

**THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CHINA'S  
ENGAGEMENT IN AFRICA**

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University in  
partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the  
degree of*

**MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

**RAJEEV YADAV**




**Centre for European Studies  
School of International Studies  
Jawaharlal Nehru University  
New Delhi- 110067  
2012**



26 July 2012

**DECLARATION**

I declare that the dissertation entitled “The European Union and China’s Engagement in Africa”, submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** is my own work. This has been done under the guidance and supervision of Prof. R. K Jain. The dissertation has not been submitted for the award of an M.Phil. degree in this university or any other university.

  
Rajeev Yadav

**CERTIFICATE**

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

  
Prof. R. K. Jain

**(CHAIRPERSON)**  
Chairperson  
Centre for European Studies  
School of International Studies  
Jawaharlal Nehru University  
New Delhi-110067, India

  
Prof. R. K. Jain

**(SUPERVISOR)**  
Supervisor  
Centre for European Studies  
School of International Studies  
Jawaharlal Nehru University  
New Delhi-110067, India

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

- ACP - Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific
- Aft - Aid for Trade
- AGOA - African Growth and Opportunity Act
- AU - African Union
- CCP - Chinese Communist Party
- CNPC - Chinese National Petroleum Company
- DAC - Development Assistance Committee
- EAC - East African Community
- EBA - Everything But Arms
- EC - European Commission
- EC - European Community (EC)
- EDF - European Development Fund
- EEP - European Economic Community
- EIDHR - European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
- EITI - Extractive Industries Trade Initiative
- EPA - Economic Partnership Agreements
- EU - European Union
- FLEGT - Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade
- FOCAC - Forum of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum
- GSP - General System of Preferences
- ICBS - Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC)
- JAES - Joint Africa–EU Strategy
- LDC - Least Developed Countries
- MDG - Millennium Development Goals
- MOFCOM - Ministry of Commerce People's Republic of China
- NEPAD - New Partnership for Arica's Development
- NPE - Normative Power Europe
- ODA - Official Development Aid (ODA)
- OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
- OPEC - Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
- REC - Regional Economic Communities


**SADC - Southern African Development Community**

**SER - Social and Environmental Responsibility**

**UNSC - United Nations Security Council**

**WB - World Bank**

**WTO - World Trade Organization**





## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Africa from its colonial history and present had become a continent facing problems. All sorts of calls are being made on Africa because of its oil and mineral wealth and, secondly, because it represents a fast-growing consumer bonanza as its population rises. To explain this phenomenon, several factors have to be taken together, in particular the hunger for raw materials of the emerging countries, especially China with its exponential growth. Keeping in mind the insecurity, which reigns in the Middle East, the US has also tried to enhance the access to African resources.

Recently whole of the world has observed the “Arab Spring” and the area of effect was the Middle East and northern part of Africa mostly in the resource rich countries governed and managed by dictator governments. It has also raised the concerns for the immediate neighbourhood as EU along with others traditional donors, had always tried to maintain peace and security. The different movements throughout the region clearly display similarities: first and foremost a desire for democracy and freedom, especially of opinion and expression, as well as a determination to rid their country of corrupt rulers and a system that abrogated their basic rights. The demographic situation in these countries, especially in Egypt, also played a role, as did negative economic prospects, which were further undermined by the ongoing economic crisis. This rings the alarm bell for EU policy makers to infuse in the recipient countries more responsibility towards civic issues and democracy and this could be only done when EU able to include most of the African countries to their aid and trade regime. On the other side China also does not want to miss the opportunities of exploring the African continent in search for natural resources to fuel its economic development.

With the recent discoveries of oil in Mozambique in 2011 in which European companies hold most of the stakes while China does not have any stakes as yet highlights the importance of Africa. None of the major powers want to lose any chance to fulfil their national interests In this context Africa becomes an

important player in world politics as it has unexplored natural resources and secondly most of countries are in poverty, so it also gives the scope to traditional as well as emerging donors to play their games of aid and trade on African land. Hence it is important part of study to investigate the competition between EU and China in Africa and secondly this would also bring out impact of Chinese activities in Africa over the policies of European Union (EU).

### **The European Union and Africa**

The EU attempted to establish an institutionalised arrangement governing its relations with the colonies and former colonies of its member states in the African continent. The first of these arrangements was an association of French colonies with the EU in the Treaty of Rome of 1957. This association initially existed alongside the last French colonial political relationship with its colonies, the French Community, which was established in 1958. The French Community came to an end in 1960, with the achievement of political independence by most of the colonial territories. However, the European response to independence was to offer and renew its association with the former colonies. This took place under the two Yaounde Conventions of 1963 and 1969, between the European Community and African States. The accession of Britain to the European Community in 1973 raised the question of the relationship of Britain's Commonwealth to the European Community and its approach towards African states.

A reformulation of the EU's relations with developing countries resulted in the Lome Convention of 1975, which included the former French and British colonies in Africa. The Lome Convention was the most extensive of these agreements and dominated EU relations with the countries of Africa. It was more extensive in terms of issues covered and signatories than any other EU agreement with developing countries, and 'set the tone' for EU policies in agreements with African States. Two grand frameworks govern EU relations with African countries. The most long-standing one is the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP), enshrined in the 1975 Lomé Convention and updated in 2000 by the Cotonou Agreement. More recently, a continental approach has gained ground,

which led to the Joint-EU Africa Strategy (JAES) conceived in the 2007 EU-Africa summit in Lisbon and reflecting the pan-African dimension.<sup>1</sup>

However, the post Cold War period showed a little shift on the policy guidelines, EU was clear that throughout the process leading to the Partnership Agreements, it wanted an explicit joint agreement on political principles. This was something of a change, it was always argued that Lome was non-ideological and non-political. The EU's negotiating guidelines were thought to be neutral in their impact on the African countries and their political environment. However, EU-Africa co-operation is now seen as having a clear political dimension.

### **Joint Africa-EU Strategy**

Democratisation and reform processes have been launched and are being deepened in both Africa and Europe and efforts have continued on both continents to address conflicts. At the same time, integration processes on both continents have accelerated – on the one hand, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) has been transformed into the African Union (AU) with its socio-economic programme, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD); on the other hand, the European Union (EU) has nearly doubled in size and is in the process of deepening the Union which shows the commitment of EU towards multilateralism (Joint Africa-EU Strategy 2011).

In response to these changes, cooperation between Africa and the EU has developed rapidly and has also diversified. Both sides have developed political strategies and policy documents to guide their cooperation, including the AU Constitutive Act and the Strategic Framework 2004-2007 and the EU Africa Strategy of 2005.

In justifying a new arrangement with the African countries, the European Commission argued that not only did it affirm the value of the EU-Africa relations in a multipolar world, but also that the relationship would help to enable

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<sup>1</sup> See web page- [http://eeas.europa.eu/africa/continental/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/africa/continental/index_en.htm)

the kind of development that is more compatible with European political and social values. This led to a revision of the political elements of the relationship in Lome IV (1995), which restated the new agreement, the 'Respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law'.

EU's aid policy also aimed at achieving its desired goals to develop territorial security and harmony in its backyard with the political conditionalities. In particular, it enabled the EU to ensure that aid is used in accordance with the newly agreed aims and principles of development co-operation, and to switch aid resources to those states that most successfully took new 'shared values' of Africa-EU co-operation. This was again emphasized in the Joint Africa EU Strategy Action Plan 2011-2013 with the partnership agreement II that the promotion of democratic governance and human rights constitutes a central objective of the Africa-EU partnership.

In this respect, the newly established Platform for Dialogue on Governance and Human Rights should enable Africa and the EU to jointly address key issues of common concern with a view to formulate shared governance agendas and recommendations and to enhance the Africa -EU Partnership. This should include coordinated action in responding to political crises, support for the African Governance Architecture and economic governance. In this context, the AU decision to dedicate the January 2011 AU Summit to Shared Values was welcomed. EU has been always working on creating a development cooperation to African partners so that to create a situation of peace and security among the countries. The Joint Strategy also welcomed the progress achieved in the implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and agreed to build upon the operationalisation of APSA to address peace and security challenges in the African continent.

One of main purposes of the Lisbon Treaty was to enhance the coherence of EU's external action by gathering all available instruments at the service of diplomatic objectives. The European External Action Service (EEAS) in particular will most likely have a strong and long-term impact on EU's relations with the African continent, its states and its regional organisations. In the year 2011, Africa

faced serious challenges in terms of democratic transition and consolidation, with electoral processes completed in major countries such as Nigeria, Sudan and DRC, amid recent transformations in Northern Africa. Meanwhile, the events in Cote d'Ivoire demonstrated the fragility of so-called "post-conflict" societies, despite a strong international and EU support for the elections. Key security issues are still undermining parts of the continent's stability, while being directly linked to EU security interests. Meanwhile, Africa's geopolitical importance has been rising, as shown by the growing interest of emerging donors and powers like Brazil, India and China in the continent.


The club of traditional donors is being shaken by the power shift occurring across the global economy. Emerging economies are quietly beginning to change the rules of the game. China, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Korea, Venezuela, India, Kuwait and Brazil, among others, have been increasing their aid to poorer countries. However their aid is largely on terms of their choosing. None of these countries belong to the donors club established within the OECD, called the OECD Development Assistance Committee (Woods 2008: 1205).

Common to most of these donors is the quest for energy security, enlarged trading opportunities and new economic partnerships as these emerging powers build aid programmes and forge stronger relationships with poor countries (Woods 2008: 1206). This new line of emerging donors has alarmed traditional donors as these emerging donors provide aid according to their preferences and generally do not forge any conditionality upon the recipient countries. In the African context China is the most important emerging donor and due to its national interests and quest for energy the Chinese are giving aid to the undemocratic regimes without any concern.

China and Africa have been historically linked right from 13th century. However, the period after the Cold War brought in a lot of change and new actors emerged on international arena with China being foremost. Due to the problems in Middle East and conflicts of interest Africa suits most of the emerging donors.


closer partnership with the new China. “Sino-sceptics” are less sanguine and view China’s renewed interest and greater involvement in Africa as neo-colonial both in intent and consequence. They maintain that China is another neo-colonial power in the making because the logic of capital is the same whether those in the driving seat are the Europeans, the Americans or the Chinese. “Sino-pessimists” go further and claim that Africa’s engagement with China would not only perpetuate the structure of dependency and underdevelopment which is already in place, but it would also inhibit or block Africa’s efforts to overcome them. It should be also noted from the outset that a degree of correspondence seems also to exist between an analyst’s perception of the cause of Africa’s underdevelopment and the presumed consequences arising from Chinese massive penetration of the continent, with those linking Africa’s underdevelopment to external factors viewing the consequences of China’s arrival more favourably. China’s re-entry into Africa in the last decade and a half was driven by the country’s growing demand for Africa’s natural resources, so goes the master-narrative, a narrative which is also supported both by official rhetoric on both sides. The value of Africa’s export of its natural resources to China has grown substantially in recent years with cobalt, chromium, manganese and timber constituting major non-oil items. Another critical resource for which China significantly relies on Africa is oil. The following pie charts show the importance of Africa to the China’s energy security:

**Figure: 1.1: China’s oil imports (2001-2006)**



Source: Broadman, H. G. (2007), *Africa’s Silk Road: China and India’s new economic frontier*, Washington, DC: World Bank, p.82.

**Figure: 1.2: Sub-Saharan oil exports to China (2001-2006)**



Source: Broadman, H. G. (2007) *Africa's Silk Road: China and India's new economic frontier*, Washington, DC: World Bank, p.83.

China's trade with Africa has grown exponentially over the past several years. Two-way trade with Africa was about US\$10.5 billion in 2000, and this figure grew tenfold to US\$117 billion in 2008. In 2006, 40 percent of Africa's oil production was exported to the United States while 15 percent went to China (Alden et al. 2008: 6).

The new Sino-African relations are also fuelled by the formula of "resources for infrastructure" or the so called the 'Angola mode'. The 'Angola mode' which facilitates the exploitation of abundant African natural resources, and enables Africa to import much needed goods from China, which it could not have done so if financial repayment should be required. More significantly, the "Angola mode" ties the exploitation of natural resources or infrastructure development to Chinese imports of Africa's resources. In addition to Angola, this formula is being heavily relied upon in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Guinea, Zimbabwe, Gabon and Botswana.

China's focus on infrastructure development or development aid in Africa in recent years has drawn special attention. This is not surprising because the level of Chinese investment in this sector is not only high but is growing rapidly. Chinese investment in Africa jumped from US\$500 million in 2000 to US\$7 billion in 2006.

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Most of the aid that Africa gets from China is in the name of infrastructure development. China has recently showing interest in strengthening of institutions, which China calls as the ‘soft infrastructure’. Recent observations of international trends in development aid strategies give fair reason to wonder that is ‘Beijing Consensus’ might replace the traditional ‘Washington Consensus’.

In November 2009, at the fourth meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), Premier Wen Jiabao expressed China’s intent to deepen its relationship with African countries a relationship that is increasingly important for Africa. This relationship, of which Chinese foreign aid is the glue, challenges the very traditional foreign aid and the development paradigm.

Consequently, both China and the EU are confronted with the necessity of widening the scope of their cooperation on global challenges beyond statements of intention in Africa. So far the Europeans, who increasingly have seen their regional and local policies strategically and effectively undermined by China’s increasing influence, have mainly felt the pressure. To some extent this pressure is due to the perception by China, that the EU ultimately pursues similar commercial and resource interests to its own. China does not sufficiently recognize that the EU increasingly considers Africa’s development as a multidimensional global



challenge. China has come under international pressure and is facing local criticism too. Thus, Beijing has not only taken the first steps to review its policy agenda but has also carefully started to rethink its stance towards non-interference and intervention towards a less blunt approach. Moreover, the willingness to actively extend the partnership on the EU-China political agenda to African issues has slowly been rising.

In view of the pressing issues on the development agenda, the differences of approach causing mistrust and discontent and the differences to tackle at forthcoming meetings, addresses the crucial points for the definition of a coming agenda that suits best to the local conditions. The review of recent changes of perceptions and awareness of problems yields insights and starting points for cooperation. At the same time it shows limitations and possibilities for both sides to start with in forthcoming measures. However, if we see the approaches involved we will find a big difference because most of the things, which EU commences, are 'tailor-made' solutions and is different in a sense compared to what is practiced by China with their own way.

China is increasingly becoming a factor in European considerations strategy and policy towards Africa. Particularly possibilities and effects of its commercially driven and politically high-level partnership with Africa have catalysed rethinking in Europe. Will Chinese enforcement in Africa transform traditional EU-Africa donor-recipient relationship into a new kind of partnership?

The demands of a new generation of African leaders to take Africa's destiny into their hands in concert with outspoken African critics of aid dependency were the reason for a profound change of mutual perceptions in Africa, China and Europe. This change also involved the insights that globalization and the new possibilities for cooperating with the emerging powers like such as China, India and Brazil.

Yet, besides the economic potential since the end of the Cold War, non-traditional security threats originating in Africa have strong repercussions on the interests of African countries and the EU. These include failing states and conflict,

calling for direct international involvement in peacekeeping and reconstruction as well as but also migration, international crime and narcotics traffic that has started to spread even into China. There is also fear about lawless lands in Africa becoming new breeding grounds for terrorism.

In this context, reviews of the strategic orientations among the EU's key actors, including the European Security Strategy (2003) sought to bolster the EU's role of an off-territorial global security actor beyond its immediate neighbourhood (Berger and Wissenbach 2007: 5). However, this renewed focus on Africa was not accompanied by a substantial increase in the continent's economic significance for the EU, although a coming diversification strategy for energy supplies might change this.

### **EU-Africa-China trilateral co-operation**

The EU and China have already identified two tools to advance their partnership in dealing with Africa. Firstly, the Dialogue on Africa's Peace, Stability and Sustainable Development, initiated at the 9<sup>th</sup> EU-China summit in September 2006, is being pursued at the level of Africa Directors. The first meeting took place on 15 June 2007 in Beijing.

An expert level conference on EU-China cooperation on Africa was held on 28 June 2007 in Brussels hosted by European Commissioner Louis Michel. Secondly, a number of issue-areas for cooperation have been envisaged and will be adopted progressively during the dialogue. These issues still need to be set out in concrete terms, but are likely to focus on infrastructure, health, and rural development and, perhaps, on security sector reforms in selected countries. Berger and Wissenbach (2007) had described with respect to trilateral cooperation that EU has stressed African ownership as a crucial basis for common engagement and so has China. Due to the different procedures on both sides, the implementation of common action will certainly not go without problems. However, in the long term the three partners may well succeed in building a political basis for joint action beyond options for practical cooperation.

Complementary approaches exist where the EU can build on the positive effects of China's engagement and vice versa. For instance, economic growth based on China's demand for resources provides an opportunity to rebuild traditional export economies. China's infrastructure investments in Africa will also benefit European business. On the other hand the European Partnership Agreements will also create more interesting, larger markets for Chinese enterprises. However, such an approach can only be successful as long as China and the EU agree on a development agenda that favours long-term sustainability beyond short-term growth and don't block each other.

Moreover, both the EU and China have a strong-shared interest in promoting stable and sustainable development in Africa. This has been emphasized by the EU and China at the tenth China-EU Summit held in Beijing on 28 November 2007, the EU and Chinese leaders 'welcomed more practical cooperation by the two sides through their respective existing cooperation mechanisms with Africa so as to contribute to Africa's peace, stability and sustainable development on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. In this EU and China agreed to continue their dialogue on African issues, and actively explore effective ways and channels of cooperation among China, the EU and Africa in appropriate areas'.

