BODY AND POWER

A STUDY OF MICHEL FOUCAULT'S WRITINGS'

Dissertation Submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
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Master of Philosophy

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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled **"BODY AND POWER - A STUDY OF MICHEL FOUCAULT'S WRITINGS"** submitted by ***Avaneendra M.V.M.*** is in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the award of the degree of **`Master of Philosophy'**, is his bona-fide work and has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other university.

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Preface

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CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

For long, says Foucault, political power had construed itself on the legal and juridical imagery acquiring in the very process, connotations like 'Influence', 'Domination', 'Repression'and 'Hegemony'. Its mode of Government is a negative one whereby it diminishes and destroys 'potentials', and 'aptitudes' of its individual and collective 'subjects'. But power concieved and operating in such an imagery (which Foucault Calls it as Juridico-discursive Conception of power) can never repress or coerce indefinetely, since such powers are never tolerated. But power survives, strengthens and maintains itself. It is not only tolerated but also actively assisted to by its subjects.

This for Foucault, amounts to rethinking and reorienting politics towards a more positive conception of poewr, which by permeating to the last minutae of social body actively disciplines its subjects. A new micro physics of power must replace the beheaded Sovereign of classical political theory. The locus of such political power lies not in the abstract and ideal concepts like subject and his rights but in the matirality of body and its potentials, forces and capacities, which contaray to being dinimishied

and destroyed are developed, subjected and converted into docile utilities.

Having said this, we must actually turn our attetions to that notion of body existing analytocally prior to politics and its forces and potentials. How does this body comes about in the western expirience so that can envelop any and discipline it.

Chapter - II Analysable Body

An. Archaeology of Life.

> "The great book of Man the Machine was written simultaneously on two registers. The Anatomico Metaphysical register of which Desecrates wrote the first pages and which the Physicians and philosophers continued and technico political register which was constituted by a whole set of regulations and by empirical and calculated methods relating to the army, the school and the hospital for controlling or correcting the operations of the body the two registers are quite distinct since it was a question on the one hand of submission and use, on the other, of functioning and explanation: there was a useful body and an intelligible body[1].

With the classical age and its emerging structures of Modernity, says Foucault, novel technologies of power with the objective of a positive subjectification of bodies were operationally installed, whose aim was not to do away with the body through repression. But to positively discipline it and in the process enhance its aptitudes and potentials in order to create economically useful bodies. Hence disciplinary sites like schools, hospitals and prisons were established whose objective was to discipline the bodies by

actively shaping and channelising their forces towards docile utilities. But such a project implies a simultaneous and concomitant presumption of a particular notion of body before subjecting it to disciplinary apparatus. If this being the case, what then is this notion of body that presents itself to the western experience implicitly harboring physiological forces and functions that are transformed into useful potentials and aptitudes by the technologies of power. In the western 'experience' the notion of body is indissociably linked with the motility of 'life' so much so that even where life has viewed as an immaterial entilu or agent as something separate from and 'superadded' to the body to has generally been thought to require for its active expression a proper material vehicle or substrate. As a result 'physiology', perceives this relation in terms of life and matter where the inkling of the formers presence can only be deduced in the movements of the latter. The forces of life by their 'expressive' potential animate the body, thereby proving its existence. Consequently the routes to 'life' and 'death', health and disease crisscross the material terrain of the body. Are we not too after reminded that 'La vie est l' ensemb,e des functions qui resistant a la mort.', before being advised to safe guard them. It is a pathology of death that articulates the physiology of life.

Though by eighteenth century, the ending 'Biological Ancien Regime' removed death as a physical threat from the immediate experience of the west it still continues to haunt the western imagination in an individualised from. Foucault himself says that

> "Through the latter years of the eighteenth century this kinship (between knowledge and erotiasm) opened up death to the task, to the infinitely repeated attempts of language.. The nineteenth century will speak obstinately of death; the sewage, castrated death of Goya, the visible muscular, sculptural death offered by Gericault, the voluptuous death by fire in Delacroix, the lamartinian death of aquatic effusions, Baudelaires death. To know life is given only to that derisory reductive and already infernal knowledge that only wishes it dead. The Gaze that envelops, caresses details atomises the most individual flesh and enumerates its secret bites is that fixed allentive rather dilated gaze which from the height of the death, has already condemned life.

During the Renaissance death was charecterised by a heterogeneous perception laid lurking every where and touching every one in an egalitarian gesture. But by eighteenth century it acquires a singularity by which and individual escapes the monotony of life what was hitherto a

physical Omnipresent feature of fragile Biological Ancien Regime now transforms into a truth of an individual. A truth which articulates the constant threat of 'morbidity'.

Putting it in even more simpler terms, one may ponder, how did body as we conceptualise it come about in the western experience.

> "Hence with these questions in mind, this chapter exclusively concerns itself to examine those bodily histories written by M. Foucault about the Anatomico-metaphysical register, or rather those histories of knowledges which normatively define and explain the body, whereby it becomes 'what it should be', by being not, 'what it should not be'. (Thus medicine establishes physiology of the body by prying open the pathological body, while Psychiatry defines normal mind by conceptually excluding "Unreason.)

Accepting the conventional charecterisation of Faculty's initial historical works of " Madness and Civilisation," The Birth of clinic" and "The Order of things" as an Archaeological project, this chapter traces the trajectory of body along with the associated domains of Natural history and Biology is these three works. Keeping in mind the methodological self-reflections of "The Archaeology of knowledge".

It was a strange medley of 'Unreason' that the classical age confined. Within a homogenising singularity it enveloped the most possible diversities, defining in the process homogeneity itself.

> From the creation of Hospital general, from the opening in Germany and in England, of the first houses of correction and until the end of eighteenth century, the age of reason confined. It confined the debauched, spend thrift fathers, prodigal sons, blasphemers, men who seek to undo themselves, libertines and through these parallels, these strange complicities, the age sketched the profile of its own experience of 'unreason'. [6]

> Yet, Foucault reminds us, even within this heterogeneous homogeneity insanity as such was accorded with a particular place and importance. Since, "in the general sensibility to unreason there appeared to be a special modulation which concerned madness proper and was addressed to those called without exact semantic distinction, insane,alienated deranged, demented, extravagant".[7] It was this special treatment proffered to madness, that assists one in grasping the paradoxical nature of 'classical confinement'.

Preceding the 'classical confinement', the renaissance age, in a marked contrast, atoned forms of evil and 'unreason' in a spectacular visibility. It allowed the forms of 'unreason' to emerge into the light of the day where their sinister and hideous aspects were redeemed through public outrage and censure. In order to fulfill itself 'evil' must necessarily acquire public avowal and manifestation before being eliminated through punishment. Consequently, uptill the seventeenth century, punitive interventions were ritually spectacular since, 'the light in which confession was made and punishment executed could alone balance the darkness from which the evil issued. A theme to which Foucault would return to,in his opening discussion of 'Discipline and punish '.

Yet, for now he maintains that "classical confinement" in a striking contrast departs from the renaissance age in its 'consciousness of evil'. The visible catharsis of evil so marked during the renaissance is replaced in the 'classical age' by a conception of evil in which inhere forces of contagion and scandal. Visibility merely accentuates these dark forces and multiplies them infinitely. 'Evil' finds its salvation only in oblivion and suppression. To display the forms of 'unreason that abode in religion or nobility would be scandalous,and its

exemplary potential horrendous. Confinement on other hand precludes scandal and purges 'unreason' of its contagious character. Secrecy, the virtue classical age discovered, mitigates imitation. " Hence all those forms of evil that border on 'unreason' must be thrust into secrecy. Classicism felt a shame in the presence of inhuman that renaissance never experienced".[8]

Yet 'classical confinement' displays a curious ambiguity in dealing with madness. Secrecy makes an exceptional gesture towards insanity when it displays it. The old custom of exhibiting madmen, existing from the middle ages, finds its way into the closed confines of classical age.

Institutions of confinement opened their gates and possibilities, during the classical age for madness to become a spectacle for the curious. A spectacle that functioned as insanity's proof. Deviation from 'reason' was also its delightful distraction. Hence those public excursions to houses of confinement like Bicetre and Bethlehem, where the bizarre antics of madmen constituted entertainment par excellent for the classical age. A strange contradiction says Foucault, since for the classical age, it was scandalous to display 'unreason'.

Not only was madness, - in distinction with the

preceding ages, - totally reabsorbed into a blanket category of 'unreason', where it mingled indiscriminately with other forms, but was also, paradoxically singled out for public display. Thus the classical age 'doubly' signified madness, not as a sickness or malady but as a glorified scandal.

What is it that makes such an ambivalent signification possible whereby madness is displayed from a vantage point of confinement, already being unfit for therapeutics ? The answer to such a contradiction lies in the classical ages perception of madman's body. A body that can naturally withstand the rigor of climes, travails of confinement and emaciations of illness since it houses strange potentials and unknown capacities. For the classical age a strange affinity existed between 'bestiality' and 'insanity' whereby the body of madman becomes homologous with the body of beast. 'Madness' consequently, is endowed with a power of 'animality' which places it beyond the reach of therapeutics but accessible to the controlling powers of confinement under a spectacular visibility that constantly reminds 'reason' with the animal consequences of Man's fallenness. Madness is " no longer a monster inside oneself but an animal with strange mechanisms, a bestiality from which man had long since been suppressed".[9]

Now, this perception of classical age was coterminous with its taxonomic logic where each animal species was

rendered visible through their structures and characters only to be confined within a delineated taxonomic space.[10]

But it is at this rupture between the classical age and renaissance we must pause, and retrospect on the renaissance's notion of animality and its adequacy. If the classical ages perception of animality led it to a peculiar treatment of body then what were the consequences of the same relation during its preceding age,(if at all one exists). With this intention we must return to 'Madness and civilisation' and what it has to say

> "In the thought of the middle ages, the legions of animals named once and for all by Adam, symbolically bear the values of humanity. But at the beginning of renaissance the relations with animality are reversed; the beast is set free; it escapes the world of legend and moral illustration to acquire a fantastic nature of its own and by an astonishing reversal, it is now the animal that will stalk man, capture him and reveal him to his own truth. Impossible animals issuing from a demented imagination become the secret nature of man and when on the last day sinful man appears in his hideous madness, we see that he has monstrous shapes of a delirious animal; these are the screech owls whose toad bodies combine in Thierry Bouts's 'Hell' with the

nakedness of the damned, these are Stephan Lochner's winged insects with cats heads, sphinxes with beetles wing cases, birds whose wings are as disturbing and as avid as hands; this is the great beast of prey with Knotty fingers that figures in 'Mathias Grunewalds Temptation;. Animality has escaped domestication by human symbols and values; and it is animality that reveals the dark rage, the sterile madness that lies in men's hearts ".[11]

The emergence of this notion of Animal with its strange and diabolical powers, 'Madness and civilisation' tells us, was due to the result of a division that occurred at the onset of renaissance - A schism between 'word' and 'image'.

" Between the word and image, between what is depicted by language and what is uttered by plastic form, the unity begins to dissolve; a single and identical meaning is not immediately common to them. And if it is true that the image still has the function of speaking of transmitting something consubstantial with language, we must recognise that it already no longer says the samething; and that by its own plastic values painting engages in an experiment that will take it farther and farther from language, whatever the superficial identity of the theme "[12].

By the time of expiring middle ages, plastic and verbal expression no longer refer each other - reflecting the distance between word and image - with a homogenous meaning issuing from their interrelated reference*. The distance that intrinsically separating them becomes irreconcilably wide. No longer does illustration and commentary proceed together, hand in hand, towards the attainment of a common meaning.

But are we not confronted with a paradox, when our attention is directed towards that long line of illustrated 'Bestiaries' and 'Herbariums' which present us with a fantastic imagery of natural beings within themselves, until Linneaus and Buffoon shattered their lineage forever.

Do they not stand in testimony for new relationships and novel harmonies between the 'words' and 'images', whereby commentary and illustration, hand in hand, laid bare the whole natural landscape. But on the other hand, by accepting the liberation of images and their autonomy from words, form and meaning, are we not compelled to suspect the whole enterprise of depicting natural beings during the Renaissance. As per the arguments of 'Madness and civilisation', the liberation of images from the constraints of form and meaning was synonymous with the freedom of beast from the constrictions of symbolism during the Renaissance.

Both, by being prone to multiplicities of meaning properly belonged to the domain of 'unreason'. But is this to mean that the free pictorial habitat of Renaissance natural science has no other origin but the demented imagination of man. What should be the status of that 'illustrative space' of Albrecht Dourer, from which emerged not only his 'Apocalypse horsemen' but also those exotic Rhinos which inevitably found their way into the adornments of each and every Renaissance bestiary.* Hence to this alternative pictorial space, we must direct our attention. A space never anticipated by 'Madness and civilisation' and partially attended by the 'order of thing's.

> "As early as in 1485, 'Johann Van cube ' employed woodcuts to illustrate his Gart der Gesundheit. Similarly, 'Hortus Sanitatis' of 1491, with its fantastic illustrations of plants and animals, remained as the much sought after picture book of the period. In this fantastic canvas of natural beings one can also include Pierre Belongs 'portraits d'oyseaux,animaux,serpens (Paris 1557);Adriaan Collaerts 'Avum viva icons'; Gesner's' 'Icons animalium quadrupedum... et avium Omnium' (Zurich 1560); Lonicer's 'Venatus et aucupium' (Frankfurt 1582) and Cotter's 'Human Corporis tableau' (1573). With its emphasis on images, the demand for illustrations had

never been so acute as was the case with Renaissance natural histories. This esoterism of images, consequently,accorded painters and illustrators with an unparalleled importance bordering an respect and reverence. 'Plantin of Angers' illustrated Garcia da Orta's 'Colloquies' while, A. Nicolai's plates were incorporated into the first Parisian editions of Belongs 'Observations' and 'Clusius 'Exoticorum libri' in which many previously unknown animals were depicted. Thevet's 'Singularities de la France antarctique' had engravings made by C.L. Woeiriot of Lorraine who also engraved Belongs 'De la nature des Oyseaux'. In Germany, the first drawing of a giraffe was made by Ehrhard Rematch. Other animal illustrators were the two Hoefnagels, Just Amman who illustrated Jans Bocksperger's 'Tierbuch' and Albrecht Dourer himself. Hand Feed Manual illustrated the German translation of Agricola's 'De re metallica'. In Switzerland, Gesner's work was illustrated by Jean Aspire, Jean Thomas and Lucas Schroen. In Italy, Salviani employed Bernardus Aretinus, while Aldrovandi fetched painters 'Cornelius Sivint' from Frankfurt and Lorenzo Bernini from Flounce and C. Coriolanus from Nuremberg. It was a refugee from Italy Giorgio Revered, who illustrated Rondelets 'Poisons', while Below took the figures illustrating the fishes of the Adriatic, Again. Poetic and

Mediterranean seas, from Plinio, a painter employed by the venetian ambassador to London, Denial Barber.[13]

But if we, for a moment ignoring this domain of image, shift our attention to the geography of 'word' and its utility for Renaissance natural history we find a similar 'descriptive' emphasis.

Putting even a contemporary play wright to shame, Thomas Mouffet invites our attention to his 'Theatre of Insects' (1589), where what is presented to us, is a spectacle of insect life constituting of tapewroms, spiders, scorpions, seaslugs, caterpillars sea pen, larvae and even a sawhorse. The idyllic picture drawn by him describing the life in a beehive, especially, was in no way inferior to the 'ideal life' of political common wealths put forth in the contemporary political treatises of the period.

