

CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT IN JHARKHAND
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ORGANISED VIOLENCE

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled “**Conflict and Development in Jharkhand: The Political Economy of Organised Violence**”, submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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
List of Abbreviations

BDI	Backward District Initiative
BPR&D	Bureau of Police Research and Development
CPFs	Central Police Forces
CPI (Maoist)	Communist Party of India (Maoist)
CPMF	Central Para Military Forces
CPML-PW	Communist Party (Marxist Leninist- Peoples War)
DC	District Collector
IED	Improvised Explosive Devices
IR	India Reserve
JLT	Jharkhand Liberation Tigers
JMM	Jharkhand Mukti Morcha
JPC	Jharkhand Prastuti Committee
LRGS	Local Regular Guerrilla Squads
MCC	Maoist Communist Centre
MCCI	Maoist Communist Centre of India
MCOR	Marxist Coordination Committee
MHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
NREGA	National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
NRHMS	National Rural Health Mission Scheme
NSS	Nagrik Suraksha Samiti
NTPC	National Thermal Power Corporation
PDFI	People's Democratic Front of India
PDS	Public Distribution System
PESA	Panchayat (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act 1996
PGA	People's Guerrilla Army
PLFI	People's Liberation Front of India
PMGSY	Pradhan Mantri Grameen Sadak Yojana
PMS	Police Modernization Scheme
PWG	People's War Group
RDF	Revolutionary Democratic Front
RSVY	Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana
SLR	Self loading Rifles
SP	Superintendent of Police
SPF	State Police Forces
SPM	Sashastra People's Morcha
SPO	Special Police Officer
SRE	Security Related Expenditure Scheme
SRGS	Special Regular Guerrillas Squad
SSA	Sarva Siksha Abhiyan
TPC	Tritiya Prastuti Committee
VDC	Village Defence Committee

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
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Map 1: The State of Jharkhand



Map 2: Regional Bureaus of CPI (Maoist)

Source:
 Institute of Conflict Management,
 Delhi, 2008.



Chapter 1

Introduction: The Image and Practice of the State

There existed a widely held view in the 1950s and 1960s that every society has to pass through historical stages before conforming to the modern nation state and every economy has to pass through stages of growth before attaining the blessing of development. To pass through these stages, they had to “restructure their culture by shedding its regressive and traditional parts and developing cultural traits compatible with the modern state’s requirements”.¹ Simultaneously, a web of international norms and institutions were created which generated expectations about the capabilities of the state. Plans for state-led social change and its direction were laid down by legitimate bodies like the United Nation in their charter. The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) put forth a set of socio-economic rights to act as guidelines for state goals. After independence, countries like India included these in their respective constitutions; thereby the “idea of a civilizing mission was internalized in the Third World after decolonization, as native elite gained control over the state and developed their native versions.”²

However, even as the first decade of the twenty-first century comes to a close, the world seems to be gripped by a problem of persistence of the legacies of the twentieth century like poverty, hunger, endemic violence, despite ‘sustained state efforts’. What makes the situation even more complex is the fact that such legacies co exist with affluence, wealth and relative peace within the same territorial space. Thus, for a country like India, one of the fastest growing economies of the world, there are some super rich people living alongside some extremely poor people. On a particular day everything in Delhi may be normal, however the next day, the news of a terrorist attack can instantaneously and irrevocably change everything. Even countries like UK and USA, considered by most to be the economic and military super powers of the age, cannot guarantee their citizens the security or stability of income as is exposed by the terror attacks and financial crisis they

¹ Ashis Nandy, ‘State’ in Sachs, Wolfgang, ed., *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power*, London, 1992, p. 264.

² *Ibid.*, p. 269.

have experienced over the last decade. Therefore, the only thing that is common among all states of the world today is that ‘they can’t do what they claim to do’. But why this is so, therefore becomes an interesting proposition to explore.

It is with a similar objective that this study looks at the sustenance and even intensification of Naxal violence in India over the last decade in spite of a sustained ‘multi pronged’ approach of development and security put forth by the state. Before moving ahead, it is important to analyse the image of the state, based on its objectives, and then see how it actually translated in terms of practice. As the study is based on India, most of literature would be drawn from the larger post-colonial Third World that India was a part of.

The Image of the State

By the early twentieth century, Weber explained state as “a compulsory political organization with continuous operations insofar as it’s administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.”³ Two distinctive features of this definition were particularly important: firstly, Weber pointed out that the state is a collection of institutions with dedicated personnel. Secondly, Weber regards the modern state as having an absolute and authoritative rule-making capacity that is enforced by ‘a monopoly of the means of physical violence within a territorial space’.⁴ Michael Mann made a similar argument much later wherein he argued that “state contains four main elements ... a differentiated set of institutional and personal embodying... centrality in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from the center to the cover... a territorially demarcated area, over which is exercised... a monopoly of authoritative binding rulemaking, backed by a monopoly of the means of physical violence.”⁵

³ Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, Berkeley, CA, 1925/1978 as cited by Colin Hay, Michael Lister, and David Marsh, eds., *The State: Theories and Issues*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 9.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 9-10.

⁵ Michael Mann, ‘The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origin Mechanics and Results’ in *European Journal of Sociology*, vol. xxv no. 2, 1984, p. 189-90.

These assumptions about the way the state worked were accepted by scholars and policy-makers as being inherent to the state. Over the course of the second half of the twentieth century, this state and its inherent traits were imposed across the world in the hope of achieving security and development. As the states across the world pursued these objectives, it increasingly became evident that the inherent traits of the state were actually not so inherent. Still, in order to understand the process of social change it is important to start with what the idea was. The rest of the chapter deals with how the institutional set up, referred to as the 'state' today, that emerged in nineteenth century industrial Europe, went on to become *the* institutional setup across the world. Then we look at the implicit assumptions regarding the functions of the state that were associated with this institutional set up. Understanding these assumptions is important to be able to explore as to what the states failed to do.

Hegemony of the 'Western State' Image

The indigenous intellectuals and political activists confronting colonial power too saw the idea of 'nation state' as a clue to the West's economic success and political dominance.⁶ Prakash has argued that "those interacting with the colonial state... in collaboration or opposition... recognised and respected the invincibility and importance of western rationality."⁷ Similarly, Migdal points out that "founding fathers of the new states shaped their goals on the basis of those of already established states and the dominant European nationalist ideologies of the nineteenth century".⁸ Thus, whatever diversity existed in the conception of the state across the world was steamrolled into either a "pre-modern state... or oriental despotism".⁹ There was a "unanimous consensus across political theorists about the central role of the state in moulding society thorough its policies and planning".¹⁰

Thus, it is seen that the driving force was the 'need to do something' to bring about economic reconstruction and growth. Theorists argued that "the welfare state can, with

⁶ Nandy, Op. Cit., p. 267.

⁷ Amit Prakash, *Jharkhand: Politics of Development and Identity*, New Delhi, 2001, p. 39.

⁸ Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State Society Relation in the Third World*, Princeton, 1988, p. 4.

⁹ Nandy, Op. Cit.

¹⁰ Migdal, Op. Cit.

strong economic analysis and sufficient supply of capital, deal with economic problems. It could do so by increasing the productivity of agriculture and shifting under-utilized labour from the agricultural to the industrial sector.”¹¹

Assumptions about State-Society Relations

By the 1970s, political leaders in every society across the world had adopted the idea that the state should set the common rules that govern the lives of its population. J. P. Lewis, commenting on India, argued that “the business of the state to be the principle planner, energizer, promoter and director of accelerated development efforts is a fundamental and undisputed fact.”¹² Even though the concept of state was rarely invoked, planning and policy making were seen as subjects with boundless possibilities.¹³ Thus, it became incumbent on the citizens of the modern states in the post-colonial world to educate themselves with the intricacies of modern socio-economic and political institutions.¹⁴ One of the distinctive features of these newly emerging states was the belief in the axiom that state should provide for a predominant set of rules in society. Thus, state leaders of the Third World continuously reiterated the central role of state as seen in the declaration at Bandung (1955), Cairo (1962) and Lusaka (1970).¹⁵ All along it was assumed that the state had the capability to “*penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources and appropriate* or use resources in a determined way”.

Thus, the relationship between the state and its people involves multiple dimensions with certain presumptions associated with the roles of the state. As Rajni Kothari puts it:

It was seen as the mediator, mitigating the strains in the traditional social structures to ensure justice, equality and liberation to the marginalized...[having an] implicit role to act as a mediator that could translate conflictual interests into transformative policies...the engine of growth and development that ensured new civil order based on progress and prosperity, rights of life and liberty, equality and dignity... hav[ing] the autonomy and power to influence, discipline and coerce entrenched interests and classes towards policies aimed at transforming status quo... to plan and organize maximum economies ... to ensure either self reliance by import substitution and building infrastructure for industrialization or greater welfare through provisions of social minima (basic needs)...

¹¹ Ibid., p. 8.

¹² J P Lewis, *Quiet Crisis in India: Economic Development and American Policy*, New York, 1964, p. 26.

¹³ Migdal, *Op. Cit.*, p. 10.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

So the visions of transformation that emerged in the third world, pinned all its hopes on state power.¹⁶

Thus the state was an avatar that was to end all social evils of the state. In order to do so the state laid out some exclusive zones for action. The next section elaborates on these boundaries between the state and the rest.

Boundaries of the State

Another important point to note here is that, such an image of the state was based on some boundaries that distinguished the state from other social actors within its territorial confines. Kaldor points out:

a whole series of new distinctions which were characteristic of the evolving state... included ... distinction between public [state activity] and private [non state activity]... between internal [what took place within the clearly defined territory of the state] and external [what took place outside this territory]... between civil [domestic non violent legal intercourse of civil society] and military [external violent struggle of anarchic international arena]... between legitimate bearers of arms [soldiers and police personnel] and criminals.... and between war [discrete violent interaction between states] and peace [day to day security, domestic peace and respect for law and justice]¹⁷

In this image, the state had to maintain “a complex relation between the process of *governance* (how human affairs are managed), *legitimacy* (on which power to govern is based), and *forms of security* (how organized violence is controlled)... in order to protect individuals in the physical sense, to provide for a secure basis for administrative capacity, to guarantee the rule of law, and to protect territory externally... [all of which] are primary functions of the political institutions from which they derive legitimacy”.¹⁸ By the 1970s, as Aaron Vildavsky had noted, the capacity of even the most advanced states in transforming society in a desired way was questioned.¹⁹ Kothari points to a similar case of “deep uncertainty about the direction in which the state is moving”.²⁰

Having seen how and with what assumptions the institution set up today, referred to as ‘states’, was adopted across the world, we now move on to discuss how most of the third

¹⁶ Rajni Kothari, ‘Masses classes and the State’ in Shah, Ghanshyam, ed., *Social Movement and the State: Readings in Indian Government and Politics*, New Delhi, 2002, pp. 72-73.

¹⁷ Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, 1st Edition, Cambridge, 1999, p. 20.

¹⁸ Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, 2nd Edition, Cambridge, 2005, p. 179-80.

¹⁹ Migdal, Op. Cit., p. 11.

²⁰ Kothari, Op. Cit., p. 69.

world states failed to do what they that so euphorically claimed to do at the time of their independence. The next section looks at how the newly independent states went about pursuing their objectives of attaining the ‘status’ of a strong, secure and developed state like those in the west and why they failed.

The Practise of the State

The emergence of the modern state in Western Europe was accompanied by the “building of a triad of essential state tentacles- a standing army, a vastly improved tax collection mechanism and an expanded set of judicial courts”.²¹ These were supposed to provide for a balance between security and governance and thereby the legitimacy of the state. Migdal points out that the extension of the judicial system was essentially for “inducing population to behave as the state leader wanted them to” therefore the courts and the police that fed into this system were “essential for shifting social control to the state.” On the other hand improved taxation was needed to sustain the ‘agencies of the state’ including the judicial system and the standing army. The army provided the necessary force “to back up demands and decisions of the tax collector and the judicial authorities”.
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Over the course of the second half of the twentieth century, most Third World countries did manage to penetrate society and monopolize means of organised violence but they have failed to regulate social behaviour and remain autonomous from the vested interests in the society. Migdal argued that third world countries like India, “have displayed remarkable instances of both high and low state capabilities in different realms... extraordinary capabilities of the Indian Civil Services... [has] shown astonishing weakness ... [in their attempt] to mobilise and appropriate resources to change ... daily habits in intended ways.”²³ At the same time, it became evident that “monopoly of the state over means of organised violence has ensured only territorial security to the state and not security of its population, as the state-controlled process of development did

²¹ Migdal, Op. Cit., p. 22.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid., p. xviii-xix.

guarantee the development of states but not of its societies”.²⁴ The discrepancies in the role of the state in the Third World were a product of many factors. While some of these were foreseen by theoretical models of historical change, others are a result of unforeseen factors.²⁵ The next section moves on discuss some of these.

The Model of Catching Up and the Tag of ‘Strong Developed State’

A model of ‘catching-up’ in development policies adopted by these states to become like the western ‘developed states’, produced an opportunity structure that was biased against the masses. By emphasizing capital accumulation, rapid industrialization and associated patterns of urbanization and outward oriented modernization (from rural to urban), resources were distributed unevenly against the poor. As inequalities acquired the permanence of a structure; a lot of vested interests were created. The reasons for this were many. The dominant class in control of state power and administration were unwilling to make the sacrifices needed to allow for redistribution of the surplus in favour of the marginalized class. Thus, the liberal bourgeois democratic assumption did not work well in highly divided societies.²⁶

Another dimension of the catching-up that these states did was in terms of becoming a ‘developed state’ externally. This involved building an efficient, strong and hard state equipped with heavy industrialization and militarised with the latest weaponry. The ‘mirage of greatness’ in an era of superpowers and multinationals, drained resources in return for ‘high-tech status’ and comparative advantage in global management structure. Thus, it becomes necessary to suppress challenges locally in order to deal with them externally. The technological system thus eroded the characteristics of natural resources as a ‘public good’ by over-exploitation²⁷.

The Freedom of the Economic Man and the Market Society

The conception of an individual’s freedom was purely economic, since the liberal rationality of government was dependent on ways social behaviour was regulated in the

²⁴ Kothari, Op. Cit., pp. 72-73.

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 72-73.

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 76-77.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 79.

name of planning. Therefore, the state had the basis of its authenticity or legitimacy in a system where the subjects are the figure of *homo economicus*. This brand of social science was dominated by a “materialistic creed”²⁸ of intellectuals who saw a “solution to all human problems in unlimited material commodity”.²⁹ Thus, the distinctive feature of the economy of Western Europe in the 19th century was the centrality of market in the productive organization; organised around machines in the wake of the Industrial Revolution, for mass production. Thus, the need for institutionalization of market in society was bound to emerge.³⁰

This led to the emergence of a market society where all income started emanating from sale or exchange. As motives for productive action changed from subsistence to ‘gain on exchange’, a market system or a productive system of society being directed by market emerged.³¹ The emergence of market economy was also closely associated with the rise of the modern state. This discourse provided powerful support for the economic basis of human collectives and their motives and interests.³² However as the labour market changed the way poor lived, popular government became a source of political tension.³³

Divisive Politics and the Crisis of Legitimacy

In order to distract attention from the social-economic sphere, a highly volatile communal and ethnic sphere is set rolling; releasing strong religious, linguistic and cultural sentiments. These were violence organized at the behest of those in power through the available hordes of ‘lumpen’ and criminals to unleash a reign of terror. At the same time the state acquires more fire power in the name of national unity and security and threats to it. This undermined all the processes of ‘politics of struggle’ as laws against ‘terrorism’ were enacted to deal with popular unrest and social movement. This was a direct consequence of the ruling elite to hold on to power by precipitating a strong dose of violence and civil strife. It undermined the communitarian basis of social interaction

²⁸ Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Times*, Cambridge, 1957, p. 40.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

³² Brad Evans, 'The Zapatista Insurgency: Bringing the Political Back into Conflict Analysis' in *New Political Science*, vol. 30 no.4, 2008, p. 505-06.

³³ Polanyi, *Op. Cit.*, p. 225-227.

by communalizing it thereby straining the social fabric.³⁴ This led to a crisis of legitimacy. Poggi talking about a similar predicament argued that “as a system of rule, the state confronts the problem of legitimacy. It wants its citizens to comply with its authority not from the inertia of routine or utilitarian calculation of personal advantage, but from the conviction that compliance is right... the moral idea that ultimately legitimizes the modern state is the taming of power through the depersonalization of its exercise.”³⁵

The Resistant Process of Internal Pacification

The implicit contract between the state and its citizen was of tax, in return for protection and security. Therefore, the state had to eliminate other sources and forms of protections³⁶. Anthony Giddens call this process, of monopolizing legitimate violence for protection and security, as ‘internal pacification’. He pointed out:

Pacification does not mean disappearance of violence from the interiors of the state and is quite consistent with waging war ... it refers to more or less successful monopoly of the means of violence on the part of the political authorities within the state ... Internal pacification went along with the formation of professionalized armed services ‘pointing outwards’ towards other states in the state system, rather than being preoccupied with internal social order...the convergent development of capitalism and parliamentary democracy, together with the system of centralized law, played a major role in ‘extruding’ violence from the immediate mechanism of government... [but] processes of internal pacification have proved much harder to achieve in ‘state nations’ and ex colonial societies... Civil war is... almost a norm... contestation of power of the ruling authorities by rival military groups was frequent and often protracted.³⁷

In such situations, the delicate balance between coercion and consent was stretched by state repression. The bourgeoisie democracy, the vehicle of modernization, in its technological incarnation, worked smoothly under a depoliticised technocratic state impervious to popular aspirations of the other. While the poor were made aware of social and ethnic conflict by the politics of electoral democracy, the state failed to resolve these

³⁴ Kothari, Op. Cit., p. 80.

³⁵ Gianfranco Poggi, *The Development of Modern State: A Sociological Introduction*, Stanford, 1978, p. 101.

³⁶ Kaldor, *New and Old Wars...* 1st Edition, Op. Cit., p. 18.

³⁷ Anthony Giddens, *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics*, Stanford, 1994, p. 232.

conflicts through transformational policies. This has left the forces of change or the marginalized masses on their own and experiencing massive convulsions.³⁸

Aid and Cooption as Responses to Protest Politics

The liberal state, thus in its response to protest politics started by using aid as an instrument of war against the rebellious population. This allowed the state to subject the population into relations of clientelism and patronage. Indigenous population were made to compete amongst themselves to win favours as the leadership adopted the practices of hegemonic institution. As structures of subordination were institutionalized, local elites served their own interests at the cost of undermining the collective concerns. However, as these policies failed to pacify violent conflict, multiculturalism increasingly replaced earlier conceptions.³⁹

Multiculturalism, based on neo-liberal emphasis on deregulation, saw policies and discourses moving away from clientelism and populist relation. Multiculturalism acknowledged the marginalization of indigenous population and invoked the language of sustainable development to show the liberal state as the facilitator of empowerment of the indigenous population. Efforts directed at administering the conflict were made through co-opting prominent indigenous members into the new bureaucratic structure by sponsoring community development-cum-counterinsurgency programs. By emphasizing on 'local agents of change' the power was now concerned with governance at local levels.⁴⁰ Yet another dimension of this strategy, 'development with identity', involved empowerment of indigenous beneficiaries in the political and governance arena, which was to be provided for by strengthening their capacities within the state and private structure. Therefore, self reliance had to be in accordance to a governance-type that best served to promote capacity building for the state as a whole to be socio-economically productive.⁴¹

³⁸ Kothari, Op. cit., p. 67.

³⁹ Evans, Op. Cit., p. 502.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 502-03.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 503.

It was argued that freedom of autonomous existence and underdevelopment was fermenting all kinds of destabilizing flows. Insurgencies were seen as movements in which opponents of established governing authorities used violence to wrest support of the population away from them. Therefore, “discourses of militarism, security and development were brought together for providing lasting solutions”.⁴² Therefore, the policy recommendations involved the establishment of a more permanent bio-political relationship that operated at the level of life itself. By doing so they removed power relations completely from the analytical arena of conflict analysis. Evans commenting on these shifts to ‘war by other means’ shows how:

... military force is but one instrument ... available for use in such contests, and it ought to be subordinate to a political strategy of offering the people a government deserving of their support. Improvements in local governance, legal systems, public services, and economic conditions may be at least as important as military operations, though the former often depend on the success of the latter... to suggest the countering insurgency concerns with the political fabric of populations represents... complimentary biopolitical strategic facets of a Liberal way of war... reworking the deployment of force along with market seductions⁴³.

Neo-liberal ideas of risk managements and social entrepreneurship were rallied to promote policies of self reliance as well as to pacify and contain rebellious population. This involved distinguishing between those types of self-reliance or freedom that displayed willingness to comply and those that were in direct confrontation with the liberal will to govern.⁴⁴

Blurred Boundaries

Thus as the twentieth century came to a close, the distinction between state and other organisations became increasingly blurred. The World Wars and the Cold War eroded the distinction associated with the state. The distinction between public and private was over as the entire system was operating to sustain the war effort. Civil and military distinctions were demolished with the compulsory conscription introduced during the war. Conscription also demolished the distinction between civilians and combatants. The political and economic distinctions were demolished as economic centres became

⁴² Ibid., p. 500-01.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 504-05.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 501-02.

legitimate targets under military necessity. The blurring of these distinctions was mainly because of conflict between rules of war and decisive victory. However, as war became total, mobilizing it in the name of state interest started losing its legitimacy as causes for mobilizing war.⁴⁵

As alliances became rigid during the Cold War, the distinction of domestic and international, the last of the rational conception of war was abolished. Individual states could no longer fight war unilaterally. Only super powers had the power to wage full scale war. The European states had to let go of the essential dimension of legitimate monopoly over violence. Outside the alliance, networks of military connections, loose alliances, arms trade and provision for military support and training set patron client relationships and increased the circulation of weapons. Cold War made war permanent instead of being a discrete event in the continually progressive process. The reality of total war fused war, state, and society together.⁴⁶ The technological version of the system consumed resources, autonomous of the will of the state or people.⁴⁷

So by the close of twentieth century, the discourses on development were still ambiguous as pointed out by Gerald G Smith who summarised this ambiguity as “state is needed...but not too much, and only when the market doesn’t work well... democracy is important but not if it leads to inappropriate demands of redistribution.”⁴⁸ At the same time, as the Cold War came to an end, it was no longer possible for war to be contained geographically as zones of war and peace existed side by side in the same territorial space. Thus, a new form of war or organized violence has re-emerged. Its nature and form are determined by the dynamic interaction between politics of identity, decentralization of violence and a war economy.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 503.

⁴⁶ Kaldor, *New and Old Wars...* 1st Edition, Op. Cit., p. 28.

⁴⁷ Kothari, Op. Cit., p. 69-70.

⁴⁸ Gerald G. Schmitz, ‘Democratization and Demystification: Deconstructing “Governance” as Development Paradigm’ in David B Moore and Gerald G Schmitz, eds., *Debating Development Discourse: Institutional and Popular Perspectives*, London, 1994, p. 31.

⁴⁹ Kaldor, *New and Old Wars...* 2nd Edition, Op. Cit., p 178.

The Struggle for Social Control

Central organizations across human history have never taken as aggressive and ambitious a stance of seeking predominance to make and authorize all rules that govern the intricacies of human social life. The triad of essential state tentacles of monopolized means of legitimate violence, improved tax collection mechanism and expanded set of judicial system are all directed towards expanding states' social control. Social control involves "successful subordination of an individual's own inclinations of social behaviour or those prescribed by any other social organization in favour of social behaviour prescribed by state rules".⁵⁰ Agreeing with Mann, Migdal argues that social control denotes the power of the state to penetrate and centrally co-ordinate activities of the society through its infrastructure. However, as gaps between the ambition and achievement of the state became evident, explaining the gap required attention on the source of resistance to efforts of state's predominance in the realm of social control.⁵¹

Explaining Gaps in Social Control

Developing a model that could explain the gap between the assumed and the actual social control commanded by the state has to begin with how such control is constructed and maintained by various social actors that exercise social control.⁵² D. A. Baldwin argued that the scope and domain of power or who is influencing whom needs to be denoted.⁵³ Social actors, state as well as non state, use a variety of sanctions and rewards along with symbols to induce people to behave in their interactions.

People in general and marginalized ones in particular, have been sensitive to norms of behaviour prescribed by organizations dominated by people with the means to deny livelihood. These organizations include those making key decisions regarding production and distribution of goods and those who can provide organized protection. The structuring of these rewards and sanctions of those seeking social control are not just discrete individual incentives but are packaged and ordered to be attractive and

⁵⁰ Migdal, Op. Cit., p. 22.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 24.

⁵² Ibid., p. 25.

⁵³ David A Baldwin, 'Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies' in *World Politics*, vol. 31 no. 1, January 1979, p. 162-63.

compelling to people. Such packaging rests on the material needs of the people and gives meaning to people's behaviour as they satisfy these needs. Thus, consciousness about social behaviour ties action of meeting material needs to a purposeful and higher cause that is higher than the act itself. Therefore, symbolic configurations are initially tied to rewards and sanctions.⁵⁴

Strategies of Survival

These symbolic configurations along with the array of awards and sanctions or the opportunity structure, determine the form of social control in society. These configurations and structures constitute the institutional arrangements that have distinguished human societies across time and space. People combine the available symbols and opportunities to develop strategies of survival. They use constructed myths and symbols to explain to people their place and prospects through these strategies. The choice of the component of strategy is determined by the resources, ideas and organizational means available to individuals. Therefore, social control rests on the organizational ability to provide for these components of an individual's strategies. Most of these strategies coincide with the existing, accepted modes of behaviour and belief that reinforce the characteristic forms of social control. Sometimes, however, the strategies have been offered that are conflictual to the prevalent norms and modes of social control thereby proposing new forms of social life.⁵⁵

Throughout human history, a multitude of strategies and forms of social control has worked over territories that were seen as a single state in the post war period. Therefore social control has mostly been fragmented. The socio-political drama in the contemporary history of mankind has been a conflictual interaction between the state and its allied social organization on one hand and other social organizations dotting society's landscape.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Migdal, Op. Cit., p. 25-26.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 27.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 27-28.

The Environment of Conflict amidst Fragmented Social Control

This drama unfolded in the Third World during the colonial period. D. H. Bayly shows that in India this battle began as the British took forwards its new approach of local police system⁵⁷. The earlier great empires in the region, like the Mauryan, Gupta and Mughal, were content with establishing contacts with autonomous villages. While details of structure and names of agents changed with each of these empires, the traditional police system had persisted. However, with the passage of the Police Act (1861) the state continued to appropriate for itself the role of spelling out police structures and its functions till after independence. More intense struggles occurred in post-colonial societies over issues ranging from strategies of survival to determining property rights that defined the use of assets and resources in society.⁵⁸

The model suggested by Migdal to study state society relations sees society as a mixture of social organizations. Groups possessing social control are heterogeneous in terms of their forms and rules they apply. Also social control is distributed across numerous fairly autonomous groups. So the overall sum of authority is high but the exercise of authority is fragmented. These organizations, including the state, offer individuals with components of strategies of survival. The actual strategies chosen by the individual is dependent on the material incentives or coercion the organization can bear to back themselves and their manipulation of symbols regarding how social life should be ordered.⁵⁹

Various organizations struggling for social control of population create an environment of conflict in society.⁶⁰ Here individuals are forced to choose from competing components of strategies of survival. These choices become increasingly difficult when accompanied by competing sanctions. State leaders too have been a part of environments of conflict. However, their success has been dependent on their ability to get the rule of the state broadly accepted. Focusing on these struggles of social control allows us a better

⁵⁷ David H. Bayly, *The Police and Political Development in India*, Princeton, 1969, p. 38.

