

US PERCEPTION OF THE KASHMIR ISSUE

**Dissertation submitted to
Jawaharlal Nehru University in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the award of the degree of**

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

SANTOSH SINGH



**American Studies Division
Centre for American and West European Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi - 110067
INDIA
2001**



जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES
NEW DELHI-110067


Centre for American and West
European Studies
School of International Studies


July 2001.

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled "**US PERCEPTION OF THE KASHMIR ISSUE**", submitted by **SANTOSH SINGH** in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of this University is his own work, and has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other University.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


PROF. RAJENDRA K. JAIN
(Chairperson)


DR. CHINTAMANI MAHAPATRA
(Supervisor)

Dedicated to

*The Indian Soldiers who laid down their
lives defending Kashmir*

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I feel immense pride in acknowledging my gratitude to my respected supervisor Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra for guidance and encouragement. I thank him especially for going through my dissertation and making suggestions to complete this work. Here I must accept without hesitation that during my research, Dr. Mahapatra treated me not only as his student but also as his son and friend. In the course of this work I learnt a great deal on American Studies and International Relations from him. Among a number of qualities that I absorbed from him, the foremost is always being on time and avoiding procrastination at all costs. Besides, I am also thankful to my teachers in the American Studies Programme for their encouragement and inspiration. I also thank the staff of the Centre for American and West European Studies who have always extended their helping hand to me.

I acknowledge the help provided by the staff of the libraries at Jawaharlal Nehru University, American Information Resource Center and Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. They provided me the required materials and important informations for my research work. No less grateful I am to Mr. Md. Tajuddin Akhtar for typing this dissertation cheerfully and carefully.

I express my special thanks to my friend and classmate Sanjay Mohanty for extending every help to complete this work. I also thank Vinay, Anshul, Chayya, Bharti, Ajit, Girish, Hemraj, Deepak, Praveen and Deoraj for helping me academically as well as emotionally.

Last but not the least, I express my gratitude to my parents, younger sister Shipra, and all family members and relatives for their love and affection. They have always been my strength whenever I felt uninspired or depressed.

I have not left any stone unturned to enhance the quality and accuracy of this work. However, I own the sole responsibility of shortcomings, if any, in this work.

Santosh Singh

PREFACE

The United States has always been involved in Kashmir dispute, one way or the other, since 1947. Its policy towards the Kashmir issue changed from time to time commensurate to its geo-strategic and geopolitical interest in the region. During the Cold War period, the Washington's policy towards this issue, was driven by its Cold War strategies in Asia. Once Pakistan joined the US-led anti-Communist block in 1954, the US adopted a pro-Pakistan stand over Kashmir issue. The basic objective of Pakistan to join SEATO, Baghdad pact and CENTO was to tighten its grip, whatever little it had, over Kashmir. In the post-Cold War era, the US policy towards Kashmir has been largely guided by the country's foreign policy objectives in the region such as nuclear non-proliferation, economic interests and the new-perceived threat of international terrorism. When the "fourth war" for Kashmir between India and Pakistan was fought in 1999, the US took a stand favouring India and pressurized Pakistan to withdraw its troops from the Indian side of the Line of Control.

The present study is a modest attempt to analyse the US policy towards Kashmir issue during the Cold War as well as the Post-Cold War era.

This dissertation consists of five chapters. The first chapter deals with the genesis of the Kashmir problem, United Nations' efforts to resolve the dispute and the US involvement in the dispute

within and outside the United Nations. It also throws light on the Cold War dynamics of the US approach to Kashmir.

The second chapter attempts to discuss the US policy approaches during the Indo-Pakistan wars regarding Kashmir in 1965 and 1971. It gives a brief account of Indo-Pak wars. It analyses the US policy in the context of larger Cold War considerations.

The third chapter deals with the Low Intensity Conflict in Kashmir and the United States' response to it. It analyses the US response to Low Intensity Conflict in the context of post-Cold War developments. It also deals, in short, with the US policy towards Kashmir from Shimla Agreement to the end of the Cold War.

The fourth chapter is an attempt to analyze the Kargil War of 1999 between India and Pakistan and its impact on the US policy and perception. The US President Clinton's visit to South Asia in March 2000 and his views on Kashmir have also been briefly described.

The last chapter contains the main findings of the study and an overall assessment of the US policy towards Kashmir issue from its genesis to the end of Clinton Administration.

CONTENTS

	Page
Chapter I	
UNITED STATES, UNITED NATIONS AND THE KASHMIR DISPUTE (1947- 1964)	1-26
Chapter II	
INDO-PAKISTAN WARS : US RESPONSE	27-49
Chapter III	
US PERCEPTION OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT IN KASHMIR	50-74
Chapter IV	
KARGIL WAR : BEGINNING OF A CHANGE IN WASHINGTON'S VIEWS	75-102
Chapter V	
CONCLUSION	103-110
BIBLIOGRAPHY	111-117

Chapter I

UNITED STATES, UNITED NATIONS AND THE KASHMIR DISPUTE (1947-1964)

The problem of Kashmir as it arose shortly after the independence of India was in many ways a by product of the political history of the Indian subcontinent. The conflict over Kashmir was symbolic of clash of the two newly independent states carved out through partition of British India. The conflict was largely a result of the fears, jealousies and rivalries that marked the political processes at work in India during the freedom struggle.¹ Many factors contributed to the partition of the subcontinent and the subsequent rise of the Kashmir problem. First important factor was religion. Religion and deep religious feelings of the people were used by the leaders of the Muslim League and Hindu Mahasabha to garner and strengthen their support base. Second factor was the British policy of "divide and rule". The British Government used this tactic to weaken the independence movement in India. Third significant factor was the wide gulf between the Hindu and the Muslim communities in their socio-economic life. This divide was the

¹ Sisir Gupta, *Kashmir : A Study in India Pakistan Relations* (New Delhi ,1966), p.1.

result of the introduction of new professions, education and administration by the British. The communal situation in India actually deteriorated after 1937 election in provinces especially in Uttar Pradesh. The Muslim League's demand for creation of a new sovereign Pakistan state on the basis of religion clearly indicated extent of the communal divide in India. Finally, the ruler of Kashmir, Hari Singh's decision not to accede to India or Pakistan by 15 August 1947 was a significant event sparking off the Kashmir problem. He did so ignoring the advice of the then Governor General Lord Mountbatten.

On 15 August 1947, India and Pakistan achieved independence and became sovereign nations. By that time all the states had acceded either to India or Pakistan except Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Kashmir. Therefore, they became independent for a while and later acceded to India. The only state that did not accede either to India or Pakistan was Kashmir. After independence Pakistani rulers started pressing the Maharaja of Kashmir to accede to Pakistan but he rejected. Consequently the Pakistani rulers decided to get Kashmir through armed invasion. On 22 October 1947, fully armed tribesmen and Army regulars led by Major General Tariq Khan of Pakistan Army clandestinely entered Kashmir and proceeded to occupy Srinagar. The Government of Pakistan did not deny that their sympathy

was for “raiders” who went to Kashmir admittedly to remedy the “woes of their brothers”. But it repudiated the charge of complicity and asserted that short of war all steps were taken to prevent infiltration into Kashmir.

Invasion and coercion by Pakistan induced the king out Kashmir to seek Indian help. The first appeal from the Maharaja of Kashmir for India’s help came on 23 October, 1947. A meeting of the Defence Committee of the Indian Government took place on 25 October 1947 under the Chairmanship of Lord Mountbatten to discuss the issue. Mountbatten suggested that India should give military assistance only after Kashmir’s accession to it. He argued that sending military assistance to Kashmir without accession to India would result in war between India and Pakistan.² V.P. Menon was sent to Srinagar to convey Raja Hari Singh Government of India’s conditions. He also told Hari Singh the problems which could arise if military help was extended without accession. Hari Singh signed a letter of accession and sent it through V.P. Menon. With this interchange of letters and the signing of Instrument of accession, Kashmir became part of India.³ After the accession, Indian Government ordered to airlift the Indian Army to

² Gupta, n.1, p.79.

³ Joseph Korb, *Danger in Kashmir* (Princeton, 1966), p.84.

Srinagar. There Indian Army showed great valour in the war against the “raiders”. Consequently, Kashmir was saved from destruction at the hands of the Pakistan Army.

To sum up, the basis of the dispute was entirely the two divergent understanding of the situation in two countries. To India, a state which had acceded to it was invaded by another country and the first task was of cleansing the soil of the invaders. To Pakistan, a State which it hoped was about to accede to it, and where people were revolting against the ruler, had now acceded to India. To this basic difference were added numerous arguments and counter arguments by both India and Pakistan in the years to follow, but the essence of the problem has remained what it was in October 1947.

On 1 January 1948, the Government of India took the Kashmir conflict to the Security Council of the United Nations. In its letter to the UN Security Council, the Government of India referred to Article 34 and 35 of the Charter of the United Nations, according to which, “any member may bring any situation, whose continuation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, to the attention of the Security Council.”⁴ The letter said that such a

⁴ *ibid*, p.100.

situation existed between India and Pakistan. The situation arose because of Pakistani invasion of Jammu & Kashmir, a state of India. Government of India requested the Security Council to call upon Pakistan to desist from using force against India. The Security Council's first response came on 6 January, 1948, when the President of the Security Council sent an urgent appeal to India and Pakistan to cease fire and maintain the status quo.

The Security Council first time met to discuss the Kashmir issue on 15 January, 1948. The Pakistan Government replied in writing to the Indian complaint and presented its own counter complaint, in which she denied giving aid to tribesmen and thereby committing an act of aggression. The Government of Pakistan also raised numerous counter complaints against India, including genocide and forced accession of Junagadh. It also denied the validity of Kashmir's accession to India. It described the Kashmir problem as one aspect of the problems related to the partition of India.

Instead of addressing directly to the Kashmir dispute, American delegate Warren Austin and the British delegate, Noel Baker, persuaded the Security Council to cover the whole

spectrum of Indo-Pakistani differences.⁵ To India, the tactics of the United States seemed to delay consideration of the main problem. Widening the scope of the United Nations investigation in Kashmir dispute would, in effect, expand the range of possible US “interference in the affairs of South Asia.” The Security Council passed its first resolution on the Kashmir dispute on 17 January 1948. It called upon the two governments to “immediately take all measures” to improve the situation and to “refrain from doing or permitting any acts which might aggravate the situation.” During the discussion on the resolution, the UK, supported by the US, suggested that both delegations should meet under the Chairmanship of the President and try to find some common ground on the basis of which some solution could be found. India and Pakistan both accepted this proposal.

The Security Council passed a second resolution on 20 January 1948 which was sponsored by Belgian representative. The resolution provided for the establishment of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to resolve the Kashmir dispute. One member of the Commission was to be selected by India, one by Pakistan and a third by the two

⁵ Srinivas C. Mudumbai, *United States Foreign Policy Towards India 1947-1954* (New Delhi, 1980), p.82.

members so designated. According to the resolution, the commission would proceed to the spot under the authority of the Security Council and act according to its directions. During the debate India opposed Pakistani efforts to widen the scope of UN investigation to include all India-Pakistan differences. But finally India was trapped in Pakistani tactics and agreed to the omission of any specific reference to "The Jammu & Kashmir question" which by implication expanded the scope of the UN investigation. Initially the word "All Indo-Pakistan dispute" figured in the resolution. The very title "India-Pakistan question" implied that both the countries were equal parties to the dispute.⁶ The Indian view point was supported by Noel Baker, the British delegate, who said if he had been the President, He would have handled the matter differently by separating the Kashmir question from other questions. Due to the opposition from Syria, Argentina and Columbia, however, he decided to withdraw the proposal. On 23 January 1948 the British delegate also brushed aside some of the Pakistani charges against India, such as "genocide". In sharp contrast to this balanced stand taken by Britain, the US delegate Warren Austin thought that India's acceptance of accession was conditional. The Government of India said that first there should be stoppage of fighting in

⁶ Michael Brecher., *The Struggle for Kashmir* (New York, 1953), p.110.

Kashmir and then people's wishes should be ascertained regarding its accession to India.

Pakistan did not agree with the Indian point of view and said that one could not have cessation of hostilities and violence unless one had an understanding with the people. Pakistan emphasized that plebiscite should be held in Kashmir before cease-fire. In the next resolution, Security Council it was suggested that the plebiscite would be held and supervised under the United Nations authority. It also specified the duties of the UN Commission in bringing the cessation of the hostilities. The United States, Canada, China, Syria and UK supported the resolution. Most of the Council members supported the Pakistani delegate's point that the Security Council would not only observe but actually hold the plebiscite under its authority. This was strongly opposed by Sheikh Abdullah, a member of India's delegation to United Nations, who said it was an attempt to deprive the people of Kashmir from running the administration. On the issue of plebiscite two members T. F. Tsiang of China and Lopez of Columbia supported the Indian view. China did not think that an entirely new regime in Kashmir was necessary to secure a free and fair plebiscite.

When the Security Council met on 10 February 1948, the Indian representative requested the Council to adjourn its proceeding for some time. He said that he needed sometime for consultations with Government of India. He came under severe criticism by the United States for this. The US delegate called the Indian suggestion of adjournment 'perfectly astonishing' and advised the Indian delegate to tell New Delhi that United Nations' business was to find a pacific "solution of the dispute not promoting war". The Chinese delegate significantly supported Indian position and moved a resolution to this effect. However, due to lack of adequate support the Chinese resolution was withdrawn the next day. But the Indian delegation was allowed to proceed to New Delhi to have consultation with the Government of India.

After N. Gopalswami Ayyangar, the Indian delegate, returned from New Delhi, the Security Council returned to the problem once again on 10 March 1948. Ayyangar pleaded for a fresh approach on the part of all Security Council members to resolve the conflict, beginning with an to end the hostilities first. Taking heed of the Indian advice of fresh approach, the Chinese representative came out with a new draft resolution on 18 March 1948. It, contained in its first part, a proposal for restoration of peace and order an issue which India felt was absent in earlier

resolution. It called upon Pakistan to withdraw tribesmen and Pakistani national from Kashmir. The second part of the resolution dealt with plebiscite. India was to set a plebiscite administration in the State to administer the plebiscite on its own authority. The Pakistani delegate Zafarullah Khan expressed complete disagreement with the Chinese resolution, while the Indian representative conceded that the proposals were worthy of serious consideration.

On 21 April 1948, the Security Council after a long debate passed the resolution on the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. It replaced all the earlier draft resolutions. This resolution increased the membership of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan to five from three and instructed the Commission to place its good offices at the disposal of the two governments. Besides, it also recommended measures intended to constitute an overall settlement of the problem. Its recommendation related to restoration of peace and order and put this obligation on Pakistan. It also recommended for plebiscite, which imposed obligations on India.

It was the first ever resolution which recommended the method of a resolution for the Kashmir dispute. It recommended that a plebiscite administrator would be nominated by Security

Council with adequate powers to prepare and conduct the plebiscite. However, the resolution was rejected by India as well as Pakistan.

After expansion United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) Consisted of five members: Argentina, nominated by Pakistan, Czechoslovakia, nominated by India, and Columbia, Belgium and the United States were selected by the Security Council. India objected to its being entrusted with the investigation of other complaints which Pakistan had brought before the Security Council, it fell on deaf ears. It is significant that while most of the members of the UNCIP were vaguely informed about the dispute, only the American delegation led by Ambassador J.Klahr Huddle was properly equipped with an expert political, military and secretariat staff.⁷ The Commission succeeded in convincing both Government of India and Pakistan to declare a cease-fire. Both the Governments ordered a ceasefire in Kashmir, which came into effect a minute before midnight on 1 January 1949. A Group of United Nations Military Observers were despatched to Kashmir to assist the Pakistani and Indian military authorities in demarcating the line of control and to oversee the armistice. But the Commission

⁷ Korbel, n.3, p. 119.

failed to achieve demilitarization. According to Michael Brecher, “the major achievement of the United Nations vis-a-vis the Kashmir dispute had been the ceasefire agreement of 1 January 1949.”⁸

After all mediation efforts were exhausted, the UNCIP suggested an arbitration of all differences over the implementation of the truce agreement. US Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz’s name was proposed as the arbitrator. President Harry S. Truman of the United States and Prime Minister Atlee of UK supported this move. They urged India and Pakistan to accept the commission’s proposal. Pakistan accepted, but India rejected the proposal of arbitration on the ground that the scope of the arbitration was not known in advance. Nehru openly expressed surprise at the Anglo-American intervention in the Kashmir dispute.

