# POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT, 1981-2011

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## MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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## DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled **"Political Development in Egypt, 1981-2011"** submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this university or any other university.

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## CERTIFICATE

We recommended that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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*Place: New Delhi*

*Figure 1Map of Africa*

**Figure 2 Map of Egypt**



*Source: www.worldatlas.com*

# CONTENTS

## ABBREVIATIONS

AL-AWKF    Ministry of Religious Affairs in Egypt

AME          Arab Middle East

BOA          Bank of America

CESCR        Committee on Economic Social & Cultural Rights

DOJ          Department of Justice

ECHR        Egypt Commission for Human Rights

FDI           Foreign Direct Investment

FOJ          Freedom of Justice Party

GDP          Gross Domestic Product

GOE          Government of Egypt

HRO          Human Rights Organization

HRW         Human Rights Wing

ICCPR        International Convenant on Civil & Political Rights

ICPD         International Conference on Population and Development

ICT           International Centre for Torture

IL             Islamic Law

IMF           International Monetary Fund

MB            Muslim Brotherhood

MOI          Ministry of Interior

NCHR        National Commission for Human Rights

NDP          National Democratic Party

NPUP        National Progressive Unionist Party

SCE        Supreme Court of Egypt

SACF       Supreme Council for Armed Forces

SAP        Structural Adjustment Programme

UN         United Nations

USA        United States of America

WB         World Bank

# Preface

In the last two decades, due to the change of domestic and international scenario, many new stimulating developments have bee taken place in North African countries. The end of the cold war era and the emergence of liberalization, privatization and globalization scenario have forced the many African countries to adopt the economic and political policies. The changing international scenario has induced many political developments in North African countries. In following the liberalisation and globalisation processes, Egypt has introduced several economic and political reforms since 1980. Since 1981, Hosni Mubarak came in to the power after the assassination of President Anwar-al-Sadat; he followed the liberalisation policies in responding the domestic economic crisis and external pressure in 1990s. He conducted direct election to the National Assembly with multi party structure and a wider franchise. President Mubarak introduced constitutional reforms in December 2006 by amending the 34 articles of the constitution. The major objectives of the amendment were to strengthen the role of parliament in ensuring the government accountability, adopting the best possible electoral process that would enable political parties to achieve greater representation in parliament. It provided guarantee to a minimum number of parliamentary seats for women. The political reforms were aimed to promote decentralisation by widening and strengthening the responsibilities of municipal councils.

Though liberal economic and political reforms during Mubarak era produced economic growth yet it could not provide benefits to all section of Egyptian society. The vast majority of Egyptians was left behind the growing poverty and infrastructure crumbled. The failure of Mubarak's policies to tackle the socio-economic and political crisis, made ground for democratic upsurge in Egypt. Though the number of efforts had been made to ensure people rights yet people's disappointment grew against Mubarak's government. The re-

elected of Mubarak in September 2005 for a fifth term created perception among the Egyptian people that Mubarak was trying to groom his son Gamal Mubarak to take over when his period was going to end. Unemployment, poverty, torture, suppression of people's democratic rights, corruption, and arrogance of the elite led to despair and frustration among the people. People started to protests against the Hosni Mubarak's corrupt regime on 25th Jan 2011 following successful Tunisian Jasmine revolution.

The rationale behind the study has identified the reasons which were responsible to fall Mubarak regime and the forces which drove the people of Egypt to force Hosni Mubarak to vacate the country. This dissertation makes an attempt to understand various dimensions of political development which took place during Mubarak and recent democratic upsurge. The study evaluates the trends and pattern of political development during Mubarak's period in Egypt. It examines the effects of liberalization and globalization policies on the Egyptian society and creation of objectives condition for the unrest in the country. It finds out the socio, economic and political issues, and reasons for the popular protest by the people of Egypt against the Hosni Mubarak regime. The focus of the study analyses the new political development, process of government formation in post Mubarak-era.

The dissertation is based on three major hypotheses. First hypothesis is the suppression of political rights and failure of Mubarak regime to accommodate the people's growing demands led to crisis to change political system in Egypt. Second, the political crisis took place in Egypt because of new liberalist policy which created unemployment, starvation and political unrest led to the collapse of Mubarak and the formation of new political force. Third, The deep difference between liberal and extreme forces is the hurdle in the formation of new political system in Egypt.

The dissertation opens with the chapter I general introduction, followed by the three Major chapters and conclusion. It deals with the brief background to the topic. This chapter covers the conceptual framework of political development and coverage of socio-political and economic overview of Egypt. The Chapter II 'Political Development in Egypt, 1981-1990' has laid down the whole background of the study of political development in Egypt. It has broadly discussed the existing political structure when Hosni Mubarak entered in the power and examines Mubarak policies, his authoritarian rule and constitutional reform, people rights, democratisation processes, people's participation in political activities.

The third Chapter 'Political Development in Post 1990s and fall of Mubarak's Regime' deals with the introduction of Mubarak liberal polices and economic reforms in order to follow globalisation. It has focused on the growing economic and political crisis in post 1990s. This chapter finds out of the impacts of liberal economic polices on social and political development. It also provides accounts of growing employment poverty which forced the people to revolt against the authoritarian regime and examined the role of external forces in fuelling Egyptian crisis. This chapter broadly discusses the major opposition political parties, role of Muslim brotherhood, extremists and liberal forces in affecting the Political development process of Egypt in the era of globalisation. It has analysed the basic questions how deepening economic crisis, suppression of political rights of people strengthened the opposition forces which led down the path for the fall of Mubarak regime.

The Chapter IV 'Political Process and Challenges in the Formation New Political Structure' concentrates on the new development of Egypt. It evaluates process of new constitution and regime formation, electoral systems, establishment new political institutions, form of governments. It examines the safeguards and the upholding of human rights, protections for minorities and freedom of religion. It also deals with the major challenge to

the formation of new political structure, challenge to incorporate the every section and ethnic group of the society. Finally, Chapter V Conclusion has drawn the major findings in the light of above discussion in chapters.

# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 CONCEPT OF POLITICAL DEVELOPEMNT

Politics concerns questions of who controls and who benefits. The focus is on the Distribution of power and of rewards and penalties with in a political system. The political system comprises all of the actors, processors and institutions involved in making and carrying out public policy and in pursuing collective goals. After the Second World War, Several Countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America attained freedom from the Western imperialism. These countries are collectively called the Third World. The Third World countries decided to rapidly industrialize themselves. They had numerous social, political and economic problems. In most of them democracy as a form of government did not succeed. Modern political scientists tried to evolve a new approach to the study of politics of these developing countries.

The concept of political development was developed by American political scientists such as Samuel Huntington, David Apter, Lucian Pye, Gabriel Almond, James Coleman, Harold Laswell, Talcott Parsons etc. Political Development have been defined in different ways, which means the expansion of power of representative institutions or the strengthening of representative institutions in a political systems.[1] According to Huntington, Political Development means the institutionalization of political structure and it involves the creation of Political institutions sufficiently adaptable, complex, autonomous

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[1] Mustafa Chaudhary, Pakistan and its politics and bureaucracy, Associated publishing house: New Delhi, 1988, p.20.

and coherent to absorb and order the participation of groups and to promote social and economic change in the society.[2] He argues that the most important problem of politics is the "the lag in the development of political institutions behind social and economic change." Thus the development of any political system depends on the relationship between political institutionalization and political participation. Political Development increases the level of participation and the capacity and the capacity of the political institutions to accommodate change must also increase, if a stable political system is to be maintained.

## 1.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:

A study of Political Development needs to be examined from the historical perspectives and the typological perspective. The historical perspective assumes that the forces of history move in a unidirectional manner. Karl Popper defines; Historicism is an approach to the social sciences which assumes that historical prediction is their principal aim and which assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the rhymes or the patterns. The laws or the trends that underlie the evolution of history, other writers such as Marx, Cointe, Hegel, Maine, Spencer and Durkhiem also maintain that development proceeds toward the western model. According to Marxian Philosophy, all societies transform through five stages before it reaches to communism that is the final stage of development: primitive communism, slavery age, feudalism, capitalism and socialism and Development as seen as both in material as well as an 'economic relationship'[3], which are determined by the development in 'tools of production'.

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[2] Samuel Huntington, Political order in a Changing Societies, Yale University Press: New Heaven, 1981, p.266.
[3] Karl Marx used two terms Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism. Historical materialism explains the stages before communism on the basis of class contradiction.

Marx observes that the nation that is more developed industrially only shows to the less developed the image of its own future.[4] This concept of unilinear growth has had a tremendous impact on the literature on political development. Following Marx, W. Rostow delineated five stages of economic growth: traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, take-off, the drive toward maturity and the age of high mass consumption.[5] In his later work, Rostow adds another stage which he calls for search for equality.[6] Following Rostow, Organski delineates four stages of development: the politics of primitive unification, the politics of industrialization, the politics of national welfare and the politics of abundance.[7] The concept of stage development implies that developed countries passed through the stages long ago and now the under developed countries will pass through the same stages. This assumption of a single course of development for all countries cannot however be accepted since there are apparently several patterns of development.

The second perspective on political development is typological. It assumes that the developing countries will converge toward a western model of development. Such ethnocentric tendencies among political scientists can be attributed to the influence of sociologists such as Weber, Parsons and Sutton upon political scientists particularly Almond and Lucian Pye. These ethnocentric tendencies are also a product of the values held by elites in western societies and are also

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[4] R.A. Nisbet, Social change & History, Oxford University press: New York, 1979, p.178.

[5] W.W.Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge university press: Cambridge, 1960, p.4-5.

[6] W.W.Rostow, Politics & the Stage of Growth, Cambridge university press: Cambridge, 1971, p.230.
[7] A.F.K.Organski, The Stage of Political Development, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1965, p.230.

accepted by corporate elites in developing countries, interested in undertaking development activities.[8]

These two perspectives on political development have been severely criticized, which envisages development as unilinear, not reversible and that they imply an identifiable historic point of departure and terminus. For this reason, Coleman has advocated an evolutionary perspective that perceives political development as a process by which a system can be changed and improved. This approach implicitly explains the idea that political development is a continuous interaction among the processes of structural differentiation, the imperatives of equality and the integrative and adaptive capacity of a political system.[9] According to Coleman these three variables differentiation, equality and capacity constitute the development syndrome.[10] The sequential concept of development offered by SSRC Committee lie on certain crises such as identity, legitimacy, penetration participation and distribution which all societies must face their attempt to realize equality, capacity and greater differentiation. The sequential concept of development points out that the appearance of various crises simultaneously reduces the ability of the leaders to respond to any one of them effectively. Thus if a country can resolve its identity crisis first it can easily resolve other crises such as legitimacy, penetration, participation and distribution.[11]

The other writers such as Diament, Eisenstaedt and Huntington also deal with the adapting capacity of the institutions of the system to the changing demands of the society. Eisenstaedt argues that the fundamental problem of political

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[8] Mustafa Chaudhary, op.cit., p.9.

