

GANDHI : DISARMAMENT AND NON-VIOLENT DEFENCE

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(M.Phil.) of this University is his own work and
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This dissertation has not been submitted for the
award of any other degree of this University or any
other University to the best of our knowledge.


(SUMITRA CHISTHI)
CHAIRPERSON
CIPOD/SIS


(S.C. GANGAL)
SUPERVISOR

To my Father and Mother

The intellectual and moral satisfaction that I failed to gain from the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill, the revolutionary methods of Marx and Lenin, the social contracts theory of Hobbes, the "back to nature" optimism of Rousseau, and the superman philosophy of Nietzsche, I found in the nonviolent resistance philosophy of Gandhi. I came to feel that this was the only morally and practically sound method open to oppressed people in their struggle for freedom.

Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.
Stride Toward Freedom

GANDHI : DISARMAMENT AND NON-VIOLENT DEFENCE

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INTRODUCTION

From time immemorial, when organised groups were formed, defence has been an integral part of inter-group interaction, based on armaments and preparation of violent action to thwart invaders, resulting in wars throughout history. Wars, in early history, involved a few hundreds on each side resulting in the destruction of a limited nature and death of a few hundreds. Wars now involve millions and lead to the death of millions together with the massive destruction of the material resources and the environment. It involves a massive diversion of scarce resources away from human development towards creation of non-productive destructive forces. The human race has now graduated from the use of spears and arrows of early history to the possession of nuclear weapons whose destructive capabilities can annihilate the human race. Man now has the possession of weapons which, instead of destroying his opponent and increasing his power, can boomerang and destroy mankind itself.

The destructive capabilities of modern wars, as evidenced by the two World Wars, necessitates an analysis of the policy of defence through armaments so as to find an alternative or improve upon it and put an end to wanton destruction. The annihilatory capacity of nuclear weapons makes such an analysis urgent. The question put forward by the two World Wars and nuclear weapons is that in this age of immense destructive capabilities, do the defence systems

and mechanisms of the previous ages, which have failed miserably in instituting a permanent peace, have the capability of putting an end to warfare, which now promises the destruction of the entire human race.

Armaments, from time immemorial, has always been the only means employed for defence preparations. Armaments also are the instruments of War. It has caused destruction throughout the ages. Armaments have now the capability of destroying its very progenitor: mankind. Notwithstanding the historical legacy of armaments, it is still the basis of the defence policy of nations. The logic of nuclear weapons is that a nuclear war ensures the annihilation of the human race. It has now become a question of mankind's survival.

There are many statesmen and militarists who claim that a stable and permanent peace is only possible through maximum armaments. A nuclear war does not produce a victor. It destroys all. With nuclear weapons and the strategy of M.A.D. (mutual assured destruction) The legions of armed peace theorists have grown. They claim that no nation will risk its own annihilation that a nuclear war ensures. PAX NUCLEARIANA (if I may use this term) is seen by them as the ultimate panacea that will ensure a permanent peace. But will it?

It is these questions that I have tried to investigate in my M.Phil dissertation's first chapter. First the rationale of armaments is dealt with. Does it have the

capability of securing peace or does it logically and inevitably lead to war? The answer being in the negative, I have then dealt with the classical approach to disarmament and the system within which it functions. Then there is an analysis of the I.N.F. (Intermediate Nuclear forces) treaty. The analysis of the INF Treaty deals with the motives behind the treaty and the system within which it was envisaged. A subsection deals with the present attitudes to war, especially nuclear war, and nuclear weapons.

The analysis of the system of armaments, the present attitude to wars, the motives behind the I.N.F. treaty and the system within which it is functioning, gives a negative answer to the question of the present system's ability in securing a permanent peace and negating war. The logical consequence of the present defence systems in war. Infact policy makers have devised strategies for a nuclear war. Hence the necessity for an alternative approach.

The second chapter deals with the Gandhian approach to disarmament, which is diametrically opposite to the classical/European approach. The rationale behind the Gandhian approach to disarmament and peace is analysed.

The disarmament process, however necessitates an alternative approach to defence. Thus, the third chapter deals with the Gandhian approach to defence and the issues he brought up with the alternative defence policy based an non-violent action.

The fourth chapter deals with the Gandhian strategy of defence. It is divided into two subdivisions: violent defence; and non-violent defence. The non-violent defence is further subdivided into five subsections: Pre-conditions for non-violent defence; negating the rationale for invasions; defence of occupied territories or the liberation struggle; defence during invasion; and the prospective defence of independent India.

Finally there is the concluding chapter which analyses the two approaches to disarmament and defence, which have been analysed within the framework of the ability of the two approaches to ensure a permanent peace thereby negating the possibility of a nuclear annihilation of the human race. History is filled with examples of defence by armaments and armed 'peace' which failed. The only historical instance of successful non violent mass action was that of the Indian Freedom Movement led by Gandhi which was indeed a non violent campaign against British occupation of India. This has been taken into account so as to ensure that the analysis is not based simply on the theoretical aspects of the two approaches.

CHAPTER I : THE ARMAMENTS RACE AND CLASSICAL DISARMAMENT:
AN ANALYSIS

ARMAMENTS : ITS RATIONALE

The Hobbesian approach to International Relations by the decision makers has ensured that armament remains an essential ingredient of national activity. This approach envisages that all nations function in a moral vacuum due to the absence of an over-arching authority which would have ensured that nations function according to specific rules of conduct. Without this over-arching authority each nation must achieve the maximum of power that can be possibly gained through various means, so as to ensure its well being. Armaments is one of those means that ensures a maximum of power at a nations disposal. In fact armaments is a manifestation of power.

The aspiration for power on part of several nations, each trying to overthrow or maintain the status quo, leads of necessity to a configuration that is called the balance of power and to policies that aim at preserving it.¹ One of the policies aimed at the maintainence of the balance of power or for its overthrow is that of armaments. It is the principal means by which a nation endeavours with the power at its disposal to maintain or re-establish a favourable balance of power. The very logic of the balance of power system leads to the armaments race. The balance of power is

favourable to some and not favourable to others. Hence for its re-establishment nations pursue a policy of power aggrandisement by increasing its military capabilities. For the maintenance of the status-quo the opposing nation also increases its military capacity to offset the increase in the first nations capacity. This leads to a continuous armaments spiral.

The uncertainty of the balance of power fuels the drive towards a vigorous armaments policy. Since no nation can be sure that its calculation of the distribution of power at any particular moment in history is correct, it must at least make sure that its errors, whatever they may be, will not put the nation at a disadvantage in the contest for power. Thus the nation must try to have at least a margin of safety which will allow it to make erroneous calculations and still maintain the balance of power. To that effect all nations actively engaged in the struggle for power must actually aim not at a balance of power (or equality) but a superiority of power in their own behalf. Since no nation can foresee how large its miscalculation will turn out to be, all nations must ultimately seek the maximum power obtainable under the circumstances. Only thus can they hope to attain the maximum margin of safety commensurate with the maximum error they might commit. This limitless aspiration for power translates itself in the power drives of nations manifested in the armament race.

DISARMAMENT : THE POWER THEORY APPROACH

Disarmament is the reduction or elimination of certain or all armaments for the purpose of ending the armaments race. It is believed that by doing away with one of the typical manifestations of the struggle for power on the international scene, one can do away with the typical effects of that struggle: international anarchy and war. Four basic distinctions must be kept in mind. Between disarmament and arms control; between general and local disarmament; between quantitative and qualitative disarmament; and between conventional and nuclear disarmament.

While disarmament is the reduction or elimination of armaments, arms control is concerned with regulating the armaments race for the purpose of creating a measure of stability. General disarmament is that kind of disarmament when all the nations concerned participate, e.g., The Washington Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armaments of 1922. Local disarmament is when only a limited number of nations is involved, e.g., the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 between the USA and Canada. Quantitative disarmament aims at an overall reduction of armaments of most or all types. Qualitative disarmament envisages the reduction or abolition of only certain special types of armaments, such as the SALT Agreements (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) and the START

Agreements (Strategic Arms reduction Talks). The distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons bears upon the political and military preconditions for arms control and disarmament.

Armaments and the armaments race are one of the most important manifestation of the struggle for power on the international scene. Nations arm either because they want to defend themselves against other nations or because they want to attack them. All politically active nations are by definition engaged in a competition for power of which armaments are an indispensable element, which leads to the armaments race. What is at stake in the armaments race between two nations is the ratio of armaments of both nations. This question is thus necessarily first on the agenda of disarmament conferences. Disarmament is thus achieved when two or more nations find it advantageous for the time being to engage in a regulated rather than free competition for power and to enter into an armaments race within agreed upon limits rather than into a wild scramble for increase in military strength. Two other alternatives are when two nations do not engage in a competition for power or when a nation or a group of nations have such a preponderance over other nations that they are able to impose upon the latter, a ratio favourable to themselves. This was the case of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The next issue that disarmament raises is that of standards of allocation, based on the defence needs of the countries concerned against the countries that are opposing it. The problems that arise from it are : the evaluation of power; assessment of political intentions; and historical tendencies of aggressiveness. Other than the first the rest are intangibles which hence is sorted out by free agreement.

These have been a few successful cases of disarmament in the 20th century. The question that arises is that: does disarmament mean peace. Three successful treaties were concluded during the period between the World Wars: The Washington Treaty of 1922; The London Treaty of 1930; and the Anglo-German Agreement of 1935. These three treaties however were not capable of aborting the movement towards World War II.

Disarmament has been realized under extraordinary conditions. Even when it seemed to have been realized, more often than not disarmament meant an increase in armaments, rather than reduction as is evidenced by the recent spurt in nuclear inventories of the two super powers after SALT I. Notwithstanding this expansion disarmament has been pursued as a means for peace and world order.

The modern philosophy of disarmament proceeds from the assumption that men fight because they have arms. From this assumption the conclusion follows logically that if men

would give up all arms all fighting would become impossible. Somewhat similar to the above is the philosophy of both the USA and the USSR with regard to nuclear weapons as expressed in the report to the President by the United States Deputy Representative to the United Nations Disarmaments Commission of January 12, 1953, as follows:

".... The objectives a disarmament programme must be to prevent war, not to regulate the armaments used in war. We have tried to make clear that the US does not accept war as inevitable; that the job is to reduce the likelihood of war by ensuring that no nation possesses the means to commit a successful act of armed aggression (emphasis mine). The aim is to reduce the likelihood of war by reducing the possibility of war and armed aggression."²

The proposition however is tacitly admitted that there exists direct relationship between the possession of arms and the issue of war and peace. Such a relationship exists but in the reverse of what the advocates assume it to be. Men do not fight because they have arms. They have arms because they deem it necessary to fight. The means have been different in different periods of history: arrows and swords; guns and bombs; gas and guided missiles; bacteria and nuclear weapons. Hence, reducing the quantity of weapons, actually or potentially available at any particular time have no influence upon the incidence of war. New technology will compensate the reduction of the old. The total prohibition of one type will ensure the emergence of another. The technology of warfare would change but not the incidence of war. Weapons are not aggressive or defensive in

nature, but are made so by the purpose they serve. Swords have served equally as tanks have for the purpose of war. It is not impossible to outlaw weapon, but it is impossible to outlaw the technology for manufacturing weapons.

There is however another possibility while disarmament could not by itself abolish war, it could to a great degree lessen the political tensions, that might easily lead to war. This is the argument mainly used by the arms controllers in the nuclear age. Disarmament or at least regulation of armaments is an indispensable step in a general settlement of international conflicts. Competition for armaments reflects, and is an instrument of the competition for power. Thus a mutually satisfactory settlement of power contest is a precondition for disarmament. Disarmament in turn will contribute greatly to the general pacification.

Arms control and disarmament in the nuclear field is based on totally different factors than that of the conventional field. In the conventional weapons field disarmament depends upon the settlement of outstanding political issues. However, the control of nuclear weapons is made possible in theory at least by the ability of major nuclear powers to reach that optimum of assured destruction beyond which it is irrational to go. After the possession of a maximum military potential, further acquisition would mean

wasteful expenditure. Consequently the conventional conception of military superiority and inferiority becomes meaningless. A nation after afflicting unacceptable damage on its enemy gains nothing militarily from further damage. The same holds true for the other nation. Hence arm control and disarmament.

ATTITUDES TO WAR AND NUCLEAR ARMS

The instruments of war are the various weapons that have been developed by mankind. Beginning with crude stones mankind has continuously refined and developed the instruments of mass destruction. The crude stones gave way to first the copper and then the iron instruments, (i.e. the spears, arrow and swords). Next came the era of gunpowder which gave way to atomic and nuclear weapons. These however are just the instruments of war. It is man that finally uses them that results in war. Hence an analysis of man attitude to war, especially in the 20th century, is essential for a paper on disarmament.

There are various views on war. There is the view that war is a natural and healthy activity, even glorious. This attitude, however, in the 20' post World War II period, has had few supporters. Next is the attitude that war is inevitable and necessary. This attitude was subscribed to by the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists till the Cuban missile crisis when the Soviet Union drastically revised its

stand. The Chinese Communists, however, continued to subscribe to the classical Marxist Leninist concept that war between the socialist and capitalist worlds was inevitable during Mao Zedong's General Secretaryship. In Beijing's view war enhanced rather than hindered the cause of communism. World War I made possible the emergence of Communist Russia; World War II gave rise to Communist China; and World War III would bring Communism to power in the United States and the end to the capitalist world.³ Beijing claimed that it was not afraid of war; although a nuclear holocaust might kill 300 million Chinese the more advanced industrial nations of the West would fare worse. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski in his THE SOVIET BLOCK: UNITY AND CONFLICT reports that Zhona En-Lon stated that after the next war these would be "twenty million Americans, five million Englishmen, and three hundred million Chinese."⁴

There is the third view that war is wicked and must be eliminated, whether by divine anathema or human contrivance. Gandhi was of the view that wars could be ended by human contrivance. This view shall be dealt with in the subsequent chapters.

Finally there is the European view. For something like 2000 years, the dominant European view has been that war is horrible but inevitable and even on occasions necessary.⁵ Hence the continuing of the medieval doctrine of *JUS AD*

BELLUM (the just war), based on a sovereign's right to make war if the cause and purpose was righteous and his motives pure.⁶ The sovereign's exclusive right to make war has been abridged by the charter of the UN whose signatories have abandoned the right to make war except in self defence which however the charter does not define.⁷

The present European and American view is that war cannot be eliminated anymore than murder can be eliminated. However by 'human contrivance and effort' wars like other crimes, may be made less numerous. Hence the movement towards arms control, disarmament conferences, and confidence building activities of many of the nuclear powers.

The present attitudes to war is a product of the mixed heritage received from earlier centuries, along with the recent experiences of the two World Wars and the Vietnam War. The mixed heritage received by the 20th century was the product of the Industrial Revolution and Nationalism. War was industrialized. Weapons became more lethal, efficient and accurate. Nationalism inflamed national passions and encouraged the resort to war. Industrialization also transformed the conduct of war. It did so by three main ways:⁸

1. By vastly increasing the destructiveness and the accuracy of weapons,

2. By depersonalizing war so that a man may kill his enemy at long range without having to witness the awfulness of his act, and
3. By making unprecedented demands on national economies not only in wartime but also in anticipation of war.

This was a mixed heritage. The increased horror and the prohibitive cost of war inhibit it, but depersonalization has helped to make war tolerable, by occluding its barbarities. This balance worked in two ways.

1. Towards a robust rejection of war, and
2. towards a greater toleration of its enormities.

The second way resulted in the two World Wars. During World War II military technology took a quantum jump with the introduction of Atomic bombs. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings however resulted in public revulsion towards atomic weapons. It however brought a sense of responsibility and maturity in policy making which ensured that the Cuban Missile Crisis did not explode into a nuclear war. The Super Powers henceforth fought battles by proxy, never in direct confrontation with each other. Hence the USSR helped (but never participated) in Vietnam's struggle against the US and the US gave full financial and other military support (but never participated) to the Mujahideen against the Soviet Union.

Historians reckon that there has been between one hundred and two hundred wars in the world since 1945, inspite of the fact that in that year fifty states by signing the charter of the UN against themselves not to use force or threat of force against another state.² The use of force and the threat of the force have, however, remained as instruments of foreign policy.

The present attitude to nuclear weapons is that since it has been invented, they cannot be disinvented. It has to be controlled so as to ensure that a nuclear war does not occur. Nuclear disarmers have not been able to abolish nuclear weapons and have not diminished nuclear stockpiles: at present economic stringency is reducing some stockpiles. Banning nuclear weapons, even supposing such a ban were practicable, would do little or nothing to prevent war, in the light of hundred to two hundred wars fought since 1945 without nuclear weapons.

The present view among European policy makers is that though technology has so far done more to aggravate war than minimize it, there are certain novelties which point to a better direction. The first is nuclear weapons, because they are of a different kind. No other weapon carries the threat of total or nearly total destruction. Since 1945 some 100,000 nuclear warheads have been made, but none have been used. This restraint is due to in some measure of fear (MAD

or Mutual Assured Destruction), but also something akin to awe. American Presidents have refused to use the weapon even if there was not risk of retaliation from the Soviets and when argument for doing so have been more persuasive than they were in August 1945. Secondly in many situations nuclear weapon have brought about a feeling of increased responsibility due to the immense destructive capabilities. More than any other weapon, nuclear weapons represents not only an accession of power, but a unique compulsion to ponder the equation of power with responsibility.¹⁰

The second item that provides a safeguard against an outbreak of a nuclear war is the development of photographic and satellite technology. It reverses the situation whereby technical development had depersonalised war both on the battle field and off it. The public horrified with the pictures of war forced the American administration to disengage from the Vietnam War. Satellite technology has improved intelligence gathering and reinforced deterrence. Knowledge of the opponents strength among nuclear nations negates adventurism which would destroy not only the opponent but the self too. The European view, hence, regarding nuclear weapons, especially among policy makers, is that nuclear arms and deterrence along with maturity of statesmen ensure that nuclear war does not occur. It even negates major wars between great powers.

Notwithstanding the logic of nuclear weapons, (i.e. the irrationality of more than the maximum of nuclear weapons and mutual assured destruction), there have been proponents of further escalation of the armaments race and even proponents for the use of it. Kissinger sought to give nuclear superiority, (in quantity only), a new political meaning. Once a nation has attained a nuclear maximum, additional nuclear weapons can add significantly to its political power. Thus a nation increases political power vis-a-vis another nation because people perceive it falsely to have become more powerful militarily¹¹. This argument falls short because it assumes that the people are ignorant, which they are not, especially policy makers.

Another group has even developed the conception of graduated deterrence, which wages nuclear war but does not escalate into an all out war. Both sides in a rational, almost predetermined way, similar to a chess game, proceeds to destroy by nuclear weapons, limited targets. This argument fall short because it assumes the detachment of a game of chess which is not applicable in real war. Both nations feel that they have been damaged more that the damage that has been inflicted upon their opponents, and hence would lead to an escalation, resulting in an all-out war.¹²

The strategy of a counter force, first enunciated by Robert S, Macnamara in 1962, was an attempt to limit nuclear war. It assumed the a nuclear war could be waged and ought to be waged not against population and industrial centres, but against strictly military objectives. It was revived lately due to the increased sophistication of missiles, which ensures accurate attacks on specified objects. This strategy too is negated by the logic of assured destruction. There will be no victors. ¹³

There has emerged of late the strategy of a tactical nuclear war which will not lead to the destruction of both the sides, but which can lead to the victory of one side. Tactical nuclear warheads would be used to destroy tactical targets. This theory too has been criticised due to the fact that it would lead to an escalation into an all out nuclear war. The fact however remains that some policymakers have thought of these nuclear wars as possible instruments of national policy. The very act of thinking that such actions are possible leads to its practical translation that would prove disastrous to the world. A new approach is hence necessary, to look at the problems of war and peace.

DISARMAMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE INF TREATY

On December 8, 1987, START I (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks culminated in the historical I.N.F. (Intermediate Nuclear Force) Treaty - its proper designation is 'Treaty

between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the elimination of their intermediate range and shorter-range missiles). The I.N.F. treaty is land-mark in the history of arms control and disarmament, with its importance and historical significance based on the fact that it is the first time in history that two nations totally antagonistic to each other mutually agreed and destroyed one whole category of weapons, after decades of piling their arsenals to capacities which were capable of destroying the planet many times over, let alone the targeted countries. Prior to the INF the only disarmament witnessed was the case of forcible disarmament. After World War I, Germany was forcibly disarmed and allowed only a limited and specific quantity of arms and a specific number of men. This failed and subsequently led to World War II, after which the military strength of Japan and Germany was curtailed.

Prior to the INF a series of arms control and limitation measures were carried out by the two Super Powers with the active participation of most of the security council members. Thus the NPT (Non Proliferation Treaty) banned the development of nuclear weapons outside the five security council nations. Horizontal proliferation did not stop and a number of nations have now developed nuclear capabilities. SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) fixed various limits to American and Soviet nuclear capabilities.

The post-SALT period however saw a massive expansion of nuclear armaments due to scientific break-throughs in strategic technology.

