

**GOLDEN CRESCENT AS AN EPI CENTRE OF
OPIUM TRADE:
CAUSES AND EFFECTS**

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MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled "GOLDEN CRESCENT AS AN EPI- CENTRE OF OPIUM TRADE: CAUSES AND EFFECTS" submitted by me for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this or any other University.

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
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Abbreviations

AIDS	Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome
ANF	Anti-Narcotics Force
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARQ	Annual Reports Questionnaire
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
ATS	Amphetamines
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DCHQ	Drug Control Headquarters
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Area
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GHB	Gamma-HydroxyButyrate
GOP	Government of Pakistan
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IDU	Injecting Drugs Users
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
KNPP	Korenni National Progress Party
LSD	Lysergic acid diethylamide
MTA	Mong Tai Army
NCCA	National Committee for the Control
NOROUZ Programme	Narcotics Reduction Unitized Programme

NLC	National Logistic Cell
NWFP	North-West Frontier Province
PATAs	Provincially Administered Tribal Areas
SSA	Shan State Army
SSPP	Shan State Progress Party
SPDC	State Peace and Development Council
THC	Tetrahydrocannabinol
UNODC	United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime
UN	United Nations
UNDCP	United Nations Drug Control Programme
UNJIAD	United Nations Joint Initiatives against Drugs
UNODCCP	United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention
UWSA	United Wa State Army
WADP	Wa Alternative Development Project

PREFACE

In the twentieth first century, the international trade in illicit drugs has multiplied in volume and created devastating effects on the world's people, even faster than the international arms trade. It became one of the most profitable of all world trades. Today, there is more awareness of the problems of illicit drugs and drug trafficking than ever before. Now the major poppy growing areas are attracting huge attention from the globe. The Asian Continent is home for two giant poppy producing regions of the world, Golden Triangle with Myanmar at centre and Golden Crescent with Afghanistan. Golden Crescent has steadily occupied the position of number one in drug production by replacing Golden Triangle.

The reality is that after years of producing the lion's share of the world's opium, the Golden Triangle is now only a bit player in the business. The countries of Golden Triangle are successfully eradicating the growth of opium production. On the other hand, Pakistan and Iran are also exhausting their efforts to make their countries opiate free. But, the radiations coming out from the opium explosion in Afghanistan is affecting whole of the world, particularly the region. It is strongly believed that peace and security, a powerful central government, alternative livelihood source with viable economic assistance and moral consideration as they influence farmers growing crops are compulsory requirements for poppy eradication from the region.

The focus of this work is on the production and drug trafficking network in the Southwest Asia, with coverage of the major responsible factors which motivated the shift from Golden Triangle to Golden Crescent, as a main opium-producing region. This study will also cover that, how poppy cultivation affects and in turn get affected by the social and economic background of these regions.

The first chapter looks into the definition of drug, various types of drugs and about their use and misuse. It also covers the methods of processing of drugs and their production its. The world's drug problem is being contained. The global markets for the main illicit drugs – the opiates, cocaine, cannabis, and amphetamine-type stimulants – remained largely stable. Today the use of these illegal substances has not only increased alarmingly, but also spreading many deadly diseases like HIV/AIDS, hepatitis among injecting drug users.

The second chapter “ *Shift from Golden Triangle to Golden Crescent*” is a comparative study that how opium production decreased in Golden Triangle and increased in Golden Crescent. It has also focused on major poppy growing areas of these regions, their counter-narcotic efforts and evaluation about their success in their efforts of opium eradication.

Third chapter “*Drug Trade in Pakistan*” covers about the rise and fall of opium production under different regimes in Pakistan. Even after controlling opium production within their territory Pakistan and Iran are facing drug related problems because they sit next to largest opium producer, that is, Afghanistan. Inside Pakistan, poppy cultivation is mainly done in the NWFP. Both the countries are exhausting all unilateral, bilateral and multilateral efforts to control drug trafficking.

The fourth chapter “*Opium Production in Afghanistan*” is a deliberative attempt to cover the whole narco history of Afghanistan. Afghanistan's opium production reached its record level under the shadow of cold war and grew rapidly at background of continuous civil war and American invasion. This converted the agrarian based economy of Afghanistan into a war-based economy. Afghanistan is not only a producer, but also a consumer and victim of adverse effects of drug abuse.

The Fifth chapter is an attempt to focus on the impact of drug abuse on the society and the economy of these two regions. It also covers how insecurity and instability provide potential ground for drug trade. In the past, attention focused principally on the product- the illicit drugs themselves. Now, discussion largely concentrated on how to

stop drugs from crossing borders, how to halt their production and how to limit or prosecute their consumption. These are important aspects, but not the whole picture. In recent years, the focus has become more balanced, with a shift in emphasis towards the individuals, the ultimate victim of this global malady.

Chapter - 1

Introduction

Drug use in some form or other is virtually universal. The use of opium, cannabis and alcohol and such other substances were not nebulous to men and he has been using these drugs even long before he became literate. To a large extent the types of drugs used and favoured by each social group have been a matter of botanical and geographical convenience. During the twentieth century 'drug misuse' has become widely regarded as one of the world's greatest social problems. It is abundantly clear that all over the world various types of drugs have been used excessively, unwisely and often harmfully (Martin A. Plant, 1981:1). Drugs are chemicals, but not all chemicals are drugs. Initially, therefore, a drug might be defined as a "*substance introduced into the body knowingly and not as a food*".

In current cultures, the word 'drug' is likely to evoke one of two images. One is that of medication for sickness, like antibiotics¹. Implicit in this concept is the idea that the drug is prescribed by some knowledgeable person such as a doctor, chemist, and that it is to be used in specified amounts and ways. The second, and probably more common image is that of illegally obtained substances used irresponsibly for hedonistic purposes by people stereotyped as young, antisocial and at least amoral if not actually immoral (Jora A. Krivanek, 1982:16). According to the pharmacologist, narcotics are drugs that depress the activity of the brain and central nervous system. In medicine, they are used for the relief of pain; in this respect they are unsurpassed, and if correctly used they are among the most valuable relievers of human suffering (Norman Imlah, 1970: 46).

Varieties of drugs and their production

Although there has been significant growth in the production of opiates in recent years, global consumption remains relatively stable, with only a marginal increase in annual prevalence: from 0.37 % of the population age 15-65 in 2005 to 0.39% in 2006.

¹ Antibiotics and similar drugs enhance the body's ability to destroy hostile invading organisms.

The total number of opiate users at the global level is now estimated at around 16.5 million people. Though the number of opiate users has increased in absolute terms, the annual prevalence rate of 0.4% of the population age 15-64 has remained stable since the late 1990s (UNODC, World Drug Report, 2008: 55).

The illicit drug cycle—from the source of natural plants to the chemical laboratory through the processing and manufacturing stages to consumption and the laundering of profits encompasses developing and industrialized countries alike. Drug refers to substances used without medical advice in order to improve mood (Richard E. Isralowitz and Darwin Telias, 1998: 3). In modern society, the numbers of such illegal substances are increasing day by day. Some of these are—

➤ *Alcohol* is one drug which is acceptable to the majority of Western society. It differs from all the other in that it is neither illegal nor subject to medical control; yet alcohol is a drug. Drinking in excess has become one of modern society's most serious problems (Norman Imlah, 1970: 89). Alcohol dependence² is without question the most serious drug problem in this world today. Alcohol users far outnumber those of all other drugs and are found along the entire continuum of dependence. The beverage alcohol (scientifically known as ethyl alcohol or ethanol) is produced by fermenting or distilling various fruits, vegetables, or grains. Ethyl alcohol itself is a clear, colorless liquid. Alcohol is rapidly absorbed into the bloodstream by the small intestine and less rapidly by the stomach and colon. In proportion to its concentration in the bloodstream, alcohol decreases activity in parts of the brain and spinal cord. The drinker's blood alcohol concentration depends on: (Narconon Drug Rehab and Drug Addiction Treatment Center, 2007)

- The amount consumed in a given time
- The drinker's size, sex, body build, and metabolism

² Dependence or compulsive drug-taking behaviour is when an individual takes the substance in larger amounts or over a longer period than was originally intended (example, continuing to drink until severely intoxicated despite having set a limit of only one drink). The individual may express a persistent desire to cut down or regulate substance use. Often, there have been many unsuccessful efforts to decrease or discontinue use. The individual may spend a great deal of time obtaining the substance, using the substance, or recovering from its effects.

- The type and amount of food in the stomach.

General effects of alcohol consumption are a feeling of warmth, flushed skin, impaired judgment, decreased inhibitions, muscular incoordination, slurred speech and memory and comprehension loss. In states of extreme intoxication, vomiting is likely to occur, possibly accompanied by incontinence, poor respiration, a fall in blood pressure, and in cases of severe alcohol poisoning, coma and death. Combining alcohol with other drugs can make the effects of these other drugs much stronger and more dangerous. Many accidental deaths have occurred after people have used alcohol combined with other drugs (Narconon Drug Rehab and Drug Addiction Treatment Center, 2007)

➤ *GHB (Gamma-HydroxyButyrate)* originally developed as an anesthetic. GHB is a naturally occurring four-carbon molecule sold in powdered, liquid or capsule form. GHB was formerly sold by health-food stores and gyms as a sleep aid, anabolic agent, fat burner, enhancer of muscle definition and natural psychedelic. GHB was first synthesized in 1960 by a French researcher. It has been used in Europe as a general anesthetic, a treatment for insomnia and narcolepsy, an aid to childbirth and a treatment for alcoholism and alcohol withdrawal syndrome. The effects of GHB are unpredictable and very dose-dependent. It has been reported that heavy dose of drink can lead to sleep paralysis, agitation, delusions and hallucinations.

➤ *Cannabis* (marijuana, marihuana, dope, hashish, bhang, kif, pot) is derived from the marijuana plant, *cannabis sativa*. This occurs in two varieties, the hemp type and the drug type. These differ in relation to the amounts of the main psycho-active ingredient delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) that they contain. The hemp type (used for rope making) contains relatively little of the intoxicating substance, while the drug type contains far greater levels of THC. It was used medically in China 4000 years ago, and has been a popular recreational drug since at least 2000 BC in the Indian subcontinent. Subsequently its use spread to the Middle East and North Africa (Martin A. Plant, 1981:25). There is little doubt that very often the effects of cannabis depend upon setting, expectations and mood. Many people who experiment with it report little or no effect whatever. The

desired short-term reaction is 'high' or euphoria similar to mild alcohol intoxication (Martin A. Plant, 1981: 27). Excessive use of cannabis may increase the heart rate as much as 50 percent, depending on the amount of THC it contains. It can also cause chest pain in people who have a poor blood supply to the heart - and it produces these effects more rapidly than tobacco smoke does.

Scientists believe that marijuana can be especially harmful to lungs because users often inhale the unfiltered smoke deeply and hold it in their lungs as long as possible. Therefore, the smoke is in contact with lung tissues for long periods of time, which irritates the lungs and damages the way they work. Marijuana has been used as an agent for achieving euphoria since ancient times; it was described in a Chinese medical compendium traditionally considered to date from 2737 B.C. Its use spread from China to India and then to North Africa and reached Europe at least as early as A.D. 500. The UN banned the non-medical/scientific research use of cannabis and opium in 1961, though no scientific evidence was advanced for the ban on cannabis (Gabriel Britto, 2001:13).

Global cannabis herb production is estimated to have stabilized at 41,400 metric tons in 2006. Cannabis is produced in massively greater volumes than opium (6,600 metric tons in 2006) heroin (606 metric tons in 2006) or cocaine (984 metric tons in 2006) combined. The area under cannabis cultivation is estimated to have amounted to some 520,000 hectares (range: 470,000 - 600,000 hectares) in 2006 (World Drug Report, 2008: 96-97).

Hallucinogens

The great civilizations offer numerous examples of the use of substances producing hallucinations. The ritual consumption of hallucinogenic mushrooms in America, the use of other intoxication mushrooms by sorcerers in Asia and the use of certain plants of witchcraft in Europe are only a few examples of the diversity of the "tradition" hallucinogens (Ikramul Haq, 1991: 119).

➤ *LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide)* is one of the major drugs making up the hallucinogen class. LSD was discovered in 1938 and is one of the most potent mood-changing chemicals. It is manufactured from lysergic acid, which is found in ergot, a fungus that grows on rye and other grains. LSD, commonly referred to as "acid," is sold on the street in tablets, capsules, and, occasionally, liquid form. It is odourless, colourless, and has a slightly bitter taste and is usually taken by mouth. Often LSD is added to absorbent paper, such as blotter paper, and divided per dose into small decorated squares. Most users of LSD voluntarily decrease or stop its use over time. LSD is not considered an addictive drug since it does not produce compulsive drug-seeking behavior as do cocaine, amphetamine, heroin, alcohol, and nicotine (Narconon Drug Rehab and Drug Addiction Treatment Center, 2007).

Opium and its derivatives

➤ *Opium* is the crudest form and also the least potent of the Opiates. Opium is the milky latex fluid contained in the un-ripened seed pod of the opium poppy. As the fluid is exposed to air, it hardens and turns black in color. This dried form is typically smoked, but can also be eaten. Opium is grown mainly in Myanmar (formerly Burma) and Afghanistan (Narconon Drug Rehab and Drug Addiction Treatment Center, 2007).

As long ago as 100 AD, opium had been used as a folk medicine, taken with a beverage or swallowed as a solid. Only toward the middle of the 17th century, when opium smoking was introduced into China, did any serious addiction problems arise. In the 18th century, opium addiction was so serious there that the Chinese made many attempts to prohibit opium cultivation and opium trade with Western countries. At the same time opium made its way to Europe and North America, where addiction grew out of its prevalent use as a painkiller. Opiates first produce a feeling of pleasure and euphoria, but with their continued use the body demands larger amounts to reach the same sense of well-being. This is one of the primary reasons why an opium addiction may develop quickly. Although the use of solutions of opium has been replaced by

morphine, heroin and codeine, mixtures containing opium are still prescribed, mainly as bowel sedatives for the relief of colic and diarrhea (Norman Imlah, 1970: 48).

Opium production, while significant, is now highly concentrated in Afghanistan's southern provinces. Indeed, the Helmand province is on the verge of becoming the world's biggest drug supplier, with the dubious distinction of cultivating more drugs than entire countries such as Myanmar, Morocco or even Colombia. Curing Helmand of its drug and insurgency cancer will rid the world of the most dangerous source of its most dangerous narcotic, and go a long way to bringing security to the region (World Drug Report, 2007: 1). Lao PDR's traditional illicit drug of choice is black opium; opium consumers are estimated to exceed 2% of the population making it the world's second largest consumer of opiates per capita next to Iran. (UNODC, Regional Center for East Asia and the Pacific, 2004: 28). The total area under opium cultivation rose to 235,700 hectares in 2007. Opium poppy cultivation in Myanmar increased 29%, i.e. from 21,500 hectares in 2006 to 27,700 hectares, in 2007. Afghanistan's higher yielding opium poppy led to a second year of global opium production increases. Opium production almost doubled between 2005 and 2007, reaching 8,870 metric tons in 2007, a level unprecedented in recent years. In 2007, Afghanistan alone accounted for over 92% of global opium production (World Drug Report, 2008: 7).

➤ *Morphine* is most prevalent, which makes up a tenth of the opium. Although morphine is not the only active ingredient of opium it is recognized that the main effects of opium are those of morphine. Extraction of morphine reduces the bulk of the original dried juice to a tenth while retaining the main characteristic properties (Norman Imlah, 1970: 46). This drug, the main alkaloid of opium, was isolated early in the nineteenth century. The morphine addiction has greatly declined, solely because of its replacement by heroin, which has less unpleasant side effects and produces pleasanter sensations. Morphine provides sedation, mental detachment, and relief from pain. When it is given by mouth the effects are slow, but with an injecting under the skin they are evident in 15 minutes. Injection into a vein produces immediate effects. The immediate effects in a non-addict frequently consist of nausea, vomiting, sweating, and itching. In the addict,

there is a short period of overactivity and talkativeness followed by drowsiness and underactivity (Norman Imlah, 1970: 48-49).

➤ *Heroin* is now regarded as the most dangerous of all existing drugs of addiction. It was discovered in 1898 and is derived from morphine by a synthetic process requiring considerable skill. It is an addictive drug, and its use is a serious problem in whole of the world. Short-term effects include a surge of euphoria followed by alternately wakeful and drowsy states and cloudy mental functioning. Associated with fatal overdose and particularly in users who inject the drug-infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS and hepatitis. Long-term users may develop collapsed veins, liver disease, and lung complications (Narconon Drug Rehab and Drug Addiction Treatment Center, 2007). Its withdrawal³ symptoms usually occur six to twelve hours after the last dose. They range from minor discomfort, similar to that from a cold, to cramps, nausea, sweating, diarrhea and insomnia (Martin A Plant, 1981:37).

Heroin is usually injected, sniffed/snorted or smoked. Typically, a heroin abuser may inject up to four times a day. Intravenous injection provides the greatest intensity and most rapid onset of euphoria (7 to 8 seconds), while intramuscular injection produces a relatively slow onset of euphoria (5 to 8 minutes). When heroin is sniffed or smoked, peak effects are usually felt within 10 to 15 minutes. After the initial effects, abusers usually will be drowsy for several hours. Mental function is clouded by heroin's effect on the central nervous system. Cardiac function slows. Breathing is also severely slowed, sometimes to the point of death. Heroin overdose is a particular risk on the street, where the amount and purity of the drug cannot be accurately known (Narconon Drug Rehab and Drug Addiction Treatment Center, 2007)

➤ *Codeine* is another derivative of opium, closely related chemically to morphine. Its general effects are the same as those of morphine, but much less intense. Codeine

³ Withdrawal is a maladaptive behavioral change, with physiological and concomitants, that occurs when blood or tissue concentrations of a substance decline in an individual who had maintained prolonged heavy use of the substance. After developing unpleasant withdrawal symptoms, the person is likely to take the substance to relieve or to avoid those symptoms.

exists in medicine as a constituent of a number of painkilling remedies, particularly headache tablets, and is a constituent of a number of effective cough mixtures (Norman Imlah, 1970: 52).

Stimulants

The drugs in this group directly stimulate the brain and central nervous system. For this reason many stimulant drugs are referred to colloquially as “pep pills”. Mild stimulants have a general tonic effects, inducing wakefulness and alertness with a general feeling of wellbeing. Mild stimulant is widely accepted in society through beverages such as tea, coffee, and Coca-Cola (Norman Imlah, 1970: 54-55).

➤ *OxyContin* is the brand name for an opioid analgesic containing the active ingredient oxycodone. OxyContin is a legal narcotic that is available, by prescription, to treat severe pain. OxyContin is a controlled-release medication that, when used correctly, provides extended relief of pain associated with cancer, back pain or arthritis. However, often when the drug is abused, the tablets are crushed and snorted, chewed, or mixed with water and injected, hence eliminating the time-release factor and allowing for a quick and intense rush to the brain. OxyContin is highly addictive - so higher doses of the drug must be taken when a tolerance⁴ develops. Illicit users of the drug have risen drastically and steadily over the last few years. The most serious risk associated with OxyContin is respiratory depression. Because of this, OxyContin should not be combined with other substances that slow down breathing, such as alcohol, antihistamines (like some cold or allergy medication), barbiturates or benzodiazepines. Other common side effects include constipation, nausea, sedation, dizziness, vomiting, headache, dry mouth, sweating and weakness.

⁴ Tolerance is the need for greatly increased amounts of the substance of the achieve intoxication (or the desired effects) or a markedly diminished effect with continued use of the same amount of the substance. The degree to which tolerance develops varies greatly across substances. Individuals with heavy use of opiates and stimulants can develop substantial (e.g., tenfold) levels of tolerance, often to a dosage that would be lethal to a nonuser.

➤ *Amphetamines* are synthetic drugs. It was discovered in 1930, account for a very large proportion of current drug abuse, and are second only to the opiates in the seriousness of the problems they create. Amphetamines are man-made drugs that have a bitter taste. Amphetamines can be snorted, swallowed, injected, dissolved in a drink or smoked. Amphetamines can also come in a liquid form, which is injected into the body. The most common form of the drug is amphetamine sulphate, commonly known as Speed. The purity of this drug is usually only about 5%, with the rest mixed with other white powders, ranging from talcum powder and toilet cleaner (Narconon Drug Rehab and Drug Addiction Treatment Center, 2007). The regular use of amphetamines means the body develops a tolerance, and larger doses of the drug will be required to achieve the same high, which can lead to addiction. Anybody who takes amphetamines for long enough may suffer from paranoia, delusions and hallucinations, as well as risking infections such as hepatitis and HIV through contaminated needles. Larger doses may cause dry mouth, sweating, shakiness, blurred vision and headache. Extremely large quantities may lead to flushing, pallor, changed and possibly irregular heartbeat, loss of co-ordination and sometimes to psychotic or irrational behaviour. Excessive amphetamine use has, rarely, led to fatalities due to burst blood vessels in the brain and heart failure (Martin A Plant, 1981: 39).

The ATS market continues to stabilise over the medium term. UNODC estimates that ATS manufacture world-wide could have ranged between 330 metric tons to 770 metric tons in 2006, with a mid-point estimate of 494 metric tons. It appears that global manufacture may be increasing somewhat for the amphetamines group and decreasing for the ecstasy group. In 2006, it is estimated that methamphetamine accounted for 68% of the amphetamines group (World Drug Report, 2008: 18).

➤ *MDMA or ecstasy* is a synthetic drug. MDMA possesses chemical variations of the stimulant amphetamine or methamphetamine and a hallucinogen, most often mescaline. Ecstasy or MDMA is a human-made drug that acts as a stimulant and a hallucinogen. It is taken orally as a capsule or tablet. Short-term effects include feelings of mental stimulation, emotional warmth, enhanced sensory perception, and increased physical

energy. Adverse health effects can include nausea, chills, sweating, teeth clenching, muscle cramping and blurred vision. Recent research findings also link MDMA use to long-term damage to those parts of the brain critical to thought and memory. It is thought that the drug causes damage to the neurons that use the chemical serotonin to communicate with other neurons.

With year on year global prevalence unchanged, ecstasy use is estimated to affect approximately 9 million people or 0.2% of the population age 15-64. There are about 3 million ecstasy users in Europe, accounting for a third of ecstasy users worldwide. Drug use trends of Western Europe are largely stable but continue growing in several East and South-East European countries (World drug Report, 2008: 164).

Phenmetrazine

This drug is chemically quite different from the amphetamines, but is virtually identical in that it creates the same reactions and problems in the same degree (Norman Imlah, 1970: 60).

➤ *Cocaine* is derived from the leaves of the coca bush, which grows most abundantly in Peru, Bolivia, and Java. It was isolated from this plant in 1885 and is a white powder with a bitter taste. (Norman Imlah, 1970: 60). It is a powerful addictive stimulant drug. The coca leaf has been chewed by indigenous people in the Andes for centuries. The plant is grown primarily in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, with Peru having the largest plant production. Smoking of coca paste often mixed with tobacco or cannabis (basuco, pitillo etc.) is now frequent among the youth of Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. Cocaine is the principal active ingredient of the coca leaf, extracted from leaves and used to make other forms of the drug such as coca paste or crack. The largest single market for cocaine is the United States, which saw sharp increases in the 1980s (UNDCP, 6-12 March 1995:8).

The powdered, hydrochloride salt form of cocaine can be snorted or dissolved in water and injected. This form of cocaine comes in a rock crystal that can be heated and its vapors smoked. The term "crack" refers to the crackling sound heard when it is heated. Physical effects of cocaine use include constricted blood vessels, dilated pupils, and increased temperature, heart rate, and blood pressure. The duration of cocaine's immediate euphoric effects, which include hyperstimulation, reduced fatigue, and mental clarity, depends on the route of administration. Different routes of cocaine administration can produce different adverse effects. Regularly snorting cocaine, for example, can lead to loss of sense of smell, nosebleeds, problems with swallowing, hoarseness, and an overall irritation of the nasal septum, which can lead to a chronically inflamed, runny nose. Ingested cocaine can cause severe bowel gangrene, due to reduced blood flow. And, persons who inject cocaine have puncture marks and "tracks," most commonly in their forearms. Intravenous cocaine users may also experience an allergic reaction, either to the drug, or to some additive in street cocaine, which can result, in severe cases, in death. Because cocaine has a tendency to decrease food intake, many chronic cocaine users lose their appetites and can experience significant weight loss and malnourishment (Narconon Drug Rehab and Drug Addiction Treatment Center, 2007).