[9] James s. Coleman, The Development Syndrome: Differentiation Equality Capacity, Princeton University Press, 1971, p. 7.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Sidney Verba, Sequences & Development, Princeton University press: Princeton, 1971, p.10.

development is the ability of a political system to adopt itself to the changing demands is the crucial test of such sustained political growth or political development and is the crucial focus of modern political system or of political modernization.[12] Diament also defines political development as a process by which a political system acquires an increased capacity to sustain successfully and continuously new types of goals and demands and the creation of new types of organizations.[13]

Both Diament and Eisenstaedt place considerable emphasis on the responsive capacity of the political system. On the other hand, Almond and Powell have defined political development as the increased differentiation and specialization of political structures and the increased secularization of political culture.[14]

Among the definitions of political development, Huntington's formulation seems to be most useful for the purposes of our study as he conceptualizes political development in terms of institutionalization. According to him political development is the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability.[15] The adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence of its organizations and procedures can measure the level of institutionalization.[16] The adaptability of an organ can be measured by its age, which can be measured in three ways: age, generational age and functional adaptability.

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[12] S.N. Eisenstaedt , Initial institutional Patterns of political mobilization, Wards worth: California, 1967, p.252.

[13] Alferd Diament, The Nature of Political Development, John Walleye: New York, 1966, p.92-93.

[14] Almond and Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, Little Brown: Boston, 1966, p.74.

[15] Huntington, Political Development and Political Decay, World Politics, VOL.17 (2), 1965, P.7.

[16] Huntington, Political Order in a Changing societies, op.cit., p.42.

The second criterion of measuring the level of institutionalization is complexity. The more complex of an organization is more institutionalized. According to Huntington, involves both multiplications of organizational sub-units, hierarchically and functionally and differentiation of separate types of organization sub unites.[17]

The third criterion of measuring the level of institutionalization is the extent to which political organizations and procedures exist independently of the social groupings and methods of behavior.[18] If political organizations are found to be outside influences, it is likely that the level of institutionalization is low. The fourth criterion is coherence. The more coherent and unified an organization is the more institutionalized it will be coherence of an organization can be measured by the availability of procedures for resolving disputes.

Both Huntington and Riggs emphasize that political parties are highly significant instruments in both democratic and totalitarian societies.[19] And they perform two major functions 'manifest' and 'latent'.[20] The manifest function of political parties is to recruit support from the people to get elected. In the process of performing this manifest function, parties also perform certain latent functions. In addition to providing decision-makers for the political system and training such decision-makers, parties also act as brokers of society. In pluralistic society parties play extremely important role in mediating conflict between competing interests. To use Almond's term, the main function of

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[17] Ibid., p.18.
[18] Ibid., p. 19-20.

[19] Almond and Coleman, The Politics of Developing Areas, Princeton University press: Princeton, 1960.

[20] Samuel, Political Parties: A behavioral Analysis, Ran McNally: Chicago, 1964.

political parties is to aggregate diverse interests of the society.[21] Political parties also articulate interests and help resolve conflicts in the society. Such roles are essential to the maintenance and survival of a pluralistic society. In fact, by articulating and aggregating interests, political parties can create a high level of consensus and cohesion; and can even create a national political culture. Since the political culture of most of the developing countries is a fragmented one, the role of parties is extremely important in creating a homogenous political culture.[22] Political parties keep a fragmented society united by performing both manifest and latent functions.[23]

## 1.3 EGYPT: AN OVERVIEW

Egypt is located in North Africa, bordering the Mediterranean Sea and lying between Libya and the Gaza strip on the west and the Red Sea on the east. It is north of Sudan and provides, the only land link between Africa and the Eastern Hemisphere. It has a total area of 1,001,450 square kilometers of which 995,450 sq. km is land and 6,000 sq. km is water. Only 2.85% of land area is arable. The country consists essentially of a vast desert plateau cut through by the Nile Delta and the Nile Valley. The population estimate in 2006 was 73.6 million, with a population growth rate of 2.3%. Egypt has a per capita income of about US$1,250.[24]

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[21] Almond, Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics, Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1960, p. 3-4.

[22] Political Culture is the part of political system which affects decision-making process, such as caste, religion, language etc.

[23] See G.A.Almond, op.cit.,

[24] African Development Bank's Arab Republic of Egypt, 2007-2011 Country Strategy Paper.

Egypt had been known for one of the most populated countries not only in the African continent but also in the Middle East in the Arab World. The Sinai Peninsula is also a part of North Eastern Egypt, which formed a land bridge to Asia. It is covering an area about 1,001,45 sq. km. Egypt borders with Mediterrian sea to the North, the Gaza Strip and Israel to the North-East, the Red sea to the East, Sudan to the south and Libya to the West. The great majority of its estimated 8 million peoples are Muslims.[25]

Egypt got independence form British colonial rule in 1922. The power was transferred to constitutional monarchy. King Farouk became the first constitutional monarch of Egypt. Vice President Anwar Sadat became President of Egypt with the death of Nasser in 1970. He was another Officer of the 1952 coup. President Sadat oversaw the establishment of a new constitution for Egypt in 1971, which legally consolidated the power in the hands of the president and rendered ostensibly democratic institutions such as the parliament as weak and inconsequential.[26]

The political institutional development in Egypt started since Mubarak came in to power in 1981. He tried to reforms Egypt's political system according to liberal principles. President Hosni Mubarak introduced liberalization policies in order to respond the domestic economic crisis and external pressure in 1990s. Mubarak government tried to restructure Egyptian economy according to a free market principle. In 1990s Egypt received debt relief from western powers in return for its support for the Iraq war. In following of the liberalization policies, Egypt's $23 billion of western international debt was forgiven. Mubarak government launched the programme of privatization of state assets and began

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[25] Encyclopedia of North Africa
[26] Egypt: Will Democracy Succeed the Pharaoh?

to see funds, both foreign and Egyptian-owned flow in the country in search of investment.

But the introduction socio-economic reforms according to liberal principles could not stop Egyptian crisis. The two decades of economic liberalization policies were accompanied by authoritarianism while at the same time these policies opened up opportunities for crony capitalism. Egypt faced the institutional fragmentation. The industrial trade and general investment policies remained fragmented among a number of state agencies that were seldom linked. Egypt during the presidency of hosni Mubarak continued to carry out neo-liberal economic reforms in responding the external pressure, particularly international financial institutions. Though it produced economic growth yet it could not provide benefits to all section of Egyptian society. The vast majority of Egyptians was left behind the growing poverty and infrastructure crumbled.

The failure of Mubarak policies to tackle the socio-economic and political crisis, made ground for democratic upsurge in Egypt. Although number of efforts had been made to ensure people rights yet people's disappointment grew against Mubarak government. When Mubarak was re-elected in September 2005 for a fifth term, there was a perception among Egyptian people that Mubarak was trying to groom his son Gamal Mubarak to take over when his period was going to end. The regressive changes to the constitution and the heavily manipulated November 2010 elections had cemented the domination of the ruling National Democratic Party. It humiliated opposition parties and infuriated the politically attuned public. Over the past three decades roughly the period of the Mubarak regimes rule, Egypt experienced unemployment, poverty, torture, suppression of people's democratic rights. The corruption, arrogance of the elite bred stagnation and anger. The unemployment has led to despair and frustration among the people.

In the face of the repressive regime, a remarkable development took place in Egypt which was also deeply influenced by successful Tunisian Jasmine Revolution. People started to protests against Hosni Mubarak regime on 25 January 2011. The uprising which began on 25 January 2011, rejected torture, poverty, corruption and employment. The revolt bought the millions of people to the street in order to fulfill the socio-economic and political demands and to end authoritarian Egypt regime. The protestors seized the symbolic space at Tahir Square in downtown Cairo which means in liberation in Arabic. The large cohort of Egyptians which included Student activists, middle class workers shown their strong desire for change and to end the oppression.

President Mubarak made efforts to satisfy the rebellion but all efforts got failed. He established a National Council for Human Rights in order to respond the domestic and external pressure, to ensure freedom human rights and democracy. Mubarak appointed his intelligence chief, Omar Suleiman as Vice-President who began listless talks with selected opposition-party leaders and offered a number of token political reforms. Suleiman attempted to restore a veneer of normality to Egypt, endeavoring to send the signal that the protests had run out of steam and reform had begun.

But these efforts could not silence the people voice and their demands for changing whole Egyptian system. The Egyptian protestors had no confidence in Suleiman. Finally, after the 18 days of mass protests across the country, Hosni Mubarak resigned on 11 February 2011 and it was the end of thirty years of authoritarian regime in Egypt. The downfall of Hosni Mubarak led to the new political development in Egypt and started a journey for establishment of democracy. Post Mubarak Egypt has witnessed positive developments such as the rise of political parties, independent trade union federations and other social groups aiming to participate in rebuilding a democratic society. But there are big

challenges to incorporate all the sections of Egyptian society in building a democratic society. Egypt is a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society. Ethnic Egyptian constitute 95% of Egypt's total population whereas Egypt's minorities include Nubians, Berbers (Siwa Oasis), Bedouins, Arabs, Turks and Greeks additionally to small tribal communities such as Bejas and Doms. There are cleavages among various sections of Egyptian society.

There is fear that Mubarak removal would result in an Islamist takeover. The Muslim Brotherhood was certainly a key part of the protest movement, but they were not the instigators, nor were they its driving force. Initially, the order Muslim Brotherhood leadership, a generation that had shadowed the Mubarak regime for the past thirty years, was reluctant for the Muslim Brotherhood to officially join the street protests. But there is possibility to play crucial role in Egyptian politics. In 1972, the Muslim Brotherhood renounced violence as the path to establishing Sharia Law and an Islamic state in Egypt, henceforth claiming to pursue them only through political means.

In short, the Muslim Brotherhood is playing the long game, participating in democracy as a means to its ultimate objectives. There is however, a risk that extremist and violent Islamists who believe in terrorism and violent acts as means of exploiting the current political vacuum during this transitional period of uncertainty is real. There is fundamental disagreement over what democracy is what should produce, and what its limits should be. The liberals fear that the people would elect Islamists who would erect a new order every bit as illiberal as the previous one. The Islamists fear that the liberal fetish for freedom would go too far, rendering Egypt unable to defend and preserve its culture and faith. The Islamists who have long dominated Egyptian opposition politics have not disappeared. The massive turn out for the Friday khutba (sermon) led by Islamists super star Yusuf al-Qaradawi the week after Mubarak departure cast

doubt on hopeful views that the youth movement was a secular one that had left Islamism behind. The Muslim Brotherhood has already announced its intention to form a political party under the name Freedom and Justice Party, and to participate in elections.