The king of the beehive, Mufti comments, inspires respect by his size and the 'sweetness' of his manners. He derives his mandate to rule from the place and rank of his birth, since he and his councilors take their divine birth exclusively from the brains of the cattle. This makes them noble enough, we are told, over their subjects - the ordinary honey bees which are generated from the 'decomposition of beef'.*

Do not, these words of natural history exhibit an extraordinary proximity to the plasticity of images that depicted affairs of human realm of the period. Similarly, Euricus Cordus in his 'Botanilogicon' (Cologne 1543) severely arraigns the German druggists of his time for falsely labeling their receptacles containing plants with old greek names that did not apply anymore and in the process this dialogue tells us about new plants and herbs. Even Brassavolas Examine Omnium Simplicium' (Rome 1536) was written in the form of witty imaginary conversation through which the author imparts us with the knowledge of plants and animals and their real or imaginary virtues.* These and other interlocutions coupled with the fantastic images of plants and animals recreated the spectacular magic of natural beings that otherwise was visible only in the constricted spaces of fairs, tournaments and legendary combats - A magic that was to be lost forever, subsequently in the sterile taxonomic tables. Verbal expression, detaching itself from the plastic expression. acquires a strange plasticity, which finds its reflection again in the fantastic images. Johann Von cube's description of whales as sirens, Gesner's endowment of formidable defense organs to them, Belong description of a whale bone as eye lashes of whales, could only find their exotic words reflected in the fantastic and estoric images of the illustrators. 'Cetaceans' which were described as 'marine monsters with

the faces of monks' by Albertus Magnus and Johann Von Cube and were depicted in an illustration presented to Rondelet by Margaret of Navarre as combining the fabulous characteristics of artificial monsters, white bellied seals, hooded seals and giant cephalopods. The titles of Ambrose pare's treatise on animals and Ulisse Aldrovandis histories of reptiles - the former being 'Animals' and the later 'History of serpents and dragons - by themselves suffice to indicate the inevitable esoterism of images that followed. To grasp the utility of these strange relationships between 'words' and 'images' for the Renaissance natural histories, we must approach the whole enterprise of natural history of the period and its coherence within the context of Renaissance episteme. Chronologically, Ambrose Pare's illustrated treatise of monsters appeared on the landscape of Renaissance natural history in 1573, only to be followed by Conrad Gesner's 'Historia Animalium' and Ulisse Aldrovandi of Bologna's 'A History of Serpents and Dragons'. Pierre Belon in 1555 compared the skeletons of birds and man in the same posture, as nearly as possible with bone for bone in his 'History of the nature of Birds', while Duret wrote an 'Admirable History of Plants'. Otho Brunfels in order to offset the influence of 'Hortus Sanitatis' published his 'Herbarum Vivoe Icones' in 1536 in his own expense.

Valerius Cordus's Dispensantorium' was published in 1535, while Hieronymous Bock's 'Neu Kreutter Buck' in 1539. Caspar Bauhin compiled literature on plants of and uptill his time in his 'Pinax', published in 1596. His incomplete 'Theatrum Botanicum' in 1568 was followed by 'Anatomica Historia' in 1597 and 'Theatrum Anatomicum' in 1592. The 'Semplici' of Luigi Anguillara of 1561 is a classic on plants. The plants and animals of the new world were described by 'Oveido Y Valdez', viceroy of Mexico in 1525 and also by Nicolas Monardes of Seville in 1565. George Hoefnagel's 'Archetypa' on minute objects in 1592 and Thomas Mouffets manuscripts on insects in 1589 were even aided by optical lenses. Ruellus wrote his 'De Natura Sterpum' in 1536, while Rambert Doedeus's 'Stpum Historiae' appeared in 1583. This list continues with the 'Herbals' of Peter Trevenus in 1516, Richard Banckes (1525) Thomas Petyt (1541), William Middleton (1546), William Turner, father of English natural history and the barber surgeon John Gerard (1597).

Small wonder then, as Foucault himself admits that " in the sixteenth century and right upto the middle of seventeeth all that existed was (natural) histories "* (addition in brackets mine) yet these were histories devoid of History.

During the middle ages in a bestiary like 'Physiologus', the image of Animal and Plant world merged totally with the christian allegory so much so that it was stated with all the seriousness required that the "cubs of lioness are born dead; but on the third day, the lion breathes between their eyes and they wake to life, thus typifying the resurrection of our lord - The Lion of Judah".

In a milieu surcharged with relegiosity like that of middle ages, even a slightest hint of resemblance assists 'Symbolism to blur the thin dividing line between religious and profane whereby even the supernatural is compelled to manifest in the natural imagery'. In comparison with his Aldrovandi's description of animal in terms of "description of its anatomy and of the methods of capturing it; its allegorical uses and mode of generation; its habitat and legendary mansions, its food and the best way of cooking its flesh"* is not totally dissimilar. Since in both the descriptions signs were part of the world and should be deciphered just as one deciphers other things in the world. The signs present in the 'book of nature' for the middle ages present an oppurtunity to attain their author while for Aldrovandi they are similar to the ones present in the books about nature, since for him "there is no difference between the visible marks that god has stamped on the surface of the earth..... and the legible words that the scriptures, or the

sages of antiquity have set down in the books preserved for us by the tradition ".*

'Order of things' tells us during the Renaissance, signs as we know them did not exist, what existed were only 'signatures' i.e. resemblances signified by resemblances. Since all the things existing in the world can only be grasped through similitudes and words by being treated on par with the things are also prone to resemblances for their signification. The consequence of this is quite clear. The sign through which one learns about the world and the ones contained in legends, myths and texts are similar by their form of resemblances. Hence both need to be accorded with equal respect.

This conception of 'Signs' allow the Renaissance natural historian to make no distinction between what he sees and what others have said before him. Neither does he discriminate between the real observable properties and the reported legendary qualities of the natural beings.

> Until the time of Aldrovandi history was the inextricable and completely unitary fabric of all that was visible of things and of the signs that had been discovered or lodged in them; to write a history of a

Plant or Animal was as much a matter of describing its elements or organs as of describing the resemblance that could be found in it, the virtues that it was thought to posses, the legends and stories with which it had been involved, its place in heraldry, the medicaments that were concocted from its substance, the foods it provided, what the ancients recorded of it and what travellers might have said of it. The history of a living being was that being itself within the whole semantic network that connected it to the world".*

So from Aldrovandi to Brunfels, natural history makes no distinction between the observed and merely reported. A distinction that assumes crucial relevance for Jonston, Buffon and Linneaus subsequently. There is no reason for the natural historian to emphasise the difference between the properties of plants and Animals observed and their location within the earlier accounts of them and legends - atleast for now his only task is to compile and recount

" Until the mid seventeenth century, the historians task was to establish the great compilation of documents and signs of everything, throughout the world, that might form a mark as it were. It was the historians responsibility to restore to language all the words that had been buried. His existence was

defined not so much by what he saw as by what he retold, by a secondary speech which pronounced afresh so many words that had been muffed".*

Brunfels marks no original attempt at plant description but merely recounts the descriptions of Theophrastus, Dioscorides and Pliny, Valerius Cordus on the other hand places along side the descriptions of new species he was recording. Those done by Dioscorides Mattioli's commentary on Dioscorides in vernacular, also adds two hundred observations of the commentator. Thus for the Natural history of Renaissance "the division so evident to us, between what we see, what others have observed and handed down, and what others imagine or naively believe, the great tripartation apparently so simple and so immediate into observation,document and fable didnot exist".*

Not only does the 'doctrine of signatures' discussed above, endow a characteristic flexibility - whereby the boundaries between the observed and received knowledges become blurred -to the Natural histories of Renaissance, but it also ensures that the objects of these histories ie., Natural Beings are infinite in nature since they resemble every living or non living entity.

Pierre Belon's comparison of the skeletons of birds and man, and Aldrovandis effort to see the reflections between

repitiles and dragons are merely isolated instances illustrative of the above observation.

Things by virtue of being connected through resemblances and similitudes and when these themselves are signified by further resemblances, as was the case during the Renaissance, then the comparisons which can be made between the natural beings can be infinite in 'nature'. As a consequence Natural beings can resemble plants,words,quantities,men and even other natural beings like themselves. Only a Natural history having a flexible character can reflect and mirror this infinite profusion of natural beings during the Renaissance.

'Order of things' draws our attention - which 'Madness and civilisation fails to do - through its discussion of 'Analogical Cosmography' pertaining to the 'Renaissance episteme' to that exemplary comparison between 'apoplexy' and 'tempests' by Oswald Crollius

> " The storm begins when the air becomes heavy and agitated the apoplectic attach at the moment when our thoughts become heavy and disturbed; then the clouds pile up, the belly swells, the thunder explodes and the bladder bursts; the lightning flashes and the eyes glitter with a terrible brightness the rainfalls, the mouth foams, the thunderbolt is unleashed and the

spirits burst open breaches in the skin, but then the sky becomes clear again and in the sickman reason gains ascendancy". *

What is visibly implicit in the above observation, is a 'notion' of body in its relation with a malady during the Renaissance age. It is this locus and its concomitant relationships, that are absent in 'Madness and civilisation' where through the discussion on the 'physiology of madness' one is initiated into the classical age.

To be fair, one should admit, the notion of body during the Renaissance age is a marginal concern for Foucault even in the 'order of things' where the chief thrust of his argument is directed towards the forms of similitude or resemblances employed within the Renaissance episteme to grasp the manner by which world was ordered. [though in his discussion of pre-classical mode of punitive interventions, the Rennaissance's notion of body is much more prominently discussed]. Nevertheless our attention is directed, perhaps in a tangential manner, to a 'notion of body' that refuses to be subsumed within the general discussion of Renaissance episteme.

One should concede at the outset itself that, though

the other forms of Renaissance epistemes similitudes are conducive for an explanation of body in a sort of related way, (for ex: the notion of sympathy in the humoral movements of the body, convenientia in the spatial relationship between body and soul, and 'aemulatio' in the explanation of bodily therapeutics where relationships exist transgressing space between body and say herbs) it is only in 'Analogy' that a notion of body is more explicit and direct.

In contrast to 'convenientia' which connotes a spatial proximity within things to be resembled and 'aemulatio' where spatially dischoate things, transgressing vast distances mirror each other, 'Analogy' says Foucault, occupies a peculiar position within Renaissance episteme. Both 'convenientia' and 'aemulatio' coexist within it through superimposition, endowing Analogy with a quality whereby it resembles things which are not only spatially adjacent but also afar. This is possible since Analogical space is a relational space where analogy is a resemblance of relations between things. Relations which may be spatial as in 'Convenientia' or nonspatial as in aemulatio. Unlike both of them which are mutually exclusive, it collapses them by sheer weight of relations unto itself. Thus within its ambit lie not only relations between the stars and the sky in which they shine, but also all possible relations

between, say

> "Planets and earth, between the living beings and the globe they inhabit, between minerals such as diamonds and rocks in which they are buried, between sense organs and the face they animate, between skin moles and the body of which they are secret marks." *

Thus through 'Analogy' all things existing could be connected and brought together relationally. However, this 'Analogical space' needs a stable reference point, a privileged locus from where all resemblances can initiate and within which all similitudes could terminate. For the Renaissance episteme, says Foucault,

> "This point is Man; he stands in proportion to the heavens just as he does also to the earth, to metals, to stalactites or storms, upright between the surfaces of the universe, he stands in relation to firmament (his face is to his body what the face of heaven is to ether; his pulse beats in his veins as the stars circle the sky according to their own fixed paths; the seven orifices in his head are to his face what the seven planets are to the sky); but he is also the fulcrum upon which all these relations turn, so that we find them again, their similarity unimpaired; his flesh is a

glebe, his bones are rocks, his veins great rivers, his bladder is the sea and his seven principal organs are the metals hidden in the shafts of mines.... Man's body is always the possible half of a universal atlas." *

By its quality of subtly resembling relations, Analogy cannot be confined to a locus of space and non-space. Consequently its relational space is a space of diffusion and radiation, across the space and transgressing the space. Only Man as a stable point marked within this relational space occupies a space on which Analogical relations impinge and from where they scatter.

Thus during the Renaissance episteme, observes Foucault, the 'body' of man, was a great fulcrum of proportions upon which Analogical relations were concentrated and from where they reflected back.

It was always the possible half of a 'Universal atlas' which communicate with every possible thing comprising the excluded rest through Analogical relations. Thus Pierre Belon could compare the human body part to part with the skeletons of the birds, while Aldrovandi did the same between the baser parts of body and the fouler parts of hell. Oswald Crollius's comparison between a bodily phenomena like 'apoplexy' and 'tempests' was part of the same 'Analogical Cosmography'.

Thus by its location in the relational space of Analogy, 'body' was prone to communicate through similitudes with every thing that stood apart from it (A more clearer implication of this argument can be discerned below in the discussion of micro-macrocosm relationship).

Now the main problem for Renaissance age and its 'episteme', says Foucault, was to draw a boundary around the proliferating resemblances that constituted it. If it was only through resemblances and similitudes, that the Renaissance episteme grasped how things were ordered in the world, then the fundamental question, as to how these resemblances can be signified arises, since sign(s) as we know them did not exist then.

The answer provided by 'order of things' is that, during the Renaissance episteme what existed were 'signatures' i.e., resemblances and similitudes signified by other resemblances and similitudes. Since the 'word' and 'world' for renaissance, were nothing but marks equally placed by god in his divine creation and which could be meaningfully deciphered through similitudes and resemblances. As a result, an 'Analogy' for example, could only be signified by a 'sympathy' which in turn relies on 'Convenientia' to signify itself and so on.

"Resemblance never remains stable within itself, it can be fixed only if it refers back to another similitude, which then in turn refers to others; each resemblance, therefore has value only from the accumulation of all the others, and the whole world must be explored if even the slightest of analogies is to be justified and finally take on the appearance of certainity. It is therefore a knowledge that can and must proceed by the infinite accumulation of confirmations all dependent on one another. And for this reason, from its very foundations, this knowledge will be a thing of sand. The only possible form of link between the elements of this knowledge is addition. .... By positing

resemblance as the link between signs and what they indicate (thus making the resemblance both a third force and a sole power since it resides in both the mark and the content in identical fashion) sixteenth century knowledge condemned itself to never knowing anything but the same thing, and to knowing that thing only at the unattainable end of an endless journey.*

As a consequence, even a privileged locus like 'body' loses its certitude in this infinite array of similitudes, making the task of knowing it is doomed from

the outset. If the 'body' through infinite relations of similitudes communicates with all possible things existing - which similitudes complicate this gloomy picture by themselves depending on the other forms of resemblances for signification - then the knowledge of this finite body are infinite in nature. As a way out of this conundrum, whereby a boundary could be drawn around this seemingly endless spiral of resemblances and similitudes externally, the Renaissance age says Foucault revived the ancient notion of 'microcosm'.

"And god said; let us make man in our image, after our likeness" (Genesis 1:26). "And god blessed them, and god said unto them, Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and the fowl of the air and every living thing that moveth upon the earth" (Genesis 1:28).

Given this biblical inspiration, coupled with the dominant Neo-Platonism of the period, the Renaissance Cosmology, perceived the hitherto dominant Aristotleian explanation of matter in terms of a quadrilateral of elements, i.e. air,fire,water and earth, and its cosmological schema based on the final cause, as inconsistent with the existing christian theological considerations. Hence from Paracelsus to Cambridge

Platonists, the basic Neo-Platonist schema of 'cosmos' as a graded hierarchy, where the hypostases at each level emulated divine creativity by generating subordinate entities which were a pale reflection of themselves in the ontological scale and whose relations between the levels were those of cause and affect rather than the final causality of Aristotleian cosmic scheme with innumerable variations found its reflection in the christian idea of a divine chain of being - a hierarchy with god at the apex and the most microscopic, miniscule entities being relegated to the bottom. The idea that all power and activity of lower levels being infused from the higher ones and where the forms of the objects in the sublunary world came from the soul of the celestial world, which contemplating the perfection of angelic or intelligible world, tried to transmit something of their perfection to the world of matter, was perfectly compatible with the new christian hermeticism of god endowing perfection to the world in his own image, which at its end, trying to approximate the heavenly perfection. While this Neo Platonist schema held out the possibility for Paracelsus, of a method based on tracing the analogies between the intelligible and the archetypal world, the macrocosm of the universe and the microcosm of the world and of the human body, it assumed a different shape for the later day Cambridge Platonists who

assimilated it with a rising mechanical philosophy to counter a threat to religion from Aristotleian Averroism of the Italian thinkers on one hand and enthusiastic sectaries on the other. The point is the neo-platonist cosmological schema and its reflection in Christian theology, far from assuming a homogenous form, had different variations and subtleties. However, we must concentrate on the paracelsian appropriation of it for our present concerns.