The first encouraging sign is that coca cultivation in the Andean countries continues to fall, driven by significant declines in Colombia. Global demand for cocaine has also stabilized, although the decline in the United States is offset by alarming increases in some European countries. (World Drug Report, 2007: 1). Particularly most of the world's cocaine comes from coca leaf cultivated in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. The global area under coca cultivation fell by 29 per cent to some 156,900 hectares between 2000-2006, largely due to reductions of coca cultivation in Colombia. The areas under coca cultivation in Peru and Bolivia increased over this period but remained significantly below the levels reported a decade earlier (World Drug Report, 2007: 7).

Potential Manufacture of Cocaine in Metric Tons

Countries	2005	2006
Peru	80	94
Bolivia	640	610
Colombia	260	280

Source: UNODC, World Drug Report, 2007

➤ *Crack* -The chemical hydrochloride is mainly what distinguishes cocaine from crack. Some users chemically process cocaine in order to remove the hydrochloride. This process is called "freebasing" and makes the drug more potent. "Crack" is a solid form of freebased cocaine. It is called "crack" because it snaps and cracks when heated and smoked. As with any street drug, what is sold may not be what it is claimed to be. Predicting side effects is difficult when the actual contents are not known (Narconon Drug Rehab and Drug Addiction Treatment Center, 2007)

What determines the observable drug effect?

The nature of drug effects varies in size and quality with four major factors: dose, time since the drug was taken, the purity of the drug and status of the time (Jora A. Krivanek, 1982: 20-25).

- *Dose*- Other things being equal, the larger the dose the greater the effect. However, this is somewhat modified by the way the drug is given. Smaller doses are required if the drug is injected directly into the bloodstream.
- *Time since the drug was taken*- In general, symptoms diminish with time, but the various effects of a drug may show quite different time courses. For example, the physiological effects of the hallucinogenic drugs peak about two hours after ingestion and are generally gone after three hours. The psychedelic effects peak four to five hours after ingestion and decline after about eight hours.
- *Purity of the drug* Multiple drug administration is becoming the rule. Such use may be deliberate. 'Street' drugs are almost never what they are advertised to be. Thus,

two-thirds of drugs sold as mescaline or psilocybin are LSD; THC, the active principle of marijuana, is almost never available and phencyclidine is the usual substitute.

- *Status of the user*- This includes all aspects of functioning, both physical and psychological. Such factors as age, sex, genetic background and presence or absence of disease interact in significant ways with the action of drugs to produce unique symptoms.

A METHOD FOR PROCESSING DRUGS

The production of drugs may be divided into three categories: (a) those processes which require only plant products, (b) those involving a semi-synthetic process where natural materials are partly changed by synthetic substances to produce the final product and (c) processes which use only manmade chemicals to produce consumable drugs. Examples of these three are (a) opium gathered in the fields for home use, (b) coca bush leaves processed to make cocaine and (c) narcotic or psychotropic drugs made entirely in the laboratory or factory (UNDCP, 6-12 March 1995: 4).

In some tribal areas of the NWFP (North-West Frontier of Pakistan) opium gum is refined into an impure morphine base, using hydrochloric acid. To produce heroin, this morphine base is then treated with acetic anhydride (or the more hazardous acetyl chloride), and passed through a heating and filtering process involving chemicals such as acetone, alcohol and tartic acid. Through this method, No. 3 heroin is manufactured which is smoked. Crude heroin is also precipitated, dried and crushed to form white or No. 4 heroin, the injectable drug used in the United States and Europe. A modern method of processing the opium poppy is to use the industrial poppy-straw process, which involves extracting alkaloids from the mature dried plant in either liquid, solid or powder form (Iqramul Haq, 1991: 82).

Until the late 1970s, the usual form of cocaine available on the street was cocaine hydrochloride, a salt form of cocaine that is usually sniffed (snorted) nasally or injected intravenously when mixed with water. Since the hydrochloride salt is quickly destroyed at high temperatures, it cannot be smoked unless it is in a freebase alkaloid form. Freebase cocaine is generally prepared by one or two ways. One method is to mix the

hydrochloride salt with buffered ammonia; the alkaloidal cocaine is extracted from the solution using ether, and then the ether is evaporated to yield cocaine crystals. When heated, the crystals make a popping sound, and this characteristic sound is the origin of the term “crack”. This form of cocaine is very pure and is generally called “freebase” on the street (J. Jaffe, 1990).

The other method of producing freebase cocaine is to combine cocaine hydrochloride and sodium bicarbonate (baking soda) and heat the solution until, solid forms. The resultant pieces of the solid, also called “rock”, when heated, release vaporized cocaine (J. Jaffe, 1990).

A method and system have been provided herein that make use of a material jetting device to produce solid drug particles of relatively small particle size. The rapid evaporation of droplets that occurs yields a rapidly quenched drug or drug formulation particle in a high-energy, metastable solid state. The method begins by dissolving a drug in solvent. The resulting solution may be referred to as a drug-containing solution. Suitable liquids include, without limitation, low boiling point alcohols, ethers, ketones, esters, halogenated solvents, or the like. In some cases, it may be desirable to include small quantities of water. In addition, combinations of two or more solvents may be advantageous (A method for processing drugs, 2007).

A moving volume of gas is then established. According to one exemplary method, the moving volume of gas is established by directing gas from a gas source to a drying vessel. It may be desirable to control the temperature of the gas used.⁵ The moving volume of gas circulates through the drying vessel until it reaches the exhaust, at which point the gas is exhausted. It also includes jetting the drug-containing solution into the moving volume of gas. In particular, the drug-containing solution is jetted at a desired

⁵ It may be desirable to use an inert gas in establishing the moving volume of gas. More specifically, the use of an inert gas may reduce the possibility that the gas will undesirably react with the drug or the solvent and possibly change the characteristics of the resulting drug or drug formulation particles. A suitable inert gas includes, without limitation, nitrogen.

droplet size. Any suitable device⁶ may be used to provide droplets of the desired size. Such devices may include devices commonly referred to as inkjet type devices.

As the drug enters the moving volume of gas, the solvent in the drug-containing solution is rapidly evaporated. The rapid evaporation of the solvent may reduce the possibility that the drug will form a crystalline structure. Further, such evaporation yields a rapidly quenched drug or drug formulation particle in a high-energy, metastable solid state. Further, the moving volume of gas may be a generally laminar gas flow that remains laminar as it is circulated past the jetting devices. The laminar flow of the gas may allow the droplets to form substantially spherical particles. Accordingly, a generally laminar flow may allow the droplets to retain their generally spherical shape as they dry. As the droplets dry, their size decreases such that the final drug particles are substantially smaller than the original droplets. Once the solvent is evaporated, the resulting solidified drug or drug formulation particles may be substantially round and have an average size of less than about 1 micron (A method of processing drugs, 2007).

However, there is an important distinction between the extent of drug crop cultivation and the extent of drug production. Crop yields can be affected by weather conditions and changes in production technology, among other things. As a result, long-term declines in cultivated area do not necessarily translate into declines in total production. Opium production in Afghanistan rose almost 50 per cent in 2006, bringing global heroin production to a new record high of 606 metric tons in 2006, exceeding the previous high (576 metric tons in 1999) by 5 per cent (World Drug Report, 2007: 7).

Drug Seizure

The world's drug problem is being contained. In 2005/06, the global markets for the main illicit drugs – the opiates, cocaine, cannabis, and amphetamine-type stimulants – remained largely stable. The share of total drug production that is seized by law

⁶Suitable devices may include, without limitation, thermally, magnetically, and/or piezo-electrically actuated inkjet type devices.

enforcement has also increased – some 42 per cent of global cocaine production and 26 per cent of global heroin production never made it to consumers. (World Drug Report, 2007: 7). The seizure and dismantling of laboratories is one of the key elements in the interdiction of ATS supply. In 2005, over 95 percent of ATS laboratories dismantled worldwide were producing methamphetamine. ATS precursor seizures rose from 5 mt in 1990 to a record high of 323 metric tons in 2004 (UNODC, World Drug Report, 2007:125)

Global drug seizures, excluding cannabis 2004 – 2005 (Metric tons equivalents)

Drugs	2004	2005
Coca leaf	1,207	3,209
Cocaine	579.4	752.3
Opium	211.7	342.2
Khat	106.9	97.5
Heroin	60.2	58.6
Morphine	39.2	32.0
Methamphetamine	10.9	17.2
Amphetamine	5.9	12.9
Ecstasy	7.9	5.3
Depressants	2.1	1.4
Methaqualone	4.8	0.6

Source: UNODC, World Drug Report, 2007: 31.

Global morphine seizures amounted to 46 metric tons in 2006, up 45% on a year earlier. Most morphine seizures took place in Pakistan (70%) and Iran (23%). Global heroin seizures amounted to 58 metric tons, about the same as a year earlier (-1%). The worlds largest heroin seizures in 2006 were reported by Iran (10.7 metric tons or 19% of global heroin seizures), followed by Turkey (10.3 metric tons or 18%), China (5.8 metric tons or 10%), Afghanistan (4 metric tons or 7%), Pakistan (2.8 metric tons or 5%), the Russian Federation (2.5 metric tons or 4%) and Tajikistan (2.1 metric tons or 4%). The

countries of West and Central Europe seized 8.4 metric tons or 14% of the total; the countries of North America seized 2.2 metric tons or 4% of the total (World Drug Report, 2008: 45).

Drug Abuse and its Social Impacts

Virtually every social group has its own pattern of drug use, either for purely casual, social purposes or for some more ritualised reasons. In western cultures the convivial consumption of alcohol is an important part of most social gatherings (Martin A. Plant, 1981: 9). The global changes which have allowed people, goods and money to move from one country to, other cheaply and easily have also had other consequences. They have made the differences and inequalities around the world more apparent and more unacceptable (UNDCP, 6-12 March 1995: 3). Rapid social, economic and technological change may, under certain circumstances, weaken the sense of family and reduce the sense of belonging to other people, groups and places. Stability of relationships, environment and expectations is a powerful force in helping people manage their lives, especially important for children and young adults.

The family is often viewed as the basic source of strength, providing nurturance and support for its individual members as well as ensuring stability for the community and culture. Rapid social, economic and technological change may, under certain circumstances, weaken the sense of family and reduce the sense of belonging to other people, groups and places. Stability of relationships, environment and expectations is a powerful force in helping people manage their lives, especially important for children and young adults. Family factors that may lead to or intensify drug use are thought to include prolonged or traumatic parental absence, harsh discipline, failure to communicate on an emotional level, chaotic or disturbed members and parental use of drugs. Lack of household stability, income or employment for a parent may increase stress on the family and its vulnerability, pushing marginal individuals to find "solutions" or solace in alcohol or drugs (Anthony P. Jurich, 1985). Although drug abuse is common among all age groups, it occurs more frequently among young adults. Increases were noted in illicit

drug demand in most countries in the Americas, in eastern Europe and Asia, where it was attributed to the socioeconomic crisis affecting these regions and, in particular, high unemployment.

The term “drug use” and “drug abuse” are often applied interchangeably; for example, the use of an illegal drug may be considered an abuse. For many people who use marijuana on occasion in order to achieve a state of euphoria, pleasure or relaxation it may be argued that they do not abuse the substance. Other perspectives of abuse rely on the notion of potential or actual harm (Ray and Ksir, L. Johnston, P. O’Malley, and J. Bachman, 1987: 4). The essential feature of “substance abuse” is a maladaptive pattern of substance use manifested by recurrent and significant adverse consequences related to the repeated use of substances.

Extent of drug use (annual prevalence*) estimates 2005-06 (or latest year available)

	Cannabis	Amphetamine Type Amphetamine	Amphetamine Type Ecstasy	Cocain	Opiate	Heroin
Million people	165.6	24.7	9	16	16.5	12.0
In % of global age 15-64 ..	3.9%	0.6%	0.2%	0.4%	0.4%	0.3%

Source: UNODC, World Drug Report, 2008, p. no. 9

* Annual prevalence is a measure of the number or percentage of people who have consumed an illicit drug at least once in the 12 month period preceding the assessment.

Since 1997 the prevalence of illicit drug used in Thailand has widened from heroin, cannabis, and other substances to also include the use of amphetamines or ‘yaba.’ Between 1993 and 2001, there was a 1000% increase in the use of this new drug. In Thailand the most common manner of administering yaba is not injecting but inhaling the fumes, a practice known as ‘chasing the dragon’ (UNODC, Regional Center for East Asia

and the Pacific, 2004: 37). Globally, an estimated 72% of the world's 16.5 million opiate users use heroin (some 12 million people). UNODC estimates for Europe suggest that close to 90% of opiate users use heroin. In Asia about two thirds of all opiate users consume heroin with opium more common in rural areas and heroin more common in urban areas (UNODC, World Drug Report, 2008: 57).

Global opiate abuse has stabilised at an estimated 15.6 million people, or 0.4 per cent of the world's population aged 15-64. Opiates continue to be the main problem drug worldwide, accounting for some 60 per cent of treatment demand in Asia and in Europe. More than half of the world's opiate using population lives in Asia, with the highest levels of abuse occurring along the main drug trafficking routes out of Afghanistan. Annual prevalence of opiates, including heroin, is high in the Islamic Republic of Iran where the number of drug abusers is said to exceed 1.2 million (2.8 percent of the general population aged 15-64) (World Drug Report, 2007:55)

Illicit drug use more frequently results in problems or disease rather than death. AIDS has changed the nature and impact of drug abuse. In the illicit drug scene, the HIV virus is spread in two primary ways: first, contaminated needles or syringes are shared; secondly, infected injecting drug abusers may travel widely. Although heterosexual transmission is the major cause of AIDS in many countries. The government recognizes the presence of HIV among drug users as the fifth priority in its National Strategic Plan, 2002, which was developed by the National Committee for the Control of AIDS (NCCA) and based on a multi-sectoral approach (UNODC, Regional Center for East Asia and the Pacific, 2004: 31). Myanmar has one of the highest HIV infection rates among IDUs in Asia. HIV prevalence among IDUs was estimated that between 150,000 to 250,000 in 2000 (Reid G. and Costigan G. 2002: 140).

Drug and Crime

Drug traffic is part of this new social, economic and political environment. It is not only individualistic and entrepreneurial but the best organized of all underground and illegal activities (Alba Zaluar, 2001: 33). Researchers have found a close connection between drug abuse, criminal behaviour and social attitudes. Review of the crime/drugs literature supports three notions: heroin addicts are usually deeply involved in crime; daily opiate use increases criminality several fold; and many heroin abusers are not interested in obtaining treatment although drug treatment programmes do reduce the criminality of addicts while they are in treatment (LaMond Tullis, 1991: 270)

Whatever the reason in any country, the lack of economic progress has put such countries in a financial bind and frequently placed severe restrictions on government services available to the most vulnerable segments of the population. In some cases, this has been the result of political instability, ethnic conflict, natural disasters or mismanagement of the economy. In this context, both the nation State and its individual citizens have become more vulnerable to the temptations of money from illicit drug production and trafficking (UNDCP, 6-12 March 1995:3). The focus of the study is, whether it is the income security associated with drug trade or some other factor responsible for opium production.

The high-risk, high-gain nature of drug trafficking is well known. Profits from the drug traffic flow back into the coffers of sophisticated criminal organizations with financial interests in other illicit areas. In some cases, drug dealing may be undertaken by political dissident groups that desire the money to support arms purchases, political insurgency or terrorism. For example, drug enforcement efforts are often hampered by insurgent groups which are engaged in bitter and violent struggles with criminal cartels for control of the drug trade. Hence, political conflicts within and between countries, often involving dissident groups, obstruct government action. Governments that are unable to control major dissident groups representing a direct challenge to their authority are unlikely to be successful in controlling a drug trade that generates enormous amounts

of money to buy influence or weapons (UNDCP, 6-12 March 1995: 7). The second hypothesis is, it is the great game of major powers that triggered opium production in the Golden Crescent. Mujahideen needed money for weapons to counter Soviet army and it is same in the case of Taliban and Al- Qaeda (against American army).

Crime and drugs may be related in several ways, none of them simple. First, illicit production, manufacture, distribution or possession of drugs may constitute a crime. Secondly, drugs may increase the likelihood of other, non-drug crimes occurring. Thirdly, drugs may be used to make money, with subsequent money-laundering. And fourthly, drugs may be closely linked to other major problems, such as the illegal use of guns, various forms of violence and terrorism. Illicit traffic in drugs generates enormous profits. Funds are obtained in or converted into an international currency and then moved into financial centers which can electronically transfer the money around the world. Empirical data suggest that drug use is both a direct and an indirect cause of crime. In the underground economy, drug use drives dealing and property crimes directly, and many acts of violent crime occur indirectly as a result of transaction disputes or marketing conflicts (M. De La Rosa, E. Y. Lambert, and B. Gropper, 1990). It not only inherently involves violence, but may also lure other into criminal behaviour in anticipation of large profits (J. M. Chaiken & M. R. Chaiken, 1982; P. J. Goldstein, 1985).

Two schools of thought have come to dominate the debate on law enforcement in a democratic society: the traditional *professional* form of policing and the more models can be construed as complementary *community- oriented* approach. Although the two models can be construed as complementary in that a police chief may draw liberally from paradigms in setting goals for the department, they are fundamentally different approaches to policing. The community policing approach stresses the importance of a police-citizen partnership, while the professional model emphasized a police responsibility for crime control and other maintenance (Craig D. Uchida, Brian Forst, 1994: 77-78).

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Chapter- 2

Shift from Golden Triangle to Golden Crescent

An illicit drugs industry has spread its tentacles over international linkages, international terrorism has grown stronger, having diversified into “narco-terrorism”. The attention of insurgent groups has increasingly turned to drugs and smuggling networks. In the maze of several strands of criminal activity, the paradigm, which clearly emerges, is that an inordinate weaponization of societies has enabled the drug industry to acquire its present gargantuan proportions. Simply put, the “weapons for drugs” syndrome has played the key role. The multinational spread of terrorism is principally narco-supported and narco-oriented (Prashant Dikshit, 1995: 159). The drug barons have developed a nexus with the arms dealers. The illegality of the drug trade brought up the requirement of armed protection for the drug barons. A large number of such arms have found their way into the underground network of druglords and arms bazaars. Much of the profit from the drug trade is channeled into the arms; the profit from the drug trade is channeled into the arms business. The easy availability of arms has increased criminalisation.

Asian poppy fields, sprouting in areas, which were the killing fields of wars in Indo-China, Myanmar since the 1950s and Afghanistan since 1979, each year, produce on the average larger bumper harvests of opium. Once this becomes heroin, it is injected massively into the veins of Europeans, Americans, Asians and African. Marijuana or cannabis plants, despite concerted national campaigns to uproot and destroy them, sprout near thousands of towns and cities from London, Los Angeles and Kabul to Almaty. Global profits of the multinationals world drug business and its criminal management are numbered in hundred of billions of dollars each year (John K. Cooley, 1999: 126). The global consumption of cocaine heroin, and ATS has dramatically increased during the 1980s, cocaine production doubled and heroin production tripled, creating 13 million cocaine addicts and 8 million heroin addicts globally. For example of 1,000 tons of cocaine produced in 1996, 98% came from Peru, Bolivia and Colombia most of it destined for the North American market. Heroin production was estimated 330 tons, with

90% being grown in the Golden Triangle and Golden Crescent regions and intended for a global market (United Nations, General Assembly, 1998).

Golden Triangle

The Golden Triangle is one of Asia's two main illicit opium-producing areas. It is an area of around 350,000 square kilometers that overlap the mountains of three countries of mainland Southeast Asia: Burma (Myanmar), Laos, and Thailand. Along with Afghanistan in the Golden Crescent (together with Iran and Pakistan), it has been one of the most important opium-producing area of Asia and of the world since the 1950s (Pierre-Arnaud Chauvy, 2002).

Afghanistan was responsible for 92 per cent of global opium production in 2006. For no other drug is production so concentrated in a single area. This concentration went hand in hand with a remarkable long-term progress in eliminating other sources of supply, principally in South-East Asia. Poppy cultivation in South-East Asia is down by more than 85 per cent over the last decade. Between 2005 and 2006 alone, poppy cultivation in South East Asia declined from 35,000 hectares to 24,000 hectares. Although opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan increased massively in 2006, the global area under illicit poppy cultivation was still 10 per cent lower in 2006 than in 2000, due to reduction in South-East Asia. But despite the reduction in the area under cultivation, potential heroin production is up. In 2006, global opium production soared to a new record high of 6,610 metric tons, a 43 per cent increase over 2005 (World Drug Report, 2007: 10).

A concerted eradication drive over the past decades has slashed opium cultivation in this once notorious region to the point that South East Asia now produces only 5% of the world's deadliest drug – the rest comes from Afghanistan. Thailand has been opium-free for almost twenty years. Laos has cut opium production by 94% in less than a decade. Myanmar's share of the world opium market collapsed from 63% to 6% between 1998 and 2006 (UNODC, 2007).

Potential Production of Opium in Metric Tons (All figures refers to dry opium).

Country	1990	1992	1996	2000	2001	2003	2005	2006	2007
Myanmar	1,621	1,660	1,760	1,087	1,097	810	312	315	460
Lao PDR	202	127	140	167	134	120	14	20	9
Thailand	20	14	5	6	6	-	-	-	-

Source: UNODC, World Drug Report 2008, p no. 38

The 'Golden Triangle' in Southeast Asia is the main source of narcotics particularly heroin in the world. It is an area of about 2,25,000 sq. kms. including the Shan hills of northeastern Myanmar, some mountain crests of northern Thailand and a high plateau of northern Laos. It is a mountainous region interrupted by deep valleys and covered with thick jungles. The reality is that after years of producing the lion's share of the world's opium, the Golden Triangle is now only a bit player in the business. Three decades ago (1970-90s) the northernmost reaches of Laos, Thailand and Myanmar produced more than 70 per cent of all opium sold worldwide, most of it refined into heroin. Today the area averages about 5 per cent of the world total, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. The Golden Triangle has been eclipsed by the Golden Crescent the poppy-growing area in and around Afghanistan that is now the source of an estimated 92 per cent of the world's opium, according to the United Nations (Thomas Fuller, 2007).

Most of the hill tribes in the Golden Triangle live in villages located on mountain ridges, which are mostly accessible, by footpaths. The main occupation of these tribes is cultivation and selling of raw opium. This is the only sole source of income these people have. Another point, which should be taken note of, is that several insurgent groups also sustain their struggle from the income of trafficking of heroin produced in the area. Opium-poppy cultivation and subsequent manufacture of heroin from opium fetches the drug lords a huge sum of money in the international markets. Also, opium cultivation has brought additional income for the farmers who plant maize and rice after harvesting the opium. The fields are thus used for cash and food crops (Phanjoutam Tarapot, 1997: 65). Opium has a long tradition in East Asia, having been first introduced into the region by Arab traders plying their wares in the eighth century and later spread by Portuguese merchants from India in the sixteenth century. Poppy cultivation was started in the mountainous province particularly Yunan around 1875, one-third of the arable land

surface of Yunan was covered with poppies. It was pointed out that there was no proper demarcation of border at that time separating Myanmar and Laos, both of which were contiguous, and close to the Yunan province¹. Yunanese traders then introduced poppy into the Golden Triangle area and hill tribes used high-yielding methods of cultivation. Climate, history and politics have conspired to make the hills of Burma's Shan State the world's preeminent opium growing region. Isolated from the more densely populated and relatively fertile lowlands of central and southern Burma, the tribal people of the Shan State have found the opium poppy well suited to the cooler climate and poorer soils of the rugged hills that border on China's Yunnan Province and extend into Thailand and Laos (Alan Dupont, 1999: 439).