The EU's relationship with China already includes a bilateral dialogue and cooperation on Africa because China's rise in Africa has important impacts on EU relations with Africa and China. In this context, the EU has proposed to examine the possibilities of setting up a framework of trilateral dialogue and cooperation between Africa, China and the EU. The main objective was to foster an innovative, step by step process of dialogue and cooperation between Africa, the EU and China to promote mutual understanding and allow better coordination and cooperation in specific cases including on multilateral initiatives with the long term objective of improved coordination on security issues in Africa and better aid effectiveness in the context of Millennium Development Goal 8 (establishing a global development partnership). This has to be placed in a trilateral framework with ownership by our African partners (European Commission 2008).

Chapter 2 of the study would seek to trace the historical evolution of EU-African and China-African relations and the recent exponential growth of trade and aid among China and Africa. It will review and compare the aid and trade policies of EU and China in Africa and assess their implications for overall engagement. It would also examine the difference of approaches of disbursement.

Chapter 3 would deal with the importance of African resources, which meet about one-third of China's energy needs; hence Africa becomes very evident factor in the foreign policy reflections of China. It would also examine the importance of African natural resources including oil in Chinese foreign policy and would discuss European reactions.

Chapter 4 would look at values and interests aspect of EU and Chinese support to the countries. Would also try to make out the politics of interests of China's support to autocratic states and case studies of Sudan, Zimbabwe and Syria.

Chapter 5 would deal with the developments in the trilateral cooperation between EU-China and Africa, would out common goals and shared interests and would deal with the challenges to the trilateral cooperation.

Chapter 6 would deal with the main finding of the study, and would investigate that is Washington consensus has fear from Beijing consensus, then European concerns about China's growing power in Africa.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **TRADE AND AID**

#### **Historical outline of European trade with Africa**

Europe already had favorable trade policies for its former colonies in the 1950s. A number of agreements defined, among other subjects, the trade relations between the EU and its former colonies. While preparing the Treaty of Rome France insisted on special treatment for its former colonies. This resulted in the subsequent Yaounde, Lomé and Cotonou conventions between Europe and the African countries. The original group of French and British former colonies has been extended to almost all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, a number in the Caribbean and in the Pacific Ocean. Through the agreements, the EU gave non-reciprocal trade advantages to all African countries. The arrangement stated that products from these countries, if certain conditions were met, would have free access to the EU market that means no tariffs or custom rights would be imposed. This is a kind of super-preferential system, providing the preferences of the GSP (General System of Preferences) to African countries. But there was realisation amongst European politicians and observers and it was that the favourable treatment for Africa has not led to growth in trade, and this became one of the reasons for the EU to change its trade policy with respect to Africa in future.

The creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) as a trading block raised the question about treatment of the former colonies of the founding members France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The result was that colonial territories were incorporated in the internal market and a special fund for support of their development was set up - the European Development Fund (EDF). The policy

towards the former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP) remained largely a separate policy, with limited competencies of the European Commission and no influence of either the European Parliament or the European Court of Justice. Cooperation with non-EC members beyond the ACP, i.e. in Latin America and Asia, started in the 1980s and included trade issues and financial assistance. However, only in 1993 did the European Community gain the official competency for development policy (Grimm 2004: 66).

European countries tried to give African countries almost unlimited access to the European market, except for certain agricultural products. Because of the substantial subsidies the EU provides to its farmers it was difficult, however, to compete with agricultural products grown in Europe (Dijk 2007: 34).

Also tariffs for agro-industrial products tended to be higher than the tariffs for raw materials. These agreements did not require reciprocity (providing the same treatment to European exports), while also became one of the fundamental principles of international trade agreements, such as concluded by the World Trade Organization (WTO). Till this time EU has managed to get a waiver for its agreements, but since 2000 it has felt the need to make them compatible with the WTO rules. There was already the proposal for the Cotonou convention that has admitted, “the impact and relevance of the Lomé preferences (its predecessor) have been insufficient to generate a real dynamic” (Van 1997).

In 2007 Tripoli summit Jose Manuel Borosso in meeting of European and African governments, which changed the direction of issue between the continents, introduced the key phrases such as a “partnership of equals” and promises to move

beyond the traditional donor-recipient relationship”.<sup>1</sup> On this note, the diminishing of subsidies on agriculture by the EU was negotiated in the WTO Millennium round, but France remained hesitant to expose its farmers to world market prices and to wean them off subsidies from Brussels. It was not like that the burden of the subsidies were not sustainable for the EU, but the high world market prices for agricultural products in 2008 contributed to the willingness to review the current system.

Hence EU moved in the favour of the negotiation of regional or sub-regional economic cooperation and partnership agreements linked to the overall EU-Africa partnership agreement. This was also emphasised in the Joint EU-Africa Strategy 2011-2013, which basically said, “Well integrated regional markets with efficient infrastructure will attract investment and facilitate business, enhance employment creation and revenues, and improve access to better and more goods and services.”<sup>2</sup> The ultimate objective was to establish Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA’s) to increase trade and investments with immediate neighbourhood. The first stage of this gradual process was to negotiate economic cooperation agreements with regional subgroups involved in integration processes, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the East African Community (EAC).

EU has attempted to trade with whole of African continent to induce multilateral attitude in the countries in question this got reflected in many of the

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<sup>1</sup> The Guardian 2007, Africa-EU summit, Tripoli, “Europe and Africa: a partnership of equals?” online webpage accessed on 16/07/2012, URL-<http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2010/dec/03/europe-africa-ties-trade-aid-partnership>

<sup>2</sup> Europa, Joint Africa EU Strategy Action Plan 2011-2013.

agreements and arrangement made by it on several occasions.

Subsequently, EU stood for negotiating EPAs with Africa, which are WTO compatible and were based on reciprocity. The EU had to change from a Lomé type of agreement to EPAs because the WTO did not favoured such an agreement, which violated one of the basic principles of trade agreements that “all partners should be granted parity” (Djik 2009:105). EPA was European Union’s (EU) continuation of the Lomé agreement (later the Cotonou agreement). A series of interim agreements were concluded to minimise any possible trade disruption for African partners arising from the expiry of the Cotonou trade regime while maintaining progress towards comprehensive regional EPAs. The shared objective in these negotiations was to conclude an agreement at regional level and multilateral level, which supports trade, sustainable development and fosters regional integration. The areas potentially covered by the full EPA is going beyond trade in goods to include services and investment, and trade-related areas such as sustainable development, competition and trade facilitation.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> European Commission - Press release, ‘EU’s first Economic Partnership Agreement with an African region goes live.’ Online webpage accessed on 14/07/2012, URL-  
[http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?](http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?Reference=IP/12/475&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en)

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The EPAs has three new elements:

1. They are between trade blocks, rather than individual countries, although article 37-38 of the Cotonou agreement also allows individual member states to sign an EPA.
2. They include reciprocity; EU products should also get free access to the countries in the specific trade block that has signed the agreement.
3. For a number of products, African countries have negotiated a period of transition (de facto protection) to allow them to first become more competitive.

The issue were not just tariffs, but also the stringent non-tariff barriers of the EU and many 'Third World' activists argued that it is high time to do away with all subsidies in agriculture. However, such an agreement can only be achieved in multilateral negotiations, such as the Doha (or Millennium) round of the WTO, which came to a standstill in due to various impediments. In particular NGOs have criticized the EU over EPAs, questioning in particular to what extent this is a partnership? (The Citizen Tanzania, 14 December 2007). Many NGOs consider EPAs to be an instrument to defend Europe's interests in its former colonies and there many more criticisms EPA trade negotiations who argued for more equitable trade.

The EU has tried to offer a greater access to African countries by leveling up trade preferences to match the best deal under the Lomé convention or the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP EU, 1997). This became the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative to facilitate export to Europe by African states. This special

arrangement for the 50 least developed countries in the world allowed these countries the most favorable treatment, granting duty-free and quota-free access to the European market, except for arms, which would also includes many of the African countries.

But one of the problems which EBA had restrictive rules of origin and therefore is quite useless for many small countries, which need to work with other countries to obtain the parts necessary for a successful export product. Textiles are a case in point. If good quality threads need to be imported to produce quality export textile and garments the EU would not consider the final product as originating from the exporting ACP country and hence impose a tariff, despite EPA or EBA.

Although the EU is still the most important trade and donor in Africa, it runs some important risks in its relationship with Africa. In the first place it has not managed to get broad support for its EPAs. If some African countries continue to refuse to sign these agreements, or if these agreements would still be seen as negative for Africa, it could be that, in particular, the Chinese benefit the most. They offer similar or better terms of agreement and would like to use African countries to channel their products to Europe.

### **China's Policy towards Africa**

China's aid to Africa has a long history. After decades of turmoil, China was a poor country, where the excesses of the Great Leap Forward caused famines and millions of deaths in the late 1950s. It was much poorer than the Maghreb countries with which it signed its first aid agreements and than sub-Saharan Africa, to which it started providing aid in 1960. China, just emerging from the embargo caused by the

Korean War, exported very little. Its aid to Africa was greater than its trade with Africa, and it made no investments. Today, trade with Africa is larger than aid and investment.

In February 2007, President Hu Jintao announced that trade between China and Africa would amount to US\$ 100 billion in 2010 explains the magnitude of engagement. This trade may diminish in value as prices have tumbled, but nevertheless China will probably become the largest trade partner of Africa, and one could expect that this will be followed by more investment and that that investment will outstrip aid (Dijk, 2009: 123).

China has become one of the engines of the world economy since the beginning of the present decade. Its need for raw materials has driven up commodity prices and thus helped to boost growth in Africa (Goldstein 2006: 12). Trade between China and Africa increased seven-fold between 2000 and 2007, from US\$ 10 billion to US\$ 70 billion making China the leading supplier of the African continent and its second-largest trading partner after the United States. This spectacular growth has halted the marginalisation of Africa in world trade that began in 1980. Africa is of course only a modest trading partner for China, but it does have a larger share in China's external trade (3.5 percent) (Broadman 2008: 165).

Although trade between China and Africa comes under the heading of South-South trade, in structure it is closer to a North-South pattern of trade as China imports natural resources (oil and ores) and exports manufactured products. As the trade surpluses of the oil-exporting countries (Guinea, Angola, Nigeria, Sudan) are greater than the deficits of the 41 non oil-exporting countries (according to Chinese sources),

Chinese-African trade has generated a surplus for Africa up to 2006. In 2007, while prices of natural resources surged, China had a surplus trade with Africa.

Very little is known about the geographical distribution of China's FDI that of its Official Development Aid (ODA) remains wholly obscure: China provides no statistics on its aid, simply issuing press releases after ministerial visits and conferences. These announcements suggest that China is already a substantial provider of aid to Africa with an increase in soft loans and many social projects.

### Trade policies EU and China: A comparison

**Table 2.1 :Trade policies of the EU, US and China compared on major points**

Indicator	Trade policies of the EU	Trade policies of the US	China's trade policy
Tariffs	Zero under EPA or EBA, but restrictive rules of origin	Free access to American markets for African products, but under certain conditions	High tariffs, except for 450 products, which have been exempted
Exceptions	Certain agricultural products <sup>13</sup> under EPA and arms under EBA	Certain countries can be excluded for political reasons	What has been agreed in the Bilateral Investment Treaties
Non-tariff barriers, including rules of origin and necessary health and safety controls	Some non-tariff barriers, like the so-called tracing requirements, which make it necessary to always be able to track a product to its origin	Not such complicated and restrictive rules of origin as the EU EPA. The rules of origin of EPA are less restrictive than for EBA	Exist but in compliance with WTO regulation
Reciprocity	Not under EBA, but eventually under EPA	No	Wants better access to markets of African countries in the future, similar to EPA

Source: Dijk .M (ed.) (2009), *The New Presence of China in Africa*, Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, p. 110.


Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) was not taken positively by many African countries as European policy makers expected, only a limited number of agreements were signed in Lisbon at the end of 2007. Many Europeans consider the EPAs to be beneficial for Africa.

European scholars consider that the EPAs reflect the modern thinking on reciprocity in trade relations and often think it is time for African countries to also try to become competitive in the global economy. However, many of scholars also come from the school of thought that the policies of EU are also responsible for the increased amount of China's trade in Africa. Table 2.1 given below summarizes the findings EU-China and US also for instance on major points, noting that all three blocks comply with WTO rules, but have additional packages, such as EPA, AGOA and Chinese trade policy. Wissenbach (2008) remarks that the 'success' of China in Africa does not necessarily mean it's at the expense of an erosion of European influence.

Clearly EPA is in principal a favorable trade policy and China cannot match these market access conditions. Although the developing countries criticise EU for its restrictive rules of origin and the necessary health and safety controls, they usually continue to trade with Europe under the favorable EBA, even if the country has not signed EPA. China's trade policies in practice are more restrictive than those EU, and it will take quite some time before they are as open towards Africa in trade terms as EU are through EPA.

Broadman (2006: 156) argued that China's trade with Africa is about more than just raw materials. He is optimistic that this trade allows Africa to become a processor of raw materials and a competitive supplier of other goods and services.

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Recently some African economists complained that China just wants to get raw materials from Africa to sell manufactured products to the continent like that of colonial period.

Broadman (2007: 189) notes three positive trends in the relations between China and Africa. First there is the prospect for more resource-based, value-added manufacturing exports to China; second, there is a prospect for broader participation in global value chains; and finally there is the diversity among African countries, which is a potential benefit in the case of further regional integration.

### **Aid**

Traditionally Aid was a financial help given by governments and other agencies to support the economic, environmental, social and political development of developing countries. It is distinguished from humanitarian aid by focusing on alleviating poverty in the long term, rather than a short-term response. But in due course of time many more definitions of aid their objectives and form had came. OECD countries defined aid as provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and each transaction of which is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective and is concessional in character.<sup>4</sup>

But now a new approach has overlapped the discourse and now most of the aid, which is provided is to foster trade among the donor and recipient countries so that greater objectives could be achieved. Aid being now seen as overall investment,

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<sup>4</sup> OECD, Definition of ODA, online webpage accessed on 17/07/12, URL-  
[http://www.oecd.org/document/4/0,3746,en\\_2649\\_34447\\_46181892\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html#Definition](http://www.oecd.org/document/4/0,3746,en_2649_34447_46181892_1_1_1_1,00.html#Definition)

which is helpful in deriving trade preferences; this has been explained in further part of the study which aid for trade.

### **Development Aid in the Post Cold War Era**

During the Cold War years good governance and democracy were not foremost among the concerns of European and other western aid givers. Good governance conditionalities were not placed on aid money, nor was aid focused on democratisation efforts. This statement warrants an important qualification. During the Cold War period there was of course one big conditionality that decided whether a developing country would be the beneficiary of the aid and co-operation of the Western world. This conditionality was anti-communism. To put it crudely, the world was divided into communist and anti-communist blocs (rather than communist and democratic), and this geo-political division rather than any internal characteristic, such as democracy, human rights, corruption, nepotism, or political repression – had determined aid levels (Hammerstad 2003: 2). However, the main rule was that nominally communist developing countries (which were not necessarily communist in much more than rhetoric) received aid from the Soviet bloc and China, and non-communist (not necessarily capitalist or democratic) developing countries received aid from the West. The main condition attached was to keep rank within your geopolitical bloc (Hammerstad 2003: 3).

However post-Cold war environment was demanding and required restructuring of the Eastern economies and stability within the old continent. Such complex and demanding environment led many to seek for an exploration of the EU as an important actor in international sphere. The conventional wisdom was generally categorised into two mainstream approaches, that of realist perception of the world order consisting of high politics and state presence, and other inter-governmentalists

that focused on EU's soft power. In this respect, the former suggest that the EU is a weak international actor because of its lack of military assets (Hopi 2012: 2).

Above all, the European Union was able to gain its civilian normative power identity after the Cold War, with the need at first to reduce the threat of war in Western Europe. This was achieved through the transformation of anarchic relations between the states to a law-bound structure that looked like domestic politics. It was this experience and philosophy that drove the EU to have a foreign civilian policy that transcends all its functions from politics, economy, aid, policing and reconstruction (Hopi 2012: 6). It was only after cold war that EU pursued its policy of aid divorced from other western power to more a concrete and integrated form of union's structure and today European Union is the largest accumulated provider of development assistance.

Multipolarity has become a significant goal of China's foreign policy in the post- Cold War era. Chinese leaders have adopted this as a long-term objective and given the dominant position of the EU, China strives to maintain good relations with America, avoiding any sharp deterioration in the bilateral relationship. The Chinese government has established various strategic partnerships with other major powers, emphasising the promotion of common interests, while abandoning the Maoist united front strategy.

Meanwhile, China tried to maintain a peaceful international environment and concentrated on its modernisation programme, while building its comprehensive national power. In many ways, China has been pursuing a modernisation diplomacy since the era of economic reforms and opening to outside world 1978.



Therefore, the cultivation of a network of friendly supporters on the African continent therefore becomes a significant task in European Union and China's diplomacy. The strategic co-operation relationship with Egypt, for China the strategic partnerships with Nigeria and South Africa, and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation are landmarks in the building of this network. As China's economy continues its impressive growth, it wants to expand its markets and secure reliable supplies of resources in support of its economic development. Resource diplomacy, therefore, becomes a prominent feature of its modern aid. China's rising economic status also means that it should have more resources at its disposal to ensure success in its African policy. In turn, many African countries perceive political and economic ties with China to be an important asset, which strengthens their international bargaining power, especially with Western governments.

### **Traditional vs. Emerging donors: EU and China**

The rise of the emerging powers and economic and financial fragility in traditional donor countries has reshaped world politics, setting an interesting context for the debate about aid. Emerging economies are now more significant providers of development finance, as well as drivers of growth. Hence at Busan, a key objective was to engage the emerging countries in a broader development co-operation partnership. The Busan Outcome reflects a shift from Paris-based harmonisation of activities to a global system of aid governance driven.