At present, each group has turned the SCAF the junta to which Mubarak delegated power on 11 February 2011. The current constitutional amendments were passed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and caretaker cabinet has been accepted by the Egyptian people in a referendum which was conducted on 19 March, is just the beginning of a long reform process. In order to establish a stable democracy there is need to ensure a free press, freedom of expression and association, accountability, an independent judiciary, the checks and balances that come with a separation of religion from the state, and also the executive from the legislature. There is also required to provide safeguards and the upholding of human rights, protections for minorities and freedom of religion. The massive economic and social problems that fuelled the uprisings would continue to challenge any new leadership.

## 1.4 LITERATURE REVIEW

Number of studies exists on Egyptian institutional development, democratic upsurge, and the political development in Egypt. The literature available on my theme is broadly categorized into three themes, they are given below:

Political Development in North Africa: Under this category two authors describe the situation, they are:

Larbi Sadiki, (2010) The North Africa is facing severe crisis these days. The long rusted regimes have been thrown out and democratic establishment is in

process in many countries. From Tunisia to Egypt is facing unrest. The failure of regimes to integrate people and provide dignified life has created the high level frustration among the people and they stood up against the leviathan of their country. The author analyze that the spectre of succession perennially haunt Arab polities. In the past it was succession that caused the most durable schism within the house of Islam. In the present succession threatens many Arab polities with instability. A set of questions on political succession in Arab republics are in order. To what extent is the Arab Middle East Witnessing the unmaking of "Arab Republicanism" by way of transfer of power from father to son? How plausible is to argue that a new brand of "dynastic Republicanism" is on the rise? What grounds are there for correlating the rise of "dynastic Republicanism" with the return of the family to political centre stage? Is family solidarity sufficient or does it require the back-up of coercion in order to secure its stranglehold over political power? The same was expected to be done by the Hosni Mubarak as well. This also spread the discontentment among the people of Egypt.

Marion Dixon, (2011) observes the whole events differently that western governments have reacted to the uprisings, revolts and revolution in the Middle East and North Africa according to what appears to be prescribed protocol, reserved for public responses to wide spread social upheaval in the Global South, in countries with western backed unpopular and repressive governments. The protocol goes something like this; With the USA at the helm, high- level government officials urge 'restrain on both sides.' When the revolts appear to be not so easily thwarted, they can call for reform. Tensions escalate and international media attention grows, the call the reform turns to an acknowledgement of the need for a new government.

Political Development in Egypt: Under this, four authors can identify the Egypt political situation. They are:

Fauzi M. Najjar, (2011) evaluates Mubarak constitutional reforms. Hosni Mubarak introduced reforms while actually consolidating his autocratic rule. In response to domestic and international pressure, he has recently introduced further reforms in the hope of silencing the opposition and officially rectifying Egypt's poor human rights record. In his speeches and public statements, Mubarak promised to set Egypt on the road to freedom, human rights and democracy. In reality, these constitutional amendments, particularly as regards human rights, democracy, the powers of the president and the role of NGO's and ordinary citizens in decision making did not show actual results. The Egyptian government has reluctantly introduced have been drained of any real substance by legal stratagems or hedged with all sorts of restrictions.

Mamoun Fandy, (2011) argues that the people were fed up of Mubarak regime, the consistent suppression of people's voice forced people to throw Mubarak out of the nation. He says that standing next to him on Tahir square, someone said that on 28 January the Hosni Mubarak regime had shut down the internet and cut off mobile phone service, throwing Egypt into nineteenth century. Another 30 year old demonstrator told him 'I have no point of comparison. Since I was born the ruler I've known has been Mubarak.' Egyptians raised funny signs, like the one carried by an obviously tired kid in his up-raised hand reading 'Mubarak please go, my arms hurt.' The young men and women in Tahir Square and with them of rest of Egypt, wanted their country to be part of the twenty-first century, the world they knew through Facebook and the internet. They wanted to be part of modern world.

Christopher Eyre, (2011) considers that evidence for corrupt practice in pharaonic. Egypt is examined in comparative and culture specific contexts.

Definitions of corruption are related to degrees of depersonalization of government, to levels of government penetration, and to the scale, efficiency and professionalization of bureaucracy. Stress is laid on the personal nature of the Egyptian hierarchy, in the face-to-face society in which themes of loyalty, reciprocity, and client-patron relationships were important at all levels. The limitations of central control systems for the management of officials are discussed, and contrasted with the exercise of patronage based authority in the mitigation of inappropriate behavior.

Amr Ismail Ahmed Adly, (2011) examines the economic crisis regime survival and state reform in Egypt between the years 1990-2009. Structural adjustment Programme (SAP) stress on export diversification and promotion in the post 1990, the Egyptian state failed to restructure exports through promoting non-oil and manufactured products. State agencies operating in the field of trade and industry failed in either providing incentives or sending the right signals for manufactures to redirect their production.

Democratic Upsurge and Fall of Mubarak regime: The theme democratic upsurge and fall of Mubarak regime has been analyzed by several scholars, they are:

Ray Bush, (2011) says that the 25 January revolution has changed political life for good, but it will only be successful if it can link the tremendous struggle over rights and representation with economic growth that provides jobs. Egypt's economy has grown by about 5% in real terms each year since 1980. It is the ambition of all developing countries to achieve such a level of growth, especially where it outstrips the increase in population. Yet sustained economic growth singularly failed to deliver employment and poverty reduction.

Angela Joya, (2011) evaluates the socio economic reforms and neo-liberal policies in Egypt. She argues that the Egyptian revolution of 25 January 2011 has to be a understood in the context of neo-liberal economic shift. The two decades of economic liberalization policies were accompanied by authoritarianism. While at the same time these policies opened up opportunities for crony capitalism. Post Mubarak Egypt has witnessed positive in strengthening people's democratic rights. Tarek Masoud (2011) has emphasized on the dominant psychology of the fear among the Egyptian in post Mubarak and democratic future of Egypt. Liberal fears Islamist would user in theocracy or at least a deeply illiberal democracy. Mere eight months after Mubarak's overthrow, Egyptians are left with a political landscape bitterly divided between liberals who as the jurists Tariq al-Bishri put it fear democracy and democrats who fear liberty. Islamists fears that liberal would compromise with Islamic culture. After some years from now, Egyptians perhaps would not remember the precise details of the current quarrel over election timing and constitution writing, but the cleavage that the disagreement represents will not fade so easily.

Raba El-Mahdi (2011) focusses on the wave of unprecedented labour protests since December 2006. He argues that this wave of protests is an outcome of the rupture of the hegemonic ruling pact governing Egypt since 1952. As such, this movement, this includes both industrial workers as well as white-collar state employees, should be interpreted beyond its immediate material demands. Ibrahim A. Karawan (2011) analyses the role of army in Egypt's politics in post Mubarak. Egypt's higher Military Council assumed power on 11 February 2011 after the resignation of president Hosni Mubarak with the stated objective of restoring stability, putting the country on the road to democracy and restoring civilian government in the wake of the popular uprising that began. There is no evidence the army was eager to step in and dominate. But there is also a lack of accountability and credibility.

## 1.5 RATIONALE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The rationale behind the study is to identify the reasons which were responsible to fall Mubarak regime and the forces which drove the people of Egypt to force Hosni Mubarak to vacate the country. Socio-economic and political conditions apart, there are some undocumented reasons, which have played important roles in the Egypt's political development since 1981-2011, are need to study. The introduction of Neo- liberal policy in Egypt during Mubarak period increased the economic growth but it could not remove the poverty, unemployment. The high level of unemployment, acute poverty and intense corruption became persistent in Egypt and accumulated frustration of the people came out and they forced the hegemonic of Egypt to lean down. This political development makes relevant to study and examine the Mubarak's economic policies and his democratic reforms. There is scope to examine the liberal policies and globalization process regarding the political development in Egypt.

The consistent demand for popular government, democratic rights which forced people to reject torture, poverty, corruption and employment and autocratic Mubarak regime provide scope to study and analysis the whole political development in Egypt to draw conclusion under the ambit of people versus regime debate. Post Mubarak, Egypt has witnessed the formation of new political forces as the rise of political parties, independent trade union, federations and other social groups aiming to participate in rebuilding of Egypt's democratic system. But there are big challenges to incorporate all the sections of Egyptian society in building more inclusive democratic system, are need to study for understating of Egypt's recent political development.

**1.6  OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY**

2. To evaluate the trends and pattern of political development during Mubarak period in Egypt.

3. To examine the effects of liberalization and globalization policies on the Egyptian society and creation of objectives condition for the unrest in the country.

4. To find out the socio, economic and political issues, reasons for the popular protest by the people of Egypt against the Hosni Mubarak Regime.

5. To analyze the new political development, process of government formation in post Mubarak era.

**1.7 HYPOTHESES**

2. The suppression of political rights and failure of Mubarak regime to accommodate the people's growing demands led to crisis to change political system in Egypt.

3. The political crisis took place in Egypt because of new liberalist policy which created unemployment, starvation and political unrest led to the collapse of Mubarak and the formation of new political force.

4. The deep difference between liberal and extreme forces is the hurdle in the formation of new political system in Egypt.

## 1.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research work will be carried in historical and analytical framework with the available primary and secondary sources. The study will examine the political development, the process of new regime formation and role of external factors. The study employs historical, analytical and descriptive methods. For the secondary sources, useful books, journals, articles, magazines, internet and newspaper will enrich this proposed research work. In primary sources the reports of various international organizations, non-governmental organizations speeches of the leaders will be used in significant manner in due course of this study.

**CHAPTER II**

**POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT (1981-1990)**

**2.1 BACKGROUND**

Egypt remained under a foreign rule for a very long period. After a long struggle for independence it became a separate state in 1953. Its long dependence on foreign countries generated a powerful nationalism and acceptance of authoritarian state. Gamal Abdul Nasser led the nationalist reformist free officers group to liberate Egypt from traditional monarchy. Nasser introduced many schemes of land reforms, social welfare, and a nationalist foreign policy. However, Nasser could not garner the support of Egyptian land-lord or business classes and its defeat in 1967 by Israel alienated it's from United States.

After Naseer Anwar-As-Sadat became the president of Egypt. He was vice president at Nasser's time. He modifies the policies of the state and tilted the policies towards the Egyptian middle class to garner their support. He also tried to win the favour of United States. However, he carried out a limited political liberalization. He was more depended on the business classes internally and American alliance externally. He was also authoritarian rule Parliament, Opposition Parties, Interest Groups and the Press enjoyed limited freedom. On 6 October 1981, President Sadat was assassinated by Islamic extremists. His Vice-President and an air force commander Hosni Mubarak inherited power in 14 October 1981 on the basis of constitutional legitimacy. Mubarak was also supported by political elite because he has distinguished himself in a 1973 war. He consolidated Sadat's limited political liberalization and maintains the major lines of Sadat's policies with some modifications.