Parts of the Golden Triangle used for poppy cultivation for instance are: Myanmar, poppies are planted in almost all parts of the Shan state, and neighbouring areas. There has also been cultivation of opium at Tiddim and Falam areas of Chin state but the quantity there is reportedly very small compared to those in Shan and nearby states. In Thailand, the mountainous Chiang Mai, and Chiang Rai are known for heavy plantation of opium poppy besides Mae Hong Son Nan provinces. In Laos, there is a heavy concentration of growth of opium in Hangsa and Louang Prabang provinces. There is also cultivation of opium in south west China and illicit cultivation in tribal areas of the Younan province in China (Phanjoubam Tarapot, 1997: 66).

Increasingly, growers are integrating forward into processing and distribution, extending the geographical and spread of their operations by taking advantage of new heroin distribution routes opening up in southern China, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. The majority of heroin produced in the Golden Triangle once was moved almost exclusively overland through Thailand to Bangkok and then by sea from Thailand to Hong Kong, or else from Burma across the southern Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Guangxi to Guangdong, Hong Kong, and Macao. But there are new multiple land, sea

¹ In 1916, the Yunanese authorities permitted the sale of opium in order to boost their treasury. From 1918 the openly promoted poppy cultivation-possible only because the central authorities in Peking (Beijing) was in decline and many independent warlords needed to finance their armies, hence, Yunanese opium boosted opium trafficking in south east Asia.

and air routes throughout the region. Burmese heroin is frequently moved from the Shan hills of Burma through Mandalay, and then to Rangoon, Moulmein, or other seaports for shipment to Singapore and Malaysia. Some also travels westward across the Bangladeshi border to developing market in India and Bangladesh (International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1997).

Thailand is still a primary conduit for heroin from the Golden Triangle sold in the US, but is no longer a major producer of opiates for the international market. The growth in Thailand exports and tourism provides more options for smuggling ranging from individual courier to large shipments hidden deep in legitimate exports moving through containerized ports. Thailand is full of mafias specializing in this trade. Thailand is a very close country to USA which is the final destination of a good part of these drugs. Thailand is one of the major world tourist centers; there are a number of ways in which smugglers are attempting to make a fortune by taking drugs out of the country (Giriraj Shah, 1999: 116). Laos is increasingly being used as a transit point for major traffickers moving from Myanmar to Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam and China (Sumita Kumar: 31).

There is a decline in the importance of the traditional overland drug routes (in the outward movement of narcotics from the Golden Triangle) mainly those through China, Thailand and Malaysia. The latter has been attributed to the concerted offensive against smuggling of narcotics launched in the early 1990s by the government of China (in Yunnan province alone, over 400 persons are reported to have been executed in 1994 for drug offences) and in Malaysia and Singapore (where drug offences carry a non-commutable death penalty). All these deterrent actions against drug trafficking, while not having the effect of making these countries totally impervious to the flow of drugs, has nevertheless contributed to increase in the preference of drugs across the Indian sub-continent (K.P.S Gill and Ajai Sahni, 2002: 100).

The Shan hills have been providing a sanctuary to a disparate collection of narco insurgent groups that cultivate the opium poppy and transform its narcotic by-product into immensely profitable heroin. The Shan hills of northeastern Burma are the epicenter

of regional opium cultivation, producing around 90% of all heroin exported from the Golden Triangle was enough to “satisfy the U.S heroin market many times over” (U.S Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1998). Most of the heroin refineries at the Thai-Myanmar borders are located in thick jungles. One reason for the rise of several refineries on the Thai-Myanmar borders in the recent years is that the smugglers find it easier to move heroin from these areas with good roads in Thailand to other national and international markets.

Myanmar was the most vibrant area of the drug trade in Southeast Asia. The booming opium trade in the Golden Triangle is largely managed by the Mong Tai Army (MTA), otherwise known as the Homong Rebels. Operating from out of landlocked enclave in Myanmar and encircled by China, Laos, and Thailand, the MTA is an extremely potent force² (Prashant Dikshit, 1995: 157). What is of grave significance is that the potent combine of drugs and insurgent terrorism has received extremely tolerant treatment at the hands of both the Myanmar authorities and American State Department officials in the past. The reason for this tolerant treatment is the paramount need to keep the borders with the People’s Republic of China under effective control. It is no wonder that under these conditions the area under opium cultivation in Myanmar grew from 142,700 hectares in 1989 to 165,800 hectares in 1993. Opium cultivation in Laos and Thailand during the same period declined. (UNODC, 2005).

Various insurgent groups have links with the narcotic business and trafficking in the region of the Golden Triangle. The narcotics trade is unusually profitable because the average markup for illicit drugs from source to market is extremely high in absolute terms and relative to most other commodities. In 1992, a single kilogram of heroin that fetched between US \$ 1,200 and US \$1,400 immediately after being processed in Burma’s laboratories typically would double in price by the time the narcotic reached its first transshipment point in the Thai city of Chiang Mai, triple again in Bangkok, and

² The nucleus of this rebel group was laid in the 1970s by Khun Sa, a home guard turned brigand, who first set up an armed band.

eventually sell for between US \$ 20,000 to US \$ 60,000 in New York³ (Edward J. Kelly, 1992: 151). In 2006 the wholesale price of heroin in fetched between US\$ 10,190.0 to 15,290.0, in Myanmar it was 64,0000 (UNODC, World Drug Report 2008: 257). These figures are more than enough to show that it's a highly money making illicit trade.

Not only Myanmar is central to a global heroin industry, but other East Asian States also are rapidly getting involved into a growing, region-wide market and distribution network for illegal narcotics dominated by Asian criminal organizations. China is emblematic of this emerging East Asian drug security problem. The opium trade was ruthlessly stamped out by the communists to such an extent that in the mid-1960s China proudly proclaimed itself to be a country without narcotics. Initially, the drug problem was confined to the provinces adjacent to the Golden Triangle and China's Xinjiang Province in the far west of the country. But with time passed, high-grade heroin began to make its appearance throughout the country especially in the larger cities like Beijing and Shanghai as well as Fujian Province. By the mid-1990s the drug problem had become serious enough to attract the attention of senior party officials in Beijing. A nation wide, anti-drug campaign was launched in April 1997 and in May of that year, Ruan Zhengyi, the deputy director of China's Public Security Bureau acknowledged that "the problem of drug and has returned to China with a vengeance (Thomas Fuller and Dan Eaton, 1997).

A major group operating in the Shan plateau is the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) with its military wing known as the Shan State Army (SSA). Their avowed aim is to fight for a separate State from Myanmar. The other important insurgent organizations operating are the Kone National Progress Party (KNPP), which is active in the southern Shan state and northern Kayah state on the southern boundary of the Golden Triangle (Phanjoubam Tarapot, 1997: 67-68). Khun Sa and his army surrendered to Myanmar authorities in 1996. But the terms and conditions were not known Intelligence reports from across the border pointed out that Khun Sa had agreed "not to fight for an independent Shan state from Myanmar" but it was not clear whether he would be allowed to continue manufacture of heroin or transfer his heroin producing area to other "friendly

³ Profit can be even higher still, depending on demand availability, purity and exchange rate fluctuations.

groups who are still underground.” There are several other “opium warlords” in the Golden Triangle such as the Laotian leader, Kaysone Phonvihme, Lao Su of Thailand and Korn jerng of Myanmar, but Khun Sa was the most powerful and important drug lord in the region (Phanjoubam Tarapot, 1997: 69).

US President Richard Nixon launched his famous "War on Drugs", and Washington's first step was to build up its powerful Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Millions of dollars were funneled into the hill-tribe economy of the Golden Triangle to provide the opium farmers with substitute crops. The poppy fields and the so-called "drug kingpins" became the most important targets of American drug enforcement in Southeast Asia, and results soon began to show in Thailand. But Thailand's role in the international narcotics trade had never been that of a major opium producer anyway. Thailand's excellent infrastructure was needed to transport the drugs from the rugged hills of northern Burma and Laos on to world markets in East Asia, Australia, North America and Europe. Thailand was also the only country in the Golden Triangle area which had a developed banking system. Thus, Thailand's main function in the trade has always been that of a transit country, and where the financiers were based—and that did not change, despite impressive reductions in the country's yearly opium harvests (Bertil Lintner Chiang Mai, March 2000: 12-13).

Many independent observers believe that the Burmese are serious about fighting the drug trade but essentially are out resourced by the drug lords who have formidable financial and military assets at their disposal. Others disagree, arguing that regular, organized drug movement in Burma's northern border areas would be impossible without the cooperation of the Burmese Army. While there is little doubt that the government has permitted and even encouraged known drug traffickers like Khun Sa and the family of Luo Xinghan to establish themselves as leading business figures. Some Burmese Army units also appear to be involved in the heroin. The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) has denied allegations of complicity in the drug trade, pointing to the 3,000 casualties the army has suffered since 1988 the war against drug insurgents (No End to Burma Heroin Flow, 1997).

But one surprising development in recent years has been that some insurgent groups that once tolerated or encouraged opium production in the region are now campaigning to destroy the crop. At least one faction of the Shan State Army, a group with longstanding ties to the heroin business, is now leading eradication efforts. Kon Jern, a military commander for the rebel group based along Myanmar's border with northern Thailand, says "he is cracking down on opium because it profits government militias and use weapons bought by drug money to attack us" (Thomas fuller, 2007). But Myanmar, which was the world's leading opium producer in the 1970s and 1980s, poses a dilemma for Western countries. The United States and European Union want to support the country's opium eradication efforts but do not want to buttress the repressive control of its military government. The SPDC drug control strategy also contains highly controversial repressive measures, such as obligatory registration and compulsory treatment for drug users and military enforced eradication operations against farmers. Between 1985-1988 the United States supported the government in carrying out aerial chemical-spraying operations of opium fields using the herbicide (Martin Jelsma, Tom Kramer, Pietje Vervest, July 2005).

The Wa⁴ have been involved in the drugs trade for decades, largely because of the difficulty of growing any other cash crops, and lack of industry. Since 1989 the Wa have had a ceasefire agreement with the Burmese military junta. During much of that time opium production has sky-rocketed. But in the last few years poppy cultivation has declined dramatically, say UN drug control officials. Mr Bao, who along with his three brothers commands the 20,000-strong United Wa State Army (UWSA), says that over the past two years, the Wa have begun to resist the temptation to continue growing poppy. UN financial assistance has been used for crop substitution projects, including fruit trees and tea plantations, and to set up small-scale industries like tea production and slate manufacturing factories. Most independent assessments of opium production in the Wa areas also show a major reduction in the amount of poppy that is cultivated. But despite this, the Wa are still blamed by Thai army chiefs for millions of amphetamines that flood

⁴ Wa was an insurgent group in Myanmar. They used opium trade to support their actions against the government of Myanmar.

into Thailand every year, and by Western governments like the United States for most of the heroin on the streets of Europe and North America (BBC news, 11 December, 2002).

Operating under the UNODC umbrella, the United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP) in 1998 started the Wa Alternative Development Project (WADP) with the objective of supporting the commitment of the Wa authorities to have their region opium-free by 2005. The purpose of the project is to improve food security, promote alternative livelihoods and the basic improvement of living conditions, health care, and education in four townships. Without adequate resources, the longer-term sustainability of "quick solutions" is highly questionable (Martin Jelsma, Tom Kramer, Pietje Vervest, July 2005). But UN officials have been worried about the possible impact of this planned rapid decrease in poppy cultivation. They feared that as a consequence, poor farmers who are dependant on growing the illicit drug will suffer. "A 50% reduction is revolutionary and we should be happy with that," said the head of the United Nations Drugs Control Programme in Rangoon, Jean-Luc Lemahieu. "But it's too fast, too soon. I don't see enough income coming in for the opium poppy farmers and I'm concerned that we'll have a humanitarian crisis on our hands as a result" (BBC news, 11 December, 2002). UN officials feared that if in the absence of cash crops or income generating schemes for the poor farmers, they might return to poppy production the following year, as happened in Afghanistan.

Official reports from the Government indicated that the level of opium poppy eradication in 2006 (3,970 hectares) was similar to 2005 levels in Myanmar. The Government increased its eradication activities specifically in South Shan, where an upsurge of cultivation was observed, while eradication decreased in the other regions. Over- all, the decrease in cultivation can be largely attributed to the observance of the opium ban in Wa and North Shan, and not to an increase in eradication. Opium cultivation in Myanmar continues to decline. Since 2002, the year of the first joint GoUM/UNODC survey, opium poppy cultivation has fallen 73 per cent. Remarkably, no opium cultivation was observed in the Wa region in 2006. In 2005, this region contributed to 30 per cent of the national opium poppy cultivation. The decline in cultivation poses serious challenges for the rural population in the remote areas of this

region, who do not have viable alternative income strategies (UNODC, World Drug Report 2007: 213).

In Laos, where the political situation was more stable, the government began a crackdown in the 1990s partly out of a desire for increased international credibility and partly because Laotian officials realized that their own children were exposed to illegal drugs. Something clicked when they began to see drugs harming communities within urban areas, when their own families started to be affected. The Laotian government also began to see link between poverty and opium production: generations of opium farmers remained dirt poor. "Opium never really benefited the people who produced it", it's mostly the organized crime syndicates that made most of the profits (Thomas Fuller, 2007).

Laos now produced subsequently so little opium that it turned to be a net importer of the drug (UNODC, Global Illicit Drug Trend 2003). Yet experts warn that reductions are not definitive as long as opium farmer cannot find alternative means to support their families. The Laotian government which the US has in the past accused of involvement in drug production, but later agreed to start a crop substitution programme. A six million to eight million-a-year programme to aid Myanmar's military government in crop eradication was suspended along with all other US aid and loans in September 1988, after a bloody crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators there (Giriraj Shah, 1999: 116-117).

In early 2006, Lao PDR declared that it was virtually opium poppy-free. Opium poppy cultivation has declined by over 90 per cent since 1998, when cultivation culminated at 26,800 hectares. The total area under opium poppy cultivation in the Lao PDR in 2007 was estimated at 1,500 hectares – a 40% decrease over production in 2006 (2,500 hectares) (UNODC, World Drug Report, 2007: 242). Opium production in 2007 reached its lowest level since the start of surveying and corresponds to only 5% of the potential opium production of the year 2000 (or 7% of 1998 production) (UNODC, World Drug Report, 2007: 243).

The area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan increased by 59 per cent from 104,000 hectares in 2005 to 165,000 hectares in 2006. Cultivation in South-East Asia continues to decline. Since 1998, South-East Asia's share of world opium poppy cultivation has fallen from 67 per cent to only 12 per cent in 2006. Much of this has been due to large declines in cultivation in Myanmar, where cultivation declined a further 34 per cent to 21,500 hectares in 2006. There are several important elements to this decline. Remarkably, no opium cultivation was observed in the Wa region in 2006, which had accounted for 30 per cent of national opium poppy cultivation in the previous year. Also, contrary to the national trend, a large increase in cultivation was observed in the South Shan State, which increased its share of national cultivation from 34 per cent in 2005 to 73 per cent in 2006. (World Drug Report, 2007: 38). Myanmar Government indicate that 3,598 hectares of opium poppy were eradicated in 2007. In 2007, opium poppy cultivation in Myanmar increased, for the first time in seven years, to 27,700 hectares. This was a 29% increase over 2006. In Kayah State, which was surveyed for first time in 2006, opium poppy cultivation also increased. The same trend was seen in Kachin State, which accounted for 5% of national cultivation. In North Shan State, cultivation remained very low. In Special Region 2 (Wa), opium elimination has been effectively sustained (UNODC, World Drug Report 2008: 246). Based on 2006 figures, Myanmar now represents only 11 per cent of the world opium poppy cultivation. In Lao PDR, opium poppy cultivation remained at very low levels in 2006 despite a 700 hectares increase to 2,500 hectares (World Drug Report, 2007: 38).

One notable development is the region's metamorphosis from being primarily a producer of drugs for consumers in the west to the world's biggest market for illegal drugs. Long the primary producer of heroin, two thirds of the world's heroin users are now in Asia. Until the late 1980s, most of the heroin from the Golden Triangle went to the U.S or other non-Asian markets, but today much of it is destined for East Asia and Asian market. There has been an ever more dramatic rise in the production consumption of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), which seems likely to replace heroin as the future drugs of choice in the region. Some authorities believe that the rise in ATS

production may prove to be one of the most important transformations in the history of the narcotics trade. Thailand is the nation most seriously affected by the wave of stimulants now flooding into East Asia Known locally as “ya ba”(“madness medicine”) and much cheaper than heroin such stimulants have been readily available in the country for less than a decade but already Thailand has more “ya ba” users than heroin addicts (FEER, 1997: 28). Lao PDR is also an important trafficking route country as reflected by drug seizures data; in 2000, seizures of heroin increased 39% and seizures of methamphetamine tablets increased 86% from 1999. And, over 1.5 million methamphetamine (or ‘yaba’) tablets were reportedly seized in 2001 (UNODC, Regional Center for East Asia and the Pacific, 2004: 28).

Opium poppy farmers in Laos, Myanmar and Thailand are ethnically diverse and live in remote, mountainous regions. In these upland areas, difficult agricultural and geographic conditions contribute to high levels of poverty. Opium poppy is currently cultivated in Kachin and Shan States in Myanmar, in the six northern-most provinces of Laos and in the 10 northern provinces of Thailand. Those regions have produced most of Southeast Asia’s opium over the last fifty years or more. Motivated by a desire of modernization and poverty alleviation, the government of Laos, Myanmar and Thailand made the commitment to end opium cultivation in these areas by the year 2000 for Thailand, by 2006 for Laos and by 2014 for Myanmar (Golden Triangle Opium Survey, Executive Summary 2006: 10).

Golden Crescent

Golden Crescent, stretches across the central Afghanistan, North West Frontier Province (NWFP), and eastern Iran where, the opium poppy is grown each year on about 65,000 hectares (Rahul Baksh Rais, 1999). The core of the Golden Crescent – a tribal locality lying astride the Afghanistan- NWFP border- is believed to account for approximately 25-30 per cent of the heroin that enters world trade. The production of opium over much of this area does not seem to have even the type of rudimentary law

enforcement constraint, which the narcotics producers encounter in the Golden Triangle (Rahul Baksh Rais, 1999). Afghanistan is the largest producer of opium in the world. Afghan opiates represent almost 100 per cent of those consumed in neighbouring countries and 80-90 per cent of the heroin found in European markets. The country rise to this position is inextricably bound up with the course of war. In 1979 it produced only a few hundred tons, by 2002 this had risen more than fifteen-fold to 3,400 tons by 2003 it was 3,600 tons (UNODC, 2005).

During the 1990s, Afghanistan firmly established itself as the largest source of illicit opium and its derivative, heroin, in the world. By the end of the 1990s, Afghanistan provided about 70 % of global illicit opium production, well ahead of Myanmar (about 22 %) and Lao PDR (about 3%). Primarily supplying countries in South West Asia, Central Asia, East and West Europe, as well as in South Asia, the Arabian Peninsula and Africa, illicit opiates of Afghan origin were consumed by an estimated 9 to 10 million abusers, which is two-thirds of all opiate abusers in the world. More than 10,000 of them die every year from opiates produced in Afghanistan (UNODC, Afghan Opium Survey Report, 2004: 19). Global opium production also reached record levels in 2007. Led by production in Afghanistan, it increased to the highest annual level of production recorded in the last two decades. The contribution of Myanmar to overall production continued to be small due to a much lower yielding opium poppy (UNODC, World Drug Report 2008: 37).

Opium Production in Afghanistan 1994 to 2007 (in Metric Tons)

All figures refers to dry opium

1994	1995	1996	1999	2000	2001	2002	2004	2005	2006	2007
3,416	2335	2,248	4,565	3,276	185	3,400	4,200	4,100	6,100	8,200

Source:- UNODC, World Drug Report 2008.

The year 1979 is truly a benchmark for several fundamental changes. With the advent of the Khomeini regime in Iran in February 1979, the government there banned all forms of narcotics production: “The execution of some drug barons led to the flight of

narcotics dealers from Iran. Most of them shifted their business to Pakistan and Afghanistan (Ruchita Beri, 1993). In the same year Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. To oust the Soviets a multinational combine led by the United States decided to extend covert military support for the mujahideen of Afghanistan. Poppy production in the Helmand valley in Afghanistan was strengthened. The old smuggling routes between the Makran coast, Karachi and the Gulf countries were revived. Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan has been officially banned since 1957. However, weak administration, the accessibility of the production areas and their domination by tribal forces made the ban ineffective (Sumita Kumar, 1995: 30).

The flash point of the explosion in the narcotics trade in the Golden Crescent has largely to do with the former Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. As a part of the cold war politics, these so-called refugees from Afghanistan to Pakistan were converted into Mujahideen (Freedom Fighter) and were provided money and weapons to fight the Red Army that their fight against the Red Army was a jihad (holy war). In the name of mobilising the money for the jihad, the drug barons of the Golden Crescent were activated by the major players supporting the Mujahideen. This increased the poppy cultivation and poppy refining factories came up all along the Pakistan Afghan border (Sreedhar and T.Srinivas, 1997: 718). There were absurd contradictions of American policy in the "Golden Crescent" drug states of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, during the 1980s and 1990s. Quite simply the left hand did not know (or when it did, could not control) what the right hand was doing. President George Bush in 1987 and President Clinton during his two administrations in the 1990s both declared "war on drugs". But the drug wars multi-billion-dollar budgets seemed unable to cope with the floods of drugs out of South Asia in the wake of the unholy wars in Afghanistan. The CIA (Central Investigating Agency) and its allies in order to help finance the proxy US-Soviet war, tolerated the rise of the biggest drug empires ever seen east of the giant Colombian cocaine cartels. While the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and other agencies were spending billions of dollars to stem the tidal wave of narcotics from South Asia, the CIA and its allies were turning a blind eye or actively encouraging it (John K. Cooley, 1999: 128-129).

The demise of the Soviet Union and the creation of new independent states led to precipitation of host of post-cold war drug related problems. Economic doldrums, weak law enforcement, growth of armed Political movements which are short of money, unprotected borders, poor financial systems and limited institutional and material capabilities make the societies of Central Asia very vulnerable of drug operation. The area is well placed both to grow heroin and to act as middleman for the overland drugs trade between the producers of the Golden Triangle and Golden Crescent on the one hand, and the European market, on the other, Russia has become a central marketing point for heroin from the Golden Crescent region (Sumita Kumar,1995: 31).

Soon after jihadi years (1979-1989) civil war engulfed Afghan society. In civil war factions owing allegiance to the president and the Prime Minister are at war with each other. Stockpiles of arms were being used for settling personal scores. Riots have erupted owing to food shortages as the traditional cultivation of food grains has declined alarmingly. Poppy had emerged as the staple crops in the garnaries of Afghanistan (Prashant Diksit, 1995: 153). By 1999, this society had suffered 14years of war, followed by four years of social and economic chaos. This had encouraged continuation and expansion of the opium cultivation, which the generals, warlords and intelligence officers had so richly rewarded during the 1979-89 jihad. For many poor people, poppy growing is only the most profitable activity available, but also the only way of meeting their needs. For cultivators in many ways it is a miracle crop. It matures quickly, allowing double cropping in many areas. It is more weather resistant than wheat, easy to store, transport and sell. It is not only the profits that are important because it's highly valuable, it can be used as collateral to gain access to credit in the absence of any formal banking system in rural areas. The rates are, usurious however, and can be repaid only in opium, leaving farmers trapped into growing more and more (Chris Johson and Jolyon Leslie, 2004: 112).

Throughout the second half of the 1990s, the single most crucial factor in the flow of drugs out of the Golden Crescent of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran has been the conquest

of most of Afghanistan by the extreme Islamist movement the Taliban⁵. Taliban captured the capital (Kabul) in 1996. Their ambiguous attitude towards narcotics- Proscribing their trafficking, sale and use on religious grounds while tolerating and even profiting from their export- has, on balance, kept the narcotics flowing from Southwest Asia to all parts of the globe, especially the West. The Afghan poppy farmers pay to the local Muslim cleric, the mullah, a tax on each transaction called the zakat or ouchar. This is a tax at the source amounting to about 10 percent of the value of the sale (John K. Cooley, 1999: 149).

