nation (whether big or small) is busy in manufacturing armaments and deploying new weapons of war. Perhaps hoping peace in the impending situation may seem like building castles in the air, but we mankind must never leave off the task. According to rule of nature, people of any nation has no arbitrary right to flame the legacy of human civilization and peace. For happy endings, we must bell the ring of peace throughout the world. Let us jointly rise to banish war, the cruel master of death and fix our eyes on the road to eternal peace. We must never forget the ashes of war.

In the above broad frame of peace-building, the relationship between Japan and Third World can be established. For promotion of peace and co-operation, new theoretical idea, new perspective, and new paradigm is needed to Japan. It needs

careful, just, rational and impartial study, and interdisciplinary research on various problems confronting to the Third World. The theoretical consideration also needs bilateral and multilateral bridge-building for the assessment of Third World's socio-economic and political problems. The economic dependency of the Third World on Japan's global economy needs to be recognised as a part of an adequate analytical framework for understanding the relationship between Japan and the Third World. Japan needs to create new peaceful conditions for the Third World nations to restructuring their existing socio-economic organisations to bring harmonization of interest at all levels.

#### KEY PEACE ISSUES IN POST-WAR JAPAN

After the end of World War II, Japan was placed under the occupation of the Allied Powers and therefore question of peace became the central concern in Japan. Some thoughts on peace were given around 1947 by General Mac Arthur who was supreme commander of Allied Powers. With the intensification of cold war, however, United States came ahead with a 'Peace Making' formula as part of Japan's new foreign policy which was organised against the Communist Alliance. By 1949, the key political issue in Japan was focused on whether Japan should conclude a separate peace treaty with Western countries only or

overall peace with the Allied Powers including Soviet Union. It resulted in a controversy among major political parties of Japan. However the strong conservative party of Japan favoured the partial peace treaty which was strongly in favour of West Bloc. This was because Japan's political and economic systems were tilted towards the West, particularly the United States. On the other hand, the socialist party of Japan stood for overall global peace. This brought ideological strains in the relationship between the two parties viz. Liberal Democratic and Socialist.

Peace Issue Discussion Group (PIDG) consisted of a broad spectrum of intellectuals and scientists ranging from liberals to Marxists. In January 1950, they published their view that Japan needs a separate peace with the West. This view brought considerable impact on mass media, public opinion, youths, and workers movement.

The outbreak of Korean war in June 1950, turned the cold war into a hot war and caused serious problems between East-West, brought ideological and epistemological challenge due to monolithic communism and anti-communism decisively gathered force and gained wide controversy in Japan and thus the question of peace in Japan became the controversial issue during post-war period.

## 1. BASIC THOUGHT ON THE PEACE ISSUE IN JAPAN

The question of war and peace in the contemporary Japan and the world around has assumed the paramount importance. In the light of the developments and prevailing views at home and abroad today, the following headlines deserve reiteration as it points the fundamental problems.

### War as a self-defeating means

According to Yoshikozy Sakanoto :

*War is in essence one of the means - a very primitive one which man employs in solving a problem. Even if there was a time in the past when this means could be regarded as effective and useful, conditions are entirely different today... It must be pointed out that war has now become a completely outdated means.*

The dilemma inherent in the modern wars, however, did not emerge overnight. It was brought out through the evolutionary historical process whereby the development of modern industry as well as means of transportation and communication have brought the entire world into the same orbit, placing all states into a relationship of close interdependence. The modern war is global in nature and total war on the domestic level which mobilises the entire nation. Undoubtedly the war is now considered the greatest evil on earth; and therefore the maintenance and consolidation of peace has become the primary objective



without which no other value can be realised. No ideal on this earth is worth pursuing at the expense of world peace, while war and its self-sustaining development would destroy the very ideal itself. Probably Japanese were well acquainted about the nature of war and therefore post-war Japan adopted 'peace-building' as the pillar of modern Japan.

Paradoxical truth of the nuclear age

Nuclear age is the reality which confronts every nation. With realistic attitude to evaluate international and domestic problems, this goes with the hands of renunciation of war and disarmament principles which Japanese solemnly pledged to honour before the world through the promulgation of new constitution. The spirited new constitution of Japan is very much concerned about the reality of war and paradoxical truth of nuclear age. Frederick Schman, an American specialist of international politics has stated :

Few wars, if any, are the results of conspiracies by wicked men, whether the "wicked" be identified as diplomats, strategists, arms makers, industrialists, bankers, aristocrats, or demagogues, war occurs because all men value certain other things more than they value peace. Whether these things may be, they are equated, quite honestly even if natively, with the cause of God against Satan.<sup>6</sup>

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6. Frederick Schman, *International Politics* (New York, 1948), edn 4, p. 395.

II. JAPANESE VIEWS OVER THE CONFLICT & ACCOMODATION BETWEEN  
THE "TWO WORLDS"

The contemporary world is suffering from ideological, political, social, cultural and religious conflicts, Super-Power rivalry, psychological warfare, cold war between nations, political chauvinism, demoralisation, fragmentation, dissension, and distrust. These problems are more penetrating among the Third World. In order to reduce these problems, Japanese have adopted rational, optimistic, just, honest and concrete formulae for sustaining peace in Third World and stated the following recommendations:

- 1] removal of ideological conflicts and war;
- 2] removal of ideological conflicts like communism, fascism, capitalism, socialism;
- 3] the immediate solutions of the trouble spots of the Third World viz apartheid in South Africa, Paletine problem, Iran-Iraq War, Politics of Indian Ocean, Lebanon Crisis and Afghanistan Issue;
- 4] avoidance of bloc politics;
- 5] freedom, equality, justice should be linked with the victim grounds of the earth;
- 6] peaceful measure with the help of the United Nations and other agencies ; and
- 7] introduction of free, honest and healthy communication between the various nations.

### III. JAPANESE PEACE RESEARCH IN CHANGING WORLD

Peace research in post-war Japan has been considered at two levels. First, the human, political system and international system; second, peace research has been recognised as an essential value for the development of various systems. The human level refers to the consideration of peace from the view point of an individual human being. On this level, peace is elevated to an indispensable value for the good life. The political system level refers to the basic principles of the domestic political system which carries close interrelationships with the problems of "War and Peace" and "Oppression and Inequality" in the international system. On this level, the Japanese constitution article 9 declares that pacifism is one of the basic principles of the postwar Japanese political system.<sup>7</sup> Japanese peace researchers have emphasised that pacifism is essential not only for promotion of peace in the international system but also for establishing democracy. As far as international system level is concerned, the conditions of peace (both in positive and negative sense) have to be analysed in the terms of characteristic peculiar to this system.

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7. "Pacifism" in post-war Japan is not identical with that in the Western society. It has the following three unique characteristics : 1) It is a principle incorporated into the constitution, constituting, together with democracy, its two main pillars; 2) it is interpreted on the principle of "non-armament", internationalism and nuclear disarmament; and 3) it is accepted by the large majority of the Japanese people.

#### IV. JAPAN ON WAR AND PEACE

##### Establishment of the Perspective

Nation-State in the contemporary world has come to play a dominant role. Thinking only about the Nation-State, i.e. the political system level, leads the idea of "national interest". Seeing the state as an absolute entity in international politics leads the concept of "Balance of Power". A unique feature of Japanese peace research is that it has developed and continued to maintain a perspective which differs from the conventional view of international politics.

The perspective gives first priority to human beings. The first Peace Treaty (1950) was controversial to Japanese system which went on changing with the passage of time due to the establishment of the United States Defense Pact and changing nature of Japanese security. On the political system level, the first concern was as how to give democratic principle to the Japanese enshrined in constitution. At that time, however, it was difficult to achieve the goal, because these efforts were impeded by two major political forces. First, the revolutionary leftist movement sought to bring into existence a different political system which would promote further changes. From the left-wing forces, voices of protest were heard declaring that the responsibility of the old elite for the war should not be

brought up, and at international system level, it favoured an "Overall Peace Treaty" (i.e. a treaty between Japan and countries aligned with the Western Camp). These efforts brought many other peace groups e.g. Japan Peace Issue Discussion Group (JPIDG), UNESCO Peace Declaration in Japan and Tokyo Peace Research Group (TPRG) etc. Soon peace research became powerful in Japan.

#### Pioneers of Peace Research

The history of peace movement in Japan started only after atomic war of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Among the scholars who were the exponents of peace are Kuno, Tamaki, and Toga. Kuno Omasu views the importance of peace on the human level and clarified as how the individual could act the peace. Hara Tamaki<sup>8</sup> and Toga Sankichi opposed the logic of war. According to them, *war consists of violence, irrationality and hysteria in both ends and means*. Kuno stressed the "passive resistance in promoting peace which includes non-cooperation, disobedience and general strikes. Most essential which he argued was "the adoption of an unconditional position of non-cooperation and non-participation in war". In this manner, Kuno indicated the importance of thinking about peace on the human level.<sup>9</sup> The slogan of the "movement for an overall peace" such as *Never Send Our Pupil to Battle Again, Young People, Never Bear Arms Again, and Wives,*

8. For brilliant and illuminating discussion see Tamaki and Toga Sankichi 'Listen to the voice of the young who last their lives in battle', (Tokyo) Chapter I to V.

9. Kuno Osamu, 'Heiwa no Ronri to Senso no Ronri' (The logic of peace and the logic of war), Sekai, November 1949, Tokyo : Iwanami Shoten, 1972, pp 7-8.

*Never Send Your Husbands to Battle Again* show how widely shared this attitude towards peace on the human level was during that period. With these theories of peace, many other ingredients were evolved.

After the human and political system level, perspective on peace had been established, a union of these perspectives with that of peace on the international level was brought about through the efforts of Peace Issues Discussion Group (PIDG). At the end of 1949, in response to the 1948 UNESCO declaration, the group issued a "statement of Japanese Scientists on war and peace". It must be remembered that UNESCO peace group in Japan was an instrumental right from beginning in advancing peace research.

#### V. PEACE RESEARCH VS HIGHER ECONOMIC GROWTH

With the perspective of the world peace beginning with man and political system being integrated into one system by the mid 1960's, thinking about peace in Japan was placed in a context quite different from before. In other words, at a time when Japanese peace research had succeeded in establishing a systematic perspective on "negative peace", Japan appeared at the international stage in the new clothing of an "economic superpower". This gave birth to the need for peace researchers to come to grips with an issue of a different dimension called

the North-South Dialogue.

The socio-economic conditions promoting a lack of awareness of the different dimensions of 'peace' and 'non-peace' developed along with the fruits of higher economic growth. Some projections of Japan's rapid economic growth declares that "the 21st century will be the Japan's". This shows the unilinear nature of Japan's modernization and proves the ideological backing for growth. According to this view, Japan could be a successful model of development for the Third World.

#### VI. *DRAMATIC SWITCH OF JAPANESE PEACE RESEARCH*

Upto 1960, the peace research in Japan was below the satisfactory level because it was mainly confined to the Japanese territory and Japanese peace researchers were busy in analysing the war syndromes which they received from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But sudden dramatic switch took place in 1960's. Japanese peace researchers invited overseas experts on peace to have new ideas on peace. Peace researchers who mainly came from the United States of America and Europe, formulated many new peace ideas.

In 1964, the Tokyo Peace Research Group (TPRG) was organised with such help. The first report of peace research in Japan was issued in 1967. It added many new topics such as, "Peaceful coexistence in Asia-A Japanese view", "Negotiations between the West and the North-West", "International Solidarity",

and "economic equality". Such new slogans continued for many years. The last issue 'Peace Research in Japan' 1981-83, was published in 1983. At that time, articles focussed on the peace constitution, local government, nuclear-free zone and peace activism.

The new peace groups also developed personal contacts and welcomed the ideas of John Galtung, Kenneth Boulding, Tolstoy and Anatol Rapport and many other internationally established and renowned peace researchers. In addition to that, members of the group became active in international policy research circles. Such interchanges were instrumental in internationalizing peace research in Japan. The Japan Peace Research Group (JPRG) came to take up the North-South dialogue disputes and other issues concerning international peace research.

Despite having overseas contacts with the peace thinkers and internationalizing peace research of Japan, it began to suffer from politicization running inside Japan. Sections of people particularly those belonging to business community became upset on the name of peace because they were only after money-makers through economic-building in Japan. The split in the peace movement led to politicization making many ordinary citizens hesitant to become involved in peace activities. But at the same time, the peace-making in Japan became success in mobilizing the members of labour unions, youths, students and women movements



who actively participated in peace rallies and such other similar undertakings.

But today voluntary peace action of the institutionalised group is missing. Most who attend peace rallies are served by the unions and are provided with an allowance for the day's "peace activities". It is against the background of dissatisfaction with the national peace movements. Thus institutionalised peace movement is losing its ground in Japan. Despite all these weaknesses, Japan's peace movement is unique and has shown new light of hope for the world.

NEW AWAKENINGS AND LESSONS FOR PEACE :  
FROM PEARL HARBOUR TO NAGASAKI

Many questions have been raised among the contemporary scholars as to why the Japanese became over-conscious about peace. There was a time (before 1945) when Japan was one of the most aggressive actors in the eyes of world and threatened the world by exercising its militancy. The phenomenon of sudden dramatic change and Japan's emphasis from war to peace is really memorable lesson not only for the Japanese but also the world. Evidence to support the view, lessons can be have from defeat of Hiroshima and Nagasaki when countless number of innocents died in the war. But those who were survived from the war tell their lamenting - pathetic experiences and stories. Some of the original speeches collected with the help of historians will tell the real stories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

A. Shinibhiro, who survived in Hiroshima writes about his own terrible experience :

In the Hiroshima war intense white light flashed, a tremendous roar hit our minds and heads. A mushroom cloud darkened the sky and yellow-brown smoke covered the ground. Everything on the earth was on fire. Big buildings, grass roofed houses and even the roots of the trees were enveloped in flames...The sky was dark, the earth looked red. Innumerable people took their last breath. Like sunset! the opocalyptic scene was enacted-aimed a sea of fire smoke.

Nagi Dakashi writes :

The bell of Nagasaki tolls, Nations! plan no more wars. Future wars are suicidal. Listen to the waiting voices of the dead! fight no more! cooperate within the boundary of love, the dead lie prostrate before God! That the bomb of Nagasaki be the last human history!<sup>10</sup>

Sumida, a former Nagasaki city official recounts his sufferings in the tragic events, he writes :

Mankind should not fight another war.1, seeing the flash and hearing the thundering roar of the atomic explosion, got confused because I was in smoke and nothing was clear before me as where to go, but thanks God, who served my life miraculously.

Similarly the lesson that a school teacher Mrs Egashira Chiyoku learned, writes in her pathetic words :

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10. Nagi Dakashi, *The Bell of Nagasaki*, (Tokyo, 1965), pp.121-22.

In my opinion world peace should be nurtured at home first...peace education must start at home first because children are receptive to the opinions of their parents. When understanding among the people goes beyond the boundary of race, religion, nation and ideology, world peace may be realised.<sup>11</sup>

She also gives her opinions about the nature of war:

Why should we kill other? If there is no war, people can live cooperatively in harmony. But people hate each other and engage in miserable wars. Probably, men try to gain honour, prestige and success through the victory of wars, but what do they gain in actuality? Perhaps, it is high for women to work for world peace. Mothers should not send their sons to frontline...by transcending national differences, class cleavages, different skin hues and religious disharmony, we must realize world peace. Everybody longs for longevity. But why should the old and the young to be massacred indiscriminately? I do not wish to see my nation victories, but want to live peacefully...while witnessing the tragic scene, I felt that there exists neither gods nor physicians. Why do governments produce cannons and bombs to kill people with the money that people give as taxes? If a man senses glory the top of the dead bodies of his fellowmen, what satisfaction can he get? If I can save mankind by giving my own life, I will die any number of times. This is my cry for the world, the voice of Nagasaki.

To comment Mrs. Egashira, Sunid writes :

I felt a sudden impulse to decorate Mrs. Egashira with the highest peace of mankind, had I such an authority? To me, her tears looked as precious as jewels.

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11. Soka Gakkai, *Women Against War : Personal Account of Forty Japanese Women* Richard L. Gage, Trans. (Tokyo, 1986).



## REALIZATION OF WORLD PEACE THROUGH PEACE EDUCATION

The question of war and peace is one of the harsh problems, perhaps the greatest *aporiae* of human history. Mankind today is standing at the crossroad. Peace or War! the choice is ours. Should we choose war and destroy ourselves? John F. Kennedy, late U.S. President once said that unless mankind puts a "full stop" to war, war will put "full stop" to human history. Peace is something we have to achieve through our cooperative efforts. Perhaps greatest realisation of peace can be have through education.

Education plays a vital role in bringing unity and harmony in society. It opens the horizon of knowledge, attempts to cure mental malady by mental medicine. Preventing war in the society can be eliminated through proper education and considered it a spiritual remedy. It enables the individual to turn the eyes of his soul to the inward reality and truth. Coupled with these facts, post-war Japan started peace movement through peace education.



Peace education movement in Japan is imprinted with experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and it is noted that the movement has been most devotedly promoted by the teacher scholars' community in Hiroshima. In the words of Hideki Nagai: "I believe that in the case of Japanese peace education should start from the Japanese experience of atomic bombs and be developed on the basis of the spirit of the Japanese constitution." <sup>12</sup>

12. H. Nagai, *The Structure of Peace Education and the Task for Peace Research* (Tokyo, 1976), p.251.

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Women and the Peace Movement

Peace education is aimed not only simply at rejecting war and promoting international understanding, it must also aim at the creation of peace and eliminating those forces which deny peace. Peace education, then, is not only for the young ones who held the key to the future, but also must be for every citizen including women.

The Women's Christian Temperance Union whose philosophy is based on the understanding of peace education, has been one of the moving forces in the peace movement along with other women's group. Women's suffrage was the goal of the women's movement in the pre-war period and it continued even after war. Countless number of women who had lost their dear ones in the war were compelled to live without enough food and adequate jobs and under working conditions which were the most discriminatory in the society. These women wanted to oppose the nuclear war with united efforts. They participated in all peace movements during post-war period. Thus peace movement through united efforts of women became more effective and added many new dimensions to the peace movement of Japan.

*VARIOUS APPROACHES AND THEORIES TO STUDY JAPANESE SYSTEM*

System stands for a set of objects together with relations between the objects and between their attitudes. It studies

the set of interrelated variables. According to David Apter :

*System has boundary within which there are functional interrelationships mainly based on communication and has capacity for coding that is - it takes informational inputs and is able to learn from inputs, and train late inputs into some kind of output.*<sup>13</sup>

In broader meaning, system includes close cooperation, interaction of various groups, behaviour of other actors, order, peaceful coexistence, technical cooperation and thus it is interdisciplinary and multi-disciplinary in nature. In the light of these features of system, Japanese system can be best placed with the Third World nations who are looking after the help of Japan in terms of technical, economic, and other related helps. Some of the following theories and approaches will highlight the relationship between Japan and the Third World.

#### 'Economic Integration' - Theory of Knowledgism

The human society has always been influenced by the economic development, the unique feature of any system. All the historical, social, political, and environmental developments have been the vehicles and product of economic development.

The contemporary global system is characterised by economic integration due to rapid industrialisation and urbanization. The changes may be called a "leap" of human society which

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13. David Apter, *Introduction to Political Analysis* (New Delhi, 1978), pp.257-58.

is now translated into a form of "*Capitalist*" society which finally ends in a society called "*knowledgism*". Japan today stands at the top ladder so far these changes are concerned. It is the only successful example which has brought economic integration with the poor and developing Third World countries. The export of knowledgism to the Third World countries rests only on the mercy of Japan who has opened many avenues through export of technical and economic cooperation with the Third World nations. The rapid economic horizon of the ASEAN nations is solely dependent on Japan.

According to Schumpeter, *technological advances and innovations have proved the key source of development*. He argues that 'as economic circulation moves more towards service, its parameter becomes the price of credit and as it moves towards information, the parameter becomes the price of trust'. For successful economic development, these factors of production viz land, capital, and knowledge are important which pass through the three stages comprising feudal society, industrial society and information society. The final stage i.e. the information society is most important called as "*knowledgism Society*" which is congenial for Japanese economic system. Today the integrated economy of Japan has spread not only in the Third World but also in the highly developed West. The other various system of

knowledgism like communication satellites, airline network and telecommunications are being used in Japan. These have come to play crucial role for the rapid economic development of Japan.

Japan has adopted diversified economy based on mutual trust, understanding, cooperation, spiritual interest and etiquette manners. Its slogan 'towards an integrated economy for mutual trust' has been the mainstay of post-war Japan which has been employed for the welfare of Third World nations. Another question which is even more important - as how can communication-based mutual trust be encouraged by the Japan for the Third World? Then the answer is available to virtue and peace which can lead greater economic development. The peaceful integrated economic development is based on welfare, security, safety, stability, trust and sympathy. It needs both competition and cooperation between Japan and Third World for overall economic development. The following figure is helpful to understand the "PEACE MODEL" for Third World Development




Figure : Development of the Range of Competition and Cooperation



The Functional Approach to Peace

The "*functional*" sector of international organisation is a part of the mass of organised international activities which is directly related to economic, social, technical, and humanitarian matters. Functional activities are immediately and explicitly concerned with value as prosperity, welfare, social justice, and the "good life", rather than the prevention of war and elimination of national security. The theory of functionalism which is essential and defensive of the proposition that the development of economic cooperation is a major prerequisite for the ultimate solution of political conflict and elimination of war, has been elaborately developed by David Mitrany. In his words : "*The problem of our time is not how to keep the nation peacefully apart but how to bring them actively together...*" <sup>14</sup>

Theorists like Emil Durkheim, Charles H. Cooley, Robert Merton, Talcott Parsons, Kenneth Boulding, Anatol Rapoport, George Liska, and many others have developed functional model which gained popularity only after World War II, the turning point of Japanese system. Japanese peace researchers quickly borrowed the functional ideas from these scholars and tried to put them in practice.

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 14. David Mitrany, *The Progress of International Government* (New Haven, 1933), p. 122.

In the light of functional approach, Japanese peace thinkers have viewed the human values not only by promoting peace and solidarity but also tried to correlate it with social facts, cultural ethos, collective responsibility, occupational structure, productive analysis, uniformity and other conceptualizations. These are healthy, congenial, and favourable conditions of sustainable peace.