On 29 December 1949, the Security Council met to consider future steps to solve the Kashmir dispute. After deliberation, the Security Council decided to entrust the task of negotiation to Canadian General A.G.L. McNaughton. After speaking to the Indian and Pakistani representatives, he presented a plan of progressive demilitarization. The U.S.

⁸ Brecher, n.6, p.113.

delegate described the McNaughton proposals as “fair and sound”.⁹ Pakistan was ready to accept General McNaughton’s plan, but India insisted upon complete demilitarization of forces from occupied area.

India’s rejection of the McNaughton formula did not deter the Security Council from passing yet another resolution on 14 March 1950, appointing a UN representative who was “to execute within a period of five months a programme of demilitarization on the basis of principles of General Mc Naughton’s proposals or of such modifications of these principles as may mutually be agreed upon by India and Pakistan”¹⁰ The United States with the support of Norway, Cuba and Great Britain obtained Security Council’s approval to appoint Sir Owen Dixon (Australian Ambassador to Washington during world war II) as a mediator. And General H. Hodges was appointed military advisor to Dixon. Dixon arrived in the subcontinent on 17 May 1950. After holding parleys in New Delhi, Karachi and Kashmir, he returned to New York to report to Security Council the failure of his mission and made a formal proposition to the partition Kashmir. He reported : “I have formed the opinion that if there is any chance of settling the dispute on Kashmir by agreement

⁹ *ibid.*

¹⁰ Mudumbai, n5, p.95.

between, India and Pakistan, it now lies in partition” and not holding plebiscite.¹¹

In the mean time, United States was getting impatient with India’s critical stand on the US policy towards the Korean peninsula. The intensity of the United States displeasure at this stand of the Indian Government was reflected in its suggestion that there should be a United Nations Force to handle the Kashmir issue. This move of the United States was perhaps guided by its desire to increase its military presence in area’s close to the Soviet Union and China. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru reacted sharply to the US move in the UN. Speaking in the Indian Parliament on March 28, he said:

My own feeling has been a feeling of distress that the UN has some what drifted from its original conception --- we went to the United Nations to determine the accession issue or where sovereignty lies. We did not go there to seek arbitration but to complain about the aggression on another state which was likely to lead to international complications and propably affect peace. Evidently the sponsors of the joint resolution before the Security Council have a short memory and have forgotten how the matter came before the Security Council and the history of

¹¹ *ibid*, p.96.

the tragic events that preceded it. The United utilized the position of our having made a reference in the matter to widen the scope of their enquiry.¹²

In April 1951 Frank D. Graham was appointed the UN representative by the Security Council to mediate between India and Pakistan to bring about demilitarization in Kashmir. Talks started in Geneva and failed to achieve anything. The failure of the Geneva talks were reported by Graham to the Security Council on 19 September 1952. It is important to note that agreement had been achieved on most of the controversial issues. But India and Pakistan did not agree on the meaning of final disposition of the forces. In the end, Graham, like previous mediators expressed hope that only direct talks between the parties could help bring about a resolution. During this deliberation in the Security Council, the Soviet delegate contended that the US and Britain had "deliberately prevented the genuine" solution of this dispute. He also charged that Western countries led by the United States "harboured annexationist designs" in Kashmir which were part of their global strategy against the USSR. He openly criticized Frank D. Graham, and called him an agent of United States.¹³ The Soviet accusations

¹² *ibid*, p. 98.

¹³ Brecher, n 6, p.

were criticized by the other Security Council members. Britain and the United States rushed to the defence of Graham, saying “attack on Graham do not merit a reply and do not require a denial.”¹⁴

With the failure of the Graham mission, the United Nations effort to settle the Kashmir question came to a temporary close. The question was not raised in the Security Council until 1955. But the issue by then had completely taken a new dimension in Indian eyes, as Pakistan had signed a Mutual Defence Agreement with US in 1954. Reacting to US-Pak MOA Nehru said in the Indian Parliament : “The grant of military aid by the US to Pakistan created a grave situation for India and for Asia. It adds to our tensions-- The military aid given by the US to Pakistan is a form of interventions in these problems which is likely to have more far reaching results than the previous types of intervention.”¹⁵ Thus from 1948 through 1954, the United States actively intervened in the Kashmir dispute through its leading role in United Nations. It put forward several suggestions favourable to Pakistan in the name of conflict resolution, including arbitration, stationing of foreign troops and the like. It championed the cause of

¹⁴ *ibid.*,p.

¹⁵ Muduinbai, n.5, p.99.

plebiscite, evoking the liberal concept of national self determination. Washington's advocacy of plebiscite represented a general commitment to self-determination, but constituted a clear support to Pakistan, which had by then become amenable to American influences.

From the earliest discussions in the United Nations to the to Frank Graham mission, the UN goal was to effect demilitarization in the state without defining the rights and obligations of the two parties in the State.¹⁶ This explains why all these efforts could not achieve anything except ceasefire. Direct negotiations were held between India and Pakistan from 1953-56 to find some solution to the dispute. But no solution could be found. The reason was Pakistan's growing military alliance with the Western Block led by the US.

Why did US take pro- Pakistan stand on Kashmir dispute during the Truman Administration?

- 1) The United States saw the problem from the Cold War perspectives and attempted at containing Communism. United States' chief concern was to prevent the problem from escalating into a general war between India and Pakistan as this would have adversely affected its policies

¹⁶ Gupta, n. 1,p.254.

and strategies in Asia and might have pushed either or both of the belligerents into the communist camp.¹⁷

- 2) The United States backed Pakistan over Kashmir in order to make India amenable to its broad policies in Asia. Last but not the least, Americans also knew that it had no hope of getting military base in Kashmir, a territory of great strategic significance if it remained a part of India. In this respect only Pakistan could oblige her.¹⁸ With the Soviet detonation atomic of autonomic bomb, its strategic importance increased further.
- 3) Once the Korean war started in June 1950, sharp differences arose between, the United States and India. While the United States stressed on collective security, India followed a neutralist approach as the best way to preserve peace.¹⁹ Pakistan fully supported the UN action. This Korean episode made the United States realize that
- 4) Pakistan was more accommodative to its interests than India.

Cold war was introduced in the Kashmir question in 1953 with the signing of the bilateral agreement between the United

¹⁷ Saleem Kidwai, "US and Kashmir Issue", *Asian Studies* (Calcutta), Vol.XVI (1), Jan-June 1998, p.3.

¹⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁹ Dennis Kux, *India, and United States: Estranged Democracies 1941-1991* (New Delhi, 1993), p.87.

States and Pakistan. It paved the way for American military assistance to Pakistan. The atmosphere between India and Pakistan was further vitiated when Pakistan became a fullfledged member of South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), a US created military alliance, in September 1954. The pact came into force on 19 February 1955. The third military Pact which brought Pakistan into complete alliance with the West was Baghdad Pact. Pakistan's decision to join the pact was announced on 30 June 1955. It included Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Britain and Pakistan. These series of US backed alliances, of which Pakistan was a member, brought the Cold War to Kashmir. SEATO Council in its communiqué of 8 March 1956 affirmed the need for an early settlement of the Kashmir question by the United Nations or by direct negotiations.²⁰ The Government of India protested to the SEATO members about this on the ground that it was beyond the scope and functions of the organisation. As if this was not sufficient, the Baghdad Pact Council in its Communique of 19 April 1956, emphasized the need for an early settlement of the Palestine and the Kashmir dispute.²¹

²⁰ Gupta, n.l., p.301.

²¹ *ibid.*

These military pacts brought a major change in India's policy towards Kashmir. Nehru became harder. In March 1956 he said: "the American military aid to Pakistan and Pakistan's membership in military pacts has destroyed the roots and foundations of the plebiscite proposal in Kashmir."²² Then he proceeded to negate the United Nations resolutions, first by integrating Kashmir with India and finally by rejecting the idea of plebisite . He received support to his Kashmir policy from the Soviet Union.

After a gap of three years, the Kashmir issue was again brought back to the Security Council by Pakistan on 7 December 1956. It demanded that the Indian and Pakistani forces in Kashmir should be replaced by the UN force. The Pakistani demand was clearly supported by United States in the Security Council. On 14 February 1957 a draft resolution (known as Five Power Resolution), was introduced by Britain, Cuba, Australia, Columbia and United States, expressing concern at the lack of progress in the resolution of the dispute. It incorporated the Pakistani suggestion for a UN Force.

Indian representative V.K. Krishna Menon forcefully opposed the idea of introducing the UN force in Kashmir.

²² Korbelt, n.3, p.329.

Menon was supported by the Soviet delegate who circulated an amendment to the draft resolution. One of the amendments was to drop all references to UN Force and the other was to eliminate "demilitarization" as the goal of the United Nations in Kashmir. But amendment to the Five Power Draft Resolution was not accepted. Therefore the Soviet Union vetoed the resolution. This move of the Soviet Union was criticized by the United States and Britain.

Subsequently, the UN Security Council decided to send its President, Sweden's Gunnar Jarring, to the subcontinent to find a solution to the Kashmir dispute. Jarring travelled to South Asia and reported back to the Council that the Kashmir dispute remained deadlocked. Later in 1957 the Security Council again decided to send Frank Graham to the subcontinent to mediate the dispute. Graham's efforts proved as fruitless as his earlier attempt at finding a settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

After the Baghdad pact collapsed following the July 1958 coup in Iraq led by anti-western, Abdul Karim Kasim, the northern tier defence grouping reemerged in the form of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1959 with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan as regional members. It was headquartered in Ankara. Besides, in early 1959, the US concluded another bilateral defence agreement with Pakistan to strengthen its

TH-9155



security relationship. A secret clause of the US-Pak treaty extended the US commitment to cover an attack as well.²³

In 1959 President Dwight D. Eisenhower visited India. During his talks with Prime Minister Nehru he argued that Indian deployment of troops in Kashmir was wasteful measure.. He assured Nehru that US would never permit Pakistanis to use US equipment to attack India. He also agreed with Nehru on No War Pact idea between India and Pakistan. When he proposed this to Ayub, he flatly rejected the suggestion.

John F. Kennedy became the US President in 1960. Though the US sidelined the Kashmir debate in the United Nations, Kennedy increased the efforts to solve the dispute . The Kennedy administration has till now been the only administration during which the United States, with the president himself playing a role, made a major and direct effort to resolve the Kashmir dispute. In September 1961 when Jawaharlal Nehru visited Washington, at a dinner meeting, he raised the Kashmir issue. Nehru told him that in his view the conversion of the ceasefire line into an international frontier was the only possible option. However, Nehru said, if there was a general settlement, there was no reason why there could not be

²³ Kux, n. 19, p 160.

a 'Soft' border between. Pakistan and India held Kashmir.²⁴ In November 1961 President Kennedy had the opportunity to discuss the matter with President Ayub Khan of Pakistan. When he probed Ayub, Kennedy found that the Pakistani dictator's bottom line for a settlement was a partition that would leave Jammu with India.²⁵

Kennedy on 20 January 1962 proposed that former World Bank President Eugene Black should visit South Asia to see what he could do towards promoting a settlement of the Kashmir dispute. After his success in solving the Indus Water dispute – Eugene Black seemed a logical choice. He held extensive discussions with both Indian and Pakistani Governments but no solution could be found.²⁶ The UN debate on Kashmir once again took place in June 1962. When the United Nations supported the call for implementing earlier UN resolutions by holding a plebiscite, the Soviet Union vetoed the resolutions. The episode predictably added to friction between Washington and New Delhi, especially after Nehru severely criticized the US stance in the Parliament.²⁷

²⁴ Manoj Joshi, *The Last Rebellion: Kashmir in the Nineties*. (New Delhi, 1999), p.301.

²⁵ *ibid.* p. 302.

²⁶ Kux, n.19, p.198.

²⁷ *ibid.* p.201.

During the Chinese invasion of India, US Ambassador in India, John K. Galbraith was in close touch with the Government of India, especially Prime Minister Nehru. Seven days after the war began, on 29 October 1962 Nehru formally sought US military assistance, while requesting Galbraith that the US should avoid seeking a military alliance in exchange. Kennedy not only proceeded with a positive response to the Indian arms request, he also requested President Ayub Khan not to use the conflict to seek advantage over Kashmir.

After the unilateral ceasefire by China, the US and its allies undertook their last major effort to push Kashmir settlement outside the UN framework. President Kennedy said that the Sino Indian border war had given the United States an opportunity to resolve the Kashmir dispute.²⁸ For the purpose, the United States sent W.A. Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs and Britain sent its Minister for Commonwealth Relations, Duncan Sandys, to South Asia. They held discussion with leaders of both India and Pakistan. They succeeded in getting Nehru and Ayub to agree for a discussion on Kashmir. Five rounds of talks took place between the Indian and Pakistani officials, beginning in Rawalpindi in December 1962, and ending

²⁸ Joshi, n. 24, p. 305.

in May 1963. As the US was now readying to put forward a partition plan, Britain sounded out Ayub after the first round of talks on the idea of internationalizing the Kashmir valley for a ten year period and a subsequent plebiscite.²⁹ Ayub took this up and began to take up a more hard line position. In the third round of talks in Karachi on 7-11 February, 1963, India after great pressure from the United States, offered limited but significant concessions to Pakistan, indicating that it was willing to partition the valley, offering a small north western portion which constitutes the district of Kupwara to Pakistan. Karachi came up with its counter proposal. India could keep up an equally small portion of Jammu, while handing over the rest of the state to Pakistan.³⁰ In the end talks achieved nothing.

While talks were going on between India and Pakistan, US Ambassador Galbraith suddenly put the partition proposal to Nehru and press India to come up with more substantial territory concessions for Pakistan. Nehru rejected his proposal. At meeting of 15 April 1963, however, Galbraith put forward the revised proposal for a fifty-fifty partition. At the first meeting lasting an hour and half, Nehru vigorously, and then angrily,

²⁹ *ibid*,p.307.

³⁰ *ibid*.

defended India's position, and subsequently, according to Galbraith, lost his cool and rejected the partition outright.³¹

After six months of serious efforts, The Kennedy Administration came to the conclusion that the chances of settlement of the Kashmir issue were nil. Ambassador Galbraith warned Kennedy "with further foot dragging we will have to rpt no progress in Kashmir and rpt no Indians either"³²

What motivated Eisenhower and Kennedy to side with Pakistan over the Kashmir issue? Joseph Korbelt writes:

In American concept of defence of South and South East Asia and the Middle East, Pakistan was to be a pivotal state. Generous American military and economic assistance to Pakistan was meant to fortify the warm relations between the two countries, and the United States position on Kashmir, which was in keeping with the traditional stand on the question of national self determination appeared only to solidify the friendship.³³

Dennis Kux also agrees with Joseph Korbelt. He argues, "After the 1954 arms pact with Pakistan an unenthusiastic US found itself under periodic pressure to keep the Kashmir issue alive internationally through discussion in UN and the mention in SEATO and Baghdad Pact Communiques".³⁴ Lastly, India's pro-Soviet stand over the issues like Hungary in 1956. While Pakistan was totally in favour of the western view, India did not vote with the west on a single council resolution.

³¹ *ibid*, p. 309.

³² Kux, n. 19, R 218.

³³ Korbelt, n.3, p. 330.

³⁴ Kux, n. 19, p.218.

Chapter -II
INDO-PAKISTAN WARS : US RESPONSE

India and Pakistan fought the second war over Kashmir in 1965. It began with the clashes between Indian and Pakistani forces on 9 April 1965 in the Rann of Kutch. When Indian Government withdrew its forces from Rann because of flood, Pakistan took it as India's acceptance of defeat. Inspired by success in the short conflict of April- May 1965 in Rann of Kutch, Pakistan started preparation to strike in Kashmir in August. Pakistani invasion in Kashmir in August 1965 came in two ways: infiltration and conventional operations.¹ About 10,000 infiltrators, whom the Pakistanis called "freedom fighters" were actually fully armed Pakistani soldiers in civilian dress. Under the leadership of Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, GOC, 12 Division, these soldiers stepped from the 470 mile long ceasefire line on 5 August 1965 through many gaps and trailed across the Himalayas. It was codenamed Operation Gibraltar. The goal was to seize Kashmir on the basis of a proposal put by Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.² His proposal was to infiltrate trained politico-military cadres across the United

¹ B.M. Kaul, *Confrontation with Pakistan* (New Delhi, 1971), p.23.

