

Civil-Military Relations under the Yeltsin Period

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
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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled, "*Civil-Military Relation under the Yeltsin Period*" submitted by Achanger is in partial fulfillment for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy of this university. This dissertation has not been submitted to any other university and is his own work.

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For my loving parents


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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Introduction

Civil-Military relations have long been a primary focus among the researchers, particularly in democratic societies. The pivotal role of soldiers in warfare, empire building, and national security has been the subject of epic poets, historians and other social scientists since time immemorial. By comparison, one finds precious little on the role of military officers played in domestic politics, despite the fact, the military has overthrow regimes, installed new ones, and influenced government decisions in history and modern societies. Yet, beginning with World War I, a series of major political, social, and economic developments, including the travails suffered by newly independent countries, stimulated empirically oriented social scientists to seek to understand the critically important role the armed forces played in the domestic politics of old and new societies alike or due to its ambivalent character of the armed forces. These give birth to civil-military relation as sub field of comparative politics. Thus, in short, civil-military relations refer broadly to the interaction between the armed forces as institution and sector of society in which they are embedded. Most commonly, civil-military relation focus on the relative power distribution between the government and the armed forces, and it exist within the context of a particular political system in a country. Though civilian control over the military had attracted as an aspect of democracy among the policy makers around the globe, it is difficult to achieve and maintain.

The term “civil-military relations” refers to the role of the armed forces in a society, can give rise to misapprehensions. It implies that the relations between the military and the civilian population are like the labor-management relations, legislative-executive relations, or Soviet-American relations, where two concrete, organized groups

with real conflicting interests contend and bargain with each other. It thus suggests a basic dichotomy and opposition between the civilian and the military viewpoints.¹ This is a false opposition. First, in many societies little unity of interest, skill, or viewpoint exists among the military. Second, even where there is a distinct and identifiable military viewpoint, interest, and institution, in no society is there ever-comparable unity among civilians. The word “civil” in the phrase civil-military relations simply means nonmilitary. Publicists and authors often talk about civil-military relationships and, more especially, about civilian control as if there is a single civilian interest. In practice they simply identify their own interest and viewpoint as the civilian interest and viewpoint in opposition to a hostile military interest and viewpoint. Any society, however, which is sufficiently well developed to have a distinct military institution also, has a wide variety of civilian interests, institutions, and attitudes, the differences between any two of which may be much greater than the differences between the any one of them and the military. Thus, civil-military relations involve a multiplicity of relationships between military men, institutions, and interest, on the one hand, and diverse and often conflicting nonmilitary men, institutions, and interest on the other. It is not a one-to-one relationship but a one-among –many- relationships.²

¹ L. Shills, David (ed), *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, Macmillan Company and the Free Press, 1968, P.487.

² *Ibid.*, pp-487.

Military and Nonmilitary

Civil-military relations in any society reflect the over-all nature and level of development of the society and its political system. The key question is the extent to which military men and interests are differentiated from non-military men and interests³.

This differentiation may take place on three levels:

1. The relation between the armed forces as a whole and the society as a whole.
2. The relation between the leadership of the armed forces (the officer corps) as an elite group and the other elite groups of the society; and
3. The relation between the commanders of the armed forces and the top political leaders of the society or the party⁴.

Thus, at the society level the military force might be an integral part of the society, reflecting and embodying its dominant social forces and ideologies. The military order, indeed, may be coextensive with the society, and all the member of the society also performing military roles. At the opposite level the military men or order might be highly differentiated, its members playing no important roles, except in military field alone. Secondly, connections between the military officers and the other leadership groups in the society may be close; the same people may be military, economic, and political leaders. At the other end of the continuum, military officership may be extensively professional career, incompatible with other roles. Finally, at the top level the same individuals may exercise both political and military leadership roles, or these roles might

³ Bland, Douglas L, 'A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol.26, No.1, Fall 1999, P.15.

⁴ L.Shills, David (ed), *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, Macmillan Company and the Free Press, 1968, P.487.

be quite distinct and their occupants recruited from different sources and through different channels.

At each level of civil-military relations military groups may differ from nonmilitary groups in terms of skills, values, attitude and institutions. Military men may also differ from nonmilitary in relation to management of violence or in controlling it. In the history of the western states military values were often closely associated with aristocratic and conservative beliefs. In many of the modernizing countries in the second half of the twentieth century, the values of the dominant groups in the armed forces closely paralleled those of upward mobile, nationalistic reformist middle-class civilians. The development of a professional attitude and values, often differ from the attitude and values of the society within.⁵ At another extreme the military may be differentiated from the social institution that they become virtually a “state within a state”. In these circumstances they may become relatively impervious to the control of legislative or the executive institutions of government. In the societies like Japan with a tradition of strong hierarchy before 1945 and Germany before 1933, efforts by the legislature to control over the military institutions led to failure in relation to military opposition. In some countries, such as Burma and some Latin America, the military may become not just a state within a state but a society within a society, performing many economic and social functions and achieving a high degree of economic self-sufficiency.⁶ At the other extreme in societies with a “nation- in- arms” pattern of civil-military relations, the differentiation of military

⁵ Feaver, Peter D, ‘Modeling Civil-Military Relations: A Reply to Burk and Bacevich’, *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol.24, No.4, summer 1998, P.597.

⁶ Vankovska, Biljana and Hakan Wiberg, *Between Past and Future: Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Communist Balkans*. I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, London and New York, 2003, P.10.

institutions may be very slight, and the armed forces may be identical with society as a whole.⁷

In the twentieth century, the armed forces have become a universal and integral part of a nation's political system and it no longer remain completely aloof from the society or the politics of a nation. The varying role that the army plays in politics range from minimal legitimate influence through recognized channels by virtue of their position and their responsibility within the political system to the other extreme of total displacement of the civilian government in the form of illegitimate over the military intervention in politics. Such a kind of phenomenal is an important in relation to civil-military in a political system of a country. The relationship between the civilian and the military has a long history, to the very beginnings of military organization in civilian societies. In each country, it depends upon its own historical development, traditions and political institutions. It depends on the role of the army as a state institution in the given country, subordination of the military to political authorities as defined in laws and constitutional arrangement, and so on. Public perceptions of military personnel, the prestige of the military officer's profession, public opinion towards defense and foreign policy of the regime and certain action of the army, and so on, determine it. The very nature of the problem is permanently changing because both the society and the military are constantly changing as well.

The military is a political institution of a very particular kind. Four factors distinguish the military from other institutions and give it a distinct, and at times overwhelming, advantage over civilian organizations. First, as an instrument of war, the

⁷ Ibid., p.8.

military enjoys a virtual monopoly of weaponry and substantial coercive power. As the military has the capacity to prop up or topple a regime, its loyalty is essential to state survival. Second, armed forces are tightly organized and highly disciplined bodies, characterized by a hierarchy of ranks and a culture of strict obedience. They are thus an extreme example of bureaucracy in the Weberian sense. This gives the military an unusual degree of organizational effectiveness, although it can also breed inflexibility and discourage initiative and innovation. Third, the military is invariably characterized by a distinctive culture and set of values, and an *esprit de corps* that prepare its personnel to fight, kill and possibly die. Sometimes portrayed as implicitly right-wing and deeply authoritarian (by virtue of its traditional emphasizes on leadership, duty and honor), military culture can also be grounded in creeds such as revolutionary socialism (as in China) or Islamic fundamentalism (as in Iran). Fourth, the armed forces are often seen, and generally regard themselves, as being 'above' politics, in the sense that, because they guarantee the security and integrity of the state, they are the repository of the national interest. This secures for intervene in politics, particularly when, in its view, vital national interest are under threat.⁸

On the other, it is a mistake to view the military as a single, cohesive institution with common political features in all societies. Divisions within the military stem from various sources. For example, conflicts ay develop between broadly conservative senior officers, often recruited from elite backgrounds, and more junior officers, who may be either impatient for promotion or more open to progressive or radical ideas. Similarly, there is likely to be tension between an officers core that is privileged both socially and

⁸ Heywood, Andrew, *Politics*. Palgrave Foundations, 2003, p.378.

professionally, and conscripts or enlisted personnel, who are usually drawn from the working class or peasantry.⁹

Thus, it is difficult to generalize about the nature and significant of the military because of the very different roles that the military can play in political life and its character is particular shaped by the internal and external factors. These include the history and traditions of the military and specific regiments or units, and the nature of the broader political system, the political culture and the values of the regime itself.

Civil-military Model

Civil-military relations have many dimensions and can be viewed from different perspective, as differentiation of civil-military pattern exists among the Western countries, Asia, Africa, Middle East and the Latin American countries, depends on its various political institution, traditions and history. So also in the twentieth century, the political scientist, sociologist, psychologists, and economists attempt to study the relationship between the military and the society with the theoretical and empirical works of social science.

Among those influential scholars who appreciated the importance of military factors in shaping societies in the first half of the 20th century, Harlod Laswell laid the first theory-building bloc in 1937, Laswell coined and expounded on the “garrison state” concept,¹⁰ during the 1930s, the international arena was also engulfed by tension, and argued that the modern polity was tending to become a “garrison state”. In garrison state

⁹ Ibid.,pp-378.

¹⁰ Danopoulos, Costas and Daniel Zirker, ‘Civil-Military Relations Theory in the Post-Communist World’, Geneva, July 2002, http://www.dcat.ch/publication/working_papers/38.pdf.

military values dominate, and all activities are subordinated to war and the preparation for war, and according to Laswell “the garrison hypothesis provides a probable image of the past and future of our epoch”¹¹ The simplest version of the Garrison-State hypothesis is that the specialists on violence dominate the arena of world politics, however to concluded that violence as the prime factor, is not fully accepted by other scholars. The Garrison State model was followed by the Huntington’s liberal and civilian oriented professional soldier model. One can also mention Max Weber and Gaetano Mosca. Weber’s views on this problem were stated most explicitly in the monumental treatise *Theory of social and economic organization* (1922) and in the masterly essay *The economic theory of Ancient State*. Mosca discussed the factors that determine the amount of military influences in politics in *The Ruling Class* (1939), which was praised as “one of the most illuminating treatises on politics ever written”.¹² From the 1950s to the 1980s American political scientists examined civil-military interaction between the armed forces, political elites, and citizenry, focusing on the influence of the military high commanders on the making of foreign and defense policy. Major theories applicable to Western democracies were developed in the 1950s and 1960s by Samuel Huntington (*Soldier and the State: The theory and politics of civil-military relations*, 1957), Morris Jonowitz (*The Professional Soldier: A social and political portrait*, 1960) and Samuel Finer’s (*The Man on the Horse Back*, 1962).¹³ However such theories have their limitations as well, but it did contribute a worthwhile to the study of civil-military.

¹¹ L. Shills, David (ed), *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, Macmillan Company and the Free Press, 1968, p.494.

¹² Rukavishnikov, Valdimir O and Michael Pugh, ‘ *Civil- Military Relations* ’, in Guiseppe Caforio (ed), *Handbook of the sociology of the military*, Kluwer Academic/Plenum publishers, New York, p.132.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p.133.

Historically, military personnel have been trained and motivated to protect the entire nation from the external threat, formulate proper foreign policies and also to settle unrest domestic affairs. With regard to western democracies, theories on the civil-military had gained importance following the end of the World War II, especially in the developing countries, initially preceded with series of challenges. The military in the Western Europe is neither expected nor is oriented to intervene in electoral, representative politics- Greece, Spain and Portugal being rare exception.¹⁴ Politicians, who attain power after an elaborate competitive struggle on party lines, dominate the system and policy is implemented by the bureaucratic and military elites who are subordinated to the elected politicians. Nevertheless, the military operates as a persistent pressure group pursuing its own organization and material well-being.¹⁵ The political role of the armed forces in the United Kingdom, United States, Germany, and France is contained either with a relatively strong central government or within a stable party system.

The analysis on the civil-military was an integral part of both the comparative politics by the political scientists led by prominent scholars like Samuel Huntington and of political sociologists like Morris Janowitz, however, there was disagreement between the two major theoretical approaches on how the civilian control was to be executed,¹⁶ as the motives and goals of the investigators varied to a marked degree.

¹⁴ Kukreja, Veena, *Civil-Military Relations in South Asia: Pakistan, Bangladesh and India*, Sage Publications, New Delhi 1991, p.19.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.19.

¹⁶ Rukavishnikov, Valdimir O and Michael Pugh, 'Civil- Military Relations', in Giuseppe Caforio (ed): *Handbook of the sociology of the military*, Kluwer Academic/Plenum publishers, New York, p.133.

The types of civil-military relations that prevailed in nineteenth century Europe and America, which have been identified by Huntington as the professional objective type of civil-military relations were characterized by the distinction between the state, the military, and the bureaucracy in terms of a sense of mission, and responsibility of client.¹⁷ The major contribution of Huntington's theory on the civil-military relations lies in his argument that the rise of military professionalism is inversely related to military intervention, that is, the modern professional sense of mission, military-mindedness and corporate autonomy incline the military against political intervention, and high degree of civilian control can be achieved in the modern state only by a high degree of differentiation of military institutions from other social institutions and the creation of a thoroughly professional officer corps, however several scholars had challenged that professionalism alone does not prevent military intervention in politics, Finer argues that professionalism by itself may spur the military to political intervention as the servants of the state rather than of the government,¹⁸ and approach assumed that a formal body of laws and regulations, and a formal chain of command, would make the military responsible to society, given that a civilian head of the state served as the supreme Command-in-Chief of the national armed forces; a civilian legislature approved its budget; and interest of the people more broadly, with checks and balances existing between government departments.¹⁹

¹⁷ Kukreja, Veena, *Civil-Military Relations in South Asia: Pakistan, Bangladesh and India*, Sage Publications, New Delhi 1991, p.20.

¹⁸ L. Shills, David (ed), *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, Macmillan Company and the Free Press, 1968, p. 493.

¹⁹ Rukavishnikov, Valdimir O and Michael Pugh, 'Civil- Military Relations', in Giuseppe Caforio (ed): *Handbook of the sociology of the military*, Kluwer Academic/Plenum publishers, New York, P.133.

The sociological approach developed from the assertion that genuine civilian control of armed forces could be completely realized only when the military is integrated into the broader network of societal relations. Idea of this approach: civilian control of the military could be realized on the basis of social networks; not professional warriors, but citizens-soldiers, either conscripts or reservists, would better link the military to its host society through their civilian roots.²⁰

In the western countries there is no single solution to the problem of democratic control of the military. The legal and political arrangements varied widely and the patterns of civil-military relations therefore differed from country to country.²¹ In addition to specific legal and constitutional arrangements, civil-military relations are influenced by the country's historical traditions and particularly its military history; economic and social conditions; the evolution, of its internal political landscape; and, certainly, by the international security environment, primarily the country's inclusion in alliances,²² Last, politics is shaped by the personalities of the military and civilian national leaders and their informal relationships, which might influence the balance of civil-military relations. They create differences between the countries and also within the same country between successive governments and from one minister of defense to another.²³

Despite the linguistic, religious and ethnic differences, certain common features have contributed to the Western European nations. The most important one is the

²⁰ Ibid., P.134.

²¹ Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Case of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces*. University of Michigan Press. U.S.A. 1999, P.17.

²² Bebler, Anton A (ed), *The Regionwide Perspective on Post- Communist Civil- Military Relations*. Praeger Publisher, Westport. U.S.A, P.73.

