

RUSSIA-CHINA RELATIONS 1991-2001

Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University in
partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the award of the Degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

DEEPAK YADAV



**Centre for Russian, Central Asian and East European Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067
India
2005**



JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

School of International Studies

New Delhi - 110067

Tel. : 2670 4365
Fax : (+91)-11-26717586
(+91)-11-26717603

Centre for Russian, Central Asian and East European Studies

Date: 28/07/2005

Declaration

I declare that the Dissertation entitled "**Russia-China Relations 1991-2001**" submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** is my original work and has not been previously submitted for the award of any other degree of this or any other university.

(Deepak Yadav)

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

(Prof. Ajay Patnaik)
Chairperson

(Dr. Bhaswati Sarkar)
Supervisor

Prof. Ajay Patnaik
Chairperson
Centre for Russian, Central
Asian and East European Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University

*Dedicated to
my Parents*

CONTENTS

	Page No.
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	<i>i-ii</i>
<i>Preface</i>	<i>iii</i>
<i>Abbreviation</i>	<i>iv</i>
CHAPTER – I Introduction	1-17
CHAPTER – II Political Relations Between Russia and China	18-33
CHAPTER – III Economic Relations and Defence Co-Operation	34-50
CHAPTER – IV Russia-China-India Triangle – Implications for India	51-75
Conclusion	76-81
Bibliography	82-97

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The time has rendered a great favour to me while undertaking the insightful marathon of completing this piece of my academic journey. Even a greater flow of guidance, thought, ideas and caring nature emanated from my respectable supervisor Dr. Bhaswati Sarkar who propped me up not only all through thick and thin but helped me in lowering and rising academic and atmospheric mercury with her soothing smile and umbrella of cool supervision. My gratitude to the role she played in accomplishing this mammoth task is inexpressible even in million of words. It would not have been possible for me to have an easy sail in the ebb and flow of Academic Ocean without her excellent guidance. I would always remain indebted to her.

I want to extend my gratitude to Prof. O.P. Bakshi who taught me how to face difficult days in the life.

I also want to thank respected teachers of my centre, who always lend helping hands to my research work with their valuable suggestions.

Among the fellow travelers in my academic journey who made this task easy include Raghu, Devendra Pratap and Abhay. I want to thank all of my other friends and well-wishers who, I hope, will forgive me to not mentioning their names.

It is the family where child learns first lesson of his life. I just want to say to my parents that it is because of you, I exist in this world. Dear father you will always remain my ideal and source of inspiration. My elder brother

K.P. Yadav deserves the most credit, who always encouraged me to pursue higher education. Other family members whom I want to thank include Bhabhi, Nisha, Chandan, Pooja, Suraj and Khushi.

I also want to thank Library Staff of JNU especially Mr. Ram Lal (Library attendant) and IDSA for providing me useful books. Last but not the least I am thankful to Mahendra and Birendra for typing.



New Delhi
July 2005

Deepak Yadav

PREFACE

As the part of M.Phil programme this dissertation deals with the 'Russia-China Relations 1991-2001' in which it intends to show how Soviet Union and China in the past and Russia and China at present have faced ups and downs in their bilateral relations. Despite being the followers of the same communist ideology which calls for all communist countries to unite, Soviet Union and China had a bitter relationship throughout 1960s and 1970s and counted each other as enemies.

The research topic of this dissertation is confined to the period 1991-2001. However, as and when required to substantiate an augment some later development have been also briefly discussed. This research work is divided in five chapters.

Chapter one, deals with the historical background of Soviet-China relations. It gives broad view of how they managed their cooperation despite some of their ideological differences. It also discusses briefly the developments in the post-Soviet, Russia-China relations.

Chapter two, attempts to analyse the areas of common concerns and divergence area between Russia-China on various issues of national and international importance.

Chapter three, provides a detailed account of Russo-China economic relations and defence cooperation systematically with the help of tables.

Chapter four, tries to explore the possibility of emerging triangle between Russia-China-India and the way it is going to affect India's own interests.

A brief conclusion by summing up the issues dealt with discussed in this study.

ABBREVIATIONS

ABM	-	Anti-Ballistic Missile
ASEAN	-	Association of South East Asian Nations
CCP	-	Chinese Communist Party
CICA	-	Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia
CMBs	-	Continental Ballistic Missiles
CPSU	-	Communist Party of Soviet Union
CTBT	-	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
EU	-	European Union
GLONASS	-	Global Navigational Satellite System
HAL	-	Hindustan Aeronautics Limited
MBTs	-	Main Battle Tanks
NAFTA	-	North American Free Trade Area
NATO	-	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NMD	-	National Missile Defence
NPT	-	Nuclear Proliferation Treaty
PLA	-	People's Liberation Army
PRC	-	People's Republic of China
R&D	-	Research and Development
SAFTA	-	South Asian Free Trade Area
SCO	-	Sanghai Cooperation Organization
TMD	-	Theatre Missile Defence
USSR	-	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

CHAPTER – I

INTRODUCTION

Relations between Moscow and Beijing have gone full circle in the past half century, from alliance to containment and now to strategic partnership. To understand the ebbs and flows in Moscow's China policy it is necessary to look into the Soviet history.

History which is characterized as chronicle of the past provides the solid base for building up future relationships. In International Relations, there is no permanent 'friend or foe', today's bitter enemy can become tomorrow's staunchest ally. It is interest which runs supreme, and Russia and China are not exceptions to it. Despite being communist countries both Soviet Union and China counted each other as enemy number one and targeted each other with their nuclear weapons. But today Russia and China no longer consider each other as enemy and both countries have developed "very deep" relations in the strategic field.

China has the largest population in the world, while Russia is the largest nation in terms of territory. Both are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Obviously, the significance of Sino-Russian relations extends far beyond the interests of the two nations. It also affects the stability of Asia and the world at large.

Soviet-China relations before disintegration of USSR were characterized by a number of ups and downs. In February 1950 just four months after establishment of the PRC the two countries signed the treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Cooperation in the first half of the 1950s were a honeymoon period. However, by the late 1950s differences in national interest

and ideology emerged leading to serious disputes in early 1960s which developed in to acute conflict and border clashes in 1969. Hence in the late 1960s and 1970s the USSR regarded China as one of its main rivals and stationed approximately 1 million troops and one third of its SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missile along the Sino-Soviet border, threatening to make a 'surgical' first strike on China's nuclear bases. Under serious threat, China had to prepare for a military intrusion from north. However, in 1980s two countries came to realisation that these were not in the interests of either side and they made effort to alleviate the situation. These efforts resulted in the normalization of the relations during a state visit to Beijing by the then Soviet-president Mikhail Gorbachev in May 1989.¹

Historical Background

Relations between Russia and China the world's two largest states from the point of view of territory and population respectively have always had a strong impact on the course of global and regional politics. During the 1960s and 70s there have been sharp ups and downs in their relations. Soviet pilots fought on the side of Chinese when China was attacked by militarist Japan. During the Second World War thousands of Chinese helped the Soviet Union both at the front and the rear.²

Russo-Chinese relations exert a powerful influence on Asian world politics. Today, a strong and increasingly stable bilateral detente seems to have emerged, but change is the law of life and neither state's future is mechanistically predicible. The relations between Russia and China have

¹ Chen Qimao, Sino-Russian Relations after the break of Soviet Union" in the book *Russia and Asia: The Emerging Securing Agenda* by Gennady Chaufrin (ed.), New Delhi; Sipri, OUP, 1999, pp.206-300.

² Igor Rogachev, "Russia-China: The Principles and Parameters of Partnership", *Far Eastern Affairs*, no. 3, 1997, p.25.

always exerted to impact on the larger regional and global political scenario. During the historical processes of formation and expansion of two large empires or state systems they came to share the largest land boundary running into 7500km. The fact, that the two shared a long border, which was also disputed, inter alia generated nascent and actual apprehensions and distrusts regarding each others, motives and objectives. At the same time two were also compelled to extensively interact and deal with each other.

The history of Moscow – Beijing military – technical cooperation goes back to the 1950s when the two communist giants, the Soviet Union and newly formed People’s Republic of China, signed the treaty of alliance. Moscow extended massive aid to its communist ally that laid to the foundation of the latter’s heavy industry. However in July 1960 thousands of Soviet technicians and experts were suddenly withdrawn from China in protest against their political education by the latter. The following two and half decades were marked by intense political and ideological rivalry and antagonism between two coupled with serious border dispute which erupted in bloody conflicts over the Usuri river island in March 1969.³

Beginning in the late 1960s, the ideological rivalry between Soviet Union and China about who is the true communist came on surface. Soviet leadership tried to orchestrate unified socialist response to china's challenge. The international Department of CPSU Central Committee held regular meetings with its counterparts in the East European Socialist Countries and Magnolia to coordinate propaganda on China question, including symposia, research and media campaign in the third countries.⁴

³ Ibid, pp.149-160.

⁴ Elizabeth Wishnick, *Mendign Fences: The Evolution of Moscow's China Policy from Brazhnev to Yeltsin*, Washington; University of Washington Press, 2001, p. 50.

To resolve the true communist issue the international communist conference was called on June 7, 1969 at Moscow. Addressing the conference, Brezhnev bemoaned the Communist Party of China's "departure from Marxism-Leninism", "break with internationalism" and "organization of armed conflicts". He urged his fellow communists to fight against imperialism and cooperate in defense of Marxist-Leninist ideas.⁵

By the 1970s, the Chinese leadership had articulated an alternative vision of the world that ran counter to Soviet postulates on proletarian internationalism. In April 1974, Deng Xiaoping outlined China's view of international relations, the "theory of three worlds". According to this international relations proceeded from 3 groups of states:- the superpowers (first-world); the West, and East European States and Japan (second world); and developing states (third world, including China). The Soviet leadership blamed China for "deideologization" of international relations' and to sponsor a block spearheaded in the first place against the USSR and world socialism".⁶

The ideological rift between Moscow and Beijing formally ended with the restoration of party-to-party ties during the May 1989 Deng-Gorbachev summit. For the Chinese, the turnaround came following the resolution of what Deng Xiaping called the "three big obstacles" – the militarisation of northern border, Afghanistan, and Vietnam in the late 1980s. This was followed by Moscow's repeated offers to update China's Soviet built industrial plants of the 1950s and the nuclear power industry.⁷

By mid 1980s rethinking began in Moscow as well as in Beijing. The Soviet leadership and analyst began to doubt the wisdom of the 'siege

⁵ L.I. Brez'nev, "For Strengthening the Solidarity of Communists, for a New Upswing in the Anti-Imperialist Struggle" *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. 21, July 2, 1969, pp. 10, 12-13, 16.

⁶ H.J. Ellison, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1982, pp.309-315.

⁷ Harvey W. Nelson, *Power and Insecurity: Beijing Moscow and Washington, 1949-1988*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 149-158.

mentality” over defence preparedness and total reliance on military security. It was acutely realised that excessive defence expenditure was draining the resources of the country. This realisation along with other factors laid the basis for rethinking in Moscow on its general strategic policy and posture and also relations with China.

In 1980s China had begun to demonstrate signs of an opening towards Moscow. The Kremlin responded positively, hoping that an opening to China could weaken the Sino-American axis which had developed during the 1970s. For the first time since Brezhnev had attempted to create a rapprochement in 1964 an improvement in Soviet-China relations seemed possible. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, had stalled any rapprochement. In January 1980 the Chinese declared that the invasion meant that any negotiation would be inappropriate.⁸

The military build up along the border damaged the Soviet Union both economically and strategically. The split with China opened a second front in the west's confrontation with the Soviet Union that was exploited by both Beijing and Washington throughout the 1970s and 1980s. China isolated the Soviet Far East by shifting its trading relations. The number of Soviet ground forces in the Far East, and Central Asia had increased between 1965 and 1980s.⁹ These prevailing conditions forced Gorbachev to normalize relations with China to stop west and US to play 'China card' against it.

In March 1981, Moscow proposed to Chinese a series of measures to build confidence. Although the Chinese rebuffed the proposal, a series of meetings did take place between the officials of the Soviet and Chinese foreign ministries. As the result of those meetings things became clearer that Sino-Soviet

⁸ Caroline K. Pipe, *Russia and World 1917-1991*, London: Arnold, 1998, pp. 178-180.

⁹ J, Anderson, The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, *Adelphi Paper 315*, London, 1997p.9-11.

relations changed for the better again as the post-Mao leadership concentrated its energy on modernization of the country, an objective that required a more constructive relationship with Soviet Union. By September 1981 Moscow had proposed the resumption of negotiations on the outstanding issues of the border. Soviet initiatives were renewed in March 1982 at Tashkent. Brezhnev announced that the USSR wished to negotiate on issues of border, but dictated clearly that he would not make concession on the situation of Afghanistan. By the early 1980, the Soviet leadership was convinced that Sino-American forces were attempting to encircle USSR. There was every incentive to try to 'break down' the Sino-American rapprochement and reverse the trends of the 1970s.¹⁰

In addition, the Soviet leadership was also influenced by the growing relationship between Washington and Tokyo. Moscow was anxious about the growing industrial and military power of Japan and what appeared to be its inevitable anchorage in an alliance with USA. This development provided a greater degree of urgency to the necessity of certain strategic developments such as on securing of Sea of Okhotsk for the deployment of Soviet SLBMs.

When Aradopov died in March 1984 practically all this foreign policy initiatives had ended in failure. There was little progress on the Polish issue; more Soviet troops were in Afghanistan, but with little prospects of victory. In 1978, Deng Ziaoping, the new Chinese leader, introduced a reform programme that called for four modernizations, Top priority in the policy was given to economic development Moscow hoped that for a longtime to come, China would concentrate on its domestic reconstruction which would make peace with one neighbouring countries a preconditions for China. It was for instance noted

¹⁰ Ibid.

that from 1979 to 1989 PRC was reported to have reduced its defence expenditure by 7 per cent.¹¹

The Development of Relations After Disintegration of USSR

In December 1991, the Soviet Union disintegrated into 15 independent republics and Russia succeeded it as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Russo-China relations thus faced a new test. Would the two countries maintain normal relations regardless of their different social system and ideologies, or would their relations deteriorate even to a state of hostility? This was not only concern to the two neighbouring countries but also to many others, especially the US, Japan and other Northern East Asian and European nations. Fortunately, the leaders of both China and Russia handled the transition in the relationship carefully and skillfully.

On 27 December 1991, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen sent letters to new republics, including Russia, informing them that China recognized their independence and was preparing to establish diplomatic relations with them. Two days later, the Chinese and Russian deputy foreign ministers signed a protocol expressing the mutual desire to develop a “good-neighbourly” friendly relationship on the basis of the Five Principles of peaceful coexistence or Panchasheel (i.e., mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non aggression, non-interference in each-other’s internal affair, equality and mutual benefits; and peaceful co-existence), and China expressed its support for Russia as successor of State to the USSR in the UN. Thus two nations made a first key step towards the normalization of their relations.¹²

¹¹ Cowell Ditmer, “Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership” *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 2, no. 10, 2001, pp. 399-401.

¹² Ibid.

Since then the Sino-Russian relations have developed in a smooth and healthy direction. There have been three stages in the development of relationship:-

1. In December 1992 Russian President Yeltsin visited China and met Chinese President Yang Shang Kun. This was the first summit meeting between Russia and China. The two signed a joint statement on the foundation of mutual relations, stipulating that they would establish a good neighbourly relationship on the basis of five principles of peaceful coexistence. The document set the tone of friendships and cooperation. They signed a further 24 agreements on cooperation in various fields.¹³
2. In September 1994, Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited Russia for a summit meet with Yeltsin. This produced a second joint statement deepening the bilateral relationship as a “constructive partnership oriented towards the 21st Century”, and a statement affirming the two countries’ commitment to no use of nuclear weapons and not to target nuclear armed missiles against each other. The two leaders also signed an agreement delineating the 55 km. western sector of Russo-China border. This second summit could be termed as stage of ‘*constructive partnership*’. In May 1995 Jiang Zemin visited Russia to attend the 50th ceremony commemorating victory in World War II. During his visit Russia confirmed its support for ‘one China principle’ and its opposition to Taiwan joining the UN;¹⁴
3. In April 1996 the third Russo-China summit meeting was held in Beijing. Jiang and Yeltsin signed a new joint statement proclaiming the forging of a ‘strategic partnership of equality and trust oriented towards

¹³ R.H. Donaldson and J.L. Noguee, *The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing System Enduring Interests*, London, M.E. Sharpe, 1998, p.96.

¹⁴ SWB, FE/2092G/3, September 5, 1994.

the 21st century'. The Chinese leadership supported Russian position against eastward expansion of NATO. On 26 April, 1997 the heads of state of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan met in Shanghai and signed an agreement on the confidence building in the border area. Since then, Russo-Chinese relations, developed beyond a bilateral relationship, with greater cooperation in the international arena. This indicates that the relationship has a stage of strategic partnership.¹⁵

Russian leaders in the initial days of post-Soviet period entertained hopes of becoming a part of the Western world and bring about a systematic change from the communist political and economic system to western type liberal democracy and market economy with the help of Western political support and large scale economic and technological assistance. The then Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev who was staunch supporter of "Pro-West approach" and followed Atlanticist foreign policy in the hope of Russia's political and economic integration into the West. In his talk with German foreign minister Heinrich Geushev in January , 1992 Andrei Kozyrev called for the establishment of a '*single security space from Vancouver to Vladivostok*'. The threat of eastward orientation of NATO was still not on the horizon and Moscow at this time had a benign and favourable view of the west. Kozyrev was fond of saying that democracies do not wage wars and he was keen that Russia joined the "civilized democracies".¹⁶

As regards the USA in particular, it was even hoped that partnership between two nuclear powers – the USA and Russia – would provide strategic stability to the post-cold war world. Such a policy would be exact opposite of

¹⁵ Chen Qimao, "Sino-Russian Relationship after the Break up of Soviet Union" in the book, *Russia and Asia: Emerging Security Agenda* by Chaufrin Gennady (ed.), New York: Sipra, OUP, 1999, pp. 288-300.