Potential Production of Opium in Metric Tons (All figures refers to dry opium).

Country	1990	1992	1996	2000	2001	2003	2005	2006	2007
Myanmar	1,621	1,660	1,760	1,087	1,097	810	312	315	460
Lao PDR	202	127	140	167	134	120	14	20	9
Thailand	20	14	5	6	6	-	-	-	-
Afghanistan	1,570	1,970	2,248	3,276	185	3,600	4,100	6,100	8,200
Pakistan	150	181	24	8	5	52	36	39	43

Source: UNODC, World Drug Report 2008, p no. 38

While the American-led invasion of 2001 was triggered by the desire to oust Osama Bin Laden and his Taliban allies, there was also an explicit hope that it would allow a genuine and long-term campaign against opium production (Dr. Mark Galootti, 2003: 5). But since the departure of the Taliban, poppy production has surged. This includes the areas controlled by President Hamid Karzai's allies. The proceeds of the trade are financing warring factions and undermining Kabul's authority. It is also a source of funds for the Taliban and as well as Al Qaeda. In the 1930s only three provinces grew poppy, but by 2003 it had become an integral part of the rural economy, with twenty-eight of the country's thirty-two provinces growing it (UNODC, World Drug Report 2006). All ethnic groups were by now involved and the thirty-one districts cultivated it for the first time in that year. New areas accounted for about 10 per cent of total cultivation, while the

⁵ Taliban means simply "student" but it sometimes translated by the more romantic term, "the seekers".

percentage of cultivation concentrated in the top five provinces fell from 95 per cent in 2002 to 72 per cent in 2003 (UNODC, World Drug Report 2006). Since the US led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, the Golden Crescent opium trade has soared. According to the US media, this lucrative contraband is protected by Osama, the Taliban, not to mention, of course, the regional warlords, in defiance of the "international community". The heroin business is said to be filling the coffers of the Taliban. Opium is a source of literally billions of dollars to extremist and criminal groups... Cutting down the opium supply is central to establishing a secure and stable democracy, as well as winning the global war on terrorism.

Afghanistan is moving, as some optimists believe, towards a new phase of post-conflict reconstruction. In their view, most of the deadlines laid down in the Bonn Accords of November 2001 have been largely met. The representative government will establish new political arrangements, which will be moderate and democratic and respect Afghan tradition (Samin Ahmen, 2004: 15).

President Hamid Karzai's government has taken important and useful steps, banning the cultivation and trafficking in opium, adopting a ten year National Drug Control Strategy and forming a new Counter Narcotics Directorate. There have been some positive developments on the ground, notably a reduction in opium cultivation in southern provinces, not least thanks to high-profile campaigns to destroy the poppy crop. The number of opium poppy free provinces increased to 13 in 2007 compared to 6 in 2006⁶. These poppy free ⁷ provinces are: Balkh, Bamyan, Ghazni, Khost, Kunduz, Logar, Nuristan, Paktika, Paktya, Panjshir, Parwan, Samangan and Wardak. (UNODC, Afghanistan 2007 Annual Opium Survey, 2007: 7)

However, the overall situation is worsening. Cultivation has shifted to regions where government control is weaker, especially to the northeast, and the total number of

⁶ Opium poppy free provinces in 2006: Ghazni, Logar, Paktika, Paktya, Panjsher, and Wardak.

⁷ Definition of opium poppy free status in 2007: province with less than 100 hectares of opium poppy.

provinces in which opium is grown has increased from eighteen of thirty two in 1999 to twenty eight in 2003 (Dr. Mark Galootti, 2003: 5).

In mid- February 2004, an anti-drug conference in Kabul was held. The conference discussed ways of combating the problem including providing alternative livelihoods, strengthening law enforcement and creating a functioning criminal justice system. Economic alternatives for the poor farmers could include the development of horticulture and agriculture as well as the provision of micro-credit. Washington's preference was for crop eradication. The destruction of crops would alienate farmers but targeting laboratories would hurt the pocket books of the traffickers who benefit most (Samina Ahmed, 2004: 17). In a December 2004 narcotics conference held in Kabul, Karzai announced a goal of complete eradication of the opium-heroin trade within two years but so much of the economy is now tied to this industry and so many senior officials and family members are complicit in the traffic that the goal is a "pipe-dream" (Larry P. Goodson, 2005: 93). The heroin trade is booming because the demand for this intoxicant is growing not only in Europe and America, but also in the neighbouring countries of Iran, Pakistan and India. Conservative nations also have their drug addicts despite the death penalty imposed by them for drug trafficking. The profit margin is so great that the risk involved in its transportation is accepted by the drug barons and the drug peddlers (Kamal Matinuddin, 1997: 122).

"After the revolution in 1979, Iran, which had cultivated drugs for years, managed to eradicate growing of opium poppies in a year and a half," says Antonio Mazzitelli, the Teheran representative of the UN Drug Control Programme (UNDCP). Since then Iran has done its best to stem the drugs crossing its territory (Eric Rouleau, 1999). Hashish and opiates originating in Afghanistan transported through Pakistan and Iran to Europe and North America. The influx of Afghan refugees into Iran has been helping in the increased trafficking of drugs, and that the transit of illegal substances through this country will continue as long as Afghanistan remains impoverished. As it is, Iran is already struggling in its battle against drug trafficking as well as drug abuse. Numerous indicators reveal that despite the fact that Iran had some of the toughest anti-narcotics

policies in the world, where people caught even with a few ounces of the substance faced the death penalty, even conservative government estimates were giving the heroin addiction figures as, at least 1.2 million addicts by the year 1998. Today, Iran has around 3.5million drug addicts (UN office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2005).

Forty-two thousand soldiers, police and militia, a tenth of Iran's armed forces, are deployed along the eastern border, 1,950 kilometers from Turkmenistan, in the north, down to the Indian Ocean. The border has more than 200 observation posts, dozens of walls blocking mountain passes and hundreds of kilometers of trenches and barbed wire, an investment of \$1bn, plus upkeep. Iran's *majlis* (parliament) allocated \$25m to improve border fortifications in 2000: 3,140 members of the security forces, including two generals, have been killed in skirmishes with smugglers since 1979, a rate of three a day (Naom Chomsky, 2000). Most heroin sold in Europe comes from Afghanistan's poppies. Drugs cross the permeable border with Iran on their way to Turkey and Europe despite Iran's desperate efforts, costing many lives, to combat trafficking at the border.

It was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), the Islamic revolution in Iran (1979), and the Iran-Iraq war (1980-90), which disrupted the main traditional drug routes between the 'Golden Crescent' and Europe. This made the Pakistan-based drug cartels turn to alternative routes of delivery via South Asia. (K.P.S. Gill and Ajai Sahni, 2002: 90). Pakistan has emerged in recent years as the major producer-cum-supplier of drug like heroin morphine, opium, hashis ganja and bhang in the region, contributing to the sudden escalation of drug trafficking in India. The problem has increased also due to the changed political situation in Afghanistan and Iran. The traditional narcotics routes from this region to the western world via Turkey has been affected and traffic diverted through India.⁸ The heroin trade in Pakistan is flourishing and heavily armed poppy producers are expanding their fields into remote corner of the lawless North-West Frontier Provinces. Heroin addiction in Pakistan cities is also growing swiftly. The numbers of drug addicts were 5 million in 1999 (Ahmed Rashid, 2000: 122).

⁸ From India drugs move outward particularly through Delhi via Peshawar, Punjab and Bombay via Peshwar-Quetta-Karachi.

As the cold war confrontation wound down, the international press finally broke its decade of silence to reveal the involvement of the Afghan resistance and Pakistani military in the region's heroin trade. The United States had failed to take action against Pakistan's heroin dealers because of its desire not to offend a strategic ally, Pakistan's military establishment. During the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, the mujahideen accelerated the production of heroin, which became lucrative business to meet the heavy expenses of their war effort. The mujahideen brought opium across the border and sold it to Pakistani heroin refineries, which were operating under the protection of General Fazle Haq, the then governor of the NWFP. By 1988, there were estimated to be 100 to 200 heroin refineries in the province's Khyber district alone (Kathy Evans, 1989: 26). National Logistic Cell (NLC) is the largest transport organization in the country and is wholly manned by the Pakistan Army personnel and security of Afghan war and the drug pipeline, which was, supplied the resistance to Soviets. The Afghan war was clouded with an enormous illicit trade in arms and narcotics. Trucks from the Pakistan Army's NLC arriving with CIA arms from Karachi often returned loaded with heroin. They came from the Peshawar to pipri, Jungshahi and jhampir, where they deliver their cargo: sacks of grain to the government's godowns. Some of the sacks contain packets of heroin. The drug is carried in NLC trucks, which come sealed from the NWFP and are never checked by police (Ikramul Haq, 1996: 954).

However, there is little doubt that the Central Asian neighbours of Afghanistan are the worst sufferers. They are struggling to acquire economic stability and are facing the problem of proliferation of routes through which much of the illicit drug produced in Afghanistan 3,000 tons in 1998-99 and over 4,000 tons in 1999- 2000 passes through the Central Asian territory (Mahendra Ved, 2002: 220). The area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan increased by 59 per cent from 104,000 hectares in 2005 to 165,000 hectares in 2006. This is the largest area under opium poppy cultivation ever recorded in Afghanistan. As cultivation around the world declines, the share of Afghanistan in global opium poppy cultivation has consequently increased: an overwhelming 82 per cent of global opium cultivation took place in just one country in 2006. Sixty-two per cent of cultivation in Afghanistan was concentrated in the southern

region. Opium cultivation spread again at the provincial level with only six out of Afghanistan's 34 provinces being found free of opium poppy cultivation in 2006. In Pakistan, where opium poppy is grown in the Afghan-Pakistan border region, the Government reported a 59 per cent reduction of opium poppy cultivation bringing the total to just 1,545 hectares (UNODC, World Drug Report, 2008).

The international trade in illicit drugs, at the end of the twentieth century has multiplied in volume and in its devastating effects on the world's people, even faster than the international arms trade. It has become the most profitable of all world trades. The illicit drug trade is emerging as a significant long-term security issue for the region. Narcotic trafficking has grown enormously in sophistication and volume in conjunction with the spread of Asian organized crime in the decade since the end of the cold war and it will continue to do so in the absence of effective national and regional countermeasures. From hind side, one can draw some tentative conclusions on terrorism and drug trafficking connection (Sreedhar and T. Srinivas, 1997: 722-723)-

- First, illegal narcotics trade providing financial assistance to most of the sub-nationalist movements either directly or indirectly. This enabled the illegal narcotic traders to get a bunch of committed cadres of the movement for drug trafficking. These cadres of the sub-nationalist movements perceived that they were doing it for a "cause".
- Second, most of the militant outfits, especially the "Islamic" militant outfits, indulging in illegal drug trafficking, acquired a certain amount of legitimacy by talking in term of jihad.
- Third, the slow pace of development in developing countries resulting in high rates of unemployment and under-employment makes it easy for the illegal drug trafficking to get fresh recruits.

Drug induced corruption is a major threat to the stability of countries around the world and is a major impediment to anti-drug efforts. Drug money plays a significant role in the power politics of major drug barons to create organized syndicates having links with the ruling elite and law enforcement agencies. Drug operators have been known to

bribe and corrupt top officials in industry, business and government. In many cases narcotics money fuels political system, supporting party organizations and election campaigns. This not only undermines the credibility of government, but also impairs the ability of politicians and bureaucrats to defend national interest adequately. In some cases the government itself is directly involved in the drug trafficking business⁹ (Sumita Kumar,1995: 31-32). Giorgio Giacomelli, the executive director of the U.N's International Drug Control Program, issued this sober warning: "All over the world individuals and societies face an illicit drug problem. As drug abuse affects more and more countries, the power of international drug trafficking organizations threatens to corrupt and destabilize the institution of government" (Giorgio Giacomelli, 1997: 7).

The expansion of opium production in Afghanistan continues to pose a threat - to the security of the country and to the global containment of opiates abuse. Even in Afghanistan, however, the large scale production of opium is concentrated and expanding in a few southern provinces where the authority of the central government is currently limited and insurgents continue to exploit the profits of the opium trade. Afghanistan accounted for 92 per cent of global illicit opium production in 2006. As a result global heroin production is estimated to have increased to 606 metric tons in 2006. The bad news from Afghanistan also overshadows the good news from South East Asia. Opium production in the Golden Triangle (mainly Myanmar and Laos) declined by 77 per cent between 1998 and 2006 and by 84 per cent since the peak in 1991 (World Drug Report, 2007: 25).

⁹ Haji Mirza Iqbal Baig, a drug baron operating in Pakistan claimed to have assisted various illustrious figures of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) during the 1988 general and provincial elections. Also Malik Muhammad Ayub Khan Afridi, one of the biggest drug barons in Pakistan, reportedly supported Nawaj Sharif's Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) in the 1998 elections. During the 1990 election campaign, the IJI asked Afridi to oversee the election campaign in the tribal areas and help finance IJI candidates further a field. The linkage between drugs and politicians was exposed in Thailand when in May 1994, Washington announced that a Thai Member of Parliament, Thanong Siripreechapong, had been indicated by a US court for conspiring to smuggle marijuana into the United States between 1977 and 1987.

Chapter- 3

Drug Trade in Pakistan

In the highlands spanning Iran, Afghanistan and northwest Pakistan, tribal farmers used to grow limited quantities of opium. During the decade of Cold War confrontations with the Soviet Union, however, CIA intervention provided the political protection and logistics linkage that joined Afghanistan's poppy fields through Pakistan's landmass, to heroin markets in Europe and America.

----- Ikramul Haq

Narcotic drugs have been an important source of income for tribal population at the Pakistan-Afghanistan border since time immemorial. It emerged as socio-economic and political problem only during the recent past. The Baluchistan area of Pakistan, eastern Afghanistan and Iranian territories bordering Afghanistan are very important as far as opium supply is concerned and as stated earlier it is known as the "*Golden Crescent*". In Iran, the Islamic revolution changed the scene and the governments have since come down heavily on users and peddlers alike and to a large extent stamped out poppy production as well as trafficking in the western and south-eastern region of Iran, but things are quite different still in the north-west. The opium production in the north and the north-west is smuggled out to other Islamic countries and Muslim dominated republics of the former Soviet Union. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, things are moving in another direction and opium cultivation is going on unabated. The tribal region of Pakistan, Baluchistan and also Malakand, Mardan, Dir, Kalam Areas north to Khyber Pass and its promontories in Afghanistan are famous for poppy cultivation and also the laboratories which manufacture cultivated heroin and other drugs (R.C Dikshit and Dr. Giriraj Shah, 1996: 45). Processing and trafficking problems affects the region and the wider world beyond. Most processing takes place in small, mobile laboratories in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas although increasing instances of processing on the Afghan border with the Central Asian-Republic have been reported (UNODC, Pakistan Country Profile 15 July 2008).

During the course of the Afghanistan civil war, scores of militants, mercenaries and soldiers from across the Muslim world had flocked to Afghanistan responding to the call for jihad against the “godless” communists. The border towns in North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan in Pakistan had become the staging ground for these volunteers going to fight in the holy war. Once the war in Afghanistan was over, the money coming from the United States agencies started drying up, new sources of funds were found for those militants and terrorists. These new sources were the flourished drug trafficking in the Afghanistan and Pakistan region, which became the major source of financing the terrorist camps and groups in the countries around the region (Kalim Bahadur, 2001: 109).

The dramatic change in the late 1970s, when Pakistan emerged from a country, which largely produced opium for its internal consumption, to a major factor on the international drug market. In 1979, an estimated 800 tons (UNODC, 2006) of opium were produced and the amounts intended for the international market were largely refined in Turkey, Sicily and elsewhere for the US and European heroin markets. In the early 1980s, the condition changed again, and the heroin laboratories emerged in Pakistan, they are a principal factor in the subsequent outbreak of heroin addiction in Pakistan. The development of a refining capacity in Afghan North West Frontier and Baluchistan took place under the tutelage of Italian, Iranian and Thai nationals. The trend was clear—refining of high quality heroin close to its organic source in the opium fields. So even if the authorities were sincere about curbing the trade, the geopolitical considerations impinged upon their efforts. The tribal territories in the NWFP, where these laboratories are installed, remain largely autonomous (Sudhir Kumar Singh and Ana Ballesteros Peiro, 2002: 121). The subregion itself has become a major consumer market to opiate produced. Opiate processing on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border has created a trafficking and drug abuse problem in Pakistan especially since the early 1980s (UNODC, Pakistan Country Profile, 15 July 2008).

The problem of Drugs is three-fold: its illegal production, illegal trafficking and drug abuse. Drug trafficking is the most lucrative business, with profits higher than those

of the oil industry and second only to the arms trade. Inside Pakistan, poppy cultivation has been done primarily in the North-West Frontier Provinces (NWFP) and Balochistan (Muzaffar Kharral, 2003). The cultivated drug is processed in factories situated in the NWFP and Baluchistan. The tribal areas of the Pakistan-Afghanistan boarder are actually governed by local tribal rules and regulations. The central government of Pakistan generally did not intervene in the local economy and traditional political norms, which depend on cultivation of opium and production of conventional arms. During 1980s mujahideen needed large amount of arms and money to support their decade long war against Soviet Union, so they promoted opium cultivation at its fullest. The Mujahideen brought opium across the border and sold it to Pakistani heroin refineries, which were operating under the protection of General Fazle Haq, the governor of the NWFP. By 1988, there were estimated to be 100 to 200 heroin refineries in the province's Khyber district alone. Trucks from the Pakistan Army's National Logistical cell (NLA) arriving with CIA arms from Karachi often returned loaded with heroin (Kathy Evans, 1989: 26).

Although Pakistan initiated Afghanistan on opium production in the 1970s, Afghanistan rapidly gained ground in the 1980s. The Soviet invasion and nature of the occupation, moreover, contributed to the development of an illicit economy (due to the Soviet policy of trying to starve the mujahideen by destroying food crops). Afghan agriculturalist Mohammed Qasim Yusufi noted in 1988: "Because of war conditions, agricultural production factors such as labour force, fertilizers, irrigation water, improved seed varieties, agricultural machinery, proper farming and management, and maintenance of land have been greatly disrupted on the one hand, and government pays very little or no attention to the agricultural sector of the country on the other" (Mohammad Qasim Yusufi, 1988: 212). The combination of these factors led to the abandonment of the legal agriculture economy and a turn to opium cultivation. __

Poppies were planted, pruned, irrigated, and harvested by guerrilla groups, peasants, and criminal organisations and then smuggled across the porous Pakistani boarder. Opium cultivation was felt to be important by the mujahideen, because the crop could bring large amounts of cash required for the war effort. There is a huge difference in

wholesale and retail prices- the price, the opium farmers get for their crop in Afghanistan and the street value charged by dealers in Europe and North America. "One kilo of heroin purchased for US \$35,000 to \$115,000 in Southwest Asia may be sold in South America for \$60,000 to \$125,000. Dilution 'cutting' may increase the profits even further (U.S Drug Enforcement Administration, 2003).

In 2003 opium cultivation covered almost 25000 hectares approximately in NWFP only. Besides, produce of other crops being used as staple food, poppy was grown by every farmer. Opium crops provide reasonable income to the poor cultivators. That's why it was the temperamental wish of the people of NWFP and FATA (Muzaffar Kharral, 2003). Pakistan also serves as an important transit country for drug, destined for international drug markets. Elsewhere in the world the process of militarization may have created some understandable socio-political distortions, but in Pakistan this has given birth to the most undesirable phenomenon of "*heronisation*"¹ of society--- a malady that is threatening to rip the social fabric apart. In 1979, Pakistan was apparently a heroin-free country. The birth of heroin in Pakistan was the tragic consequence of (Musa Khan Jalazai, 2005: 50; D. Suba Chandran, 1998: 906)–

- a) The Islamic revolution in Iran, February 1979. In 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini came to power in Iran through the Islamic Revolution. Before that, Iran was one of the most important producers of poppy. The Shah of Iran banned its production in 1955 but in 1969 this ban was lifted. But the 1979 revolution declared all intoxicants' production and their use as illegal. It created panic among the Iranian drug barons, mainly from the Iranian Baluchistan. They shifted their movable laboratories of heroin into Pakistani Baluchistan in the early years of the 1980s. In the meantime, the Soviet Union annexed Afghanistan. This created problems for the poppy producers as well as for the barons. Around three million Afghan refugees entered Pakistan. Many of them were well aware about the production and the processing of heroin. They established heroin manufacturing plants in the NWFP and Baluchistan.

¹ Heronisation of society means that a large portion of the society is engaged in the drug network, either in as a producer or smuggler or drug abuser. In other words we can say that a large per cent of population work as a linking point in drug network at different-different points.

- b) Promulgation of the Prohibition enforcement of Hadd Order 1979 in Pakistan, which led to a total ban on opium production. That year, the country had a bumper crop of poppy on some 80,000 acres of land, and the total yield was an all-time record of 800 metric tones. Figures obtained a day prior to the imposition of the Hadd Order on February 9, 1979, recorded opium selling at Rs. 1,200 per kilogram in the Punjab. But a day after the promulgation of the Hadd Order, Prices shot up to Rs. 9,000 per kilogram in the Punjab, but went down to Rs. 300 per kilogram in the tribal belt (Ikramul Haq, 1991). Left with huge stockpiles of poppy, they did not know what to do with that. In the meantime, some western experts taught Pakistani farmers the technique of converting poppy into heroin. This is how heroin, which was produced in Europe for the first time in 1898, was introduced to this part of the world in the 1980s.
- c) The UN study on narcotics reported that in the 1980s, conditions such as falling commodity prices, debt problem and poverty contributed to the increase in drug trafficking. According to the report, “The decline of prices for commodities like sugar (64 per cent), coffee (30 per cent), cotton (32 per cent) and wheat (17 per cent), between 1980 and 1988, motivated farmers to turn to cash crops like coca bush and opium poppy to avoid economic ruin. At the national level, the export of illicit drugs often took up the stock of foreign exchange depleted by falling prices of agricultural goods as well as for minerals, including tin (down by 57 per cent), lead (28 per cent) and iron ore (17 per cent)” (UN Department of Public Information, 1990). The UN report pointed out one of the many factors that perpetuate drug trafficking. The more influential factors include political instability, regional instability, ineffective central control, and global reach of the drug syndicates and involvement of the state in illicit drug trafficking.

Pakistan is a producer of opium as well as a processor of opium into heroin. Moreover, much of the opium grown in the neighbouring country, Afghanistan, is also processed into heroin, in the NWFP of Pakistan. The long coastal belt and porous borders

with Iran and Afghanistan make Pakistan's geographical position an ideal one for drug trafficking to the great consumer markets of the west. Initially, the favourite smuggling routes were Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and Central Asia into European markets. It is basically a land route. The sea route is from Karachi in Sindh and Makran in Baluchistan. Before the Soviet invasion and Khomeini's takeover in Iran, the Iran-Turkey-European route was a very easy one. But after the sanctions imposed by Iran on heroin production, the Iranian route became tough. Between 1990 and 1999, more than 2000 Iranian border guards were killed in encounters with the drug Karvan (Steve Levine, 1999).

The oldest and the most frequent of the routes used by traffickers for shipping narcotics, has been through the port of Karachi and the surrounding coastal area. These are ideal places for shipping big consignments to Africa, Europe and the United States. Vessels carrying drug loads, normally leave Karachi port for Yemen and Southern Europe, through the Red Sea, or they follow the African route which goes via Somalia and Ethiopia to Kenya and onwards. In recent years, the Makran coast has also become popular for the purpose (UNODC, World Drug Report, 2007: 45). Drug consignments are loaded on small launches and are carried from coastal areas to the high seas, where they are transferred to ships. For the consignments destined towards Central Europe, the Balkan land route is considered to be the most feasible. This route goes from Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey, leading to former Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. From Turkey routes lead to Western Europe as well. Moreover, the disintegration of Soviet Union and the emergence of new Central Asian States bordering Afghanistan, and Iran, have opened up new and safer land routes for traffickers to ship heroin to Europe. However, the long and rugged of Baluchistan, are the most favored by the traffickers, for moving drug consignments to the launching points of their international destinations (Musa Khan Jalalzai, 2005: 53). The drugs, which follow from this route (predominantly heroin), are smuggled in much smaller quantities and some of them are destined for foreign markets. In 2005/06, new heroin routes have emerged from Afghanistan via Pakistan and Central Asia to China. This has partly offset a decline in the supply of heroin from Myanmar to China (UNODC, World Drug Report, 2007: 45)

It's very unfortunate that drug industry of Pakistan enjoys the support of high military officials, politicians and law enforcing agencies. The nexus between the politicians and drug barons that began in the late 1970s came to be consolidated by the 1980s and manifested itself in three distinct forms (D. Suba Chandran, 1998: 911):

- Personal ties between the drug lords and political leaders irrespective of parties.
- Funding of activities of political parties and leaders, particularly during the elections.
- Eventually drug barons turning into politicians.