²³ Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Case of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces*. University of Michigan Press. U.S.A. 1999, p.95.

institutionalization of competitive elections as the basis of political power. A powerful common culture has taken root in these countries to support the political institutions, which regulate civil-military. The second relevant factor is the emergence over the last half a century, of a welfare ideology and its associated operating agencies.²⁴ The third factor that constraint over the establishment of the legitimacy of the civilian political order along with the professional of the military.

During the cold war period Western scholars paid some attention to civil-military relations in socialist countries, yet their conceptualization and interpretation of the processes unfolding in the soviet were limited in many regards due to lack of reliable empirical information. A number a studies of civil-military relations in Communist and Eastern Europe have argued that the army was an important tool of the communist take over after World War II, helping the party consolidate its power through the early stages of communist system-building, and that it was subsequently used by the party elite to maintain its domination and to shore up the institutions of the communist state in times of crises. Scholars like Dale Herspring(ed), (*Civil-military Relations in Communist Systems*), Roman Kolkwicz and Andrzej Korbonski, (*Soldiers, Peasants and Bureaucrats*), and Adelman, etc did contributed a lot in the literature of civil-military. They came to the subject primarily through an interest in the role of the military in the internal politics of the countries they studied and often emphasized that in the socialist party system the armed were under the close control of the ruling Communist Party. Considering its various consequences, they discussed differences between the models of

²⁴ Kukreja, Veena, *Civil-Military Relations in South Asia: Pakistan, Bangladesh and Asia*. Sage Publication, New Delhi, 1991, P.20.

civil-military relations in Western democracies and those in the socialist world, even among the scholars in the socialist, their views on the party and military relationship, civilian or the party control over the military were differ. But what seems to be common understanding is that there is supremacy of civilian controls over the military. According to Perlmutter, the communist party state system 'represents network of complex organizations whose relationships to one another are not neutral and isolated, but integrated and, in some cases, are symbolic'.²⁵

The military's special relationship with the party can be analyzed in terms of symbiotic and conflictual relationships,²⁶ or the ambivalent character of the armed forces. The military in the communist system may be considered as an equal partner, an ally or guarantor of the party civilian regime, and also the protector of party hegemony which implies intervention in party affairs during hegemonial crises within the party even when it conflicts with its self-image and institutional autonomy.²⁷ In fact without the military, the reign of the party –state might have come to an end.

Scholars of civil-military relations in the developing countries were concerned with the role of military regimes, violations of human rights, and issues related to democratization. The most conspicuous model of civil-military relations in weak regimes or unstable states is the praetorian model.²⁸ In the post-world war II, with the gained of independence in most of the developing countries, have experienced varying levels of military intervention and erosion of democracy, and the coup zone has largely confined to

²⁵ Ibid., P.21

²⁶ Ibid.,pp-21.

²⁷ Lepingwell, John W.R, 'Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the August Coup'. *World Politics*, Vol.44. October 91- July 92, P.542.

²⁸ Michta, Andrew A, *The Soldier-Citizen: The Politics of the Polish Army after Communism*. Macmillian Press Ltd, 1997, P.9.

African, Asian and Latin American states. In these countries compared to developed countries, the armed forces are more likely than not to be among the political contenders for political power. Military intervention is characteristically associated with the less-developed countries, which are sometimes referred to as 'praetorian societies' or praetorian civil-military type, characterized by ineffective political leadership and lack of structures to channelise political support.²⁹

The term "praetorian" has come to have several meanings, according to the Perlmutter, praetorianism refers to military class of a given society exercises independent political power within it by virtue of an actual or threatened use of military force.³⁰ Huntington argues, in a praetorian system there is the absence of effective political institutions capable of mediating, refining and moderating group political actions. Social forces confront each other nakedly: no political institutions, no corps of professional political leaders is recognized and accepted as the legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflict.... Each group employs means, which reflect its peculiar nature, and capabilities to decide upon office and policy...the techniques of military intervention are simply more dramatic and effective than others....³¹

In the words of Rapport, the praetorian state refers to soldiers hired by a government to police an unruly population, but it also suggests that the loyalties of these soldiers are not fixed, for they often overturn governments they were hired to defend. The term is associated with venality, corruption, and military incapacity or cowardice. In

²⁹ Ibid.,pp-9.

³⁰ Permutler, Amos and Valerie Plave Bennett (ed), *The Political Influence of the Military: A Comparative Reader*, P.199.

³¹ Kukreja, Veena, *Civil-Military Relations in South Asia: Pakistan, Bangladesh and India*, P.23.

effect, a praetorian state is one where private ambitions are rarely restrained by a sense of public authority or common purpose; the role of power (i.e. wealth and force).³²

A praetorian regime, thus, in short, is dominated by the military, or by a coalition of the military and the bureaucracy, or a coalition of military, civilian politicians, and technocratic groups. The military elites uniformed or non-uniformed, in a praetorian regime innovate political structures and implement policies in order to dominate the regime. The key civilian institutions are very few and narrowly based and are not strong enough to assert control over the armed forces.

According to Kukreja, civil-military relations can be understood as a process in which there is a great deal of fluidity and informality, and range across a broad spectrum, as focusing only on a few can produce a seriously distorted picture.³³ The post communist states have undoubtedly made progress in reforming their civil-military relations, but problem of building a system of democratic and civilian control in the post communist context is simply a much bigger and more difficult one than is generally recognized. Second, what makes matter worse, reforms in the economic, social, and political spheres were much curtail for the transition toward democracy and market economy than reform on the civil-military, although there is focus in the army to bring reform.³⁴ To a large degree, problems in reforming civil-military relations differ from one

³² Rapoport, C. David, 'A Comparative Theory of Military and Political Types', in Amos Permuter and Valerie Plave (ed), *The Political Influence of the Military: A Comparative Reader*. New Haven and London. Yale University Press, 1980, p.23.

³³ Kukreja, Veena,, *Civil-Military Relations in South Asia: Pakistan, Bangladesh and India*. Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1991, P.28.

³⁴ Rukavishnikov, Valdimir O and Michael Pugh, 'Civil- Military Relations ', in Giuseppe Caforio,(ed): *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, New York, 2003, P.138.

post communist country to another, of course, deficiencies in Central and Eastern Europe. Thus the model on the civil-military relationship varies across the globe; especially the relationship between the civilians and military has been a long history, to the very beginning of military organization in civilian societies. In each country, it depends on its own historical development, traditions and political institutions, so also of the role of the army in the state, an important issue is also the relationships between the military and the state, societal structures, and institutions forms the core of the complex set of civil-military relations.

CHAPTER II
CIVIL-MILITARY IN RUSSIA

Theoretical overview

Past studies of the Soviet civil-military relation have focused on the ideological control and the model is based on Samuel Huntington's distinction between subjective and objective control as an analytical framework. Huntington's definition of professionalism in the military is a key element in drawing this distinction. He defines professionalism "*as a special type of vocation characterized by expertise, responsibility, and corporateness*". Inherent also is a preference for merit-based promotion within the system, that is, for advancement through furthering professional skills. Thus, the military seeks autonomy in managing its internal affairs and preferring its professional skills. Professionalism, then, is the opposite of politicization, for once politicized; an army loses its emphasis on skills and merit-based promotion to become instead a political body. In other words, professionalism is considered as the bulwark against politicization and renders the military politically "*sterile and neutral*" servant of the state.¹ According to Huntington, professional soldiers become completely apolitical and this leads to "*objective control*" of the military by the civilian leadership. Another means of civilian control over the military is the "*subjective control*". Civilian leadership use direct political tools to manipulate the military. This, in turn, results in a highly politicized military or a low level of military professionalism. It is in this manner in which different civilian leaderships deal with this closed professional group that Huntington finds crucial differences.

In his classic work, *The Soldier and the State* (1967), Huntington says the three distinguished characteristics of a profession are expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.

¹ Huntington, Samuel, *The Soldier and the State*. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, and Massachusetts, 1967, P.38.

Expertise: The professional man is an expert with specialized knowledge and skill in a significant field of human endeavor. It is the basis of objective standards of professional competence for separating the profession from laymen and measuring of the relative competence of members of the profession. They inhere in knowledge and skill and a capable of general application irrespective of time and place.¹

Responsibility: The professional man is a practicing expert, working in a social context, and performing a service, such as the promotion of health, education, or justice, which is essential to the functioning of society. The essential and general character of his service and his monopoly of his skill impose upon the professional men the responsibility to perform the service when required by the society.² This according to Huntington distinguished professional soldier from others.

Corporateness: The members of a profession share a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen. This collective sense has its origins in the lengthy discipline and training necessary for professional competence, the common bond of works, and the sharing of a unique social responsibility.³

Huntington's formulation of these models was intended to throw into sharp relief the differences between civil-military relations in democratic and communist polities. According to Huntington, subjective control was dominant in communist polities, whereas objective control was more developed in democratic societies. But while many subsequent studies of communist civil-military relations have been based on this distinction, there has no consensus on which type of control was present.

¹ Ibid., pp-38.

² Ibid., p. 39.

³ Ibid., p. 40.

David Albright has argued that Huntington's approach ignores the wide variations in the politics of communist states.⁴ Amos Perlmutter, argued, "Corporatism should be extracted from the concept of 'professionalism' and treated as an independent variable [with military interventionism as the dependent variable]".⁵ Four major suppositions support this overall argument: (1) "military professionalism can be achieved and fulfilled without an exclusively corporate orientation and behavior"; (2) "the corporate, not the professional, orientation of the modern military determines its objective or subjective political behavior"; (3) "the degree of commitment to corporatism, rather than to professionalism determines the level of political intervention by the military"; and (4) "the military mind- the military's 'acceptance' of a specific type of patron and its perception of the power and stability of the political order- determines its clientship orientation".⁶

Perlmutter thus, basing on these suppositions, classifies militaries, as "praetorian" militaries that engage in highly level of interventionist not because of their lack of professionalism but because of their high levels of corporateness. Praetorianism, in the words of Perlmutter, refers to military class of a given society exercises independent political power within it by virtue of an actual or threatened use of military force.⁷ "Revolutionary" militaries, on the other hand, are unlikely to intervene because of their low level of corporateness. The "classical professional" militaries fall somewhere in between the "praetorian" and the "revolutionary" in terms of their corporate orientations. In fact, based upon this approach,

⁴ Lepingwell, W.R. John, ' Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the August Coup', *World Politics*, Vol.44. October, 1991- July 1992, p. 541.

⁵ Moran, P. John, *From Garrison state to Nation-State: Political Power and the Russian Military under Gorbachev and Yelstin*. Praeger Publishers, United States of America, p.7.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p.8.

⁷ Perlmutter, Amos and Valerie Palve (ed), *The Political Influence of the Military: A Comparative Reader*. New Haven and London Yale University Press, 1980, p.199.

Perlmutter groups the Israel and Chinese militaries together (“revolutionaries”) as well as the French, Japanese, and soviet militaries (“classical Professional”). Logically, most of the Latin America militaries are grouped with the African militaries as “praetorian”.⁸

Perlmutter approach however is left with a fuzzy notion of what military professionalism really is, as he says, “military professionalism can be achieved and fulfilled without an exclusively corporate orientation and behavior”.⁹ Even, on the “revolutionary” militaries that they are least likely to be interventionist (because of low level of corporateness). The first and prototypically revolutionary army was undoubtedly the Napoleonic French military. Had the events of the French Revolution not ended the military intervention, the supposition that “revolutionary” armies are noninterventionist might be somewhat more “believable” Unfortunately; it was the intervention that gave us the term “Bonaparrism”.¹⁰

Huntington’s ideas however have been disputed by the authors concerned with the civil-military relations in communist and post-communist politics, despite the divergent approaches among the authors, two schools of thought emerged. One view accepts Huntington’s position that professionalism renders the military politically neutral willing to accept the supremacy of the legitimate civilian controls. The second view most clearly articulated by Morris Janowitz, which take the view that professionalism obliges the military to acquire administration and political skills. This, in turn, politicized the officer corps and leads the military to challenge supremacy. Roman Kolkwicz, one of the first to work on the civil-military relations in the late

⁸ Moran, P. John, *From Garrison State to Nation-State: Political Power and the Russian Military Under Gorbachev and Yelstin*. Praeger Publishers, Westport, p.8.

⁹ Perlmutter, Amos, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, (1977), p.201.

¹⁰ Moran, P. John, *From Garrison State to Nation-State: Political Power and the Russian Military Under the Gorbachev and Yelstin*. Praeger Westport (2002), p.8.

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1960s, proponent of the subjective model in the Soviet/ Russian experience agrees with the Janotwicz view that civil and military as opposite to party's objective of a politicized and controlled military organization, and also adhered very closely to Huntington model. Kolkwicz's approach of the party and military values in the Soviet Union can be broken into three major points: (1) the Soviet military's value system was elitist, insular, and self-reliant; (2) the demands for professional autonomy involved both strict code of honor and discipline; and (3) the military's tendencies towards institutional autonomy were "clearly incompatible with the party's objective of a politicized and controlled military organization".¹¹ These Soviet military values mostly mirrored those professional military ethics/ values pointed out by Huntington. According to Kolkwicz, as these values were very much in conflict between the party and the military characterized by constant conflict between the two distinct dichotomous institutions. The military constantly attempts to expand its autonomy in the management in the internal affairs, and the party, with its traditional fear of Bonapartism, does everything possible to constraint or control over the military specialists. Thus, Kolkwicz approaches the whole question of the Soviet civil military relations as the study of two intensely competing "interest group".

William E. Odom differed from Kolkwicz ideas (and Huntington), he argued, "neither an incompatibility of institution ethos nor disagreement over fundamental issues seems to justify the assumption that the party-military boundary marks a real or political cleavage in the Soviet political system".¹² In other words, the party hardly represents a threat to professional military and the two groups seems to agree to a certain specific issues (i.e. economic decentralization,

¹¹ Kolkwicz, Roman, 'Interest Groups in Soviet Politics: The Case of the Military', in Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes (ed), *Civil and Military Relations in Communist system*. Westviews Press, 1978, p.10.

¹² Odom, E. William, 'The Party-Military Connection: A Critique', in Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes (ed), *Civil-Military Relations in Communist system*. Westview Press, 1978, p.27.



intellectual dissent, the nationalities question, political and economic liberalization in Eastern Europe, and destalinisation), and the party was more interested in realpolitik than in the international proletariat, and was no more socially involved than the military. The alienation between the party and the army, which Kolkwicz finds and attributes to the army's "military professionalism", has a little empirical basis in Odom's view. To Odom, military officers are executives just as the leading Party cadres, and their policymaking influence is bureaucratic and administrative, not competitive with the party, and instead of looking at the Soviet military establishment under the universal category of "military", as Kolkwicz does, it is rather to view as a large public bureaucracy, a hierarchical organization that operates in peacetime not altogether differently from the other public agencies.¹³ This approach, to Odom consider as the "institutional congruence approach" or "historical institutional approach", which has an important implication to understand the civil-military relations in a communist system and the post-communist system.

Timothy Colton further underlines the conceptual framework of civil-military relations and argues that the emphasis should be placed upon the military participation in politics (as opposed to party controls over the military). In other words, the role of military in the soviet policy was confined to intra-military matters or to providing civilian leaders with expert advice on institutions questions and recognized civilian authority over non-military domains. He writes, "In contrast to the institutional congruence model I have read into Odom's work, I find it necessary to retain a notion of civil-military boundary- a boundary that is permeable, to be sure, but that has a definite shape and location. But unlike Kolkwicz and other adherents of the institutional conflict model, I do not find outright conflict across this boundary to be a

¹³ Ibid., p.34.

characteristic feature of Soviet military politics".¹⁴ And points out that Soviet military policymaking realm has been confined to "intramilitary matters or to providing civilian leaders with experts advice on institutional questions".¹⁵

Models from the west tend to conflate ideology with the lack of professionalism within the military. Empirical studies and performance of the Soviet military however show that this is not true.

