

THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A SECURITY ACTOR: FROM
ST. MALO TO LISBON TREATY

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DECLARATION


I declare that the dissertation entitled “**The European Union as a Security Actor: From St. Malo to Lisbon Treaty**”, submitted by me, in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any degree of this University or any other University to the best of my knowledge.

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Dedicated to

Mummy, Papa, Sanjeev bhaiya and Ashish

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ABBREVIATIONS

AMM	Aceh Monitoring Mission
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
BG	Battle Group
CDP	Capability Development Plan
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CHQ	Component Head Quarter
COPPS	Coordination Office for Palestine Police Support
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	European Armament Cooperation
EACC	European Airlift Coordination Centre
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDC	European Defence Community
EDRT	European Defence Research and Technology
EDTIB	European Defence Technology and Industrial Base
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community

EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUBG	European Union Battle Group
EUFOR	European Union Force
EUGF	European Union Gendarmerie Force
EUISS	European Union Institute of Security Studies
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EUPM	European Union Police Mission
EUPOL	EU Police
FASP	Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
FHQ	Force Head Quarter
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
HG	Headline Goal
HR	High Representative
OHQ	Operation Head Quarter
OSCE	Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PSC	Political and Security Cooperation
PSCoop	Permanent Structured Cooperation
RRF	Rapid Reaction Force

R&T	Research and Technology
SAARC	South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation
TEU	Treaty of European Union
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nation
UNSC	United Nation Security Council
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU	West European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Preface

This study is about the European Union as a security actor. It has been an economic and political actor since its formation in 1952 as European Coal and Steel Community. The Geopolitical changes at the end of Cold War came with new paradigm shifts in Europe. Post-Cold War situation created a zone of turmoil and instability in the European continent. The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) provided the Common Foreign and Security Policy and it was first time after the failure of European Defence Cooperation (1954) that the Union proceed to provide for provisions of security in all ways. The Treaty of St. Malo (1998) was the first major step in which the European Union decided to decrease the degree of dependency over NATO and establish its own credible force for autonomous action. Post 9/11 events made situations more complex and the European Union gradually developed itself as a security actor to tackle threats. The Treaty of Lisbon (2009) provided a new profile to the European Union and it strengthened the value of Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Chapter One of this study focuses on nature and identity of the European Union as well as construction of actorness. Various approaches are used in this chapter to define actor and actorness. Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler in their work 'The European Union as a Global Actor' (2006) define an actor as an entity that is capable of formulating purposes and making decisions and engaging in some form of action. This chapter includes various concepts such as security, strategic culture and civil-military capability.

Chapter Two elaborates on the development of European Security and Defence Policy since 1999 to 2009. It shows the gradual development of the European Union as a security actor by conducting various civil-military operations. Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane in their work 'European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009)' focus on the development of European Security and Defence Policy, civil-military operations, challenges and resources of ESDP. Chapter Three of this study is related to the security architecture of the European Union. This includes the Political and Security Committee, the European Union Military Committee, the European Union Military Staff and the European Union Battle Group. This study covers the role of the various committees and groups that help the European Union to become a security actor.

Chapter Four is related to the evolution of the European Union as a security actor. It also focuses that how the European Security Strategy 2003 and strategic culture help the Union to become as a security actor. Javier Solana in his draft 'European Security Strategy-2003' focuses on the importance of strategic objectives, policy implications and strategic culture. March and Olsen emphasised on political will power and capability, resources, organising capacity, competencies and knowledge in their work 'Democratic Governance' (1995). Sven Biscop focuses on the importance of strategy and mentions why strategy is important for the European Union to become a security actor in his work 'The European Security Strategy: A Global Agenda for Positive Power' (2005).

Chapter Five of this study presents the findings of this research. It includes critical evaluation and new findings of this study. This research is important and relevant in current scenario because whole world is facing diverse and complex security threats and in this situation the European Union emerged as an actor to counter these threats. It has successfully managed various civil-military operations not only in Europe but also outside the continent. No single country is able to tackle all threats simultaneously but the Union has enhanced the range of partnerships world wide for effective action against threats. It gradually developed its quality of actorness and it is a different actor in international politics that has adopted a preventive approach and is a strong supporter of multilateralism. It has a global and strategic vision of a safer world where democracy and rule of law are ensured. It has strong faith in United Nation and its values. It is a unique beast with a hybrid nature because it has developed both civil and military capabilities. It first created the example of establishing itself as a zone of peace with greater integration then it moved towards its neighbours for creating a 'ring of friends'. Its strategic culture is unique and different which is based on normative foundations. Its various treaties show that it has successfully adapted to the changing geopolitical environment and developed mechanisms to respond to threats. This research among the main issues examines the nature of the European Union as a security actor. It also examines the importance of European Security and Defence Policy, security architecture, strategy and strategic culture of the European Union such that this study can justify the European Union as a security actor.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“European history has been plausibly summed up as preparing for war, waging war or recovering from war” (Minogue 2000: 52). Modern European history has been characterised by a series of major wars. It includes the ‘Thirty Years War’, ‘Seven Years War’, ‘Napoleonic War’, ‘First and Second World War’ and ‘Cold War’. In the 19th and 20th century Europe has been a playground of nationalism and war. After the end of the Second World War, European leaders came with a peace process for stability and integrity in Europe. After 1952, it converted itself as a zone of peace and stability by the process of economic integration. The 21st century has come with the new security challenges and 9/11 brought multidimensional issues in security. Not only Europe but whole world is facing diverse security challenges like terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), regional conflict, state failure and organised crime.

According to the European Security Strategy (ESS) 2003, No single country has the capability to tackle today’s complex problems on its own. Security is a precondition of development. Today Europe is facing threats which are more diverse, less predictable and less visible. Now, the time has come for the European Union (EU) that it should enhance cooperation with its partners in constructive way and convert itself as a security actor to make Europe safer.

The EU is in a continuous process of evolution. It took a half century to make it as a Union from European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). During this period the European Community established itself as an economic and political actor. With the end of the Cold War, European peace was broken and Balkan crisis resulted in the return of war in Europe. This crisis changed the EU and Europe required its own security system due to the complex situation in its surroundings. This leads to the EU through a process of transforming itself as a security actor.

Security is not a new issue for the EU. It was 1950 when for the first time the European Defence Community (EDC) was proposed but it failed in 1954 due to lack

of political support. In 1970 European Political Cooperation (EPC) was initiated. Initially it was thought that it might have a link with military development but it was further developed as a civilian concept. Another achievement was the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) within Maastricht Treaty (1992). CFSP as the second pillar of the EU came with broad objectives such as to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways, to strengthen international security and to preserve peace etc. It shows that the EU was interested in security issues along with economic and political matters. Treaty of St. Malo (1998) came with the idea of development of autonomous military capability of the EU. It was a signal for the world community that the EU was going to form military capability and infrastructure. After 9/11, the EU declared ESS-2003 and clearly identified the threats and it indicated that the EU is ready to tackle any threat with a multilateral approach. Another important event in this series is the Treaty of Lisbon (2009). It is the latest Treaty of the EU and it provided a new look to the EU. It has many provisions but in relation to security, it converted European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

Nature and Identity of the EU as an Actor

Nature and identity of the EU as an actor depends upon its action and involvement in various events and processes at the global level. Here one has to focus on factors that setup nature and identity of the EU. Development of the EU as a security actor is an incremental and a gradual process. According to the existentialist school of philosophy 'existence precedes essence' and in foreign policy one might say that 'identity precedes interest' (Cooper 2004 in Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 37). The EU is very diverse in cultural and racial aspect. Cultural diversities are directly related to the identity and values. Every culture has its own norms and values so it makes its own identity. The EU is a grouping of 27 member states and each state has their own culture and identity, and so they are different to each other but when members come at the EU level then these states share their culture and ideas. It creates shared identity and value of the EU.

Identity is attained in the course of social interaction, through encounters with other actors and in the context of the external environment of institutions and events which enables and constrain EU action and which we have referred to as 'opportunity'.

Collective identity is constituted by shared understanding, both within the EU and among third parties, about the EU is, in terms of its character and its values, and what it should or should not do, in term of external policies and actions. Identity is, thus, an important aspect of the Union's international presence (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 38).

Value plays important role for the EU in making its identity. According to article 6(1) of Treaty of European Union (TEU), the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. The EU is very much committed for its principles and no country can become member of the EU without fulfilling these conditions. So it makes EU different in international platform.

Time and space are also important in articulating the identity of the EU. It has been an economic and political actor. It started with ECSC and economic interest behind it was major agenda. It proved as a base for economic integration of the EU. It was solidified with the formation of European Economic Community (EEC) that started with Treaty of Rome (1957). EPC was introduced in 1970 that strengthen the integration of the European Community. These two processes strengthened the identity of EU as economic and political actor.

The EU has been a civilian power and it reflects its values in civilian ends and means in its action. The European Community will only make the most of its opportunities if it remains true to its inner characteristics. They are primarily: civilian ends and means and a built in sense of collective action, which in turn express social values of equality, justice and tolerance (Duchêne 1972 in Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 41). Here the notion of civilian power implies both the use of civil means to support policy objectives and the external civilising influence of the community. It is not limited here but with the passes of time the EU converted itself as a security actor with military means.

As a security actor Union's identity is in process. That means the making of EU identity is not complete because Union is still evolving. The EU is a strong promoter of peace and value based community. So under any civil-military operation it follows the principle of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and rule of law.

Cohesiveness of the EU as an actor is its important identity. It means the degree of integration within its various processes makes it an emerging actor.

Attribute of an actor is essential part of its nature. So, an actor must know about rules of engagement, response and process of interlocking. Response includes proactive, active and reactive nature of the actor. Interlocking includes providing; guaranteeing and balancing nature of the actor. Process of the EU security is preventive in nature. It means that negotiation is given priority before any engagement. It uses its force for crisis management, humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping operation in civil matters. But it really uses force in maritime security issues such as various operations in Mediterranean Sea and Gulf of Aden against piracy, illegal migration, trafficking and terrorist activities. The EU Military Operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Concordia) emphasis the EU's first every military capability. Concordia was a credibility test for the EU and its successful conduct paved the way towards more missions in more challenging theatre. The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina tries to highlight the EU role as security actor and making Bosnian police more accountable in sense by setting up, training and monitoring internal control units which investigate police misconduct, professionalizing police training, implementing modern human resource management in Bosnian Police apparatus, investigate organized crime, improvement of police order policing. Its mission EUJUST THEMIS in Georgia, EU mission in Aceh, EU mission in Afghanistan shows its civilian norm.

Interdependence or cooperation is another aspect of its nature. ESS 2003 clearly reads that "No single country is able to tackle today's complex problem on its own" (European Council 2003a: 1). So in this case cooperation is inevitable and the EU for it follows multilateralism and strategic partnership at the global level. It lacks in technology and it depends upon US (United States) for technology as it uses NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) assets for its operation. Developing itself as a security actor, it does not mean that the EU is challenging US or any other country in military aspect. It means to provide protection to democratic norms with shared values.

Now it can be said that actorness of a security actor is a quality and this quality is maintained by its capability. Capability is enhanced by technology and civil-military

capacity. For an actor, strategic culture is necessary for the future aspect of deepening and widening of security. Without cooperation, no security actor can get success. It is clear that still the EU is an emerging security actor and it is not complete in itself. It lacks behind in strategic lift-off capability, technology and various military assets. It depends on NATO for military assets in many cases. Another important issue is credible military infrastructure and related security architecture. Without a proper security architecture the EU can not become a security actor. So it is important for it to develop its own security institution that can command and refuel its civil-military capability.

Ian Manners in 2002 proposed a collective identity for the Union as a normative power. It focuses on ideational impact of the EU's international identity or role after avoiding civilian or military dichotomy. Normative power both encompasses and complements the Union's civilian power as well as fledgling military power through an ideational dimension which provides the ability to shape conception of 'normal' in international relations (Manners 2002: 238-239). He focused upon divisive nationalism, imperialism and war of Europe's past and rejected these for the development of EU's unique identity. Since last fifty years, the EU developed with hybrid polity. He identified five core values such as peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and four subsidiary values social solidarity, anti-discrimination, suitable development and good governance (Manners 2002: 240). These are helpful in shaping the identity of the EU because it applies these norms in its behaviour at international level. It is easily visible when it supports United Nations (UN) and its norms.

Sometimes the EU seems to be very active as a protector of its member states and citizens from external threat. These are threats to prosperity, threats to stability and security and threats to the Union itself. There is a need of both for identification of potential threats and for the development of shared understandings that these threats can most effectively be dealt with through common action at the EU level (Rosamond 2001 in Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 57). Here EU's identity seems to be as exclusive actor and it differentiates non-European with Europeans. It means outsiders are considered as alien and potential threat and the EU is ready to tackle these threats.

These identities however related to economic, political or security actor, are directly related to capabilities and actions. Actions are related to nature of the entity. If piracy is a threat for the EU and it takes military action against it then the EU's nature nearer to military behaviour which shapes its identity.

CONCEPTS

Actor and Actorness

The EU is an emerging security actor. But before that it is an economic and political actor at the global level. It is various activities of the EU that define it as an actor. It is necessary to identify the factors from the basis of an actor and its actorness can be defined.

There are various approaches in international relation that identify and define an actor and actorness. Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler identified realism, behaviouralism, structuralism and social constructivism to define the actor and its actorness. There are two fundamental questions regarding an actor first, why does one recognise an actor? Second, on which basis does one recognise an actor?

Actors are those entities that try to interact or want to play an important role on the international platform with certain norms and values. The term actor is used as a synonym for the unit that constitutes political systems on the largest scale (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 15). It is the role played by the entity that signifies it as an actor. The process of recognising the entity as an actor is important. That means commitments, domestic legislation, priorities, policies and policy instruments play important role for an actor. Threats in international relations were always there and in near future it will be there, so if threat exists and hence to counter it, actors are required (Krahmann 2005: 199).

In international relation realism focuses on the state as an actor, interest fulfilment and survival. The EU is more than an international organisation but less than a state. Military operations of the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Sudan, and operation against sea pirates in Gulf of Aden shows its realistic approach. The use of power by various missions is for providing safe guard to the EU's norms and values

of human rights and protection of minorities. It shows the EU tries to fulfil its interest. This is not possible without using power against threat.

The EU can be identified as being close to a single entity but it is made up of various institutions and agencies. It includes within itself a multilateral and pluralistic approach. That means we cannot ignore other actors within the EU. Policy makers through various institutions empowered its capabilities internally as well as externally. Post-Cold War situation was not favourable for the EU with respect to the Balkan crisis, and its focus shifted regional security also within its neighbourhood. Since 1970s pluralist approaches have been challenging Realism. By identifying a range of significant units, in which non-state actors were not necessarily always subordinated to states, they portrayed an alternative 'mix actor' (Young 1972 in Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 16). The relative inclusiveness of such approaches reflects the condition of world politics at a time when realist state-centric analyses appeared inadequate to conceptualize a world greatly complicated by the emergence of what Keohane and Nye (1977) described as complex interdependence. After 1970, policy makers within the European Community began seeking to enhance the external policy capability and formed EPC. After the end of the Cold War the EU emerged as intergovernmental organisation. Intergovernmental processes are very prominent in decision making and European Commission plays important role in it. The multilayered structure of the EU makes it different from the other actor. So sometimes it is also called as "the new variety of international actor" (Hocking and Smith 1990 in Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 16).

According to the behavioural criteria of actorness, an entity that exhibits a degree of autonomy from its external environment and it is from its internal constituents and which is capable of exercising of their will or purpose. So it can be said that an entity that is capable of formulating purpose and making decisions must be engaged in interest oriented action (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 17). Without autonomy, actorness of the actor is meaningless. Autonomy refers to the ability to perform relevant and regular functions that can affect the inter-state relation. That means the relation between the members of actor and third party depends upon the behaviour of the actor (Cosgrove and Twitchett 1970 in Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 17). Autonomy and capability are complimentary to each other. It shows, how much an actor is self sufficient in its action that signifies its behaviour. Now it can be said that

behaviour of an actor depends upon the autonomy and capability which are drawn from the internal resources of actor.

Actor and actorness can also be defined through structural approach. This approach challenges the realism that it is not state but international system behaves as an actor. According to the Keneth Waltz (1970) structure is defined by the ordering principle of the international system, which is anarchy and the distribution of capabilities across units, which are states. He also mentioned that there is no differentiation of function between different units and it is the structure of the system that shapes all foreign policy choices. If the foreign policy is important here then we can not eliminate the behaviour of the structure of the system. The Cold War situation created uncertainty in Europe. There was a question mark on future of Europe that how could it manage to overcome with that situation. The then European Community had to play an important role to develop specific structure that could cope up with diverse situation of Cold War. The emergence of European Community was permitted because the Cold War bipolar structure served both to diminish the importance of the West European powers and mitigate the condition of anarchy. European Community behaved like an actor to decrease the degree of war during the Cold War period with increasing degree of economic as well as political integration and its actorness was continued till the formation of the EU.

At the end of Cold War, it was expected that Europe will be proved forerunner of peace. But one again Europe was caught in uncertainty and it faced the Balkan crisis. Formation of CFSP and ESDP as a policy provided the EU a constitutional basis. European Community and CFSP as a first and second pillar respectively played important role in foreign policy making. Here it can be said that an entity which forms an effective structure of system to participate in global activities is identified as an actor.