¹⁶ Jyotsna Bakshi, *Russia China Relations: Relevance for India*, IDSA, Shipra, New Delhi, 2004, pp. 24-30.

their global rivalry and deterrence of mutual annihilation during the Soviet era. The Russian Ambassador to the USA called for 'special kind' of relations between the USA and Russia. Andrei Kozyrev said in February 1992 that the Russian US interaction could become one 'decisive factor in international security today'. Lt. General Vladimir Manicov proposed a "grand US-Russian geopolitical partnership."¹⁷

Thus, in the initial Russian order of priorities China was given a place behind the USA, Western Europe, Japan and Republic of Korea. The Russian foreign ministry even asserted that China was only of secondary importance in the Russia's foreign policy. Pro-Western proponents defended the idea of strong ideological, economic and even military alliance with the West. Former Russian Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar for example, recommended "cementing a military alliance with the West and switching our deterrence potential to the Far East."¹⁸

Honeymoon with the West ended very soon and disenchantment and differences started surfacing. Russia had expected and called for the unfolding of a new "Marshall Aid Plan" by the western countries in its aid. The failure of the reforms, also led to the growth of anti-Western sentiment in the country. While in the initial period of the westerners or the Atlanticists led by the foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev and his foreign policy establishment were more assertive, now the 'geopolitics' the 'Eurasists, the 'nationalists', and advocates of great power status for Russia became more assertive and began to criticize pro-Western policy of Kozyrev as the policy of "smiles" meekly saying, "yes" and making one sided concessions to the west.¹⁹

¹⁷ Ibid, pp.24-30.

¹⁸ Ibid, pp.24-25.

¹⁹ Ibid, pp.25-27.

Following the dissolution of parliament in autumn of 1993 and the election of new bicameral parliament and adoption of new constitution in December 1993, a more workable relationship has developed between the parliament and presidency. The relationship has shifted from being strictly confrontational to one that includes more compromise and consensus building. As a consequence the foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev was forced to modify his pro-Western stance. One is able to recognize this shift in policy orientation in several areas. First, formal statements by the foreign minister Kozyrev were by then less cooperative in nature towards the west than was previously the case. Second, Russia stressed its role as a major actor in the world and asserted its position on such issues as the Balkan conflict. Finally there was a renewed emphasis placed on relations with the “Near Abroad”.²⁰

There were shifts in emphasis and priorities, but no sharp turns in the policy. Moscow was neither in the position, nor willing to confront the West in the old Soviet style. But Russia began to pay greater attention to its neighbours in Asia. Ties with great Asian countries India and China – were consolidated through Presidential visits in January, 1993 and December 1992 respectively. These visits were projected as imparting a greater balance to Russian foreign policy between the West and East.

As Yeltsin stated at a press conference on December 18, 1992 in Beijing “We want balanced relations in Europe and Asia alike”. Similarly Chinese were feeling increasingly isolated in the world as tensions grew with great Britain over Hong Kong, and the USA and France concluded arms deals with Taiwan. For this reason, the Chinese leaders shelved their political differences with the

²⁰ R.E. Kavet and A.V. Kozhemiakin, *The Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation* Macmillan: London 1997, p.195.

Yeltsin Govt. and welcomed the opportunity to enhance cooperation with Russia.²¹

In 1995, despite continued controversy on border trade and growing opposition in the border regions to any territorial concessions to Beijing as a part of the border demarcation process, high level meeting between Russia and China addressed many issues. Kozyrev's trip to Beijing in March led the groundwork for the year's bilateral contracts, including Li Peng's visit to Moscow to mark the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II', and the third Sino-Russian summit held in Beijing in 1995. In another sign of the continuing progress in Russo-China bilateral relations, President Jaing Zemin represented China at May 1995 ceremonies in Moscow marking the 50th anniversary of the victory against Nazi Germany.

It is broadly agreed that relationship between Russia and China in the post-cold war period can be classified into three stages. The period from 1992-94 is regarded as one of "*Good Neighbourliness*, the second phase from 1994-1996 as one of "*constructive partnership*" and third phase from 1996 onwards is regarded as one of "*strategic partnership*" directed towards 21st century.²²

In 1997 "Joint declarations on a multipolar world and the formation of new world order", by then Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his Chinese counterpart Jiang Zemin announced their commitment to develop a 'partnership for the purpose of strategic interaction in the 21st century.' The statement was widely seen not only as a challenge to American "hegemonism" but also a

²¹ Elizabeth Wishnick, op. cit., p. 123.

²² Ibid, pp. 2-5.

confirmation of the qualitatively new relationship that had emerged between Moscow and Beijing after the end of the Cold War.”²³

Moscow and Beijing also share many security interest and threat perceptions, from an attachment to geopolitical concepts such as spheres of influence and balance of power for international security agenda. Beijing has publicly backed Moscow on issue of handling Chechen conflict, while Russia reciprocated Chinese efforts to suppress separations in Xinjiang and supported ‘one China’ policy towards Taiwan. Both have a major stake in ensuring peace and stability in the Korean peninsula.

Both Russia and China have also developed a strategic relationship directed towards 21st century in the post-cold war era. At the summit which took place on April 24-26, 1996 both Yeltsin and Jiang affirmed that two countries “were entering into a new stage of partnership, based on equality and trust.” Given continued attempt by certain states to apply pressure and engage in block politics, by cooperating in matters of strategy Russia and China would be able to work towards a multipolar world. During this summit meeting, it became apparent that Russia and China saw their bilateral relationship as a way of relieving perceived pressures from the West. Thus Chinese side expressed its understanding for the Russian position on NATO expansion, while Yeltsin affirmed Russia’s support for the People’s Republic of China’s position on Taiwan.²⁴

In Central Asia both Russia and China have their claims for energy security and in this region the interest of both countries seems to be on odds. After the disintegration of USSR, China acquired three new neighbours –

²³ Gamett W. Sherman, ‘Limited Partnership’ in book Sherman W. Garnett (ed.), *Rapprochement or rivalry? Russia China Relations in Changing Asia* Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2000, p. 1.

²⁴ Elizabeth, Wishnick, op.cit pp.128-130

Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Trade between Central Asia and China has been low with many of the same problems afflicting Russo-China regional trade. Like the Russian Far East, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have also complained about unscrupulous Chinese traders and illegal migrants streaming across their borders. The governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, for example were vocal in their protests against Chinese nuclear testing, which took place near their border at Lop Nor in China's Xinjiang province. In May 1996 Xinjiang complained that Kazakhstan had shipped radioactive scrap metal to the region.²⁵

Beijing have some significant stakes in the Central Asian region. First, Central Asia neighbours the troubled Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), where a segment of Uighur Muslim population is striving for independence which is posing grave threat to Peoples Republic of China. Secondly, China is today a energy hungry country and a net importer of oil and wants access to Central Asia's vast petroleum resources. Thirdly, China's manufacturing sector is on the boom and need the market to sell its finished products, Central Asia is the ideal place for this purpose.²⁶

In 1994 Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were among four Central Asian states to join NATO's Partnership for Peace programme and in beginning of 1997, a series of military exercises have been taken place in Kazakhstan. Chinese analysts have paid close attention to growing military ties between Central Asian states and NATO, especially in the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis in the spring of 1999.

Due to their history of relations with Moscow and their geographic position at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and the Middle East, the Central

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Xing, G, "China and Central Asian States: A New Relationship", *East European and Central Asian Studies*, no.6, Feb.1996, pp.58-64.

Asian states have tried to maximize their freedom to maneuver. Nazerbayev has called the “*preservation of independence*” the most important aim for Kazakhstan. While president Akaev of Kyrgyzstan has outlined a “*Silk Road diplomacy*” fostering relations with East and the West alike. As these leaders develop their own approaches to foreign policy, differing from perspective in both Beijing and Moscow, Russian and China face an increasingly complex strategic environment in Central Asia.²⁷

The most serious potential flashpoints in relations between China and Central Asia, however, concerns ethnic relations. Central Asia and Xianjiang are linked by overlapping ethnic populations more than one million Kazakhs and 375,000 Kyrgyz live in Xianjiang, while 262000 Uighurs live in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.²⁸ Another potential source of friction concerns the possibility of Russo-China rivalry for influence in Central Asia. For example in 1995 Nazarbaev signed in accord with China granting Kazakhstan the right to use China’s pacific port at Liangyugang in Jiangsu Province. The agreement improved Kazakhstan’s access to trading in Pacific rim by shorting the distance to Pacific it is only 3500km from Kazakhstan to Liangyugang less than half the distance needed to reach Russian Far East ports.²⁹

In the field of military cooperation China emerged as the Russia’s most promising client in the 1990s. In fact, from 1992-94 China purchased 97 per cent of its weapons from Russia. In 1992 China spent \$ 1.8 billion on Russian weapons, including 26 SU-27 fighter aircraft. The SU-27s were supposed to be the first installment of a total purchase of 72 planes. China also purchased

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 140-142.

²⁸ Lillina Craing Harris, “Xinjiang, Central Asia, and the Implications”, *The China Quarterly*, March 1993, pp.112-119.

²⁹ Xinhua, June 3, 1996, in FBIS (PRC).

missile – guidance and rocket technology, rocket engines and surface to air missiles including SS-300 air defence missile system, similar to Patriot.³⁰

The show down between China and the USA's Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait in March 1996 demonstrated to the Chinese the importance of modernizing their sea power. According to military analysts this motivated the Chinese to purchase of two Sovremenyi class destroyers equipped with advanced missiles including Sunburn ship-to-ship missiles, SA-N-17 surface to air missiles, and SS-N-22 cruise missiles. In addition, China had contracted for four advanced kilo class submarines. To improve rapid reaction capability China has purchased 14 IL-47 transport aircrafts. In August 1999, Russia agreed to sell China forty to sixty of the Su-30 MKK fighters for \$2 billion. Chinese officials had expressed their interests in this top of the line aircraft ever since India purchased similar planes (SU 30 MKI) in 1997. In 2000 Russia provided the Chinese with several dozen SU-27 UBK fighters at a price tag of \$1 billion in partial payment of Soviet debt to China.³¹

To conclude, the first half of 1990s, the improvement of relationship with China gave substance to Yeltsin's attempt to reorient Russian foreign policy away from a pro-Westerns focus and appealed to all political spectrum. Moreover Russian hostility to NATO expansion gave new impetus to rhetoric supporting a Russo-China partnership as counterbalance. Despite changes in the strategic environment leading to close cooperation between Russia and China in the short-term lagging Sino-Russian economic relations, the growing potential for Russo-China competition in Central Asia and continuing distrust of China in the Russia's border regions all sets for a more fluid Russo-China relationship in the new millennium.

³⁰ Nigel Holloway and Charles Bicker, "Brothers in Arms" *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 13, 1997, p. 20

³¹ Inter fax, November 20, 1998, in *FBIS (Central Eurasia)*, November 20, 1998.

Russia and China share common view on many national and international issues such as, joint fight against terrorism, opposition to the US led unilateralism and supporting multilateralism just international world order, strengthening the UNO; non-interference in the internal matters etc. Both countries are the permanent members of the UNSC. All these and many more political issues of divergence and convergence interests have been discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER – 2

POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA

By the early 1980s leaders in Soviet Union realized that friendly relations with China was key that would help it to reduce its military expenditure and exploit its vast Far Eastern resources. Relationship between Russia and China took a new turn with appointment of Gorbachev as General Secretary of CPSU in 1985. Gorbachev had begun the process of overhauling the Soviet foreign policy immediately after he took over the leadership of the country. His new thinking in international relations certainly sought to add some new dimensions to the framework of Soviet Foreign Policy by novel ideas and concepts. However, its aim appeared to be mid course correction and adjustment rather than replacement of the traditional framework of Soviet foreign policy. By his new thinking, Gorbachev wanted to update it, and in this process, he put Soviet foreign policy on a new course.¹

As a consequence of new thinking in international relations, Soviet policy in Asia had logically moved to acquire a new look during the second half of eighties. It marked the activation of Soviet policy in Asia Pacific region. Improvement of relations with China was included in Gorbachev's speech to Central Committee on March 1985, who wanted to establish a rejuvenated socialist grouping on the basis of new type of Soviet-Chinese relationship. The creation of new socialist community in which due respect towards other viewpoints could be assured was one of Gorbachev's initial aims. The Soviet

¹ Zafar Imam, *Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1990*, New Delhi; Sterling Publishers, 1991, pp.156-157.

Union also sought China's cooperation against US military strategy in the Asia Pacific region in the name of socialist grouping.²

Gorbachev who took a major initiative towards improving relations with China in his famous Vladivostok speech on 28 July 1986 he declared

The USSR is prepared, at any time and at any level, to discuss with China question of additional measures for creating an atmosphere of good neighborliness. We hope that the border dividing (I would prefer to say linking) us will become a line of peace and friendship in near future... we do not want to view Amur river as a 'water obstacle: let the basin of this mighty river unite the efforts of Chinese and Soviet people in using for mutual benefit the rich resources available there and for building water management projects. An intergovernmental agreement on this account is being jointly worked out and the official border might run along the main shipping channel.³

Thus, the sign of improvement in the Soviet-China relation was clearly visible after Gorbachev took the charge as General Secretary of CPSU in 1985. Later Boris Yeltsin first president of newly independent Russia indicated inclination to further strengthen the relationship with China. Russia under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin, affirmed its commitment to all the positive achievements of Russo-China relations. Russia further pledged to continue implementation of obligations of the treaties and agreements signed by Soviet Union and China in May 1989 and May 1991. On 15 September 1992 President Yeltsin signed the "order of Russian Federation's relations with China" and reaffirmed that

- a) there is only one China;
- b) the PRC government is the sole legal representative of China;
- c) Taiwan is the part of China; and
- d) Russia will never establish official relation with Taiwan.⁴

² Ibid., pp. 156-160.

³ *FBIS-SOV*, July 29, 1986.

⁴ G. Chuftrin, *Russia and Asia: The Emerging Security Agenda*, New York; Sipri OUP, 1999, pp. 292-296.

Russia and China shared views on increasing numbers of international issues in the light of the challenge from the USA and its allies. In the first year after the collapse of Soviet Union, Russia adopted a pro-western foreign policy, hoping for economic aid from the west and for recognition as a strong power and an equal partner of the USA. Soon, however, Russia was deeply disappointed by the level of western aid. Moreover, it faced fierce competition from the west over the sphere of influence in the newly independent states. These realities forced Russia to switch to an 'omni-directional' or 'two headed eagle' (Russia's national emblem) policy, perusing relations with countries of both the East and the West. Especially after 1995, under heavy pressure from NATO's eastward expansion led by the USA, Russia attached greater importance to its relations with China; India and other Asian countries. Russia termed Asian countries as 'natural allies', among which China got the top priority. Despite odd relationship in the past both countries evolved consensus on various national and international issues.

Areas of Common Concern

On the question of separatism, religious extremism and terrorism both countries share common view today. In March 1995, Chinese president Jiang Zemin visited Moscow to participate in the celebration of 50 anniversary of victory over Fascism. In an agreement between the two, Russia reiterated its support to China on Taiwan issue and on its part China extended its full support to Russia in dealing with the Chechnya problem.⁵

Both Russia and China are opposed to US hegemonic policies and favour a multi-polar world order with different power centres. In April 1997 Chinese president Zemin paid another visit to Moscow on April 23 and the two countries issued a joint statement on the multipolarisation of the world and

⁵ Ibid

establishment of new international order. The statement rejected hegemony and power politics, and stated that 'Cold War' mentality must also be abandoned and bloc politics opposed. They called for preservation of the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 between Soviet Union and USA and they supported lifting the UN Security Council sanctions against Saddam Hussain is regime in Iraq.⁶

On 24 November 1998, when Jiang Zemin paid another crucial visit to Russia, the Russian side reaffirmed its "four nos" position. The basic thrust of which was - no support for any conception of 'Taiwan's independence; no acceptance of the position of 'two Chinas' or 'one China and one Taiwan'; no support for Taiwan's participation in the UNO or other international organizations in which only sovereign states participated; and no sales of weapon to Taiwan.⁷

NATO bombing of Yugoslavia from March end to mid June 1999 without getting any authorization from the UN Security Council sent sock waves in both Russia and China and tended to bring together the two in joint opposition of NATO action. NATO's intervention on 'humanitarian ground' was an ominous development. Being multi-ethnic and multi-religious states both Russia and China have their own separatist movements, Russia in Chechnya and China in Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang province. Being a Slav country, Yugoslavia was traditionally friend of Russia and attack on it aroused Russian sentiments in the form of massive protests in Moscow.⁸

Sino-Russian strategic cooperation culminated in the increasing close condition of their response to the NATO attacks against Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999. In the protest against air strikes, Primakov, who had been on the

⁶ "Russian-Chinese statement", ITAR-TASS, Moscow; December 10, 1999, as reported by *FBIS-SOV* - 1999-1210.

⁷ Li, Jingjie, "Pillars of Sino-Russian Partnership", *Orbis*, vol.44, no.4, Fall 2000, p.528.

⁸ Robert J. Saiget, "China, Russia beef up Cooperation on Ethnic Separatism, Taiwan, Terrorism" AFP Hong Kong November 18, 2000 reported by *FBIS-Ch*, 2000, p. 1118.



TH-12289

way to Washington on March 25, the day the bombing began, ordered his plane to turn back to Moscow. From the very beginning of Kosovo war, Russia and China had the similar view that UNO should be respected and not substituted by NATO. However, China became more furious after NATO mistakenly bombed Chinese embassy resulting in three deaths and numerous injuries. Washington regretted the incident and agreed to compensate Beijing with \$28 million for the destruction.⁹

The Russian and Chinese Presidents met in Bishkek in August 1999 at the fourth meeting of Shanghai Cooperation Organization. President Yeltsin told the reporters at the airport that he was ready for a battle "especially with the westerners". Bishkek Summit declaration underscored the commonality of Russian and Chinese opposition to NMD and TMD projects and their insistence that 1972 ABM Treaty must be respected as the basis for maintaining strategic stability in the world.¹⁰

Both Russia-China condemned strongly the NATO's bombing on Chinese embassy building in Yugoslavia. Moscow and Beijing demonstratively came together and registered strong protest against unilateralism of USA. Both countries also issued joint statement that "plans by some countries to build power bloc against others" should not be accepted. Jiang Zemin repeatedly declared that "hegemonism and power politics" are the main source of threat to world peace and stability" and as well as China's interests.¹¹

Both Russia and China are also opposed to USA's National Missile Defence Programme and fear that it will disturb the balance of power and hence start a new arms race. It is also proposed that US will transfer Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) system to countries like Japan and Taiwan which would greatly undermine the peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. The US

⁹ Elizabeth Wishnick, *op.cit.* pp.146-150.

¹⁰ SWB/SU/3623 G/3 August 26, 1999.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

withdrawal from ABM Treaty of 1972 added more suspicion among the strategists of Russia and China about the real intension of USA.¹²

Both Russia and China agree on the proposal of restructuring of UNO. Both call for strict adherence to UN rules and regulations especially in the context of developments in Yugoslavia and Iraq crisis in which NATO and US forces greatly undermined the UN authority. Both countries want greater representation from developing world but they differ on the issue of members of their choice.