The INF's historical significance, thus, lies in the fact that it is history first successful mutually agreed upon disarmament, negating a whole category of weapons. An added distinction is that it prohibits further production after the destruction of the present stockpiles, which had to be dismantled and destroyed with a specific time limit. However, notwithstanding the euphoria generated by this historical treaty, the INF treaty too has its limitations and lacunae which have to be analysed . Secondly the INF and the subsequent START negotiation have to be analysed under the framework of its function in securing future world peace, since all the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) and START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) agreements work according to the system of Balance of Power which in the nuclear period convert itself into the Balance of Terror based upon Mutual Assured destruction whose apt anacronym is MAD. Hence first a look into the INF treaty.

There are many questions that assist our of the I.N.F. Treaty and the subsequent START negotiations between the two Super Power. These are issues relating to the reasons behind the INF, the system within which the INF and START negotiation was envisaged. These issues will be related to

question of security of the non-superpower nations and to the problems of peace and war in the future. These questions are important because the I.N.F. and START, though they envisage future arms reduction, are functioning according to the rationale of the classical theory of disarmament, to which, other than the Gandhian approach, no other alternative has been provided, and which seems inherently unstable for maintenance of world peace.

President Ronald Reagan of the United States of America and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR were the two signatures of this landmark in the history of disarmaments. Hence an analysis of their motives, which resulted in the I.N.F., is necessary to get a true picture of the motives of the I.N.F. Was it for peace or was it simply a public relations enterprise? The motives were both personal and reasons of state policy.

President Reagan had won two consecutive mandates from an extremely conservative platform where he called the Soviet Union the 'Evil Empire'. The Reagan presidency witnessed a massive increase in defence spending and the initiation of the SDI (Strategic Defence Initiative) programme which envisaged an extension of military offensive and defensive action into space for the first time. The Reagan presidency caused a massive modernization of armaments so as to give the USA a quantum jump in military

superiority, resulting in the Stealth programme, manifested in the Stealth B-2 bomber; the various Cruise missiles (Sea, Air and Land Launched and the initial move towards the S.D.I. Notwithstanding his conservative ideology which bordered on jingoism, he initiated moves towards a successful START negotiations which resulted in the I.N.F., towards the close of his presidency, which seems incongruent to his ideological moorings, i.e., excessive anti-Sovietism.

The answer lies, according to some critics, in 'Creeping Nancyism,' or the first Lady's [Nancy Reagan] supposed efforts to have her husband become known as a peace maker¹⁴. The historical significance of the INF Treaty would ensure President Reagan a prominent place in the history of the world. In an atmosphere of extreme fear and suspicion, with the two antagonistic Superpowers having more than just over kill capacities, each having weapons capable of destroying the planet many times over, a successful disarmament agreement would ensure the signatories a place in the history books. Hence, the motive behind the I.N.F. witnessed here is that the I.N.F. was just a means of satisfying expanded egos. A place in the history books was the main motive, the means being the I.N.F. and the by product being a decrease in tensions between the two antagonistic blocs.

The I.N.F. was the result of President Reagan's another personal problem. For Reagan an arms control accord could prove to be a ticket out of his Iran-Contra doldrums, restoring a golden hue to his tarnished presidency.¹⁵ The Reagan presidency had been under a severe press onslaught which drastically decreased his ratings in the opinion polls due to the Iran-Contra affair. Arms had been sold to the Iranians at very high price and the excess profits had been secretly siphoned to supply arms to the Contra rebels fighting the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. The Congress had put a limit on the quantity of arms supplied to the Contras through a law passed in the Senate, which the presidency was bound to follow. The bypassing of the law by the presidency and the Senate investigations tarnished the presidency towards its close. Hence a successful disarmament programme with its historical significance would divert attention from the Iran-contra affair and also prop up the image of the presidency. Hence the I.N.F. was thus only a successful public relations enterprise. The motives were not simply peace or disarmament.

There were political motives too behind the I.N.F. which ensured the successful outcome of the START I negotiations. The intermediate range missiles are of political significance and have limited military importance.¹⁶ If dismantled only some 1,500 of the estimated 50,000 warheads would be removed from superpower arsenals. Moreover existing

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strategic forces can easily cover the targets how handled by them. Hence the INF meant a mere reduction of superficial armaments so as to achieve some political gains. The same initiative (i.e. INF) had been pursued by Reagan by another name: the Zero Option. In 1981 the Reagan administration presented such a proposal for the elimination of all medium range missiles form Europe. The move was an attempt to woo the peace activists nervous about the pending development of Pershing II missiles and the Cruise missiles which were intended to match the Soviet Union's SS-20's¹⁷. As Henry Kissinger aptly said. "The so called Zero Option ... has little utility for arms control¹⁸. The European governments could face a pacifist backlash if they blocked a Soviet American agreement to get rid of shorter range missiles. Hence the INF was a means to satisfy the peace activists by renouncing the redundant weapons, the superficial weapons to the soothe the peace activists. It was the crumbs from the military tables that were dusted off.

The American and European governments had been caught in a catch-22 situation. The 1981 Zero-Option proposals initiated by Reagan was for the removal of the Soviet SS 20's deployed in Eastern Europe in the 1970's which were far superior to the Pershing I missiles. The SS-20's were highly accurate missiles with nuclear warheads which could reach London in twelve minutes.¹⁹ NATO had not yet deployed a single missile of this type.²⁰ The Zero-Option was thus

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proposed which later translated itself into the I.N.F. after the USA deployed the Pershing II missiles in the 1980's. Hence the INF resulted in only bringing back the levels of nuclear armaments to the 1970's level. The European governments had supported the Zero-Option proposal since they did not expect any disarmament in the future and that the USSR would ever accept.²¹ The European governments had to go along with the elimination of intermediate range missiles because they had little choice: they had committed themselves earlier to the Zero-Option when Reagan proposed it in 1981 and never expected that the USSR would accept it.²² Here the INF treaty was hence the product of an accident. The European government did not want it, nor expected it. They played to the galleries and when the movement gained momentum, they were unable to stop it.

The INF was also a result of the political motivations of the Soviet. The American Pershing II missiles were not as militarily important as its removal was politically important. Militarily the Soviets had already multi-overkill capabilities. Beyond military concerns, the Kremlin was also trying to make a political point: that the US was not a legitimate power on the Continent of Europe and therefore had no right to put it there.²³ Secondly Gorbachev wanted stable relations with the US which was essential if he was to have time, energy and authority to concentrate on the internal reforms that he was attempting, i.e., Glasnost and

Perestroika.²⁴ Thus for the Soviet Union the I.N.F. was essential for two reasons: first was the necessity for the de-coupling of America from Europe and second was the need for stabilising relations with America so as to ensure the success of internal reforms. The means was the I.N.F. which reduced but a small percentage of nuclear missiles.

The reactions to the I.N.F. have been varied. The peace activists have hailed it as the first steps towards global peace. The cold war 'realists' have cried themselves hoarse that the INF would free nations of nuclear devastation tensions and would make Europe free to pursue conventional wars. An analysis of the important leaders opinions is hence essential for the true meaning of the I.N.F. to emerge. Richard Nixon thus states:

'If we get rid of all those missiles covered by the offer, were still talking about less than 3% of the 50,000 warheads in the world. We are not addressing the main issue. Nuclear weapons are not going abolished, and they are not going to be uninvented (emphasis mine)²⁵

'The I.N.F. is seen by Nixon as just mere whitewash, a removal of redundant weapons which constitutes a negligible percentage of the total warheads. Nuclear disarmament of all weapons is an impossibility since the logic of invention is that the most efficient is used and cannot be disinvented.

The US Secretary of state George Push Shultz in his reply to Nixon stated: .

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'Even after an I.N.F. agreement, NATO would retain a robust deterrent. More than 4000 US nuclear weapons would still be in Europe on aircraft that would retaliate deep into the Soviet Union and on remaining missiles and nuclear artillery. NATO is planning a modernization of several of these systems. Also several hundred submarine launched ballistic missile warheads would remain available to the supreme NATO Commander.'²⁶

Evident from George P. Shultz's statement is the fact that the I.N.F. agreement did not reduce the retaliatory capability of the USA. Implicit in his statement is the Balance of Power system (now converted to the Balance of Terror) which functions as the overall framework within which the disarmament proposals were negotiated. The I.N.F. hence was based on the basis of power and its manifestations. Secondly US. Secretary of State Shultz's statement on modernization reveals that more sophisticated and efficient weapons of destruction were being envisaged by the US policy makers. The INF was just a retrenchment of redundant weapons whose necessity had declined.

Speaking on the issue of nuclear disarmament manifested in the INF, Margaret Thatcher said.

A world without nuclear weapons would be less stable and more dangerous to us all(because) conventional weapons have not stopped two World Wars in Europe this century'²⁷ Secondly Britain would retain an independent nuclear force.²⁸

An analysis of her statement along with that of ex-President Richard Nixon of the USA that, 'Nuclear weapons are not going to be abolished and they are not going to be uninvented.'²⁹ leads to conclusion that notwithstanding the I.N.F., the policy makers of the nuclear nations are maintaining nuclear weapons as the instruments of defence. Their perception is that peace can only be possible through nuclear armaments and that the post World War II peace was a product of the Balance of Terror. Its an armed peace, that too with an overkill nuclear capability, that they envisage.

There is also an underlying economic rationale behind nuclear defenses. The reason for the European powers to hang onto American nuclear forces is that they give Europe a cheap means of avoiding the expenditures that would be necessary to build a conventional force.³⁰ For that matter, the US has never been willing to spend the money required to support a non-nuclear defence of Europe.³¹

In the 1970's the Soviets had already come to the conclusion that nuclear superiority was 'pointless' as stated by Brezhnev when he advocated the Tula line in 1977. The Soviets needed only nuclear forces that were sufficient to hold the US in check.³² Sufficient parity and stalemate in the nuclear arena had become the basis of USSR's defence strategy under Brezhnev. Infact on the 23rd of November 1981, five days after Reagan first unveiled the Zero Option,

Brezhnev on a trip to Bonn proposed the eventual elimination of Medium Range Missiles directed towards Europe, plus the elimination of all short Range Missiles.³³ Hence it is evident that the INF had been preconceived earlier due to a nuclear stalemate.

Gorbachev changed and elaborated the Soviet defence strategy that he had inherited from Brezhnev, which was based on the Tula line i.e. 'sufficient forces to check' the US forces. His arms control proposal were based on 'reasonable sufficiency.'³⁴ The doctrine holds that Soviet capabilities need not have the potential for a pre-emptive strike but must merely be adequate to respond to an attack on the Soviet Union and its allies.³³ A change in defence strategy, hence, facilitated the successful outcome of the START I negotiations resulting in the much acclaimed INF Treaty. Weapons that had become redundant to the new defence strategy were now mutually discarded and hailed as the progenitor of an era of nuclear armed peace. Here too it is evident that peace is envisaged within the framework of nuclear armaments and the Balance of Terror that seeks to ensure that the nuclear option is negated. Secondly new weapons were being developed to replace the old.

POST I.N.F.: SMART AND BRILLIANT WEAPONS.

As stated earlier, The USA has kept pursuing a policy of total modernization of weapons, which has resulted in the

Smart, Brilliant and 'Stealth' weapons. These new generation weapons have changed military strategy and made the weapons developed in the 1970's redundant. Even in the post INF era super-weapons are being developed by America and her allies. Weapons are being made to revolutionize warfare in the twenty first century, giving their operators unprecedented authority over enemy forces. Arms reduction talks are hailed as key turning points in reducing the risk of war. Yet this a public perception not borne out by the facts. These new weapons for from making war less likely may actually induce conflicts because they make it potentially more winnable.³⁶

Both the USA and the USSR have redrawn arms control guide lines to permit the development of new and remarkably advanced weapons system. Equipped with these the military superpowers could significantly widen the gap between themselves and the developing world, by arming it with one level of technology and retaining the super weapons.

Since the early 1980's the US has been researching new and exotic technologies that could transform warfare early in the next century. Funds for such development can only be found if costly and redundant weapon system are negotiated away at the conference table. Beginning with SALT (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks) in the early 1970s the US and the USSR legitimized the massive expansion of strategic nuclear weapons. In 1972 when SALT I was signed ostensibly

limiting missile forces, the USSR had approximately 1,500 ground launched I.C.B.M's (Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles) in silos and 560 SLBM's (Sea Launched Ballistic missiles).³⁷ The US had 1054, I.C.B.M's and 656 S.L B.M's.³⁸

After SALT I, each side dramatically expanded its nuclear war fighting capability. Instead of limiting each missile to one target, new technology allowed many more targets to be hit by the same number of missiles. It was the missile numbers and not the targets that were limited by SALT I. The breakthrough for US expansion in missile targeting came with the introduction of MIRV's (Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicle). With MIRV each missile carried a cluster of warheads and each warhead ejected to its specific targets during re-entry. Thus by the mid-1970's its warhead total increased from 1710 to about 7200.³⁹ By the end of the 80'S both sides had approximately 10,000 strategic nuclear warheads. The US and USSR targets threatened by these missiles had grown from 3,800 in 1972 to 20,000 by 1980.⁴⁰

This colossal expansion of warhead inventories permitted under supposed arms 'limitation treaties' was stemmed in part by START, orchestrated under the Reagan administration during the 1980's. But rather than reducing capabilities, it has eliminated those systems already

redundant and cleared the way for refined successors even though the permitted total warhead is cut in half. Moreover START endorses an expansion of nuclear tipped Sea Launched Cruise Missiles. These highly accurate pilotless flying bombs are effective when launched several hundreds kilometers away and can be used in attacks on land targets out of range of defending fighters.

But the really big strides in super weapon technology envisage aircraft flying at the edge of space and at speeds upto 9,500 Kmph. Dipping down at very low attitudes and boosting speed to some 15,000 Kmph they would be highly manoeuvrable targets able to launch weapons against heavily defended ground sites in enemy territory. These are the proposed TAV's (Trans - Atmospheric Vehicles) These are to counter the MIRV's.

The most important field, that START I did not limit, is that of space. President Reagan's insistence that the SDI was out of bounds of any disarmament negotiations during START I ensured that space too would be militarised. Laser technology and other accouterments of SDI are being developed in the USA.

The USA has already developed an array of new generation weapons that would be the envy of the cold

warriors. Stealth technology has already been successfully tested during the Gulf War. The Stealth Bomber (B-2) is just one of an array of new and expensive weapons. William Kaufmann, of Harvard, estimates that new military programmes already in the acquisition pipeline could cost more than \$ 900 billion, three times the entire amount the Pentagon will spend in the fiscal year 1988-89.⁴² Other than the stealth are the smart weapons which have extreme precision and can accurately destroy targets. Some of them, like the Cruise missiles are fitted with computer information whereby even specific buildings can be destroyed if a missile is fired hundreds of kilometres away. Some of these 'Smart' and Brilliant weapons are the Patriot missile or the 'Scudbuster' an antiballistic missile (ABM). The MLRS (Multiple Launch Report System) is mobile and can fire rapidly surface to surface missiles more than 32 Km away. The Maverick is an air to ground guided missile. The Hellfire is an antitank missile. The list of these new and lethal weapons is endless.

An analysis of the present trend towards the development of new and sophisticated weapons which are far more superior and efficient than those of the 1970's along with the history of the SALT I Talks and the subsequent expansion in sophisticated nuclear armaments

leads one to the conclusion that, notwithstanding START etc. the trend is towards more sophisticated weapons while disarmament is just the retrenchment of old redundant weapons. The speed, accuracy, the tonnage, the explosive and destructive power of weapons are increasing progressively. The life time of weapons (based upon the emergence of new and superior weapons) is decreasing as quickly as new technology is creating new ones.

PROLIFERATION OF MISSILES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Parallel to the Superpower's modernization programme, are the acquisition and modernization programmes of the non-nuclear power nations. Many developing nations, even extremely poor nations, with economies that are scarcely sufficient to provide even three proper meals to all its citizens, have pursued aggressively missiles, nuclear and chemical programmes. Out of twenty one nations surveyed by South only five nations (viz, Syria, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, North Korea and Burma) do not have a civilian nuclear programme. None of these twenty three nations have a parallel nuclear military programme. They are Iraq, Iran, Israel, India, South Africa, Pakistan, Argentina, China and Taiwan. Only two nations, i.e., Brazil and Argentina, do not have a chemical weapons programme. Even states like Ethiopia, which can scarce divert its civilian resources,

has a chemical weapons programme. Out of these twenty one nations, nine states are stockpiling chemical weapons.⁴³

The above mentioned data makes it evident that even small nations, that can never hope to achieve a great power status let alone superpower status, are vigously pursuing an active programme of modernization of the military. It is in the missiles fields that the proliferation of the new technology is most evident. Iran, Iraq, Isreal, Egypt, Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Pakistan and South Korea have got a series of missiles of latest designs. Most of these nations are developing nations that can scare divert national resources.

Since 1960 the military expenditures all over the world has gone up by over 600%⁴⁴ This amount does not include armaments oriented Research and Development programmes in defence establishments and civilian research programmes of an allied nature. In 1987, out of the total annual global military expenditure of \$930 billion, the USA spent \$293 billion and the USSR \$ 260 billion. Both represented more than 59% of the worlds military expenditure.⁴⁵ During the same year the developed countries spent \$190 billion on the military, a boost of \$ 76 billion⁴⁶. Twenty two wars were underway in 1987.⁴⁷ Between 1968 and 1978 military expenditure of NATO declined from 56.2% to 42.8% whereas

the military expenditure of Warsaw powers increased from 25.3% to 28.6% and the Third World expenditure on armaments increased from 6.02% to 13.7%.⁴⁸ This weapon build up in developing in the third World. In fact out of the 125 or more conflicts which have occurred since World War II 95% have been between developing countries.⁴⁹

It is thus evident that notwithstanding the much acclaimed INF Treaty, which has been proclaimed as the initiator of world peace and disarmament, new and more accurate weapons are being designed and developed. The arms race still remains so far as the development of new military technologies are concerned. Secondly, the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and missile technology evident in the post-INF period is proof of the fact that armaments are still the basis of defence strategy. Nations with scarce resources are spending massively on the acquisition of new military technology.

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CHAPTER II - THE GANDHIAN APPROACH TO DISARMAMENT

A: DISARMAMENT : ITS RATIONALE

The Culmination of the Historical Progress Towards Ahimsa:

•The Gandhian conception of man is based on the animal-spirit dichotomy whereby 'man as animal is violent but as Spirit is non-violent'.¹ History culminates in the awakening of the spirit within and then 'the moment he awakens to the spirit within, he cannot remain violent'.² Gandhi traced human progress in history through the first stage of cannibalism , onwards to the wandering hunter and finally to the settled agriculturist. The process is one of decreasing HIMSA and progressive AHIMSA. Hence the process is a further progress towards total AHIMSA and its manifestation in disarmament.

Reproduced here is his article aptly titled MANKIND AND NON-VIOLENCE.³

'If we turn our eyes to the time of which history has any record down to our time, we shall find that man has been steadily progressing towards Ahimsa. Our remote ancestors were cannibals. There came a time when they were fed up with cannibalism and they began to live on chase. Next came a life when man was ashamed of leading the life of a wandering hunter. He therefore took to agriculture and depended primarily on Mother Earth for his food. nomad he settled down to civilisation, founded villages and towns, and as a member of family he became member of nation. All these are stages of progress towards AHIMSA and diminishing HIMSA

Had it been otherwise the human species should have been extinct by now, even as the many lower species have disappeared.

Prophets and AVATARS have also taught the lesson of AHIMSA. Not one of them professed to teach HIMSA? HIMSA does not need to be taught. Man as animal is violent, but as Spirit is non-violent. The moment he awakens to the Spirit within, he cannot remain violent. (emphasise mine)⁵ Either he progresses towards AHIMSA, or rushes to his doom. That is why Prophets and AVATARS have taught lessons of truth, harmony, brotherhood, justice etc. - all attributes of AHIMSA.

.If we believe that mankind has steadily progressed towards AHIMSA, it follows, that it has to progress towards it still further (emphasise mine).⁶ Nothing in the world is static, everything is kinetic. If there is no progression, then there is inevitable retrogression. No one can remain without the eternal cycle, unless it be God Himself.

The present war is the saturation point in violence.⁷ It spells to my mind also its doom. Daily Gandhi has testimony to the fact that AHIMSA was never appreciated by mankind as it is today. All the testimony from the West that Gandhi continued to receive points in the same direction. The Congress had pledged itself to AHIMSA, however limited. Gandhi invited the doubters to shed their

doubts and plunge confidently into the sacred sacrificial fire of AHIMSA.⁸ "It is always within".

History thus shows three facts:

- (a) The awakening of the Spirit which is essentially non-violent in nature;
- (b) The progress of mankind towards greater AHIMSA which will culminate in its absolute form;
- (c) World War II is the saturation point in violence making people more appreciative of AHIMSA and spelling the doom for HIMSA.

It thus follows that 'history will culminate in AHIMSA, one of whose manifestation is disarmament'.