⁵⁸ Migdal, *Op. Cit.*, p. 28.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 28-29.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

insight into the process of social change.⁶¹ State has not yet established its predominance in wielding social control. However, where they have failed to do so, they have accommodated with other social actors to lead to more subtle patterns of change. Thus, the struggle over states' desire for predominance, accommodation between the state and other competing organizations, and manoeuvres to get the best deal in any impending accommodation with those competing for social control, depicts the real politics of the Third World.⁶²

Explaining Variation

Countries of the Third World differ from each other not in terms of the amount of social control but in terms of its distribution. While weak societies display low overall levels of social control, strong societies have posed stiffed resistance to moulding by states through sufficient technical resources, committed personnel and managerial skills. State leader like Indira Gandhi experienced such frustration, argues F. R. Frankel, when the government appeared powerless in carrying out its programs of institutional reform after it largest mandate in electoral politics.⁶³

Looking at state society relations in this holistic fashion allows for explaining why states have failed to increase their social control and why its predominance has been so elusive.⁶⁴ At the same time it allows us to understand as to what, in terms of rewards and sanction and/or opportunities and constraints, makes individual choose components for their strategies of survival from opportunity structure by various social actors competing for social control.

What Follows?

Social change based on different theoretical models, to ensure security and development has produced mixed results. The real irony of the way social change has evolved, however, lies in how the state offered an opportunity structure that was positive and

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 30-31.

⁶² Ibid., p. 32.

⁶³ Francis R. Frankel, *Indian's Political Economy 1947 to 1977: The Gradual Revolution*, Princeton, 1978, p. 4.

⁶⁴ Migdal, Op. Cit., p. 41.

constructive for some but detrimental and destructive for the lives of millions from the lower stratum of societies. At the same time, in the era of centralizing power in a technocratic age, as displacement became more voluminous and adjustment slower, the time-gap between the rate of change and the rate of adjustment has increased drastically. Therefore, the role of the state in providing an institution that could adjust the opportunity structure offered by the process of change so as to equally distribute the cost and benefits became critical. It was for such a model of governance that the state claimed monopoly over legitimate means of organized violence. Under such a management of human affairs, the state was to provide for security and opportunity of an improved social life for all especially the downtrodden and the marginalized. However, the states across the world have failed to provide for the same over the territorial boundaries within which the state claimed the *numro uno* status in social control.

This failure has provided other non-state organizations, in contest for social control, an opportunity to provide for components of strategies of survival for individuals by offering alternative opportunity structure of rewards and sanctions other than those of the state. Such institutional hybrids provide societies with fragmented but high levels of social control, thereby leading to a dynamic pattern of social change. The nature and form of this dynamic pattern is largely shaped by the institutional and historical context of the societies undergoing change. While the historical context is provided for in the way society has evolved, interacted with, is influenced by and has influenced the state; the institutional context is provided by the way social control is wielded in society by various institutions, including the state.

Within this broad framework of state society relations, we look at the State of Jharkhand, India. Jharkhand was created as an autonomous state within the state of India in November 2000 after a long period of struggle. However, even as the political aspirations of 'the people' have been fulfilled, their socio economic condition has deteriorated further due to the persistence of Naxal violence. A similar story can be heard across India, where a highly violent dimension in form of ultra left extremism, has been assumed, in the last decade or so. Jharkhand offers a good case for analysing this dynamic. The fact that Jharkhand as region actually deteriorated (*vis-à-vis* Bihar) after

independence, its development deficit due to the exiting statist model, its identity politics and subsequent 'autonomy' for charting its own course of development, when seen in the present context of rampant use of organized violence as a means to attain social control, makes it an intriguing context. It offers the opportunity to analyse the complex processes through which social change has evolved and the role that fragmented social control, wielded through use of organized violence, plays in it.

Chapter 2

The Problem of Persistence

The problem of persistence of the failure of the state 'to do what it claims to do' has to be analysed by exploring the gaps between the assumed and the actual social control wielded by the state. Acknowledging that there is a gap in the image of the preponderant state dominance in the realm of social control and the way it actually translates at the local levels, allows us to explore those interaction that are responsible for the persistence of this problem. With a similar approach we look at the first decade of the 21st century that brought the Indian state face to face with its nemesis in the form of left wing extremism, led by the newly emerging Communist Party of India (Maoist). The fact that the latest incarnation of the Naxal insurgency had actually emerged from the ruins of the Naxalite movement of the 1960s, shows the deep-rooted nature of the challenge.

Faced with this challenge, which had actually gathered momentum in the last two decades of the 20th century, the government's response was not only late but also disjointed. The central government took serious account of this challenge only by the early part of the first decade of the 21st century, in 2003¹. However, within a few years the state realized the scale of the challenge it faced and termed Naxalism as 'the single largest threat to internal security ever faced by the State'.² Acknowledging that it is not merely a law and order problem but has socio-economic dimensions as well, the state has over the last few years launched a dual response to this challenge. While on one hand there is massive recruitment and mobilization of security personnel to deal sternly with Naxal violence, on the other, large amounts of developmental and modernization funds are being pumped in the Naxal-affected districts of the state³.

¹ *MHA Annual Report 2003-04* includes Naxalism as an issue of internal security concern for the first time. Till then it has mostly been seen as a law and order problem and therefore a concern for the States.

² The Prime Minister in his address to the Chief Ministers of the affected states in 2006 as retrieved from www.pib.nic.in

³ Annual Reports of the MHA since 2003 give a detail of how the state has increased the number of security personnel in the 'affected area'. This figure for the death toll and incident of Naxal violence is also on the MHA Annual Reports since 2003-04.

However, in spite of sustained efforts to enhance the security and developmental indices of these regions, the state has failed miserably in meeting the challenge. The Naxals have gone on to become the single largest insurgent groups confronting the Indian state in 16 of its 28 states. According to the Home Ministry's own figures, overall Naxals influence spread from 56 districts in 2001 to 223 in 2009 with a casualty rate of 500 or more annually, for a decade now⁴. However, this geographical expansion has not necessarily translated into an increase in number of 'liberated zones' for the Naxals either. They continue to exist on the margins of the Indian political system and have not been able to have a significant say in the decision making process. What seems to be emerging is a self sustaining low intensity war that has consistently killed more people, and caused more destruction and underdevelopment.

At the same time, there is something different about the Naxalism that has emerged in the twenty first century. They, unlike earlier armed agrarian revolts, have been able to sustain their violence for over a decade now. At the same time, their military organisation and weaponry has evolved drastically from locally available guns of the zamindars to highly sophisticated and deadly landmines. Also in terms of their geographical expanse they have outgrown every other armed rebellion like those of Punjab, Kashmir and the North East.

Therefore it is important to understand the process by which this Naxal violence continues to persist despite sustained effort by the state. However, as argued in chapter 1, to be able to understand this process one has to look at the how a gap comes about in the image of the state and its objective as articulated in its policies and the actual outcome at the level of ground reality. Therefore we first expand on the state in society approach as put forth by Migdal, as it allows us to look at states as disaggregated entities and allows for the analysis of the rich negotiation that lead to the gap. Thereafter we look at how the Indian state actually operates to understand why the approach has been used in the present study. The final section of the chapter elaborates on the image of the challenge of Naxalism as has been articulated in the governmental reports on internal security. The

⁴ While the 2001 figure are from the MHA annual report 2003-04, those for 2009 have been reported in Ramakrishnan, V., '*Flawed Operation*', 2010 in, <http://www.flonnet.com/fl2709/stories/20100507270900400.htm>

deviations that have been pointed out vis-a-vis the image created by the state and the context in which the study is undertaken are discussed in the next chapter.

State in Society Approach

States in order to increase their strength and autonomy must increase their social control. But without already-existing social control, they face difficulties in offering viable strategies of social survival to individuals within their proclaimed territory. Meanwhile, other social actors, with a collection of sanctions and rewards, organize resources into selective incentives constituting alternative strategies. With the fragmented social control that they wield, these non state social actors negotiate and align with parts of the state, to further their own social control. The local state official is often in a dilemma between the state instructions and the counter pressures from other social groups on how to use resources. To avoid inflicting damages upon their chances for advancement or political survival, many state employees accommodate these local figures. Thus, even when state resources have a deep impact on local society; it may end up strengthening local social organizations at the state's expense.⁵

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Such deviations reflect the existence of alternate pockets of social control shaping how the state or its parts acts⁶. Without pre existing social control, the state may lack a sufficient autonomy to pursue policies that run counter to the existing distribution of social control among sectors in the society. Thus, policies tend to or end up favouring the most powerful sector and states are unable to change this pattern. Also, with inadequate power base for the state, the state itself becomes a tempting political prize for those with organizational backing, either in society at large or even within the state's apparatus. However with the capture of this political prize of the state apparatus, without adequate social control, leaders have to turn their attention to staying in power, lest they get displaced by others.⁷

⁵ Joel S Migdal, *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*, Cambridge, 2005, p. 53.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid., p. 54.



Explaining Deviation

In the wake of public choice theory and neo-institutionalism, these deviations in state behaviour were seen as corruption with its focus on the problem of deficiency in monitoring distribution. Various terms like corruption, weakness, and relative capacity have been used to imply that a deviation has come about between what states are in practice and the normative model of the state-society relations. However, the assumption that the state has to have preponderant social control ‘minimizes and trivializes the rich negotiation, interaction, and resistance that occur in every human society among multiple systems of rules and offers no scope for theorizing about conflict and contestation over social control’.⁸

Migdal points out that the states varied in terms of the ability of its leaders and officials to garner resources and organize its redistribution, mobilize its population through taxation, aid, plunder, conscription, and so on; in their effectiveness in executing its policies, their inner coherence in terms of their constituencies and the interest they represent, and the means used to achieve the selective distribution of rewards⁹. Therefore for Migdal:

state-in-society, depicts society as a *mélange* of social organizations rather than a dichotomous structure. Various formations, including the idea of the state as well as many others (which may or may not include parts of the state) singly or in tandem offer individuals strategies of personal survival and, for some, strategies of upward mobility. Individual choice among strategies is based on the material incentives and coercion organizations can bring to bear and on the organizations’ use of symbols and values concerning how social life should be ordered. These symbols and values either reinforce the forms of social control in the society or propose new forms of social life. Indeed, this struggle is ongoing in every society. Societies are not static formations but are constantly *becoming* as a result of these struggles over social control¹⁰

To be able explore these dimensions of state society relation, Migdal sees the state as a ‘field of power’ marked by the use and threat of violence. It is shaped by the dynamics

⁸ Ibid., p. 14.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid., p 47.

between the image of state as a coherent, controlling organization representing the people within a territory, and the practices of the state and its multiple parts.¹¹

Dynamic Conception of State

The first dimension, the image of the state, deals with perception of the state as the sovereign authority within its territorial boundaries by those inside and outside its territory. The image of the state projects it as an entity having dual boundaries. The first boundary deals with its territorial aspect as between states representing “clearly defined images of how the world is structured geographically”. The second dimension of boundary of the state deals with “social boundaries between the state (public) and those who are subjected to its rules (private)”. Social boundaries are based on the premise that “state, the sovereign authority, is distinct and above the people it represents”.¹²

The second dimension shaping the field of power of the state involves the practices of the state and its parts. The “routine performances of state actors and agencies, their practices, have a major role to play in the construction and maintenance or erosion of the image of the state with its territorial and public-private boundaries”. Various practices of the state and its agents “fortified the image of the territorial boundaries as being real and effective”. At the state time, recognition of these territorial boundaries by those outside the state reinforces and validates them even further. Likewise, practices also serve as the basis to recognize, reinforce, and validate the social separation between the state and other social formations as by reinforcing the image or myth of the state. Foucault made this point by arguing that governments use the “tactics of continuous definition and redefinition of what the state is competent to do, and what constitutes the public and the private”. Therefore, the state should be understood in its survival and its boundaries on the basis of the general tactics of governmentality.¹³

¹¹ Ibid p., 15.

¹² Ibid. p. 16-17

¹³ Ibid., p. 17

Separating Practice from the Image

Foucault separated the practices of the state or “the tactics of governmentality”, from the image of the state, but he assumed that these tactics of governmentality always reinforce the accepted myth or image of the state and its boundaries. He pointed out:

It is the tactics of government which make possible the continual definition and redefinition of what is within the competence of the state and what is not, the public versus the private, and so on; thus the state can only be understood in its survival and its limits on the basis of the general tactics of governmentality¹⁴

In reality, practices may also work against these myths and perceptions about the state. Migdal’s definition of the state allows for the inclusion of those practices that erode “the image of a coherent, controlling state and neutralize the territorial and public-private boundaries”.¹⁵ What is being labelled as corruption or criminality (nepotism or smuggling), can also be looked at as a morality favouring kinship ties over meritocracy or one expressing the right of movement of people and goods across the boundaries arbitrarily imposed by state law. Akhil Gupta has argued that “instead of treating corruption as a dysfunctional aspect of state organizations, it should be seen as a mechanism through which ‘the state’ itself is discursively constituted”.¹⁶

Thus Migdal argues

sheer unwieldy character the territory of the states far-flung parts, the many fronts on which the state and its agencies compete for social control, and the lure for state officials of alternative sets of rules that might have all contributed to deviation in the image of the state and its practice. The alliances between the parts of the state and other social actors have been forged to further personal goals by promoting a variety of sets of rules, not necessarily in consonance with those set out in the state’s own official laws and regulations. These networks and their competing structures of opportunities with their own set of sanction and rewards blur the territorial and social boundary of the state and erode the demarcation between the state as preeminent rule maker and society as the recipient of those rules.¹⁷

¹⁴ Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, ed., *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, Chicago, 1991, p. 103.

¹⁵ Migdal, Op. Cit., p. 18.

¹⁶ Akhil Gupta, ‘Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Politics, and the Imagined State’ in *American Ethnologist*, Vol. 22, no. 2, May 1995, p. 376.

¹⁷ Migdal, Op. Cit., p. 19.

Thus, by conceptualizing the state as a 'field of power' an attempt is made to encapsulate both image and practice in the definition of state. The concept of field is adapted from Pierre Bourdieu¹⁸. Bourdieu notes that fields are 'relationships in a multidimensional space', in which the central phenomenon is struggle.¹⁹ Migdal conceptualises the state as a field of power, to emphasize what Bourdieu calls the "multi-dimensional space of positions", using the word "power" to denote the struggles over who dominates.²⁰

Directing the Process of Social Change

Societal change, many assumed, came about as the modern sector gained strength and overcame stubborn beliefs and structures of the traditional sector. Drawing on Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils spelled out the implicit components of the state, the bearer of the modern sector. The first component is the central value system representing "the order of symbols, of values and beliefs, which govern the society".²¹ The second component "consists of those institutions (and roles) which exercise authority and create and diffuse cultural symbols".²² The third component of the centre is the elite or "those acting as custodians of the central value system" and the institutions. Shils understood the process of social change through "the dynamism and activism of the centre while the periphery remains a passive recipient". The essential point being made was the occurrence of "a stable process of social change based on a consensus among its elites, from various sectors with their own organizations and rules, on the essential order of values".²³ This effectiveness, however, of the centre based on the consensus amongst the elite, has been questioned especially in context of the third world countries.²⁴

Adapting from Shils, Migdal builds a new model to understand how societies persist and change. It starts with analyzing how organizations exercise social control. Political leaders assert the "idea of the state" to create the "organization with preponderant social

¹⁸ Pierre Bourdieu, 'The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups' in *Theory and Society*, vol. 14, no.6, November 1985, pp. 723–44.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 734.

²⁰ Migdal, *Op. Cit.*, p. 21.

²¹ Edward Shils, *Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology*, Chicago, 1975, p. 3.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 39.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

control”. However leaders of non state organizations exerting social control were not willing to surrender their power without struggle. In this struggle, “they formed alliances with parts of the state, and developed practices contradicting the official laws and regulations of the state”. Migdal takes these struggles for social control into account and depicts society with multiple social organizations exercising social control.

Herein, the state is seen as a much more tentative, limited entity. Seen in this light,

[s]ociety is a web or mélange, with multiple rule-making loci and the hidden and open conflict among these multiple centres seeking dominance in the realm of social control. The state, embedded in an environment of international and domestic constraining forces, allows leaders to behave in manners that undermine the very state agencies meant to be the foundation for strong states. At the same time, states through their practices lay claims to the collective consciousness of their population. However non state actors struggle and contest over defining and mobilizing the numerous forms of collective consciousness in society.²⁵

These organizations, including the state and/or its part(s), singly or in association with others offer individuals strategies of survival and upward mobility. With high levels of social control, social organization can mobilize their populations effectively, gaining tremendous strength in facing external foes, and autonomy internally to impose their own sets of rules for society; build complex, coordinated agency to establish these rules; and seek to monopolize coercive means in the society.²⁶

Indicators of Changing Social Control

Increasing levels of social control are reflected through a scale of three indicators. The first indicator is compliance.

Compliance or “the degree to which the population conforms to the demands of the organization” is dependent on the most basic of sanctions, force. The control over means of organized violence is among the most important factors in the distribution of social control in a society. The ability to control the dispersal of other resources and services also determines the degree to which the organizations can demand compliance.

²⁵ Migadal, Op. cit., p. 37.

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 48-51.

The second indicator is that of participation. Leaders seek participation more than compliance as organizing the population for specialized tasks adds to the strength of the institutional components of the organization.

The last factor is legitimacy, the most potent factor determining social control. It involves the acceptance of the organization's set social control, as true and right. While the first two indicators may be the result of consideration for the rewards and sanctions, legitimacy involves the acceptance of a particular social order.²⁷ As Poggi has pointed out, "it involves the acceptance and agreement of the organization's social control as right. It included accepting the symbolic configuration in which awards and sanctions are packaged".²⁸

Having outlined the approach that is being taken to study the problem we now look at why such a conception is applicable in this case. What follows argues how the 'intermediate class' along with the local state has created an informal economy that results in the creation of a 'shadow state'.

The Indian State-Society Relation

Most of the empirical literature on the Indian State focuses on three main contradictions or tensions. The first involves the contradiction or tension between planned (socialist) development and an accommodative, formally democratic kind of politics that leads politicians to adopt populist measures or what Myrdal calls 'the soft state'.²⁹ The second major tension is between democratic and coalition politics, where continual policy negotiations and compromises leads to policy-dilution and the proliferation of subsidies.³⁰ The third major tension is between planned development and the interests of private capital. Byres argued that "[t]he State provides the infrastructure that supports private capital, but also regulates private capital and even substitutes for it where capital will not or cannot go, or where it cannot be trusted. The scale of the funds involved gives

²⁷ Ibid., p. 51-52.

²⁸ Gianfranco Poggi, *The Development of Modern State: A Sociological Introduction*, Stanford, 1978, p. 101.

²⁹ Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*, Massachusetts, 1968, p. 11.

³⁰ Pranab Bardhan, *The Political Economy of Development in India*, New Delhi, 1998, p. 17.

rise to increasingly massive acts of fraud, accentuating the distortions caused by tax evasion”.³¹

Across these debates, the Indian State has been analyzed in terms of its developmental autonomy, the class coalitions it expresses, and its class embeddedness. Scholars like Pranab Bardhan and T J Byres saw the Indian State as consisting of coalitions protecting the capitalist class³² while ignoring the role of the developmental state in projects of non-capitalist social transformation (for example, anti-poverty policy and caste reservations). Other scholars like Atul Kohli, who have seen the state as autonomous and developmental,³³ overlook its bias towards private interest. Still others like Peter Evans see the Indian State as being embedded in class.³⁴ However, they too tend to brush aside its role as an arena of social contestation along other lines. Those reviewing the literature on the Indian State too report no consensus.³⁵ Tensions also exist between parts of the state over their respective jurisdictions, power and resources, degrees of autonomy amongst and between the different levels within each jurisdiction.

The only point that can be inferred from these debates about the Indian state is that the state, in parts, displays all these characteristics. Therefore the state cannot be assumed to be a coherent entity and has dichotomies within it. Thus while protecting the capitalist class the state has also taken up the role of the developmental state and has been involved in non capitalist projects like anti poverty schemes, protective discrimination, and public distribution. These have improved the living condition of a large section of Indian society, if not all. At the same time the state has also served as an arena for social contestation and conflicts especially through its electoral politics.

Therefore one has to explore the ways in which these dichotomies within the state have influenced the process of social change rather than focussing on failure of a ‘supposedly’ coherent entity like state. The next section therefore elaborates how the various parts of

³¹ T J Byres, *The State, Development Planning and Liberalisation in India*, New Delhi, 1996, p. 11-15.

³² Bardhan, Op. cit., p 40; Ibid., p. 67.

³³ Atul Kohli, *Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing Crisis of Governability*, Cambridge, 1990, p. 12.

³⁴ Peter B Evans, *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation*, Princeton, NJ, 1995, p. 3.

³⁵ Barbara Harriss-White, *India Working: Essays in Society and Economy*, New York, 2003, p. 73.

the state actually conceive the image of the state of India, reflected in its socio-economic policies, and how it is actually practised at the grass-root level.

The Informal Economy

Looking at the local state, we find ourselves in a realm beyond the ambit of state regulation and into the informal economy.³⁶ The informal economy works through two different though related ways. In the first sense, it involves those economic activities that are not registered for taxation and/or regulation by the state.³⁷ Here, production or/and exchange takes place outside market transactions and includes exchanges of clientelage and patronage, and other kinds of collective action. These are the kinds of exchanges that Offer has called the ‘economy of regard’.³⁸

The second meaning of “the informal economy” is a “particular type of behaviour *within* the formal economy” that is “not covered by state regulation or record-keeping” due to the alliance between the producers and the state. As parts of the state are themselves involved in it, informal practices and rules that govern them are accepted as legitimate.³⁹ What sustains this informal sector of the economy is an increasingly criminalised political process in the service of private accumulation: a nexus in which politicians, officials, criminals, and businessmen and their (often poor and dependent) ‘runners’ and fixers are bound together in a mutually protective embrace.⁴⁰

These informal economies are also regulated, partly,

some of the *non-State* means involved: the use of trusted family labour; bilateral and multilateral contracts, especially repeated and interlocked contracts, usually through networks; the importance of individual and collective reputation; regulation through

³⁶ Ibid., p. 74.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 4.

³⁸ A. Offer, ‘Between the Gift and the Market: The Economy of Regard’, *Oxford Papers in Economic and Social History*, No. 3, Nuffield College, Oxford, 1996, p 16.

³⁹ M. Khan, and K. S Jomo, eds., *Rents, Rent-seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia*, Cambridge, 2000, pp. 1-3.

⁴⁰ S Guhan and Paul, S., eds., *Corruption in India: Agenda for Action*, New Delhi, 1997; and, Visvanathan, S. and Sethi, H., eds., *Foul Play: Chronicles of Corruption, 1947–1997*, New Delhi, 1998.

collective institutions; through an often inconsistent normative pluralism; and through private protection forces.⁴¹

Most research on the local State looks at access and coverage. Much of it deals with numbers – quantifying the eligible ‘targets’ and contrasting them with the actual ‘beneficiaries’. Reviewing this body of work, Akhil Gupta noted that “surprisingly little [research] has been conducted in the small towns where ... a large number of officials live and work”.⁴² Gupta’s article on “blurred boundaries” analyzes the case from India where private space is used for public business in India. He recounts the case of Sharmaji, an Indian land official, who had converted the lower part of his home as his ‘office’. “That is where he was usually to be found, surrounded by clients, sycophants, and colleagues”. While one of his aides helped mediate between Sharmaji and people to negotiate the charge to “get the job done”, another assisted with official and household tasks.⁴³ In such a scenario the distinction between private and public space, work, and fees were all rolled in one. Therefore the interaction between the state and the non state actors within this informal economy is crucial for the process of social change.

The Intermediate Class

Michael Kalecki, explaining such a process of change, uses his concept of ‘intermediate class’ to argue that ‘self employed, might be the class elements that mattered most in the process of social change’.⁴⁴ He argued that

“The social system in which the lower middle class cooperates with state capitalism calls for somewhat more detailed discussion... this system is highly advantageous to the lower middle class and the rich peasantry; state capitalism concentrates investment on the expansion of the productive capital of the country. Thus there is no danger of forcing the small firms out of business which a characteristic feature of the early stages of industrialization under *laissez-faire*. Next the rapid development of state enterprise creates executives and technical openings for ambitious young men of the numerous ruling classes... Land reforms, which is not preceded by an agrarian revolution, is conducted in such a way that the middle class that directly exploits the poor peasants i.e.

⁴¹ Harriss-White, Op. cit., p. 75.

⁴² Akhil Gupta, ‘Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Politics, and the Imagined State’ in *American Ethnologist*, vol. 22, no. 2 May 1995, p. 376.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 379.

⁴⁴ M. Kalecki, *Essays on the Economic Growth of the Socialist and the Mixed Economy*, London, 1972, cited by Barbara Harriss-White, *India Working: Essays in Society and Economy*, New York, 2003, p. 43.

the money lender and the merchants which directly maintains its position, while the rich peasantry achieves considerable gains in the process⁴⁵.

K. N. Raj applied this conception of intermediate regime in the Indian context. He points out that

the new 'ruling class' is made up of very disparate elements- rich peasants, small traders, educated professionals, and civil servants- which have conflicting interests amongst themselves. The government has to make itself responsible for investment but this type of regime is not favourable to rapid development. Public enterprise is confined to basic industries and is expected to sell its products and service at low prices, leaving the profitable market of small business. Taxation of agriculture is almost nonexistent and taxation of the urban areas is freely evaded. Thus funds for development are hard to extract. Both agriculture and manufactures fail to develop efficiently, and whatever growth of national income is achieved is mainly swallowed up in growing consumption. The small industrial working class may be able to organize and get some benefits for itself; the great mass of small peasants, landless workers and ever growing number of unemployed, scratching a bare living in the cities, dwell in swamp of misery, but they do not pose a threat to the regime. Any attempt to organize these people politically is quickly crushed.⁴⁶

The concept was later refined and applied to India's conditions of economic stagnation by P.S. Jha. For Jha, the defining characteristic of these classes in their earnings is that "they can neither be classified as a reward for labour, nor as a payment for risk-taking (that is, profit) but as an amalgam of the two". The bureaucracy, though a wage earning class, are also "*de facto* self-employed as they earn a fee from the provision of their services⁴⁷ other than the official ones".⁴⁸

The Erosion of Legitimacy

At the same time, social identity becomes an important determinant in the access to the State, its allocations and social transfers reinforcing social divisions. Therefore as the legitimacy of the state weakens; the local state apparatus and its policies become subordinated to the interests of local capital.⁴⁹ Amidst all these coalitions between local

⁴⁵ Jerzy Osiatyndki, ed., *Collected works of Michal Kalecki: Volume V Developing Economies*, New York, 1993, p. 8.

⁴⁶ K. N. Raj, 'The Politics and Economics of Intermediate Regimes', *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. VIII, 7 July, 1973, cited by Jerzy Osiatyndki, ed., *Collected works of Michal Kalecki: Volume V Developing Economies*, New York, 1993, p. 235.