Ideology or world views are part of military training of all armies. All military training, anywhere in the world is based on 'protection of nation', nationalism, national values etc are thus part of all militaries. This value did not intervene in the 'professionalism' of the Soviet Army any more or less than it did it in the US or Chinese Army. It is only at the very highest level that commitment to a 'line of thought' as opposed to others is a consideration. Routine army issues thus remain in professional bases.

Civil-Military in Soviet Era

One would expect military professionalism to minimize the likelihood of involvement or intervention, but even a highly professionalism military may be driven to intervene if its professionalism autonomy is limited or its corporate interest threatened.¹⁶ The legacy of the Soviet era must be consider as the foundation on which the professionalism of military in Post-Soviet can be taken into account, as Russia, did inherited the bulk of the Soviet military and with it many of the old obligations, entanglements, and ambitions of the Soviet Union. And in the

¹⁴ Colton, J. Timothy, 'The Party-Military Connection: A Participatory Model ', in Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes (ed): *Civil-Military Relations in Communist system*. Westview Press, 1978, p.73.

¹⁵ Ibid., p.70.

¹⁶ Finer, Samuel, *The Man on the Horseback: The Role of Military in Politics*. London, Pall Mall, 1962, p.233.

Russian militaries, it is important to understand the level of professionalism, as measured in Huntington's terms, i.e. expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. The unique features of the Soviet political system fostered a distinct form of military professionalism resulting from its tsarist legacy, the socialization processes of the Soviet era, and the constraints of party control. Authoritarian models of officership and leadership, the harsh discipline of military life, an intense aversion to revealing its internal operations to the public, and the corruption of bureaucratic and personal ethics all came to characterize Soviet military professionalism,¹⁷ and the Soviet Political system executed through a single axis, the Communist Party. To ensure civilian control, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) retained its power over the military through a special control structure, the Main Political Administration (MPA). The MPA played the role of a "watch dog" over the military and reduced military professionalism by emphasizing political correctness over the military competence,¹⁸ and there by politicizing it and the party created military party organs to carry out party work within the military.

Norms of Promotion and advancement

A merit- based, objective system of promotion is one of the fundamental elements of a professional military. On the surface, the Soviet era promotion system seems to have had many elements of a merit- based system. Evaluations considered both professionalism and political characteristics and were reviewed by the officer's immediate supervisors, the political officer, the Secretary of the Party and Komosomol committee, and the chief of the personal office. However, commanders were required to weigh heavily the strength of officers' ideological

¹⁷ Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Case of Czech and Russian Armed Forces*. University of Michigan Press, 1999, p.22.

¹⁸Lepingwell, John W.R, 'Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the August Coup', *World Politics*, Vol.44. October 91- July 92, p.541.

convictions in the promotion process.¹⁹ The Soviet officer promotion system, however, had other problems, corruption within the system, much of it perpetuated by the professional military, made the promotion process, in reality, less than a merit-based system.

Means of advancement within the Soviet military were also corrupted by the prevalence of a patronage system in which senior patrons could be relied upon to ensure that promotions and desirable assignments went to their protégés, regardless of their qualifications. Numerous accounts of such complaints were featured in the Soviet press during the Gorbachev's period of glasnost indicating the corruption that had become prevalent in the promotion system through the Brezhnev years and still continued.²⁰ The emphasis on non-professional qualities and the involvement of authorities outside the cadre of professional officers meant that even the most equitably administered version of this system, subjective, non-professionalism factors would come into process.

Norms of officership and leadership

The core issues of professional officership-Who, Why, and how an officer serves-differs markedly in authoritarian and democratic states. As soldiers in democratic states are expected to believe within their democracy and in democracies laws come from those elected to create them, and all citizens are subject to them. Democratic control of the military is partially dependent on the shared democratic socialization of all citizens about democratic principles and the requirement of democratic responsibility. While not all democratic states have progressed equally in this aspect of democratization, the standard

¹⁹ Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Case of Czech and Russian Armed Forces*. University of Michigan Press, 1999, p.27.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

set forth on the democratic military professionalism model challenges all democratic and democratizing states to meet this ideal.

Indeed, Soviet military professionalism was characterized by its lack of rule-bound behavior. While democratic models of military professionalism limit officers' actions through legal mechanisms, the system of *edinonachilie* (one man command) essentially meant that there was no illegal order in the Soviet military. The absolute power that commanders held over their subordinates "was exercise by their exclusive right to issue orders, and the assurance that these orders, regardless of what they might entail, would be followed unquestioningly".²¹ Unlimited one-man command continues in the Russian army and has actually become more severe with the removal of political officers who used to restrict some actions of the commander. Consequently, practices that respect the dignity of each soldier and that do not suppress the individual are still absent.

Soviet military professionalism was also characterized by the toleration of *dedovshchina*, or "nonstatutory relations" among soldiers, which was essentially a systematized program of hazing new conscripts.²² "The conscript-officer relationship has always been unhealthy, and even Soviet-era people have acknowledge this as a crucible of corruption".²³ This situation becomes especially evident in the Afghan War, when the poor quality of the non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps and the poor socialization of troops were identified as key reasons why Soviet troops were performing poorly on the modern battlefield. Atrocities committed in Chechnya by

²¹ Ibid., p.29.

²² Ibid., p.30.

²³ Holloway, David and Michael McFaul, ' *Demilitarization and Defense Conversion* ', in Lapidus, Gail W (ed): *The New Russia: Troubled Transformation*. Westview press, United States of America, 1995, p.201.

the Russian troops indicate that negligent leadership and poor discipline persist today.²⁴ The Committee of Soldier's Mothers, formed during the liberalizations period of the Gorbachev period, reported in 1989 that 3,900 Soviet recruits lost their lives as a result of hazing and hazing related suicides that can be attributed to the humiliating actions of the senior soldiers and officer towards conscripts.²⁵ The Soviet model of military professionalism in these respects falls far short of the democratic model, and the toleration and reliance of *dedovshchina* for the maintenance of good order and discipline within the armed forces is evidence of a corrupt sense of military professionalism. Unfortunately, in Russia, discussions of potential military reforms are still at a low level.

Norms of Political Influence

Another essential component of democratic military professionalism is the degree to which the military institutions can participated in the politics of society without sacrificing its professionalism. The Soviet military's participation was limited in both its scope and political means employed. Most of the Soviet military's participation in politics was confined to internal matters or the dispensation of expert advice to civilian authorities in order to resolve institutional issues. Only a small portion of political behavior crossed into the territory of outright political bargaining,²⁶ and there was no movement toward direct military rule until the 1991 coup.²⁷

The military had some experience with exerting political power vis- a- vis the party in the Soviet era, but was mostly confined this activity strictly to matters involving military affairs. At

²⁴ Ianin, Sergei, 'Factors of Social Tension in the Army Environment', *Russian Social Science review*, Vol.36.1995, p.16.

²⁵ Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Case of Czech and Russian Armed Forces*. University of Michigan Press, 1999, p.30.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.35.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.35.

such times, party control was loosened and greater professional autonomy granted when the party was more dependent on the military due to domestic or international crises. It was in these periods that political participation increased. However, ultimate authority always remained with the party, and the military influence generally did not extend beyond limits that were acceptable to the political leadership.²⁸ Political control in the Soviet military depended greatly on the symbiotic nature of the relationship between the party and the military. The party needed the military to defend the regime from the external and internal enemies, to serve as the guardians of the revolution, and to socialize society through military service. On the other hand, the party was the source of the military's prestige and material status, and the continuation of a stable system of government. Neither the legislature, the executive, nor the judiciary had separate autonomous realms of authority vis- a- vis the military. Each was present in the Soviet system, but only the authority of the party, which controlled all institutions of government, mattered. Even the enumeration of powers and rights in the Soviet mattered little in comparison to the will of the party,²⁹ and the acceptance of civilian supremacy was undisputed in the Soviet officer corps.

Civil-Military Relations and Soviet Disintegration

The Soviet military was always a relatively autonomous organization, and was never deeply involved in politics at the local or regional levels. This autonomy was an important factor in civil-military relations, for it allowed the military to devote more time to its professional concerns, and to develop a significant level of professionalism. In

²⁸ Albright, E. David, 'Democratization and Civil- Military Relations in Russia and Ukraine', in John P.Lovell and David E. Albright(ed), *To Sheathe the sword*. Greenwood press, London, 1997, p.40.

²⁹ Arnett, Robert, 'Can Civilians Control the Military?', *Obris*, Vol.38.1994, p.43.

recent years, however, this professionalism has been threatened by a number of trends.³⁰ During the Gorbachev era, the civil-military relationship began to change. Perestroika exposed the military to scrutiny and criticism by the people, press, and legislature. 'New thinking' in foreign policy led to major reductions in the size, weaponry, and budget of the military, as well as the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the eventual break up of the Soviet Union. The military was losing its favored status not only the within the government but also within the society and the disorientation has affected many Russian servicemen in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and challenges have come about during a period of unprecedented economic and political instability within Russia that threatens to deteriorate into chaos, and the fact is that a new, robust system of civil-military is yet to fully developed.

As early as 1988-89, "Committees of Soldiers' Mothers", appeared in Moscow and other cities to lobby against physical brutality and other conscripts.³¹ The committee of Soldiers' of Mothers was to eliminate hazing and to force the commanders to take responsibility for the incident and also to pressure the MOD (Ministry of Defence) but Mothers have found many indifferent to the problem, "if a commander happen to be good one, then the mothers can have a good relationship with him, but many allow hazing to continue. Commanders think that hazing is convenient for them- it maintains discipline. It's much easier to let it go gain than to try to fix the problem".³² However the most obvious change apparent between the current Russian and the past Soviet forces is the

³⁰ Lepingwell, John, 'The *Russian Military in the 1990s: Disintegration and Renewal?*', in Douglas W.Blum(ed), *Russia's Future*. Westview Press, U.S.A.1994, p.117.

³¹ Ibid., p.25.

³² Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Case of Czech and Russian Armed Forces*. University of Michigan Press, 1999, p.133.

drop in the percentage of conscripts. During 1992 and early 1993, of the 130,000 conscripts brought in, barely half were allocated to regular combat formations, most to rest being assigned to the border guards, interior troops, and railways and construction units.³³ As a result of this change, the Russian Army, and to a lesser extent the other service, has become a predominantly volunteer force. The transformation of the Russian Army from a predominantly conscripts force to a predominantly volunteer- professional one has important implications for civil-military relations. In effect, these changes will give Russia a smaller and more professional army but one less receptive to democratization and civilian control rather than more so.

Although Russia's new military culture may be suspicious of politics and politicians, it is not apolitical. As early as 1989-90, a number of "societies" and "unions" began to developed in the military. Perhaps the single most important one is the All-Army Officers' Assembly, which basically functions as the mouthpiece of a High Command.³⁴ The Party aim to seek the support of active duty officers, reservist, and sympathetic civilians to support candidates of Communist, agrarian, and nationalist blocs. Additionally, every major political party or bloc has recruited a senior officer to serve in its leadership.³⁵ Such justify the increased of direct political involvement as fulfilling their duty to ensure that the problems of the armed forces are adequately addressed to protect the state, and the influence of Russian nationalism has grown in Russian politics since the

³³ Spence, Richard B, 'Servants or Masters? The Military', in the "New Russia" in Constantine P. Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker (ed), *Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor states*. Westview press, p.20.

³⁴ Ibid., p.24.

³⁵ Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Case of Czech and Russian Armed Forces*. University of Michigan Press, 1999, p.144.

election of December 1993. This is evident in the Russian foreign policy, which is forthright in its assertion of Russian national interests.³⁶

One of the keys to stability of civil-military relations is the legitimacy of the government as perceived by the population as a whole, and especially as perceived by the military. In the August coup 1991 and 1993, the military attempted to adopt a position of political neutrality,³⁷ and in spite of the turmoil and dissatisfaction in the military, the Russian High Command has shown no desire to seize power or to act as the Kingmaker, deciding who should rule. General Grachev made it clear that he wanted to stand aside from the conflict between Yeltsin and the congress of People's deputies in 1992 and 1993. He told the Congress of People's Deputies to exclude any playing of 'army card' from the means of political struggle.³⁸ Despite the military ambivalent to stay 'out of politics', and was averse to taking part in the Yeltsin's fight with parliament in October 1993, but ultimately participated in order to preserve order in the capital. The use of the military for such roles is dangerous for states in transition, because a certain amount of indebtedness to the military is created that may distort the military's perception of what norms of political influence it must adhere to in a democracy and the August 1991 coup was a turning point in the development of Soviet Civil-military relations, as it marked the military's first, albeit ambivalent, intervention in Soviet politics.

³⁶ Holloway, David and Michael McFaul, 'Demilitarization and Defense Conversion', in Lapidus, Gail W (ed): *The New Russia: Troubled Transformation*. Westview press in United States of America, 1995, p.203.

³⁷ Lepingwell, John, 'The Russian Military in the 1990s: Disintegration or Renewal?', in Douglas W. Blum (ed): *Russia's Future: Consolidation and Disintegration?* Westview Press, U.S.A. 1994, p.118.

³⁸ Holloway, David and Michael McFaul, 'Demilitarization and Defense Conversion', in Lapidus, Gail W (ed), *The New Russia: Troubled Transformation*. Westview press in United States of America, 1995, p.202.

Thus, the legacies of the late Soviet period- Politicization and the internal use of the army- continue to plague Russia civil-military relations. Timothy Colton, in contrasting his approach against those of Kolkowicz and Odom he writes, “ A more appropriate approach is to orient the analysis towards military participation in politics rather than toward the exercise of civilian (in this case Party) control over the military”.³⁹It remains an open question, however whether Russia’s civilian politicians can create the necessary conditions to exclude once and for all the possibilities of military involvement in domestic politics, and the transitioning military needs to work on improving the compatibility of military and societal values. The implementation of democratic reforms can reduce the gap that has developed since the advent of democratization.

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the elements of Soviet military professionalism that are incompatible with military professionalism in a democracy and the process of political control and accepted standards of military professionalism in the Soviet bloc has revealed some serious discrepancies between democratic and Soviet era perception of military professionalism. Some of these deficiencies can be related to the necessities of authoritarian rule while others can be attributed to practices that were allowed to endure within it. One can expect that incompatible with democratic systems of government will eventually adapt to more appropriate forms associated with democratic models of

³⁹ Moran, P. John, *From Garrison State to Nation-State: Political Power and the Russian Military under the Gorbachev and Yeltsin*. Praeger Westport (2002), p.12.

legitimate government. More troublesome will be the corrupt habits of Soviet military professionalism that have been tolerated for decades and that paralleled the pervasive bureaucratic corruption of life in the Soviet bloc.

This applies in particular two most troubling legacies of the late Soviet period for Russian civil-military relations: the increased reliance of the political leadership in the armed forces for internal policing and control; and the politicization of the officers' corps caused by the collapse of Communist Party authority.⁴⁰

If this dangerous trend is to be halted, the Russian government must take measures to reinforce military professionalism and civilian control. Firstly, it should move to disallow the participation of active-duty military personnel in legislatures, because such participation draws the military into politics. Secondly, the merit-based promotion system must be maintained and strengthened, especially for senior officers. Thirdly, special care will have to be taken to avoid the use of military forces for internal security missions. Lastly, it is necessary to create robust institutions for oversight of the military.

