

**THE PROCESS OF EUROPEANISATION IN  
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE:  
A STUDY OF POLAND**

*Dissertation Submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University to Partial fulfillment of the  
Requirements for the Award of the Degree of*

**MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

**MUKHTYAR SINGH**



**CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES  
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY  
NEW DELHI-110067  
INDIA  
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### DECLARATION

I declare that the deissertation entitled “**The Process of Europeanisation in Central and Eastern Europe: A Study of Poland**” submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

*Mukhtyar Singh*

Mukhtyar Singh



### CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed the examiners for evaluation.

*Ummu Salma Bava*

**Prof. Ummu Salma Bava**

**(Chairperson)**

*Sheetalsharma*

**Dr. Sheetal Sharma**

**(Supervisor)**

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Mukhtyar Singh.

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

|      |   |
|------|---|
| AWS  | Solidarity Electoral Action<br><i>(Akcja Wybrocza Sotidarnosc)</i>            |
| CEE  | Central and Eastern Europe  |
| ECSC | European Coal and Steel Community   |
| EFTA | European Free Trade Area  |
| EMU  | European Economic and Monetary Union  |
| EPP  | European People's Party   |
| EU   | European Union  |
| KOR  | Workers' Defense Committee<br><i>(Komitet Obrony Robotnikow)</i>              |
| LPR  | League of Polish Families<br><i>(Liga Polskich Rodzin)</i>                    |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization  |
| PES  | Party of European Socialists  |
| PiS  | Law and Justice<br><i>(Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc)</i>                            |
| PO   | Civic Platform<br><i>(Platforma Obywatelska)</i>                              |
| PSL  | Polish People's Party<br><i>(Polskie Stronnictwo Ludwe)</i>                   |
| PZPR | Polish United Workers' Party<br><i>(Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza)</i> |
| SDP  | Social Democracy of Poland  |
| SLD  | Democratic Left Alliance<br><i>(Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej)</i>             |
| S&D  | Group of the Progressive Alliance of<br>Socialists and Democrats              |
| UD   | Democratic Union<br><i>(Unia Demokratyczna)</i>                               |

|      |   |
|------|---|
| UK   | United Kingdom                          |
| UP   | Labor Union<br><i>(Union Pracy)</i>     |
| USA  | United States of America                |
| USSR | Union of Soviet Socialist Republic      |
| UW   | Freedom Union<br><i>(Unia Wolnosci)</i> |
| VAT  | Value Added Tax                         |

*CHAPTER ONE*  
*INTRODUCTION*

## BACKGROUND

The concept of Europeanisation provides a European route to the study of national politics. The Political scientists and economists accept that the European Union is an advanced instance of regional integration and has a profound impact on national politics. Further, there is a multiplicity of opinion among scholars regarding the impact of European Union on the member states. Some scholars say that the EU is following out the true nation state while some other scholars contend that it is new opportunity for European states. In the latter context, it has been aptly commented by Harmsen and Wilson (2000:14): "Europeanisation should not however, be understood simply as a synonym for European integration. Rather, the emphasis is placed on the ways in which European integration has led to redefinitions of the conceptions, relations and structures of power at both the national and the supranational levels."

The present research aims to study the Europeanisation in the political sphere in the central and eastern European countries after their accession in the European Union taking the case study of Poland. The undertaken research attempts to study how the EU has encouraged democratization in Poland locating it within a broader framework of studying how EU has pressed the CEE countries into implementing democratic human rights regimes and an open political system.

The EU, representing the most advanced stage of European integration was formed by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. Since its inception, the European Union laid emphasis on democracy, prevalence of rule of law and establishment of human rights. In 1993 European Union made three main criteria for membership for the member countries. They were: a) It should have democratic and multiparty ruling. b) It should have market an open economy that is based on the theory of the demand the supply. c) It should respect the human right, particularly for minorities.

The European Economic Community which started with six countries has since then witnessed many phases of enlargement. According to Desmond Dinan, "Enlargement has been central element in EU history." After the fall of Berlin wall and disintegration of USSR the ideological conflict between West and East ended. The European Union, that till then had consisted of mainly Western European and



some Southern European countries, now opened its door to Eastern Europe, including the countries that emerged after the breaking of USSR as well as countries that were held under Communist influence in the Cold War era. In 2004, ten Central and Eastern European Countries (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia Poland, Czech, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Malta, and Cyprus) joined the EU. It was a historical event for the EU as it was the largest expansion in terms of member of countries. Two other countries (Romania, Bulgaria) joined the EU later in 2007.

The Soviet Union disintegration rendered the CEE states to pursue an independent political system for the first time since the 1930s. According to Brennan (2006:14), "The new CEE governments from the beginning framed their endeavors and aspirations with explicit reference to the core values of European integration. They sought freedom, prosperity and a secure place in the international commonality of nations, especially within European organizations.

One of the main factors that contributed to the accession of CEE countries in the EU and the subsequent policy convergence between them and EU was the process of post communist transformation. The CEE countries were pressurized for adoption and policy convergence in the prospect of the completion of the single market in 1992, the integration of the Schengen area of the passport free movement into the EU in 1997 and the launch of single currency in 1999.

The CEE countries tended to engage in anticipatory adjustment to EU policies as well as EU norms and values. In the first years of post communist economic transition, these countries made reference to EU economic models and EU regulatory policies to justify their policy choices, even before the EU required conformity. These countries have also rapidly adopted the EU's still sketchy for border control, police cooperation, migration and asylum policy.

Poland is one of the largest countries of central and Eastern Europe, both in area as well as in population. At the time of World War II (Sep.1939), Poland was attacked by Germany and erstwhile USSR. In the end of Sep.1939 Poland was divided between Germany and USSR. Western part of Poland was occupied by Germany and the eastern part of Poland was occupied by USSR.

After the end of World War II, Poland was totally occupied by USSR. USSR imposed communist ruling and economy on the Poland. Stalin's puppets ruled over forty years. There was no freedom of expression in Poland, no freedom to make political party or organization.

In the decade of 1980, Poland witnessed a major historic event. This was propelled by the termination of labourer Lech Walesa from his job without any reason. He started a movement in the opposition of this dictatorship. This movement was called Solidarity Movement. The movement was successful and the then Polish government had to give permission to make labour organizations.

In the latter decade of 1980s, as the disintegration of erstwhile USSR began to take shape, the central and eastern European countries started to come out of the clutches of the communist rule. Poland adopted free market economy and multiparty ruling at the place of centrally planned economy and single party ruling. This process is called as Shock Treatment. In December 1989, Poland launched a reform program to transform the Polish economy from centrally planned to a free-market economy. Changes were made in the political structures of the Polish state. The most important among them was the end of single party ruling by a constitutional amendment. It declared itself the new Republic of Poland. Another major development took place in December 1989 when the first popular election was held. Lech Walesa was elected as President. Poland's new constitution was formed which gave guarantees of civil rights, freedom of speech, press and assembly.

In the 1995 general election SLD (Democratic Left Alliance) got full majority and its leader Aleksander Kwasniewski was elected as President. In 2000 election was reelected.

Currently, it can be said that three political parties are popular in Poland, namely - Self-Defence, Civic Platform and 'Law and Justice'. The first mentioned party is a left wing party, while the latter two are inclined towards the right. In 2005 Presidential election, right-wing leader Aleksander Kazynski, of the Law and Justice Party, won the election. Both Self -defence and Civic Platfrom support EU membership but are also highly critical of the flaws in the proposed EU constitution. The Law and Justice Party too is harshly critical of the proposed EU constitution.

## **REVIEW OF LITERATURE:**

For, the purpose of the undertaken research, literature dealing with the following themes is pertinent. a) Europeanisation, b) Political structures in Central and Eastern European countries, c) Poland and its accession into European Union

### **a) Conceptualizing Europeanisation**

*Europeanisation: New research agendas* (2008) edited by Gaziano and Maarten P. Vink, presents the main theoretical and empirical issues involved in the concept of Europeanisation research. They underline the relevance of both construction and diffusion of EU institutions and policies. According to them, Europeanisation can be broadly understood as the domestic adaptation to European regional integration. The chapter by Radaelli and Pasquier attempts at the conceptualization of the term Europeanisation. They remark that Europeanisation produces socialization through the growing interdependence between the actors at the European as well as domestic level. Simon Bulmer in one of the chapters presents the major theoretical approaches to Europeanisation. He dwells into the debate of Europeanisation being an “exclusively top down phenomenon or horizontal”. He then postulates that this depends on the analysts understanding of the dynamics of Europeanisation. “ An understanding of the EU in hierarchical terms points the researcher towards judging domestic conformity with the supernational... an understanding of the EU in terms of domestic actors... suggests more horizontal, mechanisms of Europeanisation.”

*Yearbook of European Studies:14 Europeanisation: Institution, Identities and Citizenship* (2000) tries to study various perspectives on Europeanisation. In the introductory chapter, Harmsen and Wilson study eight different connotations of the term Europeanisation. According to them, "Europeanisation is devoid of core tenets and is suggestive of a wider concern with the manner in which institutional change may reshape identities and reciprocally, of the ways in which changing identities may create pressures for new institutional forms." They remark that in the context of EU enlargement to central and eastern states, Europeanisation can be defined as joining Europe and the firm anchoring of domestic political institutions and economic structures in conformity with the EU norms.

Martin Wink, in his article *What is Europeanisation? and Other Questions on a new Research Agenda* (2002) attempts to define what is European about Europeanisation. According to him the study of Europeanisation requires a closer look at the European integration process. The author is of the opinion that even when EU policies strongly affect domestic politics, they still are the result of political action by domestic actors who shift the domestic issues to the European level.

Johan P. Olsen, in his article *The Many faces of Europeanisation*" (2006) locates different concepts of Europeanisation. He distinguishes between five different uses of the term: - a) Europeanisation as changes in external territorial boundaries. b) Europeanisation as the development of institutions of government at the European level. c) Europeanisation as central penetration of national and sub-national systems of governance. d) Europeanisation as exporting forms of political organization and governance that are typical and distinct for Europe beyond the European territory. e) Europeanisation as a political project aiming at a unified and politically strong Europe.

Trine Flockhart's article *"Europeanisation and EU-ization"* (2007) too tends to broaden the concept of Europeanisation by situating it in a historical context. For the author, "Europeanisation is a process which involves the transfer of a specific idea set one group of agents to another usually followed by behavioural change through different forms of internationalization and institutionalization. He adds a socialistic dimension to the concept of Europeanisation while presenting a historical outline of the various phases of the emergence of this phenomenon. His approach is very different from the dominant writings on the subject as he locates the evolution of the concept within the paradigms of major historical events in Europe, such as modernity and Enlightenment. For Flockhart, the period of contemporary Europeanisation should be termed as EU-ization., "which is currently undergoing rapid change as a result of structural, procedural, and agent level changes within the EU and its member states."

#### **b) Europeanisation in Central and Eastern European Countries**

Secondly, and more importantly literature dealing with the process of convergence in the CEE countries after the accession in the EU is pertinent for this research.

John O' Brennan in *Eastern Enlargement of the European Union* (2006) highlights the process of accession of CEE countries in the EU fold. The book outlines the evolution of eastern enlargement process. Importantly, the author contends that normative and ideational factors rooted in issues of identity, norms and values drove the eastern enlargement process forward and proved decisive in determining its content and form. The EU used the eastern enlargement process as the main instrument supporting its efforts to 'democratize' and 'Europeanize' Central and Eastern Europe thereby transforming the geopolitics of Europe.

*Europe Union enlargement* (2004) by Neill Nugent is a comprehensive work on the European enlargement process and its subsequent aftermath in the EU member states. For the research the chapter titled "The unfolding of the 10+2 Enlargement Round" is important as it chronicles the unfolding of the 10+2 enlargement round and identifies its key distinguishing features. The differing attitudes of EU-15 states towards the round are then considered. This is followed by an examination of how the EU prepared for enlargement to the 10+2, there is then a description of the accession process itself.

*Contemporary Europe* (2006) edited by Richard Sakwa and Anne Stevens studies the various aspects of European civilization as well as the defining points of European history. For the purpose of this research, the chapter titled "Toward one Europe" by J. Gower is important. The author shows how the process of democratization is taking place after the fall of Berlin Wall. Author contends that whole Europe is going on a path of uniform identity. Subsequent chapters show how government and politics Eastern European countries are being integrated with the Western European countries.

*The Eastern European in Twentieth Century and After* (2006) by R. J. Crompton traces the history of CEE countries from the end of First World War to nearly present time. The book is relevant for the research as it shows the political institutions in the CEE countries that were present during the communist rule, and subsequently changed after the collapse of USSR.

*Contemporary European Politics* (2007) by Thomas M. Magstadt studies the major difference in the politics of eastern and western Europe, locating them in a historical context. In one section of the book, Magstadt studies the emerging democracies in

select in CEE countries and is of the opinion that democratic institutions are being firmly established in the post- communist member states. The author also contemplates the formation of a “United States of Europe.”

*Democracy in the New Europe* (2006) written by Christopher Lord and Erika Harris describes the emerging democracies in Europe and its different forms. The writers show an analysis of the diversity of democracy within European states. They also highlight how different states of the New Europe make use of direct and indirect democracy, presidential and parliamentary systems, consensus and majoritarian democracy, proportional and less proportional electoral system.

The article "*Post - enlargement European order: Europe United in diversity*" (2006) by Paul Blokker, contends that "a dimension from difference can equally be observed in the enlargement politics of the EU. The enlargement process and the relations between EU-15 and CEE countries can be shown as assimilation. Europeanness as expressed in the accession process is served to portray less towards diversity and divergence from the European identity."

The article "*Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of central and Eastern Europe*" (2004) by Frank Schimmelfenning and Ulrich Sedelmeier presents comparative case studies of EU rule transfer in a great variety of policy areas and CEE counties. The writers show that rule transfer is best explained by external model of governance. The governance approach to the study of the European Union is applied to describe and analyse particular forms of policy making within the EU. The writers show the theoretical framework to study governance modes.

In the article "*Making sense of post-communist central administration: modernization, Europeanisation and Latinization*" (2001) H. Goetz writes that Europeanisation captures important aspects of the development of post-communist public administration. Post-communist administrative development is part of a comprehensive modernization of the CEE countries. The main elements that are visible are liberalization and democratization in the political sphere, privatization and marketization in the economy and pluralization and individualization in the society.

### **c) Europeanisation in Poland.**

There are writings that study transition in Post Communist Poland and also the impact of EU membership on various institutions of Poland.

*Poland and the European Union* (2000) edited by Karl Cordell assesses how the recently democratised political system in Poland is adapting to the challenges posed by the country's desire to 'rejoin Europe'. The chapter by Jablonski titled "The Europeanisation of Government in Poland in the 1990s" examines the evolution of governmental and constitutional structures in Poland in the 1990s from the perspective of their convergence with the institutional patterns of Western Europe.

In the article "*From Socialist Solidarity to Neo-Populist Neoliberalisation? The Paradoxes of Poland's Post-Communist Transition*" (2009) Stuart Shields writes that presidential election 1995 and 2000 signalled a clear and decisive rejection of neo-liberalisation despite the absence of a serious left alternative. He argues that both opposition and former state-socialist forces have been co-opted into reproducing neoliberalism.

The article "*Poland Accession into the European Union: Parties, Policies and Paradoxes*" by Ray Taras argues that Polish accession in the EU is fruitful only when Union is maximized. He quotes the famous Polish philosopher Kolakowski "Within the European Union Poles could lose their national identity only if they wanted to do so. That is extremely unlikely, for they are an example of one of few countries in Europe-and in the entire world -of a homogenous state in terms of its nation and culture."

Radoslaw Zubek, in the article "*Complying with Transposition Commitments in Poland: Collective Dilemmas, Core Executive and Legislative Outcomes*" examines the effect of EU legislation in Poland before accession. He writes that institutionalization of a strong domestic 'European' core executive positively affected the extent to which Polish ministers and departments complied with EU criteria.