² *ibid.*

Nations armistice line in Kashmir and then to establish cells to motivate and assist the local population to start a rebellion. This was to be supplemented by scattered acts of violence to be carried out by the Pakistani Commandos. Bhutto argued that if his scheme was brought into practice, Indian's would be restricted to their response only to the disputed territory of Kashmir and would not accuse Pakistan of violating international law. He also thought that India would not counter militarily because of two reasons. India's military weakness and the fear of Chinese intervention. After the 1962 Indian debacle and its India's poor showing in the Rann of Kutch, an over confident Ayub Khan had took India and especially its Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri too lightly.³ Ayub was also confident of receiving US military aid to provide Pakistan a qualitative edge over India in armour and air power. When serious fighting got underway in Kashmir by late August 1965, the failure of Kashmiris to rise up in revolt was a bitter disappointment to both Ayub and Bhutto. To avoid defeat, the Pakistan on 1 September 1965 escalated the war and launched a major attack across the ceasefire line in Southern Kashmir. Its sole objective was to cut the road that linked Kashmir's capital Srinagar with India. It is note worthy

³ Dennis Kux, *Stranged Democracies : India and United States* (New Delhi , 1993)

that in this attack Pakistan heavily used the US supplied Patton tanks. When Indian Army faced enormous difficulty with Pakistani army in a restricted fight in Kashmir, they attacked across the international frontier in West Pakistan and started marching towards Lahore. Pakistan was almost shocked over this Indian move

After intelligence reports indicated the likelihood of a Pakistani attack, the US became active and pressed UN Secretary General U Thant to urge restraint on both sides. In New Delhi, US Ambassador Chester Bowles asked Indian Foreign Minister Swarn Singh to respond calmly warning that a military thrust by India at some more favourable point.....will almost touch the war".⁴ Swaran Singh, in turn, protested against the use of U.S. supplied Patton tanks by Pakistan contrary to American assurances. Bowles urged for direct US pressure at earliest on both India and Pakistan in support of Secretary General U Thant's appeal. Bowles asked Washington's authorization to tell, the Prime Minister of India that if the Indians agreed to ceasefire and troops withdrawal, and Pakistanis did not, the United States would stop military aid to Pakistan. The Johnson Administration

⁴ *ibid.* p. 236.

rejected the suggestion given by Bowles. President Lyndon B. Johnson decided not to involve his country directly in fighting between India and Pakistan. Instead he decided to extend his support to the UN which had been trying hard to end the fighting. The recently declassified US official documents provide a slightly different picture. It says that President Lyndon Johnson took great interest in the Indo-Pak war and sought to “prevent them from diverting US economic assistance towards military purposes.”⁵ Secretary of State Dean Rusk informed Bowles that decision had been taken here not to engage in direct pressure on either Pakistan or India for the time being, but to support the efforts of United Nations.⁶

The US policy to rely on the UN role to achieve ceasefire became more pronounced when key members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, agreed with Dean Rusk that it was not “wise for the US to “get out in front of the UN to carry out the burden of trying to force India and Pakistan to cease hostilities.”⁷ Seeing no possibility of ceasefire, the United States finally decided to stop military exports and suspend economic assistance to both India and Pakistan. On

⁵ As cited in T.V. Parasuram, “President Johnson Took Keen Interest in India and Pakistan”, *Times of India* (New Delhi) 6 December, 2000.

⁶ Kux, n3, p.236.

⁷ *ibid* . p. 237.

8 September 1965, the *New York Times* reported, "US suspends deliveries of military supplies to Pakistan and India, action seen as warning against attempt to fight major war and aimed more at Pakistan, which had received about \$5 billion in military aid over last decade. US officials indicate US favours ceasefire on Indian terms, rebuff Pakistan's call for aid through CENTO"⁸

Like Washington, Moscow also extended its full support to the UN efforts to stop the Indo-Pak war. It offered its good offices at Tashkent. It was the rare instance of Soviet-American cooperation during the Cold War. Though Soviet Union suspended arms supply to both these countries, it withdrew its ban on arms support to Pakistan.

British, Prime Minister Harold Wilson charged India with aggression on international border. The Chinese response was more worrisome for India. On 17 September 1965. Beijing issued an ultimatum that India remove construction works on the Tibet border or face consequences. At this time of crises, Moscow and Washington changed course and came to India's help. They warned China against any such action. Beijing realized the gravity of the situation and backed down by

⁸ *New York Times*, 8 September 1965.

extending the deadline to remove the so called construction on the Tibet border. On 22 September 1965 the fighting came to a halt. India and Pakistan accepted a demand by the Security Council for a ceasefire. Before accepting ceasefire, New Delhi had achieved its goal of thwarting Pakistan's attempt to seize Kashmir by force. Pakistan gained nothing. Moscow offered its good office. In January 1966, Ayub and Shashtri met with Kosygin in Tashkent. On 9 January he obtained their agreement to withdraw to positions held before the war, to exchange prisoners, and to try to solve their disputes.

When we analyse the US policy during the 1965 war, we find it was slightly favourable to Pakistan. It is evident in the mild US reaction to Pakistani's attack across the ceasefire line in Kashmir in September 1965 and its sharp reaction to India's counter-attack in Punjab. By suspending military and economic assistance to both, the United States equated Pakistan, the aggressor with the victim.⁹ But "given the special US -Pakistan strategic relationship it was not unexpected". In fact, US military aid to Pakistan was one of the key factors which encouraged Pakistan to solve the

⁹ Narottam Gaan, 'Super Power Involvement in Indo Pak relations : A case study of the US,' in Virendra Grover and Ranjana Arora, ed., *World Community and Indo Pak Relations*. (New Delhi 1999), p.34.

Kashmir problem militarily in 1965. This was revealed by John K. Galbraith, former Ambassador of the US to India, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1966. Galbraith said, "If we had not supplied arms, Pakistan would not have sought military solution."¹⁰

US policy during the war pleased neither India nor Pakistan. The Indians were angry that the US had failed to prevent the use of American weapons by Pakistan despite repeated promises that it would do so. Washington's even handed action in stopping the military assistance also irked New Delhi, because there was not the slightest doubt that Pakistan started the trouble by launching the "Operation Gibraltar". The Pakistanis were more unhappy that United States, their strategic ally, not only refused to help in its war against India but even stopped the military supplies during the hour of need. It brought the US-Pakistan relations to its lowest.

Why did the US adopt even-handed approach towards India and Pakistan during the 1965 War.?

(1) According to recently declassified US official document by adopting even handed approach the US policymakers tried

¹⁰ *ibid.*

to respond to the needs of both countries, forestall Soviet and Chinese inroads into the area, as well as balance the military capabilities of both the India and Pakistan.¹¹

(2) The United States was deeply involved into the Vietnam War during the 1965 war in South Asia during the 1965 war in South Asia. In this situation the US did not want to engage it self in any other conflict.

(3) Washington feared that its would intervention in the fighting in the subcontinent, could widen and escalate over.

(4) By 1965, Washington had an alliance relationship with Pakistan, and a positive relation with India since the 1962 Sino-Indian War.¹²

(5) Pakistan's new and growing relationship with China could have influenced the US decision to stay neutral.

(6) According to some analysts, the Johnson Administration took "cautious and restrained" attitude on the Kashmir conflict because it felt that "direct intervention would result in US being blamed for unsatisfactory accommodation".¹³

¹¹ As cited in , T.V. Parasuram, "President Johnson took Keen interest in India, Pakistan", *Times of India*, 6 December 2000.

¹² H. W. Brands, "*India and the United States : The Cold Peace*(Boston, 1990), p.115.

¹³ *New York Times*. 23 Sep. 1965.

(7) It is also argued that through arms embargo, "Washington hoped to influence Pakistan to an early termination of hostilities and also to punish it for its resort to force in Kashmir". When the Pakistani Ambassador requested for US assistance, Secretary of State Dean Rusk firmly responded by laying that the US was "being involved in on the crash landing without being in on the take off."¹⁴

(8) Some analysts argue that Washington instituted the arms embargo because it lacked influence over Islamabad. The only course available to it was to "deny Pakistan the necessary weapons" to continue the war and thus force it into a ceasefire.

The US had successfully alienated both sides with its war time arms embargo. The only other power that might have been able to mediate the dispute, the UK did not seem interested in taking the job. Essentially the field was left for the Soviet Union. Prime Minister Kosygin succeeded in hammering out an agreement between India and Pakistan. On 10 January 1966, both countries declared that "all armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn not later than 25 February , 1966, to position they held

¹⁴ Shirin R.Tahir-Kheli, *The United States and Pakistan : The Evolution of an Influence Relationship* : (New York , 1982), p.22.

prior to August 5, 1965 and both sides shall observe the ceasefire term on the cease-fire line.”¹⁵

Indo-Pakistan War of 1971.

The Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 had its genesis in the internal crises of Pakistan. The crisis arose when Awami League, the proEast Pakistan autonomy party won majority in the proposed national Assembly, but its electoral victory was rejected by President Yahya Khan of Pakistan. Instead of finding a political solution of the problem President Yahya Khan ordered the repression of the people in East Pakistan. Consequently, thousands of Benglai Hindus started fleeing into India as refuges. These millions of refugees posed enormous economic burden on India. It could not have afforded to allow the refugees to stay permanently in India. This internal Pakistani problem was soon transformed into a problem between India and Pakistan big the rising number of refugees entering India. India extended military help to Bengali members of the Pakistani military who entered India as refugees. Subsequently, they became the backbone of the

¹⁵ .*Text of the Tashkent Declaration January 10, 1966.*

Mukti Bahini, a guerrilla force that would wage an armed struggle to liberate East Pakistan.

During the crisis in East Pakistan, the United States clearly sided with Yahya Khan, the military ruler, ignoring the human rights violations in East Pakistan. Moreover, the US supplied \$50 million worth of arms to Pakistan violating her own embargo. Pakistan did not heed to Indian concern of growing East Bengali refugees in India. Therefore, Prime Minister ultimately authorized the Indian forces to enter East Pakistan to help the innocent people.

When did the war begin between India and Pakistan in 1971? Indian accounts have claimed that the war began with the Pakistani preemptive attacks on Indian airfields on the last night of 3 December 1971. The Pakistani official history says that the war began with an Indian attack on Jessore on 21 November 1971, the day of Id-Ul-Fitr.¹⁶ What is the truth? "India's official history of the war, treads the middle path. It does not deny that Indian military action began well before 4 December 1971 but it claims that the Mukti Bahini activities, and Pakistani retaliation had brought the situation "into almost a state of undeclared war."¹⁷

¹⁶ As Cited in "When did the war begin ?", *Times of India*, 1 December 2000.

¹⁷ As cited in, Dinesh Kumar, " IAF raids stole Pak thunder", *Times of India*, 6 December 2000.

There is unanimity on the starting of the declared war. On 3 December, 1971. On this day the six month old undeclared war between India and Pakistan in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) erupted into an all out war. On the night of 3 December. Pakistan attacked eight Indian Airfields in the western part of the country and the next day declared war on India. Indian Air Force performed brilliantly during the war. On western front it destroyed Pakistan Armoured Regiment at Longewala and on the eastern front it virtually grounded the entire Pakistan Airforce within 36 hours of the launch of offensive operations.¹⁸ Crowned India in the east, the story in the west was full of disappointments The 15 Corps chamber offensive war pre-empted by Pakistanis with disastrous consequences for India. India lost Hussainiwala conclave on account of complacency followed by confusion, and the bridge at Beriwalla near Fazilka was lost. The poor showing in the western front was due to a Government directive that Indian Army must not lose any territory.¹⁹ This directive badly handicapped the Indian commanders, since it compelled them to thin out their forces for defence, rather than to concentrate them for use in a decisive punch towards one or the other

¹⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁹ As cited in Manoj Joshi, "How we won the East and Nearly Lost the West", *Times of India*, 1 December. 2000.

objective. Within 13 days three Indian Army thrusts had reached Dhaka and the Pakistani Forces in the East surrendered. The war resulted in the break up of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent country. However, during December 1971 War, Kashmir saw only limited military conflict.

While the Indian leadership had insisted since late April 1971, that little short of independence would meet the expectations of the Awami League, the Soviet Union had consistently avoided endorsing this position. Indeed it had steadily pressed the Indian leadership, both Privately and publicly, to reach some form of negotiated settlement with Pakistan on the basis of regional autonomy for East Pakistan.²⁰ The reasons for Soviet position seem to be as following. First, the Moscow insisted, particularly prior to the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty, on a negotiated settlement to avoid alienating Pakistan. Second by Moscow probably did not want to offend the US prior to the upcoming 1972 Summit. Even after signing the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Corporation, the Soviet leadership persisted in pushing the Indian leadership to move towards a negotiated settlement.

²⁰ Sumit Ganguly, *The Origins of War in South Asia* (Westview, 1986), p.92.

However, in late October., 1971 Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Filryvbid visited New Delhi, a trip that coincided with a marked shift in the Soviet policy which endorsed the Indian position on the concerned issue. Prime Minister India Gandhi visited Western Countries to get their support for Indian position. She met with partial success. She succeeded in convincing the US leadership to cut off arms to Pakistan. However, that this cut off was by no means complete, and American weapons were supplied to Pakistan during the conflict.

While the Indian Prime Minister visited the western capitals, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistani Foreign Minister, led a high level military delegation to China. From any standpoint, the mission was failure. The Chinese were not willing to commit themselves to Pakistan's defence. Chinese Foreign Minister Chi P-eg- Fie said, "our Pakistan friend may rest assured that should Pakistan be subjected to foreign aggression, the Chinese Government and people will always resolutely support the Pakistan Government and national independence"²¹ It was mild statement and did not spell out Chinese position if Pakistan would indulge in aggression.

²¹ *ibid*, p.123.

Indian The Chinese in all likelihood had taken notice of the Indo-Soviet Treaty and were unwilling to embroil themselves in a costly war.

The US had decided to take pro-Pakistan stand even before war started between India and Pakistan in December. 1971. This is evident from a *New York Times* report of 5 October 1971. It wrote : “ US officials in Washington----- express deep annoyance with Indians as “not very lovable people” who are obsessed with rivalry with Pakistan, blame Indian emotionalism for prolongation of East Pakistan crisis and resent India’s refusal to urge restraint on East Pakistani rebels.”²² Later in the second week of November US Secretary of State William Rogers, expressing Administration’s growing concern that India and Pakistan border clashes may lead to war, said the “US has counselled maximum restraint on both sides.”²³ But it did not put any pressure on Yahya Khan to resolve the East crisis in East Pakistan.

As tensions increased during November, the United States hardened its stance towards India, which Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon accused was inciting the conflict. On 7 December Washington announced a suspension

²² *New York Times*, 5 October 1971.

²³ *New York Times*, 13 November 1971..

of military sales to India. After a couple of days, the US again held India responsible for war, ignoring Pakistan. US State Department official said India was largely responsible for increased hostilities in the subcontinent.²⁴ On 5 December 1971, Secretary of State Rogers complained to Indian Ambassador in Washington that India made an attack on US merchant ship.²⁵ Still unsatisfied, on 6 December 1971, the United States froze its economic assistance to India. On the same day a State Department Official indicated President Nixon's views by saying, "Nixon is determined to pin responsibility for war on India, following Gandhi's total lack of responsiveness to US efforts to find diplomatic solution."²⁶ The next day Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco declared that India bore the major responsibility for war. In the UN Security Council, US representative George Bush criticized India and put a resolution in the Security Council demanding ceasefire. But it could not materialise. Moscow vetoed the resolution. Its motive behind using veto in the Security Council on the question of ceasefire was to help India achieve its objective in East Pakistan. This move of the Soviet Union

²⁴ *New York Times*, 5 December 1971.

²⁵ *New York Times*, 6 December. 1971.

²⁶ *New York Times*, 7 December. 1971.

did not surprise the United States because Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty had already been signed by both countries in August 1971.

Participating for the first time as a permanent member of Security Council. China joined the United States in supporting the cease-fire, resolution. But Britain, France and some US allies abstained in the Security Council vote. Outside the Security Council, the Chinese condemned India for attempting to create a puppet Bangladesh and denounced the Soviets for getting involved during the crisis. Unaware of the Nixon Kissinger secret relationship with Yahya, the US Ambassador Kenneth Keating in New Delhi, US Consul General Archur Blood in Dacca and various foreign policy bureaucrats in the State Department all advocated tough measures against Pakistan.²⁷

Nixon's overriding proviso, according to Kissinger, was more accurately expressed in the following order, " "To all hands don't' squeeze Yahya at this time."²⁸ The official US finds a clear explanation in Kissinger's memoirs. It held that despite the obfuscation, India could not realistically claim that its 200000 troops had been attacked by 70,000 Pakistani

²⁷ Tahir Kheli, n. 14, p.42.

