


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**"BHUTTO'S ROLE IN PAKISTAN'S POLTICS
1968 - 69"**

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1968 - 69"**

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PREFACE

The present study is aimed at evaluating the role of Bhutto in Pakistani politics during the years 1968 and 1969 with special emphasis on his role in the down fall of Ayub Khan's regime.

The popular upsurge that unseated the well-entrenched regime of President Ayub Khan was a unique phenomenon in the history of Pakistan. Never before since the creation of Pakistan had the people agitated in such large numbers and for such a long period of time. The anti-Ayub movement reflected the growth of political consciousness that had so far been lacking at least as far as the West Pakistani population was concerned.

In the analysis of any popular movement three factors are of fundamental importance. First of all there is the question of the leader's personality. The leaders of popular movements have certain attributes of personality that set them apart from the rest of the population and lead the people to repose faith in them. The first chapter of this study, therefore, has been devoted to the study of Bhutto's personality. An analysis has been made of the process of his socialization and of the factors that influenced his thinking in the formative years. Bhutto's political ideas have also been analyzed in this chapter since it is necessary to understand his political ideology in order to have a fuller picture of his personality. His role as a Minister in Ayub Khan's cabinet, especially as Foreign Minister, has also been discussed.

The second important factor in the study of popular movements is the condition prevailing in the society at the time of the movement. There should be a general dissatisfaction in the population with the status quo. In the second chapter an analysis has been made of the forces and factors operating during Ayub Khan's rule that led to discontent among the masses.

The third important factor is the leader's message and the creation of an organization. The message of the leader must have relevance for the times for the leader to be successful. He must be able to articulate the feelings of the people he is appealing to, and should be able to give them the promise of a better future. In order to carry out his promises the creation of an organization is also necessary through which the charisma of the leader is institutionalized. The third chapter has been devoted to the study of Bhutto's message and its relevance to the prevailing conditions of Pakistani society. Bhutto created the Peoples Party in order to give his appeal an institutional base. Bhutto's role in the anti-Ayub agitation has been discussed in the third chapter. An analysis has also been made of the People's Party's support structure, in which sections of society it became more popular than in others and why, and how it reflected as well as aided the process of change in the socio-political structure of Pakistani society.

There is shortage of relevant material on this topic.

The reason might be that before Bhutto's overwhelming success in the 1970 elections the observers of the Pakistani scene grossly underestimated his popularity in West Pakistan and except for some passing references no detailed study was made regarding this topic. This scarcity of material is more sharp regarding the early phase of Bhutto's life where except for one book by Pilloo Modi, no other material is available. This is a limitation which it has been impossible to overcome in this brief study.

I am deeply indebted to Dr. Mohammed Ayooob, my supervisor, for his able guidance. My heart felt thanks are due to Professor Bimal Prasad, Chairman of the Centre for South South East and Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies for his constant encouragement. I am also grateful to the staff of Sapru House and Jawaharlal Nehru University libraries for their kind cooperation.

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Chapter I

THE FORMATIVE PHASE

There have perhaps been few leaders in recent history who were called upon to guide the destiny of a nation at such a critical juncture as has been the case with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the present Prime Minister of Pakistan. It is, therefore, surprising that so little has been written about him. In whatever literature has been available attempts have been made either to paint him as a charismatic leader next only to Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah or as a villain of the ^{is} peace. Unfortunately very little material is available on Bhutto's early life and the initial period of his socialization process. Pilo Modi's "Zulfi My Friend" and Dilip Mukherjee's "Zulfikar Ali Bhutto - Quest for Power" are the only two books which undertake a detailed study of Bhutto's personality. For the earlier part of Bhutto's life one has to depend almost exclusively on Modi's observations. This is a limitation which it has been impossible to overcome in this short study.

In order to assess the role that Bhutto played in shaping the events in Pakistani politics one must have a thorough understanding of his personality. As the process of socialization is one of the most important factors in the moulding of a personality, special efforts need to be made to study this process. It is the impact of the surrounding environment--family, class, community, educational institutions etc. - that interacts with the inherent - inherited or unique - traits of a person to make him what he is.

Bhutto being a member of the privileged class was fortunate in having the advantages of an aristocratic family background and in receiving his education in some of the best institutions in the world. Bhutto's main characteristic feature is his ambition which has been the driving force behind all his achievements and has led him to the high office of a head of government. Thus the privileges of an aristocratic family background provided an atmosphere conducive to the growth of his intellectual talents and the realization of his high ambitions.

Bhutto was born into a tradition of political activity. His family enjoyed a prominent position in Sind politics. In matters concerning Sind their opinion was sought by the British government because they were considered to have been carrying the Sindi public opinion with them. His father Sir Shahnavaz Bhutto was a prominent politician of Sind who had acquired the reputation of being a spokesman of Sind in British India.

Sir Shahnavaz Bhutto was very active in politics. He was a member of the Bombay Legislative Council from 1912-1936. Bhutto's father commanded much importance in government circles and many honours were bestowed on him. He was given the OBE in 1919 and made a Khan Bahadur in 1921. In 1925 CIE followed and then ^{KN} Knighthood in 1930. He attended in 1931 the Round Table Conference heading a four member delegation from Sind. He put forward the demand for a separate

province for Sindi Muslims. In 1934 he was appointed a minister in the Bombay Government and after the separation of Sindh from Bombay Presidency he worked as the chief advisor to the Government of Sindh till a popular ministry was installed there. He launched the Sindh United Party which in the election of 1937 won 18 seats in a house of 60 and emerged as the largest single party. He, however, lost his own seat. After this he quit politics and became a member of the Bombay-Sindh Public Service Commission. In 1947 he moved to Junagadh and in the capacity of Dewan he advised the ruler of Junagadh to opt for Pakistan, an action which caused bitterness between India and Pakistan and gave rise to the revolt of the population that forced both the Ruler and the Dewan to flee to Karachi. After this he retired from public activity.

This background of political activity might have laid the foundation of young Bhutto's political thinking. Living in a home where top politicians used to assemble to discuss politics he got to know politics from a very early age, and developed an interest in it. Modi, his childhood friend recalls that Bhutto hero-worshipped Jinnah. His father's views on Pakistan must have also influenced his thinking.

Bhutto was not sent to school until he was nine years old but was given varied type of education at home. About Bhutto's early upbringing Modi writes:

...his family life and the manner in which he was looked after showed rather a high

degree of perception and understanding. Although he was given whatever he needed or wanted, Zulfi was also permitted the necessary amount of independence, which built his character and judgement. He also did his share of roughing it out and experienced the normal amount of knocks which as a result of his mischievous nature was quite frequent. This made him realize the value of companionship and friendship which I have described earlier as his most endearing quality. 1

Bhutto joined the Cathedral and John Cannon High School from where he did his Senior Cambridge and then spent two years at the J.J. School of Arts. Young Bhutto, as his school friends recall, hero worshipped Jinnah who was also a resident of Bombay till he moved to Karachi in 1947. "He was a great advocate of the two nation-theory and felt that without Pakistan the rights of the Mussalmans could not be safeguarded." To him "everything that Jinnah said or did was correct." 2

In trying to trace the origin of Bhutto's anti-India views Modi attributes them to his family background. He writes: "Zulfi's family background and the sort of people who collected at his house must likewise have helped to crystallize his beliefs; living in Bombay with its communal riots and tensions and the gossip associated with them must have left its indelible mark on him. What is more, it is possible

1 Piloo Modi, Zulfi: My Friend (Delhi, 1973), p. 47.

2 Ibid., p. 35.

that he heard only one side of the story."³

In 1947 Bhutto left Bombay and went to the University of California at Berkeley from where he graduated with honours in political science. It was during his stay at Berkeley that his political ideas started taking shape, and he prepared himself for a political career about which he was very determined. As his friend recalls:

Each year Zulfi kept improving in his studies, doing ever better in his course, reading more and more, broadening his mind and preparing himself for a political future in Pakistan about which he never had the least doubt or hesitation.⁴

The slogan of socialism that has been the major factor contributing to Bhutto's sweeping victory in 1970 elections also owes its origins to the training in University of California, so his friend writes. Bhutto for himself "maintains that his commitment to socialism is an old one which found its origin in the grotesque poverty of Sind, that it is a commitment that stems from human values and from human reactions to the realities of life." He insists that "the lectures and writings of Laski did not make him a socialist; they only confirmed his ideas and his own convictions."⁵

Thus Bhutto maintains that his commitment to socialism is an original one and socialist thinkers "did not convert

3 Ibid., p. 34.

4 Ibid., p. 45.

5 Ibid., p. 49.

him to socialism, they merely confirmed his own views."⁶

It was also during his stay at Berkeley that Bhutto acquired the training in sophisticated styles of expression and developed that gift of oratory which proved a great asset to him as foreign minister while presenting his country's case in international forums and that ability to play with the emotions of the people which has led him to the office he now holds.

Throughout his stay at Berkeley Bhutto was preparing himself for his future political career. He was mainly interested in international politics and quite often appreciated Krishna Menon's performance in the United Nations. He himself dreamt of representing his country's case in United Nations. Modi writes:

Zulfi always assumed that he was destined to be something some day and all his actions and thoughts were directed towards that end... In those days Zulfi imagined himself as being his country's representative at the United Nations. 7

From Berkeley Bhutto went to Christchurch, Oxford, from where he took his master's degree in Jurisprudence with distinction in 1952. In 1953, he was admitted to the Bar from Lincoln's Inn, London. He was appointed lecturer in International Law in the University of Southampton, but he could not

6 Ibid., p. 49.

7 Ibid., p. 50.

take the job as he had to return home on account of his father's illness. He returned to Pakistan in November 1953. He set up his practice in Karachi and looked after the family affairs.

Bhutto's educational background and his knowledge of International Law helped him in securing entry into the Pakistani delegation to the United Nations in 1957. Speaking on the definition of aggression at the U.N., he said that "it is neither possible nor desirable to define aggression" because "a definition may quite conceivably act as a barrier⁸ against quick and decisive counteraction." His speech in the United Nations proved his intellectual capacity and oratorical skills and won him recognition as an effective debator. The next year he was sent to Geneva as the leader of the Pakistani delegation to attend the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. He made his mark in the conference and "many governments wrote to the Government of Pakistan paying⁹ tributes to his leadership."

The strength of his family connections and his proven ability as Pakistan's representative in the United Nations proved great assets to Bhutto in starting a high political

8 Address to the Sixth Committee of U.N. General Assembly, 25 October 1957, reprinted in Politics of the People, vol. 1 (Rawalpindi), A Collection of Statements, Articles and Speeches by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, edited by Hamid Jalal and Khalid Hasan, p. 87.

9 Modi, n. 1, p. 56.

career. Bhutto was very fortunate in having the right family connections. President Iskandar Mirza was a friend of the Bhutto family. President Mirza and General Ayub, then C-in-C of Pakistan Army, frequently visited Bhutto's house at Larkana. The 1958 army coup is said to have been hatched at Larkana where the chief actors of the coup met for a shoot. As a gesture of goodwill towards the host, his son (Bhutto) was included in the new cabinet formed under the presidency of Iskandar Mirza. When Ayub Khan removed Iskandar Mirza and declared himself the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator he saw no reason to remove Bhutto. To quote Dilip Mukherjee, "The reason why Mirza picked up Bhutto in the first place, and Ayub retained him afterwards, was that the young lawyer had not only talent but also the right family connections."¹⁰

Starting his political career in Ayub's cabinet in 1958 at the age of 30 Bhutto was the youngest minister in the Commonwealth. He was first given the portfolio of Commerce. As Minister of Commerce he introduced the bonus voucher scheme designed to boost Pakistan's exports. The scheme was very attractive to the exporters as they were allowed to retain a substantial part of the foreign exchange earned and could use it for importing scarce commodities.

In January 1960 Bhutto was given the portfolio of

10 Dilip Mukherjee, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: Quest for Power (Delhi, 1972), p. 24.

Information and National Reconstruction and Minority Affairs. Three months later, he was given the charge of Kashmir Affairs and Fuel, Power and Natural Resources. In his capacity as Minister for Natural Resources he was responsible for accepting Soviet offer to help in oil exploration. This agreement proved very beneficial for Pakistan.

But his main contribution to Pakistan under the Ayub regime was as Foreign Minister from 1962 to 1966. After the 1962 Constitution was enforced, the cabinet was reconstituted and Manzur Quadir who was the Foreign Minister was dropped. The portfolio was given to Mohammed Ali Bogra. Bogra was on good terms with America and was identified with pro-American policies. As Bogra was in indifferent health, Bhutto often stood in for the ailing Foreign Minister on important occasions and after Bogra's death the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was given to Bhutto.

As it happened, foreign policy turned out to be his main forte and it is to his performance in this field that Bhutto owes his international image and the resultant recognition at home. His educational background and his shrewd political judgement enabled him to understand the complicated power game of international diplomacy. His views on foreign policy and international politics are systematically put forward in his "Myth of Independence" written in 1967 and published in 1969. While some of these views seem to have undergone change since he assumed office in 1971, they are still

important to us because they help us to understand Bhutto.

Bhutto realized that in the modern age as colonialism has given way to neo-colonialism the exploitation of smaller and weaker nations by rich and powerful ones has not stopped but the methods of exploitation have changed. The policy of "divide and rule" has given way to that of "unite and rule". The great powers were forcing unnatural alliances on smaller nations in order to facilitate their own selfish ends and make exploitation convenient. With the change in the times, the objectives of territorial expansion have been replaced by those of ideological subjugation of the erstwhile colonies and the instrument of expansion has become "ideology instead of gunboat".¹¹

Bhutto believed that in their dealings with small nations global powers are motivated by their own global interests and not by their commitments to smaller nations or the righteousness of a cause. He subscribes to the view that nations do not have permanent friends or enemies but permanent self-interests. A small nation in its dealings with great powers must ascertain which great power has interests coinciding with its own and seek greater cooperation with it while at the same time avoiding confrontation with any great power and resisting their interference in its internal affairs.

11 Z. A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence (London, 1969), p. 11.

He observed that the international milieu is in a state of flux, and great changes are taking place everywhere and the greatest of these are in Asia. In this state of affairs, it would be fatal to be dogmatic about the future course of international events.¹²

As the international scene is rapidly changing he argued:

The external policy of any country should be based on a realistic assessment of the current power conflicts. These add tensions to tensions but also offer opportunities that small nations can ill-afford to ignore for the protection of their own vital interests and indeed sovereignty.¹³

In 1967 when Bhutto wrote the "Lyth of Independence" he advocated that Pakistan should leave the Western-sponsored alliances because they were no assets but only liabilities. He thought that a reappraisal of Pakistan's foreign policy was necessary in the changed circumstances:

Our national commitments are so heavy, the consequent responsibilities so great and the threat to our security and integrity so serious that this government will be failing its people if it did not reappraise its position, political and military.¹⁴

In the early and middle sixties he was the chief instrument in demarcating the course Pakistan's foreign policy was to take. In his opinion it was necessary that Pakistan should

12 Ibid., p. 16.

13 Ibid., p. 16.

14 Z.A. Bhutto, Foreign Policy of Pakistan (Karachi, 1964), p. 105.

eliminate foreign interference from her soil. "Pakistan must determine its foreign policy on the basis of its own enlightened self-interest, uninfluenced by the transient global requirements of the great powers.¹⁵ He was a great advocate of an independent foreign policy and favoured non-alignment. He was firmly convinced that -

Under no circumstances must Pakistan get entangled in the ideological or territorial disputes of the global powers. We must maintain a non-committal attitude in global confrontation, but at the same time, take a clear and independent position on world issues affecting the rights of peoples and nations to equality, self-determination and social and economic emancipation. 16

He further added:

We should demonstrate strict neutrality in the ideological confrontation of the global powers. In determining her relations with such powers, Pakistan must take into account her geographical situation and the support she received in her own just cause. 17

The emphasis on "geographical situation" indicates that Bhutto sought closer relations with China because he believed it to be geographically more important for Pakistan than the United States of America. The support received in the "just cause" also referred to the fact that China extended full support to Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute while

15 Bhutto, n. 11, p. 134.

16 Ibid., p. 143.

17 Ibid., pp. 143-44.

U.S.A. never committed itself on this issue. Bhutto has been a great advocate of closer relations with China. In his opinion Pakistan has many reasons to develop intimate relations with China and vice versa. Bhutto maintains that Pakistan's friendship with China was not based only upon the negative factor that both countries had disputes with India but also on positive ones.

According to Bhutto, the first reason why Pakistan should develop close relations with China was that "China has emerged as the undisputed champion of oppressed people and their just causes"¹⁸. Another factor was that China was a powerful force in Asia and Pakistan being an Asian country could not afford to have antagonistic relations with China. China was important for Pakistan for security reasons also as both the countries had a common boundary, i.e. between Pakistan occupied Kashmir and Sinkiang.

The most important factor, however, was that China supported Pakistan's "just cause" on Kashmir issue. According to Bhutto, China had unequivocally supported the right of self-determination of the people of Jammu and Kashmir and this, quite apart from other considerations, should influence¹⁹ Pakistan in seeking friendly relations with China.

Pakistan, in Bhutto's thinking, would always need a

18 Ibid., pp. 121-22.

19 Ibid., p. 132.

"plus factor" in its dealings with India, India being four times the size of Pakistan. That plus factor could only be China. Bhutto believed that Sino-Pakistan relations were based not on considerations of passing expediency but on long term considerations. His reading of the international situation convinced him that Sino-American relations were going to improve and any attempt therefore aimed at provoking China would be counter productive when Sino-American rivalries ended.