⁴⁰ Lepingwell, John W.R., 'Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the August Coup', *World Politics*, Vol.44, October 91 - July 92, p.570.

CHAPTER III

MILITARY AND POLITICS IN RUSSIA

The Russian military was in its earlier incarnation of the Soviet armed forces and is naturally influenced by its past experiences. It is important to refer to the nature and magnitude of the Soviet army's involvement in politics. Even Russian analysts are divided over the true role of the military in the Communist era. One view claims that in the former Soviet Union "the military were the chief architects of the political course; they even decided who should stay in power, and who and when should be removed from the office".¹ Others assert that "in the Soviet period the interrelation between the political authorities and the socialist Army was based on the principles of unreserved subordination of the latter"² Supporters of both the views believe that they put forward rather convincing argument to substantiate their cases.³ The truth lies somewhere between the two extremes.

Generally speaking, the army was one of the chief pillars of the Soviet State. It had crucial internal and external security functions, but it was not the dominant institution in the society. The military leadership was an integral part of the Soviet ruling elite, and as such it had its own interest, lobbyist, privileges, and of course sphere of activity, where it took most "technical" decisions at its own discretion.

¹ Sorokin, Konstantin. E, '*Russia and the Former Soviet Union*', in Constantine P. Danopoulos and Cynthia Watson (ed), *The Political Role of the Military: An International Handbook*. Greenwood Press.U.S.A.1996., p.392.

² Ibid., pp-392.

³ Two sets of arguments can be mentioned as an example. First, that the military were lavishly represented in the state legislature- the Supreme Soviet, as well as lower level Soviets. The counterargument here is that the Soviets were rather rubber stamping bodies with in real influence on political process. Second, the post of defense minister was held exclusively by the military: defense ministers also used to sit in the highest decision- making body of the CPSU, the Politbureau. On the other hand, the armed forces were tightly controlled by a number of the Communist/ State institutions over which the army had no control, including several KGB agencies(which pervaded the army: and the CPSU Central Committee, the Chief political department of the armed forces, had the status of a central Committee's department.

Political Control in the Soviet Era

Political control in the Soviet era was characterized by different degrees of centralization at different levels of administration. This enabled the political leadership, embodied in the upper echelons of the Communist Party, to prioritize and concentrate its resources and attention on areas in which it had the greatest interest. The role of the rest of the institutions of government was to ratify Party policy and to implement it.⁴

In the last thirty of forty years, the military participated in the “rules of the game” played by the national elite in several ways. First, it was to maintain stability inside the leadership and in the society. Second, it was able to avoid excesses of the Stalin era by maintaining equilibrium (in terms of power and privileges) between different branches and institutions of the regime. Most important, it balanced power between the supreme bodies: the Communist Party apparatus, three “power” ministers (KGB, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs), the defense industry commission (whose influence was growing in the Brezhnev years), top executive and legislature branches (the government and the presidium of the Supreme Soviet), and the top judiciary. These rules were enforced by an intricate system of “check and balances,” Soviet style (the army, for instance, was doubly controlled by the KGB and the CPSU Central Committee through the network of security and political bodies in the armed forces, living side by side with the military chain of command), and by solidifying interinstitutional personal

⁴ Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Case of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces*. University of Michigan Press. U.S.A. 1999, p.14

connections.⁵ On the other hand, the Party was the source of the military's prestige and material status, and the insurer of the continuation of a stable system of government.⁶

The dominance of full- time Party apparatchiks at the highest levels of the decision- making process ensured that all policies would serve the Party's interests. Chief among these interests was controlling the military institution. To achieve this end, the Party created military party organs to carry out Party work within the military, embodied in the structure of the Main Political Administration (MPA); it ensured the political reliability of the armed forces and carried out their programs through political officers and basic Party organisation.⁷ The MPA played the role of a "watchdog" over the military and reduced military professionalization by emphasizing political correctness over the military competence, and there by politicizing it.⁸

A necessary condition of service for the military was the forfeiture of much of its professional autonomy throughout the Soviet era. Ensuring the military's continued reliability within political systems suffering from legitimacy problems of varying degrees required a conscious decision on the part of the political leadership to trade maximum efficiency and competence for the objective of political reliability. Political control was maintained through a network of nonautonomous political- governmental bodies that

⁵Sorokin, Konstantin. E, '*Russia and the Former Soviet Union*', in Constantine P. Danopoulos and Cynthia Watson (ed), *The Political Role of the Military: An International Handbook* Greenwood Press.U.S.A.1996, p.392.

⁶ Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Case of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces*. University of Michigan Press. U.S.A.1999, P.15.

⁷ Bebler, Anton A (ed), *The Regionwide Perspective on Post- Communist Civil- Military Relations*.Praeger Publisher, Westport.U.S.A, p.73.

⁸ Lepingwell, John W.R, 'Soviet Civil- Military Relations and the August Coup', *World Politics*, Vol.44. Oct-1991/ July 1992, p.541.

were responsible to the centralized authority embodied in the Politburo⁹ and the General Secretary of the Communist Party.

The decline in the Soviet military's fortune began after the insipid Marshal Sokolov was appointed defense minister and continued under Marshal Yazov, who succeeded him at this post. Both were unable to check the negative sides of the demilitarization crusade by Gorbachev, most significant the progressive worsening of social and economic conditions for the army. (This decline mostly held true for officers of medium rank and below, or the overwhelming part of the army; but though generals were not affected at that time, they were fearful of losing their privileges in the near future.) Yazov also acquiesced to irresponsible and repeated use of the army to quell political and ethnic unrest in non Russian republics, which was not crowned with any success but caused a storm of angry protests from the democratic part of Soviet society amounting to a virulent anti- army propaganda campaign.¹⁰ Together with apprehension over Gorbachev's allegedly yielding and defeatist foreign and arms control policies, caused growing discontent in the military ranks, triggered a process of "politicization" of the whole army (openly revealed by the end of 1990), and gave rise to a political sense of "unity in need" among the military. 'New thinking' in foreign policy led to major reductions in the size, weaponry, and budget of the military, as well as the collapse

⁹ The 'political bureau', i.e. ruling committee of the USSR Communist Party, and the effective bearer of executive power within the state. Established as a subcommittee of the Party Central Committee in 1919 (members, Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Kamenev, Krestinsky) it gradually grew, until abolished in 1952, when it was replaced by 25 member presidium. This has since contracted to ten members and is often called the Politburo from the sense that its nature and function are indistinguishable from those of the previous committee of that name in Roger Scruton: *A Dictionary of Political Thought* London 1982, p.359.

¹⁰ Sorokin, Konstantin. E, '*Russia and the Former Soviet Union*', in Constantine P. Danopoulos and Cynthia Watson (ed), *The Political Role of the Military: An International Handbook*. Greenwood Press. U.S.A. 1996, p.393.

of the Warsaw pact and the eventual breakup of the Soviet Union. The military was losing its favored status not only within the government but also within the society.¹¹

To sum up, with the instability to cater the army basic needs, the government was hamstrung by an economic crisis that limited its field for maneuver, and keeping the level of its politicization high. Thus, it remains an open question, whether Russia's civilian politicians can create the necessary conditions to exclude once and for all the possibilities of military involvement in domestic politics, and the transitioning military needs to work on improving the compatibility of military, social values and with an apolitical military outlook, there by creating a vibrant civil-military relations.

1991 Coup Attempt

All these developments led to the army showing an uncharacteristically high political profile during the attempted coup in August 1991. Former Soviet Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov and Ground forces Commander Valentin Varennikov helped to plan the coup (the key figure in the plot was KGB head Vladimir Kryuchkov) and several other officers took part.¹² The August coup 1991 was a tuning point in the development of Soviet civil-military relations, as it marked the military's first, albeit ambivalent, intervention in Soviet politics.¹³

Many commentators have suggested that the August coup was timed to prevent the signing of the Union treaty. While that may have been the aim of the nonmilitary

¹¹ Arnett, Robert, 'Russia after the Crisis: Can Civilians Control the Military?' *Obris*, Vol.38, 1994, p.41.

¹² Taylor, Brain D, 'Russian Civil- Military Relations after the October Uprising', *Survival*, Vol.36, no.1, spring, 1994, p.6.

¹³ Lepingwell, John W.R, 'Soviet Civil- Military Relations and the August Coup', *World Politics*, Vol.44. Oct-1991/ July 1992, p.561.

coup leaders, it seems unlikely that it was the primary reason for the participation of the military. To what extent was the military involved in the coup? Support for the coup among the senior leadership was mixed,¹⁴ as shown by the fact that nine out of the seventeen members of the Defense Ministry collegiums were replaced after the putsch.¹⁵ And opposition within the military prevented the storming of the white House and contributed to the quick collapse of the coup attempt.¹⁶

Two fundamental conclusions from the late Soviet period and, particularly, from the failed coup. First, politicization was a treat to the institutional cohesion of the armed forces. Second, it was recognized that internal operations reflected poorly on the military- only when some officers refused to followed orders (August 1991) did the social standing of the armed forces increase.¹⁷ Which intum affect the stability of civil-military relations and thereby undergoing erosion.

Factionalism and Post- Communist Military Politics

The greatest potential for substantial military reform in Russia was in the Perestroika era when the restructuring of the Soviet Union was driven from the top and political forces were capable of demanding changes. The military as an institution, though, was never excited about reform, continued to argue for more advanced

¹⁴ Ibid., Page-562.

¹⁵ Moran, John P, *From Garrison State to Nation-State: Political Power and the Russian Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*. Praeger. Westport. U.S.A.2002. Page-33.

¹⁶ Taylor, Brain D, 'Russian Civil- Military Relations after the October Uprising', *Survival*, Vol.36, no.1, spring, 1994.page-7.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp-7.

technology for the armed forces, and interpreted all attempts all reform as thinly veiled attempts to downsize the military.¹⁸

In the late Soviet era there was conflict between pragmatic high- ranking officers, who understand the impossibility of Marxist economics sustaining military capability, and Party ideologues resistant to change. There was hope that with the creation of the Russian Federation on 1 January 1992 there was also the possibility of creating a new military for the new state.¹⁹ By March 1992, the Russian government accepted that the Soviet Armed could not survive without the Soviet state. On May 7, 1992, Yeltsin signed a decree established the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.²⁰

Establishing the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was difficult for the reasons as well- the military assets of the Soviet Union had to be divided up and military relations with the former republics worked out; a new military doctrine had to be elaborated to provide guidance for defense policy; new arrangements for civil-military relations had to be devised. Moreover, these tasks had to be accomplished in a drastically changed economic environment.²¹ And it was consider that Yeltsin's announcement of the creation of the Russian Federation Armed Forces helped to establish clear lines of authority from the Russian political leadership to the military forces under its control, questions have continually been raised about the military loyalty.²²

¹⁸ Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Case of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces*. University of Michigan Press, U.S.A. 1999, p.112.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp-112.

²⁰ Holloway, David and Michael McFaul, 'Demilitarization and Defense Conversion', in Gail W. Lapidus (ed): *The New Russia: Troubled Transformation*. Westview Press, U.S.A, 1995, p.196.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp-196.

²² Arnett, Robert, 'Russia after the Crisis: Can Civilians Control the Military?' *Obris*, Vol.38, 1994, p.43.

In the wake of the Soviet collapse, a new group of military men rose to prominence in Russia. Key among these were Col. Gen. Vladimir Achalov, an airborne forces commander and Soviet deputy defense minister who refused to support the 91' coup; his successor as airborne forces chief and later Yeltsin's defense minister, Col.Gen. Pavel Grachev; Communications officer and Yeltsin's subsequent deputy defense minister, Maj.Gen. Konstantin Kobets; the post- coup chief of the general staff, Gen. Vladimir Lobov; Yeltsin's Vice-president, Aleksandr Rutskoi; Marshal Engenii Shaposhnikov, chief of aviation; and former military propagandist and "political pariah," Col. Gen. Dmitri Volkogonov, who became Yeltsin's political chief for the armed forces.²³

Although these men presumably shared a common commitment to military reform, democratization and the Yeltsin period, in fact the group was rent by political differences and, perhaps more importantly, personal antagonisms and rivalries. The first to go was Lobov, who was sacked as chief- of – staff in December 1991. His main sin may have been his firm commitment to massive force reductions and a defensive military doctrine. Achalov and Grachev, both airborne officers, were personal rivals. Rutskoi's appointment of Achalov as his "defense minister" in October 1993 seems to have what finally provoked a hesitant Grachev to throw his weight behind Yeltsin. But Grachev's position has been under attack from Kibitz and Volkogonov, both of whom have drawn closer to Yeltsin while Grachev's status has become more problematic.²⁴ Grachev was replaced by Igor Rodionov, but within less than a year in his post Yeltsin sacked him in

²³ Spence, Richard B, '*Servants or Masters? The Military in the "New Russia"*', in Constantine P. Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker, *Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States*. Westview Press. U.S.A. 1996, p.28.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p.29.

public rage orchestrated to blame Rodionov for the lack of progress on military reform. In this respect, the sacking of Rodionov was more in the Russian tradition of searching for scapegoats than an accurate designation of accountability.²⁵ The main point is that the Russian military leadership is deeply divided although perhaps more over personal than philosophical issues. Such divisions have prevented them from taking a unified stand on purely political questions and making vulnerable for stability in civil-military relations.

The Issue of Legitimacy

One of the keys to stability of civil-military relations is the legitimacy of the government as perceived by the population as whole, and especially as perceived by the military. One of the principal reasons for the failure of the August 1991 coup attempt was the existence of a strong, democratically elected president (and parliament) in Russia. Similarly, the military's decision to support Yeltsin in October 1993 was partly based on the Perception that the president enjoyed greater legitimacy and popular support than the parliament and Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi.²⁶

President Boris Yeltsin's decision to disband the Russian Parliament on 21st September 1993 constituted a test for civil-military relations. Yeltsin's action immediately raised the question- 'on whose side is the army?' The issue became even

²⁵ Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Case of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces*. University of Michigan Press. U.S.A.1999, p.84.

²⁶ Lepingwell, John, 'The Russian Military in the 1990s: Disintegration or Renewal', in Douglas W. Blum (ed), *Russia's Future: Consolidation or Disintegration?* Westview Press, U.S.A, 1994, p.118.

more acute when Rutskoi was sworn in as 'President' by the Supreme Soviet and then appointed Colonel- General Vladislav Achalov as his 'Minister of Defense'²⁷

According to the Constitution, the President is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Yet in both the March 1993 and October 1993 constitutional crises, the military attempted to adopt a position of political neutrality. The military's profession of neutrality in these crises appears to have reflected a real desire to stay out of political intrigues. In the part this may have been motivated by a fear that direct participation in the political struggle might have exposed rifts within the military and precipitated a split in the ranks, one that could conceivably have led to open after there had been violent conflict in Moscow suggest that its neutral position was difficult to change. But while noting the military's neutrality, it is also important to point out the limits of this neutrality. During both crises, it was made clear that Grachev remained a loyal member of the cabinet, and he provided symbolic and political support to Yeltsin. The terms of neutrality excluded the use of force, but allowed Grachev fair amount of political latitude.²⁸

Indeed, while the military did finally support Yeltsin in his decision to storm the parliament building, it did so reluctantly. Had Yeltsin ordered the military to take armed action without a previous provocation, the result would likely have been quite different.²⁹ As it is, the Russian military crossed the Rubicon in October 1993: it chose sides in a political conflict and determined the outcome by force. While such an action may not

²⁷ Taylor, Brian D, 'Russian Civil- Military Relations after the October Uprising', *Survival*, Vol.36, no.1, spring, 1994, p.7

²⁸ Lepingwell, John, 'The Russian Military in the 1990s: Disintegration or Renewal', in Douglas W. Blum (ed), *Russia's Future: Consolidation or Disintegration?* Westview Press, U.S.A, 1994, p.119.