⁴⁷ P. S. Jha, *The Political Economy of Stagnation*, Delhi, 1980, p. 95.

⁴⁸ Harriss-White, *Op Cit.*, p. 60-61.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

state and non state actors, the institutions needed by the mass of the workforce to redress the 'hidden injuries of class' get destroyed.⁵⁰

There has been a rise in the discretionary powers of officials, and also of their patrons and minders in civil society. But as the state and its elements become weaker, it attempts to buy off powerful challenges. Politicians have long used this strategy to project themselves as brokers who are paid by local elites for preventing regulation and taxation and by officials to influence their transfers and promotions. These payments are seen as returns to investments in the electoral process, and reinforce a politician's capacity to see off challenges⁵¹. At the same time, officials who have made the payments drastically reduce the quality of administration. As the quality of supervision declines, disincentives to innovate get built in and planned projects become subject to time and cost overruns.⁵²

The Crisis of Leadership

During the 1980s, the pattern of political change in India saw on one hand, a trend whereby the control over governmental decisions tended to centralize/concentrate in leaders who ruled by the virtue of personal popularity. However these leaders found it extremely difficult to transform their personal power into problem solving political resource. The resulting consequence on the political system of this dichotomy in the power of the leaders and their ability to transform society had some typical political consequences. Governmental legitimacy was hard to sustain. There was a high leadership turnover below the highest rank. The state continued to perform at low levels of efficiency in terms of accommodating conflictual interests and of solving development problems. Political violence and poverty dictated the political scene. There was a double movement towards centralized action and powerlessness in India. With this analysis Atul Kohli argues that such tendencies towards centralization and powerlessness are generated

⁵⁰ Stuart Corbridge and John Harriss, *Reinventing India: Liberalisation, Hindu Nationalism and Popular Democracy*, Cambridge, 2000, p. 171.

⁵¹ Harriss-White, Op. Cit., p. 95-96.

⁵² Ibid., p. 97-99.

in a political environment with near absence of systematic authority links between state's apex and its vast social periphery⁵³.

Kohli points out that in the 1950s, Congress forged patronage links with regional and local elite to create a chain of influential class that stretched from the local to the central. However, in the 1970s and 1980s, these links within the authority structures were severed due to several factors. The democratic politics undermined the influence of the elite while the nationalist parties were destroyed by intra elite conflicts. The plural diversity of the country eroded traditional authority of the Congress leaders in the social structure created by a fragmented political situation.

Leaders with populist and personal appeals were the ones forging the semblance in such a fragmented polity. Once in power, these populist leaders did not perceive the need to build political institutions or rules and procedures like party organizations. This made the link between state and society even weaker.⁵⁴ Political struggles and conflict emerged in the localized social arena, with the spread of democratic polity, it facilitated the emergence of leaders who ruled by personal and populist appeal. This allowed the leaders to claim too much without having the capability to do so.⁵⁵ This state of affairs was described as 'political decay'⁵⁶ by Kohli himself earlier.

The Persistence of Intermediate Class

The "proliferation of subsidies and grants" in the 1980s was seen as the reason for this problem.⁵⁷ The 'solution' was seen in a *reduction* in the rewards to political power, and 'removing the economy from politics'. In other words, it implied stopping the state from being used as a means of accumulation.⁵⁸ The 'intermediate classes' thrived on a structure of regulation that has a heavy emphasis on trade and distribution. The

⁵³ Atul Kohli, 'Centralization and Powerlessness: India's Democracy in a Comparative Perspective' in Joel S. Migdal, and Atul Kohli, eds., *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World*, Cambridge, 1994, p. 89.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

⁵⁶ Atul Kohli, *Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing Crisis of Governability*, Cambridge, 1990, pp. 3-7.

⁵⁷ Bardhan, *Op. Cit.*, p. 218.

⁵⁸ Harriss-White, *Op. Cit.*, p. 63.

dismantling of the regulative structures in the 1980s and early 1990s was seen as having led to a shift away from trade and towards production. The tax system was changed so that small businesses and the self-employed were to have a tax liability, so as to reduce non-compliance. At the same time, cuts in fertilizer subsidies and directed credit for removing price distortions were hedged and mitigated in practice.⁵⁹ Thus the 1990s saw a new era of public-private partnerships ushered in, when innovations in regulation policy were first given shape by the Congress and United Front government.

However, the intermediate class continued to persist as

the process of liberalization was slow and erratic due to factors like the politically unstable conditions... the resistance within parts of the state... coalition politics setting constraints on action due to consensus. In this process, election agendas were based on identity, national security and control over the means of repression”.⁶⁰ Organized crime based on the privatization of physical security measures concentrated in sectors such as non-institutional finance, the wholesaling of food grains, and transport. At the same time, “taxes are evaded by a great variety of means like under-declaration, under-billing, unlicensed operation, collective negotiation, pre-emptive investment and so on. At the same time, labour continues to be treated in an oppressive manner.”⁶¹

Thus, even if the economy was being effectively removed from the control of elected politicians by liberalization, there is a ‘politics’ or real power relations at work in the economy. Since the 1990s, a new wave of ‘primitive’ accumulation has swept through the local economy. It is primitive as “it was still the accumulation prior to and needed for modern capitalist enterprise... [and] significant elements in these initial resources are obtained through fraud, corruption and economic crime against labour, consumers, weaker competitors and the State. ‘Primitive accumulation’, therefore, not only *pre-exists* the era of productive capital but also *coexists* with it”⁶². Barbara Harriss-White contends that the official part of the state has been hollowed out and replaced by a ‘shadow

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 61-62.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 63-64.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 64.

⁶² Ibid., p. 65.

state'.⁶³ They also need the protection of intermediaries to chart an unsteady course through what Chatterjee has called 'the politics of governmentality'.⁶⁴

The state in society approach allows for a better understanding of the working of the Indian state put forth by White. By incorporating the alliance and network and the negotiation that takes place between them, the approach not only acknowledges the existence of the informal economy but is also aware to the alliance of the 'intermediate class' and the state that sustains this informal economy. Having elaborated on the working of the Indian state at the local level using the state and society approach we now try and look at the issue of persistence of Naxal violence in India especially in the last decade or so.

The above discussion of state society relation was to understand how the state at the local level—where the actual practice of the state takes place—works in ways that do not necessarily reinforce the image of the state. The agents of the state use the resources and services available through the state to further enhance their own interest via the interest of their collaborators. It is these intricate networks of alliance that brings about a difference in objective and the outcome of governmental policies. It is such a working of the Indian state that makes it pertinent to analyse the problem of persistence through the state in society approach. The next section elaborates on how the image of perpetual war has been created by the Indian state.

This first involves looking at how the image of the war has been created by both these actors, the state and the Naxal. The rest of the chapter looks at how the images of the war have been projected by both these parties. While the first part of this section looks at how the Naxals have projected their side of the war in their attempt to seek social control, the second looks at how the state has responded to the challenge. The purpose of this section is to look at how the state and the Naxals have sought to compete for social control.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 77.

⁶⁴ Partha Chatterjee, *The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World*, New York, 2004, p. 24.

The Image of the Perpetual War

Mao had noted that “revolutionary warfare is never confined within the bounds of military action. Since its purpose is to destroy an existing society and its institutions, and to replace them with a completely new structure; any revolutionary war is a unity of which the constituent parts, in varying importance, are military, political, economic, social and psychological.”⁶⁵ Following this ideology, the Naxals in India led by CPI (Maoist) have engaged in a ‘protracted.

Even though the Naxal movement began in the late 1960s, it has been for most part of its history seen by the state as a law and order problem. As law and order is within the state list, the problem has been mostly look at by the State which experiences such a movement. Even then, as an expert committee formed by the Planning Commission pointed out, “no report since the late 1980s has tried to examine the issue [of Naxalism] for the government.”⁶⁶ This was primarily because since the late 1980s, the two different streams of the Naxalite movement, Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI) and People’s War Group (PWG), drifted along with their respective tactics – often fighting among themselves. However, by the mid-1990s, they had been able to re-organise enough underground bases to launch an offensive.

As the decade and the century came to an end, Naxals had remerged in the Indian political scene. A high level Coordination Centre was set up in 1998 headed by the Union Home Secretary with the Chief Secretaries and Director General of police of the Naxal affected states as its member to “ review and co ordinate steps taken by the by the States to control Naxalite activities”⁶⁷. Still the government did not consider it important enough to be included in the annual Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) till 2003. Thus since 2003, the state has not only projected but has even mobilised its resources and forces to meet this challenge.

⁶⁵ Mao Tse-tung, 1962, p. 7 as cited by Ajai Shani, ‘*Left Wing Extremism in India: Evolving Strategies for Containment*’ Institute of Conflict Management, October 2006.

⁶⁶ *Development Challenges in Extremist Affected Areas: Report of an Expert Committee to the Planning Commission*, New Delhi, 2008, p. 3.

⁶⁷ *MHA Annual Report 2005-06*, p. 18.

The Genesis of Conflict

As the Naxals began expanding in India by the turn of the century, their prime motive was seen as “spreading into new areas to carve out a ‘Compact Revolutionary Zone’ spreading from Nepal through Bihar, Orissa, Chattisgarh, to Andhra Pradesh”⁶⁸. Towards this end, the various Naxals groups in India had started reuniting after almost two decades of infighting. At the same time the MHA argued that the Naxals had taken up “vigorous militarisation... organising a string of military camps... extensive recruitment in their strongholds... using sophisticated weapons like AK 47s, Self loading Rifles (SLR)... have developed expertise in the fabrication and use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED).” The ministry also pointed out that there was an “increase in attacks on the Police” and the Naxals had “started blasting railway stations”. On October 1, 2003, the Naxals conducted, their first of what has become a long list of high profile attacks, attempted to assassinate the then Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister, Chandra Babu Naidu “by blasting claymore mines”.⁶⁹

The ministry however saw the challenge as merely a ‘matter of grave concern’ that could be dealt with by

removing all the shortcomings in intelligence sharing and mounting a well coordinated anti-Naxalite operation by joined task forces of the concerned States... accelerate the physical and social infrastructure in the affected districts... the central government has adopted multi-pronged strategy to tackle the problem of Naxalism which includes modernization and strengthening of the State Police Forces, better training to police personnel, Special Task Forces for intelligence based coordinated anti Naxalite operations, focused attention on developmental aspect and gearing up of the public grievances redressal system and encouraging local resistance groups at the grass roots level.⁷⁰

The state governments were asked to harness the strong anti-Naxal feeling prevailing amidst a section of the villagers. The Central Government cited “recent developments in Jharkhand, where Communist Party (Marxist Leninist- Peoples War) (CPML-PW) encountered strong resistance from villagers in Lango village, in Dumaria, in the East

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 18.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 19.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 21.

Singhbhum district... states were requested to ‘explore the feasibility of appointing Special Police Officers (SPOs), Nagrik Suraksha Samitis (NSSs) and Village Defence Committees (VDCs) in the villages affected by Naxalism’. The states were also given the freedom to “engage Naxal outfits in peace dialogue within the framework of the Constitution”.⁷¹

At the same time, “the Planning Commission included 55 Naxal affected district under the Backward District Initiative (BDI) ... to fill the critical gap in physical and social infrastructure in these [Naxal affected] area... while Ministry of Rural Development has placed...additional Allocation to execute rural roads in the Naxal affected areas under the Pradhan Mantri Grameen Sadak Yojana (PMGSY)”

The Emerging Enemy

In the year 2004, challenge posed by the Naxals in India changed its scope and dimension with the “CPML-PW leaders announced (October 14, 2004) the merger of CPML-PW and MCCI and the creation of a single outfit called the CPI (Maoist)”. The merger was “affected on 21st of September, 2004 ... under the overall command of Muppala Laxamana Rao a.k.a Ganapathy”. In this light the government believed that merger would “amplify the Naxal menace particularly in the state of West Bengal, Orissa and West Bengal”⁷². However except for a change in the way the challenge was articulated no major shift in policy recommendation in 2004. Another reason for this could also be the ongoing ‘peace talks’ in Andhra Pradesh between CPML PW, the Jana Shakti leaders and the State government.

In terms of articulating, there was a greater detailing of the characteristics of the challenge. So from being “a serious threat to internal security in the country” in 2003, was in 2004 being seen as a “cause of serious concern”. The report saw the Naxal challenge as being characterised by “Jan Adalats, targeted attacks on police, police informer, ruling political class and soft targets like the railways, buttressed by steadfast

⁷¹ Ibid., pp. 22-23.

⁷² Ibid., p. 39, 44.

militarisation including upgradation in military capability and change in tactics ... called for boycott of Assembly/Parliament polls in their stronghold.” The report also claimed the “the Naxalites have an assessed strength of around 9300 hard core cadre and a holding of around 6500 regular weapons beside a large number of unlicensed country made gun” and have “built up an expertise in fabricating Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)/ Landmines that they use with telling effect”.⁷³

Elaborating of the Jan Adalats organised by the Naxals, the report stated “the Jan Adalats [were held by Naxal cadre] essentially to dispense quick and crude justice and redress local grievances... to supplant the State machinery and assert their hegemony over rural tracks”. It also gave out the figure for the execution and Jan Adalats of the last two years as “155 Jan Adalats were held (15 executions) in the year 2004 as against 153 Jan Adalats (21 executions) in the year 2003.”⁷⁴

Persistence of War

The detailed conception of the challenges posed by the Naxals was emanating primarily because,

[d]espite serious efforts at the Central and State levels to contain Naxal violence and initiation of peace process between the Communist Party Marxist Leninist – Peoples War Group (CPML-PW) and the government in Andhra Pradesh, the overall quantum of Naxal remained more or less at the same level as during the preceding year. The problem, however, has affected a larger area, in varying degrees⁷⁵.

In this light, the state changed its view of the nature of the Naxal challenge by seeing it “not merely a law and order problem.” Therefore, it aimed to tackle the situation on “political, social, economic and security fronts by way of a multi-pronged strategy”.

These included

having a peace dialogue by the affected States with Naxal groups if they are willing to shun violence and local conditions are conducive for talks; Strengthening of administrative machinery to make it more responsive, transparent and sensitive to enable effective redressal of public grievances and improved delivery mechanisms aimed at

⁷³ MHA Annual Report 2004-05, p. 44.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 44.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 39.

accelerated integrated development including enhanced employment opportunities of Naxal affected districts, and Building up of local capabilities by the affected States in terms of improved intelligence gathering and sharing mechanisms and specially trained and well equipped police forces to facilitate effective police action in a coordinated and sustained manner⁷⁶.

So during the 16th meeting of the Coordination Centre, held in New Delhi on December 4, 2004, “[t]he Naxal affected States were advised to give topmost priority in evolving an effective strategy to counter this menace. Simultaneously, it was once again emphasized that the Naxal problem has to be addressed on both security and development fronts.”⁷⁷ At the same time “a Task Force has been constituted on October 7, 2004 under the Chairmanship of Special Secretary, MHA, to deliberate upon the entire gamut of steps needed to deal with the menace of Naxalism more effectively and in a coordinated manner”.

War for Security and Development

However, as peace talks ended abruptly in Andhra Pradesh, there was a significant increase in the number of casualties which the report chooses to underplay (an increase of 19% between 2004 with 566 casualties and 2005 with 677 casualties). At the same time “Police personnel killings ... show a sharp increase by 53%”. Therefore a change comes about as the state saw the problem as “not merely a law and order problem but” as having “deep socio-economic dimensions”⁷⁸.

The change that had comes about in the prioritisation of the various strategies of the government to tackle the Naxal challenge is evident from the report that pointed out

[n]axal leaders have exploited socially and economically deprived sections of people living in remote areas to lure them to the path of armed struggle. Therefore, a multi-pronged integrated strategy is being pursued to effectively combat the menace of Naxalism. This strategy essentially comprises of ... building up of local capabilities by the affected States in terms of improved intelligence gathering and sharing mechanisms and specially trained and well equipped police forces to facilitate effective police action, in a coordinated manner, against the Naxalites and their infrastructure and support systems... strengthening of the administrative machinery to make it more responsive, transparent and sensitive to enable... effective redressal of public grievances and ensuring

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 45.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p 46

⁷⁸ MHA Annual Report 2005-06, p. 23.

improved delivery mechanisms aimed at accelerated socioeconomic development including enhanced employment opportunities in the Naxal-affected districts, encouraging local resistance groups and sensitizing the civil society about pitfalls of falling a prey to Naxalite ideology / propaganda / violence; and ...having a peace dialogue by the affected States with Naxal groups if they agree to shun violence and give up arms⁷⁹.

The Police Modernisation Scheme (PMS) for the State Governments to upgrade their police forces in terms of modern weaponry, mobility, communication equipment and training infrastructure was being funded. Another non-plan scheme since 1996, Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme was comprehensively revised in February, 2005 to include items like

ex-gratia payment to the family of a civilian / policeman killed... provision for transportation, communication and other logistic support for CPFs deployed in the State... ammunition used by the State Police Personnel for anti-Naxalite activities...training to the State Police Forces... community policing by the local police... lump sum grant to the Village Defence Committee / Nagrik Suraksha Samiti and honorarium to Special Police Officer (SPO)... _ rehabilitation of hardcore, underground Naxalite surrenderees; and premium for insurance of police personnel engaged in anti-Naxalite operations. The revised scheme has raised the rate of reimbursement from 50% to 100% and also allows advance release of funds to the Naxalite-affected States⁸⁰.

The Naxalite-affected States have also been sanctioned of India Reserve (IR) battalions for “not only supplementing the security apparatus in the States but also to provide gainful employment to the youth particularly in the Naxalite- affected areas”. The Central Government now provides more funds to the States for raising of IR Battalions and has also sanctioned additional IR Battalions for the Naxal-affected States.⁸¹ Steps have also been taken “to strengthen intelligence collection and sharing mechanism” by setting up an “Inter-State Intelligence Support Teams (ISISTs) in the States”.⁸²

The affected States have also been assigned

Special Police Forces for anti-Naxalite operations... inevitably well equipped and trained [by] the Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D) ... programme for training of the State Police Forces (SPFs) in the Central Police Forces (CPF) run centres of excellence. During the year 2004-05, 53 training slots were utilized in various courses such as Counter Insurgency and Bomb Disposal, Weapons & Tactics, Un-armed Combat,

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 25.

⁸⁰ *MHA Annual Report 2005-06*, p. 27.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid., p. 28.

etc. in various training institutes of the CPFs run centres of excellence. Besides Greyhounds, Training Centre in Andhra Pradesh has also organized training programmes to the police personnel of the other States engaged in anti-Naxalite operations.⁸³

The BDI component of the Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana (RSVY) of the Planning Commission provided an additional “Rupees 15 crore per year per district to 55 Naxal affected districts for 3 years from the year 2003-04” to the Naxal affected districts as “Special Central Assistance (SCA) to fill in critical gaps in physical and social infrastructure in these areas”. Requests have been made by the Planning Commission “to include more Naxal affected districts under their proposed scheme of the Backward Regions Grant Fund (BRGF)”⁸⁴. At the same time the report argued that “overall progress in implementation of Panchayat (Extension of Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 is rather slow... States have been advised to take vigorous and effective steps to ensure expeditious implementation of PESA”⁸⁵.

The ‘awareness campaign’ of the report of 2003-04 returned as “public perception management” whereby the affected states were “advised to undertake a publicity campaign to expose unlawful activities and misdeeds of Naxal outfits and their leaders, futility of violence and armed struggle and loss of human life and property caused by Naxal cadres, absence of development activities in the affected areas due to fear and extortion of Naxal cadres, etc”⁸⁶.

Mobilising War

Massive deployment and recruitment drives were taken up by the central and affected state’s government. Apart from a core of 26,000 personnel of the Central Para Military Forces (CPMF), a special elite anti-Naxal force of 11,000 personnel is undergoing training in Silchar (Assam). Bihar was the first to begin enlisting ex-servicemen for a special anti Naxal task force of 5,000 men. In Andhra Pradesh, apart from the already existing 18,000 personnel of the “Greyhounds”, two new centres, with 7,000 personnel

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 29.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

each have been granted for Rayalaseema and Visakhapatnam. The state is also raising two 'girijan' battalions comprising of the people from tribal as well as settler communities. The Orissa government plans to raise a tribal force of 3,000. Jharkhand is raising 'pahari' battalions and has recruited a special force of 14,000 to fight Naxals. Each state is also being financially aided by the centre to raise India Reserve Battalions (IRBs). Nineteen such battalions have been raised until 2005 by the nine affected states. They have been asked to raise 19 more.⁸⁷

By 2006-07, there was a major shift in the government's response to the Naxal challenge. A Naxal Management Division was created, w.e.f. October 19, 2006, in the Home Ministry "to deal with the Naxalite menace from both security and development angles". Its sole purpose was to monitor the Naxal situation and counter-measures being taken and to ensure optimum utilization of funds released, and proper implementation of various developmental schemes in the Naxal affected areas".⁸⁸ The state also put forth its argument for the persistence of the Naxal violence. The report argued that "Naxalites typically operate in a vacuum created by inadequacy of administrative and political institutions, espouse local demands and take advantage of the prevalent disaffection and perceived injustice among the under privileged and remote segments of population"⁸⁹.

The report also for the first time acknowledged the dimension of social mobilisation of the Naxals by pointing out the "CPI (Maoists) have also been attempting to intensify their efforts for social mobilisation. The Revolutionary Democratic Front (RDF), set up in May, 2005 for this purpose, has been enlarged into the People's Democratic Front of India (PDFI)". The report also acknowledged that the Naxals have increased their targets to include "police posts, railway stations, forest checkpoints and other Government and private properties".⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Gautam Navlakha, 'Maoists in India' in *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. XXII no. 23, June 2006, p. 2188.

⁸⁸ *MHA Annual Report 2005-06*, p. 3.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

Thus with such an understanding the strategy of the state underwent changes, and comprised of the following main components:

The Government will deal sternly with the Naxalites indulging in violence.... address this menace simultaneously on political, security, development and public perception management fronts in a holistic manner....being an inter-State problem, the States will adopt a collective approach and pursue a coordinated response to counter it...no peace dialogue by the affected States with the Naxal groups unless the latter give up violence and arms... accord a higher priority to ensure faster socio-economic development in the Naxal affected or prone areas... to distribute land to the landless poor as part of the speedy implementation of land reforms, ensure development of physical infrastructure like roads, communication, power, etc. and provide employment opportunities to youth in these areas....Central Government will continue to supplement the efforts and resources of the affected States on both security and development fronts and bring greater coordination between the States to successfully tackle the problem.⁹¹

The important change was the emergence of a clear policy for the states wanting to conduct peace talk with the Naxals. Unlike the earlier reports which agreed to 'have peace dialogue' if Naxals shun violence and surrender arms it clearly stated the 'there will be no peace dialogue' unless the latter give up violence and arms'.⁹² Yet another remarkable change was the disappearance of the recommendation to organize local people into resistance group. The factor responsible for this change was evident as the report attributed the rise of violence in Chattisgarh to 'the formation of Salwa Judum, a local resistance group'. Apart from this, there was a massive drive for raising special police force battalions and projecting it as an employment generation strategy.⁹³

The Thrust towards War

Since P. Chidambaram assumed the office of the Home Minister of India, in 2007, the state has increased its effort to launch offensive actions against the Naxals. The ministry acknowledged the persistence of the Naxal challenge by pointing out that "[s]everal Naxalite groups have been operating in certain parts of the country for a few decades now". Also apart from repeating what the previous report had to say about the reasons for the operation of the Naxal the report also pointed out that the impact of these operations. It argued that

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 26.

systematic efforts are made by them [Naxalites] to prevent execution and implementation of development projects, deliberately target critical infrastructure like railways, roads, power and telecommunications, and to try and create an environment, through violence and terror, where the governance structures at field levels are shown as being ineffective.⁹⁴

In this light the policies yet again underwent a reorganisation as the view and the policy of the Government that

it is necessary to conduct proactive and sustained operations against the extremists, and put in place all measures required for this, it is also necessary to simultaneously give focussed attention to development and governance issues, particularly at the cutting edge level. Towards this end, there is need to develop short term programmes, involving immediate activities such as health camps, effective implementation of the Public Distribution System (PDS), provision of drinking water facilities and other basic needs, and medium term and long term measures for overall development of the area as per time bound action programmes. In this context, the large amount of funds available to the States under various Central Schemes like, the BDI, BRGF, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGA), the PMGSY, the National Rural Health Mission Scheme (NRHMS) and Sarva Siksha Abhiyan (SSA) etc., acquire special significance and can go a long way in alleviating the situation and circumstances which the Naxalites attempt to exploit⁹⁵.

In this light, a Task Force was constituted on February 12, 2008 “to promote coordinated efforts across a range of development and security activities so that problems in the Naxal affected areas can be tackled in a comprehensive manner”. However the report continued to insist that Naxalism, as a problem, has to be dealt by the affected state and the centre can only offer facilitator’s role in the efforts of the state⁹⁶. Therefore the State Governments were advised to take the following measures:

Time-bound action for augmenting the police force in the State (with reference to police population ratio)... filling up existing vacancies, particularly in the Districts and Police Stations in the Districts/areas affected by Naxalite violence.. Develop suitable incentives for persons who are posted in these areas and a rotation policy for people posted in these areas... Action to ensure that the Police Stations and police outposts in the areas affected by Naxalite activities are provided the necessary infrastructure in terms of secure Police Station buildings (with perimeter security), barracks, armoury, mess arrangements, etc.... Urgently earmark a reasonable component of the State Police for being provided with special commando/jungle warfare related training, for which establishment of training facilities within the State and, in the interim, tie ups with the Army, Central Paramilitary Forces and other States with such facilities could be made...While the importance of strengthening the capabilities of intelligence gathering in the State generally is important, a special thrust should be given in terms of strengthening these arrangements in the

⁹⁴ *MHA Annual Report 2005-06*, p. 18.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

Naxalite affected areas... Adherence to the standard operating procedures for various types of police and security force operations so as to pre-empt possible attacks and casualties... Focused measures should be adopted to ensure that the field and intermediate level functionaries of key departments such as health, education, drinking water, electricity, revenue and other development departments could be available and accessible to the people. This would not only include filling up of posts/vacancies, but also secure arrangements for their staying in the area of their posting... Identify critical infrastructure and development projects in the affected areas, as also critical infrastructure gaps, particularly in the sphere of connectivity, and formulate action plans to ensure the timely implementation of such projects. Create mechanisms for public grievance redressal, mass contact and public awareness, for creating an overall positive environment and confidence of the people in the local administrative machinery... Under a well conceived strategy, a publicity and counter propaganda campaign should be mounted.⁹⁷

By 2008, the ministry reports starts looking at the war in terms of “intensity of violence (i.e. number deaths per incident)” and Naxal are being looked at as “Left Wing Extremists”⁹⁸ but the problem was still termed as “Naxal Situation”. It emphasised the need to give “focused attention to development and governance issues, particularly at the cutting edge level”⁹⁹. Therefore, the report points out that,

After various high-level deliberations and interactions it has also been felt that an integrated approach aimed at the relatively more affected areas would give surer results. With this in view, a detailed analysis of the spread and trends in respect of Naxalite violence has been made, and 33 seriously affected districts in 8 States have been taken up for special attention on planning, implementation and monitoring of development schemes. Within these, 8 most affected districts in 4 States viz. Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa have been taken up for implementation of integrated security and development action plans, an approach that can be replicated in other affected districts also. In furtherance of the approach of dealing with the Naxalite problem in an integrated manner, a high-level Task Force under Cabinet Secretary has also been formed for promoting coordinated efforts across a range of development and security measures¹⁰⁰.