It is EU's global presence of economic as well as political activities that help us in defining it as an economic as well as political actor. At the global level war like situation is not a regular activity but international trade and market economy is part of regular activity of an entity. Every entity wants to become a dominant economic player so that it can regulate the international system. In the Copenhagen criteria of 1993, the EU clearly identifies the free market economy as basic entry criteria. Today

there are many trade blocs that are trying to create free trade agreement. It is very much favourable for those entities that are advance in technology. The emergence of macro-regional economic sphere has been in a part a response to economic globalisation. It has been associated with the emergence of complex, multi-layered system of governance which challenge Westphalian assumption of sovereignty and territoriality and which might be considered as a new form of state (Cox 1993 in Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 19). It can be understand through the economic integration of the EU. It was started from ECSC based on economic norm and it reached till Single European Market in 1986. It further enhanced itself through adopting single currency EURO in 1999. This process expanded the European market in European continent. This is helpful in European economic activity and today member countries are not rival to each other but facilitator to each other in economic activities. It makes them nearer to each other and it is opposite to realistic approach of sovereignty in which war and fulfilment of national interest is inevitable. Without cooperation, shared understanding, social norms and values, no single entity can emerge as an actor. That means social constructivism is an approach which focus neither structure, nor agency, but try to link between them. In constructivism, structure is intersubjective and it consists of shared understandings, expectations and social knowledge embedded in international institution (Wendt 1994 in Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 21). It can understand through the example of Operation Head Quarter (OHQ) and European Union Military Staff (EUMS). Both are different structure but military staff cannot take action without the help of OHQ. It provides control and command to military staff during operation in field. Both have different work but cannot work without each other and both share information regarding operation. Hence if an entity has structures and these structures have no coordination to each other then it is difficult for entity to work as an actor. It is difficult for any structure to determine outcome without the cooperation. No actor in the world is complete in itself, so they need effective settings with enhanced cooperation for success. Actors may be of different identity, so space differentiation must be there such that interests should not clash or overlap. This space differentiation is related to resources. It means all actors are not self reliant in resources. So, they are dependent on each other. These resources may be a natural resource, economic resource, political resource, military resource or access of knowledge. Structures are helpful in action setting but determining the outcome is work expert agency related to it. These

experts have knowledge in determining or prediction of results. It may vary from expert to expert. These experts are like an actor and they can change the action setting according to out come. So it can be said that actors are knowledgeable about the setting within which they are located and potentially able to change structures (Hay 1995 in Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 21).

Actorness of any entity is not a complete process but according to the dynamic changes in the world politics an actor changes its behaviour, structure and action setting. So it can be said that actorness is a continuous process of development. Post-Cold War conditions in Balkan region were not favourable for the EU. This region was suffering with ethnic conflict and in this situation, the EU failed to take any action due absence of autonomous force. So it decided to create security structure after 1999. So, different environment after the end of Cold War shaped EU's behaviour for conflict resolution and with the different Council meeting it developed its security structure for action planning.

Opportunity, presence and capability are three important factors for an entity to become an actor and its actorness. Opportunity denotes the external context, presence is the influence of the actor beyond its boundary and capability focuses on the ability to utilize opportunity and capitalize on presence (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 24). It can be understood with the ongoing situation in Afghanistan. It provided opportunity to the EU that it can setup action planning in Afghanistan. Here Afghanistan is external context for the EU. Presence of the EU in Afghanistan for various humanitarian and reconstruction activities shows its influence. The EU's capability in Afghanistan shows it has used effective policy instruments such as negotiation, financial aid etc. neighbourhood policy and related enlargement process is another good example for the EU to utilize opportunity, presence and capability in Eastern Europe. The enlargement process of 2004 shows EU did not loose the opportunity for the creation of stable Eastern Europe and it was a win-win situation for the EU that it favoured the creation of peaceful and prosperous Europe after the Balkan crisis. These tasks are not an easy work for an actor and its actorness until unless there is consistency and coherence in internal policy making and consensus among other members, agency or structure within the actor itself and outside environment.

Security

Security has traditionally been seen as relating to issues of war and military power. Although security is one of the important aspects of international relation, it is however, a very broad term. It includes social security, economic security, human security, environmental security and so many others. After the end of the Cold War, threat is defused today and to counter it, strategic and collective response is necessary.

Security means being secure against threat and identifiable enemy and it requires corresponding calibrated military responds. Security in traditional term related to the state as a referent. When we follow the realistic approach to security then it is related to struggle for the power. State is considered as an actor. It means if any actor can identify its enemy and related threats then it can calculate the requirement of military needs for effective response to the enemy.

According to the Copenhagen school, 'Security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile. The bottom line of security is survival, but it also reasonably includes a substantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence. Quite where this range of concerns ceases to merit the urgency of the "security" label (which identifies threats as significant enough to warrant emergency action and exceptional measures including the use of force) and becomes part of everyday uncertainties of life is one of the difficulties of the concept (Buzan 1991:432).

According to the leading Cold War specialist Walter Lippmann, security is "the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if changed, to maintain them by victory in such a war". According to Arnold Wolfers, "security measure the absence of the threats to acquired values and the absence of fear that such values will be attacked".

However, security is not a new issue for the EU but developing the EU as a security actor is definitely a new concept. As a security actor it is still an infant or it can be said that it is military worm. The sense of security for the EU is to protect its norm and values. At the individual level it wants to protect the human rights, at the state level it wants to protect the confidence among the states such that no one can breach

the boundary and at the international level it wants to protect the multilateral values against terrorism, WMD, organised crime, state failure etc. For the EU security is also related to its deepening and widening. Institutional integration and enlargement process are two factors that are important for the EU's security. For decision making institutional integration is necessary and enlargement is necessary for secure and safer neighbourhood.

Strategic Culture

Strategic culture is a term which is widely used within the military aspect. Every country has their national strategic culture. According to their interests, strategic culture varies from state to state. Thinking about the strategic culture for Europe was a difficult task during Cold War because Germany was divided. After the fall of the Berlin wall and unification of Germany, a ray of hope emerged for the then European Community. Maastricht Treaty provided convergence point for European Community for identical and normative space to form strategic culture. But at that moment acceleration for strategic culture was slow due to Balkan crisis.

It can be defined as sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy (Snyder 1977: 8).

According to Gray, strategic culture comprises the persisting socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, tradition, habits of mind and preferred methods of operations that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community that has had a necessarily unique historical experience (Gray 1999 in Meyer 2006: 16).

Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards defined European strategic culture as the political and institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military forces as apart of the accreted range of legitimate and effective policy instruments, together with general recognition of the EU's legitimacy as an international actor with military capabilities (Cornish and Edward 2001: 587).

Meyer defined strategic culture as comprising the socially transmitted, identity derived norms, ideas and patterns of behaviour that are shared among the most

influential actors and social group within a given political community which help to set of actions for communities pursuit of security and defence goal (Meyer 2006: 20).

Javier Solana the former High Representative (HR) for CFSP described it as “a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention” (European Council 2003a: 11).

Now it can be said that ideas, traditions, social group, experiences, behaviour, defence goal cooperation, legitimacy and capability is required aspect for an identified geography and strategic culture. Formation of various European forces is the part of its strategic culture. The experience of Balkan crisis mooted the idea for formation of integrated capable forces with the legitimacy and social support of the EU.

The events of 9/11 came with dynamic changes in the world politics. It was the time for the EU to re-evaluate its strategy and strategic culture. It was an opportunity for the EU that it could create strategic capability and develop it not only as a security actor but also a strategic actor. The launch of the ESS in 2003 was the parts of its strategic project that how will ESS provide direction to the EU to achieve its strategic vision. This culture is all about military capability and with the experiences that an actor learns with the interaction of external and internal diverse situations. The EU has learned a lot from its civil-military operations and they are trying improving their strategy. A strategy can never get success without the support of political platform and strategic partnership. So cooperation is necessary aspect for strategic culture.

Military Capability

The term military is directly related to external aspect of security. Military capability is necessary to counter the threat. There can be various measures of military capability. First, it is a qualitative and quantitative military capability. Quantitative capability refers to sufficient number of military personals and related recruitment and qualitative capability refers to professional aspect of military. Military capability is related to operations and requirements. The 2001 Laeken European council stated that the “union is now capable of conducting some crisis-management operations”. For effective capability there is requirement of command. Control, intelligence capability, logistics and other combatant support services. The EU is growing in naval and air

capability. The EU military capability is interlinked with protection, deployability and information superiority (EU Council Secretariat 2009:1).

Cold War Europe and Security Dimension

Europe was transformed by the result of Second World War from a geographical and strategic centre of global balance of power system to a stake in the Cold War competition between the two nuclear armed super powers. The result was a two sided hegemony enforced by the apparent risks of starting any war under the shadow of nuclear escalation and probable societal destruction. Although America's assertive NATO allies roamed free within the very broad guidelines of the alliances consensus on policy and strategy, they were constrained by the military impasse of unacceptable consequences, attendant to nuclear war and uncertain escalation, once war began below the nuclear threshold (Cimbala 1993: 163).

East-West conflict was the main threat during the Cold War. The intensity of cold war in Europe framed together military and political fears with elements of economic and societal security. Cold War situations are one of the important parts for understanding the evolution of European security. EDC was first initiated in this direction but its failure in 1954 broke the hope of defence cooperation in Europe. European security cooperation proceeded separately from the process of economic integration. "European security cooperation found its own *raison d'être* by becoming a means to solve various problems such as German rearmament issue" (Aybet 2001: 82).

German question was major concern for the European security. It was directly related to its re-emergence and threat to France. So, France was worried about this issue. German issue was not only threat to Europe but US-USSR rivalry was also threat to Europe. Failure of EDC was not the end of defence cooperation in Europe. Treaty of Rome (1957) was a mile stone during Cold War and it came with a new hope for defence cooperation. This Treaty founded EURATOM and EEC. Nuclear power issue was major issue for the cooperation. The US and USSR both were nuclear power and both were concentrated on Europe. During 1960-70s, European security cooperation took place through three levels i.e. political, nuclear and economic.

Treaty of Rome was symbol of first political integration in Europe after Second World War. Charles de Gaulle (French President) who was totally against of European integration during 1940s and 1950s but in 1960, he favoured European Community and this Community further proved as building block of the EU. For political cooperation and security in Europe, it was necessary that both France and Germany cooperate with each other. Paris Treaty of 22 January 1963 incorporated regular consultation between France and Germany. This Treaty increased cooperation especially in area of Defence and foreign policy. "The European security cooperation in 1960s and 1970s occurred as a necessity, resulting from a side effect of external conditions such as the burden sharing debate and nuclear issues" (Aybet 2001: 128).

There was no foreign policy unit till 1970 in European Community collectively. EPC was first establishment within European Community that was considered as synonym of foreign policy unit. It played major role in the formation of Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and encouraged for the formation of political union. CSCE was centred on common and comprehensive security for the Euro-Atlantic community. The EPC system in particular was used to forge common views, pool resources, and even influence the interests of European Community member states. The Helsinki Final Act (1975) was an important step in this row in which three "Baskets" were created. Basket-I was related to politico-military dimension which was aimed at Confidence and Security Building Measures. EPC was converted in the EU in 1992 with Maastricht Treaty. This Treaty came with the new phase of foreign and security policy. It provided pillar structure to the EU and out of three pillars European Community and CFSP are most important pillars for the EU. CFSP under the Maastricht Treaty deals with foreign and security policy. During Cold War period European Community tried for development of security infrastructure but it was defined in the bipolar rivalry context. During this period Trans- Atlantic relation could not be ignored. With the fall of Berlin Wall and disintegration of USSR, the intensity of the Cold War went down forever.

Post Cold War Europe

The Post Cold War Europe is very dynamic with the changing nature of geopolitical pattern. World became unipolar and one again US supremacy was proved hegemonic. "The World after Cold War is a paradox in that it returns Europe to the centre of

attention, but the focus of European and other concern about stability shifts towards East-Central Europe and the saving remnants of former Soviet empire. Security community must be grown from within Post-Cold War Europe, it cannot be imposed from outside, as it was during the Cold War years” (Cimbala 1993: 163).

The “European Union” was successfully formed as a new beast in 1992. The End of the Cold War came with instability in Europe and Balkan crisis proved that the EU was still not self sufficient in its security. NATO under US leadership played very important role during 1991 to 1999 i.e. NATO was real actor since Bosnian crisis to Kosovo crisis. Eastern European countries were also in dilemma that where should they move just after the disintegration of USSR. NATO was safe heaven for them at that moment against Russian threat. The EU was still searching space for itself but geopolitical circumstances were not favouring it and NATO umbrella was safer for it till 1998.

The end of Cold War heavily impacted Europe as well as the EU. Europe suffered with return of war in this continent and it was losing its importance compared to pre-Second World War situation. The EU was silent and waiting for an opportunity to play important role. It was worried for security of European continent. CFSP provided provision for security but it was not enough for the EU. There was a requirement of a new actor within Europe which could fulfil the desires of European society and could create confidence among European nations. It was not only limited to this extent but new actor had to play role in security and foreign policy also. It must decrease the dependency over NATO for its security and will create its unique image as a security. This dream fulfilled with the inter-governmental meetings between France and UK in 1998, when they decided to develop autonomous and credible force for action against threat.

Finally it can be said that the Cold War period prepared background for the gradual development of Europe towards the EU and then the EU as an emerging security actor. This study further explains with ESDP and how it is helpful in the development of the EU as a security actor.

CHAPTER 2

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

European Security and Defence Policy has been a dynamic EU project since 1999. The central aim of this project was to develop civil and military capabilities for the EU such that it could ensure conflict prevention and crisis management. In the context of internal security governance, the development of the ESDP has arguably been one of the great political revolutions of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries (Webber, Croft, Howorth, Krahmman 2004: 19). The end of Cold War bi-polar confrontation provided opportunity to European Community to prepare its own foreign and security policy and European Community got success in it by formulating CFSP in 1992. But with the passes of time it felt that CFSP was not enough for security policy. There was lack of autonomy in its civil-military capability. So, capability building was important for the EU at that time and it directed the EU to draft ESDP.

Development of ESDP

The end of the Cold War, the perception of a security vacuum in Europe and the resulting need to 'assert its identity on the international sense through CFSP, provided the context in which EU governments interest began to overlap. Security and Defence became important with the process of integration. The EU's security and defence policy is based on the recognition that security is no longer a matter of preparing to resist invasion. It is about trying to contain, or suppress, violence elsewhere in the world before it irrupts into Europe in the form of terrorism, or international crime, or triggers unmanageable immigration flows. It is about conflict prevention, about intervening in crises to keep the peace or make it, if need be, and about helping to rebuild failed states and conflict-ravaged regions. It is about offering effective support to the UN's role. And it is about doing these things not only because they are in the interests of Europe's citizens, but because Europeans share strong humanitarian values (Witney 2008: 10).

Treaties and Criteria that provided base for ESDP

CFSP under the Maastricht Treaty was first the policy after the formation of the EU that provided security provisions for the Union. According to the article 21.2 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU),

- a. Safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity,
- b. Consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and principles of international law,
- c. Preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security in accordance with the purposes and principle of United Nation Charter, with the principle of Helsinki Final Act and with the aim of Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders (European Union 2008a: 29).

According to the Copenhagen Criteria (1993) of the EU, its first clause reads, “stability of the institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for the protection of the minorities.

The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) incorporated that the West European Union’s (WEU) Petersberg tasks which included humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peace-making laid the treaty basis for the development of the ESDP. These criteria show that these are combination of civilian and military norm. These helped in mooting the idea of ESDP. St. Malo Treaty was next in this row that came with strong determination for the creation of autonomous and credible military forces.

St. Malo Treaty

Treaty of St. Malo is a land mark in the history of the EU. It was for the first time that the EU decided to develop its own autonomous military capability. For more than fifty years West European countries were dependent on NATO for defence cooperation. Since the end of the Cold War to Kosovo crisis, NATO was very prominent in European security. Kosovo crisis emphasized the limited resources and capabilities of the EU as a security actor and it further understood the saying that “the EU is an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm”. The joint UK and

French action showed enthusiasm to create an autonomous capability and decrease dependence on NATO. It was the first time when UK changed its attitude towards the EU defence and it lifted its long term objection to the EU acquiring an autonomous military capability. The Franco-British summit of 3-4 December 1998 is considered as the starting point of the European defence project and it was the first step for the establishment of the ESDP. The declaration in St. Malo agreed that,

First, the EU needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. This means making a reality of Treaty of Amsterdam, which will provide the essential for action by the Union. It will be important to achieve full and rapid implementation of the Amsterdam provision on CFSP. This includes the responsibility of European Council to decide on progressive framing of a common defence policy in the framework of CFSP. The Council must be able to take decision on an intergovernmental basis, covering the whole range of activity set out in the Title V of Treaty of TEU,

Second, to this end, the Union must have capacity for autonomous action, backed up by the credible military force, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises. In pursuing our objectives, the collective defence commitments to which member states subscribe (set out in the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Article V of the Brussels Treaty) must be maintained. In strengthening the solidarity between the member states of the EU, in order that Europe can make its voice heard in world affairs, while acting in conformity with our respective obligation in NATO, we are contributing to the vitality of a modernized Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defence of its member. Europeans will be operating within the institutional framework of the EU (European Councils, General Affairs Council and meeting of Defence Ministers). The reinforcement of European solidarity must take into account the various positions of European states. The different situations of countries in relation to NATO must be respected,

Third, In order for the EU will take decision and approve any military action where the alliance as whole is not engaged, the union must be given appropriate structure and a capacity for analysis of situation, source of intelligence and capacity for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of existing assets the WEU and the evolution of its relation with the EU. In this regard,

the EU will also need to have resource to suitable military means (European capabilities predesignated within NATO's European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework),

Fourth, Europe need strengthen armed force that can react rapidly to the new risk, and which is supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology,

Fifth, we are determined to unite in our efforts to enable the EU to give concrete expression to these objectives (Rutten 2001: 8).