²⁹ Ibid., pp-119.

whet the military's appetite for further intervention in domestic politics, it contributes to an erosion of restraints on both civilian and military leaders concerning the use of the military in politics.

The First Duma and the Russian Military

When the crunch came and the relations between president and parliament broke down into violence in October 1993, after Yeltsin, in violation of the constitution, dissolved the parliament, parliamentary appeals for popular revolt were ignored and Yeltsin was able to organize the military suppression of the Parliaments. The treat of civil and fizzled out in shocking, but localized, bloodshed around the parliament and Moscow's main television studio (over 100 people were killed)³⁰

In September 1993 Yeltsin dissolved the parliament and began to rule by decree pending a new parliamentary election in December.³¹ Yeltsin quickly moved to implement a new constitution that would enhance his own presidential powers.³² The defeat of the old parliament was followed by a referendum on a new Constitution, drawn up under Yeltsin and granting extensive power to the president, and elections to a new, two-tier parliament, the Federal Assembly, comprising the State Duma and the Federation Council.³³ The powers granted by the 1993 constitution to Yeltsin led some analysts to describe the presidency as being 'superpresidential' and having 'hegemonic decision-making powers' which are virtually unmatched amongst post-communist

³⁰ Robinson, Neil: *Russia, A State of Uncertainty*. Routledge Publisher, London and New York, 2002, p.82.

³¹ Chubarov, Alexandr, *Russia's Bitter Path to Modernity: A History of the Soviet and Post-Soviet Eras*. Continuum, New York and London, 2001, p.220.

³² Moran, John P, *From Garrison to Nation-State: Political Power and the Russian military under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*. Praeger Publisher, Westport, London and U.S.A, 2002, p.164.

³³ Robinson, Neil: *Russia, A State of Uncertainty*. Routledge Publisher, London and New York, 2002, p.82.

presidents.³⁴ Yeltsin moved to replace the Supreme Soviet with much weaker parliamentary body to be known as Duma. This 450- member body would be elected based upon a mixed single-member district/PR (party list) electoral systems. However, just as was the case with the Russian and Soviet Supreme Soviet, no restrictions were placed upon military officers who wished to run for positions within this new body.³⁵

The first elections to this body were scheduled for December of that year. Much in keeping, up to twenty- five military men were registered to run in the December 1993 election that would determine the composition of the Duma. Of these, eleven were elected. Four were elected by virtue of their position on party lists. Dmitri Volkogonov and Sergei Yushenkov were elected from the list the of Russia's Choice, and Evgeni Loginov and Viktor Ustinov were elected from the list of the Liberal Democratic Party. Seven others won in single-member district contests, meaning that they were out canvassing votes as any other civilian politician would.³⁶

All of this occurred in spite of a general agreement among the top ranking generals within the MOD that military men should not run for Duma seats. Grachev had repeatedly said that, "Anyone who wants to engage in politics must take off his shoulder boards.... [T]he Army is outside of politics."³⁷

To complicate matters further, the law dealing with the question of military officers on the Duma was ambiguous. Article 44 of the law on Military Responsibility and Military Service said that a soldier's service within the military was suspended for

³⁴ Ibid., p.-83.

³⁵ Moran, John P, *From Garrison to Nation-State: Political Power and the Russian military under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*. Praeger Publisher, Westport, London and U.S.A, 2002, p.164.

³⁶ Ibid., p.165.

³⁷ Holloway, David and Michael McFaul, 'Demilitarization and Defense Conversion', in Gail W. Lapidus (ed), *The New Russia: Troubled Transformation*. Westview Press, U.S.A, 1995, p.202.

the entire period of his full-time participation in the elected body. Just after the election, on 24th December, this article was abolished by presidential edict. No law was drafted to replace it.³⁸

Because putting these men in parliament provided “the best representatives of their own interest in the organs of power,” it was logical that they would seek places in the new Duma Defense committee. A majority of them were successful. The chairmanships went to Lieutenant Colonel Sergei Yushenkov and the three deputy chairmanships went to General Major Nikolai Bezborobov, Major Evgeni Loginov, and Colonel Aleksandr Piskunov. Intersentingly, the two famous military men to elected, General Colonels Yuri Rodionov and Dmitri Volkogonov, obtained nonleadership positions within the committee.³⁹

The elections of the new parliament, the Federal Assembly, in December of that year failed to produce a reformist’s majority in the new legislature. Moreover, the majority in the lower chamber of parliament- the Duma- was in the hands of authoritarian parties: the Agrarian Party and the woefully misnamed ultranationalist Liberal-Democratic Party headed by right-wing populist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy.⁴⁰

The elections also approved Russia’s first non-Soviet constitution. It set clear terms of reference for the branches of power and endowed the president with enormous prerogatives. The Russian president appoints and dismisses the premier and his cabinet ministries and issues decrees and orders that are valid throughout the territory of the

³⁸ Moran, John P, *From Garrison to Nation-State: Political Power and the Russian military under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*. Praeger Publisher, Westport, London and U.S.A, 2002, p.165.

³⁹ Ibid.,pp-165.

⁴⁰ Chubarov, Alexandr, *Russia’s Bitter Path to Modernity: A History of the Soviet and Post- Soviet Eras*. Continuum, New York and London, 2001, p.221.

Russian Federation. The president orders the elections to the Duma, and he alone can dissolve it. He is also commander chief of the armed forces. The powers of the new parliament, called the Federal Assembly, are restricted to passing legislation, approving the budget, declaring amnesty, and ratifying international treaties.⁴¹

Thus, the capacity of the parliament to exercise control over the armed forces is extremely little, whereas power of the president to command the military is very high. In this context the powers granted by the 1993 constitution to Yeltsin, the contemporary analysts described the presidency as being 'superpresidential' and having 'hegemonic decision-making powers' and also described Russian civil-military relations a system of presidential control over the military. This type of civil-military relations seems to highly unstable, thus the future role of the army in politics and the democratic institutions of civilian control over the military in Russia will largely depend on the actions of politicians, and on the stability of various institutions, for a vibrant civil-military relations.

Corruption and Chechen Crisis

Charges of corruption also plagued birth Ministry of Defense (MOD), but corruption charges persist and have gone unaddressed in the Russian case. Under the Soviet system ministries controlled vast areas and their resources. Officers with access to military property have been selling it for personal gain. As much as \$65 million may have

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp-221.

been pocketed by Russian generals in such endeavors.⁴² Under Garchev, corruption, embezzlement, and theft flourished luxuriantly in the army, and the word general came to be associated with the construction of dachas at the state treasury's expense, using soldiers as slave labor. Grachev was universally despised and criticized by his subordinate, including General Alexander Lebed.⁴³ On June 18, Yeltsin appointed Lebed, who had just received 14.7 percent of the vote in the first round of the presidential elections to be the secretary of the Security Council and his national security adviser. Pavel Grachev was fired. This form of civilian control, a form we call subjective fragmentation, was nothing than an individualized "divide- and- conquer" strategy.⁴⁴ Clearly, such a development would have an extremely negative impact on the established system of control.

Poor transparency within the MOD also makes it impossible to exert control over the ministry. One particularly egregious transgression was the failure of President Yeltsin to halt the bombing of Grozny when he ordered the shelling to cease on 27 December 1994. Yeltsin's impotence as commander in chief fueled speculation that a group known as "the party of war" was dictating policy in the Chechen operation according to the preferences of the chiefs of the power ministries.⁴⁵ This incident raised serious questions about the loyalty of the military to Yeltsin. Some regard the Defense Ministry as a pyramid of purely military staffs and administrations whose inner workings are hidden

⁴² Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Case of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces*. University of Michigan Press. U.S.A. 1999, p.84.

⁴³ Ibid., pp-84.

⁴⁴ Moran, John P, *From Garrison State to Nation- State: Political Power and the Russian Military under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*. Praeger Publishers, U.S.A., 2002, p.26.

⁴⁵ Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Case of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces*. University of Michigan Press. U.S.A. 1999, p.87.

from the public and beyond control of the political leadership. The impact of the events in Chechnya on relations between the military and the population at large in Russia are varied and differ depending on the point of view of the observers.⁴⁶ William Odom, to claim that “the Russian generals are so frustrated that they are lashing out in a number of different ways at the same time”. Some western and Russian analysts have gone even further, arguing that the Russian army already has launched a “silent coup” and is now the *defacto* ruler of the country.⁴⁷ The Russian people, though, did not initially protest the need to intervene in Chechnya. There is evidence of some disappointment over the decision-making process leading up to the commitment of forces, but, by and large, the Russian people accepted the initial rationalization of the intervention presented by the government.⁴⁸

However, as the war progressed and the Russian military’s disastrous performance became evident, popular unrest grew. Democrats and human rights activities opposed the war on legal and moral grounds. Nationalist spoke out against the killing of Russian civilians. A primary cause of the rift between the populations and the government in the war was the decision to use virtually conscripts in combat. When the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers organized a protest in Red square in March 1995, their main complaint was not that the war was unjust or that the intervention should not have

⁴⁶ Albright, David E, ‘*Democratization and Civil-Military Relations in Russia and Ukraine*’, in John p. Lovell and David E. Albright (ed), *To Sheathe the Sword*. Greenwood Press, U.S.A, 1997, p.37.

⁴⁷ Kramer, Mark, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Russia and the Chechnya Conflict’,. December 1999.*Ponars Policy Memo*. Harvard University, p.11.

⁴⁸ Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Case of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces*. University of Michigan Press. U.S.A.1999, p.99.

been taken place, but that the military was sending untrained conscripts into combat. Some mothers even pulled their sons, including officers, from the ranks and took home.⁴⁹

The decision to launch the Chechen war revealed a return to Soviet era predemocratic practices evidenced by the complete ignorance of public opinion and democratic structures. It exposed the inadequacies of civil liberties of the army. The problem is that military will not be effective unless it is driven from the top, but the necessary personal cuts and industrial closures have not been embraced by either parliament or the military.⁵⁰

Recruitment and Retention

In the Post-Soviet era, the primary recruitment and retention factors of pay, prestige, opportunity for advancement, and over all quality of life are all currently working against Russia to build a quality officer corps. The general economic decline and failure to downsize the force have resulted in a precipitous decline in living standards. Paychecks have been arriving months late for years. And at the end of 1998, reports from the field indicated that soldiers are still not regularly paid.⁵¹ Also in Russia, the problem worsened by the dramatic decline in the material status and prestige, competition for entrance to military schools has virtually disappeared, and the new military academy graduates are not going to serve in the armed forces, and shun their military option because of the lack of social guarantees, the war in Chechnya painfully demonstrated the

⁴⁹ Ibid., P.100.

⁵⁰ Goldstein, Lyle J, 'Russian Civil-Military Relations in the Chechen war', December 1994- February 1995, *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Vol.10, March, 1997, p.121.

⁵¹ Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Case of Czech and Russian Armed Forces*. University of Michigan Press, 1999, p.117.

low level of military competency that has been achieved four years after independence with a force of demoralized officers and low-quality conscripts.⁵² Another grave and seemingly intractable issue is providing housing for officers and families. This problem grows in severity as Russian troops are withdrawn from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet republics, as around 125 thousands officers in Russia are virtually homeless.⁵³

Promotion and Advancement

Merit-based promotion system, performance and seniority balanced, officers' promotion dependent on the support of the democratic principles marked the feature of military professionalism in a democratic society.⁵⁴ In Russia, many of the elements of Soviet model still exist and practice by the system. The Prime defects of the Soviet era that it promoted officers automatically based on time in service, often made promotions without giving responsibility, and ultimately created an officer corps that allowed for a disproportionate number of officers to serve in the higher ranks with no expected standards of competency driving their daily performance or their next promotion and this led to the development of a disconnection between the rank and the position.⁵⁵ Thus, the promotion of officers on time instead on merit led to the development of a disconnection between rank and position. This, dilution of a merit-based system, where an officer's evaluation is based on an objective and standardized assessment of his or her contribution

⁵² Ibid., p.121

⁵³ Sorokin, Konstantin. E, 'Russia and the Former Soviet Union', in Constantine P. Danopoulos and Cynthia Watson (ed), *The Political Role of the Military: An International Handbook*. Greenwood Press.U.S.A.1996, p.396.

⁵⁴ [http://www.dcat.ch/publications/working-papers: Democracy and Russian military Professionalism, p.80.](http://www.dcat.ch/publications/working-papers: Democracy and Russian military Professionalism, p.80)

⁵⁵ Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Case of Czech and Russian Armed Forces*. University of Michigan Press, 1999, p.129.

to the unit's mission, led to a distorted view of "merit" that is difficult to reform in Russia.

Norms of Officership and Leadership

The concept that "leaders are made and not born" is the fundamental to the U.S. system of officer and leader development.⁵⁶ Furthermore, with regard to officership and leadership, the proper appropriation of democratic values includes respect for the rule of law and law-bound behavior, respect for the individual and nontolerance of the violation of civil liberties and individual human rights, equal opportunity for advancement based on merit, and the positive use of democratic ideology as a motivator for service.⁵⁷ In Russia, the Soviet era leadership practices continue virtually unaffected by the changes in political system. One indication of poor leadership among the Russians officer is the high death rate among conscripts in military service.⁵⁸ Also the force reductions and the budget cuts have seen thousands of military careers terminated while even more have seen once bright prospects vanish. As a result of such factor, roughly 50,000 officers left the army in 1992, and many were among the military's "best and brightest".⁵⁹

Perhaps the greatest evidence of inhumane leadership is the persistence of *dedovschina* (i.e. hazing) in the Russian military. The number of reported incidents increased markedly in 1994, but the official statistics do not accurately portray the problem since

⁵⁶ Ibid.,-129.

⁵⁷ <http://www.dcat.ch/publications/working-papers>, *Democracy and Russian military Professionalism*.Page-81.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p.132.

⁵⁹ Spence, Richard B, 'Servants or Masters? The Military in the "New Russia"', in Constantine P.Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker (ed), *Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor states*. Westview Press, U.S.A.1996, p.22

commanders are still more likely to conceal than to report incidents in their units. The system of discipline through corporal punishment and allowing unsupervised harassment in the conscript ranks arises from two phenomena: the detached leadership styles of commanders who permit the practice to continue and the warped sense of interpersonal relations of the conscripts themselves, who perpetuate such behavior against each other.⁶⁰ In reality it is a kind of caste system by which senior soldiers practically rule the lives of recruits, exploiting, brutalizing and even killing them with relative impunity.⁶¹

Conclusion

In Russia, reaction to the goal of achieving democratic political control directed by civilian leadership has been overwhelmingly negative and appears to be worsening. Sergey Rogov observed that “the MOD and other ‘muscle’ agencies are practically no longer subordinated to the government”⁶² This is a serious deficiency of democratic political control since the only real authority for oversight falls to the executive and those accountable to him.