In Central Asia Russo-Chinese interests converge on the issues such as Islamic extremism, drug trafficking, arms smuggling etc. It is in the larger interest of the two countries to maintain stability in the region which is prone to Islamic extremism due to its relative backwardness. Being, the region's largest neighbours and trading partners, the two countries have huge stake in the region. Also by promoting economic cooperation together, Russia and China could partially alleviate the fear psychosis among the Central Asian states that one or other will dominate the region.¹³

In post-September 11, world scenario both Beijing and Moscow view with considerable concern and consternation the presence of US troops in the Central Asian Republics, which is strategically situated very close to their borders. US military bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have provided the former an opportunity to monitor some of the sensitive strategic facilities that Soviet Union had on the territories of these countries. The presence of US troops at Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan just 200 km. from the Chinese border

¹² Michael Pillsbury, *China Debates the Future Security Environment*, Washington DC; National Defence University Press 2000, pp. 10-15.

¹³ S. Bilal, and M. Olarreaga, "Regionalism, Competition Policy and Abuse of Dominant Position" *Journal of World Trade*, vol.32, no.3, June 1998, pp.153-66.

have provided USA unique opportunity to keep on the eye on the Chinese territory from there.¹⁴

Decades old border dispute was another area which the two states have successfully tackled though some misunderstandings and suspicion among the populations of the both sides persists. Under the agreement on the eastern border signed in 1991 an area of 15 km in Russia's Primorski Karai (Maritime Province) including some small piece of islands in the Amur and Ussuri rivers and small piece of land along the Tumen River was to be transferred to China. However, some local officials in Primorski Karai denounced the agreement alleging that land to be handed over would include two strategic section of Tumen river that would provide direct access to the sea of Japan and 'that Chinese were expected to build a seaport in the area that could compete with existing Russian Far East ports.¹⁵ Now the border dispute has been resolved with the help of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Nevertheless, some Russians still fear that China will claim territory from Russia in the future.

Problem Areas

A Russo-China border issue of considerable sensitivity concerns the extensive Chinese migration much of it illegal in to Russian territory. The demographic imbalance along the border with 150 million Chinese crowded in the North Eastern part of China and only 7 million Russians in the vast bordering territories of Siberia and the Far East has been a source of concern for Soviet and Russian citizens, officials and journalists for many years. As the border tensions eased at the beginning of the 1990s, the scale of illegal immigration increased rising three fold between 1992 and 1993. This prompted Russia to conclude an agreement with Beijing in 1994 to establishing formal

¹⁴ C. Ruisheng, "Some observation on the international situation since September 11", *China Report*, vol. 38, no. 1, January-March 2002, pp.331-335.

¹⁵ *Asian Survey*, vol. 36, no. 1, January 1999, p. 106.

border crossing posts and tighten visa restrictions. The immediate impact was the sharp reduction in Sino-Russian trade much of which “concentrated across the border by Chinese traders. The Russian press continued to provide sensational accounts of illegal immigration (termed in one account as an “invasion of Huns”), prompting to an advisor to Yeltsin, Emil Pain, to write an article in the government’s newspaper stating that “claims about dangerous level of Chinese immigration and related real threat to national sovereignty in Russian Far East are not supported by the actual facts.” By his calculation the “Chinese Diaspora” in Russian Far East accounted for less than 3% of the region’s population – about half as many as resided there after World War II. Pain pointed out that trade with China is a “life preserver” for the Far East and he blamed local authorities for whipping up anti-Chinese fears.¹⁶

The reduction in shuttle trade caused the level of Sino-Russian trade, which had reached \$7.8 billion in 1993 (second only to the level of Russia’s trade with Germany), to fall to \$ 5 billion the following year. It recovered somewhat in 1995, reaching at \$ 5.5 billion and rose to \$6.8 billion in 1996 – with the Russians enjoying a \$ 3 billion trade surplus. Yeltsin-Jiang set a target of \$20 billion by 2000.¹⁷

In fact, this insecurity regarding illegal migration are not the result of Chinese actions and policies but a reflection of internal Russian problems. Russian concern that Chinese could become the lingua-franca of the Russian Far Eastern Region are directed at the failure of the Russian authorities – Central and local – to regenerate the region. Possible remedies, such as incentives to encourage migration from European Russia and from ethnic Russians in the Baltic States and Central Asia have not been seriously attempted. In the meantime, local inhabitants are leaving in droves in response

¹⁶ R.H. Donaldson, J. Noguee, *Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests*, London; M.E. Sharpe, 1988, pp. 233-254.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, pp.9-10.

to living miserable conditions even by Russian standards. Unfortunately, in the absence of any early prospects of improvement (let alone a lasting solution) the Chinese serve as convenient scapegoat and bogeyman.¹⁸

Apart from migration problem, there is some concern that Russia could loose control of its most advanced military technology. The Russo-China trade relationship is a prime example of one in which armaments constitutes the single most important export accounting to at least one third of the \$7 billion at the beginning of 1997. Combat aircrafts have been the chief components of Russian deliveries; China has purchased at least six dozen transcontinental SU-27 fighters, which are capable of making Beijing-to-Moscow trip in two and half-hours with one mid air refueling. Other categories of purchases which have been concluded or which are being discussed include naval vessels (Soveremanyi-class destroyers equipped with Supersonic missiles, two Kilo-636 diesel-powered submarines and less advanced Varshu-Vianka Submarines), S-300 surface-to-air missile sets, T-72 Tanks, Smerch multiple rocket launchers, and the technology for advanced gas centrifuges used in uranium enrichment and for MIRV missiles.¹⁹

According to the Russian air force Chief of Staff, China concluded the largest military contract in Russia's history in 1995. The deal amounted to more than \$ 2 billion for the technology and licenses to manufacture the SU-27 at a factory in Shenyang province. Production began in 1999. Russian press reported concern that China would thereby free itself of the need to purchase aircraft from Moscow in future, and that if China made minor modification to the plane's design, it might even become competitor in the export market.²⁰

¹⁸ Tremin Dmitri, *Russia's China Problem*, Washington; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999, p. 9.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 233-254.

²⁰ Swarna Singh, "Sino-Russian Techno-Military Cooperation", *Asian Strategic Review*, 1995-96, pp.180-182.

Another area of major concern between Russia and China is that by no means all the payment comes in the form of cash and defense factories often ended up relying on bartered products in order to realize their value. There has been such extreme cases as the case of the Chinese pigs which were traded for an arms shipment that was banned in Russia by the veterinary inspector, who suspected that they might spread hog plague in the country.

In another instance, the Chinese bartered 15000 low-quality radio-cassette players for three Mi-60 helicopters. However, whereas the barter method initially constituted about three fourth of Chinese payments, China's growing dollar trade surplus have enabled Russian negotiations to arrange for hard currency payment in recent year contracts.²¹

A far more significant issue is whether Russia is endangering its own long-term security by selling to its giant neighbour its most advanced weapons and the know-how to produce them. Russian military sources have expressed envy that Beijing is receiving more modern equipments than their own units possess.

China is said to be a 'sleeping giant' who is fully devoted to its economic development today and does not want to be involved in any conflict to divert its attention from development. But one can not be sure whether its present state of mind will remain same in the future. Today, Russia is desperately selling its advanced weapon to earn foreign currency which its Soviet era defence industry badly requires for its survival. In the long run once the Chinese get to acquire the technological know how this could be dangerous for Russia's own security. The AK-47 is the best example. The Chinese acquired its technological know how and subsequently produced AK-56 with slight modification and now Russia has lost the control over AK-47 completely world over.

²¹ *SWB*, FE/3668 G/9 October 18, 1919.

In the year 2000 there were rumors that Putin had signed a secret decree suspending of transfer of sensitive arms technology and know how to China. Moscow was concerned that China was buying Russian military technology and know-how while avoiding the purchase of large ready-made stock of military hardware.²² In other words China was more keen for technology transfer. This would obviously help it to develop its own defence production capability while lessening its dependence on Moscow.²³

Most Russian analysts appear to believe that China's short term foreign policy ambitions are directed towards Taiwan and the South-China Sea, and that her interest in stability in Central Asia parallels those of Russia. Russian made equipments may indeed enable Beijing to obtain a regional advantage in force projection capability in future Taiwan crisis; the Sovremennyi destroyers cruise missiles have a combat range of three hundred miles, are reportedly resistant to US air defence system, and will allow China to test the naval superiority of US in the East China Sea. But expressing Russian government's view point, former defense minister Pavel Grachev declared in 1995 that – "China poses no threat to Russian security now and will not in the near future" and he asserted that if Russia did not sell arms to China, some other country would.²⁴

Another trouble spot in China's Xinjiang province, whose population is ethnically kin to that of the neighbouring post-Soviet states, is troubled by sporadic anti-Beijing rebellious that could potentially spark a cross-border "liberation war". From that perspective even with respect to the near future by closely associating with China and by selling it arms, Russia risks upsetting the

²² *The Times of India*, 13 March 2000.

²³ Richard Sakwa, "Putin's Foreign Policy: Transforming the East" in (ed.) Gabriel Gorodetsky, *Russia Between East and West: Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of 21st Century*, London; Frankcass., 2003, p.186.

²⁴ Russia and China, Can Bear Love a Dragon?, *The Economist*, April 26, 1997, p. 19.

delicate military balance in Asia and even being drawn in to China's territorial disputes with Taiwan, Vietnam, Japan, and ultimately the U.S.²⁵

At a more generalized level, there exists a cultural divide that frequently obscures and undermines commonalities of interests. Many Russians who even advocate strategic partnerships, subscribe to the image of Russia as a "civilizational barrier" against the barbarian, 'East'. Although these days the principle danger is seen as Islamic radicalism emanating from the South, the very concept of Russian as a guardian of 'western' values inhibits rapprochement with China. It fosters a superiority complex that many Chinese find unwarranted in a state they view as economically backward, militantly crippled and of diminishing international influence.²⁶

The combination of historical fears and political / civilizational stereotyping has reinforced to some extent West-centrism in both Russia and China. As a consequence, the strategic partnership carries the whiff of second class treatment, actual priorities being elsewhere. This is especially true in Moscow, where relations with America, Western Europe and former republics of the Soviet Union absorb considerable more attention and resources. Such relativism detracts from the bilateral relationship in two ways. In the first place, it sometimes translates into a careless attitude towards the strategic concerns of the other. For example, Putin administration made significant commitments in its external relations – notably endorsement of American military presence in Central Asia post 9/11 and strategic arms agreements with Washington after only minimal consultation with Beijing. Second China and Russia have to some

²⁵ Clay Moltz "Regional Tensions in Russo-China Rapprochement", *Asian Survey*, vol. 35, no. 6, (June 1995).

²⁶ Rajan Menon and Charles E. Ziegler, "The Balance of Power and US Foreign Policy Interest in the Russian Far East" in Thorton J and Ziegler E.C. (eds.), *Russia's Far East a region at risk*, London; University of Washington Press, 2002, pp. 38-39.

extent become competitors for Western favours, whether in the form of foreign investment, political approbation or advantageous security arrangement.²⁷

Over the next decade, radical changes in the thinking of both countries are unlikely. The ambiguities with strategic partnership will remain. On the plus side, a confluence of views on many international issues, common threat perceptions, expanding economic ties can be detected. In the minus column the burden of historical and civilizational prejudices, an increasingly dominant West-centrism in Moscow and Beijing and the Russian anxieties regarding China's rise as the next superpower continue. Within this overall dynamic, three issue areas will bear particular attention i.e., (i) development over the Angarsk-Nakhodka oil pipeline; (ii) security management on the Korean peninsula; and (iii) strategic projections in former Soviet central Asia.²⁸

Few issues highlight the dual nature of the Russian-Chinese dynamics so vividly as the pipeline debate. On the one hand collaboration on this project reflects the determination of both countries to take their relationship up to the next level. However, this symbolism is double-edged and has raised stakes all round, for ill as well as for good. Large scale energy and infrastructural projects represents the 'future' and most promising avenue for diversifying and enriching the bilateral relationship, yet they also enhance the potential for serious disagreements. In the event that Putin opts for Nakhodka route, as many believe he will, there will be political as well as economic ramifications. Beijing will not take only grave offence at the cancellation of prior inter-governmental undertakings but might also interpret the decision as signaling a fundamental reorientation in Putin's foreign policy away from geographical

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Bobo Lo. "The long sunset of strategic partnership", *International Affairs*, vol. 80, no. 2, March 2004. pp.295-309.

‘balance of multivectoralism’ towards a clear strategic commitment to the West.²⁹

Moscow is also trying to restrain China discreetly from occupying too dominant a position in north-east Asian affairs, in the first instance on the Korean peninsula. To some extent Russia sees China regionally as the analogue of the US globally i.e. as a country with an overtly hegemonic agenda. Paradoxically, Russia’s position as the least influential of all the parties involved in the Korean question is to its advantage, since its weakness enables it, more or less plausibly to put itself forward as the disinterested facilitator of the peace process.³⁰

In Central Asia, Moscow is engaged in much more activist project i.e., reestablishing itself in the traditional sphere of influence. Here Russia sees itself as a regional hegemon, a position it is reluctant to cede. However, China’s geographical proximity to Central Asia and considerable security and economic interests there mean that it will not simply ‘go away’. For the moment this is not an issue, given Beijing’s willingness to accept a secondary role and the existence of a Russian-Chinese security consensus against the threat of Islamic racialism. But there is no guarantee that this commonality of interest will remain the dominant reality. As Russia seeks to reassert its presence and influence in the region, and China attempts to maximize its economic stake Central Asia looms as perhaps the most likely theatre for renewed bilateral tensions.³¹

In early June 1999, a joint statement by the foreign ministers of Russia and China insisted that neither of them intended to form a ‘political-military alliance directed against any country or group of countries’. From 10 to 11

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ T.L. Shaumian, “Geopolitical Changes in Central Asia and Positions of Russia, China and India”, *China Report*, vol. 38, no. 3, July-September 2003, pp. 361-363.

December 1999 President Yeltsin visited Moscow and issued a joint statement with Jiang Zemin on world affairs. They unilaterally opposed NATO action in Yugoslavia, the US targeting of Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and Western 'hysteria' against Russia's military action in Chechnya. Russian analysts linked the declaration closely to Yeltsin's blunt reminder to President Clinton not to forget "for a moment that Russia holds a full arsenal of nuclear weapons" and "would not allow the USA dictate to the entire world."³²

At present both Russia and China are using each other to counterbalance Japanese or US regional dominance. Yet the emergence of China as a global super power may conflict with Russia's strategic interest, particularly if it succeeds in becoming an active and important partner with Asia-Pacific countries, which is also China's ultimate regional goal.

Russian and Chinese relations have collapsed and been restored many a time, and have also been interpreted differently in both countries. Each of the two states has complex relations with outside world. Both states were subject to aggression on the part of third countries and helped one another to struggle against foreign aggression. Taking an overview to the history of Russo-Chinese relations it is possible to make some generalizations

1. Russia and China have always had controversies in their relations but generally managed to keep the peace, not entirely large scale military hostilities towards each other and never proclaiming war against each other;
2. Russia and China have always been exploring some form of alliance with each other;

³² J.L. Black, *Vladimir Putin and the New World Order Looking East, Looking West*, New York; Rowman and Littlefield, 2004, pp. 297-305.

3. Russia and China have several times tried to conclude treaties of friendship and union, but these treaties have been broken several times.³³

To conclude, in this chapter a detailed study of the developing relation between Russia and China was undertaken. The de-ideologisation of foreign policy had specific impact on their relations and has by and large nudged them to come closer. In the present day world, however, economic might appears to be taking precedence over the Morgenthovian concept of power politics of 20th century. All countries are, therefore, keen to achieve economic, development, prosperity and security. At the same time due to pressures exerted by globalization no economy of any country can flourish in isolation. Globalization is characterized by independence and interconnectedness where established border of nation-state is diminishing. More and more regional economic grouping like EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, SAFTA etc are coming up to face the fierce competition from other regional economic blocks. Being aware of the present world realities both Russia and China are taking various kinds of steps to deepen their economic ties which has been systematically discussed in the next chapter.

³³ A.D. Voksreanski. *Russia and China: A Theory of Inter-State Relations*, London and New York; Routledge Curzon, 2003, pp. 207-08.

CHAPTER – 3

ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND DEFENCE CO-OPERATION

The following chapter intends focus on the economic relations and defence co-operation between Russia and China. The defence cooperation between them dates back to the Soviet period when Gorbachev began his policy of de-ideolization of foreign policy and first major deal between the two was signed to supply of SU-27 fighter planes to China. This chapter also discusses with the support of tables, the overall trade between the then Soviet Union and China (1986-90) and after USSR's disintegration between, Russia and China (1992-2002).

Due to ideological rivalry between USSR and China during 1960s and 1970s trade cooperation was completely ignored and economic interests had ranked well down the list of foreign policy priorities.¹ The situation only started improving in 1985 after Gorbachev took over.

Russo-Chinese economic relations are developing very slowly and chaotically in comparison to their political relation. However, the leadership of both countries understands the importance of a stable economic basis for an effective political relationship and is encouraging economic ties. In other words, political motivation in Russo-China relations heavily outweighs economic reasons, unlike Chinese cooperation with the USA and Japan where economic interests helps to soften political contradictions.²

¹ Bobo Lo, *Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy*, London; Blackwell Pub.2003, p.51.

² Gennady Chanfrin, *Russia and Asia-Emerging Security Agenda*, New York; Sipri OUP, 1999, P. 309.

The economies of Soviet Union and China had many aspects complementary in nature. China had advantage in agriculture; textiles industry and labour resources and Soviet Union had a powerful heavy industrial foundation and rich natural resources. Following data shows the ups and down of trade between Soviet Union and China from 1986 – 1990.

Table No. 3.1 : Soviet Union – Chinese Trade from 1986 – 1990 : US \$ (Million)

Year	Exports	Imports	Total Trade	Balance
1986	1230	1472	2702	- 242
1987	1247	1291	2538	- 44
1988	1476	1802	3278	- 326
1989	1849	2147	3996	- 298
1990	2048	2213	4261	- 99

Source : IMF reports, Direction of Trade Statistics Year-book of various years.

Due to suspicion prevailing about each other's intentions, Russo-China trade relations could not deepen and always lagged behind in the foreign policy priority list. As the above table shows between 1986-1990 during the Soviet period the balance of trade between the two countries was always in minus.

The overall trade between post-Soviet Russia started improving because Russia was a single entity now. Following data in Table 3.2 shows overall business conducted between the two from 1992-2002.