As this draft of the dissertation was being written, the government has removed the ‘Naxal’ from the nomenclature of the challenge and instead looked at it as “Left Wing Extremism” and had launched its offensive for what many saw as ‘the decisive battle’ against the Naxal. But the initial news pouring in through newspaper does not look promising as violence continues to not only persist by also escalate.

Having elaborated on how the state’s has progressively constructed the image of this perpetual war and projected it in its policies and strategies, the next chapter will look at

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 20-21.

⁹⁸ *MHA Annual Report 2005-06*, p. 16.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 16.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 16-17.

the context in which the study is embedded. It further elaborates on the discrepancies that have emerged in the practice of this war in terms of the intermediate class the support the operation of the informal economy involved the above persistence. A brief discussion of the tools used during the fieldwork is elaborated in the concluding section of the next chapter.

Chapter 3

Deviating Practices of Perpetual War in Jharkhand

The last decade or so has seen two important developments in the history of the region of Jharkhand. First was the creation of a separate Jharkhand state, within the Union of India, to enable the people of the region to chart an alternative path of development. Secondly, the latent social conflict perpetuated by continual exploitation of the people manifested itself in the form of violent politics under the leadership of left wing extremism. These two political transformations have been the most significant factors in way the process of social change has evolved in this region. Ever since its creation, on 15 November 2000, the state has waged a war against underdevelopment and the 'resultant' Naxal extremism. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to explore how the deviation comes about in the state's effort sustaining its projected image of war against the Naxal in the State of Jharkhand. In order to be able to do so, we look at the genesis of extremist politics in Jharkhand followed by the how the ways in which the deviation has come about in the practise of their war by the state against the Naxals. The elaboration is basically being taken up so as to gain some pointer of deviation based on which the field work was taken (discussed in the next chapter).

Having adopted the state-in-society approach, the focus is on the dynamics of "struggle for social control that not only changes the composition of the social actors in contest for social control but also their goals, the rules they promote and their modus operandi".¹ As Norbert Elias has pointed out, the emphasis is not on seeing society as it is, but as "as it becomes – has become in the past, is becoming in the present, and may become in the future".²

The chapter first takes up a contextual literature review to understand the genesis of the struggle for social control in the region of Jharkhand especially since the rise of extremist

¹ Joel S Migdal, *State in Society: Studying how States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*, Cambridge, 2005, p. 22.

² Johan Goudsblom and Stephen Mennell, eds., *The Norbert Elias Reader*, Oxford, 1998, p. 143. cited by Joel S Migdal, *State in Society: Studying how States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*, Cambridge, 2005, p. 22.

politics in the region in the late 1960s. This is followed by how the State and the Naxals have engaged in war since the turn of the twenty first century. The purpose of this discussion would to trace out the deviations that have come about during the practise of this war by the State. On a concluding note to the chapter, there is a discussion outlining the manner in which the field study was conducted and data was collected.

The Genesis of the Struggle for Social Control

Amidst the euphoria of Indian independence, Jaipal Singh, an Oxford-educated Anlican Munda from Jharkhand, along with other rising indigenous petty bourgeoisie resorted to ethnic politics, based on the category of tribal, for bargaining a better place itself in the emerging Indian State. The elite by constantly “repeating the official discourse of tribal, a politico-administrative concept to categorise human groupings, ended up legitimizing it as a social reality... they reproduced the ideology of tribalism, a mechanism through which the elite sought to share social control using a pool of common tradition and cultural code as an alternative system of values.”³ As discussed in the previous chapter, Shils had shown how ‘the system of value’ was essential for seeking alternative means for constructing legitimacy. Thus in the context of Jharkhand, the ‘tribal dimension’ has been used as a politicized and highly contested ‘system of values’.

However, as Amit Prakash has argued, it was “the policy of integration through development of the Indian state that legitimised their demand for a separate state” on the issue of underdevelopment. For Prakash, “the post colonial Indian state continued with the rationalist integrationist and bureaucratic model of governance, wherein development was seen as the most important a policy instrument with the state to pursue the objective of ‘unity in diversity.’”⁴

As a matter of fact, on a comparative note, the Jharkhand region was actually better off than its Bihari counterpart in terms of its developmental profile⁵. Analysing the developmental profile of Jharkhand, Prakash points out that region of Jharkhand was nor

³ Susana B. C. Devalle, *Discourses of Ethnicity: Culture and Protest in Jharkhand*, New Delhi, 1992, p. 154.

⁴ Amit Prakash, *Jharkhand: Politics of Development and Identity*, New Delhi, 2001.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

as poor vis a vis Bihar as a whole as was projected by the Jharkhandi political faction led by Jaipal Singh. However what was missing was “the need to adapt the developmental policies according to the region’s geographical and socio-economic condition” which was never acknowledged by the state. Therefore, only a small proportion of people living in the region benefitted from the industrial expansion that had taken place in the region due to its rich mineral base⁶.

However the realities seem to have undergone a drastic change by the end of 1960s, especially its latter half. Prakash points out that the period saw

“major shifts in the India’s politics as well as that of Jharkhand. While in the national context, hegemony of the congress party enters a downward trend and a multiparty system started merging. Also, the leftist politics that had almost ended during Nehru’s time with CPI following the strategy of collaboration started becoming active with a major drive within the party over the issue of revisionism. The developmental policies had led to an increase in socio economic conflict and unrest in late 1960s and early 1970s. The growing influence of the Naxal movement in the region of Jharkhand saw president’s rule being imposed in 1968 amidst wide spread lawlessness and disorder. These unrests undermined the legitimacy of the regime which had to increasingly resort to institutional and open coercion to induce consent for implementing its will”.⁷

He further adds that *The Report on the Situation in Tribal Area of Bihar*, saw “the declining developmental profile of the region” as the primary factor behind these unrest. As per the report, “there was a clear lack of opportunities for employment, vocation/technical training and education”. These factors had been “accentuated further by the industrial development causing alienation, rising prices and growth of political awareness among the masses”. The report also expressed concern about “the over-dependence of the people for employment on the agrarian sector ... [and] the absence of responsive and responsible leadership”. On the issue of the demand for a separate state the report categorically said “such a development would benefit only the educated section of the society in Jharkhand. The same would hold true for the policy of extending job reservation in the region”.⁸

⁶ Devalle, Op. Cit., p. 142.

⁷ Prakash, Op.cit., p. 119.

⁸ *The Report on the Situation in Tribal Area of Bihar*, Patna, 1968 cited by Prakash, Op. Cit., pp. 170-71.

Under Development of Development

In Jharkhand, by the 1970's there was no such thing as "traditional system of production. Modes of production may "remained pre-capitalist in form, but they had fully transformed to the needs of capital". The resistance to

"complete dissolution of the non-capitalist economic modes has been restrained in order to sustain the reproduction of labour...but was maintained at a low enough levels to insure a reserve of semi- proletarianised labour force which can be compelled to migrate or to accept lowly paid jobs⁹.

Thus, by 1970s the story of under development had become a reality in Jharkhand especially in comparison to the rest of Bihar. The economy of Jharkhand had become the story of the exploitation of the primary resources in the name of nation and development. These included the huge mineral deposits found below the soil of Jharkhand.

These resources provided the base for the foundation of iron and steel, machines, fertilizer and glass factories in the region. Rapid industrialization and fast urban growth led to heavy immigration from rural areas, leading to declining agriculture. Lack of investment in agriculture, land alienation due to industrial development, encroachment of the forest laws and exploitation of *adivasi* labour to sustain industrial development in the region of Jharkhand became hallmarks of political-economy of the region.¹⁰

The forest resources too were being "converted into reserved forest by the state in the name of scientific exploitation of forest and preventing ecological damage... dependence on forest was also becoming difficult for adivasis". This had a detrimental effect on the survival strategies of the *adivasis*¹¹. Ramchandra Guha has argued that contractors controlling sal seed collection paid Rs. 50 per quintal to the labour but resold it at Rs. 250 per quintal¹². Similarly, there is a lot of lac in Chotanagpur but it goes to Japan and Russia¹³. Therefore, profits resulting from these forest resources were immense but were not reaching the tribal who were around the jungle.

Labour itself became a commodity that was being reproduced. The task of reproducing labour force rested with the village. The working conditions were exploitative with use of

⁹ Devalle, Op.cit., pp. 93-94.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 82-83.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 86-87.

¹² Ramachandra Guha, 'Forestry in British and Post British India: A Historical Analysis' in *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol XVII no 44, 29 October 1983, p. 1890.

¹³ Devalle, Op. Cit., p. 98.

economic (long hour, no medical facility) and non economic (sexual) forms of exploitation. After nationalisation of coal mines in early 1970's, there was a cost-cutting wave and 200 mines were closed for being uneconomic. It also saw the replacement of tribal workers by immigrants as working condition improved. These unemployed tribal were the employed by illegal miners as cheap labour. Herein, legal procedures for mining and preventive measures against coal mines occupational diseases were largely ignored. The fear of losing the job made labourers work in a sick state. Hazaribag mining area thus became the graveyard of coal miner.

The Return of Protest Politics

The region has had a history of protest movement organised by the tribal in the 18th and the 19th century. But in the 20th century the situation remained more or less calm till 1960's when situation became critical after the drought and subsequent famine of 1966 in Bihar. In this context that

the forcible harvesting of 1968 season and violent confrontation with landlord and peasants in rural area continued for years that followed. This seasonal action of tribal protest was led by Sibbu Soren. The non-*adivasi* peasantry, especially the Kurmis, on the other hand, organised under the banner of Shivaji Samaj (1970) led a Kurmi lawyer, Binod Bihari Mahto. At the same time, worker's struggle in Collieries in Dhanbad joined forces with the peasantry trade unionist A.K. Roy of the Marxist Coordination Committee (MCOR). All these leaders and events preceded the emergence of Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM) in 1972.¹⁴

Under JMM, the peasants concentrated on the issue of land alienation and the situation of share-croppers and agricultural labourers. By 1971, "forcible harvesting became a feature of the agrarian scene". Between 1973 and 1975, "intense and violent struggle carried in form of *Dhan Kato Andolan* (forcible harvesting). There were violent exchanges between protesters with bows and arrows and CRPF, landlord, and their guards. In the same period, A.K Roy engaged in a struggle against coal companies of Dhanbad and Hazaribag. The issue included compensation and rehabilitation of displaced peasants. The period between 1973-75 was also the peak years of worker peasant alliance"¹⁵.

¹⁴ Devalle, Op. Cit., p. 142.

¹⁵ Ibid.

Protest in forest areas against the growing encroachment on land and natural resources have occurred since the fifties. By late 1970s, protest became wide spread and militant in opposition to replacement of sal with teak (for instance, in Ichanatu and Serengda). What was called the “Felling Craze” was directly related to the demand for land restoration and autonomy. JMM was then backing the jungle *kato* movement in Singhbhum for reclaiming land for cultivation from forest track. The confrontation over forest land became a highly political issue¹⁶.

Legitimacy through Socio Cultural Reforms

On the socio-cultural front, the JMM organized a series of reform movements starting with a campaign to rid the region of the habit of liquor consumption. It was argued that “this habit was at the root cause of indebtedness and consequent alienation of land. One of its most used slogans was ‘Kallali toro, Jharkhand choro’ [Break the bottles (of liquor), leave Jharkhand]”. The campaign forced the State government to prohibit its sale in the district of Dhanbad in 1976, causing “considerable loss of revenue to the state exchequer”. The JMM “secured fund for literacy programme through donations collected from the masses, and open night schools. These night schools served the twin purpose of imparting knowledge about the 3Rs (reading, writing and arithmetic) and facilitating political education”¹⁷.

Realizing the lack of government credit institutions, JMM “began implementing an indigenous scheme of establishing *golas* (banks) for grain in each village for needy peasants to borrow grain (or cash) at a nominal rate of interest”. The JMM also tried to “educate people against extravagant weddings and promoted collective farming”. Another feature was its efforts to “revive tribal people courts where cases could be speedily tried and justice delivered, especially local landlords were tried and punished. In the area of agrarian reform, the JMM resorted to direct action for recovering alienated land”.¹⁸

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 103-104.

¹⁷ Prakash, Op. cit., p.119.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 119.

The Changing 'Diku'

The changing demographic factors led to changes in the composition of the other or "Diku", literally "they", the local term for outsider. It initially applied to exploiter like the money lenders, traders and individuals eager for land or Zamindar and Jagirdar that came in the first decade of 19th century. In the post independence period, it was applied to upper class non-*adivasis*. The latter identified with people of north Bihar who earn in Jharkhand and spend in Bihar. However as politics came into this social divide – new stereotypes were attached in the characteristic of diku. Thus by 1970's, it was seen as opposed to the Jharkhandi or the producers working in Jharkhand¹⁹.

By mid 1970s, efforts of political mobilization, based on leftist ideology, were directed towards a Jharkhandi alliance of the workers and peasants. The Jharkhandi was defined as anyone who worked in the region, and a 'diku' was any one who exploited others. The effort was to unite all 'Jharkhandis' against all 'dikus' to ensure the creation of a separate state of Jharkhand. The JMM led the alliance with the slogan "Jharkhand, Lalkhand" [Jharkhand is a red (implying communist) area] organized processions and rallies that drew up to fifty thousand people, and the demand for a separate Jharkhand state again became stronger²⁰. The railway strike of 1974 and the nationalization of collieries further provided a distinct left leaning to the Jharkhand movement. Under the authoritarian regime of Indira Gandhi, a large number of workers, tribal and non-tribal, were dismissed from work for false or minor mistakes. This encouraged their participation in trade-union politics²¹.

Simultaneously, the JMM supported the mainstream development programmes such as the 20-Point Programme launched by the then, Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi. Thus, the JMM also tried to incorporate some degree of broad-based politics in its activities²². As ethnicity receded into the background by the 1980's, the Jharkhand coordination committee expressed the nationality issue of Jharkhand, as per the JCC draft declaration,

¹⁹ Devalle, Op. Cit., p. 89.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 120.

²¹ Ibid., p. 121.

²² Ibid., p. 122.

in terms of development of a composite nationality and takes into account economic and human rights issue. This made the Jharkhandi community more inclusive in its conception responding to the political need in a changed context²³.

Thus, grassroots leaders argued that “Jharkhand could not be separated: it has to be liberated as it is home of a majority of the down trodden people and oppressed nationality. They are socially and economically exploited – and are in an area that is an internal colony. The nature of the grassroots Jharkhand project was in sharp contrast of the reformed ethnicist and was of wider conception beyond Jharkhand’s geographical boundaries. Here emphasis was placed on both class issue and on the situation of many nationalities and sub nationalities like the tribals.”²⁴

The ‘Decline’ of Protest Politics

By 1980s, cracks emerge in the Jharkhand Alliance over personality clash between leaders like Soren, Mahto and Roy on ideological issues. Soon, it acquired an ideological undertone of Marxist versus the rest. Faced with such dilemma, the JMM entered into an electoral alliance with the Congress (I) for the 1980 midterm polls. It allowed Congress to forge an electoral alliance with a regional party and bolstered its image as a pro-tribal party thereby neutralizing the influence of leftist parties led by leaders like Roy. The alliance forced Soren to withdraw the more militant movement in the region.²⁵

The movement lost its mass base that had been mobilized through direct action “as the flow of huge amounts of development funds into the region under the Tribal Sub-Plan (TSP), in the form of development grants, foreign project assistance and relief operations did allow some socio economic changes to come about. Thus, the overtly Marxist phase of the movement ended a formal split between the leftist and Jharkhandi political groups followed soon”²⁶.

²³ Ibid., p. 157.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 168.

²⁵ Prakash, Op. Cit., p. 123.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 124.

The Jharkhand Alliance thus split into the pro-right JMM led by Shibo Soren, Suraj Mandal and Hakim Prasad, and the Pro-communist MCOR led by B.B. Mahto and A.K. Roy. However, by mid 1980s, the Jharkhandi leaders realized the need for joint action to maintain a meaningful political presence. Consequently, in 1987, sixty-two cultural and political organizations forged the Jharkhand Co-ordination Committee (JCC) to lead a unified agitation for realizing the dream of a separate state of Jharkhand. But JCC soon faced a threat to its survival from a student's body formed in 1988, called the ALL Jharkhand Students Union (AJSU). The AJSU, since its inception, had been the most radical constituent of the JCC with its call for blockading of all mineral mining and transportation in the Jharkhand region to force the Union government to agree to the formation of the state of Jharkhand²⁷.

Response to Protest Movement

The standard policy adopted by the state in their response to protest was of first attempting for containment through co-option of leadership and then of overt repression. The government's policy of containment saw a changed approach to tribal development under the fifth five year plan (1975-76 to 1980-81).

Policy reflected in appointment of bureaucrats for tribal welfare with sympathetic view toward rural poor especially Dalits and tribals and more allocation of resources. The new developmental approach called 'modified area development approach' (MADA) where a fixed share of the plan outlay of Bihar was earmarked for areas of high tribal concentration or the Tribal Sub-Plan (TSP). The plan was applied to 112 blocks covering atleast 86% of the tribal population. Starting with 14% of the total plan outlay, it reached to 17% by 1978.²⁸ However the situation didnot improve as reported by the National Committe on the Development of Backward Area in 1981 and instead argued for an Intergrated area development approach for the region²⁹.

As the developmental approach continued to fail, the *adivasi* grassroots movement also caught the attraction of some political parties. When movement reached its climax, many party interested in influencing it needed tribal leadership. So when popular leaders like A.K Roy, B.B. Mahato and others were in jail, Sibuo Soren becomes valuable in the eye of Congress for maintaining party's base in Bihar and containing rural movement and

²⁷ Ibid., p. 125.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 196.

²⁹ Ibid.

worker peasants alliances. In 1980, Soren joined hand with congress (I) after becoming an MP³⁰.

The series of raids to forcibly harvest crops from the alienated fields all over the region, especially in the districts of Giridih, Dhanbad and Hazaribag saw large-scale clashes and disturbances during the harvest of 1974-75. Events saw the landlords retaliate with firearms while the peasants responded with tribal weapons. However, the most common strategy for the landlords and moneylenders started eliminating the leaders of the JMM and the MCOR with the help of police and government officials. A.K. Roy and B.B. Mahto were arrested on false charges, and Sadanand Jha was killed by anti social elements. These events saw peoples fight pitched battles with the police parties and widespread violence and anarchy³¹.

At the same time, the mass movement in Jharkhand became the target of state repression. Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Bihar Military Police and Bihar Armed Police were given a free hand. They acted in collusion with money-lenders and landlords in Santhal Pargana and forest contractors in Singhbhum. Indiscriminate arrests in rural areas, plunder of villagers, molestation of women and killing of protestor became common place. Violence also led to exodus of *adivasis*. In the Koel Karo project, protest took the form of boycott of work and road blockades as well as burning the tents and threatening the engineers. In 1984 government sent armed police to superise the operation. Again in July 1980, 15,000 peasants workers stopped work at Hazaribag's Kujju coal fields of CCL by digging trenches and blocking roads. Demands was employment for local people and due compensation for lands appropriated by the management of CCL. Peasants even regained possession of 500 acres of land by force and started planting rice. The government yet again sent two platoons of RPF was sent to contain the protest³².

³⁰ Devalle, Op. Cit., p. 143.

³¹ Prakash, Op. Cit. p.120

³² Devalle, Op. Cit., pp. 101-03.

The Politics of Terror

Violence became a legitimate tactics of self-defence for the dominant section of the society. For the rural dominant sector in Jharkhand, arming themselves was justified their arming themselves against unpredictable insubordination of the subaltern classes. It does not seem incorrect to consider the ban on possession of bow and arrow by the Bihar government and while other powerful weapon like guns were not banned. Government found it natural for landlord and rich peasant to arm them for protection and may be seen as a result of structural paranoia³³. Thus, in Bihar, “dominant class clearly felt the need to demonstrate in form of arrogance and authoritarian issue. This perpetuated fear as an ‘autonomous force’ which permeated the social fabric and collective psychological realm. Thus fear merged as part of the process of socialization”³⁴.

Bihar by the 1990s was being described as ‘near lawless state’ showcasing endemic violence, economic backwardness, gruelling poverty and exploitation characterize the social existence in Bihar. Report on horrific killings, kidnapping, murder and mayhem, civic unrest and uncivil turmoil has been the feature of Bihar in the 1980’s. In 1989-90, crime went up 14% resulting in death of at least 4,500 people. The total loss of life exceeded those of Assam (650) and Punjab (4,479). National Leaders, however, are more concerned in clinging precariously to unsubtle seats of power, wheeling and dealing with petty political parties and mostly preoccupied with secessionist movement of Kashmir, Punjab and the north-east³⁵.

The Persistence of Protest

Thus in the 1990s, the political process in Jharkhand saw the people adopting a three-pronged strategy. The first part saw electoral support for national parties, particularly the INC and BJP, which were in capacity to legislate on the issue of a separate State. Secondly, on the state level support was given to the regional parties with the capability to form government at the State level so as to influence a better developmental response.

³³ Ibid., p. 209.

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 197-98.

³⁵ Arvind N. Das, *The Republic of Bihar*, New Delhi, 1992, p. xi-xii.

Finally, support was extended to the agitational politics involving blockade of mineral transportation³⁶.

By the 1990s, a new phase of Jharkhand movement had begun. “The educated, unemployed and lumpenised youth are becoming increasingly violent in Jharkhand. Local leaders will be unable to control the lumpenised upper layer of tribal youth that have adopted the non-tribal technique of legitimizing extortion through use of violence”. The efficiency of the state of Bihar was dwindling to such an extent that that “it was unable to even raise and spend money. In 1991-92, annual plan was curtailed from 2,200 crore rupees to a mere 750 crore rupees. This is the budget of the government apparatus whose annual salary was 4,680 crore rupees.”³⁷

It was against the background, when the JMM and MCOR were flipping between electoral and agitational politics, efforts were made to revive leftist extremist activity in the Jharkhand region. After 1984, when the Yadav caste supporters of the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), brutally killed 42 Rajputs in the Aurangabad and Gaya districts, the Bihar state banned the outfit and identified them as an extremist or terrorist problem³⁸. The movement had grown immensely in the face of the corrupt, casteist and incomplete administration of Bihar and by 1990, touched every aspect of social life in the state³⁹. Since late 1990s, MCC declared that the protest in Jharkhand was against ‘bourgeois state oppression’ and for the tribal poor. However, their overall goal was the formation of a parallel administration in a ‘liberated zone’⁴⁰.

It is against the historical backdrop that we look at the practice of the perpetual war in Jharkhand against the naxal since its emergence as an independent state

³⁶ Prakash, Op. Cit., pp. 226-293.

³⁷ Das, Op. Cit., pp. 92-97.

³⁸ Alpa Shah, ‘Markets of Protection: The ‘Terrorist’ Maoist Movement and the State in Jharkhand, India’ in *Critique of Anthropology*, vol. 26 no. 3, September, 2006, p. 297.

³⁹ Das, Op. Cit., p. 106.

⁴⁰ *Hindustan Times* [Ranchi], 1 November 2001, p. 2.

The Practice of War

The state of Jharkhand was unable to contain the Naxal movement in any way whatsoever. The figure collected by the Union Home Ministry regarding incident of Naxal violence and resulting casualties for the first decade of the 21st century goes on establish its continued dominance. The fact that Jharkhand is the only State, among all affected states, that has seen over 300 incidents and 100 deaths on a consistent basis for the last 9 years say a lot about the influence that Naxals have in the state. Also Jharkhand was at the centre of the swathe of territories stretching from Bihar (indeed, from Nepal further North), through Orissa, Chattisgarh, parts of Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra, to Andhra Pradesh, that are worst affected by Left-wing extremist violence.

Ever since November 2000 till 2004 March, Jharkhand government had made the largest number of arrests under POTA. Since November 2000, 234 people had been arrested, more than 650 people had cases against them and more than 3200 people were named as involved in terrorist activities⁴¹. In November 2002, however, a issued by MCC and the CPI-ML (Party Unity) - which merged with the PWG in 1998 at Patna, Bihar stated that the indiscriminate use of the POTA against the activists and sympathizers of the Naxalite groups by the Jharkhand government had 'compelled them to iron out differences' and fight jointly against the state machinery.⁴² In 2004, both parties merged to form the CPI (Maoist).

Jharkhand with its dense forest cover offered favourable terrain for the Naxalites to operate and build their bases. At the same time, the poor performance of institutions of civil governance in remote and tribal areas gives the Naxalites the political space to capitalize on popular discontent.⁴³ The State's rich forest cover has also helped the

⁴¹ Shah, Op. Cit., p. 298.

⁴² Jha, Op. Cit.

⁴³ Ibid.

Maoists open training camps in several areas, including the Martolia Hills in Ghatshila subdivision of East Singhbhum District, several locations in the Jhumra Hills of Bokaro, the Saranda Forest in West Singhbhum District, the Gurpa Forest in Palamau District, the border region of Hazaribag and Chatra, the Baruhatu and Shilaghathi Hills of Ranchi, the Madhuban Hills of Giridih, and some places in the Latehar and Garhwa Districts⁴⁴.

The Formidable Enemy

The Naxals have also streamlined their structure in the region, as the “Jharkhand-Bihar-Bengal Regional Committee’ of the erstwhile Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) was dissolved after the formation of CPI (Maoist) in September 21, 2004 and replaced by two ‘regional committees’ one for Bihar-Jharkhand and another for West Bengal”. Further, sources indicate that

Naxals have divided the whole Jharkhand State into two Zones ‘military operations and levy collection’ - the North Chotanagpur zone (headed by Prakash Dubey alias Sania alias Kamdev) and the South Chotanagpur zone (headed by Anal). These zones are divided into 12 or 13 sub-zones and each sub-zone is further divided into ‘areas’ headed by an ‘area commander’. There are Special Regular Guerrillas Squad (SRGS) and Local Regular Guerrilla Squads (LRGS) comprising 15-20 armed cadres in each ‘area’. Further down the hierarchy is the Self Defence Squad, comprising 10-12 cadres, while the People’s Militia Squad that operates at the village level, occupies the lowest rung⁴⁵.

Naxals are also reported to have set up technical wings to employ Information Technology ‘experts’ on monthly payment. These are used to draw up plans for developing more potent explosives, tap Government messages and get latest techniques in guerrilla warfare. According to a report by the Jharkhand State Intelligence (Special Branch), two technical wings have been set up by the CPI (Maoist) in their southern zone and northern zone. Each zone has four experts at the top level. The Maoists have already spent more than Rupees two million on their technical wings in the State. Shyam Sinku, a Maoist activist arrested in Jamshedpur in June 2006, admitted to the use of FM radio to intercept security forces’ communications⁴⁶.

⁴⁴ Nayak, Op. Cit.

⁴⁵ Ibid. and Jha, Op. Cit.

⁴⁶ Saji Cherian, *Bihar and Jharkhand: Playground of the Maoists*, New Delhi, 2007.

