

**THE GEOPOLITICAL ROLE OF PAKISTAN IN
TRANSITION OF POWER FROM MUJAHEDDEEN TO
TALIBAN**

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KAMLESH ATWAL



**Central Asian Studies Programme
Centre for South, Central, Southeast Asian and Southwest
Pacific Studies
School of International Studies
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
New Delhi-110067
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CENTRE FOR SOUTH, CENTRAL, SOUTHEAST ASIAN & SOUTH WEST PACIFIC STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

NEW DELHI - 110 067

Phone : 2670 4350

Fax : 91-11-2674 1586

91-11-2674 2580

25th July 2011

DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled "*The Geopolitical role of Pakistan in transition of power from Mujahedeen to Taliban*" submitted by me for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.



25-07-11
Kamlesh Atwal

CERTIFICATE


We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.



Prof. Partha S. Ghosh

Chairperson, CSCSEASWPS


Dr. Ambrish Dhaka

Supervisor

 Centre for South Central South East Asian and South West Pacific Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi

 Centre for South Central South East Asian and South West Pacific Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi - 110067

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Introduction

CHAPTER 1

1.1 Introduction

Afghanistan's location at the junction of the three strategic regions of South, West and Central Asian cultural spheres raises its importance for Pakistan and at the same makes it vulnerable to its adverse influence. Apart from geographical factor, the terrain of Afghanistan-Pakistan has overflowing ethnical identity from centuries which was divided first by Durand Line and later by an artificial state making process of Pakistan. It creates the initial problem and later list goes longer. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan not only provided an opportunity for Pakistan to realize its desire to settle Afghan hostility but also strengthen its capacity vis-a-vis India. During Soviet intervention, Pakistan invested in its militant Islamic clients because it believed that after Soviet departure it would be able to form a pro-Pakistani government in Kabul.

This study represents an attempt to examine the role of Pakistan in transition of power from Mujahedeen to Taliban. The central purpose of this study is to examine Afghanistan political developments as influenced by Pakistan a major regional state with the longest border. Therefore this study would analyse, Pakistan's Afghan policy after Soviet departure on the assumption of Pakistan's geopolitical insecurity from Afghanistan. To understand this insecurity, the first chapter would study the ethno-geopolitical challenges for Pakistan and its implications. Pakistan Afghan policy in post-Soviet period was largely based on the Mujahedeen parties. Thus, this study would explore the role of Pakistan in institutionalization of Mujahedeen Parties. Pakistan's Afghan policy has also some regional dimension. Pakistan's elite has believed that a friendly or surrogate Afghanistan would be a tool for its regional ambition. Following these factors this proposal would also analyse the Pakistan's geopolitical notion of strategic depth and its instrumentalisation through Islamists.

Pakistan has undermined all anti-Pakistani elements including Najibullah government, and some secular and nationalist parties of Afghan conflict. This work would also study the subversion of Afghan state as a consequence of the geopolitical objectives of Pakistan. It would also focus on functional operation of the Pakistani

state in Afghan's matters. Further the work will examine the most important issue after the Soviet departure that how real has been the Pakistan's insecurity from Afghanistan. The study would also focus of the Pakistan's role in different Afghan governments (Afghan Interim Government, and Taliban) formation. Finally it measures the success and failure of Pakistan's strategy to get desirable output.

Though, this research would cover the post Soviet Afghanistan – Pakistan relation, but it would not be possible to understand without historical context. The foremost reason for basis the study in a historical methodological perspective is that Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan is itself is the product of historical circumstances. The present day Afghanistan – Pakistan combo, also known as the Af-Pak, can be seen as continuations of a decades old political, cultural and religious interaction between the regions that now constitute Afghanistan and Pakistan.

1.2 Hypotheses

- 1- The Ethno-geopolitical linkages and Pushtunistan issue have been the geopolitical factor behind Pakistan's myopic vision on the formation Afghan Interim Government.
- 2- Pakistan's own pursuits of strategic depth allowed the Mujahedeen's to renege from the accords.
- 3- Pakistan's instrumentalist approach towards Mujahedeen led to the creation of Taliban.

1.2 Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations: Historical prospective

Both the present day Afghanistan and Pakistan belong south Asian civilizations with linkages further extending to (Persian and Central Asian) cultural realms. Afghanistan had close historical linkage with Indian people since the dawn of history. It is significant to quote Jawaharlal Nehru that "Afghanistan history is almost part of India's history; indeed, for long Afghanistan was the part of India" (Nehru 2007:

1086). It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a complete review the Afghanistan and India relation. This chapter hopes to accomplish is to give up an overview of Afghanistan- Pakistan relation after the partition.

1.2.1 Newborn Pakistan and the Afghan response

The creation of Pakistan resulted in igniting bitter territorial disputes between this state and its neighbours, both east and west. In the East, Pakistan had opposed the inclusion of Muslim majority state of Jammu & Kashmir with India. And in the West, Muslim Afghanistan opposed the inclusion of largely Pushtun inhabited North West Frontier (NWFP) into Pakistan. It clearly revealed that the Afghanistan- Pakistan relations were very hostile from the first day of Pakistan's formation. This hostility is closely linked with the Pakistani state making process. It is state building process that impinges upon Afghanistan, and this created problems between them since 1950s during the earlier days of Pakistan's independence. Principally it was the 'colonial boundaries and inadequate stateness' that created problems with Afghanistan (Ayooob 1995: 47). Other hand the history, their geographical and culture ties do not allow them to ignore each other, but their organising principles posed a permanent threat to each other. Rise of Pakistan was based on the Islamic identity and thus stood for the definition of the state exclusively along theological lines (Buzan1991: 78). On the other hand, Afghanistan's identity was based on tribal confederacy under the principal ethnic group, the Pushtuns. This ethnic identity was seen by Pakistan as an important threat for its national organisation of territory as the same ethnic group shared common historical linkages across the Durand line. It divided Pushtun population into two parts across the border. Pakistan was carved out of five provinces of British India plus some princely states. The provinces were Punjab, Sindh, East Bengal, Baluchistan and NWFP. In NWFP the Pushtun political identity was so strong that it found itself uneasily coexisting with the demand for Pakistan (Tablot 1998: 81). During the partition of Indian sub-continent, Afghanistan opposed the accession of NWFP into Pakistan. Even a few numbers of political elite of NWFP had also supported Afghanistan including the Frontier Congress and the Khudai Khidmatgaran. The Afghan government challenged the legality of NWFP's merger into the state of

Pakistan. Its representative to the United Nation declared in September 1947 that his country did not recognize the NWFP as part of Pakistan and voted against Pakistan's entry into United Nations (Hussain 2005: 44). Afghans have maintained this position, irrespective of who has been in power in Kabul. That was the first and foremost bone of contention between Afghanistan and Pakistan, because Afghanistan claimed that NWFP historically and culturally belonged to Afghanistan. Instead of welcoming the formation of an Islamic nation in its neighbourhood, Afghanistan was the only country who opposed Pakistan's entry into United Nations. This hostility later became more intensive.

1.2.2 The Pushtunistan issue

Pushtunistan, the land of the Pushtuns or Pathans, lies on both sides of the Durand Line, the frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Pushtun question is multidimensional. It is an ethnic, political, and geopolitical problem. It is the core of Afghan nationalism. Pushtun lands beyond the border in the east make the conundrum of nation building in Pakistan itself. Both the Pushtun and non- Pushtun elites have instrumentalized it in the two countries, although in a contradictory manner, for domestic political purposes. In Afghanistan all ruler who belong to the Pushtun ethnic group, use Pushtunistan issue time and again for their legitimacy. And the other side, Pakistan's Afghan policy has been cautious of Pushtunistan issue. The Pushtun question has been a Source of tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan since the creation of the Pakistan in 1947. According to Afghan sources Pushtunistan consists of the area west of the river Indus up to the Afghan frontier representing a territorial claim against Pakistan's Baluchistan Province and the tribal regions which are now know as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Qureshi 1966: 99).

On 12 November 1893, Mortimer Durand and the Amir of Afghanistan Abdul Rahman signed a treaty over the line of demarcation between British India and Afghanistan (Dupree 1973: 485). This particular line called the Durand line, which divided Pushtun population into two parts across the borders. Validity of this treaty was questioned on several occasions by successive Afghan governments prior to

1947. The concept of independent Pushtunistan was borrowed from the Khudai Khidmatgars, which called for the establishment of independent Pushtunistan (Anwar 1988: 30). After the creation of Pakistan, successive Pushtun led Afghan governments backed Ghaffar Khan's demand for Pushtunistan to be carved out of the territory of Pakistan. Kabul's demand was supposedly in support of the right of the Pakistani Pushtuns for self-determination. But in reality it was grounded in a firm assumption that Pushtunistan entity would be closely linked to Afghanistan (Saikal 2010: 13). Afghanistan never recognized the Durand Line as an international border. Afghan scholars claim that they have a long association with the Pushtun areas on the basis of historical, linguistic, genealogical and cultural lines. Some called that the Durand line is a line rather than boundary. Nabi Misdaq argues that the agreement was signed under the war and economic blockade (Misdaq 2006: 297). The return to Afghanistan of the Pushtun areas situated on the Pakistani side of Durand Line has always been a perennial Afghan demand. Zahir Shah, the late king of Afghanistan, late President Muhammad Daud, who deposed Zahir Shah; and the successive Communist leaders all maintained the old Afghan claim on Pushtunistan. The Pushtunistan issue became the principal Source of dispute with Pakistan, although its intensity has varied over time. In 1951 the first serious crisis occurred when Sardar Daud Khan, the Afghan defence minister, infiltrated Afghan troops as ordinary tribal into Pakistan's tribal area (Anwar1988: 32). When Daud was chosen as Prime Minister in 1953, there was an indication that he would play Pushtunistan card to exploit the sentiment of Afghan masses and he did it. Even Pushtunistan was his main agenda of foreign policy. In 1955 there was a serious border clash between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the issue of Pushtunistan which led Pakistan to close Karachi port for the landlocked Afghanistan (Anwar1988: 35). In the same way in 1962 border dispute erupted between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the latter again closed the Karachi port for Afghanistan's goods and transition (Anwar1988: 36). From these narrations it seems that the choice had been made by Kabul rather than Islamabad. Judging by public statements, Pushtunistan has become the single most important issue of Afghan foreign policy (Spain1954: 37). After the Saur revolution the communist leadership also used the similar rhetoric repeatedly. On one occasion only, when it appeared that the Afghan opposition was establishing its bases on the Pakistan side of the Durand

Line, the first Communist leader of Afghanistan, Noor Muhammad Taraki, did propose to Pakistan's military dictator Zia ul-Haq that Afghanistan would recognize the Durand Line as the international border between the two countries if Pakistan stopped helping the Mujahedeen (Anwar1988:78). It was the Pushtunistan issue, which created initial problem between them, and later the list became protracted as it included Pakistan's one unit plan.

1.2.3 Pakistan's One Unit Plan

Although, it was the Pakistan's internal matter, but it became detrimental to Pakistan - Afghan relations, leading to an economic blockade of Afghanistan. Pakistan constituted of two units till 1971, East and West Pakistan. East Pakistan was the Bengali dominated area where Muslim league was not a key political power. West Pakistan constituted the area of Sind, Baluchistan, NWFP, Karachi, and some princely state and tribal areas. Muslim league's defeat in East Bengal in the 1954 election created fear that it might lose its power in West Pakistan too. In order to perpetuate itself in power, the Muslim league mooted a proposal for the One Unit plan in West Pakistan (Kaur1985: 79). In October 1954, the constitution assembly was dissolved and the central cabinet was reconstituted. Then government integrated the administrative unit of West Pakistan into a single composite province (Kaur1985: 79). It meant the West Pakistani states unit had not autonomy which they had earlier. The establishment of One Unit Plan was the first step towards the consolidation of Pakistani state. While the provinces and the states in West Pakistan were being merged into one unit, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan headed an agitation against the One Unit, but he was arrested in 1956 by the government of his own brother. At his trial on September 3, 1956, Ghaffar said that he was advocating an autonomous Pathan province of Pushtunistan, not an independent state (Qureshi 1966: 99). Even other provincial leaders from NWFP, Sind, Baluchistan and East Pakistan rejected this idea, and express their fear of Punjabi domination. There was the argument from the supporter of this plan that once the bill was passed the issue of Pushtunistan would be settled automatically. But, the decision of integration of West Pakistan into one unit, which forced the Pashto speaking areas in to an unwilling alliance with West

Pakistan, predominated by the Punjabis led to hostility and a new tension in its relation with Afghanistan (Kaur1985: 86-87). This plan was criticised not only provincial non Muslim league leader but also by the Afghanistan leadership. The plan of the Pakistan Government to merge in one unit the provinces and states in West Pakistan was criticized by the Afghan Prime Minister, Sardar Daud, in a speech broadcast over Radio Kabul on March 29, 1955 (Qureshi 1966: 99). Demonstrations, reported to be officially inspired, followed in Kabul, Jalalabad and Qandahar. Pakistan flags were pulled down and insulted and the Pushtunistan flag was hoisted on the chancery of the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul (Qureshi 1966: 114). However the Pakistani government took a serious note and called the Pushtunistan demand as a stunt of Afghanistan (Kaur1985: 86). Then there were a series of protest and blame game from both sides. After that Pakistan and Afghanistan called their consulates from each other country.

1.3 Pakistan's Role in different government formation

In entire Afghan conflict, Pakistan was the key actor who initially provides all support including financial, military, and moral and become the international bridge against anti -Soviet resistance movement. Pakistan's leading role was determined by so many factors but, the most important one was a pro-Pakistani government aftermath of Soviet departure. For a pro-Afghan state the Mujahedeen were the biggest instrument for Pakistan. From the Saur Revolution till the emergence of Taliban, Pakistan supported the Mujahedeen Parties, who were also against the Kabul regime. These Mujahedeen parties were basically the political organizations, who made their appearance in Pakistan. They were the core instrument of Pakistan's policy toward Afghanistan during post Geneva Accord till the Taliban's emergence. Pakistan wanted to manage the Afghan conflict in its favour, for that its needed some kind of united resistance structure. Seven party alliances were a part of this strategy. Although, there were so many resistances groups but Pakistan coordinated the coalition only with the seven Sunni party alliances, which came into existence in the mid 1980s. Pakistan helped in all way to legitimize the seven Peshawar based parties. Pakistan also monopolized the representations through this alliance. Relations with the host

countries were crucial for these parties, and Pakistan wanted to use this relation for its strategic objectives.

During this process Pakistan was supported by the western countries, but far from acting simply as an instrument of the West, Pakistan made use of its position as a mediator to control the parties and develop its own policy. In institutional terms Pakistani supervision was exercised in three ways- political and military affairs were supervised by the ISI, international diplomacy and negotiations were carried on by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and aid to the refugees was administered by the Commissioner for Afghan Refugees (Dorrnsoro 2005: 144). The Pakistani government therefore decided to stop the formation of new groups and to stabilise the number of parties for the entire duration of the war and Pakistani Generals took part in the meetings of the exiled parties, while strategy on the ground was broadly laid down by the Pakistan military.

The first part of this section begins with the Geneva Accord. Here the logic behind mentioning Geneva Accord is to explain the Pakistani detestation towards any kind of settlement which limited its role in Afghan affairs. It helps to understand the later government formation process in Afghanistan. It also argues that Pakistan was not ready to settle Afghan conflict out of its pocket. The AIG formation was the first and foremost attempt to establish a pro-Pakistani government in Kabul. Latter part will analyse Pakistan's role in different phases of government formation in Kabul.

1.3.1 Geneva Accord and Afghanistan Interim government

Following the one year of Soviet intervention (1980) the negotiation process began and after eight years in April 1988, it ended with the signing of Geneva Accord. Geneva Accord was indirectly negotiated and signed by Pakistan and Kabul government. The Accords said that "a bilateral agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan about non-interference and non-intervention in each other's matter" (UNGOMAP: URL-<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/ungomap/background.html>). The

Pakistan and Afghanistan groups never met face to face (BBC News: 14 April, 1988). Afghanistan's foreign minister expressed readiness for bilateral or trilateral talks but stressed Kabul's insistence that they should be direct. It was Pakistan who insisted not to participate with Kabul government in direct talks (Grare 2003: 114). Pakistan also hardened its position, by refusing to talk directly to Kabul's delegation (Bokhari1991: 56). Pakistan insisted that, before they sign an agreement, Najibullah's government be replaced by an interim Afghan coalition government. (Bokhari 1991: 58). During Geneva talks, Pakistan represented the Mujahedeen. There are a few writings which claim that Pakistan refused to involve the Mujahedeen in any negotiated settlement as it was interested to maintain its monopoly to represent the resistance in the diplomatic arena (Rasanayagam 2005: 123). Resistance leaders were angry that they were excluded from the Geneva talks. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, chairman of the seven-party Mujahedeen alliances, attacked the accord as "imperfect, unpractical and ineffective" (BBC News: 14 April 1988). The winning aspect for Pakistan was that the Soviets leave Afghanistan under the terms of this Accord. But after this Accord, and the USSR having left Afghanistan went down into anarchy. Later this condition described as civil war which was comparatively more dangerous for this landlocked country. So as for as Geneva Accord is concerned, it was an unsuccessful attempt by international community in resolve the Afghan conflict.

Here the question arises, why Geneva Accord failed to settle Afghan conflict and most importantly this study is concerned, to know what was Pakistan's contribution for that matter? One of the principles of conflict resolution is that internal and external parties have to participate and agree to the solution. In Afghan conflict the internal parties were Mujahedeen and Kabul government and the external parties were Pakistan, USA and USSR. During all extensive negotiation of eight years neither the Pakistan directly met with Kabul government nor did the Mujahedeen participate in Accord formation. Instead the Geneva Accords was indirectly negotiated and signed by Pakistan and Kabul government. The talks were held in the absence of the main party (Mujahedeen) of the conflict. "The accords said nothing about the future government of Afghanistan" in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal (Rubin 1995: 91). Although, stopping of external interference was part of the Accord, in reality external supporters continued to flood Afghan government and the Mujahedeen with

weapon and means of violence and destruction even after the Accords was signed (Rubin 1995: 10). Only the Superpowers agreed on a negative symmetry two years later. But, Pakistan continuously violated the Accord and remained an imperative external party to the Afghan conflict.

Before coming to any conclusion, it is very important to analyze the Pakistan's position in the entire negotiation process. There is one school of thought which argued that Pakistan had not agreed to sign the Accord. This school believed that till 1985 Pakistan deliberately chose to prolong the war in order to preserve its status of a frontline state and thus sustain the flow of American military and economical aid and assistance (Grare 2003: 175). Although, it is tough to prove but, Pakistan's attitude as mentioned earlier, was not to talk directly with Kabul government and also deliberately not to allow the participation of Mujahedeen in the negotiation process showing some short of justification of this argument. The American diplomatic observation reflects in the material accessible from The National Security Archive of the George Washington University that it was the United States who pressurised Pakistan to sign the Accord. It writes "President Reagan called President Zia and assured him that the United States would stand by the rebels until they seized power and that since the USSR was probably going to withdraw with or without an agreement, Pakistan ought to sign" (National Security Archive: October 9, 2001). There is also a quantity of material which shows that Pakistani army establishment was not ready to sign the Accord. Phillip Corwin, the then UN officer in Kabul wrote a book, where he mentions that Zia had opposed signing of Accord without an interim government, but Prime Minister Junejo has a clear plan by calling a round-table conference of all Pakistani political parties. Nearly all parties, particularly Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party, approved signing the agreement even without an interim government (Corwin 2003: 10). Under these circumstances Pakistan signed the Accord, but the Government of Pakistan never followed the spirit of Accord. "The goals of Pakistan's President Zia were not simply to have a neutral Afghanistan but also to have an Afghanistan sympathetic to or under the control of Pakistan" (Corwin 2003: 10). Instead of following the Accord, Pakistan believed that after the departure of the Soviets it could play more autonomous role in Afghan sphere. Besides, that

Pakistan had a firm belief that the PDPA regime would fall to the rebels shortly after Soviet troops had gone.

After the Geneva Accord as the Soviet withdrawal began, there was a common thought within Pakistani establishment that Kabul government would fall down immediately after the Soviet withdrawal. So there should be some kind of institutional mechanism which could acquire the regime vacuum in Kabul, in favour of Pakistan. Thinking on this line, Pakistan designed a structure that called Afghan Interim Government (AIG). The parties in Peshawar repeatedly attempted to coordinate their activities, usually in response to the pressure from the American or Pakistani donors.

On 19 June 1989, the seven parties announced the formation of an interim government (AIG) where Mojaddidi became president (Rasanayagam 2005: 127). The provisional government, financed by Arab and some western countries, set up its headquarters in Peshawar. The AIG selected by the seven leaders of the Pakistan-based alliance. The ISI controlled the security, and its officers openly attended all meetings. Major disputes were resolved in the office of General Hamid Gul, director of ISI (Hussain 2005: 144). Pakistani scholars claim that the role of Pakistan in AIG formulations was determined by the fact that Pakistan wanted some kind of stability in Afghanistan. But it does not appear true. Otherwise why Pakistani establishment did not agree to involve former King Zahir Shah in the interim government, when there was nostalgia for the former king in Afghan urban population (Dorransoro 2005:166). According to Barnett Rubin "Pakistan's plan to make Hikmatyar the defence minister and the commander of the army collapsed in the complex deal" (Rubin1995: 103). May be this was the reason that turned Pakistan from AIG. At last Pakistan politically refused to extend recognition to the AIG (Rais1993: 910).

1.3.2 Post-Soviet Afghanistan and Pakistan option

Pakistan's geopolitical objective in Post-Soviet Afghanistan had dramatically changed. Now Pakistan could concentrate for removal of the PDPA government and established a pro-Pakistan Mujahedeen government in Kabul. In fact, in the context of the post-withdrawal situation, Pakistani strategy was aimed to capture the towns in

order to augur rapid collapse of the regime. After the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Jalalabad in May 1988, this city became the main objective of the Pakistani military, which believed that its fall would result in the fall of Kabul, enabling Hekmatyar to seize power (Rasanayagam 2005: 127).

The set back of Jalalabad changed the Pakistan's policy again. Because of this failure the relation between Parties and commander became worst. Shuras set up by commanders with assistance from the Pakistanis and the Americans were an attempt to bypass the party leaderships (Dorrnsoro 2005: 147). After that Pakistan had directly contact with commanders. Under changing Pakistan policy, Massoud even paid his first visit to Pakistan since 1979 and in Islamabad met the army chief-of-staff General Beg and the head of the ISI, Lieutenant-General Asad Durrani (Dorrnsoro 2005: 246). This change reflected the ground reality, where local commanders became powerful and ignored the Peshawar based parties. One example was the province of Kunar, where local commander Jamil ur-Rahman left Hezb-i Islami and independently worked with the help of Arab said. In 1991, Rahman captured Kunar province; later it was again recaptured by Hikmatyar. After defeated by Hikmatyar, he escaped to Pakistan. Pakistan observed these developments attentively (Dorrnsoro 2005: 156). Some saw it as a signal that, the ISI had dropped Hekmatyar, but in fact the recapture of Kunar by Hezb-i Islami could not have been carried out without the silent approval of the Pakistani intelligence services. In the following weeks, the governor of the North West Frontier Province mediated between the Jamil ur-Rahman and Hezb-i Islami.