Table 3.2 : Volume of Russia's trade turnover with the PRC, 1992-2002
(amounts in millions of dollars; rate of growth in %)

Year	Turnover		Export		Import		Balance
	Amount	Growth	Amount	Growth	Amount	Growth	Amount
1992*	5,862	+50.2	3,526	+69.4	2,335	+28.1	+1,190
1993	7,679	+30.9	4,987	+41.4	2,692	+15.2	+2,295
1994	5,077	-33.9	3,496	-29.9	1,581	-41.3	+1,915
1995	5,463	+7.6	3,799	+8.7	1,664	-5.2	+2,135
1996	6,845	+25.3	5,153	+35.6	1,692	+1.7	+3,461
1997	6,118	-10.6	4,086	-20.6	2,032	+20.0	+2,054
1998	5,481	-10.5	3,641	-10.9	1,840	-9.7	+1,801
1999	5,720	+4.3	4,223	+15.9	1,497	-18.7	+2,726
2000	8,003	+39.9	5,770	+36.6	2,233	+49.1	+3,537
2001	10,670	+33.3	7,959	+37.9	2,711	+21.4	+5,248
2002	11,928	+11.8	8,407	+5.6	3,521	+29.9	+4,886
Total for 1992-2002	78,846		55,047		23,799		+31,248

Source : PRC Monthly Customs Handbook, 1992-2002, No. 12.

* The rates of growth for 1992 have been calculated using the 1991 figures for trade between the former of USSR and the PRC.

There was sharp rise in Russo-China trade between 1991 and 1993, when it seemed to the Chinese that they could buy Russian products at excessively low prices and that Russian market would absorb consumer goods of any quality. Later Russian market was saturated with consumer goods and Chinese sales fell sharply. Bilateral economic ties were highly dependent on small businesses and the decrease in small companies, activities was the main reason for the dramatic reduction in trade in 1994 after the 1993 record of \$7679 million. Only in 1996 did turnover reach \$ 6845 million. In March 1992,

each party conferred most-favoured nation trading status on the other. They have established Sino-Russian inter-governmental committee on economic, trade and technology cooperation to discuss how to widen the areas of economic trade and technological cooperation. These consultations and meetings have resulted in agreement, whereby bilateral cooperation have expanded in the field of oil, natural gas, transportation, nuclear energy, aviation and military cooperation. In 1993 China was Russia's second largest trading partner only after Germany.

In 1994, the value of bilateral trade fell by one third. This was the major set back to economic co-operation between the two countries. The causes of the drop were complicated. First, before 1994, citizens of the two nations did not require visa when traveling between Russia and China. Taking advantage of this opportunity, tens of thousands of small Chinese speculators flowed over in to the Russian market with inferior goods causing considerable harm to China's commercial credibility. In 1994 in order to check speculation Russia strengthened its border controls, tightened its export control laws and raised import-export taxes. Border trade which accounted for a high proportion of the bilateral trade was drastically reduced. Second, Russia has suffered serious recession and capital shortage since 1993. Third, some Russian corporations were not always able to provide quality goods to their Chinese partners or meet contract deadlines which seriously harmed their commercial credibility. Finally, a large amount of western consumer goods were flowing into Russia greatly reducing China's share in the Russian market. These factors combined made the fall inevitable.³

Russian export to China includes aircrafts, cars, trucks, agricultural machines, mining and oil processing equipment, chemical products, timber and

³ Ibid, 308-310.

so on. Fertilizer and ferrous metal continue to be leading export goods and are worth over half of total exports.⁴

Russia and China took several steps to further boost the trade relations between the two countries in 1994. a protocol was signed on trade and economic cooperation in 1994 which also promised for cooperation in the reconstruction of enterprises built by the former Soviet Union.⁵

In 1993, China exported too many shoddy consumer goods and unwelcome immigrants to Russia's Far East. While it has since altered its policies, initial negative impressions continue to color Russian perceptions especially in the Far East. These impressions contributed to the xenophobic turn in regional policies that led to closing down the borders. Restriction on Chinese tourists and traders, delays and obstruction in granting visas, a sharp decline in trans-border trade and the fading of Chinese hopes for regional economic zones, including the Tumer River development project. Not surprisingly China in turn refused to award its three Georges Dam Contract to Russia even though the Russians confidently expected to win them and make those contracts the centerpiece of their economic policy towards China.⁶

If China seeks to maintain its impressive economic growth rate, it will face shortage of energy supply. To meet its energy needs. China imported 30 million tons of oil in 1999; by 2010 it may import 100 million tons a year. Russo-China trade was at \$5720 million in 1999, accounting for 1.6% of China's foreign trade and 5.7 % of Russia.⁷ While the trade structure between

⁴ Summary of World Broadcast, FE/20 92G/4, Sept 5,1994..

⁵ David Kerr, "Opening and Closing the Sino-Russian Border: Trade, Regional Development and Political Interest in North-East Asia", *Europe Asia Studies*, vol.48, no.6, 1996,p.31.

⁶ Stephen Blank, "Which Way for Sino-Russian Relations?" *Orbis*, vol.42, no.3, Summer 1998, pp.346-348.

⁷ Ta-Chen Jua, "Thoughts on Issues o f Sino-Russian Economic and Trade Cooperation Facing 21st Century", Ta Kung Pao, July 18, 2000 in *FBIS-CHJI*, 2000,0718.

Russia and China is weak and primarily involves Russian raw materials and Chinese low quality consumer goods and food, the potential for growth of in trade and investment is very high.

Chinese exports predict that Russia will be able to export 25 billion to 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas to China annually as well as 15 billion to 18 billion kilowatts of electricity from the newly completed hydropower station in Siberia and 25 million to 30 million tons of oil from the Kovykta oil field in eastern Siberia. In addition Russia can pump oil produced in Kazakhstan to Irkutsk and then supply it to China. Furthermore, Russia is willing to build six nuclear reactors in China to generate electricity upto 1.5 trillion kilowatts. Russia-China are also seeking high tech civilian cooperation. Chinese officials have invited Russian experts and engineers to build up high-tech incubators in the northern city of Harbin.⁸

The years 1999-2001 marked by the dynamic and increasingly rapid development of Russian-Chinese trade and economic cooperation. Trade turnover grew from \$5720 million in 1999 to \$11928 million in 2002. the rise in trade was brought about by a number of different causes. To a decisive degree, it was the result of a relationship of strategic partnership and cooperation established between Russia and China. The signing in 2001 of the bilateral treaty of Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation by President Putin and President Zemin gave a new powerful impulse to further collaboration in trade and economic spheres.⁹

While continuing to concentrate its main efforts on attracting foreign capital, China has began to attach greater importance to making Chinese investments abroad. The government has developed a special strategy to

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Sergei Tsyplakov and Evgeny Popov, "Russian-Chinese Trade and Economic Cooperation: Current Problems and Outlook", *Far Eastern Affairs*, vol.31, no.3, 2003,p.65.

provide an "outlet to the foreign market" for Chinese firms and enterprises. An important role in this strategy has been given to Russia. The creation of enterprise with Chinese capital inside Russia is seen in China as an important instrument for strengthening its position on the Russian market. The substantial improvement in Russia's investment climate and the increased flow of investments from the developed countries of West are also taken into consideration.¹⁰

At the end of December 2001, China became a full-fledged member of the WTO. Russia's admission to WTO will be an important step in guaranteeing stable and predictable conditions for mutual trade. Several rounds of bilateral negotiations have taken place. Progress has been made on the number of issues. However, certain areas of disagreement still remain. The Chinese leaders have repeatedly stated that they would welcome, Russia's immediate accession to the WTO and will extend whatever assistance is needed to accomplish this.

Possibilities for large-scale deliveries of oil and natural gas from Russia to China were cultivated in mid 1990s. Today three main projects for collaboration in oil and gas are in the anvil. These are Russia –China oil pipeline, which will have an annual capacity of upto 30 million tons and two natural gas products a pipeline from Irkutsk region's Kovyktinsk gas fields to North-East China, with an outlet to the Republic of Korea and the shipping of Russian gas from the Chajandinsk field in the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) to Northeast China.¹¹

To conclude, today there are major prerequisites for further growth in the scale and diversification of Russian-Chinese economic collaboration. These are implementing joint products in the fuel and energy sector; stepping up

¹⁰ Ibid, pp.72-73.

¹¹ Ibid, p.72.

cooperation in the field of investment ; involving Russian companies in the strategy of accelerated development of China's western region; expanding cooperation between the two countries border regions and cooperation in the manufacturing sector and the joint mastering of high technologies.

By strengthening trade with China, Russia will try to reduce its shortage of food, light industrial goods and electronics, created on economic infrastructure using cheap Chinese labour in backward areas of the Russian Far East and western Siberia, compensate for poor economic ties between manufacturers in the territories of former Soviet Union, using Chinese resources. Also Russia will reduce the pressure of the market economy on the military complexes by selling weapons to China, send part of Russia's well educated labour force to China to help create high technology industries and reduce unemployment among highly educated people in Russia, and use Chinese experience at finding investors and trade partners to enter the system of regional economic cooperation in North West Asia.¹²

China will benefit by sending a certain amount of its uneducated labour force to Russia; the excess labour in China amounts to 200 million people. This will reduce political pressure inside the country, enabling China to sell light industrial goods and to buy sophisticated military equipments. In addition, China will have a chance to participate in the economic opening of oil field sand mineral resources in the Russian Far East and Siberia.¹³

Defence Cooperation

The purchase of Defence equipments consist major chunk of trade between Russia and China. Chinese army possesses mostly USSR/Russian

¹² A.D. Voskressenski, *Russia and China-A Theory of Inter-State Relation*, London; Routledge Curzon, 2003, pp.192-194.

¹³ Ibid, pp. 193-195.

made weaponry systems. Moscow's need to sell weapons is almost compulsive since it inherited a huge military industrial complex from the former Soviet Union which is starving for funds today. Russia needed to export its arms for the very survival of its Defence industries and R &D facilities even at the minimum level. Speaking in August 1999 Sergei Stepashin, Russia's Prime Minister at that time, said that

*Arms export allows Russia to keep up its potential to provide a Defence capability for Russia without additional investment... military technical cooperation with foreign countries is very important for Russia for several reasons. It plays a major role in strengthening Russia's military and political influence in the world. It is important for Russia's social and economic development especially it in sustaining the people working in the military industrial complex.*¹⁴

Moscow followed pro-western policies in the initial days of post-Soviet period in hope that West would provide massive aid to restructure its shattered economy and would also integrate it in European family. But soon, by the end of 1992 certain disenchantment started surfacing and honeymoon period with the West ended. President Yeltsin's December 1992 visit to China, preceded by a visit to South Korea and followed by a visit to India in January 1993 were seen as an attempt to pursue a more balanced policy towards the West and East. After his visit to China, President Yeltsin promised to sell, the most sophisticated armaments and weapons to the latter.¹⁵

In June 1990, Admiral Liu Huaqing, Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission visited the Soviet Union. Admiral Liu's visit was followed by extensive and frequent dialogue between the two sides on the transfer of advanced weapon systems regardless of the collapse of USSR and

¹⁴ SWB, SUW/0605WA/Aug 6,1999.

¹⁵ Alexander A. Sergounin, and Sergei V Subbotin, "Sino- Russian Military Cooperation: Russian Perspective" *Spotlight on Regional Affairs*, vol.XVI no.10, Oct-Nov 1997, p.19.

domestic crisis in Russia. In 1990 China ordered from Soviet Union 24 Mi-17 helicopters, which it received in 1990-91. In 1991 an order was made for the supply of 288 AA-2 air-to-air missiles which were received in 1991-92. In the same period it also received 96 AA-8 air-to-air missiles.¹⁶

The first and most significant contract between Russia and China was signed regarding the supply of 26 Su-27 fighter aircrafts including two Su-27UB trainer versions, which were delivered in the year 1992. The Su-27 deal was concluded while the Soviet Union still existed.¹⁷ The Russian government announced in 1992 that it was selling Beijing \$ 1.8 billion worth of SU-27, IL-76 transport aircraft and other weapons for air defence purposes.¹⁸

In 1992, PLA became the first export customer to receive the Russian S-300 surface to air missiles.¹⁹ In 1992 China ordered from Russia 4 SA – 10C/SA s-300 PMU SAM systems. These were received between 1993-1997. During this period China also received 144 SA-10 Crrumble/5V55R SAMs for the SA-10c/SA-300 PMU surface to air missile system. In 1993 China revived 1/L Beagle from Russia.²⁰

Between, 1992-96 China also received from Russia 6 IL-76 long range transport aircrafts the likes of which it did not possess earlier as well as 4-T U-22 Backfire bombers. China is reported to be getting one Russian and Israeli

¹⁶ Alexander A. Sergounin and Sergey V. Subbotin, "Sino-Russian Military, Technical Cooperation: A Russian View", in the book (ed.), Ian Anthony, *Russia and Arms Trade*, SIPRI, London, OUP, 1998, p.208.

¹⁷ Jasjit Singh, "Trends in Defence Expenditure" *Asian Strategic Review*, 1998-99, p.47.

¹⁸ Swaran Singh, "Sino-Russian Techno-Military Cooperation" *Asian Strategic Review 1995-1996*, p.182.

¹⁹ Sergounin and Subbotin, in the book (ed) Ian Anthony, *op.cit*, pp.206-208.

²⁰ Jasjit Singh, *op.cit*, p.47.

early warning systems fitted in Il-76 freighters that would convert them into AWACS.²¹

In January 1996 Primakov replaced Andrei Kozyrev as Russia's foreign minister. Unlike Kozyrev, the architect of the pro-western foreign policy of Yeltsin's first term, Primakov reinvigorated relations with Moscow's longtime friends, such as India and North Korea and focused more attention developing multilateral cooperation in the former Soviet republics. Abandoning Kozyrev's efforts to develop a new Asia-Pacific security community and Primakov sought to raise Russia's profile in the region and India and even went so far as to advocate a tripartite alliance.²²

Several high level military visits took place between Russia and China in 1993, the commander of the PLA Navy, Zang Lianshong visited Russia, and during his visit inspected Admiral Kuznetsov the aircraft carrier of Northern Fleet, and the shipyard that produces Severodvinsk nuclear submarines. In June 1993 Admiral Liu Huaqing Vice Chairman of CMC visited Moscow and discussed with the Russian leaders military industrial cooperation and the conversion of defence industries for civilian use.²³ In November 1993, the Russian minister of Defence, General Pavel Grachev visited China and signed a five years agreement on military cooperation, which provided for the consultations on ministerial and military regional levels and exchange of

²¹ Yuri V. Tsyganov, "Russia and China: What is in the pipeline" in the book (ed.), Gennady Chufirin, *Russia and Asia: The Emerging Security Agenda*, SIPRI, OUP, 1999, pp.311-315.

²² Gennady Chufirin, "Asia as a Factor in Russia's International Posture" in *Russia and Asia: The Emerging Security Agenda* (ed) Gennady Chufirin, SIPRI, Oxford; OUP, 1999 pp.475-476.

²³ Swaran Singh, op.cit,p.180.

information and experience in the military field.²⁴ In 1993 1200 AT-II super anti-tank missiles were ordered and revived in 1995 for use in T-80U tanks.²⁵

In July 1994, China's state council approved an additional \$5 billion worth of armaments imports from Russia. China was keen to purchase SU-30MK and SU-35 fighters. It as subsequently reported that Russia was not ready to sell more advanced SU-35, but was prepared to sell SU-27 and SU-30. earlier in the year Russia and China were reported to have signed a contract for the purchase of by latter of 100 Klimov RD-33 aircraft engines, which Russia used in its export oriented Super F-7 fighters.²⁶

In February 1994, the Mashzavod plant in Nizhny Novgorod signed a contract with the PLA navy to supply three ship-born 77mm caliber automatic artillery systems. In March 1995 specialists were trained at Mashzavod plant to use these guns which were to be delivered by the end of the year.²⁷

In 1996 China received 22SU-27 Flanker B aircrafts.²⁸ The Russo-China joint statement issued at the time of President Yeltsin's visit to Beijing in April 1996 did make a special mention of their military-technical cooperation. Both sides expressed their readiness to further develop "friendly exchanges between their military forces at various levels and further strengthen their co-operation in military homology". Further they maintained that the development of military elations and their cooperation in the field of military technology are not directed against,any third country or country block.²⁹

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Jyotsana Bakshi, "Russia-China Military-Technical Cooperation", *Strategic Analysis*, vol.XXIV, no.4, July 2000, p.643.

²⁶ Sergouvin and Subbotin in the book (ed.), Ian Anthony, op.cit,p.210.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Jasjit Singh op.ci.p.48.

²⁹ Ibid.

Russia delivered 30 MI-17 helicopter to China between 1995-1997. China also received 144 AA-10 Almo air to air missiles and 96AA-8 Aphid air-to-air missiles. In 1997-98, China received 15 SA-15 surface to air missile systems as well as 255 SA-15 Gauntlet 19N 330 missiles. China revived technology from Russia for the development of DF 31/41 intercontinental ballistic missiles.³⁰

In 1996 China ordered 2 Sovremenyi class destroyers for the navy. This deal included additional weapon and electronic bits, such as 4SDS-N7 Shtil missile systems and 50SS-N-22 Sunburn /P-80 anti-ship missiles as well as 4SA-N-7Shtie missile system and 132 SA-N-7 Galdy missiles.³¹

As per agreement Russia would deliver to China 60Su-30MKK multi-purpose fighter aircrafts. This defence agreement is of special importance for India because in 1999 India had ordered 40 Su-30 MK. Russia is upgrading them to Su-30 MKI according to Indian weather and circumstances with Indian-French and Israeli avionics. Russia is also stated to transfer technology to China for licensed production of 200 SU-30 MKK aircrafts. Russia between 2000-05 would also give 4 SA-300 PMV SAM systems and missiles.³²

The agreement to deliver Su-30 MKK was Russia's largest arms contract in the last few years. The deal is likely to provide very significant indicative boost to the Chinese air force. The following table shows the major arms dealing between Russia-China from 1992-1999

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

Table No. 3.3 : Russian Arms Transfer to China (1992-1999)

Year	Item
1992	26SU-27 fighter delivered
1994	Agreement for 4 diesel powered kilo-class submarines
1994	Agreement for 6 S-300 air defence systems with 100 missiles.
1995-96	48 Su-27 (36 one seal SU -27SK and two seal SU-27 UB)
1996	License to produce 200 SU-27 SK aircrafts
1997	Agreement to buy 2 soveremenyi class guided destroyers armed with supersonic anti-ship ZM-80E Moskit Cruise missiles.
1999	Agreement to purchase 60 SU-30MK , with a consent for future licensed production in China

Source: Sipri year book 1999, Armament, Disarmament and international Security, New York, 1999, p.461; also see Bin Yu "Coping with the post-Kosovo Fallout" Comparative Connection, 3rd quarter, 1999,p.101.