By 2007, the CPI (Maoist) had taken their 'revolution' from its 'guerrilla warfare phase' to a 'mobile warfare phase' in Jharkhand. As per the changed strategy, they are to fight for 'area domination' by escalating levels of violence to establish actual control over the 'liberated areas' over the succeeding months⁴⁷. State Police sources indicated that 23 of a total of 24 Districts are affected by varying degrees of Left-wing extremism and violence. Of these, 14 Districts were 'highly affected', four districts were 'moderately affected' and five were 'marginally affected'.⁴⁸ The Maoists were in a position to dictate the electoral outcome in over 30 per cent of the State's Assembly constituencies. In as many as 15 Districts, large areas have been converted into 'guerrilla zones', where the writ of the Maoist People's Guerrilla Army (PGA) dominates. The rebels have raised 'police', 'judicial' and 'administrative' wings to run a parallel administration in these areas, which they are seeking to re-designate as 'liberated zones'⁴⁹.

Informal Economy

Finances required to back such expansion have been generated through a vast network of extortion. In August 2006, the CPI (Maoist) in Jharkhand distributed a 'rate card' to its cadres extortion;

fixing charges for manual crushers, petrol pump owners, brick-kiln owners and the like. According to the card, Rupees 8,000 was to be 'claimed' annually from manual crushers, Rupees 15,000 from brick-kiln owners, Rupees 17,000 from mechanised crushers, Rupees 25,000 from petrol pump owners and Rupees 70,000 from coal sidings. Besides this, the rate card also takes into account contractors involved in road and building construction, railway track construction, repair work and auctions. The levy from contractors varies between five and ten per cent of revenues, depending on the work order and amount.⁵⁰

Elaborate machinery for 'levy and tax' collection has also been created. A levy is imposed on Government contractors and industrialists, who are required to pay at monthly intervals, while those earning from forest products and mines are charged an unofficial 'tax' ranging between two and 20 per cent. Apart from 'taxation', the Maoists also benefit from "the rich forest produce like the illegal trade in Khair wood is used extensively in

⁴⁷ B. P. Routray, 'Jharkhand Tentative Crystallisation against the Maoists', New Delhi, 2007.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Cherian, Op. Cit.

the dye industry and is the main ingredient of *pan masala* (chewing tobacco), and fetches a price of Rs. 40 to Rs. 50 per kilogram”.⁵¹

Also excessive flow of funds has been responsible for re emergence of turf war and schism among the naxals.

This, in fact, has become part of an incipient problem for the Maoists, and has resulted in desertions by a number of corrupt elements at the local leadership level, who have absconded with substantial amounts, as well as the formation of rival ‘Maoist’ groups within the State. Two splinters, the Tertiary Prastuti Committee (TPC, Third Preparatory Committee) and the Jharkhand Liberation Tigers (JLT) are now engaged in a bloody turf war, both with the parent CPI (Maoist), and with each other. Bloody struggles between the cadres of these various factions are now on the rise, resulting in mounting fatalities.⁵²

The Dismal Policing

Ajai Sahni has pointed out that although the state has launched special operations such as *Operation Hill Top* in Bokaro District, *Operation Black Thunder* in East Singhbhum District and *Operation Chakravyu* across the State against the Maoists, these have hardly dented the Maoist infrastructure and capacities. This is because the improvements have only been on paper⁵³. Sahni pointed out:

The State has made a herculean effort to improve its abysmal police-population ratio, which stood at 74 per 100,000 in 2004 (as against a national average of 122/100,000) rising to 85 per 100,000 in 2005, and nearly doubling to nearly 164 per 100,000 in 2006 (according to Bureau of Police Research and Development data). Police sources indicate that the previously high gap between sanctioned Force and Force in position, previously estimated at almost 30 per cent, has now been narrowed down to a frictional deficit of under 3,000 men, and orders for recruitment of this number are already in place. Worse, there is a chronic and unaddressed deficiency of officers at all levels. Despite the increase of 16,000 personnel at the constabulary level, there has been no recruitment at the Sub Inspector (SI) level. Indeed, the last recruitment at this level dates back to 1994 – before the formation of the State. An acute deficiency also exists at the highest levels of the Police Administration – the Indian Police Service (IPS) cadre – where just 70 of the sanctioned strength of 110 officers are available to the State, as a result of which dozens of Districts are headed by State Police Service Officers, while over 25 per cent of IPS posts are still lying vacant. A number of Police Stations in the worst affected areas of the State are headless and deficient of officers at the SI level. Police Stations, Posts and Pickets in rural and Maoist afflicted areas are appallingly maintained, and the Policemen’s Association President, Ram Kumar Singh, claims that many pickets are unfit

⁵¹ Nayak, Op. Cit.

⁵² Sahni, Op. Cit.

⁵³ Ibid.

"even for animals to stay". Certainly, many Police Stations and Posts are not sufficiently equipped and fortified to defend themselves against a determined Maoist assault⁵⁴.

At the highest levels of administration, "there are just 98 Indian Administrative Service officers in position, as against the 143 officers assigned to the State, of who another 19 are on deputation in Delhi, and another 11 have submitted applications for transfer from the State".⁵⁵ A.K. Pathak, the President of Jharkhand State Police Association, notes: "Naxalites are a dedicated cadre who move fearlessly with a do or die motto, but policemen are here to do a job and take home their salaries. Dedication' is one of the advantages the Maoists have to achieve domination over the security forces."⁵⁶

The Politician Naxal Alliance

Issues have also been raised regarding the politician-Maoist nexus. For example, till September, 2005, Chief Minister Arjun Munda "did not clarify whether the rebels and their front organisations would be banned by the State". He nevertheless claimed that, "as the MCC and PWG were banned outfits, the organisation formed by their merger stands automatically banned. It does not need to be banned afresh". The State's Director General of Police, V.D. Ram, however, stated that the new outfit was not yet banned in the State and the proposal to ban the CPI (Maoist) in Jharkhand had been sent to the Home Department two months ago. Such procrastination lends some credence to reports of a politician-Maoist nexus in the State.⁵⁷

A report prepared by the Inspector General of Police (Law and Order), R.C. Kaithal, pointed out that "the Welfare Minister Ramesh Singh Munda had paid Rupees 1.5 million to the Maoists for support in the last Assembly Elections in February 2005. The report is also said to mention that the Minister had contacted the Maoists for their 'help' during the

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Cherian, Op. Cit.

⁵⁷ Nayak, Op. Cit. and Jha, Op. Cit.

polls and had struck a deal, offering them Rupees 2.5 million in exchange for their support”.⁵⁸

The Rhetoric of Rehabilitation

At the same time, the Jharkhand administration is devoid of ideas when it comes to dealing with the Maoists. The State government had also announced a 'rehabilitation policy' for Naxalites who were willing to give up arms and 'come overground'. Unfortunately, the response to the 'package' announced in April 2001, had been very poor. The 'surrender policy' announced by the State's Home Minister on April 20, 2006, declared that

every extremist who surrenders in Jharkhand will be free to hire a lawyer of his choice at Government expense and have a life-insurance cover of Rupees One million. Also promised was the allotment of an acre of land to the family of every surrendered extremist, along with free housing, free education for children and free healthcare facilities. These were being offered to Naxals by a state where the majority of law abiding citizens lack access to basic necessities. Fortunately, the State Cabinet shot down this idea⁵⁹

By February 2007, Jharkhand's Health Minister, Bhanu Pratap Shahi, told the Ranchi correspondent of *Hindustan Times* of a novel method of combating Maoism. He said “I have already instructed doctors in Palamu to launch a vasectomy campaign ... One vasectomy in a Naxalite-dominated village means that many potential comrades less ... when you have too many mouths to feed and too little food to eat, you may turn into a Naxalite. All I want is to minimize the number of mouths”⁶⁰ Senior Government officials, on their part, have come up with schemes to use the families of the Maoists to disarm them. As per this plan, “wife and children, a person's weakness, will be used as an emotional tool to change hardcore Maoists.” Such appeals will be communicated to the rebels through posters and over the radio.⁶¹

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Jha, Op. Cit.

⁶⁰ Chakravarti, Op. Cit., p. 295.

⁶¹ Cherian, Op. Cit.

Poor Utilisation of Funds

Jharkhand's record of utilisation of centrally-allocated funds for Police modernisation is also poor. According to the MHA, "Jharkhand received Rupees 1.827 billion under the modernisation scheme between 2000 and 2006, but utilisation has been abysmal". In 2004-05, for instance, "the utilisation of the Rupees 220 million released was a minuscule 7.33 per cent".⁶²

Unsurprisingly, the utilisation of Centrally allocated funds for various developmental schemes – which are intended to counter the Maoist onslaught at the social and political level as part of the national 'two-pronged strategy' – has been miserable. Reports indicate that the State has an unutilised balance of Rupees 2.4 billion allotted to it under the Backwards Districts Initiative (BDI) component of the Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana and other schemes to fill in the critical gaps in physical and social development. There have also been allegations of widespread corruption in the implementation of schemes like the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. Interestingly, lack of finance has never been cited as a reason for the poor implementation of projects by the Jharkhand Government⁶³.

Blurred Boundaries

On a territorial level, ex Chief Minister Arjun Munda had pointed out that as many as 21 districts of Jharkhand share borders with other States.

This makes the Maoists' task easy, as they escape into these contiguous districts after striking in Jharkhand and vice versa. Arrests and seizures by security forces in the West of the State have revealed that the Maoists use the porous border of Garhwa District, which shares a border with Bihar, for acquisition and transport of material, including small arms, explosives, medicines and uniforms. In the south, Maoists shuttle between Jharkhand and Orissa in order to escape the police dragnet in both States, while eastern

⁶² Sahni, Op. Cit.

⁶³ Ibid.

borders are used for transportation of arms and manpower from West Bengal and Assam⁶⁴.

However, on a social level, as Bela Bhatia had argued that in central Bihar, 'for the first time, on a sustained basis, after 1967 the poor can turn to their [Naxalite comrades] in the time of injustice. The poor know that there is somebody who will stand up for them against oppressive and exploitative forces, whether it be upper castes-classes or the state'. More recently, Stuart Corbridge had described the new State's failure to pay attention to its tribal communities as accompanying a 'rising tide of Naxalism', as turning to the Naxalites represents a more reasonable choice for poor tribal people given their opposition to the State⁶⁵. This perspective leads Corbridge and Harriss to attribute the MCC's success to its ability to contest 'the power of established politician-contractor groupings'.⁶⁶

The local state on its part also blames "its poor rural population for the spread of the Naxalite problem, who know no better than to join the Naxals. Thus, the new state of Jharkhand has the rhetoric of its predecessor for implicating its undeveloped masses for the situation. Thus, conventional rhetoric reproduces the view that the MCC's main support base is the rural poor and that it is against the local elites who are intimately connected with the state".⁶⁷

Markets of Protection

Alpa Shah's view of the issue becomes enlightening. For Shah, the Maoist, like the state in Jharkhand, is selling protection for access to the informal economy of the state, and also protection from the possibilities of its own wrath. Thus for Shah, grassroots support for the MCC is neither based on a shared ideology nor just on violence. It is embedded in their greater control over what can be termed a *market of protection*. It is in this context

⁶⁴ Nayak, Op. Cit.

⁶⁵ Stuart Corbridge, 'The Continuing Struggle for India's Jharkhand: Democracy, Decentralisation and the Politics of Names and Numbers', *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, vol. 40 no. 3, 2002, pp. 55–71.

⁶⁶ Stuart Corbridge, and John Harriss, *Reinventing India: Liberalisation, Hindu Nationalism and Popular Democracy*, Cambridge, 2000, p. 206.

⁶⁷ Shah, 'Markets of ...', Op. Cit., p. 302.

that different organizations employ violence as a strategy to bargain for power and material benefits.⁶⁸

The evidence collected by Shah suggests that the MCC's initial grassroots support in Jharkhand is not from the poorest population but from well-established rural elite. The village 'problems' 'resolved' by the MCC also reflect a bias towards rural elite. While such affairs are common among both the rural elite and poorer peasantry, their moral policing among the poor is of concern to an elite that sought to reproduce a purer image of a less sexually promiscuous tribal population.⁶⁹ Thus the blind assumption about the image of the naxal has also to be guarded against.

Alliance with Class Enemies

A bias towards "the rural elite is also evident in an MCC anti-drinking campaign in 2000, where MCC uniformed men broke the pots of tribal peasants selling village-brewed rice beer and alcohol distilled from the *mahua* flower in several markets west of Tapu, Ranchi". This however did not threaten the village elite sellers, the *zamindar* descendants who, in their road side hotels or shops, "illegally sell the 'English' variety of alcohol – usually whisky, rum, gin and beer, but not the local brews."⁷⁰ Besides, while drinking home-made brew is a part of tribal peasant market and ritual culture, where men and women of different generations openly drink together, village elites have generally *sanskritized* and *Brahminicized* to claim higher-caste values according to which alcohol consumption is morally wrong and ritually impure⁷¹. Dalit critics of the Naxalite movement have accused it of being '*Brahminwadi*'.⁷²

⁶⁸ Shah, Op. Cit., p. 299.

⁶⁹ Shah, Alpa, 'The Labour of Love: Seasonal Migration from Jharkhand to the Brick Kilns of Other States in India', *Contributions to Indian Sociology* (n.s.), vol. 40 no. 1, 2006, pp. 91–118.

⁷⁰ Shah, 'Markets of ...', Op. Cit., p. 303.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Bhatia, Op. Cit., p. 162.

Shah argues that

the abolition of *zamindars* in the early 1950s meant the rural elites had to face a gradual impoverishment. So they increasingly attempted to sustain their lifestyles through state-related resources – whether directly (through government jobs) or indirectly (for instance, through government contracts). They maintained their social status largely because of their participation in the informal economy of state schemes. As a result of their intimate connections to state officials they were particularly effective in siphoning-off money from the state. However, the expansion of the MCC is intimately linked to the politics of access to this economy of state patronage. In return for their cooperation in harbouring and fostering the movement, recruits in areas under MCC control are offered privileged and protected access to state resources. Thus, the MCC entered a pre-existing market to sell protection – engaging in activities that were already established. Members of the rural elite in Jharkhand repeatedly point out that they had to support the MCC for their '*suraksha*'. It was clear that what was meant by *suraksha* was not simply protection from competing factions but also protection from the MCC itself, which threatened those who were not its supporters.⁷³

Politics of Fear

The sense of the need to comply is produced by a fear of the organization. This fear of the MCC is exacerbated by the more invisible qualities of the MCC as a very powerful, almost mythical and mystical, organization.⁷⁴ Elaborating on this politics of fear, Shah points out

“Fear is always stronger in the absence of the thing that causes it than in its presence. The idea of immense power of the MCC is perpetuated in several ‘invisible’ ways. First, it is created through an *idea* of a highly centralized, hierarchical and organized movement with hierarchically connected leaders; and that the overall purpose is to create a Maoist belt from Nepal to Andhra. Second, the image of immense power is perpetuated through the clandestine nature of its operations and the movement of opaque secrets and hidden resources. The rural elites understand that this veiled structure is so strategically constructed that, if caught, they will only be able to reveal a very limited amount about the organization. This cloud of secrecy generates uncertainty about the size and spread of the organization. An idea is generated that the MCC are, or could be, anywhere and everywhere – a kind of folklore about their spread. Although this idea is dependent on secrecy, it is also perpetuated by the apparent breach of secrecy. Such tactical breaches of secrecy enhance the idea of the MCC as a powerful organization, making people fear the consequences of not supporting it and thus accelerating its spread. Third, rumours add to the myth of the MCC about an MCC collaborator high up in the state political ranks. Such rumours created the idea that the MCC is so powerful that it is increasingly infiltrating the state.”⁷⁵

⁷³ Shah, ‘Markets of ...’, Op. Cit., p. 304.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 308.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 308-09.

These ‘invisible’ qualities of the MCC combine with stories of its capacity for violence to reproduce the myth of its power. Media reports spread chilling news of the MCC’s notorious violence elsewhere. The threat of violence is perpetuated by the MCC strategy of disarming an area it aims to expand in. The MCC demanded and collected all registered civilian rifles and guns in the early phase of their expansion. While it did give them the needed weaponry, but the greater achievement was the establishment of fear through the idea of the power of an armed organization in a disarmed area. The MCC sold protection to its supporters by spreading the idea of its increasing coercive control of the area and therefore creating a fear of itself. For its grassroots supporters, an idea of the MCC’s power is thus created not only through meeting its members, its everyday functioning, its grassroots campaigns, but also through its more invisible qualities⁷⁶.

The struggle for Social Control

In rural Jharkhand, the MCC is successfully competing with previous politician and lower-level bureaucrat networks in this market of protection, fragmenting local coercive control and thus winning over the support of village elites. This is made possible by the success of the MCC in presenting itself as a dual structure: a visible one and an invisible one. The visible powers of the MCC encompass its involvement in local politics, its embodiment through local people and its everyday activities, while the invisible powers of the MCC involve its opaque secrets, its vast hidden resources and higher authorities, and its capacity for violence. The MCC’s visible and invisible qualities seem more pervasive than those of the state in producing the myth of its power and authority, and in inducing fear among its grassroots targets.⁷⁷

There is indeed a great deal of continuity between the activities of the state and the MCC in the Jharkhandi area – not only did the state remain the major source of resources, but also both rural elites and state officials who once gave support to local politicians were

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 309.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 310.

now supporting the MCC. The people who represented the MCC are the same as those who also represented the state. Indeed, local politicians too are now seeking the protection of the MCC. Looking at these continuities raises the question of whether, at the grassroots, the MCC and the state have begun to look very similar. In rural Jharkhand, the state and the MCC share many of the same qualities⁷⁸.

Sudeep Chakravarti has made similar remarks regarding the Naxal operation in Jharkhand in travelogue on the Naxal affected areas of India. His conversation with a financier in Hazaribag too explains the linkages between the Maoist and other social actors. The financier categorically pointed out that “it is impossible for any business person without a compact with the Maoists to operate in the area.”⁷⁹

These deviation in the image of not only the State but also the Naxal through its informal economy, network of alliance, politics of fear and all other discussed above allows to understand the process of becoming of perpetual war in Indian. Being aware of these deviations allows us to that we look at Hazaribag, one of the worst affected Naxal districts in state. The focus of the field work is on understanding the linkages between various social actors and highlight ways in which the actual persistence of this war operates at the local level.

Outlining the Fieldwork

A lot of emphasis is placed on the rigor of the methods used in various approaches in the social sciences. But the existing methods overemphasize the explanatory power of independent variables, such as distinctive institutional arrangements and structural factors which may underplay the real process of the continuing dynamics of social change. It was with such a realization that Ian Lustick urged scholars to see states as entities with fundamentally contested, changing boundaries⁸⁰. Migdal too emphasizes the fact that even when physical boundaries are static; their effectiveness as lines encompassing a

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 310.

⁷⁹ Chakravarti, Op. Cit., p. 298.

⁸⁰ Ian Lustick, 1993 cited by Joel S Migdal, *State in Society: Studying how States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*, Cambridge, 2005, p. 24.

people with a shared meaning varies considerably⁸¹. Smuggling rings, clan and tribal relationships, regional and secessionist movements, religious solidarities, and numerous other social formations have added to the contest over these boundaries⁸².

The way people comply, participate and legitimise social actors in contest for social control are “subtle, through the eyes of others, and with close regard to past memories and accounts that circulate in the public sphere, and how we see other people getting on or being treated.”⁸³ It is based on “the sightings of the social actor by poorer people as members of society... the sightings made by local agents of the social actors at different levels of authority in political society... and the sightings made by members of the wider community, including experts of lending agencies, senior bureaucrats, political academia and activists.”⁸⁴

The purpose of the research is to develop insights and ideas about the way the interaction and dynamics of the conflict over social control has evolved in Jharkhand; circumstances that lead to a change in the distribution of social control in an environment of conflict; pattern of maintenance and extension of social control, changes in this pattern; and the role of the state in the emerging patterns of social change⁸⁵. Given a paucity of literature on the subject, the study has adopted a flexible and unstructured method to generate empirical materials to substantiate the formulations.

Research Tools

The process of data gathering in such research have mainly involved contextual literature review, in-depth key informant interviews, administrative records, documentary evidence and case study⁸⁶. The contextual literature review discussed earlier was undertaken to provide some insight into the way deviations have manifested themselves. It shows how the problem of Maoist extremism has evolved in the context and how it has assumed its

⁸¹ Migdal, Op. Cit., p. 25.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Stuart Corbridge, Glyn Williams, Manoj Srivastava, René Véron, eds., *Seeing the State: Governance and Governmentality in India*, Cambridge, 2005, p. 8.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 9.

⁸⁵ Migdal, Op. Cit., p. 56.

⁸⁶ David E Mc Nabb, *Research Methods of Political Science: Quantitative and Qualitative Methods*, New Delhi, 2005, p. 135.

current proportion and why the state has failed so miserably. Based on these issues a case study is taken of an affected area.

During the case study, key Informant interview will be undertaken with knowledgeable people who have been involved in one way or the other with the process within which the conflict is embedded in. It is used to collect basic qualitative data for gaining and understanding of the relationship between people in the region and the larger social actors on which the study is focused upon. The objective is to amass a thick description of what is often characterized as qualitative data. The key informant interview, in particular, however is used to develop an understanding of the beliefs, opinions, attitudes, values, and motivations of people's behavior⁸⁷.

The purpose of taking up a case study is to bring out information that may have been forgotten, ignored, or underplayed in the available literature. They are generally descriptive in nature and not just theoretical construction like the surveys. Therefore, they allow the researcher to study the issue at hand beyond a surface understanding to understand why things happen the way they happen. Adopting a case study also reduces the chances of over generalization and determinism⁸⁸.

Data Collection

The pointers of the practice of war has shown that merely highlighting the institutional and structural factors that allow Naxalism to sustain fails to look at the myriad of interaction that takes place in this struggle for social control in Jharkhand. The environment of conflict that persists in Jharkhand has a lot more to do with the interaction that takes place in this environment of conflict. These interactions not only determine the opportunity structure of the people living in this area but also determine the form that the strategies of the various actors involved in the process of social change. It is with such purpose in mind a case study of Hazaribag district in Jharkhand is taken.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 137-38.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 143.

Given the exploratory nature of the research taken, the focus during primary data collection will be on the qualitative data rather than quantitative data, for which the research largely depends on secondary data. There will be broadly two categories of respondent. While the first category is of those people who are operating in this environment of conflict including political leader, bureaucrats, businessmen, police officials, Naxal leader and prominent local bodies like NGO and panchayats. These key informant were interviewed through a semi-structured interviews that will focus on the key issues that the literature has put forth to explain the current situation. These will include issues of continued under-development and the support of Naxal from the poor; politician-Maoist nexus; the financial system of levies and extortion; rivalries between Naxals; police infrastructure to deal with it, coordination issues; how developmental and other security-related funds are used and the ideas to bring about a change in the situation. At the same time, given the high propensity of suspected Naxal and police informers being killed, the people will be spoken through informal conversational interviews. The focus of these conversations will be on how the Naxal and the state is perceived and participated with in society.

The endeavour begins with analyzing the difference between the supposed image and practices of the state. While looking at the state of affairs in Jharkhand, the ways in which rule affect society depends on the manner in which they are interpreted and put into play by lower-level workers and representatives of the social actors, contesting for power and others. Therefore, there is a need to see why and how policies are seized upon, understood, reworked and possibly contested by differently placed people within the population of 'the poor' in both civil and political society⁸⁹. This is why it is important to enquire into some of the myriad of ways for improving or protecting the incomes, capabilities and legal rights of poorer people thereby influencing their livelihood strategies in the region. Attention is on how and where these interactions take place for a nuanced understanding of how people inhabit and encounter these social actors, and how they react to their policies and participate in the implementation of these policies. It is with such outlook that the fieldwork is taken.

⁸⁹Ibid. p.6-7.

Chapter 4

Exploring the Practice of War

The analysis of the deviation in the image and the practise of war in Jharkhand revealed that Naxals are a formidable enemy, in terms of influence and organisation and weaponry. At the same time, in this region, there are factions among Naxals amidst a large volume of exchange taking in formed of levies and bribes that are being exchanged and alliances are being formed between the Naxals politician and the local elite. At the same time, despite the high claims of PMS and SRE in modernising the police and security forces employed in this war, the state of affairs in Jharkhand continues to be deplorable. The leadership has only been able to offer rhetoric in the name of rehabilitation policy and the boundaries of the state, territorial as well as social, have been blurred as the monopoly of the state in the realm of organised violence has led to the operation of a market of protection. With these observations in mind we look at how the perpetual war between the state and the Naxals is actually operating at the ground level in Hazaribag district of the State of Jharkhand.

The course of rest of the chapter starts with a brief description of the region of Hazaribag followed by some of the issues that were faced during the course of the field study

The Region of Hazaribag

As per the block level directory of Census of India 2001, Hazaribag district had a population of 12,45,769. Males constitute 49.78% of the population (6,20,069) and females 50.22% (6,25,672). At the same the district has 18.83% of its population categorised as Schedule Caste and another 6.98% as Schedule Tribes¹. The data procured from the district statistical department, for the land use of the year 2008-09 reveals the total area of the district was is 10,59,184.69 acres, 500513.70 acres as natural forest and 9637.84 acres. Therefore the district has an overall 48.18% of its total areas as forest

¹ *Census of India 2001, Block level Directory, Jharkhand*, Received for the district statistical department in Hazaribag.

cover. What was interesting to note was the fact that 306528.32 acres land which could be used for agriculture had been lying fallow up to the last 5 years.²

The reasons as to why Hazaribag has been chose are numerous. Firstly, Hazaribag has had its place in the history of the Jharkhand movement. The Raja of Ramgarh, Kamakhya Narayan Singh set up the Janata Party that had a large following in the region for many years. Krishna Ballabh Sahay (Born in Khadhaiya, a village in Tandwa Block), the renowned freedom fighter and subsequently chief minister of Bihar belonged to Hazaribag. As Revenue Minister, he was instrumental in the abolition of zemindaris in Bihar. In 1952, that was the first such legislation in the country.³ During the 1970s, Hazaribag was in the thick of the agrarian movement led by Soren and the workers movement of Roy.

In the current wave of Naxal violence as well the district of Hazaribag was among the first selected by the state, in 2003, as among the 33 worst affected Naxal districts in the country. It has also been the sample centre of government of India for its policy experiments. For example, in 2005 the Tribal Cultural Youth Exchange Programme organized by the Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangathan had Hazaribag among its six selected Naxal affected district.⁴ Again the Planning Commission's Committee on Causes for Agrarian Unrest that submitted its report in 2008 also has Hazaribag among its sample study.⁵ In spite of its history, not much academic analyses have been on the district of Hazaribag.

The Field Area and Methodological Issues

The field work was conducted between the 31 May 2010 and 13 June 2010. As I left for my trip, the State of Jharkhand was going through yet another political turmoil as the 4-month-old alliance government led by JMM and BJP had collapsed yet again, leading to

² The officer in charge insisted that I sit down and copy it in front of him is not supposed to give it to anyone. This was in spite of the board hanging outside his office declaring the about the Right to Information Act (2005). Official in general feel that they are doing a great favor by serving the people and are generally condescending to people, especially the police and those developmental official who grant funds. Personal experience in the District Collector office during the second week of June, 2010.

³ From hazaribagh.nic.in

⁴ *MHA annual Report 2005-06.*

⁵ *Development Challenges in Extremist Affected Areas: Report of an expert committee to the Planning Commission*, New Delhi: Government of India, 2008.

the imposition of President Rule for the fourth time in the brief history of the State. Even during my bus ride from Koderma (the nearest railway station connecting Hazaribag to Delhi), people kept on talking about how Bihar was developing by leaps and bound under the leadership of Nitish Kumar (the present Chief Minister of Bihar had already launched a *viswas rally* [trust procession] after completing its tenure of 5 years) while Jharkhand continues to suffer.