Military professionalism in all states is measured by the degree to which civilian supremacy of the armed forces had been achieved. However, military professionalism in democratic states is differentiated further by loyalty to democratic political systems and their democratic values. States undergoing transitions from authorities to democratic

⁶⁰ <http://www.dcat.ch/publications/working-papers>: *Democracy and Russian military Professionalism*, p.83.

⁶¹ Spence, Richard B, ‘*Servants or Masters? The Military in the “New Russia”*’, in Constantine P.Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker (ed), *Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor states*. Westview Press, U.S.A.1996, p.25.

⁶² Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Case of Czech and Russian Armed Forces*. University of Michigan Press, 1999, p.91.

systems face the unique challenge of adapting inherited forms of military professionalism so that norms of democratic accountability are evident in the transitioning military institution.

Specific democratization deficits have been outlined in the chapter. First, in the area of recruitment and retention, there is need to address the basic needs of the armed forces in order to attract and retain quality personnel. Developing appropriate and sustainable force structure that can support soldiers at a higher level will facilitate achievement of this goal. Second, improvements in the standard of officership and leadership depend on the effective democratic socialization of all citizens, including those who serve in the armed forces and those who oversee them. The infusion of democratic values into a transitioning political system results in the development of higher expectations of treatment compatible with democratic principles. Third, transitioning military institutions need to work on improving the compatibility of military and societal values. The implementation of democratic reforms can reduce the gap that has developed since the advent of democratization. Finally, the Russian military has shown an inconsistent pattern of preferring apolitical behavior in some cases, but at the end of the day involve in direct participation, which the military need to stick to the apolitical principles.

In Russia the civil-military is at the nascent stage, and the two fundamental factors that determine the stability of Russian civil-military relations: the professionalism or politicization of the military, and the legitimate authority of the government. Thus, ultimately, instability in civil-military relations can be prevented by the ongoing political and economic factors and it's robust to manage this transition, or military involvement,

and perhaps intervention, in domestic politics. Until such instability is solved, there remains the danger of vibrant civil-military relations in Russia and of the military being brought in to solve political problems by force.

CHAPTER IV

ASSESSMENT OF YELTSIN'S PERIOD

In the aftermath of the failed coup of August 1991, the Soviet system seemed destined for extinction and Russia appeared to be well launched on the path to political democratization, economic reform, and a cooperative partnership with the west. Flush with then victory and enjoying widespread public support, the defenders of the Moscow White House, under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin, had committed themselves to destroying the remnants of the Soviet regime and Party for creating a new democratic Russia in which individual liberties would be guaranteed in a new constitution, and undertaking far-reaching economic reforms and the creation of a market economy which Mikhail Gorbachev had contemplated but could never embrace.

The Yeltsin regime promised a continuation and acceleration of the process of demilitarization that had begun during perestroika with steps toward cutbacks in military forces and capabilities but to undertake a program of defense conversion and privatization that would turn Russia's vast military-industrial complex to meeting the urgent needs of civilian population. New economic and political arrangements would also include a substantial decentralization of power, with new federal arrangements reversing decades of centralization by transferring significant responsibilities and resources to Russia's regions and republics.

The process of demilitarization appeared to be stalling as the unfolding political drama in Moscow encouraged the contenders for power to bid for military support and gave the military and security forces an unprecedented and central- if not entirely welcome – role as guarantors of the political status quo. Russia therefore is in the midst of a very difficult transition from an authoritarian to a democratic system of government. A critical factor on the ultimate success of this transition is whether the military, as an

institution, can adjust to a new role in society- that of an apolitical organization loyal to a popularly accountable government and for a vibrant civil-military transformation.

Civil-Military under Yeltsin

Civil-military relations under the Yeltsin began in an awkward manner. The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 created uncertainty as to who controlled the remnants of the Soviet armed forces. As an interim measure, the military forces were designated as the “Commonwealth of Independent States Armed Forces”¹ supposedly under the joint command of the commonwealth leaders. By March 1992, the Russian government accepted that the Soviet Armed Forces could not survive without the Soviet State. On May 7, 1992, Yeltsin signed a decree establishing the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,² and naming himself as commander –in-chief.³

The Yeltsin government and democratic reforms have also sought to create meaningful legislative oversight and control over the military. Until September 21, 1993, Russia had two legislative bodies, both elected in 1990: Congress of Peoples’ Deputies (CPD), which met infrequently, and the Supreme Soviet⁴. Both the larger parent body, the CPD and the Supreme Soviet⁵, which served as the standing legislative body, acted as

¹ Arnett, Robert, ‘Russia after the crisis: Can Civilians Control the military?’, *Obris*, Vol-33, 1994, p.43.

² Holloway, David and Michael McFaul, ‘*Demilitarization and Defense Conversion*’, in Lapidus, Gail W(ed), *The New Russia: Troubled Transformation*. West View Press, U.S.A. 1995, p.196.

³ Arnett, Robert, ‘Russia after the crisis: Can Civilians Control the military?’, *Obris*, Vol-33, 1994, p.44.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp-44.

⁵ In July 1988 Gorbachev announced at the nineteenth Party Congress that the Soviet Union would henceforth have a new parliamentary and presidential system. This new parliament, to be called the Congress of Peoples’ Deputies, would be partially elected by free national ballot. This congress, in turn, would then appoint a Supreme Soviet, which would remain in session in between congresses. The chairman of the Supreme Soviet would be elected by the congress before dissolving. This individual would be also be the head of state/president in John P.Moran: *From Garrison State to Nation-State*:

oversight bodies over the armed forces. The legislative branch illustrated its influence over the military by passing laws in such matters as the defense budget, the size of the armed forces, the length of military service, and military pay rates,⁶ and exercised the lion's share of power.⁷

In the 1991 election, which became the Russian's first-ever chance to freely elect their leader, Boris Yeltsin was triumphantly elected Russia's first president for a five year term. At that time, there was no constitution to define his power, which were limitless. However, by the end of 1992, a conflict emerged between Yeltsin and then Russian Parliament, the Supreme Soviet, which had been elected in 1990 before the breaking up of the Soviet Union.⁸

In September 1993, President Yeltsin dissolved the legislative branch of government,⁹ and began to rule by decree pending a new parliamentary election¹⁰ and promised to have elections for a new parliament in December 1993.¹¹ That led to the first major incident of fighting in the streets of Moscow since 1917, as armed hard-line protesters were besieged in the parliamentary headquarters and later attacked and captured by troops remaining loyal to the president.

Political Power and the Russian Military Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Praeger Publisher, U.S.A,2002, p.148.

⁶ Caforio, Guiseppe (ed), *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*. Kluwer Academic/ Plenum Publishers,2003, p.137.

⁷ John P.Moran, *From Garrison State to Nation-State: Political Power and the Russian Military Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, Praeger Publisher, U.S.A,2002, p.148.

⁸ Chubarov, Alexander, *Russia's Bitter Path to Modernity: A History of the Soviet and Post- Soviet Eras*. Continuum Publisher, U.S.A, 2001, p.220.

⁹ Arnett, Robert, 'Russia after the crisis: Can Civilians Control the military?', *Obris*, Vol-33, 1994, p.43.

¹⁰ Chubarov, Alexander, *Russia's Bitter Path to Modernity: A History of the Soviet and Post- Soviet Eras*. Continuum Publisher, U.S.A, 2001, p.220.

¹¹ Arnett, Robert, 'Russia after the crisis: Can Civilians Control the military?', *Obris*, Vol-33, 1994, p.43.

The October 1993 Events

President Boris Yeltsin's decision to disband the Russian Parliament on 21st September 1993. This constituted a test for civil-military relations. Yeltsin's action immediately raised the question-'on whose side is the army?' The issue became even more acute when Rutskoy was sworn in as 'President' by the Supreme Soviet and then appointed Colonel- General Vladdislav Achalov and his 'Minister of Defense'.¹² In October 1993, during his showdown with the former Supreme Soviet and his vice-president at the time, Aleksandr Rutskoy, Russian President Boris Yeltsin called on the army to use force to disarm bodies that had come together in open revolt against the Yeltsin government.¹³

The key to understanding the Russian military's stance during the crisis was Yeltsin's legitimacy as President, which was based on his election in 1991, the results of the April 1993 referendum and popular opinion. Few political figures in Russia took Rutskoy's claim to be the legitimate president seriously. Yeltsin clearly understood how to use the professional mores of the officer corps to his advantages, but not all of his success can be attributed to the institutional culture of the military. Political factors also played a role and, most importantly, he was helped by an ally in Pavel Grachev as Minister of Defense. Grachev displayed his support for Yeltsin during a well published joint public appearance in Pushkin Square in the center of Moscow on 22 September. He

¹² Taylor D. Brain, 'Russian Civil-Military Relations after the October Uprising', *Survival*, Vol.36.1, spring 1994, p.7.

¹³ Taylor D. Brain, 'Russia's Passive Army: rethinking Military Coups', *Comparative Political Studies*, 2001 October, p.22.

also undertook several measures to ensure that the military remain loyal to Yeltsin.¹⁴ However Grachev understood that the military support was fragile and emphasis that, 'the army will not meddle in political activity.....leave the army alone.'¹⁵ He told the Congress of People's Deputies in December 1992 that:

In the name of stability, in the name of Russia's rebirth, we propose to the various political forces and groupings to declare a kind of moratorium on drawing the army into politics. To exclude any playing of the 'Army card' from the arsenal of permissible means of political struggle...I think it is time once and for all to state whose side the Army is on. The Army was and will be on the side of the people, on the side of the law, on the side of the constitution. The Army serves the Fatherland, it is an instrument and attribute of the state and that says it all.¹⁶

Grachev's intention seems clear enough, even though political conflict between the president and the parliament deprived his statement that the Army was on the side of the constitution of much of its meaning. Grachev's point was that the Army should stand above party politics and leadership conflicts. He was not successful in achieving this goal, however. In October 1993, he came to Yeltsin's aid by shelling the White House, though he did so only reluctantly.

Rutskoy, like Grachev, understood that military support for yeltsin was not solid. Rutskoy was the best known military officer in Russia and a former Afghanistan war hero who rose through the Russian Supreme Soviet to become yeltsin's hand-picked candidate

¹⁴ Taylor D. Brain, 'Russian Civil-Military Relations after the October Uprising', *Survival*, Vol.36.1, spring 1994, p.7.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp-7.

¹⁶ Holloway, David and Michael McFaul, '*Demilitarization and Defense Conversion*', in Lapidus, Gail W(ed): *The New Russia: Troubled Transformation*. WestView Press, U.S.A. 1995, p.202.

for vice-president. Ruskoy, learned by the crisis of August 1991, that the army should stay out of internal politics; and politicization represents a serious threat to the military's cohesion. With yeltsin having the greater legitimacy and the military's inhibitions against political activity, Ruskoy had little chance of gaining widespread support in the armed forces. His best hope was for the military to remain neutral, but his effort to split the officer corps backfired and instead pushed the military leadership more firmly into yeltsin's camp.¹⁷ ruskoy, failure was that, in reality, very few officers came to the support of the White House, even those senior officers who may have sympathized with ruskoy, clearly understood that taking active steps on his behalf could bring about a split in the armed forces and, in the most extreme case, civil war.¹⁸

First of all, these events demonstrate that greater specificity in conceptualization of the dependent variable of military involvement in sovereign power issues is required.¹⁹ Secondly, the Army's reluctance to be drawn into politics springs in part from the Russian and Soviet military subservience to civilian authority.²⁰ The third possible coding is military resolutions of a civilian sovereign power dispute, or military arbitration. Military arbitration occurs when multiple persons or groups claim to hold legitimate state power and the military is forced to decide from whom to obey orders. This is different than military intervention because the military has not made an autonomous decision to

¹⁷ Taylor D. Brain, 'Russian Civil-Military Relations after the October Uprising', *Survival*, Vol.36.1, spring 1994, p.8.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp-8.

¹⁹ Taylor D. Brain, 'Russia's Passive Army: rethinking Military Coups', *Comparative Political Studies*, 2001 October, p.23.

²⁰ Holloway, David and Michael McFaul, 'Demilitarization and Defense Conversion', in Lapidus, Gail W(ed): *The New Russia: Troubled Transformation*. WestView Press, U.S.A. 1995, p.202.

become involved in sovereign power issues, but is forced to play a role due to civilian activity. Military arbitration is a case of military involvement in sovereign power issues, but not one military intervention.²¹

The October 1993 crisis was a clear case of military arbitration, not military intervention. The crisis began on September 20, when Yeltsin signed a decree closing down the Supreme Soviet. The Supreme Soviet declared Yeltsin's decree unconstitutional and appointed Yeltsin's vice president, Aleksandr Rutskoy as "president". Rutskoy proceeded to appoint his own "Minister of Defense" and other top officials. The military leadership adopted a stance of neutrality during the early phases of the crisis, declaring that they were "outside politics" and that they wanted to be "left alone"²²

President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin were forced to go directly to the Ministry of Defense at 2:00 a.m. On October 4 to convince the army leadership to agree to storm the so-called "White House" (the Russian parliament building), where the anti- Yeltsin opposition had returned after its failure to storm the main television tower. Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev extracted a written order from Yeltsin indicating Yeltsin's responsibility for the decision to, as Grachev put it, "use tanks in Moscow." Grachev's resistance nearly cost him his job.²³

The decisive factor propelling the army into action was a direct, written order from Yeltsin. When asked what it was that eventually moved the military leadership, General Volkogonov replied without hesitation, "the order of the Commander-in-Chief,

²¹ Taylor D. Brain, 'Russia's Passive Army: rethinking Military Coups', *Comparative Political Studies*, 2001 October, p.24.

²² *Ibid.*, pp-24.

²³ *Ibid.*, p.25.

the order of the Commander-in-Chief, which was given in the presence of the Prime Minister.” Yeltsin later reflected, “I took the view that the defense minister should have acted himself, but he did not. That is why I had to give the order.”²⁴

This picture, the fact that the army was dragged into the political dispute between Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet was due to low political capacity of the new Russian state. However, the Army did showed its ambivalent character to remain outside politics, at end of the day it ended up as Yeltsin’s supporters by storming the White House, which shows that in Russia the military is yet to fully maintain its professionalism characteristics and the subjective control by the civilian authority remains unresolved.

The Quality of Executive/ Ministry of Defense (MOD) Democratic Control

The prospects for additional western- style democratic institutional control measures, such as the selection of a civilian minister of defense or the creation of a civilian Defense Ministry, do not seem promising. In early 1992, Yeltsin was confronted with selecting a defense minister. Andrei Kokoshin, a civilian, was rumored as a top prospect for the job. In the end, however, Yeltsin decided to appoint a professional military officer, army General Pavel S. Grachev, to the post,²⁵ Grachev was selected on the basis of his political reliability, not his military prowess or expertise,²⁶ and was

²⁴ Taylor D. Brain, ‘Russian Civil-Military Relations after the October Uprising’, *Survival*, Vol.36.1, spring 1994, p.10.

²⁵ Arnett, Robert, ‘Russia after the crisis: Can Civilians Control the military?’, *Obris*, Vol-33, 1994, p.44.