## DEFINITION, RATIONALE AND SCOPE OF STUDY

In May 2004, ten new member states, mainly from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) joined the European Union (EU), to be followed in January 2007 by Bulgaria and Romania. This completed not only the biggest but also the most complex and elaborate enlargement round in the history of the EU. Whereas accession always requires the candidate countries to adopt the entire *communautaire*, this process has never before been accompanied by much extensive programming, conditionality and monitoring as in Eastern Enlargement. It reflects the situation that the CEE candidates for membership had to adjust with their transformation from: - a) Autocracy to democracy. b) Planned economy to market economy and, c) Multinational to independent statehood, when they embarked upon the path to EU membership. In this situation, the EU considered special attention to political conditions, additional requirements beyond the *acquis*.

The research studies about the potential impacts of EU policies in Poland that has joined the EU. In terms of its political development, Polish political behaviour continues to pursue a path of correlation with the western part of the continent. Post Communist Poland witnessed the establishment of democratic institutions. The first dimension and phase occurred as part of the general transition to liberal democracy and a market economy, as experienced by all of the countries of East-Central Europe since the fall of communism. The second dimension and phase constitutes a process of the harmonisation of norms, institutions, procedures and policies within the *acquis communautaire* of the European Union.

## RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- 1) Can Europeanisation be understood in terms of a 'process' or in terms of a 'result'?
- 2) What are the differences in political institutions in Poland before and after accession to EU?
- 3) How successfully has Poland adopted the *acquis communautaire*?
- 4) How successfully have the political institutions in Poland complied with the EU norms?



- 5) What are the problems of adjustment to the EU modes of governance in Poland?

## **HYPOTHESIS**

1. Accession of Poland to EU has brought political stability and democratization of institutions.
2. Polish membership in EU has broadened the democratic space.

## **RESEARCH METHODS**

The research analyzes the process of domestic, institutional and political change in Poland within the broad framework of the Europeanisation. The definition of the concept of Europeanisation follows a descriptive approach.

Using analytical approach, research briefly outlines history of Poland during the cold war era till the disintegration of USSR. In some detail the research then studies the impact of accession on political institutions in Poland. The research also studies the public attitude to political changes in Poland

The research make use of both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources studied deal with the official documents and policy pronouncement of the EU pertaining to Eastern Enlargement. Documents of the European commission in particular, are studied. These are available on the websites like [www.europa.eu](http://www.europa.eu), [www.euractive.com](http://www.euractive.com), and [www.euobserver.com](http://www.euobserver.com). The secondary sources mainly consist of books, journals, articles, newspapers, and clippings etc. that deal with the eastern enlargement of the European Union.

## **CHAPTERS**

The research will be divided into five chapters:-

### **1. Introduction**

The chapter offers a description of the undertaken research project along with a survey of literary sources. This chapter then enumerates the rationale and scope of study, research questions and hypothesis. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the limitations of the study.

## **2. Conceptualizing Europeanisation**

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section attempts to define the various meanings of the term Europeanisation and the context within which the concept is debated and used. The second section studies the process of Europeanisation in CEE countries with particular focus on Poland.

## **3. Political Structure in Poland Prior to joining EU**

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section briefly outlines the history of Poland from the starting of cold war till the disintegration of USSR. This section also highlights the major features of the political institutions in Poland during this era. The second section studies the transformation of political structures in a post communist phase. In this section, a brief history is also provided of process leading to Poland's membership of the European Union.

## **4. Europeanisation and Political Change in Poland Since 2004**

This chapter describes how Europeanisation has led to transformation of political structure and process in Poland and how the EU has shaped national politics in Poland. It also discusses the changes in the political structure that have happened in Poland post 2004 i.e. after accession.

## **5. Conclusion**

This chapter analyzes the future challenges before Poland in its process of democratization after its accession into the European Union.

*CHAPTER TWO*  
*CONCEPTUALIZING*  
*EUROPEANISATION*

## CONCEPTUALIZING EUROPEANISATION

Europeanisation is a contested concept (Olsen 2002). This term is used in a number of ways to describe the process of changes that is happening in Europe. As this term has no precise or specific meaning, some thinkers have argued that it is futile to use it as an organizing concept (Kassim 2001: 238).

There is no single grand theory of “Europeanisation” that can help us understand how institutions co-evolve through processes of mutual adaptations. Nor there is a single set of simplifying assumptions about change, institutions and actors that will capture the complexity of European transformation. Yet, there exists a limited reparative (middle- range) model of institutional change that may be helpful for capturing European dynamics (Ibid).

In prevalent discourses, Europeanisation is defined as domestic change caused by European integration. Hix and Goetz (2000: 27) define it as “a process of change in national institutional and policy practices that can be attributed to European integration”. Borzel (1999: 574) describes Europeanisation as a process by which domestic policy areas become increasing subject to European policy making.

In opposition of these narrow definitions, Ladrech (1994) highlights the changes more generally, including also citizenship and national identity. On the basis of Ladrech’s definition, Radaelli (2000) refers Europeanisation as “processes of a) construction b) diffusion c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing things and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourses, identities, political structures and public policies”. This definition about Europeanisation underlines the importance of change not only in the evolution of political system conforming with EU norms but also in the structures and identities.

## DEFINING EUROPEANISATION

Some systematic attempts are done to map and compare the different meanings and uses of this term. John. P. Olsen (2002:2) writes, "... rather than rejecting the term outright, I make an attempt to create a little more order in a disorderly field of research. The issue raised is not what Europeanisation really is, but whether and how the term can be useful for understanding the dynamics of the evolving European polity".

Some thinkers argue that the different definitions of Europeanisation are complementary (March 1981). Thus, we see that the current debate over the term 'Europeanisation' focuses on how the member states of the European Union should be governed and how the various institutions of governance should be organised. Thus, Europeanisation is not a *sui generis* phenomenon, but one that makes it possible to compare European dynamics with the dynamics of other systems of governance. The basic principles for the political organisation of Europe are seen as important examples of how political orders and systems of governance originate and how they evolve and alter (Olsen 2002).

Olsen (2002) in a succinct analysis locates the term Europeanisation in relation to five different frameworks:

First, Europeanisation involves the geographical boundaries to which Europe as a continent becomes a single political space. For example, Europeanisation is taking place as the European Union expands its boundaries through enlargement. Enlargement has been a successful story for the EU. The EU has been very attractive for most European states, so number of the candidate and applicant countries is very long.

Second, Europeanisation can be constructed as the development of institutions of governance at the European level. This evolves and provides some degree of political conditions and coherence.

Third, Europeanisation is viewed as a phenomenon of central penetration of national and sub-national systems of governance. In this context, Europeanisation includes the division of powers between different levels of governance. A prerequisite of such a

type of Europeanisation is that all multilevel systems of governance need to make a balance between unity and diversity as well as central union and local autonomy.

Fourth, Europeanisation can be seen as a process of exporting such forms of political organisation and governance beyond the European territory that distinctive of Europe. Here Europeanisation is concerned with the relations with non-European states and institutions. It describes how Europe finds its place in the world order.

Fifth, Olsen views Europeanisation as a political project aiming at a unified and politically stronger Europe. He remarks that Europe is taking shape as a unified political entity. It is related to territorial space and domestic adoption. It describes how European developments impact as well affect the systems of governance (Ibid).

Olsen thus focuses on how existing institutional arrangements impact on two key aspects of institutional change. First, relates to changes in political organisation, whereby development of political organisation for common action and governance takes place in such a way that it could reorganize and redirect the resources. Second, key dimension of Europeanisation, according to Olsen, is the change in structures of meaning and people's minds. Within this paradigm, Europeanisation focuses on the development and redefinition of political ideas, common visions, causal believes and worldviews as to give direction to the common capabilities and capacities.

A continual institutional change can be discerned in the current European context. Here institutional change is seen as depending on a limited number of processes that produce an array of outcomes under shifting circumstances. The political institutions and social agents react for changing opportunities and challenges.

Robert Harmsen and Thomas M. Wilson (2000) have defined the term Europeanisation by eight usages, which are as follows:

- 1. Europeanisation as the emergence of new forms of European governance-**  
According to this view, Europeanisation should be understood as “the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal and social institutions that formalise and reutilize interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specialising in the creation of authoritative European rules,” (Bartolini, Risse and Strath 1999: 2).

2. **Europeanisation as national adaptation-** In this context, Europeanisation refers to the adaptation of national institutional structures and policy making processes in response to the development of European integration. Ladrech (1994: 70) defines this as “an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy making”.

This usage addresses the question whether the domestic institutions of EU member states are becoming more alike one another, either through processes of transnational borrowing or through the emulation of an emerging European model (Borzel 1999).

3. **Europeanisation as policy isomorphism-** According to Radaelli (1997), the Europeanisation of policy has two dimensions. On the one hand, there has been a ‘direct’ Europeanisation of various public policies that have passed from the member states to the European Union. On the other hand, there has been an ‘indirect’ Europeanisation policy.
4. **Europeanisation as problem and opportunity for domestic political management-** Europeanisation may be understood as a problem which possesses the opportunities which it creates for domestic political management (Drake and Milner 1999; Cole and Drake 2000).

Europeanisation may appear as an external constraint. Many member states in particular circumstances put into practice policy choices that enjoy little domestic support. The European policy-making arena may also change the opportunity structures in ways which may be used by national governments. Governments may find that their crucial strategic position between the European and national arenas allows them usage in “two-level games,” (Putman 1988: 458-460).

According to the Robert Putman’s classic analysis, this is conducted under double constraint. This double constraint may be used as a strategic advantage.

5. **Europeanisation as modernisation** - Here Europeanisation is applied in the context of the less economically developed member states of the European Union. It implies a series of structural transformations intended to bring these countries back into the European mainstream.

**6. Europeanisation as joining Europe-** In this sense the Europeanisation may be understood within the context of EU enlargement. It points to the Central and Eastern European states who are adopting the Western European states model of the democratic institutions and market economies.

Agh (1998: 42-45) remarks that the process of Europeanisation is a successfully completed transition in which the candidate countries become fully integrated into the entire range of political, economic, and security structures of Western European integration and trans-Atlantic cooperation.

**7. Europeanisation as the reconstruction of identities-** It mentions the reshaping of identities in Contemporary Europe in a manner which relates the national identities. In this view Europeanisation stresses the role of culture and identity (Shore,1998). In this context, Borneman and Fowler (1997:487) define Europeanisation as a strategy of self-representation.

**8. Europeanisation as transnationalism and cultural integration-** Here Europeanisation mentions 'the spheres of integration' in everyday life where people of Europe engage in face-to-face encounters with each other (Ibid: 497). This form of Europeanisation is about boundary maintenance and boundary crossing within the context of both cultural and political identity as well as legal, political and administrative borders between and within states.

To study the phenomenon of Europeanisation within this perspective, it is imperative to understand the structure and dynamics of each process. At a superficial level, the different processes look separate. But, in practice, they are complexly intertwined. It may be so that a process or mechanism may fit a particular phenomenon or situation better than the others and thus, there is no reason to generally expect a one-to-one relationship between a phenomenon and mechanism of change (Ibid).

## **EUROPEANISATION AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION**

We know that Europe is a geographical continent. Its external boundary can be delimited and defined. But in the literature "Europe" is used in many ways. Currently, in the literature and the public documents, "Europe" has been synonymous to the European Union and its member states.



The process of Europeanisation is not confined to member states of the European Union but also to all European countries (Wallace, 2000). We know many examples of institution building at the European level such as the European Council, the European Commission, and European Parliament. However, along with this, there are many examples of European level institution building mechanism that fall outside the purview of the EU. One such example is the Council of Europe. Moreover, there has also been an increase in non-territorial forms of political organisation, and the meaning and importance of geographical space has altered with the intensification of functional networks without a centre of final authority and power (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998). So, to have a sufficient understanding about the ongoing transformations, it is further required to pay attention to other European transnational institutions, regimes and organisations as well as non-member states. Yet the fact cannot be denied that the EU has been the most successful in this matter as it has led to an institutionalised system of governance. At present, the EU strongly manifests itself as a symbol of political unification in Europe and so, the dominant discourses on Europeanisation highlight the role of the EU in the national policy making processes.

The basic question that confronts is why in the process of Europeanisation, some identities and obligations are activated while certain others are not paid heed to. For example, criteria for entrance in the EU for a country are a liberal democratic political system and a smooth functioning market economy. The Union admits the countries that reliably adhere to some important and universal criteria in their domestic and international conduct (Schimmelfenming 2001). Criteria may be institution specific and related to the principles on which an institution is founded, like the Copenhagen Declaration of 1993. Some argue that by evolving these institutions and criteria, Europe has an historic opportunity to reunify Europe after long artificial separation (Notre Europe 2001).

It can be remarked that the EU agreed to enlargement without calculation of the consequences that may be political, economic or related to security for member states. There is no guarantee that each number state will get benefits more than their costs. In short, enlargement cannot be seen as strategically where member states are maximizing their expected utility (Schimmelfenming 2001). A large number of EU documents describe enlargement as consistent with liberal-democratic principles and European values (European Commission 2001).

## **POLITICAL UNIFICATION OF EUROPE**

As per, Olsen's fifth conceptualisation, Europeanisation is a political project aiming at a unified and politically stronger Europe that leads the sovereign states unified into a single political space and a unitary system of governance. Coherence and structural arrangements provide a strong organisational basis for demanding action inwards and outwards. Internal borders are being weakened or removed. External borders are being strengthened. There is a clear discrimination between members (citizens) and non-members (non-citizens). In short, fragmented European continent is being unified as the boundaries of political space are extended beyond the member states. Currently there are competing ideas about what type of political organisation and system of governance is desirable.

Olsen (2002) remarks:

“A strong European Union does not simply imply maximizing territory, centre building, adaption of national and sub-national system of governance and export of European solution. Rather the institutionalisation of political borders, authority, power and responsibility is a delicate balancing act. For example, EU enlargement is increasing the Union's territory, population and resources. But it is creating more heterogeneity problems. A strong centre and a single hierarchical control and command system may under some circumstances make it possible to act in a more coherent way and play a more significant role in global developments. Yet, strong adaption pressure may also generate protest and resistance from member states and others disagreeing with common policies, likewise, vigorous adaption of domestic systems without adequate respect for local autonomy, diversity and protection of minorities may provide conflict and obstructions.”

The process of institutional change is seen as complementary rather than exclusive and is helpful in understanding the contemporary institutions. This complexity explains the dynamics of change that takes the form of mutual adaption of many co-evolving institutions at diverse levels and sectors of governance.

On the one hand, it has been seen that this process of change is not unilateral. At all levels – global, European, national, and sub-national- processes interact in complicated ways. There is no single dominant reason for this complication. “Causal changes are often indirect, long and complex. Effects are difficult to identify and disentangle. Interactive processes of feedback, mutual influence and adaptation are producing interpenetration between levels of governance and institutions” (Ibid).

On the other hand, scholars like Risse, Cowles and Caporaso (2001: 12) remark that although the causality between Europeanisation and domestic structure runs in both directions, it is more important to emphasize the downward causation from Europeanisation to domestic structure.

Currently Europe is like a world where many actors are adapting to each other simultaneously, and so it is difficult to predict, understand and control by any single actor or group of actors. Political elites and actors are facing some problems as to how the institutions should evolve and unfold through elements of shared understanding and control. So the purpose of such political leaders and actors is to establish simple rules of fair competition and to hamper complexity by protecting variation, exploration and innovation. Olsen (2002) has further written, “A complimentary position is to try to make institutional change a somewhat more guided process by improving the elements of shared understanding and coordination and reducing complexity. Examples would be institutional actors monitoring each other, exchanging information, introducing arrangements of consultation before decisions are made, developing shared statistics and accounts, making explicit efforts to reduce incompatibilities and redundancies and to deliberately develop networks of contact and interaction, joint projects and common rules and institutions”.

Europeanisation may be less useful as an explaining concept than as an attention directing device and a starting point for further exploration. We know that the European Coal and Steel community (ECSC) was established in 1951 and the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957. From this time till today Europe is in the transition period and procedures by which the European political order is in a state of change.

To understand Europeanisation, we need to specify not only what Europeanisation is but also what it is not. This term should not be used synonymously with terms like convergence, harmonisation and political integration. Convergence in policies is an

altogether different phenomenon from that of Europeanisation. Convergence can be a consequence of European integration, but cannot be said to be Europeanisation because there is a difference between a process and its consequences. Therefore to understand the broader concept of Europeanisation now we will discuss the historical and contemporary context and processes related to Europeanisation.