We must return to the sixteenth century and its optimism when Oswald Crollius anticipated that the long overdue 'paracelsian dream of overturning the ancient doctrines would soon be a reality.

For long conventional histories of science constructed this as an enthusiasm for a science that was based on 'observation' and 'experimentation' and more specifically within the areas of 'bodily knowledges' like medicine, a move away from the Aristotleian. Galenic system of speculation which by the time of middle ages acquired a connotation of useless superstition, to a humane Christian system where observation of patient is emphasised.

After all was it not the aim of Paracelsians (in accordance with the dictum's of Paracelsus) to sell their possessions, burn their books and set out to travel so that they may collect observations on plants, animals and

minerals. After which they could purchase coal and build furnaces through which they can watch and operate the fire without 'wearying'. "In this way and no other, you will arrive at a knowledge of things and properties ".

But the key to the paracelsian dictum that : " you must read natures book with your feet " and "you must cling to the practise of finding out whence the disease arises which practise will teach you " lies in the underpinning neo-platonist considerations of his epistemology.

Since man is a microcosmic extract of the Macrocosmic constituents knowledge amounts to an intuited unity between essential aspects of objects and corresponding aspects of man's 'astral' self. In other words knowing seemed to him to entail an identification of the subject with the science implicit in the object because not only subjects but even objects harbour knowledge which informs them how to be what they are. There is an intrinsic logos within the nature which can be grasped through a corresponding individual soul.

> " For nature is a light that outshines the light of the sun, beyond the purview and power of the eye and in this self same light the unseeable may be seen ".

This duality of 'sensible' and 'insensible' words is only an apparent divide or as Foucault would say effect of a 'surface effect', as we shall see below. But what paracelsus himself says through his doctrine of correspondances is that the 'Sensible, temporal things are analogs or signs of corresponding Insensible eternal things '. Microcosm being a signature of Macrocosm, observation implies a perception of those similitudinal relations between the Sensible and the 'Supra' or Insensible. Hence when Paracelsians exhort the physicians to observe the patient closely they are no more Hippocratic than Galen, what they mean is to see in the bodily deviations of patients, the maladies of heavens. Foucault himself draws our attention to the observational prorouress of Paracelsus on snakes.

> " Tell me then, why snakes in Helvetia, Algoria, Swedland understand the Greek words Osy, Osy, Osy ... In what academies did they learn them, so that scarcely have they heard the word than they immediately turn tail in order not to hear it again ? Scarcely do they hear the word when, not withstanding their nature and their spirit, they remain immobile and poison no one with their venomous wounds " .*

Observation already implies a similitudinal relation, whereby implicit within the behaviour of snakes, a relation of resemblance, connecting them to the words and vice versa, in this case. And this virtue of observation enables paracelsus " to discover all that is hidden in the mountains by signs and outward correspondances; to find out all the properties of herbs and all that is in stones. "

> " There is nothing in the depths of the seas, nothing in the heights of the firmament that man is not capable of discovering. There is no mountain so vast that it can hide from the gaze of man what is within it; it is revealed to him by corresponding sign ".*

The knowledge relating macrocosm to microcosm, -where every phenomenal thing is a signature of an eternal cryptomenal being without the connecting relation, would simply assume macrocosmic proportions. Since, as we have earlier discussed, the Renaissance episteme, in which 'paracelsus' was placed, connected things through relations of similitude which themselves depended on further resemblances for their signification, giving rise to an infinite proliferation of resemblances in the world. This entails 'observation' of the infinite world, a task which even a paracelsian physician with swiftest feet and enormous wanderlust can never accomplish. Hence the Renaissance ages employment of

the ancient notion of microcosm and macrocosm, to delimit the task of attaining knowledge and imparting it with a quality of certitude. But Foucault tells us that the appearance of this 'concept' was a 'surface effect' within the Renaissance episteme. Hence the epistemology of paracelsus by establishing correspondances between the sensible and insensible things within a heremetical framework of a bounded microcosm and macrocosm becomes an "effect of a surface effect".

As had already been mentioned, the 'sensible body' - a temporal and superficial expression of a more fundamental, Insensible and eternal body is a microcosmic signature of a 'macrocosm'. Hence every constitute of the terrestrial world resembles the 'celestial one' through a series of correspondences. Thus metals,plants, animals and even bodily parts comprising the sensible terrestial realm correspond through resemblances their eternal celestial counter parts. As a matter of illustration one can cite the case of virtues of metals - which have importance, nor only for the etiology of a disease but also for its 'therapeutics' - should be grasped by the physician. These virtues inhere in metals, for Paracelsus, because they correspond to the celestial bodies through similitudes. Thus 'gold' corresponds to 'sun'; 'silver' to 'moon'; 'lead' to 'Saturn'; ' mercury' to ' Mercury',' copper' to' Venus',

'tin' to 'Jupiter' and 'iron' to'Mars' etc.

In the case of Human body also, a similar correspondence can be discerned. For Paracelsus says, "Just as heavenly bodies constellate the firmament, so is man constellated mightily".*

In general, the human body for Paracelsus is comprised of a 'firmament'; elements; complexions and temperaments; and humours. A corporal bodily firmament, in similarity with the 'celestial firmament' possesses several planetary bodies, since, Jupiter rules Liver; Mars the Gall bladder, Mercury the lungs, venus the kidneys, Saturn the spleen, Sun the heart and Moon the brain (Hence the attribution of lunacy to luna, the Moon). However, it should be noted that, this correspondence through resemblances between the microcosmic bodily firmament and macrocosmic celestial firmament, does not bear any direct implication for the general 'physiology' of the body in contrast to its 'pathology' - A point we shall discuss below - since "the heavenly bodies do not endow us, nor draw us on, nor shape our characteristics you ought note well in what they disease and dispatch the body ". *

Vaguely resembling the celestial cycles in general, the corporate firmament decides the physiology of the body whereby "if a long life is predestined the cycles of the

corporal firmament run in a slower manner and in case of short life with a more rapidity". *

In sofar as elements are concerned, Paracelsus, effects a radical break with the Aristotelian-Galenic' medical legacy where as the antiquity, constituted the human body in terms of four basic material elements, which are the ultimate indivisibles, Paracelsus regards them are three rather than four. Inspite of their substansive connotations these three elements - Mercury, Salt and Sulphur - stand for the functional principles of transmutability, combustability and stability respectively. As a result each element of the classical four i.e., fire, air, earth and water, can be divided again " in terms of these ultimate functional principles denoted by Mercury, Salt and

Sulphur, of which, only one principle may be dominant in an individual body". This heralds the most radical change in the explanation of matter which hither to relied upon the physical paradigm now to be replaced by a chemical one by Paracelsus.

Even in the discussion of 'temperaments' and 'complexion' Paracelsus moves away from the traditional schema - where the four temperaments 'choleric', Sanguine, Melancholic and 'phlegmatic' are brought forth by the movements of corresponding humors viz. yellow bile, blood,

blackbile and phlegm with their inherent qualities of 'dry and hot'; moist and hot; cold and dry; and cold and wet' - with a chemical explanation. No longer are temperaments pale reflections of 'Humoral movements' but possess volatile chemical complexions. The 'temperants' now manifest in terms of 'tastes' or 'complexions' whereby "bitterness corresponds to choleric, Sanguine has Saltiness, Melancholic, acidity and Phlegmatic displays sweetness. Though all these complexions or tastes may exist in the body, only one will come to the fore ".* These complexions do not have a humoral basis atleast not the traditional ones, since they are omitted conspicuously by Paracelsus. Instead, he substitutes, blood in the veins, humidity in the flesh, viscus in the nerves and fluid in the fat. Apart from these four we are told that there are two others viz. the moist substances 'radical humor' and 'liquor vitae'. The classical age may have endeavoured to locate the possibility for a 'physiology of madness' at the site of 'passion' where 'body' and 'soul' meet each other in a relation of 'unity'. But in all its originality, it neither did invent the 'site' nor its relation of 'unity'. Even the Greek antiquity, Foucault tells us, in its practise of 'cultivating the self' assumed a similar relationship between the 'body' and 'soul' whereby as Plutarch tells us, both phiophy - the art proper for the cultivation of self and medicine reflected the unity between the 'body and soul' by establshing a 'common field

of shared notions'. While philosophy employed medical metaphors to describe the process of cultivating the self. Medicine on the other hand increasingly concerned itself with the maladies of soul, due to the commonality of notions charecterising the shared ' miachorea ' between them. Yet the precondition for such a field of commonality to emerge, lies in the implicit assumption of a unity between 'body' and 'soul', where such a unity is facilitated by the concept of 'Pathos', which for the antiquity denoted 'passions of the soul and illnesses of the body. 'Pathos' stood for the common characteristic of 'passivity' affecting body and soul. In the case of 'body' passivity implied a 'humoral imbalance ' while for the soul it meant involuntary movements capable of carrying it with them. Through the concept of 'Pathos' which implicitly presumed the unity of body and soul, there arose the possibility for the Greek antiquity, to have schemes and 'Grids of analysis', that were by being valid for both body and soul, constituted a 'common field of shared notions ' applicable to philosophy and medicine. Foucault says in this regard;

> "These notions and schemes are intended to serve as a common guide for medicine of the body and the therapeutics of the soul. They make it possible not only to apply the same type of theoretical analysis to

physical troubles and moral disorders alike, but also to use the same kind of approach attending to them, treating them and if possible curing them ".

In short, an underlying conceptual basis binds at once not only the dual entities of body and soul, but also domains like 'medicine' and philosophy, through a commonality of notions, shared concepts and unified schemas, comprising a 'common field'.

As a consequence of this binding conceptual basis, a whole series of medical metaphors are employed within philosophy to designate the operations necessary for the care of the self - Philisophy now increasingly speaks a medical language Epictetus characterises 'School' where through education one cultivates his self as the 'dispensary of the soul'. " The philosophers school is a physicians consulting room [iatreion].you must leave it in pain, not in pleasure ". Since uncultivated soul is akin to a pathological state, students who are in pursuit of education to cultivate their soul, are adivised by Epictetus, to present themselves as patients suffering from illness.

On the other hand, the same conceptual basis viz. 'Pathos', also allows medicine to speak about the errors of mind and their possible bodily cures

" Galen consider it within his competence not only to cure the great aberrations of the mind (love madness was traditionally within the purview of medicine) but to treat the passions (an irrational power within us which refuses to obey reason) and the errors (which arise from false opinion)".

'Pathos' standing for the characteristic of 'passivity', which for the body implied a 'humoral imbalance ' that can cause illness of body. If this being the case, how does medicine whose therapeutic locus being the body deem itself competent to cure the maladies of the soul.

For the Antiquity, the project of cultivating the self entailed not only a correction of the soul but also rectification of the body. Alredy the implicit unity postulated by the common concept of Pathos, may account for the transposition of a common vocabulary from philosophy to medicine and vice versa. But its fragility becomes obvious, when the unity of body and soul moves to a different level through their intercommunication. The point is through the sharing of common field of analysis, both philosophy and medicine may practise the cultivation of self from the point of shared concepts and notions, whereby medicine concerns itself with the maladies of soul, hitherto preoccupation of philosophy exclusively. While philosophy itself practises

the cultivation of self through the employment of an increased medical vocabulary and language, the unity of 'body and soul' assumed as a precondition for this reciprocity is exhausted at the conceptual level. It lacks the rigor to explain the mechanical binding of the body and soul, which medicine percieved by moving to a newer level basing itself on the unity achieved at the conceptual level. A level achieved on a physiological explanation.

With an implicit unity of 'body and soul' assumed, through a common conceptual basis, both 'philosophy' and 'medicine' perceive the possibility of reciprocal interaction between body and soul whereby the maladies of soul may translate into bodily illnesses and vice versa. Hence the cultivation of self for the antiquity implied not only a correction of the soul but also a rectification of the body. All the practises of self and its cultivation, consequently, were attained to that point, where the ills of body and soul communicated with each other, exchanging their mutual distresses :

> "Where the bad habits of the soul can entail physical miseries, while the excesses of the body manifest and maintain the failings of the soul. The apprehension is concentrated above all on the crossover point of the agitations and troubles, taking account of the fact

that one had best correct the soul if one does not want the body to get the better of it and rectify the body if one wants it to remain completely in control of itself ".

It is to this locus of contact - where body and soul stood in reciprocity making it the weakest point of individual - that both philosophy and medicine turned their attention. While 'Philosophy' cultivated the self, by metaphorically equating the process with the medical practice of curing the disease, medicine on the other hand turned its attention to the therapeutics of the soul. For either of them, cultivation of the self, unavoidably implied a bodily locus, - a body that in turn threatens the soul less by its too - vigorous requirements then by its own weaknesses.

In short, brought together by a common conceptual basis, the unity of 'body and soul' reflect in the sharing of a common field of analysis by philosophy and medicine, where the project the cultivating the self achieves a bodily emphasis because of the same unity of 'body and soul ' and the possibility of a reciprocal interactions between them. 'Cultivation of the self' in both philosophy and medicine, thus through the metaphors of body and bodily bases in the

therapeutics of soul respectively, attached an unparalleled importance to body - since it is through the body that soul is affected.

> "The letters of Seneca offer many examples of this attention formed on health, on regimen, on the malaises and all the troubles that can circulate between the body and the soul. the correspondence between Fronto and Marcus Aurelius to say nothing of the sacred tales of Aelius Aristides, which give altogether different dimensions to the narrative of illness and an entirely different value to its experience - shows very well the place occupied by concern for the body in these practices of the self, but it also shows the style of this preoccupation; fear of excess, economy of regimen being on the alert for disturbances, detailed attention given to dysfunction, the taking into account of all the factors (season climate, diet, mode of living) that can disturb the body and through it the soul ".*

Thus through the common conceptual basis of 'Pathos', both philosophy and medicine share a similar emphasis of medical involvement in the cultivation of 'self' whereby philosophy garbs the practises aimed at perfection of soul in medical metaphors and effects a medical regime in the process of cultivating the soul. Medicine, equally employs actual regimentation of body as opposed to mere

metaphors of philosophy, in the therapeutics of the soul. But both are in agreement when the way to cultivate the soul, primarily lies through the body. However for the Greek antiquity as opposed to bodily illnesses, maladies of soul by their anonymous nature presented formidable problems of detection.

Though the disturbances of soul posses unambiguously a bodily underside, philosophy and medicine, in their different perceptions, effected different therapeutics of soul.

Due to the difficulty of realising that one is suffering from the maladies of soul, since such maladies by their nature preclude such an awareness, or by their nature to manifest unannounced, or in their 'undetected persistence, the malaises of soul are indeterminate, the only way to check the anonymity and indeterminacy implicit within the illnesses of soul is to assume the role of a ever diseased patient. The unsuspecting fluidity of Soul's illness can be rendered immobile by the constant solidity of diseases images. Hence philosophy of 'self' exhorted its practitioners to image themselves as the ill, diseased and sufferers. The route to proper cultivation of self lies in the assumption of a piety of the diseased. - A piety which counters the anonymity and indeterminacy of the deviating

soul, through an everpresent coloration of disease. It is precisely what epictetus implies when he asks the cultivators of the self to see themselves as though one had a dislocated shoulder, the other an abscess the third a fistula and the next one headaches ".