Disarmament as a product of Non-Violence and the Law of Human Nature

Gandhi based his policy of Ahimsa on the Law of Human Nature: 'Man is essentially good and non-violent.' In fact civil society functions on the essential goodness of man, otherwise it would have become extinct long ago. The Gandhian man is a dichotomous animal and Spirit: the animal portion being violent by nature; the spirit portion being non-violent.⁹ History has led to the awakening of the spirit making it the preponderant portion of man thereby making him essentially good and non violent. Man has further

progressed in history from extreme violence towards non-violence.¹⁰

The essential goodness of man is explained by the example of a liar. The duration of his lies constitute less than half an hour of the total day which is approximately 2% of the day. For the rest of the day or 98% of the day he is an ordinary good person. The 2% being a minor portion of his actions can be changed, assimilated into the good portion of his behaviour.¹¹

There is thus a higher law than that of destruction since man is essentially good and destruction occupies a negligible percentage of man's actions.* Thus he states :

'Not to believe in the possibility of permanent peace is to disbelieve in godliness of human nature.'¹²

He reiterates again and again :

'Consciously or unconsciously we are acting non-violently towards one another in daily life. All well constructed societies are based on the law of Non-Violence. (Emphasis added). I have found that life persists in the midst of destruction, and therefore, there must be a higher law than that of destruction. (emphasis added). Only under that law would a well ordered law society be intelligible and life worth living. And if that is the Law of Life, we have to work it out in daily life. Wherever there are jars, wherever you are confronted with an opponent, conquer him with love. I have worked it out in my life... I have found that this Law of Love has answered as the Law of Destruction has never done. In India we have had an ocular demonstration of the

operation of this law on the widest scale possible...

"Whether mankind will consciously follow the Law of Love, I do not know. But that need not perturb us. The Law will work just as the Law of Gravitation will work, whether we accept it or not. Just as scientists will work wonders out of various applications of the Laws of Nature, even so a man who applies the Law of Love with scientific precision can work greater wonders. For the force of Non-Violence is infinitely more wonderful than the forces of nature, like for instance, electricity."¹³

Thus since human nature is essentially good and is guided by the Law of Love, which is far superior to the Law of Destruction, and is the cause of the proper functioning and continuance of civil society, it follows that this Law of Love with its superior and miraculous capabilities could be utilized as the basic means of a defence policy, thereby negating armaments. Gandhi thus time and again stressed on non-violent action by the strong as the basis of defence for a nation. In his article, TO EVERY BRITON,¹⁴ he advised them to lay down arms and undertake non-violent action against a German invasion. Similar advice was given to the Congress on the issue of a prospective Japanese invasion. There was no malice to be shown to the invaders. They were instead to be countered with love which was the highest Law of Nature and had the capability of melting the hardest of hearts. Thus disarmament and non-violent defence were the products of the highest Law and hence the best defence policy to pursue.

FUTILITY OF WAR

Gandhi emphasized the futility of war time and again. The Mahabharata and the Bhagvad Gita were proof of its futility.

"The immortal author (Krishna) of the Mahabharata of which the Gita is one - no doubt the brightest - of the many gems contained in that literary mind, has shown to the world the futility of war, by giving to the victors an empty glory, leaving but seven victors alive out of millions said to have been engaged in that fight in which unnamable atrocities were used on either side".¹⁵

On the Abyssinian question he again states :

"But if the Abyssinians had adopted the attitude of non-violence of the strong i.e. non-violence which breaks to pieces but never bends, Mussolini would have had no interest in Abyssinia... Mussolini wanted submission and not defiance, and if he had met with quiet a dignified non-violent defiance that I have described, he would certainly have been obliged to retired".¹⁶

• The implication here is that war as an instrument of defence policy is futile. • The implication is reiterated when he states :

"For ultimately, force, however, justifiably used, will lead us into the same morass as the force of Hitler and Mussolini."¹⁷

• Victory in war is even futile. •

"An armed conflict may bring disaster to German arms; it cannot change the German hearts even as the last defeat did not. It produced a Hitler vowed to wreck vengeance on the victors".¹⁸

Here victory and not just war was futile. In fact it was counterproductive since it produced Hitler and an even more ruthless war. Hence the futility of war even as a policy of defence necessitates the policy of disarmament.

Disarmament due to the historical failure of Armament

"An analysis of the history of mankind shows that one of the preponderant features are the wars that man has indulged in." Wars have been followed by wars ad-nauseam. The periods of peace that followed the successful conclusion of wars have just been transitory periods of preparation of a future war" so as to ensure a preferential and successful outcome. Various reasons have been appended to wars so as to provide moral justification of violent action. Wars have been called "The just war", "war of defence" and "the war to end all wars". They have all however failed to maintain peace. The method used has been that of armaments. No one has ever tried non-violence and disarmament as a means for maintaining peace and ensuring the defence of a nation.

All wars lead to a victor and the vanquished, the exceptions of a stalemate proving the rule. Historically both sides have utilized armaments as the basis for defence, maintenance of territorial integrity, sovereignty, independence and instruments of foreign policy, aggression, imperialism, colonialism and exploitation. However, since wars necessitates a victor and a vanquished, it implies that

the aggregate of all ways have produced an equal number of both. Thus 50% of all those who have indulged in wars have been defeated throughout history. Their policy of armaments as the means of defence was a dismal failure. This necessitates a drastic revision of armaments as a policy of defence.

Gandhi thus states about the orthodox method of protection, i.e. armaments :

"The "weak majority" no doubt needs protection ... against man's mischief. The orthodox method we know." (emphasise mine). Nazism is its logical outcome. ... Hitler has brutalized not only Germans but a large part of humanity ... For Britain, so long as she holds to the orthodox method, has to copy the Nazi methods if she has to put up a successful defence (emphasise mine). Thus the logical outcome of the violent method seems to be increasingly to brutalize man, including the weak majority."¹⁹

• Here the orthodox method of protecting the 'weak majority' has not only led to the growth of Nazism, but worse, it has brutalized man, not even leaving the 'weak majority'."

• When World War II had broken out Gandhi had said that unless Europe changed its ways that war would be a prelude to a third and more disastrous war.²⁰ The methods used by Europe had been that of armaments and had led to war. Historically the methods used by Europe have always been the same and has continuously led to war. Gandhi stated that if

Europe continued with those same methods they were sure to perish. "What had happened in Europe was that Hitlerism had only been destroyed by super-Hitlerism [the British policy of defence by armaments] and that chain was endless. It would go on like that."²¹

"No nation has previously used non-violence as the basic means for its defence policy. Violence has only been countered by violence and it has proved to be disastrous. It produced a Hitler vowed to wreck vengeance."²² In fact countering 'Hitlerism' by 'Hitlerism' has only bred superior Hitlerism raised to the nth degree.²³

◊ Hence Gandhi experimented with non-violence as a means for evicting the British from India, to provide a new means of defence. The British were an alien force entrenched in the nation. The means that were employed for their eviction could be the means employed to keep a prospective invader at bay. As Gandhi stated :

"Surely the means adopted for driving an enemy (Britain) from ones house must, more or less coincide, with those adopted for keeping him [i.e. the enemy invader] out of the house. If anything the process must be easier".²⁴

◊ Gandhi constantly reiterated that his experiments of non-violent mass action were being pursued to provide an alternative means for the defence of a nation. The historical means have been only created fear and mistrust.

It has been countered by superior violence which has been continuously improved to the point of an 'exact science of war',²⁵ culminating in the atom bomb. 'What Gandhi sought to provide was an alternative to the 'orthodox method',²⁶ of armaments in the form of disarmament and non-violence due to the historical failure of the orthodox method.

Gandhi thus states :-

"The safest course is to lay down laws on the strength of our usual experience, and our usual experience is that in most cases non-violence is the real antidote of violence, (emphasise) and it is safe to infer from it that the highest violence can be met by the highest non-violence."²⁷

Again in the article titled UNREPENTANT Gandhi reiterates :-

"You have never tried the method [non-violence] on any scale. In so far as it has been tried, it has shown promising results."²⁸

Fear Removal

In Gandhi's analysis of war and peace, fear is an issue which plays an important role in the disruption of peace and is one of the major causes of war. It logically follows that for the negation of war and the maintenance of peace, the major causes of war has to be removed. 'Fear and mistrust being one of the major causes of war, hence have to be removed for the maintenance of peace.'

• Fear and mistrust are the products of armaments. Hence for the removal of fear and mistrust, which is essential for the maintenance of peace, one has to negate the cause which is armaments. However, forcible disarmament cannot lead to peace. Here the remedy is worse than the disease. "Armed preparedness for the defence of a nations frontiers is the result of fear and mistrust,' which expands continuously leading to war".²⁹ He reiterated again his mistrust of armed preparedness as the future defence policy of India. "When we talk of armed preparation, we contemplate preparation to meet any violent combination with our superior violence. If India ever prepared herself that way she would constitute the greatest menace to world peace. For if we take that path, we will also have to choose the path of exploitation, like the European nations".³⁰

• Forcible disarmament is no remedy. It is the product of forcible imposition of an alien desire. It does not come from within.⁶ Speaking about the San Francisco Conference which ultimately led to the United Nations Organization, Gandhi Said :

"Whatever it may be, the Conference shall have much to do with the world to be after the so called end of the war. I very much fear that behind the structure of world security sought to be raised lurk mistrust and fear which breed war. ...Peace must be just... it must neither be punitive or vindictive... the fruits of peace must be equally shared... there will be no armed peace imposed upon the forcibly disarmed. The

retention of an international police will be a concession to human weakness, not by any means an emblem to peace."³²

Forcible disarmament is no remedy. History has proved that its results are disastrous. After World War I, Germany was forcibly disarmed by the allied and forced to sign the humiliating Treaty of Versailles. The allies in their treatment of Germany were extremely vindictive, the vindictiveness based on mistrust and fear. However it did not lead to a permanent peace. Instead Germany rose like the Phoenix and proved that the twenty years following the Treaty of Versailles was an illusory peace. Commenting as it Gandhi states :

"An armed conflict may bring disaster to German arms; it cannot change the German heart even as the last defeat did not. It produced a Hitler vowed to wreak vengeance on the victors. And what a vengeance it is!"³²

Hence it follows that forcible disarmament is not the solution for world peace. An armed peace also cannot be achieved upon the forcibly disarmed. Neither can structures of world security behind which lurk 'fear and mistrust' succeed in bringing about world peace.

Gandhi's insistence about the removal of fear as a pre-condition to world peace is implicitly found in the writings of Morgenthau, as the basis of the armaments race so as to maintain the balance of power.

Morganthau in POLITICS AMONG NATIONS states :-

"The uncertainty of all power calculations not only makes the balance of power incapable of practical applications but leads also to its very negation in practice. Since no nation can be sure that its calculation of the distribution of power at any particular moment in history is correct, it must at least make sure that its errors, whatever they may be, will not put the nation at a disadvantage in contest for power. In other words the nation must try to have at least a margin of safety which will allow it to make erroneous calculations and still maintain the balance of power. To that effect, all nations actively engaged in the struggle for power must actually aim not at a balance - that is equality of power, but at superiority of power in their own behalf. And since no nation can foresee how large its miscalculations will turn out to be, all nations must ultimately seek the maximum of power obtainable under the circumstances. Only thus can they hope to attain the maximum margin of safety commensurate with the maximum errors they commit. The limitless aspiration for power, potentially always present, as we have seen, in the power drives [manifested in the armaments race etc.] of nations finds in the balance of power a mighty incentive to transform itself into actuality."³³

It is implicit in Morganthau's theorem that armament is the product of fear, which increases continuously. One nation unsure of another nation's strength and power seeks to enhance its power by increasing its arms. This results in a corresponding increase in arms by the other nation. The process is continuous such that it culminates in war. Hence Gandhi prescribes disarmament by a nation so as to remove the opposing nation's fear of the motives of armaments. Hence disarmament as a means to end fear and mistrust which is seen as one of the primary causes of war, is an essential

pre-requisite for the achievement of world peace in the Gandhian scheme of things. Here disarmament removes fear and mistrust which removes one of the causes of war which subsequently leads to peace.

Negating the Warriors Psychology

Disarmament and its complementary, non-violence of the strong, is seen by Gandhi from a different angle: it is seen as an antidote to a warriors psyche of attacking the armed which threatens him. History is replete with examples of men doing good to others. In fact it all action of the world is categorized as violent and non-violent, the non-violent action is preponderant. It is rarely that we find the non-violence action is met with extreme violence. Only violence and expected violence leads to violent action of the warrior. Regarding the negation of a warriors will to attack the unarmed, Gandhi appealed to the Britons, to lay down their arms against Hitler and stated :

"Why should the appeal breed any ill will at all? There is no cause given for it by the manner or matter of the appeal. I have not advised cessation of fight. I have advised lifting it to a plane worthy of human nature, of the divinity man shares with God himself. If the hidden meaning of the remarks is that by making the appeal I have strengthened Nazi hands, the suggestion does not bear scrutiny. Herr Hitler can only be confounded by the adoption by Britain of the novel method of fighting. At one single stroke, he will find that all his tremendous armament has been put out of action. A warrior lives on his wars, whether offensive or defensive. He suffers a collapse if he finds

that his warning capacity is unwanted' (emphasise mine).³⁴

Gandhi reiterates the psychological rationale of disarmament:

"The meaning of refusal to own allegiance [to Hitler and Mussolini by giving all earthy possessions] is clear. You will not bow to the supremacy of the victor, you will not help him attain his object. Herr Hitler has never dreamt of possessing Britain. He wants the British to admit defeat. The victor can demand anything he likes from the vanquished and the latter has perforce to yield. But if defeat is not admitted, the enemy will fight until he has killed the opponent. A Satyagrahi, however, is dead to his body even before he attempts to kill him, i.e., he is free from attachment to his body and only lives in the victory of the soul. Therefore when he is already thus dead why should he yearn to kill anyone. To die in the act of killing is in essence to die defeated. Because if the enemy is unable to get what he wants from you alive, he will decide to get it after killing you. If on the other hand, the realizes that you have not to remotest thought in your mind of raising your hand against him, even for the sake of your life, he will lack the zest to kill you. Every hunter has had this experience. No one has ever heard of anyone hunting cows." (emphasise mine)³⁵

Thus for Gandhi disarmament and non-violence is a means for opening another front in the struggle for world peace, which has hitherto been never properly analyzed. It is the means to destroy the murderous psychology of a warrior by acting not in accordance of a expected norms but using the revolutionary method of Ahimsa which removes the warriors zest.

The expected reaction of a nation being invaded is that of armed defence. For Gandhi, instead of defending by arms and using non-violence of the strong as a new and unexpected method, is a means whereby the deviation from historical and expected norms of defence attacks the psychology of the warrior leading to the 'warriors collapse'.

The element of deviation from the expected norms rendering the psychology of the warrior non-determinant is explained by Gandhi using the analogy of the wolf and the sheep and the cat and mouse analogy whereby the cat every time it attacks the mouse expects the mouse to run away. It has never expected the mouse turning around and offering itself. The fun is in the chase. However if the mouse turns around and offers itself the cat will be non-plussed and the rationale for attack is removed because the mouse does not run thereby negating the prospects of a chase.³⁶

The mouse cannot turn around and offer itself because it does not have the capacity to think and because of instinct. The human being however differs, having the capacity to think and offer itself. This will destroy the psychology of the chase.

The psychological aspect of turning the tables by acting by a norm that is unexpected of the invaded country was dealt by Gandhi on the Abyssinian question. Italy under

Mussolini had invaded Abyssinia and had made it a colony of theirs. In reply to a letter Gandhi states in an article titled THE ENGLISH PACIFISTS :

"Non-violence is the activist force on earth, and it is my conviction that it never fails. But if the Abyssinians had adopted the attitude of non-violence of the strong i.e., the non-violence that breaks to pieces but never bends, Mussolini would have had no interest in Abyssinia. Thus if they had simply said: 'You are welcome to reduce us to dust or ashes, but you will not find one Abyssinian to co-operate with you,' what would Mussolini would have done? He did not want a desert. Mussolini wanted submission not defiance, and if he had met the quiet dignified and non-violent defiance that I have described, he would certainly have been obliged to retire".³⁷

• Disarmament, thus for Gandhi has the added lustre and quality of acting on the invaders/warrior/hunters psychology whereby the unexpected action, the action that is totally incongruent to the expected norm, leads to negation of the invaders proposed action.'

The Ends and Means

Disarmament became a logical and inherent necessity for World Peace not simply from an ethical and moral viewpoint but due to the basic congruence of ends and means. If the means are good the end product would naturally be good and if the means are bad the end product would definitely be bad. Gandhi's political and moral philosophy was a total negation of Machiavellism and its total

vitiating of morality whereby no means were deemed inferior to any of the desired ends: the ends justified the means. Gandhi throughout his political life reiterated the necessity of proper means which only could achieve the desired products.

The negation of armaments as a method for the defence of a nation because the means were not good was explicitly stated by Gandhi when questioned by Miss Eve Curie (the daughter and biographer of her distinguished mother Madame Curie) as a Press correspondent representing the New York Herald. On the question of India's defence against an expected Japanese attack in 1942 Gandhi replied:

"It is physically impossible to transform India suddenly into an armed nation. To give our people weapons and to teach them non-violence are two different methods of making them strong. Both take time. I simply believe that my method is surer and more precise, and in the long run more successful. In order to beat the Japanese and German allies you must become stronger than they are and therefore worse and more ruthless. Then what have you won? Nothing. On the contrary, nations fighting with Non-violence are unconquerable, for their strength does not rely on the number of rifles and machine guns they possess. And when the method is good, there is no need to worry about immediate results. Success is bound to come in the end (emphasise mine). In a non-violent struggle there are two alternatives: either the enemy comes to terms with you, then you win without blood; or the enemy annihilates you. This last solution is not worse than what a violent war in any case brings about."³⁸

The congruence of ends and means hence negated armaments as the basis for peace. The consequences of armament are a future slaughter. 'One thing is certain. If the mad race for armaments continue, it is bound to result in a slaughter such as has never occurred in history'.³⁹ For Gandhi arms as a means for bringing about peace would always be a failure. Even an armed conflict which brought 'disaster to German arms ...produced a Hitler vowed to wreak vengeance on the victors'.⁴⁰ Here the means were an armed conflict which defeated the Germans and forcibly disarmed them. The end product was Hitler and a subsequent war. Inferior and bad means led to a disaster.

The ends means issue was further reiterated in 1939 when the Congress Working Committee felt unprepared for non-violent defence (essential for a disarmed nation) where he states:

"Surely, the means adopted for driving an enemy (Britain) from one's house must, more or less, coincide with those adopted for keeping him (i.e. the enemy or invader) out of house. If anything the process must be easier".⁴¹

Here Gandhi was speaking from personal experience and not merely theorizing. The British had invaded India, disarmed her and entrenched herself on Indian soil so as to pursue a vigorous policy of exploitation. All violent methods had failed as a means to end alien rule. Violence had been met by violence. The 1857 Sepoy Mutiny was

ruthlessly crushed. Various rebellions in every corner of India had been vigorously stamped out. Revolutionary terrorism of Aurobindo Ghosh, Surya Sen, Chandrashekar Azad and Bhagat Singh were all ruthlessly suppressed. It also did not lead to the removal of British rule.

However it was through the process of non-violent action with its various manifestations such as non-cooperation, civil disobedience and constructive work, as developed by Gandhi and utilized as a weapon effectively by the Indian National Congress during the Indian Independence struggle, that effectively secured steady concessions that began as the crumbs of an empire and finally ended in the withdrawal of the British and the establishment of an independent Indian state without shedding much blood. This bloodless revolution was the product of Gandhi's non-violent approach towards any positive action. Hence Gandhi when he says that 'the means used for removing an enemy from ones house' has to be the same as that of keeping him away is theoretically right from the point of view that he is speaking from personal experimentation. A prospective invader would at the most be equivalent to the British. Since they have not yet invaded it would be easier to keep them at bay than to remove the already entrenched. If the British can be removed non-violently and since it is much more easier to stall an invader thereby proving that non-

violence can be successful against the prospective invader. Hence a negation of the necessity of armament.

Armaments, for Gandhi, can never be used successfully for countering armaments. The cure here becomes worse than the disease since the end product is armaments and violence raised to the 'nth degree'.⁴² 'Hitlerism will never be defeated by counter Hitlerism. It can only breed superior Hitlerism raised to the nth degree.' Here all forms of violence and its manifestations (i.e. armaments) can never counter another by copying it. The product is a superior form of violence of increased intensity which can only lead to destruction. Here too the means adopted to counter violence is deficient and wrong since it is the same as the opponents and since both their means are inherently bad the product hence is bad, i.e. 'Hitlerism raised to the nth degree.'

Hitlerism and Nazism is the logical outcome of the policy of defence by armaments. It leads to the increasing brutalization of man whether he be of the strong minority or weak majority. The utilization of arms necessitates the brutalization of man since the defence by armaments means killing of others i.e. invaders.