## **EUROPEANISATION: FROM WHERE DOES THIS PROCESS BEGIN**

Europeanisation does not start from a singular source. The starting of this process may be the outcome of diverse practices such as domestic government preferences, transnational economic actors or supranational entrepreneurs (Vink 2002: 7).

Hix and Goetz (2000: 3-4) underline the difference of the new research agenda of Europeanisation with traditional approaches to European integration. At face value such a top-down approach would imply the study of domestic policy and to observe how much it has changed. The question now is to study that in what ways has the process of Europeanisation led to such domestic level changes. On a larger level, the question thus addressed is whether and how, 'Europe' can be used to explain this change. EU policies affect the domestic policies strongly. In order to analyse the range of policies, we need to understand when and how Europe becomes involved in the issues which are traditionally regulated at the national level. It may be mentioned here that approaching Europeanisation entirely from a 'top-down rather than bottom-up' perspective may in the end fail to recognize the more complex two-way causality of European integration (Borzel 1999: 574).

Scharpf (1996: 16- 18) has described two types of European integration, namely negative integration and positive integration. Negative integration follows the theory of the common market. By intervening against national barriers to the free movement of goods, persons, capital and services, negative integration reduces the range of national policy choices and separates a fundamental loss of political control over the capitalist economy. On the other hand, positive integration is an attempt of giving some power for the state and society. It is also an attempt for market unification through re-registration at the European level. Vink (2002) is of the opinion that the unwanted side-effects from liberalisation processes, in particular from the free movement of goods, persons, capital and services, require a certain level of re-registration at the European level. Positive integration is hence 'market-shaping'

because it intervenes in the economy and involves a broader institutional adaption at the domestic level to a specific European model.

Besides, another type of European integration termed as ideational European integration is highlighted by certain scholars (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002: 273-274). They point to the idea that Europeanisation is not necessarily restricted with EU regulations. Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002: 258) acknowledge that Europeanisation could proceed through the forming of domestic beliefs and expectations. Vink (2002: 9) asserts that “European policies can be distinguished not only by being market-making or market-correcting but also by being strong or weak”.

The relational aspects of strong and weak integration as well as negative and positive with respect to their outcoming are shown in this table-

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|        | Negative (Deregulatory ) | Positive (Regulatory)        |
|--------|--------------------------|------------------------------|
| Strong | e.g. Competition policy  | e.g. Environmental policy    |
| Weak   | e.g. Railways policy     | e.g. Higher education policy |

These two dimensions of positive versus negative integration and strong versus weak integration lead to four different types of European integration. Although we may see that the line between strong and weak integration is not a clearly defined, mostly European policies are probably characterised by a mixture of negative and positive integration (Ibid).

## DEVELOPING EUROPEAN-LEVEL INSTITUTIONS



Many scholars describe Europeanisation as the institutionalisation at the European level of a distinct system of governance. It has the authority to make, implement and enforce Europe-wide binding policies. Risse, Cowles and Caporaso (2001:3) define Europeanisation as “the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance that is, of political, legal and social institutions associated with the problem solving that formalise integration among the actors and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules”. Here

Europeanisation takes account of two processes, that of strengthening of an organisational capacity for collective action and, the development of common ideas, values and norms that transcend the national level and consequently emerge at a wider European level.

To understand the institutional changes at European level, the inter-governmentalist approach to the study of European integration highlights that the dominant actors at the policy making level have a choice among alternative forms of organisation and governance. They have normative criteria that make it possible to categorize between accessible alternatives and their consequences.

According to Olsen (2002:10-11), “The challenge for institutional architects is to discover or design forms of organisation and governance that makes all participants come out better than they could do on their own”. For instance, the European Union is assumed to be involved in a continuous search for the right formula for building lasting and stable institution in order to improve the functionality, legitimacy and credibility of the institutions of governance (Patten 2001 cited in Olsen 2002:11).

Thus, the focus is on the process of Europeanisation and how it reflects and modifies the ways in which political power is constituted, legitimated, exercised, controlled and redistributed. Like other political order, the upcoming European order has to unravel the tensions among unity and integration and disunity and disintegration. When the EU official lay thrust on the norms, values and voluntary cooperation and argue that “power politics have lost their influence”, it needs to be understood within the paradigms of a power relations.

All scholars have consensus on the point that Union is an extraordinary achievement in modern world politics (Moravcsik 1999: 01). However they do not have consensus when it comes to the nature of the Union (e.g. the degree of supranationalism) and the causes of its development. Intergovernmentalists emphasize institutional choices made by the governments of member states. Olsen (2002) writes that one view is that system of supranational governance has their roots in the European-wide transactions, group-formation and networks of transnational society while governments primarily play a reactive role (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998). An institutional approach, with an emphasis on historical inefficiency focuses on how the factor of determined change is subjected and constrained by accessible institutional arrangement.

For understanding the purposeful institutional choice in contemporary Europe it is necessary to compare in a systematic way different European institution-building efforts such as EU, European Free Trade Area (EFTA), and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Another option is to evaluate attempts of institution building within the EU itself.

Rokkan (1999: cited in Olsen 2002:12) suggests four dimensions for the study of state and nation- building in Europe that are pertinent both for comparing institutional spheres within the EU and for comparing the Union with other European institutional-building efforts-

1. **Regulatory institutions-** This involves building a unified administrative and military institutions for control of population, territory and its external borders.
2. **Socializing institutions-** This aspect deals with developing territorial identity and cultural community with emotional attachment and values.
3. **Democratic institutions-** They aim at creating a democratic citizenship, equal rights of political participation and organised parties for public debate and popular enlightenment.
4. **Welfare institutions-** They highlight the need to widen social and economic rights and a community that acknowledges the collective responsibility through the means of public services and reallocation of resources.

The question is, have these institutions been able to develop a pan-European identity, it is highly debated in the academic circles.

## **EUROPEANISATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PAN-EUROPEAN IDENTITY**

The term Pan European Identity may be loosely referred to a sense of personal identification with Europe. The European Union and Council of Europe are the most concrete examples of pan-European identity.

A development of European identity is looked upon as an imperative aim in pursuing the founding of a politically, economically and militarily influential united Europe in the world. It similarly supports the foundations of common European values, such as

of human rights and spread of welfare. The concept of common European identity is viewed as rather a by-product than the main goal of the European integration process and is actively promoted (Shore 2006).

The member states of the EU do have many common policies within the EU and on behalf of the EU that are sometimes suggestive of a single state. It has common civil services (the European Commission), a single high representative for the common Foreign and Security policy (CFSP), a common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), a supreme court (European Court of Justice that exercises judgment only in matters of European Union law), a peacekeeping force, and an intergovernmental research organization.

The “United States of Europe” is a name given to several similar hypothetical scenarios of the unification of Europe, as a single nation and a single federation of states, similar to the United States of America, both as projected by political scientist, politicians and historians.

The term “United States of Europe” as a direct comparison with USA, would imply that the existing nations of Europe would be reduced to a status equivalent to that of state, losing their national sovereignty in the process and becoming constituted parts of a European federation. Those who oppose and criticize forming a federation on confederation of European states may be termed Euroskeptics.

However, European Union does not include every nation in Europe and there is no consensus among the existing national governments towards becoming even a confederation. There is also significant internal opposition to the concept in many member states.

The above analysis leads us to a plausible conclusion that Europeanisation is not a singular and an isolated phenomenon. The complexity of this issue is due to the multi-dimensional effects of Europeanisation. It does affect not just policy and politics but also affects at various levels ranging from individual actors, regime types in policy areas to the overall functioning of the political system (Sittermann 2006).

Since the purpose of the research is to study the impact of Europeanisation on political structure in Poland, it is imperative to examine Poland’s polity within the paradigms of above mentioned facets. However, the impact of Europeanisation in



Poland cannot be studied independent of its past and thus, it is necessary to examine the political structures in Poland prior to joining the EU as discussed in the next chapter.

*CHAPTER THREE*  
*POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN*  
*POLAND PRIOR TO JOINING EU*

## **POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN POLAND PRIOR TO JOINING EU**

### **POLAND DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR**

During the Second World War, Poland was made to function as a buffer state between Germany and Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR). In the beginning of September 1939, Germany attacked on Poland from the West side and this incident triggered the Second World War. During the course of the war, in mid September 1939, USSR attacked on Poland from the Eastern side and now Poland was divided into halves, one under German control and other under the control of USSR. Germany and USSR divided Poland into half (Refer annexure 1). Meanwhile Poland had signed a pact with Britain and France. These powers declared a war on Germany. While Poland's military forces were fighting the involving armies, Polish top government official left the country (Prazmowska, 2004: 177- 179).

When in 1941, Germany invaded USSR, the Poles formed an underground resistance movement and a Polish government in exile, first in Paris and later in London was formed which was subsequently also recognised by the USSR. In July 1944, the Soviet Red Army and the People's Army of Poland entered Poland and defeated German forces (Ibid: 186- 189). Poland suffered heavy casualties during the Second World War. Poland lost as many 150000 soldiers. There were one million war orphans and over 50,000 war disabled. The country lost 38% of its national assets (Seamark, 2007).

### **POLAND: FROM 1945 - 1956**

In June 1945, in accordance with February Yalta Conference, a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity was formed which was recognised by The United States of America (USA). The next month, a national referendum was arranged by the Polish Workers' Party, which was established by USSR in 1942 in Poland (Refer annexure -2). The national referendum was used to legitimize its dominance and public support. The Yalta Conference had suggested for free and fair elections for entire Central and Eastern European region. These were the first elections, since the termination of Second World War, which were held in January 1947. It may be

mentioned that these elections were strictly controlled by the USSR. In February 1947, Boleslaw Bierut became the President of Poland who was the hard-line Stalinist; he remained in the Office from 1947 to 1952. In 1950, Polish People's Republic was created under the communist Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) (Prazmowska, 2004: 190-192).

From 1947 to 1952 Poland was led by two prominent personalities-Boleslaw Beirut and Konstantin Rokossovsky, both ardent supporters of Stalin. Konstantin Rokossovsky was the Marshal of Poland and Polish defence minister. The government's main priority lay in building useful heavy industry, primarily to cater to a large military. In keeping with the communist principle of public ownership of means of production, stringently controlled State run institutions, collectivization and cooperative entities were imposed, while even small-scale private enterprises were eradicated. As regards the social sector, significant steps were made in the areas of universal public education and health care (Ibid: 194-195).

In 1953, Nikita Khrushchev became the successor of Stalin. In October 1956, Khrushchev criticized Stalin openly as dictator and murderer. This was the shakeup in the communist regime history. He started a process of '*de-Stalinization*' whereby some of the rigid policies of the preceding regimes was subject to some alteration (Ibid: 196).

The year 1956 was witness to massive protests that are popularly known as Poznan protests. These were massive protests of the Polish people against the Polish communist government. The main class among the protestors was that of the industrial workers, which basically demanded for better labour conditions. The protests started on June 28, 1956 at Poznan's Cegielski Factories. A crowd around 100,000 gathered in the city centre. In order to suppress the movement, the government deployed 400 tanks and 10, 000 soldiers of *Ludowe Wajsho Polshie* (People's troops of Poland) were ordered to suppress the demonstration and during the pacification fired at the protesting civilians (Sonntag, 2004: 19).

Edward Ochab, the then Polish Prime Minister, invited Gomulka to serve as General Secretary of the Party. Gomulka demanded that he should be given real power to put reforms into operation. One explicit condition put by Gomulka was that the Soviet Marshal Konstantin Rokossovky who had ordered troops against the Poznan workers

should be removed from the Polish Politburo and defence ministry. Ochab approved this and disassociated Konstantin Rokossovky from the Polit Buro.

In October 1956 the majority of the Polish leadership brought Wladyslaw Gomulka into the Politburo and elected him as General Secretary of the Party. Meanwhile, the Soviet leadership scrutinised these events in Poland with concerning alarm. Simultaneously with troop maneuvering on the Soviet Polish border a high level delegation of the Soviet Central Committee flew to Poland, Gomulka made it clear that Polish troops would stand firm if Soviet troops advanced, but reassured the Soviets that the reforms were internal matters and that Poland had no intent of abandoning communism or its treaties with the Soviet Union. Gomulka was admired for his reforms and he sought 'Polish way to Socialism'. He declared that the party will lead Poland along new way of socialism. Gomulka's period is known as Gomulka's Era (Prazmowska 2004: 196-198).

### **THE GOMULKA YEARS: 1956 -1970**

Gomulka was the undisputed leader of Poland for the next decade and a half. As mentioned earlier, he had acquired popularity on account of his reforms. Meanwhile, in 1956, when Gomulka was on the political ascendancy, information about events in Poland reached the people of Hungary via Radio Free Europe's news and commentary services during 19-22 October 1956. A student demonstration in Budapest in support of Gomulka asking for similar reforms in Hungary soon sparked the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 (Spielvogel 2010: 619).

Meanwhile, this era was also marked by significant developments between the church- state relations. In 1956 the conference of Polish Bishops sent a letter of Reconciliation of the Polish Bishops to the German Bishops. It was first effort of the reconciliation after the tragedies of the World War II, in which Germany invaded Poland. Commonly publicized in Poland's churches, the letter drew a strong reaction from the communist authorities of the People's Republic of Poland. Gomulka saw it as clearly aimed at countering his propaganda, which was West Germany as the main external enemy of Poland and hostility between Poland and West Germany as one of the main guarantees of social order in the Recovered Territories (Davies 2001: 46-48).

To counter the threat of losing control over people's minds the communist authorities reached with anti-German and anti-catholic hysteria. The Primate of Poland, Stefan Wyszyński was denied a passport for his trip to Rome and on January 15, 1966, Gomułka announced preparations for state celebrations of the 1000 years of the Polish state, projected as a countermeasure against the church sponsored celebrations of 1000 years of the Baptism of Poland. Many Germans were forced to sign a letter of protest. In addition, the authorities twice refused permission for a planned visit of Pope Paul VI Poland in 1966. The following year the PZPR planned to limit the number of religion schools, which was also seen as a consequence for the letter of Reconciliation. The anti-church campaign lasted up until Gomułka's downfall in 1970 (Prazmowska 2004: 198-200).

An urban cultural life developed under Gomułka and his successors, despite the fact that in certain streams, the creative process had repeatedly been compromised by state censorship. Notable achievements were gifted in cultural fields such as literature, theater, cinema and music. Along with this emerged "Journalism of veiled understanding and native varieties of popular trends and styles of Western mass culture". Uncensored information and works by émigré circles were conveyed by an array of channels, the Radio Free Europe being of primary importance (Ibid: 203).

In 1968, the liberalizing trend was reversed when student demonstrations were suppressed and an anti-Zionist Campaign initially directed against Gomułka supporters within the party eventually led to the emigration of much of Poland's remaining Jewish population.

The 1968 Polish political crisis was the resultant of discontent prevalent amongst students and also the Polish intelligentsia. In order to ward off this crisis, the Polish government ordered the suppression of student strikes by security forces in all major academic centers across the country and the subsequent repression of the Polish dissident movement.

At this juncture in Polish history, the Jews also protested against the Polish regime. This was met by severe repressive measures. The government's anti-Jewish campaign had begun already in 1967. It was a well-orchestrated response to the Soviet withdrawal of all diplomatic relations with Israel after six day war-with factory workers across Poland were enforced to openly deplore Zionism. The subsequent

purge within the communist Party, led by Interior Minister Mieczyslaw Moczar and his faction, failed to topple Gomulka's government, but resulted in an actual eviction from Poland of thousands of Jewish professionals, party officials and the Secret Police functionaries blamed "for a major part, if not all", of the crimes and horrors of the Stalinist period. Before the end of 1971, about 13000 Jews emigrated. Many of those forced to leave were shocked, and were waved farewell by their Polish friends (Time: 1967).

Also in 1968, the infamous invasion on Czechoslovakia happened. On the night of August 20-21, 1968, the Soviet Union, and its allies invaded the Czechoslovakia in order to counter and negate Alexander Dubcek' Prague Spring political liberalization reforms.