Entering Hazaribag, one can immediately notice the booming education and coaching sector, with their advertisements and banners on almost every street light. A rickshaw ride to the place of my relative where I was living during the trip made the point abundantly clear as every housing colony had a mushrooming of tuition and coaching centers. As I joined my businessman relative for dinner, he started telling me about how Jharkhand has gone to the dogs and nothing will ever improve in this part of the country. The hopelessness of the situation soon became evident to me.

On the very first day of fieldwork, I met with a wall of arrogance from the bureaucrats who refused to talk as they were very busy. The first experience came as I made a desperate attempt to get an appointment with the District Collector (DC). The collector was going to be transferred and therefore was too busy in the process of handing over the charge. The district rural development officials, whose office is in front of that of the DC, was too busy preparing their report for the upcoming (11 June 2010) meeting with the Union Home minister in Ranchi. So I tried meeting the Superintendent of Police (SP) who did not turn up in at office until late evening. As I narrated failures and frustrations to my relative, he said 'you won't be able to meet anyone in this way. And even if you do meet someone, they will not talk to you or will make you follow so many procedure that you will give up on your own'.⁶

So what should I do, I asked him. He told me that I should speak to his brother. He has a lot of interaction (*uthna baithna*) with most of these officials for his business purposes.

⁶ Shocked with this revelation I decided to put it to test. I tried to procure the district crime record from the police department, got the permission from the SP to meet the DSP who gave me 7 different appointments over phone and failed to meet me each time because he was busy with something or other. Finally, I did give up and had to depend on the data compiled by Institute for Conflict Management, Delhi.

Over the next two weeks this relative of mine introduced me to most of my key informants or people who could take me to them. Given the discrete situation in which most of these interviews were taken, names of all the respondent has been withheld. These included politicians, bureaucrats, Naxal cadres among others at the district and lower levels. Yet another difficulty was the fear that people had in talking about the issue of Naxalism. The minute they saw their statement being noted down, in spite of me telling them that I am a student, they refused to talk. So I had to give up noting down during most of my informal conversational interview. In its stead, a complete field journal was prepared soon after each interview.

The Key Informants

Main issues raised in the many interviews were geared toward generating an understanding about the process by which the Naxals emerge and sustain themselves in the district and the adjoining areas, the role played by the political leaders in the process, the support for Naxals in society, the growth of infighting among the Naxals and the inability of the institutions of governance to bring about change. In the course of the field work, 14 key informants were interviewed on these and related issues.

These included three senior bureaucrats (one of the central⁷ and two of the state governments). The central government bureaucrat had served as a DC in the Bastar (another Naxal affected district), Chattisgarh and is currently the personal secretary of a Minister of the central government. One of the State government bureaucrats interviewed has worked in the region of Hazaribag for the last 35 years and was currently teaching in one of the government training centre in Hazaribag. The other State level bureaucrat was responsible for managing and coordinating personnel and equipments in the entire district. Efforts were made to meet the Local MLA and MP, but none of them could be reached as all of them were busy with the ongoing Rajya Sabha elections. However a political leader, who until 2009 had been an MLA of one of the most Naxal affected

⁷ It was not a full-fledged interview as the person was attending a marriage

region in the district, for straight 15 years, was also interviewed⁸. The Barkagaon-Keredari region was also chosen for a further in depth study as the practice of war⁹. Besides, the region has been at the centre of development project with various private and public sector companies emerging in the coal mining sector. Three State bureaucrats at the local level – one each from the police, block development office and the forest departments in the area, were interviewed. A rehabilitation and resettlement department official of one of the mining companies was also interviewed. This particular mining company, NTPC, was chosen because the company on its arrival in the region in 2006 had faced strong resistance from the local people.

Three of the local businessmen, a *tendu* leaves contractor, a bus operator and a kerosene distributor were also interviewed in the region. These businessmen were chosen because of the fact their business operation took them to areas that were dominated by Naxals. Therefore, they have to interact with the Naxals on a regular basis. Again one the local shopkeeper and a respected member of the community¹⁰ was also interviewed. The person, I was told, has attended numerous ‘Jan Adalats’ organized by the Naxals as a neutral judge. Finally, two members of the village level cadre of the MCC group¹¹ were interviewed for obvious reasons. Apart from these, a wide range of people were interviewed, during field study in the area. However, most of these interviews could not be recorded as people refused to discuss the issue in record in any form.

Drawn from these interviews, the next section offers a narrative and analysis of the complex and densely entangled sets of interaction that not only blurred that distinction between the two warring parties, the state and the Naxals, but also shows how all sides

⁸ Given that his constituency has been Naxal-affected almost throughout his term, he also didn’t agree to give a full-fledged interview citing health reasons. However, he did agree to talk for some time during which he made some very interesting and informative comments.

⁹ The Beltu Massacre of 14 April 2001 was the first major incident in Hazaribag district that established the naxal might in the area. By 2007, the area had become the core of Naxal activity in Hazaribag and adjoining areas. On November 18, 2007, the district police made one of the biggest recoveries of explosive in the State from the villages in the Barkagaon Keredari region. The recovered items included 100 kg power gel, 100 kg nitric acid, wires and detonators in large quantities. These were, as per police sources, planned to be used for making cane bombs to target at least 20 bridges in Chatra and Hazaribag districts. *Prabhat Khabar*, 19 November 2007, pp. 1, 9.

¹⁰ He is revered in the area as an honest *panch* (elderly who are called to settle village dispute).

¹¹ Nobody is aware of CPI (Maoist) in the area, other active ones include TPC and JPC.

have combined to produce the current state of affairs, violence amidst underdevelopment, and use it to the best of their interests.

The Practice of War at the Local Level

Based on the discussion with all these key informant and people in general, the conclusion that drawn about the practice of war at the local level has been narrated in the following subsection

Genesis of Struggle for Social Control

Naxalism was introduced to the area in late 1970s by “Laxman Ganju and his Birsa Party”. He and his part “used to struggle for those poor whose land had been forcibly taken by rich and the powerful. Even though “they did carry weapons but did not use it very often... only those refusing to give land were killed”¹². However this initial wave led by a single party was effectively “crushed by the then Deputy Superintendent of Police, Akbar Babu”. The 1980s was “mostly peaceful in the area in terms of Naxal violence only but criminal violence, especially Dacioty was has been common feature since the late 1980s”. At the same time, by late 1980s, “communal violence was also brewing leading to communal riots of 1989. The period also saw the decline of the influence of the popular political family of the Raja of Ramgarh”. This led the rise of both, BJP and Leftist parties in the region who have dominated the political scene since 1989 general elections.¹³

By late 1980s, Naxalites (MCC) had made “some bases in Palamu and were operating from the jungles on the border of Palamu and Hazaribag (Hazaribag had not been divided

¹² Personal interview on 2/6/2010 in the daily market of Barkagaon block in Hazaribag. The translation is by the researcher

¹³ In 1957, Lalita Rajya Lakshmi, of the Ramgarh Raj family, won the seat. Basant Narayan Singh, younger brother of Kamakhya Narayan Singh, won the seat four times, in 1962, 1967 and again in 1977 and 1980. Damodar Pandey of Congress had won it in 1971. Yadunath Pandey of BJP won it in 1989. Bhubneshwar Prasad Mehta of CPI won the seat in 1991 and in 2004. Mahabir Lal Viswakarma of BJP won the seat in 1996. Yashwant Sinha of BJP won the seat in 1998 and went on to become Finance Minister and latter Foreign Minister in the NDA government. He also won the seat in 2009 Loksabha Elections. From hazaribag.nic.in

into 4 district of Hazaribag, Chatra, Koderma and Giridih until that point of time, which happen in 1991)”¹⁴.

However, as political instability gripped the country and the district, political actors started seeking support from all possible corners to hold on to power. The local police official pointed out:

these factor that helped the absconding Naxals of Palamu in the region. The primary motive for the politician to invite Naxals in these areas was to control the polling booths in the forest areas. In this phase, the first step taken by these groups was to forcibly collect all the licensed guns that existed in the rural areas. They also started collecting extortion money from the local businessman. This collection of money and weapon slowly started increasing the power of the Naxal as well as their local influence as more and more people joined the Naxal groups.¹⁵

In the late 1990s, a lot of young people “who had been imprisoned in the late 1980s and early 1990s in cases of Dacioty also inducted themselves into the folds of Naxalism”.¹⁶ While the people in general agreed that incident of Dacioty have declined in the last ten years, the police too acknowledged that some of Naxals arrested, too had histories as dacoits. The senior central bureaucrat had pointed to the fact that a “lot of the local cadre members of the party have also been included who were not necessarily convinced with the ideology”¹⁷. At the same time, as the local police official had explained people getting out of jail found it extremely difficult to find any source of employment.¹⁸ Meanwhile, corruption, especially of the police department, had also created “huge of population with personal experience exploitation and injustice was more than willing to take up arms to get justice”.¹⁹

¹⁴ Personal interview on 6/6/2010 in a residence of a State bureaucrat in Sadar Block in Hazaribag. The translation is by the researcher.

¹⁵ Personal interview on 3/6/2010 in a Naxal-affected police station in Keredari Block in Hazaribag. The translation is by the researcher.

¹⁶ Personal interview on 3/6/2010 in a Naxal-affected police station in Keredari Block in Hazaribag. The translation is by the researcher.

¹⁷ Personal conversation on 31/5/2010 in a Naxal-affected police station in Keredari Block in Hazaribag. The translation is by the researcher.

¹⁸ The local police officer had highlighted this in the case of those were released in latter half of the first decade of the 21st century, social norms were no different 10 years earlier. Personal interview on 3/6/2010 in a Naxal-affected police station in Keredari Block in Hazaribag. The translation is by the researcher.

¹⁹ Everybody except the police official themselves agree to this fact. The local people, businessman and the MCC members agreed that those who had faced police atrocities where among the most common recruits of the Naxals. There was a near unanimous agreement across all segments of society that government

Seeking Legitimacy through Social Reforms

Thus, over the 1990s, the Naxals grew in terms of the weapons they possessed, their cadre membership and the amount of money they were generating through their levies. At the same time, “they were discharging those functions that the government was supposed to do: judicious resolution of disputes amongst the poor. The politicians on their part were able to secure their share of votes from these areas. In return, the politician would vouch for them not being Naxal supporters if caught by the police. The areas that these Naxals were especially able to dominate were the vast forested areas around the jungle of Niri, the stretches across Hazaribag, Palamu, Chatra and Ranchi.” During this period, the MCC first came in and spoke to people about how they were here to fight for the poor and oppressed. That is why during “the initial recruitment was from those sections of population who had personal experience of injustices and oppression”²⁰.

As the cadre admitted, “in the 1990s the party had very good relation with local people. They even used to help the family members of the Naxals in time of need, especially at times of medical exigency”. Coming of party has had massive influence of the people especially poor. The cadre cited the example of “Manatu village in Palamu district where the movement actually started in the late 1980s. Rajput zamindars like Mauwwar and the local MLA, Vijay Singh, were extremely oppressive to their workers”.²¹ The cadre member proudly claimed that “wherever MCC operate, nobody gets crushed by anybody, there are no dacoities and there are no rapes”. Cadre member also said that “they [MCC] believe that everybody should have equitable land and even ‘re-distributed’ some of the land belonging to zamindars in Devaria. They even warned Hindus and Muslims in

officials, especially the police, do not even do what the duty bound to do, like registering a case. During my conversation with the people in Keredari on 3/06/2010.

²⁰ Personal interview on 4/6/2010 in Barkagaon Block in Hazaribag.

²¹ Most of the people interviewed speak in Hindi but the word they used to describe the state of these people was that they had been crushed by the rich or the police. What is important to note is the person perpetuating the crushing was never distinguished by his caste. It was always a richer or more powerful relative who had taken over something that was his hereditary right. Brother or cousins fighting for their ancestral land was amongst the most dispute that led to such crushing. Personal interview on 4/6/2010 in Barkagaon Block in Hazaribag. Also during personal conversation on with people of Keredari The translation is by the researcher.

Mohdi villages against the ensuing communal riots. They were also against ‘*nagdi*’ (cash paid as groom price)”.²²

The Rise of the Formidable Enemy

However as more money came in, exclusively through extortion and levies, the party increased the number of weapon in the area by many fold. While initially they used only guns snatched from the area, by late 1990s, a lot of weapons were purchased by the Naxals. Besides, they were increasingly organizing themselves as a hierarchical organization that was highly centralized in the local levels and had no scope for difference of opinion. Thus, offices of ‘authority’, especially at the lowest level of being a area commander and sub zonal commander, became highly contested. At the same time, in order to sustain their fear they had to see to it that they do what the levy has been taken for. Thus, as businessmen and rich became the allies of the Party, ideology was sidelined to impose the orders of the party through violence.

The district-level state officer opined that in the 1990s, “Gupteswar Pandey, a former SP had had a difference of opinion with the DC. He was of the opinion that that development fund distributed by the collector office was actually sustaining Naxalism”²³. Therefore the party, by the late 1990s, had “gained enough finances and weapons to become more daring in their attacks. Thus, police parties became the targets of local Naxals who were on an increasing drive to increase their armed strength. By the turn of the century, turning Maoist was among the most prevalent source of employment and the money was good”.

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The Beltu Massacre

The Beltu massacre was studied in depth for this study as it has left lasting memories in the minds of the people living in and around the area. All the respondents from the area

²² A lot of commoners actually acknowledged that the tradition of *Nagdi* had actually declined among the poor. The cadre responded during a Personal interview on 4/6/2010 in Barkagaon Block in Hazaribag. The translation is by the researcher.

²³ Personal interview on 9/6/2010 his office in Sadar Block in Hazaribag. The translation is by the researcher

²⁴ Personal interview on 8/6/2010 at his residence in Sadar Block in Hazaribag. The translation is by the researcher.

had mentioned about the episode. The MCC cadre, who had just come out of jail for the same case narrated the following story in response to a question on Gram Raksha Dal. He pointed out that after

MCC spread, some criminal elements, especially dacoits could not operate freely from the jungles beside the roads, formed Gram Raksha Dal:²⁵

These groups started troubling sympathizers of MCC. So the MCC organized a secret meeting and decided to kill these people. Now everybody of the Gram Raksha Dal, about 15 of them, used to live together in a house. The MCC through one of its local sympathizers, organized a party for them and supplied meat and liquor for them and waited. Then MCC encircled their houses. MCC asked them to throw their weapons or we will burn the house. But they fired back and closed the house. So the house was set on fire. As they all fainted, while the house burnt down, each of them were tied and taken outside the village and chopped into pieces²⁶.

The entire movement was “led by the sub-zonal commander, Prayag da, and his 3 area-commanders Sohan Ram Mahto, Basharat and Bhagirath”. What followed in the years to come, actually led to the decline of the party.

Competition within and among the Naxal Organisation

The Naxal interviewed for this study talked about the “increasing infighting emerging among the three area commanders who were vying to be the next sub-zonal commander for the Hararibag-Chatra sub-zone after the imminent promotion of the existing the sub-zonal commander of the area.”²⁷

The responsibility of organizing and expanding the party in each area belong to the area commander. He is the one who is first trained by the central command (you have to be a area commander to even know who about the individuals and actors above the zonal level) and is responsible to recruiting, training and arming his cadre. It is with these purposes that he starts organizing men and collects levies. The area commander can also expand the party in the nearby areas with the help of his recruited cadre and appoints them as area commander. Promotion above the rank of area commander was therefore, dependent of an area commander’s ability to expand the party and the levies he accumulated for the party.²⁸

²⁵ Even though one of the local respondents saw them as poor, the criminal background seems closer to reality in the light of statement made by the senior bureaucrat about inducting criminals in such groups. Also, one of the staff-members on a bus operating in that area too reported that these people refused to pay the fare whenever they travel to the town. Personal interview on 2/6/2010 in the daily market in Barkagaon Block in Hazaribag.

²⁶ Personal interview on 4/6/2010 in Barkagaon Block in Hazaribag.

²⁷ Personal interview on 2/6/2010 in Barkagaon Block in Hazaribag. The translation is by the researcher.

²⁸ Personal interview on 2/6/2010 in Barkagaon Block in Hazaribag. The translation is by the researcher.

The emergence of the new state of Jharkhand marked a new phase for MCC in Jharkhand and more specifically in Hazaribag. Within less than a year of the formation of Jharkhand, the MCC made two of its greatest attacks in the history of Hazaribag. The first was “on the 21 of April 2001, when fourteen persons were massacred by the MCC at Beltu village, in Keredari block. The second was on the 23 September 2001 when 12 CRPF personnel were killed by a landmine blast triggered by the MCC at Abroj forest area in the Hazaribag district in Jharkhand”.²⁹ These established the highly organized and enhanced striking capabilities of the MCC in the area. However, what these fail to show is the financial resource base that had allowed MCC to have such capabilities and the kind of conflict that were being generated within the people controlling such resources. This is a gap which the next section of the chapter will attempt to plug to some extent.

The MCC cadre narrated that “Prayag da had to leave for some training with the central committee. This was an indication that he was about to be promoted to the zonal level implying that post of sub zonal commander would be open for one of the area commanders. Baghirath, Basharat and Sohan were among the top contenders for the post”³⁰. However, each one of them had their own advantages.

While Sohan was a fundamentalist in terms of ideology and was extremely popular among the people and the leader, Basharat was the highest levy generator while Baghirath had the largest militia group. Basharat had a feeling that because he was a Muslim, he may be sidelined. So he started saving some money for his exit from the levies he collected. When Baghirath found out about this, he decided a strategy of calling Basharat and his associate cadres for a meeting and killing them.³¹ So a meeting was called in the Niri jungles. Basharat and one of his close friend were the first to arrive.

As they arrived they were caught and tied with ropes and an ‘enquiry’ commenced. They were beaten up badly during this enquiry. Then they were chopped and buried in the nearby dam’s embankment. Basharat’s family was for long told on phone that he had been sent for training. It was one of the associates of Basharat group who later formed TPC against Baghirath. Sohan too was called for a similar meeting but because of his known ideological honesty, Baghirath betrayed them and then later informed the police about his whereabouts. As Sohan reached the agreed place of meeting, the police surrounded the place and arrested him.

²⁹ Personal interview on 3/6/2010 in a naxal affected police station in Keredari Block in Hazaribag.

³⁰ Personal interview on 4/6/2010 in Barkagaon Block in Hazaribag.

³¹ Once a meeting has been called by the party every one and any one has to attend or face repercussions. This not only applies to commoners but also to party workers. While the bus operator and the oil distributor agreed to this point, the contractor said it was his *phud munshi* [provide English translation] who had to deal with such things. But the fact that he had to deal with such thing clearly established that they did happen.

Having eliminated his rivals, Baghirath became extremely corrupt and himself got into an illicit relation with a married woman – something the party was completely opposed to. So one such night, the woman's husband, who was anyways annoyed with this entire affair, informed the police leading to his arrest as well.

The rise of rival factions also led to the death of some prominent leaders like Prayaag da. As the kerosene operator from the area reported, “even when police and security force had been unsuccessfully trying their best to arrest him because of his high profile attacks on politicians. However, in 2009, Prayaag da was killed by a rival party who had actually trained under him and knew all his hide outs”³².

The emergence of factionalism over Levy

So by 2004, MCC was towards a slide while other Naxal groups, especially Jharkhand Prastuti Committee (JPC) and Tritiya Prastuti Committee (TPC) began to emerge as extremely powerful actors in some villages of the area. By 2007-08, these parties were making all attempts to increase their membership, especially in terms of those sympathizers who had been indiscriminately arrested in the initial years of the new century, especially under Marandi's government. The police officer interviewed categorically stated that such individuals were really joining the factions groups for two primary reasons, as discussed below.

The first reason remains the fact that an ex-convict can very rarely find an employment in rural India. At the same time, they couldn't have joined their old party because by now someone else has taken up his rank and he would have to start afresh. However, if such an individual joined another faction, he would at least be given the same rank in JPC or TPC, if not higher. At the same time, given the fact that ideology has long been lost by the Naxals in order to expand, fear has become the most effective to seek compliance. In this regard, the comment made by the bus operator is important. On being asked if he received two letters from two different parties working in an area, who would he comply by, his argument was simple: ‘whosoever is more *prabhavshali* (powerful)’, which in turn is directly dependent on the number of local cadres and sympathizers in the areas. So today there are zones of influences for each party of the Naxals.

The above discussion on how the struggle for social control began, the way each party sought support for war, the way fund were used by the state and its agencies, the competition within and amongst the Naxals and the infighting and schism over the issue of levies highlight the process by which the war actually operates and persists. With these

³² Personal interview on 8/6/2010 at his residence in Sadar Block in Hazaribag.

The Corruption of Social Control

There was a general consensus across the respondents including political leaders, bureaucrats and police officials that the separate state of Jharkhand has actually led to the entrenchment of corruption. This corruption has also entered the Naxals who were supposedly fighting against it. The political history of the separate State of Jharkhand as narrated by one of the respondents is a story of entrenchment of corruption by leaders, most of who emerged with the separate state.³³ The kerosene distributor narrated more telling account of the political corruption in the state. He pointed out

Starting with Babulal Marandi (2000-2003), who had been removed by the BJP because, had was not ready to be as corrupt as the party high command and its allies wanted him to be. So he was replaced with Arjun Munda of BJP-led alliance in 2003 owing to his willingness to be more adjusting with everyone. That is why, Munda (2003-2004) again become CM after the 2004 election. Now, at this point of time, the governor had first invited JMM, a Congress ally (party leading the UPA at the centre) to form the government despite of the fact that it was not the single largest party in Jharkhand. But Soren could not prove support of the majority of legislators. Meanwhile, Munda managed support of 42 MLAs and went to the President of India and was therefore sworn in as the CM again. This time around, he just wanted to recover what he had spent on managing those 42 MLAs. Corruption was institutionalized by him. This period produced a lot of prominent independent candidate like Madhu Koda, Kamlesh Singh, Hare Narayan Rai, Enus Ekka, Bhanu Pratap Shahi – all these leaders had Maoist/ criminal links. However, the government lost the support of the majority of legislators and President's Rule was imposed for six months followed by Madhu Koda being sworn in as the first independent candidate to have been sworn in as CM in independent India.

One consequence of these unsettled political conditions was further entrenchment of corruption. Rates were fixed. Laws didn't matter if you can pay the cost. Then two years later there was another spell of President's Rule amidst the exposure of a massive scandal involving thousands of crores of Rupees. Koda was alledged to have made so much money in two years that from having total asset of 18 lakhs he went on buy oil wells in Liberia. Elections in 2009 lead to another hung assembly leading to an alliance between JMM and BJP which collapsed with four imposing another president rule now³⁴.

In all this melee over political office, agenda of development was lost while the objective became to amass money for the short duration in political office. Everyone of the business community from the area, except the tendu leave contractor who was not from the area, agreed to the fact that the creation of Jharkhand had most significantly led to

³³ The tribal school teacher had pointed to this fact that except for Sibu Soren, who himself had become corrupt, all the leader of the State at present had emerged in the political scene after the emergence of the separate state. Personal interview on 10/6/2010 at his office in Sadar Block in Hazaribag.

³⁴ Personal interview on 8/6/2010 at his residence in Sadar Block in Hazaribag.

rise in corruption at all levels of state officials, unlike in undivided Bihar when only the top notch Bureaucrats had to be paid for getting any job done. The local village respondent was of the belief that “Jharkhand was that diamond that has always been in the hand of diamond thieves (*heera chor*) and what it needs is a *johri* who can polish this diamond and place it on its rightful place in the crown of India”.³⁵

The Naxals on their part had become corrupt in terms of their ideology. The “propensity of people joining the party for their personal motives” was repeatedly pointed out by the MCC cadre members. At the same time “the rise of the intermediaries, people who were sympathizer of the party or knew people in the party, led to corruption creeping into Jan Adalats”.³⁶ These intermediaries or dalal charging money for putting up a case in front of the Naxal and also in helping them negotiate the amount of fine. The kerosene dealer told me that once when his “staff was abducted by the party his relative because of his contacts with a senior party member was able to get the judgment in their favour”.³⁷ Another common trend of corruption among the Naxals, as pointed out the local police officer, adopted by party (MCC) leader was “to surrender when they have collected enough cash for themselves in the name of the party. The party also allows the rich the liberty to get away for small bribes especially in cases where the injured party is poor. The bus operator had pointed out that one of the benefits of having a local MCC member as an agent was that they helped them settle any dispute that they have in the area, especially in cases of accidents involving their bus”³⁸.

The mechanics of such ‘resolution’ is interesting. When a Naxal leader realized that he had collected enough money, he would surrender in front of the police. By doing this, they are able to tell their party members, on returning from jail, that the police had seized the money and thereby not be required to pay it into the party coffers. Now, if he has enough money to contest local elections, it is most likely that he would become a politician. This way his history as an extremist (*daagi*) not only becomes immaterial but also helpful in his victory. Both the cadre members and the local police official attested to

³⁵ Personal interview on 2/6/2010 in the daily market in Barkagaon Block in Hazaribag.

³⁶ Personal interview on 4/6/2010 at his residence in Barkagaon Block in Hazaribag.

³⁷ Personal interview on 4/6/2010 at his residence in Barkagaon Block in Hazaribag.

³⁸ Personal interview on 3/6/2010 in a naxal affected police station in Keredari Block in Hazaribag.

this fact³⁹ that the recently elected MLA from the region is known to have had a history with the Naxals. But the fact that he is the local MLA, even if it was just for 4 months, forces the police to listen to him in spite of his history.

The Blame Game

The state official on their part acknowledge the corruption but blame it on other departments. The police officials in particular, even after having the reputation of being the most corrupt department, blame those it on the developmental departments. Both, the local and the district level police officials emphasized that “the constant source of levy was provided by the developmental projects, via the contractors, and has been the primary factor behind the rise of Naxalism”⁴⁰. On the other hand, local people, businessmen and MCC categorically blame the corrupt practices of the police, especially in terms of taking money from anyone and everyone for filing a case or not filing it, including the Naxals⁴¹. It was reported that “the police officials have fixed rates that are to be paid by bus operators for ignoring almost anything”⁴².

Politicians, apart from allying with the Naxals, for trading polling booths in Naxal areas, the leader also combine with the elite to run bloated developmental estimates. Thus, as the local person said, ‘if a project could be completed for 50 rupees and the contractor is willing to share with the politician, then the estimate can be bloated up to any proportion like 500 rupees’⁴³.

Citing reasons for this vertical increase in corruption, it was reported the political uncertainty and instability has been the prime factor is precipitating of an opportunity structure that is based on, and a product of, one’s ability to bribe. The businessmen were of the view that it was this recurrent cost that allowed for smooth operation and bumper

³⁹ Personal interview on 3/6/2010 in a naxal affected police station in Keredari Block in Hazaribag and on 4/6/2010 in Barkagaon Block in Hazaribag respectively.

⁴⁰ Personal interview on 3/6/2010 in a naxal affected police station in Keredari Block in Hazaribag and with a senior police official 9/6/2010 in his office in Sadar block in Hazaribag.

⁴¹ The local kerosene distributor had pointed out that the local police official taking money from the Naxal to delay the filing of the report allowing them to get an easy bail. Personal interview on 4/6/2010 in Barkagaon Block in Hazaribag, respectively.