There was also evidence of a major heroin syndicate inside Pakistan's military. In June 1986 the police arrested an army major driving from Peshawar to Karachi with 220 kilo grams of heroin. In August 1986, they arrested an air force lieutenant carrying an identical amount, indication of a tidy military mind organizing uniformed deliveries. Significantly, these were only two of the 16 military officers arrested in 1986 for heroin trafficking (Zahid Hussain, 1989: 14). The drug mafia needed the support of the Army for the safe passage of drugs. It is more than established that drug trafficking could not have thrived without the connivance of a section of the armed forces. Vehicles of the army-controlled National Logistics Cell and those used to supply arms to mujahideen have also been used as drug carriers. The other agencies did not have the authority to check these vehicles and so they were the safest means for drug transportation. The drug money is so powerful that it has left no institution untouched. Drug money is used to bribe the police and other drug enforcement agencies not to conduct raids or to make arrests. Drug money is paid to the government prosecutors not to prosecute. Drug money is donated to political parties and politicians, so that they do not show much sincerity in controlling drug trafficking, if not protecting it.

Drug Trade under different regimes

It is suspected that the military ruler General Zia of Pakistan was deliberately overlooking the growing drug trade or might they have been involved in the business. So

much so that by the middle of 1983, General Zia's 4th year in power, US narcotics control officials reported that between 85 and 90 percent of the Heroin reaching the East Coast of the United States and the countries of Western Europe was coming from Pakistan (Musa Khan Jalalzai, 2005: 58). The point that Pakistan achieved the status of largest exporter of heroin during his regime and that no worthwhile actions against heroin trafficking, reflect on the nature of mafia intervention into the political system of Pakistan. This trend caused such serious alarm in the U.S Congress that the legislators dispatched a special Congressional delegation, headed by Senator Paul Hawkins in February 1984. Mr. Hawkins was the author of a legislation stipulating that "American aid will be reduced to countries that refuse to co-operate with the United States' drug control programme" (Ikramul Haq, 1991: 9).

Pakistan at that time was receiving a multi-billion dollar economic and arms aid package from U.S. So, Gen. Ziaul Haq and his officials promised Congressional investigators everything, including willingness to crackdown on heroin refineries and money-laundering banks identified by American intelligence agents. But Zia's promises to the Americans were easier made than carried out. Shocking statistics compiled by Western intelligence sources in 1986 show that high-level Pakistani officials, who wielded considerable influence in the government, weep up to their necks in profitable dope traffic and would resist any attempt to place a damper on the lucrative industry. It is a great tragedy for this nation that despite all promises to eliminate the drug menace, this country was converted into a kingdom of heroin. It happened during the time of a regime, which had been described as the "strongest pro-American force in the region". It is ironic, to say the least, that America's heroin plague is of its making (Alfred McCoy, 1973).

The number of drug addicts was on the increase and poppy cultivation had not been eliminated. There was a serious slippage in 1986 in Pakistan's eradication programme, particularly in Gadoon. Its failure exposed the administration's inability to check the cultivation of opium, a profitable occupation for the local population, and no substitute crop has so far been introduced either. The death of thirteen cultivators and the serious wounding of a larger numbers, as a result of firing by the law-enforcing agencies, were

considered to be the cruelest possible action by those guilty of misusing huge amounts of aid received to curb opium production. In order to placate the U.S authorities, the Pakistan administration claimed that its national production of opium fell from 300 tons in 1978-79 to 44 tons in 1983-84. However, contrary to these claims, a DEA official informed the U.S Congress that opium production in Pakistan had doubled in 1985-86, reaching 100-150 tons (UNODC, World Drug Report 2006).

The United States no doubt makes all the noise about curbing narcotics but in case of Pakistan; it just does not bother how the mafia works there. Gen. Zia himself posed as a “*God-fearing Muslim*”. But during one of his journey to the United States to address the United Nation as the representative of the Muslim Ummah, New York police found large quantities of heroin in his gift packages meant for some of the worked celebrities at the U.N. These packages were transported in a plain no other then the one in which Gen. Zia traveled. Through out his tenure, drug barons operated freely, organized themselves as drug syndicates and became billionaires within a short span of time (Musa Khan Jalalzai, 2005: 86). General Zia’s involvement in drug trafficking came to light only after his death when Minister of State for Narcotics, Mian Muzaffar Shah revealed that Pakistani drug syndicates grew under the patronage of General Zia. Raza Qureshi, a Pakistani drug trafficker was arrested at Oslo Airport by Norwegian custom officials in 1984. He revealed that Zia was the main beneficiary from the drug trafficking (Indus Asia Online Journal, 2007).

After assumption of power in December 1988, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto had demonstrated her commitment to eliminate the drug mafia. However, she received a political backlash from the opposition and the danger of instigated violence from the drug barons. Her government claimed that it was determined to put an end to the evil of heroin and had decided to destroy the poppy crops in the frontier areas by a real spray but the drug mafia had threatened to shoot down the spray aircraft. The poppy cultivators had acquired surface-to-air missiles to shoot down these spray aircraft. Her worst enemies in this battle were powerful friends of the mafia in the establishment, law-enforcement agencies and even in her own political camp. They made the issue politically sensitive for

her. This battle was even harder than the one she waged against the dictator. Her only reliable support could have come from masses, but no serious effort was made to take them into confidence through a media campaign (Ikramul Haq, 1996: 957).

Nawaz Sharif referred to the evil of drug addiction, which had snatched many bread-earners from its dependents. “We cannot let our valuable national wealth the youth destroy itself, due to the rampant social evil of drug abuse, he asserted. In this regard, he declared, his government was committed to eliminate narcotics and take steps to rehabilitate the drug addicts (Musa Khan Jalazai, 2005: 73). But the promises were easier made than carried out and nothing fruitful has been achieved. The production of raw opium in Pakistan appears to have increased by 25 per cent from 130 metric tons in 1989 to 165 metric tons for crop year 1989-90 (International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1991).

The cultivation of drugs has been continuous irrespective of the fact that Pakistan’s government has already launched a campaign against the drug production. Islam also forbids the use of drugs. According to Maxim Gorki, “hunger destroys the soul of the people”. It was completely applicable in Pakistan. Out of an estimate 140 million population, some 55 million were living under the absolute poverty line (John Elliot, 1999: 62). In 2001 the opium production reached the minimal level of 5 metric tons, but it increased to 43 metric tons in 2007 as shown in the table (UNODC, World Drug Report 2008).

Opium Production in Pakistan (in metric tons)

Years	1990	1992	1996	2001	2003	2005	2006	2007
Production	159	181	24	5	52	36	39	43

Source: UNODC, World Drug Report 2008, p no. 38

The border areas at the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier continue to be the center of the narcotics trafficking emanating from this region. This is also the region where the ‘bazars’ for the open sale of arms and drugs are located. While all through the nineties

decade, in particular the mid-nineties onwards Pakistan has consistently recorded low level of poppy cultivation and opium production. This trend continued till 2002. However, the steep increase in production levels in neighbouring Afghanistan has had an effect on production here as well (Deepali Gaur Singh, 2007: 279-281). The profits from heroin are certainly spent not on food or clothes but on guns and weapons. It is no more a secret that the Afghan rebels in their war have used “poppy profits” to buy their armaments. It is also a well established fact that these weapons were supplied by countries, which received the smuggled heroin. It was a sort of extremely brutal “fair swap”---- death for death. The nexus between drug trafficking and terrorism is a phenomenon in which drug traffickers co-operate with each other to achieve their respective goals. They are partner in crime, making their profits at the cost of human suffering. While the terrorists aim to acquire political power, the drug barons’ targets are businesses, or the economy. Their collaboration creates an unstable political and economic environment, which is popularly known as “narco-terrorism”². There could be “no better source for funding terrorism than drug trafficking” (Che Guevara, 1961: 87).

In spite of a fall in poppy production in Pakistan, the number of people taking drugs has shown no appreciable decline. The increase in local heroin processing led directly to an increase in its local consumption. From 30,000 heroin users in 1982 it has increased sixteen-fold to 500,000 in 2000 (UNODC, Global Illicit Drug Trend 2003: 172). An epidemic of heroin is sweeping through the country. Even as psychiatrists and officials watch in horror the plague has spread with amazing rapidity and hit almost every section of society – students, young professionals, taxi-drivers, petty vendors and even Government officials. The problem has acquired more dangerous dimensions with the large-scale influx of heroin into every corner of the country, leading to inexpensive availability. K. B Rind, Secretary of Narcotics Control, said that downward trend of drugs users was seen in 2007, but there was an alarming trend that drug addicts were

² Narco-terrorism refers to nexus between terrorism and drug trafficking. It is a phenomenon in which terrorists and drug traffickers work together to achieve their respective goals. They are two partners in crime who make quick bucks at the cost of human suffering. The word narco-terrorism was used for the first time in the US when drug smugglers in Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, Nicaragua and other central American countries organized the illegal trade as profession and ran an almost parallel government.

injecting liquid heroin through syringes and the number has jumped up from 60,000 to 125,000. The use of syringes has also increased the number of HIV/AIDS and Hepatitis cases (Shakeel Anjum, 26 June 2008). Pakistan's borders are porous. Until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, heroin was an un-known commodity in this country. In its wake came not only genuine refugees but also manufacturing and smuggling of heroin. Drug barons and criminals have pumped crores of rupees into the election funds of their nominees in NWFP. Known as smugglers' paradise, the Frontier province has over the years become an important link for the international drug syndicates and Afghan rebels engage in the opium for guns trade. Peter Dale Scote and Jonathan Marshall, (1991) tell the story of how elements of the US government went to work with narcotics traffickers, and then fought to suppress the truth about what they had done (Peter Dale Scote and Jonathan Marshall, 1991)

The real implications for Pakistan, of this booming industry out of Afghanistan, were felt by the country's economy, as was the case with Afghanistan too. The smuggling trade for the transit of narcotics would cause serious damage to the Pakistan economy. Pakistan's heroin industry was believed to have a turnover of Rs. 74 billion, which was equivalent to five per cent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for 1992-93. This was about 20-25 per cent of the shadow economy. In 1992, Pakistan has earned US \$ 1.5 billion just from the export of heroin (Kshitij Prabha, 2001: 1879). The huge amount of money amassed by the drug barons have not only given rise to a large black economy but also afforded them possibilities of influencing politics. In November 1988 general elections, drug money helped several persons of dubious credentials to get selected to parliament and the number of MPs receiving funds from drug barons was quite larger. There was no denying the fact that the heroin "narco-dollar" in Pakistan was keeping the economy alive. Therefore, the exporters and growers were able to exert considerable covert political and sometimes even military pressure. Pakistan has now reached the stage of "narcocracy"³ (Ikramul Haq, 1991: 162). In recent years, the belief has grown both in

³ The first use of this term was perhaps in 1980 in the context of the Garcia Meza Coup in Bolivia. It was used then to elaborate the idea of a political regime, which drew its principal support from the illicit narcotics trade narcotics trade.

law-enforcement and in professional crime that drugs can generate profits as great as any other from of illegal enterprise.

The Pakistani drug syndicates adopted the following three methods for recycling their drug money (Ikramul Haq, 1991: 94-95; B.C Dikshit and Dr. Giriraj Shah, 1996: 61):

- a) Some groups manage to handle large amounts of currency received in the United States and many Western countries where drugs were sold and remitted it back in Pakistan using the bank accounts of their relatives or friends living abroad. They could not be questioned about this money in view of the decision of the Economic Co-ordination Committee of the Cabinet in 1972 that origin of funds remitted from abroad through banking channels cannot be questioned. The Income Tax Department was also instructed not to question origin of such remittances vide Circular No. 1 (28) ITI/ 82 dated September 18, 1982 issued by the Central Board of Revenue. This facility, meant for encouraging inflow of foreign exchange, has come handy to drug traffickers as government clearly directed the tax functionaries “not to probe into the sources of foreign exchange earning brought into Pakistan through proper banking channels.”
 - b) Many drug traffickers of Karachi-based syndicates laundered their drug money through non-financial movements that resemble legitimate transaction. Some of them paid cash for machinery, autos and other appliances in the industrialized nations (where they sold heroin), shipped them to Pakistan (under the cover of an import agency) and sold them here for local currency.
 - c) These profits are also being used to finance other criminal activities to undermine legitimate business, to corrupt public institutions and officials, to support political insurgencies. Drug money has institutionalized corruption (B.C Dikshit and Dr. Giriraj Shah, 1996: 61)
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Pakistan's efforts to control drug production

The example of Pakistan shows that the strategic interests of the producing regions are not necessarily served by enforcement campaigns. Geopolitical considerations have been impinging upon the various governments of Pakistan. The tribal territories in the NWFP are still practically autonomous, although on papers The Customs Act and Drug Prohibition Order extend to these areas. On the issue of reduction in poppy cultivation the government has planned that in Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATAs), Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATAs), poppy has been cultivated since long. However, in 2003 poppy cultivation was reported at 6,703 hectares. which included opium production in Balochistan, the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)⁴. Poppy cultivation in Balochistan was reported for the first time in 2003; most of the poppy cultivated in Balochistan has been eradicated every year since then (UNODC Country Office Pakistan, The Paris Pact Initiative, 2008).

Due to small and uneconomic land holdings, high monetary gains for the crop, non-availability of other equally paying crops and lack of alternate sources of livelihood the locals tend to grow opium poppy. Having ratified various UN Conventions on Narcotics, the Government of Pakistan is trying its best to eradicate opium poppy by the end of year 2000. With this in view, the Area Development Projects are under implementation in Dir District, Mohmand and Bajaur Agencies with the assistance of UN Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) and US Government, in order to provide alternate sources of income to the farmers in the poppy growing areas and to improve the quality of rural life by introducing better varieties of grain, vegetables, breed of livestock and grass, besides introducing new techniques in farming. Farm to market roads, provision of electricity, construction of irrigation channels and measures to control land erosion have also been undertaken.

⁴ These semi-autonomous tribal lands comprise seven "agencies": Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, and North and South Waziristan.

These development projects in poppy-growing areas have resulted in significant drop of acreage under poppy cultivation, which nose- dived from 7,488 hectares in 1990 to 5,091 hectares during 1995 and further to 2,400 hectares in 2005 (UNODC, 2005: 62). During the 1990's declining opium cultivation and production levels were largely due to the Government's efforts to discourage the planting of opium and to destroy opium crops, together with the provision of alternative development assistance for opium poppy growers from the international community. Alternative crop having more financial return shall be suggested to farmers growing drug producing crops. Here given under is comparative income expenditure of some crops-

Production Cost and Profit of Flower (For One Acre)

Flower Name	Cost of Production (Rs.)	Gross Income (Rs.)	Net Profit (Rs.)
Poppy	50,000	140,000	90,000
Gladiolus	354,000	790,000	436,000
Rose (Cut Flower)	211,900	392,040	180,140

Source: Pakistan Horticulture Developments and Export Board, 2003.

An analysis of poppy harvesting trend reveals a decline in the amount harvested from the peak level of 9,441 hectares in 1992 to “poppy free” status in 2000-01 (UNODC, The Paris Pact Initiative, 2008). In order to prevent poppy cultivation in NWFP, Government of Pakistan had held numerous meeting with local Jirgas⁵ and notables to dissuade the people from growing poppy in the Enforced Areas.

Pakistan is a primary transit country for opiates produced in Afghanistan. K.B Rind, Secretary, Narcotics Control, said that “trafficking of opiates into and through Pakistan increased dramatically during the period 2001 – 2006 corresponding roughly to the increase in opium production in Afghanistan from 185 metric tons in 2001 to 6,100 metric tons in 2006” (International The News, 26 June 2008). In 2005, Pakistan seized 24

⁵ Assemblies of tribal elders.

metric tons of heroin and morphine (comprising 27 percent of total global seizures). In 2006, Pakistan seized a record 35 metric tons of heroin and morphine, up from 24 metric tons the year before – an increase of 46 per cent on the 2005 figure (UNODC, World Drug Report, 2007). During the months of October, November 1999, 4,890 kgs Heroin, 16,261 kgs Cannabis and 366 kgs Bhang was seized (UNODC, World Drug Report, 2006).

Opium Seizures (in kgs) 1996-2004

Years	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2003	2004
Pakistan	7422.7	7300	5021.7	16319.9	8867	5175	5785	2495
Iran	149577	162413.9	154453	204485	179053	81061	97575	174091

Source:- UNODC, World Drug Report 2006.

Though seizures cannot give an exact estimate of the level of narcotics production in a region but they are indicators of the implementation of policies towards the control of trafficking of these illicit substances. The seizure reportedly cumulative by the efforts of the administrations of Central Asia, Pakistan and Iran all of which are already facing the repercussions of the narcotics explosion emanating from Afghanistan (Deepali Gaur Singh, 2007: 282-283). The narcotics problem has global dimensions and no country can tackle it without international cooperation. For this purpose, Pakistan has interaction with USA, South Asian countries, Iran and Afghanistan.

Many agencies have drug law enforcement responsibilities in Pakistan, but the Anti-narcotics Force (ANF) is the primary anti-drug law enforcement agency. Established in July 1994, the ANF incorporated members from the Anti-Narcotics Task Force and sections of the disbanded Pakistan Narcotics Control Board (Musa Khan Jalazai, 2005: 122-123). The ANF has a vast area of responsibility. Pakistan has over 2,500 km of porous border with Afghanistan and approximately 900 km with Iran. This is in addition to the 1,062 km long coastal belt and a 1600 km border with India. There are seven official border entry/exit points in addition to eight international airports, three seaports and 11 dry ports. The ANF has a round the clock presence at all the international

airports and seaports; however, the dry ports and border entry/exit points are checked by the ANF at random and on the basis of intelligence received. The ANF's border control responsibility is shared with other law enforcement agencies including Frontier Corps Balochistan and NWFP, Punjab and Sindh Rangers, Pakistan Customs and Pakistan Coast Guard. The importance of inter-agency cooperation can therefore not be over-emphasized. At times, Pakistan's narcotics interdiction efforts are impeded due to border forces being heavily committed on counter-terrorist operations (UNODC Country Office Pakistan, The Paris Pact Initiative, 2008). ANF Director Anwar Hafeez said in June 2008 that "the ANF has seized 13,865 kilograms heroin, 104,928 kilogram hashish and 15,355 kilograms opium in 2007 (Shakeel Anjum, 26 June 2008).

In 1995, two anti drug ordinances passed. They were converted into law in 1997- The Anti-narcotics Force Act and Control of Narcotics Substances Act (Isfaq Ali, 2004: 421-422). The Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997 encompasses all provisions of previous laws and also contains several new provisions like death penalty for trafficking and financing narcotic trade, forfeiture of drug- generated assets, establishment of Special Courts, extradition (Ishfaq Ali, 2004: 312-313). By ratifying various conventions on narcotics issues, the Government of Pakistan was committed to completely eradicate cultivation of poppy by the end of year 2000 (UNODC Country Office Pakistan, The Paris Pact Initiative, 2008). Federal Minister for Narcotics Control and Women Development, Nazar Muhammed Gondal has said that string measures would be taken to curb drug trafficking and eliminate the menace of drug addiction. The minister said that "the government would extend all possible assistance to Anti-Narcotics force in order to equip with latest technology and skill to make the country opium free". (Pakistan Times, 14 May 2008). In September 2006, the Rawalpindi Anti-Narcotics Force had arrested six people involved in drug trafficking and seized 700 grams of heroin from them (Daily Times 17 September). The commitment has been fulfilled to some extent but not fully. The main hurdle in this operation was the autonomous status of tribal areas in Pakistan or ineffectiveness of central control over all the parts of the state (Ikramul Haq, 1991: 160). Being conscious of the fact that the farmers in the poppy growing areas have to be

provided with alternate sources of income, the Government has launched ambitious development projects in the NWFP and FATAs.

In the 1980s, the fallout from the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan created the “heroin culture” that undermined Pakistan’s politics and economy (Ahmed Rashid, 2000: 193). Most of the drug barons are in Pakistan. Earlier, they were operating from the Afghan soil. They will not remain cool, because there has been a nexus between drug trafficking and terrorism. Afghanistan is a major poppy- producing country, and Pakistan is the leading manufacturer and exporter of heroin and hashish. Both the countries are playing a devastating role in the international opium and heroin markets. A powerful drug mafia has emerged in Pakistan, particularly in the tribal belt of the NWFP and Baluchistan. Pakistani criminal networks play a central role in the transshipment of narcotics and smuggled goods from Afghanistan to international markets (International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. 2006). This mafia is linked to powerful leaders across the political spectrum and economically also they are tremendously strong. Pakistan, during the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, had set up a highly developed narcotic producing and trafficking network under the control of the Inter Services Intelligence and its army which it still uses to finance militants in Jammu and Kashmir. “The trafficking was used to finance the Afghan mujahideen and Kashmiri separatists, while part of the proceeds went to top Pakistani bureaucrats and the practice continues” (Kshitij Prabha, 2001: 319-320).

Afghan rebel commanders to which the elements of Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency channeled U.S funding and weaponry are also alleged to have participated in the Afghan narcotics trade during the Soviet occupation and its aftermath, including in the production and trafficking of refined heroin to U.S and European markets. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops and a drop in U.S. and Soviet funding, opium poppy cultivation, drug trafficking, and other criminal activities increasingly provided local leaders and military commanders with a means of supporting their operations and establishing political influence in the areas they controlled. Pakistan remains a substantial trafficking country for heroin, morphine, and hashish from

Afghanistan, [and] Pakistani financiers/traffickers may also play an important role in financing and organizing opium production in Afghanistan. Control of narcotics trafficking along the remote 1,450-mile [Afghan] border has presented a major challenge for the Government of Pakistan (GOP).

Interdiction operations on the border occur, but drug convoys are becoming increasingly smaller, well guarded, and highly mobile, with high-tech communications capability and the ability to take advantage of difficult terrain and widely dispersed law enforcement personnel. The GOP has expressed concern that as counter narcotics efforts ramp up in Afghanistan, the drug trade will push east into Pakistan. Unlike Iran, which cooperates with the US and UK on drug-related issues, Afghanistan's narco-state would be much harder to sustain without Pakistan, the ISI and its proxies. Most important, success in the struggle against poppy cultivation is achievable in the long run. Afghanistan's neighbour, Pakistan, is the first opium producing country in the world to be designated poppy free. The U.S. narcotics control strategy for Pakistan was based on three pillars: demand reduction, law enforcement, and alternative development.

The U.S. Department of State counter narcotics programme run by the Narcotics Affairs Section of the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad in the border tribal areas, used both carrot and stick to convince opium-growing communities to decide as a group to stop poppy cultivation in return for expedited delivery of community services (roads, water, schools, and health care facilities) (Dr Lowry Taylor, Dr. Sherifa Zuhur, 2006). The Administrator of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Karen P. Tandy, described Pakistan as “a success story in the global war on drugs” and observed that Pakistan is “America’s vital ally on anti-drug efforts”(Embassy of the United States Islamabad. Pakistan, September 28, 2007).

Over a twenty years period, poppy cultivation dropped to less than 600 hectares by 2000. However, the opium cultivation increased to 2,500 hectares in 2003, but due to opium eradication programmes it decreased to 1,701 hectares in 2007 (UNODC, World Drug Report, 2008: 38). The U.S. has also provided assistance to strengthen overall

Pakistani counter narcotics law enforcement capacity and interdiction of Afghan opium has steadily increased over the years.