²⁶ Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson,, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Case of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces*. The University of Michigan Press, 1999, p.84.

universally despised and criticized by his subordinates, including General Alexander Lebed.²⁷

Observers agreed that democratic reform was not possible without changing the leadership at the MOD. Grachev's replacement, General Igor Rodionov, was regarded as an outsider not engaged in corruption, but he was not a great advocate of democratic reforms in general or of radical reform programs in the military in particular.²⁸ Rodionov's appointment broke with past precedence. First, it took Yeltsin almost a month to name him as defense minister. This long break between ministries was quite unusual- such a lengthy period had not been seen in Russia since 1802. Second, Yeltsin seemed to break the pattern set by Gorbachev and himself of naming an unknown quality as defense minister, as the strangeness part of the appointment was that Yeltsin- the master appeared not know who Rodionov really was.²⁹ However, he served less than a year in his post when Yeltsin sacked him in a public rage orchestrated to blame Rodionov for the lack of progress on military reform.³⁰ Rodionov, who took control of the Russian military in 1996, proposed that the reforms are needed through professionalization of the armed forces. In August he said,

“Detailed analysis of the present state of the army leads me to the uncomfortable conclusion that is experiencing crisis similar to that after the civil War. I am not dramatizing the situation; I am simply stating the objective fact. Today our armed forces

²⁷ Lebed was a General Lieutenant of Fourteenth Army in Tiraspol, Moldova.

²⁸ Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Case of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces*. The University of Michigan Press, 1999, p.84.

²⁹ Moran, John P, *From Garrison State to Nation-State: political Power and the Russian military under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*. Praeger Publisher, U.S.A,2002, p.51.

³⁰ Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Case of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces*. The University of Michigan Press, 1999, p.85.

do not have a single regiment capable of launching a combat action or moving by rail or air at two or three hours notice”³¹

To create this force, Rodionov claimed, he needed a great deal of money. At this time, the MOD received roughly 5 percent of Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP); the other power ministries received about 3 percent. However, the Russian economy could not sustain these types of expenses. Actual military budget outlays began to lag, meaning that the payment of salaries would not occur months in arrears. Training was slashed and new weapons systems were not being acquired. In an October press conference, Rodoinov explained that the military was received only a third of what was required.³²

The Russian Ministry of Defense had striven first and foremost to keep cuts to its structure and its budget to a minimum, but Yeltsin failed to provide an environment within which anything less than maintaining the present force structure was acceptable. The president neither set priorities nor provided political guidance to facilitate the process of military reform. In this respect, the sacking of Rodionov was more in the Russian tradition of searching for scapegoats than an accurate designation of accountability.³³

Perhaps the final straw leading to Rodionov’s dismissal was his proposal that the defense Council be eliminated. Eliminating the Defense Council would have strengthened the General Staff to a level unacceptable to Yeltsin. This of course violated Yeltsin’s principle of subjective fragmentation.³⁴

³¹ Moran, John P, *From Garrison State to Nation-State: political Power and the Russian military under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*. Praeger Publisher, U.S.A,2002, p.56.

³² Ibid.,pp-32.

³³ Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Case of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces*. The University of Michigan Press, 1999, p.84.

³⁴ Moran, John P, *From Garrison State to Nation-State: political Power and the Russian military under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*. Praeger Publisher, U.S.A, 2002, p.58.

Under Yeltsin, progress has been made in creating critical institutional arrangement required for oversight and control of the military in a democratic political system. The commander-in-chief of the armed forces is the democratically elected president. The democratically elected legislature, at least until September 21st, 1993, was responsible for the military budget, general oversight, and all threatened by the power struggle in Moscow, which recently led Yeltsin to abolish the legislative branch of government, between the two oversight bodies- the executive and the legislature- and by the military's control of the Ministry of Defense. A new parliament must be elected and the life-and-death struggle between the two branches must end in order for both to exercise real institutional control over the military. To established firm control, experienced and knowledgeable civilians also must be placed in key positions in the Ministry of Defense. As long as military officials control the ministry, they will control the expertise information that is used in the making of military policy decisions.³⁵

One of the Hallmarks of the democratic political control in full- fledged democracies is the delegation of over all executive oversight of the military institution to a civilian defense minister. However, in Russia civilian control of the military exists purely through Yeltsin's installment of a loyal general to head the Defense Ministry and his control of several independent channels of information about the state of affairs of the Army. Civilian control is not dependent on the performance of the democratic institutions of government, but on Yeltsin's personal control and manipulation of information networks that are directly subordinate to him 'a monitoring system involving the timely

³⁵ Amett, Robert, 'Russia after the crisis: Can Civilians Control the military?', *Obris*, Vol-33, 1994, p.45.

delivery of critical reports to the president, a system guaranteeing that military personnel do not become insubordinate and stage a putsch or some other outrage’.

In Russia, thus reaction to the goal of achieving democratic political control directed by civilian leadership has been overwhelmingly negative and appears to be worsening, as this is a serious deficiency of democratic political control since the only real authority for oversight falls to the executive and those accountable to him. Secrecy still reigns, with corruption and poor transparency plagued within the MOD have gone unaddressed. Additionally, the weakness of the legislative input to the process of democratic political control of the armed forces means it is unable to counter- balance the situation in a positive way.

Chechnya Crisis

A brief examine of the Chechnya from the perspective of civil-military relations will reveal some valuable insights. Some observers of the Russian political scene have suggested that the idea of the invasion originated in the top military circles, and was imposed on Yeltsin indebted to the army for its support during the October 1993 conflict with the parliament. However, a statement of such is invalid. As, there has been a strong resistance to this operation in the leadership of the army. One cause for this position of the armed forces may be connected with the more universal tendency among the officers to oppose use of the Army in internal conflicts. Another may reflect the growing politicization of the military since October 1993 and the use of military in domestic for gaining political ends.

The Russian forces moved into this insurgency ridden region on 11 December 1994, two weeks after Dudaev's³⁶ forces had humiliated the Russian-backed Chechen opposition. Russian forces were only able to mount an assault on the capital Grozny by the New Year. After two months of extremely costly and intense fighting, the Russian forces raised their flag over the smoldering ruin of the presidential palace pushing the Chechen insurgents out of the towns and into the mountains. But even then Russian troops could not claim to have a firm grip on the region³⁷ and ever since, Chechnya has been haunted by various militant activities and has become a great priority to the Russian government.

The factional splintering over the crisis in Chechnya could be first being seen in December 1994. When General Boris Gromov announced on Russian TV that he sympathized and would cooperate with groups active in keeping young people from being drafted and sent to Chechnya. The following day, Georgi Kondratyev said in an interview, "The problem of Chechnya will not be solved through military means.... There must no repetition of the ill [military] actions of a few days ago." He called for negotiations with "the elected president" of Chechnya. This, in turn, was followed by renewed criticism by General Aleksandr Lebed, who announced on 13 December that he "categorically opposed to any military crusade against the Muslim world."³⁸

³⁶ General Dzhokhar Dudayev was a separatist leader fighting for Chechnya's independence, he had been elected President of the Republic in October 1991, following a coup d'état against the Republic's Communist Government, led by Doku Zavgayev. At the end of April 1991, Dudayev was killed in a Russian missile attack, in *The Europa World Year Book*, vol.11, Europa Publications Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, 2004.

³⁷ Goldstein, Lyle J, 'Russian Civil-Military Relations in the Chechen War', December 1994- February 1995. *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Vol.10, March 1997, p.109

³⁸ Moran, John P, *From Garrison State to Nation-State: political Power and the Russian military under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*. Praeger Publisher, U.S.A, 2002, p.45.

By the end of the month, a structural reorganization within the military was announced in which two of these generals- Gromov and Kondratyev- were transferred to less sensitive posts. A third, General Colonel Valeri Mironov, who had been somewhat less vocal in his criticism, was also transferred to a new post.³⁹ Thus, this shows that replacement, transferring, case was an instrument used by the civilian authority over the military as a common factor of control.

Aleksandr Lebed made it quite clear how he and other Russian military officers felt about this complete lack of consultations with the “orbital”(close to center of power) generals. “Brains are being actively knocked out of the army. High-class professionals like Gromov are not held in high esteem today, but spineless, kowtowing like ‘strategists’ are .An army without gray matter is doomed to military-political impotence, a manifestation of which we are now witnessing in Chechnya.”⁴⁰ Ultimately, this lack of consultation very likely led to the disastrous results. In the first 100 days of the war the Russian military lost up to 5,000 soldiers. It also resulted in 20,000 civilian casualties and 300,000 refugees.⁴¹

Civil-military relations depend to a large degree on relations within the military itself. Like much of Russian life, this proved to be signally faction-ridden. Grachev himself was not popular within the military establishment, considered too dependent on Yeltsin and unable to defend the interests of the military, and thus always on the look out for potential challengers. The Chechen war revealed a split between those who out of a sense of professional responsibility had criticized the launching of a bloody campaign

³⁹ Ibid., pp-45.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p.47.

⁴¹ Ibid., pp.47.

when all avenues for negotiation had not yet been explored, and a group who, irrespective of the cost, were willing to pursue the campaign- dubbed the 'party of war'. The 'military opposition' to Yeltsin, if it can be called that, took two main forms: 'the professionals' (Gromov, Lebed, and, potentially, General Andrei Nikolaev, Commander of the border Troops); and 'the irreconcilables', mainly consisting of retired officers (including generals Makashov and Achalov, and the ex-KGB officer sterligov). The appointment of Lebed's ally, General Igor Rodionov, formally head of the General Staff Academy, as defense minister in July 1996 brought the professionals into the center of military and security affairs.⁴²

Poor transparency within the MOD also makes it impossible to exert control over the military. One particularly egregious transgression was the failure of president Yeltsin to halt the bombing in Grozny when he ordered the shelling to cease on 27th December 1994. Yeltsin's impotence as commander in chief fueled speculation that a group known as "the party of war" was dictating policy in Chechen operation according to the preferences of the chiefs of the power ministries.⁴³ This incident raised serious questions about the loyalty of the military to Yeltsin.

The army had traditionally been the backbone of the Russian state and thus civil-military relations would always be ambivalent. While some saw the Chechen war as the outcome of the militarization of the Russian state (allied with the security apparatus), the war in practice revealed the enormous divisions within the security, military and foreign

⁴² Sakwa, Richard, *Russian Politics and society*. Routledge Publisher, London and New York, 1996, p.319.

⁴³ Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Case of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces*. The University of Michigan Press, 1999, p.87.

policy establishments. Yeltsin's own dominance over security had been enshrined in the new constitution.

According to the constitution of 1993, the president is commander-in-chief of the armed forces and appoints and dismisses the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, the president is the Head of State, guarantor of the constitution, and has the power to set the basic guidelines for domestic and foreign policy, and to declare states of emergency and war, and in addition placed him in overall control of the Ministry of the Interior, the security services. The president nominates the Prime minister and can dismiss the entire Government or individuals in the Government.⁴⁴ The great problem, however, was that the military was not subordinated to the state as such but that civilian control came to mean simply bringing the military under the command of the presidency.⁴⁵ The Chechen war showed just how dangerous this could be, and there were few checks on the emergence of constitutional praetorianism.

The impact of the events in Chechnya on relations between the military and the population at large in Russia are varied and differ depending on the point of observers. But, the general effect of the war in Chechnya on the relationship of the post-communist Russian military with society at large was to expose the inadequacies of the Army and to illustrate the expectations for accountability and the protection of civil liberties and human rights that the infusion of democratic values into Russian society has prompted. The result was public outrage. The poor performance of military highlighted the need for

⁴⁴ Troxel, Tiffany A, *Parliamentary Power on Russia, 1994-2001: President vs Parliament*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p.35.

⁴⁵ Sakwa, Richard, *Russian Politics and society*. Routledge Publisher, London and New York, 1996, p.320.

radical reform.⁴⁶ However, the problem to solve the military reforms will not be effective unless it is driven from the top.

“Politicization” of the Army

Civil-military relations within Russia are also in a precarious state because of the increasing politicization of the armed forces. The cause of this is the lack of an apolitical tradition, the lack of adequate prohibitions on involvement by military officials in politics. The potential dangers of a politicized military include intervention in political struggles and fragmentation of the armed forces.

Russia’s transition to a democracy requires the military to become an apolitical institution that serves a popularly elected government. Until the collapse of Soviet Union, the Soviet armed forces had been a ‘political’ army because it was the instrument of a single, non-elected political party. The removal of the CPSU from the power however, led to the military’s transition from a ‘political’ to a ‘politicized’ institution. Its members, from the soldiers to senior officers, have been caught up in the struggle for power by differing political parties and movements.⁴⁷

One manifestation of politicized armed forces is that active duty officers are allowed to run for political offices in the executive branch of government. In 1991, three high ranking active duty officers in the executive were on the ballot in the Russian President election- General Albert Makashov, the Commander of the Volga Urals Military District, ran as a president candidate, and General Boris Gromov and Colonel

⁴⁶ Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Case of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces*. The University of Michigan Press, 1999, p.101.

⁴⁷ Arnett, Robert, ‘Russia after the crisis: Can Civilians Control the military?’, *Obris*, Vol-33, 1994, p.45.

Aleksandr Rutsoki ran as the Vice-president candidates.⁴⁸ In the election of 1993, up to twenty-five men were registered to run the election of Duma. Of these eleven were elected. Four were elected by the virtue of their position on party lists. Dmitri Volkogonov and Sergei Yushenkov were elected from the list the of Russia's Choice, and Evgeni Loginov and Viktor Ustinov were elected from the list of the Liberal Democratic Party. Seven others won in single-member district contests, meaning that they were out canvassing votes as any other civilian politician would.⁴⁹ Despite, of military men not to involve in the party politics many did participate.

An important step in beginning the process to depoliticize the military was taken in October 1992, when the legislature passed the Russian Federation Law on Defense.⁵⁰ The law defined the civil-military relationship, disallowed political campaigning within the armed forces, and banned organization within the armed forces from pursuing aims.⁵¹ Despite these important initial steps, the law does not ban military officials from running for or serving as elected officials in either the executive or legislative branches of government, participating in political rallies outside the armed forces, or making public statements regarding government policy.⁵²

Article 44 of the Law on Military Responsibility and Military service said that a soldier's service within the military was suspended for the entire period of his full-time

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp.45.

⁴⁹ Moran, John P, *From Garrison State to Nation-State: political Power and the Russian military under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*. Praeger Publisher, U.S.A, 2002, p.164.

⁵⁰ Arnett, Robert, 'Russia after the crisis: Can Civilians Control the military?', *Obris*, Vol-33, 1994, p.46.

⁵¹ Smith, Gordon B, 'The *Disjuncture Between Legal Reform and Law Enforcement: The Challenges Facing the Post-Yeltsin Leadership*', in Gordon B. Smith (ed): *State Building in Russia: The Yeltsin Legacy and the Challenges of the Future*.M.E. Sharpe,Inc Publisher, London and NewYork, 1999, p.113.

⁵² Ibid., p.114.

participation in the elected body. However, just after the elections, on 24 December, this article was abolished by presidential edict.⁵³ Thus far, there is no new evidence of any prohibition against running in future presidential elections or serving in regional executive positions.

The Yeltsin government has recognized the problem of the politicization of the Russian armed forces. In the summer of 1992, Defense Minister Grachev acknowledges that military officials have been too involved in politics. He stated that “whereas we used to turn a blind eye to the fact that people in the military uniform were making political statements into microphones at rallies, tough measures must now be taken.” These measures, according to Grachev, must be taken to carry out president Yeltsin’s order to depoliticize the armed forces.⁵⁴

In addition, some groups like “Officer Assemblies,” for example, threaten to become an organized political movement within the military. Grachev ordered that these organizations should deal only with issues directly related to their units and not political matters:

They have existed and will exist in the Russian Army at the level regiment and the separate unit. But they are not political debating societies. How the regimental collective is to live and to get along together, how to provide the garrison with everything it needs,

⁵³ Moran, John P, *From Garrison State to Nation-State: political Power and the Russian military under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*. Praeger Publisher, U.S.A,2002, p.165.