Between 1991 and 1996, Russia sold China weapons³³ worth an estimated \$1 billion a year. Between 1996 and 2001, the rate of sale doubled to \$2 billion per year. Reportedly the two had signed a military sales package in 1999 that between 2000 and 2005 be worth of \$20 billion.³⁴ China also obtained import know how of SU-30 MKK multirole fighter aircrafts. In 1999, China tested the JL-2, submarine launched ballistic missile and the DF-31 intercontinental ballistic missile, it also announced its acquisition of the neutron bombs it has been suggested that Russian scientists and blue prints were used in

³³ Stephen J. Blank, "Military Capability of Peoples' Republic of China", at [http://www/fas.org/spp/starars/congress/2000-100-07-19 blank.htm](http://www/fas.org/spp/starars/congress/2000-100-07-19%20blank.htm).

³⁴ Mark, Stokes, "China's Military Modernization... " pg.204,<http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/asia/strokesoggg.html>.

developing these and other armaments.³⁵ China has clearly achieved breakthrough in missile technology by introducing in its army by importing systems and prototypes from Russia. It is deploying S-300 surface to air missiles to protect ballistic missiles that could target Taiwan. It is also developing indigenous SAMs based on Russian designs, such as the S-300, SA-12, and SA-17 Grizzly.

Beijing is emphasizing the modernization of the Navy as well. It has acquired four kilo-class diesel submarines. Most important, Russia has sold Beijing two type 956E Sovremenyi class destroyers armed with supersonic nuclear capable Moskit missiles SS-N-22. Some destroyers to be produced in China are based on Russian know-how Russia also has sold China its Kamov Ka-28 (Helix) anti-submarine, destroyers based helicopters.³⁶

Russia is building two VVER-1000 nuclear power plants in China near the city of Liyanyungang in the north-eastern province of Jiangsu, now known as Tianwan nuclear power station. The construction on the first VVER-1000 unit began in October 1999. Second unit was expected to follow one year later on which the work has started in the year 2000. The power generation is expected to follow by the year 2005 and 2006 respectively.³⁷ In August 1999 Hong Kong press published reports of a deal regarding the sale of two typhoon class nuclear powered submarines valued at a billion dollar between Russia and China. The Russian foreign ministry spokesman denied the report as "an absolute falsehood". However, the main arms exporting agency of Russia, Rosvooruzhenie refused to comment on the subject its spokesperson told to

³⁵ See Military Analysis Network, HQ-9/FT-200, at <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/missile/row/sa-170htm>.

³⁶ Olga Kryazheva, "Russia-China Arms Trade growing", *Weekly Defense Monitor*, centre for Defence Information vol.4, no.5, Feb.3, 2000 p.5. at http://www.cdi.org/weekly/2000/issue_05.html.

³⁷ *Strategic Digest*, Feb.2000 pp.215-216.

interfax "we customarily do not comment on military –technical cooperation with China."³⁸

The transfer of technology and know-how is the key to Chinese being successful in upgrading its military potential. Russia and China have established mechanisms for military technology transfer and intelligence sharing. Russia even allowed China to use its space-based global positioning system, known as GLONASS. The Russian proposal to China to become full-fledged co-owner of GLONASS (Global Navigational Satellite System) would allow it to have satellite pictures adopted not for commercial but for exact military information. The 'terminator' system working with GLONASS is mounted on the state of art Russian ballistic missiles Topol-M. The programme is already in place to train Chinese military students, scientists and engineers in Russian defence institutions. According to Hong Kong media upto 1,500 Russian scientists work in China's design and production facilities.³⁹

In July 2000 President Vladimir Putin made his first visit to Beijing and both sides discussed a two stage 15 year cooperation plan in the military and technical field. During the first five years (2000-2005). China would purchase from Russia up to \$ 15 billion of new generation weapons or license to produce them. The long term cooperation would focus on joint research and development and production of military equipments.⁴⁰

Col. Gen. Valeri Manilov, first Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces visited Beijing from Nov 13-18, 2000, he stated that "current staff talks enabled us to make headway in all areas of military and

³⁸ *SWB*, SUW/0605 WA/14 September 10, 1999.

³⁹ Tung Yi, "Russian Experts said helping PRC make high tech weaponry" *Sing Tao Jin Pao*, Sept. 6, 2000 P.A. 39 as reported in FBIS-CH 2000-0906.

⁴⁰ China-Russia Relations July-sept.2000, *Comparative Connections*, at www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0300QChina-rus.

military technological cooperation". Further, Russia was ready to supply the Chinese forces with everything required for the needs of China's national security and defence interests.⁴¹

To, conclude one can say that defence cooperation between Russia and China are need based and kind of complimentary to each other. Former requires funds to keep alive Soviet/Russia made defence establishments on the other hand latter has found a cheap and reliable arms supplier to meet the needs of its defence requirements. However, there are certain factors which can be termed as 'limiting factor' which includes China avoidance on single source, lack of R&D to further modernize weapons; stopping of barter systems and Russia's own security etc. in some quarters of Russian strategist thinkers have suspicion about deepening strategic ties between the two, which might be dangerous for Russia's own security interests in the future. But seeing the present level of defence cooperation between the two countries, fear of endangering Russia's own security seems too far from reality, because Russia is maintaining for superior standard of weapons for its own security forces before it supplies to China.

Russia is also a major supplier of defence equipments to India along with China. Indian defence forces possess a major portion of their defence equipments of Soviet /Russia made since both China and India derive their major chunk of defence purchases from Russia, and also both countries, have fought a war in 1962 and unlike Russia, their border problems are yet to be solved. The repercussions of Russian defence purchases are bound to occur. The next chapter is all about how Russia-China defence cooperation is going to affect Indian security interests, also will try to explore the possibilities of emerging triangle between Russia-China-India.

⁴¹ SII/B/Su/4002 SI/3, Nov.20.2000.

CHAPTER – 4

RUSSIA-CHINA-INDIA TRIANGLE – IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

Introduction

The emerging triangle between Russia-India-China is being closely watched in the strategic and academic quarters of the West and the three countries involved. This idea was mooted by the then Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov at a time when India had been internationally isolated after its May 1998 nuclear tests. This was also the time when Russia was facing intense pressure from the West on the issue of human rights violation in Chechnya and on the establishment of true democratic system in Russia. The third component of the triangle China, was already on the hit list of the US led West due to its ideological commitment to Marxism. The Tianmen massacre incident had made China almost untouchable internationally. China has also been facing constant pressure from the West on the Taiwan and Tibet issue. Aware of the circumstances in which all three countries found themselves and the power aspirations which all these shared, Primakov gave a call to unite in the face of unnecessary intervention of the West in their internal matters. However, no triangular relation can take off and be sustained if each had problem with the other. To analyse the possibility of this triangle actually materializing it is, therefore, important to study the kind of relation these states share with each other. In the first section swings in Sino-Soviet relation is briefly discussed. The disintegration of the Soviet Union created fresh opportunities for qualitatively different relation to develop between China and the successor Soviet states, especially Russia. The triangle can only be

understood in this context. Thereafter the chapter focuses on the kind of relation developing between Russia and India and China and India. An analysis of the bilateral relations would indicate the possibilities of this triangle actually materializing. The last section of the chapter briefly highlights the implication this triangle will have on India.

The Soviet Times

Soviet Union and China were bound to each other as comrades resolutely devoted to working class and peasant revolutions. Soviet Union's assistance under the Stalin regime to Mao's revolution endeared the two, who after the success of the 1949 Chinese revolution, presented themselves as the impenetrable and expanding socialist world of the early 1950s. The comradeship however began to drift apart on several counts and there were many reasons that soured Soviet-China relations. Both wanted to establish their credentials as true Marxists. Gradually the two drifted away from each other though these two countries belonged to the same idea bloc there were strong difference between them. Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaigns were amongst the first signs of discord. Chairman Mao opposed CPSU's new ideological formulations like peaceful co-existence and non-antagonistic contradictions between imperialism and socialism. Concepts used by Soviets for the third world like non-capitalist path of development and policy of support to the 'national bourgeois' were similarly opposed. The real issue behind the ideological discord was however, leadership and hegemony over the international communist movement and relations with the newly emerging countries of Asia and Africa.¹

¹ A.M. Chenoy, "Russia-India-China: Revisioning the international political system", *World Focus*, April 2005,p.11.

The Chinese and Russians had disagreements on internal matters as well. Chinese wanted assistance from the Soviets on their nuclear programme which was denied by the Soviets. The Chinese and Soviets became competitors in the space technology; Chinese needed more economic assistance for their modernization programmes that the over extended Soviet Union failed to provide. Soviets were critical of several Chinese policies including the Cultural Revolution; Chinese called the Soviets 'revisionists', an insult to those who believed themselves to be Marxists.²

As, the Sino-Soviet dispute broke out in 1959 and became bitter after 1961, the Chinese and the Soviets saw themselves on opposite sides of major international disputes. During the Sino-Indian border clash in 1962 contrary to Chinese expectations, Soviets remained neutral and provided military equipments to India soon after that. This incidence further caused damage between the two countries whose relations reached an all time low. The Soviets were critical of the Sino-US rapprochement and opening of trade relations between the two. China's border clashes with Vietnam in the 1980s, their support to Pol Pot's oppressive regime in Cambodia, were basis of Soviet critique of Chinese opportunism.

However, the tense relationship of two communist giants eased with the rise of Gorbachev as the Secretary General of CPSU in 1985. He made epoch making changes in the Soviet history by introducing 'Perestroika' and 'Glasnost'. Some have described him in Soviet history as 'reformer in hurry'. In the realm of international relations he introduced 'New Thinking' which stressed on a de-ideologised foreign policy.

In the words of Gorbachev, 'New Thinking' stood for

² Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World*, London, Collins, 1987, pp.10-12.

We need normal international conditions for our internal progress. But we want a world free of war, without arms races, nuclear weapons and violence, not only because this is an optimal condition for our internal development. It is an objective global requirement that stems from the realities of the present day. The world is living in an atmosphere not only of nuclear threat, but also of unresolved major social problems of new stresses created by the scientific and technological advancement and by the exacerbation of global problems. Mankind today faces unprecedented problems and the future will hang in the balance, if joint solutions are not found. All countries are now more interdependent than ever before and the stockpiling of weapons especially nuclear missiles, makes the outbreak of a world war, increasingly more probable due to technical failure or human fallibility. Yet all living things on earth would suffer.³

Under the slogan of 'New Thinking' Gorbachev's foreign policy was based on shared moral and ethical principles to solve global problems rather than on Marxist-Leninist concept of irreconcilable conflict between capitalism and communism. The historic meeting between Deng and Gorbachev led to resolution of many outstanding problems between the two. The border dispute was resolved by demarcating the Usuri River; trade was opened up and threat perceptions to a large extent eliminated.

While relations were improving between the two countries, the Soviet Union itself collapsed in December 1991. It was a historical event of global significance. Relations between the two neighbours, Russia and China could not therefore, escape the global effects of this historical event.⁴ The new government of Russia appeared to ignore the need for further development of relations with China from the point where Gorbachev had left during his tenure. The reasons were obvious. President Yeltsin and his government were pre-occupied with a series of domestic problems arising out the disintegration of USSR.

³ Ibid,p.11.

⁴ Zafar Imam, "How and Why Soviet union disintegrated" *International Studies* , New Delhi, Oct-Dec. 1992,pp.379-402.

Russia's domestic factors played a very important role in the formulation of Russian foreign policy during the initial period. The economic crisis of the early 1990s produced national humiliation. Unemployment increased and a large number of people were pushed below poverty line. Between the 'Atlantists' and "Eurasians' model of foreign policy Russia went ahead with former in the hope that the West will provide huge aid to restructure the socialist model of economy into a capitalist one. But once the threat perception of Russia was eliminated the US emerged victorious in the Cold War. Neither West nor the US paid much attention to admit Russia into Western world and help it economically. Instead, they started treating Russia as competitor in various field.

The bubble of 'Common European Home and one World From Vancouver to Vladivostok" etc. burst very soon and a disillusioned Russia turned her face towards the Third World and Asia which had been a natural ally of the erstwhile Soviet Union. So in the changed circumstances and policies countries like China, India, Iran got the top priority in Russian foreign policy list.

Soon, Kozyrev was replaced by an academician Yevgeny Primakov as Russia's new foreign minister who tried to balance between the East and the West. In December 1998 he made an official visit to India. Primakov visited India at the time when India was internationally isolated for conducting nuclear tests a few months back. He proposed to formulate a triangle between three major Eurasian countries Russia-China-India to counter US hegemony and unilateralism in the world politics. According to him 'Russia favours the creation of a Moscow-Beijing-Delhi triangle and also it would be a good idea'.⁵

⁵ SWB/SU/3416 B/5, December 22,1998.

Before going into detail about the emerging triangle between the three, let us see how their individual relations are developing with each other.

Russia-India Relations

The legacy of strong mutually beneficial relations between Soviet Union and India weighed heavily on Indian expectations in developing relations with new Russia. Global events brought India and Soviet Union together in the fifties when the Cold War dominated international relations. India had identified itself with the Soviet Union world view just as Pakistan had with that of the USA. The general understanding was Indo-Soviet friendship being time tested. Indo-Russian equation would not dramatically alter. End of Soviet Union, however, altered the international scenario completely. It heralded the end of the confrontational bloc politics of the Cold War era and the weakening of ideologies. Free from ideological compulsion new Russia had new options.⁶

After prolong dilly dallying and rescheduling his visit since 1992, Yeltsin finally arrived in New Delhi only in January 1993. President Yeltsin's belated visit to India in January 1993 was aimed to reassure New Delhi that Russia was not cold-shouldering India. But Russian leaders first visited South Korea in November 1992 and China in December 1992. Russian foreign policy it appeared was now being based on the maxim 'we do not have any permanent friends or foes, but we do have permanent interests'. Since 1993 Indo-Russian relations have been growing smoothly. Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narsimha Rao visited Moscow in 1994, during his visit President Yeltsin remarked that "there was no difference at all between the two countries on international and bilateral issues". The document signed during his visit promised for joint action

⁶ Shams-ud-din and Bhaswati Sarkar, " Indo-Russian Relations: An Overview" in *India and Russia Towards Strategic Partnership* (ed). Shams-ud-din (New Delhi; Lancer's Books, 2001)p.1.

by both countries against terrorism. The document supported all forms of cooperation, investment, joint enterprise, creation of conditions for economic initiative development of scientific technical cooperation, peaceful atom, cosmos, and laser technology.⁷

Of the weapons Indian armed force possesses around 70% of weapons is that of Soviet/Russian origin. Russia supplies cheap and reliable arms to India, unlike West and USA which always puts certain conditions before delivery of arms with higher price tag. India gave more importance to Russia than the USA because Russia had been an all-weather friend and both countries maintained close political, economic, nuclear and military relations.

Between 1992-96 India imported from Russia defense equipments worth \$3.5 billion. Indian military and defence orders now sustain many defence industries in Russia, especially in St. Petersburg and Irkutsk which would otherwise have faced closure at the time of transition in the Russian economy. India is the only country with which Russia has a long term programme of military-technical cooperation, which was signed in 1994. The Soviet era Treaty of Friendship, Peace and Cooperation was renewed for another 10 years, during the then defence minister Mulayam Singh Yadav's visit to Moscow in December 2000.⁸ Russian spokesman Rosvoorouzhnie stated that Russian Indian military cooperation would touch \$4.5 billion in 2000 and \$6.5 billion in the end of 2005.⁹

The crucial and the most time testing moment in Indo-Russian relations came in May 1998 when India tested five nuclear bombs in Pokhran, Rajasthan and most of the influential countries imposed economic and many other kinds

⁷ Ibid,p.3.

⁸ A.M. Chenoy, "The Phases in Indo-Russian Relations" in *India and Russia: Towards Strategic Partnership* (ed) Shams-d-din, New Delhi; Lancer's Books, 2001, pp.183-184.

⁹ *The Times of India*, 27th March, 1997.

of sanctions on India. Although Russia also agreed with the West and USA that India should sign on CTBT and NPT and ratify it as soon as possible, but Russia opposed any kind of economic sanction against India, and refused to impose sanctions itself. Tremendous pressure was exerted by the USA led West on Russia to scrap all its agreements in nuclear cooperation with India and also stop technical support to India's two nuclear reactors under construction with Russian assistance at Kudnakulam, Tamilnadu. But Russia stood up to the Indian expectations and refused to comply with US dictates.

Russia has constantly supported India's point of view on the issue of Kashmir in various international forums. It has also promised India to use veto power in UNSC if India would be pressurised on the Kashmir issue.¹⁰ As the reciprocal gesture India also always supported Russian stand on the Chechnya issue and criticized the West for interfering in Russia's internal matters on the pretext of addressing human rights violations.

India and Russia set up a joint working group on Afghanistan. As on many other issues their stance on this issue was similar. Together they made it possible for the Northern Alliance to keep afloat and thereby a counterforce against the Taliban was available when the American attack on Afghanistan took place. Their joint proposal of resistance also mooted by General Musharraf and virtually endorsed by the USA prevented the sneaking in of Taliban elements in the interim government formed subsequently in Afghanistan under the leadership of Hamid Karzai.¹¹

Russia is one of the states which promised to support for India for a permanent seat in the Security Council, and thus has demonstrated to the Indian

¹⁰ John Cherian, 'A Strategic Partnership', *Frontline*, 27 October, 2000, p.11.

¹¹ V.P. Dutt, "Putin's Russia and India: Overview" in *New Trends in Indo-Russian Relations* (ed.), V.D.Chopra, New Delhi; Kalpaz, 2003, pp.18-19.

foreign policy establishment its loyalty to Indian position and its understanding of India's strategic aspirations globally.

Another important land mark in the development of Indo-Russian ties was Prime Minister Primakov's visit at the end of 1998. The visit sparked off a debate following his references to an Indo-China-Russia strategic triangle. He remarked that "Russo-Indian relations are perhaps unique in diplomatic history of the past fifty years. Their strength has been tested by many turns and twists in the two countries political life and during the profound transformation of international system". He also rightly noted that cooperation between the two countries rests on a long established broad public consensus in both countries regarding the priority of Russian-Indian cooperation as a factor promoting national interests.¹²

On March 22, 1999 India and Russia signed an agreement to train Indian defence personnel in key Russian defence establishment for maintaining advanced defence equipments. The 44,500 tonnes Kiev class Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier has been gifted to India by Russia. The Mig-29K Fulcrum aircrafts stand a better chance to be operated from this aircraft carrier. Upgrading of MiG-29 Bis Fished Fighters, construction of 3 Kirvak class frigates of the Indian Navy modernization of T-72 MBT, procurement of T-90s MBTs, for the Indian army and S-300 antiballistic missiles systems were discussed.¹³

India-China Relations

The history of India-China, interaction is almost as old as the two civilizations themselves. This centuries long peaceful coexistence, mutually enriching, both materially and spiritually is possibly unparalleled in human

¹² Shams-ud-Din and Bhaswati Sarkar, op. cit, p.8.