In the rapid changing of socio-economic and political scenarios of Third World, Japanese brains tried to integrate these functional elements which are the major prerequisites and promises of peace.

#### Theory of Idealism

Though the intellectual foundation of ideal approach can be traced back to Plato yet the main credit goes to Woodrow Wilson, late American President, for presenting upto date and reliable explanation. Theory of Idealism is based on norms and values, resists coercive power instrument, stresses on mutual understanding between the nations. Quincy Wright<sup>15</sup> argues that 'for peaceful coexistence and long term relationship between the nations, we need ideal outlook'. Japan has adopted ideal formula to develop good relation with the Third World. For sustaining peace, all nations need ethical values and peaceful coexistence.

15. See Quincy Wright, "Realism and Idealism in International Politics" *World Politics* (Chicago, 1954), pp. 126-27.

The concept of pacifism, non-militarism and non-violence is based on Ideal method of Japan. The decision-makers of Japan during post-war chosen peace, tranquility, and no war to sustain global peace.

#### PREREQUISITES OF PEACE

After propounding the theory-building of peace, the idea switches on the practical aspects of peace which Japan so far has done for the Third World and the world as a whole. In the present world, the practical aspects are important. Japan has adopted many methods for sustaining peace in the World. Japan's performance and prospects of sustaining peace can be seen in the light of following headlines.

##### A] Japanese Evolving Role in the International Community

A look back of Japan's history over hundred years since the Meiji period shows that Japan had great efforts to bring peace by socio-economic exchanges. It was the ambitions of the great emperors like Tokugawa and Meiji that the international solidarity and peace is essential for the healthy development of any society.

But peace took practical shape after 1952 when constitution of Japan renounced war and stressed on peace to make it the national supreme policy to play a positive role in the

international society as peace loving state and therefore, promotion for mutual understanding and friendship with other countries, the prerequisite conditions of peace, should be the basis of Japan's foreign policy. Through technical, economic and cultural exchange, the heart to heart contact between various nations correlate misunderstandings and prejudices which tend to arise in international relations and play an incalculable role in eliminating distrust and suspicion.

Although Japan's international environment is today growing increasingly harsh with the friction arising against a background of Japan's huge external account imbalances. At the same time, the world economy is facing various problems such as massive imbalance of trade, the growing protectionism and sharp currency fluctuations. In such changing global climate, Japan has important role to play. It has developed rather smoothly in favourable international environment centred on the free trade system, yet now it is difficult to maintain that international order without coordination and untiring effort on the part of all countries. It is therefore important that Japan, taking the long-term perspective and respecting international coordination, works to contribute positively to world peace and prosperity through playing an important and responsible role as a standard-bearer sustaining the international order. In the modern economic history, Japan happens

to be the major turning point and therefore Japanese economic activities are being constantly watched by the world.

Due to these reasons, Japan is being more accurately understood in the present international situation because the present environment of economic, scientific, technological, cultural, and social changes are more important than military might. Japan while maintaining its healthy relations with the world does not want to pose any threat to any region of the world. It wants to play even greater political role in contributing to the world peace and stability from the global perspective. Japan wants to take full advantage of its own economic vitality for the maintenance and development of international economic order.

With the emphasis of cultural, academic studies, science and technology, Japan wants to work for the solution of environment, medical and health care, food and nutrition, and other problems common to all mankind and contribute to the creation of new civilization.

Treasuring such universal values, good faith and humanism, Japan while fully respecting other countries' positions, seeks to win the trust of all countries.

Japan could not have achieved its present peace and prosperity without solidarity and cooperation with the other

countries without sharing these basic values of freedom and democracy. All the Third World nations are showing renewed vigour with advancing integration, and thus Japan is ensuring its close relation not only in the economic field but also in political, cultural, scientific, technological, and wide range of other fields.

B] Tasks for Japanese Foreign Policy : Efforts to World Peace

Working for these premises it is necessary that Japan while maintaining its own peace and prosperity, seriously tackle the following tasks to actively fulfil its international responsibilities and play due role.

Although mankind always desired for long peace and stability in the world, yet there are a number of destabilizing factors including the threat of wars, regional conflicts, and terrorist acts. As a nation of peace, Japan should play an ever more active part consistent with its national strength for world peace and stability in the following fields :

i. East-West Relations, Disarmament and Arms Control

Although there has been considerable ups-downs in the East-West relations, especially there is the United States and Soviet relations which are the two main pillars of world peace, and they have passed several resolution through summits, treaties

and pacts, Japan has to take the basic position that the global and total elimination<sup>of</sup> weapons is the basic solution for the security of the nations. In East-West relations, it is imperative that Japan should make an ever greater efforts to build more stable East-West relations. On the question of disarmament, Japan must continue to call upon all nations in the United Nations, the conference on disarmament and other forum of comprehensive nuclear test ban, the maintenance and strengthening of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, an early ban on the chemical weapons, and other initiatives. Japan also wants to extend moral support through the United Nations to limit dangerous weapons.

In July 1987, Nakasone became the first incumbent Japanese Prime Minister to pay an official visit to Eastern Europe and contribute to promote political dialogue and mutual understanding between the East-West.

ii. Regional Issues

Third World nations have always been the victim grounds and so far 120 wars have taken place only in the Third World nations. Today there are number of troubled, strife torn and partially ruined spots on the surface of the Third World. Some of them are tension of Korean Peninsula, Iran-Iraq war, Palestine Issues, Afghanistan problems, Lebanese crisis, the

question of peace in the Middle East, apartheid in South Africa, Fiji Crisis, Tibet issue, Sri Lanka crisis, Chile crisis, Central-America crisis etc. These problems are the results of many combined factors such as historical wars, ethical and political differences, ideological conflict, cultural and religious differences. These problems are acute and far away from political solutions. Japan being an important actor can make even greater diplomatic efforts to create a climate conducive to preventing the spread to conflicts, mitigating tension and promoting the easy solutions to these conflicts.

Japan has already taken number of diplomatic initiatives to create climate conducive to the solution of these issues and has suggested number of alternative solutions. At the same time Japan is in search of other possible peaceful formulae to curb these problems.

iii. Terrorism

Terrorism and terrorists in various shapes pose major challenges to the world. Several countries, big and small, including the mightiest powers like United States and France are directly or indirectly affected by this growing menace. Shooting, bombs, blackmail, and utter ruthlessness characterise the murderous tactics of terrorists. The menace is increasing alarmingly. Air transport is an enticing target for international



terrorism. Terrorists leave no stone unturned to harm the international community. Resolutely opposed to terrorism in all its forms, Japan believes that it is important to strengthen international cooperation for the prevention of terrorism.

C] Japan & Peace Through Economic Betterment

The notion that peace can be brought about through sharing mutual benefits is virtually an article of faith with most leading American politicians. It has an exact correlation in the belief that war is principally caused by poverty and that, to quote Robert McNamara - "There is an irrefutable relationship between violence and economic backwardness... there is direct and constant relationship between the incidence of violence and the economic status on the countries affected". The strong assertion that gap between rich and poor countries is increasing which is likely to bring frustration and economic backwardness. Coupled with this background is the birth of the North-South conflict. This growing disease is against the interest of Japanese who have adopted the policy of expansionism through trade surplus in Third World countries. In the shadow of Japanese economy, they are helping the Third World nations by all possible means. Without economic betterment, no peace movement can be imagined. Poverty, deprivation, and backwardness can not encourage the citizens to raise the slogans of peace.

Japan's formula '*Peace Through Economic Betterment*' has proved boon to many Third World nations.

D] Cooperation for the Developing Countries - Stability & Development

Most of the Third World and newly industrialised nations are witnessing the spectacles of slow economic growth, heavy debt burden, destabilisation, desertification, ecological decay, periodical famines and political rivalry. Other similar problems like mass poverty, illiteracy, low per capita income, industrial sickness, lack of planned economy, faulty bureaucratic structure, lack of national integration, growing corruption and nepotism etc. have assumed alarming shapes in most of the Third World countries and therefore immediate solution of these problems are essential.

Japan as being an economic super-power has taken many measures to reduce these problems. Japan thinks that the cooperation for the developing countries through socio-economic contributions is not only essential for humanitarian reasons but also essential for stability, harmony and peace.

Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has taken many measures to give all possible technical, economic helps and aid to the developing countries. In 1986, Official Development

Assistance<sup>16</sup> (ODA) of Japan distributed \$5634 million to the Third World Countries. It comprised 70 per cent to Asia and 30 per cent to Africa and Latin America<sup>17</sup>. Recently Japan sketched out a new, complex programme for the Third World debt relief under the supervision of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Japanese Governor Satoshi Sumita made an agreement with IMF Chief for the structural arrangement and stressed the programme to be based on market oriented approach.<sup>18</sup> Among the major contributors loan to Third World nations, Japan's name appears on the top. It shows its courtesy and sympathy towards the poor-developing nations.

Despite the grant aids to Third World nations, Japan is giving full technical support comprising expert trainees, development survey, project-type technical co-operation (socio-economic development sector, health and medical sector, population and family sector, dispatch of Japan Overseas Corporation Volunteers etc.), educational research, medical treatment, public welfare and environmental improvement projects, agricultural skills, transport and

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16. ODA means Assistance of a concessional nature, that is given by the governments and their agencies of Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member countries in order to help developing countries to improve their living standards. It includes bilateral grants and loans to needy nations and contributions to international organs such as World Bank.

17. See *White Papers of Japan 1986-87* (Tokyo, 1987) p.32.

18. *New Strait Times* (Kualalampur), 27 September 1988.

communication facilities, fishery related assistance, mental working and machinery industries development institutes, disaster relief related assistance and cultural related assistance.

With these forms of cooperation, it is very important for further revitalization of the developing countries' economies that Japan must develop a new international division of labour by positively promoting dialogue with these countries, both bilaterally and multilaterally, and further expanding its imports of commodities from developing countries and promoting private sector direct overseas investment and the accompanying technology transfer.

E] Making Japan More Open to the World

Following the contemporary global system, Japanese are becoming increasingly conscious in the international community and they have shared both pain and pleasure to gain the profits. Despite all the possible fluctuations and criticisms, Japan has adopted the humanitarian approach towards the world. For Japan to contribute to global culture and to promote harmony with the international community, it is all the necessary that Japan's import-export imbalance in terms of personal exchange, trade, culture and the entire gamut of fields be rectified. To this end, it is important that both state and society become broad-minded and tolerant, that sweeping reforms be implemented

in the entire range of fields from the international perspective.

Making Japan more open to the rest of the world in both a way to sustain and develop Japan's outstanding tradition and the strengths demonstrated in the process of its modernization and part of the process of evolving Japanese behavioral modes and social patterns of more universal values and thereby making them more acceptable to the world.

At the same time, the fact remains that the nations of the world are increasingly receptive to the Japanese film, fashion, music, architecture, food and other aspects of Japanese culture which have contributed to improving modern Japan's image in the eyes of world.

In promoting mutual understanding and friendly relations with the Third World, it is important that Japan vigorously promotes cultural exchanges, including youth exchanges and studies in international issues. With the advent of the information age, it is also imperative that Japan strengthens its information-provision capacity, using advanced telecommunication systems and other means.

The world is now at a crucial juncture and it will decide whether or not future generations change with bearing the torch of civilization in the 21st century. Given this situation, Japan

is also at a historic turning point as a responsible member of the international community, with great influence and increasing important global role to play. It is now in a position to use its economic power to make a positive contribution to peace and prosperity in the world. Japan's foreign minister Sausuke Uno has said :

*"...The new century is just around the corner. Looking ahead, we must drive ourselves as a nation to making Japan a country that is truly open to the rest of the world and contribute to a better world."*<sup>19</sup>

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19. See *White Papers of Japan 1986-87*, p.87.

CHAPTER - II

JAPAN AND NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE :  
FUTURE PROSPECTS

Is there an authentic Japanese viewpoint towards Third World issues in the context of the North-South dialogue? To answer this question, we shall analyse the changing behaviour of Japan in response to the pleas by the Third World for overcoming the rigidities hindering productivity and trade and for ushering in a new international economic order. The Japanese approach to the myths and realities of the development aid debate and the strategies adopted in the different agencies of the United Nations system reveal the many ways in which Japan has responded to the challenge of poverty in the Third World. Whether in the Tokyo round of multilateral trade negotiations or in relation to measures which should be taken to develop alternatives to the Bretton Woods system of monetary arrangements, Japan has gained increasing articulation in the political and economic discourse. The image of Japan presented by the western media does not perhaps do full justice to the efforts to Japan to pursue a progressive development policy. In a society which has been remarkably successful in achieving industrial, scientific and economic advancement, the aims of developing countries can be comprehended in ways which are very different from those determining the attitudes of countries which are expressing colonial domination in new and sophisticated forms. Japan's own transition from a backward economy to a modern industrialised economy is too recent for it to ignore the



meaning and direction of technological choices in development strategy. As far as the future prospects of Japan in relation to the North-South Dialogue is concerned, in spite of many contradictions, Japan presents a new way of thinking on development policy and the articulation of the Japanese agenda originates in the paradigmatic quality of Japan's developmental experience.

The contemporary international system is structurally divided into two sub-systems : one small but dominant and the other is large but sub-ordinate. The dominant sub-system consists primarily handful Euro-American (including Japan) states which have acquired immense military and economic power and exercise it to dominate the rest of the world. On the other hand, the sub-ordinate sub-system consists vast majority of states of Asia, Africa and Latin America. These group of nations have gained political independence yet they are economically still dependent on the West World. Thus the whole international system can be understood on the basis of structural dichotomy.<sup>1</sup>

Virtually, all South nations have failed to experience their first industrial revolution, largely on account of their impoverishment by historical imperialism and contemporary neo-imperialism. Practically none of them have yet taken off into the stage of self-sustained economic growth. This dwarfed development has made them easy prey to the hegemonistic

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1. J. Bandopadaya, *North Over South* (New Delhi, 1984), p.1.

political, military, economic and cultural policies of North.<sup>2</sup> This in return led to the North-South conflict which is not only a fundamental structural characteristic of the contemporary international system, but also from long-term point of view, the most important cause of their instability.

Just after independence from colonialism, the newly liberated states had dream that they will be able to achieve soon their economic development but it could not become possible following hunger, poverty, mass illiteracy and periodical famines. Despite blessed by all natural resources, they have not been able to overcome the backwardness and economic growth. Reviewing the whole situation, developed countries rightly or wrongly arrived at conclusion that their problems are due to weaknesses of the existing international order which basically serve the interest of the developed countries. In return, they raised the demand for the establishment of New International Economic Order (NIEO), the debate which came to be called 'The North-South Dialogue'.<sup>3</sup>

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 ibid., p.2.

The terms North and South, looked at from strictly geographical point of view, appear to be misnomers for the rich and poor countries respectively. However, in the view of the acceptability they have gained world wide and for the sake of convenience, we will also use the term viz North and South, as synonyms for the developed and underdeveloped or developing countries of the non-communist world. In the dividend or world into North-South, the centrally planned countries have been excluded, mainly because they declined to take any responsibility for the evolution of the problems of underdevelopment.

Japan one of the highly developed nations came ahead with new formulae to solve the problems of Third World countries. As an important member of the organisation for the economic cooperation has definite stake in the ongoing turmoil and instability in the developing world. It constantly stood for integrated commodity, liberalisation in trade, multinational activities and transfer of technology in supplying the Third World.

#### *JAPAN'S INTEGRATED COMMODITY PROGRAMME*

Japan's integrated commodity programme for the developing Third World economy has proved vitally important. On every occasion, Japan showed its repeated interest for a common commodity fund. When the question of commodities was first discussed in the sixth special session of the United Nations General Assembly in May 1974, Japanese delegates frankly added that Japan recognises the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources<sup>4</sup> in order to improve the trade with the developing countries although this policy strongly opposed by the west, especially United States. This sharp reaction put Japan on the tight corner.

Again in 1976, at Nairobi in the second round talk of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),

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4. Proceeding of the Sixth Special Session of UN General Assembly Meeting, 2 May 1974.

Japan's attitude towards the Integrated Commodity Programme (ICP) proposed by the Third World countries, was consistently opposed by the West and Japan repeated its interest for restructuring the economy.<sup>5</sup> Japan severely criticised the policy of West. In other succeeding sessions, Japan favoured the Third World countries due to vast market and resources.

At the 6th session of the UN Conference on Trade and Development held in July 1983, Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone emphasised that there can be no prosperity for the North without prosperity in the South. Japan equally stands for both developed and developing nations. He suggested that the developing nations should outline their domestic economies, and achieve sustained non-inflationary growth; open to domestic markets to facilitate the expansion of world trade- the driving force of global economic growth and endeavour to expand and improve their Official Development Assistance (ODA) in way that will encourage them for long term socio-economic development, free trade system and stability to ensure a flow of capital to the Third World nations. In this regard, Japan is ready to pay all possible assistance.<sup>6</sup>

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5. Malcolm Soubhan, "Hard Bargaining in Nairobi", *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), vol.91, no.21, 21 May 1976, p.57.

6. Japan Seeks North-South Dialogue at UNCTAD-IV - A Report, *Japan Review* (Tokyo), September 1983, pp.3-4.

Despite showing all possible mercy and courtesy towards Third World, Japan's economic policy is not free from criticism because Japan directly or indirectly is being guided by the United States. Upto now, what contribution Japan has made for developing world is vague and hidden.<sup>7</sup> On the one hand, Japan morally and economically favours the South Group of Nations while politically favours the North Group of Nations. Capitulated between the pressures from the developing countries and the hardliners of her western allies like United States, United Kingdom, France and West Germany, Japan tried either to maintain silence or to express its views as vaguely as possible.<sup>8</sup>

#### JAPAN'S LIBERAL TRADE ATTITUDES WITH THIRD WORLD

Japan's attitude in terms of trade with Third World has always been controversial. It has been argued that pattern of trade with the developing nations is on the same line of trade as those of the colonial powers. The single significant aspect of the trade is that developing countries supply raw materials for the industrialised nations like Japan and in return, they receive finished goods.

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7. Galal A. Amim, "Dependent Development", *Alternatives* (Guilford), vol.2, no.4, October 1976, pp.121-25.
8. Jun Nishikawa, "Japan and the North-South Problem", *Japan Quarterly* (Tokyo), Vol.21, January-March 1979, pp.210-15.

The notions of independent economic development among many Third World nations like South Korea, Taiwan, Senegal, Egypt, India etc. have changed or reduced their dependence on Japan. To maintain healthy relations, Japan is giving all possible aids to the Third World so that they could remain the main suppliers of raw materials and also purchasers of Japanese goods. Thus for Japan has been reasonably successful in its strategy. Due to these strategies, Japan's economic diplomacy has been very successful in maintaining good relations with the developing world.

Japan is a market creator in the ASEAN and developing regions, for Japanese goods. These are sustained and expanded by adopting the industries to the changing needs of the people. Japan remains as the major supplier of industrial goods to these countries.<sup>9</sup>

Japan agrees that the benefits of the economic recovery in the developed countries are spilling over and most of the developing countries continue to be troubled by depressed primary commodity prices, accumulated external debts, high inflation, and other problems. It is clear that growth and stability in the

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9. In 1978 out of all the developing countries of Asia and the Middle-East which traded with Japan, only Indonesia, India, Malaysia, Brunei and the oil producing countries of Middle-East had a surplus. Among them India's surplus was only a marginal one, whereas Indonesia and Brunei had their, because of massive oil exports to Japan; Malaysia too had the surplus because of her rubber and bauxite exports.

Third World countries are linked to world peace and prosperity. Japan's own economic interest and development are possible only in a peaceful international climate. Official Development Assistance (ODA), the core of Japan's economic cooperation has been sincerely working to strengthen the developing countries' industrial infrastructure and export capabilities by promoting the transfer of management know-how and technology without adding to their debt burdens. It is thus hoped that developing countries will endeavour to improve their investment climates for direct private-sector investment.<sup>10</sup>

The maintenance of a favourable international economic climate is a must if developing countries' self-help efforts are to bear fruit. With Japan's economic development, there has been a corresponding increase in the role Japan should play in the international community. Fully aware of its position as a free and democratic nation, Japan must be steadfast in its efforts for sustaining peace and stability.

#### JAPAN-ASEAN RELATIONS : STEPS FOR REGIONAL STABILITY AND PEACE

There has been a long historical, social and cultural relationships between Japan and the ASEAN group of countries.

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10. See *Diplomatic Bluebook, 1985* (Tokyo, 1985), pp.22-23.

Geo-politically and economically the region has been vitally important for Japan because it offers massive substantial market, supplies abundance of mineral resources.<sup>11</sup> Ninety per cent of Japan's required raw materials and mineral fuels get transported through the various channels of the region. Thirty per cent of Japan's finished goods are absorbed by the ASEAN.

For ASEAN, Japan's stand is all the more necessary due to their economic instability. For healthy, rapid and smooth economic development in the region, Japan has proved a boon.

From political point of view too, Japan is important for the region. Since all the ASEAN countries are basically ruled by conservative regimes, they naturally hesitate to come too close to Moscow or Beijing. As far as United States is concerned, it does not keep ASEAN on its priority list especially after 1975 following the communist victory in Indochina. The field is thus widely open to Japan which has both base and high stakes in the region.

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11. Southeast Asia was for a long time the main target of foreign economic expansion of Japan's capitalism. Even in pre-war era Japan's monopolies battled for the markets, raw material sources and capital-investment spheres. Japan's famous doctrine of the "Great East Asia Co-prosperity Spheres" was aimed at redividing the spheres of influence in Southeast Asia and was one of the fundamentals of Japanese foreign policies. see L.L. Kiochkousky, *Economic Neo-colonialism : Problem of Southeast Asia, Struggle for Economic Independence* (Moscow, 1975), p.66.



With the development of ASEAN and the continuing conflict in Indochina, Japan's basic policy towards Southeast Asia is one of striving to contribute to the establishment of peaceful coexistence between the ASEAN countries.

Realising the importance of development and stability in Southeast Asia, Japan has worked to maintain and develop close relations with the all nations of the region for the entire range of development. Continuous flow of support from comprehensive political solution to Cambodia and maintaining dialogue with Vietnam, Japan is persisting in its diplomatic efforts to create a climate conducive to peace in Indochina.<sup>12</sup>

#### *JAPAN'S COMMITMENT TO NIEO*

The New International Economic Order (NIEO) is based on equality, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest, and cooperation among all states, irrespective for those economic and social system.<sup>13</sup>

The notion of NIEO has always been a controversial issue and there has always been a question mark before the Third World countries about Japan's tilt towards NIEO. Since most of the

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12. See *Diplomatic Bluebook, 1985*, pp. 11-12.