But the failure of all these experiment brought about a change of view that a Mujahedeen victory began to seem doubtful in the short run. After the defeat in Jalalabad and some other military coup attempt Pakistan found that military solution was not pragmatic one, and then it returned for the political solution. In the same time there was an international pressure which forced Pakistan to go for the negotiations (Tarzi 1992: 139). In negotiations Pakistan did not leave its rigid attitude. During this period a friendly government in Kabul, through Mujahedeen parties was the main aim of Pakistan. For that Pakistan refused to all other attempts to form government which was not in the Pakistani interest. Pakistan had wanted a puppet or a pro-

Pakistani government in Afghanistan, and for that it used Mujahedeen parties. Pakistan blocked all the initiatives of Najibullah for the peaceful formation of new government. According to Rasanayagam, Najibullah's 'national reconciliation' plan had got the massive positive response from all section of Afghan society, including some field commanders (Rasanayagam 2003: 119). But Najibullah's proposal was turned down by seven parties. It was Pakistan who asked Mujahedeen parties to respond negatively (Dorrnsoro 2005: 202). In September 1991, Najibullah again proposed the modalities for a cease fire and the formation of a government of national unity which would include Mujahedeen. Sibghatullah Mojaddidi accepted the proposal but backtracked under pressure from Pakistan's ISI and fundamentalist rebel faction, letting go a golden opportunity for a peaceful transition of power (Frontline: May 22, 1992). In the similar practice Pakistan also worked firm to isolate former king Zahir Shah from any kind of compromise. Well known Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid proves this point that "the return of the ex-King Zahir Shah to lead the Afghan resistance, a move that was strongly opposed by Pakistan", when the former King was living in Rome and continued to be a popular figure amongst the some sections of the Pushtuns (Rashid 2001: 19).

Another attempt to settle Afghanistan conflict was proposed by UN in its capacity. The initial evidence showed that Pakistan had too blocked this effort. To solve the Afghan conflict it was necessary to form a broad-based government in which all stake holder of Afghanistan could be participate. The UN in its capacity did a great job to begin negotiation with all parties to form an Afghan government. In 1989, the UN security General Perez de Culler proposed an Afghan assembly of Afghan leaders representing all sections of the society to meet in a neutral place to select a council for choosing the member of an Afghan government. Later when he didn't get positive response from the concerned parties, on 10th May 1989, he appointed Benon Sevan as the UN Security General's personal representative from Afghanistan and Pakistan. In May 1991 Sevan consulted with Kabul, Peshawar, Riyadh, and agreed to make Najibullah step down in context of any transition government (Corwin 2003: 27). But every time the Mujahedeen refused these proposals. It is a matter of further research, had the Mujahedeen been autonomous enough to deny without Pakistan's consent? But a little available material suggests

that it was Pakistan who forced them to act negatively. The secretary-general envisioned that the Loya Jirga would have “150 middle-level representatives, acceptable to all sides, from all segments of the Afghan people, including representatives of political parties, religious and tribal leaders, opposition groups, resistance commanders, prominent personalities, and representatives from Kabul” (Corwin 2003: 02). After 1992 the UN had been negotiating with various opposition leaders to nominate fifteen or twenty names that would take over as an authority to replace Najibullah. The UN officer in his diary says that the “Pakistan government was still angry that the Accord might allow for a broad-based coalition, which would include communist participation, to serve as an interim government in Afghanistan” (Corwin 2003: 08). Even UN special envoy for Afghanistan Benon Sevan also has serious doubt about Pakistan’s intention. During the negotiations with the US diplomat B. Platt in Islamabad Benon told Platt that he thought that the Loya Jirga should be held in Vienna. He repeated that if the meeting was held in Pakistan, Pakistan would be accused of manipulating the results. In the view of Iran, if the meeting was convened in Pakistan, Pakistan would never allow it to proceed. The Pakistanis would disrupt it, because they won’t permit any meeting they cannot completely control as Vienna would be a neutral venue (Corwin 2003: 50).

Ever since the UN secretary-general’s statement of 27 January 1992, which outlined the UN’s plans for a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Afghanistan, Benon had been trying to organize a Loya Jirga, he told that Najibullah’s resignation was a step in this process (Corwin 2003: 121). The UN envoy Benon met with Massoud and Dostum (after the fall of Najibullah government) and agreed them for a coalition government. But Pakistan had the problem with any kind of settlement. During the talks with UN envoy Benon, Abdul Wakil (Minister of foreign affairs of Afghanistan in Najibullah government-1986-92) told that

“I am in touch with Hekmatyar. He is reasonable, but the problem is that ISI is still provoking hostility. They are supporting Hekmatyar. Coalitions are forming everywhere in Afghanistan to find a peaceful solution, but ISI is trying to destroy the peace process. They want conquest. Please, Benon, you must do something about

this. Everyone is for peace except Pakistan. There are already Shura (councils) in Jalalabad, Kandahar, and other cities. There are coalitions forming, but Hekmatyar and Pakistan are unwilling to recognize those coalitions. Only yesterday we spoke to Hekmatyar's people. They want to avoid violence, but ISI is undermining them.” (Corwin 2003: 141).

So this shows that Pakistan bypassed the UN led reconciliation process. Why Pakistan was not interested in the UN kind of Post Najibullah settlement? May be because the UN settlement was committed to give representation to all ethnical groups and ideological (nationalist, PDPA, extremist) groups. More importantly Pakistan was not ready to settle Afghan conflict out of its pocket.

1.3.3 The Accord from Peshawar to Islamabad

In the aftermath of the post cold war period, Pakistan's Afghan policy appeared confused, and essentially relied on the unrealistic assumption of establishing a pro-Pakistani regime in Kabul and expanding towards the newly independent Central Asian states. In this phase, ISI emerged as the chief architect of Pakistan's Afghan policy. Najibullah government was on the verge of collapse and in 1992, there was a power vacuum in Afghanistan. After 1992 Pakistan was the only key actor in Afghanistan conflict. So its role in any government formation was very important. Post-Soviet anarchy was not any way worthwhile for Pakistan. So during this period Pakistan had done some attempt to form a pro-Pakistani government in Kabul, through its proxy Mujahedeen groups. For that Pakistani establishment had backed those Afghan parties which have an ideological solidarity with Pakistan or seemed strategically important for it. Hekmatyar the leader of radical Hezb-i Islami was the most favoured of Pakistani establishment, among all Peshawar based parties, because he identified itself with the Pakistani Jamaat-i Islami (Dorransoro, 2005: 157). Hezb-i Islami of Hekmatyar rejected all nationalist ideology and proposed a confederation with Pakistan. So his ability to mobilise Pushtun without their national inspiration and also engage with some other ethnic groups, made him Pakistan's most favourite. Hekmatyar was the most important instrument of Pakistan's Afghan policy. Pakistan

did its best to engage Hekmatyar in to Peshawar and Islamabad Accord. As Frontline mentions that he was expected to march triumphantly into Kabul once the communist government had fallen (Frontline: February 25, 1994). This was also the plan of Islamabad. But the pace of events that proceeded the fall of Najibullah government made Islamabad to support Massoud. Till 14 April 1992, Massoud forces had taken Parwan Province to the north of Kabul, from government forces. Massoud was in a good position to enter Kabul on 15 April 1992 Bagram Air Base fell, to Massoud without a fight (Corwin 2003: 70). Now Pakistan had to support Rabbani- Massoud led Tajik forces, because Massoud stood out as the strongest and the most disciplined and visionary among all the commanders (Saikal 2005: 206). This approach of Pakistan was more pragmatic and based on ground reality. On the other hand, Pakistan had played a key role in the elimination or isolation of the Maoist or nationalist movements within the Afghan resistance because they represented a potential threat to Pakistani domination (Dorrnsoro, 2005:145).

So following this line Pakistan's role was very calculated in Peshawar and Islamabad Accord, which was determined by the fact that it wanted a friendly government in Kabul. After Najibullah's government had collapsed, the balance of power seemed to transfer in favour of the Northern Tajik group. Afterwards, Pakistan had another strategy to call all the Mujahedeen parties based in Peshawar to form a government. The result of this was the Peshawar Accord which signed on April 24, 1992. Pakistan's authority once again played a central role in shaping this Accord (Rais1993: 910). Peshawar Accord was a structural arrangement for a government based upon the power sharing between different Mujahedeen groups. Although, the details were not released, but it was rather a "complicated plan of power sharing among the different groups of Mujahedeen leading to the formation of a 432-member Shoora-i-Hal-o-Aqd (council of wise men)" that would frame a constitution and establish a government whose writs would extend to the whole of Afghanistan (Khan 1992: 132). The Mujahedeen was the only party who signed it. No other Afghan parties or even groups that controlled territory inside the country participated in the negotiations. According to Peshawar Accord, Sibghatullah Mojaddidi was the first interim president (Rais1993: 910). Pakistan recognized the new Afghan government

at once, and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif flew to Kabul the next day and donated Rs.500 million and 50,000 tons of wheat as a gesture of good will (Kahn1992: 133). After a month, the second phase was implemented when an interim government under Burhanuddin Rabbani took over. But the third phase to choose the president through Shura had not been completed, and Peshawar Accord ended without its culmination. After this, all parties fought with each other. There were serious clashes emerging in every part of country. A massive artillery and rocket attack on Kabul by Hekmatyar faction killed thousands and almost reduced the city to debris. Rabbani accused Pakistan, of supplying arms to Hekmatyar. Hectic diplomatic activity in September involving different Mujahedeen factions and the governments of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran brought about a ceasefire, and though irregular fighting continued. Thus Peshawar Accord was held in abeyance.

On 1 March 1993, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif invited President Rabbani to Islamabad for mediation. A week of hectic efforts culminated in resolution of the power-sharing problem (Rais1993: 910). The major portfolios were defined as Foreign Affairs, Defence, National Security and the Premiership. This agreement reflected a sort of compromise being a power-sharing formula between the President and the Prime Minister. Rabbani continued as President, Massoud as the Defence Minister while Hikmatyar became the Prime Minister. This agreement was signed in Islamabad on 7 March 1993 in the presence of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif from Pakistan, Prince from Saudi Arabia and Deputy Foreign Minister from Iran (Rais1993: 910). The language of Islamabad Accord was highly Islamic and didn't seem to give any place for secular group. Apart from that, the writing of Islamabad Accord praised Pakistan for its sincere efforts to promote peace and conciliation in Afghanistan. The Islamabad Accord was not implemented, because the projected office bearers were not in condition to execute it smoothly. Later Mujahedeen fought with each other. Finally Islamabad Accord broke down, and country was pushed into another phase of war and destruction.

There is different opinion about why these accords failed. B. Rubin argues that Islamabad concentrated its effort on "creating a form of unity that was imposed by leadership and created an artificial coalition" to take over Kabul. He further explains

that this attitude of Pakistan was the reason for failure of various proposed Afghan governments (Rubin1995: 169). After these accords, on both the instance Rabbani-Massoud led the proposed government to rule Kabul. But when Pakistan did not have the desirable response from Rabbani-Massoud government it again changed its strategy. As Saikal (2004: 220) writes “Islamabad could not possibly expect the new Islamic government leaders, especially Massoud to subordinate their own nationalist objectives in order to help Pakistan realise its regional ambition”. This was the reason that, after a short honeymoon period with Rabbani government Pakistan became hostile to it and continued to support Hekmatyar’s military action against the Rabbani government. That was essential reason why the Peshawar and Islamabad Accords met the same destiny. In these conditions Pakistan again helped Hekmatyar, who made a new alliance with Uzbek Commander Dostum to attack Kabul (Saikal 2004: 221). On the beginning of 1994, after they failed to install a pro-Pakistan government in Kabul, Pakistan’s interest was no longer with the Mujahedeen groups. Therefore, Hekmatyar’s failure to achieve what was expected of him prompted the ISI to come with a new surrogate force.

1.3.4 Transition from Mujahedeen to Taliban

This transition was not like any official government transition which happens in other part of world. So when one writes of the ‘transition of power from Mujahedeen to Taliban’ then it should be understood that Pakistan changed its guard from one party to another. Although, Mujahedeen never formed any kind of government structure in Kabul they remained the most vital part of any kind of political solution. This was recognized even by the international community including the UN. The different kind of power arrangement which was done in post Najibullah hanged without implementation due to the differences between rival parties. It created power vacuum in Kabul which started further competition between the Mujahedeen groups to capture more of Afghan terrain.

During 1992-94, the conflict in Afghanistan became highly territorialised. The country was divided in to war zones under various warlords, who were also divided along ethnical lines (Dorransoro 2005: 257). The base of Mujahedeen parties

had the ethnical identity, and after the emergence of independent Central Asian countries, these parties also became loyal to their respective ethnic state. Now Jihad was no longer appealing to the masses. Therefore the Mujahedeen parties used the rhetoric of ethnic identity to mobilize the people. This strategy was used by Hekmatyar, and he openly said about the Pushtun interest (Dorrnsoro 2005: 257). It was a threat to the Pakistani establishment because of Pushtun nationalism. So in these conditions Pakistan found itself in dilemma, because it seemed to have lost its entire long investments in Mujahedeen parties. May be this was the situation which made Pakistan to reconsider its strategy. On other hand, the weakness of Hezb-i Islami led to the shift in Pakistani policy (Saikal 2004: 214). Hekmatyar's failure at Kabul was also a failure of the Pakistani Intelligence Services. Therefore, Pakistan was looking for some identity which can control Afghan terrain beyond ethnic landscapes. So Pakistan changed its policy from Mujahedeen to Taliban.

In post cold-war world regional geopolitics has been getting determined by Pakistan's geopolitical objectives. Pakistan's geopolitical dream was to reach out to the landlocked countries of Central Asia, which would help Pakistan to make a Muslim alliance and dominate in the region. It was a strategic vision of the ruling elite in Pakistan since Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in the early 1970s till the emergence of Taliban. At the end of the Cold War, the opening up of the energy-rich but landlocked Muslim Central Asian Republics heightened the importance of Pakistan's geostrategic location in the exploitation of these resources (Hussain 2005: 177). Pakistan was much enthusiastic to close ties with these five newly energy rich Central Asian states but the fighting between the Mujahedeen parties had blocked any possible transit route to Central Asia via Afghanistan. The Taliban was a product of this strategic vision. A friendly government in Kabul was to provide the much needed 'strategic depth' against India and a land bridge toward Central Asia. So in post cold war period, Pakistan rushed in to Central Asia to fill the vacuum created by the collapse of USSR as it saw itself as the main player in the region. At the same time moderate establishment in Pakistan's foreign policy establishment argued that Pakistan should trade with the new Central Asian states. Sardar Asif and Babar who became the foreign and interior minister respectively in Benazir Bhutto's cabinet (1993) were one of them (Rubin 1995: 138). Babar argued that "Pakistan should deal directly with the



powers existed on the ground to facilitate the development of overland trade with Central Asia. In June 1994, Bhutto's cabinet decided to proceed with building rail and road links to Central Asia" (Rubin 1995: 138). Under all that background the Taliban, was the best choice for Pakistan. Taliban was not a Pushtun nationalist movement. "Taliban's movement was founded on a fundamentalist ideology opposed to all nationalist pretensions" (Dorransoro 2005: 267). Contrary to the other, Taliban did not have any relation with another country, excluding Pakistan. It was the best geopolitical option for Pakistan in the post cold war situation which could help it to counter Indian, Iranian and Russian influence in Afghanistan (Hussain 2005: 171). The Taliban had social and ideological links to institutional elements within Pakistani society (Rasanayagam 2005: 181) that also provided much material support during their rise to power. Jamiat-i- Ulema-i Islami (JUI) led by Maulana Fazlur Rahman was the part of Bhutto coalition government (from 1993), which played a pivotal role in its advocacy to the Taliban movement (Dorransoro 2005: 245). Rahman Chairman of the National Assembly's Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs built up an extensive network in the West Asia to gather both moral and financial support for Taliban. JUI had a series of Madrassas in Pakistani tribal area, from where the Afghan refugees were recruited as Taliban.

It showed that Taliban formation was very calculated and strategic step from Pakistani state establishment. Pakistan in the process of Taliban formation had given all material and military assistance to them. After the initial success of Taliban, Pakistani interior minister Naseerullah Babur took the credit for the Taliban's success telling journalist privately that the Taliban were our boys (Misdaq 2006: 180). According to Amin Saikal 'the god father of Taliban' was essentially, Babar (Saikal 2004: 230). In late 1994, he recruited, trained and armed a number of Madrassas student to join a few former Pushtun Mujahedeen fighters from southern Afghanistan to provide protection for a Pakistani convey to central Asia through Afghanistan. Apart from that Pakistan used sizable numbers of its Pushtun-based Frontier Corps in Taliban-run operations in Afghanistan. Ahmed Rashid says that Pakistan had helped the Taliban decisively by allowing them to capture a crucial arms dump outside Spin Boldak (Maley 1998: 81). Whatever Pakistan said about Taliban formation it was

clear that Taliban's rapid success, their capacity for night operation, their speed mobility, maintenance of tanks, arms and communication skills was the proof of external military involvement (Misdaq 2006: 177) .

According to well known Islamic expert Oliver Roy "Pakistan's support to Taliban since 1994 can be explained at two levels: (1) geo-strategic perspective, designed at the time of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan with the aim of asserting the regional influence of Pakistan by establishing a kind of control on Afghanistan through fundamentalist, Pushtun dominated movement (2) an ideological and religious connection provided by extending networks of Madrassas in Pakistan, which provide a non-governmental tool of influence in the region"(Jaffrelot 2002: 150). This statement more or less explains the nucleus of Pakistan's great design behind the Taliban formation. Although Taliban's rise on Afghan theatre which is seen by some western commentators as 'mystery Army' cannot so simply be explained. It has some other complicated dimension, like there was a serious debate within Pakistani establishment about this gamble. In Ahmed Rashid's words there is now an entire factory of myths and stories to explain how Omar mobilized a small group of Taliban against the greedy Kandahar warlords. This entire debate in extensive manner would be the part of chapter four.

Summary

The first chapter gives the introduction of the study. This chapter has explained the larger framework of this study and for that it began with the objective and hypothesis of this research work. The second part is a small attempt to understand Afghanistan-Pakistan relation through historical prism. Which concludes that the research problem is closely linked with the past. The problems began when the Indian sub-continent was partitioned and a new state formed as Pakistan. The NWFP or Pushtunistan has created initial problems between them and later this particular issue deteriorated the relation. Soviet intervention provided the first attempt for Pakistan to settle the Afghan irritant. And later with the help of resistance movement Pakistan made its strategy and found success against the mighty Red Army when Soviet withdrawal. Third part of this chapter has begun with Pakistan's role in Geneva Accord. Later it

explains how Pakistan instrumentlised the Mujahedeen group to achieved it strategic goals. In the beginning of Soviet vacate, Pakistan was reliance on the military option. Later Pakistan used Mujahedeen parties in different kind of government formation in Afghanistan. But Pakistan was not succeeded in its goal. Post cold war changed the geopolitical situation of this region and the inefficiency of Mujahedeen to take over Kabul, changed Pakistan's strategy. This led to changed Pakistan for its instrument in Afghan theatre. The transition of power from Mujahedeen to Taliban is part of this strategy.

**Pakistan's geopolitical engagement
in Post Soviet Afghanistan**

CHAPTER 2

2.1 Post Soviet Afghanistan

After the one decade of staying in Afghanistan, Soviet Union left in 1989. Later with the limited assistance to Mujahedeen, United States also lost its interest in Afghanistan. With the disintegration of Soviet Union, United State finally disappeared from Afghanistan. The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s has had a dual impact on international relations. The Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan allowed the regional powers to become more aggressive in the post cold war world order to achieve their geopolitical ambition. Therefore in the new geopolitics of 1990s, Afghanistan once again become the 'crossroad of Asia' (Goodson 2001: 133). Despite its devastated society and state institution, Afghanistan's physical location and cross border ethnic ties made it geopolitical target for the regional states. Another most significant feature of post cold war world order was the geo-economic considerations, where trade and economical activity in some way replace the earlier arrangement. Afghanistan was the very important communication routes which historically known as the Silk Route between South, Central and West Asia. In post cold war, the regional powers seems very much interested to revival of these route for their economical benefits. Before elaborate this point extensively, it is important to see the Afghan situation on the eve of Soviet exit.

2.1.1 Afghanistan on the eve of Soviet Exit

On the eve of Soviet withdrawal, it appeared very clear that Afghanistan was entering into a volatile phase. The journey of Soviet withdrawal was particularly dangerous on the Salang Pass through the Hindu Kush Mountains, where more than 10,000 Mujahedeen were operating. The Mujahedeen had been involved in heavy battles trying to force a Soviet retreat (BBC on this day: February 15, 1989). Ahead of the departure, the Mujahedeen fired four rockets in the capital, with three targeting in the airport area and the fourth on shops. It was the symbolic gesture for Afghanistan that the coming days would be more dangerous. The BBC correspondent reported, "Kabul

had been surrounded by Mujahedeen forces of around 30,000, with the city under artillery and rocket bombardment” (BBC on this day: February 15, 1989).

On the eve of Soviet withdrawal, all external parties had still existed in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union had all set to withdrawal their combat forces by February 15, 1989, as predetermined by the Geneva Accord, but they “left behind military advisers and a large stockpile of arms amounting, by their own admission, to over \$1 billion in value” (Eliot 1990: 158). Similarly, the Mujahedeen did continue to receive weaponry and other assistance from United State which came through the Pakistani sources. United States and Soviet Union decided not to mention any commitment of both sides to stop supplying their allies. Then, Washington made a unilateral statement pledging ‘positive symmetry’ (Roy 1990: 234). It meant that it would supply arms to Mujahedeen as long as the Soviet did the same with the PDPA government. When the Soviet withdrawal began under the Geneva Accord, there was a common thought within Pakistani establishment that Kabul government would fall down immediately after the Soviet withdrawal. On the one hand, Mujahedeen groups were involved in military ambush to defeat the Najibullah led Kabul government like the one as the Jalalabad attack. On the other hand they participated in government formation. As the Soviets were making withdrawal, these groups were pursued by Pakistan and the United States, to form a government that would serve as an alternative to the Kabul regime, and on February 10, 1989 they convened a Shura near Islamabad (Eliot 1990: 160). After much haggling, the Shura ended in two weeks later with the formation of an Afghan Interim Government (AIG) under the presidency of a moderate Mujahedeen leader, Sibghatullah Mojaddidi. Though, we have discussed the AIG formation in first chapter. But it is important to understand that Pakistan had a great contribution in terms of uniting the Mujahedeen parties at this juncture. Most observers agree that it forced upon the cause of ‘Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahedeen’ (also known as the Seven Party Mujahedeen Alliance) which was needed to form an interim government before the Geneva Accords were signed (Saikal and Maley 1989: 42). Although, it was not possible because the refusal of United State and Soviet Union. For them, the Soviet exit was the major priority at that time. In the same period, Pakistan had refused to any kind of broad-based political settlement where Najibullah and the former king Zahir Shah would participate.