He wrote:

We know that world conditions require that at a certain stage there must be some relaxation in tensions between United States and China. The present situation cannot last for long. Because of the impasses between them, the people of the United States and the people of China are the losers and, indeed, the people of the whole world. 20

He further wrote:

When the relations between China and the United States take more realistic turn the United States may be less hostile to Pakistan's friendly relations with China. If Pakistan were now to take provocative steps against China, her position would be the more perilous when relations between China and the United States improve. We would be left to lag behind as we lagged behind India in our endeavor to improve relations with the Soviet Union. If valuable time is lost this way, irreparable damage is liable to be caused. It is therefore essential that Pakistan continues to develop friendly relations - and resists all attempts to sever those

existing - with China, in view of the existing dictates of United States global policies. 21

He then emphatically stated the course that Pakistan diplomacy should take:

Pakistan must determine its foreign policy on the basis of its own enlightened self-interest, uninfluenced by the transient global requirements of the great powers. 22

American relations with Pakistan had shown a downward trend since 1962. As a result of the Sino-Indian confrontation, Western powers, particularly the USA, sent limited supplies of arms and equipment to India. Pakistan, however, considered American aid to India as a threat to its own security since it was linked with the USA in different alliances. America continued to send aid to India despite Pakistan's strong protestations and this move resulted in the disillusionment of Pakistan with America. Anti-American feelings ran high in the country and the anger was directed against the government, particularly President Ayub, who was closely identified with the system of Western alliances. It was Bhutto who could save the Ayub regime from becoming the target of the rising anti-American tide by giving its foreign policy an anti-American and pro-China look after he took over as Foreign Minister. This won him the applause of the nationalist sentiments, of the

21 Bhutto, n. 11, pp. 133-34.

22 Ibid.,

enthusiastic younger generation and intelligentsia as well as the leftist elements. Often his anti-American rhetoric became more than Ayub had bargained for and his rising popularity posed something of a threat to Ayub Khan's own standing. One Western scholar writing about Bhutto has said:

The new Foreign Minister was a true representative of the educated and determined younger generation. He was one of them, spoke their language, knew their thoughts, and shared their aspirations. It would not be in error to suggest that he, like so many young intellectuals, found socialist policies appealing - and this reinforced his prejudices against things Western. 23

The same scholar further observed that Bhutto proved to be a great asset for the Ayub regime and:

Through him the Ayub regime acquired a degree of credibility it could ill-afford to discount. Bhutto played his role so well that some observers believed the President would eventually name him his heir apparent. 24

In the initial stages of his career, as is apparent from the above analysis, Bhutto prepared himself for his political career, entered the government and through skilful manoeuvring consolidated his position there. His new approach to foreign policy proved better suited to the new set of circumstances that were created due to the shift in American

23 Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era (New York, 1971), p. 49.

24 Ibid.

policy in the subcontinent. Moreover, the reputation that he was able to build for himself in international forums as a skillful spokesman of Pakistan and an advocate for the cause of Afro-Asian countries also helped him consolidate his position in the domestic politics of Pakistan. This stood him in good stead when he finally decided to break with his mentor, President Ayub Khan, and launch upon a course of opposition to his former leader. However, to study Bhutto's role in the anti-Ayub movement we must first analyze the causes that led to Ayub's growing unpopularity at home. It was a combination of factors that led to the anti-Ayub agitation of 1968-69 and to his eventual downfall. The next chapter will be devoted to a study of these factors and forces. Bhutto's role in the anti-Ayub agitation will be discussed in the third chapter.

Chapter II

FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR AYUB'S DOWNFALL

Field Marshal Ayub Khan seized power in a bloodless coup in 1958. Soon after he removed Iskandar Mirza from the office of the President and sent him into exile. Since then he remained the unchallenged leader of his country for a decade until 1968 when an agitation broke out against his regime and in a surprisingly short-time he was forced to quit the seat of power.

In the early phases of his regime Ayub's rule was welcomed in Pakistan and hardly any dissenting voice was raised. His government was credited with the fact that it gave the country political stability which had been wanting under almost all earlier regimes and rapid economic progress at least in G.N.P. terms as well as an improved image in the international sphere. In spite of all this the Ayub regime collapsed in 1968-69 like a house of cards.

To understand where and why the Ayub regime failed one must have a thorough understanding of the problems that Pakistan faced when he came to power in 1958 and which Ayub could not significantly resolve.

I. Pre-Partition Legacies

The problems of Pakistan are deep-rooted in the history of the subcontinent. Muslim separatism in the subcontinent which led to the creation of Pakistan was basically negative in outlook. Besides the negative slogan of deliverance from Hindu domination, the League did not have any concrete programme to offer and except for the general assertion that it

was to be based on "Islamic ideology" the nature of the new state remained very vague. In a way this was to be expected since the Muslim League leadership, which was primarily feudal and upper middle class in character, had a definition of Pakistan which was very different from the idea which it tried to sell to the masses.

Another important reason why the nature of the new state was not clearly demarcated and all discussion of socio-economic programmes and policies was avoided was to keep the divergent interests within the League's fold and to maintain the fragile unity of the party. There was no consensus on issues of fundamental importance among the leaders themselves.

(1) Nature and Development of the Muslim League Movement

The Muslim League Movement was essentially elitist in character, controlled and directed from above. Little attention was paid to enlist the support of the masses by building grass-root organization and establishing channels of communication. It was only after the call for the creation of Pakistan caught the imagination of the Muslim masses that the League became a mass party. One scholar pointing out this character of the League movement writes:

From the early 1920's the Muslim League had remained stagnated at a stage of liberal or not so liberal constitutionalism (a stage reached by the Congress in the first decade of this century). In contrast to the development of the Congress during the next 30-35 years, when the

grass-root organization and the mass base of the party was built, the League tended to fossilize at this point. Then all of a sudden during the 1940's it found itself riding the crest of a mass hysteria created partly as a result of religious jingoism and partly as a reaction to the Congress's lack of accommodation (in fact, of understanding) of the newly emerging Muslim middle class's economic and political aspirations. 1

(ii) Political Development of Muslim Majority Provinces and the Nature of Leadership

During the pre-partition period the political ethos in the Muslim majority provinces was rather different from that prevailing in Hindu majority provinces. While in the Hindu majority provinces the Congress party won clear majorities and was able to form single party governments, in Muslim majority provinces, with the exception of the N.W.F.P., no party was able to gain a clear majority and thus coalition governments were constituted of very diverse groups. This resulted in instability of governments due to the shifting of loyalties of its members. As one Western observer points out:

In the governments of the Muslim-majority provinces on the other hand, there was no internal cohesion and no sure leadership. Political opportunism, indiscipline, nepotism and desire for self-advancement were more conspicuous among politicians than ideology or political principle. For the sake of office, some Muslim politicians

1 Mohammed Ayooob, "The Military in Pakistan's Political Development: Its Growing Strength and Implications", in S.P. Verma and Virendra Narain, eds., Pakistan: Political System in Crisis (Jaipur, 1972), p. 16.


were ready to ally themselves sometimes with the Muslim League, sometimes with Congress, and sometimes with the British official members and the Europeans. Thereby they became habituated to a mode of conduct that was ultimately ruinous to Pakistan's democracy. 2

For Jinnah this state of affairs was very agonizing. Fazlul Haq frequently shifted his loyalties, Suhrawardy united with Hindu Bengali leaders with the objective of having a united and independent Bengal and Tiwana openly defied the party High Command. The state of affairs from the League High Command's point of view was so bad that Jinnah was forced to say: "We have traitors among Muslims. We have no job to offer them. We have no money to purchase them."³

Thus the Muslim politicians got their political training in an atmosphere of political opportunism and no healthy respect for party discipline was found in their outlook. These dangerous practices of the pre-partition period were continued in the new state of Pakistan. The situation was very different in the Hindu majority provinces where the Congress Majority governments successfully operated and party discipline was strictly maintained. This is one of the reasons why India could successfully operate parliamentary democracy while in Pakistan the democratic experiment remained ineffective for a long period.

2 K.J. Newman, "Pakistan: Preventive Autocracy and Its Causes", Pacific Affairs (New York), vol. XXXII, no. 1, March 1959, pp. 18-33.

3 Dawn (Karachi), 2 May 1944.



(iii) Absence of Clearly Defined Policies

In such an atmosphere of bitter infighting any discussion on the nature of the new state and of programmes and policies was avoided in order to help the unity of the party. As late as 1944 in a speech at a public meeting in Bombay Jinnah said:

We shall have time to quarrel among ourselves, we shall have time when these differences will have to be settled, when the wrongs and injuries will have to be remedied. We shall have time for domestic programmes and policies but first get the government. 4

Thus the discussion of these matters of vital importance was pushed to the background.

II. Post Independence Situation

Such an approach to this problem was, however, not conducive to its solution in the long run. Soon after independence these centrifugal forces began to assert themselves.

(1) Lack of Consensus on Issues of Fundamental Importance

As the objective of achieving independence which worked as a uniting force for divergent and conflicting interests was achieved, the differences which had so far been pushed to the background began to come to the surface. The lack of consensus on issues of fundamental political and constitutional

4 Jamil Uddin Ahmed, ed., Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr Jinnah (Lahore, 1947), vol. II, p. 398.

importance led to confusion in the political system. As one observer puts it:

The second principal legacy of the first years of independence was a fundamental disagreement about the organization and purpose of the Pakistani state. Cabinets changed rapidly rarely lasting for more than two years, party loyalties were transient and party discipline in the legislature almost non-existent. Without confident leadership and disciplined support, no national government could clearly define the alternatives and push forward on constitutional issues. The four great conflicts of the period - the role of Islam in the state, the system of electoral procedures, the nature of executive branch of the government and the federal structure - were truly fundamental questions. 5

(ii) Ineffectiveness of Politicians and the Resultant Supremacy of Bureaucracy

One important feature of Pakistani politics since the creation of Pakistan, except for a brief spell of time during the leadership of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali, had been the supremacy of bureaucracy and the relative weakness of representative institutions.

From the time of independence till Ayub's seizure of power political leadership in Pakistan had been weak and ineffective, except for the period when Jinnah and Liaquat Ali were alive. This ineffectiveness of political leadership had

5 Wayne Wilcox, "Political Changes in Pakistan: Structures, Functions, Constraints and Goals", Pacific Affairs (New York), vol. 41, no. 3, 1968-69, pp. 341-54.

led to the concentration of decision-making power in the hands of bureaucrats giving rise to further strains in the system.

Earlier in this chapter we have discussed that the Muslim League had a very poor organization in the pre-independence India and the provinces where it was relatively better organized were the Muslim minority provinces of U.P. and Bombay. The nucleus of the High Command was also drawn from these provinces. After the partition of the subcontinent the leaders from these provinces migrated to West Pakistan and found themselves without any social and political base in their new surroundings. This feeling of lack of mass support among the politicians gave rise ^{in them} to a fear of facing the people. They, therefore, tried to perpetuate themselves in power and avoid elections.

Besides this factor, the period and mode of election of Pakistan's first Constituent-cum-National Assembly was also responsible for the ineffectiveness of politicians and their virtual absence from the decision-making process. Pakistan's first Constituent-cum-National Assembly was elected in 1946 and was only indirectly representative. The directly representative provincial legislatures which elected the National Assembly were themselves elected on the basis of a very restricted franchise. The task of the Constituent Assembly was to frame a constitution and then dissolve itself. However, it delayed the framing of the Constitution to maintain its own existence. Members of the Assembly were very ^{much} afraid of facing

the electorate as they were fully aware of the fact that they had no mass base.

Until Liaquat Ali Khan was present on the political scene the bureaucracy could not openly assert its supremacy but after his assassination in 1951, when men of lesser calibre and little mass popularity were to assume high offices, the bureaucratic-military alliance found the time ripe to intervene openly. According to one source:

At least as long as Liaquat Ali Khan lived, Punjab's dominance in the political life of Pakistan was not so evident. Neither was the ascendancy of the military-bureaucratic clique, who preferred to work behind the scenes and bide their time. 6

The bureaucracy had enjoyed almost absolute powers in the decision-making process because the political leadership had been weak and ineffective. The tradition of the supremacy of executive over representative institutions was established by Jinnah himself. Jinnah's experience with the politicians during the pre-partition period had given rise to a certain distrust of the politicians in his attitude. One scholar puts it in the following words:

The very fact that Jinnah decided to become the Governor General rather than the Prime Minister of Pakistan invested that office with a certain degree of effective political power not present in the Westminster model. This was especially evident in the Governor-General's relation with "his" cabinet.

6 Mohammed Ayoub and K. Subrahmanyam, The Liberation War (Delhi, 1972), p. 9.

Moreover, Jinnah encouraged the top civil servants, i.e. secretaries of the various departments at the Centre and the provincial Chief Secretaries, to communicate with him directly on issues of vital interest over the heads of the political executive both in the Centre and in the provinces. 7

During the period of Liaquat Ali this trend was to some extent contained but after his assassination in 1951 power passed more overtly in the hands of the clique of top bureaucrats and a few bureaucrats turned politicians. The way Ghulam Mohammed (a bureaucrat turned politician) dismissed the ministry of Nazimuddin demonstrated the weakness of popular institutions and the dominant position of the bureaucracy.

III. The Coup of 1958

General elections which had been postponed a number of times were finally due in 1959, politicians had started making sweeping promises and mobilizing the population. Once the population was mobilized and made conscious of its power it could pose a threat to the power of the ruling military - bureaucratic elite. The bureaucracy and army were both interested in avoiding elections. For this purpose it was necessary to present a clean break from the past. The military bureaucratic complex, which had been so far exercising

7 Mohammed Ayoob, "Background and Development" in Mohammed Ayoob and others, Bangladesh: A Struggle for Nationhood (Delhi, 1971), pp. 3-4.

its power behind the facade of parliamentary democracy decided to take overt control of the situation. This was the immediate reason which led to General Ayub's coup d'etat of 1958. Although to the common man this coup appeared to be a break with the past, in actual terms it brought about no fundamental change in the power structure. In fact it formalized the power structure that already existed on the eve of the ⁸ coup.

IV. Ayub's Coming to Power

In his first broadcast to the nation as the Chief Martial Law Administrator Ayub said:

The abrogation of the Constitution and the imposition of Martial Law throughout Pakistan is a drastic and extreme step taken with great reluctance but with the fullest conviction that there was no alternative to it except the disintegration and complete ruination of the country. History would never have forgiven us if the present chaotic conditions were allowed to go any further. ⁹

Ayub Khan tried to convince his countrymen and the outside world that the previous governments were responsible for leading the country into the prevailing chaos and that he had to seize power to save Pakistan from the brink of disaster.

8 Ibid., p. 5.

9 Mohammed Ayub Khan, Broadcast to the Nation from Radio Pakistan Karachi on 8 October 1958; reprinted in The President Speaks, Extracts from speeches made by General Mohammed Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, p. 1.

Explaining his objective in seizing power Ayub Khan wrote in his autobiography:

My ambition was not to prove to the world how well I could run the show: My anxiety was to establish conditions and set up institutions to prove how well the country could run itself. The vital thing was to help people identify themselves with the objectives of the revolution so that the things should move on their own momentum. 10

As a first step towards the projection of this "saviour" image Ayub took over the task of clearing the corruption that was rampant in every sphere of political, social and administrative activity. Political parties were banned and politicians prohibited from taking part in politics for a period of six years. Moreover, an Anti-Corruption Department was set up to investigate cases of corruption against former political leaders and administrators. According to the report of Director General of the Anti-Corruption Department there were cases of misconduct against 150 former ministers, deputy ministers and parliamentary secretaries and 600 members of the former provincial assemblies.¹¹

In an effort to clear the administration, screening committees were set up and anti-corruption councils were established. Cases of corruption and malpractices were reported against 997 officials, including 250 gazetted officers.

10 Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters (London, 1967), p. 80.

11 The Pakistan Observer (Dacca), 11 August 1959.

526 officers were removed from service or forced to retire while less drastic measures were taken against the rest.¹²

These vital steps raised new hopes in the people who had been victims of a corrupt political and administrative order for a long time. But disillusionment awaited them because Ayub Khan could not force the realization of the objectives he had set before him. After having captured power and experienced its functioning, Ayub found his initial enthusiasm misplaced. He came to have a different understanding of the equation of forces and discovered that the more important need for Pakistan was not so much the eradication of corruption from public life, but the provision for incentives to the entrepreneurs to ensure the economic development of the country. The confidence of the bureaucracy had to be restored as it was the only element of permanence and stability while everything else was in chaos. This situation has been well explained in the words of a well known journalist:

The fear of dire punishment lasted for a year or so but President Ayub Khan and his advisers soon recognized that Pakistan had to give direct priority to the creation of an entrepreneurial class and not the fight against malpractices. The overzealous colonels were soon sent back to the barracks and power was restored to the bureaucrats. 13

12 Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era (New York, 1971), p. 12.

13 Girilal Jain, "Turmoil in Pakistan: Crisis of Confidence in the System", Times of India (New Delhi), 29 January 1969.

The hopes of the masses to have a clean and fair administration were thus shattered and this came as an initial blow to the "saviour" image of the Field Marshal.

⊕ Attempts at Building Mass Support

Throughout the martial law period Ayub Khan kept on assuring the people that democracy would be restored to the country as early as possible. In his very first address to the nation he said:

Let me announce in unequivocal terms that our ultimate aim is to restore Democracy but of the type that people can understand or work. When the time comes your opinion will be freely asked. But when that will be, events alone can tell. Meanwhile, we have to put this mess right and put the country on an even keel. 14

But the restoration of democracy implied that the regime could no longer perpetuate itself in power by using coercive measures alone. The task of building mass support became indispensable for the government. This situation posed more of a challenge for Ayub Khan as his regime was devoid of any roots in the masses. Ayub tried to build mass support for his regime through three methods, viz., basic democracies, the Muslim League Party and the administrative machinery.