Washington NATO Summit (1999) was proved as a helping desk for the EU because it provided two provisions for the Union:

- a. Assured EU access to NATO Planning capacity able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operation,
- b. The presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capability and common assets for use in EU-led operations (European Council 1999a: Annex III).

Cologne European Council (1999)

In the European Council of Cologne on 3-4 June 1999, the member states of the EU published a declaration 'on strengthening the common European policy on security and defence' which could be considered to mark the 'birth' of an operative ESDP as an EU project (Lübke-meier 2001: 19). In the Council, it was stated that the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action and this autonomy was related to the ability to take decisions and to launch and conduct independent EU-led military operation in response to international crisis in which NATO as a whole was not engaged. Finally, this Council gave birth to ESDP.

Post ESDP European Council provided capability and it can be seen in Helsinki, Feira, Gothenborg, Nice European Council etc.

Helsinki European Council (December 1999)

In this Council, a common European Headline Goal (HG) was adopted for ready deployable military capabilities and collective capability goals in the field of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport which could be developed rapidly and achieved through voluntary coordinated national and multinational efforts for carrying out full range of Petersberg Tasks. Decisions were taken for new political and military body, principles for cooperation with non-EU European NATO members and other European partners in EU-led military crisis management would be agreed without prejudice to the Union's decision-making autonomy. Partnership for Peace (PfP) was decided with NATO and it was also decided that the EU should develop active 50,000-60,000 troops (European Council 1999: 2).

Feira European Council (2000)

This Council reaffirmed its commitment to build Common ESDP capable in reinforcing the Union's external action through the development of a military crisis management capability as well as civilian one, in the full respect of the principle of the UN Charter (European Council 2000: 1).

Nice European Council (December 2000)

This council focused on elaborated Headline Goal (HG) and military capability goals which was established in Helsinki in 1999. It covered civilian aspect of crisis management and established military institutions like Political and Security Community (PSC), European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and European Union Military Staff (EUMS) first time after the birth of ESDP. It also provided permanent arrangement for EU-NATO consultation and cooperation (European Council 2000: Annex-VI).

Gothenborg European Council (2001)

This Council was related to endorsement of the EU's capability for the prevention of violent conflict. According to the Council, the EU is committed to developing and refining its capabilities, structures and procedures in order to improve its ability to undertake the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks, making use of military and means. The development of ESDP strengthens the



capacity to contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter (European Council 2001c: 11).

Laeken European Council (November 2001)

According to this Council, the then Union achieved capability to conduct some crisis management operations (European Council 2001d: 2). This situation is achieved just after the events of 9/11. It was a clear signal that the EU was ready for any crisis management situation.

Brussels European Council (2003)

It was one of the most important Council of the EU because first time it formulated strategic draft. According to this draft, the Union identified key threats, formulated strategic objectives and policy implications. It also focused on multilateralism, coherence and strategic culture. This draft was termed as “European Security Strategy 2003” (ESS-2003) and it proved itself as a ‘directive’ of the EU.

Table 2.1 European Council and Elements

European Council	Year	Elements
Cologne	1999	Birth of ESDP
Helsinki	1999	Commitment for civil-military capability, HG
Feira	2000	Common ESDP
Nice	2000	PSC, EUMC, EUMS, EU-NATO Cooperation
Gothenborg	2001	Prevention of violent conflicts
Laeken	2001	Capability to conduct operation
Brussels	2003	ESS

Characteristics of ESDP

Various Council meetings of the EU came with the new commitments and changes. These commitments and changes provided new profile to the Union and sometimes it took form of its characteristics,

- a. Conflict prevention and crisis management is most important characteristic of ESDP because it is primary motive of this policy. It is determined for the prevention of violent conflicts. ESDP capabilities serve this objective in the acute prevention phase when the possibility of an initial or renewed outbreak of violence cannot be excluded. If violence has already erupted, the aim is to end it as quickly as possible (acute intervention). This crisis management capabilities to be developed in the ESDP framework should provide the Union with the ability to take action in both cases- acute prevention as well as acute intervention (Lübke-meier 2001: 20).
- b. The crisis management of the EU is related to civilian- military norm. Civilian norms are related to Human Rights, rule of law, administrative experts. On the other hand military norms are related to the peace keeping.
- c. ESDP clearly shows the strengthened partnership with US with respect to NATO. It is linked with NATO for pooling the military resources for civil-military operations. It makes Union stronger and capable.
- d. It has strong belief in international organization and their norms. It supports UN and its provisions for international peace. The EU deploys its capabilities in accordance with the principle of the UN Charter.
- e. It believes in coherence and this coherence is related to the integrity with its member states. It never behaves in a way such that it can harm the policies and interest of the member states. The formation of PSC, EUMC and EUMS shows its political willingness of the ESDP and this willingness helps in the integration.

Development of European military capabilities

Development of European military capability has been a gradual process. If the Union wants to play its full role then it must be provided with the necessary means and

capabilities. Without capabilities it cannot become a security actor. So, it is necessary for the Union to acquire credible military force for autonomous action. Helsinki European Council set a military target known as HG-2003 and it set a target for the establishment of up to 50,000-60,000 forces with command, control and other combat support services. These forces have capability to deploy within 60 days. Till 2001, Union achieved capability of conducting crisis management capability.

During 1999-2009, ESDP focused on establishment of a comprehensive approach to crisis management and emphasized on the need to strengthen the crisis management capability. Initially, the EU under ESDP was not very capable in military assets and it decided to cooperate with NATO. The Berlin Plus Agreement (BPA) is a agreement was made between the EU and NATO on 16 December 2002 which was based on conclusion of NATO's 1999 Washington Summit referred as CJTF mechanism. It allowed the EU to draw on some of NATO's military assets in its own peace-keeping operations. This agreement particularly provided for,

- a. EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations
- b. Establishment of list of NATO assets and capabilities that could be made available to the EU for use in EU-led operations
- c. Identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations, further developing the role of DSACEUR in order for him to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities
- d. The further adaption of NATO defence planning system to incorporate more comprehensively the availability of force for EU-led operations
- e. NATO-EU agreement covering the exchange of classified information under reciprocal security protection rules
- f. Procedures for release, monitoring, return and recall of NATO's assets and capabilities
- g. NATO-EU consultation agreements in the context of EU-led crisis-management operation making use of NATO assets and capabilities (European Security and Defence Assembly 2009: 1).

With the adoption of EES-2003, the EU decided to set new HG-2010 and it was adopted in 2004. By this, the Union wanted to develop capabilities to respond by 2010 with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operation covered by the TEU. Interoperability, deployability and sustainability are the driving factors of this goal. Under this goal the Union needs forces which are flexible, mobile and interoperable, making better use of available resources by pooling and sharing assets where appropriate and increasing the responsiveness of multinational forces. The EU must be able to act before a crisis occurs and preventive engagement can avoid that a situation deteriorates and it must retain the ability to conduct concurrent operations simultaneously at different level of stages. The Forces must be based on BG concept.

Identification of strategic planning assumptions was first step during the process of development of EU military capability towards the HG-2010. According to it, there were five illustrative scenarios were prepared for the wide range of military operations and these were

- a. Separation of parties by forces
- b. Stabilization, reconstruction and military advice to third countries
- c. Conflict prevention
- d. Evacuation operation
- e. Assistance to humanitarian operations (European Union 2008b: 2).

Requirement Catalogue, Force Catalogue and Progress Catalogue are three main parts of planning framework for focused military options. Requirement Catalogue includes types of units, recourses and assets that are required in order to deal with the crisis. Force Catalogue describes in qualitative and quantitative terms, the military capabilities which the member states could make available to the EU. It means to what extent member states can offer assets and recourses to meet the total force requirement. The Force Catalogue details military capabilities available by 2010 (European Union 2010: 2). The Force Catalogue provided the basis for identifying the EU's shortfalls and the potential risks arising from them. This resulted in the Progress Catalogue approved by the European Council in November 2007 and it sets out

recommendations to the member states on managing shortfalls. The Progress Catalogue, together with the EUMC's subsequent work on prioritizing the shortfalls, is a key contribution to the Capability Development Plan drawn up by member states via the EDA and the EUMC (European Union 2010: 3).

Military Rapid Response, Maritime Rapid Response, Air Rapid Response is important for the EU's military development and these are helpful in BG deployment and action in the crisis management. The EU is suffering with the major strategic lift capability gap so it is one of the major areas of capability development priorities. Without the cooperation between the EU and NATO, crisis management is very difficult. Hence both have established coordination mechanisms, especially EU-NATO Capability Group. It is a body for exchanging information on requirements common to both organizations.

Civilian Headline Goal 2010 is another important part of the military development programme of the EU. It is related to personnel issues and it also deals with planning and conduct capability, procedures, training, concepts, equipment and logistics with special emphasis on the security of personnel on the ground. To achieve these aims and streamline the relating work, the Council General Secretariat is developing a software application called 'Goalkeeper' which is user friendly tool consisting of four applications i.e. job descriptions for mission personnel, training and conceptual development. The Civilian Headline Goal also highlights the need to cooperate with the other players such as international, regional and non-governmental organizations in civilian crises (European Union 2010: 6).

ESDP is an integral part of CFSP and it will include all matters related to the security of the Union. The specific operational and crisis management capability of ESDP make it different from CFSP. Development of security structure under ESDP is its basic characteristic. It means that the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and capability for relevant Strategic planning (Rutten 2001: 8). ESDP is not only for the military development but it is also related to the civilian capability development. It can also be said that the union must be given the 'capacity to decide' in this policy domain. Decisions are taken on the basis of unanimity rule. The decision making process is a complex process and extensive in nature due to inter-governmental interaction. The capacity to

decide is defined as the ability to formulate, adopt and implement decisions. This capacity under ESDP includes five key functions

- (a) ability to agree common political and strategic priorities,
- (b) development the conceptual framework for EU crisis management,
- (c) collect adequate information and generate joint analysis,
- (d) harness and expand the military, civilian and financial resources available to the union,
- (e) To carry out crisis management operations. (Grevi 2009: 20).

Institutional reform and development of structures within ESDP can be understood at the wider process of institutional reform launched in 2002 with the convention on the future of the Europe, the European strategic debate and the operational experienced gained by the ESDP mission in 2003. The ESS (2003) provides various provisions for threats, strategic objectives and policy implementation, on the basis of which ESDP can work.

Civil-Military Missions of the EU

Year 2003 was a land mark for the EU because it started its civil-military operations after achieving capability for some operations in 2001. These operations were not east task but the Union successfully conducted and it reflected its increasing potential. Conflict resolution, peace-keeping, establishment of rule of law and monitoring were its objectives in various missions. It also reflects its preventive approach and strong support for UN.

Military Missions

EU Military Operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Concordia) emphasis the EU's first every military capability. Concordia was a credibility test for the EU and its successful conduct paved the way towards more missions in more challenging theaters. In this mission the EU focused on patrolling, surveillance, situational awareness, reconnaissance. First time armored vehicle and helicopters were used for field support. However, there was internal and external challenges in this mission such as information sharing between the EU and the NATO emerged as

external challenge. On the other hand as in internal challenge the EU faced problem in coordination in instrument. Beside these things the EU got success first time as military security actor (Gross 2009: 179).

Operation ARTEMIS was first ESDP initiative in Africa with 2000 personnel in year 2003. This operation was conducted in Democratic Republic of Congo. The mandate of the mission was limited to the town of Bunia. The operation was tasked to stabilize the security situation and to ensure the protection of internally displaced people. This operation was case of successful UN-EU cooperation, representing the concrete terms what the ESS would later term effective multilateralism. It showed the EU's operational readiness and proved a good indicator of its ability to act outside neighbourhood without the use of NATO assets (Martinelli 2008: 118).

EUFOR ALTHEA was third military operation of the Union in Bosnia and Herzegovina and it was a major step for the EU in the development of its military dimension. The Union took this mission from NATO in 2004 and at that time conditions of the Bosnia was critical. Politically country was divided in Croat Federation and Serbian Republika Srpska and economic condition was also very poor. There were local disputes also and harsh situation made condition of civil war so EU came here for conflict resolution and without use of military it was not possible. The Union took mandate from UNSC resolution 1575 and it deployed 7000 troops for the operation to ensure compliance with Dayton Peace process.

The tasks of EUFOR ALTHEA were twofold: key military tasks and key supporting tasks. Key military tasks took priority over key supporting tasks and EUFOR could use force to implement military tasks if necessary. Key military task included so called 'harvest' operations to collect weapons, patrolling and intelligence gathering. EUFOR also absorbed the activities of Bosnian defence ministry structures, in particular to ensure that ammunition storage and defence industrial factories complied with the conditions set in the Dayton peace agreement. Key supporting tasks centre mainly on helping the Bosnian authority do two things i.e. capture war criminals and tackle organized crime (Keohane 2009: 217).

AMIS II was also important for the EU because Sudan government did not consent to UN peace operation on its territory in 2004. The Union cooperated with the African

Union and it supported with 3000 personals. The EU also assisted with € 691 million as humanitarian aid. It was both civil as well as military in nature (Franke 2009: 255).

EUNAVFOR ATLANTA was launched on 10 November 2008 and it was EU's first naval operation in Gulf of Aden. Piracy off the coast of Somalia is a symptom of ongoing insecurity, political instability, clan-based violence and international geopolitical rivalries on the mainland. Population have been suffering from resource scarcity and displacement, as well as being subject to fear and intimidation. The local fishing industry has become increasingly threatened in the last decade by the illegal presence of foreign vessel in the countries territorial water. While Somali piracy may originally have been motivated by local frustration against these ships, it has now become highly profitable organized crime disconnected from socio-economic factors (Helly 2009: 391).

The EU's first ever naval operation and named it EU NAVFOR Somali operation ATLANTA. It was launched in support of resolution 1814, 1816, 1836 and 1846 which were adopted in 2008 by the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) to protect vessel of World Food Programme (WFP), prevention act of piracy and armed robbery of merchant vessel off the Somalia coast (European Council 2009: 1). It included 2000 strong for operation.

Map1. Military Operations of the European Union




Table 2.2 Military Operations of the European Union

Military Operation	Name	Year	Place	Strength
	CONCORDIA	2003	FYROM	300
	ARTEMIS	2003	RD Congo	2000
	EUFOR ALTHEA	2004	Bosnia- Herzegovina	1392
	EU AMIS-II	2005	Darfur, Sudan	35
	EUFOR	2006	RD Congo	2400
	EUNAVFOR- ATLANTA	2008	Gulf of Aden	1405
	EUFOR	2008-09	Tchad	3700

Civilian Operations

The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina was first ESDP operation and the process was initiated by the UN International Police Task Force.

This task force had 2000 international experts and the EU supported with 540 international staffs. It was unarmed police mission. It was started in January 2003 and ended in 2009. The EUPM had played an important role in Bosnian development. The mission had succeeded in making local police more accountable by setting up of training and mentoring internal control units which investigate police misconduct. It focused upon professionalizing police training through curriculum development. Modern human resource management in Bosnian police apparatus was major achievement. Bosnian police was also trained in crime scene management (Merlingen 2009: 169 in Grevi 2009).

The EU mission PROXIMA started on 15 December 2003 in Macedonia after the end of military operation CONCORDIA. It is a civil-police mission with an aim of supporting the process of reform within the Macedonian police service, with

particular fight against organized crime. It comprised of 200 unarmed police personnel. It was the second ESDP police operation after EUPM in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Its significance for ESDP was twofold. First, PROXIMA confirmed the EU continued commitment to the democratization process in Macedonia and rule of law criteria set out in the framework of the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). Second, the mission was also the sign of the EU's ability to adopt the tools of ESDP to specific situations, with specific needs (Manca 2004: 7).

The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was the first ESDP mission in Asia and first mission in partnership with another regional organization. It was started on 15 September 2005 with unarmed civilian ESDP mission. This mission completed its task like monitor the demobilization of fighters of Free Aceh Movement and decommissioning of their armaments, monitored the relocation of non-organic military forces and non-organic police troops and monitored the humanitarian situations and provide assistance. It also monitored the disputed amnesty cases. The aim was established in a remarkably short time using a variety of alternate funding and supply mechanism to ensure full mission function on day one of its mandate. This was the considerable achievement but one which was gained by working member states financial contribution outside of European Commission procedures rather than by making use of existing ESDP support and funding structure (Kiruwan 2008: 140).

The EU deployed its first ever rule of law mission under ESDP between July 2004 and July 2005. Georgia was suffering with social turmoil and long-standing conflicts of an ethnic nature and major reason for it was breakaway Republic of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The mission reflected the strategic entrepreneurship of the Council General Secretariat- what can be called the Solana milieu. It was constantly searching for opportunities to deploy ESDP operations. The Council wanted to raise the Union's profile as a security actor on the world stage and accumulate relevant operational experience that can be translated into political capital in intra- EU political struggle over the EU external policy. The distinct formula of THEMIS was based on the conceptual contribution of highly skilled experts to the formulation of a national reform strategy for the justice sector (Kurowska 2008 in Merlingen and Ostrauskaité 2008: 128). This mission assisted in the development of a horizontal governmental strategy guiding the reform process for all relevant stake holders within the criminal

justice sector in full cooperation. It provided guidelines for the new criminal justice reform strategy and supported the planning for new legislation.