²⁸ *ibid.*

soldiers or that one squadron of the aging, Korean Vintage Saber Jets of Pakistan Airforce had been launched against approximately 200 planes (a majority of which were the modern Mig-21) of the Indian Air Force. India was merely using the war "to establish its preeminence in the subcontinent."²⁹ On 6 December President Nixon received a CIA report to the effect that Indira Gandhi was considering moving against West Pakistan. Despite Gandhi's denial of any action in West Pakistan, President Nixon and Kissinger were not convinced. They decided to save West Pakistan. Consequently, President Nixon decided to press the Soviets to dissuade India's from attack in West Pakistan. But it did not satisfy him. The President then decided to take a tough action. On 10 December he ordered a show of US Naval Forces, directing the Task Group 74 to proceed from the US Seventh Fleet off South Vietnam towards the Bay of Bengal. Nixon's dispatch of the task force was generally welcomed in Pakistan as the first concrete step taken by an ally to signal its resolve.

Once Mrs. Gandhi achieved her goal in the east Pakistan, announced a cease-fire effective from 19 December 1971.

²⁹ *ibid.*

After the 1971 War, it came to light that during the war, Nixon was demanding the “tilt” towards Pakistan” And giving Kissinger “hell every hour for not doing enough against India.”³⁰ Due to the Nixon tilt towards Pakistan during the war 1971 Indo–US relations reached the lowest point since India’s independence.

Though US clearly sided with Pakistan during the war, it would be grossly incorrect to suggest that there was unified support in all quarters of the US Government. for the Pakistani position. Both Houses of the US Congress, in appropriate committees, expressed their disenchantment with far administration’s policy towards the subcontinent. As early as 7 May 1971 a Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted to suspend arms sales to Pakistan. Subsequently on 10 June , Senator Frank Church and senator William attached an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Bill that called for suspension of US military and economic aid to Pakistan until food and medical relief, supervised by an international agency such as the United Nations, was instituted on a regular basis in East Pakistan and the majority of Pakistani refugees in India were repatriated.³¹

³⁰ Kux, n.3, p. 306.

³¹ Ganguly, n. 20, p. 132.

The disenchantment with the Nixon Administration's policy was by no means confined to the legislative branch. On 6 April 1971 twenty US Consular officials led by Archur Blood, the US General in Dacca, cabled a long telegram through what was known as the dissent channel in the State Department indicating their inability to support the US position of tacit acceptance of the behaviour of the Pakistani leadership."³²

President Nixon sent to Congress a report on the US role in Indo-Pak 9 February 1972. This report titled *US Foreign policy for 1970's : The Emerging Structure of Peace.*" did not find any buyer. According to the report:

The United States did not support or condone this military action. Immediately in early April, we ceased ensuring and renewing licenses for military shipments to Pakistan, we put a hold on arms that had been committed the year before, and we ceased new commitment for economic development loans. This shut off \$ 35 million worth of arms. Less than \$5 million worth of spare parts already, in the pipeline under earlier licences, were shipped before the pipeline dried up completely by the beginning of the November.....As the tension along the border intensified in the fall, the United States proposed that both Indian & Pakistani troops pull back from the borders. Pakistan accepted this proposal; India turned it down.....³³

Nixon's report to Congress did not surprise anybody. It did not find any fault with Pakistan. It put whole responsibility of war on India. What made Nixon tilt towards

³² Brands, n. 12, P.130.

³³ As cited in, "President Nixon on South Asia,1972" *Current History*, November, 1972, p.224-226.

Pakistan and send Naval task force to the Bay of Bengal ?
First, Yahya was helpful for him during his efforts towards opening a communication with Beijing.³⁴

Secondly, President Nixon and Kissinger perceived the crisis almost entirely in terms of its global implications. The tilt was not just a means of expressing appreciation to the Pakistanis for their help in the opening to China, but a more important was impressing the Chinese with the US handling of the crisis.³⁵

Third, it could also be attributed to India's signing of Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with Soviet Union in August 1971. This move convinced US that India was no longer a non aligned country.

Fourth, Nixon's Sympathy for Yahya Khan also stemmed from his personal preference of Pakistan. Nixon had held the Pakistanis in high regard ever since his visit in 1953 to Karachi, where their "martial" character convinced him that the Eisenhower Administration should go ahead with its plans to arm Pakistan.³⁶

³⁴ Brands, n. 12, p. 130.

³⁵ Kux, n.3, P. 306.

³⁶ Brand, n. 12, p. 130.

Fifth, Some analysts have blurred the roles played by Kissinger and Nixon by suggesting that they both disliked India. Gandhi . Roger Morris furnishes a markedly different picture of the actions taken by Nixon and Kissinger during that crisis. Kissinger really did not care one way or the other about the East Pakistan. His primary interest lay in forging an agreement of sorts with the Chinese “to cage the Soviet bears.”³⁷ As Morris says, “The two men so largely controlled US foreign relations were to be found in the Lincoln sitting room or the Executive Office Building, not reading the cables, from Dacca or New Delhi but absorbed in the nuance of the latest Chinese note, planning their reply contemplating the historic stroke ahead.”³⁸

The last possible reason was put by the CIA Director Richard Helms at an 8 December 1971 meeting of Washington special group dealing with the US’s Seventh Fleet. He claimed that Indira Gandhi was considering to straighten out the border of “Azad Kashmir” and destroy Pakistan’s military capabilities. Henry Kissinger and Nixon studied this as India’s desire to destroy Pakistan, an US ally. But, an examination of the record of the battles in the western

³⁷ Ganguly, n. 20, p. 133.

³⁸ *ibid.* p. 134.

theatre shows that India did not seek to gain territory in the west, Nor did it seek to gain territory in Pak-Occupied Kashmir (POK)".

Another question which is often raised regarding US role in Indo Pak war is : Did US support for Pakistan specifically contribute to the outbreak of war on the subcontinent ? The answer is "yes". It provided Yahya Khan with the illusory margin of assurance that the US would intervene to prevent India from achieving its objectives in East Pakistan. To some degree this faith and optimism in US action was a function not only of the perceived support of Kissinger and Nixon but also of Yahya's relationship with the American Ambassador to Islamabad, Joseph Farland. He was one of Yahya's drinking associates who apparently kept reassuring him that US support was forth coming.³⁹

The two wars of 1965 and 1971 had shown the futility of attempting to change the status quo in Kashmir. Moreover, in 1972, the power configuration in the subcontinent had been decisively altered. Pakistan's external supporters were convinced for the moment at least of the futility of tampering with the obvious: no amount of external aid and armaments would enable Pakistan to match India's natural supremacy.⁴⁰

³⁹ *ibid.*

⁴⁰ Gowher Rizvi, "India, Pakistan and the Kashmir problem, 1947-72" in G.C. Thomas, ed., *The perspective on kashmir the roots of conflict in South Asia*, (Westview, 1992), P.72.

Chapter III
US PERCEPTION OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT IN
KASHMIR

Low intensity conflict “is warfare that falls below the threshold of full scale military combat between modern armies.¹ This types of warfare below the level of covert military operations by a state’s regular army includes proxy wars, wars fought with mercenaries, psychological operations to terrorize the populace, and death squad.² Low intensity conflict in Kashmir first erupted in 1988-89. It arose when Pakistan took advantage of the disturbed conditions of the state, and evolved a new strategy of promoting a proxy war in Jammu & Kashmir. The strategy comprised of luring disgruntled youth into Pakistan, training them, arming them, financing them, indoctrinating them and pushing them back into Kashmir, with a view to indulging in militancy, bringing down the legally established government and wresting the state from India. Regarding the origin militancy in Kashmir the Government of Pakistan and India have contrast views. Pakistan saw the origin of militancy in the Kashmiri people’s

¹ Charles W. Kegley, Jr. Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics : Trend and Transformation* (New York , 1999), p.440.

² *ibid.*

demand for self-determination. It said that since Government of India did not heed to their demand of self determination they had to adopt violent means to attain the goal. Though it flatly denied its direct involvement in militancy, it accepted that Pakistan extended full moral support to Kashmiri people in their struggle. Indian Government saw the origin of militant activity in Pakistan's strategy to provide training, arms and money to Kashmiri youth. Many experts does not agree with the official position of both Pakistan and India. Noted writer Tavleen Singh in her book *Kashmir : Tragedy of Errors* finds domestic factors responsible for rise of military in the beginning in Jammu and Kashmir. But she accepts that at later stage it was directly supported by Pakistan in men as well as in material.³ on 2 Decembr 1989, an incident of considerable importance happened. The daughter of Home Minister was kidnapped by militants in Srinagar. Her release was obtained by releasing five hardcore militants, against the wishes of the chief Minister. This incident gave a great boost to militancy in the state and it became extremely difficult to control it thereafter. President's rule was imposed on 19 anuary 1990. Militancy gathered further momentum. Police stations were attacked, convoys of security forces were

³ Tavleen Singh , *Kashmir : The Tragedy of Errors* (New Delhi , 1995), p. 204.

ambushed, bomb blasts were carried out in crowded areas, politicians were assassinated, people were kidnapped and killed.

Before examining the United States' attitude to low intensity conflict in Kashmir, it seems appropriate to have a brief look at its policy towards Kashmir after the end of 1971 Indo-Pakistan War and before the outbreak of LIC-between 1972 and 1989. After the 1971 war, India and Pakistan signed Shimla Accord in 1972, which stipulated that "issues between India and Pakistan including Kashmir, would be resolved bilaterally by the two countries without any third party mediation."⁴ Washington significantly considered the Shimla Agreement as an appropriate mechanism to resolve the disputes between India and Pakistan. Kashmir was relatively peaceful between 1972 and 1989. Consequently Kashmir issue did not draw much of the world attention due to Islamabad's inability to embark on foreign misadventures in post-1971 war period. Pakistan's pre-occupation with the Afghanistan crises since late 1979 was yet another factor which made it difficult for Islamabad to interfere in Kashmir.⁵ During this US

⁴ Chintamani Mahapatra, *Indo-US Relations into the 21st Century* (New Delhi, 1990), p.42.

⁵ *ibid.*

involvement in to the Kashmir issue was also minimal. But it can not be said that the US kept its hands off from the issue. Variety of proposals for solving the Kashmir issue bear floated floated by American think tanks during these years. It was like an indirect American involvement in Kashmir issue. Munro gave the 'Economic Zone' theory, Stephen Cohen and Vigarin put forth 'Independent Kashmir' Concept, Rudolphs enunciated his "limited or shared Sovereignty" doctrine and Selling Harrison spoke of 'Greater Muslim Independent Kashmir'⁶ Moreover, some "secret missions" made their way into the valley especially after 1975 Indira-Sheikh Accord. Heading a 9-member delegation, Nelson Rockefeller visited Kashmir on 30 April 1978 and "met with Sheikh Abdullah for 90 minutes."⁷ The fact that much of the mission's deliberations were kept secret raised questions about its intention. President Reagan's high profile emissary, Charlton Heston visited Srinagar in 1980. This was followed by US Ambassador, William Saxbe's visit in 1982 (and of the British diplomats) and meeting with the Sheikh,⁸ On the basis of these events it could be said that the US did not keep its

⁶ K.N. Pandita, "The American Hand : Four Decades of Steady Home work in Kashmir", in Shyam Kaul and Onkar Kachru, ed., *Jammu Kashmir and Ladakh : Ringside View* (New Delhi, 1998), P.43-44.

⁷ *ibid*, p.44.

⁸ *ibid*.

hands off, but just changed the method of achieving its goal in Kashmir for the time being.

Once the insurgency erupted in Kashmir in 1989, United States activism increased. On 6 March 1990, when the top most State Department official dealing with South Asia, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asia John H. Kelley testified to the Asia Pacific Subcommittee of the House of Representatives' International Relations Committee, he spoke of 'other views being voiced', calling for independence.⁹ Even as Kelly spoke, there were other issues that were bringing the US to focus sharply on the region. The Pakistan supported rebellion had sharply increased the tension between India and Pakistan. The US was apprehensive of the danger of nuclear war between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir dispute.

When India-Pakistan's relations became strained in 1990 raising suspicion of a possible nuclear confrontation, the US launched "strenuous diplomatic efforts" to defuse the situation. Robert Gates, Deputy National Security Advisor in the Bush Administration, visited South Asia on a peace

⁹ Manoj Joshi, *The Lost Rebellion : Kashmir in the Nineties* (New Delhi , 1999), p.315.

mission. His discussions with the Pakistani and Indian leaders succeeded in lowering the tensions between the two countries and in defusing the situation.¹⁰ Gates also made it clear that Washington no longer backed a UN plebiscite as the preferred way to solve the Kashmir dispute but instead supported bilateral talks in accordance with the Shimla Agreement.¹¹ Thus the US Kashmir policy under the Bush Administration was more supportive of India's preference for bilateral negotiations and was at odds with Pakistan's policy of involving a third party in settling the dispute.

But nobody should have any doubt that the Bush Administration's concern over Kashmir problem flowed more from its nuclear non proliferation policy in the region. This US policy, however, was similar to Pakistan's attempt to link the Kashmir issue and the nuclear question. Pakistan said that a resolution of the Kashmir issue would have to precede any attempt to address the proliferation question.¹² John Mallot, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, was once quoted as saying that "Kashmir is a core issue the resolution of

¹⁰ P.R. Chari, *Indo Pak Nuclear Standoff: The Role of the United States* (New Delhi, 1995), p.134.

¹¹ Saleem Kidwai, "US and Kashmir Issue", *Asian Studies*, Vol. XVI, Jan - June 1998.

¹² Chari, n.10, p. 153.

which has to be a comprehensive approach to other issues".¹³ This policy formulation suggested that the Kashmir issue could not be treated in isolation from other problems between India and Pakistan which included nuclear proliferation. The United States further more perceived the Kashmir issue as the most likely flash point that could trigger a nuclear conflict in South Asia."¹⁴

An event of considerable significance occurred in December 1991 When India internationalised the Kashmir issue. When Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front announced its plan to cross the Line of Control on 11 February 1992, the government of India's reaction appeared to be panicky. It called the Ambassadors of the five permanent members of the Security Council and apprised them of the seriousness of the matter"¹⁵ Later on Pakistan government found it expedient not to allow the march, but the event had already got extensive publicity. The British newspaper, *Independent*, commented "The apparent loss of political nerve by New Delhi has reversed its decade long policy of Keeping UN out of Kashmir

¹³ *ibid.*

¹⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁵ Jagmohan, *My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir* (New Delhi, 1992), 652.

affairs.”¹⁶ Pakistan, on the other hand, reacted cleverly. It’s spokesman, in an ironical gesture that subserved his country’s diplomatic purpose, “accused India of internationalising the Kashmir issue unnecessarily.”¹⁷ Encouraged by India’s move Amanullah Khan, the JKLF Chairman, on 25 March 1992 wrote a letter to UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali, “in which he suggested that “United Nations should take over for five years, the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir , as it existed on August 14 1947, and then hold plebiscite, giving all the three options”. He claimed in the letter that he had the support of “200 US Congressmen” and a number of British Members of the Parliament. At about the same time *New York Times* came out with an editorial asking for a UN role in the settlement of Kashmir problem, though the UN Secretary General had made it clear that the UN had no role in territorial disputes unless both the claimants wanted so.”¹⁸ When all this was going on leaders of the British Labour Party issued some statements which made India more unhappy. Geralt Kaufman, shadow Foreign Secretary, declared, “We would

¹⁶ *ibid.*

¹⁷ *ibid.*, p.658.

¹⁸ *ibid.*, p.662.

put Kashmir on the top of international agenda.” In the same strain, Roy Hattlersley, deputy leader of the Labour Party, said, “I support the plebiscite and thesis of third option.”¹⁹ These events and wide publicity which Kashmir issue got in international media appeared to be the result of Government of India’s own move. Indian policy to prevent internationalization of the Kashmir issue suffered heavily.