¹³ Ibid,p.10.

history. it is generally occupied that the contacts between India and China began as early as the time of Christ although there is as yet no definite record to establish.¹⁴ Trade and commerce flourished between them via the Silk Road, as also cultural contacts. One of the most significant aspects of the ancient contacts was the establishment of Buddhism in China. The Chinese responded with great enthusiasm to the arrival of Buddhist missionaries and thereafter initiated a number of moves to bring Indian Buddhist monks and scholars to help teach, explain and establish Buddhism firmly in China.¹⁵

The decline of Buddhism in India and also to some extent in China, led to weakening of contacts mainly after the 10th century. The rise of nationalist forces and different responses to the exploitation by imperialist powers once again led to the revival of the linkages and contacts between India and China. From 1840 onwards, when most of India came under British control, and other Western powers were becoming involved in hostilities with China, the British recruited a large number of Indians to carry out soldiering and guard duties to serve British interests. However, during the course of the Taiping Rebellion, which lasted from 1850-1864, many Indian soldiers deserted and went over to the side of Chinese. Almost a century later this phenomenon was to be repeated when Indian soldiers and policemen in China motivated by the struggle against imperialism, once again turned their arms against the British. This turnaround in their political loyalties and their radicalization came about with the work of Gadar Party in China and indeed, in retrospect, the Gadar movement figures in

¹⁴ Tam Chung, "Ageless brotherhood Between India and China", *Indian Horizons*, vol.43, no.1-2, p.12.

¹⁵ Chen, Keh-mu, *Short History of Sino-Russian Friendship*, Calcutta; ATS. 1981, pp.8-10.

the history of Indo-China relations as a notable chapter of revolutionary comradeship.¹⁶

From the mid 1920s onwards, Indian interest in China took a different turn when Jawaharlal Nehru the spokesman of Indian National Congress on foreign affairs, began articulating a world view from an Indian perspective in an anti-imperialist context. Relation with China was to figure prominently in independent India. In a notable essay "A Foreign Policy for India" in September 1927, Nehru wrote

In developing our foreign policy we shall naturally first cultivate friendly relations with the countries of East which have so much in common with us. Nepal will be our neighbour and friend, with China and Japan, Indonesia, Amman and Central Asia we shall have the closest contact.¹⁷

Nehru greeted the birth of communist China in October 1949 with great pomp. India was the first among non-communist countries to recognize the People's Republic of China. In a rare gesture, India displayed excessive zeal in promoting its membership in the UN.¹⁸ Nehru did not share the American perception that communism was a threat to world peace and stability. On the contrary, he believed that the Western hatred to communism might boomerang, since nationalism in China was stronger than communism. "For the present the Indian prime minister was convinced that Chinese nationalism played for more important part than communism and that Chinese civilization was too old to succumb completely to Marxist dogma".¹⁹ In his estimate the Chinese had

¹⁶ Alka Acharya, "India-China Relations: An Overview" in *The Peacock and the Dragon: India-China Relations in 21st Century* (eds.), Kanti Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo, New Delhi; Har-Anand, 2000), pp.168-170.

¹⁷ Jawaharlal Nehru, *A Foreign Policy for India*, AICC File No.8, 1927,p.361.

¹⁸ John Lall, "Sino-Indian Border Problem as a leftover of history" in (ed) Surjit Mansing, '*Indian and Chinese Foreign Policies in Comparative Perspective*', New Delhi; Radiant Pub.1998, p.449.

¹⁹ W.F.V. Eekelen, *Indian Foreign Policy and Border Dispute with China*, The Hague; Martinus Nihoff, 1967, p.55.

"evolved a political system which is partly based on their Marxist ideas, and partly adopted to conditions in China. We all know that it is not full-blooded communism".²⁰

The historic agreement between Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and his Chinese counterpart Zhou Enlai in April 1954 was named as Panchsheel (five principles of peaceful co-existence). This formed bedrock for India and China Their stance was similar on this issue to conduct bilateral relations with each-other. Panchsheel contained following five principles:

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
2. Mutual non-aggression;
3. Mutual non-interference in each other's affairs;
4. Equality and mutual benefit; and
5. Peaceful co-existence.

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru returned Zhou's visit in Oct. 1954 and the 'Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai' phase was inaugurated. In retrospect this phase was so brief that it appears surprising that it could camouflage the contentions issues in the relationship. Zhou's second visit to India still resounded to the slogan of Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai, but the latent tensions had begun to emerge as more obvious and clearly discordant strains were evident. Zhou viewed the demonstrations by the pro-Tibetan protestors as Indian tolerance of anti-China activity on its soil. Zhou, also stated Chinese view of the "historical illegitimacy" of the McMahon Line²¹ and in September 1957, announced construction of a road linking Sinkiang and Tibet in Aksai Chin. This so called road link for easy movement of goods was used to India's disadvantage a few years down the line.

²⁰ Ibid,pp.54-55.

²¹ R.C. Keith, *The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai*, London; Macmillan Press, 1989, pp.59-65.

The sunshine period in Indo-China relations disappeared behind the dark cloud with the border clashes in October 1962 which ultimately spread in to a full fledged war in which India suffered a crushing defeat. The opposition parties dubbed him a 'soaring idealist' incapable of defending the country's honour. Nehru's faith that a socialist China will never attack a 'non-aligned' India and his faith in non-aligned policy as a pathway to national security proved illusory.²² Post-Nehru era has been relatively smooth and peaceful for China and India relations. Without being guided by passion and idealism Mrs. Indira Gandhi, unlike her father endeavored to lend a component of 'hard realism' to Indian foreign policy. For instance, India's role in dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, its first ever nuclear blast in May 1974, and later merging of Sikkim reinforced the premise that she was a practitioner of power politics. After 14 years of gap in 1976, K.R. Narayan was accredited India's ambassador to Beijing, a pragmatic step towards normalizing Indo-China relations.²³

Sino-India relations entered a new phase with the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's path breaking visit to Beijing in December 1988. During the meeting with Deng he stated that "India and China being the initiators of five principles of peaceful co-existence can bring about sound development in Sino-Indian bilateral relations on the basis of these principles".²⁴ His visit is termed as 'historic' because he was the first prime minister to have visited China after the gap of 34 years. It was during this period that both countries signed an agreement to set up the joint working group to solve the border problems. Also both countries agreed to concentrate on expanding bilateral cooperation in non-conventional field, as was evident from the signing of several agreements on

²² Eekelen, op.cit,p.160.

²³ B.M. Jain, "India-China Relations: Issues and Emerging Trends" *The Round Table*, vol.93, no. 374, April 2004, pp.253-269.

²⁴ *The Times of India*, December 20,1988.

scientific and technical cooperation, and on educational and cultural exchange programmes.²⁵

Chinese Vice-premier Wu Xuequian's return visit to New Delhi in October 1989 set the stage for initiating confidence building measures along the borders.²⁶

President Jiang Zemin's visit to India in November 1996 took India-China relations to new heights. Four agreements were signed between the two countries to promote mutual cooperation in diverse field of which the most significant one pertained to the CBMs in the military field along the LAC in the India-China border areas. Under Art III both sides agreed to downsize their respective military forces along LAC.²⁷

The year 1998 came as the turning point when India conducted five nuclear tests on May 15 and 17 at Pokharan, Rajasthan. China's initial reaction was mild. Its acerbic rebuff resulted from the fact that the Indian government justified these tests by pinpointing China as a 'potential threat' to Indian security. China's response shifted radically after the publication by The New York Times on May, 13, of a letter from PM Vajpayee to US President Bill Clinton and other world leaders.²⁸ The Chinese government brushed aside the Indian accusation saying that it was "utterly groundless" if analysed in pragmatic terms, this was an unwarranted and provocative act on India's part resulting in unnecessary tensions with China.²⁹

²⁵ Jain, B.M. Op.cit,p.257.

²⁶ *Foreign Affairs Record*, New Delhi; Ministry of External Affairs, Govt. of India, Oct.1989, pp.109-112.

²⁷ *Foreign Affairs Record*, New Delhi; Ministry of External Affairs, Govt. of India, Nov.1996, pp.169-172.

²⁸ J.N. Dixit, *Across Borders: Fifty Years of India's Foreign Policy*, New Delhi; Picus Books, 1998, pp.408-417.

²⁹ John W. Garner, "The Restoration of Sino-Indian Comity Following India's Nuclear Tests" *The China Quarterly*, Dec, 2001, p.686.

At the same time, a number of other factors facilitated a rapid improvement in the bilateral relationship. First, Beijing was conscious that India's nuclear arsenal would not threaten China for sometime to come. Secondly the rise of radical Islam in Pakistan with which China has cultivated very close relations for decades, the increasing number of Xinjiang fighters taking refuge in poorly governed regions of Pakistan. Third, the Kosovo conflict in the spring of 1999 gave India-China a golden opportunity to condemn together NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia.³⁰ There are several issues of national and international importance on which both India-China still have their own apprehensions.

i) Pakistan Factor

The Sino-Pakistan security and strategic nexus has remained a central issue in India-China relations ever since Beijing and Islamabad signed a historic border agreement in March 1963, ceding a chunk of Pakistan occupied Kashmir to China. China also assisted Pakistan in its nuclear and missile building programmes, which were designed to help Pakistan to keep its option open'.³¹ Following an agreement signed between the two countries in September 1986, China also sold two mini nuclear research reactors to Pakistan in 1989 and 1990 and also promised to assist Pakistan's nuclear energy programmes.³²

ii) Close China-Myanmar Relationship

Another area of serious concern is the close China-Myanmar relations which has far reaching implications. Of particular concern for India is the fact

³⁰ Jean-Pierre Cabestan, "The Chinese Factor: China Between Multipolarity and Bipolarity" (eds.), Gilles Biquerat and Frederio Grare in *Ind'a-China –Russia: Intricacies of an Asian Triangle*, New Delhi; India Research Press, 2000, pp.136-137.

³¹ Allen S. Whiting, "The Future of Chinese Foreign Policy in China *and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in Post-Cold War Era*, London; Westview Press, 1999, p.264.

³² R.R. Subramanyam, *India, Pakistan and China*, New Delhi; ABC Publisher, 1989, pp.23-28.

that the Coco Island base is situated merely 30 nautical from the Andaman Islands giving China a strategic presence in the Indian ocean. The objective behind improving the Burma Road would also be security one, aimed at facilitating quick-movement of men and material between Yunan and the Indian Ocean. The Chinese are also believed to have assisted in the construction of a 50 meter-radar antenna on the Coco Islands.³³

iii) Tibet Issue

The Tibet issue has been one of the major constraints in Indo-China relations ever since Tibet was forcibly occupied by China in 1950 and declared an integral part of its territory. India argues that she has given refuge to Dalai Lama and thousands of Tibetan refugees on humanitarian ground, but China criticizes India of providing secessionist movement in Tibet and intervening China's internal matters.³⁴ A further controversy was sparked off between New Delhi and Beijing when Karmapa Lama, a Buddhist monk, fled to India in early 2000 and was given a status of a Tibetan refugee by the Indian government. The Indian government ignored Chinese sensitivity over the Karmapa episode. The real problem with China is that it regards Tibet as are edifice of unity'.³⁵

iv) Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim issue

Although China has formally recognized recently Sikkim as the part of India, but on Arunachal Pradesh its stand is ambiguous. During Vajpayee visit to China in June 2003, India termed Tibet an autonomous region of PRC.³⁶ India has also gained in return, by signing the accord on opening trade through

³³ Mohan Mallik, "China- India Relations in the post-Soviet Era: The Continuing Rivalry", *The China Quarterly* London, no.2, June 1995,p.337.

³⁴ B.M. Jain, op.cit, pp.263-264.

³⁵ T.W. Tow, *Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations*, Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2001, p.29.

³⁶ *The Hindu* , 24 June, 2003,p.1.

Sikkim (Nathula pass). The Nathula Pass was officially closed in 1975, after Sikkim became the part of India.³⁷

v) *Economic Apprehensions*

In the early 1990s with a positive mood and thinking in the leadership of both countries they signed a much awaited trade agreement on avoidance of double taxes in each –other's country to boost the flow of goods and products on the basis of mutual benefit. On the trade front there has been a boost from \$ 265 million in 1991 to \$ 3.6 billion in 2001.³⁸ According to some policy analysts, what is worrying Indian business circles is that the flooding of domestic markets by cheap Chinese goods. Their fear is rooted in the belief that all varieties of Chinese products are at unbeatable price and quality wise in international markets. That is why large and medium size business houses in India are raising a hue and cry over the 'dumping syndrome'.³⁹

The given Indc-Chinese potential and capabilities in military, industrial and economic terms, the nature and pattern of their relations will largely depend on how the two countries accommodate each –others legitimate concerns and interests. The proposed triangle of Primakov will mostly depend on the modes of India and China that how they conduct their bilateral relation to share the platform for Eurasian Triangle. And also the future other alliances on security in Asia can not succeed without taking these two Asian giants in future.

Russia-India-China Emerging Triangle

During his visit in December 1998, the former Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, proposed a Russia-India-China strategic triangle, which envisaged closer strategic cooperation. He said that

³⁷ *The Times of India*, 25 June 2003,p.1.

³⁸ *China Daily*, 16 May, 2002.

³⁹ B.M. Jain, op. cit, pp.265-266.

If we succeed in establishing a strategic triangle, it will be very good... a lot depend in the region on the policies perused by India, China and Russia. Further, this proposal was made in the framework of partnership between the three countries that could bring about greater stability not just in the region but the world.⁴⁰

The immediate response from Beijing on the proposed triangle was positive. The spokesperson of Chinese foreign ministry dubbed it as 'very positive thought' and 'would help in containing growing unilateralism in international politics'.⁴¹ India's response was cautious and rather lukewarm because she did not want to send wrong signals to the West by joining in bloc politics. In his speech then Prime Minister Vajpayee said 'Russia is a longstanding partner of India with which we have traditionally enjoyed friendly relations. At the same time, India is working on normalizing its relations with China'.⁴² Due to this cold response from India, speaking to the media Primakov explained that his earlier words on the possibility of forming a triangle between Russia-China-India were not official proposal. He said "I wanted to say that such partnership could reliably stabilize the situation in the region and in the world".⁴³

In 1990s and after 9/11 USA loomed over the world as sole superpower ready to undertake unilateral action anywhere ranging from NATO led attack on Yugoslavia to bombing in Afghanistan to oust Talibans from power. The next states which form 'Axis of Evil' i.e., Iran, Iraq and North Korea are now on USA's hit list. Presence of US troops in Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Taiwan close to the borders of Russia and China is posing grave threat to their security. Repercussions of these international developments are bound to affect the two countries.

⁴⁰ *The Hindu*, 13 May, 2005; also REF/FL 21,22 and 28 Dec. 1998.

⁴¹ *The China Daily* December 23,1998.

⁴² *The Times of India*, December 22, 1998.

⁴³ *SWB/SU/3417 B/4*, December 23, 1998.

The multi-ethnic and multi-cultural societies of Russia, India, and China have faced increasing pressure from the forces that seek to destroy their pluralistic societies. In India infiltration in Kargil was the culmination of years of infiltrations and terrorist activities. The terrorists have also attacked the highest symbol of Indian democracy, the parliament. Russia's long bleeding problem of Chechnya has been further aggravated with the Western and US media and human right groups intervention on the name of human rights violations. China is facing potential threat of secession in its Xinjiang province by Islamic extremists who are engaged with continuous low level warfare with Chinese authorities.⁴⁴ There is growing feeling among the three countries that US alone should not set the agenda of global war against terror. The experience of Iraq also shows that the US polices can leave a bigger mess in the region, the effect of which has to be born by neighbouring countries.⁴⁵

Meanwhile as Twenty First Century progresses, Asia is likely to occupy a centre stage in the international system. While on the one hand Asia has seen economic prosperity it also has sources of danger. It stretches from Persian Gulf to Philippines contains sources of tensions such as global terrorism. In American perception the 'Axis of Evil' i.e., Iraq, Iran and North Korea are located in Asia. President Vladimir Putin has proposed that the arc of instability be converted into an arc of stability. To achieve this objective India, Russia and China can play a vital role.

At broader level India, Russia and China agree that the world should be a multipolar one. China felt the pressures from the West after the Tianmen square massacre, the US relentless support to Taiwan and threat perception of China despite of years of normalization of US-Chinese relations, US sale of F-16s to

⁴⁴ "Russia-China-India, a new Geometry" *Pravda*, Feb, 12, 2002.

⁴⁵ Nirmala Joshi, "India-Russia-China Prospects for Trilateral Cooperation" (ed.) V.D. Chopra, in *New Trends in Indo-Russian Relations*, New Delhi, Kalpaz Publications, 2003, pp.187-188.

Taiwan and promised Theater Missile Defense (TMD), forced Chinese to reconsider relations with the USA. With the development of National Missile Defence (NMD), US will get cutting edge on strategic position vis-à-vis Russia and China. Russia, with its huge nuclear arsenal, could live with the US NMD. From Chinese perspective, however, the same system could immediately render China's minimalist nuclear relations force obsolete.⁴⁶

The issue of NMD and its deployment in Asia (Japan and Taiwan) is bound to affect strategic balance in the region. India on the whole, has been supportive to President Bush's decision to go ahead with missile defense, although New Delhi has opposed unilateral abrogation of the ABM Treaty of 1971. China is worried about a US defensive shield that could make Taiwan more independent minded. Russia has objected to unilateral abrogation of ABM treaty and fears that, even Russian nuclear forces are in decay and decline, the US could be poised to take a great leap forward militarily.⁴⁷

Russia-India-China have ample possibility to play together a constructive role to build stability in Central Asian energy resources. Of the three, only Russia is more or less self-sufficient in oil and natural gas. About 70% of India's oil is imported, mostly from the Gulf. Central Asian alternative supplies are being actively considered. Beijing has already indicated its interest in an ambitious venture linking up Central Asia with its industrial heartland in the eastern provinces. China and Russia have made deals for supply of oil and natural gas through pipeline which could feed oil hungry China in the decades to come.

⁴⁶ Yu Bin, "Third Quarter 2000. Putin's Ostropolitick and Sino-Russian Relations" *Pacific Forum CISIS*, at http://www.csis.org/paogor/cc/003_China_rus.html.