In the operation, codenamed Danube, varying estimates of between 175000 and 500000 troops attacked Czechoslovakia; approximately 500 Czechs and Slovaks were wounded and 108 killed in the invasion. The invasion successfully halted the liberalization reforms and strengthened the influence of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Globalsecurity.org 2005).

In 1970, the government of Poland and West Germany signed a treaty which normalized their relations and in which the Federal Republic recognized the post war de facto borders between Poland and East Germany.

In December 1970, disturbances and strikes in the port cities of Gdansk (Danzig), Gdynia and Szczecin (Stettin), triggered by a price rise for essential consumer goods, reflected deep discontent with living and working conditions in the country. As a result of riots there was a brutal repression by the Polish People's army (Prazmowska 2004: 205). It was in these circumstances that Edward Gierek replaced Gomulka as General Secretary.

### **POLAND UNDER GIEREK: 1970- 1980**

Gierek promised economic reform and organised a program to modernize industry and increase the availability of consumer goods, the chief means of such funds being foreign loans. His good association with Western politicians, especially France's Valery Giscard d'Estaing and West Germany's Helmut Schmidt, were a channel for his receipt of Western financial assistance.

Fueled by large extracts of Western credit, Poland's economic growth rate was one of the world's highest during the first half of 1970s. But much of the loan capital was not put into optimum use by the centrally planned economy. The growing debt burden became insupportable in the late 1970s and economic growth had become negative by 1979. The Workers' Defense Committee (KOR) established in 1976, consisted of dissident intellectuals willing to openly support industrial workers struggling with the authorities.

## **POLISH POLITICS IN THE 1980's: THE SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT**

In August 1980, Lech Walesa played a crucial role in the politics of Poland. In June 1978, he became an activist of the underground free trade Union. On August 1980, after another food - price hike led to a strike at the Lenin shipyard in Gdansk of which he was one of the instigators. Walesa sealed the shipyard fence and at once inside quickly became one of the strike leaders. The strike inspired similar strikes, first at Gdarisk- then across Poland. Walesa led the Inter-Plant strike committee coordinating the workers at Gdansk and at 20 other plants in the region. On August 31, the Communist government signed an settlement (the Gdansk Agreement) with the Strike Coordinating Committee. The agreement besides granting the Lenin shipyard workers the right to strike permitted them to form their independent trade union. The Strike Coordinating Committee legalized itself as the national coordinating committee of the *solidarnosc* (Solidarity) Free Trade Union, and Walesa was chosen chairman of the Committee. The Solidarity Trade Union quickly grew; ultimately claiming over 10 million members more than a quarter of Poland's population. Walesa's role in the strike, in the negotiations, and in the newly formed independent trade union gained him fame on the international stage. For it he was given Nobel Peace Prize in 1983 (Lussier 2006: 1-20). (See annexure -3)

In September 1980, Gierek was replaced by Stanislaw kania as General Secretary alarmed by the rapid deterioration of PZPR's following the Gdansk agreement. The Soviet Union proceeded with a massive military buildup along Poland's border in December 1980. In February 1981, Defense Minister Gen, Wojciech Jaruzelski assumed the position of Prime minister and in October 1981, was named General Secretary of the Communist party.



On December 12-13, the government declared the martial law under which the army and the police were used to crush the union. Virtually all Solidarity leaders and many affiliated intellectuals were arrested or detained. The USA and other Western countries responded to martial law by imposing economic sanctions against the Polish government and against the Soviet Union. Unrest in Poland continued for several years (Repa, 2005). Having achieved some permanence, the Polish government in a number of stages relaxed and later, the martial law was suspended and some political prisoners were released. Although martial law formally ended in July 1983 and a general amnesty was enacted, several hundred political prisoners remained in jail.

In July 1984, another general amnesty was declared, and two years later, the government had released nearly all political prisoners. The authorities continued, however, to harass dissidents and Solidarity activist. Solidarity remained proscribed and its publications banned.

The government's inability to forestall Poland's economic decline led to waves of strikes across the country in April, May and August 1988. With the Soviet Union increasingly destabilized, in the late 1980's the government was forced to negotiate with Solidarity in the Polish Round Table Negotiations. The resulting Polish legislative elections in 1989 became one of the important events making the fall of communism in Poland (Davies 2001:407- 409).

## **GORBACHEV AND THE DOWNFALL OF COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE**

In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became the General Secretary of Soviet Communist Party. He tried to reform the stagnating party and the state economy by introducing *Glasnost* (openness), *Perestroika* (restructuring), *Demokratizatsiya* (democratization), and *Uskoreniye* (acceleration of economic development) in 1986.

In the decade of 1980, Soviet economy was stagnating. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev announced that Soviet economy was stalled and reorganization was needed. He called for fast paced technological modernization and improved industrial and agricultural productivity.

In January 1987, in erstwhile USSR, multi-candidate elections were proposed and some non-party members were appointed to government positions. Along with, the people got better freedom of speech. This was the fundamental change in the political and social system. The Press became far less controlled and thousands of political prisoners were released. So the Gorbachev era is known for the most radical change in economic reforms and advocacy for multi-party democracy. A new executive was proposed in the form of a presidential system as well as a new legislative system. Elections for the legislative were held throughout the Soviet Union in 1989. This was the first free election in the Soviet Union since 1917 (Steele 1994: 336-384).

For these domestic reforms, Gorbachev was hailed in the Western world. The close relationships were established with the Western powers. For this, Michal Gorbachev was awarded Nobel Peace Prize in 1990. These events increased the rise of popular upheaval in the Eastern Europe. In all Eastern European, the Communist governments were over thrown. The events began in Poland in 1989 and continued in Hungary, East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Romania. One feature common to most of these developments was the extensive use of campaign of civil resistance demonstrating popular opposition to the continuation of single party rule and contributing to the presume for change. Romania was the only Eastern European country to overthrow its communist government violently.

On November 1989, people in the East Germany (German Democratic Republic) were suddenly allowed to cross through the Berlin Wall into West Berlin, following a peaceful protest. Thousands of East Germans immigrated to West Germany; Hungary's reformist government opened its borders. The exodus demands within East Germany for political change and mass demonstrations in several cities continued to grow. In the end, both Germany reunified on 3 October 1990.

The Soviet Union was dissolved by the end of 1991, resulting in Russia and 14 nations that declared their independence from the Soviet Union: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. The collapse of communism led commentators to declare the end of the cold war (Roberts 1999).

The whole countries of the world adopted democratic political system and market economy. Many thinkers, political scientists and political leaders named it the victory

of liberal ideas. Francis Fukuyama termed it the end of history. He said the history proceeds with the collision of two ideas. Now liberal ideology exists in the whole world-there is no conflict in and out. So history ends (Fukuyama 1992). These all events opened a new path for Poland that was a Soviet satellite state during the heydays of Communism, now emerged from its shadow. This process was a peaceful one. This transition changed Poland from communist state to the capitalist and parliamentary democratic state.

## **POLAND: AFTER THE FALL OF COMMUNISM**

The 1980s witnessed the emergence of a social explosion, largely caused because of economic depression and fugitive inflation that had depressed Polish living standards and deepened public rage. So by 1988 the government began a series of talks with the Opposition. These talks are called the Polish Round Table Talks. These were held in Warsaw from February 6 to 14 April 1989. The meetings were co-chaired by Lech Walesa and Minister of Internal Affairs Czeslaw Kiszczak.

The Polish government, led by General Jaruzelski, hoped to co-opt prominent opposition leaders into the ruling group without making major changes in the political structure. But the talks altered the whole shape of the Polish government and society. The conference, held in April month, resulted in open National Assembly elections (Lungescu 2009).

Now, actual political power vested with a newly created bicameral legislature and in a president who was now appointed as a chief executive. Solidarity became a legitimate and legal political party. Free election to 35% of the seats in Sejm and an entirely free election to the Senate was assumed. The election of 4 June 1989 brought a landslide victory to Solidarity, 99% of all the seats in the Senate and all of the 35% possible seats in Sejm.

On August 19, President Jaruzelski asked Solidarity leader Tadeusz Mazowiecki to form a government, the Sejm voted approval of Prime Minister Mazowiecki and his cabinet. For more than 40 years in all Eastern European countries, Poland had a government led by non-communists (See Annexure 4).

In December 1989, the Sejm approved the government's reform program to transform to Polish economy speedily from centrally planned to free market, amended the

constitution to abolish the leading role of the communist party and renamed the country (from People's Republic of Poland to third Polish Republic). The PZPR dissolved itself in January 1990. In October 1990, the constitution was amended to end the term of President Jaruzelski (Sanford 2002: 57-58).

A radical monetary reform was introduced in January 1990 with the sanction of International Monetary Fund (IMF). It was named the 'Balcerowicz Plan' after the new finance minister Leszek Balcerowicz. It aimed at creating prerequisites for a successful transition from a centrally planned economy to market economy. Mazowiecki tried to move upon a politically cautiously path, urging calm and stability and controversially declaring he would "draw a thick line" over the past (Repa 2008: 453).

The mood of buoyancy that greeted the formation of the Solidarity-led government in 1989 quickly subsided as real wages were cut down and unemployment rose rapidly. Divisions within Solidarity became more overt as Walesa considered himself to be marginalized by Mazowiecki's supporters. Walesa argued for accelerated political and economic change including Solidarity's own transformation into competing parties and a radical programme of mass privatization. Some critics of Walesa allayed fears that a free play of political forces would encourage populism and nationalism, urging the maintenance of a unified movement vivaciously made proactive by a 'Solidarity ethos'. Jaruzelski resigned in September 1990 to permit a direct presidential election to be held. Both Walesa and Mazowiecki were presidential candidates (Ibid: 453-54).

In April 1989, in the aftermath of the Polish Round Table agreement, many amendments were done in the constitution. The key changes were restoration of the Senate of Poland; powers of the Sejm were adjusted; changes to the electoral legislation in order to make election more free and fair.

The constitution of Poland was established in 1952. It was created by the Polish communists in the People's Republic of Poland. It was based on the 1936 Soviet Constitution. In 1976 it was constitutionally declared that Poland was a socialist country, the PZPR party was the leading force in the building of socialism and Poland was eternal friend of the Soviet Union.

The reformed 1952 constitution was finally replaced in 1997 by a completely new current constitution of Poland. According to constitution, the Council of Ministers (cabinet) or Polish government is the body which exercises executive power. The prime minister is the head of the government. He is authorized to distribute the portfolio as well as change their area of responsibility. The president is the head of state.

Legislative power is vested in both the government and the two chamber of parliament-the Sejm and the Senate. Members of parliament are elected by proportional representation with the proviso that non-ethnic-minority parties must gain at least 5% of the national vote to enter the lower house. Parliamentary elections occur at least every four years.

The council of ministers is typically chosen from a majority coalition in the lower house of the parliament (the Sejm), although exceptions to this rule are not uncommon. The government must pass a motion of confidence in the Sejm within two weeks. The president is the supreme commander of the Armed Forces and has the power to veto legislation passed by parliament, but otherwise has a mostly representative role. Presidential election occurs at every 5 years. The judiciary is independent from the executive and the legislature. It plays a minor role in the politics. Poland is a parliamentary representative democratic republic. The president is elected by popular vote and run off system. The Sejm has 460 members. The senate has 100 members.

The 1990 presidential elections were held in Poland in November. These were the first direct presidential elections in the history of Poland (Cole 1998: 52-60).

Lech Walesa (Solidarity Electoral Action), Stanislaw Tyminski, Tadeusz Mazowiecki were the main candidates. Lech Walesa had the image of an emotional and world populist. The first non-communist Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki was also very popular and was widely considered a front runner. Stanislaw Tyminski was the new face for the public.

In the first round any candidate could not get 50% vote. In the second round, there were two candidates Lech Walesa and Stanislaw Tyminski. Lech Walesa got 74% vote. So he became the President of Poland. After the election Tyminski tried to

establish a new political party but very quickly disappeared from the political scene. Jan Krzysztof Bielecki at Walesa's request formed a government and served as its Prime Minister until October 1991 (Bell 2001: 25- 27).

Poland's first free parliamentary elections were held in October 1991 .43.2% of the citizens cast their votes. More than 100 parties participated representing the full gamut of political views. No political party got a decisive majority and a coalition government had to be formed. 29 parties won representation in the Sejm. The most successful party was the Democratic Union (UD), representing the old Mazowiecki faction, with 12.3% of the votes share with getting 62 seats and the Democratic left Alliance (SLD) won 60 seats in the Sejm. In December 1991, a centre right coalition Government was formed by Jan Olszewski, a human rights lawyer and former Solidarity activist. After only seven months in office he resigned after constant infighting and a series of disputes with President Walesa. In July 1992 Hanna Suchocka of the UD became Poland's first female Prime Minister, leading a seven-party coalition Government. Her administration was speedily weighed down by the familiar problems of coalition infighting and labour unrest. On May 28, 1993 a 'no confidence motion' was passed by a margin of one vote and the government resigned (Ibid: 31-34).

The period from 1989 to 1993 was marked by factionalism, and policy confusion among the post-Solidarity parties. The laissez-faire, free-market policies promoted by Balcerowicz were uneasily formulated alongside the more inclusive 'Christian social' instincts of many Solidarity activists and supporters. Politicians found it hard to devise a public language that would reverberate with the common voter. Poland's political culture proved to be strongly contingent on private networking and personal loyalties, often forged during the communist era. Governments also had to rely on bureaucratic machinery and an administrative culture largely inherited from the preceding government. An additional problem was indecisive delineation of presidential powers. Walesa sought an active 'French-style' presidency; while his opponents wanted the president to remain a symbolic head. An effort of finding the middle ground was made in the 'Small Constitution' of August 1992 which approved the President's right to nominate candidates for three key ministries; defense, interior and foreign affairs.

After the resignation of Suchocka's Government, fresh electoral rules were enacted, not including from parliamentary representation any party receiving less than 5% of the votes cast. The elections held on 19 September 1993, was a clear victory for the left, with the SLD campaigning as the party of pragmatism, experience and competence. The SLD and the Polish People's Party (PSL) together won over 65% of the seats in the lower house. In the Senate, the two parties had a combined 73 of the 100 seats. On 18 October, PSL leader Waldemar Pawalk was nominated as Prime Minister by President Walesa and formed a coalition Government with the SLD. Among the opposition, the UD merged with the Liberal Democratic Congress in 1994 to form the Freedom Union (UW). President Walesa's relations with the Government and the new Sejm quickly deteriorated, due to his frequent use of the presidential veto and continuously to involve himself directly in government affairs. The governing coalition was beset by internal differences, with a disagreement over bank privatization leading to the resignation of the Finance Minister Marek Borowski (of the SLD). Pawalk resigned as Prime Minister in February 1995. He was replaced by Jozef Oleksy of the SLD (Repa 2008: 454).

The 1995 Presidential elections were held in Poland on November 5 (first round) and November 19 (second round), Lech Walesa and Aleksander Kwasniewski, the leader of SLD and a former junior minister under Gen. Jaruzelski, passed to the second round. Kwasniewski won the election, collecting 51.7% of the votes in the run-off against 48.3% Lech Walesa, and the former Solidarity leader. Both house of the National Assembly and the presidency-now controlled by the former Communists. Kwasniewski ran an effective campaign emphasizing the youth and an openness to new ideas. Kwasniewski's campaign slogans were "let's choose the future (*Wybierzmy przyszlose*) and "A Poland for all" (*Wspolna Polska*). Political opponents disputed his victory and evidence to show that he had lied about his education in registration documents and public presentation. A law court confirmed that Kwasniewski had lied about his record but did not punish him for it, judging the information irrelevant to the election result (Bell 2001: 35 -38).

The presidential election was also a disenchantment for the Roman Catholic church that saw the fall of communism as an opportunity to promote Poland as a model Roman Catholic society and other were 'modernizers' who argued that the church needed to accustom itself to life in a pluralistic democracy. Under the Solidarity

based Governments, the church had succeeded in law, the reintroduction of religious education in state schools, highly restrictive abortion legislation and a legal obligation on the state broadcast media to reflect 'Christian Values'. Despite internal advice to stay neutral, the church openly supported Walesa in the election campaign (Repa 2008: 454).