13. J. Bandopadhyaya, *North Over South*, (New Delhi, 1984), p.107.

Third World countries had been under colonial possessions of the West, Japan accepts the norms of NIEO only on ethical and moral grounds. On the political ground, Japan strongly favours the Western World. Then the issue of NIEO is left at the mercy of Japan whether it accepts or rejects its values. The following lines, however, are helpful to understand Japan's policy towards the North-South problems, the debated issue of NIEO.

- i. Realising its own vulnerability to the pressure of commodity procedures and importing countries, it does not openly want to antagonise the developing countries and hence follows a soft posture.
- ii. Being pulled in different directions by both developed and developing countries, Japan feels that it should play a delicate role favourable to both North and South countries.
- iii. Generally any major change in the existing economic and information order, for Japan which is increasingly a Western Alliance, the problem is that of East and West and not the North and South. Hence to avoid erosion of the so-called "Free World", the developing countries have to make some financial sacrifices.

In a nutshell, Japan's participation in the North-South Dialogue is a more defensive step against the onslaught of the developing countries. The inequalities, conservatism and introvert nature of Japan's policy towards NIEO are not really a surprise to any observer who knows the nature, both political and economic.

#### FUTURE PROSPECTS

Any view into the future depends basically on the accuracy of one's understanding of the past. If past trends have been correctly identified, then one can assume some continuity of their trends into the future.

Japan's tremendous contribution in developing Third World economy has been widely noted. Japan has shown to the World that economic strength is not only limited to the Western World. Through economic revitalisation, Japan has opened a new chapter of friendship with the Developing World. The even more remarkable Japanese achievement came through developing democratic values. The success of Japan in opting for Western Culture while maintaining their own cultural tradition and thus producing a dynamic cultural mix which is entirely their own, could both comfort and inspire non-western people, who fear that in becoming modernized, they will lose their cultural identity.<sup>14</sup>

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14. E. Reichauer, *The Japanese* (Tokyo, 1988), p.425.

On the other hand, Japan has also proved a boon in some way to the West. As the only industrialised power stemming from the non-western culture background, it has brought solution to the problems of industrial -urban life and mass democracy, attitudes and skills quite distinct from others. The impact of Japanese artistic skills and aesthetic concepts have been widely noted in United States and many other European countries.

The Japanese might also lead the way towards the development of global fellow feeling that mankind needs for survival. Their 'Rule of Virtue' and 'Rule of Law' have played a significant role in explaining the economic and social development. They are well aware as how to save and how to invest their capital because Japanese scholars understand Weber's "Protestant Ethics and Spirit of Capitalism". Today, Japan stands as the light of hope for the Third World.

The Pearson Report focussed on the logic of the changes in development strategy which would provide an answer to the exigencies in the Third World. Accordingly, it defined development policy as the recognition of the fact that the endeavour to achieve better living conditions in the Third World was no longer divisible from the effort in the advanced countries. Japanese thinking on development policy has over the years developed a recognizable logic and identity which is reflected in the strong

confidence which Tokyo now has in its reformulation of the aims, principles and methods of development aid. The shift in Japan's orientation is visible both in its motivation and in the quality of its cooperation with developing countries. Japan has also tried to shift the agenda of international discussion on Third World issues towards long term socio-economic development. Japanese economic diplomacy has also worked to streamline procedures at technical levels and tried to eradicate the weaknesses of existing programmes. It is thus unlikely that there will be any abrupt cooling off of Japanese interest in the Third World and needless to say the core of this concern is built of shared common national goals with the developing countries. Japan has not directly challenged the established doctrines and institutions based on the traditional relations of the Western Powers with their former colonies. The unique characteristic of Japan's development has been the adoption of a pragmatic line with realistic prescriptions for Third World development.

CHAPTER - III

JAPANESE PERSPECTIVE ON SECURITY

The preconditions for meaningful and significant cooperation between Japan and the Third World in overall national security relationships can be found in the shift from military to non-military issues of Japanese security policy. Japan's disengagement from the force structures and arms races characteristic of Super-Power interventionism has created a political consensus which is markedly different from that which governed the historical background of the Japanese perspective on security. There are controversial questions about the extent to which the traditional perspectives of pre-Second World War Japanese were dispensed with in the years following the occupation. There is hardly any doubt that the balance of political forces in Japan has been influenced by the remarkable diversion of national views on security into new channels. Security policy has always been an important issue which not only includes national territorial integrity, government and defense but also food, commerce, industry, cultural exchange, clothing, shelter, development aid, research activities, environmental protection, and other related activities. It is the security on which the pillar of a country rests. In fact, no social, political, economic, scientific, and technological development can be imagined without the security arrangement of a country particularly in the contemporary world. In lack of security, psychological, political, and social fears

Continue which will hinder the development of a country. For smooth, rapid and healthy development, the guarantee of security plays a crucial role.

Security perception in post-war Japan has been the pivotal issue and Japanese decision-makers are always concerned about the security issues immediately after the Second World War period. In the ashes of defeat, the Japanese lost the collective effervescence and were awakened by the trauma. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki defeats and recognition of deception following the patriotic fever instantly transformed the militant nation into a country of convinced pacifism. The Japanese were firmly determined never to happen such horror in future. The slogans '*No more Hiroshima!*', '*No more Nagasaki!*', '*No more War*', '*No more self sacrifice for the emperor and nation!*', and '*Let us make Hiroshima the base of world peace!*'. All these became the rallying crisis during post-war Japan.<sup>1</sup> International peace, justice, renounce of war became the daily diet of Japanese citizens.

But these slogans could not last long due to growing awareness among the nations. The phenomenal qualitative and quantitative growth in the conventional and non-conventional

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1. K. Nakamura, "Militarisation of Post-War Japan", *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* (Oslo), vol.13, no.1, Annual Special Issue 1982, pp.31-37.



weapons changed the political map of the world and security among the nations including Japan particularly, became the major issue. Living alive only on the nose of pacifism became the challenging issue for the Japanese and their security outlook received many new folds during post-war years and thus security perception became the most important issue of Japanese foreign policy which aimed not only to maintain internal law and order but also external protection through all possible means.

In the light of external security environment, many other related issues like geo-politics, strategic location, geographical boundaries, marine, and seabed arrangement also became the barriers of Japanese security. At the same time, the balance of power system, big-power rivalry in the Pacific Ocean, cold and neo-cold war politics, resource competition, issues on armaments, ideological and political differences etc. also became the debated issues for the security of Japan.

Moreover, the domestic scene of Japan like peace movement, role of political parties, youth organisations, business and trade union movements, women movements, also became important for the security of Japan.

In the light of these issues, the security of Japan not only became important for the internal politics but also

for the pacific region and the world. The decision-makers of Japan put forth many new ideas, new issues and new formulae to make Japanese security more stronger, wider and global.

Coupled with these facts, the security perception of Japan went on changing after World War II which was mainly confined to the military activities and its role was always suspected in the eyes of China, Korea, Taiwan and Manchuria where Japan had its imperial influence by exercising coercive formulae. Japan's colonial attitude towards these nations declared Japan as the aggressor but the end of World War II brought many turning points in the Japanese security policy. Due to emergence of pluralism, multipolarism, linkage politics between political security affairs and economic relations have been the fresh dilemmas for Japan's security policy. Thus to understand Japanese perspective on security, an evaluation of the past crises and current strategic problems from a broader political and historical perspective are needed.

#### *JAPANESE PERSPECTIVE ON SECURITY : A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND*

There has been a long history about the security issues in Japan. Emporer Meiji (1869-1912) was very much concerned about the security of Japan and intended to promote language, education, culture, and politics among the people to develop the feelings of patriotism, love, respect, and harmony, and to look

after the overall security of the country. In military, many foreign experts from different European countries were employed to produce expert opinions. English army officers were engaged to help in creating a modern navy. French and German officers were put to work to reform law and code.

Nothing the height of the western imperialism in the late nineteenth century, Meiji leaders were warned about the possible threats and, therefore, they made all possible efforts to settle the security issues by diplomatic means between Japan and the West. The policy was successful, for Japan did not come into conflict with until the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05. To exclude Western imperialism, Meiji leaders took clever preventive measures. As a result, Japan did not witness the height of Western imperialism and itself emerged as an imperial nation.

But many dramatic changes took place after the death of Meiji. Consequently socio-economic and political changes were experienced during 1920's. Government reforms were introduced, new political parties were formed. The conservatives and liberals managed to hold power.

In the international affairs, Japan attempted to adjust to the changing world of the 1920's. Siberia became the main

target. So, did Korea too, where resistance to Japanese rule at last had been broken. Steps were taken to make this country an integral part of the rising Japanese empire. Worried about Japan's rising naval strength, Imperial Powers called the Washington conference, which tried to limit ship-tonnages of Japanese merchants. This resulted into a tension between Japan and the West.

In the early 1930's, angry military leaders and nationalists lacking confidence in the government, decided to take matters into their own hands. Manchuria was quickly overrun, turned into a puppet state, and absorbed into Japanese empire. Within Japan itself, the opponents of expansionism and militarism were terrorised and some of the terrorists were assassinated.

All these aggressive activities of Japan made its security very critical but Japanese without noticing security, launched an attack on China in 1937. In order to crush the Chinese forces, Japanese leaders continued to prepare the nation into the war. To serve its economic interest and to establish its position in the world, Japan planned a 'Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere'. This aggressive attitude of Japan widened the scope of tension between the Japan and the United States.

Initially victorious when war broke out in 1941, Japan soon found in troubled position. The United States rapidly

recovering from early defects took the offensive actions. Its armed forces were defeated in the pacific, and the home islands were blocked and under air attack, Japan was relentlessly forced to bring total defeat. The pacific war came to an end when the bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States. The immediate aim of the U.S. occupation was to demilitarize Japan so that the nations would never become a threat again.

After 1945, Japan found in a complete new position. American interests in Japan brought completely new security issue. Since then, Japan has maintained its defense policy at a very low and smooth level. During the interval of 1945-50, Japan was completely demilitarised, socio-economic and political needs were severely felt.

Japanese felt the need of their security when Korean war broke out in 1950. In 1952, Japan-United States Mutual Security Pact was signed. The security arrangement and establishment of Self-Defense Forces became the focal point of the leftist oppositions. At the same time, the anti-nuclear movement, demonstration against U.S.-Japan Defense Building took place inside Japan and security policy of Japan met at a critical juncture. Upto 1957, the hardline posture and security policy was strongly in favour of the United States.

In 1957, National Defense Policy (NDP) was formulated which was aimed at preventing direct and indirect aggression so that the independence and peace of Japan found on democratic principles could be preserved. During 1957-76, till the National Defense Policy Outline (NDPO) was adopted, Japan had drawn its defense build-up plan, aiming at qualitative increase. The NDPO comprised 'Standard Defense Force (SDF) and Japan' reliance on U.S., in case of large external aggression or nuclear war. Technical personnel and specialised trainings in the operational field have brought qualitative improvement in the defense capabilities of Japan.

NDPO was also intended to provide greater flexibility for administrating, upgrading and cooperating the SDF in responding to any major change in the domestic or international situation and to provide a "Smooth Transition" to heightened state of defense preparedness in such event. This also further helped in strengthening the military technology matching with the world stand. All these changes were made under the guidelines of the United States of save the alarming Soviet and Chinese military build-up in the region.

Despite the above mentioned objectives of NDPO, it also stands for the following principles :

- i. to achieve the activities of the United Nation and promote international cooperation, thereby contributing the realization of world peace;
- ii. to achieve the public welfare and enhance the people's love for the country, thereby establishing the sound basis essential to Japan's security;
- iii. to develop progressively the effective defense capabilities necessary for self defense, with due regard to the nation's resource and preventing domestic situation; and
- iv. to deal with the external aggression on the basis of Japan - U.S. security aggression, pending more effective functioning of the United Nations in the future in determining and repelling such aggression.

Despite all these possible measures, NDPO is also stressing to strengthen the need to organise the various groups like business, organisation, trade unions, political parties (mainly conservatives), and public opinions to take the security arrangements in Japan. Policy-makers of Japan are in favour of making at least conventional type of weapons to meet any external threat. The hot climate to have Japan's own security has shocked the Western nations and soon the United States began to see Japan's vulnerability in the military and energy spheres. To escape from the picture of Japan's security, the

United States is stressing to increase defense expenditure in Japan. This shows dual diplomacy of the United States.

Many new dramatic changes took place in Japan's security policy since 1978 when trouble broke out at different parts of globe. With the shift of world political scenario, Japan's security policy also changed. The beginning of neo-cold war politics upset the East-West balance due to growth of Soviet Military Power in Eastern Regions which ultimately decreased the United States' influence in the region and military balance of East-West shifted in favour of Communist China and Russia. The communist influence, ideologically anti-Japanese, again posed challenge to the Japanese security and Japan was again bound to follow the U.S. Defense Security Pact. Again Japan witnessed the importance of U.S. Defense Cooperation. But the bilateral relation in the economic sphere assumes serious dimension due to Japan's bulging trade surplus, and the U.S. intensified its demands in the defense area. On the other hand, clash is likely between China and Japan. Japan wants to avoid any such indulgence and feels that it can look after its security interest better through diplomatic channels rather than turning into a potential military power. Another factor which prevents Japan to increase its military expenditure is the ASEAN relations which may react against Japan. Japan always wants to maintain friendly relation with these nations through all possible means. Its perception on security is regional aiming its own security while American perception on security is global and wider.



Probably due to these domestic and international constraints, Japanese have remained in dilemma about increasing its defense expenditure.

*GUIDELINES FOR JAPAN - U.S. DEFENSE COOPERATION*

The draft guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defence Cooperation was submitted in November 1978 created mainly on three aspects of cooperation arising in different situations. These are :

1. action to be taken when armed attacks are imminent;
2. action to be taken when armed attacks have really taken place; and
3. action to be taken jointly in response to the changes in far-Eastern Region.

The preamble also reads the guidelines that the extension of facilities and support by Japan to U.S. were subjected to take an effective joint action in case Japan was attacked. The guidelines provide the postures for cooperation between the SDF & the U.S. Defense Forces in the important areas of operation, intelligence and logistic support. This also includes conducting studies on joint defense planning, undertaken joint military exercises, training for the defense personnel, and continuing dialogue both on official and non-official levels.

The critical axiom of the Japan - United States defense cooperation is the maintenance of integrity of security arrangements while continuously assessing the linkages between the foreign policy process and Japan's domestic politics. The events connected with the Security Treaty controversy and the Okinawa question have conclusively proved that American military requirements for security could not be pursued with indifference to Japan's political demands. In any case the continuing crises in Japanese - American relations made it difficult to speak of a US - Japanese "partnership" in the manner in which American writing projected the mutual perception before the 1970s. The communication gaps between the US and Japan have often made it difficult to discern the underlying forces shaping the overall relationship, including the issues which formed the subject of heated domestic controversy in Japan over the Japanese-US Security Treaty. In the context of American antagonism with the Sino-Soviet bloc, there were important reasons for the United States to attach the greatest importance to its relationship with Japan. The Japanese, however, interacted in a much more complex manner. It would suffice here to mention that Japanese perceptions of the emergence of a multipolar world have helped to develop a macroscopic view which conditioned the political process and decision-making away from the politics of confrontation which had marked the Security Treaty Crisis of 1960. Viewed from the point of view of the future, it is

possible to perceive that Japan has the essential independent base on which to erect novel structures in area of security with the decline and passing of American hegemony as the 20th century draws to an end.

#### *SIGNIFICANCE OF JAPAN - U.S. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS*

Since the beginning of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, there has been constant debate among the various scholars as why Japan aligned with the United States. Many reasons have been given. In fact, when Japan was demilitarised, United States was the only country which gave full support because of being militarily sophisticated, economically well-off and politically strong while these conditions were missing with other nations. Japan was looking for immediate help which could become possible only with the United States. Since 1952, till date, U.S. has shown confidence in the eyes of Japanese despite many oppositions by sections of group. Due to following reasons Japan-U.S. Defense Policy has proved successful.

1. In the present international community in which each nation has different values and is pursuing its own national interests, there are incessant conflicts in various parts of the world. Nevertheless, peace and stability are maintained between East-West as large scale conflicts are deterred strongly by the balance of power centred on the U.S. and Soviet Union, both of which possess overwhelming amount of nuclear and

conventional weapons.

2. Therefore, considering Japan's security, we must acknowledge the international military structure in which deterrence is functioning where the United States and the Soviet Union, and not overlook the fact that Japan's geographic location is from a strategic point of view, extremely important for both United States and Soviet Union in their global military confrontation.
3. Considering these points, it is by no means advisable for Japan to attempt to secure its security by itself apart from the global deterrent system centred on the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Japan should keep the security arrangements with the U.S., with whom it shares basic values of freedom and democracy, and effectively employs the enormous deterrent power of the U.S. for its own security. That is best option for Japan.<sup>2</sup>

#### ARMS INDUSTRIES IN JAPAN

Japan had skill technology in producing the sophisticated arms before the World War II but all its arms industries were destroyed by the U.S. during the World War II. After 1952, Japan again entered in this profession with the help of the United States and soon started producing arms superior than old ones.

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2. see *White Papers of Japan 1986-87*, pp.39-40.

During Nakasone period, security was indispensable to the Japanese foreign policy. Speaking at a commencement ceremony at the National Defense Academy (1986), Nakasone said that 'Japan can defend itself with its own hands...We must not forget war in times of space'.<sup>3</sup> Speaking at Williamburg conference on May 13, 1983, he said : 'The security of our country is indivisible and must be approached on a global basis'.

The arms industries in Japan received impetus during Korean crisis, Japan continuously went on producing arms with the help of U.S. Defense Technology. Since Korean war, Japan laid emphasis on self reliance defense production and licencing agreement where technology is imported and adopted only on indigenous conditions.

The major military industrial complex are Mitsubishi, Kawasaki, Toshiba, Nippon, Shimrewa, Fuji, Momatsu, Nihon, Nissan, Daikin etc. Despite these, there are missile, naval and air-craft industries. With the U.S. combined efforts, the defense manufacturers have produced various defense items such as CH-47D Helicopters, F-155 Interceptors, KV-107/2A Helicopters, O-6D Helicopters, SH-3B Helicopters, AIM-7F Sparrow, P-3C Orion maritime, Sea Sparrow missiles, 214 ST Model Helicopters etc. under the licence of the United States.

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3. see *Mainichi Daily News* (Tokyo), 24 March 1986.

The past few years have witnessed a large increase in Japan's military expenditure. But the Japanese Public Opinions remain averse to arms exports, the coming year may witness Japanese penetration into the international arms markets, given the stagnation that prevails in the export sectors. There is great scope for the expansion of arms industries in Japan if the present trend continues.

*JAPANESE PERSPECTIVE ON SECURITY IN THE LIGHT OF REGIONAL ISSUES*

Japanese perspective on security can not be best understood without its relations to pacific and other regional countries. Japan's security policy with Southeast Asia, China, Korea, and Soviet Union is important. Without these issues, the Japanese perspective on security is far from complete.

A] Japan - ASEAN Relations

Japanese perspective on security can be best understood in relation to ASEAN countries which are not only Japan's stable and permanent trade partners but also <sup>amicable</sup> in terms of cultural, socio-economic and political exchanges. Because of being very close in many respects, Japanese earned credibility in the eyes of all ASEAN countries.

The situation has gone change following the present global military trend and Japan is now fastly emerging

a regional military power which is likely to threaten the stability of the region. Japanese decision-makers keep on repeating that they want defense build-up only for their own security. Stability and peace in the region can only be maintained when there is security guarantee of Japan with the U.S. assistance or otherwise, Japan will be thrown out by its immediate neighbours viz China or Soviet Union, its economic development will come to halt and in return Southeast Asian region may suffer from dangerous consequences.

Both United States and Japan trust each other; they count their ability and effect on the region more than others. Beneath the surface of their differing ideological and political orientations including the "nonalignment" external pressure of many of them, those nations earnestly look to the U.S. as the only promising character of peace and stability in the region.<sup>4</sup>

Since last many years, the situation has gone changed following the emergence of transnationalism, interdependence and global politics in Southeast Asian countries. Due to decline of the U.S. politico-military capability, socio-economic and political constraints, however, the U.S. is no longer interested to bring peace and stability in the region. The era of Pax-American is more effective and will remain effective even in the future.

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4. Herbert P. Bix, "Japan : The Roots of Militarism", in Mark Selden, ed., *Remaking Asia, Essays on the American uses of Power* (New York, 1974), pp.305-8.

On the one hand, it openly declares its commitment to bring peace in the region while, on the other hand, pressurises Japanese to increase its defense expenditure by breaking the norms of article 9.<sup>5</sup> At the same time, U.S. wants to counter the communist influence in the region by supplying more troops. These political games are not favouring to the ASEAN countries and therefore they are only looking forward to Japan for maintaining the peace and cooperation in the region which has not only sufficient economic capability to feed them but also has high level of managerial and technological sophistications. Japan has no external political or territorial ambitions; its level of political institutionalisation and internal socio-cultural development is such that its behavioral continuity, consistency, and predictability would be high; and it possesses vast financial, human organisational resources that would be utilised in concert with these of the U.S. for the benefit of the regions' development and security. These vital attributes make Japan the only logical and sensible choice as the principle partner of the United States in the region. No other East Asian nation meets these prerequisites for the stable and reliable partnership with the U.S.

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5. Article 9 of the Constitution reads :

Aspring sincerely to an international peace base on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign reight of the nation and the threat of use of forces as means for settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land , sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognised.



Despite all these, Japan's security attitude towards Southeast Asia is positive and Japan does not want to see any disturbance in the pacific region despite following U.S. Security guarantees.

Fukuda Doctrine was based on Japan's rhetorical fidelity to friendship, equal partnership, cooperation and heart to heart understanding. As a result, Japan began to be perceived by its neighbours as a purely self-centred, peace-loving nation but unwilling to contribute to the task of establishing stability and security in the region because it would only complicate its economic pursuits. The notion that Japan being an economic super-power can have political influence and responsibility, but the traditional and psychological fear that Japan might again act dangerously in the region came to be replaced by an unhappiness.