Under the Bush Administration two events gave severe blows to Pakistan’s position on Kashmir. First, in October 1990, President Bush refused to give an annual certification, as required by the Pressler Amendment, that Pakistan did not have a nuclear explosive device. As a result, all US military assistance to Pakistan ceased. Secondly, was Secretary of State James Baker in June 1992 wrote letter to the Pakistani government with a warning that Pakistan “could be branded a ‘state sponsor’ of terrorism, if it did not desist from aiding the Kashmir militants. Baker noted that he could be compelled to do so by a US legislation, specifically section 620 (a) and 6 (J) of the Foreign Assistance Act.²⁰ However Bush Administration failed to change Pakistan’s policy of sponsoring terrorism in Kashmir. two factors were responsible

¹⁹ *ibid*, p.665.

²⁰ Joshi, n.9, p.317.

for such a change in US policy. First, end of Cold War decreased the strategic value of Pakistan in US eyes. Secondly, the US started looking militant Islam as one of the biggest threat of the post-Cold War era.²¹

Kashmir Issue and the Clinton.

When Clinton became President after 1992 election, terrorism in Kashmir continued unabated. In early April 1993, Pakistan sent a high level team led by Choudhari Nisar Ali, a minister in Nawaz Sharif's government, to hold discussions with Secretary of state Warren Christopher and other American officials to convince them that the Pakistan government, was not supporting the Kashmiri militants. The US official position at this time was summed up in a response by the official spokesman of the State Department, who said, 'The US government is concerned with continuing reports of Pakistani support for militant groups engaged in terrorism in India. We are keeping the situation under review.'²² In Washington, giving testimony on 22 April 1993, to the US Senate judiciary Committee, Chief of the CIA at the time, James Woolsey, went on record to disclose that "Pakistan

was 'on the brink of being declared a state sponsor of terrorism by the US State Department, an action that would have compelled the US to end all trade relations with Pakistan. He said that Pakistan had supported the Kashmiri and Sikh groups and that these groups had found a safe haven and other support in Pakistan."²³ Following the Bombay blast in March 1993, the US, alarmed at Pakistani complicity in the event, sent John Malott, the principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State to the subcontinent. While testifying before the House of Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Asia Pacific Affairs in the same month, Malott said that " a military stand off continues along the line of control that needed attention, and in the valley, militants had launched an insurgency and were resorting to terrorist attacks, while the Indian security forces committed human rights abuses. He called for bilateral talks as envisaged by the Shimla Agreement and said that the US was prepared to be helpful if both sides wished it."²⁴

In May 1993 while delivering a lecture at the India International Centre in New Delhi, Malott declared that "the US wanted the two countries to convert the principles

²³ *ibid.*

²⁴ *ibid.*, p. 319-320.

embodied in the Shimla paper into a reality. The US would not advocate any particular solution, and the three principles guiding its policy were: 1) We consider all of Kashmir to be disputed territory, on both sides of the Line of Control; 2) This is an issue to be settled peacefully by India and Pakistan, taking the views of Kashmiris, both Muslims and non-Muslims, into account; and 3) The United States is prepared to be helpful in this process if this is desired by both sides.”²⁵ Besides, Malott also said indirectly that the US was reluctant to brand Pakistan a terrorist state’ because that action would reduce US influence there. Unstated was the proposition that the US had other more important goals like non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In early 1993, the US appointed Robin Raphel the first Assistant Secretary of State in charge of the new Division of South Asian Affairs in the State Department. This was followed by the Clinton Administration’s renewed interest in Kashmir. The focal point of Washington was twin concerns of nuclear proliferation and human rights abuse. In the pre-Raphel period while US described the United Nations resolution on plebiscite as outdated and payed lip service to Shimla

²⁵ *ibid*, p.320.

Agreement, in post-Raphel period it went to the extent of questioning the Instrument of Accession.

Why did the Clinton Administration involve itself so much in Kashmir? First, saw a linkage between Kashmir dispute and nuclear proliferation in South Asia. Second, human rights was another major issue of Clinton's foreign policy agenda. Some believed that the Clinton Administration's initial posture regarding Kashmir was long term planning for US domination over Central Asia.²⁶ It was also argued that an independent or semi-independent Kashmir could serve as an American ally to contain China.

Clinton's view on Kashmir was revealed in his 27 September 1993 address to the UN General Assembly, when he mentioned Kashmir as a conflict that posed threat to world peace. He said – "... as we marvel at the era's promise of new peace, we must also recognize the serious small threats that remain. Bloody, ethnic, religious and civil wars range from Angola to the Caucasus to Kashmir."²⁷ No other American President had made such a reference in any international fora. The main motive of President Clinton was to link the

²⁶ Vinay Kumar, *The Clinton Administration in South Asia 1993-97* (New Delhi, 1997), p.129.

²⁷ Kidwai, n.11, p.7-8.

Kashmir with the question of non-proliferation. Responding to a question on why President Clinton in his UN speech had mentioned Kashmir, Robin Raphael said : “It was meant to say we see Kashmir on the radar screen along with Yugoslavia and Somalia and lots of other places in the former Soviet Union, We cannot easily overlook it and there is a message in that”²⁸ It is worth noting that Clinton’s reference to Kashmir in his UN address came after a failed Indo-US bilateral talks on issues like technology transfer and nuclear proliferation.

The change in the US policy towards Kashmir was indicated when Clinton Administration official on 28 October 1993 questioned the status of Kashmir by saying, the US Government did not recognize the Instrument of Accession. The US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, Robin Raphael, in a background briefing in Washington said : “We view the whole of Kashmir as a disputed territory. This means we do not recognize that Instrument of Accession, meaning that Kashmir is forever an integral part of India. There were many other issues at play in that time frame as we all know here”.²⁹ Robin Raphael dismissed the Shimla Accord out of

²⁸ *ibid*, p.8.

²⁹ Kumar, n.26, p.130.

hand and confirmed that President Clinton's reference to Kashmir in UN address was not accidental. She said : "It is 20 plus years old and there have been very few discussions, if any under that accord, in terms of resolving the Kashmir disputeIt is fine to discuss the Kashmir dispute under the Shimla Accord but it has not happened. So by definition, ipso facto, it has not been very effective."³⁰ She reiterated the new American position that any final solution to the Kashmir dispute must take into account the wishes of the Kashmiri people. The Clinton Administration was the first US Administration to dispute the Instrument of Accession or the Independence of India Act under which 500 odd princely states acceded to India.

The Indian government conveyed its strong protest on the above remark by Robin Raphel and regarded it as a "studied tilt". External Affairs Ministers Dinesh Singh on 30 October warned the US that India would not brook any outside interference on the Kashmir issue. India also accused Washington of questioning the unity and integrity of India. The charge of India was refuted by the US State Department. Clarifying the US stand , the Spokesman Mike Maccruy of the

³⁰ *ibid*, p.130.

state Department said : "There is nothing that was said by any senior official of Administration indicating a change in the US policy on Kashmir." However, the doubts that Raphael's remarks might signify a change in the US policy were reinforced by this clarification.

Such statements by US officials boosted the moral of Pakistan-supported militant groups and All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC). The mercenaries in the valley felt convinced that the US, the lone superpower would secure "Azadi" for them eventually, provided they continued their fight against India. On 29 October 1993, the APHC, which had been trying to mediate a solution of the Hazaratbal crisis in Kashmir, suddenly put new demands, and when the Kashmir Administration refused to meet their demand, they pulled out of the negotiation, Syed Ali Shah Geelani then said on 1 October 1993 that the changed international situation "was to the advantage of the Kashmiris and the best proof of this lay in the US President's remark which were a pointer to the international pressure building on India."³¹

On 27 December 1993 Clinton in his reply to a letter by the Kashmir separatist Ghulam Nabi Fai, said, "I look toward

³¹ Joshi, n. 9, p. 327.

to working with you and others to help bring peace to Kashmir”³² It is note worthy that Ghulam Nabi Fai’s Kashmiri American Council is one of the several generously funded organisations. Pakistan backed it overtly or otherwise in order to cover up its terrorist design in Kashmir. Given his activities some commentators dubbed Clinton the Patron-in-Chief of secessionists of South Asia.³³

The damage done to Indo-US by US relation by US position on Kashmir was substantial. Washington thus felt the need to clarify its stand. On 2 November 1993, the US under Secretary for Political Affairs, Peter Turnoff sought to dispel the Indian impression that there was a “studied tilt” on the part of Washington towards Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. “The United States’ only interest is towards the Indo Pak relationship being normalized through peaceful dialogue,”³⁴ Turnoff told Indian Ambassador Sidharth Shankar Ray. The US State Department further clarified in January 1994 that it did not want direct Kashmiri participation in Indo-Pakistan dialogue but any workable solution of Kashmir dispute would have to take into account the wishes of the Kashmiris. “How

³² *ibid*, p.330.

³³ Kumar, n. 26, p.134.

³⁴ *ibid*, p.135.

this is determined” said the Department, “would best be established in the negotiation process.”³⁵

Throughout 1993 the US White House and State Department issued negative statements on Kashmir. But the US legislators somewhat adopted a balanced approach on the issue. For example, the subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee dealing with Asia and Pacific ruled out plebiscite in Kashmir and said any policy based on holding of a plebiscite throughout the entire pre-partition state of Jammu and Kashmir was doomed to fail. It said the UN resolutions calling for a plebiscite in Kashmir had been overtaken by history.”³⁶

Commenting on the change in Clinton’s approach to Kashmir, Tom A. Travis, Professor of Political Science at Ducknell University, said:

the forthright American statements on Kashmir may have been intended to exemplify the US role as the world’s leading power and its concomitant responsibility to provide leadership to solve global conflicts. Raphael’s stance may have been designed to “soften up” India for concessions on other issue. Washington would like India to join NPT, to respect MTCR, to accept the US position on the Tarapur Nuclear reactor and to fully implement provisions of GATT accord. US officials might have believed that by taking a harder line on Kashmir, they could

³⁵ *ibid.*

³⁶ *ibid.*, p. 138.

retract this position later in exchange for Indian concessions in some of these areas.³⁷

Travis went on to say, "As relations soured with Islamabad and improved with New Delhi, and US policy began to tilt towards India, bureaucratic politics no doubt erupted. The many old Pakistan hands, centred particularly in the Pentagon and CIA, probably campaigned to pull American policy back Forward Pakistan just as their counterparts favoured India attempted to resist."³⁸ During Robin Raphel's and Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott's visit to India in March and April 1994 respectively it was proposed by the US to freeze the Kashmir issue for the time being as it is insoluble in the short term. It seems that by that time it became crystal clear to the Clinton administration and its officials that Kashmir was a sensitive issue and their statements should not be allowed to further damage Indo-US relations. During her visit to New Delhi in March 1994 Raphel was over cautious on Kashmir and human rights and adopted a low profile on these contentious issues. She briefly touched Kashmir issue in the end. Complaining that the views of the United States on Kashmir had been 'misinterpreted she sought

³⁷ Tom. A Travis, "Indo American Relations : The Kashmir Countroversy", *India Quarterly*, vol. XLIX No4, Oct/Dec. 1993.p.54.

³⁸ *ibid*, p.55.

to clarify Washington's Kashmir policy. She said that the United States "supported a negotiated end" to the conflict in Kashmir and opposed "outside aid" to the militants. In addition to Indo Pakistani dialogue, US supported Indian efforts to find a political process that will bring an end to the fighting in Kashmir. In her effort to play down her controversial remarks regarding Kashmir's accession, she added that "the American focus is not on how it started but how it can be ended"³⁹

US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, visited both India and Pakistan in April 1994. First, he sought to delink Islamabad's nuclear programme that of from New Delhi and secondly, the nuclear issue from the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. This dual delinking sounded a new shift in Clinton's policy towards Kashmir and non proliferation. It was because of Kashmir issue that South Asia was considered a potential theatre of nuclear confrontation. while Pakistan sought to link, India sought to delink the nuclear and the Kashmir issue. Talbott's position was different from Raphael's position in 1993. He told Pakistani audience during his visit to Islamabad that, "the issue of non-proliferation is so important

³⁹ Kumar, n. 26, p.140.

that it needs to be discussed very much in its own terms.” Talbott’s reiteration that the Kashmir dispute could best be resolved by the Shimla Accord was also an indication that America was turning back to Bush policy.

Indian Prime Minister Narsimha Rao visited the United States in May 1994. After Rao- Clinton summit talks, a joint statement was issued in which both leaders agreed on the need for bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan to resolve the outstanding issues, of including Jammu and Kashmir as on the basis of the Shimla Accord.⁴⁰ It implied that any attempt by Islamabad to internationalize the Kashmir issue would not receive American support. However, Clinton seemed less inclined to blame Pakistan for supporting terrorist activities in Kashmir, despite State Department’s report on Islamabad’s involvement and ISI’s role in Kashmir.

In 1996, towards the end of Clinton Administration’s first term, the US policy towards Kashmir issue changed again. The American response to unfolding events in the Indian part of Kashmir reflected the fluctuating policy of the Clinton Administration over the Kashmir issue. This time it seemed to acquire a more realistic approach. For instance,

⁴⁰ *ibid*, p.142.

before the Indian parliamentary elections, the US Assistant Secretary of State Robin Rephael said, "If the Kashmiri people participated in India's Lok Sabha polls, the verdict would be acceptable to the US Administration."⁴¹ Subsequently, the US invested quite a bit of political capital in creating the right atmosphere for a peace process to be started. The then US Ambassador to India, Frank Wisner, along with a team of South Asia specialists visited Pakistan to help create a political dialogue between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. Commenting on Wisner's mission, President Clinton observed, "our embassy in New Delhi is in frequent touch with the major Kashmiri political groups and with Indian officials involved in Kashmir. Through these channels, we are working to reduce human right violations, allow greater access by international organizations and encourage political dialogue in Kashmir that would lead to credible democratic process."⁴² After the election in Kashmir, while talking to a delegation from Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), Robin Raphael said that the elections in Kashmir were free and fair. More important, Raphael came out openly against the Pakistan Government's proposal for a Nine Nations

⁴¹ Kidwai, n.11, p.13.

⁴² *ibid.*

Conference on Kashmir and regional disarmament and squarely blamed Islamabad for the inability of any indo-Pak dialogue to get off the ground. She was of the opinion that it was Pakistan that was reluctant to hold a dialogue with India on Kashmir and that the US had been urging "Pakistan not to meddle in Kashmir."⁴³ There US approval to electoral exercise in Kashmir was a reflection of change in policy towards Kashmir.

The US State Department's annual report on terrorism, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1996*, considered terrorism in India, Algeria, Sri Lanka and Pakistan as "domestic terrorism." Which" is probably a more widespread phenomenon than international terrorism."⁴⁴ By describing terrorism in Kashmir as domestic one, the report ignored the Pakistani hand and contradicted CIA reports which indicated the direct involvement of Pakistani Intelligence Agency in Kashmiri violence.

In August 1997 George Pickart, a Senior Advisor to the South Asian Bureau of the State Department, repeated the US position that Jammu and Kashmir was a disputed territory

⁴³ *ibid*, p.15.

⁴⁴ Mahapatra, n.4, p.48

and was an issue to be resolved between India and Pakistan, taking the desires of Kashmiri people into account. Why did the US introduce this new elements in the Kashmir conflict introducing a third party to the dispute that is the people of Kashmir which was absent in its earlier Kashmir policy. The objective appeared to be to shape the third option of independent Kashmir which might be more amenable to the US influence. The US was perhaps convinced that an independent Kashmir could emerge, only from a long drawnout, low intensity Indo-Pak conflict. Washington's ambivalence approach towards Pakistan's involvement in the Kashmir violence in a way helped to prolong the conflict.⁴⁵ American researchers and economic and strategic analysts have given their assessment that if the US wished to have economic access to Central Asia, the most effective land route would be through Jammu and Kashmir. In this context, one may conclude that the US would like to take advantage of the centrifugal political in Jammu and Kashmir to further its own interests regardless of the impact on India's territorial integrity and security. The US could to use Pakistan Occupied Kashmir to gain access to Tibet and needle China on human rights violations. The China factor is important as the US was never

⁴⁵ Kidwai, n.11, p.18.

reconciled to Pakistan ceding certain areas in Northern Territories of Jammu and Kashmir to China in 1962.⁴⁶ In fact, US policies on Kashmir are not based on the merit of the case but on its own political and security and economic interests.