Map2. Civilian Operations of the European Union




Table 2.3 Civilian Operations of the European Union

Civilian operation	Name	Year	Place	Strength
	EUPM	2003	Bosnia-Herzegovina	271
	EUJUST THEMIS	2004	Georgia	10
	EUPOL PROXIMA	2004-05	FYROM	150
	EUJUST LEX	2005	Iraq	58
	EUBAM Rafah	2005	Palestinian Territory	21
	AMM	2005-06	Aceh, Indonesia	240
	EUPAT	2006	FYROM	29
	EUPOL COPPS	2006	Palastinian Territory	84
	EUPOL	2007	RD Congo	64
	EUPOL	2007	Afghanistan	500
	EULEX	2008	Kosovo	2848
	EUMM	2008	Georgia	425

The EU also played important role in Iraq, Congo, Palestinian territories and in Kosovo.

Military Crisis Management

Initially, the development of ESDP was largely focused on military aspect because the EU was facing the severe problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo crisis. "The Petersberg tasks gave a new profile to the EU's external role and also opened the door for the use of military force by the Union" (Duke and Osanen 2006: 479). The adoption of 'Headline Goal' in 1999 focused upon the military ability of the EU to respond to external crisis with military tools. The goal for fixed for establishment of 50000–60000 troops ready by the year 2003 for operations and these forces will be in field up to one year. Establishment of troops was not only primary issue but new structures were also required to administer the forces and it included PSC, EUMC, EUMS and other institutions.

Capability development was another important issue so ESDP provided provisions for establishment of Battle group. The EU is connected through the UN with Battle Group. When, the UN requests for troops then the EU provides troop for UN operation. Each Battle Group consists of 1500 personals. The Battle Group is a permanent force and available at very short notice. The EU has already conducted various civil-military operations worldwide.

Civilian Crisis Management

Use of the military is not only method for crisis management but also civilian crisis management is required to support the military in form of monitoring, rule of law making, negotiation or arbitration. Civilian and military tool are complementary to each other. At the initial stage of ESDP the French and British authority emphasized on military tool but on the same level Finland and Sweden favored civilian tool.

At the Feira European Council in June 2000, four civilian intervention areas were identified: police, rule of law, civilian administration and civilian protection. Police operation includes police advice, assistance and training programme for police personnel. Till 2003, member states committed to form 5,000 personal for police operation goal and it has capability to deploy in less than thirty days.

The rule of law is related to Justice System. Many prosecutors, Judges, penitentiary administration officers have already participated in various rule of law mission, for example EUJUST THEMIS in Georgia (2004-05) and EUJUST LEX in Iraq (2005-06). "The civilian administration goal includes the ability to have a pool of experts on standby to help bolster local administrative capacities in order to preserve bureaucratic functioning during crisis management. The civil protection goal consists of having two or three 'advance teams of ten experts always on call that can be sent within three to seven hours for crisis evaluation and early coordination. Those teams would be followed by intervention teams containing up to 2,000 people deployable for a short period, and more specialized groups deployable within two weeks for more specific crisis needs. A civilian capabilities conference organized by member states in 2004 on matters as human rights, political affairs and security sector reforms (Duke and Ojanen 2006: 481). EUSEC/DR Congo (2005-06), AMM/Aceh (2005-06), EUPOL COPPS/Palestinian Territories (2006-09) and EUBAM Rafah/Rafah crossing (2005-06) are examples of civilian mission of the EU.

Another important aspect is bridging the external and internal dimensions of crisis management. External crisis management is different from the internal crisis management and sources are different in both the cases. The EU seems to be single actor on the external crisis management because it is larger aid and assistance provider regarding this case and on the other hand it cannot behave as a single actor on internal issues within its territory because it uses resources of its member state and there are multiple institutions are available for resolving the issues and problem on internal issues (Duke and Ojanen 2006: 405). It means that there are 27 member states and it is difficult to raise a 'single voice' on internal crisis management.

It is also necessary that there should no gap between military and civilian crisis management. Duke addressed 'Convergence' – as the root for bridging the gap between Civil–Military crisis management. He identified various sources for convergence, for example natural disaster and terrorist attack, new ideas and doctrines, dual use and overlapping capacities, institutional venues and informal bridging, information network and the search for legitimacy.

ESDP's military and civilian mission can work together and effectively in natural disaster and terrorist attack with humanitarian assistance. New ideas and Doctrines are

helpful in bridging the gap. For example European Security Strategy 2003 and multilateralism are suitable as doctrine and idea respectively. ESS 2003 identifies various key threats, it proposes strategic objectives and implications. There are many structures or institutions that are applicable in many areas so these can be used in multiple ways. For example, situation centre, intelligence, the EU Satellite centre can be used in multiple manner. Institutional venues are related to security and crisis management. Civil-Military Cell in the EUMC can be used for planning and deployment of crisis management missions. The EU's role in internal as well as external aspect of security must be perceived as 'legitimate' that means politically accepted, practically necessary and publically supported.

ESDP Resources

Without the availability of resources no actor can play important role in international affairs and availability of resources made them powerful and independent so resources are important for the EU action at global level. Finding adequate resources is one of the biggest challenges for ESDP since 1999. Civil, military and financial resources are important resources for the ESDP. Huge budget is required for conducting any civil-military operation. The EU collectively spread over \$ 200 billion on defence which is largest after the US defence budget. But despite these financial resources, the EU does not have enough soldiers with necessary skills for international peacekeeping. Military resources for the ESDP: The 1999 Kosovo war had exposed huge equipment gaps between the US armed force and European armies. At the Helsinki summit of 1999, EU governments signed up to a number of military capability goals. The EU was committed for a 'Headline Goal' plus supporting naval, aerial and civilian capabilities. It was committed for 100,000 troops, 400 combat planes and 100 ships to the force. To improve their performance, in 2002, the EU agreed on a new implementation programme- The European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) and it aimed to focus European Council on acquiring particular crucial assets (European Council 2001: 2).

In April 1999, NATO members also agreed on a programme called Defence Capabilities Initiative to focus European procurement efforts on particular needs. It was not successful. The Prague capabilities Commitment of 2002 agreed on a new, smaller and more precise procurement programme and it focused on critical areas

such as secure communications, precision-guided weapons, air and sea transport, and air to air refueling (Prague Summit 2002).

At the Le Touquet Summit in February 2003, the French and British governments proposed that the EU should be able to deploy nine 'Battle Group' each consisting of 1500 troops and deployable within two weeks. Till 2007, this Battle Group extended up to 13 groups.

Financing of the EU military operations is important aspect of its resources. Under "Athena Mechanism" of 2004, Member states have to finance the common cost of military ESDP operations.

Civilian Resources of ESDP

According to the Article 28.3 of TEU, the operating expenditure incurred in implementing CFSP and ESDP decisions is charged to the budget of European Community, except for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications. It means that the cost of civilian ESDP operations is charged to the EU budget.

Military Integration of the EU

The method of integration will be through progressively intense cooperation that progressively mutates into integration. It will start in 'tail elements' and progress towards 'teeth elements'. It will be faster in the smaller states than the bigger, it will move forward by euphemisms, such as permanent structured cooperation, specialization and pooling- in other words, integration by other name. That means integrated forces are the most efficient expression of combined and joint military effect (Lindley-French 2005: 39).

Military integration is not possible without cooperation and policy integration. Today, the EU is moving towards military integration due to its policy integration and related reform treaties. It reformed its CFSP, Amsterdam Treaty, ESDP, Nice Treaty and arrived at Lisbon Treaty with greater coordination. It comes with CSDP that shows EU's strategic vision for military integration.

Now, the question arises what are the basic requirements for military integration? For military integration integrated forces, headquarters, planning and procurement

structures and mechanism, task and role sharing, collective capabilities, multinational approaches, pooling of sovereignty, political and societal support is required (Heise 2009:47). Hence it can be said that if the EU wants to become a security actor then military integration is primarily required.

Military integration is one of the important parts of ESDP to achieve vision of a 'European Army'. Here question arises that how can Union achieve military integration? "There are environmental, functional and political dynamics driving Europe towards Military Integration" (Lindley-French 2005 in Biscop 2005: 39). Without cooperation military integration cannot be achieved. Permanent structured cooperation, specialization and pooling are three important ways of military integration.

Pooling and specialization are symptoms of integration under tight budget and defence industrial and procurement process. Two ways are identified for it.

- (a) Complete specialization by smaller power by which they can limit their budget,
- (b) Partial specialization by the bigger powers as environment, budgets and role force them to return to traditional military emphases. (Lindley-French 2005 in Biscop 2005: 39).

Pooling of assets and capabilities are also important for military integration. Permanent Structured Cooperation (PSCoop) has two functions to enable big power relationship and to constrain it:

- (a) To enable the 'trirectoire' to move forward on the basis of a strategic vision that only big power can generate, underpinned by a strategic consensus and strategic planning with those so minded to join them,
- (b) To ensure that British, French and German planning, stays firmly locked within the institutional framework of the Union and does not relegate the union to simply an enabler for their own actions (Lindley-French 2005 in Biscop 2005: 39).

Specialization is a sensible approach in particular for those nations which are not able to provide for the full spectrum of process anyway. It is most economical approach

for smaller countries. To concentrate on 'niche capabilities' is highly recommended for smaller states with limited resources (Heise 2005 in Biscop 2005: 43). Example: Task and role sharing are approaches highly recommended for their expected economic effect. Countries or member states can share their assets and task. It makes mission easier and economic. Achieving the collective capability is not an easy task, it is funded, operated and maintained collectively. It only exists at NATO level. The only collective capability provided by the EU so far is the satellite centre at Torrejon, which is inherited from the WEU (European Council 2001).

Multinational Approach is better option for the EU member and at this level they can share information, intelligence report regarding terrorism and organized crime. Gradual pooling of sovereignty which is not harmful for core issues of a member state will be fruitful for integration (military). Joint national command structures, joint air policing and pooling of capabilities are necessary conditions of military integration.

Lisbon Treaty (2009)

Lisbon Treaty is an international agreement that was signed by the EU member state on December 13, 2007 and entered into force in December 1, 2009. It amended the two treaties which comprise the legal basis of the EU. It amended the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) and make treaty establishing the European Community. The key objective of this treaty is to render the enlarged EU more effective and to increase its transparency and democratic legitimacy. Basically it came with new changes such as the office of the President of the European Council, new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, new External Action Service, new decision making opportunities, and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The Treaty of Lisbon comprises a series of innovations designed to increase the coherence and capabilities of the EU as a security actor. It converted ESDP into CSDP. There are also new substantive concepts, such as protocol on "Permanent Structured Cooperation" (Mölling 2008: 1).

The Lisbon Treaty affects the area of the ESDP in two ways. First, general harmonisation of the overall institutional framework should facilitate relation between the Council and the Commission with respect to crisis management issues. Second, several articles in the treaty are intended to strengthen the EU's role in the world

directly through the improvement of the CFSP and its subordinated area of ESDP (Mölling 2008: 1).

The Lisbon Treaty confirms the commitment of the EU to the framing of a common defence policy. ESDP is now presented in new form. The aim of the ESDP is defined as providing the EU with an operation capability drawing on civilian and military assets. The treaty for the first time includes the extended form of Petersberg tasks. It includes joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks and fight against terrorism. The provision for the protocol of “Permanent Structured Cooperation” (PSCoop) is not about operations and binding commitment for the military deployment or towards mutual defence. Rather, objectives of PSCoop are to enhance the EU’s operational capabilities through collaborative efforts (Mölling 2008: 2).

The Treaty of Lisbon: Key changes relating to ESDP

Table 2.4 Key changes related to ESDP

Article	Subject	Content
9E, 13A, 14, 19	HR for FASP	New provision
27	Special provisions for implementing the CSDP	Significant changes
188R	Solidarity clause	New provision
28A-7	Mutual defence clause	New provision
28A-1, 28B	Petersberg task	modification
28A-5, 28C	Implementation of task by a group of member state	New provision
28D	European defence agency	New provision
27-6,31, Protocol PSCoop	Permanent Structured Cooperation	New provision

Source: (Mölling 2008: 2).

Security Challenges and ESDP

Security challenges are major concern for a security actor. With the implementation of the ESDP, the EU got new profile. But new profile was full of various challenges.

At the initial stage of ESDP, the Union was facing problem of lack of military assets for civil-military operation. Development of military assets made adverse effect on the EU-US relation. US perception about the EU that it was trying to develop a military structure under ESDP and it will be proved a challenge for the US.

Till 1998, the EU was a politico-economic actor but after this it tried for military actor. This challenged the EU's civilian norm. The EU has been more civilian than military actor. After the formation of ESDP, the CFSP gradually lost its importance because ESDP proved itself more efficient than CFSP in civil-military operations. Budgetary expenditure on defence is another challenge for the Union. Small member countries are reluctant to spent huge money on defence.

Before 2003, the Union was very uncertain about its neighborhood because there was situation of uncertainty in the mind of neighborhood that who would be safer for them i.e. NATO or the EU. However, today they are part of the EU but NATO security umbrella is important for them.

One view holds that tensions have become increasingly evident between ESDP and the EU's civilian power. While only in its stronger form does this perspective suggest that military and civilian instruments might directly contradict each other, there is a wide spread feeling that the balance between these two strands has shifted significantly in favor of the military dimension (Youngs 2002: 103).

It has been seen that there were change in policy - making culture. France has been the state most open about its desire to ensure that through ESDP power shifts toward the council and away from the commission. Smaller member – states were defeated in their attempt to ensure that ESDP would be led clearly from within the commission, which they saw as essential to retaining a pre-eminently civilian character to European approaches to international challenges (Howarth 2000: 40 in Young 2000: 104).

Duplication of capabilities and structures are controversial between the EU and NATO. Most of the EU members are part of NATO and they have experience of collective engagement. When these members work at the EU level then there may be chances of action or policy making duplication and NATO criticized it several times.

Toje identified challenges related to military capability. He mentioned most of the European states are simply not spending enough on defence. In 2005, Europe was the only region where military spending fell by 1.7% in comparison to Russia and US. Funds were often spent in a manner opposed to the ESS. Increasing number of military staff at the EU level increase extra burden on EU budget. The EU defence market is also facing problem of inefficiencies to stop the duplication because the several small national defence industries producing similar hardware that leads to duplication (Toje 2011: 50).

Lisbon Treaty came with institutional innovations and ESDP related changes. Creation of the post of a High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy, this post aims to allow EU external policies to be formulated and implemented more coherently and to provide Europe with a visible and continuous representative. It integrates the position and functions of the EU commissioner for external relations and the High Representative for CFSP, which are in turn abolished. The task of High Representative is to assure effective inter-institutional coordination between common community elements of EU external relations and CFSP (Mölling 2008: 2).

President of the European Council is another new institution created by the Lisbon Treaty. The president is given responsibility of chairing the Council. In this row, the European External Action Service (EEAS) is the third creation of Lisbon Treaty. The EEAS will be recruited from national civil servants, the council secretariat and the commission. The military expertise will be needed to enable the EEAS dealing with military and defence questions, so the role of the military within the EEAS will remain open. Lisbon Treaty is also committed to the formation and framing of a Common Defence Policy. For any operational capacity ESDP used civilian and military assets. Lisbon Treaty also included the extended list of Petersberg Task and humanitarian rescue, peace-keeping and crisis management (including peace keeping) operations, joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks and

fight against terrorism. These extended functions will be helpful for the EU in conducting civil-military operations.

This Treaty also included Solidarity clause and mutual defence clause. Solidarity clause refers that the member states must support each other in the case of a terrorist attack. Mutual defence clause is related to offer aid and assistance if one of the members is victim of an armed aggression on its territory. Another development is related to the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PSCoop). It is not related to operations. It contains no binding commitment to deploy troops or towards mutual defence. The objective of PSCoop is to enhance the EU's operational capabilities through collaborative efforts. PSCoop will operate on an opt-in basis. It is open for those member states that meet two criteria: first, their willingness to proceed more intensively to develop their defence capabilities through the development of their national contributions and participation in the respective multilateral endeavors and second, their capacity to supply capabilities, either at national level or as a component of multinational groups, structured at a tactical level as a battle group (Mölling 2008: 2).

After the implementation of Lisbon Treaty, Arab Spring is major crisis outside the EU. The EU's Mediterranean neighbour Libya is major concern here. Countries which are part of Arab Spring are suffering with lack of democracy, unemployment, massive corruption, inflation. These causes Arab Spring, opposition and rebellion want immediate change in government and governance. Libya is still suffering with internal disturbance. The EU is observing the humanitarian crisis in Libya and NATO has already started air bombing on it. Thousands of people are killed and injured in Libya.

It is second time after 2003 Iraq war when the EU members have fragmented vision towards Libya. Germany is not supporting the violence and NATO air raid in Libya. On the other hand Italy, France and the UK supported NATO activity in Libya. The European Commission supported up to 30 million for humanitarian needs in the Libya.