On the other hand, many southeast-Asian countries have shown their credibility with Japan in terms of trade <sup>and</sup> defense. Even Japan emerges regional military power, it is not going to harm the ASEAN. Phillipines former president Gen. Ferdinand Marcos has declared :

We have no fear for a resurgent military power of Japan provided U.S. maintains its military presence in Asia, and provided that the development of the capabilities of Japan are for defensive purposes and not for aggressive war.<sup>6</sup>

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6. Jose de Vera 'Japan Assures No Military Plan' *Bulletin Today*, 11 January 1987.

Such statement clearly implies that the acceptance of Japan's role in the global imperialist security system envisaged by the United States. In the light of these facts, it can be said that Japan acts as the champion ruler in the region in absence of which the security of the region would be difficult to maintain. Other nations like United States, Soviet Union and China have adopted the policies of military expansionism which can never sustain peace in the region. The sustainable peace and security in the Southeast Asian region can be brought only by Japan.

B] Soviet-Japanese Relations : Problems of Security

First diplomatic relations were established between Japan and the Soviet Union on 25 February 1925, and both agreed to replace the principle of non-interventionism in their internal affairs and to refrain from any hostile act. In the first 'Fishing Convention' of 1928, Japanese nationals obtained the right to catch and process all types of marine products but there were number of limitations. The restricted law and order of the Soviet Union did not suit Japanese, they found it uncomfortable, soon they started to violate the restricted rules and refused to fulfil the obligations. In return, Japanese took help of Japanese Forces in 1944, adopted fascist tendency towards the Soviet Union with the help of German Army.

This brought enmity between them and the Soviets declared war against Japan on 8 August 1945. Japan suffered from military defeat and signed the act of unconditional capitulation on 2 September 1945. The Kurile islands of Japan were occupied by the Soviet troops which resulted big gap between them.<sup>7</sup>

Again in 1956, the Joint Declaration put an end the war with USSR. After the end of war, the question of security became the crucial issue because for Japan, Russia presents a uniquely important security problem, one that can not be separated from the issues concerning of East Asia which is rooted in the peculiar nature of their economic and political relations throughout the modern times. Following the normalisation of diplomatic ties in 1956, bilateral relations with the Soviet Union was signed especially in economic field.<sup>8</sup> But the potential for future growth seem to be great. Non-economic ties have improved by reciprocal visits of their leaders. Despite these positive achievements, however, Soviet-Japanese relations still are essentially coldly formed by mutual uncertainty regarding their future respective roles in Asia.

Three factors in Japanese domestic policies are particularly important for Soviet relations : First, the long standing

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7. Hiroteru Yamamoto, "History of the Kuriles, Shikotan and Habomai Islands", *Contemporary Japan* (Tokyo), October-December 1951, pp.459-65.

8. see *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* (New York), vol.24, p. 358.

negative attitudes for the Japanese towards the Soviets, Secondly, the Northern Territories problem remain a big obstacle in the realisation of proposals for improvement of bilateral relations, and Thirdly, Japanese reactions of the "Soviet threat" have been simply alarmist and assessment and prognosis in writing of this variety can hardly form the basis for guaranteeing security and developing cooperation.<sup>9</sup>

Throughout Japan's modern history, Russia has been seen as a menacing neighbour, a challenge to the nation's security if not an enemy in the war. Since the time of Korean war, the Russians have also loomed as prognostics of the cold war and a threat to the peace and security of the country. Understandably, the Soviet Union has consistently ranked as the "most disliked" country in opinion throughout the post-war period. Such widespread and intense feeling can not establish close relations rather it augments the opportunity of conflict.

Since the break of cold war till mid 1960's, Soviet Union has been the only possible threat for the security of Japan as it was evident in both security treaties with United States in 1952 and 1960 respectively.<sup>10</sup> Emergence of China as a nuclear

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9. Yasuo Ishimoto, "The Northern Territories and a Peace Treaty with the USSR", *Annual Review* (Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo), Vol.4, 1965-68, pp.39-40.

10. Fukuda Takeo, "Japanese Foreign Policy from Now - We Do Not Choose the Road of a Militarist Big Power", *Ajicho Geppo, Asian Survey Monthly*, March 1972, pp. 2-13; Ohira Masayashi, "The Various Problems which surround Japan", *ibid*, February 1972, pp.30-41; and Miki Takeo, "The Political Topics of the Year", *Jivu* (Tokyo), April 1972, pp.123-27.

power and the Soviet influence in the region brought complexity in the Pacific area.

On the other hand, good signals between Japan and Soviet have been witnessed. Since last few years, Soviet officials have taken diplomatic moves to develop good relations with Japan. There was a time when Japan had earned honour in the eyes of Russia. Soviets were the ones who had an adverse reaction when bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. One Moscow specialist has shown his anger over the American policy and mused privately :

We did not fight a long and bitter war with Japanese, we did not drop atomic bombs on Japan. We did not occupy Japan and at present we do not have our troops on Japanese soil. So why do they like you (Americans) and not us?

Such frustration aside, Soviet citizens give every indication with Japan for showing their benevolence and curiosity. Russians like Japanese view the world as the hierarchy of nations ranked according to status and prestige.<sup>11</sup>

Moscow is yet to sign a peace treaty with Japan, which would be a major step forward; bringing political and economic benefits. Soviets do not want to see the rising nationalism and continuity of defense with the United States.

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11. John J. Stephan, "Japan in the Soviet Mirror : The search for Rapprochement", *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* (Oslo), vol.13, Special Annual Issue 1982, p.61.

Recently dramatic switch on took place in Japan when Russia proposed for holding of depth talks of defense with Japan. Starting at the private and unofficial level, Soviet military experts with Japan had detailed talks. Admiral Nikolai<sup>12</sup> emphasised that both nations would be true to prevent defense information. Pacific Quarterly writes that 'with the possible revitalisation of socialism as a part of Gorbachev's reforms like Prestroika and Glassnost, there is new respect in Japan for Soviet leaders.<sup>13</sup> Although Japan continues to have ambivalent attitude towards the soviets, the advent of Gorbachev provides an opportunity for promoting confidence and paving the way for innovations in Japanese security policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

Soviets also assume that new military policy will be based on more realistic approach. It is believed that Moscow is interested in importing Japanese technology and wants to reduce the U.S. Military influence in Japan.

C] Korean-Japanese Relations and Its Implications on International  
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 Relations  
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Since Post-Korean war period, the peaceful coexistence between Japan and Korea has been considered vitally important for  
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12. Admiral Nikolai, Former Commander of the Pacific Fleet and New Advisor of Foreign Ministry of Japan, see *Times of India* (New Delhi), 9 July 1988.

13. see *Blitz* (Bombay), 22 October 1988.

Japanese security. Number of important joint communiques issued with United States and Korea (South Korea particularly), Japan has repeatedly acknowledged the importance of peace and security of Korea as its own security. Such perception has been reinforced by continuing tension and confrontation between South and North Korea with little prospects for rapproachment between the North and South Korea in the near future. In view of the two Koreans' uncomprising hostility towards each other and seemingly endless arms build-up along with both sides of the demilitarized zone, Japan regards the Korean peninsula as the most dangerous trouble spot in East Asia which can erupt into a major conflict that may engulf the entire region.<sup>14</sup>

In order to understand the Korean Japanese relations in the light of security perspective, it is worthwhile to have a brief historical outlook.

In the post war period, Japan's Korea policy has been shaped largely by Japanese conservatives and decision-makers to seek national security primarily through the U.S.-Japan alliance system, Japan's Korea policy has reflected the strong influence on the United States which has guaranteed the security of South Korea under the U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defense Pact in 1953, while maintaining a policy of non-recognition towards North Korea.

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 14. Honk N. Kim, "Japan's Two Korea Policy and its implication for International Relations", *Korea Observer* (Seoul), vol.17, no.3, Autumn 1986, pp.293-313.

The basic framework of Japan's Korea Policy was laid down by Prime Minister Sato Eisako at the time of signing of the Japan-South Korea normalization treaty of 1965. During his time, there were harmonious relation between Japan and Korea. Not only political and economic considerations were important but also security interest was widely important. Japan also considered South Korea as vital while signing peace treaty. For example, in the Nixon-Sato Joint Communique (NSJC) of November 21, 1969, Sato declared that "the security of Republic Korea is essential to Japan's own security".<sup>15</sup> Sato reiterated this at a press conference by stating that the "trouble of South Korea can not be treated as the fires on the other side of the river."<sup>16</sup>

After Sato, the new Tanaka Government (1972-74) also agreed that the "peace and security of the entire peninsula is vital to Japan's own security".<sup>17</sup>

In 1975, the new Prime Minister Miki Takeo was even more eager to make defense build-up with the United States and to seek the improvement with South Korea. In his mutual exchange while talking with the American President Gerald Ford

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15. *New York Times*, 22 November 1969.

16. *Mainichi Shimbun* (Tokyo), 26 November 1969 (Evening Edition).

17. *Asahi Shimbun*. (Tokyo), 20 & 30 August 1974 (Evening Edition).



both leaders agreed that 'the peace and security of the Republic of Korea is essential to the peace and security of the Korean peninsula, which, in turn, is necessary for the peace and security of East-Asia, including Japan'.<sup>18</sup>

Both leaders also expressed the hope that "the dialogue between South and North Korea would proceed in order to ease tensions eventually to achieve peaceful unification" and that "all concerned would recognize the importance of maintaining an international structure which would preserve the armistice now in effect".<sup>19</sup>

Some dramatic changes took place during Fukuda period who was in favour of complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. On his earnest request, President Jimmy Carter became ready on Fukuda Doctrine. Both Fukuda and Carter "noted the continuing importance of the maintenance of peace and stability of the Korean peninsula for the security of Japan and East Asia as a whole".<sup>20</sup> President Carter's decision to withdraw the troops from South Korea was also welcomed by the Korean citizens but the main credit goes to Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda whose earnest request proved fruitful.

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18. *New York Times*, 7 August 1975.

19. *ibid.* 7 August 1975.

20. *Japan Times* (Tokyo), 24 March 1977.

After 1979, there were some drastic changes in Japan-South Korea policy following the outbreak of neo-cold war, assassination of South Korean President Park Chung-Hee, shoot down of Korean Airline by Soviet Union, and some domestic problems inside Korea brought some setbacks between Japanese and South Korean relations. When Nakasone came into power, he tried to solve these problems. His frequent visits to Seoul released many tensions and turned into mutual respect and confidence. Nakasone's sympathy with the Koreans, persistent demand to Moscow for an adequate explanation about the Korean Airline incidence etc. brought solidarity between them.

In exchange, Korean President Chin visited Tokyo, broke the "wall of History" and entered into a new era of development which reaffirmed their belief that the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula is essential to bring harmony in the region. Nakasone also declared his commitment for Seoul's recent invitation to reopen dialogue with North Korea. Both leaders also expressed their determination to oppose international terrorism.

D] Sino-Japanese Relations

A great deal of scholarly attention has been devoted in Japan to the ideological, political and strategic dimensions of the Sino-Japanese relationship. In particular Japanese

concern about the Chinese use of force, whether in the Taiwan Straits Crisis or in relation to India or Vietnam, had led several writers to examine the persistence of certain mental traits in Chinese decision-making. The mutual images and perceptions of the Chinese and the Americans, and the Chinese and the Soviets have been of great interest to the Japanese in understanding the Chinese view of world politics and international security. There has also been closer scrutiny of the possibilities of global realignments and in particular attention has been focussed on the characteristics which are shared by or which differentiate Japan, China and America. The major complications of the so-called US-Japan-China alliance have also been examined in great depth. In a post-hegemonic world order, Japan does not perceive identity with either the American or the Chinese views on world politics. There is an increasing tendency in Japan to see its constructive relations with China as part of a more stable pattern of international cooperation, rather than as an exclusive contribution to any rigid structure of security.

Since the end of World War II, there had been romantic appeal of China towards Japan. Feeling deeply their geographic propinquity, racial affinity, close cultural relation, the Japanese had tremendous yearning for the establishment of friendly contact with China. However, in 1951, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida under the guidance of U.S. refused to have any dialogue with Communist China. At the same time many political

groups belonging to business circles continued trade relations with China. Despite the obstinacy of U.S., cultural and trade exchanges were signed between China and Japan in 1952,53 and 57 respectively.

In 1960's, China tried to lead the Communist World. But when the Sino-Soviet split widened into a harsh polemics, China sought to get it alone. In 1965, Chinese attitude towards the Japan and other nations went on changes because it adopted 'Military Expansionism' policy and started to sell arms to Asia and Africa. Following the "Cultural Revolution" in China during 1966-69, many dramatic changes took place. Japan was alert at every front from China's hostile attitude.<sup>21</sup>

But in 1972, "Nixon Shock"<sup>22</sup> brought several disagreements between Japan and the United States. Japan felt that they had no other alternative and developed again good

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21. Shinkichi Eto, "Japan and China - A New Stage?" *Problems of Communism* (Washington, D.C.), vol.21, no.6, November-December 1972, pp.1-17.
22. "Nikuson shokku" - popular designation for a number of policy changes announced in the summer of 1971 by US President Richard Nixon without prior notification to the Japanese Govt. The policy changes had significant impact on Japanese foreign and economic relations, and the failure of the United States to consult with the Japanese was taken as an affront - and an indication that the United State had abandoned the practice of close policy coordination in effect since the World War II. The first "shock" occurred in July 1971 when Nixon announced his plan to visit the People's Republic of China...The second "shock" occurred when Nixon announced the New Economic Programme which included the abandonment of the gold standard and the assessment of a 10 per cent surcharge on many of the goods imported to the U.S. For detailed see *Kondansha Encyclopedia of Japan*(Tokyo), vol.6, p. 23..

relations with China. The first sign of new efforts occurred in 1977 when China-Japan Friendship Treaty was held at Tokyo. Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda and Chinese ambassador Fu Chino stressed the need for an early conclusion of bilateral treaty, and thus new initiative was inspired by Japanese domestic and international development.

Since the agreement of Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978, political and economic ties have become much closer. Currently, Japan is the second largest partner of China in terms of technological and financial help and manager market for China's energy and labour intensive exports. Top political leaders of both countries have visited each other's capitals to promote friendly relations. China's leaders Deng Xiaoping (1978 & 79), Hua Guofeng (1980), Zhao Ziyang (1987) and Yaobang (1983) visited Tokyo, and Japanese visits were reciprocated by Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira (1978), Zenko Suzuki (1982) and Nakasone (1984 & 86) who travelled to Beijing. Furthermore, in order to discuss problems of common interest, annual bilateral ministerial meetings have been held alternatively in Tokyo and Beijing since 1982.<sup>23</sup>

The warning of relations between the two countries can be attributed to several factors; Japan's willing to

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 23. Hong N. Kim, "Sino-Japanese Relations", *Current History* (Philadelphia), vol.87, no.528, April 1988, pp.153-56.

provide substantial economic help to China, the complementary nature of the two economies, and the common interest in coping with the Soviet military build-up in Asia. The other most important warning point to Japan for China is that China is rapidly developing full scale nuclear arsenals; and gives voice to the revolutionary international aim; and has directly or indirectly participated in major wars of the East-Asia since 1945. On the other hand, Japan lacks nuclear weapons and avoided alien military troops in Japan.

Since 1985, both nations have experienced some diplomatic difficulties on various bilateral issues. The multiple problems have brought trouble for Sino-Japanese relations; these are the alleged "revival of Japanese militarism", Japan's existing ties with Taiwan; a bilateral trade imbalance and rise of nationalism in Japan.

Former Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone aroused some uneasiness on the part of Chinese leaders, because Nakasone's hawkish views on foreign and defense policies were generally well known. In the aftermath of Nakasone's visit to Seoul and Washington in January 1983, China showed its unhappiness over Nakasone's foreign policy, changing in part that his policies were designed to increase military alliance in Japan and the United States, however, Nakasone disinclined to accept it and recited that Japan's relation with China is friendly.

By the close of 1983, it became clear that Nakasone administration would pursue a policy of close cooperation with China for "keeping China on the side of Western Powers that would serve the common interest of the West as a whole"<sup>24</sup> Japan did not want to see the re-emergence of a Sino-Soviet bloc that would threaten its security. As long as Japan-China perceived the Soviet military build-up as the greatest threat to their security, Japanese leaders believed that prudent for Tokyo and Beijing is to cooperate for common security interests.

To ensure the development of friendly relations, Nakasone agreed to establish a "Sino-Japanese Friendship Committee for the 21st Century" and follow four basic principles governing Sino-Japanese relations, peace and friendship; equality and mutual benefits, long term stability; and mutual trust.

After Nakasone's visit to Beijing, many Japanese felt that the relationship between the both nations were improved. However controversy erupted about the peace agreement when sections of Chinese students staged anti-demonstration in Beijing against Japan's "economic invasion" and they regarded it as a move designed to revive militarism in Japan.

Even Takeshita government contineously denied Japan's military expansionism and added that Japan was maintaining

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24. *Asahi Shimbun*, 21 November 1983.

military balance only for security of Japan. So, there was hardly any question of posing any threat to the region during Takeshita period.

#### JAPAN'S CHANGING SECURITY PERCEPTION

Japan's keen interest to participate in Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) has resulted in a big controversy not only in Japan but also in whole Third World countries. There has been an intense and hot debate among the decision-makers of Japan over former U.S. President Ronald Regan's *PET CHILD - Star wars*. It has become increasingly evident that Japan is gradually moving towards some form of participation in SDI. Nakasone favoured participation for the strategic, political, economic and technological benefits, but Japan has not finally been decided its participation in SDI. Opposition parties argue that participation of Japan in SDI may erode its benefits, violate the nation's three principles banning arms exports, and Japan as a signatory of NPT can not partake in nuclear weapons development.

Sections of people in Japan argue that Japan has been encouraged to participate in SDI on keen American interest. Americans believe that Japan's interest to participate in SDI will bring unity within the alliance of SDI, which is imperative if the system is to reach the development stage, it will be the best method to transfer technology with Japan.



On the other hand, the atmosphere of Japan is hot on its decision to participate in SDI. Many Japanese are becoming concerned about the nation's security and viability of the American Security Guarantee. The changing international environment, economic well being and "new psyche" of the Japanese people are cited as the reason for the shift from apathy towards concern about security.

Japan's decision to participate in SDI is still on consideration by the Japanese decision-makers because so far Japan has not started its SDI programme. With joint efforts of the United States, Reagan Administration is over and new Bush Administration is still in dilemma whether to continue SDI programme or not. Future will decide it. Japan's interest in SDI is still far from practice.

The Japanese have of course understood in the aftermath of the Second World War that the perceived security threats in times of peace cannot be counteracted in isolation. The majority perception is that the security arrangements with the United States have been beneficial and should be preserved. The meaning, goals and nature of the Japanese debate on security have, however, been strikingly different from the moral climate of the discussion in the United States. The horror, and indignation of the Japanese People at the direct experience and realisation of nuclear devastation has led them to develop a measure

of resistance to the norms and values which underlie the models of thinking which govern the U.S. establishment views on nuclear weapons or global security. Thus the Japanese response to the American agenda of security issues has been cautious even when it has been positive. The geo-strategic situation of Japan is naturally of interest to the United States. Yet the history of Japanese-U.S. relations has demonstrated that Washington was unable to produce behavioural change in Japan in a general sense although in particular areas of international security American rhetoric and confrontational attitudes undoubtedly affected Japanese positions.

Even those in Japan who favoured a visible strengthening of Japanese-American strategic relations have not put all their trust in Washington to solve contemporary security policy issues. In fact there has been a deep seated mistrust of the way in which the American discussion of nuclear deterrence and flexible response have proceeded. Even if we adopt a narrower focus and concentrate on the treaty regime between the US and Japan, we find that the Japanese have not allowed their interests to be neglected by the "escalation ladders" prominent in U.S. thinking. In spite of US pressure, Japan has avoided getting involved in undertakings which would lead to the renunciation of measures conducive to political stability through its well - defined policies of non-militarism.

At a time when the cost of modern weapons systems has risen astronomically, Japan while having the technological and economic potential for exploiting military high technology has refused to strengthen its deterrence through unnecessary and dangerous arms build-up. The Japanese strategy of cooperative behaviour through entrepreneurial measures has in fact extended its concept of national security. By refusing to emulate the strategies of all-out domination followed by the Soviets and the Americans, Japan has decoupled its evolution of technology and the supportive measures in strategic thinking. All this highlights the characteristic features of Japanese autonomy and sovereignty which have little use for the power struggle model. Japan has multiplied its impact on the global and regional environment by steering its security interactions to particularly advantageous conditions. Like any other state Japan is involved in conflict and competition and the total pattern of its relations is exceedingly complex. It has, however, created an advantage for itself by developing a stable scenario of peaceful coexistence by freeing resources from the pursuit of strengthening deterrence focussed on nuclear and conventional defence options. It may even be claimed that Japan has been able to anticipate the need to transcend inflexible deterrence structures which prevent other nations from achieving realistic descriptions of the global scenario. Japan's economic

and technological relations have increased her policy alternatives and helped her to join the main forces shaping the future evolution of relations among the nations more peaceful and less anarchic.

It is evident that Japan's technological capacity is phenomenal. While not being used for creating a war-fighting capacity in a maximal sense, it is highly instrumental in providing Japan with the means to respond to the situations created by proliferating technologies elsewhere. Japan's efforts are in line with the new approaches to "risk-of war reduction", and these undoubtedly give Japan a leverage in the security domain.

A basic question, which is often posed in countries of Asia which Japan had occupied during the World War II, concerns the extent to which Japan itself may move to increase its defense effort and ultimately become a security threat to other nations. Would this lead to a collective de-legitimation of the peaceful coexistence scenario referred to above? It is not easy to arrive at a specific definition of the socio-economic conditions and lines of political development which lead a country to destroy bridges of friendship and cooperation. The available information about Japan tends to support the evaluation that Japan's influence and pressure will be for uniting the international community (including the Third World) against hegemonism and for concrete measures to support international security.