⁴⁶ *ibid.*

CHAPTER-IV

KARGIL WAR : BEGINNING OF A CHANGE IN WASHINGTON'S VIEWS

The Pakistan supported terrorist activities in Kashmir took a nasty turn in mid- 1999. Pakistan had failed to gain anything substantial even after ten years of backing, aiding and equipping the militant organizations, which have been playing havoc with the lives of the innocent Kashmiris since 1989.

Months after Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee embarked upon his bus diplomacy to end hostilities with Pakistan, India was shocked to discover Pakistani armed infiltrators crossing over the Line of Control (LoC) and entering Indian territory in Kargil Sector of Kashmir. This incident and in early 1997 when General Pervez Musharraf was the Corps Commander.¹ The preparation for infiltration was assigned to 62 Infantry Brigade of Pakistan. It was provided all the support needed including SSG company teams and about 400 or more mujahiddin cadres. Arms and ammunition provided to them comprised 25 Pounders, 105 mm Field guns, 5.5 inch guns, 120 mm mortar, and 122 mm multi barrel

¹ Ravi Nanda, *Kashmir and Indo Pakistan Relations* (New Delhi, 2001), p. 142.

rocket launchers. Gun locating radars for accurate counter bombardments were also available. The long range artillery was deployed to interdict the NHIA.² It is tragic that Prime Minister Nawaj Sharif “had been briefed about the operation in January 1999 and he had given his approval. He had even flown over the defences, along with Musharraf, in February 1999, just before the Lahore summit.”³

The presence of intruders was first discovered in the Batalik area of the Kargil. On 2 May 1999 first skirmishes took place between Indian army patrols and Pakistan backed intruders. The United States assumed it as the usual shootout between Indian and Pakistan forces on the line of control. It was the destruction of the Indian Ammunition Depot near Kargil town on 7 May which made the United States take it seriously. When preliminary intelligence reports were processed Washington came to know about of the intense fighting.

Indian Army began a serious offensive against the intruders on 8 May 1999, two days after receiving the reliable information about Pakistan backed intrusion into the area.⁴

² *ibid*, p.143.

³ *ibid*.

⁴ Sumit Chakaravarti, “Understanding Washington in Kargill”, *Mainstream* (New Delhi) 17 July, 1999.

On 14 May Indian reconnaissance parties encountered a number of defensive positions being occupied by intruders. On 12 May when Defence Minister visited Siachen, he described the intrusion as "sporadic" and said that intruders will be evicted within 48 hour. On 24 May 1999 the first meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security was held. It was decided to launch Operation Vijay and use of air power to evict intruders. After the meeting the Prime Minister Vajpayee described the Kargil situation as war like. Indian Armed Forces were given the direction to evict the pocket of intrusion and restore the sanctity of Line of Control⁵.

By 15 May, Pakistan's conspiracy was conspicuous and Washington was in doubt that Pakistan was responsible for placing the intruders inside Indian held territory.⁶ New Delhi's decision to put the Indian Air Force on high alert on 20 May, made Washington take the conflict with full seriousness. The US National Security Council meeting was held on 23 May 1999 Bill Clinton and Sandy Berger, his National Security Advisor, attended the meeting and demanded more intelligence information.⁷

Once India launched airstrikes on 26 May 1999, US quickly reacted. In her first reaction the United states equated

⁵ Vinod Anand, "India's Military Response to the Kargil Aggression", *Strategic Analysis*, September 1999, p. 1055.

⁶ *ibid.*

both India and Pakistan. Karl Inderfurth summoned the Ambassadors of India and Pakistan separately. He expressed very strong concern over the fighting in Kargil. He said that the Clinton administration was worried that the downing of the two aircraft added to the potential for further worsening of the situation. Inderfurth said that the two countries were moving in the opposite direction of the Lahore process. "This concerns US", ⁸Inderfurth said. Michael Hammar, spokesman of the National Security Council on 27 May 1999, said, "We are concerned about the rising escalation of violence in Kashmir. We have appealed to the government in both India and Pakistan to abide by the Lahore Accords."⁹

The following day James Rubin, the State Department spokesman, hinted publicly of Washington's knowledge of Islamabad's involvement when he said that the United States had its own view on how the situation developed?"¹⁰ His message was directed towards preventing the escalation of the conflict, but Pakistan's role in initiating the conflict was highlighted.

⁷ Pramita Pal Choudhary, "A Question of Restraint : US Policy During the Kargil Conflict", in Kanti Bajpai, Afsir Karim, Amitabh Mattoo, ed., *Kargil and after Challenges for Indian Policy* (New Delhi, 2000), p.3.34.

⁸ *ibid.*

⁹ *International Herald Tribune* (Bangkok), 28 May 1999.

¹⁰ Choudhary, n.7, p.334.

Pakistan's response to India's military action in Kargil was to try and get the international community sufficiently alarmed and thus internationalize the Kashmir Question. Its strategy was also to have the UN Security Council take up the issue. Part of this diplomatic strategy was to publicly undermine the Line of Control. Islamabad hoped that if a ceasefire was called, the Line of Control would shift and Pakistan would be allowed to hold on to the territory it had seized. As has been pointed out in the Kargil Review Committee report, "Islamabad's aim was to internationalize the Kashmir issue and freeze the ground situation to Pakistan's advantage through a cease-fire expected to be imposed by the international community."¹¹

It was the statement of the US Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth which removed all the doubts from the minds of Pakistan Government that Washington would extend and help in achieving its goal. Inderfurth said that "the intruders must go back before peace prevails in Kashmir. He believed that the fighting in the Kargil area of Kashmir "would not end until the militants who had entered from Pakistani side had left. Clearly, the Indian Government is not going to

¹¹ "From Surprise to Reckoning," *Kargil review Committee Report*, New Delhi, 15 December 1990, p.207.

cede this territory that these militants have taken”, said Inderfurth. And then he went on to warn : “They have to depart and they will depart either voluntarily or because the Indians take them out.”¹² Secretary of State Madeleine Albright reportedly told Pakistani Foreign Minister Sartaj Ajiz over the phone to pull back the intruders from Kargil. Other state Department officials also refused to believe the Pakistani version that Kashmiri militants and not Pakistani regular forces, were involved in the Kargil offensive”.

Shamshad Ahmed, the Pakistani Foreign Secretary, tried to arouse international concern over Kargil by declaring in an interview on 31 May the possibility of using any weapon in his arsenal. It was not taken seriously by Washington which knew Islamabad’s real goal was to internationalize the conflict. Nonetheless, Inderfurth summoned the Pakistani Ambassador to the United States, Riaz Khokhar, and warned him against inflammatory statements. Pakistan made statements about its nuclear weapons a few more times. It also raised the nuclear threat on its official website. However, it could not succeed in its motive of linking Kargil war with a nuclear flashpoint to an extent where the international community would be alarmed.

12 Chintamani Mahapatra, “US Approach to Kargil Conflict ,” *Himalyan and Central Asian Studies*, Vol.3 Nos.3-4, July-December, 1999, pp. 87-98

On 2 June, Sartaj Aziz , the Pakistani Foreign Minister, told BBC Urdu Service that the Line of Control was not demarcated on the ground. He followed this up by questioning the validity of the Line of Control on Pakistan Television the following day.”¹³ Initially the US State Department did not understand the objective of deliberately undermining the Line of Control. However, it quickly set the record straight in Washington. In press conference on June by Bruce Riedel said that “Kargil was a dangerous situation, one in which restraint was urgently required and one in which respect for the Line of Control of reaffirmation of the Line of Control was very important.” He went on to say, “ We think that the Line of Control was demarcated over the years. The two parties have not previously had significant differences about where the line of control is. We think that the forces which have crossed the Line should withdraw to where they came from.” ¹⁴Inderfurth responded to Pakistani government’s claim by sending a copy of the annexe to the Simla Agreement, which maps the line, to both the Indian and Pakistani Embassies.

¹³ Choudhary, n.7,p 337.

¹⁴ Ibid.

When Pakistan failed to receive direct or indirect support from the US, it started looking elsewhere for support and sympathy. It wrote letters to the UN Secretary General and Chairman of the Organizations of the Pakistani Islamic countries to intervene in the Kashmir conflict. Again the motive was to internationalize the Kashmir issue. However, these efforts were of no avail. Washington was at the forefront of blocking any attempt by Pakistan to gain any mileage from its aggression. The United States ensured that the positions of other members of the UN Security Council complemented its own view. The Clinton Administration throughout the conflict believed that India was a victim of aggression and was well within its rights to use its military to push them out. It also blocked a Canadian attempt to bring Kargil to the attention of the UN Security Council.

Moreover, President Clinton personally involved himself in a diplomatic effort to resolve the conflict. He rang up Sharif on 2 June 1999 and urged him to get the intruders out of Kargil. "Washington also opened up channels with Pakistan's main ally, China, in late May. The United States was "pleasantly surprised," to find that Beijing shared its views that Kargil was a dangerous confrontation that had to be defused and this would require a Pakistani troops

withdrawl.¹⁵ India was happy with the US attitude towards the Kargil conflict because the Clinton Administration wholeheartedly endorsed the Indian view point. Jaswant Singh rightly observed, "Diplomatically it is for the first time that India has total international support. Pakistan's aim to internationalize the issue has failed"¹⁶

There was near consensus in United States among Executive, Congress and media regarding the Kargil war. They endorsed the Indian military's response to the intrusion. They asked Pakistan to withdraw the "intruders" and "troops" to defuse the crisis. Benjamin Gilman, Chairman of the House International Relations Committee, wrote a letter on 4 June 1999 to Nawaj Sharif. He wrote, "Pakistan has nothing to gain by permitting the fighting to continue and much to loose by provoking the crisis. I urge you instruct Pakistan's military forces to withdraw and to end its support for the current fighting."¹⁷ Congressional activism over the Kashmir did not die down even after Pakistan agreed to withdraw its forces from across the Line of Control. Democratic Congressman, Frank Pallone , former co-Chairman of India caucus in the

¹⁵ *ibid*, p. 338.

¹⁶ *ibid*.

¹⁷ *Telegraph* (Culcutta), 16 June 1990.

United States Congress, urged President Bill Clinton to oppose Islamabad's frequent efforts to drag Washington into resolving the Kashmir issue. He said : "It is clear that Pakistan has long sought to drag the United States into this conflict as an international mediator, as a strategic ploy to enhance its position in the conflict. Such a step would not be appropriate for the Kashmir conflict".¹⁸ While branding radical Islamic militants and their supporter, Pakistan as the main culprit of Kargil incident, Pallone went to the extent of urging Indian National Human Rights Commission to declare the Kashmiri Pundits as victims of genocide and interanally displaced persons. Prominent Congressman and Co-Chairman of India Caucuss Gary Ackerman wanted the US Administration to press upon Islamabad to stop funding and equipping the Kashmiri militants before asking New Delhi to resume Lahore process.¹⁹ The Chairman of the House International Relations Committee, Benjamin Gilman, said: We will want to assure ourselves that the conditions do not deteriorate, and Pakistan must dismantle the structure for training militants for disrupting peace in Jammu and Kashmir, and maintain sanctity over the Line of Control, not

¹⁸ Mahapatra, n.12, p.89.

¹⁹ *ibid*

only in Kargil but also throughout Jammu & Kashmir. Further Pakistan must stop its support for cross border terrorism against India.”²⁰ So overwhelming was Congressional support for India’s policy of restraint during the Kargil war that traditional anti-India resolutions in the Capital Hill could not be moved. India’s bete-noire Dan Burton, the Republican from Indiana had to withdraw his anti India amendment to foreign operations Authorization Bill for 2000 in the face of strong opposition by his fellow Congressmen.²¹

American media too refused to buy the Pakistani Government’s argument. They supported the stand taken by the Executive and Congress. After Sharif’s Washington visit, The New York Times said : “India has been right to demand withdrawal of the militants before any further negotiations on Kashmir.”²² The *Washington Post* said : “This time the Pakistan Government is palinly to blame for having started the fighting.”²³

²⁰ *ibid.*

²¹ *ibid.*, p.89-90

²² Kapil Kak, “International Responses,” in Jusjit Singh, ed., *Kargil 1999 : Paksitan’s Fourth war for Kashmir* (New Delhi, 1999), p.196-197.

²³ *ibid.*

Did the United States achieve its foreign policy goals during the initial period of the Kargil war? First, Washington's main foreign policy goal of preventing escalation of conflict was successful. The sole reason for this was India's belief that a policy of restraint was in its self interest. India exercised self-restraint to defeat the Pakistan's motive of internationalizing the Kashmir issue. Secondly, the United States failed in getting India and Pakistan to resolve the crisis bilaterally. Thirdly, US most important role was in ensuring that internationalization of the conflict did not take place. By the end of the first week of June, a US official could say that, Pakistan's "strategic purpose was to involve the international community in Kashmir, but that has been defeated. Not only did its diplomatic efforts thwart Pakistan, but Washington

took pains to focus its campaign on preserving Line of Control's sanctity as well."²⁴

India suffered heavy casualties in its Kargil Operation. Therefore, the Government of India came under sharp criticism in media and in general public for not crossing the Line of Control. US feared India would be tempted to either open a second front in Rajasthan or escalate conflict in Kargil by

²⁴ Choudhary, n.7, p.340.

crossing the Line of Control. At this point Washington began to reconsider its strategy of using private channel diplomacy.

On 15 June 1999, Brajesh Mishra, Indian National Security Advisor, met his United States counterpart Sandy Berger in Geneva. Berger told his Indian counterpart that “the US would continue to press Pakistan to respect the Line of Control and return to Lahore process . Mishra handed over a letter from Vajpayee to Bill Clinton. The Prime Minister’s message was interpreted by Washington to mean that the sands of time were running out for India’s policy of restraint. India would have to reconsider crossing the Line of Control if Pakistan did not withdraw soon.”²⁵

The United States responded to Indian Prime Minister’s letter by increasing its diplomatic pressure on Pakistan. Bill Clinton promptly rang up Vajpayee to urge him to hold on to a policy of restraint. Immediately after his talk with the Indian Prime Minister, he rang up Nawaj Sharif. He asked Pakistani Prime Minister to pull back his forces from the other side of Line of Control warning that the troops deployment will hold any effort to end the fighting between the two

²⁵ *ibid*, p.341.

nations.²⁶ The United States in asking Nawaj Sharif government to pull back infiltrators also made it clear that the resolution of the larger issue of the Kashmir should not be held hostage by the Kargil adventure.²⁷

The United State also decided to use the upcoming Group of Eight Summit to send a strong warning to Pakistan. It seems to have informed its European partners that the United States was now certain that Pakistani regular troops were involved in Kargil. The Group-8 statement, while falling short of naming Pakistan, expressed concern for the infiltration of armed intruders which violated the Line of Control and warned that the Group regarded any action to change the status quo as irresponsible. It called for the immediate resolution of the Line of Control and resumption of the Lahore process. The statement did not call for a cease-fire, an implicit acknowledgement of India's right to defend its territory. Government of India regarded the Group-8 Communique on the Kashmir issue as major diplomatic victory.

²⁶ *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 16 June, 1999.

²⁷ *Asian Age* (New Delhi), 17 June 1999.

M.K. Akbar contradicts the Government of India's claim of diplomatic victory at Group-8 Summit. Commenting on Group-8 communique he wrote, "While the Group-8 criticised any military action to change the status quo, it also called for an immediate cessation of the fighting. Implicit in this stand is the plea that the continuation of hostilities has to be stopped. This can be used against the operations against the intruders by India."²⁸ He saw the interventionist tone in Group-8 Communique. He wrote " it is equally important to note that the stance of the Group-8 lays the basis for future intervention, particularly since the question of Kashmir and the issue of nuclearisation of India and Pakistan have been taken together."²⁹

Finally, the United States felt the need of some tough talking. For this purpose it sent General Anthony Zinni, Commander of the United States Central Command, to Islamabad. He was accompanied by United States Deputy Secretary of State, Gibson Lanpher. The US took the decision to send General Anthony Zinni because they knew that the problem lay with military rather than political leadership.

²⁸ M.K. Akbar, *Kargil : Cross Border Terrorism* (New Delhi : 1999), p.224.

²⁹ *ibid.* p.225.