The resurrection of Zahir Shah to head a broad-based coalition of all the parties was the most pragmatic political alternative for the peaceful solution of decade old Afghan conflict (Frontline: February 18, 1989). Throughout 1989, the Kabul regime and the Soviet Union pushed for a 'government of national reconciliation', a coalition of the PDPA, the Mujahedeen leadership, and other Afghan leaders in and out of the country. They also called for a UN-sponsored conference, including themselves and Pakistan, Iran, China, India, and the United States to negotiate a settlement (Eliot 1990:162). From time to time, Najibullah suggested general or local ceasefires, and the Soviets called for a halt to all external military assistance to the Kabul regime and the Mujahedeen (Eliot 1990: 162). But the Mujahedeen parties firmly refused to negotiate with the Najibullah's regime. Throughout this time, Pakistan had firmly supported the Mujahedeen as earlier irrespective of the political elite in Islamabad. After a decade of military rule, this was the time when a new democratic elected government of Ms Benazir Bhutto was in the country. But that didn't change Pakistan policy toward Afghanistan. "Instead of hastening a peaceful democratic settlement of the conflict, the coming of a democratic government in Pakistan under Benazir Bhutto had Pakistan's latent annexationist proclivities. The massing of troops on the Durand line near Jalalabad and the incredible proposal of the Pakistani president for a 'confederation' with Afghanistan revealed its complete disregard for Afghanistan's territorial integrity and sovereignty" (Frontline: February 18, 1989).

On the eve of Soviet withdrawal, the Afghan state had lost its capacity to function with any significant degree of autonomy (Maley 2002: 157). So the basic need of an hour was to form a capable state that would be able to regulate the anarchic Afghan terrain. And it was not possible without a legitimate and competent government in Kabul. This was the biggest problem that was faced by Afghanistan on the eve of Soviet withdrawal. During this time, Afghan ethnical equilibrium had also changed. Afghanistan constituted Pushtun as a larger ethnic group who historically ruled the country. But after ten years of Afghan resistance movement, other ethnic groups had become more politically conscious, particularly the Tajik (Maley 2002: 159). In this new environment it was not possible to subordinate the minority groups as earlier. Therefore the power sharing arrangement had become more complex.

2.1.2 Post Soviet Afghanistan: Changing Geopolitical Environment

The most considerable post-cold war change had occurred in Afghanistan's neighbourhood; in Central Asia where five Central Asian Muslim states emerged. These countries had given enough space to regional power for attracting towards them. Out of five, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have a direct border with Afghanistan. Their emergence near Afghanistan had also changed the regional dimension vice-versa. These Central Asian states changed the earlier geopolitical setting and regional affairs entirely. Now the regional actors began to get involved in Afghanistan. Iran increased its support to the Shia Mujahedeen parties under a common banner of Hezb- i- Wahdat. Saudi Arabia supported Abdul Rasoul Sayyaf's party (Goodson 2001: 147). Other hand, Uzbekistan supported Dostum's militia and Tajikistan supported Tajik led Rabbani and Massoud (Goodson 2001: 147). But the most important actor; Pakistan supported Peshawar based Pushtun parties which were developed in 1980s. Between these regional competition Pakistan had the clear edge upon all of them because Pakistan has created a structure of Mujahedeen parties during anti-Soviet resistance. Another factor which helped Pakistan to dominate was the participation of its state organs in Afghan conflict deeply over a decade. Pakistan was the larger channel of aid and assistance which came from different part of world. In the year following the February 1989, there was expectation for the changed in Pakistan's Afghan policy. Because of the immediate threat to Pakistan's political integrity through outside the military measures became remote (Weinbaum 1994: 44). But Pakistan's policy had not changed drastically. Pakistan continuously remained engaged in Afghanistan.

With the emergence of these countries, Islam again revived in this area. The resurgence of Islam created an opportunity for the Islamic countries of the region to influence the Central Asian states in terms of common identity (Goodson 2001: 135). The Central Asian countries share ethnic linkages with Afghan minority groups which inhabit in the periphery of their respective countries. In post cold war Afghan conflict these ethnic groups were in commendable situation in most of the northern Afghan territory. It inspired the Central Asian elite to engage with these groups directly or indirectly. Although this situation made Afghan conflict much more complex. As

earlier discussed that economic factor also worked in their calculation. The landlocked Central Asian countries were much eager for the sea access, which was only possible through Afghanistan. On the other hand, South Asian countries were also interested to reach Central Asia by going through Afghanistan. So in these conditions Afghanistan became important for all regional states.

2.1.3 Post Soviet Afghanistan and its implication on Pakistan's policy

After nearly a decade of carnage and political chaos following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979, the Soviets withdraw from Afghanistan marking an end the only one episode of foreign direct intervention in the country's modern history. Soviet intervention was not only the cause of Afghan conflict. Out of domestic problem in Afghanistan there was also other external power in Afghan conflict that remained in post- Soviet Afghanistan. It is more right to say that these external powers became more influential and autonomous in Post-Soviet Afghanistan. The Pakistani role in post-Soviet Afghanistan was the example of this phenomenon.

Soviets exited from the Afghanistan under Geneva Accord, but did not provide ground for transition to a legitimate government in Afghanistan. So in this condition the Najibullah led PDPA government survived with the help of indirect Soviet help till the end of cold war. During this period Pakistan and its allies Mujahedeen parties had only one dream to i.e., dismantle the Kabul government. For that Pakistan with the seven party alliance had used different strategy, most importantly the militarily solution. In these conditions, Pakistan found itself in a dominant situation, which could change, historically a hostile neighbour state. In this period, Pakistan's policy towards Afghan state was based on military solution and Pakistani militarily was involved with the Mujahedeen in Afghan conflict. The ISI, as chief planner of the policy, used several Mujahedeen factions to attack and capture a major city to install the Afghan Interim Government. Dorransoro (2005: 200) argue that in Jalalabad attack and in 1991 unsuccessful coup Pakistani officers were decidedly involved. Although they didn't get success as they hoped for. After three months of Soviet

disintegration, the Najibullah led Kabul government fell down and Pakistan under these circumstances moved towards a political solution. It is worthwhile to remember the remarkable geopolitical changes that emerged at the regional and global level after the post-cold war. Now, United State did not have any interest in this region. It created much geo-political space for the regional player to indulge in Afghan State under the changed regional geopolitical dynamics. Under these conditions, Pakistan saw Afghan conflict for their national interest. On the other hand, the emergence of new Central Asian countries also changed their Afghanistan policy from time to time according to the ground situation.

2.2 Pakistan' geopolitical objective in Post-Soviet Afghanistan

These are the Pakistan's geopolitical objective in post-Soviet Afghanistan.

2.2.1 Pro -Pakistani Governments in Kabul

Form the very first day Pakistan wanted a friendly government in Kabul. As we discussed in first chapter both had an antagonistic relation from the birth of Pakistan as a state. Afghanistan had dispute with Pakistan on the Durand line, which added another security issue for Pakistani decision maker. The imagined or real threat to Pakistan's integrity as a state gave rise to the primacy of security concern in the state's internal and external policies. Pakistan has faced external threats to its independence and territorial integrity right from its origin. "Although it is true that perceptions sometimes matter more than visible objective facts, the Indian threat was so obvious that it hardly required any help of perceptions (or misperceptions) to convince the decision makers to devise an adequate defence strategy with a view to effectively warding off the threat" (Cheema 1983: 227). To deal with the perceived threat from India, Pakistan's security planners engaged in a constant effort to improve its security situation (Cheema 1983: 243). Pakistani scholar believed that Pakistan is one of the least secure countries on the planet in terms of threat it faces. These threats come from both part, external and internal. As Javeed Ahmed Sheikh significantly elaborates these threats in terms of "exchanged hostile statement" issued by Delhi,

Kabul and Moscow (Hasnat and Pelinkad 1986: 88). They often projected the deep rooted psychological concern, about insecurity of Pakistani state from its neighbours. "The outside threats have been couched in phrases like 'Pakistan should stop interfering in our internal affairs', 'Pakhtoonistan is the right of Pathans', 'the domination of Punjabis has been depriving the smaller areas from their just rights' (Hasnat and Pelinka 1986: 89). The writer further with the statistics claims that the average of these statement from 1947 to 1986 per year ranged from 10 to 200 from India, 40 to 360 from Kabul and 10 to 300 from Moscow (Hasnat and Pelinka 1989: 89). For Pakistan, the greatest concern in this regard was in the territory bordering Afghanistan, where Pushtun tribesmen regularly have threatened to withdrawal from the Pakistani state to form a greater Pushtunistan nation with their kith and kin across the border in Afghanistan. Pushtunistan issue, for Afghanistan represented a territorial claim against Pakistan, particularly parts of Pakistan's Baluchistan Province and the tribal regions. Pakistan policy toward Afghan state was based on the counter against any threat for its territorial integrity. Therefore it should be seen as, how a state would respond, when there is the question of its territorial unity. The Pakistani military intervention, through established training camp and Madrassas in the tribal belt could be seen as a state instrument to counter the demand of Pushtunistan. This is the larger context in which Pakistan formulates its security policies. Although, the Afghan crisis did not develop to threatening proportions for Pakistan until the Soviet intervention of the country, which dramatically complicated the security situation on Pakistan's western border. Afghanistan, by itself, had never been capable to pose much of a problem because Pakistan's military strength was regarded as more than sufficient to handle Afghan threats. But at the same time Pakistan was not in condition to dominate or improve its relation with Afghanistan. However a Soviet-backed and protected Afghanistan introduced many disturbing elements into Pakistan's security environment. First, the invasion had generated fears and apprehension among many Pakistanis that their country would be the next target.

The overall involvement of Pakistan's in the Afghan conflict was the part of its strategy that once the Soviet exits, it would be able to form a pro-Pakistani government in Kabul. For that, Pakistan actively participated in different government

formation in Afghanistan. During these government formations Pakistan did its best to involve its favourite Mujahedeen parties and isolated anti-Pakistan groups. Pakistan's policy on Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union appeared in confusion, and gradually formed on the basis of unrealistic concept of establishing a pro-Pakistani regime in Kabul and expanding toward the newly independent Central Asian states. After the fall of Najibullah government, Pakistan's immediate concern was to set up a friendly government in Kabul. A pro-Pakistani, Kabul government was the most desirable objective for Pakistan, who can also strengthen Pakistan vis-a-vis India. The strategic plan, often expounded by the Pakistani military, was to provide Pakistan with 'strategic depth' in relation to India, through the installation of a pro-Pakistan government in Kabul, and furthermore to create a Muslim region capable of standing up against India economically, demographically and perhaps even militarily. In this case Pakistani assumption was that a pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan would be able to block an alliance of Afghanistan and India against Pakistan. A friendly Kabul government could be more benefitted in the following issues- Settle the Pushtun nationalism, to reach Central Asia and its regional ambition.

2.2.2 Desire to Settle the Pushtunistan Issue

One of the principal aims of Islamabad's policymakers was to block the revival of Pushtun nationalism and assure recognition of what Pakistan had always claimed was its international border, the Durand Line. Pakistan hoped to achieve this through the creation of a pro-Pakistan government in Kabul in post-Soviet Afghanistan, who doesn't care about the Pushtun nationalism. Although, the greater contribution to decline the Pushtun nationalism goes to Islamic revivalism; which emerged during anti-Soviet Jihad (Roy 1990: 230). Pakistan has a great contributor to intensify the Islamic revivalism through its policy directly or indirectly. In post Soviet Afghanistan there was little reason for Pakistan to be concerned about a revival of the Pushtunistan issue. Although, Pakistan worked with Pushtun Islamic party like Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami and in this period nationalistic themes had a secondary role in Afghan domestic affair. Most of the familiar spokesmen for Pushtun nationalism are no longer on the scene, and the parties that once championed the cause are declining

(Weinbaum1991:85). Pakistan had deliberately chosen the Islamic fundamentalist party in any government formation in post-Soviet Afghanistan. Pakistan had done his best to participated Hekmatyar in different government formation as mention in first chapter. And after the cold war once Hekmatyar used the Pushtun question he was dropped by the Pakistan (Frontline: March5, 1992). The emergence of Taliban in Afghan chaotic terrain should be seen as to counter the Pushtun nationalism. Well know Afghan scholar Barnett R. Rubin says that “Pakistan's concerns about Pushtun territorial claims had been one of the reasons why old-school elements within Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence supported the Taliban during the 1990s” (Radio free Europe Radio Liberty: 2006).

2.2.3 Access to Central Asia

After the end of cold war an unstable neighbour no longer seemed obviously in Pakistan's economical and strategic interest. The disintegration of Soviet Union created five new Central Asian countries. The emergence of Central Asian republic in the wake of Soviet disintegration has created excitement in Pakistan both in official and unofficial level. According to Tahir Amin “most Pakistani observers consider it is a historical opportunity for Pakistan and are enthusiastic over the prospects of building political and economical relation with newly emerged Muslim nation of this potential region” (Banuazizi and Weiner 1994: 216). Pakistan has embarked upon a serious of modest political, economical and culture moves towards the central Asian state (Banuazizi and Weiner 1994: 220). But the most significant limitation, however is the unsettle nature of politics condition in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s major communication routes to Central Asia lie through Afghanistan. Therefore, until and unless a friendly government established in Afghanistan, Pakistan vision of building an effective relationship with Central Asian States would remain unrealized. So Pakistan’s effort to engage in post-Soviet Afghanistan and broking Accord between different groups should be seen under these lines.

Pakistan’s Central Asian policy which was seems somehow part of it Afghan policy, to create an alliance to counter the mighty India. According to Tahir Amin,

Pakistan wished to develop an economical alliance with the Central Asian countries to counterweight India at the regional level (Banuazizi and Weiner 1994: 220). Pakistan's official document on Central Asia stresses that, "Central Asian states could provide Pakistan the strategic depth that we lack" (Banuazizi and Weiner 1994: 220). Economic dimension has also influence its relationship with Central Asian states. In ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization which consists five Central Asian countries) meeting held in Islamabad, where Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on 30 November said "Our organization now corresponds to the boundaries of the ancient region which had brought prosperity and civilization to its people through fruitful exchange along the historical silk route. The people of this land have a share and common spiritual and culture values." (Banuazizi and Weiner 1994: 220). Although Pakistani officers have stressed that the ECO was not a Muslim block but merely an economic block (Banuazizi and Weiner 1994: 221).

More than realpolitik, it was the economical factor which motivated Pakistan to Central Asia. The significant economic potential which attracted Pakistan toward Central Asia was the hydrocarbon, the engine of today's economical activity. The energy resources of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, (which we shall now call the Caspian region and includes Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan), have been described with "breathless hyperbole" over the past few years (Rashid 2001: 26). "Central Asia has large confirmed reserves of oil (1-2 % of the estimated world total) and 3.8 per cent of proven gas reserves. It also possesses around 6 per cent of the world's hydropower potential and 20 percent or more of its uranium deposits" (Spechler 2008: 114). According to some energy expert, since the Soviet Union never did a thorough examine of possible reserves, further exploration will probably increase these totals (Spechler 2008: 114). These energy resources could help Pakistan in two ways, first to increase its energy security and second to become a transition route between Central Asia and South Asia. Pakistan was the first country who had taken economical initiative to engage with Central Asian countries after the immediate disintegration of Soviet Union. A high level delegation led by the then minister of State for Economical Affairs, Sardar Assef Ahmed Ali, visited Central Asian state between 24 November and 15 December 1991 and concludes several

bilateral economic engagements with these countries (Banuazizi and Weiner 1994: 221). The instability in Afghanistan was the biggest hurdle for Pakistan to reach Central Asia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Pakistan's Afghan policy had faced some sort of dilemma. Successive Pakistani governments were desperately keen to open up direct land routes for trade with the Central Asian Republics (CARs). The major obstruction was the continuing civil war in Afghanistan. In this situation, either Pakistan could carry on backing Hikmatyar in a bid to bring a Pushtun group into power in Kabul which would have Pakistan-friendly, or it could change direction and urge for a power-sharing agreement between all the Afghan factions at whatever the price for the Pushtuns (Rashid 2001: 26). When Benazir Bhutto was elected as Prime Minister in 1993, she adopted a fresh approach to open a route to Central Asia (Rashid 2001: 26). They still stick to Zia's vision of an Islamic Central Asia under their influence, to be attached by the hope that a stable and peaceful Afghanistan would give them access to the region's commerce, as well as to Central Asian oil and gas. Both American and Saudi interests joined them in the latter aspiration, hoping to construct a pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan. The Pakistani drug and trucking mafia were also strong proponents of free access to Afghanistan and the routes to Central Asia (Rashid 2001: 27).

2.2.4 Regional dimension of Pakistan's ambition

Most important driving force of Pakistan's Afghan policy was the regional geopolitical ambition. During Soviet intervention Pakistan's huge investment in Afghan conflict was based on this assumption that, once Soviet would withdraw from Afghanistan it would use Afghanistan as a tool for regional supremacy. As we have discussed in first chapter that Pakistan from the first day of its formation face the insecurity from eastern and western border. So it was the particular region where the Pakistan's insecurity lies. In the post-Soviet Afghanistan, Pakistan had not that kind of insecurity from one frontier. In this condition Pakistan had wanted to use this juncture to settle other part of border. Pakistan's geopolitical objective in Afghanistan can be understood in the larger context of South Asian security complex (Buzan

2003:101). Which define by the prominent Scholar Barry Buzan. According to Buzan “a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan 2003: 43). Barry Buzan defines the concept of security complex in terms of amity and enmity that are interlinked within a geographical area. Regional security complex provides some theoretical outlook to understand Afghan conflict on regional lines. It proposed to look for the motivations of Pakistan’s Afghan policy in the structure of ‘South Asian security complex’. Its thesis is that the Source of Pakistan’s objective and its management of the Afghan conflict is essentially, but not entirely, dependent on its relations with its neighbour, India (Grare 2003: 03). The choices made by Pakistan are mainly explained by an analysis of the structuring of this complex. It highlights the central role of Pushtun question and Indian threat perception the actual foundation of Pakistan’s Afghan policy. Through this framework it can be understood that Pakistani security dilemma one hand from India and other hand from Afghanistan. The uses of this concept highlight the interconnection between the respective dynamics of Afghan- Pakistan and Indo- Pakistan relation. It also helps to understand Pakistan’s Afghan policy which was based on the assumption that friendly Afghanistan would help them to reduce the danger of Indian threat. The Pakistani elite approach to security in the context of territorial threat from Afghanistan and India, revolved around military threat and the fear of subversion directed by these states to foster the secessionist movements (Hussain 2005: 05). Although Pakistan had not feared to a direct attack from Afghan military, but India’s support for Afghanistan’s claims on Pakistan territory have long created unrest among Pakistani military planners, who fear the prospect of a major two-front war.

India has periodically shown some interest in the Pushtunistan issue as one that could potentially destabilise Pakistan. “In 1965 the Indian foreign minister Swaran Singh told the Indian parliament that we are fully aware that the fundamental freedoms and natural aspirations of the brave Pushtoons have been consistently denied to them, and their struggle has got our greatest sympathy and we will certainly support the efforts that Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan might undertake in that direction”

(Jones 2002: 139). The Indian factor focuses Pakistan's perception of Afghanistan and its policies there.

From independence until 1992, India supported whatever government was in power in Kabul. They all were anti-Pakistan. Pakistan expected that things would be changed after 1992 when the Pakistan-backed Mujahedeen entered Kabul. Even after the formation of Rabbani government in 1992, India made contact with Kabul and there was an understanding in Indian foreign policy makers that India should deal with whosoever was in power and focus would be in cultivating a friendly government in Kabul that would be sensitive for India's national interest (The Hindu: May16, 2011:). Definitely India's links with Rabbani government was a setback for Pakistan's geopolitical interest in post-Soviet Afghanistan. However, internal fighting led to a split between Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and all other parties. India then supported whoever opposed Pakistan. This is the larger context in which Pakistan has been formulating its security policies. Pakistan's major concern from 1970s remained largely centred around efforts to create a new regional balance vis-a-vis India toward off any further erosion of its territory (Iftikhar 1994: 84). To counter India, Pakistan was motivated to develop closer ties with 'Muslim nations'. First Afghanistan, and later with the emergence of the five independent Central Asian Republics, Pakistan was enthusiastic to develop the links with two vital 'Muslim Regions', which allowed Pakistan a 'strategic depth' (Iftikhar 1994: 84) The notion of Strategic depth is an idea that in the event of war with India its military would be able to operate from Afghanistan to offset its disadvantage as a small country compared to its much bigger neighbour (Siddiqi: 2010). Pakistan's approach to Afghanistan can be inferred in to two words: 'strategic depth', the holy grail of the nation's strategic policy for more than two decades. Strategic depth remains the central pillar in Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan. However, the concept itself is being reinterpreted by Pakistan's security establishment as a consequence of the sliding balance of opportunities and threats, both foreign and domestic (Siddiqi: 2010). In this way, Regional security complex will help to understand the post cold war competition between India and Pakistan for influence in Afghanistan.

In Post –Soviet Afghanistan Pakistan as a state has some regional dreams also. Kashmir has always remains a vital issue in Pakistan’s geopolitical calculation. After the Mujahedeen victory against the mighty Soviet it was the Kashmir which later seen by Pakistan’s security establishment in the similar kind of solution. The Mujahedeen victory had seen as the triumph of Islamic guerrilla’s tactic. In post- Soviet period these instrument has seen by Pakistan as another Afghanistan kind of operation in Kashmir. The geopolitical understanding in Pakistan was that the western trouble border has settled now it should be the eastern one. Since 1989 the Indian administration Kashmir has been under the insurgency which has an ethno-religious flavour. Although the origin of this insurgency was indigenous but Pakistan involvement in the insurgency has expanded its scope and intensity (Jaffrelot 2002: 179). In 1990s, Pakistan has favoured the Islamic groups like Hizbul Mujahideen and several others groups that aimed at Kashmir’s merger with Pakistan rather than the secular Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front which was the Pakistan instrument before 1990 (Anant 2009: 763). Around this time, “Pakistan shunned the pro-independence Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), and turned towards Islamist militant organizations, who favoured Kashmir’s final accession to Pakistan” (Behuria 2009: 435). This was the time when after a decade of military rule the civilian government of Ms Bhutto run the Pakistan. Later the Nawaz Sharif government in his first turn (1990-93) also used the Kashmir rhetoric. It has believed that “under pressure from the military establishment, both Nawaz and Benazir were seen to be trying hard to outdo each other and the army in projecting themselves as hardliners on the Kashmir issue”(Behuria 2009: 435). The balance of power with India and the issue of Kashmir therefore entirely determined Pakistan’s Afghan policy in post –Soviet Afghanistan.