CHAPTER - IV

JAPANESE ALTERNATIVES IN AN ERA OF HEGEMONIC

DECLINE :

RESOURCE DIPLOMACY

NUCLEARISATION

MILITARISATION

There is considerable evidence that the militant policies pursued by the United States and the Soviet Union and their practice of diplomacy marked by sharp Cold War rhetoric were contrived to put off the retrenchment that is necessitated by their hegemonic decline. Both the Super Powers sought diplomatic and political opportunities in the Third World by accentuating regional conflicts. As an economic Super Power, Japan has not sought to provoke destabilisation in the Third World even when the structure of high tension created by the US-Soviet antagonism could have provided it a contentious role.

We will seek to formulate the problem raised by the era of hegemonic decline for Japan's Third World policy by considering [1] Resource Diplomacy, [2] Nuclearisation and [3] Militarisation. This will help to define Japan's role in dynamic terms. While the problems of decline necessitate reconstruction of foreign policies by the Soviets and the Americans, the Japanese are beginning to perceive opportunities built upon equitable patterns of relationship. It is always difficult to decide priorities in foreign policy, but Japan has been greatly helped by its refusal to adopt offensive doctrines.

## Resource Diplomacy

'Resource' means the source of material for energy, food, land and mineral. It can also be regarded as a means of obtaining above mentioned things, particularly through industrial and agricultural know-how, capital investment, foreign exchange and transport services. Resource is the base of both security and opulence, the foundation of wealth and power and effects man's destiny in both war and peace.<sup>1</sup>

The contemporary world lives in an age of scarcity. Practically all materials are scarce under most circumstances in the sense that if they were available without cost, more would be demanded than could be supplied. The fears of scarcity, depletion or short supply of resources like minerals have become global issue. The focus on raw materials had led to the development of new branch of diplomacy known as 'Resource Diplomacy', which operates during war as well as in peace and aims to ensure the fulfilment of a country's national interests.<sup>2</sup> The rapid growth of population, urbanization and increased consumption habits of people, uneven geographical distribution of resources, and the nature of existing pattern of geo-political

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1. E. Staley, *Raw Materials in Peace and War* (New York, 1937), p.3.
2. C.W. Howe, *Natural Resource Economics* (New York, 1979), p.1.

boundaries have increased the fear of scarcity.

Japan is in the category of countries with least mineral deposits<sup>3</sup>. Areawise it is very small, major parts of the Japanese land is hilly, poorly endowed by natural resources and heavily dependent on sea-water. All these conditions are not favourable for the overall development of Japan.

Despite all these unfavourable conditions, Japan's emergence as an Economic Super-power has surprised the world. This is because Japanese have used technical know-how, skillful knowledge, and scientific methods in an optimum manner.

The burst of Oil Crisis in 1973 sensitised the Japanese people powerfully to the resource crunch. In order to cope with the change, Japan developed her resource diplomacy which is based on three guiding principles.

- i. Diversification of sources;
- ii. Promotion of sources; and
- iii. great involvement in local processing of raw materials.<sup>4</sup>

This involved a complex combination of methods. In practice Japan acknowledges its position as a principle consumer of resources, positively contributes to the expansion of the

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3. In 1980, Japan imported U.S.\$ 8.43 billion worth of raw metallic minerals and it constituted 6 per cent of its total imports. see *Japan : A Pocket Guide 1982* (Tokyo, 1982), p.77.

4. "International Trade Paper", *White Papers of Japan 1980-81* (Tokyo, 1982), p.88.



capacity of the resources supply on the global basis and believes in the need for the establishment of an orderly system of utilizing the world's resources and ensuring a rational supply of resources.<sup>5</sup>

The integrative ties of Japan as the world's major importer of resources have led to encouragement rather than frustration on the part of the Third World countries.<sup>6</sup> An example in point in the ASEAN group of countries. In spite of major impact on the economies of these countries with its technical know-how, industrial projects and the supply of electronic goods, Japan has adopted a low political profile and not engaged in any power contest. Tokyo's adoption of a low visibility profile has enabled its presence in ASEAN area to be regarded as essentially consultative in nature and it is likely that Japan will continue to make progress along this line. Although challenges may arise from time to time, Japan has explicitly articulated policy aims which places it on an equal footing with the ASEAN states politically, in spite of the different levels on the spheres of economy and technology.

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5. Miyoshi Shuinichi, "Japan's Resource Policy at a Turning Point", *Japan Quarterly*, vol. 18, no.3, July-September 1971, pp.281-7.

6. Sakuro Okita, "National Resources Dependency and Japanese Foreign Policy", *Foreign Affairs* (New York), vol.52, no.4, July 1974, pp.714-24.

Among major mineral resources, Petroleum stands at the top. Its proportion is 60 per cent of the total import materials. Middle East is the major supplier of petroleum to Japan. Other mineral resources and export nations are Iron-ore (Australia, Brazil and India), Chromium (South Africa and USSR), Nickle (Cuba and Canada), Cobalt (Zaire, Zambia and Canada), Manganese (India), Rubber (Maylasia and Indonesia), etc. It must be remembered that these resource suppliers to Japan are not only geographically dispersed around the globe but also politically and culturally diverse. It is important for Japan's future that the major suppliers among them should remain relatively stable and not threatened by immediate danger of serious internal upheavel and their external conduct should remain relatively predictable.

At the same time, Japan's government is seriously concerned by the danger of creating friction and overseas animosities and is taking various measures to reduce external vulnerability. Japan's former Prime Minister Takeo Miki stated regarding Japan's increased demand for overseas :

...If our government and economy were allowed to follow their course as before, a terrible situation would confront Japan. I fear that the same would happen to world itself.<sup>7</sup>

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7. *Japan Economic Journal* (Tokyo), 17 December 1974.

It clearly states that Japan would no longer be able simply to continue drawing upon overseas resources. If its economy continue to grow as fast as it had done in the past. Fukuda then the Deputy Prime Minister elaborated upon this view and announced that government would adopt a strategy based on slow economic growth. He observed:

As the world's economy has entered a period in which there is limit to acquiring resources, necessity has arisen to switch to a low economic growth.<sup>8</sup>

Hardly fifteen per cent of Japan's land area is under cultivation. Nonetheless, a relatively long growing seasons, plentiful rainfall, unlimited hard work and high agricultural skills have made it very productive. Seedlings grow in dense profusion in special seed beds and later transplanted to the main field by machines. Transplantation assures more uniform growth. Areawise, Japan's agricultural yields are much higher than any other nation due to modern means of technology. Today, Japan's per acre agricultural output is eight times of United States and sixteen times of India.

Natural marshes, swamps, hilly lands and unirrigated areas have been carefully drained, diked and turned into extreme productive areas. The crops are planted in careful

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8. *Japan Times*, 15 December 1974.

straight rows that fill every square inch of space. Advanced agricultural techniques have been carefully spread from more progressively areas to backward regions; cheap transportation by steamships and railroads make possible a greater regional specialisation of crops, and finally government agricultural institutes have been made available modern scientific agricultural knowledge.

In ocean technology, Japan is far ahead of most other nations. The small but precipitously descending rivers of Japan are also a significant source by hydroelectric power.

Oceans of Japan have provided food adventure and inspiration. In recent years, nations have begun to recognise the ocean as an important source of resources. The surrounding seas of Japan are major economic asset and source of its chief protein supply-fish and also vitamin rich sea-weeds. Coastal water have always provided vital food resources for Japan and today there is considerable cultivation of fish, shelfish and sea-weeds. Japan's fishing industry stands at the top in the world. The ocean also provides the Japanese with easy communication. Japan's major cities like Tokyo, Nagasaki, Hiroshima, Yokohama, Osaka, Nagoya, Kyoto, and Hiroshima are situated on the coasts and have been linked with major cities of the world by all possible communications.

In many ways, Japanese have extended sea-wards by the construction of new docking facilities and factory sites through the filling of large stretches of shallow water. Japan's ship building construction ranks top in the world. The bulk of Japanese heavy industries have been located on the sea for efficient transportation purposes. The large spectrum of ocean related industries include oil drilling gears, ocean reclamations and anti-pollution devices. Recently many new miraculous ocean-based achievements like buildings, hotels, restaurants, research institutes, observatories, and floating atomic power plants have come up on the sea. The recently opened Japan's Seikar, the largest undersea tunnel of the world stretch 54 Kilometer length which joints Hokaido and Honshu islands, is an outstanding achievement.<sup>9</sup>

While the perspective is hopeful in many areas for Japan's survival and healthy development, there is need for re-examination of Japan's position in view of the following development and challenges which Japan is facing.

1. Many other nations like South Korea, Taiwan, Maylasia, and Hong Kong are fastly emerging as economic powers which have cut into the markets of Japan. These nations to some extent have claimed a share of mineral resources which directly or indirectly effect the Japanese economy adversely.

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9. *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 14 March 1988.

2. The United States is constantly pressing to Japan to have balanced trade measures which are disruptive and destructive as far as Japan is concerned.
3. Japan's heavy dependence on minerals has created misgivings even among Japanese and made them over-conscious of the disorderly consequences. In an increasingly turbulent world, Japan is not sure of the fidelity to commitments of the resource supplies.
4. The Oil Crisis of 1973 and 1978, OPEC policy has aggravated the fall of trade surplus of Japan. The extent of Japan's dependence on oil has been virtually exponential. This means that any disruption in oil supply would produce a proportionately far greater negative impact.
5. Many Westerners argue that 'Ocean Based Economic Strategy' of Japan is too expensive to maintain upto long period. It would not be accurate to say that all critics consider Japan a "profile blossom"; it is, however, true that there is increasing concern with the viability of the post-war modernisation process in Japan.
6. Current studies show that Japan is emerging a regional military super-power. Even with one per cent of its GNP, Japan's defense expenditure is next only to that of

United States and Soviet Union. Will this new image complicate Japan's management of international relations, if it creates fresh anxieties in other nations? There is now less consensus about Japan's rules of restraints in military matter.

7. Phrases like 'Economic Animal', 'Economic Ghost' and 'Economic Super-Power', have been used in a pejorative sense against by many developed nations as a convenient rationalisation. But these may effect Japan's image.

The evaluation of Japan's resource diplomacy can be approached from a number of viewpoints. If we place it in a wider perspective and examine the forms of interaction it has provided Japan, we can see that the norms and values of this nation have led to a new form of socialisation in the international economic sphere. There is participatory quality in the way in which Japan has endeavoured to secure its resource needs. We can only compare it with the designs of certain European Powers who had to alienate other nations from the international social environment in order to achieve access to resources. Japan also faces risks and dangers in its resource diplomacy but it is clear that its approach has been embedded in realistic attitudes in the international arena. The common denominator of Japan's ideas on resource diplomacy is pluralism which entails accepting the specific positions of countries, chiefly in Third World, from which Japan mobilises its essential resources.

## Nuclearisation

During the World War II, Japan met the traumatic and tragic defeat when the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States. From the rapid dramatic victories early in the war, the invincible war machine of the empire of Japan soon came to halt, tottered and collapsed in ruin accompanied by the object, poverty near famine and psychological shock. The severe shock brought intense 'Nuclear Allergy' among Japanese minds. They followed the path of pacifism, and assumed a low-key non-military posture. Thus nuclear research was a 'dead issue' in Japan upto 1952.<sup>10</sup>

But soon after 1952, Japanese began to realise the importance of nuclear energy because all the major nations like United States, France, Britain, Canada, Soviet Union, and China were concentrating the use of nuclear-energy in different fields related to development. The policy-makers of Japan could not remain indifferent and they considered it as a strategic importance. But their approach was rather conciliatory and cooperative and they stressed the use of nuclear energy for civilian purposes only.

It was, however, during 1952-56 that Japan took concrete steps to develop nuclear energy. During this period in Japan,

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10. T. Akaha, "Japan's Non-nuclear Policy, *Asian Survey* (Berkeley), vol.24, no.8, August 1984, pp. 852-60.



the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy were intensely discussed and popularised. In 1955, Japan formulated a basic law on atomic energy in order to promote research, development and peaceful use of nuclear energy for the welfare of mankind and economic development. In 1956, the Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) came into existence. 1956 was the crucial period when Japan made phenomenal progress in the field of nuclear technology as the most reliable alternative source of energy.

By end of 1956, the Diet approved ¥ 235 million (U.S.\$ 0.65 million) for start of atomic reactor which was the turning point of the nuclear research programme. Japanese nuclear scientists reacting in part against their bitter experience under military rule, wanted guarantee that the results of their research would never be converted to military use.

According to JAEC, nuclear energy is to be utilised strictly for civilian and peaceful purposes only. Since 1967, there has been rapid expansion of civilian nuclear programme in Japan. Japan decided to stick to the three non-nuclear principles viz not to manufacture nuclear weapons, not to possess nuclear weapons, and not to introduce nuclear weapons in Japan.

At the same time, Japan's economy grew appreciably and many economic development projects were made under the guidelines of JAEC. By close of 1967, JAEC launched a new, long and comprehensive programme to be undertaken in about twenty years, which included the construction of large number of nuclear reactors, policies to be undertaken for fuel supply, and the expansion of generation of energy for commercial use.

#### BASIC CONTENTS OF JAEC

The total items are enacted in nine chapters comprising 20 articles. However the main provisions are as follows :

- 1] Secure energy resources in the future, to achieve the progress of science and technology, development and utilisation of atomic energy and thereby to concentrate the welfare area of mankind.
- 2] The research, development and utilisation of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and performed independently under democratic management, the result therefrom shall be made public to contribute to international cooperation.
- 3] The JEAC shall plan, deliberate and decide on the matters related to research, development and utilization of atomic energy.

- 4] JAEC is to conduct development concerning the fast-breeder and the advanced converter in reactors, nuclear source materials and nuclear fuel materials, the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development shall be established.
- 5] The 'import', 'export', 'transfer', 'receipt' and 'purification' of nuclear source material shall be entrusted.

During 1960's and the 1970's Japan was faced with the central question relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the dangers of proliferation of nuclear weapons. Though the government of Japan desired stick to its three non-nuclear principles, it was aware of the global environment in which the possession of nuclear weapons carried a lot of relevance to national power and status.<sup>11</sup> At the same time it realised that total and complete elimination of armament was still a long way off. It calculated that in a world threatened by weapons, it would be unrealistic for it to seek to safeguard its national security on the basis of its conventional military strength. It, therefore, sought the U.S. Nuclear deterrence to meet any external threat.

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11. Monte R. Bullard, "Japan's Nuclear Choice", *Asian Survey* (California), vol.14, no.9, September 1974, pp.845-50.

Its commitment to Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1976 was largely predicted upon its reliance on United States nuclear deterrence.

#### PROVISIONS OF NPT

Japanese decision-makers discussed two propositions with the United States' counter parts :

- 1] The Treaty will serve as the first step towards nuclear disarmament.
- 2] The Treaty must in no way restricts Non-Nuclear Weapon States in their research, development or implementation of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, or in their international cooperation in these fields, or must it subject them to discriminatory treatment in any aspect of such activities.

#### A) Disarmament and Security

Government of Japan also attaches great importance to declaration of the U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R. affirming their intention to seek immediate Security Council Action to provide assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any non-nuclear weapon state, partly to the Treaty, that is a victim of an act of aggression in which nuclear weapon are used, and hopes that the nuclear weapon states will continue their studies with regard to effective measure to ensure the security

of non-nuclear weapon states.

The government of Japan will also pay particular attention to the development in disarmament negotiations and progress in the implementation of the Security Council Resolution on the Security of Non-Nuclear Weapon States.

B] Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy

This includes the following provisions :

- 1] Treaty of Japan and IAEC (article-3) - Japan government intends to give full consideration to safeguard the nation.
- 2] Government of Japan hopes that with the help of IAEC to their all nuclear activities, national security and hopes will be honestly assured.
- 3] Certain strategic points of the nuclear fuel cycle, and the procedure for their application must be rational. Government of Japan hopes that IAEC will make constant efforts to improve safeguard in the light of technological development. Japan is ready to pay all possible cooperation in this regard.
- 4] Concrete measures to international cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and for the peaceful application of nuclear explosion.

The expansion of nuclear energy facilities have become increasingly expensive due to rising cost labour, plant construction, equipment, research and development, land for suitable sites, natural and enriched uranium, waste disposal, plant shutdowns, and underutilisation of plant capacity.

A number of technical problems also remain. Japan lacks enough skilled man-power to operate and maintain the planned number of facilities, and more importantly, authorities must convince the public that atomic power plants are safe, especially after the Mile island incident of 1979 in the U.S. Other problems witnessed are sudden shutdown of light reactors, radioactive leaks, earthquake prone land, perceived technical imperfections, and heightened public sensitivity about the hazards of radioactivity and the development of nuclear plants in Japan<sup>is</sup> far from universal support in Japan. While, on the one hand, big-business, government of Japan and the press generally favour the full development of nuclear energy, on the other hand, there is opposition from environmentalists, peace organisations, reformists, and local citizens.

Many nuclear reactors have also given rise to the environmental pollutions. Moreover, Japan's small geographic location, zig-zag topography, thick population and coastal industries are physically vulnerable in the event of nuclear war. A few bombs can affectively destroy a major part of the

population and wipe out the industries. Secondly to develop its own nuclear weapon, it would need to develop a network of delivery system entailing jet-engine technology, nuclear power sub-marines, a sophisticated missile-guidance system, etc. These are too costly to Japan and more important for its security, and it is all difficult at the moment to make such arrangement. At the same time, Japanese government promotes the U.S. to introduce nuclear weapons under the security treaty means that there is danger and Japan may be the target of nuclear attack and will be involved in nuclear war.

These set of problems indicate that the nuclear programme is still incompatable elements. Past experience and future problems caution against overly optimistic expectation, and the transition from dependence on import fossil fuels to other form of energy is likely to be more time consuming and difficult than anticipated. The nuclear energy programme will do if it can help in reducing crude oil imports from 75 per cent of Japan's energy supply to 70 per cent by the year 1990.

#### *ACHIEVEMENTS OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY IN JAPAN*

Despite all the possible shortcomings and deficiencies, Japan's nuclear programme has received tremendous achievements due to many favourable conditions. Thanks to its compactness, nuclear fuel had an advantage over oil in the matters of shortage and

transportation, and all countries which supply nuclear fuel to Japan are friendly and their supply of such fuel seem more assured than the supply of oil by the Middle East.

Japan's remarkable development of nuclear for peaceful purposes has impressed the international community. Since World War II, Japan's nuclear programme did not threaten to any other nation which has morally supported not only Japan to increase its nuclear missions but also to the alien countries. Constant moral, political, social, and economic supports have proved blessing to the Japan's nuclear mission. Number of nuclear reactors are increasing day by day. By end of 1987, 34 nuclear reactors were in operation with the total generation capacity of about 25.84 million kilowatt, fourth largest in the world after USA, France and Soviet Union. In terms of electric power supply, nuclear power is estimated to have occupied the largest portion among all electric power sources. In terms of its own experimental Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR), it stands fifth in the world. There is widespread use of radiation in the fields of medicine and food. Though Japan is poor in uranium resources, it has so far managed to get enough uranium through long term contracts with Australia, Canada, South Africa and United States. Japan also participated in the exploitation of natural uranium in other countries, and is among the few countries to have a complete nuclear cycle.



*NUCLEAR ASSISTANCE TO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES*

Nuclear technology reflects most clearly and the complex interaction of the technological and political issues in the international relations of the modern world. Number of Third World countries are sincerely looking towards the nuclear technology for the future as the major source of their energy. Japan has always been helpful in supplying nuclear technology in Third World on the very cheap and cooperative scale.

As far as nuclear cooperation with the developing countries, Japan's contribution to IAEC's, technology cooperation stand has been next to the United States and the Soviet Union. Especially Japan has extended technological and financial cooperation positively in the field of isotope and radiation utilization projects through the IAEC's regional cooperative agreement on research, development and training of nuclear science and technology. In addition, Japan has been an active in accepting trainees and dispatching experts for the utilization of isotope radiation through Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). As an advanced nuclear technological country, Japan must continue responsible cooperation with the developing countries.

Japan has played a prominent role in challenging the legitimacy of nuclear weaponry and has continued to push harder

for nuclear disarmament. In its bilateral and multilateral exchange of opinion, Tokyo has taken advantage of its role as a power which has undertaken not to possess or use nuclear weapons. Such restraint has in turn helped to project a number of self-evident factors in Japan's major initiatives in the area of nuclear energy. One might also add that there are no quick answers to the challenges and questions raised by nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. But Japan has assumed a fairly settled position with respect to nuclearisation, and is accordingly rewarded by its influence among Third World Countries. It is also to be observed that nobody regards Japan's case as that of indecisiveness like is the case with some other near-nuclear countries; on the other hand Japan's nuclear posture may well be on its way to becoming a permanent and integral part of the international order.

## Militarisation

Militarism is a doctrine or system that values war and accords primacy in state and society to the armed forces which exalts a function, the application of violence and an institutional structure and the military establishment. It implies both a policy orientation and power relationship. Its ideology rationalizes the primacy in foreign policy. War is considered to be divine commandment or an experience that ennobles by developing courage, patriotism, honour, unity and discipline. It seeks to universalize such values by precept, symbol and ceremony. Its power is the backbone not only of war but also of trade and diplomacy and closely allied with the development of weaponry.

Contemporary military system is characterised by a basic military confrontation between East and West led primarily by the United States and the Soviet Union, with political, economic and ideological differences at the core. Both camps consists of their respective dominant military powers and collective security system. Thus the current international military system is harsh, complicated and fluid. Japan because of being a unique from both strategic and economic point of view is exercised by both super-powers. United States uses the overt means to exercise its influence on militarisation while on the other hand, Soviet Union uses covert means to exercise or dominate the militarisation of Japan.

The failure of the American war effort in Vietnam and the dismal end of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan are both examples of the counterproductive nature of militarisation which is driven by technological change and aggravates the long-term decline of Super Power foreign policy. Japan's innovation and experimentation with Self Defence Force has provided Tokyo with a peace perspective and kept it distant from the more explicit context of the hegemonic policies of the two Super Powers. Japan's own militarisation has nothing to do with the globalisation characteristic of both the US and the Soviet Union. Japan's militarisation has received critical attention from its peace movement but it has not come in the way of conducting diplomatic negotiations in bilateral and multi-lateral forums for the peaceful development of intersystemic relations. Japan's ideas on military defence have of course to be taken seriously on account of the ease with which the country can further develop its military technology. But there is no question of Japan seeking to accentuate the importance of military power in its foreign policy, nor has it any need to undercut its fundamental ethos as a non-military power. Japan's militarisation is not the prelude to ideological or political strife. Indeed the importance of the military dimension in Japan lies in the mounting emphasis on international pluralism.