(1) Basic Democracies

The scheme of basic democracies was an attempt on the part of Ayub to give his authoritarian regime a semblance of

democracy and to build popular support for his regime at grass-roots level. He decided to bypass the politically conscious urban intelligentsia and establish direct communication with the rural elite. The scheme was devised to give the rural population a sense of participation in the adventure of national reconstruction and gain their support in this manner.

Basic democracies were a five tier structure at the base of which were union councils in the villages and towns in the urban areas. These primary bodies were to be directly elected on the basis of universal adult franchise with one Basic Democrat representing from 800 to 1,500 people. There were 80,000 Basic Democrats, half representing West Pakistani constituencies and the other half from East Pakistani constituencies. Under the 1962 Constitution, these 80,000 Basic Democrats were to form the electoral college for the election of the President, the National Assembly as well as the Provincial Assemblies.

Union councils elected chairmen from their own body who automatically became the representative members of the next stage, the thana or the tehsil council. The thana or tehsil councils consisted of chairmen of Union Councils plus some nominated members whose number could not exceed the total number of elected members. The nominated members could be government officers and others. The next stage of the pyramid were the district councils and the divisional councils respectively. The membership at both these stages was half elected

and half official. The presidents of District and Divisional councils were District Magistrates and Divisional Commissioners respectively. From the District council level upwards the powers of the representative members tended to diminish and the powers of the official and nominated members tended to increase. Finally there were two Provincial Development Advisory Councils, one in each province with provincial governors as chairmen. This council consisted of official and non-official members appointed by the president on the recommendation of the Provincial Governors. Each Provincial Council had 48 members. They were set up for the first time in May 1960.

The idea behind providing a multi-tier structure might have been that in that structure dissent could be channellized at relatively lower levels of the political system and political conflicts were localized. In addition to this the localized type of politics would prevent the emergence of any political leadership of national stature, thus minimising the chances of alternate leadership and contributing to the stability of the regime.

In the urban areas also the regime ignored the groups and classes that had traditionally been politically mobilized and articulate. It tended to recruit the support of a new class of businessmen which had been the main beneficiaries of the regime.

The system worked reasonably well for some time but the

election results of the 1965 presidential elections demonstrated two things clearly. First, that the urban segment of the country's population was disenchanted with the Ayub regime as was evident from Ayub's poor showing in the two most important cities of Karachi and Dacca. The second trend that became evident was that the regime had failed in building an adequate support-structure for itself in East Pakistan where Ayub won by a narrow margin over Miss Jinnah.

(a) Urban Discontent

The urban population had felt alienated under the new political order for various reasons, both economic and political. The system had alienated those interest groups which had so far been politically active, namely, the intelligentsia, the students and the salaried workers. The urban intelligentsia which believed in direct elections and universal adult franchise became contemptuous of Ayub's system of basic democracy. In the new system no account was taken of the wishes and aspirations of the urban middle classes which had increased in strength substantially due to rapid industrialization, technological advancement and spread of education, particularly in West Pakistan. Moreover, in real terms, the income of the urban salaried worker - both white collar and blue collar - was reduced during this period. A Bangladeshi scholar summed the position in the following words:

Thus, by disfranchising the urban areas, the Basic Democracies alienated the previously mobilized and semimobilized groups, and the

groups it enfranchised were neither mobilized nor large enough to counteract this urban dissatisfaction. And, finally, by monopolizing electoral rights the Basic Democracies system became the most visible target for the discontent of all alienated groups, who looked upon it as the mechanism by which the regime perpetuated itself. Ultimately, therefore, the Basic Democracies not only failed to legitimize the regime but in fact lost their own legitimacy. 15

(b) The Rural Scene

The scheme of Basic Democracies was particularly designed to suit the genius of illiterate and politically unsophisticated masses. The urban population was historically more politically conscious and literate. It was the villager therefore, who needed a simplified version of democracy "to suit his genius". Not only training in political sophistication but also the economic uplift of rural masses was aimed at through Basic Democracies. Rural development programmes were introduced to improve the condition of the villages and to create employment opportunities for poor farmers and landless labourers in that part of the year when they were without any work. Co-operative societies were established which gave loans at easy interests so that poor farmers could be freed from the clutches of money-lenders.

The biggest limitation of the scheme of basic democracies which rendered it ineffective as an agent of socio-

15 Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (New York, 1972), p. 126.

economic change was the class character of the Basic Democrats. They were drawn from those sections of society whose interest lay not in change but in the maintenance of the status quo. When developmental tasks were entrusted to those people, any effort for change was destined to be rendered futile.

The Basic Democrats were the landlords of West Pakistan and the surplus farmers of East Bengal. Studies of the social class-background of the basic democrats reveal that they were the economic elite of rural Pakistan. Rehman Sobhan, in his study of Basic Democracies in East Bengal, found that an overwhelming majority of them belonged to the economically privileged class of surplus farmers.

Rehman Sobhan, while tracing the class character of Basic Democrats, revealed that they were essentially members of the more prosperous class. He found that while only 10 per cent of East Pakistani farmers owned more than 7.5 acres, 63.2 per cent of the Basic Democrats owned as much or more land. Indeed, 42.8 per cent of them owned more than 12.5 acres while only 3 per cent of the farmers owned as much as this.¹⁶

The economic superiority of owning more lands is further supported by higher incomes. Highlighting this aspect

16 Rehman Sobhan, "Social Forces in the Basic Democracies", South Asian Review (London), vol. 1, no. 3, April 1968, pp. 166-76.

Bobhan further wrote:

This is confirmed by the figures of income distribution. Only 10 per cent of the families in East Pakistan as a whole have been classified as having income Rs.3000/- but 66.4 per cent of the Basic Democrats elected in 1964-65 elections had incomes above that level. 17

Ayub's idea might have been that as these people had a high socio-economic status in the village community (due to their economic superiority), they were in a position to influence public opinion. They were, therefore, entrusted with the task of building support structure for the Ayub regime at grass-root level.

One scholar commenting on this motive of Ayub Khan wrote:

Apparently the assessment made was that the traditional structure of society coupled with the rural population's economic dependence on these strata of society made them the obvious opinion moulders and opinion leaders in the Pakistani countryside. It was, therefore, further assumed that by mobilizing support from these traditionally privileged sections of rural society the regime could entrench itself for a longer time to come. 18

But the Basic Democrats largely failed to recruit support from the rural population. On the contrary, by misusing political power to serve personal ends, they alienated

17 Ibid.

18 Mohammed Ayub, "Pakistan's Political Development, 1947-1971: Bird's Eye View", Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay), vol. VII, nos. 3, 4 and 5, Annual Number January 1971, pp. 199-204.

the poorer sections of the population (which constituted the majority) from the regime.

Ayub in his economic programme gave much priority to the betterment of the condition of the rural poor. He poured large sums of money in the rural sector in the form of development funds and cooperative movements. The idea behind the introduction of rural development programmes was to improve the conditions of the villages and provide employment for poor villagers in that part of the year when they were practically without any work. The development funds were to be distributed through Basic Democrats who started using them to serve their own personal ends. They could now decide whom to give employment. To the poor villagers this meant all the difference between food and starvation. This control over economic resources further reinforced their already existing power. They used this power to keep the villagers under their control and to suppress them.

Another important step towards improving the condition of villagers was the establishment of cooperative societies. The poor peasantry had perpetually been in the clutches of money lenders. The government through cooperative societies arranged for loans at low rates of interest (7 per cent). But the implementation of this programme through Basic Democrats proved to be self-defeating as the money lenders were no other people but landlords and surplus farmers themselves. Allowing the villagers to get money from cooperative societies was

against the interests of these people. They, therefore, used their influence to obtain money from these societies at the rate of 7 per cent and relend it to the villagers at as high interest rates as 70 per cent.

Thus, very little of the benefits of these socio-economic programmes could percolate down to the people for whose welfare they were intended. In fact, the scheme of Basic Democracies only provided new opportunities for the traditional exploiters. This did not contribute except negatively to the image of the regime among the village population. Ayub's attempt to build popular support at grass-roots level through basic democracies thus failed in both the rural and urban areas.

(ii) The Muslim League

Another vehicle through which Ayub Khan tried to build support for his regime was the Muslim League. The League had been the party in power ever since the creation of Pakistan but it had not succeeded in developing any real popular base for itself. In East Pakistan it had lost almost all support. In the elections held in March 1954 only nine members of the Muslim League were returned to the Provincial Assembly in which there were 237 Muslim seats. A united front of the Awami League and the Krishak Praja Party won 224 seats.

Ayub Khan, after taking over the reins of the party, made no efforts to organize it. Having seized power with the

backing of the Army, Ayub Khan did not derive his authority from the support of the League. He, therefore, instead of being directed by the party made the party follow him. The League was not the party "in power" but the party "behind power".

Sure of the support of the army and bureaucracy and confident about the outcome of his newly devised scheme of Basic Democracies, Ayub did not depend upon the party even on the eve of elections. He fought the elections with the help of the government machinery. He issued his own manifesto which the party later adopted. It is interesting to note that in his election manifesto the Muslim League did not figure even once. In fact, the adoption of the Muslim League by Ayub Khan was the result of an after thought. When political activity and party politics was permitted after the introduction of the 1962 Constitution, Ayub Khan felt that it may not be a bad idea to adopt the Muslim League as "his" party and thus acquire a further degree of legitimacy for his regime since in popular minds the Muslim League was still somehow linked with the creation of Pakistan.

The membership of the party was such as rendered it incapable of exercising any effective check over government actions. It was a party constituted mostly of the supporters of the government, the people who derived benefits from the existing system. Their interests lay, therefore, not in criticizing and controlling the government but in following it

blindly.

What then, was the utility of the party for Ayub Khan if he did not depend upon it for support? He used the platform of the party to project his image and build popular support for his regime in this manner. An Indian scholar discussing Ayub's equation with the League writes:

President Ayub viewed the function of political parties as all authoritarian leaders have done - as an instrument of public relations for a government the source of whose authority lies outside the party system. The way he created the Muslim League of his own in Pakistan was symptomatic of his approach to the role of a political party. 19

Though the League had overwhelming majorities in the national and provincial assemblies, this was no true index of its popularity. The members, like their leader, fought their elections on personal basis and not on the strength of the party machinery. This policy of domination of the League by the President was responsible for the people's loss of faith in the party. A Pakistani scholar commenting on this situation wrote:

What the people at large feel is that if they chose to support the President they could do so without the intermediary of the Convention Muslim League. The position of the President is so strong that

19 Bisir Gupta, "From the Partition to Yahya Khan: A Political Survey", in Pran Chopra, ed., The Challenge of Bangla Desh: A Special Debate (Delhi, 1971), p. 33.

he can get votes anyhow, he bestows prestige on a political party and not vice versa. 20

The force of Ayub's powerful personality thus dominated the League. The party became overshadowed by the President's personality and failed to evolve an independent character of its own. This policy of total subservience of the ruling party to the President's authority had disastrous consequences for the regime. Devoid of any roots in the masses, the League proved to be a poor asset for the government in the hour of need. It was so closely identified with Ayub Khan that in place of sustaining his regime through the crisis it itself went down with it. Had some efforts been made to reorganize the League on a popular basis and had it tried to evolve some constructive programme instead of blindly following the President and projecting his personality, the fate of the Ayub regime might have been different.

(iii) The Bureaucracy

Another vehicle through which President Ayub Khan tried to build support for his regime was the permanent bureaucracy. Ever since the creation of Pakistan bureaucracy had been in a commanding position. The Mirza-Ayub coup of 1958 did not bring about any fundamental change in the power structure, as the traditionally powerful groups still continued

to rule the roost. After his initial zeal to cleanse the administration of corruption, Ayub soon found his enthusiasm misplaced. He realized that the immediate need of the country was rapid economic progress for which political stability was a necessary pre-condition and bureaucracy was the only element of permanence in the whole political structure. The dependence on bureaucracy was thus inevitable. The power of bureaucracy was therefore reinforced in the new system.

Under Ayub's new scheme of Basic Democracies politics as a nation-wide process came to a halt and political participation was restricted to the local levels. Moreover, Ayub's initial resentment against politicians and political parties prevented him from building a support-structure in the usual manner through the agency of a political party. He, therefore, entrusted the bureaucracy with the task of building a support structure for himself. He did it in several ways. First, he associated some ex-bureaucrats with his regime by appointing them ministers in his government. A look at the list of the cabinet ministers during his regime reveals that most of them were ex-bureaucrats. The following table shows the ex-bureaucrats who held cabinet positions during Ayub's regime.

Name of the Minister	Cadre	Portfolio held
Mohammed Shoab	Indian State Railway Service	Finance

F.M. Khan	Indian State Railway Service	Railway and Communication including Shipping
Habibur Rehman	C.S.P.	Education
Mohammed Hafizur Rehman	C.S.P.	Commerce
Akhtar Husain	C.S.P.	Information Minister including Broadcasting, National Reconstruction and Kashmir Affairs
Zakir Husain	I.P.S.	Interior
Gulam Farooque	I.P.S.	Minister of Commerce
Anwarul Haq	I.P.S.	Education and Health Labour and Social Welfare
Abdul Quadir	I.P.S.	Finance

21

Even outside the Cabinet, Ayub's closest advisers were the officials of the civil service. They were the members of the innermost circle and determined the policies of the government. Even during the Martial Law period President Ayub Khan appointed a senior civil servant (Aziz Ahmed) and not any army officer as Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator. Another important personality who wielded much influence upon the President was Altaf Gauhar, another civil servant, who was his Information Secretary. There were others besides him who

21 C.P. Shambri and Bhaskaran Nair, "Bureaucracy in Authoritarian Political Systems: The Case of Pakistan", in J.P. Verma and V. Narain, eds., Pakistan: Political System in Crisis (Jaipur, 1972), p. 89.

advised the President and whose opinions counted. They included Fida Hasan, Qudratullah Shahab, Arshad Husain, and a few others. All these personalities wielded much influence on the political decision-making in Pakistan as the President depended too heavily on their advice on all matters.

In another attempt to build support through bureaucracy Ayub placed the bureaucrats in commanding positions in the scheme of Basic Democracies, as the government officials were the ex-officio presidents of the Councils at various levels. As the level of the council rose the number and powers of the elected representatives tended to decrease and those of nominated members (officials mostly) tended to increase.

All these measures however, failed to build a popular base for Ayub Khan in Pakistan. On the contrary, they only helped to alienate the common man and make him critical of the regime. The reasons for this are not heard to discern. During the pre-Ayub period, that is from 1947 to October 1958, though the bureaucracy was the actual source of power, it was hidden behind the facade of parliamentary democracy. The politicians, therefore, were held responsible for every failure and they were thoroughly discredited. But during the Ayub Khan era, since the politicians were completely removed from the political scene, Ayub's open reliance upon the bureaucracy made it responsible in public opinion for all that was wrong in the Ayub government. This fact was responsible for the popular resentment against the bureaucracy. According

to one author, the Ayub regime:

removed the politicians from the legislative wing and the cabinet and so even from the arena of symbolic governance which they had held so far. While in theory this made the bureaucracy even less accountable to popular opinion, in practice it aided the process of political development in Pakistan. With the removal of the parliamentary facade the political shock absorber was gone. The regime's bureaucratic-military character was now naked to the public view. Therefore, criticism for malfunctioning could be directed at the real source of power. Along with the significant growth of the middle class during the 1960's, this critical assessment of the regime's performance was responsible for the disenchantment with the regime which attained the proportion of a Mass Movement in 1968-69. 22

Elections

The 1965 election was another factor that contributed to the unpopularity of Ayub regime. It brought to the forefront the political forces that had been pushed to the background since the imposition of Martial Law in 1958. With the lifting of the ban on political parties and the prospect of elections many political parties came into the field. We have already discussed how the Ayub regime had failed to build any popular support for itself. In the absence of any popular base for the ruling party the opposition parties could hope for a good future.

The presidential election was preceded in November 1964 by the election of 80,000 Basic Democrats who were to form the electoral college for the elections of president as well as National and Provincial Assemblies. The opposition parties joined to present a united front and chose Miss Fatima Jinnah as their candidate.

The election results made it clear that Ayub Khan did not enjoy substantial support in the urban areas and that his popularity in East Pakistan, even among Basic Democrats, who were his creatures, was marginal.

East-West Equation

	Ayub		Miss Jinnah	
	No. of votes cast	Percentage of votes cast	No. of votes cast	Percentage of votes cast
Pakistan	49951	63.31	28691	36.36
East Pakistan	21012	53.12	18434	46.60
West Pakistan	28939	73.56	10257	26.07

It is evident from the table that while Ayub Khan received an overwhelming majority of votes in West Pakistan (73.56%), in East Pakistan he won only by a narrow margin (53.12%).

23 Pakistan Election Commission, Report on General Election in Pakistan, 1964-65, vol. 1 (Lahore), p. 68.

Another trend showing the rural-urban dimension of the election is evident from the following table. Miss Jinnah got clear majorities in the following cities of East Pakistan.

	Miss Jinnah		Ayub Khan	
	No. of votes	% of votes	No. of votes	% of votes
Dacca	2193	55.33	1764	44.51
Comilla	1874	54.76	1536	44.88
Noakhali	1174	63.05	682	36.62
Sylhet	1551	57.40	1142	42.26

24

In West Pakistan, Karachi was the only city that gave its verdict against Ayub Khan. The results were as follows:

	Miss Jinnah		Ayub Khan	
	No. of votes	% of votes	No. of votes	% of votes
Karachi	1049	55.50	837	44.28

25

Karachi however had to suffer for its unfavourable election verdict. The procession that Gouhar took out in Karachi to celebrate his father's victory led to severe

24 Ibid., from map no. 1

25 Ibid., from map no. 2

between pp. 118 and 119

clashes in the city in which several lives were lost and property destroyed. The situation worsened so much that the Army had to be alerted to restore peace. An enquiry commission was later set up to enquire into the matter, but nothing tangible came out of it. This episode gave rise to deep seated anger against Ayub in the population of Karachi that eventually manifested itself in the anti-Ayub agitation of 1968-69.