"There is always a weak majority that would want protection against man's mischief. The orthodox method (i.e. defence by armaments) we know. Nazism is its logical outcome. It is an answer to a definite want... Thus the logical outcome

of the violent method seems to be increasingly to brutalize man including the weak majority."⁴³

Preparing for defence by armaments, as the specific means towards the defence of a nations frontiers is a policy that is essentially wrong since its end product is exploitation of other nations which is the basic cause of wars. Hence the necessity of ending even preliminary armaments so as to ensure peace and negate one of the main causes of wars. Gandhi states that:

"when we talk of armed preparation, we contemplate preparation to meet any violent combination of violence with our superior violence. If India ever prepared herself that way she would constitute the greatest menace to World peace. For if we take that path, we will also have to choose the path of exploitation like the European nations'.⁴⁴

Armed peace to Gandhi is inherently contradictory. Weapons and armaments have been historically used to impose an alien will on a nation. It has historically been the means for wars, annihilation and mass murders. It is the product of the 'science of war'. Hence the methods and instruments used for disrupting peace can never ensure or maintain peace. If ever there is peace it will 'only be for a short period and thus illusory. War will be the logical outcome just as the Great war was followed by an illusory peace that was experienced by Europe before this war'.⁴⁵ Hence for the maintenance of peace it is essential to disarm

since an armed peace is theoretically and practically contradictory in Gandhian political philosophy. The means not being congruent to the ends results in a disaster. Armaments are a means of war and not peace. Hence an armed peace would consequently lead to a war. The interregnum between two wars that continually dot the political landscape of history evidences of armed 'peace's' that are failed disastrously. It had only culminated in wars, each more ruthless than the previous such that the primitive wars using spears and stones has now culminated into the utilization of atomic and nuclear weapons.

Armaments, hence, being contradictory for the maintenance of peace necessitates its negation. It thus follows that peace can be maintained only by disarmament and by no other means. History is the proof of the failure of various experiments of armed peace. The experiment of armed peace having failed throughout the course of history hence requires its substitution by a new means for desired peace. The only other alternative is a disarmed peace. Here the means are congruent with the ends and also have the Gandhian pre-requisite of being good whereby the results would always succeed in being good. Neither is disarmament contradictory to peace. In fact it is an essential pre-condition for peace.

The Pre-condition for a true Democracy

•Disarmament and non-violence are the essential preconditions, in Gandhian thought, for the establishment of a pure democracy.* Democracy and armaments which are instruments of violence are antithetical. As Gandhi stated:

'Democracy dreads to spill blood.'⁴⁶

Armaments are the products of the 'Science of war'. Beginning with stone tools, this science of war has produced an infinite variety of the instruments of destruction, culminating in the atom bomb: the ultimate weapon of destruction. However, this science of war has also produced Nazism and Hitler. As Gandhi stated:

'There is always a "weak majority" that would want protection... The orthodox method (armaments) we know. Nazism is its logical outcome.'⁴⁷

The science of war has produced Hitler and 'Hitlerism'.

'Whatever Hitler may ultimately prove to be we know what Hitlerism has come to mean. It means naked ruthless force, reduced to an exact science and worked with scientific precision.'⁴⁸

The science of war, manifested in armaments, has been raised to very high level and has led to inhuman

dictatorships, characterized by Hitler and Mussolini, which subsequently led to some of the worst outrages and inhuman acts in history. Since the science of war, manifested in armaments, leads to dictatorship it follows that disarmament is a necessary precondition for the establishment of a pure democracy. Thus Gandhi states:

'Science of war leads one to dictatorship, pure and simple. Science of non-violence can alone lead one to pure democracy'.⁴⁹

Ideally speaking, Gandhi is for the abolition of the State, for it represents violence in the most concentrated form. But, as a 'practical idealist' he felt that such an ideal was impossible of full realization, as far as he could see. Hence he retained the State as a 'practicable' or second best ideal, but divested it of violence or concentrated power to the maximum extent possible. And he therefore called it the 'predominantly non-violent state'.⁵⁰ It is such a state which is a pure democracy based on the science of non-violence.

B. Disarmament: The Process

The Gandhian process of disarmament does not merely involve two heads of states or a conference, whereby a reduction of arms is a matter of bargaining and strategy. The classical method of disarmament involves precise calculations based on the profit motive: i.e. to secure or

maintain an advantage in terms of armaments. It is also based on the arithmetic of armaments and ends there. The outcome of the disarmament talks is just the reduction or abolition of one class of weapons, which compared to the weapons that are to be retained is an insignificant percentage.

Gandhi's analysis of war and peace led him to conclude that the springs of disorder and violence are not to be found at the international level alone.⁵¹ According to Gandhi, the problems of war and peace form part of a larger problem of world order at various levels, namely, individual, national and international. Gandhi's approach to world order and disorder formed an entire social philosophy or way of life.⁵² Disarmament hence involved more than the mere reduction of arms.

International conflict is not the product of a leadership crisis, or bad leaders, nor is it a product of diplomatic failures. International conflict arises, according to Gandhi, because violence permeates every sphere of life. It thus follows disarmament per-se cannot be brought about by simple reduction of arms, nor can a stable world order be brought about by merely eschewing violence in international relations.

The individual as well as his local or national environment should be so ordered or organized as to regulate

or minimize and possibly eliminate violence - the individual by re-ordering his life through self discipline, education and training, and the nations of the world by re-structuring their political and socio-economic objectives and structures along non-violent lines. Only then will international relations tend to be peaceful and co-operative.

It is through the development of the individual that the process of disarmament can be successfully concluded, for it is the aggregate of individuals that make up the state and impart their characteristics on the state which gives the state a definite ideology, structure and direction.

.Thus if the majority of the individuals believe in violence as the means of defence, the nation will pursue a policy of armaments. Similarly if the majority believes in the capability of non-violence as not only the instrument of defence but also the basis of human action then the state becomes a non-violent disarmed state. Hence, in the Gandhian scheme it is the individual and his development that becomes a necessary condition of successful disarmament:

Gandhi thus states:

'Disarmament is only possible if⁵³ you use the matchless weapon of non-violence'.

'A non-violent State must be broad based on the will of an intelligent people, will able to know its mind and act up to it. In such a State, the assumed section (i.e. believers of violence as the means of defence) can only be negligible. It can never stand against the deliberate will of the overwhelming majority represented by the state. The government of the day is not outside the people. It is the will of the overwhelming majority. If it is expressed non-violently, it cannot be a majority of one but nearer 99 against 1 in a hundred.⁵⁴

Thus disarmament is only possible with the use of non-violence by a state. Such a state is possible when, the majority of the people believe in non-violent defence. Hence to achieve disarmament it becomes necessary to convert the individual into a believer of non-violence.

The best field, according to Gandhi for the development of AHIMSA in human beings is the domestic field, because non-violence between members of a family is easy to practice. Secondly non-violent action outside the house is a contradiction if action inside is the opposite, leading to its failure. The family hence becomes the 'primary school' for AHIMSA education.

In an article titled THE BEST FIELD FOR AHIMSA,⁶³ Gandhi states:

I propose to invite attention today to the ...best field for the operation of non-violence. This is the family field in the wider sense than the ordinary. Thus members of an institution should be regarded as a family. Non-violence, as between members of such families, should be easy to practice. If that fails, it means that we have not developed the capacity for pure non-

violence. For the love we have to practice towards our relatives or colleagues in our family or institution, we have to practice towards our foes, dacoits, etc. If we fail ⁵⁵ in one case, success in the other is a chimera.

We have generally assumed that though it may not be possible to exercise non-violence in the domestic field, it is possible to do so in the political field. This has proved a pure delusion. We have chosen to describe our methods as non-violence, and thus caricatured non-violence itself. ...(and) proved useless at the critical moment. The alphabet of AHIMSA is best learnt in the domestic school, and I can say from experience that if we were a success there, we were sure to do so everywhere else. For a non-violent person the whole world is one family. ⁵⁶ He will thus fear none nor will others fear him.

Subsequently Gandhi adds another means for the development of AHIMSA, i.e., the constructive programme. On the question of preparation for non-violence Gandhi states:

'The best preparation for, and even the expression of, non-violence lies in the determined pursuit of the constructive programme. Anyone who believes that, without the backing of the constructive programme, he will show non-violent strength when the testing time comes will fail miserably. It will be like the attempt of a starving unarmed man to match his physical strength against a fully fed and panoplied soldier, foredoomed to failure. He who has no belief in the constructive programme, has in my opinion, no concrete feelings for the starved millions. He who is devoid of that feeling cannot fight non-violently. In actual practice, the expansion of my non-violence has kept exact pace with that of my identification with starved humanity. I am still far from the non-violence of my conception, for am I not still far away from the identification of my conception with dumb humanity.' ⁵⁷

As stated earlier, the Law of Love forms the basis of Gandhian thought and it is through that law that non-violence functions. Hence for the development of AHIMSA by an individual necessitates his functioning through that Law of Love which leads to the constructive programme and identification with the dumb humanity.

.In the regimen provided by Gandhi for the development of the individual, Gandhi lays stress on training and discipline.' He states:

'It takes a fairly strenuous course of training to attain to a mental state of non-violence. In daily life it has to be a course of discipline though one may not like it, like, for instance the course of a soldier. But I agree that, unless there is a hearty co-operation of the mind, the more outward observance will be mask, harmful both to man and himself and to others. The perfect stage is reached only when mind, and body and speech are in proper co-ordination.'⁵⁸

.The discipline of the individual consists, chiefly, of a five fold commitment'- broadly based on the famous PANCH YAMAS of Patanjali - whose YOGASUTRA Gandhi studied in South Africa.⁵⁹ They are - SATYA (Truth), AHIMSA (non-violence), BRAHMACHARYA (self control), ASTEYA (non-stealing) and APARIGRIHA (non-possession or only such possessions as are dictated by necessity).⁶⁰ There are however, other commitments or 'VOWS' recommended by Gandhi which include fearlessness, removal of untouchability, 'bread labour' (earning one's bread by manual/physical labour), tolerance,

humility, silence and the use of SWADESHI.⁶¹ This is a formidable list but it is subject to some concessions. Gandhi stressed not on total adherence or achievement but on honest, ever-increasing endeavour.⁶² Gandhi did not expect the full vigorous observance of discipline from the masses - that is limited to leaders.⁶³ His personal example was always cited by him to prove that this regimen was not impossible. What he could do could be, hence, done by others. Secondly the military also enforces vigorous discipline. Gandhi thus states:-

'Of course the critics can reasonably argue that the non-violence pictured by me is not possible, for masses of mankind, it is possible only for a few highly developed persons. I have combated that view and suggested that, given proper training and proper generalship, non-violence can be practiced by masses of mankind.'⁶⁴

On the issue of discipline Gandhi states:-

'It takes a fairly strenuous course of training for them to attain a mental state of non-violence. In daily life, it has to be the course of discipline ...like for instance the life of a soldier.'⁶⁵

This view of Gandhi (that individual discipline and training is essential for the creation of a peaceful world order) has wide support among contemporary thinkers and social philosophers. Thus Bertrand Russell writes, "What is needed is unifying or integration first of our individual lives, then of the life of the community and of the world, without sacrifice of individuality."⁶⁶

The next essential step in Gandhi's long term approach, is the re-structuring or re-organization of the political, socio-economic and the educational system within the states or nations. The most outstanding feature of this re-organization is de-centralization, both political and economic.

The re-organization of the educational system and its curriculum was essential to the Gandhian scheme. Gandhi said that education must be of a new type for the sake of creation of a new world. He referred to Aldous Huxley who, he observed, represented a new type of thought which was working in the mind of Europe today. 'It might be a minority today but if Europe was to save itself from suicide, something along the lines of non-violence has to be adopted.'⁶⁷

In the Indian context, Gandhi advocates education through handicrafts, with the CHARKHA as its symbol.⁶⁸ The idea is to establish coordination between the mind and the body - so as to guard against the depressive or frustration-aggression potentialities of a purely mental or sedentary culture - and to canalize and give a vigorous, peaceful direction to man's impulses and drives from early childhood.⁶⁹ Such an education in conjunction with the discipline of the individual and other constructive activities (advocated by Gandhi), could help much in shaping

a peace loving co-operative personality. To use Tinbergens phrase, it is a 'shift not only frame a war to a peace economy, but (also) from a war to a peace mentality.'⁷⁰

The next essential step is the creation of a non-violent state. Ideally speaking, Gandhi is far the abolition of the state, for it represents violence in the most concentrated form. But as a 'practical idealist, he felt that such an ideal (like ultimate ideals generally) was impossible of full realization, as far as he could see. Hence he retained the state as a 'practicable' or second best ideal, but divested it of violence and coercive power to the maximum extent possible. He therefore called it a predominantly non-violent state.

Gandhi, hence, advocates the widest possible dispersal of power, since corruption is in direct proportion to concentration of power. The greater the power, more the corruption and greater violence. His 'predominantly non-violent state' hence will have a federal structure in which the Central Government would have only a few, enumerated functions of national importance. The real repository of functional power or responsibility will be the village - the smallest socio-political unit - where the people will rule themselves and where there will be little scope by one over the others, and for political indoctrination, manipulation or abuse of authority. Even defence will be decentralized.⁷¹

Decentralization will be achieved by means of small-scale and widely-scattered village or cottage industries, in the socio-economic sphere. Production would be geared to the needs of the local population so as to make every village self-sufficient. And though Gandhi is not absolutely opposed to the use of machinery his emphasis is un-mistakably on the handicrafts. Machinery may be used in those rare cases alone where it leads to no exploitation and where it helps lighten the cottage workers burden.

,Gandhi's non-violent state bids farewell to arms and police. Their place will be taken by peace brigades or satyagrahis who in the performance of their duty would be prepared even to lay down their lives without taking recourse to arms and force.' Thus Gandhi states:

'Nevertheless, I have conceded that even in a non-violent state a police force may be necessary. This, I admit, is a sign of my imperfect AHIMSA. I have not the courage to declare that we can carry on without a police force as I have in respect of an army. Of course, I can and do envisage a state where the police will not be necessary; but whether we shall succeed in realizing it, the future will show.

The police of my conception will, however, be of a wholly different pattern from the present day force. Its ranks will be composed of believers in non-violence. They will be servants, not masters of the people'.⁷²

The chief qualities of the soldiers of a non-violent army and police should be, according to Gandhi, a living

faith in God, discipline, truthfulness, and devotion to duty. A training in arms becomes unnecessary.

Only after these transformations in the internal structures of nations making them 'predominantly non-violent states', and a non-exploitative state that the stage is set for successful disarmament, since conference among nations by themselves will not provide for a permanent peace.

'Peace cannot be established through mere conferences.'⁷³

Gandhi speaks of a World Federation of Free States⁷⁴ and a Common-wealth of World States⁷⁵ but they are for 'reducing to minimum the possibility of armed conflict between different states'.⁷⁶ It is only after the state becomes predominantly non-violent that disarmament is possible. °

It is after this state that Gandhi proposes unilateral disarmament by one state, i.e. that state that has become 'predominantly non-violent'. Gandhi thus states:

'Peace is unattainable by part performance of conditions, even as chemical combinations is impossible without complete fulfillment of conditions of attainment thereof... If recognized leaders of mankind, who have control over the engines of destruction, were wholly to renounce their use with full knowledge of implications permanent peace can be obtained.... If even one great nation were unconditionally to perform the supreme act of renunciation, many of us would see in our lifetime visible peace established on earth.'⁷⁷ [emphasis mine]

Unilateralism is reiterated again:

'It is however, open to great powers to take it up and day and cover themselves with glory and earn the eternal gratitude of posterity. If they or any one of them could shed the fear of destruction, if they disarmed themselves, they will automatically help the rest to regain their sanity.'⁷⁸

'Peace will never come until the Great Powers⁷⁹ courageously decide to disarm themselves.'

Disarmament by a nation subsequently leads to fear removal, which being on the major causes of war, will automatically negate wars. Non-violence and disarmament will subsequently spread like contagion leading to further disarmament and world peace.⁸⁰ Gandhi thus states:

'Not until the Congress or a similar group of people represents the non-violence of the strong, will the world catch the infection.'⁸⁰

Disarmament is a manifestation of the non-violence of the strong. It is only after this that the world will catch the infection of disarmament.

The proposal for unilateral renunciation of nuclear capacity has been advocated from a religious, moral and pacifist point of view by several writers apart from Gandhi, like Victor Gallancz, Lewis Mumford and other. It has been endorsed by Bertrand Russell, Stephen King Hall and C. Wright Mills.⁸¹ Sir Stephen King Hall of England pleaded for a non-violent defence in his book DEFENCE IN THE NUCLEAR

AGE.⁸² He made a case for the Royal Commission of enquire into the possibilities for a non-violent defence of England through means of non-violent resistance. King Hall is a non-conventional pacifist, since he served in World War I and II. Naval cammander, Sir Stephen King Hall states:

'I have come round to the view that on the facts known to me and after endeavouring to assess the relative dangers of the risks inseparable from our present defence policy and those which seem to arise from adoption of the alternative policy (i.e. non-violent resistance), I support the idea of changing the basis of our defence strategy from one of violence to one of non-violence.'⁸³

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

1. Harijan : 11 Aug, 1940.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Harijan : 11 Aug, 1940.
5. Ibid.
6. Harijan : 12 Aug, 1940.
7. Harijan : 11 Aug, 1940.
8. Ibid.
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10. Harijan : 11 Aug, 1940.
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CHAPTER III : THE GANDHIAN APPROACH TO DEFENCE

Gandhi throughout his life experimented with different techniques of non-violent action as an alternative for violent action in the various spheres of human activity. Success of his experiments would be definite proof of the efficacy of non-violence, thereby helping to make violent action redundant. Gandhi was not a simple 'conscientious objector'. He was a pioneer against violent action. His work represents a major development of historical significance both in ethics and in politics.¹ The experiments with non-violent action began in Africa and with continuous refinement there developed the possibility of its effective use in conflict situations against political injustices and oppression while applying only non-violent means of action. It was then used effectively against the British. In the application of this approach many problems in the further development remained. Since history prior to Gandhi did not have any evidence of non-violent mass action, and his was a pioneering work, Gandhi believed that success of this nascent work proved that it was the key to the dilemma of how one can behave peacefully and at the same time actively and effectively oppose oppression and injustice. He believed that he had the solution for the conflicting demands of peace and national defence. Gandhi did give conditional support to violent resistance, but only as an alternative to cowardice and not non-violence. Hence

I shall first deal with the issue of Gandhi's support of violent resistance.

GANDHI'S CONDITIONAL SUPPORT TO VIOLENT ACTION

When faced with violent attack, suppression and political evil, Gandhi repeatedly said that resistance by violence was morally better than cowardice, submission and impotence. Thus when these specific statements of Gandhi are taken out of context, some distortions arise, making Gandhi sound contradictory to his creed of non-violence. This happens especially when the additional passages which contain explicit rejection of those same passages are not taken into account.

Gandhi never endorsed violence as a means of action is evident from his writings. Instead, Gandhi was condemning cowardice, passivity and submissiveness to evil. He wanted to end personal hypocrisy, whereby cowardice under the grab of non-violence distorted it. One has to first believe in non-violence and then only is it successful. One should not be hypocrites if they believed in violence. Thus Gandhi's crusade against cowardice is distorted, sometimes as support of violence.

He said that there was a superior alternative non-violent way of acting, which was the course in which he believed and which he recommended to others. There is no

sin like cowardice, in Gandhi's view.² Cowardice is "violence double distilled."³ There were some who sought to justify their passivity and inaction in times of crisis by pleading they were being "non-violent". Gandhi wrote, however,

We have always proclaimed from the housestops that non-violence is the way of the brave but there are some amongst us who have brought ahimsa (non-violence) into disrepute by using it as a weapon of the weak. In my opinion, to remain a passive spectator of the kind of crimes⁴ that Bombay has witnessed of late is cowardice.

Non-violence is not a cover for cowardice, but it is the supreme virtue of the brave. Exercise of non-violence requires far greater bravery than that of swordsmanship. Cowardice is wholly inconsistent with non-violence. Translation from swordsmanship to non-violence⁵ is possible and, at times, even an easy stage.

But cowards cannot for ever remain cowards. You do not know what a coward I was when young, and you will agree that I am not quite a coward today. Multiply my example and you will⁶ have one whole nation shaking off its cowardice.

Gandhi's condemnation of cowardice had a political as well as a moral intention. A national change from passivity and submission to defiance and self-reliance was essential in Gandhi's thinking. His view was that it was the Indian's submission and cooperation which made the British Raj possible.⁷

Gandhi insisted that people ought not, to pretend that they are abstaining from violence because of moral reasons

when in fact they are afraid to take part in any kind of struggle, even less courageous violent struggle.

...It is better to be violent, if there is violence in our breasts, than to put on the cloak of non-violence to cover impotence. Violence is any day preferable to impotence. There is hope for a violent man to become non-violent. There is no such hope for the impotent.

For, under swaraj (self-rule) too I would not hesitate to advise those who would bear arms to do so and fight for the country.

If an individual or a group of people are unable or unwilling to follow this great law of life (non-violence) ...retaliation or resistance unto death is the second best, though a long way off from the first. Cowardice is impotence worse than violence. The coward desires revenge but being afraid to die, he looks to others, may be the Government of the day, to do the work of defence for him. A coward is less than a man.¹⁰

It is clear from several statements that in these and some of the following quotations, that Gandhi was not supporting violence in certain cases but was rejecting cowardice in action. Violent action becomes a by product of this rejection and not the main product.