⁴⁷ Kanti Bajpai, "Confidence Building Between India, China and Russia" in (eds.), G./ Boquerata and F. Grare, *India-China-Russia, intricacies of an Asian Triangle*, (New Delhi, India Research Press, 2004),pp.160-170.

There are other interested players in the region, foremost and most influential being the USA. Due to presence of petroleum and hydrocarbons, the 'great game' in Central Asia has been revived. Russia, China, USA are the major players in this game and competing for lion's share in the Central Asian natural resources. India, though a marginal player in this game is trying to reduce her dependence on Gulf oil, and looking forward for supply of oil from Central Asia.

Russia, India and China can also combine to discuss and if necessary deal with terrorism. Islamic extremism in Kashmir, Xinjiang and in Chechnya has grown over the years. Although US war on terrorism will help in reducing the problem, Washington clearly can not do everything.⁴⁸

There has been a consensus between the three countries on the growing menace of terrorism. In April 1996, the 'Shanghai Five', a multilateral forum composed of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, was created with the aim of fighting ethnic separatism as well as Islamic fundamentalism. In March 2000, a meeting was held in Astana, Kazakhstan, to determine a common position on these two issues. This was later confirmed in a joint declaration in July 2000 in Dushanbe followed by a decision to create an anti-terrorist centre in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.⁴⁹ Likewise, in October 2000, during President Putin's visit to Delhi, India and Russia reaffirmed their convergence of view on fighting terrorism, expressing their deep concern over the situation in Central Asia and Afghanistan for which they agreed to set up a working group.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Ibid, pp. 165-170.

⁴⁹ Mohammad Raza Djalili and Thierry Kellner, *Geopolitical in the New Central Asia*, Paris, University of France, 2001, pp.64-65.

⁵⁰ Baidya B. Basu, "Putin's Visit and Future of Indo-Russia Defence Cooperation", *Strategic Analysis*, vol.24, no.9, p.1764.

Although the period of study of this research work is 1991-2001, but it would be worth taking note of some of the recent developments vis-à-vis the triangle. Since the time of proposal of the triangle in December 1998 to 2001, by and large no concrete steps seem to have been taken was by the three concerned steps to realize it. But the more US unilateralism became blatant the more attractive the option seemed. As a result for the first time the three foreign ministers of Russia, China and India met on the sidelines of UN General Assembly meet at New York in 2002 to explore the 'triangle' possibility.

The approach continued to be an extremely cautious one. The three foreign ministers gave no media briefing for the press except that informally they let the press know that they had met and that these meetings will continue. By comparison at the second 2003 New York meeting the difference in both their body language and press briefing could be clearly noticed. At the conclusion of their second meeting, three foreign ministers were ready to convey to the press that three states had adopted a common approach on Iraq favoring return to political process to ensure quick return of sovereignty to Iraqi people.⁵¹ This clearly had strong connotations for the USA, especially as all three of them had also refused to send troops to Iraq.

The 2004 meeting on the eve of the UN General Assembly session in New York could not occur due to change of government in New Delhi leading to some scheduling problems with the Indian establishment. Nevertheless, this was soon rectified and the three foreign ministers had their third 'trialogue' on strategic triangle on the sidelines of the Almaty meet of the 16 nation Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA)

⁵¹ Swaran Singh, "Future of Strategic Triangle: India's Options" *World Focus*, April 2005, pp.14-16.

in October 2004. In the press briefing all three countries agreed to strengthen a "collective approach" in world affairs.⁵²

On June 2, 2005 the three foreign ministers of Russia, China and India namely Sergei Lavrov, Li Zhaoxing and Natwar Singh had their first ever stand alone meeting at the port city of Vladivostok in Russia's Far East. The presence of large number of Western journalists at this meeting indicated that the meet generated curiosity beyond these states. Most experts believe that a meeting solely for this purpose reflects the beginning of the new era in the evolution of the Russia-India-China triangle.⁵³

For various reasons, all three countries feel that they are under Western pressure. Russia because of NATO's eastward expansion, Chechnya issue, and more generally, because of perceived US design on former Soviet republics, including Central Asia and Caspian Sea region. China is experiencing Western pressure on human rights issue and feels threatened by US arms sales to Taiwan and more generally, an East Asian security policy which moves towards greater use of Japan in balancing China. India is experiencing ill concealed Western propensity to try to get involved on Kashmir issue and helping Pakistan to internationalising Kashmir issue; as well as the Western –mainly US attempt to limit country's nuclear and missile programme.⁵⁴ India also accused US for pursuing 'double standard' on fighting with terrorism. India blames that terrorist outfits functioning in Pakistan with covert support of Pakistani establishment are posing grave threat to India's security, but US in eliminating only those terrorists who pose threat for her own interests and not that of India.

⁵² Ibid, pp.14-16.

⁵³ *The Times of India* June 3, 2005.

⁵⁴ François Heisbroug, "American Hegemony? Perceptions of the US Abroad" *Survival*, vol.41, no.4; Winter 1999-2000, pp.5-19.

Implications for India

India on its side is also willing to engage in great power politics and is looking for international recognition it has been deprived since independence. Nehru wrote movingly of India's desire and its destiny to play a major role in the world politics. He hoped that it would not be military role, but one based on sound moral values. Today although there exists no "white paper" enunciating the objectives of the country's foreign policy, India still strives towards this goal. The most spectacular example of this new assertiveness, largely founded on the self-confidence generated by the relative success of the nuclear tests, is the claim for a permanent seat at the UNSC.

On the issue of triangle, it is only India that seems to be least under pressure to pursue this triangle. India has to carefully weigh its policy options and maintain a delicate balance between promoting strategic triangle and strengthening its engagement with the USA. Individually both Russia and China have maintained good relationship with the US and their trade volume are increasing rapidly with the US.

Fear persists at the bilateral level as well. To some Chinese analysts Russia still represents a potential threat and vice-versa is also true. Both Russia and India presume that in the short and medium term, China may pursue the policy of peace, but in the long term equations may change. China's overt and cover support to Pakistani nuclear and missile development programme pose a great security danger for India.

India-Russia-China can do some sensible things together in the military and geopolitical realm. There is very little prospect that they are going to be allies or even thoroughgoing strategic performers. Moreover there are number of areas where protocol, discussions and agreements might be reached which would enhance their security and contribute to the security of Asia. If the idea

of triangle between them mean anything, it is probably means a relatively modest set of understanding on which their view coverage.

The Eurasian security in future will depend a lot on how these three largest countries harmonise their relationships. They represent world's most populous segment, rich with natural resources and are on a fast track to emerge as leading global economic power. The June 2, 2005 concluded meeting at Vladivostok recently solely for this purpose indicate that future of triangle is very promising and the picture will be clearer in the time to come. At the same time the future of triangle rests with how India and China solve their own long standing problem of border disputes.

To conclude, therefore, if Asia has to make any positive contribution towards the evolution of new global order and if world has to evolve an adequately representative framework for international security then, increasingly mutual cooperation of these three Asian powers amongst themselves and also their cooperation with other major players remains the most critical pre-requisite to all initiatives in building the future world order.

Russia, China and India have great historical experience of dealing with such Western influences and preserving their Asian identity despite all challenges. The fundamentals of strategic triangle seem robust and clear and effort must be made to make it effective. As of today Russia-India-China stand together in their support for evolving a 'just and rational' new international order with democratization of international politics and multipolarization. Also all three have been suffering from transnational and cross-border terrorism and have not been comfortable with unipolar world led by the US. The trilateral cooperation among themselves holds the key of 'triangle' and how these three Asian giants resolve their internal disputes would be the deciding factor in the emergence of 'Eurasian triangle'.

CONCLUSION

With about two fifth of the world population and a substantial proportion of its resources and power, Russia and China collectively are undoubtedly the two major non-western powers of the international system. One way or the other, they aspire, in the short or middle term of global power status. Russia, in particular, wishes to regain the role the erstwhile Soviet Union once enjoyed, but China is also showing signs of new ambitions, based on her history, population and military power, and also on her emergence, actual and potential, as an important international economic actor.

China which is already the largest power in Asia is gradually emerging as a major global power and could acquire formidable economic and military capability in the first few decades of the 21st century. In Jiang Zhemín's report to the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on November 19, 2002, it was noted that in overall quantitative economic indices China holds sixth place in the world. It accounts for 12.1% of the world's GDP. In 2001 China's GDP amounted to 9593.3 billion Yuan. The period prior to the congress was a period in which "China's influence in the world has grown notably, and the cohesion of the nation has increased remarkably". As for Russia, it is also on the road to recovery overcoming the negative consequences of the 1998 economic crisis. In 2001 its GDP rose by 5% and in the first six months of 2002 by about 4%. In 2001, Russia's share of the world GDP amounted 2.6%.

On the military side, the Chinese have, in recent years stressed the need for 'comprehensive national strength, in determining their country's role in international affairs. China's, military expenditure has been increasing at an annual rate of 10% in real term since 1995; more interesting perhaps, is the fact that this is still not a heavy burden, because of China's strong economic growth.

China has embarked on an extensive modernization effort which aims exclusively at "resisting aggression, curbing armed subversion and defending state sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and security". By strengthening its military China could be in an advantageous position in settling its dispute with Taiwan and over the Spratley's islands in favourable terms. Hence the emphasis on bolstering naval and air forces, which seems from a desire to project power well away from China's shores. There is little doubt also that a more powerful China would seek to enhance its status on a global scale, both as a matter of prestige and to play a larger role in the settlement of major issues on a worldwide basis.

Both Russia and China have greater common ground to chalk out their strategy to deal with outside world compared to the issues on which they are at odds. The Russo-Chinese link was built on a number of shared concerns; the struggle against unipolar hegemonism; humanitarian interventionism; Islamic secessionism, opposition to NATO enlargement and intervention in others domestic matters; some mutual acceptance of Russia's hegemony as a guarantor of order in Eurasia; opposition to NMD and TMD; opposition to US withdrawal from ABM Treaty of 1971; restructuring and strengthening the UNO etc.

The Russian and Chinese economies are among the ten fastest growing economies in the world. Both have vast potential to become the economic superpower. Russia is near self dependent in oil and natural resources and China has abundant cheap labour and edge in manufactured goods and both countries can benefit from each other's expertise.

As far as emerging triangle between Russia-China-India is concerned, it is evolving slowly, cautiously but steadily. The meeting of June 2, 2005 the three foreign minister of Russia, India, China, first ever stand-alone meeting at

port city of Vladivostok in Russia's Far East, shows that all three countries has progressed substantially on this issue.

All the three countries are faced with the task of developing their economy. Except for three small islands, China has demarcated its borders with Russia. Russia and China have also concluded agreements on strengthening military relations and mutual reduction of military forces in border areas to ensure peace and stability. Though the question of the Indo-China boundary is still unresolved, the leaders of the two countries have maintained that boundary issue should be solved through peaceful negotiations and consultations and not with force or threat of using force.

In his latest visit on July 1, 2005 to Moscow, Chinese president Hu Jintao signed a declaration on the *New World Order in the 21st Century* with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin. Both agreed that "All countries of the world must strictly abide by the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non aggression, non-interference in internal affairs of each other, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. Both leader's stated that "the task facing mankind can be achieved only under a just and rational world order based on the universally accepted principles and norms of international law". Attacking on the USA's (though without mentioning) "double standards" in the war against terror and the practice of linking terrorism to 'particular countries, nationalities and religions. Putin-Hu declaration says that the international community should "completely renounce the mentality of confrontation and alliance".

The Putin-Hu declaration on the 'New World Order in the 21st century' has further deepened the Russo-China relations on the international issues. On the issue of proliferation both countries share the view that the issue of proliferation of WMD's should be resolved through political, diplomatic and

international cooperation within the framework of international law. In the July 2005 meeting of SCO at Astana, Kazakhstan, India was invited as the guest member and finally joined the grouping as an observer at the end of the Summit on July 6, 2005.

The declaration of 'New World Order in 21st century confirms that relations between two headed Eagle and the Dragon has reached on its peak. Both countries have gone very far and deep in their defence transactions and no longer count each other as enemies. Their defence personnel, scientists, students are getting training in each other's established institutions. Russia is building up nuclear reactors in China and has offered partnership in the state owned space agency GLONASS which itself indicates the comfort level in their ever flourishing bilateral relations.

One of the prime reasons of developing close ties between Russia and China is the US factor, the common cause of concern for the both countries. USA's continuous military and economic support to Taiwan and its huge military presence poses grave threat to the Chinese sovereignty. The USA is also agreed to deploy TMD technology to Taiwan, which may virtually neutralize the Chinese missile capabilities and would disturb the strategic balance in the region.

Russia is consistently under immense pressure from the western human rights groups and media on the issue of human rights violations in the Chechen war. These groups had virtually shut their eyes on the Moscow Theatre tragedy and Beslan school crisis in which hundreds of Russian people lost their lives, committed by the terrorists fighting with the Russian forces in Chechnya. It shows as if these human rights groups and media people are acting at the behest of their respective governments to settle their political goals with Moscow. When the issue of human rights violation comes in US occupied Iraq,

Afghanistan, human rights and media group keeps mum. Throughout the continuing war in Iraq and Afghanistan these groups supported USA's point of view.

To neutralize this double standard on terrorism both Russia and China call for the implementation of UN Charter and international laws globally without any fear or favour. The most frequent violator of UN Charter and international laws, Israel always go unpunished due to overt and covert support from USA but a single incidence of Tianmen Square in China made her virtually untouchable in the international politics.

There is near consensus between on Moscow and Beijing on all international issues including war on terror and restructuring of the UNO. Despite their close relations there are certain problem areas which needs to be addressed such as extensive Chinese migration to Russian Far East; Russia's own security concerns; potential clash of interests in Central Asia; security management in Korean Peninsula; cultural divide; mistrust about each other intensions etc.

The trade relations between the two countries are not satisfactory or commensurate with their vast potentials. Their trade mainly consists of defence equipments from Russia, which needs to be diversified in other potential sectors such as agriculture, service, manufacturing of consumer goods etc.

To turn the Primakovian dream of India-Russia-China triangle into reality, it mainly depends that how these three powers conducts their relations individually with each other. Among all, India is the weakest link in the chain. India does not want to send any wrong signal to the West that she is joining a bloc politics which is in fact anti-West. The future of triangle also depends how India-China solve their border disputes and how they make a sound and

mutually agreeable solution to some irritant factors in their relation Pakistan, Aksai Chin, approval to MacMohan line, Myanmar issue, Tibet issue etc.

The confidence level in the Indo-China relations is far less than that the Russo-China relations. To some extent China does accept the big brother role of Russia in international politics in general and in former Soviet republics in particular. But China treats India as a competitor in Asia to retain its leadership and that is why China is yet to decide candidature of India in the UNSC. Both countries have, however, agreed to solve their bilateral relations peacefully on the basis of *panchasheel* agreement and not using or threatening to use force. Recently, China has given final approval to the map that considers Sikkim as the part of India and during the then Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to China, India officially declared Tibet as 'Autonomous Region' of China. This shows the growing confidence level on controversial issues between two on the basis of mutually acceptable formula.

Russo-China relations are smoothly progressing in the post-cold war era where there is no ideological constraint remained and it is national interest which is torch bearer in their individual relations. Both have a lot to share for the larger benefit to their countrymen and few things to bother about contentious issues. For the emerging triangle Russia-India-China need to develop their economies to the commanding heights and due to their geographical size and human and natural resources they simply can not be ignored by any international power. Due of their economic strength they are bound to influence the global politics in the favour of Asia. At time when USA's dictates are running supreme, Russia-India-China should unite, they have nothing to loose but 'fear psychosis' the gain will be immense where Asia will have its say in the world politics.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Joint Communiqué between Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin, *News from Russia*, vol.2, no.51, December 17, 1999, pp.14-17.

Joint Declaration by Vladimir Putin and Jiang Zemin "Russia-China ready to Combat Terrorism together", *News from Russia*, vol.5, no.49, December 6, 2002, pp.17-20.

NATO hit on Chinese Embassy clouds Kosovo picture, *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, vol.51, no.19, June 8, 1999, pp.12-14.

Russia Accepts One China Policy on Taiwan by Igor Ivanov, *News from Russia*, vol.2, no.30, July 23, 1999, pp.15-16.

Vladimir Putin and Jiang Zemin Emphasize and to adhere to ABM Treaty, *News from Russia*, vol.3, no.27, December 07, 2000, p.17.

Secondary Sources

Books

Amin Saikal and William Maley (eds.), *Russia in Search of its Future*, (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1995).

Anderson Jennifer, *The Limits of Sino-Russian Partnership* (London, IISS, 1999).

Aron, Leon and Kenneth Jonser (eds.), *The Emergence of Russian Foreign Policy* (Washington D.C.; US Institute of Peace, 1994).

Bajpai, Kanti and Mattoo, A (eds.), *Securing India: Strategic Thought and Practice* (New Delhi; Manohar, 1996).

- Bakshi, Jyotsna, *Russia-China Relations: Relevance for India* (New Delhi; Shipra, IDSA, 2004).
- Banerji, A.K., and Bhattacharya P. (eds.), *Peoples Republic of China at Fifty: Politics Economy and Foreign Relations* (New Delhi; Lancer, 2001).
- Bialer, Seweryn (ed.), *The Soviet Paradox: External Expansion, Internal Decline* (London; I.B. Tauris, 1986).
- Black, J.L., *Vladimir Putin and New World Order: Looking East, Looking West?* (New York; Rowman and Little field Publication, 2004).
- Boquerat, G. and Grare, Frederic, *India-China, Russia Intricacies of an Asian Triangle* (New Delhi; India Research Press, 2004).
- Bowker, Mike (ed.), *Russian Foreign Policy and The End of Cold War* (Brookfield; Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd., 1997).
- Chaufrin, Gennady, *Russia and Asia: An Emerging Security Agenda* (OUP; Sipri, 1999).
- Christoph, Bluth (ed.), *The Nuclear Challenge: US-Russian Strategic Relations After the Cold War* (Hants; Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2000).
- Crankshaw, E. (ed.), *The New Cold War, Moscow vs., Peking* (Harmondsworth; Penguin, 1963).
- Davisha K. and Parrot B. (eds.), *Russia and New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1994).
- Dawish, Adid and Davisha, Karen (eds.), *The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (New York; M.C. Sharpe, 1995).
- Donaldson R.H. and Noguee J.L. (eds.), *The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests* (New York ;M.E. Sharpe 1998).