It was observed on the several occasion and incidents that the willingness of emerging donors to participate in DAC initiated donor coordination seen through the eyes of emerging donors, “engagement” by DAC donors implies an unequal power relationship where non-DAC donors are expected to be normalized into mainstream development thinking and practices. It is politically difficult for emerging donors to

join the donor club. Policy-makers in emerging countries have found economic success outside of the paradigm offered by the neoliberal Washington Consensus so that they doubt the relevance of this mainstream development thinking for African development. And African countries also are reluctant to see emerging donors join the camp of traditional donors, for alternative financing and ideas offer recipient countries the bargaining power to achieve policy autonomy.

Moreover, it is institutionally not feasible for emerging donors to comply with DAC standards. (Xu 2012: 3). Emerging countries, as donors do not have the same 'altruistic' approach as the DAC, self-interest and mutual benefit are more in play and it was also observed by many scholars that DAC donors also paid more attention to their self-interest historically. This type of approach we also find of China who is determined to provide aid in the African countries keeping their national interest in front. One of the biggest criticisms of traditional donors regarding the emerging donors is that they in their development assistance do not follow the aid conditionalities and due to that they are not hesitant in providing aid to the autocratic states those are condemned of the gross violation of human rights and democracy. But these emerging donors such as China, which is giving aid to African states, have differentiated concept of aliens and citizens and this is why they follow the concept of realist philosophy of aid disbursement depending on their national interest.

EU remains by far Africa's main source of official development aid. With more than USD 250 billion, the EU is Africa's largest donor. While most of its loans date from past decades, it continues spending an annual average of US\$ 1.2 billion via all kinds of credit. But EU follows conditionalities in giving aid and does give the instructions to many of the African states for their institutional reform and consolidation of democracy. This is reason why at many instances to many countries

it refused the development assistance for example the Robert Mugabe regime of Zimbabwe. The European Commission has integrated conditions regarding good governance in all its projects with Africa. The EU and individual European member states cancelled up to US\$ 50 billion of African debts over the past decades.

In the case of China, it provides Africa with large amount of economic and technical assistance. By the end of 2005, China gave foreign assistance to altogether 53 African countries and completed 769 projects. Chinese have been accused of giving aid to many of autocratic states without considering any sort of aid conditionality, this have been obvious feature of many of the emerging donors. China is not exclusive of that because its goals are different from EU and they seek resources against aid disbursements, so it is not a matter of China that to where aid is going, as they have to fuel their engine of growth.

European Union have different concerns as they also want to infuse stability in their immediate neighborhood as member countries always complaint about the illegal migrants coming from African coast to European coast. EU has different type of strategic interests as compared to China. EU want to establish peace and security in the region and perhaps that is the reason they follow the traditional aspect of aid disbursement and secondly China in back their home still lack full grown democracy which is why it also misses it in their foreign policy.

### **Washington vs. Beijing Consensus: Paradigm in Aid Disbursement**

EU and other western donor follow the principle of conditionality while China imposes no conditions for its aid, but there are two exceptions to the rule. Breaking off diplomatic relations with Taiwan has long stood as a prior condition for aid from China. This is no longer really an issue, since owing to its economic success, China

has “won the war” over UN representation. It now has cooperation agreements with countries that maintained relations with Taiwan. Beijing does, however, expect support for its positions at the United Nations: for example, it requests African support for its opposition to a Security Council seat for Japan or to elect a candidate to a top job in a United Nations organization (a recent example is the World Health Organization). Moreover, the strict secrecy surrounding the publication of data on aid and credit terms to Africa suggests that Chinese authorities may require a contractual undertaking not to publish the data.

Apart from these points, China’s aid is not subject to conditionality, in contrast to that of the OECD countries. As long as African countries do not express their willingness for social and environmental responsibility (SER), Chinese firms face no requirements for SER and their method can lead to abuses, as in the example of the Merowe dam in Sudan. It does not comply with international standards, and its construction caused the displacement of the local inhabitants to distant locations where the land was not suitable for farming. The Chinese government recognizes these abuses but, on grounds of non-interference, refuses to take the initiative of requiring SER clauses in contracts (Djik 2009: 75).

China’s attitude has led Ramo (2004: 4-5) to propose the concept of a “Beijing consensus” against the Washington consensus. According to Ramo:

“Both pursue the same goals but in a different order of priority, with Beijing giving priority to stability and development while the Washington consensus views reforms as a pre-condition for stability and development. Leonard (2008) wrote that the Beijing consensus could be the worst ideological menace to the Western world since the collapse of communism. While the Washington consensus favors privatization, the Beijing consensus

encourages the use of public money and a push to protect public property. These differences contribute to the positive image of China in Africa where Asian heterodox strategies have long been regarded with deep interest. Chinese aid is attractive to the countries that are most resistant to reform, such as Angola, which was granted a loan of US\$ 2 billion at a time when it was being called on to account for the disappearance of US\$ 4 billion from the public treasury. It is also attractive to countries that have suffered from instability caused by overly mechanical application of reforms designed according to the Washington consensus.”

The 2008 world crisis that led the Western countries to proceed to large-scale nationalization has weakened the ground of the Washington consensus. On this occasion, Chinese vice Prime Minister Wang Qishan remarked, “*teachers have some problems*”.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, while the crisis will reinforce the appeal of the Beijing consensus, this new paradigm does not translate into practical measures. As time passes, circumstances may lead China to change its practice. Loans by the Exim Bank account for a rising share of China’s aid commitment, and being more concerned about repayment, it pays closer attention to country risk and becomes more attentive to countries indebtedness. As a larger number of countries facing difficulties will flock to Beijing, the Chinese government may have to take a closer view of their economic prospects and to differentiate between them.

Fear also loom, as there are predictions that Beijing consensus might replace Washington consensus because of the non-conditionality it has and secondly African partners could also derive the benefits of the presence of China in UN security council

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<sup>5</sup> Quoted by Roger C. Altman, “The Great Crash, 2008.” *Foreign Affairs*, January – February 2009.

which can also vote in favour of them when needed. But still it could be very high handed approach because Arab spring and recently in Syria there were revolutions among the civil society and citizens regarding the approach of their governments over human rights and democracy, this also presents the alarming situation for the China as its policy of non-intervention will only work when there would be presence of autocratic governments, if not then the preferential trade would not be the same as we see of China today. So, Beijing consensus will only serve when there would not be civil uprising.

### **EU and Chinese Aid to Africa: Economic Infrastructure vs. Social/Political Infrastructure**

The EU's aid priorities have been transformed largely by its development experiences, from being economic infrastructure focused to more social infrastructure focused. Until Lomé IV, economic infrastructure was the EU's aid priority. Since then, social infrastructure has begun to play an increasingly important role in the EDF, it becomes clear that in the total share assigned to social infrastructure, "government and civil society" takes the largest share. This is understandable because of the changing aid philosophy that has occurred in the EU, involving a major shift in the EU's discourse and practice from "partnership" to "good governance" to "aid effectiveness". The Lomé Convention was signed under the partnership principle; it is to a large extent granted on a need basis reflecting African countries who need to improve their infrastructure (Ling 2010: 10-12).

EU placed a great deal of emphasis on economic institutional reform, which required that more should be spent on governance structures, resulting in the share allocated to government and civil society structures increasing. This trend accelerated with the political shift to "good governance". This transition was partly demonstrated

in the European Commission's 1995 "Green paper on relations between the European Union and the ACP countries on the eve of the 21st century".<sup>6</sup>

China has long been focused on economic infrastructure in aid co-operation with Africa. China has also prioritised rural development and other forms of social infrastructure in its aid to Africa, but comparatively speaking, the main focus is on economic infrastructure development. Of the 900 projects China has supported in Africa, 519 are focused on infrastructure support. China's aid co-operation with Africa in economic infrastructure development is mainly in the form of concessional loans delivered through the Export- Import Bank of China (Exim Bank)- 79% of Exim Bank's commitment to Africa is for infrastructure projects. According to a report published by the World Bank, the power and transport sectors receive the largest share of infrastructure finance from China, followed by telecommunications and, with a much smaller share, water supply infrastructure.

Compared with the EU, China has had more positive experiences with Africa in aid co-operation. China's aid priorities in Africa are jointly decided by three factors, i.e. Africa's demand, China's own development experiences and the potential for mutual beneficiary co-operation. Regarding Africa's needs, poor infrastructure is a critical barrier to accelerating growth and alleviating poverty. One in four Africans does not have access to electricity. Travel times on African roads and export routes are two to three times higher than in Asia, increasing the prices of traded goods. Power generation capacity is around half the levels achieved in South Asia. Africa is in urgent need of infrastructure whose lack has acted not only as a bottleneck in the

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<sup>6</sup> EC, Green Paper on Relations between the European Union and the ACP Countries on the Eve of 21st Century. Brussels: EC, 1995.

continent's quest for sustainable development, but also as a brake on plans for regional integration.

As to China's own development experiences, the rapid expansion of infrastructure has been an important factor in sustaining China's growth, captured in the Chinese saying that "building roads is the prerequisite to becoming rich". So as a developing country itself, China is better able to understand the centrality of infrastructure to Africa's development aims. Moreover, China has a comparative advantage in the area of infrastructure, which provides the biggest potential for win-win co-operation and co-development. Africa has an infrastructure deficit and China has both the financial resources and the construction industry capacity to help meet the continent's needs, and this is the best illustration of how win-win co-operation works. With China's finance, Africa's infrastructure deficit can be overcome, while as a part of the deal China wins access to Africa's natural resources that are important for the country's economic growth (Ling 2010: 10-12).

### **Conditionality vs. No-conditionality Approach**

European Union and China has different principles to some extent reflect two different perceptions of Africa on their part, based on long experience with the continent. Generally speaking, the EU's perception of Africa is rather pessimistic, and the continent is seen more as a challenge or a kind of burden, as Michel (2008) describes: "Afro-pessimism is still too prevalent in Europe, not just in the circles of power, but in public opinion too. Africa continues to be regarded as a problem".<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Michel L, 'EU and Africa: The indispensable partnership', speech at the London School of Economics, January 2008.



EU has long been troubled by a flood of illegal African immigrants, which has threatened Europe's security and stability. Thirdly, since the attacks in the US of 11 September 2001, the EU has sensed the threat of terrorism coming from Africa's poverty and instability. This is reflected in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, where co-responsibility was strengthened as a principle in the bilateral relationship.<sup>8</sup> Additionally, co-responsibility is also in line with the EU's emphasis on ownership in aid delivery. China also thinks that Africa will have to meet challenges on its way to development, but, differently from the EU, the general Chinese perception of Africa is positive and optimistic. This can be clearly seen in China's 2006 Africa Policy paper, which states: "Africa has a long history, vast expanse of land, rich natural resources and huge potential for development. Africa will surely surmount difficulties and achieve rejuvenation in the new century".<sup>9</sup>

The win-win principle is the natural results of the "non-interference" and "two-way co-operation" principles. But at the same time, the win-win principle is also a reflection of China's own aid policy transition. It has been stated that China's aid policy to Africa has experienced three stages of transition, from ideological weakening to the broadening of co-operation areas and then to strengthening the win-win principle since the introduction of the market economy in China (Anshan 2008: 69-93). So, compared with the two-way co-operation principle, the win-win approach puts more emphasis on bilateral co-operation in the economic area. Additionally, it is

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<sup>8</sup> European Commission - Press release, 'EU's first Economic Partnership Agreement with an African region goes live.' Online webpage accessed on 14/07/2012, URL-  
[http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?](http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?Reference=IP/12/475&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en)

[Reference=IP/12/475&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en](http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?Reference=IP/12/475&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en)

<sup>9</sup> PRC (People's Republic of China), China's Africa Policy, 2006.

also a result of China's own thinking on aid effectiveness. For instance, in 1982 the former president of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) said, "as to economic aid, history shows that grants are not good for the two sides and since then China has started to explore different forms of delivering aid, coming up with the win-win principle."

### **Aid priorities.**

Measuring development aid, be it European Union or Chinese, has always been a delicate task. In donor meetings, each participant announces its commitment for the coming year, and the sum of these commitments is made public at the conclusion of the meeting, giving an idea of the amount of support provided by the international community. The problem is that this sum is calculated by adding components that are not comparable, from either the donor or recipient standpoint. A US\$ 100 million grant has a budget cost of US\$ 100 million for the donor, whereas a US\$ 100 million loan has a higher cost for the recipient as it has to reimburse and a lower cost, which varies with interest rates, the length of the grace period and the maturity.

The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is responsible for checking whether the assistance offered by DAC member countries is properly classified as ODA. To be considered as ODA, aid must: i) come from an official institution; ii) benefit a developing country; iii) be intended to foster development, and iv) include a minimum concessional element if it is not a grant. This "grant element" is measured by the difference between the face value of the loan and the discounted value (using a fixed rate of 10%) of the borrower's re-payment flows (interest and principal); the ratio between this difference and the face value of the loan is the grant element. To qualify as ODA, a loan must have a grant element of at least 25%, which rises to 35% when the aid is tied to purchase of goods and services

produced by the donor. A thirty-year loan of \$100 million at the concessional rate of 2.5%, with a ten-year grace period, contains a grant element of 60% (Djik 2009: 67-75).

China provides aid to 53 African countries, among which are countries that have not adhered to the “one China” principle. Which countries receive the most aid from China? The available statistics do not answer this question directly. MOFCOM publishes statistics on what it calls “international cooperation”, which show a total of US\$ 21 billion in 2004, of which 10 billion went to Asia, 4 billion to Africa and 0.8 billion to Latin America. Under the heading of international cooperation, MOFCOM aggregates all contracts mostly construction and civil engineering contracts obtained by Chinese firms in foreign countries, providing a breakdown into capital expenditure, wages paid to Chinese workers and consulting services. These statistics aggregate construction projects that are financed from very different sources and that, for the most part, do not constitute aid.

Although we have no way of determining which projects are financed by private firms, it can be assumed that, in certain countries such as South Africa, Botswana, Mauritius and Nigeria, such projects play an important role, whereas in the poorest countries this is not the case. For the latter countries, the difference between “international cooperation” and the data provided by the multilateral organizations gives a good proxy of Chinese aid.

Of the seventeen countries receiving the most aid in 2005, only seven were among the top seventeen in the earlier period (Tanzania, Congo, Sudan, Egypt, Mali, Ethiopia and Algeria). There is thus considerable turnover in the ranking. Countries

entering the top seventeen in 2005 include Angola<sup>10</sup>, Nigeria and Botswana, indicating that countries, which export oil or raw materials, are among the priorities of Chinese cooperation. Due to the spectacular announcements made in 2007 and early 2008<sup>11</sup>, the Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) will probably rank among the first beneficiary of Chinese international cooperation.

**Table 2.5 - Chinese priorities in Africa**

Aid per country	"International cooperation" excl. external financing in 2004/05; in millions of US\$	
	1959-1998	2004-2005
Tanzania	534	Sudan 1 342
Zambia	372	Algeria 1 065
Congo DR	303	Nigeria 787
Mauritania	239	Angola 305
Sudan	230	Egypt 276
Somalia	220	Botswana 265
Congo	205	Tanzania 181
Egypt	193	Mali 169
Guinea	161	Libya 132
Ethiopia	155	Zimbabwe 89
Mali	148	South Africa 82
Madagascar	144	Ethiopia 77
Burundi	125	Mauritius 76
Cameroon	124	Eq. Guinea 75.6
Mozambique	116	Ghana 69
Senegal	108	Congo 68
Algeria	100	Tunisia 65

Source- Dijk M (ed.) (2009), *The New Presence of China in Africa*, Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, p. 67

Chinese aid projects are mainly concentrated in oil-rich countries, such as Angola, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sudan and Zimbabwe. In the summer of 2006, a US\$ 2 billion infrastructure loan announced during Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Angola as part of a seven-nation African tour (Benoit 2006: 73). When visiting Africa in early

<sup>10</sup> China had previously aided the adversaries of the ruling MPLA.

<sup>11</sup> China announced two financial packages, with a total amount of 12 billion US\$ to the DRC in The Economist: "A ravenous dragon." 15 March 2008.

2006, Chinese president Hu Jintao promised to provide preferential credit of US\$ 3 billion and preferential supplier credit of US\$ 2 billion and announced that China's support to African countries would be doubled by the year 2009<sup>12</sup>. China is also using debt relief to assist African nations. Since 2000, Beijing has taken significant steps to cancel the debt of 31 African countries. That year, China gave off US\$ 1.2 billion in African debt; in 2003, it forgave another US\$ 750 million (Broadman 2007: 275).

EU 's aid broadly does not have considerations like China, which only focuses on resource rich countries and for that they even give their assistance to the undemocratic and autocratic states, being a normative power EU has its considerations and it solely not depends on trade. EU imposes restrictions and sanctions on its aid recipient countries so that greater objective of other than trade also emerges in the continent, which is helpful in attaining peace and security.

### **EU's policy towards Africa: Impact of Chinese presence**

European Union faces a fundamental question: can it still consider Africa as its own 'backyard'? Europe has a longstanding commitment to Africa's development, partly because of the former colonial ties between some member states and African countries. EU's High representative Catherine Ashton forcefully argued in her speech at Corvinus University that the EU tries to promote "post-imperial partnership for a post-imperial age"<sup>13</sup>. It would be wrong to treat these arguments as mere propaganda

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<sup>12</sup> Financial Times, December 28, 2006.