Various statements also make it clear that in such violence it is not the willingness to kill which Gandhi finds admirable, but the willingness to risk one's own death fighting for one's belief. It is in this context that his admiration can be best understood for instances of men fighting tenaciously to the last man against overwhelming

odds without any hope of victory. "If a man fights with his sword single-handed against a horde of decoits (bandits) armed to the teeth, I should say he is fighting almost non-violently."¹¹

...You must understand the meaning at the back of my mind. There is the refusal to bend before overwhelming might in the full knowledge that it means certain death. The Poles knew that they would be crushed to atoms, and yet they resisted the German hordes.¹² That was why I called it almost non-violence.

However, these statements do not mean that Gandhi viewed violence, even for a good objective, as an unmixed expression of bravery. Violence contained a significant element of fear and weakness. Thus Gandhi did not view violence even for a good objective as an unmixed expression of bravery.

"...Vengeance is any day superior to passive, effeminate and helpless submission. Forgiveness is higher still. Vengeance too is weakness. The desire for vengeance comes out of fear of harm, imaginary or real".¹³

Gandhi pursued the nonviolent way which was better. He made it clear in that discussion that "I do not believe in the use of arms, and ... it is contrary to the religion of ahimsa which I profess...." He said that it was difficult to practice that doctrine "in the midst of a world full of strife, turmoil and passions ... and yet the conviction too that without it life is not worth living is growing daily deeper."¹⁴ Gandhi wrote:

"I do not believe in short-cuts to success ... However much I may sympathize with an admirable worthy motives, I am an uncompromising opponent of violent methods even to serve the noblest of causes".¹⁵

In 'THE DOCTRINE OF THE SWORD' Gandhi states:

"Thus when my eldest son asked me what he should have done, had he been present when I was almost fatally assaulted in 1908, whether he should have run away and seen me killed or whether he should have used physical force which he could and wanted to use, and defended me, I told him that it was his duty to defend me even by using violence. Hence it was that I took part in the Boer War, the so-called Zulu Rebellion and the late War. Hence also I do advocate training in arms for those who believe in the method of violence. I would rather have India resort to arms in order to defend her honour than that she would, in a cowardly manner, become or remain a helpless witness to her own dishonour".¹⁶

The next paragraph which follows immediately and also certain other passages in the article to be quoted, negate the view that the passage establishes that Gandhi was a supporter of war and military defence:

"But I believe that non-violence is infinitely superior to violence, forgiveness is more manly than punishment. Forgiveness adorns a soldier. But abstinence is forgiveness only when there is the power to punish; it is meaningless when it pretends to proceed from a helpless creature. A mouse hardly forgives a cat when it allows itself to be torn to pieces by her. I therefore appreciate the sentiment of those who cry out for the condign punishment of General Dyer* and his

* General Dyer had ordered the shooting without warning of people at a peaceful meeting in 1919, the "Massacre of Jallianwala Bagh" in Amritsar.

ilk. They would tear him to pieces, if they could. But I do not believe India to be helpless. I do not believe myself to be a helpless creature. Only I want to use India's and my strength for a better purpose.¹⁷

AN ALTERNATIVE TO VIOLENT ACTION

Gandhi did not want simply an abstention from violence for whatever reason. He wanted men to give up violence because they were strong enough not to feel the need for it and because they had a better way of facing serious conflicts.

"What is wanted is a deliberate giving up of violence out of strength. To be able to do this requires imagination coupled with a penetrating study of the world drift".¹⁸

"Strength does not come from physical capacity. It comes from an indomitable will".¹⁹

"We are regarded as a cowardly people, Gandhi said.²⁰ He saw nonviolent resistance as a technique which did not make cowards of men. It also "infused courage" into them and so he recommended nonviolent action since "it was the weapon of the really brave."²¹

"The bravery of the non-violent is vastly superior to that of the violent.... there is no comparison between the two types of bravery. The one is limited, the other is limitless".²²

"And it is wrong to say that a person is unarmed in the sense of being weak who has ahimsa as his weapon."²³ There was no passive submission here. The use of nonviolent

action "does not mean meek submission to the will of the evil-doer, but it means the pitting of one's whole soul against the will of the tyrant."²⁴ In the code of the Satyagrahi there is no such thing as surrender to brute force."²⁵

It never implied that a non-violent man should bend before the violence of an aggressor ... He was not to return violence by violence but neutralize it by withholding one's hand and, at the same time, refusing to submit to the demand. This was the only civilized way of going on in the world.²⁶

The essentials for nonviolent struggle were courage and fearlessness, Gandhi insisted, it required more courage than did violence.

"I present Dr. Benes [President of the Czechoslovak Republic at the time of the Nazi invasion] with a weapon not of the weak but of the brave. There is no bravery greater than a resolute refusal to bend the knee to an earthly power, no matter how great, and that without bitterness of spirit and in the fullness of faith, that the spirit alone lives, nothing else does".²⁷

Gandhi's view was, therefore not that violence and military defense were necessary and right because the alternative was cowardice and submission to evil. A nonviolent alternative existed which he supported and sought to develop. "Satyagraha is always superior to armed resistance ... It is the weapon that adorns the strong."²⁸ "Non-violence is without exception superior to violence,

i.e. the power at the disposal of a non-violent person is always greater than he would have if he was violent."²⁹

Gandhi's nonviolent alternative was "designed to be a complete and effective substitute" for the means of violence in political conflicts. Satyagraha was, he said, "the real sanction".³⁰ In his testimony before the Hunter Committee in 1920, Gandhi declared that the Satyagraha movement was "intended to replace methods of violence ..." "It is conceived entirely with the object of ridding the country of the idea of violence."³¹ Gandhi wrote of satyagraha: "It was conceived as a complete substitute for violence."³² repeating. "Satyagraha has been designed as an effective substitute for violence."³³ Critics, or even smug "believers," might argue that such nonviolence was only suitable for a small moral elite. This was not Gandhi's view:

"Of course the critics can reasonably argue that the non-violence pictured by me is not possible for masses of mankind, it is possible only for the very few highly developed persons. I have combatted that view and suggested that, given proper training and proper generalship, non-violence can be practised by masses of mankind."³⁴

In Gandhi's view there thus existed two broad techniques of struggle, between which any realistic politics had to choose: the established means of political violence and the developing technique of nonviolent action.

"Non-co-operation may have come in advance of its time. India and the world must then wait, but there is no choice for India save between violence and non-co-operation".³⁵

Gandhi's basic approach to the problems of struggle and violence, therefore, was first to try to arouse people from cowardice and submissiveness, to urge them to be true to their convictions and ready to act against injustice, and second to try his best to present and demonstrate the nonviolent alternative technique of struggle which they could use. He could not do everything himself. Others too, would have to choose between the two techniques and help in their implementation. If people did not choose the nonviolent alternative then violence became inevitable; in such cases Gandhi often said that it was such, but these statements were descriptions of the situations, and not expressions of Gandhis moral choice.

MILITARY DEFENCE: CONTRADICTORY TO DEMOCRACY

Notwithstanding the fact that Gandhi in the early part of his career gave qualified support to violent resistance [and that too only against cowardice] and participated in a certain degree, but never using weapons Gandhi never favoured military defence. Arms was a symbol of helplessness and not of strength. Infact arms would lead to the negation of democracy and hence military defence never become a part of his whole social and political Philosophy. It is however

important to note that Gandhis thinking about war and the means of removing it developed considerably in his later years.

Gandhi never changed his view that those who believed in violence ought to be willing to take part in violent resistance against oppression and invasion. His 1921 statement remained valid: "For, under Swaraj too I would not hesitate to advise those who would bear arms to do so and fight for the country."³⁶ But that did not mean that he favored military defense. Violence was "at best a poor weapon of defence."³⁷ Arms were a symbol of helplessness, not of strength. Contrary to the preponderant view that military defense was necessary to defend democracy, Gandhi believed that democracy and the military way were incompatible with each other. "It will be a poor democracy that depends for its existence on military assistance."³⁸ Democracy and the military spirit he held to be a contradiction in terms."³⁹ "...[D]emocracy and dependence on the military and the police are incompatible."⁴⁰

"Peace through superior violence inevitably led to the atom bomb and all that it stood for. It was the completest negation of non-violent and of democracy₄₁ which was not possible without the former".

This perception of interrelationships between the type of ultimate sanction and the type of political system was based in part on Gandhi's view that under democracy "the

weakest should have the same opportunity as the strongest. That can never happen except non-violence".⁴ Gandhi believed that there also existed a significant interrelationship between modern political violence and extreme dictatorship. The processes operating in modern war strongly tended toward the destruction of genuine political democracy even in the victorious and previously democratic country.

"Science of war leads one to dictatorship pure and simple. Science of non-violence can alone lead one to pure democracy".⁴³

"Democracy and violence can ill go together. The States that are today nominally democratic have either to become frankly totalitarian or, if they are to become truly democratic, they must become courageously non-violent".⁴⁴

SUPERIOR NAZISM IS NOT THE MEANS.

Gandhi, rejected any possible alliance with Germany or Japan even for the aim of defeating the British which would lead to the independence of India. He rejected any military alliance with the Allies as part of a bargain in exchange for India's independence (although he gave them moral support) Gandhi respected the Allies' determination to fight Nazism. He, however, could not approve of the means they used, since the product would be brutalization of human nature.

"For Britain, so long as she holds to the orthodox method, has to copy the Nazi methods, if she is to put up a successful defence. Thus the logical outcome of the violent method seems to be

increasingly to brutalize man including "the weak majority." For it has to give its defenders the required measure of co-operation".⁴⁵

"... [C]ounter-violence can only result in further brutalization of human nature".⁴⁶

"After all, what is the gain if the so-called democracies win? War certainly will not end. Democracies will have adopted all the tactics of the Fascists and the Nazis, including conscription and all other forcible methods to compel and exact obedience. All that may be gained at the end of the victory is the possibility of comparative protection of individual liberty. But that protection does not depend upon outside help. It comes from the internal determination to protect it against the whole world".⁴⁷

"What terrifies me," Gandhi wrote in late 1940. "is that as things are going on at present, defeat of Nazism will be bought at a terrific price, viz., superior Nazism, call it by any name you like."⁴⁸

In the July 1940 appeal "To Every Briton," Gandhi developed this theme:

"I appeal for cessation of hostilities, not because you are too exhausted to fight, but because war is bad in essence. You want to kill Nazism, You will never kill it by its indifferent adoption. Your soldiers are doing the same work of destruction as the Germans. The only difference is that perhaps yours are not as thorough as the Germans. If that be so, yours will soon acquire the same thoroughness as theirs, if not much greater. On no other condition can you win the war. In other words, you will have to be more ruthless than the Nazis. No cause, however just, can warrant the indiscriminate slaughter that is going on minute by minute. I suggest that a cause that demands the inhumanities that are being perpetuated today cannot be called just".⁴⁹

After the war, Gandhi wrote: "The United Nations set out to fight Hitler with his weapons and ended by out-Hitlering Hitler."⁵⁰ The Axis Power were crushed true but the result was "an empty victory."⁵¹ The atomic bomb and all that it stood for were a negation not only of nonviolence but also of democracy itself.⁵² Liberty and democracy would not be defended "by following totalitarian methods so far as war is concerned," Gandhi warned in 1940. "If liberty and democracy are to be truly saved they will only be by non-violent resistance no less brave, no less glorious, than violent resistance."⁵³

AGAINST THE MILITARIZATION OF INDIAN DEFENCE

In the absence of confidence in nonviolent alternatives leading to the inevitable use of violent means for India's defence was recognised by Gandhi. These acknowledgements of the probable course of events have been distorted by some critics. Gandhi explicitly rejected military defence for India, placing confidence on non-violent resistance. Thus in 1947 :

"Gandhiji said... that he had been an opponent of all warfare. But if there was no other way of securing justice from Pakistan, if Pakistan persistently refused to see its proved error and continued to minimize it, the Indian Union Government would have to go to war against it. War was not a joke. No one wanted war. That way lay destruction. But he could never advise anyone to put up with injustice ... ⁵⁴ As for Gandhiji himself, his way was different".

Later

"Gandhiji said ... that newspapers had displayed his remarks about war in such a way that there was an enquiry from Calcutta whether he had really begun to advocate war. He was wedded to non-violence for all time and could never advocate war. In a State run by him there would be no police and no military. But he was not running the Government of the Indian Union. He had merely pointed out the various possibilities ... That did not mean that his faith in⁵⁵ non-violence had weakened in the least degree".

Gandhi had said earlier :

"It is true that I do not agree with what many of my closest friends have done or are doing ... And what are the differences that matter? If you analyse them you would find only one fundamental difference to which all the others could be traced. Non-violence is my creed. It never was of the Congress. With the Congress it has always been a policy ... The Congress had every right to change it when it found it necessary".⁵⁶

Gandhi wanted that free India would present to the world a lesson of peace, not the lesson of hatred and violence of which the world is already sick of a otherwise India would become a third rate power, an unwieldy soulless imitation of western military states. The level of expenditure for military defence would mean that free India would bring no relief to the her exploited people.

"Our statesmen have for over two generations declaimed against the heavy expenditure on armaments under the British regime, But now that freedom from political serfdom has come, our military expenditure has increased and still threatens to increase and of this we are proud! There is not a voice raised against it in our legislative chambers. In spite, however, of the

madness and the vain imitation of the tinsel of the West, the hope lingers in me and many others that India shall survive this death dance and occupy the moral height that should belong to her after the training, however imperfect, in non-violence for an unbroken period of thirty-two years since 1915."⁵⁷

Gandhi had rejected outright any violent course that possibly India would adopt in the future.

"I believe absolutely that she has a mission for the world. She is not to copy Europe blindly. India's acceptance of the doctrine of the sword will be the hour of my trial. I hope I shall not be found wanting".⁵⁸

With the coming of independence India from British political rule, Gandhi saw the deliberate increase of India's military and warned of dictatorship emerging as the product and the possibility of war

"I see clearly that if the country cannot be turned to non-violence it will be bad for it and the world. It will mean goodbye to freedom. It might even mean a military dictatorship."⁵⁹

"When we talk of armed preparation, we contemplate preparation to meet any violent combination with our superior violence. If India ever prepared herself that way, she would constitute the greatest menace to world peace".⁶⁰

"If I am in the minority of one, I must try to make converts. Whether one or many, I must declare my faith that it is better for India to discard violence altogether even for defending her border. For India to enter into the race for armaments is to court suicide. With the loss of India to non-violence the last hope of the world will be gone".⁶¹

DEFENCE POLICY

History is replete with examples of oppression, injustices and conflict. In the future these will be oppression, injustice and conflicts. The military technique however was not the way to face these problems in Gandhi's opinion.

"He was convinced that unless India developed her non-violent strength, she had gained nothing either for herself or for the world. Militarization of India would mean her own destruction as well as of the whole world".⁶²

Gandhi rejected the military way while accepting the need for struggle and defense against aggression. There was a nonviolent alternative which could be adopted and applied successfully even by men who had spent their lives fighting by military methods.

In Gandhi's view defence capacity did not come from violence. Instead it was based in the capacity to live as men and remain, free men. There was no need for an army, if the people learned not to live as slaves to anyone. Gandhi spoke of "the true art of self-defence" :

"Violence always thrived on counter-violence. The aggressor had always a purpose behind his attack; he wanted something to be done, some object to be surrendered by the defenders. Now, if the defender steeled his heart and was determined not to surrender even one inch, and at the same time to resist the temptation of matching the violence of the aggressor by violence, the latter could be made to realize in a short while that it would

not be imposed in that way. This would involve suffering. It was his unalloyed self-suffering which was the truest form of self-defence which knew no surrender".⁶³

Gandhi at the time of the Italian invasion of Ethiopia expressed his opinion that Ethiopia should have been nonviolent, (not offering military resistance) refusing to give the Italians any cooperation even in face of violent sanctions. This noncooperation would thwart Italy's will because she wanted submission. Mussolini could have had "no interest in Abyssinia [Ethiopia] Mussolini wanted submission and not defiance and if he had met the quite, dignified and non-violent defiance that I have described, he would certainly have been obliged to retire."⁶⁴

He wrote:

"... [A]t the back of the policy of terrorism is the assumption that terrorism if applied in a sufficient measure will produce the desired result, namely bend the adversary to the tyrant's will. But supposing a people make up their mind that they will never do the tyrant's will, not retaliate with the tyrant's own methods, the tyrant will not find it worth his while to go on with his terrorism".⁶⁵

Hitler too saw this as a crucial point and argued that it was imperative to reach the minds of the populace and convince them that they were defeated. In ruling conquered people, the impression had to be given that conquerors were indeed the masters, Hitler told Rosenberg in May 1943. In the

occupied East, German policy had to be so tough as to numb the population's political consciousness. Hitler continued:

"... [R]uling the people in the conquered regions is, I might say, of course a psychological problem. One cannot rule by force alone. True, force is decisive, but it is equally important to have this psychological something which the animal trainer also needs to be master of his beast. They must be convinced that we are the victors ..."⁶⁶

But Gandhi maintained that men could and ought to refuse to become submissive and defeated subjects. By maintaining their courage, their self-respect and their self-confidence, they had the possibility of throwing off the tyrant. "It is claimed that a State can be based on non-violence, i.e., it can effect non-violent resistance against a world combination based on armed force".⁶⁷

Gandhi was convinced that national defense by nonviolent resistance would be more powerful and effective than military defense. Ahimsa was a force mightier than the force of the most powerful arms. The power that armaments give to defend right is nothing compared to the power that non-violence gives to do the same thing and that too with better show of reason. Such a means of defence would cost no more lives and in terms of financial and material cost would be much cheaper.⁶⁸ To the conflicting demands of peace and national defense, this was his solution.

Gandhi firmly rejected the view that nonviolence was of no present use to India since she needed instead a strong army. He said "that in this age, non-violence has little scope in the face of violence whereas, I make bold to say that in this age of the atom bomb unadulterated non-violence is the only force that can confound all the tricks of violence put together."⁶⁹

On problems of personal as well as wider conflicts Gandhi wrote:

"For me there can be no preparation for violence. All preparation must be for non-violence if courage of the highest type is to be developed. Violence can only be tolerated as being preferable always to cowardice ... The real effective resistance lies in non-violence ... [Since the world lacked] the highest courage namely courage born of non-violence, it arms itself even unto the atom bomb".⁷⁰

"... [I]n this age of the atom bomb there was no weapon like non violent resistance. It did not make cowards of men. It infused courage even in women. If he recommended non-violence, it was because he was convinced that it was the weapon of the really brave".⁷¹

"... [H]owever small a nation or even a group may be, it is able, even as the individual, provided that it has one mind as also the will and the grit, to defend its honour and self-respect against a whole world in arms. Therein consists the matchless strength and beauty of the unarmed. That is non-violent defence which neither knows nor accepts defeat at any stage. Therefore, a nation or a group which has made non-violence its final policy, cannot⁷² be subjected to slavery even by the atom bomb".

"... If my argument has gone home, is it not time for us to declare our changeless faith in non-violence of the strong and say we do not seek to defend our liberty with the force of arms but we will defend it with the force of non-violence".⁷³

NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE

Gandhi admitted that the non-violent technique had not been tried on a large scale, but has shown promising results whenever tried. These results and his distrust of the efficacy of violent means of conflict, led Gandhi to suggest that the victims and enemies of Nazism use nonviolent resistance instead of war as the means of fighting Nazism.

"Drastic diseases require drastic remedies. In this instance nothing but non-violence can cure Nazi violence".⁷⁴

Gandhi's appeal, was not simply on abstract moral grounds. It was also on grounds of practicality: nonviolent resistance if applied would be more effective in destroying Nazism and would give long-term results for peace and democracy.

"The non-violent method would have meant no abject surrender. It would have confounded all modern tactics of war, indeed rendered them of no use. The new world order, which all dream of, would surely have been found".⁷⁵

Gandhi appealed to Jews in Germany, to resist the Nazi persecutions by nonviolent resistance. Gandhi appealed to the Czechs and Slovaks to resist with his technique of

struggle. Munich was "a peace that was no peace."⁷⁵ British and French intervention could, however, have led only to unprecedented bloodshed and destruction. Yet violent resistance by Czechoslovakia alone was "pure bravado".

"If I were a Czech ... I would not be a vassal to any nation or body. ⁷⁶I must have absolute independence or perish".

Gandhi's prescription was resistance by non violent means :

"The Czechs could not have done anything else [other than what they did] when they found themselves deserted by their two powerful allies. And yet I have the hardihood to say that, if they had known the use of non-violence as a weapon for the defence of national honour, they would have faced the whole ⁷⁷might of Germany with that of Italy thrown in".

In particular, Gandhi appealed to the British peoples to resist Nazism with his technique of non-violent resistance.

"Herr Hitler ... contemptuously rejected the way of peace or persuasion and chose that of the sword. Hence my sympathy for the cause of the Allies. But my sympathies must not be interpreted to mean endorsement, in any shape or form, of the doctrine of the sword for the defence even of proved right. Proved right should be capable of being vindicated by right means as against the rude, i.e. sanguinary, means".

"I want you to fight Nazism without arms, or, if I am to retain the ⁷⁹military terminology, with non-violent arms".

"The meaning of refusal to own allegiance is clear. You will not bow to the supremacy of the victor, you will not help him to attain his object".⁸⁰

When Nazi armies seemed at times invincible and had conquered vast territories, Gandhi wrote.