Post-war Japan found themselves in an entirely new situation. The Japanese could not forget the havoc of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they were demoralised and an outcast nation in the world. They were far away from military or economic super-power and their chief concern was merely survival of people.

There were national consensus on the following :

- i. Anti-Militarism of Japanese people could effectively prevent militarism;
- ii. The economic rationalism of Japanese business would favour limited military expenditure; and
- iii. U.S. dominance over the Japanese military would make militarisation less dangerous.

In the year 1945, the year of surrender, Japanese military forces were completely disarmed as a condition put forth by the allied powers, especially the United States. Even economic and political system was demilitarised and most of the Japanese weapon industries were destroyed. In a new complete demilitarised atmosphere, the new constitution of Japan was enacted in 1947 so that all Japanese people could experience a complete reversal of social and political system from militarisation to demilitarisation.

But sudden dramatic change took place since the outbreak of Korean war in 1950 and this offered Japanese new opportunity to rearm the country with the help of United States who strongly encouraged Japan to go far militarisation in the shadow of pacifism and soon Japan started to remilitarise. By 1954, the nucleus of a new military forces was gradually organised and the military euphemistically named 'The Ground, Maritime and Airself Defense Force' of Japan was established. By 1955, Japan's military expenditure increased 8.5 times.

After 1975, Japanese military leaders publicly started political efforts for further militarisation, and step by step achieved the long standing goals:

- i. to ensure the public support for the "de-facto" constitutional authorities;
- ii. to establish a favourable position in deciding military policy; and
- iii. to arm themselves with highly modernised weapon.

With the new move of militarisation in Japan, political leaders, public as well as peace movement began to lose the ground following the new militarisation policy. Many opposition parties mainly parties belonging to socialist ideology started opposition. At the same time many youth movements, political leaders, peace researchers, and women

community started campaigning against the possible danger of militarisation.

#### *CREEPING MILITARISATION*

The new militarisation policy of Japan adopts the low posture and carefully follow the rules of the law and democracy while the old one (before 1945) took an overbearing attitude towards civilian and flagrantly violated human rights and democracy, deteriorated the healthy development of a civil oriented economy and military involved foreign countries and interventions. Thus the unique synthesis of indirect approach of military and structural change in the new circumstance is the key issue of post-war militarisation. During post-war period, the three major factors came to restrict the expansion of militarisation :

- i. Legal and political limitation set by public opinion and political leaders;
- ii. economic limitation set by business circle; and
- iii. international limitation set by foreign countries.

These three formulae hindered the military's way at the time of formation but gradually it crept out these obstacles through three phases viz phase of adaptation (1950-54), phase of acceptance (1954-64) and Phase of penetration (1964's).

Coupled with these facts, anti-militarism warning was institutionalised in three ways : first, the war renouncing clause of the constitution; second, the de-legitimisation of the existence of the military by the opposition parties; and finally, the weak position of the military in the decision-making system.

#### *JAPAN - AN EMERGING MILITARY POWER*

Though Japan started to remilitarise since 1960's, yet it grew appreciably when Nakasone came into power in 1982. Prime Minister Nakasone was strongly in favour of rearming Japan for the security of country. The new dramatic move in Japan's defence policy not only made Nakasone controversial inside Japan but also he became the target of criticism in Southeast Asian Region because many of these nations had memories of Japan's military power before World War II. The psychological fear of war is still alive in the minds of many nations which suffered from Japan before 1945.

On the other hand Nakasone was severely criticised by socialist party of Japan, peace groups, youth organisations, and other communities favouring peace while, on the other hand, he was appreciated by liberal democratic party and business community.



Nakasone understood geo-politics and probed to find out how far Japanese post-war taboos could be modified to find out an appropriate defense role for Japan within the confines of its constitution and domestic political reality. Under Nakasone's administration, Japan Government abandoned the public popular one per cent barrier on defence, which dated from 1976, and adopted a five-year defense programme for 1986-90. The present ~~Sosuke~~ ~~Uno~~ administration is following the guidelines of Nakasone so far defence policy is concerned but at the same time ~~Sosuke~~ ~~Uno~~ government is concerned with the section of people who are not happy with defense expenditure.

#### JAPAN'S DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

If we have a look over Japan's defense expenditure, we find phenomenal increase no matter one per cent of Japan's GNP. During the fiscal year 1972-73, an alarming increase of 22 per cent over the previous year was evident in the military budget. In 1955, the expenditure of defense was \$134.90 billion, in 1970, it was \$569.50 billion and in 1979, it went up \$2094.50 billion. Japan's 1988 defense budget may be the world's largest, surpassing the spending total of Britain, France and West Germany.<sup>12</sup>

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12. Japan's 1988 Cabinet approved defence budget is ¥3.7 trillion, is excess \$30 billion at 123 Yen per Dollar. The British, French and West German defence budget were all less than \$30 billion in 1987. If Japan does not become number three in 1988, it will probably reach that status in 1989 or in 1990.

To be sure, Japan is far from being a military super-power. But the centre of the global economy has shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific Basin, and Japan has key geostrategic location in the area. Today Japan's high technology air-defense, anti-submarine and anti invasion defence network, which compliments the U.S. offensive and defensive capability, has gradually but radically changed Japan's status. Instead of being a U.S. protectorate (a "free rider", in view of some U.S. Congressmen), Japan is assuring an indispensable role in pacific deterrence. The change has been so gradual that even America and Japan have not been still to recognise.

The growing 'Military Realism' of Japan loaded with the 'Economic Super-Power' status could make Japan a significant military power by the turn of the century. This opinion has been expressed by the former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the former U.S. Secretary, Casper Wineberger and some other top Pentagon officials.

#### MILITARISATION IN JAPAN AND ITS IMPACT ON THE THIRD WORLD

Regarding the impact of Japan's militarisation in the developing Third World, there is considerable ambivalence. Some Third World nations strongly oppose the militarisation in Japan and consider it as the threat to them while on the other hand, other group of developing nations either favours it or are indifferent.

The ASEAN countries do not favour the spread of militarisation in Japan because they consider it as the threat to the region but on the other hand, there are elements which favour it because it is essential for the security and stability. In their views, Japan's security means the security of the economy in the region.

It seems obvious that after considerable hesitation Japan's current security system will be modified and the tendencies towards militarisation will be strengthened. This development seems to be of considerable concern externally and also for those at home who wish to stick to the traditional policy adopted after the Japanese surrender. From the point of view of the majority of Third World nations, the heterogeneity of international relations does not suggest that Japanese armament should remain at a fixed level in order to ensure the survival and well-being of the world. What is crucially important is that Japan has a systemic consciousness which in no way goes against the credibility of the developing states. Japan's increased military strength does not appear from a Third World point of view to lead to aggravation of militarised systemic conflicts which may adversely affect the developing countries. There are of course divergent assessments of various future models for Japan, including some which would identify



phases when militarism and imperialism would experience a resurgence in Japan. Such scenarios do not represent the dynamics of the current Japanese situation. There are enough societal protests against the revival of a militaristic culture and the increased strength of the Self Defence Force can only provide more flexibility to the more autonomous foreign policy tendencies in Japan. With a militarily stronger Japan there would be a greater likelihood of ideas sympathetic to nonalignment entering the political agenda of Japan in the coming decades.

In the foreseeable future as the hegemonic decline of the two Super Powers proceeds, Japan will continue to evoke a variety of images. A scenario is always possible which resembles the development which took place after the Meiji restoration was launched. In this case the Japanese would have to make great sacrifices to pursue an aggressive nationalism. It is, however, hard to believe that Japan would turn its back upon the emergent multilateralism in the global system. It is equally unlikely that the Emperor would become once again the centre of a cult which would impose its destructive potentialities on the Japanese people. Another scenario could be that Japan would participate in an international cooperative system with the United States in order to promote the latter's dominance to avoid the uncertainties arising out of hegemonic

decline. This scenario could be developed to postulate cooperation between the People's Republic of China, Japan and the United States. In case Gorbachev's initiatives to China succeed and the latter no longer feels threatened by the Soviet Union, the network of commitments envisaged in this scenario may not be realised. The third scenario suggests that Japan can avoid the self-destructive characteristics of nationalism as a mobilising device for warfare. They way out would be to motivate itself and Third World societies for sustainable peace by stressing a common goal with the Third World. Japan's advantage is that unlike the US and the Soviet Union, it does not have nuclear weapon capabilities. Japan can control its own war proneness and aggressive propensities by involving itself in coordinated peace and development efforts in the Third World. As far as the Third World countries are concerned the demonstration effect of the Super Powers, which continue to be perceived as belligerent nuclear weapons powers inspite of the I.N.F. Treaty, works to enhance the self-destructive tendencies. The result is that peace initiatives in the Third World are pursued half-heartedly without being holistically integrated at all levels of policy. Japan and the Third World together provide a synergism, which could hopefully be the means of achieving " a middle stage toward a world state."<sup>13</sup>

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13. Shigeo Fukuda, *India, Japan and the World*, pp. 40-45.

CHAPTER - V

CONCLUSION:

JAPAN'S ROLE IN GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING  
FOR PEACE

This analysis of the motivating forces for Japanese peace and security policies has concentrated on the basic Japanese position which encourages a more positive pattern of interaction with the Third World. It is of course only common-sense to say that there are many nagging problems for a global economic power which has not yet discovered the parameters of what appears to be an irreversible trend towards global responsibility. Broadly speaking there are two opposite schools of thought. For those who favour the *status quo* the existing security relationship with the United States cannot be weakened without raising numerous insoluble questions. Indeed, it would be counterproductive to extricate Japan from this secure position even if Tokyo and Washington may reach dangerously contradictory positions on macro-economic policies. In this view there cannot be a marked disjunction from the inherited community of interests between the US and Japan and the long-range approach to foreign policy could only be a US-Japanese condominium as the further development of constructive internationalism for Japan. The other school of thought perceives the need for Japanese "new thinking" for developing a new structure of international relationships. There is a doctrinal gap between the two sides and there are limited grounds of congruence on the question of burden-sharing in the political and economic management of world politics. In the latter view, it is not simply a question of readjusting

perspectives. There is a conflict of values which manifests itself in the growing divergence of foreign policy interests of the two countries. There is a situation of flux and Japanese political responses both domestic and international are marked by ambivalence. The overall balance between the two schools favours the latter, since, both strategically and economically, the Japanese are no longer prepared to be an appendage to the global politics of the United States. Many of the Japanese initiatives for developing a new structuring of international relationships are still tentative but there is no mistaking their direction. The pragmatic aspects of decision-making in Japanese foreign policy leads to a support of continued membership of the U.S. alliance; but, at the same time Japan's formidable economic bargaining power will be used to develop different with the United States. As Japanese diplomatic dependancy on the United States weakens, Tokyo will develop its role in the global restructuring for peace, away from global interventionism. With the wanting of Cold War tensions, Japan can be expected to give negative responses to bloc polarisation under US or Soviet auspices. This should enhance the possibility of Japan's initiatives towards a broadened programme of cooperation for building sustainable peace in the Third World. Initially Japan's increasing investment in Third World countries may impinge on the search for greater political autonomy of developing countries and raise questions of Japanese dominance or hegemony. But if



Japanese decision-making encourages a deeper awareness of mutually supportive measures which are necessary for strengthening the industrialising processes in the Third World, Tokyo may bring to bear new problem-solving capabilities on Third World problems. Viewed in the aggregate with the possibility of huge financial transfers, Japan offers a real alternative to the existing patterns of interaction and priorities visible in the existing hegemonic decline. The premises, values and goals implicit in the shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific require a thorough examination in order to delineate the central issues about Japanese development options in the Third World. The coming period will be deeply influenced by the capital and high-technology transfers from Japan to the Third World countries and this is likely to be achieved by Tokyo while distancing itself from the political-strategic arrangements shaped by the United States. It is true that Japan does not have a precise conception of Japan-South relations, but it is of particular relevance in this context to emphasise that the conception will be influenced by Japan's room for manoeuvre in relation to the Third World. Japan is not obliged to follow the oscillating character of disarmament initiatives which have marked Soviet and American policies while each has fuelled the arms race. Japan's interests also do not demand that it should work for a coercive international authority in the world order context. Japan's role for the future may be in terms of both integration and differentiation so as to help promote a process of accommodation

instead of a policy that seeks world domination. This would be the logical answer to the dilemmas presented by the Third World in the quest for economic growth and sustainable peace. It may, however, be questioned whether such a rational consideration by Japanese policy makers will be possible if the past tendency towards integration with the structural policy of the United States persists. There is reasonably strong evidence that despite the tendency to view Japanese policies as derivative phenomena from United States internationalism, Tokyo is beginning to take advantage of the thaw in global and regional relationships to find a *modus vivendi* of peaceful coexistence centred on socio-economic supportive measures and not on military scenarios.

Faced by the problems of Japanese - American trade frictions, Japanese statesmen have been compelled to think of the pitfalls arising out of the lack of autonomy from the United States. There has also been a sustained scholarly effort in Japan to understand the pluralisation of world politics following the end of the American adventure in Vietnam. Consequently there is a greater willingness to understand the significance of the Nonaligned Movement and to elaborate on the role Japan could play to help Third World countries to attain economic independence. The absence of the military factor in Japan's foreign policy has been related to the cultural, economic and political dimensions of the North-South problem leading to realistic analyses of

possible Japanese initiatives for resolution of Third World conflicts. Of course there were a few writers who affirmed the identity of the Japanese point of view with the American strategy in the intervention in Vietnam. The characteristic Japanese response has, however, been against American military intervention. By their realistic analyses, several Japanese works predicted that United States' intervention would end in a fiasco. Although there is no consensus among Japanese scholars, yet the debate between the "realists" and "idealists" has resulted in a clearer understanding of the major problems faced by the developing nations. Thus there is considerable support for the view that it is imperative that Third World nations be dissociated from the war-making institutions and activities of the advanced countries. An important conclusion reached by several Japanese analysts is that security expenditures hinder economic growth and development in the Third World.

The symbolic character of Japan's support for the abolition of nuclear weapons has reinforced empirical investigations into the implications of Japan's rejection of nuclear deterrence and its consequences for the multidimensional face of violence in the Third World. The Japanese experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been related to the far-reaching readjustments which are necessary to deal with both "structural violence" and more direct forms of violence which have deformed the historical structure of the international system. The

idealists in Japan, therefore, address the entire spectrum of issues relating to conflict formations within the Third World from a new vantage point where Japan would opt out of the power games being played by the United States and the Soviet Union. Of course the idealist view-point does not control the rationales for security doctrines and ideologies which govern the reassertion of national positions by the Japanese Government. The idealist argument, nevertheless, has helped to create an orientation for appreciation of the complexities and choices involved in Japan's policy process towards the Third World.

As far as the Japanese Government is concerned, it has not placed its development eggs in the NIEO basket; nor has it clearly outlined its support for the ecological security of the world. What has emerged, however, is the beginning of a comprehensive approach on the part of Japan to development problems. There is a mix of rationality and pragmatism which is helping Japan to develop normative view on her relationship with the Third World in the context of resource scarcity and to identify areas for linking its enlightened self-interest with development assistance. As a country which is on its way to becoming the world's largest donor country, Japan can no longer avoid facing the problem which Raul Prebisch described as the vicious cycle in which the Third World is caught, in which increases in productivity are siphoned off as rent and labour to the developed countries of the core (Charles. A. Jones : *The North South Dialogue* -

*A Brief History*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1983 pp. 14-19).

The crucial issue for Japan is to provide assistance in more complex forms which can harmonise the economic content and the rationale of Japan's relations with the Third World with the greater political autonomy which the developing countries are demanding. Given open-mindedness on both sides the question of redistribution of resources which is vital to the development of the Third World could be achieved through new forms of economic collaboration and thus strengthen the polycentric structure. If, however, Japan should choose to follow less prudent and non-conciliatory policies it, would sooner or later find itself involved in covert or overt interventions and the picture that would emerge would be no different from that which led the US and the Soviet Union to encourage the diversion of resources from economic development to military purposes. Japan can only break loose from the hegemonial syndrome if it follows the advice of Sakamoto Yoshikazu to develop sustainable peace by supporting middle powers and non-governmental actors whose roles are essential for maintaining peace in a world where values have become increasingly diversified. (Sakamoto Yoshikazu : *Peace : Realities and Perceptions*, Tokyo : Mainichi Shinbunsha 1973).

The interpretational framework for Japan's role in the global restructuring for peace must include the active reinforcement of popular participation in the peace movement. Although

at the official level the Japanese government has continued to affirm that a strong America is essential for Japan's future, at the popular level, there has been an impressive rejection of 'power politics' in the nuclear age. The peace movement has successfully exploited the incompatibilities of political interest and has been able to bring the discussion of global hierarchy to the forefront. While discussing Japanese technological and financial independence, the Peace Movement activists have been able to provide conceptual clarifications about conflict formation in the Third World. These theoretical interpretations have to some extent filtered into general public understanding. It must also be said that there is manifest resurgence of nationalism in Japan which leads to an emphasis in certain quarters for the development of a dominance system. On the other hand, peace ideas influence both actors and processes in Japan with a comprehensiveness which strengthens the inherent tendency in Japanese policy towards development instead of arms build-up.

What will the new politics of Japan for achieving sustainable peace in the Third World consist of? With the inequality inherent in the international system, Japan can hardly be expected to rework the total pattern of North-South relations. The Japanese scenario can, however, emphasise the need for curbing militarisation and applying resources to

development. As the 1980s draw to an end, Japanese politics is experiencing deep changes. In many areas, it continues to reflect deficiencies in the democratic process, and, also, there is considerable confusion regarding the more ambitious structures that can be constructed in external relations with Japan's enormous economic resources. Perhaps the only clear conclusion that is possible is that Japan has now a unique opportunity for laying the foundations of a relationship with the Third World which can pave the way to a futuristic global interdependence. The starting point, however, is crucial. Approaches like the so-called Trilateral approach which claim a monopoly of decision-making for the advanced countries can hardly enable Japan to meet the challenge of a new age. Japan will only be able to accept this challenge if it ensures that decisions affecting the dynamic of Japan-South relations are taken at a level close to the developing countries, so that the Third World political forces support Japan's scenario for applying resources to development.

Attention is generally focussed on Japan's contribution to peace and stability in the Asian-Pacific region. The explanation lies in the fact that this area directly affects Japan's security and geopolitical concerns. This study has adopted a Third World perspective on conflict-resolution and peace-building. Against the background of the problems of economic growth and


redistribution, Japan's position should be reexamined in relation to the socio-economic and political processes in the entire Third World. Given the prominence of the concept of sustainable peace in understanding contemporary policy alternatives, we have considered it appropriate to focuss on the ways in which Japan can contribute to stabilising policies in the context of Third World problems and conditions.

Reasonably speaking, the main characteristics of Japan's alternative approach to sustainable peace in the Third World should be on the following lines :

- 1] Implementation of Macro-economic measures which can ensure a more comprehensive approach to developmental problems.
- 2] Increased response to demands in the Third World for peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance.
- 3] Demonstration effect of Japanese refusal to project itself as a military power, although with an increased size of military effort.
- 4] Increased contribution to the buildup of the authority of the U.N. system for shaping the future evolution of the Third World.
- 5] Strengthening the role of Japan's multilateral diplomacy and supporting regional cooperation in the Third World.



To some extent, these trends are already visible in current Japanese politics. The need therefore is to think over them more deeply and apply them in practice--May be in a somewhat phased manner in the beginning and watch the outcome and public reaction both at home and the Third World. But the time is long past when Japan could wish away its obligations towards Third World development. It has to act here and now--(and in its own interests) dynamically, independently and innovatively.



## APPENDICES

APPENDIX - I

FOREIGN POLICY SPEECH BY MINISTER FOR  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS TADASHI KURANARI, TO  
THE 108th SESSION OF THE NATIONAL DIET

## Foreign Policy Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs Tadashi Kuranari, to the 108th Session of the National Diet

(January 26, 1987)

At the resumption of this 108th Session of the National Diet, I would like to state some of my basic views on Japan's foreign policy.

### Introduction

I find it impossible to be optimistic about the international situation as it pertains to Japan.

On the political front, a summit meeting was held between the United States and the Soviet Union in Reykjavik last October within a climate of continuing harshness in East-West relations. Although in-depth discussions were held on arms control and disarmament and other issues and a sign of progress was seen at this meeting, the meeting failed to yield any specific agreement.

Elsewhere, there are continuing conflicts and disarray in Indochina, the Middle East, Africa, Central America, and other regions, and the international situation is further destabilized by frequent outbreaks of international terrorism.

Looking at the international economy, while there are some bright spots, including the start of the GATT Uruguay Round last September, the sharp decline in inflation rates, lower interest rates, and the progress made in international policy coordination, there are still many problems remaining, not least among them the increasing protectionist pressures fueled by current account imbalances and high rates of unemployment and the continuing issue of accumulated external debts.

### For a More-open Japan Contributing to a Better World

Given this difficult international situation, there is increasing international interest in what role Japan should play, possessing the second-largest economy in the free world. If Japan is to avoid becoming isolated within the international community and to continue to prosper, I believe it is important that, while maintaining an attitude of tolerance and humility toward different cultures, we seek to become a more-open Japan and play more active role in contributing to a better world.

It is indispensable in this that Japan should adopt the broader

perspective, not pursuing its own short-term narrow national interests but rather sharing the pain with other countries and working together with them to ensure shared long-term prosperity. From this perspective, I would like to propose that Japan see the various problems facing the international community as its own problems and move to respond actively for their solution.

Japanese foreign policy has an important mission in working together with other countries to ensure a bright future in the new century beginning just 14 years from now. From this perspective, I intend to take a one-by-one and honest approach in dealing with the issues facing Japanese foreign policy.

### Solidarity and Coordination with the Other Free and Democratic Nations

Solidarity and coordination with the other Western industrialized democracies sharing the basic values of freedom and democracy is indispensable in the effort to maintain peace and prosperity of Japan. It is important that the Western countries including Japan, in close consultation and liaison, exert the maximum force as a whole by undertaking each role and responsibilities commensurate with its capabilities and situation.