After become a President, Mubarak confronted a number of challenges as the trauma of Sadat's murder faded. The first challenge was Mubarak himself. Although he rose through the ranks of the military quickly and was ultimately tapped to become Vice-President, Mubarak seemed hardly skilled at politics. During the early years of his Presidency, Mubarak reputation as a, be neither of these things, but in the early 1980's there was a sense that Mubarak was weak. This concern brought into sharp relief a second challenge facing Mubarak, which came in the form of his minister of defense, Field Marshal Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala, who was an implicit and indirect challenger to the president.[27]

## 2.2. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT

The concept of political development focuses on the institutional building, mass mobilization and participation, administration and legal development, increasing franchise, free and fair election in order to strengthen democracy and political stability. It is the process to encourage more and more people's participation in decision making and political processes. It emphasises the openness in the working of government and accountability of rulers to the ruled, to ensure the independence of judiciary and existence of the rule of law. Egypt got independence from British colonial rule in 1922 and instituted a constitutional, parliamentary monarchy, which remained in place until 1952.

The institutional development in Egypt started with Mohammed Ali's decree of 1824 which established Majhlis-al-Ali ( High Council) and Kedvive Imsa'il's Majhlis Shura al-Nuwab (Council of Deputies) followed by the liberal constitution formed in 1923 and a number of Constitutional declarations drafted by military rulers after revolution of 1952. The nationalist *Wafd* ("delegation")

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[27] Steven .A.Cook, The Struggle for Egypt (From Nasser to Tahir Square), Oxford University Press: New York, 2012, p. 158.

party, which had led the domestic movement for Egyptian independence, dominated parliamentary elections throughout this period. In July 1952, British-backed King Farouk was overthrown by a group of Egyptian army officers, the Free Officers' Movement, led by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, who became President of Egypt and ruled the country until his death in 1970.[28]

Egypt has been republic since 18 June 1953 by British Colonizers. From that day Egypt has a four president namely Mohamed Naguib, Gamal Abdul Nasser, Anwar al-Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. The last of these was the 1971 Constitution, promulgated by president Anwar al-Sadat.

While in the 1970s Egypt experimented with pluralism and a multiparty system (called infitah, meaning "open door"), this was a highly controlled experiment that did not fundamentally change the country's political structure. The relative openness Egypt witnessed during this period was curbed by a number of rules and regulations that were adopted at the same time to limit if not abolish—what little freedom and diversity remained.[29]

Hosni Mubarak came in to power in 1981 after the assassination of Anwar- al-Sadat. He introduced the several political reforms. He conducted direct election to the National Assembly with multi party structure and a wider franchise. new parties in opposition-was a resurrection of the liberal *Wqfd* party, dating back to the time of the monarchy Mubarak introduced constitutional reforms in

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[28] Egypt: Will Democracy Succeed the Pharaoh? [Online: web] Accessed 10th July 2012, URL:http://www.diplomatshandbook.org/pdf/Handbook_Egypt.pdf.

[29] Hala Mustafa (2006), "A Policy for Promoting Liberal Democracy in Egypt", *FDD White Paper Series*: Voices form the Middle East on Democratisation and Reform, Foundation for Defence of Democracies, Washington DC, P.2.

December 2006 to amend the 34 articles of the constitution. To strengthen the role of parliament in ensuring the government accountability, adopting the best possible electoral process that would enable political parties to achieve greater representation in parliament. It provided guarantee to a minimum number of parliamentary seats for women promoting de-centralisation by widening and strengthening the responsibilities of municipal councils[30]

Despite these constitutional amendments to ensure the human rights, freedom of expression, political participation and other rights, Egyptian people complained the sorts of political, social and economic disabilities. Political reforms had been less tangible than appears at first impressions. Egypt remained a single party state with president as Head of the State as well as leader of the ruling party National Democratic Party.

There are several Political Institutions in Egypt under certain categories:

## 2.2 .1 PRESIDENT

Egyptian state is headed by the president who is executive head of the state. Under the 1971 Constitution, the President of the Republic was elected every six years with no term limit. The powers of the president lay out in articles 73-85 and 137-152 of the 1971 Constitution. The major powers of the Egyptian President are: He appoints an Army Commander, Heads of the Security, Senior Civil Servants, Heads of Autonomous Bodies, Governors, News Paper Editor, University President, Judges, Major Religious Officials and Public Sector Managers. He functions through a Council of Ministers. He formulates the

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[30] Fauzi M. Najjar (2011), Mubarak's Constitutional Reforms" *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 38(01):7-22

foreign policy of the Country. He all-powerful because he can dismiss the parliament at will. He also enjoys a legislative veto.

## 2.2 .2 SUPREME COUNCIL OF ARMED FORCES (SCAF)

The Supreme Council of Armed Forces is composed of 20 senior officers from the Egyptian military. Under the Mubarak Regime, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, the former minister of Defense was the head of SCAF. The SCAF has effectively taken the role of the executive branch of Government following Mubarak fall from power.[31]

## 2.2 .3 THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY (Majhlis al-Sha'ab)

The People's Assembly serves as the lower house of the legislative branch. Article 86-136 of the 1971 Constitution set out the powers of the People's Assembly, which was elected for five years but can be dissolved earlier by the president. Out of the assembly 454 deputies, 444 are directly elected while no more than 10 may be appointed by the president. Four hundred seats are voted on using proportional representation while the remaining forty- four are elected in local majority votes. The Constitution reserves fifty percent of the assembly seats for workers and peasants.[32]

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[31] http://www.cabinet.gov.eg/decrees/presidential Decrees .aspx.
[32] Foreign Affair Magazine, October 2011, "Commanding Democracy in Egypt", Jeff Martini and Taylor, P. 127-137.

## 2.2 4 THE CABINET MINISTERS

A Cabinet Ministers plays the role of a caretaker government until new parliamentary elections can be held. Prime Minister Essam Sharaf was appointed by SCAF to lead the Cabinet of Ministers during the transition period.[33] Article 57 of the interim Constitution assigns the following functions of the Cabinet Ministers, they are given below:

First, participate with the SCAF to put in place public policies of the state and supervise their implementation, according to the laws and resolutions of the republic;

Second, Direct coordinate and follow the work of the ministers and their related fronts in addition to public institutions and bodies;

Third, Issue administrative and executive orders according to laws, regulations and decisions and see to their implementation;

Fourth, Prepare draft legislation, regulations and decisions;

Fifth, prepare a draft public budget for the state;

Sixth, prepare a draft public plan for the state;

Seventh, Contract and grant loans according to constitutional principles;

Note the implementation of laws, preservation of state security, and protection of citizen rights and state interests.

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[33] http://www.cabinet.gov.eg/default.aspx.

**2.2 5 THE SHURA COUNCIL (Maglis al-Shura)**

The Shura Council or Consultative Council is serves as the upper house of the legislative branch. It was established as the result of a constitutional amendment in 1980. Article 194-205 of the constitution set out the functions of the body such as amendments of the constitution, for draft laws that touch on fundamental rights and for peace treaties. It is composed of 264 members, two-thirds of whom are elected representatives and one-third of whom are directly appointed by the presidents.

**2.2.6  ELITE GROUP**

The actual use of presidential power has evolved through the changing relationship between the chief executive and the rest of the power elite. The style of presidential leadership determined how the president controlled the elite. In this regard, Mubarak is less dominant in figure. He did not create an elite group. Mubarak sought stability and incremental change but he lagged in ideological vision and political will to tackle the problems. He delegated considerable authority to his ministers. Mubarak personal integrity and genuine commitment to limited democratization made him the most widely acceptable leader. Mubarak's inner core groups were headed by two advises with diplomatic service background. Mubarak upgraded the role of technocrats in an inner circle. Wherever, a dominant ideology has generally bound the Egyptian political elite. Mubarak is unlike his predices. He was in favour of modernization and stability in the Arab World. Under Mubarak democratization became the legitimacy formula. He sought a balance between liberal and fundamentalist group among the elite. And he also believed in equal partnership in Public and Private sector.

## 2.2.7 MILITARY

A major issue of Egypt Elite politics was the role of military in the state. Under Mubarak also the military remained a powerful corporate actor in the political system. However, Mubarak was not careful to relate military officers and balanced him with rival's officers or with strong civilian politician. Due to this, some military officers became over ambitious and try to take undue advantage of the status. This also resulted in a co-type situation in a 1987. By 1989 he positioned his own man at key positions.

## 2.2.8  LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Local government has very limited role to play in Egypt highly centralized state. Under the central government were twenty-six governorates such as sing, muhafzah, pl. muhafzah. These were sub divided into districts such as sing, markaz, pl. markaz and villages such as sing, qaryah, pl.qura or towns. At each level, there was a governing structure that combined representative councils and government appointed executive organs headed by governors, district officers and mayors. Governors were appointed by the president and they appointed subordinate executive officers. However, on attaining independence Nasser brought about land reforms and gives some power to local heads. Mubarak also makes efforts to mobilize peasants. The local power of the old families and headman were revived. Local government was encouraged to enter into joint ventures with private investors. Under Mubarak local policies often reflected special local conditions.

## 2.2 9. LEGAL SYSTEM

The Egyptian legal system was based on both Sharia and the Napoleonic code. However, Napoleonic code was abolished and Egyptian code becomes more secular. However, In 1980s Muslim political activists succeeded in advancing

the impact of the sharia adjudication. But in the year 1990 Egypt court system was otherwise chiefly, secular, applying criminal and civil law deriving from the French heritage. Under Mubarak the independence of the Courts and their role is expanding constitutional rights and procedures grieved. Courts over turned a banned on a New Wafd Party and throughout the electoral law of 1984. The court also expanded the scope of press freedom by dismissing liable suites of government ministers against the opposition, press. Court also widened the scope of labour rights by dismissing charges against strikers. Even though, court gives more freedom to press but still government appointed editors were expected to self-sensor their product and were subject to removal when they did not. Mubarak also allowed the New Wafd Party to publish Al-Awafd and Nasserites to open Swat Al-Arab.

## 2.2.10 INTERESTS GROUPS

The widening scope for interest groups politics was the most significant dimensions of the limited liberalization began under Sadat because he wanted to win the support of land-owning and educated classes. The influence of interests groups was more powerful in policies council. The interest group mounted pressure on the government for tax reduction, tax holdings and mobilization of savings. However, Mubarak regime did not allow these groups to interfere excessively in policy making and successfully managed to rearrests its control.

## 2.2.11. POLITICAL PARTIES

Egypt has several political parties and elections are claimed to be held on democratic pattern. Mubarak allowed New Wafd Party, NPUP[34] and Muslim Brotherhood to fill their candidates along with the government candidates in the elections held in their regime. Campaigning was fair and more extensive and

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[34] National Progressive Unionist Party founded in 1970.

every party brought forward some issues before the people. However, the election law during Mubarak's time makes mocri-off the democracy. The law was framed in such a manner that only government candidates could win the elections. The government party monopolized the media and government tried to restrict opposition attempts to reach the voters. The ruling party tough man and police intimidated opposition political vouchers, workers and peasants from voting against the government.