Philosophy not only bases the project of cultivating the soul, on a bodily metaphor, but it also declares a constant alert on the part of the body to anticipate the unexpected ills of the soul which are surreptitious in their arrival.

Within the realm of natural history, classification didnot begun with the classical age and its desire to systematise the proliferation of exotic flora and strange fauna. Even before it, the Renaissance age displayed within its illustrative enterprise of natural history an urge to systematically grasp the plenitude of nature.

Daring the Renaissance, given the peculiar character of natural history (discussed above) classifying the natural beings was effected in two different directions, which were not mutually exclusive viz. "empirical" and ideal classifications. This loose distinction, for conventional histories of science represent an opposition between the observation and abstract speculation, which in turn effected a prioritisation of one mode of renaissance's natural

history over the other. A neat teleology then highlights Renaissance as the age which discovered the powers of observation over the other less progressive epochs which indulged in useless speculation, whereby surviving speculative habits were vestiges of a ignoble past. For these histories then it was a pure gaze of natural historian that captured the living being before descriptively relegating it to the illustrative spaces of Bestiaries and Herbariums. But following the arguments of 'order of things' one is able to discern the naivete of such a historical accounts. Since even signifying a natural being was tantamount to a signification of all those resemblances that related and connected the natural being with every possible thing in the creation by further similitudinal signs. Hence in both 'empirical' and 'ideal' modes of grouping the natural beings, an apriori similitudinal relation preceded observation or abstraction, thus making their manifest opposition superfluous. The silent observations and abstractions of natural history were already preceded by the voices of similitudes and resemblances articulated by the Renaissance episteme. Between 'observation' and 'abstraction' lay not the distance of a progressive or retrogressive natural history, but an incipient urge to delimit 'what is to be known '. From the 'empirical' direction, if Paolo Giovio observed and classified fishes on the basis of culinary considerations or

when Bloffon did the same for animals on the basis of degrees of domestication were they not observing those virtues, whose legitimate empirical basis of classification was unacceptable to later day natural history as frankly subjective. But for the natural history of the period, these considerations and virtues were part of a natural being, on par with say physiology of the being. Since the natural history of Renaissance, did not endevour to make distinctions between the observed properties and reported accounts, nor between the physiological aspects and the legendary virtues of natural beings. Nothing was important or unimportant in the descriptions of natural beings to be included or excluded. It deemed virtous to describe and report on an equal scale all the features, observed and of past speculations, of a natural being since a peculiar process of signification formed an apriori basis to it.

But it was also the same apriori conception of sign that held portents for endless spirals and infinities in observations. By the infinite nature of observations - given the signification process of Renaissance episteme - haunting a natural being, consequent classifications of it would be arbitrary, indeterminate and incomplete. The proliferating features of a natural being preclude any complete classifications of it until and unless a boundary delimits the process. This is what the Renaissance ages

rediscovery of that age old mechanism of 'microcosm - macrocosm' relation sought to achieve by endowing an external certitude to knowledge over its internal infinities, by its statement that whatever existed in the sublunary terrestrial world should posses a necessary counterpart in the celestial world. With this assuring certainty it was possible for the natural history to replace infinite details of the natural being that provided a basis for classification, with terrestrial, natural order that had to be necessarily present, in it since the celestial world had a divine one. No longer was it necessary to empirically observe and record the inexhaustible minutae of natural beings. An ideal abstraction of a celestial principle would, by its necessary terrestrial reflection, in nature, suffice as a basis for classification. Consequently the story of divine creation reflects in this world as a terrestrial principle of 'animistic dynamism' whereby natural beings can be classified in the order in which god created natural beings on the fifth and sixth days of creation. At the bottom of the scale could be found corals followed by zoophytes which were the link between animate and inanimate realms. Upon it would rest in different gradations of perfection, the whole of animal and plant kingdoms forming a 'great chain of being ' that culminated in man and even upwards in god. Even the principle of

Humors and their physiological motions - that was, in itself a terrestrial reflection of an order between divine elements and the planetary motions - as a basis of classifying natural beings was grafted to this hirarchial arrangement whereby down the scale came the natural beings that were bloodless followed by red blooded 'exsangeria, melancholic, phlegmatic and choleric ones. Or the most directly related principle, to this notion of divine order reflecting in the natural one was that of 'generation', where the made through which natural beings were created, reflected a celestial design and occupied a divinely ordained space in the hierarchy of life. The mode of generation of natural beings exhibited gods order which explains why certain natural beings can be ranked over others in the divine hierarchy of the world. The most lowly and imperfect natural beings generated according to Jehan Masse from 'superfluous humors', while for Jose de Acosta it was earth. Ambrose pare observed a toad being generated in a hollow stone by the effect of 'putrefied humidity'. In contrast to this spontaneous generation which relegated natural beings, that were produced this way, to the lowest strata of creation, natural beings generated by sexual reproduction reflected gods true design and hence occupied higher gradations of the hierarchy of nature, where the constituent strata defined by their mode of generation on the whole on can discern the providential design.

In these classifications, it was the principle of celestial design and order that dictated what the natural history could observe. Thus Aldrovandi could observe barnacle goose spring from the fruit of tree, while pierre Belon could see predatory qualities in sparrows. Since observation no longer led to infinite task of description eluding classification. But it was preceded by a divine order that made the classification of the observable susceptible to its logic.

The classificatory grouping of plants effected in one of the last herbariums of the Renaissances natural history, John Parkinson's 'Theatrum Botanicum ' (1640) displays an ambiguity, when six of its seventeen groups of plants are labeled as a) sweet smelling b) purgative c) opiate and poisonous d)cooling e) hot and sharp in taste and f) fit for healing wounds, while seven others were morphologically based as g) unbelliferous plants h) ferns i)grasses and reeds j) leguminous plants k) cereals l) thistles and other thorny plants; and m) trees and shrubs. The penultimate groups on the other hand, which were based partly on morphology and partly by habitat, were (n) Saxifrages or "Breakstone plants"; and (o)miscellary of Marsh, water and sea plants, and Mosses and Mushrooms. The final groups to complete the tally had no underlying basis and hence carried

labels as (p) The unordered tribe, and (q) Strange and outlandish plants.

Coexisting within this single classification. lie two incompatible orders of natural history indicating not only what was the obvious habit of Renaissance age, ie., attaining knowledge of natural beings through Similitudinal relations but also pointing out to the future where 'identity' and 'difference' were to configure the knowledge of nature. It was a fragile portrait of nature holding uneasily, within its bosom not only the possibility of infinite nature but also a constraint of its finitude - that was to break subsequently, resolving the ambiguity by making possible a novel history of nature to emerge.

Foucault himself indicates such a break point or a point of departure when he points out to the appearance of Jonstons 'A natural history of quadruped's in 1657. Quite loosely, this event is the sudden separation of two different orders of knowledge hitherto coexisting ambiguously in a singular classification such as the above mentioned one, providing a new direction to natural history. In its sudden disappearance the Renaissance age gives way to the natural history of classical age - An age of taxonomic table.

Writing in 1682, John Ray in his 'Methodus Plantarum'

seperated flowering plants from flowerless ones, in his effort to classify plants. The further subdivided the former class into 'monocotyledons' and dicotyledons. Ray is not solitary his endevour. Robert Morrison (1610-83) made a systematic arrangement of plants into eighteen classes, distinguishing them as woody and herbaceous, flower bearing and fruit bearing. After Ceaselipinus (1672-80). Augustus Quinus Rivinus of Leipzig classified plants by the petals of the flowers. Towards the end of seventeenth century. Joseph pittton de tournefort in his Elemens de Botanique of 1694, described eight thousand species of plants arranged in twenty one classes according to the form of corolla. The classificatory system was further expanded by Michael Adanson (1727-1806), whose 'Familles des plants' (1763) comprised an arrangement of genera in 58 families ; Antonie laurent de Jussieu (1748-1836) in his 'genera plantarum' of 1789 adopted a natural system of one hundred orders arranged in fifteen classes, harking back to the basic principles suggested by Ray-Acotyledons, Monocotyledons and Dicotyledons-and further subdividing these according to petals. The most influential of all, however was Carl Linneaus's 'genera plantarum' (1737) which classified plants on the basis of characters derived from the stamens and pistils -the sexual organs of the flower .the age of taxonomic table has begun .It was an age where a strict distinction differentiates ,with in the realm of 'Natural

History ' between what is observed and what is reported . No longer are signs part of the World they are removed from it

observation and its virtues .At the epistemic level . According to Faucault the Renaissance episteme has lost its efficacy .It is the age of classical episteme now . NOT only does the new natural history merely accord privilege to 'seeing ' but it also aims at transcribing into a smooth faithful and natural language .The enterprise of the natural history now is to represent things observed in language as exactly as possible .The New natural history things says Foucault is merely a nomination of the visibility acquires a stricter definition where it privileges the faculty of sight in an exclusive manner over other faculties of sensory perception .The grid through which the natural history observes is strictly delimited and defined a observation is to see few things systematically and naming it so that it is under stood by all .To this effect the natural history two interrelated entities through which a natural being is observed and translated into transparent language .

According to Faucault ,the 'structure ' employed by this new natural history encompasses four aspects of elements that constitute a natural being . Their 'Form' their number , their natural spatial arrangement and their relative magnitude these four aspects provide a grid through

which the visible organism is filtered and then tanscribed into language .

By being 'structures' (used in the above sense), natural objects are exhausted by their visible patterns of 'Surfaces ' and 'Lines' and not as organic unities of functions or invisible tissues .

" Natural history traverses an area of visible , simultaneous , concommitant variables without any internal relation of subordination or organisation ".

Physiology of the organism is prioritised over its anatomy . Hence the major preoccupation with the physiology for the classificatory medicine of seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Structure however is not entirely sufficient for the new natural history since as merely an individual reality and does nothing to place it in relation to other plants and animals . Hence out of each individual structural description natural history extracts the essential nature of each thing described i.e; those features that would enable us to assign the thing its exact place in an taxonomic table . The features constitute what was called the 'character ' of a plant or animal.

By employing structure and character the natural

history , not only observers an individual natural being but defines it through a filtering grid , extracts its essence and then assigns it to its delineated space of class, order ,genera and species of the taxonomic table .

According to faucault the new natural history employs two different modes in the determination of characters. One , called the 'system' begins with the arbitrary specification of small set of descriptive elements - an initial character. This is the way, how Linneaus classifies natural beings. When he selects those parts or elements of the plants that where relevant to its fructification. Each individual plant is analysed in terms of these elements and characterized as similar or dissimilar to others on the basis of the sameness or difference of the elements. The second mode employed by Adanos was the 'Method' who unlike Linneaus did not begin with arbitrarily selected elements but with an arbitrarily chosen species of plant or animal. The chosen species was then described exhaustively taking into account all the elements. The next species encountered was likewise exhaustively described except that any features already included in the description of the first were not mentioned. Similarly each subsequent species was described with the omission of features already encountered in the preceding species. On the basis of the series of description, there would eventually emerge a general table

of relations as various species were seen to share the same characters. Inspite of their differences says faucault 'method' and 'system' rest on the same underlying epistemological base. They are alternative means to the same goal of

> "a knowledge of empirical individuals in terms of the continuous, ordered and universal
>
> tabulation of all possible differences;

whereby 'Method' and 'System' for all their superficial differences are simply two ways of defining identities by means of the general grid of differences.

Under lying such a project of Natural history, faucault says, lies the assumption that Nature exhibits a continuity. Whereby a natural being exhibits sufficient continuity with other beings, so as to allow a taxonomist to group them on the basis of shared characteristics. The discontinuities displayed by the natural order are dismissed as of belonging to an extrinsic nature and has nothing to do with the inherent nature of natural beings. Hence for the new natural history these exists a possibility of two natural orders. On th one hand, there was the 'ideal' spatial grouping expressed in the great tables of taxonomic orders, that represented the true continuity of nature, on the other, there was the experienced grouping of living things

that had resulted from the temporal series of events in the history of earth. The task of natural history was to reconstruct the ideal order of the former from the fragments presented by the latter. In prioritising the latter the classical Natural history eliminates 'temporality' whereby it classifies natural begins in a permanent tabulation with a sort of evolutionism that is supposed to believe in an immemorial history of nature.

Given this conception of Natural beings, the entities which threaten the natural beings are also susceptible to the same intemporal taxonomic logic. In the domain of medical knowledge, given the emphasise on the surface line of visible bodies by physiology, diseases or pathology paradoxically possesses the same structure as that of the organism they threaten. Both body and its disease are merely two faces of the same natural order

> "The order of disease is simply a carbon copy of the world of life; the same structures govern each, the same forms of division, the same ordering the rationality of life is identical with rationality of the which threatens it their relationship is not one of nature and counter-nature, but in a natural order common to both, they fit into one another, one super imposed upon

the other in disease on recognizes like because it is on the law of life that knowledge of the disease is also

Hence the same classificatory logic applies to both Natural and Morbid beings. Diseases are grasped on the basis of their superficial symptoms through a perceptual grid, their essence understood and are classified in an ideal taxonomic space. Anatomy with its emphasis on local as opposed to essential, temporal in contrast to ideal and intemporal, function in distinction to structure is alien to the classificatory medicine of seventeeth and eighteenth century. Hence the major emphasis on physiology from Descartes to Sauvages.

It was Linnaeus buttressing the possibility of taxonomic project for natural beings, who declares that

> " there just as many species as issued in pairs form the creators hands and no more"

then regarding the morbid forms, Sydenham is not far from him when he says :

> "the supreme being is not subjected to less certain laws in producing diseases or in maturing morbific humors, than in growing plants and animals..... He who observes attentively the order, time, the hour at

> which the attack of quart fever begins, the the phenomena of shivering, of heat, in word all the symptoms proper to it, will have as many reasons to believe that the disease is a species as he has to believe that a plant constitutes a species because it grows, flowers and dies always in the same way.

Nature harbouring both the natural beings and morbid forms changes its connotation for the classical medicine of seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. To this changed connotation of 'nature', we should direct our attention.

It was ancient Hippocrates, the foremost of all to assert that 'Nature is the healer of disease ( ). Nature itself will find the means and ways to heal.

> not through reflection,....without education without having learned it, nature performs her duties

Nature finding the humors of body in a state of 'Dycrasia' or improper mixture, proceeds to bring them back to their proper condition which is called 'pepsis' or coction, a cooking or ripening of the crude mixture of humors produced by the innate heat of the body and resulted

in an eucrasia or proper mixture of body fluids accompanied by an elimination of excess material fever often aids this process and may be beneficial, not harmful to it. This whole process proceeds in three stages- ' Apepsia' or Crudity, 'Pepsia' or Coction and 'Crisis', the point at which the humors of the body are restored back to their proper proportions. Disease acquires consequently an ambivalence, not only to be regarded as 'Suffering' ( ) but also a toil ( ) the struggle of the body to restore its normal state.

In this perennial interplay between 'Ease' and 'disease', the dividing line between physiology and pathology is blurred, since physiology deals with 'physics' or constitution, where there is a perfect balance between humors, elements and qualities; and in disease this balance is upset to result in pathology only to be restored back in physiology. disease is not a pathological identity - defined by its 'Difference' from 'Normality' - but only a fluctuating condition of the patients individual body - a battle between 'Materis'morbi' and the natural self healing tendency of the body. Hence therapy was centered upon assisting the patient through his particular 'Physics' to react, in his own peculiar and specific way. In this continual process of balance and imbalance of human body, health and disease are merely reverse of each other -

Ceaselessly repeating and following one another in a curious dialectic, processing no essential identities to normalise prioritise over each other. The contemporary division between physiology and Pathology yet to be inserted. Hippocrates's 'Nature' had not yet abrogated to physician in his interventions the judicial power - that was to pathologically normalise itself subsequent of 'Normal' and pathological over human body. The Physician atleast for now aided nature and her heating process by not hindering her.