As the elections were indirect there was much room for manipulation. The electoral college consisted of only 80,000 basic democrats whose interests were better served under Ayub's system. In fact they owed their very existence in politics to this system. It was unwise to expect them to commit political suicide by voting against the system. Moreover, political pressure was also used and the state machinery was used for election purposes.

After the elections the politically conscious strata of the society felt that they had been cheated and it became clear in the public mind that it was impossible to have fair elections under the system devised by Ayub. The devices used by the regime during the elections were responsible for the urban population's loss of faith in the system, and "some of the government workers conceded that they had won the elections but lost the people."²⁶

26 Fazla Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or Peoples Power? (New Delhi, 1971), p. 16.

Indo-Pakistan War of 1965

One very important factor which contributed to Ayub Khan's unpopularity and led to his eventual ouster from office was the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war and the Tashkent Declaration that followed it.

India and Pakistan had been at odds since independence over the Kashmir question. In both the countries the Kashmir question involved, apart from rational political considerations, considerable popular emotion. In West Pakistan especially, the people were very sensitive about the Kashmir question.

During the election campaign of 1965 the Kashmir issue was given much publicity by both the government and the opposition parties. A few days before the presidential election, Bhutto, Ayub's foreign minister at that time, had announced that steps will be taken for the solution of the Kashmir problem. The future of Kashmir must have been one of the considerations which led Pakistanis (West Pakistanis in particular, as Kashmir was not a sensitive question in East Pakistan) to vote overwhelmingly in favour of Ayub. Ayub's supporters were giving publicity to the idea that he must be returned to the office of the President if Kashmir was to be liberated, as Miss Jinnah being a woman might prove unequal to the task. Ayub's army background left him in a position to deal with this question more skilfully than anyone else.

Tashkent Declaration

Throughout the war the government had tried to convince the people through massive propaganda that the Pakistan army was winning. Therefore, when the ceasefire was accepted it gave rise to discontent among the masses who had come to believe through government propaganda that Pakistani forces would "liberate" Kashmir and "teach India a lesson". This anger was directed against Ayub whom the people considered responsible for accepting the ceasefire.

The Tashkent agreement aggravated the discontent very much. Large segments of people, especially in West Pakistan, considered it against the interest of their country. As they were made to believe that Pakistan was on the winning side at the time of ceasefire, they felt that Ayub should have used this situation to Pakistan's advantage at the negotiating table.

Moreover, it was difficult for them to digest the Tashkent Declaration because they were fed upon a policy of constant confrontation with India. They felt that by accepting the Tashkent agreement, Ayub had accepted Indian terms and had "sold out" the future of Kashmiris.

The government spokesmen, without regard for the sentiments of the people, started to glorify the Tashkent Declaration. This act had further adverse effects on the people. In the words of a well known Pakistani journalist (and now Pakistan's Information Secretary):

President Ayub was right in accepting military disengagement. But his official spokesmen and political lieutenants put about that the Tashkent accord was in fact the "sesame" from which the solution of Kashmir dispute would soon emerge. This was a certain recipe for further disillusionment not only among the masses but also in the armed forces who fought valiantly to defend Pakistan against a well-equipped enemy four times their size. 27

Crisis of Succession

Yet another factor contributing to the downfall of Ayub regime, though it came much later, was Ayub's illness in early 1968 and the resultant crisis of succession. During his tenure of office Ayub Khan discouraged the emergence of any alternative political leadership. In the scheme of basic democracies the leadership was restricted to the lower levels and no leadership of national standing could emerge. Ayub Khan did not allow any political figure to attain national stature and many of his close associates, Bhutto among them, had to pay the price of their rising popularity. As no institutions were established for an orderly succession, any alternative leadership was absent from the political scene. Thus with Ayub's illness in 1968 a political vacuum was created. The crisis of succession which was thus started did not end with his recovery. In fact, a behind the scene power struggle had been going on which was

accentuated and brought to the forefront by Ayub Khan's illness.

Ayub's illness and all that followed, reflected the incapacity of Ayub Khan to build an adequate institutional base for his regime. His system was highly personalized. Therefore Ayub's fall as a person had immense repercussions for the regime as such.

EAST BENGAL DISCONTENT

Political Dimension

There were two distinct yet interrelated movements that were responsible for Ayub Khan's ouster from the seat of power. While in West Pakistan the movement was against Ayub Khan and his regime per se, in the eastern wing it was directed against Ayub Khan and his regime which was treated as a vehicle of West Pakistani domination.

While the feeling of being discriminated against in all spheres was present among the politically conscious East Bengali middle class almost from the very inception of Pakistan, until 1958, as long as the facade of parliamentary democracy was maintained, East Pakistan at least had parity of representation in the legislature and therefore, the feeling of political ineffectiveness though present, was not very acute. During the Martial Law period, however, all normal political activity in Pakistan came to a standstill and all

the powers were vested in the central executive. In 1962 when Ayub fulfilled his promise of restoring democracy to the country "but of the type that people could understand and work", the situation from the East Pakistani point of view did not improve. Under the 1962 Constitution a new power structure emerged, with the army, the bureaucracy and the legislature as the three components of the power structure. Of these three, only the military-bureaucratic complex exercised effective political power while the legislative wing was relegated to a position of insignificance. This state of affairs was highly unsatisfactory from the East Pakistani point of view as East Bengal's representation in both the military and the bureaucracy was very poor.

The sense of alienation of the East Bengalis increased because Ayub Khan associated men of his choice with the task of the government. These men did not represent the wishes and aspiration of the East Bengalis. Commenting on the gravity of the situation one East Pakistani scholar wrote:

The return to politics under the new Constitution was no less frustrating for East Pakistan. The emasculated legislatures remained irrelevant to the decision-making process. The provincial Governor was appointed by the President and in turn appointed his cabinet, thereby making the provincial governments creatures of the President. The pocket franchise sustained by lavish patronage to the Basic Democrats, made it difficult to use the election process

to express East Pakistan's sense of alienation. 28

The concentration of the decision-making powers in the hands of the military bureaucratic complex had adverse implications for East Pakistan as it was poorly represented in both these services. Even as late as 1968 the share of East Pakistan in the CSP - the elite cadre of civil servants - was only 36 per cent. The situation was no better in other services like taxation, audit and accounts, police, customs, etc.²⁹ In the higher echelons of bureaucracy the situation was even worse. Not more than half a dozen East Pakistanis could attain the rank of secretaries to the central government. And in the key ministries of Home, Finance and Defence no East Pakistani could attain the rank of secretary. It is also interesting to note that in the crucial Ministry of Finance, out of the six finance ministers of Pakistan (from 1947 to 1969) five³⁰ have been bureaucrats and all the six West Pakistanis.

The situation was similar in the top cadres of military. At the end of the Ayub decade East Pakistan's representation in the armed forces was less than 10 per cent.³¹ According to

28 Rehman Sobhan, "East Pakistan's Revolt Against Ayub", Round Table (London), no. 235, June 1969.

29 Information given by Khwaja Ishaquddin, Minister of Information and Broadcasting in the National Assembly of Pakistan, National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, vol. 1, no. 32, 18 June 1968, col. 2395.

30 Sobhan, n. 28.

31 Sisir Gupta, n. 19, p. 33.

the figures available in 1963, in the Navy the share of East Pakistan at the officers level was 19 per cent in the technical cadre and 9 per cent in the non-technical cadre. In naval ranks as a whole the proportion was around 28.5 per cent.³²

Among Air Force officers the East Pakistanis constituted 11 per cent of pilots, 27 per cent of navigators, 17 per cent of technical officers, 31 per cent of administrative officers and 13 per cent of education officers.³³

Indo-Pakistan War

The 1965 Indo-Pakistan war proved to be a turning point in Ayub's fortunes in more senses than one. Besides affecting the economy very adversely, it also added new dimensions to the East Pakistani discontent.

During the war East Pakistan was left almost completely unprotected. There was only one division of the army in East Pakistan while all the military might of Pakistan was concentrated on the western border. Foreign Minister Bhutto's pronouncement that China had promised to defend East Pakistan in case India attacked it, only added insult to injury.³⁴ The Bengalis were not emotionally involved in the Kashmir issue. This situation gave rise to deep seated anger in them as they

32 National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, vol. 1, no. 1, 8 March 1963, pp. 29-31.

33 Ibid.

34 Z.A. Bhutto, ^{quoted in} Ibid. n. 6, p. 65.

felt that the regime had sacrificed their security for the sake of far away Kashmir.

Moreover, during the 17 days of war all the inter-wing traffic and foreign trade came to a halt. East Pakistan, therefore, had to depend on its very meager resources. The feeling that East Pakistan was kept undeveloped while the national resources were pooled for the development of the western wing became even ^{more} very acute.

The Economic Dimension

In the economic sphere also East Pakistan was being highly discriminated against. In fact it was being run as a colony of the western wing. This fact will be evident from the following figures. Regarding the disparities in per capita income the gap widened during Ayub Khan's tenure of office. According to a report of the Pakistan Planning Commission, while in 1959-60 West Pakistan's per capita income was 32 per cent higher than that of East Pakistan, by 1969-70 it was 61 per cent higher.³⁵ The gap doubled in percentage terms. In absolute terms this increase was even greater.

According to the study made by a group of scholars in Vienna, West Pakistan's per capita income which was Rs.335/- in 1960 rose to Rs.492/- in 1970. During the same period in

35 Government of Pakistan Planning Commission, Reports of the Advisory Panels for Fourth Five Year Plan 1970-75, vol. I, July 1970, p. 2, Table 1.

East Pakistan, there was a meager rise from Rs.239 in 1960 to Rs.308 in 1970. Thus, difference in per capita income which had been Rs.86 in 1960 was more than doubled to Rs.184 in 1970.

According to a study made by M. Akhlaqur Rehman, by 1967-68 the per capita income in East Pakistan was Rs.331 at 1959-60 prices while in West Pakistan per capita income had reached Rs.497.

Exports and Imports

Regarding East Pakistan's contribution in exports and its share in the allocation of foreign exchange resources the figures are as follows: According to the Vienna study, during the period from 1958-1968 West Pakistan exported goods worth £820 millions or 41 per cent of Pakistan's total exports and imported goods worth £2,315 millions or 70 per cent of total imports. East Pakistan on the other hand, exported £1,153 million worth of goods or 59 per cent of total exports but imported only £1,000 million worth of goods that is only 30 per cent of the total imports.

36 a group of scholars in Vienna, "Why Bangla Desh", reprinted in Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, Bangla Desh Documents, vol. 1, p. 21.

37 M. Akhlaqur Rehman, "Role of Public Sector in the Economic Development of Pakistan", in M.A.G. Robinson and Michael Kleron, Economic Development in South Asia (London, 1970), p. 75.

38 Bangla Desh Documents, vol. 1, p. 16.

Allocation of funds

Regarding the allocation of developmental funds, 77 per cent of the funds were allocated ^{to} West Pakistan while only 23 per cent of the funds were allocated ^{to} the Eastern Wing. The foreign exchange allocation ratio was nearly 80-20. 66 per cent of the American aid was allocated to the Western Wing while only 33 per cent went to East Bengal. Regarding the economic assistance given by other countries only 4 per cent was allocated to East Pakistan and the rest 96 per cent went to the Western Wing.³⁹

Moreover 40 per cent of all West Pakistan's exports was sold in the Eastern Wing during 1968-69. In 1968-69, the Western Wing sold 50 per cent more to the Eastern Wing than it bought from it.⁴⁰

According to the Planning Commission's report cited earlier, planned development expenditure for the Eastern Wing was 36 per cent in the period 1965-66 to 1969-70. But the actual expenditure was even less than the planned expenditure.⁴¹

The above figures are sufficient to reveal that East Pakistan had been constantly exploited. It was the combination of these factors - a sense of political impotence and economic deprivation - that led the East Bengali demand for

39 Ibid., p. 17.

40 Ibid., p. 12.

41 Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission Report, n. 35, p. 6, Table 2.

autonomy to a point of no return. One Western observer analysing the situation wrote:

The Bengalis of East Pakistan feel that they are continually short changed by a power structure in the west. They are resentful at receiving less than their full share of development funds, jobs in the civil service and appointment in the army, and their resentment poses something of a threat to the unity of the country. 42

Discontent over the economic policies of the Ayub regime prevailed not only in East Bengal but in the whole of Pakistan. Though the economic achievements of the Ayub regime were many, yet they were insufficient to satisfy the masses because in the absence of fair distribution of wealth the advantages of the economic development could not percolate to the masses.

In his economic programme Ayub Khan gave priority to the creation of an entrepreneurial class. He encouraged private enterprise and offered various sorts of incentives to the industrialists. Government aid was generously given to the ambitious industrialists and many other incentives like exemption from taxes and share in the foreign exchange earnings were given. These measures resulted in rapid economic progress. During the Ayub regime Pakistan was considered a model for the developing countries with an annual growth rate of around 6 per cent. The economic experiment was so

42 Terence Smith, "Ayub's Pakistan: A One-Man Show", New York Times (City edn.), 26 February 1966.

successful that the New York Times wrote:

Pakistan may be on its way to an economic milestone that so far has been reached by only one other populous country, the United States of America. 43

But this overemphasis on private enterprise resulted in the concentration of wealth in fewer hands. Ayub based his philosophy of development on what Papanek calls "the social utility of greed."⁴⁴ The emphasis remained on production and the process of distribution was neglected. The theory of economic development was thus unrelated to social norms. The extent to which the concentration of wealth had taken place is evident from the information given by Mahbubul Haq, one time Chief Economist of the Planning Division of the Government of Pakistan. He stated in April 1968 that "66 per cent of all industrial projects, 97 per cent of all insurance funds and 80 per cent of all bank deposits were in the hands of some twenty families."⁴⁵

Not only did certain privileged classes monopolize advantages of economic development, completely ignoring other groups and classes, but certain areas were developed at the expense of others. In the words of Burki:

43 New York Times, 18 January 1968.

44 Gustav Papanek, Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives (Cambridge, 1967), p. 226.

45 Pakistan Observer, 2 May 1968.

The economic development of the Ayub era, though impressive on many accounts, was nonetheless the result of unequal distribution of wealth between certain privileged classes and regions. As the income grew, inter-regional and inter-personal income inequalities grew with it. Since the rate of economic growth was far more rapid in West Pakistan than in East Pakistan personal and regional income disparities appeared sharper and more prominent in the former than in the latter. The people and areas bypassed by economic growth grew progressively resentful. Political troubles started to brew whenever these two causes of resentment happened to exist together. That is why the towns of West Pakistan played such an important role in the anti-Ayub movement. 46

1965 War and Its Effect on the Economy

The 1965 Indo-Pakistan war had a crippling effect on the Pakistani economy. The economic consequences of the war proved to be disastrous for Pakistan. American aid was stopped during and after the war. This proved to be a great loss since Pakistan heavily depended upon American aid. Because of the war the defence expenditure was doubled putting further strains on the economy. Moreover, two subsequent years of drought forced Pakistan to buy food from other countries and foreign exchange was required for this purpose. In the industrial sector there was a shortage of raw materials and capital goods for industrialization. An American journalist explaining the situation wrote:

46 Shahid Javed Burki, "Ayub's Fall: A Socio-Economic Explanation", Asian Survey (Berkeley), vol. XII, no. 3, March 1972, pp. 201-12.

Like everything else in Pakistan's life the economy was deeply affected by the 1965 war. Reduced foreign aid, increased military expenditure, two subsequent years of drought cut the agricultural output and further reduced Pakistan's meagre foreign exchange reserves by forcing her to buy food from abroad. 47

The Great Decade

This setback in economy led to an unprecedented increase in prices and people found it difficult to make both ends meet. It was at this time that the celebrations of one decade of Ayub's rule were started in October 1968. The 'Great Decade' campaign was intended to highlight the achievements of Ayub Khan and his regime. A great deal of publicity was given to the economic achievements of the Ayub regime and large sums of money were spent on these celebrations. But all this fanfare had the effect of enraging the people who were suffering under the heavy burden of continually rising prices. The effect of the campaign is very well explained by Feldman who wrote:

Judged by the test of the ultimate fate of Ayub Khan, the Great Decade publicity campaign must be deemed to have failed totally. It did nothing to dispel the adverse image which had taken hold of the public mind, of a man with an appetite for power and the firm intention of retaining it; of a man whose integrity in the conduct of his office had become doubted and whose administration was known to be highly corrupt. The campaign did little to remove the impact of rising prices

and the knowledge that the economic miracle for which Ayub Khan had made so many claims was not quite the miracle that people had been persuaded to believe. 48

Ayub Khan's associates had no idea of the depth of the public discontent. Ayub's image was greatly tarnished by the conduct of his son Gohar Ayub, who had acquired vast fortunes using his father's influence, and by the corruption that was rampant all over his administrative machinery. For the people these celebrations of the decade of development proved to be the proverbial last straw on the camel's back, and it was just after these celebrations had started that the troubles which eventually threw Ayub Khan out of office began.

The combination of these political and socio-economic factors mentioned above gave rise to deep-rooted discontent in both wings of the country. The situation was thus ripe for an agitation. The sudden students uprising in Rawalpindi and Peshawar on 7 November 1968, proved to be fatal for the Ayub regime. It proved to be the catalyst for the release of discontent.

The agitation gathered alarming proportions as new groups joined it. All that was required now was the presence of a popular leader who could give the movement direction and strength. In West Pakistan that leadership was provided by Bhutto who capitalized on this discontent and became the first martyr of the movement as well as its foremost symbol.