<sup>13</sup> Europa- Press release, Speech by Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission, "A world built on co-operation, sovereignty, democracy and stability", Date: 25/02/2011, Online webpage accessed on 16/07/2012, URL- <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do? Reference=SPEECH/11/126>

aimed at disguising the EU's imperial ambitions

The EU may have no imperial ambitions, but this does not mean that its discourse does not bear any resemblance to civilizing missions (Zielonka 2012: 3). The "privileged" relationship with Africa has had to adapt to changing international and European circumstances. Today, the African continent is becoming a coveted partner for many "new" actors such as China, which inevitably challenges the European Union's role as the main trading partner and donor on the continent. This also triggers questions regarding the future of the EU's position in the world and more particularly its trade and development policy. In this context, the growing presence of China brings the greatest challenge. In the summit meeting of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum (FOCAC) in November 2009, the Chinese Prime Minister announced that China would grant US\$ 10 billion to Africa in concessional loans over the next three years. This attitude clearly demonstrates China's overall ambitions to considerably strengthen its ties with the African continent, thus becoming an attractive partner for many African countries.

Most notably, this presence has led to restructuring the current EU aid policy. Since 2000 indeed, the European development policy has undergone a significant reform process (Carbone 2007: 35). The Chinese Africa policy is characterised by very distinctive objectives compared to the European development approach, giving the impression of a competition between European and Chinese models in Africa.

#### **Normative aspect of EU's overall policy**

First and the foremost argument are about normative position on EU's development policy towards Africa. EU as an entity in its own right, having moved

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beyond traditional state structures to a “hybrid supranational form of governance” (Manners 2002: 240). Ian Manners has argued that because of its history, hybrid polity and unique constitutional configuration, the “EU has a normatively different basis for its relations with the world” (Ibid: 241). Coined by the concept of Normative Power Europe (NPE), the EU is characterised by the ability to promote beyond its borders its own core normative principles, ranging from human rights, democracy and good governance to sustainable development and regional cooperation (Ibid: 242). It is understood by foreign policy as an “area of politics which is directed at the external environment with the objective of influencing that environment and the behaviour of other actors within it, in order to pursue interests, values and goals” (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 19). According to this broad definition of foreign policy, European development aid can be understood as a key component of the EU’s normative aspiration towards developing countries (Manners 2008: 24). The EU’s eagerness to promote specific norms in its relations with developing countries is most prominently expressed in the 2005 European Consensus on Development, the first common European framework in the area of development policy.

The EU’s foreign policy plays a key role in this respect and it is reflected in many of the statements given again and again by the EU’s platform, President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Borosso in delivering a speech in Brussels in March 2011 clearly remarked over the Libyan situation and said, “ We need a new political paradigm in the relations with our Southern Neighbourhood. We need a “Pact for Democracy and Shared Prosperity”...Of course; we all know the risks in these transition processes very well. But Europe would rather be accused of holding illusions of democracy than be guilty of cynicism or of missing this rendezvous with history. In order to bolster these positive changes, the Commission will target its substantial aid along three pillars: i) democracy, the rule of law and respect for

fundamental rights; ii) inclusive social development; and iii) a strengthened and thriving civil society. We have around € 4 billion up to 2013 for Neighbourhood assistance that we will use in an even more targeted way. I already see a number of specific priority actions: i) democratic and constitutional reform, ii) judicial reform, iii) support to non-state actors such as NGOs, trade unions, women organizations and media. We will apply stronger conditionality to reward those who live up to democratic values and the rule of law”.<sup>14</sup>

For historical reasons, Africa has always occupied a special position in the European development policy and identified as a key region for European efforts to promote a value oriented policy (Olsen 1998: 345, European Commission 2005). To underline the particular importance of Africa in the European development structure, experts commonly refer to the EU’s “dual-track approach to development” (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 213), making the distinction between the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states and the rest. The cooperation between the EU and the African states is based on a number of distinctive agreements, institutions and instruments.

The 2000 Cotonou Agreement is the current contractual basis of cooperation. A wide range of development policy instruments has been developed in order to uphold democratic and human rights principles in its relations with sub-Saharan Africa. This was again emphasised when President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Borosso visited in South Africa, he further elaborated in his speech that EU is

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<sup>14</sup> Europa – Press release, speech by Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission Statement on the situation in North Africa, Press point Brussels, 2 March 2011. Online web accessed on 16/07/2012, URL- <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/11/137>



having grave concerns over the Africa as a strong partner and is pledged over to take actions on development and environmental issues, he stated, “We emphasized the need to reach a balanced set of decisions to make operational the outcome of the Cancun conference but also to go beyond that and address those issues that are still unresolved. We need collective action by all major emitters reflecting the common responsibility we all have in the fight against climate change. Regarding our relationship, we now cooperate on an impressive range of political matters, but also on issues that lie at the heart of economic recovery”.<sup>15</sup>

President Barroso in his commencement address at the Africa-EU Summit 2010 said, “The EU and Africa: consolidating our strategic partnership”. Borroso emphasized on the EU-Africa relationship by claiming that, “ We can build on the Joint Africa-EU Strategy as a political framework that allows us to project our common values, and jointly pursue our common interests in a changing world. Africa is on the move for peace and prosperity. For sure, many serious problems persist – poverty, human rights, conflicts but you are addressing them and we are your partners in this effort. In the past twenty years, the number of armed conflicts has decreased by over a third. With the consolidation of the African Peace and Security Architecture, the African Union and African regional communities are now better equipped to bring peace and stability to the continent. I would like to commend the work of the African Union and of its Commission. Also, Africa's economic growth has been impressive: per capita GDP increased annually by 6% between 2006 and 2008. And Foreign Direct Investment inflows to Africa have been rising strongly

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<sup>15</sup> European Commission -Press release, Statement by President Barroso following the EU – South Africa Summit, 15 September 2011, Online webpage accessed on 16/07/2012, URL-<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/11/580>

since 2002. The overarching priority for the EU, as set out in our Europe 2020 reform strategy, is growth. This strategy specifically refers to Europe's relations with Africa, and to how we can translate our political objectives into concrete action over the next decade".<sup>16</sup>

When referring to the normative orientation of European development policy, it has to stress the importance of political aid conditionality. This entails the linking of aid to the fulfilment of various political conditions, relating to human rights, democracy and good governance. To this regard, "negative" conditionality involves the suspension of aid if the recipient country violates the conditions. In the Cotonou Agreement, human rights, democracy and the rule of law are marked as "essential elements", which implies that their violation can lead to the suspension of development aid (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 291; Holland 2004: 286). This "negative" conditionality also refers to the EU's sanction policy. Thus EU can impose sanctions in two ways: it can implement sanctions decided by the UN Security Council or impose autonomous sanctions. These sanctions generally entail measures such as arms embargos, the freezing of funds or travel bans for officials. The EU also has "positive" incentives at its disposal to encourage the promotion of certain norms.

Despite these formal principles, Experts have raised serious doubts about the NPE concept as an explanatory basis for European foreign policy in general and for

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<sup>16</sup> Africa and Europe in partnership, Opening speech by President Barroso at the Africa-EU Summit: "The EU and Africa: consolidating our strategic partnership", Date-29/11/2010, Online web accessed on 15/07/2012, URL-<http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/news/opening-speech-president-barroso-africa-eu-summit-eu-and-africa-consolidating-our-strategic-par>

development policy in particular. The actual commitments of the EU in sub-Saharan Africa to promote the shared values and principles have been strongly criticised (Olsen 1998: 345; Santiso 2003: 16). It has been argued that within a post-Cold war context characterised by a renewed, more ideological rhetoric on aid, and although the EU has followed this general trend in the redefinition of aid strategies (Santiso 2003: 19), “there was a lack of serious European commitment to promote the declared ideals of the first years of the so-called new international system” (Olsen 1998: 367). This is often referred to as the so-called “rhetoric-behaviour gap” (Wood 2009: 128).

The EU sanctions policy is a good illustration of this contradiction. Despite strong rhetoric, EU sanctions have generally been imposed in a rather mild and unequal way. In practice, the EU has only sanctioned very few of the countries which violated the agreed norms, and it remains unclear as to how the EU selected these countries<sup>17</sup>. Furthermore, numerous exemptions to sanctions were applied, bringing in inconsistency in terms of policy enforcement. To illustrate this, Robert Mugabe was invited by the French President, Jacques Chirac, to attend the 2003 France-Africa Summit despite sanctions imposed by the EU on the government of Zimbabwe, including a travel ban for President Mugabe. In 2007 EU agreed to temporarily lift the travel ban to allow the Zimbabwean president to participate in the EU-Africa and, in so doing, it showed the accommodated pressures of the African Union, which threatened to boycott the summit (Brummer 2009: 201).

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<sup>17</sup> Sarah Grauls & Anna Stahl, "European development policy towards sub-Saharan Africa: Challenges of the growing Chinese presence", *Émulations*, 2010. ( 9 nov 2011), online webpage accessed on 16/07/2012, URL- <http://www.revue-emulations.net/archives/n7/grauls>

It has been pointed out that, too often, the EU's normative rhetoric serves only its own strategic interests. Development policy specialists refer to this as a problem of inconsistency of European development policy, where specific foreign policy objectives in the area of security, energy or trade trump development policy considerations. A particularly striking example for this is the increasing "securitisation" of European development policy, in particular to Africa. As expressed in the European Security Strategy, the security concerns of the EU also include non-traditional security threats such as illegal migration (Olsen 1998: 364). Although the European development policy and the security policy have traditionally been kept apart (Woods 2005: 405), some experts point out that European development aid, in an attempt of policy coherence, has sought to fulfil short-term security objectives at the expense of normative principles like human rights and democracy.

The ability of the EU to present itself, as a normative power in Africa is further undermined by a lack of internal coherence. As already pointed out, Community aid policy is complementary to that of the member states. It is therefore not surprising that the European Union and the Member States face many difficulties in coordinating their development policies both at the overall strategic level as well as on the ground (Alden and Smith 2005: 5). It should be underlined, that although European development policy is not immune to member states influence, the power of member states in this regard is not equally distributed. Former colonial powers continue to have unmatched influence within the European development aid system (Olsen 1998: 347; Zanger 2000: 308). There are several cases demonstrating the reluctance in the implementation of the EU principles and ideals, due to special relations and interests of a member state in a specific African country.

More importantly, African leaders themselves have been questioning the EU's normative stand with regard to the policy of conditionality, claiming that it cannot be a substitute for domestic ownership. The President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, stressed that "actions will only bear fruit when Africa substitutes external conditionality that is, doing what the donors tell us to do with internal policy clarity that is, knowing ourselves what we need to do and articulating this vision clearly to our development partners" (Michel 2007:11). Furthermore, it has also been argued that political conditionality of aid leads to an asymmetrical power relationship between the donor and the recipient.

To sum up, not only are the normative principles described above key features of the EU's involvement in Africa, but they also constitute core elements of the EU's international identity. Yet, it seems that in many cases the normative debate has been modified by elements of realpolitik and by strategic considerations. The normative characteristic of the EU's policy has hence come under pressure both from internal and external factors.

### **Challenging the EU - China's approach to Africa**

European policy makers seem to start adopting a more pragmatic approach as a response to this dilemma in particular to, the Chinese "no conditions attached", presenting an alternative source of financing and political support to African countries that do not comply with heavy principles. Philippe Maystadt, president of the European Investment Bank, stated that the EU needs to think about the degree of conditionality it wants to apply, in order to avoid "excessive" conditionality. He expressed fears that unless the conditions are set at a realistic level, African states might turn to other sources of financing without such conditionalties attached to it. It is however important to stress that even prior to the growing Chinese presence in

Africa, EU policy of “negative” conditionality was increasingly abandoned due to its often half-hearted implementation by member states. Instead, the EU puts now more effort in “positive” conditionality by rewarding the good performers. A first attempt of strengthening incentive mechanisms is the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), which is a rather flexible instrument to grant aid to groups or individuals within civil society, intergovernmental organisations defending democracy and human rights, without agreement from government.

The success of the Chinese African policy has also initiated a more fundamental discussion on the European development policy. Indeed, as a consequence of the China’s growing international role, EU faces the question of the universality of its norms and values. The Normative power of Europe concept has been accused of being Eurocentric, hiding a new form of cultural imperialism of a “civilising” power which is projecting its own understanding of norms on to the rest of the world (Bicchi 2006: 73). African leaders regularly complain that EU normative policy is characterised by an unequal relationship between the European “donor” and the African “recipient”, leaving no other choice to the latter than to adhere to European norms. As a result, African leaders increasingly see Beijing as a promising alternative to the European presence (Hackenesch 2009: 2). Many African leaders welcome the Chinese rhetoric of “win-win cooperation” and it compels the EU to adapt its discourse to this new reality. Hence recent European policy statements on cooperation with countries of sub-Saharan Africa have increasingly referred to the concept of “strategic partnership”.

The EU now stands at a crossroad in order to maintain its current role in Africa, an in-depth revision of its policy is necessary, taking into account both internal and external factors. There is evidence that both actors influence each other in

Africa (Hackenesch 2009: 56) and that the Chinese presence contributes to current changes in the European development policy. One should however remain cautious about a supposed causality between Chinese presence and the mutation of European policy. It is likely that the EU will continue to hold a normative discourse, as it represents the main basis of legitimacy of the European development policy. Despite the prospect of both actors converging on some points, the European and the Chinese development approaches towards sub-Saharan Africa will continue to differ (Hackenesch 2009: 55). Yet, this should not discourage triadic cooperation between the EU, China and Africa, which creates synergies that are beneficial to the development of Africa. More pressingly, the need for a coherent and effective European development policy has to be addressed, especially if the EU wishes to remain a credible international player.

### **CONCLUSION – EU's response**

The EU's image in Africa has suffered by the comparison with the new suitor from Asia. Some European states carry post-colonial baggage (Yates 2006: 93), EU trade diplomacy is perceived as hard-nosed and the misconceptions on development such as the lack of local ownership, duplication of aid and the dogmatic ideas of the international liberal main-stream about political transformation (Kiely 2007: 167) means that China has not to do much to be attractive partner to African policymakers frustrated by their traditional partners. In response the EU, driven by the EC to "Europeanise" development and Africa policies, has refocused on ownership at continental, regional and national levels in Africa and started to backtrack from "conditionality" (Mayall 2005: 68). In the early years of EC–Africa cooperation under the Yaunde and Lomé Conventions, EC strictly respected sovereignty and non-interference principles in its trade and aid agreements because of sensitivities after de-colonisation.

Linklater (2005: 13) rates conditionality as a distinguishing feature of post-Cold War development policy. This conditionality can be explained by the failure of the earlier approaches to yield desired development outcomes in Africa. The EC now offers political and financial incentives for good governance (The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership 2007). This is in part because of the confidence in the vitality of African democracy and good governance trends (as embodied in the AU Charter and developments in many countries), partly it is also because of the realisation that change cannot be imposed from the outside. This marks a change from both the unconditional support to African dictators in return for strategic benefits during the Cold War and the overly prescriptive approach of the Washington Consensus.

In order to overcome these dilemmas, the EU has concluded that effective cooperation between the EU and China in taking up common responsibilities is central to the shaping of international affairs and global governance in the future. Hence, the proposed trilateral dialogue and cooperation (European Commission 2007) can be regarded as a test case for the Africa-EU Partnership which is discussed in chapter 5, the EU-China strategic partnership and more generally for the EU's strategy to promote global security and governance through effective multilateralism instead of prescriptive moral crusades, for China's ambition to be a responsible power and for Africa's development and position in the world. While at the beginning European politicians and media were harshly critical of China's African policy (Tull 2008: 87), dismissing its "unethical" approach, they have now adopted a less negative tone and undertaken cooperative efforts (Berger and Wissenbach 2007: 5). One could argue that recent adaptations in both European and Chinese policies in Africa might lead to closer cooperation on some issues: the EU moves away from a normative discourse towards a more pragmatic approach, and Chinese leaders realise that they



cannot ignore broader political and social circumstances, and that international rules might help to protect their economic interests

## CHAPTER 3

# THE QUEST FOR ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES

### Introduction

Africa has strategic significance in maintaining the global energy security architecture. Oil and gas remain commodities critical to the functioning of the global economic system. Africa is known to have a global share of 10% oil and 8% gas reserves respectively. According to the 2009 U.S. Energy Information Administration records of the year 2009, Libya is home to Africa's largest oil reserves (43.7 billion barrels), followed by Nigeria (36.2 billion barrels), Algeria (12.2 billion barrels) and Angola (9 billion barrels). Apart from these countries, Sudan, Gabon, Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Egypt, Mozambique, Ghana and Uganda are also known to have huge deposits of oil and gas which are either being exported or are being developed for export. Tapping these reserves is of utmost importance for the energy dependent economies of US, China, India, and the EU.<sup>1</sup>

Europe's dependence on Africa's energy is also growing. Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Libya and Nigeria in particular have become key energy suppliers to the European Union. France for instance is the single largest EU importer of Angolan oil. The 27 EU memberstates together buy three-fifths of Algerian Liquefied Natural Gas exports. Nigeria with its 3% share of global gas reserves, exports nearly two-thirds of its gas to the EU making her the EU's fourth largest major natural gas supplier. A US\$

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<sup>1</sup> The Herald Online, Africa and global energy security, Date-25 January 2012, online webpage accessed on 16/07/12, URL-  
[http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=32255:africa-and-global-energy-security&catid=42:features-news&Itemid=134](http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=32255:africa-and-global-energy-security&catid=42:features-news&Itemid=134)

10 billion Trans-Sahara Pipeline from Nigeria passing through Niger and going onto Algeria is expected to boost gas exports from Nigeria to the European market and shall consequently help the continent emerge as a major gas exporter to the EU. Similarly, the EU is expected to secure about 15% of its power needs from the planned US\$ 550 billion solar power project in North Africa dubbed as the DESERTEC<sup>2</sup> Project. The newcomers in the global energy consumption league including China and India have also turned their focus upon Africa. Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, and the Republic of Congo have become China's major oil suppliers providing 30% of its annual oil imports.

Whether analysed from the perspective of the EU or China, there is growing recognition that Africa is on the course of a “strategic transition” and it is very likely to emerge in the near future as a major geostrategic powerhouse for the maintenance of the global economic system. As a matter of fact, Africa now features in the international calculus of many of the major global energy importers indicating the growing significance of the continent towards maintaining a healthy global economic system.