The unleashing of violence in Libya has triggered a major humanitarian crisis at Europe's door step. Europe's values and interests command us to act decisively and this is what we are doing. Europe has mobilized itself not only to evacuate EU in a

coordinated and speedy manner, but also to address the dire needs of people suffering whether refugees fleeing Libya or those trapped by conflict inside the country (Georgieva 2011: 1) Experts from the European Commission's humanitarian aid and civil protection department (ECHO) has started working in Libya on first assessment of Humanitarian situation.

Role of the EU is not only limited to the year 1999, it extended itself beyond it. Now with the various civilian and military operations, it can be said that the Union has established its position in international community where it has been active for democracy promotion, peace keeping and conflict resolution. The Union also successfully managed its military integration. Most important point is that the EU utilized all its opportunity that it found since 2003 and a real actor is that, who usually do not loose opportunity.

Future challenges are also prominent and in the regard ESS is most important because this world is very dynamic in nature and it always changes itself. Hence, The ESS must be reformulated after the implementation of Lisbon Treaty.

The EU has established as a key component of the EU's external projection and international profile. It is very sensitive to its security and it developed strategic culture for crisis management. The successful development of the EU will decrease rapprochement to NATO. Stronger institutions are required within the EU for capacity to decide together. More resources are required to deal with further challenges.

This study will further show that the EU has developed various security infrastructures under the ESDP policies. These are results of various Council meetings. It will show its political willingness of the EU members. The roles of various security institutions are necessary to tackle threat and their operation outside the Europe shows its capability to sustain in battle field. The EU has also developed the Gendarmerie force as a subsidiary part of its security architecture. Successful coordination between security intuitions in the battle field or Operation Head Quarter shows its effective command, control, communication and capability.

CHAPTER 3

EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY ARCHITECTURE: FROM ST. MALO TO LISBON TREATY

The end of the Cold War resulted in the end of the long peace in the Europe. Some scholar identified it as “Return of war in Europe”. The Balkan crisis was major concern in this process. During this period the EU was seen to be more concerned for its own security. It was totally dependent on NATO for its security. CFSP is the second main pillar of the EU and is responsible for the security of the Union in all ways. Till 1995 it formed Eurofor and European Maritime Force. But this was not enough for the crisis management and control. After the St. Malo Treaty (1998), the EU changed its profile and it came with ESDP. The first five years of the EU with ESDP i.e. since 1999 to 2004 was very crucial. During this period the EU formed its own credible security structure and it is still evolving. These structures are the part of ESDP.

Europe’s ambition for security autonomy has been a political ambition unequally shared with its members. Today, attaining this autonomy is still not a strategic reality. As it is a gradual process of evolving, so it will take time to achieve autonomy. However, this autonomy is institutionally difficult to achieve and militarily demanding to perform. Because Europe’s agenda in security issues evolves around humanitarian tasks and crisis management, the added value of security institutions is increasingly in doubt. The reasons for this institutional fragility are linked to the nature of world politics, which privileges autonomy over trust, short-term commitment over long-term obligations and relative positions over objective power. This is all more so when cooperation is about collective goods, because the problem of free riders is even more acute (Haine 2008: 1).

The EU has setup structures and procedures which enable it to analyse, plan, decide on, launch and carry out military crisis management operations when NATO as a whole is not involved. The 1999 Helsinki guidelines, the 2000 Nice European Council meeting endorsed the creation of the three new bodies. The Political and Security Committee (PSC), the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and European

Union Military Staff (EUMS) - for the oversight of European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) policy and strategy (Lachowski 2001: 156).

Political and Security Committee

The PSC came into existence on 22 January 2001. It replaced the Political Committee for CFSP. It is the linchpin of the ESDP and the CFSP. It exercises political control and strategic direction of the EU's military response to crisis (Nice European Council 2000: 191).

The following arrangements will be put in place to enable the PSC to ensure full 'political control and strategic direction' of a military crisis-management operation

- a. for launching an operation the PSC sends recommendation to the Council on the opinion of the Military Committee and Council decides for a operation within a framework of joint action
- b. in accordance with Article 18 and 26 of the TEU, the joint action will determine the role of the High Representative in the implementation of the measures falling within the political control and strategic direction exercised by the PSC
- c. The Council will be kept informed through the PSC reports presented by the High Representatives in his capacity as a chairman of the PSC during the operation (European Council 2001a: 3).

On the other hand the PSC receives information, recommendations and opinions from the committee for civilian aspect of crisis management and sends guidelines on matters falling within the CFSP. It leads the political dialogues in its own capacity and in the form laid down in the treaty. With the help of the Council it takes responsibilities for political direction of development of the military capabilities taking into account and types of crisis to which the Union wishes to response.

European Union Military Committee

At Helsinki (2001), the European Council decided to establish a new permanent political and military body. The new military body is responsible for the full range of

conflict prevention and crisis management. EUMC was made permanent on 9 April 2001. It is the highest military body with the Council.

According to the Article (1) of the EUMC, it is composed of the member state's Chief of Defence, represented by their military representatives. The Committee gives military advices and make recommendations to the PSC as well as provides military direction to the EUMS.

Major areas of attention under EUMC are following

- a. development of the overall concept of crisis management in its military aspect
- b. military aspects relating to the political control and strategic direction of the crisis management operations and situations
- c. risk assessment of the political crisis
- d. military dimension of a crisis situation and its implications, in particular during its subsequent management, it receives the output from the situation centre
- e. The EU's military relationship with non-EU European NATO members, the other candidates for accession to the EU, other states and other organisation including NATO
- f. financial estimation for the operations and exercises (European Council 2001b: 4).

Role of the EUMC

It has dual role i.e. role during crisis management situation and role during an operation. In crisis management situation, it issues an initiating directive to the Director General of the EUMS to draw of and present strategic military option. It evaluates the strategic military options developed by the EUMS and forwarded them to the PSC together with its evaluation and military advice. It provides advice and recommendation to the PSC which is based upon the EUMS evaluation on the concept of operations developed and on the draft operation plan drawn up by the Commander of the concern operation. In the case of ongoing operation, the EUMC

monitors the proper execution of military operation conducted under the responsibility of the Commander of operation (European Council 2004: 5).

Implementation of the Lisbon Treaty came with the new strategic priorities. It improved the planning, capacity and approach of the EUMC. There are following strategic priorities,

- a. Improve planning and execution of the CSDP mission and operations- this is the fundamental part of the Military Committee's business. Forces must make best use of the mechanisms that already exist and optimise opportunities.
- b. Contribute to the development of a comprehensive approach in the EU- it extends all aspects of the civil-military synergies with the aim to achieve more with the recourses available to the EU.
- c. Contribute to the reduction of the priority capacity shortfalls- military committee must analyse the activities and related capabilities during operations. This will be helpful in future requirement of equipments related to collaborative actions such as pooling and sharing to resolve the shortfalls.
- d. Contribute to the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty- it came with the new structure. This can be successful only when member states contribute to it properly. It also supports the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Lisbon Treaty came with new possibilities such as Permanent Structured Cooperation, Mutual Assistance and the Solidarity Clause. These new aspects affect the working of the EU, so the EUMC contribution is required.
- e. Contribute to the development of the EU strategic partnership- the Military Committee has a role to play in the improvement of strategic partnership with the other organisations as well as with the neighbouring countries (Syrén 2010: 2).

European Union Military Staff

The EU has established EUMS within the European Council. It is a new permanent political and military body enabling the EU to assume its responsibilities for the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks. It was made permanent on 9 April 2001. The EUMS within the Council structure provides military expertise and

support to the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP). It also includes the conduct of EU-led military crisis management operation.

Article 17(2) of TEU clearly mentions that the EUMS is to perform early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for missions and tasks. It also covers the identification of European national and multinational forces and to implement policies and decisions are directed by EUMC.

EUMS works under the direction of EUMC and it also reports to EUMC. It is a department under Council Secretariat. It is headed by the Director General of EUMS. In crisis management situations, the EUMS may setup Crisis Action Team (CAT), drawing upon its own expertise, manpower and infrastructure.

Role and Task of the EUMS

It is the source of EU's military expertise. It assures the link between EUMC and the military resources available to the EU. It provides military expertise to the EU bodies as directed by EUMC. It provides an early warning capability. It plans, assesses and makes recommendations regarding the concept of crisis management and general military strategy and implements the decision and guidance of EUMC. It supports temporary mission to third countries or international organisations for advice and assistance on military aspect of conflict prevention, crisis management and post conflict stabilisation. It also works in the close coordination with the EDA. It maintains the capacity to reinforce the national Head Quarter (HQ) designated to conduct an EU autonomous operation, primarily through the Civil-Military Cell. It monitors potential crisis by relying on an appropriate national and multinational intelligence capabilities. It supplies military information and receives its output. It identifies and lists European national and multinational forces for EU-led operations coordinating with NATO. It contributes to the military aspect of the ESDP dimension of fight against terrorism. It contributes to the capabilities for natural and man made disaster consequence management operations. It also assists in technical exchange with third countries offering military contribution to EU-led operation and in the preparation of force generation conference (Council Secretariat 2005: 124).

The European Union Battle Group

The Battle Group (BG) consists of highly trained, battalion-size formation including all combat and service support as well as deployability and sustainability assets. Each battalion consist 1500 soldiers. The battalion should be available within 15 days notice and sustainable for at least 30 days. It may be extendable to 120 days with the provision of rotation of battalion. The battalion is flexible to take action in crisis area under UN mandate. These also can conduct operation in very tuff environment such as forest, desert and mountainous areas.

The BG concept is an important part of the defence aspect of the ESS 2003 and integral part of Headline Goal (HG) 2010. The HG 2010 is the extension of Helsinki HG 1999. The BG concept was developed at Franco-British summit in Le Touquet on 4 February 2003. The military instruments of the EU were firmly anchored to the goals advanced in CFSP.

The French and the British government at St. Malo in 1998 and then in Le Touquet in February 2003 have highlighted the close relationship between the values of CFSP and the objectives of its military instrument by agreeing that “the potential scope of ESDP should match the world-wide ambition of the EU’s CFSP and should be able to support effectively the EU’s wider external policy objectives to promote democracy, human rights, good governance and reform (European Parliament 2006: 4).

It was further mentioned that our two countries now wish to build on these first steps in crisis management operations in two areas: first, the relationship between the EU and the UN in the field of crisis management and second, work on capability development...., we now propose that the should build on this (Operation Artemis) precedent so that it is able to respond through the ESDP to future similar request from the UN, whether in Africa or elsewhere (European Parliament 2006: 4).

The BG concept can be identified as mobilising tool. The BG has been described by officials as specific form of rapid response whereby it is the minimum military effective, credible, rapidly deployable and coherent force package capable of operations.

According to the HG 2010, the BG should be rapidly deployable, sustainable and interoperable. The November 2004 declaration on European military capabilities

reiterates this by adding an objective to achieve “overarching standards and criteria”. These were initially agreed in March 2005 and refer to availability, employability and deployment, readiness, flexibility, connectivity, sustainability, survivability, medical force protection and interoperability”. The overarching standards and criteria should also form the basis of member states development of criteria for “evaluation/certification” (European Parliament 2006: 5).

Objectives of the BG Under the EU

- a. To take the decision to launch an operation within 5 days of the approval by the Council of the general political and military parameters of the operation.
- b. In response to a crisis or to an urgent request by the UN, to undertake simultaneously two battle group size operations sustainable for a maximum period of 120 days. Forces should be on the ground no later than 10 days after the EU decision to launch the operation. For example the EU Operation Artemis in Congo in 2003 represented a first successful example of the UN-EU cooperation.
- c. Member states made commitment to the formation of 13 EU BG. The ability to undertake one BG sized rapid response operation is performed very well and it reached full operational capacity on 1 January 2007. Modalities for the force generation i.e. training and rotation of the forces have been developed.

According to Gerrard Quille, the BG Concept is not just about re-arranging existing capabilities but is rather a tool to produce new ones. A key bench mark for measuring the value of the concept will be in seeing which countries offer to provide or create new BG at the commitments conference likely to be held this autumn. The EUMS will also need to develop the concept through realistic scenario-based work to promote readiness, sustainability, and concurrency and follow forces, as well as cooperation with a transition to civilian operations. The Civil-Military Planning Cell provides the obvious location for discussion relating to how BG might be deployed in complex conflicts and peace building process (Quille 2004: 1).

Thirteen EUBG Commitments

At the 22 November 2004 Military Capability Commitment Conference, member states made an initial commitment to the formation of 13 EU BG. Till 2007, its strength became up to 19,500. Some member countries of the EU contributed force strength of 1500 individually and some members collaborated with each other and contributed to EU BG.

Table 3.1 Force Strength and Battlegroup commitments

Force strength	BG commitments
1500	France
1500	Italy
1500	Spain
1500	UK
1500	France, Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg and Spain
1500	France and Belgium
1500	Germany, the Netherlands and Finland
1500	Germany, Austria and the Czech Republic
1500	Italy, Hungary and Slovenia
1500	Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal
1500	Poland, Germany, Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania
1500	Sweden, Finland and Norway
1500	UK and the Netherlands
Total : 19500	13 BGs.

Source: EU Battle group 2004: 2

Challenges of EUBG

According to Gustav Lindstrom, challenges of EUBG are categorised as operational and political challenges. Operational challenges include standard, certification and training, credibility gap, process of adaptation. First, there are certain criteria which are identified by the Council and EUBG performs on the basis of these criteria. If EUBG fulfil the required standard for any operation then it is certified for the operation. Flexibility is necessary for the operation that comes through training processes. But a high degree of flexibility in standard and certification sometimes creates problem in interoperability of forces. The use of command, control and communication at multilateral level is difficult. Second, problem of credibility gap is created due to the lack of common approach in procedure. Many member states took part in civil-military operations so there should be transparency in procedure. Third, sometimes standards are not enough to fulfil the criteria of measurement for the military capability. Process of adaptation in different criteria is difficult so standards need to be consistent with the EU norms and criteria. Fourth, member countries have different techniques and processes of their military training. When they come for EU-led operation or any participation then there is lack of similarities among forces and their preparedness. The lack of training at EU level may impact on the choice of the EUBG reserve force (Lindstrom 2007: 27).

On the other hand there are political challenges which are related to the decision making processes. First, decision making process related to military strategy, military directives, concept of operation, operation planning and rules of engagement are very lengthy. Second, the relationship between domestic decision making processes across countries contributing to the EUBG and its impact on deployment schedules. If any member takes more time in decision making related to deployment then it affects the whole EUBG. Third, deployability related factor such as distance, destination, deployment demand with enough equipment and duration of operation is the core issue for the strategic planner. Fourth, the EU always faces the shortage of large transport aircraft carriers. Aircraft capacity for EUBG operation is limited by the small cargo planes. It also faces the problem of the problem of airfield and alternative airports nearby operation area (Lindstrom 2007: 28).

European Airlift Coordination Cell (EACC)

It is important for the EU that it should develop airlift capability. In 1999, it was considered that the EU must be linked with NATO in air transport cooperation. On 30 November 1999, German-French Defence and Security Council collaborated to setup European Air Transport Command (EATC). It was further suggested that the EU should develop “Technical Arrangement Air Transport, Air to Air refuelling and other Exchanges of Services (TA ATARES) and signed on 8 February 2001 (Wilmer and John 2011: 36).

Coordination for the air transport was one of the most important tasks among the member states. So in 2001, EACC was established at Eindhoven located in The Netherlands. Coordination, resource utilisation, efficiency gain, interoperability is important issues in working of the EACC. Still EACC is not gaining success due to lack of big transport air carriers and its dependency on NATO for it.

European Union Institute of Security Studies (EUISS)

The EUISS is a think tank institute of the EU and it is based in Paris. It works under CFSP. It was established by the Council Joint Action of 20 July 2001 and started working on 1 January 2002. This Institute is involved in security and defence related research, publication, seminar, conferences and cooperation. According to Article-2 of EUISS, the Institute shall contribute to the development of CFSP, including the ESDP, by conducting academic research and analysis in relevant fields. To that end, it shall, inter alia, produce and, on an ad hoc basis, commission research paper, arrange seminars, enrich the transatlantic dialogue by organising activities similar to those of the WEU Transatlantic Forum and maintain a network of exchanges with other research institutes and think-tanks both inside and outside the EU. This Institute’s work shall involve this network as broadly as possible (European Council 2001e: 1).

European Defence Agency (EDA)

It is a CFSP body set up in 12 July 2004. It refers to improving the EU’s defence capability for ESDP. It had an initial operational capability with limited staff in early 2005. But at the end of the same year it reached to its full operational capability. It acts as a catalyst, promotes collaborations, launch new initiatives and introduce

solutions to improve defence capability. For improved defence capabilities there are four functions of EDA namely

- a. To work for a more comprehensive and systematic approach to defining and meeting the capability needs of ESDP, which includes the harmonisation of military requirement
- b. To enhance the effectiveness of the European defence research and technology which include the promotion of R&T collaboration
- c. To promote and enhance European armament cooperation through establishing programmes, quicker and more effective than in the past
- d. To strengthen defence technology and industrial base and to create an internationally competitive European defence equipment market (EDA Strategic Framework, 2004: 3).

EDA has legal personality and it is governed by three elements with specific function,

Table 3.2 Elements and Functions of European Defence Agency

ELEMENTS	FUNCTION
Head of the Agency	Organisational function, implementation of guidelines and decisions
Steering Board	Decision making body, it includes defence minister of member states which is led by the head of the EDA
Chief Executive	Supervision and coordination of units.