48 Herbert Feldman, *From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962-69* (London, 1972), p. 231.

Chapter III

BHUTTO'S ROLE IN AYUB KHAN'S DOWNFALL

Having analysed the circumstances that led to Ayub Khan's downfall and having reviewed the objective conditions that prevailed in Pakistan when the anti-Ayub agitation started, we can now proceed to study Bhutto's contribution to this agitation.

The reasons why Bhutto and Ayub Khan fell out are still not quite clear. Several reasons, however, may be inferred from the course of successive events. The differences between Bhutto and Ayub Khan became acute after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war and the subsequent Tashkent agreement. One possibility is that Bhutto, having always assumed a posture of confrontation towards India, could not afford to tarnish his image by accepting a settlement with India. Hence he decided to dissociate himself from the Tashkent agreement. The second possibility might have been that Bhutto with his shrewd political judgement sensed the unrest that lay beneath the apparently calm surface. He jumped at the opportunity and seizing it with both hands he severed his connections with the regime, came out in direct opposition to Ayub Khan and capitalized upon the public discontent.

Another possible reason may be that Bhutto's rising stature abroad and his immense popularity at home, especially with the younger generation, the students and the intelligentsia, made Ayub Khan apprehensive. He saw in Bhutto a potential rival and therefore, decided to oust him from the government. Besides this, there might have been considerable external

as well as domestic pressures on Ayub Khan to ease out Bhutto. The fact that American aid to Pakistan was resumed soon after Bhutto's removal is of no little significance. Moreover, Bhutto's popularity caused concern to the more seasoned politicians. Men like West Pakistan Governor Amir Mohammed Khan, Commerce Minister Ghulam Farooque and Information Minister Khwaja Shahabuddin might have exerted pressure on Ayub Khan to remove Bhutto.

Ziring traces the origin of Ayub-Bhutto differences. The differences arose as Bhutto's views regarding Tashkent were entirely opposed to Ayub Khan's. Ziring writes: "It appears now that Foreign Minister Bhutto counseled the President against accepting anything less than an agreement for the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir."¹ The same observer further writes:

Ayub gave considerable thought to Bhutto's appraisal of the contingencies and his recommendations but at the last minute decided to disregard his advice. When the President revealed he would sign the Tashkent Declaration drafted by the Soviet Union, Bhutto asked that he be permitted to publicly dissociate himself from it. He also insisted on resigning from the cabinet. The President, however, refused to accept his resignation and ordered him to remain at his post. Depressed and powerless, Bhutto offered no resistance. When the President put his signature to the Tashkent declaration the Foreign Minister is reported to have looked on dejectedly. 2

1 Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era (New York, 1971), p. 66.

2 Ibid. p. 66

Bhutto claims that he offered his resignation at several occasions after Tashkent but the President refused to accept it.³

After Tashkent speculation was rife in the urban population that Ayub and Bhutto had fallen out, Ayub Khan, however, denied this report. In a speech on 29 January 1966 in Rawalpindi:

the President ridiculed all those who predicted that trouble would develop in his administration. Digressing from his speech, he pointed to the rumour citing differences between himself and Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The President acknowledged that it had been circulated by a number of newspapers in the country and he caustically remarked: "how fertile some brains are". His critics interpreted a recent visit to the Governor's home at Kalabagh as a manoeuvre to oust the Foreign Minister. "All these rumours are absolutely untrue. This however shows that we are very good at manufacturing and I do hope that when manufacturing in general expands in our country we will be equally good at that." President Ayub then commented that "such false stories did not good to the country." 4

But only a few months later in June Bhutto offered his resignation and Ayub Khan accepted it. In a press statement Ayub Khan said that Bhutto had gone on leave for medical treatment.⁵ Whether he himself resigned from office or was removed by his master is a controversial point. Commenting on Bhutto's

3 Pilloo Modi, Zulfi - My Friend (Delhi, 1973), p. 92.

4 Ziring, n. 1, p. 84.

5 The Dawn (Karachi), 20 June 1966.

departure from the Foreign Ministry, an Indian newspaper wrote: "There is no denying that his removal too has been mainly due to personal factors cloaked under an ideological cover."⁶

But if the motive behind Bhutto's ouster was to remove a formidable potential rival, later events proved that Ayub Khan had made serious miscalculations. Bhutto had become extremely popular with the students and the intelligentsia. He was considered by the intelligentsia as the formulator of an independent foreign policy for Pakistan which had freed the country from the unproductive Western alliances and secured good relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Moreover, his anti-India rhetoric and his brilliant advocacy of Pakistan's case in the international forums had turned him into the hero of the student community. On top of all these was the general feeling that Bhutto was being ousted because he did not support the Tashkent Agreement and, in the perception of Pakistanis, was not prepared to accept the "sell out" on Kashmir.

After resigning from the office of Foreign Minister when Bhutto returned to his home town in Larkana big crowds of students gathered at various stations on the way to greet him. On 22 June at Lahore station a big crowd consisting mostly of students gathered to greet him. The crowd was

6 Indian Express (New Delhi), 16 July 1966.

"wild with enthusiasm" and Bhutto was carried on shoulders. It took him 40 minutes to reach his car. Slogans were shouted.⁷ In Karachi also he received a big welcome from students. He was greeted with slogans and the crowd was so thick that Bhutto could not move out of his saloon for 25 minutes. He was again carried on shoulders. It was estimated that the crowd that had gathered on the station was nearly 50,000 strong. His immense popularity was reflected in the slogans that the students raised, like "Bhutto Zindabad", and "Bhutto don't go abroad". They showered rose petals on him from the roof of his saloon. Students carried placards with slogans like "Sino-Pak friendship Zindabad", "Karachi students salute Bhutto", "Quit SEATO and CENTO" and "Pakistanis do not want U.S. Aid".⁸

Bhutto remained abroad for less than three months. He came back to Pakistan on 1 October 1966 after a tour of Europe, Iran and Afghanistan. In his public statements till then he did not give any indication of his plans for the future. He just waited and watched the trend of politics. It was not before the early months of 1967 that he started his political career afresh. In February 1967 he began attacking Ayub Khan openly. In a speech made in Karachi on 26 February 1967 he attacked Ayub Khan and accused him of dictatorship. He called on the opposition parties to get

7 The Dawn, 23 June 1966.

8 Ibid., 25 June 1966.

ready for the struggle within one month. In another speech made in Lahore he charged Ayub Khan of running "a dictatorship under the label of democracy". Speaking to the left wing students and lawyers he said that the people of Pakistan no longer wanted one man rule. Even at this time he did not make his intentions public. The Dawn of 27 February 1967 reported him as saying: "I have already taken my decision but I do not want to make it public now." Writing about Bhutto's decision to come out openly in opposition to Ayub, an Indian newspaper wrote:

Shrewd politician that he is, he would not have come out openly against the dictatorship of President Ayub Khan, were it not for the fact that the opposition to the President has noticeably grown. The growth of the movement for the restoration of the democratic liberties forced the government to lift the ban on several opposition parties. In the Eastern wing despite the repressive measures taken by the government the movement for regional autonomy has gained in strength. To this may be added the effect of the prolonged drought in West Pakistan where the food situation is becoming extremely difficult. Mr. Bhutto perhaps thinks that because of the growing economic discontent in the country and other reasons the tide has turned against the Ayub regime. Whether his calculation is correct remains to be seen. 9

It was a measure of the growing popularity of Bhutto that Government ministers and the Government controlled press mounted a campaign of strident criticism against him. In a

9 Indian Express, 2 March 1967.

statement issued to the press, Ahmed Sayed Kirmani, Acting President of West Pakistan Muslim League criticized Bhutto for remaining associated for eight years with the regime which he now called dictatorial. Kirmani, like many other henchmen of Ayub Khan, refused to give Bhutto the credit of Pakistan's China policy. He called Bhutto's dissatisfaction with the Tashkent accord an afterthought. At the time of Tashkent declaration Bhutto, according to Kirmani, had favoured it.¹⁰

In another statement, Sardar Aslam Khan, Secretary General of the Pakistan Muslim League, said:

Mr. Bhutto has also tried to paint himself as the architect of the present foreign policy forgetting that the real architect was President Ayub who brought him out of sheer anonymity of Larkana and made him his trusted colleague. After having worked as a mason under that able architect, he is now trying and very shamelessly pretends to be the original author of it.¹¹

In similar strain Khwaja Shahabuddin, M.A. Khuhro and others also criticized him. Posing questions to Bhutto, Khuhro tried to make it clear that Bhutto was associated with the very system he was now criticizing and shared the responsibility of all the limitations of the system. He was one of the three gentlemen who framed the constitution, he supported the system of basic democracies, and did not raise his

10 The Dawn, 24 February 1967.

11 Ibid., 4 March 1967.

voice against the press laws or the subversion of student activities and the promulgation of the Defence of Pakistan Rules. He himself was a party to the election that he was now calling unfair. Khuhro asked why did Bhutto not resign in protest immediately after the Tashkent Declaration if he considered it against the interests of the nation, and why did he support it before the National Assembly? He then challenged Bhutto to contest against him from any constituency in Larkana.¹²

The warning Khuhro gave the students and young lawyers indicated that Bhutto by that time had acquired a sizeable following among these sections of society. He wrote:

As a matter of fact I hereby invite the students and young lawyers of the country to appoint a commission of enquiry from among themselves to visit Larkana, tour in the district, meet the peasantry and see Mr Bhutto in his own natural habitat. I have no doubt they will regret the moments they have wasted in pursuing a mirage. 13

But this mounting wave of criticism could not unnerve Bhutto. In a speech made in Lahore on 4 February 1967 at the Inter-Collegiate Student body meeting, he said:

The ring is being tightened round me. Benile and discarded politicians of my district are seeking to ingratiate themselves with the Government by unleashing against me vicious falsehood

12 Ibid., 6 March 1967.

13 Ibid

which I shall separately answer at the district level. People of my district and my friends are facing a crescendo of difficulties. This mounting wave of harrassment is not going to daunt me. I shall continue to face it with greater fortitude as I have done no wrong to my people. 14

Khwaja Shahabuddin was the foremost among the politicians who were trying to discredit Bhutto. He along with many others accused Bhutto that his dissatisfaction with the Tashkent Declaration was only an after thought. Why did Bhutto not resign in protest immediately after the agreement was signed, he asked, if his advice was ignored at Tashkent and he was unhappy about the accord. Bhutto answered in no uncertain terms. He said:

Khwaja Shahabuddin has asked why I did not resign at Tashkent if "my advice was ignored or if I was unhappy with the results." In asking this question Mr. Shahabuddin seems to have forgotten that that was a time when only recently the Pakistan nation had concluded a heroic struggle against aggression and was passing through its most difficult and delicate test. In my judgement it would have been a catastrophe if I had taken a personal approach at the height of a national crisis and that also on the soil of a foreign country. 15

14 Speech at Inter-Collegiate Student's Body Meeting, Lahore, 4 February 1967, reprinted in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Politics of the People, vol. 2 (Rawalpindi), A Collection of Statements, Articles and Speeches from 1966-1969, edited by Hamid Jalal and Khalid Hasan, p. 32.

15 Ibid., p. 36.

Justifying his association with the Government after the Tashkent accord, Bhutto further said:

"I remained in the Government because I wanted to put ointment on national wounds before making my departure to oblivion. I was not prepared to make convenient adjustments on fundamental issues and I knew that I had to go."¹⁶

He then threatened to tell the truth about Tashkent if the Government so desired. He said:

Whether we like it or not Tashkent has left an unerasable mark on the face of Pakistan. The Declaration is germane to the future and is chained hand and foot, body and soul, to the September conflict. In the highest national interest I have thus far refrained from uttering a word on this delicate subject from the day I left office. I am now in a more independent position to speak on the subject. If this is one of the purposes of the Information Minister's statement, I am prepared to debate the issue threadbare with Khwaja Shahabuddin or any other Minister of Government. Let them all come together assisted by their paraphernalia. I will stand alone. Let the nation scrutinize and adjudicate.... Lift the curtain of secrecy and let the light shine for the public to see more. Anything short of the conditions that expose the truth would be a travesty of the exercise. We are reckoning with the future of a hundred million people. 17

This wordy warfare continued for some time but all these accusations failed to wean away Bhutto's support. Later on even Bhutto's nationality was called into question and the issue was discussed both in the National Assembly and

16 Ibid., p. 36

17 Ibid., pp. 36-37.

in the press. On 30 June 1967 in the National Assembly Khwaja Shahabuddin said that from relevant documents it appeared that "till 1958 Mr Bhutto was claiming in Pakistan citizenship of Pakistan, and in India he was claiming citizenship of India."¹⁸ The controversy continued for quite some time but it failed to discredit Bhutto in the public eye. Instead, people began to ask why was Bhutto retained in the crucial ministry of Foreign Affairs when it was known in 1965 that his citizenship was in doubt.

In the next two months Bhutto decided upon his future course of action. On 16 September 1967, he announced in Hyderabad (Sind) that he had decided to form a new party and would announce the formation of the party before the year was out. Soon after that he undertook intensive tours of West Pakistan. He announced at a public meeting that he would publish the manifesto of his party within two months. Writing about his growing popularity an Indian newspaper wrote: "His popularity among the younger generation, particularly students, has apparently unnerved some members of Ayub Khan's ruling party judging from their criticism against his move to form a new party."¹⁹

The party was established at a two-day National

18 quoted in The Dawn, 1 July 1967.

19 "Bhutto Seeks Support for his new Party", Times of India (New Delhi), 11 October 1967.

Convention in Lahore on 30 November and 1 December 1967. About 300 delegates were present but none of them was from East Pakistan. The Government had enforced section 144. The convention therefore met at the residence of Mubashir Hasan. The party laid down its motto in the form of four slogans. "Islam is our faith", "Democracy is our polity", "Socialism is our economy", and "All power to the people".

Bhutto presided over the first convention of the Pakistan People's Party. In his inaugural address he outlined the ills prevailing in the society in no uncertain terms. Till Bhutto's time Pakistani politics had been elitist politics. Bhutto decided to reverse the emphasis. He emphasized that all the ills prevailing in the Pakistani society were due to the fact that people had not been taken into confidence by the rulers. The foundation papers quoted him as saying:

The root cause of immobility lay in the fact that the fundamental national problems had not been referred to the people at any time. The people alone could finally settle the issues. No individual held a special mandate from God to lay down the law for the people of Pakistan. The people had struggled for their ideological objective the creation of Pakistan, and had made sacrifices on its behalf. Their existence and welfare was at stake and they only could determine the final nature of their state and government. The continuing crisis and suspense is the result of denying the people the possibility of deciding their future themselves. 20

20 Bhutto's speech at the inaugural session of the People's Party, quoted in Foundation and Policy: Pakistan People's Party (Karachi, n.d.), p. 4.

Further emphasizing the need to establish contacts with the common man he said:

Whatever anyone else may do, we of the People's Party must cross the barriers and reach the people. We will go to the people in humility to learn as much as to teach. Once the people are mobilized we can march forward together, hand in hand, towards our destined goal. You members of the party must study the problems of the common man and carry the party's message to the masses. In this way they will be brought to the right path and we shall correct our mistakes. 21

Bhutto criticized the government for the corruption that was rampant in the society. He said that the people had been deprived of their fundamental rights and that the Defence of Pakistan rules were still in force though Pakistan was no longer facing any external threat. He urged all opposition parties to unite on one platform and fight for the restoration of fundamental rights. He said:

Action for the restoration of fundamental rights is an immediate task. Every democratically minded political party must apply itself to this task with all its energy. This offers a common ground to all opposition parties, whatever their differences, for fruitful co-operation with one another without hesitation. The People's Party is prepared without reservation to cooperate with all opposition parties for the common purpose of restoring to the people their lost civil liberties. I endorse this statement unequivocally. 22

21 Ibid., p. 6.

22 Ibid., pp. 5-6.

Reviewing the economic situation of the country he said:

We are living in a monstrous economic system of loot and plunder which the regime lauds as free enterprise. The economic policy of the regime is making the poor poorer and the few rich richer still. While official propaganda is painting a false picture of economic progress the true fact is that the basis of economic progress, which is the heavy industry, has not yet been established in Pakistan. 23

Bhutto then explained the economic programme of his party.

He said:

The economic programme of the party aimed at social justice. The principle was that the means of production should not be allowed to become the means of exploitation of the masses. In accordance with this principle, the ownership of all key industries should be vested in the people. All the basic industries should be nationalized and the public sector should include banking, insurance, transport, the production of electrical energy, fuel resources and the exploitation of the mineral wealth of the country. 24

Speaking about the merits of a socialist economy he said:

The socialist economic programme would quicken the pace of economic progress, which was being actually hindered by unrestrained monopolist capitalism such as exists in Pakistan today. The party's programme of social justice would release the energies of the working class by giving them the right to the fruits of their labour. 25

23 Ibid., p. 5.

24 Ibid., p. 5

25 Ibid., pp. 5-6.

Despite his preoccupation with the socio-economic programme, Bhutto, with the instinct of a populist leader, did not forget that Kashmir was a burning issue in which the people were psychologically involved. He directed his appeal to the hurt pride of his nation. He criticized the government for demoralizing the people of Pakistan and Kashmir. The Government was becoming flexible in its attitude towards this problem and from talking about the right of self-determination it came down step by step to talking of "meaningful discussion".

In the second session a number of resolutions were passed concerning various issues including Kashmir, national defence, academic freedom, Vietnam and the Middle East. The convention condemned the military alliances and urged the Pakistan Government to establish special relations with the Indian State of Assam. The convention payed homage to the unparalleled heroism of Vietnamese people. It expressed its solidarity with the Arabs on the question of Arab-Israeli conflict and also supported the Turks on the question of Cyprus.