### **EU energy policy towards Africa**

The EU's focus on energy policy in Africa pertaining to Africa has been rather limited compared to the importance Europe attaches to energy questions in other producer regions. Energy was not a prominent topic in EU–Africa relations until the

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<sup>2</sup> The DESERTEC Foundation is a global civil society initiative aiming to shape a sustainable future. It was established on 20 January 2009 as a non-profit foundation that grew out of a network of scientists, politicians and economists from around the Mediterranean, who together developed the DESERTEC Concept. Founding members of DESERTEC Foundation are the German Association of the Club of Rome, members of the international network as well as committed private individuals

2000. At the level of high politics, European attention to African energy resources continued to remain scant. Energy security was not a priority issue at the first EU–Africa summit held in 2000. Moreover, the holding of a second summit was then delayed for reasons related primarily to Zimbabwe until 2007. Energy was not a sector funded by the European Development Fund (EDF). Javier Solana admitted the obvious when he said that, “We have not paid enough attention to Africa’s energy potential and its needs” (Austin 2007: 14).

Europe has considered Africa as low priority as an energy source for a long period of time due to its attention to Russia and Middle-East countries. Countries such as the UK, France and the Netherlands have focused heavily on a conflict resolution agenda. Spain has tripled the amount of aid to Africa, but in its diplomacy towards the continent, it is almost exclusively preoccupied with the issue of migration.

Energy became a priority issue for discussions at the EU–Africa ministerial in Brazzaville in October 2006. Energy cooperation was for the first time identified explicitly as a priority focal area for the Euro 23 billion EDF budget. This funding was to include a new Africa–Europe Partnership on Infrastructure, focusing in particular on energy projects. A ministerial meeting in May 2007 did appear to increase the level of political engagement and commitment. New high-level energy dialogue with African states materialized as a special part of the EU’s overall 2007–2009 Energy Action Plan (EAP). The EU talked more explicitly about Africa being crucial to its own future security of supply, alongside the longer- standing language relating to security of local citizens supply (Youngs 2009: 6).

A new Africa–EU Partnership on Energy was formally signed at the EU–Africa

summit held in December 2007. The document outlining this Partnership reiterated the familiar range of commitments relating to infrastructure links, supported through new African Energy Funds; cooperation on climate change; more senior level political dialogue on energy; technology and know-how transfer, the latter through new twinning programmes involving energy ministries; and the need for reform of national energy agencies in Africa. Former development commissioner Louis Michel argued that all this represented a significantly upgraded strategic commitment, based on the fact that “Africa is a safer producer than most other regions”<sup>3</sup>. Energy was identified as one of the priorities in a broad ranging action plan that would supposedly guide EU– Africa relations.

However, even at this stage the question of energy was overshadowed by other issues at the summit and did not receive the political push as some diplomats argued it required. The new energy action plan agreed at the summit was not taken up was not discussed and the summit mainly focused on the rule of Zimbabwe ruler Robert Mugabe, the visa issue and UK’s human rights question. The other important issue that dominated discussions was the rejection by approximately half of the African states of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) being offered or, in African states view, imposed by the European Commission (Youngs 2009: 7).

In short, the whole tone of European energy policy in Africa has been different from strategy towards Russia, the Caspian, Central Asia and the Middle East.

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<sup>3</sup> Europa Press release, Louis Michel, "Europe-Africa: the indispensable partnership". Speech at the European Policy Centre, Brussels, 5 December 2007, Online webpage accessed on 16/07/2012, URL-<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/782&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>

Officials in the European Commission's Development Directorate insisted that the EU would not dictate terms to Africa with regard to the new energy action plan. It would rather wait to see what African states want to do with it. This approach is markedly different from the one adopted in case of Russia or the Middle East, where energy policy is much more explicitly infused with geopolitics.

The official European agenda was that the developmental approach is not only a coherent part of EU Energy Security Strategy., It should rather be regarded as the most sustainable means of pursuing Europe's own interests. The British Prime Minister lists the provision of clean energy sources to Africa as a new UK priority and links this to broader UK energy interests. The primary effort to increase energy efficiency and productivity within ACP states will increase capacity and thus the amounts available for export. The prospect of greater export to European markets will in turn drive improvements in capacity and efficiency, in a virtuous circle of better governance and resource allocation.

### **China's new energy strategy**

China's oil venture in Africa has expanded over the last few years. Since 1999, crude oil imports from Africa have accounted for over 20% of its total oil imports. In 2005, this percentage increased to 31% (38.47 mts/year). Angola, Sudan, Congo and Equatorial Guinea were among China's top ten oil importing partners in 2005 while other oil producing African countries such as Nigeria, Gabon and Cameroon are increasing their oil exports to China. The growing dependence on imported oil from the continent means that China will continue with its emphasis on Africa as part of its new energy strategy (Zhao 2007: 404).

The Chinese government began giving financial support to African countries in

the 1970s. At the outset, the objectives of support were largely ideological in nature. With the advent of its economic reforms in 1978, the Chinese government stepped up its diplomatic aid to Africa and such assistance began to serve multiple purposes, including economic and oil objectives. In 1980's the assistance has become more sophisticated, in terms of instruments utilized, and geographically diverse. Chinese government provided much of its economic aid in the form of building large non-commercially oriented projects, such as sports stadiums, hospitals, schools and government office buildings in Gambia and Sierra Leone among other countries. In the 1990's, support began to shift to grants. Today, the proportion of non-commercial aids has been decreasing, with commercially oriented loans accounting for the vast majority of Chinese government-sponsored African aid (Zhao 2008: 105).

According to the World Bank in 2007, 2005, the Chinese Export-Import Bank had made an accumulated commitment of US\$ 800 million in concession loans for 55 projects in nearly 22 African countries by 2005, and after the first half of 2006, the total amount of Export-Import Bank loans to Africa reached over US\$ 12.5 billion in infrastructural development alone (Gill 2007: 38). These projects are mainly concentrated in oil-rich countries, such as Angola, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sudan and Zimbabwe. In the summer of 2006, a US\$ 2 billion infrastructure loan was announced during Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Angola as part of a seven-nation African tour (Zhao 2007: 405). When visiting Africa in early 2006, the Chinese President Hu Jintao promised to provide preferential credit of US\$ 3 billion and preferential supplier credit of US\$ 2 billion, and announced that China's support to African countries would be doubled by the year 2009.<sup>4</sup> China is also using debt relief to assist

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<sup>4</sup> Financial Times, December 28, 2006.

African nations. Since 2000, Beijing has taken significant steps to cancel the debt of 31 African countries. China gave off US\$ 1.2 billion in African debt in 2000 and in the very next year US\$ 750 million (Broadman, 2007: 275).

In the past years, strengthening of bilateral relations with African countries has been the priority of China's diplomacy consequently most of the aid was routed through bilateral channels. As China becomes a greater player in Africa, it has begun cooperation with multilateral organizations. China has become part of "Donor Coordination Groups" which are based in Kenya and Tanzania China started cooperation with NEPAD (New Partnership for Arica's Development) in 2003 wherein the development priorities in Africa were discussed.

#### **Adjusting the Approach of Non-Interference with Economic Interests: The Sudan problem**

China actively worked to block western initiatives at the U.N. Security Council aimed at forcing Khartoum into allowing a more robust peacekeeping mission in the Darfur region. China has been careful not to endorse U.N. involvement in the domestic affairs of the host government without consent, out of fear that someday such a standard could be used against its own interests. China believed that its activities in Sudan were commercial in nature, and was in doubt that foreign intervention would bring democracy and justice to that troubled nation, because "history has shown that oil-importing countries have little power to effect change in many of the world's oil states" (Daojion, 2006: 112). However, with the strengthening of the Sino-African relationship, a change of policy has been observed.



After 2004 China's investment interests have been repeatedly jeopardized and harmed in Sudan and some other African countries. "China is finding it more difficult to follow its non-interference policy in Sudan, while also ensuring the stability of its investments in the country's oil industry" (Wolfe 2007: 10). Indeed, Beijing does not believe that Khartoum's actions will lead to a resolution of the crisis, and this could potentially undermine China's investments and oil interests in Sudan. Beijing now believes that the only way to maintain stability in the region is for outside powers to force a negotiated settlement.

China started bringing about changes in its approach in October 2006 when it voted in favour of a bigger UN peacekeeping presence in Khartoum. On his visit to Khartoum in February 2007, Chinese President Hu Jintao told Al-Bashir, "Darfur is a part of Sudan and you have to resolve this problem"(Wolfe 2007: 14). In May 2007, China announced the dispatch of 275 military engineers to help strengthen the international presence. China subsequently appointed Liu Gui Jin (former Chinese ambassador to South Africa and Zimbabwe) as China's special representative for African affairs, indicating that China is "loosening its non-interference policy" in certain with so as to protect its interests.

However, there is little reason to believe that China shall be inclined towards the isolation policy advocated by the west. In the past months, China has held several meetings with Sudanese officials, pushing for closer relations and a more "flexible" approach to Darfur. In fact, the Chinese approach for solving the long-lasting conflict in Darfur has been to provide comprehensive development assistance making use of all possible tactical means to persuade the Al-Bashir's government to comply with Western requests.

## **Oil and conflict of interests: China and EU**

One of the important reasons why the conflicting oil interests of the EU and China is plays out in Africa instead of the Middle East or other regions, is the fact that China's growing demand for energy coincides with a shift in the EU's principal source of oil supplies. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the EU feared a possible energy crisis caused by instability in the Middle East and therefore shifted the bulk of its oil imports from Middle East to Africa. According to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy, the amount of oil imported by Europe between 2004-2008 from the Middle East, plunged by 20% (32 million tones).whereas the amount of oil imported by Europe from Africa surged by 20% (27.6 million tones)<sup>5</sup>.

China's energy demand has grown rapidly in recent years alongside its GDP. Owing to its high dependence on oil imports and for the sake of energy security, China urgently required to increase its energy import channels worldwide. China's energy diplomacy focuses on Middle East, Africa and Latin America., China's oil imports form 2004-2008 from the Middle East (29.2 million tones) and Africa (18.5 million tones) increased by 50% each respectively. Increased by 29.2 million tones, a growth of 50 percent; in the same period China's oil imports from Africa increased by 18.5 million tones, also a growth of 50%. Thus, in addition to the Middle East, Africa has become China's second-largest oil supplier in the world<sup>6</sup>.


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<sup>5</sup> Over the same period, the United States also reduced its oil imports from the Middle East and increased the amount of oil it imported from Africa

<sup>6</sup> British Petroleum (BP), BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2005, and BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2009. Available online at: [www.bp.com/statisticalreview](http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview).

**Figure 3.2: Europe and China's oil imports by source regions (in 2004 and 2008)**

**in million tonnes**




Sources- Lirong, L. (2011), "The EU and China's engagement in Africa: the dilemma of socialization", Occasional Paper, *JSS*, p.23

It is worth emphasizing that there are significant regional differences between oil imports of EU and China from Africa. In 2008, Europe imported 151.4 million tonnes of oil from Africa: 54 million tonnes of this 66.91% came from North Africa, whereas China imported 53.9 million tonnes of oil from of which 7.79% came from North Africa. The main arena of the EU-China energy conflict lies in Sub-Saharan Africa.

**Eastern & Southern Africa:** Compared with North Africa and West Africa, the total amount of oil exported from this region has been relatively low. The main export destination is China and Japan. In recent years, Sudan has become the world's fastest

growing country in oil production. From 1998 to 2008, Sudan's oil production increased from 0.6 million tonnes to 23.7 million tonnes – an unprecedented growth of 3,850%. Sudan is not a part of OPEC. The political confrontation between EU and China over Sudan is not only related to differences over norms and values, but also to a clash of oil interests.

**Figure 3.3- Distribution of China's oil import from Africa, 2008 (regionwise)**



Source: Lirong, L. (2011), "The EU and China's engagement in Africa: the dilemma of socialization", Occasional Paper, ISS, p.27

**Western Africa:** From 2004 to 2008, oil exports from this region increased from 201.9 million tonnes to 228.8 million tonnes. Over the same period, the output in the majority of oil-producing countries in West Africa did not increase whereas Nigeria's oil production dropped sharply. Oil production in Angola (which joined OPEC in 2007) grew by 91.29% (from 48.2 million tonnes to 92.2 million tonnes), contributed to the growth of the total amount of oil exports from West Africa and balanced the impact of oil production decline in other countries. From 2004 to 2008, Europe's oil imports from this region grew by 83.3% (from 27 million tonnes to 49.5 million tonnes) while China's oil imports from the region grew by 42.18% (from 27.5 million tonnes to 39.1 million tonnes). It is Angola rather than South Africa

which has become China's most important trading partner in Africa. In May 2010, the Chinese State Construction Engineering Corporation and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation signed a Memorandum of Understanding to build oil refineries and the necessary infrastructure for petroleum in Nigeria at a total cost of 23 billion US dollars<sup>7</sup>. Next to the fragile China-Angola cooperation model, Nigeria could become yet another theatre of oil conflict between EU and China. Oil is a political commodity. As far as energy security issues are concerned, the conflict of interests between EU and China in Africa is becoming increasingly problematic. This is one of the reasons why China's trade with Africa comes in for much more criticism compared to the other regions.

### **Europe: Issues against China's approach**

Many European scholars have examined the impact and consequences of China's quest of energy in Africa. Although progressing rapidly, China's energy diplomacy is encountering problems Africa. The main problem relates to Beijing's traditional approach of focusing upon state-to-state relationship when engaging with African countries. For instance, its aid to Africa is not very transparent and the deals are made at the inter-state level. Beijing's unsophisticated aid apparatus is primarily controlled by the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and state-owned banks such as China Export-Import Bank and China Development Bank (Alden 2007: 86).

As a result, some scholars believe that China's engagement with Africa has

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<sup>7</sup> The Financial Times, Tom Burgis, 'China in \$23bn Nigeria oil deal', 15 May 2010. Online webpage accessed on 17/07/2012, URL- <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/098d91c8-5fba-11df-a670-00144feab49a.html>.

been primarily centered on capturing elites and natural resources, with shallow roots in wider African society (Alden 2007: 84). The civil society in Africa is becoming increasingly concerned about China's role in Africa especially Beijing's close relationship with Sudan and Zimbabwe (Obiorah 2007: 49). Some authors argue that although the African leadership views China–Africa relationship as “a golden opportunity to escape Western domination and make the West less relevant to Africa”, the people in Africa have yet to see whether this relationship will benefit them or just the leadership (Chidaushe 2007: 107).

Chinese NOC operations in the continent have have invited a backlash. For example, militants in the Niger Delta have warned Chinese NOCs to stay clear through by means of threats and acts of violence and hostage taking. In certain African countries like Ethiopia and Sudan, some Chinese oil workers have been kidnapped and even killed by rebels. It is likely that China shall increasingly become vulnerable to such incidents in the coming years. One of the primary reasons responsible for the occurrence of such unwelcome events is the uneven distribution of the benefits reaped by China–Africa economic and energy co- operation among various groups within Africa. As elsewhere in the world, it is impossible for all social groups to benefit from engagement with China, but if such benefits cannot reach more people, especially at the grassroots, China is bound to face stronger resistance in the future.

Also, state-to-state relationships are essentially opportunistic in nature. Campbell (2007: 74) argued that, in the long run, transnational civil society links between the Chinese and African populace would be more important than the relationship between leaders and heads of state. Alden (2007) too contends that the

future China–Africa relationship will increasingly be determined by the experiences of Africans and Chinese on the ground, rather than by the Chinese government or African elites. There is no doubt that Beijing has been making efforts to increase contact and communication between the Chinese and African people and providing aid and assistance to the people in Africa for decades.

This is likely to adversely affect Beijing’s diplomatic and national interests in Africa. It shall also tarnish the reputation and affect their long-term interests of Chinese enterprises. A typical problem is the negative impact of the operations of Chinese enterprise that harm the local environment. It is largely felt that Chinese firms are causing the same kind of environmental damage, which is leading to “community opposition”, that Western firms have generated around the world. For example, in 2006, Gabon ordered Sinopec to stop exploration in the Loango National Park after a US conservation group accused it of damaging the forest and operating without an approved environmental impact study (Gill and Reilly 2007: 46).

Another issue often under severe criticism by some Western and African observers is making use of significant numbers of Chinese workers by Chinese companies in their projects in Africa. Chinese firms justify the employment of Chinese workers on the grounds of low cost, high productivity, easy communication and cultural familiarity. They are accustomed to bringing workers from China. It is the Chinese nationals who tend to be recruited for the managerial positions. It is more efficient and convenient for Chinese enterprises to recruit skilled workers from China than to train local workers in Africa. Chinese workers are more familiar with the technologies and have few language and cultural obstacles in communication with the management. Also, Chinese workers are more compliant to the demanding labour

practices of Chinese firms, and are used to working extra shifts and hours. Nevertheless, from the perspective of these company's long-term interests and for the sake of development of the African continent, the focus should be on safeguarding the interests of local communities and in order to lay the foundation for a good and sustainable relationship and thereby ensure a win-win situation for the local people.

### **Conclusion- EU response over China's quest for energy**

The rapid emergence of China as a dynamic actor in Africa with different approaches from Europe, and the strong reaction to this phenomenon affects the EU-Africa and EU-China partnerships. China's role in conflict and post-conflict situations, most notably Darfur, Angola and DRC, has prompted strong public criticism of China in EU. China has become an important player in most countries and sectors, and that too not only in resource-rich countries (Asche 2008: 37). China's cooperation with Africa has mainly focused on economic growth, trade and investment. A number of studies describe this in detail. China has concentrated most of its funding on the infrastructure and resources sectors. These dynamics have brought to the fore misperceptions, media criticism and suspicions about hidden agendas on all sides. With the renewed interest for African oil and minerals, some African countries tend to play off external competitors against each other and often load this game with political overtones. Simultaneously, the debate about the resource curse has been fuelled by China-Africa relations (Wissenbach 2009: 16).