2.3 Pakistan’s Geopolitical Instrument in Post Soviet Afghanistan

To acquire its geopolitical objective every country uses some instrument. They may be material (Finance, Weapons) or the human resources (Political sympathiser, Parties, Non-government organization, Intelligence agencies). In Case of Pakistan the similar approach seems true. Pakistan used different instrument to achieve its geopolitical objective in post-Soviet Afghanistan. Mujahedeen parties and the Army

and its intelligence wing Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was one of them. In entire Afghan conflict Pakistan used these two organs to achieve its goal in different circumstances differently. Although some time it seems these two organs has gone out of Pakistan's control and act autonomously. But in the larger context they worked with Pakistani state establishment. This part is an attempt to explain how Pakistan had engaged with them to get its geopolitical objective in post soviet Afghanistan.

2.3.1 Mujahedeen Parties

Mujahedeen parties were the most vital instrument of Pakistan's geopolitical design. From the Saur revolution till the emergence of Taliban, Pakistan supported the Mujahedeen Parties. These Mujahedeen parties were basically the resistance political unite which as an organization made their appearance in Pakistan. They were the core instrument of Pakistani policy toward Afghanistan from anti-Soviet resistance till Taliban emergence. Pakistan wanted to manage the Afghan conflict in its favour for that its need some kind of united resistance structure. Therefore Pakistan helped to shape a central political unites which was earlier as a spontaneous but divided resistance movement. These unites operate from Pakistan and established their entire network there.

These units generally called the Mujahedeen parties. Although there were so many resistances groups but Pakistan coordinate its alliance only with the seven Sunni parties alliances, which came into existence at mid 1980s. Pakistan helped in all way to legitimize the seven Peshawar based parties (Dorransoro 2005: 139). Pakistan also 'monopolized the representations' through this alliance (Dorransoro 2005:142). Relations with host countries were crucial for the parties, and Pakistan wants to use this relation for its strategic desire.

Peshawar Based Resistance party				
Name of Party	Chief Leader	Ethnic group	Mode of Party	Extra Links
Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami	Maulavi M. Nabi Mohammadi	Pushtun	Moderate Party	Follower in South Afghanistan
Hezb-i-Islami(H)	G. Hekmatyar	Pushtun	Fundamentalist	Pak's beloved
Hezb-i-Islami(K)	Yunus Khalis	Pushtun	Fundamentalist	Follower in Eastern Afghanis
Ittehad-i-Islami Bara-yi Azadi Afghanistan	Rasoul Sayyaf	Pushtun	Fundamentalist	Funding- Saudi Petro-dollar
Jamiat-i-Islami	Pr. Burhanuddin Rabbani	Northern Minorities Tajik	Fundamentalist	Commander-Ahmed Shah Massoud, Ismail Khan
Jebha-i-Milli Nejat	Pr. S. Mojaddidi	Pushtun	Moderate	President of AIG in 1989
Mahaz-i-Milli Islami-yi Afghanistan	Pir Sayed Ahmed Gailani	Pushtun	Moderate	It supported the return of the exiled king Zahir Shah

Source- (Frontline: May22, 1992; Goodson 2001:189-191)

No political and militant movement can run without finance. In Afghan conflict Pakistan was the main source of finance for Mujahedeen, which came from different channels. Most important resource of finance was the aid and assistance which came from the West and Muslim countries were directly under the Pakistan's control. Mostly aid had distributed through the Pakistani supply network, according to their interest on Peshawar based parties (Dorrnsoro 2005:139). Apart from these aids Pakistan also diverted Humanitarian assistance to its favoured groups particularly

Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami (Dorrnsoro 2005:139). Rather than becoming just mediator between these countries and Mujahedeen, Pakistan made use of its position as a mediator to control the parties and develop its own policy. As we discussed in first chapter Pakistani supervision was exercised in three ways- political and military affairs were supervised by the ISI, international diplomacy and negotiations were carried on by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and aid to the refugees was administered by the Commissioner for Afghan Refugees (Dorrnsoro 2005:144). The Pakistani government therefore decided to stop the formation of new groups and to stabilise the number of parties for the entire duration of the war and Pakistani General took part in the meetings of the exiled parties, while strategy on the ground was broadly laid down by the Pakistan military.

Within the seven parties alliance, Pakistan have some favourite leader like Hekmatyar, the leader of Hezb-i Islami, who has good relation with the Pakistan intelligence services and made himself the privileged ally of Islamabad. Subsequently Pakistan distributed a large proportion of aid to Hezb-i Islami, probably around 40%. Hezb-i Islami also took advantage of its good relations with the Pakistan administration to establish itself in the refugee camps. There was some reason which determined Pakistan to support Hekmatyar, like his excellent centre based organisation. Hekmatyar was in a position to make crucial decisions more or less on his own (Dorrnsoro 2005: 154). While, most party's commanders were allowed wide autonomy on the ground, the leadership of Hezb-i Islami reserved as far as possible strict control over local commander. Another most important point was that Hezb-i Islami identified itself relatively with the Pakistani Jamaat-i Islami. Hezb-i Islami 'rejected all nationalist ideology and proposed a confederation with Pakistan' (Dorrnsoro 2005: 158). So its ability to mobilise Pushtuns without their national inspiration and also engaged with some other ethnic group made it Pakistan's favoured.

Another party which had also for a few times supported by Pakistan was the Jamiat-i Islami. It's selectiveness over the representation of the non-Pushtuns certainly played a part in Pakistani strategy (Dorrnsoro 2005: 157). Pakistan has also invested in some other parties like Ettehadia, who was significantly assisted by the

ISI. From Pakistan's point of view, the advantage presented by the Hazara nationalists was that they acted as a counterbalance to the Iranian revolution (Dorransoro 2005: 149). But the Hazar didn't work for Pakistan. Pakistan designed to identify the resistance in seven groups and helps one group in particular time frame, was a strategic tactic. It was based on the assumption that united and organized resistance movement in exile, combined with a large refugee population, could create a danger for host government. On the other hand, Pakistan had played a key role in the elimination or isolate of the Maoist or nationalist movements within the Afghan resistance, because they represented a potential threat to Pakistani domination.

These Mujahedeen parties had the biggest investment where Pakistan first invested during Zulfalihar Bhutto civilian regime and latter it shaped by the military dictator Zia Ual Haq against the Kabul- Soviet alliance. The idea behind this strategy was that once Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan with the help of these Islamist Parties would establish a pro-Pakistani government in Kabul. As the first chapter argues, Pakistan during Geneva talks represents the Mujahedeen. After Soviet departure Pakistan did a huge effort to engage with these parties to settle Afghan conflict in his favour. As we have discussed in earlier chapter that with the help of these parties Pakistan has broke different power sharing arrangement including AIG, Peshawar Accord and Islamabad Accord.

In Post Soviet Afghanistan, Pakistan with the help these parties used different strategy according to the best suited ground condition. Pakistan's policy during this period was to represent the Mujahedeen party, was based on this assumption that the outcome of Soviet withdrawal should necessary come into its favour. It was based on the realistic assumptions that Pakistan's interest would be the supreme. Therefore, Pakistan had changed it strategy through one party to another, one Accord to another, one attempt of coup to another. But its interests in Afghanistan remained the same and its policies had changed with each successive transition in Afghanistan. A friendly government in Kabul, through Mujahedeen parties was the main aim of Pakistan. For that Pakistan refused to all other attempt, to formed government which was not in Pakistani interest. During this process Pakistan has backed those Afghan parties which had an ideological solidarity with Pakistan or seems strategically important for

it. After the Soviet withdraw Pakistan with the help of these parties involved to direct military confrontation against Kabul government, such as, May 1989 Jalalabad attack and 1990 Tanai coup, which were also assisted by ISI. After the fall of Najibullah government, Pakistan found that military solution was not pragmatic one, and then it returns for the political solution. The participation of Mujahedeen in Peshawar and Islamabad accord was the continuous of this policy. When Pakistan didn't get desirable result then it shifts from Taliban.

2.3.2 Pakistan Army and ISI

Another important instrument which Pakistan used in Afghan conflict was the Pakistani Army and its notorious intelligence agency (ISI). Some scholars argue that Pakistani Army had decided Pakistan's Afghan policy. Even some called Pakistan's Afghan policy was nothing but its military policy. This part would discuss the role of Pakistani Army which was the only powerful institution of Pakistani state and who define the Pakistan's Afghan policy.

The imagined or real threat to Pakistan's integrity as a state gave rise to the primacy of security concern in the state's internal and external policies. This lead to the growth of a large military establishment, which over the short period of time became the most powerful and domination institution, in the new Pakistani state. Pakistan's state interests largely define by the Pakistani bureaucratic-military alliance. Thus, the military started out as the dominant institution in the new state, and this dominance has continued over the years. Since "General Ayub Khan assumed power in 1958, ruling through martial law, the military has directly or indirectly dominated Pakistani politics, set Pakistan's ideological and national security agenda, and repeatedly intervened to direct the course of domestic politics." (Haqqani 2004: 85–96). This alliance of military and bureaucracy had defined the Pakistani external policy, which was also influence by the insecurity of this new born state. So since formed as a nation Pakistan's decision makers give priority to security concerned. Well known Pakistani journalist Najam Sethi defines Pakistan as a "national security

state” (Sethi: <http://youtu.be/7cQkqPzP0cc>). According to him a state which has overwhelming military security concern rather than Social security called “national security state”. This kind of state defines its interest in guns rather than butter (Sethi: <http://youtu.be/7cQkqPzP0cc>).

In his classic account of the Pakistan army, the American academic Stephen Cohen has recognized three generations of officers (Cohen 2004: 99-110). First, he argues, there was the British generation. When Pakistan’s army was established, its men were all products of Britain’s India Army. According to Cohen, the second Generation of Pakistan army was the American generation of Pakistani officers. During the cold war period Pakistan was the member of US led security pact, so many Pakistani military personnel officers went to the US for training, these officers had modernist, even secular, attitudes and the leading figures had distinctly un-Islamic lifestyles. But after the 1971 defeat in Bangladesh, the American generation was totally discredited and came to be replaced by the third generation of officers identified by Cohen the Pakistani generation (or, as he later described it, the Zia generation). Although, Stephen Cohen rejected the view that these men were driven by radical Islamic ideals (Cohen 2004: 101). But it seems that, they used Islam as an instrument. “Throughout the whole world, yes throughout the world, no armed force is so irrevocably devoted to Islam as the Pakistani armed forces. -Editorial in the armed forces’ weekly journal *Hilal*, 1996” (Jones 2002: 250). Although after Pakistan state formed, Pakistani army was a secular one, and they remained for nearly three decade.

The first Pakistani army chief to play religion card was General Zia ul Haq. His Islamisation campaign affected Pakistani society as a whole but he made an exceptional effort to reform the military and to create a more puritanical, religious army (Jones 2002: 253). During his tenure Greater stress was laid on organising Namaz at times and religious fasts for army personnel. He also allowed some religious groups to operate in the army with relative freedom. “Zia encouraged the largest Islamic organisation in Pakistan, the Tablighi Jamaat, to become active within the army and he became the first army chief to attend the Tablighis’ massive annual conventions in Raiwind near Lahore” (Jones 2002: 257). Zia also wanted religion to

be integrated into the syllabus of the Staff College and he encouraged the study of Islam's teaching regarding the conduct of war. One compelling reason for believing that the rank and file of the army is becoming increasingly radical is the ever closer relationship between the military and various Islamic militant groups or Jihadis. (Jones 2002: 258). Pakistani soldiers are bound to be affected by their experience of working and fighting with Jihadis. During Zia's tenure Pakistan's army became the supervisor of Pakistan's Afghanistan policy. After Zia's death it was expected that a civilian government could make the independence Afghanistan policy to bypass the army. Ms Bhutto's government did some effort for that but did not get success. When Bhutto diminished the ISI's power the army strongly resisted it (Weinbaum 1994:44). Later Bhutto compromised and Afghan policy was determined by the Army. Weinbaum (1994: 44) writes that there was some uncertainty in the Mujahideen party about Bhutto's initiative to reduce the army and ISI's power, but Hekmatyar was assured by the army that there would be no important changes in Pakistan's Afghan policy.

Here it's worthwhile to discuss the composition of Pakistan's army. Although the Pakistani army is dominated by the Punjabi ethnic group, but in officer rank the Pushtun was proportionally larger than any other ethnic group, nearly 20 per cent (Rashid 2001:26). This was the region that the "Pakistani military was convinced that other ethnic groups would not do their bidding and continued to back Hekmatyar. Ahmed Rashid (2001:26) "Pakistani Pushtuns and the pro-Pushtun and Islamic fundamentalist lobby within the ISI and the military remained determined to achieve a Pushtun victory in Afghanistan".

Another institution which is the part of the army and very closely linked with the Afghan conflict is the Inter services Intelligence (ISI). The ISI's head is a lieutenant general appointed by the army chief, but he reports to the prime minister (but during the long Afghan conflict there was no prime minister, so the ISI director reported to the General in his capacity as chief executive) (Cohen 2004: 100). The ISI only emerged as an important agency during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and has remained a powerful political force ever since. The ISI is responsible for foreign intelligence, which means, in practical terms, a dominant focus on India, but with some attention to Afghanistan, and other regional states. Afterward Zulfikar Ali

Bhutto substantially increased the ISI's budget and it used in Afghanistan. During the Afghan revolt, the ISI grew a great deal, with funding coming directly as petro dollar from both Saudi Arabia and the United States, and its resources, influence, and foreign contacts expanded exponentially (Cohen 2004 :100). To observe its power, some time it called a state within state. During Afghan war the major responsibilities fell to ISI's assignment to implement policy was understandable given the covert nature of the operation (Weinbaum1991: 73). In entire Afghan conflict ISI was the main instrument for Pakistani state. Post Soviet period ISI remained powerful instrument of Pakistani Afghan policy. Even the ISI was the United States' main Source of information about the politics of the resistance groups. According to Weinbaum (1991: 75) "the ISI was assumed, in Washington, to have a good understanding of the Afghans and invaluable contacts among the resistance parties"

Summary

Since the Soviet withdrawal, the primary purpose of Pakistan's Afghan policy has been to bring about the military conquer of the Najibullah led Kabul regime and install a strongly pro-Pakistani Islamic government who would resolves the traditional border dispute with Afghanistan. A friendly Afghanistan would also help to counter India in regional conflict. Toward this end, Pakistan appeared to resist a political resolution of the crisis and heavily favoured Hekmatyar, the most rigid and fundamentalist leader of Peshawar based Mujahedeen leader. In post-cold war, regional geopolitical situation had changed Pakistan's earlier calculation. In the intermediate term, Pakistan's Afghan policy had tended to evolve in favour of a political settlement for several reasons. First, Pakistan's policy to supporting Mujahedeen had gone wrong when Afghanistan enter in to a civil war. Second the chaotic situation was no longer in Pakistan's interest because it creates a barrier for Pakistan's dreams to reach Central Asia.

**The Failure of Interim Government
under competing Geopolitical
objectives**

CHAPTER 3

3.1 Afghan Interim Government Formation:

“The soldiers smile their smile of pride;
each heart contains a fist inside.
The land they left has gone to seed;
they’ve learned to shoot but not to read.
In villages with holy names
they’ve seen the sky explode in flames.
In godly mountains thick with pines
their pets have been deformed by mines.
In playgrounds meant for girls and boys
where lethal pellets lay like toys,
a child that only played at war
has two less fingers than before.
For decades long the *feringhee*
dispatched their best technology
to help the people kill themselves,
then granted aid to fill their shelves.
Now we sit like stumps and wait
as rival armies infiltrate,
as women blot their skin with mud
and stock their cellars with cold food.
My landlord is inured to war,
has seen it many times before.
The only hope, he says, is faith;
the only waste is useless death”.

—Phillip Corwin (*Corwin 2003: xx*)

These lines express the tragedy which Afghanistan had faced, during the period which this chapter address. The decade long Afghan conflict which had begun in 1979 doomed the Afghan society and state institution. The involvement of Mujahedeen and other external actors in Afghan conflict had been motivated by the fact that, once the communist regime was toppled, they would form a government where their stake would be supreme. So in these calculations, the Mujahedeen was seen as the essential actor who would form the government, but the Mujahedeen were not the unified identity. They were divided along various lines of ethnic, sectarian and different external support. After the fall of Kabul government, they ran from their sanctuaries towards Kabul to obtain their subsequent interest. In this situation there was a chaos faced by Afghanistan as a state, ubiquitously. Rather than forming a legitimate Afghan government they had fought with each other to acquire their goal with the help of regional player including Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. This made the government formation the toughest job. The following part would discuss it extensively.

3.1.1 Fall of Najibullah and attempt to formed Interim Government

After the Soviet withdrawal, the war had intensified between the Najibullah led PDPA government and the Mujahedeen. At the same time there was no unity between the Mujahedeen groups, and it helped to survive the Kabul government. After the Soviet disintegration, when it had seemed that Kabul government would fall down soon, the rivalries between the Mujahedeen groups come in to surface for capture the Kabul. Najibullah government survived till April 1992. During this period he made attempt to get legitimacy. In this process he changed the name of PDPA as Hezb-e Watan and few other reconciliation courses (Maley 2002: 172). This was preceded by an abandonment of Marxist rhetoric and adherence to the principles of Islam. Najibullah's new plan had also introduced the multi-party system and creation of coalition government (Saikal 2004:206). In the same time he dispatched his foreign minister Abdul Wakil, and minister of state security Faruq Yaqubi, to Geneva in an

eleventh-hour attempt to convince Zahir Shah to come back to Afghanistan and become the head of state again but these attempts didn't work (Saikal 2004: 206).

During this time the 53 Infantry Division of General Abdul Rashid Dostum, which made by the mostly of Uzbek had shifted its loyalty from Najibullah to Ahmed Shah Massoud (Saikal 2004: 206). Dostum used to be the important ally of Najibullah government in post Soviet Afghanistan and somehow he was responsible for the survival Kabul government so long. Other hand many ranking Parchamis also shifted toward this new alliance and it made the non Pushtun alliance capable for power bidding in Kabul (Saikal 2004: 206). First time in Afghanistan history, non-Pushtun groups were in dominated situation in Kabul and other part of Afghanistan. This alliance called the 'Coalition of North' (Ittilaf-e-Shamal) which had been active in March 1992. It also included the Hazara group, Hezbe-e Wahdat which was headed by Abdul Ali Mazari (Kakar1995: 274). On the eve of Najibullah's departure, Massoud, Dostum, Ali Mizari and Ismail Khan controlled most of northern, western and central Afghanistan. "Massoud controlled Takhar, Badakhshan, Kapisa, Parwan and some district of Kunduz. Dostum remained strong in the provinces of Jawzjan, Baghlan, Balk, Faryad, Samangan and parts of Kunduz. Hezbe-e Wahdat hold Bamyan, most of Uruzgan and part of Ghor and Ghazni. Ismail Khan was in charge in Herat, Badghis and Farah" (Saikal 2004: 207). The other hand the Pushtun provinces in the south, south-east and south-west were under the control of different field commander who were affiliated from the seven Peshawar based Sunni Mujahedeen parties (Saikal 2004: 207). Under these circumstances it was very hard for Najibullah government to survive, when all these Mujahedeen groups looking to capture Kabul. On 22 March, Ahmad Shah Massoud, Dostum, Abdul Ali Mazari, and some other commander decided in a meeting to overthrow President Najibullah and set up a new government with Massoud as the head of state who was the strongest and the most visionary leader in the 'Coalition of Northern' (Kakar1995: 274). During the last days of Najibullah government, UN in its capacity did a great job to form some kind of broad-base transition government in Kabul. But before the UN accomplished the mission- to form a transitional government Mujahedeen reached to Kabul and the

Najibullah escaped from the presidential palace. So the Najibullah regime finally collapsed on 15–16 April 1992.

After the fallen of Kabul government, Pakistani Prime Minister call a meeting of Mujahedeen leaders in his Islamabad residence. In that meeting the UN plan came to an end when participants from Rabbani and Mojaddidi parties expressed a preference for the immediate establishment of an Islamic government, rather than the UN's transitional approach (Maley 2002: 190). According to Maley (2002: 190) the moved away to the UN plan, came from both an Islamist and moderate parties. Absolutely for Pakistan it was a more comfortable choice then the UN option. But to form a government, between Mujahedeen groups, who were so diverse in terms of their formation, action and operation were never an easy task, particularly in the condition which was prevailed that time, where the Mujahedeen groups and commander changed one coalition to another. And it had clearly visualized at that time that the future would be more volatile. The other hand regional players were heavily involved with the Mujahedeen parties and commanders to capture the Afghan terrain in post-Najibullah Afghanistan. Although, after the Soviet withdrawal, there was some attempt to form an Afghan interim government. As we have discuss in first chapter, under the Pakistani guidance Peshawar based Mujahedeen parties attempted to coordinate their activities. On 19 June 1989, the seven parties announced the formation of an interim government where Mojaddidi was declared as the president. But this government had remained in exile because Najibullah government has survived in Afghanistan. After one year Pakistan had refused to recognise it, when Pakistan had some clash of interest with it. Therefore, Mujahedeen didn't have any experience to coordinate with each other to form a government and govern a state. It was the legacy of their anti-Soviet Jihad, because during the anti-communist resistance movement they remain divided. It is right to say, they were intentionally divided by Pakistan. Pakistan was well aware about the danger of a united movement. Therefore, a loose kind of coalition of Mujahedeen groups could be valuable for Pakistani interest in Afghanistan then and ever. So in these situations it was a tough job to bring all rival Mujahedeen parties in one stage to form a government to rule the

fragmented Afghanistan. The Afghan government formation process went through different phases. They were following.