There is a reciprocal narcotics relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Some predict that as Afghanistan cuts back on poppy cultivation, a balloon effect will take place in Pakistan, especially in the areas of least governmental authority. The elastic relationship between price and supply⁶ for Afghan farmers -- price increases result in more area cultivated in poppies. "As a counter terrorism and counter narcotics measure, the U.S. country programme since 2001 has sought to enhance border security" (Dr Lowry Taylor, Dr. Sherifa Zuhur, 2006). A worst-case scenario in Afghanistan is resulting from an expanded eradication campaign would be the wholesale movement of refugees or poppy farmers across Afghanistan's restive, porous frontier region with Pakistan. Indeed, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda already have a strong presence there, and such refugees would be vulnerable to recruitment by these extremists (Joseph Krisch, 29 February 2008). In both Afghanistan and Pakistan drug abuse is rapidly increasing and internal demand for opiates is rising comparably. The 2006 National Assessment Report on Problem Drug Use in Pakistan reported that there were approximately 630,000 opiate users in Pakistan, equivalent to 0.7% of the population age 15-64. Of these, around 480,000 (77%) were heroin users (UNODC Country Office Pakistan and the Paris Pact Initiative, 2008).

⁶ Two attributes come into play with the economics of drugs. One is the price elasticity of opiates for drug users and the other is the price elasticity of supply for poppy farmers. On the demand side of the equation, addicts in the short term have an inelastic demand for opiates because they will pay whatever the price is to sustain their habit. In the long term, addicts may seek demand reduction treatments or alternative drugs to sustain their habit. On the supply side of the equation, the amount of poppy cultivated by farmers is related to the perceived price that they will receive at the farm gate at harvest time. The observed bounce in poppy production after eradication is a rational response by farmers to increased prices for limited supply reaching external markets.

Problem of Drug Abuse in Pakistan and Iran

Distribution of main drug in percentage

Country	Source	Year	Cannabis	Opiats
Pakistan	ARQ ⁷	2004	37.0%	49.0%
Iran	Government report	2001	2.5%	91.6%

Source: UNODC, World Drug Report, 2008, p. no. 283.

Drug Trade in Iran

Iran is a major transit corridor for opiates and hashish smuggled from Afghanistan and eventually through Pakistan to the Persian Gulf, Turkey, Europe and Russia. After the narcotics shipments cross the Iranian border they usually are broken up into smaller units so they are more difficult to intercept. As much as 60 per cent of the drugs that enter Iran pass on into Turkey, the Caucasus, and the Persian Gulf. The remaining 40 per cent stays in the country. Following the 1979 Islamic revolution, Iran's opium poppy crop was largely eradicated, and the old traditions of opium consumption were wiped out, with opium production shifting to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Iran continues to record enormous seizures of opiates, though its seizures in morphine and opium have been lower in recent years than during the late 1990s, probably due to the increased manufacturing activities in Afghanistan, as well as to the shift in drug trafficking through Central Asia. However, since 2003, seizures in Iran have been rising again (Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 2004).

No manufacture of illicit drugs has been reported in Iran in 2006. Nevertheless, the possibility of the existence of small heroin processing laboratories on the main trafficking routes from Afghanistan-Pakistan toward the western border of Iran ought not to be ruled out. In 2006, a dramatic increase in the abuse of synthetic drugs, the existence of illegal

⁷ UNODC, Annual Reports Questionnaire

synthetic drug manufacturing laboratories been observed (UNODC, 2006). The head of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Antonio Maria Costa, urged Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran today to share intelligence on drug trafficking, both among them and with the international community. At the end of a three-day visit to Iran, he said the country's police were scoring major successes in intercepting drugs from Afghanistan, the world's largest opium producer, but could do considerably more if they were able to exchange intelligence about drug shipments with their neighbours. In June 2008, Iran's police chief Esmael Ahmadi Moghad said in Tehran that "only about 900 tons of the 2,500 tons of drugs that entered his country from Afghanistan were seized in 2007 (Daily Times, 15 July 2008).

Different Types of Drugs Seized
Years 1997-2004 (Figures in Kg)

Year	Heroin	Morphine	Opium	Hashish	Other Drugs
1997	1986	18949	162414	11096	255
1998	2894	22291	154454	14376	248
2000	6189	20764	179053	31581	1459
2001	4001	8668	81061	46084	1314
2003	3327	13063	97575	76491	1664
2004	4715	12878	174091	86500	6174
2005	5553	6937	225095	67277	6319

Source: UNODC, 2006; National Drug Control Report, 2005.

Afghan-origin hashish and opiates transit through Pakistan and Iran to Europe and North America. About 50% of the total opiate production of Afghanistan flows through Iran. There are three main trafficking routes: Northern (Khorasan), Southern (Sistan/Baluchestan), and Hormuzgan (Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 2004). Iran is having dismal results in its fight against drug trafficking, but officials predict that the struggle will only get much more difficult due to the political

and economic instability in Afghanistan. As the United States continues its war against terrorism on Afghan soil and opposition forces consolidate their hold, neighboring Iran is getting more headaches from a deluge of Afghan refugees, as well as the side effects of the uncertainty there. Iran is already struggling in its battle against drug trafficking as well as drug abuse. Numerous indicators reveal that despite the fact that Iran had some of the toughest anti-narcotics policies in the world, where people caught even with a few ounces of the substance faced the death penalty, the number of drug addicts is increasing day by day. In the Islamic Republic of Iran where the number of drug abusers is said to exceed 1.2 million (2.8 percent of the general population aged 15-64) (UNODC, World Drug Report, 2007: 55)

The number of people using drugs—from addicts to casual users—is estimated to be around 2 million. The average age of users is falling. A Gilan Province official says the average addiction age has fallen to 10-19, whereas it used to be 25-29, and the head of the Drug Control Headquarters ascribed the increase in young drug abusers to the country's population explosion (Tehran Times, 2001). Drug abuse has led to a growing prison population. Forty percent of all crimes in Iran are drug-related felonies (IRNA, 2002). A related problem is the rise in HIV/AIDS transmitted through the sharing of needles for intravenous drug use. Between 19,000 and 20,000 Iranians suffer from AIDS, and almost 3,500 are HIV-positive. Approximately 65 percent of all the recorded cases are transmitted through the sharing of needles, the remainder are through sexual contact (10 percent), contaminated blood products (less than ten percent), or from mother to infant. The economy, and especially the high rate of joblessness, tops the list of reasons given by Iranians for drug abuse. An addict said, "We have no freedom, no jobs, nowhere to go and have fun. So we are all addicts" (A. William Sami, 2003: 288).

Iran's drug scourge is directly related to its common borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan - two leading producers and exporters of narcotic drugs in the world. Some 2,000 kilometers of Iran's borders are constantly penetrated by armed drug smugglers from these two countries - but especially from Afghanistan. There are periodic reports of corruption among lower-level law enforcement staff, which is consistent with the flow of

huge amounts of drugs through the country. As many as 500 police staffs have been fired for corruption in 2004 alone, there have been no charges of higher-level governmental officers being involved in or compliant in drug trafficking (Tomas Muzik, 2004). From 1989 to 2003, the number of cases of armed clashes between Iran security/ police and drug gangs were 12,238 and 3,700 numbers of Law Enforcement members were killed in these clashes (UNODC, 2006).

Officials have pointed to poverty and unemployment as contributors to the rise of drug trafficking and abuse. These poor souls are taken advantage of by organized crime Mafia type units who are making billions out of the narcotics trade. Drug trafficking is too lucrative a trade to give up easily. Opium alone increases in price each time it crosses borders. The wholesale price of one kg of opium is about \$154.7 in Afghanistan, it climbs to \$664.9 at the Pakistani border and in Iran and it costs some \$807.0 (UNODC, World Drug Report, 2008: 256).

Iran's Counter-Narcotics Efforts

The continuous raids by drug trafficking bands into the Iranian territory have forced Iran to adopt innovative strategies, including the creation of villagers' paramilitary armed units, relocation of border villages previously used for drug trafficking, and the launching of alternative crop substitution projects. The 1989 law created a new Drug Control Headquarters (DCHQ) to centralize counter-narcotics efforts. Iran's president is the acting chairman, and the secretary of the DCHQ serves as the country's "Drug Czar"⁸ (A. William Sami, 2003: 291). There are DCHQ offices in the country's 28 provinces. DCHQ coordinates the drug-related activities of the police (the leading enforcement unit in terms of drug seizures), the customs, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Ministries of

⁸ Other members of the DCHQ are the Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Intelligence and Security, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance, the Prosecutor General, the chief of the Law Enforcement Forces, the Prisons Organization, Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, the head of the Tehran Courts, and the Basij.

Intelligence, Security, Islamic Guidance and Education, and Health (Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 2004).

Iran has deployed almost 20,000 anti narcotics police and border guards along its 1,845 kilometers border with Afghanistan and Pakistan- the world's most active opium smuggling route. Twenty- eight mountain passes have been blocked by huge concrete structures. Hundred of kilometers of trenches- four meter wide and four meters deep- have been dug to stop drug caravans eluding patrols (International Herald Tribune, 30 November 2006). Iran has actively participated in the negotiations resulting in the UN Convention against Trans-national Organized Crime and is a signatory to this Convention. Iran has also signed and ratified agreements for cooperation in security matters with the governments of Italy, Saudi Arabia, Belarus, Kuwait and Yemen. The provisions of these agreements cover issues directly related to transnational organized crimes. Acting as a strong proponent of an integrated regional approach to combating drug trafficking from Afghanistan, Iran is a party to the Paris Pact mechanism initiated in May 2003 for countries affected by trafficking in Afghan opiates (the so-called 'Six plus Two'⁹ group, comprising Afghanistan's six neighbors, as well as Russia and the US) (Tomas Muzik, 2005).

Iran is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, as well as the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, it also signed and ratified the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs in 2001. Iran has signed but has not yet ratified the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime. Iran has shown an increasing desire to cooperate with the international community on narcotics control issues. The UNODC is working with Iran through the NOROUZ Programme (Narcotics Reduction Unitized Programme, launched in June 1999, and totaling a budget of US\$ 13 million in 2002-2005) to modify its laws, train the judiciary, and improve the court system. The UN Joint Initiatives Against Drugs (UNJIAD), another programme run by UNODC, focuses on awareness

⁹ The 6+2 group countries are—China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan

raising on opium production and abuse, and targets specifically the Afghan refugee community in Iran (Tomas Muzik, 2005).

Widespread availability of drugs may be one reason for drug abuse among Iranians. Iran and the rest of the international community promoted crop substitution in Afghanistan. It made no inroads with the Taliban, but Tehran has a much closer relationship with the post-Taliban leadership in Afghanistan. Tehran offered in mid-December 2001 to discuss crop substitution with the Afghan leadership, and in the following month an Iranian Foreign Ministry official said during a visit to Kabul that Iran has already implemented several poppy substitution projects in the regions bordering Iran. This topic was formalized in February 2002 via a memorandum of understanding signed by Iranian Minister of Agriculture Jihad Mahmud Hojjati and Afghan Minister of Agriculture Hussein Anwari (IRNA, 26 February 2002). The Afghan administration offered to compensate farmers for not planting poppies, including rewards for destroying the crops (about \$350 per jerib or 2,000 square meters) (A. William Sami, 2003: 286).

The battle against drug trafficking can only succeed if the Government first of all cleans its own house by checking the growing influence of drug baron in politics and in the bureaucracy. There is need to counter the well-armed, well-financed and well-equipped criminal gangs with an equally effective law enforcement and intelligence response and to cooperate as easily across borders.

Chapter- 4

Opium Production in Afghanistan

Any attempt to understand the drug trade in Afghanistan¹ in its totality must place it in the cold-war and post-cold war security environment that has been coloured by the crime-terror nexus where organized crime, the drug trade and terrorism converge. The crime-terror nexus illustrates the complex nature of the regional drug trade while distinguishing between the players who control it and those who merely take advantage of its presence and the instability it creates (Musa Khan Jalalzai, 2005)

Although disadvantaged by its landlocked nature, Afghanistan has traditionally capitalised on its geographic location. Historically a trading nation, Afghanistan has long served as a trade and transit bridge between three main geographic regions: Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. It has very poor infrastructure and has suffered multiple years of drought as well as major shortages of food, shelter and medical care. Agricultural production has been limited by the lack of modern farm equipment, fertilizer, water and good quality of seeds. Unfortunately, Afghanistan's chief agricultural export is an illicit crop, opium poppy (Mir Hekmatullah Sadat, 2004). Opium poppies have always been grown on both sides of Pakistan's border with Afghanistan, but the region did not become the world's main exporter of heroin until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 brought near-anarchy. Production and refining exploded as the Afghan mujahideen, with connivance of Western intelligence agencies, traded in drugs to finance their war against the Russians.

Historically, opium has been used in Afghan communities as medication for different conditions, particularly pain and respiratory complaints. Opium use also has a traditional role in the societies of some groups. Opium for centuries was ceremonially imbibed and also offered as a gift as dowry in weddings and funeral services and is thereby, linked to the social status in very intimate ways. Afghanistan is the largest

¹ Afghanistan, along with Pakistan and Iran, from the Golden Crescent, an area known for opium and cannabis cultivation and trafficking.

producer of opium in the world. Afghan opiates represent almost 100 percent of those consumed in neighboring countries and 80-90 percent of the heroin found in European markets (Chris Johnson and Jolyon Leslie, 2004: 110).

Afghanistan is not only a producer, but also a consumer and victim of adverse effects of drugs use. Several lakhs of people within Afghanistan are addicted to different psychoactive substances. Heroin is easily accessible in Afghanistan and there is a disturbing trend towards injection of heroin alone and in combination with other substances (UNODC, *Community Drug Profit #5: an Assessment of Problem Drug Use in Kabul City*, 2003). According to a drug user in Kabul: “*Drugs are like vegetables here, very cheap and infinitely available*” (UNODC, *Community Drug Profit #1: Problem Drug Use in Afghan Communities: An Initial Assessment*, 1999). Afghanistan is at a cross- road, the country is emerging from more than twenty years of political and social unrest as the leading global producer of opium in a geographic region widely affected by drug use, particularly injection drug use, and blood- borne infections, including human immunodeficiency (HIV).The country’s rise to this position is inextricably bound up with the course of the war. In 1979 it produced only a few hundred tons, by 2002 this had risen more than fifteen fold t 3,400 metric tons, and by 2003 it was 3,600 metric tons (UNODC, 2005: 62).

It is true that today Afghanistan is the largest opium producing country of Golden Crescent. But the explosion of opium production in the region ironically began from Pakistan. The production of poisoned opium poppies in Afghanistan did not reach large scale until the Russian invasion in 1979. By this time, Iran had significantly decreased opium production due to blockage of trade routes and severe punishment for drug- related conviction. Restriction on cultivation and refining of opium in Pakistan in the mid to late 1990’s led to the shift of these activities to Afghanistan. Investigation carried out by The Daily Mail revealed that in addition to opium poppy cultivation, another serious development, which had further complicated the situation, was now that the poppy was being increasingly processed into opium and heroin within Afghanistan (Makhdoom Babar, 24 July 2006). During the mujahideen era, opium and heroin production rose

steadily with Afghanistan becoming the leading global supplier, overtaking Burma in the mid- 1990's (UNODC, Crop Monitoring, 2003). The disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991 threw open the floodgate of drug trafficking from Afghanistan across Central Asia to Russia and further west to Europe. The principle routes of Afghan drug trafficking are: in north, through Central Asia and Russia; in west, through Iran; and in south through Pakistan. In 2006, out of all opiates that left Afghanistan, 53 per cent went via Iran, 33 per cent via Pakistan and 15 per cent via Central Asia (mainly Tajikistan). If only heroin and morphine are considered, the bulk is estimated to have left Afghanistan via Pakistan (48%), followed by Iran (31%) and Central Asia (21%) (Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006).

There is nothing new about the central role of drugs and drug lords in modern Asian history, for example, China's opium war of the nineteenth century. Both the colonial French and the theoretically anti- colonial Americans used, and were in turn afflicted by, drugs, during the wars in Indo- China from the 1950s until the 1970s. The memories of Indo- China, in addition to their shared anti- communist stance, played an important role in their subsequent collaboration a few decades later following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This resulted in a Franco- American venture in 1981 under Reagan's presidency. The Regan administration's more direct venture with the French was christened Operation Moustique or Mosquito. Though the French subsequently dropped out of the venture the operation was named so probably because of what the head of French Intelligence Alexander de Mercnches, is famously believed to have told President: "do you know how much trouble a mosquito can cause the bear? If you are not in the position to shoot the bear yourself you should consider this method" (John K. Cooley, 1999: 127). He said, "take all those confiscated drugs and do as the Vietcong did with the US Army in Vietnam. Supply them to the Russian soldiers. In a few months, they would be demoralized and their fighting ability would be gone" (John K. Cooley, 1999: 127- 128).

With the jihad stretching to a decade it was the drug economy that eventually sustained the war efforts of the Mujahideen. The area already had stockpiles of weapons

that had been dumped through the arms pipeline. In the mid- 1980's, "there was an arm pipeline going in, and a drugs pipeline coming out of Afghanistan" (Jonathan Goodhand, 2005: 198). This two-way trade continued and helped in sustaining the civil war as well during the war against Russia the huge and illicit drugs trade nurtured by the Mujahideen was ignored and tolerated by the CIA and other western intelligence agencies in return for their commitment to fight the Soviet Union. U.S. officials had refused to investigate charge of heroin dealing by its Afghan allies because U.S. narcotics policy in Afghanistan has been subordinated to the war against Soviet influence there. In 1995, the former CIA director of the Afghan operation, Charles Cogan, admitted the CIA had indeed sacrificed the drug to fight the Cold War. "Our main mission was to do as much damage as possible to the Soviets. We did not really have the resources or the time to devote to an investigation of the drug trade" (Mc Coy, 1999).

Jihadi Movement and Drug Trafficking

"These gentlemen are the moral equivalents of America's founding father," was how Regan introduced the Mujahideen to the American media in 1985 at the height of the Soviet-Afghan war. The identity of these 'founding fathers' is a revelation of the administration's intentions in its policy towards Afghanistan- to channelise the extreme versions of political Islam in their struggle against the Soviet Union (Mahmood Mamdani, 2004: 119). The actual plan of the Afghan jihad had been worked out by the CIA, albeit in complete collaboration with ISI of Pakistan. The Inter- Service Intelligence (ISI) was the executive agency for the Jihad while the job on ground was carried out by the Mujahideen. The responsibilities of each of the three parties involved directly or indirectly- in the war were very clearly demarcated (Deepali Gaur Singh, 2007: 73). Throughout the protracted period during which Afghanistan was at war, both with itself and with outside invaders, the political economy of pursuing and sustaining conflicts has been closely intertwined with illicit activities. Indeed, the link between war and illicit activities became progressively stronger over the long conflict in the country. The Mujahideen exploited poppy cultivation to the fullest under Afghanistan's war economy opium production registered an annual growth rate of 14 per cent. But in the aftermath of

the jihad, once the Soviet had withdrawn, it went up by another five percent and showed an annual growth of 19 per cent till 1999 (UNODC, 2003: 94).

When the Soviet troops withdrew in 1989, there was a reduction in external assistance to Mujahideen. Combined with devastation of the rural economy, it created strong incentives for cash producing activities primarily the smuggling of all kinds of goods and the cultivation of opium. There was absurd contradiction of American policy in the “Golden Crescent” drug state of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran during the 1980s and 1990s President George Bush in 1937 and President Clinton during his two administrations in the 1990s both declared “war on drugs”, but the drug wars’ multi-billion dollar budgets seemed unable to cope with the floods of drugs out of South Asia in the wake of the unholy war in Afghanistan (John K. Cooley, 1999: 128-129).

A new wave of what was termed “narcomafia”² is what quite prophetically became a cause for alarm as the Mujahideen were seen as earning money by selling drugs to buy weapons which in turn would be used to expand their activities. And this in a continuous cycle would only result in more drug addicts and more death and more crime because that is how the narcomafia nexus operated. In the closing years of the jihad (1986-1990) the Pakistan- Afghan border alone was producing 75 percent of the world’s opium, which was worth multibillion dollars in revenue (Mahmood Mamdani, 2004: 143).

War based Economy

With such rapid developments, the economy shifted from a productive one to war based one. The people of Afghanistan have suffered from a quarter- century of civil war and external military intervention. During the major conflict from 1979 to 1992, the value and quantity of illicit activities grew considerably. The devastation wrought by the conflict resulted in the collapse of physical economy and government infrastructure across the country, a process which is only now being slowly reversed. Afghanistan was very poor. Before it was engulfed in persistent conflict, but the conflict made the

² Narcomafia refers to those dissident groups, who rely on revenue from illicit drug trade.

circumstances of the country much worse. Recent rapid economic growth and improvements in some social indicators have not fundamentally changed the overall position (World Bank, 2005: 15).

The counter-insurgency waged by government and Soviet troops devastated the rural subsistence economy, with food production estimated to have fallen by as much as two-third (Barnet Rubin, 2000: 1792). As the war prolonged, the rural economy simultaneously deteriorated as a result of the fighting with food production falling by half. This meant that growing urban population was more and more dependent on government assistance and the government as well as the Mujahideen, on foreign aid. Participation in the war became the only way of supporting their family. With opium becoming the only commodity capable of generating any income, and sale of the illicit produce is what could sustain the unending need for arms. From an initial informal barter system, there grew an increasingly structured and formalized economic system based on the nascent “drugs for arms trade”.

It is clear that poverty is prevalent in Afghanistan. In 2003, it was estimated that 3.5 million rural Afghans were extremely poor, 10.5 million were vulnerable to extreme poverty and among rest, a further 3.5 million were less poor but nonetheless still vulnerable to poverty (World Bank, 2005: ii). For many poor people, poppy growing is not only the most profitable activity, but also the only way of meeting their needs. In the current environment in Afghanistan, opium poppy cultivation is clearly an appealing option. In many ways it is a “miracle crop”. It matures quickly, allowing double cropping in many areas, it is more weather resistant than wheat, it is a non-perishable, low weight-high value product, is easy to store, transport, sell and it is ideally suited to the war-damaged physical infrastructure. Moreover, as an annual crop, with a relatively guaranteed market, opium has provided a degree of security that many crops, such as fruit and vegetables, cannot offer. It is not only the profits that are important. Because it is very lucrative, it can be used as collateral to gain access to credit in the absence of any formal banking system in rural areas. Wherever opium is produced, it has become the

primary medium for obtaining credit³ (Chris Johnson and Jolyon Leslie, 2004: 112; David Mansfield, 2002).

So as, in the case of Afghanistan, credit is usually obtained as an advance payment on a fixed amount of opium. This system known as *salaam*⁴, provides an advance payment on a fixed amount of agricultural production.⁵ Although the majority of households that cultivate opium poppy in Afghanistan utilise this system to some extent, the resource poor typically sell their entire crop prior to the harvest in return for an advance payment (David Mansfield, 2001). Poor farmers grow poppy in order to pay debts, their payments are normally made in fixed quantities of opium that are determined well in advanced of the harvest. If they fall short in their payments, the farmers become increasingly indebted to drug traffickers and have to produce even more opium at the next harvest or face dire consequences. This vicious cycle can be broken by providing farmer with legitimate alternative livelihoods, which enable them to survive without poppy cultivation, and by interdicting the drug trade, which lowers the demand for poppy and reduces prices.

Work done by UNODC showed that in 1988 over 60 per cent of the opium traders in the provinces of Kandhar, Helmand and Nangarhar provided credit to farmers against future opium production. Although the amounts earned were limited, the repayment terms were harsh (Chris Johnson and Jolyon Leslie, 2004: 112). Another factor for the farmers that created a bias in favour of poppy cultivation was that while calculating profits seed, fertilizers and hired labour were calculated in costs to the farmer. But they never included the costs of family labour, like wives and daughters. Female labour meant fixed costs and since poppy production is highly labour intensive, the zero costs attached to female labour coming form the family meant higher percent of profit. Three quarters of

³ In South East Asia, *Haw* traders provide cash, commodities and agricultural inputs to remote highland groups in return for opium. In Pakistan, local shopkeepers, known as *beopari*, provide goods on the understanding that any debts accrued will be repaid in the form of opium.