Did the classificatory medicine of Seventeenth and eighteenth centuries rediscover those virtues of passivity, that charecterised Hippocratic Physician, when it opined that the Physicians.

> .....Intervention is an act of violence if it is not subjected strictly to the ideal ordering of nosology,.....In the period of invasion (by the disease) the doctor must hold his breath, for the beginnings of disease reveal its class, its genus and its species; when the symptoms increase and become more marked, it is enough 'to diminish' their violence and reduce their pains; when the disease has settled in, one must follow step by step the paths followed

> by 'nature', strengthening if it is too weak diminishing if it strives too vigorously to destroy what resists it.

With an similar emphasis, was it not sydenham - the english Hippocrates - who begins his 'Methodus curandi febres' with an almost Hippocratic phrase

> A disease in my opinion how prejudicial soever its causes may be to the baby, is no more than a vigorous effort of nature to destroy (exterminare) the morbific matter and thus recover the patient.

Yet, paradoxically for the classificatory medicine of seventeenth and eighteenth centuries - inspite of its Hippocratic insistence on the neutrality of physician in relation to nature the Hippocratic substratum of patients body on which health and disease displayed their true colours was of little or no importance. there lies the ambiguity of Sydenham when he equally recommends that

> He who distinguishes a disease must take care to distinguish the symptoms that necessarily accompany it, and which re proper to it, from those that are only accidental and fortuitous such as those that depend on the temperament

and age of patient.

In the 'nature' of Hippocrates complex the physician to follow the secret trajectories of disease by reading the natural history of patient, then it is the natural history of disease that nature presents to the Physician of classificatory medicine.

> The medical reading must take him into account, only to place him in parentheses of course the doctor must know the internal structure of our bodies; but only in order to subtract it and to free to the doctors gaze the nature and combination of symptoms crisis, and other circumstances that accompany diseases. It is not the pathological that functions in relation to life as a counterforce, but the patient in relation to disease itself.

In relation to the internal fact of disease, the diseased for the classical medicine of Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries, was an external fact that needs to be abstracted. Naturally, for the English Hippocrates, the specifics of patient's body are marginal in comparison with the 'Species of disease. In short 'nature' had changed its connotation for the classical medicine of Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries, 'Nature' from Linnaeus to Sauvages

could only be grasped in the ideal order of taxonomic table. Disease in its kinship with natural bring belonged to the order of great classificatory systems. Disease and plants, are what they are because of their delineated space in the taxonomia. A physician could only be faithful to nature if his gaze is directed, not on the disease manifested in an ideal and relational order.

From our contemporary vantage points, Historians direct our attention to the consistent and constant references in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries, classical medicine to the physiology and pathology of Humors, before invoking the sacred image of venerable Hippocrates, yet only in the Nineteenth Century, after Bichat, could corvisart exhort his students, pointing patients

> "These are your books read them But you will find them more difficult than those printed".

Only after the rediscovery of the virtues of observation, could modern medicine pay attention to the forgotten antiquity.

> Hippocrates applied himself only to the observation and despised all systems. It is only by following in his foot steps that medicine could be perfected.

The comparison of two different modes of classifying 'Natural Beings' would sufficiently indicate the two different perspectives based on epistemic changes. Consequently, these changes would assist one, to grasp the transformations that were to present themselves, within the domain of medicine, in the reading of disease.

In 1750, Linnaeus classified the whole domain of Animal Kingdom on the basis of structure of heart and nature of blood, whereby the following taxonomy appears.

Mammalia (Mammals)	- Warm red blood and four chambered heart
Aves (Birds)	- Warm red blood and four chambered heart
Amphibia (Amphibians)	- Cold red blood and two chambered heart
Pisces (Fishes)	- Cold red blood and two chambered heart
Insects (Insects)	- Cold white blood and one chambered heart
Vermes (Worms)	- Cold white blood and one chambered heart

For Linnaeus, each organism - in order to be placed in the taxonomic table - is to be grasped in terms of its structure i.e four aspects of these elements that constitute a natural being - form, number, spatial arrangement and relative magnitude. The structure provides a grid that by limiting and filtering the visible, enables the natural being to be transcribed into language. As a result natural

beings appear as 'Visible patterns of surfaces and lines' and not as organic unities of functions or 'Invisible tissue's. For Linnaeus, naturally then, in the case of Animals, the spatial ordering of heart and the 'Form' of blood form the discrete elements of 'Structure. This structure however is capable of only describing a plant or animal as an individual entity, not in relation to other plants and animals. Hence out of these individual entities and 'Essence' is abstracted, which is the characteristic of the whole class. Interestingly, a simple correlation between the structure of heart and blood, in terms of 'Circulation' a function is quite alien to Linnaeus placed in the classical 'Episteme.

In contrast to the classification of Linneaus, Cuvier from Vantage point of modern episteme, effects a totally new dimension to classification of Animals. For Cuvier the structure of an organism is to be understood in terms of the function it performs. For a natural being to enter into the taxonomic table, now the basic characteristic is its 'Function' rather than its essence. For instance, the organs of respiration like lungs and gill were totally dissimilar for Linneaus since their structures, i.e. form, number, spatial arrangements and relative magnitudes - are dissimilar. But for cuvier, lungs and gill form a class due to the respiratory 'Function' they perform. The living

being now is a functional being. Three derivative features can be concluded, says Foucault, from this Cuvierian conception of living being.

(a) Discontinuity of life forms : The possibility of ordering the variety of 'Functional' systems (living things) in a continuous series is remote since each living being is a complex system of organs, each performing a function related to the survival of the organism as a whole. Some organisms display a complexity in terms of more functions they perform than others.

(b) Life is connected with its environment : The 'Nature of a species is causally dependent on the environment in which its members exist. AS a result the separation of living things into different classes is due to the different ways that living things are linked to the surroundings on which they depend on survival.

(c) Temporality of life : Since living beings are scattered into discontinuous groups, which are formed by the effects of environmental forces, they are essentially linked o the 'Time' in which these forces and their effects exist.

Life with cuvier becomes a thoroughly historical reality since its totally dependent on time. Here lies the key to Cuvier's comparative method, when he tries to compare

systematically the structure of existing animals with the remains of extinct fossils, thereby correlating the past and present through the temporality of evolution.

For Cuvier, Animal Kingdom can be seen in terms of a hierarchy . The higher forms performing complex functions to contrast to lower forms, yet there is an evolution from lower forms to higher forms whereby at a point of time one can fix the animal kingdom in the following manner.

(a) Vertebrata (Animal with back bone)

- Mammalia :
- Aves :
- Reptilia : HIGHER FORMS
- Batrachia :
- Pisces :

(b) Mollusca (Soft bodied) : LOWER FORMS

(c) Articulata (Jointed) :

(d) Radiata (Organs disposed around a centre)

Thus only with the epistemic transformation, whereby the living beings acquire new meaning of 'Life' in terms of 'Function', does a new way of reading a disease is initiated.

Not only life, but which threatens it also acquires a temporal function Disease lose their 'Essence' and transform into alterations, causalities etc., pathological Anatomy

becomes possible only when time enters into the domain of living and non living. Organs function, Diseases threaten these functions through their own causalities, sequence and temporalities.

In 1783, when an Irish giant 'O' Brien was nearing his death, the Anatomist John Hunter intending to dissect the giants body, arranged to stalk 'O' Brien with his own henchman Howison. Before dying the giant countered by contracting with his undertaker to arrange for a watch over the bier, day and night, until a lead coffin was fashioned which containing the giants body, then would be thrown into sea. Finally it was an empty coffin that was thrown over board. For Howison had already acquired the body for his master by bribing the watchers with a reported sum of Five hundred pounds sterling. This Anecdote, oft repeated, is part of that same transfigured history which portrays Valsalva slipping.

> "Furtively into graveyards to study at leisure
> the progress of life and destruction"

or where Morgagni could be seen "digging up the graves of the dead and plunging his scalpel into corpses taken from their coffins". since

> "dissection was carried out only under cover
> of the shadowy twilight, in the great fear of

dead: 'at day break or at the approach of night".

For a long time, religion, morality and stubborn prejudices prevented the opening of corpses, as a consequence of which pathological anatomy could not emerge into visibility. Medicine was deprived of its own foundations until the advent of enlightenment.

> With the coming of enlightenment, death too, was entitled to the clear light of reason and became for the philosophical mind an object and source of knowledge: 'When philosophy brought its torch into the midst of civilised peoples, it was at last permitted to cast one's searching gaze upon the inanimate remains of the human body, and those fragments once the vile prey of worms, become the fruitful source of the most useful truths.

Pathological Anatomy could only provide medicine with an element of positivity only when a

> fine transmutation of the corpse had taken place; gloomy respect had condemned it to putrefaction, to the dark world of destruction; in the boldness of the gesture that violated only to reveal, to bring to the light of the day, the corpse became

> the brightest moment in the figures of truth. Knowledge spins where once Larva was formed.

Yet, According to foucault this historical construal is by itself historically false. Since, Morgagni performed in the middle of Eighteenth century, nearly autopsies, with an ease, in a year. Even before him, Bonet compiled some 3000 protocols based on necropsies. Beniveni's work correlated the diseases with the anatomical findings at autopsies. Similar compilations based on dissections were made by Jean Fernel and Bartholin, in the Seventeenth century.

> From 1754, the Vienna clinic had a dissection room; so had the clinic that Tissot had organised at Pavia; at the Hotel - Dieu in Paris, Desault was quite free to demonstrate on the body deprived of life. The alterations that had rendered art useless. one has only to recall Article 25 of the Decret de Marly: 'Let us urge Magistrates and directors of hospitals to provide the professors with corpses and so enable them to carry out their anatomy demonstrations and to teach the operations of surgery.

Thus, there was no dearth of corpses for the anatomists to perform their necropsies and dissections even from the Seventeenth Century Valsalva dissected the fetus to display

and identify the sinuses posterior to the semilunar values of the Aorta. Bonet substantiated the descriptions of ancient disease with pathological findings. Thus the conventional historical explanation for the inhibition of pathological findings. Thus the inhibition of pathological anatomy due to the absence of dissections was part of an historical illusion, Foucault tells us, widespread in the nineteenth century a product of mythified history written by Michelet.

> "History painted the end of Ancien Regime in the colours of the last years of the middle ages, confusing the upheavals of the Renaissance with the struggles of Enlightenment".

This illusion was not an accidental anatomy that made its entry into the conventional Histories of medicine. It had a precise meaning says foucault

> "It functions as a retrospective justifications; if the old beliefs had for so long such prohibitive power, it was because doctors had to feel, in the depth of their scientific appetite, the repressed need to open up corpses. There lies the point of error and silent reason why it was so constantly made the day it was admitted that lesions explained symptoms and that the

> clinic was founded on pathological anatomy, it became necessary to invoke a transfigured history, in which opening up of corpses, at lease in the name of scientific requirements, preceded a finally positive observation of patients, the need to know the dead must already have existed when the concern to understand the living appeared. So a dismal conjuration of dissection an anatomical church militant and suffering whose hidden spirit made the clinic possible before itself surfacing into the regular, authorised, diurnal practice of autopsy, was imagined out of nothing.

Thus by an chronological inversion, pathological Anatomy which by its nature, must have preceded medicine, was made to wait until the nineteenth century , when, as conventional history tells us, medical knowledge under the influence of empiricism, rediscovered it. The question that still persists

> "Why did time deposit at the end of its course what was contained at the outset, already opening up and justifying the outset, already opening up and justifying the way ?"

Partially, one can say, that this inconsistency was the

result of a distorted chronology. A chronology that converts a rediscovery into discovery. Hence the need to provide a proper chronological account of Pathological Anatomy.

Bonet's 'Sepulchretum' published in 1679 was an encyclopedia containing a record of each recognisable disease from ancient times to his own, with an account of the clinical features followed by a description of the pathological findings acquired during the course of necropsies. It was Valsalva, and his dissections of the dead bodies, which even today proffer to explain the structure of the ear. Morgagni merely joined this long line of anatomists from Beniveni to Valsalva when he Published his 'De sedibus et causis Morborum per anatomen indagatis' in 1760, yet Morgagni's 'De sedibus' could only be discovered as Pathological Anatomical work only in the Nineteenth Century. When Bichat and Corvisart retrieved pathological anatomy from a shadowy zone. The forty years separating De sedibus and Bichat's rediscovery of pathological Anatomy, Foucault tells us, form a period of Latency a locus for chronological inversions and distorted histories. Since the clinical method formed in this latent period was by its emphasis on temporality was incompatible with pathological anatomy of Morgagni which by definition concerned itself with the intemporality of dead.

"The clinic, a neutral gaze directed upon manifestation frequencies and chronologies, concerned with linking up symptoms and grasping their language, was, by its structure foreign to the investigations of mute, intemporal bodies; causes and locales did not interest it; it was interested in history not geography. Anatomy and clinic were not of the same mind; strange as it may seem to us always to have been, it was clinical thought that for forty years prevented medicine from hearing the lesson of Morgagni".

For Morgagni, the densities of the organs and their changed volumes specified the disease, says foucault. Accordingly Book I, letter XXI, Article 27, of De sedibus et causis Morborum per Anatomen Indagatis of Morgagni, describes the hepatisation of lobar pneumonia in the following manner.

"27. A virgin of two and forty years of age who had every winter, been subject to a violent cough...was seized, in the night with a fever with which she first shivered, and was cold through her whole body and after that grew hot. After an interval of 24 hours, a pain on one side of the breast was added to the fever,

together with a difficulty of breathing a cough quite dry, and a rather hot pulse..... in the progress of disease, the pain shifted from one side of breast to the opposite part. There was a sense of weight within the thorax..... On the beginning of 7th day she died. When I heard this relation I said, in dependence upon those we had always found after the chief of such kind of symptoms, "Come let the body be dissected; this will be certainly found to be the nature of the disease, that the lungs shall appear to have the substance of lever".

The articulations of perception, for Morgagni could only be achieved, if the disease is investigated from its symptoms to the organ from which the symptoms arose and then demonstrated the disease in the organ concerned. A correlation is established between the symptoms of the disease and the organic alterations displayed to be perception of physician, on the table.

"2. A boy of thirteen years of age of a ready wit whose brother and sister died of consumption, having himself labored under an inflammation of the left lobe of lungs, the year before, was seized with a pain in his head over his eyes, his

> eyes were also painful, and troubled with a viscid defluxion. The day following he became delirious, his eyes were fixed on those about him; and he threw up a little Phlegm. Then on a sudden, he was seized with Convulsions, after which he fell into a kind of lethargy, yet was frequently roused by convulsions attended with difficult respiration. At length he died. Having saw'd open the skull, the dura mater was found tinged with a cineritious colour, along the sides of the blood vessels. And when dura mater was torn away from the Crista galli, a little sanious serum bust forth (Book I, letter I, Article 1.3).

Hence lies the uniqueness of Morgagni, placed in the great line of anatomists from Valsalva to Bonet, when he sought to correlate the physical findings and clinical course of disease with the structural alterations in the organic space of the body. A disease, consequently , localises itself in the densities of organs. Hence pathological Anatomy must return itself to the 'Seat ' of the disease as contained in the altered organic space of the body.

> For Morgagni, the seat was the point of insertion in the organism of the chain of causalities.