3.1.2 Peshawar Accord

In the aftermath of the collapse of the Najibullah regime, the need for a functioning political system was considerable. For that, there should have been some compromise between the different Afghan groups who had badly divided in different lines. According to the Afghan scholars Maley (2002: 197) and Saikal (2004: 207), Peshawar Accord of April 1992, was the first attempt at an 'elite settlement' which provided for the structure and process for the Islamic State of Afghanistan. Pakistan had the important role as a broker to this accord. Only Hekmatyar refused to attend, saying that "his presence was needed inside Afghanistan", Qutbuddin Helal represented him in the meeting (Kakar1995: 275). Pakistan had always supported the Hekmatyar, and wanted to Afghanistan under his grip. But it was not the realistic option because of the existing ground condition. As we have discussed earlier most of the Afghanistan was under the 'Coalition of North' headed by Ahmed Shah Massoud, a popular commander who engineered the end of Najibullah's six-year rule (Deseret News archives: April 21, 1992). Massoud and his allies were in commendable situation that time in Kabul also. May be that was the reason which determined Pakistan to give large power share to Massoud- Rabbani in Interim Afghan government. The other hand Massoud was actually aware of Afghan ground situation, that no single ethnic group could effectively rule this ethnic diverse country on its own and the best way to proceed was to secure a broad-based transitional coalition. He thus called the Peshawar based leaders to work out such a deal (Saikal 2004: 214). Then this 'elite settlement' was made possible which called the Peshawar Accord.

Peshawar Accord provided the framework for an interim government to be implemented in different stages. In the first phase, the job for Kabul went to a Mujahedeen leader of a small Pushtun party (Jebha-i-Milli Nejat), Sibgatullah Mojaddidi for two months (Saikal 2002: 214). He headed a 51-person council (Shura-i Intiqali) to take over power from the present rulers of Kabul. The council included

five members from each of the 10 major guerrilla parties based in Pakistan and Iran, including Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, head of Hezb-e-Islami party (Deseret News archives: April 24, 1992). Mojaddidi had served as President as a compromise choice to head a two-month transitional government (Saikal 2002: 214). The Accord came a day after Hekmatyar told moderate rebels that he would accept an interim council that would rule until elections within a year (Deseret News archives: April 24, 1992). Hekmatyar previously demanded the establishment of a strict Islamic state and proposed that neither he nor Ahmed Shah Massoud serve on the council (Deseret News archives: April 24, 1992). Later he was forced to compromise by Pakistan. The second phase to be followed was a four-month interim government to be headed by Rabbani the leader of the Jamiat-e Islami, who's had control Kabul through his commander Massoud. And in third phase the interim government would be selected by the Shura, and this government would remain in power for two years (Kakar1995: 278). The Accord also distributed key ministry to the parties: the Prime Minister post to Hekmatyar's Hezb e- Islami, the Defence Ministry to the Jamiat-e Islami, and the Foreign Affairs Ministry to Gailani's party(Maley 2002:198). In the third phase it had to be followed by "the holding of a council of expert (Shura-ye ahl al -hall wa l-aqd) on solving and binding to constitute an interim government for 18 months as a prelude to a general election for creating a popular government" (Saikal 2002: 214).

After signing the Accord Mojaddidi led a convoy of vehicles carrying 30 of the 50 members of the council which formed under the Peshawar Accord toward Kabul. "The group, riding in 35 Jeeps and Land Cruisers and accompanied by 150 bodyguards armed with AK-47 rifles and rocket-launchers, began the journey from the Afghan border town of Tor Kham at the mouth of the Khyber Pass and were on the outskirts of the capital by early afternoon" (Deseret News archives: April 27, 1992). But here in Afghanistan the rival groups of Hekmatyar and Massoud were fighting to capture as much terrain as they could. After three days of signing the Accord, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif mediated between Hekmatyar and Massoud a round of negotiations by telephone. Then 'Coalition of North' forces, under the command of interim Defence Minister Ahmad Shah Massoud, declared

cease-fire with the rival troops of rebel hardliner Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (Deseret News archives: April 27, 1992).

On 28 April 1992 Sibgatullah Mojaddidi formally received power from a vice-president of the Kabul regime in the presence of Afghan dignitaries and foreign diplomats (Kakar1995: 278). At the same time, one after another, members of the former government of President Najibullah had stood at this ceremony in the capital and promised loyalty to Mojaddidi. "It is a Source of great happiness that we are once again seizing control of our country, Mojaddidi told a room packed with foreign dignitaries, journalists and rebel fighters" (Deseret News: April 28,1992). After four days of formed government, Pakistan had recognized the rebel council as Afghanistan's legitimate government. Pakistan had also send medicine, wheat and other food to Afghanistan (Deseret News: April 28, 1992). As president of the first Afghan-Islamic state, Mojaddidi appointed ministers and other senior officials to the departments which the previous regime had set up. Mojaddidi had no prime minister, Ahmad Shah Massoud, the minister of defence and chairman of the security commission, acted as the second in command (Kakar1995: 278). M. Hassan Kakar (1995: 278) beautifully elaborating the Kabul's situation after the Mojaddidi had taken the charge, writes the people of Kabul accepted Mojaddidi and gave him joyous welcome, made the government look legitimate. He further writes "Kabulis accepted the government, assuming that it would provide essential goods, restore basic services, and maintain law and order".

According to the Peshawar Accords, Burhanuddin Rabbani, became president after the Mojaddidi term had ended. When Rabbani took over, the foundation of e Islamic state had been laid down. He tried to broaden and solidify it. He convinced Hekmatyar to let a member of his party become prime minister, as the Peshawar Accords had set. Thus, Abdul Sabur Farid became the first prime minister of the Islamic state (Kakar1995: 282). However he remained in office, for only a few months. Efforts were also made to broaden the basis on which the army was to be built. Four persons of various Mujahedeen and ethnic groups, including General Dostum, were named deputies to the minister of defence however, Dostum declined

the offer. General Mohammad Rahim Wardak, member of the National Islamic Front, was again given the post of chief of staff (Kakar1995: 282).

This agreement faced a number of fundamental challenges. Hekmatyar, who resented Massoud's appointment as Defence Minister, resorted to the strategy of 'spoiling' (Maley 2002:198). But scholar like Saikal (2002: 215) believes "Hekmatyar's thrust for power and his ISI patrons displeasure with not having him at the helm of post Najibullah Afghanistan rapidly led them to work against Peshawar Accord". After signing the Accord, Hekmatyar, was threatening to attack the capital from the positions to its south unless the government surrenders within a week. Hekmatyar had said he would not participate on any council that included Massoud, his rival (Deseret News archives: April 28, 1992). "A solution is not possible, Hekmatyar can't agree to anything that includes Ahmed Shah Massoud," said his Pakistan-based spokesman, Nawab Salim (Deseret News archives: April 21, 1992). Later Hekmatyar refused the offer of the Prime Minister ship for his party, and criticised the Rabbani government as communist, because of Dostum presence in government. His argument was that Dostum had once been a significant ally of Najibullah. He had said that "General Dostum association with the old Government made him ineligible for any position in an Islamic Afghanistan" (New York Times: January 17, 1993). Following these event he persistently bombard on Kabul.

The second challenge came from the Rabbani side. At the end of his four-month term, Rabbani was unable to arrange for an elected Shura to set up a new government, as the Peshawar Accord had fixed. Therefore, he convinced the Council to extend his term for one and a half months (until 12 December 1992), despite the fact that the accords prohibited extension (Kakar1995: 283). On 29 December, when he was not legally the head of state, Rabbani summoned a thirteen hundred member's council of resolution and settlement (shura-e-ahl-e-hal wa aqd) (Kakar1995: 283). There was argument that, most of its members had been won by money. Rabbani was the only candidate for president, and the Shura elected him for the position for two years by 737 votes in favour, with 380 abstentions; 60 members walked out in protest. The boycotts, the rigging, and the novelty made the Shura controversial, incredible, and ineffective. The random war of rockets and bombs continued (Kakar1995: 283).

3.1.3 Islamabad Accord

The failure of Peshawar settlement had created the chaos in Afghanistan. The fighting between the Mujahedeen and commanders intensified. Fighting since April had killed an estimated 5,000 people, wounded thousands and forced an estimated 750,000 people to flee Kabul (The New York Times: March 8, 1993). This was of great frustration for the common man of Afghanistan and also for Pakistan. Pakistan's strategic dream could not be implemented in this situation. In this state of war, the new wave of refugees came to Pakistan. Once, the situation had so deteriorated that "Pakistan sealed its border with war-ravaged Afghanistan leaving hundreds of Afghan refugees trapped after fleeing relentless rocket attacks in Kabul" (Associated Press: August 30, 1992). It was an extremely dangerous situation even when Pakistan faced serious sectarian clashes within its population. Hekmatyar had been rocketing Kabul in an attempt to defeat his arch-rival Ahmad Shah Massoud, but without success. So ISI engineered the Islamabad Accords to get Hekmatyar to the prime minister's seat and to evict Massoud from the powerful defence ministry (BBC News: 7 November, 2001). In this process the Qazi Hussain Ahmad, leader of the Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan, and General Hameed Gul, the former chief of the ISI, tried to do their best to bring Mujahedeen parties to table, for the Islamabad Accord (Kakar1995: 284).

Before the negotiation, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan arranged a cease-fire between different groups. Although more than a half-dozen cease-fires had been signed since Mujahedeen factions ousted the Najibullah government in April and each time they began warring between themselves in a struggle for power (The New York Times: March 8, 1993). Mr Nawaz Sharif officially the architect of the peace talks said the cease-fire would be monitored by the Organization of Islamic Conference and representatives of each of the 10 factions (The New York Times: March 8, 1993). At the urgings of Islamabad, Tehran and Riyadh most of the warring Afghan factions signed a Peace Accord in Islamabad. After five days of intense, often tangled negotiations piloted by Pakistan's Prime Minister and his national security team, the Afghans arrived at an understanding (The News: March 10, 1993). This

Accord was the successor to the May 24 Peshawar Accord and provides broad guidelines for peace-making in troubled Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the Islamabad Accord had been significant in some respects, for the first time in many years' most warring factions of Afghanistan, moving away from gun-powder language sat down for dialogue. Two, that the three most influential countries demonstrated a genuine interest in bringing peace to Afghanistan; distinct from the past, when all three attempts to promote their own agendas through their 'own favourite groups'. There appeared to be more trust among the Iranian officials, unlike the past, to understand the need for Saudi involvement in peace-making (The News: March 10, 1993). Although Saudi Arabia did not share borders with Afghanistan and nor was it playing host to Afghan refugees, but its past support and related influence on the Afghan political scene justified their participation in peace-making efforts (The News: March 10, 1993). Key features of the March Islamabad Accord were- A new government would be formed for 18 months. Cabinet would have formed in two weeks by the Prime Minister in consultation with the President and other Afghan leaders. President Rabbani would remain President and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar or his nominee would assume the office of Prime Minister. Powers of the Prime Minister, the President and the cabinet had also been detailed in the Accord (The News: March 10, 1993). An electoral process would be implemented in a period of not more than 18 months, with effect retrospectively from December 29, 1992. This would include formation of an independent Election Commission immediately. The Election Commission would hold elections for a grand Constituent Assembly within eight months and the Constituent Assembly would formulate a constitution (The News: March 10, 1993). A Defence Council comprising two members from each party would be formed. This Council will retain the operational control of the armed forces Also the Council would oversee the collection of all heavy weapons (The News: March 10, 1993).

The problem with this accord was that it excluded two important actors in power sharing arrangement, Massoud and Dostum. Massoud refused to attend the talks in Islamabad. During the Islamabad talk the biggest issue to be settled in the naming of a Cabinet was that who should be Defence Minister. President Rabbani wanted Ahmad Shah Massoud to remain in the job, which he held since the Mujahedeen overran Kabul. But Mr. Hekmatyar argued that no group should control

both the Presidency and the Defence Ministry (The New York Times: March 8, 1993). So Massoud was not happy with the Accord because if the 'Defence Council element' of the Islamabad Accord had to be implemented Massoud would not continue as the Defence Minister. His powers under a Defence Council arrangement would be diluted. Similarly Dostum had been kept out of the Islamabad negotiations on demand from the Afghan groups (The News: March 10, 1993). Although his representatives had participated, the Accord gave no power to the Mazar-i-Sharif-based military commander. Pakistan did its best to ensure participation of Hekmatyar who once walked out of the talks as he was ferried back from Peshawar in a helicopter' by none other than the Director-General of Pakistan's Foreign Affairs Ministry (The News: March 10, 1993). Islamabad accord was never implemented. Even after this accord the rivalries remained between Mujahedeen groups which led to the fighting in entire Afghanistan. Troops loyal to the Defence Minister, Ahmed Shah Massoud, battled street by street in the capital's southern neighbourhoods (New York Times: May 18, 1993). The troops were trying to retake territory controlled by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who was named Prime Minister but never took the position. An estimated 25,000 people, largely civilians had died in that fighting by the end of 1993 (BBC News: November 14, 2001). Finally Islamabad Accord had also failed due to lot of reasons but most importantly was that, the Accord was the part of external choice rather than the internal parties. This Accord did not address Hekmatyar's spoiling capacity by putting in place a mechanism for the monitored removal of his armed forces from the Kabul area (Maley 2002: 199).

3.1.4 Jalalabad Accord

Despite the Islamabad Accord the rival groups never resolved on an acceptable power sharing arrangements and fighting erupted repeatedly between these groups. Indeed, ever since the collapse of Najibullah regime there had been difficulty in making a national coalition who would be accepted to all parties, was a reality. There was the continued violence between various Mujahedeen and field commander. To settle the mess there was an attempt which was held first times at Jalalabad in Afghanistan. To short out the differences, leaders and representatives of the eight Islamic groups

assembled on 30 April 1993 in the city of Jalalabad under the supervision of the Ningrahar shura and Governor Abdul Qadeer (Kakar 1995:285). After a long negotiation, on 20 May they concluded an agreement known as the Jalalabad Accords (The Times News: May 24, 1993). This Accord had some unique clauses like- agreed on the implementation of the Islamabad Accords; the formation of a supreme council to be composed of leaders of the Islamic groups, commanders, and the Ulema; the implementation of a cease-fire; the escape by the groups of their heavy weapons to the Ministry of Defence; the setting up of a national and Islamic army and the formation of a commission composed of two commanders from each province to select in the course of two months the ministers of defence and home affairs (Kakar 1995: 285).

The immediate outcome of the Jalalabad Accord was the official resignation of Defence Minister Massoud (Kakar 1995: 286). This was a significant change. But there were also few issues of differentiation between Rabbani and Hekmatyar. Rabbani wanted the Defence Ministry under him, but Hekmatyar argue that, it should go to an unaffiliated person who had not taken part in the fighting. Finally Massoud took his headquarter and the heavy weapons to Parwan just north of Kabul (Kakar 1995: 286). Although, Massoud had no official position, he still controller the government forces of some 20,000 (Kakar 995: 286). This situation made Hekmatyar suspicious of entering Kabul, just as Massoud had felt insecure about going to Jalalabad to take part in the meeting. So in this situation both created the trouble for each other. Therefore, the other clauses of the accord could not be implemented. After the Jalalabad Accord in mid-June 1993 Hekmatyar and his cabinet were sworn by President Rabbani in Paghman, which was under the control of his new ally Sayyaf (Kakar 1995: 286). As explained earlier, since Hekmatyar felt worried in Kabul, he kept his office in Darul Aman and chaired cabinet meetings in his stronghold Chahar just south of Kabul (Kakar 1995: 286). But his Ministers were unable to travel freely. This was hardly an effective way of governing. Then Hekmatyar and Massoud became active on the ground to take long-term views of their positions. Hence from all these points it clearly shows that the Afghan interim government had never successfully implemented.

3.2 The failure of Afghan Government:

As we have discussed earlier, Mujahedeen made Afghan interim government never worked. It was not a legitimate government, in terms of its capacity to control the territory. The writs of that government had not worked even in entire Kabul. Its only achievement was to declare Afghanistan as an Islamic state. The unusual marriage between the Mujahedeen groups didn't work. Even the minister fought them-self killing the thousands of innocent people. These are the following important causes for the failure of Afghan interim government.

3.2.1 Ethnicisation of the Conflict

This term has given by Gilles Dorronsoro (2005: 257). It illustrates a unique characteristic of Afghan conflict where the Afghan territory was divided between diverse ethnic warlords and they formed their own kind of administration there. During this period the mobilization of masses had shifted from religion to ethnic identity. Afghanistan has a country where a number of ethnic groups habitat, but most prominent are Pushtun, Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek. Historically this country had ruled by the Pushtun who constituted the 40 percent of the Afghan population. But the Afghan resistance movement against Soviet had provided the golden opportunity to other ethnic groups to participated in political process and ask for their share in power. These ethnic groups have largely lived in one particular area, as Tajik from north, Pushtun from south and southeast, where they share border from the respective country of the same ethnic group. This ethnicisation of politics had helped vice-versa. The external players used them for their national interest in Afghan conflict and similar way the Mujahedeen groups taken some material helps from the respective state. Through this process the Afghanistan had divided into different region. In this situation it was near impossible to form a strong central government, without the participated of these regional power men, whose writ would be accepted in all part of Afghanistan. Since the end of the Najibullah government, at least four factions divided along ethnic, linguistic and religious grounds have fought for control of Kabul. Hezb-i Wahdat was entirely Hazara, Jombesh was predominantly Uzbek, Jamiyat-i Islami was for the most part Tajik, and the Hizb-i Islami drew its

membership essentially from the Pushtuns. Although if we look the social structure of Mujahedeen parties then it found that, historically the base of these parties was the ethno- religious. During the anti Soviet Jihad they mobilized people on the religious bases. In post Najibullah Afghanistan this motivated factor diluted and replaced by ethnic one.

After the Najibullah had fall down the royalists, Hezb-i Islami and Jamiyat-i Islami all increased their contacts with the communists (Dorransoro2005: 237). After April 1992, when two broad coalitions were formed to fight for control on Kabul, the battle seemed to constitute a struggle between Pushtuns and non- Pushtuns, with former communist factions Parcham and Khalq and Mujahedeen factions joining together along ethnic lines (Rubin 1994:186). Competition between rivals got under way, to see who could profit most from the changed of regime. Under the Peshawar Accord when power had transited to Mojaddidi to Rabbani, than it becomes the Pushtun vs. Non-Pushtun. The most absolute grounds for the failed of Afghan government was that a country which driven by ethnic, religious and linguistic conflicts, unity has always been dangerously tough. During 1992-94, with the appearance of powerful regional leaders and the ineffective central Government in Kabul, the partitioning of the country into three autonomous territories was becoming a fact of life. The fast part was the northern city, where a former militia leader backed by two of Afghanistan's main ethnic groups controls the nation's strongest military force and is establishing virtually a separate state (The New York Times: January 17, 1993). The Uzbeks and Tajiks who support him make up about one-third of Afghanistan's (The New York Times: January 17, 1993). A second region, in the south and the east, is inhabited mainly by Pushtuns, who form nearly half of the country's population and who had traditionally dominated Afghan politics. That area includes the capital Kabul. In the west territory had controlled largely by Afghans with close ethnic ties to Iran and open to Iranian influence (The New York Times: January 17, 1993). Because of its location and its ethnic and religious links with too many countries in the region, including the Central Asia Republics, Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, become a battleground, for the competition and influence. So these events seriously affect the stability of Afghanistan and finally led to Afghan interim government to fail.

3.2.2 Regional actor and their competing geopolitical interest.

The Peshawar and Islamabad Accords was not the product of consensus among Afghanistan's elites, but of external pressure, especially from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia for their own geopolitical interest (Malay 2002: 199). There is a consensus among scholars that Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia were the major regional powers with significant interest and continued involvement in the Afghan conflict, which leads to fail the Afghan interim government. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran, by involving only Mujahedeen parties and keeping the majority of Afghans out of political process, had accentuated the tribal divide (Frontline: February 25, 1994). These three regional powers had their own divergent interests, and rarely exerted any pressure towards a peaceful solution. (Dorransoro 2005: 236). Their main intend was to use Afghan reSource for their own narrow interest. The collapse of the Najibullah regime and the withdrawal of the United States and Soviet Union created a power vacuum that led to an intense struggle for power among the Afghan groups and among their foreign supporters in the region. However, all the Afghan actors benefited from external assistance. It is impossible to ignore the role played by these neighbouring countries, which intervened on a large scale in the conflict through their Afghan proxies. Such proxies were Jombesh, which acted for Uzbekistan, Hezb-i Wahdat, which served the purposes of Iran; and Hezb-i Islami, which acted for Pakistan. Meanwhile, Jamiyat-i Islami developed its relations with India, Iran, Russia and the western countries (Dorransoro 2005: 236). As we have earlier discussed that after the Najibullah fall down most of Afghanistan, particularly Kabul had controlled by the 'coalition of north' under the leadership of Massoud. This alliance of ethnic minorities, including Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara had sifted, historically power equation in favour of non-Pushtun. This change was reflected immediately in formation of Peshawar Accord; where Pakistan played a significant role and the non-Pushtun got the vital share in power. Among the Mujahedeen commanders, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia had minimal control over Massoud. He had rarely visited Pakistan and occasionally criticized Pakistan's policy in Afghanistan (Ahady 199: 88). Worse yet, Pakistan did not have any control over the other members of the Massoud's alliance, like Dostum and Mazari. Thus, former Prime Minister Sharif was knowledge the fact

that the collapse of Najibullah's government at the hands of the 'Coalition of North' meant a significant loss of power for Pakistan (Ahady 199: 88). Therefore Pakistan as a negotiator had helped to establish Peshawar Accord; but the same time ISI encouraged Hekmatyar to attack on the Kabul and Rabbani government (Indian Express: October: 15, 1992). Later, with the helped of Pakistan Hekmatyar get the Prime minister post.

Apart from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran had also important regional actors. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia had supported the similar Sunni Mujahedeen groups in entire Afghan conflict. Saudi involvement in Afghanistan through Mujahedeen created suspicion in Tehran, and consequently relations between Iran and Pakistan begin to deteriorate. Iran and Saudi Arabia has historical antagonism, to lead the Islamic world. In Afghanistan this rivalry had played by their proxy Hezb-e Wahdat and the Ittehad. Wahdat was an Iran-backed Shiite party, while Ittehad was a Saudi-supported Sunni party, bitterly hostile both to Shiism and to Iranian influence (Maley 2002: 202). After the Soviet departure Iran had been pursuing policies to increase its influence in Afghanistan. Political, economic, ethnic, cultural and ideological instruments were employed by Iran to increase and strengthen its position in Afghanistan and in the Central Asian region (Alam 2004: 533). Iran was keen that all minority ethnic groups be represented in the new government in Afghanistan, especially, the Hazara Shiites, who were major beneficiaries of Iranian assistance during the Soviet intervention (Alam 2004: 533). In contrast, Pakistan along with the Saudi Arabia had supported the Pushtun Mujahedeen parties. The factions supported by Pakistan and the Saudi Arabia were viewed by Iran as an attempt at religious and political containment. In order to counter it, Iran pursued a pro-active policy towards Afghanistan by supporting the Shiite parties and the 'Coalition of North'. Iran coordinated with Russia, India and the Central Asian countries to counter Pakistani move in Afghanistan (Dorrnsoro 2005: 236).