Along with doing what it can to promote arms control and disarmament, Japan also intends to support the United States' efforts for more stable East-West relations and to call upon the Soviet Union to approach these issues in a constructive manner.

Friendly and cooperative relations with the United States based upon the Japan-United States security arrangements are the cornerstone of Japan's foreign policy.

Along with seeking to enhance its own defense capability, Japan intends to continue working for the still-smoother operation of these Japan-United States security arrangements. Japan and the United States are currently engaged in a wide range of efforts to rectify their trade imbalance, but the protectionist mood is growing stronger in the United States, especially in Congress. In my recent meeting with Secretary of State Shultz in Brussels, realizing that the situation continues difficult as it pertains to Japan-United States economic relations, we reaffirmed our determination to work for the continued solid development of the bilateral economic relationship and to make further efforts to maintain the smooth relationship.

The relationship between Japan and the United States has now developed into a cooperative relationship with a global perspective, and Japan intends to contribute to peace and stability around the globe

through maintaining and strengthening cooperation with the United States.

In relations with Canada, we intend to work to further promote the new relationship of cooperation established with the exchange of visits at the highest level last year.

Promoting close solidarity and coordination with the countries of Western Europe is one of the main pillars of Japanese foreign policy. While it is increasingly important to strengthen the wide-ranging relations between Japan and Western Europe now that Western Europe has come to hold a more important political and economic position in the international community as a result of its own integration and regional cooperation, the West European attitude toward Japan is extremely strained over the trade issue. Having visited Europe last month to attend the Japan-EC Commission Ministerial-level Meeting as well as to visit Belgium, Italy, Vatican and France and to meet with British Foreign Secretary Howe and other high-ranking officials in Brussels, I intend to continue to work through intense dialogue between Japan and Western Europe to resolve the economic friction and to further strengthen our relations.

The quest for arms control and disarmament demands that patient and untiring efforts be made to gradually reduce the level of armaments, step by step, while maintaining deterrence through the balance of force. The experiment that Japan has been engaged in since last December to exchange seismic waveform data so as to enhance nuclear testing verification capabilities is part of this effort. Japan intends to continue to contribute to the activation of realistic disarmament deliberation.

#### Relations with the Other Asia-Pacific Countries

As an Asia-Pacific nation, Japan intends, while seeking to further strengthen its relations of friendship and cooperation with the other countries of the region, to play an active role for the region's development.

In line with Japan's basic position of learning from history and its lessons and respecting the initiatives of the other Asia-Pacific countries, our goals are to contribute to regional stability as a nation of peace, to establish mutual understanding and mutual trust by advancing exchanges and dialogue in a wide range of fields, and to promote the kind of cooperation that each country truly needs.

Relations with the Republic of Korea are becoming still closer, and there is agreement in both countries on the need to further strengthen

the political, economic, cultural, and other bonds between us at all levels. From a viewpoint of achieving reduced tensions on the Korean Peninsula, Japan both hopes for an early resumption of the dialogue between North and South Korea which has been suspended since last January and intends to do everything it can to cooperate for the success of the 1988 Olympics. Toward North Korea, it is Japanese policy to continue to maintain economic, cultural, and other exchanges at the private level.

Preserving and strengthening friendly and cooperative relations with the People's Republic of China is important not only for our two countries but for peace and stability in Asia and the world as a whole. While the Japanese Government is watching the recent political situation in China with deep interest, Vice-Premier Tian Jijun, who has recently visited Japan, explained to us that no change is to be made as to Chinese basic external policies including that toward Japan. In keeping with the Joint Communiqué of 1972, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1978, and the four principles governing Japan-China relations, I intend to promote the broad range of exchanges with China and to continue Japan's cooperation to the economic construction which China is undertaking despite various difficulties.

In its relations with the ASEAN countries, a stabilizing force in Southeast Asia, Japan intends to continue to work for steady progress in our relations of friendship and cooperation and to continue to extend all possible cooperation to these countries in light of the economic trials that they face. Especially with regard to the Republic of the Philippines, having received President Aquino as a State Guest last November, Japan will spare no effort in support of the Philippine government's new nation-building efforts.

Peace and stability in Southeast Asia demands a political solution to the Cambodian problem, and Japan will continue to work to create a climate conducive to peace, supporting the ASEAN countries' efforts for peace and conducting dialogue with Vietnam and the other countries concerned.

Japan's relations with the countries of Southwest Asia are growing closer, and we have established diplomatic relations with Bhutan. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation is also becoming more active in this region. Japan intends to continue its cooperation for this region's stable development.

I have recently visited Australia and New Zealand. In Australia, I attended the Ninth Japan-Australia Ministerial Committee Meeting and

conducted candid exchanges of views on how we can expand anew the cooperative relationship between the two countries in keeping with the changing world economic climate. Taking advantage of this opportunity, I also visited the Pacific island countries of Fiji, Vanuatu, and Papua New Guinea, countries that have become increasingly important in recent years, and worked to strengthen Japan's relations with these countries. In Fiji, among others, I elucidated specific policies for strengthening Japan's relations with these Pacific island countries and forthrightly demonstrated our positive stance.

Likewise, we welcome the efforts being made mainly by the private sector for progress in Pacific cooperation for harmonious development in the Asia-Pacific region, and the government intends, with all due respect to the will of the ASEAN countries and the Pacific island countries, and others concerned, to continue to cooperate with these efforts.

#### Relations with the Soviet Union

The Japan-U.S.S.R. Foreign Ministerial Regular Consultation was held last year, for the first time in eight years and twice. As a result, this consultation has been firmly institutionalized. In addition, negotiations were resumed on the peace treaty including territorial issues, and its continuation agreed upon. There was also agreement on the further strengthening of the Japan-U.S.S.R. political dialogue including at the highest levels, and I believe that these are an important first step in promoting Japanese policy toward the Soviet Union.

Welcoming the fact that General Secretary Gorbachev has expressed a desire to visit Japan, we hope that this visit will take place soon.

While the Soviet Union has taken an obstinate position on the territorial issue, the government of Japan, backed by the Resolution on Promoting a Conclusion to the Northern Territories' Issue adopted again unanimously in both Houses of the Diet last October, intends to continue its tenacious efforts for the return of all four islands and island groups in the Northern Territories in line with its unshakable policy of seeking to establish stable relations with the Soviet Union based upon true mutual understanding through resolving the Northern Territories issue and concluding a peace treaty.

#### Relations with the East and North European Countries

The fact that Prime Minister Nakasone recently became the first Japanese Prime Minister to pay official visits to Finland, German Democratic Republic, Yugoslavia, and Poland for candid exchanges of

views with the leaders of these countries was most significant both in providing new momentum to Japan's relations with these countries and in contributing to the promotion of East-West political dialogue and mutual understanding.

#### Relations with the Middle Eastern Countries

Conflict continues in the Middle East along national and ethnic lines, and the situation there remains in flux. On the issue of peace in the Middle East, and especially the pivotal Palestinian issue, Japan very much hopes that new progress will be seen in the moves for peace that have been stalled since last year and intends to continue to call upon the parties concerned to make further efforts for the early realization of peace in the Middle East.

In consultation with the United Nations and the countries concerned, Japan intends to continue its untiring efforts to create a climate for peace in the Iran-Iraq conflict.

It is most regrettable that more than seven years have already passed since the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, and Japan intends to work for a political solution there including a total withdrawal of all Soviet military forces.

#### Relations with the Latin American Countries

While there have been signs that democracy was advancing and becoming better established in Latin America in recent years, the countries of the region continue to be faced with accumulated external debts and other economic difficulties. Japan has contributed to resolving these countries' debt problems, including active cooperation for Mexico's economic reconstruction, and it intends to continue to do everything possible to support these countries' efforts. President Alfonsín of Argentina and President de la Madrid of Mexico both visited Japan last year, and these visits were very successful in promoting stronger relations between Japan and the countries of Latin America. On the issue of the conflict in Central America, Japan, while strongly supporting the Contadora Group and other forces for peace in the region, intends to cooperate for the economic and social development of Central America and the Caribbean.

#### Relations with the Countries of Africa

Africa continues to be faced with structural food shortages, ballooning external debts, and other grave economic difficulties. While support-

ing the bootstrap efforts of the African countries, Japan intends to work for the realization of the "Green Revolution for Africa" that it has proposed, with a view of solving these countries' food and agricultural problems.

The situation in South Africa is increasingly deteriorating, and developments there are of grave concern. Resolutely maintaining its long-standing opposition to apartheid, Japan intends to continue, in cooperation with the rest of the international community, to strengthen its support for the victims of apartheid and to call upon all parties concerned to work for apartheid's abolition and a peaceful resolution of the issues involved.

#### Contributing to the Sound Development of the World Economy

Japan's current account surplus continues to run at high level. Yet these continuing external imbalances are in no way desirable either for harmonious international economic and social development or for the Japanese economy's own long-term management, and we must continue to make every effort for the steady reduction of this surplus.

Specifically, Japan must, while working for further market opening in line with the Action Program for Improved Market Access and other programs, promote economic structural adjustment. While this process may engender various domestic difficulties, we must accept this as a trial to be passed to ensure Japan's continued prosperity and overcome these difficulties one by one. The expansion of domestic demand and the resultant creation of new employment opportunities are indispensable in promoting the smoothest possible structural adjustment.

On the international trade front, the start of the Uruguay Round with the concerted efforts by Japan and the other countries concerned at last September's GATT Ministerial Meeting marked major progress in stemming protectionism and assuring the future of free trade system. The important thing now is to enter into substantive negotiations as soon as possible, and Japan, while contributing to a prompt conclusion of negotiating structure and plan now under way among the countries concerned, is resolved to do its fair share to ensure that these Uruguay Round negotiations are successful.

#### Cooperating for Stability and Growth in the Developing Countries

Stability and growth in the developing countries are prerequisite to world peace and prosperity, and Japan regards the cooperation with these

countries an important international responsibility, and intends to further promote it with a stress on heart-to-heart contacts.

Realizing this, Japan has set forth its third Medium-Term Target and is working to enhance its official development assistance (ODA). Along with proposing a fiscal 1987 ODA budget that is 5.8% more than in the previous year and in the efforts to ensure effective and efficient implementation of assistance through reforming Japan International Cooperation Agency operations, improving the preparedness of its international disaster relief scheme and seeking to make qualitative improvements in Japanese assistance such as by lowering interest rates on ODA loan, Japan intends to continue to work to be able to respond flexibly to meet the developing countries' diverse requirements.

Believing that accumulated external debt problem is one of the most important problems facing the developing countries, I intend to continue to cooperate actively for this issue's resolution. In addition, it is also important to facilitate the developing countries, nation-building efforts through cooperating in trade, investment, finance, technology transfer, and other fields. Looking ahead to the convening of the seventh United Nations Conference on Trade and Development this July, Japan also intends to cooperate positively for the promotion of constructive North-South dialogue.

Likewise, Japan intends to continue to do its best, in financial and foodstuff assistance and in accepting Indochinese refugees, to alleviate the world's continuingly serious conditions of refugees questions.

#### Cooperation with the Work of the United Nations

Japan intends to fulfill its important international responsibilities for world peace and stability as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council for the next two years.

There is an urgent need to vitalize United Nations functions in order to make the United Nations a truly effective forum for international cooperation, and Japan thus has the highest regard for the resolution endorsing administrative and fiscal reform that was passed by the United Nations General Assembly last December. As one of the original sponsors of this Resolution to establish the Group of High-level Intergovernmental Experts to make the United Nations function more efficiently, Japan intends to continue to spare no effort in cooperating with these reforms.

#### Stemming International Terrorism

There have been frequent outbreaks of violent international ter-

rorism in recent years, and such terrorism is both a challenge to the international society and an issue that Japan cannot overlook in light of the security of Japanese living overseas. In line with its resolute opposition to international terrorism in any form as clearly stated at the Tokyo Summit, Japan intends to further strengthen and promote international cooperation to prevent terrorism.

#### **Promoting Mutual Understanding with Other Countries**

Because the friction between Japan and other countries stems partly from deficiencies or inaccuracies in the mutual understanding between Japanese and other peoples, it is very important to enhance accurate awareness of each other's national situations and policies and true understanding of different cultures, and the government of Japan therefore intends, with the understanding and cooperation of local governments and the private sector, to strengthen and expand its research on international issues, to enhance a wide range of public information activities, and to work for exchanges across a broad spectrum of fields such as youth and student exchanges as well as programs in culture, education, sports, and other areas.

#### **Conclusion**

As I have stated, there are many important-yet-difficult issues facing Japanese foreign policy. If we are to deal with these issues forcefully and effectively, there is, I believe, an urgent need to strengthen the foreign policy executing structure, meaning especially the establishment of sophisticated information-processing and communication systems, so as to be able to quickly and accurately discern international developments as they affect Japan and to formulate anticipatory responses to the situation as it develops. Along with this, Japan intends to pay even greater heed than before to protecting the steadily increasing number of Japanese traveling and living overseas, with special attention to their protection in times of emergency, and to providing improved educational opportunities for Japanese children overseas.

As we move forward toward the twenty-first century, I am determined anew to do what I can to enable Japan to continue to enjoy the benefits of peace and prosperity and to contribute positively to making the world better, and I pledge that this task will have my resolute and unflagging efforts.

Yet no foreign policy can succeed without the understanding of the

people. I would therefore like to close by appealing both to my fellow Diet members and to the public at large for your continued support.



APPENDIX - II

STATEMENT BY H.E. MR SHINTARO ABE,  
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF  
JAPAN AT THE JAPAN-ASEAN FOREIGN  
MINISTERS' MEETING IN MANILA

## Principal Addresses by Japanese Delegations

### (1) Statement by H. E. Mr. Shintaro Abe, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan at the Japan-ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Manila

(June 26, 1986)

#### Peace and Prosperity in Asia — Toward a Creative Partnership —

Your Excellency Foreign Minister Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen,  
Distinguished ASEAN Foreign Ministers,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am most grateful to H. E. Mr. Rithauddeen for his kind words of welcome for me.

Four years have passed since my appointment as Foreign Minister and this is the fourth time for me to attend the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference.

It is always a great pleasure for me to meet with the distinguished colleagues from the ASEAN countries.

The relations between Japan and the countries of Asia including the ASEAN countries have witnessed steady progress. As the one directly responsible for Japan's foreign relations, I am very pleased with this development.

#### Assessment of the Asian Situation

Excellencies,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Our Asia has distinguished itself over the past two decades with its remarkable economic development. The countries in East Asia have made strides in economic progress and increased political stability to a degree unknown in other development areas. In particular, ASEAN countries, by promoting intra-regional cooperation, have been successful in raising the resilience of individual member countries and of the group as a whole. The ASEAN's achievement in economic development deserves special mention as a model case in the industrialization of developing countries.

East Asia, encompassing many countries which have realized dynam-

ic economic growth, has now become one of the greatest sources of vitality sustaining the world economy. Asia's success has historical significance in that it has given bright hope for the objective of economic development, a common aspiration of people around the world.

As an Asian, I take personal pride in this success.

The Asian countries are steadily increasing their role in the international political arena as well. Their basic orientations are firmly for peace and they are actively working to secure peace in the region. They aspire for a sustained peaceful international environment so that they can better concentrate on their most important domestic political task of promoting economic development and raising people's standards of living.

The untiring peace efforts of the ASEAN countries concerning the Cambodian problem, the moves toward North-South dialogue on the Korean Peninsula and the establishment of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in Southwest Asia; all these should be viewed as part of a broader current of self-reliant efforts of Asia to secure peace.

I attach great importance to the historic implication and potential of this new trend in Asia.

Excellencies,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Asia's voyage, however, will not always be blessed by favorable winds. Its economy is now facing a serious trial. Politically, an early solution to the Cambodian problem is not easily foreseen and tension continues in other parts of the region as well.

Particularly since the turn of the decade, many Asian countries have been facing the slowdown of economic growth or, at worst, even negative growth. This has been caused by such developments as deceleration in the growth of the developed economies, deteriorating primary commodity prices, and protectionist trends. Japan has itself experienced the growing pains as a developing country in the not so distant past, and can easily understand how trying economic stagnation can be to developing countries, and what serious implications it has beyond the economic realm, with social and even political consequences.

The state of affairs in Asia today leads me to believe that the Asian countries are now at an historical turning point in the course of their development. In other words, the recent slowdown in economic growth of many Asian countries signifies that they have completed a certain stage of development and are at a point of transition preparing for the next

stage yet higher.

It is with these ideas that I have come to Manila.

Analyzing and evaluating past history is perhaps a task for historians, but it is up to us statesmen acutely to discern an historical turning point, to seize it as an opportunity, and provide the proper response, in anticipation of the future to come. It is then of great significance for both ASEAN and Japan that we are gathered here at this Conference against this historic background. I hope that, on this occasion, we, my distinguished colleagues and friends from ASEAN and myself, will take a greater stride forward for grappling creatively with this historic task, and thus strengthen the creative partnership between Japan and ASEAN for building peace and prosperity in Asia.

Our Asia is endowed with a vast domain, abundant natural resources, and, most important of all, excellent human resources. There is immeasurable potential for further development toward the fast approaching 21st century and the future beyond.

The challenges before us may be difficult, but I am confident that no problems will be too difficult to solve once we summon the wisdom of Asia.

#### Japan's Asian Policy

Excellencies,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am convinced that consistency and adaptability are both essential in foreign policy. Consistency in the foreign policy of a country, so long as it is justifiable, will win the trust of the other party and the international community as a whole. However, consistency must not mean inflexibility and it should allow for adaptability enabling a country to respond effectively to different situations as they arise. Japan's fundamental policy toward Asia has been a consistent one, as it has been made clear on many occasions. I will therefore not try to add any new precepts but identify the course of action Japan should pursue at this historic turning point in Asia, on the basis of this established policy.

The first pillar of Japan's Asian policy is "Japan's contribution as a country committed to peace." It is Japan's basic, consistent policy stance and the firm determination of the Japanese people to observe the lessons of history and never again become a military power. Therefore, Japan will continue to reject a military role for itself in Asia. Indeed, it is my conviction that one of the major avenues for Japan to contribute to peace and prosperity in Asia is to steadfastly maintain its commitment to peace and

utilize its capabilities solely for non-military purposes. This means that Japan will not be satisfied with pursuing peace merely for itself, but will make active contributions, together with ASEAN and other peace-loving nations, to such efforts as peaceful settlement of conflicts, relaxation of tensions and promotion of dialogue.

It goes without saying that the earliest possible settlement of the Cambodian problem is a prerequisite for establishing lasting peace in Southeast Asia. I have already expressed in detail Japan's views and policy regarding this issue in the Post-Ministerial Conference. Japan will continue its forceful support of the efforts the ASEAN countries have taken on to themselves for the peaceful settlement of the problem. It will also continue to make active contribution to engendering an environment conducive to peace by promoting dialogue with the countries concerned including Vietnam.

The second pillar of Japan's Asian policy is "promotion of mutual understanding through continuous dialogue and heart-to-heart exchange for the establishment of mutual trust."

For this purpose there is a strong need to deepen mutual understanding at a popular level between Japan and Asian countries including those of ASEAN. Japan has already been making such efforts as to mutually strengthen facilities for language education, expand exchange programs for our youth, who will be at the forefront of the next generation, and to promote area studies and better appreciation of respective cultures on both sides. In this connection, I am appreciative of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' favorable reference in their communique to the satisfactory progress made in these fields. We will continue to vigorously expand and strengthen such activities.

Today, when Asia is at an historical turning point and faces unprecedented, difficult problems, Japan and the ASEAN countries need positively to pursue dialogue and exchange in a broad range so that we may better understand each other's problems and views, become bosom friends, and use our creative imagination together to find a path to future prosperity. Therefore, I wish to stress the importance of deepening and expanding exchanges, as well as continuous dialogue, between Japan and the ASEAN countries.

The third pillar of Japan's Asian Policy is "establishment of a cooperative relationship between Japan and ASEAN capable of effective response to a changing environment."

As I stated at the outset, many of the Asian countries including the ASEAN states are confronted with serious economic difficulties as

reflected in sluggish exports and the shortage of funds for economic development, owing particularly to the slower growth in the developed economies and the fall in primary commodity prices.

This situation represents a major challenge for developing countries and is the most important problem requiring urgent solution.

The manner in which the ASEAN countries tackle this problem could affect their long-term development strategy for the future and, further, have certain bearing on their resilience as nations.

Therefore, Japan wishes to extend actively its cooperation to the ASEAN countries to support their efforts to overcome these difficulties as their partner in Asia.

In order to make certain that Japan can extend "sincere and truly effective cooperation", there is an urgent need for the ASEAN countries to take the initiative in formulating a development program attuned to the changing environment and for Japan and the ASEAN countries to establish, through continuous dialogue, a cooperative framework which will ensure flexible and prompt response to the true needs and changing circumstances of ASEAN.

In the Third Medium Term Target for ODA (Official Development Assistance) Expansion starting from this year, Japan will continue to regard the ASEAN countries as its most important partners and will pursue cooperation with them in the spirit I have just described.

To elaborate on our economic cooperation to the ASEAN countries, I wish to take up a few specific points.

The first point is the question of local cost financing. Japan is prepared to consider making ODA loans available for local cost financing as well, taking into account the situation in each of the ASEAN countries which require such financing, and in line with our basic principle of assisting the self-help efforts of the recipient countries.

Secondly, while the emphasis is on project aid, Japan will also consider diversifying the forms of its economic cooperation with a view to assisting specific policy objectives or comprehensive development programs in the developing countries.

My third point concerns technical cooperation and its diversification. Being responsive to the current needs of the ASEAN countries, Japan intends to place added emphasis on technical cooperation programs in coordination with financial assistance as necessary, in such areas as integrated assistance for export promotion through product quality and testing capability improvement, investment promotion through the organization of symposia and the dispatching of advisors, and cooperation in the field

of high technology. It will also strengthen cooperation in what might be called the "soft-oriented approach" by assisting in the creation of an environment which will facilitate technical transfer by the Japanese private sector which possesses valuable know-how.

There has been increased interest among the Japanese general public in the way economic assistance is utilized as we must contend with very serious fiscal difficulties. I believe this is also the case in the ASEAN countries as well. Under these circumstances, it is imperative for us to ensure the proper, effective and efficient implementation of our economic assistance by promoting increased cooperation with the ASEAN countries to strengthen policy dialogue and improve prior surveys and subsequent evaluation.