Therefore, free election was a farce and invariably. The ruling party candidates win with thumping majority. However, the 1987 election marked the blowing influence of Islam and the decline of the secular left. Mubarak recognized the growing influence of Islam and was irregular consultation with opposition leaders. In 1990 at the behest of opposition campaign he removed his Ministers of Interior. The growing influence of Islam radicals was visible in 1985. When parliament rejected the immediate application of the sharia. Islamic agitation at that time Swept-Cairo and bitter clashes occurred between the Islamic Group and the Security Forces. Though, Out-worldly Mubarak was more tolerant but Islamic streets demonstration for implementation of Sharia and Anti-Israeli protest were regularly smashed with the use of Force. The regime continued to round up leftists the Islamic decedents charging them with belonging to illegal organizations or spreading anti-government propaganda. In some cases, the whole families of political decedents were held as hostage to mount pressure on the public.

## 2.2.12 FOREIGN POLICY

The Foreign policy of Egypt is more influence by Geo-politics. Egypt occupies a strategic position as a land bridge between two continents and a link between two principle water based that is the Mediterrian Sea and the Indian Ocean. Its security is also linked to control of the river Nile of whose water survival

depends. Therefore, it has historical ties with Sudan and Uganda. Egypt identity was Arab-Islamic. Egypt foreign policy tilted towards Soviet Union in 1967 for military aid and protection. But by the late 1970s President Sadat relied more on American diplomacy to recover Egyptian land from Israel. This alienated Egypt from the Arab world to some extent.

Mubarak had to follow the foreign policy which was tilted toward USA because the regime dependence on USA was irreversible for arms chief food to maintain social peace. Despite the lack of progress towards a comprehensive peace or recognition of Palestinian rights. He remained passive during 1982 Israeli-invasion of Lebanon against the vases of Arab world. However, Mubarak rejected pressure from the USA by the late 1985 and early 1986 and was joint action against Libya and he restored Cairo's diplomatic relations with Moscow. He could resist the USA pressure because USA has invested lot of capital in Egypt. The mistakes of his rivals allowed Mubarak to achieve a gradual reintegration of Egypt into Arab World. Without prejudices to Egypt-Israeli links, 1983 he extended his protection to Yasser Arafat[35] and Ayyumed. Patronage of the Palestinian resistance, then the Arab-Oil States, fearful of Iran and of the spread of Shia Islamic Activism, looked to Egypt for a counter balance. This way Mubarak was able to demonstrate Egypt usefulness to the Arab's and was eventually inducted in 1989 to league of Arab States. Mubarak tried to break the peace process between Israel and Arabs. Though, in vane Syria also break peace with Egypt and Egypt thus emerged as a major power in the Arab world. Egypt also shrouded used its Western influence with the international creditors.

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[35] First President Leader of Palestine National Authority.

# CHAPTER III

## POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE POST 1990s AND FALL OF MUBARAK REGIME

### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

By the end of 1980's the international loan pressure has mounted on Egypt because of low economic growth. Egypt massive debt, significant unemployment, growing population and low Gross Domestic Product did not still confidence in investors and international financial institutions. A 1987 Egypt and International Monetary Fund struck an agreement in which Egypt could be permitted to reschedule its debt in exchange for a series of reforms such as modification of price control, increase in the interest rate, loosening of import restrictions and steps towards unifying the exchange rates. However, Egypt was reluctant to carry out the reforms as suggested by International Monetary Fund. In 1990's the political atmosphere in Arab World was more favorable for Egypt with the Iran- Iraq war will full swing, Cold war heating up Egypt was more important with United States that ever. Cairo play an important role in checking Iran's influence containing Soviet penetration of the Middle East and leading the camp of Arab moderates.

 In August 1990 Iraqi Army entered Kuwait and it proved to be an enormous economic wind fall for Egypt. Mubarak coalited with George Bush[36] and sent a contingent of 35,000 soldiers and an officers to Kuwait. Suddenly, Egypt was regarded as most influential Arab States. After the defeat of the Iraq, Egypt was duly regarded for its participation in the Gulf War United States and Arab

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[36] American President in the year January 2001 to January 2009.

creditors wrote-off or cancelled most of Egyptian debt. United States of America also convinced the Paris club to forgive full or half of what Cairo ought to a group of European countries such as Canada and Japan. The benefit of debt relief was immediate and Cairo was able to borrow money from international market at a lower interest rate. However, invasion on Iraq and growing friendship with United States was not liked by Muslim Brotherhood but Mubarak did not listen to the criticism made by Muslim Brotherhood and did not allow them to interfere in the internal policies. Some of their leaders were even arrested or retained in police custody. Egypt also plays an important role in grouping peace with Palestinian and Israelis. Mubarak was dealing with Palestinian leader Yaser-Arafaat who was shooned and crazy. After the assassination of Israel leader Rabin, Egypt was convinced that feature Israeli leaders were politically incapable or unwilling to deal with the Palestinian. Consequently, Egyptian lost interest by the late 1990s United States no longer saw Cairo as a partner in the peace process.

## 3.2 POST 1990s ECONOMIC SITUATION IN MUBARAK ERA

By 1996 Egypt was not happy with the Israel growing economic ties with the Arab World. At the time, President Mubarak suggested that the third Middle East North Africa Economic Summit an annual meeting began in 1994, which includes Israelis- be changed to a conference. In 1997 ,reflecting the deterioration of Israeli-Palestinian ties, most Arab countries boycotted the MENA Conference in Qatar while the Israeli's only sent a small low level delegation. In 1998, the conference was cancelled outright due to lack of progress between Israeli and Palestinians, the Arab side blamed the government of   Benjamin Netanyahu.[37] In the year 1999, the MENA conference, Amr

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[37] Israel Prime Minister in the year 2009.

Moussa[38] again conditioned Israel participation in the meeting on "substantive progress in the peace process" and for good measure, he added that there must be balanced security for all countries in the region based on international standards for disarmament" which was code for Egypt's long-standing demand that the Israeli's give up their nuclear weapons.[39] In the mid-1990s terrorist movement in the name of Jihad[40] started their influencing activities in Egypt. More than 2000 people were killed by the Islamic fundamentalist. Government active shifty embarked on information campaigning to delegitamize extremism and violence. The Government also cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood. The jihadi leaders were rounded up and were tried before military judges. By the turn of the century, Mubarak had taken the presidential oath for four times and was every way the master of the Egyptian political universe.

In the early 2000 the ruling party NDP launched a major initiative under the banner "New Thinking and Priorities" that would lay the groundwork for Egypt transition to democracy. A new young Turks were emerging in Egypt politics. The central figure in this group was the president son Gamal. Gamal had a reputation for being serious, hardworking and always in control of his environment. He had a master degree in Business Administration and work with Bank of America in Cairo and London. Gamal tilted the debt ridden economy to his advantage. He was benefiting for the sale of the debt of his employees and from BOA'S profit derived from Egypt's that by back programme. In 2002 the ruling party NDP set up a policies secretariat which would become the vehicle for Gamal's influence and ambition. The secretariat with Gamal in the chair was the place from which the NDP launched its programme of economic and

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[38] Egypt Foreign Minister in the year 2001.

[39] Steven A.Cook, The Struggle for Egypt (From Nasser to Tahir Square), Oxford University Press: New York, 2012, p. 164.

[40] Jihad is an Islamic term in Arabic which means struggle.

political reforms. Gamal increasing public profile also shed a spotlight on the groups of advisers around him who would play central roles advancing the ruling party agenda throughout the 2000's. His associates were well accomplished in their own field and were Minister in Mubarak Cabinet.

In early 2005 Mubarak directed the NDP law makers to amend the article 76 of the Constitution in a way that would allow on multi-party presidential elections. This was unprecedented in Egyptian history. After the amendment was passed president Mubarak embarked on his first competitive presidential campaign. He promised most of his initiatives in the economic and social spheres, further constitutional amendments to enhance personal and political freedoms, establish checks and balances between the branches of the government and ensure the independency of judiciary. As a result, In September 2005 the president was returned to his office with 88% of the vote. On the economic front the changes that took place during Mubarak years were impressive according to government statistics. The private sector was flourishing most of Egypt macro-economic indicators were pointing out in the right direction. Even though, the massive problem of under and unemployment and public that remained. Egypt became an international destination. Egypt was identified as the emerging market in the world and started attracting Foreign Direct Investment. This progress was reflected in the overall value of Egypt's stock market which increased almost 14 times between 2002 and 2010. Though, Egypt privatized 191 state-own companies but the position of the workers did not improve.

A number of Egyptian that worked in state sector decreased. The workers perceived that they were paying a heavy price for the privatization. They argue, that although privatization had been a boon to the Egyptian business class, the sale of the state-own sector has contributed not only too unemployment but also to an ever increasing an income gap in Egyptian society. In 2006 Youssef

Boutros Ghali, declared that the Egyptian economy was at the "take off stage".[41] The same year, Business week magazine identified Egypt as one of the top emerging markets in the world, and two years later "Egypt day" at the New York stock exchange was, according to investors who attended, a big hit.[42] In 2007 Egypt attracted a record $11 billion of foreign direct investment, more than half of which came from the Houston-based energy company Apache.[43] This progress was reflected in the overall value of Egypt's stock market which increased almost fourteen-fold between in the year 2002-2010.[44]

After the privatization floating the Egyptian pump was the other component of Egypt's economic liberalization programme. This move devalued the Egyptian bound and made the Egyptian export more expensive to the rest of the world. Egypt enjoyed a period of unprecedented economic growth of the second half of 2000's. But Egyptian grappled with the spite in prices as the pound was worth for less. Food and other consumer products became more expensive. The problem becomes acute in 2008 when Egyptian encountered a Bread shortage. Bread prices were well beyond the means of majority of Egyptians. However, the situation was brought under control and the price of bread fell considerable and bread was available at state level bakeries. The bread episode revealed the profound unpopularity of the economic reform programme and is architect.

The difficult economic condition that remains in Egyptian confronted also ran parallel to a political system. Egyptian has two houses of parliament and held regularly scheduled elections but still Egypt was police state in which rule prevailed by law. The regulation, decrees rules, and the laws of the state provided neither a level legal playing ground for all citizens nor the means to

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[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.

redress for the grievances through a neutral legal system. Since 2003 Egypt has undertaken many political reforms under western pressure. These reforms seem impressive and looked as an Egypt was moving at a democratic politics. At the direction of Mubarak a provision for multi candidate's presidential election was introduced and the law governing the establishment of political party altered.

As a result, in 2005 presidential election president Mubarak faced nine challenges none of whom were independence. 34 Constitutional amendments were passed in people's assembly in March 2007. These changes were made the rebalancing the powers of three branches of the government. As a result amendments to the constitution required that the government presents its budget to the parliament at least three months before the end of fiscal year and legislators were given the responsibility to approve the budget by line by line. Another amendment permitted the people's assembly to withdraw its confidence in Prime Minister without having to submit the decision to the public for a mode. Both changes were appreciated by the Egyptian as it's provided a check on executive power. Another Constitutional amendment allowed the president to dissolve the parliament at any time without having to answer to the public referendum. This was a power that Mubarak seems to relish.