Rabbani-Massoud government had the good relationship with Iran. A few months after the conclusion of the Peshawar Agreement, both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan realized that Iran had a major role in the formation and success of the 'Coalition of North' and that Rabbani-Massoud government had tremendously

increased Iranian influence in Afghanistan (Ahady 199: 88). Pakistan and Saudi Arabia did not want open conflict with Massoud and Rabbani, but decided to strengthen Hekmatyar and encouraged him to violently challenge Massoud and Rabbani's power in Kabul (Ahady 199: 88). It seems that Saudi Arabia's and Pakistan's primary objective was to challenge Iranian dominance of Afghanistan.

In the same pattern, Dostum's Jombesh had some connection with Uzbekistan as he visited Uzbekistan several times. Uzbekistan's support to Dostum explained by Dorronsoro (2005: 262) in terms of the search for a reliable ally to guard its southern frontier and not as ethnic solidarity between Uzbeks, which seems to have been a marginal factor. He further argues that the "construction of an Uzbek nationalism such as Jombesh envisaged was certainly not encouraged by Uzbekistan" (Dorronsoro: 2005: 262). Jombesh's forces received armaments from the Uzbek army and the frontier were relatively open and trade was active (Dorronsoro 2005: 262). So from all these study it has very clear that external interference was the main factor behind the failure of Afghan interim government.

3.2.3 Personal Rivalry Between Elites

Another important reason for the failure of Afghan interim government was the failure of elite settlement, notably distrust between Hekmatyar and Massoud was too high. Both had created much trouble for Afghan people through their indiscriminate bombardment in to each other's position, even when they were the part of the same government. Both belonged to diverse ethnicity and their ethnicity superficially determined their rivalry. But the most important distinct feature between them was the ideology. Massoud and Hekmatyar, not only came from different ethnic backgrounds, but also had different political orientations, with Massoud being a moderate Islamist while Hekmatyar, in Olivier Roy's phrase, was an 'Islam-Leninist' (Maley 2002: 189). The rivalry between Massoud and Hekmatyar developed during the anti-communist Jihad. Massoud like other members of the resistance movement immigrated to Pakistan after Daud's coup and was one of those who went inside Afghanistan in 1975 to lead attacks against the government. "It appears that, Massoud never fully forgave Hekmatyar for his role in these uprisings or trusted him again,

and, after that time, Massoud generally stayed inside Afghanistan, rarely setting base in Pakistan, in part because of his distrust of Hekmatyar” (Edwards 2002: 244). This rivalry had intensified when Massoud with his alliance capture the Kabul in post-Najibullah period. In the case of Massoud, the Maley’s (2002: 200), explanation was more rational. Maley argue that, Hekmatyar had given Massoud excellent grounds to be wary, not only through the killing of commanders in 1989 and his spokesman’s open anti-Massoud statement in April 1992, but through a sustained and documented record of using violence to eliminate or threaten those in the Afghan resistance who would not subordinate themselves to him (Maley 2002: 200). But the Pakistan had a great role to intensify this enmity to blindly support Hekmatyar.

In the same way the quarrel between Hekmatyar and Rabbani that began before the revolution proved to be one of the defining fault lines of the Afghan interim government formation. Underlying this dispute were the personal ambitions and animosities of the chief protagonists, but there were other factors as well. Hekmatyar represented a younger generation, which came of age in the political confrontations that tore apart the Kabul University campus during the late 1960s and early 1970s (Edwards 2002: 242). Hekmatyar’s world vision was shaped by his experiences as a “member of the inner circle of the Muslim Youth, and, for him, all issues, relationships, and options were judged in relation to the party, its ideological tenets, and its organizational interests” (Edwards 2002: 244). Rabbani, however, grew up in a less polarized climate. Rabbani had qualified through Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and then came back to Kabul to join colleagues in discussions about Afghanistan’s future (Edwards 2002: 242). Rabbani ultimately was more open to compromise than Hekmatyar, in part at least because he had wider experience in and awareness of a world larger than Afghanistan.

The second problem for an elite settlement was the impact of external powers, “which affected the identities of the participants in the settlement” (Maley 2002: 200). In Hekmatyar’s case, there was two way to explain him. First as a most radical second the Pakistan’s instrument. Hekmatyar was the crucial instrument of Pakistan’s Afghan policy till the emergence of Taliban. As we have discussed above, Pakistan’s

intelligence agency used him to capture Afghanistan. Officials in Pakistan, the host of the talks which led to the Peshawar and Islamabad Accords, had long held the view that Afghan opinion should be articulated through political parties, rather than the ground commander (Maley 2002: 200) . This was another cause where some key actor like Massoud and Dostum found Pakistan and its ally hostile. In this way personal rivalry between the elite, was ultimately became the cause for the failure of Afghan interim government.

3.2.4 Opportunism for capturing the Resources and Power

There were so many reasons for the failure of Afghan interim government as above discussed (ethnic polarization, external interfere and the personal enmity). The event of 1992 to 1994 had clearly shown that, apart from these factors opportunism for capturing the resources and power was also the key factor behind it. Otherwise what was the cause to changed one alliance to another, one party to another? It shows that the Mujahedeen parties and ground commander were thirsty for power and for that they could do anything, even killed the innocent citizens including children. In entire civil war the Mujahedeen leaders were changed their pendulum once they believed that they could benefited through new arrangement, in terms of power sharing. The action of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was the most dangers, some time it was hard to understand. During negotiation he had accepted the terms and condition of accords, but within some time he contradict with his own words. Before the Peshawar Accord, Hekmatyar had repeatedly bombarded the Kabul. When other factions called him to ceasefire, he then demanded the expulsion of a rival Uzbek militia Dostum from the Kabul (Deseret News Archive: August 30, 1992). His logic behind was that, Dostum had once a significant allied of Najibullah. He said that “General Dostum association with the old Government made him ineligible for any position in an Islamic Afghanistan” (New York Times: January 17, 1993). While Hekmatyar made these charge, he was continuing to work with Khalqis faction of the former communist government (Maley 2002: 198). After 1994, Hekmatyar became the ally of same Dostum who was in alliance with Rabbani-Massoud in 1992-93. In the same way Hezb-e-Wahdat (one of the Shiite parties) led by Ali Mazar had also shifted toward

Hekmatyar, earlier they were the part of Massoud led coalition (Khalilzad 1994: 148). In 1994 they all created an alliance, Supreme Coordinating Council (SCC). Other hand Rabbani declared a Jihad against Dostum, after several days of intense fighting when Dostum came to capture Kabul (Khalilzad 1994:148). The Massoud had also done the same in February 1993, when he joined Sayyaf to attack the Shia Hazaras, who controlled the western suburbs of Kabul (Edwards 202: 289). In the same way the commander on ground also shifted from one party to other. So the party leaders themselves were as willing as ever to make opportunistic deals across ethnic boundaries to advance their personal positions. For all these argument it clearly expose that the opportunism of Mujahedeen groups was an important cause for the failure of Afghan interim government.

3.3 Option of Indigenous Afghan Solution and Pakistan's Response

During the anti-Soviet resistance, the major target of Mujahedeen groups and their foreign allies were to force Red Army for withdrawal. But there was not very clear cut understanding between them, what would happen after Soviet withdrawal. How the government would form? Who would lead the post-Soviet Afghan government? But one thing is very clear on their mind that they would rule the post-Soviet Afghanistan. After the collapsed of Najibullah government in 1992, the Mujahedeen had the only actor who contestant for forming the government in Kabul. Thus, by 1992, the Mujahedeen had a near monopoly of political legitimacy, diplomatic recognition and military strength. They, especially the seven opposition parties designated by Pakistan (and thus the United States) to receive aid, were the obvious successors to the Najibullah regime. So in this process the Mujahedeen had suppose to accepted the truly representatives of the Afghan people. But they were not representing all section of Afghanistan. So due to these assumptions all other alternative attempt to form indigenous afghan government had marginalised. If these indigenous options had executed then it may be possible the Afghanistan had not entered in to a civil war.

3.3.1 United National's Plan

To solve the Afghan conflict it was necessary to form a broad-base government in which all the stake holder of Afghanistan would be participated. Although the UN did its first government formation attempt in 1989, after the immediate Soviet withdrawal when it appointed Sevan Benon as the UN Security General's personal representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. As we have mention in first chapter, in May 1991 Sevan consulted with Kabul, Peshawar, Riyadh, and agreed to step down Najibullah in context of any transition government (Corwin 2003: 27). But every time the Mujahedeen refused these proposals. It is a matter of further research, had Mujahedeen so autonomous to deny without Pakistan's consent? But a little available material suggests that it was Pakistan who forced them to act negatively. The secretary-general envisioned that the Loya Jirga would have "150 middle-level representatives, acceptable to all sides, from all segments of the Afghan people, including representatives of political parties, religious and tribal leaders, opposition groups, resistance commanders, prominent personalities, and representatives from Kabul" (Corwin 2003: 02). After 1992 The UN had been negotiating with various opposition leaders to nominate fifteen or twenty names that would take over as an authority to replace Najibullah. The UN officer in his dairy says that the "Pakistan government was still angry that the Accords might allow for a broad-based coalition, which would include communist participation, to serve as an interim government in Afghanistan" (Corwin 2003: 08). Even UN special envoy for Afghanistan Sevan Benon also has serious doubt about Pakistan's intention; during the negotiation with US diplomat Platt in Islamabad "Benon tells Platt that he thinks the Loya Jirga should be held in Vienna. He repeats that if the meeting is held in Pakistan, Pakistan will be accused of manipulating the results. In the view of Iran, if the meeting is convened in Pakistan, Pakistan will never allow it to proceed. The Pakistanis will disrupt it, because they won't permit any meeting they cannot completely control. Vienna is a neutral venue" (Corwin 2003: 50). Ever since the UN secretary-general's statement of 27 January 1992, which outlined the UN's plans for a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Afghanistan, Benon has been trying to organize a Loya Jirga, he tells the Najibullah's resignation was a step in this process (Corwin 2003: 121). By spring

1992, in accordance with the wishes of the different actor and after months of laborious negotiation, the UN had finally convinced Najibullah to resign his post as president of Afghanistan. All the parties involved in the Afghan conflict had agreed that there could be no peace until Najibullah was gone. Accordingly, on 18 March 1992, Najibullah publicly announced he would resign as soon as an authority could be chosen to replace him. He did not specify a date for his resignation (Corwin 2003: 01).

The UN envoy Benon was convened Massoud and Dostum (After the fall of Najibullah government) and agreed them for a collation government. But Pakistan had the problem between any kinds of settlement. During talks with UN envoy Benon, Abdul Wakil (Minister of foreign affairs of Afghanistan in Najibullah government (1986-92) told that “I am in touch with Hekmatyar. He is reasonable, but the problem is that ISI is still provoking hostility. They are supporting Hekmatyar. Coalitions are forming everywhere in Afghanistan to find a peaceful solution, but ISI is trying to destroy the peace process. They want conquest. Please, Benon, you must do something about this. Everyone is for peace except Pakistan. There are already Shura (councils) in Jalalabad, Kandahar, and other cities. There are coalitions forming, but Hekmatyar and Pakistan are unwilling to recognize those coalitions. Only yesterday we spoke to Hekmatyar’s people. They want to avoid violence, but ISI is undermining them.” (Corwin 2003: 141). So these points confirm that Pakistan had bypassed the UN led reconciliation process. Why Pakistan was not interested in the UN kind of Post-Najibullah settlement. May be because the UN settlement was committed to give representation to all ethnical groups and ideological (nationalist, PDPA, extremist) groups. More importantly Pakistan was not ready to settle Afghan conflict out of its pocket.

3.3.2 The Zahir Shah Option

The Afghan interim government was a power sharing arrangement between the Mujahedeen parties who had based in Pakistan and Iran; and some other field commanders. Most importantly these all exercise isolated the common man, royalist and secular elite. Afghanistan had a unique political system before the Daud coup

happened. In this system, king had ruled the state but the tribal and local had certain autonomy. This was a model for Afghanistan where all ethnic groups lived with a larger peace. But after the collapsed of Najibullah government the only option which could help regional player to influence Afghanistan was the Islamic government. So all external actors, especially Pakistan was committed for an Islamic Afghan government through it client Mujahedeen parties. There was another political alternative that was historical experienced. It was about the returned of former king Zahir Shah and lead a broad-base government. Even before the Soviet departure the Zahir Shah option came into air. There were few reports which indicated that after the Soviet departure country should be rule by the former king. In April 1987, the Afghan Information Centre in Peshawar the only independent Afghan source of news about the fighting inside Afghanistan broke its general rule of avoiding news and commentaries on the political situation in Pakistan to note the groundswell support for Zahir Shah (Edwards 2002: 279). According to the Afghan Information central report, there was an enormous support for the king, particularly among Afghans from the southern provinces. The former king also supported throughout the refugee (Edwards 2002: 279). According to Information central report-

“A large number of refugees from the camps as well as resistance commanders and fighters from all political organisations met in Miranshah, North Waziristan on April 11. People were shouting pro-Zahir Shah slogans. All the speakers at the meeting without exception made strong declarations in his favour. Even Amanullah Mahssur and Shahzada Massud, commanders of Hezb-e-Islami (Hekmatyar), commander Khan Gul Khan of Jamiat (Prof. Rabbani), Gulam Jan, a Jamiat commander in Samangan, and Sufi Abdurrouf, commander in Herat, delivered speeches and declared their support to the former king” (Edwards 2002: 279).

Further this report went on to describe a meeting outside Quetta of some six thousand refugees and Mujahedeen from the four western provinces (Qandahar, Helmand, Zabul, and Uruzgan) at which the speakers deplored the persisting disunity among the political leaders and criticised their inability to unite, and at the end all

shouted: 'We want King Zahir Shah!'(Edwards 2002: 279). There was one survey happened, which revealed public opinion for the returned the king Zahir shah to rule the country. Especially within the refugee the king was the most favourite. Professor Bahauddin Majrooh had done a survey of Afghan refugees, which asked the question "Who would you like to be the national leader of Afghanistan?" The data-collection team put together by Majrooh contacted more than two thousand respondents in 106 of 249 camps, representing twenty-three of the twenty-eight provinces, the eight major ethnic groups, and all seven political parties (Edwards 2002: 282). The result was that 72 percent of respondents wanted Zahir Shah as the national leader of Afghanistan. Only nine of the two thousand people surveyed, or 0.45 percent, wanted one of the leaders of the resistance parties in Peshawar, and a mere 12.5 percent indicated that they would like to see the establishment of "a pure Islamic state" (Edwards 2002: 282). But the Zahir Shah option was not accepted by Mujahedeen and Pakistan. In that time, it was not seemed much pragmatic option because of the ongoing UN talks. In a BBC interview on 11 May 1987, Zahir Shah said he was ready to take up his responsibilities if the majority asked him to do so. On 10 June Najibullah said he was also willing to negotiate with the king, but on 16 June Zahir Shah gave his final refusal as a consequence of the negative reactions from the Mujahedeen (Dorransoro 2005: 200) . In response of Zahir Shah option, Hekmatyar's, as well other radical leaders position, was that Afghanistan should be an "Islamic state and that the head of state should be selected by a council of qualified Islamic scholars and leaders from among those who had played an active part in the jihad" (Edwards 2002: 283). In post Najibullah Afghanistan there had no one tall figure such the former king who could unite the Afghanistan. In this condition the Zahir Shah was the best option. May be he was the only man who can united the ethnic diverted country. Finally this alternative had finished similar to United Nation negotiation.

Summary

After one decade of war with PDPA government, the Afghan resistance movement had finally won in April 1992. This victory led to the government formation process ahead. The Mujahedeen and their sponsor were ruled out any other attempt of

government formation. Then the artificial and immature kind of power sharing arrangement had done between the unnatural allies. This arrangement had not performed as a legitimate government ever. Interestingly this idea (they can run a coalition government) had given by external forces. These Mujahedeen had few common feature like to maintain coalitions across regional and ethnic lines. Although there were so many reason for the failure of Interim government. It can be count like the external interference, ethnical and ideological difference. But if we observe the larger picture, than it concludes that, it was the pure political interests who make the arrangement fail. Pakistan had the greatest contribution in this regard.

**Pakistan's Disillusionment with
Mujahedeen and the rise of Taliban
'Frankenstein'**

CHAPTER 4

4.1 Pakistan's Disillusionment with Mujahedeen

Afghan civil war was not only betrayed the hopes of Afghan people but also the sentiments of Pakistan. A friendly government in Kabul was the most passionate desire of the Pakistani elite. On this hope they invested huge resources (material and human) during the anti-communist jihad. But the post- communist Kabul government was not able to execute Pakistan's geopolitical desire and became hostile to it. Even Pakistan's favourite Mujahedeen group didn't work for Pakistan. On this situation Pakistan looked for another pawn who could sit in Kabul to favour Pakistan.

4.1.1 Mujahedeen's failure to promote a friendly Afghanistan

Pakistan was supporting the anti-communist resistance on this belief that once Soviet withdraws, then with the help of Mujahedeen, Pakistan would form a pro-Pakistani government in Kabul. Later the Najibullah government departed and Pakistan helped to negotiate the power deal between the Mujahedeen groups through different Accords. In these process the Rabbani government had taken the charge of Kabul. After taking Kabul under their control, the different Mujahedeen who were the part of coalition government fought with each other. As we have discussed earlier, Pakistan had a great contribution to increase the enmity between the Mujahedeen groups, when Pakistan supported Hekmatyar blindly to take over Kabul. The support of ISI for Hekmatyar had antagonized Islamabad's relationship with the Afghan Mujahedeen government led by Burhanuddin Rabbani (Crews and Tarzi 2008: 101). Moreover Pakistan remained silent over Hekmatyar's repeated violation of these Accords. Later, Rabbani-Massoud government blamed Pakistan for interference in Afghan's internal affair. However the Tajik' domination of post-communist power in Kabul had proved unsettling for Pakistan's plan. The Rabbani administration's attempted to 'flirt' with India, in addition to other unfriendly acts considered a threat for Pakistani security interest in the region (Hussain 2005: 182). According to Amin Saikal (2004:220) Islamabad could not possibly expect the new Islamic government leaders like Massoud to subordinate their own nationalist objectives in order to achieve

Pakistan's interest. Not only the Pakistani state establishment but also the other pressure groups like Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan, who had historically influenced Pakistan's Afghan policy and the staunch backer of Mujahedeen was disappointed with the Afghan situation. One of its leaders was quoted to have said 'the current fighting as mischief' (Frontline: February 25, 1994). Quazi Hussain Ahmed, the Jamaat chief said it is 'no longer a jihad' (Frontline: February 25, 1994). At the end of 1994, the Pakistani elites were arriving at the conclusion that the Rabbani-Massoud government would not accept Pakistan's hegemony. Therefore, Pakistan initiated a campaign from the spring of the 1994 aimed at undermining international recognition of the Islamic state of Afghanistan (Hussain 2005: 182). Pakistani officials began to emphasise that the Rabbani regime had no legitimacy after 28 June 1994. Islamabad repeatedly stressed that the Rabbani had to hand over power as stipulated by the Islamabad and Jalalabad Accords (Hussain 2005: 182). In 1994, there was intense hostility in Pakistan- Afghan relations. Both side accused each other for violation of the border. Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan hit rock bottom when some Afghan hijackers kidnapped a school bus carrying children in Peshawar in February, drove it to Islamabad, and demanded the opening of the Pak-Afghan borders at Torkham and a supply of food trucks to go to Kabul (Amin1995: 146). The hijackers were killed by the Pakistan army in a commando operation, and the children were rescued safe. The Pakistani action caused a reaction in Kabul, where Pakistan's embassy was ransacked by angry protesters (Amin1995: 146). This event started a blame game from the both sides. On October 1995, the relation with Rabbani government was so deteriorated that Pakistan's government expelled the envoy of Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani (The Washington Post: October 10, 1995). Therefore this situation motivated Pakistan to create a new surrogate force. The basic problem between the Pakistan and Afghan government was that Pakistan could expect a surrogate government in Kabul and Rabbani government was not fit under this assumption from the very beginning, although Pakistan had an important role to form this government. It shows that Pakistan had not agreed to solve Afghan conflict, out of his pocket. Therefore the failure of Rabbani- Massoud government can be understood on this line, because it was not supported by Pakistan. And after that Pakistan looked for some other identity that could control Afghanistan and same time remain friendly for Pakistan also.

4.1.2 Hekmatyar as liability for Pakistan

Hekmatyar, the leader of Hezb-i Islami, was Pakistan's favourite among the Mujahedeen leaders fighting against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. He was pampered by the ISI with the largest share of the weapons coming from the West and the Arab world. Pakistan's support for Hezb-i Islami continued after the death of Zia ul-Haq and only ceased because of the movement's failure on the ground. As has been observed, the relationship between the Islamists and the ISI went back to the 1970s, especially in the organisation of the coup of 1975. Hekmatyar liaised at that time with the Pakistan intelligence services and had made himself the privileged ally of Islamabad. Hezb-i Islami also took advantage of its good relations with the Pakistan administration to establish itself in the refugee camps and to assassinate its political adversaries, particularly the leftists, nationalists and royalists (Dorransoro 2005:146). As we have discussed in the above chapter that, Hekmatyar was shifted from one alliance to another for capturing power. Initially Pakistan helped to put him into power sharing arrangement with Rabbani-Massoud. Later when he failed to do so, he indiscriminately bombarded on Kabul. However, despite the alliances he made and the bloodbath and destruction he engaged, Hekmatyar was incapable to snatch power from Rabbani and Massoud. According to Amin Saikal (2004:220), this led to two inescapable conclusions for Pakistan. First was that Hekmatyar had become a serious liability for Pakistan. Another was that now Pakistan lacked a workable Afghanistan policy to enable it to secure a friendly government in Kabul to settle the border dispute in Pakistan's favour. That was the basic idea for supporting the Pushtun Mujahedeen parties including Hekmatyar since 1979. Later in the civil war, Pakistan discovered that Hekmatyar was not a popular leader in Afghanistan as he shifted loyalties from one group to the other to survive as a warrior (Daily Times: January 31, 2003). It seems that, the Hekmatyar had been observed as a trouble maker since the mid 1993 from the some quarter of Pakistani side. As 'The Observer' (May 20, 1993) quotes Pakistani News paper The Dawn editorial, which writes that "it is regrettable that Hikmatyar has not displayed the statesmanship that is required to break the deadlock." It further says that "The realities of power on the ground do not favour

him. Yet he has not shown the spirit of compromise that was necessary...". But Islamabad's full support to Mr Hikmatyar had continued despite the international press castigating the Hizb-i Islami's inflexible stand (The Observer: May 20, 1993). Pakistan's was severally criticized by the international community for supporting the militant groups in Afghanistan. Hekmatyar's anti-west rhetoric also created problem for Pakistan, when United State asked to stop Hekmatyar (The Hindu: July 04, 1993). But the Pakistani intelligence agency supported him despite these pressures. At the end of 1995, Hezb-i Islami was a much smaller force than at the beginning, having lost much of the area it controlled to the Taliban, the group still controlled some territory in Paktia, Logar, and Nangerhar provinces (Khalilzad 1996:192) Therefore in these conditions it was much easy for Pakistan to say goodbye to Hekmatyar. The ISI calculated that its trusted forces under Hekmatyar would be able to capture power in Kabul, but it ended up in a fiasco. According to Dorronsoro (2005:244) Hekmatyar's failure at Kabul was also a failure for the Pakistani intelligence services whose head, Lieutenant-General Naved Nasir was dismissed along with several dozen other officers. After General Nasrullah Babar, Benazir Bhutto's new Minister of the Interior took charge of Pakistan's Afghan policy. All these points establish the fact that, Hekmatyar became a liability for Pakistan. Saikal (2004:220) argue that, the Hekmatyar's failure to achieve what was expected to him encourage the ISI leader to come with a new surrogate force. Thus, a new group replaced the Hekmatyar under the brand name of Taliban.