"If the Nazis come to India, the Congress will give them the same fight that it has given Great Britain. I do not underrate the power of satyagraha...."⁸¹

With the prospect of a Japanese invasion of India, Gandhi counseled nonviolent resistance, although India's lack of independence of action and the presence of British armed forces fighting the Japanese, complicated the situation.

"If the British have retired in an orderly manner, leaving things in Indian hands, the whole thing can work splendidly and it might even be made difficult for the Japanese to settle down in India or any part of it in peace, because they will have to deal with a population which will be sullen and resistant. It is difficult to say what can happen. It is enough if people are trained to cultivate the power of resistance, no matter which power is operating - the Japanese or the British".⁸²

It is quite clear that Gandhi's general position was strongly in favour of national defense by nonviolent resistance by India and other countries. However He admitted that when it came to explanations of how his policy would actually operate, or to expositions of detailed courses of action which might be used, Gandhi's appeals and statements

were too vague and general to convince the "Hard-headed realists." He expressed his faith, that the self-suffering of Satyagrahis would convert the invaders or at least could influence them, who had been duped by their or at leader so that they might rebel against him, while reforming to Hitler.

Some critics feel that a times Gandhi's comments on how to meet an invasion were especially inadequate and unconvincing. In 1940 Gandhi was asked what he thought were the chances of free india adopting a non-violent defence policy, an in that event whether resistance would take place at the frontier or would be put into operation only after the physical occupation had taken place. Gandhi discussed the questions only generally, and prefaced his comments by a statement which made it clear that he realized that adequate answers to the practical problems had not yet been developed.

"The questions are admittedly theoretical. They are also premature for the reason that I have not mastered the whole technique no non-violence. The experiment is still in the making. It is not even in its advanced stage".⁸³

Gandhi clearly acknowledged the practical difficulties in the implementation of such a policy, saying, " the snag comes in when we consider the ways and means of working the non-violent method".⁸⁴ Gandhi assumed that these

difficulties would be solved in the course of action. Thus he wrote after the war: "If the Government had not arrested me in 1942, I would have shown how to fight Japan by non-violence".⁸⁵ "A non-violent man or society does not anticipate or provide for attacks from without. On the contrary, such a person or society firmly believes that nobody is going to disturb them."⁸⁶ Gandhi however demonstrated a fairly realistic anticipation of what the British and other governments might do such as the above comment on the prospect of a Japanese invasion and the need to resist it. He frequently emphasized the importance of training for such resistance.

"I have always advised and insisted on non-violent defence. But I recognize that it has to be learnt like violent defence. It requires a different training"⁸⁷

"... [G]iven proper training and proper generalship, non-violence can be practised by masses of mankind".⁸⁸

He was able only to point the general direction, and to try in a small way to find the answers. He never pretended that he had all the answer to all the questions on non-violent defense. His life was an experiment to gain a few insights and lead the way in the direction of non-violent defence.

"It [the experiment with nonviolence] has entered upon a most interesting, though at the same time a most difficult, stage [concerning its application to the defense problems]. I am

myself sailing on uncharted waters. I have to take soundings every half hour. ⁸⁹The difficulty only braces me for the struggle".

Very few understood how to wield this mighty weapon. People would gain an increased understanding of, and confidence in, nonviolent action as they saw it demonstrated in action as a powerful and effective technique against violent action.

"An ocular demonstration of the success of nation-wide Satyagraha must be a prelude to its world-wide acceptance and hence as a natural corollary to the admission of the futility of armament. The only antidote to armament, which is the visible symbol of violence, is Satyagraha, the symbol of non-Violence".⁹⁰

India's nonviolence could be "a sendable commodity" - to assist, for example, Norway, Denmark, Spain, and China in their plights - "when India has gained her freedom through non-violence."⁹¹

Gandhi sought to apply the technique in a society filled with inequality, injustice and oppression. He tried to develop a quite different way of fighting. Some have maintained that before men can use satyagraha they must first seek to perfect themselves. Gandhi counseled that no one ought to wait for perfection before trying to deal with oppression and war. His appeal to the British to adopt nonviolent resistance against Nazi system was met with strong criticism, but Gandhi remained convinced that his basic advice was sound.

"In spite of the fierce criticism which has been levelled against my letter "To Every Briton", I adhere to every word of it, and am convinced that posterity will adopt the remedy suggested therein against violence however organized and fierce. And now that the enemy is at the gates of India I am advising my countrymen the same course of action I advised the British people. My advice may or may not be accepted by my countrymen. I would remain unmoved ... I would subscribe to the my imperfection But a satyagrah does not wait for perfection before he invites others to experiment with him, provided always that his faith is immovable like a mountain ... If the war is damnable, how can [one] stop the things that go on by taking part in it, even though it may be on the defensive side and at the cost of his own life? For the defence has to resort to all the damnable things that the enemy does, and that with greater vigour if it has to succeed. Such a giving of life is not only not saying it but a mere waste".⁹²

Gandhi did not want people to accept his advice simply because he offered it: everyone had to think for him or herself and not "imitate others sheep-like",⁹³ since this would not lead to non-violent action of the strong. Imitation is only a poor variety, a useless caricature of the original.

DEFENCE POLICY OF INDIA

With independence visible in the horizon, the question of India's national defence naturally arose. There soon developed a rift on this question between Gandhi and the other national leaders led by Nehru and Patel who wanted a military as the means of defence as the politics of realism demanded, while Gandhi remained steady to his ideal that

non-violence and Ahimsa should form the basis of Indian defence. However with his rejection of power and it going into the hands of the Congress, Gandhis policy on non-violent defence was discarded. Looking forward to the time of independence, Gandhi saw the strong possibility that India would adopt military defense. Gandhi was of the opinion that the Congress ought to continue to rely on nonviolent means of struggle in political conflicts, including its use as a defense policy instead of war.

"It will make all the difference in the world whether the Congress is party to them [military preparations] or not. The world is looking for something new and unique from India. The Congress will be lost in the crowd, if it wears the same old outworn armour that the world is wearing today. The Congress has a name because it represents nonviolence as a political weapon par excellence".⁹⁴

In late 1939 Gandhi discussed with members of the Congress Working Committee the question of defending India against invasion by nonviolent means. The question was no longer "hypothetical".

"... [T]he Congress has to declare its policy and say whether it would fight the invading host violently or non-violently. So far as I can read the Working Committee's mind after a fairly full discussion, the members think that congressmen are unprepared for non-violent defence against armed invasion. This is tragic. Surely the means adopted for driving an enemy from one's house must, more or less, coincide with those to be adopted for keeping him out of the house. If anything the latter process must be easier.

Free India can have no enemy. And if her people have learnt the art of saying resolutely "no" and acting up to⁹⁵ it, I dare say, no one would want to invade her".

Gandhi acknowledged that "the chances of non-violence being accepted as a principle of State policy [by independent India] are very slight, so far as I can see at present".⁹⁶ On 21 June 1940 the question of defending India against invasion by nonviolent resistance was again discussed, when Gandhi attended the Congress Working Committee. Gandhi later wrote that he had "pleaded hard" with the Committee. They faced the problems both of internal order and external defense. Gandhi advocated meeting the emergency, "by non-violent action. For if all were non-violent, there could be no anarchy and there would be no question of anybody arming for meeting aggression from, without".⁹⁷ Following this discussion the Working Committee passed a declaration of policy which made it clear that Congress and Gandhi had different views on the means for national defense and that neither was responsible for the views or policy of the other. The Working Committee declaration read in part:

"Mahatma Gandhi has presented to the peoples of the world, crying for relief from the crushing burden of war, a weapon in the shape of organized non-violence designed to take the place of war for the defence of peoples rights and freedom against armed aggression. He feels that at this critical phase in the history of man the Congress should enforce this ideal by declaring that it

does not want that India should maintain armed forces to defend her freedom against external or internal disorder.

While the Working Committee hold that the Congress must continue to adhere strictly to the principle of non-violence in their struggle for independence, the Committee cannot ignore the present imperfection and failings in this respect of the human elements they have to deal with and the possible danger in a period of transition and dynamic change, until the Congress has acquired non-violent control over the people in adequate measure and the people have imbibed sufficiently the lesson of organised non-violence. The Committee have deliberated over the problem that has thus arisen and have come to the conclusion that they are unable to go the full length with Gandhiji. But they recognize that he should be free to pursue his great ideal in his own way, and therefore absolve him from responsibility for the programme and activity which the Congress has to pursue under the conditions at present prevailing in India and the world in regard to external aggression and internal disorder.

Many of the problems which the Working Committee have considered in this connection are not of the present, though they may be of the near future. The Committee wish to make it clear that the methods and the basic policy of non-violence in the national struggle for freedom continue with full force and are not affected in the least by the inability to⁹⁸ extend it to the region of national defence".

Gandhi failed in carrying the Congress with him, but he kept trying. In the midst of the war, in 1942. Gandhi was asked whether free India would adopt the methods of total war. He replied :

I cannot say whether free India will take part in militarism or choose to go the non-violent way. But I can say without hesitation that if I can turn India to non-violence, I will certainly do so. If I succeed in converting forty crbres

[400,000,000] of my people to non-violence it
will be a tremendous thing, a wonderful
transformation.

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32. Harijan, 15 Apr. 1933; Satyagraha, p. 202.
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CHAPTER IV

THE GANDHIAN STRATEGY FOR DEFENCE

Throughout his political career Gandhi wrote continuously on the aspects of war and defense based on the specific issues that arose during the turbulent period of World War II. Infact he had participated in Britains defence in World War I (without using weapons) and prior to that in the Boer War and thus had experience of its problems. His writings on defence and defence related problems do not constitute a single monograph or book. Instead it is scattered throughout his writings as solutions or answers of specific questions and issues that emerged during the period of his active political career. The prepondenat portion of his writings obviously deals with actions against British rule.

The British had earlier invaded and had deeply entrenched their alien rule over the Indian people after systematically destroying native defence capabilities. Hence the British were an alien power ruling over an occupied territory. Thus action against the British, with the goal being the removal of their political and military hegemony can thus be seen as defence action in an occupied territory against an alien rule. Here Gandhi's contribution is immense and historically significant especially due to the successful non-violent action which resulted in the

withdrawal of the British. His work here was experimental. Successes ensured posterity of a proven means of non-violent action as an alternative to violent action which had hitherto been regarded prior to Gandhian action as the bare essentials of national defence. Failures formed the basis of new experiments and the rejection of theories that failed the practical application. It also led to the refinement of techniques and strategies.

The question relating to the strategy for defence during invasion were dealt by Gandhi in response to the Italian invasion of Abyssinia; The German invasion of Poland, Czechoslovakia and France; British action against the Germans; and finally on the issues of a prospective invasion of India by the Japanese during World War II. The writings obviously lack practical first hand experience leading to the criticism of generality. However this lacunæ is filled up by the theoretical portions of his writings but lack the sweep and depth that characterizes his articles on action against the British, due to the pioneering and experimental nature of his actions and articles. He however never wrote anything the he himself would not have done.

Many of Gandhi's activities and policy recommendations for nearly thirty years involved problems of national defense. National defense in this context includes both preparations and resistance for dealing with new attacks on

a country's independence and freedom, as well as efforts to liberate a country already under foreign military occupation and political rule. In this national defense context, then, Gandhi made strategic and tactical recommendations for meeting three defense situations: (1) how to achieve the national liberation of India from British political and military occupation; (2) how to deal with a Japanese invasion during World War II; and (3) how to defend an independent India from future invasion. Of these three defense tasks, Gandhi necessarily primarily concentrated on the first. The breadth of his recommendations encompassing all three defense situations is highly important. His insights, policy judgments, strategic decisions and recommendations for these defense problems have significance far beyond the particular political situations and historical contexts in which he operated. The conflicting demands of world peace and of effective defense against aggression still remain unresolved. Gandhi thought he had found the basis of their resolution.

A : VIOLENT DEFENCE

In the Gandhian scheme of defensive action there was no place for violent actions. The non-violent soldier might have to face death in the process of non-violent action but he can never take recourse to any form of violent action. In fact if the invader is dying of thirst, the non-violent

resister would have to give water and save the life of the invading soldier.

Recourse to violence, however, was given a belated approval by Gandhi only when the people do not believe in non-violent action and the only other alternative is cowardice and impotence. Gandhi thus does not approve of violent resistance per-se. It is on the condition that non-action would be due to cowardice and impotence and would lead to the subjugation of a people who do not believe in non-violence. Violent resistance was the second best since the next option would have been cowardice. It was cowardice that also had to be fought. Since, cowardice was 'violence double distilled'¹, and 'there was no sin like cowardice'.²

It is not violent defence, that Gandhi admires, but the willingness to risk ones own death fighting for ones beliefs. Infact, his admiration for such acts led him to state that violent resistance under immense violent action was almost non violence.

Thus Gandhi States:

"It is better to be violent if there is violence in our breasts, than to put on the cloak of non-violence to cover impotence, Violence is any day preferable to impotence. There is hope for the violent man. There is no such hope for the impotent"³

"For under SWARAJ [Self rule] too I would not hesitate to advise those who would bear arms to do so and fight for the country".⁴

"But better than emasculation should be the bravery of those who use physical force. For better than cowardice would be meeting one's death fighting".⁵

"If an individual or a group of people are unable or unwilling to follow this great law of life (non-violence)... retaliation or resistance unto death is the second best, though a long way off from the first. Cowardice is impotence worse than violence. The coward desires revenge, but being afraid to die he looks to others, may be the government of the day to do the work of defence for him. A coward is less than a man".⁶

On the issue of exemplary bravery in violent action being almost non violent Gandhi states.

'I a man fights with his word single-handed against a horde of dacoits [bandits] armed to the teeth, I should say he is fighting almost non-violently.'⁷

".... you must understand the meaning at the back of mind. There is the refusal to bend before overwhelming might in the full knowledge that means certain death. The Poles know that they would be crushed to atoms, and yet resisted the German hordes.⁸ That was why I called it almost non-violence".

Again in 'THE DOCTRINE OF THE SWORD' Gandhi deals with the issue of violence and cowardice.

'I do believe that where there is a choice between cowardice and violence I would advise violence.'⁹

He also gives a specific example.

'Thus when my eldest son asked me what he should have done, had he been present when I was fatally assaulted in 1908, whether he should have run away and seen me killed or whether he should have used physical force which he could and wanted to use, and defend me, I told him that it was his duty to defend me even by using violence Hence also I advocate training in arms for those who believe in the method of violence. I would rather have India resort to arms in order to defend her honour than that she would, in a cowardly manner, become ¹⁰or remain a helpless witness to her own dishonour.

Gandhi thus allows for violent defence only to those who disbelieve in non-violence and that cowardice. But such violence and vengeance is also inherently weak.

'..... Vengeance is any day superior to passive effeminate and helpless submission. Forgiveness is higher still. Vengeance too is weakness. The desire of vengeance ¹¹come out of fear and harm, imaginary or real.

Gandhi did not support violent defence per se. It was only better than cowardice.

'If an individual or a group of people are unable to follow this great law of life [non-violence]: retaliation or resistance unto death is the second best.'¹²

'But I believe that non-violence is infinitely superior to violence, forgiveness is more manly than punishment. Forgiveness adorns a soldier. But abstinence is forgiveness only when there is the power to punish; It is meaningless when ¹³it pretends to proceed from a helpless creature".

'The bravery of the non-violent is vastly superior to that of the violent ... there is no comparison between the two types of bravery. The one is limited, the other limitless.'¹⁴

Gandhi thus does not advocate a violent defence. He only gave his consent to those who did not believe in violence. It became the second best since the third alternative was cowardice, impotence and subjugation, Non-violent defence was far superior to violent defence.

He States

'Satyagraha is far superior to armed resistance it is the weapon that adorns that strong.'¹⁵

'Non violence is without exception superior to violence, i.e. the power at the disposal of a non-violent person is always greater than he would have if he was violent.'¹⁶

PRECONDITIONS OF NON-VIOLENT DEFENCE.

Preparations for defence, in the Gandhian schema, differed radically from the classical notion of armaments and alliances. Armaments, for Gandhi, was simply not a part of the solution since the means were not good. Infact this remedy was worse than the disease since it was one of the basic causes of war due to the mist~~Must~~ it bred. Secondly

since the ends followed the means, it would mean that war would follow armaments because armaments was essentially the means for destruction and war. Hence Gandhi outrightly rejected giving armaments even a minor role in his scheme of national defence, even as standly second option. The solution to the problem lay in the preparation of non-violent resistance, which was to be achieved by the constructive programme. ¹⁷

The constructive programme was a means for the awakening of dormant nationalism and developing the social roots for resistance which was essential for non-violent defence. This nationalism was not to be parochial but beneficial to all nations. Infact to be an internationalist one had first to be a nationalist. It was a 'non-violent nationalism' differing from jingoistic nationalism.

This special nationalism also underlay his approach to national defense. Just as one should serve one's family and through it serve one's community, and through it serve one's country, so, Gandhi argued, one should serve one's country and through that service benefit the whole world. Indeed, one of the reasons why he wanted India to be independent and self-reliant was that she could thereby better benefit that world. This approach differed radically from what was often called nationalism in the West, for it rejected domination, aggression, and exploitation of other nations, and even

military power.

"I live for India's freedom and would die for it, because it is part of Truth ... But my patriotism is not exclusive; it is calculated not only to hurt another nation, but to benefit all in the true sense of the word".¹⁸

"Through the deliverance of India, I seek to deliver the so-called weaker races of the earth from the crushing heels of Western exploitation ... India's coming to her own will mean every nation doing likewise".¹⁹

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"... [I]t is impossible for one to be an internationalist without being a nationalist ... It is not nationalism that is an evil, it is the narrowness, selfishness, exclusiveness which is the bane of modern nations which is evil".²⁰

"I want the freedom of my country so that other countries may learn something from my free country, so that the resources of my country might be utilized for the benefit of mankind".²¹

Non-violent nationalism was essential because the method of non-violent defence called for the non-violent soldiers to actively resist invaders to the point of death. The non-violent resistor might die for his nation without lifting a finger against the invader and hence non-violent nationalism becomes a necessary pre-condition for defence. For it is only the love for one's nation that a person will willingly court death, if the need arises.

Gandhi's view of what made self-reliant national independence possible was more complex than the view of military defense specialists. It was far from being simply a

matter of the relative balance between military weaponry, size and efficiency of the armed forces, and related factors. Hence one of his contributions as a national defense strategist was to produce certain underlying conditions in the people and the society which were necessary for national defense. In other words success or failure of the specific defense strategies in crises would hinge upon whether or not there was sufficient genuine vitality and strength in the country's citizens themselves and in its social institutions to carry out a policy of nonviolent noncooperation.

Although this was a rather complex and sophisticated political view, Gandhi had reached it very early in his life. In 1908 Gandhi wrote his pamphlet "Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule." In "Hind Swaraj" Gandhi argued that it was the internal weakness of India which had led to British control, especially Indian internal rivalries quarrels, and greed for British goods.

"The English have not taken India; we have given it to them. They are not in India because of their strength, but because we keep them".²²

"If man will only realize that it is unmanly to obey laws that are unjust, no man's tyranny will enslave him. This is the key to self-rule or hom-rule".²³

Addressing the English in that booklet he wrote:

"You have great military resources. Your naval power is matchless. If we wanted to fight with you on your own ground, we should be unable to do so, but if the above submissions be not acceptable to you, we cease to play the part of the ruled. You may, if you like cut us to pieces. You may shatter us at the cannon's mouth. If you act contrary to our will, we will not help you; and without our help, we²⁴ know that you cannot move one step forward".

" We shall get nothing by asking; we shall have to take what we want, and we need the requisite strength for the effort"²⁵

Most of the remainder of Gandhi's life after writing "Hind Swaraj" as devoted to efforts to strengthen India internally. The aim was to bring her as a nation and her people, individually and collectively, to that greater strength which would make it impossible for any domestic tyrant or foreign conqueror to oppress India. Internal strength was the necessary prerequisite for effective national defense.

Gandhi charted out a programme for creating mobilizing and utilizing the internal strength of the nation which was essential for defence. The constructive programme was to be its basis and it varied according to the nations specific socio-political and economic situation. It required a transformation of the individuals whose aggregate was the nation. The constructive Programme was the educational means for transformation. It was to increase the moral

stature of the people, transforming them from cowards to the brave who would be capable to withstand the brutalities of the invaders and adopt AHIMSA as their creed, since it was for the strong and not for the weak. Otherwise non-violent resistance would be doomed to failure by becoming a caricature of the real non-violence of the brave.

A transformation was needed in the Indian people themselves. The needed changes involved increased dignity and self-respect and the reduction and elimination of all feelings of inferiority especially as regarded the English. Because, Gandhi believed Indian civilization was superior to that of the Europeans, Indian should be proud of being Indians, and should in no way regard the foreign rulers as their superiors, nor cower in passive submissiveness before them. This renewed self-respect would express itself in minute aspects of individual behavior as well as in major nationalist campaigns of resistance.