Nawaz Sharif could not move because the Pakistani military was on his back. From long experience of its dealing with Pakistani military, United States knew that in Pakistan no Civilian ruler could carry out major policy shifts on his own. It was felt that direct contact had to be made with General Parvez Musharraf. The mission had virtually one purpose : warn the Pakistan army that Kargil was militarily and politically an untenable adventure and that it had to withdraw. In preparation of withdrawal, the US diplomats stitched together a face saving means for Pakistan to withdraw its soldiers and mujahiddin from Kargil. The plan that eventually came out was one that would have Indian troops loosen their cordon around position on Tiger Hills, Marop La and to Batalik heights in Drass and Kargil to allow the Pakistani troops to quietly move across to their side of Line of Control. At Pakistan's request, the United States agreed that Clinton would meet with Sharif³⁰

On 24 June, the same day that Anthony Zinni and Gibson Lanpher landed in Pakistan, the Governor of Pakistan's Punjab province Shahid Hamid, met Karl Inderfurth in Washington and requested to get Kashmir on to

³⁰ Choudhary, n.7, p. 342.

the Kargil agenda. Karl Inderfurth clearly told him there could be no mention of Kashmir until Kargil was vacated. He also told that United States had enough evidence to decide who was the aggressor .

Next day Anthony conveyed to Nawaz Sharif a message from President Clinton underscoring the need for “de-escalation of the current situation in Kargil and the importance of the peaceful resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.”³¹ Anthony Zinni also met with General Musharraf and, by all accounts passed on extremely severe warning from Washington that Pakistan had to withdraw from Kargil. He told him that “Pakistan could not hope to win and would not make any territorial gains. According to one report, he also warned the general not to consider staging a coup against Nawaj Sharif or else the United States would starve Pakistan to death. Musharraf assured Zinni that Pakistan would withdraw.”³²

Two days latter, the US Deputy Secretary of State, Gibson Lanpher informed India that General Anthony Zinni had delivered a blunt unambiguous and direct message to

³¹ *Times of India* (New Delhi), 26 June 1999.

³² Choudhary, n.7,p.343.

the Army brass in Pakistan that it must withdraw its forces from Kargil sector and restore the Line of Control.³³ Moreover, the *Washington Post* reported on 27 June, that the United States might withhold the \$100 million disbursement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) due to be released to Pakistan in a few days, if Islamabad did not pull back its troops from Kargil sector.³⁴

When Zinni-Lampher mission returned home, Nawaj Sharif started looking for some concession which could save him from sharp criticism at home. He pursued a number of options. Finally he decided to visit China on 28 June 1999. He wanted to persuade a China to help Pakistan in internationalizing the Kashmir dispute. As Washington had already told China about Pakistani involvement in Kargil intrusion, China shared the US view that Pakistan's actions were too risky. Having failed to get any assurance from China, Nawaj Sharif cut short his visit and returned home.

On 29 June 1999, United States tried- to remove all the apprehensions from the Indian mind regarding the United States role in resolving the conflict. The State Department

³³ *The Hindu* (Madras), 28 June 1999.

³⁴ *The Statesman* (New Delhi), 28 June 1999.

spokesman, James Rubin categorically stated that the United States “is not a mediator but it simply wished to see the dispute resolved.”³⁵

President Clinton on 3 July 1999 rang Vajpayee to tell him that Pakistan Prime Minister wanted a trip to Washington to discuss the Kargil issue.³⁶ During talks he also invited Indian Prime Minister to Washington. But Vajpayee turned down the invitation.³⁷ He did so to avoid even the remote possibility of any US mediation in future. At this juncture, a White House official told that Bill Clinton agreed to receive Nawaj Sharif after Vajpayee said he had no objection to Nawaj Sharif’s visit to Washington.³⁸ The talk took place between Bill Clinton and Nawaj Sharif on United State Independence day. After the first round of talk, Bill Clinton phoned Indian Prime Minister to brief him on developments. In the joint declaration issued the next day the two leaders agreed that “it was vital for peace of South Asia that the Line of Control on Kashmir be respected by both parties in accordance with 1972 Shimla accord.” They agreed that “concrete steps will be taken for

³⁵ *Times of India*, 30 June 1999.

³⁶ *The Statesman*, 5 July 1999.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *ibid.*

the restoration of the Line of Control in accordance with the Simla agreement. The President urged "an immediate cessation of hostilities once these steps are taken."³⁹ The United States offered Pakistan the "sop of monitoring declaration that followed the summit the that Bill Clinton would take a 'personal interest in encouraging an expeditious resumption of and intensification of 'bilateral dialogue once the sanctity of the Line of control had been restored.'" ⁴⁰ A few days later Pakistan claimed that it had no Control over the infiltration in the Kargil sector. The United States flatly rejected the Pakistani claim and "cautioned Islamabad against linking withdrawal to Indian pull out from Siachen."⁴¹

The joint statement "made it evident that the United States did not agree with all the major contentions raised by Islamabad on the Kargil issue : (a) that the forces which crossed the Line of Control at Kargil were Kashmiri freedom fighters; (b) That Pakistani military had no role in the Kargil operation; (c) That Prime Minister Nawaj Sharif had no control over the forces which crossed the Line of Control at Kargil; (d) That the Line of Control was not clearly defined. By

³⁹ Choudhary, n. 7, p.349.

⁴⁰ *ibid.*

⁴¹ *The Statesman*, 9 July 1999

signing the joint statement Nawaj Sharif did nothing but contradicted his own earlier statements. Seen from the Indian perspective, Bill Clinton got all major assurances from Nawaj Sharif on the Kargil issue which were nothing but the Indian demands.”⁴²

What could be the rationale behind United States stand on Kargil conflict ? Was it a tilt in favour of India by the Clinton Administration? Was Washington trying to find a mediatory role for itself to resolve the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan?

There is no doubt that the United States’ approach towards the Kargil conflict was based on post-Cold War and post- Pokharan/ Chagai developments. This did not mean that the United States decided to move closer towards India and farther from Pakistan.”⁴³ United States’ only objective during the Kargil crisis was to avoid all out war between India and Pakistan. Nuclearization, no doubt, was one of the many reasons which encouraged United States to do so. United States fully succeeded in achieving this foreign policy goal.

⁴² Mahapatra, n.12, p.91-92.

⁴³ *ibid.* p.92.

The thesis that during Kargil crisis United States made efforts to find a mediatory role for itself, is supported by bulk of Pakistani politician and scholars. Robert Wirsing of the University of South Carolina also agreed with the view. He believed the United States had acquired the Status of a mediator. He said: "You may not call it mediation, but facilitation is mediation. Kargil has given gains to Pakistan that Siachen never gave to India."⁴⁴

What caused United States to take the stand in favour of India during the Kargil war?

First, many experts see a paradigm shift in the US policy towards India during the Kargil War. India's External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh also has the same view. These people say that United States is shifting towards India because of increasing threat of terrorism and religious fundamentalism.⁴⁵ Secondly India's impressive economic performance in contrast with Pakistan's deepening economic crisis could be another reason on for this shift.

Many experts reject this paradigm shift thesis. According to Kapil Kak of Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, "It

⁴⁴ Akbar, n.28, p.270.

⁴⁵ Muchkund Dubey, "Kargil Crisis : Limits of Diplomacy," *Mainstream*, 17 July 1999.

would be the height of naivete to believe that there has been a paradigm shift in United State policy towards India when the support in fact has been Kargil specific.”⁴⁶ However it is important to note that “Washington’s relations with New Delhi, Beijing and Islamabad are in flux. The Cold War factor that guided United States ties with China and Pakistan are beginning to disappear. New concern about an Asian balance and the rise of religious terrorism in Pakistan may have begun to impinge on American thinking that could have a long term impact on Pakistan’s relation with the Unites States.”⁴⁷

Secondly Some experts say that the United States might have favoured India during the Kargil war to make New Delhi its junior partner in its global strategy.⁴⁸

Thirdly, Sumit Chakravarty said that Unites States wanted to ensure the territorial integrity of Pakistan. Therefore, when the military situation turned against Pakistan in Kargil, “United States intensified its activity pressuring India not to cross the line of Control.”⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Kak, n. 22, p. 148.

⁴⁷ C Raja Mohan, “ The Unites States and Kargil”, *World Focus* (New Delhi), June- July 1999, p.31.

⁴⁸ *ibid.*

⁴⁹ Chakravarti, n.4, p.4.

After Kargil War United States maintained that it had not changed its view that Kashmir was an issue between India and Pakistan. The US State Department press spokesman James folley stated on 13 July 1999 in a press briefing : “international attention ---- does not constitute international mediation. Our interest in encouraging an expeditious resumption and intensification of efforts by India and Pakistan to resolve their outstanding differences, again including Kashmir. The US is not a mediator.”⁵⁰

In February 2000, the US activism on Kahmir increased. Statements were given by higher governmental functionaries linking Kashmir to the danger of nuclear war in South Asia. Secretary of State Madeline Korbrel Albright while testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee described South Asia as a “tinder box” and a “most dangerous place” due to the Kashmir problem.⁵¹ She further said, “Kashmir is obviously the fuse that makes the situation very dangerous and it is our hope that they can in fact begin to talk about it with whatever assistance we can.”⁵² Giving indication of the US desire to play a more active role she said,

⁵⁰ Barbara Leitch Le Poer, “Recent Developments in Kashmir and United States concerns”, *CRS Report for Congress*, 26 July 1999, p.5

⁵¹ *Times of India*, 10 February 2000.

⁵² *ibid.*

“ our policy is to encourage dialogue at narrowing down differences and preventing violence and we intend to remain actively engaged with both the countries toward this end.”⁵³

The following day, President Bill Clinton described South Asia as that “troubled part of the world where the potential of conflict was greater than commonly understood”⁵⁴

India quickly reacted to Secretary of State Madeline Albright’s remark about Kashmir. An official in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) said that, “we were not surprised by Albright’s remark linking the nuclear war with that of Kashmir. He also said that by linking Kashmir to nuclear war Albright was encouraging Pakistani belligerence in Kashmir”.⁵⁵ Government of India’s final reaction to Albright and Clinton’s remark on Kashmir was put by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. While addressing non resident Indians and people of Indian origin he said, “while we will not brook interference in our internal affairs or allow others to meddle in our bilateral relations or problems, we are ready to engage with any country in a cooperative framework.”⁵⁶

In the third week of March 2000 President Bill Clinton arrived in New Delhi on a state visit to India. On the eve of the President’s visit, militants massacred 34 innocent sikhs in Kashmir. The brutal act was done to draw the attention of the

⁵³ *ibid.*

⁵⁴ *ibid.*

⁵⁵ Manoj Joshi, “Albright offends Indian officials,”. *Times of India*, 10 February 2000.

⁵⁶ “ Don’t Meddle in Our Affairs,” *Times of India*, 13 February 2000.

President Clinton. While addressing Indian Parliament Clinton said that “massacre of 35 Sikhs in Kashmir reinforced the need for dialogue between India and Pakistan. He said that in Washington’s view the major cause of deadlock between India and Pakistan was the lack of dialogue.”⁵⁷ Further he expressed concern at the belief in India and Pakistan that possessing nuclear weapons was not all that dangerous.⁵⁸

During Clinton’s visit, there seemed a slight shift in American approach to Kashmir. First, President Clinton came close to endorsing India’s refusal to talk to Pakistan until it stopped its support to insurgency in Kashmir. He said, “you can not expect a dialogue to go forward unless there is an absence of violence.”⁵⁹ Second, India and the US agreed to establish forum on terrorism. Third, by appealing Pakistan to respect the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir, Clinton indirectly endorsed Indian view that Pakistan should stop its support for cross border terrorism. However, Clinton did not back the Indian government’s claim that massacre of Sikhs in Kashmir was the work of Hizbul Mujahiddin and Laskhar-e-Toiba based in Pakistan.

⁵⁷ New York Times, 23 March 2000.

⁵⁸ *ibid.*

⁵⁹ Clinton warms to India”, *Economist* (London) 25 March 2000, p. 34.

When Clinton visited Islamabad on 25 March 2000, he reiterated traditional American stand on Kashmir. Rejecting the US mediatory role he said, “we cannot and will not mediate or resolve the dispute in Kashmir.”⁶⁰ Clinton accused Pakistan of backing terrorism in Kashmir by saying, “It is wrong to support attacks against civilian across the Line of Control.”⁶¹ Overall Clinton gave message to Pakistani government that its policy towards Kashmir was no longer backed by the United States.

The United States extended its full support to Government of India when it declared Ramzan ceasefire in Kashmir on 19 November 2000. Washington expressed hope that Pakistan and militants groups in Kashmir will respond positively.⁶² In December Government of India decided to extend cease-fire by another month, President Clinton welcomed the cease-fire and called it Indian Prime Minister’s determination to pursue peace in Kashmir. He said, “ I Welcome the announcements by both India and Pakistan aimed at reducing tension in Kashmir. The decision by Vajpayee that India will continue cease-fire initiated last

⁶⁰ “Will Pakistan get Any Close to Clinton.”, *Economist*, 1 April 2000, p.27.

⁶¹ *ibid.*

⁶² *Times of India*, 1 December 2000.

month in Kashmir is a step forward.”⁶³ Later, it was reported by *Frontline* that November peace process in Kashmir became possible due to the efforts of U.S. businessman Mansoor Ijaz. His peace initiative had full backing of President Clinton.⁶⁴ Perhaps it was the last effort of Clinton to find a peaceful solution to the Kashmir dispute.

⁶³ *Times of India*, 22 December 2000.

⁶⁴ Praveen Swami, “US Role in Evidence”, *Frontline (Chennai)* 22 December 2000, p.25.

Chapter-V

CONCLUSION

Ever since the Kashmir problem was tabled in the United Nations, the United States has been actively involved in it. In the initial phase it adopted a pro-Pakistan stand along with its allies in the Security Council. It ignored the Indian demand of ceasefire before plebiscite. Instead the US supported the Pakistani demand that plebiscite should precede ceasefire in Kashmir. At this stage, Security Council members forgot that Kashmir issue was brought by India to the United Nations due to Pakistani aggression and by this position they equated the aggressor with and the victim. The United States put forward several suggestions favourable to Pakistan in the name of conflict resolution, including arbitration, mediation, and stationing of United Nations force. It also championed the cause of plebiscite evoking the liberal concept of national self-determination. It tried to resolve the Kashmir dispute favouring of to Pakistan through the mediatory efforts of Owen Dixon and Frank G. Graham. India's opposition backed by the then Soviet Union and China defeated the US objectives in the UN Security Council. Why did US took a pro-Pakistan stand in initial phase ? The United States was beginning to realise that India would not be a cooperative ally in the emerging Cold War scenarios. Pakistan was more likely to be amenable to American influence. It was possible that the US had seen a potential

benefit in an independent Kashmir which was strategically located, bordering former Soviet Union, China, India and Pakistan. If Kashmir would have become part of India, the possibility of acquiring a base facility would have become remote.

Cold War was directly introduced in the Kashmir dispute in 1954 with the signing of the South East Asia Treaty organization (SEATO). Moreover, Pakistan was also roped into Baghdad Pact in 1955 and Central Treaty organization (CENTO) in 1959. The United States created these military alliances keeping in mind its global interest, but Pakistan joined these alliances to strengthen its position vis-a-vis India in Kashmir. During these years, the US extended its full support to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue to please the military ally. When Indo- China war erupted in 1962, the US not only extended military help to India during the war, but also it also advised Pakistan to avoid taking advantage of India's military weakness in Kashmir. However, after the war, President John F. Kennedy increased efforts to find a solution to the Kashmir dispute outside the framework of the United Nations. Five rounds of bilateral talks were held between India and Pakistan. Under the US pressure, Nehru had agreed to give district of Kupwara to Pakistan, but it was rejected by

Pakistani President Ayub Khan. Ayub's bottomline was leaving Jammu with India. Seeing the rigid stand of both India and Pakistan, President Kennedy, through the US Ambassador in New Delhi, tried to force India to accept the fifty-fifty partition proposal. India rejected any proposal that would lead to the division of Kashmir.

A few years later Pakistan indulged in armed aggression to occupy Kashmir. The second war between India and Pakistan in 1965. Initially the US put pressure on both the countries to stop fighting. But seeing no possibility of ceasefire it decided to impose military as well as economic embargo on both the countries. The US attitude during war was slightly favoured Pakistan because it reacted mildly to the Pakistani attack across the ceasefire-line in September 1965 and sharply to India's counter-attack in Punjab. Besides, the United States also failed to keep its promise to India that it would not permit Pakistan to use US supplied weapons against India. By imposing embargo on both the countries the US put the aggressor and the victim on equal footing. Two factors influenced the US attitude towards the 1965 Indo-Pak War. First, the US was deeply involved in Vietnam War. Second, the US did not want to isolate either India or Pakistan.