In early 1996 the (Pro-Walesa) Minister of Internal Affairs, Andrzej Milczanowski, announced the finding of documents suggesting that Prime Minister Oleksy had been a long standing Soviet agent. Oleksy strongly refuted the charges but was forced to submit his resignation so that the evidences could be examined by the official prosecutor. It was eventually decided that inadequate evidence existed to carry out a prosecution, and Oleksy was acquitted in an official report published in October 1996. In appointing a successor to Olesky, President Kwasniewski turned to Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, an academic lawyer and former communist.

The formation of the new Government in January 1996 was marked by none of the machinations and procrastination that accompanied changes of government under Walesa's presidency. Nevertheless, there renewed internal strife among the coalition partners and a succession of industrial disputes involving state-sector workers. In June 1996 a major dispute developed over the fate of the loss-making Gdansk shipyard, the iconic birth-place of Solidarity. The Government's decision to file for the shipyard's bankruptcy provoked protest; nevertheless, by August the shipyard had been officially declared bankrupt (Ibid: 454).

As the 1997 parliamentary elections approached, relations with the Roman Catholic Church yet again came into prominence. This was to a degree the consequence of a revival in the political fortunes of the centre-right opposition. Aware of the failures caused by past disunity, 36 parties and pressure groups came together to form an electoral bloc called Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS). A major role in this process was played by Solidarity's new leader, Marian Krzaklewski.

On 2 April 1997, the *Zgromadzenie Narodowe* (National Assembly of Poland) adopted a new Constitution, later accepted in a national referendum on 25 May. The Constitution committed Poland to a market economy based on the freedom of economic activity and private ownership. The Roman Catholic Church failed to secure an article in the preamble recognizing its 'special status' in Polish life. Its



efforts to secure a Concordat-an agreement with the State, major the Church's legal rights and prerogative-were also defeated, owing to opposition from the SLD (Ibid: 454)

## **THE 1997 ELECTION AND ITS AFTERMATH**

The general elections were held on 21 September 1997. The AWS became the most powerful group in both legislative chambers, securing 201 seats in the Sejm and 51 in the Senate. The SLD won 164 seats in the Sejm and 28 in the Senate. The UW got 60 seats in the Sejm and 8 in the Senate, while the PSL saw its representation reduced to 27 seats in the Sejm and 3 in the Senate. Krzaklewski declined to assume for the post of Prime Minister, leading to an assumption that he intended to challenge Kwasniewski for the Presidency in 2000. Jerzy Buzek, a Protestant academic and a longstanding Solidarity activist, was chosen Prime minister. After one month the AWS signed a partnership agreement with the UW and a new Council of Ministers was formed. Among UW representatives in the new cabinet were the party's leader, Leszek Balcerowicz (the author of the monetary reform undertaken in who was appointed Minister of Finance). The new Government's programme prioritized European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Membership. EU membership negotiations duly began in March 1998 and NATO membership was achieved in March 1999, in spite of verbal resistance from Russia.

The Buzek Government promised to accelerate administrative reform, involving a reduction in the number of voivodships (provinces) and the restoration of an intermediate tier of local government, in the form of some 300 powiats (counties). Following considerable opposition from President Kwasniewski and from politicians and voters in the exposed provincial centers, a law establishing 16 large provinces came into effect in July 1998. In April 1998, the Government offered its plan for the coal industry, envisaging a 50% reduction of the work-force. Further reorganized projects were announced, involving the railways and the steel industry. Despite this, in May the European Commission announced a suspension of its programme of development aid, owing to the insufficient number of viable projects presented by the Government. This resulted in the dismissals of Poland's chief EU negotiator and his deputy.

The Government was also discomfited by the activity of a right group, led by a disaffected former Solidarity activist, Kazimierz Switon, which began erecting hundreds of crosses outside the Second World War concentration camp at Auschwitz (Oswiecim), after Jewish pressure to remove a large cross, erected there after a Papal visit. The Roman Catholic hierarchy was also embarrassed by the Polish Primate, Cardinal Jozef Glemp, having initially supported the action. After long-drawn-out legal maneuvers, the crosses were removed. In January 2000, Switon was convicted to be an offender of prorogating racial abhorrence and given a six-month suspended prison sentence (Ibid: 455).

In January 1999 the Government started four ambitious reforms, involving education, health, local government and pensions, apparently aimed at reducing the role of the state and initiating competition in the relevant sectors. This also resulted in bureaucratic confusion, and thereby led to an increase in public dissatisfaction with the Government. Economic growth had slowed, partially due to the effects of the Russian financial crisis of August 1998 and there was a considerable increase in unemployment as industrial reorganization began to take effect. In December Balcerowicz threatened to resign when the AWS rejected his proposals for a flat-rate income tax. When, in May 1999, Buzek suspended the administration Government of Warsaw province, until now run by a UW-led coalition, the UW left the Government. The AWS formed a minority Government with Buzek remaining as Prime Minister. The Polish right had difficulty in agreeing on a candidate to contest the presidential election, scheduled for October (Ibid: 455).

## **POLISH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2000**

The Polish presidential election 2000 took place in Poland on 8 October. President Kwasniewski was widely supposed to win re-election in the run up to the presidential election with polls showing that his popularity was increasing (Reed 2000) His main challenger was expected to be Marian Krzaklewski from the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS), which had formed the government since winning the last parliamentary elections in 1997. The other main candidate was a former foreign minister and liberal conservative Andrzej Olechowski who won support from voters who were dissatisfied with both of the other main candidates and in particular younger votes, businessmen and intellectuals. Other mains candidates were Andrzej

Lepper and Lech Walesa. Walesa was abandoned as the candidate for the Solidarity party, he had won the presidency for and thus ran separately in this election.

In this election three candidates raised objection against the EU. Andrzej Lepper was one of them. President Kwasniewski's campaign forced on reconciling all of Poland with slogans including "Poland, our common home". Krzaklewski's popularity was not high due to the infighting in the government led by his Solidarity party since they had won the 1997 parliamentary election.

The election result came about as predicted. Kwasniewski was re-elected in the first round with 53.4% of the votes cast. Independent leader Andrzej Olechowski came second with 17.3%, and the AWS leader Krzaklewski came third with 15.6%. The Polish voters embarrassed Walesa, who received just 1.0 % (Times 2000).

In October 2000, Balcerowicz became Governor of Poland's Central Bank and resigned as leader of the UW. Bronislaw Geremek, a former foreign minister was elected as the party leader, prompting the pulling out of the liberal faction led by Donald Tusk. In January 2001, the formation of a new political movement Civil Platform (PO) was announced by Andrzej Olechowski, Donald Tusk and Maciej Plazynski (Speaker of the Sejm). The organization advocated a state administration free from party political support and a conservative liberal political predilection.

The resolution of historical issues took on great significance in 2001. President Kwasniewski was prompted to make an apology officially for the mass execution of the Jewish inhabitants of the town of Jedwabne in 1941, by their Polish neighbours (following the discovery that this was not committed by Nazi occupiers). The exposure caused widespread storm throughout the country, with the Roman Catholic Church expressing regret but rejecting to add its name to an apology.

With the next parliamentary elections scheduled for September 2001, opinion polls indicated victory for the SLD opposition. The Government was swift in welcoming the election of George W. Bush, who took office as president of the USA in January 2001; President Bush visited Warsaw in June describing Poland as a strong democracy like that of America (Repa 2008: 455).

## **POLISH PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 2001**

Polish Parliamentary elections of 2001 were held in the month of September. Former Solidarity parties, namely the AWS and UW were unsuccessful to win any seat. SLD won 216 seats in the Sejm and 75 of the 100 seats in Senate. It got 41% of the vote share. PO was the second-placed party with 65 seats in the Sejm. A new left-wing party, SRP came third with 53 seats in the Sejm. A new conservative party, founded by Lech Kaczynski, came fourth with 44 seats in the Sejm. Leszek Miller, the leader of SLD, took oath of office as the Prime Minister.

The Miller government sought to improve Poland's foreign relations. In March 2002 Poland's Roman Catholic Bishops allowed future Polish membership of the EU. In March 2003, Prime Minister Miller broke off his coalition agreement with the PSL (Polish People's Party) and remained in charge of a minority government.

In March 2004, some prominent SLD leader and MPs formed a split creating the new SDP (Social Democracy of Poland) party. The government led by Leszek Miller resigned on May 2, 2004 just after Poland's admission to the European Union. He was replaced by the former Finance Minister Marek Belka. He was viewed from the start as a 'caretaker' prime minister. He governed until the parliamentary elections in 2005 (Ibid: 456).

## **POLAND'S ACCESSION TO THE EU 2004**

With the fall of communism in 1989, Poland had embarked upon a series on reforms and changes in foreign policy, with its primary aim to join the EU and NATO. On 19 September 1989, Poland signed the agreement for trade with the (then) European Community. Polish intention to join the EU was expressed by Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki in his speech in the European Parliament in February 1990. On May 1990 Poland started a process to begin negotiations for an "association agreement" and the negotiations officially began in December 1990. About a year later, on December 1991, the European Union Association Agreement was signed by Poland.

At this time the whole Europe was changing rapidly. The dissolution of USSR occurred and the cold war ended. The Central and Eastern European States that were

in the USSR bloc came out of the USSR (Russian) bloc. The CEE countries became dependent on the Western States particularly USA on economically and militarily. At this time the Western European States were developing the European Community. On 7 February 1992, the European community was changed into the European Union and it came into effect on November 1, 1993. This treaty (Maastricht Treaty) was the turning point in the history of the European integration process. It envisaged a European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), with the introduction of a common currency- the Euro and a single regulatory body- the European central Bank. It led to a complete EMU and helped the consumer to shop throughout Europe and make a comparative analysis of the price structure in different parts of the EU.

The EU decided at its Copenhagen summit in June 1993 that associate member states from Central and Eastern Europe, if they so wish, will become members of the EU. To achieve this, they must fulfill these conditions.

1. The candidate countries should achieve the stable institutions that guarantee democracy, legality, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.
2. They should have market economy.
3. They should be capable of accepting all the member responsibilities political, economic and monetary.

At the Luxemburg summit in 1997, the EU invited several CEE States (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus) to start talks on their accession to the EU. The negotiation process started on 31 March 1998. Poland finished the accession negotiations in December 2002.

On the other side, in 1999, Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic were added to NATO, which is military alliance in the leadership of USA. This was done despite vocal opposition of Russia. NATO continued its enlargement. After some years, in 2004, some other CEE states Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania were added to NATO (Poland.gov.pl 2011).

In the history of EU Eastern Enlargement, a significant was the signing of the Treaty of Accession in 2003 in Athens. This treaty was the agreement between the EU and ten CEE States (Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta,

Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia), concerning these countries accession into the EU. The treaty was signed on 16 April 2003 and it came into force 1 May 2004, the day of the enlargement of EU. This was the largest single expansion of the EU-in terms of territory, member of states and population, not in terms of GDP.

For accession in EU, a referendum was taken place in Poland in June 2003. According to Polish official results, 58.85% of population voted, 77.45% of them answered in positive and 22.55% answered in the negative (BBC 2003).

The entry of Poland into EU was greeted with great optimism and cheer among the political leaders too. Here it would be apt to quote the famous lines of President Aleksander Kwasniewski speech cheering the crowds in Warsaw: "We have returned to the European family" (Ibid). With accession Poland witnessed the process of Europeanisation and a change in the political and institutional structures.

*CHAPTER FOUR  
EUROPEANISATION AND  
POLITICAL CHANGE IN POLAND  
SINCE 2004*

## **EUROPEANISATION AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN POLAND SINCE 2004**

The 2004 EU enlargement has been generally viewed as a 'big bang' signifying enormous changes in the EU. The early years of the Poland's membership in the EU demands an understanding of the role of Poland in the EU as well as the likely impact of the EU on Poland.

According to Klatt (2010), the notion of Europeanisation as a three-way process which is developed down-wards, up-wards and horizontally. Klatt analyses this three-way flow of Europeanisation within the context of Poland's Foreign Policy and its effect on Poland's approach to the EU's Eastern neighbours. These three dimensions are namely, the national, the EU and the horizontal. The national dimension focuses on a possible change in a national approach to formulation of policy preferences in Poland. The second dimension focuses on the policy processes within the EU where the 'export' of national preferences and their transformation may be analyzed. The third dimension focuses the horizontal relations of the EU member and non-member states through the examination of cooperation outside the EU framework which may result in exchange of ideas, power and policies between them.

According to Klatt (Ibid), the Europeanisation process refers not only to the vertical dimension (EU-member state), but it is also characterized by horizontal dynamics (nation state-nation state). The horizontal dynamics result from exchange of ideas, powers and policies between member states' actors created by the context provided by the EU (Radaelli 2004: 7). The horizontal process creates a culture of cooperation, which includes the coordination of ideas and policies between the member states or between the member state and non-member state. Horizontal linkages put demands on actors without the association of supranational institutions. Horizontal cooperation may also generate linkage to other transnational organization and the non-EU members.



## **THE NATIONAL DIMENSION**

From the time of its accession to the EU, Poland has continuously played a vigorous role in formulating the EU's policy towards its Eastern neighbours with the objective to engage the EU in the East. It has endorsed the EU's expansion ahead of its Eastern borders (Geremek 1998). Poland's foreign policy objectives towards its Eastern neighbourhood result from the combination of its Central-Eastern European identity, attachment to European norms and its political and economic interests.

The 2004 enlargement connected Europe, the West and the East. Poland's predilection towards its Eastern neighbours is notably influenced by the Polish national identity. The Polish foreign policy objectives are based on the belief that the independent Eastern neighbours are the foundation of Polish and European security and it can establish the stability in this region. According to Poland's National Security Strategy, the strengthening of democratic institutions in Ukraine, Moldova and the democratization of Belarus would reinforce Poland's security.

“Poland's preference for formulating the EU's policies towards its Eastern neighbours is very high regardless for the political orientation of the governing elites. Since the 1990s, all foreign ministers' policy statements have included relations with the Eastern neighbours as a priority of Polish foreign policy. Poland's willingness to actively contribute to the formulation of the EU's Eastern policy has been clearly declared since negotiations regarding Poland's entry into the EU first started in 1998, nevertheless Poland's intension has been implemented only in 2008, in a form of the Eastern Partnership”, (Klatt 2010: 3-4).

## **THE EU DIMENSION**

This aspect can be observed during different phases of policy dialogues. As noted by John Petersen (2008), the European decision makers have adjusted to the specificity of the EU decision-making process, which has unwritten rules that have emerged over time through practice. Consensus and compromise are highly valued. Ability to form conditions, particularly in the case of smaller EU members, has a significant role in influencing EU policies. The possibility of decision making by majority has changed the negotiating strategies which in turn promotes coalition-building behaviour.

## **THE HORIZONTAL DIMENSION**

The horizontal dimension of Poland's foreign policy-making shows multilateral and bilateral cooperation at the regional level with other EU member states and non-EU member states. It allows the free transfer of ideas, values and policies outside the EU but within EU context. Poland has been engaged in bilateral relations with its Eastern neighbours as Ukraine, Belarus etc. Therefore, it shows the developments in transnational Europeanisation.

The ability of a government to put together alliances with one or two governments external to the EU is an increasingly vital facet of government strategy to endorse its ideas and interests (Nugent 2006: 526). Poland has participated in many regional groups as Visegrad Groups, the Council of Baltic Sea States and the Weimar Triangle. Gosia Klatt writes: "The cooperation within these organizations with other EU members provided an additional forum for discussing the issues related to the common region, and also allowed for the consultation of positions for negotiations at the EU level" (Ibid 2010: 4).

## **POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN POLAND AFTER ACCESSION TO EU**

After the Parliamentary Election 2001, SLD (Left and Democrats) formed a coalition government with the agrarian Polish People's Party and the Leftist Labor Union (UP). In May, 2004, at the time of enlargement, both President Kwasniewski and government were vocal in their support. The only party decidedly opposed to EU entry was the populist Right-wing League of Polish Families (LPR) (ipu.org 2001).

After the fall of communism, the government policy have guaranteed full employment, and numerous unprofitable state enterprises were closed or restricted. This and other economic woes of the transition period caused the unemployment to be at times as high as 20%. With the EU access, the gradual opening of West European labour markets to Polish workers, combined with the domestic economic growth, led to marked improvement in the employment situation in Poland.