Emphasizing the need for a new party, the Foundation Papers said that a new party was required to foster unity among the opposition parties. "It will form a bridge between the existing conflicting interests and give a lead in reconciling the historical dichotomies of the opposition." The second reason why a new party was needed was that in the new

circumstances only a new party with a revolutionary programme could meet the challenges of the situation. The Foundation Papers said:

A growing and powerful body of people spear-headed by the younger generation, firmly believes that the old ways and the traditional methods are not sufficient to surmount the colossal problems of Pakistan. Each epoch has its own political significance. This epoch, which is both so exciting and full of challenges, requires a new party with a new face and vitality to build the new society sought with passionate zeal by the entire population of Pakistan. The people are not prepared to return to the past. Nor are they willing to tolerate the present conditions much longer. They want a new system based on justice and attached to the essential interests of the toiling millions. Only a new party can discharge this responsibility. 26

In the draft declaration of principles it was categorically stated that the ideology of Pakistan is undisputably rooted in the religion of Islam. It was stated that the Declaration of Principles related only to the political and economic matters that concerned the nation. In the draft declaration of principles the objective of the party was laid down as "the transformation of Pakistan into a socialist society in conformity with the aspirations of the people." Two guideline principles were stated:

(a) Egalitarian democracy, that is, classless society;
and

(b) The application of socialist ideas to realize economic and social justice.²⁷

To the peasants and workers the party held out promise of a better future. The Foundation Papers stated:

The Peasants and the Working Class must, as Producers of the National Income, enjoy the full Fruits of their Labour. All Agrarian and Industrial Programmes must be directed Towards the Welfare of the Labouring Masses of the People. 28

Bhutto wanted to make sure that his party received support in rural areas also. He, therefore, besides advocating, higher wages for industrial workers, adequate housing, adequate health facilities and better education also advocated that land be given to the tillers. The Foundation Papers declared: "The party stands for the elimination of feudalism and will take concrete steps in accordance with the established principles of socialism to protect and advance the interests of the peasantry."²⁹

About Jammu and Kashmir the party declared:

No matter how great the obstacles, no matter how tireless the efforts of their oppressors, the people of Jammu and Kashmir must return to the brotherhood of Pakistan. This is the article of faith of the people of Pakistan and the supreme mission of the party. This mission takes precedence over all other internal and external responsibilities of the party. 30

27 Ibid., p. 37.

28 Ibid., p. 41.

29 Ibid., p. 42.

30 Ibid., p. 68.

It was after launching People's Party that Bhutto became a man of the masses in the true sense. As Foreign Minister his achievements had brought him the applause of the intelligentsia and the students. But through the People's Party he became the hero of the common man. He spoke the language that appealed to the common man. The issues he now took up were concerned with the daily lives of the masses.

After the Convention the government controlled press went all out to criticize Bhutto. This mounting wave of criticism displayed the nervousness of the regime and showed that in the calculation of Ayub Khan Bhutto had already become a force to reckon with. An Indian scholar commenting on the situation wrote:

The mud slung against Bhutto in the government controlled press in Pakistan continued. No opponent of Ayub had ever attracted so much attention on the part of the "establishment". That itself is a proof of Bhutto's popularity and his potentialities of posing as an effective alternative to Ayub. In the Eastern Wing also Bhutto enjoys a degree of popularity unparalleled by any West Pakistani politician after Liaquat Ali Khan. He has successfully been able to give East Pakistan the impression that he supports its autonomy move without having committed himself on the subject. 31

The criticism of Bhutto did not come only from the Government circles. Religious leaders also began to criticize

31 Mohammed Ayub, "Bhutto's New Party", Weekend Review, vol. 11, no. 4, 30 December 1967, p.

him partly to appease the government and partly because he also presented a challenge to the religious orthodox. The Hindustan Times of 15 February 1968 wrote:

Muslim religious leaders in Pakistan have begun a holy war against Z.A. Bhutto. Mr. Bhutto's recent statement that foundation of socialism had been laid by the holy Prophet came under severe attack in the mosques. Well known Mullah Faiz Ali Faiz has accused Mr Bhutto of having insulted the Prophet by proclaiming that the Prophet had laid the first brick of the edifice of socialism. His remark, the Mullah said, had hurt the sentiments of Pakistani Muslims. He has asked Mr. Bhutto to tender an unqualified apology to Muslims. 32

But Bhutto had made enough provision to outwit the orthodox religious teachers. He had included Islam as a motto of his party and had qualified his slogan of socialism also as Islamic socialism or Mussawat-o-Mauhammadi. That this worked well was showed by the election results of the 1970 elections.

Bhutto's slogan of Islam, socialism and democracy indicate that he was planning to take into the folds of his party people belonging to different ideological orientations; both extreme left and extreme right. If he were to talk of Islam alone, he would be browbeaten by Maulana Maudoodi who was a greater advocate of Islam and styled himself as the custodian of the faith. Besides, there were many "Islam pasand" parties

and also the three factions of the Muslim League who historically talked of Islam and had a longer standing in this field than the People's Party. If he were to talk of socialism alone there was the NAP with its leftist orientation to be reckoned with. Bhutto, therefore, with his shrewd political judgement decided to combine the two. He qualified his socialism as "Islamic Socialism". The inclusion of democracy was inevitable to gain the support of all the elements opposed to Ayub Khan and his system of basic democracies, particularly the students and the intelligentsia.

Bhutto knew that religion continued to have an important place in the minds of the people and therefore included Islam as one of the tenets of his political ideology. He, however, unlike other "Islam pasand" parties and the three factions of Muslim League, did not indulge in religious sloganeering. In his speech on Radio/TV just before the election he said: "I repeat with all the emphasis at my command that Islam is not in danger in Pakistan. The awakening of the people and their increasing determination to resist exploitation has endangered vested interests. That is why the vested interests are exploiting religion to divert the people's attention from the main point in dispute."³³

In Pakistan People's Party manifesto of 1970 it was

33 Address to the Nation over Radio and TV on 18 November 1970; reprinted in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Politics of the People, vol. III (Rawalpindi); A Collection of Statements, Articles and Speeches from 1970-71 edited by Hamid Jalal and Khalid Hasan, p. 154.

asserted:

The real problems that confront the nation are political and economic, but not religious, since both exploiters and exploited profess the same faith - both are Muslims. 34

The manifesto condemned religious fanaticism in no uncertain terms. It stated: "It can be shown by the history of the Muslim people that their civilization declined into intellectual sterility because dogmatic fanaticism obtained ascendancy.... Our governments have too readily yielded to the blackmail of religious bigots."³⁵

But keeping in mind the dominant role that religion played in Pakistani society, Bhutto qualified his programme as Islamic socialism and based his message of an egalitarian society on Mussawat-e-Mauhammadi. He emphasized over and over again in his speeches that Islam and socialism were not incompatible. He said:

We have said that Islam is our faith and for Islam we will give our lives. It is our religion, it is the basis of Pakistan. There is no controversy on that and if any party were not to make Islam as the main pillar of its ideology, then that party would not be a Pakistani party. It would be an alien party. That goes without saying. 36

He further said:

34 Pakistan People's Party Manifesto, p. 7

35 Ibid., p. 45

36 Address to Muzaffargarh Bar Association, 17 January 1968, reproduced in p. 44. n.14, p.44

But, at the same time we believe that we should not start controversies or go into academic discussions, because, after all, in the modern context, if Quaid-e-Azam, who was the founder of this state, believed that Islam and socialism are compatible; and if Iqbal, who was a philosopher, and who dreamed of Pakistan, also said that Islam and socialism are compatible, then we should, without entering into an academic controversy, follow these great leaders. We believe that the country must have a socialist economy because for 20 years we have seen only loot and plunder. 37

He then criticized those who supported the status quo and accused them of being unIslamic. He said:

The present system is not Islamic. How can they say that Islam and socialism are not compatible? What are they doing? This highway robbery, that is taking place in the name of capitalism, is a kind of capitalism which does not even exist in the United States of America. When the people are getting more and more miserable, when the living conditions of the masses are deteriorating, how can this system have the sanction of Islam? 38

Bhutto emphasized that socialism was the modern technique of attaining the equality that Islam preaches. He said that as socialist system was a part of the concept of Pakistan in the thinking of its two great leaders Jinnah and Iqbal, the task of creating Pakistan, therefore, would not be complete unless it has a socialist economy:

Islam and the principles of socialism are not mutually repugnant. Islam preaches

37 Ibid., pp. 44-45.

38 Ibid., p. 45.

equality and socialism is the modern technique of attaining it. Dr. Mohammed Iqbal, Pakistan's great poet-philosopher, dreamed of Pakistan as an Islamic State having a socialist system. Only a part of his dream has come true. Pakistan is a Muslim State but its piratical form of capitalism which has wrecked havoc upon the people is a violation of Islamic tenets. The Founder of Pakistan, Mohamed Ali Jinnah, declared on more than one occasion that Pakistan would be an Islamic State with a socialist form of government. 39

Bhutto emphasized over and over again that his brand of socialism was different from the Communist countries and would be based on the Islamic way of life. He said: "A socialist economy does not mean a communist economy. We need no foreign inspiration or guidance. We are capable of evolving our own pattern of socialist principles according to the conditions and framework of our Islamic way of life."⁴⁰

Bhutto knew that the urban population held the system of basic democracies in contempt and almost all the opposition forces were united on this issue. He, therefore, emphasized that the country should have a democratic order. He said:

The present conditions must give way to a democratic dispensation in which the entire population participates, feels that it is doing so and takes pride in it. In the same sweep, it is essential to restore fundamental rights and mobilize the people of Pakistan to build an egalitarian society serving

39 Z.A. Bhutto, Political Situation in Pakistan (New Delhi, 1968), pp. 11-12.

40 Address to Khairpur Bar Association, 8 March 1968, reprinted in ~~p- 76~~ n.14, p.76

the needs of the people and at their command. All power must pass to the people. This can only be done by democracy. That is why 'democracy is our polity.' 41

Bhutto criticized the system of basic democracies. He said that basic democrats were imposed on the population like Brahmins and, therefore, this system was against the principles of Islamic equality. In a speech at a public meeting at Mirpur Khas he said:

The Basic Democracies, the so-called democratic system, have nothing democratic in them. In fact this country has been bequeathed to the 80,000 Brahmins who are enemies of the people. The Basic Democracies system has increased corruption, and widened the gulf between the people and the Government. We separated from Hindu India only because we wanted equality under Islam. We left the Brahmins and made Pakistan. But the Government has virtually again imposed Brahminism on us in the name of Basic Democracies. We are, however, determined not to rest until we banish this Brahminism. 42

Bhutto asserted that the system of Basic Democracies was designed to serve the interests of a small group in which the interests of the common man were completely ignored. It was a tool which the rulers of the country had devised in order to exploit the masses. This system, he emphasized should be eradicated and the common man should be given his right. In a pamphlet entitled "Political Situation in

41 Bhutto, n. 39, p. 7.

42 Speech at a public meeting at Mirpur Khas, 18 February 1968, reprinted in n. 14, p. 55.

Pakistan" he wrote:

Quite clearly, Basic Democracy, which is another name of fascism, will not do. Independent institutions are needed, capable of Outlasting their creators and resisting capture by individuals lusting for power and avid for money. They must so function as to inspire confidence, which means that they must protect the rights of society against the exercise of arbitrary power. The law must function as an instrument of the people, and not as a shield protecting an unjust status quo. The people when they come into their own, will build a just society out of the existing shambles. They will create a free fraternity of equal men and women, the fulfilment of their ideals. 43

But except for emphasizing the need to have a democratic order, for which he was sure to receive the support of all sections of society opposed to the Government, Bhutto did not commit himself on any other controversial issue. The issues like the form of government - parliamentary or presidential; nature of state-federal or unitary; the relations of the two wings with each other and with the center were kept open. In this way Bhutto made sure that he would not alienate any shade of opinion. He would not alienate the advocates of provincial autonomy as well as those of a strong center. The advocates of parliamentary and presidential system could both be accommodated in his party. Moreover, East Pakistanis, afraid of domination by the Western Wing would also find his programme suited to their needs. In West Pakistan also the

43 Bhutto, n. 39, p. 3.

proponents of one unit scheme and those who strongly advocated the break up of one unit, both could be accommodated in his party. With regard to all these questions he said that they would be resolved by the elected representatives of the people. He wrote:

The people of Pakistan alone must decide, for good or bad, whether the State should be a federation or unitary; what should be the relation of the two wings to the center and to one another; whether regions should enjoy autonomy; whether the form of government should be parliamentary or presidential or one combining features of both. The federal and the unitary forms are both compatible with democracy, and the same can be said of the presidential and the parliamentary systems. This is all the more reason why the views of the people must be ascertained on issues to which answers cannot be deduced by debate on abstract principles. 44

Bhutto also tried to gain the sympathies of the East Bengali population without committing himself on the autonomy issue. He strongly criticized the Government for charging East Bengalis of secession and emphasized that they were being denied their rights. In an address to the Khairpur Bar Association on 8 March 1968 he said:

The Government says that East Pakistanis want to go their own way. I cannot believe that. They are the majority. The seeds of Pakistan were sown in Bengal. The Muslim League was born in Bengal. Had there been no Bengal, there would have been no Pakistan. It is our majority province and it has made a very big contribution to Pakistan. How can a majority leave

on its own? How can it surrender its rights? Why should they leave Pakistan and become a part of India? The people are not secessionists, but what they want are friends, not masters. If we treat them like friends then, of course, they will be friends. But if we treat them like servants and think that we have the legacy of the British to rule them, then they may want to go. The Government has become the heirs of the British. It believes in the maxim of 'divide and rule'. The Bengalis are being denied their rights. If a minority can feel the denial of rights, imagine how a majority will feel. That is why I think the time has come when all of us should actively work for the future of this country. 45

Bhutto avoided any comment on the Awami League's "six points" and unlike many other West Pakistani politicians did not criticize the Awami League.

He articulated the feelings of students community when he criticized the oppressive University ordinances.

The students have become the central butt of this Government. Our youth, in whom we repose all faith for the future, is distrusted - Oppressive ordinances have been promulgated to put in cage the flower of Pakistan's manhood - Degrees, that is, proof of the acquirement of knowledge which is inalienable, are taken away as forfeited - it is a dacoity of the mind being officially committed. Instead of daring to trust the younger generation, the Government is suspicious of our students and fears this segment of the population more than any other. 46

He went further on to criticize the Government for not giving

45 Address to Khairpur Bar Association, 8 March 1968, reprinted in n. 14, pp. 75-76.

46 Bhutto, n. 39, p. 5.

autonomy to the universities. "Along with all the other freedoms, academic freedom has been taken away. The universities are thus made subservient and deprived of autonomy. At this rate, in the end, it is the police alone that will dictate what is to be taught."⁴⁷

Bhutto was being accused by the establishment of leading the students astray. Repudiating this charge he declared:

If the Government, with all the control it exercises over propaganda, is unable to muster the support of the students, how can the students be misled by those who are denied access to them? The students form a community that is learning to think for itself and is, therefore, not easy to be led astray. The regime, being estranged from the people, is incapable of understanding the Youth and the yearning of the people generally. Thus, this Government has disillusioned the present and lost the future generation. 48

He further criticized the Government for restricting the freedom of the Press and monopolizing the means of communication for its own propaganda:

Little wonder that the press has been muzzled and the opposition silenced. The Government's voice alone is that of truth and it is spread nauseatingly by a Nazi style propaganda in the controlled press, over the radio and on the television. Turn in whatever direction you please and you will encounter dissatisfaction. The poor can not much longer endure the growing burden of corruption nepotism and lawlessness. The exploitation has reached a climax. 49

47 Ibid., pp. 5-6.

48 Ibid., p. 6.

49 Ibid., p. 6.

Bhutto emphasized that democracy was essential for Pakistan. It is necessary to give people their fundamental rights and mobilize them to build an egalitarian society; but democracy was not an end in itself. It was only a means for the attainment of another end, viz., economic and social justice.

Democracy is essential but that is not an end in itself. In the struggle to establish democracy we must never lose sight of the economic objectives, which remain paramount. Without economic progress a nation cannot find satisfaction in democracy alone. Democratic freedom is essential, but economic equality and justice are supremely important. Profound changes in national life cannot come without economic changes. Economic problems remain pivotal. Democracy must go hand-in-hand with enlightened socialism if the servitude of the people is to be ended. 50

Bhutto pointed out the miseries of the labouring classes. He said:

I have told you that people nowhere are happy with this Government. But one can look at the whole affair from another angle. May we ask them what the plight of the worker is? What do they get? What wages are paid to them? What are the facilities they enjoy? Do they enjoy medical care? Do they get food, clothing and shelter? Nowhere in the world is the worker so poor. Animals in other countries lead a better life. 51

And about the farmers he had to say:

50 Ibid., p. 8.

51 Speech at a public meeting in Kohat, 25 October 1968, reproduced in n. 14, p. 140.

What about the farmers? They are even worse off. They are living in stark poverty. The labourers are poor and the farmers are poor and these classes constitute 80 per cent of the population. 52

Bhutto was uniquely and remarkably different from all West Pakistani politicians in that while others were quarrelling about the Pakistan ideology and place of Islam in it, his emphasis was on the hardships and sufferings of the common man. — He was pleading better wages, housing and medical facilities for workers. He was advocating that land be given to the tillers. He was making people conscious of their miseries and the injustice that was done to them. He said: "Our people are not different from those of other countries. There is a limit to their endurance. They feel the pain of privation and yearn for the happiness of their children. Their poverty is unimaginable but yet they hope for a better future. They are entitled to a decent livelihood, to shelter and clothing." 53 He was articulating the feelings of the common man when he said:

It is not the law of God that our people must live eternally in despair and that their children should die of disease and want. Our people demand a better life for themselves and for their children; they want food and clothing, employment and protection. These are not wild dreams but the expectations arising out of this marvellous age of science. Deny them their

52 Ibid., p. 140.

53 Affidavit in High Court, Lahore, 5 February 1969, reproduced in n. 14, pp. 203-4.

rights and they will find a redeemer, and if none is available they will redeem themselves. No plan for change is needed when the people seek it. The mood of the people is the plan. 54

Bhutto talked about the deteriorating economic conditions and said that socialism was the only remedy. "In the scale of national wealth Pakistan stands at the lowest rung and there is nowhere else to be found an aggregate mass of human misery present in a similar area as that of Pakistan with its population of a hundred and twenty million. The region of the earth with highest concentration of poverty is Pakistan. This stigma has to be wiped out by socialism." 55

He further emphasized the need for socialism: "Only socialism, which creates equal opportunities for all, protects from exploitation, removes the barriers of class distinction, is capable of establishing economic and social justice." 56

Bhutto then presented his own solution. He advocated the nationalization of the key industries and breaking of capitalistic monopolies. He strongly opposed state patronage for entrepreneurs:

The immediate task would be to end predatory capitalism and to put socialism into motion. The means of production that are the generators of industrial advance or on

54 Ibid., p. 204.

55 Bhutto, n. 39, p. 10.

56 Ibid., p. 10.

which depend other industries must not be allowed to be vested in private hands. All enterprises that constitute the infrastructure of the national economy must be in public ownership. 57

The People's Party laid down the following aims with regard to nationalization of the key industries:

The general principles to be observed in applying the necessary socialist reforms are, firstly, that those means of production that are the generators of industrial advance and on which depend other industries must not be allowed to be vested in private hands; secondly, that all enterprises that constitute the infra-structure of the national economy must be in public ownership; thirdly, that institutions dealing with the medium of exchange (in other words money), that is banking and insurance, must be nationalized. 58

The People's Party programme of nationalization included, banking and insurance, all the key industries like, iron and steel, non-ferrous metal production, heavy engineering, machine tools for industrial use, chemical industries, including petro-chemical, ship-building, arms ammunition and all armament for defence, motor car assembly and manufacture and essential electrical equipment for power production, distribution and use.