Chinese Africa policy has taken an almost exclusively economic twist, despite the political rhetoric, with unexpected negative impacts on some social groups in Africa. This raises questions about the benefits from Africa's industrialisation and the durability of China's engagement beyond the commodity boom. The current



economic crisis and cooperation in the G-20 will be a litmus test and the Chinese leadership seems to have realised this. During his 2009 visit to Africa, President Hu sought to reassure African leaders about China's resolve to fulfil its commitments, while Prime Minister Wen has sought to fend off expectations of new pledges.

In order to overcome these dilemmas, the EU has concluded that effective cooperation between EU and China in taking up common responsibilities is central to the shaping of international affairs and global governance in the future. Hence, the proposed Trilateral Dialogue and Cooperation (European Commission 2007) would be regarded as a test case for the Africa–EU Partnership, the EU–China strategic partnership and more generally for the EU's strategy to promote global security and governance through effective multilateralism instead of prescriptive moral crusades, for China's ambition to be a responsible power and for Africa's development.

## CHAPTER 4

# THE EU AS A NORMATIVE ACTOR AND CHINA'S ROLE IN AFRICA

### EU as Normative Power

The concept of normative power, in its ideal or purest form, is ideational rather than material or physical. This means that its use involves normative justification rather than the use of material incentives or physical force. Clearly, the use of normative justification implies a very different form of engagement in world politics. In this respect, relations and policies with the rest of the world should be “normatively sustainable” that is, normatively explicable and justiciable to others, and “sustainable” into the next generation (Gerrits 2009: 8).

In the post-Cold War period, the power of ideas and norms has been influential in the evolution of the European Community (EC) into the EU. Such ideas have helped to create an EU that is concerned about more than economic policies, and that exercises more than material forms of influence and power (Manners 2002: 240). In this respect, the assimilation of normative power and exercise of normative justification can be increasingly found in much of the EU's relations with the rest of the world, including the external dimensions of internal policies that is enlargement, trade and development policies and external relations more generally. Two examples of the power of ideas in the EU's post-Cold War relations with the world include, the ideas of “sustainable development” and “humanitarian intervention”. In both cases the ideas came from within the UN system, which were adopted into the EU treaty base, and then were eventually promoted and practiced in EU's external relations.

EU's role in international politics must be seen as one of ‘normalization’, spreading common principles disregarding Westphalian conceptions of power balances, no matter how do states behave in their mutual competition, the EU enjoys the unique ability to shape conceptions of “normal” in international relations (Manners 2002: 239), an ideational perspective that clearly contrasts realist criticism.

Therefore, the EU is structurally different, and may claim a peculiar attitude towards the international community. Indeed, a combination of historical context, hybrid polity and legal constitution turned the EU into a worldwide promoter of those universal norms and principles, by which its external relations are now completely defined. As soon as the EU constitutionally binds itself to the consolidation of democracy, rule of law, respect of human rights and fundamental freedom (Manners 2002: 241).

According to Gerrits (2009: 8)

“EU in the promotion of norms and principles cover a full spectrum of practices and policies, encouraging a comprehensive approach to the many challenges of world politics. The EU has historically been better at addressing more structural challenges through development aid, trade, inter-regional cooperation, political dialogue and enlargement.”

During the last decade, the gradual evolution of conflict-prevention and crisis-management policies has helped to improve the EU’s ability to deal with more immediate challenges, such as humanitarian crises and post-conflict reconstruction for example the case of Macedonia. This combination of EU actions marks a first step towards a more sustainable peace strategy, where the EU is able to address both the structural causes and violent symptoms of conflict. However, the EU’s inclination in the promotion of principles is to encourage processes of engagement and dialogue. Such EU engagement entailed the initiating and institutionalising regular patterns of communication or partnership, such as through accession procedures, stabilization and association agreements, like in European Neighbourhood Policy and its relation with African, Caribbean and Pacific relations, and strategic partnerships (Gerrits 2009: 8).

Such type of approach is also seen in the trilateral co-operation where EU consistently devising out the measures to engage China in the promotions of democratic norms in Africa.

The European Union has a history and practice of normative power in world politics, but there are some challenges that remain in its way. First, the evolution of EU politics and policies over the past decade that has tried to assimilate some of the habits of other actors in world politics, for instance like “war on terror” and the

“securitization” of ordinary life, or in trying to rival other “great powers” in international relations. This has created some sort of suspicion among the countries in Africa and other about the role of EU, who do not freely want to engage with it.

In this respect, the development and use of EU material incentives or physical force has tended to follow the patterns and practices of great powers instead of thinking about and using normative power in a more justiciable way.

Secondly, there are serious setbacks due to the emergence of new powers who are also assuming the role of traditional powers, like China, India and Brazil who are emerging as the new donors and traders. The new players are not in consistent with traditional players and they have their own way of dealing out with the situation. So, there is increased confrontation among the traditional (EU) and emerging (China) players, which is discussed in the next part of the study and resource rich autocratic regimes (some of the states of Africa) becomes the playground for such type of confrontation.

### **Values vs. Interests**

The conflicts over norms and interests between the EU and China in Africa is a complex one which is looming behind the dispute over aid to the autocratic regimes which has lead to the situation of status quo and does not change much in the polity of these regimes.

Secondly, the EU’s trade interests have been adversely affected by China’s economic engagement in Africa; the competition for energy resources has led to a negative public perception of China in Europe<sup>1</sup> and generated mutual accusation and a debate over norms and values.

Besides that EU policies were aimed at to achieve its desired goals to develop territorial security and harmony in its backyard with the political conditionalities and democratic norms. In particular, it enabled the EU to ensure that aid is used in

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<sup>1</sup> A series of resolutions and reports on China including the European Parliament’s Report on China’s Policy and its Effects on Africa led to a negative public perception of China in Europe. The opinion polls showed that China’s popularity in Europe dropped dramatically to its lowest in 2008.

accordance with the newly agreed aims and principles of development co-operation, and to switch aid resources to those states that most successfully took new “shared values” of Africa–EU co-operation.

The EU’s emphasis on values and norms may be interpreted as motivated by the following reasons:

(i) In the process of European integration, it is necessary for the EU to establish a set of “common values” to deepen integration and uphold cohesion within Europe. At the level of the EU, common values are relatively easier to define than common interests. Emphasising values and norms will contribute to upholding the coherence and consistency of the EU’s foreign policy. At the level of the EU Member States, it is relatively easy to define national interests. This being the case, the EU Member States are often more inclined towards a pragmatic foreign policy. (ii) Successfully exporting its own model of governance and social standards is essential for the sustainable development of the EU, as well of its member states. The EU’s criticism of China’s engagement in Africa focuses on norms that protect the Human rights, Democracy, Environment, Labour standards and Social welfare. If other global competitors do not accept European norms and standards, European firms might find themselves at a comparative disadvantage due to higher production costs.<sup>2</sup> From this point of view, the dissemination of European norms and standards might be interpreted as an attempt by Europe to shore up its own interests, i.e. the EU’s foreign policy is an instrument to uphold the social standards within the Africa. (Lirong 2011: 147)

But if we contrast with China with EU, it has its own and different type of philosophy which was given in December 1955, when Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai met India’s diplomatic mission, he advocated that —after the New China was built, it has established the principles for dealing with China-India relations, which are mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful

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<sup>2</sup> As indicated in the European Parliament report, ‘China’s trading policy approach to Africa is based on one- to-one relations between states and neglects references to human rights, corporate social responsibility, and environmental and social standards, thus giving China quite a considerable comparative advantage in Africa’. See Report on China’s Policy and Its Effects on Africa, op. cit. in note 15, p.30.

coexistence. Afterwards this set of rules got intermingled with all of the foreign relations conducted with any country and Prime Minister Zhou Enlai remarked that they would form the solid base for peace and security. Then in the first Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung, China's diplomatic mission explained these five principles and developed them into ten ones, which were also accepted by this conference.

However, at that time this Five Principles originally was not used to direct China's relations with socialist and advanced capitalist countries. In the period of 1950s, China considered socialist countries are like brothers and they should unite together to fight against capitalists. Clearly, China didn't totally trust western countries, the leader of capitalist countries. But after a series of events that China experienced, including China-India war, collapse of Sino-Soviet relations, and engagement with the United States in 1960's, China was aware of the universal features of this Five Principles to deal with each state's relations with other countries, regardless of developing countries, socialist countries or advanced capitalist countries. So since 1950s, the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence is the basic philosophy that China cherishes in order to maintain its sovereignty, independence and national interests, and keep international stability both in the era of the Cold War and in the age of globalization (Junbo 2008:66).

So, it was from the very beginning that China followed a different kind of philosophy, which China called as anti-hegemonic and that's why China advocated on different norms and values, which were very not in conformity with existing set of western values.

After Post Cold war when China emerged as a bigger player in the international politics they again followed the same principles to carry out their trade and aid, which was directly responsible for their national interests. It started supporting undemocratic and autocratic regimes without the concern for the human rights, because for Chinese what was happening in alien territory was not a matter of concern and they commenced their trade with utmost objectives.

China was criticized for their involvement in Sudan and other regimes for not considering the human rights before doing trade. Chinese merged their 'non-

interference' philosophy with 'indifference' while carrying out their trade. Secondly China is now a fast developing country with immense need for energy and natural resources and many of the natural resources sites are located in the autocratic regimes. And China does not want to create a problem for its development engine and want hassle free supplies of natural resources and energy.

### **Support to Autocratic Regimes**

China's position on human rights, in particular its foreign policy in relation to human rights, has been the subject of increased discussion (Kent 1999: 18-37). The government of the People's Republic of China has maintained for some time that human rights are a Western creation and are inappropriate for China or indeed Asia—a position also championed by former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore. The Asian values argument holds that Asian countries value community and family over individuality and thus do not require international human rights guarantees that emphasize individual civil and political rights (Zakaria 1993: 109-123). China further makes the claim that civil and political rights should not be given primacy over economic, social, and cultural rights, and that China was committed to promoting the latter.

China refrained from joining international human rights conventions until the 1990s. Following the crackdown on dissidents in Tiananmen Square in 1989 and the international criticism that it provoked, China began to engage with the international human rights architecture. In 1991, the Chinese government issued the first of many white papers on China's human rights policy.<sup>3</sup> This white paper, like the ones that followed, emphasized China's commitment to human rights but carefully circumscribed that commitment by emphasizing national conditions and national views. The white papers presented a detailed account of the protection of human rights in China but are notably lacking in discussions of many civil and political rights, such as freedom of expression and association, or protection against torture or genocide. Instead, discussion of protection of human rights begins, in the two most recent white papers, with accounts of improvement in crime prevention.

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<sup>3</sup> State Council, People's Republic of China, "Human Rights in China" (November 1991), Online webpage accessed on 15/07/2012, URL- [www.china.org.cn/e-white/7/index.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/7/index.htm)

Further, while recognizing “human rights”, China has adamantly insisted that promotion of human rights must not impede on state sovereignty and must not be used as a political tool to interfere in the internal affairs of states. While this position was staked out in significant part to prevent criticism of China’s own domestic human rights record, it also explained China’s wariness of censuring African governments for their own abuses.

One of the important leverage which autocratic states get with the involvement by China is because of its position as one of only five countries with a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council gives it the power to veto resolutions that might condemn member states or authorize actions against them, such as sanctions or intervention. It can and has delayed and narrowed resolutions by threatening to veto them. Thus, regimes may feel free to engage in massacres, torture, enforced disappearances, and even genocide, with the promise that China will shield them from the international community’s response. Where such vetoes or threats of veto result in a delay or halting of a resolution, many lives may be lost or irreparably harmed. As discussed below, there are calls for China to use its considerable power and influence on the Security Council and in Africa to pressure abusive regimes to change, rather than to shield them (Rotberg 2008: 252).

Many countries of interest are embroiled in vicious cycles of conflict and abuse of human rights. Thus, investment, contracting, or operations in many countries carry a very high risk of aiding human rights abuses or the commission of war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity. In countries engaged in vicious internal conflict, the sale of arms to any party will foreseeably result in harm to civilians. Where countries have poor human rights records, this is even more likely to be the case. This is also happening in Africa where there is effective involvement of China, which lead to the volumes of.

The African countries where human rights abuses are frequent and where Chinese engagement is significant are the Sudan, Zimbabwe and recently Syria.



## **The Sudan**

China's rapid growth relies upon oil, and it extracts a significant amount in the Sudan, with most operations being conducted by the state-owned and run Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) (Taylor 2006: 943). However, where the CNPC exploration has been extensive, the Chinese-owned company partnered with the Canadian company Talisman and Malaysian company Petronas.

Nonetheless, Chinese interest in Sudanese oil is undeniable, and to ensure continued access to that oil, China has been a staunch supporter of the Sudanese government (Large 2011:28). As a result, China has been the subject of significant international criticism, with criticism blaming China for the abuses perpetrated in Darfur by the Janjaweed militants, with the support of the Sudanese armed forces, or demanding that it place pressure upon the Sudanese government to refrain from or curtail abuses and permit a significant international peacekeeping force. However, China like any other country investing or carrying out commercial activities abroad cannot be held to account for every violation committed by a host state. Rather, any analysis must be clear about the nature of activities by the Chinese government or state-operated corporations that may directly or indirectly facilitate abuses. These include China's direct supply of arms to the Sudan's military, both before and after the imposition of a UN arms embargo on the sale of weapons to the Sudan destined for Darfur and direct support to or facilitation of rights abuses through the construction of roads and the hiring of the Sudanese military for security (Brown and Sriram 2008: 257).

China has engaged in extensive arms sales to the Sudanese government, selling it some US\$ 100 million in arms between 1996 and 2003 alone. These weapons included jets and helicopter gunships, reportedly used for the repression of civilians in the South as part of the now terminated North-South conflict. The weaponry, which China sold to the Sudan throughout the 1990s, helped the government to target villages in the South during the long-running conflict with the Sudan People's Liberation Army (Rone 2003:605-621). In particular; such targeting resulted in massive civilian casualties and forced displacement. Violence has arisen since the 2005 North-South peace agreement in parts of the South where Petrodar, a consortium involving Chinese and Malaysian companies, is conducting exploration. There has

been significant displacement of the civilian population (particularly Dinka) and environmental damage, with tensions leading to civilians killing the Petrodar team leader in January 2006.

China's arms sales clearly facilitated gross abuses by the Sudanese government, but the sales themselves did not violate international law. While the United States imposed sanctions and the European Union (EU) imposed an arms embargo, China was bound by neither.

China actively resisted the imposition of international sanctions that would prevent it from selling arms to the Sudan, as did Russia, another significant supplier of arms to the Sudan. Until the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1591 in 2005, which bars sales to all parties involved in the conflict in Darfur (on which China abstained), such sales were not illegal. However, arms sales made by both Russia and China since the passage of this resolution do appear to violate the embargo.<sup>4</sup> While both governments insist that they are not selling arms destined for Darfur, Amnesty International has reported that small arms and aircraft supplied by China and Russia have been sighted in Darfur and that such aircraft have been used by the Sudanese military to support Janjaweed attacks on civilians.<sup>5</sup> The UN has further found that the government has painted aircraft white and even stenciled UN or African Union (AU) logos on them to mislead civilians into believing them to be aid aircraft.<sup>6</sup>

Chinese activities had tend to facilitate many abuses by the Sudanese government. Still, it is important to distinguish those for which it is clearly responsible and from those that one might merely wish it to constrain or prevent. China is clearly responsible for the current delivery of weapons that are known to be used by parties to the conflict in Darfur and is in violation of the UN embargo. China can further be

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<sup>4</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 1591 (29 March 2005), UN Doc. S/RES/1591. See Amnesty International, "Sudan: Arms Continuing to Fuel Serious Human Rights Violations in Darfur", 8 May 2007, Online webpage accessed on 23/06/2012, URL [www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR54/019/2007](http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR54/019/2007)

<sup>5</sup> BBC news online, "China, Russia, Deny Weapons Breach," 8 May 2007, Online webpage accessed on 14/07/2012, URL-<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6632959.stm>

<sup>6</sup> Amnesty International- News online, "South Sudan: Arms supplies fuelling violations in forgotten conflict", 28 June 2012, Online webpage accessed on 21/07/2012, URL-<http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/south-sudan-arms-supplies-fuelling-violations-forgotten-conflict-2012-06-27>

found responsible where abuses were committed by Sudanese forces that it hired for security, and if its oil exploration involved harm to the Chinese laborers that it used in southern Sudan. These acts should be clearly distinguished from action or inaction for which China is frequently criticized, such as investing or engaging in oil exploration and exploitation in the Sudan more generally or for failing to restrain the acts of the government (Brown and Sriram 2008: 260).

### **Zimbabwe**

Beginning in 2000, and to a greater degree after the 2002 elections, Western countries imposed a series of punitive measures. These included the drastic reduction of non-humanitarian foreign aid, suspending Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth, putting in place an arms embargo, and imposing “smart sanctions,” notably freezing regime elite’s bank accounts and banning their travel to the EU and the United States. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund also ceased assistance. Faced with increased international isolation and an economic crisis reaching to larger proportions, President Mugabe in 2005 announced a new “Look East” policy. Henceforth, Zimbabwe would turned its back on the West and moved to Asia, especially China, for trade, investment, and loans. This made official practice that was already in place. With the Western economic withdrawal, China had already become an economic partner of growing importance (Brown and Sriram 2008: 260).