As a consequence of such Anatomical perception, a different nosorgaphy based on the real organic spaces becomes possible, since.

> A nosography based on the affection of the of the organs will necessarily be invariable.

Even before Morgagni, Bonet percieves such a possibility one only need to glance at the arrangement of 'Sepulchretum'. Book I diseases of head, Book II concerns with the diseases of chest, Book III with the diseases of abdominal cavity, diabetes, gonorrhea, hernia etc., and Book IV with fevers, tumors, fractures, gout etc., In his Nosoraphic analysis, Morgagni was merely reordering the Sepulchretum.

> Like the sepulchretum and many other Seventeenth and Eighteenth century treatises, Morgagni's letters specified diseases by means of a local seperation of their symptoms or point of origin. Anatomical dispersal was the directing principle of nosological analysis; frenzy, like Apoplexy, belonged to the diseases of the head; asthma, pleuropneumonia and haemoptysis formed the related species in that they were all three localised in the chest. Morbid kinship rested on a principle of organic proximity; the space that difined it was local."

It is from this vantage point of Nosography, that Bichat has rediscovered Morgagni. Says Foucault.

For Bichat, the rereading of Morgagni did not involve a break with the clinical experience that had just been acquired on the contrary, fidelity to the method of the clinicians and, even beyond that method, the anxiety, which he shared with Pinel, to provide a basis for a nosological classification remained essential. Paradoxically, the return to the questions of the De sedibus was made on the basis of a problem in the grouping of symptoms and in the ordering of diseases.

From the vantage point of physiology in the absence of pathological Anatomy - Seventeenth century perceived nervous action due to the existence of nervous fluid. The nervous fluid flowed down the nerves to inflate or extend the muscle fibres. Inflation was supposed to shorten the fibres and so the muscle came to contract. Extension, the converse of this principle. It was Stephen Haller and even before him Swammerdam, who were to question this.

A muscle fibre, Haller said, had in itself a tendency to shorten with any stimulus and afterwards to expand again to its normal length. This inherent tendency, Borrowing from Francis Glisson, Haller named as the property of

irritability. The movements on the contrary were to occur due to the presence of this vital element of irritability. By its characteristic irritability under the effect of slight stimulus produces a movement altogether out of proportion to itself and that it would continue to do this repeatedly so long as the fibre remains Alive-a deduction based on the external physical movements of living body where life is more than sheer mechanical movements. Irritability is a property of organism and its life.

From a pure organic view point, the vitalist school at Montpellier argued a similar case. Bordeu percieves each seperate part of the body possessing a vital property (Vita properia) while Barthez uses the term (Vital agens) vital principle to denote the cause of bodily phenomenon in the living body.

Chapter - III
Manipulable Body
A genealogy of Discpline

In saying that, at the end of eighteenth and on the threshold of nineteenth century, punishment comprising of a public display of torture and invocation of pain for a whole gamut of crimes differing from each other in intensity and degrees of seriousness had disappeared from the juridical corpus, across Europe. Only to be replaced by less spectacular incarcerative techniques sober in their visibility and effects, 'Discipline and Punish ' does not claim any credit for stating a new historical fact. Numerous, now familiar, histories have already drawn our attention to that 'great transformation ' in the modes of punitive technologies occurring at the beginning of nineteenth century - by imputing causes and motives of a variable nature - in which such an increasing leniency of punishments had a factual existence. The novelty of 'Discipline and Punish ' lies on the other hand, in situating the locus of such punitive transformations at a bodily level, whereby lurking beneath the apparent transformations of modes of punishment, lies the latent relationships between 'body and punishment. Thus, says Foucault by the beginning of nineteenth century, along with a particular mode of punishment, body as a target of penal repression also disappeared. No longer punishment meant a

'dismembered amputated body, symbolically branded on face or shoulder, exposed alive or dead to public view. It retreated from the spectacular domain involving meticulous rituals of pain and ceremonies of torture employed on a publicly exposed body of criminal to a more surreptitious refuge of carceral mechanisms involving penal sobriety. Consequently,

> it leaves the domain of more or less everyday perception and enters that of abstract consciousness; its effectiveness is seen as resulting from its inevitability, not from its visible intensity, it is the certainty of being punished and not the horrifying spectacle of public punishment that must discourage crime; the exemplary mechanics of punishment changes its mechanisms*.

What makes the spectacular mode of punishment unattractive, in the face of newly initiated punitive measures involving incarceration, is due to its implicit ambiguity, whereby justice, which takes the public responsibility of punishing the criminal through a spectacular employment of calculated calibrations of pain and torture, too often became prone to be seen in a bad light. The exemplary horror of tortured body enveloped in its spectacularity even the torturer. "It enveloped both

executioner and condemned; and although it was always ready to invert the shame inflicted on the victim into pity or glory, it often turned the legal violence of the executioner into shame ".

In contrast, the new punitive regime, employs a more subtler mechanics of example. Henceforth,

> it is the conviction itself that marks the offender with the unequivocally negative sign. The publicity has shifted to the trial, and to the sentence. The execution itself is like an additional shame that justice is ashamed to impose on the condemned man; so it keeps its distance from the act, tending always to entrust it to others, under the seal of secrecy. It is ugly to be punishable, but there is no glory in punishing. Hence the double system of protection that justice has set up between itself and the punishment it imposes*.

If one correlates the rise of criminal punishment with a minimum level of state formation, then the approximate date at which criminal justice as a systematic procedure of defining the crime and establishing rituals of punishment emerged, can be set around twelfth century, when territorial principalities embodied the nascent character of centralised exercise of power of later day 'states'. In the process of

their varying emergence across the European landscape, these units of power redefined the hitherto existing relationship between freedom and dependence thereby endowing a new nature to criminal justice. It is this relation which acquires crucial importance in the legal and juridical histories of punishment. since as 'Immink' notes 'punishment is never used unless the person upon whom the penalty is inflicted is clearly subordinate to the one imposing penal act.

Before twelfth century, freemen were never subjected to punishment defined in the above sense, but unfree persons were the lord of manor was the absolute authority over his serfs, in punishment. The determinants of his punishment belonged to the realm of custom and tradition in contrast to the codified determinants of Barbari codes (Leges Barbarorum) that referred to the actions of freemen. References to these codes were made even in the case of 'unfreemen' but only insofar as their actions could lead to a conflict between freemen.

In case of Freemen on the other hand, punishment had a connotation of private revenge since there was no arbiter strong enough to improve his will over them in the settlement of conflicts. Hence.

" A settlement could be reached through revenge or

reconciliation vengeance and feud were accepted forms of private retaliation, but they did not necessarily follow every injury. In a situation where violence is not monopolised, private violence is potentially omnipresent,but does not always manifest itself in practice. Notably it can be brought off. Reconciliation through payment to the injured party was already known in Tacitus's time".

The chief task of the 'Barbarian codes', in fact, was to establish the modalities for the translation of physical revenge into compensatory indemnities, where the amount of amount of compensation varied according to the nature of the crime and the age, rank, sex and prestige of the injured party. Thus, 'A free born man was worth more than a woman but less worthy when compared to a person of high social rank and prestige. In an intricately stratified society of the early middle ages, where the value of a human being was more or less fixed by the social position he occupied, even the compensation accorded in case of violations also followed a stratified logic. To this hiererchic logic, Barbaric codes added a new twist, by establishing an equally intricate system of correlations between physical violations and economic compensations whereby every kind of blow or wound given to every kind of person had a price to be paid. Consequently, uptill the twelfth century, Barbaric codes

determined the compensation that was to be accorded to an individual, when violations in terms of killings, woundings and assault (wergeld) took place among the freemen. Then even fixed the form of restitution when properly had been stolen, destroyed or damaged.

If a violator was reluctant to pay or was unable to do so, he was declared as a 'friedlos' or outlaw through ostracisation and the consequent 'value' attached to him by virtue of his position was in direct correlation with the treatment in store for the criminal; since by the amount of compensation with the treatment by the victims social rank, a criminal could state whether or not he could fulfill the obligation.

By twelfth century, criminal justice in its nascent form emerged regulating punishment and defining crimes - within a new social miles. Victor Achter posits the emergence of criminal justice in the middle of twelfth century suddenly at Languedoc, from where it spread to the rest of Europe Immink, on the other hand, accepting the historical time of emergence, links criminal justice to the processes of feudalisation across Europe which by initialing fundamental changes in the motion of 'freedom' laid conditions for its emergence. he argues that in the Prefeudal Europe, the nation of freedom was inextricably

linked to an Allod - an estate that was free from external interference - whose occupant was his own master. His freedom meant a total independence from secular, this worldly powers, other then himself, approximating the connotation of subsequent political concept of Sovereignty. Theoretically, since the occupant of an 'Allod' was free from the will of any power other than himself, he was deemed to be a freeman, whose relationship with the unfree persons subject to him was that of a ruler and ruled. The feudal institution of Vassalage, in its emergence, gradually terminated this notion of freedom based on an Allod with Frankish Kings and their successors, freeman themselves were subject to a relationship of hard and 'fideles' whereby they no longer held the same sort of total independence which hitherto existed in their possession. By the time feudalism had firmly crystallised the whole network of feudal ties, enveloping even the freemen, the hitherto existing notion of freedom had been totally transformed. "Freedom meant being bound directly to the king or to be more precise, there were degrees of freedom depending on how direct the allegiance was ".

Thus, it was this transformation of the notion of 'freedom', initiated by feudalism says Immink, that led to the emergence of a penal system applicable even to the freemen. In the ancient 'Allodial' sense of freedom, only

the king remained as a sovereign freeman. His imposition of penalty in the case of an 'infedelitas' by his 'fideles' connoted punishment in a true sense resembling the incurrance of justice by a master over his serfs. With more and more acts being declared as illegal, the inclusion of freemen into a widened net of penal system with corporal and capital punishments also increased.

In the context of correlating the systematic emergence of criminal justice with 'state formation', Immink's argument- in summary - amounts to saying that in the absence of a central authority punishment assumed the character of a private vengeance or feud and a voluntary reconciliation. Only with the emergence of strong rulers coterminous with a process of 'feudalisation occurring across the European landscape could criminal justice emerge in a parallel manner. Thus what was practiced within the hermetic confines of a manor, by a lord over his serfs, gradually transformed in proportions to become applicable to territories and their rulers, including within an enlarged scope even freemen.

The ruling councils of these cities hardly had any authority that was characteristic of territorial principalities and their rulers, and hence could not impose their will and control events. In this situation, there was always plenty of room for private violence. Only towards

the end of fifteenth century, did a semblance of criminal justice emerged when the ruling elites finally became real authorities.

> Patriciates emerged everywhere, constituting a socially superior group. The towns became increasingly stratified. The patrician courts could act as superiors notably towards the lower and lower-middle citizens. In the towns of the Netherlands this development is clearly reflected in their ways of dealing with criminal cases. For a long time the main business of the courts had been to mediate and register private reconciliations. Around 1500 'corrections ' gradually outnumbered reconciliations. the former were measures expressing a justice from above and often consisted corporal punishment*.

Clearly, during the Feudal age punishment with differing geographical bases and variations, could only emerge as a part of systematic corpus of 'criminal justice ', when a relation of superiority and subordination was firmly established - A relation that was correlative to the increasing consolidation of state power and authority. Hence the emphasis on the process of state formation and urbanisation in the emergence of criminal justice, which had as their underside, the legal notion of superior and subordinate.

In itself, the consolidation of centralised authority - occurring by the time of twelfth century as a part of state formation processes - may lay down the conditions conducive for the emergence of criminal justice as a systematic corpus, But it still cannot adequately account for the reasons involved in bringing such an emergence to the force. Towards this end, most of the historical accounts of punishment advance the motives of morality for bringing a transformation in the practice of criminal justice. By the beginning of twelfth century, though the territorial princes were strong enough to put an end to private revenge, what actually prompted them to do so was their perception of moral reprehension involved in the acts of private revenge.

Even before the territorial princes, church attempted to put an end to private revenge in order to protect its own ecclesiastical interests through the instrument of 'treuga dei ' (temporary peace in the name of god). it equated the acts of private revenge with the offenses against divinity, whereby they were prone to invite the wrath of the god like any other blasphemy. Hence it was the task of ecclesiastical courts not only to try the breaches of religious order, but also the acts of private revenge. However, church was unsuccessful in this agenda of regulating and ending the private revenge. Even it had to

await for the emergence of strong secular powers to put an end to the private character of punishments. But its major contribution lay in attaching a moral connotation to the acts of private revenge as moral and religious breaches. Both Achter and Immink see the moral connotation attached to the acts of private revenge as the major feature in the transformation of criminal justice in the hands of centralised authorities. Achter considers the element of moral reprehension as the essence of punishment that was largely absent in the ancient Germanic low, which could not distinguish between accidental and intentional acts. If a felled tree accidentally killed a man, even then full compensation had to be rendered. Only when the latter acts became an essential component with an moral reprehension attached to them in the criminal punishment, could criminal justice emerge. Immink, on the other hand incorporates the moral factor into the wider context of nascent state formation and consolidation of central authorities. Before the transformation of criminal justice, says Immink, the moral reprehension of the violation was so obvious for the injured party in its self evidence that there was no need to justify the retaliatory revenge on any other ground other than the offense itself. Insofar as law was concerned, its efforts were directed towards effecting a reconciliation rather than being concerned with the moral appreciation of

the offensive act which was largely left to the judgement of the aggrieved. But by twelfth century when the territorial lords started administering punishments over offenders who had not wronged them personally, their laws acquired an impersonal character. A distinction between civil and criminal cases is now perceived whereby the latter are termed as iniquitates i.e., acts that have a moral reprehension attached to it. The author of such an act becomes a 'misericordia' for the lord.

Thus along with the wider transformation in the nature of criminal punishment, occurring by the twelfth century, there was also a change in the perception of morality involved in the criminal act, thereby assisting a systematic criminal justice to emerge.

We have already discussed above, how in the absence of a centralised state power criminal punishment largely assumed the character of private vengeance and feud in the medieval Europe. And also about the gradual translation of physical revenge into an economic and monetary compensation for the injured party as a way of reconcialiation. If a violator either refused or was unable to compensate the injured party, he was prone to be declared as an outlaw or 'freidlos'. Thus the system of Freidlosigheit (outlawry) had its basis in the failure to compensate the injured by the violator. But over a period of time, what was basically

an economic and monetary reconciliation between the aggrieved parties either on an individual or a communal basis, changed its complexion. And this change becomes, the point of departure for 'Punishment' and 'Social structure.

Rusche and Kirchheimer point out to the historical period of fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. When a number of developments having their determinance in the 'economy' militated against the private character of early medieval criminal law, gradually transforming it into an instrument of domination. It was neither the considerations of moral reprehensibility nor the political implications of private revenge that led the central powers to put an end to the private character of criminal justice. But on the contrary, they argue, it was the consideration on part of the centralised authorities to exercise power and domination over their subjects in order to accrue fiscal and monetary benefits in the process of fining and penalising the violators of public peace. In the old system of 'Freidlosigkeit' there existed a provision of double payment of compensation that was rendered by the violator went to the overlord or king for being a commission in the process of reconciliation of disputes. One part of the compensation that was rendered by the violator went to the overlord or king for being a commission in the process of reconciliation

between the two parties in the forms of 'Freidensgeld, fredus or gewedde. The other part was victims share which assumed the forms of 'wergeld, busse,emenda or lendis. Thus in the Saxonian England existing along with 'wer' (payment that was to be rendered in cases of homicide) and 'bot' (compensation to be paid for injury) lay 'wite' (payment to the king or overlord).