⁵⁴ Arnett, Robert, ‘Russia after the crisis: Can Civilians Control the military?’, *Obris*, Vol-33, 1994, p.47.

*how to help one another- these are the questions that they must tackle.*⁵⁵The political activity of the Officer Assemblies continues despite Grachev's order.⁵⁶

The Russian military is politicized also because active duty military officials have been allowed to speak out publicly against government policies. General- Major Aleksandr Lebed, the commander of Russia's fourteenth Army in Moldova, for example, has not hesitated in making statements that are not only highly provocative but also that contradict the policies of the Yeltsin government,⁵⁷ and described the government and president as "useless", Lebed resisted a series of attempts by Grachev to remove him and eventually rendered his resignation after Grachev issued an order in April 1995 disbanding the 14th Army's command structure. Lebed argued that his removal and the reduction of forces in the region could result in the loss of the Army's control of weapons in the volatile region.⁵⁸ Regardless of the truth contained in Lebed's objections, his long history of public disobedience was indicative of the MOD's (Ministry of Defense) inability to control its own officers.

Likewise, prominent generals like Lev Rokhlin who won elections to Duma in 1995 used the opportunity to organize "military opposition" movements to Yeltsin. Rokhlin's murder under very suspicious circumstances also suggests the politicization

⁵⁵ Ibid., pp-47.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p.48.

⁵⁷ Blank, Stephen, 'The Great Exception: Russian Civil-Military Relations', *Civil-Military Relations in Post Cold War Europe Conflict Studies Research Centre*, p.70.

⁵⁸ Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Case of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces*. The University of Michigan Press, 1999, p.88.

and use of internal violence to resolve domestic issues, and ties between the armed forces and Russia's criminal world.⁵⁹

Conclusion

Many of the trends discussed above suggest that the potential for instability in Russian civil-military will not disappear over the next few years and presents a virtual paradigm of Samuel Huntington's "subjective" control. The Russian leadership's should attempt to convert the military into an apolitical institution subordinate to democratically elected officials faced major obstacles. Russia's severe economic problems, coupled with political gridlock in Moscow, creating pressure for the military to take sides in the severe power struggle. Creating an apolitical military in such an environment will be extremely difficult. A major requirement is the enactment and enforcement of laws that help to separate the military from politics, develop a deep seated belief in the inherent values of democracy. While these obstacles exist, the military will remain politicized, and the danger of military intervention in the political struggle will continue.

Thus, the two legacies of the late Soviet period- politicization and the internal use of the army- continue to plague Russian civil-military. Although the October crisis, like the August 1991 attempted coup, appear to have reinforced the belief of most officers that the military must remain 'outside politics', there are also disturbing signs that some officers have become more politicized by these events.

⁵⁹ Blank, Stephen, 'The Great Exception: Russian Civil-Military Relations', *Civil-Military Relations in Post Cold War Europe Conflict Studies Research Centre*, p.75.

The October 1993 crises, led to fears about the heightened influence of the Russian military in domestic politics were based on a false premise. As the *Izvestiya* commentator Otto Latsis has correctly pointed out, such a conclusion is based on a misunderstanding of military intervention in politics. A 'military intervention' is an independent military decision to take a stance against the legitimate political leadership. The army was used in Moscow on the orders of the political leadership.⁶⁰ At the same time, civilian decisions to use the military internally undermine professionalism and contribute to the politicization of the officers corps.

Despite of all this, the fact is that the Yeltsin government failed to take necessary steps to retain the armed forces as a professional body concentrating on external missions. For a longer term, the loyalty of the military will remain an issue of concern as long as Russia is confronted with economy crisis and political instability, major deficiencies in protecting the welfare of officers and soldiers, and lack of a deep-seated belief among military personnel in the inherent value of democracy, and it remains an open question, however, whether Russia's civilian politicians can create the necessary conditions to exclude once and for all the possibility of military involvement in domestic politics.

⁶⁰ Taylor D. Brain, 'Russian Civil-Military Relations after the October Uprising', *Survival*, Vol.36.1, spring 1994, p.18.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Conclusion

The future of Russia is, at least in part, an extension of its past. Russia's past is one of absolute rule, imperial expansion, and lack of experience in democracy and market economics. Russia has now turned a corner. It has had at least a decade of practice in attempting to build a non-authoritarian political system and an economy based mainly on private enterprise. Although pessimists predict doom for Russia on both counts, optimists note that Russia has come through 'times of troubles' before. Russia's tsars, commissars, and post-Soviet leaders have defied political gravity on more occasions than most heads of state.

In chapter 1 shows what is the relationship between civilians ("people without arms"), the society at large, and the military ("people with arms") established as a separate armed body in order to protect a society? This question has a long history that goes back to antiquity, to the very beginnings of military organization in civilian societies. In each country the answer to this question is deeply influenced by national history, sentiments, and traditions. It depends on the role of the army as a state institution in the given country, subordination of the military to political authorities as defined in laws and constitutional arrangements, and so on. Public perceptions of military personnel, the prestige of the military officer's profession, public opinion toward defense and foreign policy of the regime and certain actions of the army, and so on, determine it. The very nature of the problem is permanently changing because both society and the military are constantly changing as well.

Civil-military relations have many dimensions and can be viewed from different perspectives, and through out the centuries political scientists, sociologists, physiologists, and economists attempt to study the relationship between the military and society with the

theoretical and empirical tools of social science and arrived at results which were more precise and accurate than the accumulated wisdom of ages.

However, the world will not settle on a single model; there is no one model appropriate for all nations. Foreseeing a future convergence among models of civil-military relations is to remember that states are approaching it from very different starting points, reflecting different national histories. Change in the pattern of civil-military relations in each country is part of the further democratization of society. Democracy is an ideal toward which human societies work: It is a process, not an existential state. The postcommunist era is now more than a decade old, yet the transformation of civil-military relations to democratic norms is still at nascent stage or a difficult political issue in many ex-socialist countries as well as Russia.

Chapter II began with theoretical overview on civil-military relations among various scholars (Huntington: *Soldier and State*, 1967; *Finer: The Man on the Horse back*, 1962;) and scholars who paid attention to civil-military relations in socialist countries, yet their conceptualization and interpretation of the processes unfolding in the Soviet bloc were limited and scholastic in many regards due to lack of reliable empirical information.(see Kolkowicz,1967; Herspring and Vogyes, 1978, Kolkowicz and Korbonski, 1982) They came to the subject primarily through an interest in the role of the military in the internal politics of the countries they studied and often emphasized that in the socialist party- state system the armed forces were under the close control of the ruling Communist Party. Considering its various consequences, they discussed differences between the models of civil-military relations in western democracies and those in the socialist world (see Perlmutter, 1981):

However, no discussion done here the extent to which the western theories of civil-military relations were in agreement with the reality or contradictions between different theories.

However, the processes of political control and accepted standards of military professionalism in the Soviet bloc have revealed some serious discrepancies between democratic and Soviet era perceptions of military professionalism. Some of these deficiencies can be related to the necessities of authoritarian rule while others can be attributed to practices that were allowed to endure within it. Indeed, in the chapter II demonstrated that there are many elements of the form of military professionalism practiced in the Soviet era that are incompatible with military professionalism in a democracy and picture the subjective control of military in the hands of Communist Party. In the chapter it illustrated the democratic deficits in the sphere of recruitment and retention, promotion and advancement, officership and leadership, norms of political influence, and strength of civilian and military leaders' commitment to democracy.

Chapter III examined the degree of military intervention in the internal level affairs during the late Soviet era and post-communist period which it did increased, and what seems to tracked in the internal was mainly because of the politicized of the military or lack of professionalism and the instability of legitimate authority, which was largely because of the role play by the civilian authority over the military for gaining political means.

The Soviet military was a key player in the August coup 1991, so as the Russian military in 1993 October event and Chechen crisis, breaking a long tradition of nonintervention in domestic politics. The military at these events show their ambivalent character or its reluctances to involve in internal politics. However, at the end of the day, the military end up in supporting the civilian leadership in the power struggle. Moreover, the

military became highly politicized, with political differences between military officers and other actors, and splits within the officer corps itself, quickly became apparent, unfortunately, no steps were taken to prevent officers from becoming members of parliament and political organizations, or from expressing their personnel political opinions in the press. These processes weakened military professionalism, based on the principle of civilian supremacy and the concentration of the armed forces on its narrow professional tasks and at the same time, civilian decision to use the military internally undermine professionalism and contribute to the politicization of the officer corps. As a 'military intervention' is an independent military decision to take a stance against the legitimate political leadership, but this was not the case in Soviet era and Russia, the army was used on the orders of the political leadership as evidently discussed in various chapters.

An examination of the democratic deficits explored in the areas of recruitment and retention; officership and leadership; promotion and advancement; and corruption within the military- suggested that militaries transitioning from authoritarian to democratic political system finds it themselves caught between two incompatible systems of military professionalism.

Chapter IV examined an assessment of civil-military relationship under Yeltsin's period. It during Gorbachev and Yeltsin's time the increased the level of intervention was the desire to conduct a "balancing act" with regards to the faction within the military.¹The pattern of increasingly aggressive forms of intervention as a result of subjective fragmentation can be found in the post-communist period. Through out his term in office,

¹ John P.Moran, 'From Garrison State to Nation-State: Political Power and the Russian Military Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Praeger Publisher, U.S.A, 2002, p.188.

Yeltsin was consistent the appointment of Rodionov, Sergeyev, and Kvasnin were seen as “balancing act” strategies.² Yeltsin’s “balancing act” a politician’s “chief weapon.” be evidently seen in the statements and actions of Aleksandr Lebed, refusal to allow Grachev’s deputy to inspect his Moldovan area of operation.³ Aleksandr Zhilin’s summation on this incidents remarks, “The case of an army commander calling a Deputy Minister of Defense a ‘thief’ and not allowing him to review his troops is unprecedented in the history of the Russia Army. Moreover, disobeying a superior officer in the army may qualify as mutiny.”⁴

The fact was that Boris Yeltsin did not see it this way. In fact, six months after this event, on June 18, Yeltsin appointed Lebed, to be the Secretary of the Security Council and his national security adviser, Pavel Grachev was fired. As mentioned above, Yeltsin’s “balancing act.”

The Chechen crisis also provided Russian military officers the opportunity to clash. Gromov’s statements of opposition to use military force was quickly followed by statements from Generals Kondratyev, Lebed, and Podkolzin, show the military factionalism, and by June 1996, four major factions had emerged among high-ranking active- duty military officers.(i) the Yeltsinites (led by Kokoshin and Kobets);(ii) the Neutrals (led by Kolesnikov); (iii) the anti-Grachev or Afghantsi opposition (consisting of Gromov, Mironov, Kondratyev, E.Vorobyev, Lebed, Rodionov; and (iv) Grachev’s

² Ibid., p.190.

³ In October 1994, it was announced that Russia’s defense minister, Pavel Grachev, had ordered Deputy Defense Minister Matvei Burlakov to travel , Moldova, to inspect General Lieutenant Aleksandr Lebed’s Fourteenth Army. Upon hearing of the planned visit, Lebed not only refused to allow Burlakov into his area of operation, but publicly said that “Burlakov is a banal thief who is wanted by all prosecutors in Russia.” In John P. Morgan: *From Garrison State to Nation-State: Political Power and the Russian Military Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, Praeger Publisher, U.S.A, 2002, P.25.

⁴ John P.Moran, *From Garrison State to Nation-State: Political Power and the Russian Military under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, Praeger Publisher, U.S.A, 2002, p.191.

cronies (consisting of Lapshov, Ivanov, B. Gromov, Yevnevich, V. Vorobyev, and several others).⁵

The main point is that the Russian military leadership is deeply divided although perhaps more over personal than philosophical issues. Such divisions have prevented them from taking a unified stand on purely political questions and making vulnerable for stability in civil-military relations and the great problem, however, is that the military was not subordinated to the state as such but that civilian control came to mean simply bringing the military under the command of the presidency. The Chechen war showed just how dangerous this could be, and there were few checks on the emergence of constitutional praetorianism.

Boris Yeltsin's decision to disband the Russian parliament on 21 September 1993 contributed to an erosion of restraints on both civilian and military leaders concerning the use of the military in politics. The October 1993 crisis, arose fears about heightened influence of the Russian military in domestic politics are based on a false premise. As *Izvestiya* commentator Otto Latsis has correctly pointed out, such a conclusion is based on a misunderstanding of military intervention in politics. A 'military intervention' is an independent military decision to take a stance against the legitimate political leadership. The army was used in Moscow on the orders of the Political leadership.⁶ At the same time, civilian decisions to use the military internally undermine professionalism and contribute to the politicization of the officers corps.

⁵ Stephen, Black, 'The Great Expectation: Russian Civil- Military Relations', *December 2002*, p. 105.

⁶ Taylor D. Brain, 'Russian Civil-Military Relations after the October Uprising', *Survival*, Vol.36.1, spring 1999, p.18.

This picture, the fact that the army was dragged into the political dispute between Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet was due to low political capacity of the new Russian state. However, even though the Army shows its ambivalent character to remain outside politics, at the end of the day it ends up Yeltsin's loyalty in storming the White House, which shows in Russia the military is yet to fully maintain its professionalism characteristics and still prevalent the subjective control of the civilian authority.

Some progress has been made in Russia in moving towards the creation of an apolitical military controlled by democratically elected officials. Major positive developments include: the military's reluctance to involve in the power struggle or its avoidance of intervention, such as what occurred in August 1991 and October 1993; the creation of institutional controls over the military; and the increased support of senior military and retired military advocates for an apolitical, democratically controlled armed forces.

At the same time, the progress of this tradition faces serious obstacles. Among the negative developments are; the political power struggle that is pressuring the military to take side; the serious difficulties in protecting the welfare of officers and servicemen; the continuation of military officials serving in elected offices, participating in political activities, publicly criticizing government policy, and both in March 1993 and October 1993 constitutional crises.

What then, is the future of Russian civil-military relations and its impact on the transition to a stable democratic political system? For the near term, military leaders will try to avoid being dragged into the political struggle. The pressure for intervention will be countered by military leaders' concerns about a split within the armed forces and by their

belief that the military may once again become a 'scapegoat,' as they believed it did after Afghanistan, Tbilisi, 1991 coup and 1993 crisis.

For a long term, the loyalty of the military or with an apolitical military will remain an issue of concern as long as Russia is confronted with the transition to a market economy are causing a hardship among the Russian people, and political instability, a lack of enforced laws separating the military from politics, major deficiencies in protecting the welfare of officers and soldiers, and a lack of a deep-seated belief among military personnel in the inherent value of democracy.

Russia has made significant progress in its transition from an authoritarian to a democratic political system. The transition to a stable democracy, however will be lengthy process, is also threatened by the centrifugal force of internal ethnic and territorial conflicts and the increasingly uninhibited devolution of power from the central government to regional governments. For it to be successful, further progress must be made both within the political system (free and regularized elections, constitutional checks and balances, and the development of a deep-seated belief in democracy) and in the creation of the type of civil-military that is consistent with a democratic system. But, whether or not Russia succeeds on its transition to a stable democracy will essentially decide by the Russian people.

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