⁴ *Salaam* is a system, which provides an advance payments on a fixed amount of agricultural production.

⁵ Whilst *salaam* sometimes provides advance payments on other agricultural products, such as wheat or black cumin, opium is the crop that is favoured by lenders.

the total work was done by family members, which went unaccounted in profitability calculations (UNODC, 2003: 100).

In poppy growing areas, everyone grows opium, but “many of the mullahs preach against it”. On way to the Faizabad, signs proclaim that the cultivation and trafficking of narcotics are against Islam-the signs are surrounded by fields of poppies. Chris Johnson and Jolyon Leslie say that here farmers discuss openly about the cultivation of opium. You can pull up and talk to any farmer and he will happily tell you what he made last year and what he hopes to make this year. A few people are deeply against it, but majority feels little concern about its immorality. Ordinary people rationalize it by their poverty: “Islam says that Pork is forbidden, said one, “but if you are starving the Quran says you can go out and eat pig”. Besides, the West is seen as responsible for sending the weapons that have caused Afghanistan so much misery. This is our export to the West’, was a common refrain (Chris Johnson and Jolyon Leslie, 2004: 118-119).

Afghanistan has proven to be a favourable environment for opium poppy cultivation. In 2008, World Drug Report estimated that 131,000 hectares of opium poppy was cultivated in Afghanistan, representing almost 90% of total global cultivation of illicit opium and significantly more than the previous peak in cultivation of 90,583 hectares in 1999. In 2007, cultivation was reported to reach the record level of 193,000 hectares (UNODC, World Drug Report, 2008: 38). Yet opium is till very much a minor crop in terms of overall cultivated area, trailing behind, wheat, barley, rice and even maize. For example in 2002/03 29 percent of cultivable land was dedicated to wheat and only one per cent of poppy (FAO 2003). The land potentially available for crop cultivation amounts to 8.05 million hectares in Afghanistan (out of a total land area of 65 million hectares). The land dedicated to opium poppy thus accounted for 1.6% of potentially arable land in 2004, up from 1% in 2003. The land actually under cultivation is currently estimated at around 4.55 million hectares according to the Afghan Ministry of Agriculture. Based on these data, the area under poppy cultivation rose from 1.8% in

2003 to 2.9% of total land used for agriculture in 2004 (UNODC, Afghan Opium Survey Report, 2004: 47).

Agricultural land use in Afghanistan in 1999 (in hectares)

Crops/produce	Cultivated area
Cereals	2,534,000
Wheat	2,227,000
Coarse grain	367,000
Maize	160,000
Rice paddy	140,000
Opium poppy	91,000
Seed cotton	60,000
Vegetables	57,000
Grapes	52,000
Pulses	37,000
Potatoes	14,000
Water melons	7,8000
Almonds	5,500
Apricots	5,150
Plums	4,500
Figs	3,300
Pistachios	3,000
Apples	2,350
Walnuts	2,300
Citrus fruits	2,270

Source: UNODC, the Opium Economy in Afghanistan in International Problem, UN New York, 2003, p. no. 44.

The relationship between the price of agricultural commodities and the level of utilization in Afghanistan is far from simple. For example, research has indicated that

during the drought years, household determined how much land to dedicate to wheat based on estimates of water availability rather than the market price of wheat (A. Hale, 2002). In 2004 a research in Nangarhar suggested that while opium poppy has been cultivated in a wide range of areas and by varied socio-economic groups, it tends to be concentrated in areas with limited access to irrigated land, high population densities and limited off and non farm income opportunities (David Mansfield, 2004). In many of these areas cultivation of other crops is a limited option. With such small landholdings and such a high number of persons per jerib of land, cultivating wheat exclusively would lead to food shortages. Under such conditions, household need to produce cash crops to meet their basic needs. Yet vegetables and fruits (and indeed wheat) are vulnerable to crop failure as a result of water shortages and inability to reap full value due to poor transportation endemic in these areas. The attraction of opium poppy in these areas lies in its role as a low risk crop in a high risk environment rather than as a possible strategy for maximizing economic returns.

Cultivation at the national level has certainly fluctuated widely. The new entrants into poppy cultivation also have had widely contrasting experiences. The emergence of the new areas of cultivation has contributed to a shift in the distribution of cultivation. By 2003, there were nine more provinces cultivating opium poppy than in 1999. Opium poppy cultivation in Helmand province increased by almost 50% and reached 102,770 hectares, compared to 69,324 hectares in 2006 (Afghanistan 2007 Annual Opium Survey, Executive Summary: 5). In Kandahar province, opium poppy cultivation increased by one third to 16,615 hectares in 2007 compared to 2006, despite the eradication of 7,905 hectares of opium poppy. Opium poppy cultivation in Nimroz province tripled compared to 2006 and reached 6,507 hectares in 2007. The majority of the cultivation was located in Khash Rod district. The total area under opium poppy in Farah province almost doubled to 14,865 hectares in 2007 (Afghanistan 2007 Annual Opium Survey, Executive Summary: 5). In 2007, opium poppy cultivation in Nangarhar increased by 285% to 18,739 ha. In 2005, the province had become almost opium poppy free as a result of self restriction on the part of farmers, which led to a 96% decrease on 2004. In 2006, opium

poppy cultivation began to increase but could only in very remote parts of the province (Afghanistan 2007 Annual Opium Survey, Executive Summary: 6).

Main opium poppy cultivation provinces in Afghanistan (in hectares)

Provinces	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2006-2007
Helmand	15,371	29,353	26,500	69,324	102,770	+48%
Nangarhar	18,904	28,213	1,093	4,872	18,739	+285%
Kandahar	3,055	4,959	12,989	12,619	16,615	+32%
Farah	17,00	2,288	10,240	7,694	14,865	+93%
Uruzgan	4,698	N/A	2,024	9,773	9,204	-6%
Nimroz	26	115	1,690	1,955	6,507	+233%
Rest of the country	36,246	66,072	49,464	58,763	24,281	-59%

Source: UNODC (2007), Afghanistan 2007 Annual Opium Survey, Executive Summary, p, no. 5

It is evident from the fact that Afghanistan has the right conditions for widespread opium poppy cultivation not only in agronomic terms (hence the particularly high yield obtained) but also socio- economically and politically- like weak governance, insecurity, and the lack of viable legal livelihoods. The country now produces nearly 90 percent of the world's opium. Opium revenue accounts for 52 percent of Afghanistan's licit Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and constitutes about 30 percent of the total GDP (UNODC, 2005). According to UNDCP, only about one per cent of the Afghan drugs sale on the international market goes to the Afghan poppy farmers and less than 10 per cent to Afghan traffickers and traders.⁶ Even with this low-rate of return, it is conservatively estimated that at least one million Afghan framers are making over US \$100 million a year on account of growing poppies. The other 90 percent goes to traders and distributors outside Afghanistan. However, there is considerable disagreement among the national

⁶ The value of Afghanistan's opium sold on the international market is estimated to be worth between \$30 billion and \$60 billion

and international partners about strategic approaches and target priorities (Ali A. Jalali, 2006: 10). Tekeste Tekie, country representative for the UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation said, "an significant increase in what crops is expected. The high price of commodities has encouraged farmers to switch from poppy cultivation to wheat." In fact we are already seeing evidence of this happening, for instance in the Bamian region, where some farmers have planted half wheat and half poppy crops (Pia Heikkila, 13 May 2008).

While formulating policies and programmes for complete poppy eradication, the main issue will be who to target first. Is it producers and farmers or processors and traders? The farmers receive such a small portion of the drug revenue in Afghanistan. The rest goes to a nexus of traders, traffickers, illegal militia commanders and corrupt government officials. Therefore targeting the nexus can have a much greater impact on the enterprise. There are two groups of people involved in the drug business: those who do it out of need (farmers) and those who are doing it out of greed. It so happens that the greedy ones of ten force the needy ones to produce opium by offering them cash credits, leasing their lands, and using coercive methods (Ali A. Jalali, 2006: 10).

Taliban and Drug Trafficking

After 1992 when the mujahideen took Kabul, the country fragmented into a series of sub- conflicts as local warlords fought each other or turned inwards to consolidate their economic activities. The fragmentation of Afghanistan by the mid- 1990s, warlords and commanders and their militias provided an opportunities for the rise of the Taliban. Expanding from its base in the south with its headquarters in Kandahar, the Taliban eventually conquered of most the country's territory. Taliban- ruled Afghanistan became strongly integrated into regional trading and smuggling networks, providing the new regime with an important source of revenue. While in the two decades starting from the latter half of the 1970s and all through to the mid-1990s it was the politics of the proxy war between the U.S. and Soviet Union that determined the flow of narcotics out of the region, in the following period, from the mid-1990s the single most crucial factor in the

flow of drugs out of the Golden Crescent Countries was the conquest of most of Afghanistan by the Taliban (Deepali Gaur Singh, 2007: 97-98).

When Taliban first captured Kandahar they had declared they would eliminate all drugs and U.S. diplomats were encouraged enough by the announcement to make immediate contact with the Taliban. The worsening situation prompted attempts by the international community to talk to the Taliban. After six months of secret negotiations UNDCP concluded an agreement with the Taliban in October 1997. The Taliban agreed to eradicate poppy growing if the international community provided funds to help farmers with substitute crops. Pino Arlacchi, the head of UNDCP asked for U.S. \$ 25 million from donors for ten-year programme to eliminate poppy farming in areas controlled by the Taliban (Ahmed Rashid, 2000: 123). But the agreement was never implemented by the Taliban and after the pull-out of U.N. agencies from Afghanistan in 1998, it simply fell apart (Catherine S Todd, Naqibullah Safi and Steffanie A. Strathdee)

Taliban regime can be marked as second phase of revolutionary increase in opium production, despite their earlier commitment to completely eradicate the poison poppies. Increased opium production has been attributed to economic realities faced by the Taliban, they needed a permanent source of money to cover the length of their activities. The Taliban charged a 10 percent tax to opium farmers, netting \$20 million or more each year and controlled the opiate trade, with confiscated boxes bearing the words, " Not for use by Muslims". (Catherine S Todd, Naqibullah Safi and Steffanie A. Strathdee).

A combination of religious principles, ambiguity and expediency was the magic formula that guided the Taliban's position towards drug cultivation, production and trafficking. In August 1996 the Islamist Sharia radio station in Afghanistan announced that the production, consumption and sale of hashish and heroin had been banned. But no mention was made about the cultivation of poppy (John K. Cooley, 1999: 147). Having realized the importance of the revenue from poppy cultivation and the export of raw opium and the strength of its exchange value was too big a temptation for even the

Taliban forces to forego. One of the reasons often cited by the Taliban in their inability to put a stop to poppy cultivation was that in already poor conditions of the farmers and it would reduce the farmers to the state of paupers. However, within a few months the Taliban realized that they needed the income from poppies and would anger farmers by banning it. They began to collect an Islamic tax called “Zakat”⁷ on all dealers moving opium (Ahmed Rashid, 2000: 118).

“We can not be more grateful to the Taliban,” said Wali Jan, an elderly farmer as he weeded his fields. “The Taliban have brought us security so we can grow our poppy in peace. I need the poppy crop to support my 14 family members, he added (Ahmed Rashid, 2000). The Taliban objective of reestablishing peace and security in the country side has proved to be an immense boon to opium farming. The Taliban have provided an Islamic sanction for farmers like Wali Jan to grow even more opium, even though the Quran forbids Muslims from producing or imbibing intoxicants. Abdul Rashid, the head of the Taliban’s anti-drugs control force in Kandahar spelt out the nature of his unique job. He is authorized to impose a strict ban on the growing, of hashish, ‘because it is consumed by Afghans and Muslims’. But Rashid tell without a hint of sarcasm, “Opium is permissible because it is consumed by Kafirs (unbelievers) in the west and not by Muslims or Afghans. There are other political imperatives for letting poppy farming flourish. We let the people cultivate poppies because farmers get good prices. We can not push the people to grow wheat as there would be an uprising against the Taliban, if we forced them to stop poppy cultivation” (Ahmed Rashid, 2001: 118).

Taliban’s stand on poppy production, at least in the first two years of its dominance in Afghanistan of banning its production, kept most warlords and drugs lords uncertain because the Taliban were also known to be quite ruthless in enforcing their prohibition. As a result of this ambiguity the harvest from some areas in the year 1997 fell as the farmers in many provinces like Dar-e-Noor province, which was a major opium production zone, were reluctant in seeding their fields out of fear of the Taliban

⁷ According to Koran, Muslims should give 2.5 percent of their disposable income as Zakat to the poor, but the Taliban had no religious qualms in collecting 20 percent of the value of a truckload of opium as Zakat.

reprisals which could have been anything from destroying their fields, to flogging or probably even worse (John Cooley, 1999). But eventually the local population gained more clarity on the Taliban's actual position on cultivation and lack of sincerity with regard to eradication. Over the years Helmand and Nangarhar accounted for most of the country's opium production. Over time, these areas also came under the control of Taliban.

In fact according to UNDCP reports the Taliban was controlling 96 per cent of the opium poppy cultivating areas in Afghanistan. The fact that liquid gold or opium was increasingly becoming the substance that lubricated the finances of all the Afghan warlords, and particularly the Taliban became evident from the fact that despite the ban of 2001, poppy cultivation regained its lost ground, literally, and was back to achieving the pre-2001 levels in 2002. In 2000, poppy cultivation had reached 82,171 hectares of land in Afghanistan. And in 2006, it touched an all-time high of 165,000 hectares (UNODC, World Drug Report, 2008: 38).

Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, 1994- 2007 (Opium poppy harvestable after eradication in hectares)

1994	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2002	2004	2005	2006	2007
71,470	56,824	58,000	64,000	90,583	82,171	74,100	131,000	104,000	165,000	193,000

Source:- UNODC, World Drug Report 2008, p. no.38

The belief that the Taliban would put an end to poppy production in Afghanistan turned out to be nothing more than an illusion. Far from being partners in the "war against drugs", the Taliban turned out to be both benefactors and beneficiaries in the entire poppy trade, from the cultivation to the trafficking abroad. Between 1992 and 1995 Afghanistan had produced a steady 2200-2400 metric tones of opium every year, rivaling Myanmar as the world's largest produces of raw opium. In 1996, Afghanistan produced 2,250 metric tons. Then, in 1997, as Taliban control extended to Kabul and further north. Afghanistan's opium production rose by a staggering 25 percent to 2,800 metric tones. However, in 2000, there was huge decline in the amount of opium production, it was due

to the intermingled effect of Taliban's ban on opium cultivation and served drought in Afghanistan which ultimately resulted in drug shortages in Europe and a ten fold increase in price (G. Farrell, J. Jhorne). Some believe the move was economically motivated to increase price.

The thousands of Pashtun refugees arriving in Taliban-controlled areas from Pakistan were farming their lands for easiest and most lucrative cash crop available. Within the year following removal of the Taliban regime, opium production recovered to near- record levels, with 3400 and 3600 metric tons produced in 2002 and 2003, respectively (Catherine S Todd, Naqibullah Safi, and Strathdee, 2005). In 2003, total income to opium farmers alone was equal to the half of the Karzai's declaration of a jihad on opium. However, the production levels achieved in 1999 remained unchallenged for seven years till they reached a phenomenal 6,100 metric tones in 2006 and 8,200 metric tons in 2007 as shown in the table.

Opium Production in Afghanistan 1994 to 2007 (in Metric Tons) All figures refers to dry opium

1994	1995	1996	1999	2000	2001	2002	2004	2005	2006	2007
3,416	2335	2,248	4,565	3,276	185	3,400	4,200	4,100	6,100	8,200

Source:- UNODC, World Drug Report 2008.

Drug production after American invasion

The traditional sources of terrorist funding; individual donors and charity organizations, these sources have become compromised by the United States' anti-terror campaigns after 9/11. Once the centralised and traceable sources of funding have become more difficult and expensive to operate, forcing terrorist networks to find new more clandestine avenues to raise and to move their money. One promising source is the opium drug trade (Cathy Yan, 2006). The power vacuum allowed the farmers to go ahead with poppy cultivation, processing, trafficking and consumption. The United States

intervened in Afghanistan in 2001 to remove the Taliban regime that supported and allowed Al- Qaeda camps to flourish in its territory.

The U.S military remains in Afghanistan both to capture the remaining Al- Qaeda leaders and to create conditions that will prevent terrorist from returning. Working group participants noted that this cannot be done, without combating illicit narcotics which provide funding not only for corrupt officials, warlords and traffickers but also for the remaining Taliban and Al- Qaeda cadres. Contrary to belief that an American military presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia would discourage the illicit trade in narcotics, some studies conducted by the UNODC had confirmed that Afghanistan's drug trade has actually risen to new heights (Makhdoom Babar, 24 July 2006). A shocking contrast to this was the UNDCP report of 2004 that showed that opium was grown in all 32 provinces of Afghanistan (UNDCP, 2005). Though the situation, with successful eradication measures, changed in 2006 with a fall in the number of provinces showing poppy cultivation of 28, yet there has not been a corresponding fell in actual area under cultivation.

Number of provinces showing poppy cultivation

Years	1999	2000	2002	2003	2004	2006
Provinces	18	23	24	28	32	28

Source: UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey, 2006. p. no. 1.

However, since the U.S -led invasion, the poppy fields have mushroomed again. The Daily Mail's investigation indicated that despite the serious security implications of the increased drug trade from Afghanistan as well as the socio-economic hazards associated with heroin and opium addiction, the U.S led coalition and the Karzai government have closed their eyes to the poppy cultivation supported by Afghanistan's warlords in control of various provinces of the country where Kabul literally has no control (Makhdoom Babar, 24 July 2008). According to the United Nations Authority on Drugs and Crime, in 2007 Afghanistan produced 8,200 tons of opium, enough to make a stunning 93 percent of the world's heroin (The Hindu, 2008). Weather conditions in

2007 were ideal for opium poppy, contributing to the highest opium yield of the last 5 years. Also, favorable weather conditions contributed to a lack of plant disease on opium poppy or on other crops. The average yield was 42.5 kg/ha at the country level compared to 37.0 kg/ha in 2006. Record levels of cultivation and the high yield led to a 34% increase in potential opium production in Afghanistan for 2007 (8,200 metric tons) (UNODC, Afghanistan 2007 Annual Opium Survey, 2007: 7).

The political climate of Afghanistan has undergone a dramatic change as the Americans following the events of 9/11 chase the Taliban to the peripheries of the political environment. There have been forces before the Taliban and were forces even after the Taliban all of whom had acted in much the same manner in exploiting the gains of poppy cultivation and trafficking of the narcotics. Evidently lofted promises⁸ of eradication have not yielded the desired results.

The Taliban- led insurgency, particularly in the south and east, the presence of illegal armed groups, the illicit drug trade are the main security threats in Afghanistan. Security continues to be a pre-requisite for political developments and economic growth. Security cannot be achieved only by securing the state, but also requires removing the threats faced by the vast majority of Afghan citizens. An international focus on fighting terrorism should not over- shadow the threats emanating from militia commanders, drug traffickers, corrupt provincial and district administration, and government incompetence. Such threats are often more damaging to the population than terrorist violence (Ali A. Jalali, 2006).

One of the greatest challenges to post- conflict Afghanistan is the alarming increase in poppy cultivation. Since the ousting of the Taliban regime, large- scale opium production and trafficking has hindered legitimate economic development and stable governance, shifting the focus of the international community from stabilization and reconstruction to combating narcotics. Efforts to establish a stable government based on

⁸ The promises are to give money in return of poppy destruction, financial and technical support in cultivation of alternative crops etc.

the rule of law are severely undermined by the fact that nearly 40 per cent of the nation's economy is dependent upon an illegal drug trade. Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said Afghanistan was tottering on the brink of becoming a "narco state". Narco business has emerged as virtually the only economy of Afghanistan valued at some \$10 billion a year. Opium trade is estimated by the U.N to be equivalent to 53 per cent of the country's official economy and it is helping to finance the Taliban. President Karzai banned opium poppy cultivation and trade on 17 January 2002. (The Hindu, 2008).

Government's efforts to control opium production

The Afghan government's counter-narcotics programme aims at developing the capacity to conduct targeted and verifiable eradication of 20,000 hectares or 15 percent of total poppy cultivation per year down to an overall crop of 10,000 hectares by 2013. (Ali A. Jalali, 2006). A counter-narcotics directorate has been set up as part of the National Security Council, but with a current staff of only fifty-two it is hard to see how it can make a real impact (Chris Johnson and Jolyon Leslie, 2004). Over the past two years, Kabul has successfully reduced the power of warlord, but their networks continue to influence provincial administration. Meanwhile, former factional commanders who are appointed to government position in police and civil administration have loaded their offices with their unqualified supported and corrupt cronies. This grave situation can be understood by the fact that the drug dealers had infiltrated Afghan state structures to the extent where they could easily paralyse the work of the government if a decision to arrest one of them was ever made. The US was also convinced that Afghans in positions of power were engaged in narcotics trafficking or tolerating and protecting it out of financial and political gain (Mir Hekmatullah, 2004). Meanwhile, both donors and the government have failed to come up with an integrated strategy that would bring long-term bring long-term jobs and development to rural areas.

Now the government of Afghanistan is seriously making efforts to avoid the country from becoming a narco state. Afghan government became party to a number of international conventions and made specific commitments concerning the cultivation,

trafficking and abuse of illicit drugs in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a party to the 1998 UN Drugs Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. There was no evidence of substantial compliance with any of these agreements in Afghanistan in the period before the establishment of the Interim Authority in December 2001. Afghanistan also signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime in December 2000 (Musa Khan Jalalzai, 2005). The United Nations Security Council Resolution and the Bonn Agreement⁹ of 2001 stated that the new government of Afghanistan should respect international community in the fight against terrorism, drugs and organized crime (Relief Web. Org.).

Use of opium products is illegal in Afghanistan, conviction result in a three month prison sentence. The Interim Authority has pledged to abide by international legal obligations to which Afghanistan is a party, and has already begun to work with the international community to bring Afghanistan into compliance with its international obligations. Afghanistan now faces a daunting set of challenges. In particular, it faces the challenge of whether legitimate state formation and economic growth will be subverted by the expansion and consolidation of the illicit economy. The dangers for the new government are immense. As Barnett Rubin noted about the final year of Taliban rule: "Ending war in Afghanistan might transform the criminalized war economy into an even faster-expanding criminalized peace economy. Whoever rules Afghanistan, the incentives for the misgovernment are nearly irresistible" (Barnett Rubin, 2000). The illicit drug trade is a low- risk activity in a high- rise environment. In order to eliminate it, the situation needs to be reversed: the illicit drug trade must be made a high- risk activity in a low- risk environment.

⁹ The parliamentary election in Afghanistan were the final event of the internationally- sponsored Bonn Accords. During the past four years, Afghanistan has made significant progress towards democracy while reconstructing the country's political, social and security institutions. These include adopting an enlightened constitution (January 2004), holding a successful presidential election (October 2004) and parliamentary elections (September 2005), while creating a national army and a national police force, dismantling major factional militia units, building a national economy from ground zero, expanding and improving a formal education system, and improving the status and future of Afghan women.

The prospect of the United States imposing a plan of aerial eradication programme in Afghanistan has been put on hold, although some ground-based, forced eradication is underway. In December 2007, Afghan President Karzai turned down the US plan of aerial spraying over the Afghan poppy fields (Joseph Kirschke, 29 February 2008). Eradication activities were carried out chiefly in March 2007 (27%) and April 2007 (36%). Only 12% of eradication activities were carried out during the early months of cultivation (between November and January), clearly showing the delayed implementation of eradication policy in most of the provinces. Early eradication enabled farmers to cultivate alternative crops, when available, and no security problem was observed. Most of the security incidents happened close to the harvesting time. Eradication did not contribute to an effective reduction in cultivation in most of the provinces. In Badakhshan, eradication was carried out at an early stage, thus allowing farmers to cultivate alternative crops. This, together with a relatively successful preplanting campaign, contributed to an overall decline in opium poppy cultivation. The extent of eradication since 2005 is shown in the table below (UNODC, Afghanistan 2007 Annual Opium Survey, 2007: 19).