The 2007 Constitutional Amendments further restricted the rights of citizens to organize parties. Amended Article 5 of the Egyptian Constitution affirms the rights the rights of Egyptians to form political parties but also prescribed political activities and party based on religion.  The Muslim Brotherhood was banned on all political activities. Besides, Muslim Brotherhood other political leaders like Nour and Dr. Saad also came under increasing state pressure for asking questions about the informal sources of power and legitimacy in Egyptian  society. More restrictions were put on Egyptian press. The curve on press gave rise to bloggers who posted shopping pictures and videos of police

beating, sexual assault of women on the internet. The interior ministry systematically targeted bloggers and even arrested them. International press also started publishing the stories of police torture and sexual assault on women which tarnish the image of Egypt. However, the atrocities of interior ministry did not deter the journalist to protest against the restricted laws and outright coercion in March 2008. Many opposition newspapers reported fallacy that President Mubarak had fallen gravely ill. This Report gives an opportunity to exact take revenge on the papers and their editor's up to January 2011. The Regime always managed to prevail through a combination of bravery and coercion.

## 3.3 FAILURE OF LIBERAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS IN EGYPT

In the thirty years period, Mubarak introduced several reforms. The introduction of the introduction of political, economic reforms according to liberal principles could not stop Egyptian crisis. The two decades of economic liberalisation policies were accompanied by authoritarianism while at the same time these policies opened up opportunities for crony capital. Hosni Mubarak continued to carry out neo-liberal economic reforms in responding the external pressure, particularly international financial institutions. The vast majority of Egyptians was left behind the growing poverty and infrastructure crumbled.

Since the assassination of President Sadat, Egypt has been ruled by emergency laws. During Mubarak's period, Egypt was ruled by the regressive laws that restrict civil society and consolidated authoritarian rule. It suspended the basic rights of the people. Mubarak regime derives its international legitimacy from a

false political dualism that offers the international community only two choices for Egyptian governance: the current regime, or Islamic extremists.[45]

Poor governance in Egypt also fuelled vast economic discrepancies and poverty. The poor human rights records and living conditions owe largely to Mr. Mubarak's autocratic tendencies. In 2005, he faced strong public disapproval after halting efforts of human rights activists contesting his power. Both local and international human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International have criticized the country's poor human rights record.[46]

Though the political and economic reforms in the following of liberal policies led to 5 percent annual macroeconomic growth During the 1990s, yet it did not distribute these gains fairly and transparently. The introduction of political, economic reforms according to liberal principles could not stop Egyptian crisis. Egypt faced the Institutional fragmentation- The industrial, trade and general investment policies remained fragmented among a number of state agencies that were seldom linked. Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) stress on export diversification and promotion in the post-1990 years, the Egyptian state failed to restructure exports through promoting non-oil and manufactured products. [47] Economic growth could not provide benefits to all section of Egyptian society. President Hosni Mubarak introduced liberalisation policies in order to respond the domestic economic crisis and external pressure in 1990s.

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[45] Dina Guirguis (2009), "Promoting Democracy in Egypt", [Online: web] Accessed 9th Sept 2012, URL:http://www.eurasiacritic.com/articles/promoting-democracy-egypt#.

[46] Ashley Gagne (2011), "Egypt's Revolution: A Prelude to Democracy", [Online: web] Accessed 9th Sept 2012, URL:http://wphr.org/2011/ashley/egypt%E2%80%99s-revolution-a-prelude-to-democracy/.

[47] Amr Ismail Ahmed Adly (2011), "When Cheap is Costly: Rent Decline, Regime Survival and State Reform in Mubarak's Egypt (1990–2009)", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 47(2): 295-313

According to Raymond A. Hinnnebush, in a weak state-weak society scenario, neither state nor society has the strength to reform. Egypt received debt relief from western powers in return for its support for the Iraq war in 1990s. The failure of Mubarak's policies to tackle the socio-economic and political crisis, made ground for democratic upsurge in Egypt. The unresolved problems increase Egypt's vulnerability to international forces allowing them to impose reform. This loss of autonomy deprives Egypt of the ability to craft reform according to its own interests. Mubarak also inherited Sadat's legacy of infitah. *Infitah* sought to replace *etatism* with foreign, Arab, and private capital as the engines of development but, in failing fully to roll back Nasser's heritage; it did not create the necessary investment climate.[48]

National Democratic Party (NDP) took many internal reforms in the post 2000s. But the NDP was embarrassed by its initial showing in the 2000 parliamentary elections, in which independent candidates (most of whom later allied themselves to the NDP) won a majority of seats. This spurred the emergence of a new wave of younger-generation, Western-educated reformers within the NDP. This group was led by President Hosni Mubarak's son Gamal, who was appointed Chairman of the newly instituted Policy Secretariat - the third-ranking position in the NDP - in 2002. Gamal Mubarak and his allies from the Policy Secretariat led the effort to transform the NDP into a modern institution modelled after Western political parties. [49]

The presidential elections were followed in November 2005 by parliamentary elections, which were held with a number of guarantees in place to ensure the fairness of the process. These included reducing the number of voting stations,

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[48] Raymond A. Hinnnebush (1993), "The Politics of Economic Reform in Egypt", Third World Quarterly, 14(1):159-160.

[49] Egypt: Will Democracy Succeed the Pharaoh

in order to properly implement the constitutional requirement that all stations be presided over by a judge, and opening all balloting stations to monitoring by Egyptian civil society groups, who provided approximately forty-five-hundred monitors observing all stages of the elections.[50]

Despite the several reform and political developments, there were many backwards steps taken during Mubarak's period. Emad Shahin has pointed eight major factors, which led backward to Egypt's political system. First factor was the cancellation of local elections after parliamentary elections. Second step was the extended power granted to corrupt local governments. Third reason was crackdowns on judges and journalists. Fourth factor was denial of legitimization to political parties. Fifth major reason was the denial of legal status to the most important political parties. Seventh factor which contributed to fuel the political crisis was harsh crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood. Seventh was the control and manipulation of elections. It made the de-legitimisation and declined the people's trust in system. Eight factor was withdrawal of support for democracy as an objective of the regime. President Mubarak's plans to have his son succeed him in the absence of military intervention and in the absence of a vice president.[51] The regime's efforts to restore control after 2005 and fear over the erosion of popular support for the government were important issues which caused the democratic upsurge and led the new political development in Egypt.

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[50] Fahmy, Nabil (2006), "Egypt's Unwavering Path to Democratic Reform", *Mediterranean Quarterly,* 17, (3): 6.

[51] Emad Shahin (2007), "Challenges to Transition in the Middle East and North Africa", lectured on the Prospects for Democratic Transition in the Middle East and North Africa: Implications of the Central /East European and African experiences at October 18-20th 2007, Council for a Community of Democracies, the Smith Richardson Foundation, Budapest Hungary, p.15.

## 3.4 DOWN FALL OF MUBARAK REGIME IN EGYPT

Mubarak started his term office with an attempt to ameliorate the political tensions that swept the political scene under his predecessors. He released political prisoners and expanded the level of press freedom. The 1980's saw regular multi-party elections. Although, fairly widespread irregularities despite a number of constitutional amendments, the Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution remained intact. Constitutional amendment initiated by Hosni Mubarak in 2005 and 2007 were widely perceived as attempt to temper the political participation of Muslim Brotherhood. Mubarak also relied an Al-Azhar to give legitimacy to his politics. He used fatwa's from Al-Azhar to justify participation of in the second Gulf War[52] to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait and to denounce Islamic extremism which witnessed and upsurge and wave of terrorist's activities during the 1990's. Elevating the practice of nationalization and control over mosque the Mubarak regime increases the pace of nationalization of Mosque and curtailed the number of permits to establish new private Mosque.

As a matter of fact down fall of Mubarak era started somewhere in 2007, when the people gathered in the streets to opposed the mounting price of Bread. Mubarak era was the symbol of terrorism, torture and illegal detention. In the year 2007 Amnesty international alleged that Egypt has become as International Centre for Torture.[53] Even Human Rights Organization in its report suggested that Egypt follows policies of torture, arbitrary detention, and trial before military and state security court. Egypt also has a NCHR which is headed by former UN Secretary General, who directly report to president. The council has also come under heavy criticism by local activists who content it undermines human rights works in Egypt by surveying as propaganda tool for the government to excused its violation and to give legitimacy to repressive laws.

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[52] The second Gulf war was held in the year 2003.
[53] www.amnesty.org/report/2007/africa/egypt.

Mubarak government's policy to privatize more than 100 state-own corporations was also not linked by the politician and workers alike. Instead of increasing the employment rate, this new resulted is more unemployment or under unemployment and workers unrest also increased. Up to 1990 Mubarak government was under heavy debt burden, the burden was ease to some extent. After the second Gulf war when United States and other European countries waved off a substantial portion of debt which Egypt owed to them. At for this, Egyptian pound[54] was subject to market fluctuation and the value of the pound decrease appreciably making Egyptian export difficult. Inflation was it's at height and economic growth was decreasing consistently. The gap between the rich and the poor widened. All this led to 2011 revolution in Egypt, After 18 days of mass protests against the thirty years of authoritarian regime, which was resulted that Mubarak resigned on 11 February 2011. The downfall of Hosni Mubarak led to the new political development in Egypt and started a journey for establishment of democracy.

## 3.5 EGYPT'S TRANSITION AND POST MUBARAK POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Since the fall of Mubarak authoritarian rule on 11feburary 2011, there have been taken several political development in Egypt. SCAF assumed executive power, dissolving parliament and suspending constitution two days later. According to CRS report for congress 2011, the referendum endorsed the constitutional amendments. SCAF issued constitutional declaration with approved amendments and new provisions in March 2011. New political parties began to register for parliamentary election in May/June 2011. Though SCAF released the electoral law in July 2011 and delayed the parliament election to November and amid call for more time for parties to organize, yet the Debate over

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[54] Currency of Egypt

constitutional principles and electoral law intensify party coalition blocs began to form and swift in august 2011. Many protestors were killed by military in Cairo. SCAF amended electoral law under pressure, reducing proportion of non list candidates in September 2011.[55]

The parliament election was conducted since November 2011 to March 2012. The presidential election had also taken place in April 2012. Md. Morsi became Egypt's President on 30th June 2012. The process for formation of constitutional assembly was decided to begin between summer 2012 to as long as spring 2013.[56]

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[55] Jermy M. Sharp (2011), *Egypt in Transition*, CRS Report for Congress, 18 November 2011, RL 33003, Prepared for Members and Committee of Congress p.6.

[56] Ibid, p.10.