It was in these circumstances that the 2005 Parliamentary elections were held on September 25. The election resulted in a sweeping victory for two parties of the Centre-rights, the conservative Law and Justice (PiS) and the liberal – conservative

Civic Platform (PO). The incumbent Centre-left government of the Alliance of the Democratic left (SLD) was defeated. The two victorious parties won 288 out of 460 seats, while the SLD was only 55 seats. The PiS won 155 seats while PO won 133. PiS leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski declined the opportunity to become Prime Minister so as not to prejudice his twin brother Lech Kaczynski's chances in the Presidential race(See Annexure 5). The PiS instead nominated Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz for the prime ministerial post .

Actually after 2003 a variety of factors combined to bring about a collapse of support for the government. Discontent with high unemployment, government spending cuts (especially on health, education and welfare), affairs linked to privatization was compounded by a series of corruption scandals, leading to the resignation of the Prime Minister Leszek Miller in May 2004, who was succeeded by Marek Belka. All opinion polls suggested that the governing parties would be heavily defeated at these elections and that the right-wing parties would win a large majority. With the expected downfall of the leftist SLD, the right-wing parties competed mainly against each other.

Both Right-wing parties were rooted in the anti-communist Solidarity movement but different on some issues such on the budget and taxation. The BBC commented on Election Day: "Law and Justice, whose agenda includes tax breaks and state aid for the poor, has pledged to uphold traditional family and Christian values. It is suspicious of economic liberalism. The Civic Platform strongly promotes free market forces and wants to introduce a flat 15% rate for income tax, corporation tax and VAT. It also promises to move faster on deregulation and privatization, in order to adopt the Euro as soon as possible", (Bartha and Derlacz 2008:9).

In 2007, the Parliament was dissolved. All parties voted for dissolution except the two junior coalition partners in the former government, LPR and SRP. Fresh elections were held in the month of October. The Civic Platform (PO) defeated Law and Justice (PiS) clearly. The Civic Platform won 209 while the Law and Justice won 166 in the Sejm. Third Party was Left and Democrats. SRP and LPR could not get entry in the Sejm and Senate both. Donald Tusk (Civic Platform) became Prime Minister and he governs in a parliamentary majority coalition with Polish Peoples' Party (Refer Annexure 6).

Poland's President Lech Kaczynski was killed in a plane crash on April 10, 2010 in Russia. So Presidential election were held on July 2010, Bronislaw Komorowski (Civic Platform) defeated Jaroslaw Kaczynski (Law and Justice), twin brother of late President Lech Kaczynski. At present time the President and government both belong to Civic Platform Party. It will ensure smooth cooperation with PM Donald Tusk's economically liberal government to tackle a big budget and prepare the country to adopt the Euro in 2015.

The European Commission hailed the results of the elections, expressing into confidences in future, formulated cooperation within the new government. European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso said in a statement, "I would like to emphasize of Poland's contribution to the European Union and the European spirit of the Polish People." He also sent a personal message to Donald Tusk-congratulating him and expressing him hope for a positive engagement.

At the victory of Bronislaw Komorowski, some EU supporters said, "EU's dream candidate wins the Polish election." The election result was hailed as a victory for the younger, urban class of Poles in the Northern and Western Poland, who had prospered over the past 20 years and who see the country's future in terms of further EU integration, market liberalization and reconciliation with Germany and Russia. President Komorowski and his Civic Platform Party plans to cut Poland's budget deficit to the EU limit of 3% of GDP by 2012, to press ahead with a measured pace of entry into the Euro Zone. He also indicated to follow Prime Minister Donald Tusk on foreign policy, such as pulling Polish soldiers out of Afghanistan, heralding a new period of stability in Polish politics after three years of head-butting between Mr. Tusk and late president Lech Kaczynski. "But I get the feeling that the pain of our division is too great. I am appealing for us to do even we can build, not divisions, but a feeling of unity" was how Komorowski commented on after his victory.

According to analysts, the Polish Centre – left SLD could hamper the Civic Platform's economic agenda by calling in its political clash. In the second round, the SLD threw into support behind Mr. Komorowski. Experts also warned that the Civic Platform could become prone to infighting after behind its common enemy in the figure of the veto-wielding, traditionalist late President (Rosset 2011: 241 -244).

## **THE IMPACT OF EU MEMBERSHIP ON POLAND'S POLITICAL STATE OF AFFAIRS**

It may be mentioned that Poland gave with a 77% majority vote in favour of EU accession that was held in June 2003. This happened under Prime Minister Leszek Miller and President Alexander Kwasniewski; both were belonging to SLD.

According to a survey 2010, "80% Polish citizens are satisfied with EU membership". They think that in this period Poland has got more than lost. This is despite the accompanying economic mayhem faced by Poland in the wake of radical changes triggered to a very large extent by EU financial aid.

Danuta Hubner who has been first Polish EU commissioner for regional policy (2004-2009) and currently he is a member of European Parliament (Civic Platform). He emphasizes that EU membership had become apparent not only in large cities such as Warsaw and Krakow but also at municipal level. This transformation is due to subsidies granted under EU Programmes and by EU funds, which helped to develop the infrastructure. A generation is growing up that do not know border controls and visas. According to him, "representatives of Polish authorities had learned to lobby more successfully for the interests of their country. It was difficult to learn the rules of the EU but Poland was already copying much better."

Jerzy Buzek, who has been the Prime Minister of the Poland from 1997 to 2001, was elected president of the European Parliament in 2009. According to Buzek, "Poland's accession to the EU marked the end of the division of the European continent". He is of the opinion that a new era has started for Europe. He describes the EU as a huge success together the EU member states are able to achieve a lot more.

After accession, many EU Programmes are started for Poland such as Integrated Operational Programme for Regional Development, Human Capital Programme, Infrastructure and Environment Programme etc.

In 2008, Poland became the EU member state receiving the most subsidies from EU funds. Compared to the period 2004 to 2006, the financial assist allocated to Poland from EU funds has surged by 200%. In 2013, Poland will obtain the largest amount of funding to a member state in the history of the EU. Small and medium – sized

companies will be the main beneficiaries of the centrally administered Operational Programme for Innovative Economy. EU funding has been distributed over 16 Programmes at regional level. From 2004 to 2010, Poland has received a total of 38 billion Euros from EU funds and paid 17 billion Euros into the joint EU coffers. In December 2007, the European Commission approved the operational Programme, 'Infrastructure and Environment' for the period 2007 to 2013. The aim of this programme is to enhance Poland's attractiveness as an investment location and to strengthen its competitiveness.

Poland became a member of the Schengen area in 2007, by which border and passport controls were lifted. Polish people could travel freely within the Schengen area comprising the major part of Europe. For Polish people it is an important advantage, which they owe to EU membership. Strict border controls as well as the obligation to hand over and collect passports before leaving the country during the communist regime have become a thing of the past (wieninternational.at 2001).

Since accession, Poland has staked out a distinctive position for itself in EU politics. Before two years, following the European Parliament (EP) elections 2009, the PiS changed allegiances in the EP by joining the European Conservatives and Reformists, new Right-wing Euroskeptic group. This caused controversy as the PiS politicians had been criticized for holding far-Right conservative views. As a supporter of the Iraq war Poland went against the majority of EU member states that opposed intervention. The Polish government has also been willing to take on the EU institutions. During the negotiations for the 2007-13 budget deal, Poland threatened to use its veto if subsidies to new member states were cut. As a part of their membership agreement, Poland is committed to join the Euro, although no date for entry has yet been set. The December 2007, Poland joined the Schengen Area, allowing free movement across some national borders. This right had been withheld by many existing EU member states in 2004 because of fear of a flood of Eastern European workers to the West.

In 2008 Poland's ratification of the Lisbon Treaty proved contentious. Whilst Poland's parliament rectified the Treaty in April, President Kaczynski, who must formalize the ratification, declared the treaty 'dead' after Ireland rejected it in a referendum in June 2008 (Civitas 2010).

Lech Kaczynski's Presidential term fell into two major phases. Until October 2007, his party was leading the government. . From then on, Poland experienced an uneasy cohabitation with the government in PO's hands while Lech Kaczynski remained President. "This resulted in some controversies, notably between Prime Minister Donald Task (PO leader) and President Lech Kaczynski about their respective roles in foreign affairs and representing Poland abroad. The struggle culminated with the presence of both the President and the Prime Minister at an EU summit in October 2008 following a disagreement over who was the rightful representative of the country at the summit. Regarding domestic matters, the cohabitation also led to some tensions and delays in policy making. The President did not hesitate to send bills to the constitutional court before signing them or to use his veto over the legislature's decisions.", (Rosset, 2010: 242).

In the election, the two main candidates converged on the centre ground and avoided strong stands on policy issues, instead emphasizing their personal and presidential attributes and their ability to create consensus. Jaroslaw Kaczynski showed a much more moderate face during the Presidential campaign. Meanwhile, Komorowski was in the uncomfortable situation of having already taken over presidential duties while at the same time campaigning as a candidate of change, this resulted in undulation between consensual and unfavorable approaches, the latter increasing in frequency as the campaign advanced.

At the point of foreign Policy, Komorowski clearly advocated the withdrawal of Polish troops for Afghanistan while Kaczynski did not take a clear position, declaring that the political campaign was not the best time to discuss this issue. Both Party had also hardly any debate about relations with EU, Kaczynski presenting a much more pro-European face (Hunter and Ryan 2011: 1547-1548; BBC 2010; Rosset 2010: 244).

## **ATTITUDE TOWARDS EUROPEANISATION IN POLAND**

It will not be out of context to examine whether Europeanisation can be linked to the emergence and success of populist parties or populist rhetoric in domestic political debates. Poland has exhibited major variations in support for the EU in the party political sphere and amongst public opinion. Before EU accession, Poles consistently showed eagerness towards EU (77% in May 1994, 80% in May 1996, and 72% in

August 1997). But after 1998 Poles showed a very cautious attitude toward EU and only 55% of population supported EU integration in May 2001.

After accession, this support for European integration has grown significantly amongst the Polish Public (77% supporting EU integration in November 2004, 80% in January 2006). In addition support for Euroskeptic political parties in Poland has declined dramatically since the 2007 general election.

From 2004, Poland benefited extensively from EU funds. The economy performed strongly in these years immediately before and after accession, with GDP growth of 5.3% in 2004, and continuing on to be one of the few economies in the EU to experience growth in 2009. Yet in the run up to accession Poland saw increasing levels of support for Euroskeptic, and populist parties despite the growing economy and the structural fund riches that were promised; this was due to alarm over the increasing social and economic costs of the enlargement process. So Poland saw rapid economic development that was closely related to EU financial support, after long drawn out periods of economic transformation.

One of the most important characteristics of its relationship with the EU has always been the economic benefits of membership. Poland has been a grateful beneficiary of transfers from EU; however a reciprocal increase in levels of a European identity has not developed, and indeed has gone into reverse in some sections of the population. A more nuanced view of Polish attitude towards the EU shows that despite widespread acknowledgement of the economic benefits of membership and electorate can remain skeptical of further integration and hold on strongly to own national identity and fear further integration.

This analysis shows that increased Europeanisation has had a negative effect on public sentiment towards European integration in Poland despite it being viewed as pro-European. Thus the emergence of Euroskeptic stances as a successful electoral issue in ostensibly pro-European countries can be understood.

A populist party, Self-Defense of the Polish Republic (SRP) owned Euroskepticism as one of its main issues. Furthermore, the two parties the League of Polish Families (LPR) and Law and Justice (PiS), that used a Euroskeptic populist rhetoric similar to



self-defense, were less successful when the EU salience decreased (LPR) or often softened their Euroskepticism (PiS).

Actually Euroskepticism went hand in hand with a populist party, SRP but also with the hard Euroskepticism radical Right League of Polish Families (LPR), and with the soft Euroskepticism Law and Justice (PiS). Self Defense (SRP) emerged from its trade union-as the earlier Solidarity. Andrzej Lepper is the founder of SRP. Andrzej Lepper and his SRP represented the defence of farmers and those citizens perceiving the country on going in the wrong direction. This party was registered shortly after the foundation of the trade union. Lepper belongs to the North-East Poland where the Balcerowicz plan and the transformation changes further made an impact on the cost of the transition.

Poland was moving towards a triple transformation after the fall of communism and part of the society felt, lost and alienated. Lepper and SRP opposed not only the transformation costs, but also EU and NATO membership. Andrzej Lepper knew the distress of 'his people' because he was one of them, and in 2001, SRP sat for the first time in the Sejm, gaining 10.2% of the votes in the parliamentary election. The uncertainties were growing and the opinion that Poland was becoming a 'Second-class member' was gaining prominence in the country. He not only talked to the people, but he also used their language. After 1998, when the relationship between Poland and the EU became more acute, because of the opening of the negotiation process and the hope of accession, the domestic political scenario was affected by the impact of the EU. He was the charismatic leader and he promised to fight corruption. Later, in 2006 he joined –with his party the government coalition with PiS and he was appointed Deputy Prime Minister.

This analysis shows the high level of Euroskepticism that in Poland impacted on the emergence of the populist Euroskepticism, political parties in the 2001 parliamentary election, the EU was delivering benefits and was worthy of trust.

The Polish Party system has experienced many parties owning Euroskepticism as their own issue due to the impending accession. Within the instability of the party system and weak party loyalty, low levels of turnout at elections are likely to indicate the distance between citizens and political parties. The distance between the people and the parties about EU integration increased people's perceived fears. The idea that

the country was going to be sold by the political elites and the concrete fear that foreigners would buy Polish lands while Polish farmers, the losers of integration in the national imagery, were straving became the image of EU membership. Andrzej Lepper, SRP leader, used, 'conspiring theories', interpreting his people's most, perceived anxieties, and the fear of the foreign economic invasion.

We know that Poland had many political debates since the opening of the negotiation process. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2005) remark: "Europe is often the 'dog that does not bark', European integration is usually an absent debate at the domestic level." If we study about Euroskepticism, a mention therefore should be made of the SRP. In 2001, the Polish National Election Study reported that 12.2% of those respondents who identified themselves with SRP answered 'protect our sovereignty' to the question on their position towards joining the EU. On a scale from '0 to 10' 60.6% were clustered between values in the middle of the scale and the most protective position towards Polish sovereignty. Only 3.1% answered they wished to join the EU 'as soon as possible'.

SRP points to the gap between 'the people' and 'politicians', and talks about corruption, it is not the party that particularly addressed corruption as was the case with the LPR. Cases of bribery and corruption have emerged in Poland since the mid – 1990s and the LPR and also PiS and partly PO, used the fight against corruption as one of this key issues. On the other hand, immigration is not an issue in Poland. It is an ethnically homogenous country.

On taxes, SRP supports state subsidies for those citizens who represent its electorate and its 'people', pensioners who worked in the agricultural sector. In 2001, 16.9% of the SRP electorate replied that they were in favour of progressive taxes, which is much higher share compared to the other electorates (7.7% of the LPR voters and 4.3% of the PiS voters). It is on economic issues and subsidies for agriculture that the SRP voters markedly different from the average Polish voter. Lepper's Party was a 'popular-national, ecological and pro-social group representing the interests of the national economy, particularly connected to peasants. Self- Defense protected Poles, peasants, workers, 'us' against the growing inequalities, and the threat from foreigners, Germans, Jews, capitalists, and political elites. He protected the heart land and life that would be lost due to EU integration. SRP opposed the EU, as 'populists do not

like the influence of international organizations in domestic politics (Fitzgibbon and Guerra 2010: 273-285).

SRP stand out due to its populist identity, and not simply because of its populist rhetoric when talking to their 'people', populists can refer to 'a legendary and constructed sub-self of the whole population (Mudde 2004).

In Poland, support for the EU decreased to 2002, and in 2002 more respondents in CBOS surveys responded that they felt closer to SRP (17% in July 2002 when only 57% of the Polish citizens supported EU integration). In February 2003, 52% of the SRP's electorate showed opposition to integration. Nevertheless, Andrzej Lepper and his party maintained a more critical attitude towards the terms of accession, and the slogan was given 'The Choice is Yours'.