But by the time of 'Treaty of Verdun', the fine that was to be paid to the central authority gradually replaced and outweighed the compensation that was to be rendered to the victim of violation. The amount of money penalties was no longer in correlation with the nature of injury or violation, but rather was no longer in correlation with the nature of injury or violation, but rather was fixed by independent tribunals. As the central monopolisation of punishment progressed, the rights of injured party were separated from the realm of penal law. Compensation to the victim was now the prerogative of civil law.

Rusche and Kirchheimer view these transformations, on the other hand in a different light whereby with the location of power to punish in an authoritative central agency, the fines and monetary restitutions transformed from being a compensation to the injured party into a method of enriching the judiciaries. As a consequence, they argue,

punishment through the imposition of monetary fines and penalties was reserved only for the rich, while poor offenders unable to meet such exorbitant sums of redressal had corporal punishment as their privileged share.

Thus, there may be differences in the motives and determinants involved in the above discussed historical accounts on the emergence of criminal justice, but on the whole they all are in argument by sharing a more or less basic outline of the story, i.e., the emergence of a systematic corpus of criminal justice with the power of define crime and establish consequent rituals of punishment, during the historical period between twelfth and fifteenth centuries correlative to the emergence of a strong and centralised powers, organised over definite geographies. It is during the same historical period under consideration i.e. between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries, that there was an increasing tendency on the part of central authorities to resort to corporal and capital punishments which were no less brutal than the blood revenge they replaced. The legal accounts of punishment surprisingly do not account much to his bloody character of criminal justice. Only the explanation put forward by Rusche and Kirchheimer in this regard, comes close in doing so.

According to them, this period was marked in its contribution of an impoverished and displaced population of

peasants who were forced into vagrancy, vaga bondage and crime due to the rise of a capitalistic pasturage system which displaced agriculture with grazing resulting in a pauperisation of large sections of country side. The threat posed by these men forced into committing offensive acts and was retaliated by the central powers - employing their new found authority to punish - with repressive corporal punishments since fines and other monetary penalties were reserved for the rich.

The elements of barbarism and sadism within these corporal penalties they fee, can be ascribed to two factors existing at different levels. On the one hand the grotesque cruelty involved in the punitive displays, satisfied the publics 'lust for cruelly' while allowing the authorities to direct this mass hatred against individual offenders thereby diverting the responsibility for its economic hardships away from themselves. On the otherhand, cruelty expressed in judicial acts, can itself be a social phenomena with particular conditions of existence needing to be explained by reference to socio-economic conditions within which it exists. To this effect, they explain cruelty of the periods corporal punishments with reference to the existing economic conditions. during this period, they say, there was a massive oversupply of labor particularly in the growing urban centres, which led to the devaluation of human life

and therefore penal policy of the period was little short of being genocidal.

As the price paid for labor decreased, the value set upon human life also decreased, which consequently reflected in the attitude of authorities in employing harsh repressive measures. The hard struggle for existence caused the penal mechanisms of the period, to employ these punitive measures which prevented or atleast offset the great increases of population.

With in a framework where punitive measures are determined by economic conditions, Rushche and Kirchheimer are compelled to perceive the objective of punishment in a negative vein. For them punishment serves the purpose of regulating the labor supply on one hand and an incipient ideological control on the other. Once these economic considerations are removed, punishment collapses into an unrestrained barbarism needing no further explanation.

But punishment during the middle ages was hardly a brutal employment of force alone, it had a political intent behind it and operated within the context of a specific social symbolism.

During the middle ages, Huizanga tells us, 'life' was charecterised by a violent tenor whereby things presented

themselves to the medieval mind in violent contrasts and impressive forms, lending a tone of excitement and passion to every day life. Despair and joy, cruelty and pious tenderness through their perpetual oscillations endowed the life of middle ages with a contrastive character. All things in life were marked by a ostentatious publicity. In such a milieu, corporal punishments displayed no exception, and were spectacular spiritual dramas containing moral messages for the common people. For during, the middle ages religiosity pervaded every aspect of life whereby every social act was also a religious act. The division between sacred and profane was removed since in order to be grasped even god had to reside in the proliferating rituals associated with the profane acts like child births, marriages and executions. Consequently the blind passion associated with religion also found its vigor in trivial pursuits like the practice of criminal justice.

> Man at that time is convinced that right is absolutely fixed and certain justice should prosecute the unjust every where and to the end. Reparation and retribution have to be extreme and assume the character of revenge. In this exaggerated need of justice, primitive barbarism, pagan at bottom, blends with the christian conception of society. The church, on the one hand had inculcated gentleness and clemency, and tried in that

way to soften judicial morals. On the other hand in adding to the primitive need of retribution to the horror of sin, it had, to a certain extent, stimulated the sentiment of justice. And sin, to violent and impulsive spirits was only too frequently another name for what their enemies did. The barbarous idea of retaliation was reinforced by fanaticism. The chronic insecurity made the greatest possible severity on the part of the public authorities desirable; crime came to be regarded as a menace to the order and society as well as an insult to divine majesty. Thus it was natural that the late middle ages should become the special period of judicial cruelty that the criminal deserved his punishment was not doubted for a moment. The popular sense of justice always sanctioned the most rigorous penalties*.

However, Foucault's account of 'corporal punishment ' for the same historical period under discussion is stark in its contrast with the other historical accounts discussed above. It also forms the starting point of the narrative of 'Discipline and Punish '.

For him the torturous infliction of pain over the body of condemned man can neither be deemed as a reflection of the general tenor of violence charecterising the middle ages, nor can it be ascribed to the imperatives of class

control. With its own specificity, this mode of punishment had a specific political intent and purpose to convey within an articulate strategy of domination. Consequently 'Torture' far from being an arbitrary out burst of cruelty and revenge of the sovereign powers was a carefully regulated affair attached to a set of legal doctrines and ceremonies which controlled its use and gave it a practical meaning. Its purpose was to mark, the, victim

> either by the scar it leaves on the body, or by the spectacle that accompanies it, to brand the victim with infamy; even if its function is to 'purge' the crime, torture does not reconcile; it traces around or, rather, on the very body of the condemned man signs that must not be effaced; in any case men will remember public exhibition, the pillory, torture and the pain duty observed. And from the point of view of the law that imposes it, public torture and execution must be spectacular, it must be seen by almost as its triumph. The very excess of violence employed is one of the elements of its glory.*

With this, purposive nature, Torture or supplice was widely employed within the punitive rituals of 'Ancien Regime ' says Foucault. As a punitive technique, its production of pain was not arbitrary and uncontrolled. On

the contrary, to become 'Torture punishment ' must be determined by certain criteria, i.e. the pain produced during the process should be subjected to 'calculation', comparison and hierarchial gradation. It is a precise and calibrated infliction of pain on the condemned body. Thus death becomes torture since it is the culmination of a calculated gradation of pain.

> from decapitation (which reduces all pain to a single gesture, performed in a single moment - the zero degree of torture) through hanging, the stake and the wheel (all of which prolong the agony), to quartering which carries pain almost to infinity; death - torture is the art of maintaining life in pain, by subdividing it into a thousand deaths by achieving before life ceases 'the most exquisite agencies. *

In its calibrated state, torture then is correlated with a 'legal code of pain ' i.e. 'the quality, intensity, duration of pain with the gravity of the crime, the person of the criminal, the rank of his victims '.

Thus torture as a technique of precise and calibrated production of pain in conjunction with the types of crime and nature of courts, for Foucault hardly displays an arbitrary nature reflective of a primitive barbarism, it

is a differentiated production of pain, an organised ritual for the marking of victims and the expression of the marking of victims and the expression of the power that punishes; not the expression of a legal system driven to exasperation and forgetting its principles, losing all restraint. In the 'excesses' of torture, a whole economy of power is invested*.

Hence almost all the serious penalties pertaining to the crimes committed during the Ancien Regime involved an element of torture.

However, a tortured body was preceded by a legal ceremony, says Foucault, whose main objective was to produce the truth of the crime without the presence of the criminal. From the mid Thirteerth century, excluding England, a new procedure of inquisitorial trial emerged across the continent replacing the older Accusatory trials.

A criminal justice whose main objective was to arbitrate and reconcile private feuds and blood revenges, rather than to impose its will, was compelled to employ an Accusatory trial, which in all its openness accorded to the feuding parties or question, an equal treatment. It favoured both the accused and the accuser a same scale, subjecting them without any discrimination to judicial custody during the process of trial. If the accuser could not substantial his accusations with sufficient and necessary proof, he was made to receive the same punishment which the accused would have received, had he been convicted.

But by mid thirteenth certary, criminal justice sheds off this visible neutrality, by borrowing from the ecclesiastical law, the old christian institution of inquisition for its secular laws to effect a new procedure of criminal trial, known as the inquisitorial trial. This procedure of Inquisitorial trial in its departure from the old Accusatory trial, condemned the accused behind the veil

of a shrouded secrecy. It proceedings were enveloped by an opacity that only terminated in the visible clarity of the verdict. Its most characteristic feature was the possibility of an 'exofficio' prosecution, with the court starting an independent investigation on its own initiative without the accusation of the accuser. For this irquisitio, then the court's officers would collect denounciations in order to substantiate the condemnation of the criminal by the court. In the old triadic relation of Accuser-Judge-Accused, an equal distribution of judicial power was present. With the emergence of Inquisitorial trial, however, it was a brinary relation that, within an unequal distribution of power, operated between the courts and accused, whereby the courts assumed the role of accusers through their prosecutors, imposing upon themselves in the process the twin responsibilities of condemnation and judgement.

Historically, this displacement of Accusatory trials by Inquisitorial ones was uniform neither in causes nor in pace. In France its use by Phillip the Fair, against the Templars accentuated its spread. However with the consolidation of Royal power, prosecution by the courts acquired a prominence between fourteenth and sixteenth centuries. In the case of Netherlands, where urbanisation acted as a major determinant in the emergence of criminal justice, the growth of Inquisitorial procedure was linked to

the formation and rise of Patrician elites within the urban ruling councils. Even Phillip II in order to quell the Dutch revolt of 1570 resorted to this procedure. England, being an exception, had a vague semblance of this procedure within its criminal law, only when the Tudors through consolidation acquired the monopoly of judicial violence. Thus more or less in all the cases, a fundamental process of centralisation and consolidation of the power to punish preceded the displacement of Accusatory procedures and the imposition of Inquisitorial ones, whereby the judicial powers preferred to impose their will from the above, rather than to arbitrate and reconcile.

Accordingly, says Foucault, "the secret and written form of the (inquisitorial) procedure reflects the principle that in criminal matters, the establishment of truth was the absolute right and the exclusive power of the sovereign and his judges."

The Accused by his insignificance in the process was only expected to substantiate truth of the crime arrived independently at, by the judicial powers with his confession, rather than to participate in its production. However, in this form of criminal justice, the law may exclude the accused from the process of the trial, but it certainly did not ignore, the imperatives of the systematic production of truth. From the moment of Accusation or

condemnation to the final act of consummation of trial through the confession of the accused, the secrecy of the trial completed truth to obey certain rules in its establishment:

> A whole tradition dating from the middle ages and considerably developed by the great lawyers of the Renaissance laid done what the nature and the sue of evidence might be. Even in the eighteenth century, it was still common to meet distinctions like the following: true, direct or legitimate proof that provided by waitresses for example) and indirect, conjectural artificial proof obtained by agreement) or again manifest proof, considerable proof, imperfect or slight main or again urgent or necessary proof that did not allow one to doubt the truth of the deed approximate or semi full proof, considerable proof, imperfect or slight or again urgent or necessary proof that did not allow one to doubt the truth of the deed approximate or semi full proof which may be regarded as true as long as the accused does not destroy it with evidence on the contrary lastly distant or adminicule dues which consisted only of opinion.*

These distinctions are operational by virtue of their ability to produce a corresponding judicial effect. For

example 'Full proof' may bring with it any punishment, semi full proof on the other hand may invite heavy penalties excluding death and so on. On the other hand it is because of secrecy that this system obeys a complex penal arithmetic. But on the other hand it is this complete by being accessible only to specialists buttresses and reinforces this secrecy these formal constraints on legal proof were a mode of regulation internal to an absolute power and exclusive of Knowledge. operating with the aid of an elaborate system of pond arithmetic, penal investigation became a legal mactrine that was competent to produce broth without the presence of the accused.

However, the truth thus produced, was incomplete and unfulfilled, until and unless it was consummated by a confession from the accused. Confession on one hand renders the further arithmetic of proof and the mechanics of truth unnecessary by pre-emption. On the other hand it symbolises the victory of this impersonal penal arithmelic constructed without the accused over the accused, since he validates it by translating and transforming into his own responsibility.

> Within the crime reconstituted by writing, the criminal who confessed came to play the role of lining truth. The confession n act of the criminal, responsible and speaking subject, was the complement to the written secret preliminary investigation. Thence the importance

that all this procedure of an inquisitorial type accorded to the confession.

it transecnded all other evidence an element in the calculation of the truth, it was also the act by which the accused accepted the charge and recognised its truth it transformed an investigation carried on without him into a voluntary affirmation. Through the confession the accused himself took part in the ritual of producing the penal truth.

Even though it emanates as a living and oral counter part to the mechanically constructed proofs of penal with metic from the person of the accused confession still had to be guaranteed by certain legal formalities. Mode in full consciousness in front of a competent court, confession should possess a spontaneous nature whereby the accused entered into a transactory relationship with the law committing himself to its procedures and signing the truth of its preliminary investigation. Given this nature of confession-not only as a judicial proof to be weighed along with other forms of evidence, but also as a voluntary participation on the part of the accused it was wrested from the accused by the oath under which he was placed and through the employment of judicial torture Surprisingly, judicial torture was considered as a conducive instrument for the production of spontaneous confession. Torture was

not considered as a defective mechanism by the classical law on the contrary.

> It occupied a strict place in a complex mechanism in which the procedure of an inquisitorial type was reinforced with the elements of accusatory system in which the techniques of proof administered by the magistrates were mingled with the methods of the ordeal to which the accused was challenged in which he was called upon if necessary by the most violent persuasion to play the role of voluntary partner in the procedure in which it was a question in short of producing truth by a mechanism consisting of two elements that of the investigation carried out in secret by the judicial authority and that of the act ritually performed by the accused. The body of the accused the speaking and if necessary, suffering body assured the interlocking of these two mechanisms*.

A Torture's main purpose within the regime of corporal punishments as a precise and exact punitive technique was to "mark" the body of the condemned, with a venegeance that matches the nature of the crime. A transgression of law for the criminal justice of Pre-classical period meant an injurious attack on the sovereign's body-since it embodied the law of the realm. The kings body for the

judicial theology of the middle ages connoted a 'double body'.

> "... since it involves not only the transitory element that is born and dies, but another that remains unchanged by time and is maintained as the Physical yet intangible support of the kingdom; around this duality, which was originally close to the Christological model, are organised an iconography, a political theory of monarchy, legal mechanisms that distinguish between as well as link the person of the king and the demands of the crown and a whole ritual that reaches its height in the coronation, the funeral and the Ceremonies of submission".

Hence an attack on law implies an attack on the body of the sovereign. Criminal justice percieves even a petty criminal as a potential regicide and turns even and inconsequential infringement of law into an exaggerated rebellion. The crime commited consequently must be punished by the full force of law. The spectacular display of torture with all its meticulous and calculated rituals of inflicting the pain. Can only restore the lost power of the Sovereign. Consequently, public execution performs a juridico-political function. "It is a ceremonial by which a monentarily injured sovereignity is reconstituted. It restores that

sovereignity by manifesting it at its most spectacular."

B Like, the divine god who has stamped his creation with 'marks' that ought to deciphered by an intricate web of resemblances and similitudes, the Sovereign, who by virtue of being an secular and earthly divinity, inscribes the signature of his wrath over the body of the condemned. The site and occasion of 'public execution' provided an opportunity for him to that either directly or through his functionaries. The type of torture and punishment inflicted on the body of the condemned resembled the crime that was committed.