# CHAPTER IV

# POLITICAL PROCESS AND CHALLENGES IN THE FORMATION OF NEW POLITICAL STRUCTURE

## 4.1 INTRODUCTION

On 25 January 2011, widespread protest began against Mubarak regime. The objective of the protests was the removal of Mubarak from the power. Large protests begin in major cities. Over 18 days protestors clash with police. These protests took the form of an intensive campaign of civil resistance supported by a very large number of people. After three days, even Muslim Brotherhood joint the protests by 29 January 2011 it was becoming clear that Mubarak's regime had lost control when a curfew order was ignored and army took a semi-neutral instance on enforcing the curfew order. On 11 February Hosni Mubarak resigned and flat Cairo Vice-President Amr-Soulemein announced that Mubarak had step down and then the Egyptian Military would assume control of the nation-affairs in the short term. Juvelline celebration broke out in Tahir Square.

On 13 February 2011, the high- level military command of Egypt had been dissolved. The parliamentary election has to be held in September. The Muslim Brotherhood was the clear winner in the parliamentary election that ended in January 2012 holding roughly half of the seats. In March, the brotherhood reneged on a promised not to see presidency. Its initial candidate was rejected by the courts. On the basis of Mubarak era conviction and the parties' back-up candidate Mohamed Morsi became the President. On 8 July 2012 Mohamed Morsi unexpectedly ordered that parliament is re-convened in a direct challenge

to the military and the court which the next day reaffirm its ruling dissolving the body. On 30 June 2012, Mohamed Morsi was formerly Sworn in as the first democratically elected president of Egypt signaling a new stage in an ever merrier struggle to define the future of the nation. After six decades of military backed autocracy.

## 4.2 CHALLENGES FOR THE NEW POLITICAL STRUCTURE

The biggest challenges that Mohamed Morsi faces to rectify the mistakes committed by Hosni Mubarak and fulfill the dreams of masses. Some of the Challenges are given below:

### 4.2.1 ECONOMIC STAGNATION

The biggest challenge facing Mohamed Morsi is the country's economic progress. The biggest challenge facing Morsi and the MB is the economy. Today Egypt has an economy worth $168 billion, almost entirely driven by agriculture, media, petroleum exports and tourism. Its services industry constitutes 49% of the economy.

The problem with the Egyptian economy is the fact that an elite few control it. When elites control an economy, they use their power to create monopolies and block the entry of new people and firms. This is how Egypt worked for three decades under Hosni Mubarak. Even when they did "liberalize," they privatized large parts of the economy right into the hands of Mubarak friends and those of his son Gamal. Big businessmen close to the regime, such as Ahmed Ezz (iron and steel), the Sawiris family (multimedia, beverages, and telecommunications), and Mohamed Nosseir (beverages and telecommunications) received not only protection from the state but also government contracts and large bank loans.

Egypt's economy needs to be restructured away from services and towards agriculture and industry. This will make the nation self-sufficient, remove foreign dependency, create jobs and stimulate the wider economy. In order to achieve this, the following plans can and should be perused:

First, the government in Egypt spends more than 60% of the revenue it collects in debt repayments. This amounts to over 120 billion Egyptian pounds annually. This government expenditure needs to be removed, eliminating illegal expenditure such as interest debt repayments and focusing the remaining funds on the critical needs of the country. A significant burden on government resources would be removed immediately by the cessation of payments on interest based loans.

Second, The Sharia makes it illegal for an individual or company or group of companies to seek to corner the market in a product and then use this position to inflate prices. The Morsi government should investigate and prosecute those attempting to monopolize the market and break up existing monopolies.

Third, Agriculture should be mechanized. Egypt has over 3 million hectares of arable land, which is more than enough to supply Egypt's population given the appropriate high yield technology. This will also bring in significant taxes for central government.

Fourth, in modern times, Egypt shifted its agricultural base to produce cotton, a crop whose demand for high temperatures, solar input and water supplies are uniquely suited to Egypt. Cotton supplied the country with additional income streams, but at a huge cost: Every hectare of land that is dedicated to cotton is one not dedicated to Wheat. As cotton output increased, Egypt imported more and more food. Today roughly 60% of the country's wheat requirements are

imported. Feeding the domestic population rather than exporting should be Morsi's number one aim.

Fifth, Egypt has around 4.4 billion barrels of proven oil reserves coupled with 2.1 trillion cubic meters of proven gas reserves. This should be used to kick start an industrial drive.

Sixth, Egypt's geography is unique in that all its population lives in only 30,000 sq km out of 1 million sq km. This population, due to the climate lives in a strip running down the center of the country. Further cities should be constructed on the coast with the Red Sea; this will lead to a construction boom and stimulate numerous related industries. These coastal towns should be linked from a transport perspective with the river Nile thus linking the whole nation together. This will then allow the nation to look for off-shore oil and gas in the Red Sea and will also link it to international sea lanes. All of this will create jobs and led to economic growth.

Seven, Islam's economic distributive model rather than the Western capitalist free market should be implemented straight away. This will mean wealth distribution rather than economic growth will be the priority. Islam achieves this by removing all obstacles to wealth distribution such as interest, reducing taxes down to a few, the implementation of the gold standard and the removal of speculative financial markets.

## 4.2.2 DEALING WITH ARMY

The Egyptian military since Nasser rose to power has shaped the country ensuring they remained the real rulers. The Egyptian president has always been the head of the army. Another challenge for Mohamed Mori's government is to

deal with the army because the majority of Egypt's regional governors are retired army officers. Many of the big civilian institutions and public sector corporations are run by former generals. The country's three main land-developing authorities (agricultural, urban and tourism) are headed by former military officers who, in addition to their pensions, receive lucrative salaries and perks associated with their civilian jobs. The army would for obvious reasons want to maintain such a position and that is why it has supported the US in its aims in the region in return for annual military aid.[57] The army's interference in the running of the country and its disproportionate influence is the problem which both Mohamed Morsi and the MB need to tackle. There are a few possibilities in attempting to weaken the army:

The army's leader has always been the defense minister in the cabinet, which in reality should be a civilian role, as is the case with all countries. This should be countered by Morsi, as defense production, military sales and purchases will not be in the hands of the army.

The military is currently run by a junta of 21 senior officers, who ousted Mubarak and have made themselves the rulers of the country. The SCAF is composed of soldiers who should have retired a long time ago. Due to them not retiring a generational gap has evolved in the military as younger officers have been unable to gain promotions. The current crops of generals are loyal to the US and need to be replaced with younger officers who are loyal to the civilian leadership.

Morsi could counter the armies role in the country by arming a new police force, which is loyal to him and giving them wide powers in removing the army's

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[57] www.khilafah.com

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interests from the different strata's of the county. This is a similar strategy used by Erdogan of Turkey.

The role of the army should be changed to achieve a grand vision. This vision should be none other than reunification with the rest of the Muslim world. This will keep the army busy with external issues and away from domestic interference. This will also strengthen Morsi as for the moment the army view him as a weak leader that can be used.

## 4.2.3 SOCIAL COHESION:

The challenge Morsi and the MB face are creating a level playing field internally, which will create social cohesion and which will lead the position of Morsi being much stronger. In order to achieve this, the following policies could be pursued:-

First, The MB should have already had an adopted constitution written and used this as a basis to rule the country. Without doing this, what the MB stands for is not clear and the army will in reality impose a constitution which will strengthen itself rather than the country. As the MB won a landslide victory in the parliament, although now dissolved and the presidency – a clear mandate to rule by Islam, an Islamic constitution should be drawn up. After this it would be debated by the country and maybe even disagreed upon with some elements in the country. This debate will allow the MB to shift the discussion to which specific articles should be in the Islamic constitution and thus would have made having an Islamic constitution the public opinion in the country and would have silenced the secularists. This would also give confidence to the nation that the MB can rule as they have general principals in the form of a constitution in order to develop detailed polices. As the principles the MB stand for would have

been clearly aired, this would have left no room for compromise as this would be a flagrant disregard for what they stand for.

Second, the current situation prevalent in the Muslim world where ruling families decide the laws that society must abide by whilst they remain above the very laws they have created, this is just the other side of the democratic coin. A direct consequence of people is making the laws. Whether laws are developed collectively, through consensus or by a monarch it is inevitable that a tiny segment of society will legislate for them.

Third, Money and politics should be completely separated as Islamic governance obliges, this will deal with the corruption that plagues the country. Anyone in government should have a fixed wage especially the ruler himself and this should be determined by the people.

Fourth, the powers of Morsi should in reality be restricted by the establishment of a Majlis al-Ummah. This is an elected council whose members can be Muslim, non-Muslim, men or women. These members represent the interests of their constituencies within the country. The Majlis should have no powers of legislation like in a democratic system but have many powers that act as a counterbalance to the executive powers of the ruler. These should include expressing dissatisfaction with officials and in this matter the view of the Majlis view should is binding and the ruler must discharge them at once.

### 4.2.4 CORRUPTION

The next challenge for Mohamed Morsi's government is the corruption in high places. "The Mubarak era will be known in the history of Egypt as the era of

thieves".[58] Corruption in Egypt has reached unprecedented heights in the name of privatization and the change to a market economy. The government has sold the great part of the public sector companies for less than a quarter of their value to businessmen working for Mubarak's sons, or to foreign companies in return for huge commissions for Mubarak and his sons or other top officials. Reports believed the personal wealth of Mubarak and his family to be between US$40 billion and $70 billion due to corruption, kickbacks and legitimate business activities.

## 4.25 REUNIFICATION

The grand vision Morsi and the MB should always have had and now should be implementing is the Islamic obligation of reunifying the Muslim world. This is the grand vision the Egyptian army should be tasked with and the only way to rid the country of US dependency.

Morsi should immediately work to reunify both Libya and Sudan who Egypt shares borders with. Libya since the fall of Gaddafi has turned into a battlefield between competing tribes, clans and militias. The west abandoned the country after the removal of Gaddafi like it abandoned Afghanistan after the soviet occupation ended. Many from Libya called for Egyptian intervention when they were launching the uprising against Gaddafi. With the size of the Egyptian army this is easily achievable and will allow for synergies as Egypt can provide food and agriculture to Libya, which it has a shortage of, whilst Libya can provide Egypt with energy, which Libya has immense reserves of. Sudan and Egypt were once one nation until the destruction of the Khilafah and has ever since been the battleground between western powers. Western powers have been able

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[58] Ibid.

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to use the weak central governments neglect of its people to interfere which ultimately led to the creation of South Sudan.

After this unification with Algeria and Tunisia it should be launched. This strategy of reunification will end any dependency on the US. Last but not least we are saying that Morsi government have to facing above challenges and will trying to create a prosperous, progressive, inclusive and modern Egyptian state that is in keeping with its people's aspirations. If he fails to do so, the Egyptian people will lose far more than what the Muslim Brotherhood has lost in terms of its popular support.

**CHAPTER V**

**CONCLUSION**

In conclusion some remark may be made over the study so far taken in the main chapters. It is clear by now that the concept of political development focuses on the institutional building, mass mobilization and participation, administration and legal development, increasing franchise, free and fair election in order to strengthen democracy and political stability. It is the process to encourage more and more people's participation in decision making and political processes. It emphasizes the openness in the working of government and accountability of rulers to the ruled, to ensure the independence of judiciary and existence of the rule of law

Egypt has a history of authoritarian regime for the past thirty years. Mubarak became Head of the State in 1981 and carried forward the reforms initiated by Sadat. He conducted direct election to the National Assembly with multi party structure and a wider franchise. Among the new parties in opposition was a resurrection of the liberal Wqfd party, dating back to the time of monarchy. President Hosni Mubarak introduced liberalization policies in order to respond the domestic economic crisis and external pressure in 1990s. Mubarak government tried to restructure Egyptian economy according to a free market principle. In 1990s Egypt received debt relief from western powers in return for its support for the Iraq war.