Within the Polish Political System the LPR is the only party that has always held a hard Euroskeptic stance. Even though SRP broke into the system as a rigid Euroskeptic party; it slowly changed its opinion on EU integration and left its voters free to cast their vote independently in the accession referendum. In Parliamentary election 2001 and 2005, Euroskepticism was a prominent question. Political divisions within the Polish party system increasingly led to the success of new parties, and also contributed to the success of the LPR on the extreme right. (Ibid 2010: 286))

Fragmentation, low institutionalization and territorial diffusion created fertile ground for the success of opposite parties. The LPR used Catholicism and a fundamentalist rhetoric, and positioned itself on the extreme Right (when the Right lacked a major party, as the AWS split into main parties, PiS and PO ), whilst SRP represented the farmers in a country. Andrzej Lepper used populism when Europeanisation became a significant factor. "The impact of integration permeated party politics and as a centre – periphery divide, represented by the urban-rural cleavage (in Poland secular-religious, socio-economic), could easily 'own' the EU issue. Self –Defense, considered to be difficult to locate ideologically, represents to best example of accession populism in Poland, emerging in 2001 and almost dissolving in 2007", (Ibid 2010: 287).

Figures show that the EU issue did not gain at high level in the two parliamentary campaigns before and after accession (in 2001 and 2005). "Furthermore, there is little

evidence in the Polish Parties' electoral programmes of an increase in the importance of matters relating to the EU, and the EU had a very limited role in specific policy programmes. As for as transnational cooperation in concerned, the impact on party organization and bilateral contacts are significant, even though limited, in the case of two political parties, Civic Platform and the Democratic left Alliance (in the 'Left and Democrats' coalition in 2007 national election), which belong to the two largest EP groups, EPP (European People's Party) and, formerly PES (Party of European Socialists), now S&D (Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats) respectively", (Ibid 2010: 288).

SRP did not devote to EU policies in the party programmes; It had only a small number of references to the EU. In 2005, it viewed accession as a historical success although it thought the terms of the negotiations should have been discussed again. This issue again and again stood by the organizational change of the party and its relations beyond the party system. Polish MEPs (Member of European Parliament) can hardly change their own national party line following the decision of their European group affiliation.

Actually the politicization of the EU made an impact on the success of protest political parties, more than new parties. In the case of SRP, this party emerged from its trade union base during the transformation process channeling emerging dissatisfaction towards the EU. EU accession had little significant impact in terms of increasing the influence of the EU on Polish party politics. A limited impact from Europeanisation was registered among the main parties on the Left and Right of the political spectrum, but not among the political parties on the fringes of the Polish party system, such as SRP (Ibid 2010: 273- 290).

Thus, from the above analysis, it can be commented that Poland, along with the rest of the new member states, is acting as a 'downloader' of European institutions, policies and models of governance. From creation of the new institutions and offices through implementation of EU rules of law, legal patterns and behaviours, there is a need to examine at the impact of Europeanization being a spread of European normative and institutional standards as discussed in the subsequent chapter.

*Conclusion*

## CONCLUSION

The EU has devised powerful mechanism to shape institutional development and policy making in its member states. While assessing the process of alignment of Polish policies in conformity to the EU, it is imperative to state that such alignment is a result of long drawn out years of building and adapting Polish legislation and have not merely developed within a short span of only some negotiating years. After the Polish accession in the EU, Poland like other member states, is working to comply with the regulations of the European patterns. This chapter provides a ‘balance-sheet’ of the impact of Poland’s membership into the EU.

Poland is the largest of the former Communist countries and at the time of its accession into the EU, it was contemplated in strategic circles that Poland would prove to be of considerable importance to EU. This was so because Poland served as the gateway of Western Europe, opening into the large Eastern European countries as Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine (urgentEssays.co.uk 2007).

At the time of its accession, in 2004, Poland had a manageable inflation rate of 1.9% percent coupled with an unemployment rate of 18.4 percent. It is primarily an agriculture driven economy with agriculture accounting for 63 percent to its GDP and the agriculture sector employing 20 percent of the work force. Around 18.4 percent of the Polish population lives below the poverty line (Mind Your Own Business, 2004).

“Before making an assessment of Poland’s membership in the EU, it is worthwhile to recall the pros and cons of joining the Union as postulated by various analysts and members of political spectrum. The European optimists pointed out the possible advantages for Poland on joining the EU, mostly as a result of competition resulting of free movement of goods, services, capital and labour access to better and relatively cheaper education, European management, innovations, new technology, etc. The Euro-pessimists mainly pointed out the disadvantages of joining the EU. In particular, fears linked to the buying up of land, the loss of national sovereignty, a rise in the unemployment rates, resulting from huge import levels of goods and services from the EU, the bankruptcy of many businesses, secularization of the country, a rising inflation rate, etc” (Nowak 2007:11).

As one can see, the advantages and disadvantages claimed by both sides were of different weight and caliber. Thus, in order to examine the impact of EU accession on Poland, one should look out for various facets. In particular, there are economic and financial viewpoints, as well as political and social perspectives. But, it is not possible to rank this stringently in order of preference.

## **THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS**

The prerequisite for Poland's EU membership in economic terms were opening up its economy and formulating level playing field for business. These policies were designed to attract much required foreign direct investment to modernize its infrastructures and industry, including new capital and new ideas. As an EU member state, Poland was entitled to access to EU structural funds for infrastructure. The current government of Poland under Komorowski has raised the scope for implementing reforms that were difficult to be carried under previous regime (Rosset 2011: 244).

In a recent interview, the Polish foreign minister has stated that Poland's priority is to lead back the Polish economy and thus contribute to restarting economic growth in Europe. This reflects that Poland today talks of growth of Europe as a whole (Refer Annexure 7).

## **THE POLITICAL ASPECT**

According to Nowak (2007:8) , during the course of Poland's history, the commitment to ideas of democracy, citizens' freedom and security, both national and that of the neighbouring countries, as well as peaceful development, were familiar to Poland. Thus, for Poland it is quite obvious and natural to be interested in the peaceful development of both the modern world and the European continent, and to be involved in shaping those processes through active participation in EU structures.

The political benefits for Poland of acceding to the EU can be divided into two groups. In the first, benefits accrue regarding the creation and development of democratic institutions and this is inextricably related with the transition to a newly established market economy. This concerns private ownership of the means of production, protection of property rights, a more proactive role for the parliament as

well as the regional and local governments. Poland's accession to the EU has reinforced and consolidated their national importance.

Second, nature of the political benefits was analogous to those political reasons on the basis of which the EU formed and then developed. It may be mentioned that supranational European integration ensured the peaceful development of the continent. It is widely recognized and accepted that Europe has been able to develop peacefully thanks to establishment of the EU. In relation to purely political matters and considering Polish population, the size of the country and its geographic situation into account, Poland's accession to the EU has led to a consolidated stabilization in the region.

From a political perspective, by joining the EU, Poland became an active player on the European scene ( Refer Annexure 8). It has taken part in the debate on the Constitutional Treaty, the EU budget , the Foreign and Security policy, European Neighborhood Policy, etc. It can be safely postulated that never in its history did Poland possess such privilege to decide matters together with the leading European countries about the future of Europe and its prosperity, development and strategy.

Poland within the EU now sits alongside the decision makers and like all EU member states, contemplates terms of political, economic and social development of the EU and Europe. This gives an opportunity to Poland to employ to be an active player always together with the other EU members. In a recent interview; the US President Barrack Obama has hailed Poland as a model for new democracies. According to him: "Poland can play an extraordinary role, precisely because they have travelled so far so rapidly over the last 25 years" (Refer Annexure 9).

## **THE SOCIAL ASPECT**

Although Poland is a fully democratic state in relation to a number of social issues but it has some negative experiences from the past. In particular, problems of individual freedom, principles and terms of employment, equal status of both sexes, workplace safety, consumer protection etc. Some weaknesses are mostly just a burden inherited from the past as non-democratic system. On the other hand, there is no disputing the fact that problems occurring in those fields could be solved without any direct reception of patterns established in the EU.



In the social sector, regarding the question of social benefits, Poland has been successful in raising the living standards of its population as compared to the level that has carried over from the past. From a social point of view, it should be stressed that, as a result of EU membership, there has been an increase of social awareness concerning the advantages and disadvantages of being a member of the EU. People are no longer apprehensive, but instead think and act in order to adjust quickly to the new situation and take advantage of it. In the meantime, there has been a major change in the perception of EU in terms of human rights, social achievements, education, environmental protection, and so forth. These apply generally to the young generation, but not only. This latter fact has also diminished the role of the politicians who had earlier opposed Polish participation in the EU.

### **WHAT CAN POLAND OFFER TO THE EU**

Moreover, the question needs to be examined that what Poland is bringing to the EU after EU accession; Poland brings an enormous consumer market. If Poland manages to meet certain conditions, it will be in a position to build a strong economy, developed education and jobs. If the country is successful in avoiding the sort of depopulation so evident in most EU member states, then, in perhaps a dozen or in twenty years, it will become a very strong economic partner. This will be an obvious profit for the Union.

Nowak (2007: 10) looks to define a prescriptive role for Poland in EU

“An improvement in the living standards of the Polish population may also be achieved by putting the state bureaucracy in proper order as a result of adoption of some standards of procedure, as well as providing citizens with proper instruments of appeal against erroneous administrative decisions, both to domestic and international bodies. The introduction of such tools should help to implant more discipline into the currently far from perfect -- Polish administration. Contrary to what could be heard in a number of populist opinions of opponents of integration, the point should also be made that accession to the EU can bring a growth of rights and status of individuals in Poland in other terms. For example, at present, no university or academy is allowed to undertake any serious enterprise, such as the construction of a new

building or the preparation of study programmes, unless the issue of unobstructed access for handicapped persons is properly taken into account. In the past the handicapped in Poland were generally treated with pity or even contempt, but several years ago the handicapped suddenly became socially visible in Poland and today no-one is surprised to see a blind student in university or a disabled person traveling down the street in a wheelchair. This also reflects a very significant influence of the EU, which has been much more sensitive and demanding in these respects and which, in a sense, fortunately managed to impose such solutions on Poland and other applicant countries. One could easily mention many more similar examples of positive changes taking place in Polish society in recent years.”

Thus, Poland can play a major role within the EU. An example may be cited of the Polish model of family life. Polish solutions in many fields may constitute an advisable pattern to follow. The model of family life and parent-child relations in Poland is also an important socio-cultural resource. These are hailed as Poland's assets.

## **PUBLIC PERCEPTION IN POLAND OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**

It needs to be mentioned here that Europeanisation as a top down process confines itself to political elites. In order to gauge the impact of Europeanisation, it is imperative to study this as a bottom up process. An important tool in such a study is the public attitudes towards Europeanisation.

According to a poll concerning on the first year "Balance sheet" presented in Poland in May 2005, around 73% responded that they had not experienced any advantage from joining the EU, while at the same time around 60% confirmed that they had not experience any disadvantage. These numbers indicated that the feeling in Polish society concerning year Polish attendance in the EU is generally positive (Nowak 2007:3-15).

● “In the survey presented at the end of 2006, after two years of Polish presence in the EU, around 80 % of Polish population was in favour of being a member of the EU and only 11% was against this. This implied that the number of supporters of the EU

membership increased within two years by 16 percentage points and in the meantime the number of opponents decreased by 18 percentage points. The number of Poles assessing positively the balance of Polish membership in the EU is increasing systematically, too. After two years of membership the number of respondents being convinced that it brings to Poland advantages is more than three times higher (54%) than the number of those who have opposite opinion (18%). Among the positive results of the integration are: permission to work within the European Union, open frontiers within the EU and inflow of the EU funds. A third of the respondents were unable to enumerate any disadvantages and approximately 20% of them claim that there are no disadvantages as a result of enlargement of the EU” (Ibid 2007: 12).

### **POLAND IN THE EU: THE WAY AHEAD**

As an aftermath of the EU membership, contemporary Poland is characterized by a modern political system adhering to liberal democratic norms and culture that has more in common with Western Europe than it does with a majority of former Communist States. It pursues foreign policy goals that are not marked by either extreme demands or unrealistic expectations.

In terms of its political development, Polish political behavior aims to pursue a path of correlation with the western part of continent. This is not to suggest that Poland is blindly aping the acts of countries such as United Kingdom, Germany or Sweden. Poland has its own distinctive history and traditions. However, in many cases they form a part and parcel of a shared Communist heritage. It would be both unreasonable and imprudent to expect Poland simply to attempt to mimic any of the countries of Western Europe and USA. But correlation and convergence are taking place. Political campaigns in Poland now lean strongly on North American or Western European experiences.

With regards to political reforms, the fact cannot be denied that entry into the EU has increased their pace. But problems still persist. The process of reforms is not complete, and there are complaints that the reforms have been poorly constructed.

There is also the issue of the remnants of the vestiges of Communist rule. Whilst it would be unrealistic to claim that such remaining elements wish to disrupt the process of reform, or are capable of so doing, they are quite capable of indulging in

bureaucratic inertia. “Given that such individuals do actually possess administrative expertise, and in part have to be relied on in order to ensure that policy design and implementation is effective, reformers have little choice but to proceed with caution. The resolution of this problem cannot be achieved simply by administrative fiat. It is also a question of changing the mindset, and of rooting out individuals who are unwilling or unable to adapt to the requirements of a competitive society” (Cordell 2002: 200).

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*APPENDIX I*  
*TABLES*



**Table – 1****Polish Parliamentary Election 1991**

| Name of Party                  | Vote Share | Seat Won |
|--------------------------------|------------|----------|
| Democratic Union (UD)          | 12.32%     | 62       |
| Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) | 11.59%     | 60       |
| Catholic Electoral Action      | 8.79%      | 49       |

Source: [http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2255\\_91.htm](http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2255_91.htm)

**Table – 2****Polish Parliamentary Election 1993**

| Name of Party                  | Vote Share | Seat Won |
|--------------------------------|------------|----------|
| Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) | 20.41%     | 171      |
| Polish People's Party (PSL)    | 15.40%     | 132      |
| Democratic Union (UD)          | 10.59%     | 74       |

Source: [http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2255\\_93.htm](http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2255_93.htm)

**Table – 3****Polish Parliamentary Election 1997**

| Name of Party                     | Vote Share | Seat Won |
|-----------------------------------|------------|----------|
| Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) | 33.83%     | 201      |
| Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)    | 27.13%     | 164      |
| Freedom Union (UW)                | 13.37%     | 60       |

Source: [http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2256\\_97.htm](http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2256_97.htm)

**Table – 4****Polish Parliamentary Election 2001**

| Name of Party                  | Vote Share | Seat Won |
|--------------------------------|------------|----------|
| Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) | 41%        | 216      |
| Civic Platform (PO)            | 12.7%      | 65       |
| Self-Defence (SRP)             | 10.2%      | 53       |
| Law and Justice (PiS)          | 9.5%       | 44       |

Source: [http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2255\\_01.htm](http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2255_01.htm)

**Table – 5****Polish Parliamentary Election 2005**

| Name of Party                   | Vote Share | Seat Won |
|---------------------------------|------------|----------|
| Law and Justice (PiS)           | 27%%       | 155      |
| Civic Platform (PO)             | 24.1%      | 133      |
| Self-Defence (SRP)              | 11.4%      | 56       |
| Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)  | 11.3%      | 55       |
| League of Polish Families (LPR) | 8%         | 34       |

Source: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish\\_parliamentary\\_election,\\_2005](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish_parliamentary_election,_2005)

**Table – 6****Polish Parliamentary Election 2007**

| Name of Party               | Vote Share | Seat Won |
|-----------------------------|------------|----------|
| Civic Platform (PO)         | 41.5%      | 209      |
| Law and Justice (PiS)       | 32.11%     | 166      |
| Left and Democrats          | 13.15%     | 53       |
| Polish People's Party (PSL) | 8.91%      | 31       |

Source: [http://globaleconomydoesmatter.blogspot.com/2007/10/polands-early-parliamentary-election-of\\_09.html](http://globaleconomydoesmatter.blogspot.com/2007/10/polands-early-parliamentary-election-of_09.html)

**Table – 7**  
**Polish Presidential Election 1990**

| Name               | Vote Share | Party       |
|--------------------|------------|-------------|
| Lech Walesa        | 74.3%      | Independent |
| Stanislaw Tyminski | 25.8%      | Independent |