Besides this the party advocated the nationalization of all sources of supply of energy like electricity, gas, oil and coal and all major means of public transport, i.e. railways,

57 Ibid., p. 10.

58 Foundation and Policy - Pakistan People's Party, p. 35.

shipping, airways and road transport.

But the programme of nationalization, emphasized Bhutto, would not mean that private enterprise will be stopped altogether. But monopolistic control would not be allowed to flourish under state protection.

The control of essential means of production and of the medium of exchange by the people does not mean that the private sector will be eliminated. Private entrepreneurs will be permitted to play their own useful role, but will not be able to create monopolistic preserves. The private sector must flourish under conditions proper to private enterprise, namely, those of competition, and not under the shield of State protection such as at present. 60

Bhutto took pains to emphasize that the take over of key industries by the State would not lead to state capitalism but the profits so acquired will be used to improve the lot of the industrial workers. He would be given rightful share in the fruits of his labour. He would be provided with better housing, medical care and education for his children. In general his standard of living would be improved:

Public ownership will not be allowed to degenerate into state capitalism. The workers will be encouraged to participate in the efficient running of the factories by appropriate incentives. Along with nationalization, steps will be undertaken to improve the condition of the wage-earners by providing for proper housing, recreation, health of the worker and his family. Education of the children, and by any other ways

59 Ibid., p. 35.

60 Ibid., p. 95. Bhutto n.39, p.45

that may help to raise his standard of living and cultural level. 61

The relevance of Bhutto's message and of the socio-economic programme of PPP in the late sixties is unquestionable. It was his uniqueness among West Pakistani politicians which accounted for his success.

Coming back to the anti-Ayub agitation we find that two very significant events occurred in the beginning of the year 1968. It was at this time that the Agartala conspiracy case was discovered in East Pakistan and Sheikh Mujib was imprisoned in this connection. It was also during this period that Ayub Khan fell ill. The hollowness of his system was exhibited during his illness. With no mechanism evolved for orderly succession it seemed that the whole system would collapse with the fall of the Field Marshal. The succession struggle started though it did not become very evident at this stage.

At this time rumours about Ayub Khan's successor were floating in the air. Some felt that General Musa was being groomed for succession. This was concluded from the way the Government controlled press was trying to build up the image of General Musa, the then West Pakistan Governor and the former Army Chief. Another name was being mentioned in this connection was that of Admiral A.R. Khan, Ayub's Defence Minister and former C-in-C of the Navy, because it was he who

took the salute of the armed forces on Pakistan Day, on 23 March 1968. This was considered evidence of President Ayub Khan's latest thinking. An Indian newspaper wrote: "In the bazzars and by lanes of Karachi, Lahore and Dacca, they are asking each other in hushed tones, what does Zulfikar Ali Bhutto say?"⁶²

Writing about the struggle for succession another Indian newspaper wrote:

With President Ayub confined to his Islamabad mansion, the political aspirants now feel free to operate. In West Pakistan, chief of those who have cashed in on the opportunity is former Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto, who is currently riding on the crest of a wave of popularity that extends beyond his home province former Sind.⁶³

Bhutto's efforts to discredit Ayub Khan were not confined within the boundaries of Pakistan. He preached his gospel even in other countries where Pakistanis lived. In London also he had acquired a following among Pakistani students. He attacked the President vehemently in London on 6 July 1968. He said that Pakistan could no longer tolerate "a coterie getting together and ramming a system down the peoples throats". He said "change was needed." "If I had gone to Sandhurst instead of Oxford perhaps this would have

62 "Speculations Rife in Pakistan about Ayub's Successor", National Herald (New Delhi), 25 March 1968.

63 "Signs of Struggle of Succession in Pak", The Hindu (Madras), 1 April 1968.

been done long ago."⁶⁴

The People's Party had established its unit in London also. Bhutto addressed its meeting in London. He was very popular among the Pakistani students. Commenting on Bhutto's speech in London, an Indian paper wrote:

Mr Z.A. Bhutto came out flatly for self-government for the people of Pakistan. He also raised the slogan of democratic socialism for Pakistan which had been deprived of genuine democracy by President Ayub Khan. 65

The paper further wrote:

That sentiments of the kind voiced by Mr. Bhutto have strong appeal to Pakistani students and others abroad was confirmed by the demonstrations which greeted Mr. Ayub Khan in London last week. The demonstrators demanded the release of political prisoners in West Pakistan where the Dacca conspiracy trial is now going on. 66

On 21 September 1968 Bhutto addressed a meeting in Hyderabad (Sind) in West Pakistan in which he bitterly criticized the President. He charged him of corruption, nepotism, favouritism and wrongful distribution of import licenses.

In order to counteract Bhutto's challenge the government charged him of misappropriation of government owned property. It was alleged that he had used government-owned

64 Quoted by Hindustan Times, 8 July 1968.

65 "Bhutto's Challenge to Ayub Khan", The Hindu, 27 July 1968.

66 Ibid.

tractors for the cultivation of his own farms and had tampered with the documents and maps so that a piece of land which was 284 acres had become 584 acres.

The students riots which sparked off the general conflagration against the Ayub regime started early in November 1968. It all began with a minor incident. Some 70 students of Gordon College, Rawalpindi, had gone to Landi Kotal (on Pakistan-Afghanistan border) and had purchased some foreign articles from the market. On the way back the items were seized by the customs officials. The students were enraged because it was quite common for the higher ups to make purchases from Landi Kotal. They felt that they were being victimized while the high ups got-away unpunished. Returning to Rawalpindi they took out a demonstration which took an anti-establishment character. Bhutto was present in Rawalpindi at that time. The students met him in a procession but Bhutto was prevented by the police from addressing the students. The police used tear gas and opened fire on the students. In the course of firing a seventeen year old student Abdul Hamid was killed. This incident occurred on 7 November 1968.⁶⁷ After this incident students rioting gripped the whole of West Pakistan. On 8 November the Army had to be called out in Rawalpindi to restore order, curfew was imposed and the atmosphere became very tense. Bhutto attended the boy's funeral

67 Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power? (New Delhi, 1971), pp. 156-85.

and gained the sympathy of students. Student's temper in the whole of West Pakistan rose to boiling point. On 10 November 1968, while Ayub Khan was addressing a public meeting in Peshawar a young man named Hashim fired pistol shots in his direction. Hashim was immediately arrested. Bhutto was considered responsible for the student disturbances and he made no efforts to deny the charge. In the words of a Western observer:

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto shared responsibility for the students' disorder. Not only had he refused to aid the government in restoring law and order, but he had urged his young supporters to continue this fight until Ayub was forced out of office. His standard reply to those wanting an end to the turbulence was, "How can I do that when they are fighting against tyranny." It is possible that Bhutto wanted the government to arrest him. He had been unsuccessful in uniting the political factions opposing Ayub and in the present anomic situation a stint in jail might provide him with the needed leverage. What the government lost in the way of prestige, Bhutto gained. Furthermore, the greater the degree of repression the larger the confirmation that the struggle was one in which good was pitted against evil. 68

Bhutto was arrested in Lahore on 13 November 1968 on charges of preaching sedition. This was what Bhutto needed to turn himself into a martyr. One Western newspaper commented: "Every month in gaol now should erase the stigma of at least six months in the Ayub government."⁶⁹ One Western

68 Ziring, n. 1, p. 99.

69 Neville Maxwell, The Times, 14 November 1968.

observer, commenting on the advantages of Bhutto's arrest wrote: "The martyrdom which only last July he thought would never happen had begun". Bhutto thought that Ayub would avoid arresting him "since that would give him immediate status as a martyr. Also, in hard political terms as Bhutto well knows, it would identify him and his newly formed People's Party as the focus of dissent endowing them with the status the other opposition parties have failed to acquire."⁷⁰ The observer predicted that Bhutto's political future was very bright and Pakistanis had started realizing this. He commented: "His star may well be in the ascendent now. And there must be many a public servants from Karachi to Islamabad who is asking himself if Pakistan may be pursuing very different policies at an unpredictable date in the 1970's under President Bhutto."⁷¹ Another foreign newspaper wrote about his arrest:

Events left little for President Ayub to do but arrest Mr. Bhutto and turn him into a martyr. Now there is the possibility that if Mr. Bhutto remains in jail he may have a better prospect of winning Pakistan opposition parties to his side than if he were free. ⁷²

After Bhutto's arrest a number of other politicians

70 Earnest Weatherall, "Arrests Heat Pakistan's Elections", Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 5 December 1968.

71 Ibid.

72 Patrik Keathley, "Bhutto Earns the Role of Martyr at Last", The Guardian, 24 November 1968.

were also arrested. By 15 November 1968 nearly 45 politicians were arrested most of whom belonged to Pakistan People's Party and the National Awami Party.

In the same month a new personality entered the political scene. Air Marshal Asghar Khan (retd) joined the ranks of the opposition. He was the highest ranking military officer ever to come out in opposition to Ayub Khan. He criticized the Ayub regime bitterly and charged it of corruption and nepotism. Speculation became rife in political circles that Asghar Khan might be acceptable to the regime as well as to the opposition as a successor to Ayub Khan. By this time other groups that were previously uncommitted also joined the agitation.

The Government realized that the tide had turned against it. On 1 December 1968 Ayub Khan repealed the seven year old order that enabled the Government to withdraw college degrees from students engaged in subversive activities. The minimum qualification marks were lowered and the students in the lowest grade were given another chance to improve their marks. All these measures indicated that the Government was clearly on the defensive.

Early in December the agitation that had so far plagued only the Western Province spread to the Eastern Wing also. In fact there were two interrelated movements that brought down the Ayub regime. In the Western Province the movement was against Ayub Khan and his autocratic regime but

in the Eastern Wing the movement was against Ayub Khan and his regime as a vehicle of West Pakistani domination. This was precisely the reason why with Ayub Khan's announcement in February that he would not seek reelection for the next term, the passions in West Pakistan to some extent cooled down while the movement in East Pakistan received a further impetus as the East Pakistanis considered it the first step towards the achievement of their goal.

The disturbances in East Pakistan began early in December 1968. A small strike by rikshaw pullers led to a general strike in Dacca on 7 December 1968. Late in December 1968 Ayub Khan offered reforms in the Constitution but the foreign press speculated that this offer was aimed at dividing the opposition as the opposition was united on the issue of changes in the Constitution but on the nature of change they had irreconcilable differences between the East and West Pakistani politicians as well as the rightist and the leftist elements.

With all this happening on the political plane, opposition leaders were still not firmly united, their only point of agreement being opposition to Ayub Khan. While Bhutto had announced his candidature for the forthcoming presidential election, the rest of the opposition parties were not definite whether to contest or to boycott the elections. While many of them insisted that the presidential candidate should be from the Eastern Wing, no such candidate

could be mutually agreed upon.

On 8 January 1969 eight opposition parties united to form a "Democratic Action Committee" to launch a movement for replacing the presidential system with a federal parliamentary system. The PPP refused to join the DAC. The DAC decided to work for direct elections on the basis of universal adult franchise. It demanded the withdrawal of black laws and repeal of laws providing detention without trial. It demanded the release of political prisoners, students, workers, journalists and restoration of the right of labourers to strike. The committee's statement reasserted that the massive upsurge of the whole nation had demonstrated beyond any doubt the complete rejection of the existing government. The opposition parties were called upon to restore democracy by accelerating and intensifying a relentless, non-violent, organized and disciplined mass movement for replacing the "one-man dictatorship" which had "brought degradation and ruin to the country in all aspects of national life."⁷³

By this time rioting in both the Western and Eastern provinces had increased very much. In Rawalpindi nearly 70 persons were arrested while in Dacca 34 had been taken into custody.⁷⁴ On 27 January 1969 fifteen truck loads of troops

73 "Restoring Democracy in Pakistan", Guardian 9 January 1969.

74 The Hindustan Times, 22 January 1969.

were sent to Karachi and a 24-hour curfew was imposed.⁷⁵ On the same day the army took control of Lahore and a 24-hour curfew was imposed there also.⁷⁶ Demonstrations were rampant in Dacca, Narayanganj and Rawalpindi.

By the end of January 1969 Ayub Khan gave indications that he was ready to have talks with the opposition. On the first of February 1969, he invited representatives of the "responsible political parties" for talks. "The Constitution is no word of God and it can be changed", he said.⁷⁷ This marked a significant change in the attitude of the Government as earlier the President had refused to consider the demands of the opposition for a change in the Constitution. He had made it clear that any change in the Constitution could be made only by the elected representatives of the people.

Despite the President's call to negotiate with the opposition the agitation in both the wings of Pakistan continued. In the last week of January alone more than 1700 people were arrested and 31 killed in both wings.⁷⁸

Bhutto's People's Party rejected the President's offer of talks outright. Bhutto insisted that the President must first step down from office. By not agreeing to sit on the

75 The Times, 28 January 1969.

76 Daily Telegraph (London), 28 January 1969.

77 Times of India, 2 February 1969.

78 The Hindustan Times, 3 February 1969.

negotiating table with the President, Bhutto's anti-establishment image was further strengthened.

Wali Khan, the leader of NAP in West Pakistan insisted that the state of emergency must be lifted first of all. Ayub Khan did not agree with the idea of releasing the political prisoners. "How can you release them in a hurry", he ⁷⁹said.

During all this period Bhutto was in jail. He had been arrested on 13 November 1968 and was still detained under the Defence of Pakistan Rules on the charge of inciting the students. His party had stayed away from the DAC and he had rejected Ayub's offer for negotiations. In February 1969 he threatened that he would start a fast unto death if the state of emergency was not lifted. In a statement in Lahore High Court on 7 February 1969 he said:

I cannot forsake my duty to the people of Pakistan. I must do everything in my power to prevent the impending disaster. The opposition must not be divided, it must not be intimidated, it must not let itself be split into classes. It must not be allowed that it should be taken to the conference table under the shadow of the Defence of Pakistan Rules. Whatever the consequences, the right of the people must prevail, their struggle must culminate into a genuine victory. I am prepared to lay down my life for the sake of this ideal, to join the ranks of those who have given their blood for the cause of the people. 80

79 Ziring, n. 1, p. 105.

80 Statement in Lahore High Court, 7 February 1969, reproduced in n. 14, p. 230.

He emphasized that the lifting of emergency was the first necessary precondition, and threatened to go on a fast unto death if the emergency was not lifted. He said:

In the context of the present situation in this struggle for democracy in its present form, as a protest against this tyrannical law which stands as a wall between the people and their freedom, I hereby withdraw my writ petition and declare that if within one week from today the emergency is not lifted, I will take a hunger strike unto death. 81

Bhutto had threatened to start his fast on 18 February 1969. Just an hour before his fast was scheduled to start the Government lifted the three year old state of emergency and released all political prisoners including Bhutto himself. —

With Bhutto's release the agitation took on a new dimension. His followers assembled in Larkana to celebrate the release of their leader. In Karachi Bhutto was taken out in a procession and the roaring crowds urged him not to negotiate with Ayub Khan. This procession led to some commotion. Bhutto proceeded to Jinnah's Tomb where he made another of his emotionally charged speeches in which he said: "If the President thought Bhutto would sit down and discuss their differences he was sadly misinformed." He made it clear that he would not compromise. 82

Bhutto not only wanted to stay away from the Round Table Conference himself, he also wanted that no opposition

81 Ibid., pp. 230-31.

82 Ziring, n. 1, p. 105.

party should attend the Round Table Conference. As he had stated in his earlier speeches, he was of the view that these talks were aimed at weakening the opposition by dividing it and thus reinforcing the hold of the Government. In Lahore, Bhutto's wife, Begum Nusrat Bhutto led one of the two processions which reminded the opposition that they should not agree to negotiate with Ayub Khan.