Trade is another important area for Japan-ASEAN economic cooperation.

The promotion of exports will continue to be extremely important for the economic development of the ASEAN countries. For this reason, Japan carefully considered their concerns when it decided last year on the Action Program for improved access to the Japanese market, covering both tariff and non-tariff areas. I hope these efforts, along with such factors as the recent appreciation of the Yen, will lead to increased ASEAN exports to Japan.

Both Japan and ASEAN share an interest in stemming protectionist pressures and maintaining and strengthening the free trade system. Therefore, Japan wishes to join forces with the ASEAN countries to promote the GATT New Round.

For ASEAN to increase its exports, it needs to reorient the traditional export structure, dependent on primary commodities, by diversifying the product range of exports. While hoping the ASEAN countries will achieve fruitful results from their efforts already in progress in this area, Japan is prepared to extend all possible support to them in their endeavors. Moreover, the further promotion of ASEAN exports of manufactured goods to Japan must be pursued within a wider and historic framework. It must be carried out in the context of transforming economic structures of both Japan and ASEAN and against the background of global economic structural adjustment. In this connection, I welcome the recent developments in some of the ASEAN countries in approaching the task of structural adjustment in a comprehensive manner. I am also encouraged by the increased interest taken by Japanese firms in establishing their plants abroad in view of the recent appreciation of the Yen.

I believe that investment and technology transfers from Japan will play an increasingly important role in effecting such structural adjustment and raising the ASEAN economies to a higher level. Again, Japan is resolved to strengthen its cooperation to help achieve an environment which will facilitate Japanese investment and technology transfer to the ASEAN countries and looks forward to efforts on their part for the same objective.

Particularly as the private sector plays a major role in this area, close coordination between the government and the private sector is essential to the cooperation between Japan and the ASEAN countries. There was a common recognition on this point in the Japan-ASEAN Economic Ministerial Conference held in Tokyo last year. I wish to underline the need for government-private sector cooperation and recommend that the government and the private sector in both Japan and the ASEAN countries intensify their consultations at various levels, and also create more systematic links between various avenues of contacts.

At the same time, Japan is determined to continue to support the initiative of the ASEAN countries in pursuing intra-regional cooperation and extend its cooperation in this area.

Excellencies,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,

As I expressed earlier, Asia is now at an historical turning point, particularly with regard to economic development. ASEAN and other countries of Asia are confronted with difficult tasks of extreme urgency. This very hour of difficulty should rather be seen as an opportunity for us to display our creative imagination to reach for a higher stage of development.

Our Asia has tremendous potentials. We have inherited the profound wisdom and rich diversity in culture and tradition from our forefathers. Creative concepts and sweeping changes in patterns of thought are most likely to emerge from diversity. From this diversity will be born a new wisdom relevant not only to Asia but to the world as a whole.

Now is the time, when Asia is facing a difficult, uncharted course, that ASEAN and Japan should strengthen their creative partnership and muster their wisdom to realize the peace and prosperity of Asia.

I am confident that through our efforts, a brightest future will dawn upon us.

APPENDIX - III

STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN ON THE  
OCCASION OF THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY ON  
THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,  
FEBRUARY 3, 1970

*Statement of the Government of Japan on the  
Occasion of the Signing of the Treaty on the  
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,  
February 5, 1970*

The Government of Japan, believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would increase the danger of nuclear war, has always been in favor of the spirit underlying this treaty, since the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons is in accord with its policy with regard to the maintenance of world peace.

The Government of Japan is signing this treaty on the basis of its fundamental position which is stated below.

The Government of Japan is convinced that this treaty will serve as a first step toward nuclear disarmament and hopes that as many states as possible will adhere to this treaty to make it effective. The Government of Japan hopes, especially, that the governments of the Republic of France and the People's Republic of China which possess nuclear weapons but have yet to express their intention of adhering to this treaty will become parties thereto at an early date and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament and that they will refrain, even before that, from taking such actions as are contrary to the purposes of this treaty.

This treaty permits only the present nuclear-weapon states to possess nuclear weapons. This discrimination should ultimately be made to disappear through the elimination of nuclear weapons by all the nuclear-weapon states from their national arsenals. Until such time the nuclear-weapon states should be conscious of the fact that they have special responsibilities as a consequence of this special status.

The prohibition under this treaty applies solely to the acquisi-

tion of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and of control over them. Therefore, this treaty must in no way restrict nonnuclear-weapon states in their research, development, or implementation of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, or in their international cooperation in these fields, nor must it subject them to discriminatory treatment in any aspect of such activities.

The Government of Japan wishes to state that it has a deep interest in the following matters in the light of its basic position stated above.

This Government stresses that it will also concern itself most vigorously with these matters when it decides to ratify the treaty as well as when it participates in the review of its operation in the future as a party to the treaty.

#### I: DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY

1. Under Article VI of the Treaty each state party "undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." The Government of Japan believes it essential for the attainment of the purposes of this treaty that, above all, the nuclear-weapon states should take concrete nuclear disarmament measures in pursuance of this undertaking. As a member of the Committee on Disarmament, Japan is also prepared to cooperate in the furtherance of disarmament.

2. The Government of Japan deems it important that in the preamble to the treaty there is a provision stating that "in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, states must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." It also wishes to emphasize that the nuclear-weapon states must not have recourse to the use of nuclear weapons or threaten to use such weapons against nonnuclear-weapon states.

3. The Government of Japan also attaches great importance to the declarations of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union affirming their intention to seek immediate Se-

curity Council action to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to any nonnuclear-weapon state, party to the treaty, that is a victim of an act of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used, and hopes that the nuclear-weapon states will continue their studies with regard to effective measures to ensure the security of nonnuclear-weapon states.

4. The Government of Japan, pending its ratification of this treaty, will pay particular attention to developments in disarmament negotiations and progress in the implementation of the Security Council resolution on the security of nonnuclear-weapon states and continue to make a close study of other problems which require consideration for the safeguarding of her national interests.

5. The Government of Japan takes note of the fact that Article X of the Treaty provides that: "Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country."

## II. PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

1. The safeguards agreement to be concluded by Japan with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with Article III of the Treaty must not be such as would subject her to disadvantageous treatment as compared with the safeguards agreements which other states parties conclude with the same agency, either individually or together with other states. The Government of Japan intends to give full consideration to this matter before taking steps to ratify the treaty.

2. The Government of Japan greatly appreciates, as a measure supplementing this treaty, the declarations of the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, which are both nuclear-weapon states, that they will accept the application of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency to all their nuclear activities, excluding only those directly related to their national security, and earnestly hopes that these assurances will be faithfully implemented. It also hopes most earnestly that the other nuclear-weapon states will take similar action.

3. Safeguards should be subject to the principle that they should be applied at certain strategic points of the nuclear fuel

cycle, and the procedure for their application must be rational when considered from the point of view of cost-effectiveness and made as simple as possible by making the maximum use of material control systems of the respective countries. Furthermore, adequate measures must be taken to ensure that the application of safeguards does not cause the leakage of industrial secrets or otherwise hinder industrial activities. The Government of Japan hopes that the International Atomic Energy Agency will make constant efforts to improve safeguards in the light of technological developments with the above aims in mind. This Government is prepared to cooperate in such efforts and hopes that the states concerned will also cooperate to achieve this end.

4. The Government of Japan understands that no unfair burden in connection with the cost of applying safeguards will be imposed on the nonnuclear-weapon states to which such safeguards are to be applied.

5. The Government of Japan considers that, when safeguards are applied in accordance with the safeguards agreement to be concluded by Japan with the International Atomic Energy Agency under Article III of this treaty, steps should be taken to arrange that such safeguards supersede the existing safeguards which are being applied in connection with Japan's cooperation with the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

6. Concrete measures should be taken to promote the implementation of the provisions of Articles IV and V of the treaty relating to international cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and for the peaceful application of nuclear explosions. In particular, no peaceful nuclear activities in nonnuclear-weapon states shall be prohibited or restricted, nor shall the transfer of information, nuclear materials, equipment, or other material relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy be denied to nonnuclear-weapon states, merely on the grounds that such activities or transfers could be used also for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.



APPENDIX - IV  
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION  
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, JULY 1, 1968

*Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of  
Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968*

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty,"

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in

cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

#### ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

#### ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nu-

clear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

#### ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.

3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

#### ARTICLE IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

#### ARTICLE V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty

shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

#### ARTICLE VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

#### ARTICLE VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

#### ARTICLE VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other

Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

#### ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the

date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

#### ARTICLE X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

APPENDIX - V

[ Tables ]

TABLE I	RECORDS OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION
TABLE II	RECORDS OF REGION-BY-REGION ECONOMIC COOPERATION (1986)
TABLE III	FLOW OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS IN 1985 (GLANCE AT COMPARISION WITH MAJOR DEVELOPED COUNTRIES)
TABLE IV	RELIEF AND AID GIVEN TO REFUGEES BY JAPAN

TABLE I  
Economic Cooperation

1. Japan's Economic Cooperation (Summary Table)

(1) Records of Economic Cooperation

(net disbursement, unit: million dollars)

	1981		1982		1983		1984		1985	
	Volume	Distribution ratio	Volume	Distribution ratio	Volume	Distribution ratio	Volume	Distribution ratio	Volume	Distribution ratio
<b>Total resource flows (as % of GNP)</b>	12,231.1	100.0	8,765.8	100.0	10,523.4	100.0	16,048.6	100.0	12,926.3	100.0
<b>I. Official Development Assistance (ODA) (as % of GNP)</b>	3,170.9	25.9	3,023.3	34.5	3,761.0	35.7	4,318.7	26.9	3,796.8	29.4
1. Bilateral grants	810.4	6.6	805.2	9.2	995.4	9.4	1,063.9	6.6	1,184.8	9.2
Technical assistance (note 4)	378.4	3.1	392.9	4.5	458.3	4.4	520.5	3.2	548.7	4.2
Grant aid	432.0	3.5	412.3	4.7	537.1	5.1	543.4	3.4	636.1	4.9
2. Bilateral lending	1,450.0	11.9	1,562.1	17.8	1,491.8	14.1	1,365.5	8.5	1,372.1	10.6
3. Contributions to multilateral institutions	910.5	7.4	656.0	7.5	1,273.8	12.2	1,891.4	11.8	1,239.9	9.6
<b>II. Other Official Flows (OOF)</b>	3,022.6	24.7	2,790.7	31.8	3,754.3	35.7	742	4.6	-301.9	-2.3
4. Official export credit (of over one year)	1,410.4	11.5	849.5	9.7	472.1	4.5	493.0	3.1	-152.3	-1.2
5. Direct investment finances	1,489.5	12.2	1,971.9	22.5	1,441.5	13.7	380.2	2.4	-1.3	-0.0
6. Loans to multilateral institutions	122.7	1.0	-30.7	-0.4	40.7	0.4	-130.4	-0.8	-146.3	-1.1
<b>III. Private Flows (PF) (note 3)</b>	6,010.6	49.1	2,926.5	33.4	4,778.5	45.4	10,946.4	68.2	9,332.0	72.2
7. Private credit (of over one year)	712.3	5.8	-1,762.5	-20.1	-2,000.0	-19.0	-655.2	-4.1	-995.5	-7.7
8. Direct investment (including securities investment and overseas loans)	3,698.6	30.2	3,162.3	36.1	3,270.9	31.0	9,241.9	57.6	7,750.3	59.9
9. Loans to multilateral institutions	1,599.5	13.1	1,528.5	17.4	1,574.2	15.0	2,359.7	14.7	2,575.3	19.9
<b>IV. Grants by Private Voluntary Organizations</b>	27.3	0.2	23.3	0.3	29.7	0.2	40.7	0.2	101.4	0.8
<b>Reference (note 1)</b>										
Total export credits	2,122.7	17.4	-912.8	-10.4	-1,596.5	-15.2	-162.2	-1.0	-1,145.8	-8.9
Total direct investments	5,188.3	42.4	5,134.2	58.6	6,714.4	63.8	9,622.1	60.0	7,748.9	59.9

- (Notes) 1. Total export credit in the reference column refers to the total of official export credit (of over one year) in the OOF column and private export credit (of over one year) in the PF column. Similarly, total direct investments refer to the total of II. 5. direct investment finances and III. 8. direct investment.  
 2. As figures in each column were rounded, the actual total does not necessarily correspond with total column figures.  
 3. Private flows are on a consolidated basis (including flows extended by overseas branches of Japanese banks).  
 4. Technical assistance includes administrative expenses and public support for NGO.

(Source) DAC data

TABLE II

## (2) Records of Region-by-Region Economic Cooperation (1986)

## Table of Region-by-Region Total

Country or region	Form	Official Development Assistance					Distribution ratio (%)
		Grants			Government loans	Total	
		Capital grant assistance	Technical assistance	Total			
Asia		481.79	367.63	849.42	1,644.13	2,493.54	64.8
Northeast Asia		25.68	97.28	122.96	366.61	489.57	12.7
Southeast Asia		241.88	222.28	464.17	705.32	1,169.49	30.4
Southwest Asia		214.22	44.53	258.75	572.19	830.95	21.6
Others		—	3.54	3.54	—	3.54	0.1
Middle East		82.55	43.40	125.95	213.86	339.82	8.8
Africa		211.90	69.35	281.26	137.20	418.46	10.9
Latin America		45.06	129.19	174.25	142.29	316.54	8.2
Oceania		32.20	16.39	48.59	6.10	54.69	1.4
Europe		—	2.90	2.90	- 0.59	2.31	0.1
Unallocable		1.05	219.80	220.85	—	220.85	5.7
<b>Total</b>		<b>854.55</b>	<b>848.66</b>	<b>1,703.21</b>	<b>2,142.99</b>	<b>3,846.21</b>	<b>100.0</b>

- (Notes) 1. Breakdown figures may not add up to totals due to rounding.  
 2. — mark denotes no record and - mark excess receipts.  
 3. Falling into the unallocable category are dispatch of survey missions to two or more regions, subsidies to organizations taking care of students from abroad, management expenses related to JICA's and other groups' technical cooperation operations, and other items that cannot be classified by region.  
 4. Aggregate total refers to the total of rough disbursement amounts.



TABLE III

(3) Flow of Financial Resources to Developing Countries and Multilateral Institutions in 1985 (Glance at Comparison with Major Developed Countries)

	Donor nations			Japan	U.S.A.	France (note 1)	FRG	U.K.	DAC total	Remarks	
	Volume	Quality									
Official Development Assistance (ODA)	Volume	(unit: million dollars)	Net disbursement basis	3,797	9,403	3,973	1,942	1,531	29,428	On a net disbursement basis, third among the DAC member countries behind the U.S.A. and France (12.9% share)	
			growth from the previous year	-12.1	7.9	5.5	1.8	7.1	2.4		
			% of GNP		0.27	0.24	0.18	0.47	0.34	0.35	15th among the DAC members, Norway first with 1.05%
	Quality	On a commitment basis (note 2)	Grants as a share of total ODA	%	47.5	88.9	78.1	76.9	98.6	80.0	18th among the DAC members, 100% for Australia, N.Z., Sweden and Ireland
			Loan terms	Interest (%/year)	3.7	2.8	3.3	2.9	0.0	3.1	Grant element of bilateral ODA loans (%)
				Repayment period (year)	27.7	33.6	23.6	31.1	17.3	(28.5)	
				Grace period (year)	8.8	9.4	8.2	3.9	5.3	(8.5)	
		Grant element	%	73.6	96.0	89.1	89.1	99.5	91.4	18th among the DAC members, 100% Australia, N.Z., Sweden and Ireland	
		Tying status (gross disbursement basis) (excluding administrative expenses) (note 3)	United (%)	67.6	46.8	45.5	42.2	39.0	53.8	United ODA loans as a share of total bilateral ODA loans (gross disbursement basis)	
			Partially united (%)	15.8	7.8			1.5	5.6		
Tied (%)			16.6	45.4	54.7	57.8	59.5	40.6			
Technical assistance as a share of total ODA (net disbursement basis) (note 4)		% of total ODA	11.1	15.5	18.1	11.8	21.8	20.4	14th among the DAC members, France first with 38.1%		
		% of bilateral ODA	16.5	17.8	46.1	34.2	38.7	27.4	15th among the DAC members, France first with 46.6%		
Multilateral aid as a share of total ODA (net disbursement basis) (note 5)	% of total ODA	32.7	13.0	18.5	11.7	45.8	23.5	4th among the DAC members, Denmark first with 48.0%			
ODA to LICs (note 6) as a share of total ODA (net disbursement basis) (note 7)	% (in multilateral aid)	63.6	18.4	51.1	63.1	64.5	54.5	8th among the DAC members, Finland first with 70.9%			
	Aid to LDCs as a share of total ODA (Least among Less Developing Countries) (% including multilateral aid)	19.8	16.0	19.3	26.5	29.2	22.2	15th among the DAC members, Italy first with 40.1%			
Total resource flows	Total amount (million dollars)		Net disbursement basis	11,242	1,816	8,874	5,749	3,673	46,325	1st (24.3% share)	
	% of GNP		%	0.84	0.05	1.74	0.92	0.81	0.55		

(Notes) 1. Resource flows to DOM/TOM included

2. Excluding debt relief

3. Based on the new DAC definition being studied (united = open to all the OECD countries, all the developing countries, partially united = open to all the developing countries, tied = all else, including contributions to the EEC)

4. Excluding administrative expenses, and support of NGO

5. Including EEC

6. Countries with per capita GNP less than 200 dollars in 1983

7. 1984-1985 average

Japan	U.S.A.	France	FRG	U.K.
49.8	63.9	20.4	52.8	64.7

Japan	U.S.A.	France	FRG	U.K.
60.7	15.8	59.2	69.2	30.7

TABLE IV

Relief and Aid Given to Refugees by Japan (Breakdown of Aid Recipients)

(As of end of March 1987)

Aid recipients			Fiscal year		1982		1983		1984		1985		1986		Grand total (accumulated FY '79-FY '86)	
			¥100 million	\$10 thousand	¥100 million	\$10 thousand	¥100 million	\$10 thousand	¥100 million	\$10 thousand	¥100 million	\$10 thousand	¥100 million	\$10 thousand	¥100 million	\$10 thousand
Budget spent abroad	Indochina	UNHCR	(93.20)	4,000	84.0	(3,300)	71.32	(3,101)	68.09	(2,879)	58.8	(2,813)	738.75	32,865		
		WFP	41.3	(1,780)	36.3	(1,512.5)	36.57	(1,590)	29.41	(1,242)	26.0	(1,244)	305.48	13,445.4		
		ICRC	(2.33)	100	3.6	(150)	3.43	(150)	3.60	(150)	3.50	(167)	27.63	1,245.2		
		UNICEF	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	23.5	1,080.4		
		UNBRO/WFP	—	—	2.4	(100)	5.25	(230)	7.2	(300)	8.00	(383)	22.89	1,013		
		Thai Gov't	8.65	372	15.03	(627.5)	8.77	(381)	—	—	—	—	104.67	4,756.5		
		Philippines Gov't	10.3	(442)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10.3	442		
		Subtotal	155.98	6,694	141.33	5,890	123.4	5,432	109.60	4,571	96.30	4,607	1,233.22	54,865.5		
	Afghanistan	UNHCR	(16.31)	700	16.8	(700)	17.23	(730)	17.70	(740)	17.0	(814)	113.22	5,023		
		WFP	24.0	(1,030)	24.5	(1,021)	20.5	(890)	24.0	(1,000)	21.5	(1,209)	138.3	6,079		
		Pakistan Gov't	0.7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	11.0	506		
	Subtotal	41.07	1,730	41.3	1,721	37.73	1,640	41.70	1,740	38.5	1,843	262.52	11,610			
	Africa	UNHCR	(8.83)	387	7.92	(330)	11.12*	(450)	11.31	(450)	21.0	(1,005)	82.31	3,600		
		WFP	20.0	—	10.70	(700)	15.0	(630)	15.0	(630)	6.31	(302)	102.37	4,490		
	Subtotal	29.43	1,200	24.64	1,030	31.12	1,331	31.50	1,315	27.31	1,307	184.68	8,090			
	Poland	ICRC	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.19	50		
	Lebanon	UNICEF	(2.33)	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.33	100		
		ICRC	(2.33)	100	(1.2)	50	—	—	—	—	—	—	3.53	150		
		Subtotal	4.66	200	(1.2)	50	—	—	—	—	—	—	5.86	250		
	Palestine	UNHCR	(2.1)	—	2.5	(100)	(21.13)	850	(31.3)	1,364	(27.61)	1,130	198.74	9,050		
WFP		—	—	—	—	—	—	(2.3)	100	—	—	2.37	100			
Subtotal	25.0	—	27.5	1,240	21.13	850	33.67	1,464	27.61	1,230	201.11	9,150				
Central Africa	UNHCR	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.50	(24)	0.50	24			
UNHCR general program	(0.23)	10	0.46	(20)	0.23	(10)	0.58	(24)	0.52	(25)	2.96	125				
ICM	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.42	(18)	0.50	(24)	0.92	42				
Total	260.33	11,084	238.51	9,933	215.63	9,303	217.35	9,132	191.24	9,560	1,892.96	84,222.5				
Budget spent domestically	Expenses for commissioning of settlement promotion		7.16	(310)	6.73	(281)	6.74	(293)	6.90	(281)	6.89	330	49.46	2,173		
	Temporary properties		24.06	(1,030)	9.11	(380)	9.53	(414)	9.53	(391)	9.60	(459)	72.12	3,146		
	Total	31.24	1,340	15.86	661	16.27	707	16.54	684	16.49	789	121.58	5,321			
Grand total			291.57	12,424	254.37	10,614	231.9	10,010	234.13	9,821	207.73	10,349	2,014.54	89,543.5		

\* Moreover, contributions in kind (bulwats) worth about 100 million yen were made

(Note) Conversion was based on the official disbursement rate at the time of the pledge or the signing of notes exchanged. fiscal 1982 one dollar = 240 yen, fiscal 1984 one dollar = 230 yen, fiscal 1985 one dollar = 240 yen, fiscal 1986 one dollar = 209 yen

APPENDIX - VI

[ Map ]

JAPAN'S FORCE POSTURE : DEPLOYMENT



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