The US handling of December 1971 Indo-Pakistan War was different from earlier wars. The US heavily tilted in favour of Pakistan from the very beginning of the war. First, it ignored the suppression of East Pakistani people by Pakistani Army. Secondly, it suspended military sales to India. Thirdly, the US held India responsible for the war. Fourthly, the US directly came for Pakistan's help by issuing orders to its Task Force 74 headed by USS Enterprise to proceed towards Bay of Bengal, from South Vietnam. The action was taken as a warning against India. The US policy action could be attributed to two reasons. First, Pakistani President Yahya Khan was helping Washington to open communication with Beijing. Secondly, India had signed the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with the Soviet Union in August 1971. Thus while Pakistan acted like a friend, India appeared to be riding with America's adversary.

Once the war ended the Prime Ministers of both India and Pakistan met at Shimla in 1972 and signed the accord which stipulated that all issues between India and Pakistan would be resolved bilaterally. The US extended its full support to Shimla Accord and urged both the countries to resolve the Kashmir dispute through bilateral talks. In the post Shimla Accord period not only the US involvement in Kashmir issue

decreased but Kashmir as an issue disappeared from the global agenda. This happened largely due to the US and Pakistani involvement in Afghanistan crisis. Pakistan acted as America's frontline state in its Cold War activities against Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. It is significant that though the US avoided direct involvement in Kashmir during the period between Shimla Agreement and emergence of militancy in Kashmir, it did not appose the idea of an independent Kashmir through various American think-tanks.

Outbreak of Low Intensity conflict in Kashmir coincided with the end of the Cold war. This novel method of proxy war was adopted by Pakistan against India after having failed to snatch Kashmir away through direct wars. The US interest in Kashmir was renewed with the rise of militancy. It also began to see the danger of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir dispute. In spite of this, the Bush Administration did not regard plebiscite as the preferred way to resolve the Kashmir dispute. It continued to support bilateral talks between India and Pakistan in accordance with Shimla Agreement. Such a policy flowed more from the Bush Administration's nuclear concern in South Asia. Bush's Kashmir policy had direct effect on Pakistan's attitude to Kashmir. Pakistan stepped up its proxy war against India in

Kashmir, and started raising the Kashmir issue at international forums, even as it perceived the Bush Administration's Kashmir policy as favorable to India.

When Bill Clinton became the US President in January 1993, Washington's Kashmir policy tilted in favour of Pakistan. The new Administration did not show much concern over Pakistan-supported militancy in Kashmir. Initially, the Administration expressed its disapproval Pakistani support to insurgents in Kashmir but it was only lip-service-and did not last long. With the appointment of Robin Raphel as Assistant Secretary for State of South Asian Affairs, the US involvement in Kashmir dispute further increased. First, she raised the issue of human rights violations in Kashmir by Indian Security forces. Secondly, she described the Simla agreement as outdated. Thirdly, she questioned the legal validity of the Instrument of Accession. Finally, she crafted a new American position that any final solution of the Kashmir dispute must take into account the wishes of the Kashmiri people. Further clarifications given by the US State Department reinforced the view that the Clinton Administration had knowingly taken the pro-Pakistan position over the Kashmir issue.

Kargil War erupted between India and Pakistan in May 1999. Initially, the US approach to this war was to prevent the military escalation between two nuclear armed countries. Once Pakistan's military misadventure became clearer, the US took a pro-India position. The US not only urged Pakistan to respect the Line of Control (LoC) but pressed Islamabad to withdraw its troops from the Kargil sector. The US also doused the Pakistani strategy to internationalise the Kashmir issue by blocking a Canadian attempt to bring Kargil to the attention of the Security Council. However, the US support to India during Kargil war did not indicate that its Kashmir policy had changed. It still regarded the Shimla Agreement and Lahore process as the best way to resolve the Kashmir dispute.

In February 2000, a month before Bill Clinton's visit to South Asia, the US activism over Kashmir increased. It again tried to link Kashmir issue with the danger of a possible nuclear war in South Asia. During President Clinton's visit to South Asia in March 2000, there appeared a minor shift in American approach to Kashmir. Clinton endorsed the Indian position saying that talk with Pakistan could not be held until and unless it withdrew its support to insurgency in Kashmir. When Clinton said goodbye to White House, there was no

marked change in US policy towards Kashmir issue. It regarded the whole of Jammu and Kashmir as a disputed territory. It reiterated that the Shimla and Lahore Agreements were best mechanisms to resolve the dispute. The US also kept alive the scope of independent Kashmir by saying that any final solution of the Kashmir problem should take into account the wishes of the Kashmiri people.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Bowles, Chester, *Mission to India* (New Delhi : B.I. Publishers, 1947).

-----, *Promises to Keep : My years in Public Life, 1941-1969*, (Bombay : B.I. Publishers, 1971).

Congressional Record.

Cristopher, Warren, "Strengthening United States Relations with South Asia", *United States Department of State Dispatch*, vol. 5, 7 March 1994.

From Surprise to Reckoning, Kargil Review Committee Report, New Delhi, 1999.

India, Government of, *Lok Sabha Debates*, New Delhi : Publications Division, 1958-60, 1964-70, 1988-90, 1992-98, 1998-99.

Testimonies in House Committee on International Relations and Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

United Nations Documents

Reports

Council on Foreign Relations, "A New United State Policy Toward India and Pakistan" Report of an Independent Task Force,

Le Poer, Barbara Leitch, Jonathan, Medalia, Dianne Rennack and Richard P. Cronin, "India Pakistan Nuclear Tests and Unites States Response", *CRS Report for Congress*, 24 November 1998.

-----, "Recent Developments in Kashmir and US Concerns", *CRS Report for Congress*, 26 July, 1999.

-----, "President Clinton's South Asia Trip", *CRS Report for Congress*, 31 March 2000.

SECONDARY SOURCES

BOOKS

- Akbar, M.K., *Kargil : Cross Border Terrorism* (New Delhi : Mital Publications, 1999).
- Anand, Mulk Raj, ed., *V.K Krishna Menon's Marathon speech on Kashmir* (Allahabad : Wheeler, 1992).
- Bajpai, Kanti, Matto, Amitabh, ed., *Estranged Democracies : India US Relations in the 21st century* (New Delhi : Her Anand, 2000).
- Bajpai Kanti, Afsir Karim & Amitabh Mattoo, Ed., *Kargil and After : Challenges for Indian Policy* (New Delhi : Har Anand, 2001).
- Behra, Navnita Chandra, *State Identity & Violence Jammu Kashmir and Ladakh* (New Delhi : Manohar Publication, 2000).
- Bose, Suma, *The challenges in Kashmir : Democracy, Self Determination and a just Peace* (New Delhi : Sage, 1997).
- Brands, H.W., *India and the United States : The Cold Peace* (Boston : Twayne, 1990).
- Brecher, Michael, *The Struggle for Kashmir* (New York : Oxford University Press, 1953).
- Chari, P.R., *Indo. Pak Nuclear Standoff : The Role of the United States* (New Delhi : Manohar, 1995).
- Chopra, V.D., *Pentagon Shadow over India* (New Delhi : Patriot, 1989) Chowdhury, Srinjoy, *Despatches from Kargil* (new Delhi : Penguin India, 2000).
- Deora, M.S., Grover R., ed., *Documents on Kashmir, Vol.I* (New Delhi : Discovery publication House, 1991).
- Glazer, Sulochana Raghvan and Glazer, Nathan, ed., *Conflicting Images India and United States* (Date : Riverdale; 1990).
- Goswami, P.K. *Ups and Downs of Indo US Relations, 1947-83* (Culcutta : Firma, 1983).

- Grover, Virendra, and Ranjana Arora, ed., *World Community and Indo Pak Relations* (New Delhi : Deep and Deep Publishers, 1999).
- Gupta, R.C., *US Policy Towards India and Pakistan* (Delhi : HR. Publishers, 1977).
- Gupta, Sisir, *Kashmir : A Study in India Pakistan Relations* (Bombay : Asia Publishing House, 1967).
- Harrison, Seling, *India and United States : the First Fifty years* (Washington D.C. : India Abroad Centre for Political Awareness, 1997).
- and Geoffry Kamp, *India and America after the Cold war* (Washington D.C. : The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993).
- Hayes, Louis D., *The Impact of US Policy on the Kashmir Conflict* (Tucson : Arizona Press, 1971).
- Jagmohan, *My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir* (New Delhi : Allied, 1992).
- Joshi, Manoj, *The Lost Rebellion; Kashmir in the Nineties* (New Delhi : Penguin, 1999).
- Kaul, B.M., *Confrontation with Pakistan* (New Delhi : Vikas, 1971).
- Korbel, Joseph, *Danger in Kashmir* (Princeton University Press, 1966)
- Kaul, T.N., *The Kissinger years : Indo- American Relations* (Arnold, 1980).
- Kux, Dennis, *Estranged Democracies : India and United States, 1941-1991* (New Delhi : Sage, 1993).
- Lamb, Alistair, *The Kashmir problem* (New York : Praeger, 1966).
- Limaye Satu P., *US-India Relations the Pursuit of Accommodation* (Boulder : Westview Press, 1993).
- Mahapatra, Chintamani, *Indo-US Relations in the 21st Century* (New Delhi : knowledge world 1998).
- Malhotra, Vinay Kumar, *The Clinton Administration and South Asia 1993-1997* (New Delhi : South Asian Publishers, 1997).

- Mansingh, Surjit, *Indo-American Relations in the Post Cold War Period* (New Delhi : Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, 1993).
- Mishra, K.P., *Kashmir and India's Foreign Policy* (Allahabad : Chugh, 1979).
- Nanda, Ravi, *Kargil a Wake-Up Call* (New Delhi : Lancer, 1999).
- , *Kashmir and Indo Pak Relations* (New Delhi : Lancer, 2001).
- Nath, Birbal, *Kashmir : The Nuclear Flashpoint* (New Delhi : Manas, 1998).
- Nayar, Baldev Raj, *American Geopolitics in India* (New Delhi : Manohar, 1976).
- Noorani, A.G., *The Kashmir Question* (Bombay, 1964).
- Palmer, Norman Deenbar, *The United States and India : Dimensions of Influence* (New York : Praeger, 1984).
- Pannikar, K.M. *A Study of Kashmir and Jammu* (Delhi : Oxford University Press, 1948).
- Puri, Balraj, ed., *5000 years of Kashmir* (New Delhi : Ajanta, 1997).
- Schofield, Victoria, *Kashmir in the Crossfire* (New Delhi : Viva Books, 1997).
- Singh, Bhupinder, *Indo-Pakistan Conflict Over Kashmir* (Patiala : B.C. Publications; 1983).
- Singh, Jasjit, *Kargil 1999: Paksitan's Fourth war for Kashmir* (New Delhi : Knowledge world, 1999).
- Singh, Tavleen, *Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors* (New Delhi : Viking, 1995).
- Swami, Praveen, *The Kargil war* (New Delhi : Left world Book, 1999).
- Tahir -Kheli, Shirin, *The United States and Pakistan : The Evolution of an Influence Relationship* (New York : Praeger, 1982).

- , *India, Pakistan and United States : Breaking With The Past* (New York : Council on Foreign Relations press.1997).
- Thomas, Raju G.C. , *Perspectives on Kashmir : Roots of Conflict in South Asia* (Boulder : Westview Press, 1992).
- Verma, Bharat, and Manvendra Singh, eds, *Kashmir : The Troubled Frontier* (New Delhi : Lancer, 1994).
- Vinod, M.J., *United States Foreign Policy Towards India : A Diagnosis of American Approach* (New Delhi : Lancer Books, 1991).
- Wirsing, Robert, *India-Pakistan and Kashmir Dispute : A Regional Conflict and its Resolution* (New York : St. Martin Press, 1994).
- Wolport, Stanley, *Roots of Confrontation in South Asia : Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and Superpowers* (New York : Oxford University press, 1982).
- Wright Dennis, *India-Pakistan Relations, 1962-1969* (New Delhi, 1989).

Articles

- Anand, Vinod, " India's Military Response to the Kargil Aggression", *Strategic Analysis* (New Delhi), September 1999, pp. 1053.
- Baluch, A.B. , "Kashmir and United States Perceptions", *Defence Journal*, vol. 19, July/ August, 1993, pp. 27-31.
- Chakravarti, Sumit, "Understanding Washington in Kargil", *Mainstream* (New Delhi), 17 July 1999.
- Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal, "Kashmir Dispute and International Community," *Strategic Studies* (Islamabad), 18 (2-3), Winter 1995, and Spring 96, pp.57-79.
- Cohin, Stephen P., "India and America Towards a Realistic Relationship", *Asian Affaris*, Vol. 15, no.4, winles 1988-89.
- Dasgupta, S., "Clinton's sanctimonious Diplomacy", *World Press Review*, Vol. 41, 1994, p.50-51.

- Guyana, E.A. , "Where violence has silenced verse (Kashmir)", *New York Times Magazine*, no.22, 1992, p.46-50.
- Hillali, A.Z. Kashmir Disptue and UN Mediation Efforts : An Historical Perspective", *Small War And Insurgency*, Vol.18, no.2, Autumn 1997, pp. 61-86.
- Kanwal, Gurmeet, "Proxy War in Kashmir : Jihad or State Sponsored Terrorism ?", *Strategic Analysis*, April 1999, pp.55-83.
- Kidwai, Saleem, " US and Kashmir Issue ",*Asian Studies* (Calcutta), Vol.16, no.1, January/June 1998, pp. 1uuy26.
- ,"US Approach to Kargil : No Paradigm shift in South Asia Policy", *Journal of Peace Studies* (New Delhi), Vol. 6, no.3, May/ June 1999, pp. 9-12.
- Mac Faguhan, E., "*Bleeding Kashmir*", *US News and world Report*, 1990, no.19, pp. 109-53.
- Mahapatra, Chintamani, "American Activism on Kshmir Qeustion", *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 27 no.7, October 1997, pp. 907-997.
- , " US Approach to Kargil Conflict", *Himalyan and Central Asian Studies* (New Delhi), Vol.3, no. -49, July/ December 1999, pp.87-96.
- , " Clinton's Trip to South Asia : An Assessment", *Journal of Peace Studies*, (New Delhi), vol. 7, no.2, March- April 2000, pp. 3-8.
- Manegold, C.S., "A New Clash over Kashmir", *Newsweek* (New York), 115 : 36, F5, 1990.
- Malviya, Gopalji, "American Approach to India's Kashmir", *Strategic Studies*, 15 (5) August 1994, pp. 627-639.
- Mohan, C.R., "The US and Kargil", *World Focus* (New Delhi) June-July, 1999.
- Muralidharan, Sukumaran, "Strategic Games India, Pakistan, US." *Front line (Chennai)*, 17 (3), Feb 18, 2000, p.4-24.
- Punjabi, Riyaz, "Kashmir : The Restructuring of Caliphate", *Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol.6 (5.6), Sep./Dec 199, p. 3-9.

- Rappai, M.V., "Clinton's Asia Policy" *Strategic Analysis* , Vol. 19, no. 10-11, January / February 1997, pp. 1575-79.
- Sewei, Mao, "China and the Kashmir Issue", *Strategic Analysis*, March 1995, pp. 1573-1595.
- Thapliyal, Sangeeta, " Indo-Pak Conflict and the Role of External Powers ", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 22, No.7, Oct. 1998, pp.42-50.
- Travis, Tom A., "Indo American Relation : The Kashmir Controversy : An American Perspective", *India Quarterly* (New Delhi), vol. 49, no.4, October/December 1993, pp. 49-58.
- Waslekar, Sundeep, "Charging western perceptions of Kashmir", *Peace Initiatives*, July/ August 1996, pp. 1-5.
- Wirsing, Robert, "The Siachin Glaciers Dispute-I : The Territorial Dimension", *Strategic Studies*, vol. 10, No.I Autumn 1986, pp. 49-66.

Periodicals

Economist (London).
India Today (New Delhi).
Newsweek (New York).
Out Look (New Delhi).
Time (Hong Kong).

Newspapers

Asian Age (New Delhi).
The Hindu (New Delhi).
Indian Express.(New Delhi).
New York Times .
The statesman (Calcutta).
Times of India (New Delhi).
Hindustan Times (New Delhi).