In recent years, Chinese companies have invested in mining and farming, as well as building roads (Kaplinsky 2007: 93-94). In exchange for mining concessions, China has also reportedly become the largest importer of Zimbabwean tobacco, as well as an important supplier of cell phones, televisions, and radios. Chinese firms have provided agricultural equipment and helped with electricity generation.(Youde 2006:11).

China has also sold light arms to Zimbabwe and even built a weapons factory (Meidan 2006:364). In 2005, China sold Zimbabwe 6 jets for its air force, soon followed by 12 jet fighters and 100 military vehicles, valued at about US\$ 240 million, at a time when 1 million Zimbabweans were at risk of starvation. Beijing supplied tanks, artillery, armored vehicles, and anti-aircraft batteries (Eisenman 2006:223). It has been said that China might also have provided the Zimbabwean

government with riot control gear and radio-jamming equipment. In addition, China has reportedly provided equipment to monitor electronic communications and had planned to provide assistance in the area of law enforcement and prison management.<sup>7</sup>

China also has given Zimbabwe political support at the international level. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it blocked UN condemnations of Mugabe's government and binding sanctions. Among non-African countries, only China endorsed the 2005 elections. It also publicly supported Operation Murambatsvina (Youde 2007: 10).

China has shielded Mugabe's regime from international oppositions, including potentially binding UN sanctions. Whether China's support was key in keeping the regime in power and that China actually had the power to alter Zimbabwean policy is yet. But as discussed China was effective supporter of Mugabe's regime to which many western countries including EU held accountable for gross human rights violation.

### **Syria**

China became Syria's number one supplier of commodities after their trade boom. While figures from Syria's Bureau of Statistics put the value of Syrian imports from China at US\$ 691 million. Syria's newfound interest in Chinese markets is also redefined its relations with her traditional trading partners, particularly the EU. Syria's share of imports from the Europe has fallen by around 15 percent in recent years from 50% of all imports in 2003 to now less than 35%. The country's share of exports has followed a similar trend<sup>8</sup>, falling by 17% over the same period. The decline in trade explained that over a period of time Syria found a reliable partner in the form of China against the European traditional partners and has turned to east to secure its economic and political future. But condition deteriorated when Syrian National Council, an umbrella group dominated by the country's Sunni majority, including Islamist groups like Muslim Brotherhood opposed ruling power. In the course of which began from

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<sup>7</sup> International Herald Tribune, 25 July 2005, Sophie Richardson, "China Can Help the People of Zimbabwe and Sudan," Human Rights Watch Commentary (3 November 2006), Online webpage accessed on 16/07/2012, URL- <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/11/03/china14509.htm>

<sup>8</sup> Executive (2007), Syria - China - trade partners, online webpage accessed on 23/07/2012, URL- <http://www.executive-magazine.com/getarticle.php?article=9819>

mid of march of this year government tried to suppress the movement by repressive measures that also lead to Houla massacre in June 2012. Since the crisis began in March 2011, the United Nations estimates more than 10,000 people have been killed.

International Committee of the Red Cross claimed on July 15 the sixteen-month old conflict as a civil war. Fighting between anti-government activists and Syrian security forces has spread across the country, including new outbursts of heavy violence in Damascus. International diplomatic efforts aimed at isolating the regime of President Bashar al-Assad still continuing their efforts, including calls for a transition government. UN security council brought resolution against Syria seeking the permission for the international intervention on 6<sup>th</sup> June 2012 which was vetoed by China along with Russia, they opposed against the international intervention in Syria as well as promoting forced “regime change” at UN Security Council.

Chinese veto to the crisis in Syria clearly explains the willingness to support human rights and democracy. Chinese support to the autocratic regimes are largely driven by the economic interests and their policy of non-intervention tend to favour their economic interests.

### **Conclusion**

EU and China in their principle and approach are different entities favouring their interests on different fronts. EU as a normative power had always trying to infuse the democratic values, good governance and human rights. But Chinese principle of non-intervention and Beijing consensus of aid disbursement in biggest hurdle to infuse the norms professed by Europe.

Arab spring and recently in Syria there were revolutions among the civil society and citizens regarding the approach of their governments over human rights and democracy, this also presents the alarming situation for the China as its policy of non-intervention will only work when there would be presence of autocratic governments, if not then the preferential trade would not be the same as we see of China today. Chinese support to autocratic regimes behind the garb of non-intervention would not work for quite a long time because civil uprising going on in the African countries could turn the face of the situation.

## CHAPTER 5

# THE EU-CHINA-AFRICA: TRILATERAL DIALOGUE

### Origins of Trilateral Dialogue

European Union, especially the European Commission, has driven the Africa-China-EU cooperation initiative with the Chinese and Africans beginning to engage on the issue of trilateral cooperation. Though China's growing presence on the African continent was increasingly felt by 2000, Brussels and member states were slow to recognise the magnitude of the changes occurring in Africa. Even as late as 2005, the fact that the British to the G8 Gleneagles invited China denoted the rapidly changing circumstances on the Africa. Controversy over the Sudanese government's actions in Darfur brought China, the most important backer of and key trading partner with the regime, into sharp focus. Integrating these concerns into the EU's broader aspirations for the relationship with China set about constructing a dialogue through a series of conferences, workshops and shared discussions on how the EU and China might cooperate with Africa. (Alden 2009: 3)

At the 2006 EU-China summit, the joint communique noted that:

The Leaders agreed to pursue a structured dialogue on Africa and explore avenues for practical cooperation on the ground in partnership with the African side, including with the support of NEPAD initiatives and with the aim of attaining the Millennium Development Goals ... Both the EU and China are signatories of the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness. The two parties will continue to promote the effectiveness principles contained in the Paris Declaration.

This was again reiterated in the 2007 communique, in which the two sides agreed "to continue their dialogue on African issues, and actively explore effective ways and channels of cooperation among EU, China, and Africa in appropriate areas." EU and Africa have established a new and comprehensive partnership agreed at the second Africa-EU summit in Lisbon in December 2007. The Africa-EU Joint Strategy and its first Action Plan agreed in Lisbon, identified common challenges, common interests and concrete sector-based partnerships with the aim to eradicate poverty, reach the Millennium Development Goals and promote security, human rights, democratic governance, sustainable development, regional integration and integration

into the world economy. In line with these objectives and principles, the EU, collectively the largest provider of Official Development Assistance (ODA), has agreed to scale up its aid, in particular to Africa, and to make it more efficient<sup>1</sup> and has undertaken to align its Africa policy on AU priorities. Untied grants and soft loans were the main financial tools<sup>2</sup>. All this was again emphasised by the publication of a communication by the European Commission in October 2008, entitled *The EU, Africa and China: Towards Trilateral Dialogue and Cooperation*.

Secondly, birth of the African Union (AU) and the reinforced role of Africa's Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the African blueprints for economic development (NEPAD-New Partnership for Africa's Development) and for democratic governance (the African Peer Review Mechanism) together with the Strategic Plan of the African Union (2004-2007) marked a fundamental break in the way Africa looks at itself and how it engages with its external partners. Africa is now determined to assert its international status and is becoming active on major global issues like food security, energy and climate change and changing economic environments.

Africa has been becoming pivotal in creating a network of partnerships, which imply taking more responsibility for its own development, looking for African solutions to African problems. At the same time there is a renewed interest in the African continent because of its strategic significance in economic, security and political terms. This provides a genuine and welcome opportunity for Africa's development and its fight against poverty.

Since 2000 China-Africa trade has steeply increased, Chinese investments in Africa have risen sharply and China has been offering increased development cooperation to African countries. This includes its domestic experience with poverty reduction. The new approach to Africa was laid out in 2006 when China presented a White Paper on its Africa policy focusing on the promotion of peace and stability,

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<sup>1</sup> In its Communication "EU as a global partner for development", the Commission proposes a number of actions to encourage Member States to increase the volume and the effectiveness of aid as well as areas where EU policies could be better coordinated.

<sup>2</sup> Commission of the European Communities, *The EU, Africa and China: Towards trilateral dialogue and cooperation*, Brussels, 17.10.2008.

development and common prosperity.<sup>3</sup> China's official development policy is to pursue cooperation with the focus on sovereignty, solidarity, peace and development with non-interference in domestic affairs and mutual benefit as key principles. Trade, investment, and infrastructure projects and training in China (fellowships) are the main tools supported mainly through loans and in-kind operations.

At the Beijing summit in November 2006, China and Africa had commenced a new strategic partnership within the framework provided by the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC<sup>4</sup>). Many observers of this process noted a number of shared objectives and interests in promoting Africa's economic growth and integration into the world economy, the pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and efforts to conflict management and peacekeeping.

Moreover, both the EU and China have a strong-shared interest in promoting stable and sustainable development in Africa. This reality has been recognised by the EU and China: At the tenth China-EU Summit held in Beijing on 28 November 2007, the EU and Chinese leaders welcomed more practical cooperation by the two sides through their respective existing cooperation mechanisms with Africa so as to contribute to Africa's peace, stability and sustainable development on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. The two sides agreed to continue their dialogue on African issues, and actively explore the effective ways and channels of cooperation among China, EU and Africa in appropriate areas.

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy explicitly welcomed the contributions by other partners and was open to cooperation with African countries on the common objectives of the partnership. These statements therefore provide an explicit opportunity to strategically link and mutually strengthen the EU's partnerships with both Africa and China.

The question is whether more can be done between the EU, Africa and China to reinforce their policy dialogue and cooperation through forms of trilateral cooperation,

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<sup>3</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC (2006) 'China's African Policy', January 2006.

<sup>4</sup> The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was inaugurated through a ministerial conference in Beijing in 2000. The third FOCAC was held at summit level in Beijing 3-5 November 2006.



which complement the bilateral partnerships<sup>5</sup>. This Communication argued that it should begin on the basis of consensus to establish, in a gradual, but in progressive way, a cooperative three way agenda with both of its African and Chinese partners in a number of areas where synergies and mutual benefits could be maximised.

But first and foremost it is necessary to discuss the shared interests which will drive for further EU-China co-operation that was emphasized by Berger and Wissenbach (2007: 19-22) were:

*Security and stability.* Stability in and among African states is first and foremost an issue of shared economic interests. Economic risks exist where inter-state conflicts, civil strife, migratory pressures and terrorism prevail. Therefore the protection of investments will go along with conflict resolution, combating corruption and the promotion of good governance standards and the rule of law. Chinese, Europeans and Africans have a shared interest in preserving the unity of Sudan (and of other countries that face inter-ethnic tensions, political unrest or secessionist movements). The Darfur crisis and the controversy around China's relations with Sudan show that security is a shared interest that can only be realised by at least a minimum of coordination within the triangle and with the co-operation with European Union.

*Energy and environmental security*<sup>6</sup> are global challenges that need to be comprehensively addressed in terms of supply and demand of energy sources,

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<sup>5</sup> The more general impacts of China's rise were addressed in the 2006 Communication EU-China: Closer Partners, growing responsibilities. The "The EU, Africa and China: Towards trilateral dialogue and cooperation", Brussels, 17.10.2008, focused specifically on the EU response to the development opportunities and challenges arising in Africa due to China's emergence as a key development partner of Africa.

<sup>6</sup> The concept of energy security itself has evolved since the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) boycott in the 1970s focused attention almost exclusively on supply and to some extent demand. In this traditional sense, energy security is defined as the reliable supply of energy at reasonable cost. Today, the definition has to take account of other variables. The concept of "sustainability" in economic growth questions the definition of reasonable cost, which can no longer ignore the environmental and social costs, which are normally not reflected in the market price, but "outsourced", sometimes at tremendous cost to producer countries. These costs, which are unaccounted for, come in terms of political and social instability, corruption, theft and other crimes, and pollution including in Africa. At the other side of the equation the indirect costs of consumption of energy (at a cheaper price than the one reflecting these costs) also needs to include the cost of global warming and air pollution which are once again not fully reflected in the current market price (except for ecological taxes in some countries).

effects on climate change, energy efficiency and the “resource curse”. Environmental security is particularly relevant for Africa because it will most likely suffer from climate change, natural catastrophes, and scarcity of basic supplies of water and food and resulting consequences to human security. Because these problems are central challenges for global governance and respective long-term interests of China and the EU in Africa the EU-China strategic partnership in concert with Africa can serve to promote global cooperation on these issues by setting new directions.

Coping with the security risks coming from underdeveloped, yet resource-rich countries is problematic because principles of non-interference stand in the way of cooperation. So far, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), G8 and EU were contented with a piecemeal approach by inviting China to join existing initiatives and to subscribe to agreements and rules that it had not co-authored. Such advances were perceived as attempts to undermine China’s trade relations with third countries and a blockade strategy to impede its access to energy and resources. China’s unilateral search for an own contribution to global order with own approaches has led to the so-called stakeholder challenge, a provocation that in worst case is branding China as an irresponsible actor in case that it does not submit to Western values in foreign aid. This stance has to change and China needs to be treated as an equal member and involved in international agenda setting.

*Good governance or the Chinese term ‘soft infrastructure’<sup>7</sup>* involves effective implementation of the rule of law, financial accountability, efficient public services, a well-educated, healthy human resource base in order to uphold an active civil society and a viable economy. China’s approach has differed because it had for long made its own developmental experiences the basis for external development assistance considerations. Principally China promotes the need for alternative and indigenous development paths abroad. Additionally, qualified expertise on contemporary external development assistance has to date

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<sup>7</sup> The term ‘soft infrastructure’ was used by the Governor of the Chinese Central Bank, Zhou Xiao Chuan, in his speech at the Annual Meeting of the African Development Bank in Shanghai in May 2007 which meant institution building.

been lacking. China is slowly catching up with the multiplicity of international and domestic challenges coming with its rapid development and international rise.

*Economic growth and sustainable development.* Europeans and China agree that economic growth and sustainable development are crucial to fight poverty in Africa. Otherwise countries will remain a burden for traditional (mainly the EU) and new donors alike. Especially China would have to take on a greater burden in the future. Despite China's legitimate claim that it is a developing country itself, Africans increasingly perceive China as a wealthy country that can be pressured to increase assistance in return for the benefits that China hopes to gain from Africa—be it resources or diplomatic support.

At the same time, a European debate about leaving the burden of assisting Africa to China, should Beijing act against European economic and political interests cannot be excluded. A call for fair burden sharing is inevitable if the EU-Africa partnership does not develop beyond a donor-recipient relationship. For the moment China might ignore such a risk, as it remains convinced that Europeans are intent on protecting their rights of guarding over the issue of development and human rights, not least through increased development assistance. However, in the long run China hardly possesses the means to support lasting improvements and development alone in Africa (Alves and Draper 2007: 24).

### **Problems and approach with trilateral engagement**

There are a number of setbacks the EU and China are facing in possible cooperation in Africa. These are primarily related to the terms of cooperation. As we have seen, the EU and China have their own set of values and principles that can only be brought in line with difficulty. It remains to be seen how long and how seriously Africans can simultaneously subscribe to a community of values with the EU (as at the EU-Africa summit in December 2007) and accept that this value community is called into question by the political rhetoric of Africa- China meetings.

The differences between the EU and China could be overcome by adopting a two-track approach: the combination of pragmatic policy mainstreaming on the one hand and a focus on complementarity on the other. Such an approach would require

readiness to compromise and a pragmatic attitude on both sides. At the same time the cooperation could lead to confidence building and have spillover effects into other areas of possible cooperation. Policy mainstreaming in the first phase is only an option for those areas that are relatively uncontroversial in terms of values and objectives. For example, public sector support or infrastructure- building require coordinated policies in order to achieve efficient results, self-sustaining institutions as well as measures to monitor and deal with environmental and social consequences. They have to be part of a sector-wide approach in order to be sustainable. The achievement of common policies in these fields would be a litmus test for the “people centred” partnership that both the EU and China have been advocating. (Berger and Wissenbach 2007: 19-22)

In order to regulate the responsible handling of natural resources, the EU, China and Africa can build on nascent initiatives such FLEGT (Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade) or the Kimberley process. The EU and China can shape these processes as equal partners from the outset. According to its Special Representative to Africa, China is already applying EITI (Extractive Industries Trade Initiative) principles in its bilateral relations (Wissenbach 2007: 12). At the same time China is engaging in dialogue with the EU on FLEGT involving participants from African timber-producing countries. In fact China has already made progress in this area, not least because domestic forest management became a top priority at the end of the 1990 given the catastrophic floods blamed on deforestation. This has raised awareness about sustainability and improved the regulatory framework, including a good level of port inspections. However, a lot of illegal logging or unsustainable logging products still reach China's processing industries. However, buyers (notably in the US, EU and Japan) have a strong influence on the exporting segment of the wood industry in China.

The EU and China have already identified two tools to advance their partnership in dealing with Africa. Firstly, the Dialogue on Africa's Peace, Stability and Sustainable Development, initiated at the 9th EU-China summit in September 2006, is being pursued at the level of Africa Directors. The first meeting took place on 15 June 2007 in Beijing. An expert level conference on EU-China cooperation on Africa was held on 28 June 2007 in Brussels hosted by European Commissioner Michel

(Wissenbach 2007: 23). These issues still need to be set out in concrete terms, but are likely to focus on infrastructure, health, and rural development and, perhaps, on security sector reforms in selected countries. The EU has stressed African ownership as a crucial basis for common engagement and so has China. Africans need to take a stance now. Due to the different procedures on both sides, the implementation of common action will certainly go with some problems.

Complementary approaches exist where the EU can build on the positive effects of China's engagement and vice versa. For instance, economic growth based on China's demand for resources provides an opportunity to rebuild traditional export economies. China's infrastructure investments in Africa will also benefit European business. On the other hand the European Partnership Agreements would also create more interesting, larger markets for Chinese enterprises. However, such an approach would be only successful as long as China and the EU agree on a development agenda that favours long-term sustainability beyond short-term growth and don't block each other.