A Long Term Vision (LTV) was issued by EDA in 2006. The LTV focused on the key topics on which the member states should concentrate on in terms of capability development. It includes

- a. Knowledge exploitation: improving intelligence, information and analysis at all levels and developing appropriate forms of network-enabled capability

- b. Interoperability: it focuses on greater commonality of equipment and systems and shared or pooled capabilities
- c. Manpower balance: it finds different ways to enable greater investment by cutting manpower numbers and costs, while providing for “boots on the ground”
- d. Rapid acquisition: it is related to the quicker exploitation of the new technology
- e. Industrial policy: it averts contraction and decline of the European defence industry by increasing investment, consolidates the European technology and industrial base, utilises Europe’s full potential and targets what it wants to preserve and develop
- f. Flexibility for the unforeseen: it recognises the limitations to how far the EU can penetrate the fog of the future (Herz 2009: 2).

Coherence is important for the functioning of the Agency. Research and Technology should support capability development. Armament cooperation has to focus on collaborative programmes, delivering equipments faster and most cost effectively. Industry should produce what the military need tomorrow. EDA houses four communities under one roof: military capability planners, research and technology expert, armament and research programmers and industry & market. This is the unique way of working of EDA i.e. the integrated approach (EDA Strategic Framework 2004: 3).


In 2007-08, the EDA Steering Board had endorsed four strategies, providing the destination and setting the course. These are mentioned in EDA strategic framework (2004) as,

- a. Capability Development Plan (CDP): it defines future capability needs, it connects short term ESDP needs of the EU Headline Goal 2010 to long term capability and capacity needs beyond 2020, for which the EDA long term vision of 2006 forms the original basis. The CDP is a strategic tool, the driver for the R&T investment, armament cooperation and for the defence industries.

- b. European Defence Research & Technology (EDRT) strategy: it helps in the enhancement of more effective R&T in support of military capabilities. The EDRT strategy defines the 'Ends' (in which key technology to invest), the 'Means' (how to do this) and the 'ways' to implement the ends and means through road maps and action plans.
- c. European Armament Cooperation (EAC) strategy: it is to promote and enhance more effective European armament cooperation in support of ESDP capability needs. The EAC strategy defines how to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of European armament programmes by a series of actions, applying lessons learned from past experiences through a 'Guide to Armaments Cooperation Best Practice'.
- d. European Defence Technology and Industrial Base (EDTIB) strategy: it describes the future European defence industrial landscape, based on the three Cs: Capability, Competent and Competitive. The future EDTIB has to be more integrated, less duplicative and more independent, with increased specialisation, for example by establishing industrial centres of excellence. It refers to action fields for which government will be responsible, such as consolidating demand and investment. The strategy link the work on releasing the future EDTIB to the Agency's activities on the European Defence Equipment Market. Special attention is paid to the importance of small and medium sized enterprises with their typical flexibility and capacity to innovate (EDA Strategic Framework 2004: 4).

EDA Steering Board is the highest authority which consist 27 Defence Ministers and chaired by Head of the EDA. Chief Executive is assisted by two Deputy Chief Executive. They help in strategy and operation planning making. Policy and planing unit is important part because it helps in implementing the policies and planning. Effective communication and reporting is important aspect to bridge the gap between top and lower hierarchy, so communication unit is essential body. On the other hand media is required for information to general public for openness and transparency. Capability, R&T, armament and collaboration between corporate and industry and market is required norm for the security and defence development.

Organisation of EDA



Source: www.eda.europa.eu/Aboutus/Howweareorganised/Organisation

Diagram 1: Organisation of EDA

Capability priorities of the EDA

According to EDA, there are 10 priority area of EDA which are following,

- a. Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED)
- b. Medical support
- c. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
- d. Helicopters
- e. Cyber defence
- f. Multinational logistic support
- g. CSDP information exchange
- h. Strategic and tactical airlift management
- i. Fuel and energy.

Now the question arises that how does EDA work? According to EDA, this agency is the place for European defence cooperation. This can only be achieved through an effective coordination at all levels: internally in EDA, between the different defence communities, between the Agency and its participating member states and with other organisation. The focal point of agency is its “integrated way of working”- not only at EDA itself, but also in the participating member states. The paradigm shift in the way of working is dramatically changing capability development in Europe, bringing together all relevant actors early in the process.

The function of EDA is challenged by the security-exemption and limitation of political willingness of the EU member states. Article-296 of the treaty establishing the European Community declared that no member states shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it consider contrary to the essential interests of its security. Any member state may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or the trade in arms, munitions and war materials. Such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the common market regarding products which are not intended specifically for military purposes. That means it

allow the member states of the EU to maintain national control on armament activity and they can protect their essential security interest (Schmitt 2000: 80). Sometimes there is controversy between big and small countries, big country has big defence budget as comparison with small countries. It is difficult for small countries to maintain the big defence budget. It can cause contradiction during defence cooperation.

With the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty on 1 December 2009, the EDA and its tasks are enshrined in the treaties; refer to article 42(3) and article 45 on the TEU. The article 42(3) of the TEU sets that Agency “shall identify operational requirements, shall promote measures to satisfy those requirements, shall contribute to identify and, where appropriate, implementing and measure need to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, shall assist the council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities”.

The EU Operation Centre

Conducting an operation is one of the most difficult tasks for the EU. Command and Control is the basic requirement for the operation. In this sequence the next issue is operation centre i.e. from where the EU can command the operations. So, for the solution of this problem member states provided a suitable EU Operational Headquarters (OHQ). The OHQ is multi-nationalised to plan and command the EU led military operation. There are five member states France, Germany, Greece, Italy and the UK have declared their national OHQs as being available for the autonomous military operations. These OHQs provide necessary premises and technical infrastructure to run a military operation with multinational staffs. The EU's two military operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo managed through the OHQ. One is OHQ Paris for operation ARTEMIS-2003 and second is OHQ Potsdam for operation EUFOR DRC-2006. OHQ works at military or strategic level. The EU Operation Centre is activated since 1 January 2007.


Table 3.3 Operation Headquarters available to the EU

Country	Location
UK	Northwood, London
France	Mont-Valérien, Paris
Germany	Potsdam
Italy	Centocelle, Rome
Greece	Larissa

Source: Chaillot Papers 2007.

Besides OHQs, there are two more Headquarters one is Force Headquarters (FHQ) and second is Component Headquarters (CHQ). FHQ works at operational level and CHQ works at the tactical level. At the operational level FHQ functions as the base of operations, providing command and control over troops on the ground. At the tactical level CHQ might be used to accommodate EU component commanders deployed to the area of operations.

Diagram 2: Headquarters associated with an EU-led operation



Source: Chaillot Paper 2007.

European Gendarmerie force (EGF)

EGF was established on 2004 and came into force in 2006. It is initiative of five EU member states France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Romania joined this group in 2008. It is responsible for the crisis management and civil security action. Civil security means maintaining public security and public order. It assists police forces during peace keeping operations. The main objective is to deploy 800 gendarmerie officers within the timeframe of 30 days and this number can be increased up to 2000 for longer time period. However, it is not directly linked to the EU but the EU tries to coordinate with it in the field of law enforcement, rule of law, civil administration and civil protection (Eurocop Facts 2008: 1).

Table 3.4 European Council and related Structures

Council	Date of Establishment	Date of Enforcement	Structure
Nice European Council	7-9 December 2000	22 January 2001	PSC
Nice European Council	7-9 December 2000	9 April 2001	EUMC
Nice European Council	7-9 December 2000	9 April 2001	EUMS
French-German Security and Defence Council	3 November 1999	2001	EACC
Council Joint Action	1 January 2002	1 January 2002	EUISS
Council Joint Action	2004	12 July 2004	EDA
		1 January 2007	EU Operation Centre
Five EU Defence Ministers meeting, Rome	17 September 2004	20 July 2006	EGF*

*EGF is not directly linked to the EU but considered as subsidiary part of it.

Lisbon Treaty and the New Security Structure

With the enforcement of the Lisbon treaty (2009), there are certain new provisions, modifications and significant changes in policies which also affect the security structure of the EU. New provisions are related to High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Permanent structured cooperation, Mutual defence clause etc. On the other hand significant changes took place in specific provisions for implementing the Common Security and Defence Policy, Petersberg Tasks and EDA. There is also new institutional development in the EU like the formation of European External Action Service (EEAS) and President of the European Council. These new formations are very important in decision making process specially related to security issues.

Now question arises that why security architecture is required and will it really capable to tackle the adverse security issues? Security architecture for the EU is required to face the challenges of 21st century. It is required for the autonomous action plan and decrease dependency on other military organisation. Security architecture and related institution of the EU shows the comprehensive engagement and cooperation among the member states for the enhanced security preparedness and readiness for action. The security architecture also related to multilateralism that means the EU is very much caucus about the request of the UN operations.

Finally it can be said that the establishment of the various security architectures are the part of ESDP under EU's strategic culture. The established structures are responsible for crisis management and conflict prevention. These structures have role from policy making to combat activities in different missions. The security architecture of the EU shows its emerging capability in security sector. It works not only in European continent but also at global level. Establishment of these security related institutions also show its increasing autonomous activity and decreasing dependency on NATO.

The civil-military activities of the EU provide it a special status as it is an emerging security actor in civil-military security sector. This security architecture of the EU is like a back bone for it and without it, the EU cannot conduct any operation. Success of the EU depends upon the coordination of its various security agency. In 21st century, the Union is gradually changing its nature and shifts from political and

economic actor to security actor. It is its geopolitical interest to make world safer and threat free. After the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, it is important for it to create a single European Army. If the EU wants to become an effective security actor then military integration is required.

The study will further examine that without the support of the ESDP and security architecture, the EU cannot become a security actor. The success of the EU depends on the integration of various level of security architecture. Coherence and strategic culture is also helpful in enhancing the EU's capabilities.

CHAPTER 4

THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A SECURITY ACTOR

Security for the EU is not a new concept. Since the end of the Second World War it is cautious about the security issues. But after the implementation of the ESDP, it is defined in a new frame of security. This is related to the civil-military capability of the EU. Under the frame work of the ESDP, it has performed various autonomous civil-military operations. The increased capability during 1999 to 2009 provided it as new face of security actor. Military capability and related influence are important factors for an entity to be called as security actor. It is not only responsible for its security but also it wants to play major role in global security. “The European union is a global actor, ready to share responsibility for global security” (European Council 2004: 1). In this chapter we shall also deal with ESS that is helpful in shaping it as a security actor.

Balkan crisis made the EU to think and develop a credible and autonomous military force that can take action in any adverse situation. 9/11 changed the discourse of the security worldwide and the EU developed its own security strategy in 2003 under its strategic culture that helped in shaping its security structure. “The evolution of the EU places it at the heart of major contemporary debates, not only about the meanings of security in the post-modern world, but also the time honoured and defining the relationship between the sovereignty and the means of violence”(Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 189). It means that within the Europe rivalry among various nation-states and ethnic clashes in Balkan region was very prominent. This caused internal disturbance in the Europe. Till the end of Second World War, Germany was perceived as a threat to sovereignty of other states in the Europe. So Europe was very cautious since the end of the Second World War for its security and stability.

Evolution of the EU Security

Peace and integration have been the important agenda for the EU. This was not possible without the cooperation between France and Germany. The then Council of Europe was a significant component of the European process as a whole. The 1947

Treaty of Dunkirk was an important agreement between the UK and France to prevent resurgence of German militarism. The Pleven Plan¹ for European Defence Community (EDC) was put forward at a defence committee meeting of NATO in October 1950. The EDC could not survive longer and in August 1954 the French National Assembly rejected the proposal because the Pleven Plan had the advantage of firmly linking the German rearmament to European political institutions (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 192). The failure of the EDC initiative marked the end of the deliberation to incorporate European security cooperation into a wider framework of European integration or it can be said that security cooperation divorced from the European integration process (Aybet 2001: 82).

The initiative of the ECSC in 1951 was another important step for the European security by the process of economic integration. The process of economic integration was most success process in providing stability to the EU and strengthens its security by cooperation. Political cooperation was another track to move ahead in enhancing the security of the WEU since the 1960s. The European Community needed strong political cooperation during Cold War period. European Community was hanging between the rivalry of the US and the USSR during Cold War era. The USSR was a threat to WEU and to counter it WEU was dependent on the NATO. “Throughout this time European security cooperation was mainly driven by two external dynamics: the superpower squeeze and Soviet threat. These were related to entrapment and abandonment dilemma (Aybet 2001: 132).

According to the some scholars the Cold War period is the period of frozen peace and end of Cold War came with the “Return of the war” in the Europe. In this period Europe was suffering with the Balkan crisis. There were four wars in Balkan like Slovenia (1991), Croatia (1992-93), Bosnia (1992-95) and Kosovo (1999). The EU was unable to tackle the problem and it was dependent on NATO for the security assistance. This was the question mark on the political and institutional capacity of the EU. The security challenges and related requirement were filled with St. Malo summit of December 1998. It proposed the formulation of the European security structure and related policies. It was advocated that it should be capable in autonomous military

¹ René Pleven was Prime Minister of France in 1950 and he proposed the creation of a Common Defence of Europe. This proposal consisted of the concept of multinational divisions, whereby each division would consist of combat teams from various nations.

action. It has been a prominent economic and political actor since 1951 to 1992 and CFSP as the second pillar of it, motivated to start develop military capability. It was further strongly favoured by the ESDP for developing itself as a security actor since 1999.

The EU as a Security Actor

CFSP under the TEU was established as an intergovernmental pillar of the Union. There were two new policy instruments- Joint Actions and Common Positions. Its objectives are to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principle of the United Nations charter. It is committed to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways, preserve peace and to strengthen international security, to promote international cooperation and favours democracy, rule of law, respect of human rights and fundamental freedom. This promotes the EU to perform as a security actor. As we are dealing with the EU as a security actor, then question raises what kind of power it is actually perceived in international politics. As a security actor it is like a coin having two sides- military and civilian norm. As a military and civilian power it is trying to influence the international affairs.

“The EU is neither a state nor a non-state actor, and neither a conventional international organisation and not an international regime” (Ginsberg 1999: 432). It is intergovernmental and supranational. It is not like a state but behaves like a state. It has institutions for decision and policy-making like a state. In security issues and related operations, member states send their troops and this means it is also dependent on the member states. So it is not single actor but in unique form, it is collectively a security actor like a state.

Now the question arises that what are the basic requirements to become a security actor? In the case of the EU these are the following criteria:

- a. Military and civilian power
- b. Political will power
- c. Security strategy
- d. Influence in international affairs

Military and Civilian Power

Military power is related to the military instrument over civilian tools with effective technology. “An actor which uses military means (exclusively, though admittedly this is difficult to envisage), relies on coercion to influence other actors, unilaterally pursues ‘military or militarised ends’ (again, difficult to envisage this, but we might include here goals such as territorial conquest and acquisition of more military power), and whose foreign policy making is not democratic” (Smith 2004: 5). A pure military power always tries to enhance their military capability and for the fulfilment of their interest and survival, they can attack on the other actor. Military power is required for the territorial defence and balance of power. It is nothing but realistic approach of an actor.

On the basis of above statement we can not say that the EU is a military actor but it is a soft-power² military actor. Its military power is related to peace keeping and conflict management. It is democratic in its foreign policy making. It never used its forces for territorial defence. Some scholars quote it as “Soft Power Europe”.

The EU is not using military means as primary tool for foreign policy, neither is it conducting unilateral action or trying to kill as efficiently as possible. It developed a very distinct defence dimension within its framework, which addresses a new military scheme. Under this scheme military action is to protect and promote universal human rights (Krohn 2007: 10). After the Constitutional Treaty (2004) there were transformations in the EU’s priorities. It should fulfil joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, task of combat forces in crisis management, military advice and assistance task, conflict prevention and peace keeping task, peace making and post-conflict stabilization.

Now the question arises on which basis we can say that the EU is a military actor. It has initiated various military operations. It has developed strong security architecture and related other institutions. PSC, EUMC, EUMS, EDA, EACC, EUBG, EUISS etc are prominent example. It has performed various military operations during 2003-2009. It launched operation CONCORDIA in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and operation ARTEMIS in Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003.

² Soft Power is ability to obtain what one wants through co-option and attraction. Joseph Nye identifies value, culture, policies and institutions as primary currency of soft power actor.

Operation EUFOR ALTHEA was performed in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2004. EUFOR also involved in Chad and EUNAVFOR ATLANTA in Gulf of Aden in 2008.

The next episode is related to the civilian capability of the EU. It means involvement in non-military action. "Civilian capability is non military in nature and it includes economic, diplomatic and cultural policy instruments" (Smith 2004: 1). The term "Civilian Power" is coined by François Duchêne. He referred the European Community as a "civilian group of countries long on economic power and relatively short on armed forces" (Duchêne 1973 in Krohn 2007: 4). The civilian power EU also includes police training facility, border monitoring, reconstruction and development work, send law expert on disputed issues. Civilian power is a subject of democratic control and is willing to address international matters in cooperation with others.

Today the EU itself is a best example of a civilian actor. Europe has been massively involved in two world wars and the Balkan crisis. The formation of the EU with CFSP and later ESDP changed its look from economic and political actor to security actor. Its civilian norm is also reflected by the ESS 2003. It clearly reads "spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order" (Solana 2003: 4). Its civilian norms also reflected by the Copenhagen Criteria 1993. It is largest provider of the development assistance, favours Doha Development Agenda, and supports disarmament initiative. It strongly opposes the killing of innocent Tamil minority in Sri Lanka during 2008-09.