> There was the use of 'symbolic torture in which the forms of the execution referred to the nature of the crime: The tongues of blasphemers were pierced, the impure were burnt, the right hand of murderers was cut off; sometimes the condemned man was made to carry the instrument of his crime-thus Damiens was made to hold in his guilty right hand the famous dagger with which he had committed the crime, hand and dagger being smeared with sulphur and burnt together. As Vico remarked, this old jurisprudence was an 'entire poetics'.

By being a possible half of the Universal atlas the body of the criminal was prone to Communicate in a relationship of inferiority with the superior powers of the Sovereign.

Thus torture far from being an arbitrary infliction of pain Connoting primitive barbarism- as viewed by conventional legal and political histories, which extrapolate punishment from the wider social and economic milleau-operators for Foucault as a specific penal technique having its own.

C Internal rationality, operating with a political intent within a social symbolism.

> "If torture was so strongly embedded in legal practice, it was because it revealed truth and showed the operation of power. It assured the articulation of the written on the oral, the secret on the public, the procedure of investigation on the operation of the Confession; it made possible to reproduce the crime on the Visible body of the criminal; in the same horror, the crime had to be manifested and annulled. It also made the body of the Condemned man the place where the vengeance of the Sovereign was applied the anchoring point for a manifestation of power, an opportunity of affirming the decimeter of forces."

Phillipe Aries tells us that, during the period between the end of fifth century and the middle of eighteenth, there existed a 'Promiscuity between the living and the dead' in Western Europe. Shops and market stalls existed within or adjacent to graveyards. A burial was no less than a theatrical event with Musicians and Actors performing. Graves were frequently opened and their decomposing Cadavers were removed. Each cemetery inevitably had an ossuary: a gallery in which skulls and limbs of the poor among the interred were displayed for ornamental purposes.

D It is this familiarity with death, that made torture and death acceptable in the penal realm, it is argued. Foucault accepts the determinance of factors like these , along with the others like low cost of labour power, Christian Contempt for the body and high mortality rates to a certain extent in the persistence of torture in penal measures. But it is the above mentioned internal rationalities of these measures that explains the application and persistence of it uptill the Revolution. Specific political considerations along with the internal rationalities of these punitive measures kept the system of punitive displays operative at least in the eighteenth Century France.

But why did Torture as a penal technique disappear from

the criminal punishments by the end of eighteenth century? From the point of view of the organisation of Power, the public executions employing torture as a penal technique, degenerated into disorder and chaos, instead of being exegetical spectacles. These displays gave rise to ambiguous meanings and reversals of roles. Too often the executioner or the Sovereign behind him were see to be unjust parties, while the Condemned man was transformed into a public hero. During this same period, the rising capitalism also effected a change in the Complexions of offences which were increasingly economic in nature. A vast proliferation of these property based crimes made the irregular and exemplarily isolated eighteenth Century criminal justice, infective. With multiplicity of courts, competing jurisdictions, vast number of legal loop holes and lack of Systematic police, the punitive net of the eighteenth century failed in maintaining a penal economy.

Hence Reformers demanded a more rational and more certain system of justice based upon detailed policing, a uniform and systematic penal procedure and punishment should be Carefully Calibrated to fit the crime.

> " The true objective of the reforms movement even its general formulations, was not so much to establish a new right to punish based on more equitable principles, as to set up a new 'economy' of the power to punish to

assure its better distribution so that it should be distributed in homogenous circuits capable of operating every where, is a continuous way down to the finest grains of the social body."

Thus, the Reformation of criminal punishments, at the end of eighteenth century had dual objectives in mind while laying down a 'new penal economy.' On one hand, the net of criminal justice was to be enlarged to incorporate the criminality of the lower classes. On the other to delimit the arbitrary power of the Sovereign.

Against this backdrop. Beccaria and the 'Ideologues' advanced a 'gentle way in punishment' as opposed to the tortures excesses of Ancient Regime. Punishment they Proclaimed must reflect the nature of the crime.

We have already seen above, how even preclassical technique of punishment like Torture also correlated the type of punishment to be inflicted to the nature of the crime. A correlation based on the operation of resemblances and similitudes. With the Ideologues such a correlation had a difficult connotation separated from its previous one by an epistemic shift.

The new correlation between the crime and punishment effected by the ideologues is based on the classical

epistemes order of knowledge where, everything is differentiated by identity and difference . Work becomes the cure for idleness, shame against vanity ,pain against voilence and so on. Corresponding to the general Madness of the world the classical age perceived its recommendations as compatible with the Natural law as opposed to the arbitrary nature of sovereigns punishment. The law was a taxonomic table with identities and differences for which the body of the criminal has least importance. The reformers recommended that the punishment and their implicit messages should be publicly displayed for all to see, since punishment6 was at once an example to every one and in the interests of everyone. But if punishment still aimed to influence others, it was not addressed to the calculating, reasoning mind of the citizen and not to the trembling bodies of cowed onlookers - a matter of gentle didacticism, and not of terror. Punishment was now to be lesson, a sign, a representation of public morality which was to be openly displayed to all : In the penalty, rather than seeing the presence of the Sovereign, one will read the laws themselves."

For this to happen, a whole diverse repertoire of suitable public punishments would have been necessary, reflecting the different crimes, reversing the various interests, revealing their warning signs for all to see. It

is therefore a central historical paradox that what in fact developed at this time was not the diversified public theatre of punishment which the reformers had outlined, but instead a system of imprisonment in which the prison became the standard sanction for virtually the whole range of offences.

As Foucault makes clear, the generalized use of the prison, with its characteristic secrecy, isolation, and monotony, was largely at odds with the theories of the reformers. And this development is all the more surprising when Foucault tells us that, prior to this time, imprisonment had only a limited and marginal position within most penal systems, functioning merely as a place to secure offenders awaiting trial or punishment, rather than as a standard penalty n itself. This being the case, how could imprisonment so quickly become the general mode of legal punishment?

The usual explanation for the rise of the prison points to the prior existence of several great models of punitive confinement-the Rasphuis of Amsterdam, the Manison de Force at Ghent, the Gloucester penitentiary in England, and the Walnut Street Prison n Philadelphia. These institutions, with their emphasis upon work and reformation, had developed regimes which to some extent converged with the reformers' programmes, in so far as they were correctionalist rather

than punitive in design. But if prison regimes and the reformers' programmes both aimed to reform the individual, they went about this in quite different ways, each using a quite different technology to get hold of the individual and transform him, each developing its own specific techniques for addressing the body and gaining access to the soul. The reformers approached the matter at the level of ideas- proposing signs, lesson,s and representations as forms of persuasion or aids to calculation. In contrast to this the prisons seizes the body of the inmate, exercising it, training it, organizing its time and movement in order ultimately to transform the soul, the seat of the habits. It takes hold of the individual, manipulating and moulding him or her in a behaviouristic mode, rather than just attempting to influence his or her moral thinking from the outside. There is thus a major difference between the reformers model of the prison-based system which came to be established a difference which is primarily technological rather than legal or theoretical.

The major problem, then, around which the whole of Discipline and Punish actually turns, is why did the prison succeed in displacing the demands of the reformers and the logic of penal theory? Where did it come from and how did it come to be so quickly and universally accepted? At this point the text undergoes a sudden and rather disconcerting

shift of focus, moving away from penal ideas and legal theory to examine a much wider, non-discursive, series of developments; the evolution of what Foucault calls the disciplinary techniques.

Discipline, for Foucault, is an art of the human body and a method of mastering the body and rendering it both obedient and useful, and as such has a very long history. However, it was in the classical age that the body came to be conceived as an object and target of power which could be controlled and improved without the costly use of violence. The techniques that provided these means of control and improvement were first generated in a variety of institutions-in the army, the monasteries, and in schools, hospitals, and workshops-but from he sixteenth century onwards these began to be consolidated and reproduced whenever and wherever they seemed applicable.

Foucault sets out a kind of blueprint of the general methods and principles of discipline, abstracting these from the practices and texts of the period. In his description, discipline is above all a political anatomy of detail. It operates on the smallest scale of control, paying attention not primarily to the whole body but to its individual movements and gestures. it aims to increase the efficiency of each movement and develop its co-ordination with others,

exercising different forces and building them up together. It does this by bringing to bear a constant, uninterrupted supervision which is alert to the slightest deviation, thereby allowing a meticulous control of the body which is being disciplined.

In order to facilitate this kind of control, certain organizational principles were developed, adapted to particular institutions at first, but later generalized to suit other circumstances. Thus it was the army which did most to develop the art of distributing individuals in space-its ranks and files introducing a set orderliness into a mass of individuals, separating them one by one so that they could be individually viewed, supervised, and assessed. This same form of distribution was quickly adopted in the schoolroom, the workshops, the hospital, and so on. Similarly the monastery developed the timetable-a means of imposing set rhythms to organize time and movement, specify a series of occupations,a and regulate the cycle or repetition. On a smaller scale, the concept of the manoecuver derives from both the barracks and the workshop. In this repeated routine the exact posture of the body, the positioning of the limbs, and the smallest of bodily movements were programmed to increase their efficiency and link them to the use of a weapon or the operation of a machine. By these means, bodies were to be put through their

paces until they became docile, efficient, useful machines, programmed to carry out the functions to which they had been trained.

Of course individuals are by nature recalcitrant, and so dealing with disobedience is a central problem for any method of control. Significantly, these disciplinary methods do not simply punish troublesome cases, but develop a whole new method of sanctioning which Foucault calls normalization. THis method is essentially corrective rather than punitive in orientation, concerned to induce conformity rather than to exact retribution or expiation. It involves, first of all, a means of assessing the individual in relation to a desired standard of conduct: a means of knowing how the individual performs, watching his movements, assessing his behaviour,a nd measuring it against the rule. Surveillance arrangements and examination procedures provide this knowledge, allowing incidents of non-conformity or departures from set standards to be recognized and dealt with, at the same time individualizing the different subjects who fall under this gaze. And since the object is to correct rather than punish, the actual sanctions used tend to involve exercise and training, measures which in themselves help bring conduct into line and help make individuals more self-controlled.

The examination is, for this system, a central method

of control, allowing close observation, differentiation, assessment of standards, and the identification of any failure to conform. So too is the dossier or case record, which allows the characteristics of the individual to be assessed over time and in comparison with others. From this time onwards, writing about individuals ceases to be a form of worship fit only for notables, kings, and heroes, and becomes instead a form of domination to which the powerless are more and more subjected. Out of these practices emerges a detailed and systematic knowledge of individuals, a knowledge which gave rise, in turn, to the various human sciences of criminology, psychology, sociology, and so on. And, as Foucault is at pains to point out, the procedures of observation, examination, and measurement which allow this knowledge to develop are, at the same time, exercising power and control over the individuals who are isolated-and in a sense, constituted-within their gaze.

The Panopticon or Inspection House which Jeremy Bentham designed in 1791 is seen by Foucault as the very epitome of these power-knowledge principles. It takes the form of a circular building, with individual cells around its perimeter whose windows and lighting are arranged so as to make their occupants clearly visible to the central inspection tower, though it remains opaque to them. It is thus an architectural form designed to individualize bodies

and to render these individuals constantly subject to the knowledge and power of the authorities who occupy its centre. In time, this constant visibility and vulnerability induces self-control on the part of the inmates of the cells. Power no longer needs to unleash its sanctions and instead its objects take it upon themselves to behave in the desired manner. Any remnant of physical repression is thus gradually replaced by a gentle but effective structure of domination. Moreover, the power relations involved are, in a sense, automated and objective. THey are an effect of the distribution of places and visibility and do not depend upon the strength or intentions of those who occupy these positions: the perfection of power should tend to inter its actual exercise unnecessary... this architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it; in short,... the inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers.

According to Foucault,t he usefulness of these panoptic, disciplinary principles was such that they were soon imitated in society's major institutions and eventually came to be generalized throughout the entire social body. However, the actual nature of this generalized panopticism is not precisely detailed in Foucault's text. Sometimes the claim is relatively modest-that all modern forms of power

have been affected by the development of disciplinary principles. At other times a more inflated rhetoric takes over and describes modern society as the disciplinary society-a society of surveillance in which we are all subjected to infinite examination in the panoptic machine.

Whatever the exact extent of these large claims, a number of points are clearly made regarding the genesis of the disciplines and their subsequent effects. First of all, although it was within he context of early European capitalism that the disciplines achieved their rapid development, their techniques and principles are transferable and may be operated elsewhere and under different regimes. However, they do have a special and interesting relationship to the development of democracy in the West, summed up in the aphorism that 'the "Enlightenment" which discovered the liberties, also invented the disciplines'. According to Foucault, it was ultimately the generalization of democratic constitutions and the expansion of liberal forms of freedom. Without this vast infrastructure of power relations which subjected the masses to an orderly, disciplined existence, the extension of 'liberty' could never have taken place. This echoes the Hobbesian argument that freedom under the law implies a prior process of subjugation, and it constitutes the meaning of Foucault's suggestion that discipline is 'the dark side'

This genealogical argument that the disciplines are the ancestors of the prison - is presented by Foucault in its strongest version when the argues that the 'general from' of the prison institution was prefigured in these wider disciplinary developments, and simply imported into the legal system from outside. To this extent, nineteenth-century penal history should not be seen as part of the history of moral ideas but rather as a chapter in the history of the body and its investment by power-knowledge techniques. Within these terms, the great model prisons of Ghent, Gloucester, Walnut Street, etc. must be seen as the first points of transition or imitation, not as innovations as such. This genealogy also serves as an explanation for the rapid acceptance of the prison as an 'obvious or 'natural' institution. In a society which was already becoming inured to the operation of disciplinary mechanisms, the prisons could appear to be self-evident right from the beginning.

of democracy and its egalitarian laws. Foucault argues that the effect of disciplinary relations is to undercut the fairness of exchange and the equalities of status provided for in law and legal doctrine, an effect which operates in an invisible and extra-legal fashion. The disciplines ensure that real constraints and controls are introduced into relationships which the law deems to be voluntary or contractual, thus permitting the coexistence of legal freedom and habitual domination. It is in this sense that the disciplines are said to be 'a sort of counter-law'.

Returning now, after this long but crucial detour, to the problem of penal history, we are able to view the rise of the prison in a rather different light. Given the context in which Foucault has located it, the prison now appears as an aspect of that wider historical phenomenon, the development and generalization of the disciplines. And indeed, if one thinks of the specifically modern developments in penology which have been associated with the prison the investigation of 'the criminal' behind the crime, the concern with correction and adjustment, the involvement of experts whose task it is to observe, to assess, and to cure then one can see the extent to which disciplinary and normalizing concerns have indeed penetrated the judicial framework of the criminal justice system.

CHAPTER - IV

CONCLUSION

In the preceding two chapters, we have seen How M. Foucault has traced the history of the body albeit a discontinuous one. Foucaults archaeology locates the locus of the body in the statements made about it. Confirming to various discursive rules. This 'a' history of body such as that of Pre-classical madness belongs to a rule of 'grid of specification' while in the Birth of Clinic it is the rule of 'enunciative modality' that makes body to emerge. In sum 'Archaeology' of body is a n Archaeology of its its statements. Thus Body in the Archaeological works of Foucault is a discursive construct. While being 'genealogy' is a meticulous and patient history of all the bodily forces that are disciplined by the power separating through knowledges where by docide bodies are created, we have acquianted our selves with a such a project of Foucault in the domain of criminal justice. Thus with Foucault A history of body is a discontinuous line of history operating at archaeological and genealogical levels.

At every historical threshold, a body as a construct emeges with its concommitant forces and potentials which are then enveloped in a disciplinary Matrix, so as to make bodies docile, pilable and to be utilisable.

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