#### **Africa's response to the Trilateral Co-operation**

Whereas both the EU and China need to come to terms with their respective policy failures in Africa, they also need to accommodate the tensions arising in the EU-China Strategic Partnership. Their new Africa policies therefore need to take into account shared and competing interests, the realities of globalisation and the needs of sustainable development in Africa. This, however, also requires that the common African agenda that is based responsibility for development itself in African hands.

The EU-China dialogue serves foremost to build trust and to define the issues at stake on both sides more clearly. An identification of common objectives and viable results might be achieved as long as either side's fundamental interests are not questioned. So far African influence on this dialogue remains a weak point. African leaders have not actively sought to become involved. Many of the African leaders are also of the opinion that they are not being consulted on the trilateral framework and it seems that both the entities EU-China are negotiating their interests on this platform and that they somewhat marginalized on this cooperation.

However African leaders and civil society have long called for a national responsibility of African states for their people's development. Part of this responsibility is to take a stand on African issues, which are debated between external partners. African governments are now trying to manage potentially conflicting external and internal expectations. If African countries fail yet again to seize external opportunities for development, that failure may become a convenient excuse for further disengagement and international marginalisation of the continent. The primary responsibilities for most African countries are security and stability, good governance and the rule of law, economic growth and reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

At the same time, if the EU and China cooperate more closely, the complementarity of their respective approaches could be used better to achieve these ends. Africa would probably gain more by setting an agenda in a triangular frame so as to bring out complementarity between the competing EU and China approaches, rather than trying to play one off against the other as some countries seem intent to do. At the same time African policy-makers will remain in the situation to deal with many external players. They are co-responsible and need to decide whether the EU, its Member States and China should cooperate on their development agenda or in the long and short-term competing for influence. Especially the latter would prolong post-colonial pattern of African policy-making that is influenced by outside actors. (Grion 2007: 141)

Yet, Africa is still the weakest pillar in potential trilateral cooperation. The level of institutionalisation at continental or regional level is still low. Common external relations are not conceivable yet. Domestic implementation of rules and common decisions had failed due to ineffective domestic institutions in all sectors. The two central African institutional platforms for development cooperation and monitoring are the AU/NEPAD as well as the African Development Bank. Particularly the African Development Bank has several advantageous features. China, EU member states and other donors are among its stakeholders. It has result-oriented decision-making structures and readily defined standards for implementation. Yet, its role is limited to that of a development finance institution.

## Conclusion

The EU's new strategy with regard to Africa is undoubtedly just one of many responses to China's growing presence on the African continent. The idea of trilateral EU-Chinese-African cooperation probably has to be viewed in similar terms. Considering the wider context, i.e., the rivalry for energy resources and the new threats to Europe originating from Africa, it is difficult to view this idea otherwise than as a reaction to China's growing involvement in Africa. There is much to support this view. As an organization made of 27 member countries, the EU is not engaged on the international stage purely for charitable purposes, but, like national players in international relations, strives to realize its national interests. However, on the other hand, it is worth remembering that in contemporary international relations, which are based on far-reaching interdependencies, the problems of individual regions become global ones, and resolution requires multilateral efforts based on coordinated action. The absence of coordination between those partners wielding considerable influence on the economic and political situation in a given region can contribute slowing the state-building processes on the African continent, and can thus lead to a worsening of the economic and political situation.

In reality, considerable anxiety on the part of the EU lies behind this neutral-sounding statement contained in the September 2005 EU Strategy for Africa, especially for the Union countries whose interests and foreign policy are connected with Africa. Beijing is becoming the EU's economic especially in the domain of energy resources and political competitor in Africa.

EU's anxiety is also fuelled by the fact that, for Africa, China is becoming an interesting alternative political partner, one that trades and offers assistance or loans without political preconditions. The EU's efforts to strengthen institutions, fight corruption and promote human rights in African countries are thus undermined. China's involvement in Sudan is a prime example. After the withdrawal of Western corporations due to the civil war and the humanitarian crisis, China became the foremost investor in the Sudan's petroleum industry and associated infrastructure projects. China's offer to Sudan was comprehensive in nature: extensive funding, expert technical assistance and a guarantee of protection from UN sanctions.

EU's policies towards Africa got more impetus as from European Commission's document of June 2007 – that if the EU wants to remain a privileged partner and make the most of its relations with Africa, it must be willing to reinforce, and in some areas reinvent, the current relationship – institutionally, politically and culturally<sup>8</sup>.”

This got also reflected in a fragment of the declaration from the 9th EU-China Summit<sup>9</sup> concerning both partner's structural dialogue on behalf of African development. It states that: “The EU reaffirmed its attachment to the principles of good governance and human rights, as embodied in its Africa Strategy. The Chinese side emphasized the upholding of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, in particular the principle of non-interference into others' internal affairs.”

EU and China have different stances with regard to the principle of conditionality. The European Union, like the United States or institutions such as the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank, makes economic cooperation and developmental aid dependent on fulfilling specific conditions usually connected with adapting the internal situation of potential trade partners and/or development aid recipient countries to liberal-democratic standards. Under such pressure, African states interested in economic cooperation or receiving EU developmental aid have to introduce economic or political reforms and to respect human rights.

A characteristic trait of China's policy toward Africa is the absence of any link between trade and investment issues on the one hand and political issues on the other. This is in accordance with the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” formulated by Premier Zhou Enlai in 1953 and still observed today in Chinese foreign policy, i.e., mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefits, and peaceful co-existence. While the EU is trying to convince authoritarian governments to implement Western political standards, China is only interested in economic cooperation without additional conditions. Such a form of cooperation is more accessible to many African leaders who wish to avoid western accusations of corruption, nepotism, repression of political opponents, or failure to abide by human rights.

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<sup>8</sup> Europa – The EU-Africa Strategic Partnership, Brussels, 27.6.2007, COM(2007) 357 final, p. 3

<sup>9</sup> 9<sup>th</sup> EU-China Summit, Helsinki 9 September 2006, Joint Statement, Brussels, 11 September 2006, 12642/06 (Presse 249), p. 4, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/cr/90951.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/cr/90951.pdf).



Viewed from the EU perspective, this form of cooperation with China weakens the pressure to introduce democratic reforms or to fight corruption in African states, thus weakening the effectiveness of EU policy aiming at Africa's development. The offer of international organizations, whose assistance is tied to the above-mentioned issues, loses out against China's offer, which is financially far more attractive and easier to accept.

Trilateral cooperation is merely a new concept which exists at the level of a bilateral, sectorial dialogue between the EU and China and which hasn't gone beyond the EU-Chinese declaration on the subject of common action for "Africa's peace, stability and sustainable development." The two parties did agree "to pursue a structured dialogue on Africa and explore avenues for practical cooperation on the ground in partnership with the African side<sup>10</sup>," but from an institutional perspective, this has only led to the beginning of a EU-China dialogue at the level of directors for African Affairs. After the Ninth EU-China Summit, the directors met for the first time on 15 June 2007 in Beijing. Soon thereafter, on 28 June 2007, a conference of experts on the subject of cooperation between the EU and China in Africa took place under the patronage of the European commissioner for development, Luis Michel.

Initiation of Trilateral dialogue is doubtless the first step on a long road and forms part and impact on the EU's policy of encouraging China to greater involvement in the resolution of global problems. In relations with China the EU applies the strategy of constructive engagement, which is based on a belief that by engaging China in a constructive way and by concentrating on supporting China's transformation process, over time the EU will acquire more diplomatic leverage over political developments in China. A similar rationale can be advanced as an explanation for the EU's striving to secure China's cooperation in its efforts on behalf of Africa (Casarini 2006: 21).

The major impact on EU over the Chinese intrusion in Africa is Trilateral

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<sup>10</sup> Europa, 9th EU -China Summit, Helsinki 9 September 2006, Joint Statement, Brussels, 11 September 2006, 12642/06 (Press 249), p. 4, Online web page available at :[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/90951.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/90951.pdf).

Cooperation dialogue which is merely a EU's idea and, for the time being, is still at the conceptual stage.<sup>11</sup> The remaining two elements – the EU's and China's bilateral relations with Africa are characterized by a more or less visible rivalry for economic and political influence on the African continent. On the one hand, the EU policy toward Africa is a mixture of a realistic and idealistic approach, which leads frequently to contradictions, misunderstandings, and lack of coherence. In this context, the EU proposition of trilateral cooperation can be perceived by African states and China with some degree of suspicion. On the other hand, the wide discrepancies in the principles forming the basis of the EU's and China's policies with regard to Africa persist and many things would depend upon the confidence building exercises.

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<sup>11</sup> Europa- "UE/Afrique : Louis Michel récompensé par un prix pour la paix en Afrique", Agence Europe, Online webpage accessed on 22/07/12, URL- [http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission\\_2004-2009/michel/Press/articles/index\\_en.html](http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2004-2009/michel/Press/articles/index_en.html)

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSION

In recent years, China's aid and trade to Africa has witnessed a phenomenal increase. Increased involvement in Africa since 2000's and its booming manufacturing industry has led to an enormous demand for raw materials which has driven up commodity prices and thus also helped to boost growth in Africa (Goldstein 2006: 12). Trade between China and Africa increased seven-fold between 2000 and 2010, from US\$ 10 billion to US\$ 126.9<sup>1</sup> billion making China the leading supplier of the African continent and its second-largest trading partner after the United States. The recent recession may lead to a decline in China-Africa trade but China is likely to become the largest trade partner of Africa in the near future and Chinese investment in Africa may outstrip its aid to the continent (Dijk 2009: 123).

Chinese aid projects are mainly concentrated in oil-rich countries, such as Angola, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sudan and Zimbabwe. The growing dependence on imported oil from the continent means that China will continue with its emphasis on Africa as part of its new energy strategy (Zhao 2007: 404). China is also using debt relief to assist African nations. Since 2000, Beijing has taken significant steps to cancel the debt of 31 African countries. That year, China wrote off US\$ 1.2 billion in African debt. In 2003, it forgave another US\$ 750 million (Broadman, 2007: 275).

Autocratic regimes in Africa find China extremely important since Beijing's membership of the United Nations (UN) Security Council enables it to veto resolutions that might condemn client states or authorize punitive action against them, like sanctions or even intervention. China can and has delayed and narrowed resolutions by threatening to veto them. For instance in July 2012, China vetoed a resolution in UN Security Council against Syria.

The growing influence of China in trade, oil and mineral resources and support to autocratic regimes in Africa has increased the debate in Western countries, including the EU about the challenges that Chinese engagement in the region poses

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<sup>1</sup> FOCAC, China's Trade Rush with Africa, 05/05/2011, (online web) URL-  
<http://www.focac.org/eng/zfgx/t820242.htm>

for the West.

Chapter Two highlighted the differences in approach of EU in view of the increased Chinese engagement on the African continent and with that dealing with engagement with the continent has become a more complex undertaking for the EU. The difference of approaches in the context of traditional and emerging donors and difference in Washington and Beijing consensus has the concerns of EU. EU has realised that the partnership with Africa requires new foundations and more trust. China's emphasis on a commercially driven and politically high-level partnership with Africa has led many to contemplate whether the old donor-recipient partnership could be transformed into a modern or even post-modern partnership. China has led to changes in the EU-Africa relations and adjustments in its development policy in order to copy with the Chinese no-strings-attached approach.

Chapter 3 of the study has focused on the quest for natural resources and energy that drives the aid for trade approach. China and new developing countries need energy and natural resources to fuel their development model, which has, lead them to search for new resource rich countries. In the same way Europe's dependence on Africa's energy is also growing. Algeria, Angola, Egypt and Nigeria in particular have become very important energy suppliers to the European Union. France for instance is the single largest EU importer of Angolan oil. Secondly, whether analysed from the stance of the EU or China, there is growing recognition that Africa is on a strategic transition to become a major geostrategic powerhouse for the maintenance of the global economic system. That was perhaps the reason why EU is also trying to manage within their policies so that greater objectives could be achieved this also became evident when Javier Solana said, "We have not paid enough attention to Africa's energy potential and its needs." (Austin 2007: 14)

The quest for natural resources and energy had increased the tussle between the policies. This situation has negatively affected the strategic nature of the EU–Africa and EU–China partnerships. The bilateral EU–China dialogue on Africa created a dilemma for the relationship with Africa, the EU to interfere in the bilateral relations of African countries to enlarge their donor cartel. This in turn limits the intended positive impact of EU–China dialogue as neither side wishes to lose their African

partners.

Chapter 4 focuses on the political aspects of the relationships of which focused more on the China's support for the autocratic regimes with case studies of Sudan, Zimbabwe and the recent crisis in Syria. It had been discussing the confrontation of interest and values, which becomes an inevitable question for the African condition, as there are many countries in Africa, which is ruled by the autocratic rulers who do not conform to the democratic principles and good governance. Democracy and the human rights are thus the glaring issues, which haunts to the politics of Africa, due to Africa's rich mineral resources these issues are undermined when China is engaging with them. China's unique setting in the international order also gives leverage to autocratic regimes of Africa because they could be saved by China whenever west tries impose sanctions over them. For example Syria is the recent case in which China vetoed the resolution in the favour it.

Chapter five accessed the nature of EU-China-Africa trilateral co-operation. Since 2008 EU proposed establishment of a trilateral dialogue and cooperation mechanism between the EU, China and Africa, which so far has not yielded any substantial results. The differences between China's and the EU's Africa policies are mainly visible in aid, trade and security. The contradiction between their respective aid policies lies in China's "no-strings-attached aid" versus European "conditionality" or emphasis on "fundamental principles". With regard to their security approaches in Africa, China's non-interference policy and the European concept of human security are clearly not on the same wavelength. Promoting common normative values and principles is at the core of the Trilateral Co-operation, which is important for the EU's self-construction at present. The EU and other Western donors have traditionally followed the principle of conditionality and structural adjustment and have sought to introduce democratic principles and good governance in recipient countries. However the rise of new and emerging donors like and India poses major challenge for Western donors and principle of the Washington consensus.

China imposes no conditions for its aid, except for its resistance on snapping diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Both the Beijing consensus, as well as the Washington Consensus pursue the same goals but in a different order of priority, with

Beijing giving priority to stability and development while the Washington Consensus views reforms as a pre-condition for stability and development. Mark Leonard (2008) wrote that the Beijing consensus could be “the worst ideological menace” to the Western world since the collapse of communism (quoted in Dijk 2010: 75).

These differences contribute to the positive image of China in Africa where Asian heterodox strategies have long been regarded with deep interest.<sup>2</sup> Chinese aid is attractive to the countries that are most resistant to reform which could also lead to change in regime, such as Angola, which was granted a loan of US\$ 2 billion at a time when it was being called on to account for the disappearance of US\$ 4 billion from the public treasury. It also became acceptable and attractive to those countries that have suffered from instability caused by overly mechanical application of reforms designed according to the Washington consensus (Dijk 2010: 75).

The 2008 world crisis that led the Western countries to proceed to large-scale nationalization has weakened the basic premises of the Washington Consensus. This apparently led Chinese Vice Prime Minister Wang Qishan remarked, “Teachers have some problems”.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, while the crisis has tended to reinforce the appeal of the Beijing Consensus, this new paradigm does not translate into practical measures. As time passes, circumstances may lead China to change its practice. Loans by the Exim Bank account for a rising share of China’s aid commitment, and being more concerned about repayment, it pays closer attention to country risk and becomes more attentive to country’s indebtedness. As a larger number of countries facing difficulties will look to Beijing for assistance, the Chinese government became more discerning in extension of economic assistance.

The China offers African counties an alternative to traditional Western donors. Beijing’s policy of not asking inconvenient questions regarding democracy, human rights or nature of the regime etc. is extremely attractive for African countries.

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<sup>2</sup> In the 1980s and 1990s, at the time of the first structural adjustment programmes, African leaders took an interest in the experience of the newly industrialised economies.

<sup>3</sup> Quoted by Roger C. Altman, “The Great Crash, 2008.” *Foreign Affairs*, January – February 2009.

European perceptions have been critical of Chinese business practices in Africa, which have led riots, the closure of local businesses and frequent accusations economic exploitation. Given its heavy emphasis on and other commodities China is often said to have an unequal underdevelopment of Africa and development of China on the means of Africa. However growing trade with China offers African Countries greater resources to accelerate development.

Growing Chinese involvement in Africa has raised four key concerns of the European Union. Firstly, Chinese support of autocratic regimes in Africa undermines its foreign policy objectives to rein in autocratic regimes, prevents punitive action in the UN Security Council and at times leads to an increased no migrants to Europe. Secondly, budgetary support to the African states has tended to redirect finance Chinese projects.

In this context Tull remarks that:

As the instrument of development policy EU always argued that budgetary support would enhance the local ownership and enables the government to set up their own priorities. So indirectly the budgetary support to the recipient countries benefits China which is a issue of concern for the EU policy makers as they also want that the support which is given to the countries should benefit to the recipient countries plus also viable for the economic interest of EU (Tull 2008: 5).

Europe is also concerned about the growth in African indebtedness towards China. Europeans are concerned about the easy availability of Chinese loans at a time when European countries have extensive debt relief. This can potentially create a bigger problem to African countries where China could dictate its terms.(Tull 2008: 6)

Lastly, Europeans feel that China's preference for the bilateral relations tend to undermine European Union's efforts to foster multilateralism and cooperation with the African Union and the other African regional institutions such as NEPAD.

China is reluctant to constrain its African policy by the "common principles" advocated by the EU and the development aid institutions promoted by Western powers. Europe tend to perceive the EU-China-Africa trilateral dialogue mechanism

as a one way process wherein it expects to bring China around to its point of view but have not met much success so far.

The European Union is being increasingly challenged by the emergence of other new powers and emerging donors like China and India, which have their own interests and priorities. This is growing awareness in Europe that China's rise as a global superpower poses significant challenges in terms of its accommodation into a global order of things that hitherto was largely defined by the western countries.



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