Its civilian capability cannot be strengthened without the help of military capability. That means, combat forces are important to provide a shield to civilian operation. The Petersberg Task is changed by Amsterdam Treaty. Now it also includes task of combat forces in crisis management. Without a credible military and autonomous action civilian norm cannot be achieved.

There are various examples of its civilian mission. EUPM in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2003, EUPOL PROXIMA in FYROM and law mission EUJUST THEMIS in Georgia in 2004, AMM in Indonesia, EUJUST LEX Iraq and EUBAM Rafah in 2005 and EUPOL in Afghanistan in 2007 were civilian missions.

Political Will Power

Any entity cannot become a security actor until unless it has a strong political will power, political support and political stability. The Treaty of St. Malo (1998) shows a strong political will power of the UK and France by which they successfully managed to provide a new face to the EU. “Developing appropriate identities and acting accordance with them require resources and capabilities. The tending of capabilities-creating, sustaining, mobilising and regulating them is the task of governance [and that without] such a structure of capabilities, little in the way of individual or collective purpose can be accomplished” (March and Olsen 1995 in Rieker 2007: 4). It means that if the EU is to be characterised as a security actor, it needs to have central political capabilities.

March and Olsen further identified four broad types of capabilities that are particularly relevant to governance. These are,

- a. Political Capability- it is referred as rights and authorities. Rights and authorities are capabilities. It is in written form and codified as rules. These are enforced by the related institutions. Officials play important role in using these authority for smooth and regular working of the organisation.
- b. Resource- it means the assets that make it possible to do things or to make others to do things. Those assets include money, property, time, information, facilities and equipment.
- c. Competencies and knowledge- it is the type of political capability that is possessed by individuals, professions and institutions. Individual has competencies from education and training. Institution encodes knowledge in traditions and rules.
- d. Organizing capacity- it is important because it allows effective utilisation of formal rights and authority, resources and competencies. March and Olsen argue that “without organisational talents, experience and understanding, the other capabilities are likely to be lost in problems of coordination and control, logistic, scheduling, allocation and mobilisation of efforts, division of labour, specialization, motivation, budget, planning, organisational meeting, collective expectations (March and Olsen 1995 in Rieker 2007: 5).

Security Strategy

Under this section we shall deal with the ESS and how it is helpful for the EU. Strategy is a long term or short term planning. No operation can get success without an effective strategy. "A strategy is a policy making tool which, on the basis of the values and the interests of in this case the EU, outlines the long-term overall policy objectives to be achieved and the basis categories of instruments to be applied to that end. It serves as a reference framework for day to day policy making in a rapidly evolving and increasingly complex international environment and it guides the definition of the means i.e. the civilian and military capabilities- that need to be developed" (Biscop 2005: 1). After 9/11, the EU evaluated its security policies and it needed security strategy. Javier Solana, High Representative of CFSP was given task to draft the security strategy for the EU. At the Thessalonica European Council on 19-20 June, he presented the first draft related to security strategy. On 12 December 2003, the European Council meeting in Brussels adopted the final document, "A Secure Europe in a Better World- European Security Strategy" (European Council 2003).

The adoption of the strategic document covering in the whole of the EU foreign policy, across the pillars, from aid and trade to diplomacy and the military. Soon after its adoption the ESS would disappear into some dusty drawer- the key of which some would probably have like to present to NATO for safekeeping. There was indeed a risk that the adoption of the ESS, which was accompanied by the necessary pomp and circumstances, would be nothing more than a one-off demonstration of regained unity after the intra-European divide over Iraq, a step of high symbolic value but with little impact on actual policy-making. A stratagem rather than a strategy..., (Biscop and Andersson 2008: 2).

In international politics events, actors and processes are important. Without events and processes, actor is meaningless that means actor will have no opportunity to play a role. "Without strategy any actor can really only be a 'reactor' to events and developments. Equipped with a clear strategy and endowed with a strong strategic culture, an actor can shape the world (Biscop and Andersson 2008: 4).

Now questions arises that what is ESS, why is it needed and how does it work? First, ESS is a strategic draft which reaffirms common determination to face our

responsibility for guaranteeing a secure Europe in a better world. It will enable the European Union to better deal with the threats and Global challenges and realize the opportunities facing the EU. It shows an active, capable and more coherent European Union would make an impact on global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world (Presidency Conclusion European Council 2003b: 11). Second, The ESS as a strategic draft is required to identify the threats and challenges within democratic world. ESS provides the legitimacy to the EU and partners to take action against the threat. It is also required for the providing space for evolving strategic culture. It shows the willingness, commitment to fulfill the objectives. It provides the safeguard to EU's interest worldwide. It also helps the EU to take decisions. Third, It is very difficult to say how does ESS work, but provides guidelines to perform the EU in a specific manner.

The European Security Strategy 2003 is broadly divided into three parts

- a. The security environment: global challenges and key threat
- b. Strategic objectives
- c. Policy implication for Europe.

In the era of globalization we cannot ignore the global challenges and related key threats.

War like situation, hunger, pandemic, AIDS, ethnic clashes, global warming are global challenges for us. These challenges have no boundary and these are transnational in their nature. These can kill millions of people worldwide. Since the end of the Cold War more than 5 million peoples are killed and most of them are civilians. The most affected section is children and women.

“Security is precondition of development. Conflict not only destroy infrastructure, including social infrastructure, it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. A number of countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty” (European Council 2003a: 2). ESS identifies five key threats like terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflict, state failure and organized crime.

Terrorism is a hydra headed monster and seems to be a strategic threat to human beings. In the 21st century it is one of the most dangerous threats. Some states use it as foreign policy tool to counter their foe. Terrorists are non-state actor and affect the decision making of states. 9/11 attack on US is one of the major terrorist activity ever in history. It changed the whole dynamics of international security. Terrorist attacks in London and Madrid made the EU to think about their security policy. It is also linked to violent religious extremism. Terrorist organizations are well funded and they use modern technology. It can create political, social and cultural crisis. Taliban and Al Qaeda are most dangerous terrorist organization of the world. Not only Europe but also whole world is facing the problem of terrorism.

Atomic, Chemical and Biological weapons are considered as WMD. These are potential threat to human being. Spread of nuclear technology is major concern these days. If once it goes to wrong hand then it can be misused. So, safeguard measures must be there for nuclear technology. “The last use of WMD was by the Aum terrorist sect in Tokyo underground in 1995, using sarin gas. 12 people were killed and thousands injured. Two years earlier, Aum had sprayed Anthrax spores on a Tokyo street” (European Council 2003a: 3). Atomic weapons can kill human being n-numbers of time or it can be said that due to the WMD and possibility of Thermo nuclear warfare, conditions of “age of overkill”³ is created. WMD can increase the degree of destructiveness so it must be eliminated.

Regional conflicts are third key threat in this sequence. This is not new issue but it can cause instability in concern region. Conflict in Middle- East, Balkan crisis and Kashmir issue are prominent example. It promotes terrorist activities and it can cause state failure. It demands WMD to fight against their rivals. It causes ethnic clinching, rape of women and refugee problems.

Abuse of power, weak institutions, lack of democratic norms and accountability, massive corruption and dictatorship can cause state failure. Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan under Taliban are examples of it. State failure can create the regional instability. Failed state may be heaven for terrorist and related activities. Military

³ John Medaris coined the term ‘overkill’. Max Lerner characterizes the present period as the “age of overkill”. The United States and the Soviet Union individually have the capacity to kill every person in the world many times over. He contends that today we are living in an age of potential overkill, of power surplus rather than power scarcity.

coup may be possible outcome of the state failure. It can create fear psychosis in neighboring country.

Organized crime is direct threat to internal security of a country. It includes cross border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrant weapon, fake currency and money laundering. Local criminal gangs are generally involved in it. Sometimes these gangs make link with terrorist organization. Money laundering and fake currency affect the economy of the country. Illegal trafficking of women is related to the sex trade. Illegal migrants may involve in criminal activities and it is threat to internal security of a country. The money earned by the drug trade is used in purchasing of arms and ammunition and payment of private army. It is dangerous for the law and order of the country. These are the potential key threat worldwide and the EU as a security actor has to tackle these problems by using its military and civilian capabilities.

Second dimension of the ESS is strategic objectives. Threats are strategic in nature so there is requirement of strategic objective to identify and counter these threats. Threats are defused and diverse in nature so “we need both to think globally and act locally” (European Council 2003a: 6). According to EES 2003 the EU has adopted some measures to tackle the key threat. It includes European Arrest Warrant, block terrorist financing and mutual legal assistance with the US. It supports the measures of the International Atomic Energy Agency for nuclear technology safeguard. It tightens the export control, illegal shipping and illicit procurement. It has also signed multilateral treaties for verification provisions.

ESS has particular emphasis on the European Neighbourhood Policy. The aim is building security in the neighboring countries. “The ESS recognizes that the EU has a special responsibility towards its neighbourhood and that its strategic aim and vision is to ‘promote a ring of well-governed countries to the East of the EU and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relation” (European Council 2003a: 9). Diplomacy played major role with the European neighbouring countries. In 2004, the EU went through Big-Bang enlargement towards Eastern Europe. It integrated 10 countries of the Eastern Europe. The EU can potentially project itself with the full complement of economic, political, diplomatic and military instruments and can most effectively promote its distinctive comprehensive conception of security. Thus the EU’s neighborhood is a testing

ground for its strategic ambitions to be taken seriously as an autonomous and powerful actor in international politics. The importance of the immediate neighbourhood for it is that it is also the principal testing ground for the EU's claim to have developed a unique capacity to promote the internal transformation of states, which is driven less by a realist calculus of military power than by the civilian tool of economic integration and moral persuasion (Dannreuther 2008: 63).

The neighbourhood policy is directly related to check the illegal migration, trafficking and other crimes. The EU is very much concerned with the problems of Mediterranean and Middle-East countries. Huge number of Muslim migration in Europe from North African countries created problems and fear psychosis in minds of white Europeans. Israel-Palestine issue is another problematic issue here. Promoting economic and political transformation in its neighborhood is counter-balanced by number of strategic and security driven interest which support a much more conservative and status-quo approach. "Interest in transformation is directly related to the 'welfare divide' between the enlarged EU and its new neighbour. According to the 2003 economic situations, the 450 million population of the EU enjoyed a GDP per capita of € 21,300 while the neighbouring countries with a combined population of 400 million had a nominal GDP per capita which was less than € 2,000. On the political side, this 'welfare divide' is matched with democratic or governance gap, where the majority of the countries had authoritarian rule with weak institutions" (Dannreuther 2008: 72). These could create the problem of extreme poverty and uncertainty in livelihood. It could lead to criminal activities.

Political reconciliation and conflict resolution is a major concern of the EU in the Middle-East and Balkan region. In Balkan region ethno-nationalism is very strong. It caused Balkan crisis just after the end of the Cold War. According to the ESS 2003, resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict is a strategic priority but still the EU is not successful in it. In the same line the EU has to face the problem with status quo approach of the Israel. It does not want to lose the captured territory. So interest conflict is there. These are the difficult question to solve it because it is directly related to the national interest of the country and no country want to compromise their national interest. It can create the situation of war among countries and terrorist activities and it is prominent in Middle-East.

External interference in neighbourhood can also create problem. Russian interference in Georgia in 2008 created war like situation. This time was very crucial for the EU because any mistake could cause full fledged war. In similar way US is planning to establish missile defense shielding in the European neighbourhood. It is not accepted by the Russia. These issues create tension between US and Russia and it affects the EU security.

Now the question arises what should be the effective way to minimize the problems and create the environment of mutual confidence. Effective multilateralism is the best approach in this way. "The first great commitment is to defend our security and spread freedom by building effective multinational institutions and supporting effective multilateral action" (Bush 2004). According to ESS 2003, "our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. We are committed to upholding and developing international law. The fundamental for the international relations is the United Nations charter".

Strengthening of international and regional organization is necessary for the effective multilateralism. The EU has strong belief in the UN system because it provides the international platform where in collective manner issues are discussed and try to find out solutions. It is always ready to send their troops on UN request. However all the decision making is not accepted by the member states and there are always some confrontation. So the EU has responded by developing a defuse set of ad hoc form of cooperation with elements of the UN system. "Effective multilateralism requires not only broad international support and legitimacy, but also the capacity to generate initiatives, and political leadership to set the agenda, define deadlines, mobilize resources and promote effective implementation. A key qualification in this context is the ability to form and sustain broad-based coalition" (Maul 2005: 786). It means without any international support and authority no actor or entity cannot get success. It also depends upon the availability of the resources.

It is not always possible to create consensus at the multilateral level. It can be seen in the Iraq war 2003, where the EU has clear differences with US. In Iraq, no WMD is found and US made an attack on it. It was clear breach of UN mandate. Kosovo crisis was another point where UN mandate was not respected and Serbia was attacked by NATO in 1999. There should requirement of reform in the UN system due to these

types of failure. The EU can play major role here as a political catalyst. Regional organization can also play the important role in effective multilateralism at the regional level. The EU has relationship with ASEAN, SAARC and other regional organizations where these entities can resolve the problem at regional level. At the regional level, the EU is largest humanitarian aid provider in the world.

Third aspect is policy implication of the EU which is related to more active, more capable and more coherent Europe. The ESS is implemented to achieve far-reaching changes in how the EU conducts its foreign and security policy in a coherent manner. The issues of coherence is complex, arising at many stages in the policy making process, also at the political level. “Coherence means positive connections and it sets a higher standard for the EU’s various policies” (Tietje 1997: 211-12 cited in Anderson 2008: 123). Coherence is interconnection of external and internal policy goal. In coherence, actor can choose any institution and policy tool. “Coherence can be divided into two dimensions: ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ coherence. Horizontal coherence concerns the extent to which the various external policies and activities of the EU’s institutions, agencies and representatives are logically connected and mutually supportive. Vertical coherence concerns the extent to which the external policies and activities of the member states are logically connected and mutually supportive with those of the EU’s institutions, agencies and representatives” (Tietje 1997:211-12 cited in Andersson 2008: 124). It means the EU is only stronger when it acts with its member together with cooperation and supportive nature on policy making. By this process both the EU and the member states can avoid clash of their interest fulfillment.

A security actor should more active, more capable and it should work in effective partnership. “Active policies are needed to develop a strategic culture that foster early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention” (European Council 2003a: 11). It requires military capability, the EU must be active in UN, and it should follow process of negotiation or arbitration as possible to prevent war. Capability can acquire through the establishment of the security architecture. For it, it has already established PSC, EUMC, EUMS, EUBG, EDA, EUISS and other defense institutions. It is not alone capable in establishing these institutions. Member state’s participation and concept of pooling of sovereignty played important role in it. It has strong diplomatic and strategic partnership with various countries like US, Russia, China, Japan and

India. The EU is also working with civil society, private sector and international financial institutions for greater coordination in security issues.


Influence in International Affairs

It is an important part for the EU as a security actor. Without influence no entity can get a strong position in the international affairs. Power is the strongest factor to increase the influence. Today, the EU is increasing its influence with the various activities. Its civil-military role at the global and regional level makes it different from others. Under civilian norms, it is largest aid provider in the world. It is a strong supporter of arbitration, negotiation and meditation for peace process. It believes in the preventive engagement to avoid war. It believes in the multilateralism. It has strong support in third world countries due to its civilian norms. It has performed border monitoring and policing mission in its neighbouring countries. The role of the EU in Afghanistan is constructive in nature. It has used its military and police force in various missions. It is ready to send their troops on UN demand. Today, whole world is looking towards it. It has strong economic and political base and it is establishing civil-military capability to counter the defuse threat. Some scholars use the term 'Quiet Superpower' for the EU. Without the effective partnership no actor can become as a security actor. Hence, the EU should make partnership with other actors.

The EU as a Security Actor and Relationship with NATO and OSCE

Today, it is an emerging security actor but it does not mean that it is challenging the US. Within the Europe, the EU is not only a security actor but NATO is still very relevant and most of the members of the EU are part of NATO. OSCE is third organization in the Europe for security cooperation in the European continent.

Diagram 3: The EU, NATO and OSCE



During the Cold War period US-led NATO was very prominent in Europe. But after the end of the Cold War and demise of the USSR, NATO seems to be smaller in activity but it played very important role during the Balkan crisis. After the formation of the ESDP, the EU became more autonomous but still it is using assets of NATO. New security challenges moved NATO “go out of area”⁴ approach. It means that it has to focus outside Europe and move towards Asia. Both have shared interest in Afghanistan. Events of 9/11 fuelled this concept. Approach based differences made them different i.e. US is a hard power and follows pre-emptive measures, on the other hand the EU is soft power and it follows preventive approach. “Common democratic values, a shared identity and institutional ties will hold Europe and America together. It means that the US and the EU share a common interest in defending democracy against potential threats like terrorism and in maintaining the liberal international economic order on which capitalism rests. Common interest based on common values will reassert them” (Nye 2000 in Cottey 2007: 72).

During the Prague NATO summit 2003, US President Bush stated that the survival of the NATO is dependent on credible European capabilities. This means development of the EU defence is directly related to the strengthening the NATO also. The reason is that most of the EU member states are also the member of the NATO and still they have strong belief in NATO. In the informal NATO meeting of defence ministers in Warsaw in September 2003, the then defence secretary of the US Donald Rumsfeld proposed for the integration of the NATO Response Force and European Rapid Reaction Force. Both countries have also defence and security collaboration. US participated in the EU rule of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX). The US contributed 81 officers to the total of 1700 international staff in the mission. It also participated in the EU training mission for the Somali soldiers in Somalia and Uganda. NATO is an organisation for security and cooperation on the Europe. The events of 9/11 changed both NATO and OSCE to focus on terrorism. So there is a requirement of cooperation in the European security structure.