Total eradication in Afghanistan 2005-2007

Year	Eradication (ha)	Number of Provinces
2005	4,007	11
2006	13,378	19
2007	15,898	26

Source: UNODC, Afghanistan 2007 Opium Survey, Executive Summary, p. no.20

The Rapid Assessment Survey conducted in January 2007 indicated that the eradication campaign of 2006 had had no significant impact on cultivation at the national level in 2007. Sixty-three per cent of villages opted once again to cultivate poppy in 2007, despite having faced eradication in 2006 (UNODC, Afghanistan 2007 Annual Opium Survey, 2007: 20). In Afghanistan the problem of opium production is accentuated by the weakness of state institution, the blurring of political and criminal interest, and the increasing secrecy in which drug trafficking is being conducted. The unique circumstances in Afghanistan make it more than evident that organised crime has strong potential to consolidate itself in the immediate post-conflict phase, constituting an

important challenge to state consolidation. Even the American NATO commander in Afghanistan is at a loss. "We are not manned, we are not equipped, and we are not trained," for forced eradication, Army Gen. Dan K. McNeill, commander of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force told the *Financial Times* in May 2007. "Eradication done improperly is counterintuitive to running the counter insurgency because it will alienate people and you may have more insurgent people appearing than you had before" (Joseph Krischke, 2008).

Writing in 1998, John Cooley noted how two conditions were necessary to suppress drugs. One was that there had to be internal and external peace and security. The second was that Afghanistan had to have one strong central power in control in Kabul with real authority everywhere (Chris Johnson and Jolyon Leslie, 2004: 123). Clearly, the drug trade has become one of the major sources of funding terrorism, and the need to eradicate opium crops is greater than ever. Counter-narcotics official had uncovered 260 tons of hashish hidden in 6th trenches in southern Afghanistan. NATO's International Security Assistance Force said, "the hashish, found in the southern province of Kandahar on Monday, was worth more than \$14 million in profits. The hashish was burnt on the site (Jason Straziuso, 12 June 2008).

Hopkins by using economic models shed light on current opium eradication efforts and their failures thus far. The scope of eradication has not been comprehensive enough and because of the "balloon effect" whereby successful eradication in one area correlates with increased poppy cultivation in neighbouring provinces. Once economically viable alternatives are made available, eradication can then take place without incurring grave consequences (Walter Hopkins, 2006). Poverty and the lack of income are the main reasons, why farmers produce opium. The demand of the time is to formulate and implement a long term, dedicated and economically supported programme. It will take a long term commitment and probably more than a decade to create alternative income opportunities.

There is urgent demand of a programme aims to rehabilitate agricultural infrastructure to strengthen ties between regions and the central government, particularly in some of the main poppy producing areas and to boost horticulture, livestock and cash crop production in order to create alternative livelihoods for small farmers, landless workers and vulnerable groups (Musa Khan Jalalzai, 2005: 140). Experience has shown that there are crops that are more profitable than opium poppy. For instance, in Thailand, the substitution of flowers for opium poppy has led to profits per square meter being increased by over 50 times (David Mansfield, 2001). Even in Afghanistan, there are a range of crops including apricots, apples, black cumin grapes, pomegranates and melons that can generate higher returns than opium poppy.

The UNODC Alternative Livelihoods Database covers over 100 projects that represent a total of US\$ 1.2 billion, covering a period of 10 years. This is divided in US\$ 684 million of bilateral funds and US\$ 516 million in multilateral funds (National Programmes). As of June 2005, the actual commitment of funding for alternative livelihoods (including through bilateral projects and National Programmes) in 1384 (2005/2006) is approximately US\$ 490 million. About 40% of the funds have been allocated for infrastructure and sustainable employment, followed by agriculture (13%) and rural finance (13%). Nangarhar (US\$ 70 Million), Hilmand (US\$ 56 Million) and Badakhshan (US\$ 47 Million) have been by far the biggest alternative livelihoods aid receivers. Nangarhar (-27,120 hectares) and Badakhshan (-8,237 hectares) were the two provinces showing the strongest declines – in absolute terms - of opium poppy cultivation in 2005 and the decline in Hilmand was still substantial in absolute figures (-2,853 hectares) though less impressive as a percentage (-10%). However, there have been also examples of provinces receiving assistance and showing rising levels of opium poppy cultivation (e.g. Kandahar) (UNODC 2005: 13).

The opium economy- including its nexus with insecurity, warlords, state weakness and poor governance- constitutes a central development problem for the country. The nexus of drugs with insecurity and warlords, a vicious circle that would keep Afghanistan insecure, fragmented politically, weakly governed, poor, dominated by

the informal illicit economy and a hostage to the drug industry, is clearly the most serious problem. It is not only an Afghanistan's problem, but it is also posing threat at regional and global level. So fighting narcotics requires a joint national and international effort. The location of Afghanistan on global map is of great importance, so the extension of inter- regional economic ties can revive its historical role (trade and transit bridge between Central Asia, South Asia and Middle East), contributing to its economic recovery. Afghanistan's recent inclusion in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)¹⁰ and the adoption of the "Kabul Declaration"¹¹ on regional cooperation at a 12 nation conference in Kabul in early December 2005 can facilitate the resurgence of Afghanistan as the hub of inter- regional economic exchange (Ali A. Jalali, 2006).

¹⁰ The SAARC groups seven South Asian countries: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

¹¹ The ministerial meeting was attended by delegation from Afghanistan, China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, India, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Representatives from the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, G8 and NATO also participated.

Chapter-5

Conclusion

Drug abuse affects every segment of our society. Day by day more frequent and dramatic drug-related problems are touching the lives of individuals' at all social and economic levels and the public has become alarmed. The illegal trade in drugs and its ramification in terms of political instability and cross border terrorism in large parts of the world has become a major problem in recent years. Drug trafficking has been restored to as a major fund raiser by terrorist organisations. Despite the declaration of "War on Drugs", the fact remains that the problem is on the increase. There is no controversy regarding the growing drug-abuse in society. It is an accepted reality that heroin dependence has caused great harm to Youth population. In many societies, opium poppies have been used in traditional medicine. However, during the last few decades, their abuse has increased alarmingly.

Illicit drugs destroy innumerable individual lives and undermine our societies. Confronting the illicit trade in drugs and its effects remains major challenge for the international community. Although the consumption of drugs has been a fact of life of life for centuries, addiction has mushroomed over the last five decades. The number of global opiate abusers are 15.6 million, or 0.4 per cent of the world's population aged 15-64 (World Drug Report, 2007:55). The drug phenomenon is unique in the number of aspects of people's lives which it affects- the health of the individual, political and economic development, the safety of the streets and the stability of governance. Drug addiction prevents the individual from realizing his or her full potential. In doing so, it acts as an obstacle to social development. The social and economic costs of drug abuse place an intolerable strain on the social and economic costs of drug abuse place an intolerable strain on the social infrastructures of developing countries alike. The illicit productive activities and weakens the foundation for long-term economic growth.

Illicit drug use in any form can be associated with harmful consequences, drug injection is commonly regarded as the most dangerous method. The disease also spreads

by unprotected sexual intercourse with an HIV-positive partner of the gender. Hepatitis B and C (formerly non- A, non- B), were recognized as potential risks by injecting drug users even before the era of HIV. Over the last 30 years, awareness of illicit drugs, access to them and their abuse have dramatically increased. Despite major gaps in information, increases in the abuse of major dependence- producing drugs are reflected in reports from official and unofficial sources. Reports from the United Nations, observations of experts, studies of crime, education, work and health - all point to serious problems in developing and industrialized countries. There is general agreement that populations at highest risk are those in the age range most needed for productive work. Other groups of people, however, are involved in substance abuse, such as street children in developing countries as well as youth elsewhere who misuse volatile solvents, thinners and marijuana (UNDCP, 1995).

The Asian continent is bearing the burden of two largest opium production region of the world, Golden Triangle with Myanmar at center and Golden Crescent with Afghanistan. Hence the Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent remain the world's two major opium production areas. The Golden Triangle led world production until 1991 with Burma ranking at the top. After that date the Golden Crescent took the lead, with Afghanistan breaking previous records in 1999. The area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan increased 17% in 2007, with cultivation expanding to a record high of 193,000 hectares in 2007. Global opium poppy cultivation, as a result, rose 17% in 2007 to almost over 236,000 hectares. Afghanistan's share of global cultivation remained 82%. In 2007, opium poppy cultivation in Myanmar increased, for the first time in seven years, to 27,700 hectares. This was a 29% increase over 2006 (World drug Report 2008: 227-246).

The border area of Burma, Thailand and Laos is the main opium producing region where the poppy plant can be grown naturally without any extra manuring or other care. The Shan plateau of Myanmar (Burma) is the most important poppy growing area of the world. This region is covered by forests- from dense tropical forests to degenerated jungles divided by the rivers of Salween drainage system. As a rugged upland block it has

little flat land for agriculture. The illicit cultivation of poppy has led to establishment of clandestine heroin or morphine laboratories whose operation depends on easy supply of chemical acetic anhydride and other chemicals which are diverted from legitimate use.

The governments of these countries realized the threat of drug trafficking and started taking serious steps to suppress the drug production. Opium smoking is diminishing in the region but unfortunately it is being replaced by heroin injecting, mainly in south-east Asia. The region is seriously affected by the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine, the illicit traffic in methamphetamine and its precursors, particularly ephedrine and the large-scale abuse of methamphetamine (International Narcotics Control Board, 1997).

The government activities against dissident groups in Myanmar, operation launched by Thai army with US support to destroy thousand acres of opium poppies fields, crop substitution programmer launched by Laotian government resulted in steep decline in drug production. It was evident from the fact that The total area under opium poppy cultivation in the Lao PDR in 2007 was estimated at 1,500 hectares a 40% decrease over production in 2006 (2,500 hectares). This brings cultivation to its the lowest level since 1998 when opium poppy cultivation peaked at 26,600 hectares (World Drug Report 2008: 242). Domestic poppy cultivation has been reduced in Thailand by the government's alternative development initiatives, supported by UNDCP and other donors. Thailand is currently a net importer of opiates.

In Thailand, efforts made by inter-regional and international agencies have produced commendable results in drug control and crop rotation. The programme of crop substitution has established agriculture extension services which provide training to the farmers so that they can make good living thus encouraging farmers to keep away from underground dealers. Only occasionally have heroin laboratories been found and destroyed in Thailand in recent years. One sizeable heroin refinery was destroyed in 1995 (United States Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, May 1996). Thailand acted as pilot country in the implementation of a UNDCP executed project on precursor control from 1994-1996 through which several successful initiatives

against diversion and trafficking of precursors used in the manufacture of heroin and methamphetamine (UNDCP, 1996). According to Thai law, the unauthorized possession, production, manufacture, import, export or acquisition of narcotics drugs or psychotropic substance is punishable by a fine, imprisonment or the death penalty, depending on the quantity of drugs involved and on the criminal offence committed (C. Yodmani, 1992).

Golden Crescent has steadily occupied the position of number one in drug production by replacing Golden triangle. By the year 2004, with poppy cultivated in all the provinces of the country, Afghanistan was catering to the lion's share of the demand of the opiates industry. And in 2006 its opium production has ensured that only eight per cent of the opium comes from the rest of the world. While crop reduction efforts in Myanmar were showing slow yet steady results. Particularly from 1998 it gradually started losing its position to Afghanistan by 2004 was already the largest cultivator of the illicit crop but what is more interesting is that while the global area under cultivation had gone down, the area under cultivation in Afghanistan registered an increase. This means more and more opium is actually going out of Afghanistan to meet the demands of the global market.

In 2006, Afghanistan, as the country was responsible for 92 per cent of global opium production. For no other drug is production so concentrated in a single area. Poppy cultivation in South-East Asia is down by more than 85 per cent over the last decade. Between 2005 and 2006 alone, poppy cultivation in South East Asia declined from 35,000 hectares to 24,000 hectares. Although opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan increased massively in 2006. In 2006, global opium production soared to a new record high of 6,610 metric tons, a 43 per cent increase over 2005. (World Drug Report, 2007:10). In 2007 opium cultivation in Afghanistan was increased to 8,200 metric tons, in Myanmar 460 metric tons, in Pakistan 43 and in Lao PDR 9 metric tons. The contribution in opium production by Afghanistan has been increasing year by year (World drug Report 2008: 38).

It is true that today Afghanistan is the largest opium producing country of Golden Crescent, but the explosion of opium production in the region ironically began from Pakistan. Pakistan had consciously been active participants in another version of the 'great game' that was waged on the Afghan platform. But Pakistan did manage to reduce the actual cultivation of poppy within the territorial boundaries of the country. Still Pakistan is facing the repercussions of opium production taking place in its neighbouring country Afghanistan. The real implication for Pakistan, of this booming industry out of Afghanistan was seen on the country's economy, as was the case with Afghanistan too. The smuggling trade route established between the two countries, which also was the route for the transit of narcotics would cause serious damage to the Pakistan economy. Pakistan's heroin industry was believed to have a turnover of Rs 74 billion, which was equivalent to five per cent of its GDP for 1992-1993. In 1992, Pakistan had earned US \$ 1.5 billion just from the export of heroin (Kshitij Prabha, 2001: 1879). Narcotics control in Pakistan is based on the Control of Narcotic Substances Ordinance 1995 and its amending Ordinance of 1996. But the biggest hindrance here has been that the tribal areas that hardly come under the purview of national administration.

In Afghanistan to counter the Soviet Union invasion in Afghanistan mujahideen needed a permanent source of money to cover the length of the war. So, they exploited this "liquid gold", opium to expand their activities. This is evident from the fact that all through the jihadi years (1979-89) opium production registered an annual growth rate of 14 per cent. After the withdrawal of Soviet army 19 per cent of growth rate had been registered. Though it was the Soviet occupation that triggered the development of opium economy in the country. In 1998, the Taliban controlled 80 per cent of the country's territory is over 95 per cent of the where opium poppy is cultivated. In initial years of Taliban acquisition in the country more or less continuous opium production was registered.

The Taliban provided an Islamic sanction for farmers to grow opium, even though the Koran forbids Muslims from production or imbibing intoxicants. Taliban believe that growing poppy is not against Islam but its consumption is. Therefore they refuse to

control poppy cultivation unless the international community offers development assistance and also political recognition. In 2001, opium production dramatically reduced, it was related to a ban imposed by Taliban and drought also. But very soon Taliban realized it's importance to raise the revenue, they started collecting an Islamic tax 'Zakat' on all dealers moving opium. After September 11, 2001, the political and social structures of Afghanistan, the promises of eradication have not yielded the desired results. UNDCP report of 2004 was a shock everyone according to which opium was grown in all provinces of Afghanistan. It slightly came down to 28 provinces in 2006. The trend changed after September 11, terrorist attacks in the United States. The victorious anti-Taliban Northern Alliance (United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan) promised that under its rule opium production and sales would be eliminated. The new Afghan leadership also issued a counter-narcotics decree. All countrymen, especially peasants and farmers, are informed that from now on, the cultivation, manufacturing, processing, impermissible use, smuggling, and trafficking of opium poppy and all its derivatives is declared illegal...Violators will be dealt with severely.

There were grounds for skepticism about the Northern Alliance's sincerity. Opium cultivation and production in areas under the Northern Alliance's control skyrocketed. In Afghanistan there are, unfortunately, some permanent figures in some areas have been involved in, or encouraged, drug trafficking in a certain way. As a consequence of this continuous state of war, Afghanistan now faces overwhelming reconstructive challenges. Afghanistan's population is among the poorest in the world. This is a potential challenge to the new constitutional order.

After revolution in 1979, Iran, which had cultivated drug for years, managed to eradicate growing of opium poppies. Despite the fact that Iran, had some of the toughest anti-narcotics policies in the world, where people caught even with a few ounces of the substances faced the death penalty, it is not free from the adverse effects of the drug trafficking. Iran had the highest rate of addicts. This is over nine times the global national percentage average and a high percentage of these drug addicts are affected by HIV

(UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2005). Iran is a signatory to the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988. Because of its shared borders with many countries already involved in the narcotics trade including Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkeminstan, Iran has found itself a popular transit destination not just for the trafficking of opiates from Afghanistan but, with enhanced processing abilities, likes acetic anhydride¹ to Pakistan.

The countries of Golden Triangle are successfully eradicating the growth of opium production. On the other hand Pakistan and Iran are also exhausting their efforts to make their countries opiate free. But, the radiations coming out from the opium explosion in Afghanistan is affected whole of the world, particularly the region. It is strongly believed that peace and security, a powerful central government, alternative livelihood source with viable economic assistance and moral consideration as they influence framers growing crops are compulsory requirements for poppy eradication from the region.

Optimists on both sides of the Pacific hoped that the end of the cold war would also hasten the end of Asia's undeclared drug war. Rapid economic development would ease the grinding poverty that fostered both poppy cultivation and narcotics addiction, political liberalization would root out corrupt officials and impose the rule of law on criminal dealers, and multilateral cooperation by Pacific Rim governments would crush Asia's narcotraffickers. The optimists were wrong. Rising incomes have stimulated demand for narcotics throughout the region, creating a booming market for opium cultivators in the rural backwaters left untouched by Asia's economic miracle. Politicians and police in Asian democracies have shown themselves no more immune to "donations" from drug syndicates than their counterparts in South or North America. Meanwhile, lingering suspicion, bureaucratic distaste, and multilateral sloth impede regional efforts to suppress the drug trade.

¹ Acetic anyhydride is an important material in the processing of opium into more popular drugs of abuse.

The UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 provides the framework for the regulation of substances commonly referred to as 'precursors' that are frequently used in the illicit manufacture of drugs. Strengthening international treaties and conventions and harmonizing standards of arrests, convictions and penalties amongst member states help in monitoring the movement of this illicit crop. Bilateral attempts to deal with narcotics are inevitably infused with bilateral tensions, and narcotraffickers can easily elude bilateral crackdowns by slipping through third countries: therefore much faith has been placed in the efficacy of multilateral institutions to construct a common framework of policies to suppress demand and interdict smugglers.

The UN has passed a series of conventions and protocols on narcotics, culminating in the UN International Drug Control Program in 1991, which consolidated a variety of efforts. In 1996 the UN also coordinated a memorandum on controlling the trade in narcotics precursor chemicals and on trafficking with Burma, Cambodia, China, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. Unfortunately, funding for the UN programs has been sparse, and few would argue that they have made much of a dent in Asia's narcotics markets. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forums have been equally important in addressing the foreign policy problem of narcotics.

Organized crime seeks the path of least resistance. Many trafficking routes traverse zones of instability, and where corruption negates interdiction. The challenge is to block these routes by increasing law enforcement, stopping the diversion of precursor chemicals, improving the integrity of the judicial system, and - not least -- fighting corruption among officials at borders and in local administrations. Southeast Asia is closing a tragic chapter that has blighted the Golden Triangle for decades - the region is now almost opium free. Yet it is not free of poverty and therefore farmers remain vulnerable to the temptations of illicit incomes. Much more assistance - for alternative crops and also for viable income substitution - is needed to sustain the poppy eradication programme. The same logic applies in Afghanistan and the Andean countries. Rewarding

licit rural activity and promoting development will encourage farmers to voluntarily give up their illicit crops in a way that will offer them brighter, and longer-lasting prospects than forced eradication.

This proves the first hypothesis that, the central factor for continuous high poppy production is the income security associate with it. This statement is correct. The gross income from poppy cultivation per hectare amounted to US\$5,400. This is still almost 10 times higher than the gross income a farmer could expect from one hectare of wheat (US\$550 per hectare on irrigated land). However, this poppy to wheat income ratio (10:1) is now smaller than in 2004 (12:1) or 2003 (27:1) (UNODC 2005: 18). The average annual cash income of an opium poppy cultivating household was estimated at US\$ 501, approximately US\$ 56 higher than the average annual income of a non-opium poppy cultivating household (UNODC, World Drug Report 2008: 248). Yet, even with income from opium, opium poppy farmers stayed poor.

Though the high income of opium is one of the main reasons for its huge production, but there are several other significant factors associated with it. Drug cultivation thrives on instability, corruption, poor governance and insecure environment. Most opium poppy farmers of Myanmar and Lao PDR live in remote mountainous terrain, cultivating thin soils on steep hills. With traditional farming methods in these difficult conditions, yields of rice and corn are not enough to sustain annual food needs of most households. Thus, households have until recently depended on high-value and easily transportable opium to increase their food security. The general political context also shapes drug supply. The world's biggest drug producing centers are in regions beyond the control of the central government, like South Afghanistan, South- East Myanmar. Opium production in these two areas can be attributed to the protracted civil wars that have plagued Burma since 1948 and Afghanistan since 1979. In reaction to Afghanistan's prolonged insecurity, warlordism and factional infighting, there is a widespread Afghan public desire for a strong central government that can provide security in the chaotic post- conflict environment and offer needed services to war- devastated communities. A recent ABC News survey in Afghanistan indicates that 77 percent of Afghan believes their country is

heading in the right direction. Despite the prevalent economic difficulties and poverty they face, 91 percent prefer the current Afghan government to the Taliban regime and 87 percent call the U.S- led overthrow of the Taliban good for their country (ABC News Polls, 2005).

It is very much correct to say that it is the lure for high monetary gain behind the hugely growing drug trade. Opium prices in the Golden Triangle have increased over the past years. However, there are pronounced price differences between countries as well as between regions in countries. In 2006, the average farm-gate price for one kilogramme of opium at harvest time was highest in Thailand (US\$1015), second highest in Laos (US\$550), and lowest in Myanmar (US\$230). The steep price upsurge in Laos by 240% between 2002 and 2006 reflects the scarcity of opium in the country, which turned from an opium exporter to a net importer within a few years. In Myanmar, by far the largest producer, prices rose as well but much slower. Here, the opium price doubled from US\$115/kg to US\$230/kg in the same period. Prices in Thailand remained for a second year at a comparatively high level of over US\$1000/kg (Golden Triangle Opium Survey Executive Summary, 2006: 15).

The second hypothesis being stated, the problem of drug trade can not be solved until and unless the major powers stop playing their great in the region. The overall developments in Golden Crescent, particularly in Afghanistan are more than enough to prove the statement. Today, Afghanistan's opium production is the direct outcome of Cold War rivalries and conflicts waged by proxies who helped develop a thriving narcotic economy in the country. From 1979 to 1989, war was fought between the Mujahideen and Soviet troops. In this war America backed the mujahideens with sole purpose of defeating the Soviet Union. For this they not only turned blind eye towards the opium cultivation, but also played significant role in strengthening the opium production and trafficking. From 1989 to 1996 was a period of civil war during which warlords fought against each other for the control of country and its capital Kabul; finally, the last period of conflict corresponded to the rise to power of the Taliban in 1994, which met

with the resistance of the Northern Alliance, and is concluded by the American intervention conducted to oust the Taliban following the attacks of 11 September 2001.

After the America's attack on Afghanistan many- many were hopeful that this "war on terror" will be followed by the "war on opium". Because it is the only lucrative trade which has the potential to cover the activities of Taliban and Al Qaeda. But after seven long years of American presence in Afghanistan no positive trend or sing has been seen. On the contrary, record levels of cultivation and the high yield led to a 34% increase in potential opium production in Afghanistan for 2007 (8,200 metric tons) (UNODC, Afghanistan 2007 Annual Opium Survey, 2007: 7). Now it is clear that intervention by major powers led Afghanistan on this vulnerable path. For too long Afghanistan has been the battleground for external powers' Great Game. It is time for the Afghans to be given a chance, with international support to determine their own destiny.

After analyzing the whole development, it is clear, that there is a triangle in Golden Crescent, that is, sum of politics, war and drug trafficking. It has huge potential to pose security threat to international peace and security. There is a need of multidimensional solution for the problem. Crop eradication is not only the solution for the problem, it should be followed by launch of alternative crop production programme with viable economic assistance, peace and security should be maintained in the region.

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