Dependence of any kind by Indians on the foreign occupation regime helped only to perpetuate it, Gandhi believed. Therefore, deliberate efforts were required to strengthen India's own society, including its economy and its social and political institutions. As the Indians became more self-reliant, and less dependent on the British, the balance of power and control in the country would shift. The development of a strong Indian society outside of British

control, and continuing efforts to improve the society and to uplift all sections of the population, would result in greater "Indian power" which meant control of their own destiny. This would be true even while the British remained; it would finally make continued foreign domination impossible. Gandhi therefore pressed various aspects of his constructive program.²⁶ Greater economic self-sufficiency was vital; it both reduced British motives for remaining in India and enabled Indians to control and improve their economy.

An India filled with internal injustices and problems was both doomed to weakness and was a violation of the human dignity which its leaders espoused. Therefore, efforts were needed to eradicate untouchability to achieve communal unity and the rights of women, and to advance the education of both children and adult, though a new Indian approach to education. Various Indian social and political institutions had to be strengthened or revived, and new ones needed to be created. For example, the settlement of civil cases by local PANCHAYATS (village councils) was to be encouraged because it kept cases out of the British court system, and to that degree thereby reduced the British regime's control over the country. The very growth of the Indian national Congress as a political institution provided the country with a rival national authority and an alternative to the British Raj. In certain extreme situations elements of the Congress took on

characteristics of a parallel government. In addition, by transforming the Congress from an elitist discussion group into a mass organization, the power of the people (including students, urban poor, and peasants) was mobilized to strengthen the national cause. The constant internal strengthening of Indian society and its institutions was seen by Gandhi as leading to the inevitable end of British rule.

Struggle- not petitions and patient pleas - was needed to attain national liberation

"The matter resolves itself into one of matching forces. Conviction or no conviction, Great Britain would defend her Indian commerce and interests by all the forces at her command. India must consequently evolve enough force to free herself from that embrace of death".²⁷

But Gandhi saw no reason to assume that "force" must be violent. To the contrary, in his view the Indians could mobilize much greater power if they waged their struggle by nonviolent action only. Violence was "at best a poor weapon of defence."²⁸ It was possible for India to replace violence even though the substituted nonviolent action was not of the highest possible quality: "We may not be perfect in our own use of it, but we definitely discard the use of violence, and grow from failure to success".²⁹

Gandhi offered India nonviolent struggle as the means with which to combat and disintegrate domination by the

British Empire. It is clear that the Indian National Congress' acceptance of this technique as part of the grand strategy for achieving independence was not a moral or religious act. It was a political decision which was possible because Gandhi offered a course of action which was nonviolent but which above all was seen to be practical and effective. Gandhi and others credited this nonviolent action with achieving the extraordinary growth of the Congress, the involvement of the masses in Congress activities, the casting off of submissiveness and passivity in the people, and their replacement with courage and fearlessness. All these instances of the empowerment of India contributed significantly to the achievement of independence.³⁰

Gandhi also had a distinctive approach to "the enemy." He distinguished between the people on the one hand and their policies and system on the other. Sometimes he described this as the difference between the evil-doer and the evil itself. The "enemy" was also seen as a victim of his own system, a view which was usually interpreted from a moral perspective. Whatever the origins of this distinction, it is clear that from a strategic point of view it was very effective. This approach deliberately encouraged Britishers to oppose policies of the British Government in India and to work for Indian independence. The nonviolent character of the Indian national struggle made it easier and very much more likely for Indians to receive assistance from within

the heart of the empire itself.

Support for the Indians within Great Britain was not simply a result of special qualities in the British, or even the Labour Party, but at least as much, or more so, the result of the Indian reliance upon the nonviolent technique to fight the British Raj. This made it easier for people within the United Kingdom to support the Indians, for they did not then appear unpatriotic or as defenders of murderers of the mother country's sons. In the absence of distracting violence by the Indians, it was easier to keep attention concentrated on injustices in India. And certainly even relatively mild violent repression against disciplined nonviolent men and women aroused sympathy for the Indians and condemnations of British measures, in Britain as well as throughout India and the World. More severe repression against serious nationalist violence would not have had these results. The distinction between individuals and the policies, therefore helped to promote internal opposition in the "enemy's" own country and to encourage help to the Indian cause.

Gandhi also sought to mobilize the strength of India by increasing the moral stature of Indians, individually and collectively. He sought to do this in a variety of ways believing that enhanced moral qualities in individuals would have many beneficial social and political consequences. One

of these would be to make the country's freedom invulnerable. If men and women were willing to live and die for Truth, Gandhi believed, and willing persistently to refuse to submit to any tyrant or aggressor no matter what the suffering inflicted, no one could conquer that people. Nonviolent resistance was "the weapon of the really brave."³¹ Through it a country could "defend its honor and self-respect against a whole world in arms."

"That is non violent defence which neither knows nor accepts defeat at any stage. Therefore, a nation or a group which has made non-violence its final policy, cannot be subjected to slavery even by the atom bomb".³²

DEFENCE BY NEGATING THE RATIONALE OF INVASION

The logical consequence of non-violent defence is that the country which pursues that policy does not indulge in the armaments race. Infact it disarms itself. As stated in the chapter on disarmament, armed preparedness causes fear and mistrust and is thus one of the prime causes of war. Thus the removal of fear would negate one of the causes of war or invasion. Hence the logic of non-violent defence policy (manifested in disarmament) leads to an automatic negation of one of the prime causes of war. On the issue of fear and mistrust leading to war Gandhi thus states:

"Whatever it may be, the conference [San fransisco Conference] shall have much to do with the world to be after the so called end of war. I very much fear that behind the structure of world security

sought to be behind the lurk mistrust and fear
which breed war.³³

Non-violent defence and its corollary disarmament negates the rationale of an invasion in another way: it is an antidote to a warriors psyche of attacking the armed which threatens him. The warrior never attacks the unarmed. It is only violence that is met with violence. Thus on this issue Gandhi, when he appealed to the Britons to lay down their arms and give non-violent resistance to Hitler, states:

"Herr Hitler can only be confounded by the adoption by Britain of the novel method of fighting [non-violent resistance]. In one single stroke, he will find that all his tremendous armaments has been pur out of action. A warrior lives on his wars, whether offensive or defensive. He suffers a collapse if the finds that his warning capacity is unwanted (emphasis mine)".³⁴

He reiterates:

"The meaning of refusal to own allegiance (to Hitler and Mussolini) is clear. You will not bow to the supremacy of the victor, you will not help him attain his object. Herr Hitler has never dreamt of possessing Britain. He wants the Britist to admit defeat. The victor can demand anything he likes from the vanquished and the latter has perforce to yield. But if defeat is not admitted, the enemy will fight until he has killed his opponent. A Satyagrahi, however, is dead to his body even before he attempts to kill him, i.e. he is free from attachment to his body and only lived in the victory of the soul. Therefore when he is already thus dead why should he yearn to kill anyone. To die in the act of killing is in essence to die defeated. Because if the enemy is unable to get what he wants from you alive, he decide to get after killing you.. If on the other hand he

realizes you have not the remotest thought in your mind of raising your hand against him, he will lack the zest to kill you. Every hunter has had this experience.³⁵ No one has ever heard of anyone hunting cows ".

He reiterates this point when dealing with the Abyssinian issue he states: 'Mussolini wanted submission and not defiance'

The second means of dissuading a prospective invader is economic. The economic decentralization with special emphasis on Swadeshi will negate any invasion by an exploiter because he will see that no benefit will accrue from the invasion. It is exploitation that is one of the causes of invasion. Prospective exploitation led to the British invasion of India. No invader will launch an invasion.³⁶ Finally, the resolution of outstanding conflicts amicably, results in negating the rationale for invasion.

DEFENCE OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES / THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE.

It was on the question of defence of occupied territories that Gandhi proved that his technique of non violent struggle was the most potent means for the liberation of an occupied nation. Infact he spent his whole life experimenting with those techniques which he continuously refined. Here his actions and writings were not merely conjectural but was wholly supported by practical

action which culminated in the liberation of India from British rule. As already stated earlier, the British were like an alien occupation force, which was driven out by non-violent action spearheaded by Gandhi.

Gandhi's writings on the liberation struggle deal mainly with the Indian situation since the success of his pioneering work would be proof of the viability of the Indian path and would act as a beacon to other nations in similar situations. Hence some of the issues that he raised, some of the means that he utilized were specific to the Indian context. However the overall theory of non-violent action for a liberation struggle against an occupying force that emerges from Gandhis writings on the Indian independence movement remains applicable to other liberation struggles since it is the product of a successful practical application.

From Gandhis writings emerges a cogent overall theory of non-violent action based on utilising specific issues, the choice of them being important for gaining as much favourable publicity for the oppressed and destroying the moral credibility oppressor both in the occupied nation as well as the occupier's. The system of Gandhian action was based on the choice of favourable issues (limiting them to specifics), the timing of action, the place of action, the choice of weapons, i.e. non-violent techniques). This was

however to be preceded by constructive programmes necessary for the development of the peoples moral stature so that they can be capable of working under the rigours of non-violent action, for the people were the weapons of non-violent defence. The choice of specific issues made it possible often to concentrate resistance efforts on the opponent's weakest points, and often on issues with the potential for the greatest possible support. "Independence" or "freedom" were too vague and elusive to be the sole demands of a struggle. Instead, Gandhi insisted upon making the issue very specific. "The issue must be definite and capable of being clearly understood and within the power of the opponent to yield".³⁷ A number of specific issues, carefully chosen, could constitute the substance of independence, or, if they should be granted as a result of nonviolent struggle, the power positions would have been so altered that full independence could not long be withheld.

This was not a case of being moderate in one's aims but of concentrating one's strength in ways which made victory more likely. Success in such limited campaigns would in turn increase the self-confidence of the nonviolent actionists, and also their ability, with experience, in wielding nonviolent action to gain their larger objectives. The choice of the specific "points" is therefore very important. In the 1930-31 campaign for independence, for example, Gandhi formulated eleven specific demands which if

won, would- he believed- constitute the substance of independence. The more obviously justifiable were the specific demands, the more likely would be sympathy and wider support for the actionists in time of repression.

Gandhi also placed great importance on the smaller, tactical decisions. These included the choice of the place of action. For example, as the place where he would in 1930 break the Salt Laws and spark nationwide civil disobedience, Gandhi chose the little known Dand beach on the Gulf of Cambay. The beach was not significant in itself, but it was far enough away from his ashram to allow Gandhi and his followers to walk for twenty- six days- the now famous Salt March- while the country and world watched with increasing suspense. ³⁸ He also had a sense of timing. Sometimes Gandhi timed the launching of a campaign to coincide with a significant day or occasion. In 1930, for example, civil disobedience was started on 6 April, the beginning of National Week, which was observed in homage to the victims of the Amritsar Massacre of Jallianwala Bagh in 1919.

Gandhi was also careful in his use of numbers of actionists. He frequently used small numbers of highly disciplined satyagrahis for very important missions. He rejected large numbers for their own sake for, when undisciplined and unreliable, they weakened the movement. Under necessary standards and discipline, however, large

numbers become "irresistible."³⁹

To seize and keep the initiative was crucial for effective strategy, in Gandhi's view. He wrote:

"An able general always gives battle in his own time on the ground of his choice. He always retains the initiative in these respects and never allows it to pass into the hands of the enemy".⁴⁰

Since there are a multitude of specific methods of nonviolent action it was also important, Gandhi felt, to select those non-violent weapons most suitable for the needs of the particular struggle. The potential of the method of picketing, for example, is very different from that of a fast. Both of these methods differ from civil disobedience and economic boycotts. A nonviolent raid, or establishment of a nonviolent parallel government also have - as two other specific methods- their own particular qualities, dangers, and potentials. There were many others. Gandhi spent much time considering when and how such specific methods should, and should not, be used. Certain classes of methods- such as non-cooperation- had requirements for effectiveness which differed from other group of methods. For example, for effective non-cooperation, larger numbers of participants are usually required and the action usually continues over longer periods of time. Gandhi said in 1930 that, whereas the cooperation of three hundred million people would be necessary for the boycott of foreign cloth to be successful,

for the civil disobedience campaign, and army of ten thousand defiant men and women would be enough.⁴¹

The more extreme nonviolent methods had the potential, Gandhi suggested in specific comments, of working faster, but the risks to the satyagrahis and the wider political dangers were both greater. Careful preparation, high discipline, higher quality leadership, and often supplementary use of milder methods, were all required. "The quickest remedies are always fraught with the greatest danger and require the utmost skill in handling them."⁴² Gandhi frequently utilized the public response to the use of certain specific methods- as the hartal - to judge whether it was wise to launch more extreme measures, such as civil disobedience. In the 1930-31 struggle, a varied plan was used, with both mild and strong methods applied during all phases.

For Gandhi, strategic and tactical considerations were vital when the struggle was going against the nonviolent actionists as well as in times of advances.⁴³ Where there were necessary retreats -as in war- it was necessary to regroup, mobilize new strength, and be ready to launch a new more powerful struggle. When victories occurred, they were to be springboards to greater ones, to full independence, and to a better society.

DEFENCE DURING INVASION

Gandhi's writings on the question of defence during invasions are few compared to those that deal with the question of liberation of India. They deal with the issues that arose during his political career when he was spearheading the non-violent struggle against the British. This period witnessed various invasions of alien powers during World War II. It began with the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, Japanese interference in China by creating the puppet state of Manchukuo, German occupation of Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia and then the German attack on Poland that led to World War II. Next came the prospect of Japanese invasion of India.

On the question of defence during invasions Gandhi reiterates his stand that non-violent resistance is the best means of defence. However, his writings lack the details and specifics that characterize his writings on the liberation struggle. This lacunae is due to Gandhi being a pioneer and an experimenter. He did not have previous theories which he could refine and apply. He had to develop them himself according to the given situation. Since the Japanese invasion was only confined to the North Eastern border and during that time Gandhi was in jail, he could not participate in the defence and hence this.

There is, however, ample source material in Gandhi's writings that show that non-violent resistance and non-cooperation were the basic defence strategies for defence during invasion. Thus on the Italian invasion of Abyssinia Gandhi states:

'But if the Abyssinians had adopted the attitude of non-violence of the stronce i.e. non-violence which breaks to pieces but never bends, Mussolini would have had no interest in Abyssinia. Thus if they had simply said: you are welcome to reduce us to dust on ashes, put you without find are Abyssinian to co-operate with you, what would Mussolini would have done? He did not want a desert. Mussolini wanted submission not defiance, and if he had met the quiet dignified and non violent defiance that I have described, he would certainly have been obliged to retire.'⁴⁴

During the German invasion of Czechoslovakia, Gandhi wrote:

"I present Dr. Benes (President of the Czechoslovakia Republic at the time of the Nazi invasion) with a weapon not of the weak but of the brave. There is no bravery greater than a resolute refusal to bend the knee to an earthly power, no matter how great, and that without bitterness of spirit and in the fullness of faith that the spirit above lives, nothing else does."⁴⁵

'If I were a Czech I would not be a vassal to any nation or body. I must have absolute independence or perish.'⁴⁶

'..... I have the hardihood to say that if they [i.e. the Czechs] had known the use of non-violence as a weapon for the defence of national honour, they would have faced the whole might of Germany with that of Italy thrown in.'⁴⁷

During World War II Gandhi advised the British to offer non-violent resistance to the Germans again and again.

In the July 1940 appeal 'To Every Briton' Gandhi states:

" I appeal for cessation of hostilities, not because you are too exhausted to fight, but because war is bad in essence. For want to kill Nazism. You will never kill it by its indifferent adoption. Your soldiers are doing the same work of destruction as the Germans. The only difference is that perhaps you are not as thorough as the Germans. If that be so, yours will soon acquire the same thoroughness theirs, if not much greater. On no other condition can you win the war. In other words you will have to be more ruthless than the Nazis. No cause however just, can warrant the indiscriminate slaughter that is going. I suggest that a cause that demands the inhumanities that are being perpetuated today cannot be called just."⁴⁸

" For British, so long as she holds to the orthodox method, has to copy the Nazi methods, if, she has to put up a successful defence The logical outcome of the violent method seems to be increasingly to brutalize man including the weak majority."⁴⁹

Gandhi in March 1942 rejected the British plan for a scorched earth policy in India if the British military forces retreated.⁵⁰ The next month, in the 12 April issue of Harijan, Gandhi insisted that, " Resistance, violent or non-violent, has to be well thought out."⁵¹ However, in that same issue in a discussion of a possible Japanese invasion, he prescribed simply "determined pursuit of the constructive programme" as " the best preparation" for nonviolent resistance.⁵² This was scarcely the presentation of a careful plan for resistance activities, nor the presentation of a thought-out plan for carrying out the needed organizational and training preparations for such resistance.

" If we were a free country, things could be non-violently to prevent the Japanese from entering the country. As it is, non-violent resistance could commence the moment they effected a landing. Thus non-violent resisters would refuse them any help, even water. For it is no part of their duty to help anyone to steal their country. But if a Japanese had missed his way and was dying of thirst... a non-violent resister... would give water... Suppose the Japanese compel resisters to give them water, the resisters must die in the act of resistance. It is conceivable that they will exterminate all resisters."⁵³

Gandhi acknowledged his absence of detailed strategic planning to deal with the Japanese:

" I have no plan in mind... there should be unadulterated non-violent non-co-operation, and if the whole of India responded and unanimously offered it, I should show that without shedding a single drop of blood Japanese arms- or any combination of arms- can be sterilized. That involves the determination of India not to give quarter on any point whatsoever and to be ready to risk loss of several million. But I would consider that cost very cheap and victory won at that cost glories ... India may not be ready to pay that price ... but some such price must be paid by any country that wants to regain its independence ... Therefore, in the non-violent technique I am asking India to risk no more than other countries are risking and which India would have to risk even if she offered armed resistance."⁵⁴

In July he affirmed in a letter "To Every Japanese," the intention of full resistance against the possible Japanese incursion.⁵⁵ Later he told Americans that if India's independence were unconditionally recognized. India would be able then to offer "irrestible opposition to Japanese aggression."⁵⁶

Non-violence resistance was thus the basic strategy for defence during invasion. As Gandhi stated.

'Surely the means adopted for driving an enemy [i.e. the British] from ones house must, more or less coincide, with those adopted for keeping him [i.e. a invader] out of the house. If anything the process must be easier.'⁵⁷

The defence strategy during an invasion thus was to be similar to the strategies adopted during the liberation struggle: non-violent resistance and its various manifestations.

PROSPECTIVE DEFENCE FOR INDIA

During the years in which he struggled for independence and in the short time between that achievement and his death, Gandhi made it clear in general terms that he favored for his country a policy of national defense by nonviolent resistance in place of the usual military defense. Citing the brave struggle of 1930-31, he already evinced, if India has to contend against an invader."⁵⁸ National defense by nonviolent resistance would be, Gandhi was convinced, more powerful and effective than military defense; it would cost no more lives and its material cost would be much cheaper.⁵⁹

Gandhi acknowledged the practical difficulties in the implementation of such a policy.⁶⁰ At times he seemed to assume that these difficulties did not require prior solutions, but would be solved in the actual course of

struggle. He even once rejected the idea of preparations,⁶¹
a view inconsistent with other statements:

I have always advised and insisted on non-violent
defence. But I recognize that it has to be learnt
like⁶² defence. It requires a different training
.....

Attempts to apply nonviolent action to the national
defense problem of an independent country he compared to
"sailing on uncharted water."⁶³

The last years of Gandhi's life were the years of
World War II, and then for India the approach to
independence and its first months. Gandhi's advocacy of
national defense by nonviolent resistance intensified. He
made it very clear that he intended this policy seriously
both for India and the whole world. In 1939 when he foresaw
India as a whole adopting military defense he still wanted
the Indian National Congress to reject that course and to
continue the development of "non-violence as a political
weapon".⁶⁴ "A nation that had won freedom without the force
of arms should be able to keep it too without the force of
arms",⁶⁵ he said in 1947. In late 1939 Gandhi discussed
with the Working Committee of the Congress the question now
no longer "hypothetical of defending India from invasion by
application of nonviolent means unprepared for this type of
national defense Gandhis view proposal, based on the
judgment that Congressmen themselves were unprepared for

this type of national defense Gandhi view was that the methods they had used to deal with the british more or less coincided with those for use against a new invasion and perhaps the latter would be easier.⁶⁶ The latter suggestion was inconsistent with his later recognition that there might be million of casualties in the nonviolent defense of India against Japanese invasion. Also he appears never to have contemplated seriously whether, and if so how he might have dealt with the objection of Congressmen that they were unprepared for such defense by himself initiating development of a program of preparations for nonviolent defense of India of comparable extent and complexity to that of military defense.

In June, 1940 Gandhi urged the Working Committee to extend the political use of nonviolent action to India's national defense. This the Committee rejected, arguing for several reasons that India was not ready to take that step.⁶⁷ Gandhi, however continued to insist that India for her own sake, as that of the world peace sought to reject military defence and military preparation of defense of her independence by popular nonviolent resistance. This was India's mission.