The OSCE was born during the Cold War period and it has remained one of the primary regional organisations in Europe. It is an important part of security architecture in Europe. The OSCE approach is common and comprehensive. By the

⁴ Richard Linger used this term in US Senate in 1993 and called for new security tasks beyond the defence of the member’s territories.

comprehensive approach to security covers all routes to instability, but particularly traditional or strategic security. The OSCE has appeared to focus increasingly more on the human dimension which makes it nearer to the EU. 'The Helsinki Final Act' (1975) was important because it gave birth to politico-military dimension. In case of military dimension it is limited to OSCE region.

Strategic Culture

Javier Solana has described as 'a strategic culture that foster early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention'. Strategic capability is necessary for the EU to make its security and defence policy credible and useful. The developing strategic culture is totally different in its nature as comparison with the other partners. Its strategic culture is the combination of the strategic objectives and civil-military aspect of capability with preventive engagement. The actual beginning of the strategic culture is started with the implementation of the ESDP. The beginning of the strategic culture was indication of de-hyphening with US in development of civil-military capability. Under it, it needed huge military assets and infrastructure. The 'Capability Commitment Conference' of November 2000 took place in Brussels and the EU offered amounting to 100,000 troops, 400 aircrafts and 100 ships. "It needed pool of manpower and equipment. The force would need to be improved before the most demanding Petersberg tasks are to be fully satisfied that certain operational capability were still lacking, and that crucial strategic capability needed improvement, including strategic air and sea transport, command and control system and particularly strategic intelligence, where serious effort would be needed" (Cornish and Edwards 2001: 593). It was suggested that these should be developed in coherent and complementary manner.

Cornish and Edwards try to examine the EU's character not only as a security actor but also as a strategic actor. With the military capability it has to focus on humanitarian and peacekeeping task. Without military capability, "it is difficult to provide protective shield to civilian norm and it may prove as ring hollow. Reliability and legitimacy is necessary for the autonomous action. Appropriate level and depth of the civil-military integration is necessary. Without cooperation, it is difficult to tackle the complex problem so cooperation is inevitable. Hence, it should cooperate with NATO/US and not challenge them" (Cornish and Edwards 2005: 802).

Acquiring the capabilities is most important part of the strategic culture. It can be armed force or high-end combat force. But the civilian capability is different here and it talks about unarmed forces as preventive approach. Kagan described as the Americans 'making the dinner' and the Europeans 'doing the dishes' (Kagan 2003 in Meyer 2006: 176). It means the US fights a war and the EU deals later with peace keeping, reconstruction and nation-building. Afghanistan War 2001 is a good example of it, where US waged a war and it causes heavy destruction. The EU is still engaged in Afghanistan for its reconstruction and provided huge amount of humanitarian aid. It create question mark on EU's strategic culture that still it is not much capable as US.

Capability is an integral part of the strategic culture. Its crisis management capability needed an army corps of 50000-60000 troops, available at 60 days notice and sustainable up to one year. Tactical capabilities, identification of priorities, planning-budgeting, European Capability Action Plan to rectify the remaining deficiencies, achieve capability by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management option covered by the TEU is necessary for mission. Without advanced technology, it is difficult to achieve any successful mission so in this line the EU should fill the transatlantic gap. It means as a security actor it must create a strategic identity at the global level.

Finally it can be said that the largest achievement of the EU as a security actor is shift from 'zone of turmoil' to 'zone of peace'. Approach of it is totally different from the other entity because it has preventive approach in its action with soft power and cooperative nature. Its strategic culture provides it strategic identity. Integration of its civil-military capability makes it capable to think global and act local. We can say that it has successfully established a bridge with two lane road network, one is civilian and other is military lane. This is guided by strategic draft ESS. This draft provides new global security agenda for the EU. It can be said that it has developed itself as a security community also at the local or regional level. With the grouping of 27 member states it successfully manages to abolish the conflicts by peaceful means.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The study has shown how the EU as a security actor is a gradual and incremental process. It is not an easy task for an entity but it achieved this profile in a different way. It is not a complete military as well as civilian process but it is combination of these two processes. In this study, it can be seen that how various intergovernmental meetings accelerated the process of becoming as a security actor. Each meeting strengthen and provided special criteria to the EU. ESDP played one of the most important roles and during its 10 years of journey from 1999 to 2009, development ESS 2003 was a major achievement. It is a security directive for the EU because it provides guideline to it. During that period, it also established security architecture. Without security architecture, an entity seems to be militarily paralysed so it is an important part of a security actor.

The End of Cold War changed the situation of the world politics and it came with the new unipolar structure of the world. US one again came as a hegemonic power. In whole scenario of Balkan crisis, it played a dominant role. European powers were silent during this period but at the end of the 20th century, it changed its profile and tried to convert itself as a security actor. This process was started with the Treaty of St. Malo. Economically and politically the EU is a mature entity but as a security actor it is like an infant. Becoming a security actor is not an easy task. Establishing influence is the first necessary condition and it can be possible through military power. The study has shown only military capability is not important but civilian capability is also important for a security actor.

Classical realism clearly says politics is governed by the human nature and international politics is through concept of interests which is defined in terms of power. After the St. Malo Treaty, interest of the EU is completely changed and it is trying to establish itself as a security actor. In realism, this interest can only fulfilled by military capability. Operational BG and its military missions show its developing military capability.

Power politics is directly related to the realism and it creates influence and hegemony for an entity. Anarchy, survival and state as an actor are important factors within realism. Anarchy on the world stage causes states to be obsessed with security and it results in a security dilemma where every state wants to enhance its security. Self-help is an important aspect of the anarchy. The EU and its ESDP is directly related to the power politics. The Balkan crisis after 1991 created anarchic conditions in that part and it was critical that how Europe could respond to this situation. In this situation, the EU decided to work as a self-help group and decided to form autonomous military capability after the St. Malo Treaty. At that moment definitely the EU failed to play a role as an actor but this situation made it aware about the need to become a security actor. In a realist perspective, the EU is not a state and so the question arises here how it can be categorised as a state actor? The EU is a grouping of twenty-seven countries and each country is like a unit and these units interact with each other within a system more in foreign policy. This system may be the European Council or the European Parliament where collectively it takes decisions and the EU seems to be a state actor because all the decisions are taken at the EU level.

During 1999-2009, the Union took several military missions and these military missions are different from realist views. It creates a question mark on the Union that its approach cannot be realistic because these military missions are preventive in nature. That means it is for peace-keeping and conflict resolution. On the other hand the EU can also be judged through offensive and defensive realism. It is not only responsible for its own security but it played an important role outside Europe also. Offensive realism in terms of security suggests that an actor should pursue security policies that weaken their potential enemies and increase their power relative to all others. The EU is offensive in nature but not against any state. It is offensive against terrorism, WMD, organised crime, failed states and regional conflict and defensive for the human rights, rule of law and democracy. Most of the EU's military missions are for the protection of democracy and rule of law. Operation ATALANTA of the EU is a perfect example of offensive realism for it because it took action against piracy in the Gulf of Aden in 2008. On the other hand defensive realism sees war can be avoided by creating institutions. The EU is itself a good example of it. It avoided war and followed the economic integration to create a war-free European continent.

Military capability is directly related to the power notion in international relation theory. Without this capability no country can act as an actor. It is military capability that provides autonomy in military affairs. In this study, it has been examined also why military capability is necessary for the EU? It is not only related to decreasing the dependence over US led NATO but it is also related to providing security umbrella or security shield to its norms. It also can be said that military capability is related to military security. Security dilemma is directly related to the military capability. Events of 9/11 created the condition of security dilemma in the EU. It was another reason for the EU that it must have military capability to counter various threats.

Military capability of the EU can not be considered as the balance of power with US. Both are not rivals to each other but it is all about the decreasing dependency over US. Today, the US is following an 'out of area approach' in security matters. It means, no longer US will be always present in European affairs. It led to two things, first the EU is politically mature entity and it is now capable to solve its problem in its multilayered political system such as through Commission. Second, this approach motivated the Union to develop credible capability in the absence of US. Now, it also can be said that out of area approach created a power vacuum in Europe. Then who is capable to fill this gap? The Union itself successfully managed it. This study also focused on how in the near future US may return to Europe. It is directly related to the idea of missile shielding programme in Europe and the European neighbourhood by the US. It can create threat perception to Russian interest and Russia can take coercive action in its surroundings. So it can create a possibility for the return of the US in Europe and the Union must be prepared for a realistic approach as it gave clear indication by forming CSDP by Lisbon Treaty and future ambitions of the Union.

Now, this study one again raises this question that does the evolution of the ESDP signify European challenge to US in the military arena? Here two approaches convergence and divergence can be applied. Divergence shows that the EU is reluctant to dependent on US for its security so it wants to develop it own credible military forces. On the other hand convergence shows both are cooperating each other on security issues and the EU still lack in military assets so convergence again make it nearer to US for use of NATO assets.

Neoclassical realism focuses on unit level variables which must support the existing system. It means how power is perceived and how leadership is exercised. It is reflected through the Lisbon Treaty. It came with new changes such as EEAS, then definitely this unit perceives power and according to it, leadership will response. It manages general foreign relation, security and defence policy and control situation centres for intelligence. It has intelligence capabilities to response EU's crises and leadership of this unit will response according to the intelligence information.

Constructivism is another important method by which this study can be justified. It is about ideas, cooperation and norms. If roots of the power politics lie in human nature then it is also human consciousness and ideas that led to cooperation. Ideas and material forces are responsible for how actors interpret their material reality and are interested in how agents produce structure and structure produce agents. The formation of the EU is example of greater cooperation among the European countries. This is the product of human idea and cooperation. The EU started itself as economic actor and then political actor that made it different in international affairs. It is proved as reality due to the political willingness and enhanced cooperation. Evolution of the ESDP at the end of 20th century was important change in issues in European security. Different ideas and material forces interacted with each other that caused the formation of ESDP. Balkan crisis provided situational condition to the EU that it should develop its own security infrastructure.

It is easier to explain on analysis the role of the EU using constructivism. As EU's actorness has evolved and it continues to grow and change, it draws attention to the dynamic quality of actorness of the EU. This cannot be captured by neo-realism as it does not focus on the internal dimension of an actor. The EU is determined to protect human rights, minorities, rule of law and democracy promotion. It was first placed in Copenhagen Criteria and then focused in ESS 2003. It is directly related to the civilian approach of the EU. It performed more than twelve civilian operations which are related to monitoring, supervision, training programme, legal advice and infrastructure development. The EU has always been civilian in nature but the change in geopolitical culture also changed its ideas towards international politics. Development of strategic culture and formulating ESS 2003 as a grand strategy are important achievements of the EU.

Culture is an integral part of the EU and thus the EU in this regard; it is strategic culture that can be connected to the EU. This strategic culture is related to the development of military capability. It is a gradual and continuing process. It depends upon the security environment i.e. development of strategic culture is related to security perception. Initially the EU was more civilian but Post Cold War security environment changed its perception towards security and it turned towards military culture. Events of 9/11 again fuelled it and it needed a grand strategy as apart of its strategic culture. This strategy is related to drafting of ESS 2003. It includes various norms like multilateralism, integrating neighbourhood and coherence.

Since the end of the Second World War, there were huge changes in ideas and material forces with the passes of time. It is 21st century and there is need of new dynamism in ideas and cooperation. Formation of the EU as a security actor was an idea and the political willingness provided it material force to it. Becoming a security actor is objective reality and political willingness for it is a subjective reality. Social responses cannot be ignored after political cooperation and willingness. Social responses works as material force and it can be seen in referendum after intergovernmental process. It means that European society can say 'Yes' or 'No' for any policy. The Constitutional Reform Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty are good examples of it. It means the EU is not only limited to political ideas and cooperation but it is deeply routed to the society and its acceptance.

This study focuses how on multilateralism, neighbourhood policy and coherence are helpful for the EU to create its different image in international politics. After the disintegration of Soviet Russia world became unipolar but 21st century came with new international players that believe in multilateralism and support for international system like UN. The EU is strong supporter of UN and its norm and it is reflected in the TEU. Its neighbourhood policy is directly related to the security and stability in the neighbouring countries. A secure neighbour means a secure and stable Europe. It is helpful in creation of zone of peace and stability in European continent. Coherence is related to the deepening of the connectivity with its partners for cooperation and tackle threats.

Today, the EU is a grouping of 27 countries and each country has their geographical size, structure of their military capability, economy and finally national interest. In

realist view no country is ready to compromise with their national interest. But it is the EU that developed different norm which is related to the pooling of sovereignty as an approach for greater integration and preventing the conflict between interest at national level and at the EU level. Economy matters for the smaller countries of the EU and it has been seen that they are reluctant to spend more on the defence. Here economic structure provides material force for the smaller countries to develop idea for cooperation with the EU. The Economic crisis of 2008 changed the economic efficiency and circumstances of European countries so it can re-evaluate its economic efficiency for defence expenditure and other domestic activities. It may create relative drift among the big economies and smaller economy of the EU. So, it is necessary for the EU that it must create combination in its defence budgeting and economic interest of smaller countries.

The Treaty of Maastricht came with CFSP, it provided new dimension to the EU as a part of foreign and security policy and its agenda was very clear for security in all ways. Treaty of St. Malo and Helsinki European Council provided it military profile and treaty of Lisbon reenergised both CFSP and ESDP with new setups. It is very difficult to predict, what is the hidden agenda of the EU in near future? But in this study, it is clear that the EU still have to wait for becoming as a full fledge security actor. After 1999, it got many opportunities and it utilised these opportunities to become as an actor. But still it is not a real actor in aspects of military security. It only proved as back-up provider to civilian operation.

The EU as a whole is different in its own continent and it is different outside the European continent. It is related to the vision and decision making at national level and the EU level. Most of the EU's members are part of NATO and they took part in NATO military activity. It is their individual decision at the national level and it seems to be more realistic in nature. It can be seen in the case of Afghanistan War 2001, Iraq War 2003 and current ongoing Libyan crisis (2011) and most participants are from Europe. On the other hand when decision are taken at the EU level for military action then it starts facing problem due to lack of resources, lack of effective coordination, lack of strategic lift of capability. It creates problem for military missions. In both the cases most members are common in both NATO and the EU but it is only due to leadership factor that creates difference between NATO and the EU. NATO is led by US but in the EU, institutions are prominent. Most EU members feel

more secure under NATO umbrella. The decision of making credible force, autonomous action and reducing the dependency over NATO in St. Malo treaty was only taken by the UK and France. It was not the decision of all members and in 2004 the EU came with 10 new members which were part of former Soviet Russia so their belief for security, defence and national interest collectively lies with NATO. So it is a drift within the EU members.

The strategic culture of the EU should not be limited to the EU itself, it must focus on next door neighbours and it is directly related to the future security perspective of the EU. Arctic region has huge natural resources and it is not only claimed by Russia but also by US and other countries. In near future, it can create problems and increase tensions between Russia and US. It will be a threat for the security of the EU. It should also include Mediterranean, Maghrib and Caucasus region to create a greater zone of peace and stability. But in the Russian-Georgian conflict, the EU failed to utilise the opportunity and it seemed to be a silent actor in the whole discourse of conflict. Arab Spring is also proved as a litmus test for the EU and it has been seen that the EU members are fragmented over it. France, UK and Italy supported NATO action and Germany made distance on this issue. The EU is again divided over Libya and this shows that a realistic approach is step ahead to constructivism when the decision-making process goes on at the national level.

Absolute and relative gains are important for the EU as a security actor from an International Relations perspective. The EU as an actor is definitely interested in increasing its power and influence as it can be seen through its various policies and civil-military operations. It is not possible without cooperation and it focuses on strategic partnership and coherence with its neighbourhood partners. This process is helpful in increasing its capability. On the other hand, how much influence other entities might achieve relative to the EU. It achieves a glory of global actor especially in the security sector. It is also identified as a silent power. This process provides it wider and deepened integration and its military integration is important in this respect. By this process, it has established a different identity at the global level. Today most of the regional organisations want to follow it. It is trying to develop itself as a security community. Relatively other entities show confidence in it. They want good and cooperative relationships with the EU.

The EU is combination of power maximiser as well as security maximiser with respect to its military and civil capabilities respectively. After the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, it enhanced its capability but it should be careful about the defused threats and these threats are like “Hydra-Headed Monsters” so relatively it must increase its capability and utilise the opportunity to maintain its position at global level. Today’s Europe is new Europe and there are huge opportunities in coming future. So “Soft Power” is not enough for the EU. It must create new institution under its strategic culture by which it can coordinate with its effective partners in near future. It should expand its area of military capability and try to become as an active security actor but not as a silent actor. Today world community is looking towards EU and every country wants a strategic partnership with it. The EU should not loose the hope of world community and it should play effective and result oriented role.

Finally in this study, it can be said that the EU has conducted various civil and military operation with the help of security architecture which was established during 1999 to 2009. These operations could not get success without the help of security architecture. These security architectures are back bone for the EU military capability. So with the help of strategic culture and security architecture, the EU can develop itself as a security actor.

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