The failure of Mubarak policies to tackle the socio-economic and political crisis, made ground for democratic upsurge in Egypt. Although number of efforts had been made to ensure people rights yet people's disappointment grew against Mubarak government. When Mubarak was re-elected in September 2005 for a fifth term, there was a perception among Egyptian people that Mubarak was

trying to groom his son Gamal Mubarak to take over when his period was going to end. The regressive changes to the constitution and the heavily manipulated November 2010 elections had cemented the domination of the ruling National Democratic Party. It humiliated opposition parties and infuriated the politically attuned public. Over the past three decades roughly the period of the Mubarak regimes rule, Egypt experienced unemployment, poverty, torture, suppression of people's democratic rights. The corruption, arrogance of the elite bred stagnation and anger. The unemployment has led to despair and frustration among the people.

Now in the present scenario Post Mubarak Egypt has witnessed positive developments such as the rise of political parties, independent trade union federations and other social groups aiming to participate in rebuilding a democratic society. But there are big challenges to incorporate all the sections of Egyptian society in building a democratic society.

In the following page brief conclusion of each chapters may be narrated

In Chapter I deal with the Introduction part in which the concept of political development can be defined by different political scientists such as, Diament and Eisenstaedt, David Apter, Gabriel Almond, James Coleman, Harold Laswell, Lucian Pye, Samuel Huntington, Talcott Parsons etc. What we found that among the definitions of political development, Huntington's formulation seems to be most useful for the purposes of our study as he conceptualizes political development in terms of institutionalization. According to him political development is the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability. The adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence of its organizations and procedures can measure the level of institutionalization. The adaptability of an organ can be measured by its age, which can be measured in three ways: age, generational age and functional adaptability.

It is also mentioned that the second criterion of measuring the level of institutionalization is complexity. The more complex of an organization is more institutionalized. According to Huntington, involves both multiplications of organizational sub-units, hierarchically and functionally and differentiation of separate types of organization sub unites. The third criterion of measuring the level of institutionalization is the extent to which political organizations and procedures exist independently of the social groupings and methods of behavior. If political organizations are found to be outside influences, it is likely that the level of institutionalization is low. The fourth criterion is coherence. The more coherent and unified an organization is the more institutionalized it will be coherence of an organization can be measured by the availability of procedures for resolving disputes.

So, we found that the institutional development in Egypt started with Mohammed Ali's decree of 1824 which established Majhlis-al-Ali ( High Council) and Kedvive Imsa'il's Majhlis Shura al-Nuwab (Council of Deputies) followed by the liberal constitution formed in 1923 and a number of Constitutional declarations drafted by military rulers after revolution of 1952.

In Chapter 2 it refers to that after a long struggle for independence it became a separate state in 1953.Gamal Abdul Nasser led the nationalist reformist free officers group to liberate Egypt from traditional monarchy. Nasser introduced many schemes of land reforms, social welfare, and a nationalist foreign policy. However, Nasser could not garner the support of Egyptian land-lord or business classes and its defeat in 1967 by Israel alienated it's from United States. After Nasser Anwar-As-Sadat became the president of Egypt. He was vice president at Nasser's time. He modifies the policies of the state and tilted the policies towards the Egyptian middle class to garner their support. He also tried to win the favour of United States. However, he carried out a limited political

liberalization. He was more depended on the business classes internally and American alliance externally. He was also authoritarian rule Parliament, Opposition Parties, Interest Groups and the Press enjoyed limited freedom.

On 6 October 1981, President Sadat was assassinated by Islamic extremists. His Vice-President and an air force commander Hosni Mubarak inherited power in 14 October 1981 on the basis of constitutional legitimacy and was also supported by political elite because he has distinguished himself in a 1973 war. After become a President, Mubarak confronted a number of challenges as the trauma of Sadat's murder faded. Mubarak struck a moderate tone during his first year of president. On the foreign policy front, he continued to cultivate good relations with USA, which remained Egypt principle aid donor. Mubarak also did not back away from the peace with Israel. Mubarak policies were e cautious and enabled it to repair its relationships with Arab states.

It also mentions that Egypt political institutions includes President, Supreme Council of Armed Forces, The People's Assembly, Cabinet Ministers , The Shura Council, Elite Group, Military, Local Government, Legal System, Interests Groups, Political Parties, Foreign Policy. The major powers of the Egyptian President are: He appoints an Army Commander, Heads of the Security, Senior Civil Servants, Heads of Autonomous Bodies, Governors, News Paper Editor, University President, Judges, Major Religious Officials and Public Sector Managers. He functions through a Council of Ministers. He formulates the foreign policy of the Country. He all-powerful because he can dismiss the parliament at will. He also enjoys a legislative veto.

In Chapter 3 focuses on the post 1990 development in Egypt. It is clearly understood that President Hosni Mubarak introduced liberalization policies in order to respond the domestic economic crisis and external pressure in 1990s. Mubarak government tried to restructure Egyptian economy according to a free

market principle. In 1990s Egypt received debt relief from western powers in return for its support for the Iraq war. In following of the liberalization policies, Egypt's $23 billion of western international debt was forgiven. Mubarak government launched the programme of privatization of state assets and began to see funds, both foreign and Egyptian-owned flow in the country in search of investment. But the introduction socio-economic reforms according to liberal principles could not stop Egyptian crisis.

The two decades of economic liberalization policies were accompanied by authoritarianism while at the same time these policies opened up opportunities for crony capitalism. Egypt faced the institutional fragmentation. The industrial trade and general investment policies remained fragmented among a number of state agencies that were seldom linked. Egypt during the presidency of Hosni Mubarak continued to carry out neo-liberal economic reforms in responding the external pressure, particularly international financial institutions. Though it produced economic growth yet it could not provide benefits to all section of Egyptian society. The vast majority of Egyptians was left behind the growing poverty and infrastructure crumbled. However, the failure of Mubarak policies to tackle the socio-economic and political crisis, made ground for democratic upsurge in Egypt. Although number of efforts had been made to ensure people rights yet people's disappointment grew against Mubarak government. When Mubarak was re-elected in September 2005 for a fifth term, there was a perception among Egyptian people that Mubarak was trying to groom his son Gamal Mubarak to take over when his period was going to end. The regressive changes to the constitution and the heavily manipulated November 2010 elections had cemented the domination of the ruling National Democratic Party. It humiliated opposition parties and infuriated the politically attuned public. Over the past three decades roughly the period of the Mubarak regimes rule, Egypt experienced unemployment, poverty, torture, suppression of people's

democratic rights. The corruption, arrogance of the elite bred stagnation and anger. The unemployment has led to despair and frustration among the people.

It is also clearly mentioned that Mubarak government done most constitutional amendments to ensure the human rights, freedom of expression, political participation and other rights. Egyptian people complained the sorts of political, social and economic disabilities. Political reforms had been less tangible than appears at first impressions. Egypt remained a single party state with president as Head of the State as well as leader of the ruling party National Democratic Party. As a matter of fact down fall of Mubarak era started somewhere in 2007, when the people gathered in the streets to opposed the mounting price of Bread. Mubarak era was the symbol of terrorism, torture and illegal detention. In the year 2007 Amnesty international alleged that Egypt has become as International Centre for Torture. Even Human Rights Organization in its report suggested that Egypt follows policies of torture, arbitrary detention, and trial before military and state security court. Egypt also has a NCHR which is headed by former UN Secretary General, who directly report to president. The council has also come under heavy criticism by local activists who content it undermines human rights works in Egypt by surveying as propaganda tool for the government to excused its violation and to give legitimacy to repressive laws.

Mubarak government's policy to privatize more than 100 state-own corporations was also not linked by the politician and workers alike. Instead of increasing the employment rate, this new resulted is more unemployment or under unemployment and workers unrest also increased. Up to 1990 Mubarak government was under heavy debt burden, the burden was ease to some extent. After the second Gulf war when United States and other European countries waved off a substantial portion of debt which Egypt owed to them. At for this, Egyptian pound was subject to market fluctuation and the value of the pound

decrease appreciably making Egyptian export difficult. Inflation was it's at height and economic growth was decreasing consistently. The gap between the rich and the poor widened. All this led to 2011 revolution in Egypt, After 18 days of mass protests against the thirty years of authoritarian regime, which was resulted that Mubarak resigned on 11 February 2011. The downfall of Hosni Mubarak led to the new political development in Egypt and started a journey for establishment of democracy.

In Chapter 4 basically concentrated on Post Mubarak Egypt has witnessed positive developments such as the rise of political parties, independent trade union federations and other social groups aiming to participate in rebuilding a democratic society. But there are big challenges to incorporate all the sections of Egyptian society in building a democratic society. Egypt is a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society. Ethnic Egyptian constitute 95% of Egypt's total population whereas Egypt's minorities include Nubians, Berbers (Siwa Oasis), Bedouins, Arabs, Turks and Greeks additionally to small tribal communities such as Bejas and Doms. There are cleavages among various sections of Egyptian society.  In the face of the repressive regime, a remarkable development took place in Egypt which was also deeply influenced by successful Tunisian Jasmine Revolution. People started to protests against Hosni Mubarak regime on 25 January 2011. The uprising which began on 25 January 2011, rejected torture, poverty, corruption and employment. The revolt bought the millions of people to the street in order to fulfill the socio-economic and political demands and to end authoritarian Egypt regime. The protestors seized the symbolic space at Tahir Square in downtown Cairo which means in liberation in Arabic. The large cohort of Egyptians which included Student activists, middle class workers shown their strong desire for change and to end the oppression.

It is also mentioned that at present, each group has turned the SCAF the junta to which Mubarak delegated power on 11 February 2011. The current constitutional amendments were passed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and caretaker cabinet has been accepted by the Egyptian people in a referendum which was conducted on 19 March, is just the beginning of a long reform process. In order to establish a stable democracy there is need to ensure a free press, freedom of expression and association, accountability, an independent judiciary, the checks and balances that come with a separation of religion from the state, and also the executive from the legislature. There is also required to provide safeguards and the upholding of human rights, protections for minorities and freedom of religion. The massive economic and social problems that fuelled the uprisings would continue to challenge any new leadership. The downfall of Hosni Mubarak led to the new political development in Egypt and started a journey for establishment of democracy. It as also noteworthy that the Egypt's first elected president over long decades, Mohamed Morsi has to deal with strong military, corruption, unemployment, education issues, accumulated economic problems and poverty etc should be eradicate to establish a "Real Democracy" in a modern Egyptian State.

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