⁴² Personal interview on 7/06/2010 at Hazaribag bus stand.

⁴³ Personal interview on 2/6/2010 in daily market in Barkagaon Block in Hazaribag.

profits (especially in the case of petrol pump owner who sells adulterated petrol).⁴⁴ The loser in every single case is the poor as the quality of products and services delivered degenerates amidst declining accountability on the part all wielding power, including the Naxals.

Blurred Boundary of the State and the Naxals

The central-level bureaucrat had made an interesting observation in relation to this issue. He explained that the

Naxals are not as cohesive as they come across to be. Even though at their core, the leadership is highly idealistic and against injustice, because of the organizational needs for expansion, the party has on the periphery included even those people within their fold who are not necessarily convinced with their ideology. Thus, in spite of an extremely hierarchical, centralized and disciplined organizational structure, people have been able to use the party for their own benefits. On the other hand, the government officials too are not a homogenous entity. Not all of them are corrupt or honest. He chose to categorize them into 4 categories. First group comprised of honest and effective bureaucrats while the second group consisted of honest but ineffective. The third group was of dishonest and ineffective while the last group comprised of those who were dishonest but effective. The trouble is that the majority are in the ineffective category – whether honest or dishonest. The problem with the Indian state is the ninety percent of those who represent it for the people are either corrupt or ineffective.⁴⁵

However the senior district bureaucrats had pointed out something very different.

It was not possible for government department to pay levies to the Naxals out of their departmental expenditure budgets that was the main source of funding for the joint forest management. Therefore, the government switched to a contract system, making it easier to restart operation in the jungle areas. The contractors, through their local agents like the *phud munshis*, were able to pay the Naxals and collect the forest produce while the administrators got their share. Thus, began a system of perpetuation of under-development which helped the armed groups of the area, in form of the state and the Naxals. With the emergence of politician-Naxal -contractor nexus, the quality of work also declined⁴⁶.

As most of the funds were diverted by this nexus, the same infrastructural project, especially roads and bridges, had to be made again and again. And every time, the same bad quality was maintained. Thus, it creates a system where each subsequent lot of funds are used to repair the existing infrastructure in such a way that it needs repair by the time the next lot of funds arrive.

⁴⁴ This is not actually petrol but Kerosene whose density is chemically altered to match that of petrol. As told during a Personal interview on 8/6/2010 at his residence in Sadar Block in Hazaribag.

⁴⁵ Personal conversation on 31/5/2010 at his relative's residence in Sadar Block in Hazaribag.

⁴⁶ Personal interview on 6/6/2010 at his residence in Sadar block in Hazaribag.

The Naxals on their part, after appropriating their levy, relieve the contractor of all accountabilities of the quality of work. Therefore, government and bureaucrats sponsor the argument about development-deficit financing Naxalism, because it helps them to also line their own pocket without being accountable. At the same time, by forcing the local public officials to implement some the government policies, like the Annapurna project for giving cheap food grain to the poor, has helped them maintain their rhetoric of pro-poor support.⁴⁷

At the same time, they have a crucial role to play in way the local businessmen operate their business. By being in their good books and by paying bribe or levies, the businessmen are able to get away with violation of laws. For example, the bus operator was able to “park anywhere outside the bus stand and load as many passengers as he felt like if he has paid his monthly bribe”. Similarly, the petrol pump owners are able to sell “sub-standard quality petrol if they can pay the sales officer for not visiting their pumps”.⁴⁸

The Tragedy of Justice

Justice seems to have lost the direction to the rural areas of Hazaribag. What exists today are moribund institutions that at some point of time used to dispense justice. The area had always had “a community based panchayats system to decide on most of the cases in the area. The local village headman pointed out that it was mostly community panchayats (here those of *tolas* like Muslim Tola, Chatti, Pandu, Bhumya Tola)” that used to settle such dispute. However, “the courts have many procedures and each process has a cost. It may be as low as Rs. 10 to the court *munshi* for putting up the file in court, and then, after all the procedure all you get is another date to follow the first. No matter where you register your case, either in court or through the police station, it only gets registered and not resolved. The *wakil*, *munshi*, *peshkar* – everybody takes money and gives you a date.”⁴⁹

On other hand, ever since the enactment of Panchayat (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996, there has been an ongoing legal case over the issue of reservation of the seats

⁴⁷ Personal interview on 6/6/2010 at his residence in Sadar block in Hazaribag.

⁴⁸ As told during a Personal interview with the Kerosene distributor on 8/6/2010 at his residence in Sadar Block in Hazaribag and Personal interview with the Bus operator on 7/6/2010 at the Bus Stand in Hazaribag.

⁴⁹ Personal interview with the local village headman of the Muslim community on 2/6/2010 at Barkaagaon Daily market in Hazaribag.

for the tribals. This has created serious tensions in the area. A former MLA's son pointed out, that "even areas with 4% of tribal population have been reserved for tribal. So while the panchayats are more or less moribund, police is corrupt beyond imagination and the courts are too expensive and involve long bureaucratic delays".⁵⁰ In is against such paucity of dispute settlement mechanism that the Jan Adalats of the Naxals came into popularity. The fact that they initiated as a free of cost and by far the most judicious mechanism for dispute settlement in rural area is not questioned by many in the area.

However, the real tragedy lies in the way justice is meted out. There is an excessive dependence on "fear as a means to deter people in future from committing the same crime." However, "in most cases where the situation has been reached of meting out justice through punishment, nothing is left for improvement".⁵¹ In most of the cases, people were either very badly beaten with sticks or even worse, chopped into pieces. While some of rural community panchayats do exist, most of them are either working after being instigated by the Naxals or in presence of their sympathizers. Where the tragedy lies is the fact that most of the times it is the representatives of the rich, mostly local poor who get punished for the rich.⁵² The maximum damage that the Naxal judicial system does to the rich is to cause material damage.

Mostly organized deep inside the jungle in the presence of local villagers, "these Jan Adalats have increasing become the platform through which the Naxals deal with those who have dared to defy their order". This has increasing made "participation in these Jan Adalats stimulated by fear. What is of an even greater concern is that participation in these Adalats has increasingly attracted the wrath of both, other party cadres and the police."⁵³ Therefore, the last decade has seen an increasing decline in the legitimacy of the Jan Adalats. At the same time, with increasing attacks on police informers and other Naxal outfits, these Jan Adalat have become a mere sham that is used to kill some people without trial.

⁵⁰ Personal interview with the ex MLA on 2/6/2010 at his residence in Barkagaon Block in Hazaribag.

⁵¹ The Naxal generally impose fine. Punishments are given out only for defiance to party orders. Personal interview with the MCC card member in Barkagaon lock in Hazaribag.

⁵² It was the staff of the bus operator or the oil distributor had been abducted. It was generally their property that comes under attack.

⁵³ Personal conversation with the people of Barkagaon and Keredari Block Durin 2/6/2010 to 5/6/2010.

The Underdevelopment of Development

Two of the naturally existing resources available in the district of Hazaribag in general and the Barkagaon Keredari block region in particular are coal and forest. However, the political economy of the region, as it emerged over the last two decades, has left the area grossly under-developed. The irony of the matter lies in the fact that while both the state and the Naxals have been fighting a violent war against this under-development, they have been the ones to benefit the most from it and consequently sustain it. This apparent paradox requires analysis, which is undertaken below by weaving together the narration of the process from the viewpoint of all the respondents.

Hazaribag has the second largest deposit of coal in the Jharkhand region, after Dhanbad. Still, except for a few mines in Kujju, most of the mines in the district, especially in the Karanpura coal belt stretching across Barkagaon, Keredari and Tandwa block had been closed after nationalization of coal mines. This was especially done because most of the mines in this area were suitable for open-pit mining which was labour intensive whereas nationalization had led to mechanization of the mines. This left a huge section of the population largely unemployed and a serious wave of out-migration from the rural area to the township of Hazaribag had started. However, the poor were employed by the coal mafias in the region for the purposes of mining coal from this area and transporting it in sacks on a bicycle to the nearby town⁵⁴. Though some of it was sold in the illegal coal market, most of it was bought at dirt cheap rate by the '*koyla taal*' or the illegal coal wholesaler. These *taals* then sold it to the local mafia who transported it in his trucks to factories in Dehri and Benares. Thus, every morning one can find rows of people carrying up to a ton of coal on their bicycle to the nearest town 30 kilometres away⁵⁵.

Government's attention shifted to these coal deposits in 1999, with the announcement of "the Tandwa thermal power project on 6 March 1999 by the name of north Karanpura Super Thermal Power Project". However the project did not take off. The focus shifted back in 2006 when "NTPC was given the Pakri Barwadih coal block for mining". Two

⁵⁴ Personal observations during the researcher's stay in the Barkagaon region. Every morning you can see hoards of people taking sacks full of coal to be sold in the nearby areas.

⁵⁵ During personal conversation with one of the coal porter in Hazaribag outside a tea stall on 9/6/2010.

things were extremely important to note in the changed project. It was not to be a thermal power plant but a mining site from where coal will be extracted by NTPC for its thermal power plants elsewhere. At the same time this was among the first mining project undertaken by NTPC, a power sector enterprise⁵⁶.

As the company officials reached the site, they met with stiff resistance and violent protest⁵⁷ from an angry mob. The local resident however disclosed “the procession and the protest was organized by the coal mafia and was mostly comprising of those whose land was not even in contention”⁵⁸. These groups “stalled the meeting of Village Development Advisory Committee (VDAC) who had convened at the behest of the company along those whose land was to be used for the project to discuss various developmental measure that were to be taken by company for community development”. The local MLA even while “agreeing to the benefits of the proposed project inside meeting with company official, used to play to the galleries while in front of the mob”⁵⁹. The main dispute was over “the rate of compensation for the land acquired: Rs 4.5 lakhs per acre proposed by the company was contested”. Negotiations started between “company officials, district administration and the affected families by 2007 and the rates were finally settled at Rs. 10 lakhs per acre in 2009”⁶⁰.

However, as the company’s employee explained, the rates had not actually changed.

While initially company was giving a lot of additional benefits like 30% solarium grant, 12% interest etc., the renegotiated rate of Rs. 10 lakhs per acre is inclusive of everything. At the same time they have uniform rate for all kinds of lands now. Earlier different rates were proposed for different kinds of land like agricultural, *tand* land, etc. This would mean a loss for a lot of people who would not get the real value of their land while others would get an enhanced value for their land. At the same time, given the Collector’s warning at the time of the Chepakur settlement regarding the problems he can create for people to even claim the money for land says a lot about the way negotiation were sealed.⁶¹

⁵⁶ Personal interview on 8/6/2010 in NTPC office in Hazaribag.

⁵⁷ Its office was vandalized on the 6th of November 2006. *Prabhat Khabar*, 7 November 2006, p. 2.

⁵⁸ Personal interview on 2/6/2010 in the daily market in Barkagaon Block in Hazaribag.

⁵⁹ However he was influential in checking the eruption of violence on a number of occasions. Personal interview on 8/6/2010 in NTPC office in Hazaribag.

⁶⁰ Personal interview on 8/6/2010 in NTPC office in Hazaribag.

⁶¹ The noted village resident who was present during the meeting makes a mention of this. Personal interview on 8/6/2010 in NTPC office in Hazaribag.

Over the last 15 months, it was a pleasant surprise to note that the company has actually doing whatever it claimed. The initial “Community Development stage with its heads of education, health and welfare has been implemented”. Under this the company has distributed furniture to school, uniforms and books to school children, and repaired school building, paid for ITI training of wards of affected families, etc. They have also put a solar lamps, organised eye & health check-up camps, etc. They have also started a mobile medical bus, drinking water facilities as *piaos* and all these were based on request. All these works were undertaken in collaboration with the local NGO called Manav Sewa Santhan, whose director was more than happy to show pictures and newspaper clippings of these events⁶².

Both NTPC and the NGO have agreed that the Naxals do not cause too much hindrance in their work.⁶³ What they fail to realize is that the Naxals are not interested in these small benefits that they are putting forth for the people. They are waiting for the big fish, the money from the land sale to arrive for extorting levies. Some people have already been feeling weary and living in constant fear of losing a substantial part of their money to the government official as bribes and to the Naxals as levies.

On the other hand, the forest department has become redundant because of “its inability to generate any revenue from the sale of timber of the tree planted during the joint forest management scheme after state-trading ended”. The primary reason for this has been the “growing dominance of the Naxals in the forest area. The *tendu* leave contractor of the local forest explained how the Maoist had become the real masters of the Jungle”.⁶⁴ However, contractors had appointed local *phud munshis* who deal with these Naxals.

It is the persistence of the current situation of underdevelopment, poverty and injustice that allows the state and the Naxals to justify and legitimize their existence. If people don't see and experience these feelings they would neither need a state or the Naxals.

⁶² Personal conversation with the beneficiaries in Barkagaon Block in Hazaribag during 2/6/2010 to 5/06/2010

⁶³ Though the NTPC official did acknowledge that street lamps that had put had been broken and they were at times stopped from entering certain areas. However, this was mostly because of the government logo on their vehicles, Personal interview on 8/6/2010 in NTPC office in Hazaribag.

⁶⁴ Personal interview on 3/6/2010 in Barkagaon Forest Department office in Barkagaon Block in Hazaribag.

Underdevelopment supports both the state and the Naxals in quite the same way albeit from different vantage points.

On a Concluding Note

While I was still continuing with my field work, all the trains plying via Jharkhand including the Rajdhani had been asked to not travel through Jharkhand during night. At the same time, yet another series of *bandhs* had been called by the CPI (Maoist). As I returned to Delhi and was busy typing these interviews, the question that cropping up was to make some sense of the wide disparity between the idea and the practice of the state as well as Naxal. I had been wrong in my assessment. State had not failed in terms of its policy implementation. It had failed in providing an honest articulation of the purpose of these policies. These policies were aimed at sustaining underdevelopment and they have been successful in doing so and have been actively supported by the Naxal through its politics of fear based on a threat rather than use of violence.

Chapter 5

The Political-economy of Organized Violence

Even after a decade of protracted low intensity war between the state and the Naxals, neither the state nor the Naxals have been able to make much head way in their objectives. The multi-pronged approach of the state with its focus on development and security has failed to contain the persistence and intensification of Naxal violence. At the same time, the Naxals have failed, as Sumanta Banerjee pointed out, “in spite of its programmes and some achievements in Chhattisgarh in building up alternative ‘organs of people’s power’, the CPI (Maoist) has failed to expand politically or organizationally in the rest of India”¹. Similar opinions had also been made by T D Gupta, who argued:

in spite of continued Maoist expansion and a remarkable increase in its military capabilities and striking power, some of the more fundamental goals of the party like ‘building a mighty mass movement against imperialism, isolating and defeating dangerous Hindu fascist forces and building a powerful urban movement, particularly of the working class remain as elusive as ever. Also in absence of legal and open opportunities for propaganda and agitation, it is extremely difficult for them to launch large scale mass movements and demonstrations even in areas where they have considerable popular support.’²

Those trying to explain this state of affairs have focused on issues of inefficiency of the structures of security and development, the persistence of socio economic underdevelopment feeding discontent, greater organization and modernization of Naxal weaponry, and lack of coordination among affected States. However, most of this lexis of the state-Naxal war does not enlighten much on the praxis of this protracted low intensity war at the local level. It was with similar pursuit that the problem was studied through a state in society approach as put forth by Joel Migdal that allows us to analyse the complex deviation that come about between the image and the practice of the war between the state and the Naxals.

The study of the problem through a state in society approach reveals that the idea of this protracted low intensity war between the state and the Naxals is actually sustained by a

¹ Sumanta Banerjee, ‘The Maoists, Elections, Boycotts and Violence’ in *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. xiv no 18, 2009. p. 78.

² T D Gupta ‘Maoism in India: Ideology, Programme and Armed Struggle’ in *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 29 no. 2, July 2006, p. 3175.

practice of cooperation between various actors including political leaders, state officials, Naxals and economic elite of the region. For the state, the idea of war is projected by seeing the intensity of the problem in terms of violent incidents, death toll, and number of 'affected district' and mobilization of forces to deal with the situation. For the Naxals, it is projected by their rhetorical objective of capturing state power through an armed struggle by the masses. However, the practice of this war actually exposes a political-economy of organized violence that is sustained by a network of alliances between the political leaders, state officials, economic elite and the Naxals; a politics of fear that depends on violence for compliance and participation; and, a vicious cycle of underdevelopment that is self-sustaining and benefits the members of the alliance. This has seriously altered the balance of governance, legitimacy and forms of security needed for directed social change. The *crisis of security* has led to *war for legitimacy* that perpetuates a *tragedy of governance* based on the political economy of organized violence.

Image of the War between the State and the Naxals

The image of the state being involved in a war with the Naxal is of recent origin, even though the problem of Naxalism itself is over four decades old. The ultra left ideology of the Naxal had always seen its objective as the capture of state power through an agrarian movement based on the strategy of guerrilla warfare. The state, however, has for most of the history of the Naxals underplayed the challenge posed by the Naxals and has seen them as a law and order situation. The primary reason for this approach of the state was the disintegration of the Naxal movement in India in the post-Emergency period into various factions over issues of ideology and strategy. The last two decade of the twentieth century saw multiple schisms within the Naxal groups marred by inter-group war. As the movement, in the wake of state repression, went underground, it entered a phase of organising local mass movements in rural areas of Andhra Pradesh and Bihar (chapter 2). However as the fieldwork in Jharkhand reveals, over the course of the 1990s, the Naxal had been able to command a sufficient degree of autonomy in terms of their finances (accumulated through extortion, ransom and levies for protection against itself) due to their control of bands of armed men. This allowed them to increasingly expand their area

of influence and their capacity to make attacks on railways and policies agencies (chapter 4),. As a senior state bureaucrat pointed out:

The extremist ... carved their own niche in the forest and hilly areas...remaining mostly underground extorting money, collecting weapon, organizing Jan Adalats during the 1990s... with political support and enough extortion money they advanced their power especially in terms of their weaponry. Small weapon and the locally available licensed guns came first. Then came the A.K 47s finally land mines...³

By the turn of the century, as war on terror began in the global arena, the Indian state also launched its own drive against terror under its anti-terrorist law POTA. The indiscriminate arrest made under POTA pushed the Naxals against the wall and forced them to restart talks for unification among various Naxals factions in India (Chapter 3). Highlighting this aspect in the context of Jharkhand Alpa Shah had pointed out:

Under POTA, the MCC along with the other main Naxalite factions Party Unity and People's War Group were identified as terrorists. By March 2004, according to the Union Home Ministry, Jharkhand alone had 234 people arrested, more than 650 people had cases pending against them and more than 3200 people were named as involved in terrorist activities since November 2000.⁴

Against this backdrop, the issue re-emerges at the central level when the Union Ministry of Home Affairs dedicated a complete section on Naxalism within the chapter on internal security in its report for the year 2003.⁵ After an abrupt end of peace talks in Andhra Pradesh, the Naxals came together to form the Communist party of India (Maoist) in 2004.

Since then, both the state and the Naxals, the latter being increasingly recognized with CPI (Maoist), have projected being at war with each other. This idea was reflected in their perceptions of each other, their objectives and the mobilization of forces and resources in pursuit of this objective.⁶

³ Personal interview with a senior State government bureaucrat on 06/06/2010 in the Sadar block of Hazaribag.

⁴ Alpa Shah, 'Markets of Protection: The 'Terrorist' Maoist Movement and the State in Jharkhand, India' in *Critique of Anthropology*, vol. 26 no. 2, September 2006, p. 298.

⁵ *MHA Annual Report 2003-04*, p. 40-45. Even though, a high powered committee of the Naxal affected state did exist since 1997, it was not included as an issue of internal security till 2002-2003 by the Home Ministry.

⁶ *MHA Annual Report 2004-05*, p 44. The document reported that "the CPML-PW and the MCCI ... have finally merged to form a new party called the Communist Party of India (CPI-Maoist) ... effected on September 21, 2004".

The idea of the war

As discussed in the chapter 1, in the post cold war era, war had seen a change in its basic conception. The exclusivity of the state as the only actor with legitimate means of organised violence was increasingly eroded in the civil wars of Africa and Eastern Europe. The violent interactions of non-state actors with mean of organised violence (like insurgent groups, terrorist organization, tribal clans, etc.) were increasingly engaged violent interaction with the state and its representatives to pursue their own political goals. Therefore, the idea of being at war did not necessarily involve its declaration by the state. War, or absence of peace, had become perpetual, as is reflected in the comment of a local police official in Jharkhand, "...*aaj kal har jagah shanti hai or kahin bhi nahin hai* (nowadays peace is everywhere and nowhere)".⁷ War was reflected in the intention and actions of the involved party against its enemy. However, for waging a war the construction of the enemy against whom war is to be waged is inherent.

Constructing the Enemy

The state and the class whose interest it represents has always been the traditional enemy of the Leftist ideology. The revolutionary capture of this state through an armed struggle has been the political objective of almost all the ultra-left Maoist or the Naxals as they are popularly known in India. In a press statement dated October 14, 2004, General Secretaries of the Central Committee of the two outfits, Kishan of the MCC and Ganapathi of the PWG, declared:

The immediate aim and programme of the Maoist party is to carry on and complete the already ongoing and advancing New Democratic Revolution in India as a part of the world proletarian revolution by overthrowing the semi-colonial, semi-feudal system under the neo-colonial form of indirect rule, exploitation and control... This revolution will be carried out and completed through armed agrarian revolutionary war, i.e. protracted people's war with the armed seizure of power remaining as its central and principal task, encircling the cities from the countryside and thereby finally capturing them. Hence the countryside as well as the Protracted People's War will remain as the "centre of gravity" of the party's work, while urban work will be complimentary to it⁸.

⁷ Personal interview on 3/6/2010 in a Naxal-affected police station in Keredari Block in Hazaribag. The translation is by the researcher.

⁸ *The Hindu*, 15 October 2004.

The state was seen as the representative these classes and had been increasingly made the target of Naxal attack as reported in the annual reports of the home ministry every year since the years 2003-04.

The state, on the other hand, has underplayed the scope of the Naxal threat as a mere law and order problem. It took some time for such a state to declare that “Naxalism is the single largest threat to internal security ever faced by India”.⁹ The first steps towards this direction were taken when the Union Home Ministry first took up the issue as a concern for internal security in 2003. In their perception of the problem created by Naxalism, the state focused exclusively on the violence that the number of ‘affected district’ which had witnessed Naxal violence. The degree to which a district was affected was dependent on the number of such violent incidents and the resultant deaths. The acknowledgement of the socio economic dimension of the problem comes only by 2005-06. After the creation of CPI (Maoist), the government also made it a point to emphasize in each report that the party was responsible for most of (around 90%) of the total number of incidents and death. At the same time, the reports since 2003 have consistently emphasized their continued attack on railway and private property. In terms of response of the state, the most visible and sustained effort has been on increasing security personnel in affected areas and sanctioning more funds for the modernization of the police machinery and other security related expenditure. At the same time backwardness was assumed to be the source of this problem and therefore, more developmental funds were directed to the affected districts.¹⁰

The Dynamic of the war

Clausewitz had pointed out that war is a resistant medium where strategies do not necessarily unfold as they were intended. As the strategies were based on the goals and objectives that either party wish to achieve by the use of organized violence, the state and Naxals approached the war with different strategies as the objective was different. For the Naxals, the objective was to launch guerrilla-style warfare in the rural areas to encircle

⁹ Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in August 2006 made the following remark about the issue of naxalism in the meeting of the naxal affected chief ministers in Delhi. As retrieved from www.pmo.nic.in

¹⁰ This was in spite the fact that 33 of the 55 districts seen as highly affected by the state did not correspond to the criteria of backwardness of the Backward District initiative.

the urban areas before finally capturing power.¹¹ For the state, “[t]he prime motive behind the expansionist designs of CPML-PW and MCC-I, together with the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), is to spread into new areas to carve out a ‘Compact Revolutionary Zone’ spreading from Nepal through Bihar and the Dandakaranya region to Andhra Pradesh”.¹² However, the CPI (Maoist) had released its own set of five documents that outlined its ideology, strategy, etc., which was released soon after the formation of the State of Jharkhand. One of the five documents drafted by the Central Committee of the CPI (Maoist) titled *The Strategy and Tactics of Indian Revolution* elaborates on how the Indian revolution would have to pass through two stages:

The first stage involves the process of changing the semi-colonial and semi-feudal society into an independent new democratic society. This involves carrying on and advancing the people’s war, by arousing and organizing the people for agrarian revolutionary guerrilla war in the rural areas especially the more remote ones as they are more favourable for the building up of the people’s army and the base areas through guerrilla warfare.¹³

On the other hand, as the objective of the state was to foster security and development in its backward areas. Therefore, the state’s initial strategy against the Naxals was summed up by the home ministry as:

a multi-pronged strategy to tackle the problem of Naxalism which includes modernization and strengthening of the State Police Forces, better training to police personnel, Special Task Forces for intelligence based coordinated anti-Naxalite operations, focused attention on developmental aspect and gearing up of the public grievances redressal system and encouraging local resistance groups at the grass roots level.¹⁴

However, as the peace talks in Andhra Pradesh came to an abrupt end in 2005, the States, Andhra Pradesh in particular, started raising and deploying special trained forces in the Naxal-affected areas while simultaneously sponsoring local resistance movement like *Salwa Judum* in Chhattisgarh. However, except for the famed ‘Andhra model’ of successfully dealing with Naxalism in the state of its origin, others states saw an escalation of Naxal violence and resultant death. The case was extremely severe in Chhattisgarh, a state sharing a boundary with Andhra Pradesh, where both number of

¹¹ For a detailed discussion on the objectives and strategies of the Naxals refer to chapter two

¹² *MHA Annual Report 2003-04*, p. 40.

¹³ As procured from the website of Institute of Conflict transformation, Delhi titled ‘Communist party of India (Maoist)

¹⁴ *MHA Annual Report 2003-04*, p. 42-43.

incidents and death in such incidents, double between 2005 and 2006 (from 385 incident causing 168 deaths in 2005 to 715 incidents causing 388 deaths in 2006).¹⁵

The Mobilisation for War

The year 2006 marks a break-point in the war as both the Maoist and the state adapted their strategies according to their changed situations. The Naxals were again the first to adapt. As was later revealed by the a State-level CPI(Maoist) activists in Jharkhand in 2007, the Party had brought about two major changes in its political and military practice as evolved during the Party's Unity Congress, held in January-February 2007 in the jungles bordering Jharkhand and Bihar. Outlining the changes he said:

At the military level, the change has been from guerilla warfare to mobile warfare that involved the extension of the war zone to newer areas by utilizing the cadre from regions under guerilla control. At present Karnataka and Tamil Nadu are supposed to be the new fronts in this extended war. At the political level, the interface for mass movements, too, is also becoming more and more broad-based. In the issues of land acquisition for industrial projects, the Maoists have been able to have a massive influence is setting the agendas in these areas. Their impact is such that they have emerged as principal opponent to the ruling party like the CPI(M) in West Bengal. The ranks and files of mainstream political parties like Trinmool Congress, Bhartiya Janta Party and Congress have deflected to join the CPI (Maoist) in significant numbers. The activists claim that this switch-over has been made possible by the skilful strategizing by their party to attract new sections of the population to the Maoist path.¹⁶

The state on its part followed suit with the 2006-07 report bring about major changes in the government's approach to the issue. As the prime minister had already declared Naxalism as the single biggest threat, a Naxal Management Division was created w.e.f. October 19, 2006 in the Ministry of Home Affairs. The sole purpose of this division was to "effectively tackle the Naxalite menace from both security and development angles... monitor the Naxal situation and counter-measures ... with the objective of improving ground-level policing and development response ... ensure optimum utilization of funds released under, and proper implementation of various developmental schemes in the Naxal affected areas".¹⁷ At the same time a hard line approach comes about in the state's strategy towards the Naxals. The MHA Annual Report for 2006-07 points to a 'clearly defined policy' with the following components:

¹⁵ *MHA Annual Report 2005-06, and MHA Annual Report 2006-07.*

¹⁶ As quoted by V. Ramakrishnan, *Naxal Terror*, 2007 on <http://www.flonnet.com/fl2418/stories/20070921500400400.htm>

¹⁷ *MHA Annual Report 2006-07*, p. 7.