On 21 February 1969 Ayub Khan dramatically announced that he would not be a candidate for the next general elections. This gave further impetus to political activity. On 23 February 1969 Bhutto, who had already announced his candidature, offered to step aside and allow an East Pakistani candidate to take over the Presidency from President Ayub Khan. He said that he would favour an agreed opposition candidate from East Pakistan and if this was not possible from West Pakistan. But in the absence of an agreement⁸³ he would stand for the presidency himself.

Bhutto by this time had acquired the image of a great leader not only at home but also abroad. Writing in Sunday Times, Neville Maxwell wrote under the heading "Bhutto could be an Asian Castro":⁶⁶ "If anyone can tap the discontent of the rural masses and develop into an Asian Castro, it is liable to be Zulfikar Ali Bhutto."⁸⁴ He further wrote that the

83 Reproduced in The Hindustan Times, 24 February 1969.

84 Neville Maxwell, "Bhutto could be Asia's Castro", Sunday Times (London), 23 February 1969.

withdrawal of the Agartala conspiracy case and release of Mujibur Rahman were intended to undermine Bhutto's popularity and added:

Meanwhile, with the instinct of a populist leader, Bhutto himself has moved ahead of the public demand. While other opposition politicians were concentrated on getting rid of Ayub, and on developing a system with which he can be replaced, Bhutto was demanding that land be given to the tillers. 85

But the journalist was not sure about Bhutto's success.

He wrote:

Whether such radicalism will carry him forward in a society where, at every level, power lies with the orthodox and the conservative, is doubtful. Yet the possibility of his achieving the potential role of an Asian Castro is underlined by the nature of his People's Party which, though formed in 1967, already commands considerable support among people and intellectuals. Six legislators from President Ayub's Muslim League have also just announced that they are changing to Bhutto's party. 86

The Round Table Conference that Ayub Khan had offered on 1 February and which could not be held because the opposition parties could not reach a consensus regarding this issue, ^{was} were finally held in Rawalpindi from 10-13 March 1969. Bhutto and Bhashani both stayed away. They feared that they might have to compromise their stand under pressure from the other opposition parties. Bhutto for his part was determined not to take part in the talks from the very beginning. First, he

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid.

had placed the precondition that the state of emergency be lifted. But when the state of emergency was lifted and he was released he again changed his stand and said that he would not sit with Ayub Khan at the negotiating table. The reason for this might have been that after his release Bhutto found his followers urging him not to have talks with Ayub Khan as was evident from the slogans that were raised at his public reception. Besides this, by not attending the talks he wanted to prove it to the nation that in no circumstances will he compromise with the establishment. He wanted to make the masses believe that he was the real hero of the people who could uphold their cause firmly and strongly.

One scholar commenting on the effect that Bhutto's refusal to attend the Round Table Conference had on his image commented:

As a result of the downfall of Ayub Khan and his own uncompromising stand against the Round Table Conference, arranged by Ayub to divide the pie with the opposition parties, Bhutto emerged from the crisis of 1968-69 with greatly enhanced stature and unmatched popularity. For the first time in West Pakistani politics, cooptation was rejected and confrontation had succeeded. The laurels of this feat went to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. 87

The Round Table talks ended in failure. Ayub Khan agreed to dispense with indirect elections and the presidential system. West Pakistani politicians could be silenced by

87 Feroz Ahmed, "Structure and Contradiction in Pakistan" in Gough and Sharma, eds., Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia (New York, 1973), p. 184.

offering these reforms but Mujib was highly dissatisfied. He refused to cooperate until the East Pakistani demand for autonomy was conceded. The draft of amendments that he presented to Ayub Khan included shifting of the capital to East Pakistan, representation on the basis of population and separate budgets for the two provinces. Ayub Khan found himself unable to meet these demands. He felt that a strong hand was again necessary to set the East Bengalis right. He therefore, stepped down from the office of the President on 25 March 1969 and handed over power to General Yahya Khan who, immediately after assuming power imposed martial law throughout Pakistan. The Ayub regime thus came to a sorry end after a decade of rule in Pakistan. There were two interrelated movements that brought down the Ayub regime. Though it was the movement in East Pakistan which finally pushed Ayub Khan out of office, the first spark of the movement was lit in West Pakistan. The movement in East Pakistan started much later (in December 1968).

Bhutto's contribution lies in eloquently articulating West Pakistani discontent against Ayub Khan. The discontent was already present among the population. Bhutto articulated this discontent and turned it into a mass movement. He not only responded to the popular demand but also gave it a new formulation. As soon as the first spark of the agitation was lit Bhutto jumped into the field. He gave the movement what it had lacked: An effective organization and a charismatic

leadership. He gave a message that was relevant in the prevailing conditions and created an organization through which the promises for a better future could be fulfilled. Had Bhutto not come to the field at the right time to lead the movement, it was possible that the movement would have died down for want of effective leadership, and had he not created his People's Party in the closing months of 1967 there were chances that the dissenting voices could be silenced due to lack of an effective organization.

It was the movement in West Pakistan which was to a large extent responsible for bringing down Ayub Khan because had the Ayub regime been sure of its strong base in West Pakistan, it could have concentrated all its might in tackling the discontent in East Pakistan and quite possibly may have been able to tackle it. The agitation in the Western Wing, which was traditionally considered to be the strong hold of Ayub Khan, made the Ayub regime nervous and in its nervousness the regime lost grip of the situation in both wings of Pakistan. Bhutto's contribution lies in turning West Pakistani discontent into an organized mass movement. A large share of the credit for the downfall of Ayub Khan therefore goes to Bhutto.

Many reasons accounted for the massive support that Bhutto's party received in the urban areas of West Pakistan. One was that while the Ayub regime had entrenched itself in the rural areas, it had failed to build a strong support

structure in the urban sector. The Basic Democracies system had essentially a rural bias. The rural elite were the main beneficiaries of Ayub's scheme of basic democracy and as they exercised considerable influence on the rural population the chances of a popular upsurge in the villages were bleak.

In the urban areas on the contrary, the main beneficiaries of Ayub's system were the neo-rich industrial class and the permanent bureaucracy. The traditional channels of influence did not work in the cities with the same efficacy as they did in the rural sector. The urban population, therefore, remained alienated and in the urban middle and lower middle classes Bhutto found a group that was dissatisfied with the status quo and therefore could be easily mobilized for a popular upsurge. The fact that Ayub Khan had a weak political base in the cities was evident from the election results of 1965 in which, despite his overwhelming majority in West Pakistan (73%), his showing in Karachi (40%) and Lahore (60%) was comparatively poor.

There were many reasons for the urban discontent. These reasons are very well explained in the following comment of an observer who commenting on the urban discontent wrote:

A number of reasons accounted for this. One, of course, was the fact that traditional channels of communication and influence did not work as well in the urban sector as they did in the rural sector. But, there were other reasons as well. The growth of a strong urban middle

class which had resulted from the relatively rapid industrialization of West Pakistan during the 1960s, the decrease in the real wages of the industrial worker over the same period, the repressive policies of the regime regarding educational institutions, the alienation of the emerging entrepreneurial class from the regime because of the latter's support to the established monopoly houses - all these had combined to make the oppressive political system, with a distinct rural bias, galling to the urban sector in West Pakistan. It was this urban discontent with the system which erupted in massive discontent in the closing months of 1968. Bhutto very intelligently manoeuvred himself into a position where he became the first martyr of the movement. 88

The widespread support that the People's Party received indicated that West Pakistani social and political structure had undergone a profound change. It signified, at least as far as the towns and cities in West Pakistan were concerned an erosion of traditional patterns of authority. This meant that the people were now available for new modes of thought and action.

West Pakistani society, especially in Punjab (where Bhutto has the strongest base) was dominated by the landed aristocracy. It was this class which provided the majority of the elite in politics, the civil service and the defence forces. This class dominated the social and political life of West Pakistan. The Muslim League which was the party of the elite was the vehicle of aristocratic dominance. The

88 Mohammed Ayoob, "Profile of a Party: PPP in Pakistan", Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 7, February 1972.

League never tried to consolidate its base among the masses or outline a socio-economic programme.

But the rapid changes during the sixties tended to break the hold of this traditional aristocracy. The changes due to rapid industrialization, urbanization and spread of education weakened the grip of traditional authority over the population. The situation in the late 1960's caused unbearable burden on ^{the} common man. The constant inflation, rising unemployment, inability of the common man to make both ends meet because of the sudden rise in the prices of consumer goods,—all these added to the dissatisfaction of the common man. With increased political consciousness the population became critical of the situation. The urban population especially was sour about the rising prices, increased corruption and the concentration of the nation's wealth in the hands of twenty families.

The rightist parties were unable to take account of this situation. The Muslim League and the Islam pasand parties, in their anxiety to preserve the status quo, continued to talk of Islam and refused to chalk out a socio-economic programme. All this loud talk about Islam and the Pakistan ideology seemed irrelevant to the population which was more concerned about the immediate problems of daily living than the place of Islam in Pakistan's political structure. One scholar commenting on the situation wrote:

In this changing millieu, a plethora of rightist parties arose, sustained by

industrial tycoons as an insurance against the rising tide of subversive ideas; they talked stridently, even hysterically of Islam, of a Pakistan ideology, of Islam as the only panacea for all social and economic ills as well as for the problems arising out of the East Bengali dissatisfaction with the status quo. The irrelevance of all this now stands proven. The refusal of the right wing elements to deviate from the status quo ante made their own destruction inevitable. 89

Another scholar commenting on the People's Party's massive support writes that one most important reason for PPP's massive support "was the lack of a viable alternative to Bhutto. The other parties including the three factions of the Muslim League, the Jamaat-i-Islami and the various Jamiats, were led either by old discredited politicians like Mian Mumtaz Daulatana and Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan or by obscurantist Mullahs whose political (as distinct from their religious) appeal was extremely limited." 90

It was this uniqueness of Bhutto among the West Pakistani politicians which was responsible for his massive popularity.

Bhutto, despite his feudal background, symbolized not the traditional but the progressive forces. His advocacy of putting an end to feudalism and giving land to the tiller as

89 M.B. Naqvi, "West Pakistan's Struggle for Power", South Asian Review, vol. 4, no. 3, April 1971.

90 Ayooob, n. 88.

well^{as} his challenge to the religious orthodox were symbolic of his resolve to break the hold of traditional forces. Bhutto was conscious of his aristocratic background. He answered all those who ridiculed him for being a socialist as he belonged to the aristocracy himself. He said:

I do agree that socialism cannot be brought about unless its leadership is assumed by peasants, labourers and the oppressed classes. But I must tell my critics that history is replete with instances where wealthy individuals have abandoned the interests of their class, joined the ranks of the oppressed and risen in rebellion against the community to which they belonged. I am such a person. 91

He went on to say that there were such people in the French and Russian revolutions. Giving it a religious tint he said that there were wealthy individuals who "rejected worldly riches and lined up behind the Prophet of Islam in order to spread the message of liberty, equality and peace. I only want to bring about a revolution in Pakistan." 92

Bhutto's bitter criticism of the whole government right from the President to Ministers, bureaucrats and officials, down to the Basic Democrats and lowest functionaries of the establishment shows that he was challenging the established order. In doing so, while on the one hand he was voicing and articulating the feelings of the urban masses, he

91 Address to 3rd Convention, Hyderabad, 21 September 1968, reproduced in n. 14, p. 132.

92 Ibid., p. 132.

was also making them conscious of the situation on the other hand, and by doing so mobilizing them for action. The PPP had become a mouthpiece of dissent during Ayub's period and it was able to mobilize all the forces that were opposed to the regime and dissatisfied with the status quo.

Bhutto's anti-establishment image which was to a great extent responsible for his popularity in West Pakistan rested also, at least in the initial period, on his anti-India and anti-Tashkent image. It was for this reason that Bhutto constantly harped on the anti-India theme. Another important reason was that his policy of confrontation with India had not only endeared him to the students and the militant sections of West Pakistani society but also won him friends in the armed forces. The younger elements in the armed forces were particularly attracted by his anti-Tashkent tirade. An Indian journalist commenting on this motive of Bhutto wrote:

Bhutto has been mouthing anti-India stuff not so much to play to the popular gallery, but to please an important section of the military. By remaining 'on record' that he favoured a confrontation with India, he wanted to assure the military leaders that if and when he came to power he would not dispense with the need to have a strong army and an equally strong air force. 93

The People's Party drew its support from the middle and lower middle classes, the students and certain sections

93 Dewan Brindranath, "Importance of Being Bhutto", Mainstream, 19 December 1970.

of the armed forces. Its advocacy for the breaking up of monopoly capitalism consolidated its base among the upcoming entrepreneurs who were sour about the established monopoly houses. The organized labour and trade unions also supported Bhutto's party. The greatest source of support for the People's Party was, of course, the student community which practically idolized Bhutto and it was through the support of the students that he could mobilize the other sections of society. Besides the students, the legal profession and the other professionals who, because of their higher degree of education were more conscious of the evils of the system supported Bhutto's party.

The party attracted recruits from a wide enough social strata but it was mainly the party of the middle and lower middle classes. As one observer puts it:

capitalistic Himself a big landlord, Bhutto's socialism exemplifies, up to a point, an old aristocrats contempt for ~~socialistic~~ upstarts. However, the socialism of PPP is not a defined category. The successful PPP dignitaries come from a broad enough social spectrum, ranging from lower class to scions of old aristocratic houses; but a big majority of them come from the urban middle class. 94

Bhutto's policy of confrontation towards India had won for him the support of the armed forces. This fact was also reflected in the election results of 1970 elections:

It was a feature of election results in Panjab that PPP's success in constituencies known to have been the recruiting areas of pre-independence Indian Army approximated towards 100 per cent while elsewhere, particularly in the non-perennially irrigated areas, its proportion of success was dramatically slow. This throws some interesting light on the party's well known anti-India militance and its preoccupation with Kashmir; both attitudes put emphasis on the role, prestige and size of the armed forces. 95

In Punjab the PPP drew its support from middle and lower middle classes and none of the old landlord families had supported Bhutto. In Sind many feudal landlords threw in their lot with PPP. Most notable among them were Abdul Hafiz Parzada, Chairman of Karachi PPP, Ali Ahmed Talpur, Chairman of Sind PPP, and Mumtaz Ali Bhutto. The characteristic that sets them apart from other feudal lords, in the words of an Indian scholar, "is their relatively modern outlook and the fact that they are in the professions (mostly barristers-at-law) and do not live off the land exclusively." 96

Besides these notable aristocrats the Sind PPP had attracted in its folds many elements of the middle and lower middle classes. There were also trade unionists and Marxists like Mairaj Mohammed Khan and Shamim Zainuddin. The inclusion of such personalities gave the People's Party the image of a progressive party that stood for change. 97 At the same

95 Ibid.

96 Ayooob, n. 88.

97 Ibid.

time the inclusion of the leading aristocrats had made it more acceptable to the traditional groups which otherwise have felt their interests threatened by a party of the committed left.

The extent of Bhutto's popularity could not be adequately judged until the results of 1970 elections were declared. The overwhelming majority that the PPP received in West Pakistan came as a great surprise to many observers of the Pakistani scene. The voting pattern exhibited that the West Pakistani electorate had voted for progressive forces. It became evident that Bhutto not only had responded to the changes in the situation but had also contributed to this phenomenon of change. One observer commenting on the role of People's Party in stimulating the process of socio-economic change wrote:

The PPP, a product of the changing character of West Pakistani society during the 1960's, has in turn acted as a catalyst for the forces of change by mouthing relevant slogans and winning a massive mandate on the basis of a radical programme. Whether it is able to fulfil its promise or not, it has certainly changed the political culture of Pakistan to an appreciable degree. Pakistani society can never be the same again. 98

As has been discussed in the preface of this study, there are three factors that have a bearing upon the leadership phenomenon and the emergence of popular movements. The

first is the leader's personality, the second factor relates to the socio-economic and political conditions prevailing in the country at the time of the leader's emergence which give rise to discontent in the masses and the third is the leader's message and its relevance to the prevailing conditions in the society.

In this study we have come to the conclusion that Bhutto had certain charismatic attributes of personality which helped him to emerge as the most popular leader in West Pakistan. Secondly, we have seen that the conditions in the later part of the Ayub regime were such that they led to a great degree of dissatisfaction among large segments of society, particularly in the urban areas. The West Pakistani society had undergone a profound change and certain new forces had emerged which were trying hard to find a place under the West Pakistani sun. These new forces although ^{they} had been strengthened as a result of the economic development that had taken place during the Ayub decade, were not given adequate representation in the process of political decision-making in Pakistan. So, they were thoroughly dissatisfied with the status quo and were looking for an alternative to the Ayub regime.

The third and the most important point was that Bhutto was able to fully gauge the discontent that prevailed in West Pakistani society and realize that the time was ripe for a popular upsurge. He articulated the feelings of the large dissatisfied segments of West Pakistani society and directed

his appeal mainly to those sections of society which were feeling left out under Ayub's system. He gave them the promise of a better future and created his People's Party in order to fulfil that promise. His party became the main focuss of dissent and attracted large sections of society in West Pakistan. He realized that the West Pakistani society had undergone a profound change and a new type of appeal was needed to gain political support. He, therefore, deviated from the well-trodden path and instead of giving the slogan of "Islam in danger", presented a socio-economic programme. The new social forces, mainly the lower middle and middle classes of Punjab and Sind, that were feeling alienated under Ayub's system, found in Bhutto and his party the most desirable political alternative and gave him their full support. Bhutto mobilized these forces and organized them through the People's Party and through their organized support was able to drastically weaken the Ayub regime in West Pakistan, which was considered its traditional stronghold. He was thus able to demonstrate the fact that the Ayub regime was a colossus with feet of clay. This weakening of Ayub's own home base sharply reduced the regime's capacity to handle an already alienated East Bengal. It was the combination of these two movements - the Bhutto led anti-Ayub agitation in West Pakistan and the autonomy movement in East Pakistan - that brought about the downfall of President Ayub Khan.

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