4.2 Afghanistan at the Dawn of Taliban's rise

It is important to look at the situation which emerged on the eve of Taliban formation. Afghan terrain was divided by the civil war which followed after the Najibullah's departure. The civil war created an anarchic situation and Afghanistan fragmented between warlords. This was serious concern for civilian because there was no guarantee of life and property. Apart from the internal situation, this Hobbesian condition had also concerned for the external actor especially Pakistan. Pakistan's curiosity about Afghanistan had motivated by the deep strategic notion. This went beyond from Afghan frontier to Central Asia.

4.2.1 Afghanistan's ground situation

Prior to the Taliban formation, Afghanistan was under chaos and facing the serious crisis to disintegrate. On 1 January 1994, a new alliance, Shura-i Hamahangi (Council of Coordination), consisting of Hekmatyar, Dostum, and Hezb-e Wahdat, with Mojaddidi as a loose association, launched a huge rocket and artillery attack on the capital (Maley 2002:203). Forces loyal to the Afghan President, Burhanuddin Rabbani, attacked their opponents in Kabul with artillery and infantry, capturing several strategic positions and killing and injuring dozens of people. Mr. Rabbani's forces bombarded positions held by Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his allies, and the Prime Minister's troops also responded the same way (The New York Times: 26, 1994). In these situation hundreds of civilian were killed each day particularly in Kabul. It created the atmosphere where UN's aid agency and other foreign mission and diplomat left the country. On the first week of January 1994, a 24-hour cease-fire between the rival groups in Kabul, allowing diplomats to leave the capital (The New York Times: January 9, 1994). Two dozen foreigners, including four United Nations staff members and diplomats from Pakistan, India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Libya, drove out in two convoys headed for neighbouring Pakistan (The New York Times: January 9, 1994). But interestedly some Pakistani, Saudi, and Iranians diplomats stayed on (The New York Times: January 9, 1994). In this possess the UN had also evacuated its international staff (Maley 2002:203). But the fight between government and opposition intensified day by day. As The New York Times reported that on a single day in September 28 "at least 58 people were killed and 224 were wounded today in rocket and mortar attacks on Kabul, the Afghan capital, the official Kabul Radio said" (The New York Times: September 28,1994). The rocketing of Kabul reduced large tracts of the city to debris, but the Human tragedy was more pathetic. According to different sources the killings of people during this time estimate between in thousands, alone in Kabul. "The Special Reporter of the UN Human Rights Commission estimated that at least 3500 people had been killed since the beginning of the 1994" (Maley 2002:205). Last episode of this fighting ended in March 1995 when Taliban took control Kabul. It is right to say that, Afghanistan was under civil war on the eve of Taliban formation. Under these circumstances ordinary

Afghan people were eagerly waiting for someone who could solve this anarchy and restore law and order. The later part of this chapter would extend this argument, how Taliban was best situated under these conditions.

4.2.2 Pakistan's geopolitical dream

However, we have mentioned the Pakistan's geopolitical interest in post Soviet Afghanistan in second chapter. But on the eve of Taliban formation, the regional geopolitical situation had changed drastically. At this moment Rabbani government made close ties with some regional countries including Iran, India, Russia and Central Asian Republics. On the eve of Taliban's rise Iran had made good influence on the Afghan government. It was seen by Pakistani elite that the Afghan government's good relation with other countries was on the cost of Pakistan. Pakistan's Afghan policy from 1979 was based on the assumption, that a friendly Afghanistan would be its strategic tool for the regional competition. But on the eve of Taliban formation this dream was smashed. Pakistan was much frustrated when Rabbani- Massoud government engaged with other country simply ignoring Pakistan. Even Russia made the close ties with new Afghan government. Moscow had provided some assistance to Massoud in Kabul and to Dostum in northern Afghanistan (Khalilzad 1995:151). These all situation forced Pakistan to rethink for a new Afghan client who would be free from the other regional influence.

Second geopolitical goal was to reach Central Asia for trade and energy resources. Competition for access to the oil and gas rich states of the Central Asia added an economic element to Pakistan's policy toward Afghanistan. The transportation of oil and especially gas from Turkmenistan, estimated to have one of the largest natural gas reserves in the world, via Afghanistan to Pakistan had already emerged before the Taliban rise (Crews and Tarzi 2008: 102) . Although it was a decade old Pakistan's ambition but first time it was near to materialization during this time. Bhutto's regime viewed access to these Central Asian markets and the transport of energy as critical to Pakistani industry (Crews and Tarzi 2008: 101). The United States and some other countries had assisted Pakistan to go ahead with this plan. The important dynamic which pressed Pakistan's elite to consider this plan seriously was a

new lobby of trader who want to open trade route with Central Asian states. For instance Asif Ali Zardari husband of the then Prime Minister Ms Bhutto was given permits to export fuel to Afghanistan (Rasanayagam 2005:184). Apart from these entire factors it was the great incentive for Pakistan economy which could largely benefited by the huge foreign investment. Even in 1993 “Significant commitments of foreign investment worth \$16.5 billion were made in the energy sector from the different oil giants these included \$4 billion from American businessmen who accompanied U.S. Energy Secretary Hazel O’Leary to Pakistan, \$8 billion from Hong Kong investor Gordon Wu, and \$4.5 billion from South Korean businessmen” (Amin1994:144). Pakistan thus became an important player in the construction of two giant pipelines before the Taliban emergence. But the only problem which Pakistan had faced was that, the civil war prevented any transition through Afghanistan. So on the eve of Taliban emergence it seemed that Pakistan was ready to welcome anyone who could give a peaceful and friendly Afghanistan. Later the United States gave the green signal to Islamabad to go forward with supporting the Taliban, which then believed it a stabilizing force amidst the chaos of Afghanistan (Crews and Tarzi 2008: 102).

4.2.3 Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma

Pakistan’s support to Taliban could not clearly define. Within the different organs of the Pakistani state establishment there was no uniformity in term of supporting Taliban. It might be possible because some Pakistani state institutions worked more autonomously, thanks to the legacy of Afghan conflict. There was a dispute within Pakistan’s elite, regarding Taliban formation. After Hekmatyar’s failure to achieve what was expected to him, Pakistan’s leaders at that time disagreed on how to achieve these objectives. The foreign minister favoured a political settlement in Kabul with the former king playing the role of the transitional leader (Khalilzad 1996:193). Minister of Interior Babur, who was a key advisor on Afghanistan to Prime Minister Bhutto, had strong ties with the Taliban and apparently favoured its outright victory. The Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence Service (ISI), which was the main channel for providing assistance to Afghan resistance movement, maintained ties with a number

of Afghan parties, especially Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami (Khalilzad 1996:193). These disagreements caused policies to fluctuate. For example, when the Taliban were driven back from Kabul in April, the Foreign Ministry for the first time allowed General Wali to visit Pakistan and signalled that it favoured a role for the former king. After the fall of Herat to the Taliban, the attempt to move the king to Pakistan was put on hold (Khalilzad 1996:193). According to Pakistani Journalist Ahmed Rashid, "since 1994 Pakistan has rarely defined its Afghan policy a reflection of the confusion, conflicting interests and rivalries of the various factions in government" (Rashid: April 11, 1998).

One part of Pakistani establishment supported Hekmatyar even though Taliban emerged powerful in southern part. In May 1996 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, again signed a peace accord with President Burhanuddin Rabbani's government after four months of negotiations. Under this new agreement Hezb-i Islami members would be appointed to major posts within the next nine days, including the Prime Minister and defence and finance ministries (The New York Times: September 28, 1996). Maley argues that the architects of this rapprochement were the Pakistani politicians Qazi Hussain Ahmad of the Jamaat-e Islami, and General Hamid Gul (Maley 2002: 215). The ISI, trapped by its own strategic vision, continued to back the sinking ship of Hekmatyar.

It is important to understand Pakistan's internal politics during the period when this transition (Mujahedeen to Taliban) happened. Because the domestic factor always determined the foreign policy of any state and it true in Pakistan's case also. Internal atmosphere of Pakistan was not very calm. The serious problem which Pakistan had faced in 1994 was the volatile atmosphere in NWFP which had always link with the Afghan state of affairs. On November 2, 1994 a religious revolt broke out in the Malakand Division of the NWFP, the intensity of which took the government completely by surprise (Amin 1994: 140). The revolt was led by the 'Tehreek-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Mohammadi' a movement to enforce the Islamic Shariat in place of the extension of civil law (Amin1994: 143). In Sind, "the absence of an agreement on power-sharing between the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) and the PPP, internecine civil war between the two factions of the MQM further fuelled by

the covert role of civil and military intelligence agencies, and sectarian conflict between extremist Shia and Sunni organizations all worked together to create a proverbial Hobbesian condition of 'war of all against all' in Karachi" (Amin 1994: 140). This resulted in approximately 800 dead during 1994, including some very prominent personalities. Apart from these provincial conflict an intense political confrontation between the PPP government led by Benazir Bhutto and the opposition Pakistan Muslim League led by Nawaz Sharif dominated Pakistani politics in 1994 (Amin 1994: 140). Both the government and the opposition remained in bitter confrontational politics. Therefore in these condition, Pakistani ruling party PPP was facing so many problems from the entire front and Afghanistan was also going to out of their control. Therefore the Taliban option was the best suitable option for the Bhutto regime under the existing environment, which not only solve the foreign policy option but also divert attention from the domestic hurdle and the same time add some achievement in government profile, which always remains very important for any civilian government. Fortunately for Bhutto administration as for the foreign policy is concerned especially Afghanistan, there was no serious difference between opposition and government because it define by the Pakistani security establishments even in the civilian rule. Another dilemma which Pakistan had faced during this period was the relation with Unites states in regard of the nuclear programme. The Clinton administration, instead of following a neutral policy toward India and Pakistan, decided to focus on capping Pakistan's nuclear program (Perkovich 1993: 85-88). On this regard Pressler Amendment continued to be the major hurdle in developing any meaningful political and economic links which banned most economic and military assistance to Pakistan unless the President certified on an annual basis that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device (Perkovich1993:85-88). But the same time United States had economic interest in Central Asia in terms of crude oil. And for Pakistan it was a challenged how to provide safe access to US oil giants in central Asia through Afghanistan-Pakistan. If it would be implemented, than Pakistan not only benefited economically but also restores strategic links with USA as happened during the cold war. Finally After two years United States had changed its earlier decision, to modify the Pressler Amendment to allow the sale of military hardware to Pakistan (The New York Times:

October 6, 1995). The New York Times reports that it would help to increase U.S. influence in Islamabad (The New York Times: October 6, 1995). There are many ways to see this particular US action, one which relevant of this study is concern is; then US could believe that Taliban was in commendable situation all these years. Therefore it was strategic important to engaged with Pakistan whose proxy had control most of the Afghanistan.

4.3 Rise of Taliban

Till today there is no clear cut explanation how Taliban emerged so swiftly. In Ahmed Rashid's word it was the unique nature of the Taliban and the lack of literature about their meteoric rise (Rashid 2000: VIII). There is an Afghan folklore about the rise of Taliban. "Two teen-age girls from the village of Singesar (village of Mullah Mohammed Omar) had been abducted by one of the gangs of Mujahedeen, who controlled much of the Afghan countryside. The girls' heads had been shaved, they had been taken to a checkpoint outside the village and they had been repeatedly raped. At the time, Mullah Omar was an obscure figure, a former guerrilla commander against occupying Soviet forces who had returned home in disgust at the terror Mujahedeen groups were inflicting on Afghanistan. But the girls' plight moved him to act. Gathering 30 former guerrilla fighters, who mustered between them 16 Kalashnikov rifles, he led an attack on the checkpoint, freed the girls and tied the checkpoint commander by a noose to the barrel of an old Soviet tank. As those around him shouted 'God is great!' Mullah Omar ordered the tank barrel raised and left the dead man hanging as a grisly warning" (New York Times: December 31, 1996). This is the one story on Taliban's rise which is accepted everywhere. Apart from that, there were other vital actors behind this story. A single man like Mullah Omar could not form a structure like that which had controlled the entire country. Thus, Taliban's rapid success, their capacity to night operation, their speed mobility, maintains of tanks, arms and communication skills were the proof of external military involvement (Misdaq 2006: 177). And this external power was the Pakistan, who supported Taliban through its state institution or even non state institution.

4.3.1 Understanding Taliban

Different scholars define Taliban in a different way like the Islamic fundamentalist, Pushtun resurgence, and external instrument. First factor that explain the rise of Taliban is the existing condition of Afghanistan. Particularly Pakistani scholar believes that Taliban was an indigenous movement which rise due to Afghan civil war. Well know Pakistani Journalist Ahmad Rashid described Taliban as the by product of Afghan civil war. "The Taliban phenomenon was a reaction to the state of anarchy in Afghanistan. It was neither the ideology the Taliban propounded, nor the religious fervour of the people that accounted for their subsequent success. Rather it was the war weariness of the populace which stood ready to welcome any force that promised the disarming of the local brigands, the restoration of peace, the semblance of an honest administration, no matter how rough and ready its system of justice"(Rashid: April 11, 1998). The similar argument given by another Pakistani journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai, who works for diverse news group including BBC. He is the one man who has seen more of the Taliban than any other outsider, put it simply to talk with The New York Times "The story of the Taliban is not one of outsiders imposing a solution, but of the Afghans themselves seeking deliverance from Mujahedeen groups that had become cruel and inhuman. The Afghan people had been waiting a long time for relief from their miseries, and they would have accepted anybody who would have freed them from the tyranny" (The New York Times: December 31, 1996). Rahimullah Yusufzai further quotes that Mullah Omar who said in a gathering that "We were fighting against Muslims who had gone wrongHow could we remain quiet when we could see crimes being committed against women, and the poor?"(The New York Times: December 31, 1996). Ahmed Rashid illustrates Mullah Omar emergence as a Robin Hood figure, helping the poor against the greedy commanders. His prestige grew because he asked for no reward or credit from those he helped, only demanding that they follow him to set up a just Islamic system. Rashid (2000: 25). According to Yusufzai in most places, the people welcomed the Taliban as liberation, so there was no need to fight and they rapidly moved towards Kabul (The New York Times: December 31, 1996).

Not only Pakistani scholars but many other eminent Afghan scholars like Dorronsoro and Maley for some extent agreed with this argument. "The Taliban were a product of the war, displacement and dislocation brought by the Soviet invasion and Western response. The leaders of the Taliban movement were almost without exception former Mujahedeen, many of them affiliated with traditionalist Pushtun parties" (Maley 1998: 15). According to Maley (1998: 20) the majority of Taliban militia and leaders had only known war and life in the refugee camps. "Thus, the Taliban's ultraconservative orthodoxy was not simply a fundamentalist or literalist return to the scriptures or a traditionalist reversion to a pristine life in Afghanistan. It was the translation of the myths of religious and traditional Afghan village life as interpreted through the harsh conditions of the refugee camps" (Maley 1998:20). Dorronsoro also justified the Argument that Taliban was the by-product of anarchy and civil war. "In such a situation of moral and social crisis, allegiance to a charismatic person or movement enabled social relations to be rebuilt especially in a segmentary society where mobilisations around charismatic personalities were historically commonplace" (Dorronsoro 2005:246). All these argument also seems valid because Taliban appeared to present an alternative of Mujahedeen who killed more people than the Soviet-Mujahedeen war. Taliban's officially programme was based on the restoration of law and order: freedom of movement and of trade, the end of banditry, a ban on drug use, and so on (Dorronsoro 2005: 246). Finally, Taliban fulfilled its promise to bring peace to Afghanistan, establish law and order, disarm the population, and impose Sharia and it appreciated by the people.

The second factor that explains the rise of Taliban was its success in mobilizing to masses rapidly. The most important question arise how they mobilizes the masses in their favour. There are several interpretations of Taliban phenomenon, most either politically or ideologically motivated. Here the argument is that the shared Pushtun identity had a great role to mobilized masses behind the Taliban movement. As we have discussed earlier, that during the Afghan interim government tenure from 1992 till Taliban emergence, Pushtun remains isolated in the power sharing arrangement, thanks to the legacy of anti-Soviet Jihad. Especially a number of decisions taken by Rabbani-Massoud government like to removal of the Kabul Police

Chief Abdul Haq, who was a moderate Pushtun had been created a anxiously within moderate Pushtun (Maley 2002: 214). Maley argue that moderate Pushtun had felt that they were being marginalised, or even excluded. According to Maley “In other cases, the stance taken by ‘Pushtun moderates’ simply suggested that they were more Pushtuns than moderates when it came to the crunch. a conclusion which no social anthropologist would find surprising, given that individuals’ identities consist of complex and not necessarily compatible strands of values and affinities” (Maley 2002: 214). If we want to examination Taliban’s rapid success, than we have to look how Taliban mobilized Pushtuns. Entire Afghan history shows that whosoever successfully mobilizes the Pushtuns, ruled Afghanistan; and Afghanistan cannot be ruled without their consent. Two rulers with little support among the Pushtuns were the Tajiks Habibullah Kalakani and the Ahmad Shah Massoud tried to ruled but failed. (Crews and Tarzi 2008:59). Pushtun identity had also easily digested by the Pakistan. Taliban belong to the Pushtun ethnic group, which was best suited for Pakistan in its strategic calculation. Within Pushtun most of Taliban come from the more acceptable Durrani sub-ethnic Pushtun (Goodson 2001:107). Particularly the key leader of Taliban from Inner Shura and most of from the Supreme Shura belong to Durrani (Goodson 2001:107). Historically Durrani tribal groups belong to the rulers and nation leader including the Royal family. The Durrani Pushtuns were underrepresented in Afghan politics since the Saur revolution, at least relative to their historical role in national leadership. Much of the Pushtun communist leadership and the leading Pushtun Mujahedeen party’s leader belong to the Ghilzai sub-group (Goodson 2001:107). The Durrani Pushtuns inhabit in south particularly Kandahar and Taliban movement first emerged from there.

Although Taliban never identified itself as a Pushtun group but it recruited only among the Pushtuns, and such, it was seen by many as facilitate a return to the traditional Pushtun domination of Afghanistan’s national territory (Dorrnsoro 2005: 266). In this sense the Taliban is sometimes described as a tribal Pushtun movement. The Taliban retained a Pushtun sensibility, especially in cultural affairs, tending to reject the Persian culture which was the basis of the training of Ulema in pre-war times (Dorrnsoro 2005: 266). Teaching in the Madrassas of the North-West Frontier

Province was traditionally carried out in Pushtu and Arabic. The Pushtuns had also continued to nurture the desire once more to achieve domination within Afghanistan's national territory. Dorronsoro argue that, the Taliban did at some points employ ethnic arguments to mobilise support. For instance, in 1995 as Ismail Khan advanced towards Kandahar, it appealed to Pushtun solidarity against a Tajik aggressor (Dorronsoro 2005: 268). Similarly in the north its preference for alliances with Pushtun minorities gave credence, with hindsight, to the ethnic prejudices of both sides. The Taliban was also led by confrontation and suspicion to institute discriminatory practices, for example against the Panjshiris of Kabul who were suspected of assisting Massoud (Dorronsoro 2005: 268).

Third factor that explain the identity of the Taliban is religious one. Taliban was a movement dominated by a group of religious individuals, who come from the Madrassas. Most of the Taliban were the children of the Jihad against the Soviet Union. Many were born in Pakistani refugee camps, educated in Pakistani Madrassas and learnt their fighting skills from Afghan Mujahedeen parties based in Pakistan. In addition the Taliban movement was founded on a fundamentalist ideology opposed to all nationalist pretensions (Dorronsoro 2005: 267). Its official goal was the reunification of all Afghans under an Islamic government. It rejected all national or tribal justifications and took satisfaction in drawing attention to the presence within the movement of non-Pushtuns such as mullah Ghaysuddin Agha, who was a member of the shura of Kabul and came originally from Badakhshan (Dorronsoro 2005: 267). There was some classical example where Taliban had given priority to Islamic identity rather than tribal one. When some former communists believed at one point that they could merged themselves into the Taliban movement on the basis of Pushtun solidarity. At first the Taliban accepted them since their officers were particularly important for a relatively unstructured movement without military experts other than some Pakistani officers. After the capture of Kabul, however, most of the former communists were ousted or even physically eliminate (Dorronsoro2005: 267).

Fourth factor that explain the success of the Taliban is it's supported by the external power like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Without their material support it could

not sustained so long. Saudi Arabia was the champion of the cause of Sunni Muslim world wide because of its interest to lead the Islamic world. But in Afghanistan's case it wants to counter Shia Iran with the help of Pakistan. As for the Pakistan's role in concerned, it was the founder of Taliban. Without Pakistan it would never possible the rise of this mysteries army. The next part would extensively discuss Pakistan's role in Taliban formation.

4.3.2 Pakistan role in forming Taliban 'Frankenstein'

Pakistan's search for an Afghan client was the main cause of Taliban formation. As we have point out above, there are different (Indigenous, Pushtun, Islamic) interpretation about the Taliban phenomena and all these features appropriate for Pakistan's calculation. Pakistan historically wanted an Afghan client, who would be Pushtun or Islamic. The Hekmatyar was the model of that, and when he failed Pakistan search for another one. If it accepts for a while, that Taliban was an indigenous movement, even than it did not score their successes alone. Pakistani leaders saw domestic political gains in supporting the movement, which draws most of support from the ethnic Pushtun who predominate along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border (The New York Times: December 31, 1996).