Source: <http://uselectionatlas.org/FORUM/index.php?topic=134934.0>

**Table – 8**  
**Polish Presidential Election 1995**

| Name of Candidate      | Party                             | Vote Share |
|------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------|
| Aleksander Kwasniewski | Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)    | 51.7%      |
| Lech Walesa            | Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) | 48.3%      |

Source: <http://www.facebook.com/pages/Polish-presidential-election-1995/136958536324684>

**Table – 9**  
**Polish Presidential Election 2000**

| Name of Candidate      | Party                             | Vote Share |
|------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------|
| Aleksander Kwasniewski | Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)    | 53.9%      |
| Andrzej Olechowski     | Independent                       | 17.3%      |
| Marian Krzaklewski     | Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) | 15.6%      |

Source: <http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/p/poland/poland-presidential-election-2000.html>

**Table – 10**

**Polish Presidential Election 2005**

| Name of Candidate | Party                 | Vote Share |
|-------------------|-----------------------|------------|
| Lech Kaczynski    | Law and Justice (PiS) | 54%        |
| Donald Tusk       | Civic Platform (PO)   | 46%        |

Source: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish\\_presidential\\_election,\\_2005](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish_presidential_election,_2005)

**Table – 11**

**Polish Presidential Election 2010**

| Name of Candidate    | Party                 | Vote Share |
|----------------------|-----------------------|------------|
| Bronislaw Komorowski | Civic Platform (PO)   | 53%        |
| Jaroslaw Kaczynski   | Law and Justice (PiS) | 47%        |

Source: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish\\_presidential\\_election,\\_2010](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish_presidential_election,_2010)

**Table – 12**

**Presidents of the Third Polish Republic (Since 1989)**

| Time      | Name of President      |
|-----------|------------------------|
| 1989-1990 | Wojciech Jaruzelski    |
| 1990-1995 | Lech Walesa            |
| 1995-2005 | Aleksander Kwasniewski |
| 2005-2010 | Lech Kaczynski         |
| Incumbent | Bronislaw Komorowski   |

Source: <http://www.worldpresidentsdb.com/list/countries/Poland/>


**Table – 13****Prime Ministers of the Third Polish Republic (Since 1989)**

| Time                        | Name of Prime Minister  |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------|
| August 1989-January 1991    | Tadeusz Mazowiecki      |
| January 1991-December 1991  | Jan Krzysztof Bielecki  |
| December 1991-June 1992     | Jan Olszewski           |
| June 1992- July 1992        | Waldemar Pawlak         |
| July 1992- October 1993     | Hanna Suchocka          |
| October 1993- March 1995    | Waldemar Pawlak         |
| March 1995- February 1996   | Jozef Oleksy            |
| February 1996- October 1997 | Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz |
| October 1997- October 2001  | Jerzy Buzek             |
| October 2001- May 2004      | Leszek Miller           |
| May 2004- October 2005      | Marek Belka             |
| October 2005- July 2006     | Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz |
| July 2006- November 2007    | Jarosław Kaczyński      |
| Incumbent                   | Donald Tusk             |

Source: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_Prime\\_Minister\\_of\\_Poland](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Prime_Minister_of_Poland)

*APPENDIX II*  
*MAPS, NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS*  
*AND MAGAZINE ARTICLES*

Item – 1




Source:

[http://2.bp.blogspot.com/\\_a4bGeBvK5Nk/SbXbkMJiFNI/AAAAAAAAAD0/nmPz0Pq1FvA/s400/poland1940s.jpg](http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_a4bGeBvK5Nk/SbXbkMJiFNI/AAAAAAAAAD0/nmPz0Pq1FvA/s400/poland1940s.jpg)



## Item - 2



**INDEPENDENT POLAND, 1921-1939, After World War II, the borders of Poland shifted west, taking parts of Pommern and Brandenburg and giving up parts of Grodno, Volhynia, and Vilna to Russia.**

Source: <http://www.progenealogists.com/poland/>

### Item – 3



Lech Wałęsa is pictured here being carried by Polish Solidarity supporters after he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1983. He fought for workers' rights during a time of economic and political crisis and played a decisive role in bringing down Communism not only in Poland but throughout Eastern Europe.

Source: Poland by Zoran Pavlovic, Page 65.


Item – 4



Source: <http://www.xtimeline.com/evt/view.aspx?id=79131>

## Item -5

68 Poland



Pictured is the former president of Poland, Lech Kaczyński (left), and the prime minister, his twin brother, Jarosław. At 13, the brothers starred in *The Two Who Stole the Moon*, a film based on a popular children's story. In the late '70s, Lech was a member of the anti-Communist trade union Solidarity, and later became an adviser to Lech Wałęsa.

Source: Poland by Zoran Pavlovic, Page 68.



Poland

## Common sense victorious

**The election returns more predictable politicians—and brings relief in Europe**

**T**HE era of the terrible twins is over. That is the upshot of the election on October 23 in which the ruling Law and Justice party, a populist and nationalist outfit, was swept aside by a more moderate and pro-European party, Civic Platform. On the highest turnout since the collapse of communism in 1989, almost 54% of Poles voted, including for the first time large numbers from the diaspora in western Europe. Civic Platform, under its leader, Donald Tusk (above), polled just over 41%, winning 209 seats in the 460-member lower house of parliament, an increase of 11 seats on the 2005 elections (see chart).

Law and Justice, led by the outgoing prime minister, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, polled more votes than last time and even increased its seats by 11, thanks to the demise of two small populist parties that had been its on-off allies in the unstable governing coalition of the past two years. Mr Kaczynski's brother, Lech, remains president until 2010, and may try to use various delaying powers to hamper the new government. But his veto can be overruled by a three-fifths vote in a quorate session of the lower house. With only 166 seats, Law and Justice cannot block that.

The result was a surprise. For most of the campaign, Civic Platform had been lagging badly. The government seemed to have made the election a referendum

about corruption, one of Poland's biggest problems in the post-communist era. That seemed to polarise opinion successfully: only the austere Mr Kaczynski and his zealous corruption-busters stood for change. Opposing them meant defending the sleazy practices of the past. A strong dose of social conservatism on issues such as homosexuality and abortion, though it appalled liberal-minded, middle-class opinion in the cities, went down well with the many traditionalist rural voters.

The alarm and contempt with which the Kaczynskis were viewed abroad seemed to make little impact. Prickly, monoglot, untravelled and old-fashioned (neither uses a computer and Jaroslaw does not even have his own bank account), they embodied and exploited the inferiority complex felt by many Poles.

But Law and Justice overdid it. The high-handed approach of the publicity-loving justice minister, Zbigniew Ziobro, and the appointment of a close Kaczynski political ally, Antoni Macierewicz, as the head of a new military counter-intelligence service caused widespread queasiness in the country. Coupled with a highly partisan approach to top appointments in supposedly neutral institutions such as public broadcasting, the Kaczynski way of doing things risked comparison with Vladimir Putin's authoritarian regime in Russia.

Also in this section

- 60 Europe's "blue card" plan
- 60 Inside the EU treaty
- 61 Turkey and the Kurds
- 62 Switzerland's election
- 62 The French presidency and the press
- 63 Russia's food prices
- 63 Fractures in Bosnia's politics
- 64 Charlemagne: New top jobs in Brussels

Europe.a.view, our online column on eastern Europe, appears on Economist.com on Thursdays. The columns can be viewed at [www.economist.com/europeview](http://www.economist.com/europeview)


Such fears were overdone. Polish democracy may have been bruised by the Kaczynski era, but it was not in danger. Voters were unconvinced by the Kaczynskis' sometimes hysterical claims of the dangers posed by the corrupt overlap of ex-spooks and ex-communists. The use of sometimes primitive and xenophobic language prompted younger, better-educated Poles, previously apathetic about domestic politics, to vote in large numbers.

The turning-point of the campaign was the prime minister's humiliation by Mr Tusk in a televised debate. Mr Tusk used humour, calmness and command of the facts to flatten Mr Kaczynski, allegedly flustered, who came across as bombastic and waffly. Mr Tusk highlighted Law and Justice's weakness on economics, such as an unfulfilled pledge to build 3m new homes. He also pointed out that 2m Poles had gone to seek work abroad.

Law and Justice then made matters worse by overplaying their strongest card: anti-corruption. Earlier in the campaign, police had arrested a Civic Platform par-

Tusk's triumph

Seats in the Polish Sejm 2007 (2005) election results



Source: The Economist, October 27, 2007.

# Our priority is to restart economic growth in Europe: Poland's Foreign Minister

'Resolving the continuing instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan on the agenda.'

Smita Gupta

As a student leader in Poland, **Radosław Sikorski** was forced to flee to the U.K. and seek political asylum there in 1982. He went on to do Philosophy, Politics and Economics at Oxford, after which he became a war correspondent in Afghanistan and Angola for British newspapers. He returned to Poland — and politics — in the 1990s, after the fall of Communism in that country. In 1987, at the age of 28, Mr Sikorski trekked through war-torn Afghanistan with the mujahideen fighters, a Kalashnikov under his arm, to witness the war as a journalist.

Next week, days after Poland took over the presidency of the European Union on July 1, he returns to the region to visit India in a very different avatar — as Foreign Minister of Poland. He is also vice chairman of the party he represents in the Polish sejm (Parliament), the Civic Platform, and has been Defence Minister in a previous government.

On June 29, Mr Sikorski spoke at length to Smita Gupta at his office in Warsaw about his impending visit to India, starting July 11.

**What will be on your agenda when you visit India?**

I will be going there in coordination with Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the entire EU for foreign policy. It will be during our presidency of the EU, so I'll be presenting not just Poland's agenda, but Europe's agenda in relation with the EU. That will be trade issues but also political issues, which are well known. The agenda will also concern resolving the continuing instability due to radical politics in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

**What can Pakistan do?**

We'd like Pakistan to overcome its internal problems. We lost a citizen two years ago who was kidnapped by the Pakistani Taliban and brutally executed, and we know how important Pakistan is to preventing the spread of radicalism into Afghanistan.

**You've been to Afghanistan as a journalist and I understand you even won**



countries?

With Germany, we are a treaty NATO and members of the same European family. We [recently] had a session of the governments of Poland and Germany here in Warsaw as signed a political declaration on the anniversary of the Polish-German treaty with a work plan of almost a hundred initiatives, closely modelled on the man-French work plan. So relations with Germany are excellent, the history because of a commonality of interests and models of development are both now northern style industrial economies with our levels of independence under control and balanced finances. We have had a true reconciliation buried the problems of the past. The expression of that is that under Schengen system we have removed border controls. If it wasn't for the rise we wouldn't know that you are five from one country to the next, while miraculous given how many million people died over a thousand years wars over where that border should

With Russia it's different. Russia is a member of NATO; it's not a member of the EU. We have a brittle but pragmatic relationship. We are at the stage of solving difficult issues of the past proving our trade relations which is important as Russia is our second largest trading partner and we are working to facilitate travel between the two countries including local border traffic agreements for Kaliningrad Oblast, and investment in trade are growing very rapidly.

**And the energy sector, as far as Russia is concerned?**

God gave Russia gas and oil, and we have the funds to buy them, we're a major customer. We have signed a gas agreement with Russia that complies with EU regulations. We would like a major transit country for Russia but at the same time, we want energy to be a business issue, not a tool of politics.

**You've said somewhere that you see Poland as a loyal ally of the U.S., not a vassal state. How do you see the relationship?**

For most countries, including [the] European Union, an alliance with the US

Source: The Hindu, July 11, 2011.

Poland and Europe

A foreign affair?

WARSAW

The Polish government realises it needs a foreign policy, but doesn't yet have one

A FLURRY of interest in the outside world might not seem odd in one of the European Union's bigger members. But when it comes from Poland's president and prime minister, the twin brothers Lech and Jaroslaw Kaczynski, it is a pleasant surprise. The prime minister, Jaroslaw, visited the Netherlands and Denmark last week. Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, visited Poland, meeting the prime minister, speaking at Warsaw University and spending a day at President Lech's house on the Baltic coast.

This almost counts as a love-in. Polish foreign policy has been introverted, in-

competent and marked by hostility to Germany since the Kaczynskis came to power in late 2005. Ms Merkel showed the value she places on improving German-Polish relations by bringing her husband, who rarely accompanies her abroad. Her main aim was to persuade the Poles to drop their resistance to this weekend's Berlin declaration celebrating the EU's 50th birthday, and to be more open to reviving the EU constitution. Poland had held out for a mention of God and the Christian tradition, but it has given up—though it will still be awkward on the constitution.

Ms Merkel seems to have persuaded

the Poles that she is a sympathetic friend, not a revanchist and bullying neighbour. Her experience under totalitarian rule in communist East Germany helps. But she has also showed sensitivity to Polish concerns. The anti-ballistic missiles that America wants to base in Poland did not spoil her talks and her seaside stroll. The Polish president also avoided the knacker issues of German atrocities against Poland. He made no mention of plans by a group of Germans deported from Poland after the war to open a museum. Nor did he whinge on about the planned pipeline that will pump Russian gas directly to Germany under the Baltic Sea.

Closer ties with Germany are welcome, but not enough. The Polish government's foreign-policy woes stem largely from prejudice and ignorance. Not only are the Kaczynskis untravellered and monoglot; they distrust cosmopolitans. They have sacked or intimidated any advisers or colleagues who showed too much knowledge of, or interest in, the abroad. One result is more clashes with the EU, some unnecessary, others badly managed.

The Kaczynskis are sceptical about the euro, and so of the reforms needed to join it. Their method of communication has annoyed the EU: the economics commissioner, Joaquín Almunia, recently complained that the Polish government simply didn't inform him of its economic policy. One reason is that finance ministers change with alarming frequency (the incumbent is the fourth in 18 months). The foreign minister is a close Kaczynski chum, who sees her job as relaying his views bluntly, not building diplomatic alliances.

Poland's image is worsened by the antics of the League of Polish Families, a minority coalition partner. One of its leading lights is campaigning against the teaching of evolution in schools. The party wants to ban abortion in Europe. This week the European Court of Human Rights awarded a Polish woman damages of €25,000 (\$33,250) for being refused an abortion that could have saved her eyesight. The party leader, Roman Giertych, who is education minister and deputy prime minister, wants to restrict what he terms the "promotion" of homosexuality in Polish schools. To secular liberals in the rest of Europe, all this makes Poland seem a bastion of medieval barbarism.

Other issues are more substantive. The Poles are being taken to the European Court for building a motorway through a conservation area. Their insistence on sticking to the voting system agreed in the Nice treaty in 2001, rather than the new one in the draft EU constitution, grates in Brussels—and Berlin. But Poland's leaders seem to have realised that a country wishing to have any influence needs a functioning foreign policy. All they must do now is formulate one. ■



Merkel plus a Kaczynski: togetherness by the sea

Source: The Economist, March 24, 2007.

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## NEWS

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### Obama: Poland A Model for New Democracies

May 28, 2011

Kent Klein | Warsaw




Photo: AP

President Barack Obama and Poland's Prime Minister Donald Tusk shake hands during a joint news conference at the Chancellery Building in Warsaw, Poland, May 28, 2011

President Barack Obama, in Warsaw Saturday, praised Poland as an example for aspiring democracies in the Middle East and elsewhere. The president also reassured Poles about the U.S. commitment to ensuring their security.

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President Obama, at a Warsaw news conference with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, said Poland has overcome extraordinary challenges and built a successful democracy. And he said Poland can use its experience to serve as an example for new democracies in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa.

Obama Meets With European Leaders in Poland

Obama, Medvedev Discuss US Missile Defense

Missile Defense is Key Issue of Obama's Poland Visit

"Poland can play an extraordinary role, precisely because they have traveled so far so rapidly over the last 25 years," said the president.

Earlier in the day, Obama and Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski met with some of the activists who brought democracy to Poland to discuss their recent efforts to help Tunisia start a democracy.

President Obama reaffirmed that the United States remains committed to Poland's security, and that the so-called "reset" in ties with Russia will help calm tensions in the region.

"What we want to do is to create an environment in this region in which peace and security are a given. That is not just good for this region, it is good for the United States of America. And we will always be there for Poland," he said.

The president reassured his Polish hosts that despite Russia's objections,