... deal sternly with the Naxalites indulging in violence... address this menace simultaneously on political, security, development and public perception management fronts...the States will adopt a collective approach and pursue a coordinated response ... no peace dialogue by the affected States with the Naxal groups unless the latter give up violence and arms... accord higher priority to ensure faster socio-economic development... distribute land to the landless poor... development of physical infrastructure like roads, communication, power, etc. and provide employment opportunities to youth¹⁸.

Since 2007, war has grown more intense with 2009 seeing an abrupt rise as war efforts by the state increased in what was popularly termed as ‘Operation Green Hunt’.

The Aggressive Thrust in War

The year 2009 marked the beginning of the ‘clear (an affected area of Naxals), hold (the area militarily) and build (the area through development)’ strategy of the state. With this, the protracted war is all set to enter a decisive stage as the new initiative involves aggressive thrusts in the Naxal-affected areas by the newly recruited security forces. This is to be followed by focussed development schemes for the overall socio-economic development of the local population in these areas. The distinctive feature of this strategy, according to a Home ministry official, was

the new initiative a detailed study of the Maoist-affected areas was done and the most sensitive and difficult areas were mapped. The study identified 11 areas as most sensitive, spread over 40 districts. Overall it is a comprehensive operational strategy that would first seek to clear an area of Maoists, occupy it militarily and follow it up with socio-economic development activity. The understanding is that it would take 18 to 24 months in each of the phases to operationalise the strategy and implement it successfully ...¹⁹

As for the Maoists, their leadership are going ahead with their plans laid out in the circular dated June 12, 2009, which proclaims that

In order to defeat the new offensive by the enemy...to defend our guerilla bases... and to advance the armed struggle in guerrilla zones we have to carry out the following immediate tasks: prepare the people, the party and the PLGA [People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army] politically to confront the brutal enemy onslaught; educate the people regarding the scale and intensity of the enemy offensive, it’s cruel nature and the need for enormous sacrifices; take initiative unite with other struggling organizations and forces to forge strong united fronts in various parts of the country and prepare them to undertake similar operations; enhance the initiative and involvement of the mass in fighting and defeating the superior enemy forces. The manner in which we had defeated the Salwa Judum should be projected as role model to be emulated elsewhere... [P]repare and mobilise the entire party, People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army and the

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 24-25.

¹⁹ As quoted by V Ramakrishnan, *Taking on Maoists*, 2009, on <http://www.flonnet.com/fl2622/stories/20091106262200400.htm>

people for carrying out tactical counter-offensives and various forms of armed resistance and inflict severe losses to the enemy forces; attacks should be organised with meticulous planning against the state's khaki-and-olive-clad terrorist forces, SPOs, police informants and other counter-revolutionaries and enemies of the people; these attacks should be carried out in close coordination with, and in support of the armed resistance of the masses; these should be linked to the seizure of political power establishment of base areas...any mistake on our part will be utilised by the enemy to isolate us ... branding us as anti-people and terrorists; hence we should take extra precautions not to cause damage to people's property or cause inconvenience to people by our actions, and to apologise for our mistakes promptly assuring the people that such mistakes will not be repeated in the future.²⁰

In light of the evolving hardening of the images of the enemy and dynamics of the war between the state and the Naxals, a further escalation of war seems imminent. The literature that has sought to explain this emergence of war in terms of factors like the success and/or failure of the state and/or the Naxals to address the key issue of socio economic equity and justice, inability of the state to understand the nature of the Naxal challenge, inefficient policing and dispute settlement mechanism in the affected States, corruption of the state, etc.²¹ However, each of these accounts have been unable to understand the real practice of this war as they do not account for the intense negotiation and interaction that takes place between the state, the Naxals and the society that they are embedded in. However, the real contribution of these accounts lies in the fact that they have reiterated time and again that the practice of this war has more than what the image projects.

The Practice of the War

The massacre of 78 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel at Chintalnad in Dantewada district of Chhattisgarh on 6th of April 2010 raised serious question about the “concerted and coordinated initiative against Maoists” launched in October-November 2009 by the government.²² The fact that the war has become perpetual over the last decade is reflected in the figures provided by the Home Ministry.²³ At the same time, the Naxals themselves seem to have lost sight of their ideological dedication as critiques of

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ For detailed discussion of the factors that have perpetuated the current state of the perpetual war between the state and the Naxals refer to chapter 2.

²² Ramakrishnan, Op. Cit.

²³ The data provided by the government for the last itself reflects an average of over 1500 such events every year with an average death of over 500 people annually.

their strategy have started emerging from amongst their supporters. For example, Sumanta Bannerjee a noted scholar of the Naxalbari movement, points out:

The CPI (Maoist) in their fight for the rights of the poor has shown a cruel disregard for the basic amenities demanded by the people by disrupting power supply and obstructing road building in the backward districts. This has been done purely from their partisan interest to cut off communication so that the police cannot raid their hideouts. Their model of development is based on a system of autarky, which can function for a while within an enclosed enclave of self-sustained economy. However the Maoist method of governance in their strongholds still consists of ad hoc responses to immediate local problems rather than a part of a well-thought-out long-term strategy of countering challenges and coping with problems at the national level²⁴.

By Ganapathy's own admission "at present our forces are weak, we are weak in urban areas, and we are also weak in workers and among petty-bourgeoisie. People's army too is weak and its weapons are inferior to the enemy".²⁵ Therefore, the alleged success of the Naxals too seems to a farfetched story. Therefore, there is more to the persistence of failure of either party to achieve their goals. This can only be explained by examining the inner dynamics of this war by decoding the practice of the actors involved in this violent process.

The perpetual practice of war mobilization has led to the emergence of an environment of conflict where "the overall sum of authority exercised in society is high but the exercise of that authority is fragmented".²⁶ Similar arguments were made by Kohli in context of India.²⁷ The data collected from secondary sources and field work points to the existence of a network of alliances between enemies that have used the image of this war for their own interest. By their excessive dependence on violence for compliance and participation, they have eroded the legitimacy of both the parties. The complex process of violence has dissolved the institution of local governance and dispute settlement.

²⁴ Sumanta Banerjee, 'The Maoists, Elections, Boycotts and Violence' in *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. xiv no 18, 2009, p. 10.

²⁵ J Myrdal and G Navlakha 'In Conversation with Ganapathy, General Secretary of CPI (Maoist)' in *People's March* January-February, 2010, p. 7.

²⁶ J Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State Society Relation in the Third World*, Princeton (1988) p 28

²⁷ For detail on the double movement of centralization of power in the hand of the leader and their powerless to change society refer to chapter 2

The Crisis of Security: The Enterprise of Perpetual War

War therefore has become perpetual. However, the institutional and structural factors that have dominated most explanations of the perpetual war do not explain why even in a situation of stalemate, where both the state as well as the Naxal continued with this war and not begun negotiations for restoring peace. As the field study revealed, the practice of war is actually sustained by a network of alliances between parties on either sides with an excessive dependence on violence. In particular, three alliance networks are of special importance as they show how the image of the enemy is blurred in practice.

Naxals-Politician Alliance

The fact that there exists a close nexus between the Naxals and a variety of local political actors has been pointed out by various scholars and sources. The field study too has provided ample evidence to support a formulation that there exists complementary alliance between the state and the Naxals. To quote Sumanta Banerjee

Maoists in West Bengal align with Trinamool Congress leader Mamata Banerjee...for harnessing popular discontent ... revealed by Koteswar Rao's hope that Mamata would protect his party from police persecution in return for their help in the past²⁸

Similarly sources indicate that, a report prepared by Jharkahnd's Inspector General of Police (Law and Order), R.C. Kaithal, had established that "the Welfare Minister Ramesh Singh Munda had paid Rupees 1.5 million to the Maoists for support in the last Assembly Elections in February 2005".²⁹ During the course of the fieldwork, a more interesting point emerged that the Naxal leaders were actually contesting election and even becoming MLAs and MPs. The MCC cadre members pointed out

It is common in areas where party has larger following. For example, in Chatra district, the party has a huge party following. They take money from the politician in return for captured booths. If party puts up some one or support any leader then they will win. See Joginder Sav only. He was able to defeated longtime MLA, Loknath Mahto, because he had party's support.³⁰

²⁸ Cited by Sumanta Banerjee, 'The Maoists, Elections, Boycotts and Violence' in *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol xiv no 18, 2009, p. 78.

²⁹ Quoted by Nihar Nayak 'Red Spread over Jharkhand', Institute of Conflict Management, Delhi, 2005.

³⁰ Personal interview on 4/6/10 in Keredari block of Hazaribag.

Similarly the kerosene dealer interviewed pointed out that after 2005, “prominent independent candidate like Madhu Koda, Kamlesh Singh, Hare Narayan Rai, Enus Ekka, Bhanu Pratap Shahi, all had maoist links or support”.³¹

Political leaders and the Naxals have a tacit understanding whereby the leaders allow the Naxals to evade state laws and find refuge from the state laws in return for electoral support in form of votes of captured booths.

Naxal-Government Official Alliance

Even though the literature on the alliance between the Naxals and the governmental official is thin, Sudeep Chakravarty narrates “a story told in local police and media circles about a former senior cop in Hazaribag. He ‘turned’ a CPI (Maoist) fellow in the know of things, Umesh Ojha, and the two entered into a compact. Umesh knew a cache of Maoist money secreted in the region’s forests, estimated at up to eight crores, Rs. 80 million”.³²

The fieldwork once again provides evidence for the same. A senior state bureaucrat was of the opinion that

as forests were increasingly controlled by Naxals, the forest department were not able to generate revenue. The problem was that the departmental funds were too low to pay levies to the Naxals so no work was taken up... that is why the contract system was reintroduced so as to facilitate the payment of levies for the Naxal and at the same time generate some revenue for the department³³

Similarly the Kerosene distributor had pointed out how “the security personnel in Chatra district had formed an alliance with the Naxals whereby the Naxals agreed not to commit violence in the area of their posting... This saved the personnel from being accountable to the senior who enquired into [such] cases [of] violence... in return the Naxals had a free hand in their collection of levies”.³⁴ Similarly, the MCC cadre member who had been arrested in relation to the Beltu massacre in Keredari block explained how the local level

³¹ Personal interview on 8/6/10 in Sader block of Hazaribag.

³² S Chakravarti, *Red Sun: Travels in a Naxalite Country*, New Delhi, 2008, p. 301.

³³ Personal interview on 6/6/10 in Sader block of Hazaribag.

³⁴ Personal interview on 8/6/10 in Sader block of Hazaribag.

cadre member could ‘pay the local investigating officer money to file the report for three month making them eligible for bail’.³⁵

Naxal-Rich Alliance

Even though strategist like Ajai Sahni have pointed to the huge financial base created by the Naxals,³⁶ they have not shown how the rich actually benefitted from the levies that they pay to the Naxals. Alpa Shah put forth her argument on market of protection to explain how the Naxals support the rich.³⁷ Sudeep Chakravarti’s financier too pointed out that

... [o]n being asked as to how the financier knew so much, he replied that he had to know in order to survive in Hazaribag, a Naxal area. Also he is area’s premier collector of loan repayment with his toughs going and ‘collect’ the goods from all across Hazaribagh district, from town to jungle, and the adjacent Maoist-infested districts of Chatra and Latehar. It’s impossible without a compact with the Maoists, the same as any business person who needs to work in such areas³⁸.

The field study too presents a similar story wherein the bus operator gets a leverage of ‘settling the dispute outside court and police station in cases of hit and run or accidents’³⁹.

These alliances have transformed the war between political enemies into an economic enterprise whereby violence facilitates the accumulation of capital. The fact that both the parties actually pursue economic rather the political objective has made the war perpetual. In order to maintain the validity of offensive, the war has increasingly been seen as one being fought for the poor.

The War of Legitimacy

The real irony of this perpetual war is that both parties claim to be fighting for the people. While the state has waged the war to ensure security and development of the people, the Naxals are fighting for the liberation of the poor masses from the shackle of class oppression. While the universality of the organization of the state to all living within a territorially demarcated state is inherent in its concept, the Naxals too, have been making

³⁵ Personal interview on 4/6/10 in Barkagaon block of Hazaribag.

³⁶ Sahni has made this point in context of Jharkhand, See chapter 3 for details.

³⁷ Shah too has made this point in the context of Jharkhand. See chapter three for details.

³⁸ S Chakravarti, *Red Sun: Travels in a Naxalite Country*, New Delhi, 2008, p. 298.

³⁹ Personal interview on 7/6/10 at Hazaribag bus stand.

similar claims. To quote Ganapathy again, the CPI (Maoist) represents “above 95% of population for whom we are fighting for their socioeconomic demands as well as for the qualitative change of the very basic structure of the society”.⁴⁰

However what their actual practice reveals is that these rivals, in parts or as individuals, align with each other to perpetuated an under-development against which they have launched their war. Explaining this vicious cycle of underdevelopment, the senior State bureaucrat elaborated the dynamic as follows:

With Politician/Bureaucrat-Naxal-Contractor nexus, the quality of work has done down as most of the funds were eaten by this nexus... so we had to keep making the same road again and again... and every time it the same bad quality road being made. The government and bureaucrat sponsor this argument about development deficit facilitating Naxalism, because it helps them fell their own pocket without being accountable. The Naxal affected areas are the worst in terms of accountability.⁴¹

In such a scenario, the sustenance of war is of vital interest for the parties involved. Violence thus becomes an effective tool in pursuit of social control.

In this war of legitimacy, compliance as well as participation is sought through violence. Therefore, even when MCC is actually on a decline in the Barkagaon-Keredari region due to schisms and turf war, the Bandhs called by them still have an absolute impact. Explaining the reason behind this the Bus operator explained “the Naxals have burnt so many vehicles in the area for not complying with the call of Bandhs that nobody dares to do it anymore”.⁴²

As legitimacy based on the use of violence, it leads to a politics of fear which perpetuates more in its absence than occurrence. So the resources employed by one party, especially the state, are used by the other to further perpetuate the war. Both the levy economy based on levies collected from executioner of developmental projects of the state and the weapons of the police and security personnel are example wherein the state resources and forces are used against the state. As state action itself perpetuates war and blurs its image in practice, it leads to a tragedy of governance.

⁴⁰ Myrdal and Navlakha ‘In Conversation...’ Op. Cit. p. 7.

⁴¹ Personal interview on 6/6/10 in the Sadar block of Hazaribag.

⁴² Personal interview on 7/6/10 at Hazaribag bus stand.

The Tragedy of Governance

As consent becomes exclusively dependent on coercion, mean of organized violence often becomes the means as well as the ends of politics. In such a situation the leadership is only interested in maintain its seat of power and play on local issues to create vertical divisions in society. Thus, there is a serious lack of vision in the policies made under such command as it fails to maintain discipline across their own party lines. Thus, parts of the state increasingly play the blame game, thereby eroding the jurisdictional boundaries across these parts. At the same time, settlement of dispute amidst politics of fear either becomes corrupt or violent.

Crisis of Leadership: Lack of Vision

The leadership on either side of the war have failed to bring about a decisive strategy to achieve the target of security, development, equity and justice. What both parties fail to realize is that the Indian society in its current state actually need all four of these objectives to be fulfilled. Thus, there is some serious lack of vision in the policies adopted by either side. For example, the state has excessively depended on NREGA and raising security forces to generate employment. While short sightedness at best or leading to perpetuation of the war at worst, the policy of generating employment by raising battalion seems to be destined to defeat its very own purpose. If the state is raising these battalion to quickly deal with the challenge of Naxalism, then its fails to acknowledge that those employed in these forces will soon face serious issues of their own continued sources of livelihood. On the other hand, if the state sees a continued and perpetual need for these newly raised forces, then where is the security.

Similarly, in context of NREGA, the local development officer of the Barkagaon region points out

NREGA the policy is for manual labourer. Now you only tell me, do the policy makers want to keep rural India a land of labourer only or what. It can be a temporary arrangement but it can't be a long term plan of generating employment. Therefore success story of NREGA can't be seen as development. NREGA is a policy that inspires the poor to remain poor.⁴³

⁴³ Personal interview on 6/6/10 in the Sadar block of Hazaribag.

On the other hand, the Naxals too seem to be devoid of ideas of helping poor, as its rhetoric of land distribution, *jan adalat* and social reform are increasingly becoming just that – mere rhetoric. During the field study, it was repeatedly pointed out that the “Naxals *used to* fight for the poor”; their only concern now is expansion of military cadre base so as to generate more levies.⁴⁴ The MCC cadres too pointed out the Naxals are not interested in educating children in their Bal Dasta [Child Units] as after teaching them basic reading writing skills, they engage them in military training exclusively.⁴⁵

The Blame Game

As accountability declines amidst perpetual violence, the state officials, leaders and Naxals blame each other for the vicious underdevelopment and the ensuing violence. Ganapathy points out that the CPI (Maoist) “people and Maoist revolutionaries do not want violence or armed confrontation... In unavoidable condition only they take up arms and resist their enemies... in a war of self-defence... In this context of all-out war... the cruelest and dangerous Special Forces have been trained by the state... [They] launch a brutal and violent repression campaign aimed at the suppression of the political movement of the people, and for exploitation of the minerals”.⁴⁶

The state on its part blames the Naxals for their futile violence. At a more local level, various departments of the state target each other. So the local forest official saw the police as ‘snobbish and arrogant because they have guns while we don’t; even though we work closer to the Naxals (in forest)’.⁴⁷ On the other hand, the police official at the local level as well as local developmental officials felt that their department was the only one fighting against the Naxals, as the district official reiterated:

Public is the first vital components, followed by businessman, politician, bureaucrats especially development official giving fund to people and finally the mafia here, the coal, cement and timber mafia. They all get protection from MCC and pay levy for it.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Personal interaction with the local residents of the village of Keredari and Barkagaon over 2/6/10 to 5/6/10.

⁴⁵ Personal interview on 4/4/10 in Barkagaon block of Hazaribag District.

⁴⁶ Myrdal and Navlakha, ‘In Conversation..’ Op. Cit., p. 10.

⁴⁷ Personal interview on 3/6/10 in the Barkagaon forest office.

⁴⁸ Personal interview on 9/6/10 in Hazaribag Police Line.

The businessmen and the local people blamed it to the '*bhrāshṭ*' (corrupt) leader. The real irony of the situation lies in the fact that all of them have gained with this so called Naxal-challenge.

The Death of Justice

As local mechanism of dispute settlement succumb to the pressure of bureaucratic delay and corruption, the Naxals had garnered considerable popularity and support among the poor by organizing Jan Adalats, a free of cost and instant dispute settlement mechanism. However, these Jan Adalats have a tendency to excessively depend on brute force involving beating people to death, burning their houses and chopping parts of their bodies as punishments. Thus, instead of justice what the Naxals did was to perpetuate fear. At the same time, given complete intolerance for non compliance, these courts have increasing become an 'example-setting arena' for the crime of non compliance. Thus, justice instead of combating fear is actually based on it.

Conclusion

The image of a perpetual war between the state and the Naxals is actually sustained and facilitated by a network of 'alliance between enemies' who have actually made an economic enterprise out this political exercise. Their operation sustains a vicious circle of underdevelopment that is perpetuated by a politics based on fear and an economy of levies and bribes. The poor, in whose name this perpetual war is actually being fought, is actually the worst loser in this entire process. He continues to suffer from exploitation, with the Naxal being the latest in its list of exploiters, while those actually projecting the war have minted money from their misery. Therefore, any attempt to address the problem of persistence of Naxal violence amidst sustained state efforts to maintain law and order, has to keep in mind how the practice of this war is very different from what the image projects.

Annex

The first two key Informant (The Central government Bureaucrat and the ex MLA did not give the interview. just had an informal discussion with them)

VILLAGE LOCAL SHOPKEEPER

1. Why the Jharkhand so under developed?
2. How did Naxal coverage in this area?
3. But the Naxals fights for the poor?
4. Tell me something about the Jan Adalats?
5. How has the coming of big companies like NTPC changed the employment option of people who had till now earned their livelihood by selling coal that is mined illegally?

LOCAL POLICE OFFICER

1. What are you needs in dealing with Naxals (helicopter, guns, equipments)
2. Why are they still growing in influence?
3. Why the rise of several groups like JPC, TPC, MCC
4. How do feel about gram Suraksha Samiti?
5. What can be done?

LOCAL NGO – Barkagaon called Manav Seva Sansthan.

1. Why did you start NGO?
2. So who all do you meet in context of your work?
3. What's their response?
4. How do you choose your area of operation?
5. Who all do you work for?
6. What kinds of support do have in the village?
7. Did change of state (from Bihar to Jharkhand) make a difference?
8. What about Naxalism? How does it help?
9. So are Naxal mostly from low caste or tribal origin?
10. Do they affect your work?
11. How do people feel about Naxalism?

LOCAL FOREST OFFICER

1. What are the forest products available in the area?
2. What are plan being implemented to manage these products?
3. How has the people response been to these schemes?
4. What about the tribal people?
5. Why have these plan failed to generate revenue?

6. How has the rise of Naxalism changed the situation?
7. But Forest official have been target of Naxal attack?
8. Any co ordination between Forest department and police department to deal with naxalism
9. Information sharing between forest and police department?
10. What about rehabilitating Naxal?

FOREST CONTRACTOR

1. How do you get tender for collecting tendu leaves from forest?
2. What about corruption?
3. How do you operate?
4. How has rise of Naxalism changes things over the years?
5. So how was your experience working in this area?
6. So have you gone to the fields/ jungles. Are Naxal helping the poor?
7. So do you as worker for outside faces other problems?
8. Are there any rates of levies?

LOCAL MCC CADRE

1. Tell me about the history of the party in the area?
2. What is their organization structure at the local level?
3. How do people get promoted? What is criteria?
4. What all training exercises are taken?
5. What weapon are they using?
6. Tell me something about the JAN ADALAT?
7. What kinds of punishments are meted?
8. What the Source of revenue
9. How much drug money is used?
10. Tell me about women organization?
11. What about BAL DASTA.
12. Are they teaching them any skills?
13. Why has violent action become so preponderant?
14. Gram Raksha Dal- Tell me something about them?
15. Rehabilitation plan of state what do you know about that?
16. What their formation during attack?
17. What about MCC Politician naxals?
18. What about people for ideology and people with opportunities?
19. What about exit option?
20. Tell me about MCC vis-à-vis Panchayat?

SENIOR DISTRICT BUREAUCRAT

1. Sir firstly how has the administration of Hazaribag changed over the last 20 years or so?

2. How?
3. How did naxalism emerge in the scene?
4. So when did state take notice of the problem?
5. So what do you have to about state policy of increasing security forces and police of backward district initiatives?
6. So how do we change all this?
7. Can the state be improved?
8. So as per you modern Indian Nation state should never have been build?
9. So where does left politics and its extremist violence fit into all this?

LOCAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICER

1. Sir why do developmental politics fail?
2. So what should be done?
3. What about people participation, don't employed people say anything?
4. So what do official do?
5. Then what do people do?
6. Now amidst all these, what does Naxalism do to your working?
7. Why has their recruit been so high among poor and the tribal?
8. So what about government plans and new policies like backward district initiatives and participatory governance?

BUS OPERATOR

1. How did you start your business? And which official did you meet for it?
2. Then won't you fall short for your funds for the bus?
3. Then why you need a loan?
4. So what after getting a bus?
5. So how do you settle dispute?
6. How?
7. Okay after you get the permit. How do you operate?
8. So how do you choose the local agent?
9. And how much do you pay them?
10. What kind of problems do you face?
11. What about corruption?
12. How?
13. Do political connections matter?
14. How have things changed after Jharkhand became an independent state?
15. How did this happen?
16. How has naxalism changed your operaton?
17. Then how do you negotiate?
18. But if you pay wont it be less profitable?
19. So the police does help?

LOCAL NTPC OFFICIAL

1. How did you start your project in Hazaribag?
2. So you got you coal block allotted in 2006 and reached Barkagaon. (Pakri Barwadih is within Barkagaon block) Then what happened.
3. So what did you do?
4. How did the change come about in people's perception?
5. What all does the package now include?
6. How does your rehabilitation project work after buying land?
7. Why
8. What about political leader, the MLA.
9. SO Why did you continue talking with them?
10. What is that?
11. What about skill training?
12. Has Naxalism caused hindrance?
13. Any employment for the affected families?

PETROL PUMP OWNER AND KEROSENE DISTRIBUTOR

1. How did you get a petrol pump?
2. How come you do not qualify but your relatives do?
3. Okay you get selected then what after that?
4. So you signed the agreement (either with dealer or as a dealer) then what?
5. What kinds of difficulties of operation do you face?
6. How about kerosene oil distribution?

THE KEROSENE OIL DISTRIBUTOR.

1. How do you operate?
2. Okay this is how is it supposed to work how does it actually work and how to do increase profit?
3. But why corruption. Kerosene is mostly used for lighting lamp. Cooking fuel in this area is predominantly coal?
4. As in?
5. What for?
6. How things change in terms of how you operate since the separate state of Jharkhand?
7. Okay amidst all this corruption what happens to naxalism?
8. Why doesn't the police do anything?
9. Why they turn to government official in killing?
10. How has your operation been affected?
11. Then what do you do in such situation?
12. How do these Jan Adalat work?
13. So the security forces do?

14. How has emergence of so many parties changed your dealing with them?
15. Who is Prabhavshali?
16. So what can be done?

DISTRICT POLICE OFFICER

1. What factors have led to rise of Naxalism?
2. What are these components?
3. What capacities have the police development to counter these?
4. Sir could you elaborate on the training part?
5. But what all new equipments have your force included?
6. Do you have helicopter as your representative we keep demand?
7. Any initiative to cooperate with people on this war?
8. How can you say that?
9. How do they move across so fast?
10. What about politician Naxal nexus?
11. What are your parameters of success?
12. How have you improved your defensive strategy?
13. What is your policy on rehabilitation of Naxal affected families?
14. Tell me something about their rivalry/gang
15. What about drug money?
16. Tell me about Grameen Raksha Dal.

TRIBAL TEACHER OF A REPUTED JESUIT SCHOOL

1. Why are tribal still poor?
2. What do you mean by the spirit of the constitution?
3. Tell me something about the Jharkhand movement.
4. But why did not things even after Jharkhand was as separate state?
5. Why?
6. What about rise of Naxals among tribal?
7. Is there exploitation the reason for their support for Naxals?
8. What about Naxal politician alliance?
9. Why do people twin against Naxal?

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