Notes to Chapter IV

1. Harijan, 2 Apr. 1946; Non-Violence in Peace and War, (NVPW). II, p. 119.
2. Harijan, 3 Nov. 1946; NVPW, II, p. 159.
3. Harijan, 21 Oct. 1939; NVPW, I, p. 240.
4. Harijan, 17. Nov. 1921; NVPW, I, p. 23.
5. Harijan, 2 Apr. 1938; NVPW, I, pp. 136-137.
6. Harijan, 15 Sept. 1946, NVPW, I, p. 148.
7. Harijan, 25 Aug. 1940, NVPW, I, p. 323.
8. Harijan, 8 Sept. 1940, NVPW, I, p. 338.
9. Young India, 11 Aug. 1920, NVPW, I, p. 1.
10. Ibid.
11. Young India, 12 Aug. 1920, NVPW, I, p. 60.
12. Harijan, 1 Sept. 1946, NVPW, II, p.148.
13. Young India, 11 Aug. 1920, NVPW, I, p. 1.
14. Harijan, 1 Sept. 1940, NVPW, pp.335-336.
15. Harijan, 17 Mar. 1946, NVPW, II, p.60.
16. Harijan, 12 Oct. 1935, NVPW, I.p. 111.
17. Harijan, 12 Apr. 1942, NVPW, I. pp. 398-339.
18. Young India, 2 Apr. 1924; Bose, Selection from Gandhi, p.43.
19. Young India, III, pp.548-549; Gopi Nath Dhawan. The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi (Third ed: Ahmedabad: Navajivan 1962). p. 326.
20. Young India, II, p. 1292; Dhawan. The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi, p. 326.
21. Mahadev Desai Gandhiji in Indian Villages, p. 170; Dhawan. The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi, p. 326.

22. M.K. Gandhi; Hind Swaraj or Indian Home rule, p. 38.
23. Ibid., p. 81.
24. Ibid., p. 100.
25. Ibid., p, 101.
26. See M.K. Gandhi. "The Constructive Programme" Navajivan (1966).
27. Gene Sharp, Gandhi Wields the Weapon of Moral Power: Three Case Histories, p. 64.
28. Harijan, 27 July 1947; NVPW, II, p. 64.
29. Harijan, 21 July 1947; NVPW, I, p. 278.
30. Harijan, 26 July 1940; NVPW, I, p. 113).
31. Harijan, 8 June 1947; NVPW, II, p. 261.
32. Harijan, 18 Aug. 1946; NVPW, II, p. 141. See also, Harijan, 1 June 1947; NVPW, II, p. 254.
33. M.K. Gandhi Towards Lasting Peace (TLP)p. 147.
34. Harijan July 28, 1940. TLP p. 127.
35. Harijan, 18 Aug. 1940, TLP, p. 131.
36. M.K. Gandhi TLP, p. 92.
37. Gandhi, quoted in Nirmal Kumar Bose, Studies in Gandhism
38. Gene Sharp: Gandhi Wields the weapon of Moral Power, p. 60.
39. Dhavan. The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi, pp. 224-225.
40. Gandhi, quoted in Bose, Selections from Gandhi, p. 202.
41. Sharp, Gandhi Wield the Weapon of Moral Power, p. 72.
42. Satyagraha, p. 173.
43. Bose, Selection from Gandhi, p. 202; B.
44. Harijan : 19 May 1988.

45. Harijan 15 Oct. 1938 : NVPW, I, p. 154.
46. Harijan 13 Oct. 1938 : NVPW, I, 152.
47. Harijan 8 Oct. 1938 : NVPW I, 149.
48. Harijan 6 July 1940 : NVPW, I, pp. 280-281.
49. Harijan 11 Aug. 1940, NVPW, I, p. 302.
50. Harijan, 22 Mar. 1942; NVPW, I, pp. 388-389.
51. Harijan, 12 Apr. 1942; NVPW, I, p. 390.
52. Harijan, 12 Apr. 1942; NVPW, I, pp. 398-399.
53. Harijan, 12 Apr. 1942; NVPW, I, p. 397.
54. Harijan, 24 May 1942; Satyagraha, pp. 377-378.
55. Harijan, 26 July. 1942; NVPW, I, p. 410.
56. Harijan, 9 Aug. 1942; NVPW, I, p. 415.
57. Harijan, 14 Oct. 1939.
58. Harijan, 14 Oct. 1939; NVPW, I, p. 236.
59. Harijan, 25 May. 1947 NVPW, II, p. 251);
60. Harijan, 11 Aug. 1940; NVPW, I, p. 307.
61. Harijan, 14 Apr. 1940; Satyagraha, p. 386.
62. Harijan, 2 Mar. 1940; NVPW, I. p. 260.
63. Harijan, 11 Aug. 1940; NVPW, I, pp. 307-308.
64. Harijan, 14 Oct. 1939; NVPW, I, p. 237.
65. Harijan, 14 Dec. 1947; NVPW, II, pp. 340-341.
66. Harijan, 14 Oct. 1939; NVPW, I. pp. 235-236.
67. See NVPW, I. Appendix VI pp.445-447.

CONCLUSION

Man, after using sticks and stones in prehistory as the instruments of offence and defence, developed science and technology for the manufacture of both productive and destructive forces, such that he is now in possession of nuclear weapons that have the capability to destroy the planet Earth many times over. Wars which once claimed a few hundred lives now claim over millions. It now has the potential of destroying all living beings on this planet, if ever one is fought using nuclear weapons, hence the urgency for an alternative to war.

An analysis of the armed peace theory proves its historical bankruptcy. The history of man is the history of continuous warfare or preparation for it. The alleged 'Peace' that succeeds the conclusion of a war is just breathing space provided to nations for the preparation of another war, more ruthless and more destructive than the previous one. The successful strategies and weapons of the previous wars are mastered for future use, the failures analysed and discarded and new ones visualised for future wars. Stones gave way to the spear and the sword which after proving its usefulness in the art of mass destruction was later replaced by superior destroyers; gun powder and the gunships. Man now has the ultimate weapon in his hand: the nuclear weapon. The irony of it is that thought it ensures the total annihilation of the opponent it also ensures that

there is no victor.

The very logic of nuclear weapons (i.e. total destruction of both the opponents) has ensured the legions of armed peace theorists that they will command a respectable following among the policy makers, (who as yet have never acknowledged the viability of a weaponless peace). However an analysis of prospective strategies visualised by the decision makers negate the theory of armed peace, notwithstanding the nuclear rider added to it. Thus the US has visualised various nuclear defence and offence strategies. The strategy of graduated deterrence or the strategy of counterforce strike have important adherents who have rationalised the possibility of a successful and victorious nuclear war. In fact Mao Zedong and Zhou En-lai were of the view that a third World War was necessary and the use of nuclear weapons essential for the establishment of Communism throughout the world. The rationale for a final nuclear war was that the two World Wars had brought communism to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe alongwith China respectively. The third would ensure the dominance of communism throughout the globe since a nuclear war would destroy nearly everything leaving the numbers favourable to China.

These are just a few of the attitudes towards nuclear weapons and a prospective war, of some of the important

decision makers whose attitudes and decision to either war or peace can result in them. The above mentioned attitudes are inherently antagonistic towards a stable peace. Hence the necessity arises urgently, for a analysis of the very logic of armaments and an armed peace. Is an armed peace stable, or will it result in War? If no, then is there an alternative?

Armaments have a logic of their own. It signifies power which is essential to possess in an international situation bereft of an overarching authority. The policies that the decision makers envisage are based upon the characterization of the international situation in Hobbesian terms. The non-existence of a superior authority capable of forcing the participants in the international game to adhere strictly to the rules of conduct leads to the creation of a power vacuum which necessitates the accumulation of maximum power to ensure the very survival of the participant. Power is manifest in armaments, hence the accumulation of armaments is the basic precondition for survival in the Hobbesian world. The quantum of armaments necessary for the survival of the participant is based upon calculations of the opponents power so as to create a favourable balance of power, which is the product of the aspiration for power on part of several nations. each trying to maintain or overthrow the status quo.

The calculation of a participant is, however, not based on absolute facts and has various errors, Which can become

fatal if not minimized. Hence for the minimization of errors, the participant seeks to maximize power so as to negate any fatal error. Hence the logic of armaments is that it becomes an inherent necessity to arm oneself to the teeth. In the Hobbesian framework it thus follows that once an advantage is gained, the participant pursues policies that ensures the maintainence of that advantage which necessarily leads to war, which is the only means of further acquisition of power and the maintainence of the advantage previously gained. War hence is the product of the inherent logic of armaments.

An armed peace, thus, is an impossible proposition due to the inherent contradiction that the term connotes. History has proved the bankruptcy of the armed peace theory. As stated earlier, that armed 'Peace' is a necessary preparation for a future war. It is a period of preparation whereby the techniques and instruments are refined progressively to ensure a successful outcome. The theory of armaments itself negates any question of an armed peace. Armaments can only lead to war, never to peace.

The proponents of an armed peace point out the four decades of relative peace witnessed in the post World War II period as evidence of the practicality of their theory. Notwithstanding the hundred or two hundred minor wars fought after World War II or the Vietnam War or the Cuban Missile

Crisis which brought the World on the brink of a nuclear War, one has just to look at the earlier theorists who, in the century between the Napoleonic wars and World War I, saw that period as proof of the theory of armed peace. World War I shattered their theory. World War II shattered Neville Chamberlain's (the British Prime Minister in 1939) 'peace with honour' based on the theory of armed peace. As stated earlier, the relative calm that one witnesses after a war is but an illusory peace and hence cannot be taken as proof for the armed peace theory. The historical laboratory has proved that hypotheses to be false. Theory too negates the proposition.

Armed peace, thus, being proved a chimera necessitates an analysis of disarmament as an instrument for a stable and permanent peace. The development of nuclear weapons necessitates a careful analysis. Classical disarmament as has been shown in Chapter I, functions within a system based on armaments, and the power game which itself is based on armaments. A minor fraction of the total armaments that the negotiating nations possess is discarded at the negotiating table so as to maintain the status quo. That too the redundant ones. The development of new weapons makes some of the older categories redundant and easily discarded since the new weapons fulfill their functions as instruments of mass destruction more efficiently and effectively. The much touted disarmaments in history have simply been the retrenchment of useless weapons, paving the way for the

channelization of the blocked resources for the development of a new generation of weapons. The logic of classical disarmament is based upon the maintenance of armaments itself. The old order changes, yielding place to the new.

Another aspect of disarmament is the fact that with the armaments race spiralling upwards necessitates an unviable channelization of resources, which forces the contenders to control that spiral whose logic itself negates the power equation. Power is based on armaments, and the quantity of armaments is based upon the economic strength of a nation; a disproportionate allocation of resources to the non-productive military sector destroys that economic strength which destroys the basis for armaments and its corollary: power. Hence the power theory approach to disarmament and arms control, is not for peace per se, but for ensuring the non-vitiating of power. It is for the maintenance of the basis for armaments. Classical disarmament is thus within the framework of power and armaments, not without.

The classical approach to disarmament is best witnessed in the I.N.F. (Intermediate Nuclear Forces) Treaty, of 1987, between the USA and the USSR. Both sides agreed to the total destruction of a whole category of missiles. The intermediate range land based missiles were abolished from the military inventory of both nations. Prohibition of its further production was agreed upon. A breakthrough was achieved in the verification process. An analysis of the

I.N.F. proves that it was a hollow disarmament. Only a fraction of a percentage of the nuclear arms that the nations possessed were discarded. That too, those which had been made redundant with the development of superior weapons. The objectives of the discarded weapons were being fulfilled by other weapons. Both nations retained over kill capacities capable of destroying the earth many times over.

The motives behind the INF treaty, too seem dubious, notwithstanding the halo of enlightenment that has been imposed upon the two signatories by an euphonic public, after the fear psychosis that had been generated by the Cold War. The first of these dubious motives is that of 'creeping Nanciyism'; Nancy Reagan, the first Lady of the USA wanted to ensure a place in the history books, for her husband, President Ronald Reagan as a great peace maker. It was not for peace but for a place in history. The cooling of tension was just a by product. The second and more dubious motive was to turn media attention away from the Iran-Contra affair which was totally discrediting the Reagan Presidency. Hence the INF, whereby a few redundant missiles were signed off bailing the Reagan presidency in the process from the Iran-Contra fiasco. The other reasons behind the INF were economic, the theoretical aspects of it having been explained previously. The armaments race had cost both the super powers dearly. The Soviet Union's economy was in shambles making it an economic Third rate power. The USA was in the throes of a nascent economic crisis due to huge budgetary deficits and an extremely unfavourable balance of

trade which necessitated an increased allocation of resources for the productive military sector away from the non-productive sector. The urgency of the situation forced both the nations into the I.N.F, not a prospective and permanent peace.

The I.N.F. Treaty itself does not disallow the development of new weapons, especially those envisaged by SDI (Strategic Defence Initiative), proves the hollowness of classical disarmament. New weapons are being devised. The 'Smart' and 'Brilliant' weapons have already been tested in the Gulf War. A new generation of weapons are being devised that would make even the smart weapons redundant, let alone those to be discarded by the I.N.F. The I.N.F. has just been the retrenchment of the redundant weapons. It is not disarmament.

Classical disarmament thus proves to be a hollow disarmament, due to the fact that it retains armaments as its basis. Armaments lead to war, not peace. Hence the necessity for an alternative approach to disarmament: that which is capable of envisaging a permanent peace; which is theoretically sound; and viable for the practical implementation after experimentation of defensive action of a disarmed nation. The Gandhian approach comes very close to fulfilling these conditions.

The Gandhian rationale for disarmament is a complex mixture of various historical, psychological and social facts. Firstly human progress in history, is a progress

towards Ahimsa. With the Spirit awakening within man, Ahimsa becomes the preponderant characteristic of man. It is contradictory to violence and armaments. Secondly the law of human nature proves that man is essentially good. Violence is but a deviation from the essentially good nature of man, that too the duration of the deviation is just a fraction of the time span in which he is good. Since man is essentially good it follows that national policies ought to reflect the true character of man and not regard it in Hobbesian terms as manifested in the policy of armaments. It is this law of human nature, the law of love that is the reason for the proper functioning of civil society. Without it society would not have existed.

War as a means of offence and defence is futile, according to Gandhi, hence armaments as a policy for defence is futile. The Mahabharata is proof of the futility of war, leaving only seven victors of the millions that participated. Secondly, the use of force only produces a Hitler and Mussolini. War as means for defence policy too is futile. Victory in war is even futile. The British victory in World War I produced a Hitler vowed to wreak vengeance on the victors. It thus follows that disarmament and non-violence defence should form the basis of national defence policy.

Disarmament, for Gandhi, is a necessity due to the historical failure of armaments in ensuring peace. Armaments

have also failed in protecting the political independence and sovereignty of nations. It has failed in maintaining the territorial integrity of nations. Wars produce both a victor and the defeated. For the defeated war and armaments as the basis of defence failed. Infact the outcome of armaments was the growth of Nazism and the brutalization of humanity. It has also culminated in the development of the atom bomb, which has the capability of anmhilating the human race.

The success of non-violent action against the British in India and the successful Satyagraha in South Africa were

pointers to the fact that non-violent action was a credible alternative to violent action as a means of defence. The method of non-violent action had never been adopted by a nation prior to Ghandians experiments. In so far as it has been tried, it has shown promising results.

Disarmament was a necessary pre-condition, to Gandhi, as a means for a stable peace due to the logic of ends and means. If the means are good the end results would hence automatically be good. Bad means would never produce good results. Hence the congruence of ends and means are essential. Armaments as the instrument for peace is inherently contradictory. The means utilized are the means for war and not peace. Secondly with the means being armaments, the logical and product would naturally be war, since the ends follow the means. Hence for the negation of

war, disarmament is essential.

Two inherent characteristics of disarmament automatically lead to a negation of some of the prime causes of wars and invasion. Firstly disarmament by a nation completely removes the fear psychosis that armaments generate. In fact the realist approach to international relations is based upon an all prevailing fear due to the lack of a superior authority. It is this fear for ones security that nations seeks to possess an advantage in power which results in war as the means of ensuring that the advantage remains. Gandhian disarmament removes that fear which is one of the causes of war.

Disarmament also has that inherent quality whereby it acts as an antidote to the warriors psyche of attacking the armed which threatens him. A warrior suffers a collapse if he finds that his warring capacity is unwanted. A warrior lacks the zest to kill an unarmed person. 'No one has ever hunted cows.'

Disarmament is a necessary pre-condition for the establishment of a true democracy. Democracy and the instruments of violence are antithetical. The science of war (manifested in armaments) has produced Hitler. Infact the Science of war leads are to dictator ship. The science of non-violence can alone lead one to pure democracy.

The Gandhian process of disarmament is completely

different from the classical process of disarmament. It is not the product of conferences and negotiations between two heads of state at the super structural level. Infact it is the product of a total change in the infrastructure. The Gandhian disarmament process begins at the bottom with man and the community since the springs of disorder and violence are not to be found at the international level alone. It is the violence permeating every sphere of life, that manifests itself in war and disorder.

The individual and the community is the basis of Gandhian disarmament. A distinct change towards a non-violent education and culture is essential. This has to be achieved through the constructive programme and a change in the mode of education. One of the ways is through the adoption of the of the PANCHYAMAS ensinciated in PATANJALI'S YOGA SUTRA: SATYA (truth), AHIMSA (non-violence) BRAHMACHARYA (Self-Control) ASTEYA (non-stealing) and APARAGRIHA (non-possession). The domestic field is the best school for learning AHIMSA, which can then be translated into social action.

When the majority of the people becomes non violent, the state automatically becomes a 'predominantly non-violent state'. The next phase is the re-structuring or the re-organization of the political, socio- economic and the educational system within the state or nation, with special emphasis on decentralization and the widest possible dispersal of power to ensure that the state becomes an

almost non-violent state. It bids farewell to arms and police.

The next stage is the unilateral disarmament by a nation: a total renunciation of the use of armaments by a nation, as an instrument of defence policy. The nation will have already become an 'almost non-violent' nation, capable of defending itself non-violently. Non-violent action and disarmament would subsequently spread like contagion leading to further disarmament and world peace.

The corollary of disarmament is non-violent defence. The Gandhian approach to defence was the product of his pioneering work in the realm of non-violent action. It's success proved its efficacy and was an indicator that it could be successfully adopted by a nation, especially occupied nations.

The first step towards non-violent defence preparation is the removal of fear and cowardice, by providing essential inputs for human development through proper education. This is to be achieved by the constructive programme. The removal of cowardice is essential for non-violent resistance. In fact violent defence is condoned by Gandhi as a better alternative if the only other option is cowardice and subjugation. Those who do not believe in non-violent action should not indulge in it, whereby it become a mediocre caricature. However, non-violent defence is infinitely superior.

The next step is the development of a non-parochial nationalism, (i.e. the good variety of nationalism which does not seek to harm). It is essential for without it the legions of non-violent soldiers would for ever be filled. One has to love one's nation to fight for it. Gandhi next charted out a programme for creating, mobilizing and utilizing the internal strength of the nations. This was to be achieved through the constructive programme. Non-violent defence negates the rationale of an invasion. Firstly it removes fear that is produced by armaments and hence removes one of the prime causes of War. Secondly it acts as a front against the warrior psyche. No warrior has ever harmed the unarmed. Secondly, the 'predominantly non-violent state would sort out outstanding issues, that could lead to conflicts'. This conflict resolution itself negates future aggressions and hence negates the need for defence by armaments.

Gandhi's writings on the defence of occupied nations are comprehensive and deal extensively with the issues thrown up throughout the Indian Liberation Movement. Non-violent action here is based upon the choice of specific issues, the timing of action, the place of action and the choice of weapons (i.e. non-violent techniques). It necessitated confidence building among the actionists, through the constructive programme. It also required good generalship.

The Gandhian approach to defence against invasion

however lacks the sweep and depth of his writings on the liberation struggle which is full of theoretical and practical detail. Gandhi simply reiterates the efficacy of non-violence which was capable of ejecting the enemy from the house and hence would be capable of keeping the enemy at bay. He never advocated a violent defence for India. This shortcoming in the Gandhian approach is due to the fact that though the invasion took place it remained confined to the North Eastern Frontier and Gandhi was taken into preventive custody, and hence negated experimentation which was the basic approach of Gandhi, since he was the pioneer of non-violent action and lacked the support of any precedent on which he could build up a theory on. He began with an empty sheet of paper gradually and successfully build up a theory of non-violent action through constant experimentation. Gandhi however, reiterated that non-violent resistance would be far more superior as a policy of defence during aggression, than a violent defence.

Notwithstanding this lacunae in the Gandhian approach to disarmament and non-violent defence, Gandhi did provide a cogent theory and successful pioneering activity which proved the efficacy of non-violent action, in at least one specific sphere of defensive action (i.e. the liberation of an occupied nation). Its success proves that the same means can be applied for defensive action against invasion.

In the ultimate analysis the Gandhian approach to disarmament and defence is far superior to the classical

approach of disarmament and defence which functions within the overall frame work of armaments. As has been shown, armaments as the means for the maintainence of world peace contradicts the desired result. Armaments can only lead to war and not peace. History has proved the bankruptcy of the armed peace theory. A nuclear armed peace too is unstable, and a nuclear war means the annihilation of the human race. Hence the necessity for an alternative approach, which so far only Gandhi has provided.

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