There had been a change of government in Pakistan, with democratic elected Benazir Bhutto returning to the Prime Minister office in 1993. On resuming office, she installed the retired Major General Naseerullah Babar, her Interior Minister who had been her father's adviser on Afghanistan (Maley 2002: 219). Interestingly, Pakistan's Afghan policy was monitored by the Ministry of Interior rather than the External Affairs. Naseerullah Babar, who was a Pushtun from the NWFP and a former governor of that province, had been in the 1970s the chief adviser on Afghan affairs to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto the than Prime Minister (Dorransoro 2005: 245). Mr. Babar saw a Pakistan linked to the newly independent Muslim republics of Central Asia, along roads and railways running across Afghanistan. He believed that stability in Afghanistan would mean a potential "economic bonanza for Pakistan and a strategic breakthrough for the West" (The New York Times: December 31, 1996). General Babar was undoubtedly involved from the beginning in Taliban activities in

Afghanistan. On September 1994 Babar had taken a group of Western ambassadors (including the US Ambassador to Pakistan John C. Monjo) to Kandahar, without even bothering to inform the Kabul government (Maley 2002: 220). According to Ahmed Rashid the Kandahar warlords viewed the plan with mistrust, suspecting the Pakistanis were about to try and intervene militarily to crush them (Rashid 2002: 27). “One commander, Amir Lalai, issued a blunt warning to Babar ‘Pakistan is offering to reconstruct our roads, but I do not think that by fixing our roads peace would automatically follow. As long as neighbouring countries continue to interfere in our internal affairs, we should not expect peace’” (Rashid 2002: 27).

The first major operation by the Taliban had begun on 12 October 1994, when some 200 Taliban from Kandahar and Pakistani Madrassas arrived at the small Afghan border Spin Baldak on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. This place was an important trucking and fuelling stop for the transport mafia and was held by Hikmetyar's men (Rashid 2002: 27). Here Afghan trucks picked up goods from Pakistani trucks, which were not allowed to cross into Afghanistan and fuel was smuggled in from Pakistan to feed the warlords' armies. For the transport mafia, control of the town was crucial. They had already donated several hundred thousand Pakistani Rupees to Mullah Omar and promised a monthly payment to the Taliban, if they would clear the roads and guarantee the security for truck traffic (Rashid 2002: 27). The Taliban force attacked on Hikmetyar's forces and Pakistan then helped the Taliban by allowing them to capture a large arms dump outside Spin Baldak that had been protected by Hikmetyar's men (Rashid 2002: 27). This dump had been moved across the border from Pakistan into Afghanistan in 1990, when the terms of the Geneva Accords obliged Islamabad not to hold weapons (Rashid 2002: 27). After that Taliban moved rapidly to capturing the Kandahar and Pakistani help gave the opportunity to increase a major operation. On 5 November, after a number of clashes, it succeeded in occupying the Kandahar, and by the end of November entered the neighbouring provinces of Helmand and Zabul (Dorransoro 2005: 245). Till January 1995 the Taliban captured the Helmand and Ghazni (Dorransoro 2005: 245). Following some enormous fight with the Mujahedeen, finally Taliban swept into the Kabul at the end of September 1996, with little resistance from Government troops,

most of them had fled (The New York Times: September 27, 1996). After reaching Kabul, immediately Taliban hanged the former Afghan President, Najibullah, and his brother from a concrete traffic-control post at the gates of the presidential palace as a crowd of more than a thousand people around to watch (The New York Times: September 27, 1996).

During these three years when Taliban was moving from Kandahar to Kabul, Pakistan help them diplomatically and militarily. But Pakistan's help in military operation perhaps was more important. After the initial success of Taliban, Naseerullah Babur took the credit for the Taliban's success telling journalist privately that the Taliban were our boys (Misdaq 2006: 180). The U.S. 'Intelligence Information Reports' which are now available on the National Security Archive of The George Washington University describes that Pakistan had used its armed forces to assist the Taliban . It says that Pakistan used sizable numbers of its Pushtun-based Frontier Corps in Taliban-run operations in Afghanistan (National Security Archive: October 22, 1996). It further claims that even food supplies from Pakistan to the Taliban were conducted openly through intelligence agency (ISI). Another report concludes that the ISI was much more involved with the Taliban than Pakistani officials have been telling U.S. diplomats. American intelligence indicates that the Pakistan Interservice Intelligence Directorate is using a private sector transportation company to funnel supplies into Afghanistan and to the Taliban forces (National Security Archive: October 18, 1996). Although food supplies from Pakistan to the Taliban are conducted openly, the munitions convoys depart Pakistan late in the evening hours and are concealed to reveal their true contents (National Security Archive: October 18, 1996). But Pakistan has denied being the power behind the Taliban and ridiculed accusations by India and Iran that Pakistani military officers have been involved in Taliban operation (The New York Times: October 16, 1995).

4.3.3 Pakistan's Socio- political links with Taliban

Pakistan's role in Taliban formation cannot be understood without knowing the Taliban's relation with Pakistani society. It's helped Pakistan to create Taliban

without come to international notice. And for Taliban's main advantage was that they never depended upon an exclusive relationship with just one Pakistani lobby. Taliban had social and ideological links to institutional elements within Pakistani society that provided much material support during their rise to power. They had access to more influential lobby and groups in Pakistan. The first one was the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i Islami (JUI) whose leader Maulana Fazlur Rahman believed as a key architect of Taliban. The JUI ran the network of Madrassas along the Pushtun belt in the NWFP and Baluchistan where it offered young Pakistanis and Afghan refugees the chance of a free education, food, shelter and military training (Rashid 2000: 89). Most of these Madrassas were in rural areas and Afghan refugee camps and they were run by semi-educated mullahs (Rashid 2000:89). Although, JUI as a political party had won a few seats in elections to the National and Baluchistan Assemblies but had remained in opposition to governments (Rasanayagam 2005: 144). In 1993, the situation changed when it become the part of a coalition government which run by Pakistan People Party (PPP) of Benazir Bhutto. Jamiat-i- Ulema-i Islami had played a pivotal role in its advocacy to the Taliban (Dorronsoro 2005: 245). Its leader, Rahman was made chairman of the National Assembly's Committee for Foreign Affairs, a position that enabled him to influence Pakistan's Afghan policy. He established close links with the Army, the ISI and with the Interior Minister retired General Naseerullah Babar. Rahman as his capacity, the Chairman of the National Assembly's Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs, built up an extensive network in the West Asia to acquire both moral and financial support for Taliban (Rasanayagam 2005: 144).

The second non-state actor was the truck mafias, who had an important role in Taliban formation. These mafias were the first one who got the service from Taliban by clear the transit route. During the anti-communist jihad, a transportation system had involved, hundreds of trucks were established to distribute aid to the Afghan resistance from the port of Karachi to Peshawar (Crews and Tarzi 2008: 101). This system was controlled by the Pakistani military and employed thousands of military members as well as some retired officers, and emerged as a profitable trader. The truck owners, drivers, and administrators became involved in the return shipment of narcotics from Peshawar to Karachi (Crews and Tarzi 2008:101). Because the operation of these trucks fell under federal military authority, none of the local law

enforcement agencies were authorized to stop or search these vehicles. The engagement of the trucking industry in narcotics converted the system into a “transport mafia” (Crews and Tarzi 2008: 102). Once the Soviets had departure from Afghanistan, this system became a joint enterprise between the government and private sector. It believes that General Naseerullah Babar had also some economical interest with this network who later established the Afghan Trade Developing Cell, a government-sponsored unit to convey the “transport mafia” toward transporting goods from Pakistan to Central Asia via Afghanistan (Crews and Tarzi 2008: 103). The emergence of Afghanistan as an economic highway to the landlocked Central Asia Republic offered a significant opportunity for the already established ground transport network in Pakistan. Within several months after the collapse of the Najibullah government in Kabul, the trucking industry to Central Asia was booming. The mixture of transport both goods and narcotics had expanded the local interests of opium producers, refinery owners, and thousands of merchants, as well as truck drivers, truck owners, and auto shops (Crews and Tarzi 2008: 104). At the same time, both politicians and the military establishment benefited from the high level of profit generated by this industry. As we have mentioned earlier, people like Mr. Asif Ali Zardari was the part of this industry. Yet the main barrier was the absence of law and order in Afghanistan. A large numbers of checkpoints on the Afghan highways had established by the warlord and they were collecting taxes, harassing owners and drivers, and forcing extortion payments (Crews and Tarzi 2008: 104). So these truck mafias’ lobby made pressure on the Pakistani establishment to help Taliban for their narrow business interest.

Another important factor which helped Taliban to rise was the composition of Pakistani army. As we have earlier mentioned, near 20 per cent of the Pakistani army officers were belongs to the Pushtuns ethnic groups. Ahmed Rashid called them the ‘Islamic fundamentalist lobby’ (Rashid 2000: 250). So these pro- Pushtun and ‘Islamic fundamentalist lobby’ within the ISI and the military remained determined to achieve a Pushtun victory in Afghanistan. Therefore this commitment of Pushtun army and intelligence officers also helped in Taliban formation.

Summary

Pakistan's Afghan policy, historically determined by the fact that it wants a friendly government in Kabul. Following the Soviet departure Pakistan's aspiration become more extensive when it was not satisfied with a friendly government alone. Then, Pakistani establishment looked for a puppet Afghan government, who could help Pakistan to achieve its regional ambition. That created problem, when Pakistan worked with its favourite Hekmatyar to undermine the Afghan government. Later the relation between Pakistan and Rabbani-Massoud led Afghan government become deteriorate. In the same time the changing geopolitics of the region could not allowed Pakistan to tolerate a hostile neighbour. The new political elite of Pakistan were more ambitious in term of economic affair. In this condition Pakistan favoured a group which had socio-political and financial links with Pakistani state and society. This chapter conclude to say that, after some initial confusion Pakistan backed Taliban to capture Kabul through its entire capacity and instrument (military, economic and diplomatic).

Conclusion

CHAPTER 5

5.1 Conclusion

This study comes to the conclusion that, Pakistan's role in transition of power from Mujahedeen to Taliban had been shaped by the existing geopolitics of the region and Afghanistan-Pakistan's historical enmity. Pakistan wanted a friendly Afghanistan through Mujahedeen led government. The Pakistani establishment had believed that a friendly Afghanistan would settle the Pushtunistan issue and provide the strategic depth against India. After the departure of Najibullah, Pakistan had engaged with the Mujahedeen but within some time it found that they were no longer useful to achieve its aims. It was Pakistan who expected some unrealistic anticipation from Mujahedeen government. Although, Pakistan played a major role to bring together the Mujahedeen to form an interim government in Afghanistan, nonetheless it failed to anticipate the brittleness and lack of coordination within the ranks of the Mujahedeen themselves. What can one ascribe this failure to? Either the Pakistani intelligentsia and its foreign policy makers seemed to lack vision in dealing with the Afghan problem, or perhaps they deliberately allowed it to falter in their own larger interests.

To elaborate on the argument further: Was Pakistan interested in seeing the collapse of the Interim Government of Mujahedeen, or much too confident about their capacity to survive and run the Afghan state? This study has not been able to come up with a concrete answer. Part of the reason is that because of the lack of documentation on the part of the Mujahedeen government and the unavailability of official records, it is very difficult to arrive at a definitive conclusion. However, making use of the available records and secondary writing on the subject, the present study has laboured to make certain plausible assertions: The first that, Pakistan was under pressure to form the Afghan Interim Government. The pressure came from the 'Coalition of North', over which Pakistan exerted little influence, compared to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. As the chapters in the dissertation stress, Pakistan was keen to form the government because it wanted Hekmatyar to participate in it.

Secondly, as the study reveals, the changing nature of regional geopolitics in the post cold war era played an important role in shaping Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan. In fact it motivated the Pakistani elite to pressurise the newly elected democratic governments in the 1990s to think of a peaceful solution of the Afghan conflict and in the process push their economic and business interests beyond the Afghan frontier.

Thirdly, Pakistan was rather too confident that the Mujahedeen government would follow its dictates. There was a reason for this overconfidence. Pakistan had believed that its assistance to Mujahedeen during the anti-communist movement would pay them rich dividends in future. Whatever the rationale of Pakistan's calculation, the Mujahedeen government did not work in the interests of Pakistan. Rather than being friendly, it became hostile towards Pakistan and forced them to look towards other options, the Taliban.

The study concludes that:

i) Ethno-geopolitical linkages and Pushtunistan issue have been the geopolitical factors behind Pakistan's myopic vision on the formation of Afghan Interim Government. It emphasises the fact that Pakistan's Afghan policy has always been determined by the Pushtun syndrome because of its geopolitical implication. The Pushtuns, who make the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, and who have ruled the region through all its history, share an ethnic identity with other Pashtun communities across the border in Pakistan, and envisage an idea of Pushtunistan which stresses ethnic identity rather than Islamic. This has remained a lingering cause of insecurity for Pakistan's integrity as a nation state.

Pakistan's counter to this very idea of Pushtunistan based on a strong ethnic identity was to create a parallel group of Pushtun Mujahedeen who championed the Islamic idea of *ummah* and in the process neutralised the ethnic resurgence of the Pushtuns. Even before the Sour Revolution, the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had chosen Gulbuddin Hikmatyar as its principal contact among the Islamist parties that had taken asylum in Pakistan from Daud's fear. And this is precisely the reason that made Pakistan help the Islamic Mujahedeen to form the interim government after

the end of Najibullah's rule. And quite obviously, Pakistan's role in this negotiation and later the government formation was determined by the ethno-geopolitical factors. Before forming the Afghan interim government, the Afghan ground situation was not in Pakistan's favour, where much of the terrain had been captured by the 'Coalition of North'. The commanders of this coalition were not so closely associated with Pakistan during anti-communist Jihad. These leaders had linked with other regional countries including Iran and Central Asian Republics. Pakistan's concern was that if this coalition captured Kabul, it would be a strategic setback for it, and hence they backed Hekmatyar for the interim government. However, there were also certain exceptions to this general policy when Pakistan supported non-Pushtun Mujahedeen groups like Massoud and Rabbani. But this should not be seen as a shift in its policy towards Afghanistan. Considering the realities, it was a purely pragmatic approach: both Rabbani and Massoud had enormous presence on the ground compared to any other Mujahedeen leaders.

ii) Pakistan's own pursuits of 'strategic depth' allowed the Mujahedeen to renege from the Accords. However, that should not be seen as the only reason that made the Mujahedeen betray power sharing arrangement among themselves as mediated by Pakistan. Mujahedeen also acted independently on their own, being completely unmindful of the provisions of the Accord. The Mujahedeen leaders could not suppress their ethnic biases, and in the process disturbed the Pakistan agenda badly. Very soon as it turned out, Hekmatyar's independent mindset became a liability for Pakistan. The Mujahedeen turned out to be as opportunistic as Pakistan was in their Afghan politics. The grandeur of power seemed to have captured them completely, and in the process disregard Pakistan's advice consistently. Even then, Pakistan certainly had some role in the failure of Mujahedeen led Afghan interim government. Pakistan's unconditional support of Hekmatyar and its suspicion of Rabbani-Massoud alliance were the main reasons for the failure of the Accords. The basic problem with Pakistan's Afghan policy can be located in its ambiguous idea of 'strategic depth': the notion that a friendly Afghanistan would be useful to counter India. Pakistan's most important foreign policy concerns had always remained to the east, especially its relationship with India. As long as India remain in a hostile clash with Pakistan over

Kashmir, Pakistan wanted to be sure that its western borders was secure. Such a security was only possible if a friendly government in Kabul would suppress the creation of a Pushtunistan, and in the process help Pakistan achieve 'strategic depth'. However, when Pakistan realised that the Rabbani government would not help their aim, they encouraged Hekmatyar to go against the Kabul government.

iii) Finally: Pakistan's instrumentalist approach towards Mujahedeen's led to the creation of Taliban. Pakistan had used the Mujahedeen as an instrument for its strategic desire. It also intensified the rivalry between them. Due to this rivalry, civil war trapped the entire nation, and in the process allowed the Taliban to emerge. The Pakistan establishment nurtured the Taliban to promote its own interests especially after the Mujahedeen did not come up to their expectations. The Mujahedeen government who had earlier taken over the reins of Kabul under President Burhanuddin Rabbani, with Ahmed Shah Massoud as Defence minister, were not keen to work under the advice of Pakistan. Given these circumstances, Pakistan looked for someone else who could work as an instrument to secure its geopolitical interests. It found its ally in a mysterious army group which had close links with Pakistani state and society, the Taliban. Taliban militia, made up mostly of ethnic Pushtuns from both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border, turned out to be the most appropriate force to secure a compliant government in Kabul.

Further, this study also emphasises that Pakistan's Afghan policy has historically been influenced by the regional equation. Pakistan's competition with India, Iran and the Central Asian states on Afghanistan led it to support Taliban movement which had no links with these countries. Pakistan backed the Taliban because Iran supported the Afghan government of Burhanuddin Rabbani and Shiite factions of the opposition alliance. In fact, this rivalry has also been seen as one of the factors in the emergence of the Taliban. What also prompted Pakistan to back the Taliban was the support rendered to the Rabbani Government and its military strongman, Ahmad Shah Massoud by two of its traditional enemies, India and Russia. Pakistan anticipated that both India and Russia would gain control of Afghanistan if they did not counter it by raising a counter militia.

As already discussed in this study, Pakistan saw itself as the most insecure state in South Asia in terms of danger it was facing internally and externally from both sides of border till the Soviet departure. Given this feeling, Pakistan wanted a friendly settlement with Afghanistan especially as it shared a similar religious identity with it. This was the defining feature of Pakistan's foreign policy both regionally and globally. However, the desire to have a friendly neighbour on its western border did not actualise. Interestingly, it was Afghanistan which created problem for Pakistan when the Afghan Pushtun elites raised the Pushtunistan rhetoric. The Afghan-Pakistan relation should be seen on the bases of the state formation of these two countries. Pakistan's formation as a state was not welcomed by the Afghanistan's elite. It was the Durand Line, fashioned by the British imperial power, which created the earliest problems between them. Afghanistan was the only state who opposed Pakistan's entry into United Nation. Afghanistan's demand for the return of the Pushtun area of NWFP was seen by the Pakistan as a direct threat to its unity. The long history of each state offering sanctuary to the other's opponents resulted in bitterness and mistrust between the two. Although, Afghanistan was not a strong military state that could pose a serious threat to Pakistan, however, its closeness to Soviet Union and India was seen as an intimidation by the Pakistani security elite who have historically defined the Pakistan's security and foreign policy.

During the last decade of Cold war, when Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan to save the PDPA government, the imagined threat converted into a real one. In their most horrible moments, Pakistani planners could imagine having to fight a two-front war in which its army would face the Soviets and their Afghan allies joined by Pakistan's traditional adversary, India. Even if the Soviets had no intention of making a direct move against Pakistan, the danger existed that a war that moved slowly could spill over, drawing in Pakistan as a combatant. Apart from this fear Soviet-Afghan alliance could intensify the Pushtun nationalist demand for Pushtunistan. In the same time Pakistan became a victim of rebellion from provincial secessionist movements from within. The most serious of these were made by ethnic groups with long standing grievances against the central government, especially the

dissident elements among the Sindh and procommunist Baluch nationalists. Further, the fight between Communist government and Islamic resistance groups in Afghanistan forced millions of people to take asylum in Pakistan. The settlement of more than 3.2 million refugees, most of them in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), posed a serious threat to their security. And the most painful memory of loss of East Pakistan was still fresh in their security establishment. Thus, Pakistan was anticipating a serious threat to its existence as a state on the eve of Soviet intervention. It was under these circumstances that Pakistan supported the Islamist militia among the Pushtun, to neutralize Pushtun nationalism within its borders. Thanks to the super-power rivalry, Pakistan who had joined the US camp to counter the Soviet presence in Afghanistan became the main pipeline for supplying arms and ambulation to the resistance. Although, the Afghan resistance movement against the PDPA-Soviet was a spontaneous one but Pakistan gave it a unique structure which came to be known as the seven party's alliance that operated from Peshawar. During the decade long war, Pakistan and its allies especially United States used these Mujahedeen parties to promote its own narrow interests in Afghanistan. In this process Pakistan never allowed Mujahedeen parties to unite and coordinate their activity. The apparent lack of coordination turned out to be the legacy of Afghan resistance movement and later became the main reason for the failure of its interim government. Moreover, after the Soviet departure Pakistan got a chance to convert Afghanistan as a friendly state through its proxy Mujahedeen whom Pakistan used in the Soviet-Afghan conflict.

The greatest legacy of the Afghan war was that, it brought Pakistan closer to Afghanistan. Pakistan from the very first day of Soviet departure worked to establish a pro-Pakistani government in Kabul. Pakistani authorities had long been uncertain about the kind of state they preferred to see emerge in Afghanistan. Although, they sought to create a pro-Pakistan state, it still had many ambiguities associated to it. Pakistan was keen that the successor regimes in Kabul should not be hostile towards them. However, there was little uniformity within the Pakistan establishment on how to proceed forth on its Afghan policy. Pakistan's confusing and unrealistic policy towards Afghanistan not only impacted the Mujahedeen adversely, it also paved way for the Taliban to emerge as a new power base in the region. As discussed in earlier

pages, Pakistani state, society and different pressure groups were collectively responsible for the rise of Taliban. Taliban's initial success created new hope for the Pakistani elite trader lobbies who hoped to acquire its strategic goals through them.

Today one can comfortably say that Taliban is now a Frankenstein rather than a strategic tool for the Pakistani state. Pakistan's Afghan policies, so consequential for its neighbour, have also had a deep impact on the country's political landscape and society. In the process of supporting Taliban, Pakistani society has become a victim of this radicalisation. Pakistan's policy makers have also frequently ignored the long-term and wider implications of their policies domestically and regionally.

Pakistan's Afghan policies over the past three decades, whether pursued for domestic, political or strategic reasons have come at the expense of the country's political stability and social cohesion. They have been heavily responsible for intensifying Pakistan's ethnic split, weakening its economy and fuelling religious radicalism. For its imaginary strategic goals, Islamabad has turned a blind eye to domestic radicalisation, and the impact of this radicalisation on its ability to govern within its own borders. Today Pakistani army is struggling to control much of its terrain. All these processes have undermined Pakistan capacity as a state, and its ability to ensure a democratic political culture. Pakistan's image at the international level has been badly affected, and its Taliban's links have only served to accentuate that notion, even when it considers itself an alliance on the 'global war on terror'. These arguments clearly show that Pakistan's Afghan policy to sponsor Taliban has failed badly. It is now interesting to see how Pakistan engages with Taliban again when NATO led western forces would withdraw from Afghanistan. It is for Pakistan to learn from the blunder, or otherwise it seems history would repeat itself again.

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