- Garnett, W.S., *Limited Partnership: Russia China Relations in a Changing Asia* (Washington; Russian and Eurasian Program Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998).
- Gill, G. and Slider, D. (eds.), *The Politics of Transition: Shaping a Post-Soviet Future* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1993).
- Golsman M.I. (ed.), *What Went Wrong with Perestroika* (New York; W.W. Norton, 1992).
- Gorbachev, Mikhail (ed.), *Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World* (London; Collins, 1987).
- Gorodetsky Gabriel, *Soviet Foreign Policy 1971-1991: A Perspective* (London, Frank Cass; 1994).
- Grachev, Andrei S., (ed.), *Final Days: The Inside Story of Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Boulder; Westview Press, 1995).
- Grare, Frederic and Mattoo, Amitabh (eds.), *India and ASEAN: The Politics of India's Look East Policy* (New Delhi; Manohar, 2001).
- Harris, Stuart and Klintworth, Garry (eds.), *China as a Great Power: Myths, Realities and Challenges in Asia-Pacific Region*, (Melbourne; Longman 1995).
- Huntington, S.P. (ed.), *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman; University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
- Ivanov, Igor S, *The New Russian Diplomacy* (Washington D.C; The Nixon Centre and Brookings Institution Press, 2002).
- Kanet Roger E, and Vrozhemiekin Alexander, *Foreign Policy of Russian Federation* (London; Macmillan, 1997).

- Kanet, R.E. and Kozemiakin, A.V. (eds.), *The Foreign Policy of Russian Federation* (London; Macmillan, 1997).
- Kim, S.S., *China and the World Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era* (San Francisco; Westview Press, 1994).
- Laszek Buszynski (ed.), *Russian and Asia-Pacific Region*, (Banberra; Australian National University Press, 1992).
- Lederer, Ivo (eds.), *Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Perspective* (New Haven; Yale University, 1962).
- Leo, Cooper, *Russia and One World: New States of Play one International Stage* (London; Macmillan, 1999).
- Lijun, Sheng, *China's Dilemma: The Taiwan Issue* (London/New York; I.B. Tauris, 2001).
- Lo, Bobo, *Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking* (New York; Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).
- Maleome, Neil (ed.), *Russia and Europe: An End to Confrontation?* (London; Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994).
- Malik Hafeez (ed.), *Role of US, Russia and China in the World Order* (London; Macmillan, 1997).
- Mathews M. (ed.), *Poverty in the Soviet Union*, (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1986).
- Miller, John (ed.), *Mikhail Gorbachev and End of Soviet Power* (London; Macmillan, 1993).
- Mosbahi, Mohiaddin (ed), *Russia and Third World in Post Soviet Era* (Gainesville; University of Florida Press, 1994).

- Nathan, A.J. and Ross R.S. (eds.), *The Great Wall and The Empty Fortress; China's Search for Identity* (New York; W.W. Norton, 1997).
- Rahr Alexander, *Russia and Europe: An End of Confrontation?* (London; The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994).
- Rajan, M.S., *India in World Affairs 1954-1956* (Bombay; Asia Publishing House, 1964).
- Rasgotra M. (ed.), *India's Relation with the Russia and China: A New Phase* (New Delhi; Gyan Publication, 1998).
- Rasgotra M. and Chopra V.D., *India's Relation with Russia and China: A New Phrase* (New Delhi; Gyan Publication, 1997).
- Rasgotra, M. and Chopra V.D. (eds.), *India's Relation with Russia and China*, (New Delhi; Gyan Publishing House, 1997).
- Ray, J.K. (ed.), *Asia Annual 2000* (Delhi; Shipra, 2000).
- Roger E. Kanet (ed.), *Soviet Foreign Policy in Transition* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1992).
- Sakwa Richard (ed.), *Gorbachev and His Reforms 1989-90* (New York; Philip Allan, 1990).
- Sherarman Peter (ed.), *Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990*, (San Francisco; Westview Press, 1995).
- Solzhenitsyn, A. (ed.), *Rebuilding Russia* (London; March 1991).
- Ted Apopf (ed.), *Understanding of Russian Foreign Policy* (Pennsylvania; Pennsylvania State University, 1999).
- Voskressenski, A.D. (ed.), *Russia and China: A Theory of Inter-State Relations* (London; Routledge Curzon, 2003).

- Webber, Mark, *The International Politics of Russia and the Successor States* (Manchester; Manchester University Press, 1996).
- White, S. (ed.), *After Gorbachev* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1993).
- Wohlforth, W. (ed.), *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War* (Ithaca & New York; Cornell University Press, 1993).
- Yeltsin, Boris (ed.), *The view From Kremlin* (London; Harper Collins, 1994).

Articles

- Adomeit, Hannes, "Russia as Great Power in World Affairs: Images and Reality" *International Affairs* (Moscow) vol.71, no.1, January 1995, pp. 35-68.
- Ahmed, A.K.N., "Economic Liberalisation in China and Russia: Contrasting Experience" *Mainstream*, vol.37, no.42, October 1999, pp.6-9.
- Akana Tsune, "Russia and Asia in 1995: Bold Objective and Limited Means", *Asian Survey* (London) vol.36, no.1, January 1996, pp.100-108.
- Anderson, Jennifer, "Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership", *Adelphi Paper*, 315(London), 1997, pp.13-94.
- Bakshi, Jyotsna, "Post Cold War Sino-Russian Relations: An Indian Perspective" *Strategic Analysis*, vol.26, no.1, Jan-March 2002, pp.80-117.
- Basu Baidya Bikas, "Russian National Security Thinking", *Strategic Analysis*, vol.24, no.7, pp.1285-1305.
- Batra, R.K. and Khetan, A., "Russia-India- China: Energy Cooperation" *China Report*, vol.40, no.2, April-June 2004, pp.169-84.
- Bazhanov, J.P., "Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy in the 1990s", *Review of International Affairs*, (Belgrade) 49(1063-64), 1998, pp.15-18.

- Bszyuski, Leszek, "Russia and West: Towards renewed Geopolitical Rivalry?" *Survival*, vol.37, no.3, Autumn 1995,pp.104-25.
- Buszyuski L, "Russia and Asia Pacific Region" *Pacific Affairs*,vol.65, no.4, Winter 1992-93,pp.486-509.
- Chellany Brahma, "New Delhi's Dilemma" *Washington Quarterly* (Washington DC), vol.23, no.5, Summer 2000,pp.147-149.
- Cheng, J.Y.S., "Challenges to China's Russian Policy in Early 21st Century", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, vol.34, no.4, 2004,pp.480-502.
- Chikahito Harada, "Russia and North East Asia", *Adelphi Paper*, 310(London), 1997,pp.11-81.
- Christofferson Gaye, "Nesting the Sino-Russian Border and the Tumen Project in the Asia Pacific: Heilongjiang's Regional Relations", *Asian Perspective*, v.20, no.2, Fall-Winter 1996,pp.265-99.
- Cirincione, J, "The Asian Nuclear Chain" *Foreign Policy* vol.118, Spring 2000, pp.120-136.
- Crocker, C.A., "Engaging Failing States" *Foreign Affairs*, vol.82, no.5, Sept-Oct.2003,pp.32-44.
- David Kerr, "Problems in Sino-Russian Economic Relations", *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol.50, no.7, 1998,pp.1133-1156.
- David Shambaugh, "Sino-American Strategic Relations: From Partners to Competitors" *Survival*, vol.42, no.1, Spring 2000,pp.97-115.
- Denda, Milorad, "Partnership on Long Term Basis", *Review of International Affairs*, vol.51, no.1096, August 20-00, pp.21-23.
- Deve Murarka, "Russia and China: A Hollow Alliance", *Economic and Political Weekly*, (Bombay), Aug.2, 1997, pp.1955-1958.

- Frank Peter, "Russian Decides" *World Today*, vol.51, no.7, July 1995, pp.139-42.
- Frische, Klaus, "Russia Refocuses on China" *Aussen Politik*, vol.46, no.4, 1995, pp.376-83.
- Gerald Segal, "China and Disintegration of the Soviet Union", *Asian Survey* (Berkeley), vol. XXXII, no.9, Sept.1992, pp.848-868.
- Gidadhubli, R.G., "Russia: Resolving Financial Crisis", *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol.33, no.22, July 11-17,1998.
- Gilbert Rozman, "Sino-Russian Relation in the 1990s: A Balance Sheet", *Post Soviet Affairs*, (Columbia), vol.14, no.2, 1998,pp.93-113.
- Glacer C.L, and Fetter S, "NMD and Future of US Nuclear Weapons Policy" *International Security* (Cambridge), vol.26, no.1, Summer 2001,pp.71-74.
- Glumicic, Dragan, "Foreign Policy Initiatives of the Russian Federation" *Review of International Affairs*, vol.51, no.1096, August 2000, pp.18-20.
- Grover, V.K., "Strategic Triangle" *India Quarterly*, vol.58, no.1, Jan-March 2002,pp. 21-26.
- Gu Zuewu, "China's Policy Towards Russia", *Aussen Politik* , (Hamburg, Germany),vol.44, no.3, 1993, pp.288-97.
- Hanlou, O.M., "Why China can not Conquer Taiwan" *International Security*, vol.25, no.2, Fall 2000, pp.51-86.
- Igor Ivanov, "The Missile Defense Mistake Undermining Strategic Stability and the ABM Treaty", *Foreign Affairs* (New York) vol. 79, no.5, Sept-Oct. 2000, pp.15-20.
- Igor Rogachev, "Russia-China: The Principles and Parameters of Partnership", *Far Eastern Affairs*, (Tokyo), vol.3, 1997,p.25.

- Jiali Ma, "Strengthening the Role of UNO Cooperation of India-China and Russia in UN" *China Report*, vol.39, no.3, July-Sept. 2003,pp.385-92.
- Jullie Rahm, "Russia-India-China: A New Strategic Triangle for a New Cold War?" *Parameters* (Washington DC), vol.39, no4., Winter 2001-02, pp.94-98.
- Kausik, Devendra, "Triangle for Peace and Prosperity" *World Focus*, vol.24, no.9, Sept.2003, pp.44-48.
- Kozyrev, "Offers Draft Foreign Policy Guidelines", *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, (Ohio) vol.44, no.48, 1992,pp.14-17.
- Kuijper, Hans, "Proposal to Solve Taiwan Problem" *China Report*, vol.40, no.2, April-June 2004,pp.189-208.
- Li Jingjie, "Pillars of the Sino-Russian Partnership" *Orbis*, vol.44, no.4, Fall 2000, pp.527-539.
- Lo, Bobo, "Long Sunset of Strategic Partnership: Russia's Evolving China Policy", *International Affairs*, vol.80, no.2, March 2004, pp.295-309.
- Lounev, S.I., "Russia-India: Political Cooperation in the Sphere of Global, Regional and Bilateral Relations" *China Report*, vol.38, no.1, Jan-March 2002,pp.109-11.
- Lukin Alexander, "Image of China in Russian Border Regions" *Asian Survey* (Berkeley), vol.38, no.9, Spet.1998,pp.821-35.
- Mahapatra, Chintamani, "India-China and Russia: Strategic Triangle is Possible", *Strategic Analysis*, vol.22, no.11, Feb 1999, pp.1113-96.
- Malcolm Neil, "New Russian Foreign Policy", *World Today*, (London) vol. 50, no.2 Feb. 1994, pp.29-32.

- Mehrotra, O.N., "Sino-Russian Relations in the Current Period" *World Focus*, vol.22 no.4, April 2001, pp.9-11,17.
- Mehrotra, O.N., "Sino-Russian Strategic Ties" *World Focus*, vol.20, no.2, February 2000, pp.22-23.
- Mikheev, Vasily V, "Russian-Chinese Strategic Cooperation: The Migration problem in Perspective", *BIISS Journal*, vol.20, no.3, July 1999, pp.374-406.
- Myasnikov, V.S., "Russia-India-China: Cooperation in 21st Century", *China Report*, vol.39, no.3, July-Sept. 2003, pp.34-60.
- Myasnikov, Vladimir, "Strategic Interaction between Russia and China, *China Report*, vol.38, no.1, Jan-March 2002, pp.43-55.
- Philip, E.C. and Rhinelander J.B., "NMD and ABM Treaty" *World Policy Journal*, (New York) vol.18, no.3, Fall 2001, pp.12-18.
- Raja Mohan, "China-Russia sign 14 Accords", *World Focus*, (New Delhi), vol.17, no.4, April 1996, p.14.
- Rajan Menon, "The Strategic Convergence Between Russia and China" *Survival*, (London) vol.39, no.2, Summer 1997, pp.101-125.
- Ranganathan, C.V., "Towards an Understanding of the Bases of Cooperation Between Russia-India-China", *China Report*, vol.38, no.1, Jan-March 2002, pp.43-55.
- Rappal, M.V., "China Joins the Great Game" *World Focus*, vol.23, no.6, June 2002, pp.14-16.
- Ritu Mathur, "TMD in the Asia Pacific: A View From China", *Strategic Analysis*, (New Delhi), vol.XXIV, no.8, November 2000, pp.1455-1466.

- Rozman, Gilbert, "New Sino-Russian American Triangle" *Orbis*, vol.44, no.4, Fall 2000, pp.541-56.
- Rozman, Gilbert, "Sino-Russian Relations in 1990s: A Balance Sheet" *Post Soviet Affairs* , vol.14, no.2, April-June 1998, pp.3-113.
- Ruishong, Chang, "Areas of Possible Political Cooperation Between China, Russia and India in the New Century", *China Report*, vol.38, no.1, Jan-March 2002, pp.87-94.
- Singh Swaran, "India-China-Russia" A Strategic Triangle ?" *World Focus*, vol.24, no.9, Sept.2003, pp.9-11.
- Singh Swaran, "Jiang-Yeltsin Summit", *Strategic Analysis*, vol.21, no.10, January 1998, pp.1583-87.
- Singh Swaran, "Russia-China-India: Time to Revive the Strategic Triangle Concept", *Mainstream*, vol.37, no.42, October 1999, pp.10-12.
- Singh, Rai, "Chinese Foreign Policy Directions in Regard to Russia" *India Quarterly*, vol. 57, no.1, Jan-March 2001, pp.161-170.
- Singh, Swaran, "India-China-Russia: A Strategic Triangle?" *World Focus*, vol.24, no.1, January 2003, pp.15-17.
- Slank, Stephen, "Russia's Real drive to the South" *Orbis*, vol.39, no.3, Summer 1995.
- Stobdan, P. "Shanghai Treaty: Readjusting the Frontiers", *Strategic Analysis*, vol.19, no.3, June 1996, pp.513-20.
- Tan Chung, "Russo-Sino-Indian Strategic Triangle: Signal missed in India" *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol.34, no.1-2, January 1999, pp.12-13.

- Titarenko, Michail L, "Russia and China: Partners for Peace" *World Affairs*, vol.5, no.4, Oct-Dec. 2001, pp.38-45.
- Wang Lijiu, "New Starting Point, New Challenges: Sino-Russian Relations in New Century", *Strategic Digest*, Nov.2000, pp.1557-1563.
- Wishvick, E, "Russia and China : Brothers Again?" *Asian Survey*, vol.41, no.5, Sept-Oct. 2001, pp.797-821.
- Yakovlev, A.G., "Triangle of Russia-China India: Prospects and Contrast" *China Report*, vol.38, no.1, Jan-March 2002, pp.101-113.
- Yu Bin, "Sino-Russian Military Relations: Implications for Asia-Pacific Security" *Asian Survey*, (Berkeley), vol.33, no.3, March 1993, pp.302-16.
- Zhammian, T.L., "Geopolitical Changes in Central Asia and Position of Russia, China and India", *China Report*, vol.39, no.3, July-Sept.2003, pp.360-363.
- Zhu, Lisheng, "Problem of the Intelligentsia and Radicalism in Higher Education under Stalin and Mao" *Europe Asia Studies*, vol.3, no.2, December 2000, pp.1489-1513.

Journals and Magazines

Adelphi Paper (London)

Alternatives (USA)

Asian Affairs (London)

Asian Survey (Berkeley)

BISS Journal (Dhaka)

Cooperation and Conflict (Norwich, UK)

Economic and Political Weekly (Mumbai)
Foreign Affairs (New York)
Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.)
Frontline (Chennai)
India Quarterly (New Delhi).
India Review (Philadelphia)
International Affairs (London)
International Security (Harvard)
International Studies (New Delhi)
International Studies Perspectives (Portland, USA)
International Studies Quarterly (Malden, USA)
International Studies Review (Malden, USA).
Journal of International Studies (London).
Journal of Peace Studies (New Delhi)
Modern Asian Studies (Cambridge)
Orbis (Pergnamon)
Pacific Affairs (Columbia)
Post Soviet Affairs (Florida, USA)
South Asian Politics (New Delhi)
Strategic Analysis (New Delhi)
Strategic Digest (New Delhi)

Strategies Studies (Oxfordshire, UK)

Survival (London)

The Review of International Affairs (Oxfordshire, U.K.)

The Round Table (Canterbury, UK)

Third World Quarterly (Hants, USA)

World Affairs (New Delhi)

World Today (London)

News Papers

Indian Express (New Delhi)

Pravda (English from internet (Moscow).

The Hindu (Chennai)

The Pioneer (New Delhi)

The Statesman (Calcutta)

The Telegraph (Calcutta)

The Times of India (New Delhi)

Internet Sources

www.ics.si.edu

www.prophecyandcurrentevents.com/thglory

www.idsa-india.org

www.rediff.com/news/2000/eug/22sepc.htm

www.stimson.org/southasia

www.csis.org/pacfor/issues/4-01.html

www.uscc.gov/

www.ess.uci.edu/~oliver/silk.html.

www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/3q2000.asp.

www.wps.ru/digest/defence.html.

www.cnn.com/f2000/ASIAa1/10/ii/centralasia.russia.ap/index/html.

www.referl.org/nca/features/2001/05/09052001123432.asp.html.

www.english.pravda.ru/world/2002/12/Q2/40258.html.

www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/003_Q-China-rus.html.

www.pfejournal@lava.net

www.cns.miis.edu.

www.fmprcgov.cn/english

www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0300QChina.rus.

www.muzi.com

www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0101/QChina-rus.html.

www.russiajournal.com/news/index.shtml#n12+2

www.latelinenews.com/11/english/1093662.shtml.

www.atinues.con/c-asia/AC11_Ag03.html.

www.ce.cei.gov/in/engew/new_e2/e41dog58.html.

www.english.pravda.ru/diplomatic/2001/04/30/4486.html.

[www.russiajournal.com/news/index/shtml#8445? nd=8445.](http://www.russiajournal.com/news/index/shtml#8445?nd=8445)

www.latelinemuzi.net/11/english/1083451.shtml

[www.taiwansecurity.org/News/ST-110400html.](http://www.taiwansecurity.org/News/ST-110400html)

